IN SEARCH OF A FORMULATION OF
THE GENERAL AIM OF EDUCATION

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State
University

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1960

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Dedicated to

my family from whom I have learned how
to educate and to Dr. H. Gordon Hullfish
for his sympathetic encouragement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like in the first place to express my gratitude to my family, especially to my six children in Indonesia who have missed the presence of their parents for almost two years. Their genuine sacrifice has made this kind of research possible. My deep gratitude is also directed to my wife who joined me after my three quarters stay in the United States. Her presence, company, assistance, and encouragement have helped me to surmount many necessary and unnecessary troubles. In this connection I want to extend my great appreciation also to Dr. George L. Lewis, Chairman of the Committee on Graduate Work in Education, for his moral support which was of great value. I wish to express my thanks also to Dean Everett Walters of the Graduate School who helped me with a University fellowship which enabled me to complete my doctorate studies in residence. Special thanks go to Professor H. Gordon Hullfish, my major adviser, whose help, patience, encouragement, and understanding have made the completion of this work possible. Dr. Hullfish spent many valuable hours reading my manuscript with tight editing, correcting, criticizing, questioning. Last but not least my particular thanks are directed to Mrs. Diana L. Seebode who was very kind to help me with rereading the first draft for linguistical errors, in spite of her crowded academic and domestic schedule.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Education is a deliberate human activity, and is therefore purposive. We try to educate people for a certain end, though in many cases we are not explicit about this end. If we teach a child a certain skill, such as reading, we have an end in mind: to enable the child to read books, letters, newspapers and the like. Or we might say the child must learn to read in order to meet the demands of modern life, since without the skill of reading, it is hard to earn a living. We might also say that the child should learn to read to have the necessary primary means for further development.

It is the same with the teaching of other skills and habits, i.e., telling the child not to lie, to be friendly to people, and to have good manners. We can always ask, Why should we tell the child all these things?
When we do, we actually mean, For what purpose should we teach the child those habits? In short, we seek an end, a meaningful purpose. Very often people do not realize consciously the meaning of what they are doing with the child.

But the well-informed parent and teacher should know the "why" and the "what for." They should know why they treat the child this way or the other. Our actions suggest that we are viewing ourselves as responsible, partly at least, for the well-being of the growing individual and for his future. Responsibility refers to a certain norm, a certain "ought," an end or an ideal. We should ask ourselves in all our educational work, What is the best way to deal with the child, and what kind of person is he supposed to become through our actions? The means we use and the way we follow make sense to us only if they are connected with an end we have in view. The end may be very near and direct -- to teach reading in order to enable the child to read a book, -- but it can also be remote and indirect: we teach the child to read as a part of his intellectual education. The end determines the means we should use.

As ends are usually not simply ends in themselves, but may function as means (reading a book is an end, but also, a means of attaining a further purpose), we might
ask endlessly, What for, What for?, and so on, and so on. As we may say that a certain skill to be learned or a certain knowledge to be acquired is a part of the developmental task to be accomplished, we still may ask further: What is the meaning of the developmental task? The further we ask, the harder it becomes to answer the question. We shall never be able to escape those questions, if we are to account for what we are doing. This is particularly true in the case of education, where we are dealing with the lives of others.

It is important to make it clear that there is a distinction between education and instruction. What the aims should be of instruction are not too hard to define. Those are the results of the discussion of the demands of a certain society in a given span of time in terms of what kind and how much knowledge, skill and habit formation should be taught by a group of people, rather than the fruits of speculative and scientific reasoning by an educational theorist. The practical thing how to determine the aims of instruction, is to appoint a committee representing all classes in a society, and after many days of deliberation, the members will find out what should be taught. They may do it through a nationwide questionnaire. If, for instance the curriculum for the "education" of women is under consideration, the effort will be made to
discover what activities of women are. If it then appears that letter writing is a feminine activity of high frequency, then the curriculum should include the subject matter "Communication."\(^1\)

Quite different is the problem of the aim of education. If we would agree with the saying that education is more concerned with the total personality (whereas instruction is more concerned with the teaching of disciplines and skills), then we plunge very rapidly into fundamental difficulties. We get involved very soon in problems of the sort: what kind of personality do you want? What about religion and morality? Have we to teach values? What does it have to do with life itself? What is your notion of life? Can we separate personality from the problem of life at large? We see that intellectual knowledge, skills and dexterity have little to do with morality and religion. A well-informed person might be immoral or in emotional misery.

Many people talk about education when they mean instruction, as it has been planned in a curriculum. In the Anglo-Saxon countries particularly, education is identical with formal school instruction, though the

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educational integration is usually attempted through guidance work:

From quite a different point of view we might also estimate the limitations of what has grown out of 19th century pedagogy. And let us, here again, take Dewey as an example. It is with good conscience that we go back again to his Democracy and Education as it is supposed to be an educational classic, worthy to be mentioned among the world's greatest spiritual achievements. I open this book again to discover what education is and to my astonishment, I find that the child, the home, the family, the parents hardly appear anywhere in the book. This proves that "education," in the Anglo-Saxon horizon, has indeed shrunk to school education, to problems of what a school has to do.\(^2\)

In his book The Public and Its Problems, Dewey touches the importance of home education very cursorily.\(^3\)

One seldom realizes that the basis of education is (has been) laid in the homes, where children are educated "informally." The narrow notion of the meaning of education has lead to the common belief that real education should be (is) done in the schools, and that many parents without scruple shift off their educational responsibilities to institutions, with the inevitable consequence that the school is occupied with a lot of patchwork and is not seldom


forced to relegate the child back to the parents for repair work, assuming that the "cause" of the trouble is the unfavorable environment in early childhood.

On the other hand, parents think that the home should learn from the school how to educate children, as they believe that teachers alone understand the lore of education:

And just like Dewey and his followers or Maria Montessori and hers we see that the home must learn from the school how to educate children. However true this may be in certain respects, two facts of primary importance remain true as will: First of all, the school begins only after a number of years of home-education, and, secondly, the parents have a number of tasks to fulfill and a number of aspects to attend to which are essentially their business and their responsibility.⁴

Another common notion is that education is identical with teaching of knowledge, and that educability is the same as teachability. As a consequence of this line of thinking, one posits the question: "Can virtue be taught?" If the question is put in an inadequate fashion, we shall get a distorted answer. Related to the notion of education as the teaching of knowledge, is the reasonable conclusion that education should be based on a certain theory of learning. If we know, how the learning process takes place -- they say -- then we would know how to educate. This seems

⁴Langeveld, loc. cit., p. 53. (Italics in original).
very logical and relevant. But since we may assume that the educative process is more than merely the teaching and learning of knowledge, the basis of education should be more than learning theory alone.

How to educate depends also on what education is. There are people, however, who think that education is a kind of rhetoric, an art of the verbal teaching of knowledge:

There, Prof. Feibleman of the University of Alabama writes, "Education might be defined as the formal communication of the known." (p. 358). Here again we see that education is the equivalent of the teaching and learning of knowledge. This becomes even more clearly true when we see that Professor Feibleman subordinates education entirely to didactics, although he prefers the somewhat vaguer term "rhetoric" to that word. "From one point of view," he says, "education proper is the acquisition of existing knowledge on the principles of rhetoric. Rhetoric is the theory of communication. The theory of education is a branch of pure rhetoric, the practice of education, applied rhetoric." 5

As education is more than teaching knowledge alone, the fundamental problems of education are more complicated than those of mere teaching. In teaching it is not too hard to agree on what and how we should teach; and, in these terms building a curriculum is not a too difficult job.

