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SIR GUY CARLETON AS A MILITARY LEADER DURING THE
AMERICAN INVASION AND REPULSE IN CANADA,
1775 - 1776
Volume I
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
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* * * *
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PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to bring to light the numerous problems which confronted Sir Guy Carleton in order to indicate both his capabilities and his faults. Though there have been many studies of the American invasion of Canada, the vast majority are either pro-American or pro-Canadian in their outlook. Moreover, they are clouded with controversy and have not considered some of the important factors in a military operation of this nature. Instead of dealing with military problems many of these studies are mainly concerned with political developments, later events, or the romantic adventures of the Siege of Quebec.

I have, therefore, organized this paper in order to indicate some of the basic military considerations which had to be solved by the Commander-in-Chief. His policies towards the different populations, his logistical, naval, manpower, prisoner of war and anti-espionage activities combined with his tactical and strategic abilities signify that he was neither a perfect hero nor a scoundrel. On the contrary, his operations were frequently limited by his superiors, by shortages of vital supplies, by geographic obstacles and by his own prejudices.
By way of acknowledgment I would like to express my gratitude to all those who assisted me in uncovering the vast stores of resources and to all those who aided me in the formulation of this paper. I wish to extend my appreciation to the personnel of the several libraries, archives and historical societies, particularly the following: the Public Archives of Canada possessing the Haldimand Papers and the transcripts of Colonial Office Records, The William L. Clements Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan containing the Gage Papers and the Germain Mss, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress holding the Admiralty Papers, the New York Public Reference Library with its Emmett Collection and Germain and Schuyler Mss, the New York Historical Society containing Montgomery Mss and various orderly books, the Toronto Public Reference Library and the Burton Historical Collection of the Detroit Public Library holding the Lernoult orderly book.

I am also indebted to several persons for their untiring assistance in the formulation of this paper: Paul E. LeRoy for his many hours of proofreading, Professor Eugene Roseboom under whose direction I was able to compile this paper, Professor Francis P. Weisenburger for his helpful suggestions and recommendations and Professor Harry L. Coles for his guidance regarding manuscript materials. I am also thankful to several others for the excellent
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

Chapter

I. THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY AND SECURITY PROBLEMS ................. 6

II. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC .......... 51

III. TACTICS AND LOGISTICS DURING THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC ................. 108

IV. TACTICS AND STRATEGY, MAY THROUGH JUNE, 1776 ......................... 144

V. APATHY AND DISLOYALTY AMONG THE FRENCH CANADIAN MILITIA .............. 182

VI. CARLETON AND THE ENGLISH MILITIA .................................. 242

VII. CARLETON AND THE INDIANS AS A MILITARY FACTOR ...................... 278

VIII. THE MAINTENANCE OF MANPOWER STRENGTH .......................... 323
LIST OF TABLES

Table | Page
--- | ---
1. State of Two Companies of His Majesty's Royal Regiment of Artillery 7th (or Royal Fusiliers) and 26th Regiment of Foot In the Province of Quebec, Montreal, June 5, 1775 | 65
2. State of the Troops Under the Command of Major Charles Preston, September 17, 1775 | 66
## LIST OF MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Operations in Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Assault on Quebec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In 1724, Guy Carleton was born in Strabane, Ireland, a community of emigrants from Scotland and the English border. His father, Christopher Carleton, died fourteen years later but left the family with modest properties. His mother afterwards married the Rev. Thomas Skelton of Newry. This gentleman appears to have exerted a profound influence upon his ward, and thus he deserves considerable credit for moulding those qualities which were to enable Carleton to achieve his future missions with success.

Carleton's military career began in May, 1742, when he was commissioned an ensign in Lord Rothes' regiment, later the 25th. Promotions, however, did not come his way with any degree of speed for the next nine years. When he was twenty-seven, Carleton was only a lieutenant in the Foot Guards while his friend, James Wolfe, had already been commissioned a captain though only twenty. By 1757, however, Carleton had advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel commanding the 72nd Regiment. Thereafter, his steady climb seems to have been due to both Wolfe and Pitt, the Elder.

Carleton's early career, nevertheless, was confronted by two obstacles which helps to explain his delayed
promotions. First, his patron, William Conolly of Stratton Hall, Staffordshire, M.P., privy councillor and a powerful man in Ireland, died in 1754. But Carleton managed to surmount this loss. More significant was the hostility of George II. During the Seven Years War, both Wolfe and Lord Amherst wanted Carleton on their staff when they began the siege of Louisbourg. The King refused to allow it. Instead, he directed that Carleton be sent to the British legion serving under Prince Frederick in Germany. The cause seems to have been some unfavorable remarks by Carleton in reference to the King's favorite Hanoverian troops, a serious offense in the Royal mind.

It was only after several persistent appeals in his behalf that Carleton's fortunes changed for the better. Wolfe and Pitt exerted continual pressure, even sending the ranking British commander to the Court in order to win their point. But it was only when Wolfe declared that the King should be informed that a general entrusted with the responsibilities of a difficult mission should be able to name his coadjutors that the Royal resistance was overcome. Carleton was then permitted to serve under Wolfe as his quartermaster general. His efforts were such as to help his superior overcome a serious want of able engineers.¹

In his activities in Canada, Carleton displayed the qualities of a successful commander and brave soldier. He also gained important experience in the fighting methods of the New World. In the famous battle of the Plains of Abraham, he suffered from minor wounds. Returning to Europe, he participated with valor in several other battles and again received wounds. In 1761, now a full colonel, he performed excellent service for Lord Albemarle at the siege of Havana. He sustained a wound in leading a sortie. Unfortunately, until his appointment as Lieutenant Governor in 1766, there is little else known of his military activities. This much is certain: he proved his abilities as a leader and as an agent for other men's tactics. Henceforth, he would command in the most difficult circumstances, whether in peace time or in war.

The personal traits of this man who was given the task of saving the province of Canada to the Crown and who endeavored to make the Canadians loyal citizens has been described by a British officer in the following words:

Certainly he is one of the most distant, reserved men in the world; he has a rigid strictness in his manner, very unpleasing, and which he observes even to his most particular friends and acquaintances [sic], at the same time he is a very able General and brave officer; he has seen a great deal of service and rose from private life: though a very good family, by merit to the rank he at present bears. In time of danger he
possesses a coolness and steadiness ... which few can attain; yet he was far from being the favorite of the army.²

These qualities and faults were put to the test in an atmosphere full of discontent and jealousies by the Canadian and British inhabitants. There were innumerable complex and difficult problems to be solved. There were quarrels between the habitants and the merchants, between the government and the traders seeking to contact the Indians in the western regions, between the Roman Catholics seeking to restore the lost privileges of their church and those who wished to convert them from what they considered a pernicious religion and, most important, there were disturbing influences from the southern neighbors who were growing increasingly impatient with the Mother Country, particularly after the Stamp Act. Nevertheless, from the start, Carleton exhibited a selfless attitude and a firm determination to succeed. He began by rejecting fees and perquisites which were attached to his office. He considered them impositions upon a people who had just undergone tremendous hardships in the French and Indian War, who had been swindled by their former masters, and those

whose country now seemed to be a field of exploitation for
the grasping British merchants who followed their army. A
man of lesser character would not have subtracted the in-
come likely to come from the fees and Carleton was not a
rich man. But he had integrity.
CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

When Governor James Murray of Quebec returned to England in late August, 1766, Sir Guy Carleton was named Lieutenant Governor in his place. The appointment of the Brigadier General was not only made with the approval of both civil and military officials but also with every expectation of excellent performance. Within five months, the new Lieutenant Governor presented a sweeping plan which considered such problems as fortifications, military organization, the raising and training of the militia, and the alternatives if these were not adopted. The plan reflected Carleton's military experience. The lessons of the late war had indicated the geopolitical importance of such posts as Quebec and New York, as well as the need to hold the Lake Champlain route.

Though the route lay in the semi-wilderness and was impassable for a good portion of the year, Carleton and his superiors had no difficulty in recalling the campaigns of Montcalm, Amherst and others. There was one basic difference, however. England now held both terminal posts of the paths from New York on the south to Quebec
on the north, via the Hudson River, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River.¹

The objective of the plan was twofold, to strengthen the vital posts at Crown Point, Ticonderoga and Fort George, as well as the terminal citadels at Quebec and New York City, and to provide for recruiting troops either from the people under his jurisdiction or from Great Britain. The details were dispatched to Gage at Boston, February 15, 1767. In his explanations, Carleton, reinforced by reports from his subordinates, spoke of the potential dangers if the Lake posts then in decay were not immediately renovated and repaired. This served to confirm the doubts of Gage who had requested the information. Carleton elucidated the full geopolitical considerations involved in the question of adequate defences. The old forts must be repaired and new ones constructed at the terminal points in order to secure communications with Great Britain. In case of war, the possession of port facilities would permit the quick transportation of ten to fifteen thousand troops. Carleton, however, did not anticipate the obstacles in the way of receiving reinforcements from Great Britain. The lesson of vast distances was to reveal itself in 1775.

The plan also envisaged the political influence that these fortified posts would have upon the actions of the colonists. Both terminals would possess a deterrent force. One purpose of the plan was

to establish Tranquillity, and a firm Attachment to His Majesty's Government, at the same time it is equally essential to establish that security and Strength as can properly curb and overawe, should such ever arise, who by the Ties of loyal Subjects and honest Men, are not thoroughly bound to their duty.\(^2\)

Though the prophesy was clear it did not necessarily mean that had the plan been adopted there would have been no revolution. However, success of the American cause would have been made exceedingly difficult. Carleton, moreover, desired that his proposal be accepted as a means of securing the vital Royal magazines until adequate military forces arrived.

Another political consideration then seemingly critical, but which proved to be insignificant, was Carleton's fear that the French government sought to reconquer its lost colony. This fear served as the basic reason for the fortifying of the city of Quebec. With the construction of a citadel, the available forces could

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\(^2\)Major General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, February 15, 1767, Transcripts of Colonial Office Records, Correspondence between Governor Carleton and Lord Dartmouth 1775, Canada, Quebec No. XI, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 295-296. Hereafter cited as Q. XI.
defend the city until reinforcements arrived from the nearby colonies or from Great Britain. In this manner, Canada could be retained for the King, even if the population supported its former masters. A strong fort would oblige the French to employ larger forces and material than would have been necessary otherwise. At the same time it would serve as a morale booster for the British. Preparations for the proper establishment of alarms also had to be considered.

The total force that could be available in the event of an emergency if the quotas were complete was estimated by the Lieutenant Governor to be 1,625 men. Another 500 might also be recruited from the British traders. Carleton never anticipated the small size of the force he was to have when the crisis did come. In case of a siege, he knew that London would have to send troops, artillery, ammunition, provisions and ships.3

As for the existing fortifications, Carleton's description was designed as a warning. The only post worthy of the name was Quebec. Its walls, however, were so decayed that it was thought that they were sufficient only for the resistance of musket fire. No repairs had

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been instituted since the previous war although there were holes in the walls. Nor was there a capable engineer to undertake the mission. The best that could be said for the deteriorated conditions was that Quebec could protect a dozen battalions with its bastioned ramparts dominating the heights. But there was no moat, not even a ditch. The parapet was virtually useless. The remaining sides of the encampment which skirted the heights overlooking the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles Rivers, found only a thin wall or corroding stakes. Carleton nevertheless, believed that the flanks and the rear could be improved to such an extent as to force an enemy to attempt assault from the front. Conditions at the other posts, however, made Quebec look like an impregnable fortress. In a letter to Gage, the Lieutenant Governor complained that there were not even barracks to house the few men he did have. It meant the Government had to rent houses from the people it had so recently conquered. Gage could only recommend the use of the Billeting Act or the construction of rooms at Chambly. Most of the old French fortifications had either

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4General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, February 15, 1767, Q. XI, pp. 295-296.

5General Carleton to Lord Shelburne, Quebec, November 25, 1767, C. A. 1888, p. 41.
been destroyed or rendered useless through deterioration.\textsuperscript{6}

Un fortunately, the British government did not foresee the strategic needs as Carleton had. At best the ministers merely discussed the plans of the proposed citadel, the condition of the fort at Oswegatchie, or the barracks in the old French Intendant's Palace.\textsuperscript{7} Some of leading personalities, nevertheless, found a great deal of value in Carleton's plans. Lord Townshend, early in 1773, rated them the most beneficial suggestion yet forwarded for securing Canada. His Lordship was highly pleased with the peculiar knowledge of the science of fortifications that had been revealed.\textsuperscript{8} But the plan to hold the Lake forts, to construct a citadel and to win over the Canadians, was dismissed as an unnecessary project - this, in spite of its obvious value to the military. If it had been carried out, the difficulties of logistical support versus the handicaps of distance and time would have been reduced, at least in the initial stages of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6}General Gage to Lord Shelburne, New York, April 17, 1767, Carter, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. I, p. 133.
\item \textsuperscript{7}To Lord Hillsborough, New York, September 9 and May 13, 1769, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. I, pp. 194, 225.
\end{itemize}
controversy. On the other hand, it would be hindsight to endow the Royal ministers with prognosticating powers. The history of Carleton's plans indicated his advice fared poorly. A few short months prior to the outbreak of fighting, the Cabinet decided that it was not advisable to make recommendations. They did allow him to make some repairs but not to construct a citadel.

As far as raising a French-Canadian force was concerned, Carleton placed too much importance on the seigneurs, the aristocratic portion of the population. At the same time he failed to take proper notice of the place of the militia captains in the old French system. Wishful thinking and a natural inclination seemed responsible. Never mingling with the peasants, the habitants, Carleton relied upon a people who appeared to have had profound influence upon him. Since he, too, was an aristocrat the error was unavoidable as well as costly. Letter after letter told of the need to employ officers from the seigneurs. He did not understand the democratic forces of the frontier or the influence of British tradition as


practiced by the small number of American and English settlers or traders. Though ignorant of the militia captain, in justice it must be said that Carleton did seek to recruit permanent military regiments rather than a mere militia unit.\(^{11}\)

During the months that followed the close of the French and Indian War, at a time when it still seemed possible that France might attempt to invade Canada, Carleton tried vainly to persuade his superiors to adopt the second part of his strategy, mainly winning the population to the British Crown. He believed that a proper balance of discipline against the traitors and ample use of oaths of allegiance, combined with adequate safeguards for French properties, customs and religion, would quiet most of the discontent. Thus the basic tenets of the controversial Quebec Act made their appearance. Assuming that the seigneurs possessed a tremendous influence, Carleton proposed that they be given some significant political posts in the hope that they would forget their former loyalties to France. More important, raising a few Companies of Canadian Foot judiciously officered, with three or four trifling Employments, in the Civil Department, would make very considerable Alternations on the Minds of the People.

But he had not correctly interpreted the words "judiciously officered." He meant the seigneurs and not the militia captains. Aristocratic preference dominated his thinking. He thought that the people would serve under the seigneurs through the device of supporting the "Gentlemen" and their families by "Employments" to prevent them from "sinking into the lower Class of People," a process which was mainly due to French inheritance laws which provide for equal shares. Consequently, Carleton won the support of the seigneurs but not the habitants. There was, however, an effective argument in behalf of the seigneurs. If the proposed measures were not instituted they were likely to reassert their past loyalties in the event of a war with France.

A letter to Lord Shelburne in November of 1767 indicated Carleton's erroneous views of the situation, which were to prove embarrassing to him when he was called upon to fulfill this part of his plans. Not only did the habitants refuse to follow the seigneurs they were also an unmilitary people. They might have been able to furnish

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13 General Carleton to Lord Hillsborough, Quebec, November 20, 1768, ibid., pp. 325-326.
some 18,000 men if they had not hated the militia system as well as the corvee. Montcalm had found them recalcitrant, and Carleton was to have a similar experience in 1775. This does not mean, on the other hand, that they did not have potential valor or a knowledge that could prove useful in fighting upon the frontier. The letter also contained a warning of the possibility that those seigneurs who had fought for France and gone into exile might return to fight again. More revealing, Carleton unconsciously stated the reason for his future troubles. The seigneurs were the objects of hatred by the habitants who

[have] deprived them of their Honors, Privileges, Profits and Laws, and in their Stead, have introduced much Expence, Chicanery, and Confusion, with a Deluge of new Laws. . . . Therefore all Circumstances considered, while Matters continue in their present State, the most we may Hope . . . is a passive Neutrality . . . with a respectful Submission.

This description was must accurate for 1775. Since the British government decided not to raise a permanent Canadian military establishment, those who had served the King were dismissed without even the traditional half pay. The history of Canada might have been altered if such a force had existed in 1775, but that was not possible. The Royal ministers were strongly opposed to additional tax burdens and would not have endangered the
aristocratic monopoly of the British establishment by admitting Canadians.14

At the same time, the Lieutenant Governor followed a policy which discriminated against the English and American traders and settlers who had followed the army in 1763. An indication of the future was present though Carleton was not aware of it. He had already classified these people in an uncomplimentary fashion because they desired to establish traditional institutions including assemblies, juries, and due process. But he had reason for concern. A prototype of the future, John McCord, had sold liquor to his soldiers, which had resulted in undisciplinary conduct. When the trader lost his source of income he turned "Patriot." The problem deteriorated with the Quebec Act. Carleton, no doubt, was correct in assuming that the Canadians preferred some of their traditional practices, especially those regarding equity and property. The error was in opposing any form of representation for the English and American settlers. Instead, he agreed with the conclusions of the seigneurs who feared that the establishment of assemblies would give the habitants a means to restrict their waning influence. Acting in their behalf and aristocratic by nature, Carleton could

14 General Carleton to Lord Shelburne, Quebec, November 25, 1767, C. A. 1888, p. 450.
only look upon democratic procedures as an invitation to corruption. His inability to understand either the habitants or the English made compromise impossible.\textsuperscript{15}

The test of Carleton's political attitude became apparent only after he received a call for help from his superior in Boston. Because of the controversial Tea Act and the Five Intolerable Acts, Gage was forced to send an emergency dispatch to his subordinate in Quebec. Fearing an armed conflict, the General wrote that he was sending transports in order to bring the 10th and 52nd Regiments to Boston. At the same time, realizing the potential effects that this request might have upon the Canadians, he made significant inquiries.

I submit to you, whether you think any Thing is to be dreaded from the Absence of these Corps, internally in the Province of Quebec during the winter, for as these Regiments will come down the River so late in the Year, and may be replaced early in the Spring, I imagine no Danger can be apprehended from without. If therefore you think the Fusiliers at Quebec, and the part of the 26th at Montreal, with the small Detachments from them at Trois Rivieres and Chambly, can preserve the Peace and good Order in the Province, I am to beg you will order the 10th and 52nd Regiments to embark without Delay upon the Transports.

Gage had no doubts that Carleton could consent to his vital request with due speed. The choice was up to Carleton, who had been elevated to Governorship in

\textsuperscript{15}General Carleton to Lord Shelburne, Quebec, January 20, 1768, Shortt, op. cit., pp. 295-296.
September 1774. In addition Gage desired Carleton's opinion "Whether a Body of Canadians and Indians might be collected and confided in" in case of need. If so, the Governor was to submit his plan of recruitment.

Returning in the fall of 1774 with the victorious accomplishment of the Quebec Act, Carleton made his most serious errors in military and political judgment, so apparent to later historians. Therefore, instead of carefully evaluating the situation, Carleton responded by sending the two regiments, including pilots. This left him with only half his military force. As for the Canadians, in answer to the second question, Carleton stated that they had voiced appreciation and gratitude to the King for the passage of the Quebec Act. Furthermore,

a Canadian Regiment would compleat their Happiness, which in Time of Need might be augmented to two, three or more Battalions, tho' for the Satisfaction of the Province, and 'till the King's Service might require more, one would be sufficient, and I am convinced their Fidelity and Zeal might be depended on.

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17 The Campaigns of Carleton, Burgoyne and Howe; precis of operations, abstracts of correspondence with the British Ministry, and other documents dealing with the conduct of the war 1774-1778, 15 transcripts from the State Paper Office, 1850, P° Bancroft, The Manuscript Division of the New York Public Library, pp. 20-21. Hereafter cited as CBH.

18 General Carleton to General Gage, September 20, 1774, Shortt, op. cit., p. 584.
He also recommended that their pay be equal to those of the other forces when they were activated. The raising of such a force was considered a favorable influence upon the Indians. Many historians agree that Carleton must assume a portion of the responsibility because of his erroneous judgment of loyalties. Only gradually did the truth make itself known to the Governor that the protestations given by the seigneurs were not the sentiments of the habitants. The militia system was still regarded as basic but under the control of the seigneurs and not the captains.19

The persistent belief in the Quebec Act continued to guide Carleton's views as late as February 1775. In a secret message to Gage, gratitude by the people seemed to be the chief factor. The Governor, nevertheless, recognized that the militia system did have weaknesses. The first hints that there was need for a better military organization appeared when Carleton admitted that the zealous seigneurs, while willing to serve in regular regiments, did not relish the idea of commanding "base Militia." The main reason still appeared to be that they feared that they might again be dismissed without pay when the

emergency ended. Carleton had not yet understood the impact of the hatred of the habitants for the seigneurs.

A realization of the true attitude of the people was brought to the attention of Gage when he read the concluding paragraphs of the February letter. It was a shock which directly contradicted the earlier assertions that assured definite fidelity. The full implication came only with the American incursion into Canada. The Quebec Act had won only the seigneurs and not the habitants as had been anticipated. The reaction of the latter was in part due to their experiences with the English who provided them with a means to ignore the seigneurs.

Carleton's solution was to reinstitute the old habits of discipline and obedience. It would take time to erase the harmful effects of the past ten years. But such a proposal was both unrealistic and impossible. The observations, however, relating to the military consequences were correct. Carleton rightly assumed that the habitants were opposed to the sudden creation of a militia which might take them from their homes as well as their country. 20

Rather than admit that these people had attained some benefits from the lax rule of the past, which included

20 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
some judicial protection from the abuses of the seigneurs, he placed the entire blame upon the factions which bitterly opposed his Quebec Act. He failed to see that the habitants would resent the re-establishment of privileges which benefited the seigneurs and the clergy. Inexperienced as they were, the habitants had been given a taste of English democracy, and it did not matter that some of the English merchants had cheated them. The habitants preferred to recall the fact that the seigneurs had in the past encouraged war although they were peaceful farmers.

In spite of the ominous reaction, Carleton still clung to the possibility of raising two battalions. He hoped that this measure would restore the former power of the seigneurs, but that desire soon received a serious setback. He made three other observations. The first stated that the Indians were favorably disposed under the guidance of Sir William Johnson. Second, a large reinforcement was a certainty once the navigation could be resumed. The third indicated that Moses Hazen, a former Ranger commander, would be a dependable servant for the Crown. The first observation was correct until the death of Johnson; the second was neglected by the Home Government; and the last was a definite case of misjudgment. In fact, Carleton was to recall that prediction with regret. Hazen
was regarded as a man of zeal and activity in whatever he undertook.\textsuperscript{21}

Though the Quebec Act was mostly concerned with political matters, the reaction of the seigneurs, habitants, and American and British settlers was one of great consequence to the security of Canada. The latter two peoples resented the Governor's open discrimination in favor of the seigneurs. They resented being categorized as a worthless stock. As a result they were bound to form groups of resistance, legal or otherwise. In the hope of repealing the hated Quebec Act, they sent petitions to London. A list of their names proved that they were, for the most part, not security risks but rather loyal citizens seeking redress of their grievances. Many of them merely desired to continue the practice of traditional rights. Carleton, however, had difficulty in making a distinction between the seditious and the loyal which caused him to refuse to accept the services of some of the latter.

An explanation can, perhaps, be found in the methods employed by the enemies of the Quebec Act. Carleton's opinion of these people was revealed in a letter to Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of State for the

\textsuperscript{21}General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, February 4, 1775, Q. XI, p. 290; and to General Gage, February 6, 1775, Gage Papers, The Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
colonies. The relationship to the problem of internal security was closely interlocked with its potential military implications. In justice to the Governor, there was a vocal element of sedition which was fed by the neighboring colonies. Correspondence between the congresses and the local population had already been uncovered. Meetings had been held in both Quebec and in Montreal for the purpose of forming committees. The method was typical. A local coffee house or tavern served as the headquarters. In this way the names of seven men received particular attention, John Paterson, Zachariah Macaulay, John Lees Senior, John Aitkin, Randal Meredith, John Welles and Peter Pargues. Their crime was to send a letter of thanks to the London merchants who were laboring in their behalf in order to repeal the Quebec Act.

Carleton, in particular, objected to the influence "such Meetings and nocturnal Cabals" had upon the attitudes of the Canadians. Falsehoods were used by these people in an attempt to frighten the Canadians into joining their ranks. Some of the letter signed the petitions in the belief that had they not done so they would lose their properties. Others were told that they would be separated from their families in order to fight the "Bostonians." In an effort to counter these falsehoods, Carleton assured his followers that the "Quebec Act would not be repealed."
Nevertheless, Dartmouth was informed that the meetings were increasing their agitation. Urging that this "Infection" be halted, the Governor stated that vigorous measures had to be utilized. The same view was sent to Gage on January 23, 1775. The letter indicated that Carleton had been offended by the petitioners because they had not consulted him prior to their action. Criticizing the "Art and Cunning" of these people, he added that they had taken "uncommon Pains and Diligence to keep them [the petitions] from my knowledge." In response, Dartmouth requested information as to what kind of action to take against the consequences of seditious proceedings.

The offending petition was received at the Court, January 22, 1775. Its contents seemed to voice an appeal for the restoration of traditional English rights. In particular, the petitioners asked for the franchise, the use of jury trials in property cases and the continued practice of Habeas Corpus.

We therefore most humbly implore your Majesty to take our unhappy state into your Royal

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22 Governor Carleton to the Earl of Dartmouth, Quebec, November 11, 1774, Q. XI. pp. 11-16.
23 General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, January 23, 1775, Gage Papers.
24 Lord Dartmouth to Governor Carleton, Whitehall, January 7, 1775, Q. XI, pp. 61-62.
Consideration and grant us such Relief as your Majesty in your Royal Wisdom shall think meet.  

Most of the 173 signers were not Canadians. They were the English, American and Scottish merchants. Many of them expressed fear that Carleton might raise a "Papist" regiment which was contrary to their traditional Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Sir George Savile championed their cause in Parliament. The Government, through Lord North, admitted that they intended to use such "Roman Catholics" as might be needed to crush a revolution.

Besides disliking the anti-Quebec views of the British, Carleton was also annoyed at their persistent democratic tendencies as well as their anti-militaristic attitudes. These were in direct contradiction to his aristocratic bearing as well as his alliance with the seigneurs. Nor did the clergy wish to weaken their hold upon the superstitious habitants. It was no easy task to avoid religious prejudice where a population was predominately Roman Catholic while its Government was Protestant. The Governor had overcome any individual prejudices he may

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25 Petition of the Ancient Subjects to the King, January 22, 1775, ibid., pp. 96-102.

have had but the same thing cannot be attributed to the majority of the English speaking community. 27

Coinciding with these developments were the first steps toward military operations. The people of New England and New York believed that Carleton could encroach upon their cherished liberties. They knew of the Governor's plans for the restoration of the forts and the construction of citadels as well as the possibility of facing Canadian battalions. Many thought that a combined regular and militia force would be sent to the relief of Gage. Moreover, the enactment of the Quebec Act and the new Royal Instructions endangered the American cause. Others heard that the Canadians were set to march. Past history reinforced the fears of a potential punitive force coming down, as had the French and Indians. The frontier people, in particular, recalled the barbarous raids upon isolated settlements. Doctor Eleazer Wheelock, at Dartmouth College, informed the Governor of Connecticut in March 1775, that the Seminary was defenseless as were the towns of Vermont and New Hampshire. Reporting invasion preparations and the recruiting of warriors, the Doctor

secured his school by retaining Indian children as virtual hostages. But what if the parents insisted upon the return of their children? In addition, James Dean, a missionary, was sent among the Six Iroquois Nations in the hope of warding off an invasion. With the rising fears, Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen separately decided to take the initiative by blocking the Lake Champlain route.\(^{28}\)

Because of the negligence of the London government, the vital line of communications between New York and Quebec had not been prepared for the forthcoming shocks. The penalty for pigeonholing Carleton's fortification plans soon made itself known. If those plans had been adopted the May exploits of the Americans would have been impossible. Late in 1774, both Gage and Carleton expressed concern for the security of the Lake region. They began to take some remedial measures. In May, Captain John Montresor, an engineer, received orders to repair the three Lake forts of Ticonderoga, Crown Point and Fort George. Gage had already been informed of the need to place those forts in a proper conditions of defense.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{29}\)Smith, op. cit., pp. 11-113.
At the first post, the commandant, Captain William Delaplance, limited his activities to a few minor authorized measures though he was concerned with the problem of adequate barracks.

Carleton requested a full report of the status of the fortification with the idea of sending reinforcements provided they could be properly received. At the same time, he issued an alert warning which apparently fell upon deaf ears - this in spite of two suspicious events in the vicinity of the fort. Gage had learned that a provisions train had been attacked by persons from New Hampshire and that unusual curiosity had been exhibited by a visitor to the fort. The guards reported that they were questioned about the post and the available powder supply. Though the intentions were obvious, the Captain merely requested that Gage verify his fears of a potential plot to seize the post. In answer, Gage, believing that the Captain was on the alert made the error of concluding that there would be no attempt upon the fortifications. The General had also assumed that if succour were necessary the Captain would inform Carleton. At the same time, Gage warned that roving bands of armed men in the vicinity might desire supplies of powder, cannon and muskets. These measures should have been sufficient to secure Ticonderoga from surprise.
The orders issued by both Gage and Carleton were designed to safeguard the several links of the communications system. In March, Carleton was informed that the King had requested the construction of a fort at Crown Point which would replace the old ruins. Though it was not to be as elaborate as the former, Gage stated that it must be strong. The stone or brick was to come from the ruins. The plans drawn up by Montresor the previous spring by order of General Frederick Haldimand, Carleton's future successor, were submitted for critical study. Carleton was told to investigate and to substitute any desirable alternatives. But there was no longer ample time for plans; action was essential.

Meanwhile, Ticonderoga was reinforced by two small groups, the first numbering 26 men and the second ten. Five days later, Carleton received an urgent dispatch from Gage who, though he himself needed a regiment, requested that the 7th Regiment be sent to the Lieutenant Governor of New York in order to crush an insurrection in Cumberland County.

I am therefore to desire you to send the 7th Regiment to Crown Point or Ticonderoga without

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30 General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, March 16, 1775, Gage Papers.

delay, if Tents & can be promised for them the better, if not, they will lodge as they can in the Hutts and Houses. The Officer Commanding will concert with Lieut. Govr. Colden, the operations to be carried on in Cumberland County, but will not move unless he is joined either by a good number of the Provincial Forces, or by a body of well appointed Militia.32

But by the time Carleton received this dispatch it was too late. The small reinforcement, the minor repairs and the messages of alert had all failed.

Arnold and Allen had succeeded because Delaplace had been negligent. As the accounts of this episode are numerous, though controversial, they need not be repeated here. The importance of this development upon the security of Canada was staggering. The losses suffered at Ticonderoga, Crown Point and Fort George were irreplaceable. Allen wrote that he took 47 captives, plus 100 cannon, one howitzer and numerous swivels. Thirteen other captives and another large supply of cannon came from the second fort.33 A more recent account has lessened the number of prisoners by some fourteen.34 The details were not as important as

32 General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, April 19, 1775, Gage Papers.


the fact that the land communications between New York and Quebec had been severed. Carleton found his small force further reduced. Soon after, moreover, Colonel Seth Warner took Fort George while yet another band of Americans seized Skenesborough.35

The worst was still to come. Carleton did not learn of these events until after Canada itself had undergone two raids. The gateway to Quebec, St. Johns, had actually been in American hands on two occasions. Though control proved to be only temporary, many feared that a full scale invasion was in progress. As long as the Americans remained in possession defense of Canada seemed imperiled. In an official report to Gage, Carleton told his superior that Hazen had recited that in the morning of the previous Thursday

one Dominick Arnold, said to be a Native of Connecticut, and a Known Horse Jockey, who has been several times in this Province, and is well acquainted with every Avenue to it landed at St. Johns, captured one sergeant and ten men, plus the sloop.36 This placed the Americans within 30 miles of Montreal. Hazen, moreover, claiming that he had been a captive, states that a force of at least 500 was on its way. Arnold, however, remained only long enough to

36General Carleton to General Gage, Montreal, May 31, 1775, Gage Papers.
collect his prizes and depart, meeting Allen on the way. The latter, who also took the same post, finding all the valuables gone, had to be content with a demand upon the merchants for their future support.  

Carleton's troops were too weak to regain control of Lake Champlain, too weak to overawe the habitants, too weak to crush sedition and definitely unable to take advantage of the dispute between two American leaders, each of whom aspired to command expeditions. Instead of being able to come to the aid of Gage, the Governor had to think of his own defenses. It did not matter that the enemy had thought him capable of taking an offensive action. It did matter that the people of Canada were aware of his weaknesses.

The effect this serious crisis had upon seditious elements was dangerous to the very existence of the province. Dissatisfaction with the Quebec Act, unfair discrimination and the loss of the frontier posts led to the commingling of all the English speaking peoples, loyal and disloyal. The Governor, now reduced to dependence upon a mere skeleton of a force, was in no position to counter the revolutionary activities. The historian, Alfred LeRoy Burt,

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38Raddell, op. cit., p. 21.
implied that the militia could have defeated the local Americans.39 Such a view, however, tends to underestimate Carleton's difficulties and ignores the fact that the Canadians, for the most part, did not desire to serve in the militia.

An illustration of this point appeared in the spring when unknown Colonial agents insulted a Royal bust in the city of Montreal. According to a proclamation which was published in the Quebec Gazette, evil designing persons had disfigured the bust during the night of April 30, by affixing to it a "False and Scandalous" libel with the object of alienating the King's cause in the hearts of the Canadians. The religious issue was brought forward through the implication of the libel which declared that George III was "the Pope of Canada and the Fool of England." In the hope that the guilty parties would be uncovered, the Governor authorized a considerable reward for those days, two hundred pounds, to the informer. If the latter was one of the participants he was to be pardoned unless he personally had insulted or affixed the said libel. The receiver-general would make the payment upon conviction of

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39Alfred LeRoy Burt, A Short History of Canada for Americans (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota, 1944), pp. 75-78.
the guilty. The reward was large but unless the people support such measures they are useless.

While sensitive Canadians were angered by the insult to their religion, others were leveling accusations against the merchants. The only result, however, was the incarceration of a martyr who was soon set fire by the attorney-general. At the same time, Carleton had to drop Monsieur de L'Hory from the Royal Council because the latter refused to accept the rank of colonel in the militia. Since this was still a time of peace, civil functions were in operation, particularly due process and the normal judicial procedures. Carleton had not been idle; he had tried rewards, persuasions and encouragement. There was little he could do, however, without sufficient military power to overawe offenders since the courts could not. The only possible solution was not in the employment of an unwilling militia but rather in winning the loyalty of all the peoples of Canada. Moreover, this was primarily a political and not a military issue in spite of the interrelationship.

Many of the English community, on the contrary, supported their southern neighbors in their fight against

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41 Smith, op. cit., pp. 204-209.
the obnoxious Intolerable Acts. They even sent bushels of wheat to Boston in an effort to counter the closing of that port. Furthermore, John Hancock, Joseph Warren and John Brown organized a committee to correspond with their Canadian supporters. The leader of the latter group was a prominent merchant of Montreal, Thomas Walker. He had the aid of Colonial agents who had appeared on the scene during the previous winter. Letter after letter dispatched to Lord Dartmouth reported the increased activity of these agents.

Carleton did what he could with his limited power to counter their movements. The mails were censored and seditious material confiscated. Carleton seized letters from a Mister Jeffreys of Boston to Jonas Clark Minot, an American settler at Trois Rivieres. Another letter sent from New York contained the petition of the Continental Congress to Great Britain. Moreover, Carleton knew that another petition was to be sent to win over the Canadians. The Governor wrote that cabals and intrigues were designed to make Canada another Massachusetts.

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42 Ibid., pp. 90-99.

43 Governor Carleton to the Earl of Dartmouth, Quebec, November 18, 1774 and January 12, 1775, Q. XI, pp. 103, 110-111.
Additional correspondence disclosed the activities of the colonial agents. Intelligence from Montreal indicated that they had successfully reached their destinations after a trip via the Kennebec River. It was also known that they delivered letters to Zachariah Macaulay and Thomas Walker. Other merchants had gone to Lachine to converse with the agents. John Brown, presiding over several of the meetings, tried to persuade his listeners to form committees of correspondence and to elect two delegates to the Continental Congress. Besides Walker, Isaac Todd and James Price were called upon to contribute their efforts. In spite of threats that a large force was to be sent into Canada, Carleton knew that the agents had not been completely successful. Most of the merchants, while anxious to hear the latest news, had no intention of participating in such events. Some of them declined even to receive letters from the colonies. Todd, thereafter, avoided contact with the people who had sought his support.

At last Carleton had proof that many of the English would not risk their lives in behalf of the colonies. Nevertheless, more agents were reported in Canada, spreading rumors that fifty thousand troops were to invade the province. Examples of "intrigues and Cabals" were common

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44 Intelligence received from Montreal, April 5-7, 1775, Ibid., pp. 166 and 149-151.
throughout the winter.\textsuperscript{45} Another report declared that most of the larger parishes and towns had been covered by their activities. When questioned by the authorities, the agents excused their presence on the grounds of business. One insisted that he was merely a horse trader. Carleton, however, was "apprehensive" that these people had other missions in mind. The same thing happened at Laprairie and Lachine.\textsuperscript{46}

If Burt was correct in his judgment that the Governor did not attempt to counter their open subversion, why did not the Canadians flock to the Colonial side? The fact was that Carleton's policy of persuasion, alertness and judicial procedure was not completely unsuccessful. The Colonial agents were only partially successful in their endeavors. Only a minority of the population agreed with the declaration of the Montreal committee that the colonies must come to their aid. It did little good to charge that the Governor had violated their rights as Englishmen. Supposed threats of confiscation and incarceration did not materialize as anticipated. Though many of

\textsuperscript{45} Same, April 6, 1775, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 147-148.

\textsuperscript{46} Same, May 15, 1775, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 164.
the settlers might be sympathetic they were not anxious to risk overt support. 47

Though Carleton intercepted the mails he was not able to prevent the circulation of all the seditious literature. That he was not completely unsuccessful was evident by the complaint of John Brown, who charged that the Governor had restrained the freedom of the press. Nothing could be printed in Canada without a license. Naturally, the Governor did not permit the publication of the Address from the Continental Congress though its supporters were bold enough to try. 48 The Americans, nevertheless, managed to import several hundred copies from the neighboring colonies, thereby circumventing Carleton's control of the printing. 49

An opportunity arose which was to the advantage of the Governor when the Petition of the Continental Congress to the King was translated into French. The Canadians were shocked by its anti-Catholic tone. The petitioners


49General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Quebec, March 13, 1775, Q. XI, pp. 129-130.
had protested that Parliament was seeking to impose a hated religion upon them. An angry outcry naturally ensued. Now Carleton could expose the hypocrisy of the Americans. The Canadians knew that he had followed a policy of toleration and humanity. But the Governor did not desire to inflame the people with bigotry, though he did not fail to inform them of the petition. The clergy and the seigneurs were especially vocal in their resentment.

The Governor, nevertheless, was aware that an undetermined number of habitants were favorably impressed by the arguments of the Americans. Resolves and addresses came from New York and Massachusetts which promised no hostility. The Address of the Continental Congress of May 29 called upon the Canadians to join the struggle for the preservation of their liberties. They were told that Carleton's rule was one of slavery, despotism, and strata
gems. The only reason for the seizure of the Lake posts was to preserve their liberties by blocking the potential route of an invasion of Boston.


While the Governor endeavored to insure internal security, it was also necessary to devise a defense plan in order to offset the losses at Ticonderoga, Crown Point and Fort George. However, since Carleton was not the ranking officer in America he was subject to the orders of Gage. The latter was not fully cognizant of the seriousness of the military situation. The result, Gage wanted Carleton to undertake an offensive operation in order to retain control of the Lake, presumably with Canadian and Indian allies. Carleton, on the other hand, favored a plan which would secure the entrances to Canada from invasion, a purely defensive step.

In a series of dispatches the optimistic Gage unfolded his plan. Shocked by the loss of Ticonderoga, he expressed fears for the security of Fort George, not yet aware that it too was in enemy hands. Gage also wrote that rumors indicated that Niagara and Detroit were in danger. In order to prevent additional disasters, Carleton was placed in full command of all the military services in Canada, plus all the posts along the frontier. Gage was certain that this move would halt the success of sedition among the Indians, especially at Ontario.52 Henceforth, the commanders of the several posts of the

52General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, May 25, 1775, Gage Papers.
Great Lakes were subject to the orders of the Governor of
Canada who was now its Captain General. All communications
were to go via Quebec.\textsuperscript{53}

On June 3, the poorly informed Gage begged Carleton
to gather all the recruits he could and to fall upon the
frontier of New England and the Lake Champlain area. This
diversionary tactic was considered essential to the British
in Boston.\textsuperscript{54} To aid Carleton in this mission Brigadier
General Richard Prescott was sent to Canada.\textsuperscript{55} As this was
an emergency no time was to be lost. Gage's plan received
the approval of Lord Dartmouth long after it had any possi­
bility of success. As late as July 4, Carleton was
directed
to pursue any Measure for that purpose which your
own judgement & experience shall point out to you;
and you will co-operate with General Gage in what­
ever Plan he shall adopt for suppressing . . . a
Rebellion which menaces the subversion of the
Constitution.\textsuperscript{56}

Again Carleton was advised to replenish his depleted forces
by raising Canadians, Loyalists and Indians.

\textsuperscript{53}To Captain DePeyster and Captain Lernoult, May
20, 1775, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{54}To General Carleton, Boston, June 3, 1775, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{55}To Lord Dartmouth, Boston, June 25, 1775, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{56}"State of His Majesty's 7th and 26th Regiments of
Foot, June 2, 1775," Canadian Archives, "Appendix I, War of
1775-76," \textit{Sessional Paper No. 15, Report Concerning Canadian
Archives For the Year 1904} (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1905),
pp. 371-372, Hereafter cited as \textit{C. A. 1904}.\textsuperscript{55}
Though the Governor believed that such a plan needed at least 10,000 men, he was called upon to try when he had only three regiments. One of these, however, was not available, since it garrisoned the remote western posts. The other two, the 7th Royal Fusiliers and the 26th Regiment of Foot, numbered only 650. In addition they were scattered in the different posts at St. Johns, Chambly, Lachine, Montreal and St. Francois. The few in the Royal Artillery were incapable of even forming a small detachment. Yet Carleton had to raise troops to aid Gage. There was no talk of reinforcing Canada. Many believed that they had been abandoned by officers of the Crown who failed to realize that Massachusetts was not the only endangered post in America.\(^5^7\)

With the help of the able Allen McLean, Carleton did all that he could not only to gather the two regiments but also to raise the Loyalists of upper New York. If the Governor gained control of Ticonderoga it would serve as a place of rendezvous and as an encouragement to others seeking safety. For that reason McLean was commissioned a lieutenant colonel and authorized to raise the Royal

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Highland Emigrants. Carleton was directed to provide them with the essential weapons which Gage believed were in ample supply at the Quebec depots. Half pay officers or those in retirement were called upon to offer their badly needed services.\textsuperscript{58}

It was from the Canadians and the Indians, however, that both Gage and Lord Dartmouth expected the best results. They remembered Carleton's earlier optimism but had forgotten the warnings that the situation had changed. On July 1 Carleton received a directive from London which called for the recruitment of three thousand Canadians. They were to form light infantry units which could either be attached to the regular forces or could operate as separate bodies. Carleton was to make the choice after consultation with Gage. This in itself was foolish. Communications between the two commanders had virtually become impossible. These Canadians, moreover, were to be raised as they had been in 1764. This meant that they were not entitled to half pay or equal rank upon reduction. Furthermore, they were to be subordinate to regular officers even if they held equivalent rank. Lastly, these men were subjected to the usual stoppages or reductions made for the hospital, provisions and supplies. His Lordship also suggested the reactivation

\textsuperscript{58}General Gage to Lord Dartmouth, Boston, June 12, 1775, and to General Carleton, June 15, 1775, Gage Papers.
of former Canadian regiments so that the Government might cease payment of pensions.

Orders had already been given in London for the forwarding of the essential equipment, provisions and clothing. Carleton was also directed to bear in mind that he should not neglect the natural born subjects, though the majority of the commissioned officers would have to be Canadian. Only when he could not avoid this expediency did the Governor reluctantly enforce the directive. He simply did not trust the English community until the end of the year. At the same time, Carleton received another dispatch, dated July 24, which doubled the quota to be provided by the Canadians. Lord Dartmouth also wrote that the necessary stores were on the way.

As for the Indians, Carleton had the assistance of three men, Colonel John Caldwell, commandant of Niagara, John Stuart and Guy Johnson. In the past these men had kept the Six Nations loyal to the King. The warriors were expected to prove their value upon the frontiers. The Government of Canada provided the arms and provisions.

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59 Lord Dartmouth to General Carleton, Whitehall, July 1, 1775, ibid.

60 Lord Dartmouth to General Carleton, Whitehall, July 24, 1775, Haldimand Papers, Correspondence of the Ministers with Generals Amherst, Gage and Sir Guy Carleton, 1760-1778, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 101-102. Hereafter cited as B. 37.
Though Gage desired their services he also wanted them to be led by capable persons. He hesitated because he wished to avoid the consequences of their barbaric customs. Meanwhile, Carleton learned that the Caughnawagas and the Two Mountain tribes had offered to help defend Canada.61

Coinciding with these developments was the need to secure the military communications between Boston and Quebec. Carleton took the initiative with his orders for the seizure of letters and persons from the colonies. The latter were subjected to interrogation.62 In January, the Governor began to number his dispatches as a precaution in the hope of detecting any American attempts to interfere. Not satisfied, Carleton, in a secret message to Gage, dated February 4, recommended the institution of a cypher. The answer was in the affirmative, but unless Carleton had the essential coding material it could not be attempted. Not until June 15 was Gage able to forward both a cypher and a decypher which fortunately had arrived from London. In

61 General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, June 3, 1775, Gage Papers; and John R. Alden, General Gage in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), pp. 228, 258-259.

62 General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Quebec, November 11, 1774, Q. XI, p. 16.
addition, a new communication route was opened via Nova Scotia. 63

Contrary to the expectations of both Gage and Lord Dartmouth, the Governor was in no position to effect a diversion in favor of besieged Boston. Indeed, Carleton's major concern was the reconquest of St. Johns on the probable invasion route. Because of the raids, the commander at Montreal had dispatched a force of Canadians and regulars under Major Charles Preston. Their mission was to capture Allen. The latter, however, had been warned of the approach of the force of one hundred and forty men and had quickly departed. The troops returned to Montreal. As late as June 9, there were only 180 men to guard against the likely invasion. 64

While Carleton was torn between the needs of Canada and those of Boston, contemporary correspondence among the Americans indicated that they feared his potential military ability, especially the possibility of a renewal of Indian raids upon the frontier. They were not fully aware of Carleton's difficulties. Men like John Adams, Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold had already determined that measures

63 General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, January 23 and February 4, 1775; and General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, March 16 and June 15, 1775, Gage Papers.

64 General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, June 9, 1775, Q. XI, p. 184.
should be taken to prevent an offensive or diversionary movement from Canada. Adams suggested a plan that would counter Carleton's power over the Canadians and Indians. The enrollment of the latter was recommended, though with the realization that horrible acts might result. Another American leader, James Warren, believed that the settlements around Lake Champlain and further west faced disaster unless the Indians were reconciled to the American cause. Others wrote to the members of the Continental Congress of the need to guard against the "malevolent misrepresentation" of the Royal officials among the Indians.

In fact, the excuse for the forthcoming invasion of Canada was an indication of the American respect for the potential capabilities of the Governor. On June 27, the Congress adopted the following resolve:

That as governor Carlton [sic] is making preparations to invade these Colonies, and is instigating the Indian nations to take up the hatchet

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against them, major general Schuyler do exert his utmost power to destroy... all vessels, boats or floating batteries preparing by said governour, or by his order, on or near the waters of the lakes. 67

They knew of the nature of Gage's proposals for a diversion in his favor. In reality both sides undertook defensive action in order to counter threatened invasion. The Americans, however, were preparing a preventive movement which was shortly to become an offensive operation.

The powers which the Governor possessed to resist this American strategy were defined in three separate documents. The first was the Royal Instructions of January 3, 1775. The delegated military responsibilities in articles 45, 46, 48 and 50 enabled Carleton to undertake the defensive steps of the spring and summer. The first mentioned article consisted of a commission issued by the Office of the High Admiral of Great Britain and the Plantations. By it Carleton became Vice Admiral of Canada. The following articles defined his naval duties in the event of a war. He was to prohibit the use of private warships against allies and to impose an embargo against trade with the enemy. The local subjects were to be warned not to reveal military information in their correspondence. Article 50 dealt with the instructions issued by the Secretary of State, the Master General of Ordnance

and the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations. It was the Governor's duty to keep these people informed of the status and security of the several military posts. In addition, he was to make recommendations for their improvement.68

The second document, concerning the Indians, contained more powers and restrictions. Commanders in Chief, governors and post commanders when within the Indian districts had to consult the Indian superintendent and agents on all matters of mutual concern except in case of emergency. They were to provide intelligence. Commanders were not to interfere with trade without the consent of the agents. Fortunately, Carleton had the assistance of loyal men in Guy Johnson and John Butler.69

The third document, his Royal Commission, was publicly received at Quebec following a parade in late April. The Royal salute and three volleys honored the Captain General and Governor in chief who took his oath of office.70

68"Instructions to Guy Carleton, Captain General and Governor in Chief of Quebec, Our Court at St. James, January 3, 1775," C. A. 1904; Transcripts of Colonial Office Records, Quebec Instructions to Governor's, 1763-1787, Public Archives of Canada, p. 72. Hereafter cited as M. 230.


70The Quebec Gazette, April 27, 1775.
Henceforth, in view of the declining security of Canada, Carleton possessed the power and authority to levy, arm, muster, command, and employ all persons whatsoever residing within our said Province; and, as occasion shall serve, them to march, embark, or transport from one place to another, for the resisting and withstanding of all enemies, pirates, and rebels, both at land and sea; to transport such Forces to any of our Plantations in America, if necessity shall require, for defense of the same . . .

And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority, by and with the advice and consent of our said Council, to erect, raise, and build in our said Province such and so many Ports, Platforms, Castles, Cities, Boroughs, Towns, and Fortifications, as you . . . shall judge necessary; and the same or any of them to fortify and furnish with Ordnance, Ammunition, and all sorts of Arms fit and necessary for the security and defence of our said Province; by the advice aforesaid, the same again, or any of them to demolish or dismantle, as may be most convenient. . . .\(^7\)

The next few months would reveal serious difficulties which obstructed the successful application of these regulations.

The background developments had set the stage. The failures must be shared by the Home Government, Gage and Carleton. All three had made serious errors which now endangered the very existence of Canada. The first had neglected the vital forts of Lake Champlain though warned by Carleton. The second weakened Canada by detaching two regiments and by underestimating the Rebels. The last had misled the former two as to the availability of the Canadians and the loyalty of the English community.

\(^7\) "New Commission to the Governor of Quebec, April, 1775," A. A., 4, Vol. II, pp. 407-408.
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC

Weeks of confusion passed before General Thomas Gage and Lord Dartmouth realized the desperate conditions which confronted Sir Guy Carleton. The diversion policy gradually gave way to the necessity of saving the colony to the Crown. If Carleton's ability as a strategist did not meet the test it was not because of faulty reasoning but rather because of an apathetic population, a lack of fortification experts and, most important, the absence of adequate troops. These factors had been virtually ignored by the Secretary of State and by Gage, who, moreover, had created the perilous status by ordering the 10th and 52nd Regiments to Boston. This deprived Carleton of half of his effectives, a condition which was not alleviated either by the expansion of his powers or by his newly acquired command over the western posts.

The long list of messages requesting a diversion from Canada in order to aid Gage also called for quantities of provisions, ordnance and other supplies, at the very time when wisdom should have dictated the opposite. While the Governor carried out these orders with due
speed, increasing his own difficulties thereby, the Home
government began to alter its policy as the true military
picture clarified. In May and in June, Gage and Carleton
corresponded with each other as to transports for forage,
cannon, flour and pork. The former sent the vessels
while the latter obtained the items either from his mili-
tary stores or by purchase from the population. Carleton
had warned both the Treasury and the Secretary of State
that shortages would result. Warrants, nevertheless, were
issued to purchase the articles Gage found essential for
the Boston defense. This meant, of course, that the
Governor would face difficulties in trying to recruit the
militia from a population which saw, instead of a sizable
reinforcement, the exportation of flints, and carbines
which could have armed the militia at an early date.¹
Scarce tools were among the strategic items taken from
the Quebec storehouses. Most of the goods provided came
through the contractors, but there was a deficiency in
funds. Gage was not entirely at fault, for he too had
written to Lord Dartmouth stating that there was no money
to send to pay for the items.² In July, however, His

¹General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, May 20
and June 16, 1775; and General Carleton to General Gage,
Quebec, June 4, 1775, Gage Papers.

²General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, June
28, 1775; and General Gage to General Carleton, Boston,
August 18, 1775, ibid.
Lordship dispatched the Jacob storeship which brought weapons, clothing, and necessities for the anticipated militia. He also promised to send out reinforcements. Admiral Graves was alerted and ordered to seize American vessels and to give asylum to any hard pressed subjects. The plan of operation, however, suggested that it would be Carleton who provided aid and not the contrary.

Though seemingly abandoned, Canada may have been saved by the arrival of the Lizard and other limited help, but the hope for the augmentation of troops which became the basis of Carleton's strategy failed to materialize. In the meantime, he sent the Thomas to Boston with more provisions of flour, pork, and peas, items which could have been useful during the winter. A bill of lading listed the number of items as 1,501 barrels of flour, 700 of pork and 460 of peas, all essential to the mess of the British Army.

Though faithfully conforming to Gage's desires, Carleton gave numerous warnings which should have been conclusive evidence against a policy of diversion. In order to cross the lakes there was a need for vessels and

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3Lord Dartmouth to General Carleton, Whitehall, June 12, 1775, B. 37, pp. 97-100.

4Bill of lading in General Carleton's of July 27, 1775, Gage Papers.
tools. Of these there was a shortage. Nor were there enough seamen and the militia were not dependable. When Captain Thomas Gamble delivered cattle to Gage in September, he carried news that prospects in Canada were not encouraging. The attempt to raise the militia had met with open resistance. By this time, the Governor's policy was the preservation of Canada from both internal and external subversion and invasion. Only if that policy succeeded could diversion succeed, providing additional troops arrived. In fact, the Captain declared that Gage "must look for no diversion this year from Canada."\(^5\)

Earlier Carleton informed his superior at Boston that "far from being in a Condition to act offensively against the Rebels, this Province is in no small Danger of falling into their Hands." The weakness of the troops was an invitation to attack and did cause the Canadians to refuse to defend their homes. Moreover, there was no fleet with which to regain and to hold Lake Champlain, even after the accidental arrival of the Gaspe.\(^6\)

Throughout August and September the Governor was handicapped by the Home government's emphasis upon limited

\(^5\)Thomas Gamble to General Gage, Quebec, September 6, 1775, A. A. 4, Vol. III, p. 962.

\(^6\)General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, August 5, 1775, Gage Papers.
aid when it should have been upon satisfactory reinforcements for the security of Canada. Though it was not until the following spring that this neglect was corrected, the little aid sent did help to preserve Canada. As early as August, Gage recognized Carleton's lack of seamen and carpenters by ordering the vessel carrying his dispatch to stop at Halifax in order to obtain all who could be spared by its governor; there were none at Boston. Eventually, a few did arrive but Carleton had to pay pensions to those who had left their wives behind. Thus help reached Quebec by sea after all land communications were blocked by the enemy.

Somewhat better informed, Lord Dartmouth abandoned diversion, realizing that the real problem was now the holding of Canada and not the impossible task of regaining the Lake forts with imaginary militia or troops. Expressing his confidence in Carleton's ability to resist the incursions against St. Johns, His Lordship dealt the death blow to all hopes of large reinforcements that year. The King would send 20,000 troops to America but not until next spring. Gage was recalled to England leaving Carleton in complete command of Canada. Considering the Governor's presence an absolute necessity, His Lordship declared that

7General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, July 3, August 12 and September 29, 1775, ibid.
such a mission could not "be intrusted to any body but yourself."9

Instructions and reinforcements were subjected to human errors and the will of nature. Carleton was informed that if he made a junction with the troops under General William Howe he was the senior officer. But the enacting orders did not arrive until early October, when they were virtually useless. Knowledge that the Empress of Russia might provide mercenary troops since there were no regulars was not encouraging. None ever came and even if the Empress had agreed they could not have reached Canada until the spring.10 The September 25 dispatch disclosed that four regiments would attempt the passage to Quebec but if the weather proved unfavorable they would have to proceed to Halifax. A fifth regiment was also alerted.

In preparation, Carleton was advised to detach all the supplies he might need for them from the transports bringing provisions to Howe.11 Instructions at Cork for the

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10Lord Pownall to Governor Carleton, September 8, 1775, Q. XI, p. 217. The involved regiments were the 17th, 27th, 28th, 46th and 56th.

11Lord Pownall to General Howe, Whitehall, September 25 and to General Carleton, September 25, 1775, B. 37, pp. 111-112 and 118.
necessary convoy and transportation, however, could not be carried out until the following spring. Not aware of this factor, Lord Pownall informed Carleton that the five regiments would attempt to penetrate the likely gale winds of the St. Lawrence. If that proved impossible they were to disembark and proceed by land. In such an event, Carleton could conceivably provide small craft for their baggage and stores. The fall winds, however, were more likely to drive the transports to seek shelter further south. No doubt the fleet commander was confused since he had instructions to land at Halifax.

The only other source of troops was colonial America, the very area where Carleton had sent two of his regiments. In a September dispatch which did not reach Howe until October 13, reinforcements were requested. Anxious to comply, Howe ordered two transports to prepare for the embarkation of a battalion. They would be conveyed by the Cerberus frigate. But Admiral Samuel Graves vetoed the measure after consulting his captains on the feasibility of navigating the St. Lawrence in October. The attempt was judged too dangerous and perhaps fatal to those who would have been involved. All the while the transports were ready to proceed. Howe then suggested the use of

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12 To the Commanding Officer of regiments at Cork, Whitehall, September 27, 1775, C. A. 1904, p. 359.
smaller craft but was told that they could not be readied in time. Though never completely convinced by Graves' argument, Howe had no choice but to decline sending reinforcements. History might have been altered if the marines had reached Quebec. The American commanders knew about Carleton's desperate condition. Unless he could get aid from colonial America his status seemed hopeless.

As for the events in Canada, after the reoccupation of St. Johns, Carleton's strategy was to block the possibilities of another American incursion into the vital Richelieu valley by sending a large portion of his regulars, plus a number of Canadian volunteers and Indians, to bolster its defenses. He could not have done otherwise for to have yielded all the defenses south of the St. Lawrence would have led to increased disloyalty. Sir James Carmichael-Smyth, however, stated that Carleton should have retreated to Montreal on the supposition that the naval vessels could have stopped further American successes. The troops sent to the exposed St. Johns would


14 General Schuyler to Mr. Lynch, Ticonderoga, October 1, 1775, Schuyler Papers Letter Book, June 28, 1775-February 24, 1776, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library, No. 126.

have been of greater service as a nucleus around which a dependable militia could have been built. There was a demand among the Canadians for English officers due to class antagonisms. But the author ignored the demoralizing effects such a policy would have entailed. If the Crown did not defend the passage to Canada at logical places, then how was an open city with only the poorest remnants of fortifications to hold out against the Americans? There were to be several instances, moreover, to show that while His Majesty's vessels were respected they did not prevent the enemy from crossing vital waters. On the other hand, Carleton might not have lost so many of his regulars if he had not concentrated them at St. Johns in June. It was a gamble which he lost.

His strategy was based upon three considerations, all proving too difficult to attain through no fault on his part. First, he decided to construct suitable fortifications and redoubts at St. Johns, with entrenchments at Chambly. Second, he sent available naval power up the Richelieu either in the hope of regaining control of Lake Champlain or, at least, to aid in the defenses. Third, he decided to employ the doubtful Canadians and Indians.

In a letter to Major Charles Preston, commander at St. Johns, Carleton ordered the construction of redoubts, one around Hazen's house and the other around
the small barracks. Speed was essential. The Governor even presented the details on how this work should be carried out, through the employment of the troops on either two or four hour shifts. As an inducement, he permitted the mixture of rum in their water, but if they abused the privilege they were to lose the allowance. Carleton also promised to send entrenching tools. More instructions were sent June 26. Captain John Marr of the Engineers was placed in charge of the construction projects. The buildings were to be large enough to cover as many troops as possible during the winter months. Carleton also desired a warm encampment between the redoubts, connected by a strong palisade with a seven foot ditch on three sides. In addition, Marr ordered the installation of projecting pickets on the outer base of the walls while the fourth side was protected by the Richelieu. Carpenters and sailors were kept busy adding to the works.

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17 General Carleton to Major Preston, June 26, 1775, No. 4504, Emmet Collection, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library.

That Carleton devoted a great deal of his time and energy to this undertaking was proven by the numerous intelligence reports made by the American agents to their commanders. The Albany Chamber learned that a settler of the Lake Champlain region who was going to Canada was seized by the British in order to keep their progress secret. They also knew that the Caughnawagas had received gifts on the condition that they would help defend their country. Another piece of intelligence disclosed that Carleton had sent 480 troops to St. Johns and 110 to Chambly, a small fort a short distance to the north. This report continued with a description of the progress of the two redoubts, one nearly completed with eight mounted cannon and howitzers. The report stated that 30 to 40 cannon of the caliber of twelves, eighteens and twenty-fours were likely to be shipped there. One of the vessels being constructed had a keel of 53 feet, the other 55. Both were between the two redoubts which, the report declared, were of equal size with the eastern and southern sides having parapets and ditches, the northern and western ten-foot pickets and a ditch filled with water on the

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north. A third account, confirming the previous except for slight modifications, added that the vessels carrying 16 guns apiece had been transported in sections and were nearly ready. The British in vain sought to prevent this news from getting to the Americans by stopping all travel in the area to the colonies. A fourth report, in mid-August, indicated that Marr was succeeding, but that the row galleys carried 12 guns not 16. It placed the number of troops at only 300, probably a deliberate underestimation in the hope of speeding the invasion. Little did Carleton know that by fixing his defenses at St. Johns he was aiding the secret project of Benedict Arnold through Maine.

The second part of the strategy, that of building vessels in the hope of contesting control of Lake Champlain, was thus very much in evidence. Its chances of success, however, decreased with each passing day. The two row galleys were never to be used because the siege began before they were completed. Carleton called upon local citizens and visitors to offer their services. Lieutenant

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23 Carrington, op. cit., p. 127.
William Hunter of the brigantine *Gaspe* was sent to St. Johns in early August, but he could do little because of the earlier loss of the sloop, bateaux and other stores, all irreplaceable. By the sixth, when there was no longer any doubt of hostile intentions, the Lieutenant became commander of a river fleet which was to cooperate with the land defenses as far as the shallow Richelieu would permit. The heavier vessels at Quebec could not get up to the forts. Later Carleton wrote that this strategy failed because the artificers sent from Halifax did not reach Canada until the siege of the redoubts had begun.

To effect this project, Carleton sent all available men to forts above, plus small detachments to St. Francis, Chateauguay and La Galette in order to prevent a surprise from those sectors. A return of June 5 disclosed that there were only 78 men of the 7th and 108 of the 26th Regiments at St. Johns, plus 46 of the latter at Chambly, and 32 of the former at St. Francis and 13 at Lachine.

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25 General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, November 5, 1775, Q. XI, p. 274.

26 State of two companies of the 7th and 26th Regiments, June 5, 1775, C. A. 1904. See Table 1.
Four months later the force increased to 412, not including 38 members of the artillery.27

The hopes for Canada now depended upon maintaining the two forts at St. Johns and the one at Chambly. Carleton defined the mission but left the practical implementation to his subordinates. This was in accordance with the tradition which made it unethical for a superior officer not present at the scene of battle to interfere in the successful prosecution of the assigned mission. There were no orders to Preston indicating that he should alter his operations. By this time, it was no longer possible to pursue an effective counter attack.

Severe criticism has been leveled against the Governor because he would not risk additional losses by attacking the Americans in early September. The views of the American Commissioners during their trip the following spring concurred with this. They believed that had the St. Johns commander ventured to take the offensive when the Americans made their initial landing the British would have won a major victory, especially since the Americans lacked either discipline or experience.28 Lord Germain in his


28 Brentz Mayer, editor, Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton During His Visit to Canada in 1776 (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1876), p. 77.
TABLE 1

STATE OF TWO COMPANIES OF HIS MAJESTY'S ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY 7th (OR ROYAL FUSILIERS) AND 26th REGIMENT OF FOOT IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC COMMANDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY MAJOR GENERAL GUY CARLETON ESQUIRE, &c
MONTREAL, THE 5 JUNE 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>7th or Royal Fusiliers</th>
<th>26th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensigns</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter Masters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants present</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drums and Fifers present</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present and Fit for Duty</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick in Quarters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Furlow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John's</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Francois</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sloops from Quebec</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Chine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>389</strong></td>
<td><strong>355</strong></td>
<td><strong>744</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C. A. 1905
### TABLE 2

STATE OF TROOPS UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR CHARLES PRESTON
26th REGIMENT, 17 SEPTEMBER, 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery consisted of</th>
<th>17th September</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Lt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombardiers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunners</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattrosses</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N. B.:** One Mattross Killed by the Enemy
One Killed by Accident.

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**Detachments of the 7th & 26th Regiments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>7th</th>
<th>26th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensigns</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drum &amp; Fifers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank &amp; File</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank &amp; File</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

precis added that Carleton did not make effective use of the Indians then in large number at Montreal, had not enlisted the militia or even taken their boats away in order to prevent their use by the enemy, and did not order a sally from St. Johns. None of these charges was accurate. They ignored the actual state of affairs. In a letter to Gage, September 16, Carleton expressed his desire to employ both the Indians and the Canadians but that such was not possible due to the dangerous influence of the American agents. Nowhere in his writings did His Lordship recognize the effect of a lack of regulars. How could he have naively expected a peaceful population to come to the aid of the Government which was not able to send reinforcements?

Prior to the full investment of St. Johns, the opposing forces met each other in minor engagements. The Americans began their invasion on September 4, when 1,200 men embarked for the forts. Approaching their assigned landing goals within two miles of St. Johns, they encountered artillery fire which forced them to make a short retreat in order to effect a landing without opposition.

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29 C. B. H., pp. 45-47.

30 General Carleton to General Gage, Montreal, September 16, 1775, Gage Papers. Details of the part played by the various elements of the population are treated in separate chapters, starting with Chapter V.
Marching through the dense swamp, however, the left flank of the Connecticut detachment was attacked by a party of Loyalists and Indians under Captain Gilbert Tice. The invaders drove off the attackers with minor loss. Thus the first fight in Canada was a victory for the Americans but it also made them more cautious. They retreated to Isle aux Noix. If Carleton had had troops he might have crushed them. Instead, the influence of the clergy and the seigneurs; plus martial law, seemingly had failed.

This gave the Americans a chance to regroup their forces. Agents were sent among the Canadians. Colonel Ethan Allen tried to recruit men and to reconnoiter around Chambly. Sympathetic Canadians ready to join his force urged the seizure of the vessels at the mouth of the Richelieu. Colonel James Livingston, a settler, urged General Philip Schuyler, Commander of the American forces, to cut off communications between St. Johns and Montreal. Accordingly, on the 10th of September, Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema with a party of picked men was to take possession of Laprairie, a village 15 miles northwest of St. Johns. General Richard Montgomery, second in command of the

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Colonial Army, with another large force of equal size, was to effect a landing. Eight hundred men should have been able to achieve their assignment, but the troops were green. An American flanking party, lost in the woods, ran into the main force which broke under what was thought to be a full scale British ambush. The result was panic which even bayonets could not stop. At best, a temporary order was restored.32

The following morning, the American officers at a council of war again decided to advance but could do so only after winning the approval of the soldiers. News of the near presence of one of Carleton's sixteen-gun schooners, however, caused a portion of them to bolt for the boats in order to retreat. Thoroughly demoralized, the advance was halted. Montgomery, mortified, was obliged to retreat to Isle aux Noix where a panic among the New York troops then had to be subdued.33

Nevertheless, orders were issued for the investment of St. Johns and the command was given to Montgomery since


Schuyler was too ill to come. A small number of additional troops from Vermont and New Hampshire were added to the army, strengthening its morale. It now totaled about 1,400 effectives. This time there would be no retreat. The Americans occupied the same breastworks which they had abandoned earlier. The encirclement was completed on September 17 when Colonel Timothy Bedel moved his forces to the northern breastwork. Major Brown, however, was attacked some distance to the north while attempting to cut communications between the British posts. Five hundred men under Bedel drove the attackers away. The latter force of near equal size retreated in good order to the safety of St. Johns, even carrying their field pieces with them. Though the losses were minor on both sides, the investment was complete. Other Americans entrenched themselves two miles below St. Johns, upon the only two roads leading into the province. About 200 Canadians joined them, entrenching on the east side of the Richelieu, only 500 yards from British guns. Nine hundred more were on the opposite side while 1,000 formed the main camp to the east. They

constructed a redoubt and battery under the able guidance of Captain John Lamb. The siege was on.

Unfortunately, Carleton did not know of the difficulties within the enemy ranks, of the widespread desertions, colonial jealousies, supply shortages and incidents of cowardice and petty insubordination. He did know that his own forces were heavily outnumbered and that his militia was undependable, except for the seigneurs. In a letter to Lord Dartmouth, Carleton stated that at least 2,000 Americans were in Canada and had been successful among the population. All the men he could collect as of September 21 for the relief of St. Johns numbered less than one hundred.\footnote{General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, September 21, 1775, Germain Mss. 1774-1776, Extracts of letters from Gage, Carleton, Hamilton, and Guy Johnson to Lords Dartmouth and Germain, The Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Q. XI, p. 261.} It meant that the third part of his defense tactics was impossible to execute, though he did not give up the attempt for several weeks. The object in mind was to construct ample entrenchments near St. Johns and Chambly which would be manned by the Canadians. Instead, the Governor began to find what he termed was "corruption" and "stupid baseness" among the habitants who not only deserted but actually used their arms against the King. The disaffection was widespread for the Americans
were roaming the region south of the St. Lawrence, seemingly at will.\textsuperscript{36}

As far as the actual operations at St. Johns were concerned, Carleton seems to have relied upon the abilities of Preston and Prescott. The latter ordered Preston to defend the forts to the last extremity, to send out frequent intelligence parties and all dispatches of importance. Carleton, who opened his headquarters at Montreal, authorized Captain Hazen to raise the militia, the same Hazen who would soon switch sides. Difficulties multiplied. Messengers were obligated to carry written orders or else face the possibility of being refused boats or horses. Outnumbered by at least two to one, the forces within St. Johns, nevertheless, decided to follow orders to the last extremity rather than risk a retreat to Montreal.\textsuperscript{37}

There did not seem to be any high degree of alarm among the British officers and Carleton seems to have had a greater fear of disloyalty than of American victories. Preston announced that the redoubts were "very defensible" with their parapets, inside embrasures, ditches and mounted guns, even if the platforms were inadequate. The artillery

\textsuperscript{36}General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, November 5, 1775, Q. XI, p. 274.

\textsuperscript{37}General Prescott to Major Preston, Montreal, September 11 and 15, 1775, C. A. 1914, p. 7.
was known to be more than a match for that of the enemy. Preston had already driven them back on one occasion by a judicious employment of firepower. Perhaps he thought it could be done again. The garrison consisted of 239 Fusiliers, 198 of the 26th Regiment, 71 volunteers, 31 artillerists, and 18 members of the Royal Highland Emigrants, a total of 557 men. The enemy had an estimated 1,200 to 2,000 men. These figures did not include officers. In addition, 80 women and children from the neighborhood were housed in one of the barracks. There seemed to be only one danger, a shortage of provisions. Efforts to send in supplies only led to their capture. Forays were made into the countryside not only to learn of the enemy movements but also to collect all the available cattle. There was also a shortage of winter clothing.

On the morning of September 25, Carleton was given an opportunity to demonstrate his tactical abilities, a chance which proved to be temporary because it was not

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carried to its logical conclusion, the relief of St. Johns. The ever ambitious and rash American leader, Ethan Allen, had devised a plan to take the almost defenseless city of Montreal. Conferring with another soldier of similar views, Major John Brown, he drew up a plan to cross the St. Lawrence by using the American troops at Longueuil. Though Montgomery was informed of the project, he did not prohibit it. Admitting that the men might not be fit for such an undertaking, the General assumed that Carleton had left Montreal in a defenseless state. In other words, he thought there was a possibility of success in spite of his doubts.39

Allen felt confident of victory and posted his men, consisting of 50 Canadians and 30 Americans, in order to cross the St. Lawrence a little to the north of the city. Brown, in the meantime, was supposed to cross to the south with nearly 200 others. Additional recruits were expected from the local population with the assistance of Thomas Walker. Since there were not enough canoes, Allen had to transport his detachment across in three waves. Brown, who had canoes, failed to come at the appointed time, perhaps due to contrary winds.40 Later, Ira Allen charged


that both Seth Warner and Brown had given their word of honor to forewarn Allen in the event of a change of plans. Warner, however, was not even in the area. Nor is there any proof of such a promise in the writings of the participants.41 Once across the river, Allen realized his desperate situation. A spy informed the British of his presence and numbers. Last minute appeals for help failed to win over the population and there were not enough boats to recross the river.

Though it might be argued that Montreal would have been saved to the British, even if Carleton had not been there, because of Allen's serious mistake, there can be no doubt as to the value of his influence. There is no way of knowing whether the population, on the verge of panic if not sedition, would have joined the small force under the command of General Prescott. It is possible that if both Brown and Warner had participated, Allen might not have been defeated. At any event, the Governor acted speedily and effectively. Assembling the citizens of Montreal, he told them of the likely consequences of a victory by the enemy. Briefly describing the danger, he called upon them to assist in repulsing the "Banditti."

Accordingly, arms were issued to the men on the Champ de Mars. With approximately 34 soldiers, nearly 100 British volunteers and Rangers, 120 Canadians and six Indians, Carleton pressed against Allen and cut off the retreat. What originally could have developed into a panic -- some officers had actually fled to the boats -- became an orderly organization of defenses, and a loyal force fell upon the Americans and destroyed their boats.\textsuperscript{42}

The small group of Americans, outnumbered nearly three to one, was obliged to yield ground. To protect his flanks, Allen posted Richard Young behind a bank of the river, John Dugen and 50 Canadians on his right, while he led the center. The maneuver was useless for the other two fled with their men. The hopeless situation was described by Allen, though with some exaggerations as to the British force. As fast as he was able to retreat, the combined British force was able to outflank and crowd him in the rear. He was obliged to surrender with the remnants of his men, 31 effectives and seven casualties.\textsuperscript{43} The British losses were small, two killed and three wounded.

The results of this minor victory were such as to change the attitudes of the merchants and Canadians.

\textsuperscript{42}\textit{The Quebec Gazette}, October 5, 1775; Ainslie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{43}Allen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
Pro-American sentiment gave way to an attitude of neutrality, reducing the possibility of mass desertion. The British now tried more vigorously to enlist the habitants while removing the enemy agents through arrest. Carleton was optimistic for over 900 answered the militia call. Though the south shore of the St. Lawrence was held by the Americans, the people on the north were not only convinced of St. Johns' security but their leaders wanted to prove their martial abilities.\(^4\)

At the very moment when the zealous seigneurs were demanding that a relief party be sent to the besieged forts and when Carleton again thought that his entrenchment plan might still be feasible, the military situation darkened with the investment of Chambly. It appears to have been neglected. This was a serious error for it was both a supply depot and a key part of the entrenchment strategy. Its commander, Major John Stopford, besides being non-vigilant, ran his post as if it were a hotel. James Livingston, the Canadian raider, with the approval of Montgomery, conferred with Brown and Bedel in order to execute a night assault. With a few cannon, the expedition floated past St. Johns without loss. The population of

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Chambly joined them, bringing the total force to about 350. The cannon were carried to strategic positions. After a short examination of his ample provisions, Stopford decided to surrender, for undisclosed reasons. The Americans took possession on October 18, a national disgrace for the British.\textsuperscript{45}

This easy victory gave the Americans badly needed supplies and reduced Carleton's effectives by some 80 men. The proof of the Major's incompetence can be seen in the fact that there were more women and children than men in the fort.\textsuperscript{46} Food in fair quantities was sent to the besiegers at St. Johns. Included in the spoils were 80 barrels of flour, 130 of pork, 11 of rice and smaller amounts of peas, butter and damaged foods. One hundred and twenty-four barrels of powder formed the best prize, as the Americans did not have enough. Quantities of ammunition, swivel shot, cartridges, shells, grenades, mortars and French arms were also taken.\textsuperscript{47} Just as important was the capture of the garrison of regulars. The colors of the 7th Regiment were sent to Philadelphia. The first major blow to the hopes of the St. Johns garrison had thus


\textsuperscript{47}Trumbull, op. cit., p. 82.
Three days later, Stopford received five bateaux so that he could convoy the baggage and dependents to the enemy camp and then prepare for confinement in New England.

While these events were transpiring, the Governor still clung tenaciously to the hope that the habitants, not just the seigneurs, might realize the errors of their ways and thus enable him to build the entrenchments at Chambly. Weeks passed before any definite action was taken. The seigneurs were bitter over the fact that the Governor seemingly did not trust their abilities to lead the habitants. The journals of these ambitious people tell of wasted opportunities, of neglect and perhaps even cowardice on the part of their Governor. Though hundreds were willing to join the British troops at Montreal, particularly after the capture of Allen, Carleton, nevertheless, continually refused to give them orders to raise the siege of St. Johns. Instead, arms distributed to the militia, as well as provisions, were either wasted or idled for weeks. The seigneurs tried to arouse the Governor to action by indicating that the plundering raids of the Americans were

48 Samuel Mott to Governor Trumbull, October 20, 1775 and Terms, October 18, 1775, A. A., 4, Vol. III, pp. 1124-1125, 1133.

49 J. Stopford to Preston, October 21, 1775, C. A. 1914, p. 12.
hurting the parishes in and about Varennes, Boucheville and Longueuil. Nor did volunteers from Varennes and St. Ours induce the Governor to cross.

Indeed, Carleton could not forget that hundreds of Canadians had deserted with the King's weapons in order to join Brown, Allen or Livingston. Sedition was still widespread. Of what use would it have been to send armed Canadians across the St. Lawrence only to have them desert? This important consideration was ignored by the seigneurs. Carleton, moreover, did not wish to impose unnecessary hardships upon the civil population. As a professional soldier he knew the discomforts of battle and had a deep distrust of the militia potentialities. Though recognizing that a sizable group exhibited zeal in behalf of the Crown, he preferred to consider the welfare of the province. Perhaps, thinking of winter, he ordered the militia captains not to ignore agricultural pursuits, such as harvesting and ploughing. Moreover, the Governor feared to send the militia on scouting parties to nearby Lévis, Longueuil and Vercheres, contrary to the wishes of the volunteers.50

Carleton, nevertheless, was obliged to test their sincerity and loyalty or face the consequences of conditions

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dangerous to morale in Montreal. Therefore, he permitted several small reconnaissance expeditions to the opposite shore. A force of 60 Canadians and 12 regulars under the command of a Captain McLeod crossed over to Longueuil but found no Americans. They did raise the general morale by returning with spoils, including 60 loaves of bread, several hundred livres of grain and some barrels of powder and bullets. The result was a louder demand for action and more expeditions. Giving in again, Carleton allowed 200 men to embark in seven or eight bateaux in order to search the shores around Boucherville, but with the express order not to fire upon any Americans. None being sighted the party returned. Throughout all these expeditions, Carleton continued to believe that desertions would occur under the stress of battle. The next raid proved to be discouraging to the people. When a guard, using a telescope, spotted a small American force at Longueuil, the Governor sent a Major Hughes with 40 men in two bateaux but they were repulsed. Discontentment spread rapidly. The seigneurs lamented that Carleton did not trust them and it was clear that if no action were taken St. Johns would fall.  

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The leading critic of Carleton's attitude and treatment of the Canadians, Monsieur DeSanguinet, was bitter in his accusations. The explanation accepted by the supposedly disheartened zealots was simple:

Tout le monde gémissait contre le conduite du general, et se persuadait qu'il avait recudes ordres de la cour d'Angleterre afin d'épargner de sang de ses sujets dans l'esperance qui les Bostonnais retreraient dans leur devoir. . . . Evidemment le gouverneur ne montra pas assez le confiance dans nos ancetres.52

Though no orders exist to verify the charge that Carleton was not permitted to injure his subjects, there was little doubt that he did have a high regard for their welfare and did not wish to cause needless casualties. The second part of the statement by the seigneur probably portrayed the Governor's inherent distrust of the militia. All the while, the seditious factions made fun of their dilemma, intimidating with tales of large American forces on their way to Canada. The morale was such as to cause Carleton to recall 40 soldiers from La Galette to Montreal, mostly as a precautionary measure. People thought he refused to relieve the forts in spite of their offers of assistance.53

52Ibid., pp. 59-64.

53Louis P. Turcotte, Invasion de Canada et Siege de Quebec en 1775-76 (Quebec: Imprimerie A. Cote et Cie., 1876) p. 33.
When the report of the fall of Chambly reached them the seigneurs declared if Carleton had wanted a camp at Longueuil and had taken action, that fort would not only have been saved but also St. Johns. Desertions again appeared to increase. Nevertheless, Carleton sent a force into the nearby parishes of Lachine, La Pointe Claire and St. Ann, as well as St. Geneviere, in order to gather together the militia, at least 15 out of every potential company. There was some resistance to these endeavors. Finally, another expedition to Longueuil was attempted by merely 600 Canadians and other alerted personnel. It, too, failed to achieve results. By the end of October, many foresaw the fall of Montreal.

Realizing that relief had to be sent to St. Johns before it was too late, Carleton organized a two-pronged attack. While he was crossing the St. Lawrence Colonel Allen McLean, of the Royal Highland Emigrants, was to collect recruits and join him in preparation for the desired entrenchments near Chambly. Carleton's immediate objective was Longueuil. Three days passed in which a force of Canadians, Indians and regulars collected at St. Helen Island, opposite Montreal. The force consisted of

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an estimated 800 Canadians, 130 regulars and 44 Indians.\textsuperscript{55} The recruits assembled at the Casernes where they were issued directions as well as powder and ammunition. Loyal citizens presented a testimonial of service in behalf of the Crown, which Carleton accepted with pleasure. He even allowed some of the units to choose their own leaders who included Sanguinet, Lorimier, and Berthelot all prominent, zealous seigneurs. They promised obedience as to maneuvers, retreat and fire power.\textsuperscript{56} Lorimier and St. Luc La Corne equipped their bateaux for the coming battle. Both led Indians into the battle. In other words, Carleton decided to take the chance that perhaps the militia and the Indians would prove dependable and victorious.

