This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received

CONLEY, Michael Charles. EDUARD DOUWES DEKKER AND THE DUTCH DISPUTE ON COLONIAL POLICY.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1960
History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
EDUARD DOUWES DEKKER AND THE DUTCH DISPUTE ON COLONIAL POLICY

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
MICHAEL CHARLES CONLEY, B.A., M.A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1960

Approved by

[Signature]
Advisor
Department of History
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Professor Pieter Geyl, Professor Willem Ph. Coolhaas and Dr. J. C. Boogman, members of the History Department of the Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, for their assistance during the years 1954 and 1955 while research was being conducted in the Netherlands, and likewise for the care with which they examined the original manuscript of this work during the winter of 1959-1960. They, however, are not to be held responsible for such errors as may appear in the text. I am also indebted to Mr. C. J. Heemskerk of Amsterdam for permission to carry on research in his family archives in detail, and to the J. J. Dorresteijn family of Zeist and Jan Bolwijn in Utrecht for their help in gaining facility in the Dutch language.

The author also wishes to express his appreciation for the patient support of his superiors, A. M. Denny and Ivan De Vries, at Oberammergau, Germany, where this work was written, and to thank the members of his reading committee at Ohio State University, Professor Lowell Ragatz, Harold J. Grimm and Eugene H. Roseboom, for their understanding and attention. Finally, I must thank my wife, Ilse, her parents, Friedrich and Rosa Benz of Heidenheim
an der Brenz, Germany, and my father Charles Conley in Cleveland, Ohio, for their constant assistance. Without them, this work could never have been completed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE EVOLUTION OF DUTCH THOUGHT ON COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS TO 1860 AND MAX HAVELAAR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE RAW MATERIALS OF FUTURE POLITICS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. EDUARD DOUWES DEKKER AND THE AMSTERDAM CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE LIBERAL'S IMAGE OF DEKKER'S POLITICAL INTENT</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. MAX HAVELAAR AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT IN 1860</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE LIBERAL CHANGE OF HEART I: A RUDE AWAKENING AT HOME</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE LIBERAL CHANGE OF HEART II: THE REVIEW OF MAX HAVELAAR IN THE BATAVIAASCH HANDELSBLAD</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. THE CONSERVATIVES IN SEARCH OF A NEW PRINCIPLE</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. DEKKER'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. THE NEW CONSERVATIVE APOLOGETICS</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1866</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. THE TRIUMPH OF SENTIMENT</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAPITULATION</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF DUTCH THOUGHT ON COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS TO 1860 AND MAX HAVELAAR

The Netherlands of the early post-Napoleonic era suffered visibly from the dislocations and stresses of two decades of European war. Economically, they recovered only in the second half of the nineteenth century, but political regeneration dated from 1848 and the new constitution which was largely a product of the thought of the jurist and politician Thorbecke.¹ During the greater portion of this period of recovery, the Dutch ruled their East Indian colonies through a system of obligatory government-directed cultures, known as the Cultuur Stelsel. Its originator, Van den Bosch, had served as adjutant of the Governor-General in the East Indies in 1807 and, later, spent the years 1828 and 1829 studying the productivity of Negro slave society in the West Indies. He received the King's approval for his scheme in 1830.² and the system he established was dismantled but gradually beginning during the eighteen-sixties.


²W. A. Knibbe, De Vestiging der Monarchie: Het Conflict Elout-Van den Bosch in Verband met de Voorgeschiedenis der Regeerings-Reglementen van 1830 en 1836, Vol. IV of
Van den Bosch was bent upon making the colonies financially self-sufficient and his own paternalistic and authoritarian inclinations provided him readily with a solution. The key to effective rule, he argued, was the native nobility. Through full utilization of their power and authority over the natives in behalf of Dutch interests, stability in the colonies and prosperity for the Motherland could be assured. The most comprehensive account of the Van den Bosch system appeared in his "Report on my activities in the Indies during the years 1830, 1831, 1832, and 1833," and dated 25 January 1834. Here he set forth the specific principles to be implemented. Each dessa (village) would be required to

In extracts, this report was available to the Dutch public in 1840 in appendix A of the Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie, No. 22. As the climax of a political epoch, the entire report finally appeared in 1864 in the periodical, Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie (Nieuwe Volgreeks, VIII ), pp. 295-477. The bare twenty-five pages of the original text in the 1840 edition permitted the inclusion of only those portions of the report which dealt with the central concepts behind the system of obligatory government cultures. Thus, the lengthy defense of the theme that Dutch law was simply recognizing age-old law (adat), that, far from introducing new institutions into Java, royal policy was now finally going back to the original institutions of native society--this argument was known from Van den Bosch's pen only in 1864. Further this report is an excellent source on the latter's reasons for supporting a near monopolistic relationship between the Handelmaatschappij and the Dutch colonial administration.

A dessa consisted of a (mother) village, some hamlets and the surrounding land, whether cultivated or not.
set aside one-fifth of its cultivated grounds for the growth of products, saleable on European markets. In this portion of their dessa grounds, the native would labor for the colonial administration. These service obligations were called the heerendienst, or services in behalf of the masters by the Dutch. They may be understood as an imperfect parallel to the western corvee. Such heerendienst was not to require more time from the native than he would customarily spend on rice culture, nor would he be subject to any further taxation once he fulfilled this service obligation. Further, if the products raised on this fifth of the dessa territory proved to have a value in excess of the former landrent collected, then such difference would be paid out to the villagers as untaxable profits. Crop failures, insofar as they were not the consequence of laziness or indifference, would be booked by the government as unrecoverable losses.

The natives were also to provide the manpower necessary for processing the crops produced under the system. This phase of the work was to be directed and superintended by European concessionaires who entered into specific

---


contractual relationships with the colonial administration. Such persons stood on an altogether different footing from the independent enterprisers who enjoyed no special dispensation in the Indies and frequently suffered from open or covert discrimination.

The legally binding contract between the concessionaire and the government obligated colonial authorities to supervise the planting of a fixed area of land in sugar, tobacco or coffee, etc., and placed upon the favored European party involved the dual responsibilities of preparing the resultant crop for shipment to Dutch markets and paying very modest wages to the natives who did the work. The concessionaire was also required to sell a certain portion of the finished product to the colonial administration at fixed prices.7

The crops purchased by the government were then turned over to the Handelmaatschappij, a trading company organized by King William I in 1824. Usually the concessionaire also employed the services of this organization to transport the remaining portion of his finished products to European markets. As a result, the Handelmaatschappij enjoyed an almost complete monopoly on transportation in the Indies.

But the native had not satisfied all of the demands placed upon him once he had fulfilled his government service obligations, i.e., the heerendienst. In addition, he was responsible for the execution of a series of pantjenservices in behalf of his indigenous superiors. This term was understood to include labors performed in behalf of the immediate hamlet, the dessa, the dessa chief or the Regent and his court. Of the two types of service obligations, the native performed the latter duties most willingly since he tended to identify his own fate with that of his hereditary superiors. Nevertheless, exactly this group of tasks, ill-defined and nowhere uniformly applied, could weigh heavily upon the native and cause much hardship.

Van den Bosch appreciated that such a system, implemented for the most part through native chiefs who were supervised by relatively few European officials, could become a source of oppression and abuse. Consequently, he placed great stress upon the careful screening of all administrative personnel and filled orders and instructions to his subordinates with admonishments to maintain a high morality in office through personal integrity:

The happiness and the satisfaction of the Javanese must always be the first concern of the government; the native has complete right to such care because of the natural submissiveness of his character and because of his childlike ill-comprehension of facts, which gives occasion enough to make misuse of his simplicity. Enterprisers who act in conflict with this principle must not be tolerated no matter how
much this might lead to retarding the expansion of the government supervised cultures. It would be better that we raise no products at all than that they be produced in violation of the obligations which we owe the population.°

In setting up the new system, Van den Bosch had the assistance of the vigorous Jean Chretien Baud who served as Governor-General ad interim in the Indies from 1833 to 1836, after his predecessor returned to the Netherlands to become Minister of Colonial Affairs. Upon Van den Bosch’s retirement from the government, Baud followed in the post of Colonial Minister, holding that cabinet office from 1840 to 1848. In time he, more than the originator of the Cultuur Stelsel, became its great protagonist.9

With his approval, the colonial administration during the eighteen-forties assumed an increasingly hostile attitude toward free enterprise in the Indies and began to ignore Van den Bosch’s admonishments to restraint. The colonial system now began to produce huge yearly surpluses for the Dutch treasury. In the Motherland, Baud provided a generation of Dutchmen with their principal rationalizations in behalf of an arrangement which expanded the powers of the indigenous nobility at the expense of the native masses.10

8 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie voor 1834, p. 76.


10 P. Mijer, Jean Chretien Baud (Utrecht: Kemink, 1878), pp. 521-525; 518-590.
The colonial apologists of the eighteen-forties suffered his first reverse with the adoption of Articles 59 and 60 of the 1848 Constitution which asserted that Parliament might play a role in the formulation of policy for the colonies. But a new liberal spirit was also manifest in the Indies in this same year. On 22 May, an assembly of Europeans of "pure or mixed blood" convened in Batavia to protest colonial regulations which required officials to send their sons to the Netherlands for their educations before they could be admitted into colonial service.

This affair brought into prominence Dr. Baron Van Hoevell, since 1837 a preacher at Batavia and editor of a local periodical, the Tijdschrift voor Neerlandsch-Indie. Van Hoevell was dismissed from his post in the Reformed Church for participating in the meeting. He did win reinstatement, but decided to return to the Netherlands where he continued to publish his magazine during the following decade and a half under the slightly altered title of Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. In 1849, he was elected a representative to the Second Chamber by the district of Zalt-Bommel.

---

11Van Welderen Rengers, op. cit., p. 335.
13Ibid., p. 84.
During the eighteen-fifties, Van Hoevell argued the case for a gradual reduction and an eventual abolition of the obligatory government cultures in favor of free enterprise. But, more importantly, along with Baud, who stood politically far to his right, Van Hoevell played a pedagogical role of prime significance in educating the membership of the Second Chamber and the Dutch public at large on the nature of their East Indian colonies.

The prestige of the colonial apologist was further weakened by news reaching the Motherland in 1849 of a catastrophic famine in Java which took the lives of thousands in the two provinces of Grobogan and Demak. Thereafter, Duymaer van Twist, representing the Liberal First Thorbecke Ministry (1849-1853), was appointed Governor General (1851-1856), and a new spirit made itself evident in the colonial hierarchy itself. Finally in 1854, the States-General, employing its newly-won powers, drew up a new Regeringsreglement, a kind of constitution for the Indies which attempted to define in a comprehensive manner the legal rights and procedures which should govern Dutch rule over the natives.

The most radical voices during the debates of July and August of that year which produced the new regulations

were those of Van Hoevell and two members of a small Dutch Protestant political faction known as the Anti-Revolutionaires. If Van Hoevell called for the adoption of genuinely liberal policies in the Indies, then the members of the religious organization, Elout van Soeterwoude and Baron Mackay, decried the many hindrances in the way of the missionary, deplored the "politics of budgetary surpluses" and took up the defense of the "little man" in the interior against his own capricious native chiefs. Neither Van Hoevell nor the Anti-Revolutionaires could hope for decisive developments in the direction they envisaged. The kind of reforms they desired would necessitate a fundamental alteration in the a priori from which the Dutch had built their colonial system since 1830. However, one very important concession was made by incorporating into the Regeringsreglement the new Article 56 which seemed to provide for the future abandonment of the Cultuur Stelsel. This read:

The governor-General shall maintain the system of obligatory cultures, implemented by state authority, insofar as possible, and shall take care of the following in accordance with the decrees of the King.

(1) That the cultivation of the obligatory cultures does not stand in the way of the cultivation

\[15\] W. R. Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen, II (Zalt-Bommel: Norman, 1862), pp. 73-75; 87-91.

of sufficient food for the natives.

(2) That insofar as the obligatory cultures are cultivated upon grounds which were originally developed by the native peoples for themselves, the determination, regarding this ground, shall be made with fairness and with respect for the existing rights and customs of the people.

(3) That the same principle be taken into account in the division of labor.

(4) That the remuneration of the natives involved, while avoiding damaging inflationary tendencies, shall be of such nature that they receive in working upon the government cultures at least as great an advantage as they would receive from labor freely contracted of the same nature.

(5) That insofar as possible, those objections be removed which, as the consequence of a purposeful investigation, may be found to exist within the system of obligatory cultures.

(6) That consequently a regulation be prepared which rests upon the principle of voluntary agreements with the communes and persons involved and which will act as a transition into the condition in which the intervention of state authorities shall no longer be necessary.

By agreeing to the inclusion of Article 56 in the Regeringsreglement, Baud, by implication, was admitting, after a decade during which he had only praise for the system, that something was wrong in the Indies and that distinct alterations must be made there. But even more remarkable were the words in which he accounted for his new point of view.

Baud assumed an almost apologetic attitude in the States-General on 17 July and frankly admitted that, if circumstances had permitted, laissez-faire would have been preferable—that the system of obligatory cultures was based upon fallacious principles which only the distress of
the moment excused. These words, along with paragraph six of Article 56, produced reverberations which still weighed heavily upon the course of events a decade later.\textsuperscript{17}

The period from the passage of the new regulations for the Indies on into 1860 was largely one of lull in the States-General but, outside of Parliament, a lively debate now developed among the writers of books, pamphlets and newspapers. An important new element was the appearance of a group of journals in the Indies during the eighteen-fifties: the \textit{Bataviaasch Handelsblad}, the \textit{Java Bode}, \textit{De Lokomotief}, \textit{Het Soerabajasch Handelsblad}.\textsuperscript{18} The colonial administration sought to restrain their editorial policy with repressive regulations which proved to be no more than a holding action, doomed to early collapse, but administrative persecution did bring the editor of the \textit{Bataviaasch Handelsblad}, H. J. Lion, popular attention when he was sentenced to eighteen month's confinement in January 1860 on the charge of "insult, libel and slander against the Governor-General."\textsuperscript{19}

Lion's voice, like that of Van Hoewell, Duymaer van Twist, Mackay and Elout van Soeterwoude—no matter how they

\textsuperscript{17}P. Mijer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 652-654.

\textsuperscript{18}C. W. Wormser, \textit{Journalistic op Java} (Deventer: Van Hoeve, 1935), pp. 16-25; 29-34.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Bataviaasch Handelsblad}, Wednesday, 11 January 1860, No. 1.
might disagree among themselves—was a challenge to a colonial status quo which could no longer be easily defended. Seemingly the Dutch, in 1860, stood on the threshold of a new epoch which would see the rapid abandonment of Van den Bosch's principles. This, however, did not transpire. A series of political events in the Motherland substantially compromised Liberal intent. Between 1860 and 1864, a strong, integrated Conservative party grew out of the ill-defined parliamentary factions of the fifties and sought, in the defense of Van den Bosch's system, its most effective rallying point.

In evolving their new rationale to counter the rising wave of Liberal insistence upon fundamental change, the Conservatives were heavily dependent upon the line of thought set forth during the early eighteen-sixties by a former official of the Dutch colonial administration, Eduard Douwes Dekker, whose first book, Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Handelmaatschappij, appeared in May 1860. Without the unique, invincible and arrogant admonishments and the impassioned harangues of the man who called himself "Multatuli," the Conservatives could not have

---

produced that synthesis of ideas which won adherents to their cause and confounded the Liberals for a decade.

Dekker went to the Indies in 1838 at the age of eighteen and worked for the colonial administration there in a variety of capacities until 1856. During this period, he returned only once to the Netherlands, during the years 1854-1855. In 1856, only a few months after his return to the Indies, he resigned from his position as Assistant-Resident of Lebak in protest against the decisions of his superiors. Dekker always viewed his separation from the colonial service and the events leading up to that critical juncture as the decisive moment in his life. The greater part of his Max Havelaar was taken up with a highly subjective accounting of that episode in his life which, at the same time, clearly reflected his natural inclination toward egocentricity and authoritarianism.

On 22 January 1856, Brest van Kempen, the Resident of the province of Bantam in western Java, formally installed Dekker as the highest colonial official in the Assistant-Residency of Lebak, one of the several regions into which Bantam was divided. Four weeks later, on 24 February, Dekker accused the principal native official of Lebak, the Raden Adipati Karta Nata Negara, of gross abuse of the prerogatives granted him by the colonial administration.

Although only a brief period of time had elapsed, Dekker, had acquired considerable information—in part of
questionable accuracy—which indicated high irregularity in the local administration. From his own immediate subordinate, the Controller Van Hermert, and from Lieutenant Collard, the commander of the local military detachment, he heard many tales of abuse, extortion and murder.\textsuperscript{21} The native Djaksa, Astra Koesoema, who was charged with the direction of civil and criminal investigations, brought more reports to the Assistant-Resident.\textsuperscript{22} An element of drama was added when Dekker began to receive nightly visits from simple natives who would creep up to the back of his house from a ravine near by to make personal complaints against their chiefs.\textsuperscript{23} Finally, Dekker had available in the government archive at Rangkas Betoeng, the seat of his Assistant-Residency, copies of the official correspondence and reports which had been made there by his predecessors.

Dekker was encouraged to move with dispatch against the Raden Adipati in order to terminate malpractices once he was told about the death of Assistant-Resident Carolus, the man who occupied the post at Rangkas Betoeng before him. This information was supplied by Carolus' widow who still resided in the government compound when Dekker arrived with

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21}Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 259-260. \\
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., I, pp. 211-212. \\
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 217.
\end{flushright}
his family. Her husband, said Mrs. Carolus, was poisoned in the home of the Demang (subordinate chief) who ruled in the subdistrict of Paroeng-Koedjang. Supposedly he had been brought home in a "pitiful condition . . . holding his stomach and crying 'fire, fire!' And a few hours later, he was dead." According to Max Havelaar, this story was checked with Doctor Benson at Serang who had examined Carolus. The Doctor believed that the cause of Carolus' death had been a liver abscess. But Dekker remained unconvinced. He was strongly inclined to believe that a poison, unknown to western medicine, had been employed, producing superficially the symptoms commonly associated with liver disorders. Since there had been no autopsy to prove the contrary, Dekker's thesis was altogether rational.

---

24Ibid., p. 258.

25Ibid., p. 259. One of the principal arguments used by those seeking to detract from the significance of Lebak and Dekker's later writings about it, derives from an article published in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant on 30 January 1861 by an unidentified party who declared that Dekker had been misinformed completely on the course of Carolus' last days by the latter's widow. This contention by a party who, although unknown, appears to have been intimately acquainted with conditions in Lebak and Serang, is accepted by the present writer as authoritative. From this letter, it becomes apparent that Carolus' ill health had begun, not a matter of hours, but a matter of days prior to his actual death, that Carolus could not have been poisoned at the home of the Demang of Parang-Koedjang, but that he himself aggravated a condition of illness which had persisted for some time by insisting upon participating in a trip on horseback through the agricultural districts of Lebak along with a commission of representatives from Batavia who were examining the local stand of cultures. Further, Carolus had not died in his home, but in a military
In the same document in which he made his charge, Dekker set forth a recommended course of action. First, he requested Van Kempen to have the Raden Adipati forthwith removed from Lebak for confinement at Serang, the principal town of the Residency of Bantam. Secondly, he called for the immediate detention of additional members of the native chief’s family, including the Demang of Parang-Koedjang, so that they would be in no position to interfere in the course of a thorough investigation which he planned to make. But the situation was more complicated. The Raden Adipati’s nephew, the Regent of Tjiandjoer, was on his way to Lebak for a visit. Dekker was anxious to bring the wrongs which had long infested Lebak to a halt at the earliest possible moment, that is, before the Regent of Tjiandjoer arrived. To wait until after his subsequent departure would mean additional months of inaction. Therefore he recommended yet another step in his 24 February letter: that the visit of

hospital at Serang where Bensen moved him after lengthy expostulation over the danger of remaining in Lebak in such a bad state of health. Only after several hours in the hospital in Serang and after several days of illness during which he complained of his liver, did Carolus finally die.

This statement, however, does not detract from Dekker’s belief that Carolus could conceivably have been poisoned. Given the general attitude of superstition, the psychological mood in which Dekker lived and the specific concern with poison among the peoples of the Indies in the middle of the century, Dekker could quite legitimately believe that, irrespective of the medical statement on the cause of death, some unknown poison had been employed.
the Raden Adipati's nephew should "immediately be countermanded." Significantly, Dekker did not support his charge by listing specific illegal acts that had been perpetrated. Van Kempen soon learned that this information would not be made available until after he had complied with the Assistant-Resident's preconditions.

Van Kempen refused to give his approval to such a scheme but he agreed to refer the whole matter to the Governor-General, Duymaer van Twist, for a final decision.  

26 Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 502-504.

27 Ibid., pp. 274-275. The Residency of Bantam was in many respects a unique region of Java. First of all, there were no government-directed cultures in this territory. The last efforts to establish them there were abandoned in the early eighteen-fifties. But, more importantly, private landownership did exist among the native population. It had made possible the rise of a wealthy class which was free of any obligation to the colonial administration. In a letter of September 1856 to Governor-General Pahud, Van Kempen sought to account for the social and administrative instability of Bantam on the basis of these factors.

In areas where government-directed cultures existed, it was the practice of Batavia to allow the local dessa chiefs a percentage-wise emolument on the worth of the crops raised within their area of supervision. The greater the yield, the greater their salary. This arrangement seemed to provide the chiefs with an adequate income. In Bantam, however, Van Kempen wrote, the only source of income for native administrators was the designated eight per cent on the income from land rent. And that eight per cent, farcically, frequently amounted to not more than ten guilders per dessa chief! By the very nature of the situation, the native chief found that genuine authority came to rest, unofficially, with the landowners.

However, this was no solution, for the propertied class in Bantam displayed no interest in accepting the local responsibilities of government despite the encouragement received in that direction in an administrative directive of 18 October 1844. One was left with dassa chiefs who were very poorly salaried and who did not represent wealth. Such
For a moment, Dekker may have fancied that Van Twist would support his own revolutionary approach to the correction of abuse in the interior. He knew the Governor-General well and had spoken with him informally in the autumn of 1855 on a number of occasions while waiting at Batavia for a new assignment. Dekker figured wrongly. Van Twist was no more pleased with his strategy than Van Kempen. In a cabinet missive of 23 March addressed directly to the Assistant-Resident of Lebak, Dekker was officially reprimanded. But, rather than expell him from the colonial service or reduce him in rank, the Governor-General reassigned him to direct the administration of Ngawi in the Residency of Madiun. His punishment was to consist simply of a transfer in grade to a post of equal responsibility. Dekker would not accept this solution. He felt that Van Twist was side-stepping a conflict over principles. He sought his release from the

men resorted to what were, strictly speaking, illegal methods to make up for the deficits and to compensate themselves for the extremely difficult tasks placed upon their shoulders.

Given such an arrangement, Van Kempen, like his predecessors at Serang, followed a policy of resorting to legal prosecution only under extreme circumstances and Van Kempen recommended to Governor-General Pahud that such a working principle be perpetuated. Prosecution only after severe provocation was the least reprehensible arrangement under the prevailing circumstances and should be continued, Van Kempen wrote, until the Batavian government was prepared to make fundamental changes in the salary structure for native officials in Bantam. *(Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 651; 644-645.)*

---

28 *Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 274-275.*

29 *Ibid., pp. 570-573.*
colonial service with the intention of pleading his case personally before the Governor-General. Van Twist, however, refused to grant him an audience and, therewith, his career in the Indies was ended.

These events are central to Max Havelaar but are only part of a multi-colored work which sought to hold the reader's attention through melodramatic contrast and biting irony. The first fifty pages of the work are not concerned with colonial matters at all but attempt, rather, to awaken in the reader a contempt for the pettiness and hypocrisy of the Dutch middle class of the earlier nineteenth century personified in the caricature of the coffee broker Droogstoppel, whose name, roughly translated into English, means "dried-out stick of wood." The cheapness and superficiality of Droogstoppel's life and attitudes are contrasted with the heroic qualities which Dekker assigned himself under the pseudonym of "Max Havelaar." And, in the phantom-like figure of "Shawlman," a specter of the poverty in which Dekker lived after his resignation, the reader is disposed to indignation toward the heartless immorality of public tribunals.

Nor were these the only fictitious stereotypes introduced in the earlier chapters of Max Havelaar. If Droogstoppel was an instrument through which Dekker assaulted the morality of the Dutch businessman, then the satirical sketch
of Preacher Wawelaar gave him occasion to denounce the meanness and superficiality of the Dutch Reformed Church. The connotative bite in the name Dekker chose for this caricature came from the fact that a very similar Dutch verb, spelled with an additional "u," means to twaddle, to drivel or to chatter.

Again Dekker sought to identify himself with the contemporary literary school of German Romanticism by bringing the person of Ernst Stern into his narrative. This teenage German boy is the son of one of Droogstoppel's best customers in Hamburg. Hoping to keep the father, Ludwig Stern, from giving his business to the rival Dutch firm of Busselinck & Waterman, Droogstoppel invites Ernst to come and live in his fashionable house in Amsterdam and learn the brokerage business first hand. And anxious less the reader confuse him with his competitor, Droogstoppel repeatedly gives his specific address in Amsterdam: Lauriergracht, No. 37. The young Stern is supposedly Droogstoppel's co-author of the greater part of Max Havelaar. Dekker pretends that Stern wrote the tale of Lebak and that his host only contributed a chapter now and then to give the book "a more solid basis," as he is made to say. The style and content of the chapters in the book consequently vary considerably, for Dekker wrote now as an impassioned German Romantic and then as a bigoted Dutch coffee broker.
To emphasize the promethian stance of his Assistant-Resident, Dekker likewise reduced the person of Brest van Kempen to a figure of ridicule. That dignitary, he informed his readers, was encumbered with a speech impediment.

He spoke with a tone as if a period should be placed after each word. The silence following each word could only be compared with that following an 'amen' in the church during which the people in the congregation did their coughing and nose blowing. . . . The inhabitants of the principal town Serang, insofar as they were not government employees—a relationship which necessitates a certain caution—called his manner of speaking 'slimy.'

Dekker declared that he also thought this a good description of the Resident's peculiar enunciation, so he renamed Van Kempen in his book, "Slymering." In fact, Dekker wished, through the use of this revulsive name to awake in his reader's mind, totally different connotations.

Before Van Kempen and Dekker agreed to turn their dispute of 1856 over to the Governor-General for final decision, the Resident had made a trip to Lebak in order to dissuade his subordinate from the proposed line of action. Unsuccessful in this effort, the Resident had then paid the Raden Adipati a visit. According to Max Havelaar, he asked the native Regent two questions: whether the Raden Adipati had any complaints against the Assistant-Resident, and whether the Regent needed money. When the Regent answered

---

30 Volledige Werken, I, pp. 78-79.
in the affirmative to the second question, "Slymering" gave him two one-hundred guilder bills which he had apparently brought along specifically to meet such an eventuality. The strong implication in Dekker's book was that this money was to be used by the Regent to buy off the witnesses which "Max Havelaar" intended to use later against him! In this light, Van Kempen was nothing but an unprincipled accomplice to extortion.31

31Ibid., p. 278. Actually Van Kempen was not at all the insensitive intriguer described by Dekker. While he resolutely disagreed with his subordinate's approach to the manner of administering justice in Bantam, he was deeply struck by Dekker's personal problem. When he received Dekker's letter to the Governor-General requesting his discharge and a brief note addressed to himself asking that the letter be forwarded through channels, he immediately composed a warm, sympathetic letter for Dekker in which he encouraged his Assistant-Resident to change his mind and destroy his request to Van Twist. This private, unofficial missive, written on 30 March, assured Dekker that he did not stand alone, that Van Kempen still held him in great esteem. "Put off the forwarding [of your letter] for at least one more mailing day," he advised Dekker. "Your quickly formed decisions may be gratifying for yourself, but in the eyes of other persons such haste shall seem precipitancy and condemn you." The letter ended with references to Dekker's responsibility toward his family and financial position. (Volledige Werken, IX, p. 593.) Dekker was not amenable at this date to the Resident's moderation and self-restraint. He briefly thanked his superior for his letter and requested the transmission of his own to Batavia. But Van Kempen was still of service to him thereafter. Dekker stayed with his wife and two children in the Resident's house on his way to Batavia, and the latter also assisted in the transportation of his household goods out of Bantam.
Despite the brilliance of his kaleidoscopic portrait of extremes, Dekker felt compelled to go further to bring out in its sharpest outline the contrast between hypocrisy and wickedness in public norms and official forms as against the nobility of the just and the oppressed. Standing beside the faultless Assistant-Resident, he placed his idealized dessa-dweller—the "little man" whom the colossus would protect—and called him Saidjah.

Saidjah's father had a buffalo with which he worked his fields. When the buffalo was taken away from him by the district chief, he was very sad and spoke not a word for many days. For the time to plough was at hand and one needs must fear that, if the sawah was not taken care of promptly, that the time of sowing would pass by and that finally there would be no padi to cut and to store in the lumbung of the house.

Saidjah's father was greatly concerned; he feared that his wife would have need of rice and also Saidjah, who was still a child, and the brother and sisters of Saidjah. And also, the District Chief would complain of him before the

---

32 A flooded rice field.
33 Unharvested rice.
34 Storehouse for rice.
Assistant Resident if he fell behind in the paying of land rent. For one could be punished in this matter according to the law. 35

Then Saidjah's father took a dagger which had been a pusaka inheritance from his own father. It was not particularly beautiful but there were silver strips on the side and at the end of the sheath. He sold this dagger to a Chinese who lived in the principal village and came home with 24 guilders with which he bought another buffalo.

Saidjah, who was about seven years old at this time quickly made friends with the new buffalo. "And I do not say purposelessly: friendship, for it is indeed moving to see how the Javanese buffalo become attached to the small children that watch over and take care of them .... [sic] the great powerful animal willingly bent his heavy head to the right, to the left or to the ground at the finger's touch of the child whom he knew, whom he understood and with whom he had grown up."

35 In a brief passage not included in the above translation, Dekker specifically states that in Bantam "personal landownership" existed which is not the case elsewhere. In conjunction with this it should be noted that while repeated references are made to land rent in the tale of Saidjah and to abuses arising from the authority of the local chiefs, there is no single reference to the pantjen-services as a source of abuse. All oppression then, in this tale is associated with "official buffalo robbery" and "unpaid landrents."
Such a friendship then, the little Saidjah had known quickly to establish with his new companion and Saidjah's encouraging childish voice seemed to give yet greater power to the powerful withers of the strong animal, when it ploughed up hard clay ground and left, in its foot steps, deep sharp furrows. The buffalo turned willingly about, when he had reached the end of the plot, and lost not the width of a thumb in laying down the following furrow which was so carefully dug as if the sawah were but a garden patch hoed-up by a giant.

And next door lay the sawahs of Adinda's father. It had been decided that Saidjah would one day wed her, and when Adinda's brothers came to the border between their plots at the time that Saidjah was there with his ploughing then they called to each other happily and disputed with praise the power and obedience of their respective buffalos; "but I think that the one of Saidjah was the best, perhaps indeed because he understood better than the others how to speak to him. For buffaloes are extremely responsive to the manner in which one speaks to them."

Saidjah had reached his ninth year and Adinda was already six years old before this buffalo was taken from Saidjah's father by the district chief of Parang Koedjang.\(^{36}\)

\(^{36}\)Volledige Werken, I, pp. 233-235.
Through the use of short simple sentences which suggest an almost oriental declamatory monotone, the events in Saidjah's young life are related with tender affection and Dekker himself assures us repeatedly, with evident satisfaction, that his tale is monotonous. But with great success he nevertheless brings his European reader to appreciate that a close sentimental attachment exists between the native and his buffalo; indeed Saidjah's very life is saved by a new buffalo, which, standing with its four legs spread over the child, catches up a springing tiger on his horns, killing the creature before it can do any harm to the child. With a genuine indignation which Dekker, writing with superb virtuosity, has inspired in his reader by the third page of the narrative, one learns that this buffalo, too, was taken from Saidjah's father, and then, as if mocking his reader, Dekker repeats, "I have already told you, reader, that my story is monotonous." Saidjah's father flees from the land fearful for the consequence of his unpaid land rent. He had no more pusaka which he could sell to buy a new buffalo, since, we are told, his parents like himself had always lived in Parang Koedjang.

Saidjah is possessed with a great idea—he will go to Batavia and there he will make enough money to return to
Parang Koedjang and buy two buffaloes, something his father had never been able to do. Thus the young Saidjah at the age of fifteen tells Adinda of his plans—he will be gone three times 12 moons and Adinda is to cut marks into her rice block, keeping track of the time, and when she has cut three times 12 marks into her rice block she is to go to the Djati forest and await Saidjah's return under the Ketapang. In moving words, Dekker describes Saidjah's trip by foot to the East. He described Saidjah's longings for Adinda as he proceeds daily further away from Parang Koedjang. And then Saidjah arrives in Batavia.

"He besought [a Dutch] gentleman to take him into his service, which the latter did immediately, because he could not understand Saidjah. For in Batavia one prefers servants who still do not speak Malay and consequently are still not so depraved as the others who have been in contact with European civilization for longer periods of time."37 For three years, Saidjah worked diligently for his master. The latter greatly praised his services and bestowed upon him many gifts and considerations and felt it something of an injustice when Saidjah, at the end of three years, asked for a letter of recommendation and took his departure.

---

37 Ibid., p. 242.
In his clothing he had enough money to buy three buffaloes. He wore a new sword (kris) and carried a beautiful silver linked belt, a gift for Adinda. Saidjah's reaction to the countryside through which he passed upon his return is very unlike that which he had experienced three years previously. Now, the towns and villages along the way could not awake his interest, for he had seen Batavia itself and he had seen the great men who live in Batavia. Nor could Saidjah have great interest for the news of Bantan-Kidoel which was told him by another who accompanied him one afternoon along the way. He was unimpressed when told that, after many years, the government coffee culture had now been revoked in Bantan-Kidoel, that the Demand of Parang Koedjang had been imprisoned for 14 days in the house of his father-in-law as a result of his abuses; that the seat of the Assistant Residency of Bantan-Kidoel had been moved to Rangkas Betoeng and that there was a new Assistant Resident who had spoken powerfully during his first meeting with the chiefs of the assistant residency, at the Seba.

Saidjah finally arrived at the Ketapang tree near his village of Badoer in the district of Parang Koedjang.

---

38 The Assistant-Residency of Lebak was called Bantan-Kidoel by the native Sundanese who lived in this region.

39 A formal public assembly of the native chiefs.
The author describes at great length Saidjah's yearning to see once again Adinda. "Saidjah had not learned to pray, and it would have been a shame indeed to teach him that, for more holy prayers and more fiery thoughts than lay in the speechless ravishment of his soul were not amenable to expression in human language."

As the sun mounted in the tropic sky, Saidjah made repeated excuses in his heart for why Adinda still had not appeared and then suddenly he thought: what is she is sick or dead?

"Like a wounded deer Saidjah fled up the passway that led from the Ketapang into the village where Adinda lived. He saw nothing and he heard nothing and still he could have heard something for people stood along the way at the entrance to the village and called: 'Saidjah, Saidjah!'

But . . . was it because of his hurry, his excitement that he could not find the house of Adinda? He had already rushed through the village to the place where the pathway stopped and, as if mad, he turned about and wondered at himself that he could have gone passed her house without seeing it. But again he had reached the entrance to the village and--my God was this a dream?--Again he had not found Adinda's house! Once again he flew back and then stood still finally, seizing his head with both hands as if

---

40 Ibid., p. 247.
to press away the madness which possessed him and he cried out: 'drunk, drunk, I am drunk!'

And then the women came out into the pathway and they explained to Saidjah that Adinda's father, perturbed at any solution to his problems under the extortion of the Demang of Parang Koedjang, had fled with Adinda and her brothers to Tjilangkahan and had gone from there by boat north to the Lampongs where organized existence to the Dutch existed. At first Saidjah heard these words with incomprehension, as if dazed; he was taken by an old woman, who felt pity for him, to her house where she cared for him. For all the people of the village thought Saidjah insane.

But Saidjah was not insane, and, at night, he arose and under the light of a bright moon sought out among the many ruins of former houses in the village of Badoer the ruins of Adinda's house and then he asked of the old woman, with whom he stayed, where the rice block had gone on which Adinda had ground her flour. And the rice block when found contained 32 stripes cut in by Adinda's hand. Thus Adinda and her father and brothers had been gone only shortly. Saidjah gave the old woman with whom he had stayed money enough to buy a buffalo and then proceeded himself to Tjilangkahan where he purchased a boat and sailed north to the Lampongs, there joining a band of
rebel Bantamers. But Saidjah joined them, not so much to make war against the Dutch, as to seek out his Adinda.

"On one day that the insurrectionaries had been defeated anew he wandered about in a village that had just been conquered by the Dutch army and was therefore still in flames. Saidjah knew that the band that had been organized there had consisted for the most part of Bantamers. As a ghost he crept about in the houses which were still not entirely consumed in flames and he found the corpse of Adinda's father with a klewang-bayonet wound in the chest. Next to him Saidjah saw the three murdered brothers of Adinda, children or almost children, and a bit further on lay the corpse of Adinda, naked, repulsively abused . . . .

There was a short strip of blue linen forced into the gaping chest wound which apparently had made an end to long struggling . . . . Saidjah then ran towards several soldiers who, with leveled rifles, were driving the last remaining rebels back into the fire of the burning houses. He bared his chest before the broad sword bayonets and pressed himself forward with force, driving the soldiers back with his last effort, as the points struck against his chest. And shortly thereafter there was great celebration in Batavia over the new conquest which once again added so many laurels to the laurels of the Dutch-Indies
army. And the Governor-General wrote to the Motherland that peace had been restored in the Lampongs and the King of the Netherlands, advised by his state officials, rewarded once again such heroism with many knightly orders.

And supposedly there arose in the hearts of the pious, during Sunday services or prayer-meetings, words of thanksgiving to Heaven upon learning that the Lord God of Hosts had fought once again under the banners of the Netherlands... "But God, taking pity upon such affliction did not accept that day's benediction!"\(^{41}\)

This was Dekker's Saidjah. Its strong sentimental flavor would have a powerful impact upon Dutch imagination and upon Dutch colonial politics in the following decades. But, more immediately, the tale of Saidjah played a central structural role in the organization of the book Max Havelaar. For Saidjah becomes a preparation for the real story which Dekker wishes to tell, namely the tale of what happens to Max Havelaar at Lebak. The stage setting for the actual narration of events in March of 1856 presupposes a strong sentimental attachment to the "little men" in Java. From the point of view of simple

\(^{41}\)Ibid., pp. 253-254.
organization, there is, from the very beginning of Dekker's literary career, close interdependence between two specific demands: 1) treat the natives, those "coffee and sugar machines which are called 'the indigenous'", like human beings and 2) see to it that the government supports "Max Havelaar" against his opponents in the colonial administration and in the Dutch government. Nor was this interrelationship between Havelaar's affair and the natives' cause, accidental. Writing to his wife in November 1859, in the weeks immediately after he had finished his book, Dekker specifically stated: "That gentleness in the chronicle of Saidjah causes my harshness to stand out and the harshness in turn emphasizes the gentleness."\(^{42}\)

CHAPTER XI

THE RAW MATERIALS OF FUTURE POLITICS

It has traditionally been assumed in the literature on "Multatuli" that the request for discharge from the colonial service was an act of open defiance and the most extreme step which Dekker took in his life. In fact, however, the writing of Max Havelaar and its publication without any substantial alterations represents the truly climactic moment in the life of its author. Dekker conceived his book as a means of awakening a mass movement among the people against the Dutch government. One need not look far for clear indications of his primary preoccupation with the political impact which the work would make. His book was a "petition to the public" and it was dedicated to the King. The work "will fall like a thunderbolt upon the land."

In a letter of 28 September 1859, he compared Max Havelaar to Uncle Tom's Cabin, and specifically indicated that his purpose was to attract public support against the government and the ministers who would now be forced...
to heed his words. "Every favorable review [produces] a compatriot for me against the government and then they will perhaps do in fear what they would not do in righteousness." He expected the work to awaken widespread controversy and create a readiness among the general public to read a collection of official documents he intended to have published which would otherwise never find their way into the hands of the man in the street.  

Dekker was extremely successful in accomplishing his political intent, for, almost universally, the first response of the Dutch to Max Havelaar was political. It would serve in the early eighteen-sixties as a source of liberal party slogans, but, paradoxically, came to exercise its greatest influence over the conservatives as the decade progressed. It drew both defiantly hostile and strongly sympathetic comments from Conservatives, Liberals and Moderates. The remarkable phenomenon among the political factions of simultaneous repellence from, and attraction to, Max Havelaar, necessitates some attention to those elements in the book which can be labeled political.

Dekker's ideas were not formulated in a manner which permitted their easy assimilation by any specific contemporary political faction. His frame of reference always remained peculiarly egocentric and non-historical.

3Ibid., pp. 44-45.
His ideas did not mesh well with current lines of thought which had evolved in the eighteen fifties. Consequently, because there would be so much controversy on these points, it is necessary to examine exactly what Dekker believed regarding the existence of obligatory government cultures and, with them, the pantjen-services. Also, one must understand his attitude toward the introduction of more widely spread private enterprise and free western initiative in Java and Sumatra. Finally, this must be tied up with his own personal experiences and his relationships to other specific persons.

If it is customary in Dutch literature to see Lebak as the decisive moment in Dekker's life, then it is also true that this body of writing uniformly evaluates Max Havelaar as a plea for the new, more liberal school of thought in the Netherlands regarding the Indies. Dekker—it is generally believed—was the author of a defense of the institutions of free enterprise and his book was a Philippic against the system of obligatory government cultures. These assumptions are false! Already at Lebak in 1856, Dekker was essentially opposed to free enterprise in the Indies and the appurtenant institution of private landownership. Thus, in a note made in mid-March 1856, Dekker toyed with the idea—which he, at the time, held in common with Brest van Kempen—that one of the reasons for
the grievous "tendency toward unrest" in Lebak was the unnatural "self-esteem nourished by personal landownership." And, in April, Dekker jotted down the following highly significant remark: "the only manner in which to arrive at free enterprise is [by forcing the performance of] labor by coercion [which is coupled with] the legitimation of the [use of] coercion by equitable remuneration.'

Despite the positive manner in which the above statement is made, its exact meaning becomes clear only after some reflection. Elsewhere and later, "Multatuli" would say that free enterprise was, in fact, simply a matter of turning the powers of the native chiefs—who were in theory at least, amenable to administrative control—over to private persons who could not be controlled so directly or so thoroughly as the native chiefs. Certainly Dekker, in using the word coercion, did not have such private persons in mind. In the words "labor by coercion," Dekker is in fact referring to the element of force that already existed in the system of obligatory government cultures and his commentary on it is that of

---


[^5]: Ibid., p. 601. In the original Dutch, this critical passage is as follows: "De eenige wijze om to geraken tot vrije arbeid is dwang tot arbeid en wettiging van dien dwang door billijke betaling. regt van eigendom"
the paternalistic moralist. The implication in the qualifying phrase: "legitimation . . . by equitable remuneration" is that genuine free enterprise is the logical end product of the system of obligatory government cultures, once that system became in fact what it had always been in the theoretical framework proposed by Van den Bosch, namely the formal structure of an enlightened despotism with a strong element of the ethical. Thus, by the Spring of 1856, Dekker had already formulated the position which he would propose publicly in his later major works, beginning with the Minnebrieven (Love Letters). By 1861, he would declare: "Do not extort and misuse the little man in Java, and gradually we'll see whether he will work of his own free will!"

It is a matter of consequence to distinguish Dekker's stand of 1856 from that of such Liberals as Van Hoevell for, superficially viewed, there seemed to be substantial agreement between them. In both cases, there was an unwillingness to accept a program for the immediate abolition of the obligatory government cultures and both tended to see that system as something transitory to the achievement of a more ideal scheme. But, beyond these similarities, Dekker and Van Hoevell were in disagreement.

While Van Hoevell was prepared to pay his compliments to the positive achievements of the government system,
he did fully intend its ultimate total abandonment. Dekker, on the contrary, was satisfied that the system's theoretical structure and original intent—as proclaimed by Van den Bosch—was the best possible colonial settlement and could be made acceptable by removing the blemishes, faults and irrelevancies which had grown around it during the last decades. For Van Hoevell, transition meant movement into a new system; for Dekker, the final realization of Van den Bosch's original concepts. Van Hoevell was thinking historically and Dekker not. In the latter's mind, free enterprise meant that the labor presently carried out by the natives under coercion would one day be performed voluntarily for the same paternalistic despot. This would happen when the system had been "legitimized," that is, when it became morally justifiable as the result of a thorough turn over in personnel.

From this fundamental dissimularity came, on the one hand, Van Hoevell's concern with immediately increasing the role of private initiative in the Indies, and, on the other hand, Dekker's almost total silence on the matter of free enterprise during the period 1856-1860. In Van Hoevell's mind, the private enterpriser was an integral, indispensable element to hasten the 'transition'; for Dekker, such parties were largely irrelevant to the problem of reform. Purification, and not the abolishment of the
system of obligatory cultures, was the order of the day in Dekker's mind.⁶

Dekker's thought reflected his experiences at Lebak, conceivably complemented by personal observation earlier at Poerworedjo. To this was added his contact with several free enterprisers in the autumn of 1856. Dekker had remained in Java for the better part of a year after his resignation from the colonial service. While his wife and young son took up residence with his brother, Jan, who was head of an independent tobacco farm at Bodjonegoro near Rembang, Dekker sought a position in some private concern on the island. His failure to find a position permanently soured his respect for the "self-made-man" who became the

⁶On a separate line, directly after the phrase discussed above, came the further words: "right of property." Since these words were written on a separate line, it would be wrong to conclude that they were intended as the climax and solution to a single line of thought. The position in which these words are placed, indicates that they were part of a separate but related line of thought. After the word "remuneration," one might continue: and in this conjunction the right of the Javanese to private property should be considered. What Dekker would have said cannot be specifically determined. The words do not in themselves indicate approval or disapproval but, if the interpretation here is accepted, if one allows Dekker's later opinions some weight, if one considers the consistency which is clearly apparent in so much of his thought both before and after 1859-1860, and if one considers his strongly authoritarian inclination, then it can be concluded that an elaboration of this point would have involved an outright rejection of the institution of private property.
butt of repeated attacks in a later series of works which Dekker entitled: *Ideeën*.

Dekker's most important business contact was Van Son. He wanted this business man to sell him a rice concession in Bandung on credit. Next to his association with his brother, this was probably Dekker's most intimate contact with any private Dutch resident in the Indies. His frustration is apparent in a letter of November to his wife. "Van Son plays with thousands and I have to watch [from the outside]." When Dekker timidly threatened to go into business in competition, Van Son had assured him that he could reduce his prices to a point at which only the wealthiest could compete.

Van Son can get as much money as he wants. When he was still a young man, he made ten thousand guilders as the administrator for his mother at Kedong Badok and from his present establishment he has made fifteen thousand guilders, a sum that can still rise. . . . [sic] thus he can play with money.  

The incipient hostility toward private enterprise which can be detected in these words revives most interestingly in Dekker's correspondence of October 1859 with his wife, Everdina, regarding the just completed *Max Havelaar*. Dekker had departed from the Indies in April 1857, leaving his wife behind with his brother. In the spring of 1858, Jan had returned to Europe and about 12 months later,

---

*Volledige Werken*, IX, pp. 660-661.
"Tine"—Dekker's term of affection for his wife—arrived in the Netherlands. Dekker was unable to keep his reunited family together. His wife—after being rejected by members of her own family—was obliged to take up residence with Jan once again, this time in his Dutch country house, de Buthe, near Brummen. Dekker, in the meantime, lived in a wretched hotel in Brussels, the Prince Belge which despite its name was nothing more than a Bierstube in the Rue de la Montagne. Repeatedly, passages in the letters that passed between Dekker and Everdina at this time indicated that he anticipated major disagreement from his brother over the political content of his writing. Everdina continually wrote of Jan's great interest in his labors and Dekker knew, consequently, that his brother would give serious attention to the manuscript once he had it in hand. Thus Dekker's defensive attitude toward his brother was at the minimum an admission on his part that Max Havelaar was no defense of free enterprise.

In a letter of 10 October from Brussels, Dekker wrote, "yes my dear, you say that I must send you the manuscript, and that is my plan; and Jan can read it to you in the evenings. I know for sure: 1° that he shall indeed find much that is beautiful in it, 2° that he will savagely reject very much of it." And, a few days later, once

9Brieven, III, pp. 48-49.
Dekker had sent off his new book in the mail, he cautioned "Tine" to read the work privately before giving it to Jan. By then he promised to provide her with appropriate arguments to defend the work against criticisms which he anticipated from his brother. And Dekker added, in an obviously defensive mood, "Ask Jan whether he will have my book printed irrespective of whether he approves of the content." Dekker continued to entertain suspicions of his brother's reaction, given Jan's vested interest in private enterprise in the Indies, until in early November he received a letter from his wife informing him that his brother had expressed unreserved praise for the book. He responded with wonderment: "but my dear one, I didn't dare hope that Jan would think so highly of it. I had counted upon almost complete rejection."11

---

10 Ibid., p. 55.

11 Ibid., p. 77. Italics added. It might be contended that Dekker's apprehensiveness toward his brother's evaluation of Max Havelaar was not based upon an anticipated conflict over principles, but on more personal and private antipathies and aversions growing out of Dekker's consistent dependency on his brother, first at Bodjonegoro and then at his country house, de Buite, near Brummen. To be sure, their relationship to each other was not always smooth, and Jan was given occasion enough to be exasperated with his brother, yet this is an unlikely explanation of the statements cited above. That a question of principles is involved is apparent from the further course of their relationship. Typical of the grounds for Dekker's later suspicions of his brother is his complaint to his wife on 29 November 1859 that Jan "continually places the stress on his [tobacco] contract which as a result of my obstinacy and excessive demands [on the Colonial Ministry] might be
In these few last words, Dekker's attitude toward his Dutch public and the political content of his book is made apparent. It is further of the utmost importance to note that, by implication, the first "free enterpriser" who got his hands on the book misunderstood its intent! Dekker was interested neither in the defense of the government system of cultures nor in an apology for privately controlled capital in the Indies. Dekker was attacking a group of immoral practices that had been allowed to grow up in a colonial system which, in itself was acceptable to him. The vehemence of the assault followed from his instinctive tendency to generalize his own personal grievances. He blamed his calamity at Lebak on those malpractices. As he explained to his wife, the book was not written to satisfy his brother, "nor the tea concessionaires, nor the residents nor Duymaer van Twist ... but for me and you, for us, who have been beastly mistreated." Because pinched off." (Brieven, IV, p. 11). Here Jan is seen as the interested defender of a cause which Dekker would not support.

Yet another factor which runs counter to the thesis of personal antipathy can be found in the numerous passages in Dekker's private letters of the eighteen-forties and fifties which attest to deep affection between the two brothers. Such statements easily counterbalance the expressions of displeasure. Finally, when the two do permanently break with each other, it is indeed because of Dekker's refusal to defend the cause of private enterprise in the Indies. (cf. Chapter VI, p. 206.)

12 Brieven, III, p. 67.
of his egocentric point of reference, Dekker was quite unable to understand the nature of the reaction which would occur once his book had been published. And the more enlightened Dutch middle class, trained to think according to the political categories of the day, could not immediately comprehend the intent in Dekker's words.

In emphasizing the immoral elements which had crept into the government system, he had placed on paper words which Liberals like Jan Dekker interpreted as a defense of free enterprise in the Indies. While preparing a savage attack against his personal enemies, the Raden Adipati, Brest van kempen and Duymaer van Twist, he seemed, in other eyes, to be rejecting the legitimacy of government supervision over enterprise in the Indies. And, ironically, his work was being grossly misinterpreted by his brother at just that moment when Dekker's hostility toward the private business men, in general, was being focused more specifically against a group of men associated with his brother-in-law, Van Heeckeren, and the colonial official, Bekking, men publically acclaimed as proponents of private enterprise for the Indies!

Van Heeckeren had married Everdina's sister in the Indies in the eighteen-forties and through his wife, Dekker had been acquainted with him. No close relationship developed. However, when Everdina arrived in the Netherlands in the spring of 1859, Dekker hoped that she would be able
to stay with her brother-in-law who had also returned from the Indies and who resided in The Hague. "Tine" traveled to The Hague to visit her sister. But not only would her sister not admit her into her home, she and her husband actually put pressure on Everdina to divorce Dekker. It was this turn of events which obliged Everdina to travel on to Jan's home, de Buthe.  

If Dekker's attitude toward his brother, a tobacco enterpriser, was defensive, then his attitude toward his estranged brother-in-law was one of open hostility. In Max Havelaar, Dekker narrated how Droogstoppel once made a secret inspection of the bare apartment of the poverty-stricken Shawlman and found a letter signed by a blood relative of Shawlman's (read: Dekker's) wife "whose name is distinguished in the Netherlands." It demanded that she divorce her husband. This was an incident sketched from life. Van Heeckeren actually caused such a letter to be written. Indeed, it is quite possible that Dekker's caricature of Droogstoppel was patterned after Van Heeckeren who, about the year 1859, had set up an East Indies commercial agency in the Hague. And, whether or not it was true, Dekker believed that this man ran "a complete system of espionage" to accumulate information on the intimate

---

14 *Volledige Werken*, I, p. 266.
details of his life since Lebak, information which was supposedly being passed on to Duymaer van Twist himself.

In Dekker's mind, Van Heeckeren was, on the one hand, associated with the free enterprisers and, on the other hand, with Duymaer van Twist, the villain of *Max Havelaar*. Much later he would refer to Van Heeckeren as "a man who was trying to butter-up the influential Duymaer van Twist!" 15 In addition to this, Dekker, on the basis of information apparently supplied by his wife, associated van Heeckeren with the person of Henri Charles Bekking, 16 an outspoken defender of free enterprise in the Indies, who would be discharged from the colonial service in 1861 for irregularities in the issuance of tobacco agreements encouraging private capitalist investments at the expense of the government and against the relevant administrative regulations. Dekker had known this man at Poerworedjo in 1848 when Bekking came to fill the post of secretary of the residency and, upon arriving in Lebak, Dekker had had occasion enough to renew his acquaintance with him, for he had also served as Assistant Resident of Lebak in the beginning of the decade and the archive at Lebak contained a number of his official letters. In 1858, Dekker seems to

---


16 *Brieven*, III, pp. 45; 48.
have had access to information on Bekking's tenuous standing with the government in the Netherlands, and he had little respect for Bekking's polemics, appearing regularly in the liberal to radical periodical, De Indier which was under the direction of yet another advanced Liberal, Van Soest.

One is provided here, then, with a substantial body of more than circumstantial evidence which supports the contention that Dekker, at no time between 1856 and 1859, identified himself with liberal colonial politics. An authoritarian by nature, he was surely not attracted by Liberal ideology, nor could he be led to associate himself with liberals for personal reasons. He felt only enmity for a whole group of liberals: Duymaer van Twist, Van Heeckeren, Bekking and Van Soest. To this group his own brother Jan, would shortly be added and Brest van Kempen--as shall be shown--also belonged here. Finally, the very course of events at Lebak between February and April 1856 may well have soured Dekker's respect for private land-ownership in the Indies, a matter close to the heart of the Liberal program for the East Indies. In this context alone is Dekker's memorandum of April 1856 understandable.

The only manner in which to arrive at free enterprise is [by forcing the performance of] labor by coercion [which is coupled with] the legitimation of that [use of] coercion by equitable remuneration.

The critique of the system of obligatory cultures imbedded in these words is a moral one: the system as it is
practiced at the moment has not yet been legitimized! This can be accomplished through equitable remuneration, that is through the reaffirmation of a moral principle which had been lost from sight. But this was altogether unlike the solution which Van Hoevell sought. What Dekker demanded could be achieved, in his mind, without recourse to the stratagems championed so persistently by Van Hoevell, to bring more private capital into play in the Indies. Dekker confused the private investor, whom he did not understand, with the middle class hypocrisy sketched so convincingly in his own figure of Droogstoppel. 17

If one substitutes the system of obligatory cultures in the following statement made by Dekker in 1863* for the symbolic figure of the ship, and turns the captain into a

17 It was Dekker himself who first used the epithet "Droogstoppel" as a designation for one of the moderate Liberals, Duymaer van Twist. On 20 January 1860, he believed that Rochussen would be willing to settle with him, i.e., give him an official government position, simply "in order to vex Duymaer van Twist with whom he does not get along very well . . . . Rochussen considers Duymaer van Twist to be a Droogstoppel." (Brieven, III, p. 94.) Since Rochussen at that moment could not possibly have known Max Havelaar, this phrase can only mean: Van Twist is the personification in Rochussen's eyes of the attributes Dekker ascribed to the figure of Droogstoppel in his book! If Dekker thought in these terms, then clearly he could not intend his book to be an outright attack on the apologists of the colonial system of obligatory, government-directed cultures.
Governor-General, then a totally adequate basis for Dekker's position is provided:

Ask a sailor if his commander ever gave faulty orders? He is at liberty to think this, to demonstrate this in as much detail as he desires, suppose even that he is correct; and the wise sailor, while busy on the forecastle demonstrating this succinctly, suddenly hears the voice of the fallible captain sounding, "Reef the sails, all men on board!"

And away is the [captain's] fallibility. He calls: "Reef the sails," and if this is not quickly accomplished, then the ship is finished, along with the wise sailor in the crew! If he is really intelligent, he will box the ear of the apprentice, who shaken by the demonstration, would dare to protest against the order. Indeed the captain can err, but no mistake on his part can work such misfortune upon all as the loss of respect for his voice.

There where I object to "He, the master has said it!" in the student of Pythagoras, thinking that he has thus proven something, I speak of schools, of study, of philosophy. There where I advocate infallibility I am speaking of acting.

In this sense, I must be infallible ... and amusing though it may seem (cause and effect once again fused together) the belief that another is infallible is itself protection against much that is faulty.

The belief in power, gives power. Belief? It is completely stupid or sublime! Stupidity in reasoning, in seeking after truth, as sublime as the greatest sacrifice in action!18

Next to establishing the fact that Dekker was no proponent for free enterprise in Java, the most important fact to note is, that none of these elements in Dekker's thought, despite the fact that they were meaningful and central to his frame of reference, appear in Max Havelaar.

---

18 Brièven, VI, pp. 139-140.
On the other hand, passages do occur in the book that imply, to the casual reader, that Dekker rejected in substance the system of obligatory government cultures. Why this disparity, if he distrusted both the intent and consequences of free enterprise for the Indies?

In answering this question, one must first direct his attention to the fact that the book was conceived as a means of creating a mass basis for a movement against the status quo. Dekker was concerned with exposing the malpractices which had crept into a system long established, and he knew too little of free enterprise to include it in this status quo. The emphasis must be placed on the issue of immorality. Dekker did not oppose Brest van Kempen and Duymaer van Twist because the latter preferred obligatory government cultures or Free Enterprise; his opposition to both of them was based upon what he considered their failure to perform their moral obligations.

Dekker, since his youth, had remained continually obsessed with the idea of the creation of his Insulinde.19

---

19 As early as 1843, when he was only twenty-three years of age, Dekker reflected in all seriousness upon the possibility of one day freeing the East Indies from Dutch control and turning them into an independent empire which he would call Insulinde. He himself would rule over this state as an enlightened despot. At that time he wrote (Volledige Werken, VIII, pp. 373-374):

Would it not be a handsome goal to make a people happy--what do I say--to bring a happy people into existence? Who before me has done such a thing? Other men have simply conquered or organized. But
Whether he would or not, the colonial government of necessity, was for him a competitor. If he could accept this system, he would nevertheless take its direction away from the appointess of the Dutch crown. He could not help but see in the colonial government under which he had actually labored more enmity than could be attributed at the moment to a theoretical system of free enterprise.

In Dekker's account of the origins and nature of the Cultuur Stelsel appearing in *Max Havelaar*, there exists, in consequence, an unresolved conflict arising from his fundamental attraction to the mathematical simplicity of Van den Bosch's authoritarian system on the one hand, and his preoccupation, on the other, with the immorality which has developed in the system and his inclination to take up the leadership of an insurrectionary movement which would break completely with the past. His discussion of

---

I shall call together in one family the ravaged step-children of a senile Europe, and place myself at the head of the family, and perhaps from the cover of banishment I shall be able to cause the unnatural mother, who rejected her children, to tremble. Is that not a great and elevated goal? Should he who brings it about be subject to the mean conventions of respectibility and propriety? Can the lion be constrained with the same bonds that leash the doe?

This idea did not die out when Dekker reached maturity. In the *Max Havelaar*, Dekker referred to his constitution for an independent Insulinde and in his books and correspondence from the eighteen-sixties into the eighteen-eighties, this theme repeatedly reoccurred.
this subject begins by describing the natives' natural proclivity to plant only rice and to live a life totally devoted to the simple agrarian society derived from it. Then he continues:

But then there came strangers out of the West, who made themselves masters of the land. They wished to gain profit from the fertility of the soil, and caused the inhabitants to devote a portion of their labor and time to the raising of other crops [than rice], which would engender more profit in the markets of Europe. To induce the little man into taking such a course, nothing more was necessary than a very simple policy. He obeyed his chiefs, thus one had only to win over these chiefs by promising them a portion of the profit . . . and the scheme was completely successful.

If one observes the fantastic mass of Javanese products which are brought to auction in the Netherlands, one can convince himself of the efficacy of this policy, even if he does not find it noble.20

In this single sentence, Dekker's perplexity is clearly enunciated. On the one hand, he saw this as a calculating system for the reduction of the mass of the native population to cogs in an impersonal, oppressive machine but, at the same time, the element of authority applied to the simplest of formulas had created an ingenious system which was given order and symmetry through a hierarchial structure. From this point of view, the arrangement attracted Dekker's sense of majesty, and supplied a want in his character. Nowhere is Dekker's admiration of the grandeur and power of such an organization of power more marked than in his letter to Miss Hamminck Schepel of 30/31 July 1863 (Brieven, VI, pp. 137-138). There he wrote:

"The passage of the Hellespont is no art, the water there as elsewhere supports a boat, a ship, according to general laws. But one had more necessary in order to cause 2 1/2 million people (minus the padding in historical figures) to go along. All of those Asiatics abandoned their lands, their pleasures and their families because a single person wished to found a world empire which extended through Greece. That monsterous development rested upon a very simple multiplication, almost too simple to explain, and
For, if one asks whether the peasant himself enjoys a return proportionate to this result, then I must, in response answer in the negative. The government still one does not give it sufficient attention. Divide Xerxes' empire once into three parts, and each part into three lesser parts, etc. Assume that the three chiefs of each part believe in (pay obedience to) the chief that stands above them, then one arrives already at the 15th subdivision at a figure of ca. four million persons who follow the wishes of a single person. There are only 12 or 13 steps between Xerxes and the lowest of the warriors who accompanied him from as far as the borders of India. But let the series be divided by a larger number (there were more than three satraps) multiply the larger number through which the [leaders'] will was transmitted at each step by 30, by 50, by 100, then one has a much shorter way to descend to reach the basis of the enormous pyramid from its unipersonal top. $1 \times 100 \times 100 \times 100 \times 100$ is a hundred million. Multiply it once again and you surpass ten-fold the total number of inhabitants on our small earth! I am very fond of numbers, and I find this exposition more striking than the account of leaven by Jesus, although he meant to say the same thing. And the Catholic Church has indeed comprehended this well! It has always been the most beautiful organization that ever existed. From the pope to the least cloister portier or nun there exists relatively only a few steps, but through a matchless unity of purpose it has ruled the world with its system! For the manner in which it has made use of its power, I of course make no defense, but the organization is magnificent.

In these words one can identify the essential reason that made cooperation with Liberals impossible. Authority for him was synonymous with order. His attack on the government was hobbled from the beginning by the fact that he would rule his dream-land Insulinde according to the same hierarchical mathematics that had already been implemented by Van den Bosch! Dekker's emphasis on morality as opposed to a more concrete program which might be integrated into a political platform arose from the fact that he had otherwise no argument!

---

21 Dekker is paraphrasing here his April 1866 pronouncement to the effect that the system is indefensible because there has been as yet no "legitimation ... through equitable remuneration" for the "labor by coercion!"
obliges him to plant on his ground that which it pleases, it punishes him if he sells the resultant product to any one else, and the government itself determines the price which it pays him for it. The cost of the transportation to Europe, through the offices of a privileged commerical body, are high. The incentive payments handed out to the chiefs in addition, weigh heavily on the purchase prices, and . . . since in the final reckoning this whole transaction must bring a profit, the latter can be found in no other manner than by paying out to the Javanese just enough so that he does not die of hunger, which would reduce the productive capacities of the nation. Also the European official receives a remuneration proportionate to the amount produced. It is true that the poor Javanese is thus whipped on by two sets of authorities, it is true that he is often torn away from his rice field and that starvation is often the consequence of these measures . . . still the flags can merrily wave at Batavia, at Semarang, at Soerabaja, at Paseroean, at Besoeki, at Probolinggo, at Patjitan, at Tjilatjap, on board the ships which are loaded with the harvests which make the Netherlands rich.

*Starvation?* On the rich, fertily blessed island of Java, starvation? Yes reader, only a few years ago, whole districts were depopulated by hunger. Mothers have eaten their children . . .

But then the motherland concerned itself with the matter. In the deliberative halls of the people's representatives, men became displeased with the affair, and the contemporary head of the Indies administration had to issue orders against the further expansion of the respective European-market products to a point at which starvation could once again threaten . . .

This has made me bitter. What would you think of a person who could write down such affairs without bitterness?23

---

22 The phrase, "the respective European-market products," is in Dutch, "der dusgenaamde europese-marktprodukten." It is significant that the author carefully refrains from using the expression: "Cultuur Stelsel" here or elsewhere!

23 *Volledige Werken*, I, pp. 64-66.
Dekker sought to resolve his perplexities by seeking out a dual set of institutions upon which he could lay primary responsibility for the immorality in the system as it functioned in the eighteen-fifties while calling the original system as formulated by Van den Bosch ethical and righteous. First of all, he could hold the native Regents for guilty of abuse. But their capriciousness was made possible by the guilt; secondly, of Batavia, the central European authorities were not willing to intervene directly and with dispatch. Dekker objected, not to Batavia's autocracy, but to its failure to use that authority in behalf of a heroic principle! Dekker, then, was in no way distorting the truth when he wrote to a member of the Second Chamber of the States General, Wintgens, in December 1862 saying:

When I underwent [the experiences related in] the Havelaar, I was thinking in terms of no system. Nor was this the case when I wrote the Havelaar. No system functioned in Lebak. In that province, there was neither Free Enterprise nor government culture. The population had trouble enough in paying its landrent. 24

With these facts in mind, one can then consider the passages in the book relating to the pantjen-services.

Dekker's discussion of the relationship between the native chiefs and the central administrative offices of the

---

24 *Brieven, IX*, p. 60.
Dutch colonial administration occur early in the book, in the fifth chapter, even before he has made his character sketches of the principal persons to appear in the narrative of Lebak. This portion of his book carried the strongest political overtones and served as a place where he could defend his later acts in general terms without yet referring to specific events.

Formerly, he wrote, it was an accepted thesis in nearly all Asia, that the subject and all his possessions belonged to the sovereign. Now, in greater parts of the Indies, that former sovereign has been reduced to the status of a salaried official of the Dutch government with the official title of Toemenggoeng, Adipati, or--at the highest--Pangeran. The taxes and tributes of the little man to the native nobility have been replaced in statute law by "the meagerly paid labor in the coffee gardens and sugar fields." The indigenous officials, however, have carefully refrained from making this clear to the natives who continue to carry out the traditional pantjen-services. But sometimes the demands of the native chiefs are even more excessive. "If the Regent should cast a desirous eye upon the horse, the buffalo, the daughter, or the wife of the little man, one would consider it unheard of, if the latter refused the unconditional surrender of the desired object."\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{25}Volledige Werken, I, p. 66.
The society that evolves under these circumstances is thoroughly static and weighed down by the dead hand of history. Some Regents use this prerogative only to the extend necessary to maintain the opulent standard of living expected from the native nobility; some make considerably greater use of arbitrary services. But nowhere is native society totally free of such customs.

It is then indeed difficult, yes even impossible to totally eradicate such abuse, since it is deeply rooted in the character of the population, even in that portion which suffers under it, for the Javanese is open-handed, particularly when generosity is associated with demonstrations of attachment to his chief, to the descendant of him whom his father obeyed.26

The grievous situation which had evolved was not to be blamed on Van den Bosch, argued Dekker by implication, for the danger of abuse "is known to the government. He who read the Staatsbladen in which the laws, instructions and manuals for the officials are contained, applauded the humanitarianism and righteousness which seems to have been foremost in their formulation." Yet they bear little relation to daily reality. Everywhere, he argued, it was well known that the native nobility demanded more extensive services from their changes than regulations permitted. Assistant-residents took an oath to fight against just such excesses. Nevertheless, it

26 Ibid.
was only very seldom that a Regent was accused of arbitrary actions or abuse of authority.

Multiplying ten-fold an already perplexing situation, Dekker continued, was the perverse system of official reports which, in fact, served to suppress any realistic account of actual conditions. At each level in the administrative hierarchy a premium was placed upon the preparation of accounts for one's superiors which painted a false picture of local order, welfare, and repose. The colonial official in the interior, then, stood between a capricious native nobility abetted by a conniving bureaucracy at Batavia, and a "system of lies" which fettered the will of the reformer. In dismay, Dekker declared the assistant-resident's job an impossible one. "There appears to exist an almost insurmountable difficulty in carrying out the oath: 'to protect the native population against exploitation and extortion.'"27

Havelaar's tragedy was caused, not simply by Duymaer van Twist, but by the spirit of immorality generally prevalent at Batavia. The nineteenth century reader concluded, logically, that the book was a plea for the curtailment or abolition of the autocratic powers which the administrators at Batavia enjoyed. This was not Dekker's meaning, but his brother Jan, for example, thought this to be his intent.

27Ibid., p. 69.
Between the discussion of pantjen-services and the close of the book come some 200 pages of material but slightly germane to the subject of politics. One reads of Droogstoppel, of Busselinck & Waterman, of Saidjah, and finally of the exchanges between Havelaar and Slymering, and of Havelaar's failure in Batavia to gain a private audience with Duymaer van Twist after his resignation. Then, suddenly, the reader is faced with a veritable manifesto for revolution.

The end of the volume begins with the dismissal of young Stern, who had supposedly been writing the narrative of Lebak. We are informed that, "I, Multatuli, take up the pen." Turning to his repoussoir, Droogstoppel, the new author, Multatuli, says:

Halt, you lowly product of filthy money-grubbing and blasphemous cant! I created you ... you have grown to a monster under my pen ... I loathe this creature of my own invention: choke in coffee and be gone!  

And then "Multatuli" affirms that his book is of personal concern for all kinds of people in every profession, and insists that he shall indeed be read.

Once that goal has been reached, I shall be satisfied. For my purpose was not to have written well ... my only intent was so to write that people pay attention. And just as a person who cries: "stop that thief," is little concerned with the style in which

he accidently addresses the public, it is a matter of indifference to me what people say about the manner in which I cried out my own "stop that thief."

'The book is motley . . . there is no graduality in it . . . preoccupied with seeking effects . . . it had bad style . . . the writer is unskilled . . . has no talent . . . no method . . .

Good, good, everything good! But . . . the Javanese is being abused! And remember this: the refutation of the CENTRAL THEME of my work is impossible!29

His proper place, he suggests, on the basis of this book, is in the States-General--from where he could more effectively protest the innumerable abuses of the government. But should the people refuse him a seat in the States-General and decline to listen to his complaints--

"Then I shall translate my book into the few languages that I know and into the many languages which I can learn in order to ask from Europe that which I have sought fruitlessly in the Netherlands. And then there would be sung in all the great cities songs with refrains like this:

There lies a land of plunderers on the sea between East Friesland and the Schelldt!

And when this isn't enough?