5Ibid. (Italics in original).
Though we might easily agree on a certain curriculum, we still face the problem of the personality of the teacher. Not only does each teacher teach in a different way — in terms of teaching methods — but each teacher has his own frame of reference. This means that each teacher gives a different meaning to his subject matter, although it is the same subject matter, such as physics or mathematics, that others teach. Giving meaning means that he is referring to a greater order than the subject matter itself. Physics is not just physics, but it has a certain meaning in the totality of life, and its meaning is different for each individual child as well. In other words, instruction can never be separated from education. And each teacher has his own notion about education, what education actually means. Aims of instruction are inseparable from aims of education.

The notion of aim, of course, is implicit in the notion of education. Education is a human activity of a special kind. This special kind is that the activity is directed to a constructive aim. If we are to define what education is, we should include in the definition some indication of this constructive aim. Defining education without mentioning its aim, would be an impossibility.

There are several kinds of aims of education which we can classify under certain categories. Langeveld
distinguishes six kinds of aims, as follows:

1. the general, or complete, or ultimate aim
2. the particularization of the ultimate aim
3. the incidental aims
4. the tentative aims
5. the incomplete aims
6. the intermediary aims.

The first two kinds will be considered later, after a short discussion of the other four. Incidental aims are separate moments on the way to the ultimate end, whereby the relationship between these aims and the general aim is remote, though the two aims are related. When I call a child and tell him not to play on the street because it is almost dark or in another situation, forbid him to play on the street, because it is a hindrance for traffic, in each instance the aim may be said to be incidental.

The tentative aims are certain steps leading to the general aim: the child must learn to be clean, learn to eat and go to bed promptly, and must put his toys back in the proper place, and so on. Usually we are not aware of the ultimate end we try to attain.

The incomplete aims have something to do with certain "dimensions" of the personality of the child. These

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dimensions are particular mental functions which are active in certain "values," such as ethical, aesthetical, religious, and social. In this connection we talk about moral, aesthetical, religious, and social education and their specific aims. These are incomplete aims, since they consider the personality special and separate points of view.

The problem of a general aim -- the concern of this writing -- is a complicated one. First of all, the question may be posited: Is there such a thing as a general aim of education? Postponing the answer to the question until the end of this thesis, we may tentatively assume that the idea of a general aim would make some sense to us. The general aim may be defined as a general idea or a general frame of reference as the underlying guide for all of our educational activities. All means and all other particular aims are to serve this one general end we try to attain. It is the universal idea which makes all other specific aims -- whatever they may be -- meaningful. It is the total unit that integrates all of our educational efforts, though we are usually very vague about this general end. This is the aim we try to attain with the child, under all kinds of conditions and situations, though some conditions rather hamper than promote our general objective. Of course, this general objective takes a particular or specific fashion, according to particular conditions, such
as: the unique individuality of the child in terms of his native qualities, his age, sex, and birth rank, the possibilities of the family and the total environment of the child, the function of the child in a certain social context, the abilities of the child's educators, the task of a certain educational institution (home, school or church), and finally the task of the nation (to which the child belongs), and the concrete world of here and now. Each historical period has its own cultural characteristic which gives the general aim a specific form. The general aim in the Middle Ages, for instance, was quite different from that in modern times.

This idea of general aim and its formulation, has seldom been the concern of educational theorists or discussion groups. A general aim would have no meaning at all in the pragmatic view, because in this view, every aim becomes or will become a means for another end, and this end again will serve as a means for another end, and so on, and so on. Dewey puts it even bluntly:

And it is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims. Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea like education.7

He says further:

Educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate. Every activity, however specific, is, of course, general in its ramified connections, for it leads out indefinitely into other things. So far as a general idea makes us more alive to these connections, it cannot be too general. But general also means 'abstract,' or detached from all specific context. And such abstractness means remoteness, and throws us back, once more, upon teaching and learning as mere means of getting ready for an end disconnected from the means. That education is literally and all the time its own reward means that no alleged study or discipline is educative unless it is worthwhile in its own immediate having.\(^8\)

In The Aims of Education, Whitehead states that the purpose of education is "to stimulate and guide self-development," so that ideas do not become inert. But he still puts emphasis on the importance of knowledge, though he thinks that the essence of education is that it be religious:

It contains within itself the problem of keeping knowledge alive, of preventing it from becoming inert, which is the central problem of all education.\(^9\)

A few pages further he says:

We can be content with no less than the old seminary of educational ideal which has been current at any time from the dawn of our civilization. The essence of education is that it be religious.\(^10\)

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\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 127-28.


Having read these lines in Whitehead, one may be confused in finding the central idea in Whitehead's educational thinking. One may wonder, whether it is knowledge or religion. What does he mean by "essence of education" and "central problem of education?" Which one is primary? Could it be "live knowledge" implying religion, or the reverse: religion implying live knowledge?

Marique in his The Philosophy of Christian Education, sums up eight categories of aims of education, as follows:

a. Cultural aim (cultural interest and ability in social intercourse)

b. Unfoldment aim (the unfoldment or growth of powers or faculties in the sense of Pestalozzi's and Frobele's educational ideas)

c. Knowledge aim (humanistic idea that man is able to know and should know the truth, also in utilitarian sense: Knowledge is power!)

d. Adjustment aim (adjustment to life and environment)

e. Progressive aim (keeps up with the rapid change in civilization)

f. Utilitarian aim (economical and social efficiency)

g. Civic aim (preparation for good citizenship)
h. Moral-religious aim (conduct according to eternal laws).  

Though Marique does not make clear the relationships and the hierarchical arrangements of these various aims, he states that there is a supreme end of education (= end of life):

Beyond and above all other educational aims, though closely related to each, stands the supreme end of education and life which has been most clearly formulated in the following words of Christ: 'Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind - This is the greatest and first commandment.'

As Catholic education will be discussed in a separate chapter, it may suffice to remark here that Marique is dealing with theology rather than with education in its general sense.

The existentialist sees the aim of education from a quite different angle, and formulates it also in an existentialistic fashion, though we have all sorts and conditions of existentialists. Fallico formulates the existentialistic educational aim as follows:

The objective of this kind of education is not to fill the hollowness which is man from the

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12Ibid., p. 130.
outside, but to help in its self-disclosure so that the agent himself can take his own action. The primary aim of existentialist education is then the confession of ignorance. The habit of examining one's self and one's purposes; the habit of assuming full responsibility for one's judgements of value and for one's choices in life is all that education can and should give to a man.\textsuperscript{13}

If we look at the works of committees that usually represent actual groups of people or an entire nation, we find that their ideas about education are more socio-political than pedagogical or philosophical. They are more practically oriented, striving for efficiency and a social order and peace.

