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GLICK, Edward Maurice. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE PARTY IN POWER DURING THE 1958 CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1960
Political Science, public administration

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF
THE PARTY IN POWER DURING THE
1958 CONGRESSIONAL * 
CAMPAIGN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1960

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PREFACE

The doctoral dissertation is an original piece of work which is expected to reflect a mature capacity to conduct research in the field of choice. However, it is a safe assumption that most dissertations reflect substantial contributions of time and thought of persons with whom the Ph. D. candidate has been in contact during the development of his thesis. This dissertation is no exception.

The writer owes much to his Advisory Committee at Ohio State University— to Drs. E. Allen Helms, Lawrence Herson and Harvey Mansfield. Dr. Helms, committee chairman and long-time friend and adviser, bore the additional burden of maintaining continuous long-distance liaison with the writer during the dissertation's preparation. All committee members made numerous constructive suggestions which contributed to the development of the thesis but— perhaps equally significant—all equated their demand for sound scholarship with a warm, human approach which permitted full and frank consideration of any research problem encountered.

The writer owes a major debt of gratitude to Florence Glick, a severe editorial critic who also typed the final draft of the manuscript. Her contribution has been a great one in both material and morale terms.

The writer is also indebted to many officials—past and present—of both major parties who have been most cordial in
responding to requests for data and in answering questions which were often quite pointed. While it is not possible to name some of these very helpful people here, each has been thanked by individual letter.

The significant contributions cited above notwithstanding, it must be said that this dissertation and the conclusions drawn therein are the writer's and the writer's alone. For any shortcomings or errors in fact, analysis or interpretation, therefore, the writer accepts sole responsibility.

Edward M. Glick
Bethesda, Maryland
June 2, 1960
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INTRODUCTION

Lord Bryce wrote near the turn of the century that "public opinion rules in America." He saw public opinion "towering over Presidents and State governors, over Congress and State legislatures, over conventions and the vast machinery of party....

the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it."  

Bryce recognized the hazards of unbridled public opinion and discussed them at length but his conclusion about the role of opinion in America was nevertheless an optimistic one. He contended that "...opinion of a whole nation, a united and tolerably homogeneous nation, is, when at last it does express itself, the most competent authority to determine the ends of national policy."  

It was clear that, in reaching this conclusion, the Englishman was accepting the fundamental premise that the public--somehow or other--was able to walk the road of reason.

Some seventy years and two World Wars later, another discerning observer of the American scene was to term public opinion "master" in the United States. But, unlike Bryce, Walter Lippmann was to reach a pessimistic conclusion about the capacity of public opinion to make the "right" decisions. Said Lippmann: "The unhappy

Bryce, James. The American Commonwealth, Vol. II.

Ibid., p. 367.
truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures.  3

It is significant that two such perceptive men, writing so many years apart, should reach fundamentally the same conclusion as to the dominance of public opinion in this country. But it is perhaps even more significant that they should differ as to its net effect on the course of government and governmental policy. For this difference goes to the very heart of the democratic process.

Reducing the pertinent positions to their simplest terms, Bryce saw in the mass mind the long-run capability for rational direction (but not administration) of the government whereas Lippmann saw in that same mind a basic tendency to irrationality incapable of the "right" political decisions. Bryce admitted that quality leadership was necessary to curb the adverse manifestations of mass opinion. Lippmann has held that the mediation of "philosophers" capable of educating the masses was essential if the public opinion "monster" was not to devour Western democracy.

Nor are these two the only democratic thinkers at odds as to the rationality or lack of rationality of public opinion. For every Alexander Lindsay and John Stewart Mill who defends the "rule" of


4 Ibid., pp. 177-81.
reason as the fundamental characteristic of democratic public opinion, there is a Graham Wallis or a Harold Laski who attacks it. And, more recently, there have arisen the "eclectics" who see both reason and unreason as characteristic of public opinion and who—at least in some cases—find in this mixture the capacity for sound direction of government in the policy sense.

It is no chance occurrence that many democratic theorists who have been concerned with the rationality (or lack of it) of public opinion have also been preoccupied with the role of government in molding or influencing that opinion. For there is a rather general recognition of the fact that government does have such a role in a democracy. However, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the nature and scope of that role among those who have commented on it and—interestingly enough—even among the theorists who accept reason as the fundamental "spring" of public opinion.

Mill, for example, conceived of democratic government as a very active force in educating and "training" of the masses. This, though he was certainly no advocate of government "control" of education and, in fact, warned against it. In his Considerations

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on Representative Government, Mill wrote:

"...a government is to be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it makes of its citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the peoples themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it does for them, and by means of them. Government is at once a great influence acting on the human minds, and a set of organized arrangements for public business."  

Bryce, who advocated the need for better and more courageous leadership in public office and out, saw the American government exercising very little leadership or true educational influence. He wrote bluntly that American politicians "do not aspire to the function of forming opinion" and the "practical statesman is apt to be timid in advocacy as well as infertile in suggestion. He seems to be always listening for the popular voice, always afraid to commit himself to a view which may turn out unpopular."  

Lindsay has stressed the importance of the function of government in fostering "free discussion" and in "the supply of scientific information about the community."  

Another commentator has concerned himself with the "legitimate" limits of government propaganda, concluding that:

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8 Ibid., p. 127.

9 Bryce, op. cit., p. 364.

"The position is that a democratic government, without forfeiting its own title to allegiance, is not entitled to use propaganda (for democracy) ....It is, however, free and under an obligation to encourage voluntary agencies, and primarily party agencies, to put forward the views upon which its authority rests. There is an entirely legitimate field of government party propaganda, as distinct from state propaganda." 11

Lippmann, who speaks at length for those who term public opinion essentially irrational, appeals to "the philosophers" to alter "the terms of discourse in public controversy." 12 Lippmann's "public philosophy" is one based on truth and reason and---if the semantics are overlooked---is not too far removed from the "natural law" of the 19th century rationalists. He does not hold that government must educate the masses. His appeal is the roundabout one to the "philosophers" both within and outside of government and he makes particular reference to those in the universities.

Yet, Lippmann leaves little doubt that he accepts government as an educator in some sense when he deplores the failure of politicians to provide adequate leadership. "With exceptions so rare that they are regarded as miracles and freaks of nature," Lippmann writes, "successful democratic politicians are insecure and intimidated men. They advance politically only as they placate, appease, bribe, seduce, bamboozle, or otherwise manage to


manipulate the demanding and threatening elements in their constituencies....politicians rationalize this servitude by saying that in a democracy public men are the servants of the people."  

Thus, it is clear that, while there is disagreement as to the specific nature of the government's role as a positive influence in molding public opinion, both "rationalists" and "irrationalists" see the need for government to play such a role. And while there is a broad-based feeling that democratic government must communicate with a view to "training", "educating", or "leading" public opinion, there is also a relatively ill-defined concern with where the legitimate limits of governmental activity lie.

Of considerable significance is the fact that government is accepted as a crucial communicator in a democracy regardless of whether public opinion is held to be fundamentally rational or irrational.

It is well, then, to look somewhat more intensively at government as communicator in the modern sense and a prerequisite here is a more specific definition of "communication." One sociologist has defined communication as "the fundamental human institution in that it sets the limits of community size and by its nature affects all types of human association." It has also been termed "the fundamental social process in that the way in which meanings are transmitted must inevitably affect all other social processes and the

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14 *Albig, op. cit.*, p. 21.
resultant forms, folkways, mores and institutions." In this latter context, public opinion is among the "other social processes" which are affected by communication.

These definitions conceive of communication as an all-embracing concept—one to which "propaganda", "education", and "information" are all subordinate. It is in this sense that "communication" is employed in this paper. Communication, then, is not peripheral to the democratic process. It is central to it. And to the extent that democratic government, as an institution, functions as communicator, to that extent must it be reckoned with as a molder and influencer of the public opinion which so many theorists maintain is its master.

Are there, then, some generalizations that can be drawn about the American government as a communicator in this day and age?

Certainly, the Federal government today is a very different kind of communicator from what it was before Franklin D. Roosevelt swept into the White House on the wings of the New Deal. The number of persons specifically concerned with the dissemination of public information, for example, is many, many times what it was thirty years

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ago and this is true both of the Executive and the Legislative branches. The types and volume of informational and educational material issued today is to what was being disseminated thirty years ago as the whale is to the minnow. New techniques of dissemination have been introduced. And methods of reaching and using the media introduced earlier in this century--e.g., the official press conference--are used with far greater regularity and by a far greater number of government officials than was the case in the pre-Roosevelt era.

 Entirely new administrative programs specifically concerned with educational and promotional activities have been conceived during the past twenty years. The President's Committee on Employment of the Physically Handicapped, for example, is primarily a promotional activity which came into being with World War II. And the United States Information Agency, a massive international propaganda organization with a "domestic" information branch, is little more than a decade old.

 The many new government agencies created during the past thirty years have, with very few exceptions, developed independent informational programs and staffs. Finally, major government departments have created new and extensive statistical and statistical analysis

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17 This is discussed in some detail in Chapter I.

18 Pollard, James E. The Presidents and the Press. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947, points out that the press conference as such was officially inaugurated by Theodore Roosevelt, regularized by Woodrow Wilson. See, in particular, pp. 569-98 and 630-91. It was not, however, until the Roosevelt era that the official press conference became a standard procedure for Cabinet members, this though some Cabinet members conducted relatively regular press conferences during the Hoover regime. This trend has continued through the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.
programs which represent sources of data to which important segments of the American society pay close attention.

Whatever the qualitative impact of the Federal communications Goliath on public opinion, there can be no denying that its quantitative impact is far greater today than it was some thirty years ago. Further, this quantitative output is greater in relation to the total output from all communications sources.

Given this enhanced day-to-day role in the total process of communication, the Federal government's capacity to influence public opinion is obviously greater--considerably greater--than it was in the days of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. The effectiveness with which that capacity is employed is, of course, beyond our purview here but that capacity's existence is of itself a very significant factor in the total communications pattern of the American society.

**Government As Communicator During Political Campaigns**

During a national political campaign, the Federal government reaches its acme as communicator for it is during this period that the Party in control of the Administration focuses its informational resources to a considerable extent on a unified objective: the maintenance of

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19 During World War I, President Wilson set up the so-called Creel Committee as a focal point for dissemination of governmental information as well as for surveillance of what was said about government in the domestic press. See Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 659-91. However, it is doubtful that the Creel Committee's output, at its height, began to approach the magnitude and diversity of Federal informational dissemination during the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.
political power. And, conversely, the resources of the opposition party are centered to a considerable extent on the achievement of power. Thus, the campaign period provides both the greatest test of government as communicator and the greatest opportunity for government manipulation of the mass mind. During the political campaign, Executive Agency communications--under the direction of the Party in Power--are crystallized or channeled with the greatest care and precision. The stakes are very high indeed.

In this context, it is pertinent to note that the role of the Federal government as communicator in a national campaign cannot be measured purely in terms of the amount of information or informational material generated. As will be shown later in this paper, there is also the element of discrimination whereby decisions are made to "play up" some types of information and "play down" others in the interest of furthering the Party in Power's immediate political objectives--a discrimination which is drawn much finer during the campaign proper than in the intervals between campaigns. There is the development of materials and "deeds" specifically directed to influencing the campaign. There are cases of outright suppression.

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20 Evidence of this is cited at length in the body of the dissertation.

21 Ibid.
But perhaps most significant is the evidence that the
"non-political" bureaucracy is harnessed to a considerable degree
to the requirements of the campaign as the Party in Power's
strategists see them.

In light of the fact that the role of the Federal government as
communicator has evolved both in scope and nature during the past
several decades, one may legitimately inquire what, if any, impact
this evolution has had on the function of the political campaign in
this democracy. The question of political campaign function--and
here "function" is used in the broad sociological sense--is one of
the central ones faced by the political scientist today. It has important
theoretical and practical implications. The campaign clearly plays a
role in the molding of public opinion. The Party in Power--utilizing
both party and bureaucratic channels--is able to focus an intensive
propaganda barrage on the electorate during the campaign even as
the opposition is able to employ its sources of power in the Congress
and in its National Committee to the same ends.

Is the function of the campaign today different in some respects
from what it was a generation or even a decade ago? If so, to what
extent has this difference been conditioned by communications
developments and by the expanding role of government as communicator?
Must the function of a campaign in a society in which public opinion
is fundamentally rational in its formation differ from that in a society
in which the opinion process is fundamentally irrational? Are there
objective ethical standards to which the political campaign can and
should adhere?

It is doubtful that any of these vital questions lend themselves to precise answers given the present state of the social sciences and the present-day limitations of psychological and sociological measurement tools. Further, it is likely—in a society characterized by dynamism and change—that even if the answers could be secured with any precision, they would be subject to modification at a rate which varied greatly with time and circumstance.

Despite the above-noted limitations, it is believed that the paper which follows will help pave the way for a constructive approach to coping with the questions raised. This paper is a case study of the propaganda strategy and tactics of the Republican Party during the 1958 Congressional Campaign. It is concerned with Republican planning and implementation of that campaign at the national level. It is concerned with state and local developments only to the extent that these had a bearing on the nationally-conceived and directed propaganda activity.

It is hoped that this dissertation will add to the perspective of others who would probe the nature and impact of the national campaign. It is further hoped that it will not only contribute to the discussion of campaign function but will also shed light on the validity of current theoretical assumptions as to what that function ought to be and on whether—in fact—the function itself has not become something different from what it was as recently as the nineteen-forties.
We shall begin by investigating the concept of function, as it pertains to campaigns generally, in some depth and by seeking to relate the 1958 national Congressional campaign to the theoretical concepts of the past and to the broader socio-political environment of the present.
CHAPTER I

The Function of the Political Campaign

In everyday conversation, the term "function" is used to describe the purpose or use of a given object, institution or practice. Thus, it could be said that the function of an automobile is to transport its owner from place to place. Or it could be noted that the function of a church is to provide a place in which the faithful can worship. Or it could be held that the function of a school is to educate the young.

In this everyday usage, then, "function" is a term employed to define one or more of the immediate ends or uses of the object or practice under consideration. In this sense, "function" is neither concerned with the relationships between the object being considered and other objects and practices or with the object's interrelationship with the social environment as a whole. It is not concerned, for example, with such things as the impact the development of the automobile or the school has had on society or with what society would be like without either.

Sociologists have defined function as a "key concept for the analysis of social dynamics." They have elaborated as follows:

"The question about the function of an item or practice in a society is in part a question about what effects on other behavior the given item or practice produces. In trying to answer this question

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the analyst attempts to discover the way in which an item or practice is connected with other practices in the society. When he is able to describe the connections between various items and practices and to indicate the way in which their mutual presences have reciprocal and interesting effects, he has answered the question about the function of the item or practice. ²

It is in the broader context implicit in this sociological definition that the term "function" will hereinafter be employed.

A. The "Functions" of the National Political Campaign

If the sociological concept of "function" is applied to the national political campaign in the United States, it is clear that one must be concerned with a good deal more than describing how the campaign operates or the extent to which it achieves the objectives of those who conduct it. One must also be concerned with the impact of the campaign on the total socio-political system, with the basic long-term role played by the campaign in furthering the Democratic process, and with the ethical and cultural implications of the methods and techniques employed by those conducting the campaign.

Viewed in this light and in the perspective of recent history, the political campaign begins to emerge as something a good deal more complex than might seem to be the case at first blush. The diversity of views among democratic political theorists and commentators as to the central purpose or nature of the campaign is ample verification of this and some of these views are well worth

²Ibid.
examining here. This, despite the fact that relatively few political theorists have been preoccupied with the campaign as a sociological phenomenon.

The "rationalists"—as typified by Mill, Lindsay and Bryce—were constrained to look upon the campaign as a vehicle for loosening the forces of education or discussion. The campaign, to them, was a means of presenting the issues for the "rational" reaction and decision of public opinion. But, obviously, thinkers like these could not write the campaign off purely as "an appeal to reason" despite their belief in the fundamental rationality of the public mind. Bryce, for example, coupled the concept of "diffusion of political knowledge" with the stirring up of the "public life" and of the citizen's "sense of responsibility" in defining the objectives of the national campaign in America. Thus, he wrote:

"If the presidential contest may seem to have usually done less for the formation of political thought and diffusion of political knowledge than was to be expected from the immense efforts put forth and the intelligence of the voters addressed, it nevertheless rouses and stirs the public life of the country. One can hardly imagine what the atmosphere of American politics would be without this quadrennial storm sweeping through it to clear away stagnant vapours, and recall to every citizen the sense of his own responsibility for the present welfare and future greatness of his country."3

The "irrationalists", such as Lippmann, Wallis and Laski, could hardly have accepted either the purely rationalist concept of

the campaign or Bryce's modification thereof. This is not to suggest that they would support the view attributed to Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, that political propaganda "has only one purpose--the conquest of the masses. Every means that serves this end is good." 4

Thus, Laski has held that "the decisions of men, when they come to choose their governors, are influenced by considerations which escape all scientific analysis." 5 And Wallis has written that "...the student of politics...can never create an artificial uniformity in man. He cannot, after twenty generations of education and breeding, render even two human beings sufficiently like each other for him to prophesy with any approach to certainty that they will behave alike under like circumstances." 6

These statements do not make their creators any less concerned than were Bryce or Mill with the preservation of democracy. It does make it logically impossible for them to accept the political campaign as fundamentally an appeal to reason or as a means of ventilating the "true" political issues of the day for mature consideration and reflection by the public. The campaign, to the "irrationalists",

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becomes a well-managed, well-calculated appeal to the emotions of the crowd but—hopefully—an appeal directed to good ends. As Lippmann once put it, "the real problem (of the Democratic State) is not how to abolish these (special) interests or how to silence them. It is how to keep them manageable, how to prevent them from becoming intransient and irresistible."  

A third approach to the "function" of the political campaign in a democracy is that which rests upon what may be described as the achievement of "unity" between the governors or those who seek to govern on one hand and the governed on the other. It is here that democratic thinkers begin to conceive of the function of the political process in the broader context approaching that of the modern-day sociologist or student of mass behavior.

Thus, Mary P. Follett, who was concerned with political experience on the "motor level", wrote:

"When the process of cooperation between expert and people is given its legitimate chance, the experience of the people may change the conclusions of the expert while the conclusions of the expert are changing the experience of the people; further than that, the people's activity is a response to the relating of their own activity to that of the expert..."  

Applying the Follett thesis to a specific campaign situation, one would conceive of the campaign as the vehicle for bringing about...
"unity" or harmony or balance as between the policy makers and the public.

More recently, a student of public opinion has looked at this "unity" argument in a little different way. He has conceived of the political campaign as a sort of "compromise" between the rulers and the ruled or between those who seek to rule and the ruled. He writes:

"The overall result of the political process in a democracy seems to be a kind of compromise.... Democracy succeeds or fails as it manages to discover some point between government-by-public-opinion—which is not feasible and perhaps not desirable—and the crisis approach. To strive to reach such a point, the leaders and interested citizens place stress on education. They believe that the electorate must become more completely aware of the issues which confront the country and should acquire as much of the relevant information as possible."

A fourth way of assessing the purpose of a political campaign in the United States is one which is broadly sociological. Lazarsfeld is one of the prime exponents of this view which holds that the campaign functions primarily to develop mass interest, reduce apathy, strengthen consistency of voting patterns, and reinforce opinions already held. The campaign period—in this view—is not a time of basic change. On the other hand, it is held that both reason and emotion are at work during the campaign and that John Stewart Mill was not completely wrong.

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Lazersfeld and his associates have written:

"Political campaigns tend to make people consistent both sociologically and psychologically; they vote more with their social groups and agree more with their own prior ideas on the issues. But new ideas and new alignments are in their infancy manifested by inconsistency psychologically and heterogeneity socially; they are also by definition deviant and minority points of view. To the extent that they are inhibited by pressure or simply by knowledge of what is the proper (i.e., the majority) point of view in a particular group, then the campaign period is not a time to look for the growth of important new trends." 10

Finally, there is a fifth way in which the function of the political campaign can be viewed—that of the practicing politician primarily concerned with the maintenance or achievement of power. This is not to suggest that all politicians are so preoccupied with the end—power—that means cease to matter to them. There are politicians with both social consciences and great integrity. 11 It is to suggest that—in the politicians' view—a campaign can function to change enough votes or voting intentions to make the difference between victory and defeat and this is its essential purpose as they are constrained to see it.

Odegaard and Helms, who have examined the "significance" of the campaign and its mechanisms in some depth, have cited what can be taken as an important exception to the general Lazarsfeld point of

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10 Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, op. cit., p. 317.

11 This based upon considerable personal experience with national politicians.
view. They state:

"Nevertheless, in spite of general agreement that an overwhelming majority of the voters have already made up their minds so that no amount of propaganda could change them, there is widespread belief among political strategists that the campaign is necessary and often decisive in swinging the doubtful vote upon which the result may depend."12

If the politicians have tended to view the campaign as a struggle for power and an instrument for changing crucial voting intentions, there are also those who—in their awareness of this struggle—have been concerned with whether the politician might not misuse the Federal bureaucracy to further campaign ends. Then, there is the related question of whether the bureaucracy does not in some cases lend itself to such misuse.

One who has been particularly concerned with the "political" role of the Federal bureaucracy has put the problem as follows: "The fact that we have eliminated the more obvious forms of campaign and election-day skullduggery must not lead one to suppose that those who are in control of the Federal government find no way of using the power of government to influence elections and make sure their continuance in power."13 In this connection, it is well to bear in mind that the bureaucracy may act in the propaganda sense both by


deed and by word and by omission as well as by commission.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that there is no one "function" of a national political campaign in the United States. It is probably sound to state that there are many objectives and that those who have chosen to comment have tended to extract that one which appeared to them to be most fundamental at the time.

One astute political observer has written: "The problem of power is reduced, in the real world, to the control of specific acts of particular powers. It is not one problem but many problems; for there is no one abuse of power, there are only abuses, various in form and often markedly different in degree." If the power which a political campaign is directed to achieving is thus a many-sided, many-faceted thing, it seems inconsistent to assume that the vehicle for achieving such power is itself susceptible to being described or evaluated in terms of a single function.

The key question confronting the political scientist concerned with the function of the campaign, then, is not: "What is the function?" Rather, it is: "Is the campaign today functioning in a manner consistent with the best interests and inherent values of the American democracy?" This question implies mobility and evolution in the total socio-political framework within which the campaign is operating. We are therefore justified in seeking to ascertain whether there have been substantial

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changes in the broader environment during the past several decades which have, in turn, influenced the function of the political campaign.

B. Pertinent Changes in the Socio-Political Environment

The intensive study of the propaganda strategy and tactics of the Party in Power (in control of the Administration) during the 1958 campaign to which this paper is devoted has revealed various differences from the methodology employed in campaigns only a decade before. These differences will be explored in some detail beginning with Chapter II. Here, however, it is pertinent to note that the differences may well reflect certain broader changes in the socio-political environment. It should also be noted that such differences may be either of degree or of kind.

All societies are continually and continuously in the process of change. As John Dewey has put it, "Change is the primary social fact as surely as motion is the primary physical fact."\(^{15}\) Dewey has also stated:

"Just as publics and states vary with conditions of time and place, so do the concrete functions which should be carried on by states. There is no antecedent universal proposition which can be laid down because of which the functions of a state should be limited or should be expanded. Their scope is something to be critically and experimentally determined."\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\) As cited by Bennett and Tumin, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

The past thirty years have seen some far-reaching changes in the American social and political environment and, more particularly, in the function of the Federal government and in that government's interrelationships with the American society as a whole. There are undoubtedly as many ways to characterize these changes as there are views as to their number and diversity. Certainly, any effort to categorize them in a comprehensive manner is beyond the purview of this paper.

However, there are three sweeping changes which have occurred in the period since Franklin Roosevelt entered office which can be said to have had a significant impact on the manner in which the struggle for national political power is waged. These changes may be defined as follows:

(1) The substantial expansion of the role of the Federal government in the social and economic spheres with particular reference to the providing of additional public services and the regulating of private interests.

(2) The weakening of key influences and structures upon which the national party formerly depended heavily for the achievement or maintenance of political power. This encompasses the decline of the boss and of the urban machine, the taking over by the State of welfare activities formerly performed to a considerable extent by the machine, the decline (but not elimination) of the patronage system, and the rise of the mass educational level.
(3) The development and/or expansion of new mass communication media and changes in the relationships between the Federal government and the media.

Each of these broad evolutionary developments is discussed briefly below.

With the coming of the New Deal and the far-ranging crisis which helped to bring it into being, the Federal government began an era of major expansion. The Washington bureaucracy increased from 200,000 in 1900 to more than 2,000,000 in 1950 but it was during the Roosevelt period that this increase was greatest. Nor was this substantial rise in Federal employment the only measure of the augmentation of Federal influence as it related to the total social structure.

Dozens of new administrative and administrative-judicial agencies came into being with the New Deal—among them such regulatory units as the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The powers of older regulatory commissions such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission were substantially increased. New executive agencies concerned with important aspects

of the public welfare were created, not the least of which was the
Federal Security Agency. 18

The proliferation of agencies under the New Deal has not halted
under the Eisenhower Administration which has seen the rise of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Civil Rights
Commission and such units as the "Nixon Committee" which is
concerned with the problem of employment discrimination on projects
being built by private contractors with Federal funds. In addition,
the Republican Administration has actually seen a gradual strengthen-
ing of the Federal interest and contribution to the fields of health,
education and welfare—a strengthening in no little measure due to
Congressional prodding. The conversion of the Federal Security Agency
to a Cabinet-level Department of Health, Education and Welfare and
the tremendous increases in budgets of key programs administered by
this Department are a significant measure of the continued growth of
Federal influence and activity. 19

The growth and expansion of the Federal bureaucracy and its
increased relative impact on the society as a whole have influenced

18 For detailed discussion of the evolution of Federal regulatory
and related agencies in the economic field, see Rohlfing, Charles C.,
Carter, Edward M., West, Bradford W., and Hervey, John G.

19 Thus, expenditures of the National Institutes of Health, a
constituent of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
jumped from $52.1 million in 1950 to $211.2 million in 1958.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Report of the
Secretary's Consultants on Medical Research and Education,
the function of the national political campaign in several ways. The gamut of issues which could be exploited for political purposes has been broadened if only because so many new governmental activities have been opened to discussion and criticism. New channels of information (and propaganda) have been developed via the new agencies brought into being. There has been an intensification of the problem of "coordinating" Federal activities so that they contribute to campaign objectives of the Party in Power or, conversely, do not militate against these objectives. Local issues have been sublimated to those of national scope to a considerable extent because the locus of economic and political power has shifted to the Nation's capital. Formerly, this power was both much more diversified and much less centralized.

The second underlying change which has conditioned the nature of the national political campaign—the weakening of the traditional organizations and influences for "getting out the vote"—is closely associated with the great growth of the Federal bureaucracy and its impact on the society. The old-line political boss and the urban and county machines which he controlled have either become things of the past or are in the process of becoming so. The government has taken over welfare functions previously handled by the machines. The coming of old-age assistance, unemployment compensation, the network of public job-finding programs, and of an expanded vocational rehabilitation effort—these are but a few of the government activities which have helped to erode the power of the boss and of the local
machine.

The rise of the civil service and the decline of the patronage system—a decline which has been most obvious in the last few decades—have cut deeply into the power of the local machine "to get out the vote." There are far fewer jobs available to the Party Faithful for "being faithful." This falling away of the patronage power has been, in part, compensated for by such favors to the faithful as may be found in the dispensing of government contracts and related practices but there is reason to believe that the cold light of publicity and the prodding of Congressional investigators have not been without their limiting effect even on the granting of "business" largesse.

Finally, the mass level of education in the United States has risen substantially during the past generation and it is probable that the "average" capacity to tell "right" from "wrong" on public issues has also risen. This last is not easily proved but there is evidence in support of the generalization that persons with more formal education are likely to be more discriminating in the political arena than are

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20 Moos, Malcolm. The Republicans. New York: Random House, 1956, pp. 485-525, discusses the patronage and related factors which have weakened traditional political influences. He points out (pp. 494-5) that in May, 1956, there were only about 15,000 Federal patronage jobs filled by "deserving Republicans"—this 3 years after the Eisenhower Administration had come to power. He also cites statistics which demonstrate a dramatic decline in patronage available at the state level.

21 Key, V. O., Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1948, pp. 316-339, discusses patronage and related "favors" in detail. He concludes that there has been a "decline in glaring corruption."
Those with less of it.

In light of the foregoing developments, which have weakened or eliminated the traditional bulwarks upon which the national party has relied heavily for mobilization of the vote, the political strategists have found it necessary to turn to various compensatory activities. To a large extent, these activities have shown up in the actual conducting of the national campaigns of the past decade and—in particular—in the Republican conduct of such campaigns. New propaganda techniques, new types of mass opinion appeals, new concepts of political organization and new modes of propaganda planning have been invoked by the party strategists to offset the failings of local party organization and of limitations in the capacity of local forces to effectively "herd" the voters. 23

The third basic change which merits discussion here has to do with mass communications and, in particular, with the relationships between the Federal government and the mass media. The period since the late 1920's has seen the development of one remarkable new medium (television), the coming of age of another (radio), and a substantial increase in the number of such related media as telephone and telegraph: Only the daily press has shown a long-term down-trend in numbers but certainly there has been no drop


23 See Chapters II through IV for detailed consideration of the Republican national strategic and tactical approaches to political propaganda.
The tremendous development of the mass media has been paced by a major increase in governmental informational programs and specialists, by broadening of the scope of governmental regulation of the media, and by significant changes in the role of government as source and generator of news.

A brief analysis of the personnel and budget growth of the Department of Agriculture's Central Office of Information provides some measure of the overall growth of Federal informational activities. The Department boasts one of the larger and more comprehensive informational programs in Washington. It employs specialists in all major media areas—press, periodical, radio, television, films and exhibits. It actually produces its own movies and, in fact, makes films for other agencies.

In 1950, funds obligated for the central Office of Information totalled $1,502,837 and the average number of employees was 154. In 1959, the amount obligated was $2,677,826 and the average number of employees was 235. Thus, the monetary investment had jumped some 40% and the number of employees about 35% within a decade. However, when the funds obligated for 1959 are compared to those available for comparable purposes in 1930, the increase is

almost four-fold $2,677,826 in 1959 as compared to $716,480 in 1930).

Yet, the statistics for the Department's Central Office of Information do not reflect the true increase in the agency's total informational activities because they pertain only to the central function and not to the informational programs of the multitudinous operating services, bureaus and divisions. Though it is virtually impossible to compile accurate comparative figures for these operating constituents, some idea of how the informational activity has expanded at the operating level may be deduced from the fact that numerous new programs have been blanketed into the Department since 1932. Each of these programs has developed an informational unit which functions with considerable independence of the Central Office of Information.

Strictly speaking, the Federal regulation of communications can be said to date back to the original Alien and Sedition Acts of

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25 These statistics must be treated as sound estimates. They are based on Webster, R. Lyle. The Informational and Educational Work of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, (unpublished doctoral thesis). Washington, D. C.: American University, June, 1958, p. 300, and also on discussions with Mr. Webster and members of his staff.


27 Based upon conversation with Mr. Webster, April 5, 1960.
George Washington's Administration. The Federal regulation of media other than the press can be said to have begun in 1866 when the Postmaster-General was authorized by Congress to fix rates for government telegrams but it was in June, 1934, that the government first began sustained peacetime regulation of the mass media in the truly comprehensive sense. On that date, the Federal Communications Commission came into being with broad powers which have grown even broader since. Today, the Commission exercises jurisdiction in such diverse fields as common carrier rate making, station licensing, political broadcasting, frequency and channel allocation, network relationships with advertisers and local stations, and the protection of life and property through the use of radio and wire communication.

Commission rulings relative to "equal time," "comparable time," and "political libel" insofar as broadcasts by candidates for office are concerned have had a direct impact on campaigning but this specialized impact is less significant than the overall inhibiting effect.


30 Ibid.
the power to regulate has had on the manner in which television and radio have handled the dissemination of political information. This assertion, it should be said, is not to be construed as an argument in opposition to regulation in the public interest.

The increasing complexity and size of the government bureaucracy coupled with the growth of Federal informational programs has also led to a significant change in the relationships between the government and the media in the actual gathering and evaluation of the news. Today, the Federal government is as important as a generator of information as it is as a source. Today, the average Washington reporter is probably more dependent for his information on the government press release and press conference than he is on his own initiative and on direct personal contacts at the policy level.

Whereas the reporter of the pre-New Deal era was engaged to a considerable extent in "digging out" and even "making" the news, most reporters today appear to be concerned primarily with evaluating, sifting and reconstituting material prepared and released by the

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31 Heavy dependence upon the Government hand-out was very apparent during the early phases of World War II. Of this period, a veteran Washington reporter and editor has written: "There are three basic sources from which the Washington reporters obtain the news you find in your daily paper. They are the "handout," the press conference, and the personal interview....Practically every government agency of any consequence has one or more individuals all or part of whose time is devoted to preparing these handouts. Some of the more important or more publicity-minded departments have large staffs of a hundred or more devoted to information work. Kiplinger, W. M. Washington Is Like That. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942, pp. 165-66.
government or in following up "stories" based upon government
releases.

This is not to suggest that Washington media men are necessarily
deeper or less enterprising today than they were a generation ago or
that there is anything malevolent about government informational
services per se. The great majority of reporters have no realistic
option but to accept the government's informational assistance and
adequate coverage of the huge bureaucracy would be impossible
without such assistance. The media representatives have become
very dependent upon the government informational specialist both
because of the growth in size and complexity of the bureaucracy and
the increasing "distance" between themselves and the various
departmental policy makers. More and more, the informational
specialist has become the day-to-day link between his agency and
the media.

What, then, has the evolution of the mass media and of the
Federal government's relationships with these media over the past
thirty years or so meant for national political campaigning? For one
thing, the change has given those who plan and implement a national
campaign access to new and more direct pipelines into the home and

32 The assumption as to the current situation is based on ten
years of personal experience as Washington reporter and editor and
as information officer for several government agencies. For a
comparative evaluation of what transpired during the Hoover
Administration, see Allen, Robert S. Washington Merry-Go-Round.
hearth of the voter. It has given the political strategist new weapons for making the media party to his propaganda efforts and—in some respects—has limited the freedom of such mass media as television and radio to take "editorial" positions on campaign issues and candidates.

To some indeterminate extent, the changing government-media relationship has impaired the capacity of media representatives to effectively evaluate government informational activities and materials because these reporters and editors are further from agency policy sources than was once the case and thus heavily dependent upon intermediaries. Finally, the evolution of the media and of governmental-media relationships has made it possible for politicians seeking national power to reach a far greater number of voter ears and/or eyes at one time than was the case little more than a decade ago.

Having examined the more fundamental underlying changes which have had a substantial impact on national political campaigning, we turn now to consider the function of the national campaign in the Eisenhower era and to a preliminary examination of the 1958 campaign within the context of the Eisenhower "decade."

C. The 1958 Campaign Within the Context of the Eisenhower Era

As the "outs" who had been out of power for twenty years, the Republicans in 1952 were the first of the major parties to feel the need for a new approach to the quest for political power. Republican strategists realized that basic changes in the mass communications
network offered an opportunity to compensate for the demise of the old boss system, the substantial reduction in patronage opportunities and the decline of related traditional influences for getting out the vote. In a manner of speaking, the Republicans in 1952 were the first to test the product of the sociological evolution which began at the time the New Deal came to power.

Confronted with a new communications pattern and problems, the Republican strategists turned to "Madison Avenue"—to those who were most experienced in the use of the newer mass media. And this seems a natural reaction in light of the prevailing circumstances. The result—at least in 1952 and 1956—was the partnership of the commercial public relations specialist and the politician, the adoption of an advertising-type approach to the use of the mass media and, in particular, of television, the development of new kinds of "volunteer" organizations, and the resorting to commercial-type advertising gimmicks.

The Republican campaign for the presidency in 1952 produced a number of raised eyebrows and cries of anguish from political commentators who saw the techniques employed as a threat to the democratic process. These techniques and related practices carried over into the first years of the Eisenhower Administration. And those concerned by this development raised the question: Can Government be merchandised?

33 See Chapter II for detailed discussion of this.
This is how one critical analyst saw the heart of the problem:

"A public relations man in politics may say he is only doing better what politicians have always done. But though the 'old-style' politician often did simplify and sloganize and appeal to fear and greed, he does not seem to have done this quite so systematically or so effectively as the modern advertiser in politics. He did not have the dominating control of the sources of opinion that the modern national "mass media" advertiser can enjoy. And he had a restraining set of pressures on him to which some of the political advertising men do not seem to be subject: at least he had to pay some attention to facts."  

This analyst and others who shared his point of view were thus primarily concerned with the effectiveness of the "new type" of campaigner, his freedom to operate with little concern for factuality, and the ethical implications for the American democracy. They were apparently little concerned with why it was that the commercial advertising and public relations specialists had achieved impressive status in national politics. And they appeared to take it for granted that these specialists were at least in the process of supplanting the old-line politician as top dog in the political scheme of things.

Yet, the heart of the question posed by the national Republican approach to campaigning in 1952 and 1956 is neither the use of advertising men and advertising techniques nor the purported domination of the politicians by Madison Avenue. The advertising man in politics is merely a symptom as is the manner in which the Republicans have utilized the mass media and, in fact, the entire approach of the Party

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in Power to the use of political propaganda may well be viewed as symptomatic. Nor is the advertising man peculiar to the Republicans—he is and has been very active among the Democrats as well.

The essence of what the Republican Party did in 1952 is that it sought to achieve political power by employing new (in the political sense) propaganda techniques in a highly-organized manner in keeping with a formal plan which deliberately emphasized the appeal to the irrational in a communications milieu which may well have militated against reflective thinking on the issues. The term "milieu" here reflects the existence and intensified use of the mass media. The premise that the mass media are detrimental to reflective thinking has been put by Mumford as follows: "For over against the convenience of instantaneous communication is the fact that the great economical abstractions of writing, reading and drawing, the media of reflective thought and deliberate action, will be weakened." 36

What the Republicans did in 1952—and again in 1956—was to make use of the situation produced by the underlying changes in the American society which had been evolving over the past generation. And the crucial questions posed by their activities have little to do with advertising and advertising men. These crucial questions are:

35 This implicit in Chapters II through IV.

36 As cited in Albig, op. cit., p. 49.
(1) Does the national political campaign as it has been waged during the Eisenhower era represent a significant departure in function from that of the past? (2) If it does, is this departure one of degree or of kind?

If there has been a significant change in the function of the national campaign and that change is one of kind or is in the process of becoming so, the implications for the American democracy may well be considerable.

The national political campaign waged by the Party in Power in 1958 must be looked upon as a benchmark in an evolving process which first came to the surface in 1952 but which has its roots in even deeper changes in the total socio-political structure. Viewed in this evolutionary light and appropriately related to predecessor developments, the 1958 campaign can—if closely studied—help to lay a foundation for answering the critical questions raised immediately above.

What, then, does analysis of what transpired in 1958 tell us?

The 1958 Campaign was not conducted or planned by the Republicans in a manner which suggests that the politician was carrying the water jug for the public relations or advertising specialist. Nor was it carried through on the premise that standard political organizational requirements were secondary to mass media propaganda and advertising gimmicks. In this context alone, the campaign has considerable significance because it occurred six years after various pundits were assuming that the old-line politician was on the way out
and that the traditional pressures upon the politician were being 
vitiating by "control" of the mass media by irresponsible men in 
grey flannel suits.

This is not to suggest that what was feared by some analysts 
after 1952 cannot possibly happen or that there is not cause for 
concern with the ethical and sociological implications of the commercial 
public relations or advertising specialist in politics. It is only to 
state that the 1958 campaign did not appear to indicate any intensification 
of the trend toward dependence upon Madison Avenue.

But the Party in Power's conducting of the 1958 campaign did 
reveal characteristics which, when taken together, do raise the 
question of whether there has been a change in campaign function. 
These characteristics include the following:

* The use of a formal strategic plan in advertising agency 
  format—the first such plan to be employed in a national Congressional 
  campaign.

* The employment of a single, simple basic theme throughout 
  the campaign period.

* The use of commercial-type advertising techniques and 
  practices.

* Creation of a streamlined "Strategy Board" which brought 
  White House, Congressional and National Committee leaders together 
  at regular intervals for development and implementation of campaign 
  strategy and tactics.
Very heavy dependence upon irrational appeals—upon "dodges," and half-truths, and on "issues" which often had little basis in reality.

Considerable manufacturing of "news" and the use of the mass media as propaganda channels in a remarkably overt way.

Use of the "non-political" bureaucracy for the dissemination of political propaganda not labeled as such but nevertheless consistent with strategic political decisions and the drive for maintenance of political power.

These characteristics and others relating thereto will be documented in the following pages. The next few chapters, however, will concentrate on the manner in which the Party in Power planned and organized its propaganda efforts at the national level. One might say that the emphasis of these chapters will be on the "administration" of the campaign by Republican strategists. We will begin with an effort to precisely relate the 1958 Republican Campaign Plan to political planning in general as it has been conducted by both major parties since Franklin Roosevelt made his first race for the Presidency.
CHAPTER II
The 1958 Campaign Plan and Its Antecedents

The 1958 campaign had the unique distinction of being the first Congressional race for which a comprehensive written, advertising-type Campaign Plan setting forth national propaganda strategy, tactics and techniques was drafted. It was the third national Campaign Plan prepared by the Republicans, such plans having been employed in 1952 and again in 1956. But it had a number of predecessors in state politics and Congressional campaign committees today routinely prepare written campaign plan documents for the use of senators and congressmen in their own races.

The fundamental significance of the formal Campaign Plan in national politics does not lie in the assertion that it represents an excursion into public opinion motivation in depth. Nor does it lie in the assumption that commercial public relations and advertising techniques have been foisted on the national politician.

Its long-term significance is wrapped up in the question of whether it—when viewed in the context of other campaign practices of the Eisenhower era—represents a basic change or the beginning of such a change in the function of the political campaign at the

national level. Its more immediate significance is that key national political leaders have accepted a new type of organized approach to the planning and implementation of the struggle for power as a matter of necessity on the premise that the piecemeal approaches of the past no longer seemed adequate.

As of 1958, the broad acceptance of the formal campaign plan approach in national politics was limited to the Republican party. This, though both parties were employing campaign plans of this nature in state races. No formal campaign plan was employed by the Democrats during the Roosevelt campaigns. James A. Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee during the first and second Roosevelt campaigns, has written:

"...we had no definite campaign plan as such, during either of the two campaigns for the Presidency I managed for Mr. Roosevelt. We had in mind the way in which we would present the case for Mr. Roosevelt, and then we let it be governed by our day to day observations of the campaign itself."  

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, one of Roosevelt's closest advisers and a Presidential speechwriter in all four campaigns, has made it clear that no single, overall formal Campaign Plan was employed during the third and fourth campaigns. Roosevelt was his own strategist even as he was the spearhead of every campaign in which he participated. Judge Rosenman has written:

2 Letter to the writer from James A. Farley dated October 27, 1959.
"Although his own campaign trips were generally planned in consultation with him by the campaign committees, the committees had very little to do with the speeches or his own personal strategy. Their participation was restricted to general advice as to where the campaign train should stop, where the principal speeches should be delivered, who should be on the train, etc. Even with respect to these, the final decision was always made by the President himself."³

No formal campaign plan was utilized by the Democrats during the Stevenson campaigns of 1952 and 1956. Nor was such a plan utilized in Mr. Truman's drive for election in 1948. These statements should not be construed to mean that the Democrats did no campaign planning. They relate merely to the nature, scope and characteristics of the planning approach.

Because the formal Campaign Plan represents a relatively new departure in national politics, it is well to examine some of its antecedents in the state arena. In doing so, one must bear in mind

³Letter to the writer from Judge Samuel I. Rosenman dated December 11, 1959.

⁴Letter to the writer from Samuel G. Brightman, deputy chairman for public affairs, Democratic National Committee, dated November 20, 1959. "The campaign efforts," Mr. Brightman writes, "were coordinated through conferences and memoranda dealing with various phases of the campaign." Stevenson campaigns actually had two "headquarters"—one in Springfield, Illinois, and the other in Washington.

⁵The best available discussion of the strategy and mechanics of the Truman campaign of 1948 is to be found in Redding, John M. Inside the Democratic Party. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958. Redding was director of public relations for the Democratic National Committee during the campaign.
that the application of political propaganda in keeping with a formally conceived "blueprint" in state politics presents a problem far less complex than that posed by a national election.

The "blueprint" propaganda approach to politics in this country is some twenty years old and one of its chief testing grounds has been the "Golden State" of California. Among its earliest and possibly most intensive users was the public relations firm of Whitaker and Baxter in San Francisco. A more recent but nevertheless veteran entry is Murray Chotiner and Associates which masterminded Richard Nixon's campaigns for congressional office and took an active role in Nixon's drive for the vice presidency in 1952.

Whitaker and Baxter, which began operations in the early thirties, represents the husband and wife team of Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter. Generally speaking, the firm has worked the conservative-business "side of the street" in political campaigns and was busily applying the formal Campaign Plan approach in the early forties. The firm is perhaps best known nationally for its campaign on behalf of the American Medical Association against "socialized medicine."

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7 Kelley, op. cit., pp. 67-106, discusses the AMA campaign in detail.
One who has made a careful study of the Whitaker and Baxter approach to politics describes their concept of the Campaign Plan as follows:

"Whitaker and Baxter are systematic in their approach to the problems of political public relations. According to their own description, their first move, once they have accepted responsibility for a campaign, is to blueprint it. Issues are developed, the time sequence of action is plotted, and the media are selected. Then a plan of campaign is written for the opposition and Whitaker and Baxter's own procedures are adjusted to meet it. Finally, the campaign is budgeted."8

Elsewhere, it is pointed out that Whitaker and Baxter have always insisted on a "centralized determination of the issues that will be emphasized." For example, during Goodwin Knight's campaign for the governorship of California in 1954, the firm wrote a letter to various local supporters stressing that "we must stick closely to the main issues outlined, and leave out many of the secondary and less important issues, however interesting they may be to some of us."9

A third basic ingredient of the Whitaker and Baxter approach consists of the development and utilization of a simple theme. According to Leone Baxter: "The theme...should have simplicity and clarity. Most of all, it must high-point the major issues of the campaign with great brevity—in language that paints a picture understandable to people in all circumstances."10

8 Ibid., p. 46.

9 Ibid., p. 47.

10 Baxter, Leone. Speech delivered before the Conference of State Medical Societies, Chicago, Illinois, (February 12, 1949).
There are other operating ingredients but the three cited above appear to cover the essentials of the planned approach taken by Whitaker and Baxter to the propaganda of politics. Others have taken a leaf from the Whitaker and Baxter book at the state level though it is doubtful that many have approached their objective with the almost machine-like consistency and polish of Whitaker and Baxter. Further, it is a sound assumption that some type of propaganda plan devised with the help of public relations specialists has been used in a substantial number of local elections during the past decade though PR men have been much less active in local politics than at the state campaign level. 11

Whitaker and Baxter's formalized campaign techniques made the jump to national politics for the first time in General Eisenhower's drive for the presidency in 1952. This is not to suggest that prior presidential campaigns had not been planned or that public relations had not been involved in such campaigns. But the 1952 race was the first in which a major Party employed a single formal blueprint setting forth issues, propaganda strategy and tactics, the elements of media use, the time of specific informational efforts, and suggested themes. It was the first national campaign during which a major party utilized the organized "selling" techniques of the advertising agency in a fully coordinated fashion.