Then I would translate my book into Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, Alfurs, Buginese, Batak . . .

And I would hurl war songs of swords into the conscience of the poor martyrs to whom I promised help, I, Multatuli.

29 Ibid., p. 292-293.
Salvation and sustinance, by approved ways where this is possible . . . by the legitimate way of force where there is no alternative.
And this would be very disadvantageous for the COFFEE AUCTIONS OF THE DUTCH HANDELMAATSCHAPPIJ!
For I am no fitful poet, no gentle dreamer like the trapped Havelaar who carried out his duty with the courage of a lion and suffers hunger with the patience of a marmot in the winter.
This book is an introduction . . .
I shall use increasingly powerful and sharp weapons as they may become necessary . . .
Pray God that this is not necessary!

No, it will not be necessary! For I dedicate my book to you, William The Third, King, Grand Duke, Prince . . . you who are more than Prince, Grand Duke and King . . . Emperor of the magnificent empire of INSULINDE that sweeps along the equator like a chain of smaragd . . .
Of you I dare ask with confidence whether it is the imperial will:
That the Havelaars be spattered with the mud of the Slymerings and the Droogstoppels?
and that over there your more than thirty million subjects be ABUSED AND EXPLIOTED IN YOUR NAME?
CHAPTER III

EDUARD DOUWES DEKKER AND THE AMSTERDAM CONSERVATIVES

During the course of the summer of 1860, this defiant and highly subjective book would exercise great influence; it would cause a veritable shockwave to pass through the Dutch nation but, before that moment, a nine months period would pass during which Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Handelmaatschappij would gradually be made known to a small group of Conservatives. The actual writing occurred during September and October 1859 while Dekker lived in the Prince Belge in Brussels. But even before he began work on his famous book, he had taken steps to establish contact with prominent persons in the Netherlands. From among the papers which he had brought with him from the Indies, he picked out a juvenile drama he had written at Padang in 1843. This manuscript was sent to Eduard Stumph who was a well known Amsterdam theater owner and a Mason. Through him, Dekker came into contact with Edward De Vries, a Dutch impresario. De Vries and a fellow Mason, Van Hasselt, almost immediately

1Brieven, III, p. 35.
interested themselves in Dekker's literary capacity and, in turn contacted the important literary figure, Van Lennep.²

By this time, however, Dekker's primary interest was with his apology for the entirety of his official career with the Dutch government in the Indies. He acquainted both De Vries and Van Hasselt with the fact that a new work had just been completed. When De Vries arrived at the Prince Belge on 30 October to discuss his youthful stage drama with him, Dekker read portions of the completed Max Havelaar to him.³

It is a matter of some consequence to note that both of the men instinctively interpreted Dekker's new book as a political attack upon the contemporary Dutch cabinet headed by the former Governor-General, J. J. Rochussen. Van Hasselt, essentially a conservative, was dismayed at a new attack "directed against the government in the Indies and full of bitterness." He considered it his immediate duty "to dissuade Mr. Dekker from publishing a provocative writing . . ." of such a nature.⁴ When De

²Ibid., pp. 41-42.

³Archief Van Lennep, Library of the Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, Brieven en Stukken aan en over E. Dekker-Multatuli, 1820-1887, Document No. 4, Van Hasselt tò Rochussen. This collection of papers will be referred to hereafter as Archief Van Lennep.

⁴Archief Van Lennep, loc. cit.
Vries reported to him in Amsterdam after his visit with Dekker in Brussels, Van Hasselt's apprehension increased. Referring to _Max Havelaar_, he wrote on 11 November: "According to my informant, it is written in a romantic style, fiery, stimulating and convincing and includes the specific indication of the places and the persons involved." This book, concluded Van Hasselt, was the Dutch counterpart to _Uncle Tom's Cabin_.

De Vries's response was no less emphatic than Van Hasselt's. He told Dekker, upon the conclusion of the recitation, that such a work should be shown to the King before it was published. De Vries declared his readiness to personally attend to the preparation of a new copy of the work in a larger handwriting for that purpose.

Early in November 1859, Dekker sent the manuscript to _de Buthe_. He requested his brother Jan to give it to Van Hasselt when he finished reading it. Van Hasselt in turn agreed to bring the book to the attention of Jacob van Lennep, the literary figure. But Van Hasselt also brought it to another's attention. On 11 November, he wrote to Rochussen, briefly outlining the course of his association with Dekker and warning of the consequences

---

5__Ibid__.  
6__Brieven_, III, p. 75.  
7__Ibid_., p. 77.
should the book be published. He assured Rochussen that it might be printed not only in Dutch, but also in the English, German and French languages which he believed Dekker able to use with as much ease as Dutch. Should this happen, "it will become a weapon in the hands of those who would so willingly take our possessions away from us." But Dekker's sole incentive, Van Hasselt believed, was to escape from poverty. If Rochussen could find him a substantial official appointment somewhere, then Dekker could be used by the cabinet against the contemporary liberal attacks. 8

Van Hasselt apparently received the manuscript on 14 November. Van Lennep got it the next day. 9 Three days later Van Lennep returned it to Van Hasselt, along with two letters dated 18 November. In spite of his many responsibilities, wrote Van Lennep, and irrespective of the concentration which the poor ink and the small letters demanded from his weak eyes, he had verily devoured the manuscript. "Pectus est quod disertos facit and facit indignatio versum." While the author did not provide him

8 Archief Van Lennep, Loc. cit.
9 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 5. These two dates and others to which reference is made in the following pages come from an important chronology that Van Hasselt wrote on the backside of a letter which he received from Dekker on 14 or 15 November 1859. This information is invaluable in establishing the sequence of events during the important month of November 1859.
with new factual material, continued Van Lennep, his style and manner of presentation make the work a "masterpiece."

Unlike Van Hasselt, Van Lennep saw no reason to hinder dissemination of such a work. However, he listed four provisions which should govern the manner of publication. Since these stipulations would play a major role in the future relationship between Van Lennep and Eduard Douwes Dekker, they should be noted with care. First, Van Lennep wanted the author "to take into consideration that the factual data in the book, when combined with the specific indication of the places where the action took place, gives to the work too much the sense of a factual history, or perhaps better, brings into the work a positivism which harms the effect desired." Van Lennep proposed that specific place names be eliminated. Secondly, Van Lennep looked with disfavor upon the dramatic last pages of the work:

Should it be evaluated in conjunction with some of the other passages in the narrative, then it causes one to think that the author is motivated primarily by a desire for revenge. The simple suspicion that a less noble motivation caused him to write shall bring great harm upon the credence which one grants him, on the respectability of the work.

Third, the text must be printed by a "fashionable book dealer" and not by a "bookworm of bad reputation." Its publication by the latter sort of business man would cause the public to view Max Havelaar not as a great literary
contribution to the Dutch language, but rather as alarmist journalism. Finally, Van Lennep believed that the author could earn a significant sum of money with his book and that he should not allow it to be published for nothing. He was prepared to see that Dekker received "appropriate terms" if the matter of publication was turned over to him and if he were given a carte blanche for such further arrangements as might be necessary.\(^\text{10}\)

The letter in which these terms were set forth was accompanied by a second one, also addressed to Van Hasselt. The second missive began:

In the accompanying letter which you can make known to brother D., I have attempted to pour a bit of cold water upon his fire and, insofar as this is possible, to neutralize to some slight degree a blow [for the Dutch public] which I consider unavoidable. At first I thought of writing to Rochussen and to advise him urgently to find some official position for this man; but I have abandoned this idea. I am not certain that such a man as I have come to know in his book and in his letters would accept such a position, given to him with the understanding that he would not allow his book to be printed . . . . There is no way of avoiding the fact, that this man considers himself an apostle; he has suffered much, very much, and this suffering can only be indemnified by an outpouring on his side and by a sympathetic response on the side of the public.

In closing his character analysis, Van Lennep gave expression to a passing fear that he could conceivably leave

\(^{10}\)Jhr. Dr. D. M. F. Van Lennep, Het Leven van Mr. Jacob van Lennep (Amsterdam: P. N. Van Kampen, 1909), II, pp. 153-156.
himself open to blackmail should Dekker refuse to accept the results that might follow from his direct intercession with Rochussen, but, in principal, Van Lennep's second letter of 18 November adjudged Dekker to be a man of integrity who stood above such forms of intrigue. He had read Max Havelaar with attention and sympathy and he accredited Dekker with utter sincerity in what he had written. Yet at the same time, it is clearly evident that Van Lennep did fear the consequences politically and otherwise of the publication of Max Havelaar more than Van Hasselt himself. As if in desperation, he called upon his friend to suggest some means of "deflecting the blow" which must fall with the publication of Max Havelaar. "I would learn of any such suggestion with pleasure, still valde dubito. It is better that the book be published here [in the Netherlands] than that Multatuli carry out his threats."\(^{11}\)

In these letters Van Lennep set forth, on the one hand, the general terms which did indeed govern publication by J. de Ruyter in May 1860. If he was restrained from suppressing the last pages of the manuscript by Dekker's insistence, then he did partially "deflect" the feared "blow" by expurgating several impolitic observations in the manuscript. On the other hand, these letters of 18 November foreshadow Van Lennep's more articulate

\(^{11}\) Ibid., pp. 157-158.
identification of his fears in his January 1862 Letter to Mr. E. Douwes Dekker.

Two years hence he would openly admit the kinds of thoughts that had passed through his mind for, in 1862, he accused Dekker of wishing "to bring into motion the scum of our nation, here [in the Netherlands] and in the Indies, to cause the weapons of the murderer to be whetted and the torch of destruction to wave, and [to cause] catastrophies without number to pour out over the land of my birth." To attribute such an impact to Dekker's book in 1862 speaks volumes on the effect which Max Havelaar had upon Van Lennep when he first read it. And such a statement is, in inverted fashion, a compliment of the highest order to Dekker's literary capacity. But, more important, Van Lennep's sensitive, artistic temperament led him immediately to identify exactly what Dekker had in mind: Max Havelaar was an instrument to revolutionary change. In his essay, "Multatuli and Van Lennep," P. Geyl has called the two letters of 18 November "equivocal." In fact they form a single Gesamtausdruck from a man who had been deeply moved and was writing in all sincerity. After returning

12Ibid., p. 184.
14In a letter which Dekker wrote to the lawyer, J.D.A. Faber, on 25 February 1861 at the time when Dekker was contesting ownership of Max Havelaar with Van Lennep, he
elaborated a theory regarding the nature of Van Lennep's attitude towards himself during the nine months prior to the publication of the book. This argument has since been restated by Dekker's second wife and is incorporated in the 1912 edition of Dekker's letters. It has been too widely accepted as the authoritative explanation.

Dekker's argument is as follows: Van Lennep's original willingness to assist was motivated purely by affection and sympathy. There was no relationship between this and the fact that a bill which would determine the railway network of the Netherlands in such a manner as to harm the commerce of Amsterdam was the subject of heated debate in the Second Chamber of the Dutch States-General. However, Van Lennep had then been influenced by fellow Conservative friends from Amsterdam who "saw in Max Havelaar an excellent weapon with which to threaten the Ministry, and thus force it to abandon the proposed railway plan. Once the bill had been defeated in the First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, the Conservative friends from Amsterdam no longer had any reason to employ Dekker's manuscript as a political weapon. Consequently, they then placed influence upon Van Lennep to inhibit the impact of the book in every way possible. Dekker believed that Van Lennep, under these circumstances, had agreed to expurgate large sections of the original manuscript, to set the price for the book too high for the poor to buy, to allow only minimum number of copies to be printed, and finally to send only a few copies to the Indies. (De Ruyter indeed originally sent only thirty copies to the Indies.) Brieven, IV, p. 159.

Thus Dekker saw Van Lennep as playing only the cowardly role of an instrument with which the Conservatives of Amsterdam might conduct intrigue, first against the government, and later against himself. And, equally important, Dekker believed that Van Lennep had gone through a gradual evolution from whole-hearted support to estrangement and hypocrisy.

In the light of the two letters of 18 November, this theory is simply unacceptable. Van Hasselt received the manuscript on 14 November, got it to Van Lennep on 15 November and received it back on the eighteenth. This means that these two men arrived at their conclusions without the assistance of third parties. In this brief period of time neither could have turned the book over to the other Conservative friends before arriving at their opinions. It is a matter of some importance then, that under these circumstances, Van Lennep should have placed on paper the
Hasselt and wrote to Rochussen attempting to convince the latter that Dekker must be given serious attention. (In this letter, probably written on 19 November, Van Lennep went so far as to recommend that the Minister of Colonial Affairs give Dekker a very high position in the colonial administration.)

But, at the same time, Van Lennep requested Jan Dekker to call his brother to Amsterdam as soon as possible. With great enthusiasm, Dekker departed from Brussels on 23 November, praising his benefactor's willingness "to take matters in hand."\textsuperscript{15} Rochussen responded to Van Lennep's letter by writing letters to both Van Lennep and Van Hasselt on 21 November. In the first letter he referred to Dekker "as the Dutch Harriet Beecher Stowe" and said that he had known him since 1846. Douwes Dekker, he continued, "is obliged to me for much, but that is no reason to be thankful. He is clever but eccentric." Rochussen agreed to investigate the matter further, and, should it appear that Dekker deserved assistance, he would

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Brieven}, III, p. 98. 

provisions under which \textit{Max Havelaar} would appear many months later. The facts that other political friends saw \textit{Max Havelaar} as a political weapon has nothing to do with Van Lennep's position.
do what he could, but only so long as nothing was published.  

In light of the further course of events to be narrated, it is significant that Roehussen had the person of Dekker well fixed in his mind when he received Van Lennep's letter. Roehussen was Duymaer van Twist's predecessor as Governor-General of the Indies and served during the period 1845-1851. He first met Dekker when he agreed to grant the latter a private audience on 31 January 1846. At that time, Dekker had recently finished an unpleasant three month's stint on a temporary basis as a deck in the village of Poerwakarta, seat of an administrative district in the Residency of Krawang.  
He had been engaged to Everdina since September 1845, and now he looked forward to an early marriage. He grew impatient of waiting for a new assignment and thought to speed up action by appealing directly to the Governor-General. Roehussen accepted Dekker's apology for his worn and tattered clothes on the plea that he possessed no others and gave him an opportunity to explain his position at great length. Dekker was invited to return at the end of the week for a  

---

18 Ibid., pp. 415-416.  
19 Ibid., p. 626.
decision, but it was not at all what he had expected: he was reassigned to Poerwakarta, and this time for six months.

For a time, he considered resigning from the colonial service, but he did finally acquiesce in the appointment. However, from Dekker's point of view, this Governor-General was no friend for him thereafter. Nevertheless, considering the remarks in the letter to Van Lennep, it is altogether possible that Roehussen was personally responsible for the rapid series of promotions which Dekker received in the following years. In May 1846, he was given the position of kommies at Poerworedjo in Bagelen. In October 1848, he became the secretary to the Residency of Menado, a promotion which doubled his previous salary. Finally he became the Assistant-Resident at Amboina on the island of Ambon in October 1851. Dekker and Roehussen met one final time in the Indies after Dekker had left Batavia. Roehussen paid a visit to Poerworedjo in July 1847 while Dekker served there as kommies. During 1846 and 1847, the

---

20 Ibid., p. 600.
21 Ibid., p. 679.
22 Ibid., IX, p. 47.
23 Ibid., p. 230.
24 Ibid., p. 35.
personality of the Dutch Harriet Beecher Stowe was firmly fixed in the Governor-General's mind.

Dekker's life as a figure of political import began with his arrival in Amsterdam. He had become a subject of concern for a small group of the Dutch upper class, a group that would rapidly expand in size. During the following period of slightly less than six weeks, from November 1859 to early January 1860, Dekker tried out his political wings for the first time. The steps he took were characteristic of the tactics he followed during the whole future course of his public life. His autocratic temperament and exalted concept of himself became immediately apparent.

Dekker had only a very primitive and naive concept of the contemporary situation in the Netherlands. In November 1859, the political carte du pays was just as irrelevant, just as vague in his mind as it had been when he wrote Max Havelaar the preceding September. For him, the current factional maneuvering was nothing but the insanity of busybodies. He would resolve such discord in his own person. The only positive conviction which he brought to Amsterdam was a sense of identity with the king, who served in Dekker's mind as a symbol of the ideal of paternalistic authoritarianism. In keeping with his own, well-articulated devotion to autocratic principles, Dekker was prepared to follow the suggestion made by De
Vries in his chambers in the Prince Belge. He wished to send his book directly to the King. And he was prepared to expurgate the defiant last pages from his book for the King's sake, a step which he later refused to take for anyone else.

But even though Dekker did not conceive of himself in terms of the political left and right, he did find it considerably easier to associate himself in the following weeks with a group of Amsterdam Conservatives rather than with their Liberal counterparts. A significant reason for this was his personal hatred for Duymaer van Twist. To seek revenge upon this man, Dekker joined his former superior's political critics. But surely another factor which led him to associate with Conservatives was his feeling that, among such people, he found greater accord for his own concept of paternalism, personified for the moment in the King. But this had nothing to do with compromising his own goals.

Dekker's attitudes made him quite incapable of accepting a situation in which he would become simply another member of an Amsterdam faction. Cooperation with a political faction was synonymous with personal domination. Dekker was prepared to make a direct appeal to Rochussen

\[25\text{Brieven, III, p. 74.}\]
for an official government appointment,²⁶ but a favorable response, as Dekker conceived it, would involve the Minister's obeisance to Dekker's will. The acceptance of an appointed office must serve to celebrate the "crowning of a principle."

It was this same unqualified egocentricity which led Dekker continually to emphasize the thesis that, only through a "personal victory" over his enemies, could Dutch policy in the Indies be put on to a correct footing. Here was the frame of reference for his admonishment: "I will accept a position on the Council of the Indies, but if this is not offered, then I am Multatuli."²⁷ The Conservatives must either capitulate or be superseded.

But the Conservatives, of course, would not submit in 1859 or 1860, and consequently Dekker spoke increasingly in terms of a "third party," and he adopted tactics which quickly dissipated the enormous influence that he might have used to great effect had he been able to think in terms of the political proprieties of a democratic country. Only after his original influence was dissipated did Dekker begin to think in terms of political parties. In his Minnebrieven (1861) and Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie (Regarding Free Enterprise in the Dutch East Indies, 1862), Dekker did consciously address himself to the current

²⁷Ibid., IV, p. 11.
political norms after having suffered for his ill-comprehension.

Dekker met Jan again during the evening of 23 November. His brother told him of Van Hasselt's great hesitation to promote the publication of Max Havelaar. But Dekker's misgivings were washed away the following evening when he was welcomed heartily into the home of Van Lennep himself. He was so moved by the friendly manner of the reception that his evaluation of his host became quite uncritical. In Van Lennep he saw a future lieutenant of his own Conservative Party. His reception was a "complete indemnification for all the non-recognition" from which he had suffered in the past.28

The following afternoon, Dekker paid his respects to Van Hasselt and, in the evening, went to see Van Lennep once again in order to be on hand for a prearranged conference with Willem van der Hucht.29 This man was related by blood to the family of Dekker's wife and he had known him

28 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
29 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 5. The following two entries were made in the chronology, referred to in a previous note, which Van Hasselt jotted down on the back of this document:
Friday 25, visit from E.D.D., who informed me that Mr. Van der H. would come to the home of Mr. V. L. the coming Saturday.
Saturday 26, visit J.D.D., who told me that Mr. Van d. H. had already come yesterday and had made a proposition.
in the Indies as early as 1845. In 1859, he served as a representative in the Second Chamber of the States General.  
Dekker had vainly attempted to keep his own activities secret from both this relative and the younger Van Heeckeren, and now Van der Hucht confronted him as the Colonial Minister's private emissary. On 23 November, Rochussen had written Van Lennep:

I have acquainted Mr. Van der Hucht in Haarlem who belongs to the family of Douwes Dekker or better to that of his wife, with the affair and I have sought his advice. I have thought it right to do this for it is his sincere wish to help D. D. if this is possible. Mr. V. D. Hucht shall come to visit you the morning of

30 Volledige Werken, VIII, p. 690.
31 Dekker's desire to maintain a veil of secrecy about his private life explains his hesitancy to make his real name known to those whom he first contacted in the Netherlands after September 1859. De Vries still knew him by his pen name as late as the second half of October. Only on 19 October did Dekker finally give his permission to Van Hasselt to make his real name known to De Vries. He wrote: "I shall be honored to meet Mr. De Vries and I want you to tell this [Masonic] brother my name. However, do beg him to keep the name secret even though this will probably be of no ultimate value for me ..." (Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 1) Indeed Dekker was right in his surmise; both Van Heeckeren and Van der Hucht were informed of his activities at an early date. In November, Van Hasselt was aware of Dekker's relationship to Van Heeckeren and at the bottom of a letter from Van Lennep, dated 22 November, he wrote: "The brother-in-law of D. is Van Heeckeren van Walten; both of them are married to Baroness van Wijnbergen. Van Heeckeren will have nothing to do with him." (Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 13) Van der Hucht, on the other hand, was informed of the details of Dekker's life by no less a person than Minister Rochussen.
the day after tomorrow. I take the liberty to introduce him herewith that he might speak with you of this matter.

As an afterthought, Rochussen added a last sentence to his note which may well have been intended as an indirect commination: "I had a hard battle today in the Second Chamber on colonial affairs—that struggle can last for a long time and be vehement." 32

In fact, Rochussen attached greater importance to Dekker and made more extensive demands upon his relative's services than is implied in this letter. Van der Hucht informed those present in Van Lennep's home that he had originally been dispatched by Rochussen to counsel Dekker in Brussels, and that only after missing Dekker there, had he proceeded on to Amsterdam. The seriousness with which both Rochussen and Van der Hucht approached Dekker is further emphasized by the extent to which Van der Hucht went in pleading for an acceptance of Rochussen's peace settlement. When Dekker, in Van Lennep's home, refused Rochussen's offer, Van der Hucht followed Dekker to his own dwelling, late in the evening, to continue his entreaties and threats.33

32 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 16.

33 Brieven, IV, p. 10. (Dekker to his wife, 26 November 1859.)
No authoritative statement exists on the course of the 25 November meeting. Dekker's account of it in a letter of 26 November is fragmentary and the more elaborate statement on this meeting, written in the year 1877 is little more than an afterthought, but since the latter statement agrees with the November 1859 letter in those points which occur in both documents a substantial element of credulity can be granted the later account. The following was written in 1877:

In the fall of 1859, the government offered me an 'honorable, lucrative and profitable position in the West [Indies].'\textsuperscript{34} So were literally the terms that were brought to me in the name of the minister. This happened in the house and in the presence of Mr. J. van Lennep, who consequently was at the same time witness to my refusal... My negative response... was accompanied by several peculiar antics on my part, and I am convinced that the scene - and scene it was indeed for I became quite incensed - has been described by Mr. Van Lennep to his friends and associates. It was too emotional [a scene] not to be the subject of discussion.\textsuperscript{35}

Dekker obviously could not accept such a solution for this was a deal between two equal partners and involved compromise. In return for his agreement not to publish \textit{Max Havelaar}, he would receive a position in the Dutch West Indies. But Dekker could cooperate with the Conservatives only on a basis of capitulation. A principle must be

\textsuperscript{34}The reference to the fall of 1859 is obviously a mistake and should be replaced with the word "winter."

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Volledige Werken}, VI, pp. 377-378.
"crowned", which he saw personified in his own struggle for recognition.

The warm reception which he received in Amsterdam, coupled with the impression which his own impatient rejection of Van der Hucht's proposition had generated, deceived Dekker into believing more emphatically than ever that his *Max Havelaar* represented a form of "capital,"\(^{36}\) and put him in a position of strength from which he might force Roehussen to appoint him to an elevated post which carried great prestige. Thus, his brother Jan was sent off on 27 or 28 November to present Roehussen personally with Dekker's terms: he would accept nothing less than an appointment to the Council of the Indies! Here was the first climactic moment in the six weeks' political career of Dekker in the Netherlands.

Roehussen clearly had gone to some length to pacify the angry petitions and the anxious warnings coming from Amsterdam with reference to Dekker. The challenge presented by the author of *Max Havelaar* had received his serious attention; he was prepared to give him a new position. But with resolution equal to that of the intrigant and with a position of strength much more concrete than

\(^{36}\) *Brieven*, III, p. 94-95 (Dekker to Jan Douwes Dekker, 20 November 1859).
Dekker's imagined literary "capital," he delivered the first irrevocable blow to his antagonist's exalted dream. Clearly, he was not amenable to the simple pressure-group tactics which Dekker conceived as political action. The course of the conversation in the Hague was described briefly in a letter to Everdina, dated 29 November. The passage not only reflected Dekker's frustrations before Roehussen but also displayed his artless suspicions toward his private-enterprising brother.

As for the sending of Jan to Roehussen it is a complete failure. When he (but I fear not in an appropriate manner) spoke of the Council of the Indies, R. sprang up [from his desk]. That is a matter of no consequence to me, but what does bother me is that Jan who agreed with me that this was the only manner in which to seek redress, when I set forth my instructions for him, now agrees [with Roehussen] that I demanded too much. Thus once again the ambassador who does not support his own cause.37

Dekker's response to Roehussen's refusal was not to drop the tactics of intrigue, but to intensify them. Van Lennep seemed to supply him with the means to such an end when he introduced Dekker to several prominent men. He was brought into contact with an Amsterdam businessman, Jhr. C. Hartsen, who had been Van Lennep's son-in-law since 1850. Aside from his business activities, Hartsen served as a representative for North Holland in the First Chamber of the Dutch States-General from 1859.

37Ibid., IV, p. 11.
until 1877. Dekker also met A. J. de Bull, the chief editor of the *Amsterdamsche Courant*, who held his position primarily due to Van Lennep's influence on the newspaper. Finally, Dekker made the acquaintance of J. W. Tydeman who represented a second Amsterdam newspaper, the *Handelsblad*, which supported more liberal policies than the *Amsterdamsche Courant*.

By way of introduction, Van Lennep sent to each of these men, before a personal acquaintance was made, a copy of a lengthy letter which Dekker wrote to Duymaer van Twist in 1858. Thus, each was acquainted with the

---

38 D. M. F. van Lennep, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.
40 *Archief Van Lennep*, Document No. 18 (Tydeman to Van Lennep, 2 December 1859).
41 M. F. van Lennep, *op. cit.*, p. 157. While Van Twist was cast in the role of a villain during the writing of *Max Havelaar* in the autumn of 1859, Dekker had thought differently of him as recently as the winter of 1858-1859 when he condescended to accept money from Van Twist to take care of his most pressing needs (*Archief Van Lennep*, Document number 59, probably date: 17 June 1860). Even before this, Dekker had turned to Van Twist, once he was back in the Netherlands, hoping that the former Governor-General would come to his assistance. Thus in December 1858 Dekker personally requested Van Twist to intercede in his behalf with the French authorities so that he could get the post of clerk to the French consulate in Nagasaki which had just been vacated. The enquiry was unsuccessful (*Volledige Werken*, VT, pp. 146-147). And in January 1858, Dekker sent off the long letter, referred to above. This document would be published in 1860 under the title: *Letter to the Governor-General in Rest*. It was accompanied, in its original form, by a series of documents from the archive at
essence of Dekker's previous colonial career before coming face to face with the author of *Max Havelaar*. And, from each of them, Van Lennep received responses that were highly favorable to Dekker. Hartsen indicated a strong desire to see *Max Havelaar* published, and action taken immediately.\(^{42}\) And Tydeman's indignation upon learning of the fate that befell Dekker was without bounds:

> The heart beats with indignation when one considers how a people ruled over by the Dutch government are oppressed and how an official who does his duties falls into disfavor . . . Mr. Dekker seems to me to be a real martyr of his devotion to duty and professional zeal. I hope with all my heart, that he may receive a brilliant atonement [for all that he has suffered], but that the goal of his noble strivings might also be attained and the Augeas stables of Bantam be cleaned out.\(^{43}\)

In Hartsen, Dekker thought he saw an efficient lackey who could be used for direct contact with the Rochussen ministry and, in the two Amsterdam newspapers, Dekker thought he had found effective organs from which to broadcast his ideas to the public. But more important, through these newspapers, Dekker could reach two of the three larger political associations within the city of Amsterdam.

Lebak which 'proved' the correctness of the steps Dekker had taken. Van Twist did not respond to Dekker's apologetic (De Gruyter, *op. cit.*, p. 86).\(^{42}\)\(^{43}\)

\(^{42}\)Ibid.

\(^{43}\)Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 18. (Tydeman to Van Lennep, 2 December 1859).
The Handelsblad was the spokesman of the liberal political faction, "de Grondwet" and the Amsterdamsche Courant was the spokesman for the Conservative faction, "Amsterdam."\textsuperscript{44}

Nor were the directors of the two newspapers reserved in responding to Dekker's show of interest. They were willing to let him try his hand at politics on a new level. Both De Bull and Van Lennep spoke frequently of putting his name on the Amsterdam candidate list for the winter election to fill a seat in the Second Chamber left vacant by the death of the Conservative member, Stolte. Van Lennep, on his own, apparently spoke to members of the two Amsterdam political associations with this thought in mind.\textsuperscript{45} Van Lennep also reported to Dekker on Tydeman's indignant feelings towards the government, once he had read the letter to Duymaer van Twist.

Dekker was favorably impressed with both Tydeman's response and the man himself after their personal meeting on 8 December. Tydeman, indeed, continued to encourage Dekker to enter the electoral contest, after De Bull and Van Lennep had bowed to the insistence of Hartsen and other Conservatives who argued that the local party association had to support another candidate. The organization,

\textsuperscript{44}Brieven, IV, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 13.
"Amsterdam," as Van Lennep told Dekker, was under a "moral obligation" to back up a certain Mr. Baud, a relative of the better known J. C. Baud. Nevertheless, Van Lennep and De Bull remained a strong influence on Dekker's thoughts, and it was De Bull who started Dekker on his newspaper career.

On 5 or 6 December, De Bull suggested that Dekker write an article for the *Amsterdamsche Courant*; its purpose would be to let Roehussen know that "... I am not just sitting pat, and to cause him to realize that I can become a member of the Second Chamber even if I am not [nominated] at the present time, in order from that vantage point to force him to make me [a member of] the Council of the Indies." It is altogether conceivable that De Bull was not interested in whether Dekker got into the Council of the Indies, and that he saw in the author of *Max Havelaar* only an instrument with which to apply pressure on the ministerial supporters of the "anti-Amsterdam" railway bill. However, it would be wrong to assume that Dekker was totally blind to the attention this matter was receiving. Even Van Lennep had brought the railway subject to Dekker's attention. He had assured Dekker, during their original meeting on 24 November, that the

---

Lebak affair was "... of considerably greater importance than the railway question with which the parliament has been preoccupied for so long." In his 25 February 1861 letter to the lawyer J. G. A. Faber, Dekker specifically charged that, in the exchange of letters between Van Lennep and Rochussen his own affair "was brought into the context of the dissatisfaction which accidentally prevailed at that time in Amsterdam regarding the pending railway bill."

But in writing these words, Dekker was not revealing new information, recently acquired; he testified further in the same letter to Faber that he had been kept abreast of the contents of that correspondence of the previous two years, for it was "usually made known to me by Mr. v. L." Placed before proffered assistance which might conceal subterfuge Dekker concluded that he would work with the Conservatives—whose bill of fare was distinctly more palatable to his autocratic tastes than the Liberal's hard tack—and still retain the initiative to dominate at a later date, if he repeatedly asserted that he belonged to neither party. This point, he reckoned, could be established if his newspaper articles were published simultaneously in both the Amsterdamsche Courant and the Handelsblad. With evident satisfaction, then, Dekker

48 Ibid., p. 8.
49 Ibid., p. 153.
50 Ibid., p. 13.
informed "Tine" that his first article, written on 6 December, proved, "that I am no partisan of those who would break with present conventions for I commend [the competence of] Stolte who belonged with the Conservatives." But on the other hand, this article was also to show, "that I am just as little a full-blood Conservative, for I state that I very frequently disagreed with Stolte. 51

When Dekker wrote his first article, he had still had no personal contact with Tydeman. With their meeting, however, it was suddenly abundantly clear to Dekker that there was a breech of major importance between Tydeman's "Grondwet" and the organization "Amsterdam" to which De Bull, Van Lennep and Hartsen belonged. The 6 December article which had pleased both Van Lennep and De Bull was not acceptable to Tydeman. Despite his attraction to Dekker as a figure of a significant political timber and despite Dekker's desire to assert his neutrality between the factions, there occurred in this article a passage which Tydeman could only interpret as outright conservatism. Tydeman read:

The question of the day is: free enterprise or labor by coercion . . . . The theorists despite the best of intention cannot possibly judge this matter adequately without the assistance of people like Stolte; they can expound and even prove that freedom of labor is better, more moral, can contribute more to welfare, . . . but certainly, who doubts this for a moment?

51 Ibid., p. 19.
Who doubts but that the absence of theft, murder, robbery, adultery, and laziness are desirable? Who doubts that goodness is better than badness?

These questions are superfluous. The question is not what would be better here. The question is whether the better can be achieved and if so by which means? And to this question, Mr. Stolte could answer better than the best theorist. For that answer presupposed first of all a knowledge of the characteristics of the natives, whose ambitions are [supposedly] to be made realizable through [the institutions of] freedom of enterprise. One who ignores that fact clings to the absurdity implicit in [such an idea as] 'freedom by coercion.' The question is: how old and to what an extent are the natives matured for whom one requests decrees of emancipation? Must not that emancipation be a consequence of moral adulthood?52

Within the terms of the colonial debate that had proceeded thus far in newspapers, books, periodicals and the Dutch parliament, it was hard to see this statement as anything but a reaffirmation of Conservative principles. But Tydeman further objected to Dekker's neutral stand on the person of Stolte and, in a letter of 8 December to his wife, Dekker complained that "Tydeman desired that I should clearly declare myself in sympathy with his party [i.e., De Grondwet], and this namely [by writing a piece] against the politics of the deceased Stolte. This I do not want to do."53

52 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
53 Ibid., p. 16.
Dekker found himself before a paradox. While both newspapers would support him, they did it for dissimilar reasons. De Bull had his eyes on the current dispute in parliament over a railway bill and the Handelsblad would accept him only if he broke with the Conservatives. De Bull, Dekker informed his wife, had placed his paper at his disposal, but at the same time Tydeman was playing the role of agent provocateur in attempting to encite Dekker to break "immediately" with Van Lennep, and take up the part of the opposition to the candidate of the Amsterdamsche Courant. Dekker then was placed before a choice between immediate entry into party politics, if he was prepared to cooperate with the Liberals in the "Grondwet," or the postponement of such tactics in favor of polemics in De Bull's newspaper until "the next following vacancy in the Second Chamber," if he wished to seek his future with the Conservatives.

Dekker's first response to the events of 8 December was surprise and elation at the flattery directed towards him. Essentially foreign to the political institutions of western democracy and motivated by a desire to seek personal acclaim, he found the situation "a genuine comedy; the most comical of all is that actually I am the prize for

---

54 Ibid., p. 18.
which they fight. Tydemar wants to have me on his side."

But then instinctively seeking to assume a stance above the field of dispute, Dekker declared himself unwilling to assume the obligations that came with participation in either faction: "But I do not desire to be on anyone's side. That, I shall announce in my next article [for the newspapers]. I desire to belong to neither of the parties." 56

Such a declaration—in large part simply an expression of frustration—might meet the needs of one who was prepared to retire from the field, but it could not satisfy Dekker's needs at that moment. Positive action, despite his protestations of neutrality, obliged him to cooperate in some degree with one of the two political factions which were now complicating his drive to dominate. He was becoming conscious of the alternatives and set forth his perplexities for his wife on 8 December:

If I should so desire, I can become the [Conservative's] opponent in the election. Tydemar, who does not support Baud, wishes me to follow such a course, but that is just the problem. In the first place, I would run the danger in such a position of finding myself checkmated, and secondly I would then have to work against V. L. and that is repugnant to me. 57

56 Ibid., p. 19.
57 Ibid., p. 16.
Dekker resolved his problem in the Conservatives' favor. Enmity toward specific persons within the Liberal fold drove him the other direction. And his steps toward the Conservatives' threshold were encouraged by Van Lennep's warm reception and Hartsen's show of interest in *Max Havelaar*. But his instinctive attraction to many of the Conservatives' attitudes of mind played an important part. When he addressed himself specifically to the public debate which received increasing attention in the following months: Free enterprise vs. the obligatory culture system, and when he put aside the moral issue treated in *Max Havelaar*, then he became conscious of a large element of agreement with the Conservatives even on colonial matters! The viewpoint elaborated in his article on Stolte was not insincere and was not the result of a desire to please his Conservative hosts. That viewpoint, announced three months after the writing of the ringing last pages of his book, was not repudiated later; rather he rephrased and elaborated it in his later writings as he progressively came to think in terms of the developing political alignments of the 1860's in the Netherlands.

For the time being, Dekker found good the policy of intrigue which he had pursued since 23 November. He decided to continue his covered attacks upon Roehussen via newspaper articles. But this machination against Roehussen was coupled paradoxically with a moderate conservatism,
tempered with sentimentality. These two elements supplied the body of Dekker's second newspaper article, published in the *Amsterdamsche Courant* on 10 December.\(^{58}\)

Touching on *Max Havelaar*’s admonishment to righteousness, Dekker declared that it is "purposeless to talk about a system of government, as long as one is not certain that a particular system is indeed being followed." There are, he continued, "touching provisions in the statute books; provisions which testify to their author's love of mankind," but they are never implemented. He himself, the reader was informed, resigned from the colonial administration for reasons of conscience. He would publish the details of that affair (i.e., *Max Havelaar*) if he was forced to it!\(^ {59}\) The wired report received in the Netherlands the morning of 8 December became the major theme of the article. That cablegram had spoken of wide-spread fear in Java, of a general revolt of the natives. It stated that "all Europeans are armed." In all likelihood, Dekker's elaboration of this theme, like his threat to publish, was intended to strike fear into Rochussen. He specifically indicated to his wife that this theme might be used to "intensify the strain."\(^ {60}\)

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 25.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., pp. 25-26.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 16.
Dekker's resolution and the position he argued in his newspaper articles meant automatic loss of initiative to Van Lennep, Hartsen and De Bull, but he was convinced of the correctness of his tactical decision when Van Lennep, later the same day, showed him a letter he had written to Rochussen. Van Lennep compared Amsterdam to a cask of gunpowder, in his missive, and said that Dekker might be the one to apply the flame. "Dekker has awakened great sympathy here and if he becomes a candidate, you will see people of a variety of opposing political directions joining together to see to it that he is a success." If he had written no more, Van Lennep would have gained Dekker's loyalty with these words, but he added to his note with a flurry, the dramatic phrase: "In the Indies, there is need of a real man, and D. is a man."61 It was also during this period, between the eighth and tenth of December, that Hartsen received at his own request, the manuscript of Max Havelaar.62

Yet another factor restrained Dekker from a more aggressive course. His final goal was not simply membership in the Second Chamber—that was but a stepping stone. On 6 December, he categorically stated that his only interest in entering the Dutch Parliament was "to force R. to make me [a member of] the Council of the Indies."63

---

61 Ibid., p. 16.
62 Brieven, IV, p. 36.
63 Ibid., p. 13.
membership in Parliament were only a lever for negotiation, then it followed, conversely, that actually to participate in an election campaign and lose would be to weaken his bargaining position with Rochussen. Therefore, the fact that the association "Amsterdam," would not support him as their candidate in December 1859 was no severe blow. Dekker believed he could better achieve his goal with less risk via the newspapers.

If anything, Dekker was drawn closer to Van Lennep in the following weeks because of the tactics adopted by an increasingly vociferous Rochussen. "Are you quite certain," Rochussen wrote to Van Lennep on 9 December, "that Mr. Douwes Dekker is an unimpeachable gentleman whose past can be excused?" Here was one of Dekker's most sensitive points. He believed that tales were being whispered into Rochussen's ear by men who sought his downfall: Van Heeckeren, Van der Hucht and yet another relative, Kerkhoven. Dekker was particularly sensitive to any mention of the many debts he contracted during the preceding decade. And, because he attributed such an important role to intrigue as an element in politics, he probably saw in Rochussen's words a greater significance than necessarily applied.

---

64 D. M. F. van Lennep, op. cit., p. 162.
Van Lennep also responded to these tactics with indignation. To acknowledge such arguments would be to admit that he himself had been duped. Van Lennep put Dekker's name on the candidate list for the seat of the deceased Stolte without even consulting his protege. Dekker's response was not indignation with Van Lennep for reversing his decision. His sole concern was that, since Hartsen had stated his intention of supporting Baud, defeat at the polls would give Rochussen the incorrect impression that he was no one to fear.65

In the meantime, Dekker made two more attempts to assert his neutrality between the faction, now only a fiction. The Handelsblad had failed to print either of his articles, written on 6 and 8 December. Dekker attempted to rectify this by writing a handbill which was distributed in preparation for the coming Amsterdam elections. Then, in the midst of the month, he finally succeeded in getting an article in the Handelsblad itself. However, it was not printed in the Amsterdamsche Courant. Dekker found some solace in the fact that his new piece began with a reference to a previous issue of the Amsterdamsche Courant and continued with another declaration of impartiality between the contending groups.66

66Volledige Werken, I, pp. 444-445; 445-447. These two documents, the handbill and the article for the Handelsblad, do not appear in M. Douwes Dekker-Hamminck
Nevertheless, neither of these articles broke with the themes of the two earlier pieces. They were only a last fitful effort to rescue something from the collapse of the impractical political line which the egocentric authoritarian postulated as a position of strength.

In fact, Dekker capitulated when he agreed to a proposition which Van Lennep made at the end of December. He explained this agreement in his letter to the lawyer, Faber:

Mr. Van Lennep would put me in a position to [live together with] . . . my wife and children by a payment of two hundred guilders a month during a half year period. During that time I was to prepare myself for [a career as a] "homme de lettre" (an act I might add by way of parentheses which is impossible for me). In the meantime, Mr. van Lennep would concern himself with the publication of the Max Havelaar, for which, as he contended, he could gain better conditions through his long experience than would be possible for me.67

In spirit, this arrangement fully accorded with the policy Van Lennep set forth in his letters of 18 November to Van Hasselt. As a last touch of biting irony, Dekker agreed to Van Lennep's further suggestion that fifty guilders of the sum be set aside monthly to pay off debts

Schepel's collection of Dekker's letters, but both pieces were incorporated by Dekker in an essay which he published in October 1860, entitled Aan de Stemgerechtigden in het Kiesdistrict Tiel. This article, in turn, has now been published by G. Stuiveling as part of Dekker's complete works.

67 Brieven, IV, p. 154.
to the aunts of his wife from whom he had once borrowed money. He was obliged to follow Van Lennep's counsel for fear of alienating him, but also because he believed that his supposed desertion of these elderly ladies had been an important element in the information on his past life provided for Rochussen by Van Heeckeren.68

Dekker returned to Brussels. The second phase of his new career began. It lasted from his 18 January letter to the King until his second, 5 May letter to the same sovereign. During these months, the initiative lay with Van Lennep in Amsterdam, who busied himself with the preparations for the publication of Dekker's manuscript by the fashionable book firm of De Ruyter. Dekker made several unsatisfactory attempts to start work on a book which he entitled, Fancy, and which would become known later in an altered form as the Woutertje Pieterse (literally: Little Walter Pieterson). More significant, for the moment, was his first letter to the King.

This document was conceived as one more stratagem to "intensify the strain" upon the Minister of Colonial Affairs. Dekker wished to write a letter which Rochussen would be forced to forward to the King out of fear, but which, if read by the sovereign would cause him to question his Minister's conduct. To make Rochussen squirm, Dekker

68 Ibid., p. 40.
threatened to call upon the Dutch nation or even all of Europe, if there was no response from the King to his letter. Still attempting to strike the Minister mortally, Dekker went a step further and asked the King to request from Duymaer van Twist the letter which he wrote in 1858. "Your Excellency's Minister of Colonial Affairs," wrote Dekker with unbounded insolence, "has indeed read this letter, whereafter he sent someone to me with the offer of a profitable position in the West!" 69

Dekker clearly anticipated results from such tactics, only slightly removed from open blackmail. A letter to Van Lennep of 8 February discloses in its enormity the seriousness with which he wrote. In reflecting upon his strategy, he wrote:

It seems to me that R. must now find himself in a pretty scrape with that [kind of a] countermove [on my part]. He cannot decide to simply lay my letter away [on file], for seeing that the Max Havelaar which he does not know, hangs over his head, he must fear, just because he has not read it, that it is of such a nature as to lead his Sire later to hold it against him that the publication was not forestalled. And R. (who has a very bad conscience - as G. G.,) must have a greater fear of that book than it is worth. I have hardly touched upon him [in the Max Havelaar] and he himself knows best of all that I could have done more. 70

69 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
70 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
Dekker clearly indicated how firmly he believed in the efficacy of his stratagem when the King failed to request the manuscript. His scheme was not wrong, he concluded—it was only that Rochussen, by some trick, was able to stand in the way. But his speculations are not confined to Rochussen. He also outlined a role for Hartsen to play in the Hague. Van Lennep's son-in-law was to make certain that Rochussen read further a note from Dekker which accompanied a copy of the letter to the King, prepared especially for Hartsen.\(^7\)

If some passages in the 18 January letter were intended for Rochussen’s consumption, other sections were definitely intended for the King. Thus Dekker entreated the King to read his manuscript by informing him that no less an authority than Jacob van Lennep had praised his work. And he concluded his missive with a poorly disguised petition to the King to give him that position in the Council of the Indies which Rochussen was unwilling to open for him.

If Your Majesty . . . should be willing to appoint me in an honorable manner to an office in the territory where I have spent the greater part of my life in the nation's service - and further in such a manner that I would be provided with the means to cause the principles for which I have surrendered my likelihood, to win out, then I would accept such a placement

\(^7\)Ibid.
with great gratitude. But without the victory of those principles, I prefer to remain in poverty.72

Dekker's ability to take such a scheme seriously shows conclusively his ill-comprehension of the substance of politics and the bankruptcy of the tactic of intrigue which he had followed unremittingly since his first appearance in a political guise in Amsterdam in November 1859. Again, it is clear that he looked upon his acquaintances back in the Netherlands, not as his equals, but as lieutenants who should obediently play the roles assigned them. What, in effect, was he trying to do but get one Conservative, in good standing in his own party, to break another good Conservative. Hartsen in the Hague was to carry out Dekker's orders against his own compatriot Rochussen. That these men would think first of their own means and interests, can hardly be viewed with surprise. Hartsen surely did not wish the fall of the Rochussen Ministry despite the ill feeling awakened by the railway bill which was ultimately rejected in the First Chamber of the States General. It is more logical to believe that he showed the manuscript of Max Havelaar to Rochussen than to believe that he carried out orders coming from Dekker. Hartsen received the work between the eighth and tenth of

72 Brieven, IV, p. 59.
December; he returned it during the second week of January 1860. During this interval, the manuscript could have been placed not only in Rochussen's hands, but also in those of several other key figures associated with him. In the course of a few months, Dekker showed himself politically incompetent. His personal failure reflected upon his own psychological limitations.

More concrete than Dekker's antics was Van Lennep's letter of 24 January, requesting Dekker to sign a legal document which would turn over the ownership of *Max Havelaar*. Van Lennep, as he told Dekker, could then better negotiate with the publisher, De Ruyter:

> In order to be able to make a contract with De Ruyter, I need to have proof to the effect that I have a right to take such a step. Neither he nor any publisher would print, naturally, let alone extend credit, without transfer of the copyright, and I cannot transfer that to him without being able to show that I own it. Be so good therefore to send me a [certified] piece with seal affixed (Belgian), in which you declare that you have handed over to me the copyright for the work entitled, etc., and that you have been compensated in full for it. I can then have that piece inserted in the agreement which I make with De Ruyter.73

Dekker immediately sent such a document to Van Lennep. He later claimed that he had turned the ownership rights over willingly and without mental reservations. In fact, however, the correspondence between Dekker and Van Lennep

during this period indicates repeated instances of sus­
picion and fear of dissertation.

Dekker was able to retire to a passive role in
Brussels only because he could convince himself that Van
Lennep at least was his faithful liegeman. Lacking a more
substantial debenture, he had found consolation for his
failure as a political intriguer in this thought. It
served as a salve to quiet his anxieties and foreboding.
Yet such an idea could never provide true peace of mind,
for it reflected in fact nothing more than the position of
weakness from which Dekker negotiated. Consequently, the
letters which passed between these two and between Dekker
and his wife prior to her arrival at Brussels from De Buthe,
are made up of a combination of anxious requests for news
of events in The Hague and complaints of possible signs of
disloyalty.

Reflections of the disquietude in Dekker's spirit
are already evident prior to his departure for Brussels.
Thus he wrote in dismay:

It is indeed peculiar, how everything has devel­
oped in a manner other than it should have developed
and could have developed. If I may express my
feelings straight out, there has been too much
use made of diplomacy. The way which we should
have followed was I believe ______ and we
have actually gone:  

And then, as if suggesting a partial explanation for the
course of events, Dekker added a few lines later:

May I be frank with you? I think I have noticed
some flagging in your interest. Is this
the case? That would cause me bitter sorrow. These suspicions in Dekker's mind were intensified when he received in Brussels in the second week of January a brief letter from Hartsen in which Van Lennep's son-in-law thanked him for the opportunity to read Max Havelaar. This note was written only after a period in excess of a month during which Dekker had heard little or nothing of Hartsen's activities in his behalf in The Hague. He tagged it as a kind of "acquit de conscience." On top of this, he was discomforted by his "dependence" on Van Lennep's two hundred guilder monthly allotments. The resultant loss of initiative, he complained, interfered with his planned activities to encourage a general movement in Java: "I cannot allow myself, not even for reasons of food and shelter, to deviate from my plans of bringing about a change in the Indies, 'by approved ways where this is possible . . . by the legitimate way of force where there is no alternative.'"

In these last words, Dekker had touched upon a theme which would shortly lead to the total alienation of the author from his liegeman. Max Havelaar was conceived as a

75 Brieven, IV, p. 40.
76 Ibid., p. 50.
vehicle to foment mass protest in the Netherlands, but it also contained elements which revealed its author to be dedicated to the same dream of an independent Insulindian Empire which had figured in the youthful writings of the young Dekker of 1843. Tacit acquiescence in a folk's movement, by preference in the Netherlands, by default in the Indies, was the sine qua non of fealty to another. Once he came to the conclusion that Van Lennep had sabotaged his efforts to reach the people, he was incapable of any further compromise despite its passing convenience.

Dekker was in a state of incertitude, consequently, when Max Havelaar appeared before the public. Dekker's second letter of 5 May 1860 to William III accompanied a gift copy of his book. As in the first letter, Dekker still entertained serious hopes of personally reaching the King.

Sire, in no time at all the names will have been forgotten of the counsellors of the throne who as a consequence of ignorance, lethargy or self interest drove the Netherlands up the road to ruin - there insignificance discharges them of any accountability to their progeny - But, Sire, those descendants shall utter with thankfulness and respect the name of the King who with a resolute hand caused the state to turn back from such a way.


[78]Ibid., pp. 60-61.
CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERAL'S IMAGE OF DEKKER'S POLITICAL INTENT

Writing in the early eighteen-sixties, Baron Van Goltstein drew a highly sensitive and well integrated sketch of the nation about him. The nation, he held, was conservative in its disinclination for change; it was liberal in its traditional claim on liberty and national independence. "Unusually devoted to the self-sufficiency of the community and the province, [the Dutch] . . . frequently place local interest above common welfare. Of a practical bent, they place little interest in political theorizing. And in the factional struggles which occasionally divide their representatives, they take no part." Only matters of great material (1848), or spiritual (1853) concern could awaken in the Dutch nation impassioned interest, and outside of these areas,

One meets among our people a temperateness which devolves much too far towards laziness and indifference. The sedateness which has secured us from the impact of the revolutions which have caused all of our continent to tremble, is in normal times a failing. In vain was the principle of direct elections honored in our constitution of 1848. It has only caused the political apathy of our people to stand out more sharply.

107
Van Goltstein cited as a demonstration of his people's political apathy the 1862 election in Middelburg, during which a vigorous political contest took place. Only 1,190 of the voters, out of a duly registered total of 2,544, took the trouble to cast ballots.\textsuperscript{1}

And the British ambassador to the Royal Court in The Hague in 1860, Lord Napier, saw in this sedateness and conservative temper an explanation for the reliance of the Dutch upon the budgetary surpluses (batig sloten) which were gained annually from the Indies. Lord Napier wrote to the British foreign office:

> Yet this peaceful, wealthy and prosperous people is so devoid of active patriotism and useful enterprise, that they have lagged behind every nation in Europe in the construction of railways and have at length thrown upon their government the performance of a task which if necessary as they assert, they were themselves bound to undertake. The government sharing the selfish instincts of its subjects goes for means to the colonial treasury, and the public works of the Netherlands are defrayed from the fruits of forced labor, forced sale, and commercial monopoly in a distant and uncivilized dependency.\textsuperscript{2}

If this sense of self sufficiency was apparent in politics and colonial policy, then it also appears in

\textsuperscript{1} W. Baron van Goltstein, Nederland Tegenover de Constitutionele Beweging Onzer Eeuw, Eene Stadtkundige Beschouwing (s'Gravenhage, W. P. van Stockum, 1862), pp. 50-53.

\textsuperscript{2} J. C. Boogman, "De Britse Gezant Lord Napier over the Nederlandsche Volksvertegenwoordiging (in 1860)," Blijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap, LXXI (1957), p. 191.
literature, art and social conventions. Baron Van Goltstein wrote further:

The emotions of the Dutch are not easily stirred; while slow to comprehend, they are amenable to strong convictions. Slow in reaching decisions, they work to achieve their goals with tenacity. Cold at first acquaintance, their friendship is more than a mere word. The nation's pragmatic attitude passes censure on even the most attractive of theories which have not stood the test of practice. That which is truly noble finds from her ready access, but she has no sympathy with Don Quixotism in any form whatsoever... Art carries the stamp of this folk's character; reality and not the idealized is at home here. The Dutch nation is infrequently stirred up by issues and never by a person.3

But indifference bordering on laziness was not solely an attribute of the bourgeoisie—it also characterized many of the upper class, many of the statesmen in prominent positions in the country. "Fear of difficulties, reasons of a personal nature, disinclination... hold many far away from the benches of the legislator and causes others to shrink from the responsibility of royal counsellor. Lavish in the use of unfavorable criticism, they are afraid of a hard and sometimes unfair criticism of themselves."4

Despite Van Goltstein's dismay with his fellow-citizens, there were some sectors of Dutch society in 1860 where progressive liberal inclinations were manifest. Among the events of this year which would invigorate Dutch life was the appearance of a new weekly magazine, De

3Van Goltstein, op. cit., p. 50.
4Ibid., p. 55.
Nederlandsche Spectator. This periodical, published in The Hague, became the rallying point of many of the younger liberal figures in the Netherlands.\(^5\) The novelist Cremer, the journalists Arnold Ising and Gerard Keller and the critic Carel Vosmaer served as its editors. Keller was, at the same time, The Hague correspondent of the East Indian newspaper, Java Bode,\(^6\) and Carel Vosmaer later became one of the champions of the controversial "Multa tulu." Among the contributors to this magazine were men who excelled in the use of irony and who were quick to denounce inertia, in society at large, but particularly in the States-General.

Lord Napier distinguished three groups in the Second Chamber of the States-General in 1860. He labeled eighteen of its members "Reactionary Conservatives." Twenty were designated as "Liberal Conservatives," and thirty-four, the core of which followed the policies evolved by Thorbecke, were listed as "Liberals." The leader of this last group


\(^6\)[Busken Huet], "Herinneringen," Java Bode, Saturday, 29 January 1870, No. 24. Here Busken Huet stated that Keller had been the correspondent to his newspaper for a fifteen year period prior to December of 1868.
was characterized by Lord Napier as "... dry in his manner and aspiring in his temper," and the Foreign Office was assured that Thorbecke's "honesty is unquestionable, his abilities are equally fitted for speculation and business, and he inspires affection among his steady adherents who may be numbered about sixteen members." As for the rest, wrote Napier: "The Liberals not enrolled in the sect of Mr. Thorbecke, and the indifferent herd of conservative-liberals, vote independently, every man being ruled by his individual convictions, partialities and enmities."8

William III, the Dutch King, looked upon Thorbecke and his liberal faction with displeasure. Napier wrote his superiors that Thorbecke was "... an object of strong repugnance to the King, to whose will he would never bend, and for whose failings he had not sufficient charity, but whose office he always treated with respect."9 But if Thorbecke did not enjoy the King's confidence, the current ministry did. The Rochussen Ministry had resigned when the railway bill was rejected, but its presiding

7J. C. Boogman, op. cit., p. 204. In a note added by Boogman, reference is made to an article in the Arnhemsche Courant, which attributed twenty votes, and not sixteen, to Thorbecke.

8Ibid., p. 205.

9Ibid., p. 204.
member continued his labors in the Colonial Ministry in the new cabinet formed by Van Hall, the "Liberal Conservative." Rochussen indeed would continue to hold his office until 31 December 1860. Like him, Van Hall also enjoyed William III's warm approval.

Originally, the Rochussen Cabinet had been greeted with anticipation. He had been responsible for the first important early modification of the system of obligatory government cultures in the Indies, and the early months of his Ministry did see so memorable an event as the abolition of slavery in the Dutch colonies. In November 1858, he had gone further and proposed a bill--viewed as distinctly radical at that time--which would have turned full responsibility for the colonial budget over to the States-General.

Such progressive steps were abruptly halted in 1859. Suddenly, Rochussen reversed himself and embraced wholeheartedly the conservatism of his predecessors in the colonial office. Most important in bringing about his changed attitudes was the news of what had happened at Bandjermassin early in 1859. A court intrigue between pretenders to the native throne at Bandjermassin had led to insurrection and the brutal murder of a number of Europeans.10

Now, it was the Liberals' fault that unrest existed in the Indies. Their guilt was traced back to 1848 and to the increased intervention of Parliament in colonial matters. Rochussen indicated his agreement with such arguments in a significant speech of 29 September 1859. Nothing was more pernicious for the colonies, he declared, "than the excessive fanaticism of the Mohammedans, the excessive liberalism of the Europeans and the excessive intervention of the Second Chamber in colonial affairs."11

The Liberals' response to Rochussen's policies of 1859 and 1860 was made on 10 and 11 May 1860 during the debates which followed an interpellation made by Van Hoevell. Van Hoevell later called these debates "the turning point" in Dutch colonial politics. By 11 May, "the 'colonial opposition' was replaced by a new and dissimilar direction," and a liberal government was rising which would "rule both in the Netherlands and in the Indies in the same spirit."12 Van Hoevell wished to know whether the Minister of Colonial Affairs intended to introduce a bill to regulate the selection of concessionaires by the colonial administrators in the Indies. Specifically, he protested the arbitrary fashion in which Rochussen

11Ibid., p. 348.

12Van Hoevell, Parlementaire Redevoeringen, IV (Zalt-Bommel, Noman, 1865), p. x.
granted sugar concessions. Since there were no statuary guide lines, argued Van Hoevell, the great profits associated with the sugar concessions provided the Minister of Colonial Affairs, and the Governor-General and his administration in the Indies with a means of rewarding the friends and apologists of the system while excluding the competition of independent enterprisers.

Both Van Hoevell and Duymaer van Twist argued forcefully in favor of free enterprise in the Indies. They wanted open, unrestricted competition between all private parties, not restricted government benefices for a select few. But to open anew the dispute between free enterprise and the government's system, which was tabbed "labor by coercion," was to concentrate attention once more upon the sixth paragraph of article 56 of the 1854 Regeringsreglement. And the provisions found there, as if by chain reaction, riveted attention in turn upon the propriety of the budgetary surpluses which had become a tradition in the financing of the Dutch debt by 1860. The last section of article 56 read:

A regulation shall be prepared which rests upon the principle of voluntary agreements with the communes and persons involved and which will act as a transition into that condition in which the intervention of state authorities shall no longer be necessary.13

13Cf. Chapter I, pp. 8-10.
The full realization of the principle here espoused would clearly have ended the government's activity as the buyer and shipper of colonial products. This development, in turn, would unequivocally end the budgetary surpluses that poured into the state treasury.

On May 10, Duymaer van Twist indicated explicitly his appreciation of the relationship between this formula adopted in 1854 and the budgetary surpluses. With his eye on article 56 he referred to the atmosphere, "totally in reaction to the direction prescribed in the Regeringsreglement of 1854, [in which] we move since several months." At the same time, he labeled as spurious the argument that no beginning could be made with genuine free enterprise until after the Dutch had learned to do without budgetary surpluses.14

Rochussen could follow the expedient of a categorical denial when faced with the Liberal's contention that all aspects of colonial policy should be determined in the States-General. He was obliged to tread more carefully and employ sophisticated rationales when rejecting the slogan of "free enterprise." Rochussen made a distinction between genuine laissez-faire in the Indies, of

---

14 Verslag van de Handelingen der Staten-General, Zitting van 19 September 1859 tot 6 September 1860 (Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Staats-Courant), 1860, p. 650. Hereafter referred to as Verslag.
which he declared himself a proponent, and labor contracts between private Europeans and native villagers which would, in fact, be little more than concealed coercion. He declared himself a firm opponent of this second arrangement. Assuring his audience of his sincerity, Rochussen cited his earlier steps as Governor-General in withdrawing government intervention from the cultivation of tea—a crop of minor significance in the economy of the Indies—and insisted that this was a proof of his dedication to true free enterprise. As for the major cultures of coffee, tobacco and sugar, Rochussen spoke in the following words:

But is it then my intention to retain the staples eternally as obligatory cultures? No. My intention is to make those cultures into a source of welfare for the Javanese through faithful obedience to the five stipulations prescribed in article 56 of the Regeringsreglement and to cause [the natives] . . . to become so attracted to them that even if no coercion existed, they would continue their labors out of self interest.\textsuperscript{15}

He was making a distinction, between the first five paragraphs of article 56 and the sixth. He would deny the implications assigned to the last stipulation by the Liberals, accepting their general contentions only as they related to the earlier article. His comments on this point were enlightening:

Paragraph six of that article [i.e., 56] did not set forth an obligation to implement [a system of] free enterprise; there, nothing more is enunciated

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 659.
than an anticipation, a hope, an issue. Obligatory for the government are alone the five stipulations and should the regulations, which I have drawn up with the greatest care, appear not to be in harmony with those five provisions then the House may rightfully raise objections and call the minister to account.16

The Liberal's affirmation of principles and Rochussen's defense of the status quo were not the decisive events of this May debate despite the terse and lucid character of the respective statements. More critical was the step taken by the lawyer Wintgens, a representative from Delft. He was classified "Conservative Reactionary" by Napier,17 but in May he seemed a veritable left-wing radical despite the fact that he assuredly did not wish to encourage men like Van Hoevell and Van Twist. Wintgens requested the floor in order to propose a motion to the Second Chamber which censured the policy consistently followed by the Minister of Colonial Affairs toward concessionaires in the Indies. "And when I propose such an amendment," he said, "then it is because I believe that an end must be put to the system of patronage, to the system of bon plaisir; that rules must be established, not of a complicated nature, but in which the principle is affirmed that there shall be

16 Ibid.
17 Boogman, op. cit., p. 211.
[business] rivalry, so that all may compete who are competent, have fitness and possess capital."$

Rochussen declared his unwillingness to conform to the principles implied in this motion. He was ready to prepare a regulation on sugar concessions. But it would have to be issued as a royal decree; he would not turn the matter over to the States-General. Given the Minister's stand, support for the Wintgens motion was tantamount to a vote of no-confidence for Minister Rochussen. Yet it rapidly became apparent that large numbers of persons, not immediately associated with the Liberal Party, did intend to support this motion.

"My vote for the motion," said the Conservative Reactionary Van Nispen van Sevenaer,$^{19}$ "is not a vote against the Minister, but only my way of indication that I hold firmly to the principle of regulation by law and that I believe that the Minister's tactics cannot possibly guarantee the conclusion of the régime du bon plaisir." Rochussen would not accept Van Nispen van Sevenaer's reasoning. The latter, argued Rochussen, "may not wish to place the force of a vote of no-confidence in his vote--a vote which coming from him particularly would cause me

---

$^{18}$Van Welderen Rengers, op. cit., p. 349.

anguish—but that would remain nevertheless the case; the
motion is intended to so bind my hands that I cannot carry
out my responsibility in a manner which accords with my
concept of my obligations."²⁰

Against Rochussen's protests, the Wintgens motion
was adopted by the substantial majority of 43 to 21. The
lesser figure represented the core of the formal Conser-
vative party, in the process of organization in 1860.²¹

Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch
Handelmaatschappij made its appearance in the midst of
this dispute over colonial policy. The public instinctively
judged the book as a political act. And in the first stage
of the book's public reception, it was universally viewed
as a liberal attack upon the status quo in the Indies, de-
defended currently by Rochussen as Minister of Colonial
Affairs. To many an observer, it presaged the early demise
of the institutional structure erected by Van den Bosch
and Baud. It is therefore not surprising that the earliest
commentaries on Max Havelaar came from that group which had
only recently begun to influence public norms in the pages
of De Nederlandsche Spectator.

Two alternate sources provide documentation on the
attitudes prevalent among this group. On the one hand,

²⁰ Van Welderen Rengers, op. cit., p. 350.
²¹ Ibid.
Gerard Keller, a member of the editorial board, provides a running commentary on events and attitudes in the Netherlands in 1860 in his articles for the *Java Bode*. On the other hand, Robide van der Aa, another member of the same group, published a lengthy critique on *Max Havelaar* at an early date.

Keller's first response to Dekker's book, written either in the end of May or the beginning of June 1860, was hesitant but highly sympathetic. "He wants everyone to read him, not for his sake, but rather because of that which he champions; he desires that all be convinced that the Javanese are abused." Something of the spirit in which the book was received among the Liberals can be detected in the closing lines of Keller's first reference which assumes as self-evident that *Max Havelaar* damned the contemporary cabinet.

I assure you, that his book has caused an impact here, matched by no other work of recent date. It is a prodigy in our political and literary firmament . . . whether it now will be equally agreeable to all, we doubt, for it contains hard truths which strike home at certain people, even though they are not identified by name.

Particularly, Keller stands aghast before the last pages of *Max Havelaar*.

His work is only an introduction, he says. Should it be of no avail, should no one wish to hear his voice, then he will translate it into the languages which he knows (the author knows ten of them) and into the languages which
he can learn; he shall proclaim to Europe how the Netherlands act with their colonies, he will translate it into East Indies languages - in a word he shall leave no stone unturned, to change the existing circumstances.\textsuperscript{22}

By the middle of June, that is some two weeks after the original spontaneous, half articulate comments, Keller, reflecting the thought of the \textit{Spectator} clique, begins to draw a distinction between two main elements in the book: the form, which "remains an object of praise," and the contents, in which "the author has failed to communicate the whole truth."

In particular, Keller informed his readers, objections were being made by many people to Dekker's treatment of the persons of Slijmering, that is Brest van Kempen, and the Governor-General Duymaer van Twist. At present, Keller continued, the critique which is frequently unfavorable, is directed "no longer at the novel but at the author." And, second only to the author, criticism was now directed at the closing pages of \textit{Max Havelaar}. Those last words remained an object of emphasis, but the original simple astonishment had been displaced by indignation.

\textsuperscript{22}[Gerard Keller] "Nederland," \textit{Java Bode}, Wednesday, 11 July 1860, No. 55. The period required for the transmission of letters and papers to or from the Indies is reckoned throughout the remaining chapters of the present work at approximately six weeks each direction. However, allowance is made for even longer periods where necessary. It is well to keep in mind that the Dutch had to wait some three months customarily before learning of the response in the Indies to developments at home.
Many are incensed that "he should wish to see a fundamental alteration in the existing state of affairs through [the use of] illegitimate ways."  

The article of Robide van der Aa drew together into a coherent statement the tendencies apparent in the articles of Gerard Keller. That Van der Aa reacted negatively towards the dramatic, emotional elements in Max Havelaar, has long been a matter of general agreement, but this fact, which is adjudged decisive in the limited Dutch literature dealing with the question of Max Havelaar's influence, is actually of only secondary importance. More important is the nature of Van der Aa's response to the various portions of the factual matter of the book and what they meant to him from a political point of view.

Van der Aa divided the content of the Max Havelaar into two dissimilar and unequal elements. The one he

---

23Ibid., Wednesday, 1 August 1860, No. 61.

24C. G. N. de Voos's comment on Van der Aa's article is characteristic of recent Dutch thought on the matter of Max Havelaar's reception in 1860. De Voos attached great importance to the fact that Van der Aa failed to understand the relationship between Shawlman and Havelaar, and he quoted with evident satisfaction such passages in Van der Aa's essay as the following: "Why such a novel in a 'freakish and provocative' style? Why not rather 'a historical account of facts' and this then in that sedate tone which alone is capable of creating general interest in our temperate nation." (C. G. N. de Voos, "De Invloed van Multatuli's Letterkundige Werk op Oudere en Jongere Tijdgenoten," Verzamelde Letterkundige Opstellen (Amsterdam: Kosmos, 1947), p. 174).
called rational and "worthy of considerably more than passing attention;" the other he considered irrational and the consequence of "feverish excitement." By the commendable elements in the book, he meant those portions of the narrative which described in a derogatory manner the institutions and procedures employed by the colonial administration in the Indies. But the narration of events at Lebak, done with "feverish excitement," was almost totally unrelated to the commendable elements in the book in his evaluation, and at the same time indefensible. He was, however, greatly taken with the former element, and fearful that the attention directed to the book would soon evaporate, he restated these elements in his own essay. He wished these elements to enjoy a longer life among the Dutch people.

Van der Aa's assumption that the book was self-evidently campaign material for the Liberals and for free enterprise was implicit in his restatement of the passages antagonistic to the colonial administration. "The detailed account of how it happens that the Dutch authorities mostly connive at the suppression of the natives," affirmed Van der Aa, "is without a doubt the most important part of his book." Since he was thoroughly convinced that the

authoritarian colonial authorities are the true villains of Dutch colonial history, he accepted with evident satisfaction the validity of "Multatuli's" arguments and the distinction between official reports and the true conditions in the interior. He concluded, "We wish nothing more than that that wide-spread cancer which gnaws on the welfare of our resplendent colony, be acknowledged in its full proportions . . . ." Only thus, could Dutch authority in the Indies become secure and desirable from the Javanese point of view.26

However, the Liberal could ill afford to close his critique at this point. For he was faced with the paradox that a book, which made such excellent cannon powder for the Liberal guns, at the same time contained a defiant attack upon one of the principle Liberal figures in Parliament, Duymaer van Twist. The accusation which Dekker hurled at the Governor-General, that he "had sanctioned the system of abuse of authority, of plunder and murder under which the poor Javanese is pressed down . . . .", was rejected by the reviewer, who self-consciously assumed the defense of another man whom he considered a fellow-member of the Liberal Party in good standing. And Van der Aa took great pleasure in proclaiming in the last

26Ibid., p. 207.
line of this critique that definitive evidence existed which totally invalidated "Multatuli's" feverish defense of his own actions at Lebak.

He turned for substantiation to an administrative decision of 11 December 1856, issued by Governor-General Pahud after receipt of a report which Brest van Kempen submitted to Batavia in September of that year. The decision of March which had released Dekker from his position, had also requested him to report his suspicions to the Resident at Serang. This Dekker had refused to do until his own terms were met. Consequently, Van Kempen had carried out fresh investigations from late June throughout July 1856. The result of his work was the removal of several native chiefs in the Lebak district, including the chief of Paroeng-Koedjang. As for the Regent of Lebak, Karta Mata Negara, Van Kempen proposed in his September report simply that this noble's salary be increased by reducing the size of the monthly deductions from his income that went toward the payment of an old debt owed the colonial administration. The Regent had admittedly been guilty of minor infractions against specific laws, wrote Van Kempen, but he had been assured by the Regent that such infractions as had occurred had arisen through the
heavy liabilities which the native customs of adat placed upon him.\textsuperscript{27}

Van Kempen's proposals were accepted by Pahud without exception and served as the basis of the administrative decision of 11 December 1856. Among other things, that document stated:

Should a thorough investigation of the activities of the Regents everywhere in Java be carried out, it would certainly appear that there are only very few Regents who hold themselves strictly to the official regulations. . . . The so-called act of extortion of which [the Regent] . . . has been accused and to which he has admitted, belongs to those kinds which are not regarded as impermissible by native chiefs of high rank.\textsuperscript{28}

This decision by Pahud was published in extract in the government paper, \textit{Report Concerning the Management and Condition of the Colonies during 1856}.