A United States Commission on Higher Education, appointed by the President, reported in 1947 and presented the following conclusion on the general goals of education:

1. Education for a fuller realization of democracy in every phase of living

2. Education directly and explicitly for international understanding and cooperation

3. Education for the application of creative imagination and trained intelligence to the solution of social problems and to the administration of public affairs.\textsuperscript{14}


In the Indonesian provisional constitution we read the aim of public education formulated as follows:

The deepening of national consciousness, the strengthening of the unity of Indonesia, the stimulation and deepening of the sense of humanity, of tolerance and equal respect for everyone's religious conviction and the provision within school hours of the opportunity for religious teaching in accordance with the parents' wishes.¹⁵

From the above statements, it is apparent that the idea of the general aim, encompassing all other educational aims -- though not necessarily in an absolute and universalistic sense, and valid for all times and all places, as the Catholics purport to maintain -- has not been adhered to or explicitly formulated. Some are completely unaware of the possibility of a general aim, and others make some formulations, without accounting pedagogically for their statements. Many of them are general philosophers who show some interest in education. They think that every philosopher can become an educational theorist, that is, one who reflects on educational essentials, based on educational practices, educational physiology, and educational anthropology. This is one of the reasons why many educational philosophers -- they are neither philosophers nor

educators -- think that educational theorizing consists of making implications from general philosophy for the process and content of learning, without having any understanding of the physyology and anthropology of the child (the nature of the child as a human being). In many writings on the philosophy of education, we find very few discussions on the aims of education, because most of the authors do not realize that the crucial problem in every educational theory is the aim of education. They prefer to talk about the learning process, axiology and epistemology. The realists are usually talking about subject matter, the naturalist about the natural developmental stages, the idealists on self-development and the Catholics on character-molding, because of the weakness of the child's reason and will through the fall of Adam.

The various forms of the general end of education may suggest a qualitatively different outlook or basis of that end. The great educators of the centuries -- Socrates, Plato, Locke, Rousseau, Pestallozi, Dewey and many others -- have formulated the general aim of education differently, according to their views of man and the world, each thinking his formulation "better" than the others. The way they have formulated their views reflects, on the one hand,

\[16\text{Cf. footnote 6 of Chapter II.}\]
the specific traits of a particular historical period; and, on the other hand, it reflects their own personality structure which may be regarded as either an exponent, or as a "child" of their time. Rousseau for instance, can be said to be an exponent of his time — namely as one who ushered in a new era —, as well as a child of his time, who reacted to a period of over-rationalism with romanticism.

Although we recognize the right of existence of fundamentally different educational views, we still cannot abandon the idea of an over-arching view which would be common to all views. This tendency of universality — the basic identity of all mankind — is very strong in us. On the one hand, we accept the individual differences among philosophical views, but on the other hand, we believe in the possibility of bridging the cleavage among the differences. We still believe in the paradise of complete agreement among men on philosophical views of world and life. In spite of individualities there should be a basic commonality.

The search for a universal aim of education stems from this same human tendency toward universalism. There should be a kind of a universal aim of education on which we base our various specific or incidental aims and our educational efforts in all circumstances.
The search for generalization is a strong drive in man, because it is one of the bases of his very existence. Without generalization he cannot possibly maintain himself. Generalization is a way of getting out of the confusion of the manifoldness of things. Every emerging event is a new happening, always different -- in its totality -- from the moment before. Generalization furnishes us a grip on the "chaos" of things so that we can handle and control different events. Generalization makes the world more meaningful for us. This is why a crucial part of the biologically important learning process, is generalization:

The concept of generalization is given the important function of accounting for the tendency on the part of the individual to display the same response even though there has been variation in the cue situation. In simple terms, this concept implies that habits learned in one situation will tend to be transferred or generalized to other situations to the extent that the new situations are similar to the original situation. The more similar the cues are to the original cues, the stronger the tendency to generalize to the new situation.17

By generalization in learning we do not mean of course, the mere transfer of meanings according to the Stimulus -- Response pattern as stated above, but more a general tendency in us to put together similarities, and make inferences from the phenomenal similarities. Actually

the whole Darwinian evolution theory -- which most people strongly believe in -- is based on the idea of linking together analogies and similarities, and of accepting these "facts" as evidence for the theory, not realizing that analogical thinking is a kind of a leap in the epistemological dark. But for the sake of "certainty," we take this risk and take our theoretical findings for granted.

In everyday life in dealing with people, generalization is much used; we conclude, for instance, that this man seems unreliable. Beware of him! Or we take the attitude: With this kind of people you have to be hard!

There is another angle of this habit of generalization. It may lead to intolerance, attended with a propensity for expansion or to draw other people under our influence. If we have found a "truth," we try to convince others to our belief. The spread of religions in the history of man is an obvious example of the tendency in men to extend the influence of their beliefs. Intolerance or prejudice is an aspect of the generalization "instinct" in man, for intolerance tends to ignore the uniqueness of the individual. It means the denial of individual differences.

18 Note: Instinct is here not used in the sense of instinct psychology, as it has been defined by McDougall, but rather in the meaning of a general tendency.
With respect to the problem of prejudice, Allport says about generalization:

The human mind must think with the aid of categories (the term is equivalent here to generalizations). Once formed, categories are the basis for normal judgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it.

It costs the Anglo employer less effort to guide his daily behavior by the generalization "Mexicans are lazy," than to individualize his workmen and learn the real reasons for their conduct. If I can lump thirteen million of my fellow citizens under a simple formula, "Negroes are stupid, dirty, and inferior" I simplify my life enormously. I simply avoid them one and all. What could be easier?19

On the one hand, deep in us is a strong native tendency for universalism; on the other hand, we are at the same time convinced that the existence of individual differences is no less a fact. We are caught in this dilemma of the ambiguity of life. In other words, any conviction, however universal it seems to be -- often acquired after a long and broad research -- summarized in a verbal formulation can never be of absolute value, and cannot be applied to all people for all times. Each of us has to interpret and to realize it in our own personal way. A generalization is no more than a way of seeing things, so that it makes some sense for us. It implies, therefore, the possibility

of error, and can only be applied to people with cautiousness and prudence. Prudence means taking full account of the uniqueness of each individual case or situation.

The notion of formulation is basic here. It refers to a concluding moment after a period of searching for the truth, a tentative rest, a brief relief, so that we can now pay more attention to other aspects of our life. If in this short period of rest we find new evidences against our former conviction, then, we take up our task again, engaging in a new adventure in search for the truth, trying to find a new formulation.

The formulation is also a verbal summary that serves as a medium of communication with our fellow-men, so that they can share the profits of our laborious efforts. But a formulation can never convey fully our meanings and intentions. At best it can only hint at those meanings with reference to the personal experiences of each individual.

Oldewelt gave a beautiful introspective report on his personal psycho-organical experience of the growth and development of an idea up to the final stage of a formulation of the idea, the words of which are almost untranslatable into any other language. We will try to render a close translation of a short passage of his subtle introspective report:
Its [of the formulation] intention is, therefore, that it procures me some rest and a
firm ground as a rescue out of the fast nearing exhaustion which would have forced me to
give up the idea, and curiously enough it can give me that relief just because, apart
from my subjective way of "sense giving," it also has, thanks to the words that form it, its own existence, in which I still find what I now understand in it, though only in a
decreased degree.