It would be naive to assume that the Eisenhower Campaign Plan of 1952 was identical in scope and methodology with those developed

for state campaigns or that it was rigidly adhered to in every respect. It would be equally naive to assume that the 1952 document was simply an advertising-type document grafted onto a political situation. The document was essentially a political one realistically geared to political objectives but employing advertising-type format and concepts.

The 1952 Plan has never been made public in its entirety but its existence has been publicized and various portions of it have been released. Thus, in January, 1953, the retiring executive director of the Republican National Committee showed an audience of national committee members a copy of the Campaign Plan booklet which he termed "....the most complete blueprint ever drawn up in advance of a presidential campaign." This is the way one who has had access to at least some parts of the Plan describes it:

"Prepared in standard advertising agency format, the plan outlined basic strategy, organization, appeals, types of speeches, literature, advertising, television and radio programs, the relative weight to be given to the various media, the kinds, places and times of campaign trips and rallies, and the areas in which efforts were to be concentrated."13

This general view of the Campaign Plan of 1952 is further confirmed by a political scientist who served as an "intern" at Republican National Headquarters during the period immediately preceding the 1958 campaign. This source points out that the Campaign Plans generally explained "the general pattern for the


allocation of funds, the way in which various communications media will be used, and times and places at which it is planned to have major speeches given."\(^\text{14}\)

The 1952 Campaign Plan was very specific as to the manner in which the new TV medium should be employed and counseled heavy dependence upon this medium. It recommended wholesale revision of traditional policy speeches with a view to taking optimum advantage of TV and, in particular, urged that the "set" speeches of the past be supplanted by more "informal, intimate" productions.

"...these set speeches, by their very nature, cannot impart the real warmth of personality with which both candidates are endowed. Therefore, informal intimate television productions addressed directly to the individual American and his family, their problems and their hopes, are necessary to make the most of the ticket's human assets."\(^\text{15}\)

The 1952 Plan went into strategic considerations in depth and urged a basic departure from the approach which had guided the Republican presidential campaigns of 1940, 1944 and 1948. It rejected the premise that the GOP must appeal to the Independent vote, asserting that the crux of the problem lay in appealing to the much larger "stay-at-home" vote. Thus, the Plan's writers argued:

"...The pertinent fact is that the Stay-At-Homes outnumber the Independents by approximately forty-five million to an estimated three or four million. This campaign is based upon this second approach for two reasons: (1) The "me-too" approach has proved

\(^{14}\) Wilder, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20.

\(^{15}\) Kelley, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 161.
unsuccessful in three campaigns, its most notable failure occurring in 1948 when every political authority in the country in both parties agreed that the Republican ticket was certain to win.

(2) The alternative approach, which admitted into consideration some forty-five million Stay-At-Homes, offers a vastly larger area than the three or four million Independents for the enlistment of new recruits...the recommended strategy is: Attack! Attack! Attack!" 16

The charge has been made that the Republican Campaign Plans have gone deeply into motivation analysis and have encompassed techniques designed to stimulate the voter's subconscious. This charge has been denied by the individual who prepared the initial drafts of both the 1952 and 1956 Campaign Plans. 17 It has also been denied by another source with direct access to Republican National Headquarters if not to the Plans themselves. According to this latter source:

"...A belief has developed in some quarters that these documents are the quintessence of the 'hidden persuader's' black magic. This is not correct.... Nowhere in a Campaign Plan document is there evidence of the use of motivation analysis or other types of opinion research of kind more esoteric than that which is regularly presented in the general press." 18

The 1952 Campaign Plan--like that in 1956--was prepared in first draft by Robert Humphreys, then head of the Republican National Committee's public relations division and, more recently, (1959)

16 Ibid., p. 155.
17 Office conversation with Robert Humphreys, June 11, 1959.
18 Wilder, op. cit., p. 20.
Committee Campaign Director. Humphreys' background is that of publicity man, sports commentator, press association reporter and magazine editor. He saw service with both the Indiana State Republican Committee and with the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee before coming to the National Committee. He is a mass media man who has worked both within the media and at influencing the media.

But Humphreys is an astute politician as well as a public relations-newspaper type. And the fact that he prepared the first editions of both the 1952 and 1956 Plans does not justify the conclusion that the public relations or advertising specialists have dominated the 1952, 1956 or any other campaign at the national level. Humphreys' draft in 1952, for example, was revised and approved by a Republican Strategy Committee in Washington and that Committee was dominated by politicians—not PR or advertising men. Further, the final version was approved by the immediate staffs of Eisenhower and Nixon and the candidates themselves.  

Thus, the ultimate responsibility for strategic decisions during these campaigns has inevitably been that of the top politicians. If the PR specialist has infiltrated the higher echelons, he has done so as an influential adviser and creative assistant. He has not done so as the supplanter of the politicians.

This fundamental politician-public relations specialist relation-

ship was again demonstrated during the 1958 campaign--the first

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19 Kelley, op. cit., p. 151.
national Congressional race for which the Party in Power developed a formal Campaign Plan. There had been no Campaign Plan in 1954.  

The 1958 Campaign Plan, though it had much in common with the Plans of the presidential election years in terms of its organization and format, was nevertheless very different in certain basic respects.

To begin with, it was not a "Blueprint for Victory" as had been the 1952 and 1956 Plans. Humphreys has stated that the Plan "foresaw no victory" but was designed to keep Republican Congressional losses to a minimum. The Plan was based on three fundamental assumptions:

(1) That economic conditions would be on the upturn by September, 1958 and thus recession would not be a major issue in the campaign;
(2) That there would be no great nationwide issues; and (3) That money would not be very plentiful insofar as the Republican Party was concerned.

Closely linked to these fundamental assumptions were what Humphreys termed the basic strategic factors. He defined these factors as (a) The candidates running on the Republican and Democratic tickets would be about equal in terms of quality; (b) The campaign would be fought on local issues with national issues lacking; and (c) Organization was the key to campaign success insofar as the Republicans were concerned.

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20 Office conversation with Robert Humphreys, June 11, 1959.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
It is significant that the "lack of national issues" concept was both a fundamental assumption of the Plan and a basic strategic factor in the conduct of the Campaign. In effect, the Plan tied the lack of national issues in with the vital need for looking to sound organization as the only hope for keeping the Republican losses to a minimum. Further, the Plan accepted the pessimistic premise that the party could not produce "any sizeable increase in the off-year election vote" unless new and more effective organizational methods were developed and employed. Thus, it stated:

"The quarter-of-a-century political phenomenon which has seen the virtual elimination of city and courthouse political machines in both parties, together with the rise of civil service at all levels of government, has virtually destroyed effective party organization at the precinct level.

"Today, the Democrat Party depends on organized labor's professionals for precinct work; the Republican Party depends on volunteers. Without burning nationwide issues and candidates of superb appeal (i.e., Korea, communism and corruption, and candidates Eisenhower and Nixon in 1952) the volunteer system fails. There can be no doubt that the volunteer system will fail again in 1958 unless effective methods are applied both from the standpoint of (a) volunteer recruitment, and (b) new techniques."

The 1958 Campaign Plan--like its Presidential year predecessors--made no fetish of motivation analysis. Humphreys reports that it contained no discussion of "images" and paid little attention to means of appealing to mass emotions through slogans or gimmicks as

had been done in 1952 with the Korea, communism and corruption trilogy. It can be taken that this was more the product of a lack of issues calculated to excite mass emotionalism than of any veneration for an appeal to reason.

The Campaign Plan was divided into nine basic sections as follows: (1) Foreword; (2) strategy; (3) basic techniques; (4) targets—i.e., priorities in terms of Senate and House races; (5) coordination; (6) field forces; (7) use of media; (8) travel and speakers; and (9) timing—i.e., when to get various phases of the organizational drive underway.

Those who have held that employment of the mass media by commercial public relations specialists had become the hallmark of Republican political operations during national elections would have been disappointed in the 1958 Plan. This Plan counseled against extensive use of television—the key medium on which millions were expended in 1952 and 1956. It also counseled against the use of inspirational "gimmicks" which were widely employed both in 1952 and the 1954 Congressional races.

The argument against the use of TV was dictated both by the premise that adequate funds would be lacking and the assumption that

25 Office conversation with Robert Humphreys, op. cit.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.
creation of an effective vote-getting organization within the Party was the only realistic approach to waging of the campaign. Massive use of TV generally presupposes an attempt to reach the mass audience regardless of party status.

There is agreement among those who were closest to the drafting of the Plan that the organizational techniques recommended were not well applied. One spokesman spoke of the Plan as a "good plan with poor action." Another stated flatly that the Plan as a whole was "shelved" for lack of money. Whatever the fate of the Plan in specific terms, it is clear that its recommendations were at best applied in a very limited way.

This, however, is not tantamount to asserting that the Plan had no impact on the Campaign. For it did.

What about those who conceived and approved the 1958 Plan? Humphreys was again the initial author as he had been in 1952 and 1956. However, he was assisted in the drafting process by William Warner, executive director of the Republican Campaign Committee in the House. Humphreys says the Plan was drafted in initial form in January, 1958 and approved in February.

28 Ibid.

29 Conversation with William Warner, Executive Director, Republican House Campaign Committee, June 11, 1959.

30 Office Conversation with Robert Humphreys, op. cit.
It is significant that the Plan was developed at the specific request of Meade Alcorn, Republican National Committee Chairman. Humphreys himself did not feel that a Campaign Plan was necessary for 1958 and has since questioned the value of such a Plan in any national non-Presidential election. However, he believes a Campaign Plan to be imperative in any Presidential race.

The Plan was approved in final form by Representative Richard Simpson, of Pennsylvania, and Senator Andrew Schoeppel, of Kansas, respectively chairmen of the House and Senate Republican Campaign Committees, as well as by Alcorn. Alcorn then cleared the Plan with President Eisenhower and with Vice President Nixon.

The fact that the Plan was drafted at Alcorn's request in the face of Humphreys' feeling that it would not be feasible is but another indication of the relative status of politician and public relations practitioner in national politics. The clearance process through which the Plan then went and the fact that it was poorly implemented further substantiate that the public relations specialists were not "running" the campaign.

It can be assumed that the "target" section of the Plan had some bearing on what was actually done in practice. This is the

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., also Warner, op. cit.
section that had to do with the areas of geographic concentration
insofar as both Senate and House races were concerned. Vice President
Nixon, who carried the lion's share of the national campaigning load
for the Administration along with Secretary of Agriculture Benson,
stressed the geographic implications of the campaign in both public
speeches and in key communications to Republican politicians in the
field.

Mr. Nixon's statements indicate that the Party strategists
virtually wrote off the South and set out to concentrate heavily on
the North and West. Neither Eisenhower nor Nixon made a speech
south of the Baltimore-Washington area during the campaign. In a
talk considered to be the kick-off of the campaign from the
Administration's standpoint, Nixon told a partisan audience in
Indiana that the primary danger the country faced was a Democratic
Congress dominated by the "radical ADA wing which controls the
Party in the Northern and Western States. Because these are the
states in which the key contests for control of the House and the
Senate are being fought out." 34

And in a telegram sent to all Republican congressional candidates
on October 19 but made public only after the election, the vice
president stated:

"In appealing to Democrats, we should point out
that Democrats who support our Republican candidates
are not deserting their party but that their party has

34 Nixon, Richard. Text of Speech before Republican Fund-
Raising Group, Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29, 1958).
deserted them because of its domination in the Northern and Western States by the radical wing. 35

This emphasis on the "North and the West" cannot be shrugged off merely as political scare talk because—in both cases cited—the "directional" comments were made to Republican Party audiences and, in the latter case, they were not (initially) made for publication. However, the vice president's mention of the "Western" states must be taken to encompass the Midwest and the Far West and his use of the term "Northern" must be assumed to cover both the north and the eastern seaboard. Mr. Nixon's speaking itinerary actually focused on the Midwest, Far West and East and Mr. Eisenhower made more limited appearances in these areas. 36

The fact is that the Republicans had no realistic choice but to concentrate in the indicated areas if only because the Democrats were doing so. Of considerable significance in this connection was the manner in which the Democratic National Committee laid out its national speakers' itinerary for the closing three weeks of the campaign.

In assigning senators, governors and others to some sixty-six speaking engagements, the Committee scheduled 24 talks for the Far West, and 14 for the North and Northeast. 37 Thirteen of the 17 Far


36 For Nixon's campaign itinerary as initially planned, see The New York Times (October 5, 1958).

37 Release No. B-1826, Democratic National Committee (October 16, 1958). The last minute decision to send Senator Lyndon Johnson (D., Texas) on a trek into Indiana and several Far Western
Western talks were made in California—a priority area for both parties. Of the 11 remaining speeches, only three were scheduled for Southern states and eight for the border state areas. California, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin accounted for about half of all the speeches.

If there was any area in which the Campaign Plan's basic assumptions were accepted in practice, this was in the area of "issues." The Plan's fundamental assumption that there would not be any true national issues such as Korea and Communism in 1952 was implicit in the strategy actually employed by the Party in Power during the 1958 campaign.

Lacking what it conceived to be "true" issues—issues with national appeal and which could be exploited effectively in the propaganda sense—the Republican strategists focused on creating and defining issues. This process was apparently indulged in on the premise that it represented the only practical means of seizing the propaganda initiative. This process of issue definition will be examined in detail in Chapter III.

The writer has been unable to determine whether the 1958 Plan actually recommended that the initiative be taken in seeking to create issues in the public mind. But those who wrote the Plan were among the group which directed the campaign strategy in Washington (see Chapter II) and the course actually taken was a logical progression states to counteract the Administration's "radicalism" charges was not reflected in this release.
from the Plan's fundamental assumption as to "exploitable" issues. In any event, the Plan's position on the issue question certainly laid the foundation for what transpired.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Republican campaign strategists have since admitted that they failed to anticipate two crucial developments in the political propaganda sense. One of the "inner circle" states that the "latent" strength of the recession as an issue was not anticipated and another points out that the Democrats' development of the "right-to-work" issue was not expected. Many of the propaganda steps taken by the Party in Power during the campaign to cope with these issues were thus essentially not the product of the Campaign Plan. They were improvisations developed to cope with the unanticipated.

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38 Robert Humphreys, op. cit., (office conversation) brought out the recession question whereas A. B. Hermann, executive director of the Republican National Committee, pointed up the right-to-work problem in a conversation with the writer on June 3, 1959.
CHAPTER III

Planners and Theme

1. The Strategy Board

The strategy and tactics of the Party in Power's Congressional campaign in 1958 was to a considerable extent planned and directed by a top policy board consisting of representatives of the White House, the Republican National Committee, and the two Republican Congressional campaign committees. This group met at regular intervals throughout the campaign period. According to one who attended, the meetings were generally held once a week on Tuesday morning in a Washington hotel. ¹

It was this strategy group which passed on Robert Humphreys' Campaign Plan before submitting it to the White House for final approval and which played a major role in developing the propaganda policies for coping with unanticipated Democratic thrusts such as those relating to the recession and "right-to-work" issues. The manner in which these policies were implemented by the Administration will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The strategy group's membership was somewhat flexible. Howard Pyle, President Eisenhower's administrative assistant, was among those who attended for the White House though General Persons is also reported to have attended upon occasion. ² Meade Alcorn

¹ Conversation with a member of the Strategy Board, June 11, 1959; also letter from a member of the Strategy Board, June 10, 1959.

represented the Republican National Committee, usually bringing with him Robert Humphreys and A. B. ("Ab") Hermann, the Committee's executive director. Rep. Simpson (R., Pa.), chairman of the House Republican Campaign Committee, generally attended along with his executive director, William Warner. Sen. Schoeppel (R., Kansas) chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee, was usually present and brought with him Victor Johnson, executive director of the Committee. 3

Vice President Nixon apparently kept in touch with the strategy board from the field during the height of the campaign. It is known that he participated in at least one session involving strategy board members and others at the White House. 4 However, as a general rule, the board reached agreement on a policy or recommendation and then sought to "sell" it to Messrs. Eisenhower and Nixon. 5 It may be taken for granted that there were some decisions reached which did not require Eisenhower-Nixon approval.

Apparently, the board found the task of approaching the White House en masse a difficult one because of personality and other differences among its members which came to the fore whenever they

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3 Ibid. Letter from a member of the Strategy Board, op. cit.


5 Conversation with a member of the Strategy Board, July 11, 1959, op. cit.
reached the Executive Mansion. As a result, it was decided to allow Alcorn to communicate with the White House alone on behalf of the group in most cases. Alcorn appears to have been very successful in these endeavors. On at least one occasion, he was able to get White House agreement on a propaganda policy to which there was some opposition among other members of the Board.

The Strategy Board met at regular intervals but liaison between its Congressional, National Committee and White House components was carried on between meetings at the "second level" by phone or other informal contact. Thus, according to a reliable source, Warner, Johnson, Humphreys and Pyle or other members of the White House staff were in steady communication and in position to work out the details of plans and policies agreed to by the Board at its regular meetings. The source in question maintains that this liaison was exceptionally good throughout the campaign.

Eisenhower himself apparently played no role in the actual development of strategy and tactics, leaving these matters to Mr. Nixon and to the strategy board. At least twice during the campaign, the President made comments which appeared to reflect his willingness to leave politics to the "politicians." However—as has been noted—

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6 Ibid.

7 Letter from a member of the Strategy Board, op. cit.

8 Conversation with a member of the Strategy Board, July 11, 1959, op. cit.

9 Elaborated later in this chapter.
the President was consulted regularly as to major recommendations made by the Strategy Board.

There were rumors during the campaign that the Republican National Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committees were not seeing eye to eye on some issues and indeed that there was growing friction between the units in question. When asked about this state of affairs, a member of the Strategy Board flatly denied that the working relationships among the Committees were anything but the best. 10

However, there does appear to have been some sensitivity between the National Committee and the Congressional groups at least insofar as prerogatives were concerned in the strategy planning process. In private discussions with the writer, three top-ranking National Committee representatives went out of their way to point up the fact that the key role in development of campaign strategy was played on Capitol Hill. Each of the three made his comment in a separate conversation. 11

2. The Role of Vice President Nixon

In the 1954 Congressional Campaign, Vice President Richard Nixon flew 26,000 miles, visited 95 cities in 31 states, delivered 204

10 Conversation with a member of the Strategy Board, op. cit.

11 Humphreys and A. B. Hermann, executive director of the Republican National Committee, were among those who made this comment in private and separate conversations. The evidence, however, indicates that the Republican National Committee was more active and influential in the strategic sense than were either of the Congressional Campaign Committees.
speeches and held more than a hundred press conferences. During the 1958 campaign, he came very close to duplicating this energetic performance. He went into 26 states or territories, traveled about 24,000 miles, gave 54 full-dress speeches plus many which were "off-the-cuff," staged an estimated 35 to 40 press conferences, participated in 6 television programs.  

Thus, in 1958—as in 1954—Nixon was the operating spearhead of the Republican Congressional Campaign. The only Republican leader who came anywhere close to matching Nixon's effort in 1958 was Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.  

The key question that remains to be resolved, however, is the extent to which Nixon was a strategist as well as the campaign's "front man." In short, what was Nixon's role in the political policy-making sense?  

A top-level Republican National Committee spokesman states that Nixon's all-out participation in 1958 was a "calculated risk." This assumption is hardly a novel one inasmuch as sundry political

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13 Phone conversation with Vice President Nixon's office, August 25, 1959.


15 Office conversation with A. B. Hermann, Executive Director, Republican National Committee, June 3, 1959.
reporters commented on this during the campaign itself. Thus, an
Associated Press writer who is said to be close to Nixon wrote that
"Mr. Nixon realizes there are some heavy risks connected with his
campaigning this year when all signs point to a substantial gain by
the Democrats."\footnote{Bell, Jack. "Nixon, on Congressional Campaign, Builds Good
Will for Self in '60", The Evening Star (October 27, 1958).}

Whether Mr. Nixon indeed took a "calculated risk" is a
significant question. A more likely assessment is that Mr. Nixon,
being ambitious and desirous of seeking the Presidency, had no
choice but to enter the campaign in "a big way" if he were to build
himself up for the 1960 race with state, county and local Republican
leaders and organizations. The point would seem to be that he
would have been taking a much bigger risk insofar as his political
future was concerned if he had not gone all out in 1958.

The same writer who mentioned the "heavy risks" quoted above
said of Mr. Nixon's campaigning that "a very important by-product
evidently is in Mr. Nixon's mind--the cementing of his ties with the
Republican organization members who are likely to turn up as delegates
to the party's 1960 convention."\footnote{Ibid.} This newsman traveled with Mr.
Nixon through much of his 1958 campaign trek and thus was in position
to observe the vice president's operations closely.

Gould Lincoln, one of the country's veteran political reporters
who has close ties in the upper echelons of the Republican Party,
wrote even before Nixon began his campaign trek: "In some measure, Mr. Nixon's campaign this year—although he is not running for any office in the November 4 election—must be considered a warming-up gallop for 1960. It gives him not only an opportunity to solidify his hold on the G.O.P. but also to impress the voters of the entire country." 18

It is hardly likely that a man with so much at stake in a campaign would be constrained to leave all strategy and long-range planning to others.

It is known that the Campaign Plan for 1958 was cleared with Nixon as well as with Eisenhower and that Nixon was in contact with the Strategy Board. 19 And, generally speaking, the available evidence strongly supports the case for accepting the vice president as one of the major strategic brains of the campaign.

It is known that President Eisenhower had from the very beginning of his Administration leaned heavily on Nixon as a "political" advisor. Nixon has not only been a "bridge" between the White House and Republicans in Congress; he has been the key "political" spokesman for the Party in Power. 20 During Cabinet meetings, Nixon has often been called upon to discuss the domestic political implications of policies under discussion. The picture of Nixon at Cabinet meetings

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19 See Chapter I.

20 Donovan, op. cit., pp. 269-84.
which emerges from the "official biography" of the first four years of the Administration is that of a man with his political ear to the ground who is constantly preoccupied with the "public relations" implications of policy. 21

During the 1958 campaign, Nixon's political position and stature in the party was such that he was able to win a public argument on an issue with definite strategic implications with both the President and the potent John Foster Dulles on the other side. On October 14, Dulles told a press conference that "I do not think it is wise that current aspects of foreign policy should be injected in the campaign..." 22 The next day, Mr. Eisenhower told reporters that foreign policy "ought to be kept out of partisan debate" and that he deplored the practice of responding to charges made against the Administration in the foreign policy field as well as the fact that such charges were made. 23

The Dulles-Eisenhower statements in effect left Nixon out on a political limb inasmuch as he had boldly countered Democratic foreign policy charges only the day before. The Vice President immediately got in touch with the White House and on October 16 the President capitulated to the Nixon point of view in a telegram which

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21 Ibid.


23 Ibid.
was released to the press. The wire read, in part: "The matter of administrative operation of foreign policy...has time and again been challenged...by ourselves in the past and very recently by some of our political opponents....These need to be answered whenever they occur (and) no one can do this more effectively than you." 24

Even more significant than the White House's capitulation to Nixon in this exchange insofar as the Vice President's role as strategist was concerned is the fact that Nixon chose to make foreign policy a campaign issue without consulting the White House or the Department of State. In a statement on the foreign policy question made to the press on October 15—the day before Mr. Eisenhower wired him but after Dulles had made his initial comment—the Vice President made it clear that he considered his responsibility for the campaign to be a more immediate and direct one than the President's. He came very close to saying that he—not Eisenhower—was running the campaign. Nixon said:

"If it (Nixon's view on the foreign policy issue) differs from that which the President perhaps has expressed, the difference is not because of the difference we have as individuals. The difference is because of the positions we hold. He is the President of the United States, a man who has to mobilize the entire country behind its policy, if that is possible. I am the Vice President of the United States and have certain responsibilities in a political campaign...." 25


Thus, the Republican Strategy Board met regularly and developed strategic and tactical recommendations which were, in turn, generally "sold" to the White House by Meade Alcorn. President Eisenhower's blessing was requested and received and Mr. Nixon was certainly consulted. Further, the latter's position was such that he freely developed strategy "on the run," made it clear that he thought of himself as the key Administration spokesman in "political" matters, and openly challenged the head of his party and the single most powerful political figure in the country on an issue which certainly had important strategic implications.

3. The Campaign Theme

The very successful California political public relations firm of Whitaker and Baxter considers development and constant reiteration of a simple theme basic to every campaign. "The theme," the firm holds, "should have simplicity and clarity...must high-point the major issues of the campaign with great brevity--in language that paints a picture understandable to people in all circumstances."\(^{26}\)

Development of a single, simple theme with true propaganda impact in a national campaign is a good deal more difficult than doing likewise at the state or local level. National campaigns are far more complex, much more difficult to coordinate and must, of necessity, concern themselves with a greater number of issues, real or manufactured. But the 1958 Congressional campaign, as waged by the Party in Power, had one major theme which was expounded with "simplicity and clarity"

\(^{26}\) See citation, Chapter I.
from one end of the country to the other.

In essence, this theme was that the Democratic Party was in control of dangerous left-wingers who were seeking to lead the country into ever greater radicalism. The corollary was that election of a Democratic Congress would immediately start the country toward leftish ruin. The theme allowed for a distinction between "true" Democrats and the dangerous "leftists" who controlled the party. This theme was the hard core around which the Republicans wove many of their manufactured issues and it was a theme which was certainly the product of strategic decision well before the campaign actually got underway. This, despite the fact that the author of the Campaign Plan states that the theme is not specifically mentioned in the Plan.

The theme began to make its appearance in campaign materials by August, 1958 which is, of itself, a sign of its strategic significance and it was carried forth, with some variations, by the White House, the Congressional Campaign Committees, and the Republican National Committee.

Historically, it is of interest to note that the essentials of the theme have been used by Republican Party spokesmen in Congressional races at least as far back as 1946 and that Nixon himself used it in his races for the House of Representatives and the Senate in 1946,

27 Phone conversation with Robert Humphreys, July 16, 1959.
1948 and 1950 respectively. But perhaps even more significant is the fact that the theme was virtually identical with that employed in the Congressional race of 1954 in which Nixon also took the leading role on the stump.

This is how Nixon's authorized biographer speaks of Nixon's use of the theme in 1954:

"Always, Nixon was inviting 'true Democrats' to vote Republican. At Rock Island, Illinois, on October 21, 1954, he said: 'The Democratic Party has a great tradition, but unfortunately, nationally and in states like California and Illinois, the party has been captured and is under control of its A.D.A. left wing....I do not question the sincerity of the members of this clique of the Democratic Party. I am sure that they sincerely believe in the socialistic schemes that they want to impose upon the economy of the United States, but I say they do not deserve to be called 'Democrats'--the word 'Doom-o-crats' fits them much better."29

In a speech a few days later in California, Nixon was even more pungent in putting the theme across. He said that:

"The candidates on the Democratic ticket in the close races for the Senate and House in California and other key states are virtually without exception men who have the support of the fanatical A.D.A. left-wing elements of the Democratic Party. They favor imposing the Truman socialist left-wing policies on the country again."30

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28 Keogh, James. This Is Nixon. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956, pp. 36-37; 42-44. The Keogh book is an authorized biography--that is, it was prepared with Nixon's full cooperation.

29 Ibid., pp. 178-79.

It is important to note that throughout 1954, Nixon not only hammered away at this theme but that he took pains to distinguish between the "good" Democrats and the "fanatical A.D.A. left-wing element." This is not without pertinence for 1958. It is illuminating to trace the theme as it unfolded during the 1958 campaign by reference to key benchmarks.

The essentials of the theme make one of their earliest appearances in the 1958 Campaign Speech Kit which was completed by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committees in August and made available to Republican members of Congress either late in August or early in September. The heart of the kit is a detailed outline for "A Basic Republican Speech" which, under a subheading entitled "Peril of Our Times," contains the following comment:

"The left-wingers, the socialists, and the communist sympathizers never quit. They are at large in our land today and, given a push to the left on November 4, will again renew the erosion of the pillars of our liberty and freedom of opportunity....A Republican Congress in 1953-54 proved it can turn the tide of these pressures (inside America and abroad). It will prove it again when you vote into office a Republican Congress in November."

It is pertinent to note that no effort is here made to segregate the "leftists" or the A.D.A. element of the Democratic Party from the "true" Democrats. This refinement was to come from another source.

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32 Ibid., p. 3.
At about the same time as the Speech Kit was issued, the Republican National Committee published a brochure entitled *The Alternatives to the Election of a Republican Congress*. The booklet was widely distributed through state and local political channels. Its cover bore the following statement attributed to National Chairman Meade Alcorn:

"More than ever before, the Democrat party is dominated by certain politico-labor bosses and left-wing extremists. This means, beyond question, that the next National Democrat Administration and any future Democrat-controlled Congress would be far to the left of the new and fair deals."  

It remained for Nixon himself to drag the A.D.A. into the equation—even as he had in 1954—when he formally opened his personal campaign effort in an Indiana speech to a Republican audience on September 29. In his talk, he said:

"...Our (Republican party) differences are infinitesimal when you consider the gulf between the principles in which most Republicans believe and those held by the radical ADA wing which dominates the Democratic National Committee today. Here we come to the key issue of this campaign. We say elect more Republicans and assure continuation of the policies of our Republican President and his Administration. They say elect more Democrats so that those policies can be changed....If more Democrats are elected, what kind of Democrats will they be? To which Democratic Party will they belong? They will not come from the conservative Southern wing of the Party. Newly-elected Democrats will come from the radical ADA wing which controls the Party in the Northern and Western States."
The "radical Democrat" theme was to thread its way through the speeches of Nixon's entire campaign effort but Nixon himself studiously avoided calling the "radicals" in the Democratic Party "socialists." In this latter respect, he departed from his earlier campaign strategy in California where he had persistently equated the Democratic Party with "Socialism". Further—as he had done in 1954—Nixon regularly distinguished between the "true" Democrats and the left-wingers.

On October 6, 1958, however, the Party in Power presented a united front on the "socialism" label when a much-discussed "Joint Statement" was issued as a Republican National Committee release from the White House. The statement came as the culmination of a meeting involving Eisenhower and Nixon, who had just returned from his first campaign swing. Also attending the meeting were Meade Alcorn, Spencer Olin, the finance chairman of the Republican National Committee, the chairmen of the House and Senate Campaign Committees, various other Republican leaders of House and Senate, and other members of the White House staff.

The statement was clearly looked upon as a major propaganda effort on two counts: It was designed to stress the "unity" of the

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36 Press Release, Republican National Committee, "Joint Statement Issued Following Luncheon of Republican Leaders with the President and the Vice President," (October 6, 1958).
Republican Party which the Democrats had been attacking as badly split between the Eisenhower and "regular" Republican wings and it was also designed to replace the image of a Democratic Party dominated by "radicals" with the more menacing one of a party dominated by "socialists."

The Joint Statement, which was widely quoted and debated in the press, said in part:

"More today than ever before, the Democrat party is dominated by certain politico-labor bosses and left-wing extremists. This means, beyond question, that the next Democratic Administration and any future Democrat-controlled Congress would be far to the left of the New and Fair Deals. The alternatives to a Republican victory in 1958 are clear. Either we Americans dedicate ourselves to strengthening and preserving private enterprise, using the only dependable political instrument available--the Republican Party--or we are certain to go down the left lane which leads inescapably to socialism."37

The best evidence indicates that the basic draft of the statement was prepared in Republican National Headquarters either by Meade Alcorn himself or by a writer working under his direction. Nixon has said that the statement was "prepared by the staff of the Republican National Committee."38 The first half of the portion of the statement quoted above is identical with a statement made by Alcorn earlier in the year (see page 74). A person who attended the White House luncheon and was a member of the Strategy Board has

37 Ibid.
reported that the statement originated neither at the White House nor in Congress.  

In light of the foregoing, there is little question but that the statement was basically Alcorn's brainchild. Though both Eisenhower and Nixon approved the statement and were present when it was discussed, neither had anything to do with its actual drafting. And it is known that there were differences of opinion over the content of the statement among Strategy Board members.

Eisenhower himself subsequently told a press conference that "politicians" had drafted the statement, making it clear that he himself had simply accepted the advice and counsel of others in this matter.

Nixon—as previously noted—subsequently shied away from using the "Socialism" term but consistently hammered away at the basic theme that the Democratic Party was dominated by left-wing radicals and that a Democratic Congress in 1958 would swing the country to the left. On October 19, he took a step which made it clear that he attached very great importance to employment of the theme as a campaign tactic and that he himself was directly concerned with basic strategy. On this date, the Vice President sent identical

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40 Ibid.
telegrams to every Republican candidate for a House or Senate seat.

The telegrams read in Part:

"As far as our opponents are concerned, they offer again nothing new but a return to the radical policies that in 20 years failed to produce prosperity except in war or as a result of war. The choice the voters have—very simply— is guarantee progress by electing more Republicans....stop progress by electing more Democrats. And, in addition, by electing more democrats the voters are taking a grave risk that their taxes will be raised, prices will skyrocket and unemployment will increase because of the stifling effect of the anti-private enterprise policy of the radical wing of the Democratic party. In a nutshell, with 1959 promising to be the best year of our history if we continue the sound policies of the Eisenhower Administration, why take a chance with change? In appealing to Democrats, we should point out that Democrats who support our Republican candidates are not deserting their party but that their party has deserted them because of its domination in the Northern and Western States by the radical wing. I am sending similar wires to all our candidates for the House and Senate. I am convinced that if we hammer on this line from now to election day we can blitz the opposition and shift thousands of votes in close races throughout the country."42

It can, of course, be argued that Nixon was here simply serving as the mouthpiece for the Republican Strategy Board. But Nixon's use of the theme in 1954 and before, the manner in which he stood up to Eisenhower and Dulles on the foreign policy issue, and his general standing as the "political" spokesman for the Administration tend to suggest that the initiative in this case was his though his action may well have been in accord with the Strategy Board's thinking. Nixon's

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42 Text of Wire to Republican Candidates for the House and Senate, October 19, 1958, made available to the writer by the Vice President's office.
advice that all Republican candidates "hammer" the "radical-Democrat" line as a means of shifting "thousands of votes" certainly spells out his concern with campaign strategy in the broader sense as does his reference to the need to appeal to the "non-Radical" Democrats.

4. Eisenhower, Johnson and Theme

President Eisenhower, who went to the hustings only late in October, made the "radical-Democrat" theme the heart of major addresses on both the East and West Coasts. In an address in Los Angeles, billed as his "first all-out political speech of the 1958 campaign," the President stated flatly that the Democratic Party was dominated by "political radicals" and that "nationalization and socialization of industry would inevitably follow" a Democratic victory on November 4. The Los Angeles speech was delivered on October 20 to both an auditorium and television audience.

A week later in Pittsburgh, Eisenhower reiterated his charge at length in a television speech beamed to 18 states in the East and Midwest. Using such terms as "harebrained spending programs" and "phony doctrines" Mr. Eisenhower warned that "pump-priming spending proposed by the more radical wing of the Democratic party would saddle you and your children with debt." He


urged his listeners to "repudiate these phony doctrines which would merely put the private citizen in a wheelchair furnished by the Federal Government." 45

Democratic strategists were obviously concerned by the fact that the President had made the "radical" theme the center of his attack—apparently much more so than they had been by Nixon's use of the theme. In a last-minute move to cope with the Eisenhower assault, they dispatched Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson to key Midwestern and Western states to repudiate the President's allegation. 46 Senator Johnson accused the President of resorting to "scare words" and of "competing for headlines" with Nixon. He implied that the President did not believe his own words and said that the President had "never once" during the preceding four years complained to either him or House Speaker Sam Rayburn about "political radicalism." 47 In a second of this series of speeches, Johnson challenged the President to list any "radical Democratic measures he would ask a Republican Congress to repeal" and stated that the "left wing socialism" campaign theme was the brainchild of Meade Alcorn, G.O.P. national chairman. He again suggested that

45 Ibid.

46 Kilpatrick, Carroll, "Sen. Johnson Excoriates President on Calling Democrats 'Radical' Party," The Washington Post and Times Herald (October 31, 1958). Johnson's trek was not mentioned in a Democratic National Committee press release on October 16 which purported to set out the Democrats' complete "national speaking schedule" for the remainder of the campaign. See footnote 37, Chapter II.

47 Kilpatrick, op. cit.
the President was mouthing words he did not believe.

5. In Perspective

There is no doubt that the "Radical-Democrat" theme was central to the Republican campaign in 1958. It was certainly not a new theme, having been employed persistently by Mr. Nixon in 1954 and in his own races for Congress earlier. The theme appeared with minor variations in propaganda materials released by the Republican National Committee and the Republican Congressional Campaign Committees and was in sustained use by both the President and the Vice President during the campaign period.

Republican National Committee Chairman Meade Alcorn was certainly a prime mover both in planning general campaign strategy and in urging specific use of the "Radical-Democrat" theme. Vice President Nixon, in addition to being the key spokesman for the Administration during the campaign, was also a major strategic influence. The Strategy Board was the operating link through which the Republican leaders were able to map short-term changes in strategy as well as to define implementing tactics and ways and means of coping with unanticipated propaganda problems. Alcorn played the primary role in communicating Strategy Board recommendations to the White House and in securing Eisenhower and Nixon approval of such recommendations.

48 Associated Press Dispatch, "Johnson Hits President on 'Radical-Democrat' Measures," The Evening Star (November 1, 1958).
The Democratic High Command was clearly disturbed by the Republican enunciation of the "Radical-Democrat" theme—particularly when President Eisenhower began to employ it late in October. The use of Senator Lyndon Johnson, the Senate majority leader who is generally recognized as a "moderate," to refute the theme in a series of speeches during the closing days of the campaign testifies to Democratic strategic sensitivity on this score. A month after the campaign was over, Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul M. Butler spoke at some length of the Republican use of the "Radical-Democrat" theme in a "post mortem" speech to a highly conservative audience. He termed the employment of the theme "ridiculous" and stated that "nothing was done in the whole campaign which more assured a Democratic landslide." Whatever the validity of Butler's conclusions as to the theme, his detailed discussion of it after the Democratic victory clearly reflects Democratic strategic concern with its usage during the campaign.

Finally, the central theme played a more important propaganda role for the Republicans than might otherwise have been the case because the G.O.P. Campaign Plan and planners accepted the premise that there would be no "burning" nationwide issues that could be effectively exploited and because they did not anticipate the extent of

the emotional impact made by the recession and the right-to-work controversy. The Republican strategists recognized their failure in this latter respect late in the campaign but did not shift their basic strategic emphasis which was on creating and defining issues both as a calculated effort to seize the propaganda initiative and as a means of defending the Administration against Democratic attack. This basic approach was consistent with the Campaign Plan.

The following chapter will concentrate on the issues as they were created and defined by the Party in Power as well as on the Republican reaction to the recession and right-to-work issues. It will also seek to shed light on such differences as existed between the Democratic and Republican strategic concepts insofar as the "issue" question was concerned.
CHAPTER IV

The Issues: Real and Manufactured

Two of the three fundamental assumptions upon which the 1958 Campaign Plan was based had to do with issues: (1) that economic conditions would be on the upturn by September 1958 and thus recession would not be a major issue in the campaign and (2) that there would be no great nationwide issues of any kind. The third assumption was that the Republican Party would be hard-pressed for funds.

Inasmuch as the basic strategy to which the Party in Power subscribed as it moved into the campaign proper was developed in accordance with the above-noted assumptions, the validity of these assumptions was of over-riding importance. Given a lack of validity, one could logically assume that the strategy employed by the Republicans was itself invalid or—at the least—of limited validity. In actuality, two key questions are raised. First, was there a true nationwide issue in the 1958 campaign? Secondly, were there any major—i. e., "regional"—issues of sufficient impact to drastically affect the political fortunes of either party?

Neither of these questions is susceptible to definitive answer if only because we have yet to achieve mathematical precision in our public opinion measurement techniques. Both are worth exploring in the quest for a rational evaluation of the soundness of Republican strategy during the campaign.

1 See citation, Chapter I.
1. Were There Nationwide issues in 1958?

During the campaign period, The New York Times and Dr. George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion conducted independent studies of the "issues" question. The conclusions reached by these respected entities were not such as to gladden the hearts of the Republican planners.

Two days before election, The Times, which had had experienced reportorial teams carrying out on-the-scene surveys in thirteen key states for roughly a month, concluded that there was one issue--and only one--that was truly national: the recession. It also asserted that there were various other issues of local or regional significance.

The Times reported:

"In a Congressional election dominated in many areas by personalities, one overriding issue seems to reach across state lines: the economic recession. This appears, on the basis of Times surveys and reports coming into the national party headquarters here, to be the only issue of which it can be said that it is truly national, in the sense that it transcends local concerns and is persuading voters either to abandon their traditional political patterns or to return to them after lapses caused by the personal popularity of President Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956."  

Thus, The Times concluded that the one truly national issue was having a significant impact on voting habits. It then proceeded


3 Ibid.
to list several other issues of local or regional importance. It mentioned farm policy, foreign policy, the question of President Eisenhower's leadership and the right-to-work controversy.

Insofar as "right-to-work" was concerned, The Times stated:

"And bitter as local emotions are in six states that have "right-to-work" legislation on their ballots this year--California, Ohio, Kansas, Idaho, Colorado and Washington--this labor-oriented issue, too, stirs scarcely a ripple in other states. The careful way in which the President, the vice president, and Republican National Headquarters have disassociated themselves from it has prevented it from becoming a truly national concern." 4

On the leadership issue, The Times found that "two insurmountable facts" had rendered it of limited effect despite the fact that it was "raised by many Democratic campaign orators."

The insurmountable facts: (1) The President was not a candidate in 1958; (2) "A widespread feeling" that "he could be elected again today" if he were running. The Times found foreign policy a major issue in none of the areas surveyed and farm policy "driven back within the borders of the farm states where it might logically be expected--Minnesota, Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin and the rest." 5

George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion, in a poll published a month before election day, came up with the conclusion that there were three big "problems" on the "minds of voters."

Dr. Gallup did not define these problems as the major issues of the campaign but made the point that they would have "great political

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4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
significance" and that they would redound to the benefit of the Democratic Party.

The Gallup Poll defined the East-West Conflict and Peace, Unemployment, and Integration as the three big problems on the minds of voters but poll statistics showed that the high cost of living was a close fourth and that the suspension of nuclear testing debate also seemed to be worrying a substantial number of voters. This is the statistical table published in conjunction with Dr. Gallup’s analysis regarding the question: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Today</th>
<th>March '58</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East-West Fight, Keeping Peace</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Cost of Living</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Tests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The poll's statistical indication that unemployment was much less of a problem in the voters' minds than it had been six months earlier is partially compensated for by Dr. Gallup's statement that "despite the recent upturn, millions of Americans are still concerned about unemployment--'when will there be more jobs?' is a frequent query." The political significance of how the voters were found to be feeling

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7 Ibid.
about "problems" was assessed by the pollsters by tieing the "problem" question to another which read: "Which Party Can Handle That Problem Best?" After eliminating all respondents except those who named one of the two major parties, Dr. Gallup concluded that 62% favored the Democrats whereas only 38% favored the Republicans.

2. The Politicians' Post-Mortem

The role of issues in the 1958 Campaign was discussed at length by leading strategists of both major parties before the same audience a month after the election.

On December 3, 1958, both Paul M. Butler and Meade Alcorn, respectively chairmen of the Democratic and Republican National Committees, spoke before the "Annual Congress of Industry" in New York City. The Congress was sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers. Both were asked to "pull no punches" by the inviting group.

The two disagreed on whether or not there were any true nationwide issues in the 1958 Campaign.

Butler stated that "national issues were decisive in producing the strong Democratic tide." He said, in part:

"First of all, I believe that the results of the 1958 campaign were a ringing repudiation of the Eisenhower Administration and its failure to provide aggressive, full-time and forward-looking leadership in the areas of economic growth, employment, cost of living, labor legislation, education, defense, human rights and foreign policy. These were the issues, almost without exception, on which our Democratic candidates campaigned vigorously. The fact that our victory was overwhelming and national in scope indicates that
national issues were decisive in producing the strong Democratic tide.\(^8\)

Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn took a very different position. He stated:

"In retrospect, it seems clear that the outcome of the 1958 elections did not hinge upon any single factor or issue. Rather, a combination of events and circumstances sparked the sweep by the opposition. There was a definite tide running for the opposition party from Maine to California. But there were cross-currents, too. There were areas where local issues transcended national ones. There were contests in which the personality of the candidate overshadowed everything else. . . . Over the last two years, there was an accumulation of factors, mostly unrelated, which added up to a national victory by the opposition on November 4."\(^9\)

It is significant that Alcorn did not flatly deny that there were major issues in 1958 but his remarks, taken in context, certainly bear out the assumption that he did not believe there were any truly national or overriding issues.

So it was that Butler maintained that true national issues "were decisive" whereas Alcorn held that the Democratic victory in 1958 was not the product of such issues but rather of "an accumulation of factors, mostly unrelated." In this respect, Alcorn's position remained consistent with one of the three fundamental assumptions


upon which the Republican Campaign Plan was based. In a speech
delivered to members of the Republican National Committee the
following month, he subscribed to a second of these basic
assumptions: That the Republican Party was hard-pressed for
funds during 1958. 10 But—as will be seen below—Alcorn backed
away from the third assumption which held that the recession would
not be a "major" issue in 1958.

The fact is that Butler and Alcorn were pretty much in agreement
on both the recession and right-to-work issues in their respective
post-mortems. In this context, it is important to reiterate that
Republican strategists did not anticipate that either of these would
have a major impact when they drew up their basic strategy for the
campaign and thus were not initially prepared to cope with them in
the propaganda sense. 11

Butler had defined "employment" and "economic growth" as
major issues but Alcorn examined the recession as an issue in specific
detail, terming it "the greatest handicap confronting Republican
campaigners in 1958." Alcorn said:

"The downtrend in employment and general business
activity was unquestionably the greatest handicap
confronting Republican campaigners in 1958. Thirty-five
of the 49 Congressional districts in which we lost

10 Alcorn, Meade. "A Road to Victory," Address before the
Republican National Committee, Des Moines, Iowa (January 22, 1959).

11 See Chapter II.
Republican seats showed one or more areas of substantial unemployment in the Labor Department's September report. Even though unemployment had dropped well below the 4 million mark before election day and business activity was heading toward new high ground, recovery came too late to aid the Republican Party politically.  