Van der Aa seized upon this document as proof that arbitrary extortion and abuse did not go unpunished in the Indies and that Dekker could indeed have witnessed the triumph of justice at Lebak if he had only followed the ways of dispassionate sobriety and honored the formal channels of administration. The investigation which led to this decision, Van der Aa continued, "was instigated at the suggestion of the resident and under the authority

\textsuperscript{27}Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 644-652.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., pp. 672-673.
of the Governor-General, both of whom were described in highly unfavorable terms by Multatuli."

Perhaps most enlightening of all was Van der Aa's interpretation of the last pages of the book. Despite all reservation, he viewed the book ultimately as a call upon all good Dutch Liberals to join together in casting out the colonial devil, synonymous in his mind with the colonial administration at Batavia. He objected to Dekker's "legitimate means of force," not because of the goal to be achieved, but because of the means employed. His own position was essentially: the devil, i.e., the autocratic centralized reactionary colonial administration which you would cast out by way of a general revolution, is the enemy which we Liberals, by more mature means, would likewise replace with the institutions of free competition. Therefore, Multatuli, abandon your crusade against Duymaer van Twist and take up your proper modest station in the ranks of the truly righteous!

If Robide van der Aa was the first to set forth a dual principle of organization for the discussion of the book in the spirit of the Liberal faction, then Pieter Johannes Veth, in a review appearing in De Gids thereafter,

29 Van der Aa, op. cit., p. 207.

30 Veth, a Dutch geographer and Orientalist who lived from 1814 to 1895, was a well-known figure in Liberal circles in the Netherlands. He was associated with the staff of one or another advanced liberal periodical during the greater part of his life. From 1844 to 1876 he was a
was the first to give these categories real substance while simultaneously qualifying the assertions of irrationality with respect to Dekker's account of Lebak. Veth referred to the "great and holy cause for which [Multatuli] . . . has plead during his life and continues to plead in his work: the rights of an oppressed and down-trodden people," and he placed the book together with such works as Uncle Tom's Cabin and Van Hoevell's Slaven en Vrijen, a collection of essays on life in the Indies. The purpose of this book? Veth defines it as a "... powerful protest against the suppression of the Javanese, by the native Regents it is true, but assisted in their inclination by the Dutch government which extends them a helping hand."31

For Dekker's discussion of the pantjen-services, Veth provided an honorable intellectual genealogy, tracing

staff member of De Gids. During the period 1850-1852, he worked with the radical De Indier, and from 1867 to 1871, he contributed regularly to the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie. In 1864 he became a professor in the royal institute for the training of colonial officials where he taught East Indian ethnography and Islam. Veth's most important scholarly work was his three volume Java, geographisch, ethnologisch, historisch on which he labored for eleven years. H. H. Juynboll, "Veth," Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, ed. Molhuysen and Blok, Vol. III (1914).

31 P. J. Veth, "Multatuli versus Droogstoppel, Slijmering en Co.," De Gids, XXIV (July 1860), p. 64.
the origins of his ideas back historically to the critical account of the obligatory government culture system made by L. Vitalis in 1851 and, more importantly, to the wide-ranging debate in the Second Chamber of the States-General between 17 July and 8 August 1854 during which the Regeringsreglement for the Dutch East Indies was formulated and adopted. It was during those debates, Veth carefully emphasized, that the recently-elected representative, Van Hoevell, gained true stature as an outspoken and highly competent proponent of reform for the colonies. Thus Veth, in a perfectly logical manner, made it appear that Max Havelaar was the consummation of a line of thought whose antecedent was exclusively Liberal. More specifically, Veth argued that the book followed as a necessary consequence from the Second Chamber's failure to heed Van Hoevell's criticism of articles 55 and 69 in the Regeringsreglement. Article 55 read:

the protection of the native population against arbitrary action no matter from what side, is one of the most important duties of the Governor-General. He sees to it, that the officiating officers obey with exactness the regulations concerning this matter, either already in existence or hereafter to be formalized, and further that the natives everywhere are given the opportunity to present complaints freely.

---

32L. Vitalis, De Invoering, Werking en Gebreken van het Stelsel van Kultures op Java (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1851).
As these lines defined the responsibility of the head of the European bureaucracy, so article 69 determined the position of the native regents:

The division of the territories into regencies occurs at the Governor-General's behest. In each regency and according to such official titles as native custom entails, a regent shall be appointed, who is to be selected out of the native population by the Governor-General. The instructions of the regents and their relationship to the European officials will be determined by the Governor-General. Should the office of the regent fall vacant on the island of Java, then insofar as possible, one shall choose for a successor, provided that this does not impair the requirements of competence, diligence, honesty and loyalty, one of the sons or close relatives of the last regent.

For those not intimately familiar with conditions in the Indies, Veth wrote, Articles 55 and 69 seem "to contain humanitarianism, fairness and profound governmental wisdom." But, he continued, this was not the opinion of the "colonial opposition during the debates in 1854 and on the substance of the arguments raised by Mr. Van Hoevell and his supporters at that time against those articles in the debates of 28 July and 2 August, the book, Max Havelaar of de Koffeeveilingen van de Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij, is the most complete and eloquent commentary available."33

These two articles acted as supports, the one for the other. They made any act of resistance on the part of the natives to their own chiefs ipso facto a challenge to Dutch hegemony in Java.

That condition of affairs although denied at that time by Mr. Baud, the actual principle defender of the government's bill, and his fidus Achates, the minister of colonial affairs, is, alas! a fact which will continually reappear in the light no matter what technics might be used to force it into the shadows.34

Veth believed that he had adequately accounted for "Multatuli's" intellectual antecedents. Pursuing his syllogism a step further, Veth then extracted Dekker's ludicrous figure of Droogstoppel from the body of the text, and proceeded to demonstrate to other Liberals how it could be used for political ends. He, of course, was in no position to realize that this name conjured up visions of persons like Van Twist and Van Heeckeren in Dekker's mind.

Thus, Veth informed his readers that Baud's defense against Van Hoevell's speeches in 1854 was actually no better than Droogstoppel's defense of colonial institutions against the critiques in the packet of Shawlman.35 Baud was able to dominate policy in 1854, Veth asserted tersely, only because his attitudes harmonized well with the

34 Ibid., p. 66.
35 Veth, op. cit., p. 67.
interests of yet many more Droogstoppels "whose band in the Netherlands is legio." The question of how the Indies should be ruled was displaced by the Droogstoppels with another question: How could the most coffee and sugar be brought to auction by the Handelmaatschappij?

That spirit of the Market place which values the East Indies only in accordance with the profits they produce, is the cancer which gnaws on our colonies. It is that spirit which has called into life the system of ruling the Javanese through their own aristocracy on the grounds that it is the cheapest and easiest solution.

Veth went considerably further than Robide van der Aa in grasping Max Havelaar to his bosom and proclaiming its fundamental liberalism. It is clear today that Dekker was a very different person from the man Veth thought he had discovered. The genealogical antecedents proposed by Veth were quite erroneous. Dekker was no scion of his family. At best he was but an adopted orphan! But Veth, who specifically stated in his article that he had not met the author personally, could not know this and, persisting in his highly rational and logical analysis, turned next to the second category of material which Robide van der Aa identified.

---

36 The original Dutch for this phrase is "Kruideniersachtige geest."

37 Ibid., (August 1860), pp. 265-266.
Veth judged the discussion of the pantjen services and the analysis of the nature of the administrative apparatus as a description of the rules of the colonial game. The Lebak affair, in turn, became a case study which gave the reader "a glance into the work room where the official truth is contrived that so often misleads the nation in its evaluation of the situation in the Indies." But to attribute objective validity to the narration of events at Lebak, was to make two further assumptions: first, that Dekker had understood the native population of Bantam and, secondly, that, in part at least, Duymaer van Twist had actually been at fault. Veth actually accepted both contentions!

He spoke of the "lucid graphicalness" with which Dekker drew for the Dutch a picture of "those conditions in Java that are so alien to us." And, at the end of his critique, despite his abhorrence with the last pages of the book, Veth sides with Dekker against Governor-General Duymaer van Twist. In the Lebak affair, "I can do nothing else than declare that in principle he [i.e., Max Havelaar] acted with complete correctness." This remained the case, he continued, no matter what was printed in the Report Concerning the Management and Condition of the Colonies during 1856. That document, in his mind, proved

---

38 Ibid., (July 1860), p. 72.
nothing more than the correctness of the ancient adage that one hangs the little thief and leaves the big one loose. 39

The public discourse on the intent of Max Havelaar was now suddenly elevated from the pages of popular periodicals to deliberation in the Second Chamber of the States-General. The occasion was the debate on the King's speech from the throne which opened a new parliamentary session. Regarding the Indies, William III said: "The condition of our overseas possessions is in all respects satisfactory." But the committee charged with the preparation of the Second Chamber's response did not agree. All three of its members (Vander Linden, Olivier and Van Twist) had voted for the motion Wintgens. Now they declined to accept the King's assurances. Their report disagreed saying: "To learn that the condition of our overseas possessions is satisfactory in all respects, has surpassed our expectations." 40

Early in the debate over these words, Van Hoewell rose and made his original contribution to the public discourse on Max Havelaar:

I believe that it is worthy of note that at just this moment such an extraordinarily

attractive picture is presented from the govern-
ment's side to the nation. Of late an unmistakable
shudder has passed through the land, caused by a
book. It is not here the place to judge that book.
I leave it to speak for itself. But it is proper
to note the fact, that through this book great un-
rest, yes, I might even say indignation, has arisen
in the conscience of many in this land. And while
still in this state of mind, the up-right commonalty
now learns from the speech from the throne: the con-
dition is in all respects satisfactory. Shall those
words from the King's speech be able to dissipate
the impact of that book?\footnote{1}

Van Hoevell, in accordance with the line laid down by
Veth, was here employing Max Havelaar as a liberal batters-
ing-ram, put to work as a powerful new tactical weapon to
dispatch the enemy fortress already breached in the course
of the 10 - 11 May Interpellation.

It is a matter of no little significance that the
man who rose next to carry through the assault, so to speak,
was not listed among the Liberals. Baron Mackay, the
second to speak during this debate of 25 September, was
listed by Lord Napier as a "Conservative Liberal," dis-
tinguishing him from his fellow Anti-Revolutionaire Elout
van Soeterwoude, who was identified as a "Conservative Re-
actionary."\footnote{2} For several years, Mackay had attempted in an
incomplete and unsatisfactory manner to distinguish himself
from the faction which had grown up around Baud. He was
repelled from the politics of budgetary surpluses and he

\footnote{1}{Verslag, Zitting van 15 September 1860 tot 3
September 1861, p. 27.}

\footnote{2}{Boogman, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 209-210.}
had sought a corrective in ethical sentimentalism which encouraged an attitude of hostility towards the native chiefs in Java. What motivated Mackay to rise now?

Through *Max Havelaar*, his own natural inclination towards sentiment was encouraged by a 'classical' statement in the tale of Saidjah and Adinda. Here in a single book, an ethical core was provided about which Anti-Revolutionaries and Liberals might rally, permitting the former to escape from their role as an appendage of the Conservative Party, while relieving Groen van Prinsterer the leader of this small religious faction, from the unpleasant task of capitulating to Thorbecke. Indeed, the only element from *Max Havelaar* which Mackay in his following words singled out for comment was the questionable ethics of the system of lies, as defined by Dekker, encouraged in the Indies in the "official reports." This issue had likewise been central in that portion of the book which the Liberals, Robide van der Aa and Veth, commended. Mackay's remarks amounted to nothing less than a hesitant effort to seek the basis for a new kind of coalition in the Second Chamber.

In the book to which reference has been made an amusing expression occurred in the discussion of how reports are prepared in the Indies for the government in the Motherland, and where one in Indie makes a report about the peaceful peace in the Indies. No one can be more happy than I over that "peaceful peace" in Indie . . . but
after the minister's statement that there is
tenseness in the Indies as in all other Mohammedan
kingdoms, I may not refrain from observing that
that "peaceful peace" in the Indies is in fact a
matter which must be our joint concern, that is
to say, a matter toward which we must be alert
and must act with caution and prudence. 43

In his mind, the formulation of intelligent policies
for the Indies was impossible unless greater reliability
was reflected in the reports from the colonial adminis-
tration. To be both fair and firm in one's steps against
fanaticism in the East, one had to be fully informed. Only
a Liberal government, amenable to Parliament's thirst for
information, could satisfy this need.

Neither Rochussen nor Duymaer van Twist made an
immediate response. P. Mijer, the preceding Minister of
Colonial Affairs, came to the defense of both the colonial
system and Dekker's private devil, Van Twist. He could
make a certain claim to objectivity on the ground of his
earlier service in the Indies. He had served as Attorney-
General of the Indies under Rochussen in 1849 and again
thereafter under Van Twist. Though seemingly uninspired,
Mijer's statement was, in fact, a brilliant defense of the
government's system against the book which "is certainly
known to the most, if not all of the members of [the Second
Chamber]." He understood full well the principles involved
in the discussion.

43 Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 29.
Both Van Hoevell and Mackay had ignored the Lebak affair during their short speeches. They emphasized exclusively the supposed general principles and criticisms of the colonial system portrayed in Max Havelaar. They had been distinctly unwilling to enter into a general evaluation of the work as a whole. Mijer reversed this approach; he insisted on treating the work as a unit and concentrated attention specifically on Lebak.

Mijer reasoned that, if one could show Dekker's account of events at Lebak to be fallacious, then one would have destroyed the corner stone upon which the whole work rested. If Dekker was in the wrong at Lebak, then there would be no specific "case history" to which Liberals like Veth could point to validate the charge of the universality of the abuses attributed to the system. Van der Aa had not considered Max Havelaar as a single whole. While rejecting Dekker's account of Lebak, he had believed that at least parts of the book could be salvaged separately. Mijer, on the other hand, agreed with the proposition explicit in Veth's analysis: the book must stand or fall as a single statement.

Veth's stand had led him logically to accuse Duymaer van Twist of being at least in part at fault. This could never be an agreeable conclusion for the Liberal. Mijer, in defending the correctness of Van Twist's behavior, called
for the total negation of the book's contents. Van Twist
suddenly figured prominently in the Conservative defense of
the colonial system! By coming to his defense, Mijer could
achieve dual objectives: while embarrassing the Liberals
who had employed the book for political ends, he could
simultaneously deflect the blow aimed at the system of
obligatory cultures by those "who accept with pleasure
that which is said against the administration in the Dutch
East Indies."

That Mijer was arguing from a fundamental question
of principle is immediately apparent from his definition
of the meaning of Max Havelaar. He spoke as follows to
the membership of the Second Chamber:

In the Dutch East Indies a system of arbi­
trariness exists; the government rules arbi­
trarily; it is blind to the suppression of the
native people by their chiefs; injustice is the
order of the day there; the last retired Governor­
General of the Dutch East Indies (Mr. Duymaer
van Twist) was himself guilty of such arbi­
trariness; to the money with which he bought
a country house, blood clings and specifically
because he left Java without having given the
writer of that work an opportunity to account
for his recommendations to have the regent of the
district over which he was the assistant resi­
dent and against whom he had raised complaints
of misuse of authority and whom he suspected of
extortion, banished without warning so that a
free investigation of the affair could be in­
stigated, seeing as how no freedom would in fact
exist before the banishment of the regent.44

44Ibid., pp. 30-31.
Having thus stated the case, Mijer proceeded to explode Dekker's account by showing that Van Twist was indeed prepared to act firmly against oppressors. He cited the case history of the regent of Kendal in the residence of Samarang, who had been discharged from his office some three months after Duymaer van Twist's accession to the office of Governor-General. Through the offices of the Attorney-General, Mijer himself was well acquainted with the case. He laid stress on the fact that the Regent of Kendal was purposely left undisturbed in his office in accordance with Article 84 of the Regeringsreglement while the investigation, leading to his later discharge, was conducted.

Seemingly, Mijer had made Van Twist his accomplice, not only against the strategy Dekker had once had in mind for the Raden Adipati, but also against Van Hoevell's critique of the Regeringsreglement in the summer debates of 1854. The Liberals of 1860 did not fully appreciate the strength of Mijer's argument, but he had given them excellent grounds for a more critical examination of the book that had caused "a shudder to pass through the land."

"I would be greatly grieved," concluded Mijer, "if the commission [charged with preparing a response to the King's speech] . . . allowed itself to be influenced in drawing
up this paragraph by the impact of this book, and other such works."45

After Mijer's speech, Van Hoevell asked for the floor once again and, in a brief emotional statement, decried Mijer's preoccupation with the details of Max Havelaar. The author himself, declared Van Hoevell, could and in all likelihood would answer the arguments raised by Mijer.

But I have referred to a fact; I have noted, that as a consequence of that book, a shudder has passed through the land. I have been referring to the impact which it has had. That fact is not to be denied. I ask: will the declaration in the speech from the throne, cause that shudder to cease? I ask: shall the speech of the preceding speaker cause it to disappear?46

With the pitch of emotion rising, Duymaer van Twist finally broke silence and with evident discomfort, briefly thanked Mijer. Regarding Max Havelaar, he would make no comment, nor could Parliament properly demand that he prepare a defense: "And it is further my opinion that that which I could say, regarding that book and its author could not escape a reflection of bias." As for the words uttered by the respected member from Zwolle, "they shall at least convince you that the retired Governor-General did not shrink from punishing even the most distinguished chiefs of Java when their guilt was

46 Ibid.
made quite apparent after an appropriate investi-
gation."\textsuperscript{47}

If the Liberals at this time generally ignored
Mijer's remarks, they were incensed by Duymaer van Twist's
weak and incomplete statement. Within the Spectator
clique, a typical, advanced Liberal group, there had
already been a distinct reversionist movement in Dekker's
favor in the late summer. The analysis of \textit{Max Havelaar}
by Robide van der Aa ceased to be characteristic of this
group as a whole. If one can believe comments made by
Dekker himself on Van der Aa, then he at no time played
a dominating role within this group.\textsuperscript{48} In the 18 August
edition of the \textit{Nederlandsche Spectator} a whimsical article
was published, in which an unknown author joined Dekker in
casting reproaches upon the ludicrous stereotype figures
appearing in \textit{Max Havelaar}. To live on the Lauriergracht--
where Droogstoppel had his abode; to have been a former
resident in Java; to be a broker in coffee or sugar; to
hold noble orders from the Dutch government--as did Van
Kempen; these were derogatory attributes.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{48}In the notebook of Dekker's second wife, a passage
occurred, dated 22 March 1877, in which she recorded a
conversation between herself and her husband with respect
to those high in the circle of the \textit{Spectator}. Dekker had
informed her that Robide van der Aa was an undistinguished
little fellow who played no central role. (\textit{Brieven}, IV,
p. 198.

\textsuperscript{49}"Eene Huishoudelijke Zaak," \textit{De Nederlandsche
Spectator}, 18 August, 1860, No. 33, p. 263.
During the same period, "Multatuli" became an often cited authority for a multiplicity of subjects in the pages of this magazine. He was an authority on Dutch conventions, on the habits of Governor-Generals in the Indies and on Javanese sociology. This was an important development because it reflected a general willingness among Liberals—once they had overcome the shock of the last pages of Max Havelaar—to concern themselves once again with the general charges Dekker made against the colonial administration. Keller, in a report to the Indies in early July, wrote that "people here [in The Hague] are not in agreement with regard to the content [of the book]. But far and away the largest number who have read this work acknowledge that it contains much truth, even though it is exaggerated here and there."

The demand now, was for a "serious investigation" of the charges in the book, "and should it be in part or in its entirety, true, then it is time that one puts an end to the Uebelstande which it points out." The preoccupation with an investigation of the charges in Max Havelaar mounts steadily in the following letters that Gerard Keller wrote to the Indies. It is apparent that he

51 Java Bode, Saturday, 4 August 1860, No. 64.
attributed increasing credence to Dekker's threats that the ultimate consequence of denial would be a Jacquerie.52

Given this state of mind, it is not surprising that Van Twist's refusal not only to support an investigation of the charges, but even to comment upon the book, was received with great disapproval: "In contesting the content of Max Havelaar a different terrain [than simple debate] exists; unfortunately we must conclude from the words of Mr. Duymaer van Twist, that he has no intention of following such a course."

That which it pleases Multatuli to say, according to Mr. Duymaer van Twist, places him under no obligation to respond. This is entirely correct, but the lie must be given to Multatuli if he does not speak the truth; and if he does speak the truth, then we pity the Indies and we pity the author and we lament the Government which does not desire or does not dare to rectify injustice.53

Van Twist, however, had made one important statement. He said that he was unafraid of discharging native Regents after an "appropriate investigation." This implied that he would be obliged to follow Mijer (and Veth) in

52See Keller's remarks in the Java Bode, Saturday, 25 August, 1860, No. 68, where he concerned himself at great length with a restatement of Dekker's account of the system of lies perpetuated in official reports. He concluded: "Finally the inflammable material which has been piled up in a gigantic heap by abuses through the years will break out suddenly in enveloping flames, and then . . .? Heaven protect us from such a thing!"

presuming that the events at Lebak proved or disproved the validity of the general charges in Max Havelaar; that the work must stand or fall as a whole. In other words, he found himself in the position of having to defend the correctness of the Conservative-inspired article 47 of the Regeringsreglement, which specified that a native chief could be removed from his post only by the Governor-General. The latter was unlikely to act until after the chief's guilt had been clearly established. If Van Twist had followed a different tack now, he would be calling his own conduct into question! He necessarily felt, then, that he was constrained in future attacks on the colonial administration. But, at the same time, Van Hoevell must also have felt limited in his freedom to comment on Max Havelaar. This situation is reflected in the lengthy appeal to Dekker at the end of Van Hoevell's article in the Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Indie. He is asked, there, to give up his attack upon Van Twist. Van Hoevell, who wanted greatly to retain "Multatuli's" work for Liberal consumption, thought to rectify an unpleasant situation by bringing Dekker on a pragmatic level to reverse himself with regard to that element in the book which needs must repulse the unequivocal Liberal.

But the political situation that had developed by October 1860, when Van Hoevell published his critique on Max Havelaar, may also account for the important change of
emphasis since the publication of Veth's critique. Veth had called the book "a powerful protest against the suppression of the Javanese, by their native Regents it is true, but assisted in their inclination by the Dutch Government which extends them a helping hand." Van Hoevell now calls the book "a sketch for the Dutch people in glowing lines of how the Dutch Government surrenders the native peoples over to their own chiefs; how the latter take from them all that they please, cause [the people] . . . to work for them as much as they please, and arbitrarily utilize them at will."54

Whereas Veth had been primarily concerned with the European portion of the colonial administrative hierarchy and had emphasized that fact by underlining the latter portion of his definition, Van Hoevell was primarily concerned with the relationship between the native chiefs and the population of like racial and ethnological background. Thus, where Veth had concerned himself with the official reports, like Robide van der Aa before him, Van Hoevell was now more concerned with a different group of passages in *Max Havelaar*. Attention is directed to Dekker's

54 W. R. Van Hoevell, "De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java (Max Havelaar, of de Koffeeveilingen van de Nederlandsch Handelmaatschappij door Multatuli, Amsterdam 1860), "Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (October 1860), pp. 258-259.
discussion of the origins of the system of obligatory government cultures, to his note on the hunger and famine which occurred at Demak and Grobogan and finally, to Dekker's discussion of the pantjen-services.

Veth saw the book primarily as an attack on the colonial bureaucracy. Van Hoevell saw it as a commentary on the deplorable conditions under which the mass of the Javanese lived. While both men viewed the work as a re-affirmation of the principles Van Hoevell enunciated during the 1854 debates, Van Hoevell tended to emphasize article 69 while Veth had emphasized article 55. Thus, the book now "proves that those members of the Second Chamber knew what they were talking about, who in the tentative report on the Regeringsreglement in 1854 characterized [article 69] . . . in the following manner:

the population of Java consists of a few million peasants and several thousand chiefs; of which the latter, so it states, are to be watched over and controlled in their actions by a totally insignificant number of European officials. These [i.e., the European officials] continue to be judged by the Government as ill-suited for intercourse with the natives whenever they do not collusively agree to permit the native chiefs, in accordance with adat as they call it, to incriminate themselves in infinite extortion and torment."55

These words directed the emphasis away from the European hierarchy, although Van Hoevell, of course,

55 Ibid., pp. 259-260.
never lost sight of the upper echelons of authority at Batavia. And in this context, he then made his own original contribution to the public evaluation of Dekker's first book. Van Hoevell attempted to universalize the misuse of authority and abuses which Dekker had discussed on a localized basis at Lebak. His message was: The corrections needed in the colonial administration of the interior could not be achieved through any increase in the moral integrity of the European officials employed, or through augmenting the number of European officials locally available in the interior. The situation in Java would necessarily continue to be fundamentally immoral so long as the Dutch employ an intervening strata of the native nobility to rule over the masses. This did not mean that the whole body of the Javanese nobility must forthwith be obliterated, but Van Hoevell felt strongly that steps in this direction, gradual though they might be, were indispensable for the establishment of good local native government.56

56 Van Hoevell gave a terse, forceful statement to his position with respect to the government's system during the debates of 14 December 1861:

I oppose the government system of cultures, if it must be viewed as a strait-jacket in which the Javanese people or a portion of them is doomed until eternity to remain squeezed; but I am a proponent of the government system of cultures when it is implemented as a means of education and maturation that
In terms of this frame of reference, Van Hoevell could assure his reader that Max Havelaar was not a book against the Raden Adipati Karta Nata Negara but a book against all regents in Java everywhere. "Multatuli," he continued, "transposes us to a regency in the most westerly portion of Java, but the evil which existed there in a high degree when MAX HAVELAAR [sic] was the assistant resident, is found almost everywhere in a greater or lesser degree."

The discharge of a Regent in one area or another cannot make any fundamental difference in the situation, nor does the fact that some Regents treat their charges with greater

is progressively abrogated as the conditions of Javanese society which progressively develop make this instrument unnecessary. I oppose the government system of cultures when it is employed to enrich the state treasury, but even more the select few, at the expense of the Javanese laborer; but I am a proponent of the government system of cultures when it is employed to accustom the Javanese to steady and useful work, to the cultivation of products, advantageous for himself and advantageous for the enterpriser for whom he works. I oppose the government system of cultures if its purpose is to cause the government to remain permanently in the abnormal condition of cultivator, proprietor and merchant, but I am a proponent of the government system of cultures if it [can be viewed as] . . . a transition to a condition in which one can do without administrative intervention. (Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 710.)

57"De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXII (October, 1860), p. 260.
regard, alter the problem, for "as a rule the population is oppressed by them. And why do I dare to state this with such certitude? Because everywhere the cause of that evil exists. Already, in 1854, I placed my finger on that wound; I demonstrated at that time already how necessary it was, that the Dutch authorities protect the people against their own chiefs."\(^{58}\)

In so arguing, Van Hoevell was making a distinct contribution to the Liberals and, indeed, he was encouraged in the elaboration of his position by certain passages in *Max Havelaar*. Still, he was no closer to identifying Dekker's true Weltanschauung than Veth. Dekker was preoccupied with a point of immorality which he understood as something distinct and actually incongruous in the paternalistic, theoretically defensible structure of the colonial administration. Dekker sought correction through a change in personnel and not through parliamentary interference. This is demonstratively clear from his attitude toward membership in the Second Chamber during the weeks in Amsterdam prior to the elections to fill the seat of the deceased member Stolte!

A parliamentary seat, he had written on 6 December 1859, was but another means "to force R[ochussen] to make

me [a member of] the Council of the Indies." 59 That he could have turned such a seat into a rostrum from which to plead for legislation in the Indies, did not even occur to him, for this was irrelevant to the kind of a solution he sought! The elements in the book which assumed a central position in Van Hoewell's argument were of only subsidiary interest to Dekker. Where the former saw Lebak as an element of detail in a fabric of universal applicability, the authoritarian egocentric Dekker would subordinate all to his unique experience. Nor was this an unconscious step on his part; not only are we informed in the tale of Saidjah that the obligatory cultures in Bantam had been withdrawn, but in a private letter to Van Lennep, Dekker added on 12 January 1860 that the tale of Saidjah and Adinda itself would have been impossible anywhere but in Bantam. 60

59 Brieven, IV, p. 13.

60 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 72. In this letter of 12 January 1860, Dekker wrote further:

That which I say about Lebak would not be true of another district . . . all the things I say about population, live stock and land rent would be held for lies by, e.g., a person from Samarang, who knows nothing of the west end [of Java]. Yes, the whole story of Saidjah is impossible in Central or East Java . . . again and again in discussion with specialists on the Indies, it occurs that I must explain to the people who have not been everywhere in the Indies, how this or that affair is set up in those territories which they have not visited.
One of the reasons why the localization which takes place in *Max Havelaar* is of the utmost importance, is that the Conservatives simultaneously were attempting to reduce Lebak to an isolated occurrence. This was not the case with Mijer who thought that he had saved the whole system by disproving a single "case history," but it does apply to J. J. Rochussen who would exercise considerably more influence over his fellow Conservatives than Mijer did, during the course of the eighteen sixties.

Rochussen took up *Max Havelaar* in all seriousness, a fact attested to by his letter to Governor-General Pahud of 25 June 1860, obviously written following an examination of papers in the state archives. As had all previous critics, so Rochussen in his evaluation of *Max Havelaar*, "a work," as he wrote, "that has caused quite an impact here in the country," recognized two distinct elements. It contained first of all "... a criticism of the Dutch rule over the Indies, "but likewise, "an apology for his official acts," Unlike Mijer, Rochussen does not indicate in his letter that he sees any necessary interrelationship between these two elements in the book and, as if pleased that at least one of these elements could be negated, he adds the following significant words which effectively accomplished the same localization of
Max Havelaar which was implicit in Dekker's letter of 12 January. Wrote Rochussen:

We can count ourselves fortunate that the acts of extortion by the chiefs at Lebak are related in no way at all to the obligatory government cultures and that those acts of extortion were later on during your Excellency's administration, not left unpunished so as appears from your Excellency's decision of 11 December 1856, No. 17 . . . 61

The potentiality latent in these remarks would make it possible for Dekker to collaborate later with the Conservatives. But Van Hoevell in October 1860, was in no position to appreciate the consequence of the remarks stated respectively by Rochussen and Dekker. Satisfied with his own logic as Veth before him had been, Van Hoevell proceeded to carry his argument yet one step further. If it was true that the evil in Bantam arose, not from the capriciousness of a single Regent or the negligence in duty of a specific European resident (at Serang?), but, rather from the very institution of native officials with distinctly separate standards, then it followed that during the Lebak tragedy, Van Twist's hands had in fact been tied and that he was not at liberty to respond to Dekker's petitions of 1856 with a personal intercession. And, as a corollary, it necessarily followed

that "Multatuli's" true victory could only be gained through parliamentary action to amend the system established by Van den Bosch and Baud.

Therefore, Van Hoevell's critique bid "Multatuli" welcome to the ranks of the Liberal party with the counsel that he best forget his thoughts of achieving his purposes through force; rather, let us join in a Parliamentary attack upon "the harmful, inhuman, short-sighted system of the market place." Help us to "disclose in its nakedness" this system and help us "characterize its wickedness." Let us "stigmatize it before everyone's eyes in its selfishness and self-seeking, in its narrow-mindedness and insipidity, in its egotism and nepotism."

But simultaneously Van Hoevell calls upon Dekker to make his peace with Van Twist who in fact, he is told, seeks the same ends as you:

He may have made himself guilty during his administration of many other faults, nevertheless he was, in as far as his hands were not tied by the system, in truth a protector of the people; and still he stands with honor in the ranks of those who demand improvement and reform in the condition of the Javanese people. Add then, to the attractive factors which you have sketched into your character of Havelaar, one additional factor: self-deception, and even against him towards whom your heart is now filled with bitterness! Do not seek through your weapons to cripple
the power of him, who attempts to replace "the system of authority of theft and murder under which the poor Javanese are bent down," with a system of humanity and honesty.62

62 "De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXII (October, 1860), pp. 264-265.
CHAPTER V

MAX HAVELAAR AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT IN 1860

It is customary to attribute to Max Havelaar and Dekker's later writings no direct immediate applicability to the course of contemporary political developments in the 1860's, but rather to assign his works an obscure intangible psychic value which, in some inexplicable manner, worked as a ferment upon the conscience of the Dutch, ultimately contributing through the sentimentality of such figures as Saidjah and Adinda to the triumph of neo-Liberalism in a form later known as the "ethical direction." This is the position taken by one of Dekker's admirers, J. Prinsen, who wrote of Max Havelaar's enormous influence, "working slowly and mysteriously through the years and along great circuitous routes as a ferment in colonial affairs."¹

But to attribute so important a role to Dekker's writings at the end of the century is to recognize in them no important casual force in understanding the course of events between 1860 and the passage of De Waal's 1870

bills for the reorganization of colonial policy. Thus, the same J. Prinsen would deny that there had been in 1860 "a shudder that passed through the land," and would assure his reader that the romantic individualism and personal egocentricity of Dekker made him incomprehensible for his contemporaries.

The reader forgot the author and his personal fate and the living and suffering Javanese - which for the reader back in the sixties, as compared to today, had so little about them that was substantial - he lived and suffered with Saidjah, he made fun of Droogstoppel, he admired the courage and the conviction of that man Havelaar and was so astonished by the closing pages, that he completely forget, that Shawlman was still wandering about [without hope] in the streets of Amsterdam and still did not know how late it was, and that the little Max still had no stockings to wear.2

De Vooys agreed completely with Prinsen's thesis that the Dutch public in the 1860's had seen in Havelaar only a particularly brilliant but essentially fictitious novel. Elaborating this theme further, De Vooys emphasized the fact that the Liberals of 1848, who had represented triumphant radicalism, had, by 1860, become the new Conservatives, who emphatically demanded sedateness and a meaningless formalistic propriety from all who would play a role in the life of the upper class.3 Despite such

2Ibid., pp. 249-250.

veracity as might be conceded these observations, it re-
mains the present author's contention that Max Havelaar
did, in fact exercise, great influence on the course of
political events as early as 1860, and that both Prinsen
and De Vooys, in attempting to evaluate the significance
of Max Havelaar, socially and politically, placed emphasis
in the wrong place.

The preoccupation of these men with commentary on
Dekker's own anticipated protest movement among the people
and Van Hoevell's "shudder," reveal their ultimate interest
in resolving a proposition of dissimilar import, namely:
Did Havelaar have the weight of righteous morality on his
side at Lebak or not? That the Dutch have occupied them-
selves with this question for so many years, whether in
Dekker's defense or to the end of condemning him (think of
the ludicrous attacks of a De Kock), is a compliment to
the continuing impact of this unique personality on the
Dutch moralizing mind; it is to evaluate him on his own
terms and not on the basis of an object study of causation
in history. The absence of any comprehensive statement in
Dutch literature on Dekker's political influence is no
sign that he had none, but rather a reflection of the fact
that the Dutch, preoccupied with a moral question, have
not conceived that there was another question regarding
this man, which for the historian must ultimately be much
more important.
The question is not whether the people demonstrated in the streets (in showing that they did not, De Vooy by implication, concludes that he has resolved the moral question which is uppermost in the Dutch mind) and the question is not whether Dekker really was eccentric (this charge in Dutch literature once again carries the connotation that he must consequently have been at fault in some undefined manner), but what factual use could and was made of "Multatuli's" writings, by whom, at what time, under what circumstances and to what end? The question is not: was Dekker right, but how his ideas—whether they were brand new or not is less important—were actually integrated into the body of thought which ruled the minds of the sedate, self-satisfied "conservative-liberal" (to borrow a phrase from both Lord Napier and Van Goltstein) upper class in the Netherlands in the middle of the second half of the nineteenth century.

One is provided with an eloquent testimony to the manner of Max Havelaar's reception by a contemporary source. Writing early in 1861, G. H. Van Soest, an outstanding champion of Liberal principles in the Netherlands, took exception to such criticisms of the Dutch character as were made by men like Van Goltstein. He denied the contention that the Dutch possessed no passion, that their politics rested on pure rationalism in the absence of sentiment.
"That opinion," he declared, "is incorrect; that reproach undeserved. Indeed, we perhaps possess less than others the gift of passion, still the Dutch nation is not insensitive, not heartless; he who, passing through the superficial coolness, knows to touch the cords of our feelings, shall not need to complain of a deficiency of sympathy." This fact, he argued, was proven by the general indignation the Dutch felt towards the institution of slavery in the West Indies in the 1850's and was proven once again by the reception given Max Havelaar.

The writer of Max Havelaar possessed the talent of penetrating to the heart of the nation; he knew how to awaken its sympathy for the simple Javanese, who have been brought under the rule of the Netherlands by conquest and who at the same time have remained the victim of that Asiatic despotism with which our policies have related themselves; he has fathomed the wounds which have consequently been brought to a good natured and peaceful people, and which as a result of long indifference and disagreement in intent have not been allowed to heal, but which nevertheless demand redress. Enlightened by that revelation, public opinion penetrated deeper into the question of the Indies, more general became the doubt of the soundness of the precepts upon which our colonial politics had been established, and which are still endorsed with great fierceness by the Conservative Party. The old axioms in which people had so long acquiesced now appeared to be highly questionable. People realized, that in order to retain the conquered lands, there was no need at all for covert channels and mysterious negotiations of an uncontrolled colonial administration; that the financial needs of the Motherland did not necessarily demand the social servitude of innumerable natives; that the maintenance of Asiatic customs, which offend our Western ideas of righteousness and impartiality, could not possibly be acceptable to the Javanese; that above all else our policies err, when one supports the native aristocratic elements in order to
reign over the great mass and make them exclusively servicable to avarice and dirty profiteering.\footnote{G. H. van Soest, "De Koloniale Staatkunde in 1860," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (March, 1861), pp. 150-151.}

Here one finds in a single statement, awed respect for the emotional impact of \textit{Max Havelaar} combined with an attack upon the politics of budgetary surpluses and a naive evaluation of the structure of oriental society. Van Soest, at least, believed in this book's casual relationship to the Liberals' drive for reform in the 1860's, and he was personally motivated in his own tactics by that book. Nor can one avoid the conclusion that, by the Autumn of 1860, the Conservatives were measuring off the efficacy of their own apologetics against the pace set by Dekker.

In response to the "Liberal Max Havelaar" which had been "created" in a series of critiques between June and October 1860, the Conservatives had available two principal lines of thought. They could either attack the system of free enterprise--for which, everyone was agree, this book pleaded--or they could attempt to introduce into a defense of the system of obligatory government cultures an element of the sentiment which stood out so strongly in \textit{Max Havelaar}. The sources of these arguments lay in the period prior to the book's appearance in May 1860 but, as the month passed, the Conservative arguments, no matter which direction they
took, tended progressively to be reformulated within the context established by the Liberal interpreters of *Max Havelaar*.

The Conservatives argued on the one hand, that if the system of obligatory government cultures provoked criminal activity by the native chiefs, then the indiscriminate admission of private capital and individual industrialists into the interior of Java would be still worse and would introduce an uncontrollable evil which was, indeed, universal and integral to the nature of *laissez-faire*, even as a theoretical system. Such an argument proceeded from an analysis of the social structure of the desse, emphasizing the obedience which the native people demonstrated towards their chiefs, who in turn could be bribed by private enterprising capitalists. But, on the other hand, the Conservatives could frankly admit that there were indeed faults in the system; in the case of C. H. F. Riesz, one of the more important Conservative apologists of the year 1860, there was an open acknowledgment of validity in Van Hoevell's charge of universality. Rochussen, however, would never use this argument in such an extreme form.

But no matter what the degree of stress, this argument insisted that the original primitive system introduced by Van den Bosch was not faulty as a theoretical structure—
that, once immoral persons had been removed from the administrative structure and once other imperfections and blemishes that had crept in, had been cleansed, the system would be, in fact, the faultless administrative organization proposed by Van den Bosch. The great attraction in this argument was that it combined a paternalistic concern by the Dutch with the welfare of the natives with the assurance that budgetary surpluses would continue to pour into the Dutch treasury. Yet another great attraction in this argument, seeing the quasi-socialistic tendencies of the Dutch in the first half of the century, was that it offered an alternative to the uncontrolled atomized society of agrarian proletariat which supposedly would appear with the introduction of full-fledged laissez-faire.5

5To the eventual astonishment and dismay of the Liberals, these two arguments were greatly attractive to Dekker. Indeed, in the course of the next two years, he would reformulate these Conservative arguments in his own later writings. There was an implicit hostility between the tale of Saidjah and Adinda and the analysis of the obedience of the native dessa dweller to his chief, for Dekker attributed to Saidjah a self-willed "puritanical" independence and consciousness of self which did not fit the Conservative scheme of things. Otherwise, however, there was nothing in Dekker's remarks on the subject of the natives in Java which necessarily contradicted the Conservatives' argument. Perhaps more attractive than this, to Dekker was the second argument which revolved around the question of personnel rather than statutory enactment. Such an argument fitted Dekker's personality like a glove.
In formulating the Conservative attack against the introduction of private enterprise into Java, it was, surprisingly, Fransen van de Putte, the leader of the radical wing of the Liberal Party in the middle of the decade, who performed yeoman service. In 1858, he had written a lengthy letter to his employer in the Netherlands from the east end of Java where he worked. While genuine free enterprise was possible in the cultivation of coffee, he had written, it could not in fact exist in the sugar industry. The development that had taken place in the sugar culture under the label of "free enterprise" was indeed more fearful than conditions under the government regulated obligatory cultures. This letter found its way into the hands of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. He used it in the debates on the colonial budget in December 1858 with great effectiveness. With pleasure, Rochussen read to the Second Chamber:

The so-called free sugar cultures is a system of coercion, just as severe as the contemporary [government system], but in addition [involving] corruption and extortion . . . a frank investigation of all free sugar cultures has given me the conviction, that it was without exception forced labor by concealment, there where the industrialist was not given the disposal over the ground.6

6W. R. van Hoevell, Parlamentaire Redevoeringen, III (Zalt-Bommel, Noman, 1864), p. 201.
Highly satisfied with the effect achieved, Rochussen once again brought this letter to the attention of Parliament in December of 1859. To the dramatic words recited twelve months before, he added yet another quote: "I find that the so-called voluntary agreements with the chiefs and elders of the desse (altogether legal and authorized in the Staatsblad and by administrative policy) are in fact much worse than the system of obligatory cultures as such, indeed are a step backward instead of a step forward."7 Van Hall, the Minister of Finance, considered this statement an argument against the public auctioning of government concessions, the object of the important May 1860 Van Hoevell interpellation. If it was true, Van Hall argued, that abuse was an inherent characteristic of free enterprise in the sugar industry, then one must be extremely cautious in Java as to whom concessions were granted. "If you give it to a person of—as one says in the Indies—untidy demeanour and bad manners, then you have committed an inconceivable fault."8

The damage caused the Liberal cause was further aggravated when Fransen van de Putte in 1860 published a defense of his 1858 letter. In a pamphlet of the later date, he attacked no other than Van Twist. The former

7Ibid., IV (Zalt-Bommel, Noman, 1865), p. 34.
8Ibid., p. 33.
Governor-General was accused of having intensified the coercive elements in the sugar culture during his tenure of authority in the Indies, not by intent but through ignorance of the actual conditions as they existed. Specifying, Van de Putte contended, Van Twist had unsuspectingly encouraged the hypocritical misuse of the free enterprise concept among the residents of Java who felt themselves obliged to employ it as a political football in competing with one another for the favor of the Governor-General.

This unfortunate consequence, he continued, had followed from Van Twist's appointment of the Resident of Soerabaja, who had distinguished himself as a proponent of

9I. D. Fransen van de Putte, De Regeling van de Suiker-Contracten op Java (Schetsberg: Goes, 1860), pp. 22-26. The Liberals in both the Motherland and the colonies reckoned Van de Putte to the Conservatives. They completely failed to appreciate that he would correct the situation, not by destroying free enterprise, but by legalizing private landownership. This hostility is clearly apparent in an article published in the Bataviaasch Handelsblad by H. J. Lion ("De Polemiek van den Heer I. D. Fransen van de Putte," Monday, 29 October 1860, No. 20). Lion accused him of being, not only reactionary and opportunistic, but intellectually dishonest: "He who knows him, anticipated in a general sense no solid observations attesting to political stature from him; and he who felt that he had comprehended the true intention of the writing, he understood that [Van de Putte], who by chance and the forced labor of the natives became rich in the Indies and wished then to play a political role in the Netherlands, had to speculate on the sympathies of one or another commercial city.

The "commercial city" to which Lion referred was Rotterdam, where Van de Putte began his political activities.
private enterprise and an enemy of the pantjen-services, to the office of Vice-President of the Council of the Indies in 1856. Though he did not name him, Van de Putte referred to De Perez, who served in the Council of the Indies until his premature death in 1859. From this office, De Perez had been responsible for a vigorous effort to replace pantjen-services with voluntary labor contracts.\(^\text{10}\) This appointment, lamented Van de Putte, "... had caused the wide-spread conviction to arise among the officials in Java that the attitude of that high official was likewise the attitude of the government and that, by acting in that spirit, one could open the way to promotion for himself.

One saw then a race begin between the heads of the provincial administrative districts to create the greatest possible amount of free enterprise in their residencies, even if it existed in fact solely on paper or in name alone; in the same manner, once, [officials had been motivated] to get the highest possible land rent figures and as many products for the European market as possible by means of the obligatory cultures.\(^\text{11}\)

The line of thought in Fransen van de Putte’s position was further elaborated in an Arch-Conservative manner in 1860, in a pamphlet which indicated its stand by its title: *The Soundness of the Present System of Cultures in Java as Opposed to the Riskiness and Dangerousness of*

\(^{10}\)Zwart, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

Free Enterprise on a Large Scale. The author who used the pen-name of "Salak," began his argument by insisting that the surpluses of the Dutch treasury from the Indies were essential to the maintenance and growth of the Netherlands. "The Netherlands stand or fall with the East Indies possessions . . . . The question of the maintenance or abolition of the existing system of cultures strikes [our] political economy."12

But, if the Netherlands needed the budgetary surpluses from the Indies, this fact harmonized completely, he claimed, with the interest of the Indies, for there ". . . . the whole structure of native Javanese society is in opposition to free, genuinely free cultivation on a large scale." Harking back to the kind of argument which had once figured prominently in Baud's apologetics of the 1840's, Salak affirmed that the submissiveness of the natives to their masters contradicted the theoretical structure of a laissez-faire society. But, likewise important in Salak's position (and here he drew upon a theme enunciated by Fransen van de Putte) was the absence in the greater portions of Java of a concept of individual

landownershlp which would be exploited to the advantage of the private peasant. On the other hand, where communal land ownership did exist, "free enterprise . . . is neither advantageous nor desirable for the common Javanese, in a word, for the man who must perform the labor . . . "13

But, in fact, Salak abjured the free enterpriser's right, even to a hearing, for his system "will sacrifice up the substance [of Javanese productivity] to an illusion, to a beautiful sounding name, and what is even worse, one will deliver the population over to an innumerable army of little tyrants, who shall oppress, extort and exhaust them."14 Indicating a fierce revulsion from "free enter­prise," Salak rejected the whole body of Liberal apolo­getics and rather argued that it was the Liberals' intent to reduce the natives of the East Indies to the slave status of the West Indies or to the level of peonage which he believed to exist in Cuba and the Philippine Islands "where private enterprisers cause a poverty­stricken population to work."15

J. D. van Herwerden, writing in the fall of 1860, elaborated Salak's point of view in a sketch of the future which awaited the East Indies if the Liberals won

13 Ibid., p. 34.
14 Ibid., p. 35.
15 Ibid., p. 21.
out. He saw a situation in which private enterprisers would multiply rapidly within each regency until there might be as many as fifty or a hundred.

Everywhere where the opportunity presents itself, private enterprisers will rise up as if from the ground, and then, proponents of free industry! Who shall protect the inarticulate population of Java, increasingly controlled by capricious native chiefs and speculating enterprisers? Be so kind, and suggest an appropriate regulation! Shall the five or six officials who assist the local authorities, take care of this? Now already they complain and with right, over the obligations that increase more and more! Now already it is difficult to properly meet the many official duties and obligations at home and in the territory, perhaps ten or twenty hours distant! Even now much must be left half done, because there is not sufficient time to take care of everything with exactness . . . the means of control, of supervision already for a number of years have not stood in proportion to the comprehensiveness which that system has gained and which it needs for its further development.16

With complete pessimism, Van Herwerden concluded that the administrative problem placed before the authorities at Batavia could not be solved. Even, if the personnel increased three-fold, they still could not effectively police the immoral avarice which he attributed to all free enterprisers. The Resident, together with the few officials under his control, would be "forced in a short time to shut his eyes in order to let private industries proceed at

their own pace, that is assuming that they do not finally become official industries!"¹⁷

The proposition that admitted imperfections blemished the actual implementation of the obligatory government culture system meshed readily with the approach of a Salak or a Van Herwerden. A competent formulation of this position came from the pen of J. J. Hasselman, a former resident in Djokdjakarta. This argument placed great emphasis upon the humanitarian principles laid down by Van den Bosch in his official report published in the Staatsblad of 1834. Hasselman cited from that report such passages as this:

> The happiness and the satisfaction of the Javanese must always be the first concern of the government; the native has complete right to such care because of the natural submissiveness of his character and because of his childlike ill-comprehension of facts, which gives occasion enough to make misuse of his simplicity. Enterprisers who act in conflict with this principle must not be tolerated, no matter how much this might lead to retarding the expansion of the government supervised cultures. It would be better that we raise no products at all, than that they be produced in violation of the obligations which we owe the population.¹⁸

In all frankness, continued Hasselman, it must be admitted that, in the actual development of this system, many of Van den Bosch's humanitarian principles were lost from

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸J. J. Hasselman, Beschouwingen omtrent het Cultuur Stelsel (Zalt-Bommel: Noman 1860), pp. 3-4.
sight with the consequence that today, "Java produces not so much as a result of the perfection in the state of affairs, but rather in spite of the many existing faults." This, however, was not to say that the system as implemented was necessarily responsible for all failings and tragedies in Java during the last thirty years. Hasselman denied any relationship between the governmental system and the tragedy at Demak and Grobogan. The calamitous development there was a consequence of the excessive collection of land rents which had become a source of government revenue during the period of the Napoleonic war when the English ruled the Indies. Indeed, Hasselman considered the system a positive good: "The system of obligatory cultures is, following its original intentions, specifically intended with respect to material welfare, to better the conditions of just the Javanese and to assist him in the payment of his taxes." To argue from such a position is immediately to suggest a number of corrective steps. As Van Herwerden would solve the problems of the interior by increasing the number of European officials, so Hasselman would correct the grievances now admitted by ending the country's old custom of unpaid pantjen-services and by more direct intervention

---

into the life of the dessa. Among other things, he suggested that the redivision of dessa ground cease to be a yearly phenomenon. He wished to see a native family occupy the same land for a five year period. Hasselman believed that such a step would gradually accustom the natives to the concepts of private property.  

A not entirely satisfactory attempt at a synthesis of Conservative arguments was made by another prolific Colonial apologist, C. H. F. Riesz, late in 1860. He wrote fully under the impact of Max Havelaar. Acknowledging Dekker's book as a Liberal weapon, he attempted to vitiate its affect by emphasizing the defiant closing pages and by noting carefully that an unspecified member of the Second Chamber (i.e., Van Hoevell) had highly commended this work. By implication, some unholy alliance existed, in his mind, between the revolutionary Dekker who would start insurrection among the Javanese and the superficially more calm and disinterested Liberal spokesman in the States-General.

Riesz argued that two central problems demanded immediate solution. First, the arbitrary powers of the nobles, which led to abuse, must be checked, but, at the same time, the shortage, of colonial officials in the interior needed attention, for their inadequate numbers made

21 Ibid., pp. 38-39; 44-45.

such supervision, as did exist, inadequate. Bending over
backwards, Riesz combined the theme derived from Van
Hoevell's discussion of Max Havelaar the preceding month
(October 1860), with the central theme of Van Herwerden's
pamphlet written approximately at the same time. He be­
lieved that the correction of both of these failings was
equally important to defenders of free enterprise and to
defenders of the government system of obligatory cultures.23

This was the nature of the dialectic discourse
between the Liberal, industriously engaged in exploiting
the possibilities of his new battering-ram, and the colonial
apologist, far too dependent upon vague generalization, as
the last two months of Rochussen's rule in the colonial
department began. The arguments treated above figured
prominently in the next weeks. Nor were the representatives
in the Second Chamber so unprepared to participate in de­
liberations over colonial matters as in the eighteen­
fifties when Van Hoevell and Baud commenced their peda­
gogic activities. This, however, is not to say that the
great majority of the representatives in the Second
Chamber were specialists. Heemskerk Az was probably
speaking in behalf of many more representatives when he
referred to "the large number of us who are not armed with

23 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
special knowledge of the Indies and must derive it from elsewhere."^{24}

But the sources available for the enlightenment of Conservatives at this moment were considerably weaker than those of the Liberals, and the debates on colonial matters in the Second Chamber between 15 October and 14 December 1860 exposed the weakness of the Conservative standpoint to Conservatives and Liberals alike. The apologist's preoccupation with protecting the budgetary surpluses served merely to alienate large numbers of undecided moderates in Parliament. The sentimentality of Saidjah and Adinda employed by the Liberals, was winning converts for the reformers. A totally new phenomenon--unknown before May 1860--threw the majority on colonial issues to the Liberal side. In December, Rochussen was forced from office.

At the end of this period, Van Nispen van Sevenaer who, since May, had voted consistently with the Liberal-dominated majority, asked a rhetorical question, which defined the nature of the problems confronting the Dutch. In his words one can identify the programs for the Indies proposed by the extreme right and left, coupled with an expression of the ethical quandary in which the uncertain moderates found themselves.

^{24}Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 77.
A most delicate question has arisen, which is of the greatest importance for the Fatherland; that question is: can the profits gained during so many years out of the Indies by means of the system of obligatory government cultures remain secure for the Fatherland, without placing burdens upon the native population which should never have been placed upon them and which may no longer be allowed to exist? The question is: shall the struggle which is carried on inside and outside of this Chamber regarding the intent of the *Regeringsreglement* with respect to free enterprise, with respect to private parties who would like to become rich and if possible richer and richer - and on the other side with respect to that which can and must be done in accordance with the regulations to secure the Dutch state's interests, shall that struggle be satisfactorily resolved?  

Van Hoevell, at this moment the most emphatic and aggressive of Liberal spokesmen on the Indies, would have seen no fundamental conflict between the state's interests and the desires of free enterprisers to invest in the Indies. He most assuredly believed that the satisfactory resolution of Van Sevanaer's quandary within the program proposed by his party. And the last phase of the attack upon Rochussen in behalf of this party began on the first of October 1860 with a report by Van Hoevell, Duymaer van Twist and Van Nispen van Sevenaer to the Second Chamber.

The subject remained the arbitrary manner in which sugar concessions were granted by the government to Europeans in Java. The specific occasion was an investigation of a concession granted for an enterprise at Pangka early

---

in the preceding summer. Van Hoevell turned this report into an open attack upon the practice of making the emoluments paid the native chiefs proportionate to the value of the crops raised under their supervision. Such a procedure, he flatly declared, was nothing more than bribery and its intent was the destruction of free enterprise. The emoluments gave the native chiefs a vested interest in encouraging a form of agriculture that fundamentally was hostile to free enterprise. In all fairness, he continued, the application of emoluments should have been accompanied, in the spirit of Article 56 of the Regeringsreglement, by a regulation of free enterprise in the Indies on a legal basis.26

This subject of an alliance of unholy parts between the colonial administration and the native chiefs remained a preoccupation of the Second Chamber in yet a second report dated 24 October and presented by a five-man committee again including Van Hoevell. The spirit of Van Hoevell's

---

26 Verslag der Commissie belast met het onderzoek der stukken en mededelingen betreffende de regeling voor de gouvernements - suikercultuur op Java en de onderneming Pangka in het bijzonder, Bijlagen van het Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Zitting van den 1sten October 1860 (Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Staats-Courant), 1860-1861, p. 270. Hereafter referred to as Bijlagen. The statement that the "majority" disagreed with this argument definitely fixes Van Hoevell's authorship of this portion of the report. In a three-man committee, the legalistic Van Twist assuredly formed that majority of two with van Sevenaer.
polemics stood out obviously in the opening words of the fifth paragraph:

In more than one committee attention has been attracted, as a consequence of current literature, to the [question of] protection which according to article 55 of the government regulation, should be enjoyed by the native population, against arbitrariness no matter from what quarter. It was wondered whether the system that is followed with respect to the native chiefs, does not make it impossible for the Governor-General [to carry out] his obligation to protect the people?27

Here was a rhetorical question whose referent lay in Van Hoevell's critique of Max Havelaar in his Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie! Only days before, he had argued in his own periodical that Van Twist could not come to Havelaar's assistance at Lebak in accordance with Article 55 of the Regeringsreglement because his hands were bound by Article 69. Now, in a government report, Van Hoevell was again dealing in universals in accordance with his evaluation of Max Havelaar. He was attempting to point out an evil in the Indies not amenable to correction by personal, direct acts of intervention in any single district. Van Hoevell's solution? Rectification, simply because this was a problem of universal proportions in the Indies, could only be found in a body competent

to handle such universals, that is, in the States-General.

The impact of this Liberal agitation in which Max Havelaar played a role, left its traces on Rochussen long after the immediate battle had been concluded. As late as 6 March 1865, he would still refer "to the time, not in 1859, but . . . in 1860 when colonial politics were used as an instrument to fight the cabinet." And, on 15 October 1860 during the important Second Chamber debates on the report of 1 October and on the documents regarding the sugar concession granted at Pangka, Rochussen complained of the "daily repetitious false representations and malicious insinuations [made] outside of the Chamber." "My efforts, he continued, "are daily attacked in public, in the most vehement manner and my acts are censured in the most scornful way." Rochussen indicated beyond any shadow of a doubt that he understood full well the source to which Van Hoevell was referring in the October committee reports when he prepared his own ministerial memoire of response of 19 November 1860. As long as it was agreed that Article 69 of the colonial regulation must be obeyed, he argued, one

---

28 Verslag, Zitting van 19 September 1864 tot 16 September 1865, p. 545.
29 Ibid., Zitting van 15 September 1860 tot 3 September 1861, pp. 59-60.
could not allow any interference in the Regent's jurisdictional field or approve any act that would reduce the respect which the latter enjoyed in native eyes. Turning specifically to the Liberal's use of *Max Havelaar*, Rochussen was careful to avoid any statement which might give credence to the charge that the abuses deplored specifically at Lebak could be found universally throughout Java. Rochussen sought out specific causes, only locally applicable, to account for the mismanagement and abuse in Lebak. He wished to make the point that, in taking corrective disciplinary steps locally, the colonial administration had rendered obsolescent the complaints in *Max Havelaar*. This is the spirit in which Rochussen wrote in his ministerial memoire:

Where the administration has noted illegitimate utilization of the ground by the regents, it has not failed to put an end to it, nor are its eyes closed to extortion or other unlawful and punishable actions on the part of the native chiefs. From the government report covering [the year] 1856 it can already be ascertained, should one be willing to grant it a bit of attention, that complaints which were lodged with the administration regarding extortion and abuse of authority by several native chiefs in the district of Lebak, residency of Bantam, have been the subject of a deliberate investigation. And that this investigation has led as a consequence, for the regent, in whose behalf extenuating facts were advanced, to a severe reprimand and warning, and for the district chief, the village head and the constable [i.e., mantrig], who were involved in the affair, to discharge out of their offices.

Where more examples of such extortion, abuse of authority or punishable action of native chiefs have come to light, the colonial administration has even very recently repeatedly furnished proof [to the effect that] immoderate indulgence with respect
to the native chiefs is considered incompatible with the stipulations of the government regulation and with the population's rightful claim on protection.30

This passage occurred in the midst of a discussion of possible future general revision of wage levels for native chiefs. In this context, Rochussen's words gave the impression that he wished to declare himself open to suggestions on this subject from the membership of the Second Chamber, while simultaneously protecting himself from the imputation that he had been forced into such a declaration by the appearance of Max Havelaar.

In his general self-defense against the Liberals and against Max Havelaar, Rochussen had recourse to practically every weapon in the Conservative armament. In his self-defense during the 15 October debates on the sugar concession at Pangka, Rochussen adapted a comparatively mild stand emphasizing elements which had recently been employed by Hasselman and Riesz. The colonial system, he argued, was humanitarian in essence. The condition of the Javanese had continued to improve in the last years; the population increased continually and general welfare was good. The dual task before the Dutch was to retain the colonial system, free of excesses, and

30 Memorie van Beantwoording van het Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor het Ontwerp van Wet tot Vaststelling van Hoofdstuk XII der Begrooting van Staatsuitgaven voor het Dienstjaar 1861, 19 November 1860, Bijlagen, 1860-1861, p. 476.
to care for the best interests of the natives. While the nation was under obligation to the Europeans in the Indies, the first responsibility of the Dutch was "to the inhabitants of those extensive and beautiful territories."

We must administer them in behalf of the good [sic], encourage their welfare, and protect them as far as possible against all forms of oppression, no matter from what side and under what pretext. But we must leave to them the enjoyment of their ancient customs and the leadership of their own chiefs.31

To such arguments, Mijer, the later biographer of Baud, added the first of a series of apologetic accounts of the latter's career in the Indies. In his mind, the defense of the government's obligatory culture system stood or fell with one's approval or disapproval of the factors which led to Baud's decision to work diligently in behalf of an essentially undemocratic system. As a consequence of his own research into government archives, Mijer was convinced that Baud was essentially a moderate proponent of laisser-faire. However, he had realized that such a system was ill-suited to the conditions which had been found in the Indies in the earlier part of the nineteenth century.

As he had bowed to the unavoidable stubborn facts of native social structure, so Mijer expected recognition

31 Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 60.
of the unavoidable by the membership of the Second Chamber. Baud had said: "To a social reform under which each Javanese might become the owner of the rice field which he presently holds in simple usage or in long term lease, I would look forward with pleasure in the future." But, added Mijer, Baud had been convinced that this could not be accomplished in his time because of clear-cut facts: First, individual landownership, without which truly free enterprise is inconceivable, was unknown to the Javanese. Secondly, most if not all ground in Java was worked on a communal basis which destroyed the sense of individualism. For Baud, and by implication for the membership of the Second Chamber as well, there could be no alternative to a paternalistic authoritarian system with its concomitant restriction upon private western initiative and the injection of private western capital.32

Duymaer van Twist, though associated with the Liberals in the Second Chamber, lent his support to much that Mijer said. Perhaps none of the Liberals held Baud in such esteem as he. Back in 1851, when he learned of his likely appointment to the office of Governor-General, Van Twist entered into a series of discussions with Baud which lasted from 14 January through 16 February. He considered this man, more than Van den Bosch, to be the builder

32 Ibid., p. 73.
of the system of cultures and he consequently questioned him on every aspect of colonial life and on all phases of the Governor-General's responsibilities in the Indies.  

Van Twist had thereafter conscientiously implemented many of Baud's ideas during his five year tenure of office and, as recently as the May interpellation, he had reaffirmed his devotion to at least one of the central principles for which Baud had stood. On 10 May, he had told the Second Chamber:

Prior to my departure for the Indies, I spoke with no one over Indian affairs more than with [Baud], and because I was greatly attached to his word, I maintained every time notes on that which had been discussed and now I would be able to show you that there was one main point against which he warned above everything else; and that is: that one must attempt to resist as much as possible, the tendency to become involved in the economic life of the dessa. One can accomplish much in Java, he said, provided that one leaves the natives free in the organization of that affair. And although, I now have not always been able to agree with his ideas, the more I have seen of the affairs and conditions of the Indies, the more I have been convinced of the truth of his opinion in this respect.

However, by the end of 1860, Van Twist's position did more to weaken his own standing than to strengthen the Mijer argument. Sentiment gradually overpowered the pre-eminently rationalistic temper of the Second Chamber—among

34Verslag, Zitting van 19 September 1859 tot 6 September 1860, p. 651.
both Conservatives and Liberals. There was a tendency to reject the rationalistic Baud and to emphasize the sentimentalism which, in fact, could be found in the Van den Bosch report. But the tendency to cast doubt on Baud also involved the discrediting of Duymaer van Twist. The acclaim once uniformly granted him by Liberals had already been qualified by the outspoken stand adopted by Van Hoevell during the 25 September debates on the King's speech. By the end of the year, Van Twist stood in an even less favorable position.

But the ineffectiveness of Mijer's and Van Twist's arguments applied also to Rochussen's defense of the colonial system and the budgetary surpluses. One could no longer build political capital with the simple affirmation that the Dutch needed additional sources of revenue to pay for railways and water canals. Heemskerk Az, who voted with the Conservative minority after the debates of 15 and 16 October, probably gained no friends for his Conservative Party when he stated: "... it is indeed regrettable, that - to state the matter in terms of popular stereotypes - in order to loosen the fetters of Uncle Tom we must make Saidjah plough just that much harder; but such facts, even if they are not pleasant to hear, must still receive our attention."35

35Ibid., 1860-1861, p. 78.
Van Hoevell referred Finance Minister Van Hall to "Multatuli's" book, when Van Hall attempted to defend budgetary surpluses, and the Liberal majority was of no mind to tolerate Rochussen or Heemskerk when they used similar arguments. Both of the motions introduced into the Second Chamber during the debates on the Pangka sugar concessions were adopted by substantial majority. Together, they amounted to a more defiant vote of no confidence against Rochussen than the 11 May Wintgens Motion. The first of these motions reaffirmed the earlier resolution; it was adopted on 16 October with a vote of 40 against 20. The second motion specifically condemned Rochussen's settlement of the Pangka sugar concession during the preceding summer; it was passed on 17 October by a vote of 44 to 15.

The final critical debates ending Rochussen's tenure as Minister of Colonial Affairs occurred on 13 and 14 December. The defiant but frustrated Rochussen, in the light of the campaign which the Liberals were conducting under Van Hoevell's leadership, it is significant to note Rochussen's complaint in his speech of 13 December that people were attempting to belittle him. He openly declared his opposition to the whole idea of parliamentary reports by commissions and that, as if pointing a finger at Van Hoevell, he concluded that the unfriendly and impolite tone in the 24 October
reaffirmed the country's need for income from the Indies report "... was not to be attributed to the greater majority of the Second Chamber, but rather to the disposition of a few of its members." (Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 514.) But it was not only Rochussen who showed himself highly sensitive and possibly overwrought during these debates. This was also the case with Duymaer van Twist.

In a disjointed awkward statement which attested more to personal indignation than a will to expound and convince an audience, he uttered words which were simultaneously a personal credo and an apologetic defense of the principles by which he had acted as Governor-General. The restless defensive character of this speech of 14 December, which was probably delivered in an impulsive extemporaneous manner, may well be accounted for by the fact that about a month before Van Twist spoke, Dekker had allowed his letter to Duymaer van Twist written back in 1858 to appear in print. In October 1860, it had first appeared in a magazine De Tijdspeigeler and the following month it was republished by D. A. Thieme as a brochure with the title, *Indrukken van den Dag, medegedeeld door Multatuli No. 1.* Also, Dekker enjoyed at this time his most intimate relations with Van Hoevell himself.

While the principal theme of his speech was a defense of free enterprise against the charge of encouraging abuse, Duymaer van Twist found himself more concerned with defending the colonial administration's inability to hinder the continual reappearance of acts of abuse inside the framework of the government system. "Send out an inspector once, no friend of the system of obligatory culture, to seek out abuses in that system! I am convinced that he will turn housewards with a harvest richer than anyone might wish. But what have men done in all correctness with this system of obligatory cultures? They have been consistently preoccupied with reducing and hindering those misuses, in order to make that a better system and with such steps, people are busy up to the very moment."

What could be more natural than the fact that, in a country living in such uncultivated circumstances, abuses and extortions should appear. The emphasis, he argued, must be placed upon the amelioration which Dutch authority had brought and not upon the continuation of faults still uncorrected. And then turning to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, he asked a question, which was in fact no question at all. "Have abuses occurred, what has one done with respect to those who carry out those abuses? Have there been enterprisers, who entered into collusion with the
and launched into an attack upon the morality of free enterprise and the institutions associated with it in the interior of Java. Rochussen abandoned the milder approach of Hasselman and Riesz and turned to the stronger defense line implicit in Baud's arguments of the 1840's, but more recently associated with Fransen van de Putte, Salak and Herwerden. Rochussen had already refused to acknowledge any fundamental defect in the system of obligatory cultures. Now he insisted that there were on the other hand faults in the system of free enterprise, that the alternate arrangement defended by the Liberals was based upon "fundamental fallacies."

There was no means of controlling the free enterpriser's influence over the local dessa chiefs. Private enterprise based upon the bribery of such persons was in fact no "free enterprise." And the little man in the interior became the "... victim of the arbitrariness and avarice of the dessa chiefs and elders, who expropriate chiefs in order to cheat the people, to coerce, to steal? Have the guilty been punished? Will they be punished? Have steps been taken to prevent such abuses again in the future? I cannot believe that a person, having sought out such abuse with heartfelt satisfaction, would forget to punish those abuses and to work against them. There is certainly no one more desirous than I of maintaining in all severity a guard against misuses through their punishment with harshness; this is the greatest service which anyone can perform in behalf of the development of free industry." (Verslag, 1860-61, p. 520-521.)
the profits." Rochussen also accused the private enterpriser and speculator of employing opium to entice the childish natives into unfair labor contracts and of forming buyer monopolies in the interior to suppress the price level paid the natives.

"There you have it, gentlemen, a revelation drawn from official sources on the case for free cultivation and so-called "free enterprise." Touching once again upon the fifth paragraph of the Second Chamber's 24 October report, Rochussen asked: "And how can the native population possibly be protected under such circumstances against 'arbitrariness from any source,' [an obligation] which the Governor-General is to acknowledge as one of his most important duties according to Article 55 of the Regeringsreglement?"

Sentiment was coming to play an increasing role in the defensive apologetics of the right wing as can be seen in Rochussen's 14 December speech but in 1860, the use of such means by men long associated with the defense of the colonial status quo seemed unnatural. It was a tactic which the Conservative adopted under pressure. And the Second Chamber condemned this approach by rejecting Rochussen's colonial budget by a majority of 41 against

---

38Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 528.
39Ibid., p. 529.
In December 1860, the use of sentiment seemed more natural in the rhetorical onslaught of the Liberals. The Conservative party in the process of formation, had yet not come to realize that their most important source of sentimentality would lay in Dekker's work.
CHAPTER VI

THE LIBERAL CHANGE OF HEART I: A RUDE AWAKENING AT HOME

On 15 May, Dekker wrote to his publisher, J. de Ruyter, that he had received three copies of Max Havelaar. He immediately cocked his ear awaiting the explosion from the city which Van Lennep had once called a "powder cask." The reverberations seemingly failed to reach as far as Brussels. Dekker besought his acquaintances in the Netherlands to keep him posted on developments. Still no word! His anxiety that something might have gone wrong provided an irrepressible urge for a trip to the Netherlands.