Montgomery, however, had anticipated the move and had taken precautionary measures. When the Governor embarked his men on 34 bateaux on October 30, he found a respectable American force under Seth Warner waiting for him. Three hundred and fifty "Green Mountain Boys" and New Yorkers watching the shores of the river, placed their cannon. An attack here would be a true test of militia discipline and courage. Eagerly seeking battle, Carleton's forces advanced across the St. Lawrence. The Indians

\textsuperscript{55}Monsieur De Berthelot, "Extraits d'un Momoir de M. A. Berthelot sur L'Invasion du Canada en 1775," Verseau, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.

uttered their traditional war chants in expectations of scalps. The Americans, on the other hand, remained hidden among the protective rocks and foliage near the river bank, fully convinced that the attempt would be made nearby. The tactical abilities of Carleton were not sufficient to overcome the resulting confusion. As he had feared, the spirit so eagerly presented before a phantom enemy broke under actual battle conditions, reinforcing his distrust of the militia.\textsuperscript{57}

Carleton soon had his difficulties trying first to maintain an attack formation and then when that failed to effect a decent retreat. Though possessing cannon, the British were not able to use them. Nor could they reach the shore by wading. The American musketry and grape shot easily drove them back in utter confusion. DeLorimier's Indians, who had wanted to debark and reach the shore via the reefs, now sought to escape into the forest or the water, or tried to hide behind the shore rocks. Others yelled to Lorimier to jump into the water in order to sink below the fire range of the devastating American grape shot. In the hope of salvaging the bulk of his troops, Carleton

ordered the flags to signal the retreat. The struggle was now to bring the bateaux around so that they could reach the opposite shore. One batteau, carrying part of the 26th Regiment, not having seen the signal, sank and Lorimier lost some of his Indians.\(^58\)

While recuperating his men at St. Helen Island, the Governor counted his casualties. In the meantime, two fires were set to warn the Indians who had helped save many of the others. Lorimier reported the death of Hotgouentagehte, a leading chieftan. Sanguinet wrote that three Indians were lost and that two Canadians, Jean Baptiste Lemoine and a man called La Coste, were now American prisoners.\(^59\) Another report estimated Carleton's losses at nearly 50 men including five Indians and five taken prisoner.\(^60\)

Demoralization permeated the ranks. Carleton was soon confronted with the worst accusations. Berthelot declared that "Il n'en fut rein, et ils furent faits prisonniers," completely ignoring the utter confusion which prevented any effective measure. Continuing, the Seigneur stated that

Le Gouvr, au lieu d'aller joindre le Col. McClean [sic] à Sorel, ou il aurait pu mieux juger s'il


\(^{59}\) De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 65.

In other words, the Governor's bravery was suspect. Henry Livingston, an active American agent, stated that the British defeat was a disgrace. Moreover, in his opinion the Governor was a coward, mainly because he kept the regulars and himself "the farthest distant from danger." The accusation was not fair because it ignored the complete lack of discipline and experience among the militia and Indians. In addition, of what service to the Crown would needless exposure to deadly fire have been? As it was, Carleton managed to save some of the expedition. The true spirit of the General was too well known to give credence to this charge. As another account reported, Carleton "is an intrepid old fellow, and may resist to the last."

Ignorant of this defeat, McLean's 60 Royal Fusiliers and 120 Royal Highlanders slowly made their way from Quebec to the assigned meeting place at Sorel. McLean


vainly sought to execute Carleton's instructions by forcefully recruiting Canadians all along his route. By mid-October he had reached Trois Riveieres with almost 400 unhappy militia. To add reinforcements, the Colonel crossed the St. Lawrence at Nicolet. His aides-de-camp, Godefroy Tannancour de Lanaudiere and Chevalier Tannancour, threatened and intimidated the parish habitants in order to get enlistments. Some of the latter feared that their barns would be burned to the ground while others fled into the woods. At Sorel, the expedition met the armed schooner which was conveying ten ammunition bateaux to be distributed to the militia. But it was soon evident that many had pretended loyalty in order to gain possession of arms which they wanted to turn over to the Americans. They set the example for the others to follow.

Though an able leader, McLean could not control the Canadians who quickly deserted upon learning of Carleton's defeat at Longueuil. It meant that McLean's mission was impossible. Matters deteriorated. The Scotchman was confronted by an American force under Brown, Livingston and Easton, coming from Chambly. The result was a defeat, mainly due to the broken morale of his men. To advance further was impossible since the bridges at St.

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64 DeBerthelot, op. cit., p. 231.
Denis had been destroyed by the Americans. The entire force, accordingly, evacuated the south shore, taking with them these supplies which could be removed while destroying the rest. It left only the garrison at St. John's which was then in the process of surrendering.\(^{65}\)

Before these defeats had occurred, the fort had not been effectively damaged by the Colonial artillery save for the sinking of the schooner in mid-October. There was no way in which Preston could have saved the vessel. All that could be done had been accomplished, mainly the anchoring of the schooner between the redoubts so that the artillery and stores would not be lost.\(^{66}\) St. Johns, moreover, seemed well protected by its ditch fed by the Richelieu, by the strong pickets and the ample artillery. The resulting duels were ineffective and harmless, the losses on either side being minor. The appearance of the American guns from Ticonderoga failed to alter the situation to any degree.\(^{67}\)

Nevertheless, within the fort, conditions were slowly deteriorating. The only hope was aid from Carleton.

\(^{66}\)William Hunter to Major Preston, Royal Savage, October 14, 1775, C. A. 1914, Appendix B, p. 11.  
\(^{67}\)Trumbull, op. cit., pp. 147-151.
All supplies had been cut off, forcing the soldiers to accept half rations. Montgomery, moreover, established a more effective battery to the west of the fort though temporarily hindered by the British artillery, on October 26. Two twelve-pounders, one niner, and several mortars soon began their work. The British losses were still limited. The American Commander, however, was correct in not ordering an assault against the experienced gunners and regulars for he knew it was just a matter of time. Preston's hopes diminished with the news that over 2,000 Canadians had joined the regiments of Hazen in the camps before the fort. Possibilities of succour declined.68

The most serious setbacks, notwithstanding, had been due to Carleton's inability to win at Longueuil and McLean's reverse at Sorel. The first news of these events came when Montgomery sent the captives to persuade Preston of his desperate situation but the Major rejected the accompanying capitulation terms.69 Instead, the latter sent one of his captains with counter proposals under a flag of truce to Montgomery's tent. Refusing to accept the stories of the prisoners, Preston demanded a four-day cessation of hostilities during which time he promised not


to receive any reinforcements. The time was to be used to
draft terms of capitulation. Since the Major did not be-
lieve that Carleton had been repulsed, Montgomery produced
Lemoine and Lacoste to verify the tale of the other
prisoners. 70 Throughout this entire period, Preston was
further disturbed by the fact that "not a Syllable of
Intelligence from General Carleton arrived altho' we sent
repeated Messengers to Montreal." 71 In actuality, there
was no way to penetrate the vigilant American lines. With
the failure at Longueuil Carleton had no time to send in-
structions, assuming that such could have reached St. Johns.
It may be that the Governor should have ordered the garri-
sions to make a breakthrough to save the men and some of the
supplies but Carleton was by nature cautious and desirous
of avoiding useless bloodshed. More practical, he realized
that if Preston's messages could not reach him, he would
also be cut off.

As a consequence, Carleton had no influence whatso-
ever on the negotiation then underway. Even if he had, he
would still have hesitated to interfere with his

70 Trumbull, op. cit., p. 151; and de Sanguinet, op.

71 "Narrative of the Siege of St. Johns, Canada, by
Major Charles Preston, November 3, 1775," C. A. 1914,
pp. 24-25.
subordinate's decisions. Montgomery, meanwhile, in his reply, refused to delay because of the advanced season. If the cannon signal for surrender was not made, the traditional honors of war would be rejected. Negotiation began on the basis of Preston's proposals, November 2.

Montgomery agreed to the first article. All acts of hostility were halted during the period of the drafting. However, there was a difference of opinion on article two. It proposed that the prisoners proceed with their baggage and personal effects to the nearest convenient port. There they were to await the arrival of British transports with provisions, to take them to Great Britain. Montgomery accepted the honors of war because of the stiff resistance of the garrison during the siege, but not the remainder of the proposal. The American Commander, instead, insisted that all noncommissioned officers and privates ground their weapons and prepare for immediate embarkation. The officers were to keep their side arms while the rest became the property of the victors. The prison was to be in Connecticut unless the Continental Congress should designate an alternate.

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72 Second Letter, Montgomery to Major Preston, November 2, 1775, ibid., p. 15.

73 Articles of Capitulation proposed and answered, November 2, 1775, ibid., p. 151.
The third article requested permission to send either an officer or a quartermaster from each unit to Montreal in order to settle all transactions accumulated in Canada. Moreover, the officers were to collect and transport all their baggage and the clothing and pay for their corps. Montgomery agreed to this article.

As for the Canadians who had served under Preston, the fourth article asked that they be allowed to return to their homes with all their arms and baggage. But Montgomery insisted that they be subjected to his answer in article two. That meant that they must yield their arms since they were part of the garrison, except for the officers. All were to accompany the British to the same destination.

Preston's fifth article suggested that the sick and wounded be taken care of properly. They were to be allowed to go to their homes until recovery and then to join their respective units. Montgomery agreed in part except that their own surgeons were to take care of them.

When the other articles were signed, Preston agreed to surrender all the ammunition, provisions and other stores within the fort. Montgomery answered that

Tomorrow Morning at 8 o'clock the Garrison will March out having first Collected their Baggage and effects together, in a convenient Place for embarkation and leaving a Guard for its Protection. The Officers must be upon Honor with Respect to their Baggage; for should any Canadians, or others . . . escape, his Baggage shall be given as plunder to the Troops.
The Quartermaster General with proper Commissaries will attend at 8 o'clock to receive the Artillery, Ammunition, Naval Stores & C.  

The termination of the 55 day siege removed the last obstacle to the American advance on Montreal. The next morning, the victors appeared in their dress uniforms. At 8 o'clock, the garrison marched out with the honors of war, in a regular military pattern. In order of units, first came the 26th Regiment in red, second the Royal Fusiliers in red with blue facings, third the Royal artillerists in dark blue coats, followed by sailors in blue and white. After them came the proud Highland Emigrants, Canadians, Indians and laborers. The rear was brought up by a few armed men, flying the colors, beating the drums and playing the fifes. All marched around the fort and then drew up in a line.  

The honors of war had been carried out.

In accordance with article three, Captain Williams and four other officers went to Montreal to complete the essential arrangements and to inform Carleton of the proceedings. Consternation spread quickly throughout the city as it was obviously the next American objective. Discontent

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74 Terms of Capitulation, November 2, 1775, C. A. 1914, pp. 16-17.  
75 Smith, op. cit., p. 456.
again appeared. Sanguinet blamed the Governor for the
disaster due to the failure to relieve the fort earlier.\textsuperscript{76}
Two years later, Carleton voiced his opinion of the conduct
of the garrison. He refused to blame the commanding officer
of either fort for the surrender because he knew their
missions could not be attained.\textsuperscript{77} One of the Governor's
characteristics was loyalty to his subordinates even if
they were in suspect.

Almost four-fifths of his regulars had been lost.
They included 38 members of the Royal Artillery, 228 of the
7th Regiment. It meant that except for the western posts,
Canada had considerably less than 200 regulars. Over 611
men, Canadians, Loyalists and regulars, had been lost to
the Governor.\textsuperscript{78}

As for supplies, the Americans were happy in their
prizes, especially the artillery. Thirty-nine iron and
brass cannon had fallen, including some heavy 24 pounders.
Other spoils netted were a cartload of small arms, over
700 stands, and about 500 French arms. Ammunition was

\textsuperscript{76}DeSanguinet, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{77}General Carleton to Lord Barrington, May 21,
1777, \textit{Military Despatches, British Army in North America,
Quebec & Canada, Carleton, Haldimand etc., 1776-1780,
Public Archives of Canada, } p. 27. Hereafter cited as \textit{M. 318}.

\textsuperscript{78}Lord Germain to Governor Tyron, Whitehall,
plentiful in comparison with the provisions. There were all types of shells, numerous cartridges and minor ordnance equipment. Drums, cutlasses and hatchets were uncovered.\textsuperscript{79} The British provisions, on the other hand, had nearly been depleted by the siege. Preston had only one barrel of pork, six of peas and a little rice. That was all. As for powder, there remained merely a single barrel, not nearly enough to satisfy the victors. It was no wonder that Preston had capitulated but it was unfortunate that so many supplies were stored in the doomed forts.\textsuperscript{80}

In naval equipment the victors fared better. They restored and renamed the vessels. The schooner became the \textit{Yankee} while the row-galley was christened the \textit{Douglas}. There were also a number of bateaux and bark canoes, valuable for the transportation of equipment, men and supplies. With the boats came anchors, rigging, pitch and rosin. There were small quantities of oil. The next goal was Montreal.\textsuperscript{81}

The fortifications of the city had long been neglected in spite of Carleton's warnings. It was now too late to prepare for a siege. The citadel, overlooking

\textsuperscript{79}Trumbull, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 157-158.
\textsuperscript{80}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{81}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
the city from domineering Mount Royal, might have been
difficult to assault. The houses, designed originally
for defense, had partitions of masonry and iron doors to
resist fire. The walls were of heavy stone, virtually
blockhouses, but the Governor had no hopes of holding
out. The parapet was only two feet thick, while many
stones were missing. Most of the people, moreover wanted
to surrender. The merchants refused even to protect their
flag. They did not want to risk the confiscation of their
merchandise by the Americans. Carleton's former suspicions
were now verified. The Canadians not only refused to
mount guard but also declined to give up their ladders
for use on the parapets. They recalled the arrogant
attitudes of the seigneurs and clergy when in the militia.
Moreover, they were favorably impressed by American
promises of liberty and peace. They had already been in-
vited to send delegates to the Continental Congress. The
agents among them respected their religious beliefs and
practices.82

It was, therefore, no wonder that the people tried
to convince Carleton of the futility of defense. Dis-
gusted, the Governor told them to do what they wanted.

82 Smith, op. cit., pp. 474-481; and Edmund C.
Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: The
Thereupon, they selected four delegates to be sent to
Montgomery in order to learn his intentions. In answer,
the latter despatched the following message:

Gentlemen: My anxiety for the fate of Montreal
induce me to request that you will exert your­selves among the inhabitants to . . . prevent
the necessity of opening my batteries on the
town.83

By then the Americans had occupied all the parishes across
the St. Lawrence and were busily transporting men and
equipment to the other side. The people of Montreal had
no choice. They faced the realities of an artillery
barrage, fire and destruction. There was no chance to
offer resistance. Though the terms of capitulation drafted
by the citizens were rejected because the Governor would
have no part of them, Montgomery was anxious to gain this
city since his men were suffering from the cold weather.84

Before the capitulation was completed, Carleton and
Prescott prepared to embark upon the waiting vessels and
bateaux. A poor wind detained them but they were protected
by the Gaspe and two armed vessels until the favorable
weather returned. Everything that could be used by the
Americans and which could not be loaded on the ten small
boats was demolished or made useless. The cannon was
spiked and the bateaux left behind destroyed, but the

83Proclamation to the Citizens of Montreal, Lossing,
op. cit., pp. 460-461.

84Trumbull, op. cit., p. 164; and extracts of a
barracks were left intact. A large gathering of militia, many of whom had already deserted, with the King's arms, were dispersed to their respective parishes.

An excellent description of the Governor's composure during this difficult time has been left by Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton. In a letter to Lord Dartmouth, in the summer of 1776, the former wrote:

I was exceedingly struck by the unmoved Temper and Firmness of the General. Tho' deserted by the most ungrateful race . . . , tho' a General without Troops, and at the Eve of quitting Montreal . . . his mind appeared unshaken and he gave me his last orders for the western Post with apparent unconcern, tho' most undoubtedly . . . wrung to the soul. Tho' I had frequently seen in him instances of uncommon Fortitude, yet nothing of so trying and discouraging a nature had perhaps put his Resolution to tryal before, and I believe all who know him rejoice sincerely to see him rise superior to so complicated distress . . .

This was an excellent testimonial to the mental and emotional stability of the leader of the British forces.

Nor did Carleton ignore the west. On November 9, Hamilton was directed to repair the King's vessels on the Great Lakes for the coming spring. Two days later, with a fair wind, the flotilla sailed for Quebec, in the

hope that they would not be intercepted during the course of the voyage.86

At nine o'clock, on the 13th, the Americans at Recollect Gage received all the keys to the public storehouses, including the barracks. As for the people, they received the benefits of the promised terms. They were not to be molested in their religious practices, did not have to join the army and did not have to lodge the soldiers. From the Canadians, moreover, Montgomery purchased great quantities of woolen goods and supplies.87

All the available evidence indicated that the British Fleet should have reached Quebec, but the proper preparations had not been taken in anticipation of the maneuver or the climate. Bitter criticism of Carleton's seemingly serious omission, which was not to be his last, appeared in the journals of the demoralized seigneurs and in the precis of the campaign made by Lord Germain. Both tend to ignore the unfavorable winds which caused a disastrous delay while Brown of the Americans erected a battery opposite the mouth of the Richelieu. The latter


87 United States Army, Continental, Articles of the Capitulation Between Montgomery and the Citizens and Inhabitants of Montreal, November 12, 1775, Photostat Copy, Connecticut State Library.
had hopes of capturing both the fleet and the Governor before they reached Quebec. The delay enabled the Americans to get to their destination first. Carleton, however, did not take all the precautions he should have.

It does not appear that Genl. Carleton had taken any Precaution during his stay at Montreal, to secure this Passage, by placing his armed Vessels there, or any part of his Regulars, nor indeed that he had any Apprehensions of the Rebels being in Possession of it. 88

Carleton seemed to have completely underestimated the capabilities of his opponents. Sanguinet could only ask why the two frigates at Quebec had not convoyed the bateaux and "Why they had hurried off to Quebec without firing a gun?" Others suspected a conspiracy. 89 Though Carleton could have employed these vessels more effectively he could not have secured the vital passage by Sorel. He did not have enough troops and a march along the river banks was out of the question.

When the fleet approached the mouth of the Richelieu, it was obliged to retire due to artillery fire from both the newly erected battery and the two row galleys. Soon after, a summons for surrender, written by Colonel James Easton, was delivered by Ira Allen. The

89 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 87; and O'Callaghan, op. cit., p. 65.
American Commander informed the British that Montreal had
already fallen and that Sorel was in his hands.

Your own Situation is Rendered very disagreeable—I am therefore Induced to Make You the Following Proposal viz—

That if you will Resign your Fleet to me immediately without destroying the Effects on Board, You and Your Men Shall be used with due civility together with women & children on Board—to this I expect your direct and Immediate answer—Should you Neglect You will Cheerfully take the Consequences which will follow—

The Americans appeared to have three twelve-pounders, one nine and two sixes, mounted on shore, plus the two galleys. They were enough to prevent the British fleet from escaping. Indeed the British twice tried to avoid the guns by retreating upstream. The Americans, in the meantime, improved their artillery positions. Did Carleton want to avoid bloodshed? Sanguinet declared that their fleet had some thirty cannon yet it fled. The facts, however, indicate that this claim was a great exaggeration. Perhaps, if the armed vessels had been present the outcome would have been different.

A clever ruse by Brown apparently convinced Prescott, the commander of the vessels, that the American

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90 James Easton to General Carleton, Sorel, November 15, 1775, Q. XI, p. 323; and General Montgomery to General Schuyler, Montreal, November 17, 1775, A. A., 4, Vol. III, p. 1633.

91 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 87.
batteries would sink them. Sanguinet, moreover, if accurate, stated that the passage was also blocked by a barge with the cannon which the Americans brought from St. Johns. Brown suggested that Prescott send an officer to inspect the incomplete batteries. It is not known what the officer saw but he was thoroughly convinced. Several months later, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, visiting the battery, declared that there was not a single mounted gun. At any event, the fleet capitulated.\(^ {92}\)

This action came somewhat as a surprise to the members of the expedition, to the British authorities at Quebec, and to the American leaders. Sanguinet and several other seigneurs professed ignorance of the cause of surrender. Lieutenant Governor Hector Cramahe at Quebec, certainly knew that Carleton's passage was blocked at Sorel and that the winds were unfavorable, though communications had been cut off. In spite of poor prospects of success, there was no serious attempt to dispatch armed vessels to the rescue. Cramahe did have five transports and the \textit{Fell} and \textit{Snow}, naval vessels. The reason for this apparent error was the sudden appearance of Benedict Arnold's small force before the walls of Quebec.\(^ {93}\)

\(^{92}\)Mayer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97.

\(^{93}\)Cramahe to Lord Dartmouth, Quebec, November 19, 1775, \textit{Q. XI}, p. 324; and General Howe to the Secretary of State, Boston, December 3, 1775, \textit{C. A. 1904}, pp. 355-356.
Montgomery had even stronger remarks to make respecting the conduct of the British. In a letter to his wife on November 24, the following scathing statements were inserted:

The other day General Prescott was so obliging as to surrender himself and fourteen and fifteen land officers, with above one hundred men, besides sea officers and sailors, prisoners of war! I blushed for His Majesty's troops! Such an instance of base poltroonery I have never met with, and all because we had half-a-dozen cannon on the bank of the river to annoy him in his retreat! The Governor escaped - more's the pity. Prescott, nevertheless, is a prize. He is a cruel rascal! I have treated him with sovereign contempt his inhumanity and barbarity merit.

The prisoners were sent to Montreal where Prescott was greeted with jeers on the twenty second. There were practically no regulars left in Canada except for a small number at Quebec and the Eighth Regiment in the west.

Before escaping, however, Carleton had ordered all the powder and cannon balls thrown overboard which was executed prior to the capitulation. Nonetheless, the spoils were sufficient to the Americans. The visitors added four cannon to their artillery. Small quantities of ammunition, small arms, musket cartridges and two hundred pairs of shoes were no less appreciated. The

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entrenching tools would find future use at Quebec. The chief vessel, the Gaspe, was given to Captain Cheeseman, one of Montgomery's aides. All that remained of British hopes centered in the strongly situated city of Quebec.

The most important prize, however, escaped in a manner to inspire romantic writers and legend-worshippers. The Americans were disappointed for they were convinced that if they had captured the Governor, Quebec would surely fall "without firing a Shot." Carleton, as the legend goes, indignant at the weakness of the resistance, had escaped from the doomed fleet by persuading a Canadian Captain, Bouchette, to row him past the enemy at night. Dressed as a farmer to prevent recognition, he reached Berthier. But Brown had occupied the parish forcing them to continue to Trois Rivieres, in the hopes of getting a rest. After securing lodging for the night, they retired only to be awakened a few hours later by the appearance of a Colonial patrol. Carleton nonchalantly made his way past them to his boat. Shortly after, the Fell rescued the harassed and tired Governor and brought him to Quebec on the nineteenth.96


From June until the beginning of December, Carleton's strategy had gradually fallen into complete ruin. The tactical operations designed to protect the entrance to Canada failed. Much of the blame must be placed on the War Office and the British Ministers for not having sent a sizable reinforcement, instead of insisting upon a diversion to help Gage. How could Carleton possibly hold out without regulars? The militia was inadequate and discipline was possible only if troops were present. Accused of Fabianism and a lack of initiative the Governor really had no alternatives. He had depended on his subordinates and they had failed him. The only fault with Carleton was his lack of vision, his inability earlier to predict the attitudes and capabilities of the population and the enemy, and to foresee the need to save the few men he did have, plus the valuable stores at the forts, at Montreal and at Sorel. He had counted upon effective resistance by his subordinate at St. Johns, but had erred on provisions. It was a gamble which he lost up to this point. Defeated in tactics, he would have better results in managing a besieged fortress.
CHAPTER III

TACTICS AND LOGISTICS DURING THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC

The first steps for the defense of the City had been undertaken in accordance with the Royal Instructions of January 3, 1775. In great detail, the articles described the methods which were to be used in the event of an emergency by determining a system of certifications, embargoes anti-smuggling rules, commandeering and by defining Carleton's naval jurisdiction. He could command vessels upon the rivers and lakes but not upon the open seas. In fact, he could not even send the vessels to England which were meant for the internal security of the province unless the need be most pressing.¹

Prior to Carleton's arrival at Quebec, Cramahe had first instituted the embargo on September 28 and had begun endeavors to hire and arm vessels in the harbor so that he might still retain command of the St. Lawrence. He wrote that "we have got the town put into little better Posture of Defense, to which a body of eighty stout Seamen, besides the Number wanted for the Armed Vessels, will prove

¹Instructions, January 3, 1775, Appendix E. C. A. 1904, pp. 258-259; Lord Dartmouth to Governor Carleton, September 5, 1775 B. 37, pp. 103, 120.
no Inconsiderable Reinforcement." For this purpose, all ships arriving or leaving were ordered detained, effective to the 22nd of October. A series of extended dates followed thereafter. The chief enforcing agents were the customs officials.3

Certain that no additional reinforcements were likely, and with Arnold's force already at Point Levis, Cramahe called the first of several war councils, each of which was composed of the chief police, naval, militia and regular officers. The meeting of November 9 determined on the continuation of the embargo and offered a bounty of three pounds to each sailor who would enlist in the cause. When Arnold succeeded in crossing the river, further action was essential. A second war council, accordingly, summoned six days later, agreed upon six measures.4 After examining the returns of the garrison and of the vessels, the

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councilors laid down the chief objectives of their actions which were to be successfully executed by Carleton. "it is the unanimous opinion of the Council of War that it is for the Benefit and Honor of His Majesty's Services at all Events to defend the town to the Last Extremity." Secondly, the embargo and the bounty to the volunteers was reaffirmed. Captain John Hamilton, the senior naval officer, even stated that defense was impossible unless all seamen were employed, whether from the King's vessels or private ships. Letters were therefore dispatched to all ship masters, requesting that they "lay up the Ships and order the Seamen on shore for the Immediate Defense of the Town." This action was justified in the belief that only a large reinforcement could ultimately save them. For that reason, Captain Thomas Pringle was sent to London so that he might describe the gravity of the situation. Steps were taken to collect provisions, wood and other necessities. Thirdly, realizing that there was a possibility that all the vessels might have to be destroyed before May, the Council sent ashore most of the cargoes of the war vessels and merchant men in the harbor. They were fortunate to have two storeships, the Elizabeth and the Jacob. The valuables, however, were forwarded to Halifax or to London so that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. Some of the expected war
materials were found wanting, particularly matches and fuel, though the Elizabeth carried twine and paper.5

Fourthly, the Council believed that it was obligatory to demolish all suburban buildings, especially those in St. Johns and those adjacent to the fortifications. Though advised that this step should be instituted before the suburb fell to the Americans, Carleton delayed since it was contrary to his nature to destroy private property unless it was absolutely unavoidable. He guessed wrong but it had no great effect except to make the shortage of wood more crucial. Next, the Council determined to send pilots to Europe and to arrange a system of security signals. Accordingly, all available pilots were ordered aboard the express vessels which carried the Government dispatches. These men would prove valuable as guides for the future relief forces in the spring. Without them travel to Quebec would be dangerous due to winds, sea currents, shoals and tricky channels. As for the signals, they were given to the care of the vessel's commander by Hamilton.6 Lastly, the Council had some words of praise

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6Private signal for the Information of the Fleet, Quebec, November 20, 1775, Q. XI, p. 337.

The relief vessels had to prove that they were friends by hoisting a red flag at the top of the masthead
for the cooperation of the ship masters. These patriotic citizens, however, did not fail to present a memorial in the hope of compensation for their troubles, especially for their expense, time, and possible losses. They "humbly" requested assistance and provisions and asked that two men be placed aboard each of their vessels for their protection. The Council agreed.\(^7\)

On November 13, Arnold had succeeded in crossing the St. Lawrence through clever stratagem. His small force had been drawn up in the cove of the Chaudiere, where canoes and dugouts had been collected with great difficulty. The first group which landed at Wolfe's cove included their leader. Canoe after canoe quietly slipped into the water only to return later for another load of passengers. Before dawn, over 500 men had crossed and only then were the British aware of the fact. The Hunter had sent a boat toward Wolfe's Cove which was fired upon. There were still 150 men left at Point Levis.\(^8\) On the following day, the Americans climbed to the Plains of

\[^7\text{Council of War, Quebec, November 16, 1775, ibid., pp. 342-344.}\]

\[^8\text{Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, editors, Revolutionary Journals of Henry Dearborn 1775-1783 (Chicago: The Caxton Club, 1939), p. 57.}\]
Abraham. They were ill-clad, scantily fed and many of their muskets were inoperable. While one group reconnoitered, another seized the mansion of Henry Caldwell and converted it into their headquarters.9

Arnold now invested the City hoping that the British would attempt to assault his lines so that his friends within might take them from the rear. He acted pompously and there was derision among the defenders of Quebec for some plundering had taken place. Realizing that his force was too small, he had to resort to methods that did not include an assault. That opportunity had been lost when the element of surprise had been destroyed. One of the American participants wrote that had Arnold attempted to storm the City the very night of the landing it probably would have fallen. It appears that the Gate of St. Johns was not only unbarred but also open. There was not even the deterrent of one cannon. But Arnold was either unaware of this fact or he questioned its authenticity.10

Two measures were then tried but with no avail. First, the Americans were paraded within half a mile of


the defenders and gave three cheers. The object was either to intimidate or to frighten the people into capitulating. Instead, the defenders fired upon them. Then Arnold tried the device of a bombastic missive, half threat and half bluff. This ultimatum was dispatched to the defenders under a flag of truce. But the British fired upon the deliverer and when Arnold directed a second attempt the same reply greeted the messenger. The American Commander considered this a breach of the laws of nations which virtually sanctified the lives of those under flags of truce. Cramahe was warned that if such violations continued there would be retaliation. Arnold also cautioned his opponent not to harm the persons or properties of the habitants in an obvious move designed to win the support of the latter. If capitulation was not acceptable, the defenders must not hope to save their properties from general ruin.\footnote{Benedict Arnold, "Letters Written While on an Expedition Across the State of Maine to Attack Quebec in 1775," edited by William Willis, Vol. I, Series I, Collections of the Maine Historical Society (Portland: Bailey & Noyes, 1865), p. 486.}

Actually Arnold was greatly worried and was confronted with innumerable problems which made it extremely dangerous for his troops to remain near Quebec, especially since there was the possibility that Cramahe might launch
an effective counterattack. Moreover, there were serious dissensions among the Americans, plus a definite lack of ammunition, warm clothing and food. Therefore, the entire force abandoned their lines near the City and retreated to Point aux Trembles in order to await Montgomery who, they learned, had ample captured British uniforms for them and other critical supplies. The two American units met on December 1 and shortly thereafter returned to the vicinity of Quebec to begin the siege in earnest.

When Carleton reached Quebec he expressed satisfaction with the defensive measures instituted by the council and Cramahe. There was no doubt that the sailors and marines formed a substantial portion of the defense force. The exact figures vary, depending upon the source and date. The official return of November 16, 1775, stated the following distribution of men: from the Lizard, 37 marines and 114 sailors, plus 19 naval officers, from the Hunter eight officers and 60 men, from the Magdalen four officers and 16 men and from the Charlote four officers and 46 sailors. The merchant and transport vessels could but had not yet provided another 74 mates and sailors. It meant that 37 officers and nearly 300 men from the ships constituted 28 per cent of the defenders. These activities did not escape Arnold who had his own estimates. He informed Montgomery that the British seamen were
distributed as follows: 200 from the Lizard, 100 from the Hunter, 150 with Captain Napier and another 150 from the frigates and the two transports. Ten days later, November 30, Hugh Finlay counted 400 seamen and 350 marines out of a total force of some 1,600. This estimate was virtually verified by a detailed account dated December 4, which listed 160 from the Lizard, 70 from the Hunter, 80 from the Little John and 20 from the Chabot, exclusive of marines. A report made in May 1776, indicated a drop in numbers. The effective optimum had been largely achieved because of the embargo on shipping, the use of impressments and of volunteers. Carleton's main contribution to these people was not found in altering the policies of the War Council but in his exhibition of strong determination and resolve to win, a feeling which permeated the ranks of all his men and enabled them to undergo the hardships of the dreary siege which lingered to May.

While Carleton was mustering his force and was preparing for an attack which might come at any time; Montgomery was busily endeavoring to organize his maneuvers. He warned his men of the dangerous situation they were in

12"Return of men for the defense of Quebec, November 16, 1775," Q. XI, p. 344; Finlay, op. cit., p. 3; Arnold "Letters," pp. 488-489.

13Finlay, op. cit., p. 4; Letter from Montreal, December 4, 1775, Q. XII, p. 35.
as long as Carleton held out. An investment and an assault seemed necessary but the approach of winter would make the digging of trenches and the placing of mines exceedingly difficult. The soil was already too hard. Nor did the Americans have sufficient siege machinery. An investment necessarily depended upon keeping Quebec's supply lines cut off from across the seas.\textsuperscript{14} Montgomery therefore, sought to find other means to take the fortified City, namely through the use of threats, promises and demonstrations which would convince the defenders that their task was a hopeless one.

But in resorting to these methods, the American Commander had not counted upon the cleverness and determination of his foe. Carleton refused to open any negotiations with the enemy. He would not even accept messages which were directed to him. The first attempt to deliver a summons had failed earlier under Arnold. The sending into Quebec of an old woman who had the mission of delivering an ultimatum to both the Governor and the local merchants did not succeed. The messenger, on the contrary, was incarcerated for a short time and then ingloriously drummed out of the City. An examination of the missives

\textsuperscript{14}Codman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 198.
themselves shows that they were not likely to have had much effect upon Carleton except to amuse him. In the letter directed to him, Montgomery complained that in spite of ill-treatment given to him he was willing to grant the Governor a means to save himself from certain destruction. The American Commander tried to present arguments in proof of his allegation that defense would be a crime. He declared that the British were too few to man the extensive walls, that they were the dregs of society and that there was no likelihood of succour. He pictured his own army in glowing terms, well disciplined, determined, incensed at British inhumanity and only with difficulty held in restraint. Montgomery also complained that ordinary communications were impossible since the flag of truce was still being fired upon. "Should you persist in an unwarrantable defense, the consequences be on your own Head." He also warned against the destruction of stores of any kind, public or private. No mercy was to be shown if these terms were rejected.\footnote{General Montgomery to General Carleton, December 6, 1775, Q. XII, pp. 16-17.} 

The missive to the merchants was similar and naturally bent to their interests. Montgomery wanted them to use their influence upon Carleton to capitulate. He protested that he had only come to rescue them from British
tyranny. The merchants were reminded that the Colonial army had not yet suffered defeat. At the same time, Carleton learned that his opponent had issued an order which was to be enacted if the ultimatum were rejected. Montgomery declared that his troops would have the right of spoils, especially in regard to the Governor's property as well as that of the garrison or any who chose against liberty. One-hundredth of a share was to be devoted to award the valorous.\textsuperscript{16}

Montgomery, however did not actually expect Carleton to accept these terms. He knew that he had participated in the assault of Quebec under Wolfe and hence was unlikely to repeat Montcalm's tactical error. Indeed, Carleton's chief objective was not to fight the besiegers but to hold out until the arrival of succour in the spring. The American General wrote to Robert R. Livingston that the Governor had refused the terms because he preferred to face death rather than disgrace, that his situation was desperate and that he was guilty of unmilitary and indecent conduct. Yet, on another occasion, Montgomery admitted that the advantage was with

\textsuperscript{16}General Montgomery to the English Merchants, December 6, 1775, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 18-19; Order of December 15, 1775, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 20-21.
Carleton unless the Americans could choose a place and time for an assault. 17

The Americans drew up their assault plans, designating the Lower Town as the goal. While the St. Roch battery was to shell the City, Arnold's forces were to approach the City through the St. Roch suburb and storm the barriers which protected the sole entrance from the Lower Town into the Upper. At the same time, Montgomery's column was supposed to take the narrow passage between the heights of Abraham on one side and the river on the other, by way of Anse des Meres in order to force the barrier at Pres de Ville. These two divisions were to join at Mountain Street, which led through the narrow picketed passage to the Upper Town. While this major maneuver was in operation, several divisionary movements were to be made to divide the attention of the garrison. One was to burn St. Johns Gate, another to feign at Cape Diamant, and the last to surprise the Palace Gate. 18

The British, however, under the able leadership of their Governor and his chief aides, had been placed on a 24 hour alert on repeated occasions. Several times, alarm bells had been rung in the mistaken notion that an attack


18 Codman, op. cit., pp. 198-218.
had been launched. It became a practice to have the troops as well as Carleton himself sleep fully clothed and prepared for instantaneous action. As a consequence the British were alerted to the attack which came at about 4 A.M. on the last day of the year. Captain Malcolm Fraser, doing his guard rounds observed signal fires near St. Johns Gate and the sentries reported seeing numerous flares on the Plains of Abraham. They noticed that the signals were placed at definite intervals. These were followed by the firing of two rockets which were thrown up from the foot of Cape Diamant. Shortly thereafter, the Americans started a barrage against the walls in those areas. Enemy movements were observed in the suburb of St. Johns and the glare of fire showed that there were others hiding behind the snow banks. Bells and alarms rang. Within ten minutes, the garrison was in position upon the ramparts.\(^9\)

The progress of the American columns was slow. Their timing was off. Both Montgomery and Arnold should have started at the same time but snow prevented it. Bravely, Montgomery led his detachment along the narrow foot path to the first target. He personally tore down

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the pickets but only a few of his men kept up with him. Because the diversionary attacks had failed, he knew that he had to speed his progress and accordingly rushed forward in the company of his immediate aids. Convinced that the British might not be alerted to the presence of his group, he shouted for his men to push on. However, inside a log cabin blocking their path the British and Canadians led by a Captain Barnsfaire waited until the Americans came within range and fired with devastating effect. Donald Campbell, one of the ranking Colonial officers rushing to the head of the column, questioned one of the survivors who told him there was no officer up in front. Campbell replied:

"It was impossible, Let me Pass and follow me. You shall have an Officer in the Front," upon which I scrambled . . . to the Right while several Shott . . . were fired . . . on the Ice to our Right end Rear. . . . Lieutenant Platt of Chessman's company was standing within reach of his hand, where the General and the rest fell, there were 4 or 5 dead against the Rock end 5 or 6 wounded. . . . I inquired for the General, Platt replied he was Dead. . . . "Where is Macpherson? I think Dead, Where is Chessmen? Dead."21

Since Campbell was now in command, the remnants retreated, though they should have pushed forward to join Arnold, 


21 Donald Campbell to R. R. Livingston, March 28, 1776, L. C. L.
instead of releasing enemy troops against those of the latter.

While these events were transpiring, Arnold led his force of some 700 from the opposite side of the Lower Town. The advanced group consisted of 25 men followed by the artillery unit, a small group with ladders, Daniel Morgan's riflemen and, in the rear, the main body, though Henry Dearborn was lost behind them. The Americans had to proceed in a single column in the deep snow, so deep that the cannon had to be left behind. Entering the City, they soon encountered all the disabilities that Carleton had planned for them. He knew that they would be caught in the narrow streets and that an enfilading fire was possible. When Arnold succeeded in carrying the first barrier he only encountered the second which was protected by cannon and a number of regulars and militia. Since the American leader was wounded in the leg the command fell to Morgan who tried to advance without guides into the unfamiliar streets. Then came the news that Montgomery was dead. The anticipated juncture was no longer possible. Morgan wanted to advance; others wanted to turn back. The fact that many of them wore British uniforms soon led to confusions. Moreover, many of their weapons were inoperable because the powder was wet. Dearborn's men sought cover
from the increasing enemy fire by entering the houses on both sides of the street.\footnote{Brown, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 67-69.} 

Carleton, kept informed of the progress of the attack by repeated messages which were operating under his orders in the manner of a rotation system, learned of the critical situation in the Lower Town. With an air of definite calmness, he ordered an immediate sortie from the Palace Gate which was designed to capture Arnold's troops in the rear and to cut off their retreat. Accordingly, advised that Montgomery's column had been stopped, Carleton dispatched a troop of 60 under a Captain Laws, to which was added another force of near equal size from McLean's command. Major John Nairn of the Royal Highland Emigrants and the Canadian force under Francis Dambourges joined the sortie. House to house fighting was bitter. Losses were heavy among the entrapped Americans who vainly tried to prevent the defenders from repulsing them from the protection of the houses. Acts of heroism found men of both sides attempting to storm some of the houses by the use of ladders. But the end was in sight. The Americans, at first, were not aware of the seriousness of their situation. Since Captain Laws arrived in advance of his troops and demanded their surrender the Americans claimed that he was their
prisoner instead. But that illusion soon terminated with the appearance of the British and militia detachments. Bayonets and a heavy enfilade soon resulted in a mass capitulation. Few of the 700 escaped via the frozen Charles River.23

Though some of his men were impatient, Carleton did not forget that his main objective was to hold the City and not to risk an all out counterattack. However, he did allow a small sortie to penetrate the American lines at St. Roch. This force brought back a six pounder and several small mortars, and set the village afire. The garrison had performed well under the influence of their leaders. The regulars, the militia, whether British or Canadian, and the seamen had acted under the greatest discipline and performed bravely, many officers setting examples for their followers. The American prisoners were escorted to their places of confinement.24


Though there were repeated alarms and though the guards called out the garrison on several occasions, the Americans did not attempt to repeat their assault tactics. With Montgomery dead and Arnold incapacitated at Montreal, American leadership devolved upon the incompetent David Wooster. Reduced in numbers, suffering from significant shortages in supplies, provisions and ammunition, the demoralized, smallpox-infected besieging force was incapable of massing another assault and the number of reinforcements was small and scattered. Carleton, consequently, found his opponents again resorting to propaganda attempts across the lines in the vain hope that the British garrison might be frightened into surrender by tales of huge reinforcements and victories against their armies. But, as before, the Commander-in-Chief refused to receive any messages from them at least on three different occasions, February 11 and 14 and March 14, Colonial messengers approached the walls under flags of truce. Each time, the officer in charge asked them their purpose. When it was discovered that they had not come to ask the King's mercy but merely wished to bring letters to Carleton, sometimes from captured British officers, they were dismissed. On one occasion, after the Americans had been warned that no correspondence would be received, the British fired upon
and forced a truce team back. Thus, Carleton maintained his policy throughout the invasion period.25

The Americans, however, did attempt one bit of stratagem. On April 20, Carleton learned that they were seeking to convert the Gaspe into a fireship with the purpose of destroying the shipping in the Cul-de-sac. They were offering 2,000 livres to any incendiaries who would accept the mission but they lacked the money. Nevertheless, on May 3, just when the garrison was expecting the momentary arrival of reinforcements, a vessel was sighted and hailed. Fortunately Carleton has ordered his artillerists to their positions. When the vessel did not respond to their hail even with a threat of opening fire, the British realized that it was the fireship but the vessel veered off course and broke out in a blaze some 200 feet from the objective. One garrison observer said he saw shells, grenades, petards and other ammunition coming forth from the vessel. The battery fired upon it and it floated down the river without doing any damage. The danger was over.25

The members of the garrison were confident that they would win but carefully observed the demeanor of their

26 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 82; Artillery Officer, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
commander. There was never any sign of anxiety or fear in his features, though he must have worried a great deal. He was the kind of leader who could infuse his strength into his followers. They knew that he would not capitulate. He had conduct, spirit and experience according to several of his men.\textsuperscript{27}

The defense, however, really depended upon an adequate quantity of provisions. The fact that Quebec was the chief port and depot of the province had led to the practice of storing various goods upon its wharves and its storage buildings prior to distribution throughout the rest of Canada. Carleton thus found a sufficient supply of both provisions and ammunition to last some eight months. There was more than enough to feed the population of approximately 5,000. No one starved though there were shortages of some items, and though prices were inflationary. The official return of November 16 listed hundreds of barrels of flour, wheat, rice, biscuits, pork, butter and peas.\textsuperscript{28}

Measures were undertaken to insure that these stores would meet all essential demands. The proclamation

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., p. 230-231.

\textsuperscript{28}Return of Provisions in the Garrison of Quebec, November 16, 1775, "C. A. 1904, p. 372. The exact numbers were: 1950 barrels of flour, 1500 of wheat, 146 tiers of rice, 450 pounds a piece, 1100 quintals of biscuit, 1217 barrels of pork, 406 firkins of butter and 800 bushels of peas.
which expelled the suspicious and the idle from the City in mid-November had also reduced the number of people who had to be fed and brought to the City supplies which had been hoarded. In addition, an official record of payment for the confiscated goods was kept, certainly a lenient policy which seemed to benefit everyone. Unfortunately, the exact number of those who were expelled was not found in the records though it might have been close to 500. But the number of prisoners who had fallen into British hands after the failure of the Colonial assault on December 31. In the meantime, another directive prevented the exportation of any provisions whatsoever without the approval of either the Commander-in-Chief or his immediate subordinate, the Lieutenant Governor.

Furthermore, Carleton soon discovered that the control of the distribution of food could be used as a means to discipline the people. An order, dated December 20, fixed a penalty, the loss of one week's provisions, for those who made improper or false returns to the quartermaster. Shortages, however were unavoidable. Though there was ample wheat, there was but one solitary grinding

29 "Proclamation of November 22, 1775," The Quebec Gazette, November 20, 1775.

mill to convert the grain into flour for bread. It took an hour to convert three bushels of wheat. What would have happened if the enemy had been able to destroy it? There was plenty of liquor, too much to satisfy Carleton, for there were numerous disorders caused by intoxication. There were, on the other hand, significant deficiencies of hay, oats and medicines.31

The most important shortage was fuel, meaning wood to burn in order to warm the houses and barracks during the severely cold winter. It was necessary to send foraging parties into the nearby suburbs for the scarce item, even into enemy territory. The Americans did not ignore the effect that this had upon the garrison. Indeed, they burned houses, commandeered some timber and made it exceedingly dangerous for any parties to venture from the besieged City. In order to avert hardships, rationing and strict regulations had to be imposed. On December 30, Carleton ordered that if members of the militia were in need of wood they would have to have a verified certificate signed by their respective captains, who, in turn, were definitely instructed to investigate the claims and to ascertain their truth. After receiving confirmation, the

31Clarence E. Bennett, Advance and Retreat to Saratoga in the American Revolution (Schenectady, N. Y.: Robson & Adee [c 1927]), p. 51.
militia then had to make application to one of three officers designated for that purpose. The price paid for each cord of wood was two dollars upon delivery. By this means, all supplies were closely guarded, regulated and conserved.

A typical foraging order was issued on January 12:

A covering party [is] to go out and take post near Mr. Grant's House, all the British Militia off duty, have therefore leave to go out to St. Rochs and to continue to forage for wood, within the Centuries, they have to leave to bring in any wood they find, in and about the burn't houses and to cut down and bring in any pickets they find.\(^{32}\)

This did not include the right to plunder. It was not unusual to permit volunteers on such expeditions. Foraging orders were issued frequently throughout January. On the 21st, the distribution of the spoils was thrust upon the adjutant, the quartermaster, a field officer and several English militia sergeants. Weather conditions had to be favorable. Sometimes sleds were employed and assigned to individual companies. They generally went out in small numbers, perhaps two or up to eight. The last reported forage was made on March 20, 1776, and the last wood distributed and delivered to the garrison, though there was still an emergency supply of 150 cords. In two weeks the

\(^{32}\)Vialar, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
siege was terminated and the coming of warmer weather made the need for wood less urgent.  

The shortage of medical supplies was almost as serious. In a report to Cramahe, Adam Mabane, the surgeon of the garrison, wrote on November 17, 1775, that it was essential that applications be made to the proper officials in London for the medicines which would be needed by the hospital next spring. Apparently none had been sent since 1760 and there were no Royal Hospital stores in Quebec. Surgical instruments were also in want. It was impossible, however, to present an exact list since the future needs would depend upon the size of the spring reinforcements. Nevertheless, there seems to have been sufficient quantities from civilian and clerical sources, certainly enough for vaccination against smallpox which was decimating the besiegers.

Carleton was also concerned with problems of ordnance and ammunition. Fortunately, the Lizard had aboard it thousands of muskets. The Commander-in-Chief directed his subordinates to conserve and to maintain all weapons and ammunition on the best manner possible. Theft and waste were serious offenses. Weapons were reconditioned

33 Orders of December 30, 1775, January 12, 17, 21, 22, and 26, 1776, C. 1198.

34 Adam Mabane to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, November 17, 1776, Q. XI, p. 336.
and repaired by the armory. Many of the arms had inoperable parts which had to be replaced with available carbines and old French arms, including cartridges and priming wires. Though there seemed to be no shortages, Carleton directed that ammunition not be delivered to individuals until proper application and approval had been made through the company commanders. As an extra precaution, the officers were required to inspect the arms of their men. The guards were allotted only 18 rounds in an obvious move to prevent waste. Captains were held responsible for any misuses, including embezzling by their men. Those found guilty were fined four coppers per cartridge.35 By such means as these, Carleton succeeded in stretching the quantities of ammunition and arms until the arrival of succour.

In the field of heavy artillery, however, there is no doubt but that the British held the advantage over their opponents. Yet, Cramahe was somewhat negligent in mounting the cannon upon the walls. Joseph Pell, a British officer reported that in November, 1775, the artillery works were deteriorating, that there were few gunners and that there

[35Orders of December 10 and 14, 1775 and January 26, 1776, C. 1198.]
were only six cannon ready for action. Another account declared that there were 30 mounted upon the ramparts as early as September. A precis, written by Lord Germain a year later, states that Carleton had only nine ready before Arnold's appearance and 14 shortly thereafter. Whichever account is true, there is no question but that the walls were bristling with cannon by May, 1776. "Not less than 148 Pieces of Cannon were upon the Walls." It meant that some 126 had been mounted in the interval. Lord Germain was highly critical of the fact that they had not been ready before the siege began.

His Lordship, however, failed to recognize some of the handicaps which faced the garrison. In fact, he seems to have ignored them deliberately. First, Carleton had forwarded complaints to the office of the Secretary at War, particularly regarding the shortages of engineers and artillerists. Secondly, the deterioration of the fortifications had been common knowledge. Thirdly, no one had anticipated the invasion of Canada. Moreover, when it did come, the Governor was not given a free hand. On the contrary, he was directed to regain possession of Lake


37C. B. H., pp. 53-54.
Champlain and to strengthen St. Johns. In either case, the few gunners and engineers available could not be spared to provide for Quebec.

As for clothing, the presence of ample quantities did much to reduce potential sources of anxiety. But that did not mean that Carleton was not concerned with issues relative to uniforms. As it was, several shiploads of clothing, meant for the militia who did not respond in the anticipated numbers, were safely stored in the warehouses. Regulations were imposed in order to conserve the available quantities and to clothe adequately the motley group of defenders. On November 24, 1775, a general order directed that all militia sergeants be furnished with a uniform pattern. Four days later the officers received a similar order. The tailors were kept busy under proper guidance. Considering welfare first, Carleton saw to it that those men whose uniforms were worn the thinnest were reclothed before the others. The sergeants were required to maintain records of all transactions. In March, he ordered that no man receive a new uniform until those in want had been supplied first. The company commanders were instructed to make uniforms suitable for the severe weather. In the event of errors, Carleton was obliged to interfere. On one occasion he had to force the return of uniforms which

38 Orders of November 24 and 28, 1775, C. 1198.
had been given erroneously to the British militia. He declared that the recipients should be men who had done difficult service.\(^39\)

While these events were transpiring under Carleton's guidance, vigorous efforts were being undertaken in his behalf in both Great Britain and in Nova Scotia. The authorities recognized that Quebec's primary need was adequate manpower and that time was of the essence. Previous attempts to send limited reinforcements in the fall of 1775 had been brought to nought because of Admiral Graves' refusal to cooperate with Howe and Gage in their efforts to help Carleton. London in the same months had not yet really become cognizant of the potential scale of the Revolution. All this changed when the urgent dispatches from Canada, predicting disaster if aid did not come forthwith, reached the ranking authorities. Thus alerted in late December, Lord Germain took immediate and decisive action in order to speed an optimum number of vessels, transports and men across the ocean before weather prohibited such attempts. But it was too late for that year. That reinforcements reached Quebec early in May must be accredited to the efforts of His Lordship. This does not mean that some other Secretary of State would have done less, but

\(^{39}\)Order, March 14, 1776, \textit{ibid.}, Vialar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 236.
it does mean that Germain's incompetence has been exaggerated.

In a letter to Carleton, dated February 17, but which did not reach Quebec prior to the first reinforcements, Germain stated that because of past events in Canada he had no alternative but to send relief as soon as possible. He hoped that it would arrive while the City was still in British possession. He further declared that the small advance relief force was merely the vanguard of a huge expedition, definitely sufficient to retake the fortress in case it had fallen to the Americans. In order to accomplish the immediate objective, the salvation of Canada, when Captain Pringle provided His Lordship with all the details, steps were instituted for the formation of an emergency relief force which would have the capability of crossing the ocean and penetrating the hazards of the St. Lawrence at the earliest navigable date.

This fleet was divided into two components. The first part consisted of the war vessels, the 50 gun Isis, the frigates Surprise and Triton, and the sloop of war Martin. The other section was composed of three victuallers and two naval transports which carried provisions for three thousand men for three months. "This squadron has been accordingly prepared with the greatest despatch." In addition, the King directed that the 29th Regiment be
distributed aboard the several vessels. The fleet, under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Gordon, got under way on February 22. But some complications arose as to jurisdiction. The Admiralty assumed the right to issue the orders to the ship captains, and their Lordships had not received orders to prepare the flotilla until January 24.\textsuperscript{40} At any event, it could not have sailed earlier due to the severe frost and the generally intolerable weather. The trip was a harsh one as it was.

If Carleton was unable to hold out until its relief reached its destination, the commanders of the fleet had substitute instructions which were to be immediately operative. In the event of Carleton's death, the command was to devolve upon Howe. But as he could not be spared from the coming campaigns to the south, the King decided that Burgoyne must command in his place. Lord Germain also wrote that the Government was seriously considering sending Major Generals George Clinton, Lord Percy and Lord Cornwallis. In fact, Carleton was informed that Clinton's regiment had already departed for Canada. In the meantime,

in order to secure the success of the expedition, the British garrisons in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were alerted to maintain a high degree of vigilance and security. Lord Germain, moreover, ordered two other battalions to Halifax and a detachment to St. Johns, Newfoundland.\footnote{41}{Lord Germain to General Howe, February 1, 1776, Baxter, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. XIV, pp. 328-329.}

The second and larger embarkation, originally scheduled to sail on March 20, was vigorously organized, prepared and equipped. It was supposed to include eight regiments, two of which were then stationed in Ireland and two in England. In addition, there were four artillery companies and a sizable bettering train. The expedition was under the command of Burgoyne. Once this force reached America, Carleton was to regulate the debarkation and to employ the regiments in the best manner possible. The general officers were instructed to comply with his commands. The regiments were to proceed to the Island of Coudres, an island in the St. Lawrence for the rendezvous of the fleet. Thereafter the ranking officer was inferior to the Commander-in-Chief.\footnote{42}{Lord Germain to General Carleton, February 17, 1776, \textit{A. A.}, 4, Vol. V, pp. 939-940; Lord Germain to Lieutenant Colonel Frazer, March 19, 1776, \textit{C. A. 1904}, p. 362.}
A third relief force, consisting of approximately 5,000 German auxiliaries was also organized and prepared for service in Canada. These men were furnished by the Duke of Brunswick and the Prince of Waldeck, at a set price per capita. Two-thirds of this expedition was scheduled to leave from the Elbe ports at the beginning of March. In a letter to Howe, dated May 3, Lord Germain informed him that part of the force, which was under the command of Simeon Fraser, had sailed on April 8. The first division of the Brunswickers, 200 Hanau troops and the 21st Regiment had left Plymouth, the major port for military purposes in England, the previous day.

Realizing that all these troops might not arrive in time, His Lordship requested Howe to send part of his men as quickly as possible. As it was, the expedition which was supposed to sail on March 20 was already 17 days late. In response, Howe dispatched the 47th Regiment from Halifax on April 20, under the convoy of the Niger. He hoped that such a force might be "seasonable Relief" in the event it reached Quebec before the arrival of the relief expeditions from Great Britain. This regiment in

conjunction with the forces already in Canada was adjudged ample to hold the fortress in the interim, at least prior to the arrival of the emergency expedition.\textsuperscript{45} 

Germain's force won the race. Since Howe had detached a regiment, he was to get to the Waldeck unit and with the rest of his force attack New York.\textsuperscript{46} 

The first relief vessel to reach the St. Lawrence was the \textit{Isis}, which was under the able command of Captain Charles Douglas, a valuable naval officer. In spite of numerous difficulties, the small vessel managed to penetrate the ice so that it reached the Island of Anticosti on April 21. From there the vessel fought contrary winds until it reached the place of rendezvous, the Island of Coudres, on May 3. Shortly thereafter, it was joined by the \textit{Surprise} and the \textit{Martin}. All three were welcomed at Quebec three days later. The troops and supplies which they carried virtually terminated the siege. In conjunction with the garrison troops, they easily and quickly drove the enemy from the surrounding countryside. Two days later, three transports and the \textit{Niger} brought the 47th Regiment. On the 10th, the \textit{Triton}, the store ships

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} General Howe to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1776, \textit{ibid.}, p. 357.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Lord Germain to General Howe, June 21, 1776, \textit{ibid.}, p. 364.
\end{itemize}
and the remaining transports of the first expedition attained their goal. With the timely aid sent forth by both Lord Germain and Howe, Carleton had the capability to resume a limited offense. Learning these troops were but a vanguard, he sent all available pilots to the mouth of the river, in order to speed the arrival of Burgoyne.  

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"B. H., pp. 25-26."
CHAPTER IV

TACTICS AND STRATEGY, MAY THROUGH JUNE 1776

For nearly six months, the people of Quebec had remained loyal and steadfast because of the Commander-in-Chief's stubborn courage and exemplary attitude. Now he owed it to them and to the King to terminate the siege as soon as possible. His mission was made easier by the fact that the Americans had already begun their retreat when they first learned that the vanguard of the British relief expedition was sailing up the St. Lawrence. He knew that they lacked clothing, food, discipline and resolution. Spies had reported that many of their companies were departing for the colonies rather than serve beyond the term of their original enlistment.¹ The habitants, moreover, no longer regarded the Americans with awe and friendship. In this atmosphere, the people of Quebec expected an immediate and decisive military action.

In spite of this, Carleton was not fully cognizant of the total demoralization of his opponents. Nor did he

know how many men and what defensive measures they might be contemplating. Welcomed though the reinforcements might be, he was certain that the mere addition of one regiment was not sufficient to risk an all-out offensive maneuver. His basic objective was still to preserve the City at all costs. Nevertheless, he realized that he now possessed a limited ability which enabled him to plan a pleasant surprise for the enemy. After landing two companies of the 29th Regiment and some marines, he decided to send an exploratory force to test the strength of the Colonial positions. About one thousand men issued forth from the gates of St. Louis and St. Johns. They encountered little resistance. It was the end of the hopes of the Americans. Their officers were divided: some like David Wooster refused to stay; others like John Thomas desired to form some force to halt the British before a serious situation developed. But no more than three hundred could be mustered. There was no choice but to retreat in the face of confusion, rampant and contagious. Carleton, who personally led his troops of mixed regulars, marines, sailors and militia, was astounded that the enemy had not even prepared lines of entrenchment. Though they fled in great disorder except for a small group, the Commander-in-Chief adhered to his determined policy of caution. Many of his officers could not understand why.
All they could see was abandoned supplies, empty guard posts, and even the dinner of the enemy commander, still steaming on the table of his headquarters. But the offense was only a sortie which achieved unanticipated success. Preparations had to be made before the advance could really get underway. Carleton was more than satisfied that he had been able to clear the "mighty Boasters" from the Plains of Abraham.  

In the meantime, though Thomas knew that the best place to make a stand was where the St. Lawrence narrowed and was dominated by a height of land, he could do little more than to station temporarily a rearguard of 500 men at Deschambault and at Jacques Cartier. The rest of his army continued its flight to the safety of Sorel.  

Though Carleton realized that they had fled the Quebec battlefield in great disorder, he still possessed a deep respect for the abilities of their leaders. Montgomery was dead, but Arnold was a man not to be underrated.  

In spite of the impatience of his subordinates, Carleton was content to pursue a limited offense until the arrival of the substantial reinforcements in mid-June. Though he now had two regiments at his immediate disposal,  

2General Carleton to Lord Germain, Quebec, May 14, 1776, Germain Ms. and Q. XII, p. 7.  

he did not know how many troops his opponents had. He presumed, quite reasonably, that their numbers might easily equal or even surpass his own. Thus, he did not have the military capability of launching a sudden flank offense. But he did seek to drive the enemy as far away from Quebec as was consistent with his power. Accordingly, he directed the commanders of the three men-of-war, the *Surprise*, the *Isis* and the *Martin*, to regain control of the St. Lawrence as far as practicable. He was pleased that they were able to capture two of the vessels he had lost to the enemy the previous fall, the *Gaspe* and the *Maria*, with their entire cargoes. The troops, at the same time, captured a small number of brass and iron cannon, hospital stores and provisions. His militia had performed well but now that the siege was over many of them lay down their arms. Partial demobilization was unavoidable. That some of them chose to accompany the 29th Regiment and the other troops did not dispel the fact that it was one thing for them to protect their homes from attack and plunder and another to venture out into open battle.⁴ Time was needed to train the militia and the newly arrived regiment in the methods of fighting suitable for the forests and wilderness. The

⁴General Carleton to Lord Germain, Quebec, May 14, 1776, Germain Mss.
men of the 29th had not yet been given any rest after their long and arduous trip across the Atlantic.

There were other motivations behind Carleton's carefully calculated maneuver. Time was to his advantage. A humane policy was designed to speed the disintegration of the Colonial forces. He was certain that Canada would be easier to liberate if they could be converted to the Royal cause. This was all to obvious in his treatment of prisoners of war. Secondly, there were excellent grounds for expecting the internal collapse of the opposition. Their soldiers were ill disciplined, mutinous and offensive to the Canadian population. He knew that the Continental Congress was despatching a special committee in an attempt to salvage their cause but he was also aware of the climate of opinion. The people would not dare to join the Americans when they realized that large British reinforcements were due to arrive within a few weeks. Third, the Commander-in-Chief may have desired not to expose his troops to the ravages of smallpox, which in a sense was one of his most valuable allies.

Fourth, he had good reason not to risk an all out offense since intelligence, as primitive as it was, had

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5 A more detail discussion of this policy appears in connection with his military advance during the summer. See Chapter XII.

6 See Chapter V.
informed him that there was a possibility of large scale reinforcements being sent from the colonies. The Continental Congress, upon receipt of the news of the disaster before Quebec, had resolved to dispatch nine regiments to Canada, that is, after they were recruited. Two of the regiments were supposed to come from the ranks of the Americans in the province and a third was supposed to be raised by Colonel James Livingston from the volunteers among the habitants. Of the rest, three were requested from the colonies of Pennsylvania and New Jersey and the last three from New York.

After the initial retreat, moreover, Carleton learned that the Americans had reorganized their forces and had restored some degree of morale and order. He knew that their officers were preparing either to regain the offense or to hold on to what they had. On May 13, General William Thompson, determined to reverse the course of military events and to defend the area between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu, optimistically assumed command over all the American forces since his predecessor had been fatally stricken with smallpox. The General instituted remedial measures. Provisions of all kinds were

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collected at Sorel while the hospitals were searched for
the malingerers, and over 100 able bodied men were dis­
covered. Though they lacked engineers and trained ar­
tillerists and though they were short of powder and ball,
the Americans thought that the situation was improving
and their morale recovered. They realized that they need
not fear the reinforcements which had reached Carleton,
namely the 29th and 47th Regiments. But they did not know
by early June that more than four times this force would
be debarking.\footnote{General Thompson to the Commissioners, Sorel, May
25, 1776, \textit{ibid.}, 4, Vol. VI, pp. 593-595.}

Carleton, however, preoccupied with all manner of
problems, had neglected to dispatch a full report to Lord
Germain. His Lordship learned only that the Americans had
been driven from the walls of Quebec but he was not informed
as to Carleton's next move. In his letter to the Commander-
in-Chief, Lord Germain did not refrain from mixing praise
with bitter criticism. He believed that he had been
personally insulted. Carleton was congratulated for his
victory of May 6 but in terms which implied that no less
could have been expected from anyone. His Lordship, more­
ever, resented the fact that Carleton had not risked a full
scale offense instead of a limited operation. He was
unaware of the reasons for Carleton's decision and could only conclude that detailed instructions would have to be sent. Yet, being poorly informed, he could not do so. This was probably a boon to Canada in view of his record of misconduct at Minden and his gross ignorance of American geography. But this did not excuse the Commander-in-Chief for his neglect, even if some of the blame might be placed upon his subordinates. 9

Nevertheless, Lord Germain expressed the view that he expected great things to be accomplished before the termination of the year's campaign. With the large reinforcements landing in Canada, Carleton was instructed not only to liberate all the occupied areas but also to pass Lake Champlain so that a conjunction could be made with General Howe. Describing the regiments and artillery units which composed the before mentioned force, His Lordship stated that they should be useful in cutting all enemy communications with the neighboring colonies. Then he proceeded to contradict himself by declaring that

these operations must be left to your judgment and discretion, as it would be highly improper, at such distance, to give any positive orders, especially as so much confidence is placed in your knowledge and military experience. . . . 10

9 Lord Germain to Governor Carleton, June 21, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 44-48.
10 Ibid., pp. 44-48.
Unfortunately, His Lordship was not sincere and his later correspondence makes this statement seem pure hypocrisy.

Cautiously, Carleton devised his total strategy. Only a portion of it could be implemented prior to the arrival of the large reinforcements. The key to victory depended upon possession of the vital St. Lawrence and its tributaries, plus the maintenance of the forts to the west. Accordingly, the advance was designed to take place along two fronts. British and auxiliary units were instructed to proceed from the forts of Oswegatchie and Nisgara. Their goal was Montreal. If they succeeded, they were to act in conjunction with the main body of the army, which, in turn, was to move in two columns. One half was directed to advance up the Richelieu while the rest were to march along both banks of the St. Lawrence to a point opposite Montreal. From there the combined force was to proceed across the narrow strip of land to St. Johns. The total strategy was thus a huge pincer movement but success depended upon numerous factors.

On May 12, Captain George Forster of the 8th Regiment left Oswegatchie with his force of mixed Indians, militia and regulars. The Americans, apparently, had realized the importance of Montreal and the approaches to it from the west. Since they had never planned to take
the posts of Oswegatchie or Niagara, they had to establish a strong garrison at strategic locations. For that reason, they had posted 600 men under the command of Major Isaac Butterfield at the Cedars, which overlooked the St. Lawrence only 30 miles to the southwest. They had begun the fortifications, breastworks and the placing of their cannon as early as April 26. Yet, the investment of May 19 caught them by surprise. The advantage lay with the Americans who had cannon and ample ammunition which was not true of the besiegers.\textsuperscript{11} Forster had no difficulty in carrying out his operations and he succeeded in cutting off all communications between the fort and Montreal. In fact, Butterfield only learned of these events when some of his men eluded a British raid upon their provision train at Cascade Falls.

Forster summoned the garrison to surrender and rejected a reply which asked for a four-day delay. He could not risk facing a large American reinforcement which was likely to come from Montreal. He did not hesitate to inform Butterfield that he had few regulars and numerous Indians. If time was consumed there would be no means to restrain the warriors from committing atrocities. The consequence was a disgrace to American arms. Though he had cannon and was expecting reinforcements, Butterfield

\textsuperscript{11}The composition of this force is discussed in Chapter VII.
contrary to the wishes of his subordinates, decided to capitulate. The Continental Congress later viewed his action as cowardly but also accused Forster of barbarism and of torturing his prisoners.¹²

Learning that Major Henry Sherburne was leading a relief expedition to the fort, Forster detached a force of 100 Indians under the command of De Lorimier with the mission of creating an ambush. According to the American account, Sherburne, with a like number of men, vigorously resisted a force five times his own but had to yield. The Indians supposedly scalped, stripped and butchered many of the survivors. James Wilkinson, one of Arnold's aides, wrote that the Major had exhibited outstanding courage and fortitude. The Continental Congress accepted this fable.¹³ In actuality, however, if there was resistance it was short-lived. The ambush was far more successful than had been anticipated. Yet, because of the numerous prisoners Forster had taken and because his victories had


incited alarm in the enemy, he was unable to achieve his main goal, the capture of Montreal.

Arnold, with a force of some 600, vigorously pursued Forster's dwindling force up the St. Lawrence. Many of the Indians had already left, taking with them some of their captives. It was only the threat of a massacre of the latter which obliged Arnold to halt his advance and to begin negotiations for a cartel. The price of victory would have been too high. Without any authorization, he succeeded in rescuing nearly 500 of his men but they could no longer engage in further fighting, at least until an exchange was effected with the British. Forster was thus able to reach Oswegatchie with his regulars and the remnants of the militia and Indians. What had thus begun as a victory terminated in a virtual stalemate, though the losses to the Americans were irreplaceable. Nevertheless, this part of Carleton's strategy had failed. Montreal would have to be taken in some other manner.\(^{14}\)

While these events were transpiring, Carleton was endeavoring to build up his force near the town of Trois Rivieres, which he had selected as the base for his future

\(^{14}\) General Carleton to [?], Quebec, June 2, 1776, Q. XII, p. 69.
operations. From here, the British regiments were supposed to initiate the last phases of his grand strategy. But nature was against him. His offense was delayed by the slow arrival of the reinforcements from Great Britain. During the last week of May and the first two of June, troops arrived in large numbers, but in a semi-disorganized manner. Carleton, in desperation, returned to Quebec in order to speed the forces southward. Over seven British regiments marched or remained aboard their vessels, whichever way got them to Trois Rivieres the quickest. The winds were contrary. There were too few small boats available to transport the soldiers. In the midst of all this confusion, the Commander-in-Chief did not forget the potentialities of his opponents. He knew that his army was new to the area. Orders were dispatched, therefore, for the forces to be wary and alert. For all he knew, the Americans still had five thousand men and were being reinforced.\textsuperscript{15}

Ignorant of the strength of the British, the Americans made preparations for a daring attack against Trois Rivieres. Though they had received but small and scattered reinforcements, the appearance of eager and bold leaders like John Stark, Anthony Wayne and John Sullivan

\textsuperscript{15}Governor Carleton to Lord Germain, May 25, 1776, and June 2, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 49 and 69.
invigorated and emboldened the men. Before the end of May, some 1,400 troops had successfully completed their long journeys from the colonies to Canada. In this optimistic atmosphere, John Sullivan, as the highest ranking officer, assumed command and set about to restore order. He was informed that the British had only one frigate, one brig, eight sloops or schooners and 300 men. ¹⁶

Accordingly, Sullivan determined to resume the offense by directing Thompson to take 2,000 men for what he considered a certain victory. Carleton later wrote that this force crossed the St. Lawrence in 50 boats to a place called Pointe du Lac, completely ignoring the presence of the Martin and the transports which were only three miles above Trois Rivieres. After landing, moreover, they depleted their force by leaving 200 to guard the boats. The attacking force itself was divided into three units. Only when they finally made their attack did they realize that they had virtually fallen into a trap of their own making. Their intelligence had blundered seriously. In addition, valuable time was lost before the

assault was begun because of the treacherous action of their guide, Antoine Gautier.\textsuperscript{17}

By the time the Americans reached their goal, the British had been alerted. The Martin's guns easily reached the attackers along the river banks. With all hope of surprise gone, the fatigued and hungry men vainly sought to regroup in the morass, the brooks and the bushes. Courageously, Wayne continued to press the assault in the face of overwhelming resistance. Over 230 men were made captives, though a large portion managed to return to Sorel. The attack of June 8 had terminated in a debacle.

What was the size of the British force that had so easily defeated Thompson? It apparently consisted of three British regiments - the 29th, 47th and the 62nd.\textsuperscript{18} If Carleton had not returned to Quebec in order to supervise personally the transportation of the reinforcements southward the Americans would not have faced a superior force. The 62nd Regiment, for example, had reached Quebec on June 1. Orders were issued for the transports to continue their journey without stop. In addition, six other British

\textsuperscript{17}De Berthelot, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 239. Strange as it might seem, De Berthelot explained that when Carleton learned of Gautier's service he only stated that the guide could have been hung for such a deception.

\textsuperscript{18}General Carleton to Lord Germain, June 20, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 64-65; Pell, "Diary," p. 43.
regiments arrived within the next few days, along with a force of 1,000 Germans and four artillery companies. Except for 300 Germans who were assigned garrison duty at Quebec and Point Levis, the entire army advanced as quickly as transportation and forced marching would permit.

Carleton ordered Generals John Burgoyne and Friedrich von Riedesel to gain possession of both banks of the St. Lawrence as far as Trois Rivieres. They were joined by militia, Indians and the Royal Highland Emigrants. They reached the scene of battle too late, however.

Though Carleton had won a major victory, his tactics have been challenged. Evidence is conflicting. The charge has been made that he deliberately allowed the bulk of the mangled American force to escape. In none of the orderly books does there appear even a hint that he wanted the Americans to reach safety. In a letter to Lord Germain, dated June 20, 1776, the Commander-in-Chief merely explained that the enemy had realized it was in danger of being outflanked and had prudently attempted to organize a retreat to the boats. Moreover, the troops under Generals William Nesbitt and Simeon Fraser had been sent in pursuit, the objective being to get to the American boats before the enemy did. At the same time, the Martin,

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19 Epping, op. cit., p. 38; Belking, op. cit., p. 285.
and several of the other armed vessels attempted to prevent their escape across the river. But the Americans succeeded in effecting their retreat, that is, except for those who were stranded and a couple of bateaux.  

Secondly, according to instructions printed in one British orderly book, the credit for the consequences must be attributed to the enemy who made every endeavor to reach the boats. In fact, their escape succeeded because they had been able to disperse and flee through the woods and swamp by the shortest routes possible. This denies any prearranged plan by the Commander-in-Chief. Nesbitt hurried his regiment a distance of 18 miles in anticipation of winning the race but the American guards "had received intelligence of our approach and got off." Even Sullivan reported that Carleton had directed a dangerous flank maneuver, though fortunately it was unsuccessful.  

Sources which support the allegation, on the other hand, are far more numerous. They are mainly limited to hearsay, to Carleton’s critics, to overzealous but uninformed subordinates and to Americans. The Seigneurs were

20 General Carleton to Lord Germain, June 20, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 64-66.

21 Great Britain, Army in America, Journal of the British Army, Probably Compiled by a Member of the 47th Regiment of Foot, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress, p. 27. Hereafter cited as Army in America.
particularly critical of his conduct. In a long derogatory account, De Berthelot declared that the Americans were in great distress, hiding in the swamps and in the woods, suffering from all the miseries of demoralization and nature. Yet, Carleton instructed Major Robert Grant to abandon a strategic bridge, a position which certainly would have cut off many of the enemy. Continuing, the Seigneur added his conclusions.

Je ne sais ce que l'on plus blâmer, ou de la témérité et de l'imperite des Américains dans cette expedition contre Trois Rivieres ou de la mollesse du genl. Carleton qui les laisse echapper des marécages ou il pouvait si facilement les forcer a mettre bas les armes, et qui favorise leur fuite. Quelle reponse eut-il faite si on lui demande pourquoi il sauvoit les armées du Congress?

De Sanguinet, on the other hand, wrote that when Carleton reached Trois Rivieres in the evening of June 7, he deliberately recalled Fraser from his advanced position since he desired to exhibit the King's mercy and humanity. Contemporary American reports tend to verify this thesis. Most of them, however, are heavily opinionated and contain considerable hearsay. Lewis Beebe, a physician to the American army, stated that not only had the Commander-in-Chief been lenient he was also helpful to the

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22 De Berthelot, op. cit., p. 240.
23 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 133.
A more intriguing account was given by James Wilkinson. It may be dubious but it is not impossible.

Sir Guy Carleton coming up ... he [Captain Richard English] mentioned to him [that the enemy escaping along a back route] and asked permission to cut it off, who replied, "What would you do with them; have you spare provisions for them, or would you send them to Quebec to starve? No, let the poor creatures go home and carry with them a tale which will serve his majesty more effectually than their capture." If such benevolence had marked the conduct of all the British commanders, the royal cause would have had a much better chance of success.25

That Carleton had such a plan for the prisoners of war cannot be denied. A proclamation was issued shortly after the battle which directed the authorities to rescue all the lost and starving Americans, to feed them, make them well and then send them home. On the basis of such information, Alfred Leroy Burt has concluded that the Commander-in-Chief belied his military capabilities, qualities which were well known both to the enemy and to the allies. "It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this strange behavior was deliberate, that he wished the Americans to escape." On the other hand, the proclamation contradicts Wilkinson's description. Carleton did not desire to allow his opponents to starve even if he originally directed that they be permitted to escape.


26Burt, Old Province, p. 239. Chapter XI contains a description of what befell the prisoners of war.
At any event, no matter what conclusions may be drawn regarding his tactics, a major and unplanned victory had been achieved, but in such a manner as to increase his respect for the boldness and daring of the Americans. Over 236 prisoners of war, including Thompson and some of his top officers, were dispatched to Quebec. Thus, in a single battle, most of the fresh Colonial troops had been lost, whereas more than two-thirds of the British army had not yet participated in the struggle. Hundreds of Americans deserted or perished. Sullivan reported that 25 had been killed but that he had only 2,500 men left to hold what was still under his control. Unaware of this, Carleton maintained his vigilance and continued to expect a stiff resistance.\textsuperscript{27}

The opportunity now offered itself to put his strategy into operation. In order to effectuate the giant pincer maneuver which was designed to entrap the enemy, Carleton speeded his army towards Sorel where the Richelieu flowed into the St. Lawrence. At this point, the army was to divide into three sections. One part was to march up the tributary to its targets at St. Johns and Chambly. The other two sections were to march along both shores of the St. Lawrence. Those on the north shore, he hoped, might be

\textsuperscript{27}Hammond, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 230; Army in America, p. 27.
able to capture Arnold and his garrison in Montreal. The troops on the opposite side would march to Longueuil and thence inland towards St. Johns, which was but a short distance away, since the Richelieu virtually flowed parallel to the St. Lawrence. If Burgoyne did not press his attack too vigorously, they would be able to cut off the enemy retreat. Success, however, depended upon numerous factors, chiefly the availability of transportation, especially small vessels, favorable winds and currents and the element of surprise. Carleton did not expect to find it easy to maneuver, to debark or to carry nearly 10,000 men with all their equipment, artillery, and provisions. This was in essence to be a combined army-navy operation.

Sorel was a fortified post and depot, strong enough to oblige Carleton to consider the possibilities of a sudden rash Colonial flank attack against his columns which were designated for the St. Lawrence. The post was his immediate object but the British and German regiments were delayed because of two reasons. The first, expressed in a letter from the Commander-in-Chief to General Fraser, indicated that there was a serious shortage of bateaux and other small boats. Carleton could only hope that a sufficient number might be obtained from the habitants,
particularly in the parishes around Varrenes. The regular fleet could not sail up the river because of the shallow water. As it was, nearly one-third of some of the regiments had been left behind at Trois Rivieres on June 10 due to a lack of shipping. The second cause was the lack of favorable winds and currents, which easily lost Carleton at least three days and probably saved the American army. There was no way in which to carry out his directives which repeatedly emphasized speed and vigilance. General Riedesel was instructed to locate a place for a landing of the troops. Accordingly, the south shore was combed for a suitable encampment, especially near the Riviere de Godefroy. On June 13, the findings were reported. But the wind failed the fleet when it reached Lake St. Pierre. Calm settled upon the sails, making progress nil. Orders had to be issued to maintain loaded guns, to post guards and patrols and to send parties of militia and Indians to scout both shores. There was always the possibility that Sullivan might counterattack. But the Commander-in-Chief's spirits revived when the winds altered for it seemed of great importance in this unhappy war, that the Rebels should be driven from the

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28 General Carleton to General Fraser, June 1, 1776, B. 39, p. 10.
29 The details appear in Chapter XIII.
30 Engelking, op. cit., p. 287.
upper part of the Province, as soon as possible. The wind springing up fair, the fleet sailed and arrived off Sorel the evening of the 14th Instant. 31

During this same period, Sullivan had resolved to offer the strongest possible resistance rather than lose the strategic town of Sorel. Entrenchments were dug by over 500 men, while others placed cannon on the several banks and the Island of St. Ignatius. The town was virtually located upon a truncated piece of land, with the St. Lawrence on the west and the Richelieu on the east. From dawn until dusk, they constructed abatis and fortifications, and sought to remove all positions of weakness. But the configurations of the area immediately to the rear of these fortifications consisted of a dominating height of land which largely nullified all their endeavors. The warming weather, moreover, caused the rivers to overflow their banks, removing any possibility of erecting an effectual chain across the Richelieu.

In a last desperate move, the American commander, nevertheless, collected a force of close to 2,500, nearly the remnants of the entire army except for the small garrisons at Chambly, St. Johns and Montreal. This did not include the smallpox victims. Not cognizant of the fact

31 General Carleton to Lord Germain, June 20, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 64-67.
that he was facing nine British regiments; in addition to their auxiliaries, Sullivan encountered other obstacles, including shortages of food, clothing, powder, balls, tents and medicines. There was little likelihood of succour from the south. Congress could merely requisition battalions from the colonies, while forwarding insufficient supplies which were often spoiled.32

Sullivan realized his plight only after he became aware of the size of his opponent's army, over 10,000 men. Now he regarded it as foolish to risk the loss of the bulk of his force in a certain defeat. The appearance of the British column under the command of Fraser along the northern shore and the sight of the numerous British transports were sufficient grounds for ordering a retreat. Accordingly, Sullivan directed the destruction of the trenches and had the moveable equipment and supplies put aboard his bateaux. They withdrew just as the British began preparations for an assault landing.33

Three factors had robbed Carleton of his opportunity to catch the Americans off guard. The winds continued to be adverse. There was a decided shortage of landing craft and, significantly, Fraser's column was on the wrong side. At any event, vigorous instructions were issued to effect

33Pell, "Diary," pp. 45-46.
an immediate landing in order to take possession of the abandoned post. The debarkation consumed two valuable days, but there was no choice. As the last of the Americans disappeared, the first of the grenadiers and light infantry waded ashore only to discover an empty post and abandoned equipment which had been sabotaged or dismantled. Carleton then directed Nesbitt's brigade to debark and to pursue the enemy as far as St. Denis. Shortly thereafter, a small detachment of artillery, consisting of two cannon, joined this force. The entire force was then placed under the command of Burgoyne.\textsuperscript{34}

The events which followed this action have become clouded in controversy. Carleton had sound tactical reasons for his maneuvers and the speed with which they were executed. Before the advance could continue it was necessary to secure the flanks. Carleton realized that it would be extremely dangerous to continue the advance of one of his columns while the others were detained and exposed.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34}Order of June 15, 1776, B. 83, pp. 9-10; Belking, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{35}The importance of this consideration becomes clearer when it is compared to more recent events, though each has its own peculiarities. Thus, General George Patton left open a gap in his lines while he advanced into Luxembourg. The result was the famous battle of The Bulge. Likewise, during the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur permitted his army to divide into two separate segments, one to proceed along the east and the other the north-west. The Chinese Communists were thus able to infiltrate our lines. Both of these illustrations indicate the value of Carleton's maneuvers.
He did not want an American counterattack to break his communications and supply line, especially after he had managed to liberate Montreal. It did not matter that the enemy no longer had the potential to undertake such a venture. The Governor had to base his decisions upon the intelligence which was available. He was not one to risk the lives and fortunes of his army in a needless fashion. In addition, the information regarding the size of the enemy force was contradictory and unreliable. Estimates placed it at from five to eight thousand men, certainly a force that could not be ignored. Past experience had made Carleton wary. He did not want to have one of his columns suddenly engulfed in disaster.