The two chairmen were far from agreement as to the intrinsic merits of right-to-work legislation but were in accord as to its dramatic political impact. Butler spoke of its "devastating political effect" on the Republican Party and Alcorn stated that "scores" of Republican candidates at all levels lost out "largely on the right-to-work issue." These are Butler's pertinent comments:

"... one of the most important lessons to be learned from this election was the devastating political effect that the misnamed "Right to Work" law had on those who supported it and forced it on the ballot in many states. It caused consternation in the ranks of the Republicans, opposition among Democrats, denunciation from large numbers of civic and religious leaders, and only more concentrated organization and group effort on the part of labor. Right-to-work proved the final undoing of the Republican Party in several large industrial states.... As far as the Democrats are concerned, it would appear that "right-to-work" propositions on the ballot are the best guarantee of Democratic success."  

Alcorn was no less vehement in his assessment of the damage done the Republican Party by right-to-work. He said:

"Even though many Republican candidates and leaders openly opposed right-to-work and even though virtually all states which have such laws

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Alcorn, Meade. Address before Public Affairs Program of Annual Congress of Industry, \textit{op. cit.}

\[13\]

Butler, Paul, \textit{op. cit.}
also had Democratic Governors and legislatures, the Republican Party was successfully branded by the opposition leadership as the right-to-work Party....It is my considered opinion that the Republican Party lost scores of candidates for national, state and local offices--men like Senator John Bricker of Ohio--largely on the right-to-work issue. Whatever the pros and cons of right-to-work--and surely as a matter of principle persuasive arguments can be made in support of it--a majority of voters said emphatically that they don't want it. And as a consequence, the political careers of some of the nation's ablest public servants were shattered.14

In summarizing this section, reputable independent commentators on the political scene concluded that there were truly national issues inherent in the 1958 campaign. The New York Times stated that there was one major national issue--the recession. The Gallup Poll held that there were at least three major "problems" in the minds of the voter and gave no indication that any of the three was local or regional in scope.

The leading politicians, however, differed overtly on the issues question. Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul Butler said "national issues" were "decisive in producing the strong Democratic tide." He held forth at length on the specific damage done the Republican cause by "right-to-work."

Republican National Committee Chairman Meade Alcorn publicly refused to accept the assertion that there were any truly

\[14\]
Alcorn, Meade, Address before Public Affairs Program of Annual Congress of Industry, op. cit.
overriding national issues as such. On the other hand, he went
along with Butler on the premise that "right-to-work" had hurt his
party badly and concluded that the recession had also had a major
impact on the election. However, he carefully refrained from
giving either of these issues "national" status. He left little
doubt that money and organization were, in general, considerably
more important than issues in determining the outcome of the campaign.

Alcorn's post-election position on the role of "national"
issues in the 1958 campaign was reiterated in a subsequent speech
in January, 1959. Here, he once again stressed the lack of money
and of organizational effectiveness as key factors in the Republican
loss. This position was thus consistent with one of the three
fundamental assumptions upon which the Republican Campaign Plan
was based. However, in accepting the recession as a major issue,
Alcorn did depart from the second of the three premises.

3. Definition of Issues During the Campaign

It is not always easy to distinguish the candid politician from
the one who is being something less than forthright. The problem is
particularly difficult when one is dealing with the same politician in
different roles. Fortunately, the context within which political
statements are made is often very helpful in making the distinction
possible.

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15 Alcorn, Meade. "A Road to Victory," op. cit.
The 1958 Republican Campaign Plan was drafted at the specific request of Meade Alcorn, was subscribed to by him, and was "sold" to President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon by him as the spokesman for the Republican Strategy Board. In accepting the premise that there would be no true nationwide issues in 1958, the Plan paved the way for the enunciation--for the "manufacturing" of issues by the Party in Power. Lacking truly national candidates in an off-year election and confronted by major party organizational problems, Republican strategists obviously concluded that they had no propaganda option but to seek to develop issues which could be emotionally exploited.

On October 16--less than three weeks before election day--Mr. Alcorn defined the "major issues" of the 1958 campaign before a non-partisan national audience. He cited six such issues. He did not refer to "right-to-work" and recession was mentioned only incidentally. Yet, less than two months later, the Republican National Chairman was to tell a New York audience that national issues were not decisive in the campaign but that "right-to-work" and the recession had been instrumental in defeating many Republican candidates.

These were the six "major issues of the 1958 political campaign" as Alcorn saw them in October:

16 See Chapter II.

"Preservation of the Peace. This is the great overriding issue. It concerns every American and, indeed, all mankind."

"The maintenance of a prosperous, dynamic national economy. Today more Americans are at work earning more, building more, investing more, saving more and buying more than in any year of the New and Fair Deals."

"Maintenance of fiscal integrity. This is not an abstraction nor is it a cold, impersonal ideal. It touches upon every one of us in our homes, our jobs, and our businesses."

"Maintaining and strengthening the private enterprise system. This is not an abstraction either. This system has brought us the highest living standards man has ever achieved."

"Enactment of effective legislation to curb labor racketeering. The Republican Party is the friend of the union member who pays the dues....we are determined, however, to push for long-overdue laws which would prevent widespread abuses by those corrupt labor bosses who collect the worker's dues."

"Civil Rights. The first meaningful civil rights legislation in more than 80 years was enacted under this Administration, despite repeated efforts by many Democrats to sidetrack it in the Congress."

Inasmuch as the Alcorn statement was issued rather late in the campaign by one of the key strategists of the Party in Power, it may be taken as a reference point for evaluating the national Republican approach to the entire issue definition process. This evaluation may
be made by relating the Alcorn statement to other documents released by the Party in Power which were concerned primarily with issue definition. These "comparison" documents were five in number. All were issued as booklets or leaflets by the Republican National Committee. All have certain salient features in common.

The five documents were issued before the campaign proper got underway. All were primarily directed to Republican Party members and candidates and specifically distributed or delivered to Republican audiences. All were organizational as well as propaganda tools in the sense that they were designed to foster campaign organization. And all sought to list or present the issues in an organized fashion and most employed a symbol or numbering system to pinpoint the issues.

Only one of the documents referred to "right-to-work" and then very briefly and not in the issue sense. Several mentioned the recession but did so as an incidental aspect of a broader concept such as "economic stability" or "prosperity." This failure to pinpoint "right-to-work" and the recession as issues reflects the fundamental Campaign Plan strategic assumption that neither would have a major impact on the outcome of the campaign.

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18 Another document put out by the Party in Power prior to the formal launching of the campaign which touched on the issues was the Congressional Speech Kit made available to Congressional candidates by the Republican House Campaign Committee at the close of the legislative session. The heart of this Kit, however, was a "sample" campaign speech and it did not concentrate on the issues as such.

19 All five documents were distributed well before Vice President Nixon officially kicked off the campaign on September 29.
The timing of their release, the audiences to which they were directed and the nature of their contents label these five documents as strategically significant. They defined issues which it was expected would, in turn, be defined by Republican candidates for Congressional and other offices. Though some of them used terms like "principles" or "points" as synonyms for "issues," these were inevitably couched as issues which distinguished the Republican and Democratic parties and philosophies.

The "issue" content of each of the five documents under analysis is set out briefly below:

The 1958 Republican Speakers Handbook prepared by Republican National Headquarters provided "facts for use in the campaign to elect a Republican Congress in 1958." Its foreword, in which the foregoing words are contained, also noted that "the facts are presented in concise summary fashion. Each page, or group of pages, covers one specific subject. Thus, notes for talks on any issue or variety of subjects may be easily prepared." In a section entitled "Republican Congress--Need," the handbook defined the basic issues as adequate national defense, maintenance of free enterprise, civil rights, prosperity and freedom for the farmer, labor reform, prosperity without inflation, and keeping taxes down.  

Facts for Americans, a vest-pocket-sized brochure issued by the National Committee, defined the issues as prosperity, inflation, national defense, foreign policy, farm policy and Republican friendship for the "little man." In a leaflet entitled Democratic Distortions vs the Facts, the Committee answered the Democratic "Charges." It defined eight major issues: farm policy, economic stability, power and resources, defense, foreign policy, labor reform, aid to small business and scandals in government.

In a folder called On the Record: Six Points for Republican Speakers, the National Committee defined the major issues as peace, fiscal integrity, tax reductions, vigor in combatting red subversion, honesty in government, and "prosperity, progress and freedom for you and your family." This last catch-all segment covered high employment, maintenance of free enterprise, aid to small business, farm recovery, labor reform, national defense and civil rights.

Finally, in a two-page booklet entitled As An American Voter, What Do You Believe?, the Committee defined the issues as big government, economic and political freedom, inflation, labor reform, maintenance of free enterprise, lower taxes, farm policy, foreign

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policy and national defense.

In the six documents under analysis (including the Alcorn speech), a total of thirteen issues were defined. Generally speaking, "peace" and "foreign policy" were used to define the same issue. This was also true of "fiscal integrity" and "inflation" though in one publication the phrase "without inflation" was used to qualify "prosperity" which was termed a basic issue. Four of the six issues defined in the Alcorn text appear in all five "comparison" documents. A fifth appears in four of the documents. The only Alcorn-defined issue not specifically mentioned in a majority of the five documents is "civil rights." "National defense" and "Farm policy" are the issues defined in all five "comparison" documents which do not appear in the Alcorn text.

In summary, then, the six documents under analysis show a concentration on seven issues, each of which appears in at least five of the documents. Four appear in all six documents. The seven issues are: peace-foreign policy, national defense, economic prosperity, farm policy, labor reform, free enterprise and fiscal integrity. Civil rights and "keeping taxes down" are the only other issues mentioned with any consistency. Each is treated in three of the six documents.

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The high degree of issue-correlation among the six documents under analysis cannot be attributed to coincidence or "automatic" repetition. The nature, purpose and distribution-timing of the comparison documents clearly identify them as the product of strategic conception. The extent to which the issues defined in the documents issued prior to the inauguration of the overt national campaign correlate with those stressed by Alcorn in mid-October simply buttresses the assumption. The 1958 Republican Campaign Plan not only paved the way for concentration on issue definition but also for fundamental pre-campaign agreement as to which issues ought to be defined.

4. Implementation of the Issues

Documents issued by the national leadership of the Party in Power thus provided for broad concurrence in the definition of seven issues. In addition, the Party in Power found it necessary to accept and cope with two issues thrust upon it by circumstance and the Democratic opposition. These latter issues, the impact of neither of which was fully anticipated by the Republican strategists, were the recession and "right-to-work' issues.

The "right-to-work" issue was segregated from the others, propaganda-wise, by the Party in Power. On the other hand, the recession question was inevitably linked to the "economic prosperity" issue both by its nature and by the manner in which it was employed in the propaganda sense.
At least one top Republican strategist has stated that the Sherman Adams-Goldfine case was a major issue in the 1958 campaign. However, Adams resigned before the campaign rolled into high gear. Neither Paul Butler nor Meade Alcorn specifically mentioned Adams-Goldfine as a major campaign issue in their respective campaign post-mortems. And there is no evidence that the Party in Power made any concrete propaganda plans to cope with the matter once it was decided that Adams would leave the White House.

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to consideration of what the Party in Power did in the propaganda sense to support (a) the issues which it had itself defined and (b) to cope with the several issues forced upon it but whose impact it had not fully anticipated. A separate chapter will be devoted to each of the major issues as defined.

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CHAPTER V

The Prosperous Economy Issue

There is a distinction between defining an issue per se and the propaganda methodology employed to amplify, elaborate or "sell" it. To put it another way, there is a difference between the simple assertion that something is an issue and the techniques and methods used to cement the assertion in the public mind. In the process of issue creation, the latter is certainly as important as the former.

As previously noted, the Republican Campaign Plan of 1958 had as a basic strategic assumption that the recession would not be a major issue. A Republican strategist has since admitted that the Party in Power was off base in not anticipating the "latent" impact of the recession in key areas.¹

The Democrats trained some of their biggest guns on the recession. Ex-President Truman stressed the Administration's responsibility for failing to cope with the recession properly in several key speeches. At one point, he accused the Administration of having "fought, stalled, or vetoed almost every constructive measure designed to relieve the economy."² The Democratic National Committee's basic campaign propaganda document listed "The Recession" as the first of ten issues on its cover and devoted 11 pages to the

¹See Chapter II.

²Smith, Reed. "Truman Says Recession Paralyzed Republicans," The Washington Post and Times Herald (October 5, 1958). Truman's recession charges were made in speeches in Washington State (September 27); Ohio (October 4); and Wyoming (October 2) among other places.
"GOP Recession" at its beginning. Early in October, the Democratic Advisory Committee issued a 1400-word policy statement setting out what press reports termed "the party's main lines of economic attack in the campaign." The statement pointed out three "deficits" in the Administration's economic policies—too few jobs, too high prices, and too much red ink in the Federal budget.

The extent to which the Democratic assault conditioned the Party in Power's decision to emphasize the "prosperous economy" issue late in the campaign is difficult to assess but the Republican decision to merchandise it was made long before the Democratic attack became operative in late September and early October. The Republican Campaign Plan certainly paved the way for the playing up of "prosperous economy" as an issue by its basic assumption as to the recession.

However, the validity of the manner in which the Party in Power set out to create the issue is very directly related to the validity of the underlying assumption—i.e., that recession would not be a major issue. Propaganda-wise, the soundest course for selling "economic prosperity" if recession is not truly a major issue is not necessarily the soundest course if it is.

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The Party in Power had at least four alternatives in determining its specific propaganda approach to definition of the economic prosperity issue in light of the recession situation. (1) It could have merchandised "economic prosperity" without any reference whatsoever to the recession; (2) It could have treated the recession as an experience of the past and coupled this with a rosy picture of the present and the future; (3) It could have admitted to the recession's continued existence in areas where it was still a problem, stated that things were looking better generally, and expressed the hope that the areas still adversely affected would soon be in a prosperous condition; (4) It could have taken the position that there had never been a recession.

The decision arrived at by Party strategists was basically the second option sketched above. Though this decision must have been arrived at early in 1958---at the time the Campaign Plan was cleared by the White House---it was not departed from in the implementation sense even after numerous polls and analyses were showing that the recession was a major issue in various key areas. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the Party in Power would have been better off politically if it had revised its strategy on this score. And certainly it would have been extremely difficult to create an effective

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image of full-blown prosperity if at the same time it were candidly admitted that the recession was still a problem in various parts of the country.

The strategic decision to sell "economic prosperity" coupled with a focus on recession as a thing of the past is implicit in the salient characteristics of the propaganda methodology employed throughout the campaign. Three such characteristics stand out:

- Topflight National Republican speakers consistently referred to the recession, always linking the reference with the comment that the recession had been reversed or halted. The basic literature directed to state and local Republican organizations and candidates by Republican National Headquarters took the same tack.

- There was an obvious concentration on selling economic prosperity in areas of heavy unemployment and—to a somewhat more limited extent—in areas of mixed labor and farm discontent due to the economic situation. That is, the selling was most pronounced in places where the psychological impact of the recession would normally be expected to be most pronounced.

- There was an all-out effort in Washington during the campaign's closing weeks to develop, release and exploit statistical data which could be used to support the contention that the recession was over and that the economy was in a healthy state and getting healthier.

In summary, then, the Party in Power functioned in a manner calculated to focus the public mind on the recession rather than away from it.
1. The Semantics of "Economic Prosperity" and "Recession"

Throughout the 1958 Campaign, there was a remarkable degree of consistency as between the Republican National Committee and spokesmen for the Administration proper in the handling of the economic prosperity issue as it related to the recession. Further, there was consistency among the various speeches and other releases issued by the Committee as well as among those disseminated by the White House and Cabinet members. Finally, there was no obvious deviation from this consistency with the passage of time.

The strategic decision to relate the economic prosperity issue to the recession as a thing of the past is implicit in pamphlets and brochures issued during August and September by the Republican National Committee. These were the documents which specifically defined the issues as the Party in Power wanted them defined and which were among the "comparison" documents referred to in Chapter IV. 6

It must be remembered that these documents—which included the 1958 Republican Speakers Handbook—were designed to foster Republican campaign organization and to provide campaign ammunition for speakers at the state and local levels. They were prepared in keeping with the basic strategic assumptions laid out in the Republican Campaign Plan. The Speakers Handbook, which is 100 pages in length, may well have been placed in production as early as the spring of 1958.

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6 See Chapter IV, pp. 97-98, for document citations.
Of the five issue-defining documents distributed by the National Committee in August and September, four specifically mentioned the "recession" and three stressed that the Party in Power had reversed or halted it.

Thus, one of the materials held that "The so-called recession of 1957-58 has ended. In fact, it was short-lived, 9 months compared to the 13-month Democrat recession 1949-50, and it was moderate."\(^7\) Another stated that "Republicans reversed the recessionary trend by easing credit and accelerating previously planned expenditures."\(^8\) A third noted that the Democrats had charged the Republicans with bringing "recession and unemployment" and used increases in gross national product and in overall employment to counter the charge.\(^9\)

That the fundamental strategy calling for meeting the recession problem head-on was not changed even late in the campaign insofar as the Republican National Committee was concerned is underscored by a speech made two weeks before the election by National Chairman Meade Alcorn. In his talk, Alcorn stated that "the recession--which Democrats helped to deepen and prolong with their scare talk--is on the run" and went on to give facts and figures designed to support the

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contention.

Spokesmen for the Administration proper—from the Vice President down through the Cabinet—were equally consistent in tying specific reference to the recession in with the economic prosperity theme. And this consistency was apparent throughout the campaign.

Thus, on September 30—the day after Vice President Nixon kicked off the campaign in Indiana—Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks opened a major speech in Philadelphia with this comment:

"The most striking economic fact today is the pace of business recovery which has confounded the carping critics and the faint hearts. The recovery is developing faster and on a broader scale than most people anticipated in April—turning point of the recession."^{11}

Secretary Weeks then cited voluminous statistics to back up the economic prosperity theme.

Roughly a week later, Secretary of Interior Fred Seaton, one of the more active campaigners among Cabinet members, repeated the refrain in a Chicago talk. He said, in part:

"Their (the President's Cabinet) one concern was to bring the recession to an end as soon as possible, to relieve the hardships of the jobless wage-earner and his family, and to get the country back on the high road of economic progress and economic stability. And that's exactly what we did, by pushing more

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than 50 Administration measures to stimulate business and put the wage earners back to work."^{12}

On October 16, Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell highlighted the reversed-the-recession argument in a talk to a labor group in Atlantic City. He told his audience that "continued strong improvements in employment, the average work week, sales, personal income and production all pointed up the fact that the recession is behind us and receding into the past very rapidly."^{13}

Two days later, on October 18, Secretary of Agriculture Benson played the same record in Mesa, Arizona. He said:

"We have had unprecedented prosperity in the years of peace which followed Korea. This Administration wisely avoided extreme action urged on it by panicky politicians during the recent temporary recession. Our economy is moving strongly forward again toward what most economists say can be a new high level of prosperity if we choose the right course."^{14}

The Vice President, who spearheaded the Administration's drive on the hustings, referred to the economic prosperity issue in the majority of his prepared speeches and stressed it in a number of them. There was neither a geographic nor a time pattern per se in Nixon's use of the "reversed-the-recession" thesis as part of the

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^{14} Benson, Ezra Taft. Text of Address at Public Meeting, Mesa, Arizona (October 18, 1958).
economic prosperity argument. That is, he used it early as well as late in the campaign and he used it in the East, the Midwest and the Far West.

Thus, Nixon made the prosperity-reversed recession tie-in in talks in Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29), California (October 1 and October 3), Philadelphia (October 8), Pittsburgh (October 10), Huntington, West Virginia (October 10), San Francisco (October 14), and Lincoln, Nebraska (October 26).

Here are some examples of the way in which the Vice President used the reversed-the-recession thesis:

In Huntington, West Virginia, he said:

"This recession hit hardest in the heavy goods industries and with people going back to work in those industries we are on the way to the record employment we all want for America's wage earners." 16

In Lincoln, Nebraska:

"....the fear of recession which our opponents tried to parlay into votes has been destroyed by the fact of prosperity in virtually every section of the country." 17

In Philadelphia:

"Most important, the economy is moving up. People realize that the recession is over and that the United States is headed for a good year in 1958 and the best year in history in 1959." 18

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15 Texts of all above-noted speeches made available by the Vice President's Office.


17 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 25, 1958).

If the Vice President thus appeared to be using the economic prosperity-recession tie-in at random, the same cannot be said for the manner in which the Party in Power selected the areas in which to concentrate on the economic prosperity theme. This will be discussed in detail below.

2. "Economic Prosperity" and Areas of Unemployment

Generally speaking, Republican speakers during the 1958 campaign laid the greatest stress on economic prosperity in areas which were hardest hit by unemployment. With Vice President Nixon leading the way, the Party in Power's heaviest guns emphasized economic prosperity in such pivotal industrial states as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey. Michigan is the only industrial state which had heavy unemployment into which the Vice President went in which he did not stress economic prosperity. And here he laid the blame for lack of prosperity on the Democratic State Administration. 19

Of all the heavy unemployment areas listed above, Illinois was the only one in which the Republicans did not have a Senate seat at stake. West Virginia was the only one in which there were two Senate seats at stake. The disagreement on the recession issue notwithstanding, reliable independent reports published immediately prior to election day, 1958, showed the recession to be an issue in

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Michigan and Ohio and—to a more limited extent—in Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Minnesota. 20

But perhaps a better measure of the psychological impact of the recession were the official statistics on unemployment in the industrial belt. According to an official Labor Department report issued on September 30, 1958, there were eighty-nine major labor market areas and 195 smaller areas in the country with a "substantial labor surplus" (6% or more unemployment). Fifty-eight of the major areas were in ten industrial states as were 114 of the smaller areas. 21

The best evidence of the Party in Power's concentration on the economic prosperity issue in those areas in which the recession was most pronounced can be found in an analysis of Vice President Nixon's campaign speeches. This is so because Nixon was the avowed spearhead of the Party's national campaign in the oratorical sense and—to a considerable extent—in the strategic sense.

Mr. Nixon made public about 40 speech or statement texts for press use during his campaign. 22 Though his total number of speeches far exceeded 40—if interviews and various impromptu efforts are included—the published texts are nevertheless very representative of

20 Drury, Allen, op. cit.


22 All texts made available to the writer by the Vice President's office. In several cases, the same text was used in more than one address. Here, the text for each address is treated as a separate entity.
the Vice President's total campaign effort. As a general rule, texts are made available to the press for all major speech efforts and, in particular, for those designed to make a propaganda point of more than local interest. Failure to make a text available to the press can drastically limit the "play" received.

More than one-third of the published Nixon texts focused on the economic prosperity issue or heavily emphasized it. Such speeches were presented in—among other places—Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio. It is of interest that Nixon did not stress the economic prosperity theme in any area which did not have either heavy unemployment or farm discontent associated with some measure of unemployment. He thus talked economic prosperity to a marked extent in places like Fort Dodge, Iowa, and Wichita, Kansas as well. 23 He did not stress the economic prosperity theme anywhere on the West Coast with the exception of two talks in the Los Angeles area in which unemployment was a problem—this though he spent more time on the Coast than in any other area. 24

Pennsylvania and West Virginia are two of the areas which were particularly hard hit by unemployment during the campaign period. The Department of Labor reported 12 major and 11 minor areas of substantial

23 Nixon spoke in Fort Dodge and Wichita on October 30, 1958.

24 The Los Angeles talks were given on September 30 and October 15 with the first being televised. The Los Angeles—Long Beach area is one of two in California listed as being major areas of "substantial labor surplus." The Vice President made two swings into California totaling 5 full days—September 30 through October 2 and again on September 14-15. See Area Labor Market Trends, op. cit.
unemployment in Pennsylvania in September 1958 and 3 major and 11 minor areas in West Virginia. The Vice President made the identical speech in both Pittsburgh and Huntington on October 10, less than a week after the Democratic Advisory Committee had issued its policy statement attacking the Administration's economic policies and blaming it for the slowness of recovery.

In his talks, Mr. Nixon stressed a variety of statistics designed to demonstrate that the American working man was better off than he had ever been. He made absolutely no mention of the unemployment situation in Pennsylvania and West Virginia in his prepared text but he did state that "we have pulled out of the recession and are on the way to the best year in our history in 1959." This later statement was to be repeated verbatim in sundry later speeches.

Among the economic prosperity arguments made by Mr. Nixon were the high level of employment (65 million jobs available), a new high in average weekly earnings by manufacturing workers ($85), a "dramatic difference" in real income, less time lost due to strikes, expansion of social security coverage to 11 million people who were not covered in 1952, a Federally-sponsored program to help workers over forty find jobs, and Secretary of Labor James Mitchell, "one of the best

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25 Area Labor Market Trends, op. cit.
Secretaries of Labor in the history of those who held that office." 26

With the exception of a speech which he made in Flint, Michigan on October 27, Nixon scrupulously avoided referring to local unemployment or to any adverse aspect of the local economic situation in his speech texts. Even in Michigan, his only reference was not designed to take cognizance of the unemployment problem per se but rather to seek to turn it into a political battle ax with which to belabor the Democratic Administration. This is how he put it:

"Michigan has not shared as it should in the unprecedented progress and prosperity which the nation has enjoyed in the six years of the Eisenhower Administration. What are the reasons for this? It is not the fault of Michigan's highly skilled labor force or of its able and qualified business executives. A major part of the blame must be placed squarely on the State Administration which has created an unfavorable climate for new investment." 27

Pennsylvania was a state in which the Republican High Command made a major effort on the economic prosperity front. In addition to Mr. Nixon, other "big guns" who stressed economic prosperity there were the President (October 26), and Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks (September 30). Mr. Eisenhower told his audience that "things are good and are rapidly getting better" and Mr. Weeks said that "the outlook for continuing recovery is bright--the brightest yet this year." 28


27 Flint, Michigan text, op. cit.

Neither dwelled on the specific situation in Pennsylvania.

New Jersey, a state which was listed by the Department of Labor as having five major and four minor areas of substantial unemployment, was visited three times during the campaign for major speeches by Secretary of Labor Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell is a native of New Jersey. On October 3, Mr. Mitchell told a district Kiwanis meeting in Asbury Park that the average work-week, industrial production, housing, retail sales, personal income and employment were all up from the spring and that "the recession has run its course." It is of passing interest to note that the text of the speech—as released to the press—had carried the word "depression" initially and this term had been crossed out and "recession" written in in black pencil.

On October 15, Mr. Mitchell told the Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union Convention in Atlantic City that unemployment was down, production up, and that new nonfarm housing starts in September were the highest for any September since 1950. "This," he asserted, "is another sure sign that the recession is behind us, and that the economy is heading for the most prosperous period in our history."


30 Department of Labor Press Release USDL-2588, op. cit.
And on October 30, Mr. Mitchell told a Republican dinner in Newark—like Atlantic City a center of substantial unemployment—that employment, home ownership and real income were all up due to the "Republican philosophy."

Major Republican speakers moved into Illinois even as they did into the other key industrial states. This, even though no Senate seat was at stake. And, once again, they sold economic prosperity. In addition to Mr. Nixon, the state was visited by Secretary Mitchell, Secretary of Interior Fred Seaton, and Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn.

On October 7, Mr. Mitchell told the Illinois State Federation of Labor in Peoria, a major area of substantial unemployment, that employment was picking up in most parts of the country and that "this is one indication among many that full recovery is just a matter of time." Once again, the Republican speaker did not refer—in his published text—to the situation in Peoria.

On October 8, Mr. Seaton informed a Republican Party audience in Chicago, also a major area of unemployment, that the Administration had put "the country back on the high road of economic progress and economic stability." And on October 16, Meade Alcorn told the

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31 Mitchell, James P. Text of Address at the Walter Edge Dinner, Newark, New Jersey (October 30, 1958).
33 Seaton, Fred A., op. cit.
radio-TV news directors convention in Chicago that the recession was "on the run." He said further that "the number of unemployed dropped 600,000 in the month ending August 15, another 600,000 in the month ending September 15 and, when the October 15 figures are made public, they will certainly show a total well below 4 million. The job picture is steadily improving." Neither Mr. Seaton nor Mr. Alcorn referred to the unemployment prevailing in Illinois.

In summarizing this section, it is clear that top echelon Republican speakers concentrated hard on the economic prosperity issue during the campaign, that their employment of the issue was heavily focused on the areas hardest hit by recession, that they consistently referred to the recession in general terms and, for the most part, as a thing of the past, and, finally, that they scrupulously avoided specific reference to the economic situation in the area in which they were speaking.

3. The Statistics of Economic Prosperity

In the little more than a month between September 29—when Vice President Nixon kicked off the Republican Party's national campaign effort—and November 4, the Administration poured forth a remarkable volume of statistical reports, all of them providing grist for the "economic prosperity" mill. There was an equally remarkable absence of statements or comments of any kind by Administration sources which could conceivably be interpreted as reflecting an adverse economic shift.

34 Alcorn, Meade, op. cit.
It was as if the Administration had turned the faucet for "economic prosperity" statistics on and that for "economic recession" statistics off. Were it not possible to contrast the performance in 1958 with that in a like period in the preceding year, it could be argued that what actually occurred immediately before the election was merely the product of "good" or "better" economic conditions.

But the comparison tells a different story on the basis of volume, content, context and timing.

The New York Times carries some comment on virtually every statement in the economic sphere issued by the Federal government as a matter of course. In late 1957—when concern over recession was being expressed in many areas of the country and in the press—press interest in Washington economic announcements was particularly intense. A review of The Times for the period September 29, 1957 through November 4, 1957 reveals only five statistical reports bearing on the economy based upon releases issued by the Executive agencies. These statements concerned themselves respectively with a downtrend in corporate profits, lowered production, a rise in the consumer price index, a lowering of personal income, and a substantial shift of population from farm to urban areas during a recent one-year period.

In addition, The Times carried a number of statements attributed to Administration sources which pointed up adverse

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economic developments not necessarily based on statistical reports. Thus, Federal Housing Administrator Albert Cole admitted that new mortgage discount controls "provided no aid to home buyers" and the Federal National Mortgage Association took action which produced the headline: "GI mortgage program is weakened as Federal Unit cuts its Buying Price." Further, the Commerce Department published a Business Advisory Council prediction that "a small and gradual decline in business activity" was likely for the next eight months to a year.

During the 1957 period in question, the White House made only one clearcut effort to publicly discount the slump. On October 31, The Times headlined: "President Doubts Slump! Sees Economic Breather." It went on to report that the government was ready to move, in terms of fiscal policy, if such move was required and that the economic indicators were being watched "very closely."

In short, the month-long period in question in 1957 was characterized by (a) five "adverse" statistical reports on the state of the economy based upon Federal releases, (b) open Administration discussion of adverse economic decisions affecting key groups,


37 Ibid., (October 26, 1957).

38 Ibid., (October 31, 1957).
(c) no visible effort to "time" or withhold economic reports, and
(d) no substantial effort by the White House to allay the public fears
insofar as economic developments were concerned. An unattributed
report that the Federal Reserve was considering easing credit curbs
was discussed on October 24 but the writer stated that "the decision
(which had yet to be made) does not involve, as yet, any change in
the basic policy of restraint." 39

During the period September 29-November 3, 1958, the Admin-
istration issued a minimum of thirteen (non-agricultural) economic or
economic-statistical reports demonstrating, in one way or another,
that the economy was on the upswing. These reports were issued by
at least six different sources including the White House, the Labor
Department, the Commerce and Justice Departments, the Federal
National Mortgage Association and the Federal Housing Administration.
At least six such reports were issued during the two-weeks immediately
prior to election day. 40

39  Ibid., (October 24, 1957).

40  The six included a special report prepared by Chairman Raymond
J. Saulnier of the Council of Economic Advisers, forecasting a continued
increase in personal income, The Washington Post and Times Herald
(October 22); a Bureau of Labor Statistics report indicating stability of
consumer prices, The Evening Star (October 26); a Federal National
Mortgage Association press release announcing a $100 million issue
of debentures priced at par, Press Release 437 (October 29); an optimistic
report on Federal prison industry sales, Department of Justice press
release (October 28, 1958); a Commerce Department monthly report
showing recovery moving at a more rapid pace than anticipated, The
Washington Post and Times Herald (October 29); a Commerce Department
special report on unemployment decline, The Washington Post and
Times Herald (November 2). In addition, the Department of Agriculture
issued numerous statements and releases during the two-week period
pointing up increased farm prosperity in one way or another. These
will be analyzed as part of Chapter VII.
This is not to suggest that the volume of these reports alone constitutes a measure of political activity or that some of the reports might not have been issued had it not been an election year. It is to suggest that the volume has political implications within the total context of the Administration's propaganda activity at the time.

For example, the President and Vice President took occasion to play up statistical reports—particularly those related to unemployment declines—in six major speeches or special statements released during the three-week period immediately before the election. In addition, the Administration issued no press releases or statements interpreting economic reports between September 29 and November 4 which reflected a worsening of any aspect of the economic situation. Nor did any spokesman for the Party in Power issue a statement of any type which could be construed as suggesting any kind of weakness in the economy. This, while there were 89 major and 114 minor areas of substantial unemployment in the country according to the most recent Department of Labor "trends" report. In fact, this report was itself hailed as a harbinger of vastly improved economic

41 The President alone made 5 such statements on October 11 (Thurmont, Md.); October 15 (New York TV broadcast); October 22 (Chicago); October 24 (Washington) and October 31 (Baltimore). The vice president referred to an employment report issued by the Commerce and Labor Departments on October 10 (Pittsburgh, Huntington) and Secretary of Labor Mitchell played up a housing report on October 15 (Atlantic City).

42 This based upon a careful survey of The New York Times and of the two major Washington papers for the period in question. It can be taken for granted that any government report bearing on the economic situation would have "made" these papers during this campaign period.
Thus, the volume of statistical and related economic reports, the manner in which these reports were exploited, the context in which they were exploited, and their timing in the general sense represented a very different kind of propaganda picture in the month prior to the 1958 election than that for the like period in 1957. But the voluminous use and exploitation of economic reports during the 1958 campaign was not the only technique utilized to merchandise prosperity. There was also the matter of timing the issuance of specific reports to coincide with a specific politically-oriented occasion or situation.

The best example of this kind of political timing during the campaign involved the premature issuance by the Department of Commerce of a report which showed an unemployment drop so that the President could announce this in his campaign wind-up speech in Baltimore on October 31. Normally, the Commerce Department data would have been released in conjunction with Labor Department material on November 6 or 7—two or three days after the election.44

In order to get the employment report out early, the Census Bureau, which prepared the pertinent data for the Department of Commerce, detached personnel from other assignments and worked a

43 Department of Labor Press Release USDL-2566, "Employment Conditions Improve in Major Areas" (September 30, 1958).

number of people overtime. When queried by the press as to the reasons for the premature release, a Commerce Department spokesman was quoted as saying the Administration was acting "in the public interest" and that Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks had a "special reason" for wanting the figures out early. The "special reason" was not spelled out.

The Administration's decision to spring an early "good news" report—if the final figures warranted it—leaked to the press the day before the President announced the figures in Baltimore. The press report noted that only the Commerce figures would be available inasmuch as the Labor Department would not be ready with its statistics until November 5 at the earliest.

A third way in which the Administration utilized economic statistics for political purposes was the semantical handling in press releases with a view to creating a false or misleading impression. A prime example of this was a Labor Department release issued on September 30 and based on the Bureau of Employment Security's "Area Labor Market Trends." This report,


46 Ibid.

47 Nossiter, op. cit.

48 Department of Labor Press Release USDL-2566, op. cit.
which was widely quoted by national Republican speakers including the Secretary of Labor, carried detailed information on employment conditions throughout the Nation.

The lead paragraph on the release was:

"The U. S. Labor Department today announced that employment conditions improved in all but a few of the Nation's principal employment and production centers during the late Summer."

The release went on to say that the report was based on surveys conducted in 149 major areas. The implication of the lead was certainly that employment had made a rather general comeback.

However, analysis of the report itself revealed that the "few" referred to in the lead represented one-fifth of the total major areas surveyed, that the total number of major areas of substantial unemployment was exactly the same as of the time of the past survey (89), and that the unemployment declines were "generally small in scale, and did not yet significantly affect the over-all labor demand-supply situation in most areas." 49

Semantical mishandling of a somewhat different type insofar as the economic prosperity issue was concerned was reflected in a press release issued in October by the Federal Housing Administration. The lead paragraphs of this release read:

"Extraordinary demands of a rapidly expanding market in trade-in houses have made it necessary for FHA to introduce a new method for handling certain applications for mortgage insurance on existing construction, Federal Housing Commissioner,

49 Area Labor Market Trends, op. cit.
Norman P. Mason, said today, in announcing a new type letter of agreement to insure. These demands reflect a rapid improvement in the market for homes and in the economy generally."50

The assumption that there had been a "rapid" improvement in the economy was certainly not born out by government employment and related statistics contained in most of Federal reports issued during the fall of 1958. Further, a step-up in trade-in housing does not necessarily reflect either economic conditions generally or good economic conditions specifically. The Federal Housing Administration release literally pointed out the latter possibility in a subsequent paragraph when it stated that a large percentage of the trade-in houses on the market were houses "for which buyers have not yet been found." No reference was made to the possibility of an upsurge on trade-ins due to defaults on mortgages or related adverse economic circumstances.

CHAPTER VI

Foreign Policy and Peace

The 1958 Republican Campaign Plan did not anticipate that foreign policy—in any of its aspects—would constitute a major issue during the 1958 campaign. The Plan's drafters, of course, had no way of knowing that the Chinese Communist government in Peking would in August launch an intensive attack upon Nationalist-held Quemoy and Matsu. And there is no certainty that the Administration's Formosa policy was indeed a major issue in the public mind though the Democrats strove to make it such.

In his post-mortem on the campaign a month after the election, Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn made no mention whatsoever of Formosa, Quemoy-Matsu or foreign policy generally in setting forth his reasons for the sweeping Republican defeat. He cited five major factors or issues: the recession; the great financial support given the Democrats and the reduction in financial support given the Republicans by traditional fund suppliers; the successful branding of the GOP as anti-labor with the "right-to-work" issue playing a major role; substantial organizational and monetary contributions of Labor to the Democratic Party; and the failure of the GOP to do an effective job of presenting a "true image" of the Party.

In a post-mortem given at the same meeting before which Alcorn was a speaker, Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler mentioned foreign policy as one of the "national issues" which "were decisive in producing the strong Democratic tide." But he discussed foreign policy not at all--above and beyond this brief mention--and concentrated heavily on the impact of Right-to-Work and on the Republican use of the "Socialist" and "radical-Democrat" themes as major factors in the G.O.P. defeat. Butler's speech, then, leaves the impression that he did not believe that the foreign policy-peace issue was an over-riding one.

1. **Initial Definition of the Foreign Policy-Peace Issue**

In keeping with a Campaign Plan which foresaw no major issue in the peace-foreign policy area, the "organizational" materials distributed as campaign "ammunition" by the Republican National Committee in August and early September sought to create a "peace" issue favorable to the Administration. These booklets and leaflets defined the peace-foreign policy issue in succinct black and white terms which compared Republican success with Democratic failure. In none of these materials was there any mention of Quemoy or Matsu through several contained general references to Formosa.

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2 Butler, Paul. Address before the National Association of Manufacturers, New York City (December 3, 1958).
Implicit in these preliminary materials was the effort to brand the Democrats as a "war party" in contrast to the Republican "peace party." Most of the materials sought to anticipate Democratic "foreign policy" charges and then to provide campaign speakers with the means of countering these charges. Virtually all contained the assertion that the Eisenhower Administration had halted the expansion of communism which the Democrats had permitted while in power.

Thus, Democrat Distortions vs The Facts, a widely-distributed 8-page folder, contained the following commentary under the heading "Foreign Policy."

"THE CHARGE--Republican foreign policy has taken chances with national security by going to the brink of war. THE FACTS--The only alternatives to firmness in the face of threats are appeasement and piecemeal surrender as at Munich, or blundering into war on the enemy's terms as in Korea. In this century America has had three wars under the Democrats, none under the Republicans. By refusing to be bluffed or duped the Republican Administration has halted expansion of Communism which by 1953 held 700 million people behind the Iron Curtain. Marine landings in Lebanon and assistance to Nationalist China in Formosa Straits were vital moves in our firm policy to preserve and strengthen Free World."

In another of its organizational materials, a small booklet containing key "points" for Republican speakers, the Party in Power listed peace as its number one issue. "On the record," the booklet

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asked, "which party has best demonstrated its ability to maintain
peace?" It answered the rhetorical question with the following
brief factual observation:

"THE FACTS: In this century Democrats have
controlled the executive branch of the government
for 28 years, Republicans for 30. Three times during
this period we have gone to war--three times under
Democrat Administrations, never under a Republican
Administration."

And so it was that the "peace-foreign policy" issue was
defined--in more or less the same general terms--in all five
"organizational" documents made available by the National
Committee to Republican state and local organizations prior to
the formal launching of the national campaign by Mr. Nixon late
in September. And it may well be that the Party in Power would
have gone through the entire campaign without any substantial
deviation from the "line" laid down in these preliminary materials
were it not for the Chinese Communist artillery assault on Quemoy
which broke out on August 23. But by that time, all of the
"organizational" materials had been printed or committed to the
printer and it was too late to recall them.

Between the time that the Republican National Committee's
"organizational" materials were developed and Mr. Nixon's formal
opening of the national Republican campaign in Indiana on
September 29, the Democrats mounted a major propaganda assault

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4 The Republican National Committee. On the Record: Six
designed to make Quemoy and Matsu the hallmarks of an ineffective Administration foreign policy. What actually triggered the Democratic offensive was not the attack of the Peking government itself but the so-called "Newport Statement" which Secretary of State Dulles issued on September 4 after a conference with President Eisenhower at his Newport, R. I. vacation spot.

Mr. Dulles' Newport Statement was an eight-point analysis of the Formosa situation, of the current status of the Chinese Communist attack, of the strategic relationship between the offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu with Formosa, and of the President's authority to cope with the situation. Mr. Dulles asserted that Congress had authorized the President "to employ the armed forces of the United States for the securing and protecting of related (to Formosa) positions such as Quemoy and Matsu." He did not state that the President had decided it was necessary to send American military forces into action on behalf of Quemoy and Matsu. The strategic and political crux of the Newport Statement was the assumption that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was essential to that of Formosa and of the entire U. S. position in the Far East.

It was upon this assumption and its corollary—that the U. S. would go to war to preserve the offshore islands if the Nationalists could not hold them alone—that the Democrats seized when they launched their major propaganda offensive on the heels of the Newport

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Statement's release. The attack came from three key sources in its initial stages: from Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and former Democratic presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson.

The pattern of the attack was set by Acheson who—on September 6—attacked Dulles' Newport Statement on a point by point basis. Mr. Acheson charged that the Administration was "drifting" toward war with Red China over issues "which are not worth a single American life." The essence of his attack was that Matsu and Quemoy were not necessary to the defense of Formosa or that of the broad U. S. position in Asia. To go to war over the offshore islands, Acheson held, would be both foolhardy and totally unnecessary.

On September 9, the Administration sought to rebut Acheson on a point by point basis. The rebuttal was planted in the press by "administration officials" who declined "to be quoted by name." The most telling argument made in the rebuttal was that the Chinese Reds themselves had declared that Quemoy and Matsu were the means of "liberating" Formosa. The rebuttal also pointed out that

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"liberation" of Formosa would leave the Red Chinese free to launch
an assault on "free world" positions in southeast Asia.

This rebuttal, obviously authorized by John Foster Dulles,
did nothing to stop the Democratic attack. Between September 5
and September 10, criticism came from such varied Congressional
spokesmen as Senators Morse (D., Oregon), Mansfield (D., Montana)
and Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyoming). Adlai Stevenson, back
from a European tour, landed in New York terming Quemoy and Matsu
"little islands" which were "only incidental" to Red China's objective
of taking Formosa. He called Administration foreign policy "clumsy,
erratic and self-righteous."

On September 14, however, former President Harry S. Truman
poured sand into the gears of the Democratic offensive when he
published a syndicated article supporting the Administration's
position on Quemoy and Matsu. This apparently served to quell
Democratic criticism for more than a week but the Congressional
offensive was renewed in the period between September 23 and
September 30. During this time, the attackers included Senators
Kerr (okla.), Smathers (Fla.), O'Mahoney (Wyoming), Humphrey
(Minn.), and Clark (Penna.) On September 30, Sen. Green (R. I.),

8 "Mansfield and Morse Urge Caution on Administration in
Quemoy Row," The Washington Post and Times Herald (September 6,
1958). Also "U. S. Step Seen Inviting War," The Washington Post and
Times Herald (September 9, 1958).

9 "Stevenson Back in U. S., Hits 'Clumsy' Policy," The
Evening Star (September 10, 1958).

10 Kilpatrick, Carroll. "Democrats Split Sharply Over
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a letter to the White House in which he attacked the Administration's China policy and urged that the President submit the issues at stake to Congress for discussion.

What the press reported as a "split" in the Democratic ranks occurred when Sen. Douglas (Ill.) joined Mr. Truman in supporting the Administration position. But those among the Democrats who overtly took the Douglas view were a very small minority.

So it was that the Democratic assault was in full cry when Vice President Richard Nixon formally opened the national campaign drive of the Party in Power in a speech to an Indiana Republican audience on September 29. The general "issue" line laid down in the Republican National Committee's "organizational" literature was clearly not adequate to his task. And it was modified accordingly for this speech was designed to set the line for the entire campaign.

The speech did not overtly blast Democratic foreign policy as such. In fact, Mr. Nixon was most moderate on this score. Basically, he set out to establish the Republican Party as the party of peace on the basis of its long-run record, to suggest that the Democrats were the party of war without actually saying so, and to defend the Administration position on Quemoy and Matsu within the broader context

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12 Kilpatrick, op. cit.
of an Administration foreign policy which he maintained had kept
the peace.

In specific terms, this is how Mr. Nixon sought to achieve
his three objectives. In seeking to establish the Republican Party
as the party of peace, he said:

"We have heard a lot of criticism of our foreign
policy over the last six months. We have been too
tough on the Communists and too soft. We have put
too much emphasis on defense and too little. We
spend too much for foreign aid and too little. We
were wrong in Suez, wrong in Lebanon, wrong in the
Formosa area. But the major test of the success of a
foreign policy is--does it keep peace with honor?
And all the criticism in the world cannot obscure
this solid fact: This Administration got the United
States out of one war, it has avoided other wars,
and it has kept the peace without surrender of
principle or territory."13

Mr. Nixon then proceeded to imply that the Democrats were
the sponsors of a "weak" policy which led to war by dragging
Secretary Acheson and Korea into the picture.