Dekker returned to the Netherlands in early June 1860 and was temporarily relieved of apprehension. Attention was lavished upon him from all sides. An autocrat who stood politically to the far right, Dekker found himself unexpectedly at the forefront of a Liberal onslaught against Minister Rochussen. By the end of August, he had agreed to write for the Nederlandsche Spectator, for De Tijdschijlgen, and for the Rotterdam bookdealer Nygh, associated with the highly reputed Liberal newspaper, the Nieuwe Archief, Van Lennep, Document No. 48.
Rotterdamsche Courant. And, when the Arnhem bookdealer, Thieme, visited him at the end of the month, he was assured that it was his own fault that he was still in debt to so many persons. "There is not a single publisher," he was told, "who would not reckon it an honor to give you money. You have a treasure in your pen . . . . I would that I could but publish your private letters!" And from England, word came that an English language edition of Max Havelaar was under consideration. In the middle of September, he was requested to prepare new notes and appendices for the English translations of his book. "In generous England," he was informed, "you'll find open hearts for your person and your sake!"

Again Gerard Keller, writing early in September, had named "Multatuli" the hero of the day. "De Gids is outspoken in his praise; De Tijdspiegel has taken his side and challenges the retired colonial officials before the bar of public opinion; the Spectator, through its satire, champions his cause against egotism and narrow-minded selfishness and the cant of so many, who are chastised in the Max Havelaar." Only a few newspapers, Keller continued, attempted to reject him and they were exclusively of a Conservative temper and followed the line of the 's

3Ibid., pp. 115-116.
Gravenhagsche Nieuwsbode. Only such newspapers, dominated by reactionaries, attempted through scandal and slander to weaken the impact occasioned by "Multatuli's" work.4

Here indeed was enough to make Dekker believe that it was the Liberals to whom he should turn for support. Yet, in the very first weeks when his book had begun its incursion into the conscience of the Dutch citizenry, Dekker had reaffirmed his colonial profession of faith in a letter to Van Lennep. Writing from Brussels on 23 May, he had expressed dismay with his brother's reaction to Max Havelaar. He and his like, Dekker had written, believe that I can keep on writing. "... if only people keep me supplied with scandalous subject matter, and that [under such circumstances] I would continuously attack the government a tort et a travers.

Look once, as an example at my brother who gives as his reason ... the fact that he, Jan D. D., dislikes the government! - As a matter of fact, in the matters which have given him occasion for dissatisfaction (he, the concessionaire, the tobacco planter), I am seven eights on the side of the authorities."5

Like all businessmen, Dekker continued, his brother Jan was for or against something, depending upon his personal vested interests in it. "My brother would like to

4Java Bode, Wednesday 24 October, 1860. No. 85.
5Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 51.
have me press for the matter of free enterprise. I am in favor of free enterprise, but I am against the enforcement of free enterprise, for that is in truth nothing but oppression." These words were followed by a passage which could have been written by a Van Herwerden or a Salak and which reminds one of the charges made by Fransen van de Putte against Duymaer van Twist in his 1860 pamphlet. But

6This is a remarkable confirmation of the interpretation assigned to a remark which Dekker had jotted down in his notes at Lebak back in 1856. In April, 1856, Dekker had written: "The only manner in which to arrive at free enterprise is labor by coercion and the legitimation of that coercion by equitable remuneration." (Volledigen Werke, IX, p. 601) In an earlier chapter, it was concluded that Dekker meant by "labor by coercion," the maintenance of the system of obligatory government cultures. In the passage quoted above, in the main text, Dekker was adding that it was pointless to introduce a new coercive system, whose consequences might be more undesirable than those associated with the coercive government labor system. His solution was: keep the old system which has much that is commendable in it and legitimize it "by equitable remuneration." cf. Chapter II, p. 37. But this was precisely the position which almost any "Conservative Reactionaire" could accept.

7In this letter to Van Lennep of 23 May Dekker wrote these highly significant words: I could give you the details in chapter and verse [on what happened] where the existence of free enterprise made great profits for . . . the resident, who was a silent partner in the deals which produced such good results, Duymaer van Twist, who actually doesn't know night from day, bases his opinion in the question of free enterprise, mainly on the attitude of such a resident."

The reference here, as in Fransen van der Putte's 1860 pamphlet, is unmistakably to De Perez, who did serve as the resident at Soerabaja from 1856 to 1859. He was largely responsible for vigorous efforts to introduce private enterprise into the Indies from his later office in the Council of the Indies. Cf. Zwart, op. cit., p. 156. Dekker continued his letter to Van Lennep:
then relenting, Dekker closed his letter in the
spirit of a Hasselman or Riesz:

My profession of faith in colonial matters boils
down to the proposition that for the moment the
question is not so much: what must be determined?
What system is the best? But rather: what factual
condition actually exists - how do things really
occur?

The East Indies housekeeping is in a state of decay,
not as a result of bad laws, but as a consequence of
faulty implementation. Everything is dominated by a
spirit of — my God, all one has to do is look in my
book!

Many people did look into Dekker's book, but they
failed to see in its pages what Dekker considered to be
self-evident. He argued that there must be a change in
the level of morality within the colonial administration,
a change which could best be affected through the appoint­
ment of a different kind of individual to policy-making
offices. Dekker did not seek change through parliamentary
action or through cooperation with a Liberal majority.

"Knowing such a thing - knowing that free enterprise was
synonomous with oppression - knowing that that whole tale
of intrigue formed a single affair, my brother would now
demand from me that I attack the authorities where they
refuse to encourage free enterprise - or better said, where
they refuse to order the enforcement of it. If one turns
that affair over to the local authorities in the various
residencies of Java, then there will be greater or lesser
amounts of free enterprise in any given residency, de­
pending on the extent of vested interests which the exe­
cuting officers have in the matter. It's sinful, but it
is true!"

8 Archief, Van Lennep, Document No. 51.
The period from June until Dekker returned to Brussels in December 1860 presents the analyst with a second opportunity to study his capacities for political action. Much that he now did was repetitious. The attitudes and techniques which he employed earlier reappear without substantial alteration. The important distinction between the two periods lies in the fact that he now played his game against a Dutch national background instead of within an exclusive group. Also of significance now, was his effort to achieve his egocentric ends through association with Liberals.

There were two obvious reasons for this temporary rapprochement with the left wing. First, Liberals' applause for *Max Havelaar* easily attracted Dekker. Since he still was not thinking in terms of the current political scene, despite his fiasco in Amsterdam in the end of 1859, he allowed several contemporaries to strongly influence him. For the moment, neither of the parties involved appreciated the fundamental dissimilarities in their respective *Weltanschauung*. But there was another factor involved. Dekker's alienation from Van Lennep reached the breaking point toward the end of this period. Their personal estrangement would mean Dekker's loss of important connections with the Amsterdam Conservatives. He sought to counterbalance this disadvantage by turning to Van Lennep's political opponents. Most assuredly no master of
his own fate, Dekker started up the wrong road. He regained his sense of direction only in early 1861.

By December, at the latest, the Liberals were fully alive to the fact that Dekker did not belong in their ranks. An open letter which he wrote to the voters at Tiel was important in establishing this fact. His publication of the 1858 letter to Van Twist as a pamphlet, slightly earlier, also indicated that he was no Liberal. But of greater importance was the derogatory judgment of Max Havelaar made by the 'colonial radicals' in Batavia. The newspapers carrying this critique arrived in the Netherlands about December 1860. Contemporary sources showed a rapid decline in the Liberals' interest in Dekker during the following weeks.

Dekker first met the directors of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant after his return to the Netherlands. Nygh, an editor who was a bookdealer as well, wanted to know whether sufficient copies of Max Havelaar had been sent to the Indies. Tels, the editor-in-chief of this newspaper, told Dekker that the effect of his book was "such as no book ever had had in Holland."9

Shortly after the middle of June 1860, Dekker went on to Amsterdam. He renewed acquaintance with Tijdeman, Van Hasselt and Van Lennep. De Bull, he wrote to "Tine,"

9Brieven, IV, p. 67.
had warned him "against the clique of Rotterdammers, just as the Rotterdammers warned me against Amsterdammers."

Dekker's resolution of such factional strife in the formula: "I think that they are both correct when they call each other names, displayed the same arrogance and ill-comprehension which reduced his political strategy to desultory sniping in late 1859.

But Dekker could not devote himself fully to the enjoyment of his newly-won renown, for he lived in debt and poverty, a fact whose consequences were more stark and debilitating in the Netherlands of the eighteen-sixties than to-day. To be without means was to make oneself socially unacceptable among the clannish upper class where wealth was equated with decency and poverty was synonymous with personal deficiency. Van Lennep had been broad-minded enough to rise above the endemic exclusiveness of the propertied bourgeoisie but Hartsen, for example, had considerably greater difficulty in doing so.

In the past, Dekker had depended upon his brother's magnanimity to meet his most pressing needs. But the implicit subordination of such a relationship went against Dekker's grain and played its part in his alienation from Jan. Dekker had turned to the gambling table repeatedly in seeking a way out. In July 1860, he had recourse to games of chance once more. Now he hoped to acquire from
this source the funds necessary to move easily in the Netherlands. But like his earlier ventures, this one proved totally unsuccessful.

In the middle of July, Dekker threw himself emotionally into the defense of the cause of the French poet, Barbier, who had supposedly been banished from his homeland. A man who used this name had first turned to Jakob van Lennep who, in turn, requested Dekker, then in Rotterdam, to assist his fellow writer. Dekker responded by announcing that he would put on a benefit performance for the expelled poet before the citizenry of Rotterdam who, according to Gerard Keller's account in the *Java Bode*, "were quite taken with his book just like everyone else of cultivation and taste in the Netherlands." Then suddenly evidence suggested that the French poet was an impostor.

The Hague poet, Boggaers, informed Van Lennep and he, in turn, Dekker. Nevertheless, "Multatuli" appeared before the Rotterdammers, recited to them the famed odes to freedom by Auguste Barbier, and petitioned them to make a collection in the poet's behalf. "But the businessmen of Rotterdam asked each other who that might be? Should they wish to give something, then Barbier was now in Baden - and Bonsoir la compagnie." To the best of his knowledge, wrote Keller, "no one as yet has sent anything off to Baden." He regretted that "Multatuli, without knowing or wishing,
has become once more the victim of his good heart, and has provided oil to those who are firing the stove in which they are attempting to reduce his character to cinders.\textsuperscript{10} July was also the month when the first part of Veth's \textit{Max Havelaar} critique appeared in \textit{De Gids}. It intensified contact between Dekker and the Liberals. At the beginning of the month, Dekker wrote his wife excitedly: "\textit{De Gids} appeared today, and it is tremendous, I have no words with which to express how wonderful! I wouldn't give up that review for Fl. 1000! That review is my guarantee that I shall win my affair. . . . After that critique no one would dare abandon me."\textsuperscript{11} Within the month, Dekker had established personal acquaintance with Veth. But he had also introduced himself to the editorial board of \textit{De Indier}. From a political point of view, the association now established with the editors of \textit{De Indier}, Van Soest and Bekking was more important.

The contact with Van Soest and Bekking followed an exchange of letters between Dekker and a newly-won devotee, an elderly gentleman named Halberstadt. The latter was in no position to advance Dekker's cause directly, but his opinions seemingly carried considerable weight among \textit{De

\textsuperscript{10}[Gerard Keller], "Nederland," \textit{Java Bode}, Wednesday, 29 August 1860, No. 69.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Brieven}, IV, pp. 80-81.
Indier group in The Hague.\textsuperscript{12} In early August, Halberstadt informed Dekker that Van Soest and Bekking intended to provide him and his family with a dwelling in The Hague. Bekking confirmed this fact in a letter the following week.\textsuperscript{13} However, Dekker's response was one of suspicion rather than of pleasure. Was a scheme under way to subordinate his interests and his goal of membership in the Council of the Indies to the will of a political combination which he could not dominate?

Rather than provide them with a furnished flat in The Hague, the simplest help, he assured his wife, "would be to send me through the mail anonymously a few thousand guilder notes. What is the meaning of that providence, that organization, that searching out of a place of residence for me, that business of being together with you?"

Dekker was fully alive to the possible political consequence of an arrangement to work with De Indier. This was clear in his following words: "Still something else, in The Hague I would (and indeed that is my intention) hurt the Ministry, but suppose now that there were among the participants in the [planned] assistance, people who have such dissimilar ideas that we would come into conflict with

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 80.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 87.
one another; what an unpleasant relationship that would cause."\textsuperscript{14}

Dekker's instinctive apprehension of Bekking figured importantly in a letter of early August to his wife: "Just think once of Bekking, of [the issue of] free enterprise, of the tobacco concession etc.; that they do not comprehend, this is terrible."\textsuperscript{15} Halberstadt had assured him that he would be intellectually free and Dekker presumed that this assertion was made in all sincerity. Still, he was apprehensive. "Will the independence which I feel so necessary for myself really exist even with their assurances? I doubt it."\textsuperscript{16}

Dekker's attraction to, and eventual repellance from, the Liberals is perfectly mirrored in his relations with his brother, "the concessionaire, the tobacco planter," against whom he had declared himself in May to be "seven eights on the side of the authorities."\textsuperscript{17} In June, Dekker noted his brother's profound pessimism for the future of his independent enterprise at Bodjonegoro. "Private cultivation," Jan told his brother, "is at the moment almost

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 85-86.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 80.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 51.
dead." Only after the removal of Rochussen from the government, he continued, could there be any improvement. But Jan's hopes for private enterprise improved in August when Bekking requested Dekker to write for the September issue of Van Hoevell's *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie.* In the middle of August, Dekker could inform his wife: "Jan has interested himself very much of late in me and my affair. He has been warmed up now by other people." Bekking, in his August letter, informed Dekker that Van Hoevell "occupied a first place among the admirers of your brilliant talent." Dekker replied that he was preparing a copy of his 1858 letter to Van Twist for publication. Almost immediately, he received a second letter in which Bekking insisted that not Van Twist, but Rochussen, should be attacked. "He must be the anvil upon which you hammer." Here was confirmation of the suspicions in Dekker's mind. He evaluated Bekking's second letter as an attempt to reduce him to the status of slave. It did not occur to

18 *Brieven,* IV, p. 78.
Dekker that Bekking might well have misunderstood the goals for which he was working. Totally egocentric in his evaluation of the political scene, he interpreted Bekking's words as a devilish temptation: "And then that Bekking suddenly pops up, throws off his masks, and declares straight away that the help is conditional on collaboration with his party, that is [with] the tobacco contractors!—That is why they did not give me assistance at once. I had first to find myself in real necessity, so that I would capitulate from hunger. It is frightful." But Jan, too, must have known about this intrigue; indeed he may have been one of the originators of the scheme. In exasperation, Dekker suggests, as his next appropriate step, a letter to his brother in which he would attempt to explain to the latter "that I can serve no party. If the party to which Thorbecke, Bekking, D. van Twist and Van Hoevell are dedicated, defends goodness, then they must support me and not the other way around."  

23It should be noted in this context that Bekking and Jan Dekker were fairly intimately acquainted. This fact is born out by several references in Eduard Dekker's letters in the summer and fall of 1860. Bekking had last served as the Resident of Rembang and it was in this Residency that Jan had directed the independent tobacco enterprise at Bodjonegoro. Bekking was released from the colonial service in 1861, on charges of complicity in encouraging just such enterprises at the cost of the government's cultures. It is also a matter of note that, in a pamphlet which Bekking published in 1861, he singled out the person of Jan Douwes Dekker for particular attention. (H. C. Bekking, De Ontwikkeling der Residency Rembang (Rotterdam: Nygh, 1861), cf. pp. 69, 80.)  

24Brieven, IV, pp. 89-90.
But the negotiations with De Indier were not broken off. Dekker made a trip to The Hague in the middle of August and conversed at length with both Bekking and Van Soest. "In The Hague," he wrote, "they now understand that I need freedom; I have told it to them! That I assure you, and they looked up as if petrified." Even Bekking, we are told, when he had seen the piece about Van Twist, which Dekker had desired to publish in the Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, "seemed as if prepared to sacrifice up his friend D. v. T. in order to have the pleasure of seeing what I wrote printed. Van Soest tore a letter that I wrote for the Tijdspeigel out of my hands (for use in the Indier)."25 The arrangement, as finally made, provided that Dekker would come to The Hague and live on one thousand guilders which he borrowed from the publisher Veenstra. It was understood that he would pay it back in written work during the next weeks.

Dekker was flattered by Veenstra's trust but he was likewise compelled to enter into some financial arrangement by dire necessity.

His wife and children back in Brussels were having much trouble in meeting current expenses. The only significant source of income continued to be brother Jan. This financial dependence probably hardened Dekker's

25Ibid., p. 91.
natural hostility towards one whom he was inclined to dislike as a free enterpriser. Friendly relations could be maintained with the editors of the *Indier*, despite the fact that Dekker did not enter their services. Peace could not be maintained between the brothers, however, once the agreement with Veenstra was made. The ultimate break with everything Liberal was foreshadowed by Dekker's severance of all relations with his brother in late August. During an argument with Jan in a restaurant in the presence of Veenstra, Jan chided him for not entering into an accord of the nature proposed by Bekking. Dekker in indignation rose from the table and departed in anger. "I want nothing more to do with him and I forbid him to intervene any further in my affairs. Out!"  

It was not political tact but pathetic anxiety that the Lebak affair might simply become an instrument for the advancement of a political party and get out of his own keeping which dominated Dekker's next steps. The same attitude which had led him to attempt to publish concurrently in a Liberal and a Conservative newspaper and which had led him to the ludicrous step of distributing handbills to the voters in Amsterdam, now led Dekker to new steps of like design. In response to a letter by the Dutch Reformed

---

minister Franken, which was published in De Tijdspeigel, Dekker also wrote a brief piece for the same periodical during the last week of August. In the course of a few lines, Dekker attacked Rochussen, Van Twist and Dutch missionary work among the Javanese in succession. His motivation was again to proclaim his nonconformity to any specific political group and his independence from any religious faith. To the Minister of Colonial Affairs he declared: "Either have one of your fabricators of reading matter prove that I am a liar— or resign and make place for another who will oppose and defeat, or agree and improve." And, to the retired Governor-General, Dekker declared: "Take up my challenge— or admit your guilt and try to your capacity to correct that which has been ruined by that guilt." For all Christians he wrote into this bombastic article:

And if I believed . . . oh do you think I would occupy myself with making books, with ministers of colonial affairs, with Wawelaars-caricatures and such nonsense? No, I would go to Insulinde, where millions have need of the knowledge of the omnipotent. Yes, thither I should go, where every palm tree murmurs a prayer, where the flowers offer up incense, where the entirety of nature is a single temple - a temple full of splendor and majesty which reverberates the name of Jehova - with the names of those who cannot dwell within structures made of human hand. . . But that is poetry - that is for me: lies - for I cannot comprehend Him, neither in a temple nor in nature nor in a dogma.27

The net effect of Dekker's condemnation of Van Twist and Rochussen was slight. The Liberals were accustomed to Dekker's displeasure with Van Twist. The Conservatives already believed that "Multatuli" was against them. But the public proclamation of Dekker's atheism did have lasting significance. Though he had poked fun at Protestantism in *Max Havelaar*, Van Lennep, who prepared the manuscript for the printer, had expurgated the most offensive passage. In any case, there was no open declaration against the Church in *Max Havelaar*.

Now the Dutch Protestant and the Anti-Revolutionary party were faced with the paradox that "Multatuli," who championed the cause of the little man in the Indies, opposed the church in the Netherlands and its missionary work. Already the pious looked with suspicion on Van Hoevell. Suddenly the very man whom he had championed in the Second Chamber in September, declared his atheism. Seemingly, Pietism at home necessitated Conservatism in colonial politics. This meant further that Mackay's efforts in September to find a rallying point for Anti-Revolutionaires and Liberals in "Multatuli's" indictment of colonial practices was predestined to failure.

Nor may one belittle the attention given to Dekker's response to Franken. 28 A veritable army of Protestant

---

28 Not only was Dekker's proclamation of his disbelief well-publicized in the Netherlands but it was also made
ministers lavished attention on him. In September, he was visited by ministers from The Hague, Rotterdam, Arnhem, Zwolle, Kampen and Harlingen. He established close relations with two of them from Amsterdam, De Keyser and Stemberg. He was flattered by their attention and he characteristically believed that he had won the support of the pious and could depend upon them in political campaigns. But Dekker refused to accept conversion from any of these ministers. The consequence? Far from having gained their personal loyalty he had made impossible a cooperative effort on a political level which could have had profound results in the Dutch nation. He hurt not only himself, but also the cause of the Liberals and the Javanese.

His anxiety to maintain the initiative, which in the case of the Dutch Protestants cost him much of his initial favorable reception, also led Dekker in August to enter into a more rash and less tactful strategy. Through his wife in Brussels, Dekker ordered from a Belgium quickly known in the Indies. The entirety of Franken's letter and Dekker's reply to it, were published in the Java Bode, Wednesday 10 October 1860, No. 81

29 Brieven, IV, pp. 108-109; 110.

Dekker wrote his wife in early September: "The Christians absolutely want me to belong to them. You shall see that they will vote for me, if it should come to a question of electioneering." (Bri Even, IV, p. 105).
photographer five hundred lithographic reproductions of himself which he planned to use in a fund-raising campaign. The bookdealer Thieme in Arnhem and Nijgh in Rotterdam were to attempt to sell them. Both men expressed disapproval of the idea. They anticipated little success. They were correct. None of the pictures were sold. Dekker created an unnecessary debt in Brussels and suffered a personal blow to his vanity.  

Yet more examples are evident of this anxiety lest he be associated with one or another group in the late summer and early fall of 1860. He refused to accept what he called "partial assistance," meaning help which might be construed as obligating him to some clique or political faction. For the same reason, he consistently refused to make a lecture tour through the Netherlands. He did not wish to find himself in a situation in which he would be sponsored by a group of Liberals. On the other hand, he was greatly attracted to the idea of a national subscription campaign in his behalf. And such a scheme did receive serious attention from several quarters as early as June


32 Brieven, IV, p. 114.

33 Dekker made one exception and agreed to give a lecture in Arnhem for one hundred guilders. His sole motivation was financial embarrassment. (Brieven, IV, p. 121).
1860. Among others, the editors of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant were interested. When Dekker finally departed from the Netherlands in December, a commission, charged with this task, had actually been formed. For him, such an organization and such a campaign was a substitute for his failure to dominate politically.

It was hard to cooperate with so egocentric a personality, yet the magnetism of his book continued to exercise great attraction upon both Veth and Van Hoevell through September and October. Veth, indeed, in December 1860, became a member of the committee charged with the raising of a national subscription in "Multatuli's" behalf. Dekker first met Veth personally early in August. He visited Veth frequently at tea-time thereafter. Dekker first met the more important Van Hoevell in the beginning of September.

Supposedly Van Hoevell made a special trip to Amsterdam expressly for the purpose of meeting him. In any case, Van Hoevell made a strong impression. "Van Hoevell wants to have me in The Hague. It's the old story. They will help me, provided I join the opposition."\(^{34}\) Despite the flippancy of the remark, the attraction between these two men was stronger than might have been anticipated at first. Dekker was excited by Van Hoevell's defense of his book in Parliament on 25 September. Van Hoevell, in turn,

\(^{34}\) _Brieven_, IV, p. 107.
wrote what was ultimately the most personal and intimate critique of *Max Havelaar*. The essay in his *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, while perhaps less flattering than Veth's article, was more obviously directed specifically to the person of Dekker himself. The defense of Van Twist in his critique was no abstract statement of principles. Van Hoevell was making a sincere and personal appeal to the author in words which may very well have been a restatement of what Van Hoevell said directly to Dekker during their intimate conversations.\(^\text{35}\)

Personal factors necessarily played a more important role in the formulation of Van Hoevell's review than was the case with Veth's. Veth had known little or nothing of Dekker when he wrote. He specifically stated this in his article in *De Gids*. But Van Hoevell wrote his critique only several weeks after making Dekker's acquaintance. He had already read the letter to Preacher Franken. He knew

\(^{35}\)In his later private correspondence, Dekker frequently charged that Van Hoevell had served as Van Twist's personal agent and that he had sought to make a gentlemen's agreement under which Dekker would agree to cease his literary attacks upon the former Governor-General. (Cf. eg. G. F. Funke (ed.) *Briefwisseling tussen Multatuli en G. E. Funke* (Amsterdam, Wereldbibliothek N. V., 1947), p. 131. Dekker to Funke from Wiesbaden, 10 November 1873) While it is altogether unlikely that Van Hoevell would have played the role of Van Twist's lackey, one may gain some hint of the kind of conversation that passed between these two men during their period of personal acquaintance from the above letter. It is quite possible that Van Hoevell did plead with Dekker in behalf of the former Governor-General.
Bekking and Van Soest well. He had been kept abreast of developments by the latter two men and by other persons as well. He knew that Dekker spoke constantly of his need for independence. He was acquainted with Bekking's failure to acquire essays from him on the Conservative faction, conceived in the fashion in which a doctrinaire Liberal or a colonial Radical was expected to write. Possibly Van Hoevell had read Dekker's letter to Van Twist. If not, he had assuredly been told about it. He probably knew that it was about to be printed in the Tijdspeigel and published as a brochure by D. A. Thieme in Arnhem.

These factors explain the strong personal tone in Van Hoevell's critique of Max Havelaar. This article necessarily reflected such intimacy as existed between the two men. Thus Van Hoevell could write for Dekker's eyes:

> We also, like MULTATULI [sic], have our grievance in private against officials, Governors-General and Ministers. But insofar as they have only grieved and mistreated us personally, no vote of them is made in the fight; only when they, by their word or actions, continue to prop up and defend the revulsive system, do they become our opponents. In this respect, also we hope to have in MULTATULI a compatriot.36

If Dekker was unable to respond to Van Hoevell's near classic expression of Liberal fair-play in a fashion agreeable to the former, he was nevertheless attracted to both

36"De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXII (October, 1860), p. 267.
of his reviewers for another very pragmatic reason. These two men were prepared to take steps in his support against Van Lennep's manner of distributing *Max Havelaar*. The zenith of Dekker's attraction to the Liberals as an asset came at the same time that he openly broke with the Amsterdam Conservatives about Van Lennep. But cooperation with Veth and Van Hoevell did not mean Dekker's application for membership in the Liberal party. This was evidenced first of all by Dekker's break with his own brother which antedated the newer development by about six weeks, and secondly by his refusal to enter into collaboration with the editors of *De Indier*.

Anxious to provoke a movement among the Dutch people, Dekker had desired wide distribution of his book in the form of a popular edition; anxious to play an influential role in the Indies, he had wished several hundred copies of *Max Havelaar* to be sent there. But neither of these conditions was met by Van Lennep who held title to the book. In the Netherland, the work was made inaccessible to the masses by its high price and luxury format; in the Indies it was not obtainable because the publisher, De Ruyter, originally sent only thirty copies.37

---

37 *Brieven*, IV, p. 199.
Dekker's anxiety that the "powder cask" explode is evident enough in his letters to Van Lennep while still in Brussels. Within two weeks after the appearance of his book he complained: "That lethargic silence frustrates me. If I were in the Netherlands, I would try to bring an end to that silence. And I know how I could do it--even if as an example: by publishing my two letters to the King."38 And in a note of early June, Dekker exploded: "I want to go to the Netherlands. I shall leave neither the king nor the Ministry nor the Chamber in peace.... I shall see to the announcement of my book!.... A national subscription must be opened to pay for the debts of Max Havelaar. I shall make my children into Frenchmen or Englishmen."39 I have already sacrificed my wife and children to my devotion to duty and I can see no wrong in others now also being sacrificed."40 And, once in the Netherlands, Dekker was speaking to Van Lennep of his will ".... to make Indie free (with our without a change in flag)."41

To these insurrectionary statements, Van Lennep responded with awe and trembling. As in the earliest stage

---

38 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 51.
39 Brieven, IV, pp. 148-149.
40 D. M.F. Van Lennep, op. cit., p. 171.
41 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 59.
of their relationship, Van Lennep still took Dekker and Dekker's potential as a revolutionary altogether seriously.

I have - and with a warm heart - desired to put you in a position to be united during six months with your wife and children in order to live purposefully; and of this act I shall never have regret; - I have likewise done everything possible to make your complaints and objections public knowledge; and I have just as few regrets of that; but I shall never expend a single cent in making myself an accomplice in an action which I would have to reject, and you know quite well that I have not intended my acheronta Novebo in that sense. It is true, you have warned honestly that having sacrificed up your wife and children to your devotion to duty, you feel no hesitation to offer up others as well; but I have also a wife and children, and I have sworn to no oath to protect the Javanese, and I have renonce to being sacrificed, without even knowing how. I am not easily frightened, but if one asks me to be his second in a duel, then I should at least learn whether he will fight with pistol or sword, or rather with knives and fists.

Do not believe that I do not understand and excuse your sorrowness, your disappointment, your desire to come here even if perhaps you do not know what you would do. Yes, in your position I perhaps might act likewise; but this does not yet prove that I consequently may approve it. Not even a Javanese can demand that you do more than you have done; having once exhausted all methods in their behalf, you are in my opinion now obliged to redress your obligations to your own.  

These were clearly the words of a man who really did consider Amsterdam to be a "powder cask" as he had informed Rochussen in December 1859. At the same time, these words are a confirmation of the consistency and uniformity of Van Lennep's attitude towards "Multatuli." But this was no

---

42 M. F. van Lennep, op. cit., pp. 171-172.
solace for Dekker, not an explanation for why so very few copies of Max Havelaar were sent to the Indies. The Rotterdam bookdealer Nijgh made Dekker particularly conscious of this point. "Yes," he was told, "if this had been my business I would have sent 1,000 copies to the East."^43 In August, Nijgh sent a clipping from the Bataviaasch Handelsblad to Dekker which stated:

Every one speaks of Max Havelaar [here in Batavia] and no one has read the book because the Dutch booksellers sent us nothing but the brochure from the recently appointed Consul at Leipzig, whom no one comprehends? But I am mistaken..... a single copy of the Max Havelaar lies in the [club] Harmonie, but someone always has it in his hand, and we consequently shall have to reserve our judgment for a later occasion.^44

"I am infuriated with De Ruyter!" Dekker expounded to his wife. Dekker was further antagonized by the manner in which Van Lennep expurgated and altered the text of Max Havelaar beyond a point which he was prepared to accept. In response to his protest, Van Lennep replied: "He who buys a house has the right to rebuild it without consulting the seller."^45

^43 Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 59.
^44 Brieven, IV, p. 104.
^45 Ibid., p. 124. The expurgations and alterations in the first edition of the Max Havelaar can be divided into four groups: (1) those which suppressed the use of specific person's names in order to avoid the "positivism" which gave the book, as Van Lennep had written, "too much the sense of a factual history" (D. M. F. Van Lennep, op. cit., p. 155.), (2) those which treated religious matters
But the same month saw the rapid deterioration of relations between Dekker and his editor witnessed the high

in a derogatory manner in conjunction with the figures of Droogstoppel and Wawelaar, (3) those passages which dealt with the narration of events in Dekker's life in Sumatra and at Lebak, (4) the last pages of the book where Van Lennep made a single deletion in a passage where Dekker characterized various types of readers.

Most important in the first group of deletions and alterations is Van Lennep's suppression of those remarks in the account of Governor Michiels which named Governor-General Merkus and gave the impression that he was Michiels' opponent and, by implication, Dekker's champion. Where Dekker had written that the Governor-General Merkus finally ordered him [i.e. Michiels] to let me depart for Batavia," (Volledige Werken, I, p. 167.) Van Lennep altered the passage to read that Michiels "finally received an order from his own superiors..." to let Havelaar depart. (G. Stuiveling, "Verantwoording," Volledige Werken, I, p. 531. Hereafter referred to as "Verantwoording.")

In the same manner, Van Lennep suppressed the use of Merkus' name in Dekker's commentary on the objections raised by the central administration to Michiel's campaigns in Mandailing and the Batak lands prior to Havelaar's arrival on the West Coast of Sumatra. Dekker had written of the time "when a government commissioner arrived in Sumatra, it was Mr. Merkus, who considered this expansion of Dutch territory purposeless..." Van Lennep, while keeping the sentence, removed from it the phrase underlined above. ("Verantwoording," p. 532, reference passage in same volume p. 176.) Thereafter, wherever Dekker wrote the name Merkus, Van Lennep would substitute: "the previously mentioned government commissioner." ("Verantwoording," pp. 532-533, reference passages in same volume p. 176. and p. 179.)

While the above expurgations were made without consulting Dekker, another group belonged in this same category with his approval. In a letter to Van Lennep of 12 January 1860 (Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 72.), Dekker agreed to the suppression of the names of the native chiefs involved at Lebak so that only their rank would be indicated, followed by dots to indicate an omission. In accordance then, The Raden Wira Koesoema became, in the published text, simple "Raden..." as an example. ("Verantwoording", p. 525, reference passage in same volume, p. 110).

The most extensive expurgations involved the removal of satirical comments on Christian dogma. According to the original manuscript, when Droogstoppel admonished his son to obey all social conventions and not imitate the
bad manners of the young Stern, he said: "Now be proper and obedient, Frits, and think once that the Lord died for you on the cross, and don't pull the maid on her skirt when she brings tea into the office...". From this sentence, Van Lennep removed the few words referring to Christ. ('Verantwoording" p. 526. reference passage in same volume p. 126.) But, more important, Van Lennep expurgates some thirty-five lines of Dekker's original text in the sixteenth chapter, where Dekker described the troubles the preacher Wawelaar was having with Droogstoppel's son during catechism. This passage, first printed in the 1881 edition of Max Havelaar, included a number of embarrassing questions which Frits had gotten out of Shawlman's packet, e. g. "What would have happened if Eve had not eaten that apple?" "Where were the police when Peter caused Ananias and Saffirah to fall dead?" "How far could Jesus ascend before he reached the edge of the earth's atmosphere and how did he proceed from that point?", etc. ('Verantwoording," p. 537, reference passage in same volume, Pp. 228-229.)

The third group of expurgations and alterations dealt with Havelaar personally. The removal of the passages involved here tended to weaken his case against Dutch colonial officialdom. But too much emphasis must not be placed upon this fact, since the passages in question are widely dispersed and many other more critical sentences were not touched. Such a passage occurs in Dekker's account of Sumatra. Upon arriving in Padang from his station at Natal, and before learning of the charges which Michiels was about to bring against him, he wrote, "I wanted naturally to visit the Governor," but the latter, he continued, refused to grant him an audience. Van Lennep altered Dekker's text by replacing the word "naturally" with a phrase which changed the whole meaning of the sentence. In the 1860 edition, it read: "I wished to visit the Governor as stipulations required." (That is: "Ik wilde volgens plicht den Gouverneur bezoeken." Dekker had originally written in Dutch: "Ik wilde natuurlijk den Gouverneur bezoeken." Italics added. "Verantwoording," p. 530, reference passage in same volume, p. 163). The second such passage referred to Lebak. When Havelaar explained to Verbrugge why he was crediting the Raden Adipati with money before it had been formally accounted for in his office ledgers, he emphasized the fact that, without money, the Raden Adipati would be forced to resort to extortion. He wrote further: "Moreover, Verbrugge, an utterly repulsive misuse of authority is practiced in Lebak. This is something with which you must already be acquainted. Are you not aware of this?" According to the 1881 and later editions of Max Havelaar,
side. Dekker was in frequent communication with Veth and

Verbrugge had not responded, for "he did know of these things." But, in the first edition, Van Lennep expurgated this last phrase with the result that Havelaar's statement ceased to appear to be a statement of fact and took on the character simply of an opinion. ("Verantwoording," p. 525, reference passage in same volume, p. 115.)

Again, Dekker wrote that Havelaar hesitated to seek an audience with the new Governor-General i.e. Pahud, when he received no satisfaction from the old one (i.e. Van Twist) prior to the latter's departure for the Netherlands. He gave as his reason for not wishing to consult with Pahud the fact that "he knew the new G.G. all too well to anticipate anything from him." When Dekker received his own copy of the book in the middle of May, what he read at this point was quite different. He complained to Van Lennep in his 23 May letter: "Hey, why did you have me say that I did not know the successor of D.v.T.? Or is that a printing error? Havelaar said: 'I know his successor all too well to anticipate anything from him'. And Havelaar had good reason for saying that... il etait paye pour cela!" (Archief Van Lennep, Document No. 51).

There remains, finally, the end of the book which Van Lennep wished to expurgate in toto according to his 18 November 1859 letter to Van Hasselt. The last pages, he had written, if evaluated in conjunction with other passages in the book, "...cause one to think that the author is motivated primarily by a desire for revenge." (D. M. F. van Lennep, op. cit., p. 155). Dekker replied by comparing Max Havelaar to a paradise bird: "The whole bird was created for its tail. Exactly, leaving away that material, turns M.H. into a novel; but it is no novel. It is historical fact." What seemed undesirable from a literary point of view, he continued, "may be necessary as a point of departure for a movement among the Javanese..." (Brieven, IV, p. 51) To this argument Van Lennep capitulated, but he felt nevertheless compelled to suppress a short passage in the section where Dekker listed the kinds of people who would read his book. Significantly, the expurgation removed Dekker's own proposed partial definition of the meaning of "Droogstoppel." The passage which the Dutch public did not see referred to the "thousands and tens of thousands of examples of the race of Droogstoppel who - while continuing to pursue their own interests in customary fashion - shall acclaim with the greatest exuberance, the attractiveness of my writing..." ("Verantwoording," p. 540, reference passage in same volume, p. 292.)
also with Van Hoevell even though he lived farther away. At his behest, Van Hoevell sent a copy of the September issue of his *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie* to Dekker's wife. "That was sent to you on orders from Van Hoevell," Dekker wrote, "I asked him [in a letter] to request it from his printer and I wrote underneath: 'I have no money with which to buy it.'" And, while it did not necessarily correspond to the factual situation, a possible reflection of the degree of intimacy which existed between the two men occurs in the same letter, where Dekker suggested to "Tine" that the anonymous sender of a gift of 200 guilders, which his wife had recently received, might well have been Van Hoevell.⁴⁶

But the presence or absence of such a phrase as the last could not change the nature of the impact which such a work as *Max Havelaar* would have on the Dutch public. All in all, the self-control which the highly excited Van Lennep exercised over himself in his expurgations is remarkable. No truly fundamental point that Dekker wished to make in his writing suffered from the latter's hand and, with respect to the religious theme, Van Lennep probably created a greater receptivity for the book than would otherwise have been the case. There where the greatest temptation might have existed to suppress, there where the origins of the system, the nature of the pantjen-services and the "official truth" were discussed, not a single deletion was made! Van Lennep, as he would later say, had felt an obligation to see to it that Dekker's complaints and criticism were made known to those in official positions; that he did not touch these passages of political content is a demonstration of his sincerity and unwavering obedience to his original resolution, freely assumed.

⁴⁶*Brieven,* IV, Pp. 124; 126.
By October, one of the central problems under discussion by these three men was the failure of Van Lennep to provide for a new printing. The original edition had long been sold out. From Nijgh in Rotterdam, Dekker had been receiving repeated assertions as early as August that more copies must be made available. The ultimate consequence of their conversations and letters was a veritable onslaught against Van Lennep in October. Each of them in his own way called Van Lennep to account. Van Hoevell chose as his medium the concluding page of his review of *Max Havelaar*. If that article could serve the dual purposes of an academic apology for Van Twist and a direct and personal appeal to Dekker to abandon his crusade against the retired Governor-General, then it could also serve as a public platform from which to chastize Van Lennep's obstructionary tactics.

Although writing as if totally unfamiliar with the relationship between editor and author, the implication of this article was only too apparent. Van Lennep was given to understand that Van Hoevell considered him a Droogstoppel for having spoken in behalf of the colonial apologist when he was a representative in the Second Chamber in the early eighteen-fifties. He was also a Droogstoppel for having stood in the way of a more efficient distribution of *Max Havelaar*. Even as the mentality of the market
place defends oppressive practices in the Indies in behalf of budgetary surpluses, so, wrote Van Hoevell, has our national poet Van Lennep defended the exploitation of the Indies when he was a member of the Second Chamber.

Alas! the poet VAN LENNEP [sic] stands not alone in this wretched politics of the market place! He is the type that is half of Amsterdam, yes, I should almost say, half of the Netherlands; at least of that portion which enjoys direct or indirect advantages from those millions. It seems to me that the book by MULTATULI should bring about a change of opinion within such groups; even VAN LENNEP must change his narrowminded thinking about "the East" and the 240 millions after he has read it.47

Assuredly by no accident, Van Hoevell then quoted the passage near the end of Max Havelaar in which Dekker listed the various interest groups which must read this book. All these people will read your book, MULTATULI, concluded Van Hoevell, "but you will be read by even more, even in the houses of the lower middle class, who in the Netherlands have great power, if you will but see to it, that an inexpensive popular edition of your work appears."48 This was the perfect background to Dekker's own defiant letter to Van Lennep of 12 October 1860 in which he had declared emphatically: "I have not sold my manuscript!"

I handed the manuscript over to you in the belief that you would attend to it in accordance with my

47De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXII (October, 1860), p. 266.
48Ibid.
own interest. Your cordial sympathy with my problem gave me reason to believe this, and I could hardly have been expected to suppose that I would fall into the hands of a book-dealer, a salesman, a shop-keeper, who to make matters worse belongs to a party or at least imagines that he ought to be a member, which — particularly after the railway question had settled down — conived against my book. 49

The third missive in this explosive denunciation which Van Lennep must have considered an expression of Liberal Radicalism, was a personal letter from Professor Veth dated 16 October 1860. Where Van Hoevell would chas-tize and Dekker would protest, Veth would bring shame to Van Lennep’s name. Despite your legal claims, Veth argued, you are under a moral obligation to follow Dekker’s requests; to do otherwise is to vitiate the moral obligations under which you were allowed to control the destiny of his first literary production.

I’ll state quite frankly that I have gotten the impression that you, although impressed with the book as a product of literature, disapproved of the political line in it, or at least feared the consequences of its widespread dissemination, particularly in the Indies; that it has been your purpose, as you perhaps would say, to make it harmless; that you have placed the publisher under restriction and that you are personally responsible for the excessive expense of the edition as well as the failure at distribution in the Indies. Assuming that I have guessed correctly, then I have the key to your indeed polite but nevertheless uncompromising refusal to give the author

48Brieven, IV, Pp. 149-150.
the opportunity, now that a reprint is necessary, even to discuss with the publisher the manner in which that second edition should appear.... His [i.e. Dekker's] attitude towards the goal to be reached with his book is in complete conflict with the attitude which I presume to be yours.50

In rapid succession Van Lennep was made aware of what seemed to be an uncompromising and innerly homogeneous expression of a powerful and highly articulate Liberal combination. Dekker himself must have looked upon this display of full support as proof that he had risen to a position of leadership, dominance and authority. In fact he was being sustained by two men who retained freedom of initiative and personal independence in their future courses of action. This was not clear to Dekker. He saw these expressions of support as the externalization of their submission to his egocentric will. He could not respond by freely supporting the interest of these men as they had supported his interests.

Inarticulately, the relationship of lord and liege-man is mirrored in the same letter in which Dekker speculated that Van Hoevell was the probable sender of the gift of two hundred guilders. That Van Hoevell, "who is not rich," Dekker wrote his wife, should send money anonymously is fully understandable. "He did this just because I refuse the assistance of Bekking and those other gentlemen

in fear that I might lose my independence. He consequently has a reason to remain in hiding." Dekker's attitude could hardly be clearer: he would accept Van Hoevell's knightly services gratefully, but that this should consequently encumber him in any way was utterly foreign to his way of thought.

Van Lennep contended that the original intent of publication had been achieved. The purpose was "to make the existing faults known to those who can carry out corrections." The purpose was not "to awaken dissatisfaction and blind passion" or to strew the book about "in the manner of a libelous pamphlet." Nevertheless, Van

\[51\text{Brieven, IV, p. 126.}\]

\[52\text{D. M. F. Van Lennep, op. cit., pp. 177-178. In the light of Liberal criticism, in the fall of 1860 and among Dekker's apologists thereafter regarding the manner of publication and distribution, it should be noted that the number of copies printed in the first edition of Max Havelaar (May 1860) surpassed the customary size of a Dutch first edition in the middle of the nineteenth century almost three-fold. Instead of printing 500 copies as was normal at that time, De Ruyter produced 1,300 copies.} \]

\[\text{Brieven, IV, p. 127.}\]

In Van Lennep's response of 17 October to Veth's letter, from which the above quotations were taken, he defended himself against Veth's insinuations in words that clearly recall his two letters of 18 November 1859 to Van Hasselt. With those documents in mind, one must acknowledge the essential veracity of Van Lennep's self defense. Van Lennep wrote:

"Despite the polite and decorous wording in which your letter of yesterday was cast, its real meaning amounts to this, that I made misuse of someone's unfortunate positions in order to turn his work into an object of speculation and to perpetrate treachery against his person. That
Lennep did relent. He agreed to make more copies available. *Max Havelaar* reappeared in the book stores in November 1860. The second printing by De Ruyter cost as much as the first. There was not a word of a cheap popular edition. But Dekker's interests had turned elsewhere. Whether *Max Havelaar* came back into the book stores or not, "Multatuli" had been confounded in his desire of bringing on a mass movement in the Netherlands. It was as if a group of Amsterdam Conservatives were propelling him into the Liberal camp.

Surely Dekker did wish to retain the allegiance of both Veth and Van Hoevell, yet, if the situation were

________________________________________

accusation is a hard one, especially since it must have an allure of probability for all who are not completely acquainted with that which passed between Mr. D.D. and me from the very beginning. He who is only partially aware [of our relationship] shall only too easily believe that he discovered in the heartiness with which I received him and supported his interest, a deception which would make my action just that much more revulsive....The only one whose testimony could and must exonerate me in this affair of any blame, is no one else than my friend D.D. himself. If he will reread the letters written by me before and after I met him personally, [they will prove] that I have never misled him with reference to M.H.; that the manner of publication which has been followed is no other than that which I indicated to him from the very beginning as the only desirable and correct one; and that if there had ever been a question of strewing the book about in the manner of a libelous pamphlet, I would never have concerned myself with the publication" (D.M.F. van Lennep, *op. cit.*, Pp. 177-178).

The November 1860 edition of *Max Havelaar* first became available in the Indies only some four to five months later. The first notice of its appearance occurs in the *Java-Bode* of Wednesday, 9 April 1861, No. 29.
allowed to drift, he was afraid that he would be submerged in their Liberal Party. He feared the loss of his individuality in the public's eye. As a poor second choice then, there had to be a reaffirmation of his freedom from political obligations. Consequently, the same October that two prominent Liberals were attracted to Dekker, he published two articles which necessarily set under way the estrangement of his recently won protagonists. These pieces were Dekker's *Letter to the Governor-General in Rest* and his *To the Voters in the District of Tiel*.

While the letter to Van Twist provided no new information, its publication was nevertheless meaningful. For Van Hoevell, the act of publication was itself a slap in the face. It meant that Dekker was ignoring his supplications for a gentlemanly settlement with Van Twist and that Dekker was not interested in seeking redress for the Javanese natives through parliamentary action. For the body of the Liberal Party which was vaguely aware of Dekker's earlier refusal to cooperate with De Indier, the act of publication symbolized hostility toward Liberal colonial policy as personified in Van Twist. But, above all, alienation was caused by the considerably more important letter to the electorate at Tiel.

Dekker gave free rein to his emotions in his *To the Voters in the District of Tiel* and he turned out a
commentary on his own frustrations since his return to the Netherlands in June 1860 in an article of some twenty pages. He introduced remarks which appeared to belittle Van Hoevell. He launched into yet another denunciation of Van Twist. The biting edge of his new philippic was sharpened a hundred-fold by the procedure he adopted of substantiating his charges by extensive citations from an arch-Conservative newspaper. Warming to his role as a marplot par excellence, Dekker gave still further indication that he was a foreign element in the Liberal camp by making his first hesitant, imperfectly articulated exegesis on the political content of a book that had not originally been conceived within the context of current politics.

This was to be only the first of a series of such attempts by Dekker to give *Max Havelaar* political alignment. His later explanatory addenda would grow progressively more elaborate and precise. To indicate his seriousness in this attempt at a political commentary on *Max Havelaar*, Dekker accompanied these observations with a rejection of the Liberal program for the Indies and a declaration in favor of the theoretical structure of the existing colonial system. Finally, he polished off his work with a series of personal insults to Rochussen in the beginning and a vote of confidence for the same man at the end.

The shock which this essay caused the Liberal who had considered "Multatuli" a member of his own party was
increased by Dekker's use of three of his old articles, written back in December 1859 and long since forgotten. In his letter of advice to the electorate of Tiel, Dekker quoted in succession from his newspaper article prepared for the 9 December issue of De Bull's *Amsterdamsche Courant*, from his December hand-bill which De Ruyter had printed at Van Lennep's request, and from the newspaper article written for Tijdeman's *Handelsblad*. It can be assumed that these articles had relatively little influence on the course of events at the end of 1859. Rochussen and a handful of other Conservatives were probably well aware of them but few, if any, outside of this group knew of their existence or recalled the fact that they had ever appeared in print. However, when these earlier articles were reprinted by 'Multatuli,' one can assume that they received considerable public attention. Consequently a number of additional facts regarding Dekker's general attitude towards colonial policy could be added to the information available from *Max Havelaar*. In the analysis of Dekker's intellectual development, decisive import must be assigned to his use of these articles in October 1860, for Dekker took the most important single step in the gradual process of reformulating his ideas in terms of the current situation.

---

when he decided to bring public's attention the conservative temper of his thought in a period pre-dating the appearance of Max Havelaar. Gradually it would begin to dawn upon the Conservatives that "Multatuli" was their ally against the Liberals!

If Van Hoevell had felt that his desires had been contravened by the publication of the letter to the retired Governor-General, then he must have been openly incensed to read in Dekker's second pamphlet that, although he was a "very courageous and competent champion of the natives," his best efforts in the native's behalf "had achieved up until the present only very inadequate successes," implying that perhaps another (Dekker himself?) could do a better job of it. While Dekker did refer to "the shudder, which according to the pithy expression of a member of the Second Chamber, has passed through the land after the appearance of Max Havelaar . . .", Dekker failed to acknowledge that it was precisely Van Hoevell who had uttered these words.  

Such discourtesies were far surpassed by the nature of the attack upon van Twist, for Dekker quoted extensively from an editorial in the Rotterdamsche Courant, a reactionary journal of ill-repute and highly limited circulation. In this weekly, Dekker found an aggressive commentary on

---

54 Ibid., I, pp. 439-440.
the Liberal protest of 25 September against the King's statement on the colonies at the opening of the new session of the States-General. The article attempted to seize the initiative from the Liberals by blaming a whole series of untoward incidents in the Indies in the last half decade (in the fashion of Van de Putte's 1860 brochure) on decisions made by Van Twist as Governor-General. These decisions had been a result of Van Twist's ignorance and ill-comprehension of the native situation, according to this editorial.

Thus, the Rotterdamsche Courant attributed the Bandjermassin insurrection to Van Twist's bad judgment regarding the native nobility's line of succession in that principality. Further, Van Twist's regulation governing pilgrimages to Mekka was labeled the principal cause of the spread of Mohammedan fanaticism through Java. And Dekker's fate at Lebak, in the opinion of this article, was yet a third example of the consequences of Van Twist's ill-comprehension. By implication, Max Havelaar was a book which simply collaborated and reaffirmed an opinion already long held by Conservatives regarding the person of Van Twist. The utilization of this work by Liberals on 25 September was merely an indication of their general ill-comprehension of its meaning. In this context, Dekker could cite the editorial's conclusion with pleasure:

The people's representative, Duymaer van Twist must truly be abnormally naive - after having
occasioned so much calamity through shortsightedness when he was Governor-General - to reproach the present ministry because the condition of the Dutch East Indies is not satisfactory.55

Only after introducing such material into his essay, did Dekker make his first brief commentary on Max Havelaar's relationship to current politics. This he did by way of a curt, unembellished foot note affixed to the body of the article originally published in the Amsterdamsch Courant of 9 December 1859 and reprinted in its entirety in his letter to the voters of Tiel. The upshot of his new deliberations, when evaluated with due attention to the laudatory discussion of the recently deceased Stolte,56 was an avowal to the Dutch nation that the solution of the colonial problem could be found within the institutions already existent in the Indies. He believed that there was no need for recourse to new provisions or new organizations.

In his 1859 article, Dekker had argued that the prerequisites for the establishment of an animated, aggressive society as conceived in the minds of laissez-faire economists did not exist in the Indies. Such fundamental requirements of "moral adulthood" as legal equality and educated self-interest were foreign to the life of the dessa

55Ibid., p. 438.
56Cf. Chapter III, p. 89.
in the interior of Java. Dekker's viewpoint on December 1859 had been summed up in the fashion of Salak's rhetoric with the question: "To what an extent are the natives for whom one requests decrees of emancipation, mature?" And then, providing his own answer, he had written: "Must not that emancipation be a consequence of moral adulthood?" Dekker was clearly arguing then that, in the absence of the essential preconditions, the clamor for the introduction of free enterprise into the Indies was senseless and meaningless. Ten months later, Dekker proceeded one step further from his old argument. In October 1860, he believed that "free enterprise," as a system, should be consciously shelved for a later age when the natives had achieved "moral adulthood." In the meantime, the Dutch nation should abandon its preoccupation with a chimera and concern itself with creating an environment favorable to the natives' rapid transition of the puberty years. But this, he noted, was a responsibility which fell fully within the competence of the colonial administration. If the colonial official would only follow the spirit of his printed instructions, all would be in order and stories like that of Saidjah and Adinda will not reoccur. "And when that buffalo was taken away from him . . . etc. in those words lies the whole answer to the question: does

57 Volledige Werken, I, p. 443.
the Javanese desire to work under contracts with free enterprisers. "58 As could be seen, when Dekker integrated political elements with his moral principle, he appeared to be anything but a Liberal. His strong Conservative tendencies, however, were made most apparent when he quoted his hand-bill in full.

In this latter document and in the article reprinted from the Handelsblad, Dekker assured his readers that he was without political color. In the article written for Tydeman, he was not entirely unsuccessful in striking a pose of neutrality but, in the hand-bill he failed utterly at such an attempt. He had written in his one-page leaflet of the danger before the nation if the "incompetent" were allowed to destroy "that which already existed" before there was "something new to put in its place." He indicated further his abhorrence with those who would apply Western concepts to Eastern affairs, "of those who would undermine Asiatic authority with the ram of Western preconceptions." He could not "... traverse that way ... which would lead directly to the total disorganization of Dutch administration in the Indies ... and which - need it be said? - would lead just as well to the total destruction of budgetary surpluses from the Indies!" But, most remarkable were the following words in

---

58 Ibid.
which Dekker made a positive conscious defense of the colonial administrative system as a theoretical structure. He declared this organization essential to the maintenance of Dutch authority in the colonies.

But it is not alone those surpluses which will be lost if restorations are not carried out quickly on the artificial building of our imperium in the Indies. Yes, I would even argue that those surpluses are not the most important things that the Netherlands would lose if some day 'disturbing telegrams offer no consultation for encouraging observations...', The total existence of our Fatherland stands or falls with that building.59

The same man who exulted in the mathematical beauty and simplicity of the hierarchical principle which brought Xerxes's armies into motion60 could very easily find room in his credo for the dire predictions of Salak and Van Herwerden. As for the Liberals, Dekker's advice to the voters at Tiel achieved for him the rank of persona non grata.

Nor could Dekker's skirmishes with Rochussen displace the shock which the Liberal had experienced upon making acquaintance with a different "Multatuli" for, if Rochussen was accused of conniving and attempted bribery in the opening pages of the pamphlet, then he was granted a princely pardon as the innocent victim of circumstances

59Ibid., p. 446.

60Cf. Chapter II, p. 53.
in the last lines of the pamphlet. With crude impro­
priety, Dekker revealed that he had been offered a
"profitable appointment" to a governmental position, but absolution was provided for Rochussen in the words:

I trust that the Minister of Colonial affairs frequently believes that he has spoken the truth. He himself obviously can be misled by others, and those others by yet still others. And if above this, such a minister occupied earlier in the Indies an elevated position, which held him swaddled up for long years in the swathe of Batavia officialdom, without other form of nourishment than the yearly reports of tranquility from residents who think only of their approaching pensions, don't you see, gentlemen, then it would be an inequity to think in terms of perfidy.  

The same month which saw the dissemination of this essay witnessed further public attention to Dekker in his capacity as candidate for membership in the Second Chamber of the States-General. In the middle of October he followed up his pamphlet by actually participating in the elections at Tiel against eight other candidates. With amusement, the electorate learned that Dekker received only a handful of votes. The winner, Van Lidith de Jeude, would join the Conservatives in the Second Chamber and vote for the approval of Rochussen's colonial budget in December. Early the following month, Dekker also

---

61 Ibid., p. 440.
62 Ibid., p. 448.
63 Among the other participants in this election campaign were J. J. Hasselman, the former resident of
participated in elections at Leeuwarden. The former member Dirks was reelected by a great majority. Of the 1,656 votes cast, Dekker received only 101. He had refrained from entering the Amsterdam elections of the winter of 1859, fearful that a loss at the voting booth would weaken his bargaining power. Coming after his decisive pamphlet to the voters at Tiel, his role in the contests of October and November 1860 probably did reduce the steadily growing attention granted his book during the late summer and early fall.

The final fiasco of Dekker's second period of political maneuvering occurred during his last weeks in the Netherlands. Reverberating like the sound-wave of a cannon fired from great distance came the Judgment of the Indies on Max Havelaar. It was ruinous for Dekker's cause among the Liberals. Interestingly, the collapse of the Liberal interpretation of Max Havelaar occurred within a few weeks after the mortal weakening of the Van Hall Ministry through the expulsion of Rochussen from Djocjokarta; a personal acquaintance of Dekker, W. Poolman who had associations with the Conservatives; and Van Lennep himself (Java Bode, Wednesday, 21 November 1860, No. 93).

office. Both events displayed the strength of the Liberal Party in the Netherlands in December 1860. It would be several months before the significance of December 1860 was clear to the Dutch.
THE LIBERAL CHANGE OF HEART II: THE REVIEW OF MAX HAVELAAR IN THE BATAVIAASCH HANDELSBLAD

The most peculiar aspect of Max Havelaar's introduction into the Indies is the fact that the critiques of that book by Robide van der Aa, Veth and Gerard Keller were known long before the book itself could be acquired either through purchase or hire. Thus the editor of the Bataviasch Handelsblad, writing as late as the end of September 1860, informed his readers in the Netherlands that he had read the "outstanding piece of Professor Veth and the pieces in the Spectator, but that to date he had the opportunity only to thumb through the book in a great hurry. "The Dutch public [in the Netherlands] has the right to expect an impartial judgment also from the Indies . . . nor shall we disappoint [our readers]; we shall willingly assume the obligation as soon as the work is obtainable here."1

In response to Rochussen's letter of 25 June requesting more information on the steps taken in Lebak in 1856, Pahud wrote on 20 August 1860: "The work to which your Excellency referred, entitled Max Havelaar, is not

1Bataviasch Handelsblad, Monday, 24 September 1860, No. 18.
available here and has not yet been sent to me from the Netherlands; I am consequently not in a position to fulfill your Excellency's request."2 Surprised, Rochussen sent a copy off to Pahud on 24 October, apologizing that he had thought it "available in the Indies and consequently already long in your Excellency's hands."3

As in the Netherlands, so in the Indies--the original response to Max Havelaar was applause from the Liberals and the more extreme Colonial Radicals. Thus, a contributor to the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, who had obtained a copy, supported it against the Conservative's charge of pedantry: "A system which has to be defended with such arguments by men who are otherwise respected and informed persons has most assuredly had its best days."4 The first qualification on this universal praise appeared in the Java Bode which suggested hesitantly that, if the writer of the book was indeed Douwes Dekker, then one might anticipate that "this book will contain much exaggeration, particularly because of the well-known over-strung character of its author."5 But

---

2 C. Th. Van Deventer, op. cit., p. 197.
3 Ibid.
4 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Monday, 24 September 1860, No. 18.
5 Java Bode, Wednesday, 11, July 1860, No. 55.
the ultimate, definitive Liberal critique for the Indies appeared in the *Bataviasch Handelsblad*. The author was Martinus des Amorie van der Hoeven who served as the editor of this newspaper from 10 July 1860 until the middle of July 1861.6

Van der Hoeven was a clever, dogmatic thinker for whom the question of the correct colonial policy for the Dutch was clear-cut and self-evident. He was, by character, one who eternally sought absolute certitude. He would accept conversion in the Roman Catholic Church in the late eighteen-sixties.7 This, however, would be his second 'act of faith,' for, in the eighteen-fifties, this psychic need was satisfied by the thought of such Liberal economic thinkers as Bastiat (*Harmonie Economiques*) and the Englishman, Carey (*Principles of Political Economy*). Van der Hoeven argued from conviction and was without compliments for figures such as Rochussen.

Characteristic of the thought of this man was an article written in August 1860 in which he affirmed, with reference to Bastiat and Carey, that the uninhibited introduction of Western capital into the Indies was an act of the greatest humanity. The natives, he argued, would necessarily

---

6 *Bataviasch Handelsblad*, Friday, 14 December 1860, No. 23 and *ibid.*, Wednesday, 31 July 1861, No. 15.

7 Van der Hoeven, *Mijn Terugkeer tot de Kerk van Christus* (Amsterdam: Van Langenhuysen, 1871).
profit far more than the investing capitalist himself from such an act. "The greater the prosperity, the greater the gains for both, and at the same time the greater the portion of that gain to the laborer in proportion to the portion to the capitalist. This contention is a political economic law which . . . has been demonstrated in an irrefutable manner." However, he continued, the obligatory system of cultures created an artificial situation in which this natural law could not function. "From the implementation in an extreme form of the policy of coercion regarding labor, the United States of North America are presently harvesting the bitter fruits."8

With this highly simplified argument, Van der Hoeven was provided with a yardstick against which all human frailties, inaccuracies and faulty judgments could be measured. For him, the sixth paragraph of Article 56 of the Regeringsreglement of 1854 was a reflection of natural law. It provided him, further, with a statutory basis from which to proclaim the correctness of the policies followed by Van Twist during his tenure of authority in the Indies.9

8[Van der Hoeven], "De Verlenging der Zuiker- Contrac- ten," Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Tuesday, 7 August 1860, No. 15.

9[Van der Hoeven], "De Redevoering van den Heer Duy- maer van Twist over de Motie van den Heer Wintgens," ibid., Tuesday, 24 July 1860, No. 14.
In the fall of 1860, when Van der Hoeven wrote his review of Max Havelaar, his bitterest condemnations were saved for the person of Rochussen. He was particularly incensed with the Colonial Minister's speech before the Second Chamber on 15 October during the interpellation respecting the Pangka sugar contract. That speech was uttered in the spirit of the "well-intending slave holder." The statement, "We must protect the natives, encouraging their welfare, but leave them in the enjoyment of their ancient institutions and under the direction of their chiefs," meant, according to Van der Hoeven: "We must not abuse the native in an inhuman manner; insofar as possible, we must protect him from starvation—but above all else, we must prevent him from developing himself, from abandoning his confined concepts in favor of more enlightened concepts by which he might work his way up to moral and intellectual equality with us." The ancient practices and customs of the natives, associated with the word adat, became, in Van der Hoeven's mind, the garbage of history. He was more radical than Dekker in his rejection of the past.

But it was not doctrinaire liberalism alone which ordained the nature of the appraisal which Van der Hoeven

---

10[Van der Hoeven], "Het Formulier van Eenheid der Nederlandsche Staatspartijen," ibid., Friday, 14 December 1860, No. 23.
made of Max Havelaar. Also instrumental in shaping the outlook with which he approached this much publicized book was his personal acquaintance with the preceding editor of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, H. J. Lion who had directed this newspaper for three years prior to Van der Hoeven's appointment. Lion called himself "the spokesman... of those who could not approve of the course of colonial government in the Netherlands and, for his impudence, he had been given an eighteen-month prison sentence in Batavia.

He had opposed in principle making a personal appeal for clemency to the Governor-General on the ground that this would imply his factual guilt. Consequently, he began to serve his imprisonment in the spring of 1860. Before Lion completed ten weeks of his sentence, he fell dangerously ill and was moved to a hospital ward in Batavia where he came under the attention of Dr. P. Bleeker. The latter assured him "that only a complete abstention from all intellectual concentration during an extensive period would be able to restore his health; and that the moral and physical burden of a lengthy confinement among criminals would be extremely harmful for his constitution, if not fatal."\(^12\)


\(^{12}\)Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Tuesday, 24 July 1860, No. 14.
For good reason, then, Lion retreated from his original resolve to ask no pardon and, while still under the care of Dr. Bleeker, he addressed a petition to Governor-General Pahud requesting a release from imprisonment on 21 July 1860. But Lion's plea for clemency was a carefully worded statement couched in terms which came close to challenging the rectitude of his original sentence. While Lion stated his regret that he had "insulted or slandered your Excellency . . . and . . . [was] not conscious of ever having had the intention of being responsible for such insult or slander," still he would place the moral responsibility for the privation his family must suffer after his demise upon the Governor-General. Lion believed that he was obliged in the interest of his wife and children for whom his preservation was necessary, to set aside all considerations which have restrained him from sending in a petition for grace, likewise so that --should that petition unexpectedly be denied-- [he] might waste away to his grave without having to place the blame for the condition in which he left his beloved ones behind upon his own self-worship.\textsuperscript{13}

To petition Pahud in such terms was to qualify intent, but such a step was likewise an expression of willingness to settle for less than an unqualified total personal victory. Lion, if hard put to it, had a mentality which permitted responsible compromise. Though combative and aggressive by

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
nature, he could stop short of confusing his cause with his person, an attribute which he would instinctively find wanting in another controversial figure with a colonial background, Dekker. Lion could easily contrast his own adventure at Batavia with that which Dekker experienced at Lebak. The charge that Dekker had indeed allowed 'self-worship' to lead him astray figured as a major factor in H. J. Lion's personal attitude towards Max Havelaar though this would not be the sole basis of Lion's unfriendly review.

Lion was a free man within three days after his petition to the Governor-General. He departed almost immediately from Batavia for the more elevated and consequently markedly cooler climate of Malang where he hoped to recoup his strength and improve his health with rest.\(^1^4\) Meantime on 10 July, Van der Hoeven took up the editorship of his newspaper declaring that, "although the new editor wishes to remain completely independent in his principles and attitudes, he can make the declaration that his principal effort shall be the same as that of his talented predecessor and that he shall always be found up ahead at the breech whenever right and freedom need to be defended."\(^1^5\)

\(^{1^4}\)Ibid.

\(^{1^5}\)[Van der Hoeven], "Algemeen Overzigt," ibid.
In the following months, the question frequently arose of exactly how independent the new editor was from the person of H. J. Lion. As late as December 1860, Van der Hoeven found it necessary to declare solemnly in the pages of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* that Lion had exercised no influence over the paper's editorial policy "either directly or by way of influence" since the preceding July. "We are just as little responsible for his observations as he for ours. Is this now clear enough?"  

But leaving aside the question of some form of collusion or artificial subordination, a natural attraction did necessarily exist between the two men. If Van der Hoeven was doctrinaire in his way of thought, so was Lion. They were both considered 'Colonial Radicals.' They probably knew each other with some degree of intimacy since 1859 and communications continued to pass between them during Lion's absence at Malagg. This fact is certified by reports from Lion which appeared in the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* during July and August. And when Lion, unsuccessful in restoring his health, returned to Batavia in early September  

16 [Van der Hoeven], "Het Formulier van Eenheid der Nederlandsche Staatspartijen," *ibid.*, Friday, 14 December 1860, No. 23.  

17 The exact date of Lion's return is not certain, but on 23 August, Van der Hoeven wrote that he was expected back in Batavia at any moment. "Algemeen Overzigt," *ibid.*, Thursday, 23 August 1860, No. 16.
with the intention of leaving for a prolonged stay in Europe, there was time enough for further extensive cooperation and discussion between the two. Lion did not actually sail until the end of October.18

Lion probably made his views on Max Havelaar known to Van der Hoeven during this period of somewhat more than a month and a half. And it was with the information and opinions of Lion well in mind that Van der Hoeven wrote his review. Indeed, Lion probably had the opportunity of reading over the first half of it before leaving for Europe. He warmly approved Van der Hoeven's views. Later Lion wrote: "I am strongly inclined to regard the reviewer [of the book] in the Bataviaasch Handelsblad as the man who knows that Max Havelaar the best and has appraised it without prejudice."19

Lion's contributions to Van der Hoeven's article concerned the person of Brest van Kempen whom Dekker reduced to the low comedy figure of Slijmering. There appears to have been a close and, in some respects, intimate friendship between Lion and Van Kempen and, through Lion,
Van Kempen was able to set forth his own defense for Van der Hoeven's use. Lion claimed—though this claim has not been precisely verified—that he had in his possession in Batavia in October letters "in Dekker's own handwriting" which were sent to the Raden Adipati back in 1856. A careful examination of these letters, declared Lion, proved that "never has a more scandalous and closely interwoven fabric of lies and false imputations been published then that which can be found against the Resident of Bantam in Max Havelaar." In Van Kempen's behalf, Lion directed his attack particularly against the imputation that the 200 guilders lent by the Resident of Serang to the Regent of Lebak were intended for the bribery of such witnesses as the Assistant-Resident might assemble during an investigation. Dekker

---

20 Provided that one is prepared to accept Lion's unconfirmed claim, the presumption is that he was provided with these documents by Van Kempen himself who must have gotten them directly from the Regent of Rangkas Betoeng. While Van Kempen never made an official public protest against the manner in which he was treated in Max Havelaar, it is altogether believable that he wanted someone else to speak a word in his defense. Since he himself was a recent convert to 'free enterprise' in the Indies (Cf. following footnote number 29) and had come to know Lion well, it is quite conceivable that he sought out the former editor as his unofficial defender.

knew very well the reason for the loan, Lion confided to Van der Hoeven, and he informed his friend of the petition from the Raden Adipati to Dekker for assistance to meet the additional expenses incurred in welcoming his nephew, the Regent of Tjiandjoer. More importantly, Lion showed Van der Hoeven Dekker's abrupt, impolitic reply and the correspondence between Dekker and the Raden Adipati immediately after. Dekker had replied with "a curt note that was impolite toward a Regent" in which he enclosed a one hundred guilder banknote. The Regent had responded with queries. He could accept the money only if it were to be viewed as a loan. Dekker had then written again "in a crude manner" declaring that he should send the money back if he did not want it.22

The Regent did return the money and was left without the means to receive his nephew properly. Van Kempen had consequently felt obliged to give money to the Raden Adipati to repair the insult suffered at the Assistant-Resident's hands and to meet the Regent's pressing needs. Neither collusion, intrigue nor bribery were involved in the loan of the 200 guilders, according to Lion.

Not only were Van Kempen's actions completely accountable but, according to Lion, he had treated Dekker with

---


great sympathy and understanding. He had done his utmost
to soothe his subordinate's impetuosity and bring him
back from his resolve to request a discharge from the
colonial service.

In the meantime, Douwes Dekker had requested his
discharge. The resident sent that request for
discharge back to him with a letter written in the
most warm and sympathetic of words in which he
pointed out to him his family responsibilities and
financial position and tried to persuade him into
withdrawing his request and go to Ngawi. D. D.
refused to follow him in his advice [and made this
known] in a private letter in which he at the same
time acknowledged fully the sympathetic and more
than friendly attitude and consideration which the
resident had adopted towards him. Thereafter the
resident volunteered the use of his dwelling to
him when he passed through Serang and gave him at
the same time all the assistance which he might
demand or need.