Through the latter it also becomes understandable to my language-fellow and can serve
as a communication, so that I can engage in a productive cooperation with others. But this
advantage was absolutely not its original intention, no more than an artist creates his
work for the sake of his fellow-man.20

In another passage referring to formulation, he says:

As a painter sometimes on a pencil sketch hastily made, writes up the names of the
colors, to help him at home to remember the color nuances of this particular scene, so is
the formulation also a report for the use of those, who already have the experience. If
another who never saw the scene, gets hold of the sketch and draws from it the conclusion,
that the compound of the written colors constitutes the beauty of the scenery, so he
takes the words instead of a memory as a starting-point, then he comes out irretrievably
to a wrong end.21

The creation of language is a necessary consequence of man's drive to generalize. He labels all objects that
have the same properties with the same name, e.g., chair:

20 Trans. from H. Oldewelt, De Plaats van den Mensch in de Totaliteit van het Leven [The Place of Man in
the Totality of Life] (Amsterdam: N. V. Noord Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1945), p. 34.

21 Ibid., p. 96.
every object with the quality of "chairness" is called chair. The word "chair," however, does not cover the same meaning for different individuals, since their experience background differs considerably.

A word is nevertheless a mighty instrument to treat equally individual objects which "show" some similarities. This is also a phenomenon of generalization. Without the ability to generalize through the use of language we would never be able to recognize objects as the same ones of yesterday, or as the same objects we have seen elsewhere.

Our problem as indicated in the title of this writing is thus: Is there a general aim of education? If there is, is it possible to formulate one in a meaningful way, without the pretention of a universal applicability?

We shall try to categorize various educational theories, and to discuss some significant theories, the findings of which can be used for our research. We will then arrive at the problem: how to integrate those contradicting views so as to produce a new coherent wholeness. In this sense, this writing is an effort to unify contrasting views in a way that will be acceptable to a great number of educational theorists. It is not the intention of the author to attempt to satisfy all theorists. We will try only to throw a new light on the heart of every educational problem, i.e., the aim of education.
The statement of the problem "in search of..." implies that the formulation of a possible general aim of education is no more than an attempt. Attempt includes the possibility of failure, and admits that the search is always preceded by attempts of others.
CHAPTER II

THE STATUS OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY AMONG
ADJACENT DISCIPLINES

Education as Science

The notion of "education as science" is rather incorrect. If we consider it more closely, we shall find that education is the process or act of educating itself, rather than a body of knowledge about the process, while science is a theory about some area of "objects." The Anglo-Saxon connotation of science is quite different from the continental Wissenschaft. Science indicates the study of natural and social phenomena. In this frame of reference (an American term) education should belong to the social sciences. This is an indication that the outgrowth of this science is determined in a certain (fixed) direction, leaving no room for other theoretical possibilities, such as an idealistic view.

Education is in its essence, not a completely social affair, especially when we consider self-actualization and self-realization as essential parts of the educative process. The term science itself is often conceived as natural science, thus covering the physical aspect of
the universe, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy and biology. In this natural science, mathematics -- which we can hardly call natural science -- is essential. We had better label mathematics "formal science," to indicate that it is purely a product of our creative mind. To build up mathematics without the physical world is possible, while it is not with natural science.

There is another angle of the problem of education as science (in the sense of the broader term Wissenschaf). It is not a purely descriptive science -- like psychology purports to be in which such words as sinning and morality are taboo -- for it is more concerned with an "ought" (how should I do it?) than with "how is it?" Some people say that education has a normative character (though not completely), and this is not amazing if we bear in mind that education is directly concerned with practice. For this reason education can be called "practical" science (not in the utilitarian sense), in that it deals with the human "action." ("Practical" comes from the Greek word prattein that means to act). Its character is thus very distinct from a science such as mathematics or physics that are not concerned with the "ought" at all.

If the indication "social science" is not adequate enough, we should look for better terms. Rickert, the German philosopher (1863-1936), had developed another way
of classification in his *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. He distinguished fundamental differences between *Naturwissenschaft* (natural science), such as physics, chemistry and biology, and *Geisteswissenschaft* (spiritual science), such as history and pedagogics. The difference is in the methodology. According to him *Naturwissenschaft* puts more emphasis on generalization, objective description and analysis, and refrains from value-judgment. *Geisteswissenschaft* lays more stress on the importance of the individual, on synthesis and is rather subjective. It is never free from normative judgment. While natural science puts more emphasis on causality, "spiritual" science stresses the teleological aspect.

Education, in the scheme of Rickert, is more a *Geisteswissenschaft* than a *Naturwissenschaft*. The human being cannot be merely explained in terms of causality, and is rather unpredictable in his behavior, because of his creative and spontaneous aspects.

Another approach of classification of the sciences is the ontological one, i.e., according to the objects of inquiry. The human child can be made an object of study. But it can be viewed from a psychological angle or from a physiological one. Ontologically speaking there would be no difference between child psychology and child physiology.
The ontological approach would be inappropriate for our purpose with respect to the theory of education, since the object of educational theory is not the human child, but the educative process and its implications. Besides, in our educational activities, the child can never be considered an object, in the sense that we treat material objects in physics.

Education itself is a fairly young discipline, not like the other disciplines such as biology, physics, or chemistry, and philosophy. In Kant's time it was still a branch of philosophy. Kant himself occupied the chair for *Pädagogik*. So, not long ago, some people still denied education as science, because science implied much research and experimentation, while pedagogics was more a philosophizing activity than research in the scientific sense. If we bear in mind that science (*Wissenschaft*) is a systematically interrelated body of knowledge and the search for this kind of knowledge, we may safely state that pedagogics is not less a science than other classical natural sciences. Educational theory, too, is a systematically arranged whole of knowledge. Only the methods of approach are different.

Many people are skeptical about the necessity or usefulness of a theoretical construct of education. They argue that they do not need theory to provide a good educator, saying that education is an art rather than a theory.
They advance motives that, since Adam and Eve, all parents have been educating their children for the good, learning from their own experience or doing the same way as their parents have always done. So, what is the theory for?

One can deny the necessity of an educational theory, according to Langeveld, only on two conditions: first, that he should abandon his claim for doing a justified job; second, he should honestly and consequently give up his own concealed and disordered theories. As to the first condition: everybody who will do a good warranted job, should make plans for what he is going to do; he considers his intentions seriously before he takes the actual steps, to prevent him from making unnecessary errors. He conducts his acts systematically and with thoughtful planning. In other words, he acts on the basis of a theory.

As to the second point: One who acts, knows what he is doing, although he acts at one time this way, at another time that way. He cannot, however, justify and rationalize his capricious behavior, because the justification of a conduct means using a theory. In this case, however, he uses a bad one.¹

As education we cannot abandon educational theory. It is not only a rational but also a moral responsibility,

because we are dealing with people for whose growth we are a great deal responsible. An error made, causing a distortion of the growth of people entrusted to us, would be unforgivable. An educational error is hard to correct. It takes much time, energy, and patience to bring derailed people back to the right track. Psychotherapists can certainly affirm this fact.

There is another reason why the educator cannot go without a proper theory. Gunning, one of the first Dutch educational theorists († 1900), said that "studying pedagogics means changing one's self." Theorizing forces us to thoroughness and depth, and in this respect a way of self-perfection.