Equally as important, the success of his strategy depended upon careful timing among the movements of the three divisions. It would not do to have Burgoyne's brigade reach St. Johns too early. The enemy had to be pushed gently so that the British and German regiments could get behind them by crossing from the west. The pincer could succeed only if there were still some Americans to capture. Consequently, battle engagements were avoided and Burgoyne was instructed to follow the enemy up the Richelieu "but without hazarding anything till the column on the right should be able to cooperate."

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36 General Carleton to Lord Germain, June 20, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 64-67. Several historians have sought to
An opposing view appears in the writings of James Wilkinson, one of Arnold's aids. He considered Carleton's seizure of Sorel as a "faux pas" which enabled the Americans to escape. The basis of his argument was the fact that Montreal and Chambly were equidistant from Sorel, but that the flow of the Richelieu and the St. Lawrence was such that they contracted between the former places to only 12 miles. Wilkinson declared that the British should have made a vigorous and immediate debarkation and should have pursued, harassed and delayed the disorderly, confused and disheartened Americans until an engagement was commenced. Or Carleton should have bypassed Sorel, taking advantage of the favorable winds to reach Varennes and Longueuil on June 15. In either case, Wilkinson believed that the entire American army would have been obliged to capitulate.37

While Burgoyne began his march southward, Carleton had set in motion the other two columns. His success would depend upon the prevailing winds and the adequacy of transportation. His objective was to take Montreal before the Americans were alerted, a venture which almost came to pass. interpret this order as evidence that Carleton wanted the Americans to escape. See the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 1763-1793 (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1911), Vol. III, p. 181.

If the account by Wilkinson is accurate, it was only fortune which averted the disaster to Arnold's detachment. The latter did not know that Sullivan had abandoned Sorel and, consequently, had occupied himself with either commandeering or purchasing the goods of the Canadians, some have charged, for his own pocket. Ordered to deliver a dispatch to Sullivan at Sorel, Wilkinson and a small escort made their way in the face of contrary winds. In his own words, referring to himself, "I was made the instrument of saving Arnold and the garrison of Montreal from the grasp of Sir Guy Carleton." Nearing the parish of Varennes, only 14 miles north of Montreal, Wilkinson decided to investigate the sounds of cannon fire. Grounding his bateaux, Wilkinson ordered his men ashore and proceeded to the main road, completely oblivious of the presence of a large detachment of the British. Within a short distance of the town, he suddenly was confronted by an entire platoon, a sight which naturally caused him to consider the danger to Arnold even while he raced to the safety of his bateaux. What would have happened if he had, instead, chosen to go on to Sorel? Cognizant of the near presence of huge British forces, Wilkinson jumped upon a horse and obliged a Canadian to provide him with a boat, by which means warning was delivered to Arnold. In a bit of speculation, Wilkinson thought of what might have happened if the winds
had not failed Carleton at this point, or if the British had been able to debark so that they could have used the good road along the St. Lawrence.\(^\text{38}\)

While Carleton was rushing his troops southward, the American officers completed preparations for the abandonment of Canada. The accounts of the participants indicate that confusion reigned supreme among them. Caleb Cushing wrote that they were being hard pressed by Burgoyne and that the British fleet seemed to be inclosing them. Hurriedly, the Americans loaded and towed their cannon from above the lower falls to a place of safety, half way to St. Johns. Though tired and hungry, they managed to salvage most of the equipment, artillery and stores which had been at Sorel. What could not be transported was steved in, including the burning of row galleys and the sinking of four schooners.\(^\text{39}\) While Sullivan was thus putting the torch to Chambly on June 17, Arnold performed similar duties, evacuating the sick and loading supplies. Wilkinson was sent to get an armed escort of some 500 men but, instead, found widespread confusion. The men were scattered in small groups, without a guard mount to alert them in the event of an attack. In vain did Wilkinson seek

\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 50.

out Baron de Woedtke, a Prussian general who had offered his services to the Americans. Everywhere there were men without officers and officers without men. Informed that the Baron was probably intoxicated somewhere in the rear, Wilkinson fortunately came upon resolute Anthony Wayne. With his aid, order was brought out of chaos and the 500 men were rushed to Arnold's location at Longueuil. But he had already gone. Whereupon the detachment followed his example and went to St. Johns. Wilkinson's comment was direct and provocative: "If the escape of our army . . . was not countenanced by Sir Guy Carleton, it must appear miraculous."40

With the full British might fast closing in upon them, the Americans abandoned St. Johns. Hazen set fire to his own mansion while all personnel were sent to Isle aux Noix, Isle aux Motte, and Point au Fer. Since there were not enough bateaux, several trips were necessary. Some of the men waited eight critical days, fearing that Carleton might suddenly descend upon them, many suffering from smallpox and flu. Carleton failed to appear and the evacuation was completed.41

40Ibid., p. 54.

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief had not been negligent though he failed to close the pincer upon St. Johns because adverse winds prevented his fleet from reaching their goal on time. Nevertheless, he was in Varennes on June 15, where the habitants had eagerly awaited him and had mounted a guard to protect themselves. After obtaining intelligence that Arnold had escaped the trap at Montreal, he ordered the 29th Regiment to embark and carry out the mission of liberation. A deficiency in landing craft, however, caused considerable delay. At the same time, Carleton directed the immediate debarkation of the German troops on the shore opposite St. Sulpice. Again progress was halted, this time because of rain and the heavy packs of the individual soldiers.

For unknown reasons, the horses remained aboard ship.

Numerous orders, instructions and directives show that Carleton was impatient with the delay, particularly on the 17th and the 18th. In a letter to General Fraser, after obtaining intelligence that the enemy had departed from Chambly during the morning of the 17th, he stated: "I much wish to come up with their rear before they leave St. Johns, or to be able to attack them with our united

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[^42]: Belking, op. cit., p. 289.
force should they remain." Fraser was, therefore, instructed to make a diligent march but the troops were not to be overfatigued so that they would not be able to fight. Crossing the St. Lawrence at Repentigny, his brigade pressed closely upon the rear of the Germans. Similar instructions were also received by Riedesel. A report made by General Phillips, on the same day, stated that nearly 900 men from the four British regiments and artillery had already left Vercherres on their way to the same destination. Order after order emphasized the need for speed. Carleton wanted the juncture with Burgoyne's brigade to be consummated either at Chambly or at St. Johns. The marching orders were issued with great care, with the object of avoiding any transportation snag.  

All three columns made rapid advances on the 18th. Burgoyne was informed that Canadians and Indians from Montreal were due to join them. Others came from La Gallette and the Ottawa River. The road to St. Johns from La Prairie, however, had to be repaired because of American sabotage. The troops, nonetheless, continued their pace. All the troops that had been at Boucherville, Longueuil and  

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45 General Carleton to Generals Fraser and Riedesel, June 17, 1776, B. 39, pp. 12-13; Report of the British Troops at Vercherres, June 17, 1776, M. 332, p. 35. The four regiments included the 20th, 21st, 24th and 53rd. The actual total was 872.

46 General Carleton to General Fraser, June 17, 1776, B. 39, p. 11.
Varennes succeeded in reaching La Prairie, while Major Carleton was directed to bring his Indians and Canadians to St. Johns immediately.\textsuperscript{47} The Commander-in-Chief intended to follow with the last corps on June 19.\textsuperscript{48} When the advanced guard reached their target destination on the morning of the same day, they found that Burgoyne had won the race, having taken possession of the fort the previous evening.

Though the army desired to continue the pursuit, they were disappointed to learn that the enemy had neglected to leave behind a supply of bateaux. Halted out of necessity, therefore, Carleton discontinued the advance and directed that the regiments be cantoned in a set fashion. Fraser was ordered to relieve the guard at St. Johns and to post his men upon the roads leading to it. The grenadiers were stationed next to the fort, the 24th Regiment on the Chambly road and the light infantry on the route from La Prairie. Gordon's brigade, minus the 29th Regiment, camped to their rear. At the same time, Nesbitt's troops took the positions behind the 24th Regiment with Powell's behind him at Bellaile, and Phillips'
artillery occupied St. Charles on the Richelieu.⁴⁹ There was nothing else Carleton could do. Lacking boats since Lord Germain had neglected to send any with the reinforcements, the Commander-in-Chief had to turn his attention to collecting artificers, carpenters, and other personnel to overcome this handicap. It is not likely that there was a satisfactory road to the Ilse aux Noix. If one existed, the Americans certainly would not have left it in a perfect state.⁵⁰

A leading critic of Carleton's measures, Alfred Leroy Burt, supported by some lesser historians, has developed a hypothesis which suggests that either Carleton was naive or he was guilty of treasonable actions. Basing this contention upon the writings of Wilkinson, Lord Germain and other disgruntled officials, Burt states that Burgoyne was told not to advance too rapidly and the other two columns were deliberately detained so that the enemy might escape the trap. If Carleton had acted with due speed, Burt believes that Lake Champlain and, perhaps, even Albany would have been regained to the Crown.⁵¹

⁴⁹Orders of June 19 and 20, 1776, B. 83, p. 10.
⁵¹Alfred L. Burt, A Short History of Canada for Americans (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota, 1944), p. 81.
explanation for this thesis seems to be in Carleton's prisoner of war policy, in which statesmanship supposedly took precedence over military considerations. This view is amplified by Frederic F. Van De Water as follows:

He [Carleton] was generous and kindly toward his inferiors . . . and he clung to the belief that peace could be most effectively regained not by battle but by appeasing. He thought he could kill a rebellion with kindness.52

Both historians thus contend that the Commander-in-Chief wanted to exhibit the King's mercy, presuming that such a policy had covered those who had escaped. But the latter had not signed parole agreements which bound them never to fight against the King.53 If, indeed, Carleton was as solicitous of their welfare as Burt states, then why did not he invite the Americans to accept the parole policy so that they could be fed, clothed and sent home?

To read into the future as Burt has tended to do and to suggest thereby that Carleton had conducted his operations in the hope of preventing the majority of the Colonists from declaring their independence seems incredible.54 Marcel Trudel, a well known Canadian

52De Water, op. cit., p. 179.
53General Carleton to General Howe, August, 8, 1776, B. 39, pp. 93-94. I have treated this subject in some detail in Chapter XI.
54Burt, Short History, p. 81.
historian, has not only refuted Burt's argument but has also charged that he had no proof to support his allegation. Marcel stated that Burt did not write history but pure "hypothétique." This view, however, seems to be equally extreme. Actually, there was enough doubt in the prisoner of war policy, in Carleton's caution, to make Burt's thesis appear plausible upon first glance. What was the truth?

The explanation has been presented. The causes of Carleton's delay were largely beyond his control. He could not create the winds by which his vessels could attain their goals. He did not have enough boats to land even the regiments in a quick operation. If caution must be attributed as the cardinal controllable factor, Carleton might seem guilty. Yet, his tactical considerations were based upon sound experience. He dared not leave one of his columns exposed to the full fury of his opponents. At the same time, he never neglected to instruct his subordinates to reach their targets as soon as possible, as long as such

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55 Marcel Trudel, Louis XVI, Le Congres Americain et le Canada 1774-1789 (Edition du Quartier Latin, Quebec: Publications de L'Universite Laval [c. 1949], p. 82. His exact words were: "Cette explication, mise de l'avant surtout par M. Burt, n'est pas moins suprenante que le conduite meme de Carleton: conclure que Carleton aurait pu capturer toute l'armee americain s'il eut voulu, c'est disons-le encore une fois, tenter unutillement d'ecrire une histoire qui n'est histoire hypothetique."
operations were consistent with his total strategy. In none of his correspondence or his directives did he indicate a desire to be lenient to the extent that he wanted his trap to be empty. Clearly, he wished to catch up with their army. What would have Burt and De Water stated if Arnold had been taken in Montreal? Only adverse winds and the timely dispatch of Wilkinson prevented such an occurrence. Finally, the Commander-in-Chief realized that many of the reinforcements had not even had a period of rest and could not be overfatigued without serious results. Nor were they experienced in the combat methods of the New World. Carleton's advice to advance with caution seems applicable on this basis and not on one which was suggestive of a deliberate policy designed to aid his opponents.

If such controversies be dismissed and the total military operation be examined, from May 6 to June 19, the record of clearing Canada is impressive. It had been satisfactory enough to oblige even Lord Germain to congratulate the Commander-in-Chief. In six weeks, he transformed the dismal picture of an occupied territory into a liberated and loyal province. Since the large scale succour did not attain Canadian shores until the first week of June, moreover, this astounding feat actually was accomplished in less than 20 days. Certainly such speed cannot be regarded
as deliberate slowness. If Carleton was not a genius, he was unquestionably superior to many of his compatriots who guided the course of battle in the colonies to the south. If the tactics were not bold or daring, they were, at least, prudent and conducive to results. But the resourcefulness of his opponents must not be forgotten. Even if he had been able to reach Longueuil one day earlier, it is quite likely that they would have found some alternate way to escape. As it was, the speed with which Arnold had managed to evacuate Montreal had astonished Wilkinson. In other words, had the Commander-in-Chief completely mastered Canada on June 17 instead of the 19th, it would have been no guarantee that the American army would not have been able to reach safety. Surprise, after all, had become impossible after June 15.
CHAPTER V

APATHY AND DISLOYALTY AMONG THE FRENCH CANADIAN MILITIA

The Governor failed to understand the true militia tradition of the French Canadians for he was advised by the ambitious seigneurs. Ever since the conquest of Canada, the province had been divided into three military districts, specifically Quebec, Trois-Rivières and Montreal. Each of the districts was under the direction of a militia colonel who executed his functions through subordinates. They, in turn, held smaller jurisdictions, depending on their rank, whether lieutenant-colonel, major or captain. These people were in no way different from the habitants. They were elected to their posts and were confirmed by the district colonel.

Their work included promulgating Royal decrees, executing police regulations, enforcing law and order, providing military quarters, transport, work parties and road repairs and forwarding military orders. But there was no way to prevent insubordination on the part of the militia officers. The experiences of the invasion and the disclosures of the special investigation indicated that this weakness was widespread. Beneath the captains were
the police lieutenants and sergeants who aided in the
normal police functions and performed minor military
duties. They were likely to be habitants. During the
crisis, only the top three or four positions were domi­
nated by the seigneurs, which caused considerable contro­
versy and reacted against any potential of success. What
would have happened had Carleton promoted only the deserving
regardless of social status can only be left to conjecture.
There was no guarantee that the habitants would not have
been as susceptible as events proved them to be.

In May and in June, the Governor was confronted by
a steadily deteriorating security. The Americans held the
vital lakes; sedition and propaganda were growing; some
form of strategic defense was essential. A basic component
of his plan was to make St. Johns an impregnable base for
both defensive and offensive action. In order to succeed
he needed not only troops and skilled personnel but also a
substantial number of loyal Canadian militia. In a letter
to Lord Dartmouth, June 7, 1775, Carleton disclosed his
difficulties. Aside from a few youths around Montreal,
few Canadians were willing to follow the example of the

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1Letter from Canada by a German Staff Officer,
Batiscamp Parish, November 2, 1776, William L. Stone,
editor, Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers During
the American Revolution (Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons,
1891), pp. 21-23. A detailed account of subversion among
the militia appears in Chapter IX.
zealous seigneurs. Nevertheless, a small volunteer force under the command of the Englishman, Samuel Mackay, was collected and sent to bolster the St. Johns garrison. The habitants, however, proved to be "backward." There were bitter critics of Carleton's methods. Francois Baby, a leading citizen, wrote that the officers nominated, whether former holders of commissions or mere youths, "fut si désagréable que personne ne voulut enrôler." If Carleton relied upon the seigneurs possible revolt by the habitants was certain. It was no wonder that the Governor was unable to send help to Gage.

Carleton pointed out the widespread consternation that had developed because of "our impotent Situation." There were less than 600 regulars scattered along the frontiers and the rivers. The "ancient Provincial" force was either broken or insubordinated.

The minds of the People poisoned by the same Hypocrisy and Lies practised with so much Success in the other Provinces, and which their Emissaries and Friends here have spread abroad with great Art and Diligence; had it not been for those few troops three hundred Rebels might have procured all the Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions ... at St. Johns with great Security.

2 General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, June 7, 1775, Q. XI, p. 184.

In a pessimistic tone, Carleton indicated that he had little faith in victory without an army. There was no hope either from Gage or from Europe. Nevertheless, the Governor promised to do what he could to hold on to Canada.

In order to achieve this objective, the plan was to raise the militia. The hope was that the population would fulfill their obligations and follow the example of the clergy and the seigneurs. However, though they have been very useful upon this Occasion, and shewn great Fidelity and Warmth for His Majesty's service, . . . both have lost much of their influence over the People; I propose trying to form a Militia and if favourably disposed, will raise a Battalion, upon the same Plan as the other Corps in America, as to Numbers and Expence, and were it established, I think, it might turn out of great public Utility, but I have many Doubts whether I shall be able to succeed.

The measures which he proposed had been popular prior to the Quebec Act, but now they were regarded with suspicion by the people. Carleton did not deceive himself as to the need for caution and circumspection in order to avoid a rebellion. Yet, he still blamed all the problems upon sedition and cabals, not upon the abuses of the seigneurs and the clergy. Never a believer in democracy, the aristocratic Governor could only regret having recommended the use of habeas corpus and the English criminal law as part of the Quebec settlement in 1774. If only French criminal
law could be returned to crush the traitorous Ameri-
cens.  

The seigneurs held more optimistic views in this
regard. Monsieur de Sanguinet, in his journal, emphasized
the great zeal and voluntary offers of his people in be-
half of the Crown. With disgust he noted that when the
loyal citizens called upon the Governor they were received
coldly "sans en scevoir la cause." Conceding that there
had been some exhibitions of discontent the Seigneur in-
sisted that the majority of his people were loyal. In
fact, an eight-man commission had been organized for the
purpose of taking the census in order to compile the
militia rolls. In carrying out their mission, however,
they became the targets of stone throwing women in the
suburb of St. Laurent. Though this only served to confirm
Carleton's pessimism, he decided to follow the advice of
the seigneurs. Perhaps he had no choice.

Carleton agreed to reestablish the militia on the
French basis and prepared to issue a general call. Some
of the dissenting deputies of the commission, however,
warned of trouble but the Governor answered that this was
an emergency. Secondly, Carleton accepted 35 volunteers

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4 General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, June
7, 1775, Q. XI, p. 184.

5 De Sanguinet, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
who held no commission but included important seigneurs such as Chartier De Lotbiniere, Hertel De Rouville and Louis St. Luc de La Corne. Some of them were patriotic, some indifferent and the rest traitors.  

Even while preparations were being made to institute martial law, American propaganda, especially designed to appeal to the habitants, was being issued, published and distributed, primarily through American merchants in Montreal and Quebec. On June 2 Peter Van Livingston, the President of the New York Congress, presented the Colonial objectives in behalf of the Canadians. Though declaring that he had the power to coerce them, Livingston stated:

> Be persuaded we are friends and love you like brothers. In the dispute raised between the British and her colonies, the question is one of subject or slavery.

In other words the Americans only sought to protect traditional rights in opposition to the tyrannical ministry. There was no intention of hostilities or harm. Other provincial congresses sent similar messages. The Continental Congress, moreover, divided its attention between an appeal to the Canadians and a petition to the King.

Carleton lost his opportunity in this respect for he failed to emphasize the bigotry of the Colonists. This

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6 Huct, op. cit., p. 7.

7 "To the Gentlemen of the Province of Canada, June 2, 1775," C. A. 1904, p. 383.
was probably because of his sense of tolerance. Throughout the invasion the clergy did attempt to inform their uneducated flocks of the contradictions in the two petitions of the Continental Congress. The one to the King was full of anti-Papal sentiment while the other professed brotherhood and friendship. The Catholic historian, John Gilmary Shea, declared that Canada did not become the fourteenth colony because of the bigotry of John Jay, ignoring the fact that some of the Canadians did take arms in behalf of the Americans. At any event, Carleton decided to enlist the population, even though he knew chances of success were slight, especially since he had no troops to overawe them.

Due to the dangerous situation, Carleton declared martial law on June 9. It was posted upon convenient church doors and published in the Quebec Gazette within a few days of its promulgation. Stating that the province had been invaded by an armed party which was disseminating false and libelous propaganda in order to alienate loyal subjects, the Governor defended his course of action in hopes of defeating the invaders and their allies so that peace and order might be restored. Until that goal could be achieved, the Governor added that

I shall, in the virtue of the Powers and Authority to me given by His Majesty, execute Martial-Law,

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and Cause the same to be executed throughout this Province, and to that end I shall order the Militia within the same to be forthwith raised; but as a sufficient number of Commissions to the several Officers thereof cannot be immediately made out I shall in the mean time direct all those having any Militia Commissions from the Honble. Thomas Gage, the Honble. James Murray, Ralph Burton, & Frederick Haldimand, Esquires, heretofore His Majesty's Governors in this Province, or in either of them to Obey the same, and execute the powers therein... All citizens were ordered to conform to the proclamation by obeying militia officers and regulars. Yet Carleton appears not to have had too much hope in this device. How could he? He had no troops to enforce martial law much less to confine suspicious persons. In one respect, however, he did err; he failed to consider the antagonism between the habitants and the seigneurs though he knew of its existence. Perhaps he believed that there was no able body of citizens to take the place of the overambitious seigneurs.

Strong attacks upon this newly instituted policy were made by two prominent citizens, Francis Maseres, a prominent lawyer, and Chief Justice William Hey. In a letter to Lord Shelburne, August 9, 1775, Maseres presented his biased but realistic arguments, advice which the Governor should have recognized for the truth contained within. The basic reason for the failure to raise the militia was attributed to the choice of officers. Instead

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of issuing new commissions to outstanding men in the French or English communities, Carleton remained influenced by the seigneurs. Maseres noted that even before the martial law proclamation, Carleton had found he could not get the officers he desired. Monsieur De L'Hory, a member of the Royal Council, refused to command the Canadians except under impossible conditions.

He could not accept the command unless his Excellency could give him rank in the army, for that to have the command of the Canadians and be himself commanded by an Ensign though he had the rank of Captain in the French army, was incompatible—but that if his Excellency could give them the rank and power to raise them . . . he was ready.¹⁰

How many potential officers were lost to the King on this account cannot be determined. It may be that Carleton did not trust these people or thought that they were incompetent. Nevertheless, he was ungracious and possessed of a certain degree of British prejudice which was based upon the tradition of the army. Militia and foreign troops, even if they possessed equal rank, were regarded as inferior.

¹⁰Francis Maseres to Lord Shelburne, Inner Temple, August 9, 1775, Shelburne Manuscripts, Vol. 66, American Affairs, The Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; French, The First Year, p. 411. Maseres was unfair in presenting this theme for it deliberately ignored Carleton's numerous applications to his superiors which called for permanent Canadian regiments and commissions equal to those of the English. At any event, the Governor did not have the power to accede to the request.
Maseres also claimed that Carleton had failed to make full use of the British settlers in the province. Instead of offering them the command of the Canadian militia the Governor insisted on blindly following the advice of the seigneurs.

Some unwise selections were made and better men were, at first, overlooked. Maseres declared that Carleton did not have the ability to distinguish between loyal or disloyal Englishmen. Their loyalty was judged solely upon whether they had supported or rejected the Quebec Act.\textsuperscript{11} Men like Major Henry Caldwell were largely ignored or dismissed with a mere thank you for having offered their services.\textsuperscript{12}

Maseres also criticized Carleton's attempt to win over the Canadians by applying to the Bishop of Quebec, Monsieur Briand. The latter offered to write a circular letter to his subordinates to the effect that they endeavor via private conversations to persuade their parishes to serve the King. Being anti-papal in sentiment, Maseres naturally expressed his happiness that this move had proved useless. There would be no "Popish Army" to conquer the

\textsuperscript{11}Maseres to Lord Shelburne, Inner Temple, August 9, 1775, Shelburne Papers.

\textsuperscript{12}Maseres to Lord Shelburne, Inner Temple, August 24, 1775, \textit{ibid.}; French, \textit{The First Year}, p. 411.
Protestant though erring neighbors. The circular letter was issued on June 13. In the words of Monsieur Montgolfier, it was declared that the Governor was doing the people a favor by reestablishing the militia.

This is an efficacious means of maintaining order in our parishes and polity among our country people; and it is at the same time a mark of esteem and confidence in which he honors every individual... all those whom he appoints to military situations he does not wish to choose except inasmuch as his choice may be agreeable to the public.14

The timing of martial law was also brought under attack. The pretexts, as far as Maseres was concerned, were the raids of Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen. The strategic importance of the lakes and the fort at St. Johns was unknown to the Lawyer, who could only declare that martial law ought to be promulgated only during an actual invasion. Moreover, he believed that the Americans had far more to fear from the Canadian than the latter had from the former. But as there appeared to be no actual rebellion on June 9, the proclamation seemed unjust. If the situation had been similar to that of Boston, he declared that he would have concurred. Instead, he charged that Carleton's reason for the action taken is a desire to assume to himself... an authority to press the Canadians into service, since they

13Ibid.

14"Circular Regarding the Canadian Militia Issued by Catholic Authority, 1775," Martin K. J. Griffin, Catholics and the American Revolution (3 Volumes, Philadelphia: Published by the author, 1907-1911), Vol. I, p.17
were not . . . disposed to engage in it of volunteers. Thus the General might think himself authorized to do by virtue of the Martial Law.\(^{15}\)

In a series of other papers, Maseres continued his bitter criticism. He firmly believed that the militia would be employed against the people of Massachusetts. Far better to persuade the 6,000 men to follow a policy of neutrality until an invasion actually occurred. Then they would defend their homes.\(^{16}\) In a letter dated November 9, he returned to his old argument that the chief cause of difficulty was due to the Quebec Act. The people refused to serve the King until it was repealed. He based this statement upon information furnished by James Finlay who had heard the complaints of an Canadian militia captain.

By this time Maseres recognized that Carleton had no troops with which to enforce martial law.\(^{17}\)

As for the part played by the clergy, Maseres explained that the habitants resented the reinstitution of the tithes under the Quebec Act. Though the people were

\(^{15}\)Maseres to Lord Shelburne, Inner Temple, June 22, 1775, Shelburne Papers.


\(^{17}\)Letter of November 9, 1775, ibid., p. 106.
religious, they discovered the advantage of having a free choice after 1763. The clergy had lost its tithes and had to conform to the will of the population. The letter of October 24 disclosed Maseres' bias, for the clergy and the seigneurs were classified as "rascally pensioners of the crown." If martial law failed, the blame must be attributed to the New England emissaries, memories of past customs and the haughty behavior of the seigneurs. He also implied that the Governor was a coward.

Chief Justice William Hey, on the other hand, took a decidedly more impartial and realistic viewpoint in regard to Carleton's military actions. But like Maseres, Hey believed that the season precluded any real invasion, a mistake that the Governor dared not make. The Chief Justice noted that the people had become disobedient because of the departure of the two regiments and because of the activities of Colonial agents who spread false rumors of impending invasions. The Americans also declared that transports were being sent from Boston to bring the Canadian militia into actual combat. Another rumor stated that Gage had sold the proposed militia to the Spanish.

18"On the Dissatisfaction of the Canadians at the Reestablishment of popery in Canada, December 9, 1775," ibid., pp. 147-150.

19Letter, Quebec, October 25, 1775, ibid., pp. 91-93 & 98-99.
The root of the difficulty, according to Hey, was not encumbered by false tales but by unfavorable conditions:

Gen. Carleton had taken an ill measure of the influence of the seigneurs & Clergy over the lower order of people [habitants] whose Principle of conduct founded in fear & the sharpness of the authority over them now no longer exercised, is unrestrained, & breaks out in every shape of contempt . . . of those whom they used to behold with terror [seigneurs] & who gave them on many occasions [under the King of France] to express it. And they [the seigneurs] on their parts have been and are too much elated . . . from the restoration of their old Privileges & customs & induced themselves in a way of thinking & talking . . . which will admit no alteration in their antient laws particularly in the article of commerce. . . .

Let me say in general that this country affords as gloomy [a picture] as one in the point of security & in the ill humors & evil depositions of its inhabitants [as can be possible]. . . .

However, Carleton had no confidence in the British settlers and certainly none in the uneducated habitants as far as leadership was concerned.

In order to implement martial law, Carleton made militia appointments, some wise and some unfortunate. Response to the call was slow. A few parishes such as Riviere au Loup and Machiche obeyed his directive. Others like Nicolet, Benaucourt and Saint Pierre les Besquets openly defied him and his militia officers. The reason can be found in the method employed in the selection . . .

20Chief Justice Hey to the Lord Chancellor, Quebec, August 28, 1775, Shortt, op. cit., pp. 669-671.
of officers. At Montreal, the Governor appointed Dufy Desauniers colonel, Neveu Sevestre lieutenant colonel and St. George Dupre major of the district militia. These three men then proceeded to follow an unjust policy of nepotism. Friends and relatives obtained most of the subordinate positions. Ignoring merit and the militia rolls, they, with the knowledge of the Governor, named civilians who had no prior military experience or rank to be ensigns, lieutenants and captains. Was it any wonder that the people refused to obey such appointees? The habitants insisted that they be given the opportunity of forming their own companies of 30 men each as well as nominating their own officers, but Carleton had no faith in democratic methods. There would be no absurd elections to fill command positions. It was against British military tradition. In spite of numerous protests against the abuses of the three men, the Governor appears to have instituted no corrective steps. Instead, he merely forwarded their commissions. Fortunately, the officers nominated at Quebec were of a better breed of men, particularly Colonel Noel Voyer. Nevertheless, Carleton must assume a share of the blame for the resulting dissatisfaction.\(^{21}\)

Other appointments and recruits for the militia were obtained through the use of individual commissions, by requests to the leading seigneurs or by quotas. In all these, Carleton continued to bypass the willing British settlers, the very people whom the habitants declared should be their leaders. The individual commissions, such as to Laurent Archambault on June 24, outlined the duties and obligations to be performed. This zealous gentleman was given the rank of militia captain in the parish of La Assomption. He was both to obey his superiors and to be obeyed by his inferiors.\textsuperscript{22} John Nairne, the English Seigneur of Murray Bay, illustrated the Governor's dependence upon this class of people. On July 13, Nairne obediently attempted to raise the militia along the northern shore of his jurisdiction, primarily by spreading the tale that the Americans were thieves and bigots. Nor did he neglect to mention the fact that the British navy might arrive to punish all those who refused to answer the call.

Carleton, however, seems to have realized that he had to end the abuses practised by the seigneurs. Consequently, Nairne was ordered to employ former militia captains, to prepare a roll of those fit for duty, to count

\textsuperscript{22}Guy Carleton, Document in French signed by Guy Carleton, Montreal, June 24, 1775, Miscel. Mss., C., The New York Historical Society.
the discharged soldiers, to issue commissions to subordinates and to use the clergy's influence. The Seigneur's endeavors, however, were only partly successful. Thirty-two frightened men answered the call at Murray Bay as did others at Les Eboulements and Baie St. Paul. Many of them refused to fight. At Isle aux Coudres, the habitants ignored his call while those at St. Anne de Beaupre were openly hostile. Nairne later became a commissioned officer in the Royal Highland Emigrants. It was evident that the Governor's plan to use the seigneurs was beginning to encounter serious obstacles.

Numerous other accounts verified these results. Benedict Arnold was not without some basis of truth when he declared that while the Governor was able to raise small groups in some of the parishes hundreds appeared willing to serve the Americans. James Livingston reported that Carleton, in fear of a full scale rebellion, vainly was offering 100 acres of Boston land to each volunteer. Few were enlisting at Trois Rivieres or at Chambly. A third

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letter, from a Loyalist, stated that fear alone prevented
the raising of even one regiment. The Loyalist also be-
lieved that if the people were issued arms they would sur-
render them to the enemy.  Some people believed that if
the former rights of the British were restored trouble
would vanish. That, however, was the extreme view. Even
if Carleton had restored all the former rights, a guarantee
of sincere loyalty was not likely. The people really de-
sired to be left alone.

Though the Governor was aware of the possible repercus-
cussions of a strict enforcement of martial law, his
ambitious seigneurs nearly provoked the habitants into
rising up in arms against the King. The seigneurs were
demanding that the habitants should conform to the feudal
customs of fealty and homage. The former also insisted that
they had the authority to engage the personal services of
their vassals or of any tenant holding land "par foi et
homage or par cens et rente or en Roture." Since the

26 Extract of a letter from Quebec, July 20, 1775,
Haldimand Papers, Correspondence with Major Fr.: Hutcheson,
1766-1778, Public Archives of Canada, Hereafter cited as
B. 20.

27 William Lindsay, "Narrative of the Invasion of
Canada by the American Provincials under Montgomery and
Arnold; with a particular account of the Siege of Quebec,
from the 17th of September 1775," The Canadian Review and
passage of the Quebec Act, which supposedly restored the former French property laws, the seigneurs had assumed that they had powers similar to their namesakes in France. They, therefore, called upon Carleton to forfeit the properties of any habitant who did not agree with their interpretation. Carleton, however, though favoring the seigneurs, refused to adopt such a policy on the grounds that there were no troops to enforce it and that such an action would only serve the purposes of Colonial propaganda.

Soon after the martial law proclamation, open resistance appeared in several of the parishes along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence and along the Richelieu. The methods of the seigneurs were thoroughly discredited. The very men that had been sent out to enlist the militia had to be rescued. In early July, almost 1,200 Canadians rose in anger and drove out unpopular militia officers, primarily with the aid of pitchforks. To the surprise of the seigneurs, Carleton rewarded the ring leader with a captain's commission.


The other instances of trouble indicated that Carleton had good reason not to expect too much from the Canadians. Yet, instead of acting upon the basic cause of the discontent, he preferred to let the matter rest until the arrival of regulars which would alter the dangerous situation. The youthful nephew of the untrustworthy St. Luc De La Corne was dispatched to the parish of Terrebonne with the directive to activate the militia. Lacking tact, he lost his temper when the habitants refused to comply. After striking a respected parish elder, he was obliged to flee for his safety. The people, fearing that La Corne would return with troops, decided to organize a defense. A force of close to three or four hundred men gathered with the objective of forming some resistance. Some had guns, others only clubs.

Carleton, however, did not desire to precipitate additional trouble since he had no troops to send. In the hope of pacifying and conciliating the people, he sent Captain Henry Hamilton, a regular officer, to learn the cause of the disturbance. The habitants answered that La Corne had threatened to return with 200 soldiers to avenge his flight. Furthermore, they professed loyalty to Carleton but demanded that English officers lead them. They absolutely refused to be commanded by "ce petit gars".

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30 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 39.
which indicated hostility only to the seigneurs and not to the Government. The habitants dispersed when the Captain promised that La Corne would not return.

Though Carleton averted a dangerous insurrection, he did not choose to test their protestations of loyalty by sending Englishmen to command them. Though there were a few able and available men like Thomas Caldwell, the Governor still had not altered his suspicions regarding their loyalties. As for the regular officers, there were none to spare. The disbending of a few companies on the frontier failed to alleviate the situation, for custom dictated that once a unit was deactivated its officers were to be sent home. Their conduct might have proved just as obstinate even if British officers had been sent to command them. It was a gamble he chose not to take.

Monsieur Deschambaud, a former French officer then on leave, had the same type of trouble in his father's seigneury on the Richelieu. Angered by the response, he drew his sword but suffered a severe beating which brought his father to the scene. The latter insisted that the offenders go to Montreal in order to seek forgiveness or to suffer punishment. This foolish act only provoked them.

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The habitants began to purchase ammunition at exorbitant prices. Maseres reported that three thousand men collected at Chambly and prepared to march on St. Johns in order to fight the British. Carleton did all in his power to pacify them and succeeded in getting them to disperse when he disavowed Deschembœuf.\textsuperscript{32}

Two further examples illustrated only too clearly the price of enforced enrollment. When Charles de Lansiudiere managed to recruit 70 men at his seigneur of St. Anne, he prepared to march them to Carleton's aid. However, they lacked weapons. The people of Berthier, upon the selected route, dispersed the force with ease and held the Seigneur as hostage until he agreed to obtain a pardon from the Governor for their benefit. Their excuse was that they had lost the recently gained privileges because of the Quebec Act.

We have enjoyed very valuable privileges, since we became subjects of Great Britain; We had the Royal Promise for the continuance of that enjoyment. On a sudden . . . we are deprived of those inestimable privileges, and reduced to our former state of slavery. The people, whom we desired to regard as enemies, tell us, they are our real friends;\textsuperscript{33}

American propaganda was thus effective. The other example involved a half-pay British officer, James Cuthbert, who

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{A Narrative of Freehold Conduct}, Maseres, Additional Papers, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., pp. 77-78.
like Nairne had purchased a seigneury. After he called his parish to arms, he found, instead, that the habitants had gathered together at the crossroads and had taken an oath not to bear arms. If any among them dared to violate the oath, they were threatened with the destruction of their property and cattle. Yet Carleton failed to realize that when an Englishman became a seigneur and assumed all the rights of the title, he, thereby, inherited all the hate of the habitants.

During the siege of St. Johns in mid-September, Carleton continued to find it impossible to raise more than a small percentage of the militia. After Allen's first raid upon St. Johns, some of the parishes had to furnish 15 from each militia company. Two hundred and twenty volunteers under the command of Le Moyne de Longueuil had gone to the aid of the fort while volunteer companies formed in the cities. While the Governor was devising his defense strategy which included militia entrenchments near Chambly, his subordinate civil and military officers continued their efforts to recruit, train, and organize the militia. The results were the same. On September 10, Lieutenant Governor Hector Cramahe ordered four Canadian militia companies to appear on Quebec's parade grounds.

35 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 43.
Not only did a mere 100 out of a potential 320 obey the order, they also insisted that proper authority for the muster be shown to them. Cramahe found it necessary to return with Carleton's specific commission. After reading it, commissions were given to the officers.

Two days later, after the habitants of Point Levis, opposite Quebec, had driven out recruiters, Cramahe could gather a force of only 200 though by now the militia rolls included 560. Some excused the poor showing on the ground that it was a working day. Zealous Loyalists harassed Cramahe as they had annoyed Carleton. Jason Shepard, an English merchant, demanded that the Lieutenant Governor shoot the Canadians who had insisted upon official proof for the muster. If Cramahe had shown firmness, there would have been plenty of Canadians to answer the call. Nevertheless, Carleton's policy of conciliation remained in force. The Loyalists not only failed to realize the possibility of revolt they also forgot that there were few British regulars to halt a large scale insurrection. Neither Carleton nor Cramahe was so foolish. Carefully avoiding too much dissatisfaction, the latter formed 16 companies by the 17th, and a guard was maintained from nine

to nine daily. Just as a measure of caution, the guards received only four rounds each evening.37

The reason was the widespread expectation of mass desertion or insurrection. Carleton, apparently, tried to prevent the true state of affairs from becoming common knowledge. The Loyalists knew that there were less than 600 troops and 900 dependable Indians in Canada. Some, like Hugh Finlay, believed that the Governor was capable and was doing all he could in the face of numerous obstacles. However, several hundred habitants joined the Americans at St. Johns. Carleton's task was to prevent others from doing the same. Finlay, however, did not expect St. Johns to capitulate. He was positive that the garrison would be ordered to Quebec, so that there would be nothing to fear from the Americans "with such a General as our Governor at our head."38

Rumors of disaster spread in spite of all precautions. The habitants learned of the successful activities of the American recruiters like James Livingston and Jeremiah Dugan and, even worse, that Lady Carleton had taken passage on the Lydia in order to go to England. Moreover, belief that a siege was impending was furthered

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37Baby, op. cit., p. 346.

38Hugh Finlay to Anthony Todd, September 19, 1775, No. 1152, Roberts, op. cit., pp. 408-409.
by the construction or rehabilitation of barrier gates and stockades, the mounting of cannon, the embargoing of shipping and the use of guard mounts. The first irregular guard service commenced on the 17th. Difficulties continued. Though a Canadian guard of 120 was ordered to the Quebec gates only 30 appeared.\textsuperscript{39} All was not hopeless, however, for the bulk of the population along the northern shore of the St. Lawrence appeared loyal. In fact, the parish of St. Denis, which had previously befriended Livingston, had been persuaded by its leaders to reassert its loyalty and to seek pardon.\textsuperscript{40} The Governor recognized that the habitants were likely to follow the results of battles as a guide to their degree of service. In the meantime, he attempted to hold their loyalty or, at least, to keep them neutral. Many had deserted, turning their arms over to the enemy. The numerous instances of resistance to the Crown along the south shore of the St. Lawrence and the desertion of Moses Hazen had been demoralizing blows.\textsuperscript{41}

Allen's raid on September 25 brought about a temporary improvement. Not knowing whether the people would come


\textsuperscript{40}Governor Tryon to Lord Dartmouth, New York, November 11, 1775, \textit{C. A. 1904}, p. 375.

\textsuperscript{41}General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, September 21, 1775, Germain Mss.
to the defense of Montreal, Carleton, nevertheless, ordered a muster at Camp de Mars. He convinced his listeners of the likelihood of theft and damage to their properties if they did not help drive out the bandits. One hundred and twenty Canadians, issued weapons, joined in the defense. The real test, however, would be against the army of Montgomery, not against a marauding band. Moreover, if there had been no regulars present and if the English merchants had not volunteered, the Canadians, no doubt, would not have answered Carleton's call.

At any event, the Governor, for the first time, began to take what seemed to be aggressive action. The leader of the seditious faction, Thomas Walker, was arrested. More important, the militia was called out in the hope of carrying out the entrenchment plan and to relieve St. Johns. But Carleton still depended upon the seigneurs in his preparations for an assault upon Longueuil which guarded the approaches to the besieged fort. De Longueuil was invited to join the proposed force as an individual since it was not possible for him to serve as leader of his parish. Another seigneur, De Lorimier, was given the task of winning some of the tribes to the

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42 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 14; The Quebec Gazette, October 5, 1775.
cause, especially the St. Regis and the Lac des Deux Montagnes. 43

Though nearly 1,200 men rallied to the cause, Carleton discovered that his plan still faced numerous obstacles. Lacking troops and unsure of loyalties, he pursued a policy of Fabianism. He had good reason; desertions were again on the increase. Whether it was due to his procrastination or to American sedition cannot be determined. Certainly, the policy did encourage dissatisfaction and disloyalty. But the procrastination was also due to Carleton's inability to collect an adequate force. When he desired to raise 15 per cent in the parishes of Lachine, Pointe Claire, St. Anne and Genevieve, he had to send a force of 200 troops in order to remind the habitants of their obligations. 44

Entire parishes across the St. Lawrence failed to send more than a mere handful of their quotas. Further results were not reassuring. At the parish of Nicolet, the people absolutely rejected the demands of their militia captain. In an attempt to bring them to their senses, Jean Baptiste Badeaux, a prominent Canadian, was dispatched with Colonel Tonnancour's son in order to explain the Governor's

order. After hours of persuasion, plus threats of possible punishment, only ten volunteered.\textsuperscript{45} Experiences of the seigneur of Verchere were not much better. Fearing the consequences of declining morale, Carleton informed Lord Dartmouth that desertions were now numbering 30 to 40 each night. In disgust, the Governor added, "I had purposed on the first alarm to have a considerable Corps here & should have encamped them at Chambly, had not this wretched People been blind to Honor, Duty & their own interest."\textsuperscript{46} Zealots called upon the conduct, firmness, experience and favorable opinion "all ranks of people have" of Carleton.\textsuperscript{47}

The seigneurs, however, accused Carleton of failing to take the initiative. He seemed to be neglecting the necessary relief of Chambly and of St. Johns. It was obvious that he did not trust their leadership. The journals of the seigneurs began to impute cowardly tendencies toward the Governor. On October 19, Carleton ordered the militia captains to send the habitants back to their farms so that the harvest could be collected before the winter set in.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{46}General Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Montreal, October 25, 1775, Q. XI, p. 267.

\textsuperscript{47}To Sackville Hamilton, Dublin, October 19, 1775, Roberts, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. IV, p. 449.

\textsuperscript{48}Proclamation, October 14, 1775, The Quebec Gazette, October 19, 1775. Houses needed repair; ploughing
Nevertheless, to many of the seigneurs this action seemed an open invitation to trouble. They could not reconcile this policy with the supposed build-up of a force to take Longueuil. They overlooked the widespread suspicions of some of their own group, especially St. Luc de La Corne.  

The seigneurs went on dreaming and complaining. De Sanguinet was positive that 2,500 men could have been enrolled at Boucherville and Longueuil. If Carleton would only order the advance the habitants would flock to the Royal Standards. Instead, weeks passed without action though arms had been distributed. Some parishes requested action, fearing that the Americans would burn their farms or steal their cattle.

The answer was always the same. Wait until the proper time. The seigneurs boasted that they could have led the habitants to complete victory within eight days. The result was an increase of desertions.

had to be undertaken; hay mowed and grain cut. If the men could not be spared, corvees were to fill the gap. The captains were held responsible. If they proved disobedient, they paid for any resulting losses to the buildings and the crops. The militia colonels and the Lieutenant Governor were kept informed of all action taken. Carleton had to consider the welfare of the province. He had to think not only of the present but also of the future.


50 De Sanguinet, op. cit., pp. 55-58.
The historian, Thomas Chapias, has answered the charges of the seigneurs, "Carleton était un soldat de carrière, un militaire intrepide et experimente qui avait fait ses preuves dans mainte campagne." The extreme caution was based upon sound considerations. How could he risk the lives of untrained militia? They might be of service in the defense of their homes or as scouts but not in actual battle. The test proved Carleton's worst expectations. They fled from Longueuil when confronted with Seth Warner's cannon. The rapid military victories of the enemy, after October 25, terminated all chances to raise the siege of St. Johns. After its fall Montreal had to be abandoned. The militia, however, still played a major part in the defense of Quebec, though many suspected that Governor had "sold the country to the rebels."

The second phase of Carleton's relations with the Canadians could be said to be limited to the dreary and demoralizing months of the siege of Quebec. The militia underwent several significant though overlapping changes. From the commencement of the siege in November until the December assault of the Americans, disloyalty and


52 William Grant to Robert Grant, November 8, 1775, No. 9, Roberts, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 484. See Chapter II.
unreliability characterized the militia. The next period, which extended to the appearance of relief in mid-May, 1776, produced a mixture of weariness and awareness that the Americans could no longer win. Moreover, the latter had been transformed from friends into enemies of the Canadians.

In November, both Cramahe and Carleton, faced by open threats of insurrection, were forced to institute drastic but essential steps to insure the possibility of withstanding a long winter siege. They were confronted with problems of provisions and of fuel not only for the few regulars and the militia but also for the civil population. The November 22 proclamation of Carleton, therefore, had a double purpose. It was an attempt to rid the city of seditious persons and, thereby, to enable the authorities to better distribute provisions. The more immediate aim, however, was to purge both the Canadian and British militia of all undesirable elements.

Though the militia had been alerted as early as September, it was far from an effective dependable force. Complaints were numerous. Peaceful citizens did not relish bearing arms, particularly for a long period of time. The task, therefore, was to raise, maintain and discipline a dependable body of militia capable of co-operating with the conglomeration of defense units which
included sailors, soldiers, Scots, volunteers and British settlers.

The terms of the proclamation had to be distinct and harsh. There could be no half-way measure. Carleton had resolved to make an effective stand. There would be no surrender. The proclamation declared that many Canadians and British "have contumaciously refused to enroll their Names in the Militia Lists," or have refused to bear arms, and that others, who had previously conformed to their duties, had since laid down their weapons. These elements, apparently influenced by American propaganda, had been instilled with a defeatist attitude. Worse, some were definitely alienating loyal segments of the population by openly arguing against service in behalf of the King. Consequently,

to rid the Town of all useless disloyal and treacherous Persons . . . I [Carleton] do hereby strictly order and enjoin all and every person and persons whatsoever liable to serve in the Militia and residing at Quebec who have refused or declined to enroll their Names in the Militia Lists, and to take up Arms in Conjunction with his Majesty's good Subjects of this City, and who still refuse or decline so to do, as well as those, who having once taken up Arms, have afterwards laid them down, and will not take them up again, to quit the Town in four days . . . with their Wives and Children and to withdraw themselves outside the Limits of the District of Quebec before the first Day of December next, Under Pain or being treated as Rebels
or Spies, if thereafter they shall be found within the said Limits. 53

As harsh as the proclamation may have appeared, it still offered the guilty a chance to reform. Carleton hoped to convince a portion of them of the realities of war by including their families in the exile order. As it was not a desirable status to be labeled as a spy, there seemed a good chance that some would take advantage of the two-day grace. The proclamation which was published on November 20 was not to be in force until two days later. Some, however, preferred to leave the city in the belief that the hardships of a siege would be too much for them.

Drastic measures were also coupled with gentler means, particularly after the failure of the American assault on December 31. The loyal citizens, whether regulars or militia exhibited a better morale and a sense of humor. All were proud of Carleton's bearing and confidence. The British in particular, joked over the thought of a Colonial army of 10,000 habitants. They were positive that the habitants were unreliable and unfit as troops. Actually, they regarded all militia forces as incapable of sustained disciplined military undertakings. The early successes of the Americans were attributed to the few Europeans

53Proclamation of November 22, 1775, The Quebec Gazette, November 20, 1775. See Appendix B. No. 2.
among them. Carleton was determined to employ the militia in the best manner possible. They seemed useful as guards, pickets and fatigue workers. There were too many gates and walls to watch in case of attack to dispense with their services.

Anti-British rumors continued to make their appearance after the exiles had left. Right after the repulse of December 21, one story related that 60 pro-American Canadians who had been captured by the British had been hung from the ramparts and their bodies thrown into a ditch, exposed to starving dogs. The purpose, of course, was to arouse fear, to discourage the loyal and to ruin discipline. As far as the actual prisoners of war were concerned, Carleton had adopted a lenient and merciful policy.

At all times, Colonial propaganda was able to reach expected ears within the City. The Americans permitted neighboring Canadians to go through their lines and the British allowed them to enter, either because they appeared loyal or because they might provide valuable intelligence. No doubt there were still pro-Americans within Quebec. The prisoners, too, did not hesitate to

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disseminate their views to the militia guards.\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, the Continental Congress made additional promises to its supporters. It declared that it would never abandon its friends to the enemies of liberty and that six new battalions would reach Canada before the arrival of any British reinforcements. It also recommended the formation of local assemblies and associations.\textsuperscript{56} These announcements had greater effect among the Canadians outside the walls than those within. Yet they could not forget the American repulse. Few believed that the Americans could win. Though most of the habitants were neutral, those in the country were subjected to the will of the conquerors who began to impose undesirable burdens and give vent to expressions of bigotry. All these things, however, were not immediately apparent. Most of the people continued to be swayed by the course of battle and the long siege was a severe test on their loyalties.

Unsatisfactory disciplinary conditions still perplexed the Governor. It was necessary to institute humiliating measures in order to instill a sense of duty among the militia units. On March 5, for example, because of

\textsuperscript{55}Ainslie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48. Details appear in Chapter XI.

open laziness and outright disobedience, Carleton ordered the formation of an invalid company. This was for the benefit of the malingerers who sought to avoid the inconvenient but necessary guard and picket duties. They preferred the comfort of their beds and had no scruples concerning the additional burdens placed upon their replacements. In order to shame them, they were examined. Those found fit to bear arms were paraded and then enrolled with the true invalids. Their tasks included guarding the prisoners and the secure posts. The idea, of course, was to impress upon them the stigma of cowardliness in the hope that they would forthwith reform. At worst, it did provide some useful employments which freed the dependable for the more onerous and dangerous tasks.57

On March 14, Loyalists from the nearby Beaumont, told of the rising dissatisfaction caused by the invaders. Here was an excellent opportunity to test the firmness and vigor of the militia. Carleton also learned that the Americans had encountered resistance when they attempted to revoke all the Royal commissions.58 Now was the chance to quiet the critics. Carleton decided to strike at the enemy position at Point Levis. Accordingly, instructions were

57 MG 23 B 7, March 5, 1776.
58 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 54.
issued to the Seigneur of Crane Island, de Beaujeu, and to Father Baillie and William Ross. In the vicinity of Isle aux Grues, they organized a force of several hundred. With the aid of Seigneur de Gaspe, these militia, after a period of training, set forth by the end of the month.

But as the advanced guard of 50 men entered the parish of St. Pierre, Arnold, who had been informed of these activities sent two contingents of troops with cannon to cut them off. De Beaujeu's project came to nought when the advance guard was taken by surprise. Six Canadians were killed while 34 or 40, including Baillie, were wounded or taken prisoner. The victors, however, freed all but 18 whom they sent to Montreal. The others promised not to take up arms.59 The rest of the force prudently dispersed into the woods rather than face the Americans. In spite of this setback, the Governor was encouraged. Habitants, clergy and seigneurs had combined to fight the enemy. There was also a likelihood of support from the parishes near Trois Rivieres. But it was also evident that the militia lacked the stamina to face cannon fire.60


A proper degree of discipline was maintained within Quebec throughout the remaining months of the siege. On May 12, when a relief force was sailing up the St. Lawrence and it was obvious that the siege was terminated, Carleton added a supplement to the exile proclamation. He ordered that none of those who had departed be allowed to reenter the City. This also applied to those who deserted after November 22. Only by the personal intercession of the Governor or the Lieutenant Governor could any exceptions be made. The policy was one of reward to the loyal and disfavor to the unpatriotic. 61

At the same time, members of the garrison looked upon Carleton's face for a sign of reassurance. Morale was a major factor which the Governor did not neglect. On several occasions the militia was assembled for what might be called pep talks. Thus on May 1, he stated that he had a list of the disaffected as well as the friends of Government. "He was determined never to grace the triumph of the rebels." The example persuaded the loyal Canadians to fulfill their obligations. On the other hand, it may be doubted that if Carleton had really been in danger the majority would have chosen to fall by his side. 62

61 A Proclamation, Quebec, May 12, 1776, Transcripts of Colonial Office Records, Correspondence between Gov. Carleton and Lord G. Germain, 1776, Canada, Quebec, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 31-32. Hereafter cited as Q. XII.

62 MG 23 B 7, May 1, 1776.
As for the number of Canadian militia doing service at Quebec, the minimum was 300 privates according to the November return while a maximum of 508 was reported the following May. The latter total included 23 officers. In both returns the portion of the total force contributed by them was approximately one-third. It was no wonder that the Governor had a deep concern for their part and was gratified by their service.\(^3\)

When the army assumed the function of defending the province on May 22, Carleton dismissed the militia unit. In accordance with contemporary practice, he gave public thanks to the population for having faithfully endured the rigors of the siege. The exact form was as follows:

The General returns His hardy and Sincere thanks, to the British and Canadian Militias . . . , for the Spirit and Perseverance they have shown, thro' the Course of a very hard service during a long and tedious winter. He ever shall endeavor to give them . . . the strongest proofs of his entire satisfaction of their conduct, upon this trying and Critical occasion.\(^4\)

The last phase of the Governor's relations with the Canadians was linked to the victorious campaign of the summer and fall of 1776. The abuses inflicted by the American officers coupled with British strength served to

\(^3\)"Returns of November 16, 1775 and May 1, 1776," Q. XI, p. 344 and Q. XII, p. 35.

alienate the habitants from the Colonial cause. Nevertheless, Carleton failed to take full advantage of the situation though the clergy did not neglect the opportunity of withholding the sacraments from those who did not espouse the correct cause. Naturally, in retaliation, some of the Americans subjected the clergy to humiliation. 65 Even some of the prominent pro-Americans warned of the consequences of unjust actions. Hazen wrote that the habitants were dragooned

with the point of the bayonet, to furnish wood for the garrison at Montreal, at a lower rate than the current price; carriages and ... articles furnished, for which certificates were given, not legible and without signature — the one half of consequence rejected by the Quartermaster-General. 66

In response, George Washington expressed the fear that if such activities did not cease the habitants would join Carleton's forces. 67

In view of the spreading confusion, the want of leadership, the deterioration of relations and the unlikelihood of large scale reinforcements, the Continental Congress appointed a three-man commission to salvage what they could.

They were told to end the abuses, to establish a free press, to dismiss incompetent officers and to convince the people of the advantages of freedom. They were also instructed to inform them that the paper promises would be exchanged at a future date. What Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll found was most encouraging to the British. The Loyalists began to use the grievances of the population against the invaders. Carleton, moreover, never made the error of stealing private goods, for he had a military chest upon which to draw for expenses. Under such conditions, he did not have to worry about the possibility of large scale enlistments of the population in behalf of the Americans.

After giving the task of establishing a free press to Fleury Mesplet, a French printer from Philadelphia, Carroll, a devout Catholic, with the aid of his brother, The Reverend J. Carroll, vainly sought to win a portion of the clergy to the American side. Some minor clergy did help to overcome the handicap created through the curtailment of sacraments, but two of them, Fathers La Valiniere

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and Louis Lotbiniere, were obliged to flee Canada later and thereby lost their parish holdings. Yet, in spite of these efforts by the Commission, there was no chance of success because of the bigotry of the American commander, General David Wooster, and the staunch loyalty of the vast majority of the clergy to the King. Later Carleton rewarded the loyal clergy and others who had suffered incarceration with pensions. 70

More important, here was the nucleus of a resistance movement in the occupied areas, around which the Governor could build loyalty. War in the Eighteenth Century, however, was conducted by the professional soldier and not by the clerics or the civilians. Yet, the historian Lewis A. Leonard has chosen to interpret the bigotry of John Jay and others as the primary cause for the failure of the invasion. 71 It did play a part but this had not been an unknown factor before the invasion. The determinating factor was the growing British military strength, in contrast to the dwindling force of the Americans.

Another issue concerned the British commissions held by Canadians in the districts of Trois Rivieres and


Montreal. Wooster claimed that several militia captains wanted them to be rescinded. They insisted that the holders had only accepted the commissions in fear. Consequently, the American General ordered that they be surrendered and that the militia elect their replacements who would then receive Congressional commissions. But while many obeyed the invaders, others refused. Wooster had naively assumed that his policy would deprive Carleton of his authority to call these people to arms. Moreover, since many holders refused to renounce their Royal obligations, including St. George Dupre, several of them were sent by the invaders to Chambly. Nor did Wooster succeed in finding more suitable replacements. Election methods only served to produce disputes and corruption. Most militia officers in the occupied areas, fearing the advance of the King's troops did not dare to join the American army even if they still were sympathetic to the cause.72

The invaders lacked leadership, discipline, supplies, and currency. The Canadians declined to accept paper money in exchange for flour, wheat or meat. No longer did they have faith in the Colonial promises. Their shops, warehouses and homes were violated by raiders. Wooster, found

incompetent and undesirable by the Commissioners, did little to curb the abuses directed towards the civil population. The Commissioners declared that he was:

totally unfit to command your army [Washington's] and conduct the war. We have hitherto prevailed on him to remain in Montreal. His stay in this colony is unnecessary, and even prejudicial to our affairs. We should . . . advise his recall.73

How could confidence be placed in a man biased against the very people he was supposed to convert to the American cause? Forced requisitions by Arnold and others and the failure of the Continental Congress to obtain hard currency served to alienate most of the countryside.74

Carleton did not fail to use these developments to his advantage. However, he had no intention of repeating his former errors with regard to the loyalties of the population. He preferred to keep the Canadians neutral rather than again to test them in combat as he had attempted to do under De Beaujeu. Subordinate officers, nevertheless, were instructed to inform the population of the true character of the former invaders as compared with the attitude of the Crown. Moreover, the Governor was assisted by a primitive espionage system which had been in operation during

73Commissioners to Congress, May 27, 1776, Ford, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 119-120 fn.

74To the President of Congress, May 1, 1776, A. A., 5, Vol. I, p. 1166.
the darkest days. It provided important intelligence, though it was often difficult to separate it from deliberately false news circulating from the American headquarters. Loyalists spread rumors that the invaders were going to be massacred. A mysterious proclamation had appeared on several church doors within the invaded areas, calling for insurrection. Others secretly recruited for the King. ⁷⁵

The best available illustration of the nature of this espionage system is found in the activities of Pierre Foretier, a militia colonel in Montreal who operated an intelligence center. With the assistance of two others, he sent messages to the Governor through the device of hiding them in hollow sticks. The agents traveled through the woods along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence and, at night, used the roads to the Island of Orleans. By this means, Carleton learned that the people of Vaudreuil were anxious to attack the invaders but did not have the necessary powder, shoes or even bullets. While all this was going on, Foretier was obliged to billet the American colonel, John P. de Haas, plus his aides and servants. This served as an excellent cover for the work in progress. While the Americans slept, the Loyalists gathered powder

⁷⁵Ibid., Vol. II, p. 239.
and balls, putting them into sacks which were lowered into waiting vehicles. The supplies were then transported as if they were from the flour mill. Eventually, the goods reached the cure of Vaudreuil. They were then hidden in a fallow field. Because of this venture, a militia force under Monsieur de Montigny, the elder, was able to join the expedition against the Cedars in the spring.

The Americans, however, became suspicious but they did no more than admonish Poretier. In fact, after they began to evacuate, de Haas invited his host to visit him at Longueuil and told him that his stores were going to be pillaged. Feigning loyalty to the King, the American convinced Poretier that he should furnish the troops with eight hundred pairs of boots. More surprising, de Haas gave his host a letter of credit in payment for the boots. Nevertheless, Poretier salvaged most of his goods from the stores, leaving little to be stolen. Basile Proulx, a Loyalist, spread the news that over 400 British troops were on the way. Carleton expected Poretier to help in providing the essential lodging.

76Pierre Poretier, "Notes and Reminiscences of an Inhabitant of Montreal During the Occupation of that City by the Bostonians from 1775-1776," Canadian Archives, Report of the Department of Public Archives For the Year 1945, edited by Gustave Lancot (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946), pp. XXIII to XXVI.
Though the chief task of clearing Canada of its invaders was carried out by the regulars, Carleton, nevertheless, employed the militia upon minor scouting expeditions and upon the unpopular corvees. While thanking the Canadians for their zeal in June, the Governor was already planning further uses for them when he ordered them to prepare for the march of victory. Preparations were made for the contemplated recapture of the vital communications link to New York. Operating through the militia chain of command, on September 23, Carleton instructed the captains of the three districts to assemble their companies in order to take a roll call of the officers and men who voluntarily agreed to serve in the King's army. They were alerted to march on the first notice. The lists were duplicated, one copy going to the militia colonel and the other to Carleton's headquarters. Colonels Dufy, at Montreal, Tonnancour, at Trois Rivieres, and Voyer, at Quebec, proceeded on the assigned task. Volunteers were also called upon from the towns of Montreal and Louisbourg, the Island of Perot, and the parishes of Vaudreuil and the Cedars. They marched with their baggage to St. Johns, at the end of September. Major St. George Du Pre received

them while the militia captains at La Prairie provided the necessary wagons. Both of these orders illustrate Carleton's desire to use only volunteers. In each case, specific militia officers were told to prepare the men of designated parishes and no others. Moreover, only the healthy were accepted.78

There was more evidence of Carleton's leniency than was exhibited in those orders. Reports made by intelligence officers to the Americans verified this policy. General Horatio Gates, the new American commander, learned that Burgoyne had been instructed not to molest the population around Lake Champlain.79 Carleton's September orders came to the attention of the enemy when a habitant who had fled St. Francois with his family was interviewed by American officers. Moreover, after the fall campaign, Carleton placed funds at the disposal of his subordinate officers for distribution to the volunteers. These were to be properly accounted and receipted, with the beneficiaries signing opposite their names on the payroll lists.80

78 Orders to militia captains, September 23-28, 1776, ibid., pp. 180, 182 and 192.


In his use of corvees, moreover, the Governor indicated a desire to consider the feelings of the habitants by strictly limiting the nature and duration of the hardships. Corvees were essential in order to transport army supplies. On practically every advance, the Canadiens were employed to guide the bateaux. But they had to be relieved every fortnight as well as properly provisioned. By an order dated June 29, 100 habitants were obliged to work on the roads between St. Johns and Chambly. Their parishes, Contrecouer and Nercheres, were not to be called upon for any other service whatsoever. In July, the policy of designating quotas, specific parishes and exact duties was continued. The district of Montreal and those parishes which extended to the Cedars were not to furnish horses or carts to the army except for the purpose of carrying provisions. Those of St. Therese, moreover, had to be used within the confines of their parish and St. Johns. They were to go no further. Nor were the officers to use the services of the habitants for personal favors.

81Great Britain, Army in America, Adjutant General's Orderly Book (1776, May 11 to 1784) of Major R. B. Lernoult interest, Photostat copy, The Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 11. Hereafter cited AGOB.

Two additional orders show that the Governor had not forgotten his civil duties, mainly the welfare of the habitants and their ability to prepare for the next winter. On August 24, consequently, Brigadier General Henry W. Powell was instructed to examine the harvesting problems in the parishes along the Richelieu. The habitants, for this reason, were exempted from all military, corvee and fatigue obligations. To ease the problems of army transportation, provision and supply boats were handled by rotating troop detachments beginning with Colonel Barry St. Leger's corps. All subordinate officers were informed of Carleton's pleasure on the subject. In November, he advised the continuance of corvees in the late season only if those involved could still tend their farms. "I wish that nothing more than is absolutely necessary be required of them." He recommended the use of refractory parishes so that the loyal might be spared from the unpopular duty. Unfortunately, instances indicating a desire to discriminate between the loyal and the disloyal were rare.

Time and circumstance largely dictated the nature of the response by the habitants to the unpopular orders. During the summer advance of the British, liberated

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83 To Brig. Gen. Powell, Chambly, August 24; and to General Phillips, Quebec, November 20, 1776, B. 39, pp. 110 and 269-271. Problems of discipline are discussed in Chapter VII.
peoples hastened to express their devotions to the King. Though some were sincere, most acted out of prudence. The population of Montreal sent a flattering congratulatory address to Carleton in August, expressing their happiness for his valor and humanity. They insisted that they had always been loyal, ignoring their welcome to the invaders the previous year. Now with good reason they regarded the latter as unjust and cruel. The citizens were probably more concerned for their trade and properties than they were for the Crown. They wanted peace and order, plus the reestablishment of civil government. In response, the Governor declared his satisfaction at being able to terminate the rule of "tyrants." His objective was to reestablish security in order to guard their rights. He was only too happy to assist in the restoration of civil functions and, in particular, to reconvert the disloyal. It was hoped that the brave stand of the Quebec citizens might induce the Loyalists to rescue themselves. The response did not sound any more sincere than the address.

The opinions expressed by British and German officers with regard to Carleton's prestige among the Canadians were confused and contradictory. Naturally, it depended on

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whether seigneurs or habitants were considered. In November 1776, a German staff officer was positive that the Canadians loved the Governor because of his "noble" qualities. In fact, the observer declared that no leader had ever attained such popularity. Both the Canadians and the Indians "belong to him body and soul." Though the seigneurs might love Carleton, they were considered decadent, including those who served as aides-de-camp. They endured hardships but were treacherous. No wonder the authorities were on guard. The German officer also declared that the Governor's chief strength was his ability to "ferret out" any anti-British plot.

As for the personal views of Carleton himself, they were expressed in a letter to Lord Germain, September 28. Apologizing for not having previously informed His Lordship of the "disposition of the Canadians" so that the proper instructions could be sent, he stated that:

As to my opinion of the Canadians, I think there is nothing to fear from them, while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for when in distress; I speak of the People at large; there are many . . . who are guided by Sentiments of honour, but the multitude is influenced only by hopes of gain, or fear of punishment.

85Letter from Canada by a German Staff-Officer, Batiscamp Parish, November 2, 1776, Stone, op. cit., pp. 20, 26, 29, 31 and 37.

86General Carleton to Lord Germain, Chambly, September 28, 1776, Shortt, op. cit., p. 675.
In the spring of 1776, Carleton began to institute his plan to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal, whether Canadian, British or Colonial. They were judged on the basis of their performance in the militia. In order to achieve this purpose, a three-man board, composed of Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau and Jenkin Williams, was commissioned to visit the numerous parishes, particularly those which had been disaffected. They examined all suspects. Some became scapegoats. While the Governor found some use for the findings, he neglected to inform his superiors for unknown reasons. It may be that the conclusions were too partial or inadequate. At any event, they reinforced his view that the Canadians could be trusted only if troops applied pressure. The disclosures uncovered numerous instances of commission holders among the militia who had deliberately ignored the call of 1775. At each parish, the militia were assembled, commissions examined, and if the holders were found guilty of sedition or of neglect, their commissions were revoked.87

Besides the Commission, Carleton also resorted to the expediency of garrisoning British and German troops

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87 Francois Baby, Journal de MM. Baby, Taschereau et Williams 1776 (Quebec: Publie par Asgiduis Fauteux, 1929), p. 4. The details of sedition will be found in Chapter IX. Hereafter cited as B. T. W.
along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence between campaigns and during the winter of 1776-1777. Patrols were established in order to observe the behavior of the habitants, while subordinate officers were on the alert to feel out the traitors. The Governor still had sufficient reason to suspect the population.

Closely related to the above problem was that of discipline, particularly upon the corvees. There could be no encouragement of laxity or of sedition. In July, the Governor, on obtaining a list of corvee deserters, ordered a detachment of troops to go to the offending parishes and round up the guilty in a population not accustomed to the rigors of regimentation. The militia officers were obliged to return the offenders as prisoners of war. Carleton also suggested that a proper guide be provided so that they would not be led out of his power.

As for individual cases of discipline, Carleton usually approved of the actions of his immediate

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89 General Carleton to Cramahe, Quebec, July 25, 1776, B. 39, p. 112.
subordinates. In August, therefore, Burgoyne ordered Jacques Avis Louis de Rosier, Joseph de Rosier of Kamaska and Francis Poier of Belleville to be sent under guard to the Isle aux Noix where they were forced to labor on fortifications "during the pleasure of the Commander in Chief." The crime, they had disobeyed their militia captains, a charge found true by the commissary of police. Two others suffered punishment. One had failed to inform the authorities of the presence of an enemy party and had actually aided them. The other had concealed and clothed an army deserter. They, too, were punished with hard labor but also had to wear heavy irons. In November, Carleton advised the Seigneurs De Longueuil and De Beaujeu to try to win the loyalties of their people and suggested that the wives of the prisoners should not be forgotten. The Germans also encountered similar problems. When they captured a party of deserters, they also took two Canadians who had aided the deserters. Carleton approved of the form of punishment, whipping before the entire army. It "caused quite an excitement among the inhabitants, who will be careful in the future."

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90Order of Burgoyne, Chambly, August 8, 1776, B. 83, pp. 32-33.
92General von Riedesel to Prince Charles of Brunswick, late July 1776, Max Von Belking, editor,
Balanced with this policy, however, were increasing instances of abuses in the employment of the militia and the corvees, as well as in the treatment of civilians. Except for isolated cases, Carleton did not rectify abuses, even when they came to his attention. At least, that was the view expressed by the Canadian and American observers. But the statement that the Governor had never attempted to reward the loyal and to punish the disloyal, made by the historian Mason Wade, is equally extreme. It was based upon developments in 1777, when a more stringent militia policy was instituted. Wade ignores the numerous examples of leniency by claiming that mercy was limited to prisoners of war.  

An American account recorded the interrogation of two Canadian captains by Gates. Stating that they had been employed in the construction of boats and roads, they presented a picture which was not flattering to Carleton. The Loyalists declared that their cattle were being taken from them. The Governor, moreover, had not only burned the Congressional commissions, but had also confiscated the properties of those who either fled from

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the province or had served the enemy. In other words, the Governor's popularity was declining.

Evidence provided in the accounts by the seigneurs can not be dismissed. De Sanguinet found that the habitants were being molested and ill-used without justification. One Loyalist was even forced from his own home by an armed party, though he was lodging two soldiers. The people began to question Carleton's motives and sincerity. It was obvious that they were not receiving the treatment due to loyal inhabitants. They wanted compensation.

Though De Sanguinet probably exaggerated, the humiliating ceremony of December 31, 1776, the first anniversary of the death of Montgomery, did appear to indicate a trend towards a lack of respect for Canadian feelings on the part of the Governor, quite in contrast to his policy of humanity and conciliation. According to a German description, the celebration began at nine in the morning with a thanksgiving service by the Bishop.

Eight unfortunate Canadians who had sided with the rebels were present, with ropes about their necks, and were forced to do penance before all . . . , and [to] crave pardon of their God, Church and King.

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95 De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 135.
96 Private Letter from Canada, Which Arrived in Lower Saxony, August 1, 1777, Parish of St. Anne,
Seemingly the seditious or apathetic attitudes of numerous Canadians were equated with the worst sins of mankind; a political error was thus transformed into a religious transgression. Carleton had made his choice to support the unpopular but loyal Catholic hierarchy, as he had continued to bolster the seigneurs, in defiance of popular will.

In the coming year, the Governor leaned towards a harsher policy in regard to the habitants, as the reports of his subordinates and the findings of the special inquest on their loyalty had not been encouraging for the future. No longer did Carleton rely upon the militia, save in corvees or as scouts. The former professional bias against their employment in actual combat reappeared. But as their labor was essential, a new and stronger militia act was enacted in 1777, with the avowed purpose of disciplining the recalcitrant and the idle. Even though civil law was reestablished, it can not be said that the majority were entirely pleased with Carleton's justice. Yet, though he may have become confused, it was never his intention to be partial or unfair in the dispensation of justice and mercy. He insisted, nonetheless, upon harsh

treatment but not upon death to the disloyal. Firmness, backed by troops, provided the guide for the remaining months of his rule. These actions, after all, were based upon experience and military necessity.
CHAPTER VI

CARLETON AND THE ENGLISH MILITIA

The Governor's relations with the English speaking population, whether English born, Scot or Colonial, were hampered by unfavorable past experiences, aristocratic outlook, a military distrust of a people who emphasized material gain and, particularly, an inability to distinguish between the true friends of the Crown and those who were active rebels. His reaction to their just grievances was to ignore them. His interpretation of their unfavorable attitude towards his Quebec Act implied that they were traitors. He simply lacked the foresight to cultivate an understanding compromise, a failure he was to feel with deep regret during the invasion. By following the advice of the seigneurs, he offended his own people. Because of the abuses of men like John McCord, who had illegally sold liquor to the troops, or others who had robbed the habitants through sharp trading, Carleton concluded that the merchants were selfish, bigoted and materialistic. The Quebec Act had been designed to eliminate such abuses.1

1Arthur R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada (Toronto: Longman's, Green and
The result was nearly disastrous. Writing to his superiors in London to stop anti-Quebec petitions, the Governor alienated both the Colonists and the English settlers and merchants by denying them traditional rights. Carleton was also suspicious of many who seemed to be active in the seditious corresponding committees. What did the English want? In a petition of 1774, which had been rejected on the advice of the Governor, they had asked for the re-establishment of British property and commercial laws, the use of juries and the other familiar traditional rights. Since the Royal Court refused to hear them, their friends in Parliament, particularly Sir George Savile, uncovered what was believed to be a "Popish" plot to crush all those in the colonies who were fighting against tyranny.

After the enactment of the Quebec Act, Carleton's enthusiasm for his anticipated utopian solution faced immediate disillusionment. He could not forgive the one hundred and seventy-three signatories of the above petition. However, he had some justification, for among them were trouble makers and seditious elements. He knew of their

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2House of Commons, May 18, 1775, A. A., 4, Vol. I, pp. 1836-1837; Governor Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, Quebec, November 11, 1774, Q. XI, pp. 11-16.
town-meetings and their correspondence with seditious persons south of Canada. The enormity of the problem was more revealing when one realizes that the total number capable of bearing arms was estimated at 500. Thus the English, particularly the merchants who had been considered unworthy of political privileges, were now charged with causing disaffection. Cramahe joined in this hunt for a scapegoat by angrily accusing Zachariah Macaulay of actively preventing the arming of the habitants.

Carleton should have encouraged the active participation of the loyal through consultation with the important community leaders. However, it was only with the news of the loss of the vital Lake Champlain route that the Governor began to alter his policy. He still preferred to by-pass the advice of active citizens like Francis Maseres, and Henry Caldwell. On the other hand, the activities of Thomas Walker overshadowed those of the loyal people and forced Carleton to be cautious, too cautious.

Throughout the summer, both Maseres and Caldwell argued for reform. Both charged that the Governor had turned to the seigneurs for volunteers and officers in outright discrimination against the English. This was true to a certain extent. Carleton simply had not discovered a means by which he could judge who was patriotic and who was disloyal. In vain did Maseres write that his
people wanted to lead the habitants. "Their offers were not accepted." It was useless to state that Walker was the exception to the rule and that everywhere the English population was actively engaged in defense measures. A retired officer, a Major Cox, and the Lieutenant Governor of Gaspe promised to bring 25 volunteers from Beaufort to St. Johns only to learn that a seigneur had been appointed in their stead. In May, Caldwell wrote that the Governor was acting mysteriously in his plans for the recovery of Ticonderoga. He consulted only the Bishop and Cramahe, the only "person that seems to be in his confidence." In bitterness and in disappointment, the Colonel continued: "When I sent to Mr. Carleton . . . to offer my Services, trusted as I was at the head of the most Considerable seigneury, his thanks was the only answer I received."^3

The answer was probably due to two factors. First and foremost, Carleton was greatly disturbed by the widespread American propaganda which prevailed in the coffee houses and which was so vigorously led by a small but vocal British and Colonial minority. Second, he decided to rely upon his regulars in the initial stage of the

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3"Narrative of Freehold Conduct," Maseres, Additional Papers, p. 80. See Chapter I.

revolution, never anticipating the vast scale of its potential operations. As it turned out, the seigneurs did not have the influence that they were expected to have. On the other hand, the offers of service by the English, while not uncommon, were either conditioned by business reasons or suffered all the handicaps of the Canadian seigneurs. This is in reference to those Englishmen who had purchased seigneuries. The summer insurrections probably would have occurred even if British officers had been appointed to lead the habitants. Both Caldwell and Nairne, as mentioned, being seigneurs, had encountered resistance to their endeavors to raise the militia of their Canadian parishes.

The June 9 proclamation was an extreme measure and very unpopular but Carleton believed it necessary. In its form it applied to Canadian and British subjects. Anyone holding a commission issued by General Thomas Gage, or by Governors James Murray, Ralph Burton and Frederick Haldimand, was ordered to activate his official position. Everyone was instructed to obey or to aid the militia officers in their undertaking. Carleton probably had little confidence in its enforcement, realizing that the real hope of the Crown depended upon the regular army overawing the habitants if not the English settlers and merchants. He knew that the latter were divided in sentiment.
Nevertheless, he correctly anticipated that most of them, particularly those born in England or in Scotland, plus the more wealthy, would eventually abandon the sidelines in order to benefit from possible war contracts.5

The first test of loyalty came in the response of the English communities of Quebec and Montreal to the call for militia and volunteers. Immediate misunderstanding over the meaning of the new obligations and commissions arose to the great annoyance of the Governor who failed to realize the differing concepts of military needs as viewed by the professional in contrast with the views of the volunteer. As a result, when three English merchants were offered commissions, they were rejected because the merchants had meant to offer their services only for the defense of Montreal.6 The Governor could only lament the fact that the English could not be shamed into accepting the martial responsibilities of citizenship. Yet these people were supposed to provide the example for the Canadians.7


6Francis Maseres to Lord Shelburne, Inner Temple, August 9, 1775, Shelburne Papers, Vol. 66.

7General Carleton to General Gage, Montreal, June 28, 1775, Gage Papers.
The actual formation of the English militia, however, indicated that Carleton's pessimism was exaggerated. A company of local merchants was raised at Montreal. Its members organized to preserve peace and order, as well as to prevent mob activities or to repel an attack by the Americans. They were sincere but their military concepts were those of typical Englishmen. They would serve as volunteers to defend their families and homes, a view which did not include an extension of military activities for any great mileage. Moreover, some of them had petitioned against the Quebec Act and others had corresponded with New England merchants. Statements by Baby, on the other hand, that these people were zealous and courageous were equally exaggerated. They did offer their services for the defense of Montreal and they had subscribed to a provisions vessel which was sent to Boston with the purpose of aiding sick British soldiers. But they were civilians and not a disciplined military force.\(^8\) The Governor was aware of those factors.

Meanwhile, preparations had been initiated by the English community of Quebec after regulars were dispatched.

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\(^8\) A Mr. en Angleterre, Montreal, July 10; A Mr. en Ecosse, Quebec, August 20, 1775, Baby, "Letters," p. 340.
to St. Johns and other key posts. On June 28, they sent a petition to Carleton offering their services.

Sir: As it has been found necessary to withdraw His Majesty's Troops from this garrison, we, the subscribers, think it our duty, in the present situation of affairs, to offer our services in protecting the King's Magazines, as well as our own property in this place; and we do therefore humbly entreat your Excellency to order the Militia of Quebec to be embodied, and to appoint such for the purpose of protecting His Majesty's subjects, and your Excellency's most obedient humble servants.  

However, the manner in which this address was presented did not encourage Carleton. The best account of the proceedings was recorded by James Jeffrey who had just returned from a trip to Boston with important correspondence, papers and news of enemy activities. At noon, the petition was "smuggled" into Simpson's Coffee House. The purpose was to recruit soldiers to replace the departed. Since the place was crowded, many subscribed their names without reading it. Others did so, not desiring to be outcasts, or because their friends had signed. Before nightfall, however, a majority of the subscribers "would have been very glad if their names had not been there as the Govr. could not get any of ye French to enlist 'till they saw what the English would do." The dilemma was created. Carleton depended upon the example of the English.