D.D. stayed with his wife and child in the home
of Mr. B. v. K., took his departure from him with a
handshake of grateful friendship, waited four years
and wrote then a book in which he characterized
this warm friend as the most miserable of egotists
whose whole way of thought and action consisted
exclusively of cold meaningless forms. But still
not satisfied with that, he characterized him at
the same time as a man who in his longing for peace
and inconsequentia would not even shrink from
performing a crime in order to achieve that slimy
lust.24

24Ibid. The possibility that Lion actually possessed
the letters he claimed to have is heightened by the accuracy
of his account of the steps Van Kempen took once he learned
that Dekker desired to leave the colonial service. The
warm and friendly letter to which Lion referred above is no
other than Van Kempen's letter of 30 March 1856. (Volledige
Werken, IX, pp. 592-593.) In that document, Van Kempen
touched upon essentially the same points listed by Lion.
Cf. Chapter I, pp. 21-22. If that part of Lion's story
which can be checked against other sources is substantiated,
then the other portions of his story for which there is no
collaboration necessarily gain in probability. But the
confirmation of the factual correctness of Lion's paraphrase
That this information and Lion's personality exercised great influence over Van der Hoeven's review of *Max Havelaar* is made manifest in the fact that the same issue of the newspaper which carried the first part of the appraisal also contained a letter from Lion in which he proclaimed that, upon arriving in the Netherlands, he would prove with the use of Dekker's own letters the falsity of his charges against Van Kempen.\(^{25}\)

Lion's influence is likewise probable in the hardly accidental printing of two bits of information specifically regarding Van Kempen in the same issue of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*. These two items throw considerable light on the place Van Kempen had come to occupy in the Colonial Radical's scheme of things. In the first piece, the reader of Van Kempen's letter of 30 March also strengthens the probability that he had received this document personally from Van Kempen along with the latter's commentary on *Max Havelaar*. The exchanges between Van Kempen and Lion may very well have occurred in the same month of October when Lion was in frequent contact with Van der Hoeven. It can be established from an anonymous letter printed in the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* that Lion spent several days during that month in the principalities and particularly at Djocjakarta. ([H. J. Lion?], "Ingezonden Stukken," ibid., Monday, 29 October 1860, No. 20.) At this time Van Kempen was the Resident of Djocjakarta. While he provides no concrete information to substantiate his claim, S. Kalff also supported the contention that Lion's source of information was specifically Van Kempen. ("Multatuli en Insulinde," *De Indische Gids*, XLII (January, 1920), p. 201.)

\(^{25}\)H. J. Lion, "Een Brief gestuurd aan de Redactie."
was given an account of a dinner at Djocjakarta where Lion rose and proposed a toast to Van Kempen "whose attitude and actions regarding the regulation of land rent will have a great influence on the future development of Djocjakarta."26
The second item was even more striking in its commendation for Van Kempen. The Bataviaasch Handelsblad proclaimed:

There is no residency in Java where free cultures in the true sense of the word—that is cultures free of interference from the administration—make greater advances and produce more wholesome fruits than in the residency of Djocjakarta. This is so clearly apparent that the present resident, Mr. Brest van Kempen, who came there with a strong prejudice against private enterprisers and freely contracted labor, is now one of the greatest proponents of free enterprise.27


27H., "Vrije Arbeid op Java," ibid. Van Kempen's thought had undergone an evolution since 1856 in exactly the opposite direction from that followed by Dekker. It has already been suggested that Dekker may have found concrete reasons at Lebak for his alienation from a private economic system involving the institution of private property. Cf. Chapter II, p. 36. At Serang, Van kempen seems to have been largely of the same opinion, and this point of view was evident in his extensive missive of 20 September 1856 to the new Governor-General, Pahud. In that document, he had argued that the unhealthy situation in Lebak could be primarily attributed to two factors: that there was no obligatory government culture system to serve as a security that native chiefs would be properly remunerated, and secondly, that those who had private property would not accept administrative responsibilities among the natives. (Volledige Werken, IX, pp. 644-645, cf. Chapter I, pp. 17-18.) But in the early eighteen-sixties, Van Kempen was repeatedly praised in the Bataviaasch Handelsblad as the proponent of a railway system in Java and as the defender of the free unhindered intercourse of the natives with private European parties. ("Particuliere Correspondentie," ibid., Saturday, 14 December 1861, No. 24.) Again, he was commended as a government
To these communications with their editorializing overtones, Van der Hoeven paid his obeisance in a note printed at the end of the same issue of the paper. After referring to Lion's promised unmasking of "certain points of distinct falsehood and of malevolent revilement towards Mr. Brest van Kempen" (sic), Van der Hoeven added: "one can be assured that that worthy official, presently the Resident of Djocjakarta, is not known in Java by the name of Slijmering, but is respected and held dear by all who know him."28

Far from uttering his judgment of Max Havelaar from a vacuum, Des Amorie van der Hoeven—the only voice from the Indies to attempt a coherent and total statement on the book—strongly felt an obligation to defend the conduct and good will of a man he held to be a fellow reformer. This motif gave direction and purpose to an essay in which Van der Hoeven's tendency to think in terms of absolutes was again apparent, while his excessively rationalistic mentality

official who stood ever ready to assist the private industrialist in the difficult task of transporting machinery over the poorly developed road system into the interior and in the transportation of agricultural products from the interior to the port cities on the coast. (Z.Z., "Andere Residenten Andere Beginselen," ibid., Monday, 30 September 1861, No. 19.

28[Van der Hoeven], "Algemeen Overzigt," ibid., Monday, 29 October 1860, No. 20.
warded off the danger of his falling prey to the sentimen-
tality of Saidjah and Adinda.

Van der Hoeven could praise Max Havelaar as a work
which authentically reproduced the heart and emotions of a
real person. He placed Max Havelaar in the same category
as the Confessions of Saint Augustine and Rousseau and he
compared it with Pascal's Lettres a un provincial and
Byron's Childe Harold. But Van der Hoeven could not help
but turn his principal attention to Slijmering and the
narration of events at Lebak. If great as a work of litera-
ture, Max Havelaar had to be rejected as an "act of indict-
ment." If no case could be made for Droogstoppel, then one
could most assuredly be made for Slijmering. Van der
Hoeven took offense at the very name. "Slijmering gives one
the idea of something revulsive and indescribably low" and
it was this connotation, he argued, and not a desire to
indicate a speech impediment, that led "Multatuli" to select
such a name. Premeditated scurrility, he continued, could
be proven from the closing lines of the book where the
author asked if it be the imperial will "that the Havelaars
be splattered with the mud of the Slijmerings?"

After the fashion of the earlier critics of Max
Havelaar in the Netherlands, Van der Hoeven accepted the
duality of the book and provided perhaps the most efficient

29[Van der Hoeven], "Multatuli's Grieven," ibid.
formula for distinguishing between the 'good' and the 'bad' as the Liberals and the Colonial Radicals understood these terms. He argued, with a show of some independence from Lion, that "while we hasten to make the declaration that we consider Multatuli an honest man whose noble nature is not capable of a premeditated falsehood, we would immediately add that his devil, pride, makes him extremely susceptible to self-delusion and causes him very often to proclaim with fervent conviction as truth that which is nothing else than a delusion of his own imagination." There, where pride does not impinge upon his thought, "his judgment is unimprovably correct." Thus his commentary upon the colonial system was, in Van der Hoeven's mind, unimpeachable. But his attacks upon Van Kempen and Van Twist were without substance. They were the consequence of perversion and egocentricity such as once characterized the brilliant author of *Le Contract Social*.30

Turning from Van Kempen to Van Twist's defense, Van der Hoeven cited Havelaar's response to his reassignment to Ngawi as a splendid example of what happened to the author's powers of discrimination once his personal ego had entered the picture. As a matter of fact, argued Van der Hoeven, the appointment to another Assistant-Residency was an unprecedented act of grace on the part of the Governor-

---

30 Ibid.
General. "That he in good faith believed and wishes us also to believe that that appointment occurred with no other goal than to plunge him into misery--this is only explainable through a pride which borders on the state of madness."31

The editor of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad had now raised major qualifications and objections. He disagreed with the greater part of the book. He had introduced a new dimension into the public debate by informing the Dutch that Slijmering had as much reason to complain as did the Governor-General. Such declarations made Max Havelaar too fragile an instrument for further Liberal use on an effective level. It would never again play in Liberal hands the role that it had played in the destruction of the Rochussen Ministry. In fact, the distinction which Robde van der Aa had made had served a fundamentally different purpose from that which Van der Hoeven now made. Van der Aa's action had been positive--he had wanted to save as much of the Max Havelaar as possible. Van der Hoeven's action was negative--he wished only that the collapse of Max Havelaar in the public's estimation not drag down with it the other defenses of free enterprise that had been developed by himself and H. J. Lion. Consequently, by the end of the second installment of Van der Hoeven's protracted review he

31 Ibid.
was prepared to acknowledge greatness in Max Havelaar only as literature.

Havelaar disappears from the stage to make room for Multatuli. And Multatuli has arisen with a power and a luster which even Havelaar's friends—no matter how high they judged him—had not anticipated. He has demanded and won the admiring applause of all the Netherlands. Multatuli's name, yesterday still unknown, is today one of the principal names in our Fatherland. Multatuli's fame, yesterday but a dream of Tine, is today immutably established and shall live on in posterity.

But not as he had wanted, nor as Tine had predicted it, not as a statesman, not as the King shall he be celebrates both among us and among those who come after us, but as a humorist, as a poet and speaker. That which he did shall long have been forgotten when that which he wrote still holds a place of honor among the most priceless treasures of our literature.32

This attack upon Dekker's book, more savage in its way than any objection which had been raised in Conservative newspapers and pamphlets, became widely-known back in the Netherlands in the course of the month following the publication of Dekker's letter to the retired Governor-General and his address to the voters in the electoral district of Tiel. The final coup-de-main was applied by H. J. Lion who had arrived in the Netherlands in the meantime. He published his account of the relations between the Regent of Lebak, Brest van Kempen and the former Assistant-Resident, in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant on 14 January 1861. Lion

32 Ibid., Wednesday, 14 November 1860, No. 21.
concluded his newspaper article on a note of nostalgia: "It is a shame that a book which contains so much that is beautiful and so much that is true, is disfigured by imputations which one must attribute to a muddled-up brain, provided that one does not prefer to see this as a highly refined example of depravity."33

Then, as a follow-up, there appeared in the same newspaper on 30 January an anonymous letter in which Dekker's account of the death of his predecessor at Lebak was declared false without qualifications.

Did the widow of Carolus gull Max Havelaar with fabrications or did he invent them himself? I'll not attempt to decide this question. I have no reason to doubt the honest intentions of the writer, however, I declare formally that that which he wrote regarding the death of his predecessor is UNTRUE.34

These events, following after one another in November and December 1860 and in the first weeks of January 1861, had an immediate and direct effect upon Dekker's position. The decline of interest in his cause can be traced in the letters which passed between Dekker and the members of the committee formed for a national subscription in behalf of Havelaar's cause. Dr. P. Bleeker, the man who had nursed H. J. Lion back to health after his ten week confinement

---


in prison at Batavia, was a member of this group. His com-
ments to Dekker reflected the attitude of the larger group.

Bleeker wrote Dekker on 27 January 1861 from the Hague:

And above all the review in the Bataviaasch
Handelsblad has reduced the sympathy of many for
your work. Those reviews, detailed and still
warm, have not yet been attacked nor refuted. I
do not know if it is your intention to refute
that which occurs in them, regarding your own
person, but be assured of this that I have made
the acquaintance of persons who are not disposed
in your favor and who are prepared to open a
campaign against you and who claim that they are
armed with documents whose publication perhaps
will not assist you in your cause. In any case,
I am convinced as are many others, that at this
moment one can reckon on no great sympathy for
you.35

Aware that Rochussen had been replaced as Minister of
Colonial Affairs by Jhr. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg,
Bleeker suggested to Dekker that he make a new attempt to
get into government service. By way of emphasis, Bleeker
added that the other members of the commission agreed with
him in this suggestion. But Bleeker had still not sur-
rendered the idea that Dekker, in some way or other, was a
Liberal; he added: "Leadership and direction of the Colonial
Administration has been changed. I believe that the [new]
direction shall be more in agreement with yours."36

Bleeker’s certitude as to Dekker’s political prefer-
ences weakened upon learning that Lion had published an

35Brieven, V, pp. 9-10. Italics added.
36Ibid.
attack upon Max Havelaar in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Liberalism's first organ in the Netherlands. He wrote a week later: "I know Mr. Lion personally and I do not suspect him in the least of bad faith, but it is my understanding that he is in the possession of innumerable documents and even one or more letters from you yourself which it is said will not work in your own interests if published."37

Thereafter Bleeker's suspicions of Dekker were increasingly aroused. He paid a visit to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and learned with surprise of his friend's rejection of an offer for a position in the West Indies. Still further unfavorable reports were made known to him by members of Dekker's own family (Van Heeckeren?) "before which I stood astonished and which I cannot believe."

Bleeker did not specify the nature of the information he had gained, but an indication of its possible direction can be found in a later letter from Dekker to his wife. There he described the scandalous rumors about himself that were circulated. People were saying: "I am a wretched creature for I allowed my wife and children to suffer want, while living well myself: I drank all the time the finest wines!"38

Bleeker continued to believe that his friend's best hope lay

37Ibid., p. 11.
38Ibid., p. 27.
in attempting to gain an appointment in the Colonial Administration from the new Minister. 39

Dekker, of course, had no interest in such an appointment, but he was deeply concerned about the articles appearing out of the Indies. He decided to leave Belgium once again and go back to the Netherlands. He reached Rotterdam in the middle of February. His wife and children stayed in Brussels. It is interesting to note that once he obtained a copy of Lion's newspaper article, he instinctively attributed the information in it to Van Kempen. 40 His first plan was to go to Van Hoevell and request him to intercede in his behalf with Lion. Van Hoevell was uncooperative and pointedly suggested that Dekker seek a position in the Colonial Administration. Relations between him and his erstwhile critic had distinctly soured. He commented on Van Hoevell's response, "that is only in order to get rid of me." 41

Dekker did finally publish a brief article of his own in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant. The attack upon his own explanation of Carolus's death was declared to be irrelevant to the principal matter of Max Havelaar. As for Lion's account of his relations with the Regent and the

39 Ibid., p. 11.
40 Ibid., p. 12.
41 Ibid., p. 25.
Resident, Dekker declared it false, but failed to provide evidence to support his stand. However, most importantly, Dekker made no attempt to repudiate Van der Hoeven and this was tantamount to abandoning any positive steps to check the general alienation from his person then in process. By April 1861, Veth was added to the list of those who had deserted him. "Veth is a wretch, he dares not do anything because it might cause Duymaer van Twist offense." And, again in early May: "That man Veth! It is sinful! You have no idea of the rottenness of people."

With the process of alienation finally completed, Dekker published a pamphlet in May 1861 reaffirming the stand taken in his letter to the voters at Tiel. It was as if he wished to give the Liberals additional grounds for concluding that he was not one of them. Dekker wrote:

One is mistaken in blaming such misgovernment on a system. No system sets forth that one should steal from the Javanese. It is not the intention of the proponents of free enterprise that the Javanese be delivered over to covetousness of private parties. But Count Van den Bosch intended just as little that the natives should be robbed of their property by the chiefs. The fault does not lie in a system—varius modis bene fit—the fault lies in the bad implementation of a system, in the absence of principles,
in lazyness, in the spirit of temporizing, in
egotism, in the absence of resilience and
honesty on the part of the persons who in the
name of the Netherlands administer that resplend­
ent empire. The fault lies with the Governor's-
General.
India does not need a genius, a development which
indeed would be extremely unfortunate!
India needs: a worthy man who seeks truth, and who
has the courage to stand up in defense of truth!
Shame on you Netherlands, if you cannot point out
such a man!45

It was indeed biting irony that, in the same May 1861
when Dekker declared himself in concord with the attitudes
expressed by Hasselman and Riesz, he lost his court trial
against another Conservative, Jacob van Lennep. Van Lennep
was declared the owner of Max Havelaar and given exclusive
control over the manner of its further exploitation. Thus,
Dekker lost his opportunity to promote a general movement
among the Dutch people. There would be no popular, cheaply
priced edition. Dekker came to the close of the second
phase of his political activity in the Netherlands with
depening bitterness. Writing for the Java Bode in early
May, Gerard Keller summed up the current stand of affairs
with respect to Dekker in the following words:

If you ask me whether the writer has achieved
his goal with that work--I would not be able to
present the proof, and the program of the govern­
ment as far as this concerns colonial politics,
forces one to assume that the present ministry

45Volledige Werken, I, p. 492 (Wijs mij de Plaats waar
ik gezaaid heb).
at least, has not the slightest plans of following the nod of Multatuli with respect to the colonies. 46

More characteristic of Dekker than of the state of Dutch politics by this date were the conclusions he placed on paper early the following year: "There are no political parties, there only exist cliques." 47

---

46 [Gerard Keller], "Nederland," Java Bode, Wednesday, 19 June 1861, No. 49.

47 Volledige Werken, II, p. 489.
CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSERVATIVES IN SEARCH OF A NEW PRINCIPLE

The Conservatives found themselves in a progressively more difficult defensive position from the fall of Colonial Minister Rochussen in December, through the intervening period of uncertainty, to the formation of the second Thorbecke Ministry on the first day of February 1862. There was, seemingly, no immediate means of escape. The traditional defenses of the colonial apologists no longer produced the results that two decades of custom had led them to consider invincible. Van Hall, under whom Rochussen had served since February 1860, determined that his Cabinet should not resign because of Rochussen's defeat. A search was made for an appropriate replacement in the department of Colonial Affairs. Van Hall wanted a man of more liberal inclinations than Rochussen, for such a person might even strengthen the rest of the Cabinet. Van Hall thought he had found the ideal person in Jhr. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg who had served under Baud as the Secretary-General of the Department of Colonial Affairs a decade and a half before, and had worked thereafter as a member of the Council of the Indies. His public career seemed to guarantee
that he would be dedicated in principle to the retention of the colonial system in its fundamental elements. Yet, at the same time, he was no reactionary for, during the middle eighteen-fifties he had played an important part in the education of the Dutch public in colonial matters.

With less than complete frankness, the other members of the Van Hall Ministry indicated their acceptance of Cornets de Groot's proviso of general ministerial support for a bill to regulate the rights of free enterprisers in the Indies by law. Cornets de Groot became a member of the Van Hall Ministry and, to the embarrassment of his fellow ministers, took them at their word. He moved immediately to introduce his bill. His colleagues began to doubt the efficacy of their tactics in attempting to hold onto their offices. On the fourth of February 1861, Cornets de Groot wrote the Governor-General at great length informing him of his early intention of introducing legislation into the States-General in behalf of the free enterprisers. He made his intentions known to the representatives themselves in a ministerial memorandum of 21 February. Then all future planning suddenly became uncertain.

Van Hall submitted his resignation to the King and departed from his own Ministry on 23 February 1861, exactly one year after his original elevation to the premiership. It was as if he were attempting to escape with a good name
from the responsibility of a collapsing Conservative majority. The Second Chamber, during the debates of 27 February, expressed its disapproval of the questionable maneuvering going on with the Cabinet. The original members of the Van Hall Cabinet who were still in office were subjected to the sharpest of criticism. The following day, Cornets de Groot declared his intention to resign. The last crippled remnant of the Van Hall Ministry had no alternative but to submit its resignation as well.1

This fiasco intensified the sense of defeat among the Conservatives which grew in the months following Rochussen's defeat. The joint resignation which should have been offered at that earlier date was now offered to the King in an atmosphere of hostility and to the sound of repeated reprimands from the Second Chamber. However, the Conservatives were still unwilling to read the handwriting on the wall and acknowledge that the moment for a new Liberal cabinet had come. The increasing self-conscious Conservatives attempted to establish still another government in the middle of 1861. Once again a man of essentially Liberal intent assumed the office of Minister of Colonial Affairs.

Baron Van Zuylen van Nyvelt rose before the Second Chamber on 23 April and attempted to account for the

homogeneity of his own new Cabinet in which James Loudon, the Secretary-General of the department of Colonial Affairs from 1859 to 1861 held office as the new Minister of Colonial Affairs. All of the members of this Ministry, said the Baron, were agreed that the system of obligatory cultures must be retained in the Colonies. He was prepared to admit that that system should be cleansed of such failings as had crept into it, but "the Indies must remain what they are now: A Dutch possession." And Loudon asserted his general agreement with this statement. But, despite his assertions to the contrary, it became readily apparent to the Second Chamber that Loudon's ministerial memoir of explanation for the colonial budget for 1861, dated 7 May 1861, embraced concepts totally foreign to Van Zuylen's. Clearly Loudon wrote in the spirit of the Liberal opposition.

This apparent lack of homogeneity became the center of attention during the debate on the colonial budget on the eleventh, twelfth and fourteenth of May. Aghast, Van Zuylen heard Van Hoevell declared himself in accord with the Minister of Colonial Affairs, while Mijer refused to accept Loudon's interpretation of the sixth paragraph of Article 56. Van Zuylen was left with no other defense than the reaffirmation of his Cabinet's solidarity. Colonial policy,

\[^2\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 369.}\]
\[^3\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 373.}\]
he insisted, had been a subject of deliberation between the members of the present Ministry prior to its formation. If the Minister of Colonial Affairs determined upon a more radical course than that which had been mutually agreed upon, then he would run into the open opposition of his colleagues. Actually it was Van Zuylen who found himself in trouble with his fellow Ministers. Ultimately, he was obliged to follow in Van Hall's footsteps. Van Zuylen resigned on 21 November. But the rest of the Cabinet including the Minister of Colonial Affairs, remained in office until the beginning of 1862.

The ministerial rear guard action of the Conservatives was as bankrupt as its defense of Colonial institutions. Even Mijer acknowledged this during the May 1861 debates on the colonial budget. Said he: "The existing colonial system and the existing colonial institutions are condemned not by just one person, but by many members and even by those who are not accustomed to participate in the general discussion of colonial affairs." Mijer's words were borne out in the appointment of Baron Sloet van de Beele as the new Governor-General. Even more than Van Twist, he represented the Liberals' approach to colonial matters.

4Ibid., p. 375.
5Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 689.
Faced with the distinct possibility of total bankruptcy, the defenders of the colonial status quo began a fundamental re-evaluation of their policies during the course of 1861. This was the period when the Conservatives began to function in the manner of a modern political organization. Consequently, the self-examination of 1861 produced a new definition of the party's function in a law-making body. But, simultaneously, the Conservative found himself obliged to write off much of the redundant baggage of the old colonial apologist. One of the most distinctive characteristics of the new attitudes among the Conservatives was their evident inclination to abandon the extreme rationalism and pragmatism associated with Baud in the eighteen-forties and fifties. The Conservative of the sixties placed progressively greater emphasis upon the kind of sentiment which figured large in Van den Bosch's writings in the early thirties, but which had fallen from favor in Baud's time. It was at this level that the Conservatives gradually came to realize the efficacy of Dekker's writings to their cause.

Van Lennep's son-in-law, Hartsen, was among the first to make significant use of sentiment in the First Chamber debates in the summer of 1861. Even earlier, there were hesitant attempts among the Conservatives to use Dekker's ideas. At first, his rhetoric was only used in attacks on Van Twist. This was the case in the editorial which appeared
in the old *Rotterdamsche Courant*, cited by Dekker in his letter to the voters at Tiel. The same kind of hostility toward Van Twist was unmistakable in a pamphlet of December 1860 by one A. M. Bousquet. Put more distinct is the use of *Max Havelaar* against Van Twist in a pamphlet of January 1861 by a certain Van Doren. There, the author specifically cited the discussion in *Max Havelaar* of the stark change taking place in the life of the newly-appointed Governor-General as he ceases to be merely another member of the

6A. M. Bouquet, *De Gouverneur-General in Ruste en zijne Redevoering van 15 October 1860* ('s Gravenhage: H. C. Susan, 1860). Aside from the first words in the title which suggested Dekker's letter to Van Twist, published two months earlier (the last page of Bousquet's essay carries the date of December 1860), a passage on the twelfth page of this work also suggests dependence on Dekker's anti-Van Twist expressions. There Bousquet calls Van Twist a man "who through high favor has enjoyed the privilege of hoarding during a five year period the neat little fortune of around a half million in return for which he---[a man] totally unequal to the elevated office which he was presented by the King---brought about much that was bad and depressingly little good."

One could easily see in this a paraphrase of Dekker's 1856 Letter to the departing Governor-General in which he sought an audience from the latter in vain. In this document which was reproduced in *Max Havelaar*, he wrote: "Blood clings to the hoarded-up savings of the colonial salary which you received under these circumstances, Excellency!" (*Volledige Werken*, I, p. 291; IX, p. 635). These two passages particularly attract comparison because of the word which Bousquet used in the original for "hoarding." The original passage is: "De heer Duymaer van Twist, die door hoogge gunst, het voorregt heeft genoten om in vijf jaren tijdens het aardig fortuntje van ruim een half miljoen te vergaren . . . ." And Dekker had written: "Er kleeft bloed aan de overgegemaarde penningen van uw dus ontvangen indisch traktement, Excellentie!" The word, "vergaren," or "vergaren" was not of frequent use in the Dutch language in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Dutch upper class, modest and unsupposing in his habits, and becomes a kind of godlike King for the millions of the natives in the Indies. Only a man with great natural capacities and wide learning could undergo such a metamorphose and retain perspective declared the author. In Van Doren's mind, as in Dekker's, Van Twist, a narrow-minded inconsequential man, was incapable of such a transition.7

But the use of Dekker's writings as a base from which to attack Van Twist was work for second rate figures in the apologetic movement of the Conservatives. The essays by Riesz and the words uttered by Hartson on 29 May showed greater finesse and looked more to the future position of the Conservative party. Riesz pointed out that the failure of the government obligatory cultures--considered a positive good--to spread to Bantam was in part a consequence of local individual landownership in that region. Further, he recalled the tale of Saidjah and Adinda to his readers. Riesz cited the census of buffalo and cattle in the Indies as a scale against which to judge relative prosperity at various moments in the island of Java.8


To these early attempts at a new basis for apologetics, Harsen added his own sketch. His colonial picture was not of the Dutch official in the interior, fighting against the collusion of the indigenous nobles and the colonial government. Rather, he drew a picture of a Havelaar-like figure fighting against the conniving of native chiefs, who are indeed acknowledged as a source of evil, and private industrialist who were much more difficult to control than indifference or complacency within the Dutch colonial hierarchy itself.

Should the industrialists conclude, that the government official is not working sufficiently in his interest, if the former looks after the native's interest, if he actually gives attention to greater and lesser acts of extortion by the chiefs, and to the misuses of power and authority by these in behalf of the industrialists... then I believe that the residents and their subordinates will find themselves ultimately in such difficulties, that they finally will have to submit, above all because the native chiefs naturally will choose the part of the industrialists since these have a vested interest, in behalf of the success in their undertakings, in binding the princes to their own cause.9

The early uses of sentiment and themes from Max Havelaar were hesitant and seemingly awkward, nor did the Liberals fail to point out the seeming paradox in the new tactics gradually adopted by their opponents. Thus, Van Hoevell, in referring to this speech by Hartsen of 29 May 1861, declared that portions of it "might take up an honored

9Verslag, 1860-1861, p. 192 (insert 7).
place among the Droogstoppelish intercessions of MULTATULI [sic]." Consequently the Conservatives could not free themselves completely in the earlier portion of 1861 from the rationalizations that had served as a defense of the colonial system prior to 1860. However, they did conscientiously expand the media through which they might reach the public at large. The production of Conservative apologetic literature was greatly accelerated in 1861; new pamphlets appeared almost monthly. A particular strike of good fortune augmented the organs available to the Conservatives in April 1861 when a colonial Conservative, Buijn, became editor of the Java Bode. In him, Des Amorie van der

10 [Van Hoevell], "Varia," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (July, 1861), p. 57.

11 Contrary to the popular misconception in the present-day Netherlands, it was not Busken Huet who first gave voice to Conservative sentiments in a newspaper published in the Indies when he took over the editorship of the Java Bode in 1868. Long before the appearance of Busken Huet, an authentic Conservative, if not reactionary spokesman, directed the editorial policy of the Java Bode. The editor who had directed the newspaper in the late 1850's, W. L. Ritter, resigned his position in late December 1860 or early January 1861. Thereafter, for a three months period, the paper was under the direction of a man whose identity can be established no further than that he signed his articles with "P." (Cf. Java Bode, Saturday, 13 April 1861, No. 30 and ibid., Wednesday 6 February 1861, No. 11). While Buijn did not officially become editor until April, he was already a contributor in March (Ibid., Saturday, 13 April 1861) and it is altogether possible that the article entitled "Wat behoeven de Javanen" which appeared in the newspaper as early as 20 January was also from his hand. (Ibid., Wednesday, 30 January 1861, No. 9.)
Hoeven and his Bataviaasch Handelsblad finally found a polemic opponent, not unworthy of respect.

The moral and intellectual rearing of the Javanese, Buijn declared in April, was indeed the obligation of the Dutch government. This, however, was a slow process whose ultimate achievement lay in the distant future and which could be adequately achieved only through the institutions presently in existence in the Indies. The "sickly philanthropic ardour" of the Liberals could contribute nothing, for the potentials of the actual situation in Java presaged the decimation of the native peoples if the offices of the central administration did not regulate and police private initiative with severity. On the one hand, there existed a native population whose mentality was that of a child and which would revert to medieval barbarism if left over to itself. On the other hand, one could see an increasingly aggressive white population anxious to exploit those child-like people.

Only the current paternalistic colonial institutions could maintain peace and order. In a statement of 13 April, on the basic principles which would govern his editorship, Buijn went so far as to declare that he had taken up the direction of the paper with "the unalterable determination of making our pen . . . servicable . . . in behalf of the maintenance and defense of the government system, whose
perpetuation in our opinion is the prerequisite for the lasting welfare of Motherland and Colony. Buijn showed his deep suspicion of Liberal intent in the Indies in the concluding remarks of his editorial of accountability. He wrote:

This system had become the object of attack of a great party. In its essence it has made itself known exclusively as an endeavour to achieve material welfare; its origins derive from pauperism, its goal is the conquest of the Indies to the end of unrestricted exploitation of the natives; it called itself the friend of the Javanese, and its tactic is to dislodge the government from her constitutional position as mediator. With this party we do not cooperate.

While applauding the sentiments of Buijn, the Conservatives placed their greatest hope in the establishment of a new newspaper, the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland and 's Gravenhage. It was intended to become the preeminent voice of Conservatism in both domestic and colonial matters. In the summer of 1861, the Conservatives had, as their principle organs, three newspapers. In Amsterdam, they had the services of De Bull's Amsterdamsche Courant, and in The Hague, they were supported by the two weeklies Nederlandsch Indie and 's Gravenhaagsche Nieuwsbode. In the spring of 1861, it was decided to discontinue the last two and to

12Buijn, "De Redactie van den Java Bode," ibid., Saturday, 13 April 1861, No. 30.
13Ibid.
establish a new daily with a capital of 200,000 guilder. The subscribers to the original investment came largely from conservative circles such as the stockholders in the Dutch Handelmaatschappij.\textsuperscript{14}

The editor of the new journal was Iz. J. Lion who worked as a Conservative apologist and as Rochussen's confidant. Ironically, both Iz. J. Lion and the outspoken Liberal editor of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, H. J. Lion, were Jews, and both were past masters in the employment of defamatory denunciation and provocative censure. The editor of the new Dagblad had already been associated with Rochussen for several years. Through the Minister's influence, Iz. J. Lion had also worked in turn as editor of a Conservative magazine, De Wespen, and as correspondent for the Conservative (old) Rotterdamsche Courant. Indeed, Iz. J. Lion would well have been the author of the editorial which Dekker reproduced in his letter to the voters at Tiel. Thereafter, he served as editor of the Nederlandsch Indie and the 's Gravenhaagsche Nieuwsbode. During this period, he had written a series of pamphlets in defense of Minister Rochussen under the pseudonym of "Philalithes." And rumor in 1862, would have it that he had been responsible for

\textsuperscript{14}"Uittreksel uit een particuliere correspondentie, 's Hage, 20 Junij 1861," Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Wednesday, 14 August 1861, No. 16.
writing Rochussen's ministerial memoires to the Second Chamber. The post which Iz. J. Lion finally won with the new Dagblad would remain his for the greater part of the remaining decade and he would become one of the central figures in the controversial political literature of the eighteen-sixties.

But the integration of Conservative forces was hardly under way when an event occurred which seemed for the moment strong enough to cancel out the loss of prestige suffered by the Conservatives through Rochussen's fall, the collapse of the Van Hall Ministry and the resignation of Baron Van Nyevelt. Almost a year to the day after the publication of Max Havelaar, a book appeared in England which declared the Dutch Colonial system far superior to that in existence in the British Indies. The guide lines which the editor of the Dagblad might use in constructing a new and better defense of Conservative Colonial policy seemed as if, by pre-arrangement, to have been placed in his hands. The book which caused such a stir among Conservatives in the summer of 1861 was written by the English barrister-at-law, J.W.B. Money, and was entitled Java; or How to Manage a Colony, Showing a Practical Solution of the Questions now Affecting British India.

\(^{15}\)Nemo, De Penvoerder der Koloniale Reaktie (Kampen: van Hulst, 1862), pp. 11-14.
This exhaustive work in two volumes of over six hundred pages painted, on the one hand, a pastoral picture of the tranquility in which the native population lived and, on the other hand, pleaded for a system of colonial administration which, while recognizing historical fact, did not attempt fundamental reformation of native life and left ultimate direction and leadership with the dominating European element within the official and paternalistic administrative system. Money did not judge the Dutch colonial scene within the context of the constitutional struggle in progress in the Netherlands—rather, he saw the Indies under the Dutch as collaborating evidence for a protest against "the puny efforts of philanthropical sentimentalism" which had encouraged the wholesale introduction of Western laissez-faire concepts into British India. Consequently, Money tended to idealize that which he had found in Java during his stay of several months there, and he served it up to his own government in England as a more adequate solution of the conflict between two civilizations in India which had only recently been in revolt. Not through equality before the law, Money preached to his home government, but through paternalistic admonishment, does one make a colonial population obedient, thriving and progressing.
Money took great pleasure in describing in detail the cleanliness, neatness and good repair of the Javanese village dwellings. "The roads and lanes in Bandong," Money informed his reader, "run for miles between hedges and cottages in such perfect order that one is almost inclined to believe that native makeshifts had given way to proper appliances, and that native disorder had been superseded by 'a place for everything, and everything in its place.'"\(^{16}\) Once having ascertained this fact, in seeking to make his point, Money then declared that such habits, commendable as they were, were once quite foreign to the native in his low level of culture.

These habits were as foreign to the natives in Java as in India, till the Dutch made dirt and neglect punishable as petty police offenses, enforcing tidiness and constant cleansing and repair, both for sanitary and for civilizing purposes. The exertion and example of the native chiefs are still more effectual and the Dutch estimates the character of a regent by the state of the cottages in his station town. It is said that the peasants themselves soon learn to appreciate the beauty of cleanliness and order and voluntarily apply themselves to the improvement of their houses and garden.\(^ {17}\)

But such paternalism, continued Money, provided more material and substantial rewards for the natives than cleanliness. Thus, he affirmed that the Javanese were "the

\(^{16}\) J. W. B. Money, Java; or How to Manage a Colony, Showing a Practical Solution of the Questions now Affecting British India (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861), I, p. 37.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
happiest and richest peasantry I have seen in any country but North America.\textsuperscript{18} And, in open conflict with the story of Saidjah in \textit{Max Havelaar}, he assured his reader that "almost every cottier had his own plough and buffaloes and that many had likewise a cart and horses."

For the Dutch Conservative, it seemed for the moment as though the impact of \textit{Max Havelaar} could be totally deflected. One read forty pages later that "never has the peasant's land, cattle or plough been sold . . . either for arrears of land rent, however willful, or to satisfy the claim of any creditor, who had not stipulated in mortgage, for its sale as security for his advance."\textsuperscript{19}

These were the fruits of a wise Dutch colonial administration, said Money, which did not make the mistake, made in the British Indies of "enforcing European ideas of justice and political economy on a society as yet unfitted for their reception."\textsuperscript{20} Such wisdom had paid full reward to the Colonial Government which, Money averred, was loved uniformly by the native population under its authority.

Money's elaborate account of the system of obligatory cultures was presented in the most favorable of lights. And he unwittingly provided the Conservative with excellent

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 35.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 70.
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 71.
material with which to attack Dutch Liberal demands for free enterprise, when he declared that, because of the system of obligatory cultures, "no European was allowed to seek wealth at pleasure, by foisting his own terms on the natives or by using his superior strength, knowledge, and capital to gain advantages at the native's expense." In his account, the native chief became a counterweight to the natural selfish interests of the European concessionaire. "Till the crop was cut and carried to the mill the contractor neither had nor was allowed to usurp other control over cultivation, than to report to the officials such neglect or misconduct as he thought likely to injure the crop."

The duality of authority vested in the concessionaire and the chiefs secured the European, on the one side, from losses arising from the native's evation or infringement of his responsibilities and, on the other, protected the indigenous laborer from violence at the hands of the European.\(^{21}\) The safeguard of the natives against excesses or abuse were further guaranteed, Money wrote, by the practice of the Dutch Colonial Administration of allowing only members of the "class of educated gentlemen" to secure the concessions in the interior.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\)Ibid., pp. 113-114.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 154.
How great, then exclaimed Money, was the contrast between the humane, though authoritarian, system of the Dutch and the theoretically humanitarian but wretched system of the English!! The "occasional real hardship" worked by the Dutch Colonial system had been duly compensated for by the reclamation of the deserted lands which became cultivated areas "tilled like gardens" and which encouraged communication and commerce, not only to the advantage of the Dutch enterpriser, but also the greater welfare of the native peoples. Paternalistic authoritarianism was excusable, then, for it "enabled light to be led into the darkness of centuries."

As opposed to this, British attempts at the introduction of legal equality had destroyed the natural class of native leaders. The chiefs and princes had been humbled. They had lost their authority when forced to appear before the same court as the lowest of their subjects. Such tactics in the British Indies encouraged antagonism and made British authority little more than "a rope of sand. . . . The scenes of our chief philanthropic innovations were also the scenes of the most general rise against our rule, while, at the same time, the condition of general poverty to which we have reduced those districts by our ill-judged measures
in favor of the peasant, will prevent their assisting much in the payment of the mutiny debts."²³

Where the British system had encouraged competition between the races and placed the Colonial official, with his philanthropic motivation, as a block in the way of the European industrialist's desire to positive achievement, the Dutch system had marked out for Europeans and for the natives of Java "such lines of ambition, of power and of prosperity . . . as best suits the respective ideas of each race and the station in life of each individual . . . ."²⁴

Different duties, ranks, and advantages are allotted and strictly preserved to each. The native has ample fields of employment and ambition open to him, from which he is not ousted by the European's superior knowledge and power. . . . Each race has its allotted sphere, and it is as impossible for the native to be a contractor, a planter, a resident, a secretary, or a controller, as it is for a European to be a regent, a member of the landraad, a Wedana [sic], a Mantrie or a village chief.²⁵

Such a demarcation of authority between the races was "a far greater advantage to the native than any mere theoretical equality." What the native needed, Money argued, was a principle of organization and not the atomized society postulated by Western laissez-faire. British policy which was motivated by "fear of the native noble" had led to

²³Ibid., II, p. 224.
²⁴Ibid., p. 236.
²⁵Ibid.
mistakes which the Dutch had not made. "We must deal with their state of society as we find it . . ." and acknowledge the natural influence of birth and ancestral feudal rights which Western institutions could not displace but only estrange.

As long as we persist in acting as if the claims and interests of the natives were paramount to those of all other classes of natives, and as if the only mode of protecting him from his fellow-countryman was by reducing all others to his level, so long we must daily take his government more and more into our own hands, and daily supplant Native by European agencies.26

The lesson which Money would draw from Dutch colonial practices was the necessity of acknowledging the pre-eminent role of the native nobility in efficient pragmatic government. They should be allowed to exercise authority, undeluted by untested and inapplicable Western ideas. The revolution which British practices would affect in the village "merely irritate the upper classes without gaining the lower, while it is only with the upper ranks of natives that we can hope to establish the cordial relations of mutual labors and interests."27

This defense of Dutch colonial practices achieved great stature among the Netherlanders, more than could any comparable work in Dutch itself because of its availability

26Ibid., pp. 239-240.
27Ibid., p. 308.
for international consumption. Buijn, in the *Java Bode*, applauded the work without qualification. "In the field of comparative colonial politics it has done pioneer work... and as a first attempt it may consequently be called a master piece... We shall take occasion frequently in the future to discuss Money's work."28 And thereafter, Buijn reprinted in three issues of his newspaper an extremely favorable review of Money's book published in the English *Times*. To many, in the summer of 1861, this work must have seemed an effective rejection of practically every element in *Max Havelaar*. Not only had Money defended the institution of native chiefs, but he had denied the content of the tale of Saidjah, attested to the humanitarianism of the system itself and even complimented the Dutch upon the cleverness with which they had provided themselves with budgetary surpluses from the East. In fact, Dekker would unquestionably have agreed wholeheartedly with many of the arguments elaborated by Money, to the Dutch in 1861 this would have seemed paradoxical.

The dismay of the Liberal protagonist of Havelaar's cause found expression in an anonymous pamphlet which identified Money as the pre-eminent defender of the Conservative's policy of budgetary surpluses from the Indies. The

28 *Java Bode*, Wednesday, 24 July 1861, No. 59.
author decried the fact that, after having made a trip through "the most beautiful portions of that most beautiful smaragd of the empire of Insulinde, Money had written a book which caused the Dutch to shut their ears to Douwes Dekker." The theory that Money's book had effectively broken the impact of Max Havelaar so that it ceased to exercise influence after 1861 has been advanced and defended by M. Van Geuns who declared that "[Money's] book partially destroyed the influence of Max Havelaar which was being used as a weapon against the system of obligatory cultures." According to Van Geuns, the Conservatives won new converts to their cause with Money's book.

The writer had one great attribute: he was a foreigner and such a person is believed more readily than a fellow countryman. And still one more attribute must be granted to him: he did not loose himself as did Multatuli in digressions, rather he presented figures. And these appeared to be a practical tool in dispute.

Van Geuns is wrong on two accounts. Despite circumstantial evidence supporting the thesis that Money's book had weakened Dekker's, Max Havelaar by the winter of 1861-1862 probably exercised greater influence than it did prior

---


31 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
to the appearance of Money's work. Secondly, *Max Havelaar*, as shall be shown presently, was used even more than Money's book to win converts to the Conservative cause. *Max Havelaar* had ceased to serve as Liberal ammunition against the Conservatives.

The nature of the influence exercised by Money's book was controlled by two major facts. First of all, in the weeks immediately following the book's appearance in the Netherlands, the Dutch discovered, to their startled surprise, that the secret archives of the Dutch colonial administration at Batavia had been open to the English Barrister-at-law with the understanding that the information provided would be used in the defense of the Conservative system. The wide publicity given to this fact among the Dutch weakened, rather than strengthened, the respect in which the Dutch held the Conservative party. Secondly, the book, as it appeared in May 1861, was printed in English, and could be read only by a highly limited Dutch public. The Dutch translation which could appeal to a large reading public in the Netherlands was available first in December of 1861 or January 1862. But before the Dutch edition appeared, a six months period had passed, during which a Liberal attack combined with the the general indignation at the tactics followed by the colonial administration
at Batavia had grasped the Dutch nation and substantially weakened the book's impact when once available.\textsuperscript{32}

Nor was this Dutch translation, following a half year of Liberal barrage, calculated to vitiate the Liberal charges, for the book fell into the hands, not of a Conservative, but of a Liberal who provided the translation with a running series of footnotes and a Dutch preface in which he

\textsuperscript{32}With reference to the date when the Dutch translation of Money's book was available in the Netherlands, the following information is available. Van Hoevell, writing in his Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, in December 1861 (p. 344) made note of the Dutch translation of Money's book and continued by stating that he had wanted to wait with a critical review of the latter book "until the Low German translation, which has been announced [as forthcoming] recently, had appeared." In the same month, Mackay in the States-General (Verslag 1860-1861, p. 616, insert 2) made reference to Money's book, which "shall soon appear or has already appeared. . . ." These words obviously referred to the Dutch translation, since the English edition had already appeared in May. Both of these statements suggest that the Dutch translation was available not before December and probably received no wide distribution before January 1862. This remains the case despite the fact that already on 25 September 1861, the Java Bode (Wednesday No. 77) was advertising for subscriptions for the forthcoming, but apparently as yet unprinted Dutch translation. This means then, that a seven to eight months period intervened between the Highly limited distribution of the original English version and its general availability to the Dutch upper class in a Dutch form. If Dutch views on Max Havelaar were known in the Indies, before that book was generally available, then the savage Liberal attack on the book by Money was generally known in the Netherlands before Money's book was available to the wider public. With this fact in mind, the possibility of Java, or How to Manage a Colony, causing a "shudder to pass through the land" had already largely been cancelled out before the book could be read.
consistently took Money to task for inaccuracies and absurdities in his evaluations. D. C. Steyn Parve, a highly respected, scientifically-minded Liberal specialist on the colonies, declared, in the preface, that the Englishman whom he was translating "had appeared upon the scene as the panegyrist and defender of our system in the colonies and did this with a conviction and warmth, which, we acknowledge it with pleasure, goes considerably beyond our own attitude with respect to some of the peculiarities in colonial administration."

Those, who are acquainted with our own works on Java and who are also not unfamiliar with the numerosness of the opponents of the system of obligatory cultures and the system of consignment from the Dutch East Indies [to the Handelmaatschappij] and the proponents of freely contracted labor and free trade, will understand as self evident that we do not share all of the attitudes which the writer lays before us in his work with regard to this complex subject.33

If Money called the Javanese "the richest peasantry I have seen in any country but North America," Steyn Parve suggested that this was a statement based upon ignorance and that the poverty of the population of the Preanger, as an example, was proverbial. If Money declared that the Dutch government exercised no monopoly rights, this Steyn Parve averred, was an open untruth and accounted for the

---

existence of the Handelmaatschappij as totally depended exactly upon monopoly.\textsuperscript{34} If Money declared that the native's land, cattle and plough were never sold to pay for land rent arrearages, Steyn Parve added that this is perfectly natural since the peasant did not own the land and possessed so very little that one could not make up arrears through sale.\textsuperscript{35} And, if Money declared that the Dutch judiciary system for the natives was more effective than the English system since fewer cases are brought before the law, then Steyn Parve noted that this arose from the fact that the peasant possessed nothing over which he might seek legal redress and that, since the minimum sum involved in a case before a court must be fifty guilders, the native could not meet even the minimum requirement, seeing that his yearly wages were less than 25 guilders.\textsuperscript{36}

Such an unfavorable running commentary in the Dutch translation necessarily hobbled Money's defense of the colonial system. But the Conservative's cause, as defended by Money, suffered an even more serious blow as a result of the information on colonial revenues which Money supplied the Dutch public.

Not only was the Liberal incensed when he learned that the colonial administration in the preceding twenty years...
years had failed to account for some 115 million guilders, but he was further angered that seemingly valid information on this intimate aspect of Dutch government had been given to an Englishman who was understood to be writing a book in defense of the Conservative's stand. Factual data of this nature was traditionally refused those who might be considered opponents. The threat of severe punishment had faced anyone who attempted to use official documents without seeking the approval of colonial authorities since the promul­gation of the administrative regulation of 13 January 1854. Under the provisions of this decree, a cloak of secrecy was thrown around all questions concerned with the disposition of revenues from the Indies. Yet for the English Barrister-at-law, this had been thrown aside and a wealth of information had been supplied.

First of all, Money had had the services of Mr. Ament, the Director of Revenue and Domaines of the Dutch East Indies, and a former Resident of Cheribon. But through the agency of Mr. Fraser, an English merchant at Batavia who served at the same time as the British Consul, Money had received information from Van Bloemen Waanders, the Inspector of Cultures, from M. Diepenheim, the Director of Finances at Batavia and from M. Barkmeyer, the Bookkeeper-General at Batavia. These persons had supplied information to Money through the offices of no less a person than
Governor-General Pahud himself "who directed every department of Government to supply Mr. Fraser, for my use, with any information required."37

No wonder, then, that such a person as Gerard Keller identified Money's book as a work written at the orders of a group of entrepreneurs associated with the Handelmaatschappij.38 Nor was it surprising that the Liberal Utrechtsche Courant identified the warmth in Money's defense of the colonial system as "un enthousiasme de commande."39 But, that via an English source, the Dutch should now learn for the first time that a sum in excess of a hundred million guilders could not be accounted for in the bookkeeping of the colonial administration, left the Liberal majority awe struck,40 and this in the very year when, for the first time since the eighteen-thirties, the Minister of Finance, van Tets, made known to the States General that there was a deficit in the colonial budgetary surpluses of approximately F 6,300,000! This information, and not Money's book,

37Java; or How to Manage a Colony, I, p. 51.
38"Nederland," Java Bode, Wednesday, 24 July 1861, no. 59.
39Java Bode, Saturday, 20 July 1861, No. 58, quoting V. c. B. [sic], "Bijdrage tot de Kennis van de Goede Trouw der Koloniale Oppositie," Utrechtsche Courant, June 1861.
40Money, Java; or How to Manage a Colony, I, pp. 292-293.
according to one representative, now caused "a shudder to pass through the land."\textsuperscript{41}

One of the outstanding Liberal figures in the States-General, Van Bosse, called for an interpellation of the Minister of Colonial Affairs which was held on 13 July 1861. He requested from Loudon precise information with regard to the factual information provided in Money's book. Loudon's responses, based on information sent to him from the Indies, would be available only after 29 January 1862. But, by that date, the book had already become a condemnation of Conservative policy in the eyes of many people and definitive proof that parliament must be made competent to control the whole disposition of colonial fund. By December 1861, Van Hoevell could affirm that the Liberals "had drawn new arguments even out of the book by that Englishman, with which to commend and defend their own propositions."\textsuperscript{42} And, noting the Liberal demand for total parliamentary control over colonial budgets, Buijn regretfully acknowledged the truth of Van Hoevell's contention. "It cannot be denied that the appearance of the work by Money gave a powerful drive to that

\textsuperscript{41}Verslag, 1861-1862, p. 234 (Betz in the Second Chamber on 26 November 1861).

\textsuperscript{42}[Van Hoevell?], [Eene Stem uit den Vreemde over het Koloniale Stelsel van Nederland," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (December, 1861), p. 343.
demand [of the Liberals;] and the writer, without himself
knowing it, has contributed much to the early solution of
the question of fixing the colonial budget by law."

The period from March to July 1861 witnessed renewed
activity in Dekker's life. He gave up all thought of
collaboration with the Liberals. He turned to a positive,
purposeful course of action more befitting his own natural
inclinations during the same period which saw the Conserva-
tives adrift, floundering from fiasco to fiasco. Dekker
began to write. He also established personal contact with
no less a person than Rochussen during the catastrophic
period between the fall of the Van Hall and Cornets de
Groot Ministry and the commencement of the Liberal diatribe
over Money's book. Dekker played the role of the ideologue
in his new writings of 1861 and 1862 and produced arguments
which the Conservatives took up with eagerness and incor-
porated into their new apologetics. Yet he placed severe
obstacles in the way of a smooth rapprochement by reaffirm-
ing his atheism in the brief article: Prayer of the
Nescient, published in March 1861 by the free-thinker,
F. S. Günst in Amsterdam.

For Günst, Dekker wrote: "Call him Zeus, or Jupiter,
Jehova, Ba'al, or Jao ... it makes no difference: He is

\[43B\text{uitjhn}, "Inkomsten en Uitgaven van Ned.-Indie}
\[sic\] volgens de Indische Boeken," \textit{Java Bode}, Wednesday,
16 October 1861, No. 83."
nonexistent, or he must be good. . . ." Dekker's God, an enlightened despot, could not expect worship from men unless he made it apparent to everyone in quite uncertain terms that he existed. To worship him before he made himself apparent, argued Dekker, is "foolishness." He who serves God for the profit in it, or out of fear, turns something good into something bad. Did not Jesus himself say, "lama sabachtani?" And with the full crassness explicit in nineteenth century romanticism, Dekker concluded his defense of the Nescient with the words: "Oh God, there is no God!"

But, on 4 March, Dekker could seek rapport with an earthly enlightened despot through a visit to Rochussen's home. To his wife he declared that he had decided to "join up with Rochussen (against the clique of D. V. Twist)." Rochussen had received him "extremely well." He had said "straight out that he appreciated my demarche very much; and as an example, he picked up my card and said: 'I am all too conscious of the value of your visit. Eduard . . . Dekker . . . with Rochussen!!!'." [sic] Rochussen admitted to Dekker that "I have made mistakes [in the past]." And

---

44 Volledige Werken, I, pp. 475-477 (Het Gebed van den Onwetende).

45 Brieven, V, p. 30.
Dekker replied: "Yes, you have made many mistakes, but those were mistakes of a real man, and Mr. Van Twist has all the propriety of a piece of wood." Rochussen, in a flattering mood, had told Dekker of the influence he exercised over the ladies and his own daughter, married to Baron Van Zuylen van Nyevelt, had broken in on the conversation between the two men "expressly to meet me." She too, Rochussen had confided to Dekker, "is deeply impressed with you."

Dekker concluded: "In short, everything was perfect, I felt with him as if I were at home." The purpose of his visit? Rochussen had been requested by the King, upon the dissolution of the Van Hall and Cornets de Groot Ministry, to form a new cabinet. Dekker sought restitution through the good offices of so influential a politician, and to his wife Dekker wrote that Rochussen had declared himself prepared to assist him. Dekker counseled Rochussen to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections as soon as he had formed a Cabinet, and Rochussen "had declared straight out that he accepted my offer to help him against the so-called opposition."[46]

Rochussen's attempt at the formation of a new Ministry failed. Van Hall was followed in office by Baron Van Zuylen van Nyevelt, yet the tenured support from

---

[46] Ibid., pp. 30-31.
Rochussen was not relinquished by his successor. In a letter postmarked 29 March and written supposedly after later visits to Rochussen, Dekker could still affirm that, should Baron Van Zuylen van Nyvelt later be appointed Governor-General, he would be assisted in finding some office. This eventuality likewise failed of realization. The Governor-Generalship would go to another upon Sloet van de Beele's retirement in 1866. Dekker consequently achieved no concrete successes for the moment through his association with Rochussen.

Nevertheless, this meeting is of the greatest importance in appreciating Dekker's mental attitude while writing his second book, Minnebrieven, and in understanding the Conservatives' responsiveness to the arguments set forth in this work. Dekker declared himself to be at home in the midst of the Conservatives, yet Dekker remained unwilling to assume a subordinate position. He would not abandon the hope that had motivated his action in December 1859. He still wished to subordinate the Conservative Party to his own will. Four days after his first meeting with Rochussen, Dekker wrote:

Today I wrote a little letter to Rochussen: Excellency! I take the liberty to request from you an introduction to the new minister [Loudon]

---

47 Ibid., p. 46.
for the post of Secretary-General. Not one word more! How do you find that? Short and to the point!
Now it is not so much my intention to get such an appointment as to establish whether I can count upon Roch. I know that he will be flattered with my words. The previous Secretary-General has become the Minister.48

Dekker's intent was all too apparent. He was seeking for a new liegeman to replace his earlier feudal dependent, Jacob van Lennep! When Rochussen did, indeed, provide Dekker with the opportunity for a private audience with the new Minister of Colonial Affairs, Dekker may well have concluded that he had achieved his purpose. "Don't you see," he wrote his wife at the end of the month, "that all things considered together, something is brewing now?"49

Dekker, of course, was wrong in his conclusions. While Rochussen was attracted to Dekker and while he and other Conservatives, particularly Wintgens, would use his arguments extensively, this was not synonymous in their minds with a capitulation to him. Rochussen, already with a background which included the techniques of intrigue, must have seen in him a potential replacement for Iz. J. Lion, then chief editor of the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage.

---
48 Ibid., p. 31.
49 Ibid., p. 46.
The audience with Loudon led to no favorable conclusion. Dekker was, in fact, uninterested in an official appointment in any case. With a loan of twenty-five guilders, he took his leave from the new Minister of Colonial Affairs\(^5^0\) and, with increasing antagonism towards his own brother and toward Bekking—dishonorably discharged from the Colonial service by Loudon in 1861 but with a pension\(^5^1\)—and toward Van Twist,\(^5^2\) he took up his pen and wrote his *Minniebrieven*.

---

\(^5^0\)This meeting with Loudon was a subject of repeated attention on Dekker's part. Cf. *Volledige Werken*, VI, p. 138 and M. Douwes Dekker-Hamminick Schepel (ed.), *Brieven*, V, p. 64.

\(^5^1\)Ibid., p. 93.
CHAPTER IX

DEKKER'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT

The title Minnebrieven, literally love letters, provides no more adequate clue to the contents of Dekker's second book than does the title, The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Handelmaatschappij, provide an indication of the nature of his Max Havelaar. There is no attempt in this book to narrate a love story in the fashion of Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse. Dekker did use the technique of letters to make his point, but he did not restrain himself from the use of extensive quotations from newspapers and from official government sources, and his goal was not the dispassionate narration of the intimacies between loved ones. Dekker rather sought to cut out for himself a position of greater elevation than that permitted the figure of Max Havelaar in the earlier book.

Minnebrieven is an expression of the bitterness in the mind of a man who failed to bring the nation into motion in his own behalf, but it is also an attempt by an authoritarian to reformulate Max Havelaar in terms of the developing colonial struggle in the homeland. In Minnebrieven, Dekker went much further in this matter than in his Letter.
to the Voters in Tiel. Finally, in his new book, Dekker sought to instill within the Dutch nation that will to demonstrations which he had not achieved with his first one. "People are recognizing that I am bringing about a revolution in literature," he wrote his wife, "yes, revolution is my metier!"¹

The sarcasm of Max Havelaar can be found here again, but it is sharper. The sentimentality of Havelaar is also apparent, but it is more extreme, more exaggerated. New is his conscious preoccupation with contemporary policies and his increasing desire to dominate. "As soon as I can, I shall establish a periodical that must become a power in the State," he told his wife "My periodical must give me power and then money. I shall most assuredly succeed and the ministers etc. [sic] shall tremble, that I promise you."² The resultant Minnebrieven were literature of a high quality, yes, but so intimately a part of the political world of the summer of 1861 in the Netherlands, that it cannot possibly have for the student of literature today merit equal to the earlier essentially unhistorical, narration of evens of Lebak. Minnebrieven is as much a pamphlet of political propaganda as an attempt at belles-lettres.

¹Brieven, V, p. 75.
²Ibid., p. 78.
The new book was built up of two successive crescendos of occasionally crass sentimentality, the second one climaxed by one of the most powerful moving defenses of sentiment ever to appear in the Dutch language. But, quite unlike Max Havelaar, Minnebrieven concludes with passive calm. Dekker found a political resolution in the reflective speculation on the attributes of the hero in the capacity of Governor-General, and he found a personal resolution in communion with the eternal law of 'necessity.' Beginning with disarming informality, Dekker demonstrated his contempt for such Liberals as Bekking and Van Soest, unnamed, by rejecting them as the lackies of Van Twist and, as if encouraging gossip to the contrary by an inadequate denial, he assured his readers that Van Hoevell was free of guilt in any such affair.

Assuming a more serious tone, he reaffirmed his atheism and declared that God after all, was synonymous with the law of necessity, by which he meant his own peculiar concept of causality. And then, after moralistic attacks on the spirit of "Main Street," upon the imperfections of Dutch family life, and the inferior role of women in the Netherlands, he proceeded to commend his own publisher Günst and the latter's spiritual compatriot, the book dealer Meyer. The latter's address is given as the Vygendam and he informed the reader that one could purchase there
"Voltaire and the prayer of the Nescient by the mad "Multatuli" and many other sinful writings."³

With increasing warmth, Dekker launched into a fanciful correspondence in letters between himself, his wife, Tine, and an abstract feminine personification of the 'necessity' of which he had spoken earlier. She received the name of "Fancy." To Fancy, Dekker narrated his nine "histories of authority," in which he accounted in the fashion of Biblical parables for the dishonesty with which lustful persons had cleverly fooled the masses of the people into subservience and submission throughout the course of history. In these letters, Dekker's bitterness with the Dutch public's failure to acknowledge his leadership found its most poignant expression. Since he related his parables to a phantom of the law of universal "necessity," his discourse and his grievances proceeded at the most elevated of levels and his declared personal injustice became a matter of universal concern. Lebak, in fact, assumed the proportions of a new Gethsemane. The effective resolution of the wrongs he suffered became a task which demanded the undivided attention of all peoples; the resolution of the Lebak affair became an assignment that could be discharged only by the combined efforts of the Dutch nation as a whole.

This book, loose and discursive in its structure, did not profess to tell a story as Max Havelaar had, yet a unifying theme was apparent upon closer inspection. Whether it be the machinations of the Liberals around Van Twist or the doctrine of subservience taught by the concept of God, whether it be the lowly role of women in Dutch family life or the poverty in which freethinkers lived, whether it be the incompetence of statesmen or the failure of the Dutch to recognize and honor Dekker, in every case one was ceaselessly confronted with the theme of the suffering of the innocent righteous in the hands of "public," an unthinking, insensitive, amorphous mass of mediocrity. Dekker turned upon this fiction of his own invention and declared in indignation: "Public, I despise you with great fervor!"

Whereas Droogstoppel had given the figure of Max Havelaar added stature by way of contrast and Saidjah had added to Dekker's hero the nobility of a guiltless sufferer in the hands of the trite, mean and perversed, so now Fancy raised the author to even more remote eminences above the narrowness of daily life. But, if Fancy displaces Saidjah, then the curt, mean interjections of "Kappelman," a symbol for the Dutch commonalty and the interspersed comments of a Dutch Reformed preacher and of an uncle complaining of

4Ibid., p. 22.
the shame that the author would not write for the free enterprisers, these symbols were intended to achieve the same ends of Dekker's earlier repoussoir.

But, also among Droogstoppel's progeny, came now the new minister of Colonial Affairs, Loudon, and the English Barrister-at-law, Money. Loudon receives only passing attention, Money became the object of Dekker's contempt, second only to that in which he held the person Van Twist. Indeed Minnebrieven, in a sense, is a polemic against Money. That Englishman, he declared, has taught us nothing new. "I can understand all too well how he shows that the Dutch have taken as much out of the East Indies as was at all possible. What more can one want? Il preche des convertis. He wins his plea before he begins."5

But, it was altogether unfortunate, Dekker declared sarcastically, that the firm of Budgetary Surplus & Co. had to go to an foreign country to order its defense. "It would have been cheaper to read on this matter what Multatuli had written in his book on the auction:

But then there came strangers out of the West, who made themselves masters of the land. They wished to gain profit from the fertility of the soil, and caused the inhabitants to devote a portion of their labor and time to the raising of other crops [than rice], which would engender more profit in the markets of Europe. To induce the little man into taking such a course, nothing

5Ibid., p. 70.
more was necessary than a very simple policy. He obeyed his chiefs, thus one had only to win over these chiefs by promising them a portion of the profits . . . and the scheme was completely successful.

If one observes the fantastic mass of Javanese products which are brought to auction in the Netherlands, one can convince himself of the efficacy of this policy. . . .

See here, declared Dekker, I have already told the Dutch nation in my first book, that their system is efficient; but this is to overlook the moral problem, unrelated to obligatory cultures or free enterprise, unrelated to Conservatives or Liberals. If the Dutch nation needs a certificate of efficacy, they need not go to an Englishman they need only add up the yearly deaths among the native peoples, a consequence of immorality in the implementation of administration. See here, he continued, how Multatuli stated this:

If one observes the fantastic mass of Javanese products which are brought to auction in the Netherlands, one can convince himself of the efficacy of this policy, even if he does not find it noble. For, if one asks whether the peasant enjoys a return proportionate to this result, then I must, in response answer in the negative. The government obliges him to plant on his ground that which it pleases, it punishes him if he sells the resultant product to any one else, and the government itself determines the price which it pays him for it. The cost of the transportation to Europe, through the offices of a privileged commercial body,

---

are high. The incentive payments handed out to the chiefs in addition weigh heavily on the purchase prices, and . . . since in the final reckoning this whole transaction must bring a profit, the latter can be found in no other manner than by paying out to the Javanese just enough so that he does not die of hunger, which would reduce the productive capacities of the nation. Also the European official receives a remuneration proportionate to the amount produced. It is true that the poor Javanese is thus whipped on by two sets of authorities, it is true that he is often torn away from his rice field and that starvation is often the consequence of these measures . . . still the flags can merrily wave at Batavia, at Samarang, at Soerabaja, at Pasoeroean, at Besoeki, at Probolinggo, at Patjitan, at Tjilatjap, on board the ships which are loaded with the harvests which make the Netherlands rich. Starvation? On the rich, fertility blessed island of Java, starvation? Yes, reader, only a few years ago, whole districts were depopulated by hunger. Mothers have eaten their children. . . . But then the motherland concerned itself with the matter. In the deliberative halls of the people's representatives, men became displeased with the affair, and the contemporary head of the Indies' administration had to issue orders against the further expansion of the respective European-market products to a point at which starvation could once again threaten. . . .

Dekker reached the climax of his first crescendo of sentimentality as he turned the full wrath of his sarcasm and irony from Money to the Second Chamber, a body which had been subject to repeated sniping during the preceding seventy odd pages.

That dear Chamber of Representatives! . . . never again to the point of starvation! . . . I assure you that since that time a few Javanese have indeed stayed alive.

\[7\text{Volledige Werken, II, pp. 72-73.}\]
And yet another certificate! For several years now, many people have been meddling with the Indies. They can be divided into two principal sorts, the Conservatives and the Liberals. Conservatives are the people who like as far as possible to draw profits from the Indies; and one labels as Liberal, those people who like to draw profits from the Indies as much as possible. See there, the distinction which resolves itself in striking like-mindedness, but the unanimity discloses itself even more clearly in the consonance of the abusive language which they hurl at one another. Well now, they are both completely correct. It is entirely true what the Liberals say: the Conservatives are sucking out the Indies... but equally respectable is the frankness with which the Conservatives extend the honor of having done the sucking out to the Liberals.8

But at this moment of intense rhetoric, Dekker no sooner declared a plague on both their houses than he immediately began to qualify his supposed stand of political neutrality. Indeed, from this point on, the pitch of his declamation turned in an increasingly Conservative direction. "If a choice must be made, then I would choose the side of the Conservatives..." Why? Because the money taken unrightfully from the Javanese, if allowed to go into the hands of Liberals, will be invested at a higher rate of interest, and will weigh more heavily upon the mass of the Dutch citizenry, than if employed in a form of budgetary surpluses through the government itself. A railway system for the Netherlands built under government auspices would be a cheaper means of transportation than a railway system

8Ibid., pp. 73-74.
built with the investments of those who have made their fortune "in Liberal coffee and tobacco." But alas, concluded Dekker, such grounds for supporting the Conservatives are little more than rationalizations. The Conservatives, like the Liberals, had made themselves responsible for the abuse of the natives.

"In principle the whole affair resolves itself about the fact that the Indies are exploited in a most advantages manner, and that Money gave himself unnecessary trouble."

A third party was needed, concluded Dekker, dedicated not to the discussion of "the manner in which the Javanese ought be sucked out," but one dedicated to the principle "that one should not abuse the Javanese." But the line of thought which Dekker now set forth in behalf of such a "Third Party in a new "Letter to the Voters of the Netherlands," would have the practical effect of pointing out to the Conservative, who was increasingly concerning himself with sentiment, that there existed a powerful new line of defense with which to break the liberal onslaught.

Dekker echoed a sentiment widely held in the Netherlands when he asserted that the danger was ever present that the East Indies might be taken from the Netherlands by one of the greater colonial powers. Specifically, he concerned himself with the loss of the Colonies during a French-English struggle for imperium in Asia. We could
retain our colonies in such a struggle, argued Dekker, only if an effective administrative system, which duly respected the legitimate rights of the natives, attracted them to our standards against a potential "liberation." The defense of the East Indies by the Dutch would be extremely difficult, "yes it would be impossible, if the native population joined in a common cause with the invaders . . . or with the unsought for protectors, which is exactly the same thing. And the retention of the East Indian possessions will be easy, if the population supports us. Consequently much depends upon the attitude of the population. That attitude is a natural consequence of the manner in which they are governed."  

The central question thus became, what administrative system would assure the Dutch a stable and long lasting rule in the Indies? Dekker sought his answer in neither new laws nor systems but in the character of administrative personnel. The final critical problem for him was the character of the Governor-General and he protested the appointment of Sloet van de Beale, a petty party official who had risen no higher than recorder of the Courts of Gelderland. How could it be that a man with the genius demanded to rule as Viceroy over the Indies could have been hidden away these
many years in an office of such obvious insignificance? he asked.

And second only to the stature of the Governor-General who would determine the spirit in which the European cadre fulfilled its written instruction, came the question of the character of the native chiefs. The attributes which Dekker now assigned these officials were of the greatest importance:

The Javanese obeys his chief. Those chiefs have a need for affluence and pomp. He who has the friendship of a chief, can exhaust the people subordinate to him as much as he desires. He who pays such a chief—bribery!—can be assured of being compensated tenfold...

In his definition of the role and character of the native chief, Dekker had introduced a most important new element of emphasis not previously enunciated in his treatment of such a figure as the Raden Adipati of Rangkas Betoeng. Dekker's earlier writings had left his readers with the impression that the very existence of native officials was a positive evil, inseparable from the system of administration in the Indies and amenable to amelioration only through the abandonment of the autocratic centralized monopolistic administrative system. Now the native chief was made to assume an administrative role of a neutral quality. Whether they exercised their authority to the detriment of the

\[10\] Ibid., p. 123.
native population or not, now seemed to depend upon motive forces applied to them from outside by other persons and institutions. Under the direction of officials who ruled with compassion, he could serve the end of positive good; under the influence of parties indifferent to native welfare, he would become an unchecked evil.

With this significant new definition in mind, it is a matter of more than passing consequence to note the respective definitions which Dekker gave in this book to the obligatory cultures and to free enterprise. While the former system is referred to simply as "labor in behalf of the government," free enterprise is called, "labor in behalf of private persons who are left over to their own devises and make agreements with the natives without the protection of the government."11 Clearly Dekker saw free enterprise as a source of positive danger to native society. In his mind, it could not serve as the basis for a durable administrative structure in the lands of the Javanese.

This new line of thought had been gradually revealed by Dekker in the midst of a rhapsodie crescendo of sentimentality which once more rose to the proportion of a tempest. The "histories of authority" had provided a strong sentimental element in the earlier portion of the book; as their counterpart in the latter portion of

11Ibid., pp. 122-123.
Minnebrieven came a series of "fairy-tales." The third one dealt with Dekker himself in the guise of Christ on Golgotha. Then followed a series of "Proofs that the Javanese is Abused," and an extensive quotation from the Tielse Courant which dealt with the debate in the Second Chamber on 25 September and took Van Twist to task for failing to respond more adequately. Finally at the crest of the wave of emotion, Dekker turned contemptuously against Liberals such as Van Bosse, who had concerned themselves so much with the statistics in Money's book:

But voters, it is indeed well worth the trouble nowadays to find out whether the figures presented by that Money are correct. Your "respected speakers"—who for a large part cannot speak and are little respected—interpellated the Minister of Colonial Affairs for enlightenment in this matter. This is highly characteristic! One says to you, in a manner "which caused a shudder to pass through the land" that you are robbers... deferential silence! Then there appears reports, records, tables of the sums which you steal yearly... suddenly your eager representatives want to know whether those records, tables and reports are correct, and how anyone got a hold of such information!

Extortion, plunder, theft, murder... oh that is nothing at all! But that a stranger should be permitted a peak in the books... the incorrect and incomplete booking from that whole swindle... Yes, that would be an abomination! Nothing more than this is necessary to characterize the manner in which you, oh people of the Netherlands, allow yourselves to be represented, to characterize the level of your morality, and the weight of your devotion to God!12

12 Ibid., p. 125.
No passage from Dekker's writings could demonstrate more adequately his total incomprehension of the indignation which swept the Liberals upon their acquaintance with Java, or How to Manage a Colony. In Dekker's writings one must search in vain for a defense of the program supported by the enlightened Liberalism of the Netherlands in the eighteen-sixties. His center of attention is a question of morality and he seeks its solution through parternalism within the administrative system in the colonies already in existence.