**Educational Theory and Philosophy**

The problem of the proper relationship between general philosophy and educational theory is theoretically very important. We say "theoretically," because the common notion about this relationship is that educational philosophy -- instead of using the term educational theory -- is a discipline which derives its implications from a certain philosophical belief:

There are two chief ways in which philosophy and education are related. (1) Philosophy yields a comprehensive understanding of reality, a world view, which when applied to educational practice lends direction and methodology which are likely to be lacking otherwise. By way of reciprocation,
the experience of the educator in nurturing the young places him in touch with phases of reality which are considered in making philosophic judgments. Because of this, those who are actively engaged in educating can advise philosophers about certain matters of fact. That is to say, that while philosophy is a guide to educational practice, education as a field of investigation yields certain data as a basis for philosophic judgments.²

It is obvious that, according to Butler's view -- also apparent in the title of the book -- philosophy is the guide which makes philosophical judgments concerning educational matters, now and then asking advice from the practical educator when it is deemed necessary. Philosophy is still the mother science from which education receives its guiding principles. In his book, Butler discusses four major philosophies (i.e., naturalism, idealism, realism, and pragmatism), and derives from each philosophy its consequences for education and religion. The educational issues he discusses, as they are viewed and derived from a particular philosophy, are education as a social institution, the pupil, the objectives of education, and the educative process.

Brubacher also discusses the problem of the proper relationship between general philosophy and the philosophy of education. According to him there are four different

opinions: (1) Philosophy is primary and basic to an educational philosophy; (2) philosophy is the flower, not the root of education; (3) educational philosophy is an independent discipline which might benefit from contact with general philosophy, but this contact is not essential; (4) philosophy and the theory of education are one. The latter is Dewey's view:

"Philosophy of Education" is not an external application of ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin and purpose: it is only an explicit formulation of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral habits in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life. The most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is, then, that it is the theory of education in its most general phases.

According to Brubacher, the most obvious trend is that general philosophy is the basis for a philosophy of education:

What shall we take to be the proper relation of general philosophy to philosophy of education? On this point there are several opinions. Most obvious is that which holds a philosophy of life basic and primary to a philosophy of education.

Brubacher himself believes that there are still philosophical issues which guide educationists how to tackle educational problems:

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5Brubacher, loc. cit., p. 19.
Whichever of these is most appealing, it still remains to consider just what disciplines are still left under the philosophic roof with which to attack educational problems after the exodus of the sciences. There are three which principally concern education. They are ethics, or the theory of values; epistemology, or the theory of knowledge; and metaphysics, or the general theory of being or reality. In examining the aims of education, the motivation of learning, or the measurement of its results we are inescapably dealing with ethical problems, problems of value.6

The Committee on Philosophies of Education of the National Society for the Study of Education published as its Forty-first Yearbook a volume on Philosophies of Education. Here, too, is the leading idea that philosophy is the basis, from which educational issues are derived, though among the members there is no agreement about the essential problems in philosophy of education. The Committee agreed that five philosophies -- which are supposed to cover the entire history of man's philosophical reflections -- and what these philosophies mean for education should be explored:

In this Yearbook there are presented five important world-frames, or philosophies, within each of which the meaning of education is to be considered. These philosophies are (1) the Aristotelian, (2) The Thomistic, (3) the modern, or absolute, idealistic, (4) the realist, and (5) the pragmatic, or instrumentalist.

6Ibid., p. 20.
Among them, these world views pretty well fill up the entire history of man's sophisticated thought about the universe in which he has lived, especially in the Western World.

In a recent publication we have found the same tendency as to the place of philosophy in the study of education. The selection of writings is based on the prevailing philosophical trends: pragmatism, idealism, realism, Catholicism, protestantism and Jewish thought.

In the introduction we find a brief discussion of the relationship problem. The conclusion of the author is:

Education, on the other hand, is the art or process of imparting or acquiring knowledge and habits through instruction or study. Thus the philosopher, when involved in philosophizing about matters in the area of education, is attempting to answer some of the ultimate questions concerning education. He is seeking to establish a system of principles that can be used in directing the educational process. He hopes to find answers to such questions as: What is education? What are the proper ends for education? What means should be used to attain these ends?

There is only one author (Everett J. Kircher) represented in the selections who is fully aware of the danger

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in the belief that a philosophy would free man from his life problems, including education. He sees the dilemma of man in facing philosophical antitheses. On the one hand, we have to recognize the right of each philosophy to look at the world according to its own view; and, on the other hand, we all agree that we should cooperate with each other — for the sake of world peace and freedom — in spite of our philosophical differences. The author's conclusion is: there is no such philosophy for all, and there is no such philosophy of freedom:

There is no open-minded philosophy in the sense that each often boasts that it is. No philosophy is open to other than its own assumptions, its own methods, its own distinctive pattern of meanings and, above all, its own ultimate propagation. No philosophy frees a man in all directions for any or all assumptions or values. Every philosophy releases man into the full and generous arena of the only universe there is — the materialistic, the idea-istic, the realistic or the empirical — but the only universe there is; and it is designed to explain all the others away. If there is anything characteristic of any system of philosophy, it is that it is sufficient unto itself.°

There is actually one step Kircher could take, that is, to indicate the meaning of the philosophical dilemma for our current problem of the proper relationship between "general" philosophy and education.

Another author proposes a kind of fusion between the two disciplines, so that the relationship would not be of the kind of a unilateral deduction from the general philosophy to education, but that there would originate a two-way communication, fertilizing each other. In the introduction the editor says:

It has already been remarked that the fusion of philosophical and educational concerns, in the sense here discussed, represents a departure from the approach taken by those who "deduce" educational implications from general philosophical doctrines in unilateral fashion. It must now equally be stressed (especially in the light of what was said in the previous paragraph) that such fusion departs just as radically from the picture often projected, by educational practitioner and researcher alike, of the ideal role of the philosopher of education.  

But this is not the kind of fusion that Dewey means by his phrase "philosophy is the theory of education in its most general phases." Dewey is more radical. This is conceivable if we understand Dewey's system. Dewey's philosophy is more epistemological than metaphysical or axiological, the basis of which is instrumental empiricism, stating that the basis of knowledge is experience. The latter is identical with learning, i.e., knowledge can only be acquired through experience or learning. And learning is pivotal in every education (although this tenet can

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be questioned as we shall see later). That this standpoint might lead to exclusive philosophical conclusions is obvious. In this philosophy, metaphysics (in the traditional sense) has no place, because metaphysics does not belong to the world of experience. On the other hand, the educational implications are also exclusive, in the sense that education has little to do with aims beyond this earthly life of experiences, as the Catholics propose it.

The extreme opposite view to Dewey's holds, on the point of the identity of general philosophy and educational philosophy, that educational theory has nothing to do with philosophy. This radicalism is, of course, self-narrowing and might lead to self-destruction. It does not recognize the interrelationship of all areas of knowledge. Any adjacent discipline, especially philosophy, may have, as a matter of fact, a fertilizing influence on education.