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9To His Excellency Guy Carleton, June 28, 1775, A. A., 4, Vol. II, p. 1126; and The Quebec Gazette, July 6, 1775.
in order to persuade the Canadians of their obligations, but the English preferred to await the successful recruitment of the others. News had already arrived to show that recruiters were being driven off by armed men.\textsuperscript{10}

The full effects of such events were not yet apparent. The Governor still had some hope of success as progress seemed evident in the ample enrollments at Montreal and Trois Rivieres. Answering the English of Quebec, he thanked them for their "good Sense and Duty" and promised to do their bidding. In vain he might delude the people that the tranquillity of Canada could now be safeguarded from invasion or subversion. Did he really believe that he had the power to chastise the seditious, the Walkers and the Prices?\textsuperscript{11} Everyone knew of the circulating American propaganda. Yet Walker had not been arrested. The English, moreover, were not ignorant of the fact that Carleton had insufficient troops.\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, the militia began to hold meetings which were more social than military in appearance. Comforted by the existence of two punch bowls, the leaders tried to harangue the men into a proper muster and to select their

\textsuperscript{10}Jeffrey, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 114-117.

\textsuperscript{11}General Carleton's Answer to the Quebec Merchants, The Quebec \textit{Gazette}, July 6, 1775.

\textsuperscript{12}Can. Genl. Staff, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 3-4.
officers. James Dunn, who presided, said that if no one objected he would name four officers to lead them. With that the meeting adjourned. What could the Governor have thought of such unmilitary proceedings?

During July, while Carleton was absent, more militia meetings were held in Quebec. The merchants again gathered, this time at the popular Simpson's Coffee House. The purpose was more serious, to learn if they were willing to form militia companies and to elect officers. These actions, of course, were subject to approval since Carleton alone had the authority to confirm commissions. The majority elected Anthony Vialars captain, Charles Grant first lieutenant, Rendel Meredith second lieutenant, John Painter ensign, and Peter Mills adjutant. Dunn approved in the Governor's absence. Many of these officers were to perform excellent service in the coming months though one of them, Meredith, had signed the anti-Quebec petition. Two days later, they mustered on the parade grounds at the appointed time. Some did not have firelocks. They were reviewed by Justice Hey. What Carleton thought of their drill was not recorded. It certainly was not military. Grant did manage to form 50 of his men into files and marched them with a bagpipe. In

13Jeffrey, op. cit., pp. 121-122. The four were listed as Captains Neiran, Ecuyer, Alexander and Malcolm Fraser.
all, one hundred and eighty names appeared upon the militia rolls. 14

During these months, apart from Carleton's direct activities, Gage undertook measures to raise Loyalist regiments under the leadership of the retired officers residing in New England, New York, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The method was called a beating order, under which a designated commandant agreed to recruit a definite number of men. As a result, Allen McLean and Sir John Johnson were to provide significant aid to Carleton's meager forces in Canada. McLean received his beating order in June, 1775. His goal was to raise two battalions of five companies each or 600 men. Modeled upon the Royal Highland Regiment, his force was christened the Royal Highland Emigrants. Agents were dispatched into the neighboring regions with instructions to seek out Scots with experience in the King's regiments. McLean himself had been a hero at the battle of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747 and had participated in the French and Indian War in 1759. 15

14 Ibid., pp. 122-123.

It was one thing to raise these men but another to get them safely into Canada. In small parties they managed to penetrate through American areas. McLean succeeded in reaching Montreal only after Johnson had provided him with an escort led by Ronald MacDonell. The corps also collected 100 men in Canada, a force which may have saved Quebec during the critical months prior to the arrival of reinforcements.\(^\text{16}\)

Loyalist activities during September were probably encouraging to Carleton. A small militia force under the command of Captain Gilbert Tice was the first to encounter the invading Americans. However, it can be disputed as to which had won the engagement since both sides fled in confusion. A more disciplined force of 18 Royal Highland Emigrants participated in the early days of the siege at St. Johns. With its fall, moreover, an American report listed 37 captives.\(^\text{17}\) As for the militia of Montreal, they were


loyal to the King when Allen made his raid upon the City, on September 25. One company even guarded the market gate. Moved by Carleton's warning that the enemy might rob them, between 80 and 100 English and Ranger volunteers joined the defenders. They included at least 30 merchants, motivated by the desire to protect their homes and not a desire to go to the relief of St. Johns. At any event, Carleton found them brave and willing though their offer of service was limited. They lost one merchant in the affair, Alexander Paperson.18

But this was balanced by unsavory developments, particularly in and about Montreal. Several important merchants were concerned only with their properties and trade, an attitude which did not please the Governor. But if they proved undependable to the Crown, they also failed to serve the invaders. The fur trader, Isaac Todd, typical of his group, had dropped from the Montreal committee in April, though not because of patriotic reasons. A recent study has disclosed that most fur traders disappeared into the forests, thereby escaping all political entanglements. Donald Creighton stated that "It was the men whose business activities were least attuned to the distinctive commercial system of the north, who went over to the enemy."19 These

people did not find American propaganda pleasing. Rather, they saw competitive business and trade interest which could only endanger themselves. Thus, when Montreal faced its crisis, men like the Thomas and Joseph Frobishers and the Alexander Henrys were scattered throughout the fur country, hundreds of miles beyond the reach of either Carleton or appeals for help.

Carleton was confronted with perplexing problems. He was suspicious of all petitions presented to him, including those offering to defend Montreal. In the latter case, 57 inhabitants had published a patriotic statement in the Quebec Gazette of October 5. They subscribed to measures to counter the invaders, claiming that peace and tranquillity, trade and commerce, were being impeded and that their properties and lives were in jeopardy. They resolved and promised to cooperate in all undertakings to defend the City, their families and their homes. Though a fair number of them had already demonstrated their reliability during Allen’s attack, Carleton examined this offer with misgiving. Why? Two known supporters of the Americans, Edward Antill and Joseph Bindon, had added their names to the petitioners. In addition, several others had been signers of the anti-Quebec petitions. On the other hand, if the Governor had had an intelligence corps

20 The Quebec Gazette, October 5, 1775.
he might have learned, as developments proved, that most of the English had little cause to declare for the enemy.

Carleton's Fabian tactics prior to the disaster at Longueuil had an unfavorable influence upon the English community. In vain, Caldwell and Naime tried to persuade him to take aggressive measures to relieve St. Johns. Nevertheless, defensive measures were ordered and undertaken with much grumbling from the civil populations. The English of Quebec formed 11 companies, then under the command of Cramahe. After September 9, they participated in guard duty and in the construction of pickets, platforms, sally ports and blockhouses. James Frost of Rhode Island offered his services and his vessel to the grateful Carleton. They were promptly accepted, and the vessel was refitted and added to the naval vessels.21

But if some were eager to aid in the defense, others began to hedge and to neglect their obligations. In September, the walls of Quebec were repaired and the neighboring families moved within their protective covering. However, in early October, Anthony Vialars and Adam Lymburner, militia officers, complained to Cramahe that the Colonials among them refused to bear arms. They wanted such shirkers

banished. By October 9, Jeffrey reported with disgust that "Most of the merchants in town denied having applied to the Lt. Gov. to oblige us to take arms."

Moreover, sedition was common. Many Quebec merchants were disturbed when they learned that members of their community had collaborated with the enemy. The manner in which a guilty party had been arrested, however, served only to increase tensions. John Mercier, who had sent intelligence to the Americans, was confined aboard the Hunter. The English leaders, not knowing the cause of the surprising arrest, sought an explanation for what appeared to be an illegal and arbitrary act. Cornwall refused to consult with them. The morale of the English was damaged but, in this case, Carleton was not to blame.22

If there had been any hope of effective resistance before Montéal, it was crushed at Longueuil on October 25. Everyone realized that the city was defenseless. Concern for property and lives now took priority over resistance and loyalty, much to the disgust of the Governor who tried to salvage something for the defense of Canada. Most of the people wanted to surrender and refused to defend the British flag, no doubt influenced by American promises. When Montgomery's troops reached La Prairie on November 7,

22Jeffrey, op. cit., pp. 139-142.
the alarmed merchants waited upon the Governor only to learn that the city could not hold out. Suspicious of their motives, he replied that he was going to leave and that they could do as they wished. Out of necessity, they were obliged to open negotiations by sending a deputation of four to Le Prairie, a step which was resented by Carleton who had hoped to recruit some of them in the anticipated flight to Quebec. Montgomery's answer was an open threat of bombardment, destruction and plunder if they chose not to surrender. They were advised to convince Carleton of the uselessness of further opposition. There was no artillery and very few regulars. The Americans desired to take the City without a fight.

The result, indicated in the chapter on tactics and strategy, was the abandonment of Montreal. Carleton loaded his bateaux with all movable supplies and sent subordinates to destroy the rest. Royal dwellings were wrecked; windows were broken and floors torn up. General Richard Prescott even ordered the burning of some of the buildings, but the Governor countermanded the directive because an unknown gentleman informed him of the possibilities of widespread conflagration. On November 13, the occupation began. The English seemed satisfied that the invaders had

promised not to force them to lodge soldiers and had offered payment for all goods taken. Events were to alter their views.\textsuperscript{25}

The second phase of Carleton's relations with the English speaking population took place during the long siege of Quebec. Earlier, preparations for defense had been ably undertaken by Cramahe who had the aid of the militie. Though sedition appeared common, loyal supporters testified that the Lieutenant Governor had been "indefatigable" in organizing the Canadian and English militie for garrison duty. Fear was taking its hold upon the meek, the individuals having a great concern for property. Seditious meetings were held while rumors spread that traitors would open the gates. Cramahe worked tirelessly to put the City in a favorable defense posture. Loyal citizens, in contrast to the others, willingly mounted their guard turns. But others desired to yield to the Americans. Colonial propaganda spread throughout the coffee houses.\textsuperscript{26} Threats were delivered by Benedict Arnold whose small force began the siege in mid-November.

\textsuperscript{25}Trumbull, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 165-166; and "Articles of Capitulation."

\textsuperscript{26}Anonymous, "Military Journal, November 1775 to May 1776; chief events in the siege of Quebec; a lively account by a British garrison officer," \textit{New York Historical Society Collection}, 1880, p. 176; Ainslie, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 15-16.
His objective was to frighten the English merchants by hinting at potential destruction of property and injuries to persons if they did not surrender. If an assault proved necessary, "the merchants, who may now save their property, will probably be involved in the general ruin."27

Cramahe’s effective measures and the appearance of the Governor on November 19 produced significant changes in the morale of the civil population. The Loyalists now claimed that the seditious elements of the community had been dealt a damaging blow. Carleton was pleased with Cramahe’s progress in raising the militia and in improving the defensive works. Two additional steps were taken. First, Carleton approved the selection of militia officers and ordered that proper commissions be prepared. For purposes of morale, he then gave

particular thanks to that corps, for the zeal and attachment, they have shown the King’s Service, and for the good example they have given their Canadian Brethren, he makes no doubt but that they will persevere in so laudable conduct . . . and he will always be ready to bear testimony of the zeal they have shown for the public service at this critical junction.28


In response, Colonel Henry Caldwell, leader of the English militia, ordered his officers and gentlemen to gather on the parade grounds in order to congratulate His Excellency on his fortunate arrival. The latter had become the symbol of resistance and of salvation. In addition, the Colonel directed an official return on the number of dependents in each company so that the quartermaster could make a proper distribution of provisions. Carleton wanted a healthy, satisfied militia and civilian population within the walls of the City. Consequently, relations improved with the English merchants and settlers. Now it appeared that they sought to aid the defense instead of resisting it.  

The second measure taken by Carleton, who was now Commander-in-Chief, was to secure the internal defenses from espionage or sabotage by the numerous pro-American element among the English and Canadian populations. As has been indicated, the purpose of the November 22 proclamation was to rid Quebec of subversive individuals in order to improve the effectiveness of the two militias. Unlike Cramahe, the Governor did not hesitate to use the banishment decree. He was just in that he allowed the exiles to depart when he could easily have imprisoned them. He was unusually mild when he permitted all members of the militia.

who chose not to bear arms or who had once supported the
Crown but had changed their minds to leave the City. It
was not a sign of weakness but of humanity. The conse­
quense, a group of reliable men remained in the event of
an emergency. The fact that the militia could feel secure
from internal dangers undoubtedly added to the total se­
curity of the garrison.30

Just how many left and how many remained to obey
Carleton's orders had a profound effect upon the develop­
ments of the winter months. Prior to the proclamation,
the returns of the numbers in the militia were contra­
dictory. Hugh Finley, an English Loyalist, placed the
figure at 300, not including the 200 men of McLean's corps,
the 32 Newfoundland artificers or the 90 recruits from
there and St. Johns. The official return of November 16
listed only 200 English militia.31 The historian, Arthur
G. Bradley, however, stated that the proclamation reduced
the size of the militia to 330 from a maximum of five
hundred.32 I have not been able to uncover a return to

30 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 17.

31"Return of Men for the Defense of Quebec,
November 16, 1775," C. A. 1904, p. 368; Hugh Finley,
"Journal of the Siege and Blockade of Quebec By the Ameri­
can Rebels in the Autumn 1775 and Winter 1776," Menu­
scriptions Relating to the early History of Canada, Histori­
cal Documents, No. 4 (Fourth Series, Quebec: Dawson & Co.,
1875), p. 3.

32 Bradley, op. cit., p. 114.
support his view. At any event, the rebels within the militia were expelled, while some of the others had four days grace to reconsider their position. The other result of the proclamation was to insure that the scarce provisions would last longer to the benefit of the 5,000 civilians and troops. It also increased the attachment of the garrison to the Commander-in-Chief.

Carleton also considered the possibility of conflicts between the Canadian and the English militias, as well as between officers of one group and the enlisted men of the other. Past experience indicated a definite antagonism between the two communities. Carleton sought cooperation for the sake of security. In this measure he was successful. Caldwell described remarkable instances of wealthy merchants, worth the then fabulous sum of three to four thousand pounds, willingly standing guard in mixed units, commanded by a Canadian officer. Enforcement of discipline also helped, such as fines or incarceration in "the black-hole on bread and water."

By this time Carleton had decided to make more effective use of the available English leadership, especially since the seditious were gone. Confidence was now bestowed upon those who had proven their loyalty by raising and drilling the militia. In humility and in a patriotic gesture, Caldwell openly visited and offered his personal
services to Carleton in a successful attempt to terminate the poor relations between them. With harmony now established, at least on the surface, Carleton proceeded with greater security.33

In addition, all the forces were reorganized in order to increase the strength of the garrison and to remove any fears that there were too few regulars among them. In a letter to Lord Barrington on May 14, 1776, he described the new corps, which consisted of 70 Royal Fusiliers, all the marines and the Royal Highland Emigrants. All the troops received new equipment and clothing late in the month. Obsolete weapons were exchanged for more efficient arms.34

The actual performance of the English militia was conditioned on their employment as set by the general headquarters or by the corps and regimental commanders, including their subordinates. The Governor often displayed minute attention to details. In early December, for example, he instructed his subordinates to prevent anyone from using the route from St. Charles or St. Roch's Streets to the Lower Town. For security reasons, everyone had to


34General Carleton to Lord Barrington, Quebec, May 14, 1776, C. A. 1904, p. 387; C 1198.
use the alternate route via the Palace Gate. Carleton was also determined that the militia should be vigilant in case of alarm. The English provided their quotas to the daily guard duty as well as the night guard and pickets.35

Other general orders fixed assemblage locations for the English militia in case of alarm. Thus, on December 7, all militia units which operated in the Lower Town gathered at the market place, while those of the Upper Town rushed to the General Parade. The other military groups also had their places of rendezvous, usually at some designated gate, barracks or ramparts. When the sentries sighted enemy movements, alarms were given and the operation of these orders was effected. Often a specified number of officers were obligated to attend these exercises. Upon mustering, the officers in charge reported the effectiveness of the proceedings.36 It was just as well that these exercises were carried out either by Carleton's order or by alarm signal. Many militiamen neglected their duties and grew lazy in the comfort of their warm homes during the bitterly cold days and nights. As a result, Carleton

35 General Order, Parole St. Anne, Quebec, December 4, 1775, Vialar, op. cit., pp. 188-189. Detail concerning guard duty and discipline are treated in Chapter X.

36 General Orders, December 7, 1775 and March 12, 1776, ibid., pp. 190-191, 232.
was obliged to form an Invalid Company. Unfortunately, the returns failed to disclose how many of them were English. A return of May 1, 1776, however, showed that the English militia had been reduced to 277, whereas the Invalids numbered 55. The return did not state whether any of the reduction was due to deaths or to serious wounds.37

Morale was good, primarily because of Carleton's able direction. In fact, the English grew impatient with the security of the walls and desired to go out and defeat the Americans, particularly because the latter's sharpshooters were picking off the British sentries.38

The steps instituted by the Governor had been responsible for the American repulse in the critical assault of the last day of December, 1775. The militia displayed a high standard of discipline under fire and some individuals performed heroically. The Commander-in-Chief, consequently, issued the following general order on January 1, 1776:

His Excellency General Carleton returns his thanks to the Officers and Men of the Garrison for their Gallant and spirited behavior yesterday. The General was . . . pleased to see the Alertness

37 "Return of May 1, 1776," Q. XII, p. 35. See Chapter X.
38 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 21.
and sobriety of the different corps which greatly contributed to the success of the day...39

The militia were purposely assembled on the parade grounds in order to hear the above tribute to their courage.

Though most of the militia were confident of Carleton's capabilities, there was some unfair and adverse criticism. After December 31, Caldwell, in particular, complained of the lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Governor. In the Colonel's opinion, the significance of the victory was reduced to a mere opportunity to capture some enemy cannon and to burn down their sniping positions. The zealous critic, however, did admit that the main problem was not an effective counterattack but the preservation of Quebec to the King until the arrival of succour. In May, the Colonel expressed anger that Carleton had not crushed the enemy by means of a lightning advance against their weakened lines. Caldwell added that had the Governor dropped his Fabian tactics after the arrival of the first reinforcements on May 6 he might have cut off the enemy at the General Hospital and at Beauport.

With the end of the siege, Carleton issued his final general order designed for the morale of all militia units. That he was sincere in his congratulatory remarks

is beyond question. The militia had exhibited excellent
conduct throughout the trying months, fully meeting his
desires. The militia orderly books dully recorded his
words which declared his thanks for "the Spirit and Perse­
verance they have shown, thro' the course of a very hard
service during a long and tedious winter." He promised
to demonstrate his pleasure through civil measures. This,
however, did not mean that Carleton would have no further
use for the English militia. Guard and picket obligations
did terminate and alarm calls came to an end, but the
Commander-in-Chief also insisted that they must keep their
weapons in proper condition. They could still be called
into action in the future. Some volunteered for additional
service but the majority returned to normal civil pursuits.
The Royal Highland Emigrants, however, in accordance with
their terms, accompanied the regular troops in their south­
ward march.

While Carleton was engaged in organizing and
speeding the advance of his regiments southward, the
merchants living under American occupation had, with a few
exceptions, become thoroughly alienated by the infliction
of unnecessary abuses. The same factors, excepting bigotry,
which annoyed the Canadians also bothered them. The

40Vialar, op. cit., p. 264.
greatest concern to some was the trade of the upper country and across the seas. They wanted passports. Carleton, who had earlier believed that most of them had been pro-American or at least apathetic, now discovered increasing professions of loyalty. Yet his correspondence indicated that he did not understand their mentality though his agents reported their grievances. The Americans, of course, had to reject the requests for passports to London. Moreover, they suspected any trade with the British, the western Indians and the garrisons. General Charles Lee, who anticipated an appointment to command the northern American Army, ordered Wooster at Montreal to "suffer the Merch[an]ts of Montreal to send none of their woolen Cloths out of Town." The merchants, finding their means of subsistence halted, tried in vain to petition the Continental Congress. Too late did the invaders seek to rectify their errors.

Carleton was thus aided in his military relations with the English settlers, much to the disgust of the pro-American Canadian and English elements. Moses Hazen wrote that probably over seven-eighths had become Loyalists. The forced loans, unpaid debts and depreciated paper money had alienated too many. The only prominent merchant still enlisted in the American cause was James Price. Some of the others had fled in order to escape the advancing British
and German troops. The opportunity was now available to the Commander-in-Chief to convert the remaining merchants to the Crown. Several of them did offer their services. Trade was restored with the ordinary legal limitations. After that, however, the past controversies and distrust reappeared.

Individuals not only exhibited loyalty but also undertook dangerous missions. Allan Paterson, who had previously participated in the repulse of Allen at Montreal, spied on the American garrison and fled to the British expedition at the Cedars. Later he served as a courier for the Governor and Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton of Detroit. The English joined their Canadian neighbors in drafting proclamations of a laudatory nature in response to Carleton’s victories. On November 21, congratulations were officially presented for the destruction of the enemy fleet on Lake Champlain. They also reiterated the hope for peace and tranquillity while remarking on the "unshaken constancy" of perseverance and steady resolution so exemplarily displayed during the siege. The merchants promised in a burst of emotion to offer their lives and fortunes to the Royal cause. In a

\[41\text{Creighton, op. cit., pp. 64-71.}\]

\[42\text{Fraser, op. cit., pp. 268-269.}\]
typical response, Carleton acknowledged their loyalty, ardor and spirit but past experience prevented complete faith in their words. 43

The Governor discovered that increasing numbers of Loyalists from the neighboring colonies were penetrating his lines in the hope of securing safety. A good portion of them came from the Mohawk Valley of New York, the baronial territory of Sir John Johnson, the Loyalist leader among the Six Nations. In July, 200 Loyalists under the letter's command reached the recently liberated Montreal. They were more than anxious to offer their arms. Assuming that it was the King's purpose to help these people to defend themselves, Carleton empowered Johnson to raise a frontier battalion which was to be called the King's Royal Regiment of New York. The new Lieutenant Colonel was instructed to recruit his men in the fashion practiced by McLean. 44

Complications soon confronted Carleton when some of the New York Loyalists objected to serving under Johnson. In a dispatch to Major Grey, who commanded in Johnson's absence, the Commander-in-Chief advised that the


44 General Carleton to Lord Germain, Chambly, July 8, 1776, Q. XII, P. 102.
numerous refugees at the advanced British posts should not be treated as soldiers drafted against their will. They were, however, to remain with that battalion in order to be victualled and rehabilitated. A list of their wants was forwarded, but the Major was instructed on no account to compel them to serve.\textsuperscript{45} Lacking instruction from London, Carleton decided to join all Loyalist arrivals to Johnson's battalion. Moreover, he informed Lord Germain of the changing sentiment of the former seditious population in the vicinity of Lake Champlain. Many were now "sensible of their Error & desirious of returning to their Duty." They wanted a Royal proclamation to grant them the King's mercy.\textsuperscript{46}

Throughout the fall of 1776, Carleton repeatedly rejected attempts by the New Yorkers to form independent units, though it was obvious that they disliked restraint and preferred their own officers. There was no compromise. However, the Governor did grant them the right to depart or to follow his wishes.\textsuperscript{47} The coming of Captain Edward Jessup in November was but the start of a stream of

\textsuperscript{45}Captain Foy to Major Grey, November 11, 1776, B. 39, p. 251.

\textsuperscript{46}General Carleton to Lord Germain, Quebec, November 17, 1776, Germain Mss.

\textsuperscript{47}Cruikshank, "K. R. R. N. Y.", p. 203.
Loyalist recruits to the British posts on Lake Champlain. Most of them returned to Canada upon the termination of the year's military operations. Jessup's company had been recruited by Sergeant John Buel and Corporal Martin Kelley, but only for 82 days. Nevertheless, Carleton directed that they join Johnson's battalion. They received the usual rates due to commissioned and enlisted men. In a move to lessen dissension and in order to respect the wishes of Governor Tryon of New York, Carleton approved Jessup's officer and noncommissioned nominees. All told, the latter's company numbered 58 men.48

Other English citizens served as scouts and were valued for their experience in forest life. Carleton was only too glad to make use of these people. There was also a large number of Scots among them, many having previously resided in the Mohawk Valley. In June, as an illustration, Duncan Murchison served variously as a scout, a secret agent and a recruiter in enemy territory. On one occasion, he succeeded in bringing 43 Loyalists to safety.49 Another prominent scout, John McAlpine, reached the British fleet on Lake Champlain by use of a canoe which he cautiously


49 Fraser, op. cit., p. 255.
guided through hidden swamps. In his narrative, he described his reception on board the Commodore where he had the honor of a confidential conversation with Carleton. McAlpine recounted his observations of American and Loyalist activities around Crown Point, "especially a minute information of their state, situation, and force at Ticonderoga." This apparently pleased the Governor who decided to follow it up with a reconnaissance. McAlpine, therefore, volunteered to scout and, in addition, to procure cattle and salt from the country. Before he departed, Carleton warned him of the dangers of such a venture.50

The expedition numbered 260 men, including one Ranger captain and one Canadian militia captain. McAlpine was designated the "confident conductor of the expedition." They proceeded upon bad roads and through the swamps. Dividing into three groups, they captured enemy guards and procured cattle before they met again at a rendezvous. Whereupon, McAlpine organized another party which gathered 30 bullocks. The total take was 107 cattle, which included ten formerly owned by McAlpine but confiscated by the Americans. In a public declaration, Carleton congratulated

him and told him to keep his own cattle, an offer which was rejected but with the proposal that those cattle belonging to Loyalists be returned. The grateful owners tried to reward the soldiers but were forbidden by army regulations.

When Carleton began his retreat from Ticonderoga, he sent a sergeant and 12 men to help move the McAlpine family and their possessions to safety by means of an armed convoy. He did not wish to have a faithful servant subjected to possible retaliation. However, there was no way to prevent the loss of the buildings and the crops. 51 At St. Johns, the McAlpines were given ample rations and a house which had been confiscated from a rebel Canadian. In the following year, the scout served Burgoyne only to be captured and to lose his horses. In one final note, many Loyalists later demanded compensation and rewards for having served the King. McAlpine, no exception, claimed over four hundred pounds due to his loss of farm crops, animals and buildings, plus the cost of moving to Canada. 52

Carleton's relations with the English had thus gone through a cycle. In the beginning, the English Canadians had been apathetic or seemingly pro-American. But,

51 Ibid., pp. 16-19.
52 Ibid., pp. 20 and 65.
in turn, the Governor had been overbearing in his favoritism of the seigneurs and in his refusal to rectify just grievances. Misunderstandings continued to underlie the civil-military relations. The low point had been reached in November of 1775, when there were no troops to send to the relief of St. Johns. The militia had proven unreliable in spite of the claims of the English seigneurs. Yet much of the trouble could have been avoided if cognizance had been taken of the vital interests of the merchants, instead of grouping them with the seditious elements. During the siege and after the expulsion of enemy agents and sympathizers, improved relations reached such a high point that Carleton was looked upon as a savior. The merchants subordinated their interests to those of the Crown. The militia willingly carried out their duties. This trend continued into the summer because the Americans had been abusive and because trade had halted. However, Carleton, though accepting English services, remained suspicious of their motivations. He could not forget the Walkers and the Prices. The cycle neared completion at the end of 1776. At the same time, the Governor was capable of expressing gratitude and sympathy to Loyalist families by making provision for their safety and welfare. He was happy to accept them as scouts, if not as militia. But at all times, his ingrained professionalism dictated against
the continued use of militia when trained disciplined troops were available. With the latter, he included the newly raised Loyalist regiments which certainly should not be confused with the militia.
CHAPTER VII

CARLETON AND THE INDIANS AS A MILITARY FACTOR

Aside from the reluctant Canadians and the English settlers, the Governor had one other source from which to bolster his manpower. The theory that undisciplined Indians could be transformed into trained and obedient soldiers was first suggested by General Thomas Gage in a letter to Carleton on September 4, 1774. Describing the deteriorating conditions around Boston, Gage inquired whether a body of Canadians and Indians might not be recruited to serve the Crown.¹ The answer was that the Indians seemed favorably disposed but that their dependability might be conditioned by the Canadian response. Moreover, there was a definite lack of enthusiasm, on Carleton's part, in the employment of "Savages" because of their barbarous methods and capriciousness.² Gage, nonetheless, recommended that the proper agents be notified, even around Detroit, in order to institute the

¹ General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, September 4, 1774, Germain MSS.
² Governor Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, September 20, 1774, ibid.

278
steps that would be necessary for their recruitment.

The problem was further complicated by the governmental machinery which had been created for the benefit of Indians residing in Canada, New York and in the west. The Royal Instructions of January 1775 were strict in their definition of powers. The result was fortunate. In the western districts between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, there were supposed to be four lieutenant governors, one each at Detroit, Vincennes, Kaskaskia and Michilimackinac. Henry Hamilton was appointed to the first while Edward Abbott was at the second. But no one held the position at Kaskaskia, though the Sieur de Rocheblave, Phillippe Francois Rastel, performed the same functions. At the last post, Patrick Sinclair presided but Major Arent S. De Peyster headed the garrison. Hamilton encountered similar lack of authority and the unnecessary division of civil-military functions seemed likely to cause Carleton considerable trouble which he preferred to avoid. Though divided

3 General Gage to Governor Carleton, Boston, September 11, 1775, ibid.

authority proved a hindrance, he refused to interfere in neighboring jurisdictions, at least until ordered to do so. This opinion was favored by Colonel Daniel Claus, the superintendent of the Northern District, who favored subordinating all authority to the Governor of Canada instead of retaining a nearly independent agency which controlled the Iroquois. Carleton had the power to summon a council for defense and military purposes and he did send officers to remind the chieftains of their obligations to the Crown.

In a secret message to Gage, Carleton assured the Commander-in-Chief, on February 4, 1775, of the intense loyalty of the Six Nations, the proteges of the recently deceased baron of the Mohawk, Sir William Johnson.

I have ever considered the late Sir Wm. Johnson, to whom, I suppose, Colonel Guy Johnson succeeds, as having their Political concerns under his . . . Direction, with which I never interfered further, than their Commercial Interests, and . . . if I am not greatly deceived in my Intelligence, not only the Domicilies of the Province, but all the neighboring Indians are very much at your Disposal, whenever you are pleased to call upon them, and what you recommend shall be complied with.

A distinction was thus made between civil and military functions, as well as among the Canadian, New York and


6Governor Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, February 4, 1775, Q. XI, p. 290.
western tribes. Carleton promised to carry out Gage's commands to employ the warriors but his cardinal interest was limited to maintaining their loyalty in order to overawe the frontier settlers. This was not an easy task since American emissaries were propagating neutralist views among the Oneidas, a leading Iroquois Nation, and the Caughnawagas, their Canadian kin.

There was a great deal of controversy concerning just exactly what Carleton had in mind when he directed the Indians to consult with his agents in order to serve the King. Throughout the summer, the Johnson family managed to retain the loyalty of most of the Nations, who represented a significant potential force. Claus, John Butler, Sir John Johnson and Colonel Guy Johnson were willing agents. They realized that the Americans might know about their endeavors to enlist the warriors, especially since the Oneidas kept the Albany authorities informed of all activities. It was necessary, therefore, after a gathering of the Six Nations, for Sir John to promise to keep the peace. The Colonists had good cause for alarm, fearing sudden barbarous attacks upon isolated homesteads with all the accompanying destruction of life and property. Nor had they erred in their assumptions.

that the Johnsons were conspiring at Guy Park Manor, the fortified home of the Loyalists.

The Americans, however, did not know of Carleton's innate humanity, his sincere hope to avoid a relapse into barbarism. He did wish that they would return to their proper allegiance before circumstances might alter his opinions. A barbarous Indian war in the frontier fashion of the past would certainly not achieve this goal. This outlook was the controlling factor of his Indian policy as long as he held the reins. Though he set drastic limits to the employment of the warriors in military ventures, it did not mean that he did not want to take advantage of their skills.

The famous chieftain, Joseph Brant, stated that prior to the call from the Governor the warriors had already determined that they would remain loyal and would seek to protect the Johnson family for whom they had a great love. The Chief also stated that considerable time was wasted before the mobilization order. Carleton, however, merely exhorted the Indians to remain loyal to their past allegiance, since it was to their advantage to side against the Colonists. Brant, on the other hand, believed that Carleton could protect them if necessary. Furthermore, at the council in Montreal, July 17, 1775, General Frederick Haldimand recounted the past events in the
colonies and said that it was time the warriors prepared for war. He promised that they would be compensated for any losses incurred. Roger Lamb, a British officer, later declared that there were definite plans to combine the few regulars with the Indians. For that reason, plus the hope of countering the efforts of the Continental Congress to neutralize them, Carleton favored putting them on the war path. Consequently, the Six Nations and their Canadian brethren were invited "to feast on a Bostonian, and to drink his blood." This was not what actually happened but rather a symbolic interpretation in Indian style.\(^8\)

The ceremony involved no more than a roasted ox and a pipe of wine. It was an entertainment designed to win allies. If Carleton had not done it, there was a good probability that the warriors might join the enemy.\(^9\)

The events leading up to and through the Montreal Council of July 17 give a clear insight into what the Governor hoped to accomplish. He called for the warriors to announce their loyalties, intending to employ them and not to ignore them. Following the instructions of Gage and Carleton, Guy Johnson collected a force of Mohawks,


\(^9\)Roger Lamb, *An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, from Its Commencement to the Year 1783* (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809) p. 78.
Cayugas and Oneidas. Going from village to village, he eventually had assembled some 1,460 warriors. But it was no easy task to move them from New York into Canada, where they could cooperate in the defenses, under proper leaders. As a result, the Colonel began his trek to Montreal on July 11 with a much smaller group of 220 Ontario warriors and rangers. An interview was then held with Carleton concerning the raising of the tribes and the hope of securing the vital communication link to New York. All told, over 1,500 Indians, representing the Six Nations and the members of the Northern Confederacy, including the Caughnawagas, St. Francis and Twin Mountain tribes, gathered to greet Carleton at Montreal. But he was also aware of the signs of Colonial infiltration, as well as the adverse influence of the unfavorable recruitment of the Canadians. The Indians began to grow discouraged. Carleton lost no time in interviewing the chiefs, but then his policy became known.

The policy was not to ignore the Indians, as Colonel Johnson had claimed, but to seek some compromise method in order to avoid unnecessary hardship on the frontier population. In spite of urging by his subordinates for their immediate use,

The General observed that he had but a slender force of regular troops, that the Province of

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10Guy Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, Montreal, October 12, 1775, C.A. 1904, Appendix I, p. 345.
Quebec must depend on the Canadian Militia, that he had some hopes in a little time of assembling a good body of them and that the Indians must... be amused in the best manner that could be found, as he did think it prudent to let them go beyond the 45th deg. of Lat: or over the Province Line.11

Most of the warriors, who had visions of hunting scalps, now felt that their ways had been rejected. Demoralized and disappointed, Colonel Johnson proceeded to write to the Earl of Dartmouth, in order to present a contrary opinion. Before dismissing the warriors, however, Carleton did advise them to be prepared in case they were called to arms. He could not forget his earlier conclusions:

I would not even suffer a Savage to pass the Frontier, though often urged to let them loose on the Rebel Provinces, least cruelties might have been committed, & for fear the innocent might have suffered with the Guilty...12

Giving them presents failed to hold the warriors together after this news. In vain did Johnson appeal to Gage's instructions. Within days, less than one-third of the warriors were still encamped in the vicinity of Montreal.

Nevertheless, direct employment for small numbers was immediately found by General Richard Prescott, in the the absence of the Governor who had returned to Quebec. The eager Indians were used in intelligence and scouting

expeditions. Moreover, by Carleton's own express desires, 30 warriors, led by a white officer, had been dispatched to St. Johns. When news came that the enemy had reached Point au Fer on August 5, Carleton still was not moved to use frontier warfare. Prescott refused to disobey his superior in spite of all pleas to the contrary. More Indians, consequently, departed. On August 12, one group, tired of inactivity, took their war belts, but promised to return if "vigorous measures should be resolved on." 13

The Indians, moreover, complained that on the few expeditions in which they had participated they had not been supported by the regulars, even when a small party had gone to protect the King's Magazine at Lachine. Nevertheless, other Indians, though in small numbers, appeared upon the scene, in September, after Prescott had decided to hold the bulk of the warriors in Montreal as part of the defense force. As it was, he had sent four officers and 121 Indians to reinforce St. Johns on the 3rd. At the same time, Butler was nominated deputy Indian commissioner by Johnson, and then dispatched to Fort Niagara by Carleton with the mission to win the local tribes to the Crown, or to retain their neutrality.

In sum, it seems on the surface that the Governor was openly violating the instructions of his superiors. It may be that Germain and Johnson were correct, that if the warriors had been employed Canada could not have been invaded and the Mohawk Valley could have been saved. But such a view ignores realities and policy uncertainties. Carleton could not ignore the consequences of a brutal frontier war which might easily result in the indiscriminate massacre of friend and foe, of soldiers and civilians. Carleton desired to use them but only if they were led in a disciplined manner by regular officers.\textsuperscript{15}

Colonel Johnson faithfully continued his struggle in opposition to the Governor's humane instincts. Lord Dartmouth held high expectations of the loyalty and the potential military value of the Six Nations. On July 24,


\textsuperscript{15}John A. Scott, \textit{Fort Stanwix and Oriskany} (Sesquicentennial Edition, Rome, N. Y.: Rome Sentinel Company, 1927), pp. 42-47. At least one recent historian, nonetheless, has chosen to blame the loss of the Fort Stanwix battle by Colonel Barry Saint Leger in 1777 upon Carleton's policy in 1775. The assumption, which ignores the above, was that the Colonists could not have fortified the post. Who could have predicted such an expedition still two years in the future? The generalization must be dismissed as one based on hindsight.
1775, he outlined his views to the New York Indian Superintendent.

The unnatural Rebellion ... calls for every Effort to suppress it and the Intelligence His Majesty has received of the Rebels having excited the Indians to take a part, and of their having actually engaged a body of them - in arms..., justifies the Resolution His Majesty has taken of requiring [their] Assistance. ...

It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that you do lose no time ... as may induce them to take up the Hatchet against ... Rebellious Subjects in America, and to engage them ... upon such plan as shall be suggested to you by General Gage. ... 16

But these instructions were not transmitted to the Governor. His Lordship had neglected to send specified detailed instructions for Carleton's use in Canada. Carleton, nevertheless, called Indian councils, had met the Indian superintendents and did succeed in obtaining declarations of loyalty. There was no order from London requesting that he attempt to recruit the warriors in the traditional military manner. The only advice he had received was to raid the frontiers.

In a letter to Lord Dartmouth on August 14, Carleton outlined his accomplishments with the tribes. He reported the success of the councils, the promises of help and the employment of Indians at St. Johns since June

eighteenth. He conceded the excellence of the Superintendent's work with the Six Nations. He agreed to undertake the necessary considerable expenses which had to be met to hold loyalties, chiefly by providing entertainment and presents, a procedure he never liked. Because of American emissaries among the tribes, he believed it might be dangerous to give the tribes arms and ammunition only to have them used against the British.  

Nearly one year later, Lord Germain, the successor to the Earl, wrote a scathing epistle to General Burgoyne, highly critical of Carleton's Indian policy. Accepting Johnson's report, Germain charged that the Governor had kept the warriors idle so long that Canada was overrun. They might easily have guarded the borders, as they had done in earlier colonial wars with the French. The bitterness expressed was coupled with the Bath Award to the Governor, a procedure definitely disapproved of by His Lordship.  

While Carleton was busily preparing to meet the anticipated invasion, the Americans were cognizant of the instructions given to Colonel Johnson and the other Indian

17 Governor Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, August 14, 1775, Q. XI, p. 222.

18 Lord Germain to General Burgoyne, Kew Lane, August 23, 1776, Germain Mss.
agents. Positive that the Governor would obey such directions, the Americans began to organize a preventive campaign. Several daring adventurers were sent into Canada during the summer in order to investigate the situation. Thus, on his return to Albany, Garret Roseboom informed the local committee of the events which had transpired among the Canadian tribes. He reported that St. Luc La Corne was engaged in raising the warriors but that the Canusadagas, Esquasne, Oswegathie and the Caughnawaga had rejected proposals to take up the hatchet. In fact, the last named tribe was prepared to prevent the others from acting in behalf of the King. They had stationed 12 mounted warriors near St. Johns for observation purposes. Roseboom also reported that a small party of Massesagas, in war dress, had departed for St. Johns on a scalping raid. In addition, he had witnessed Colonel Johnson's recruiting at Oswego.19

Other reports exaggerated and distorted Carleton's plans for the Indians. The Americans fully expected that he would utilize all his potential strength. Governor Cooke of Rhode Island informed the Continental Congress on July 18 that Carleton was ready to "set the indians upon

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us," that he had between four and five hundred drunken Indians singing war songs. Cook was positive that once the Indians became sober they would return to their homes and refuse to break the peace. Another Colonial account declared that some of the tribes were either friendly or had declared their neutrality. The Reverend Eleazer Wheelock stated that only two remote Nations had promised to aid the British. The Reverend had no fear of attack as long as there were Indian children at his school in Dartmouth "unless the design be secreted." The prevalent opinion, however, was that Carleton would send his Indians against the frontier settlements.

This view was not altered by the initiation of skirmishes with Colonial troops much to the disgust of the revenge seeking warriors. A small party of Canadians and Indians, exploring the frontier, came upon two Indians who were carrying American presents to the Sault St. Louis Iroquois, the object being to induce neutrality. Stopping that mission, the party proceeded to Lake Champlain, along which was discovered a barge hidden in the green boughs.

20 Governor Cook to Rhode Island Delegates, Providence, July 18, 1775, Matt, op. cit., p. 257.

Shortly thereafter, upon returning to the scene, they were fired upon by Captain Remember Baker, a member of the Green Mountain Boys. He attempted to get them to retreat but was killed after wounding two Indians. It was a provocation which the Indians hoped would alter Carleton's plan to limit them to scouting parties north of the 45th degree latitude. Since the skirmish took place at night and the size of the enemy force was unknown, the party returned to St. Johns. On the following day, they found Baker's body, decapitated it and brought back important papers from American officers. Carleton, of stubborn nature, refused to allow the incident to persuade him to forget his humanity. In fact, the episode only served to reinforce his opinion that the Indians were barbarous.22

The fighting of September demonstrated the type of Indian support that was to be available in 1775, but it was complicated by evidence of apathy and disloyalty. When the Americans first approached St. Johns on the 6th, they were twice repulsed by an Indian force under the command of Captain Gilbert Tice, the British Indian officer. Carleton never employed the warriors on their own but under a proper person so that barbarity might be restrained. The skirmish cost the Indians six dead and six wounded. The

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22De Sanguinet, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Governor Tryon to the Earl of Dartmouth, New York, September 8, 1775, C. A. 1904, p. 373.
reaction to the encounter again verified the wide divergences of opinion respecting the warriors. Colonel Johnson informed the Earl of Dartmouth that

This, My Lord, was the critical time for striking such a blow, as would have freed the Country of these invaders and greatly contributed to assist General Gage’s operations, but such was the Infatuation of the Canadians that they could not with all general Carleton’s endeavors be prevailed upon, even to defend their Country.  

Yet, Johnson failed to see the interrelationship of the Canadian and Indian problems. Carleton recognized that the Indians could not long remain dependable in the face of the example set by the Canadians. The Governor commended the action of September 6.

The General gives his thanks to the Indian Chief and Warriors who behaved so gallantly in the action of the 6th Instant near St. Johns and desires that the same may be communicated to them and their Nations by Col. Johnson. . . .

The latter continued to keep the Indians in readiness. That Carleton was loath to use them was certain but that he would not was false.

The test came when Allen made his famous raid upon Montreal, on September 25. The earlier orders to Prescott to retain a large force of Indians for the defense of the  

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23 Colonel Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, October 12, 1775, ibid., pp. 345-347.

City now proved their worth. The day before the attack Johnson again requested permission to send the warriors to relieve St. Johns. Carleton declared that the time was not yet right. Perhaps he anticipated the raid? Besides, if the Indians had been let loose upon the countryside they would have done more harm than good. It was wiser to hold them, even if involuntarily, in a disciplined and alert status in the event of an American assault upon Montreal. The consequence was a major blow to Montgomery and no doubt surprising to Allen whose very life was endangered by a scalp hunting warrior. Try as they might the American officers could not hide their disappointment. In a talk with the Caughnawagas, Colonel Warner discovered that several of their warriors had participated in repulsing the raid. It did not help that the delegation voiced regret and attempted to blame Carleton for having made them drunk.

The effectiveness of Carleton's policy with the Indians of Canada throughout this period can also be examined through the correspondence of the Americans. That


the Governor did not fully trust the Caughnawagas in particular had basis in fact as the Baker episode had disclosed. Colonial agents had begun their work in earnest as early as June. Benedict Arnold prepared a special epistle for the tribe which was delivered by Winthrop Hoyt. The latter, however, was captured and subjected to a court martial until the Indians became incensed. They resented having their "brother" who had come to visit them from being treated so arbitrarily. They promised not to forget the insult.  

Abraham Minham, one of the Colonial Stockbridge envoys, in his speech to the New York Provincial Congress, reported:

> il fut arrêté par des soldats britanniques et conduit à Montréal; un chef indien réussit à obtenir sa mise en liberté en menaçant les Britanniques de livrer contre eux la hache de guerre: Carleton s'efforçait justement en ce temps-là obtenir le concours des Indiens en les comblant de présents.

The Caughnawaga and the Stockbridge tribes told the envoys that they would be happy to listen to their pleas for neutrality by willingly opening their hearts to the symbolic strings of wampum and belts.

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The July Council did not improve the situation though Carleton did manage to get limited concessions. Nevertheless, the Caughnawagas prevailed upon the Stockbridge Nation not to honor the call for arms made by the Governor. Their sense of security, however, was threatened by the fact that Carleton might dispatch a force from Montreal, which was close by, in order to coerce them by depriving them of their hunting grounds. They were too easily exposed even if the warriors were on the alert for an attack upon their village. Therefore, the sachems and war chiefs waited upon the Governor and virtually had to commit themselves to the defense of Montreal. They were then given presents and ammunition before being dismissed. But this concession was only temporary and involuntary. There was also the possibility that the Caughnawagas merely had sought to gain possession of coveted presents and weapons for themselves as well as for the Americans. Their sincerity was found wanting when Carleton called for a volunteer force in mid-September.

The influence was strong among the St. Francois sachems, some of whom did not overlook the fact that they had children at Dartmouth College. In conjunction with the Caughnawagas, they too decided upon a policy of defense only. Moreover, they dispatched messengers to the Seven Nations in order to persuade them to do the same. Thus a
portion of the tribes was lost to Carleton. The St. Francois, moved by the Colonial threats that 2,000 soldiers were going to invade, not only declared that they were not afraid of the Governor but also welcomed his enemies.

The weakness of Carleton's Indian policy was similar to that confronting his efforts to recruit the Canadians and the English militia, mainly that he did not possess a regular force with which to overawe anyone but those already loyal. Nor did he have the power to stamp out sedition and espionage, whether by local citizens or by the Indians. During the month of October, when the seigneurs and zealous British officers were urging a relief expedition to St. Johns and when Carleton still hoped to establish entrenchments at Chambly, he was thus faced with this additional problem. How could he build a reliable force out of the practically raw, undisciplined and unwilling militia and Indians?

Important American leaders, especially Colonel James Livingston, had easy access to the Caughnawaga Castle, even after Allen's defeat. In fact, Livingston personally led one hundred of his regiment to protect the

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tribe from the Governor. Everyone was aware of the attempts to construct a force of at least 500 in order to take Longueuil. In response, the citizens of LaPrairie welcomed the Colonial soldiers into their homes. They gave them bread, milk and other available edibles, even when not offered payment. The Caughnawagas no longer needed to fear the Governor. They informed Montgomery that they did not require any assistance to resist a landing by the British but they were happy to see the offer made. The sachems promised to forward intelligence. Soon after, they held a council with the invaders who treated them regally with ample food, including soup, beef, turkey, beans and potatoes. Carleton, unlike Montgomery, had never participated in the ceremonial feasts.\textsuperscript{32}

Some of the Governor's most trusted Indian agents also came under suspicion. Prior to the fall of Chambly, St. Luc La Corne and some of the Montreal citizens, secretly desiring a conference with the American Commander, suggested a meeting with the Caughnawagas at LaPrairie about October 9. Doubting St. Luc's sincerity, Montgomery directed his delegation to be circumspect in the negotiations.

and arranged affairs so that Carleton might be informed. It appeared that the American General hoped to involve St. Luc in serious difficulties. Though the letter eventually reached Carleton, he burned it without reading its contents. The messenger, an Indian, nevertheless, disclosed the activities then in progress. It left some important questions unanswered. Why had St. Luc called the conference? There is no evidence that the Governor desired one, nor proof that it was a design to capture Montgomery. Though Carleton may not have had a direct connection with the conference, it did serve to strengthen his Fabian tactics.

Shortly thereafter, Carleton made his unsuccessful attempt to rebuild morale and to relieve St. Johns but was repulsed at Longueuil. It was a gamble with the prevalent apathy and sedition. Carleton had to depend upon the militia and some 44 Indians. DeLorimier and St. Luc led the detachment of chanting scalp hunters. The outcome was a severe repulse, dooming St. Johns and Montreal. The Indians lost one chief and two warriors, plus five who were taken captive. They had performed satisfactorily but were no match for the

34 Clarence E. Bennett, Advance and Retreat to Saratoga in the American Revolution (Schenectady, N. Y.: Robson & Adee, c. 1927), p. 30.
Carleton did what he could to relieve their wants and provided warmth for them after the narrow escape. 36

With the approach of winter, the Governor decided that the Indians would not prove of value for the remainder of the year. St. Johns had fallen, which left only the possibility of a siege at Quebec, an experience they probably would not be able to endure. As it was, they had grown restive in consequence of the American victories. Therefore, many were advised to return to their homes until the next spring. Colonel Johnson and Brant, however, decided to visit London in the hope of converting the authorities to a policy of unlimited Indian warfare. They sailed from Quebec on the 11th of November.

From November to the following May Carleton had little opportunity to contact the tribes or to find any considerable employment for them. The Americans, however, did not believe him to be negligent or idle. The Albany authorities were convinced that Sir John Johnson was actively recruiting the warriors of the Six Nations in Carleton's behalf. They decided to thwart his endeavors. Leading a militia force of Colonials, General Schuyler began negotiations at Schenectady, near Guy Park Manor,

36 De Lorimier, op. cit., p. 260; De Sanguinet, op. cit., p. 65. See Chapter II for the description of the battle.
with the Mohawks under Little Abraham, a friendly chieftain of some influence. The Mohawks denied having aided Brant but evidence was produced to show that some members of their Nation had been captured at St. Johns. Schuyler then wrote to Sir John, on January 16, 1776, requesting a conference and he promised safe conduct to Johnson. By this time, the American militia numbered nearly three thousand.37

A list of demands was presented which included the following. Sir John was to yield all weapons, munitions and stores, distinguishing between those meant for the Indians and those meant for Governor Tryon. Johnson, however, was to retain what was essential for domestic purposes. Third, he must agree to a parole within Tryon County. All of his tenants, especially the Scots, had to yield their weapons and, in addition, must guarantee neutrality by delivering six of their number into hostage. The Royal supplies for the Six Nations were to be turned over, which, of course, would have been a significant loss to Carleton in the next spring campaign. Lastly, Schuyler promised to protect their property.38

38Stone, op. cit., Vo. I, pp. 117-134.
In response, after a slight delay, Sir John agreed to yield the weapons, save those privately owned, but denied that he possessed any Royal stores. Nor did he desire to limit his activities to one county. The Scots, moreover, while willing to surrender their arms found the hostage clause, thoroughly distasteful. In order to secure his demands, Schuyler delivered an ultimatum, by a threat of force. In protest, the sachems of the Lower Castle of the Mohawks, plus a few of the Upper, conferred with the American Commander with the object of preventing any contemplated exile for their leader. They wanted Sir John's terms accepted, which would be a virtual acceptance of the bulk of the ultimatum. Johnson, however, agreed to yield the desired arms and the six hostages. But, again, he reiterated that he did not have any Indian supplies. Moreover, he wanted time in which to collect the weapons. On January 19, Schuyler accepted the proposals and extended parole zone to interior Colonial regions but not to the seaports. After signing the terms, the Colonials proceeded to disarm the Loyalists and discovered a secret arms cache in the process.

It was soon evident that the influential leader of Six Nations was not going to honor his pledge since positive evidence disclosed that he was instigating the tribes in behalf of either Carleton or Howe. In May, 1776, Sir John
and many of his followers began their flight northward while the Americans were preparing an expedition to pacify the Mohawk Valley. In a footnote, William Stone, the chief biographer of Joseph Brant, implied that a rescue party was organized under Carleton's direction but this was unlikely. The British offense in Canada did not begin until May 22. Thus communications to upper New York were possible only via the roundabout route through the western lakes and rivers.39

Early in the spring, anxiously awaiting the arrival of succour, the Governor decided to take more aggressive steps in the employment of the warriors. The commanders of the western posts were instructed to send all available Indians to help relieve Quebec. Since great distances were involved, the commanders initiated preparations for the undertaking with the realization that travel would consume much time.40 At the same time, news reached Quebec that the tribes were still loyal to the King. Because of favorable intelligence from Upper New York, Lord Dartmouth again was led to believe that Carleton

might attempt a diversion with the assistance of the Six Nations and, perhaps, even reach Albany.\textsuperscript{41}

Though still using councils and small scouting parties the Commander-in-Chief believed that a major blow could be struck if Montreal could be captured before the enemy evacuated it. The consequence was a modification of his former Indian policy. De Berthelot declared that Captain John Forster of the 8th Regiment, posted at Oswegatchie [Ogdensburg], was directed to proceed with approximately 126 and a like number of Indians to the strategic post at the Cedars, then an American possession. Stone, on the other hand, states that the warriors, presumably under the command of Brant, numbered about 600. A more recent study counted 40 regulars, 100 Canadians and 200 Indians. The differences in estimates could be attributed to the tendency to exaggerate on the part of both the Canadians and the Indians.\textsuperscript{42} Nevertheless, it would have been necessary to have had a sizable force of warriors, though the regulars were few.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41}Governor Tryon to the Earl of Dartmouth, February, 8, 1776, Lon. Doc. Vol. VIII, p. 664.


The American commander was taken by surprise. Forster had no difficulty in debarking his force at Pointe au Diable, a mere six miles from the church at the Cedars. In addition, he sent two small parties into the woods in order to cut off the communications with the enemy base at Montreal, which was supposed to be the next and major objective of this expedition. However, a provisions detachment near the Cascade Rapids managed to survive long enough so that the presence of the British became known to Major Isaac Butterfield, the American Commandant. Forster summoned him to capitulate. The Major proposed a four-day delay, probably expecting additional troops from Montreal. It was then that Forster declared that his few regulars would not be able to control the barbarities of the warriors if they were provoked. If the terms were rejected he could not promise to restrain them. Butterfield then tried to obtain terms which would permit his garrison to retire to Montreal, whereupon the besiegers tightened their lines. The next morning intelligence disclosed that a small Colonial relief expedition was approaching. Whether or not it resisted an Indian ambush is a matter of conjecture. At least, the surprise succeeded and numerous prisoners were taken. However, the Indians seemed eager to practice their barbaric customs of
scalping, adopting or torturing, depending upon the circumstances.\textsuperscript{44}

It was soon apparent that Carleton's desires for humane warfare had been transmitted to Forster or that the latter held similar views. Only with difficulty were the 40 regulars able to maintain discipline among the warriors who regarded the captives as their own property. The negotiations which were soon opened with Benedict Arnold, who had organized a rescue force, cannot be attributed to Carleton. The Captain already descending the St. Lawrence in order to return to his base, was obliged to halt because Arnold had reached Vaudreuil with 600 troops. Moreover, many of his Indians had departed. Arnold was informed that it might be difficult to restrain the Indians from inflicting torture and death on the captives if the pursuit was continued. Therefore, a prisoner of war exchange was essential, in order to avoid the Indian practice of disen- cumbering themselves of captives in the cruelest manner.\textsuperscript{45} Both Forster and Brant tried to prevent a massacre but, as it was, several prisoners suffered death. The War Chief was reported to have personally intervened to save the life

\textsuperscript{44}DeBerthelot, op. cit., p. 237.

\textsuperscript{45}The Quebec Gazette, September 19, 1776. The exact terms appear in Chapter XI. Over four hundred and forty were involved.
of Captain John McKinistry who had been wounded. While successful in this instance, his influence was not great enough to save all. The Indians, eager for spoils, and angry at the thought of a treaty which might deprive them of potentially bloody entertainment, grew restless under the imposed discipline. Several prisoners obtained their release only because considerate British officers agreed to pay ransoms for them. Forster had to pay the Mississaugues, as late as August 1, from ten to 16 dollars in order to rescue 11 more men.\textsuperscript{46}

Carleton never abandoned his earlier policy of insisting upon respectable and disciplined warfare. Increasing emphasis was placed upon the need of properly guiding and officering the Indians. In a letter to General Burgoyne, July 25, the Commander-in-Chief requested that the Indians who joined the British army be "disciplined," as well as satisfied with gifts to retain their loyalty. There was doubt that he was offended at the cruel practices

\textsuperscript{46}Eben. Sullivan to General Sullivan, Montreal, August 14, 1776, Haldimand Papers, Papers of Secret Intelligence from Various Parts, 1775-1782, Vol. I, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 22-22A. Hereafter cited as B. 181 L. A. Wood, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 45; Stone, \textit{Border Wars}, pp. 130-133. Louis A. Wood, however, repudiated this account on the theory that Brant did not reach America until July and thus was not present. Nor had De Berthelot mentioned the presence of the Chief. Stone, on the other hand, insisted that Brant must have returned before the end of April.
at the Cedars. Statements like following were typical:

"I cannot help . . . hoping that the party . . . sent off towards Crown Point may not commit any acts of cruelty." 47

Thus Carleton turned his attention to smaller scouting parties and raids led by responsible British officers and Indian agents, which did not please the warriors. Brent was still ambitious for an armed confederacy. He contacted the Nation of the Two Mountains after his failure to win over the Oneidas who were indebted to the American missionary, Samuel Kirkland. The Chief complained, "I do not think it right to let my brothers go to war under the command of General Carleton as General Carleton expects and tries to have the Indians under the same command" as the regulars. 48 It was to Carleton's honor that he did not alter his policy in the face of constant pressure from the Johnsons and the chieftans.

On June 5, there began a series of conferences with representatives of the Indian Nations of Canada, New York and the west. The chiefs were received by the Governor with some of the German officers in attendance. An elaborate public ceremony was held. Accepting the tribal protestations of loyalty, Carleton directed that the visitors

47 General Carleton to General Burgoyne, Quebec, July 25, 1776, B. 39, p. 83.

be given militia uniforms, minus the trousers. The chiefs were presented with silver medallions upon which were stamped the image of George III. By these means, the Governor won their support but he did not choose to employ large bodies of them as had been the custom in the past.  

The British and German regiments which reached Canada during May and June needed guides and sources of intelligence. In these respects, the Governor found the Indians indispensable. Numerous orders to subordinate officers mention the presence of Indians in the columns advancing towards Sorel, Montreal and St. Johns. Carleton was careful to place them near the troops. In a letter to Burgoyne, he stated that warriors were due from La Gallette and the Ottawa River sometime in the early summer. 

The response to his appeals for Indian auxiliaries was producing numbers in greater amounts than anticipated. The western commanders had done their jobs too well. The Indians might have been needed if the siege of Quebec had not been terminated or if reinforcements had not arrived but the military situation had been so altered that their presence was more of an embarrassment than a help. Major

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De Peyster had already dispatched a band under the leadership of Charles Langlade on June 4. They had orders to place themselves under the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the vicinity of Montreal, or under the commanding British officer.\(^{51}\)

While preparations were being made for the first large council, Carleton found it necessary to send orders to his western commanders to restrict their activities in forwarding warriors. On June 20, Captain Forster learned that there might be a combined Indian and regular expedition which was to operate around Lake Ontario. He was ordered to consult Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell for any needed assistance and was directed to recruit no more than advisable. Carleton declared: "I have more than sufficient warriors here, therefore you will let no more come down here."\(^{52}\) Five days later, he instructed De Peyster to cancel the order which he had called upon him to dispatch Indian auxiliaries from his post. This had to be done without "giving them offense." Similar orders were communicated to the remaining garrisons. Though large


\(^{52}\) General Carleton to Captain Forster, June 20, 1776, B. 39, p. 27.
migrations were stopped, Langlade's expedition of one hundred and forty Chippewa and Ottawa were already beyond De Peyster's jurisdiction. When they arrived in Montreal, they were diplomatically persuaded to return home with ample gifts.\(^53\)

While these events were transpiring, Carleton was encumbered with another council which gathered on June 24 for a three-day session. The presence of all the British and German officers who could be spared, in their full dress uniforms, impressed the tribes with the power of the Crown. The Nations represented included 300 Iroquois plus unnumbered western tribes. The first gathering took place in the early evening at the ancient Jesuit church. The Germans have left the best detailed descriptions of the proceedings and the emphasis placed upon rank and prestige.

The high choir was covered with carpets, upon which were placed a row of stools. In the centre was a large arm-chair for Governor General Carleton, who during the whole of the meeting kept his hat upon his head. Behind him was a table, near which sat the adjutant generals, Captains Foy and Carleton, who served as his Secretaries, there were also benches, upon which sat three hundred wild men, with their pipes lighted, every nation had its chief and interpreter, the latter acting as spokesmen and translating into French all that was said to General

\(^{53}\) General Carleton to Major De Peyster, Montreal, June 25, 1776, "Papers From the Canadian Archives-1778-1783," Vol. XI, Coll. of Wis., p. 174.
Carleton. In order, however, that there be no mistakes, General Carleton had his interpreter. Thus each nation spoke for itself.  

The chiefs praised Carleton's valor and declared their esteem for his person. They stated that they had come to provide their services. The Caughnawagas attempted to excuse their former neutralist actions by blaming their failures to come to his support in 1775 upon an eighty-year old councilman. All the nations agreed to an annual engagement; the specific assignments were made later. At the end of the ceremony, they shook hands with the Governor and his officers. A few days of feasting and frolic followed. The Indians even tried to honor Carleton, Burgoyne and Phillips by presenting them with American scalps. No wonder Carleton did not want too many allies.

On July 18, the third important council was held with the representatives of the western nations, including Langlade's people. Numbering about 180 warriors, they had largely come from the tribes of Lake Ontario and Erie. They were Chippewa, Ottawa and Sauk. Since they had come from a long distance in obedience to his request, Carleton was glad to welcome them but he rejected their service. Thanking them for their expressions of loyalty, he advised the chiefs that on their departure each nation would get "

\[54\] Eelking, op. cit., pp. 46-49.
few silver dollars." In return, they promised to come again on any call. In addition, because of their excellent discipline during the long march to Montreal, they found their trade liberties extended and were promised roads. On the second meeting, they became somewhat jovial and boisterous after gifts of wine. It must be noted, however, that the Governor obtained the commitments prior to any drinking and not after they had become drunk. The warriors departed after giving him a string of corals. Their British officers had the difficult tasks of discipline and muster in any future emergency. 

In order to prevent further warriors from being sent to Montreal except under special conditions, Carleton dispatched additional directives to the several post commanders. On July 19, therefore, Colonel Caldwell at Niagara, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton at Detroit, Captain Forster at Oswegatchie and Major De Peyster at Michilimackinac were instructed not to forward any more Indians. As for the Ottawas, though they had been eager to fight, they were sent home with the rest since they were "not prepared to pass the winter here." War belts and gifts eased the tension. 

\[55\text{Ibid., pp. 52-55; Barnhart, op. cit., p. 27.}\]

\[56\text{General Carleton to Colonel Caldwell, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, Captain Forster and Major De Peyster, Montreal, July 19, 1776, B. 39, pp. 73-79.}\]
The fourth major council was held with members of the Sioux Nations from August 16 to 18. Again the best description appears in a contemporary German account, that of the Reverend Frederick V. Melscheimer, chaplain of the Brunswick troops. Numerous British and German officers, guides and interpreters were present. Carleton, as usual, was again given the seat of honor, flanked by his aides. On his left was the official interpreter, on his right, the Indian interpreter. A leading chief then proceeded first to shake the Commander-in-Chief's hand and second that of Captain Christopher Carleton. A speech followed in which the Chief declared that he had come to his aid only to find that the Governor was absent from Montreal. They were only able to hold the council due to the kindness of Captain Carleton. The Chief considered himself as a "Child" obeying his "Father." Though offering his services to the King, he pleaded for the Royal mercy due to the past misdeeds of some of his youthful warriors. They had murdered a Canadian tavern owner who failed to furnish them with brandy. Continuing, "I am told thou art not in need of our services. I will therefore return, when it is thy pleasure, to my own people, and tell them of the happiness I had in speaking to the Father of the world." He then handed a symbolic pipe to the Governor who, in turn, completed the ritual by smoking it while the interpreter
explained its significance. The Indians hoped that it would purify hearts and "in cite the General to pity and paternal sentiments." Several other officers were also obliged to smoke the pipe rather than insult the warriors by refusing. The council closed with the traditional and departure of the Governor.  

Two days later, the council reconvened. By Carleton's orders each brave received a silver medal which portrayed the bust of the King on one side and the British coat of arms on the other. They were designed to be worn upon the chest. Moreover, each received a linen shirt, probably militia uniforms. The warriors were promised safe conduct back to their homes. Carleton realized that the enemy tribes and memories of past wars made such a long trip precarious. Consequently, the western commanders were alerted to aid them in their passage and to restrain local tribes from committing unauthorized acts of violence.

In the fall, Carleton received an important dispatch from Lord Germain relative to his expectations.

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58 Ibid., p. 175.
regarding the military employment of Indians. His Lordship suggested that certain steps be instituted.

The Proofs which many of the Indians have already given of their Zeal & Fidelity, and the manifest utility which large Parties of them must be of to the Army leaves no room to doubt but you will have exerted every means . . . to induce them to a general Declaration in Our favor, and to . . . enable you to prevail . . . a considerable Supply of Goods, suitable for Presents to them, has been provided, the greatest part of which is sent . . . on board the Lord Shuldham, armed victualler now at Cork . . . & the Remainder will be sent. . . .

Carleton had already won the necessary allegiances for the coming year, but he was averse to using large parties of them. Germain could have looked upon the refusal and the sending home of western warriors only with disfavor.

The Governor, nonetheless, continued to use the Indians in limited assignments. Riedesel counted approximately 400 Canadians and Indians under Captain Carleton when the British offense reached Point au Fer at the northern entrance of Lake Champlain. Another small force was dispatched from the opposite shore with the mission of seeking out enemy positions. Seven Indians led by a British lieutenant fell upon an American reconnaissance party and may have killed 15 while taking no captives.

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59 Lord Germain to General Carleton, Whitehall, August 22, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 92-93.
60 Eelking, op. cit., pp. 67-69.
61 General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, Chambly, September 9, 1776, B. 39, p. 136.
It was this sort of engagement which angered the Americans, who thereby justified the murder of Brigadier General Patrick Gordon by one of their own scouts. Elbridge Gerry stated that it was in retaliation for the indiscriminate murder of innocent and peaceful frontiersmen. He added that if Carleton did not disband the Indians the Colonial scouts ought to remove the existence of the British general officers.\textsuperscript{62}

The presence of the Indians on Lake Champlain was a matter of great concern to Benedict Arnold. In fact, one of the reasons the American fleet was scuttled, after the second Lake battle, near the shore was to avoid Indian ambushes and to escape from Ticonderoga. At the battle of Valcour, which preceded it, marauding warriors had roamed both shores, the mainland and the island which sheltered the bay. Local historians verified the presence of war-painted braves. Carleton, however, unknown to the Colonials again instructed his subordinate to keep the Indians in a state of discipline and to protect the innocent. The Indians were there solely to prevent an overland escape by the would-be American sailors. Frightened local women had to be convinced by the various chiefs who did not speak

their language that harm was not intended. As for the prisoners, Carleton pursued a policy of humanity and parole. Those taken in the Lake battles were fed, made well and then sent home with an armed escort in order to protect them from the Indians who, no doubt, still preferred their barbaric customs.63

Until the termination of the year, Carleton's problems with them consisted of discipline, supply and preparations for the spring campaign. During the winter, Captain Fraser was informed that the Governor desired "that some English officers reside in all . . . villages, contrary to any local opinions given by the Canadians." Preference was given to those who had served with the tribes, but it was voluntary. More gifts were presented to the loyal, but they had to have official approval. If this order was not obeyed, the guilty person found his pay stopped. Exact receipts and returns had to be prepared.64

In order to provide the Indians with necessities and gifts, the Governor relied upon the services of his


64 Captain Foy to Captain Fraser, Quebec, November 20, 1776, E. 39, pp. 272-273.
paymaster general and reputable local merchants. Moreover, the London authorities began to ship presents on their own. Indian agents received official warrants for expenses. Captain Fraser, an assistant superintendent, learned that he was to obtain £1,000 sterling and that his accounts would be examined in the interest of economy. Nevertheless, evidence of abuse was uncovered by the Commander-in-Chief, who wrote that:

The Indian Presents sent out this year I know not by whom, have been so improperly chosen, that they were of little use; as it is of so material a consequence to gain these People, I have been obliged to make them very considerable Presents, and for the next year's ordered Messers. Orilat and Forietier of Montreal, two honest Merchants, well acquainted with this trade, and very zealous Subjects, to commission out a parcel of Indian Goods...

The two merchants had sent their plan for supplying provisions and present to Carleton on September 20. It was approved. In fact, Carleton appointed them to the task of supplying Canadian Indians

according to the Orders and direction which you may from time to time receive from me, or from those in authority under me, and that you may have goods necessary for the Savages next year, it is my desire that you order from England... a proper Assortment of Goods... to the amount of £14,000 Sterling the first cost in England

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65 To Captain Fraser, Quebec, November 25, 1776, ibid., p. 278.
on account of Government to be paid for according to your proposals.66

In order to prepare for the 1777 campaign, Carleton sent instructions to the various British officers and Indian agents on October 8, 1776. Caldwell was informed that Langlade had been advised to gather 200 warriors and the several commanders were directed to aid in the project. Moreover, De Peyster gave two medals and a "Gorget" to the chiefs in the Langlade party. Carleton had a high regard for that agent unlike some of the others, who were classified as selfish and deceitful.67

The situation in the western region became serious because of the known intrigues of the Virginians. Yet, Hamilton received no additional orders from the Governor, except to hold the braves in readiness. At the same time, The Lieutenant Governor had difficulty in restraining them from all unauthorized raids. The Indians considered themselves provoked by the Americans. Nevertheless, either by his own design or that of the Governor, the warriors of the Ottawa, Chippawa, and Wyandot Nations were placed under


67 General Carleton to Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell and Captain DePeyster, Off Point au Fer, October 6, 1776, B. 39, pp. 201-203.
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell at Niagara.

Hamilton did his best to obey Carleton's directives and like him hoped that the Americans would realize the error of their ways. Perhaps, then, barbarism would be avoided.68

Later in October, Carleton learned that the Spanish were attempting to influence the Indians against the King. He received a detailed report from the Sieur De Rocheblave. Since war had not yet broken out with that nation, the Commander-in-Chief advised caution in the hope of preventing an unnecessary breach. However, everything was done to discredit American and Spanish propaganda. Carleton relied upon the officers and Indian agents to hold the loyalties of the tribes during the winter.69

On the other hand, he no longer feared the alienation of the Six Nations or the Canadian tribes. The passage of time served to solidify his prestige, especially since the former military reverses had become victories. He had resisted pressures urging the use of large Indian groups but, nevertheless, had modified his policy in two ways. First, he attempted the Cedars campaign and the


capture of Montreal. That had failed and only resulted in reinforcing his humane convictions. Second, the Indians had been sent south of the 45th Parallel in September. Yet, if barbarities occurred they were contrary to his desires. In the coming year, because of controversies with Lord Germain, Carleton lost control of Indian Affairs. Though His Lordship cannot be entirely blamed since he had expected discipline to be imposed on the large warrior parties he favored, the killing of Jane McRrea was one of the turning points of the Revolution. Perhaps, Carleton might have avoided such an incident.
CHAPTER VIII

THE MAINTENANCE OF MANPOWER STRENGTH

The maintenance of a regular force of trained British and Loyalist regiments involved complications in regard to rank, promotion, recruitment and allowances. Some of these aspects were regulated by Royal decree and by the King's ministers in London, and others by the personal attention of Sir Guy Carleton. In none, however, did he have a free hand, because of limitations of power and ministerial interference caused partly by geographic handicaps and partly by dominant personalities.

The Royal Rules of Rank and Authority, dated February 9, 1765, attempted in part to prevent any disputes which might originate over the proper issuance and enforcement of orders between military officers and civil representatives.

Together with the "Instructions of 1776 to the Royal Governors" and the commission as Commander-in-Chief, these Rules set the pattern by which Carleton managed, with a fair degree of accomplishment, to maintain and recruit a respectable if somewhat limited regular force in Canada and along the frontiers. His jurisdiction was
extended in October of 1775, when he was made Major General and Commander-in-Chief of his province as well as the western posts. Subordinate officers were instructed to obey "accordingly." In the event of his death, the Ministry decided sometime early in 1776 that command would devolve on General William Howe, though it appears that Major General George Clinton was the original nominee, at least until he was dispatched to Cape Fear, North Carolina.

The Royal Rules of Rank and Authority consisted of two explanatory documents, both of which were designed to serve as guides to Crown officials. The first, entitled The Royal Extract on Rank and Precedence, based on regulations formulated under George II, was again instituted "in order to prevent all abuses" between military and civil officers of the several ranks. The Commander-in-Chief with the Great Seal of Great Britain led the list, followed by the captains general, colonial governors, staff officers of general rank, captains general and commander-in-chiefs of colonies when out of their governments, lieutenant governors and council presidents, colonels, lieutenant governors and council presidents when the commander-in-chief was out of the colony, governors of charter colonies and if not in

1Order of General Gage, October 10, 1775, B. 23, p. 156.

their areas field officers below colonels and lieutenant governors of proprietary colonies, and absentee charter governors. All rank and precedence originated with the date of the commissions or charters.3

The second document, His Majesty's Orders Ascertaining the Power and Authority of the Civil Governors over His Majesty's Forces, attempted to define the relative powers and functions of the different civil and military officers. George III intended to make his commanders-in-chief supreme in all military matters with all American civil officers duly obeying without controversy. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, however, the civil governor, acting with or without the council, could "give such orders for the marching of troops, the disposition of them," escorts and detachments, plus other purely military matters which did not conflict with those of the superior military officers. The troop commanders had to report all directions given to them by civil authorities. The governor, moreover, was supreme as long as he was not under a brigadier general or commander-in-chief. Military returns, regarding magazines, fortifications and troops, nevertheless were made available to both the ranking military and civil officials. The governor, however, was not

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3Royal Extract on Rank and Precedence, Court at St. James, December 17, 1765, B. 83, pp. 64-65.
to interfere in the details of regimental duty or discipline. If the commander-in-chief were in the area only he had the power to issue military orders. Fortunately as governor as well as commander-in-chief, Carleton avoided much of the civil and military disputes that arise under such conditions as rebellion.

Events, nevertheless, show that he did not escape all civil and military disputes or even those between those of the armed services, particularly regarding rank and precedents in the German and British regiments. Lord Germain interfered directly in the matter of conferring rank on members of the foreign auxiliaries. His Lordship hoped that a list of commissions would prevent any complications or any embarrassment or inconvenience from any claim in the General Officers of the foreign troops to have command in consequence of superior rank to the natural born subjects . . . upon whom it is His Majesty's intention that the command in all cases devolve.5

The prejudice of the Anglo-Saxons was again made evident. Though instructed to give priority to nationals, Carleton welcomed and made full use of the services of General

4"Copy of His Majesty's Orders Ascertaining the Power and Authority of the Civil Governors over His Majesty's Forces, stationed in the respective Provinces, February 9, 1765,"ibid., pp. 65-66.

Friedrick Von Riedesel which surprised the letter. The other British commanders did not evaluate equally the abilities of the Germans.

Among the British regulars and the Loyalist regiments, Carleton encountered numerous protesting memorials and complaints, some minor in character, but which occupied a considerable portion of his busy schedule. The Royal Highland Emigrants appear to have led the way with their constant bickering and claims to rank. One affair involved two military jurisdictions. When General Howe commissioned Neil MacLean as a captain on June 14, 1775, three captains thought that their commissions antedated his. The three, moreover, had been commissioned captains by one of Carleton’s beating orders, two days earlier. Howe, however, gave precedence to his candidate in seeming violation of the rules of seniority. This was a result of a conflict of commissions separately issued by two different generals. Carleton evaded the problem by dispatching a memorial to London. He was never one to argue with other general officers, even if he might disagree with them. He correctly recognized that unity among the general officers was a necessity in time of war. On the other hand, there was

6 The Memorial of Captain Alexander Fraser, George MacDougal and Malcolm Fraser of His Majesty’s Regiment of Royal Highland Emigrants, no date, M. 319, pp. 6-7. See Appendix C, No. 1.
little he could do to prevent the rise of cliques and followings of some of the officers who had influence, such as Colonel Allan McLean. Carleton refused to take sides, though he might make recommendations in behalf of worthy men.

Promotions were often left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief who did recommend specific individuals for particular positions. Though those pointed out might exercise their duties, final confirmation still had to come from the War Office or the Royal ministers. In general, disapproval was uncommon, though when it did occur serious complications did develop. During the first year of the Revolution, the Governor, finding his communications cut off with his superior at Boston, had no choice but to nominate and use all officials available for the successful prosecution of the war. Appointments were usually made in the form of a general order which Carleton endeavored to have confirmed as soon as possible. After October, however, no confirmation could be made from Boston since General Gage was recalled to London.

In the meantime, Carleton found himself in need of a "little staff." He recommended and employed the services of an able ex-veteran on half pay in the office of quartermaster general. Major Carden was a man in whom the Governor could place confidence and a man, moreover,
who knew the Montreal area. In addition, in his letter to the London superiors, Carleton stated that Carden's two sons had purchased commissions which left him destitute. When Lord Barrington of the War Office was finally able to send the Royal confirmation of the nomination, it did not reach Canada until after Allen's unsuccessful raid upon Montreal, in the course of which Carden died from wounds. The practice of dispatching approval of selections was maintained but was cumbersome due to the vast distance and primitive means of transportation between Quebec and London. Handicapped as he was, Carleton did not hesitate to nominate proper candidates but engineers were lacking.

With the passage of time, the orderly books of the different regiments became filled with numerous appointments, all by means of general orders issued from Carleton's headquarters. These orders were generally short and specific and concise. Such orders were also found in the regiments under the command of General John

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7 Major General Carleton to General Gage, Quebec, January 26, 1775, Gage Papers, American Series; and to Lord Barrington, Montreal, June 7, 1775, Great Britain, Public Record Office, War Office, Class 1, Vol. 1, lettered on the back North America, 1773-1776, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress.

Burgoyne. A few examples will suffice. An order of June 3, 1776, named Captain Edward Poy of the Royal Artillery deputy adjutant general to the army in Canada. Other selections were made to fill vacancies for staff positions and majors of brigade. The phraseology of these orders indicated the existence of a standard format. On May 8, 1776, "Major Thomas Carleton is appointed Quarter Master General and is to be obeyed as such" and three days later, "Captain Christopher Carleton is appointed Aid-de-Camp to His Excellency the Commander in Chief and is to be obeyed as such." The obeying clause meant that the nominees had the authority to employ the full power of rank, precedence and discipline as defined by the Articles of War. Though this example might indicate nepotism, the Governor always made his selections on the basis of merit and seniority. Others receiving advanced offices included Allan McLean as adjutant general and Captain Little John as master attendant and naval storekeeper for the district between St. Johns and the mouth of the Sorel River.10

During the victorious advance of the summer of 1776, Carleton divided his army into four brigades and nominated

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10 General Orders, Quebec, May 8, June 6, and July 17, 1776, B. 83, pp. 1, 5 and 22-23.
a brigadier general to each. The new brigadiers named were all lieutenant colonels, William Nesbitt of the 47th Regiment, Simeon Fraser of the 24th Regiment, Henry Watson Powell of the 53rd Regiment and Patrick Gordon of the 29th Regiment. When informed of this transaction, Lord Germain assented but noted two complications. One of the generals was an artillery officer, and it was not customary to promote them to posts. His Lordship stated that the involved promotion must not be construed as a precedent. The second complication concerned the fact that a victorious march would place these brigades in the jurisdiction of General Howe, presuming the army penetrated to Albany. If such an event occurred, the brigadiers were to again serve as lieutenant colonels. This was not a slap at Carleton but a matter of justice to officers of equal rank but higher seniority in Howe's army. Closely linked to this aspect was the fact that Carleton would compete with Howe, who though younger held equal rank. The latter, however,

11 General Carleton to Lord Germain, Montreal, June 22, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 68; and Lord Germain to General Carleton, Whitehall, August 22, 1776, ibid., p. 86.

12 Lord Germain to General Carleton, August 17, 1776, Transcripts of Colonial Office Records, Correspondence between Gov. Carleton, Genl. Burgoyne and Lord Germain, 1777, Canada, Quebec, No. 13, Public Archives of Canada, p. 238. Hereafter cited as Q. XIII.

13 General Howe to Lord Germain, Halifax, June 7, 1776, Historical Manuscript Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stanfurd-Sackville of Drayton House,
informed His Lordship "That he [Carleton] may be assured no difficulties can arise on my part, respecting his command upon a junction of the two armies." He was more than willing to cooperate and to act under the direction of the Governor.

The British officers, despite army regulations requiring the presence of Anglican chaplains for each regiment, were generally without the services of religious personnel. Carleton, though not a religious enthusiast, complained periodically that he had only two Anglican chaplains to perform all the necessary functions of the Church for the benefit of the troops. He had to rely upon the services of the Reverend Mr. Brudenell, who had accompanied one of the general officers to Canada. Even when there were unemployed clerics within his jurisdiction, Carleton does not appear to have exerted any considerable effort to obtain their services. The Reverend Mr. Lewis Guerry was named to one of the parishes, but proved to be negligent in his tasks. Since his presence was no longer desired, he was obliged to return to England, though he


might have been of service as a chaplain. 15 On the other hand, Carleton, recognizing that many of the soldiers were Roman Catholics, did accept the services of the Loyalist Priest, John McKenna. With the approval of the leading members of the Canadian Catholic hierarchy, the Priest officiated for the benefit of the Irish, British and German Catholics, migrating from post to post and encouraging his flocks to remain steadfast to the King. In appreciation Carleton paid him the annual sum of £150 and published an approbation of his conduct. 16

Subordinate officers, moreover, presented their own candidates for approval. Generally, the Governor affirmed the selections unless there were grounds for rejection. In June 1776, it was found necessary to block the nomination of a Mister Wauchop, since the selection was not in conformity to the army regulations. But, strangely enough, Carleton recommended that he receive the salary that would have come with the office. Even Cramahe discovered one of his favorites could not obtain the desired


post. In this case, Carleton uncovered security doubts regarding the candidate's loyalty.17

On two occasions, concerning other recommendations, a clash developed between the dominant personalities of Lord Germain and the Governor of Canada. The first involved a nomination to the office of quartermaster general and the second to the post of commissary general. Alfred L. Burt, a prominent historian, has vigorously defended His Lordship against charges that included favoritism and a possible grudge against Carleton. Convinced that the latter was at fault in the resulting quarrel over the nomination of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Christie by His Lordship, Burt justified the reactions that ensued.18 By regulations, Carleton, who had already nominated Major Thomas Carleton, had been granted the right to select all those with whom he "has so much Business to transact."19 Burt dismisses this regulation on the grounds that it was promulgated prior to the outbreak of fighting in the colonies. At the same time, Germain is excused of ignorance of the prior appointment because Christie's selection seemed to have


19 General Carleton to Lord Germain, June 2, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 62-63.
more merit than that of Thomas Carleton. Furthermore, Burt believes that the Governor was motivated by personal prejudices.