To the warming enthusiasm of the Conservatives, Dekker now turned in this new Letter to the Voters which had commenced after the denunciation of Money, to attack Van Twist again. In defense of his own course of action at Lebak, Dekker now printed in full a lengthy questionnaire which the controller Van Hemert had filled out at his request back in March 1856. But, more important, was Dekker's new commentary on the pathetic tale of Saidjah: "That man Multatuli, made a mistake in presenting the truth to you in a poetic guise. You have set the song of Saidjah to music and your daughter's murder that poor fellow at the piano with great feelings . . . but see here now a new text which I commend to your musical inspiration."
LIST
OF THE STOLEN BUFFALOES
taken from the people of a single district
during the month of February 1856
when
MAX HAVELAAR
was the Assistant-Resident of the District of Lebak
and while the honored
DUYMAER VAN TWIST
during the reign of
WILLIAM THE THIRD
in the name of
THE DUTCH NATION
administered the so-called Dutch East Indies possessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the sufferer</th>
<th>Dessa (Village)</th>
<th>Kaloerahan (county)</th>
<th>Number of stolen buffaloes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kassib</td>
<td>Kadoe Gawir</td>
<td>Badoer</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manggla</td>
<td>Tjibongbong</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oessoep</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayasih</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radaya</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadji Sadik</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapioedin</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moersid</td>
<td>Waloekoe</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>Two buffaloes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadjiah</td>
<td>Sanggir</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridjal</td>
<td>Tjimontjong</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>Two buffaloes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalar#</td>
<td>Badoer</td>
<td>idem</td>
<td>Two buffaloes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamak</td>
<td>Tjipoeroet</td>
<td>Badoer</td>
<td>One buffalo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#This man was a loerah = lesser chief. It is certainly for this reason that two buffaloes were taken from him, which is altogether fair, for he had the authority with which to transfer his losses to another.
Name of the sufferer | Dessa (Village) | Kaloerahan (county) | Number of stolen buffaloes
---|---|---|---
Kaliam | Kadoe Leboe | idem | One buffalo
Asmil | Kadoe Gawir | idem | One buffalo
Rangga | Kadoe Damas | idem | One buffalo
Marni | Tjisangsang | Goen. Kintjana | One buffalo
Sariada | idem | idem | One buffalo
Djepo | Tijdadap | Kerta | One buffalo
Djaya### | Tujoeroeh | idem | One buffalo
Bayi### | Lebak Tjitra | Tjikoessik | Two buffaloes
Asmil | idem | idem | One buffalo
Mayinten | Tijkatampe | idem | One buffalo
Ayim | Tijlegong | idem | One buffalo
Moetassi | Tijgingang | idem | One buffalo
Mandaya | Kodoe Lamboe | Kompai | One buffalo
Arday | idem | idem | One buffalo
Adjiman | Laribongoer | idem | One buffalo
Arpan | Tjikario | Tjileles | One buffalo
Abin | Tjimerak | idem | One buffalo
Dakir | Tjiorogdalong | ? | One buffalo
Moektar | Sereweh | ? | One buffalo
Assih | idem | | One buffalo

Is that enough, Voters?

Don't you see how mistaken you were to call that Multatuli a writer, since the whole imposing monotone of the tale of Saidjah was nothing more than a plagiarism, a copy taken from a pitiful reality!

One buffalo! . . . One buffalo! . . .

One buffalo! . . . Yes . . . but altogether: thirty-six buffaloes! It's not so many, you think? . . .

###Or 'Pasir Air.' I am a firm supporter of exactness in "business matters."

###Village chief.
Be so kind: in a single month! Is that not enough, Voters?

Thirty-six buffaloes in a single month! . . . It's not so many, you think? . . . Do be so kind and reconsider: in a single district . . . Is this not enough, Voters?

Thirty-six buffaloes, in a single month, in a single district! It's not so many, you think? . . .

Be so kind and consider once more: Lebak has five districts . . . Multiply, I tell you!

Five times Thirty-six is One Hundred and Eighty! Is that enough, Voters?

One Hundred and Eighty buffaloes, stolen from the people of the district of Lebak, in a single month's time! It's not so many, you think? . . .

Be so kind to the point of boredom: there are twelve months in a year . . . Multiply, I tell you!

Twelve times One Hundred and Eighty makes about Two Thousand! Is this enough, Voters?

About Two Thousand buffaloes, stolen from the people of the district of Lebak in a single year! It's not so much, you think? . . .

Be so kind, almost for the last time: The Residency of Bantam has five districts . . . Multiply, I tell you!

Five times Two Thousand buffaloes, is Ten Thousand buffaloes! Is this enough, Voters?

Ten Thousand buffaloes, in a single year, stolen from the people of the Residency of Bantam! It's not so many,
you think? . . .

Be so kind for one last time: Java has, I don't know how many Residencies. The number is constantly varying. Let us take a number based on the ratio of the population of Bantam to the rest of Java . . . Multiply, I tell you! Twenty-four times Ten Thousand buffaloes makes Two Hundred and Forty Thousand buffaloes! Is that enough, Voters? Two Hundred and Forty Thousand buffaloes, in a single year, stolen from the Javanese population! It's not so many, you think? . . .

Be so kind for the very last time: Java is but a small portion of Insulinde. It is difficult to say with exactness how small—but the ratio of the Javanese population to that of all of Insulinde, stands at about one to three. However, since the prosperousness of the people elsewhere is lesser, one is not able in the other portions of your possessions—this is what you call them, don't you?—to steal as much as in Java, I suggest that this time you multiply by two . . . Multiply, I tell you! Two times Two Hundred and Forty Thousand buffaloes, makes Four Hundred and Eighty Thousand buffaloes! Is that enough, Voters? . . .

Four Hundred and Eighty Thousand buffaloes, in a single year, stolen from the so-called Dutch East Indies population! It's not so much, you think? . . . Be so kind now,
really for the last time: such a Governor-General remains usually for five years there . . . Multiply, I tell you! Five times Four Hundred and Eighty Thousand buffaloes makes almost Two and a Half Million buffaloes! Two and a Half Million buffaloes, in a five year period, stolen from the native population during the administration of a single Governor-General who does not carry out his obligations! This is not so many, you think? . . . Be so kind now, really for the very last time: a single buffalo costs between fifteen and thirty guilders. Let us take twenty guilders . . . Multiply, I tell you! Twenty times Two and a Half Million makes Fifty Million. Buffaloes to the value of Fifty Million guilders which are stolen from the native population during the administration of a single Governor-General who does not carry out his obligations! It's not so much, you think? . . . Then now, for what is really and truly the very very last time: the theft of buffaloes from the natives is not the worst affair! Pantjen-services, unpaid labor, unpaid deliveries of all kinds of products, all those add up to a sum of money, greater, much greater, twenty-fold greater, Oh Voters . . . Multiply, I tell you! Twenty times Fifty Million makes a Thousand Million.
Is that enough, Voters?

Money to the value of a Thousand Million guilders, which is stolen from the native population during the administration of a single Governor-General who does not carry out his obligations.

IS THAT NOW FINALLY ENOUGH, OH VOTERS OF THE NETHERLANDS?13

This was a powerful new expression of sentimentality strictly for Conservative consumption. While Dekker decried the activities of Van Twist in the office of Governor-General, he did not mean to imply that the office itself and the authority associated with it should be abolished. On the contrary, he favored a more extreme form of autocracy than was desired by many members of the Conservative Party. Paternalistic compassion was to bring into the administrative hierarchy already existent the sole element necessary to turn the colonial administrative system into an administrative structure of lasting durability. The system of obligatory cultures functioning through the native chiefs, who had now been defined as a neutral element, could become a morally defensible system of control.

But Dekker had yet to unfold the most important element in his new argument. Seeking to define the character

13 Ibid., pp. 127-130.
of the moral giants who should rule paternalistically over the Indies, Dekker next took a most significant step which revealed a striking degree of consistency in his thought since 1859. He requoted a passage from his handbill of December 1859, which had already appeared in his earlier Letters to Voters at Tiel. In this document, he had indicated his horror of those who "would apply Western concepts to Eastern affairs," of those who would "undermine Asiatic authority with the ram of Western preconceptions."\footnote{Ibid., I, p. 446.} In 1861, he wished to call his reader's attention to the qualities which he had once attributed to the Conservative representative Stolte:

> I believe there is need for a man of learning, but not alone of learning, a man with practical experience, but not alone of practical experience; a man who knows the people in the Indies, who has lived among and with them, who at the same time, however, is sufficiently acquainted with scholarly erudition that he will not allow his day-to-day decisions to lead him into [a policy of] simple empiricism; a man who champions the good, through his thriving after truth; a person, who, unbounded by a system, or by fear of others, or to please his superiors, both dares and is able to show how deep is the wound which emaciates our administrative structure; a person, finally, who has experience, capability, courage and above all else, a man who possesses a heart! . . .\footnote{Ibid., II, p. 144. The same passage can be found in the "Letter to the Voters in Tiel," in Volledige Werken, I, p. 448. Cf. Chapter VI, p. 233.}
Dekker's paternalism and sentimentality would appeal strongly to the new generation of Conservatives which, about 1860, according to De Vooy's, began to displace the older Liberal generation of 1848. For sure, some Conservatives like Heemskerk Az. found it difficult to adjust themselves to what had originally seemed totally irrelevant to the Conservative's stand. But precisely this sentiment would serve as a rallying point, for it had genuine "survival value." Emphasizing the ethical rather than the rationalistic or mercenary, Dekker pointed out to the Conservatives a release from the quandaries in which they found themselves in the midst of 1861. The moral argument, not so easily assailed as the stand taken by a Money, would permit the Conservatives to turn from the defense to a new offensive against the Liberals whose commanding position in the meantime was further strengthened with the announcement that a new Thorbecke Ministry had been organized on the first of February 1862.

During the six months between the appearance of Minnebrieven and the rise of the second Thorbecke Ministry, the Conservatives began the positive integration of Dekker's concepts into the body of their new apologetics. Externally,

this phenomenon was reflected by recurrent notices to the effect that "Multatuli" had complete disassociated himself from the cause of Liberalism and had denied the use of his first book to the colonial opposition. This was the case in an editorial of the late summer of 1861 which Iz. J. Lion wrote for the 's Gravenhaagsche Nieuwsbode. In an article otherwise assuming a hostile attitude towards Minnebrieven, he affirmed that the ultra Liberals who had been so strongly attracted to Multatuli, who had been "jacked up" by Max Havelaar and who had declared that it caused a shudder to pass through the land, "would now happily reject and ruin him and cut him off as an unusable limb in the quasi-Liberal body, because he has been shockingly ungainly in Minnebrieven and has allowed his cards to be seen too much, and because he has become the enfant terrible of the Party and must consequently be removed."

The fact that such a statement by Iz. J. Lion was reprinted in full by Buijn in his Java Bode redoubled the significance of this general proclamation to the Dutch. All were given to understand that they must learn to evaluate Multatuli in a new manner. And this remained the central theme of an extremely sympathetic pamphlet which

---

17Java Bode, Saturday, 26 October 1861, No. 86, quoting Iz. J. Lion, "Multatuli's Minnebrieven," 's Gravenhaagsche Nieuwsbode, August, 1861.
must have appeared in the Netherlands about October 1861. Its anonymous author was concerned with Van Hoevell's commentary on *Max Havelaar* in the Second Chamber on the 25 September 1860. "No matter how absurd it seems to me," he wrote:

I am unavoidably led to believe that Van Hoevell . . . considered *Max Havelaar* and the deep impression which the book brought about in the country a powerful argument for his colonial politics! Judge for yourself, reader, where does Multatuli have anything to say about the system of obligatory government cultures?

The Liberals were grossly in error, he reasoned, if they believed that Dekker wrote in their behalf. "One need only read what was written regarding this matter in Multatuli's *Minnebrieven.*"\(^{18}\)

The same anonymous writer had yet a second important point to make. It was wrong, he proceeded, to see Money's book as an antithesis to *Max Havelaar* as some people did. Between Money and Multatuli, there was no factual disagreement. The one was concerned with a code of ethics and the other's insistence that great profits had been made in the colonies was irrelevant to such an issue. "Money speaks above all else of the manner in which the system of obligatory cultures works, Multatuli not at all; while his own

theme; the Javanese are being abused, has not been and indeed could not even be treated by Money." 19

This declaration by Philoverax assisted Dekker in regaining his individuality in the eyes of the Dutch. And, in this light, one must judge the words of Y. D. C. Suermond, a representative of arch-Conservatism in colonial affairs. When he drew up his list of the principal defenders of the Liberal colonial policy, both inside and outside of the States-General, he omitted one important name. The defenders of the system, he wrote, were a former pastor in the Dutch East Indies [Van Hoevell] a former Governor-General who had been an attorney at Deventer, and otherwise "almost exclusively unknown newspaper writers and members of the Second Chamber." 20 Dekker, in this man's mind, could now be considered as officially on the other side of the fence.

But more important than these skirmishes with the Liberals were the more positive attempts made by Buijn, Banck, and Wintgens to convert Dekker's ideas into usable Conservative artillery. Buijn had pounced upon one of the first copies of Minnebrieven to arrive in the Indies and had

19 Ibid., p. 16.

made it a subject of favorable editorial comment even before the book was advertized in his newspaper as available for general purchase in the Colony. At the head of his newspaper editorial, he placed Dekker's pronouncement:

Conservatives are the people who like as far as possible to draw profits from the Indies; and one labels as Liberal, those people who like to draw profits from the Indies as much as possible. See there, the distinction which resolves itself in striking like-mindedness.

These words Buijn acknowledged as just but, borrowing from the sentimentality which could likewise be taken over from Minnebrieven, he defended the proposition that the Conservative was inherently more concerned with the native's welfare than the Liberal; and that Article 55 of the Regeringsreglement was a genuine product of basic Conservatism. The Liberal's constant emphasis upon Article 56 revealed his preoccupation with profits and his ultimately indifference to native welfare.

"The Liberals reassert with much boasting and bragging that they desire the native population's welfare. But no one believes this and even the Liberal party itself considers this to be only a pleasantry." For the Liberal, the exploitation of native peoples in backward countries was natural and normal and in conformity with the laws of nature.

Buijn wrote his article, "Normal and Abnormal," for the 12 October issue of the Java Bode, but according to the advertisements in his newspaper, Minnebrieven were not available for general sale until about 23 October (Java Bode, Wednesday, 23 October 1861, No. 85).
For the Conservative, such exploitation was unjust and abnormal. Where *laissez-faire* principles had been put into effect without government interference, they had decimated or eradicated native stocks. The Empires of Montezuma and Atahualpa had disappeared without trace, Negroes were shipped to the United States to work and to die for their white masters and the Chinese were used in a like manner in South America, California and the Cape. This was the tragic fate which awaited all colonial peoples where there was no Article 55. The doubling of the Javanese population in 30 years, on the other hand, demonstrated the factual welfare of native peoples under a regime which did have an Article 55. Therefore, concluded Buijn, "Multatuli's" definition could rightfully be qualified in the following manner:

Liberals are those who considered the exploitation of native people exclusively to the benefit of selfish advantage as normal; Conservatives are those who wish to consider that process as abnormal.22

More impressive was the writing of J. E. Banck, a colonial concessionaire who had worked with the system of obligatory cultures and returned from the Indies only in 1859.23 He adapted from Dekker's *Minnebrieven* the concept

---

22 B[uijn], "Normaal en Abnormaal," *Java Bode*, Saturday, 12 October 1861, No. 82.

23 J. E. Banck, *Coloniale Staatkunde van het Cabinet* (Amsterdam: Munster, 1861), pp. 45; 60.
of the native chief as a neutral element which acted as a
detriment or improvement of native conditions depending
upon the stimuli received from outside. Following Dekker,
he warned against the limitless abuse of pantjen-services
in the hands of free enterprisers. Against an increase in
these services, "Multatuli only recently raised his powerful
voice [in the Minnebrieven]."24

But Banck likewise agreed to Dekker's acclamation for
the enlightened despot as the moral ruler of the Indies, and
he accepted Dekker's definition of the distinction between
Liberal and Conservative. If the Conservative would wipe
away the grounds which legitimized Multatuli's indictment
against those "who like as far as possible to draw profits
from the Indies," then the Conservative must be prepared to
make fiscal sacrifices. "Let us not follow the example of
the [Liberal] colonial opposition which finds its perfect
personification in Droogstoppel who wishes to appear before
the public as an honest man but who is nevertheless inwardly
devoted to mammon."25 If the Conservative would keep the
system and its surpluses, then he must obey a moral impera-
tive and devote the surpluses increasingly to the moral and
material development of the native population. And, still
in complete accord with Dekker, Banck emphasized the need in

24 Ibid., p. 42.
25 Ibid., p. 36.
the colonies of an autocratic government dominated by a unipersonal head. The move to educate and advance the natives, he insisted, must be the responsibility of a single "competent, energetic and humanitarian man."26 With paternalistic care and sympathetic compassion, such a person should preside over the civilizing mission of the Dutch in Southeast Asia. "The refinement of the natives in Java must proceed from the initiative of the [central] administration."27

The evolution of Conservative thought in the writings of Buijn and Banck brought to the fore two themes which were likewise apparent in Dekker's thought as he gradually explained his own point of view to the public. Both Buijn and Banck viewed the Conservative as one who had been granted a distinct historic birthright which allowed him to declare himself the sole benefactor of the Javanese's welfare. From their point of view sentimentality was an exclusive possession of the Conservative. Secondly, both Buijn and Banck saw the means for the better protection of the natives in precisely that autocratic, paternalistic administration system which had become the quarry of the Liberal chase. The resolution of the syllogism was self-evident: the status quo could best be defended by injecting

26Ibid.
27Ibid., p. 44.
sentimentality into the current conflict over policy. And this was precisely what happened as the polemic struggle was intensified during November and December 1861. The Conservatives were literally propelled into such strategy by the unchecked series of Liberal victories since the winter of 1860.

The Conservative Party of the end of 1861 was receptive as never before to a new line of thought, to an alternate basis from which to generate a positive line of action. The Conservative was no longer satisfied with hysterical prophecies of the future awaiting the Netherlands or with personal attacks on Minister Loudon and Governor-General Sloet van de Beele. These tactics were still the mainstay of Conservative propaganda as late as the autumn of 1861 and proved fruitless. Typical of these frustrated, unprincipled attacks had been the observation which Foreign Minister Van Zuylen van Nyevelt inserted in a circular sent to all Dutch embassies abroad. He had written that the appointment of Sloet van de Beele as Governor-General was "a triumph of the colonial opposition." And, very quickly, he found himself at odds with his own Minister of Colonial Affairs, Loudon.

The resultant conflict occasioned Van Zuylen's own resignation (10 November 1861) and the attendant cabinet crisis became a matter of widespread attention.\(^{28}\) In normal

\(^{28}\)De Bruyne, Japikse, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 397-398.
time, wrote the Dutch correspondent to the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, the Dutch concerned themselves with politics only when the stock market or some other material interest was threatened. But now it was different.

The newspapers have preoccupied themselves for weeks with nothing else than observations on the political condition of the country as a consequence of the ministerial crisis. The fight from the side of the reactionary party, or to give it its new name under which it is now generally known, of the new colonial opposition, against the Ministry and particularly against Mr. Loudon has developed a character of vehemence such as has been seldom known. Never did the colonial party, when in opposition, carry on such a bitter oral debate as that now developed by the Conservatives.  

In this highly charged atmosphere, the members of the Second Chamber reassembled on 21 November 1861 to debate the various sections of the national budget for the year 1862.

The general deliberations, which normally occurred prior to the handling of the specific sections, took place during the last days of November. Wintgens was among the first to speak. He introduced into his speech the figure of a respectable, middle class Dutchman who turned with alarm to consider the arguments enunciated with increasing sharpness by the Liberals, the *frondeurs* of the institutions in the Indies, who threatened the nation's further acquisition of annual budgetary surpluses from the Indies. Must

---

the riches of the colonies, Wintgens had his figure say, now be taken from the nation and given to private parties? This was against the common welfare of the nation and against my own well-being as well.

With vigor, Van Hoevell rose to protest such a line of argument. "The respected speaker from Delft has held before us the line of thought of the reputable, high-minded, honest, good-natured, pious, christian Droogstoppel. I will admit frankly that I am at a loss for a refutation of such Droogstoppel-like arguments . . . I admit it: there are Droogstoppels enough in our country; there are among the voters, to whom the respected speaker from Delft would turn for a decision in this question of colonial policy, Droogstoppels in abundance."30

Without troubling to check the validity of his referent, Van Hoevell proceeded to demolish the ludicrous figure of Droogstoppel, not with a resort to sentiment, but by means of rational analysis of market conditions in the Netherlands. Should the highly favorable current price of Javanese coffee fall, the whole concept of budgetary surpluses would disappear permanently from the Dutch economy. Surpluses, if desired, argued Van Hoevell, could be guaranteed only by altering the de facto tax upon productivity with new taxes such as one on land. Again, argued Van Hoevell,

30 Verslag, 1861-1862, p. 271.
the increases in productivity of the island which came with
the first years of Van den Bosch's system had disappeared in
the last decade; the administrative system had not been an
incentive to continually increasing productivity, but had
shown itself an impediment which has held productivity
stationary.

Before such an argument, Wintgens held his peace,
but, confronted once again on 19 December by Van Bosse,
Wintgens took up the challenge in Van Hoevell's earlier
speech, Wintgens' rebuttal was of the utmost significance
in establishing the alignments between Conservatives and
Liberals for the next decade. "The respected speaker from
Almelo (Van Hoevell) is the leader of a political party,
ever ready to attach epithets to those who declare them­
selves in opposition, now a new name has been discovered.
If one does not fall into step with the respected speaker,
then he says: you are a Droogstoppel."\(^{31}\)

Wintgens had joined combat with Liberalism. In the
words he was about to utter, Wintgens drew heavily upon the
gradually coalescing body of a new apologetics, and simul­
taneously contributed his own endowment to it. He became
the first Conservative to incorporate the sentiment and the
stereotypes of Max Havelaar into a formal address delivered

\(^{31}\)Ibid., p. 573.
within the Second Chamber. Even more important, this speech was not defensive in character like the one delivered by Mijer in September 1860. Rather, Dekker's ideas became an integral part of a positive offensive against those who had originally seen the writings of "Multatuli" as an addenda to Van Hoevell's speeches and letters. Wintgens continued his important 19 December speech with the following words:

I must say that in the literature of recent times, there have been, in my eyes, few more remarkable phenomenons than the book in which that caricature appears. The picture of Droogstoppel there, is sketched with a master's hand. Stern even in his best writings has not been more effective with his humor.

What is that Droogstoppel? That Droogstoppel is the ego incarnate: in him we see the revulsive and at the same time ludicrous side of the spirit of the merchant man . . . but that Droogstoppel is not to be found exclusively in the cloak of the broker or in the guise of the Bourse patron. Oh no; Droogstoppel is as the Greek God Proteus: Avarice reveals itself in many other shapes.

May one not suppose that there are Droogstoppels who view with jealous and envious eyes the advantages which are now enjoyed by the commonality; and who like to convert the cultures which now exist to the advantage of all into private husbandry? Who make of [the slogans] "labor freely contracted" and "free enterprise," a mask from behind which they seek out private advantage at the expense of the common welfare? Who would like to place upon the good-humored Javanese pressures of a completely new kind, by means of collusion with their chiefs, in order to exploit in their own behalf their own quasi-free labor where now only the Dutch nation without an exaggeration and with moderation occupies itself?32

32Ibid.
Wintgens proceeded to describe in great detail the nature of the collusion and the heights of the arrogance of the Droogstoppel-like private enterpriser who would rectify the abomination of budgetary surpluses to the Dutch government by putting them in his own pocket. Pausing in his diatribe, Wintgens denied his intent to insult any specific member of the Chamber, but "any who so desire may interpret my remarks as a personal attack." Next, he plunged into the question of personal avarice among those who criticized the Handelmaatschappij.

Simple jealousy, he suggested, figured prominently in the criticism of the consignment system. Like Buijn, Wintgens decried the Liberal's search for profits and declared himself a proponent of two other interests, which should be manifest above all others: the interests of the Netherlands as opposed to the "Droogstoppels in the Netherlands" and the interests of the Javanese, "those good-hearted and gentle people whom we have been called to develop and who now--as all primitive peoples--provide their labor for the Motherland as a tax." 33

Wintgens' speech produced a charged atmosphere in the Second Chamber. The representatives, Liberal and Conservative, found themselves involuntarily concerned with

33ibid., p. 574.
deliberations over their respective rights to the title of "defender of the native's welfare." Van Foreest came to Wintgens' defense in a speech which Van Hoevell labeled as "the most undisparagingly laudatory speech ever held on the system of coercion." And, toward the close of the second day of debates, Heemskerk Azn. could refer to the "increasingly philosophic direction of opinion in the Chamber" as a tribute to "la politique du sentiment." It seemed, he said, "as if one cries out: 'away with the millions if only the Javanese is happy!" Despite the fact that no one had troubled himself to cite a single case of oppression or suffering in the East, "that politique du sentiment asserts itself above all financial considerations."  

Despite the fact that Loudon's colonial budget was passed with a substantial majority of fifty-one to twenty, it is noteworthy that the Liberals were found strikingly unprepared to answer the Conservative attack in this one specific area. Before the politics of sentimentality, the Liberals seemed to have no effective counter. In the face of Wintgens' denial that he had called anyone a Droogstoppel, Van Twist felt obliged to speak:

The honorable speaker has said that he named no one yesterday when making his insinuation. That

---

34 [Van Hoevell?], "Varia," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIV (February, 1862), p. 128.

35 Verslag, 1861-1862, p. 607.
is completely true. But I leave it to the gathering to decide whether one cannot speak in such a manner, without actually using names, so that everyone understands to whom one is referring. I also asked the gathering whether they did not understand from the speech of the representative from Delft whom he had in mind.36

And Blusse van Oud-Alblas, who could think of no better rebuttal of Wintgens' definition than the insistence that Droogstoppel had to be a Conservative, gave himself much trouble to defend the motivations of the private enterpriser who had been tabbed by the Conservatives contemptuously as being simply "a fortune seeker," an "adventurer."37 Van Heukelom justified his vote in support of Loudon's budget on the ground that, even if he disagreed with much that was in the budget, he would not encourage division since "we live in a period of agitation, and agitation is dangerous: it hinders calm non-partisan judgment."38 Finally Gevers Deynoot attributed to the Conservatives' new stand the rapid crystallization of political factions within the Netherlands in words which recall Van Hoevell's

36Ibid., p. 594. This statement seems verily to beg comparison with Van Twist's speech of 14 December 1860. The text of the earlier statement, like the one above, gives the distinct impression of fervor if not vehemence and, like the earlier statement, Van Twist's above words might be interpreted as a reflection of his sensitivity to anything having to do with Dekker. Cf. n. Chapter V, p.187.

37Ibid., p. 595.

38Ibid., p. 597.
reference at an earlier date to a "shudder which passed through the land." Said Gevers Deynoot:

Above all outside of this chamber the attempt has been made to awaken agitation in the field of colonial legislation; the great alarm bell was so rung from there that the sound of the bell came vibrating within these walls. Now it seems that within this assembly two parties in opposition to one another in colonial matters must arise, and still I believe that there is little difference in essentials if only each wanted to understand the other. But the use of the epitaphs Droogstoppel and Pangka-concessionaires is no manner in which to bring about unity in opinions.39

In the course of this debate, there was only one man who attempted to combine sentiment with liberalism: Baron Mackay. Allowing the Conservatives no more than the notorious book by the English Barrister-at-law, Mackay declared it the responsibility of the Liberals to safeguard the welfare of the little man in Java. From Money's work, he argued, there was one thing which no one could learn, namely "that it was the obligation of the Motherland to educate a people entrusted to the Motherland, and not simply to administer and exploit them."40 It would be Groen van Prinsterer in 1863 who supplied Mackay with a formula to resolve the conflict within his own mind which

39 Ibid., p. 595.
40 Ibid., p. 616 (Supplement No. 2).
had characterized his participation in colonial debates the preceding two years.

The Liberals' seeming inability to respond with effectiveness to the Conservative's sentimental affirmations did not attract the attention which it might have received under other circumstances, for the Liberal drive to achieve power, which had begun with the Wintgens Motion of 11 May 1860, would not spend itself for another four years. At that moment, it was not clear to contemporaries that an important step had been taken in the evolution of ideology. The Conservatives would exploit the slight success enjoyed in the December debates, but they none the less had reasons for pessimism. Heemskerk Az. declared in all frankness that "the increasingly pre-eminent political direction of the moment (for I do not allow myself illusions on this account in the slightest) is against the cabinet and in favor of the minister of colonial affairs." 41

The Liberal victory, seen in a large vote for Loudon's budget, was followed by yet a second triumph when, on 21 December, the whole ministry, in which Loudon became increasingly an incongruous element, was forced to resign on a no confidence vote. 42 And the Liberals could list, as

41 Ibid., p. 607.

third running success, the continuation of the attack upon the efficiency of the colonial administration in handling its own fiscal matters. Finally, the Thorbeeke Ministry received yet another boost when Money unexpectedly qualified his own earlier work by writing in an English periodical that he had strong objections to the role played by the native chiefs within the confines of the system of obligatory cultures.

The fiscal incompetence of colonial authorities was made abundantly clear by the documentation which the Second Chamber received from the Minister of Colonial Affairs on 29 January 1862 in response to Van Bosse's interpellation of 13 July 1861. These papers, accumulated during Pahud's stint as Governor-General, were a mass of confusion, inaccuracies and impotence. The temporary committee charged with preparing a parliamentary report on the source materials provided was dumbfounded when it discovered that Money had, in fact, understated the case! Van Bosse reckoned that the colonial administration had failed to account for 144 million guilders instead of the alleged 115 million.43 "Can anyone take it amiss when one is led

43 Verslag der Commissie belast met het Onderzoek der Inlichtingen omtrent Het Werk van J. W. B. Money, getiteld: Java; or How to Manage a Colony, 28 May 1862, Bijlagen, 1861-1862, p. 923.
to think here on theft," cried out one indignant Liberal pamphleteer.44

A letter written by Pahud was found among the papers which were delivered over to the Second Chamber in which he categorically denied a number of Money's ascertainment. That Englishman, he insisted, had not been granted the use of official unpublished and unreleased sources. Any information which he might have received must have been derived from pamphlets published in the Netherlands or from the labors of Steyn Parve himself. Money responded to this statement in a letter dated Berkely Square, London, August 1862. Copies were sent not only to the Minister of Colonial Affairs, but also to the chairman of the Second Chamber and to several of its members so that it could not be suppressed.45

Money wrote in this letter:

I got the revenue tables through Mr. FRASER from the Java Government and from no other source; and if those accounts are inaccurate, the Java Government and officials are to blame, not only for their inaccuracy, but for misleading one who took great pains to get that information accurate and to whom it was totally indifferent, except for the purpose of accuracy, what were the particular figures for any separate year, since the general results of a great increase of revenue and of a large surplus from the culture system were undeniable.

44Nemo, Politiek van den Dag; Vliegende Bladjes (Kampen: Van Hulst, 1862), p. 46.

Every chapter of my book was printed on slips in Calcutta, and each one sent separately to Mr. FRASER at Batavia for correction and suggestion, and every chapter was returned to me with revisions and remarks by Mr. FRASER, and, in most cases, also by high officials connected with the department, the subject of which was treated in that chapter. One at least of the chapters thus sent to Java on slips was, I know, communicated to the Governor in person.

All these things, so opposed to the former system of concealment, led me, it seems erroneously, to impute to Mr. Pahud a liberal minded desire to facilitate my object.

I was also informed by various Anglo . . . Indian visitors to Java that every one there knew of my forthcoming book, and that inquirers about Java matters were referred to it, as it was known to be based on the information supplied to Mr. FRASER for me by the Government.

The enemies of the system of course said, it must on that account be all onesided, but no one, I will venture to say, anticipated that the Java Government would repudiate it, or would deny that the information, correct or incorrect, was derived from official sources.46

As this information became generally available toward the end of the year, carrying with it the implication that either Money or Pahud were lying, Van Hoevell was likewise able to quote from a series of letters which Money had published in the English Economist. There Money had listed as "objectionable elements" in the obligatory government system introduced by Van den Bosch: labor by coercion, state control of capital investment, and the consignment system which bound the government to the Handelmaatschappij. This,

46Bijlagen, 1862-1863, p. 348 (Supplement 43).
Van Hoevell could excitedly proclaim, was precisely the attitude of the moderate Dutch Liberal.  

Pahud was now thoroughly discredited and, with him, it was universally understood, the Conservatives had lost any chance of defending the policy of secrecy which had covered colonial fiscal matters since 1854. Wintgens was advising the Conservatives to cease opposing parliamentary control over colonial matters and to stop using Money's book as an argument against the Liberals, when he declared that, in the documentation supplied the Second Chamber by the Minister of Colonial Affairs, there lay "proof that our colonial finances suffer from very great intrinsic failings." But this need not be a great loss to the Conservatives for the man who had been providing the Conservatives with an increasingly articulate defense based upon paternalism and sentiment now produced two new works in the course of the year 1862: Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie, and Ideën, Eerste Bundel.

In the first pages of the earlier and briefer work, Dekker attempted, once again, to hold himself above the machinations of the political factions exactly as he had


48Verslag, 1861-1862, p. 644 (Wintgens in the Second Chamber on 1 May 1862).
done in December 1859. As in Minnebrieven, he reiterated his curses upon Conservatives and Liberals as well and hurled his sharpest invectives at the States-General as an institution in which the deceitful and incompetent of the nation were assembled. "Your Second Chamber, Dutchmen," wrote Dekker, "is a market place for votes. He who offers the most, collects. And he who cannot compete, associates himself with one or another partnership which they call 'political parties.'"

The commodity which people sell in this market, is never put on display or announced. It is the same affair as with some shopkeepers who lay in their windows gloves or cigars as a pretext for carrying on the business of prostitution from behind the counter.49

Trying to free himself from the grasp of any political faction, Dekker affected to see in the debates of 19 and 20 December, during which so many references were made to the stereotype of Droogstoppel, the puerilities of insignificant men. To the Liberal assertion that Droogstoppel was a Conservative, but also to the Conservatives' contention that Droogstoppel was a Liberal, Dekker gave his blessings. "You are both correct! And apart from all of this I declare myself otherwise to be completely in agreement with the opinion of Mr. Wintgens who asked the question: if the

so-called free enterprisers were not the most repulsives Droogstoppels, since they suck the Javanese out more directly than their confreres on the Lauriergracht?"50 Ultimately, there was little distinction he noted gingerly, since this was a matter of superlatives. That one is a Droogstoppel, i.e., "a wretched one" is the important point and not the question of the degree.

Declarations of neutrality to the side, Dekker clearly felt constrained to make a special effort to demonstrate his freedom from obligations to the Liberals. Thus, he made a point of bringing to his readers' attention, that "in Lebak, there worked no system of obligatory cultures and still one found there yearly starvation."51 And, attempting to demonstrate further his indifference toward the interests of the Liberals he asserted: "When I wrote Max Havelaar I was not concerned with free enterprise. I treated in it a central principle and it has caused me much wonderment to see that book misused as a weapon against the system of obligatory cultures."52

Dekker was still unsatisfied that he had disassociated himself with sufficient finality from Liberalism. But

50Ibid., p. 203.
51Ibid., p. 201.
52Ibid., p. 205.
to emphasize his hostility to Liberal concepts any further was to place himself unavoidably into a position analogous to that of the autumn of 1859. And, in early 1862, he resolved the matter as he had before. Consequently, the standpoint which he assumed at the beginning of his pamphlet was gradually abandoned in favor of a progressively more apparent partisan defense of the system of obligatory government cultures with emphasis upon the morality of Van den Bosch's intent when he implemented his system in the eighteen-thirties. Dekker returned once more to his 9 December 1859 article in the Amsterdamsche Courant in order to demonstrate that his hostility toward the Liberals in 1862 was no new development. \(^{53}\)

Also, important in his new account of his political stand, was his commentary on that passage in Max Havelaar which had already been treated in the Minnebrieven. Dekker now affirmed in his Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie that the brief discourse on the origins and nature of the colonial system in his Max Havelaar had been employed by others "out of context." This accounted for the nocuous fact that "people have gotten the idea that I was a follower of the free enterprise doctrine." \(^{54}\) Dekker

\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 205.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 239.  
\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 207.
requoted the thirty odd lines in question, and continued in his self-defense:

I acknowledge that no one after the reading of these lines could see in me a fiery defender of that system. But it does not at all follow consequently that I take the side of those who, making misuse of the attractive sound: free, wish to establish a system of labor freely contracted under coercion, under which each and every adventurer can put himself in the place of the government so as to suck out the Javanese through complicity with the Chiefs. Mr. Wintgens was altogether correct, those are the most abominable Droogstoppels!

To this point, Dekker's statement was defensive in character. Its value to the political public lay in the fact that it clarified his position in the colonial debate. But of positive utility was the argument he now proceeded to develop regarding the necessity of the colonial system as a means of control. Without an exhaustive treatment, Dekker had touched on this subject in his Minnebrieven and this theme had also been treated by such persons as Banck, but, at this date (early February 1862), there existed nowhere in Dutch literature so competent a statement on this subject as Dekker now provided for Conservative consumption.

His viewpoint rested upon a few simple generalizations taken from his own observations in the Indies.

---


56 Ibid., p. 209.
Epitomized, his argument was as follows: The contemporary situation in the colonies was such that the native worked only at the command of his chief. The Dutch, seeing this, had decided to rule through these native leaders. It was absurd to speak of a law that would make "labor freely contracted" demandatory. To oblige the native to work "freely," that is: without the intercession of his chief, would only undermine Dutch control in her East Indies colonies altogether. One could reach that state of development in the Indies where the native actually did enter voluntarily into contracts, only by an arrangement which guaranteed the native his basic human rights.

This meant a program which would bring the arbitrary, capricious self-centered prerogatives of the native chiefs to an end. But just these prerogatives would be encouraged should the free enterpriser be allowed to gain control of the natives in the interior. Only an autocratic administrative apparatus which ruled with compassion over the indigenous was capable of maintaining the authority of the Dutch in their colonies and ameliorating the burdens placed upon the native people by their autocratic, arbitrary native chiefs. For both those whose primary interest was coffee and sugar and those whose primary interest was righteous administration, the obligatory government system must be applauded without qualification for it provided
order, and only so long as order was maintained could any objective of consequence be attained in the Indies. Dekker's own authoritarian bend was now fully revealed to his reader.

Dekker's logic moved readily from the concepts of "authority" and "order" to the image of the power and majesty of the office of Governor-General. He was in complete accord in 1862 with his 9 December 1859 article for the Amsterdamsche Courant and his Minnebrieven and with such works as Banck's Coloniale Staatkunde van het Cabinet. The Governor-General could provide that agency which assured order in the colonies. And, beneath the Governor-General, Dekker saw a hierarchic organization, spread out in perfect symmetry, reaching down, from level to level, into every detail of daily life in the dessa.

I must testify that insofar as I have been able to trace the matter out, I have been able to find neither in any country in the world nor in the pages of the history of the world an organization so synthetic or resplendent as we Dutchmen 'with God's help' have brought into being in the Indies. 57

In Dekker's eyes, the colonial administrative system could be compared only with the marching armies of Xerxes, or the Catholic Church for he wrote:

The Governor-General holds a rein in his hands, which at intervals subdivides into lesser lines whose bifurcations in turn are made up of various lines and cords, which--again in their turn

57 Ibid., p. 265.
bifurcated—reach out to the right and to the left, and after repeated subdivisions reach at last each individual, hold him in line, place him under compulsion . . . that is to say: rule. This rein—and I am still speaking as the Dutch coachman—is truly a Catholic Church of perfection. Sit ut est, aut non sit. And just as that Church could not be invented, but: is the work of the centuries, i.e., the consequence of the logic of facts which occurred in those centuries, so also the manner in which we Dutchmen rule over the Indies, was not invented by General Van den Bosch, nor by anyone else, but was solely the consequence of necessity. If you desire to rule over the Indies, then rule in this fashion. If you desire to bring about changes . . . if you desire here and there to place one of the lesser reins in another's hand, than in the hand of he who holds the central rein . . . if you would cut off the lesser cords, separate off the bifurcations from the mother line from which they sprung . . . or—still more abominable—if you would draw the subsidiary lines out athwart the direction of the mother rein . . . to the right . . . to the left . . . upward . . . down below . . . here and there . . . crooked and roughly . . . so that the horse grows wild . . . than do not attempt to rule! Give up then your authority . . . and your coffee.58

Nowhere in Dekker's writings is the imperfectly resolved conflict within his own mind between a causality which recognized no principle of subordination and his will to seek order in a world of chaos more evident than in this passage. Because of the order which he believed he had found, he called this system moral, and emphasized the morality of Van den Bosch's original intent. But his solution could not be perfect for, obviously, the autocratic

58Ibid., p. 266.
administrative system was also one dedicated to systematic exploitation, a fact which he himself admitted.

Change all of those lines into pipes, set the twelve million slender subsidiary pipes, twenty-fold subdivided, upon the chest of twelve million Javanese. Connect a primer, a sturdy steam primer to the central pipe, and then. . . . PUMP, PUMP, PUMP, I tell you. PUMP for the devil . . . and for the NETHERLANDS. That is the system of obligatory cultures. One must be either a Hottentot or a genuine human being, not to find it attractive. But viewed from a Dutch point of view I must continue to profess that it overflows from Catholic resplendence. Sit ut est, aut non sit. 59

For an objective third party, there was open conflict between this argument and Dekker's unqualified declaration fifty pages earlier: "LET THE JAVANESE NOT BE PILLAGED, LET HIM NOT BE DEPREDATED, LET HIM NOT BE MURDERED. THEN AFTER A TIME IT SHALL BECOME APPARENT WHETHER HE WISHES TO WORK SPONTANEOUSLY."60 But Dekker sought to resolve this conflict by emphasizing Van den Bosch's original intent. If he declared that the colonial administration must be retained then, at the same time, it must be cleansed of the "stupidities crudely injected by slimy residents or incompetent and lazy Governor-Generals. I took the field against such in my Havelaar, and not against the system itself."61

59 Ibid., p. 269.
60 Ibid., p. 218.
61 Ibid., p. 270 (Italics added).
Like a religious fundamentalist, Dekker sought his lessons in morality back in the sources of the system and he condemned Van Twist as one who had profaned Van den Bosch's mondane scriptures. Van den Bosch had comprehended, argued Dekker, that the colonial administrative system, as a system of authority, was a necessary evil and, to check its misapplication, he had seen to the introduction into colonial instructions of a multiplicity of humanitarian regulations. He had also made of the corps of colonial officials in the interior a corps d'élite. Van den Bosch achieved his greatest moral victory in Article 55 of the Regeringsreglement of 1854. This article, and not number 56 about which controversy currently raged, was decisive in the acquisition of a righteous administrative system. To this end, Max Havelaar was written. Dekker queried his reader: Did not my book overflow with proofs that colonial regulations would not be so bad if they were maintained? But they are not maintained! "This you can see in Havelaar. At least this you could have seen in that book if you had wished to concern yourself with truthfulness. The Havelaar affair is no battle against the law, but a battle against the violation of the law."

Dekker's total preoccupation with the question of personnel, as opposed to institutions or law, is apparent

---

\[^{62}\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 271.\]
in the moral imperative he found in the regulations of Van den Bosch. The founder had admonished his officials with the exhortation: not too drastically! As a voice from the distance, each colonial official must hear the call: "apply the system, but not too drastically!"

"Slowly and with circumspection, I say to you!" Spare him!" "God"--that is to say I appoint you to the office of . . . etc. [sic]--but promise first by Almighty God that you shall take care that he not succumb--oath of office!--That one not allow it to become too extreme . . . "Not too drastic!"

The system under the direction of a Governor-General who did not perform his duty was an abomination, but purified and cleansed and implemented according to the imperative: not too drastically, it is a morally defensible system. Then control could be exercised over the native chiefs through the European officials in the interior. But no control was possible under a system of private enterprise. Ending his pamphlet with a proclamation placing him in the camp of such men as Salak, and Van Herwerden, Dekker forgot his earlier anathema against the Conservatives and hurled his invective curse exclusively against the Liberals.

"Give every adventurer ingress to the machine, to the central pipe, to the subsidiary pipes, to the least of the slender bifurcations . . . give him permission to

\[63\] Ibid., p. 272.
put his own steam engine to work directly at the source . . .
give authority, for his own pipes, his own private, and
this time unligated pipes . . .
of not too drastically there is no longer a thought . . .
. . . give him permission that those pipes the pipes of
the Honorable Mr. Droogstoppel and consortium, may be
placed upon the chest of twelve million Javanese . . .
Let him bore through that chest, until he strikes the
heart . . . and then . . . yes, then . . .
PUMP . . . PUMP . . . PUMP . . . for the devel . . . and
for the FREE ENTERPRISER. . . ."64

Dekker's pamphlet Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands
Indie was available for general distribution immediately
after the appearance of the New Thorbecke ministry. In the
following month, Dekker turned his attention to his Ideën,
Erste Bundel which he finished in October 1862. This new
work of some 350 pages was not exclusively concerned with
the current debates on matters of colonial policy but
directed its attention, with no thought of creating an
integrated whole, to every conceivable type of current
question, whether before the public's attention or buried

64Ibid., p. 275.
in the customs and conventions of society. Thus, Dekker spoke with equal fervor on the structure of the Dutch family, on the place of prostitution in Dutch society, on the character of parliamentary institutions and enlightened despotism, on the place of religious revivalists in Dutch life and the role of the modern "enlightened" Dutch Reformed preachers, on the doctrine of "necessity" and on the principle of causality, on his relationship with Van Lennep in 1859-1860 and on the concept of guilt in modern society. "My ideas," declared Dekker, "are the 'Times' of my soul." 65 And it is also here that he began his famous novel, Woutertje Pieterse.

But, among his many vigorous and fresh appraisals of the society in which he lived, there were passages directly germane to the colonial debate. Thus he declared: "I understand only too well how a person becomes a Conservative, by paying good attention to what a Liberal is." 66 And again, Dekker had increased contempt by the middle of 1862 for the Liberals' attitude toward Money's book.

A commission of the Second Chamber has demonstrated in a most entangled report that one hundred and fifteen million have been lost in the colonial administration from 1836 to 1843. The confusion in that report is caused by the

65 Ibid., p. 316.
66 Ibid., p. 507.
mixing together of the results from dissimilar sources. "Jan has hit his leg, how is it possible that Peter doesn't limp?" Or: "if Money had breakfast in Buitenzorg, how much then was stolen at Banjoewangi?"

I say: nothing has been stolen. Not in the manner assumed in any case, and the pleasure of the discovery of that deficit is nothing more than professional jealousy on the part of the Liberals. India is ruled over by paper. The administration has become so ingenious from a super abundance of "first principles," that no one knows heads from tails. This now is nothing new. The Dutch people can resume their composure regarding the 115 million. They have only disappeared on paper. On, as a result of, and by means of paper, they will be found again. But in the meantime the Liberals shall once again make use of the banality in order to shuffle aside the main problem, that is: the abuse of the native people.  

If the elaboration of a seemingly growing reactionary standpoint on Dekker's part served as a positive attraction to the Conservatives and performed the great service of providing the latter with the most effective arguments they would use in the course of the following decade, then one might rightfully anticipate a progressive alienation of the Liberals from Dekker's cause. Indeed, one can clearly trace, as on a graph, the rapid decline of Dekker's stock among the Liberals during the first half of 1862. However, if one traced such a line on a chart from August of 1861 and the publication of Minnebrieven through early February and the publication of the complete Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie to the summer of 1862, then the line would

67 Ibid., p. 511.
not proceed straight away from the upper left to the lower right. Rather, it would be a curved line, whose crest lay in the months of December 1861 and January 1862.

The debates in the Second Chamber on 19 and 20 December served as the occasion for a last brief period during which the Liberals were goaded on into using *Max Havelaar* once more as a Liberal battering-ram. One could still occasionally find a favorable reference to the writings of Dekker among the Liberals, even before the stimulation to rhetoric occasioned by the exchanges between Van Hoevell, Wintgens, and Van Twist in December. Thus Gerard Keller, speaking as the voice of the group around *De Nederlandsche Spectator*, could write favorably of *Minnebrieven* in September 1861.

Dekker's new book, he told his colonial readers, contained much that had already been said in *Max Havelaar*, but these things, "in the opinion of this writer, cannot be said often enough." In the same article, Keller could emphatically call yet once more for a new edition of *Max Havelaar*. And an anonymous writer in the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, in October 1861, drew upon the rich connotation associated with the word "buffalo" since the publication of Dekker's philippic over the "Two and a

---

68 [Gerard Keller], "Nederland," *Java Bode*, Saturday, 19 October 1861, No. 84.
half Million Buffaloes stolen from the native population during the administration of a single Governor-General who does not carry out his obligations." The unnamed writer emphasized the gradual disappearance of the Javanese cattle which made the transportation of agricultural products difficult if not impossible and which, worst of all, caused "the poor Javanese" to experience a "still heavier oppression."69

The enthusiasm generated among Liberals by the Wintgens-Van Hoevell debates left its clear imprint on an anonymous pamphlet signed simply, "Justus," which appeared in December 1861. There, a doctrinaire Liberal looked with contempt down upon the "respectable, high-minded, honorable, solicitous, pious, Christian Droogstoppel," and charged him with undue worldly interests and possible hypocrisy.70 But, more widespread, was the attention directed to the use of the stereotype of Droogstoppel as a Conservative in Van Hoevell's own periodical. In an article entitled: "An Address from Droogstoppel & Co. to the Second Chamber of the States-General," a fictitious letter was printed, supposedly

69Varia, Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (October, 1861), pp. 257-260.

70Justus, De Pangka-Kontraktanten, De Ware Sloopers van het Kultuur Stelsel ('s Gravenhage: Belinfante, 1861).
from Droogstoppel's own hand, in which the latter was made to appear ludicrous in his defense of the status quo in the Indies. Droogstoppel was made to say as an example: "We ask ourselves merely, for what other purpose does one have a government than in order to take care that the hushed and placid Dutchman be able to earn his living without much trouble or effort?"\(^7\)

This line was taken up with enthusiasm in the 29 January 1862 edition of the *Bataviaasch Handelblad* in which Van Hoevell's 29 November speech against Wintgens was reprinted in full. In February 1862, the references to the Conservative Droogstoppel in the pages of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* were frequent. A new letter, after the fashion of the one published in the *Tijdschrift*, appeared in this colonial organ on 19 February.

But the editor of the paper, an unknown who presided between the withdrawal of Des Amorie van der Hoeven in the summer of 1861 and the return of H. J. Lion to the editorship in September 1862,\(^7\) was careful to give no one the

\(^7\)In n., "Een Adres van Droogstoppel en Co. aan de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, XXIII (December, 1861), pp. 382-388.

\(^7\)The first issue of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* in which H. J. Lion's name again appeared as the responsible editor, dated from 27 September 1862, No. 78. However, Lion had contributed frequently to his old newspaper in the meantime, and a number of articles signed "L." on a multiplicity of subjects are spread out through the first three-quarters of 1862 in this newspaper.
Idea that his readiness to use the stereotype of Droogstoppel, implied a change of heart on the paper's part towards the person of Dekker. Thus the editor, while referring to the Conservatives as "the ego incarnate" whose name is Droogstoppel, referred to Dekker as "the mad Multatuli." Without compulsion, the editor printed on 4 January 1862 an article by H. J. Lion in which it was suggested that, if Dekker were elected a representative to the Second Chamber, then it would be best to move that assembly in toto to Meerenberg where the government maintained a mental institute. "Should one then by chance need douches or camisole de force, then one is immediately prepared." 

The precarious balance in the newspaper between the acceptance of Dekker's stereotypes and the rejection of his Havelaar affair, fell when the editor learned that, in Dekker's new pamphlet, Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie, "Mr. Van Twist is attacked once again with extreme severity. . . ." And the correspondent to the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Saturday, 15 February 1862, No. 14, and ibid., Wednesday, 12 February 1862, No. 13.

73[H. J. Lion?], "De Katoen-teelt in British-India," Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Saturday, 15 February 1862, No. 14, and ibid., Wednesday, 12 February 1862, No. 13.


75[H. J. Lion?], "Ingezonden Stukken," ibid., Saturday, 4 January 1862, No. 2.

76n.n., "Brieven uit Nederland," ibid., Saturday, 8 March 1862, No. 20.
Handelsblad, who had made this fact known to the editor, declared his own alienation from Dekker in a dispatch published late in March: "I declare that, if my obligations as correspondent did not forbid it, I would lay such pamphlets [as *Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederland Indie*] aside; I would not read any more the writings of Multatuli for after awhile they become too heavy to digest."77

The editor declared himself in full agreement with his correspondent's view, and suggested a new name for Dekker. The latter might well use the name of *Multadjoesta*, i.e., much (Latin) lying (Malay).78 And Lion substituted for 'Ideesn', the title of Dekker's newest work, a more "exact" name: "Multatuli's confusion,"79 in an article of late May. When Lion took over the editorship of the paper in September, all references whatsoever to Dekker and his stereotypes disappeared from the pages of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*.

In the meantime, the Liberal position in the Motherland was authoritatively stated by Van Hoevell in a brief

77Ibid., Saturday, 22 March 1862, No. 24.

78[H. J. Lion?], "Multatuli," ibid., Saturday, 26 April 1862, No. 34.

79L., "Muntwezen," ibid., Wednesday, 28 May 1862, No. 43.
review of Dekker's *Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie*.

The Javanese are abused! There is one who has been widely celebrated in recent times who continually puts this theme before our eyes in a multiplicity of variations and forms that awaken and stimulate the attention of our citizenry.  

Van Hoevell did not question the correctness of this contention but he did indicate his personal alienation from Dekker by restating essentially the same position which he had once set forth in his original review of *Max Havelaar*. By showing that he had remained faithful to his original position, he hoped to disassociate himself from his erstwhile protegé in the public's mind. The solution to the problem of abuse was not a question of the personnel used, but a question of statutory law. The sources of abuse lay in the institutions of Java and only their alteration or replacement could provide security of person in the colonies.

In the constitution for the Dutch Motherland, he continued, one found no article which specified that the King's first duty was to protect the citizenry from abuse and extortion. Why? The institutional structure of the Dutch state excluded situation of this character from developing. It was exactly these kind of safeguards which Van Hoevell would see built into colonial relationships. Only in this way could the hands of a righteous Governor-General  

---

80[Van Hoevell], "Varia," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, XXIV (February, 1862), p. 126.
be untied so that he might effectively and positively stamp out the ingrown abuses found in the colonies.

For Van Hoewell, Dekker had ceased to be a hope or guide line for positive action. His role as a propagandist of Liberalism and enlightenment in the Netherlands had been fulfilled with his first book. He had nothing further to offer his fellow countrymen. In Van Hoewell's opinion, the Dutch were not in need of repetitious cries for a principle which already enjoyed general support among Liberals. The Dutch needed positive suggestions on the course that should be followed in the deliberative and legislative bodies of the country.81

81Ibid., pp. 126-127.
CHAPTER X

THE NEW CONSERVATIVE APOLOGETICS

By the winter of 1862, when the first volume of Dekker's *Ideeen* was available to the general public, all the requisite sources were on hand for the formulation of substantial arguments against the various schemes for the Indies proposed by Liberals. The writings of Van Herwerden and Salak, of Hasselman and Suermondt, the debates over Money's book, Wintgens's redefinition of Droogstoppel, Dekker's *Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie*, and the reports which began to appear in the Netherlands in 1862 of criminal malpractices at Cheribon and Rembang where independent enterprisers had been given free rein—these were the sources from which a large group of Dutchmen drew their arguments in defending the status quo in the Indies against change, or in admonishing those whom they did charge with the task of introducing modest reforms.

One cannot speak of a distinct "Conservative" viewpoint in matters of Dutch domestic policy for most of the representatives in the Second Chamber were dedicated with varying degrees of reticence, subtlety and refinement to moderate Liberalism in this field. The
problems of the motherland did not occasion the growth of a Conservative Party. "It was above all the colonial question," Boogman has asserted, "which contributed as a powerful stimulant to the forming of a Conservative Party."¹ And it is with respect to colonial policy that one can speak of a "Conservative" position. There was a large area of agreement on colonial policy among those classified together loosely as the Conservatives, and this body of thought was clearly distinct from that of the Liberals. A high degree of unanimity was particularly apparent among the two scores of representatives whom Lord Napier in 1860 called the "Conservative Reactionaries."

Considerable heterogeneity could be noted even within this smaller group, varying from the magniloquent elevation of paternalism to the dignity of a first moral principle to the frank assertion that the government needed the yearly budgetary surpluses of the Indies. Nevertheless, it can be said that these men possessed an ideology which covered colonial matters. They did agree among themselves on a necessary minimum number of a priori.

Their way of thought followed from the joint labors of many Conservative politicians and thinkers.

¹Boogman, op. cit., p. 199.
However, a major role in the composition of a Conservative point of view in colonial matters must be assigned to Dekker, who not only provided Conservative polemics with content, but also stimulated the apologist's tendency to distort and exaggerate.  

But to employ and subscribe to such arguments as Dekker had injected into the debate on colonial policy

---

2The thesis that Dekker contributed substantially to the formation of a Conservative line of debate is not original with the writer. P. A. Diepenhorst declared in 1929 that "he who honors Multatuli as the talented adversary of the obligatory culture system, reveals a total ignorance with his work and strivings." The same author asserted further that Dekker's writings "rather hampered than assisted the struggle against the accrescence" of the system of government cultures. (P. A. Diepenhorst, Onze Strijd in de Staten-Generaal, Vol. II: Koloniale Politiek (Amsterdam: De Standaard, 1929), pp. 345; 342.

But Diepenhorst was unable to distinguish between Dekker's repeated assertions that he belonged to neither party and the fact that the pitch of Dekker's writings favored the Conservatives from the beginning. Thus, Diepenhorst came to the unwarranted conclusion that, only in 1870, in his second pamphlet on free enterprise, did Dekker cast his lot with the Conservatives. In discussing Dekker's first pamphlet on free enterprise, Diepenhorst placed emphasis exclusively upon those passages early in the pamphlet in which Dekker declared a plague on both the Liberals and the Conservatives. Diepenhorst ignored Dekker's Letter to the Voters in Tiel and his Minnebriefen but, most seriously, he failed to cite the most important passage in Dekker's first pamphlet on free enterprise in which he described the hierarchical structure of the colonial administrative apparatus and declared it morally righteous, provided one went back to the imperatives which Van den Bosch wrote into his original instructions. This passage, the only positive element in Dekker's pamphlet, had utility value only for the Conservative.
with his own unique dramatic powers, was an altogether different matter from accepting him as a person. Dekker argued that, only by a redress of his own grievances, could the nation (read Conservatives) fully validate their claim to be sincerely concerned with the welfare of the natives. The Conservatives, of course, would not go so far, although they would come close to it in 1867. But the refusal to resolve a supposed injustice was unrelated to the question of the Conservative's utilization of "Multatuli's" ideas, with or without specific reference to him by name. This ability to accept his ideas without accepting his person is important if one is to understand how many, like the leader of the Anti-Revolutionaires, Groen van Prinsterer, who were attracted to the new defenses of the Conservative Party of 1862-1864, were unaware of Dekker's role in energizing and invigorating this new aggressive combination.

A remarkable display of the fact that the Conservative was indeed able to distinguish between the ideas of "Multatuli" and the person of Dekker is provided in an intimate letter of 4 February 1862 sent by Aart Veder, in response to an earlier letter from his close friend, Jacob van Lennep. These two men had been on the closest of terms for some thirty years. Veder agreed with Van Lennep's evaluation of Dekker. Like his friend,
he had great personal respect for Dekker's integrity and for the stand which he took publicly. Yet he warned Van Lennep at the same time against allowing himself again to be intimately involved with the author of *Max Havelaar*.

"As for myself, I am convinced that he is no dishonest man, and that he is not capable of actual baseness—on the contrary his sense of pride shall harm him more than his inclination toward intrigue . . .". Nevertheless Veder urgent advice was: "Do not allow your good heart nor your admiration for that man's literary talent to mislead you again into coming into a more intimate relationship with him."

While respecting Dekker's work, van Lennep's friend was able to hold himself sufficiently apart to present an excellent sketch of Dekker's character.

He belongs to that sort of men with whom one may enjoy at moments much pleasure and satisfaction, but from whom one comes to know in the long run only burdens and spite. Such persons are men who have incorporated within their own character the unfavorable side of the feminine character, crotchety, super-sensitive, excessive in their demands on friendship and sacrifice, stated in brief it is impossible to get along with them in the long run if one is not prepared to sit up [like a puppy dog] and shake hands.3

This same kind of concurrent attraction and repulsion characterized Wintgens's first contact with *Max Havelaar*.

3M. F. van Lennep, op. cit., p. 189.
Dekker in late December 1861. He received a lengthy congratulatory letter following his speech of 19 December in which he redefined the meaning of Droogstoppel. He responded by sending a sympathetic note in which a 25 guilder note was included. But, so the letter from Wintgens had ended, "let us carry this relationship no further!" Dekker was incensed by what he considered an insult to his pride; he abruptly returned the money. One might conclude that Wintgens revealed in this letter a basic indifference to Dekker's person. But this conclusion is belied by the fact that amiable relations were reestablished in 1863 and lasted for a decade during which a series of letters passed between them.

However, the direct personal relations between Dekker and individual Conservatives, like Wintgens and Rochussen, provides no key to an understanding of the nature of his influence or the manner in which his ideas were adapted by Conservatives. Dekker's contacts with these men, like his later contact in 1868 with Hasselman and Van Zuylen van Nyvelt, was a consequence of his writings, and considerably less important than the fact that his books of the period 1860-1862 provided the Conservatives with much of their new aggressive rationale.

---

4 Briefwisseling tuschen Multatuli and Roorda van Eysinga, p. 22.
Even Van Lennep, who followed Veder's advice and maintained his distance, capitulated to the power of Dekker's published works.

Van Lennep tried his own hand at pamphlet writing in 1868, shortly before his death. Instinctively, he turned to *Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie* for his norms in discussing colonial matters. Dekker had written that the Dutch were faced with a choice between ruling over the Indies by means of the administrative system already in existence or abandoning their colonial ambitions altogether. Van Lennep wrote:

> He who would cite Multatuli as his authority in contending that the Javanese are oppressed under the system of obligatory cultures, forget not that the former has complained nowhere that such has occurred because of the system of obligatory cultures, and that he on the contrary has repeatedly stated as his opinion that by turning over to private parties that which is now the responsibility of a government which has it in its power to prevent or punish injustice, one shall infinitely aggravate their oppression.5

Central to the revised body of Conservative thought was the idea that Van den Bosch's system had provided the Dutch with an efficient technique of control which could not be excelled by any alternate scheme and which was, above all, morally defensible since

---

5 Jacob van Lennep, *De Podagra en het Manifest van Burgerpligt* (Amsterdam: J. De Ruyter, 1868), pp. 11-12.
it rested upon an effective adaptation of the condition found in situ. Thus, Wintgens argued that the Dutch were able to maintain their dominion over the Indies with a handful of Europeans, because of the nature of the administrative structure through which they asserted their authority, an organization which, according to Wintgens, was "moulded in complete accord with the nature, with the religious concepts and with the legal institutions of the natives ...".  

And, in a like manner, J. J. Hasselman claimed that the colonial system "is based upon an accurate knowledge of the character of the population; it has been implemented so as to follow the guide lines which the natives own original ancestral institution, communal land possession, has itself suggested ...". And, again, P. Myer referred his listeners to Articles 67, 71 and 75 of the government regulations of 1854 in contending that the colonial administrative system had been implemented so as to follow the guidelines which the natives own original ancestral institution, communal land possession, has itself suggested ...".  

6 Verslag, Zitting van 15 September 1862 tot 19 September 1863, p. 342 (Wintgens in the Second Chamber on 3 December 1862).  

"grafted on to native Asiatic forms and institutions of which the village organization was the core."

It followed logically that, to insist upon an administrative structure which harmonized with Asiatic concepts of organization was likewise to insist upon the legitimacy of the autocratic rule of a single man at the top. In the defense of such a contention, Baron van Goltstein turned to Max Havelaar. He considered this book an authoritative source of information, distinct from the mass of hastily prepared apologetic pamphleteering. He cited it in arguing that, to turn ultimate authority for colonial policy over to parliament, was to make impossible the maintenance of Dutch control in the Indies.

---

8 Verslag, 1862-1863, p. 395 (Mijer in the Second Chamber on 6 December 1862).

9 W. Baron van Goltstein, Het Vaststellen der Indische Begrooting bij de Wet ('s Gravenhage: van Stockum, 1864), pp. 51-52. More precisely, Van Goltstein referred his reader to that passage in Max Havelaar which occurs on pages 220-222 of the first volume in the Van Oorschot edition of Dekker's complete work. He continued with the following words:

"It is always difficult for the stranger, even if he is the most competent of statesmen, to administer a country. The nature of the country is alien for him. He feels himself completely different from the natives. And for the most part even his best efforts to identify himself with them ends in failure. Such we are taught by the history and the experiences of our own time. Is not bad administration to be feared even more where it is turned over to a house of representatives of which the majority is not even acquainted with the land to be ruled superficially?"
The Conservatives openly admitted that their autocratic system—"grafted onto" Asiatic institutions—did not fit the a priori of nineteenth century Liberalism. But such a charge was no condemnation of the system for the Conservative. It simply meant that liberal institutions had to be forgotten in discussing colonial policy. This stand was most frankly enunciated by De Brauw. He argued that the Dutch possess the East Indies only through conquest and the right of the stronger.

If you are indeed a liberal and wish to apply liberal principles then abandon Java; for it is not liberal to make use of the right of the strongest and be the overlord . . . . I have heard it said that if that liberal colonial policy is once put into effect, cords of love would bind the Javanese to the Netherlands more strongly than the cords of coercion and force majeure . . . . Just let our might once fade and you shall see what your cords of love would have accomplished. I have once heard that the cultivated Javanese say: If I then must be under alien mastery, then rather under yours than under that of another; but never does he value mastery above his own rule.

Mijer argued for the morality of this system on the grounds that the Conservatives themselves had been responsible for seeking out and correcting the principal faults within the system, and he found it particularly commendable because it introduced Western culture to

10 Verslag, Zitting van 19 September 1864 tot 16 September 1865, p. 449 (De Brauw in the Second Chamber on 17 December 1864).

11 Ibid., 1862-1863, p. 407 (Mijer in the Second Chamber on 8 December 1862).
colonial peoples in its most favorable light: through the colonial officials in the interior, a *corps d'élite*. This body had the task of accustoming the natives to systematic daily labor. "One does not attempt to convince children with arguments, one forces them to do the good . . . "*, argued Hasselman.

Only after they had experienced the advantages gained from regular employment for a long period would they accept the veracity of "our paternalistic admonishments of today."* Looking forward to the blunt language in which De Brauw would speak, Hasselman concluded that the proper role of the reformer was to improve the authoritarian system already in existence so that it might efficiently accomplish its task as the civilizer of a childlike people. And, echoing a theme which Dekker

12 J.J. Hasselman, *De Kultuur-Procenten en het Kultuur Stelsel*, pp. 23-24. At approximately the same time that Van Hoevell indicated his alienation from Dekker in his review of Dekker's February 1861 pamphlet on free enterprise, he also showed his alienation from Hasselman. He was acquainted with the latter's less pretentious pamphlet of 1860 (*Beschouwingen omtent het Cultuur Stelsel*, Cf. Chapter V, pp. 171 - 172.) and he held Hasselman to be a moderate liberal until he saw the latter's writing of 1862. In April of that year, he wrote: "We have put down Mr. Hasselman's name as that of a man of lucid comprehension, liberal inclination and ennobling principles. Is now the content of this pamphlet reconcilable in all respects with those qualities? We doubt it." [Van Hoevell], "Maandelijksh overzigt der Indische Letterkunde," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, XXIV (April, 1862), p. 250.
had repeatedly emphasized in his writings since 1861, Hasselman labeled as an artificial and irrelevant distraction the Dutch legislatures preoccupation with any other problem. "Gentlemen reformers, if you really wish improvement then leave the system that provides such an opportunity and shall continue to provide it, unscathed, and do not compound your desire for improvement with subsidiary matters."  

If it was true that the paternalistic administrative structure was the Dutchman's only guarantee of protracted rule in the Indies, then its corollary was likewise warranted: uninhibited free enterprise meant the weakening and eventual destruction of Dutch imperium. Liberalism was a challenge to the retention of the colonies! Baud had employed this argument *ex cathedra* in the eighteen-forties when there were few who thought to challenge the new status quo. During the eighteen-fifties, this thesis lost its currency as the Liberals brought about the first modifications of the colonial system. But, in the early eighteen-sixties, the thesis that the Indies would be quickly lost—if turned over to free enterprisers—became quite popular among Conservatives.

---

13 J. J. Hasselman, *De Kultuur-Procenten en het Kultuur Stelsel*, p. 57.
and moderate Liberals of a variety of persuassions. After 1860 as before, it was argued that free enterprise would lead to more abuse and greater oppression for the native peoples, but after 1862 more emphasis was placed on the theme that the retention of the colonies was imperilled. The slogans, increasingly used from now on, such as the "demolishers," the "underminders" (i.e. slopers) of Dutch rule in the Indies, rested upon this thesis. For De Brauw, Liberalism encouraged the growth of "a revolutionary party because it works subversively and does not respect that which already exists,"\textsuperscript{14} and Van Voorthuysen decried the threat to the "moral and material welfare of the Javanese,"\textsuperscript{15} while Suermondt charged the Liberals with "overthrowing pell-mell in their ignorance and short-sightedness the whole structure of native housekeeping which has existed for centuries and to which the Javanese are so attached." The consequence would be the dissolution of Dutch controls in "want, dissatisfaction and insurrection, the bitter

\textsuperscript{14}Verslag 1862-1863, p. 859 (De Brauw in the Second Chamber on 27 May 1862).

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 381 (Van Voorthuysen in the Second Chamber on 5 December 1862).
fruit to [come from] the implementation of their unholy strivings in behalf of private parties."16

This fear was very real in the minds of the Dutch in the early eighteen-sixties. It led a number of moderate Liberals in Parliament to join the Conservatives in opposing the segregation of native finances from those of the motherland. "That principle of the separation of the Indies from the financial interests of the motherland is an East Indian, no Dutch principle," declared Godefroi, "it is an Indian slogan; it is an element in an Indian program."17 And, fully in accord with Godefroi's words of December 1862, Van Heemstra, speaking in the Second Chamber on 11 March 1864, declared that while he "wished to give to the East Indies a very ample portion in the profits which they yield," he at the same time fully supported in the Indies "the autocratic government as an element of power." He could not approve any step which could undermine its basis, he told the representatives, and consequently he felt impelled to state that he "did not desire to reject budgetary surpluses [for the motherland] but wishes on the contrary to retain them and thus


17 Verslag 1862-1863, p. 347 (Godefroi in the Second Chamber on 3 December 1862).
not promote the financial independence of the East Indies." 18

But the most impassioned attack on the Liberals as the "demolishers" of Dutch imperium in the East came from Wintgens. He characterized the private speculator with words which recall Buijn's attempt to "correct" Dekker's definition of the difference between Conservatives and Liberals, in the *Java Bode*. He charged that private parties were inclined to exploit the uncontrolled powers potentially in the hands of the dominant, European race. They looked upon the Javanese as "only mud under their feet." Over against such avarice, continued Wintgens, stood "that placid child-like population, those many millions, who can not make themselves understood, to whom no one turns his ear."