"But there are those who say--Aren's we risking
war by following such a policy? (re Formosa) The
answer is that a policy of firmness when dealing
with the Communists is a peace policy. A policy of
weakness is a war policy. I am sure that Secretary
Acheson thought that he was buying peace when he
said in January of 1950 that we wouldn't defend
Korea. But the Communists took him at his word and
attacked--and in June, American boys were dying
in Korea."14

The Vice President answered the basic Democratic criticism
relative to the Administration policy on Quemoy and Matsu as follows:

13 Nixon, Richard. Address by the Vice President of the United
States, Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29, 1958).

14 Ibid.
"Why don't we give these little islands to the Communists and have peace? There are several answers to this question. In the first place, these islands are not ours to give. They belong to the Nationalist government. In the second place, giving these islands to the Communists would not bring peace. They have said over and over again that their objective is Formosa, not just Quemoy and Matsu. What we are doing is defending the principle that the use of force in settling national disputes cannot be tolerated. And what is at stake is not just Quemoy and Matsu, and not just Formosa, but the whole free world position in Asia."  

Through the balance of the campaign, Mr. Nixon and other Administration spokesmen were to merchandize the point of view that the offshore islands were inextricably related to the security of Formosa and of the United States position in Asia. But the "soft-pedal" attack on Democratic foreign policy implicit in the Indiana speech was not to be characteristic of either Mr. Nixon's subsequent campaign speeches or of the Republican campaign as a whole.

2. Characteristics of the Party in Power's Campaign

Analysis of the Republican Party's national campaign effort relating to the foreign policy—peace issue reveals several relatively clear-cut characteristics which are well worth detailed consideration. Though some of these characteristics may well be typical of the handling of foreign policy in any recent campaign, others certainly reflect the specific impact of the Formosa crisis and of the Democratic attack upon the Administration's effort to cope with it.

The basic characteristics may be defined as follows: (a) A definitive effort to soft-pedal or suppress statements or releases which
might serve to open up areas of controversy which were not already a part of the political dialogue; (b) A high-level, low-level dichotomous approach to the "selling" of the foreign policy issue with Eisenhower and Dulles traveling the "high road" and Nixon taking the overtly political channel; (c) A persistent effort to picture the Democrats as endangering the national security through their criticism of Administration foreign policy while leaving the Administration free to discuss that policy on its own terms; (d) Great flexibility of tactics linked with consistency of strategy; and (e) Concentration on merchandising of foreign policy in the coastal areas tied to very limited discussion of the issue in the interior.

These, then, are the five salient characteristics of the Party in Power's employment of the peace-foreign policy issue during the 1958 campaign. It remains now to document them in some detail.

3. Implementation of the Foreign Policy-Peace Issue

A. The "Quiet Time"

On September 27—two days before his formal opening of the Republican national campaign in Indiana—Vice President Nixon issued a statement in which he charged an unnamed State Department subordinate with a "patent and deliberate effort" to "undercut" Secretary of State Dulles. The Vice President's blast came on the

heels of a New York Times report that mail received by the Department during the preceding month had been running very heavily on the Formosa crisis and that about 80 percent of the letters opposed the Administration's policy.

Nixon not only attacked the "subordinate" who provided The Times with the mail analysis but also the concept that "the weight of the mail rather than the weight of the evidence should be the controlling factor in determining American foreign policy." 17

Whatever the Vice President's motivation, he certainly set the tone for Departmental and Administration informational dissemination in the foreign policy field for the balance of the campaign. There were no further unauthorized statements of any kind to the press. Perhaps more important, the Administration took great pains to avoid any foreign policy publicity relating to any decision or plan which could be considered new or controversial. The sole exception to this rule was the sustained publicity effort relating to Quemoy and Matsu.

During the closing days of the campaign, the Administration did break out in a rash of comments about its concern for the underdeveloped areas of the world which may well have had emotional implications for voters of Asian extraction concentrated in New York and California, for Negro voters everywhere, and for many native

17 Ibid.
Whites with broad humanitarian sentiments. But none of these statements spelled out specific proposals or programs in any detail. None represented policy decisions as such. And none could be called truly controversial in the political sense.

The best measure of just how "quiet" the Administration was on new or "different" efforts to cope with foreign policy problems lies in a comparison of the 1958 campaign period with the like period in 1957. Though the launching of the first Soviet "sputnik" in 1957 had generated a considerable Administration propaganda reaction primarily by the Pentagon, this alone does not appear to explain the marked disparity in "novel" activity in the foreign affairs area as between late 1957 and late 1958. And essentially the same basic foreign policy problems which plagued the United States in late 1957 were still plaguing us in late 1958.

In the period between September 30 and November 3, 1957, the Administration released or triggered widespread publicity relating to five major inter-governmental conferences, all of them bearing on foreign affairs and most having controversial domestic implications. These conferences included: the Eisenhower-MacMillan meeting on use of nuclear energy; Soviet-U. S. talks on

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19 The pertinent New York Times citations are for the dates of October 6, 25, 29, 31 and November 1, 1957.
the expanding of cultural and educational relationships; the President's participation in the pending NATO conference; talks between Soviet foreign minister Gromyko and Secretary Dulles on Soviet-American affairs generally; and the resumption of talks with Polish representatives relative to foreign aid. It is of interest to note that three of the five conferences were with Soviet or Soviet bloc country representatives.

In the same period in 1958--the campaign period--there were neither conferences nor talk of conferences by the Administration with the exception of the very suddenly-arranged conference which Mr. Dulles had with Chiang Kai-Shek on Formosa—a meeting the result of which was all but predicted by Mr. Dulles several days before it was held.

Again, during the 1957 period, the Administration generated the dissemination of information relative to at least four new and major foreign policy decisions or decisions in the making. Thus, a new U. S. program was unveiled before the United Nations—a program calling for the use of outer space "for exclusively peaceful and scientific purposes." Mr. Dulles was reported to be revamping U. S. policy toward the Middle East. The State Department was

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20 Mr. Dulles made comments tantamount to a prediction in a British television film "shot" on October 16, 1958 but not released to the public until October 23. The Washington Post and Times Herald (October 24, 1958).


reported to be giving serious consideration to cutting U. S. aid to Yugoslavia because it was "irked" by "Tito's growing support" for the Moscow line. And Mr. Dulles called for a redivision of military responsibilities among the Free World allies, stating the premise that "the forward position should in the main be held by local manpower." 24

In three of these four cases, the possibilities of domestic controversy were very real.

In the parallel period in 1958, however, the Administration was neither "reported" to be revising its policy in any area of the world nor did it officially announce that any such revision was under consideration. 25 Even in the case of Quemoy-Matsu, the Administration never came out and said flatly it was changing its policy. Insofar as foreign policy innovation was concerned, then, the 1958 campaign period was a "quiet time" indeed.

B. The Republican Dichotomy

As has been pointed out, the Party in Power waged two distinct but related propaganda battles in its effort to cope with the Democratic attack on the Administration's foreign policy. One battle was waged


25 This based upon careful scrutiny of three major newspapers during the period from late September through election day, 1958, the papers being The New York Times, The Washington Post and Times Herald and The Washington Evening Star.
in Washington by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower. The other was waged in the field by Mr. Nixon and spokesmen for the Republican National Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committees. The basic purpose of both approaches was to blunt the Democratic attack by establishing the premise in the public mind that the Administration was right on Quemoy and Matsu.

The Nixon approach was a blunt one. Time and again, the Vice President reiterated the essentials of the same message: The Republican foreign policy was one of firmness and peace. The Democratic policy was one which had led to war. Quemoy and Matsu must be kept in Nationalist hands—with U. S. military support if necessary—because this was consistent with a policy of firmness and peace. The Democrats were making a serious mistake in criticizing the Administration's foreign policy.

Nixon was baldly partisan and made no bones about it. He hammered the Democrats as the party which had been at the Nation's helm during three wars, criticized the "flabby" Acheson policy, emphasized Democratic responsibility for Korea and suggested that acceptance of Democratic proposals on Quemoy and Matsu might well lose both Formosa and all of Asia to Communism. Nixon never varied in his position that Quemoy and Matsu must be held at all costs.

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26 This based upon careful scrutiny of all published texts of the Vice President's speeches as supplied by his office.
The Eisenhower-Dulles approach was far more subtle and never overtly political in the domestic sense. Of it, Walter Lippmann wrote—during the height of the campaign—that Mr. Dulles' series of press conferences reflected the Secretary's concern "not so much with the disclosure of the facts (on negotiations re the Formosa situation) as with saving face in Formosa, in Washington, on Mr. Nixon's circuit and among his critics at home and abroad." The circumstantial evidence certainly suggests that the Eisenhower-Dulles statements and activities relating to the Formosa situation were directed more to coping with the domestic political situation than with any situation overseas.

Between mid-September and election day, Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles between them issued or authorized the issuance of 18 different statements dealing with the Formosa situation—above and beyond the speeches made by the President during the latter half of October which were frankly labeled "political." In short, during a period of roughly six weeks, the President and his Secretary of State served as sources for an average of 3 statements a week on the Formosa crisis.


The White House let it be known that the President's official campaign tour was beginning in Iowa on October 17.
On September 30—the day after Mr. Nixon formally opened his campaign trek in Indiana—Mr. Dulles first interjected the suggestion that the Administration might be considering a change in its China policy. Only five days before, Mr. Dulles had stated that the U. S. was standing firm on Formosa and on helping to maintain the Nationalist position on Quemoy and Matsu. A little earlier in September, the President had made a major radio talk in which he had said the U. S. would do everything to arrive at a peaceful decision in the Far East but that it would fight to protect the islands if the Communists tried to take them by force and the Nationalists could not hold them alone.

Through the period of the campaign, an American ambassador was conducting or in position to conduct negotiations on the Formosa issue with a Chinese Communist representative in Warsaw. Had Mr. Dulles or Mr. Eisenhower desired to communicate a new proposal relating to the offshore islands to Peking or to warn Peking of the consequences of "rash" action, they could have done so through these diplomatic channels without incurring the risk of misinterpretation or of alienating various members of the Western Alliance—a risk implicit in suggesting these very things at a press conference in Washington.

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30 Ibid., (September 26, 1958).

Taking these and related factors into consideration, the evidence does indeed strongly support the contention that Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles were playing a carefully-conceived domestic political game on the Formosa issue. In their numerous statements, they never attacked the Democrats as such. There was no talk of a Republican "peace policy." There was no persistence in retailing the view that Matsu and Quemoy were absolutely essential to Formosa or to the U. S. position in the Far East.

But there was an effort to make it appear that the Democrats were threatening the national security by criticizing the Administration's foreign policy. There was the effort to create the impression that the Administration was mobile and "right on top" of the situation in the Far East. There was a sustained move to develop the impression that the Administration was considering a change in its Formosa policy whereas the change itself was never flatly enunciated. Perhaps most deft, propaganda-wise, was the ability of Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles to take a sustained and unified position which appeared to oppose that of Nixon in some particulars without projecting the image of opposition to Nixon. On only one occasion did the Washington spokesmen slip—a slip which will be discussed in Section C below—and on that occasion the breach was rapidly filled.

When, on September 30, Mr. Dulles hinted that a change in U. S. policy on China was in the wind, the President immediately backed him
up at his press conference the following day. Mr. Dulles said that Chiang Kai Shek's buildup on Quemoy and Matsu had been "foolish," that it was a mistake to keep heavy forces on these offshore islands, and that he doubted Chiang could ever get back to the mainland on his own even if there were a revolt against the Peking regime.

Mr. Eisenhower agreed that the Nationalists had been "foolish" in putting so much value on the offshore islands. The President's discussion of the situation was such as to leave one astute reporter on foreign affairs with "the clear impression that a change (in policy) is afoot in Washington with his (the President's) full approval." This "clear impression" of a change in process was one which the Eisenhower-Dulles axis strove mightily to drive home in the ensuing month before election. Yet, at no time during this period did either flatly announce that U. S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Formosa or the off-shore islands had changed or was going to change. In fact, the American embassy staff in Formosa informed an American correspondent there three weeks after the Eisenhower-Dulles "hint" of a change that no change of any kind was contemplated.

In summary, then, the dichotomous Republican approach to the peace-foreign policy issue with particular reference to Formosa was a persistent phenomenon of the campaign. On one hand, Mr. Nixon

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33 Ibid.
hammered away at the opposition with bluntness and fury, never wavering in his basic doctrine. On the other, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower handled the issue with subtlety, sought to destroy the Democratic offensive with vacillation, maneuver and camouflage rather than with invective, and strove to create the impression that their discussions were "above" politics.

C. The Democratic "Mistake"

During the campaign, the Republicans made a concerted effort to instill the impression that the Democratic opposition had imperiled the Nation by making foreign policy a campaign issue. The Party in Power sought to do this while it was itself discussing foreign policy at great length. One might say it was a case of seeking to have one's cake after having eaten it. The purpose, clearly, was to put the Democrats on the defensive while leaving a clear field for definition of the "foreign policy-peace" issue in Republican terms.

Rep. Kenneth Keating (R., N. Y.)—now Senator Keating—appears to have been among the first to suggest that the Democrats were giving "aid and comfort" to Red China by criticizing the Administration's foreign policy. Mr. Keating's statement was made late in September. The theme next received national attention when Sen. Wiley (R., Wisc.), ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign

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Relations Committee, on October 3 implied that the Democratic critics of foreign policy were imperiling the Nation. The fact that the earliest use of the tactic was by Congressional representatives suggests that the line had its initiative in the ranks of the Republican Campaign Committees.

However, the theme soon was to be taken up by the Administration and--with considerable consistency--by Mr. Nixon. The President, in a letter released to the press on October 4 in which he took Senator Green (D., R. I.) to task for a prior letter criticizing the Administration's handling of foreign policy, accused the Senator of action which "would embolden our enemies and make almost inevitable the conflict which, I am sure, we both seek to avoid provided it can be avoided consistently with the honor and security of our country."  

It was only after a strategy session at the White House on October 6--a session involving the President, the Vice President, the heads of the Republican Campaign Committees in Congress, and top representatives of the Republican National Committee--that the "blame-the Democrats" theme really reached a crescendo in the Republican attack. Mr. Nixon had not used it before this meeting nor had Republican National Committee statements or campaign materials

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The Republican National Committee turned its "big guns" loose with the theme almost immediately after the White House session. Chairman Meade Alcorn jumped the Democrats on October 8 charging them with being "politically willing to undermine American diplomacy during this most serious challenge" and accusing them of favoring appeasement. On October 14, I. Lee Potter, Mr. Alcorn's special assistant, told a Colorado audience that Democratic "talk" which "would wrongly indicate that the United States was divided" might "encourage a war." He quoted President Eisenhower's letter to Senator Green as his source for this assertion.

In a speech on October 16, Alcorn reiterated the thesis. He said that "those Democrats who would hand Quemoy and Matsu to Red China are playing a dangerous game. Their persistent sniping makes a settlement of the problem more, not less, difficult. Their tempting voice of appeasement weakens the hands of diplomats who are seeking to reach a peaceful solution through negotiation. Irresponsible talk of appeasement endangers peace and the security of the free world."

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37 Based on careful scrutiny of both Nixon texts and National Committee issuances.

38 The Evening Star (October 8, 1958).


On October 10, the Administration itself "indirectly" returned to the attack when Sen. Alexander Smith (R., N. J.), who was retiring from his seat, enunciated the theme after a conference with Dulles. Smith criticized the Democrats for injecting the foreign policy issue into the campaign and urged a return to "a responsible bipartisanship on this critical issue."

Mr. Nixon who had been discussing foreign policy from the very beginning of his campaign trek even as other Administration spokesmen were accusing the Democrats of making it an issue, did not in his first swing around the country (September 29-October 4) even suggest that the Democrats were guilty of wrong-doing in making foreign policy an issue. He made this a salient part of his delivery only after the October 6 White House meeting and the theme first appears—among his published speeches—in a talk made in Columbus on October 9.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Nixon did not here—or elsewhere—overtly charge the Democrats with imperiling the national security by raising the issue. In light of the Vice President's persistent discussion of the "foreign-policy-peace" issue, this would hardly have seemed to be a wise propaganda approach. Mr. Nixon contended him-

41 The Evening Star (October 10, 1958).

42 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).
self simply with the assertion or implication that the Democrats had made an error in making foreign policy a campaign issue.

Thus, in Columbus he said, "I believe our Democratic opponents are making a major error in attempting to make the foreign policy of this Administration an issue in this campaign. Because there is no issue on which we are stronger and our opponents are weaker than in this area." In Chicago, on October 13, the Vice President charged the Democrats with making foreign policy a campaign issue and thus "leaving us no choice but to present to the American people the record of success of the Eisenhower Administration and compare it with the record of failure of the seven years that preceded it."

In Baltimore on October 21, Mr. Nixon referred to the "bitterly partisan" foreign policy statement (of October 11) of the Democratic Advisory Committee. In Lincoln, Nebraska, on October 25, Mr. Nixon stated that the Advisory Council had "made a major political error in insisting on making foreign policy an issue in this campaign by attacking our policy in the Far East and challenging us to defend it." And in

Ibid.


Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks of the Vice President, Baltimore, Maryland (October 21, 1958).
Everett, Washington, on October 31, he reiterated the accusation that the Democratic Advisory Committee was "bitterly partisan in its criticism of the Eisenhower foreign policy."46

In its effort to contain the Democratic foreign policy attack by painting it in the light of a security threat or partisan error, the Party in Power committed one very overt propaganda faux pas. In mid-October, it placed the glare of publicity on the logical inconsistency between its widely disseminated assumption that foreign policy should not be a campaign issue and its widely-disseminated effort to make it one on its own terms.

The travesty began at a Dulles press conference on October 14 in which the Secretary of State said that it was "highly undesirable" that the "topical aspects" of foreign policy be made a party of the political campaign.47 Mr. Dulles' statement was made less than 24 hours after Mr. Nixon had made a full-dress foreign policy speech in Chicago which was very much concerned with the "topical aspects" of foreign policy. Mr. Dulles compounded the felony by suggesting that a portion of the Nixon speech—read to him by a reporter—"might fit without the limits" of allowable political debate as he defined them.

At a press conference the next morning, President Eisenhower endorsed the Dulles' position, stating that he felt foreign policy

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ought to be kept out of partisan debate. Dulles, in a second statement issued on the same day (October 15), reversed himself and supported Nixon's Chicago speech as a necessary defense against the Democratic Advisory Council's attack.  

Late on October 15 in San Francisco, Mr. Nixon called a press conference to discuss what the press was now generally calling a disagreement between Eisenhower and Dulles on one hand and Nixon on the other. Previously, he had spoken with Dulles by phone. In the statement, Nixon sought to distinguish between "decision" and "policy" in the foreign policy field. He suggested that one should show "restraint" while a "decision" was being made whereas long-range or basic policy was open to partisan discussion. He distinguished between his role as a political campaigner and the President's role of having "to mobilize the entire country behind its policy...."  

The net effect of the Nixon statement was to sharpen the apparent differences between his approach and that of Eisenhower-Dulles rather than to dull them. This was apparently not lost on Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn or on the White House staff. On October 16, Alcorn made a hurried trip to the White House. On leaving, he informed the press that he had seen a copy of a telegram from Eisenhower to


Nixon which cleared the air. The telegram was made public the same day.

The Eisenhower wire which was anything but lucid stated that there was "no real difference" between Mr. Dulles' position and that of Mr. Nixon. It then made a difficult-to-follow distinction between "administrative operations" and "policy" in the foreign policy field—a distinction apparently meant to be in line with that enunciated by Mr. Nixon in San Francisco. But basically, the telegram was an endorsement of Nixon's attacks on Democratic critics of Administration foreign policy.

Following the episode of October 14-16, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower made no further efforts to suggest either that the Democrats were threatening the country by discussing foreign policy or that foreign policy should not be an issue in the campaign. Mr. Nixon thereafter staunchly reiterated the line that the Democrats had made a serious mistake in making foreign policy an issue—a mistake which could not help but redound to the advantage of the Party in Power.

D. Republican Flexibility

Both in Washington and on the hustings, the Party in Power did not turn "the other cheek" to the ceaseless Democratic attack on Administration foreign policy. It operated in constant awareness of that attack and of the situation in which that attack had its primary roots:

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52 Ibid.
The Chinese Communist assault on the offshore islands—Quemoy and Matsu. Further, the Party in Power operated with considerable flexibility in the propaganda sphere.

Vice President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles played the key roles in defining the foreign policy-peace issue for the Administration and their flexibility of word and deed best characterizes the Party in Power's propaganda approach. In his numerous overtly political speeches and statements, Mr. Nixon showed a constant alertness to Democratic attacks and to tactical shifts in the Far Eastern situation. Mr. Dulles was no less alert to these though he took great care not to define his reactions in overtly political terms.

**Mr. Nixon's Flexibility**

When Mr. Nixon opened his campaign on September 29—as has already been noted—he was very restrained in his attack on the Democrats insofar as foreign policy-peace was concerned. This in the face of the persistent Democratic assault on Administration policy in the Far East which had been going on for almost a month. But within a matter of days, Mr. Nixon departed from his position of tolerant moderation and moved into a stance of both violent criticism of Democratic proposals and of active defense against specific Democratic attacks. It was in this latter respect that he best demonstrated his propaganda flexibility.

Concluding his first campaign tour to the West Coast in Portland, Oregon on October 3, Mr. Nixon assaulted Adlai Stevenson for a speech the latter had made in Los Angeles on September 30.
Stevenson had urged that the United Nations conduct a plebiscite to allow the people of Formosa to choose the kind of government they wanted as a step toward solution of the then current crisis. The Vice President offered a "counter proposal for which there is far more justification." He said:

"That would be to ask that the six hundred million people living under the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist government be allowed to participate in a free election supervised by the United Nations to determine whether they approve of their government. And the same principle should be extended to Hungary and the other slave satellites."53

Following his return to Washington and the October 6 strategy session at the White House (see Section C, this chapter), Mr. Nixon went back on the hogs with a major foreign policy speech in Philadelphia on October 8. In this speech, he introduced two new concepts. The first was that Republicans should not be on the defensive insofar as foreign policy was concerned because the Administration's record was an excellent one. Secondly, Mr. Nixon took cognizance of the Chinese Communist announcement that they would observe a cease-fire in the Formosa straits for at least a week and warned that "this is not the time for false optimism. We must at no cost drop our guard. This is a time for watchful waiting."54

On October 8, several key Democrats attacked the Administration for seeking to "censor" Democratic criticism of foreign policy.


Democratic National Chairman Butler was particularly bitter, assailing the Republicans for seeking to make foreign policy criticism seem "somehow treasonable." In a speech in Columbus, Ohio, the following day, Mr. Nixon blithely brought forth the new concept (for him) that "our Democratic opponents are making a major error in attempting to make the foreign policy of this Administration an issue in this campaign."

On October 11, the Democratic Advisory Council released a major statement condemning the Administration's foreign policy as one of "leaderless vacillation" and pointing toward war. The Council also took up the Adlai Stevenson's Formosa plebiscite proposal first enunciated in Los Angeles on September 30. Mr. Nixon's rebuttal came in a major Chicago speech two days later in which he accepted the Democratic statement as a "challenge" which "we accept because in no area is the Republican record stronger and the Democratic record which preceded it weaker than in the area of foreign policy." He took pains to tie the Democratic statement in with Dean Acheson.

Nixon introduced two additional new twists in his Chicago speech. First, he pointed up an alleged split in foreign policy in the

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55 The Evening Star (October 8, 1958).

56 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).


58 Text of Chicago statement, op. cit.
Democratic Party with the assertion that "the Democratic Advisory Council does not speak for millions of Democrats who approve and support the Eisenhower leadership in the field of foreign policy."

Secondly, he paid tribute to Ex-President Truman for his "statesman-like" support "of the President on the Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu issues...." Mr. Truman had just published a newspaper article in which he supported the Administration stand on Quemoy-Matsu.

A day later, in San Francisco, Nixon responded to the Advisory Council's "lack of leadership" charge. The Administration's record, he said, "explodes the myth which is currently in vogue among the ivory-tower set that the President fails to provide leadership. It took great leadership to end the Korean War and to avoid other wars." The difficulty, Nixon continued, "is that the critics do not know leadership when they see it. It has been my experience that the best quarterbacks are the ones who make the hard plays look easy....the same individuals who have been complaining about lack of leadership are not criticizing the President for being too bold in his leadership in the Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu crisis."  

On the evening of October 16 in Salt Lake City, Nixon issued his famous "Call to the Cabinet" to participate more fully in the campaign and made major headlines with it. However, he took pains to exclude the Secretary of State who "cannot and should not take part

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in a political campaign." Mr. Nixon's exclusion of Dulles—who had certainly not excluded himself—was but another aspect of the Republican effort to make it appear that foreign policy was not an issue which the Party in Power would have wanted discussed in the campaign had not the Democrats interjected it.

In the face of continuing attacks by Adlai Stevenson and other top Democrats on the Administration's foreign policy, Nixon on October 21 introduced some additional new facets in a speech in Baltimore. He exploited what he said was a Democratic split by distinguishing between the leadership in Congress which was "bi-partisan in its approach to foreign policy problems" and the "leadership which presently controls the Democratic National Committee." Previously, he had contented himself with simply pointing up a split among Democrats.

In his Baltimore speech, Nixon also sought to cope with the Democratic suggestion that the Republicans were trying to create the impression that those who criticized foreign policy were guilty of treason. Nixon said, "There is only one party of treason in the United States—the Communist Party. Except for a small hard corps of Communists and Communist-sympathizers, all Americans believe that the free world must resist world Communism's drive to conquer the world."

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61 Text of Baltimore speech, op. cit.
Nixon also stated flatly that Dean Acheson was "the author of the Democratic Advisory Committee's attack on our foreign policy." He termed the Democratic approach one that had "been tried and found wanting."

With election day less than a week away and in an obvious effort to whip up Republican morale, the Vice President on October 30 told a Wichita, Kansas audience that the vigorous political debate on foreign policy had resulted in recognition by the Democrat attackers that "they had utterly failed in their efforts to develop public support" for their attack on the Administration. He predicted that Democrats running for Congressional office who had followed the "flabby Acheson line on Communist aggression in Asia will learn on election night that they have made a major political error in not supporting the President in his firm stand."

Finally, on November 3--the day before election--Mr. Nixon reversed himself on Harry Truman's "statesmanship" in a talk in Alaska. On November 1, Mr. Truman had violently attacked the Administration's foreign policy, thus reversing his previously published position. Mr. Truman had termed the Party in Power's foreign policy "a mess."

Said Mr. Nixon:

"When Mr. Truman uses the word mess he speaks as an expert. The people have not forgotten the mess he left the country in in 1952--the mess in Korea, the mess  

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of corruption, the mess of discredited radical economic policy which had failed to produce prosperity in 20 years in the United States except in war or as a result of war. The answer to his current charge is a simple but devastating one. This Administration got the United States out of the Korean War we inherited from the Truman Administration, has kept us out of other wars, and not one American boy is fighting or dying any place in the world today. "63

Mr. Dulles' Flexibility

The essence of the Democratic attack on Administration foreign policy was that the insistence on defending Quemoy and Matsu by force if necessary was an invitation to all-out war. And throughout the 1958 campaign period, Secretary of State Dulles dedicated himself to the merchandising of the thesis that the Administration's policy in the Far East would not lead to war. He did so in a series of speeches, press conferences and "authorized" Departmental statements highly concentrated in the five or six weeks immediately prior to the election.

Review of Mr. Dulles' propaganda efforts reveals some remarkable gyrations, apparent reversals and more than a little cloudiness. It reveals no basic shift in U. S. policy either toward Quemoy and Matsu or toward the Far East generally.

On September 25, Mr. Dulles told a New York audience that the U. S. was standing firm on Formosa and on defense of the offshore islands. He admitted to the existence of some difficulty in manning

the islands but stated that "other facts" were controlling. Mr. Dulles' statement coincided with a major attack on Administration China policy by Congressional Democrats.

On September 29, two developments of domestic political significance occurred. Mr. Nixon formally opened the Party in Power's campaign effort in Indiana and Sen. Theodore Green, potent chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent the President his letter criticizing the Administration's stand on Quemoy and Matsu. Green's letter was made public by the Senator only on October 4 after the Administration released its reply to the press but the contents of the Senator's letter had "leaked" to the press immediately upon its release.

On September 30, Mr. Dulles called a press conference in which, it was reported, he "hinted" at a change in U. S. China policy. At this conference, Dulles said he did not think Chiang Kai-Shek would ever return to the mainland, asserted that keeping heavy Nationalist military forces on the offshore island was a mistake, and termed the build-up on the islands "foolish." He suggested that a bargain might be struck whereby the Nationalist troops would be pulled

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64 The Washington Post and Times Herald (September 26, 1958).

65 Ibid. Senators Kerr (Oklahoma), Smathers (Florida) and O'Mahoney (Wyoming) were among the attackers at this time.

66 Text of Letters Exchanged by Eisenhower and Green, op. cit.

off the offshore islands and saved with the Communists taking over the islands. His position, in short, was a vastly different one from that of September 25.

Mr. Eisenhower backed up Mr. Dulles' position on the offshore islands in his press conference on October 1. During the ensuing week to 10 days, the attack against the Party in Power's China policy continued to flourish with both Congressional Democratic leaders and the Democratic National Committee taking a hand. The attack culminated in the release of the aforementioned Democratic Advisory Council's detailed statement on Republican foreign policy on October 11.

On the same day--October 11--Secretary Dulles invited Senator Green to visit him at his home for what the press reported to be an effort to heal the breach opened up by the exchange of letters between Green and the White House. It can be taken for granted that the White House response to Green (dated October 2) was not made without Dulles' full concurrence.

On October 14, Dulles appeared to withdraw somewhat from his statement of September 30 in which he had termed the offshore island military build-up a mistake and "foolish." He said that Chiang Kai-Shek alone would decide whether or not he wanted to pull his troops

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68 Roberts, Chalmers M., op. cit.

off the offshore islands, implying that the United States would stand behind the Nationalists regardless of this decision. 70

On October 14 and 15, Dulles became involved in the previously-discussed question of whether foreign policy should rightfully be discussed in a political campaign and, in effect, took a position on October 15 which contradicted that taken on October 14 (see 163).

On October 16, Dulles asserted in a filmed television interview that the United States would not back Chiang Kai-Shek in any military effort to regain the mainland. He stated that "we are not going to attack or tolerate attacks against the Chinese Communists...." 71 Here, once again, the Secretary appeared to return to his position as it was interpreted by the press on September 30.

On October 17, the Department of State announced that Mr. Dulles had accepted a Chinese National invitation to visit Formosa and discuss the crisis. At the same time, the press quoted Dulles and Eisenhower as reiterating that Nationalist stationing of some 100,000 troops on Quemoy and Matsu was "excessive and illogical" but that they did not intend to force a reduction of these forces against Chiang's will. 72 On October 24, the U. S. released the text of a joint communiqué, signed by Dulles and Chiang, in which the


72 The Evening Star (October 17, 1958).
Nationalists agreed to renounce force as "the principal means" of regaining the mainland.

Following a conference with the President—also on October 24—Mr. Dulles again faced reporters in the United States. The Chinese Communists had, in the interim, renewed their shelling of the offshore islands. Mr. Dulles now told the press that the renewed Red bombardment was "more for psychological than for military purposes." He also indicated that the Nationalists had gone further in renouncing force as a means of returning to the mainland than the joint communiqué had stated. Where the communiqué had said that the Nationalists were renouncing force as "the principal means" of returning to the mainland, Dulles now said the Nationalists believe their mission to be restoration of freedom to the mainland "by conduct and example" and "not by the use of force." 74

A few days later, on October 28, Dulles told the press that the U. S. had made no deal with Chiang to reduce his forces on the offshore islands. There had been considerable press speculation to this effect after issuance of the Formosa communiqué. But he also stated that the Nationalist government's "renunciation of force as the principal means for its return to the mainland is a significant reformation of mission in terms of peaceful purposes." 75 This, then, was a with-


drawal from the more extreme position he had taken on October 24 but was consistent with the language of the official communique on the Formosa conference.

Then, on October 31, the State Department released an authorized statement in which it was held that the Nationalist renunciation of force as "the principal means" of regaining the mainland clearly did not "preclude the use of force in self defense or in case of a large-scale uprising on the mainland." This took Mr. Dulles officially even further along the path away from the statement of October 24 than had the more recent statement of October 28.

The record, then, shows Mr. Dulles to have been a spokesman of remarkable flexibility in his public interpretation of U. S. policy toward Formosa and the offshore islands. But it also shows a consistency in U. S. policy per se and in Mr. Dulles' failure to claim an actual change in such policy during the period in question. The Secretary's flexibility in interpretation—a flexibility which was public, domestically-oriented and sustained—was very substantially the product of the Congressional race. But his consistency insofar as the policy itself was concerned more substantially reflected the realities of foreign policy as the Administration saw them.

E. Coastal Emphasis

The degree to which the Party in Power gave coastal emphasis to the foreign policy—peace issue is best illustrated by analysis of

76 "Dulles Asked to Clarify U. S.-China Aid Policy," The Evening Star (November 1, 1958).
Vice President Nixon's published campaign speech texts. There is no question but that Mr. Nixon was the spearhead of the 1958 Republican campaign effort at the national level. According to his office, he went into 25 states or territories, traveled about 24,000 miles and gave 54 full-dress speeches. Forty of Nixon's campaign speeches and statements were published in press release form.

Of the published texts, seventeen represented speeches or statements devoted primarily or substantially to foreign policy and peace. That is, the foreign policy-peace issue either dominated the speech or was the issue which received primary stress. Of these 17 foreign policy-peace speeches, fourteen were delivered to audiences on either the East or West Coast and nine of the fourteen were made on the West Coast. Four of the speeches were delivered in California alone.

Of the three speech texts which stressed foreign policy-peace and which were not delivered in coastal areas, two were the product of specialized circumstances. Thus, the Vice President's first major campaign speech in Indianapolis, Indiana, on September 29, stressed foreign policy but also discussed "the pocketbook issue" and others

77 See citation, Chapter III.

78 Based upon a careful review of the 40 published texts.

79 Los Angeles, September 30; San Diego, October 1; Los Angeles, October 15; San Francisco, October 15. The last-cited text was Mr. Nixon's detailed explanation of how he thought foreign policy ought to be handled in a campaign.
at some length. It was the campaign's scene-setting speech and, as such, was concerned with the total process of issue definition rather than with any kind of geographical appeal.

A second of the three "exceptions" was Nixon's full-dress foreign policy speech in Chicago on October 13. However, Chicago represented the earliest occasion on which Nixon could reply in full to the detailed foreign policy statement issued by the Democratic Advisory Council on October 11. Once again, it can be legitimately argued that this was a "specialized" occasion.

In summary, then, the evidence is quite clear that the Party in Power heavily emphasized the foreign policy-peace issue in the coastal areas whereas it sublimated it to the economic prosperity and other issues in the interior.
CHAPTER VII
Farm Freedom and Prosperity

The fact that the Republican Campaign Plan for 1958 did not anticipate that farm policy would be a major issue during the campaign did not deter the Republican National Committee from seeking to define it as such at the campaign's outset. The Committee's approach was thus consistent with its handling of the foreign policy and economic prosperity "issues." In its materials issued for state and local campaign use during late August and early September, the Committee concentrated on selling a simple dichotomy: (1) Democrats seek to strangle the farmers with controls; (2) Republicans have brought the farmer freedom and prosperity.

This is the way The Republican Speakers Handbook stated the case: "A Republican Congress is needed....To provide stable prosperity and economic freedom for the farmer. Most Democrats consistently have voted for high rigid price supports and government controls; most Republicans for more freedom for farmers to plant and to market. Net farm income in 1958 is up 22% over the same 1957 period. Farm assets are at all-time heights." 1

A second National Committee campaign brochure answered "the charge" that "the Eisenhower Administration is pushing farmers

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into bankruptcy" by citing statistics indicative of farmer prosperity and by labeling the Administration policy as one that "adds up to prosperity plus." "The plus," said this publication, represented a "sincere effort to get Government out of the farmer's business; out of his hair." 2

A third campaign document compared "G.O.P. principles with the Democrat philosophy." The Democrats, trumpeted this booklet, "imposed both price and production controls upon agriculture. They neglected market development and expansion, the key to a free and prosperous agriculture." The Republicans, said the booklet, "have expanded both foreign and domestic markets for American farm products to the highest levels in history. Market expansion, not controls, is the key to farm prosperity." 3

In addition to stressing the Democratic control versus Republican freedom-prosperity theme in all of its "advance" general issue campaign materials, the National Committee distributed several flyers exclusively directed to the farm problem. One, entitled "50 Facts for Farmers, " was based upon an August 22 speech by Senator Martin of Iowa. The "50 facts" were fifty brief statements designed to demonstrate farm freedom and prosperity under Republican


leadership. Because the "facts" were presented in capsule form and listed by number, the document easily lent itself to becoming background for local political speeches by Republican candidates in farm areas.

A second flyer, based upon a speech made by Rep. Hill of Colorado on August 20, was entitled "Agricultural Accomplishments 1953-58." This speech also served as the basis of a document issued by the Senate Republican Policy Committee to Republican candidates under roughly the same title on or about September 1. Among other standards of progress, Mr. Hill stressed farm tax reductions, increased farm income, advances in the sale of farm surpluses, and loans to family-type farms.

Insofar as the Republican National Committee's issue definition effort at the campaign's outset was concerned, farm policy received maximum emphasis. It was treated as a major issue in each of the five basic "issue" documents. And it was the only area of concern to which the Committee devoted more than one separate or "exclusive" flyer.

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The Three Major Propaganda Channels

The Party in Power's propaganda effort in the farm policy field was pushed primarily through three basic channels. These were Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, the Agricultural Department's Press Service, and Vice President Nixon. Mr. Benson was by far the most active. President Eisenhower played a relatively minor role.

A. The Benson Crusade

The controversial Mr. Benson made 41 speeches between August 22 and election day, 29 of them during October alone. He traveled an estimated 20,000 miles, spoke in 20 states. According to one report, only about a dozen of these speeches were "avowedly political."

In point of fact, the speeches were "political" almost without exception. Among the Republican campaigners, only Mr. Nixon exceeded Mr. Benson's mileage and speech records during 1958.

Mr. Benson received "countless" speaking invitations well before the 1958 campaign got fully underway. His speech and travel schedule was worked out in close consultation with the Republican National Committee and with the Republican Congressional campaign committees with a view to making optimum use of his "popularity."

For Mr. Benson, who many Republican congressmen from farm areas had considered a political liability earlier in the year, went into the

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campaign trek looked upon as an "asset" by a great many Republican candidates.

According to one report, a Midwestern Congressman urged Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn to ask Benson to come into "my district this fall." The Congressman solicited Alcorn's intervention with Benson because "after all I've said about Benson I can't very well ask him myself." 9

Whether an asset or liability to his party over the long run, Mr. Benson during the 1958 campaign concentrated his speech-making efforts more heavily in urban than in rural areas. He spoke to more Chambers of Commerce, Rotary clubs, Kiwanis, Knife-and-Fork Clubs and Economic Clubs than he did to farm audiences and the majority of his rural speeches were organized by the powerful but conservative Farm Bureau Federation. 10

Four major themes dominated Benson's campaign speeches:
(1) The American way of life is being threatened by subversive and other nefarious forces; (2) The U. S. economy is far more productive than socialist economies such as that in the Soviet Union; (3) The American farmer is more prosperous today than ever before; (4) Given God's help, the agrarian economy will continue to prosper and to maintain its freedom.

9 Ibid.
10 Cohn, Lee M., op. cit. A review of Mr. Benson's published texts shows no evidence of participation by the Farmers Union in any one of the Secretary's speaking engagements. The Grange played a role along with several other organizations in the organization and "hosting" of one of the meetings which Mr. Benson addressed.
Benson's use of the left-wing threat theme was a good deal more than the aping of Mr. Nixon. In fact, Benson went far beyond Nixon (in 1958) in both his emphasis of the theme and in the manner in which he sought to paint the Democratic Party as the "home" of dangerous influences. Time and again, he told his audiences that the American free enterprise system was being threatened by three groups: "the self-seekers," "the uninformed," and the "subversives." Upon occasion, he introduced a fourth category—the "do-gooders."

Benson seldom referred directly to the Democratic Party but he left no doubt that these "dangerous influences" would be in the ascendancy if the Democrats won control of Congress. Because his identification of the opposition was a more subtle one than that of other Party speakers, Mr. Benson could use the most inflammatory language without being accused of calling the Democrats "names."

In their enunciation of the "left-wing" and related threats, Mr. Benson's speech writers made considerably more use of scissors and paste than they did of originality. The Secretary's denunciation of the opposition as a threat to free enterprise and freedom per se was couched in identical or virtually identical words to audiences in at least five states: Pennsylvania, Nevada, Utah, Illinois and California. The following is taken verbatim from a talk to a Farm Bureau Group in Reno:

11 U. S. Department of Agriculture Press Releases numbered 2757 (October 7); 2857 (October 17); 2955 (October 28); 2973 (October 29); and 2988 (October 31).
"I thank God that our people are becoming aware of the dangers that lurk in an agriculture—and an economy—that depends too much on government. Gradually, they are learning that basic American beliefs, principles, and attitudes are threatened today as never before. By whom are they threatened? By the uninformed. By the self-seekers. By the subversives.

"Yes, our freedoms are threatened by well-meaning uninformed people who see the shortcomings of our economic system and believe they can legislate them out of existence....our heritage of freedom is threatened by another group—the self-seekers. They are men who see in government legislation a way to obtain special privilege for themselves or to restrain their competitors. They use demagogy as a smoke-screen to deceive. They have no longing for freedom of enterprise....A third, and much smaller subversive group is dedicated to the overthrow of the economic and social system that is our tradition. Their philosophy does not stem from our Founding Fathers. It is a philosophy foreign to our shores. These men understand our system thoroughly—and they hate it thoroughly too. They owe their allegiance to another land, another government. They profess no allegiance to God, nor to any moral code. They make unwitting allies of the uninformed. They rationalize the worst objectives of the self-seekers."

Thus, in speeches to a variety of audiences, Mr. Benson neatly linked the self-seekers and the uninformed with the subversives and suggested--without actually saying so—that all three were not on God's side. Mr. Benson did not need to state that the self-seekers, the uninformed and perhaps even the subversives were to be found among the Democrats. The suggestion was implicit in his remarks and in the political environment in which he was speaking.

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Mr. Benson's use of the comparison-with-Soviet Russia theme was a broad one, characterizing a number of speeches before both urban and rural audiences. And, once again, the scissors-and-paste technique was very much in evidence. Before all audiences to which he presented the theme, he utilized comparative statistics and a homely example.

However, there was an interesting distinction between the presentation made to farm audiences and that made to business groups. Before business groups, Mr. Benson generally spoke of the remarkable productivity of farm workers. And before farm groups, he inevitably spoke of the remarkable productivity of factory workers. The Secretary of Agriculture was apparently very much aware of the stresses of labor-management relations on both the farm and in the production plant.

Here, for example, is a stock paragraph Mr. Benson used to make the comparison between the Soviet and U. S. economies before Economic Clubs, Chambers of Commerce and other urban business groups:

"For just a moment, let's look at a nation where farmers are not free--the Soviet Union. In our country, one farm worker produces enough to feed and clothe himself and more than 23 others, whereas in the Soviet Union one farm worker produces enough for himself and about 5 or 6 others. I think it is generally agreed that our diet is much superior to that of the Russians. This, I believe, is an excellent illustration of the advantages of the free enterprise systems compared to a socialistic state."

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13 U. S. Department of Agriculture Press Releases numbered 2757 (October 7); 2857 (October 17); 2824 (October 14).
In a Fresno, California Farm Bureau address, however, he compared "Joe Brown, an average U. S. factory laborer," with "Ivan, a Russian factory worker." Stated Mr. Benson:

"Joe Brown, an average U. S. factory laborer, works approximately 20 minutes to buy a pound of bacon, or a pound of ham, or a pound of butter. Ivan, a Russian factory worker, labors about seven times as long--two hours to buy a pound of bacon, 2-1/2 hours to buy a pound of ham, and 2-1/2 hours to buy a pound of butter. It takes Joe less than 14 minutes' work to buy a pound of chicken. It takes Ivan 2-1/2 hours--11 times as long. It takes Joe about 7 minutes to earn a quart of milk--Ivan, 27 minutes. Four times as long."  

Beset with considerable farm disaffection in Minnesota, Wisconsin and other Midwestern states as well as with an official (September) report that agricultural prices had declined for the third straight month, Mr. Benson played the identical statistical record in the great majority of his campaign speeches. Beginning early in October and continuing through his final speeches just before election day, Mr. Benson used identical or almost identical phrases to demonstrate that farmers were more prosperous than ever before.

Time and again--before both farm and city audiences--he cited new records in realized net income, per capita and gross farm income,

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15 Bell, Jack., op. cit., cites the September report in question.
farm assets, farm ownership, farm exports and farm standards of living. In most of his speeches, Mr. Benson predicted that "realized net income" of farmers would "be 20 percent higher (in 1958) than in 1957." Where he was speaking in a state in which there was a substantial number of ranches as well as farms, he would use the 20% figure to cover "U. S. Farm and ranch operators." When in an area where there were no ranches involved, he employed the same figure in reference to "farm operators" alone.

In an effort to cope with the farm price problem, Benson usually followed up his citation of favorable statistics with a statement of his awareness that farmers "are still in a cost-price squeeze." He would then take the occasion to pin the blame for this "squeeze" on the preceding Democratic Administrations. Here, for example, is the way he handled the matter in an Idaho speech:

"For one thing, farmers and ranchers are still in a cost-price squeeze—because the damage was done years ago. Due to inept fiscal policy the value of a dollar shrunk very markedly in the period between 1939 and 1952. The index of prices paid by farmers more than doubled during that period. These inflated costs have been frozen into the farm cost structure. That figure has increased only 7 percent since 1953. But farmers are in an exposed economic position and they have weak bargaining power. Their markets suffer from huge surpluses of a few commodities—due at least in part to unwise governmental programs of the past."17

16 The case in point is made by comparison of speeches made in Kansas City (October 15) and Pocatello, Idaho (October 30) respectively. Idaho is a "ranch" state; Missouri is not.

But Mr. Benson was nothing if not an optimist. Having told the farmers that they were better off than ever before, statistically speaking, and that such problems as still plagued them were the product of pre-Republican "inept fiscal policy" and "unwise governmental programs," he generally wound up with a cheerful prediction.

This is the way the Secretary put it in his Idaho talk:

"But we are moving in the right direction--toward a prosperous, expanding and free agriculture--so that farmers and ranchers will be able to share fairly and fully in the good life our great free enterprise economy makes possible."  

Mr. Benson had an identical comment in Reno, Nevada and similar or virtually identical comments in many of the other places in which he spoke.

If the Secretary of Agriculture was much preoccupied during the campaign with the material blessings which a sound Administration policy had brought to agriculture and with the statistical proof thereof, he never lost his concern for the spiritual. With perhaps one or two exceptions, all of his published campaign speeches concluded with an appeal to heaven. Several of these appeals are selected at random below:

**Fresno, California, October 31: "With God's help we can build a prosperous, expanding and free business economy--in a prosperous, expanding and free America--an America that is economically,**

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socially and spiritually sound!"  