The facts, however, do not support such contentions. The issue was not a quarrel but rather a definite misunderstanding, caused by simultaneous appointments and the existing mode of communications between the two continents. There is no doubt, however, that tact was not one of Carleton's virtues. On June 1, 1776, Christie literally caught the Governor off guard when he presented him commission to the disputed post. At first shocked, Carleton concluded that the event was due to an error and that it was not in conformity with the established directives from the War Office or the Secretary of State. Custom and tradition supported Carleton, a factor over looked by His Lordship. The consequence, two men with excellent qualifications held the single post of quartermaster general.

In his letter of June 2, Carleton defended his action on two grounds. First, Lord Germain had neglected to inform him at the proper time that the Major was an un­acceptable candidate. Second, when the Governor had proposed the nomination, he had requested that the Major be promoted to lieutenant colonel. This was done. Lord Germain, however appeared to have been ignorant of the
stated correspondence as well as the promotion, even though it went through his office. Was this another illustration of His Lordship's neglect of duty so common in the Burgoyne disaster?

Christie unfortunately interpreted Carleton's action as revenge for his once having opposed the Quebec Act. He called the Governor's decision "unjust and unprecedented."20 Seeking vindication in late June, he conferred with Burgoyne and narrated an account to support his contention that Carleton was insulting and disrespectful. Carleton, in his words, wanted him recalled "that I may not be employed in any army with him." Naturally the charge was denied. Likewise, the claim that the Governor had promised him "politeness and civility as one Gentleman to another."21

While it may be concluded that Carleton was not diplomatic, the charge that he had a personal grudge because of Christie's opposition to the Quebec Act does not seem well founded. In a letter dated September, 1774, the Governor offered his assistance to the Christie family when they appeared to be in some need. Moreover, he gave

20Lieutenant Colonel Christie to Lord Germain, Montreal, June 26, 1776, ibid., pp. 105-106.

21Purport of a conversation with Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Christie, Montreal, June 26, 1776, ibid., pp. 113-114.
Christie's personal recommendation to a vacancy. These events occurred after the signatories to the anti-Quebec Act petition became known. At any event, Thomas Carleton was finally confirmed by Lord Germain while Christie was transferred and promoted in another American unit. Thus closed another unfortunate incident which had involved two officers of unimpeachable character.

The vacancy in the office of commissary general led to the bitter struggle over the duplication of commissions. This time the cause appeared to be due to a misunderstanding and a lack of liaison between the Lords of the Treasury and the War Office in London. The part played by the Governor was virtually limited to his support of the War Office nominee, Nathaniel Day, in opposition to John C. Roberts, the candidate of the Treasury. Believing that his appointment in 1774 had been for life, which appeared to have been guaranteed by the Treasury, Roberts was not concerned by the revocation clause affecting all office holders in the Quebec Act. His attitude was confirmed by a letter from the Treasury on March 31, 1775, which stated that he had been exempted from the provisions

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22 Governor Carleton to Gabriel Christie, Quebec, September 29, 1774, ibid., p. 118.

23 Lord Germain to General Carleton, Whitehall, August 22, 1776, ibid., pp. 90-91.
of the above clause. The only way he could conceivably be dismissed was by a judgment based upon scire facias, or misbehavior in office.

The controversy broke out on March 20, 1776, when the War Office commissioned Day as commissary general. Roberts' protests were rejected on the technical grounds that two different offices were involved. Roberts was supposed to supply the Quebec garrison while Day performed the same function for Burgoyne's troops. The March 20 commission, however, clearly stated that Day was commissary general to the army in Canada, not that his office would operate only after the invasion of New York. This problem was further complicated by commissions and pay awards to subordinate officials. The commissions were signed by the King and confirmed by the Lords of the Treasury. Roberts charged that these men had "illegally superceded" his assistants, despite the fact that "my exclusive Rights have been vested in Me for Life, by a Grant under the Great Seal."  

Carleton, disregarding the involved technicalities, gave his support to Day in terms which indicated that Roberts had been superseded. Moreover, Day's assistant, John C. Roberts, The Case of the Commissary General of Provisions and Stores for the Province of Quebec in North America (London: Printed for Fielding and Walker [c. 1777]), pp. 3-26.
Colin Drummond, was appointed to the District of Quebec, though it was supposed to be reserved for Roberts. Edward E. Curtis, in his excellent work, states that Day was the sole commissary general in Canada from the date of his commission to the latter part of 1777. If Roberts was not superseded, he certainly found that his operations were being duplicated. There was a need to liquidate one of the positions.

Day's duties were specified in his commission. He was directed to supervise and to inspect all commissary officials and functions in Canada. Moreover, he was subjected to orders issued by the War Office, the Lords of the Treasury or the Commander-in-Chief. Having the power to select his aides, Day named Fleetwood Parkhurst as his deputy and Jonathan Clarke as his assistant. Some vacancies, however, were not easily filled. Applicants tended to "think so much of their dear selves as to attend to the Popperys and Neglect the Essentials." Financial worries and a meager salary were additional problems.

Closely connected with these problems on nominations were those of promotions. In spite of the traditional
practice of purchasing rank in the armed services, Carleton emphasized merit and seniority. The War Office, moreover, directed all the major generals to fill vacancies caused by death, court martials or resignations having regard to the Merit of such officers as well as their Seniority, which last is to give way to the good of the Service if you can give a sufficient reason. Carleton, in obedience, sought out the "most deserving and fit." In a letter to Lord Barrington, July 8, 1776, he stated that appointments had been delayed by the need to investigate the character and ability of each of the applicants. All those named were reported for the confirmation of His Lordship.

There were cases in which the Governor did not approve of the selling of commissions. When a lieutenant of the 53rd Regiment died in September 1776, Brigadier General Powell presented a memorial with the designed purpose of selling the vacant ensigncy for the sum of £90, which the deceased owed to his unit. Carleton, however, preferred that the debt be liquidated in a different fashion.

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29 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, Chambly, July 8, 1776, Can. Genl. Staff, op. cit., p. 179.

30 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, Chambly, September 20, 1777, M. 318, pp. 11-13.
Similar problems also confronted Carleton in regard to the recruitment of naval personnel and officers needed for the rivers and the lakes. Some men were drafted while others offered their services from among the crews of the visiting transports, Admiralty vessels and frigates. In every instance, however, the Governor insisted upon volunteers. Sometimes, he wrote directly to the ship captains, with the realization that if they complied with his requisitions their vessels would be idled for the season. He directed Captain Thomas Pringle, in the summer of 1776, to offer a bounty of 45 shillings Halifax currency to all volunteers.  

Army promotion methods were extended by Carleton to all naval units which did not fall under the direction of the Admiralty. In this manner, he had a free hand upon all the rivers and lakes within his jurisdiction. All who served acted under his commission. Pringle was named fleet commander on Lake Champlain while Lieutenant Joseph Nunn, of the Magdalen Schooner, did like service upon Lake

31 General Carleton to Captain Pringle, June 29, 1776, B. 39, pp. 44-45.

32 General Carleton to Captain Pearson, February 8, 1777, *ibid.*, p. 353.
Ontario. The promotion orders were identical with those used by the army. On August 1, 1776, for example, Carleton appointed John Curling first lieutenant in the naval armament on the Sorel and Lake Champlain.

By virtue of the power and authority in me vested I do hereby appoint you to act as first lieutenant in the said Naval armament... You are therefore carefully and diligently to discharge the duty thereof, and all officers and seamen to the said armament or others your inferior officers upon the said River and Lake are hereby commanded to obey you as such.

In addition, Nunn had to comply with all the instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the general officers and other superiors in accordance with the rules and discipline of war.

The recruitment problem, moreover, was a dangerous one since there were few troops in Canada in 1775. The army could be expanded in only two ways, either by enlarging existing regiments or by creating new units which had the capacity to expand. At least one regiment, the 18th, formerly stationed in the west, was incorporated into the 8th, since there was a serious shortage of replacements.


But the policy of transferring men from one regiment to another did not extend to the officers, and the deficiency helped to explain the difficulty in overawing the Canadians.  

Recruits had come either from Great Britain or the colonies themselves. In either case, difficulties did occur, though Carleton was generally able to solve them. In November of 1776, approximately 150 German and British soldiers arrived in Quebec. Though they had enlisted in the 33rd Regiment, the course of battle was such that the Governor preferred to distribute them among the weaker regiments. However, after a consultation with a deputation of these men, Carleton recognized their desire as a valid one and deferred his plan so that they might join their regiment. Additional recruits were obtained by granting leaves to officers so that they could enlist men for their regiments. In June 1776, Carleton approved McLean's request to return home in order to find men and to seek permanent establishment in the army for his corps, so that they might share in the half payment due to them upon demobilization.

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36 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, November 24, and 29, 1776, M. 318, pp. 17-19.
37 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, June 21, 1776, M. 317, pp. 308-309.
McLean had done a commendable job in recruiting men from the nearby colony of New York in obedience to the June 12, 1775 directive of General Gage. By "Beat of Drum," he had been empowered to raise the Highlanders and all other loyal Americans who would serve the King and act under the command of General Carleton. The order listed the desired number of units and officers, and the pay and places of rendezvous. A bounty of 50 shillings was authorized. The corps, consisting of two battalions of ten companies each, had to follow the standard number of field and general officers in all its parts and the same applied to the noncommissioned officers. Thus each company had one field officer, two subalterns, three sergeants, and three corporals, plus 50 men. The entire corps was clothed like the Royal Highland Regiment and received the title of the Royal Highland Emigrants.\footnote{General Gage to Lieutenant Colonel McLean, June 12, 1775, Boston, Can. Genl. Staff, \textit{op. cit.}, No. 14, p. 55.}

McLean was untiring in his efforts to obey Gage and to serve Carleton. But it was not an easy task to raise 1,000 men. Advertisements appeared in the Quebec Gazette on August 10, 1775, promising every recruit 200 acres of land in any colony. The fees such as those of the Patent Office and the Surveyor General were to be paid by the King. Moreover, there was to be no quitrent
for 20 years. An additional 50 acres was offered to each recruit for his wife and each child. As a "Gratuity" one guinea levy money was given to him. The terms of service were limited to the duration of trouble in America.

While Gage had taken the initial step in raising the Loyalists, Carleton personally issued a beating order to Sir John Johnson, calling for the creation of the King's Royal Regiment of New York. With terms virtually identical to those granted to McLean, Johnson was advised that he was strictly enjoined to observe and follow such Orders and Directions as Carleton and the other superior officers might issue. All the rules of discipline were to be enforced. The battalion received a good start from recruits who accompanied Sir John's flight from the Mohawk Valley. However, neither of the Loyalist regiments reached its anticipated goals.

Subordinate officers were advised to take care that no unqualified or suspicious person be given positions of responsibility that might prove detrimental to the service. Carleton, nevertheless, was continually confronted

39 Recruiting offers for the Royal Highlanders, the Quebec Gazette, August 10, 1775. See Appendix C. No.
with disputed claims and accusations which endangered the existing discipline and efficiency of the Loyalist regiment. In January 1777, two men charged that the officer who had denied them justice was mishandling pay funds and was arbitrary in his methods. One of the aspiring officers was a reputed horse thief while the other had a questionable reputation. 41

Encouragement was also given to Carleton to make every effort to raise the Loyalists along the frontier of the Great Lakes, Virginia and Pennsylvania. In August 1775, Gage advised the recruitment of 800 men in the vicinity of Niagara. Instructions from London contained similar suggestions. Hamilton was directed to initiate steps for the raising of a corps which was to be on an equal footing with the others. The customary bounties and wages were offered as inducements. 42

This success was balanced by numerous requests by officers and men due to illness or incapacitation. Sickness in the Chatham family lost Carleton the services of his aide-de-camp, Pitt the Younger. 43 Another valuable

41 General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, August 18, 1775, Gage Papers.

42 Lord Germain to General Carleton, Whitehall, March 26, 1777, The Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. IV.

officer, a Colonel Templar, had to be sent home because of gout which had been aggravated by the severe winters. Moreover, the Governor followed the traditional practice of sending home all officers and men who were reported unfit for duty. This was especially true when regiments were drafted or consolidated.\(^\text{44}\)

The Commander-in-Chief, in addition, had to consider matters of pay in a time when financial functions were confused, overlapping and ill-defined. He did his best to overcome these handicaps. The most important official was the Rt. Hon. Richard Rigby, the British Paymaster General, who, by statute of Parliament, was responsible for all pay funds except those belonging to the ordnance department, meaning the engineers and artillery personnel. However, neither Rigby nor Carleton was allowed to disperse the funds without proper warrants from the Secretary at War or the Lords of the Treasury.\(^\text{45}\) The Governor's correspondence, therefore, included letters to both of these offices.

There was a definite chain of command which included civilian contractors and regular army pay officers.

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\(^{44}\) General Carleton to Lord Barrington, July 11, 1776, Public Record Office, War Office I, 2, Manuscript Division, the Library of Congress, p. 637.

Colin Drummond and Jacob Jordan were named agents to the contractors for supplying the King's money for the troops in North America. Each regiment, moreover, eventually employed a civil agent to aid their pay officer who usually had other duties to perform. Thus the payment of troops involved a chain extending from the Paymaster General through the money contractors and agents in America as well as in Europe to the regimental paymasters, and down to the captains of the companies who probably personally dispersed the funds.

The pay to the soldiers was meager and subjected to numerous deductions which were occasionally lightened by Carleton. The average pay was only 8d per day. All of it, however, was taken by two classes of deductions. The first category, called subsistence, totaled 6d per day. It went toward the cost of clothing, shoes, medicine and the paymaster fees. "Gross off reckonings," another 2d per day paid the postmaster one shilling per pound, the Chelsea Hospital for retired soldiers 8d and the aged of the regiment 2d. Each company also had noneffectives on

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their rolls, whose subsistence funds were often employed
for ordnance expenses.48

The Commander-in-Chief, in case of emergency, did
make use of the contingent fund of the regiments in order
to rectify any pay arrears. In October, 1776, for example,
he directed that all ensigns serving in the army without
pay must receive subsistence pay from the regimental pay-
master according to the dates of their commissions. The
same was made a charge upon the contingent funds until
some other source of income was found. A return of all
such incidents was then ordered to be sent to the deputy
adjutant's office.49

On the other hand, except for orders to subordi-
nates not to charge the troops for rum, Carleton does
not appear to have been influenced by the contemporary
criticism levied against the inadequate pay given to the
enlisted men. William Erskine, a prominent reformer dis-
closed the privations and sufferings of the soldiers who
were obliged in his opinion to pay for necessities and
"useless and unmilitary fopperies" that might be introduced
by officers favoring fancy uniforms and appearances. Though
this criticism did influence Parliament, there is no evi-
dence to indicate that Carleton was either aware of this

48 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
49 Directive of the Commander-in-Chief, October 27,
1776, B. 83, p. 52.
development or that he might have been sympathetic to it.\(^50\)

Following military regulations, he instructed his subordinate officers to examine all pay claims and to ascertain the need for warrants so that expenses could be met quickly. The Lords of the Treasury had delegated to him the power to issue temporary warrants. Such a warrant was used in December 1776, to pay the staff of the army.\(^51\) The final approval of all warrants, nonetheless, depended upon the Lords or the Secretary at War. This proved unsatisfactory, especially since considerable time might lapse before some men might receive their pay. The laying of warrants before the King and a semi-annual basis had definite drawbacks. Carleton, consequently, reported the following:

> I must observe that it would be highly inconvenient [for most] . . . Gentlemen to, wait, so long as the method your Lordship [Barrington] proposes would necessarily occasion; I must beg therefore that I may be allowed to pay . . . as I have already done, being requested for the half year ending 31st December last [1776], by my own warrant on the paymaster of the army.\(^52\)


\(^51\)General Carleton to General Philips, December 16, 1776, B. 39, p. 305.

\(^52\)General Carleton to Lord Barrington, May 21, 1777, M. 318, p. 28.
The basis for this action by Carleton appeared to be the instructions issued to the pay office to transmit an account of all staff and general officers salaries, including those in the hospital. He saw no harm in using a procedure which would avoid unnecessary duplications and delays. He added that any differences could be settled at home.

A considerable portion of his time was occupied in calling for financial returns concerning contingencies and allowances. The information collected was of vital information to the paymasters, the Treasury and Secretary at War since it provided the basis for future military estimates and warrants. Consequently, at irregular intervals such as in July 1776 the regimental paymasters were ordered to attend the paymaster in Canada or to meet with the quartermaster general. The purpose was to examine the accounts and to make out proper warrants for Carleton's signature.53

As for the salaries due to the different officers and enlisted men, Carleton and the Lords were limited and guided by Parliamentary statute. According to a report dated March 14, 1777, the daily expenses for the staff officers, assistants and hospital personnel along totaled £125:7:10. Since salary schedules had not appreciably

changed during the Revolution, the per diem allowances were revealing in their great range from the Commander-in-Chief who received £10 down to a mere £0:3 for the storekeepers. The report was divided into two parts. The general officers, aide-de-camps, secretaries, majors of brigade and muster, commissaries, barrack masters, provost marshals and judge advocates, with all the necessary deputies and assistants, made up the first part and accounted for £89,10s. The second portion, consisting of the hospital members and the western commanders and their barrack masters, totaled another £35,17s,10d. Such pay lists were forwarded to the War Office after being signed by Carleton or other responsible commanders.\(^5^4\)

The fact that the King had hired foreign auxiliaries from Hesse, Hanau and Waldeck, all minor German states, complicated the salary problems and necessitated great tact on the Governor’s part in order to avoid international tensions. The German salaries, even where there were no corresponding British ranks, had to be adjusted to army schedules and practices. In May, 1776, the King directed  

that these Non Commissioned officers shall Continue to do Duty and Receive pay and Cloathing as Serjeants and Corporals ...  

\(^5^4\) Lord Barrington to General Carleton, War Office, March 14, 1777, B. 39, pp. 24-26. See Appendix C, No. 5.
but they are to be mustered as private and the difference of pay and clothing between the Non-Commission'd Officers and Private Men is to be made a charge in the Contingent Bill in the Regiment to which they belong.

Carleton was instructed to take the "Necessary Directions." Due to diplomatic and practical consideration, British prejudice in conferring and recognizing rank among the foreign auxiliaries had to yield to some of the German customs.

Controversies, nevertheless, continued to appear. The solutions were generally undertaken by Carleton or his paymaster general, Jacob Jordan, or, if necessary, were settled by the superior officers in Great Britain. The Duke of Brunswick insisted that the terms of hiring the troops from his duchy made between the two Royal courts had contemplated complete regiments and pay. General Riedesel, his chief officer in Canada, also sought an additional advance of £15,000. Jordan, prior to acceding to his demand, had to gain the permission of Carleton. It was decided that any salary questions might better be solved between the two courts concerned.


56 Jacob Jordan to Captain Foy, Trois Rivieres, November 29, 1776, Q. XIII, pp. 46-47.
On December 1, 1776, however, Carleton uncovered some abuses. Though the Brunswick pay master had insisted upon payment due to the full establishment, it was found that several men had died. The consequence was a conference between Jordan and Riedesel. Temporary warrants, in the meantime, continued to include pay and subsistence for the dead men. Similar problems had to be settled with the other German states. Not until March 1777 did the Lords of the Treasury send adequate instructions.

Besides the salary considerations, Carleton, directed partly by instructions from London and partly by his own humanitarianism, dealt with bounties for the sick and wounded, the care of widows and children and all other social contingencies which accompany an army. Some of these were minor, such as when Carleton rejected officer allowances for furnishing their apartments in late 1776.

In August, the War Office transmitted the King's regulations and policies for the granting of bounties to those who either had been wounded or had died while on active duty, retrospective to the beginning of hostilities.

57 General Carleton to Lord Germain, Quebec, December 1, 1776, ibid., p. 41.
58 Lord Germain to General Carleton, Whitehall, March 26, 1777, ibid., pp. 93-94.
59 General Carleton to General Philips, December 16, 1776, B. 39, p. 305.
Necessary warrants for the payments had to be sent to the King. Carleton was given the task of fixing the sums, examining the merits of each case, including the right to make rejections and fixing the sums to be paid. This power, however, did not extend to the widows and orphans of noncommissioned officers. Authorities in Great Britain and in Ireland, using contingency funds, directed the paymasters in Canada to defray the cost of sending home the involved families.\textsuperscript{60}

The regulations were interesting examples of the 18th Century humanitarianism and social paternalism. They were designed not only to aid the families of the deceased but also to prevent fraud through proper inspection and certifications. The benefits were largely limited to commissioned and noncommissioned officers. If an officer lost either an eye or a limb he was given one year's pay and expenses, provided the surgeon general and the inspector general of the infirmaries made the necessary confirming certifications. Lesser wounds involved as much red tape and were scaled accordingly. In the event of death, the widow received one year's pay while children, including

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{60} Lord Barrington to General Carleton, August 17, 1776, B. 38, p. 17.
\end{quote}
posthumous, were allotted one-third. All deaths within six months of battle were defined as "Slain in Action." Certificates, however, in every instance, had to be made out by the medical officers and the commander of the units to which the deceased or wounded individual belonged. In obedience, Carleton communicated the regulations to his subordinates. In December 1776, various orderly books listed the bounties granted by the Government through the London merchants. The regimental paymasters and the Canadian Receiver General prepared to distribute £10 to the wounded men and £5 to the widows, providing they had not already received similar bounties.

Carleton often took a direct interest in the welfare of the children of servicemen actively engaged in the campaigns in order that they might receive the necessary provisions and housing. A general order of September 11, 1776, declared that all children belonging to the troops designated for the advance were to be given care in Montreal, after proper returns of parents insured ample provisions and safety. A Canadian, assisted by

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63 Order of September 11, 1776, *Army in America*, p. 98.
subordinate British officers, was put in charge and obtained the cooperation of the Recollet Fathers, who provided the lodgings. These inconveniences lasted until the termination of the fighting for the year. In the meantime, the Montreal barrack sergeant furnished the essential firewood and bedding while Jordan authorized the expenditure of £200 sterling.  

Though Carleton did not have a free hand, few problems were encountered in carrying out the directives of the War Office, the Lords of the Treasury or even Lord Germain. The difficulties which did occur, save for a clash of personalities, were born of the complexities of a system which relied upon ocean communications and which was burdened with overlapping functions. Carleton managed to deal with them on his own initiative while awaiting the confirmation of his actions. Distance and time necessarily forced action when military need required it. The controversy over the several appointments served only to show that the Commander-in-Chief remained loyal to his candidates. The Christie controversy with Lord Germain was not caused by personal differences but was a misunderstanding arising from dual appointments to one position. Salaries

64 General Carleton to Captain Nairne and to the Montreal Barrack master, September 19-20, 1776, B. 39, pp. 168-169, 173.
and bounties, on the other hand, were usually regulated by London, leaving the enforcement and communication problems to Carleton's discretion. The only defect in his character, perhaps, was a want of tact.
STR GUY CARLETON AS A MILITARY LEADER DURING THE
AMERICAN INVASION AND REPULSE IN CANADA,
1775 - 1776
Volume II
Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IX. THE INTERNAL THREAT FROM SEDITION</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. DISCIPLINE AND DRILL</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. THE EVOLUTION OF A HUMANE POLICY: THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. LEADER OF AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION. THE COMBINED NAVAL ARMY INVASION OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN THE FALL OF 1776</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. LOGISTICS, REINFORCEMENTS AND PROVISIONS DURING THE VICTORIOUS STAGE PART II</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. WINTER ACTIVITIES, 1776-1777</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CORRESPONDENCE AND PROCLAMATIONS</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. PROCLAMATIONS TO SUPPRESS REBELLION</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. PROBLEMS OF RANK AND RECRUITMENT</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A GENERAL ORDER AGAINST CORRESPONDING WITH AMERICANS</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. PROBLEMS OF DISCIPLINE</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. LIST OF CANADIAN AND BRITISH REBELS</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR, PETITIONS AND RETURNS</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. THE LAKE CHAMPLAIN CAMPAIGN OF 1776, CORRESPONDENCE AND RETURNS</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. RETURNS OF SHIPPING AND PROVISIONS</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. WINTER RETURNS</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Return of the Rebels Killed and Wounded, Brought Into Quebec, and of Those Taken Prisoners on the 31st December, 1775</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Return of Five British Regiments at Trois Rivieres, June 10, 1776 Specifying Those on Board and Those on Shore</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Calculation of Seamen Needed and Sources</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Action on Lake Champlain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IX

THE INTERNAL THREAT FROM SEDITION

Canada was in danger from the widespread sedition. The loyalties that are normally shown towards a government had not yet been strengthened by tradition. Old French ideas and British rights were in conflict. Carleton, as a consequence, was faced with apathy and discontent by the majority of the Canadians and the British settlers. Colonial propaganda was permeating all the elements of the population. The habitants were not overly eager to participate in the coming campaigns and to have tried to compel them to assist in defending the province would have ended in disaster. Though Carleton lacked enough troops and though he could not depend upon the militia, he was forced to act. Therefore, on June 9, 1775, martial law was proclaimed, though it could be but a psychological weapon.¹

The Canadians, however, were not the only source of potential sedition. A number of small English and Colonial settlers were actively engaged in the intrigues that seemed to prevail in the coffee houses. To make

¹The Quebec Gazette, June 15, 1775.
matters worse, the British authorities were unable to determine who was actually conspiring against the Government and who had merely petitioned against the Quebec Act. When Ethan Allen first appeared at St. Johns, he was warned of the approach of the small regular and militia force by a Montreal merchant, Joseph Bindon. Returning to his home, Bindon encountered Charles Preston, the newly appointed commandant of St. Johns. Soon it was known that Bindon had dined with Allen, carried Colonial correspondence, and had prevented the springing of the trap. It was only with difficulty that Preston's men were held in restraint from inflicting their anger upon the traitor.²

Additional information was disclosed through interrogating suspects and the fortunate seizure of damaging letters on the body of Captain Remember Baker. According to a deposition of Pierre Charlan, made before General Richard Prescott and Attorney-General Henry Kneller, the Canadian was employed by the merchant Thomas Walker who supposedly was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the American force and that with his telescope. Charlan, however, was captured by the British when he sought to locate the American force in early August. The Canadian also disclosed that a Captain Menard had been active in

²Atherton, op. cit., p. 67.
Montreal but had eluded arrest though not before delivering letters to Walker. In fact, the latter received intelligence every eight days by employing Sault St. Louis Indians. By this means the traitors had been told to anticipate a major movement towards Canada. Evidence found by the scouts, who had killed Baker indicated that a man named Macdonald, an overseer at Riviere LaColle, had communicated strategic information to the enemy. General Prescott ordered an armed force to bring him in for interrogation with the object of obtaining a confession.

After the defeat of Ethan Allen on September 25, Carleton believed he possessed the necessary psychological advantage to take a decisive step. He was especially angered by the disclosures that Walker had actively attempted to recruit a force to support Allen before the attack. Indeed, the merchant had not hidden his objectives or his movements. A quarrel with the Seigneur Hertel De Rouville, which had taken place at the market, was reported to Carleton. Walker, in anger, had stated that though De Rouville regarded George III as his master he did not.

I deny that the King is my master. I respect him as my lawful sovereign, and am ready to pay due

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4 General Prescott to Charles Preston, Montreal, August 31, 1775, C. A. 1914, Appendix B, p. 6.
obedience . . . but I cannot acknowledge him for my master while I live by my own industry. When I receive pay from him, I will acknowledge him. . . .5

The American community considered De Rouville an informant who was doing all he could to discredit them. Actually most of the damaging information appears to have been given by the Canadians themselves who, with the proper persuasion, usually could be made to tell all. Carleton appointed a three man commission in Montreal to undertake this task. Testifying before its members, Joseph Deschamps, a habitant of Repentigny Seigneury, charged that Walker had promised the Canadians that they would suffer no harm when the Americans made their attempt to take Montreal. But two weeks later, they were told that neutrality must give way to active resistance against the Crown. Interestingly enough, Mrs. Walker tried to caution her husband but without effect.6 On September 25, the day of the attack, two unnamed American officers conferred with the merchant at his home in L'Assomption. Deschamp reported that one officer was with Mr. Walker, in secret, for half an hour. It appeared that a promise was made to place three to four hundred Canadian followers at Allen's disposal. The


6The deposition of Joseph Deschamps, Montreal District, Q. XI, p. 301.
commissioners made haste to report these findings in order to force Carleton to apprehend the guilty while the opportunity for success remained. These disclosures were confirmed by a loyalist Canadian, Germain le Roux, a merchant of L'Assomption. Warned by friends that he would be plundered, Le Roux conversed with De Rouville in order to organize a resistance to Walker whom he would have liked to see dragged through Montreal as an example.7

Mrs. Walker paid the Governor a visit in the hope of avoiding punishment for her husband. While admitting that her husband knew of the enemy activities and received correspondence from them, she insisted that he never saw or answered the contents, preferring not to take an active part. But her pleas did not move the Governor who charged

many severe things in soft and polite terms, but concluded by saying, Mr. W . . . was a dangerous man, that he, the Governor, was accountable to the King for his conduct, and the safety of the Province required that Mr. W . . . should quit the country immediately. . . . He must go, you may stay and take care of his affairs, and you shall be protected.

The Governor permitted Mrs. Walker to inform her husband of the impending exile. But Walker had no intention of complying and arrogantly declared that he would leave Canada provided Carleton presented a written order

7Examination of Germain LeRoux, merchant of L'Assomption, ibid., pp. 311-312.
promising future indemnity for likely losses. Tension so increased that the Walker's went to L'Assomption. Carleton, however, with the immediate crisis over, no longer had to tolerate or to coddle arrogant traitors. Therefore, a small force was sent to incarcerate the merchant. Shortly thereafter, the Walkers were separated with the wife being confined to her Montreal home in incommunicado while her husband was put in irons which "were witted in so cruel a manner as to jar the bone, and were twice the usual size and weight, nor did Mr. Walker get over the injury his legs received until the day of his Death. . . ."8 Eventually, incarceration was softened by John Porteous who brought a candle, ink and paper.

Though the population recognized Walker's guilt, Carleton soon was confronted by legal criticism of the method employed. The main objection appeared to be that all these injuries were in violation of British tradition for no conviction had yet been obtained. Francis Maseres, the student of law, declared that the arrest was illegal

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8 Rev. Silas Ketchum, editor, "The Shurtleff Manuscript, No. 153. Being a Narrative of Certain Events Which Transpired in Canada, During the Invasion of That Province by the American Army, in 1775, Written by a Mrs. Walker, Whose Husband was in Prison for Raising Men to Assist Ethan Allen, in His Disastrous Attack on Montreal, on the 25th of September," Collections of the New Hampshire Antiquarian Society No. 2 (Contoocook: Published by the Antiquarian Society, 1876), pp. 42-43, 44-49, and 53.
on two grounds, improper methods and the fact that the Governor could not be forced to pay for illegal damages by a lawsuit. An arrest order should have been issued either by the Chief Justice, William Hey, or by the appointed conservators of Montreal. Therefore, Maseres argued the warrant issued by Carleton could not be justified by either martial law or by statute law. Carleton had, in fact, followed the old French law instead of the British practice. Though the legality of the arrest was definitely in question, Maseres seems not to have realized that due process or correct warrant forms were not really relevant to the existing problem, the suppression of dangerous sedition.9

In a report to Lord George Germain, May 9, 1777, Carleton presented a list of all the men who, through Canadians, had served with the Americans. Seventeen names appeared from the District of Montreal, including both American and English born. Yet, even if the total of all areas were computed they formed but a small, even if, vocal minority. This disclosure was to prove that Carleton's fears in regard to the merchants had been largely, if not completely, unwarranted. Only one Canadian

9A remark concerning the illegality of the arrest of Mr. Thomas Walker, October, 1775, Maseres, op. cit., pp. 226-229.
was listed, a man named Pellissier. Of those at Montreal, two were British born, Thomas Walker, who had long lived in London, and Joseph Bindon, who had been arrested earlier. The rest appeared in the traitor list as American colonists in Canada. James Price obtained notoriety for his open support of an American invasion. He was interrogated without success and later deserted to Boston. Three members of the Livingston clan were enrolled in the American cause, one reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel, a second major, and the youngest captain. Moses Hazen was made a colonel while Edward Antill, an able engineer, became a lieutenant colonel. Two other men, John Blake and a Mr. Blakely, carried goods to the colonies and failed to return to Montreal. The remaining suspects at Montreal included William Macarty, David Salisbury Franks, a Mr. Heywood, Joseph Fory and his two brothers. Two were named at Trois Rivieres for conducting enemy artillery in November. However, it would be an error to assume that this list was complete for many pro-Americans were cautious, desiring not to be detected.


The effect of the victory of September 25 was soon counteracted by the disaster at Longueuil and the fall of St. Johns at the end of October. The obvious seriousness of the situation was not lost upon the citizens of Montreal. Thus, on November 26, William Kay of Montreal wrote "it was high time to consult our own safety, and that of our property." The interception of letters did not serve to alleviate the grave condition of the small British force led by Carleton to the last defensive post, Quebec.

Bad as conditions had been at Montreal, Carleton and his able subordinates found themselves confronted by strong anti-government sentiment within the last fortified crown position in Canada. Though Fabianism might have been suitable at Montreal, Carleton and his officers knew that more stringent efforts had to be employed to save Quebec. The result was a combination of proclamations, vigilance, and fortunate interception of suspected correspondence. Caution had become the key policy as early as mid-September when Lieutenant Governor Cramahe decided to issue an order to safeguard Quebec City from within. All non-residents were ordered to report to the conservators in order to state their missions, names, places of residence and periods of stay. If they failed to so report within two

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hours they would be subjected to the treatment given spies. In addition, those who were likely to have contact with any visitors were also to report names and places of residence within two hours. This regulation was specifically aimed at tavern keepers and owners of public houses. By this means, it was hoped that the presence of Colonial agents would be known and the sedition so prevalent in coffee houses thereby would be curtailed.\(^\text{13}\)

Nevertheless, intercepted letters indicated that traitors were still residing within the walls of the City. In a letter to London, Cramahe enclosed a message to John Mercier, a local merchant, from Benedict Arnold, requesting information on the disposition of the Canadians, the troop numbers, leaders and morale, the arrival of ships, the attitude of the merchants and if he had any news of Schuyler. Naturally that source to the American commander was stopped. But Cramahe now knew of Arnold's expedition across the wilderness of northern Maine.\(^\text{14}\) Soon after the English community was shocked at the arrest of the merchant.

Pleased as he was with the steps taken both to defend Quebec and to reduce sedition, Carleton recognized that more


\(^{14}\)Copy of an intercepted letter from Benedict Arnold to John Mercier, Esqr., October 13, 1775, in Lieutenant Governor Cramahe's of November 9, 1775, Q. XI, p. 297.
extreme measures were essential. There were still open signs of either outright resistance or apathetic neutrality, neither of which, if they continued, would have enabled the fortress to withstand the siege. As a result the Quebec Gazette, November 20, carried an important policy proclamation from Carleton's headquarters. Besides raising the militia, the Governor ordered the exile of all who refused to help defend the City, regardless of former militia duty. A second group included all who attempted to alienate the population from the Royal cause. All such traitors and disloyal individuals, plus all who refused to enroll in the militia, were expelled from Quebec within four days of the date of the proclamation, November 22. As it was published in the Quebec Gazette on the 20th, it actually gave the guilty additional time to gather their families and belongings. Moreover, such persons were also to be expelled from Quebec District by December 1. If they failed to obey they were to be treated as spies. Since the countryside abounded with provisions, their stock piles of such were to remain within Quebec. A true inventory was made to George Allsopp, the commissary, so that a just payment could be made for them before their departure. Certainly such treatment was unusually lenient for traitors and their sympathizers. It might be argued that a more
harsh punishment would have been better. It did clear the City of several undesirable persons, if not all.\textsuperscript{15}

A more detailed examination of the results of the proclamation disclosed that those actually engaged in sedition formed but a small portion of the exiles. Unfortunately, the records do not include a full list of the names of those expelled for refusing to bear arms and those who acted as American agents. Incomplete evidence indicates slight correlation between the two. Thus in a letter to his brother, James Jeffrey told of his being obliged to depart from the City with many others for not agreeing to serve in the militia. They brought out their clothes but little else.

When the spring came and the British began their victorious reconquest of Canada, Jeffrey was among those obliged to depart for the Colonies. His name, however, did not appear in a list of traitors made out by Carleton's orders May 9, 1777.\textsuperscript{16} All told, only nine people appeared on the May 9 list. As was the case in Montreal, the majority had either been born in America or had resided in one of the colonies. Besides the already mentioned John

\textsuperscript{15}Exile proclamation, Quebec, November 22, 1775, The Quebec Gazette, November 20, 1775. Appendix B. No. 2.

\textsuperscript{16}James Jeffrey to his brother, Salem, October 14, 1776, Jeffrey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 150.
Mercier, there was John White Swift, Jonas Clark Minot, John Halstead, and the Irishman, Hector McNeil.  

These people, plus several from Montreal, illustrated a weakness of a humanitarian policy of exile mainly that they would and did offer their services to the enemy. Mention has already been made of Moses Hazen and James Livingston. The May 9 list of those banished from Quebec found three English born and one Scot offering their services to the Americans. John and Adam Bondfield, merchants, were named commissary and deputy commissary of provisions respectively by the Continental Congress. The other Englishman, John Welles, was listed as "a sort of Secretary" to General David Wooster, the ranking American officer on the death of Montgomery. The Scot Udney Hay served as a major and acting deputy quartermaster general. In fact, in early December, the American General wrote to General Schuyler that Carleton's action was "considerate" for he had thereby enabled many useful persons to join the besiegers. Carleton really had no alternative. He could not incarcerate a large number of apathetic or

17List of Suspected Persons and those Exiled, May 9, 1777, Q. XIII, pp. 105-106. See Appendix F.
18Ibid., pp. 105-106.
traitorous persons when all his guards and pickets were essential to ward off impending assaults. After the attack of December 31 it was difficult enough to provide prisoner of war guards much less to add to the already burdensome duties of the loyal citizens, militia and regulars.

At the same time, Carleton, realizing that all traitors might not have left Quebec, ordered his subordinate officers to enforce strict vigilance, to seize all suspicious persons for interrogation. Two days after the official date of the exile proclamation, the sentries were instructed to arrest any suspected persons who were seen near their posts. They were to be examined and to be checked off the militia lists to see if they were properly enrolled. If not, they were incarcerated. Interestingly enough, the postal authorities received identical orders on January 1. Any suspect leaving or entering the City was ordered to be arrested and interrogated. In addition, Carleton forbade anyone from using specific streets to gain access either to the Upper Town or Lower Town. As a result, St. Rochs and St. Charles streets were barricaded. Everyone had to use the heavily guarded Palace Gate. All these measures were but a few of the security steps instituted either directly by the issuance of Carleton's
personal orders or those orders issued by his subordinate officers. 20

From the night of Montgomery's fatal assault until the end of the siege, Carleton strictly adhered to his stubborn policy of resistance in full expectation of eventual succour. Individuals were continually leaving or entering Quebec on all sorts of pretenses. Deserters were numerous from the Colonial army as were private individuals protesting new found loyalty and some quite eager to provide the General with all sorts of intelligence, whether true, false or a combination of both. It was no easy task to weed out all the disloyal from the loyal in this respect. Yet accurate, if contradictory information did tell of dissension in American ranks. An escaped British prisoner of war entered Quebec, March 19, and disclosed at least one Colonial deserter was a spy seeking to obtain for Wooster the true condition of the garrison's supplies and men. Another, a Canadian, was placed in irons after telling several falsehoods with the seeming objective of intimidating the garrison. 21 As a general rule, however,

20 Orders of November 24, December 1 and 2, 1775, C1198.

Colonial activity, though present, was more clandestine.

With the termination of the siege in May, 1776 Carleton and his staff had to develop additional safeguards to prevent the continued existence of espionage and sabotage. In part, guided by his past proclamations and by orders from London, the Governor even with the arrival of large reinforcements restrained his feelings of revenge in the interests of the welfare of Canada. In May, the proclamation of the previous November 22 was strengthened. All persons who had been banished by its terms, plus those who deserted after that date, were denied reentry into Quebec except with the express permission of either the Governor or Lieutenant Governor.

It meant that those settlers, whether British, American, Irish, Scot, or French, who had aided the army were likely to lose all their properties as well as their freedom unless they appealed to the King's mercy. Yet the May 9, 1777 list clearly indicated that the total involved was a mere 29 who refused to conform to the new conditions. They left with the American forces. It should be obvious that many others, who had either voluntarily or under compulsion provided the enemy with information and supplies, were to be punished but only by minor corvées, fines or sentences. Carleton was humanitarian and lenient, never
forgetting that a frightened people were an unthinking people. As he desired to restore the civil functions of his office it was necessary to restore a degree of confidence among all the major elements of the population.

Nevertheless, Carleton followed the orders of his superiors as well as his own inclination in desiring to learn the full extent of dissatisfaction as it had existed during the winter. The Royal Proclamation issued at the Court of St. James the previous August 23 was duly published by the Quebec Gazette nearly one year later. There was no indication in the Canadian records to show that this proclamation had reached Quebec in 1775 but the earlier measures instituted by Carleton had virtually the same objectives. George III expressed his desire to restore the public peace and tranquility that had been interrupted by "the traitorous Correspondence, Counsels, and Comfort of divers wicked and desperate Persons." Hoping that ignorance rather than intent had encouraged the Americans, the King ordered his officers to crush them and to bring the guilty to trial. All were bound by laws either to aid in the defeat of the rebellion and to inform on the traitors, or to suffer the consequences on the convicted. Carleton was "to disclose and make known all Treasons and Traitorous Conspiracies . . ." and send this information to one of the Secretaries of State or some other designated official.
The information was to be as complete as possible so that all who had abetted the Americans against the King could face the punishment due to all "Authors, Perpetrators and Abettors of such traitorous Designs."  

As for his own inclinations, Carleton, while warning his subordinates to maintain their vigilance in the moment of victory, devised a commission system to uncover the full details of the extent of the past dissatisfaction as well as to attempt the revival of the Canadian militia parish by parish. An example of his caution appeared in a letter to Cramahe in late August, 1776. Remembering the past exiles and the widespread apathy of the population, Carleton instituted the policy of requiring all suspected persons to declare their allegiance to the Crown. This had already been tried with the prisoners of war. Moreover, this declaration had to be made prior to securing permission to depart from Canada. If this condition was unacceptable, such persons had to promise not to declare or to do anything harmful to the Government. The letter closed with a warning to watch some questionable individuals such as a certain Mr. Lerch whose name did not appear on the May 9 List.

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22A Proclamation For Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition, the Quebec Gazette, August 8, 1776. See Appendix B, No. 3.

23General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, Chambly, August 27, 1776, B. 39, p. 116.
The appointed inquest consisted of Francois Baby, Gabriel Taschereau and Jenkin Williams, all past loyal followers of the Governor. From May 22 until July 14, 1776, these three commissioners instituted a parish by parish examination of the past pro-American activities and widespread dissatisfaction. All persons who were known to have aided the enemy were interrogated. The purpose of these actions was to enable Carleton to determine the degree of present loyalty in reforming the militia and, secondly, to stigmatize the guilty while rewarding the loyal. It was primarily by this means that Carleton was to lay the basis of his civil and military policy in regard to the Canadian population. Interestingly enough, the Governor had not been ordered to make such a detailed inquest and, moreover, the findings do not appear to have been transmitted to London.24

The expulsion of the American forces from Canada and the upper section of Lake Champlain in the summer and fall of 1776 reduced Carleton's worries of subversion by Colonial agents and their sympathizers. Nevertheless, the list of suspects remaining in Canada began to grow. In a

report released on October 12, 1777, the provost office at Quebec reported that it held six suspects who had overtly abetted the Americans; yet all except one were civilians. Dominique L'Eglise, a Frenchman who had come to Canada four years earlier was suspected of being a spy and propagandist. A second man, Valentine Cole had been captured near Detroit as a prisoner of war by loyal Indian scouts. He was ordered to New York. By a special deposition to Carleton and to Baby, Louison Giroux and his wife were accused of four traitorous acts. They had refused to defend the Province in 1775, had sold leather to the enemy for the purpose of making shoes, possessed some 10,000 livres of Congress money and, lastly, had openly spoken against the defenders of Quebec in the December crisis. The fifth man, Mathew Eliot, was declared a "sure" spy in 1775 and an active agent near Detroit in 1777. By some error he had been released at Montreal upon taking an oath of allegiance. That order had to be countermanded for Carleton believed "him too dangerous a man to ... go about at large." The last suspect Augustine Bernier of St. Ignace, captain of militia, was found guilty of disobedience and of having refused to provide carriages for the army. He was given a reprimand plus two or three days incarceration. Though having ample evidence to execute

such persons and spies, the Governor preferred to treat
the suspects leniently, probably on the theory that most
of them had been misguided and that the open practice of
the King's mercy might reduce the number of future of-
fenders.

Nor was it always easy to determine the accuracy
of charges against individuals, such as the controversial
William Gilliland, an Irish ex-soldier of the 25th Regi-
ment who had pioneered the region of Lake Champlain and
had founded Williamsboro by 1765. As early as 1766, he
had contacts with Carleton, Sir Henry Moore, the Governor
of New York and Philip Schuyler. They had met at his resi-
dence in order to set the boundary between New York and
Canada. Gilliland had offered to provide passage across
to Crown Point in his bateau and had also provided his
guests with fresh salmon and beef.26 Seemingly, such loyal
cooperation would place him in the confidence of the future
Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, Gilliland possessed
democratic ideas and favored the American cause by actively
helping them in their war preparations. Apparently he
tricked the British by building a fortified stone structure

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Burgoyne's expedition and Surrender at Saratoga, 1777,
Canada, Quebec No. 14, Public Archives of Canada, pp.
255-256. Hereafter cited as Q. XIV.

26 Watson, op. cit., pp. 132-134.
at Point au Fer. He also organized the local minute men. In a memorial to the New York Congress in 1777, he even claimed credit for the early American victories on the Lake. In retaliation, Carleton had proscribed him and offered £100 for his capture. Yet the suspect who was openly selling goods to both sides and aiding traitorous Canadians soon found himself being robbed by Benedict Arnold. It was useless to complain for in return not only was he confronted with the charge of being a British spy but he was also incarcerated by the Americans. The advance of the British in the fall of 1776 found Carleton ordering the destruction of Milltown, including all its buildings, gristmills and sawmills.  

Once communications were again open to the western posts, Carleton was also able to counter the frontier activities of suspects, both Colonial and Spanish, to a limited degree. In a letter to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, probably in October of 1776, Carleton answered the former's fears concerning the dangerous deterioration of relations with the Spanish neighbors. He was confronted with a dilemma. He could not permit the continued operations of the army in the west; yet caution was essential to avoid

giving offense to the Spaniards. His solution was to send specific instructions to his subordinates who, he hoped, would be able to institute the necessary steps. Hamilton was ordered to continue intercepting and preventing correspondence that could harm the Royal cause, "but care should be taken (not) . . . to create a breach between the two Nations." The Spanish had to be respected upon all occasions. 28

Other measures also were put in operation to reduce the danger of sedition in the west. In a series of letters to Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, and Captain Forster, all commandants of western posts, Niagara, Detroit and Oswegatchie respectively, the Commander-in-Chief ordered an alert policy to limit the navigation of the Lakes to the operations of the Crown and its loyal followers. Therefore, except for the Indians, no vessels were to be permitted to navigate the lakes without the express permission of one of the post commanders, the ranking civil officers or of Carleton himself. Moreover, to further insure the security of the region no large

28 General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton, Crown Point, October ?, 1776, Haldimand Paper Register of Correspondence with Officers Commanding at Detroit, 1776-1783, B. 121, Public Archives of Canada, p. 4. Hereafter cited as B. 121.
boats save those employed by the King were to be constructed.

Lastly, Carleton commanded that each of them

seize all suspected persons passing upon or near the lakes, and all . . . attempting to sow sedition or to stir up insurrections among the people . . . , and that you send the same with proper proofs . . . to the prison in Montreal making at the same time a report thereof.29

Shortly thereafter, however, communications were again interrupted by the coming of winter when all travel was customarily terminated between Quebec and the western posts. Not until the late spring of the coming year would Carleton find himself again in contact with them.

The year 1776 closed with a vast improvement in the internal security of the province. Carleton’s policy appeared to be largely successful in routing out the dangerous elements of the population. The presence of sufficient forces effectively reduced the open acts of sedition in a way that had not been possible the previous year. Carleton, nevertheless, recognized that any action against the traitors and the disaffected had to be tempered by the realization that a mass act of revenge could lead to internal turbulence. There simply were not enough troops to invade New York and at the same time garrison all the

29 Orders, Circular, Captain Foy to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton or Officer commanding Detroit (1776), ibid., p. 5, and P. C. M. Vol. IX, p. 346; Same to Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell and Captain Forster, Crown Point, October 30, 1776, B. 39, p. 247.
parishes to prevent insurrection that probably would have broken out if executions and incarcerations had been frequent. Far better to dismiss the past indiscretions of the majority as having occurred out of fear of the Americans. Future events, especially in late 1777 and again when the young Lafayette was preparing to invade in 1778, showed the continued existence of dissatisfaction. This might have been completely uncontrollable if it had not been for a lenient policy of humanity and mercy, coupled with firmness and mild justice.
Morale and the need for efficiency made it essential for Carleton to enforce military regulations and discipline. His basic guide, periodically revised, Rules and Articles For the Better Government of His Majesty's Horse and Foot Guard, and all other His Forces, consisted of military traditions and practices which dated from the time of Oliver Cromwell. Among the disciplinary measures were the judicial proceedings, in which Carleton often took a direct interest. The provost marshal was instructed to keep him informed on all cases involving desertion or capital crimes committed by the troops. In fact, a letter, dated August 23, 1776, disclosed that the provost marshal was somewhat negligent in dispatching the details either to Carleton or to the judge advocate, Lieutenant Alexander Fraser. While requesting that accused prisoners be brought to trial under proper escort, Carleton insisted that the provost marshal attend if "you are desirous of continuing in that office." Moreover, he directed him to accompany the army in its advance.  

1 General Carleton to the Provost Marshal, Chambly, August 23, 1776, B. 39, p. 108.
The regulations, section VI, articles I through IV, were specific in their definitions of the several types of desertion which were considered among the most nefarious crimes. Those guilty were subject to general court martial, with the possibility of severe penalties including death. Similar provisions covered absences without leave. The last article dealt with those who deserted one unit in order to join another, perhaps to escape crimes or to collect bounties.²

The administration of military justice, or the court martials, which guided all British officers, was covered in section XV. Article II applied to all commanders in America or in foreign lands.

A General Court-martial, held . . . in any . . . Place beyond the Seas, shall not consist of less than thirteen Commission'd Officers; nor shall the President of such General Court-martial be the Commander in Chief, or Governor . . . where the Offender shall be tried, nor under the Degree of a Field Officer unless where a Field Officer cannot be had, in which case the Officer next in Seniority to the Commander, not under the Degree of a Captain, shall preside . . . .³

An examination of several general court martials showed that Carleton did not violate the regulations concerning

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³Ibid., p. 33.
procedure, size and membership. Care was taken to seat the members according to their commissions, with none under the rank of captain. The prosecution was handled by the judge advocate or one of his deputies. After examining evidence and hearing witnesses, the members imposed the appropriate penalties by means of majority vote, the death sentence requiring nine affirmations.

Though ineligible, Carleton, under article X, could and did confirm or alleviate sentences.

No Sentence of a General Court-martial shall be put in Execution, till after a Report . . . to us, or to our General or Commander in Chief, and our or his Direction shall be signified thereupon. . . .

Article XII extended the same powers to regimental court martials. Other sections covered the cashiering of guilty officers and the mode of transferring prisoners from the provost marshal to the place of confinement.

According to need, Carleton, either on his own initiative or by request, directed the convocation of the courts on the basis of periodical reports from the provost marshal. In the fall of 1776, Captain John Nairne was ordered to organize a general court martial for the trial of 20 deserters. The Commander-in-Chief was precise in his instructions.

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4 Ibid., p. 38.
I enclose you the general orders relative to a general court martial to be held... in consequence of which it will be necessary that you give orders to all persons of your Corp to attend, who are evidences for or against the deserters of your regiment who are to be tried and that the Adjutant attend with them.5

This order further stated that Carleton desired a full account of the proceedings, including a list of the witnesses and other significant information.

In this particular case, Carleton, a firm believer in the King's mercy, informed the court that the defendants should be given the option of either going on trial or facing exile for life in the steaming jungle posts of Africa. The exact destination had to be determined by Lord Barrington. All but three of the men signed a petition indicating a desire to serve the King in Africa rather than risk death or other forms of severity. Accordingly, they were shipped to Great Britain.6

Disturbed by the widespread desertions, Carleton directed the immediate recapture of offenders and instructed the commanders of the vital posts and barracks not to admit any suspicious persons. The cause for this concern was the appearance of a German deserter and a companion who had in their possession sixteen false credentials with which they

5General Carleton to Captain Nairne, no date, B. 39, p. 107.

6General Carleton to Lord Barrington, September 20, 1776, M. 318, p. 12. The three men who chose to stay were Edward Seeds, Edward Connor and William Clements. See Appendix E. No. 2.
hoped to persuade some of their compatriots to leave their assigned post. Naturally, such individuals were apprehended, providing they did not escape into the forests or into American held territories.

While other breaches were less serious, the Governor realized that all the regulations had to be enforced in order to preserve the morale of the troops and militia, partly in the hope that the Canadians might not be alienated. He had to persuade his men to the necessity of the preservation of property and peace. The habitants were annoyed by the destruction of property, insults, disorderliness and instances of irresponsible men firing their weapons in Quebec's streets at random hours. Respect for the officers, moreover, suffered because of petty quarrels which frequently terminated in duels, in direct violation of section VII. Orders to those responsible to prevent such occurrences were numerous. The challenger was liable to a court martial.

Numerous precautions were taken in order to reduce the instances of theft by all the troops and, especially, the sailors. This problem became serious after the end of the siege of Quebec. On May 17, 1776, Carleton ordered

detachment commanders to institute measures for the prevention of crimes by their men. The price of failure by such commanders was their assumption of all damages or losses from theft, to be taken out of their salaries. Men who had claimed they desired to get wood in the vicinity of the fortifications had been discovered pillaging instead. That came to an end.⁹

Unfortunately, Carleton, in his victorious march southward in the summer and fall of 1776, met with widespread pillaging in the areas located along the routes of march. Since the habitants were unable to protect themselves, the parish of Richelieu, on July 29, sent a formal appeal for help against marauders. In response, Carleton distributed troops along the river banks in order to halt plundering sailors.¹⁰ More than five companies from two regiments were employed for this purpose along the Richelieu between St. Johns and Chambly. Two companies of the 21st Regiment encamped in the vicinity of St. Therese, on one side of the river, while three companies of the 34th were at St. Ours, St. Denis and St. Charles. Two other companies, moreover, took up positions from Chambly to a point

⁹Vialar, op. cit., pp. 207 and 263.

opposite Belleville. But these steps did not prevent theft by the troops themselves.

When the British retreated after the termination of the full campaign, Carleton was again faced with the possibility of widespread pillage along the routes of march used by the different regiments which were establishing winter headquarters. Acting under his instructions, General Burgoyne issued the following order.

The Commander in Chief hopes the utmost Attention will be paid to prevent the smallest irregularity [sic] from being committed towards the persons or property of any Inhabitants [near] Camp, or upon the Passage down the lake and it is strictly forbidden to set fire to the huts or any other thing about the Camp or going away. The situation did not improve and it was found necessary to send more troops and even militia in order to protect the people.

Disorderly conduct among the regulars, militia and Indians, caused by intoxicating drinks, sometimes got out of hand, disturbing the peaceful existence of the people. This forced Carleton to enforce section XIV, which prohibited drunkenness in the barracks, in the garrisons or in the field. During the siege, strict enforcement was

12Order of General Burgoyne, Crown Point, November 1, 1776, B. 83, p. 54.
13Rules and Articles, p. 27.
essential. Regulations were instituted against retailers in order to reduce the availability of liquor because of unsatisfactory behavior by drunken soldiers and sailors. Accordingly, the Quebec Gazette, on November 30, 1775, carried a decree which prohibited the sale of liquor to the troops. In precise language, licensed and other retailers were not to "sell, [or] vend . . . any Rum, Wine or strong Liquor whatsoever to any Soldier or Sailor" or any other members of the garrison. The penalties included incarceration, confiscation or expulsion from the City. Retailers were not permitted to accept any pledges of clothing, weapons or ammunition, particularly that distributed by the Government, for the payment of intoxicants. Violations, nevertheless, continued. Since the retailers ignored the November decree, Carleton halted the sale of liquor after January 11, 1776.\(^{15}\) In the description of an eye witness, however, there were periods of great relaxation in the enforcement of regulations for morale reasons during the siege.

Yesterday the Soldiers and Rabble of the Garrison were permitted to get drunk to commemorate the Anniversary of St. Patrick. . . . They made a great Noise through the day- and later . . . Colours, Drums, and fifes and took a short turn in the garden . . . while a Harty Dame shook with

\(^{15}\)The Quebec Gazette, November 30, 1775; Order of January 11, 1776, C 1198. See Appendix E. No. 1.
great violence her very Prominent . . . Buttocks in a Jigg or two, with a Swarthy Gentry. . . .

Carleton could not prevent his loyal and hard pressed garrison from celebrating and releasing pent up tensions after months of dull and dreary duty.

The illegal sale of liquor with its resulting disorders was even more noticeable among the Indian allies; so much so, that Carleton had to take strong measures to reduce the evil consequences. The commander of the British forces in Montreal, during the summer of 1776, was instructed to send a drummer through the City, informing the population of the Governor's prohibition of selling or supplying Indians with intoxicants. Violators suffered incarceration and the confiscation of all illegal goods. Along the Ottawa River, Carleton learned that selfish, private persons continued to carry the "pernicious" product to the tribes, contrary to public proclamations. The offenders lost their vessels and casks, besides being arrested. Additional precautions, nonetheless, had to be adopted at St. Johns in 1776. All the troops, including the noncommissioned

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17 Captain Foy to Major French, June 19, 1776, B. 39, p. 23.

18 General Carleton to All Officers, Montreal, June 25, 1776, C. A. 1917, p. 24.
officers, had been forbidden to sell or give liquors to the Indians. Human nature being what it is, however, they discovered a means which they hoped would not be detected. The women who accompanied the army were used in this illicit business. Full prohibition failed. As a last resort, Carleton directed the watering of all supplies so that the potency was reduced.¹⁹

The Commander-in-Chief encouraged all methods which were in part designed to improve morale, conduct and military bearing. They included reading the articles of war to the troops, reprimands or rewards, respect for ranks, security measures such as guard duty, pickets, fatigue obligations and military drill, and the improvement of inter-service relationships as well as those involving the different nationals.

Carleton and many other military officers firmly believed that a proper knowledge of the articles of war would reduce the number of disciplinary infractions. Since the troops raised in America acted in conjunction with the regulars, they were covered by section XIX, article II of the Rules and Articles. The governors had to enforce the provision which required that the articles be published and read every other month before a gathering of the troops.

¹⁹Bennett, op. cit., p. 78.
The emphasis was upon the articles concerning desertion, mutiny, theft, absenteeism, conduct and accurate musters and returns. All, moreover, had to take an oath to the King in the presence of a certified justice. Yet, some commanders neglected this duty.

Though reprimands were not too common, on several occasions, the Commander-in-Chief was forced to issue his averse opinions regarding undesirable and unmilitary conduct. Such an instance occurred in October of 1776. While reviewing an evening parade, Carleton was embarrassed by the "insolent, Shamful [sic] and ungrateful Clamour" of the men of the 31st and 47th Regiments. Deeply displeased, he insisted that "visible and Equal Marks of Contrition as might have justified him in Suffering the Matter to rest" be forthcoming. The men of the two regiments reacted differently. The 47th Regiment atoned for its offense, thereby restoring itself to his favor. But the other regiment did not obey the suggestion. Further violations, instead, were permitted by its officers. Its lieutenant colonel allowed the distribution of rum to the men, contrary to "an express prohibition upon that Subject from the Generals [sic] mouth." A painful regimental censure was issued as a consequence, for all to see. The officers were

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20Rules and Articles, pp. 7, 44, 46-47.
directed to teach their men the proper behavior expected of them. The official censure was worded as follows:

Those who want recollection, are to be taught to reflect. . . . The impression of just principles carefully instilled, Soon become Visible and Certain, and Soldiers so prepared will ever consider that Decency, Regularity, Subordination and respect to their officers . . . are the best . . . honorable pledges they can offer to their Superiors for trusting [them in battle] . . . the Glory of His Majesty's Arms and the Vindication of the Rights of Great Britain.  

In such cases, as in other matters, Carleton usually preferred to let his subordinate commanders prove their worth, but if they failed he did not hesitate to intervene.

All volunteers, whether army or naval, moreover, came under the jurisdiction of the Rules and Articles. By a Royal order, dated April 15, 1775, all commands of the Commander-in-Chief had to be obeyed accordingly. The same was true for the commands of major and brigadier generals.  

In spite of the clarity of the statement, however, Carleton had to notify his naval officers that all sailors on the Lake Champlain force, even if volunteers, were subject to naval discipline. Certain advantages, moreover, were by that means opened to them,

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21 General Order, October 4, 1776, B. 83, pp. 50-51.
See Appendix E, No. 3.

22 Lon. Doc., p. 569.
which might otherwise have been denied to them. These included pay, rank and possible pensions.\textsuperscript{23}

The encouragement of respect for all ranks and of merit were additional measures designed for the improvement of discipline and morale in all the military units. The respect extended to the noncommissioned ranks, sergeants and corporals. Promotion to these grades was based upon seniority, valor, sobriety and virtue. Carleton, discovering some abuse, found it necessary to remind his officers that rank to the noncommissioned was based upon merit, in the interest of justice. A proper execution of these regulations would reduce the number of infractions. Carleton, however, was not averse to the infliction of penalties where deserved.\textsuperscript{24}

Of greater importance for the maintenance of discipline and order was his management of the guard, picket, drill and fatigue duties. Guards and pickets, however, were also guilty of offenses such as the misuse of ammunition, absenteeism from their posts, and the firing of weapons in violation of regulations. The spoilage or waste of ammunition was covered by section XIII of the Rules and Articles. Those convicted could be confined, 

\textsuperscript{23} General Carleton to Captain Douglas, Chambly, September 4, 1776, B. 39, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{24} After Orders, June 5, 1776, B. 83, p. 4.
discharged, reduced in rank, or deprived up to 50 per cent of their weekly pay.²⁵

During the siege when supplies were limited, Carleton notified his officers that they would be answerable for all the weapons and ammunition distributed in their companies. Four coppers were taken from the pay of any embezzler for each cartridge illegally in his possession. Shortages also made it essential that weapons not be fired except on need.²⁶ Repeatedly, Carleton had to reaffirm his directive which prohibited unauthorized firing in the streets of Quebec. The officers were instructed to assemble their men in order to inspect individual weapons and to see that they were empty of ammunition at the end of a duty assignment. This order was extended to the men upon the naval vessels, June 9, 1776.²⁷

More serious were the instances involving the absenteeism of the guards, especially among the militia. Though he had the power to enforce strict penalties, Carleton invariably adopted milder solutions. Instead of enacting the death sentences against those found asleep or

²⁶Vialar, op. cit., p. 213.
²⁷A. G. O. B., p. 4.
drunk on duty, he employed the expedient of 48 hours of confinement on bread and water.\textsuperscript{28} Other remedies included demotion and stoppage of pay. Generally, though section IV empowered the calling of court martials, punishments of minor cases, even if serious, were handled on company or regimental level. Sometimes, Carleton ordered the type of penalty to be used. Thus on December 29, 1775, a general order dealing with absenteeism fixed the penalty at a loss of a week's pay and provisions.\textsuperscript{29} But absenteeism became a more common problem during the critical days of the siege. Carleton authorized the punishment of sergeants who neglected to alert their men for guard duty. The penalty was loss of a week's pay. A February 17 order was precise. Those in charge of the rosters were liable to be "mulct" in place of the guard.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, such methods do not appear to have been effective, particularly among the English militia. Orders had to be repeated and emphasized to the men assembled at the main gate at retreat. He apologized to them for having to employ such methods, but he was certain that the good men did not desire to wait for the "indolent and slothful."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29}December 14, 1775, C. II 98.
\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Rules and Articles}, pp. 10, 26.
\textsuperscript{31}February 17, 1776, C. II 98; Vialar, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 238-239.
After January 26, 1776, Carleton directed that any one who refused to bear arms was to be incarcerated "in the Black Hole at the Barracks guard," even if the dispute be over the falsification of the guard roll. Grievances had to be settled through proper channels after the duty had been performed. Carleton, on February 7, regretfully expressed his sorrow at finding the officers of the Canadian and English militia relaxing their duties to the extent of making "a practice of leaving their guards to go to supper." Henceforth the officer of the day relieved and incarcerated those absent after 6 o'clock. That this violation was committed by a minority is borne out by the fact that the Governor saw fit to congratulate the garrison for their loyalty and presentation of a good example.\(^\text{32}\)

Ample employment at guard duty, together with occasional picket or fatigue parties and drill, restrained the men. The critical situation during the siege, as compared with the victorious march thereafter, made such services essential to the continued existence of the Crown in Canada. The form of guard duty was strictly regulated in order to prevent a surprise attack. The responsible officer, the field officer of the day, was drawn from the ranks of the regulars, the Royal Highland Emigrants, and

\(^{32}\)January 26, February 7 and 12, 1776, C. 1198.
the two militias. Though the procedure was set by Carleton, the operation of the duty roll was left to the subordinate officers. From the commencement of the siege until December 6, 1775, only one officer was appointed daily. Thereafter until the termination of the crisis two served.

The daily guard roster consisted of the field officer of the day; on November 25 it was Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell, and under him, by regimental order, one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, three corporals and approximately 40 men. At the same time, the number of patrols around the clock increased as did their sizes. By the end of the year, due to the threatened assault, 50 privates, six noncommissioned officers and three officers were doing picket duty along with 20 sailors, three naval noncommissioned and two commissioned officers. The militia furnished nearly 40 privates, five noncommissioned officers and a few officers. This force of over a hundred was supplemented by a night picket and the regular guard force. Because of the scarcity of officers, their names appeared on the rosters at least weekly. In April and in May, the night picket averaged 19 privates and two noncommissioned officers, the guard 40 men and six noncommissioned officers, and extra pickets another 30 and four respectively. Though Carleton did not personally regulate the rosters, on
occasions such as April 22, 1776, he did call for an extra picket, with strict orders to the sergeants to report all who failed to do their duty. Pickets terminated on May 12 with the approach of the relief expedition from Great Britain. When pleased, Carleton thanked the men of the various companies for having faithfully attended the extra pickets.

Throughout the rest of his stay in Canada, he encouraged the maintenance of vigilance and directed that all intelligence be forwarded to him. Burgoyne, therefore, ordered that information of extraordinary importance be sent to the Commander-in-Chief via the deputy adjutant general, while all the other reports from the guards continued to go through the regular chain of command. With the approval of Carleton, moreover, guard patrols were directed to take care of provisions and bateaux, particularly during the advance of 1776. For the sake of discipline and morale, no soldier ordered for the guard was to be taken from his post for any work whatsoever.

As for fatigue duty, Carleton acted in the same manner. On April 4, 1776, he had a working party from the

33 November 25, 1775 to May 17, 1776, C. 1198-1199.

34 Vialar, op. cit., p. 203.

35 Orders of November 1 and July 6, 1776, B. 83, pp. 55 and 19; November 29, 1775, C. 1198.
garrison of Quebec clear the ramparts of snow, primarily a move for security reasons rather than discipline. He, nonetheless, insisted that the fatigue parties should proceed in a correct military manner, the men carrying tools, assembling and obeying orders. Incidents of abusive use of fatigue parties came to light. Carleton opposed any orders by his subordinates which showed any type of favoritism to particular regiments or unfair discrimination in the nature of the assigned labor.

Adequate drill practice in the manual of arms, use of heavy equipment and forest methods of fighting helped to raise morale, to improve efficiency and to strengthen discipline. The Commander-in-Chief often attended these exercises himself and when satisfied he commended the participants. At other times, he recommended special training and the type of quantity of equipment to be employed. On June 29, 1776, two hours of drill were performed each morning, in order to avoid the summer heat and to attain proficiency in loading, charging and marching by frontal or file maneuvers, with the specified safety distances between each man. Evening parades were limited to one hour's duration. Five days later, Carleton, in order to conserve ammunition, restricted the recruits to

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36 Viallar, op. cit., p. 243.
twenty rounds for target practice. In mid-July, corps commanders were directed to teach their men the correct handling of boats for embarkation, rowing, landing, forming, attacking and boarding. Carleton was desirous of making them expert through exercise. 37

As for the German auxiliaries, he hoped to attain like results and though relations were generally satisfactory, there were instances of jealousy and misunderstanding among the men and the officers. For the sake of morale, he was forced to intercede in order to prevent serious complications from arising out of petty quarrels. Though he must have known that the Germans did not wish to adjust their artillery methods to those of the British or to use British cannon, igniters and wipers, he had to have some degree of conformity. 38 As it was, he was satisfied with their drills. But many of the German officers would have preferred to drill separately. They attributed the use of the combined drill to the jealousy of the British artillerists. One German captain stated that it was due to "the Devil of Jealousy" since his men outperformed the British. The truth was that they were unfamiliar with British drill methods and equipment. Many of the

38A. G. O. B., p. 15.
Germans could see only enmity and not friendship. They were also disgusted with what they considered an unhealthy quick step. Carleton did not find it an easy task to preserve amicable international relations.

The British officers considered the Germans their inferiors and mistreated them on occasion. A German artilleryman, seeking to defend himself from the insults of an unknown gentleman, struck him with the flat of his sabre and sent the stranger fleeing. It turned out that the latter was a British officer but that this fact was unknown to the German since the insignia was covered by a cloak. In retaliation, the officer had the German seized, incarcerated, cuffed and kicked. The German officers, naturally, demanded a thorough investigation though there were language barriers. It was discovered that the British officer had insulted the artilleryman by calling him a "Dutch bugger." The Germans were angered at the unmilitary treatment given to their man. In answer, the British merely stated "that these affrays occurred a hundred times ... between the men [i.e., yours and ours]." A note was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief, informing him of the

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affair. Unfortunately, there was no response. The Germans, contrary to the desires of the British officers, refused to surrender their sabres unless the Hereditary Prince of Hesse required them to. 40

In summation, it is clear that Carleton's actions were largely guided by the Rules and Articles. In dealing out justice, though not averse to the death sentence in cases of murder or desertion, he generally preferred lesser punitive measures, particularly exile, confinement and reduction of pay. His relationships with the court martials were limited to the confirmation or alleviation of sentences. In other cases of infraction, he usually depended upon his subordinates. In the event of failure to act, he interposed, even if it meant a sweeping censure of all those involved. Realizing that the best way to maintain discipline was to reduce possibilities of idleness, he favored guard and picket duty, fatigue parties and ample drill. Moreover, he encouraged peace and good order by employing the police, militia and regular units when and where needed throughout Canada. When that was not sufficient legal decrees were formulated, outlining severe penalties. The welfare of the population was always an important factor in this problem, for a dissatisfied countryside could mean defeat.

40 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
CHAPTER XI

THE EVOLUTION OF A HUMANE POLICY: THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

During the confusion of the first months of the invasion, the Commander-in-Chief wavered from a policy of treating the prisoners of war as mere traitors to one which regarded them as deluded British subjects. The first experience in handling a significant number of them occurred with the capture of Ethan Allen and his raiders at Montreal, September 24, 1775. Allen surrendered his sword but had to be rescued from a scalp hunting brave by an Irishman and a Canadian. Promised that they would receive civil and polite treatment by the British officer in charge, the Americans were escorted by the troops to the place of interrogation. General Richard Prescott, the ranking commander in the City, proceeded to violate the word of the officer by angrily inquiring if Allen was the same man who had successfully taken Ticonderoga. When this was confirmed, he yelled vile names at the captive and threatened to strike him until another British officer advised him that his actions were contrary to military decorum. The Canadians who had been captured with Allen were then menaced with extermination with the bayonet.
There is no available evidence to indicate that it was Carleton's desire to execute or even to mistreat them. According to Allen's account, he dramatically saved the Canadians by offering his life in their stead, for which Prescott promised him a hangman's noose at Tyburn, long famous for its dreadful executions.¹

The fact that the defenses were so weak in the fall of 1775 hampered Carleton in his endeavor to devise a program for the care of the rising number of prisoners of war. At first it was decided to regard them as nefarious criminals. They were, therefore, secured with irons for the hands and feet, an expediency which was considered essential in the face of a lack of guards. If Allen's description is accurate, Carleton as Commander-in-Chief must assume some of the responsibility for the consequences. Though the sick were taken to the hospital, the use of thirty-pound eight-foot bars for leg irons could not have been considered humane even in those days. Allen wrote that he had to lie down with his back upon a chest since the tight irons prevented him from resting upon his side. As the local military commander, Prescott was directly responsible but, nevertheless, he was subordinate to Carleton.

Other British officers were not cruel. One even sent food and grog from his own table to Allen. The Canadian historian, William Kingsford, defends Carleton by charging that Allen's description was false, which may be the case. This interpretation, however, which accepts irons and confinement as humane, offers no evidence to discredit the American captain. Carleton, confronted by a desperate situation, did not have an alternative, at least so far as providing guards and comfortable prisons. Montreal, the next goal of the Americans after the fall of St. Johns, could not serve as a place of detention. The prisoners, consequently, were placed aboard the Gaspe schooner, as a temporary expediency, prior to being transferred to an armed vessel at Quebec six weeks later.

A policy was formulated by the 9th of November, however, when Cramahe, acting under Carleton's orders, negotiated with Henry Wilson, master of the vessel Adamant, for the purpose of transporting the unfortunates to Great Britain. A contract was accordingly drawn up, but with the express condition that the prisoners be taken from on board by the first commander of any of His Majesty's Ships or Garrisons to whom he may tender them immediately after his arrival in England. These [instructions] are to request all . . . the officers commanding His Majesty's

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Ships, Castles or Garrisons . . . to receive said Prisoners and detain them until His Majesty's Pleasure be made Known.\(^3\)

This policy had been decided upon in the absence of definite instructions from London which might serve as a guide for Carleton.

Shortly thereafter, a list was dispatched along with the 21 Americans, 11 Canadians, one Irishman and one Swiss taken on September 25. The conditions which the prisoners encountered were not to the credit of the Commander-in-Chief and soon gave rise to serious controversy both in America and in Great Britain. The truth of the matter seemed to be that the King, the Parliament and all the other British officials themselves had not yet developed a satisfactory policy in regard to rebel prisoners of war. They had not even decided whether the latter should be considered as base traitors or war captives. In spite of his desperate situation, Carleton could have used his influence to reduce the consequential sufferings of these people. The entire crew of the *Adamant*, with few exceptions, were sadistic towards their guests, now inexcusably confined to an enclosed space of 20 by 22 feet and "provided with excrement tubs." In this fashion, covered with lice, denied adequate fresh water except for

\(^3\)List of the Rebel Prisoners put on board the ship *Adamant* at Quebec, November 9, 1775, Q. XI, pp. 313-315. See Appendix G, No. 1.
a small daily ration, the men suffered from diarrhea and fever.

Allen, however, exaggerated the mistreatment. His estimate that the ship carried 46 handcuffed men in the small space is not verified by the official list which names only 35. Many of the diseases would have originated even under ordinary circumstances, especially scurvy. Allen admitted that they received enough salt and rum and that the 40 day trip did not result in a single death. Their status improved somewhat after they were confined in Pendennis Castle, a short distance from their point of debarkation at Falmouth. He also claimed that his prison had been designated by Carleton personally, but the instructions to Cramahe proved that to be false. 4

The reaction in the American headquarters was hostile. Montgomery, angry at Allen's treatment, wrote to the British commandant at St. Johns, October 20, that he would retaliate if conditions were not improved. He also desired that Carleton be informed of the likely consequences of a barbarous war unless the prisoners were humanely treated. 5 This was followed by a personal warning


In July of 1779, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the treatment given to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, who had
to the Governor. Montgomery stated that if Carleton approved of those conditions

I shall . . . with the most painful regret, execute . . . retaliation upon the garrison of Chambly, now in my possession, and upon all others who may hereafter fall into my hands. I must be understood to stipulate for those unfortunate Canadians, your prisoners, . . . whose enraged countrymen have with difficulty been restrained from acts of violence on the garrison of Chambly.6

Carleton's humanity was in question. Though adhering to a policy which refused to acknowledge enemy correspondence, the fact remains that once in command at Quebec, he initiated a humane policy for both the American and Canadian prisoners. Just how much influence the threat of retaliation had upon his decision cannot be determined. It might have been due to his own realization that it was no longer practical to regard them as mere traitors.

Numerous accounts give credit to the Governor for his care of the prisoners taken at Quebec during the failure

been captured by the Virginians, was justified on the basis of "natural retaliation," harping back to the harsh imprisonment of Allen. Though Jefferson indicated that he believed Carleton innocent in the case, Hamilton was punished for the cruelties committed by the British Indians upon the settlers. Thomas Jefferson to Governor Carleton, July 9, 1779, James A. James, editor, George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781, Virginia Series, Vol. III, Collections of The Illinois State Historical Library (Vol. VIII, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), pp. 347-349.

of the American assault in the morning of December 31, 1775. All of them described kind and generous conditions. Unfortunately, the returns of those captured varies. The figures are complicated by the number of wounded and dying who were buried in the deep snow. One British officer counted one lieutenant colonel, two majors, eight captains, 15 lieutenants, one adjutant, one quartermaster, four volunteers, 350 rank and file, and 44 wounded - totaling four hundred and twenty-six. The official return listed 42 dead and 389 prisoners, including 355 rank and file, two drummers and 17 subalterns. Otherwise the lists coincided. Later searches collected 30 bodies, that of Montgomery, three captains, three subalterns and 23 rank and file. Falsehoods, such as the hanging of 60 Canadians whose bodies were then thrown to the dogs, spread consternation among the Americans.

Actually the Canadians who had participated in the attack were released, not hanged. Though evidence is somewhat lacking in this regard, the tale of a wealthy Canadian who had served under Montgomery cannot be dismissed as pure fiction. When he was brought before the

7 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 11.
8 Return of the Rebels Killed and Wounded, December 31, 1775, Q. XIII, p. 37. See Table 3.
TABLE 3

RETURN OF THE REBELS KILLED AND WOUNDED, BROUGHT INTO QUEBEC, AND OF THOSE TAKEN PRISONER'S ON THE 31ST DECEMBER, 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brigadier Lieut.</th>
<th>Lieut. Colonel</th>
<th>Majors</th>
<th>Captains</th>
<th>Subalterns</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Drummers</th>
<th>Separate and Rank &amp; File</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrences since the 31st December</th>
<th>Captains</th>
<th>Subalterns</th>
<th>Sergeants and Rank &amp; File</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead of their Wounds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Dead of the Smallpox and Fevers</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deserted, of those who Enlisted in</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Colo. Maclean's Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Released 7 Canadians and 3 Indians</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>-</td>
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Governor, the guards were excused. Expecting a sentence of death and stinging reproaches as well, the Canadian was instead, asked when he had last received communications from his family, though in fact all the correspondence had been intercepted by the British. The man, as the account relates, was returned to his home by his own choosing, either in the Governor's barge or his coach. The tale probably was untrue but the picture presented was the policy adopted. Carleton still hoped to convert his Canadian subjects. It was not likely, however, that he had the time to interview the Canadians separately.

The American prisoners were given the best possible treatment under the existing circumstances, in the hope that kindness and persuasion would restore their loyalty to the King, a form of statesmanship which one critical contemporary evaluated as unworthy of Carleton's potential abilities. Carleton's policy was embodied in four measures. First, the prisoners were escorted to the main guard house, where, apparently, some of the injured officers "had a good Dinner, and aplenty of several sorts of

10R. Lamb, Journal, passim.
wine." While the officers were comfortably lodged in a large room on the fourth floor of the Seminary, the men were taken to the Recollet monastery where they were given some blankets and had to share straw beds.13

Secondly, Carleton ordered that all the dead be brought into the City for decent interment, whether friend or foe, including his illustrious opponent. According to one prisoner's account, Carleton honored the remains of Montgomery with a proper funeral procession, consisting of a coffin covered by a pall surmounted by transverse swords and the 7th Regiment, with reversed weapons and scarfs on their left shoulders as an escort. Yet it was also discouraging to see the carioles of the deceased pass by in horrifying "monstrous piles." The twisted shapes of the bodies was due to the severity of the weather, not to the treatment exhibited by the Governor. Joseph Henry, who left an excellent description, characterized him as mild, humane, genteel, generous with a "candor, uprightness and honor" full of philanthropy. The other prisoners agreed.14


Thirdly, Carleton allowed them to send a major to collect the officers' baggage left in Montgomery's camp. Though some of it had been plundered, a good portion was recovered. It also served as an opportunity to inform their compatriots of the Governor's humanity, though the latter had earlier forbidden communications with the Americans. Nor must it be ignored that this would add to the consternation of the besiegers, once they learned of the serious losses suffered and the consequential hopelessness of their situation.  

Lastly, the Commander-in-Chief managed to convince his guests that he intended to grant them every accommodation regarding provisions, care for the sick and occasional privileges. Henry naively believed that there would be no attempt to "seduce our principles."  

Generosity was exhibited from the start of captivity, though there were some abuses that did occur without Carleton's knowledge. The Quebec merchants were allowed to send a New Year's gift, consisting of bread, cheese and porter, which cheered the prisoners considerably as a pint of liquor alone would probably have done.  


\[16\] Henry, op. cit., p. 139.  

\[17\] Ibid., p. 128.
visited the prisoners, promising to give them aid consistent with the garrison's situation. Due to the devastation of smallpox, moreover, Carleton allowed 16 petitionary officers who had not been inoculated to obtain the services of a doctor. Those not yet immune were given a separate room. On February 1, Carleton presented them all with good porter and informed them that there was more for the asking. The Reverend John Oliver Briand sent them two hogsheads of Spanish wine, six loaves of sugar and 12 pounds of tea, the last of which was rejected since it represented the symbol of British authority. Donations from private and public officials were thus permitted. The barrack master, Richard Murray, visited them daily in order to see to their wants and comfort. 18

Carleton paid them a visit on May 28, when Captain Alexander Fraser stated that it was the General's orders that their diets be supplemented with available fresh provisions. Actually, they did not receive any between January 3 and the first week of April. On the latter date spoiled beef or carrion was supplied for their use. The provost marshal, however, sold their provisions for his own gain, although soon he was carried off by the smallpox. 19

19 George Morison, "Journal of the Expedition to Quebec," March to Quebec, edited by Kenneth Roberts (Garden
A new provost marshal, however, ended the siege of tainted salt pork and dietary deficiencies for the time being by bringing 37 pounds of good, fresh beef, and he assured the prisoners that they would get the same daily. In this connection, it must be remembered that supplies for the garrison became plentiful only with the termination of the siege in May. Fresh provisions until then were scarce or expensive. Carleton, moreover, generally permitted the officers walks and exercises under proper escorts, two at a time in the Seminary gardens.