A modern approach to this problem of relationship, is the belief that educational theory -- using this term instead of educational philosophy -- should be an independent discipline, presupposing, of course, a considerable insight on fundamental philosophical problems -- especially philosophical anthropology -- and taking into account relevant experiential material from educational practices. The educational theory, as theory, selects its own material, orders it in a coherent and adequate way, so that the theory
in its totality cover -- in a general sense -- all possible educational problems. This kind of work and organization has been pioneered for the last 15 years by Langeveld, the founder of the Pedagogical School of Utrecht, i.e., phenomenological pedagogics. Langeveld states very clearly:

To the philosophical pedagogics the theoretical pedagogics behaves as a complete host: the guest is welcome in his home, he would like to know everything from him, he may move freely in his home - that is to say as a good guest -, but...he retains the responsibility for what happens in his home.\textsuperscript{11}

In recent times in America some educational theorists have become aware of the present situation of the theoretical problem of relationship. Foster McMurray, a Professor of Education at the University of Illinois, is critical of the common view of educational philosophers in America. He says:

According to the opinion of one group, the relationship is one in which theories of education are derived by implication from systematic philosophy. It is this view which dominated competitive textbook production and hence, no doubt, academic course work in philosophy of education throughout the country.\textsuperscript{12}

Criticizing the inadequate traditional view -- which seems very persuasive -- he says further:

\textsuperscript{11} Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 137.

Taking one step further, in this direction, the traditionalist then proposes that philosophy is the normative discipline, the one discipline into which any inquiry into ultimate values must find its way. Therefore, it is said, an educational program must be based, in final analysis, upon presuppositions of a philosophic nature.\textsuperscript{13}

McMurray contends that educational theory should define itself as an independent discipline, asking educational questions in its own way.

It seems, therefore, that educational theory cannot establish itself as a derivative from philosophy.

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To express the same idea in a different form, we might say that educational theorists must find their own way of asking questions. If they could agree upon a common set of problems, then a concerted attack and the pooling of findings by any and all investigators is more likely to occur.\textsuperscript{14}

Another American author, Philip G. Smith, is also worried by the current state of affairs:

Educational theorists repeatedly find themselves becalmed in the bottomless waters of the traditional philosophic problems and moreover are bedeviled by the baffling light winds from the semi and quasi relevant developments in such neighboring regions as psychology and sociology.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 131-132.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 134.
Smith draws the line further, and concludes that the traditional philosophical way may contain a theoretical and practical danger for education -- namely, that an educational endeavor might become a matter of arbitrary personal taste:

When theory of education is constructed as a kind of elaborate deduction from philosophy, the most serious consequence is that theory of education tends to become a matter for individual choosing according to the peculiarities of individual taste.

To express the situation crudely, we might say that any one has a perfect right to choose any of the available philosophic stances, and no one can challenge his reasonableness nor his intellectual responsibility. For philosophers and consumers of philosophy this situation is probably good.\(^\text{16}\)

Proposing the idea of an educational theory as an independent discipline, does not mean at all that it should abandon philosophical knowledge. Pedagogics as a theory has the right to suppose that one knows many things. It does not need, therefore, to build up its own system of metaphysics and afterwards to develop a complete system of anthropology or a complete ethics, or a sociology, etc. Pedagogics presupposes only a philosophy, but it is not a substitute of philosophy.

On the other hand, there are philosophies, of which the implications are inadequate to educational practice.

\(^\text{16}\text{Ibid., p. 130.}\)
Their views are in flat contradiction to essential educational principles and evidences. The naturalist's point of view, for instance, according to which man is regarded as a mechanical system, ruled only by the universal law of cause and effect, cannot be accepted by educational theory. A belief in the law of cause and effect means a belief in determinism or even in fatalism. In this case, education would not make any sense at all, because the active and creative factors in man himself have lost their meaning. Man is considered to be a mere bundle of neural reflexes, which acts only in terms of mechanical action and reaction in the framework of a Stimulus-Response theory.

Also the evolutionistic notion, in which man is regarded as nothing but a product of evolution (read: natural selection) conceived of as a one-way process of time -- beginning with the lower organisms -- cannot possibly be accepted by an adequate educational theory. Biological evolutionism assumes that there is no essential difference between the animal and the human mammal. In other words, in many instances, the human being must look at his lower species (the infra-human) to find some "norms" of pure sound behavior, such as the sexual behavior. One may think, to cure human sexual pathologics, one must learn from the animals. Nietzsche, too, said that the human being is a sick animal. One may say that man is "a species of robber apes that is suffering from megalomenia."
Can we really learn -- on educational matters -- from monkeys and rats? In answering this question positively, we would agree that animals can educate their young ones as well.

Max Otto, writing about the evolutionistic point of view of a psycho-pathologist in California, says:

Men and women have been trained by the demands of civilization to cover their natural impulses with many layers of disguises till it is very difficult to detect the real individual under the cloak. 'Now monkeys are human beings without their masks on,' Therefore 'if we want to know how to behave, according to the way nature made us, if we want to know what is good for our instincts, we must study the monkeys.' A colony of thirty monkeys which he maintained enabled him to discover human instincts in their natural form. From the study of the sex life of apes he claimed he was able to pick up useful clues to the natural sex needs of human beings, and to study the various forms of misery resulting from the conflict between the artificial limits imposed by civilized society and impulses natural to human beings as simians, which after all they are and can never cease to be.17

On this animalistic point of view Max Otto comments:

To insist upon the propriety of studying monkeys does not turn them into men. There are advantages in dealing with problems in simplified form, provided we do not then mistake them for the complex problems which are to be solved. No doubt the study of the past throws light upon the present, but the present is not therefore the past.18

18Ibid., p. 28.
The educational objections against such evolutionistic tendencies are not so much of the sort "it is beneath human dignity," but rather for some evident realistic reasons in educational practice. A child can grow up as a human being only in a "human situation," in a human relationship with human adults. In an animal environment he will grow up with animal habits, walking on all four extremities,19 because he is a human being. This is an educational paradox. This is so, because a human being is able to break through the innate limits imposed by "nature," (e.g., his erect carriage), while an animal is not. Here we discover a typical human characteristic, i.e., the principle of exploration, meaning the ability to break through "natural" limitations. Without this anthropological principle of exploration, we would not be able to bring up our children, or our upbringing would be merely the drilling of habits. Without acknowledging children as creative-explorative creatures, they would never be able to become independent adults who can take responsibilities based on their own decision-making.

The many evidences we have mentioned would sufficiently support the idea of an educational theory in its own

19As reported by Singh & Zingg in their book: Wolfchildren and the Feral Man.
right which asks its own questions on all matters related to education, building up its own principles and methods. While a philosophy of education is not able to include in its domain the history of education and comparative education, a theory of education should consider these adjacent disciplines as necessary and valuable contributions, in order to enable the educational theorist to transcend his own boundaries of here and now. Educational problems are not only his particular problems, but they are also the concern of the whole of mankind.