Reno, Nevada, October 28: "With God's help we can build a prosperous, expanding and free agriculture— a prosperous, expanding and free business economy— in a prosperous, expanding and free America— an America that is economically, socially and spiritually sound!"  

Detroit, Michigan, October 20: "With God's help, let us build a prosperous, expanding and free agriculture— a prosperous, expanding and free business economy— in a prosperous, expanding and free America— an America which is economically, socially, and spiritually sound."

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 7: "With God's help we can and will build a prosperous, expanding and free economy— a prosperous, expanding and free business economy— in a prosperous, expanding and free America— an America which is economically, socially and spiritually sound."

Clearly, Mr. Benson's devotion to things spiritual knew no geographic boundaries.

B. The Department of Agriculture's Press Service

The Department of Agriculture maintains what is probably the most extensive informational machine among the Washington Executive Agencies. It operates in all media fields and— unlike other government informational services— it has won favor and overt commendation on


Capitol Hill.

The Press Service, one of the most active segments of the Department's informational program, feeds a steady stream of releases to editors and reporters. Its daily output of press releases may range anywhere from eight or nine to nineteen or twenty. In addition, it issues a "Daily Summary" which briefly sets forth the substance of the various releases. Washington reporters covering the "Agricultural" beat are heavily dependent upon the Press Service. And the great bulk of material issued by the Service is concerned—in one way or another—with agricultural economics.

In the period immediately preceding the 1958 election, there were few obvious indications that the Service was being employed to further the Republican campaign cause. The difference between the amount of material issued in the two-week period before the election and that turned out in the comparable period in 1957 was not statistically significant. In point of fact, there were somewhat fewer releases in 1958 than in 1957.

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24 This range is an estimate based upon daily news summaries released during the October-November period in 1957 and 1958.

25 Based upon actual count of releases noted in Daily Summaries for the periods in question. The comparable figures so arrived at were 138 for 1957 and 130 for 1958.
However, three developments are worthy of comment in the sense that they did have campaign implications. First, the Press Service issued copies of a number of Mr. Benson's "non-political" speeches, all of which were very obviously campaign speeches. Further, it issued five of these texts on a single day (October 27)---just one week prior to election. In this sense, then, the Service was transmitting campaign propaganda in the guise of general news.

Secondly, the Press Service "selected" for issuance during the two-week period immediately prior to election day a very large number of releases pointing up programs having to do with the disposal of agricultural surpluses either overseas or through school lunch programs. Farmers and farm organizations had long been expressing their concern about the produce surplus problem. In his campaign trek in October, Secretary Benson often commented on the severity of the surplus problem though always after having laid down his selected group of "farm prosperity" statistics. It is doubtful that the Press Service operation in this context was purely coincidental.

A comparison of Agricultural Department releases in the two-week period immediately preceding the election in 1958 with a like period in 1957 is most revealing insofar as the surplus question is concerned. In the 1957 period, the Department issued 13 releases bearing on the disposal of surplus products, 4 of them in the week immediately prior

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26 All five texts cited in the Daily Summary for October 27, 1958, all five being "advance" papers covering speeches to be given October 28 through 30 inclusive.
preceding November 4. In the 1958 period, the Department issued 18 releases dealing with surplus disposal, 11 of them in the week immediately prior to election day and 9 in the 3 days immediately before the casting of ballots. 27

In light of the fact that the Department issued fewer releases in the two-week period in 1958 (130) than issued in the like period in 1957 (138), the "surplus" release pattern in 1958 becomes even more significant in the political sense.

Finally, the Press Service during the two-week period in 1958 moved heavily into the agricultural research area. Mr. Benson referred to research in his speeches not only in terms of its immediate benefits to the farmer and the Nation but also as one road to using up surpluses. Press Service releases during late October and the opening days of November stressed research findings which had implications in both areas.

A comparison of the releases for the two-week period in 1958 with those issued in the comparable 1957 period showed 9 research releases in the election year as compared to one the year before. 28

C. Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Nixon

The President, who played a limited role in the campaign insofar as speaking engagements were concerned, made only one

27 Based upon comparison of Daily Summaries for October 18-November 4, 1957 and October 20-November 4, 1958. Though the comparison periods begin upon different dates—October 18 versus October 20—the number of actual publication dates or summaries is identical for the two years because of the manner in which the weekends fall.

28 Ibid. 
speech which can be said to have focused on the farm issue. This was his first campaign speech delivered as a preliminary to his mid-October trek to the West Coast. It was made at the National Corn Picking Contest near Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Mr. Eisenhower adopted the Benson "freedom" line as the central thesis of his Iowa speech and—somewhat indirectly—linked farm freedom and prosperity to his Administration's accomplishments. He said, in part:

"Our farmers should always be free to make their own decisions and to use free markets to reflect the wishes of producers and consumers. Due largely to these practices of freedom, farm prices are going up. Generally, those prices are higher now than when rigid price supports were last in effect."29

The President's reference to "rigid price supports" represented criticism of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations which had tended to adhere to a one-level, high support figure for the basic crops.

Mr. Nixon devoted considerably more campaign time and effort to defending the Administration's farm policy than did the President. But the Vice President did not make farm policy a major gambit. He was content to leave the leadership in this respect to Ezra Taft Benson. But when he did take up the farm issue, Mr. Nixon was both blunt and adroit.

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29 Horner, Garnett D. "President on Stump, Hails Farm Freedom," The Evening Star, Washington, D. C. (October 17, 1958). The President employed the farm freedom-prosperity theme in several other talks including a major address in California on October 20 but the Iowa talk was the only one in which the theme was stressed.
Nixon’s use of the farm issue demonstrated three essential characteristics. First, he steadfastly quoted statistics to show that the farmer was better off under the Republican Administration than he had been under the Democrats. Secondly, he continually told farm state audiences that Republican prospects were excellent in the Farm Belt. Thirdly, he used Benson’s name for both offensive and defensive purposes depending upon the area in which he was speaking.

Insofar as favorable statistics were concerned, Mr. Nixon quoted them at some length in Fort Dodge, Iowa; Wichita, Kansas; Denver, Colorado; and Casper and Cheyenne, Wyoming. He cited new "records" for net farm income, gross farm income, farm ownership. He said farm mortgages were at a "record low," that the index of prices paid by the farmer had "leveled off" and that "the spiraling inflation in farmers' costs had been brought under control." In Colorado and Wyoming, states concerned with wool and sugar, Nixon mentioned pertinent legislation passed in 1954 and 1956 respectively.30

The Vice President's "confidence" approach made itself felt in Iowa, Kansas, Colorado and Wyoming, Nebraska and Minnesota. Thus, in Wyoming and Colorado, he said:

"I note a great improvement in Republican prospects in the farm areas in 1958 as compared with 1954 when I visited these same states. Farmers realize that the sound policies of this Administration have been in their best interests and that they have paid off in increased farm income."31

30 Texts made available by the Vice President’s office.

In Fort Dodge, Iowa and Wichita, Kansas, Mr. Nixon contented himself with "Republican prospects are better in the farm belt today than they have been for years because of (these) solid facts." And in Lincoln, Nebraska he waxed most enthusiastic of all:

"One of the most encouraging developments I have noted in my travels through the midwestern states has been the greatly improved Republican prospects among farmers. To use a standard of comparison, I can say unqualifiedly that our prospects in the farm states are substantially better today than they were in 1954, the last off-year election when I visited most of these areas, I base this statement on the fact that in each state I have visited the crowds have been larger and more enthusiastic than in 1954. And our candidates have uniformly reported that the opposition which many farmers had against the Administration in 1954, due to low farm prices at that time, has now disappeared."33

Mr. Nixon's air of confidence may or may not have been designed to bolster Republican hopes in the states in which he spoke. But the fact remains that he was speaking both to Republican audiences and to the voter at large.

The Vice President's third major gambit—that of using Mr. Benson's name for both offensive and defensive purposes— is best revealed in a comparison of his approach in Minnesota to that in Utah. In Minnesota, Senator Edward Thye was fighting an uphill battle to retain his seat. The dairy farmers were not happy about Administration farm policy or about Ezra Taft Benson—facts with which Mr. Nixon

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32 Ibid.

33 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 25, 1958).
must have been quite familiar. Mr. Thye was being hurt by the farm problem.

Said Mr. Nixon in his Minnesota speech:

"The fact that he (Thye) disagreed with Secretary Benson in some aspects of the farm program will not affect the voters either way. I have a high regard for Secretary Benson as a man and as a fighter for the principles in which he believes but I am sure he would be the last to suggest that there is not room for disagreement on the many aspects of our farm program."\(^{34}\)

In Utah, Senator Arthur Watkins was engaged in an equally tough fight for his seat but Utah was also Ezra Taft Benson's home state. Mr. Benson was popular in Utah where he is one of the guiding lights of the Mormon Church. Utah also had no major farm problem.

Said Mr. Nixon in a speech supporting Senator Watkins' bid for reelection:

"I am proud to be speaking in the home state of our Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Benson. Ezra Benson has many fine qualities which I need not enumerate to this audience. But I admire him particularly because he is a fighter--a fighter for the principles and policies in which he believes."\(^{35}\)

Mr. Nixon, an astute politician, demonstrated considerable geographic flexibility during the 1958 campaign.

\(^{34}\) Nixon, Richard. Statement by the Vice President, Minneapolis, Minnesota (October 26, 1958).

\(^{35}\) Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Salt Lake City, Utah (October 16, 1958).
CHAPTER VIII

The Labor Reform Issue

In its effort to make "labor reform" a campaign issue favorable to itself, the Party in Power faced an extraordinarily complex propaganda situation. The recession was still a sore-spot in key industrial states—a situation not calculated to make labor union members over-receptive to a clarion call for labor reform. The right-to-work battle was moving into high gear in six states. 1 Senator William Knowland, the Republican candidate for the governorship of California, had come out strongly for the right-to-work amendment then on the state ballot. 2 And Republican Congressional candidates in several states were running full-tilt against the "labor bosses" and, in particular, against the United Auto Workers' President Walter Reuther whom they pictured as the evil power behind the Democratic throne. 3

The situation was further complicated by Congress' failure to enact the Kennedy-Ives bill directed to dealing with some aspects of union racketeering and the misuse of labor welfare funds. The issue was less whether the bill was a good one than which party was guilty of having killed the Congressional labor reform drive. Democrats in Congress had launched a sustained attack charging the Republicans with

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2 Ibid. Knowland was at odds with Governor Knight, Republican candidate for the Senate seat being vacated by Mr. Knowland. Knight opposed "Right-to-Work."

3 In particular, in Michigan, Arizona and Indiana.
halting the Kennedy-Ives bill and the Democratic National Committee took up the cry in its widely-disseminated "Fact Book." The "Fact Book," a campaign guide for Democratic candidates and party workers, accused the Party in Power of launching an all-out attack against labor unions generally and, more specifically, with killing the Kennedy-Ives bill in order to keep alive the labor racketeering issue growing out of the McClellan Committee's investigations.  

In the face of this many-faceted situation, the Republican Strategy Board found itself in the difficult position of seeking to exploit the labor corruption issue without appearing to be anti-labor. It had also to work out an approach which would defend the Administration against the specific charge that Republicans in the House had killed the Kennedy-Ives bill—a bill generally associated with Democratic Senator Kennedy though it had been initiated and passed in the Upper House with bi-partisan support. Finally, there was the need to "confine" the right-to-work issue to the states in which it was on the ballot without embarrassing Senator Knowland and other Republican candidates in the vital California race.

In their initial planning, the Republican strategists had assumed that the right-to-work issue would remain primarily a matter of local concern with relatively limited impact on the overall fortunes of their party. Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn, who inspired

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5 See Chapter IV.
the development of the formal G.O.P. Campaign Plan, in an election post-mortem statement admitted that the right-to-work issue had defeated a number of Republican candidates and had gravely hurt the party nationally. Implicit in this Alcorn statement was the admission that Republican strategists had initially grossly underestimated the political impact of right-to-work.

Judging from the propaganda steps taken by the Party in Power in its earliest definition of the Labor reform issue, the Strategy Board decided to merchandise three simple themes: (1) The Republican Party was the friend of the working man; (2) It favored reform legislation to protect him against corrupt union bosses and undemocratic union practices; (3) The Democrats opposed such legislation and had deviously killed it in the last session of Congress.

Despite the fact that Walter Reuther was already being assaulted as the Democratic "grey eminence" in some state campaigns, the Party in Power initially made no overt national effort to use personification techniques in attacking the Democrats. Insofar as right-to-work was concerned, it generally sublimated the issue either by avoiding it altogether or by asserting that it was not a matter of national legislative concern. Whether a more realistic advance appraisal of the impact of right-to-work would have fundamentally changed early Republican strategy is a moot question but that the failure to fully anticipate that impact clearly conditioned the strategy

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cannot be gainsaid.

1. Initial Definition of the Labor Reform Issue: August 31-
   September 15

President Eisenhower kicked off the Party in Power's Labor
Reform drive on Labor Day by issuing a special "supplement" to the
traditional message. The supplement contained a list of "principles"
and "guarantees" which the President said should apply to labor-
management relations. At no time did the Chief Executive mention
either the Congress or the Democrats but the timing and context of
his statement was such as to develop each of the three themes which
the Party strategists were intent upon selling.

The political nature of the message was underscored by a
veteran correspondent who wrote that it was "not only an attack on
labor racketeers, especially those who have plundered union welfare
funds, but" (also) "a political document designed to help the Republican
Party in the mid-term Congressional elections in November." The
President's statement was issued only three days after he had made
another statement in conjunction with the signing of a "weak" labor
union welfare and pension bill. He had then criticized the Democratic
Congress by implication, stating that he had signed the bill only
because it "establishes a precedent of Federal responsibility in this
area....it does little else."

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
The President's Labor Day statement stressed the need for legislation which would protect the union member against the abuses of corrupt and powerful leaders by listing the following "guarantees":

"1. That funds contributed by workers to the treasuries of their organizations be used solely to advance the welfare of all the members.

"2. That organizations of working men and women be administered according to the free will of their members.

"3. That working people be fully protected against dealings between labor and management representatives that prevent the exercise of workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively.

"4. That the public be protected against unfair labor and management practices that make a mockery of collective bargaining relationships, endanger innocent parties, and give rise to lawlessness and harmful abuses of power." 

The fact that the President made this statement on the heels of the House failure to pass the Kennedy-Ives bill was calculated to demonstrate to the public the Republican Party's desire for labor reform legislation favorable to union members and public in contrast to a Democratic-controlled Congress' decision to kill such legislation. Whether the statement succeeded in its objective is not susceptible to evaluation here.

The basic materials issued shortly after the White House release by the Republican National Committee for campaign use took up this basic White House line but did so in very explicit terms. Thus, one document encompassed all three basic themes in the following paragraph:
"The Republican Party demonstrated again during the past session of Congress that the GOP—and not the Democrat party—is the true friend of the working man. While the Democrats talked of the need for labor reform, they slipped and dodged, and used every parliamentary trick at their command to prevent enactment of proper legislation to protect union members from racketeers and gangsters. The Republicans fought consistently for enactment of a sound measure to correct abuses exposed by Congressional investigators but were helpless in the grip of the iron-handed Democrat control of both Houses."

A second National Committee campaign document took up "the charge" that "Republican Congressmen killed the so-called Kennedy labor reform bill." The document laid down "The Facts" as follows:

"The Democrat Congress deliberately sabotaged legislation to curb union racketeering because of the heavy political ties the Democrat Party has with union bosses. The bosses funnel millions to Democrat candidates during campaigns and this makes Democrats indebted to the Bosses....In the House, the Democrats guaranteed that Congress would get no opportunity to amend the bill by holding it until the 11th hour and then bringing it up under a gag rule. If the Democrats really wanted to end the abuses uncovered by the McClellan committee, they had the power to do so. Democrats controlled the Leaderships, the Committees, and held a numerical majority in both the Senate and House. But at every real test--on the Senate floor and in the House Labor Committee--Democrats voted almost solidly against effective union reforms. Republicans voted overwhelmingly for legislation with teeth in it."  

The Republicans Speakers Handbook took substantially the same line but highlighted the fact that a Republican Congress was needed

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"to protect the worker against unscrupulous union leaders."
Republican proposals, said the Handbook, "to protect rights of
individual worker against racketeering were scuttled in 1958.
Democrat House leadership stalled on this problem until end of
session, then offered wholly inadequate measure which was beaten."12

On Capitol Hill, the House Republican Campaign Committee's
1958 Campaign Speech Kit came out containing "Basic Speech
Elements" which contrasted the Republican and Democratic "labor
records," accused the Democrats in Congress of "inaction" and of
killing efforts to develop a sound labor reform bill, and stressed the
Republican "demands for action." The Kit's campaign line was, once
again, substantially that of the National Committee materials.13

Vice President Nixon played no overt propaganda role during
this initial build-up period insofar as labor reform was concerned
though he was later to take a very direct hand. But Secretary of
Labor James P. Mitchell did participate in the early definition process.
Pro-Administration columnist Roscoe Drummond "interviewed" the
Secretary on two successive days, the first column appearing on
September 6. The column was, in effect, a straight question-and-
answer transcript of the interview. Its orientation is best illustrated
by the phrasing of Drummond's first question: "As a friend of organized

12 The Republican National Committee. 1958 Republican

13 Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. 1958
labor, what do you consider the principal complaint which the public
legitimately has against union leaders today?" 14

The crux of the column and of Secretary Mitchell's reply to this
and related questions was that some union leaders had grown so
powerful that they had come to disregard the needs and desires of
their membership and were not adequately aware of union responsibili-
ties to the community. The entire series of responses was kept on a
high plane. There was no vituperation and no effort to criticize the
Democratic Party as the tool of the Labor Bosses. The picture of
Mitchell which emerges—a picture calculated to benefit both him
and the Administration—was one of friendship, concern, and objec-
tivity toward the organized labor movement. The time had come for
labor reform legislation but primarily in the interest of the union
member and of the general public.

Insofar as the right-to-work issue was concerned, the White
House scrupulously avoided it during this initial definition period
and it received scant mention in National Committee and national
Congressional Campaign literature though key Congressional candidates
were discussing it at length in states where it was on the ballot. The
official Party position as of this time was best portrayed by The
Republican Speaker's Handbook which buried its comments on it at
the tail-end of a six-page discussion of recent Republican contributions
to Labor's welfare. Said the Handbook succinctly:

14 Drummond, Roscoe. "Secretary Mitchell Replies to Some
"Republican Administration opposes a national 'right-to-work' law. Taft-Hartley Act allows States to decide individually whether they want State 'right-to-work' laws."15

This curt, careful statement is all that appears in the Handbook or in any of the other basic National Committee documents issued for campaign use late in August and during the first half of September. But subsequent events were to dictate an "elaboration" of the Party in Power's public position on right-to-work.

2. Formal Opening of the Campaign: Late September

President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon and Secretary of Labor Mitchell all took part in the formal opening of the Party in Power's national campaign during the closing days of September. However, their specific roles insofar as the labor reform issue was concerned varied considerably. Mr. Nixon and Mr. Mitchell were to be very active throughout the campaign period whereas the President was to remain off the hustings until the two weeks immediately prior to the election.

The Vice President, who officially opened the campaign with his Indianapolis, Indiana speech on September 29, discussed "labor racketeering" but treated it as a secondary issue. His greatest emphasis was on the "peace" and "pocketbook" issues.

In his handling of "labor racketeering," Mr. Nixon offered the thesis that only a Republican Congress would enact "effective labor

15The Republican Speakers Handbook, op. cit., p. 70.
legislation" and that a Democratic Congress would be at the beck and call of the "labor politicians." Specifically, he warned:

"Do you want to control labor racketeering? You can kiss goodbye any chance for effective labor legislation if you increase the number of those Democratic Congressmen and Senators who will owe their election to contributions and support of the very labor politicians they are supposed to control. Because, remember, labor politicians don't give support unless they get 100 per cent domination of the man they help to elect." 16

Throughout his first campaign foray, which was to end with a series of West Coast speeches on October 1-3 and his return to Washington for a White House strategy conference on October 6, Nixon scrupulously adhered to his Indianapolis approach insofar as labor reform was concerned. In a speech delivered in Portland, Oregon on October 3, his Indianapolis "labor racketeering" statement was repeated verbatim. 17 His published California texts for this October 1-3 period stress the "prosperity" of the working man but make no reference to labor racketeering at all--an approach which may well have been dictated by the fact that both right-to-work and Walter Reuther were then issues in California. 18

Throughout this first campaign trip, Nixon carefully avoided taking a position on right-to-work as well as personalization of the

16 Nixon, Richard. Address by the Vice President of the United States, Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29, 1958).


18 These include texts of remarks in Los Angeles, September 30; San Diego, October 1; and Oakland, October 2.
"labor politicians." Walter Reuther is not mentioned anywhere in speech texts or in published reports based upon such texts. In fact, Nixon specifically denounced "wealthy Republican" financing of a pamphlet written by Joseph P. Kamp which attacked Reuther and which was distributed by Knowland forces in California in September. Knowland's wife had endorsed the pamphlet--entitled "Meet the Man Who Plans to Rule America"--as "a powerful message which could actually swing the pendulum in California if it could be gotten into the hands of millions of people." When the pamphlet became an issue which threatened to backfire, Mrs. Knowland withdrew her support, stating that she had not been aware of Kamp's background and associations.

Nixon did not, however, attack the Kamp pamphlet per se or take issue with its contents. His attack was based on political and economic grounds. According to the New York Times, which reported Nixon's attitude in a story from Portland, Oregon, on October 4:

"Mr. Nixon has advised business men concerned with the preservation of a conservative economic philosophy in the country that they would be far wiser to support Republican and Democratic candidates directly than to give money to finance activities such as Kamp's. 'There is more money wasted by big business on screwball committees and pamphleteers than the Republican party gets in a campaign,' Mr. Nixon said. 'It is a millstone around our neck.'"


Mr. Eisenhower's participation in the formal opening of the campaign also took place on September 29 but its timing was engineered by Senator Knowland by virtue of a letter from the President dated September 23. The letter is significant as a campaign strategy document not only because of its use in the California campaign—which was considered a pivotal one by national G.O.P. strategists—but also because it represented a subtle shift in the national Republican position on right-to-work.

The letter and the shift were occasioned by pressures from the "grass-roots." California forces opposing right-to-work had erected billboards which represented the President as opposing right-to-work. Merchandising of the belief that Eisenhower did indeed oppose right-to-work could conceivably create the impression in the voters' minds that the President opposed the election of Knowland, a right-to-work advocate.

The Administration's position—as stated in the Republican Speaker's Handbook—had been one of opposition to a "national" right-to-work law with the qualification that the Taft-Hartley law allowed the states to decide whether or not they wanted such a law. The position had obviously been arrived at as a means of straddling the politically-significant issue without committing the Administration in specific terms insofar as any state race was concerned.

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22 Ibid.
By virtue of the Eisenhower letter, the Party in Power "elaborated" its position on right-to-work and, in the process of elaboration, moved away from simple opposition to a national right-to-work law to a position of opposing a law which would have "the effect of denying to the States freedom of action in this field." To cope with any suggestion that the Administration had taken any position at all on State right-to-work laws, Mr. Eisenhower's letter stated: "I have never expressed myself one way or another on whether any State should exercise this jurisdiction, feeling, as I do, that this should be determined by the citizens of each State."23

The Administration—as represented by both Eisenhower and Nixon—was to adhere to this position for the balance of the campaign. This, despite the fact that Secretary of Labor Mitchell was on record as opposing State right-to-work laws.24 The only public record of any subsequent comment on right-to-work by Mr. Eisenhower relates to a televised "panel discussion" which the President had with a "Group of Republican Women" in San Francisco on October 21. In this television appearance, Mr. Eisenhower reiterated the substance of the Knowland letter, adding only that he was in favor of Section 14B of the Taft-Hartley law which gave the states the "right to determine how they want to have labor unions organized; that is, whether they are to be

23 Ibid.

union shop or open."

Mr. Mitchell himself commenced his formal political role in the campaign with a speech to a New Jersey Republican Club on September 30. The speech text was distributed by the Republican National Committee. It was not released through Department of Labor channels at all. The Secretary's role in this speech—as in most others delivered during the campaign—was to concentrate on tagging the House Democrats with the blame for failing to enact acceptable labor reform legislation.

Mr. Mitchell did not discuss right-to-work, the role of "labor politicians," or Walter Reuther. His key concern was to drive home the need for a specific type of labor legislation and to document the assertion that the Democrats in Congress had killed the effort to develop sound legislation. Mr. Mitchell, in short, was the "specialist" who dealt in detailed discussion of the labor reform issue whereas Mr. Nixon and Mr. Eisenhower were the "generalists" who dealt in its broad aspects.

In his talk, Mr. Mitchell charged that the Democrats were "deliberately misleading and misinforming American workers on the fate of labor reform legislation in the 85th Congress." He decried the delaying tactics and parliamentary maneuvers of the Democratic

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leadership in the House and incorporated a chronological list of particulars which he said described the "activity of legislation in the House." The Democrats, Mr. Mitchell concluded, "wanted Senator Kennedy to be able to claim credit for labor reform legislation and they wanted to blame Republicans for its failure to pass....What could be more hypocritical?"

On October 3—three days after his assault on the Democrats for their "hypocritical" approach to labor legislation—Mr. Mitchell made a speech to a district Kiwanis group in Asbury Park, New Jersey. The text was distributed through the Labor Department's information office. It was billed as "non-political." 27

Mr. Mitchell told his audience that "we desperately need a Federal law to curb the abuses that have been practiced by some labor leaders. But, it is only one weapon in the arsenal." He noted the "notorious evils revealed by groups like the McClellan Committee." But he did not blame the Democrats for anything and stated that a Federal law was subordinate in impact to local law and local law enforcement in many areas of crime revealed by the McClellan Committee.

This Asbury Park speech was thus campaign material in a subtle sense: It highlighted labor corruption and hoodlumism at a time when these were very much a part of the campaign and in conjunction with the

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Party in Power's effort to label the Democrats with the guilt of having blocked legislation to eradicate labor racketeering.

Mr. Mitchell was thereafter to play a major speaking role in the national campaign effort. But—not being under the pressure from press and public to which Mr. Dulles was exposed by the Formosa crisis—Mr. Mitchell was much freer to "call his shots." Most of his speeches during the campaign period were either clearly labeled as being political or were of the more subtle type given in Asbury Park. However, he was also in position to make several talks in a University environment which had no bearing on politics except in the sense that Mr. Mitchell himself was a campaign participant.

The Republican National Committee and the Labor Department information office were both active in distributing the Secretary's talks with the Committee apparently being the sole channel for those which were overtly political.

3. The Campaign Develops: The Four-Way Approach

The central theme of the Party in Power's campaign strategy—i.e., the Radical-Democrat theme—was given its initial national focus in the Joint Statement issued by the White House on October 6 (See Chapter III). As has been pointed out, the statement itself was primarily the brainchild of Meade Alcorn though it was issued at the

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28 Department of Labor Press Releases 2571 and 2604. Speeches delivered at Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New Jersey, October 4, 1958, and at University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, October 28, 1958.
conclusion of a "strategy meeting" involving White House staff, Republican Congressional leaders and representatives of the Republican National Committee.

The Joint Statement did not mention "labor reform" as such but it did mention "widespread corruption" in association with "labor strife and long work stoppages" and charged the Democratic Party with being "dominated by certain political labor bosses and left-wing extremists." It warned that election of a Democratic Congress would put Labor in the driver's seat and would open the way to destruction of the free enterprise system. The statement thus overtly committed the Party in Power as a unit to beating the "labor devil." But it did not personalize the "devil," mentioning neither Walter Reuther nor any other labor leader by name. 29

However, on the same day the Joint Statement was issued, the Department of Justice announced that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia "had indicted James G. Cross of Bethesda, Maryland, President of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union, for perjury." 30 Whether or not the timing of this announcement was purely coincidental, it did serve to personalize the Labor Reform issue without committing the White House or the Republican Party as a whole to such personalization.


The New York Times reported in mid-October that the basic decision to run against the "labor devil" in general and against Walter Reuther, in particular, was made by Meade Alcorn in mid-September. This was, at best, an over-simplification of the facts. The available evidence suggests that the national Republican decision to run against the "labor devil" had its roots and impetus in conservative elements in Congress and in State party organizations.

Prior to the issuance of the Joint Statement of October 6, Administration spokesmen had not emphasized the "labor devil" or attacked Walter Reuther. Mr. Nixon had warned of Labor "control" of a new Congress if it were Democratic but had not made this a major point of assault. The White House had avoided the question altogether. Both Nixon and Alcorn had disavowed the Kamp pamphlet. None of the basic "issue definition" literature disseminated by the Republican National Committee in August and September mentioned Reuther or any other union leader by name or stressed "labor control" of the Democratic Party.

On the other hand, the State Republican Convention in Michigan had taken a resolution on August 30 to run against Reuther, James Hoffa and the unions generally. The East Coast industrial influences who

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33 Republican Congressional candidates were running against the "labor devil" in key states before several of these documents were released.

financed the Kamp pamphlet were committed to running against the "labor devil" even earlier. And Barry Goldwater, in Arizona, was running against Reuther early in September as were Republican candidates in California and Indiana.

Thus, whereas Alcorn was the major proponent of the Joint Statement of October 6, the initial inspiration for the "labor devil" strategy almost certainly came from key Republicans running for Congress and their immediate retinues and from some of the more conservative State party organizations. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that Alcorn was an unwilling collaborator in fostering this approach.

Following the White House "strategy session" release, the Party in Power's national campaign on Labor Reform developed along four avenues of attack. These four approaches were taken respectively by the White House through Mr. Eisenhower's October speaking tour, by the Vice President, by Secretary of Labor Mitchell, and by Meade Alcorn.

Of the four, only Alcorn personalized the "labor bosses," lumping Walter Reuther with Wayne Morse, Paul Douglas and Hubert Humphrey as a collective threat to the free enterprise system. He was thus the only key national figure to go along overtly with the continuing campaigns against Reuther being waged in Arizona, Indiana and other states. But Alcorn was also careful to state that the

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35 Lawrence, W. H., op. cit.

"Republican Party is the friend of the union member who pays the dues" and to distinguish between this union member and "those corrupt labor bosses who collect the worker's dues." But it was not a point he stressed.

Vice President Nixon's campaign took a different tack from that in evidence on his first trek through the Middle and Far West. Moving into unemployment-ridden Western Pennsylvania and West Virginia on October 10, he concentrated hard on the thesis that the Republican Party was the working man's best friend and on the distinction between "the majority of union members" and corrupt labor leaders. In his initial tour (September 29-October 3), he had mentioned neither of these themes and had stressed the need for a Republican Congress as the only sure road to anti-corruption legislation.

There is some evidence that Nixon's new tactics were geared to the fact that he was operating in areas of high unemployment--areas in which the recession had had and still had a major impact.

In a speech in Columbus, Ohio on October 9--the day before entering Pennsylvania and West Virginia--Nixon was still using the pitch he had employed in Indiana and on the West Coast prior to the White House strategy session. 37 Columbus was neither a heavy industrial area nor the victim of heavy unemployment at the time.

In the heavy unemployment areas, Nixon also made it clear that he was concerned with offsetting and counteracting the image of the

37 Nixon, Richard. "Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President," Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).
Republican Party was Anti-Labor—an image which the Democrats were assiduously cultivating. This was his approach to audiences in both Pittsburgh and Huntington (W. Va.) on October 10:

"The Republican Party should not and will not allow itself to be placed in the false position of being opposed to the labor union movement. We believe a strong healthy union movement is an essential part of our free enterprise economy. We are proud that the majority of American trade union leaders have recognized the true nature of the Communist threat at home and abroad and have fought effectively against the efforts of Communists to infiltrate the union movement here. We oppose, as do the majority of union members and many union leaders, the shameful corruption and racketeering which the investigations of the McClellan Committee have exposed for the whole nation to see. We pledge ourselves to support legislation which will protect the individual union member from those leaders who violate their trust. Our objective is to require all unions to follow the honest practices and procedures that some unions adhere to today." \(^{38}\)

Thus, Nixon sought to have his cake and to eat it. He stressed corruption and the need for union reform legislation. But he distinguished between ordinary union members and their leaders on one hand and between good leaders and corrupt ones on the other. He placed the Republican Party on record for sound reform legislation which would benefit the average union member.

Later—in a speech on October 24 in Eau Claire, Wisconsin—Nixon laid less stress on the "friend of the Labor union" theme but he

preserved it and merged it with the early theme that only a Republican
Congress would enact badly needed reform legislation. Eau Claire
is a town of some industry in a rural setting. If there is a substantial
increase in the "radical bloc" in Congress, Mr. Nixon warned:

"The possibilities of getting any effective
legislation to protect union members and the
public from the racketeers who are giving a bad
name to the millions of honest leaders and men
in the union labor movement today would be lost
forever. Senators and congressmen who owe their
election to the support of labor politicians cannot
be expected to pass the legislation that is so
vitaly necessary in this field."39

Three days later in recession-ridden Michigan where Senator
Potter and other Republicans were still campaigning hard against
Walter Reuther, Nixon took still another propaganda position. In
addition to seeking to drive a wedge between union workers and
corrupt union leaders and to establish the Republican Party as the
only hope for enactment of effective anti-racketeering legislation,
Nixon also sought to create the impression that the Republican Party
(and himself) desired to treat Labor and Management exactly alike.
Mr. Nixon stated:

"I have found that no group in the country is
more interested in cleaning the racketeers and
chislers out of the labor movement than union
members themselves. The objective of this
Administration, simply stated, is to require all
unions to follow the good practices that some
unions follow today. Of one thing we can be
sure, we cannot expect Senators and Congressmen
who owe their election to labor politicians to do
this job....Labor leaders have the same right
and responsibility to participate in political

39 Nixon, Richard. "Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President,"
Eau Claire, Wisconsin (October 24, 1958).
campaigns as have the leaders from business, education and other fields. But labor leaders and business leaders are one thing. Labor and business dictators are another. The insistence that any member of the House and Senate should be a rubber stamp for any leader of labor or business is alien to our concepts of representative government. "40

In summary, Mr. Nixon's propaganda approach in the period between the White House strategy session of October 6 and the closing days of the campaign was very flexible in that he tailored his speech texts carefully to the nature of the area in which he was speaking. He did not make labor reform the major issue of any of his talks nor did he spell out specific reform recommendations. He was persistent in distinguishing between labor union members and corrupt union leaders. He strove to combat the image of the Republican Party as anti-labor or anti-Union. The boss-control-of-the-Democratic Party theme was omnipresent but secondary. And the Vice President was apparently preoccupied with creating the impression that he was more the statesman than the politician—at least insofar as labor matters were concerned.

President Eisenhower's relatively short tour of duty on the hustings was not one in which labor reform was treated as a major issue. The basic "left-wing radical" theme was central to most of his major

speeches but some careful geographic selectivity was practiced insofar as the use of the labor reform issue was concerned. Thus, Mr. Eisenhower scrupulously avoided discussion of labor reform in the talks he made in the heavy unemployment areas of West Virginia and Pennsylvania. On the other hand, he held forth on labor reform at some length during his California trek, discussing it in full-dress speeches in Los Angeles and San Francisco.  

When the President dealt with labor reform, he spoke in generalities, avoided personalization of the "labor threat," distinguished between labor union members and corrupt union leaders, blamed the Democrats in Congress for scuttling labor reform and urged the election of a Republican Congress so that sound anti-racketeering legislation could be enacted. In California, for example, he called for a Republican Congress "to fumigate corrupt labor unions" and in New York he urged election of Republicans to help "drive hoodlums out of labor."  

Whenever he cited labor reform, Mr. Eisenhower merchandised the three basic themes set forth in the "strategic" campaign booklets.

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41 Based on analysis of President's speech texts as they appear in: Public Papers of the President of the United States--Dwight D. Eisenhower 1958, op. cit.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.
released by Republican National Headquarters before the campaign proper got underway. His handling of the issue in his Los Angeles speech is typical:

"Last session I urged Congress to give American workers the weapons to drive racketeers and corrupt leaders out of the labor movement. Republicans in the Congress went full out for the law. But the radical opposition killed it--offering in its place a substitute far too weak to do the job. Rightly, Republicans rejected that political bait."44

The President reiterated substantially the same remarks in his San Francisco speech the following day.

It remained for Secretary of Labor Mitchell to continue to play the only specific role in pinning the blame for killing off labor reform on the Democrats on a point-by-point analysis basis and in setting down specific labor reform proposals. As he had done prior to the White House strategy conference of October 6--which he did not attend--Mr. Mitchell continued to make "political" and "non-political" talks. It was in his "political" talks, distributed through the National Committee and made to party audiences, that the Secretary roasted the Democrats for "hypocrisy" and for killing off the labor reform effort. And it was through his "non-political" talks--released through the Labor Department--that he enunciated specific labor reform legislative proposals.

Thus, in a "political" speech in Bristol, Pennsylvania, on October 21, Mr. Mitchell reiterated that only a Republican Congress

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44 Ibid., pp. 757-63.
could enact union reform legislation. The speech, made in support of Rep. Kearns' campaign for reelection, pointed up the fact that Mr. Kearns—if reelected—would be chairman of the House Labor Committee given a Republican Congress and that he had promised to push labor reform on a first priority basis. 45

The Secretary again made the detailed argument in support of the thesis that the Democrats in the last Congress had deliberately scuttled "labor reforms" and promised that the Administration would seek "a complete program for labor reform...We are going after the hoodlums and racketeers in the labor movement; and we won't spare crooked employers."

In a "non-political" address to the Hennepin County Bar Association in Minneapolis on October 28, Mr. Mitchell set forth the specifics of a labor reform proposal which the President would send to the new Congress. He avoided any overt mention of Democrats or an assessment of blame for failure to enact reform legislation in the last Congressional session. But Mr. Mitchell was able to nevertheless point the finger at the Democratic-controlled Congress by subtle indirection given the campaign context in which he was speaking. Said Mr. Mitchell:

"It is my hope that Congress will act speedily to fully consider and enact into law adequate labor reform legislation which will in truth, as

well as illusion, protect the workers of America
and the American public from corruption and abuses
in labor-management relations. "46

Mr. Mitchell went on to point out that the Administration
proposal would include provisions against secondary boycotts,
"blackmail picketing," theft and misuse of union funds, collusion
between employer and union representatives, and undemocratic
practices in the choice of union officials. The proposed legislation,
he continued, would also close the gap "that now exists between State
and Federal law," and would "amend the Taft-Hartley Act to make it
more fair to both labor and management."


Secretary of Labor Mitchell, Vice President Nixon and Senator
William Knowland played the key roles in the Party in Power's closing
"national" propaganda efforts bearing on the labor reform issue. And
all added new twists to their previous positions.

In Seattle, Washington, the Vice President issued a statement
for release on November 2 which was his first to label "labor racketeer-
ing" as such as a "major national" issue. Previously, he had carefully
avoided giving labor reform lead prominence in his speech texts. "On
the basis of my visits to 25 states during the past five weeks," Mr.
Nixon began, "I find that the four major national as distinguished from

Outlines Labor Reform Legislation Plans at Bar Meeting," Washington,
local issues are peace, progress, inflation and labor racketeering."

Mr. Nixon also harked back to the theme that a Republican Congress alone could pass effective labor reform legislation because the "labor politicians" would control a Democratic Congress.

In Newark, New Jersey, Secretary of Labor Mitchell wound up his "political" speaking chores with a ringing denunciation of the Democratically-controlled Congress and reiteration of his chronological discussion of how the Democrats had maneuvered to kill labor reform in the last session while the Republicans had fought for a sound bill.

But Mr. Mitchell in this closing speech also laid stress on something he had not pointed up in prior speeches—the split between "Northern Democrats" and the Southerners in Congress and the fact that both "wings" were guilty of blocking labor reform. He charged that "Northern Democrats in Congress stood by in silence while Southern Democrats so maneuvered a bad labor reform bill that there was no chance of improving it, and no chance of passing any kind of labor bill at all."

And in California, Senator Knowland and his supporters made a move which may well have reflected their desperation. They succeeded in securing and publicizing a telegram of support for the Senator from

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Secretary Mitchell. As previously noted, Mitchell had gone on record against a state right-to-work law which Knowland was strongly supporting in his race for the governorship.

In the Mitchell wire which was read by Knowland over a state-wide television hook-up, Mitchell was quoted as follows: "If I were there I would urge every voter in California to support your candidacy for Governor. Your dedicated efforts on behalf of working people, your great leadership in the United States Senate, and your devotion to the Eisenhower Administration programs, have earned for you the confidence of all Americans." 49

Following the reading of the Mitchell telegram, Knowland forces advised the press that "we think this shows it is possible for people to support Knowland even if they are against right-to-work laws." 50 Apparently, they had come to realize that right-to-work in California was a losing issue for those who supported it.

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50 Ibid.
CHAPTER IX

The Defense Issue

In its decision to merchandise the "National Defense" issue, the Party in Power was very obviously on the defensive. The Democratic assault against the Administration's defense policies at the outset of the campaign surpassed—in its fury and degree of concentration—the attacks made on most other grounds. The initial Republican propaganda strategy was thus clearly conditioned by this sustained assault.

The Democratic attack began in earnest on August 11 when the Democratic-controlled House Government Operations Committee issued a report based on an inquiry into Defense Department research and development activities. The basic allegation of the report was that the U.S. missile research effort had suffered greatly because of the Eisenhower Administration's fiscal policies. Committee Republicans promptly charged the Democratic majority with "carelessly playing politics with national defense" and spending public funds for an investigation promoting what they called "Democratic political propaganda." ¹

In putting its emphasis on the missile lag, the House report, in effect, outlined what was to be the heart of the campaign debate


² Ibid.
over national defense. Senator Kennedy (D., Mass.), took up the "missile gap" charge in a speech on August 14 in which he said the Administration's missile policies might give Russia "a new shortcut to world domination." Kennedy accused the Administration of misleading the Congress and the American people as well. He suggested that even Mr. Eisenhower was "on occasion" misled through misinformation given him by subordinates.

The assault continued on August 23 with Senators Symington (D., Mo.), Morse (D., Ore.), and Clark (D., Pa.) joining in. The renewed attack came on the heels of a talk in defense of Administration missile policy by Senator Saltonstall (R., Mass.). The Saltonstall speech was billed as a reaction to the Kennedy attack and Defense Department officials reportedly helped in its preparation. Senator Symington termed the Administration's policy and "misleading" Administration claims as to the effectiveness of that policy "very dangerous to national security." Morse bluntly labeled Saltonstall's speech "thoroughly unsound."


4 Fleeson, Doris. "Answering Defense Critics," The Evening Star (August 22, 1958). Fleeson reported that "Top officials at the Pentagon cooperated in the preparation of his (Saltonstall's) remarks and were under White House notice to give as much information as they possibly could, consistent with security."

The initial Democratic national "missile" assault came to a climax in a speech on September 3 before the 40th American Legion national convention by former President Harry S. Truman. Mr. Truman charged that the United States was behind the Soviet Union in missile development. "The Russians," he asserted, "have missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead from their continent to ours. We are also behind in the number and quality of short-range missiles." The ex-President's statements were wildly applauded.

1. **Initial Republican Strategic Response**

In its initial strategic response revealed in basic campaign propaganda documents released late in August and early in September, the Party in Power concentrated its fire on countering the Democratic missile charges though labeling the basic issue in question as "defense" or "national defense." Analysis of the five basic "issue" documents issued by the Republican National Committee and of the Republican Congressional Committees' *1958 Campaign Speech Kit* reveals a focus on three theses:

(1) The Democrats allowed missile development to lag; (2) The Republican Administration has created an effective and diversified missile force; (3) The Republicans are spending much more than the Democrats did on missiles. Of the five National headquarters documents, only one—the *1958 Speakers Handbook*—presented the

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defense issue in broader terms but even the Handbook devoted two entire pages to disputing the charge that "The Republican Administration has allowed our missile program to lag."  

The 1958 Campaign Speech Kit gave missile policy paramount billing in its discussion of the Democratic "era of errors" and Republican defense achievements. Its basic line was in accord with treatment given the defense issue by the Republican National Committee's basic "issue" documents which discussed "defense" primarily or exclusively in "missile" terms. Thus, one document stated:

"More than 99 percent of money used for missiles was spent under present Administration; less than 1 percent under Truman. Developing the 1500-mile missile, Thor, we accomplished 8 years' work in 3."  

Still another of the booklets expounded the three-part basic missile thesis as follows:

"Truman spent 30 times more for surplus peanuts than he did for long-range missiles. Not until Ike took over, did the missile program get off the ground. More than 99% of the money spent on missiles by the U. S. has been spent by Ike. Missile expenditures are 1,000 times what they were in Truman's last year. Eleven missile types are operational; work is being rushed on 35 more advanced types."  

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A third defined a basic "G.O.P. Principle" in terms which emphasized missile development within a somewhat broader context:

"Republicans have built and maintained the greatest defensive force in history and reorganized it to gain the flexibility demanded by the atomic age. They have perfected a missile arsenal of 11 operational types with work being rushed on 35 more, including the ICBM. They are spending five times as much in a single day on missile research as was spent in the entire last year of the preceding Administration." ¹¹

The question of nuclear disarmament or—more specifically—of banning atom tests was very much in the news during the 1958 campaign with both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in extensive atomic testing. Both were also actively engaged in propagandizing their respective policies and in charging each other with blocking progress toward achievement of a sound atomic disarmament agreement. However, the Democrats did not seek to make an issue of atomic disarmament. ¹² And the Republican issue materials likewise stayed away from it as an issue. Only the Speakers Handbook went into the question of atomic disarmament at all—and this on a single page well toward the back of the book. ¹³


¹² The basic Democratic National Committee campaign document makes no mention of the atomic disarmament question whatsoever. Democratic National Committee. The 1958 Democratic Fact Book, Washington, D.C. (August, 1958). The Congressional Democrats did not raise the issue during the campaign period and the two basic National Committee foreign policy statements—the Acheson statement of September 6 and the Advisory Committee statement of October 11—make no mention of it.

¹³ Republican Speakers Handbook, op. cit., p. 56.
2. Nixon and the "Missile Gap"

Vice President Nixon's role in merchandising the Party in Power's defense theme across the country was unlike that which he played in the handling of the economic prosperity and other major "issues." Nixon gave national defense considerably less emphasis in his total campaign speaking effort than he did other issues. And—significantly—he received considerably less oratorical support from the Cabinet level insofar as defense was concerned than he had received in conjunction with the foreign policy, labor reform and economic prosperity issues.

Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy was out of the country on an Asian tour for much of October and early November and thus made no practical contribution to the campaign speech effort. Nixon thus had to depend upon such "second-stringers" as Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Roy W. Johnson, head of the newly-created Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which was charged with supervising the Pentagon's space research effort. However, neither Twining nor Johnson made a sustained contribution to the carrying of the campaign speaking burden nor did any other Pentagon top-drawer official.