In one other respect, he served to alleviate the conditions imposed by incarceration. The prisoners were allowed to contact agents for the purpose of getting money from their friends in Canada or the colonies, so that they could supplement their diets and obtain clothing and other essentials. Their first agent, a Quebec merchant named Munro, ceased providing for them when he discovered he might not be repaid. The ground for this event was the failure of Return Jonathan Meigs, a ranking prisoner who


20 Ibid., pp. 69-70 and 74.

had been granted a parole to go home, to settle a past debt of two hundred and fifty pounds, Halifax currency, in spite of numerous reminders. This placed the prisoners in a difficult situation after May 20. Meigs, however, blamed Carleton and General Howe for refusing to permit American officers to make the transaction. Both had only promised to give their protection to private gentlemen who would bring the money.

On June 1, notwithstanding, after a visit from Murray, a Mr. Pagan talked with Munro and with the permission of Carleton began negotiations with his correspondent in New York, so that the prisoners could again purchase their wants. Pagan consented to furnish them a little cash. On the 27th, the Bishop and some of the Montreal merchants offered to subscribe money for their relief, an act which was scornfully rejected by Cramahe who interpreted it as tantamount to pro-American sympathy. The prisoners, meanwhile, complained that, though they now received one pound of bread and one pound of fresh beef daily, they had eaten better when they consumed only pork, beans and butter

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23 Flickinger, op. cit., p. 74.

24 Montgomery, op. cit., p. 507.
because "we had then Credit for Coffee, Sugar and Spirits." Sympathizing with their wants, Carleton dispatched Murray in vain to a Mr. Jackson with the object of getting them cash for the essential luxuries. Pagæ who on the 29th had declared that his New York source was dry, thought that Jackson should provide for their wants upon a bill until funds arrived from his brother.  

One month later, in desperation, the American officers petitioned Carleton for help, describing their extreme distress. They did not even have money for washing expenses. Flattering the Commander-in-Chief for his "Tenderness and Humanity," they stated that though their clothing was inadequate they could depend upon his promise that they would be sent home within a few days. They added that they would "gladly accept your Kind offer, so far, as to request a supply of one hundred pounds Halifax currency, which . . . on our arrival in New England, we would remit to any of His Majesty's Officers." Carleton eventually consented.

There were, however, definite retrogressions in the policy designed to convert the deluded. Many of the prisoners desired to escape their confinement and resented


26 Letter from Rebel Officers to General Carleton, July 29, 1776, B. 181, pp. 17-18. See Appendix G, No. 3.
the high-handed treatment given to them by some of the British officers who had used threats and strong persuasion. Daniel Morgan, one of the more famous captives, stated he was offered a commission with the emoluments and rank of colonel, which he rejected. On another occasion, John Pierce, also a prisoner, recorded that Carleton tried to bribe one of their men with £200 if he would undertake to retake the city of Montreal with the Canadians. There is no official record by which to verify this accusation.

The prisoners who were English or Irish born were the most exposed. Faced with the threat of a treason trial in London, many of them were persuaded to declare for the Crown and to enlist in the Royal Highland Emigrants, at least until June 1. Though 94 assented, the wisdom of this action was soon placed in doubt when desertions began to accelerate. It became obvious that many had joined not out of sincere convictions but either to effect an escape or to improve their lot with the limited freedoms granted to the garrison. They managed to pass through the British lines in small groups, some on January 21 and others on February 6. It was soon evident that this policy had failed

and that little reliance could be placed upon the remaining men. When ten more fled four days later, their enlistments were suspended and they were reincarcerated, though with the clothing and pay that they had received in the interval since some of them seemed sincere. 29

Those who lingered in the prisons attempted to effectuate several mass plots which were designed to give their cause control of the City. On January 5, Carleton, for precautionary reasons, cancelled some of their privileges, including the garden walks and the use of pen and ink. Though the details conflict, the first major escape was detected on March 31. The American privates and non-commissioned officers in the Dauphin Jail had organized into three units, one to overpower the guards, a second to seize St. Johns Gate and a third to take the cannon and turn them on the City. They succeeded in forcing the vault door but an investigation by the authorities discovered that the hinges had been wrenched off, and this led to the uncovering of a few secreted weapons. Naturally, the plot was extinguished. 30

29 Graham, op. cit., p. 110; Ainslie, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Flickinger, op. cit., pp. 44.
30 Ainslie, op. cit., p. 64; Morison, op. cit., p. 567.
Carleton, learning of the full extent of the plot, decided to play along as if nothing had happened, at least as far as the general population was concerned. He knew that several of the prisoners had gone over the walls in order to inform the American commander that they would give a signal. At such a time, the prisoners were supposed to escape and cooperate with an assault upon the City. Carleton had the signal fires set, by firing three buildings as had been arranged by the prisoners, while two brass pieces were fired at two in the morning along with the alarm bells. But the attempt failed to entice the Americans who probably learned somehow that the plot within the City had been halted. The exhibition of alertness, nonetheless, had a good effect upon the garrison's morale. 31

The other major attempt at mass escape, this time by the officers, was detected on April 27, with like results. The leader was Captain Simeon Thayer who apparently had some friends among the guards. The plan was to remove spikes from a door which led to a window, at which point a

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ladder was supposed to be provided by a guard. While a small number of the officers were slowed by unexpected difficulties with the door, others found no ropes to let themselves down from the dormers. Unfortunately for them, a Seminary priest, spotting unusual activities, reported them to an officer who upon investigation found a somewhat embarrassed Thayer with a knife in his hand, explaining incredulously that he only desired to find an American flag and to see the town.  

Carleton instituted stern punishment. Thayer was transferred to a schooner and was encumbered with heavy tight irons. Three days later, two other American captains joined Thayer after a guard reported that they had offered him a bribe. In spite of all this, the Governor favored leniency. When it appeared that the siege was terminated, the would-be escapers were returned to their respective prisons. The former privileges were restored. The last irons were removed on May 8, by the express order of the Commander-in-Chief who again turned to a policy of mercy, consideration and cautious persuasion.

33Picking, op. cit., p. 46.
34"Art. Officer," p. 49.
During the spring and the summer, the number of prisoners multiplied due to the victories of the British and the proclamations ordering the rounding up of all frightened and ill American stragglers. The battle of Trois Rivieres, according to an official return, found over 236 additional captives who had been lost, or cut off, and were in danger of starving. A description of the event only adds to the legend of Carleton's humanity. The American officers, including General William Thompson and Colonel Irvine, who left an excellent account, after being forced to march some six miles, though tired and disheartened, reported that they were denied horses or even a carriage by Lieutenant Colonel William Nesbitt. This was remedied by Carleton at the British headquarters. Irvine stated that "they ordered us refreshments immediately, indeed General Burgoyne served us himself." Later the captured officers and men were placed aboard the Blonde and Triton. On May 24, they were sent to Quebec. Carleton permitted them to write to their friends so that they might describe the treatment they received, sound propaganda. In addition, 30 more prisoners came from the Ilse la Motte, on

36Recapitulation of Rebel Prisoners taken since the commencement of the troubles to August 10, 1776, Q. XII, p. 169. See Appendix G. No. 2.
July 27, meaning that in just two operations 18 officers and 256 men found themselves in the prison ships.³⁷

The British successes in these instances were probably aided by Carleton's proclamation of May 10, issued shortly after he was informed of the sorry plight of the enemy forces in the areas under his control. Still believing that most of them were merely misguided, he directed his militia and regular officers to scour the woods in order to prevent mass starvation. He added that

All captains and other officers of militia are hereby commanded to make diligent search for all such distressed persons, and afford them all necessary relief and convey them to the general hospital, where proper care shall be taken of them. . . . And lest [sic] a consciousness of past offenses should deter such miserable wretches from receiving that assistance which their distressed system may require, I hereby make it known to them, that as soon as their health is restored they shall have free liberty to return to their respective provinces.³⁸

Whether or not Carleton himself spoke to the prisoners is not above controversy, but the facts of his sincerity were


³⁸A Proclamation of May 10, 1776, St. Lewis Castle, Quebec, No. 142, Can. Genl. Staff, op. cit., p. 155.
convincing and, no doubt, aided the Loyalist cause. Even after the Declaration of Independence became known, he did not alter his policy, either at the Cedars, or more specifically on Lake Champlain. It cannot be determined, however, how much influence the proclamation had in regard to the battle at Trois Rivieres. Most of the prisoners had already been taken prior to May 10. A knowledge of the contents, on the other hand, raised hopes of early freedom and good care.

Carleton did not participate in the negotiations between Captain Forster and Benedict Arnold. Certain it was that there were not enough regulars to safeguard the prisoners from the Indians. Nevertheless, Carleton did commend Forster's sincere attempts to conform to the directives on the subject. The Captain introduced the negotiations with the statement that compliance was essential in order

to avoid the inevitable Consequences of the Savages Customs in the former Wars ... of putting their Prisoners to Death to disencumber themselves in Case of their being attacked by their Enemies, I therefore in Compliance with ... the Dictates of Humanity, thought fit to enter into the following Articles of Agreement ... The first article declared that an equal number of prisoners would be exchanged within the next two months. The second article fixed the line of march for those to be freed. The latter were not to inform the opposing
forces of any troop movements and were permitted to send 12 men to Montreal so that they might collect their properties. The fourth article made four American captains hostages at Quebec. They were to be released once the terms of the treaty were fully complied with. The last article made it compulsory for Arnold to consent to pay reparations for any of the damages caused by Colonel Timothy Bedel's troops against private property.39

The prisoners taken at the Cedars numbered 31 officers and 443 men. But there were more that had to be rescued from the Indians. On August 1, another 11 men were purchased from certain death at the hands of the Messisques. The American officers praised Forster for his endeavors in their behalf. The proof of this can be seen in the letter written by Ebenezer Sullivan, one of the prisoners, to his brother, General John Sullivan. Charging that the Continental Congress' refusal to agree to the cartel was based upon deceptions which indicated that the Indians had massacred and tortured the prisoners, Ebenezer Sullivan added that "no one could behave with more humanity" than the maligned Captain.40 Carleton was only too happy to permit these prisoners to place

39 The Quebec Gazette, September 19, 1776. See Chapter VII.

40 Ebenezer Sullivan to General Sullivan, Montreal, August 14, 1776, B. 181, pp. 22-22a.
blame upon their own authorities. Another prisoner wrote that the Congress was unchristian, especially after they had been rescued. A third declared that he saved numbers of lives to my certain knowledge, and the Indians who carried off 13 men to their homes. Capt. Forster bought ten at 16 Dollars apiece.  

Congress, nevertheless, declined to alter its former convictions. Many of its members, moreover, did not believe that Arnold had the authority to conduct such negotiations in the first place. As it was, they believed that a stiff resistance had been offered by the Cedars garrison prior to the capitulation to Forster. 

Both sides desired a full exchange of prisoners. But the manner in which Carleton learned of the rejection of the terms of the cartel, as well as the Declaration of Independence, could have been used as an excuse to abandon his policy of paroles. A small group of Americans approached the British lines under a flag of truce on July 26. Their commander, Major John Bigelow, carried the important dispatches which were addressed not to Carleton but to Burgoyne. Because of this unusual procedure, the local British officials detained the delegation while a messenger

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was sent to headquarters inquiring if the flag should be received. 42

Ten days later, the answer came in the form of a strongly worded negative general order. The Commander-in-Chief directed that there could be no communication with "Rebels, traitors in Arms ... Plunderers, Robbers, Murderers or Assassins." Their emissaries were to be received only if they came to capitulate. Henceforth, they were to be incarcerated and punished according to law. Their correspondence was burned unopened by the hangman. The rather strong language of this directive can be attributed in part to the murder of General Patrick Gordon and in part to Congress' rejection of the Cedars agreement. Yet, Carleton refused to blame most Americans, still hoping to save the masses from error. 43 He preferred to keep on trying kindly persuasion, occasionally mixed with strong threats. The American delegation was disappointed. When informed of the affair, George Washington berated the Governor, calling his conduct "indecent, ill liberal and scurrilous," though he too desired to persuade the Congress to fulfill the Cedars agreement. 44


43 A. G. O. B., pp. 20-21. See Appendix D.

A dispatch from Lord Germain, moreover, indicated that His Lordship also wanted an exchange of prisoners so that the loyal and able bodied might return to the protection of the Crown. He commended Forster's conduct but also warned that no cartel which would compromise British dignity or endanger the foreign auxiliaries should be signed. In spite of the ample grounds for repudiating his policy, the Commander-in-Chief still pursued his plan to parole and send home most of the American captives. This was definitely a unilateral action which had only the verbal or written assurances that those released would not again take up arms against the King.

An outstanding example of this policy occurred during the second battle of Lake Champlain, October 12 to 14, 1776. The second in command of the American fleet, David Waterbury, was obliged to surrender his damaged vessel and crew. Carleton ordered his surgeons to treat the prisoners with the same care they would give their own men and directed that they be brought aboard his vessel where he praised their bravery and served them grog. They


46 General Waterbury to John Hancock, October 13, 1776, Hadden, op. cit., Appendix No. 8.
were spiritually disarmed. He promised to send them home if they would agree never to fight against the King. In a personal conversation with Waterbury, moreover, Carleton commended him for his obedience to the orders of the Governor of Connecticut who had issued his commission and thus alone was responsible for the crime against the King. Most of the near 100 prisoners signed the paroles, solemnly giving their pledges

not [to] say or do anything which may be contrary to the Interest of His Majesty's Government; and being allowed to return to our respective Provinces, do engage immediately to go there and to look upon the same as our prison, and further do faithfully promise that we will at any time when required surrender ourselves to His Excellency . . . or any other the King's Commanders in Chief in America.47

This particular type of parole had already become standard in Carleton's directives. Those released were escorted to zones of safety.48

There is sufficient ground for assuming that Carleton had devised this policy in the hope of discouraging the defenders of Ticonderoga in the face of mercy and clemency. John Trumbull, a ranking American officer, received the returning captives at the shore line. Observing that they seemed happy with their experience, he declared

47 Subscribed Parole, October 13, 1776, B. 181, p. 30.

that their conduct "appeared to me to have made a very dangerous impression." If Carleton's objective failed to bring about the capitulation of Ticonderoga, it must in part be attributed to the vigilance of Trumbull and his superior, General Horatio Gates, who immediately instituted counter measures. The Americans were not permitted to communicate with the ex-prisoners who were speedily dispatched on their way home.49

This incident was not isolated, for Carleton, throughout the fall, released individual prisoners and saw that they were escorted to safe places. Four Americans, confined at Montreal, were freed in November and were furnished with a canoe and ample provisions so that they could safely navigate Lake Champlain on their way home. Escorts were generally essential because of the presence of the Indians. At times, Carleton grew impatient when his directives were not speedily enforced. On another occasion, a man-of-war had to be employed to guard a prisoner of war detachment.50

As for the prisoners confined at Quebec, the Commander-in-Chief seems to have wavered in his attitude


50 Captain Roy to General Phillips, November 11, December 23 and 30, 1775; General Carleton to the provost marshal, September 8, 1776, B. 39, pp. 316-320, 326 and 142.
towards them. From May through August, he hesitated to
grant them paroles unless he had sufficient assurances
that the prisoners would honor their word. Two had al­
ready been given their paroles, Return J. Meigs because
he may have saved the life of a British officer during
the December assault and Henry Dearborn because of severe
illness. This had been done after consultations with
Cramahe and Carleton in mid-May. The others were informed
that similar treatment might be possible for them.\textsuperscript{51}

According to one account, British officers paid
the American officers a visit four days earlier, after
they had requested leave to return home. Daniel Morgan
wanted them to use their influence in his behalf. The
Governor, however, had not determined upon its wisdom,
though he sent word to the prisoners that if they would
assure him of their future conduct he would be happy to
comply. He knew that some did not agree and that others
wanted to escape. The officers, nonetheless, on May 14,
again petitioned him for paroles. The reply was in the
negative but the hint was given that it might be con­
ceivable once the vessels arrived in port.\textsuperscript{52}

Assured of victory, with large reinforcements in
mid-June, Carleton grew more relaxed and willing. He and

\textsuperscript{51}Brown, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{52}Flickinger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 56-60.
several of his officers visited the prisons and stated that paroles would be granted if the Americans swore not to take up arms against the King. In answer, they again petitioned on June 5 that

> on our parole . . . assuring your Excellency, that we shall make it a point to Surrender ourselves, to any of His Majesty's Officers, when and where, your Excellency may think proper . . . unless we should be released from our Parole, by an exchange of prisoners.

The 34 signatories also requested some consideration be shown for the relief of their men, explaining that their families were probably suffering. They repeated their action the following day, thanking Carleton for his offer and again promising to live peacefully as dependable "humble subjects."

The next few weeks, however, found the Commander-in-Chief preoccupied with other duties and perhaps not yet fully convinced that the paroles were reliable. He seemed convinced at this time that there was no likelihood of a cartel and thus no alternative for reliance upon sworn statements. In addition, the American officers disliked the phraseology of his terms, though he insisted upon full

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53 Petition to Sir Guy Carleton, June 5, 1776, B. 181, pp. 6-8. See Appendix G, No. 3.

acceptance. All the while, the British officers tried to discourage the Americans by spreading rumors that the only freedom they might get would be limited to the Island of Orleans. The preliminary steps, nonetheless, had been taken by Carleton, steps which he left to Cramahe to complete during his absence after June 11. Hopes were high that arrangements would be brought to completion. Instead, as indicated, Carleton had again found himself burdened with large numbers of prisoners at Trois Rivieres.

On June 13, the Commander-in-Chief urged that all who surrendered because of the earlier proclamation ought to be shipped home as a demonstration of the King's mercy. Discovering that Cramahe had not implemented his directive, he dispatched a message to Captain Charles Douglas to ready a vessel for the use of the American officers. He added that the officers and men would be kept aboard separate vessels and that the embarkation would be dependent upon conformity to the June 5 proclamation. The impasse was thus continued.\(^{55}\)

On June 28, the Americans were informed that the paroles were ready but that they would not be issued without an oath of allegiance to the King, which complicated the

\(^{55}\)General Carleton to Captain Douglas, Trois Rivieres, June 13, 1776, B. 39, pp. 7-8.
Contradictions soon appeared. In spite of these developments, Carleton stated that he desired to lighten their confinement and to send them home as soon as possible, but he would have to obtain Royal approval and test the effectiveness of the operation.57

Through July, the issue of paroles and oaths remained in doubt, with occasional instances of misfortune for the incarcerated because of a conflict among subordinate Crown officers, a conflict which was not resolved until Carleton returned to the City on the 26th. He promptly revoked an order which had been issued by the German commander of the Quebec Garrison and restored suspended privileges. The Americans had been locked up because the German had had a quarrel with Cramahe. In an expression of surprise, Carleton stated that he had expected that the vessels would have carried the prisoners back to their homes by now, which seems verified by his letter of June 12. Moreover, he stated that had he expected such results he personally would have hired a vessel at his own expense for that purpose.

Delays, nonetheless, were unavoidable. The technical language of the parole was still unacceptable to the

56 Flickinger, op. cit., pp. 79-100.
57 General Carleton to General Pownell, Chambly, June 28, 1776, B. 38, pp. 37-38.
Americans who, in addition, requested that, in the event of an exchange of prisoners, they be considered first. Nor did Carleton like their request for paroles within the City. He still wanted them to agree not to take up arms again.\textsuperscript{58} He then sent General Thompson and Colonel Irvine to confer with the Seminary prisoners, with the obvious objective of convincing them of the injustice of their demands if the hereafter clause were abrogated. A concession was in order and was, accordingly, made by the Commander-in-Chief who removed the disputed clause - "that we should never take up arms against His Majesty." This proved to be the turning point in the negotiations between the captured and the captor.

The broken Cedars agreement and the assassination of General Patrick Gordon, contrary to the worries of the Americans, did not cause Carleton to alter his new policy. Instead, in a proclamation, dated August 4, they were alerted to prepare for embarkation and were told that they would be furnished with provisions, clothing and all necessities. But they were still to regard themselves as prisoners until further notice, even while they might enjoy their home comings.\textsuperscript{59} Why did Carleton decide to continue

\textsuperscript{58} Montgomery, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 508-509.

his humane and unilateral plan? The explanation which was
sent to Lord Germain stated that he

intended to counteract that malignant spirit [the
reaction of the Continental Congress to the Cedars]
and without lowering the Dignity of the Crown,
to convince all His unhappy Subjects that the
King's Mercy and Benevolence were still open to
them. For the above purpose I had prior to these
Resolves directed that all the Prisoners should
be sent Home. This surprized them not a little,
if they fulfil their Engagements they will
become good Subjects, if not these can never
turn the scale.60

Rapid preparations were made to collect the neces­
sary shipping and supplies. The prisoners, who learned
of this on the 7th, were divided into five groups, so that
they could be better accommodated on board the ships.
Captain John Lamb and 12 others were assigned to the Lord
Sandwich, General Thompson to the Prince of Wales and Lieu­
tenant Colonel Greene to the John. Those left were embarked
upon the Mermaid and the Christopher. The fleet of five
vessels were escorted to New York by a frigate.61 Carleton
informed General Howe of his plan and requested that he
receive the released prisoners and send them to their homes,
but with the reminder that they were subject to recall.62

60General Carleton to Lord Germain, August 10,
1776, Q. XII, pp. 135-136.

61Montgomery, op. cit., p. 510; John Codman,
Arnold's Expedition to Quebec (London: Macmillan & Co.,
1903), p. 315.

62General Carleton to General Howe, August 8,
1776, B. 39, pp. 93-95.
For the journey, they obtained sufficient provisions and numerous gifts, embracing five sheep, several casks of wine (the generosity of the Bishop), eight loaves of sugar and some coffee. All this was in addition to the regular rations and the shirts to each man.  

The attempt to send home the men taken during the siege and the victorious battles thereafter was successful, though figures on their numbers are lacking and inconclusive. A return of August 10 indicated that they totaled 91 officers and 1,192 rank and file. Of these, 64 men and one officer had died in the hospital, presumably from wounds or the smallpox. As of that date, an examination of those captured at Trois Rivieres shows that 17 officers and 142 men had been sent to New York. One officer was sent to England. This meant that 114 were awaiting transportation. As for those taken during the siege, two officers were sent to Halifax, while 34 officers and 231 men reached New York, leaving 27 who awaited transports.

63 Montgomery, op. cit., p. 511; Thayer, op. cit., p. 292.

64 Prisoner Returns of December 31, 1775 and June, 1776, in Carleton's of August 10, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 158, 167-169. See Appendix G. No. 2.

Interestingly enough, 111 others were still members of the Royal Highland Emigrants, proof that Carleton's policy of persuasion, force and humanity had had some favorable consequences.
The success of the parole system was such that it was not to be altered by the Commander-in-Chief for the remaining period of his service in Canada. Even when put to the severity of American reactions, he would not abandon it. Nor was he willing to give them an excuse that could justify their unilateral abrogation of future prisoner-of-war exchange treaties. In spite of pressure by some of his ambitious and revenge seeking officers, he insisted upon maintaining the Crown's dignity and honor. As much as he desired to rescue the British troops who had capitulated at St. Johns and at Chambly, he would not violate his word. When, in August, 1776, four British officers, who had escaped incarceration in Pennsylvania, petitioned him for permission to serve the King in America, he refused. Others who managed to reach safe territory had broken their paroles to the American captors. Carleton remained resolute. The enemy would not be furnished with "a pretense ... for exercising their cruelty upon the Prisoners."\(^{65}\)

\(^{65}\)General Carleton to Lord Barrington, Quebec, August 20, 1776, Great Britain, Public Record Office, War Office I, Volume II, lettered Quebec & Canada, Carleton Haldimand, etc., from 1776-1780, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress, p. 5.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1776, Carleton was engaged in directing the construction of naval vessels, the establishment of supply depots and the completion of the liberation of the province. Numerous obstacles appeared which delayed progress. There were serious shortages and deficiencies in material and skilled personnel. The presence of the rapids on the Richelieu River prevented the employment of the vessels already in existence. Nevertheless, the British endeavored to cart the parts of disassembled boats around the rapids but success was not always forthcoming. On July 21, according to the report of an American intelligence officer,

General Carleton has miscarried in the plan he had laid to make himself master of this Lake Champlain, by drawing three vessels, ... previously built for the purpose, over sand, past the rapids of Chambly, they being entirely broke to pieces in the attempt, and now totally abandoned; so that General Sullivan will undoubtedly remain master . . . for the season at least. . . .

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Thus, Carleton had either to import and then disassemble small vessels or to construct vessels from green timber. Both of these methods were tried with indifferent results. Part of the cause was the fact that the Americans had destroyed the docks, yards, boats and construction material at St. Johns before they evacuated that post. It meant that the British virtually had to start from the beginning by restoring the former facilities. Over 200 men were employed on that mission, in addition to reconstructing the two old redoubts and laying the initial stages for the building race which would ensue with the enemy.\(^2\) Agents from both sides were definitely making progress reports to their superiors.

It may be that the Commander-in-Chief had lost his opportunity by not ordering the invasion of New York two months earlier than he did. But there were cogent factors involved. Though he was cognizant of the misery of the Americans, he was not in a position to appraise the size of their forces or the substance of their military capabilities. He had experienced the resourcefulness of his opponents and he respected them. During these weeks,

moreover, they had indeed instituted several measures to overcome their handicaps. The destruction of the abandoned vessels at St. Johns by Sullivan's order had effectively halted the British advance. General Horatio Gates, the newly named American commander of the Northern Department, and John Trumbull, his able adjutant, decided that the main resistance to any invasion would have to be at Ticonderoga and that Crown Point would have to be abandoned, even though General Nathanael Green considered it more suitable and feared that New England would be endangered by such a policy. That all did not go well with the Americans was indicated by shortages in provisions, and the supplies which were available were rancid, salty or worse. Arnold had already forwarded all the salvaged cannon and carriages.

Unless reinforced with 6,000 men, Gates did not believe that the Lake Champlain forts could be held if Carleton possessed naval superiority. Intelligence disclosed that the British were constructing three sloops and two schooners and that one brigade had been alerted for the advance. It was fears such as these which brought in large numbers of militia to defend Ticonderoga. Vigorously, the


Americans set about to make decided improvements in their defenses. The sick were sent to areas of safety while the army prepared for the anticipated attack. Vessels were refitted at Skeensborough; fortifications were strengthened and skilled personnel volunteered. Soon the Americans had one schooner, one row galley and three gondolas, with which it was hoped that Arnold might yet hold the Lake. Their ardor was not lost upon Carleton. In fact, it helps to explain his determination to have the larger and better armed fleet.

The so-called assassination of a ranking British officer on July 24 temporarily drew the attention of the Commander-in-Chief away from his mission. Though most of the British forces were encamped along the route from Chambly to Montreal, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Gordon, an acting brigadier, chose a shorter but unguarded road via La Prairie. Since the Americans had been driven out of Canada, he saw no need for caution, a definite miscalculation. At the same time, Benjamin Whitcombe, an American scout and Lieutenant, was engaged upon a mission with four other men. The result, a report to Lord Barrington stated that Gordon had been mortally wounded by an unknown assassin who had hidden behind some protective covering. Learning who the killer was, Carleton added that the murder was

committed "for the sake of getting a gold watch and a sword, as had been declared by one of his [taken] accomplices."\(^6\) Whitcombe's account merely states that after two days of observing British maneuvers he fired upon "an officer." He had great difficulty in reaching safe territory and had to move from concealment to concealment.\(^7\)

This was an unheard of practice. The murder of an officer was not to be condoned in an age in which there still lingered a strong class consciousness. Even George Washington regretted the incident. But a change was occurring. Subordinate officers and privates realized that often it was the officers who had originated the policies which endangered their own lives. They knew that the British and German troops would become confused and lost without their leaders. The principles of the democratic frontier were prevalent. The Americans, with few exceptions, refused to consider their officers better than they were. The distinction between the aristocratic officers and the common soldiers of the British army was not nearly so prevalent in the American army. The days when

\(^6\) General Carleton to Lord Barrington, August 25, 1776, M. 318, p. 9.

it was permissible to kill privates but not officers were terminating.

Four days later, the Americans tried to deliver a dispatch which contained the news of the Continental Congress' rejection of the Forster-Arnold cartel and a letter from Washington. Two things must be noted. First, the delivery was made under a flag of truce and was directed not to Carleton but to Burgoyne and, second, it was meant as a direct insult to the Commander-in-Chief who had seriously endeavored to exchange the prisoners taken at the Cedars. The Americans obviously wished to create some friction between the two British Generals knowing that there had been some disagreements between them. In actuality, however, Carleton and Burgoyne held identical ideas upon most issues.  

Finding it necessary to appease his men and in order to prevent future American attempts to communicate with his subordinates, the Commander-in-Chief issued a strongly worded order on August 14. At the same time, he still left the door open to all those who would reaffirm their loyalty and accept the King's mercy. The officers of the corps were directed not to receive any American messages,

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even if under a flag of truce. The enemy were labeled as traitors, rioters, plunderers, robbers, assassins and murderers. Messages received were to be burned by the public hangman and the agents of delivery were to be incarcerated. In fact, Carleton refused to let his officers examine the contents of these messages. This was in revenge for the death of Gordon. Yet, humane feelings were present. The officers were instructed not to regard all the Americans as evil designing men but rather as men fooled by false propaganda. The goal was to convert these people to the King's cause. At the same time, the prisoners of war at Quebec were notified that they would be returned to their homes. In other words, Carleton had not neglected psychological warfare, even if the term had not yet been invented. He still desired to win his goals without fighting.

A victory upon Lake Champlain, however, was dependent upon many factors, including geography, the status of ship building, the activities of the enemy and the successful maneuvers of the advancing combined army, militia, Indian and naval forces. Instead of moving with reckless speed, Carleton insisted on the construction of all possible flat boats and larger vessels. A fleet was largely constructed out of the green timber. The greatest concern of

9Hadden, op. cit., pp. 6-8; B. 83, pp. 30-31.
the Governor remained, that he should have a fleet which outweighed and carried more armament than his opponents. Caution ruled his thoughts. As a result, it was nearly October before a full scale invasion could be attempted. All the delays, nevertheless, were not of his own choice. He had no control over the rapids, over the shortages of seamen, artificers and carpenters, and none over the neglect of Lord Germain who failed to send the badly needed small boats. Learning of the size of the American fleet, Carleton insisted upon the construction of the Inflexible, a venture which took 28 days and which did not begin until September 6.

Adverse criticism mounted as the subordinate officers grew increasingly anxious and impatient with what they considered needless delays and unnecessary preparations. They chose to ignore Carleton's difficulties. They refused

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10 Even George III accepted this theory though Germain did not. Moreover, Carleton had the backing of Lieutenant Dacres, his agent in London at the close of the campaign. There did not seem to be any doubt but that the enemy had more cannon and weight without the Inflexible being included on the British side. If he had gone into battle without that vessel what might have happened? George III to Lord Sandwich, November 23, 1776, G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, editors, The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty 1771-1782 (3 Volumes, London: Navy Records Society, 1932), Vol. I, p. 178N.

to consider, much less to recognize, the lack of support from London and the inexperience of the majority of the officers. Lieutenant Colonel George Christie, in particular, was severe in his criticisms. In a letter to Lord Germain, he intimated that confusion reigned everywhere, that men and baggage had been unloaded in the wrong spots at the wrong time and usually not together. He accused Carleton of mislaying vital instructions which often resulted in shipping equipment to the wrong places at critical times. He also ridiculed Carleton's attempt to draw vessels to St. Johns by dragging them over the road by the rapids. He stated that it was a waste of time to restore the defenses of the forts because he believed the army itself was more than a deterrent. He was correct in charging that the commissary department was inadequate. But his general views were exaggerated and definitely partisan for personal reasons, particularly his assertion that "Confusion and embarrassment appeared everywhere under a commander absorbed within himself." 12

In truth, Carleton could not handle all the details personally and had to depend upon his subordinates, some of whom may not have been too competent. Returns depended upon adequate reports from the different units. But to

12 Lieutenant Colonel G. Christie to Lord Germain, October 26, 1776, Stopford-Sackville Germain Mss.
charge that Carleton should not have attempted to carry vessels over the rapids did not solve the problem at hand, the need for an adequate naval force. Christie did not offer any alternative. Nor would a wise commander leave his base of operations unprotected. The battle of Trois Rivieres made an impression upon the Commander-in-Chief, if not upon Christie, who did not have the full responsibility of carrying out the directives of the Home Government. In any advance mislocations were bound to occur. If there were losses and improper actions, they must be attributed to the subordinate officers who neglected to protect provisions and equipment from the elements. Carleton did all to strengthen his commissary department.

More important, the Commander-in-Chief was fully cognizant of the potential American capabilities. His Lake expedition had to consider the size and morale of the opposing army and naval force. Not all the intelligence was accurate or complete. One spy who brought him the plans of Crown Point declared that the Americans had decided not to hold out at that point. Moreover, the spy stated that there were few American recruits at Ticonderoga. But that Carleton could not possibly pass the Lake without American knowledge. He was also certain that the American fleet would not be used.\(^{13}\) Mixed intelligence of this sort

\(^{13}\)Anonymous to General Carleton, Plattsburgh, July 11, 1776, Haldimand Papers, Papers of Secret Intelligence
could not be ignored even if it could not be considered as completely satisfactory. Other reports in the passing weeks contradicted this intelligence, particularly in regard to the enemy fleet. A hasty advance without proper preparations was, therefore, out of the question.\(^{14}\)

American activities in September and in early October obliged the British to be on the alert. Skirmishes occurred in scattered and isolated areas between small groups of men. In addition, Carleton learned that Arnold had been named commander of the fleet by Gates, thus removing the incompetent appointee of Schuyler, Jacobus Wyncoop. Moreover, the American fleet was given the mission to prevent the entrance of the British fleet into Lake Champlain by blocking the narrow entrance at Isle aux Tetus. But Carleton had surmised that Gates might attempt such a maneuver and had directed his men to post several cannons at strategic points, including the island. Arnold, unaware of this, landed a small party on September 9, in the hope of collecting fascines for his gondolas. Instead, the detachment ran into an ambush and lost 15 men.\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\)Charles Bennett, Advance and Retreat to Saratoga (Schenectady: Robson & Adee [c. 1927]), p. 79.

\(^{15}\)General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, September 9, 1776, B. 39, p. 136.
With each passing day, Arnold found his position in greater danger of being outflanked. The British fleet was sighted off of Windmill Point and on the 23rd news indicated that the 47th Regiment was fast coming within range. Therefore, Arnold moved his vessels to Isle la Motte, eight miles to the south. The Gates line of defense was no longer practicable. But Carleton was not yet ready. He refused to let the Americans set the stage so that he might run the risk of a naval ambush. Some of the Americans actually thought that Carleton was afraid to resume the offensive. Schuyler was positive that there was nothing to fear as long as the enemy did not possess superiority. But this was the objective which Carleton was seeking.

The British definitely were gaining the advantage, in shipping, seamen, supplies and numbers. In spite of shortages of personnel and of small boats and flat boats, Carleton had greater resources than his opponents. The Americans had to depend upon green timber and the abilities of Arnold and a few others since their men did not have naval experience. Here was a leading naval power fighting

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an untrained and green navy. Yet, this was an exaggeration. Carleton had to construct most of his vessels as did his opponents. Nor were his advantages so decisive as has been supposed. Carleton never had sufficient seamen, or carpenters and he could not employ his large vessels because the Richelieu Rapids prevented them from reaching Lake Champlain. It did no good to argue that the Inflexible alone was sufficient to overcome the American fleet. The only charge to which Carleton might be guilty was his delay from the first week of September until October 5. 19

Orders had already been issued calling for the different regiments to be posted at designated advanced localities on specified dates. Carleton relied heavily upon his chief subordinates for the advice he might need but did not always accept. Because the Germans disliked the garrison duty which had been assigned to the Prince Frederick Regiment, Riedesel offered an alternative plan which included three German brigades and would have meant that only the very young or the too elderly would perform the unpopular task. The German General also pointed out that it would remove the suspicions of the Quebec garrison that the British desired to obtain all the booty for

themselves. Riedesel was deeply concerned with raising the morale and showing the capability of his compatriots as well as improving international relations. His plan, moreover, included several regiments that had not yet reached Canada. Eventually, Carleton accepted part of his plan and, fortunately, another division of German troops landed at Quebec.

On October 3, the Commander-in-Chief received the intelligence he was anxiously awaiting and which resulted in an immediate advance of positions for the different regiments. It was now known that the enemy had departed from Point au Fer and Isle la Motte. The enemy were reported to have four men-of-war but the number of small vessels was unknown. Suspecting that their fleet might be behind Grand Island, Carleton directed a reconnoitre, consisting of the Lady Maria and the Carleton while minor troop maneuvers continued the advance. The dragoons and the light infantry from Brunswick were moved from St. Johns to St. Theresa while one and a half German regiments were posted at Chambly, leaving another half regiment upon the Friesland. The advanced British units at St. Theresa replaced the Germans after the arrival of the second Brunswick division. When Burgoyne was ordered from Isle aux Noix
with his brigade, the Germans and the Second Brigade occupied that post. All the forward maneuvers were covered in a like manner.

The full deployment of the regiments was carefully planned. Captain Christopher Carleton's force of 500 Canadians, Indians and regulars was stationed at Point au Fer. General Simeon Fraser's brigade, including British grenadiers, light infantry and the 24th Regiment, formed the right along the left bank of the La Colle River. Burgoyne with the 9th, 21st, 31st, 47th and a German brigade of grenadiers was at Isle aux Noix where he was joined by Riedesel and the Hessians. Three more regiments, the 20th, 62nd and 29th, under General H. Watson Powell, were stationed near St. Johns while the 34th and the 59th, under General William Phillips, were posted respectively at Chambly and at St. Theresa. Shortly thereafter, Carleton ordered the embarkation of the 29th, with a company each on the Carleton, the Inflexible and the Thunderer, plus half a company on the gondolas.\textsuperscript{21}

Continual progress was made from October 4th through the 10th. In high expectation, the Commander-in-Chief notified General Howe that the Lake expedition was ready. Subordinate officers were happy at receiving new

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.
orders and commendations for their past zeal and endeavors. On October 5, one ship, two schooners and the floating battery, the Thunderer, sailed for Isle aux Noix, thus linking forces with the advanced units. The smaller vessels, the gondolas and the 20 gunboats also appeared though the Germans had some difficulties in loading their bateaux and had to be transferred to the Thunderer.

While ordering further progress, Carleton did not neglect essential defenses. Works, a depot and a garrison were established upon Isle aux Noix, Isle au Motte and at Point au Fer. A scouting party went in search of the enemy between Long and Grand Islands. On the 7th, Captain Fraser reached Cumberland Bay while Burgoyne encamped near La Colle and General Fraser near Point au Fer. Riedesel was temporarily delayed by the slow arrival of Powell's troops who were supposed to replace his positions at Isle aux Noix. In the meantime, block houses and barracks went up at all points and four companies were assigned to garrison Point au Fer.

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22 General Carleton to General Howe, October 4, 1776, B. 39, p. 199.

23 Hadden, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Pausch, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

24 Eelking, op. cit., pp. 68-70.
On the surface such a mass movement might not appear difficult but an account written by a German officer, dated November 3, implies that the Commander-in-Chief had executed a remarkable feat in spite of numerous obstacles. It was not until late September that the second division of the Germans reached Quebec. They were hurried to the front and were highly appreciative of the presence of the British men of war. On October 8, Carleton forwarded 22 bateaux in order to convoy them to Sorel. A small force of Hessians and Brunswickers protected the transports which could not go beyond the rapids. Eventually they reached the advanced positions. It might be noted that there was no period of orientation or rest from the long ocean voyage.25

The exact objectives of the Lake Champlain expedition were revealing in their contents as they were in their omissions. After angrily replying to the criticism of Lord Germain concerning the lack of returns, Carleton sarcastically implied that his victories were his own "executed long before I could profit by any Instructions your

Lordship might think necessary." The purpose of the expe-
dition

was to establish a naval Force on Lake Champlain, to command the navigation of that Lake, and to render the passage for the Troops in Bateaux secure, in order to pursue the Rebels into their own Provinces; neither in this could your Lordship have afforded . . . assistance.26

Carleton was particularly angry with His Lordship for sending but a handful of small boats, some ten constructed and another 14 in parts.

Concurrently, Carleton appointed his naval commanders and gave the fleet into the care of Captain Thomas Pringle, his ranking naval officer. Thus, Carleton delegated his authority to subordinate officers. In defining his mission and in nominating his officers, he deliberately avoided a commitment which would imply an advance beyond Ticonderoga. At best, the British might win control of the Lake.

Unfortunately the season is so far advanced, that I dare not flatter myself we shall be able to do more, this campaign, then to draw off their enemy attention, and Keep back part of their Force from General Howe. . . .

The implication was that there would be no winter campaign. Nor did Carleton say what he would do if Ticonderoga could not be taken without a long siege. Thus a potential retreat was hinted.

26General Carleton to Lord Germain, September 28, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 188-192.
The fact that Carleton lacked naval experience soon led to a number of unfortunate tactical errors on the part of his subordinates. Scouting parties, often small bands of Indians and Canadians, vainly searched for the American position along the Lake Champlain shores, for Arnold proved to be more than a match for Carleton's naval officers. Under a false assumption, the British concentrated their search upon Grand and Long Islands, completely overlooking the more likely hiding places. Since Carleton had been in the region before, such an oversight can be looked upon as a blunder for which he has to accept a measure of responsibility. Alfred T. Mahan wrote that "it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward with a fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands." Such an action was contrary to Carleton's usual operations. The only excuse seems to be that he had full confidence in Pringle. Arnold had stationed his fleet in the concealed position behind Valcour Island, on the side towards New York. His calculation was that the British would innocently sail pass and when they realized their error would confront a contrary wind. The advantage would then be with the Americans since Pringle would have to come into battle from the south side in the face of northerlies. It was only by accident that the American fleet was sighted and their position revealed.

27Mahan, op. cit., p. 19.
The commanders of both fleets have been severely criticized by their contemporaries as well as by recent historians. The balance, however, is favorable to Arnold. Some of the Americans, nevertheless, were of the opinion that Arnold should have posted his fleet closer to Crown Point. In his memoirs, one American, John Lacey, wrote that better results would have been achieved if the American fleet had been in a position to reach Ticonderoga. There is no indication, however, that such would have aided their cause. In fact, it might only have led to disaster. General David Waterbury wanted Arnold to retreat rather than face a fight with a superior force. An operation of that sort would have failed since the heterogeneous fleet could not have outsailed the British.

There is much evidence to conclude that Pringle was inept, that he erred in tactical operations which gave unnecessary advantages to the enemy and that he failed to be on the alert. In fact, he was the individual responsible for foolishly bypassing Valcour Island. According to the historian De Water, Pringle was "clumsy" and soon earned the contempt of the more able officers. Yet, Carleton


29 De Water, op. cit., p. 197.
appears to have been unaware of this handicap. Instead, he preferred to trust his subordinate officers.

Did Carleton fear that he himself was less able to lead a fleet into battle than a trained naval officer? The result seemed to confirm this. As it was, he had feared that his armament was inferior and had insisted upon the Inflexible. A comparison of the two fleets confirmed his worries, for excluding the Inflexible, they were nearly equal. An earlier return of ship armament, however, indicated that the British had a maximum of 90 guns of all sizes, of which 18 twelve pounders were on the Inflexible. The other heavy guns were on the Thunderer which had half a dozen each of the twenty-fours and the twelves, plus four howitzers. Pringle also had at his command two armed schooners, the Maria and the Carleton. The former carried 14 six-pounders and the latter 12. The remaining artillery was distributed among the gunboats and the gondolas. Just how many other boats may have participated was not recorded.

The American fleet was formidable and well positioned. It consisted of schooners, sloops, a cutter, several galleys and some gondolas. The largest vessel was the schooner Royal Savage which carried eight sixes and four fours. The other schooner, the Revenge, had eight guns equally divided

\[\text{30 State of the Naval Force at and Near St. Johns, Q. XII, p. 193.}\]
into the same sizes. The sloop carried ten fours. The *Lee*, a cutter, possessed a nine-pounder in its bow, a twelve in its stern and a six on each side. The *Congress*, a galley, had two eighteens in its bow, two twelves in the stern and six sixes on the sides. Both the *Washington* and the *Trumbull* galleys had one eighteen and one twelve in their bows, two nines in the stern and six sixes on the sides. The gondolas each had an eighteen-pounder and some carried fours and nines. In other words, the Americans had more than 70 guns. This did not include a schooner then at Ticonderoga or the Gates galley at Skeensborough. When the fighting did begin, Mahan estimated that the Americans could only employ 32 guns and the British 53, 17 of which were not in a proper location to be of much service.

The full implication of Arnold's strategic calculation and Pringle's blunder was evident on the first sighting of the American fleet, snuggled safely in Valcour Bay. Arnold had chosen his ground wisely. The British had no choice but to attack from the southward since the passage to the north of the island was considered dangerous. It meant a disorganized and haphazard attempt to reverse the vessels in the face of contrary winds. The consequence

31Account of Arnold's fleet after the two actions, October 11, and 13, 1776, *ibid.*, p. 226. See Appendix H, No. 1.
was that Pringle was not able to deploy his potential fire power with maximum force until the Inflexible and the Thunderer could reach the scene of battle. In the meantime, the Carleton and several of the gunboats had to withstand the American fire power. Fortunately for the British, Arnold could not personally direct all his gun crews or vessels. The Royal Savage, poorly managed, sailed too far south and came into the range of the Inflexible and the Carleton. Eventually the vessel was driven ashore but the crew reached safety. The fighting grew more difficult as the full British force came up.\textsuperscript{32}

With limited success, Pringle attempted to bring his fire power into maximum use. The Maria was never able to participate since it was too far to the leeward. The gunboats, perhaps as many as 20, were soon in the midst of enemy gun range. Lieutenant Edward Longcroft of the radeau, an artillery raft, was unable to bring his craft into the battle, though he did land a force to seize the guns of the grounded Royal Savage. They were repulsed, however, by clever cannonading. Whereupon, the crew of the Maria set the Royal Savage afire rather than let the enemy take it.\textsuperscript{33}

The chief target in the British fleet proved to be the

\textsuperscript{32}Mahan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.

Carleton whose commander was knocked unconscious. Fortunately for the British, Edward Pellew saved the vessel, but not before it was silenced. Nevertheless, eight of the crew were killed and another six wounded. Casualties began to mount on both sides amidst feats of heroism.\(^34\)

The German artillery captain, Pausch, reported that even when two of the American vessels began to capsize their crews maintained their fire. The British were also in need of repairs. Pausch had to go to the rescue of a bateau commander and managed to save one gun at the price of two lives. He, in turn, had to be saved by a British bateau.\(^35\)

The battle terminated at dusk, after the *Inflexible* had committed serious damage upon the enemy who lost one gondola. Hadden estimated the American loss at 70 men and his own at 20. The British won the day with their grapeshot.\(^36\)

If Pringle's bypassing Valcour was not serious enough, it was augmented when he decided that the battle should not continue into the night hours, which was not contrary to tradition. The real excuse for this decision reveals the magnitude of the errors committed during the

\(^{34}\text{Mahan, op. cit., p. 22.}\)

\(^{35}\text{Pausch, op. cit., p. 83.}\)

\(^{36}\text{Hadden, op. cit., p. 23.}\)
day. In a letter to Phillip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, Pringle explained his next moves.

As none of the other vessels . . . could then get up, I did not think it by any means advisable to continue so partial and unequal a combat. Consequently, with the approbation of his Excellency General Carleton, who did me the honor of being on board the Maria, I called off the Carleton and gun boats, and brought the whole fleet to anchor in a line as near as possible to the Rebels, that their retreat might be cut off; which purpose was, however, frustrated by the extreme obscurity of the night. . . .37

This amounted to a double confession. First, that Arnold had inflicted severe damage upon the fleet and repairs were essential. Secondly, Pringle was confident that superiority in numbers would settle the matter the next morning. With the Americans seemingly trapped in Valcour Bay, the British formed their blockade one and a half miles to the south, stretching from Garden Island on the east to the shoals of the Au Sable River to the west. Four men-of-war formed the advance line while the remainder were in the second, apparently an impenetrable force. Under normal circumstances an alert guard was in order.

Since Carleton had approved of this battle line, he must share a portion of the blame for its failure. Just who was responsible for the lack of vigilance is not recorded. It may have been that the British were positive

that Arnold could not escape by sea and if he tried to go ashore he would face the Indians, Canadians and forest regulars who had already made Valcour Bay an uncomfortable place by their fire even if it was inaccurate. If there is to be any credit it must go to Arnold. At best, Carleton appeared as a mere observer lacking any desire to implement or to contradict Pringle's maneuvers. Yet, it seems incredible that the Commander-in-Chief, who by nature was cautious, should have been caught off guard by his opponent.

Minus the gondola and the Royal Savage, the American fleet managed either to penetrate or to go around the blockade. The decision had been determined in a council of war. In an article, W. C. Watson claims that the American fleet could not have sailed through the British line but, instead, had escaped by going around the northern tip of Valcour Island and then south. This thesis is based on the failure of Arnold to mention in his report that he penetrated the blockade. In so arguing, Watson ignored the geographical difficulties in navigating the northern passage. The other participants indicated that the escape was definitely to the south.\(^{38}\) Both Waterbury and Riedesel stated that this maneuver was exercised with unusual success. The

Trumbull, under the command of Colonel Wigglesworth, led the way, carrying a lantern in its stern, carefully masked so that it could be seen only by those directly behind. At intervals of some two to three hundred feet, each of the vessels followed, using muffled oars in the process. Hadden wrote that it was not until daybreak when the last vessel was nearly out of sight that the British learned what had occurred. Why had Arnold succeeded? Because, with Carleton's approval, Pringle had called off the gunboats.\(^{39}\) It will probably never be known whether Carleton was responsible or desired to let Arnold escape. The results of the second battle seem to imply the negative. It may be that the heavy fog and the darkness were sufficient grounds for Arnold's maneuver.

Additional tactical errors preceded the second engagement but can not be said to have altered the consequences to any great degree. It would appear, however, that Carleton took a more direct part after the earlier humiliation. Angry with himself, he ordered a pursuit but neglected to leave orders for the troops on shore. Whether this was a pure act of forgetfulness or a deliberate policy cannot be determined but it did give Arnold time to repair his vessels. On October 12, the American fleet anchored

\(^{39}\)Hadden, *op. cit.* , pp. 24-25; Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 91
at Schuyler Island but departed for Crown Point, 28 miles to the south. However, they had to sink two irreparable gondolas. But their progress was delayed by unfavorable winds and the British fleet was able to catch up with them at Split Rock on the 13th.⁴⁰

Once the American fleet was encountered, Pringle brought up the Maria, the Carleton and the Inflexible, all of which were far ahead of the rest. Beginning at noon, the fighting lasted but two hours.⁴¹ Since the Congress and the Washington formed the American rear, they sustained the greatest damage and the second vessel, after devastating broadsides, was obliged to strike its colors. The Congress suffered from the grape and rounds which shattered its rigging and sail, killing four. In a maneuver to save as many of his men and supplies as he could, Arnold grounded the Congress and four gondolas. Burning them, his men proceeded to the safety of Crown Point since the British vessels could not reach this shallow landing cove on the western shore. The results would have been more disastrous if the British gunboats had been present, or if Carleton had brought the army with him.

⁴⁰Hadden, op. cit., p. 28; Mahan, op. cit., p. 24; Jones, Conquest, p. 167.

Who was the victor? As far as material victory was concerned, the British had destroyed or captured the bulk of the American fleet. All the enemy now had were four vessels, the _Revenge_, a sloop, the _Trumbull_ and one gondola which reached Ticonderoga, where they were joined by the _Gates_ and one schooner. Yet, the Americans did prevent an invasion. Carleton and Douglas had been correct in delaying their operations until the _Inflexible_ was ready for action. Douglas was quite emphatic on this view in a letter to the Admiralty.

> Upon the whole Sir, I scruple not to say, that had not General Carleton Authorized me, to take the Extraordinary measure of sending up the _Inflexible_ from Quebec; things could not this year, have been brought to so glorious a Conclusion on Lake Champlain.43

The Commander-in-Chief, however, still had one more measure which, if it had been successful, would have negated Arnold's strategy. By treating the prisoners of war who had been taken in the second naval battle in a kind and considerate manner, Carleton hoped to undermine seriously the morale of the enemy. Not only did he furnish his guests

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43 October 28, 1776, Admiralty I, 1706, Section I, No. 58.
with food, medicines and grog, he also talked them into accepting a parole so that they could return to their homes, provided they never took up arms against the King. Waterbury and the majority of the prisoners acquiesced. It was Carleton's objective to influence the Americans at Ticonderoga by demonstrating the King's mercy and thus discouraging any resistance. For this reason, he hoped that the prisoners would return to the fort on their way home and presumably fraternize and convert the rest. They were escorted to the American lines under a flag of truce. But the Americans, particularly Trumbull and Gates, had no desire to comply with this clever scheme. Realizing that contact between the troops and the prisoners would create a dangerous situation, the American officers countered Carleton's plan by prohibiting all communications and by quickly dispatching the prisoners on their way.

On the whole, Carleton was pleased with his victories and with his men, but he made it a point again to remind Lord Germain of his difficulties. "The Season is so far advanced that I cannot yet pretend to inform your

44 General Waterbury to John Hancock, October 24, 1776, Hadden, op. cit., Appendix No. 8; Subscribed Parole, October 13, 1776, B. 181, p. 30. See Chapter XI.

Lordship whether any thing can be done this year." There would be no winter campaign due to the innumerable difficulties that would be encountered. The limited mission had been accomplished, the regaining of control over Lake Champlain. In addition, Carleton believed in giving military recognition to worthy men. Three men in particular were singled out for praise and recommendations. The order in which they were named could be interpreted as an indication of the degree of appreciation expressed by the Commander-in-Chief. In letters to Lord Germain and the Earl of Sandwich, Lieutenant Dacres received first mention for his ability in salvaging the badly damaged Carleton. Captain Douglas, the second, was given the lion's share of credit along with his assistants. As for Pringle, though Carleton never openly disapproved of his blunders, he was mentioned last. In response, Lord Germain, on March 26, 1777, stated that he was happy with the performance of these individuals, especially the strongly recommended Dacres.

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46 General Carleton to Lord Germain, October 14, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 224-225.

47 General Carleton to the Earl of Sandwich, October 14, 1776, Barnes, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 185; Lord Germain to General Carleton, March 26, 1777, Nos. 9 and 10, Q. XIII, pp. 80-82.
The next objective was the capture of the forts of Crown Point and Ticonderoga. The first was an easy task since the post had been evacuated but the second fort was known to be a stronghold. Ever cautious, Carleton planned his movements, never neglecting essential defenses in the process. On October 14, the rangers and Indians entered Crown Point and a directive was sent to Burgoyne in order to bring up two brigades and sufficient provisions. Chimney Point, 1,400 yards opposite the old French fort, was also occupied. But it took nearly a week to accomplish the task. Carleton must assume part of the blame for not having directed the forwarding of troops and supplies earlier. Now delays came because of the lack of winds needed for the transports until the 21st. But it was not Carleton's intention to do more than to probe the defenses of the enemy. If their defenses proved weak, the two brigades would occupy the posts. On the 23rd, he ordered the construction of a chain across the narrows of Lake Champlain, while the arriving men enjoyed a spell of relaxation and trade with the Indians. At the same time, a large number of Loyalists offered their services.

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48 Hadden, op. cit., p. 29; Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 93.
49 Pausch, op. cit., pp. 85-87; De Water, op. cit., pp. 202-203. The latter author was unfair in his accusation
While Carleton was thus making his preparations in a seemingly leisurely fashion, his opponents had not been idle. Though Gates had been criticized for his insistence that the main defense should be at Ticonderoga, it was soon evident that in spite of its weaknesses it was indeed far stronger than Crown Point. Measures were instituted to prevent a surprise attack by the British. With the aid of John Trumbull, the American Commander augmented his forces, stored essential provisions, strengthened the key posts and out-guessed Carleton's maneuvers. The large number of sick were sent with escorts to areas of safety, removing a source of potential epidemics and at the same time making it possible to continue operations without concern for their recovery. Colonel Anthony Wayne and Trumbull surveyed the environs, particularly Mount Independence, and then made their recommendations to Gates. To the northward, the mountain fell into the Lake, while in the opposite direction it rose to a level plain, protected on three sides by steep rocky walls while the fourth was a morass. Following their advice, Gates posted a force here which was shortly reinforced. From the mountain, which was on the right and east, to the old French lines on the west, the Americans formed their line, protected against Carleton since he neglected the forces of nature. Secondly, he appears not to have understood Carleton's mission.
by redoubts and a battery with at least 100 cannon. The western wing was strengthened by adding a forward position at Mount Hope, a movement which could also effectively block the Lake. Thus the American line resembled a huge crescent with its center at Mount Defiance which commanded the point where Lake Champlain and Lake George joined. Trumbull believed that this mountain being higher than Independence had to be garrisoned. But it was necessary to prove his point by demonstrating the effectiveness of cannon which was brought to its top, albeit with difficulty. The rest of the defenses were useless or untenable until Gates rectified the situation.50

While awaiting the expected attack, Gates made improvements in his lines and his officers wrote of their expectations. On October 24, an iron chain was thrown across the Lake, which in conjunction with the two galleys and the bridge was thought adequate to block the entrance of the British fleet. Positive that Carleton would direct his assault against the western defenses, Gates ordered the cutting of timber to block the Crown Point road and altered the positions of some of his troops. A floating bridge was constructed in order to improve communications while all powder and ammunition supplies were brought up. Gradually, additional reinforcements made their appearance,  

coming from the Green Mountains, New England and upper New York. 51

As for supplies, however, there were serious shortages of key items. Schuyler was informed that the flour would last only sixteen days and the beef would run out by November 1. But Carleton was not cognizant of this; if he had been it might have altered his plans. Daily, the Americans expected to sight his banners. The surgeon Lewis Beebe wrote of the tensions caused by one false alarm when a guard erroneously fired on an ox. But the Americans also recognized that the winds were not in favor of the British until October 21. Nonetheless, Beebe declared that they would receive a "warm reception." 52 Gates informed his superiors that if Carleton did choose to advance, the force of 5,000 Americans should be able to repulse him or at least to confine his troops to the Lake. 53

The British advance consisted of two stages, a preliminary reconnoitre on the 27th and a full scale probe the following day. Carleton's directives did not indicate

51 Jones, Conquest, p. 176.


that he intended to make a full scale investment. On the contrary, he had a limited mission due to the advanced season and the lack of information concerning American strength. The 24th Regiment, the light infantry and some grenadiers seized Putnam's Point on the western side of Lake Champlain and made it their jump off station. A scouting party, meanwhile, seized two Americans who were shortly released by Carleton.

The reconnaissance in force at Three Mile Point was sighted by the Americans at 8 A.M. on the 2nd of November and alarm spread through their lines. Immediately, their redoubts and batteries were manned and flags were raised. They appeared to number close to 13,000 regulars and militia, according to one participant. The invading force of troops, Indians and Canadians was debarked by three gunboats within a half hour's march of the American alarm post. Two other gunboats proceeded to the eastern shore, avoiding the New Jersey redoubt but they were driven back by fire from the Trumbull and the other redoubts. Thirteen bateaux, meanwhile, landed more troops on the eastern side, only four miles from Mount Independence. They appeared to be converging as expected upon the western positions. Whereupon Gates sent reinforcements to the

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54Trumbull, Autobiography, p. 36; Kirkland, op. cit., p. 33.
vulnerable areas and placed the guardboat in a more advantageous locality. The entire defensive machinery and operations were open to British view. The fact that the Americans held such excellent positions, had over 100 cannon and according to Carleton's own estimate numbered between 12,000 and 16,000 was sufficient grounds for not ordering a full scale engagement.  

The offense had come to an end though Carleton did not immediately inform his opponents of the fact. The Americans did not realize that the crisis was over until Gates ordered out 400 men under Major James Dunlop to explore the western Lake shore while 500 others under Lieutenant Samuel Connor moved to Putnam's Point which was found evacuated. A further march found the British completing the evacuation of Crown Point on November 4, only one day before Ticonderoga ran out of flour. Nor was the British retreat entirely orderly, for as their troops had fallen back to Crown Point, a small contingent hunting liquor was said to have entered Essex Town only to find that the local supply of rum had been poured in "Grog Harbor."  

55 Hadden, op. cit., p. 18; Jones, Conquest, p. 186.  
On November 3, Schuyler had correctly predicted his opponent's maneuver.

I do not apprehend that General Carleton will attempt our lines. It is to be wished that he did; as it is certain, if he does, that he will experience a repulse. ... If General Carleton does not mean to attack, he must soon return, as the inclemency of this season will not suffer him to remain long encamped? Should that event take place, I shall immediately thereafter draw the troops from Ticonderoga, leaving about two thousand five hundred men as a garrison. ... 57

Carleton had indeed been outguessed and had not even anticipated that Schuyler would reinforce Washington. Though he had decided against a siege, Carleton was positive that his probe would oblige the enemy to remain alert and to maintain their garrison at Ticonderoga. If he had possessed an effective intelligence unit he might have learned of the American supply shortages or if he had learned of Howe's plans he might have attempted a junction with him. Since his tactics had failed a serious altercation would develop with Lord Germain. Yet, in abandoning the campaign, Carleton was only following precedent. A similar movement had taken place in 1758. James Wilkinson supported Carleton to the extent that he too realized that it was too late to launch a full scale siege and assault.

Even if Ticonderoga had fallen, the British would have been exposed and their communications endangered.\textsuperscript{58}

Whether or not Burgoyne would have pushed a bold siege if he had been in command is difficult to assert. The course of history conceivably might have been altered before the winter. As it was, once informed, Carleton found himself deprived of his ambitious military project for 1777. His Lordship had decided prior to the Lake expedition that the Governor must return to his task as a civil officer since he was the best man for the job. Therefore, in reading the belated dispatch, Carleton noted that

\begin{quote}
His Majesty \ldots commands me to inform you that no time should be lost in beginning so important a Work, and that you do therefore return to Quebec, detaching Lieut. Genl. Burgoyne or such other officer as you shall think most proper, with that part of your Forces which can be spared from the immediate Defence of your Province, to carry on such Operations as shall be most conducive to the Success of the Army \ldots of New York, and that you direct the Officer so detached to communicate with and put himself \ldots under the Command of General Howe. \ldots \textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

In other words, the basis of the future quarrel had been initiated prior to the sudden retreat order. However, Arthur G. Bradley erroneously stated that Carleton was removed because of the Ticonderoga campaign. Perhaps he

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Wilkinson, op. cit.}, pp. 94-97.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Lord Germain to General Carleton, August 22, 1776, Q. XII, p. 88.}
had dismissed the August dispatch on the grounds that it had not been delivered.

An examination of the controversial evidence, moreover, signifies that there were ample reasons for Carleton's actions which might also have been sufficient for Burgoyne, in spite of his ambitions and zeal. After returning to London, the General examined his position in a speech before Parliament. He stated that political and not military reasoning had motivated the August 22 dispatch. Defending his former superior from adverse criticism, the General did all he could to vindicate "the judgement, the assiduity, the activity of that highly respectable officer, careless how ill I paid my court, earnest to meet every attack against his fame."

The contemporary as well as recent critics who sympathized with Lord Germain, George Christie, the seigneurs and the other disgruntled subordinates have lined up strongly against Carleton's November retreat. In an attempt to present an impartial account of their views, the remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted to, first, a consideration of contemporary critics and supporters and, second, an examination of some of the secondary accounts, both friendly and hostile.

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The strongest advocates of continued fighting, even if it meant unprecedented winter campaigns, were Lieutenant Colonel George Christie and Lord Germain. The first, who influenced the other, let it be known that definite disagreements existed in the British camp. Both Phillips and Burgoyne had been eager for a full scale assault. Since their counsel was ignored, Carleton had to bear the brunt of the resulting disapprobation. Christie also charged that the Commander-in-Chief had instigated confusion and had assumed command of the navy during the battles, though, in fact, Pringle was in command. Moreover, he rejected Carleton's estimates of American strength, claiming that they numbered only one-third of the official figure. Believing that the Americans would flee on the mere appearance of the British, he considered Carleton "totally unfit for such a command." But the Americans did not run.

Lord Germain, on the other hand, was chiefly concerned because he had had high "Expectations" that Carleton and Howe would catch the Americans in an unbreakable trap, a movement which was supposed to be insured by the large numbers of Loyalists. Diversionary raids upon the frontier would have prevented the militia from going to the aid of

61 George Christie to Lord Germain, October 26, 1776, Sackville Germain Papers.
the enemy. Germain also noted that, except for the 8th Regiment, the British army numbered approximately 10,000 and was reinforced by additional German units. Nowhere in his precis of this campaign did His Lordship admit the existence of problems of transportation and of logistics, the lack of small boats, the presence of contrary winds and the geographical obstacles. In fact, Germain was thoroughly ignorant of the vast distances and the nature of the terrain in the New World.

Balanced against the above adverse viewpoints were numerous indications that Carleton had made his choice wisely. Leading German, British and American leaders reported in letters, memoirs and other sources that the numerous obstacles left the Governor no alternative maneuver but retreat. That did not mean that there was no hope for better results. Riedesel, though bitterly disappointed, concurred with his superior, recognizing that time was essential for the construction of winter facilities for the garrison at Crown Point. The British had too little wood and the barracks were inadequate. However, Riedesel also modified his view by stating that this problem might not have existed if the entire army had been present at Crown Point. In answer to criticism by Lord

62 C. B. H., pp. 73-87.
63 Eelking, op. cit., p. 79.
North, moreover, George III, accepting the reasons for the
delay of the expedition, dismissed the allegation that an
earlier advance with a smaller force would have been vic­
torious. But Germain won by obtaining a redefinition of
Carleton's jurisdiction upon the frontiers, a measure which
Burgoyne opposed without success.

Contemporary American views by James Wilkinson,
George Washington and, to a lesser degree, Phillip Schuyler
found little to criticize Carleton for in his campaign.
Washington remarked that as long as the Ticonderoga garri­
son numbered 9,000 the British would have "to raise the
Siege, not only for want of Conveniences . . . but for fear
the freezing of the Lake should make their return impracti­
cable." Gates and Arnold had accomplished their mission.

The historians naturally either have followed the
adverse contemporary views or have gone to the other ex­
treme. In only a few instances did there seem to be a
careful examination of both sides of the controversy. For
every bit of criticism there existed a good counter argu­
ment if one dismisses the obvious blunders of Carleton's

64 The King to Lord North, No. 1931, November, 1776,

65 Lord Germain to the King, December 10, 1776, ibid.,

66 George Washington to General Schuyler, October
22, 1776, John C. Fitzpatrick, editor, The Writings of
George Washington (Washington: Government Printing Office,
subordinates. Seven historians deserve mention in this respect. The views of Alfred Leroy Burt have already been presented in this connection. J. W. Fortescue, writing in 1911, apparently had not made a thorough study of the campaign. Not only did he err on the date of the landing at Crown Point, he also failed to mention the reasons for Carleton's decision not to besiege Ticonderoga. Instead, Fortescue insisted that a march to the fortifications would certainly have terminated in a victory. However, he was correct in stating that the Loyalists were discouraged and that the retreat had an adverse effect upon the 1777 campaign. He lamented that Arnold had not led the British. 67 Benson J. Lossing, the chief biographer of General Schuyler, attacked Carleton for his caution, stating that if the assault had been launched at the right time, Ticonderoga would not have been at its peak strength. This argument was coupled with the view that flour was nearly non-existent at the fort. 68 But there is a contradiction in his theory. The supply of flour was adequate as long as there were only 6,000 troops. It was only after the militia and the Continentals totaled some 12,000 that


the flour was reported down to the last day. In other words, if Carleton had invested Ticonderoga earlier, the Americans would have been at half strength but they would have been well provisioned.

The other historians have stressed the cautious character of the Commander-in-Chief and have questioned his naval abilities. Edward D. Sullivan, in his biography of Arnold, declared that Carleton should have listened to his zealous officers. He believed that if he had there would have been a junction with Howe's army. The advantage was thus with the Americans. But the author, neglecting to state that Howe's invasion of New York was not yet known at British headquarters, ignored the preparations, fortifications and effective garrison at Ticonderoga. De Water accredited the turn of events to "British procrastination and reluctance to force a decisive battle." Mahan, while agreeing, placed some of the blame upon Pringle. Oddly enough, neither emphasized the failure to forward the troops on October 12. This explanation did not satisfy Samuel W. Patterson who prefers to give credit to Gates for his tactics and strategy. But at the same time, he refused to condone Carleton on the grounds that the Americans lacked

70De Water, op. cit., p. 204.
artillery, medicine and provisions. Patterson stated that Carleton's known ability made the retreat that much more mysterious. 71

On the other hand, eight historians, chosen perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, have presented a list of substantial motivations for the termination of the year's fighting. First, I will discuss the Nineteenth Century historians -- Charles Botta, Charles Henry Jones, James Phinney Baxter and William Kingsford. These men uncovered three primary reasons which obliged Carleton to limit his military objectives. Botta, believing that Ticonderoga was too strong, declared that a long siege would have been necessary and yet not a guarantee of success. 72 Baxter was positive that had Burgoyne and Phillips had their way Carleton's name would have been added to the long list of defeated British generals. 73 Even if this had not been the case, Jones calculated that victory would have been too costly. The experiences of Trois Rivieres and Valcour Bay did force

71 Samuel W. Patterson, Horatio Gates Defender of American Liberties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), pp. 99-104. It would appear, however, that this author was too partial towards his subject and too anti-Arnold.


Carleton to respect the martial abilities of his opposition. 74

Geography and logistics constituted the other factors which motivated the retreat. Since the Americans had destroyed the barracks at Crown Point, no means existed for housing a garrison. Moreover, the maintenance of the supply route, says Kingsford, would have been virtually impossible in an unfriendly land and with the prevailing winds and storms common during the winter months. The very distances involved increased their danger. Kingsford believes that Carleton was certain that once navigation could be resumed upon Lake Champlain all the past gains could be quickly recovered with far less difficulty. Yet, Botta was correct in asserting that the retreat was a boon to the American cause. 75

The views of four recent historians -- Thomas H. Raddall, A. G. Bradley, George Otto Trevelyan and Helen Ives Gilchrist -- support the contentions of the Nineteenth Century historians and add further evidence in Carleton's behalf. Again, one of the basic factors was the vigor of the defense under Gates and Arnold, with their large force of mixed Continentals and militia. Nor could their Lake

74 Jones, Conquest, p. 193.

boom be dismissed. Raddall writes that the German troops, though brave, had to acquire experience in forest fighting but he neglected to state that much time and effort had been devoted to overcome this handicap. Trevelyan believed that it was the fighting spirit of the Americans which necessitated the critical delay prior to the campaign. Carleton was not one to be fooled by false enemy preparations which were not reasonably substantiated. Trevelyan also declares that a long siege would only have brought in more American militia, a statement which seems verified by the future Saratoga campaign. No doubt, if Arnold had refused to fight at Valcour, Carleton would have reevaluated the courage of his opponents. In such a case it is probable that no effective resistance could have arisen between Crown Point and Albany. The Commander-in-Chief, in other words, did not underestimate his opposition.

The difficulties attributed to nature and climate were even more fundamental. Raddall, confirming Kingsford, says that winter would have resulted in untold hardships since warm clothing had not yet been distributed to the troops. There was little likelihood that a supply line

76 Raddall, op. cit., p. 56.

could have been protected or was even practicable.\textsuperscript{78}
Bradley says that the men would have had to encamp in the
open exposed to the elements, including the cold and the
raw winds. In this connection, Gilchrist blames the forces
of nature for Carleton's fate. This was in reference to
the unfavorable winds which had appeared at critical moments
and which proved most beneficial to the Americans.\textsuperscript{79} None
of these historians considered the Commander-in-Chief over-
cautious.

A study of the correspondence between Lord Germain
and the Governor cast more light upon the controversy con­
cerning the abandonment of the campaign. The thoughts of
the two British leaders reflected the very weaknesses of a
military operation conducted on one continent with the
superior official on another. When Carleton finally learned
that his command had been limited to Canada, his temperament
was such that he had to defend himself in the most vigorous
manner possible, regardless of any consequential expressions
of disrespect towards his superiors. A careful examination
of the May 20, 1777 dispatch to Lord Germain, stripped of
its sarcasm, revealed solid tactical and strategic

\textsuperscript{78}\textsuperscript{78}Raddall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{79}\textsuperscript{79}Helen I. Gilchrist, \textit{Fort Ticonderoga in History}
(Fort Ticonderoga Museum, August 2, 1923), Chapter IV.
considerations for the military operations of the last half of 1776. 80

Carleton based his actions upon five major considerations. First, drawing upon precedent, he insisted that it was customary for a field commander to be allowed to perform his mission as he saw fit without external interference. Since the August 22 dispatch was not delivered until the following spring, he naturally assumed that he was in complete command of all frontier operations. Moreover, he was at the scene of battle whereas Lord Germain was in London and could not possibly have been familiar with the necessary details and problems which accrue in such cases. Secondly, Carleton blamed His Lordship for some of his problems since he had not provided enough small boats. The Commander-in-Chief could not resist remarking that His Lordship must have known that preparations for the Lake campaign could not have been undertaken during the Quebec siege. Most of the requests for boats, artisans and carpenters seemed to have been ignored. In a biting bit of sarcasm, Carleton declared that he

naturally concluded, either that your Lordship had taken your measures with such great wisdom, that the rebels must immediately be compelled to lay down their arms, and implore the King's mercy without our assistance, or that you had suspicions [that] the forces here might become necessary for the defense of the Province, and that your Lordship might not wish I should have the power, least . . . I should push on so as not to be able to return . . .

Continuing, Carleton sarcastically assumed that perhaps Lord Germain was so pleased with the rapid advance of the spring that he had calculated that the Lake campaign could not possibly be so soon and, thus, sent no marine. Such a conclusion, however, was dispelled by Germain's assertion that embarrassments would ensue if Carleton should place his army under the command of Sir William Howe, commander of His Majesty's troops in New York.

Carleton's third consideration was not new to His Lordship. The evils of frost bite, starvation and death likely to develop during winter maneuvers in the Canadian zone were too obvious. Carleton was positive that any detachments which might have been left at Crown Point or which might have been sent to join Howe would easily have been annihilated by the enemy. Furthermore, the climate was such that an open encampment was impossible. The troops would not have been able to escape to or to get provisions from Canada because of the dangerous winds, the ice and the intense cold. Houses to shelter the men were few and scattered, too dispersed for any emergency. There
would have been no chance to assemble the men against a surprise attack. Yet, Carleton found himself blamed for Washington's successful attack against Howe's Hessians at Trenton, New Jersey. In that case, the Hessians had been housed closely together. Carleton was astonished that Lord Germain could not contemplate possible raids on any garrisons that might be established in a far less settled territory. Naturally, Carleton refused to assume any of the responsibility for the disastrous results of British campaigns not under his jurisdiction.

Lord Germain, failed to evaluate the difficulties of transportation of all sorts of equipment and personnel. Again Carleton did not resist the temptation to employ sarcasm in his fourth consideration. Germain was advised that "such matters . . . are not attended to by persons little used to the movements of armies." There was no way to secure the safety of the transportation system while a strong American garrison remained at Ticonderoga, fully capable of making sorties against British provisions trains. As it was, frost, ice and severe winds were serious obstacles as were the deep snows and the storms. Yet, Carleton noted that His Lordship expected him either to join Howe or to protect him. Carleton asked how he could have known that Schuyler would quickly dispatch the bulk of his Continentals and volunteers from Ticonderoga to
Washington's headquarters? Carleton could only conclude that he was being punished since it was obvious that Howe had distinct geographic and logistical advantages over the Canadian army.

Lastly, in defense of his operations, the Commander-in-Chief drew upon a long list of precedents in the New World, devoting particular attention to the campaign of 1759. In that instance, instead of having the northern army draw off pressure from the southern the reverse was true. It was not General Wolfe who went to reinforce General Amherst. On the contrary, factors of climate and an unfriendly territory seething with Indians found Amherst seeking to assist Wolfe. Moreover, Amherst possessed an excellent army, numerous artificers, laborers and seamen. He was free to perform his mission as he judged best and not in a winter campaign. Yet, the General did not reach Quebec during the critical year of 1759, even though the French had but a tiny army and navy,

notwithstanding which, General Amherst received no censure from the then Minister, who was not . . . over indulgent to officers who neglected opportunities to exert themselves . . . your Lordship should know [that] such measures are less impracticable on this side of the Lake than on the other.

Moreover, unlike Amherst, Carleton had to restore a province which had been on the brink of collapse. He had
had to expect a large enemy army before he could prepare for an offense. 81

In response to such sarcasm, Lord Germain penned a dispatch on July 25, 1777. First, he rejected the allegation that he alone was responsible for any unpopular order or statement which might seemingly have appeared his own since no measure could be enacted without the King's approval. Only in the manner in which the orders were conveyed would His Lordship admit responsibility. As for the placing of command in the hands of Burgoyne, the King had issued detailed directives on every aspect, after considering all intelligence provided by the Colonial Department and Burgoyne himself. Secondly, since the Lake region bordered on New York, an expedition to the south would naturally fall upon the military commander of that jurisdiction. It was not permissible to allow Carleton, senior in rank, to submit to Sir William Howe. Thirdly, Lord Germain defended his record of providing supplies, troops and other essentials.

It would ill become my situation to enter into an ill-humoured altercation with you upon the various parts of your letters respecting the

operations of the last campaign. All I shall say... is, that every possible exertion was made here to supply you with such a force as we flattered ourselves would have been sufficient, not only for the recovery of the Province of Quebec, but to enable you to assist Sir William Howe... by sending a part of your army to... Albany.82

Finally, His Lordship again denied any personal antipathy towards the Governor. Expressing astonishment at such an allegation, he merely stated that it was unjust and contrary to his character.

The conclusions which might be drawn would seem to depend upon whether one was influenced by Germain's sincerity or by the justness of Carleton's calculations. Burt has defended the former on the grounds that the latter was unable to accept valid criticism and could respond only with invectives. Burt fully accepted Germain's views of placing the responsibility upon George III. There was some basis for such a belief.83 Yet, it does not excuse His Lordship from his part in replacing Carleton with Burgoyne. In a letter to Lord North, moreover, dated December 13, 1776, the King, exposing the hypocrisy of his minister, noted that Germain had a definite bias and rancour against Carleton. It may be that the Governor was

82 Lord Germain to General Carleton, July 25, 1777, C. A. 1885, Note D 2. Appendix H, No. 4.
overcautious and that a "more enterprizing Commander"
might have achieved more spectacular victories

but should the proposal be to recall Carleton
... or [to] censure his conduct that would
be cruel and the exigency cannot authorize
it ... let all the invectives against him be
thrown out. 84

These words repudiate Burt's thesis by disproving the
assertion that His Majesty had taken the prime movement
to recall Carleton.

The King, in addition, had expressed great pleasure
in the victories of his commander and sought to reward him
contrary to the opinions of Lord Germain. In a series of
letters in July, 1776, Carleton was informed that he had
been nominated a Knight Companion of the Order of Bath,
even though there was no vacancy. The Statutes of the
Order, as well as the Ensigns and the customary emolu­
ments, were dispatched to Quebec. Obviously, these were
in compensation for Carleton's able defense of Quebec and
the recovery of Canada. 85

In spite of his critics, the Commander-in-Chief
had managed to overcome innumerable obstacles. He had

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84 The King to Lord North, December 13, 1776, No.
407.

85 Lord Weymouth to General Carleton, July 4 and
10, 1776, Great Britain, Public Record Office, State
Papers Domestic, George III, Manuscript Division, The
not been defeated but had been victorious. The most that could be said against him was that he could have achieved even greater heights. His weaknesses were both his own as well as those of the entire military machinery of that period. If he was too cautious and held too great a respect for the capabilities of his opponents, his superiors were easily guilty of the other extreme. Nor can it be denied that Carleton had to rely upon some unfortunate subordinates but he had no choice. Lord Germain failed to send him an able naval officer to take command or to advise the Commander-in-Chief properly. Those with the adverse opinions underrated the Americans, discounted the long distances involved and dismissed the likelihood of a revolution in which a substantial portion of the population participated. Carleton was a soldier with past American experiences. He surmised that some traditional practices were not applicable in the New World, and, therefore, sought to modify fighting methods which would only prove harmful. Throughout the campaign, he pursued a consistent policy of humanity, caution and suitable defense. If he feared attack, he was justified. The errors committed during the campaign were not decisive. Lord Germain simply underestimated the opposition 3,000 miles away.
CHAPTER XIII

LOGISTICS, REINFORCEMENTS AND PROVISIONS DURING THE VICTORIOUS STAGE PART II

During the advance of the spring and summer of 1776, Carleton had to divide his time between tactical considerations and problems relative to logistics, embracing shipping, provisions and reinforcements. Most of these problems were interlocking, with the successful solution of one contributing to the successful accomplishments of the others. For the sake of clarity, I will treat transportation first and provisions second. Because of geography, it was evident that shipping would have to be the main source of transporting the troops and supplies within Canada, and, beyond any doubt, from Great Britain to the beleaguered province.

During these months, the Commander-in-Chief endeavored to inspire a sense of speed and cooperation among the officers and masters of the naval, transport, victualler and storeships which began to reach Quebec in larger and more regular fashion. Considerations of climate, especially the direction and force of winds so important to sailing vessels, and geography, particularly the location of rapids and landing sites, played a
significant part in the advance. Thus, an order issued on May 28 required the victualler, transport and store-ships "to proceed with the utmost expedition, as high as the wind, and other circumstances will permit." When halted, the ship officers were ordered to land the troops, including baggage and 15 days' provisions which were to accompany them in bateaux guided by Canadians who were furnished by the corvees. Two days later, other instructions directed them to continue in the transports as long as the wind was satisfactory. Otherwise the troops were to disembark in groups of 300 for the convenience of camping during the march.