No, such a relationship is in the long run untenable. The defenceless prey would finally come to life and rise up; and if they find their tongues, their speech would be deadly, and would become the verification of what another writer, what Multatuli once so eloquently depicted in the future. 19

Wintgens made these remarks on 3 December 1862 during the debates on the colonial budget for 1863. Two days later, he rose again to restate his defense of the

---

colonial administrative system as a means of retaining control in the Indies and to protest remarks made in the meantime by Fransen van de Putte, now a representative from Rotterdam and universally acknowledged as an advanced Liberal in colonial matters. The latter had assured the Second Chamber that Java was in desperate need of a larger community of Europeans representing, not the sedate, bigoted and urbanized upper middle class with their "elegant gloves and dainty clothing," but rather the sons of the farming community who were accustomed to hard physical labor. In the same speech, Van de Putte had further referred to the natives in a patronizing tone, as the "little Javanese." On both counts, Wintgens protested.

He professed to have found in Van de Putte's words exactly that attitude of mind which led the private speculator to view the natives as "mud under his foot." And the sons of the Dutch farmers were "perhaps in a sense, crude persons." Would they not look upon the Javanese as a kind of "raw material, matiere premiere?" Or, from a different reference point, would they not view their muscular strength as "purely power which can be animated

---

like a machine by steam, and which one may freely exploit in his own behalf?" Among a people subjected to such arbitrariness, not by its governing overlords but by private parties clothed with no executive authority in public law, there must arise "malevolent, an antipathy, an aversion, a hostile disposition which has not existed up to now in Java and which must lead to grave consequences." In the speech of Van de Putte, concluded Wintgens, one missed "the contemplation of the interests of the native people, and the discussion of their rights, their prospects and their just expectations in the future," for he was concerned exclusively with the European element in the Indies. Morality was on the side of obligatory government cultures which were "established and carried on through, or in the name of the government, under the sharp surveillance and control of officials who must above all watch over the interests and rights of the native population." 21

This speech, coming on the heels of an earlier address in which Wintgens had specifically named "Multatuli," had a galvanizing effect upon Dekker. He took up his pen on 6 December 1862 and wrote to Wintgens: "I have just read in a newspaper the report of the sitting . . . and

21Ibid., pp. 377-378.
I was so struck by what you have said in that sitting that I feel compelled to write this letter and present it to you as a testimony of my admiration." Particularly, he wrote, he had been moved by Wintgens's commentary on the speech by Van de Putte. He agreed that this man was indeed more concerned with profits than with the welfare of the Javanese.

Dekker sensed that he had an attentive reader before him and turned his 'testimonial' into a new disquisition on colonial policy. He proceeded to generalize from the specific case of Van de Putte and tagged the whole race of free enterprisers a collection of "cunning, higgling fortune makers." For his own part, he indicated to Wintgens that he was more dedicated to the defense of the current authoritarian colonial system than ever before. Dekker had now identified himself with the Conservative Party! He proceeded to set forth a brilliant exegesis on his own Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie.

I acknowledge that the Javanese, if completely free, (particularly if such a thing happened suddenly) would go wild, all the more because the system of obligatory cultures has accustomed him to restraints. This system must, even if it produced no profits, still be retained for a long time.

---

22 Brieven, IX, p. 58.
time, because it is at the same time a system of control. The historically important fact that a small country like the Netherlands rules over so many millions of human beings at a great distance, can only be accounted for in this assertion, and I am indeed surprised that the supporters of the system of obligatory cultures do not emphasize this more. At present a controller in the eyes of the Javanese is still more than a tobacco planter, than a sugar refiner,—but as soon as those gentlemen of overnight fortunes have gotten together in a hurd, in an imperium in imperio, the prestige which we need so greatly will be quickly lost. A single Governor-General with a thousand well organized officials rules over millions, but a million private parties of like authority, without organization, each out for his own fortune and nothing else, would not be able to hold 12 million Javanese in line, and then the second generation would soon have to pay the bloody debt which rested on the fortunes of the first. The condition of the Indies is artificial: our hierarchy is a model of integration. The consequence of this is: power and advantage. It is therefore nonsense to believe that that power would continue to exist and that those profits in the long run could still be attained, if one removes or alters the sole factors from which those results flow. The Javanese, abused at the instigation of higher authorities or through the permission of higher officials, will not rise up so quickly as against the capriciousness of private parties.  

Dekker's only qualification to this striking display of arch-Conservatism was his insistence that the administrative hierarchy, in itself an apparent neutral element, be made a positive good by seeing to the appointment of a man at the top of unimpeachable moral conviction, who demonstrated sincere concern for native welfare. Dekker's own conscience was put at ease once he had asserted: "The

23Ibid., pp. 61-62.
most important section in the government regulations for the Indies is Article 55! The vindication or violation of that provision shall determine between Dutch welfare and honor, of Dutch ruin and shame!"24 Dekker ended his letter to Wintgens with the words: "I have sensed congeniality25 in your speech of today and therefore I do not feel that I need seek your forgiveness for the writing of this letter."26

It is not inconceivable that this private addenda to the February 1861 pamphlet, prepared for the representative from Delft, hardened Wintgens' unwillingness to compromise with the Liberals. During the discussions of 26 May 1863, he assumed a more uncompromising stand than ever in behalf of the status-quo: "There is only a single method--every page of colonial history teaches this--to prevent the most abominable of conflicts and that

24Ibid., p. 64.
25"congeniality" for the Dutch word: "hart."
26Ibid., p. 64. Dekker's letter was not altruistic. If he accredited Wintgens with genuine concern in the welfare of the Javanese, he also hoped this representative's solicitude would extend to his own "Lebak Affair," for he wrote: "Most Respected Sir, I am so free as to request you to ask of the government, what has been done to indemnify the victims of the atrocities which I depicted in the Max Havelaar." (Brieven, IX, p. 64.) This represented yet one more attempt to find the ideal liegeman and can consequently be listed as a repetition of the same strategy used in succession on Van Lennep, Veth, Van Hoevell and Rochussen.
method is a severe autocratic management; a state guardianship over the natives even as above all over the colonist."  

And, aside from Wintgens, others were probably influenced by Dekker's addenda. In all likelihood, the letter was passed on to others to read. Indeed, Dekker may have prepared his elaborate missive with this thought in mind. He could urge Wintgens to circulate it among other Conservatives without specifically asking this in so many words by taking pains to prepare a concise and pungent statement whose very format begged wider distribution.

The identification of the colonial system with morally justifiable paternalism and the identification of

27 Verslag, 1862-1863, p. 826.

28 The above probability is enhanced by the remarkable similarity between the argument cited in Dekker's letter to Wintgens of 6 December 1862 and a passage from a speech given by the arch-Conservative Van Foreest on 10 December 1863 in the Second Chamber (Verslag, 1863-1864, p. 353). A comparison shows that not only do Dekker and Van Foreest treat exactly the same points, but that they handle them in precisely the same order, to wit: both see the contemporary colonial administrative system (1) as a means of control which is threatened by (2) private parties who break the continuity of authority from the top of the hierarchy down to the least of the peasants by forming an imperium in imperio. The consequence will be (3) bloodshed and (4) the curse of a later generation on his contemporaries. The passage in the speech of Van Foreest is as follows: "The system of obligatory labor--one should definitely not forget this--is not only an agricultural system, but also a political system par excellence, which brings the native population and their chiefs into daily contact with the government; on the other hand every private undertaking, by reducing [the frequency of] that contact, undermines the authority of the government and
Liberal policy with disorder still did not "legitimate" the Conservative's claim to be the sole protector of native rights. Before he could make good his monopoly on sentiment, he had to show why the Liberals were wrong in attributing such calamities as starvation at Grobogan and Demak and terrorism and oppression in Lebak to the autocratic, centralized administrative hierarchy. The ingenious argument developed by the Conservatives between 1862 and 1864 attempted to show similarities between the conditions in the three areas by pointing out that obligatory cultures functioned in none of these areas and that the land tax, inherited from the English, was

must provide an opportunity for the rise of lesser imperia in imperio sic! But there is more. As the European element, as Indian society increases in size and influence and independence from the government, so shall its demands also increase, so that, in the absence of surpluses, the Indies sooner or later shall become a nuisance for the Netherlands and the urge to realize the ideal of Liberalism and to raise the Indies to an independent state, will quickly become unavoidable. And what then shall become of the motherland? Finally I consider the system [of the Liberals] pernicious for Java, because after a brief epoch of feverish development which it perhaps shall experience, the consequences of the over-excitement will show up in starvation, malevolence among the native peoples and insurrections which can be broken only with difficulty and over the presently happy and slowly progressing island of Java a sea of calamity and wretchedness shall be poured out; a sea of wretchedness which shall bring down upon us the curse of our progeny, because we were warned in time and could have and should have taken precautions, and still have been too lazy, too indifferent, too care-free to prevent it, and have followed a 'wait and see' policy when it was time for us to resist."
the main means of raising revenue in all three. These
taxes, it was claimed, bore more severely on the natives
than labor on government cultures, and these taxes had
to be blamed for the results, not the government culture
system. Thus argued J. J. Hasselman.

The wide spread attention directed by Liberals
to faults in the culture system, he contended, "is
actually only a proof that the arrangement itself is too
irreproachable to be amenable to successful attack."

Hasselman tied Lebak, Grobogan and Demak together into a
single neat package in the following manner:

Even I will not deny that many wrongs have
occurred, and I regret such as much as any
other, but I would not willingly charge
those faults and wrongs to the account of
the obligatory government cultures in order
to use them to completely upset the existing
institutions. Did not Multatuli also ex-
PLICITLY declare that the abuses and vexations
in Lebak had no relation whatsoever with the
system of obligatory government cultures?

The autocratic administration was a positive good. Far
from admitting faults in the existing system, he believed
that tragedies would never have occurred in any of these
provinces if the government's system been more wide
spread. "An upright stout government can clip off every
abuse at the roots!"29

29J. J. Hasselman, Beschouwingen over de Partiku-
liere Industrie in vergelijking met het Kultuurstelsel
Along with this argument, on the other hand, the attempt was made to emphasize as strongly as possible the 'uniqueness' of the time and circumstances under which the events at Rangkas Betoeng in 1856 took place. Thus the Conservative is careful to note that private land ownership existed in Bantam—in distinction to Grobogan and Demak—which made it in Hasselman's mind "the least pleasant Residency of Java." But, at the same time, Wintgens emphasized that events, in general, were different in the eighteen-fifties than during the first two decades of Van den Bosch's system. In the last decade, Wintgens declared, there had been a general decline in the quality of leadership at the top, i.e. Van Twist at the beginning of the decade, the discredited Pahud at the close. But, of these various

30 J. J. Hasselman, "Proeve eener Verhandeling over den Grondeigendom op Java," Tielsch Stads en Arrondissements Weekblad, Friday, 12 August 1864, No. 1075.

31 In the speech of 26 May 1863, in which he called for a state guardianship over both the native and the colonist, Wintgens prefaced this recommendation (Verslag 1862-1863, pp. 824-825) with the assertion that bad leadership, combined with the beginnings of Liberal attacks on the system, also in the 1850's (e.g. 1854 and Van Hoevell), had had the most undesirable effects in Java: "From this a great confusion in concepts arose, a kind of decomposition in the direction of affairs, an administrative demoralization. The officials knew no longer what they could hold on to; they would be put in the wrong when they followed old traditions; they would be called to account
arguments, the most important was that which emphasized the factors brought into play in Bantam by the institution of private landownership. This was now made to explain away not only the avarice of the local chiefs, but even the tale of Saidjah!

It became a commonplace to cite Bantam as an indication of what would happen elsewhere if private landownership, with the encouragement of the Liberals, became general in Java. Early in 1862, Schimmelpenninck van der Oije posed the rhetorical question to the Second Chamber:

> Where does greater welfare exist, greater reasons for satisfaction, in Bantam or in Pasoeoean where the system of obligatory government cultures was fully implemented long ago? I ask: where does the more advanced civilization exist and fewer misdeeds occur, in the lands under government direction with exacting heerendiensten or elsewhere?

The natives fled from their homes where landrent was collected and took up residence in provinces devoted to government cultures. Considering this, he continued, one could rightly ask "whether the catastrophes at Demak and Grobogan would have raged with such fatality if the...

if they for their part believed that they could or must make complaints. (italics added) That confusion has had the most disadvantageous consequences on the authority and strength of the government in the colony.
system of obligatory government cultures had been more widely implemented?" And Rochussen, in the same year, in a pamphlet devoted principally to an apology for his earlier career as Governor-General and Minister of Colonial Affairs, saw conditions in Bantam as an example of what happened when the norms laid down by the Englishman, Money, were not followed.

Rochussen argued that, to introduce private land ownership into the colony before the Javanese had reached the civilized level of Europeans, was to introduce into a relatively stable social structure, factors that would cause undesirable change. The native chiefs would be encouraged to exploit the great potential advantages of their offices which the previous stability had held in abeyance. After citing relevant passages in Java; or How to Manage a Colony, Rochussen continued:

An investigation of land ownership in the scanty areas of Java where it already exists in the form of private property and above all in the east corner, will show one that the chiefs have been successful through all kinds of means in acquiring property rights to the ground, and that the share of it to the little man is, in relation, extremely small. In Bantam also, there exists partially individual land ownership; but what is the profit

32 Verslag 1861-1862, p. 134. (Schimmelpenninck van der Oije in the Second Chamber on 4 January 1862).
to the little man there as against that of the chief? To be sure relatively slight.\textsuperscript{33}

And, while writing exclusively of Bantam alone, Hasselman, in 1864, would confirm Rochussen's contention that private land ownership encouraged local tyranny. "Through a competent native chief, it was explained to me that in earlier times the princes of Bantam gave to chiefs, servants, favorites etc. etc. in usufruct great amounts of land and that many of them were able to make of this, ownership, during periods of turmoil." The resultant private property rested consequently, not on legal title, but "upon totally arbitrary arrogance and appropriation."\textsuperscript{34}

Hasselman himself had once served as an Assistant-Resident in Bantam! He had had opportunity enough to study the consequences of this institution. The land owners were men of "insolent appearance," and slothful, and their work was done for them by propertyless coolies; but, even more seriously, through their wealth, they were able to reduce the native chiefs to mere figure-


\textsuperscript{34}J. J. Hasselman, "Proeve eener Verhandeling over den Grondeigendom op Java," Tielsch Stads en Arrondissements Weekblad, Friday, 12 August 1864, No.1075.
heads. "The village chief," he wrote, "who usually is no land owner, has only slight authority. He is actually no real chief, but a decoration through whom one makes all kinds of complaints, but who otherwise has little to say in the matters of the dessa and is completely under the influence of the owners." The results of such a situation, continued Hasselman in an analysis which agreed in many of its parts with the attitudes expressed by Van Kempen in his missive of 20 September 1856 to Governor-General Pahud, is the absence of unity and repose in the village life of Bantam "such as one comes across in eastern Java with communal ownership." And, because the government's representative, supposedly the village chief, did not actually have authority, the desires of Dutch authority and Batavia's compassionate interest in the welfare of the simple natives, were only faintly perceived. Great insecurity and instability reigned there and the simple peasants and coolies lived in misfortune. "Bantam, although privileged with personal ownership, is the only residency where one must always be on his 'Qui vive,' and where repeatedly every so often insurrections

occur despite the fact that our military headquarters
are near by. 36

36. Ibid., No one went to quite such lengths as Hasselman in the exegesis of Dekker's Max Havelaar. The presence in Bantam of private property, which made that region 'unique' supplied Hasselman with a means of belittling the results which the Liberals anticipated from the substantial expansion of private investment, free enterprise and individual land ownership, while simultaneously allowing him to reduce the "Lebak Affair" from a disquisition on the universal norms of the colonial system (as Van Hoevell would have it) to a unique tragedy in one specific area where a "Liberal" institution existed, namely land ownership. Indeed, Hasselman would suggest that the very presence of property owners among the natives vitiated possible success for Western enterprise. In his "Proeve eener Verhandeling over den Grondeigendom of Java," (Tielsch Stads en Arrondissements Weekblad, Friday, 12 August 1864, No. 1075.) Hasselman wrote as follows: The government's agricultural undertakings there, have for the most part been failures. Private industry and the free enterprisers put in no appearance, because—and I am convinced of it—they would not feel secure and indeed would not be secure. (Was not the family Camphuis on the private land, Tjikandie, murdered? And has there not been even more recently insurrection in the government's territory?) The general welfare leaves much to be desired and I must acknowledge that what one sees just in Bantam frightens one away from private possession. And apart from this, through Multatuli Bantam has received notoriety enough so that one need not add anything.

In this context, Hasselman also attempted to explain the tale of Saidjah. He accepted the essential correctness of Dekker's narrative, but he would put it into a sociological framework by making Saidjah into a menumpang, one of the agrarian proletariat created in Bantam by the dual agencies of private land ownership and land taxes. These taxes in money, according to Hasselman, deprived the coolies, the menumpang, of any protection against the uninhibited lust of the propertied who were able to shift the burden of taxation to the weaker. Saidjah went to Batavia to earn money, not because of a self-centered desire for wealth, but because the alternative was unbearable subjection: In order to earn and save up money the native... does not move elsewhere,
The Conservative commentary on *Max Havelaar* and its intent came close to Dekker's own line of thought but in the rule only when one withholds everything from him, and misuses and persecutes him to such an extent that his lot becomes almost unbearable and he sees no deliverance. Again, the buffaloes were taken from Saidjah's father, not simply to celebrate pompous feasts, but to be sold for cash with which to pay the land taxes. In an article entitled "Java, Belastingen in Geld en Belastingen in Arbeid," (Tielsch Stads en Arrondissements Weekblad, Friday, 25 November 1864, No. 1090.) Hasselman supported this contention by relating an experience of his own while serving in Bantam: The balance in the collection of land taxes, there, was once far in arrears; I put pressure on the regent in order to encourage the collection. What was his response? Have only a bit of patience, Sir, the cattle market will soon take place and then the people will convert their carabao and field oxen into money in order to be able to pay!!

In introducing these considerations into the story of Saidjah, Hasselman was not solely dependent on his own inventive mind. He was given a hint by Dekker himself. At the very beginning of the tale of Saidjah, Dekker had interrupted his narrative—in a most unartistic manner—to tell his reader that private landownership existed in Bantam. (Cf. n. Chapter I, p. 24.) On the following page, he had then taken time to relate how Saidjah's father was especially fearful that he would not be able to pay his landrent and would be reported by the district chief to the Assistent-Resident. "One could be punished," the reader was informed, "according to the law in such a matter."

As if by magic, the whole intent of *Max Havelaar* was turned inside out—so argued the Liberal—but, in fact, this Conservative Saidjah was closer to the author's real intent than the one which Robide van der Aa, Veth and Van Hoevell thought they recognized. Nor may one disparage Hasselman's reasoning as the puerilities of a senile retired colonial official who amused himself with scrabble in a Dutch provincial newspaper which no one read, for there were, first of all, a large number of people, specifically in Tiel, who repeatedly indicated a strong attraction to Dekker and, secondly, Hasselman did enjoy prestige among Conservatives. While he was most assuredly no equal to Rochussen, Mijer or Van Herwerden in authority or intellect, he did become Minister of Colonial Affairs in a Conservative cabinet in 1867 and, from that office, he played his own part in a new Conservative rapprochement with Dekker in 1867-1868.
when he wrote in September 1859. In their eulogies to the potentials of a thoroughly cleansed paternalistic hierarchy in the Indies, the Conservative reproduced a line of thought that had been in Dekker's own mind for a number of years.

The Conservative was in a position to seize the offensive once he had shown the commendable elements in the Cultuur Stelsel, accounted for its efficacy and exonerated it of complicity in any of the tragedies that had occurred in Java during the preceding three decades. The areas in which combat with Liberalism could be joined were many. One of the first struggles to develop concerned the innumerable reports that began to arrive in the Netherlands on malpractices in Cheribon and Rembang where private enterprise had been allowed particular opportunities in the eighteen-fifties. "What has come to my ears of that matter," said Wintgens in the debates of 27 May 1862, "is dreadful and will leave a spot on the Dutch character if it is not stigmatized here in public. Falsity and extortions had been practiced there and that must be brought into the light." And Van Lynden, on 5 December 1862, after quoting innumerable passages from official investigations at Cheribon which

37 Verslag 1861-1862, pp. 810-811.
indicated intrigue and abuse, came to the defiant close:

"Do not say now: 'That is an exception; that which happened in Cheribon does not have to occur elsewhere.' I maintain that this is a consequence of the system itself . . . . The abuses are inseparable from the system."\(^{38}\) Three weeks later, in the First Chamber, Van der Heim van Duyvendijke would add:

One no sooner occupies himself with Far Eastern affairs, than he becomes enamored with the good-natured, trusting, child-like Javanese to such a point that I regard it as the first obligation of the government to vigorously protect that good-natured, trusting people who still live completely in the state of childhood against the exploitation of private parties such as we already know to have occurred in Cheribon.\(^{39}\)

Yet another liberal step which the Conservative could attack, in 1862, was the bill introduced into the States General in the summer of that year by Uhlenbeck, the successor to Loudon in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. This bill, a far cry from the comprehensive document which Fransen van de Putte would defend in 1866, attempted to provide a legal basis for the private enterprises already in existence in Java. Many Conservatives identified it as an attempt to foist a despicable scheme on the Dutch people. Van Lynden predicted that it would lead both to

\(^{38}\)Ibid., 1862-1863, p. 382.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 139.
"decline of our financial welfare and at the same time to the sucking out and suppression of the Javanese."

But, above all such arguments, the Conservative pushed a line of gross sentimentality which inclines one today to seek out, in the recorded parliamentary debates, the Dutch romantic movement which many authorities have failed to discover in more likely areas of endeavor. Exactly the staunchest supporters of Conservatism were the most outspoken contributors to excessive sentimentality. Thus, on 27 May 1863, De Brauw declared:

Our conservative politics, permit me to elaborate this with a few words, does not resolve itself solely in budgetary surpluses. That is not its only element. One can conceive only too well a conservative politics with respect to Java without budgetary surpluses. In this matter the characteristic differentiation does not lie . . . . Rather the distinction is primarily one of whether one shall make the Javanese happy or unhappy; whether the exploitation of Java—we can so call it, but then in the good sense—shall be turned over to private parties, or left to the government; whether one shall deliver the Javanese over to speculators who see only private riches without a thought for the future, or place them under control of the government which keeps an eye on the future and on the growth of its subjects.  

Perhaps the most extreme expression of sentimentality came from Van Foreest, intellectually a product of the

---

40 ibid., p. 382 (supplement No. 1)

41 ibid., p. 835. The word 'without' was italicized in the original; otherwise the italics are added.
same milieu, with its strong paternalistic inclination which had produced a Van den Bosch a generation earlier. A sincere and profound distrust of the free market and private initiative led Van Foreest to define pauperism as "that cancer of our Western society,"\(^\text{42}\) and to seek an alternative for the Indies in the writings of others of like inclination, among them Dekker.

In the session of the Second Chamber of 21 December 1864, he spoke as follows:

Oh, Mr. Chairman, were the victory of liberalism in the Indies, the triumph of genuine freedom and righteousness, might liberal colonial politics serve in truth to better the lot of the Javanese; could it bring to pass that the moving tragedy of Saidjah might never again be played out in the interior of Java—then I would be content that every other consideration, even the interests of the Netherlands, would have to yield to that single great interest, to that genuinely sublime principle. Were the last gasps of our authority and with them of our welfare and greatness, yes, perhaps even of our national existence, the birth pains of the freedom and happiness of a people of so many millions which there in the Far East would hold in remembrance and bless the selfless devotion of a motherland which sacrificed itself, then I could agree to joining in signing the death certificate of my fatherland. Could there be a more resplendent expiration for the Netherlands, the classical land of freedom, than in dying to have given birth to another free people?

\(^{42}\)Verslag, 1864-1865, p. 510.
But now I ask once: for what kind of freedom is it that the liberal party works and struggles? For which freedom? For the freedom of anyone who so desires—at the cost of the income now enjoyed by the state and even more abominable, at the cost of the sweat of a good-natured people—without any supervision to enrich himself with the treasures of the Indies; for the freedom to sow with a lavish hand the seeds of insurrection and alienation where the interests of the state as well as those of the Javanese require that the concept of authority remain vigorously upheld; for the freedom to use as one desires, overt or covert, premeditated or perfunctory means to cause the disorganization of that which exists, and to undermine and demolish the wondrous system which the Netherlands have to thank for their welfare and Java for its progress.\(^{43}\)

The Liberals, as might be expected, protested loud and long against the Conservative's new line. Normally the Liberals charged their opponents with hypocrisy, emphasizing that, back in the eighteen-fifties, the budgetary surpluses had been universally cited by the dominating colonial party as the principal reason why no changes should be introduced into Java. This was the line taken by a Liberal pamphleteer in 1863 who, after noting that the "so-called Conservatives have been forced to acknowledge that the desire for budgetary surpluses may not be allowed to dominate their politics," went on to reject with contempt their professions of concern over native welfare. "If they believed this sincerely, it would make me very happy for the level of morality in our

\(^{43}\text{Ibid.}\)
politics. But I do not consider them upright!" And, in the Second Chamber, Van Heukelom rose in protest against De Brauw formulation of sentimentality.

Love for the Javanese has never been the characteristic of the Conservative party; that love has only very recently arisen. The Conservative party has always wished to retain that which exists, not out of love for the Javanese, but because of the money, to the end of money, and always for money...

...I must say, I always feel a kind of nausea when I hear talk from that side of loving the Javanese.

Outside parliament, W. Bosch, the later founder of the ill-fated *Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan*, took exception to Rochussen's prose of 1862 in an article in *Van Hoevell's Tijdschrift*. Rochussen had frequently indulged in the new Conservative game of sentimentality, decrying the misuse of the natives by private speculators as "machines," who would likewise depress price levels by organizing buyer monopolies. "Oh," he had lamented, "how to protect the natives whose weaknesses are known and whom one nevertheless delivers over to malevolent monopolists." There was bitterness in W. Bosch's

---

44 *Nemo, Politiek van den Dag: Vliegende Blaadjes, II* (Kampen: Van Hulst, 1863), pp. 85-86.

45 *Verslag, 1862-1863*, p. 862 (Supplement No. 3; Van Heukelom on 28 May 1863).


denunciation: "In earlier times the politics of reaction considered the precepts of humanitarianism to be chimera. Now, however, circumstances seem to have been born making it advantageous to support such. During the course of 1862, the use of philanthropy has become keen among the opponents of . . . [Uhlenbeck]."\(^{48}\)

But the protests did not halt the Conservatives; the bitterness of the Liberals was an indirect admission that sentiment in the hands of their opponents increased the obstacles in the path of reform for the colonies. Van Heukelom's denunciation of the Conservatives during the May 1863 debates was readily repudiated by Wintgens' retort: "I admit that it awakens a peculiar feeling in me, when I hear along with the theory of free enterprise in Java, the elaboration of the theme: sympathy with the Javanese. I ask myself: when would the free enterprisers find the time for the moral improvement of the Javanese?"\(^{49}\)

And, being consistent, Wintgens and a number of his fellow Conservatives took another eventful step in the period

\(^{48}\) W. Bosch, "De Minister van Staat J. J. Rochussen als publicist in 1862 en als Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch Indie in 1845-1851," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIV (December, 1862), p. 327.

\(^{49}\) Verslag 1862-1863, p. 826. (Wintgens in the Second Chamber on 26 May 1863).
1862-1864. To remove the last significant hindrance in the way of sentiment, they repudiated Baud!

Baud's pragmatism and his opportunistic defense of the system of obligatory government cultures during the eighteen-forties and fifties was looked upon as the Achilles' heel of the new Conservative Party line. The Liberals sought repeatedly to embarrass their opponent by quoting from Baud's speeches. They stressed that, while Baud was not the originator of the colonial system as first conceived, he was largely responsible for the fact that it had actually worked. And what did he think? The essence of his thought, said Fransen van de Putte, was: "We will not be able to keep the colonies for long, so let us then use them for all their worth!"\(^{50}\)

The Liberal touched on yet a more sensitive matter when he attributed paragraph six of Article 56 of the Regeringsreglement of 1854 to Baud's initiative. In a private letter to Boreel, in September 1862, which was probably read by more persons than the addressee, Van Twist had written, "I hardly need to add that, if J. C. Baud had not agreed to Article 56, then it would not at that time have been included in the Regeringsreglement."\(^{51}\)

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 362 (Van de Putte in the Second Chamber on 4 December 1862).

\(^{51}\) J. Zwart, op. cit., p. 312.
And Van Heukelom in the Second Chamber made this a subject of repeated attention. He told the representatives during the December 1862 debates that Baud had changed his mind about many things in the mid-fifties, that he "entertained Liberal concepts back in 1854, and I might add, much more Liberal concepts than those of the members who have arisen on the other side to speak over colonial governmental policy." And, in September 1864, after noting that "the Conservatives are extremely embarrassed with Baud," Van Heukelom affirmed that less than a decade before, Baud, "although with moderation and some hesitance, did wish nevertheless progress ....

The passage of the Regeringsreglement was for him one of those occasions to make openly clear his displeasure with the institutions which had been called to life since 1830."53

The truth of Van Heukelom assertion of embarrassment among the Conservatives in the early eighteen-sixties was affirmed by the circumlocution with which Rochussen, as Minister of Colonial Affairs in 1860, had attempted to explain paragraph six of Article 56 out of existence.54

52 Verslag 1862-1863, p. 402.
53 Ibid., 1864-1865, p. 51.
54 Cf. Chapter IV, p. 116 - 117.
And this fact alone might well have served as a motivation for the Conservatives to abandon Baud's standards. This desire, however, was now grossly intensified by the introduction into the party of a sentimentality which ill-fitted the pragmatist Baud. Estrangement was already in progress by the end of 1860. After 1862, this tendency became more pronounced; it became an integral, central element in the Conservative line.

Nor can one ignore Dekker in the move to repudiate Baud. Certainly, this is implicit page after page in the arguments developed in *Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie*. Even earlier, Dekker had implied that the image of Baud had to go in his Amsterdam hand-bill of December 1859, requoted in his letter to the voters in Tiel and in Minne-brieven. In this piece, he had called for a new kind of colonial official who "is sufficiently acquainted with scholarly erudition that he will not allow his own day-to-day decisions to lead him into a policy of simple empiricism." Wintgens complained in this spirit of the quality of the men who succeeded Van den Bosch in his colonial post, using words which recalled both Dekker's description of the corps d'elite in the interior and his protest at the

55 *Volledige Werken* II, p. 144.
appointment of the completely unknown Sloet van de Beele to the highest post in the Indies.

Those who were called upon to implement and superintend the system, among whom only such persons should come up for consideration who can be reckoned among the most outstanding men and most prominent statesmen of the country, have not infrequently displayed weakness and vacillation—adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of instructions and hair-splitting—and irresolution, instead of setting the pace by emphatically maintaining the system so as to direct it toward its true intent and invigorate it in all its parts.  

Wintgens' solution was to return to the original system of Van den Bosch with its humanitarian admonishments to the officials in the interior. He desired the appointment a new kind of men to offices of responsibility in Java and in The Hague; with other words, he sought a solution along exactly the same lines as Dekker.

J. J. Hasselman who became the Colonial Minister in 1868, sought a similar solution in the series of pamphlets and newspaper articles which he produced between 1862 and 1864. Now more than ever, he wrote in 1862, the way was open to the realization of Van den Bosch's original scheme in all its parts. "The financial straits of the motherland" had been "a great obstacle" to the proper implementation of the Cultuur Stelsel back in the eighteen-thirties.

56 Verslag 1862-1863, p. 343 (Wintgens in the Second Chamber on 3 December 1862).
but that impediment no longer existed to interfere in the achievement of Van den Bosch's moral imperative: "not too much." Through the use of these three words, Hasselman showed the nature of his dependence on the original thought of others. He was simply paraphrasing Dekker's: "not too drastically!" The following year, he openly attacked Baud as a man who "could issue points of instruction, which by their very nature, seriously threatened a favorable maintenance of that which existed and must provide the death-blow to all further development." Not this man, but Van den Bosch, could provide the Dutch with their guide lines; there, where he had written:

The happiness and the satisfaction of the Javanese must always be the first concern of the government; the native has complete right to such care because of the natural submissiveness of his character and because of his childlike ill comprehension of facts, which gives occasion enough to make misuse of his simplicity. Enterprisers who act in conflict with this principle must not be tolerated, no matter how much this might lead to retarding the expansion of the government supervised cultures.

Seeking to bring the "message" from Van den Bosch to the public's attention as sharply as possible, Hasselman

57 J. J. Hasselman, De Kultuur-Procenten en het Kultuur-stelsel (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1862), pp. 46-47.

58 J. J. Hasselman, Beschouwingen over de Partikuliere Industrie in Vergelijking met het Kultuurstelsel (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1863), pp. 33-34.
then italicized the next sentence: "It would be better that we raise no products at all, than that they be produced in violation of the obligations, which we owe the population." If the Dutch actually obeyed the spirit of these words which admonished "not too much," then the colonial system would be irreproachable. "Systems of control ought not be judged according to the manner in which they have temporarily worked, but in accordance with the manner in which they were planned to work." From such a point of view, "the system of obligatory government cultures, even from a moral view, can abide the test of the most severe examination."

The sentimental drive for the rehabilitation and glorification of Van den Bosch finally reached a climax with the release to the public of the entirety of Van den Bosch's 24 January 1834 report to the government, previously known only in excerpts published by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in 1840 in appendix A of the *Staatblad van Nederlandsch Indie*, No. 22. Now this document under the title of: "Report on my Activities in the Indies During the Years 1830, 1831, 1832 and 1833," was published in the periodical, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land- en Volkenkunde van*


Nederlandsch Indie in 1864 and became available for wide spread dissemination. A new genealogical family tree had been planted for Dekker's thought which was more ancient and supposedly more respectable than the one which Professor Veth had assigned his ideas in the 1860 De Gids article on Max Havelaar. The Liberal's adopted orphan could readily find his way home; the scion was welcomed with open arms by his brethren.

Van Hoevell, in the preface to the third volume of his own collected speeches published in 1864, bewailed the tactics adopted by his opponents and attempted to instruct them once again on the principles to which Van den Bosch's successor ascribed. In his mind, the contemporary Conservatives were honorbound to acknowledge Baud's principles as the only authoritative basis for a Conservative stand in the eighteen-sixties. Baud's defense of the system, Van Hoevell informed his antagonist, rested upon the concepts of "the distress of the motherland," on the "indispensableness of the millions," and on "the wish finally to retain that which had been accomplished." Never, Van Hoevell continued, did Baud attempt to defend the system on moral or sentimental

grounds, for he knew that this would be an absurdity. He could not understand why the Conservatives did not acknowledge this fact.

His successors who after him took upon themselves the task of defending the system, abandoned the standpoint of their eminent predecessor. They seem to regard it as their obligation to recommend the system, which in Mr. Baud's opinion rested upon faulty principles, as sound in itself and uniquely appropriate for the Indies. This is the reason for their efforts, wherever room has been made for the undisturbed functioning of private industry and capital along side of the system of obligatory government cultures, to give publicity to the misery which is consequently brought over the population. This is the reason for their attempt to get the public to swallow the illusion which purports to find the faults and abuses, which even by the testimony of Mr. Baud have been observed in the functioning of the system of obligatory government cultures, in a much greater degree bound up with the other system which according to Mr. Baud, "is under all climes the best."62

The genuine vitality and positive impact of the new Conservative line—whether one identifies its motivation as hypocritical rationalizing or sentimentality or what else—is dramatically affirmed by its great victory in drawing the Anti-Revolutionaires into its fold against the Liberals. A tentative resolution of the vacillation which had characterized Mackay's stand during

the preceding years was provided by Groen van Prinsterer in his speech before the Second Chamber of 27 May 1863. 63

Altogether conscious of the role which Mackay and Elout had played in Parliament during the preceding years in his absence, Groen declared that "I do not wish to discard the direction of my antecedents in this Chamber," and again he asserted that he intended to remain faithful to his Anti-Revolutionary principles in matters of colonial policy as well as domestic politics, but this did not cause him hesitation in proceeding: "My principles are now homogeneous with those of the Conservatives of 1862!"

To a large extent my position depends upon chronology. I am not inclined to shoulder responsibility for everything earlier said and done (I know that there are honorable exceptions) by the Conservative party. Not always has the promotion of the happiness of the Javanese been placed in the forefront as the first task of the government. 64

63 The question of the position to be taken by the Anti-Revolutionaries would be reopened after 1867 by Keuchenius, a former member of the Council of the Indies and in 1866 a representative in the Second Chamber. He would try to bring Groen over to the Liberals' side. He was opposed in his efforts to influence Groen by the enigmatic Koorders, a philologist, politician and student of Javanese who's premature death in 1869 was viewed as an irreparable loss by many Conservatives. Koorders attempted to press renewed avowals of accord with Conservatism from Groen. Both Anti-Revolutionaries themselves, it is significant to note that both of these younger compatriots of Groen were strongly affected by Dekker's sentiment.

64 Verslag, 1862-1863, p. 837.
Then with precision, he cited as the basis for his stand with the Conservatives the latter's abandonment of Baud: "I have not been able to approve of everything ventured upon by a statesman who has had a seldom equaled influence on our colonial politics, J. C. Baud."

Second in importance only to Groen's attraction to sentiment was his acceptance of the argument that free enterprise in Java was a potential threat to the very existence of Dutch authority in the Indies. Where one might admonish the Conservatives to cleanse the colonial system of abuse and exaggerations one could entertain only foreboding and suspicions for the ultimate intent of the Liberals: "Your desires, your demands proceed from an absolute theory, from which the overthrow or undermining of the system of obligatory government cultures is the unavoidable consequence." Little experienced in colonial matters, Groen concluded, "I see the best basis for Java's future in the purified system of Van den Bosch."

Paradoxically, the thought of Dekker, the autocrat, the authoritarian, but also the Atheist Multatuli, had played its part in providing the Conservatives with a doctrine of sentimental paternalism which attracted the

---

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 838.
Protestant, Dutch Reformed, Anti-Revolutionary public to the side of the Liberal's opponent in time to face Fransen van de Putte, the Minister of Colonial Affairs after 1863, with formidable barriers to the achievement of a Liberal settlement in the East Indies.
CHAPTER XI

THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1866

None of the figures to participate in the dispute on colonial policy during the middle and late eighteen-sixties equalled Fransen van de Putte in brilliance, capacity to produce or consciousness of purpose. In some two and a half years, 1863-1866, a score of reforms emerged from the Department of Colonial Affairs fundamentally altering the nature of the Cultuur Stelsel. Van de Putte was responsible for a new tariff law for the Indies which moved demonstratively in the direction of abolishing all differential rights favoring the Dutch entrepreneur.\(^1\) His Comptabiliteitswet (Law on Accountability) of 1864 made the States-General fully responsible for the determination of all aspects of the colonial budget and went into effect in 1867.\(^2\)

Van de Putte was also responsible for the abolishment of all obligatory cultures in Java, Ambon and Banda

---


except those for sugar and coffee. This meant the cessation of obligatory deliveries of cloves and nutmeg in 1863, the ending of the government directed cultures of indigo, tea, cinnamon and cochineal in 1865 and tobacco in 1866. Van de Putte was preceded in these activities during the eighteen-sixties only by Uhlenbeck who abolished the single culture of pepper. The new Minister was responsible for the prohibition of contracts between independent Europeans and native dessa chiefs, for the cessation of corporal punishment, for new restrictions upon the use of heerendienst and for a proposal which looked forward to the abolition of pantjen-services. Finally, he played a major role in organizing the institutional training of prospective colonial officials and he granted a concession for the construction of a railway to run from Batavia to Buitenzorg.

Decisive as these steps were, they were secondary in the eyes of both Van de Putte and his contemporaries to his Cultuurwetsontwerp, a bill to regulate the whole future policy of the government towards native agriculture and the role of independent Western initiative in it.

3Ibid.
4Cf. Chapter I, pp. 4 - 5.
5Colenbrander, op. cit., p. 50.
The independent enterpriser's position in the Indies had improved during the eighteen-fifties with Van Twist's appearance at Batavia. However, even in 1866, private parties still could acquire grounds for cultivation only by renting them from the government for periods of less than twenty years with no guarantee of contract renewal. It was Van de Putte's intention to correct this situation by providing a statutory definition of landownership rights in the Indies so that obstacles in the way of freedom of person and possession could be removed and the state's authority brought gradually into line with the role which laissez-faire doctrines assigned to the executive.

More specifically, Van de Putte determined that the Javanese possessor of land should be recognized as the owner of his sawa (fields) and that all other land, not in the possession of third parties, should become state property which might be sold to private parties under appropriate guarantees to protect the natives. In 1858, Van de Putte had written that the so-called free sugar cultures were "without exception forced labor by concealment, there where the industrialist was not given

6Ibid., p. 49.

7Van Welderen Rengers, op. cit., p. 328.
the disposal over the ground. This theme had been further elaborated in his pamphlet of 1860. In 1866, Van de Putte proposed to effect the solution which he had pointed out eight years earlier.

The likelihood of success in Van de Putte's endeavor was sharply qualified in December 1865 when Thorbecke, the organizer of the Ministry, resigned from his office as a result of a dispute with his own Minister of Colonial Affairs. The issue was the manner in which the new penal law for the Indies should be put into force. Work on the revised code had been completed in 1861 but the short terms in office of the succeeding Colonial Ministers since Rochussen's fall in December 1860 had prevented its formal implementation. Van de Putte favored its immediate enforcement by means of a Royal Decree since the code was urgently desired by colonial authorities. Thorbecke wished to see it made law by an act of the States-General. The Minister of Justice supported Thorbecke, but the remaining members of the second Thorbecke Ministry supported Van de Putte. Thorbecke declared that

---

8 Van Hoevell, Parlamentaire Redevoeringen over Koloniale Belangen, III (Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1865), p. 34.

the unity of the Ministry had been broken and left his post. The King gave Van de Putte the authority to form a new ministry in which the Colonial Office remained in his hands. On 10 February 1866, the new cabinet was officially installed and the same day the penal law code for the Indies was put into force by Royal Decree.\textsuperscript{10}

These were the publically acknowledged facts. As one Dutch historian wrote, they did not appear "to be of sufficient consequence to account adequately for what happened." This authority suggested that there were deeper causes.

Thorbecke probably comprehended that the vigorous Fransen van de Putte was moving up besides him. By giving Fransen van de Putte a seat in the cabinet, Thorbecke had brought in a person who had no inclination to abandon his own opinions in the face of the leader. There seems, then, reason enough to give the dispute a psychological basis.\textsuperscript{11}

Thorbecke could still hold himself above personal questions a month after the formation of the new cabinet.

\textsuperscript{10}Van Welderen Rengers, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 319-321.

\textsuperscript{11}Verberne, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 231. One of Thorbecke's contemporary close friends, Van Twist, was of a similar opinion. In a letter to Thorbecke's biographer Kiehl of 21 June 1872, Van Twist wrote: I am in complete accord with your feelings that the question of whether the East Indies penal code should be enforced by law or by a royal decree was not a matter of sufficient importance to motivate the ministerial crisis in the beginning of 1866... . . In my opinion, there must already have been a number of earlier provocations that made for bad blood...". (Zwart, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 226.)
On 6 March 1866 he wrote to Van der Linden: "If I join the Chamber now [as a representative] it will seem that I wish to egg the liberals on against the Ministry. . . . My appearance will give occasion for purposeless bungling that destroys the clear-cut lines of division [between Liberals and Conservatives]." Yet, before the month of March was out, he reversed himself and accepted a mandate from Groningen to serve once again in the Second Chamber.

Between March and May 1866, Thorbecke made a serious study of the pending Cultuurwetsontwerp which he had originally accepted the previous year from his fellow-minister. Only now was the earlier discord aggravated by disagreement on this all-important bill. In December 1865, Thorbecke had indeed been prepared to postpone a settlement on the colonial penal code until after the debates on Van de Putte's bill. It was a matter of some consequence that Thorbecke, in his study, now turned almost immediately to Van Twist.

The result of Thorbecke's contemplation was the decision that there was no need to introduce private

---

13 Ibid., p. 125.
14 According to his own testimony, Van Twist never discussed Van de Putte's bill with Thorbecke until the
landownership for the natives into a bill concerned with bringing certitude into Western private enterprise in the Indies. Consequently, during the actual debates on

retired minister came to stay with him at his country estate "in the beginning of 1866" (Zwart, op. cit., p. 226). The precise period of Thorbecke's stay can be fixed from a news item in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant of Saturday, 31 March 1866, No. 90: Deventer, 29 March. Yesterday Mr. J.R. Thorbecke arrived here by train and was met at the station by Mr. A.J. Duymaer van Twist at whose country estate the retired minister shall reside for several days. In a letter of June 1872 to Kiehl (Zwart, op. cit., p. 224), Van Twist wrote that he had "repeatedly discussed the affairs of state with Thorbecke, above all colonial matters, in a confidential and frank manner." Sometimes, he continued, "I carried on rather extensive correspondence with him regarding such matters, as example, as the bill governing colonial cultures by Van de Putte."

Perhaps I am not overstating the case when I presume that my ideas, particularly those with regard to reform in the Indies, possibly have had some influence on Thorbecke's own ideas. Above all regarding reform in the Indies [sic], where conditions were so completely at variance with our own, I always believed that those reforms had to be adjusted in so far as possible to existing circumstances, and that they should be primarily directed toward the removal of obstacles which stood in the way of a favorable development at the Javanese own initiative.

This important correspondence, to which Van Twist referred above, has been preserved and appears in the Bijlagen to Zwart's biography of Van Twist. The exchange of letters consists of four extremely lengthy documents (on pages 325-342 in Zwart's Bijlagen), written during April 1866.
Van de Putte's bill in May 1866, Thorbecke gave his support to an amendment proposed by Van Hierop which would have expurgated the first articles in Van de Putte's bill and thus postpone a decision on landownership for the natives for an additional five-year period during which appropriate preparations could be made among the natives for the introduction of a concept totally alien to their own historic past.15

Van de Putte, Kappayne and Van Heukelom, who had worked closely with him in the preparation of the bill tenaciously opposed any compromise. In part, this obstinacy developed for reasons not associated with the immediate deliberations. A younger group of Liberals, supporting Van de Putte's bill, had come to distinguish themselves from Thorbecke and his following; nor was this older group disposed to compromise its own standing in the Second Chamber by submitting to dictation from what Thorbecke once called "Young Netherlands." In a private letter to Van Twist, Van der Linden, one of Thorbecke's most intimate friends, drew a highly unfavorable sketch of the tactics employed by Van de Putte,

Kappayne et al in opening the debates over the Cultuurwetsontwerp:

The discussion began. The young guard drew their knives, thinking that it was only sport against the government cultures system. . . . When one finally got to the bill, all the acridity had been shot off in the preceding fire-works and the young soldiers became angry that we were still not all dead, or at least flattened out straight. Gradually I became convinced that article 1 was a dead letter if it remained as it was. Every speech which Kappayne made cost the bill more of its supporters. This matter was agreed with Thorb [ecke]: but he dared not propose any amendment;--nor did I dare to do it, for I was under suspicions;--and it would not have helped any way. . . . When I saw then that the bill was in a bad way, I went to [Van de Putte's colleague] Geertsema and I said to him in substance:--I watched the organization of this ministry with displeasure; but now you are here; and I don't want to see you collapse, at least for the moment;--I want to see the bill passed;--is it not possible to enter into [private] discussions.16

Van der Linden addressed himself to Geertsema on Ascension Day (10 May). He was probably the first to essay an agreement with the "young soldiers." But this first attempt met with no success because of the hostility of Van de Putte's supporters who had, no doubt, been substantially aggravated by Thorbecke's reappearance in the Second Chamber. The "clear-cut lines of division"

16 Archief Duymaer van Twist, Algemeen Rijksarchief IV 35 Documents number 1 and 2 (Van der Linden to Van Twist, n.d.)
were indeed being destroyed as Thorbecke prophesied. Van der Linden related to Van Twist:

Consequently the following evening, Mr. v. Heukelom [sic] paid me a visit around 11 o'clock. He was under the influence of his dinner; began immediately to scold me; acted and spoke with all kinds of insolence so that if I had not realized that he was drunk, I would have kicked him down the steps. He began with the ingenuous declaration: modification [of Van de Putte's bill] is just so much idiocy, you boys have got to swallow the bill the way it is; we young ones have no intention of letting your Thorb [ecke] stand us on our heads, and if you fellows don't buy our bill then we will fix you and your Thorb [ecke]'s whistle. I told some friends about this meeting the following day—among other also Poortman and Hoyonck.17

Grudgingly, the "young guard" did make one attempt at a rapprochement at the end of the debates on 15 May. Limburg Brouwer, representing Van de Putte, overcame Poortman's objections—probably related to the tale he had been told by Van der Linden—and a meeting occurred the same evening in Brouwer's residence, attended by both Kappeyne and Van Heukelom.18 The result

17 Ibid.

of this conference was the formulation of three new articles intended to replace the first three in Van de Putte's own bill. The most significant element in this proposed draft was the omission of any reference to landownership for the natives. If Van Nierop's amendment postponed a settlement on that question, the new articles which became known as the Poortman Amendment, ignored this point and simple assured the natives that their own ancient customs, adat, would be honored and protected.19

Poortman advertised his handiwork to Thorbecke and Van der Linden as "the point of unification" for both branches of the Liberal party. While unprepared to abandon Van Nierop's amendment, both Thorbecke and Van der Linden agreed to support the new proposal on 16 May if the earlier amendment were rejected in the Second Chamber.20 "But neither Thorbecke nor I," wrote Van der Linden to Van Twist, "have changed a word or line in that document."21

Within twenty-four hours Kappeyne reversed himself and the whole "young guard" followed him. On 17 May, he

20Van Vollenhoeven, loc. cit.
21Archief Duymaer van Twist, loc. cit.
informed Poortman that, "after further reflection he felt obliged to decide not to cooperate any further in getting support for the amendment." From this point on until Van de Putte withdrew his bill and resigned from his post as Minister of Colonial Affairs, one could speak of three major factions in the Second Chamber.

The division in the Liberal Party was apparent to the whole nation and was given irreconcilable proportions when the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* "chose sides for Fransen van de Putte—in something close to a sensation—against Thorbecke in this conflict." But the hostility of Thorbecke, Van der Linden, Poortman and other members of the older wing of the Liberal Party did not present Van de Putte with his only problem in May 1866. Indeed, the formal debates were dominated not by Liberals, but by a series of Conservative speakers: Mijer, Rochussen, De Brauw, Wingens, Van Foreest and still others who advanced their protests against Van de Putte's bill in all its parts in the guise of sentimentality which had become increasingly popular among Conservatives since 1862-64.

---

22 Van Vollenhoeven, *loc. cit.*

In a sense, the subject debated in the Second Chamber for more than two weeks was: "Who is the genuine sympathetic patron of the rights of the 'little man' in Java, the Liberal, trying to introduce foreign institutional norms into a primitive society, or the Conservative who would expand the executive's power in the interior to better protect the natives against capriciousness and extortion while leaving them in the enjoyment of their age-old customs?" Men like Rochussen, Wintgens and De Brauw, who enjoyed prestige and honor within the Dutch nation, were not above arguing with Iz. J. Lion's Dagblad—and incidently with Dekker as well—that the true purpose behind the granting of private landownership to the simple-minded natives was to make their utter reduction and proletarianization more easily realizable. Cynical, treacherous, private Western capitalists, it was suggested, would readily acquire control of the peasantry and leave them propertyless; indeed, private enterprisers in alliance with Chinese and other parasitic elements, it was contended, would cost the Dutch their imperium!

Nor were these sallies of the Conservatives without effect. The Liberals were clearly on the defensive before such tactics. Jonckbloet, one of the prominent 'Van de Putteans' in the Second Chamber, charged the Conservatives in 1865 with being "led by the visions and
specters of an alarmed imagination." Dealing more in specifics, the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* in June 1866 pointed out Rochussen and Wintgens as those who had fought reform the previous month by arguments which rested essentially on sentiment. These men who had played their part in encouraging the growth of an indefensible system in the Indies were now:

> the first to ignore that tragic history and to color in the blackest hues the scene which they hung up of the miseries which would be brought over those dear Javanese with whose fortunes they now have so very much pity, should the bill be adopted. We do hope that people will finally make an investigation once into "what truth there is in all this," that people will make comparisons between the explanations of the Governor-General [Rochussen] and the speech held by the representative ROCHUSSEN [sig] on 2 May. Read, and then pass your own judgment.⁵

Van de Putte himself was likewise sensitive to the impact of the Conservative line which showed greater consistency and homogeneity than ever before in the Second Chamber. On 17 May, as the breech between the two Liberal factions became irreparable, Van de Putte turned his attention, not to Thorbecke and his associates, but to this Conservative onslaught. "A principal element in this

---


⁵ *Parlementaire Nalezing over de zoogenaamde Cultuurrwet voor Neerlandsch Indie, II: Ter Voorlichting van Kiezers,* *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant,* Monday, 4 June 1866, No. 152.
discussion," he declared, "had been: the awakening of suspicions regarding the intent of this bill."

From various sides it is said that the bill has the effect of giving [land] ownership to the natives but solely to the end of quickly putting that [right of] ownership thereafter in the hand of Europeans, Chinese and great financial bodies. Is this judgment deserved?1

The introduction of the Poortman Amendment into the Second Chamber on 17 May must be understood within the context of such harangues, for the Conservatives who opposed both Van de Putte's bill and Van Nierop's amendment now declared, almost to a man, that the new Poortman Amendment was nothing less than an affirmation of the Conservatives' principle of protecting the 'little man' in the interior from the avarice of Western private initiative. When Thorbecke supported the Poortman Amendment and led some 14 Liberals to join the solid Conservative bloc of about twenty-five representatives against the remaining Liberal faction of twenty-four, he was accused, first off, of being motivated simply by the desire for revenge. This interpretation of Thorbecke's move figured in Van de Putte's own evaluation of events. To Governor-General Sloet van de Beele, he wrote:

When one has to admit, alas, that the interests of Java had to be set aside this time, not for

26Verslag, Zitting van 18 September 1865 tot 15 September 1866, p. 700 (supplement No. 2).
the budgetary surpluses, yes, that they were not even sacrificed in behalf of the needs of a political faction, but simply in behalf of private European rancour or vengeance, then it put he who is fond of the Indies in a despondent frame of mind and involuntarily gives rise to the question: not whether the Javanese is sufficiently mature for landownership, but whether the Dutch parliament is sufficiently mature for the handling of matters of colonial interest.²⁷

Such a thesis also figured in editorials appearing in the Handelsblad and in the weekly De Standaard, and stenographer Israel Charles van Lier in the Second Chamber, who also worked as the correspondent to the Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, was of like mind.²⁸ Nor were the members of the other Liberal faction free of irritation and exasperation with the "young soldiers." Van der Linden concluded that Van de Putte and the two other "fathers" of the bill (i.e. Kappuye and Van Heukelom) could have adapted the amendment Van Nierop to

²⁷O.W. De Vries, op. cit., p. 255.

²⁸[Van Lier], "Brieven uit Nederland, 'sGravenhage 25 May 1866," Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Wednesday, 4 July 1866, No. 76. Van Lier's identity is assured by an announcement appearing in the same paper on Wednesday, 1 December 1869, No. 141 to the effect that Van Lier, the correspondent to the newspaper since its inception in 1866, would take over the editorship of the paper in Batavia in the beginning of the new year. Van Lier's full name can be established from an article in the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage, Tuesday, 1 June 1869, No. 126.
fit into their land settlement for the Indies but for "wounded pride."

He told Van Twist "the longer I think, the more I am convinced that Van de Putte . . . wanted to fall, provided he could do it with flying colors; with the impression of having fallen as a martyr for his principles. And Poortman, not believing that Kappeyne was serious when he reversed himself, had broken out into tears and rushed from the Second Chamber when Van de Putte withdrew his bill from the Second Chamber the day following the adoption of the Poortman Amendment. "Never was I so mistreated," Poortman later told Van der Linden.

Given the pitch of emotion in the Second Chamber as the debates progressed, such charges and counter-charges were fully comprehensible as a passing disburdening of accumulated frustrations. This was only a temporary phenomenon. The thesis that revenge accounted for the fragmentation of the Liberal Party gave place in the following weeks and during the next two years to the proposition that a portion of the Liberal Party had actually adopted principles which had been viewed as

29 Archief Duymaer van Twist, loc. cit.
30 Ibid.
Conservative property during the early eighteen-sixties.

Iz. J. Lion, in the Dagblad, exclaimed with glee that Thorbecke, by accepting the Poortman Amendment "had all of a sudden rushed over to the Conservative side with hardes et bagages." The editor of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant charged with contempt:

The gentlemen, THORBECKE, VAN DER LINDEN and a few more of their friends [sic] now stand in the ranks beside Misters ROCHUSSEN, MIJER, WINTGENS and their cohorts against the great majority of the Liberals . . . . Shall they now go ahead and govern along with the Conservatives?

To substantiate the charge that an unofficial coalition had been formed against the Van de Puttean faction, one could point to the fact that "Thorbecke took his stand repeatedly against the radical-liberal party membership even after the vote on the amendment Poortman." Thus, a bill for the regulation of the Dutch National Guard passed through the Second Chamber by a vote of thirty-seven to thirty-four, Thorbecke's faction voting with the Conservatives against the rest of the Liberals.

---

31 Iz. J. Lion], "Onze Politiek Toestand," Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en's Gravenhage, Wednesday, 23 May 1866, No. 119.

32 n.n., "Onze Politiek Toestand," Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Tuesday, 22 May 1866, No. 139.


34 Ibid.
In point of fact, Thorbecke did make it increasingly apparent during the latter portion of the eighteen-sixties that he was dedicated to considerably more moderate policies than the greater part of the Liberals, particularly in colonial matters. But the implication in contemporary literature that he had capitulated to the Conservatives and abandoned his personal integrity was erroneous. Thorbecke's conclusions were the result of his own detached study and contemplation. That his thought showed an element of accord with Conservative apologetics was accidental to those conclusions. Rather than submit to Conservative arguments, Thorbecke himself exercised influence over the Conservatives.

If Thorbecke allowed anyone to influence his ideas, it was Van Twist. Along with him, Thorbecke accepted the essential correctness of the advice which Baud had offered in January 1851 prior to Van Twist's departure for the Indies: "One must attempt to resist as much as possible the tendency to become involved in the economic life of the dessa. One can accomplish much in Java provided that one leaves the native free in the organization of that affair." Van Twist had declared his acceptance of this principle during the May 1860 Van
Hoevell interpellation and Thorbecke indicated his accord when he supported the Poortman Amendment. Thus Van Twist could assure Kiehl in 1872 that "the Poortman Amendment was the most clear-cut expression of that which I and Thorbecke as well desired: to guarantee to the native what he, according to his laws, possessed." (sic) 

Still, the two men were not completely agreed in their conclusions; the April 1866 correspondence between them showed Thorbecke to be more distrustful of Van de Putte's principle of granting landownership to the Natives than was Van Twist. Thorbecke wrote on 22 April 1866:

Will the conclusion not be that those wee bits of private property end up in the hands of the chiefs for a large part who will enter into the business of renting them out for ten year periods to Chinese, Arabians and Europeans? And I add here nothing of the [consequent] general disorders in the social make-up of the dessa. Should we lay ourselves open to all these consequences when the possibility exists of achieving the intent of the bill along much easier ways?

Van Twist attempted to calm Thorbecke's anxiety.

For him, Van de Putte's preoccupation with native

---


36 Zwart, op. cit., p. 227.

37 Ibid., p. 335.
landownership was largely irrelevant to the real problem to be resolved in the Indies. The consequence of introducing landownership, he assured his friend, would be essentially nothing. The natives neither understood nor desired it. It was quite possible that the chiefs on occasion might resort to extortion, "but I see no reason why the frequency of such occurrences should be related to whether the [legal] rights that are transferred are called ownership or have another name." When Van Twist learned later of the Poortman Amendment, he was incensed with Van de Putte's unwillingness to compromise, but to Thorbecke's friend Van Bosse, he declared: "As for myself, I admit I would have been still more conciliatory [than Thorbecke] if in this way the great cause could have been achieved. I would have submitted to [the retention of] that huge and spurious word. Why? Because the consequences would have been the same anyway, even in spite of the law." But Van Twist could not bring his friend from his distrust, either in 1866 or later, and this theme was still central to Thorbecke's contemplations in 1870

38Ibid., p. 338.
39Ibid., p. 351.
during the debates on Minister De Waal's Agrarian bill to which more detailed attention will be given in the following chapter. Clearly, Thorbecke entertained profound distrust of the consequences of allowing the private enterpriser to interfere in the social structure of native life through the instrumentality of private landownership in the dessa. Thus, on 8 March 1870, he commended De Waal's bill to his colleagues in the Second Chamber because it guaranteed that "the Javanese could not be dispossessed from his holdings, save for reasons of general welfare."

This, in Thorbecke's mind, was the essence of "the liberal principle." And on the tenth, he gave greater precision to his anxieties when he speculated on the factors which might bring the simple peasant "to prefer that which we offer him [i.e., ownership] above that which he already has." As if fearful of the correct answer, he declared: "Perhaps there are persons who would like to encourage the Javanese to take this step; but such persons might well be motivated on occasion by their own personal advantage to the detriment of the native." But Thorbecke gave the most

40 Verslag 1869-1870, p. 987.
41 Ibid., p. 1031.
unqualified expression to his distrust of uninhibited Western enterprise on 7 March 1870:

With perfect correctness, among other places in the course of the present debate, people have protested against every effort which might cause the Javanese and his land to fall prey of avaricious, private enterprisers. This law provides the guarantee that the government as well shall have to respect the land rights of the Javanese. 42

This was an element in Thorbecke's thought evident from shortly after his resignation in December 1865 until his death in 1872. Surely his distrust of Western enterprise in the Indies helped to account for his failure to "submit to that huge and spurious word" in Van de Putte's bill. And, because of this, Thorbecke, while insisting on the Poortman Amendment, could still write in all sincerity to Van der Linden: "We went to the last extremity to save Van de Putte's bill." 43 Thorbecke arrived at his conclusions independently, but the Dutch public at large did not know this and, in a sense, public opinion was justified in speaking of the 'Thorbecke-Mijer position' in the colonial question. The Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie in 1869 wrote for a comprehending audience when it referred

42 Ibid., p. 970.
to the "new Conservative-Pseudo-Liberal colonial policy respecting landownership in the Indies."\footnote{44}

But what was this Conservative Party with which Thorbecke unavoidably found himself associated in the popular mind? It was an organization which had grown powerful on the high caloric diet of sentimentality and which considered it a point of honor to blacken the reputation of private enterprisers at the slightest provocation. Thorbecke had little respect for the polemics of this new Conservatism but, without appreciating the consequences of his own stand, he actually assisted the Conservative in making his point!

The fragmentation of the Liberal Party in May 1866 made a new Liberal Ministry impossible. The King turned to Count Van Zuylen van Nyvelt and Mr. Heemskerk Azn. to form a new cabinet in which Mijer assumed the office of Minister of Colonial Affairs.\footnote{45} Almost immediately, Mijer proceeded to formulate an official, government interpretation of the meaning of the May 1866 debates. This took the presumptuous form of a Royal

\footnote{44} n.n., "De Agrarische Wet," *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, 3rd series, III (June, 1869), pp. 418 et passim.

Proclamation, formally promulgated on 23 July 1866.

To all who shall see or hear this document read forth, salute, let it be known: that the King in his ever great beneficent care for the loyal population of Java, so deeply devoted to the Netherlands, and in accord with his newly appointed government, wishes to assure to the natives who hold land in individual and hereditary use the recognition of the right to that use, as is effected here-with; that to this end one shall guard with rigorous vigilance against any form of interference with their right of usage no matter from what side such attempts might be made; that the government shall never appropriate lands in the hands of the native population in individual or hereditary use save in accordance with the precepts of the regulations controlling the government in the Dutch Indies [i.e., Regeringsreglement]. Finally, that the King and his government—while reserving the prerogative of taking into consideration whether the rights of the natives to the land are susceptible to elaboration or more exact definition following an investigation to be made into local conditions—have considered it essential not to withhold the above solemn assurances from the population of Java.46

With this proclamation, the insinuations against the intent and integrity of the private enterpriser which had figured with increasing prominence in the polemic literature of the colonial apologists and the speeches of the members of the States-General

Conservative faction became official government policy. In defending his unilateral action in effecting this proclamation, Mijer on 4 June 1866 told the First Chamber that, while the May debate had begun with a broad field of issues, it rapidly narrowed down to a single question, "the main element in that law."

The question was: "In how far can a wise and cautious policy agree at this early date that the Javanese be extended property rights to the land that he presently occupies according to individual, hereditary or communal custom?" This, said Mijer, was the meaning of the Poortman Amendment which was "nothing else than an obvious paraphrase of this idea." And such a line of thought, he insisted on 7 June, was Conservative property. "The Poortman Amendment was the expression of one of my own contentions ... proposed in the Second Chamber fourteen days before Mr. Poortman spoke. I could not have derived it consequently from his amendment." To the protest that Poortman was a Liberal, Mijer was provided with a ready rebuttal: "But if a faction of the Liberals now joined up with the Conservative Party in order to adopt a Conservative

47Verslag, 1865-1866, p. 195.
principle, . . . then is this the fault of the Conservatives?

Mijer was not satisfied to rest with this statement of principles. The investigations of local conditions in the Indies to which the Royal Proclamation referred were actually made. A Royal decree of 10 June 1867 actually set government officials to work to ferret out the multiplicity of varying provincial norms and standards. Mr. W.B. Bergsma was the most significant person involved. Under his direction, a series of scholarly works on Java and Madoera appeared in 1876, 1880 and 1896. Was it by accident that, prior to these more comprehensive works, the government published in 1871 as its first treatise a resume on conditions in Bantam?

These investigations had the practical effect of directing attention away from Van de Putte's demand for universal, uniform standards. In a sense, the Conservative hobbled the rationalistic reform movement, associated with persons such as Van Hoevell, Van de Putte, Van Soest and, in the colonies, the more radically doctrinaire Van der Hoeven and H.J. Lion, by using the

---

48 Ibid., p. 218.
49 Colenbrander, op. cit., p. 53.
same technique that took the bite out of Max Havelaar. By localizing the "Lebak Affair" with Dekker's approval the Conservatives made his writings acceptable in their own circles. By emphasizing the Second Chamber's incompetence to legislate for the Indies before all the details of native provincial life were known, they encouraged vacillation and timidity. In both cases, the maneuver to localize increased the credibility of the Conservative's sentimental contention that he was the true friend of the "little man" in the interior.

An important shift now occurred in Conservative apologetics which would have been utterly impossible to effect when the opportunity presented itself in 1866 if there had not been a general reorientation of Conservative arguments between 1862 and 1864. The rationale which excused the maintenance of an autocratic colonial structure in the Indies ceased to be the need for budgetary surpluses, the general welfare brought to the Netherlands by government-directed agricultural exploitation, or the need of teaching the Javanese to accustom themselves to systematic work. Rather, the Conservative now argued that only a paternalistic administrative organization could save the Javanese from the consequences of rural proletariatization to
the hopeless role of *menumpang*. Mijer's July 1866 proclamation elevated paternalistic solicitation for the protection of the natives against the disintegrating force of alien concepts to the eminence of a first moral principle. And, to this thesis, Thorbecke accorded his adhesion, whether consciously or not, when during his speech of 7 March 1870, he followed up his reference to "avaricious private enterprisers," by supporting De Waal's bill as "the consummation of the Royal Proclamation of July 1866."50

---

50 Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 970.
CHAPTER XII

THE TRIUMPH OF SENTIMENT

The fragmentation of the Liberal Party made it possible for the Van Zuylen-Heemskerk Cabinet to remain in office from June 1866 until June 1868 despite the number of controversies which raged over it. First off, the majority of the Second Chamber was incensed when Mijer, after successfully defending the colonial budget for 1867, resigned from his post to be appointed Governor-General to succeed Sloet van de Beele (18 September 1866). It became apparent that one of Mijer's reasons for assuming a cabinet position was to guarantee that no interloper stole the much coveted colonial post from him.1

The Second Chamber expressed its disapproval by adopting a resolution proposed by Keuchenius by a vote of thirty-nine to twenty-three: "The Chamber, disapproving of the Cabinet's line of conduct with regard to the resignation of the Minister of Colonial Affairs, Mr. P. Mijer, goes over to the business of the day." Van


444
Zuylen declared this result synonymous with a vote of no-confidence and handed in his resignation. Rather than accept the Cabinet's resignation, the King dissolved Parliament and called for new elections (30 October). After a vigorous campaign the Conservative Party returned strengthened by some three members in the Second Chamber. The Van Zuylen-Heemskerk Cabinet therefore remained in office.²

Less fortunate was Mijer's successor in the Colonial Ministry, Trakranen, when he attempted to guide a bill for the regulation of the private exploitation of undeveloped land in the Indies through the Second Chamber in the summer of 1867. The obstructionary tactics of Van de Putte from the floor obliged Trakranen to withdraw his bill and to retire from the field on 20 July.³ He was followed in office by the


reactionary Hasselman who refrained from all positive steps, pleading the need for local investigations in the Indies. 4

But the Cabinet came under the most severe attacks in 1867 because of the policy pursued by Van Zuylen in Luxemburg and France prior to the 1867 London Conference which made Luxemburg neutral territory between the major powers of Europe. The charge that Van Zuylen had abandoned the policy of Dutch neutrality served as the basis for the rejection of the state budget for foreign affairs. In response to the Cabinet's second offer to resign, the King once again dissolved Parliament (2 January 1868), called for new elections and kept the Cabinet in office for another six months despite the loss of Conservative representatives in the Second Chamber. The ultimate issue which forced the Van Zuylen-Heemskerk Cabinet from office was the vote of no-confidence instigated by Van Bosse on 23 March. 5

If weakened before the Liberal majority in the Second Chamber, Conservative polemics via the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage grew more virulent than ever during the period 1868-1869. Van Lier labeled

---

4Ibid., p. 405.
5Gosses en Japikse, op. cit., p. 853.
partisanship as the cancer of the Netherlands and put the principal blame for it on Iz. J. Lion. "The editor of the Dagblad . . . shall one day be hard put to account for himself for *il a fait ecole* and the atmosphere in our fatherland has long been perverted in many areas by that paper, above all in The Hague."^6

J.T. Buijs, a sober critic of the contemporary scene and one of the most significant contributors to De Gids, identified the Dagblad in 1869 as "the great model" in whose image all the lesser Conservative dailies and weeklies had patterned themselves. While he disapproved of its editorial policy of personal attacks and exaggeration in 1869, his anguish at this paper's policy was even stronger in 1870: "By allowing its voice to bubble over in an unprecedented manner since the preceding year, the opposition press has lost its natural tone; by exaggerating without moderation or self-control all of its grievances, both the well-intended and the pretended, in the most frightful of fashions, excess has become the

---


law of its being. And, in the midst of its incendiary Philippics, the Dagblad began a game of coquetry with the fabricator of Saidjah. Indeed it is likely that some Conservatives entertained the thought of making "Multatuli" a staff editor!

A new period in Dekker's life began in February 1867 with the publication of the pamphlet Een en Ander Over Pruisen en Nederland (Observations concerning Prussia and the Netherlands). Dekker resided in Koln at this time and was greatly impressed by the dramatic events leading to the unification of Germany. In his new book, Dekker called for the abandonment of democratic norms in the Netherlands in favor of a new kind of leadership. By the end of the same year, Dekker had also taken steps to reestablish contact with Rochussen and, with Rochussen's encouragement, he began work on still another pamphlet, ultimately published in 1870 under the title Nog Eens: Vrye Arbeid in Nederlands Indie (Once Again: Free Enterprise in the Dutch East Indies).

In essence, this new work was but another attempt to define his Max Havelaar in terms of the domestic conflict in the Netherlands and, during its writing in

---

December 1867, he had in mind specifically a defense of the Van Zuylen-Heemskerk Ministry. By 4 March 1868, Dekker was back in the Hague and Rochussen introduced him to members of the Ministry, first Van Zuylen, and then Hasselman. He may have had contact with Wintgens, only recently appointed the Minister of Justice, and possibly he met two more members of the Ministry: Schimmelpenninck, and Heemskerk. The latter served, outside of the government, as the director of the notorious Dagblad.  