In his later writings, Langeveld has stated again that he would prefer the old-fashioned term "pedagogy" -- provided with the proper meanings -- to the more abstract, but also traditional term "philosophy of education":

To express its futility it may even be sufficient to classify it as 'philosophy,' as the word 'philosophy' is often used to indicate anything that is of such an abstract or lofty character that we do not care for it. We may even say with nearly absolute generality that everybody thinks of 'pedagogy' as a dish prepared and cooked in the kitchen of philosophy with philosophical ingredients and methods and afterwards served on the table of education... though, unhappily, too hot to be consumed or even touched by the guests. I know of only very few examples, in any of the languages in which I am able to read books on educational problems, of any 'pedagogy' that takes its issue from a careful preparatory analysis of educational facts, without bothering itself in the beginning with deductions from philosophy or whatever other axiomatic discipline, but just trying at least to start a discussion
of a subject by looking this subject in the eye primarily and with tenacity.\textsuperscript{20}

The concept of educational theory as an independent discipline gives the theorists more freedom in reconnoitring their own field, without being prescribed by other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, medicine, and philosophical axiologies and metaphysical principles. The theory is also free to build up its own principles and systems, and free to define its own objectives and methods. The educational theory can freely select and order its own materials. All efforts to build up an adequate theory -- there is no more practical thing than a good theory -- are centered around the only concern of the educational endeavor, that is, the well-being and maturity of young people.

\textbf{Educational Theory and Practice}

It has been stated earlier that education as a theory is a "practical" science, i.e., that it deals with man's activities. Since there is nothing more practical than a "good" theory, we should consider the conditions of a good theory. A theory should not only meet the requirements of coherence or inner consistency, but it should also incite to further research, because of its sound judgments,

\textsuperscript{20}Langeveld, "Disintegration and Reintegration of Pedagogy," \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 55.
and its promise of new interesting aspects. Its value lies in its practicability in the actual educational processes as well. Coherence means also that it does not contradict the phenomenal facts -- educational process, child development and child characteristics -- i.e., that it should contain sufficient relevant materials. The theory should organize its materials not only from theoretical disciplines, but also from the experiences with the child. Experiences-with-the-child does not mean child-psychological and child-physiological information alone, but it contains moreover the direct experiences in the field-of-meeting-with-the-child, how the child acts and reacts in relation to our so-being and so-doing. This psychological-educational field is even more important than our alleged knowledge of the "nature" of the child, as shall never be able to disclose the child's pure nature. Self disclosure is only possible in an existential meeting between man and man, as it occurs in the educating process between adult and adult-in-becoming.

We must, however, bear in mind, that what we think as traits of the child are in fact crossing points in the existential encounter.

Because of the fairly similar basis which a community of culture lays in each of its members, the possible observations by me will be nearly the same as the ones by my culture-fellow and contemporary. Then we shall have a name for it and by that we shall mean about the same thing. We agree,
if we observe with others a same trait of character and yet the rainbow does not obtain more objective reality because hundreds of people see it.

So far there is no inaccuracy in the observation. By us and for us there is an unavoidable multiplicity of traits of character that appear in the field of encounter according to the experience-possibilities brought with us.21

There is no character trait as such, no personality as such. Personality is a resultant concept, a resultant of meetings between persons. What we mean to say is that we can obtain valuable psychological and practical material (how to do it properly!) only through an existential intercourse with the child. Laboratory experiments alone will never furnish us relevant material for educational use, particularly when the results have been obtained from experiments with rats or monkeys. This we would like to emphasize, for many psychologists think that we should look at our infra-human fellow-species, to study human nature in her purest form. Only by so doing they purport to be able to build up a truly scientific nomothetic network, so that the experiments can be freed from normative (thus arbitrary or subjective) contagion. So, they think, they can learn a lot of precious knowledge from rats

and monkeys. This scientific fallacy finds its cause in two seemingly logical assumptions: a. the infant or the child is a grown-up monkey; b. complex phenomena (as with human behavior) should be explained in terms of more simple ones (as with monkeys, in terms of instincts and reflexes), so that the complex becomes more transparent and clear. This biologistic evolutionism as stated by Lloyd Morgan is a much used principle in science, though usually unconsciously:

In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of higher (sc. mental processes) if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.  

This kind of psychology goes back to the old elements-psychology of Wundt who held that a complex was the sum total of its parts, and that every psychological phenomenon could be analyzed into physiological and material (physical) elements. Gestalt-psychology, however, has taught us that the wholeness (of a complex) is primary to and more than the sum total of its parts. A child is a human child, and not a grown-up monkey plus something else. Human behavior can never be completely understood in terms of animal behavior, or: the higher (more complex) order of

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things can never be explained in terms of a lower order. This scientific fallacy is:

A viewpoint that may be justified and fruitful in biology, but that in discussions, whereby the human being as such is involved, must lead to consequences that are anyhow unacceptable for pedagogics.23

In almost the same tone the theoretical anthropologist Bidney analyzes the relationship between "lower" and "higher" in the methodological principle of hierarchy. He indicates the difference between the "necessary condition" and "sufficient cause" of a phenomenon:

Methodologically, the principle of the hierarchical, empirical classification of the sciences requires that we distinguish "the necessary condition" from "the sufficient cause." The lower level of phenomena is the necessary condition for the actualization of the higher level, but the higher level is not thereby "explained" by or deduced from the lower. For practical purposes the phenomena of a higher level may be studied provisionally "as though" they were independent of the lower level until a synoptic view of the interrelations between the levels can be achieved. The higher level is not reduced to the lower because of any demonstration of the common elements it shares with the latter.24

It is clear that we can gather useful and usable child-psychological materials, only when these materials are obtained from a real existential situation, that is,

23Trans. from Ibid., p. 140.
from a meeting between adult and child. There is of course much experimental material concerning the child -- from laboratory experiments, tests and observations -- but these materials are detached from any reality. As long as we study the child from a remote distance, we shall never be able to understand him in his totality. Small pieces of his personality when put together will not furnish us a true picture of the child, since it is deprived of all feelings, liveliness and concreteness. A human being is not a compound of abstract ideas and traits. Of course, from abstractions we can obtain an image of a child -- in general -- but this image is not very usable for educational application. Knowledge of the child is an abstraction, but understanding the child is a more concrete living experience.

If we want to understand the child really, we should see him in a situational setting. Since our premise is, understanding the child for educational use, we should approach psychologically from a pedagogical point of view. Otherwise, we may see the child as a mere object or means rather than as a subject or purpose in itself. We may see him as a piece of nature subject to the cold law of cause and effect -- as Rousseau saw it -- or as an appropriate object to experiment with. We may see him also as an object of vengeance, as is the case in most punishment
practices, according to the law of retaliation, such as "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." In these instances we treat the child not as an educational subject and not as our fellow-being who wants our help. When Rousseaupunishes his Emile, because Emile has broken a window pane, he actually appears as a representative of nature. He applies the so-called natural punishment, and Emile must sleep in the cold drafty room. In this way, Rousseau thinks, Emile will become aware of the consequences of his misbehavior. This phrase seems at first sight very "natural," reasonable and sound. The serious educator, however, is beginning to wonder: "Who is responsible, when Emile gets sick with a cold?" Is it nature, the parent or the child himself? It is obvious that Rousseau has thrown the responsibility upon "nature." This is against the most elementary rules of education. In the first place, "nature" itself is cold and indifferent, having no feelings and responsibility. Nature can be coldly cruel and unreasonable. Secondly, every responsible educator tries to help the child, to become a mature independent adult. One essential aspect of maturity is taking responsibility. From this point of view, we may say that Rousseau has failed with his dictum "back to nature." This is even obvious from the last sentences in Rousseau's Emile, when Emile, who is well married, enters Rousseau's room and says, among other things:
But continue to be the teacher of the young teachers. Advice and control us; we shall be easily led; as long as I live I shall need you. I need you more than ever now that I am taking up the duties of manhood. You have done your own duty; teach me to follow your example, while you enjoy your well-earned leisure.25

Many educators still believe that children should develop according to a straight ("natural") line of growth, subject to their chronological age and biological-physiological development from "inside." This would be probably true for a monkey's young, but not for a human child. Human development has a broad scope and tolerance because of the many factors influencing it, of which the person's creativity and inventiveness is the greatest.