Generally, water transport was preferred to marching since it was quicker and it reduced fatigue among the troops. However, if there were no alternative, the marchers were to receive four days' provisions from the transports, consisting of one pound of both beef and bread per man each day. The men, moreover, were to carry nothing except essential arms, ammunition and knapsacks. The women, however, except for two per company, had to remain aboard the transports. The landing of the troops was to be based on units and none were supposed to march

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1Order of May 28, 1776, B. 83, p. 1. Alfred Leroy Burt tends to overlook the enormities of these problems. See his The Old Province of Quebec, passim.
under conditions inconsistent with health. As for the employment of carts and carriages, Carleton insisted that they be reserved for the sick or for "extraordinary Accidents." The marching orders were formulated with the intent of avoiding unnecessary confusion among several units in one area. Still another order, dated June 6, required the division commanders to draw upon the ship Lord Howe, then at Port Neuf. In the event of shortages, the officers were held responsible for proper purchases from the population. They were reminded that their march was in a friendly area and, therefore, sobriety and discipline were essential.

One of the basic problems concerning shipping was the lack of adequate space for the transportation of the ever increasing number of British and German regiments, plus the militia and Indians. There is sufficient evidence indicating that while some regiments had ample space aboard the transports others did not. An examination of the returns made by five different regiments on June 10 magnifies this factor. The return of the 9th Regiment, commanded by Major General Edward Lord Viscount Ligionier, shows that nearly all of the men had been provided with transport at

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3Order of June 6, 1776, ibid., p. 2.
Trois Rivieres. The regiment had ten companies or 464 men on the transports. However, there was a shortage of 75 for undisclosed reasons. The 24th Regiment had greater difficulties since only seven of its 11 companies, or 330 versus 183 men, could be embarked. In other words, approximately 36 per cent lacked transportation. Lieutenant General S. Adolphius Brighton's 31st Regiment managed somewhat better. Three hundred and ninety-five, as against 147 men unprovided for, were on board the transports, or 72 per cent. As for the 34th Regiment, eight out of ten companies, or 396 out of 509 men, managed to find shipping space. Thus 20 per cent were forced to await the arrival of additional transports. The remaining regiment, the 53rd, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel H. Watson Powell, two companies, or 82 men, were unable to embark at Trois Rivieres.\footnote{Returns of the 9th, 24th, 31st, 34th and 53rd Regiments at Trois Rivieres, June 10, 1776, Military Despatches, British Army in North America, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 28-33. Hereafter cited as M. 332. See Table 4.} Adding these figures together shows the magnitude of this problem and this concerning only five regiments. Over 500 men or enough to form an additional regiment were thus temporarily stranded. This does not include the 126 vacancies. Whether such conclusions would be just as accurate or a true test for the remaining portion of
### TABLE 4

**RETURNS OF FIVE BRITISH REGIMENTS AT TROIS RIVIERES, JUNE 10, 1776 SPECIFYING THOSE ON BOARD AND THOSE ON SHORE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Effective Rank &amp; File</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>It. Colonel</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 9th Regiment of Foot</td>
<td>1 1 7 10 5</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Companies on Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 1 8 11 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting to Compleat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 24th Regiment of Foot</td>
<td>1 1 4 7 6</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Companies on Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 4 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Companies not Embarked</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 31st Regiment of Foot</td>
<td>1 1 8 10 7</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Board Ship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Effectives on Shore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**
- 1. **9th Regiment of Foot**
  - 10 Companies on Transport
  - Wanting to Compleat
  - Total Allowance

- 2. **24th Regiment of Foot**
  - 7 Companies on Transport
  - 4 Companies not Embarked
  - Total

- 3. **31st Regiment of Foot**
  - On Board Ship
  - Effectives on Shore
  - Total


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Effective Rank &amp; File</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>Major</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td></td>
<td>[27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mates</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummer</td>
<td>396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit for Duty</td>
<td>396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. 34th Regiment of Foot
8 Companies Embarked
Companies of Lord Cavindish and Major Dundes, ashore
Wanting to Complete
Total

5. 53rd Regiment of Foot
On Shore, Companies of Captains Dunlop and Longfield

N.B. 27 Men of Lord Cavindish's and Major Dundas' companies sick on board 3 vessels.

Source: M. 332, pp. 28-33.
the campaign cannot be determined with absolute certainty. Continual references by Carleton and his subordinates imply that the situation did not improve.

Besides this worry, the Commander-in-Chief was also obliged to provide daily sailing orders and formations. Thus, on June 12, the British grenadiers and light infantry, with four days provisions, were ordered to shore, opposite their transports. Two days later, the troops were alerted for a sudden embarkation while a formation of the vessels was made known. It was no easy task to keep them in proper order. The fleet was divided into seven sections. The first vessels in the formation carried the light infantry and the grenadiers, the second light artillery, the third the first brigade, the fourth the Brunswick and Hanau grenadiers and the fifth and sixth sections the 2nd and 3rd brigades respectively. The last unit consisted of ordnance and transport vessels. Simi-
lar orders were issued for the next four days, with some units being landed at Sorel and others marching to St. Denis. More troops were disembarked on both shores of the St. Lawrence on the 16th instant. The 29th Regiment was ordered to Montreal while the Brunswick and Hanau forces advanced along the shore to Nercheres.

\[\text{Orders of June 12 and 14, 1776, A. G. O. B., pp. 6-7.}\]
\[\text{Orders, June 15-20, 1776, ibid., p. 7.}\]
Throughout June, Carleton was engaged not only in completing the reconquest of Canada but also in directing further troop and naval movements. Regiments were sent as fast as transportation permitted and as far as the vessels could penetrate. It was already obvious that many transports would have to be unloaded so that they could return to London for their next missions. The Commander-in-Chief, on occasion, personally directed the dispatching of troops. On June 23, for example, one regiment was given instructions to sail to Trois Rivieres and to march from that point. The result was to scatter this regiment in small companies. In the meantime, individual ship captains were notified to forward provisions to the new depot at La Prairie and arms, ammunition and Indian presents to the liberated Montreal. Still others carried baggage for the several regiments, from place to place. The transports had the burden of carrying not only regular supplies but also salt provisions, which with time became less needed as Carleton favored the use of fresh provisions where possible. This freed some of the vessels for other obligations in mid-June. Additional detailed instructions appeared on June 26. In

obedience to Carleton's directives, Charles Douglas of
the *Isis* informed Captain Pownell of the *Blond* that five
transports should remain either at Montreal or at the
entrance of the Richelieu. In addition, he was directed
to empty the victuallers, storeships and artillery vessels
as quickly as possible and he was told to bring efficient
pilots to the troublesome rapids.

Geographical obstacles were already slowing down
the southward advance. Carleton saw fit to place Captain
Thomas Pringle in command of the vessels on Lake St. Peters,
where the St. Lawrence suddenly widens before it returns
to normal river size. Pringle, however, was not to dis­
embark unless Carleton gave him specific instructions to
do so. The pilots were essential for the purpose of con­
ducting vessels from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to
Trois Rivieres without halt.\(^8\) Thus Carleton sought to
avoid unnecessary delay in disembarkation and re-embar­
kation. The Irish transports were able to sail directly
to the Richelieu. At that point, the men of the *Triton*,
one of the vessels stationed there by deliberate policy,
advised them on their continued passage. But since the
wind failed, some troops had to move by land though others

\(^8\) Order, June 26, 1776, Numbers 25 and 26, Admiralty
I, Old Captain's Letters, D. 1706, 1776-1777, Section I,
Manuscripts Division, The Library of Congress. Hereafter
cited as Ad. I.
managed to navigate the Richelieu Rapids. Whereupon, the
pilots were released so that they might be of service to
the following vessels. There was not one accident in
spite of the difficulties encountered in the rapids.9

It is essential at this point to indicate that
Carleton was simultaneously confronted with logistical
problems not only under his control but also directed by
the Treasury, the Admiralty, the Commissary and the private
contracting firm of Mure, Son and Atkinson. He was obliged
to carry on a correspondence with all of them, which con­
sumed considerable time. Through such means, he learned
that six small craft were on the way.10 Equally important,
he was informed that the Cork and Plymouth depots were
handicapped by the limited number of vessels available as
transports, victuallers or storeships. In order to send
supplies for thousands of men a dependable and smooth

9 Charles Douglas to Philip Stephens, June 26, 1776,
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office,
Class 5, Volume 125, Old Home Office, Admiralty 171, Ad­
miralty 1776, Manuscript Division, the Library of Congress,
p. 15b. Hereafter cited as P. R. O. C., O. 5, 125.

10 A list and description of small armed vessels
for the Canadian Service, March 28, 1776, B. 37, pp. 130-
131. The six included the Liberty, a brig of 107 tons,
the Polly, 113 tons, the Lieutenant Peter, and the Mary,
the former 90 tons and the latter 154 tons, the Ceres,
a sloop of 120 tons, all at Deptford and last the George,
a cutter of 78 tons was being fitted at Southampton.
operation was essential. Lord John Robinson of the Treasury desired that every ship going to Quebec be prepared to undertake a second voyage before winter. Carleton was instructed to obey.

I have it therefore in command from their Lordships to desire that you will give those which sailed under convoy of the Triton, as well as those now on their departure as much despatch as shall be consistent with [your] situation. . . .

Robinson also declared that one of the vessels, the Swift had been burned but was to be replaced by the Elizabeth which would be convoyed by the Tartar. The full details of this operation, wrote the Secretary, would be forthcoming from the house of Mure, Son and Atkinson.11

In a letter from Commissary Robert Gordon, the Commander-in-Chief was informed of the difficulties of procuring and loading provisions. The Commissary claimed that he personally examined every pound put aboard the vessels being readied for sail in May. Measures were taken to insure the safety of embarked goods, such as putting hoops on the beef and pork casks, encouraging better handling in order to reduce damage, and sending plated pickle casks which were to be filled by Carleton's own storekeepers. The plates were introduced to prevent the rats from eating "out the corks." The butter, however,

was spoiled and none could be provided until the sailing of the second fleet. The Commissary ordered that each ship carry a proportion of the different kinds of provisions so as to insure a more limited loss if a vessel were sunk or captured at sea.  

Other supplies were to be sent in the fall on the assumption that Carleton was making every effort to enlist Canadians and Indians. For that reason, clothing and provisions were prepared for 12,000 men in mid-September. At the same time, Robinson recommended that fresh provisions be used where possible so that biscuit and salt provisions could be saved for the winter. He further suggested that bullocks be used to draw carts and artillery, after which they might be consumed as food. The Secretary doubted not that such measures were indeed already in operation. He was correct except as to cattle. Carleton hesitated to slaughter any belonging to the loyal inhabitants. As for liquor, the Lords of the Treasury favored the substitution of spruce beer for porter. Carleton was directed to and did distribute sufficient quantities without the usual pay reductions. The expenses accrued because of this directive

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were charged to the account of the "Extraordinaries of the Army."\(^\text{13}\)

In the field of finances, the day of the traveling war chest was still in vogue. All the ranking officers were accustomed to the use of official moneys for the procurement of provisions, ordnance, recruits and other needs. It was highly important that supplies of currency reach Quebec, for without such Carleton might have had to resort to commandeering and other unpopular measures. On June 20, Robinson wrote that £20,000 were being shipped to Quebec aboard the Triton and it would have to last until Burgoyne arrived. The latter brought over £450,000 for the extraordinary services and £35,000 for pay and subsistence. Nor was this all. The Lords of the Treasury also directed that the Amazon and the Garland carry £50,000 and £25,000 respectively. This was done because Carleton had earlier written that he would not be able to depend fully upon procurement in Canada. The first division of Brunswick troops brought another £5,000 for their use as well. If additional sums were needed, the Commander-in-Chief was requested to inform their Lordships prior to winter or it would be too late to make rectifications. No doubt much depended upon the emerging needs during the

\(^{13}\text{Secretary Robinson to General Carleton, Whitehall, September 18, 1776, B. 38, pp. 54-56.}\)
campaign itself but caution was essential in order to prevent an unfavorable exchange rate or a serious drainage of specie. Otherwise all bills would have to be stopped.  

As to the nature of the supplies provided by the private contractors, a series of letters dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief reveals some of the conditions and resulting reactions, primarily concerning the firm of Mure, Son and Atkinson which seems to have had a monopoly, during this period, of goods sent to Quebec. In a letter dated September 3, Carleton learned that he was going to receive an odd assortment of items which included such things as several thousand barrack beds, rugs, blankets, sheets, shoes, linen for shirts for the Indians and Canadians, plus axes, camp kettles and flasks. The owners promised to insure against cheating or shortchanging by their tradesmen. The goods would be brought to Canada in four vessels before winter closed the transportation routes. A second fleet was also prepared but the correspondent doubted that it could sail in time. Nevertheless, if no obstacles were encountered, the Union would bring presents and currency but

14 Secretary Robinson to General Carleton, Treasury Chamber, June 20, 1776, B. 46, pp. 16-19. Funds were essential for presents to the Indians as well. Robinson also wrote that he wanted Carleton to send a detail of his needs so that the Lords might have a guide to go by.

15 Mure, Son and Atkinson to General Carleton, September 3, 1776, B. 27, pp. 443-444.
it would have to be unloaded quickly since the owners wanted it to then go to Jamaica. The remaining vessels were on a monthly hire, a common procedure at that time. Obstacles arose regarding the first fleet, however, since the crews were difficult to hold because of desertion and there was no man-of-war present in the port of Cork to overawe them. Another difficulty came in the sources for the numerous items being purchased. The owners stated that the rugs and leggings had to come from Devonshire and Leeds and that cloth for the Brunswickers came from Hamburg. No wonder it took so long to prepare the cargoes. Moreover, the goods had to be transferred from the German ships to another vessel at Gravesend. Still the writer thought that the rest would be sent before winter.  

A third letter from the firm, dated September 28, described other complications at Cork. The correspondent wrote that there was no shortage of any articles except hair for bedding which was overcome by substituting rags. As for woolens, it was found necessary to use all grades, otherwise there would be insufficient quantities. The firm then blamed the Lords of the Treasury for the further delays. The Union, nonetheless, sailed on the 22nd, bringing £58,000 sterling and a small force. Five days later, 

Mure, Son and Atkinson to General Carleton, September 20, 1776, ibid., pp. 453-455.
the General Conway and the Loudon departed Gravesend, with the latter vessel carrying Madame Riedesel and Adjutant Foy.\textsuperscript{17}

More serious trouble broke out at Cork during October, of which Carleton was later to be informed by Commissary Gordon. Seven vessels, all loaded with vital provisions, were unable to get underway because of repeated mutinies and riots. Some of the vessels had three different crews in a short period of time. In great bitterness, the impressed sailors sought their freedom by beating their officers and jumping overboard. There was, apparently, no man-of-war available. Yet the Commissary stated that otherwise all was being done to expedite the provisions.\textsuperscript{18} These, however, were problems over which Carleton had little control in spite of their importance to his requirements.

In addition, he learned that foreign vessels in the several fleets could not be employed for any other purpose than to transport troops to Canada. Once loaded, it was essential that he issue orders to discharge the vessels. Since some of their masters acted suspiciously,

\textsuperscript{17}Mure, Son and Atkinson to General Carleton, September 28, 1776, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 473-476.

\textsuperscript{18}Robert Gordon to General Carleton, Cork, October 25, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 481-482.
it was recommended that a thorough search be made of their holds in case they might be carrying unauthorized merchandise. While the Commander-in-Chief found that huge amounts of supplies were being forwarded he also observed that there was a serious shortage of vessels, that other vessels had been hired for a specified time and that crews and masters were, perhaps, violators of the embargoes.\textsuperscript{19}

Carleton endeavored conscientiously with all the resources at hand to meet the requirements of his superiors. In particular was he cognizant of the instructions dispatched on May 1 by the Treasury, to wit that all arriving vessels be unloaded and sent back with all possible speed so that a second shipment might reach Canada. The firm of Mure, Son and Atkinson repeatedly advised the same. How else were goods and reinforcements to be transported to Quebec? It was a difficult task, for the Commander-in-Chief was also confronted with a serious shortage of small vessels for employment within the province. The returns of June 10 clearly proved that. Carleton was continually notifying his subordinates to be mindful of the fact that shipping was scarce. Commodore Douglas was ordered, at the end of June, to dispatch the Triton and other vessels mentioned by Robinson. They were returned to Cork as soon

\textsuperscript{19}Q. XII, pp. 47-48.
as they were emptied. The responsibility was thus largely delegated but the criticism belonged to Carleton alone. On September 14, Carleton informed Douglas of his displeasure concerning the detention of transports because they lacked sailors or carpenters, and he deplored the fact that some were idle. In several letters during October, the Commander-in-Chief made it clear that, though he had desired that both the vessels and the sailors remain for the campaign of 1777, he still intended to obey the Treasury order by dispatching the victuallers as requested. One more illustration will suffice. Because of complaints, Carleton strongly recommended that Cramahe give "strict orders" to prevent further delays.

The importance of such action was substantiated by an official report of a list of provisions ships made at London September 20, 1776. Its detailed account of the arrival and departure of vessels at Cork confirmed the worries of the Lords of the Treasury and the firm of Mure, Son and Atkinson. However, this report covered only the period from June 10 to September 6. Thus the unfavorable balance may have been somewhat reduced during the fall.

20 General Carleton to Charles Douglas, June 29, 1776, b. 39, p. 42.

21 General Carleton to Captain Douglas, September 14 and October 21, 1776, and General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, October 22, 1776, ibid., pp. 157, 226-227, 230.
when the approach of winter obliged Carleton to impress
the fact of space shortages upon his officers. The report
showed that 23 vessels of various tonnages had reached
Quebec but only eight had returned to Cork during this
three-month period. Thousands of pounds of staples and
meats sailed from Cork on six different dates. Four vessels
--- the Diligence, the Buckingham, the Minerva and the Nancy
--- sailed on June 10, carrying ample quantities if not
qualities of beef, pork, flour, bread, butter, peas and
oatmeal. On the second date, June 21, only the Pegasus
was reported having on board a similar load. On the other
hand, five vessels --- the Active, the Tuscany, the Polly,
the Success and the Warbown --- departed from Cork on July
19. Each of these not only carried provisions but also a
small number of recruits. On the fourth departure, August
1 through 5, four more ships departed --- the Howe, the
Hyacinth, the Jupiter, and the Charlotte. They carried
both provisions and recruits, though there was no return
on the latter. Two other vessels departed during the
second half of August, the Nancy and the Bosphorous. The
former vessel was not the same as the one that had left
earlier. On the last departure date, September 6, six
more vessels left --- the Johannes, the Dove and Friendship
the Farley, the Industry, the Gruerons Friends and the Horsendon. 22

The vessels returning to Cork were listed as having entered the port during August. It was, therefore, not clear whether any of the other vessels might have returned in the other months. The eight vessels named included the Locke and the Nottingham, both formerly employed in India, the Earl of Loudon, the Mary and Francis, the Nancy, the Lord Shuldham and the Roebuck. Thus there appears a definite discrepancy between incoming and outgoing vessels. Carleton, during these three months, in spite of endeavors and advice from London and also his orders to subordinates, had failed to a large degree to fulfill his mission, namely the immediate return of the vessels. The entire responsibility cannot be assumed by him alone. The authorities in London did not question his needs but requested that the hired vessels be returned so that the contracts might be extended and additional loads of provisions sent to Quebec. Yet, these ships too faced delays and even mutinies, neither of which can be attributed to the Commander-in-Chief.

On this side of the Atlantic, the office of the commissary and his assistants put everything into operation. A sincere effort was made by Carleton to help his zealous

commissary, Nathaniel Day, by providing him with the needed subordinates. This was necessary for the improved efficiency of gathering and distributing provisions to the advancing troops. Therefore, on June 29, the Commander-in-Chief directed each brigade to provide an under assistant commissary who would be responsible for receipts and deliveries as well as obeying the orders of the commissary officers and the brigade generals. In order to encourage a favorable response, the directive allowed the appointees five shillings per day. The brigade generals were to fill the vacancies with men known for their activity, honesty, and intelligence. Furthermore, each regiment furnished a noncommissioned officer of like character who was directly subordinate to the under assistant commissaries of the brigade to act as distributors, to report ration accounts and receipts, and to make monthly reports for their superiors. Their pay was one shilling and six pence per day. There was one limitation, however; so as not to disturb the population, only the general officers could requisition horses or carriages.²³

By these means, Day was able to institute the regulations regarding salt and fresh provisions. He had the task of compiling monthly reports so that the London

authorities might be informed as to the needs of the army. These reports contained such information as the amounts of supplies received, expenditures, the number of rations drawn by both the officers and the rank and file, material transactions and other activities of the commissary. These reports were sent either to the High Treasurer or the Commissioners of the Treasury. Nevertheless, financial burdens soon bothered Day. He complained that after his arrival he had to advance money in order to secure flour and other goods from the local dealers. Moreover, he had not received any allowance other than daily pay, making it necessary to draw upon his own fortune to cover losses and to pay for rent, express, stationary and other similar expenses.24

A careful examination of the general orders issued during the second half of 1776 shows that a considerable portion of them had been concerned not only with the distribution of provisions on the vessels but also with the manner in which rations were issued to the men. Carleton was cognizant of the welfare of his troops and allies. He estimated that a properly fed army would be able to perform its missions to greater satisfaction and with higher morale than one which was plagued with shortages and semi-starvation. At irregular intervals, he examined the procedures

of the commissary. Thus by a general order of June 12, the army was furnished with complete rations from the victuallers which accompanied the advance. On a per diem basis each soldier received one and a half pounds of flour or bread and beef or pork, plus one half pint of peas and one ounce of butter and rice. When that was not possible of execution, Carleton set the alternative at one and a half pounds each of flour or bread and ten ounces of beef or pork. In the event neither of these could be carried out, each man got one and a half pounds of rice and three ounces of bread or flour. In all instances, however, Carleton, both on his own inclination as well as those of his superiors, preferred fresh provisions. All transactions were handled by the commissary and receipts were collected on a monthly basis by each of the regiments. 25

In procuring fresh provisions from the Canadians, Carleton, however, did not find it easy to institute a policy of fairness and reasonableness. The Rules and Articles, section VIII, set the criteria. Carleton was obligated to prevent exorbitant prices, to stop cheating, to guard against private impositions or duties on foods, liquors or necessities of life which were brought into the garrisons for the troops, to insure that such goods

had quality in accordance with the market prices and to issue licenses to sutlers. Moreover, he had the authority to prevent sales during holidays, the Sabbath or upon special occasions. Garrison commanders could also give liberty by means of orders or contracts so that goods could be sold to the military. To carry out these regulations fairly was difficult. The accounts of Day show that the people tried to raise prices through combinations, as on flour. The Germans complained that they had to pay exorbitant prices for the hire of carts to carry baggage or for transportation. They requested that Carleton "graciously consent" to compensate them since they did not know whether their companies had the means to pay.

Continually, Carleton insisted upon fair prices and dealings for supplies for the units as well as purchases by individual soldiers in the established markets. The troops were instructed to pay in coin and not to give receipts to the Canadians, even if the expense was to be defrayed by the government. These measures were designed to protect both the purchaser and the retailer since false

26 Section VIII, Great Britain, Army, Rules and Articles (London: Printed, 1777), pp. 15-16.
27 Curtis, op. cit., p. 119.
receipts were not unknown. In another order, issued in mid-June, the regiments were authorized to procure a definite number of oxen to provide fresh meat. The officers in charge had to keep exact accounts. As late as October, Carleton was recommending the suspension of salt in favor of fresh provisions. This time, however, purchases were limited to the Loyalists and at fair prices. But there was also a shortage of grain and flour in the domestic market since there were not enough mills. The Canadians were thus selling grain without grinding it. The only solution was to construct another mill. Nevertheless, Day succeeded in buying over 500,000 pounds of baked bread, 3,500,000 pounds of flour and 100,000 pounds of biscuit from the inhabitants between May 25 and December 24. On the other hand, in supplying provisions to the militia and the Indians, Day discovered that the British biscuits were unpopular. Not only that, both refused to eat salt beef. It was no wonder that the Commander-in-Chief had to push the purchase of fresh provisions.

In regard to markets established for the convenience of the troops, Carleton was strict in enforcing regulations

29 Order of June 5, 1776, A. G. O. B.
30 Order of June 20, 1776, B. 83, p. 11.
31 Curtis, op. cit., p. 112n.
for their benefit and for the sake of discipline. Troubles had occurred in country fairs because of the seizure of goods. Moreover, women on their way to market had been insulted by men bathing in the nude, not to mention other irregularities, all of which hurt the operations of the markets.

It is therefore ordered that no bringing Refreshments to Market be stopt [sic] or their Articles be interrupted upon pretense whatsoever, that the Market be held at the Church at Chambly, and be open'd Monday, Wednesday, and Fridays from . . . six to nine in the Morning - An Officers Guard to be mounted for the Protection and Regularity; and Patroles . . . be extended to one Mile distance to each Flank and to the Rire [sic] of their Cantooments [sic] to prevent molestation. . . . 32

As for the men desiring to bathe, recognizing that the health of the men was essential, Carleton stated that they must do so in regulated groups at appointed hours and under proper supervision. Thus he sought to find a solution which attempted to remove the grievances of both sides.

Regulations for the distribution of such items as liquor and clothing accompanied those concerning provisions. In a letter, dated July 19, Carleton learned that rum was being sent by a contracted firm in Barbadoes. In response to an order from the Lords of the Treasury, the officials of the firm stated that they were shipping

250 hogsheads of Barbadoes proof rum. They hoped that Carleton would approve the standard proof. They also claimed that they had selected the choicest items, a claim common to many contractors whether true or not. 33

When the rum did arrive in late November, however, Carleton discovered that the quantity fell far short of the Treasury order. It was too late to rectify the error by making a new contract to fill the gap so that the spring campaign would not be a dry one. Rum in insufficient quantities had also come from Grenada and Halifax. In the meantime, the Treasury recommendations in favor of spruce beer were carried out. 34

Similar problems were also encountered in the shipments of clothing. After examining an invoice of clothing made by his subordinates, on August 6, he noted that there were errors in the patterns for the uniforms. The tailors were using too much cloth in cutting them; the consequence, one suit was being lost out of every six. The uniform itself consisted of one and three quarters yards of fine green cloth and three quarters of scarlet, plus sowing silk, six pieces of buff and three of buckram.

33 Letter from Barbadoes giving an Acct. of Rum to be sent, July 19, 1776, B. 27, p. 434.

34 General Carleton to John Robinson, November 25, 1776, Darmouth Patshull Transcripts, Public Archives of Canada, Vol. V.
The shortages in shipping of clothing for the privates was even more widespread. Upon unloading one vessel, an examination of the bales indicated cheating had occurred since some bales lacked one or two suits. Carleton was obliged to make good the shortages after the corps reports were confirmed. In addition, some of the casks of shoes had been opened. In September, Lord Barrington wrote that he was sending shoes and shoe repair equipment. Carleton was directed to deliver these items on need, making the proper stoppages so that the expense would be reimbursed. The regimental paymasters had to give credit to the agents of the corps for the deductions made.

That the Home Government must assume part of the blame for the insufficient quantities of clothing sent was suggested by Carleton in a letter to His Lordship in the late fall. The soldiers, as a result, suffered from the increasing cold. Such distress did influence Carleton's conduct of the Ticonderoga campaign.

I must beg therefore that your Lordship will issue Such Orders, as that the Cloathing of All the Regiments may . . . be sent to them

35 Remarks upon the invoice of clothing delivered to Carleton, August 6, 1776, by Richard Murray, in Carleton's of August 28, 1776, M. 318, p. 8.

36 Lord Barrington to General Carleton, War Office, September 11, 1776, B. 38, p. 21.
regularly... to prevent the inconvenience to the Men, or detriment to the Service... 37

Not only was Carleton obliged to clothe the British and Canadians, he also had to furnish the Germans with fall and winter clothing. Each man reportedly received one pair of long blue cloth overalls, shoes, leather straps for leggings, a blue wool cap, a pair of mittens, a large under jacket, a Canadian overcoat lined with wool and, last, a gray cap. For these items, the stoppage totaled thirty-three shillings and nine pence, to be collected over a seven-month period at the initial rate of five shillings and a final rate of three shillings and nine pence. 38

Vigorous if not completely successful efforts were exerted by Carleton to care for the sick, to provide adequate housing, to insure proper returns, and to maintain the embargo with modifications. Taking these considerations in order, the lack of medicines and the need to establish hospitals for the sick and the wounded received his immediate attention. The orderly books were filled with detailed instructions requiring the debarking of the sick


to the Quebec hospital where they were to be delivered into the care of Doctor Adam Mabane. Each of the admitted patients had to bring his weapons and necessities. If that was not possible, they were supplied but the expense was deducted from their pay. The Germans were included by an order of June 4 which stated that their sick must be immediately taken to the hospitals in boats provided by the ship masters. Carleton modified his policy somewhat in November when the purveyor of the hospitals was instructed to give the ill sailors what they needed. These expenses were to be reimbursed by the naval department which later charged them to the seamen. Once the men recovered they were returned to their companies.

Measures had to be taken in the hospitals and on board the vessels to guard the health of the troops. On June 11, Carleton ordered the decks of the ships cleaned daily, the bedding turned on deck and the sleeping quarters thoroughly sprinkled with vinegar. So beneficial was the vinegar that Carleton requested that Lord Barrington send out additional quantities, especially since the

39Orders of May 30, June 4 and 6, 1776, B. 83, p. 4.
40Captain Foy to Mr. Barr, November 12, 1776, B. 39, p. 256.
amount available was inadequate. The Montreal hospital was set up in late June. Supplies of medicine, however, remained a lingering problem. Carleton found it necessary to require exact returns so that some medicines could be given to the regimental surgeons. Complaints also necessitated the diverting of a shipment of medicines to the headquarters itself. Thinking of future needs in early December, the Commander-in-Chief asked Lord Barrington to send a list of medicines, but in order to facilitate their use he suggested that His Lordship see that they be separated as to their destinations, either the garrison or the field hospitals. The purpose was to avoid delay because of unloading and reloading.

Secondly, Carleton had to provide for suitable camping facilities during the advance just as he was obliged to prepare winter shelter once the campaigns terminated. By so doing he was acting in accordance with the regulations covered in the Rules and Articles, section IX. There were penalties for such abuses as demanding unreasonable billets for large numbers of men without the

42 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, December 7, 1776, M. 318, p. 22.
43 Captain Foy to Mr. Barr, September 2, 1776, B. 39, p. 130.
44 Adam Mabane to General Carleton, December 6, 1776, M. 318, p. 20.
consent of the owner. Court martials were authorized in such cases. The quarters, moreover, were cleaned weekly and the soldiers were prohibited from accruing unnecessary debts. No officer was liable if the owner was foolish enough to violate the rule. But that did not mean that the inhabitants did not have any protection. An officer who refused to right a wrong against a landlord could be convicted as if he were the offender.\textsuperscript{45} While the advance was still in progress, Carleton found this problem inconsequential. On the other hand, he had to insure his men sufficient bivouacking measures. On June 12, for example, detailed orders fixed the exact localities of the bivouacking brigades with the German units, grenadiers and reserves in positions running left to right with three reserves in a second line in the event of an emergency.\textsuperscript{46}

The enforcement of proper returns constituted the third consideration in which Carleton cannot be said to have attained the highest efficiency. The placing of the blame, however, cannot be easily discerned. It was not possible for him to follow the Rules and Articles, or to meet the innumerable requests for returns made by the Lords of the Treasury, the War Office, the Commissary General or anyone else if his subordinates failed to supply

\textsuperscript{45} Section IX, Rules and Articles, pp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{46} Order of June 12, 1776, A. G. O. B., p. 5.
the vital information. Section V, nevertheless, stated that all commanding officers of regiments and independent companies had to send monthly reports to both the commander-in-chief and the Secretary at War, containing an accurate account of the status and names of the men and officers present and absent. This was modified, however, in the case of troops in America where returns were issued through the respective governors or commanders with all convenient opportunities. That the War Office was not ignorant of the resulting dilemma appeared in a dispatch from Carleton to Lord Barrington, June 21, 1776.

Our motions have hitherto been so rapid, and the Troops in their Transports hurried up from Quebec as fast as they arrived with such expedition, that the Regiments had not leisure to prepare their monthly Returns, nor . . . time for many arrangements essentially necessary in all armies; but which, for the moment, gave place to a more urgent service, that of driving the Rebels quite out of this Province with all possible dispatch. . . .

The returns covered a variety of information. Carleton ordered that monthly returns be sent to his adjutant general as early as June 23, 1776. Reports giving

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47 Section V, Rules and Articles, pp. 11-12.

48 General Carleton to Lord Barrington, June 21, 1776, M. 318, pp. 308-309. The excuse was both sound and reasonable. Yet, it has been ignored by recent historians who refuse to weaken their argument that Carleton permitted the enemy to escape. No such intention appears in the quotation. On the contrary, a reasonable explanation of obvious difficulties was brought forward.
the status of troops had to list all the officers, the noncommissioned men and privates, either on actual command or in detachments in Canada. Such a practice had been in effect the previous fall when Gage had requested similar information regarding the frontier posts. At the termination of the siege, moreover, Carleton had ordered an exact return from each corps as to the number of men killed or wounded, plus the count of provisions and ammunition from the storekeeper. Other reports concerned the artillery and the engineers who were under the command of General William Phillips. On May 11, 1776, each brigade had to send a list of their respective general staffs to Quebec so that the information could be incorporated in the complete returns. At other times, the Commander-in-Chief preferred generalized reports. Thus, on July 29, the Commissary General was told that he wanted to know how long the available provisions would last a definite number of men a set number of days, but not the quantities of beef, pork, flour or other related articles. Similar

49 Order of June 23, 1776, B. 83, p. 12; General Gage to General Carleton, September 29, 1775, Gage Papers.
50 Vialar, op. cit., p. 261.
52 Captain Foy to Nathaniel Day, July 29, 1776, B. 39, p. 88.
but more detailed accounts were requested of Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton on September 14. The return had to include the state of the troops and supplies in all the western posts, the conditions of the barracks and the strength of the fortifications. In addition, a report had to be made of the Great Lakes' shipping, listing the names of the vessels, their masters and commanders, their armament and if they were the King's or privately owned. In the event they belonged in the latter category, the terms of commission and victual had to be included. These returns were made twice a year, the first as early in the spring as possible and the other the latest in the fall.53

The fourth consideration of Carleton's policy was his continuation of the embargo on shipping and trade. Additional instructions came in the form of a statute of Parliament which prohibited any trade with any of the rebellious colonies. He alone was responsible for the granting of licenses to vessels engaged in the colonial coastal trade. Such grants had to conform to the embargo and the receivers had to specify the boat's contents,

53Orders Circular to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, September 14, 1776, B. 121, p. 2.
destinations, schedule and port of return.\textsuperscript{54} With the passage of the summer months, moreover, fears of potential shortages in key products such as wheat diminished and made it possible for Carleton to modify the embargo on August 30 and September 12. It was therein declared that inasmuch as a large portion of the wheat crop of 1775 was still available and that prospects for the year 1776 meant a greater abundance trade was no longer considered harmful to the troops or to the security of the province. But while Carleton allowed the exportation of wheat, restrictions remained on some of the other goods. The exportation of cattle, flour or biscuit, other than to nearby Nova Scotia, the fisheries or even to the West Indies, was prohibited. The customs officials were given the task of enforcing the embargo. The only exception were provisions allowed to the crews and passengers. These proclamations were enforced until December 1, and thereafter, with modifications found consistent with the security needs.\textsuperscript{55}

Before the complete liberation of Canada, the Commander-in-Chief initiated steps for the collection,

\textsuperscript{54}Additional Instructions from Lord Germain, February 24, 1776, B. 37, pp. 127-129.

\textsuperscript{55}Proclamations of August 30 and September 12, 1776, A. A., 5 Vol. I, pp. 1240-1241; C. A. 1917, pp. 24-25.
construction and organization of a fleet to carry his troops into the land of the rebellion. The lack of roads meant that only small parties of experienced Indians and Canadians could penetrate the swamps and forests of the undeveloped frontier. Carleton was indeed using every endeavor to employ all the available shipping but the Home Government insisted that the transports, victuallers and storeships be sent back to the Old World so that another shipment of materials could reach him. He was torn between this directive and the desire to keep the vessels for the coming advance. A distinction, moreover, had to be made between those vessels capable of ocean travel and those able to pass the difficult Richelieu Rapids. Even when the troops and stores were being transported as fast as possible, shipping had to be limited to vessels drawing less than 13 feet of water. Sometimes lesser draughts were essential.

From whence then could Carleton obtain the vessels if not from the ocean fleets? He had three possibilities but all of them had limitations. With the backing of Vice Admiral Shuldham, he had the authority to establish a river fleet. It consisted of a small number of vessels which were classified either as armed ships or as frigates. A ten gun armed ship, the Canceause, was stationed at Sorel, two others, the Isis and the Lord Howe, at Quebec, the
Bute and one frigate at Champlain, and an armed schooner in St. Peter Lake. In addition, Carleton had at his disposal one reserved frigate in the Quebec Basin and the Gaspe and the Magdalin which were designated as dispatch carriers. But none of these vessels could be spared for the coming expedition and they were essential for the duty of protecting the transports and victuallers from the Isle au Coudre to the Richelieu Rapids. Moreover, they drew too much water and could never have gotten around the rapids.56

The second potential source was the fleet on the Great Lakes. According to a report made on June 12, 1775, it consisted of three Crown vessels, seven vessels belonging to Alexander Grant and a sloop each to John Askin and McTavish and McBeath. Of the Crown vessels, one was the eighteen-gun, 140-ton snow Haldimand, a second a sixteen-gun, 120-ton schooner Gage and the third the twelve-gun, 90-ton schooner Dunmore. Only the Hope, a six-gunner, carried any armament among the privately owned vessels. Four of these vessels were of 60-ton caliber, two 50 tons, two 30 tons and one only 15 tons. But these vessels were scattered upon Lakes Ontario, Erie and Huron, far distant

56Charles Douglas to Captain Lutwidge, June 2, 1776, Ad. I, section 1, 1706, No. 32.
from the field of invasion and liberation. One of His Majesty's vessels appeared in each of the lakes, while six of the privately owned vessels did service on Lakes Erie and Huron.\textsuperscript{57} If any of the latter vessels were to be of service to Carleton, he had the opportunity to draw upon them through the contractual process. But they were essential to the security of the Great Lakes, their trading posts and the garrisons. Not only that, it would have been exceedingly difficult to move them from the lakes to the St. Lawrence. Even then most of them could not have been carted over the Richelieu Rapids, the gateway to Lake Champlain.

This virtually meant that the Commander-in-Chief, beginning in June, 1776, had to requisition all the available small boats from the larger vessels and from the population and had to begin construction of still others at the advanced bases of St. Johns and Chambly in order to fill the gap, all of which consumed considerable, valuable time. On June 28, Carleton advised Cramahe to procure 200 flat bottoms or bateaux without loss of time and to send them to Chambly. But complaints soon appeared as obstacles slowed the progress of the operations. Captain

\textsuperscript{57} A Return of Great Lakes' Shipping, June 12, 1775, Q. XI, p. 226. See Appendix I, No. 3. The snow belonged to the two-masted square-rigged category of naval vessels, closely resembling a brigantine.
Douglas was told to requisition the long boats from the available transports for use at Chambly. Other measures were instituted in an attempt to overcome the numerous handicaps. 58

Carleton soon found himself encumbered with minor details which included the furnishing of parts and transportation of them to the advanced posts. 59 Throughout the summer, Carleton called upon the militia officers of the various districts to procure all the bateaux they could. As late as July 22, ship masters were still being persuaded to give Carleton another 35 boats. 60 Vessels constructed at other places in the province were conveyed with due speed to the advanced stations. The officers of the Royal Highland Emigrants were engaged in the duty of loading provisions on all the collected bateaux at Sorel and at Montreal. Their task was to get them to Chambly by August. 61 Guard posts had already been established in

58 General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, June 28, 1776, B. 39, pp. 34-35.

59 General Carleton to Captains Powell and Douglas, June 28, and July 1, 1776, ibid., pp. 48-51.

60 General Carleton to Seignor de Tonnancour, June 28, 1776, ibid., pp. 39-45.

61 General Carleton to Captain Nairne, August 30, 1776, ibid., p. 123.
order to secure the valuable portages and to protect the building materials, stores and bateaux. Instead of a campaign in September, the Commander-in-Chief was still contracting for another 40 to 50 bateaux. 62

Construction work at Chambly and at St. Johns was also handicapped by significant shortages of skilled labor and materials. With increasing impatience, Carleton attempted to procure all the needed artificers, some of whom had to come from Halifax. 63 On July 3, a general order required each regiment to furnish at least one good smith and all the artificers, sawyers and carpenters available. They were accompanied by an appropriate number of noncommissioned officers. Soldiers engaged in these occupations received one shilling per day and free grog, while the sergeants were paid one shilling three pence. Correspondence disclosed innumerable requests by the Governor for boat builders to be sent to all the construction areas. 64 In late August, he ordered Cramahe to forward all the artificers who had arrived from Great Britain since naval preparations were behind schedule and the season was advancing too rapidly. Additional help

62 Order of July 6, 1776, B. 83, p. 19.
63 General Carleton to Captain Douglas, July 3, 1776, B. 39, p. 51.
64 Order of July 3, 1776, B. 83, pp. 17-18.
was shipped to Sorel and thence conducted by Canadian guides to Chambly. The men engaged in these undertakings were ordered victualled with naval provisions at full allowance. Finally, in disgust, Carleton, in late September, wrote to Lord Germain that only ten flatboats had arrived from Great Britain, though there was material for 14 more with the capacity of carrying one gun each. Certainly, His Lordship was not appreciative of this need.

Nevertheless, Carleton gave the initial directions for the first advanced movements in August and in September. The newly arrived Germans were pushed forward without rest, reaching their destination at Chambly by means of small boats. On September 10, a general order alerted five regiments to be prepared to move upon an hour's notice. Each battalion was given 26 boats which had to be properly marked, numbered and kept in order. Other units of the Germans and British received identical directives. The

65 General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, August 27, 1776, B. 39, pp. 116-117.
67 General Carleton to Lord Germain, September 28, 1776, Q. XII, pp. 188-192.
34th Regiment advanced from Sorel to Chambly, making it appear that an advance was imminent.69

In October, however, the Commander-in-Chief was plagued by logistical problems. His very tactics hinged upon the availability of provisions during every advancing maneuver. The strain was forcing him into an ever increasing caution. His attitude was disclosed in a letter to Burgoyne on October 6, while the army was still at Point au Fer. He stated that an advance was impossible since the troops aboard the Thunderer and the several gunboats lacked the absolute minimum in provisions. He later disclosed that some of the gunboats did not even carry three days' supply. Therefore, it was necessary to delay in order to send back to the victualler either at Isle aux Noix or at St. Johns. Carleton "would have none of the troops proceed beyond the Riviere la Colle without . . . provisions to the same period [November]." The Commissary General was asked to initiate a satisfactory method to forward the supplies since delays of this kind would preclude a successful campaign.70 The next day, Carleton insisted that Captain Pringles' force of 300 and the 500 attached to the artillery must have provisions for six weeks before proceeding but there was

69Hadden, op. cit., p. 279.
70General Carleton to General Burgoyne, October 6, 1776, B. 39, pp. 205-207.
still a want of boats. In a desperate measure to overcome this obstacle, Carleton ordered the lower parts of the Thunderer caulked so that its deck might be loaded with provisions and he made another urgent call for long boats. Six weeks' allowances were also essential for the brigades. It was obvious that he could not supply all of his men and further delays were necessary in order to procure fresh provisions. At the minimum, he insisted on 14 days' provisions in the troop boats which had to be immediately followed by four weeks' supply.71

When the expedition did reach Crown Point in mid-October, these troubles did not terminate. In fact, the extension of the supply lines complicated matters even further. Materials and food had to be sent from the advanced depots at Point au Fer. Carleton was deeply concerned and was kept informed by frequent reports. Over seven months' supply for 500 men was collected at Isle aux Noix and at St. Johns.72 But there was also a shortage of sailors which caused Carleton to request his superiors for 300 in Great Britain. He considered this

71 General Carleton to General Burgoyne, October 7, 1776, ibid., p. 208.

72 General Carleton to General Burgoyne, October 14, 1776, ibid., pp. 216-217; Captain Foy to Nathaniel Day, October 21, and 24, 1776, ibid., pp. 228, 237.
number as the absolute essential minimum for the rivers and the lakes. 73

A difference of opinion soon appeared concerning this problem between the Commander-in-Chief and Lord Germain. The latter, examining shipping and provision reports which did not allude to the numerous difficulties or shortages, interpreted Carleton's retreat in November as foolish and nearly treasonous. Part of the blame did rest with Carleton who did not adequately inform His Lordship. Consequently, Carleton's excuse that there was an inadequate supply of provisions was rejected. Lord Germain, though admitting that shipments had been late, declared that enough bread and meat had reached Quebec to feed 12,000 men for a full year. He also knew that Carleton had permitted a limited exportation of flour and bread. Moreover, he was aware of the fact that cattle and fresh provisions had been purchased from the population. An official report indicated that, between June 13 and September 2, Canada had received enough goods to last a 10,000 man army 59 days. As a matter of fact, Carleton had enough to send a full year's supply to the 500 men on the Great Lakes. Lord Germain noted that in an 81 day period the army had consumed only an amount

73 General Carleton to General Burgoyne, October 22, 1776, Ibid., p. 229.
equal to 41 days. At the end of August, moreover, another 75 days' supply for 12,000 men reached Quebec. He also noted that many of the victuallers were not unloaded prior to mid-November and that there was an insufficient number of store-houses as well as transports to forward them. But his Lordship exaggerated. Few, if any, cargoes had to be sent back to Cork or to Plymouth. On the other hand, the slow debarkation did oblige many ship masters to remain in Canada for the coming winter.

Strange as it might seem, Lord Germain chose to ignore his own responsibilities which had helped to create the shortage of small boats, artificers, seamen and carpenters. Nowhere in his criticism did he recognize that Carleton had placed a high priority upon these wants. Nor did he recognize that Carleton's chief concern was not the quantity of goods reaching Quebec but how to distribute them where they were needed. Instead, His Lordship preferred to seek out ulterior motives. Indeed, he charged that the Commander-in-Chief was resolved to avoid employing the Indians, and to hazard nothing with the troops under his Command. From these Motives he continued augmenting his Naval Force, tho he could not but Know [that] the Rebels were making the same use of the time ... until the Season was so far advanced that when he had overcome the Rebel

74 C. B. H., pp. 96-100.
Fleet, which he did without the Assistance of one of his largest Vessels ... he judged it was too late to make an Attempt on Ticonderoga. ... 75

Moreover, Carleton did not "think" that he could cover his men, protect the Loyalists or even detach large scouting parties. Nowhere did Lord Germain admit the shortage of essential transport, of key personnel or of the difficulties of communication in a semi-wild and unfriendly territory. The simple fact was that even if Carleton had desired to begin the campaign in September he could not since he lacked boats and since there were no roads. The experiences of Burgoyne in 1777 gave substance to the Commander-in-Chief's arguments.

In spite of the enumerated difficulties and the adverse views of his superiors, Carleton had not failed. All available resources had been employed in the best manner possible under the existing circumstances. On every occasion, the subordinate officials of the army, the militia, the commissary and the civil departments cooperated to the full extent of their capabilities. The welfare of the troops remained a basic concern. If caution seemed too prevalent it was also human. Carleton's experiences with the Americans had indicated some of the likely products of poor planning, inadequate supplies,

75 Ibid., p. 101.
poor transportation and inept subordinates. He wished to avoid a similar fate for his own men. These were problems of magnitude. Large numbers of men had been shipped across an ocean directly to the battlefield without rest or even adequate adjustment to the fighting methods needed in America. But Lord Germain was not one to consider the welfare of the troops.

Though not conscious of the fact, Carleton was responding to the changing characteristics of war. Small professional armies operating in a vacuum were becoming obsolete. Measures had to be instituted to arm the population and to allocate and distribute scarce items, particularly flatboats. The biggest obstacle in the way of victory was not Carleton's tactics or grand strategy but the failure of the London authorities to effect a total coordination of all their forces in all the rebellious colonies. The consequence was that the realistic Commander-in-Chief soon found himself engaged in a running quarrel with the well meaning but ill-informed Lord Germain. Certainly, the latter did not want to lose the war but he was totally ignorant of the actual hardships of battle and of the numerous geographical problems.
CHAPTER XIV

WINTER ACTIVITIES, 1776-1777

Acting in accordance with British tradition, the Commander-in-Chief turned his attention away from the operations of an autumn campaign to the plans for a winter encampment. There was as yet no precedent for any active warfare during the coldest season of the year. Therefore, four problems had to be solved with the greatest dispatch. The location of the various regiments throughout Canada had to be made to conform with security needs as well as with the available housing or barracks. Second, the close of the shipping season had, nonetheless, brought requests from General Howe for supplies. Even more important, the Commander-in-Chief had to prepare against any American incursions and at the same time look forward to a renewal of operations in the spring which he expected to lead. Closely integrated with the problem of building an adequate naval force and maintaining ships and sailors already on duty was the necessity of employing adequate naval force and maintaining ships and sailors already on duty was the necessity of employing adequate scouting.
parties. Intelligence, as primitive as it was, was still essential.

The Commander-in-Chief issued the first dates and marching orders for the return to Canada prior to the probing test at Ticonderoga. The advanced posts on Lake Champlain were evacuated before November 3. The units that had anticipated wintering at Crown Point and Point au Fer were sent northward. The German artillery embarked on October 28, stopping first at Isle aux Noix and then at Longueuil, the location of temporary headquarters until adequate housing could be found for them at Montreal. In the meantime, the militia officers provided them with fresh bread and meat. On November 7, they were shifted to Point aux Trembles as the Montreal barracks were not ready for them until the following Sunday. Like the other units they were promised sufficient bateaux and carts for the transportation of their baggage.¹ As for the majority of the regiments, the corps under General Fraser were temporarily located at Crown Point while other British regiments were divided among St. Johns, Montreal, Quebec, and Isle aux Noix. Most of the Germans were encamped along the Sorel to Chambly with detachments at some of the minor villages on the edge of the frontier to the east.

¹Pausch, op. cit., pp. 88-91.
The Indians and Loyalists occupied parishes along the St. Lawrence from Chateau Gage to Contrecœur, including Montreal.²

Though there were some slight modifications, Carleton provided the permanent winter quarters for all the regiments and auxiliary units on November 1. The British Artillery, the 29th Regiment and the General Hospital were assigned to Montreal which served as Carleton's temporary headquarters until he reached Quebec. The two Loyalist regiments were also assigned specific quarters. The King's Royal Regiment of New York was distributed among the parishes of La Chine, La Pointe Claire and St. Anne while the Royal Highland Emigrants had to content themselves with lodgings at La Chenaye, Terre Bonne and Rivière du Chêne. Carleton assigned the British regiments in accordance with their past maneuver formations. In other words, they were largely distributed on the basis of whether they had formed General Fraser's Corps, or had been in the First or Second Brigades. The Van Brigade, including the light infantry and the 24th Regiment, was stationed in the parishes along the south shore of the St. Lawrence from La Prairie and Longueuil to Vercherres and St. Ours. The First Brigade, like the Second, consisted of two regiments on the left

²Eelking, op. cit., p. 75.
and two on the right. Those forming the left were located upon the Sorel River. The 31st Regiment lodged at Belloeul, St. Charles, St. Denis, St. Antoine, St. Ours and Sorel, whereas the 53rd Regiment was posted at Chambly. The right of the Brigade settled along the St. Lawrence and in Montreal District. The 9th Regiment was at Isle Jesus while the 47th Regiment was distributed among the parishes of Riviere des Praires, St. du Recollet, St. Geneviere and St. Laurent.

The Second Brigade, composed of four regiments, was also divided into a left and a right formation. Unlike the First Brigade, however, they appeared to have been much more heavily concentrated upon just four parishes whereas the former were thinly distributed for the most part in a score of parishes.

The Second Brigade, composed of four regiments, was also divided into a left and a right formation. Unlike the First Brigade, however, they appeared to have been much more heavily concentrated upon just four parishes whereas the former were thinly distributed for the most part in a score of parishes. The left included the 34th Regiment at Quebec and the 62nd Regiment at Point Levis. The right was divided between Isle aux Noix, quarters of the 20th Regiment, and St. Johns, the 21st. However, there were other units not included in the above list. The 8th
Regiment still remained at the upper posts. The Germans, moreover, were quartered in the parishes from Berthier to Trois Rivieres, as well as upon the road to Quebec. ³

While it may have appeared an easy matter to assign winter quarters, the Commander-in-Chief also had to consider the problem of adequate housing if barracks were not available. He had to give some thought to the Canadians who might resent any unjust invasions of their homes in behalf of the soldiers or officers. The strain upon the habitants multiplied rapidly with the daily arrival of regiments from the Lake campaign. As no single area possessed sufficient barracks or even buildings, Cantonments had to supplement them. Violations of the Rules and Articles of War did occur. Many a Loyalist found his home invaded by an uninvited guest. These people apparently believed that only the Rebel sympathizers should be made to provide lodgings for the troops. Carleton may have been careless in some of the assignments but his major concern had to be for the welfare of the soldiers, not the sensibilities of refined people. This was a factor which has been ignored by F. X. Garneau, a leading

Canadian historian. Balanced against charges of injustice were the numerous orders issued by Carleton through his ranking officers to be as considerate as possible and to do all they could to find other means of housing if possible. Riedesel was told to send two or three of his men to a house and no more. In addition, the government buildings were converted into barracks for the season. Contradictory evidence, however, appeared in the diary of a German artillerist who reported that in Montreal, each room occupied by his men contained ten beds, each for two persons. Yet, there was no indication either that Carleton had issued such an order or if he had that there was any choice or alternative.

In an attempt to alleviate hardships, Carleton ordered his Deputy Barrack Master, Richard Murray, as early as September, to rush the completion of the barracks at Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivieres. Lodging, moreover, had to be furnished for 1,000 men at Isle aux Noix, 400


5Eelking, op. cit., p. 81.

6Pausch, op. cit., p. 91.
at St. Johns and another 200 at Chambly. Progress, however, had not been too satisfactory. In a letter to General Phillips, December 2, Carleton found it essential to make further recommendations.

Too great attention cannot be paid to preserve the troops in health and spirits, therefore if the Barracks at St. Johns and the Isle-aux-Noix cannot commodiously hold all . . . I shall content myself with leaving at those ports, what they can well contain, the rest you will cantoon where . . . best, they must be comfortably covered, whether . . . [by] regulations or not, t'is wretched economy to lose a soldier over half a blanket. . . .

Controversy also developed over the selection of barrack masters, mainly due to misunderstanding. Major General Robertson at New York was obliged to inform Carleton that two men nominated to such positions in the western posts did not appear as expected in the latter's October returns of the previous year. Both of these men, Samuel Willis at Niagara and Abraham Albey at Detroit, had received their offices from General Gage. Declaring that both were men of merit and would be ruined if not employed as barrack masters, Robertson begged that they remain as assigned. Since both were absent the latter assumed the full responsibility as his own. He stated that he would be mortified if

7General Carleton Lieutenant Governor Cramahe and Mr. Murray, Chambly, September 18 and 21, 1776, B. 39, pp. 163 and 176.

Carleton did not oblige.\(^9\) An examination of barrack masters indicated that the latter agreed. Yet as late as April, 1778, the two men were still absent. In fact, most of Gage's men were also absentees at Oswegatchie, Niagara and Detroit. But while not disputing polite tradition when it came to another's desires, Carleton definitely frowned upon similar evils among his own subordinates, Murray at Quebec, George Lawe at Montreal, and Henelm Chandler for St. Johns and Isle aux Noix. No doubt respect for his past superior, Gage, had much to do with his attitude.\(^10\)

While busily engaged in providing suitable quarters, the Commander-in-Chief was also obliged to answer the requests of General Howe for specific supplies even though shipping had terminated because of the winter. The desired items included oats and flour. But by the time the bearer, James Porteous, had been interviewed by Cramahe, it was already late December. Nevertheless, two transports were placed at the bearer's disposal. Carleton, however, was not able to provide all the hay and oats desired. Instead, where supplies were short he substituted flour and bread.


\(^10\)Return of Barrack Masters in the Province of Quebec and on the Frontiers thereof, April 30, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, p. 3.
Bickering over prices and complaints by some of the local merchants forced the Commander-in-Chief to intervene directly in the transactions in mid-February, 1777. Porteous, accused of underhanded methods of procurement, was ordered to deliver in person the order issued by Howe. Accordingly, Carleton was handed a dispatch dated December 26 which had told the bearer to proceed to Canada in order to obtain by purchase as much oats and hay as could be spared. If there was still money left over it was to be used for flour. The hoped for goal was 20,000 bushels of oats. Carleton was obliging but cautious. As was customary with him, he always acceded to the wishes of other equally ranked British officers so long as he was not endangered by such an action.  

Third, Carleton devoted considerable energy to insure the protection of Canada, and at the same time he began to prepare for a spring expedition. Attention was, therefore, given to maintaining and augmenting suitable naval units and personnel. The previous Lake Champlain expedition had disclosed that certain types of gunboats were of high value. On November 8, General Phillips asked the Commander-in-Chief to request that London send some of

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these boats for the use of the artillery, which could be framed and put together in Canada. Phillips believed English timber was superior to the American, for the latter had fallen short of buoyant qualities, besides having less resistance to the force of heavy guns. Moreover, if timber had to be cut in the Colony, delays would result. Therefore, it was deemed wise to suggest that London construct the gunboats. Secondly, the General stated that one design for all constructed was more logical than the use of several types, as had been the past practice. The following recommendation was then made. The gunboat should be five feet longer, able to carry twelve-pound cannon, light twenty-four and eight-inch howitzers that would be mounted upon movable platforms. The original English boats had not been able to accomplish that task much less to carry ammunition. Phillips, as chief artillery officer, also suggested four heavy twelve-pound brass pairs, eight twenty-four light brass pairs, eight medium twelve-pound brass, and four eight-inch howitzers. The entire works, cannon, carriages and iron works, should come from England.\\textsuperscript{12}

Carleton himself criticized the Home Government for failing to answer his request for boats in 1776. The

\textsuperscript{12}Major General Phillips to General Carleton, St. Johns, November 9, 1776, Q. XIII, pp. 22-25.
few that did come were too late. Phillips was told, therefore, that in the interim it would have to be a do-it-yourself task. At least 30 gunboats were needed. Carleton rejected a proposal that two Treasury brigs be converted, saying that one twenty-gun vessel would be of better use if it could be constructed. Phillips was asked to give his technical opinion, and to get the needed supplies to refit other vessels as needed. Moreover, Carleton delegated the right to issue the necessary orders. Earlier, Carleton had suggested the conversion of captured vessels and the construction of a twenty-gun ship according to designs submitted to him, which meant that workers and materials had to be collected. When Burgoyne returned to London, moreover, he recommended that 24 gunboats should be made, capable of carrying the different types of artillery.

The maintenance of both naval and transport components still plagued the Commander-in-Chief. Either new vessels had to be constructed or the others had to remain in Canada. The use of a contractor only served to

13 General Carleton to General Phillips, Quebec, November 18, 1776, B. 39, pp. 258-260.

aggravate the problem because of the request for exorbitant rates. Carleton believed that the contracted agent should bear the costs of timber and labor. Timber was shipped to St. Johns, while subordinate naval commanders were alerted to be ready for action. During January, the Governor inspected the progress made and confided in Phillips that all was being done, including construction, refitting and conversion of captured vessels. Before the end of winter the Royal George and an undetermined number of gunboats were launched. It was also suggested that a few transportable craft be sent to Lake George while others took up positions to ward off possible American fire ship tactics. Two booms were constructed across the Richelieu, above St. Johns and at Isle aux Noix. Carleton could not forget the fire ship which had nearly destroyed all the shipping in Quebec the previous May.

With regard to the existing vessels, Carleton was informed that some would remain in Canada during the winter months, but not all. In September, he had counted on keeping the Blond, Triton and Garland, at least until the Lake crisis terminated. But in October, he found that

15Army in America, p. 36.

16Captain Poy to General Phillips, Quebec, December 30, 1777 and General Carleton to General Phillips, January 6, 1777, B. 39, pp. 326-329. See Chapter III.
the Blond was not to stay. This was of great concern, for even though the enemy had lost the campaign, it was necessary to maintain a fleet located at strategic points so that they would not again dispute control of Lake Champlain or the rivers. Yet Carleton did not intend to counter the Treasury order which stated that all victuallers must be dispatched as quickly as possible. Orders, nevertheless, were issued to the appropriate subordinates to safeguard the control of the Lakes and rivers during the winter months. The Garland was laid up in the Cul de Sac, Quebec. Crews, ammunition and ships were to be directed according to military necessity. But the lingering transports had to be sent homeward before it was too late. The defensive naval force consisted of the following vessels, excluding the Garland. The Triton, the Viper and the Gaspe were stationed at Quebec, the Magdalen at Trois Rivieres, the Brunswic at Chambly, and the Canceause at Sorel.

In the meantime, anxieties as to the Treasury ships and victuallers plagued Carleton. Uncertain arrivals and delays were common. Thus on December 5, the storeship, Loudon, made an expected appearance. Carleton also learned that another victualler was making its way up the St.

17 General Carleton to Captain Douglas, Crown Point, October 21, 1776, Admiralty I, 1706, Section I, No. 67.

18 Order of General Carleton, November 2, 1776, ibid., No. 69.
Lawrence. Three other vessels that did eventually arrive seemed to be missing. Carleton wrote to Lord Barrington that the *Union*, *Jane* and *General Conway* which he knew had sailed before the *Loudon* had still not reached Quebec.\(^{19}\)

A report made in late May, 1777, however, indicated that a large number of vessels had remained in Canada, stationed either at Sorel or at Quebec. There were two causes for this. The first, Carleton had to recruit men for the campaign from nine vessels, all at Sorel. Secondly, the bulk of the remainder were found unfit for sea, leaky, or laid up too late to proceed to England. These numbered six, leaving but four others, according to a list prepared by Richard Pearson of the Navy.\(^{20}\)

On the other hand, the Lords of the Admiralty were informed that the river vessels had survived the ice. Carleton, moreover, had already appointed his naval commanders. Since he did not make a fresh requisition for men on the lakes, his subordinates used the crews to caulk transports in order to return them to England in a reasonable condition. All was being done to return them

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\(^{19}\) General Carleton to Lord Barrington, Quebec, December 7, 1776, M. 318, pp. 22-23.

as fast as possible but there was a shortage of caulkers. Carleton needed most of them for the army bateaux. One victualller, moreover, the Charlotte, which was not included in the previous list, was converted into a fourteen-gun armed ship.\textsuperscript{21} Another listing, May 28, indicated that Carleton had at his disposal, at least temporarily, two ordnance transports, three victuallers, and four armed Treasury ships.\textsuperscript{22}

Just as Lord Germain, the Lords of the Treasury and the Commissary had predicted incorrectly and failed to provide the minimum number of boats of all sizes, so also they had neglected to send not only a sufficient number of carpenters and artificers but also of sailors of all ranks. This meant Carleton had to devise measures to overcome this handicap. It had also been a contributing factor to the retreat of November. Now he was concerned that he might not get enough seamen for the approaching April. After careful consideration, the minimum number believed to be essential totaled 588. This number was needed to man the larger lake vessels as well as gunboats, long boats and provision vessels. The former included

\textsuperscript{21}Phillip Pownall to Philip Stephens, Esq., Quebec, May 28, 1777, \textit{ibid.}, Section 9, No. 24.

\textsuperscript{22}Additional Listings, May 28, 1777, \textit{ibid.}, Section 9, No. 28.
British and captured vessels such as the Inflexible, Maria, Carleton, Washington, Thunderer, Loyal Convert, Lee and the Jersey. Besides drawing upon local seamen, Carleton was forced to turn to the river fleet as well as the transports, victuallers, and other categories of ocean vessels. From their crews he anticipated obtaining just under 600 men. Actually, however, the latter vessels were scheduled to volunteer only 120. The remainder, Carleton suggested, ought to come from the river fleet, the Fell and the Isis, plus five of the Treasury brigs. Perhaps, by such a distribution, the Commander-in-Chief hoped to avoid the unnecessary detention of vessels that had to return to England once the weather permitted. These recruited sailors were victualled by the King's Commissary in a manner similar to the army. Carleton could not do otherwise for he did not know of naval matters in that regard. Nathaniel Day, in charge of the commissary department in Canada, received the help of Alexander Grant, a Loyalist Great Lakes shipping magnate. On December 12, Carleton ordered General Phillips to make sure his naval subordinates drew upon the commissary general or upon the barrack masters.

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23 General Carleton to Charles Douglas, On the Maria, October 30, 1776, Admiralty I, 1706, Section I, No. 68. See Table No. 5.

24 General Carleton to General Phillips, Quebec, December 5, 1776, B. 39, pp. 290-292.
### TABLE 5

**CALCULATION OF SEAMEN NEEDED AND SOURCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Number of Sailors</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Number of Sailors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflexible</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Blonde or Viper</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Triton</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carleton</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Garland</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Caneaus</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunderer</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Magdalen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal Convert</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Gaspe</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5 Treas. Brigs</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Fell</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed for</td>
<td></td>
<td>Isis</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 gunboats</td>
<td>2 each</td>
<td>Bereas</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 long boats</td>
<td>2 each</td>
<td>Fleetwood</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provisions vessels</td>
<td>to be built</td>
<td>Roseau</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lord North</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas &amp; Richard</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Laurie</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lively</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Margaret &amp; Martha</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three Sisters</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In All His Majesty's Ships and Transports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Carleton to Charles Douglas, October 30, 1776, Admiralty I, 1706, Section I, No. 68.
department. Phillips, however, was to decide if allowances needed to be improved. Unfortunately, difficulties were to develop in the coming year. Some subordinate officials began to make unauthorized augmentations of rations. Carleton was to endeavor to restore them to normal commissary quotas.

The importance of seamen was one of the recommendations that Carleton gave to Burgoyne when the latter went to London to report to the superior officials. Lord Germain found that the request included a battalion of 300 men. If they were not provided as they indeed had not been in 1776, Carleton would again be forced to hold up some of the shipping. To avoid this, additional seamen must be sent. Burgoyne's remarks on this problem supported his Commander-in-Chief. The Canadians were not considered dependable since they were undisciplined even as canoeists. If the battalion could be sent, it could be released once the spring advance had bypassed the lakes of upper New York. In addition, Burgoyne suggested the employment of English rivermen, preferably in independent companies of 60 each. Under the proper guidance of good

25 General Carleton to General Phillips, Quebec, December 12, 1776, ibid., pp. 300-301.

26 Mason Butler to General Carleton, Niagara, June 5, 1778, Haldimand Papers, Register of Correspondence with Officers commanding at Michilimakinac and Niagara, 1777-1783, Vol. I, Public Archives of Canada, pp. 210-211. Hereafter cited as B. 96.
naval officers their services should prove to be invaluable.\textsuperscript{27}

Aside from such preparations, Carleton had to consider the fourth factor, the gathering of sufficient intelligence concerning the activities of the enemy, the strength of their posts and any potential plans that they might have. In his endeavors, the Commander-in-Chief preferred the cautious employment of limited scouting expeditions rather than a large probing maneuver or even a small scale offensive attack against isolated American garrisons. In this respect, the Americans were greatly relieved for they had expected far greater dangers from the north. General Schuyler as early as November 9 had warned his superiors that Carleton might attempt a winter expedition since Canada supposedly could furnish sufficient sleds to transport his artillery and provisions. In fact, the American General guessed ten thousand men would be involved. A month later, the latter wrote that Carleton definitely would gain possession of Ticonderoga once Lake Champlain was frozen enough so that horses could be sent across it. Furthermore, the status of the American garrisons at Ticonderoga and Fort George was such as to be rated no obstacle. Schuyler believed that sleds loaded with British troops could easily remain safely out of

\textsuperscript{27}Burgoyne, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 149-163.
American cannon range which was insignificant anyway. The only hope seemed to be cantoning a large enough force to deter any movement if such be made by Carleton, or, at least, to prevent an offensive until the following spring.28

On December 10, moreover, Schuyler expressed great worry over the fact that terms of enlistment were expiring and replacements seemed non-existent. He was positive that Carleton was "minutely informed" and would not allow such an opportunity to be wasted. In a letter to Robert H. Harrison, December 21, Schuyler added:

I have some thing more than mere Conjecture to believe that General Carleton will make an Attempt on Tyconderoga as soon as Lake Champlain is possible on the Ice, which will probably be in a month from this--29

In response to the emergency, the Continental Congress could only requisition the various colonies to send forth their quotas, 2,500 from Massachusetts, 1,500 from Connecticut and 500 from New Hampshire. There was no worry concerning provisions which seemed more than plenti­ful.30

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29 To Congress, Saratoga, December 10, 1776, No. 1069, and to Robert H. Harrison, Esq., Albany, December 21, 1776, No. 1074, ibid.

30 December, 1776, Journals, Vol. VI, p. 1038.
It cannot be denied that Carleton may have lacked boldness and daring, that to a certain extent he hesitated to break long standing British military tradition. That did not mean, however, that scouting parties were not dispatched on occasion to gather vital information. Lord Germain charged that

Not even a reconnoitering Party is said to have been sent out to see what the Rebels were doing. The whole army lay quiet in their Cantonments and great Part of the Indians, which had come down . . . were dismissed to their own Homes being told by General Carleton he should not want them till the next Spring.  

This was only partially true. Carleton, indeed, had decided against barbarous frontier warfare but it was false to state that no scouting was attempted. It appears that His Lordship was poorly informed. It also seemed incredible that Carleton should have been expected to perform great things while General Howe remained confined in his winter quarters. A comparison of the climates of Canada and New Jersey should have awakened His Lordship to reality. Why should Carleton have been expected to break precedent when Howe was not? Why should a northern army participate in a winter campaign in severe weather while an army far to the south should be sheltered against a milder climate?

The scouting expeditions employed by the Commander-in-Chief appear to have been of two types. The first was limited to the immediate vicinity of the more advanced posts. In particular, remembering Arnold's bold march from Maine the previous year, Carleton advised his officers to keep careful watch of the river approaches, especially the Sorel, Yamaska, St. Francois and Chaudiere. Phillips, moreover, was told to send out parties of light infantry in the hope of discovering enemy intelligence parties. Regulars were not to be used for fear that they might weaken the posts at St. Johns or Point aux Noix by their absence. The manner in which these forces were to be deployed was also conveyed from headquarters. An officer in command of a post upon the Chaudiere received detailed instructions in early December. Patrols were to operate on both banks of the river and other patrols were to penetrate the countryside at right angles from that river. By this means, it was hoped that suspicious persons would be detected and captured. All prisoners were to be escorted to Quebec for interrogation. Carleton also ordered the posting of a small force at the most advanced dwelling on the Chaudiere.

32 General Carleton to Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, Chambly, September 9, 1776; and to General Phillips, Quebec, December 5, 1776, B. 39, pp. 136 and 290.

33 Captain Fry to Officer commending upon the Chaudiere, Quebec, December 8, 1776, ibid., pp. 295-296.
The second type of scouting expedition employed by the Commander-in-Chief consisted of small groups of forest trained individuals who penetrated the American lines, sought out intelligence, captured soldiers and, perhaps, inflicted minor damage. Such an expedition was sent out in mid-February under a Captain Mackay who was apparently accompanied by Indians and Canadians. Carleton did not make use of the regulars on such missions. Mackay managed to collect some 30 Indians but realizing their undisciplined nature kept the route of their mission secret. On March 7, however, near Ticonderoga, they learned that Carleton wanted the entire force as a body to make reports on several garrisons. Considering this somewhat dangerous because of the fears of the Indians, Mackay, instead, divided his force into four parts, one to spy on Crown Point, a second on Skenesborough, a third on Ticonderoga and the last on Fort George. The Captain led the last named party. On March 19, they captured a captain and 17 men. This action was contrary to Carleton's orders. But Mackay had no alternative for the Indians had threatened to murder all Americans if no prisoners were authorized. The Canadians were urged to insure the personal safety of the captives. The Indians, nevertheless, acted harshly and stole all the American clothing which forced Mackay to purchase it back. On the return trip,
the expedition came across an old Loyalist who was too sickly to travel with them. It was only with difficulty that Mackay saved his life from the Indians. The Loyalist had to promise to spy upon American movements and numbers. Moreover, the data so collected had to be sent to Carleton. On March 22, a rendezvous was held with the other parties except the one from Crown Point. The mission had netted a detailed plan of the Fort George works and 21 prisoners. The return trip took twice as long, 23 days versus ten, because of the straggling Indians. It was by such means that Carleton was able to learn the status of the enemy. At best, such methods were only partially successful.

While Carleton anxiously awaited orders for the spring campaign which he expected to lead, his spare time was spent in a manner then customary to gentlemen of his stature. His example was followed by his senior officers. Time seemed to be divided between reviews and balls. General Riedesel reported that they celebrated the Queen's birthday with a dinner, ball and supper. Imitating the example of the other generals, he gave a weekly supper and ball. The purpose was twofold. One was to gain the affection of the habitants. The second was to provide the

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34Captain Mackay's report, Montreal, March 31, 1777, B. 181, pp. 51-55.
officers with innocent pleasure. This might reduce their time in public houses and with bad company. William Digby, a British soldier, reported that balls and assemblies were numerous. At Quebec, Carleton apparently lived in an elegant state. Relaxations of this nature alleviated the severe winter frosts and fears of frost-bite. Digby also recorded that in spite of Carleton's severe manner he seemed well liked by the Canadians. This, however, has been challenged by F. X. Garneau.

The winter period would soon come to an end. Carleton had endeavored to build morale, to train the British and German regiments so that they could better adapt to the frontiers. He had secured Canada from another incursion. Now he expected to be rewarded with the command of a large army with which he would invade New York and Massachusetts. His plans had been carried to London by Burgoyne. The Commander-in-Chief had anticipated a three-way advance provided Lord Germain sent 4,000


more troops. A large corps was to pass Lake Ontario and penetrate the Mohawk River. A second was supposed to strike fear into the heart of enemy territory, mainly the invasion of the Connecticut Valley. The largest force was to take the route of Lake Champlain to the Hudson River. It was these thoughts which caused him to begin preparations for the spring. The naval forces had been alerted for early action. Sailors had been recruited. Intelligence had been gathered. The end result, however, was to be bitter disappointment for the command was given to Burgoyne.

37 Memorandum of General Carleton relative to the next campaign, communicated to Lieut. General Burgoyne, to be laid before Government, Q. XIII, p. 3.
APPENDIX A

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CORRESPONDENCE
AND PROCLAMATIONS
APPENDIX A

No. 1

Extract of a Letter from General Gage to General Carleton, Boston, September 4, 1774

The present Situation of Affairs in this Province obliges me to collect all the Force in my Power; I have therefore sent Transports for the 10th and 52d Regiments to bring them to this place, at the same time I submit to you, whether you think any thing is to be dreaded from the Absence of these Corps, internally in the Province of Quebec during the Winter, for as these Regiments will come down the River so late in the year, any may be replaced early in the Spring, I imagine no Danger can be apprehended from without. If therefore you think the Fusileers at Quebec, and the Part of the 26th at Montreal, with small Detachments from them at Trois Rivieres and Chambli, can preserve Peace and good Order in the Province, I am to beg you will order the 10th and 52d Regiments to embark without Delay on board the Transports, for you will think with me they will have no time to spare in coming down the River St. Lawrence.

As I must look forward to the worst, from the apparent Disposition of the People here, I am to ask your Opinion, whether a Body of Canadians and Indians might be collected, and confided in . . . should matters come to Extremities; and on what Plan, and what Measures would be most efficacious to raise them, and for them to form a junction with the King's Forces in this Province?

Source: Germain Mss, 1774-1776.

No. 2

Extract of General Carleton's Answer, September 20, 1774

Your Express reached this Place yesterday Evening about twenty Hours after my Arrival; Pilots are sent down the River, the 10th and 52nd shall be ready to embark at a Moment's Notice, and as you directed--

The Canadians have testified to me the strongest marks of Joy, and Gratitude, and Fidelity to the King, and
to his Government, for the late Arrangements made at Home in their Favor; a Canadian Regiment would compleat their Happiness, which in Time of Need might be augmented to two, three, or more Battalions, tho' for the Satisfaction of the Province, and 'till the King's Service might require more, one would be sufficient, and I am convinced their Fidelity and Zeal might be depended on; should this Measure be at length adopted (which I have long since Recommended) tis essentially necessary their Appointments should be the same as the rest of the Infantry, with half pay, in Case they should be reduced; the Savages of this Province, I hear, are in very good Humor, a Canadian Battalion would be a great Motive, and go far to influence them, but you know what sort of People they are--

Source: Germain Mss, 1774-1776.

No. 3

Endorsed: Quebec 11 November 1774, Governor Carleton to the Earl of Dartmouth, One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, (No. 3) R/5th Jany, 1775

Soon after my Arrival here, I informed Your Lordship of the Grateful Sense, the King's Canadian Subjects ... entertained of the Acts of Parliament passed in their Favour during the last Session; those more remote have since ... expressed the same Sentiments of Gratitude and Attachment to His Majesty's Royal Person and Government...

The most respectable part of the English residing at this Place ... likewise presented an Address expressive of their wish to see universal Harmony and a dutiful Submission to Government continue to be the Characteristic of the Inhabitants of this Province. ...

Whether the Minds of the [Montreal Brethren] ... are of a more Turbulent turn, or that they caught the Fire from some Colonists settled among them, or in ... Letters received from the General Congress, as reported, I know not; Certain it is however, that ... a Report was spread at Montreal, that Letters of Importance had been received from the General Congress, all the British ... flocked to the Coffee House to hear the News, Grievances were publicly talked of, and various Ways for obtaining Redress proposed, but that Government might not [learn of their aims] ... , a Meeting was appointed at the House of a
Person then absent, followed by several others ... and a Committee of four named, consisting of Mr. Walker, Mr. Todd, Mr. Price, and Mr. Blake. ...

Their Plans being prepared ... the Committee set out for Quebec ..., their Emissaries having prepared the Way, an Anonimous Summons was posted up in the Coffee House for all the British Subjects to meet at a particular Tavern, and a Messenger sent ... with a Verbal Notice.... This meeting named a 7 man committee—Mr. John Paterson, since to London, Mr. Zachariah Macaulay, Mr. John Lees Senior, Mr. John Aitkin, the Treasurer, Mr. Randal Meredith, Mr. John Welles, & Peter Fargues, named to adjust with those of Montreal, "several discreet People ... declined attending ... as soon as they discovered what they aimed at.

There have been several Town Meetings since, as they are pleased to stile them, ... they have resolved to write Letters of Thanks to the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London, to some of the Merchants ... and to Mr. Maseres, for having taken the Province under their Protection, and praying a continuance of their ... Endeavour. ... They intend a handsome Present in Cash to Mr. Maseres, with the Promise of a Larger Sum, in Case he succeeds; Petitions are likewise to be presented to the King, to the Lords, and to the Commons, but of all this I speak doubtfully as they ... Keep their whole Proceedings from my Knowledge.

This much however is certain, that the Canadians feel some uneasiness at these Proceedings; they are surprised that such Meetings and nocturnal Cabals should be suffered to ... disturb the Minds of the People by false and seditious Reports, calculated to throw this Province into ... disorder.

They express some Impatience and Indignation at being solicited to join ... and are not without their Fears, that some of their Countrymen, under the Awe of menacing Creditors, and Others, from Ignorance, may have been induced to put their Hands to a Paper, which, they are assured is intended to secure their Lands and Property, and take from the Governor the Power of seizing them ... or sending them and Their Families ... among the Savages, or waging War, at his own Pleasure, upon the Bostonians; in short to relieve them from the Oppressions and Slavery imposed upon them by ... Acts of Parliament; they are the more apprehensive ... such like Reports may have had
Effect upon some weak and ignorant People, that from the Precision... in the translation, the Acts themselves have not as yet been promulgated.

I have assured the Canadians, that such Proceedings could never affect the late Measures taken in their Favor... so that they might remain in perfect Tranquility upon that account; Notwithstanding my... [Assurances] and that all these Town Meetings, all the Reports, breathing that same Spirit, so plentifully gone forth through the neighbouring Provinces, can for the present only excite a trifling and momentary Agitation. I cannot but Regret, such Examples should be set the People of this Province, and think, Government cannot guard too much, or too soon, against the consequences of an Infection, imported daily, warmly Recommended, and spread by the Colonists here, and indeed by some from Europe, not less violent than the Americans.

I am informed, all Persons from Boston for Canada are searched for Letters, and strictly examined, if they have any verbal Message from General Gage for me, so that I am not likely to hear from the General, before the Navigation opens next Summer.

Source: Q. 11, pp. 11-16.
be paid by the Receiver general . . . on the Conviction of any one or more of them.

Given under my Hand and Seal at Arms, at the Castle of Saint Lewis, in the City of Quebec, this Eight Day of May, in the fifteenth Year of his Majesty's Reign, and in the Year of our Lord, One thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy Five

By His Excellency's Command Guy Carleton

Source: The Quebec Gazette, May 11, 1775
APPENDIX B

PROCLAMATIONS TO SUPPRESS
REBELLION
APPENDIX B

No. 1

BY HIS EXCELLENCY

GUY CARLETON

Captain General and Governor in Chief, in and over the Province of Quebec, and the Territories Depending thereon in America Vice admiral of the same; and Major General of his Majesty's Forces, Commanding the Northern District I C & C & C.

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas a Rebellion prevails in many of His Majesty's Colonies in America, and particularly in some of the neighboring ones; And Whereas many of the aforesaid Rebels, have with an Armed Force made Incursions of Late into this Province, attacking and carrying away from thence, a Party of His Majesty's troops, together with a parcel of Stores and a Vessel belonging to His Majesty, and are at present actually invading this Province with Arms in a traiterous and hostile manner, to the Great terror of His Majesty's Subjects, and in open Defiance of his Laws and Government, falsely and maliciously giving out, by themselves & their Abettors, that the Motives for so doing, are to prevent the Inhabitants of this Province from being taxed and oppressed by Government, together with divers other false, and seditious Reports, tending to influence the Minds of the People and alienate them from His Majesty: to the end therefore that so treasonable an Invasion may be soon defeated, that all such Traitors with their said Abettors may be speedily brought to Justice, and the Publick Peace and tranquility of this Province again restored, which the ordinary course of the Civil Law is at present unable to effect, I have thought fit to Issue this Proclamation, hereby declaring that untill the aforesaid good Purpose can be attained, I shall, in virtue of the Powers and Authority to me given by His Majesty, execute Martiel-Law, and Cause the same to be executed throughout this Province, and to that end I shall order the Militia within the same to be forthwith raised; but as a sufficient number of Commissions to the several Officers thereof cannot be immediately made out I shall in the mean time direct all those having any Militia Commissions from the Honble Thomas Gage, the Honble James Murray, Ralph
Burton, & Frederick Haldimand, Esquires, heretofore His Majesty's Governors in this Province, or either of them, to Obey the same, and execute the Powers therein mentioned, until they shall Receive orders from me to the contrary; And I do accordingly in His Majesty's Name hereby require and Command all His Subjects in this Province, and others whom it may Concern, on pain of disobedience, to be aiding and assisting to such Commissioned Officers and others who are or may be Commissioned by me, in the Execution of their said Commissions for His Majesty's Service.