Van Zuylen in particular seems to have interested himself in using Dekker's literary talents, possibly

9 The development of Dekker's relationship with the Conservatives during late 1867 and early 1868 can be followed closely through his letters in the eighth and ninth volumes of the Brieven. Heemskerk succeeded Dr. G. Simons as the president of the Board of Directors of the Dagblad in early 1869 after Simon's death in December 1868. Like Heemskerk, his predecessor had served in the Second Chamber as a representative from Gorinchem (Nieuwe Bataviassch Handelsblad, Wednesday, 3 February 1869, No. 15). Lion was informed by two members of the Board of Directors, Van Herwerden and Nierstrasz, that Heemskerk was interested in the position in late January. In a letter of 21 January, Lion assured Heemskerk of his willingness to follow any policy changes which the latter might wish to institute once he was in the office of president. (Archief Heemskerk, private possession of Mr. C.J. Heemskerk, Amsterdam) Heemskerk apparently first attended a meeting of the Board of Directors on 29 January 1869 (Archief Heemskerk, Lion to Heemskerk, 27 January 1869). By late March 1869, it was common knowledge in informed Dutch circles that Heemskerk had accepted the Dagblad position. ("Nederland, 's Hage, 25 March," Java Bode, Wednesday, 5 May 1869, No. 36.)
anonymously, in pamphlets or in articles for the *Dagblad*. Rochussen may have played a part in such plans. After his first exploratory conversations with Dekker, Rochussen complained to Van Zuylen: "As things now stand [Dekker] . . . will not write except with the use of his name . . . . It's a shame that things have taken this turn. Your idea was a good one."\(^{10}\)

In the literature on Dekker's contact with the Conservative Ministry, much has been made of the fact that no public collaboration was generated by his appearance in the Hague. One of "Multatuli's" later admirers, in a bibliographic sketch of his life during the eighteen-sixties, entitled the chapter in which he treated the episode in the Hague, "The Fiasco."\(^{11}\) It may have seemed a fiasco in Dekker's own mind when he left the Netherlands again in April 1868. In fact, the interests generated among Conservatives in his potential evolved rapidly during 1868. Already the week before his talks with Rochussen began, Iz. J. Lion wrote a lengthy article for page one of the *Dagblad* in which he argued that "Multatuli" fully supported Conservative colonial policy. The occasion

\(^{10}\) Archief Van Zuylen van Nyvelt, Rijksarchief No. 73, Bijlagen XXXVI, No. 19. The likely date of this letter is 9 March 1868.

was the appearance of an English translation of *Max Havelaar*. In Britain the book was uniformly viewed as the work of a Liberal.

Lion turned to Dekker's 1862 pamphlet to defend his thesis. "When I wrote *Max Havelaar*," Dekker had written, "I was not concerned with free enterprise."

"I was treating a central concept and it has caused me much wonderment to see that book misused as a weapon against the obligatory culture system. . . . In neither the Havelaar nor later, have I gotten myself involved with the trashy, hypocritical points of dispute which are used in the Hague to undermine Ministries."

Lion cited further references in *Vrye Arbeid in Nederlands Indie* regarding avaricious, intriguing private enterprisers and ended with Dekker's important words:

> At this moment, we cannot do without that (obligatory culture) system. [sic] It is necessary to maintain that system, not because it produces coffee for us, but because it provides us with AUTHORITY [over the natives]. Should that AUTHORITY be lost, then there will be nothing more on which to build systems.12

Five months later, an article by "Multatuli" himself, taken from the *Sneeker Courant*, appeared in the *Dagblad*. Dekker had written: "Particularly in matters of colonial policy--but not only in this area--I could better join up with the Conservatives than with the party

---

12*Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage*, Friday, 21 February 1868, No. 45.
which—\textit{lucus a non lucendo}!—calls itself liberal." But most important in Dekker's newest proclamation were the words:

Voluntary labor in Java is a lie, both in fact and as a political economic system. He who abuses that system—irrespective of the hair-splitting aberrations of Mr. De Waal, I remain so emboldened as to continue to call it a system—he who abuses that system, is an enemy of the Dutch nation.\textsuperscript{13}

Another four months and the reader of the \textsl{Dagblad} was presented with a speech by the Anti-Revolutionaire, Koorders, in the Second Chamber, in which he borrowed from the metaphor of Dekker's 1862 pamphlet:

Who are the people who for years have wanted to break with the present "vicious and most wretched system of obligatory cultures," as it is called here in the Chamber? Is it the native population? No! Is it the native aristocracy? No! It is the independent European element that would be very happy to keep \textit{la part du lion} of the profit produced by Java: they are the thousands of slender subsidiary pipes of which Multatuli speaks which people would like set upon the chest of the Javanese. By that independent element in Java which has the press in Java at its service, the credulous Dutch are led astray.\textsuperscript{14}

Dekker paid his due respects to the editorial policy adopted by Iz. J. Lion in 1868 when he wrote for the newspaper \textsl{Het Noorden}: "I value the zeal and the

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., Wednesday, 22 July 1868, No. 172.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., Saturday, 7 November 1868, No. 265 (Koorders in the Second Chamber on 6 November).
talent of that publicist [i.e., Lion] very highly." By the end of 1868, the Dutch correspondent to the Java Bode could report on a new rumor: people were saying that Dekker "was to become a co-worker on the Hague Dagblad." The reporter was not altogether wrong. The idea was entertained by a small circle of Conservatives. In early 1869, Dekker was earning a yearly salary of one thousand guilders for articles published in Van Kesteren's Samarangsche Locomotief. This sum was adequate to meet his most pressing financial burdens and, together with his family, he left Germany and again took up residence in the Hague in February 1869. He kept much to himself during the following eight or nine months. "I speak to almost no one," he wrote an acquaintance in Belgium, "and I feel as lonely in the Netherlands as on the steppes or in a prairie." Nevertheless, his choice of residence was not insignificant, for he had brought along the bulk of the new pamphlet which he had written in December 1867 with his eyes on the Van Zuylen-Heemskerk Ministry. In October, probably, Dekker finally made his move. He assuredly

15 Volledige Werken, V, p. 309.
16 Nederland, 10 September," Java Bode, Saturday 24 October 1868, No. 86.
17 Brieven, IX, p. 11.
entered into contact with J. D. Doorman, the acting editor of the Dagblad during Iz. J. Lion's absence for reasons of health. He probably renewed acquaintance with Heemskerk, the director, and he may well have met the assistant-director and colonial apologist, Van Herwerden. In any case, Dekker had only words of commendation for a recent article by Van Herwerden on the

18 Lion informed Heemskerk of his early departure for Wiesbaden in a letter of 2 May (Archief Heemskerk). Almost immediately, the correspondent to the Java Bode was able to learn of his absence from the Hague. He told his readers of Lion's trip to the south on 5 May, explaining that Lion suffered from throat trouble and that his doctors feared for tuberculosis ("Nederland, 5 May 1869, 's Gravenhage," Java Bode, Wednesday, 16 June 1869, No. 48). Lion apparently stayed some five months in Germany and came back to his post in the Hague temporarily in early October (cf. Dagblad, Tuesday, 5 October 1869, No. 234) but, in November, he was gone again. The Dagblad of 10 November, No. 265, informed its readers that Lion was on board the steamship Guyenne on his way to Suez to attend the ceremonies for the opening of the canal at the invitation of the Khedive of Egypt. Lion stayed in Egypt through the following December, writing articles for his Dagblad back in the Netherlands, but in no position to influence the paper's policies during the end of 1869 or in early 1870. Such a situation was surely not that which Lion had anticipated. When he left the Hague in May 1869, he had fully intended to retain control of editorial policy and Doorman had been obliged to agree "that nothing may be put in the paper regarding the Agrarian bill of De Waal without my previous knowledge." (Archief Heemskerk, Lion to Heemskerk, 2 May 1869) By the end of the year, this had become an impossible arrangement. The correspondent to the Java Bode suggested that Heemskerk himself "more or less filled the role of chief editor." ("Nederland, 5 May 1869, 's Gravenhage," Java Bode, Wednesday, 16 June 1869, No. 48.)
"Destruction of the Official Hierarchy in Java," when he wrote for the Locomotief on 4 November 1869. Van Herwerden was characterized as a "competent, honest specialist par excellence." These men in turn informed the other members of the newspaper's Board of Directors of what was on foot.

Dekker's proposition amounted to an offer to allow the Dagblad to print his piece of December 1867. Doorman countered with the proposal that Dekker write five or six shorter pieces to be published at intervals. Both Van Herwerden and Heemskerk supported this proposal. "But this offer on my part," Doorman wrote to Heemskerk, "did not stack up with the idea [Dekker]... had in mind. 'M[ultatuli]'s plan calls for a single major entity which is a prendre ou a laisser." During the second week of November 1869, Doorman finally gave Dekker the Board of Director's decision after talks with Van Herwerden: "The 50 column work had to be rejected." But he quickly "added a declaration of my readiness to publish several pieces, as an example five or six pieces, if their contents raised no other objections against

---

19Volledige Werken, IV, p. 271.
them." Dekker could not agree; rather he would "turn to the publication of a pamphlet." 20

Almost ironically, the presumptuousness of the negotiating parties, not a matter of principle, kept Dekker from consumating the polemic drive of the Dagblad by joining its staff. This result could well have been predicted in the light of the intrigant's tactics back in the period 1859-1862, for his egocentric personality had not been modified by the course of events even though his thought conformed increasingly to Conservative standards. Nor could "the great model" of all Dutch Conservative periodicals afford to be less unbending. If the Dagblad had agreed to publish Dekker's fifty columns of material which would have required a month's time, this would have made the Dagblad in the public's eyes, "Multatuli's" journal. Surely Dekker appreciated that this would have been tantamount to the Conservative capitulation to his own person, a dream already long in his mind.

On the other hand, if he had agreed to write five or six shorter pieces for the Dagblad, this would have reduced "Multatuli" to a mere creature of the Dagblad in

20 Archief Heemskerk, J.D. Doorman to Heemskerk, 10 November 1869, 's Gravenhage.
the public's eyes. The newspaper's status and Dekker's personality precluded a compromise. Thus: no deal! But this new failure at an entente in November 1869 as in March 1868, was unrelated to the question of using Dekker's ideas. According to Doorman's 10 November letter, Heemskerk had responded to the idea of "Multatuli's collaboration with a "declaration of readiness." Such expedition in acceding speaks volumes. The real issue involved between Dekker and Heemskerk was: who would hold the initiative?

In fact the question of who was to make the first move was resolved in 1869 precisely the same way it had been settled during the period 1859-1862. The November 1869 conversations did not produce a stalemate any more than did Dekker's maneuvers with the Conservatives in 1859-1860 and his tactics toward the Liberals in 1860-1861. In each case, Dekker's steps ultimately forced him to surrender the initiative by default. Van Lennep had acquired ownership of Max Kavelaar, the Liberals had broken the campaign for a national subscription in Dekker's behalf by withdrawing. And, in 1869, the Conservatives could still encourage the idea that Dekker was their ame damnee. Since early 1868, they had effected a reasonable

21Ibid.
facsimile of the "five or six pieces whose contents raised no other objections" by publishing a series of articles which put Dekker in the Conservative camp. And in early November 1869, he himself actually helped this program along by writing a single lengthy article for the Dagblad.

In his new pronouncement, he decried Colonial Minister De Waal's plan to separate administrative and judicial authority in the government of the interior. He called this "the death-blow for our existence in the Indies;" he cited van Herwerden as a collaborating authority for his standpoint, and continued:

That injustice occurs over there [in the Indies] is a fact. Je suis paye pour le savoir! But this will not be stopped by the cultivation of impractical, pedantic, legalistic quibbling, a scrub that has luxuriantly blossomed forth here at home as well for a number of years.22

This was not to be the last reference to Dekker and to the themes "Multatuli" had made popular. A week after his own article, the Dagblad called attention to conditions in Lebak—where "Liberal" free enterprise existed. Only the preceding September, a major plot against Dutch authority had been uncovered there. A

22 Multatuli [Douwes Dekker], "Ingezonden Stuk," Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage, Tuesday, 9 November 1869, No. 264.
native official, close to the old Raden Adipati, appeared to be the principle instigator.\footnote{23}

The Conservative's repeated assertions of his own moral righteousness, his insinuating attacks upon the intent of the Liberal, and his preoccupation with sentiment could not remain unanswered. The sentimentality of the eighteen-sixties gave birth to the apologist's antithesis in 1866 in the form of a group who called themselves the "Society for the Benefit of the Javanese." Its immediate genitor was Dr. W. Bosch, who had served as a public health officer in the Indies in the eighteen-forties and had already published a blistering attack against colonial practices in the early fifties. He was moved by the course of events in the first half of the sixties to call upon the Dutch nation to redress its burden of guilt toward the natives of the Indies by supporting the formation of a new organization which "would act in accordance with a pure moral principle."\footnote{24} During 1865, he arranged to have a speech which he had delivered in Arnhem published privately under the imposing title:

\footnote{23}{"Nederlandsch Oost-Indie," \textit{ibid}, Sunday, 14 and Monday 15 November 1869, No. 269.} 

\footnote{24}{"Vierde Verslag der Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan," \textit{Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan}, IV (August, 1870), p. 190.}
I Seek Mercifulness and Not Sacrifice: A Call upon the Dutch to observe Righteousness and Devotion in their Obligations toward the Javanese. The spirit of his plea and the matter treated were fully comprehensible in terms of the sentimentality evoked in the early eighteen-sixties by the stereotype of Saidjah.

Bosch's words fell upon fertile ground. In March 1866, a "rather large private meeting" occurred in Rotterdam and following a speech by Bosch, "the assembled declared their unanimous adherence to the following declaration:

that they, in the realization of the Netherland's serious responsibility toward its colonies, declare that they—not even through negligence in doing such modest tasks as they can—do not wish to be accomplices to any of the injustices of which the motherland is guilty toward the Javanese, that they are convinced that the universal humanitarian and Christian principles of freedom and justice are as valid in Asia as in Europe and that now more than ever the time has come to fulfill our obligations under those principles. Finally, that they, in this conviction, wish to seek out the best means—in conformity with legality and morality—to help promote this end to the best of their ability."


This emotional, penitent self-flagellation of those who would disavow complicity in the crimes of colonialism served as the initial act in a wave of sentimentality which quickly took on the proportions of a cult-like movement. To join this movement was to perform an act of faith: the Javanese is abused. Rectification would come through dedication to the organization's foundation in "morality and virtue to which all confess and pay homage as the most pure and elevated."27

The sense of dedication with which the novitiate took up membership is excellently shown in the words of an inhabitant of the town of Ternaard, Klaassenz, who stood up during a meeting of the local branch of the "Society for the Benefit of the Javanese" and accounted for the factors which led him to join. "The writings of Dr. van Moevell and others, the speeches in the Chamber by Colonial Specialist--until now still not refuted by the Slijmerings and Droogstoppels--had convinced him that the Javanese were being abused... He joined the society con amore whose endeavor it is to awaken among the Dutch people compassion for the needs of the poor

natives of Insulinde who are still oppressed. 28

Colonial Minister De Waal observed that the movement found its most ready acceptance "among the less educated portion of the Nation," 29 but a large number of men who played instrumental roles in Dutch politics and thought during the eighteen-sixties could likewise be found in its membership. Among these were the Arnhem bookdealer D.A. Thieme, Israel Charles Van Lier, the correspondent and later editor of the Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, P.J. Veth, the orientalist, and a number of the "young guard" from the States-General, i.e. Fransen van de Putte, Mirandolle, C. van Heukelom, Viruly Verbrugge. 30 Sentimentality in the train of "Multatuli" figured prominently through the whole structure of this society. Characteristic was the name chosen by the membership of the Alblasserdam branch: Insulinde. 31

28 "Binnenland," Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Wednesday, 19 February 1868, No. 50.

29 Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 65.

30 Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan, II (October, 1868), p. 3 et passim.

31 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Friday, 11 March 1870.
Indeed, this word of Dekker's invention acquired the property of an incantation as it was employed in the organization. Nor were specific references to Dekker himself absent in the mass of literature circulated by the society. W. Bosch wrote with rhetorical flourish:

What do you think of it, is famine caused [in the Indies] by visitations from on high or by our avarice? Answer, people of the Netherlands, is the Javanese abused or not? Has not Multatuli already long ago depicted this matter so graphically that a painful shudder passed through the whole land?

The new movement was given formal organization during a meeting in Arnhem on 10 July 1866. The original membership of 160 persons rapidly expanded under the leadership of Bosch who was elected chairman. Article five of the society's statutes required the holding of "private and public meetings" to the end of "awakening the spirit of the people and providing them with direction in the spirit of the society." With missionary zeal, the adherents to the cause set about their task. In 1867

---


33 Open Brief aan het Nederlandsche Volk, pp. 37; 40.

the participants were about 900 in number; by September 1868, there were about 1,400 and in the following month of October alone another one hundred persons joined. Branches were founded in Arnhem, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Kampen, Workum, Sneek, Utrecht, Dordrecht, Groningen, Steenwijk and many other places. The society's periodical, which was published monthly in 1867, became a bi-weekly in 1868. In August 1869, the society had 2,000 members and thirty-three branches in the Netherlands. Van Lier could write that "the financial condition of the society, in spite of the costs connected with the publication of a bi-weekly periodical, is propitious" and that "the branches are still zealous in expanding the society and increasing its consequent impact." The participants began to entertain ambitious plans. Many wished the society to attack the bill proposed by Colonial Minister De Waal for the future regulation of obligatory sugar culture in the Indies because he proposed to retain that colonial arrangement until the year 1890. This, the members argued, meant that the Javanese were being

35 "Berigten der Maatschappij," Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan II (October, 1868), p. 5.
36 [Van Lier], "Brieven uit Nederland," Nieuwe Bata­viaasch Handelsblad, Wednesday, 28 October 1868, No. 128.
37 Ibid., Wednesday, 22 September 1869, No. 111.
"Burdened anew with 20 years of coercive labor." One of the Society's adherents, H. De Bruijn, proposed that the society take upon itself the cultivation of some 20,000 bahoes of land in precisely those areas where starvation had ranged unchecked in the eighteen-forties: in Demak and Grobogan.38

No less presumptuous than the other branches, the section in the Hague, with almost a hundred members "including the most distinguished and vigorous protagonists of reform in Java" proposed that the Indische Genootschap (East Indies Association), a highly respected organization founded by Baud in 1852, be transformed into the Hague branch of the Society!39 Fransen van de Putte actively supported this idea but Dr. Bleeker was able to thwart such a move.40

38 Ibid. A bahoe is slightly less than two English acres.


40[Van Lier], "Brieven uit Nederland," Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Monday, 12 July 1869, No. 80. The Indische Genootschap played a major role during the eighteen-fifties in educating the Dutch in the basic facts of colonial history and in the nature of the Cultuur Stelsel. It provided colonial experts with a public forum where they could air their views on contemporary matters of controversy concerning the East Indies. The records of the public discussions sponsored by this association were frequently more consequential than the debates in the States-General and many viewed it as a kind of third house of Parliament.
If the Liberal camp experienced a certain exhilaration from the efforts of Bosch and his associates, at no time can this movement be said to have weakened the Conservative bloc. The practical effect of this new left-wing phenomenon was simply to enlarge the proportions of the debate over who, Conservative or Liberal, might claim exclusive rights to the dignity of "friend of the Javanese" by including a larger element of the people in the discussion. And because of the greater numbers involved, the Conservative victory, when it came in 1870, was that much more resounding.

The challenge posed by Bosch in 1866 was immediately countered by Count Van Zuylen van Nyvelt even while the debates on Van de Putte's bill were still in progress in May 1866. To Bosch's demand that the Dutch awaken to their moral obligations and not concentrate solely on the material welfare of the motherland, Van Zuylen replied:

I happily support such a point of view . . . . and I believe that I can fairly say that my political friends in this Chamber have also always supported such a point of view . . . . They have never proceeded from any other position than that they must work in behalf of the needs of the Javanese as well as those of the motherland.41

41Verslag, 1865-1866, p. 610 (Van Zuylen in the Second Chamber on 7 May 1866).
More pungent was Dekker's own rebuttal of Bosch's society in a brief letter to the Hague branch, dated 5 October 1869, which was distributed the same month as a brochure.

The Society for the Benefit etc. is unconsciously one of the instruments in the hand of the wicked, and as such a dull and grim satire on the affair of Havelaar in which the cancer that consumes the Indies was specifically pointed out.

It aggrieves me in the meantime to perceive that respectable persons . . . have allowed themselves to be seduced into playing the part of Tetzel in behalf of Droogstoppel's encumbered conscience.  

Dekker's stand was found good by the Conservatives and, with considerable variation, this stand was restated time and again during 1869-1870. Heemskerk called the society "one of the most slick swindles that ever existed in the Netherlands." With his finger on De Bruijn's proposal for the cultivation of land in Demak and Grobogan, a writer in the Dagblad dubbed Bosch's organization, the "Society for the Exploitation of Java and the Javanese," and, in the Second Chamber, Nierstrasz called

---

43 Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 341 (Heemskerk in the Second Chamber on 27 November 1869). The Dutch word, boerenbedriegerijen, has richer connotations than the English term swindle.
44 Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage, Thursday, 3 March 1870, No. 53.
attention to the fact that many of the leading figures in the society had friends and relatives in the Indies with vested interests in breaking government control of native enterprise.\textsuperscript{45} Such a counterattack upon Liberal sentimentalism was highly effective. The critical debates of February-March 1870 on De Waal's Agrarian Bill showed the consequence of the Conservatives' persistence.

In the minds of his contemporaries, De Waal's most important act during his career as Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Fock-Van Bosse Ministry, 1868-1870 was the introduction into the States-General of a new bill which, like the proposals of Uhlenbeck, Van de Putte and Trakranen attempted to seek some resolution of the question of the private enterprisers role in the Indies. While a Liberal, De Waal owed his cabinet post to Thorbecke's influence and was considerably more modest in his plans for the Indies. Side-stepping the controversy which had propelled Van de Putte into fiasco, De Waal made the "relinquishment of land by the government

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Verslag}, 1869-1870, pp. 919-921 (Nierstrasz on 3 March 1870; cf. also the sharp exchange between Nierstrasz and Moens, a member of the society and a representative in the Second Chamber, \textit{loc. cit.}, pp. 930; 932).
to private parties in the form of long term leases for not more than seventy-five years" the central element in his bill. Subordinate to this principle, De Waal proposed to settle the question of private landownership for the natives in the following formula: "Land occupied by natives in hereditary individual use, can, at the request of the lawful possessor, be ceded to such parties as [private] property, circumscribed only by their obligations towards the community [i.e., dessa] and the state." This was the content of the fourth paragraph of De Waal's bill as originally drafted.

But such a statement immediately drew attention to the Royal Proclamation of July 1866, instigated by Mijer during his short term in the office of Minister of Colonial Affairs. De Waal was very conscious of this fact and the Memoir of Explanation presented to the Second Chamber along with the bill assumed a defensive attitude from the outset. He was anxious in his Memoir to assure the Second

---

46 Memoir of Explanation on the bill for the Amplification of Article 62 of the Regulation on the Conduct of the government of the Dutch Indies [i.e., Regeringsreglement], Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Monday, 10 May 1869, No. 55 quoting Bijlagen van het Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, 1868-1869.
Chamber that he had not broken with Mijer's contentions; and, in fact, he had not, for the whole Memoir was built upon Mijer's a priori. Thus no sooner did De Waal assert that ownership of land by the indigenous would be consequent upon the initiative of the natives themselves, than he hastened to assure the Second Chamber that "in the present day obligations towards the community, there are guarantees enough that the property [right] which will be granted eventually will not pass over to Europeans or alien orientals." Nor would he lend his hand to any attempt to urge the natives to abandon their mediaeval institutions and "securities":

The dissolution of the central elements peculiar to the presently existing agrarian community: communal ownership accompanied by division of the land for purposes of cultivation, in favor of the newer form of individual possession and individual responsibilities toward the community, shall be left to resolve itself in the course of time. . . . But never shall the state take the initiative in effecting such reform, with its consequent infringement of the freedoms promised [to the natives].

Ignoring the non sequitur in his own semantics—comprehensible only in terms of the irrealism induced into Dutch politics by the excesses of polemic literature—De Waal declared himself in accord with Mijer's emphasis

47Ibid. Italic added.
on the local, the provincial and the unique in the social patterns of the interior in Java. For him, the question of providing titles of ownership to the natives was a matter resolvable only by the benevolent executive authorities following lengthy local investigations. Universal norms could not exist. "The whole affair can only be judged in situ. The Dutch law-makers dare not involve themselves consequently."48

Indeed, so completely was De Waal taken by the multiplicity of native standards and the complexities of positive reform, that he abandoned the kind of an approach which Van de Putte had adopted to the colonial issue. Where his predecessor had presented the States-General with a lengthy, comprehensive bill which made Parliament responsible for determining the exact nature of reform in all respects—land rent, heerendiensten, pantjen-services, and landownership—De Waal satisfied himself with a single statement of some twenty lines in length, sub-divided into five sections. With the utmost economy of means; he set forth within these confines a series of highly generalized provisions which were to serve as guide lines for later specific colonial reforms which would be determined by colonial officials without recourse to the States-General.

48 Ibid.
To the demands from that body that the various phases of reform proposed be worked out in more specific detail for Parliament's judgment, De Waal turned a deaf ear, "for it is a very important matter to me—and on this point the Chamber shall have to pronounce judgment—that the affair be settled with brief declarations of intent on the part of the law-makers in the fashion of the Regeringsreglement." When De Waal won his point, this meant a strengthening of the colonial hierarchy!

Considerable laughter was caused in the Second Chamber when one of the representatives pronounced De Waal's bill to be a "very lean little animal" after V.d. de Putte's mighty effort, but more serious were the complaints of Van de Putte and his close supporters Dullert, Mirandolle and Van de Hucht, who together formed the commission charged with preparing a report on De Waal's bill for the Second Chamber. The brevity and incomplete nature of the bill was seen as an indication of the illiberality of a man under the influence of Conservative remonstrations. A victim of the "snare of the amendment of Mr. Poortman," De Waal failed to commit himself to a specific program. His bill "was in many respects

49 Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 943.
50 Ibid., p. 939.
an unsuccessful effort to sail in between [the Liberals and the Conservatives]....so as not to rebuff too seriously either the protagonists of reform or the defenders of the obligatory system." In his failure to execute the maneuver, De Waal had fallen captive to the Conservatives.  

If the Van de Puttean faction charged De Waal with submission to the July 1866 Royal Proclamation, then the Conservatives for their part could supply De Waal with some support in respect to the more positive phase of his program: the granting of long-term leases to private enterprisers. There were few Conservatives by the late eighteen-sixties who were prepared flatly to reject this scheme in principle. Opposition to long-term leases was no main theme in Conservative polemics in 1869-1870. In substantial part, this fact reflected the efficiency of the editor and directory of the Dagblad in bringing organization and planning into the Conservative Party in its treatment of colonial issues.

Following extensive discussions among the members of the Dagblad directorate, the minutes of which were kept

51 Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs over het Wetsontwerp ter Aanvulling van Article 62 van het Reglement op het Beleid der Regering van Nederlandsch Indie, 10 June 1869, Nieuwe Bataviassch Handelsblad, Saturday, 31 July 1869, No. 88, quoting Bijlagen, 1868-1869.
by the newspaper's printer, Susan, the decision had been reached as early as 17 April 1867, not to oppose the principle of long term leases as such. In 1869, prior to Lion's departure in early May for reasons of health, opposition to this decision seems to have come only from Van Herwerden. Lion looked to the new president of Board of Directors, Heemskerk, for support against Van Herwerden's "opposition . . . to any form of progress no matter how minor."

That decision must be implemented in every respect and there can be no opposition to long term leases in principle. At least not as long as I shall be the responsible chief editor. The more since I elicited that decision of 17 Apr. [sic] 1867 following lengthy reflection on this matter with you among others, while you were the Minister and of the same opinion as I that at least something had to be done for the Indies.52

But, if the principle element in the bill was acceptable in principle, then its implementation in practice could be cast in a form to fit Conservative tastes by hammering on the old theme of protecting the Javanese from Western avarice. In the context of De Waal's bill, this meant even more attention to the Conservative position expressed in the July 1866 royal proclamation. Heemskerk was then, setting forth the Conservative's policy line and indicating where sentimentality could be used to the

52Archief Heemskerk (Iz. J. Lion to Heemskerk, 's Gravenhage, 2 May 1869).
best effect, when he declared: "In my humble opinion the fourth paragraph of the Agrarian bill contains the heart of the bill."53

Many of the Conservatives did follow Heemskerk's cue. "The defense of native races against colonists from Europe became now the main theme of the ultra-conservatives. . . . In a word, this remained _le morceau de resistance of conservative objections_"—thus spoke an indignant member of the 'Van de Puttean' faction.54 So incisive was the tactic pursued by the Conservatives that, by the late spring of 1870, with the debate completed, an extensive body of Liberal literature in protest testifying to injured feelings such as had been unknown after the debates of May 1866 could be collected. In addition to the lamentations of the *Tijdschrift*, J.T. Buijs was occupied in denouncing Heemskerk _et al_ in *De Gids*,55 Bosch, in the periodical of the Society for the Benefit of the Javanese,56 and Keuchenius, in the pages of the

---

53 *Verslag*, 1869-1870, p. 975 (Heemskerk in the Second Chamber on 7 March 1870).


And to the editorials of yet other periodicals, could be added the voice of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, the Arnhemsche Courant and other prominent Dutch Liberal newspapers.\(^{58}\)

Conservative tactics did not prevent the adoption of de Waal's bill although the vote was close—forty-one to thirty-six—and a change of three votes would have brought the Conservatives back into office.\(^{59}\) But the failure to prevent passage did not mean that Conservative polemics could now be lightly brushed aside as irrelevant to the future of Dutch colonial policy, nor did this mean that the Conservative had had no influence on his Liberal counterpart. Awake to the same fears that figured in Thorbecke's support of the Poortman Amendment, De Waal himself was responsive to Conservative arguments and could lend credence to the charge that the private enterpriser was a disruptive, rapacious element in native society if allowed to act unchecked.

\(^{57}\)Keuchenius, "De Suikervergadering," Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Wednesday, 22 September 1869, No.111.

\(^{58}\)e.g. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Thursday, 7 April 1870, No. 83.

\(^{59}\)Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 1035.
In De Waal's remarks there was something of the attitudes of a Van den Bosch. His speeches in February and March 1870 were decked with references to "righteousness" and the protection of the natives "through the office of the highest authorities." He assured the Conservatives that titles of property ownership would be granted natives only slowly; for their own protection, the rights extended to them would be "highly circumscribed for the time being." ⁶⁰

The very form in which the Agrarian Bill had been cast bespoke a certain paternalistic tendency and carried the implication of incipient hostility toward private initiative, particularly since it came after the comprehensive scheme proposed in 1866. More than Van de Putte, who sought reform first of all through statutory law, De Waal, like Van den Bosch before him, anticipated that a major portion of the reform needed in the Indies would follow from an improvement in the morale of the personal in the colonial administration, a corp d'elite: "The most solid guarantees [against the occurrence of abuses in the Indies] must be sought in the

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 1031-1032.
progressive growth of humanitarian principles of government among the officials [of the interior]." \(^{61}\)

But De Waal's proclivity to seek a resolution of colonial matters outside of Parliament so as not to surrender executive initiative to the legislature, and his inclination toward moralizing, is even more evident in the second law associated with his 1868-1870 ministry—the Sugar Act. As proposed, this bill prohibited any further expansion of sugar cultures, ordered the progressive reduction of the area under government supervised direction to begin after the 1878 planting season, and determined that, with the year 1890, the natives' obligation to work for the government in the sugar culture would cease altogether. \(^{62}\) Thereafter, the cultivation of this crop would be exclusively private. To this extent the bill would be positive legislation when enacted, but it fell short of specifically determining the steps to be followed. Once again, De Waal insisted upon reserving

\(^{61}\) Nieuwe Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Saturday 20 November 1869, No. 136. (De Waal in a supplementary memoir to the Second Chamber, appended to revisions in articles A and D of the Agrarian Bill, dated 19 October 1869. This second memoir was actually a ministerial defense against the charges made by Van de Putte, Dullert, Mirandolle, and Van der Hucht in the Tentative Report of 10 June 1869.)

\(^{62}\) De Bruyne, Japikse, op. cit., p. 393.
such decisions for royal decrees. The frustrated Liberal who, in the tradition of Van Hoevell and Fransen van de Putte, wished statutory clarification, complained that:

The only certainty which it [i.e., the Sugar Bill] gives is that all contracts [held by government concessionaires] which expire prior to 1878, shall be extended to that time, and that after 1890 all intercession by the government in the cultivation of sugar shall cease . . . . but what the condition of [the sugar culture] . . . will be prior to the arrival of that time remains uncertain, while in fact in just this matter above all else the law should be quite specific. 63

In the opinion of this observer in 1870, nothing had actually changed after the passage of the act. "Does not the enterpriser remain exactly as before, completely under the regime of royal decrees?" 64

But perhaps of greater importance was the criticism of the Van de Puttean faction on the elements of sentiment standing out so clearly in the Sugar Act. In fact, the greater part of the law consisted of a list of ethical principles which were to guide colonial authorities in carrying out specific acts. The concrete determinations in law occupied only some eight lines of text. Among the admonishments to the colonial official occurred

64 Ibid., p. 51.
such phrases as "decent compensation," "transgression of equity," "fitting remuneration," "appropriate tribute." These words were not amenable to statutory definition in the form used. Mirandolle declared during the debate on the bill that, so far as the natives were concerned, it contained nothing else than "a collection of well intended generalities that rested upon a highly subjective point of view." Indeed, so strongly was Mirandolle struck by the subjectivism of De Waal's whole bill that he declared in the Second Chamber:

Should there ever be a question of the accountability of the Minister regarding the manner in which the law is enforced, those *nuda praecepta* are subject to so many kinds of interpretations and express such exclusively subjective ideas, that there will be little use in calling the Minister to account because one might believe that the implementation had not taken place in the spirit of the *praecepta*.

De Waal's characteristic attitudes and the programs which he defended were far removed from the classical norms of Liberalism. The anonymous author of the July article in the *Tijdschrift* could only conclude that "although [De Waal] sat in an exclusively Liberal cabinet, [he had] pronounced Conservative inclinations." Surely

these inclinations to pay heed to Conservative admonishments were encouraged by the slight majorities that put both bills through the Second Chamber. If the March 1870 law hung on the votes of only three members, the Sugar Bill, adopted on 31 May 1870, had only a slightly larger majority, the vote being forty-two to thirty-five.68

"Is this fact a triumph for the radical party and for the Minister," asked the Dagblad? "We do not think so... The result—and we must be quite frank about this—encourages the hope for a later decision which will save both the Netherlands and the Indies from the hands of those to whom Java has been delivered over."69 The editorial policy of the Dagblad during the remainder of 1870 and 1871 conformed to this judgment. There was no let-up in the use of sentiment. "We can already hear the shouts of jubilation that shall go up," the Dagblad affirmed the next month. "How great is the host of adventurers that shall prepare for the trek to beautify Insulinde!"70

68 De Bruyne, Japikse, op. cit., pp. 395; 398. Three advanced Liberals voted with the Conservative bloc. These were Van Houten, Fransen van de Putte and Mirandolle.


70 Ibid., Friday, 8 April 1870, No. 84.
While De Waal objected to the crassness in Conservative apologetics, he remained just as responsive to the basic content of Conservative polemics after the passage of his bill as he had been before. The Royal Decrees implementing his new laws, consequently, revealed a genuine attitude of suspicion toward private enterprise and brought despondence upon the Liberals.

In this royal proclamation of 20 July [to implement the Agrarian Law] the interests of the government and the natives are excellently cared for; the long term lessee of land, on the other hand, has nothing before him but the perspective of debts and misery under which he will succumb. But then this is a matter of no consequence; they are only fortune hunters!71

But, it was not only that Conservative sentiment influenced De Waal's own policy of implementation—through him it became an element in the psychology of the Dutch official in the colonial hierarchy which was just as decisive a force in the Indies after De Waal as before him.

It was this "spirit of the government" that motivated Van Geuns' article to which reference was made earlier.72 While the thesis that Money's book destroyed


72 M. Van Geuns, "Multatuli en het Sentiment in Onze Koloniale Politiek," Onze Eeuw, IX (April, 1909), cf. Chapter VIII pp. 289 et passim. Van Geuns not only cited the work by the Englishman Money in arguing that Dekker
the influence of *Max Havelaar* is unacceptable, Van Geuns —the author of that proposition—nevertheless remains a reliable commentator on the nature of the impact of "Multatulian sentiment" on the colonial administration during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Van Geuns identified a duality which assumed progressively more critical proportions in the minds of colonial officials: "On the one side, the forceful party of the

had no influence in the eighteen-sixties, but pointed likewise to the fact that, while the sugar culture was condemned in 1870, by De Waal's second major bill, no effort was made to harness the coffee culture to which Dekker referred in the subtitle to *Max Havelaar*. But the nature of Dekker's influence obviously is not to be dispatched through such a game of semantics. Van Geuns' essay clearly consists of two unequal parts. On the one hand, his work betrayed his failure seriously to investigate the germane sources in the eighteen-sixties. Yet, on the other hand, Van Geuns showed himself to be well informed when he turned to the situation in the Indies during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This imbalance in his essay on "Multatulian sentiment" led him to draw a sharp line of demarcation at the year 1870. Before that date, he necessarily argued that Dekker was without influence. Thereafter, he could demonstrate how profound Dekker's influence on the attitudes of colonial officials had been. This line of division is, in fact, unreal; Dekker exercised profound influence after 1870 simply because he had already made a significant impact on Dutch thought before that date.

This same reply can be made to those who argue that Dekker's influence on Dutch thought came only after *Max Havelaar* was made obligatory reading in Dutch secondary schools. If the book had not already had considerable influence on an earlier generation, then it would never have found its way into the public school curriculum.
European agricultural enterprisers, and on the other side, the natives who had to be protected."

Above all the younger classes of administrative officers liked to visualize the agricultural enterprisers as blond skinned masters with a whip in the hand and the Javanese as Saidjahs and Adindas with bent backs. The Multatulian comparison with the slender pipes on the breasts of those brown skinned peoples worked upon the imagination.73

The consequence was "a breaking down of the equilibrium between sentiment and common sense" and a strong sense of hostility toward the independent entrepreneur.74

Examples to support Van Geuns' argument are not difficult to find. So significant a colonial official as Cohen Stuart in 1901 still quoted Dekker's simile of the pressure pump on the Javanese's breast in warning against the relinquishment of government supervision over the questionable intent of private initiative in the Indies.75

---

74 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
RECAPITULATION

The Dutch Conservatives of the eighteen-sixties had worked intently to build their polemic defenses so that they could better resist the demand of Dutch liberalism for fundamental reform in the East Indies. In the process, they gave shape to an attitude of mind which gradually influenced colonial officialdom. After 1870, one could detect a concern among administrative personnel lest the private European who made his living among the natives in the Indies employ the advantages he enjoyed from his Western background to the detriment of native welfare. This belief repeatedly influenced the manner in which policy was formulated and decrees were implemented. A significant evolution had taken place in the attitude with which authorities at Batavia viewed the independent enterpriser. The new point of departure was quite unlike that held when Van den Bosch's system of obligatory government-directed cultures was first being put into practice.

During the eighteen-forties, when the Cultuur Stelsel was producing huge annual surpluses for the state treasury, colonial officials had seen in private
enterprise, not a threat to native well-being, but an obstacle, barring the government from fully realizing the potentials of its system. The radical change in Batavia's point of view came when the government abandoned its earlier monetary criterium and sought justification in a moral principle: an ever-watchful, paternalistic colonial hierarchy, it was held, served best to meet the needs of the indigenous population.

Behind this new spirit within the administrative corps in the Indies lay a decade of debate in the motherland. In the course of a few years, an integrated Conservative Party appeared and strove mightily to remove the ban of censure which a vigorous Liberal Party had placed upon the autocratic colonial system. In rapid succession, Van Hoevell appeared with his periodical, the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie* and Van Soest with the magazine *De Indier*. A score of newspapers joined in the demand for change, the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* prominent among them. Even Van den Bosch's successor, Baud, seemed prepared for reform. During the debates in the summer of 1854, he assumed a defensive tone and admitted that the *Cultuur Stelsel* was built upon fallacious principles. Given the proportions of the body of opinion against them, the Conservatives by the middle of the
eighteen-sixties had fared remarkably well. But to gain parliamentary victories, they were obliged to abandon many of the arguments which had once satisfied an uninformed public and adopt a different approach.

A period of self-examination and reevaluation was forced upon the defender of the colonial status quo by the series of misfortunes which began with Rochussen's resignation from the Colonial Ministry in December 1860 and grew even more severe with the collapse of the Van Zuylen Ministry in February 1862. And it was exactly during this period of retreat for the Conservatives that a new figure appeared upon the Dutch scene with arguments which could fill the void in Conservative polemics. The man in question was Eduard Douwes Dekker.

In the literature dealing with this man, it has traditionally been assumed that he belonged, intellectually, in the ranks of the Liberals, and that his book, Max Havelaar, was an eloquent plea for exactly the kind of reforms that men like Van Hoevell demanded. This belief is erroneous. Dekker neither wrote in behalf of the Liberals nor interested himself in their desired goals. The book which has long been considered a repudiation of the Cultuur Stelsel was, in fact, an attack upon the laxity which made it possible to staff the colonial hierarchy with people who did not meet the high standard
of integrity and morality originally demanded by Van den Bosch. Dekker did not desire the dismantling of the Cultuur Stelsel any more than the Conservative apologist: he wished only that it be made morally justifiable through a change in personnel.

But, more importantly, "Multatuli" provided the Conservative with a powerful rebuttal of Liberal polemics in his Minnebrieven (Love Letters) and in his Concerning Free Enterprise in the Dutch East Indies. Not only he argued, did the colonial system provide the Dutch with a means of watching over the natives' welfare, but, to abandon this arrangement and to give free rein to the interests of independent enterprisers was to jeopardize the very retention of the colonies. The natives would bow to the will of a unipersonal authority but would grow rebellious under the rule of private parties with conflicting interests. Both the worshipper of "budgetary surpluses" and the solicitious friend of the Javanese, he continued, must oppose the schemes sponsored by the reformers.

Slowly the Dutch recovered from the shock of Max Havelaar's original appearance and attention was then directed to the content of Dekker's arguments and to the element of sentiment which he employed with great effect in his writings. It was found that both aspects of his
work had true utility value in the hands of Conservatives. In March 1861, Rochussen welcomed Dekker into his home and offered to assist him. Important in developing the new apologetic was Wintgens' speech in the Second Chamber the following December. "Droogstoppel," he declared, was the ego incarnate; it was not in the guise of the Conservative coffee broker that one should seek his progeny but among the Liberal exploiters of the natives' labor!" Dekker began a correspondence with Wintgens in 1863 which was to continue for over a decade. The same year Hasselman, the future Minister of Colonial Affairs, began to write a series of articles which stressed the element of sentimentality and became, in fact, a commentary upon Max Havelaar for Conservative consumption.

As sentiment in the fashion of the tale of Saidjah and Adinda came to play an increasingly important role in Conservative writings, many of those associated with the right wing began to disavow their earlier dependence on the deceased Baud, the man more closely associated with the growth of the Cultuur Stelsel than Van den Bosch himself. Baud's opportunistic defense of the colonial status quo in the eighteen-forties for financial reasons but, even more, his willingness later to reverse himself and allow the insertion of Article 56 with its controversial sixth paragraph into the 1854 Regeringsreglement.
made him a foreign element in the new body of apologists. Ignoring the historical antecedents of their party, men like De Brauw and Van Foreest declared in 1864 that benevolent concern for the Javanese and not a desire for state revenues had always characterized their policies.

Still emphasizing their paternalistic concern for the natives, the Conservatives came to power by default in 1866 when a breach within the Liberal Party divided its ranks and halted Colonial Minister Van de Putte's efforts to push through the Second Chamber a bill which would have reorganized agricultural enterprise in the Indies. The new Minister of Colonial Affairs, Mijer, immediately seized upon the opportunity presented to elevate the new Conservative apologetics to the eminence of formal government policy. A Royal Decree was promulgated the same month that the new Ministry was established. The Dutch government, it informed the indigenous of the Indies and the Liberals of the motherland, would, under no circumstances, permit the disruption of native customs and institutions through the removal of the restraints on free initiative which had traditionally inhibited the European enterpriser's contact with the natives.

To disband the Conservative Ministry in 1868 was not to vitiate the impact of the principle it had enunciated in 1866. Minister De Waal indicated repeatedly
that he labored under the influence of the moral arguments postulated by his predecessor Mijer. It was important for him that Western principles of legality not "infringe upon the freedoms of the natives."\(^1\) He continually defended his bills before the Second Chamber with references to "righteousness above material interests and the like."\(^2\) But, equally important, De Waal was encouraged to abandon Van de Putte's attempt to make the States-General all-powerful in the determination of the details of policy for the Indies. As he conceived it, Parliament was only to set forth the broad lines within which the colonial administration would move at its own initiative. Land ownership, as an example, was not to be determined in the States-General; "the whole affair, he asserted, "could only be judged on the local scene."\(^3\)

De Waal's two years in the Dutch government had the effect of reassuring colonial authorities that the administrative hierarchy would not be deprived of its paramount role in the Indies. At the same time, the

\(^1\)Memoir of Explanation, op. cit.
\(^2\)Verslag, 1869-1870, p. 1031.
\(^3\)Memoir of Explanation, op. cit.
attitude of the new Colonial Minister towards the implementation of policy encouraged the personnel of that organization to view its responsibilities in the Indies in a strongly moral light. A highly-favorable environment had been created to nourish the growth of ideas which necessarily acted as a drag upon free enterprise in the East Indies. To carry out his assignment, the colonial official felt obligated to choose sides with the indigenous against the private enterpriser. The intellectual family tree from which such an attitude of mind developed could be traced back through De Waal to the Royal Decree of 1866, and from there to the polemics of the Conservative Party of the earlier eighteen-sixties which had leaned heavily upon the writings of Eduard Douwes Dekker.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

SOURCE MATERIAL

A. Printed

1. Official Dutch Publications

Volumes: 1859-1860; 1860-1861; 1861-1862; 1862-1863; 1863-1864; 1865-1866; 1866-1867; 1868-1869; 1869-1870.
The official record of the debates conducted in the First and Second Chambers of the Dutch States-General.

Volumes: 1859-1860; 1860-1861; 1861-1862; 1862-1863; 1863-1864.
Compilations of committee reports, petitions, statistics, and other documents formally laid before the Second Chamber of the Dutch States-General.

An abstract from Van den Bosch's 1834 report on the policies which he had implemented in the Indies between 1830 and 1833 under the new administrative arrangement known as the Cultuur Stelsel.
2. Polemic Leaflets, Pamphlets, and Books

A protest from an anonymous protagonist of reform in the Indies against Conservative use of the book by J. W. B. Money, *Java, or How to Manage a Colony* (cf. below), in the defense of the colonial status quo.

Banck, J. E.* Coloniale Staatkunde van het Cabinet*. Amsterdam: Munster, 1861.
A Conservative's defense of autocratic but humanitarian rule in the Indies. He employed arguments and themes derived from Dekker's works.

A self-defense by a former Liberal colonial official of the policies followed while serving as Resident of Rembang in the late eighteen-fifties.

An impassioned call upon the Dutch nation to observe high moral principles in governing the East Indies. The author was a public health officer in Java during the eighteen-forties and early fifties.

A sharp partisan attack upon retired Governor-General Duymaer van Twist (1851-1856) by a colonial concessionaire. The late executive was accused of duplicity and inaptitude.

Des Amorie van der Hoeven, Martinus* Mijn Terugkeer tot de Kerk van Christus*. Amsterdam: Van Langenhuysen, 1871.
A public accounting by the former editor of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* of the reasons leading him to abandon the Dutch Reformed Church and accept Catholicism.
Fransen van de Putte, I. D. *De Regeling van de Suiker-Contracten op Java*. Schetsberg: Goes, 1860.
A defense by the advanced Liberal leader of the colonial reform movement of a letter which he had written in 1858. The earlier document which criticized Van Twist severely had been widely circulated.

The first pamphlet of Dutch colonial official who retired in the late eighteen-fifties. Although he had great respect for the Cultuur Stelsel, he could, nevertheless, acknowledge that there were faults in the system as it actually functioned.


Two later essays in which the author showed a marked shift to the right in his thinking on colonial institutions.

A concise accounting of the principal events in the life of the representative in the Second Chamber from Delft by one of the principal figures in the Conservative Party.

A lengthy and frequently pedantic examination into the principles espoused by the Conservatives in the States-General. The author was a member of the advanced "Van de Puttean" faction in that body.

An unknown member of the faction associated with the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie* charged the opposition with having brought itself into disfavor by defending the efforts of a favored group of government concessionaires in the Indies who were attempting to increase still further the "swollen profits" already enjoyed.

A pungent, uncompromising summary of the principles to which the "Colonial Radical" in the Indies was dedicated. The author was the editor-in-chief of the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* during the eighteen-fifties and sixties.

Money, J W. B. *Java, or How to Manage a Colony.* Show-a practical Solution of the Question now Affecting British India. 2 vols., London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861.


The original English edition and Dutch translation of the lengthy panegyric on Van den Bosch's Cultuur Stelsel.


A highly unfavorable character sketch of Iz. J. Lion, editor of the Conservative *Dagblad van Zuid-Holland* en 's Gravenhage.

*Politiek van den Dag: Vliegende Blaadjes.* Kampen: Van Hulst, 1862.

*Politiek van den Dag: Vliegende Blaadjes.* Kampen: Van Hulst, 1863.

Two collections of editorials and commentaries on contemporary political events by an anonymous advanced Liberal pamphleteer.


An emotional defense of this classic against its Conservative detractors by an Amsterdam free-thinker.


These are essays in an archly-Conservative spirit defending the colonial status quo against Liberal disparagement.

An extremely unfavorable evaluation of a bill proposed by Colonial Minister Uhlenbeck in 1862 partially to resolve the problem of private enterprise in the Indies written by a former Governor-General (1845-1851) who also served as Minister of Colonial Affairs (1858-1860).


In this pamphlet, an arch-reactionary denied that there were any faults whatsoever in the Cultuur-Stelsel while insisting that the Netherlands needed the "budgetary surpluses" from the Indies to survive economically.


Works to which reference is made in the text:

Volume One:

*Max Havelaar of de Koffieveilingen der Nederlandse Handelmaatschappij.*

Dekker's best known book was originally published by De Ruyter in Amsterdam in May 1860. It is an autobiographic account of his own previous career in the Indies (1838-1856), embellished with a powerful, but highly subjective commentary on Dutch and colonial politics, society and morality. (Cited in English as Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Handelmaatschappij.)

*Brief aan Ds. W. Francken Azn.*

Dekker published this open letter in the periodical *De Tijdspeigel*, in September 1860, in response to a sympathetic, but critical review of *Max Havelaar* written by a spokesman of Dutch missionary work. In this article, Dekker publicly proclaimed his atheism.
Brief aan den Gouverneur-Generaal in Ruste.

This is the formal title given a letter written to Duymaer van Twist in December 1858 when Dekker allowed it to be published in October 1860. It was the first in a series of articles published under the general title of Indrukken van den Dag. In this letter—which predated Max Havelaar by about one year—Dekker accounted for his conduct at Lebak from the time of his arrival there, up to the moment when he resigned from the colonial service. The narrative varied little from that in his book.

Aan de Stemgerechtigen in het Kiesdistrikt Tiel.

In this open letter, published in October 1860 as a pamphlet, Dekker acquainted the public with the anti-Liberal trend of his thought. (Cited in English as To the Voters in the District of Tiel.)

Het Gebed van den Onwetende.

This is a short, blank-verse poem, in which Dekker reasserted his atheism, published by the free-thinker, F. Günst, in Amsterdam. (Cited in English as Prayer of the Nescient.)

Wys my de Plaats waar ik gezaaid heb.

Dekker wrote this essay to assist in a national canvass for funds with which to assist the Javanese after a natural catastrophe. It was published in May 1861 by the book-dealer Nijg, a Liberal associated with the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (New Rotterdam Newspaper).

Volume Two:

Minnebrieven.

This is Dekker's second major work, published late in 1861. It is a kind of rhapsodic sequel to Max Havelaar and contains many passages which are meaningful only to one well acquainted with the better-known first book. (Cited in the text as Love Letters.)
Over Vryen Arbeid in Nederlands Indie en de Tegenwoordigke Koloniale Agitatie.

The commentary on Max Havelaar, begun in the autumn of 1860, was continued with this lengthy pamphlet of February 1862 in which Dekker argued that abandoning the Cultuur Stelsel would jeopardize the retention of the colonies. (Cited in the text as Concerning Free Enterprise in the Dutch East Indies.)

Indeeën, Eerste Bundel.

Dekker turned in the course of 1862 from his primary concern with the data narrated in Max Havelaar to write the first of a series of volumes known collectively as Ideas. This book consisted of a collection of essays in which he set forth, without inhibition, his own, frequently radical views on all phases of Dutch life.

Volume Four:

Een en Ander over Pruisen en Nederland.

A sharply-worded repudiation of parliamentary and democratic forms, written in 1867 while Dekker resided in Germany. (Cited in the text as Observations Concerning Prussia and the Netherlands.)

Causerieën.

In 1869-1870, Dekker wrote a column for the East Indian newspaper, De Locomotief, edited by the Liberal, Van Kesteren. These articles were originally published only in part and it remained for G. Stuiveling to bring together both the manuscript and printed fragments of this work and publish them as a single whole in the new edition of Dekker's collected works. Intellectually, they fall below the level of Dekker's earlier work.

Aan het Beëuur der Haagse Afdeling van de Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan.

A public repudiation of the Society for the Benefit of the Javanese in a page-and-a-half open letter to its Hague branch, dated 5 October 1869 and published by Dekker's friend and printer, G. L. Funke.
Volume Five:

**Nog Eens: Vrye Arbeid in Nederlands Indie.**
Urged to action by the Conservative leader, Rochussen, in 1867, Dekker prepared this lengthy pamphlet after completing his Observations. It contained his most emphatic espousal of the new Conservative viewpoint. Not published until 1870.


Two highly partisan attacks upon the leading personalities in the Dutch Liberal Party and their arguments for reform in the Indies.

Van Doren, J. B. J. *Bij Wien ligt de Schuld van de Gruwelijken Gebeurtenissen ten Bandjermassen en het zich verspreiden van duizenden fanatieke Mekkangangers op Java?* Amsterdam: J. D. Sybrandi, 1861.
An attempt to weaken the impact of Liberal thought by discrediting former Governor-General Van Twist, a man closely associated with the advanced Liberals in the popular mind.

A carefully-worded, critical examination of democratic institutions in the Netherlands after the constitutional reforms of 1848. The author was Conservative by inclination but distinguished himself in the Second Chamber by his independent voting record.

[---] *Het Vaststellen der Indische Begroting bij de Wet.*
An attempt to reason out the consequences of parliamentary intervention in policy making for the Indies through the right to determine or alter the annual budget for colonial expenses.
An apologist for the colonial status quo who was later a member of the Board of Directors of the *Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage* accounted in this pamphlet for his own approach to colonial administration.

A collection of speeches given in the Second Chamber by the outstanding protagonist of reform in the Indies. Notes were added to explain the general situation attending delivery of the various addresses.

One of the last works of the famed Dutch writer who died the year of its publication. He defended the cause of the Amsterdam Conservatives against the propaganda of the local liberal Party organization.

Vitalis, L. *De Invoering, Werking en Gebreken van het Steisel van Kultures op Java.* Zalt-Bommel: Noman, 1851.
One of the earliest critical accounts in Dutch literature of the system of obligatory, government-directed cultures.

3. Periodical Literature

An expose, contrasting Rochussen's speeches and writings of the eighteen-sixties with the policies he pursued in the Indies as Governor-General.


Articles on the current political scene by one of the more prominent spokesmen of Liberalism in the eighteen-sixties.

Cohen Stuart, Mr. J. W. T. "Deentralisatie in Indie," *De Indische Gids*, XXIII (January, 1901), pp. 31-53.

A review of the policy adopted by the Dutch colonial administration in the late nineteenth century of decentralizing executive authority at Batavia in favor of European and native provincial authorities in the various portions of the East Indies.


The first major review of *Max Havelaar*. The author was a liberal-minded student of colonial affairs who wrote frequently for *De Gids* as well as the above periodical.


An anonymous member of the advanced Liberal group, associated with the reformer Van Hoevell, commented in this article on the debates of March 1870 which led to the passage of a bill to regulate the use of land in the Indies by private parties for agricultural purposes.


An attempt to silence Conservative refutations of *Max Havelaar* through the use of sarcasm and ridicule.


An amusing sally against Conservative apologetics by way of a fictitious letter signed "Droogstoppel," in which the latter is made to appear ludicrous.

The complete text of Van den Bosch's 1834 report on his activities as Commissary-General in the Indies. This document had been made known in only fragmentary form in an 1840 government publication. (Cf. supra: Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie voor 1834, No. 22, Bijlage A.)

Van Hoevell, W. R. baron. "De Inlandsche Hoofden en de Bevolking op Java (Max Havelaar, of de Koffieveilingen van de Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij door Multatuli, Amsterdam 1860)," Tiijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, XXIII (October, 1860), pp. 258-266.

A critical but sympathetic review of Max Havelaar by an outstanding protagonist of reform in the Indies.


When J. W. B. Money, author of Java, or How to Manage a Colony (cf. supra), declared in an essay published in The Economist that he had severe objections to some features of the Cultuur Stelsel, Van Hoevell was quick to bring this information to Dutch attention.


A lengthy analysis of the course of political developments in the Netherlands during 1860. In treating the colonial question, the author attributed much of the increasing interest in this subject to the appearance of Max Havelaar.


An extremely favorable review of Max Havelaar by the Dutch Orientalist and geographer.
A bitter critique of Colonial Minister De Waal’s Sugar Act by a frustrated member of the advanced "Van de Puttean" faction.

Publications of the Society for the Benefit of the Javanese

A discussion of the famine at Grobogan and Demak in 1849 by the founder of the above society placing the colonial administration in an extremely unfavorable light.

______. "Javanen Vrienden," Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan, IV (May, 1870), pp. 129-152.


n.n. Open Brief aan het Nederlandsche Volk: Maatschappij tot Nut van den Javaan, Arnhem: D. A. Thieme, 1866.
Progress reports on the rapid growth of the society and on the subjects debated in its public meetings. The writers repeatedly emphasized the moral principles to which the membership dedicated itself.

4. Newspaper Articles

The first genuine Conservative to appear in the role of editor of a colonial newspaper here gives an accounting of the principles to which he was dedicated.

"Normaal en Abnormaal," Java Bode, Saturday, 12 October 1861, No. 82.
An attempt to draw a distinction between the Conservative approach to colonial policy and that of the Liberals and Colonial Radicals on the basis of Article 55 of the Regeringsreglement of 1854.

Having originally received Money's Java, or How to Manage a Colony with praise, Buijn was now obliged to acknowledge that the treatment of colonial finance in that work had brought irreparable damage to the cause of those championing the colonial status quo.

Dekker here defends his explanation in Max Havelaar of how his predecessor had died and his treatment of "Slymering" (i.e., Brest van Kempen) against charges published in the same newspaper the previous month.

Dekker announced his profound disapproval of the program of reform for the Indies proposed by Colonial Minister De Waal.

"In gezonden Stuk," Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage, Tuesday, 9 November 1869, No. 264.
Yet another attack upon the measures pursued by De Waal.

The editor of the above newspaper from July 1860 to July 1861 here rejects the system of government concessionaires on the ground that it contradicted natural law.


A complimentary appraisal of the policies followed by Van Twist as Governor-General from 1851 to 1856.


A review of *Max Havelaar* which rejected the political content of the book in toto, acknowledging its greatness only as belles-lettres.


An attack upon Colonial Minister Rochussen's Second Chamber speech of 15 October 1860 in which he defended sugar concessions granted at Pangka. The latter's words were characterized as those of the "well-intending slaveholder."


Two complementary essays on native institutions by a retired colonial official and future Minister of Colonial Affairs (1868). The author is particularly concerned with contrasting the conditions of instability in Lebak where private land ownership and land taxes existed with the more stable situation in other portions of Java where the *Cultuur Stelsel* operated.

A sharply-worded open letter by the retired editor of this newspaper prior to his departure for Europe. He asserted that he would provide documentary evidence against Max Havelaar in a later article which he planned to publish in the motherland. (See next entry.)


This is the article which Lion promised in the previous article. In particular, Lion took up the defense of Resident Brest van Kempen against the imputations in Max Havelaar.


An essay on comparative colonial government in which the agricultural policies followed by the British are adjudged superior to those pursued by the Dutch under the Cultuur Stelsel.


An account of the death of Assistant-Resident Carolus, Dekker's predecessor at Lebak, by an anonymous, but apparently well-informed person, which varied in every respect from the story related in Max Havelaar.

5. Private Correspondence


A compilation of all known existent correspondence between Dekker and his intimate friend Roorda van Eysinga, written for the most part during the eighteen-seventies. The editor was Dekker's second wife; they married after the death of Everdina in Venice in 1874.

An incomplete collection of Dekker's correspondence from the eighteen-forties into the eighties. The text includes a number of commentaries, frequently of a highly subjective character, written by Dekker's second wife.


The son of the only publisher with whom Dekker maintained amiable relations edited this collection of correspondence in which all of Dekker's letters to his father are printed along with part of the latter's notes.


A carefully-selected, one-volume compilation of letters so arranged as to display various aspects of Dekker's personality. Several of the letters included do not appear in any other published source.


A compilation of all the existent sources on Dekker's life as a colonial official to his resignation in 1856 and the months immediately following.

B. Manuscript Material

Documents to which reference is made in the text:

No. 1 Dekker to Van Hasselt, Brussels, 19 October 1859.
Dekker gave permission to make his name known to the Dutch impresario, De Vries, but begged Van Hasselt to request him to keep his identity a secret.

No. 4 Van Hasselt to Rochussen, Amsterdam, 11 November 1859 (confidentieel).
An expression of alarm over the possible consequences which might follow from the publication of *Max Havelaar*.

No. 5 Jan Douwes Dekker to Van Hasselt, 14-15 November 1859, Brummen.
An inquiry into Van Hasselt's readiness to examine the manuscript of *Max Havelaar*. At the bottom of this letter Van Hasselt jotted down a short chronology of events which is helpful in dating specifically the course of Dekker's activities in Amsterdam in late November 1859.

No. 16 Rochussen to Van Lennep, 's Gravenhage, 23 November 1859.
A letter intended to introduce Dekker's relative by marriage, Van der Hucht, to the Dutch literary figure, Van Lennep.

No. 18 Tydeman to Van Lennep, 2 December 1859.
An official of the Amsterdam Handelsblad gave expression to his indignation over the Dutch colonial administration after reading a copy of the letter which Dekker wrote to Van Twist in December 1858.

No. 25 Dekker to Van Lennep, 10-11 December 1859.
A query as to Van Lennep's intentions in placing his name on the candidate list for the election to fill the seat of the deceased Second Chamber representative Stolte.

No. 30 Dekker to Van Lennep, 21-22 December 1859.
An expression of Dekker's fear that Van Lennep's interest in his cause was weakening.
No. 39 Dekker to Van Lennep, 8 February 1860
(from Brussels).

An accounting of the motivations which led Dekker
to write his missive of 18 January 1860 to William
III.

No. 45 Dekker to Van Hasselt, Brussels, 27 April
1860 and Van Hasselt to Dekker, Amsterdam, 16 May
1860.

A short letter in which a gift copy of Max Have­
laar was presented to Van Hasselt. A draft of the
latter's letter of thanks was jotted down at the
bottom.

No. 48 Dekker to J. De Ruyter, Brussels, 15 May
1860.

A note to the publisher of Max Havelaar thanking
him for the three copies of the book which had
recently arrived.

No. 51 Dekker to Van Lennep, Brussels, 23 May 1860.

Dekker's first thoughts and observations on his
Max Havelaar after examining the printed text of the
1860 De Ruyter edition. This is an extremely impor­
tant document for it makes it possible to determine
Dekker's attitude toward the Liberals during the
period when his book was universally acclaimed as
a Philippic against the Cultuur Stelsel.

No. 59 Dekker to Van Lennep (Likely date is 17 June
1860).

Uncertain as to Van Lennep's loyalty, Dekker
gave vent to his past frustrations and to his dis­
appointment that the appearance of Max Havelaar had
not caused immediate demonstrative reverberations
in the Netherlands.

No. 72 Dekker to Van Lennep, 12 January 1860.

A response to a missive from Van Lennep in which
a series of editorial changes in the text of Max
Havelaar were recommended.

Archief Heemskerk, private possession of Mr. C. J.
Heemskerk, Amsterdam.
Lion, Iz. J. to Heemskerk 's Gravenhage, 21 January 1869.

The editor of the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage expressed his pleasure upon learning that Heemskerk might join the Board of Director of the newspaper.

Lion, Iz. J. to Heemskerk 's Gravenhage, 27 January 1869.

An invitation to attend a meeting of the Board of Directors.

Lion, Iz. J. to Heemskerk 's Gravenhage, 2 May 1869.

A lengthy letter written prior to Lion's departure for Wiesbaden for reasons of health. He listed a number of current problems to be settled in his absence, presumably by Heemskerk.

Doorman, J. D. to Heemskerk 's Gravenhage, 10 November 1869.

An account of negotiations with Dekker during which the latter suggested that a lengthy work from his pen be printed in a series of issues of the Dagblad van Zuid-Holland en 's Gravenhage.

Archief Duymaer van Twist, Algemeen Rijksarchief IV35. Documents No. 1 and 2 (Van der Linden to Van Twist, n.d.).

A lengthy account of the May 1866 debate on Van de Putte's bill for a reorganization of agricultural enterprise in the Indies as seen through the eyes of a prominent member of the Thorbecke faction in the Second Chamber.

Archief Van Zuylen van Nyevelst, Rijksarchief No. 73, Bijlagen XXXVI, No. 19 (Rochussen to Van Zuylen 9 March 1868).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Conservative Cabinet of 1866 was informed briefly of the results of a conference between Rochussen and Dekker in which the latter refused to enter into a scheme (unspecified) which had supposedly been proposed by Van Zuylen himself.
SECONDARY WORKS

A. General Histories

A detailed account of the parliamentary debates in the two Chambers of the States-General during the eighteen-fifties and sixties in which extended citations are made from actual speeches. The work's value is limited by the fact that, aside from the official records of the debates (*Verslag van de Handelingen der Staten-Generaal*), few sources were employed in preparing this volume. It is little more than a digest of the *Verslag*.

A detailed analysis of the works and personality of the principal figures in the Dutch literary world during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century.

An account of the Anti-Revolutionaires' part in the parliamentary deliberations over colonial matters from the eighteen-fifties until the nineteen-twenties, as seen through the eyes of a member of that political party. Lengthy citations were made from the official Dutch record of the debates in the States-General (i.e., the *Verslag*).

A single-volume survey of Dutch political history since the Middle Ages.

A detailed parliamentary history based upon the official Dutch record of debates (Verslag). Unlike other works in this field, some additional sources are employed and more emphasis is placed upon interpretation. This book's value is further enhanced by a series of elaborate footnotes by C. W. De Vries which appear in the new edition.


A survey of all phases of Dutch life in the nineteenth century, including an analysis of Dutch thought and culture as well as an outline of political developments.

B. Monographs


The only existent attempt at a biography of Dekker. A limited number of sources were employed and the author was generally unsuccessful in achieving objective detachment.


An analysis of Dekker's activities at Lebak by an outspoken critic who did not consider "Multatuli" above the use of open falsehoods.


An investigation into the influence which Dekker had upon the development of Dutch literature in the last half of the nineteenth century. His role is held to have been indecisive.

A not altogether sympathetic re-evaluation of Thorbecke's place in Dutch politics during the eighteen-fifties and sixties. This book is valuable for the many previously unpublished documents which it contains.


A scholarly analysis of the dispute between Dekker and Van Lennep over the ownership rights to Max Havelaar.


An exhaustive investigation into the political developments preceding decision's William I to send Van den Bosch to the Indies in 1830 to implement his proposed Cultuur Stelsel.

Mijer, P. *Jean Chretien Baud*. Utrecht: Kemink, 1878.

A biography of the man who, next to Van den Bosch, played the most important role in the development of the Cultuur Stelsel. The great value of this work lies in its many lengthy excerpts from Baud's speeches.


An examination of the influence which the Romantic Movement exerted upon Dekker's writings and the nature of his influence, in turn, upon his contemporaries.


A competent study in the field of economic history analyzing the relationship between independent enterprisers and the colonial administration during the period 1830-1870.
A highly unsympathetic treatment of Dekker's youth and his career as a colonial official.

A biographical account of Dekker's life in the second half of the eighteen-sixties by a writer who, like De Gruyter (cf. supra), belonged in the ranks of "Multatuli's" admirers.

A detailed study of the thought of a member of the Anti-Revolutionaire Party up to October 1866 when he proposed a motion in the Second Chamber censuring the Conservative Ministry. Extensive quotations are made from Keuchenius's letter and speeches. The appendix contains a number of documents published for the first time.

Van Lennep, Jhr. D. M. F. Het Leven van Mr. Jacob van Lennep. 2 vols., Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen, 1909.
A biography of the nineteenth century literary figure by his grandson. The author was among the first to utilize the important sources available in the Archief Van Lennep.

A concise account of the negotiations between the "Thorbecke" and the "Van de Puttean" factions in the Second Chamber leading to the formulation of the Portman amendment.

A brief survey of journalism in the East Indies since the eighteen-fifties.

A biography of the Governor-General from 1851 to 1856 which analyzes his thought and the policies he pursued in the Indies and later in the States-General. Of great importance is the appendix which includes all of Van Twist's letters appearing in the Algemeen Rijksarchief.

C. Essays and Articles


Lord Napier's report to the British Foreign Office, written in the autumn of 1860, is reproduced in full in English and accompanied by an exhaustive analysis and commentary in Dutch. The report contained a list of the representatives in the Second Chamber identifying each according to his profession, wealth, religious persuasion and political affiliation.


A brief account of the important events in the life of the Dutch Orientalist and geographer.


A not particularly original essay on Dekker's associations with others following the publication of Max Havelaar.


A commentary on Dekker's two letters of 18 January and 5 May 1860 to the King and on the correspondence exchanged between Colonial Minister Rochussen and Governor-General Pahud between 25 June and 24 October 1860 regarding Max Havelaar. The
author was the founder of the later so-called "ethical direction" and was influenced by Dekker's writings.


The only serious attempt in Dutch literature to evaluate the nature of "Multatuli's" political impact on the Netherlands in the eighteen-sixties.
I, Michael Charles Conley, was born in Dayton, Ohio, 11 July 1926. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Dayton and Sidney, Ohio, and my undergraduate training at Ohio State University, which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1950. From the same institution, I received the Master of Arts degree in 1951. During the following two years, I completed the course requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy at Ohio State University and passed the general examinations in the summer of 1953. While in residence there, I served for six quarters as a Graduate Assistant in the History Department.

Thereafter, I received a Fulbright Travel Grant to the Netherlands and, during two successive years, scholarships from the Dutch government. After completing my research in the Netherlands, I received an appointment from the University of Maryland to teach in their Overseas Program in Europe as an instructor. I remained in this position until June 1957 when I became an instructor in Strategic Intelligence in the United States Army, Intelligence, Military Police and Special Weapons School, Europe, located in Oberammergau, Germany. For three years, I have taught East European History, Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy in this institution, and, during this time have been able to complete the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.