The Defense Department's contribution in the propaganda sense was more in the realm of deeds than in words and was made primarily by the Air Force. The propaganda role played by the Pentagon and by

the New National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will be detailed below.

Judging from an analysis of the Nixon speech texts released to the press, the Vice President's discussion of the Administration's defense policy was geared to three factors: (1) He built his defense arguments around the Administration's achievements in the missile field; (2) He limited his discussion almost exclusively to the West Coast; and (3) He made his most detailed elaboration of the missile situation in those West Coast areas in which missile production facilities were heavily concentrated.

All in all, Nixon made only three talks in which the defense-missile issue was a central theme. These talks were spaced just two weeks apart. The first was made in San Diego, California on October 1, the second in Los Angeles on October 15 and the third in Everett, Washington on October 31. The Vice President's only (published) references to defense and the missile issue outside of the Far West consisted of brief one-paragraph mentions in two speeches—one in Columbus, Ohio and the other in Indianapolis, Indiana.

The San Diego and Everett speeches represented a faithful recording of the missile issue as defined in the Republican National Committee's basic issue documents of late August and early September. In both speeches, the Vice President hammered at the

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15 Based on perusal of all texts issued by the Vice President's office.
Truman Administration's failures in the missile field, on Republican
creation of an effective missile force, and on Republican expenditures
for missiles. This is the heart of the Nixon missile argument as it
appeared in his San Diego speech:

"....the United States is today stronger than any
potential enemy and we have the will, the ability and
over all the military program to maintain that position
of superiority. Those who keep hammering at the gap
are playing politics with national defense. They are
using the old political trick of blaming their opponents
for their own guilt. If there is a gap in missiles, it
is a gap that was opened by the Truman Administration
and it is a gap that is being closed rapidly and effec­tively by the Eisenhower Administration.

"The Truman Administration cancelled the Atlas
program in 1947 and delayed it in succeeding years.
They spent a total of $6.6 million on long-range
ballistic missiles from 1945 through July 1953. By
July 1959 the Eisenhower Administration will have
spent $6.6 billion--a ratio of 1000 to 1. They
spent 30 times as much in the Truman Administration
on peanuts as they did on missiles."16

Nixon repeated this argument in his Everett speech and the
essence of the argument--as well as specific figures and phrases--
may be found in the basic issue documents disseminated before the
campaign got underway by Republican National Headquarters.

3. The Pentagon Contribution to the Campaign

Oratorical support for the Republican campaign effort was
neither sustained nor well organized by the Pentagon as, for example,
it was by the Department of Labor, and the Department of Agriculture.

16 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts from the Remarks of the Vice
President of the United States, San Diego, California (October 1, 1958).
Both Secretaries Benson and Mitchell played very substantial speaking roles in the campaign and their speaking schedules were carefully worked out in conjunction with Republican National Headquarters. 17

With Secretary of Defense McElroy out of the country and Under Secretary Quarles playing a relatively passive role, "upper-brass" Department of Defense contributions to the speech parade were sporadic at best. But when speeches were made, the speakers had a very careful eye on the domestic scene with particular reference to the "missile gap" strategy as laid down in Republican National Committee campaign documents.

On September 19, for example, General Nathan Twining defended Administration defense policy in a speech to a Washington audience, taking to task the critics who had raised the "missile-gap" issue. The most substantial body of critics at the time were Democrats in Congress or running for Congress. Twining cited numerous U. S. military achievements of the past year but he stressed the launching of four satellites and a number of "very successful" missile firings. His conclusion: "I say in full confidence that we are militarily superior over all to the Soviet Union today." 18

ARPA Director Roy W. Johnson made a campaign contribution in a laboratory center dedication speech in Stamford, Connecticut,

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17 See Chapters VII and VIII.

on October 8. The heart of Mr. Johnson's talk had to do with missiles. Mr. Johnson received newspaper headlines with a statement which read, "It is our plan to have a man in space inside of 24 to 36 months." The statement was a last-minute insertion which did not appear in his prepared text as released to the press and Johnson would not elaborate as to the type of space vehicle he had in mind. The 24-to-36 month time element is what specifically attracted press notice.

The most impressive Pentagon contributions to campaign propaganda on the missile issue, however, had to do with concrete activities rather than with oratory per se. The two major deeds were achieved primarily by the U. S. Air Force and--while there is no overt evidence that they were "achieved" in keeping with specific directives from the White House for campaign purposes--both had obvious domestic political implications. Circumstantial evidence and some not so circumstantial strongly suggest that their timing was dictated by Republican campaign strategy.

The first of the deeds was the launching of what the Pentagon claimed was a "lunar probe" on October 11, 1958. The "probe" was a three-stage experimental rocket with an instrumented payload. It was named "Pioneer." The rocket ascended some 80,000 miles into space before ceasing to function. It did not remotely approach the moon.

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The evidence—circumstantial and other—which underscores the political nature of the venture is cited below. The missile was labeled a "lunar probe" in Pentagon press releases though government scientists directly concerned with the lunar probe program knew that the United States then lacked the technological capacity to approach anywhere near the moon with a missile. The United States had not achieved a truly effective "moon probe" more than a year after the launching of "Pioneer" despite several well-publicized attempts.

The Pentagon's handling of the information released in conjunction with the launching further suggests its political motivation. Between 4:45 a.m. on October 11—three minutes after the reported launching time—and 4:05 p.m. of the same day, the Defense Department issued seven progress bulletins on the flight of the missile. The phraseology "lunar probe" does not appear until the second bulletin issued sixteen minutes after launching, thus allowing the Pentagon informational specialists adequate time in which to assure themselves that the rocket was at least going to clear the atmosphere and move some distance into space. The term "Pioneer" does not appear until the third bulletin issued an hour and twenty minutes after launching when the missile was well over 12,000 nautical

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23 Ibid.
miles away. The Pentagon's clearance system is such that the title "Pioneer" must have been developed and held in reserve well before the actual launching took place. 25

In its launching day bulletins and in a basic cover statement, the Pentagon hailed the Pioneer as a "stunning success" in that it was "the first man-made object known to escape the earth's gravitational field." In its sixth of the seven progress bulletins, after having announced that Pioneer was departing from its planned trajectory, the Pentagon announced that: "Another first has been achieved in this historic flight in that scientific data is being reduced and almost simultaneously distributed for use." 26

A week after the launching, the Pentagon was still exploiting the Pioneer. A widely-distributed newspaper article quoted an Air Force report which disclosed that the lunar probe had revealed new communications possibilities: "By relaying radio signals between Hawaii, Florida and England, it (Pioneer) demonstrated that space vehicles could be used as links in a global communication network." 27

The press article stated that IGY (International Geophysical Year)

24 Ibid.

25 This assumption is based upon the writer's personal experience with federal clearance systems.


and key Defense Department officials in Washington were surprised by the Air Force finding and announcement. W. W. Kellogg, head of the U. S. technical panel on satellites for IGY, said he had not even known that the communications experiment had been planned.  

The second Pentagon "deed" which played a major propaganda role in definition of the defense-missile issue from the Party in Power's point of view had to do with the "unveiling" of the supersonic experimental plane, the X-15. More than a year after the unveiling on October 15, 1958, the X-15 was still not truly operative.

The X-15 was billed as the first "rocket ship" designed to carry man to outer space and back. Newspaper reports estimated its maximum altitude at 400 miles and its speed as one that "may range up to 4,500 miles an hour." The defense implications of the X-15 were implicit in the announcement that it would be launched by B-52 bombers from 40,000 feet up.

The evidence that the X-15 unveiling was related directly to the Party in Power's campaign strategy is even more explicit than in the case of the Pioneer. The roll-out ceremonies in Los Angeles were well publicized and the unveiling itself timed so that it coordinated perfectly with Vice President Nixon's West Coast campaign speaking

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28 Ibid.

schedule which was worked out very carefully in advance. The Vice President made the key speech at the time of roll-out. Mr. Nixon focused his fire squarely and primarily on the missile-issuse and secondarily, on the fact that the X-15 was a tribute to the fine coordination of Federal activities in the space field. Congressional Democrats had not spoken kindly of the manner in which the Administration coordinated its space activities and one of the basic arguments for legislative authorization of the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration was the lack of existing coordination.

The Vice President stated, in part:

"With the X-15 following the magnificent achievement of the Pioneer, Americans can proudly say today that we have moved into first place in the race to outer space....But the X-15 is perhaps the most exciting because of the fact that it is designed to carry man into space for the first time. It is not designed to take man into the lower reaches of the universe beyond us as a stunt. The X-15 is an integral part of an orderly and reasoned space program. It is the first and logical step in space exploration. Beyond that the X-15 is a testimony to the cooperation of every agency concerned with space—the research scientists, the Air Force and the Navy, the engineers and the technicians in industry and the scientist pilots in industry, the Armed Services and the Space Agency."

Mr. Nixon's emphasis on U. S. leadership and sound coordination of the government's space activities coupled with a dramatic unveiling of what was, in effect, a manned missile was a more effective propaganda argument for countering the Democrat "missile-gap" charges than mere oratory alone.

31 Ibid.
4. The NASA Contribution

The new National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was authorized by legislation enacted July 29, 1958 to direct and coordinate the "civilian" aspects of the Nation's space research effort. It absorbed the "going organization" of the old-line National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The President, who recommended the agency's creation to Congress, issued an executive order transferring both funds and specific responsibility for various satellite and missile programs to the new agency in September.

The essence of the NASA propaganda contribution to the 1958 campaign was the issuance of a barrage of press releases during late September and early October designed to create the impression that NASA was a fully organized, fully operative entity in the space research field. This, though the agency was still in the actual process of organization and was hiring key personnel three months after the releases had been issued.

Thus, on September 25, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan issued a proclamation stating that "I hereby proclaim that the National

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33 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Executive Order Transferring Certain Functions from the Department of Defense to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D. C. (October 1, 1958).

34 NASA press releases specifically mentioned the hiring and assignment of key personnel long after the reorganization announcement.
Aeronautics and Space Administration has been organized and is prepared to discharge the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it.... This proclamation was issued a month before the enabling legislation required that the new agency be organized and operating. At the time, NASA was definitely not in a state "to discharge" the prescribed duties or to "exercise" the prescribed powers.

On October 1, NASA issued a "fact sheet" setting forth the legislative and administrative background which brought it into being and describing the "Satellite Project," the "Lunar Probes" and the missile engine developmental responsibilities that it was taking over from the Pentagon. At the time, NASA was not equipped either in the organizational or personnel sense to operate effectively in any of these fields.

On October 5, NASA announced the appointment and/or assignment of eleven "top management" personnel in the new organization. Brief biographical sketches of the appointees were appended to the announcement.

On October 7, NASA announced that it was appointing

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36 This was ascertained by personal visit to the agency by the writer and is implicit in the fact that key appointments were being made at the top management level after the announcement was issued.

a new general counsel—a lawyer who then held the same position for the Air Force. The rash of appointment announcements was consistent with the overall policy directed to convincing the public that the Administration was moving with remarkable speed and efficiency in its organization of "civilian" missile activities.

During the closing days of the campaign, NASA made two contributions to the man-in-space propaganda which were consistent both with the Nixon approach at the unveiling of the X-15 and with the general propaganda premise that man-in-space had dramatic defense implications for the man-in-the-street.

On October 31, NASA announced that "more than a score of the nation's missile and aviation manufacturers" would meet at Langley Field (near Washington) on Friday, November 7 with a view to inviting bid proposals for development of "flyable mock-ups" for use in ballistic flight tests relating to the man-in-space program. The announcement, as such, had little intrinsic news value inasmuch as NASA had not yet even reached the stage of knowing what it wanted or of actually opening the way for bids. The announcement could have been made with equal or better effect on November 5 or even thereafter if the aim were purely to keep the general public informed.


On November 3—the day before election—Dr. Hugh L. Dryden suddenly announced that a "moon shot" was scheduled for some time later in the week. Dr. Dryden was then Deputy Administrator of NASA. The timing of the Dryden announcement could hardly have been coincidental. The "moon shot" was not fired later that week.

5. The Eisenhower Role

The Republican strategists did not overlook the potential of ex-General Eisenhower as a defender of the Administration's missile position. And they saw to it that the defense was made to the broadest possible audience. The President made four major televised "regional" addresses respectively in Los Angeles (October 20), Chicago (October 22), Pittsburgh (October 27) and Baltimore (October 31). He also appeared on a TV panel discussion in San Francisco on October 21. In all of these speeches, the President spoke of missile matters and—in all but the Pittsburgh address—he spoke of them at some length.

The President did not discuss the "missile gap" or defense generally in the numerous short speeches he made to Republican rallies on both coasts—speeches which were not televised.

40 The Evening Star (November 3, 1958). Dryden himself was present at the Congressional hearing in August in which members of his staff informed Congressmen that firing of lunar probes was—technologically speaking—a minimum of 1 to 2 years away. (See citation 21, this chapter).

The President handled the missile-defense issue with generalizations. Though he employed one or two figures to indicate the magnitude of the Nation's missile program, he shied away from specifics either as to the number and types of missiles in existence or as to the specific amount of money being expended for missile development. In this respect, his approach differed from that of Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Eisenhower set the pattern for his entire handling of the missile issue during the campaign with his major speech in Los Angeles on October 20. That speech stressed national defense and made bows to each of the four services, the U. S. early warning system and the "unmatched competence" of U. S. atomic submarines. But its emphasis was on the missile issue—an emphasis fully consistent with the pattern set in the Republican National Committee's strategic "issue" documents. The President blamed the Democrats for the missile lag, said the Republicans were rapidly closing the gap vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and stressed Republican spending on missile development.

This is how Mr. Eisenhower put it:

"For eight years after World War II, there was inadequate emphasis on development of long-range ballistic missiles. In fact, in no single year was more than a million dollars actually spent for this purpose until this Administration took office.

"Now one of my earliest acts at this time was to start an exhaustive scientific study of missiles. This study made our need crystal clear—and all long-range ballistic missile research and development programs were given the Nation's highest
priority as to talent and money. Hundreds of millions go into the program annually.

"As a result, today the so-called missile gap is being rapidly filled. I assure you that the progress we have made on every type of missile and rocket should awaken the pride of every American citizen."42

The President reiterated substantially the same argument in a televised panel discussion with Women Republicans in San Francisco the following day and repeated the Los Angeles material almost verbatim in his Chicago speech on October 22.

In his wind-up speech in Baltimore on October 31, the President again reiterated the material contained in his Los Angeles and Chicago talks but added one new twist. He picked up a reference to the Pioneer rocket which the Pentagon had moved into the headlines earlier in the month. "Sputniks," said Mr. Eisenhower, "have been matched by Explorers, Vanguard, and Pioneers.44

6. Avoidance of Controversial Decisions or Announcements

As was true in the foreign policy field (see Chapter VI), the Administration made a sustained effort to avoid decisions, actions or statements which would open up new areas of controversy relating to the defense program. This is best illustrated by comparing Administration defense statements and announcements during the campaign with what was done in the comparable period the year before.

42 Ibid., pp. 757-65.

43 Ibid., pp. 786-94.

44 Ibid., pp. 819-26.
October, 1957, was a month literally jammed with Administration statements in the defense field which were controversial and which were productive of considerable anxiety both among defense manufacturers and the various Armed Services. On October 2, for example, retiring Secretary of Defense Wilson announced the decision by the Air Force "to limit payments temporarily to major aircraft contractors regardless of the size of the bills they present to the government."\(^45\)

On the same day, the chiefs of the military services let it be known that they felt the Administration's economy policy had brought combat capacity down "to a dangerous minimum."\(^46\) On October 4, the Air Force announced that a B-47 Unit had been dropped in the economy drive.\(^47\) Pentagon officials on October 5 told the press that the decision to separate the Vanguard satellite project from missile development in 1955 "delayed the program."\(^48\) On October 7, the military service chiefs were reported to be readying an appeal to the newly-appointed Defense Secretary (McElroy) to halt defense cuts.\(^49\)

On October 8, retiring Secretary Wilson stated that the ICBM was "some little time off" and that he had received no orders from the


\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Ibid. (October 5, 1957).

\(^{48}\) Ibid. (October 6, 1957).

\(^{49}\) Ibid. (October 7, 1957).
White House to speed up the U. S. missile program. And on the same day, "Pentagon scientists" leaked a story to the New York Times that "plans for new military research projects have been brought to a standstill by limitations on spending."  

In the face of considerable pressure and criticism from Democrats in Congress, the Administration in mid-October continued to avoid any commitment to an increase in defense funds and on October 19, the Army announced a cut of 48,000 men in its strength and plans to reduce the manpower in 14 domestic garrisons by mid-1958. On October 28, Army leaders publicly criticized Administration restrictions on Army development of missiles.

At the end of October, 1957, the Administration finally gave in to various domestic pressures and agreed to revoke a $170 million defense expenditure reduction which had been authorized by Secretary Wilson. But that decision had come only after the Defense Department and the various Service branches had filled the mass media with statements and "informal" information indicative of the controversy then raging within the Department and productive of controversy outside.

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50 Ibid. (October 9, 1957).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. (October 19, 1957).
53 Ibid. (October 29, 1957).
54 Ibid.
Clearly, the Administration took no definitive action in 1957 to muzzle or suppress controversial utterances or decisions.

October, 1958—the heart of the campaign period—was a very different story. It was virtually barren of Defense Department statements calculated or liable to provoke controversy. This, despite the great pressure for increased missile expenditures implicit in the Democratic attack. Further, there was a sum of $1 billion in excess of the Administration budget request which Congress had voted for defense expenditures and this sum was not freed for use in the defense effort during the campaign nor did Pentagon spokesmen who were asked about it commit themselves to freeing it. What they did do was temporize—avoid any specific commitment one way or the other.  

Acting Secretary of Defense Quarles went so far as to announce that the Defense Department had instructed the Armed Services to "tread gingerly when they express opinions on the Formosa situation." The fact is that the various Armed Forces components "tread gingerly" in expressing any opinions which might prove embarrassing to the Administration in the political sense.

The one controversial defense item that broke into the open was a fight between NASA and the Army over an NASA effort to get White House authorization to take over Army missile research facilities at the

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Both Secretary McElroy and Undersecretary Quarles took this noncommittal position in statements on September 12 and October 9 respectively. Cited in The Evening Star, editions of September 12, 1958 and October 10, 1958 respectively.

"Lid Tightened on Comments by Military," The Evening Star (October 10, 1958).
California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and in Huntsville, Alabama. The matter was handled with a White House announcement on October 29 that no decision would be reached until further meetings had been held. 57

Related to this Administration suppression-of-controversy policy vis-à-vis defense was the Pentagon's apparent response to a charge by Representative Moss (D., Calif.). Mr. Moss, who heads the Government Information Subcommittee, stated that the Air Force was withholding an inspector general's report on management of its missile program from The General Accounting Office. 58 GAO Controller General Joseph Campbell complained about this "concealment" of data to Mr. Moss and Mr. Moss wrote Air Force Secretary James Douglas that the Pentagon was violating the law by refusing to release the data. The Moss letter was made public on October 3.

The Air Force made no immediate move to release the report in question but—on the same day that the Moss letter was made public—the Office of the Secretary of Defense announced a mass declassification and downgrading of most of the secret papers that had "been piling up between the Civil War and the end of World War II." 59


The Defense Department also released copies of an internal directive signed by Acting Secretary Quarles which stated, in part:

"It is the fundamental policy of the Department to make the maximum information available to the public consistent with military security and with over-all national interest. Arbitrary and unreasonable withholding must be avoided. And no information otherwise releasable may be withheld because its release might tend to reveal administrative error or inefficiency, or might be embarrassing."^60

The fact is that this administrative order was not prepared specifically as an answer to the Moss charge but was the product of many months of work. But the Pentagon had long been under fire from Democratic and other sources because of its informational policies and "suppression" was not a charge likely to foster the Administration's best interests during the campaign. ^61 The timing of the Quarles' directive and its public release in directive form are what label it as political propaganda in the campaign context.

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^60 Ibid.

^61 The Moss Committee was publicly criticizing Pentagon policies relative to classification of documents and their release many months prior to the launching of the campaign.
CHAPTER X

Preservation of the Free Enterprise System

The Party in Power's decision to merchandise "preservation of the free enterprise system" as one of the basic issues of the 1958 campaign was not a defensive maneuver in the sense that the "national defense-missile gap" issue was. The Democrats did not attack the Republican Administration as a "threat to free enterprise" per se at any time during the campaign. Yet, the Republican decision was not without its defensive implications.

The Republican strategists anticipated that the Democrats would attack the Administration for failing to provide adequate assistance to small business and for supporting big business at the expense of small. Merchandising of the "preservation of free enterprise" issue had the advantage both of equating the Administration's policies with general support of all private business and of appealing to the more conservative elements of the Republican Party on philosophical grounds. In the latter context, the Party in Power persistently used the "free enterprise" issue in conjunction with its basic "Radical-Democrat" campaign theme (see Chapter III).

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1 This is attested to by the issuance of a Republican campaign document in August--before the Democratic assault really got underway--in which "the charge" that "small business has suffered because GOP has favored big business" is discussed and rebutted at some length. The Republican National Committee, Democrat Distortions vs The Facts, Washington, D. C. (September, 1958).
The Democratic attack on the Administration's "Big Business" propensities and on Small Business failures was overtly crystallized by the Democratic National Committee in its Fact Book. The Fact Book, which set the Democrats' strategic pace for the campaign, was distributed to Democratic Congressional candidates and their supporting campaign organizations in August.

In the Fact Book, the Democrats charged the Republicans with (a) giving increased defense orders to big business at the expense of small; (b) interfering with Federal Trade Commission law enforcement and allowing "soft settlements" in anti-monopoly cases and (c) enforcing tight money policies that deprive small businessmen of needed loan funds. Secondarily, the Democrats pointed up increases in small business failures since the Eisenhower Administration took office, a decline in the small business share of total manufacturing profits and sales, and a drop in small business starts.

1. Initial Republican Definition of the Issue

With election day less than three weeks away, Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn termed "maintaining and strengthening the private enterprise system" one of the "six major issues" of the 1958 campaign. Mr. Alcorn continued:


\[3\text{Ibid., pp. 57-58.}\]
"This is not an abstraction either. This system has brought us the highest living standards man has ever achieved. It cannot operate effectively if the Federal government is in the hands of men with a determination to control and to regiment labor, agriculture and business. A left-wing Congress dominated by the Paul Douglases, the Wayne Morses, the Walter Reuthers and the Hubert Humphreys will become a reality in the event of a Democrat sweep this year. All Americans should take a long, hard look at the certain consequences that would stem from this."4

Chairman Alcorn's terming the "free enterprise" issue one of the "major issues" of the campaign merely confirmed a strategic decision reached many weeks before.5 The five basic issue-defining documents released to Republican candidates and their supporters by Republican National Headquarters in late August and early September bear this out as does the consistency with which the issue was hammered by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon and other top level spokesmen.

Every one of the five Republican issue definition documents touched on free enterprise. Four of them defined the "preservation of free enterprise" as one of the key issues of the campaign. All five stressed the Administration's contribution to Small Business and sought to cope with the charge that the Republicans were the party of Big Business. Three contrasted the Republican "contribution" to free enterprise with the Democratic threat to it. None of the

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5 See Footnote 1, this chapter.
documents mentioned the Administration's anti-trust activities even indirectly.

The Republican Speakers Handbook gave the need "to maintain a free enterprise economy" second place in its list of seven basic issues which called for election of a Republican Congress. Republicans, it stated, "work for a free enterprise economy, a minimum of government intervention in economic life, responsible State and local governments, ....". In contrast, The Handbook asserted, "Democrats want a controlled economy. They are quick to call for price controls, more regulation of the farmer and the businessman. They work to centralize power in Washington."^6

A second booklet, which compared "G.O.P. Principles" with the "Democrat Philosophy," stated:

"Republicans regard private business, large and small, as a dynamic force for growth and prosperity which should ever be fostered and encouraged. American free-enterprise has provided the Nation with comforts, economic security and living standards which are the marvel of the civilized world."^7

As for the Democrats, the booklet held:

"Democrats have demonstrated on many occasions their lack of faith in private enterprise, whether it be the corner store or a multimillion dollar corporation. They insist that business must be burdened by heavy taxation and subjected to a multitude of controls enforced by bureaucrats. Furthermore, they seek to extend

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Government operation of business enterprises.\textsuperscript{8}

A third of the five basic issue-definition documents handled the Republican-Democratic contrast on the free enterprise issue in the same vein if with different semantics. Speaking of the Republican Administration, the booklet asserted that:

"Stifling government controls have been lifted from the backs of the Nation's business community. An era of business-baiting and punitive legislation came to an end when the Eisenhower Administration took office. In the eyes of the federal government it is once more respectable to be a businessman. In this climate, American business has prospered and expanded as never before."

As for the Democrats, the booklet prophesied, "The American people are not about to turn the reins of government back to a political party that for 20 long years insisted and repeatedly attempted to prove that Washington could do a better job of managing the economy than the people themselves."\textsuperscript{9}

Though all five of the basic issue documents took up the Republican concern with Small Business, only three went into the matter in any depth.\textsuperscript{10} All three managed to cite a number of favorable statistics and Administration achievements without once contradicting any of the specific allegations made in the Democratic \textit{Fact Book}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[8] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[10] The \textit{Speakers Handbook}, \textit{Six Points for Republican Speakers}, and \textit{Democrat Distortions vs The Facts}, \textit{op. cit.}, are the three in question.
\end{footnotes}
Thus, the three booklets claimed: more small businesses were operating in 1958 than at any other time; small business failures were less "now than in 1939 although there are one-third more businesses"; small manufacturing corporations' profits after taxes were 7.6 pct. of owners' equity in 1957, 5.4 pct. in 1954; Small Business Administration was set up by Republicans; $3 billion in government purchases have been set aside for exclusive award to small business; over 11,500 loans totaling $535 million approved by SBA; and about one-fifth of defense contracts go to small business, "more than before 1953."

2. Mr. Nixon's Handling of the Free Enterprise Issue

Vice President Nixon discussed the "free enterprise" issue--in one way or another--in the great majority of his campaign speeches. Generally, he coupled discussion of the issue with the "Radical-Democrat" theme which was basic to the Republican campaign effort. By and large, Mr. Nixon defined the issue in generalities, avoiding any mention of small business aid figures, loans, failures or starts. And, as was true of the basic G.O.P. issue definition documents, he scrupulously avoided discussion of anti-monopoly or anti-trust activities.

This is how Mr. Nixon linked the "free enterprise" issue to the Radical-Democrat theme in his opening campaign speech in Indianapolis:
"...when you vote for more Democrats in the House and Senate you are voting to raise your taxes, cheapen your money, and to stifle the new investment and enterprise which means more jobs and more progress for the American people....Do you want to resist the trend to big government? By electing more of the radical ADA-type of Democrats to the House and Senate, you can be sure that a flood of bills will be introduced with the object of moving toward the nationalization of health, housing, power, farming and other American institutions. Because these radical ADA-type Democrats honestly and sincerely believe that government enterprise is superior to private enterprise in providing for the needs of the people."11

The Vice President employed some aspect of this approach in most of his speeches. However, there was considerable variation in the emphasis he put on "free enterprise preservation" from area to area and in a few places he clearly shied away from enunciating the theme altogether. This greatest emphasis on "free enterprise preservation" came in those areas believed to be most conservative and in which conservatism was measured by the extent to which Republicans dominated Congressional offices. Thus, he made his strongest pitch for "free enterprise" and against the Radical-Democrats in Indiana, Utah and Ohio.12

In 1958, both Indiana Senators were Republicans as were nine of the eleven members of the House of Representatives. In Utah, all


12 Based upon review of all of Mr. Nixon's published speech texts.
Congressional positions—the two in the Senate and the two in the House—were Republican-held. In Ohio, seventeen of twenty-three members of the House were Republicans as was one of the two Senators. The second Senator, Frank J. Lausche, is known as a very conservative Democrat who generally gets strong Republican support when he runs.  

Mr. Nixon's approach to the "free enterprise" issue was very different in the heavy unemployment areas with a substantial Labor vote. Thus, in Flint, Michigan, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Huntington, West Virginia, he made no specific appeal for "preservation of free enterprise" and soft-pedaled the "Radical-Democrat" theme. In Flint, free enterprise was not mentioned at all. In Huntington, West Virginia, the words "free enterprise" were used once but in a very different context. In these places, Mr. Nixon simply stated that Labor Union dependence on Washington for the settlement of Labor disputes would make a "mockery of a free labor movement and free enterprise."  

In the Farm Belt, Mr. Nixon's approach to the handling of the "free enterprise" issue generally differed from that in Utah, Ohio and


Indiana. Mr. Nixon did not hesitate to hit the "Radical-Democrat" theme but he tended to avoid any mention of "free enterprise" as such. It may be that he was sensitive to the possibility of an adverse reaction to Secretary of Agriculture Benson's "free enterprise" philosophy and to the fact that a substantial number of farmers were participants in government price support or "land bank" programs.

Thus, in Fort Dodge, Iowa, and Wichita, Kansas, Mr. Nixon referred to the "sound economic policies" of the Eisenhower Administration and "to the fact that in the twenty years of the New Deal and the Fair Deal, there was never prosperity on the farm except in war or as a result of war." He also stated that "farmers have not shared in America's increased prosperity to the extent that they should have in the past six years, not because of inadequacies in the law, but because of a rule of the market place that no law can change—mountainous surpluses lead to molehill prices."

Mr. Nixon did not here mention "free enterprise" nor did he state that the Democrats threatened it. In a second Wichita speech, he referred to the "radical policies" of the Democrats which "failed utterly to work in the past" but, once again, made no mention of "free enterprise" or of the Democratic threat to it. In Lincoln, Nebraska, late in the campaign, he again reiterated the "Radical Democrat" theme but, once again, avoided making any specific play on the "free enterprise" issue. He said:

"...I have found concern increasing everywhere among the people that they will be risking their prosperity and progress if they vote to increase the strength of the big spending radical wing of the Democratic Party in the Congress."17

In his home state of California, Mr. Nixon treated the "free enterprise" issue very differently from the manner in which he handled it in any other area of the country. He localized it completely—made it a state rather than a national issue. This novel pattern appears in Los Angeles speeches on September 30 and October 15 and in an Oakland talk on October 2. The September 30 speech was televised to the entire Southern California region.

The Oakland speech is typical of the three in the manner in which it raised the "free enterprise" issue. Interestingly enough, Mr. Nixon did not use the phrase "free enterprise" but simply pictured the Democrats running for California office as a threat to free enterprise by asserting that the policies they would pursue, if elected, would drive the state to the "brink of bankruptcy" and drive industry out of the state. This is the pertinent segment of the Oakland speech:

"If California has a state government which goes off on a wild spending spree that would mean unsound fiscal policies with higher taxes and debt, California's new investment progress would grind to a halt and business already here would seek a more friendly climate. And that is exactly what would happen if we turn the state over to Bill Knowland's opponent and the inexperienced group of candidates who are running with him for state office. However plausible or moderate he may sound in his speeches he is stuck

17 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Lincoln, Nebraska (October 25, 1958).
with the platform of his Party whether he likes it or not. That platform would inevitably lead to huge increases in the state budget and this in turn could mean not only higher taxes but pushing the state to the brink of bankruptcy from which Earl Warren rescued it when he took over from Culbert Olsen. Instead of attracting the new business that California needs for its increasing population, this kind of government would drive it away. 18

Mr. Nixon made more speeches in California than in any other state. California is his home state. It is also a state which was certain to play a leading role in determining the outcome of the 1960 election. In California, then, Mr. Nixon had much at stake. And his propaganda approach there sublimated his concern with the national campaign of 1958 to that with state politics in 1958 and the presidential race in 1960.

3. The President and Free Enterprise

Between October 17 and November 1, 1958, President Eisenhower made eleven campaign trail speeches or statements, two of them in the form of radio and/or television appearances wherein friendly panels fired questions at him. Of the eleven appearances, four were regional television-radio addresses. That is, they were speeches especially planned and staged with a view to making a maximum mass media impact in a selected group of states. 19

18 Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Oakland, California (October 2, 1958).

The radio-television regional addresses were made respectively in Los Angeles (October 20); Chicago (October 22); Pittsburgh (October 27); and Baltimore (October 31). The choice of both locations and dates reflects careful planning as does the fact that the President made not a single nationwide televised campaign speech. This limited approach to television was recommended by the Republican Campaign Plan, according to the man who was its initial drafter.

There is no question but that the President's entire tour was geared to the basic strategic decision to emphasize the "Radical-Democrat" theme and its concomitant issues: "Preservation of the Free Enterprise System" and "Fiscal Integrity." (The latter issue will be discussed in the next chapter). The Radical-Democrat theme is a significant portion of all but one of Mr. Eisenhower's campaign talks as is the "Free Enterprise" issue which is inevitably linked to the theme. This theme-issue linkage is most pronounced in the regional TV broadcasts.

The only speech in which the theme and issue are not stressed is the opening talk of the tour in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on October 17. This speech was also the only one devoted primarily to one problem rather than to many. It was a farm policy speech made on a farm in the heart of the Farm Belt.

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20 Conversation with Robert Humphreys, Republican National Committee Headquarters, June 11, 1958.

21 Public Papers of the Presidents, *op. cit.*, pp. 752-56.
As was true in the National Committee's "basic issue" documents and of Mr. Nixon's speeches generally, Mr. Eisenhower sought to contrast "sound" Republicanism with "radical" Democracy insofar as the "free enterprise" issue was concerned. Like Mr. Nixon, he distinguished between the radical "left wing" of the Democratic Party and the more conservative Democrats. He took the occasion—in several key speeches—to emphasize what the Administration had done for small business. And, in keeping with the approach taken both by Mr. Nixon and the "basic issue" documents, he shunned discussion of the Administration's anti-trust activities.

On the one occasion where Mr. Eisenhower did mention the Administration's activities in the anti-trust field, he did so in response to a question. 22 And the manner in which he answered the question tended to substantiate the assumption that the Party in Power was avoiding the monopoly question as a matter of strategy. This assumption will be explored in some detail in subsequent pages.

Mr. Eisenhower's specific handling of the Radical-Democrat-Free Enterprise linkage is typified by his radio-television talk in Los Angeles on October 20—the talk which actually launched his overt assault against the opposition. The President said, in part:

"At the other extreme is the stronger wing, dominated by political radicals. The campaign we are in, and the campaign of that wing are still going on. Now these self-styled liberals are the ones who really challenge sane, forward-looking

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22 Ibid., pp. 765-73.
government in the United States. It is against the spread of their radical influence that we are waging this campaign."23

Then, Mr. Eisenhower made his link between theme and issue. He continued:

"In every session of Congress the Radicals persistently try to vest more and more responsibility in the Federal government. They are the ones who turn to Federal power even when private power can do the job—to government housing where private housing can meet the need—to Federal domination of agriculture rather than trusting to the initiative and freedom of the farmer—to Federal domination of nuclear power where private development will best serve the interests of the United States."24

This same kind of strong emphasis on "Radical" theme and "Free Enterprise" issue was to characterize a major talk in San Francisco (October 21), and, though carried through on a television panel show on the same day, it was somewhat played down on the latter as compared to the Los Angeles and San Francisco speeches.25

The strong emphasis was to be repeated in Chicago on October 22 both in a televised regional address and in a radio and newsreel panel discussion sponsored by the Republican National Committee. In the panel discussion, Mr. Eisenhower spoke at length of the Administration's contribution to the welfare of small business.


In talks in Charleston, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on October 27, Mr. Eisenhower again referred to the Administration's many achievements on behalf of small business. In the former speech, he soft-pedaled the "Radical-Democrat" theme and "Free Enterprise" issue, comparatively speaking, and in the latter he again made it the focal point of the speech. Both Charleston and Pittsburgh were areas with strong Labor vote concentrations and considerable unemployment. But Pittsburgh represented a regionally televised speech whereas the Charleston talk was purely local.

In his concluding campaign address in Baltimore on October 31—an address which was also the last of the four regional television broadcasts—Mr. Eisenhower was as emphatic on theme and issue as he had been in Los Angeles and in Chicago. But he also had two "surprises" which he attributed to the Republican concern with preserving free enterprise and the policies adopted to this end.

The first was a wire from the Secretary of Commerce which he read and in which the Secretary revealed: "I have just received the most recent figures on new construction activity. They make it clear that October sets an all-time high and that the construction industry

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will reach the $50 billion mark in 1958." The second "surprise" was to report that he--the President--had just learned in Washington that unemployment had dropped another 300,000 in October, making for a decline of 1/2 million over a three-month period.

In summarizing Mr. Eisenhower's role in the campaign, it can be said that he operated fully in line with the "Free Enterprise" issue context as set forth by the basic Republican pre-campaign documents and that he gave this issue more sustained attention on his tour than almost any other. His strategic emphasis throughout the tour--as previously noted--was on linking the "Radical-Democrat" theme with the issue in question. Though it is true that he avoided stressing the issue in his one Farm Belt talk and played it down in an area of heavy labor concentration and unemployment, it is equally true that he showed nothing approaching the geographical discrimination exercised by Mr. Nixon.

In effect, this element of discrimination was pretty much denied the President by virtue of the Republican strategists' decision to build the tour around four basic regional broadcasts. Within every region, there were communities containing sizeable voting blocs which one might reasonably expect to be little influenced by any discussion of "free enterprise" in the terms in which the Republicans enunciated the issue. Finally, Mr. Eisenhower's speeches were far fewer in number than Mr. Nixon's--a factor which of itself limited the opportunity for geographic discrimination in the handling of any issue.

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28 Ibid.
Basically, the objective of the tour was to employ the Eisenhower personality as a platform from which to merchandise the "Radical-Democrat" theme—the heart of the Republican assault in 1958.

4. Administration Dilemma on the Anti-Monopoly Front

In merchandising the "free enterprise preservation" issue, the Party in Power was caught between two fires. On one hand, the Administration was under heavy criticism from the Big Business community for hyper-activity in the anti-trust field. On the other, it was under Democratic attack for a "soft" anti-monopoly policy and for interfering with the Federal Trade Commission's operations on behalf of business "friends" of the Administration. The revelation that Sherman Adams had "contacted" the FTC on behalf of manufacturer Bernard Goldfine was the major development which lent credence to this last Democratic charge.

The President himself pointed up the fact that the Administration was being pressured by major business interests to soft-pedal its anti-trust activities in a statement made in San Francisco on October 21. He said, in part:

"...the biggest complaints I have heard from business have been from what is called big business. Many firms have said, that our Attorney General's office--Department of Justice--is just too eager in pushing anti-trust laws. Personally, I think he is doing exactly what the law requires, because that is what he is supposed to do....but nevertheless one of the reasons that has been given me for the lack of money that has come into the Republican
exchequers at all levels—city, state and federal—is that we have been too harsh on big business."29

Mr. Eisenhower's candor in San Francisco in regard to Administration anti-trust activity and its monetary implications for the Republican campaign was not typical of his campaign speeches nor of Administration propaganda generally. The San Francisco statement was made off-the-cuff in response to a question raised on a television panel show. As has already been pointed up, the Administration's position on anti-trust activities was not even mentioned in either the Republican National Committee's basic issue documents nor in any of the Eisenhower or Nixon prepared speeches. Republican discussion of the anti-trust area was deliberately suppressed on strategic grounds. The President's San Francisco statement explains lucidly why it was suppressed.

The Democrats, of course, sought to exploit this Administration Achilles heel. The nature of the exploitation is best revealed by the handling of the "soft" anti-trust and FTC-interference charges in the Democrats' issue-defining Fact Book. In a section entitled "Republicans Weaken Anti-Monopoly Laws," the Fact Book asserts:

"Under this ("soft Anti-trust settlements") policy, the Justice Department agreed in 1957 to settle (without trying to win in court) 83% of the anti-trust cases it brought. Under such

29 Ibid., pp. 765-773.
settlements, small businessmen find it almost impossible to recover the money they have lost because of the monopolistic practices. Then they cannot use the government's findings about the monopoly as evidence in their own lawsuit against the monopolizer."\(^\text{30}\)

In regard to the FTC-interference charge, the same section contains this summation:

"White House Interference with the FTC: Congressional probers found that, at the request of Sherman Adams, the Federal Trade Commission had revealed to Bernard Goldfine the name of the firm which had complained of illegal acts by one of Goldfine's corporations, thus violating the FTC's own promises that such names would be kept confidential. Moral to small businessmen: It is now risky to complain to the FTC about violations of laws."\(^\text{31}\)

The Democrats then went on to criticize the "GOP Tight Money Policy" for putting the "credit squeeze on small firms" and to take credit for the Democratically-controlled Congress for the strengthening of the Small Business Administration and for getting "needed tax relief" for small business firms. As previously noted, the Fact Book also made much of the increase in small business failures since the Eisenhower Administration came to power, of the allegation that there had been a drop in small business profits, and of the assertion that "small business is losing out in defense orders."

\(^{30}\) The 1958 Democratic Fact Book, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 58.

In the face of this Democratic approach, the Party in Power's strategists hinged their basic effort on a generalized enunciation of the "free enterprise" issue and the related "Radical-Democrat" theme, on avoidance of anti-trust discussion, and on detailed elaboration of Administration achievements on behalf of small business.

In the merchandising process, the Administration made use of the informational machinery of at least three Federal agencies to supplement the efforts of key speakers such as Eisenhower, Nixon and Alcorn and the documents disseminated for campaign use by the Republican National Committee. The agencies in question: The Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Small Business Administration. The contributions of each are explored below.

5. The Department of Justice

Attorney-General Rogers was among the less active Cabinet officers during the campaign insofar as oratory was concerned, but the Justice Department nevertheless played a distinct informational role. This is substantiated by a comparison of the material released to the press during the month preceding election day in 1958 with that issued in the parallel period in 1957. That comparison clearly shows not only a substantial reduction in the amount of material relating to

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32 This section based upon analysis of all press releases issued by the Department of Justice during the periods in question. Releases furnished by the Department upon request.
anti-trust activity released but a very **substantial reduction** in
(a) the total number of companies identified as being involved in
anti-trust actions, (b) the total number of large corporations so
identified, and (c) the total number of indictments and complaints
as compared to consent judgments.

Between October 1 and November 3, 1957, the Justice
Department released nine statements bearing directly on anti-trust
activities. Sixty-three separate companies representing a variety
of industries were identified in connection with these activities.
Almost half of the sixty-three involved were major corporations as
opposed to those in the small and middle-sized groups and some
very substantial traditional Republican contributors were in the group.
All but one of the nine releases issued had to do with indictments,
complaints or recommended judgments as opposed to "consent"
judgments. A "consent" judgment is one in which the defendant
in the anti-trust action accepts a Justice Department decision without
court contest. It is, in effect, the product of out-of-court agreement
between Government and defendant.

Among the major firms publicly identified by the Justice
Department during the 1957 period were E. I. duPont De Nemours,
Standard Oil of Indiana, Socony Mobile Oil Company, Sun Oil, The
Ohio Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum, The Texas Company, Atlantic
Refining Company, the American Smelting and Refining Company and

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the St. Joseph Lead Company.

Department of Justice informational dissemination activity in the anti-trust field reveals a very different picture in the month or so before the 1958 election. The number of anti-trust press releases was roughly 100 percent below that for the like period in 1957 (4 as compared to 9). The total number of defendants mentioned was roughly one-fourth of that for the 1957 period (sixteen as compared to sixty-three). Two of the four actions about which releases were made were consent actions as opposed to initial indictment or complaint actions. Consent actions represented fifty percent of total actions publicized as compared to the less than 15% ratio in 1957.

The nature of the defendants in the anti-trust actions publicized is also most revealing. Only three of the sixteen defendants cited in 1958 could be said to belong in the "big business" category and two of the three were in the beer industry. The Radio Corporation of America is the only business cited which can properly be said to rank with the industrial "giants" such as Standard Oil and duPont. Of the sixteen defendants, more than half (nine) were retailers and one was a wholesale distributor of appliances.

34 Ibid.

Late in the campaign period, the Department of Justice did something in the anti-trust release field which it scrupulously avoided throughout the like period in 1957. It boasted of the importance of one of the cases which it had brought to settlement—that involving the Radio Corporation of America. The lead paragraph of the release announcing the settlement highlighted "the successful conclusion of one of the Department's most important anti-trust cases by the entry of a consent judgment against Radio Corporation of America in the Federal district Court in New York City."\(^{36}\)

This type of release lead is clearly directed to attracting press attention to something which the issuer desires be given more than routine publicity. Insofar as big business sensitivities are concerned, however, the crucial point here is that the release related to a consent judgment—not to a new indictment or charge.

6. Federal Trade Commission Activities

The Congressional Directory lists the Federal Trade Commission as an "independent agency" and, legally speaking, this is indeed its status. Politically speaking, however, two important facts must be borne in mind insofar as the 1958 campaign was concerned. First, a majority of the Commission's five members—including the chairman—were Republicans.\(^{37}\) Policy control, therefore, was in Republican


\(^{37}\) Ex-Congressman John W. Gynne was FTC chairman during 1958.
hands. Secondly, the Democrats had attacked the FTC both on general grounds and on the basis of the Adams-Goldfine case Congressional findings with a view to demonstrating a pro-big business and anti-small business bias. 38

A comparative analysis of informational releases issued by the FTC between October 1 and November 3, 1958, and the parallel period in 1957 reveals a pattern in the former year strongly indicative of a directed orientation to the Administration's campaign needs. 39

That pattern was one calculated to create the impression that FTC was remarkably busy protecting small business and the consumer from the corporate giants and from adverse practices generally. The analysis further reveals that this was done in a manner which soft-pedaled actions taken to cope with monopoly and other business practices in direct restraint of trade.

The evidence in support of the above-noted assertion follows:

On November 3, 1958—the day before the election—the FTC issued a series of 15 separate press releases, each relating to a different action. Thirteen of the 15 had to do with practices such as false advertising, misbranding, and mislabeling. Only one had a direct bearing on restraint of trade. On the comparable day in 1957, FTC issued 4 releases. The 15 releases on November 3 represented


39 Releases supplied upon request by the Federal Trade Commission.
the greatest number of FTC releases issued in any one day during both the 1957 and 1958 periods under analysis.

On the last two release days (November 3 and October 31) in 1958 taken together, FTC released 25 different press statements. On the comparable two days in 1957 (November 1 and October 31), FTC issued ten statements. The output for the two-day period in 1958 was thus 150% greater than that for the comparable 1957 period.

The quantitative relationship becomes all the more significant when it is realized that the total output during the 1958 study period was not significantly greater than that for 1957 (97 releases as compared to 90). Thus, the proportion of total (study period) releases in 1958 issued on the last two days before the election was 26%. The comparable figure for 1957 was 11%.