Given under my Hand & Seal of Arms at Montreal, this Ninth Day of June, one thousand Seven hundred and Seventy-five in the fifteenth Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Third, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, and So forth.

By His Excellency's Command, Guy Carleton
H. T. Cramahe

GOD SAVE THE KING

Source: The Quebec Gazette, June 15, 1775

No. 2

BY HIS EXCELLENCY

GUY CARLETON

Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over the Province of Quebec, and the territories depending thereon in America, Vice Admiral of the same and Major General of His Majesty's Forces, commanding the Northern District & C.

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas it has been found expedient to raise and embody a Militia with this City, to co-operate with, and to assist His Majesty's troops in this Garrison in the Preservation of the City and of the Persons and Property of His Majesty's good and faithful Subjects resident therein, against certain rebellious Persons who have invaded this Province, a number of whom have lately appeared in
Arms before the Walls of this Town And Whereas Information has been given that some persons resident here have con­
tumaciously refused to enroll their Names in the Militia Lists, and to take up Arms in Conjunction with their Fellow Citizens for the purpose aforesaid; and that others who have enrolled their Names and had for some time carried Arms in the Defence and Preservation of the City, have late; laid them down; And also that some Persons are busy in endeav­
ing to draw away and alienate the Affections of His Majesty's good and faithful Subjects of this City from His Majesty's Person and Government For these Reasons, and in Order to rid the Town of all useless, disloyal and treacherous Persons I have thought fit to issue this Proclamation And I do hereby strictly order and enjoin all and every person and persons whatsoever liable to serve in the Militia and residing at Quebec who have refused or de­
clined to enroll their Names in the Militia Lists, and to take up Arms in Conjunction with his Majesty's good Subjects of this City, and who still refuse or decline so to do; as well as those, who having once taken up Arms, have afterwards laid them down, and will not take them up again, to quit the Town in four Days from the Date hereof, together with their Wives and Children, and to withdraw themselves out of the Limits of the District of Quebec be­
fore the first Day of December next, Under Pain of being treated as Rebels or Spies, if thereafter they shall be found within the said Limits.

And inasmuch as the persons who in Obedience to this Proclamation are to quit this Town and District, may have bought up a considerable Quantity of the Provisions brought in for the subsistence of the Inhabitants of the Town; And it would be imprudent to suffer those Provisions to be carried out, more especially as the Country abounds with the Necessaries of Life; I do hereby order and enjoin all and every such person and persons to deliver in forth­
with to the Honble George Allsopp Esquire Commissary, a true Inventory or List of their Provisions and Stores, in order that they may be fairly and justly valued and the full Price paid to the respective Proprietors before their De­
parture.

Given under my Hand and Seal of Arms at the Castle of St. Lewis in the City of Quebec this twenty second Day of November one thousand Seven hundred
and Seventy five, in the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George, the Third by the Grace of God of Great Britain, France, and Ireland King Defender of the Faith and so forth.

By His Excellency's Command

GUY CARLETON

H. T. Cramahe

Source: The Quebec Gazette, November 20, 1775

No. 3

BY THE KING

A PROCLAMATION

FOR SUPPRESSING REBELLION AND SEDITION

George R.

Whereas many of Our Subjects in divers Parts of Our Colonies and Plantations in North America, misled by dangerous and ill-designing Men, and forgetting the Allegiance which they owe to the Power that has protected and sustained them, after various disorderly Acts committed in Disturbance of the Publick Peace, to the Obstruction of lawful Commerce, and to the Oppression of Our loyal Subjects carrying on the same, have at length proceeded to an open and avowed Rebellion, by arraying themselves in hostile Manner to withstand the Execution of the Law, and traitorously preparing, ordering, and levying War against Us, And whereas there is Reason to apprehend that such Rebellion hath been promoted and encouraged by the traitorous Correspondence, Counsels, and Comfort of divers wicked and desperate Persons within this Realm: to the End therefore that none of Our Subjects may neglect or violate their Duty through Ignorance thereof, or through any Doubt of the Protection which the Law will afford to their Loyalty and Zeal; We have thought fit, by and with the Advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation, hereby declaring that not only all our Officers Civil and Military are obliged to exert their utmost Endeavors to suppress such Rebellion, and to bring the traitors to Justice; but that all Our Subjects of this Realm and the Dominions thereunto belonging are bound by
Law to be aiding and assisting in the Suppression of such Rebellion, and to disclose and make known all traitorous Conspiracies and Attempts against Us, Our Crown and Dignity: And we do accordingly strictly charge and command all Our Officers as well Civil as Military, and all other Our obedient and loyal Subjects, to use their utmost Endeavours to withstand and suppress such Rebellion, and to disclose and make known all treasons and traitorous Conspiracies which they shall know to be against Us, Our Crown and Dignity; and for that Purpose, that they transmit to One of Our Principal Secretaries of State, or other proper Officer, due and full Information of all Persons who shall be found carrying on Correspondence with, or in any Manner or Degree aiding or abetting the Persons now in open Arms and Rebellion against Our Government within any of Our Colonies and Plantations in North America, in order to bring to condign Punishment the Authors, Perpetrators, and Abettors of such traitorous Designs.

Given at Our Court at St. James's, the twenty-third Day of August, One thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, in the Fifteenth Year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING

Source: The Quebec Gazette, August 8, 1776.
APPENDIX C

PROBLEMS OF RANK AND RECRUITMENT

587
APPENDIX C

No. 1

The Memorial of Captains Alexander Fraser, George MacDougal and Malcolm Fraser of His Majesty's Regiment of Royal Highland Emigrants.

That the Memorialists were Promoted to the rank of Lieutenants of the following dates. Vizt: Alexander, Fraser the 12th of February 1757 in His Majesty's 78th Regiment, George MacDougal the 30th of May 1759 in the 60th or Royal American Regiment and Malcolm Fraser the 25th September 1759 in the said 78th Regiment.

That the Memorialists received beating Orders dated 12th June 1775 and they were in Consequence employed on the Recruiting Service last Summer and your Excellency was pleased on the 21st November last to sign a Commission to each as Captain in the Regiment where they at present serve.

That Captain Neill Maclean lately joined the said Regiment being thereto appointed by a Commission signed by General Howe in the month of January last wherein it is expressly mentioned that Captain Maclean shall take Rank and receive Pay since the 14th day of June 1775 in consideration of the trouble and expense he would be put to in raising men for the said Regiment.

That as the Memorialists are informed, Captain Macleans Commission as Lieutenant is Posterior to either of theirs, his first Commission as such in His Majesty's 42d Regiment being dated sometime in the year 1762.

The Memorialists therefore Pray your Excellency may be pleased to grant each of them a Commission specifying that they shall take Rank and receive Pay since the 14th June 1775, or give them redress as your Excellency shall seem expedient.

Source: Military Despatches, British Army in North America, Quebec and Canada, Carleton, Haldimand etc., 1776-1780, M.318, pp. 6-7.
No. 2

Instructions to Nathaneal Day, Commissary General, March 20, 1776

You shall forthwith repair to the District described in your Commission as afores'd & take upon you the inspection, supervision, & direction of all Commissaries, & Deputy Commissaries, & Ass't Commissaries, of every description, & all their subordinate Officers, Ministers, & Agents whatsoever now or hereafter belonging to, or attending upon our Army that now is or shall be in Canada, subject nevertheless in all things to such Orders as you shall from time to time receive from us, or from our high treasurer, or the Commissioners of our treasury, for the time being or from the Commander in Chief of our said Army.

You are from time to time to appoint any one, or more of Deputy Commissaries, or Assistants, whom you shall think fit to preside over, take care of, superintend, aid, & assist in the securing and management of Magazines and Depots of Provisions and Forage for the use of the said Army, and also the conduct and Establishment of the Bakery, as the exigency of the Service may require.

You are to take charge of all Provisions which shall arrive in Canada for the use of our Army there and superintend the distribution thereof to the troops. And you are to follow all such Rules and Orders touching the Providing and distribution of Fresh Provisions as you shall receive from the Commander in Chief of Our said Army for the time being.

You are to make up monthly Accounts of all Provisions and Supplies which shall be received for the use of Our Army, and of the expenditures thereof, and what shall remain in Store, with an Account of the Number of the Rations drawn and of the Officers, Private Men and all other victualled, distinguishing their Rank and situation, and you are from time to time and by every opportunity to make exact and true returns thereof to Our High treasurer or Commissioners of the treasury for the time being end you are also from time to time to impart . . . all material transactions arising within the Charge of Commissariat, attending our said Army, . . . .

Source: Curtis, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
No. 3

New Commission to the Governor of Quebec

... And we do hereby give and grant unto you, the said Guy Carleton, by yourself, or by your Captains and Commanders by you to be authorized, full power and authority to levy, arm, muster, command, and employ all persons whatsoever residing within our said Province; and, as occasion shall serve, them to march, embark, or transport from one place to another, for the resisting and withstanding of all enemies, pirates, and rebels, both at land and sea; to transport such Forces to any of our Plantations in America, if necessity shall require, for defence of the same against the invasion or attempts of any of our enemies ...

And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and authority, by and with the advice and consent of our said Council, to erect, raise, and build in our said Province such and so many Forts, Platforms, Castles, Cities, Boroughs, towns, and Fortifications, as you by the advice aforesaid shall judge necessary; and the same or any of them to fortify and furnish with Ordnance, Ammunition, and all sorts of Arms fit and necessary for the security and defence of our said Province; and, by the advice aforesaid, the same again, or any of them to demolish or dismantle, as may be most convenient ...


No. 4

Conditions to be given to such Soldiers as will engage in the Royal Highland Emigrants

They are to engage during the present troubles in America only.

Each Soldier is to have two Hundred Acres of Land in any Province in North America he shall think proper; the King to pay the Patent Fees, Secretary's Fees and Surveyor-general, besides twenty years free of Quit rent. Each married Man gets Fifty Acres for his Wife, and Fifty for each Child, on the same terms.
And as a Gratuity besides the above Great Terms, One Guinea levy-money.

Allen Maclean,
Lieutenant Colonel Commandant

Source: The Quebec Gazette, August 10, 1775.

No. 5

PAY LIST TO OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOSPITAL STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Diem</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Generals and Commander in Chiefs, each £ 10&quot;</td>
<td>£ 20&quot;-&quot;-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aids de Camp to do</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Secretaries to do</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Lt. Generals</td>
<td>each £ 4&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aids de Camp to Lt. Generals</td>
<td>£ 1 of £</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Major Generals</td>
<td>each £ 2&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aids de Camp to Major Generals</td>
<td>each £ 1 of £</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Brigadiers</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;10&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Adjutant Generals</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Deputy Adjutant Generals</td>
<td>each £ 1 of £</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Majors of Brigade</td>
<td>each £ 1 of £</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Quarter Masters General</td>
<td>each £ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Deputy Quarter Masters</td>
<td>each £ 1 of £</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Assistants to do</td>
<td>each 5/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary of the Musters</td>
<td>each 5/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Deputy Commissaries</td>
<td>each 1 of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreack Master General</td>
<td>each £ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Judge Advocate Generals</td>
<td>each 1 of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary of Stores</td>
<td>each 2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Prevost Marshals</td>
<td>each £ 1 of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourrier</td>
<td>£ 89&quot;10&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Physicians</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;0&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Purveyors</td>
<td>each £ 1&quot;5&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Surgeons</td>
<td>each £ &quot;10&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apothecaries</td>
<td>each £ &quot;10&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Mates</td>
<td>each £ &quot;5&quot;0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Chaplains</td>
<td>each £ &quot;6&quot;8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Storekeepers</td>
<td>each £ &quot;3&quot;0</td>
</tr>
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</table>
No. 5 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Diem</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Post Commanders: Fort George,  
Niagara, Detroit,  [each 7"6pd] £ 3x"7"6  
Oswegatchie and Michilemakinac  [each 5"0] 2x"5"0  
Barrack Masters of posts named,  each ["4"0] 6x"4"0 | £ 125"7"10 |

APPENDIX D

A GENERAL ORDER AGAINST CORRESPONDING
WITH THE AMERICANS
APPENDIX D

General Order, Headquarters, Chambly, August 4, 1776

The Commanding Officers of Corps will take especial care that everyone . . . be informed that Letters or Messages from Rebels, traitors in Arms . . . , Rioters, disturbers of the Public Peace, Plunderers, Robbers, Murderers, or Assassins are on no Occasion to be admitted - that should Emissaries from such lawless Men, again presume to approach the Army, whether under . . . Flag of truce, Men or Embassadors, except when they come to implore the King's Mercy; their Persons shall be . . . seized and committed to close Confinement, in order to be proceeded against as the Law directs, Their Papers and letters for whomever, even for the Commander in Chief are to be delivered to the Provost Martial, that Unread and unopen'd they may be burnt by the hands of the common Hangmen; at the same time . . . neither the assassination of Brig. General Gordon, nor the late notorious breach of faith . . . at the Céderes and Quinchiors . . . be imputed to the Provincials at large, but to a few wicked and designing Men, who first deceived, then Step by Step [won] the Credulous Multitude to the brink of Risen; afterward usurpted Authority over them and established a despotic Tyranny not to be borne, and now wantonly and foolishly endeavour to provoke the spilling of Blood of our unhappy Country Men of this Continent in hopes of covering their own Guilt: 1st their crimes pursue these faithless, Bloody minded Men, who effect that Black is White & white, Black. It belongs to Britons to distinguish themselves, not less by their humanity than their Valor. It belongs to the King's troops to save the Blood of his deluded Subjects whose greatest fault perhaps is having been deceived . . . to their own destruction - It belongs to the Crown, it is the duty of all faithfull servants . . . to secure from oppression, and restore to liberty the once happy, free, and Loyal People of this Continent -

All Prisoners from the Rebellious Provinces who chuse to return home, are to hold themselves in readiness to embark at short Notice: the Commissary Mr. Murray shall visit the Transports destined for them, and see that wholesome Provisions necessary clothing, with all possible conveniences for, their Passage be prepared for their
unfortunate Men: They are to look upon their respective Provinces as their Prisons and there remain till further . . . summoned . . .

Edwd. Foy, D. Adj. General

APPENDIX E

PROBLEMS OF DISCIPLINE
APPENDIX E

No. 1
ADVERTISEMENTS

Quebec, 25th November, 1775

WHEREAS some Disorders have been occasioned in Consequence of the pernicious practice of retailing spirituous Liquors to the Soldiers and Sailors in this Garrison, to the Disquiet of many of his Majesty's Subjects residing here, which it is become highly expedient to prevent; to that End His Excellency GUY CARLETON, Captain General and Governor in Chief of this Province, Doth hereby strictly order and command that no Person whatsoever, whether licensed to sell spirituous Liquors or not, do sell, vend or dispose of any Rum, Wine or strong Liquor whatsoever to any Soldier or Sailor within this Garrison under Pain of Imprisonment and of being afterwards turned out of the City, And ... that no Person whatsoever, not having a License, do, under any Pretence whatsoever, sell, vend or dispose of any Rum, Wine or other strong Liquors to any Person ... within this Garrison, Under the like Pain of Imprisonment, and [exile] ... .

And forasmuch as it is forbid by Law under severe Penalties to take or receive in pledge payment or otherwise from any Soldier or Sailor, any Cloathing, Arms or Ammunition, which none of his Majesty's Subjects are or ought to be ignorant of, His Excellency doth hereby declare and make known that if any Person ... shall take or receive in pledge, payment or otherwise any article of Cloathing, Arms or Ammunition from any Soldier or Sailor contrary to that Law, the Penalties and Forfeitures thereby inflicted shall be rigidly enforced.

By His Excellency's Command
H. T. Cramahe

Source: The Quebec Gazette, November 30, 1775.

597
No. 2

Paper Signed by the Deserters from the Royal Highland Emigrants at Chambly 27th August, and received at Quebec 28 October, 1776.

We who have hereunto subscribed our Names accept of the Choice his Excellency General Carleton has given to us of serving for Life in Africa, or any where else it may please His Excellency to Order us.

Chambly 27th August 1776.

signed /

Edward Morton          James Grier          Benjm Johnston
Patrick Harington     Edmond McDaniel
Joseph Snodgrass      Ino. Gardner
John Singleton
Peter Trener          John Holland
Peter King            Ino. Coppinger
Chas Hawkins          David Torrey
Thomas Hudson
John Willson

And we who hereunto subscribe our Names desire to stand the Issue of a Tryal rather then accept of the terms offered to us by His Excellency Genl Carleton - Chambly 27th August 1776.

Signed Edward Seeds

Edw. Connor

Wm. Clements

General Order, October 4, 1776

The Commander in Chief delayed to Reprimand in Orders the insolent, shameful and ungrateful Clamour, made at the Evening Parade of Tuesday last, by the 31st and 47th Regiments, in hopes that the displeasure he expressed to the Commanding Officers Companies would produce visible and Equal Marks of Contrition as might have justified him in Suffering the Matter to rest thence forward in Silence.

His Excellency has been in some measure disappointed, and he has therefore in Justice to both Regts. left it in charge to take Public Notice of the difference of their Behavior.

The 47th Regiment have not ceased to acknowledge their offence, and testify their persistence in such terms of decency and respect as made due atonement and restore them to the good Opinion they before deserved.

The 31st Regiment have not only been deficient in such representation, but the Lieutenant Colonel suffered Rum to be delivered, notwithstanding he had received an express prohibition upon that Subject from the General's own mouth.

It is a painful necessity to include other Officers in this Regimental Censure, but it can hardly be supposed if the Subject of Rum had been properly explained that men could be so devoid of duty and reason as to Expect indulgencies never granted to any Army absolutely impossible to be complied with otherwise improper and prejudicial.

The Officers are required and ordered to make these truths Known to the Men, and those who want recollection, are to be taught to reflect.

The impression of just principles carefully instilled, soon becomes Visible and Certain, and Soldiers so prepared will ever consider that Decency, Regularity, Subordination and respect to their Officers when out of Action,
are the best . . . honourable pledges they can offer to their Superiors for trusting [in battle] . . . the Glory of His Majesty's Arms and the Vindication of the Rights of Great Britain.

Source: B. 83, pp. 50-51.
### APPENDIX F

LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL PERSONS SETTLED IN THE PROVINCE, WHO VERY ZEALOUSLY SERVED THE REBELS IN THE WINTER, 1775-1776, AND FLED UPON THEIR LEAVING IT...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>At Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hester McNeil</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>has long been settled and married twice in America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John and Aclan Bondfield</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>John appointed a commissary of provisions by the Congress; the other supposed to be an assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udney Hay</td>
<td>Scot</td>
<td>Acted as Deputy Quart Master General with Rank of Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Welles</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>A sort of secretary to Wooster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John White Swift</td>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John D. Mercier</td>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Clark M'not</td>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Halstead</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>A commissary of provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Freeman</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>A commissary at Trois Rivieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Holton</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Conductor of Artillery at Trois Rivieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Pelissier</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>At Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Walker</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Lived many years at Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Price</td>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>Great Zealots originally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>At Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>_____ Heywood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Barbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Antill</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Lt. Col. and Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Hazen</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>half Pay Lieut. of the 44th. Col. of the Rebel Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Bindon</td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Macerty</td>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Pory &amp; two Brothers</td>
<td>Americans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Salisbury Franks</td>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Livingston &amp; two</td>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>The eldest, Lt. Col., second, Major, and youngest Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Blake &amp;</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Carried Goods down to the Colonies in Winter &amp; did not return; the first known to be a rank Rebel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_____ Blakely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX G

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR,

PETITIONS AND RETURNS
APPENDIX G

No. 1

LIST OF THE REBEL PRISONERS PUT ON BOARD THE SHIP ADAMANT, HENRY WILSON MASTER QUEBEC 9th NOV. 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Places of Abode</th>
<th>Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taken near Montreal, 25 Sept. 1775</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethen Allen</td>
<td>Styling himself Col. but without a Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Moore</td>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td>Capt. Buels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Lewis</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>Maj. Ailmer's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi Bernham</td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Capt. Watson's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Noble</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Grey</td>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td>Maj. Ailmer's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebenezer Mack</td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Capt. Watson's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etherel Flower</td>
<td>New Hartford</td>
<td>&quot; Griswel's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barney Cann</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>&quot; Benedict's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zachy. Brinsmead</td>
<td>Bethlam</td>
<td>Maj. Hillman's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi Monson</td>
<td>Wallenford</td>
<td>Capt. Douglas's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston Denton</td>
<td>Hampsted</td>
<td>&quot; Graham's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wm Drinkwater</td>
<td>New Milford</td>
<td>&quot; Stare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathen Mayo</td>
<td>Goshem</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Gloss</td>
<td>Shannon</td>
<td>Maj. Hillman's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adonizak Mexom</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

605
APPENDIX G No. 1 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Places of Abode</th>
<th>Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Grey</td>
<td>Narawaak</td>
<td>Capt. Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Jac Bourguin</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>&quot; Mott's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Stuart</td>
<td>Stamford</td>
<td>&quot; Watson's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serj. Amos Green</td>
<td>taken by Major Le Maistre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Venemay</td>
<td>&quot; Col. Maclean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canadians taken 25th September 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Places of Abode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michel Goutier</td>
<td>St. Denis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Trudeau</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis La Roche</td>
<td>Longuil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Bellisle</td>
<td>St. Charles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Marjotte</td>
<td>Bellaisle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francois Livernois</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre La Roche</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexis Plufe</td>
<td>St. Ours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frans St. Laurent</td>
<td>St. Jean Deschaillons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Trichet</td>
<td>St. Dennis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean La Marche</td>
<td>Chambly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menard Charlan</td>
<td>taken carrying Letters &amp; Messages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Order of Cramahe

Having found it necessary . . . to send to England the above named Rebel Prisoners, and Henry Wilson Master of
APPENDIX G No. 1 (CONTINUED)

Names

Places of Abode

Companies

the Ship Adamant having agreed to receive them . . . on the express condition of their being taken from on board by the first commander of any of his Majesty's Ships or Garrisons to whom he may tender them immediately after his arrival in England. These are to request all . . . the officer's commanding His Majesty's Ships, Castles or Garrisons . . . to receive said Prisoners and detain them untill His Majesty's Pleasure be made Known.

The spelling is that of the contemporaries involved.


No. 2

RETURN OF PRISONERS TAKEN AT QUEBEC, DECEMBER 31, 1775

Recapitulation

Officers

Men

Joined Colonel McLean's Corps 111

Sent to Halifax 2

Ditto to New York 34 231

Remained at Quebec 27

Total 36 369

N.B. The above is exclusive of those who died in the Hospital

Signed Richard Murray, Commissary of Prisoners
RECAPITULATION, AS NEAR AS IT CAN BE MADE, OF THE REBEL PRISONERS TAKEN SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESENT TROUBLES TO 10th AUGUST 1776

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 25th</td>
<td>Long Point</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31st</td>
<td>At Quebec</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>Died in Hospitals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8th &amp; 9th</td>
<td>At Trois Rivieres, &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2d</td>
<td>Isle la Motte</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fell into hands of the Savages at The Cedars and delivered up by Agreement</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadiens taken at same time</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostages retained</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1st</td>
<td>Delivered by the Messisgues to Captain Forster</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To His Excellency the Honorable Guy Carleton Esquire, General and Commander in Chief of all His Majesty’s Forces in North America

May it please your Excellency

Impressed with a just sense, of your Excellency’s Humanity, and Benevolence; and urged by the peculiarity of our present disagreeable situation, being destitute of both friends and Money, we beg leave to request, that your Excellency will condescend, to take our case into consideration, and grant us Relief, by permitting us to return to our respective Homes, on our parole . . . assuring your Excellency, that we shall make it a point to Surrender ourselves, to any of His Majesty's Officers when, and where, your Excellency may think proper . . . unless we should be released from our Parole, by an Exchange of prisoners: should such an event take place, we entreat your Excellency, that we may be included.

Being likewise sensibly touched with the deplorable state of our men, who remain Prisoners at present, We . . . recommend them to your Excellency's Consideration, earnestly Soliciting that some Measures may be taken for their relief, and we should be extremely happy if they could possibly return to their families, many of whom must be reduced to the greatest Distress.

[Signatures]

Chris Greene  Christian Febiger   James Tisdale
Jim. Bigelow   Francis Nicholls   Jos. Thomas
John Lamb      Abijah Savage   B. Bruin,
Dan'l Morgan   Andrew Moodie   Ronald S. McDougall
Wm. Goodrich   John Humpston   John McGuire
John Topham    Nathal Hutchins   Mathew Duncan
Oliver Hanchet Sibs. Shaw   Thas. Porterfield
Simion Thayer  Saml. Brown   Benza Lathing

dated Quebec 5 June, 1776
[Signatures] (CONTINUED)

Samuel Ward       James Webb
Saml. Lockwood    A. Andrew
Eleazer Oswald    William Humphy
Will Heath        John Clark
Archibald Steel  Edward Slocum

APPENDIX H

THE LAKE CHAMPLAIN CAMPAIGN OF 1776,
CORRESPONDENCE AND RETURNS

611
APPENDIX H

No. 1

Account of Arnold's Rebel Fleet After 2 Actions by Pringle, 11 October under Valcow and 13th near Crown Point

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Guns/Weapons</th>
<th>Condition/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Savage schooner</td>
<td>eight 6-prs., four 4-prs.</td>
<td>Burnt 11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>four 6-prs., four 4-prs.</td>
<td>Escaped to Ticonderoga 13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sloop</td>
<td>ten 4-prs.</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee cutter</td>
<td>one 9-pr. in bow, one 12-pr. in stem, two 6-prs. in sides</td>
<td>Run on shore and burnt 13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress galley</td>
<td>two 18-prs. in bow, two 12-prs. in stern, six 6-prs. in sides</td>
<td>Taken 13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington do.</td>
<td>one 18-and one 12-pr. in bow, two 9-prs. in stern, six 6-prs. in sides</td>
<td>Escaped 13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trumbull do.</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight gondolas</td>
<td>one 18-pr. in their bows, Some four and some two 9-prs. in their sides</td>
<td>One sunk 11th, One taken 12th 13th, Five burnt 13th, One escaped to Ticonderoga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A schooner taken from Colonel Skene last year was gone to Ticonderoga for provisions. The Gates, a galley like the Congress, was to have joined the fleet in a few days.

Source: Q. 12, p. 226.
No. 2

Lord George Germain to Major General Guy Carleton
Whitehall, February 17, 1776

Sir: The events which happened in the Province under your government, in the month of November, left no room for any other consideration but that of sending as early as possible a relief to the Town of Quebec, in case you should have been able, with the small garrison you had collected together, to maintain possession of it during the winter; such relief to be followed by a body of troops sufficient to retake the town in case it should have fallen . . ., and to effect the recovery of the whole of the Province to his Majesty's possession.

To this end it was judged expedient immediately upon the arrival of Lieutenant Pringle, in the Nancy, to equip a small squadron of his Majesty's ships, consisting of the Isis, of fifty guns, the Surprise and Triton frigates, and the Martin sloop of war. This squadron has been accordingly prepared with the greatest despatch and will be accompanied with three Victuallers and two large Navy transports, having on board provision for three thousand men for three months.

His Majesty has also thought fit to direct that the twenty-Ninth Regiment should be distributed on board the different ships . . ., and the whole being now ready to sail, enclosed I send you a copy of my instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, and of the instructions given by the Admiralty to the Captains of the several ships, pursuant to the directions I had the honour to send their Lordships by His Majesty's command.

Every effort is making to push forward the second embarkation of troops, so that they may be ready to sail by the 20th of next month.

That embarkation will consist of six Regiments from Ireland, and two from Great Britain, together with four companies of Artillery, and a large battering train; the whole to be under the command of Major-General Burgoyne, who, together with Major-General Lord Cornwallis, is appointed . . . to serve under you on the side of Canada; but it will possibly be some time before you can have the assistance of Lord Cornwallis, as he is at present appointed to serve under Major General Clinton, upon an expedition to the southward, but he will proceed to Quebec with his regiment as soon as that service is over.
To this force it is proposed to add about five thousand foreign Auxiliary troops, furnished by the reigning Duke of Brunswick and the Prince of Waldeck; of which about three thousand will be ready to embark in the Elbe, in the beginning of March. . . .

Enclosed I send you the state of the British Regiments . . . ; and I am to signify to you his Majesty's Commands, that you do give the necessary directions for the disembarkation of the said troops, as well as of the foreign auxiliaries; and that you do employ them . . . most effectual for his Majesty's service.

Major-General Burgoyne will be so fully instructed in every point, in regard to the important services that are to be carried on, on the side of Canada, that it will be unnecessary now for me to say anything on that subject, and, therefore, I have only to enclose to you, his Majesty's warrant, containing a signification of his Majesty's pleasure . . . of posting officers to vacancies.

Source: B. 37, pp. 123-125.

No. 3

Sir Guy Carleton to Lord George Germain, from the Colonial Office Records, O. 13, p. 111 Quebec, 20 May, 1777

My Lord - Had your . . . despatch of the 22nd of August arrived in due time, it might have relieved me from many doubts, I thereby should have learned your wishes were not for my remaining on this side Lake Champlain the remainder of the year, as I at times apprehended. My fears did not arise from your silence on that head, this I imputed to an opinion . . . that any officer entrusted with the supreme command, ought . . . to see what was most expedient to be done, better than a great general at three thousand miles' distance; but considering your Lordship well knew how impossible it was for me to make the least preparations during the winter, and that . . . your Lordship had frequently importuned for boats, prepared timbers, with other materials necessary for suddenly putting together and equipping a marine force, for the lake service, and its immediate passes; and seeing all those solicitations disregarded . . . ; that the artificers, sent out for this . . .
work, dropped in, few at a time, and mostly late in the season, as if destined only to prepare matters for the following year, I naturally concluded, either that your Lordship had taken your measures with such great wisdom, that the rebels must immediately be compelled to lay down their arms, and implore the King's mercy without our assistance, or that you had suspicions the forces here might become necessary for the defence of the Province, and that your Lordship might not wish I should have the power, least . . . I should push on so as not to be able to return, as might become necessary . . . .

At times I flattered myself our progress had outstript all your hopes, that you judged the aids I had demanded for a marine, could not possibly be employed in '76, and that before '77 all must be over.

These doubts might have been removed by your Lordship's letter No. 5, wherein you tell me you hope soon to hear I have driven the rebels across the lakes, and taken possession of those posts upon the frontiers which may effectually secure this Province from any future insult; but the order for detaching that part of the force which might be spared from the immediate defence of this Province, to carry on such operations as should be . . . conducive to the success of the army . . . on the side of New York, the officer commanding to correspond with, and put himself under the orders of General Howe, this would have embarrassed me exceedingly . . . .

To set out upon such operations, in that season of the year, and in this climate, under the circumstances that then existed, that detached corps . . . must have perished by hunger or cold, or been cut off by the insurgents, before it could have joined General Howe's army; I say this fully persuaded they would have done everything that ought to be expected from good troops, led by an able officer.

A little reflection on . . . this climate, will . . . convince your Lordship. Troops cannot encamp in that advanced season, without perishing from the cold alone; - the inhabited country at a great distance; - and should the troops when there, avail themselves of the thinly scattered houses, for protection from the weather, they must have been dispersed so . . . [that] all might have been cut off, before they could have reassembled for their mutual defence.
Your Lordship perceives I . . . make no difficulties, even in that country, about transporting of baggage, military stores, provisions and such matters as are not attended to by persons little used to the movements of armies . . ., but if an enemy had been found strongly posted, as at Ticonderoge, this with the frost must have multiplied the difficulties, so that I regard it as a particular blessing, that your Lordship's dispatch did not arrive in due time.

Your letter of the 26th March recapitulates these orders, and imputes to my repassing Lake Champlain, that the rebels were enabled, with some . . . success, to break into the winter quarters of Sir William Howe's army.

If your Lordship means the affair of Trenton, a little military reason might prove the rebels required no reinforcement, from any part, to cut off that corps, if . . . alone; the force they employed on that occasion clearly demonstrated this. . . . a little attention to the strength of General Howe's army will, I hope, convince you that . . . they might have defended themselves, tho' all the rebels from Ticonderoge had reinforced Mr. Washington's army.

After this severe charge, your Lordship proceeds to tell me, that on these accounts, and in order to quell the rebellion speedily, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne is to have the command of almost this whole army, to attack Ticonderoge . . ., and I am ordered to remain behind at a time [when] . . . all business of legislation is over till January, and where there is a Lieutenant-Governor, whose experience, abilities, and attachment to the King's service entitle him to no small confidence.

Permit me to remind your Lordship of the campaign fifty nine when General Wolfe was sent with a small army to reduce Quebec. You cannot be a stranger to the difficulties he had to contend with; . . .

General Amherst could not but know all this. . ., seldom are stronger motives to induce a co-operating General to exert his utmost endeavours, than General Amherst had, upon that occasion to urge him to . . . drew off part of those great numbers which opposed Mr. Wolfe, and no doubt he did everything in his power.

General Amherst had a very superior army, his situation furnished him with as many artificers, labourers, and
materials for building a marine on Lake Champlain as he could wish. . . .

He was at liberty to arrange his own Plan, and make his own preparations. . . . free to begin his march, as early in the spring as he thought proper; - met with no enemy to impede his progress, and tho' his arrival on the Canada side . . . might have been of the most essential use to Mr. Wolfe's army . . . , yet Mr. Amherst did not pass this same Lake Champlain, that critical campaign, tho' the French had but a small Marine Force . . . , and a small Land Force . . . notwithstanding which, General Amherst received no censure from the then Minister, who was not . . . over indulgent to officers who neglected opportunities to exert themselves. . . . your Lordship should know such measures are less impracticable on this side the Lake than on the other.

But I, pent up in this town till May, in a Province, mostly disaffected, and overrun by rebels; - when troops arrived a numerous enemy to expel, who, in their retreat burned and destroyed all that might be of use; - arrived at the end of those navigable waters, not a boat, not a stick to employ; neither materials nor workmen, stores nor covering; tree and axmen, all must be sought for amidst confusion. . . . In spight of every obstruction a greater marine was built and equipt; a greater marine force was defeated than had ever appeared on that lake before; two Brigades were taken across, and remained at Crown Point till the 2nd of November, for the sole purpose of drawing off the attention of the Rebels from Mr. Howe, and to facilitate his victories. . . . Native had then put an end to ours. His winter-quarters, I confess, I never thought of covering; it was supposed, . . . that was the army favoured by your Lordship, and in which you put your trust, yet I never could imagine, while an army to the southward found it necessary . . . to go into winter-quarters, Your Lordship could possibly expect troops so far North should continue their operations, least Mr. Howe . . . be disturbed during the winter; if that great army, near the sea . . . had their quarters insulted, what could Your Lordship expect would be the fate of a small corps, detached into . . . rebel country in that season. For these things I am so severely censured . . . , and this the first reason assigned why the command of the troops is taken from me, and given to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to attack those Posts upon the Frontier, essentially necessary for the security of this Province.
He shall have every assistance in my power, and my most ardent wishes for the prosperity of the King's Arms; . . . the troops and Armament, destined for his expedition had immediate orders to receive and follow his directions, that he may combine their movements as he thinks proper, the same, so far as concerns Lt. Col. St. Leger's Expedition, the Hanau Chasseurs excepted; I have no such corps in this army, nor any information . . . in your dispatch, but it is set down as part of the corps I am to put under his command. At first I thought it might be a mistake, and that the Brunswick Chasseurs were meant. Lt. General Burgoyne says not; that these are to go with him, and that he thinks the Hanau Chasseurs are on their way hither.

All the Indians in the neighbourhood of Niagara and Lake Ontario have orders to join Lt. Col. St. Leger; those in the lower part of the Province, and those ordered last year from Michilimackinac are to attend Lt. General Burgoyne. Three hundred Canadian Militia are also to make the campaign, to be disposed by Lieutenant General Burgoyne; the same I had ordered, while I flattered myself I should have the conduct of the war on the Frontiers of this Province, which the Canadiens . . . must be employed for the forwarding all things for those two Expeditions. . . .

The marine has been greatly improved and augmented, which the impatience of last year's service would not permit. Those on Lake Champlain have been put under Lieutenant General Burgoyne's command, and the greatest part of those on Lake Ontario will attend Lt. Col. St. Leger. . . .

Guy Carleton

Source: C. A. 1885, Note D T.
No. 4

Lord George Germain to Sir Guy Carleton, from the Colonial Office Records, Q. 13, p. 184, Whitehall, July 25, 1777

Sir - The very extraordinary manner in which you express yourself in your Dispatches numbers 19 and 20, upon the measures which His Majesty thought proper to adopt must have arisen from your supposing that those measures had been taken upon no better authority than my advice and suggestion.

Affairs of such importance receive the fullest consideration from His Majesty's most confidential servants, and they are then submitted... to the King, who, after mature deliberation, gives such commands thereupon His Majesty judges most proper. The execution of such orders, when they respect America, belong to my Department; and if the manner of conveying them... be improper, I stand alone responsible for it. In the instance, however, of my last letter, respecting General Burgoyne's taking the command of the troops, and the disposition of the Forces in Canada, at which you have taken so much offense, I had the King's particular Directions for every part of it, after His Majesty had taken into consideration every information... furnished from the Secretary's office, and from the Report of General Burgoyne; and it remained only for me to put His Majesty's ideas into the form of a dispatch; but... there was not a part of it which I did not think most wisely calculated for the public service.

[Since in office it is the Royal policy] that the two Commanders-in-Chief... for different commands in America, should not interfere with each other;... it became impossible to vest you with the command of the Army in which Sir William Howe was to serve. It would ill become my situation to enter into an ill-humoured altercation with you upon various parts of your letters respecting the operations of the last campaign. All I shall say... is, that every possible exertion was made here to supply you with such a force as we flattered ourselves would have been sufficient, not only for the recovery of the Province of Quebec, but to enable you to assist Sir William Howe... by sending a part of your army to penetrate as far as Albany. The expectation of such success... was founded upon the opinions of many officers who had served in that country; and... if the intelligence we have since received be true, the Rebels intended to have abandoned their Post at Ticonderoga, had you marched... towards it...
whatever reports you may have heard of my having any personal dislike to you are without the least foundation. I have no time received any disobligation from you; but if I had looked upon you as my greatest enemy, I should . . . have given you every assistance in my power which could have contributed to your honour and success; a contrary conduct would have been repugnant to those principles upon which I shall ever act; but were I even capable of being influenced by private pique or resentment, my duty to the King, and the interest . . . in suppressing this rebellion . . . that you ought to have been convinced your suspicions were ill-grounded and unjust.

I cannot finish this dispatch without expressing my astonishment at your supposition that any consideration could prevail with me to condescend so very far beneath my character as to encourage faction and cabal in your Government. . . .

Geo. Germaine

Source: C.A. 1885, Note D 2
APPENDIX I

RETURNS OF SHIPPIING AND PROVISIONS
# APPENDIX I

**No. 1**

A List of Ships Appropriated to Carry Provisions to Canada for the Use of His Majesty's Forces under the Command of His Excellency Sir Guy Carleton

(In thousand pound or bushel units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Beef</th>
<th>Pork</th>
<th>Flour</th>
<th>Bread</th>
<th>Butter</th>
<th>Peas Bushels</th>
<th>Oatmeal</th>
<th>Date of Sailing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diligence</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>June 10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerva</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegasus</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>June 21st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>July 19th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polly</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warbourn</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howe</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>169.1</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>August 5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyacinth</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>118.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>August 6-8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosphorous</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>September 6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannes</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Do</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horseendon</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dove &amp; Friendship</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farley</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>126.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gruerson's Friends</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Do</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX I - No. 1 - (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Tons</th>
<th>Beef</th>
<th>Pork</th>
<th>Flour</th>
<th>Bread</th>
<th>Butter</th>
<th>Peas Bushels</th>
<th>Oatmeal</th>
<th>Date of Sailing</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>September 6th</td>
<td>Date of Arrival at Cork, Aug. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke</td>
<td>685</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August 18th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Loudoun</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August 28th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary &amp; Francis</td>
<td>271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August 19th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Shuldham</td>
<td>660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rorbuck</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haldimand Papers, B. 27.
No. 2

PROVISIONS BROUGHT IN FOR THE TROOPS
DAYS FOR 12,000 MEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships and dates of Arrival</th>
<th>Beef</th>
<th>Bread and</th>
<th>Butter</th>
<th>Peas</th>
<th>Oatmeal</th>
<th>Pork</th>
<th>Flour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transports, June 13 to September 2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ships, August 25-28</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ships, October 2 and 8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ships, October 14 and 20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 ships, November 10 and 11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bosphorous lost in the River but cargo saved</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rations for 12,000 in Days</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lieutenant Governor Cramahe, Quebec, October 6, 1776, Germain MSS.

No. 3

A RETURN OF THE SHIPPING ON THE LAKES, ONTARIO, ERIE AND HURON, JUNE 12, 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Name of Vessel</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to His Majesty</td>
<td>Snow Haldimand</td>
<td>Lake Ontario</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schooner Gage</td>
<td>Erie</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schooner Durmore</td>
<td>Huron</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Name of Vessel</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>Number of Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sloop Charity</td>
<td>Lake Ontario</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Sloops on the Stocks</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>30 each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to Mr. Grant</td>
<td>Schooner Hope</td>
<td>Lakes Erie and Huron</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sloop Angelica</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sloop Chippaway</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sloop Faith</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messrs. McTavish &amp; McBeath</td>
<td>Sloop Felicity</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Askin</td>
<td>Sloop Anchange</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX J

WINTER RETURNS
APPENDIX J

No. 1

Disposition of Winter Quarters in Canada, No. 1st, 1776

Headquarters of the Army
Montreal
Royal Artillery
29th Regiment
General Hospital

King's Royal Regiment of New York
La Chine, La Pointe Claire, St. Anne

The Royal Highland Emigrants Regiment
La Chenaye, Terre Bonne, Rivière Du Chene

B. General Fraser's Corps
The Van Brigade, Light Infantry and the 24th Regiment Along the south shore of the St. Lawrence, including La Prairie, Longueuil, Boucherville, Isle Thérèse, Isle Boucheret, Contre Cour, Varennes, Vercherres and St. Ours.

First Brigade
Commanded by Brigdr. General Powell

Left of the Brigade
31st Regiment at Belloeul, St. Charles, St. Denis, St. Aat Isle Jesus
Antoine, St. Ours, and Sorel
53rd Regiment at Chambly

Right of the Brigade
Montreal Dist. 9th Regiment
47th Regiment at Rivière des Frairess, St. du Recollet, St. Genevière and St. Laurent

Second Brigade
Commanded by Brigdr. General Hamilton

Left of the Brigade
34th Regiment at Quebec
62nd Regiment at Point Levy

Right of the Brigade
20th Regiment at Isle aux Noix
21st Regiment at St. John's

Addendum

8th Regiment at the Upper Posts
The German Troops quartered from Berthier to Trois Rivieres, and forty miles below on the road to Quebec.

No. 2

A LIST OF THE NAVAL TRANSPORTS REMAINING IN THE RIVER
ST. LAWRENCE FOR THE WINTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Names</th>
<th>Masters Names</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Place Detailed</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boreas</td>
<td>Joseph French</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td>At the Re-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roseau</td>
<td>Samuel Burrows</td>
<td>275</td>
<td></td>
<td>quisition of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td>Gilbert Wilson</td>
<td>304</td>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord North</td>
<td>Ralph Hodney</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>Carleton, for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Richard Bell</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>the use of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurie</td>
<td>Thomas Ramsay</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>their men on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Lakes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>William Preston</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>early in the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Sisters</td>
<td>Samuel Milner</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>Spring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucretie</td>
<td>James Wilson</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Cuthbert Parks</td>
<td>387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>John Stencliff</td>
<td>453</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>John Taylor</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lively</td>
<td>Robert Birch</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Much out of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorothy &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>repair and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine</td>
<td>Robert Galliks</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James &amp; John</td>
<td>George Watson</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>unfit for sea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah</td>
<td>John Penderson</td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesar</td>
<td>Wm. Wetherald</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>Laid up and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Wm. Brocklebank</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>too late to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Thomas Stevenson</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>proceed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signed Richard Pearson

Source: Admiralty I, 2303, Section 14, No. 21.
[Nov., 1776].
ADDITIONAL VESSELS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Names</th>
<th>Masters Names</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Place Detailed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleetwood</td>
<td>Ordnance Transport</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>Sorel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Victuellers</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas &amp; Richard</td>
<td>Robert Polk</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devonshire</td>
<td>Ordnance Transport</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>Loudon</td>
<td>Treasury Armed Ship</td>
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<td>Love &amp; Friendship</td>
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<td>General Conway</td>
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<td>Generous Friends</td>
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Source: Admiralty I, 2303, Section 9, No. 28.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

This report tells of the British naval preparations and Colonial expectations of possible maneuvers by the Governor of Canada late in 1776.

Journal of the Most Remarkable events which Happened in Canada Between the Months of July 1775 and June 1776, MG. 23, B 8, The Public Archives of Canada.

This journal formerly belonged to Frank T. Sabin of London who obtained it from the Dorchester family. The contents within indicate that Carleton was not the author but the honor does seem to belong to an Englishman. It does illustrate the problems of morale and command as well as the fighting spirit of the Commander-in-Chief.


There are several valuable extracts from various British newspapers of the period such as the London Gazette, with selections of correspondence from Carleton, Germain and other influential people.


This is a reproduction of the positive photostats in the collection recently given to their Majesties from Colonial Williamsburg. These papers belonged to Mr. M. Morgan, secretary to Sir Guy Carleton in the last years of the Revolution. Though the bulk of the material is concerned with the New York occupation and evacuation, there are some earlier letters and documents concerning Canada. Most of these have been duplicated either in the Colonial Office Transcripts or in the Military Dispatches.

Within is an account of military dispatches and problems from the Colonial viewpoint, plus a feeling of dejection because Carleton would not yield to Montgomery's surrender summons.


Letter or order of appointment of the militia captain Laurent Archambault, illustrative of the process of recruiting Canadian militia officers.

Carleton, Burgoyne and Howe. The Campaigns of Carleton, Burgoyne and Howe; Precis of Operations, Abstracts of Correspondence with the British Ministry and Other Documents Dealing with the Conduct of the War, 1774-1778, 15 Transcripts from the State Paper Office, 1850? Folio, Bancroft, Manuscript Division, The New York Public Library.

This item contains Lord Germain's precis on the operations of the three named commanders, giving insight as to his personal views and critical appraisal of Carleton's military maneuvers in the spring and summer of 1776. It concentrates on supposed errors in policy, defense and tactics.


It contains some intelligence and letters regarding the British advance of 1776, plus an interesting item on the shortage of rum and the need to inform their Lordships of the Treasury.

Emmet Collection. Sir Guy Carleton to Major Preston, Montreal, [26th June 1775], No. 4504, The Manuscript Division of The New York Public Library.

It reveals some of the problems of fortifications, housing and Indian relations within the St. Johns post.


These papers are especially significant for the first part of the Revolution. They contain valuable letters to and from Carleton and the leading Canadian officials which depict the problems of fortifications, supply, troop maneuvers, political deterioration and sedition.

Vols. IV through VI contain important letters from and to His Lordship in regard to all phases of the military situation in Canada and give some insight into his character. A few of his letters are also duplicated in the other collections.


This collection consists of a few select letters which reveal the divergence of views between Carleton and Germain regarding issues of loyalty, logistics and maneuvers.


Of significance is a letter from Carleton to Lieutenant Hunter concerning the river defence against the Colonial invasion in 1775.


Contains valuable letters relative to the Lake wants and campaign, clearly showing the devolution of orders from Carleton down to Captain Douglas, or the chain of command.

Army in America. Adjutant General's Orderly Book (1776, May 11 to 1784) of Major R. B. Lernoult interest, [original in The Burton Historical Collection], The Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

It contains numerous examples of Carleton's orders regarding all phases of military life, whether for maneuvers, discipline or daily martial life.

Journal of the British Army, Probably Compiled by a Member of the 47th Regiment of Foot; at Boston, 1775-1776; in Canada 1776-1777; and Burgoyne's Campaign, 1777. Photostat copy of manuscript in the possession of Mr. R. L. Reid, Vancouver, British Columbia. Manuscript Division, The New York Public Library.

This journal contains accounts on military operations
in 1776, especially those units which later became the unfortunate victims of the battles at Saratoga.

Chatham Manuscripts, Bundle 4, Volume 1A, 1756-1780, The Public Archives of Canada.
Indicates the small part played by Pitt the Younger in the Canadian scene as an aide-de-camp in 1775.

Volume 92 contains letters of Howe, Gage, Dartmouth and numerous others, though only a few pertain to Canada. The other volume includes a collection of papers from Lord Germain, indicating his desires and aspirations for the relief of Quebec.

This volume contains numerous letters of Charles Douglas, dealing with the naval problems in the 1776 advance and also concerning operation and combat on the lakes. Douglas was a vigorous supporter of Carleton’s activities.

One letter of significance from Carleton to the Rt. Hon. Elaquiere concerning the transports at Cork, September 20, 1775.

Class 5, 147, Lettered: Treasury 1776, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress.
This volume contains the letters of Robinson dealing with logistics, transportation and provisions.

More information of importance indicating the difficulties in collecting cargoes and Indian presents, as well as pay disputes.

Important papers from Lord Barrington and others illustrating the methods of sending recruits and supplies, plus a few shipping notices and monthly returns.

Letters and records indicating matters of recruitment, supply, pay and rank.

Class 5, 253 [Old A.W.I 290] Volume

Lettered: Precis [1774-1778], Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress.

Three items of value: the precis of operations on the Canadian frontier to favor Gage, measures for the relief of Quebec and the plan of operations for the Canadian army.


Correspondence of Governors Tryon and Carleton, plus a few Colonial messages concerning military operations. Many of these items have been published.


Two letters within from Lord Weymouth tell of the award of the Order of the Bath.


One of the basic sources on Canada. It gives insight into Carleton's part in the handling of provisions, appointments and other kindred problems. Some of the correspondence has been duplicated in the Haldimand Collection.


The Haldimand Collection perhaps forms the chief collection of Carleton data. It is housed at present in The Public Archives of Canada. This particular volume contains letters regarding the upper posts, the Indians, the Rangers and some of the more remote issues of the time.

Correspondence With Major Fr.: Hutcheson, 1766-1778, B. 20, Add. Mss., 21, 680.

Individual letters reveal rumors and hearsay of some interest.

Contains the order nominating Guy Carleton as Commander-in-Chief which was issued for enforcement on October 10, 1775.

A number of secondary letters from the Colonies and the Canadian scene relative to the campaigns in the north.

Correspondence of the Ministers with Generals Amherst, Gage and Sir Guy Carleton, 1760-1778, B. 37, Add. Mss., 21,697.
It relates to both civil and military affairs, the major portion concerns military movements, provisions, promotions and ideas related by the ministers to the Governor. Some are replies to his correspondence which requested certain supplies.

Significant letters, orders and drafts give ample information regarding reinforcements, promotions and fiscal matters dealing with expenses and pay.

For the dates covered it is a major source for Carleton's ideas relating to every military problem regarding the regulars, the Indians, the militia and the Germans, as well as his views on provisions, pay, naval officers, and the several quarrels with subordinates.

The same issues which appeared in the first volume continue to 1778 but they are mainly concerned with later developments at Ticonderoga and Saratoga. The orders do show, however, that Carleton would on occasion go against the spirit of Government instructions.

Letters to Carleton from the commissary, the paymaster and the treasury agents show the fiscal and provision problems faced in communications, shipping and in contracting for the American army as well as for British forces in Great Britain. Rations, transports, cash etc. receive the greatest attention. The methods used are indicated.
There are a few select letters from the commissary and the purchasing agents of some interest for their revelations.

Contains significant military orders touching upon numerous aspects such as ordnance, provisions, supply, hospitals, corvees, troop movements and relations of the field officers to their commander.

The letters are chiefly from the Butlers and Lieutenant Colonel Bolton. They deal with scalping parties, border raids and other local issues.

Register of Correspondence with the Officers Commanding at Detroit, 1776-1783, B. 121, Add. Mss., 21,781.
Many of the letters pertain to Carleton's activities in the west. Some of the information is duplicated in B. 37 and in the Q. series. Several circulars and directives show how Carleton attempted to finance and supply the western posts.

Correspondence with Lieutenant Governo Hamilton & Papers relating to Detroit, 1772-1784, B. 122, Add. Mss., 21,782.

Correspondence with Sir H. Clinton, Sir Guy Carleton, and other Officers at New York, 1777-1783, B. 147, Add. Mss., 21,807.

Correspondence with Officers of the Engineers, 1777-1783, B. 154, Add. Mss., 21,814, MG. 21.
Two items of interest: the first indicates Carleton's insistence upon adequate fortifications at St. Johns and at Isle aux Noix, and the second hints at trouble over the chain of command in the engineer corps.

Letters from the Officers of the Royal Regt. of New York, with Returns, etc., 1776-1783, B. 158, Add. Mss., 21,818.

It contains a number of informative returns and instructions which indicate the mode of transferring commands from parish to parish, as well as how the operations are sometimes executed.
Glimpses of prisoner-of-war petitions, letters from Crown agents and spies and a number of memorials and depositions by the Canadians.


Papers Relating to the Department of the Barrack Mast, Genl., 1777-1785, B. 190, [MG. 21].
Several letters and returns indicate that Carleton had a decided interest in the housing of his troops throughout Canada and the frontier, plus a complicated appointment situation due to Gage's nominees.

Letters, Private and Official, Reports, Returns etc., in Connection with the American Invasion of Canada by General Schuyler, Brigadier-General Montgomery, Colonel Arnold and Colonel Ethan Allen in 1775. From Manuscripts formerly the Property of Mr. Patrick Doyle, Quebec, MG. 23, B. 8.
Contains many now published letters and journals dealing with the militia, the troops and other connected matters.

Livingston, Henry Jr. Journal of Henry Livingston Jr. in the Campaign to Canada, 1775.
A photostat copy is in the Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. Contains a good geographic description. Livingston considered Carleton a coward.

Some of the letters deal with the character of the Governor, illustrating his firm determination to hold out until succour in spite of threats and summons to capitulate.


All the volumes containing the military dispatches will
be found in the Canadian Archives. This particular volume has within it significant returns and letters to Lord Barrington from the Governor and his subordinates.


The first part is of value for the insight given as to methods of promotion by the commanders, duplications, supernumeraries and purchases, and secondly as to the importance of troop, provision and return reports. The key letters are those between Carleton and Lord Barrington. The second part contains one letter outlining the ministry's views seeking Carleton's advice after he had left Canada.


A few select letters from Sir William Howe disclosing the fate of the 7th and 26th Regiments, once under Carleton's command.

Returns, M. 332.

Important for its revelations concerning transportation of the several regiments. The returns contain the number of men of all ranks on duty or on leave.


The folder collection actually begins with October 1 and runs to the mentioned date. Unfortunately it is too brief and hardly mentions Carleton.

O'Callaghan, E. B., translator. The Eye Witness of the War of the Americans in Canada in the Years 1775 and 1776, BV, Miscel. Section "0", The New York Historical Society.

Gives a very critical view of Carleton's military tactics and personality, particularly during the Longueuil incident. The author is a siegneur who was anxious to lead the Canadians against the invaders.


Insight regarding the regimental organization of the defense of the city, particularly as to guard and picket duty, the want or adequacy of provisions, minor disciplinary problems, reviews, funerals and parades. However, there is very little on Carleton's part.

Presents views of various British and Colonial sources which describe the assault.


A 2nd lieutenant commission to a Frenchman at Detroit.


Contains numerous correspondence from Colonists and Canadians, plus a few from Carleton and various merchants concerning problems of communication.


Letters to Sir John Johnson, leading American officers, merchants and provincial committees. They cover all aspects of American operations and problems of logistics, maneuvers and the gathering of intelligence. Illustrations of intercolonial jealousies are numerous. Schuyler reveals an unusual ability to foresee Carleton's operations but even he overestimated the Governor's ability to wage a winter campaign.

Military Information, 1775-1777, Depositions, Affidavits, etc., (including testimony against Loyalists or Tories), Manuscript Division, The New York Public Library.

The testimonies and reports indicate the activities of the Loyal colonists and Indians in the Mohawk region as well as to the degree that the Americans were able to maintain an alert intelligence in the area.


Most of this material predates the Revolution but reveals Carleton's talents in the field of fortifications, such as the proposed plans for a citadel.


This series is as important as the Haldimand Papers and the Military Despatches and like them is housed in The Public Archives of Canada. This particular volume includes dispatches from Carleton and his subordinates to the Colonial Office and contains information regarding the militia, sedition, forts, the invasion and the defensive measures.

Correspondence Between Gov. Carleton and Lord Germain, 1776, Canada, Quebec No. 12, From the Public Record Office, London.

More military dispatches, draft replies and a long descriptive letter by Justice William Hey. Other material deals with the repulse of the invaders and naval and Indian operations around Lake Champlain.


Numerous dispatches and messages from Carleton to London and replies and other indications of the operations for 1777. Much attention is given to the quarrel with Germain.


Dated from June 17 to December 18, dispatches and replies on matters concerning the expeditions, enemy operations at Ticonderoga, disloyalty in Canada, quarrels and Carleton's return to England.

Quebec Instructions to Governors, 1763-1787, M 230, [MG. II, No. 7, 1886].

Many of the directives contained within have been published in various other collections.


This particular letter explains some of the reasons why Carleton decided against holding Crown Point in 1776. It also indicates that he desired to have some of the western posts included within Canadian jurisdiction.

B. Documentary Collections


There are a few select letters concerning Benedict Arnold's activities in Canada.


This collection contains a number of significant letters concerning the progress of the Canadian expedition from the officers at Ticonderoga and the other advanced posts, and from delegates of the Continental Congress.


By far the best summary of Carleton's activities as a military leader. But it is more valuable for its 275 documents which are largely from the Canadian Archives, the Colonial Office, and various important collections, containing orders, letters, military returns and other information relating to the multi-national forces in the army and in the navy.


The pertinent proclamations and instructions to and from Carleton in relation to military affairs are on pages 58 to 109. The contents will also be found in the Canadian Archives Report for 1904 and in Sessional Paper No. 29a.


Notes D-1 and D-2 contain in full two cardinal letters relating to the altercation between Carleton and Lord
Germain, one dated 20 May and the other 25 July, 1777. Also significant is the Haldimand Collection Calendar listing volumes B. 37, B. 38, B. 39 and B. 40. Refer to manuscript section.


Report on Canadian Archives, 1890, edited by Douglas Brymner, Being an Appendix to the Report of the Minister of Agriculture (Ottawa: Brown Chamberlain, 1891). This volume lists the chief sources of the critical years, specifically the contents of Q. 11, Q. 12, Q. 13, Q. 14 and Q. 15. Refer to Transcripts of Colonial Office Records.

Report Concerning Canadian Archives for the Year 1904, Sessional Paper No. 18 (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1905). Two sections are of great value: Appendix E, "Instructions to Governors, Part I, Colonial Office Records," which shows numerous civil, religious, judicial and trade rules, and, secondly, Appendix I, "War of 1775-1776," for the valuable excerpts of letters on the war by Carleton, Dartmouth, Gage, Howe, Mclean and others, telling of reinforcements, defeats, succour and problems of loyalty and wants. Appendixes A and B, moreover, contain calendars of mss. material for series B. and Q., while Appendix B also lists series M.

Some choice proclamations of Carleton and Cramahe are to be found in Appendix C. They cover the years 1764 to 1791.

Within are found some interesting items dealing with the Loyalists in the occupied areas of Canada. See "Notes and Reminiscences of an Inhabitant of Montreal," by Pierre Foretier, pp. xxiii to xxvi.


Of particular value are the items found in series 4 and 5 which deal with the issues concerning the Cedars, troop movements and the raising of the militia of both sides. There are a few proclamations which were promulgated by Carleton as well as a long account on the debate over the petitions against the Quebec Act. These volumes are essential for the understanding of the invasion and its failures from the Colonial viewpoint.


The debates and resolves relating to the expedition can be found in these volumes. Requisitions and financial matters largely make up their contents.


This volume is important for the "Proceedings of the Loyalist Commissioners," made in 1786-1787, particularly since they give glimpses into cases of Loyalists serving Carleton and now demanding compensation.

Great Britain, Army. *Rules and Articles For the Better Government of His Majesty's Horse and Foot Guards, and*
all Others His Forces, From the 24th of March, 1777 (London: Printed, 1777).

Though this volume was published after the Canadian invasion had terminated, the rules of discipline and procedure within remained essentially the same. They give insight into matters of discipline, court-martials and relations with the civil population. Many of these rules were applied by the British army in America.


Though it is mostly a calendar of some of Lord Germain's papers, there are some letters and memoranda to be found within its contents.

Journals of the American Congress From 1774 to 1788, From September 5, 1774, to December 31, 1776, Inclusive Vol. I (Washington: Way and Gideon, 1823).

It contains the "Letter to the Inhabitants of the Province of Canada," promising never to abandon them to the British.


There are several important documents written by members of the Johnson clan and which deal with military affairs of concern to Carleton in the vicinity of Lake Champlain on one side and Niagara on the other. It is of value for the Loyalist movements in the Mohawk Valley as well as for the part played by members of the Six Nations in upper New York.


Contains select papers, returns, orders and letters to and from Carleton, Hamilton, DePeyster, Lernoult etc. They indicate Carleton's part in the Indian and naval affairs in the western areas and show the want of leadership and of supplies.
Contains miscellaneous letters from prominent individuals, postal officials and from intercepted correspondence. It is good for opinions concerning the course of events in Canada.

Scattered resolves indicate a desire to secure the vital Champlain route, the fear that Carleton might invade and the Colonial desire to convert the Canadians to the cause against the King.

This volume contains a helpful selection of original documents relating to the expedition, though basically it is concerned with the growth of the Canadian Constitution. Especially informative are the letters of Chief Justice William Hey, Cramahe and Governor Carleton. They reveal military and civil weaknesses.

Contains detailed letters on Carleton and Burgoyne. It is useful for geographic and social descriptions. Three items of significance include - "First Campaign of the Brunswickers in Canada in the Year 1776," dated November 3; "Letter from Canada by a German Staff-Officer," November 2; and "Private Letter from Canada which Arrived in Lower Saxony, Aug. 1777."

Sullivan, James, director. Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 (2 Vols.; Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1923-1925).
It illustrates some of the local efforts taken to organize and to supply the American invasion of Canada.

Carleton's military policy and relations to the upper posts and the Indians are found in select correspondence from De Peyster and the Gautier Journal.
"The British Regime in Wisconsin - 1760-1800."

Ibid. Vol. XVIII (Madison: Published by the Society, 1908).

A continuation of the previous article. It has additional material from De Peyster and Langlade and their relationship to the succouring of the hardpressed British in eastern Canada.


This volume is particularly valuable for the exploits of the eastern pincer of the American invasion. Three items provide the story: "Letters Written on an Expedition Across the State of Maine to Attack Quebec in 1775 by Col. Benedict Arnold," a journal by Col. Montressor about 1760 and, last, "A Journal of the Expedition to Quebec in 1775," by William Allen.


It contains several important journals, documents and orderly books such as Ainslie's Journal as well as a list of officers of the Royal Highland Emigrants and the rosters of the Canadian militia.

C. Journals, Letters and Writings of Participants


Ainslie was a collector of customs as well as a militia captain during the siege. The journal brings out Canadian resistance to the efforts of the siegneurs and clergy in behalf of the Crown. Military matters such as guard duty and morale receive attention.


The ill-fated assault on Montreal and the
prisoner-of-war policy during the first months of the invasion are narrated by the Colonel who may have exaggerated some of the unfortunate circumstances.


While colored in favor of his brother, Ethan, the book still contains some material on the Colonials but has some serious omissions regarding the operations around Lake Champlain in 1776.


It is mainly concerned with the hardships and problems which Arnold encountered in his famous expedition.

Anonymous. An Authentic Narrative of Facts Relating to the Exchange of Prisoners Taken at the Cedars; Supported by the Testimonies and Depositions of His Majesty's Officers (London: T. Cadell in the Strand, 1777).

A propaganda sheet with some substantial evidence put out by an Englishman in order to counteract the charges of barbarism made by the Continental Congress.

"A Diary of the Weather, Kept at Quebec in the Year of the Siege By the Americans in 1776," Transactions of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, No. 22, Session 1892-1898, pp. 45-49 (Quebec: Raoul Renault, 1898).

Though brief and skimpy it does shed some light upon the factor of climate and its relationship to the military operations.


This journal as well as the next two virtually cover the same subjects as that of Ainslie, though with slightly different emphasis and language.

"Journal of the Siege from 1st Dec., 1775 by an Artillery Officer, as his Duties Appeared to be Chiefly on the Ramparts and in the Batteries of Quebec," Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, Historical

This particular volume is a reprint from The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. III, 1884. It indicates Arnold's dislike of Allen and his high regard of himself. The initial activities of the invasion are discussed but there is only hearsay on Carleton.

Baby, Francois. Journal de MM. Baby, Taschereau et Williams 1776 (Quebec: Publie par Aegiduis Fauteux, 1929). This is one of the best sources concerning the division or absence of loyalties among the Canadians and the use of the militia to counteract such. This mission, ordered by Carleton, was directed to investigate the extent of dissatisfaction. The findings seem to confirm Carleton's hesitancy to rely upon the habitants and thus refutes Garneau, Sanguinet and the other seigneurs.

"Letters Ecrites Pendant l'Invasion Americaine. Lettres non Officielles," Invasion du Canada Collection de Memoires Recueilles et Annotes, pp. 303-376, edited by M. L'Abbe Verreau (Montreal: Eusebe Senecal, 1873). Select letters which contain some pertinent hearsay. The second portion has a good account on the raising of the militia as well as the event around Montreal and Quebec.

Badeaux, Jean Baptiste. "Journal de Badeaux, 1775-1776," Ibid., pp. 163-219. Within are indications of Loyalist opinions on the events at the Cedars as well as some of the difficulties encountered in enrolling the militia and some account of the hardships under American occupation.

An account by a Colonial officer who was sent to reinforce the invaders in 1776. It gives a fair picture of the confusion, waste and sickness among the American troops, but there is little dealing with the British or Carleton.


A few select letters show the status of naval construction and contributions in late 1775 and the naval operations on Lake Champlain the following year.


An excellent secondary account precedes the Journal, indicating Carleton's attitude towards the officers and the Indians in their military activities. It also contains a good bibliography.


In several parts the author makes unfavorable comparisons between Carleton and McLean, especially at the battles of Longueuil and Trois Rivieres. These imply that Carleton is a coward. These comments closely accord with those of the other seigneurs.


Of little value save for about five general letters on his trip to and from Canada. It also contains a section of the Carroll diary.


Contains information on the siege from the viewpoint of a Colonial prisoner-of-war who admits Carleton's humanity.

Though largely concerned with the events that followed there is some material of value dealing with military problems of various sorts which involved personal relationships between the two leading military officers in Canada. Burgoyne definitely takes Carleton's side in the latter's controversies with Lord Germain.


Though Caldwell was biased against the Canadians he did admit that they proved of value in the siege. Moreover, though he was critical of Carleton, Caldwell cooperated to his fullest extent.


There are a number of letters which indicate the early stages of the invasion which take into consideration difficulties of communication, the rise of sedition and the prevalence of apathy. Many of these materials will be found in the Gage Papers in the Clements Library.


A few select letters such as the one from Barnabas Deane, June 1, 1775, tell of the quarrels within the Colonial ranks, particularly concerning the advance into Canada.

The New York Colonel has left an informative letter about the organization and progress of the Americans before St. Johns.


It contains an interesting antedote about Carleton, as recorded by a Colonial officer.


Digby defends Carleton's retreat from Ticonderoga in 1776, but also fails to mention the suspension of the pincer which may have been responsible for Arnold's escape.


This study gives insight into Carleton's part in the advance upon Ticonderoga. Riedesel's opinions and his cooperation are indicated in the series of memoirs, letters and journal extracts, especially those sent to the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick.


The author was a lieutenant in the 3rd Regiment of New Jersey troops commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. It
contains letters which concentrate upon the activities of the Johnsons and the Indians in the Mohawk Valley in 1776.


The journal contains excellent descriptions of places and persons in Canada. It virtually illustrates how Carleton met the Indians in a series of important conferences. Du Roi is also critical of Burgoyne and feels that Carleton's plans and not Germain's should have been adopted.


The title indicates the nature of this petition to Parliament. It cannot be definitely determined if it influenced Carleton in his handling of allowances and subsidies.


A member of the expedition and an eye witness to Carleton's defeat at Longueuil. Fassett was positive that the British force had exhibited cowardliness.

[Finlay, Hugh?] "Journal of the Siege and Blockade of Quebec by the American Rebels in Autumn 1775 and Winter 1776," No. 4, Manuscripts Relating to the Early History of Canada, Fourth Series, Historical Document (Published under the Auspices of the Literary and Historial Society of Quebec; Quebec: Dawson & Co., 1875).

This work largely repeats information which is available in the other journals by the British and Canadian militia and regulars.


A group of select letters scattered throughout give some information regarding the invasion and the retreat from Canada.

The editor is a member of the Department of History at the College of William and Mary. The account is among the best but is incomplete. It reveals problems of provisions, money, oaths and paroles, as well as the part played by Carleton and his subordinates.


Fortescue, Sir John, editor. The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1783, Printed from the original Papers in the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle, Vols. III and IV, July 1773-December 1779 (London: MacMillan and Co., Limited, 1928).

Select letters of Lord North, George III and Lord Germain reveal the character of Carleton and his actions at Crown Point, plus the anger he had when he found his command limited.


Brief views by the Reverend concerning the safety of the frontier from attacks by the Indians under Carleton can be obtained from the contents.

[Grose, Francis]. Advice to the Officers of the British Army (London: W. Richardson, 1783).

The advise is in the form of satire, showing all the faults to be avoided. Though it is doubtful that Carleton knew of this work, some of the faults mentioned can be seen in his own character. On the whole, however, the Governor is fortunately the antithesis of the hero of the advise.

Hadden, James M. A Journal Kept in Canada and Upon Burgoyne's Campaign in 1776 and 1777 (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1884).

There is an enlightening introduction by Horatio Rogers. There are also some orders and directives from the commanding generals including Carleton.

Hamilton, Sir John. "Journal of the Principal Occurrences During the Siege of Quebec by the American Revolutionists under Generals Montgomery and Arnold in 1775-76,"
 Contains some correspondence which reveals the activities of the leading American officers in Canada. It is especially revealing for details regarding the battle at Trois Rivieres.

Henry, John Joseph. Account of Arnold's Campaign, and of the Hardships and Sufferings of that Band of Heroes who Transversed the Wilderness of Maine from Cambridge to the St. Lawrence, in the Autumn of 1775 (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1877).
 Though it is a memoir it still has a good account of the condition of life encountered by the prisoners-of-war. The Governor's policy of humanity and parole can be traced from the contents as well as the early attempts to effectuate an escape and to betray the city.

 It is of value solely for the Colonial side of the siege. There is nothing dealing with Carleton.

Hughes, Thomas. A Journal by Thomas Hughes for his Amusement & Designed only for his Perusal by the Time he attains the Age of Fifty if he Lives so Long (1778-1789) (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1947).
 The title indicates that the contents must be viewed with caution. Nonetheless, there is some information concerning the relief of the hardpressed American forces in 1776. Unfortunately, Hughes did not leave much concerning his captivity.

 Some interesting but unfavorable comments about Carleton and the Indians at Longueuil are to be found along with good descriptions of Montreal and La Prairie. The manuscript has also been consulted. Refer to the first section.

The author takes the siegneurs' viewpoint and gives some insight regarding their attitude towards the mobilization of the militia. There is also criticism of Carleton for his apparent inactivity. Moreover, the "Journal de Foucher, Siege fait par les Bastonnais des Retranchemots a St. Jean en 1775" is also found in this pamphlet.


A brief journal of a Colonial officer who was made a prisoner-of-war at Trois Rivieres. It gives some idea of the treatment encountered by those taken by the British. One can see a contrast between the high ranking Crown officers and their subordinates with the former being far more humane.


The attitude of the British commanders towards the employment of scalpers can be found in the Introduction and in scattered letters to frontier officials, both civil and military. Bibliographical data links to other historical collections are also given.


This is one of the best accounts on the presence of sedition within Quebec. The author was a Colonial sympathiser who was one of those banished. He describes the operations of the militia as well as their organisation and meetings prior to leaving the city.


Several letters of interest to and from such people as Governors Cooke and Trumbull and Generals Gates and Greene on the conditions at the Lake forts. There is also an abstract of Major Bigelow's journal and a Carleton order.
Ketchum, The Rev. Silas, editor. "The Shurtleff Manuscript, No. 153. Being a Narrative of Certain Events which Transpired in Canada, During the Invasion of that Province by the American Army, in 1775. Written by A Mrs. Walker, whose Husband was Imprisoned for Raising Men to Assist Ethan Allen, in his Disastrous Attack on Montreal, on the 25th of September," Collections of the New Hampshire Antiquarian Society. No. 2 (Contoocook: Published by the Antiquarian Society, 1876).

This journal, by the wife of the convicted traitor, is filled with statements to imply that Walker was innocent. But the interview between Carleton and Mrs. Walker clearly indicated the extent to which the Governor was willing to go before punishing spies.


The author was a Connecticut doctor, one of the volunteers who went to aid the cause in 1776 and thereby witnessed the retreat, the prevalence of smallpox and the Lake battles. He is biased in favor of Arnold and is also favorable towards Gates' preparations at Ticonderoga.


Scattered in four sections of the volume, the memoir gives the Colonial account of the American retreat in 1776. Lacey is critical of Arnold but commends Gates and Wayne. It contains some of the orders issued by these men at Valcour and at Ticonderoga.

Lamb, Roger. An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, from its Commencement to the Year 1783 (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809).

The author was a sergeant in the Royal Welch Fusileers who participated in the Canadian and New York campaigns. He has left us some facts and tales concerning Carleton's Indian policy, his advance of 1776, his kindness to all prisoners-of-war and how the winter encampments were set up.

Memoir of His Own Life (Dublin: Printed by J. Jones, 1811).

The Lieutenant was a Scotswoman in the British militia at Quebec. His account is devoid of personal experiences and seems written in the manner of a general history.


The siegneur was active in the cause of the Crown and ambitious to lead the Canadians in battle at Longueuil and the Indians at the Ceders. Like the other siegneurs he believes that Carleton was unnecessarily hesitant in taking advantage of their zeal.


It presents a satisfactory account of Loyalist claims, losses and services as well as opinions of the commanders. McAlpine also throws some light upon the problem of securing fresh provisions in accordance with Carleton's instructions.


Maseres, Francis. Additional Papers Concerning the Province of Quebec (London: Horace's Head, 1775).

This is largely an appendix to a study dealing with the British and Colonial settlers in Canada who were seeking to establish the traditional rights of an assembly for themselves. This account contains valuable though one-sided letters and papers, in the form of essays, usually of a controversial nature. Maseres was an Attorney-General and was in the middle of the civil and military disputes, as well as between the militia of the past and the siegneurs of his time.

Mayer, Brantz, editor. Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, During His Visit to Canada in 1776, As One of the Commissioners from Congress; with a Memoir and Notes (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1876).
The journal presents considerable evidence indicating confusion behind the Colonial lines but in the manner of a travelogue. The commissioners held civil and military powers and were opinionated but not always wise.

Written by the Chaplain to the Duke of Brunswick's Dragoon Regiment, it provides a satisfactory source for geographical and social studies. There are also descriptions of the Indian conferences and some comments on problems faced by the German troops.

This contains an excellent account of Carleton's treatment of American officers in 1776 and presents the development of the parole policy and the part played by Major Carleton.

This diary presents an account of the retreat of May 6th, from the point of view of an American officer.

This consists of a brief narrative of the siege as seen by an English seigneur but unlike the Canadian seigneurs is favorable to Carleton.

Pell presents the British side of the campaign as it
progressed towards Montreal, with an account of the defeat of General Thompson, the destruction of Sorel and the evacuation of Canada.

The Quebec Gazette, 1775-1778.
Though its publication was suspended for a good portion of the siege of Quebec, it, nonetheless, contains samples of proclamations and letters which do give limited insight into the internal conditions of both the city and the eastern sections of Canada.

A Quebeck Gentleman. "A Narrative of the Tumultuous Conduct of the Freeholders of Divers Seignories in the Province of Quebeck in the Summer of the Year 1775, in Opposition to the Endeavours used by their Seigneurs to Call them Out to Take Arms Against the American Army, that Had Invaded the Province," Additional Papers Concerning the Province of Quebec, by Francis Maseres (London: Horace's Head, 1776).
This is one of the best descriptions of the existence of dissatisfaction in the parishes near Montreal and those on the south side of the St. Lawrence.

This is a journal of the rout of the Colonists before St. Johns and the vain efforts of Montgomery to rally them, narrated by the New York Colonel who later betrayed his state.

Though one-sided, this petition for redress indicates that disputes existed in the appointment of necessary officials such as commissaries but that Carleton, though not directly involved, nevertheless supported the candidacy of Nathaniel Day of the War Office over Roberts from the Treasury.

Though several of the key journals were written many years after the events, there is much valuable information provided in regard to the conditions faced by the prisoners-of-war, plots to escape, and news as they
received it while imprisoned. Several of the narratives, particularly those of Simon Fobes and James Melvin, related the effects of smallpox among the troops. John Henry and Captain Simeon Thayer were but two of the several that wrote the details of the above events and emphasized the kindness of Carleton toward them. George Morison criticized the British for adopting Colonial fighting technics, such as firing from behind windows. John Pierce related a plot which he attributed to Carleton which was designed to bribe some of the Americans to desert to the British. The four other journals are by Caleb Haskell, Return Johnathen Meigs, Isaac Senter and Abner Stocking.

Rowland, Kate Mason. The Life of Charles Carroll of Carrollton 1737-1823 With His Correspondence and Public Papers (2 Vols.; New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1897). These volumes contain the journal and several significant letters involving the commission to Canada. One letter to General Gates is of interest for its estimate of British strength and its optimistic faith in the ability of the Americans to hold Sorel and Montreal.

Sanguinet, Monsieur De. "Témoin Oculaire de L'Invasion du Canada par les Bastonnais," Invasion du Canada by M. L'Abbe Verreau, pp. 1-156 (Montreal: Eusebe Senecal, 1873). This is the same as the unpublished manuscript in the collection of the New York Historical Society. See the comments as given in the manuscript section.


Stone, William L., editor. Journal of Captain Pausch Chief of the Hanau Artillery During the Burgoyne Campaign (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1886). It gives insight as to the voyage and activities of the Germans. Pausch participated in the advance and saw action on Lake Champlain. He also described disciplinary problems brought on by antipathy between the British and the Germans.

Letters and Journals Relating to the War of the American revolution, and the Capture of the German Troops at Saratoga by Mrs. General Riedesel (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867). Within are to be found some relevant letters and a diary by the General and his wife.

It presents some interesting glimpses into guard methods and the manner of discipline as well as how a regiment receives and keeps account of supplies.


A vivid description of the death and burial of Montgomery appears within its pages and is a credit to Carleton's humanity.


This is virtually the same as some of the journals which appear in the collection made by Kenneth Roberts.


This is by far the best Colonial source dealing with the St. Johns episode. It contains the terms of the surrender as proposed by Preston and amended by Montgomery, the list of supplies and prisoners taken, and the march to Montreal.


Trumbull left an excellent account of Colonial efforts to insure the defenses of Ticonderoga, particularly on Mounts Defiance and Independence. He also relates Carleton's design to undermine American morale by freeing the prisoners-of-war and sending them back to their regiments.


This is the best existing collection of Canadian journals concerning the invasion. The following
are represented: De Badeaux, De Berthelot, and De Sanguinet. The Contents of each of these has been given earlier in this section.


Similar to the other British journals and orderly books kept by the various officers and regiments, it, nonetheless, adds to the information regarding conditions within the besieged city and discusses problems of discipline, tensions, supply and morale.


This one of the numerous accounts written by Colonial officers. This one participated in the succour of the forces and then their retreat to Ticonderoga in 1776.


It traces the methods of discipline, the effects of smallpox and the difficult terrain encountered by the author.


This presents Whitcomb's side of the assassination of General Patrick Gordon.


Like the numerous prisoner-of-war accounts, Wild gives a description of the treatment accorded to them while they were confined in Quebec.
Wilkinson, General James. Memoirs of My Own Times, Vol. I, (Philadelphia: Printed by Abraham Small, 1816). The first three chapters are valuable, aside from discounting the heroics of the author, for their comments on the Colonial retreat and especially upon the motives and plans of Sir Guy Carleton. Wilkinson, moreover, offered alternative maneuvers which he thinks the Governor might have instituted in order to bag the Colonial army within the pincer movement.

II. Secondary Materials

A. Biographies


Arnold, Isaac N. The Life of Benedict Arnold; His Patriotism and His Treason (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Company, 1880).

Bois, Louis Edouard. Le Colonel Dambourges, etude Historique Canadienne (Quebec: Des Presses De A. Cote et Cie, 1866).


Moore, Hugh. Memoir of Col. Ethan Allen (Plattsburgh, N.Y.: Published by C. R. Cook, 1834).


B. Histories of Canada and the American Revolution


Bourinot, Sir John G. Canada Under British Rule 1760-1900 (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1900).

Burt, Alfred Leroy. A Short History of Canada for Americans (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1944). The Old Province of Quebec (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1933).


Turcotte, Louis P. Invasion du Canada et Siege de Quebec en 1775-76 (Quebec: Imprimerie A Cote et Cie., 1876).


C. Local Histories


Palmer, Peter S. *Battle of Valcour on Lake Champlain, October 11th, 1776* (Plattsburg, N.Y.: Lake Shore Press, 1876).


Smith, H. P. *History of Essex County* (Syracuse, N.Y.: D. Mason & Co., 1885).


**D. Monographs**


Bennett, Clarence E., *Advance and Retreat to Saratoga in the American Revolution* (Schenectady, N.Y.: Robson & Adee, [c 1927]).


Griffin, Martin I. J., *Catholics and the American Revolution* (3 Vols.; Philadelphia: Published by the Author, 1907-1911).


Trudel, Marcel. Louis XVI, Le Congres Americaine et la Canada 1774-1789 (Editions du Quartier Latin; Quebec: Publications de L'Universite Laval, [c 1949]).


E. Articles and Essays


"The King's Royal Regiment of New York," Ibid., Vol. XXVII (Toronto: Published by the Society, 1931).


AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Perry E. Le Roy, was born in New York City on March 17, 1930. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of New London, Connecticut. In 1952 the University of Connecticut awarded me the Bachelor of Arts degree. From the Ohio State University, I received the Master of Arts degree in 1953. I enlisted in the Army Security Agency for three years, beginning in June, 1953. In the Fall of 1956, I again entered the Ohio State University in order to complete the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. While pursuing this work I have served as Graduate Assistant in the Department of History. In addition, I have been the recipient of two Ford Foundation Scholarships in the Summer programs at the Ohio State University. During the academic year 1959-60, I served the university as a Mershon Graduate Fellow in the field of national defense policy.