The releases issued by FTC break down into a number of different subject matter categories and each release carries a label (e.g., restraint of trade, brokerage, advertising, labeling) at the top which categorizes it for the reader. Generally speaking, these categories may, in turn, be divided into two broad groups:

(a) those concerned with trade practices which directly contribute to

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40 The next largest number of releases—10—was issued on October 31, 1958—the "release" day immediately preceding the November 3 deluge.

41 FTC did not issue news releases on any weekend during the periods under analysis. November 3 fell on a Sunday during 1957. Consequently, the comparable two days in 1957 were the Friday (November 1) preceding the weekend and the Monday (November 4) following it. Even if the next two days in 1957 were to be added in, the total number of releases for the 1957 period would be increased by only one.
restraint or limitation of competition and (b) those concerned with practices such as mislabeling, false advertising and misrepresentation which mislead the consumer.

Comparison of the total group of releases in the 1958 period under analysis with the group for 1957 shows that a significantly greater proportion of the total were concerned with false advertising and related misleading sales practices in 1958 than was the case in 1957. Thus, in 1958, 75 releases representing 77% of the total fall into the false advertising, misbranding and related categories. In 1957, 56 representing 62% fall into these categories.

Releases specifically labeled "merger," "unfair competition" or "restraint of trade" numbered 8 during the 1957 period and 5 during the 1958 period. However, when those dealing with "brokerage," "promotional allowances" and related practices which serve directly to restrain trade or impede competition are thrown in, the number released in 1957 is very substantially greater than that for 1958. There were no "merger" releases at all in the 1958 period under analysis.

When contrasted to the 1957 releases, those of 1958 revealed a clear-cut avoidance pattern relating to the identification of large corporations in connection with restraint of trade or other limitation of competition practices. A number of major concerns were cited during the 1957 period including such giants as Proctor and Gamble, The Texas Company, National Sugar Refining, Union Carbide, and Socony Mobil Oil Company. In 1958, the five pertinent releases related respectively
to two jewelry chains or associations, the gummed paper industry, six drug firms, and a publications concern in the construction field. No major corporate entity was cited in 1958. The Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, a relatively large company, was mentioned in the Gummed Industry release but was excluded from the FTC complaint to which the release pertained. 42

One final point of interest pertaining to FTC informational activities: On October 3, 1957, the FTC released a "Financial Report for U. S. Manufacturing Corporations, 2nd Quarter, 1957" which showed that sales and earnings "continued at a high level" during the quarter. 43 The report also revealed that sales for the second quarter were $80.9 billion, a new record. FTC released no "Financial Report" on U. S. Manufacturing Corporations during the comparable period in 1958 or at any other time during the active campaign period.

7. Small Business Administration Activities

The Small Business Administration, which operates a relatively small informational program as government agencies go, nevertheless made its contribution to the Republican campaign. The major ingredients of that contribution were (a) a series of three speeches by SBA Administrator Wendell B. Barnes during the three weeks immediately prior to the election; (b) the issuance of releases carrying Barnes' texts in


full; (c) the issuance of releases during the closing days of the campaign stressing SBA activities which had resulted in a step-up of defense contract awards and the inauguration of a new loan program for small business.

In the comparable period in 1957, SBA published one-third fewer releases, Mr. Barnes made no speeches of press release record, and no statements were issued touching on any phase of small business defense contract procedures or on credit availability.44

In each of his three speeches, Mr. Barnes strove to create the impression that his talks were not political in nature. He did so by stressing that small business achievements to date were the product of both Congressional action and the Eisenhower Administration's recommendations. In his concluding speech, however, he made his point directly. He said: "I want, right now, to make one thing abundantly clear. There is no political aspect to this meeting. It takes a lot of advance planning to prepare for a meeting such as this..."45

Mr. Barnes' assertion notwithstanding, the fact remains that each of his speeches dwelt at length on the very points which were central to the Democratic attack on the Administration's small business policies. The Democrats during the campaign accused the Administra-

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44 Releases furnished by Small Business Administration upon request. They were four in number.

tion of stifling credit to small business and discriminating against small business in the awarding of defense contracts. They had also taken credit for tax relief granted small business by citing the passage of a "series of small business tax bills" by "The Democratic 85th Congress...".46

As Secretary of Labor Mitchell had done in connection with the Labor Reform issue, Barnes played the role of "detail" man in connection with the small business aspects of the "Free Enterprise" issue. Unlike Mitchell, however, he carefully avoided any overt attack on the Democrats. But he saw to it that the Administration was credited with positive achievements in each of the three basic areas of Democratic attack as cited above.

On the defense contract issue, for example, he told a Boston audience on October 16 that:

"Since the start of this program, the Agency has been instrumental in reserving nearly $3 billion in more than 40,000 proposed contracts for award to small business, in cooperation with military and civilian purchasing agents."47

On October 30, he reiterated this assertion but raised the figures involved to "more than three billion dollars in more than


45,000 proposed contracts." He did not point up the very real
distinction between "reserving" or "earmarking" contract funds and
the actual award thereof.

In the field of credit, Mr. Barnes commented at length in all
speeches on the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, the enactment
of which he credited to both the Congress and the President. In two
of the three speeches, roughly half of the text was devoted to this
Act which Barnes said "opens up an entirely new field of assistance
to small business." Basically, the Act authorized the Small
Business Administration to license and assist in financing privately-
operated "small business investment companies" which, in turn,
would make long-term loans to small business enterprises. The Act
authorized a revolving SBA fund of $250 million from which loans
would be made to the newly-created investment companies—not
directly to small business.

In the credit field again, Barnes also cited statistics on direct
loans made to small business in all speeches but his statistics and
qualifications varied somewhat from speech to speech. Thus, on
October 15, he said that "more than 12,500 business loans totaling
$600,000,000 had been approved, two-thirds with banks participating."^50

48 Barnes, Wendell B., San Francisco text, op. cit.

49 Boston text, op. cit. Also Address before the Seventy-first
Annual Meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Detroit, Michigan (October 15, 1958).

50 Ibid.
On October 16, he stated that "through August, more than 12,000 business loans had been approved and $313,700,000 in loan funds disbursed, two-thirds with banks participating." And on October 30, he said simply that "the Small Business Administration has approved more than 12,000 loans to small firms for more than half a billion dollars." It is interesting to note that the "approval" figure is considerably higher than the "disbursal" figure and that the former was cited in two of the three talks.

Barnes went out of his way to see to it that the Administration received credit for legislation providing tax advantages for small business. New legislation "recommended by President Eisenhower," he said, "will mean a saving of around $260,000,000 for small business concerns the first year alone." He also cited provisions permitting small business heirs to pay estate taxes over an extended period of time and allowing "certain capital losses to be offset against ordinary income." The tax advantages were mentioned in all three speeches, stressed in two.

Barnes' speeches—like the Party in Power's handling of the small business issue generally—thus cited advances made in areas which had come under Democratic attack. But, like Administration

51 Boston text, op. cit.
52 San Francisco text, op. cit.
53 Detroit text, op. cit.
spokesmen generally, he scrupulously avoided mention of the specific allegations made by the Democrats—allegations relating to anti-trust failures, the "credit squeeze" on small firms created by a high interest rate policy, and the increase in small business failures. None of this kept Barnes from stating that "this has been a great year for small business in many respects."\(^5\)\

In the closing ten days of the campaign, the Small Business Administration's press office backed up Barnes' speeches with releases designed to demonstrate Administration concern and progress in connection with small business defense contracts and loans. On October 24, an SBA release quoted Barnes as stating that:

"Proposed prime contracts numbering 4,629 valued at $177,239,093 were earmarked—representing a 44.3 per cent increase in procurements set aside for small firms over the same period of 1957."\(^5\)\(^5\)

The period in question was that of July-September, 1958. The release did not point up the fact that there is a distinction between contracts actually awarded and those which are simply "earmarked" or "set aside."

In another press release on October 29, the Small Business Administration announced "completion of the initial draft of the Agency's regulations under the Small Business Act of 1958" and publication of

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54 Texts of Detroit and San Francisco speeches, op. cit.

the "proposed regulations" in the "Federal Register Wednesday, October 29." The release also stated that copies of the "proposed regulations and sample copies of the forms to be used by applicants" for small business investment company licenses or charters would be available on November 3—the day before the election. 56

Both the release and the policy which generated it represented a "hurry-up" move to demonstrate the Party in Power's eagerness to improve credit opportunities for small business while the campaign was still on. Preparation of the regulations was rushed through under specific instructions from SBA Administrator Barnes who was reportedly "very anxious" to get them out. 57 That the "draft" regulations were deliberately pushed through without adequate time for careful reflection and drafting is attested to by the fact that a modified version was published in the Federal Register on December 4, 1958, and that a second and major revision was scheduled for release in mid-January, 1960. An official connected with the Federal Register—in which Executive and Independent Agency regulations are generally published—stated that it is "very unusual" for a set of regulations to undergo major modification twice within less than a year and a half. 58


57 Phone conversation with spokesman for Small Business Administration, January 11, 1960.

58 Phone conversation with spokesman for Federal Register, Archives Service, January 11, 1960.
CHAPTER XI

The Fiscal Integrity Issue

"Fiscal Integrity"--unlike "national defense"--is an extremely difficult concept to dramatize from the standpoint of the campaign propagandist. That is, there are relatively few "deeds" to which the Party in Power can turn to demonstrate the wonders it is performing to maintain the Nation's fiscal integrity. There is nothing so simple, for example, as sending a Pioneer rocket into space to underscore the advances being made in the missile sciences deemed so essential to the country's defenses.

Yet, Republican strategists in 1958 stressed "Fiscal Integrity" as much or more than any of the other issues they sought to define for the electorate. And, as was true of the merchandising of the "Free Enterprise" issue, they almost inevitably coupled it with the basic "Radical-Democrat" theme. Further, they merchandised the issue with simplicity and in terms of a contrast with the Democratic position.

The essence of the Republican "Fiscal Integrity" issue may be defined as follows: (a) The Democrats stand for irresponsible spending and inflation; (b) The Republicans stand for fiscal integrity and against inflation; (c) A Democratic Congress will be controlled by "radicals" who will spend, tax and unbalance the budget; (d) Republicans favor sensible spending, balanced budgets and lower taxes.
The unanimity of the Republican strategic accord on the "fiscal integrity" issue is well illustrated by the fact that the Republican Committees in both Houses of Congress and the Republican National Committee joined in emphasizing the issue in all the basic campaign documents issued for the use of candidates in late August and early September. A month or more later, President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon were to merchandise the issue basically as it had initially been defined.

1. Democrats Attack "The G.O.P. Inflation"

The Democratic National Committee was in the process of furnishing Democratic Congressional candidates with ammunition with which to attack the Party in Power for bringing on inflation even as the Republicans were initially defining the "fiscal integrity" issue. In short—as was true of most of the issues which the Republican strategists chose to define—the strategic decision to merchandise was made well before the Democratic attack actually began. 1

The initial Democratic national effort on the inflation issue—which is not to be equated with the G.O.P. "Fiscal Integrity" issue—was made through the 1958 Democratic Fact Book. In a seven-page section, the Democrats cited voluminous statistics to support their

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1 The Republican Campaign Plan, it will be recalled, was "cleared" by the White House in the spring of 1958. Republican Congressional and National Committee issue-definition materials were reaching G.O.P. candidates in late August—well before the Democratic assault was mounted.
allegations that Republican tight-money and high interest policies had intensified inflationary forces, hiked prices to the average family, forced savings down, and caused the taxpayers to "pay more for less government service." In this attack, the Democratic campaign guide focused on the high prices of food, housing and autos, tracing the increased prices in all cases to Administration policies.

About a month later—on October 4—the opposition sought to crystallize the "GOP Inflation" issue on the national level with a statement issued by the Democratic Advisory Committee and drafted by an economic policy committee headed by Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard. The statement posed the basic issue as Republican "stagnation with inflation" as against Democratic "real growth without inflation." It blamed the Republicans for helping to bring on the recession through tight money policies and hit hard at the Administration for allowing "price inflation which has imposed an intolerable deficit upon the budgets of millions of American families."

The Republican strategists did not seek to meet the Democrats on the ground of the latters' own choosing—a stance not unique in political campaigns. That is, they did not concern themselves with creating the impression that auto, housing and food prices had not


gone up during the Eisenhower Administration.

In keeping with the strategy planned well before the Democrats began to attack the "GOP Inflation," the Party in Power focused hard on the "fiscal integrity" which, they said, the Democrats would surely destroy. By so doing, they sought to place themselves on the offensive rather than to allow themselves to be put on the defensive as was the case on the defense-missile issue.

2. Initial Republican Definition of the Issue

In his key speech on October 16, Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn termed "maintenance of fiscal integrity" one of the six major issues of the campaign. "Fiscal irresponsibility," Mr. Alcorn said in obvious reference to the opposition party, "breeds inflation which in turn dilutes the value of our savings, our life insurance policies and our retirement benefits. Its harshest impact is felt by people with fixed incomes, including millions of elderly persons living on pensions and annuities."

Mr. Alcorn's definition of the issue was merely a reaffirmation of what his own headquarters and Republican leaders on Capitol Hill had enunciated in laying down the basic campaign propaganda lines six weeks earlier.

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4 See Chapter IX.

As early as August 30, Senate Republican leaders circulated what one press report termed a "handy campaign road map" in which the Congressional Democrats were blamed for unleashing a 5-year, 208-billion "barrage" of Government spending schemes and of forcing up the Federal debt ceiling. The document warned that the result might well be more inflation, higher taxes and "possible repudiation" of Government obligations.

At about the same time, the House Republican Campaign Committee released its 1958 Campaign Speech Kit for Republican Congressional candidates in which the "fiscal integrity" issue was given a very prominent role. The Kit, a large, carefully-organized, loose-leaf document which was many weeks in the making, highlighted the statement which had been stressed in the Senate. The Democrats, it charged, had submitted legislation in the 85th Congress which would have increased spending over the next five years by about $200 billion.

But it remained for the Republican National Headquarters to pinpoint fiscal integrity as one of the key issues of the campaign in each of its five "basic issue" documents dispatched to the field in August and early September.


Thus, in one campaign document which called the G.O.P. "The Party of Fiscal Integrity," fiscal integrity was listed as the second of six basic issues. "On the record," the booklet asked, "Which party is the party of fiscal integrity; which party has sought with greater success to achieve balanced federal budgets?" It answered its own question:

"The Facts: In this century, there have been 25 balanced federal budgets; 34 unbalanced budgets. Nineteen of the 25 balanced budgets were under Republican Administrations, only 6 under Democrats. Of the 34 unbalanced budgets, 22 were under the Democrats, 12 under the Republicans."\(^8\)

A second document, which accused the Democrats of having as their "traditional policy" one of "tax and tax, spend and spend," pointed out that Republicans "traditionally favor lower taxes and economic administration of government." The Republicans, the document continued, "have long recognized the peril of inflation and have sought successfully to slow the erosion of cheaper dollars and ever-rising costs on income and savings."\(^9\)

In the 1958 Republican Speakers Handbook, the Republicans termed the provision of "prosperity without inflation" a basic issue, pointing out that "consistently, Democrats have voted for big spending, Republicans against." The Handbook in this context picked up a

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concept which was to receive much hard usage by Republican speakers:

"In 1958 Republicans in Congress saved the taxpayers at least $6 billion by blocking spending or lending bills approved by Democrat-controlled committees or sponsored on the floor by Democrat leadership."

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The remaining two issue-definition documents, while pointing up the fiscal integrity issue, also made the specific point that the cost of living had gone up much more, percentage-wise, during the Truman Administration than it had in the Eisenhower Administration. Mr. Nixon was later also to make this argument in a number of speeches. But neither Mr. Nixon nor any other speaker was to question the specific Democratic charge that prices had risen for various basic commodities during the Republican Administration.

3. Mr. Nixon on Fiscal Integrity

Vice President Nixon made much of the "fiscal integrity" issue, stressing it in one form or another in the majority of his campaign speeches. However, he gave the issue his heaviest emphasis in the larger urban areas and tended to play it down in the Farm Belt. And he was particularly responsive to Democratic attacks on this issue, shifting his position to cope with them. 11

The Vice President inevitably coupled the "fiscal integrity" issue with the basic "Radical-Democrat" theme and—upon several


11 This based upon a review of all of the Vice President's published texts as made available by his office.
occasions—indulged in personalization to highlight the issue. This he did by citing Senator Proxmire (D., Wisconsin) as the arch-demon of the "radical" spenders who would control a Democratic Congress. Proxmire was also cited in the Congressional campaign literature issued by the Republicans at the outset of the campaign and by the Republican National Committee. Nixon did not use Proxmire's name or refer to his philosophy of "spending" even indirectly in Wisconsin or in any of the nearby or adjoining states. In fact, he avoided mention of Proxmire in the Farm Belt generally. Proxmire was, of course, running for reelection against a conservative Wisconsin Republican at the time.

This is the way Mr. Nixon defined the fiscal integrity issue in his campaign opener to a Republican audience in Indianapolis, Indiana:

"Here is what you would get if more Democrats are elected this year. The budget for this year is 5 billion dollars larger than it would have been because of bills voted by the Democratic-controlled Congress over the amounts requested by the President. In addition, the President vetoed bills which would have added another one and one-half billion dollars to our deficit. And Democrats in the last Congress introduced bills which would cost $206.5 billion over the next five years in addition to the amounts planned by the Administration. One Senator alone, Proxmire of Wisconsin, introduced five bills in the last Congress which would cost by his own estimate $35 billion over a five-year period... You can see what you would get if more Senators of that philosophy are elected this November.... This means when you vote for more
Democrats in the House and Senate, you are voting to raise your taxes, cheapen your money...."

The Vice President adhered to this same general line in a speech in Portland, Oregon which concluded his first campaign swing prior to a return to Washington for the White House strategy session which culminated in the Joint Statement of October 6. (See Chapter III and also Section 4 This Chapter).

Following the White House Conference, Mr. Nixon returned to the hustings with talks in Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia before setting out westward once again. Mr. Nixon now continued to stress the "fiscal integrity" issue in the urban areas but added to his prior definition of it a response to the Democratic "GOP Inflation" charge. He did so by comparing the limited rise in prices during the Eisenhower Administration with what he termed the much more substantial increase under Truman. And, in the process, he stated bluntly that he was doing so in answer to statements Mr. Truman had made in campaign speeches.

There is little question that Mr. Nixon was not only answering Truman but also the Democratic Advisory Committee statement of October 4 which attacked the Administration as having fostered inflation

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12 Nixon, Richard. Address by the Vice President of the United States, Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29, 1958).

13 Ibid., Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Portland, Oregon (October 5, 1958).
by its policies. But Mr. Nixon did not mention the Advisory Committee in this connection. He mentioned only Mr. Truman and further implied that Truman was lying.

In a speech in Columbus, Ohio on October 9, Mr. Nixon repeated his Indianapolis "fiscal integrity" spiel virtually verbatim and then moved against Mr. Truman. Said Mr. Nixon:

"Mr. Truman charges: "The cost of living has been rising month by month....seems likely to reach the moon." The truth: Let's look at the record in this respect. During the seven years of the Truman Administration prices went up 50 per cent. During the six years of this Administration they have gone up only 8 per cent and inflation has finally been checked and prices are leveling off."

On October 10, Mr. Nixon moved into Pittsburgh, Pa., and Huntington, West Virginia, both of them areas still suffering heavily from unemployment. Nixon talked "fiscal integrity" here but not in the terms he had used initially in Indiana and Portland or the day before in Columbus, Ohio. He avoided all mention of Proxmire or of the many billions of dollars the Democratic Congress had threatened to add to the national budget. He suppressed the "Radical-Democrat" theme. His emphasis, instead, was on how much better off the workers were because prices had been held down and inflation

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14 Ibid., Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).

15 Both cities were identified as "areas of substantial labor surplus" as of September, 1958 by Area Labor Market Trends, official publication of the U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, September, 1958.
controlled by the Eisenhower Administration. He said:

"The most dramatic difference is in real income. There were large wage increases in the seven years of the Truman Administration but prices went up 50 per cent in this same period. As a result, the American wage earner was not a bit better off at the end of the seven years than he was at the beginning as far as what his wages would buy was concerned. Because prices have gone up only 8 per cent more with their wages than they could in 1952."

However, Mr. Nixon did not adhere slavishly to the approach taken in Huntington and Pittsburgh in other areas of substantial unemployment. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Providence, Rhode Island, for example, he coupled the content he offered in Huntington and Pittsburgh with the scare tactics which characterized his handling of "fiscal integrity" in Indianapolis, Indiana and Portland, Oregon, on his first campaign trek. In this respect, he differed from what he did in connection with the "free enterprise" issue which he suppressed or played down in all areas of substantial unemployment (see Chapter X).

In Providence, on October 22, Mr. Nixon said:

"The Republican party is the party of financial responsibility. It has managed in the past six and one half years to curb the runaway inflation it inherited from the Democratic Party. Dollars soaring into the stratosphere can be as damaging as missiles

coming from outer space. This Administration may well find it impossible to keep these curbs if the Democrats from the free-spending wing of the Party--the radical group from the North and The West--seize control of Congress and are able to overwhelm the moderate forces of the Republican Party and the Southern Democrats.\textsuperscript{17}

In the closing ten days of the campaign, Nixon moved rapidly through Wisconsin, South Dakota, Michigan, Nebraska, Minnesota, Kansas, Iowa, Washington and--on November 1--up into Alaska. In short, most of this period was spent in states predominantly or substantially devoted to farming.

Except for the Wisconsin speech, made on October 24 in Eau Claire, the Vice President played down the Democratic "radical" threat to fiscal integrity, concentrating instead on what the Administration had done to combat inflation and what this had meant to the farmer and others. In no speech after October 24 did Mr. Nixon approach the vehemence and the detail with which he had castigated the "Radical-Democrat" spenders in Congress in his opening Indiana speech and in his talks in places like Columbus, Philadelphia and Providence prior to October 24. In the majority of these "Farm Belt" speeches, however, Mr. Nixon did not refrain from mentioning the "Radical-Democrat" theme--albeit briefly.

4. \textbf{Alcorn Sets White House Pace on "Fiscal Integrity"}

At Mr. Alcorn's urging and with Mr. Nixon's approval, the White House threw Mr. Eisenhower's prestige and the White House

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President (October 22, 1958).
informational dissemination machinery into the merchandising of the "fiscal integrity" issue on October 6 with the much-discussed "Joint Statement." It was that statement that brought the entire Republican Strategy Board together and into the open in emphatic definition of the Party in Power's basic "Radical-Democrat" campaign doctrine.

The statement, which was written in draft either by Mr. Alcorn or under his immediate auspices, was released following a luncheon hosted by Mr. Eisenhower and attended by Mr. Nixon, top White House staff, Alcorn, and the heads of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committees among others. The luncheon meeting had the unique distinction of being the only session during the campaign attended by all key strategists to be deliberately publicized as a strategy session. The act of publicity alone strongly suggests that the session itself was more concerned with generating political propaganda than with planning it.

Once having centered on the "Radical-Democrat" theme and warned that a Democratic Congress would certainly take the Nation "down the left lane which leads inescapably to Socialism," the Joint Statement moved into the "fiscal integrity" issue at some length.

It said, in part:

18 Republican National Committee. Joint Statement Issued Following Luncheon of Republican Leaders with the President and the Vice President, Washington, D. C. (October 6, 1958).

19 Letter from member of the Republican Strategy Board, June 10, 1959; also conversation with Republican National Committee official, May 18, 1959.
"The Republican-controlled 83rd Congress voted the greatest tax cut in history. This reduction amounted to $7.8 billion a year and since 1954 has brought cumulative savings to taxpayers totaling more than $33 billion—which, incidentally, is nearly the sum represented by new spending proposals offered by Democrat Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin.... Since the adoption of the Income Tax Amendment to the Constitution in 1913 there have been 15 income tax increases and 10 reductions. Fourteen of those 15 increases were voted by Democrat-controlled Congresses, only 1 by Republicans.... Taxation for political purposes would again become a harsh reality with an increased Democratic majority in Congress.... Just during this year, Democrats in the Senate and House introduced non-duplicating bills which would have called for the expenditure of more than $200 billion dollars in new authorizations over the next five years. These spending proposals would increase the federal budget by more than 50 per cent annually. They would set off inflationary forces which would defy control." 

The reference in the statement to Senator Proxmire and to Democratic spending generally is typical of the earlier documents issued by the Republican leaders in Congress even as the word "Democrat"—as opposed to "Democratic"—is a term used in this context by Mr. Alcorn and in all Republican National Committee propaganda materials during the campaign. Nixon and Eisenhower generally did not use the term "Democrat" in this way.

However, the essence of the October 6 statement dealing with fiscal integrity was to be employed in ringing terms by the President

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21 The term "Democratic" is not employed in conjunction with the term "Party" in any of the issue-definition materials nor in any of Mr. Alcorn's public statements. Mr. Alcorn is believed to have personally developed this means of denigrating the opposition.
in ten of the eleven addresses which comprised his campaign trek beginning on October 17 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. It was only in this first October 17 speech that the "fiscal integrity" issue was not given emphasis by the President. In this respect, then, the President's employment of the issue squared with his merchandising of "free enterprise." And, once again, the fiscal integrity issue was almost inevitably linked with the "Radical-Democrat" theme.

This is the way Mr. Eisenhower discussed the "fiscal integrity" issue in the speech which actually opened his campaign attack on the "Radical-Democrats" in Los Angeles on October 20:

"Most Americans are against reckless public spending. As to this, the record of the congressional radicals is too clear and too recent to need explanation. One single senator of that group introduced bills this year that, if enacted into law, would have spent tens of billions of dollars unnecessarily.... the record of the radicals is one of ever higher taxes--of dollars worth fifty cents--of sky-high prices--of an economy harrassed into producing fewer jobs, chronic unemployment, labor strife, and fear of the future."23

In this speech and in others, Mr. Eisenhower made reference to Senator Proxmire's "unnecessary" spending proposals but he never mentioned Proxmire by name. In all speeches (but that in Iowa), he equated the Radical-Democrats with "spendthrift" government, the Republicans with "progressive" government. In all cases, he linked

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23 Ibid., pp. 757-65.
Democratic spending ways with unbalanced budgets and unbalanced budgets with inflationary prices. In several of the speeches, he made an appeal for fiscal consideration for the Nation's children and grandchildren. Thus, in San Francisco, he appealed to his listeners to:

"...defend sane, moderate, right sound government—progressive government against radicalism, against spendthrift government, the kind that needlessly tacks on the backs of your children and your grandchildren debts that shouldn't have ever been incurred by us." 24

Though the President dwelt upon "fiscal integrity" in all of his avowedly political campaign speeches, analysis of the texts as a whole revealed that his concentration on the issue was greatest in the four basic radio and/or television regional speeches--those in Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Baltimore. The greatest concentration was that in the Pittsburgh speech on October 27 in which the opening and roughly one-fourth of the total text was geared to the "fiscal integrity" issue. 25 The Radical-Democrat theme, once again, was prominent in all four regional broadcasts as was the "free enterprise" issue.

In most of his formal campaign speeches, the President also made it a point to take credit for both Congressional Republicans and for himself for blocking "radical" Democratic spending proposals. His closing speech in Baltimore was typical in this respect:

24 Ibid., pp. 774–79.

25 Ibid., pp. 802–08.
"The extremists... wanted to indulge in wholesale reckless Federal spending (as an anti-recession measure). Their extravagant expenditure programs would have ended in more debt, higher prices, and an undermined economy. Happily, much of this effort was blocked both by sturdy Republican opposition in Congress and by my vetoes. Today, every economic indicator proves that our Republican faith in the economy was right."

It was in his "off-the-cuff" more rambling speeches to Republican campaign workers that Mr. Eisenhower was far less vehement and detailed in his criticism of the "Radical-Democrats" and his definition of the fiscal integrity theme. Thus, in a series of talks to Republican workers in New York City he communicated a very generalized kind of concern with the "over-spending" habits of the Democrats and was very unspecific in defining what it was that Republicans were fighting against.

This is but further evidence of the degree to which the entire Eisenhower campaign tour was geared to the four regional broadcasts. Not only were the Radical-Democrat theme and the associated fiscal integrity and free enterprise issues reiterated in detailed specific terms on all broadcasts but the concentration on the broadcasts made it clear that the President and his advisors were not seriously interested in relating the manner in which they used the "fiscal integrity" issue to the geographic area in which a given speech was being delivered.

26 Ibid., pp. 819-26.

27 Ibid., pp. 809-12 and 812-16.
Mr. Nixon was far more flexible in the manner in which he employed the "fiscal integrity" issue than was Mr. Eisenhower but—as has been pointed out—he was not much less repetitive in employment of the issue per se.

The considerable extent to which Republican campaign strategy gave emphasis to the fiscal integrity issue was well demonstrated by a "wind-up" statement issued by Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn the day before the election. The statement focused on a speech of October 31 in which Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson reportedly stated he had no idea what the Republicans would have done differently if they had controlled the last Congress. Alcorn listed ten things which a G.O.P. Congress would have done differently. Every one of the ten was concerned with spending—

with fiscal integrity. 28

5. The Executive Agencies and Fiscal Integrity

Though "fiscal integrity" does not lend itself as readily to "propaganda by deed" as—for example—the "national defense" issue, executive agency informational channels can nevertheless be geared to exploiting it. And this was done to a moderate degree by three agencies during the 1958 campaign. The three included the Bureau of the Budget, which is actually a part of the White House establishment, the Treasury Department and the Department of Commerce. Of the three, Treasury was the most active.

a. The Treasury Contribution

The Treasury Department, which is run by Robert B. Anderson, a converted Democrat from Texas, operates in a highly conservative fashion in an Administration preoccupied with conservative fiscal policy. The manner in which it disseminates information conforms both to this policy and to the conservative tradition generally associated with bankers and tax specialists.

During the 1958 campaign, the Department merchandised "fiscal integrity" through (a) a relatively intensive, well-publicized speaking effort made by its policy-makers; (b) dissemination of information calculated to demonstrate the Administration's concern with easing the fiscal burden for government bond-holders and taxpayers generally; and (c) apparent suppression of information which might give an adverse picture of the state of deposits in the national banks. Secretary Anderson, whatever his specific contribution to these activities, played no overt role in the campaign.

Anderson's failure to make political speeches may have been dictated both by the premise that a converted Democrat from Texas was not the best possible vehicle for inspiring eastern and western Republicans as well as by the fear of "crossing" Senate Majority Leader Johnson, a very active campaign participant for the Democrats at the national level. Anderson is known to have had a close working relationship with both Johnson and his fellow Texan, Speaker Sam Rayburn, in 1958, and is said to have negotiated a deal on tax legislation with both gentlemen despite the fact that he was speaking
as the representative of a Republican Administration.

During the closing three weeks of the campaign, the two
Under-Secretaries of the Treasury between them made three speeches
before national conventions of influential mortgage banker, tax
association and life insurance groups. Treasury "top brass" made
no (published) speeches at all in the like period in 1957. In fact,
the only speech made during the entire month of October and the
first week of November in 1957 was one by Secretary Anderson at the
dedication of the Sam Rayburn Memorial Library in Bonham, Texas.

Each of the three 1958 speeches was distributed through
Departmental press release channels. Each was written in a staid,
conservative fashion. Each was billed as non-political. But each
sold the fiscal integrity issue and two of the three overtly blamed
the Democratic Congress for threatening fiscal integrity and praised
the Administration for preserving it.

This is the way Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs
Julian B. Baird put it in a key speech before the American Life
Convention on October 10:

"As a matter of record, total authorizations for
future Federal spending granted by the Congress
during the recent session—only part of which, of
course, affects fiscal 1959—exceeding Administration

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29 Cater, Douglass. "The 'Little America' of Robert B.

30 Treasury Department Press Release. Remarks of Treasury
Secretary Robert B. Anderson at Dedication of the Sam Rayburn
requests by $4-1/2 billion. In addition, vetoes of spending authorizations by the President, plus Administration opposition and opposition by some members of Congress of both parties to other authorizations that passed at least one house of the Congress, resulted in the avoidance of budget authorizations totaling more than $5-1/2 billion. Part of this money would have been spent in the fiscal year 1959 if the laws had passed, thus adding further to the prospective deficit."\(^{31}\)

Mr. Baird did not have to mention Democrats or Republicans to convey the message that "radical" Democrats had threatened fiscal integrity and that Republicans, conservative Democrats and Mr. Eisenhower had fought to preserve it.

Under-Secretary Fred C. Scribner Jr., in a talk in Philadelphia on October 30, stressed "fiscal integrity" and urged citizen support for the Republican effort to "fight waste" and to avoid "unduly large payrolls and tendencies to continue government services no longer demanded by the taxpayer."\(^{32}\) Urging a continued emphasis on the drive "for balanced budgets" and reduced Federal debt, Scribner stated that "no greater contribution can be made to the strength of America than to turn back to local governmental units the maximum number of functions which can be appropriately handled at a level closer to the people."

\(^{31}\) Baird, Julian B. Remarks by Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Before Financial Section of the American Life Convention, Chicago, Illinois (October 10, 1958).

On November 3—the day before the election—Baird repeated the "fiscal integrity" argument he had made earlier but this time without the statistics. Pointing out that there was a vital need "to maintain the value of the dollar" and that "expenditure programs once entered into tend to perpetuate themselves," Baird continued:

"The Administration has tried to steer a wise course in its expenditure programs; but the Congress at this last session was in a spending mood. With the deficit we are facing and the recovery well underway, let us hope that our citizens will make it known to their representatives in the next session of Congress that they want to see sound fiscal policies pursued."33

Once again, Mr. Baird made no mention of Republicans or Democrats. But there was little question that he was urging the election of a Republican Congress—"one which would not be "in a spending mood."

During the 1958 campaign period, the Treasury Department did not substantially increase the total flow of its releases to the media. That is, the number of releases issued between October 1 and November 3, 1958 was roughly at the same level as the number released in the like period in 1957.34 The differences lay in the nature of the releases and in their timing. Thus, "non-political" speeches accounted for a greater share of total releases in 1958 and--


34 Based upon review of all Treasury Department press releases for the periods in question.
in the five days immediately prior to election day--Treasury gave heavy publicity to policy decisions and actions calculated to demonstrate the Administration's concern with improving the position of the bondholder and the taxpayer. No releases of this kind were issued during the October 1-November 3 period in 1957.

Thus, in his talk on October 30, Under-Secretary Scribner announced two proposed changes which "are expected to strengthen materially the taxpayer assistance program of the Internal Revenue Service." He also reported additional "major steps recently taken to simplify tax reporting." 35 Scribner's speech was given the standard press release treatment--that is, it was made available to press association reporters, Washington correspondents and others who "cover" Washington for the nation's newspapers, radio and TV networks.

The first of the two proposed major steps announced by Scribner was to decentralize and liberalize the examination process by which persons representing taxpayers before the Department are admitted to practice before the Department. The second step was "to permit any person who prepares a return for a taxpayer to appear as the taxpayer's representative, with or without the taxpayer's presence, before revenue agents and examining officers in the field audit or office audit branches in the offices of District Directors with respect to the tax liability of the taxpayer, for the taxable year or period covered by that return."

35 Scribner, op. cit.
These two steps, Scribner held, would make it easier for the ordinary taxpayer to secure proper representation in tax matters and to do so at much less inconvenience and expense than had often been the case in the past. Among the "major steps" previously taken and reported by Scribner was a decision to revise the standard income tax form 1040-A so that it could be "used by employees with less than $10,000 of gross income." Previously, the top limit had been $5,000. The Treasury Department had already announced this change in a press release in September. Scribner's second reiteration of a previously-announced "contribution" to the taxpayer was a Treasury decision which would foster the "easing of tax reporting" through "the revision and simplification of the reporting of expense account items."

Mr. Scribner, in short, had something of value for both the "little man" and the corporate executive.

On the day following Scribner's speech, the Treasury Department issued a press release on the "proposed changes" relating to taxpayer representation. The Department apparently wished to make certain that press and public did not miss the proposals. In the propaganda sense, it is of more than passing interest that the changes in question were merely proposals pending the actual amendment of Treasury regulations.

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On November 3, Treasury announced a policy decision which might be expected to comfort corporations and other holders of substantial quantities of government bonds and thus to foster "fiscal integrity." The new policy applied to all holders other than commercial banks. The pertinent press release stated:

"....effective December 1, 1958, the privilege of applying the proceeds of Series F and G savings bonds, at or after maturity, to the purchase of Series E or H bonds without regard to the annual limitation of $10,000 (maturity value) for each series will be extended to all holders of outstanding Series F and G bonds, except commercial banks."  

Under the new policy, the release explained, a privilege previously limited to individuals and personal trust estates was being extended "to a larger group of investors, including, among others, all trust estates, guardianship and similar estates, partnerships, public and private corporations, and unincorporated associations."

So it was that in the five-day period immediately preceding the election, the Treasury Department issued 3 distinct releases stressing five different "recent" or "proposed" changes designed to benefit the taxpayer and to foster fiscal integrity. The Administration could not promise a tax cut but it could soften the blow implicit in tax payments.

The Treasury Department during the 1958 campaign period was guilty of one omission which could conceivably be classed as suppression

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of information in the interest of political expediency. On
October 4, 1957, the Department had issued a standard statement
relating to bank assets and deposits as of June, 1957. The state-
ment indicated that the total assets and total deposits in the national
banks had decreased substantially in a three-month period. There
was no release of this type in early October, 1958 nor at any time
during the campaign period. The period of time which such a release
would have covered—March-June, 1958—was one in which the
recession had adversely affected bank deposits and assets.

b. The Budget Bureau Contribution

The Budget Bureau played a relatively modest role in the 1958
campaign but the Bureau did make a propaganda contribution to it.
That contribution consisted primarily of the manner in which the
regular "Mid-year" report was handled and in the avoidance of
dissemination of fiscal policy decisions which might conceivably
give the Democrats new targets at which to shoot.

On September 12, 1958, after the Democrats had begun
attacking the Administration in an organized fashion on the foreign
policy—peace and other issues, the Bureau published the regular
Mid-year budgetary report and Budget Director Maurice Stans called
a press conference to discuss its implications. The Mid-year report

39 Treasury Department, Comptroller of the Currency, Press
40 Walsh, Robert K. "U. S. Budget Chief Sees Biggest
Postwar Deficit," The Evening Star (September 12, 1958).
had been issued two weeks later (October 1) in 1957 and no press
conference was called to discuss it. 41

At the September 11 conference, Stans saw to it that press
attention was focused on the "fiscal integrity" issue by pointing up
the fact that the Bureau was forecasting a record $12.2 billion Federal
deficit for the current fiscal year (1959). He then linked the deficit
to the Democratic-controlled Congress by asserting that the deficit
might have been increased by another $1.6 billion if the President
had not vetoed several major "big-spending" bills passed by the
Congress.

Finally, Mr. Stans tied the deficit in with economy-wide
inflation by noting that the worsening of the Government's financial
outlook had generated a $13 billion inflationary "potential" in the
economy. 42

When the 1957 Mid-year report was issued, it should be noted,
the Budget Bureau did not seek to "guide" press attention to selected
parts of the report by the press conference technique. Further, the
1957 report stressed that Congress would be asked to appropriate $737
million in supplemental monies in 1958 to restore appropriations cuts
previously made in veterans benefit and welfare programs. 43

(October 2, 1957).

42 Walsh, op. cit.

was made in 1957 to point the finger at the Democratic Congress for contributing to the Federal deficit.

Some three weeks before the election in 1958, the Budget Bureau made one additional effort to point the "spending" finger at the Democrats in Congress. It issued a news release reporting on a report prepared for the Congress. The report, said the release, points out that "the total cost of Federal pay increases" granted to government employees "during the last Congressional session" was in excess of $444 million. Though the report proper was required by law, the release announcing it was not.

Top Budget Bureau officials did not make any political or "non-political" speeches during the campaign. At least, there were no speech texts released through Bureau channels. Nor were there any published statements of any kind reflecting new fiscal activities, decisions or policies in the period between October 1 and November 3.

In the same period in 1957, however, there were two statements issued by top Budget Bureau officials which reflected new policies or the development of new policies with controversial implications. Thus, on October 22, 1957, Robert E. Merriam, Assistant Director of the Budget Bureau, made a statement in which he said it was Administration policy to transfer various federally-

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operated substantive programs to the States. He did not specify the programs. And on October 23, Bureau of the Budget Director Percival F. Brundage announced the adoption of "new policies on the construction of housing for Federal personnel" which stressed the regulation that "in no case will the Government construct family housing if private capital can be found to do the financing." 46

c. The Contribution of Sinclair Weeks

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks made a limited but very specific contribution to merchandising of the "fiscal integrity" issue during the campaign itself. This was above and beyond his generation of statistics for the use of the White House in its effort to demonstrate that the recession was over and the economy was back on an even keel. It will be recalled that President Eisenhower read two "economic stability" messages from Weeks in his October 31 Baltimore speech and that the Commerce Department deliberately advanced the release of a favorable report on employment statistics so that it could be used for campaign purposes. 47

In a speech on September 30--the day after Mr. Nixon formally opened the Republican campaign in Indiana--Secretary Weeks struck a


47 See Chapters V and X.
blow for "fiscal integrity." The Secretary warned against "spendthrift irresponsibility, with government burdening taxpayers by offering something for every outstretched palm....spendthrift government undermines business confidence. An eventual resulting increase in taxes would weaken business incentive, cut down take-home pay and dry up customer purchasing power." 48

Weeks adopted the standard Republican strategy of distinguishing between the "radical" Democrats and the good conservative ones. He made it clear that he was talking about a Democratically-controlled Congress as the potential engine of tax destruction but segregated conservative Democrats like Harry Byrd of Virginia and Clarence Cannon of Missouri as "leaders" who thought properly about the tax situation.

In the period comparable to the active campaign period in 1957, neither Mr. Weeks nor any of his immediate assistants made any speeches in which the "fiscal integrity" argument was stressed or criticism of the Democratic-controlled Congress implied. In fact, Mr. Weeks made no recorded speeches at all during the comparable 1957 period (September 30-November 3).

Mr. Weeks' primary propaganda contribution to the campaign, however, came in a statement he issued on October 18 in which he

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Based upon a review of the U. S. Department of Commerce Business Service Checklist which presents a weekly summary of all Departmental issuances.
said that he would urge the Administration to recommend a manufacturers' sales tax to Congress in January, 1959. The Weeks' statement was made during a meeting of the Commerce Department's Business Advisory Council in Hot Springs, Virginia. Council members include representatives of some of the Nation's leading corporations.

Weeks pointed up the fact that much of the 1959 fiscal year's prospective deficit of $12 billion was traceable to the impact of the recession upon individual incomes. The income tax, he said, was "too vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the economy." A broad uniform sales tax levied at the factory, he indicated, would help to compensate for this vulnerability.

Weeks said that he was speaking for himself—not for the Administration. But he also said that he would urge the White House to recommend that business be permitted to write off more rapidly, in depreciation for tax purposes, its outlays for new plant and equipment.

Though there is no available concrete evidence that Weeks was indulging in campaign propaganda, the supporting circumstantial evidence is quite overwhelming. This latter evidence strongly suggests that Weeks was simply making a play for big business campaign support.

In the first place, Weeks had many months before indicated his desire to resign his position. The decision to resign had

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50 Green, Sterling F. "Weeks Urges National Sales Tax," The Evening Star (October 18, 1958).
undoubtedly been made before he went to Hot Springs and issued his "sales tax" statement. His actual letter of resignation was dated September 21—just 3 days after he made his statement and the White House's very friendly letter of acceptance was dated September 22. 51 Unless a man is forced out of a top-level government position—which Weeks was not—the time of resignation is normally set well before the formal letters are exchanged. It thus seems highly improbable that Weeks was seriously considering making a "sales tax" proposal to the President when he knew that he himself would not be in position to actively back it up.

Secondly, the Commerce Department is not specifically concerned either with making or implementing tax policy. That is the province of the Treasury. The Treasury Department let it be known on the heels of Weeks' statement that a sales tax was not under consideration in that Department. A spokesman for the Department stated that "Secretary Weeks is not the one who makes tax policy" but that the Secretary was free to state his own views. 52

Thirdly, Weeks' own department had apparently made no studies of the tax proposal as of the time of the statement. As one report put it, "the sales tax proposal apparently is no more than a nebulous idea even in Mr. Weeks' Commerce Department." 53

51 Public Papers of the Presidents, op. cit., p. 779.


53 Ibid.
In light of the foregoing, it seems highly unlikely that Mr. Weeks made his proposal for a sales tax with any intentions beyond those of pushing "fiscal integrity" and the Administration's campaign prospects. The Administration did not recommend that Congress enact a national sales tax in January, 1959.
CHAPTER XII

The Leadership and Civil Rights Issues

The Democrats gave early priority to defining "failure of leadership" in the White House as a major issue of the 1958 campaign. This, though independent observers were to conclude that the President's leadership or lack of it never truly became an issue of significance in the campaign and Republican and Democratic strategists themselves were not to cite it as a major issue in their respective campaign post-mortems.¹

Republican leaders initially took no steps either to portray Mr. Eisenhower as a great leader or to defend him—and the Administration—against Democratic "lack of leadership" charges. This initial reaction may have been the product of the reported disenchantment of the Republican "Old Guard" with Mr. Eisenhower's "liberal" policies—and the "Old Guard" occupied pivotal positions in the two Republican Congressional Campaign Committees. Or it may have been the product of a strategic decision to avoid playing up a charge which it was felt might better be coped with by keeping quiet.

Whatever the reason or reasons for the initial Republican approach, that approach was to give way to a spirited drive to create

¹ See Chapter IV.
the image of Eisenhower as a dynamic leader as September merged into October. And the reported "Old Guard" disenchantment—if any—ceased to exist as the President embraced "Fiscal Integrity" and the "Radical-Democrat" theme and appeared to adopt the entire philosophy of the conservative wing of the Party.

1. Democratic Definition of the Issue

In its basic campaign guidance document, the Democratic National Committee late in August gave Mr. Eisenhower's "lack of leadership" major billing. In its opening pages, the 100-page book stressed the premise that "Ike has abandoned the leadership function of the presidency." In its opening paragraph, the document stated:

"The Eisenhower-Nixon Administration, in less than six years in office, has brought America to the worst recession since World War II at home, and to mortal danger of war and worldwide defeat abroad. It has done this by its failure to give the nation leadership—a failure resulting in a surrender to Old Guard conservative domestic policies and reliance on old foreign policies to meet new problems."2

Nowhere did the guide picture Mr. Eisenhower as Mr. Nixon's tool—a depiction which was to characterize the Democratic assault during the closing days of the campaign.

The Democrats gave the "lack of leadership" issue wide currency throughout September and early October with nationally known leaders taking up the chant along with candidates for Congressional office. Thus, Senator John F. Kennedy on September 13 told a

California audience that the Eisenhower administration was guilty of "drift and indecision" which are "incapable of meeting the problem of change, and the world has changed in the last six years."³

In New York later in September, the Democratic–Liberal candidate for the Senate—Frank S. Hogan—attacked Mr. Eisenhower's position on civil rights as one which "reflects more accurately the President's indecision, rather than his disinterest...."⁴ And in New Jersey, Democratic Senatorial Candidate Harrison A. Williams expressed concern with inadequate moral leadership "even in the White House."⁵

As the campaign moved more deeply into October, top-level Democratic leaders joined in the "lack of leadership" attack with Ex-President Harry S. Truman, titular party leader Adlai Stevenson, and Senate Majority Leader Johnson all playing a role in the process. Johnson and Truman stressed the "split" in the Republican Party in addition to citing Mr. Eisenhower's "lack of leadership qualities."

Thus, Johnson, in an Indiana speech on October 31, called the Republicans "a party without purpose, without unity, without a


program and without hope in the future." The senator termed it a "spectacle" to see "this party asking for the leadership of the Nation when it itself is without leadership."  

It was Adlai Stevenson, however, who focused national attention on the "Eisenhower dances to Nixon's tune" theme during the closing weeks of the campaign. This, though Democratic Congressional candidates also picked up the approach, indicating that it may well have been a nationally-disseminated suggestion emanating from Democratic National Headquarters. 7

On October 22, Mr. Stevenson in Chicago spoke of an "old Nixon" joined "by the new Ike—or a new speech writer—in a desperate, intolerable, demagoguery type of campaign." 8 A week later, Mr. Stevenson was to charge that the President was running the Vice President's errands in the political campaign. 9 And in still another talk, he spoke of the "void left by the failure of White House leadership" and stated that Congress had had to step into the gap. 10


7 Thus, the theme was used by the Democratic candidate in the Virginia 10th district on October 21—see The Evening Star (October 22, 1958).


2. The Republican Response

As has been pointed out earlier, the Republican strategists initially simply sidestepped the "leadership issue." Though the achievements of the "Eisenhower Administration" are stressed and lauded in all the Republican National Committee "basic issue" definition documents and in the Speech Kit and related materials pumped into the campaign by the Republican Congressional committees, Mr. Eisenhower's leadership per se was neither stressed nor defended.

Some time in September the Republican Strategy Board must have reached the conclusion that the Democrats had no intention of allowing the "lack of leadership" issue to fade away, and decided to act in a positive manner to counteract the Democratic attack. The evidence that this was indeed the case is purely circumstantial--but it is very convincing. Analysis of the Party in Power's propaganda of word and deed beginning early in October reveals a coordinated effort to build Mr. Eisenhower up both as national leader and as party strategist.\(^\text{11}\)

The build-up process was, of course, not exclusively concerned with fostering a "strong leader" image as a counter-balance to the Democratic attack. It was apparently also conducted in the belief

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\(^\text{11}\) The specific overt role played by Alcorn in the build-up and the demonstrated fact that he was the key Republican Strategy Board representative to the White House lend considerable strength to the assumption that the build-up events were the product of careful strategic planning.
that such an image would serve to whip up increased popular and party grass-roots support for Republican Congressional contenders.

The first and most significant phase of the build-up consisted of a series of events and announcements centered about the White House which covered a period of little more than a week. These events and statements were such as to portray the President as a man of decision, in good health, directly involved in party strategy, and preparing to take the Republican case to the American people in the strongest possible terms. Meade Alcorn, the Strategy Board's representative in most dealings with the President, was omnipresent throughout the initial build-up process.

As late as September 19--less than two weeks before the build-up began--veteran political observers were reporting that the President was expected to take a very limited role in the campaign and that "the demand" for presidential appearances was not as great as it had been in 1954 and 1956. The likelihood was also reported that Mr. Eisenhower would make no truly nationwide broadcasts, limiting himself to regional telecasts only. 12

On October 1 the "limited participation" pattern began to fade and the campaign to reveal Mr. Eisenhower as a dynamic leader who was ready to do battle for Republican victory began. On that day, the President conducted his first press conference since August 27.

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He took the occasion to tell Republicans everywhere that they could win if they worked hard and that it was primarily a question of getting out the vote. He warned against voter "apathy." He also announced that he was going to Walter Reed Hospital later in the week for his regular annual physical checkup.  

On the next day—October 2—the White House announced that the President had called a "top-level GOP political conference at the White House" for October 6 and extended his own speaking dates with a view to peppering up the Republican campaign and banishing the "apathy" of which he had warned the day before.  

Press Secretary James Hagerty announced a series of definite political speaking engagements for the President but said that there would be additional announcements on this score in the future.  

Mr. Hagerty said that, in addition to discussing how best to erase the apathy in Republican ranks, the conference would also get into the President's personal campaign plans and into "an exchange of ideas with reference to the campaign in general." The conferees, Hagerty said, would include Vice President Nixon, Republican National Committee Chairman Meade Alcorn and several aides, the Congressional Republican campaign leaders, and White House staff. In point of fact, the entire Republican Strategy Board was represented.

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On October 3, the President held a "strategy" conference with Mr. Alcorn and Presidential Assistant Howard Pyle. This "strategy" meeting was announced in advance. Pyle was among those who represented the White House at the regular weekly Republican Strategy Board meetings (which were not publicized). Mr. Alcorn staged a press conference upon emerging from the meeting.

Alcorn told the press that the President was prepared to play his "most active" role yet in a Congressional campaign and was stepping up his plans to campaign "aggressively." "We are thinking of many alternatives—not of just one or two—but many alternative localities and alternative means of presenting the President during the campaign," Alcorn said.

On October 4, following his checkup at Walter Reed, the President was reported by his physicians to be continuing "to maintain an excellent state of health." The New York Times stated that "the report of the examination was unusually brief, compared to reports of past medical checkups of the President." A White House Associate Press Secretary subsequently stated that the President had wanted the medical report to give only a general picture of his health and not go into details as in the past.

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15 Ibid.


Early on October 6, the White House let it be known that there had been some changes in those initially invited to attend the strategy conference on that day. Rep. Keating, who was running for the New York seat vacated by Senator Ives, met with the President prior to the strategy session and told reporters that he had told the President that it looked as if the Republicans were going to take New York.\textsuperscript{18}

Later on October 6--following an extended luncheon conference--the celebrated Joint Statement setting the central "Radical-Democrat" theme of the campaign and warning that election of a Democratic Congress would lead the country "down the left lane which leads inescapably to socialism" was issued from the White House. The statement was billed as reflecting the consensus of all who attended the conference and the press was told specifically that the President and all others attending had approved it.\textsuperscript{19}

The statement, the meeting after which it was issued, and the preparatory publicity which had paved the way for the meeting all reflected an effort to stress a united party and to focus on the President as the dynamic leader of that united party. Following issuance of the statement, Alcorn, its originator, sought to add additional luster to the Presidential "leadership" image. He told the press that the President

\textsuperscript{18} Homer, Garnett D. "Eisenhower, Leaders of Party Map Strategy," \textit{The Evening Star} (October 6, 1958).

had led the discussion and was in "a real fighting mood....He intends to give this campaign everything in his power."  

Alcorn also said: "It was reported by those attending the conference that there is basically a reservoir of confidence in the President. He handled the recession right and there is confidence in his ability to keep the peace."

Within a week thereafter, the same reporter who some three weeks before had written that the President's participation in the campaign would be very limited and that the requests for his help were not what they had once been was reporting that Mr. Eisenhower was "swamped with requests for personal campaigning in behalf of Republican candidates." And Meade Alcorn announced that the President was going to step up his campaign speaking schedule even further with a specific statement on the additional speeches to be made within the week.

So it was that the President left Washington for Cedar Rapids, Iowa on October 17 to begin his hard hitting series of campaign speeches in which the "Radical-Democrat" theme was the dominant one and in which the basic issues defined by Republican National Headquarters publications in August and early September were to be merchandised in "dynamic" language.

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20 Ibid.

3. **Mr. Nixon and the "Lack of Leadership" Issue**

The assertion that a Republican Strategy Board decision paved the way for the series of events cited above in order to build up the President's leadership image is, strictly speaking, based only upon circumstantial evidence. But that evidence, cited in context, very strongly supports the assertion. There was nothing circumstantial, however, about Vice President Nixon's concern with the leadership issue during the campaign nor about the manner in which he sought to cope with it.

The Vice President first began to express his concern in mid-October just as the President was preparing to leave Washington for his campaign trek in which California was to receive prime attention. It was in California--on October 14--that Mr. Nixon made his first and only detailed defense of the President's leadership. And he did so by noting that his action was specifically being taken in response to Democratic attacks.

"I am proud to be speaking in my own state of California on the President's 68th birthday," Nixon said. "I know I need not defend him before this audience but I will not stand idly by and allow to go unanswered the snide, below-the-belt attacks on one of America's truly great Presidents by those who know better but who apparently will do anything for partisan advantage."

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Nixon then devoted himself specifically to the "lack of leadership" charge as follows:

"That (Administration) record explodes the myth which is currently in vogue among the ivory-tower set that the President fails to provide leadership. It took great leadership to end the Korean War and to avoid other wars. It was greater leadership that was responsible for the sound economic policies which have brought the American people the best years of their lives. It was great leadership that maintained a standard of integrity and honesty which is one of the highest of any administration in the Nation's history. The difficulty is that the critics do not know leadership when they see it."23

On only two other occasions during the latter portion of the campaign period did Nixon put himself in the position of defending the President against Democratic "lack of leadership" attacks. In a San Francisco press conference the day following the speech cited immediately above, he explained why he had found it necessary to defend the President against the "lack of leadership" charges.

"....the Republican Party or the Democratic Party," he said, "will go down to defeat unless it does reply to charges that are made by responsible members of the other party."24

And in New York on October 23, he issued a bitter statement in which he took Adlai Stevenson to task for criticizing "the President for lack of leadership" on the civil rights issue. He asked what "the

23 Ibid.

titular leader of the Democratic party" had done or intended "to do to enlist support of Democratic Governors Faubus, Griffin and Almond for his position on the civil rights issue." 25

The San Francisco and New York episodes excepted, Mr. Nixon's handling of the "leadership" issue was an offensive rather than a defensive one. Commencing with talks on October 17—the day the President actually began his campaign speaking tour—the Vice President began to use Mr. Eisenhower's campaign effort as a means of creating a positive leader image calculated both to whip up optimism among the Party faithful and to take the edge off the opposition attack.

Thus in talks on October 17 in Casper and Cheyenne, Wyoming, and in Denver, Colorado, Mr. Nixon stated:

"Those who have predicted our defeat have not reckoned with the tremendous impact that the President's participation in this campaign will have. I have found in my travels throughout the country during the past few weeks that he has a great well of popularity among people of both parties. The hard-hitting defense of the magnificent record of his Administration which he will make beginning in Los Angeles next week will give our Republican campaign the shot in the arm it needs and will dispel any apathy which may still exist among the voters." 26

In Providence, Rhode Island, on October 22, Mr. Nixon reiterated the eulogy of Mr. Eisenhower's leadership, referring to


Mr. Eisenhower's "hard-hitting speeches in the West" which, he said, had "alerted the whole nation to the dangers we confront in the event that the radical wing of the Democratic party increases its strength" in Congress. In Lincoln, Nebraska, on October 25, Mr. Nixon again referred to "the massive shot in the arm" which was being given the Republican Party by "the President's hard-hitting speeches."  

On October 26, Mr. Nixon arranged for the "dynamic" Mr. Eisenhower to send him a telegram in Minneapolis conveying "personal greetings to that grand group of Minnesota Republican workers who meet with you Monday morning." Once again, the leader in the White House was making his presence felt at the grass-roots.

On October 30, shortly before moving on to Alaska, Mr. Nixon again spoke of the inspiration which the President's dynamic leadership was giving the Republican campaign. He said: "I believe that the President's nationwide telecast from Baltimore on Friday will give the Republican, Democratic, and independent workers throughout the country, who are supporting our candidates, the extra inspiration that

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they need to keep working around the clock until the last vote is cast on election day."

In summarizing Mr. Nixon's handling of the "lack of leadership" issue, it can be seen that it was fully in keeping with the pattern of events which characterized the Eisenhower buildup during the first part of October. The Vice President vocalized what those events were designed to communicate by "deed." Mr. Nixon expressed his concern with voter apathy and utilized the Eisenhower personality and image as a symbol of positive leadership for coping with that apathy as well as with Democratic attacks which raised the "lack of leadership" issue in the first place.

4. The Assault on Harry S. Truman

Richard Nixon and Meade Alcorn led a national Republican assault against the person of Harry S. Truman during the 1958 campaign in keeping with strategic decision. That decision, in turn, was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Truman himself had decided to play a major role in the campaign and was attacking the Republican Administration vigorously during September—well before Nixon formally opened the Party in Power's campaign effort.

The attack, it should be noted, was centered on Mr. Truman as an individual who was not telling the voters the truth. It was a

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31 The persistence with which the Truman attack theme appears in the Vice President's campaign speeches and in materials issued by Republican National Headquarters beginning with the time of Nixon's formal opening of the national campaign effort cannot be attributed to mere coincidence.
personalized attack—not an attack on Mr. Truman's record in office or on his administration as such. In this respect, the approach differed considerably from that taken in the basic issue-definition documents released by Republican National Headquarters before the campaign got underway. These documents made no attack whatsoever on Truman personally nor did they raise any question as to his personal capacities as president. This, though they struck hard at the record of the Truman Administration.

The Nixon-Alcorn attack on Truman as an individual may have been conditioned to some extent by the assumption that this would help to counter the Democratic "lack of leadership" charges inasmuch as Truman was a recognized leader of the opposition. However, Republican orators—at least at the national level—carefully avoided measuring Mr. Eisenhower's leadership qualities per se against those of Mr. Truman.

Mr. Nixon revealed the strategy to which he would adhere in the handling of Mr. Truman in his opening campaign speech in Indiana. He told his listeners:

"We will lose if we continue to back-peddle and to allow ourselves to be a punching bag for the cheap, below-the-belt cracks of Harry Truman and his ilk. We aren't going to win by giving the voters a diet of dishwasher and milk toast. But we can win if we start slugging about our own record and the truth about the frightening alternative offered by our opponents."

32 Nixon, Richard. Address by the Vice President of the United States, Indianapolis, Indiana (September 29, 1958).
At about the same time, the Republican National Committee began to issue a series of "Truman vs. the Truth Fact Sheets." Three of these "Fact Sheets" had been released by October 10. The third of the three described Mr. Truman's speeches as being characterized by "recklessness and distortion." And Meade Alcorn told the press that Truman's activities were helping the Republicans because people are "reminded vividly of the tragedy of Trumanism, which is the alternative to election of a Republican Congress." On the West Coast on October 3, Nixon again attacked Truman's veracity—this time at greater length and with greater vehemence. At the same time, he performed the remarkable feat of complimenting the ex-President though he saw to it that the compliment was carefully subordinated to the criticism. Mr. Truman, Nixon held, "deserves the appreciation of the nation for his admirable support of the President in the Lebanon and Quemoy crises. This is in the statesmanlike tradition of our senior statesmen."

It may be that the Vice President felt that this praise would serve to make the assault he delivered in the next breath more palatable:

"There are those who say we should ignore his (Truman's) ridiculous charges. We learned in 1948, however, that if an untruth is repeated often enough the people believe it. I serve notice here and now that we are not going to

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34 Ibid.
stand by and allow Harry Truman or anyone else to misrepresent and distort the magnificent record of this Administration."\(^\text{35}\)

In the same speech, Nixon also expressed regret that Mr. Truman had not chosen to stay out of the campaign—as had Herbert Hoover—and thus "maintain the dignity a former President should have."

In Columbus, Ohio, on October 9, Nixon hit Truman harder than at any prior time during the campaign. And once again, he prefaced the attack with a favorable comment, citing Truman "for his courage and fight against great odds in 1948...." Nixon then spent roughly one-third of his published text answering Truman's charges with "the truth" and concluded with this: "In summary, the box score of the accuracy of the charges that Mr. Truman has made to date in this campaign can be summed up in a sentence. No hits, no runs, all errors."\(^\text{36}\)

In a series of speeches in Wyoming and Colorado on October 17, the Vice President stated that he wished to "tackle head-on the malicious and false charges of Harry Truman and other Democratic orators...." He then proceeded to look at what he called "the record" and concluded that "the record" showed Harry Truman to be a liar.\(^\text{37}\)

\(^{35}\) Nixon, Richard. Excerpts from Remarks by the Vice President, Portland, Oregon (October 3, 1958).

\(^{36}\) Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).

\(^{37}\) Excerpts of Remarks, Casper, Cheyenne, and Denver, op. cit.
The Vice President carried his assault on Truman into the closing days of the campaign in a statement issued in Fairbanks, Alaska, on November 3. Once again, he had a commendation for Mr. Truman who had "shown commendable statesmanship in supporting the President's strong stand in Quemoy and Matsu and in rejecting the current Acheson line of the Democratic National Committee...."

Said Mr. Nixon:

"I am sure that Democrats and Republicans alike will be disappointed in the wild pitch that Harry Truman threw on Saturday when he charged that the Eisenhower foreign policy was a mess....When Mr. Truman uses the word mess he speaks as an expert. The people have not forgotten the mess he left the country in in 1952...."

In the closing days of October, the Republican National Committee issued or paved the way for issuance of several statements regarding the civil rights issue which also reflected on Truman's integrity. Thus, on October 26, both Senator Case (R., N. J.) and Val Washington, the minorities director of the G.O.P. National Committee, charged Truman with recklessness and irresponsibility. Senator Case said Mr. Truman's comments were "shocking and unworthy of him."

In summary, then, it is clear that the person of Ex-President Truman was a primary target of Republican leaders at the national level.

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during the 1958 campaign and that the decision to make Mr. Truman a target must have been arrived at relatively late in the day. The attack was conditioned by Mr. Truman's very active participation in the campaign but this may well have not been the only factor in the strategic decision to attack him. Finally, the Republican assault was not without its implications for the "lack of leadership" issue merchandised by the Democrats.

5. The Civil Rights Issue

The civil rights "issue" was the only one--above and beyond the seven basic issues already discussed--which was merchandised to any great extent during the 1958 campaign. However, it was merchandised with much greater caution than most of the others by both major parties. For each party approached the handling of the issue in the awareness that it was dragging an "Achilles heel."

The Party in Power was handicapped by the aftermath of its dispatch of Federal troops to Little Rock late in 1957--an aftermath which included adverse reactions from areas outside the South as well as from the South itself. It was more immediately handicapped in the political sense by a Supreme Court decision (September 29) at the campaign's outset which held that Arkansas was bound by a prior Court order to introduce desegregation in its school system without further delay. 40 The decision, in effect, highlighted the fact that it was up to the Administration to enforce the court order.

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The Republican dilemma lay in the Administration's desire to avoid any action beyond moral suasion to implement the court order at a time when it was clear moral suasion would not suffice. The Party in Power clearly had no desire to again taste the political fruits of coercive action of the type taken the year before. On the other hand, to fail to take action of practical effect was to invite intensification of Democratic criticism and the antagonism of Negro and other groups outside the South.

While appearing to favor it, the Republican desire to avoid practical implementation during the campaign period was well illustrated by the barrage of statements on Little Rock emanating from the White House between late August and early October—both before and after the Supreme Court decision. One after another, these Presidential statements appealed to "the people," to "parents," or to the "sense of civic responsibility" of Arkansas and Virginia to proceed with desegregation of schools. At no time during this period did the President or any other high Administration official even hint at specific Federal executive enforcement activity to bring about desegregation.

The Democratic Achilles heel lay in the fact that the Party's Southern Wing was committed to opposing enforced desegregation of the schools and the Southern legislators—with very few exceptions—

41 Such statements were issued on August 27, September 12, September 16, September 27 and October 1, 1958.
overtly opposed the Supreme Court decision. A sustained Democratic propaganda attack against the Administration which emphasized the desegregation question was not calculated to foster unity in the Democratic Party either in 1958 or in 1960.

The Democratic dilemma was pointed up by Sen. Smathers (D., Florida), head of the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee, on September 13 when he urged Democrats to practice "moderation" on the integration question if they wished to preserve their party. Smathers warned: "If reason and moderation cannot bring about accord in the cold war between integration and segregation--if the future does indeed belong to the extremists--then the Democratic Party as we know it, in my judgment is doomed..." 42

a. Initial Definition of the Issue

In its initial definition of the civil rights issue, the Democratic National Committee attacked the "Eisenhower-Nixon Administration" for lack of leadership in the Little Rock situation and in regard to civil rights generally. Stating that a "Democratic Congress can act for civil rights," the Committee claimed that the 85th Congress had enacted the first "major civil rights bill in 82 years." That bill, said the Committee, had created a Federal Civil Rights Commission with subpoena powers, a new Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department,

and an "affirmation of the right of a citizen to go to court for injunctions to protect his voting right...".43

Risking the umbrage of the Southern Wing, the Committee document plumped for implementation of the Supreme Court's initial school integration decision and accused the Administration of (a) failing to ask for any civil rights legislation in its first 3-1/2 years in office; (b) backing down on its own Civil Rights bill in 1957; (c) failure to enforce the 1957 law; (d) failure to enforce anti-discrimination policies in government contracts and (e) "continued indifference to civil rights which resulted in the Little Rock crisis."

Some of these allegations were to be subsequently picked up by Democratic Congressional campaigners in the north and west and by such key Democratic spokesmen as Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson and Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler. But the Democrats were to make far less of civil rights in the propaganda sense at the national level than they did, for example, of the Formosa-foreign policy, defense-missile and general economic issues.

The Party in Power's initial definition of the "civil rights" issue was made in much lower key than that inherent in definition of the seven major issues. Of the five "basic issue" documents released by Republican National Headquarters before the campaign got underway,

only two defined "civil rights" as a basic issue, principle or campaign problem and two made no mention of it at all. The Republican Congressional Speech Kit did discuss civil rights but did not define it as a basic issue. The most concentrated discussion of civil rights among the afore-mentioned documents appears in the 1958 Republican Speakers Handbook which lists the need "to safeguard the civil rights of all Americans" third among the seven basic justifications for election of a Republican Congress. The Handbook defined the Republican version of the civil rights issue in these terms: (1) The Administration had put through the "first civil rights law in 82 years;" (2) The Democrats had tried to "stall" the bill and to "restrict scope and effectiveness of bill;" (3) The Executive Branch has taken numerous actions to protect the constitutional rights of minority groups and to improve Negro employment opportunities "in the face of attempts to deprive persons of their constitutional rights."

The Republican Handbook took credit for the Republican Administration regarding the enactment of the civil rights legislation of 1957 even as the Democrats took it for the Democratic-controlled

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44 The two which gave civil rights "issue" treatment were The 1958 Republican Speakers Handbook and Six Points for Republican Speakers.


Congress. Both parties initially set forth the same basic ingredients of the legislation with the Republicans labeling the 1957 act as being "a response to President's recommendation" and the Democrats claiming that the "Democratic 85th Congress enacted...the first major civil rights law in 82 years." The Handbook devoted one page to discussion of Little Rock under the heading, "Enforcement of Federal Court Orders." It did not mention the Administration decision to send Federal troops to Little Rock as such, stating only that "President Eisenhower took the necessary steps to enforce the orders of the Federal Courts."

It is interesting to note that Republican National Chairman Meade Alcorn stressed the three basic ingredients of the civil rights issue as defined in the Handbook when he himself defined it in mid-October, more than a month after the Handbook's issuance. Terming "Civil Rights" the sixth of six "major issues of the 1958 campaign," Alcorn said:

"The first meaningful civil rights legislation in more than 80 years was enacted under this Administration, despite repeated efforts by many Democrats to sidetrack it in the Congress. Today federal court decisions involving civil rights are being widely flaunted. I am proud to be able to say that no Republican governor is defying the law of the land and preventing the children of his state from obtaining an education."47

b. Eisenhower, Nixon "Soft-pedal" Civil Rights Issue

In their overtly political speeches, the Party in Power's two top spokesmen clearly soft-pedaled the civil rights issue. Mr. Eisenhower made comments relating to civil rights in only one of the four TV-radio regional addresses during his campaign trek in the latter half of October and in only two of the total of 11 political speeches which comprised that trek. In the two cases in question, the comments were very general in nature and no mention was made of Little Rock.

An analysis of Vice President Nixon's published campaign texts and of related newspaper reports reveals that (a) Nixon did not discuss civil rights at all in any of his published texts but one; (b) The one exception was a reaction to an attack on the Administration in the civil rights field by Adlai Stevenson; (c) Nixon never delineated a specific Administration approach to the problems posed by school segregation and related discriminatory practices. On the other hand, Nixon did discuss civil rights in more general terms during a press conference and on at least one television program—the Dave Garroway Today show.


49 Based upon review of texts made available by the Vice President's office.

The one Nixon statement devoted primarily to civil rights—that reacting to the Stevenson attack—was made in New York City on October 23. It was thus made in an area in which it was likely to do the most good and the least harm and Nixon took pains to tie his statement in with the Senatorial campaign of Republican candidate Kenneth Keating.

After criticizing Stevenson for his "bitterly partisan" attack on President Eisenhower and the record of the Eisenhower Administration in the field of civil rights, and stating that he did not "question the sincerity of Mr. Stevenson or of other Democrats in the northern States," Nixon turned his fire on the "Achilles heel" of the Democratic Party. The heart of his statement—an argument for election of a Republican Congress—was set forth in the following words:

"The handling of this (civil rights) problem is not a Democratic vs Republican issue. The fight on this issue is one that must be made within the Democratic Party itself. There will be no hope for more civil rights legislation as long as the Congress continues to be controlled by anti-civil rights Democrats who are chairmen of key committees."

Three days later—in a Minneapolis press conference—Nixon gave one of the very few displays of temper he has exhibited in public when he reacted to a reporter's question on civil rights by denying that he had been "ducking" the civil rights issue in his campaign speeches. One of the reporters present wrote that "veteran

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newsman traveling with Nixon said they had never before seen him so angry."^{52} Nixon claimed that he had discussed the civil rights issue, that he had made the same speeches in North and South, and that the Democrats had best concern themselves with doing "a little job" on the governors of Arkansas and Georgia.

Analysis of Mr. Nixon's speeches and related materials reveals that—his Minneapolis comments notwithstanding—he did skirt the civil rights issue during his campaign and that he made no campaign speech south of Baltimore for which a published text is available.

The White House approach to the school desegregation issue and the Eisenhower-Nixon soft-pedaling of civil rights generally during campaign speeches were manifestations of a propaganda policy designed to keep the Administration from becoming too substantial a target for charges of failure to act or "to lead" in enforcing the Supreme Court's decisions relating to school desegregation.

c. The Closing Republican Civil Rights Barrage

In the closing two weeks of the 1958 campaign, Republican strategists launched a concentrated effort to merchandise the civil rights issue in a manner calculated to protect the White House from Democratic charges while at the same time putting the opposition on the defensive. They did so by generating propaganda of word and deed

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{52} Roberts, Chalmers, *op. cit.*
which in no way directly involved the White House and which—for the most part—came from sources not directly associated with the Administration. The major source of this propaganda activity was the Republican National Committee but the Justice Department and the Federal Civil Rights Commission were also engaged.

The Republican National Committee moved into the fray during the campaign's final week on the heels of a hard-hitting attack on the Administration for failure to implement the Supreme Court's decision on school desegregation by Ex-President Truman and speeches of the same general tenor by Adlai Stevenson and Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler. The Truman speech was made in Boston on October 24. These top-level Democratic attacks clearly conditioned the Republican decision to hit the civil rights issue hard during the closing phases of the campaign but they were not primarily responsible for that decision.

On October 25—the day after the Truman speech—the Republican Strategy Board engineered two widely-quoted statements in which Mr. Truman was charged with recklessness and irresponsibility in campaign debate on the civil rights issue. As previously noted, one statement came from Senator Case (R., N. J.), the other from Val Washington, minorities director for the Republican National Committee. The selection of spokesmen known as "liberal" on the desegregation issue was not accidental.

The Case statement cited Republican Administration achievements in the civil rights field and pointed up the lack of unity in the Democratic Party on civil rights. The Washington statement urged the removal of "Democratic racists" from key committee chairmanships in Congress by electing a Republican Congress. Washington also stated that Truman had given the Negro a "slap in the face" by urging that Governor Faubus not be thrown out of the Democratic Party.

On October 29, Republican National Chairman Alcorn released a statement designed to focus attention on Governor Faubus and thus to further exploit the split in the Democratic Party on the civil rights issue. Quoting press reports in which Faubus was cited as warning against "the sort of prejudice which has been the cause of bombing incidents in other states," Alcorn termed this "a new high—or low—in political and moral hypocrisy."

On October 30, the Republican National Committee published a statement by Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell which termed the "true" Democratic Party "a bicephalous monstrosity, the dangers of which for the American people rival ancient Scylla and Charybdis."

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54 Case Press Release, op. cit.
The Secretary was reported as equating Governor Faubus with Charybdis and Senator Proxmire (D., Wis.) with Scylla. The Democratic Charybdis, the release quoted Mitchell as saying, was "a churning whirlpool of prejudice and reaction and obstructionism, into which are sucked all the moderate and decent elements in a society."

Also on October 30, Alcorn released four "research studies" which he said proved the Democrats could never provide real progress on civil rights. The "research" documents were based on quotations from newspapers, speeches and party platforms. Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul Butler responded on the same day with a statement charging that "Republican Chairman Meade Alcorn's research on civil rights is as scanty as the Republican record of real accomplishments in that field." Mr. Butler also held that there are "two Alcorns--the one who attacks Faubus and the one who tells his supporters that the people who close public schools rather than obey a Supreme Court decision belong in the Republican Party."

Civil rights propaganda generated by the Republican National Committee in the campaign's closing days represented the greatest single concentration of such propaganda to emanate from national sources during the campaign period.

The Justice Department, the executive agency directly concerned with enforcement of civil rights legislation and of judicial decisions relating to civil rights, was very quiet in this connection during the greater part of the campaign period. Between September 29 and

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November 3, Attorney General William P. Rogers made a single speech in which he discussed civil rights. On October 8, he told the California bar association that he hoped "all responsible citizens.... take their stand on the side of the law" in supporting the Supreme Court desegregation decision but made no mention of enforcement action of any kind.  

During the closing ten days of the campaign, however, the Department did issue several press releases in which it expressed its concern with the preservation of civil rights but which in no way committed it or the Administration to specific enforcement of the Supreme Court decision.

Thus, on October 23, the Justice Department stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was to hold conferences in November and December to familiarize state and local law enforcement officials with the "cooperative services" available through the Bureau "in connection with bombings and threats of bombings against educational and religious institutions." And on October 29, Rogers issued a press statement announcing that all U. S. attorneys had been instructed to act promptly on all reports of violations of federal election laws on

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November 4 and "to be particularly watchful and prepared to act upon reports concerning the intimidation or prevention of voters from casting ballots as their free will dictates."

The Federal Civil Rights Commission was created by the 1957 Civil Rights legislation and—as of October, 1958—had been in existence for a full year. Its membership was appointed by the Administration as was its executive director. Its chairman was Dr. John A. Hannah, president of Michigan State University and known as an active Republican. Its executive director was Gordon Tiffany, who had served as New Hampshire's attorney general under Sherman Adams when the latter was governor. In short, the Commission's administrative machinery and direction were in "friendly" Republican hands.

At the outset of the campaign, the Democratic National Committee attacked the Administration for its failure to put the Commission to work—for the "big stall" in "enforcing civil rights laws." The Democrats pointed out that Tiffany had not been appointed until five months after the legal creation of the Commission and that the appointment of Commission members had not been begun until two months after creation.

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In mid-October—at the very height of the campaign—the Commission suddenly became very active in the public prints. There had been little about it or its activities in the press prior to this time. Whereas those who constituted the Commission's membership were all known as reputable men and there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the sudden burst of Commission activity was the product of strategic political decision, the timing of the activity, the fact that there was much which the Commission could have been profitably investigating prior to October, the Democratic attack, and the concurrent Republican National Committee and Justice Department activities strongly suggest a degree of political motivation.

On October 18, Tiffany announced that the Commission was making a field survey of voting complaints in three states—Florida, Alabama and Mississippi—and was preparing to hold hearings on these complaints. Tiffany stressed that the Commission had no enforcement powers, was merely empowered to investigate and to analyze and report the facts. In light of the fact that the Commission had been actually functioning for a minimum of six months, this announcement could well have been made much earlier with no loss in validity.

On October 22, Tiffany told the press that the Commission had run into a "roadblock" in Alabama's Macon County where it was

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investigating one of its complaints. The County Board of Registrars had refused to let two Commission staff investigators inspect any of its voting records, acting on the advice of the State Attorney General that these records were not public information. Tiffany stated that the Commission had had to decide whether or not to use its subpoena powers in an effort to force the state to make its voting records public.

On October 23, the Commission announced that it was going to hold hearings on the Alabama complaints in Montgomery on December 8 and members "suggested" that they would subpoena Macon County records if county officials continued to deny them to Commission investigators.

Taking into consideration the Republican National Committee, Justice Department and Civil Rights Commission activities during the closing weeks of the 1958 campaign period, it is clear that all had these things in common: (1) All sought to create an impression of Party in Power concern with and activity on behalf of civil rights enforcement; (2) All sought to do so without focusing direct attention on the White House and without committing the Administration to


specific enforcement action vis-à-vis the Supreme Court desegregation decision and (3) All focused public attention on the southern states' suppression of civil rights and thus on the split within the Democratic Party.

In light of the constant functioning of the Republican Strategy Board and of the timing factor, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the above-noted activities were all, to some considerable extent, the product of campaign politics.
CHAPTER XIII

Summary

In retrospect, salient characteristics of the Party in Power's conduct of the 1958 campaign at the national level suggest that the function of the campaign in American politics has evolved significantly during the past thirty years and--in particular--during the Eisenhower "decade." These characteristics relate to the nature of the propaganda techniques employed, the manner in which the mass media were used, the utilization of the Federal bureaucracy for dissemination of political propaganda geared to campaign objectives, the broad strategic planning procedures, and the persistent emphasis of the strategists on the irrational appeal.

Taken separately, these characteristics may mean relatively little from the evolutionary standpoint. Taken together, however, they present a very different picture. Whether they are such as to constitute a change in kind rather than in degree must await additional comparative studies which pit the 1958 campaign against those of the Roosevelt and Truman eras within the context of detailed analysis. If the difference is one of kind--rather than one of degree--the implications for the American society in the total sense would be crucial ones. For the national political
campaign is, after all, either a manifestation of underlying sociological conditions, an effort to modify these conditions, or both.

In any event, it is appropriate here to summarize the highlights of the Republican conduct of the 1958 Congressional campaign. Such summarization could serve to assist those who might be moved to make the sort of comparative analysis required to provide definitive answers to the vital questions raised by this paper.

The Party in Power's conduct of the 1958 campaign at the national level bore some of the external earmarks of the "classic" design recommended and perfected in California by the public relations firm of Whittaker and Baxter. There were refinements, however, which were particularly tailored to the more complex national situation. And there were certainly basic departures which would not have been consistent with state or local campaign objectives.

The Party in Power ran the campaign through a Strategy Board which—while somewhat flexible in membership—met regularly. The same key Republican National Committee and Congressional Campaign Committee people were usually on hand for the weekly meeting, and the White House was generally represented by a top-level Eisenhower assistant. There was a central strategic plan prepared in formal advertising-type format. There was a single basic theme—the
"Radical-Democrat" theme. There were seven simply defined specific "issues" all merchandised with considerable persistence via propaganda of both word and deed and an eighth issue which played a lesser but still significant role.

The strategy and tactics were planned and executed with relative smoothness and, apparently, with good coordination considering the general unwieldiness of the Federal bureaucracy and the many independent and semi-independent sources of power which had to be brought into a working relationship. The issues were specifically defined at the outset of the campaign period so that they could be merchandised at some length both nationally and at the state and local levels. The available evidence suggests that the Strategy Board gave careful consideration to the kind of campaign the Democratic opposition was most likely to wage and did indeed anticipate most of the "issues" the Democrats sought to define. The Board also showed flexibility in meeting opposition tactics, whatever the merits of what was done to cope with such tactics.

The Party in Power sought to make maximum use of the Eisenhower public image both with a view to countering the Democratic "lack of leadership" assault and to developing greater enthusiasm among Republican campaign workers and greater voter support for Republican Congressional candidates.
The approach taken to building up Mr. Eisenhower as a dynamic leader type was a well-organized one in which the Party in Power presented a united public front and in which the propaganda usage of the mass media was remarkably overt.

The commonly-enunciated and widely-publicized premise that Cabinet-level officials did not adequately participate in the campaign is not completely valid. Four Cabinet officers—Secretaries Benson, Seaton, Mitchell and Dulles—played major roles in the campaign. Dulles was the only one of the four who made no addresses overtly billed as political but his contribution was nevertheless of major political significance.

It is possible that the lack of performance on the campaign circuit of such men as Attorney General William Rogers and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson can be explained on strategic grounds. Anderson, a converted Texas Democrat, may not have appealed to some old-line Republicans to whom the party looked for major contributions. And Rogers headed the Department which major corporate contributors complained was much too active in the anti-trust field.

For all the polish and organization which characterized the Party in Power's waging of the campaign, the Party suffered from major limitations, not the least of which was the fact that Eisenhower himself could not be merchandised as a candidate but
merely as an auxiliary or supporting influence. Strategy Board members have themselves pointed up a second limitation--lack of money--which led to a third limitation: failure to effectively implement the Campaign Plan in major respects. As one Republican strategist put it, it was "a good plan with poor action."

There were other limitations, however, and they appear to have been of major consequence. One certainly was the failure of the Plan and of the Strategy Board to fully anticipate the residual emotional impact of the recession and the direct impact of the "right-to-work" conflict. While it is true that these two items were overtly limited to selected states, it is also true that some of those states were scenes of crucial battles, the loss of which hurt the party nationally. In this sense, then, "right-to-work" and the recession had national implications for the Party in Power which lost a substantially greater number of seats than anticipated. Meade Alcorn has admitted publicly that the recession and "right-to-work" issues had a major impact on election results.

Lack of an effective vote-getting organization at the precinct and county levels in many areas hurt the Party in Power in 1958 and, of course, this lack was not unrelated to the shortage of campaign funds. The indications that Strategy Board members did not function in the most cohesive of fashions when in the Eisenhower presence suggest another deficit but one not of major consequence in light of the liaison role played by Alcorn. A more harmful limitation was the
lack of finesse displayed by some Republican leaders in failing adequately to tailor issue-definition efforts realistically to some area situations.

Perhaps the most obvious example of this finesse problem lay in the manner in which the "economic prosperity" issue was merchandised by key speakers in areas hard hit by the recession and apparently still smarting from the impact. This was, of course, directly related to the Strategy Board's slip in not properly evaluating the "residual" influence of the recession. It does appear that the Republican speakers would have been wiser to admit in specific terms to the fact that the recession had been a serious blow to many individuals in the areas directly affected rather than to seek to "ride out the storm" with the bold and simple assertion that the recession was gone and the future was a rosy one.

Factors in the Republican defeat in 1958 which had little or nothing to do with the strategy and tactics of the Party in Power but which were nevertheless important were the nature and scope of the Democratic assault, the relatively effective job which the Democratic National Committee did in pinpointing merchandisable "issues" favorable to the Democrats, the efficient organizational efforts at the precinct and state levels by labor unions in key industrial states, and the existence of the "right-to-work" and recession issues per se.
The fact that a number of Democratic candidates in key races were fresh, attractive faces may well have helped the opposition to some extent.

While it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate, Peiping's creation of a foreign policy crisis concerning the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu was certainly not without its impact on either political strategy or the voting public's mind. And it must be assumed that the Republicans--as the Party in Power--were more vulnerable on this score than were the Democrats whatever their actual contribution to development of the "Formosa Problem."

The Party in Power's campaign effort was masterminded by politicians--not by public relations or advertising men. But they were politicians who knew or at least thought they knew the mechanics, theory and practice of manipulating public opinion via all available media. There was a minimal use of television at the national level and novelty gimmicks were not greatly in evidence. On the other hand, there was a very substantial use of the mass media generally, of television at the regional and state levels, and of "political" gimmicks which were not inconsistent with standard commercial advertising theory and technique.

The two key politicians of the Republican campaign effort were Vice President Richard Nixon and National Chairman Meade Alcorn. Both were doers as well as strategists and Nixon was clearly the
G.O.P. campaign spearhead and major personality on the hustings. Alcorn was the dominant figure on the Strategy Board and its liaison with the White House. But it is a safe assumption that no basic strategic decision or major tactic was implemented without a clearance from the Vice President.

Nixon had far too much at stake in the 1958 campaign—a point that has since been demonstrated by events—to allow others to dominate strategy to his exclusion. The overt evidence of his positive strategic role is very substantial. He publicly reversed Eisenhower and Dulles—two very powerful men—on the role of foreign policy in the campaign. The Campaign Plan was definitely cleared with him. He merchandised the central theme of the campaign constantly and it was a theme which he had employed in very much the same way in his prior campaign endeavors.

The Vice President further overtly demonstrated his role as key strategist by publicly dubbing himself the political leader of the Republican campaign, by his October strategy telegram to party leaders throughout the country, by the initiative with which he made rapid tactical shifts to meet Democratic attacks while on the campaign trail, and by the indications that he often made such shifts without requiring advice from Washington.

A fact which should not be overlooked in estimating the relative influence of Nixon and Alcorn in the strategic sense is that they appear to think very much alike on philosophical grounds and that
there were marked similarities between their respective approaches to campaign issue definition and to political propaganda generally. The "Radical-Democrat" theme, for example, was an Alcorn theme as well as a Nixon theme. It was not something that either had to convince the other to accept.

It was Alcorn who played the key role in staging the meeting and the joint White House statement of October 6 and who, in fact, was responsible for preparing the first draft of that statement. But Nixon had been merchandising the basic statement theme for a number of years before 1958. It is also significant to note that the Campaign Plan was developed at Alcorn's insistence over Campaign Director Humphrey's feelings that it would not be feasible for an off-year election and that the Plan was "sold" to Eisenhower and Nixon by Alcorn as Strategy Board representative.

One of the more significant developments of the 1958 campaign was the manner in which so-called "non-political" Executive Agency and Independent Administrative Commission channels were employed by the Party in Power for campaign propaganda purposes. This went far beyond the "non-political" speeches made by Cabinet and Sub-Cabinet level officials and merchandised as "non-political" and the relatively routine practice of working out Cabinet-level speaking schedules in close liaison with the Republican National Committee.

Much more significant in the propaganda sense is the evidence testifying to the existence of the following Administration policies and practices:
A policy of prohibition in regard to public statements or releases relating to decisions or policies likely to open up areas of controversy beyond those already implicit in the campaign.

The development of special reports and the advancing of report dates so that economic data could be timed for campaign purposes with a view to demonstrating the "stability" of the economy and the departure of the recession.

The soft-pedaling and withholding of information bearing on anti-monopoly activities both by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The extent to which this type of suppression reflected any actual change in anti-trust policy per se was not measurable within the context of this study.

The suppression of some information which might have cast an adverse reflection on the state of the economy. The Treasury Department was among the agencies which were apparently guilty of this.

A concentrated flood of informational releases to the media during the closing days of the campaign—material in which various agencies sought to demonstrate "new" policy decisions calculated to improve the welfare or well-being of various special interest groups. The Small Business Administration, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Agriculture were among the agencies indulging in this practice.
The tailoring of total agency press output with a view to highlighting developments directed to solution of a major problem of concern to a large voting bloc. The Agriculture Department's very substantial step-up of release of information relating to the disposal of farm surpluses was typical of this.

The devising and carrying through of propaganda "deeds" directed to a considerable or sole extent to influencing the electorate or a substantial segment thereof. The White House build-up surrounding the issuance of the Joint Statement of October 6, the firing of the Pioneer "Lunar Probe," the new Space Agency's ultra-rapid "reorganizational" activity, and Commerce Department Secretary Sinclair Weeks' plumping for a manufacturer's sales tax three days before resigning—all would appear to fall into this category.

The Republican Party's conducting of the 1958 campaign effort at the national level may well have been typical of other campaign efforts in some respects. But it was certainly unique in others. It was the first Congressional campaign for which a single, national Campaign Plan in advertising format was developed. It was the first national campaign in which such a plan was poorly implemented for lack of money. The campaign was undoubtedly the first in which any major party developed so closely knit and representative a planning body as the Strategy Board. It was probably the first national Congressional campaign in which the non-political bureaucracy was
used in so consistent and so organized a fashion to further the propaganda objectives of the Party in Power.

Advertising-type techniques and practices were employed and there was major usage of the mass media. However, television was used very selectively and relatively little in the true national sense. There was no evidence that the politician was being subordinated to the commercial advertising or public relations man. Politicians—not advertising specialists—played the key role in mapping campaign strategy and in implementing it.

Whatever the specific implications of the 1958 campaign for American society and politics in the broad functional sense, it did produce this rather clear-cut revelation: The efficient planning and implementation of campaign propaganda can be of great political importance but it is not enough to win a national election for the Party in Power when sound grass-roots organization, "favorable" issues, adequate financing and an attractive "central" candidate are lacking.
This bibliography is arranged chronologically by chapter.
Each reference is cited only once regardless of how often it appears as a footnote in the dissertation text.

Introduction


Chapter I


3. Follett, Mary. Creative Experience. Taken from Spahr, op. cit.


Chapter I (Continued)


Chapter II


Chapter II (Continued)


Chapter III

1. Letter from a Member of the Strategy Board (June 10, 1959).


Chapter III (Continued)


Chapter IV


Chapter V


Chapter V (Continued)


Chapter V (Continued)


Chapter VI


Chapter VI (Continued)


18. Nixon, Richard. Excerpts of Remarks by the Vice President, Columbus, Ohio (October 9, 1958).


Chapter VI (Continued)


Chapter VII


Chapter VII (Continued)


Chapter VIII


Chapter VIII (Continued)


Chapter IX


Chapter IX (Continued)


Chapter IX (Continued)


Chapter X


Chapter X (Continued)


Chapter XI


Chapter XI (Continued)


Chapter XII


Chapter XII (Continued)


Chapter XII (Continued)


Chapter XII (Continued)


I, Edward M. Glick, was born in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 23, 1920. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Cleveland, Ohio, and my undergraduate training at Ohio State University which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1943. I was graduated cum laude, the degree being taken in journalism, with honors in political science, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and to Sigma Delta Chi.

I received my Master of Arts degree in political science from Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, in 1947. During 1958, I completed courses in legal bibliography, private property and contracts at the Georgetown Law Center, Washington, D. C. I have served as an instructor and research consultant in communications under Federal government auspices and, in early 1960, completed a nationwide study of the communications of a major program administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

All of my work for the degree Doctor of Philosophy has been conducted while employed full-time in positions of responsibility outside the academic environment. Most of these positions—which have been in the editing, publishing, research and government administration areas—have had some relevance to the political science discipline.