There are various ways to maturity, and only in definite cultural environment one takes a definite kind of adulthood -- and accordingly a definite development leading to it -- as a norm of what one may expect from man. The "circumstances," education and the inventiveness of the individual are in a much more important degree responsible for the shape which youth and adulthood take, than a kind of biological mechanism of regularities that out of a human seed let grow a human plant, flower or fruit etc., as long as there are food, sun and air. Just because there is so much tolerance in the human development, man is designated to be educated.26


We have stated above that educational practice and experience with the child are meaningful only in an educational situation. Let us take a closer look at this educational situation.

This is a situation in which an adult is dealing with a child, a truism that we cannot deny. Not every "dealing-with" situation between an adult and a child, however, is necessarily educational. If a father is playing cards with his children, or he is sending his son to buy cigarettes, there could be many other reasons for such a behavior. It may be: to enjoy being with the children, being in want of companionship, or merely out of laziness.

An educational situation is, therefore, a dealing-with-situation with specific characteristics:

a. It is an interbehavior with a deliberate constructive influence from one side.

b. The influence radiates from an adult or his representative (school) to a not yet mature person (child).

These interbehavior conditions might exclude other possible forms of social intercourse which we cannot call education for certain reasons. First, interbehavior between two adults cannot be regarded as education in the pedagogical sense, though we often talk about adult education. There is a fundamental difference between child education and adult education. Adulthood in adult education is reduced to a mere chronological age concept. In adult
education, there is a voluntary offer from the side of the adult to be "educated," but the adult assumes full responsibility for his own decision to do or not to do what the other adult says, recommends, suggests, orders, or forbids. Moreover, adult education usually takes the form of furnishing more information, learning better professional skills, how to spend leisure time, general knowledge, suggestions for solutions to problems of adult life, etc.:

As its major task, adult education must help all people think through, plan for, and satisfy their personal and developmental needs, assisting them to gain the material necessities of food, shelter, clothing, and health, as well as the more intangible benefits, such as security, adventure, comradeship, recognition, and self-government. It must try to make all people see that they can achieve these values primarily through cooperative group endeavor rather than through competition and conflict.27

Or it might be that the so-called adult in fact, pedagogically speaking, is not mature as yet, though his chronological age classifies him among adults, responsible for all his undertakings (he may get the capital punishment or a life-sentence, if he is considered guilty of a first degree murder).

In the case of immaturity alone, we could talk about adult education -- the education of the not yet

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mature person -- though we had better use the term re-education. We should, therefore, make a distinction between education with respect to the child, and forming with respect to the adult. Forming (and information) will never end, and education should end at a given moment -- namely, at the moment, when the educated person is already mature, is already independent in making his own self-decisions through his own self-responsibility.

Another inter-relationship possibility is the kind of influence that radiates from youngsters to other children. This influence may be exerted deliberately and probably with good effect, but it is still no education yet, because the individuals involved lack the quality of maturity. Only mature persons can lead others to maturity, because from a mature person alone can radiate moral authority. The authority of peers is often impressive, however, but this is because of their precocious moral maturity. Moral authority should be distinguished from status -- or functional authority, such as of the commander's toward his soldiers. The commander has authority because he has a high functional status in the hierarchy of ranks; although he might have at the same time high moral qualities.

Moral authority is an educational necessity (not only a "technical," but also a fundamental necessity), to inspire confidence and faith in a child. Confidence is the first basis for a proper human inter-relationship and a
first condition for having courage. Confidence refers to a certain intangible value or norm, though the norms is always tentative in character. But this tentativeness is a factual necessity, on which to base our decisions and activities. Through (and thanks to) tentative norms we can guide the youngster to a higher level of living, without forcing us, first to prove to the child its worthwhileness.

In many cases a youngster can exercise his influence, not on the basis of moral authority and a feeling of respect, but on physical power and a feeling of fear. This is usually a symptom of anxiety and a compensation for a failure in keeping up an adequate relationship with his social environment (parents or teachers). Such a youngster plays the tyrant, terrorizing the environment, either through the use of the strength of his muscles or neurotic behavior. Juvenile delinquency may be looked at as a symptom of reaction against an inadequate environment, rather than as a result of a birth defect.

On the other hand, the influence of an adult is not necessarily of an educational kind. One may try to influence the youth for other reasons than education, such as selling the youngsters pornographic reading or imparting them the habit of gambling, or out of an itch to dominate them for his own benefit. The Hitler Jugend in the time of German National Socialism presented a perfect illustration of the last point. Here the term pedagogy is abused in the
meaning of "child driving," on the analogy of the word
"demagogy," which means "people driving."

Anyhow, the interbehavior between an adult and a
child is a "pedagogically pre-formed field," i.e., the
interbehavior may change into an educational situation at
any time; the "situation" demands it. For instance, the
child is doing something that should not be done, e.g.,
playing with his soup instead of eating it. At this very
moment the adult changes his role of companion. He be­
comes an educator. A smile or a wink will sometimes suf­
fice, to make the child become aware of his wrong-doing.
A "meeting with the eyes" takes place. The child un­
derstands the meaning of this sign, and he improves (attempts
to improve) his behavior. Sometimes such a subtle sign
will not suffice. The adult "is forced" to take recourse
to a "verbal sign." He tells the child, explicitly, what
is wrong, and explains why it is wrong.

Explanations are often necessary in our educational
endeavor. Education is not a matter of mere habit forma­
tion, or a conditioning of reflexes, or a matter of mere
learning based on repetition, but more a verbal suggestion
(as an expression of the adult's feelings and his so-being)

28Note: This phrase has been coined by Langeveld
in Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 27.
to evoke a certain insight on the side of the educand. Without insight all attempts of the educator will be of no use. We cannot force people to do things of which they do not understand their worthwhileness. Otherwise, we will being mental damage to the individuals put under our responsibility.

Language is, therefore, an essential tool in education. Without language we cannot educate children. For this reason, real education can take place only when the child is able to understand verbal language, i.e., from the age of about two years. Education before this age is preliminary, is more habit formation and conditioning, though its character is no less important.

By means of language we try to account for our actions and intentions with respect to the child in a given situation, so that the child fundamentally has the right and opportunity to call us to account, to ask why he must do thus and so or why he may not. The "why" affords a motive for his behavior. Given it, he can learn (in this instance, learn to obey) in the real sense of the word. Real obeying is a consequence of understanding why one should obey. "To be able to obey one must be able to protest" is an educational paradox. This is the reason why the age between two and three is sometimes called the period of obstinacy (Trotzalter). Says Charlotte Bühler:
From two years on they attempt to motivate the disobedience, for example, by claiming the toy as their own. After the age of two the child expresses will, insistence on its own rights, and possessive impulses in its relations with adults.

The first signs of obstinacy, a phenomenon that no childhood lacks entirely, appear in this phase.29

In fact, the child wants to know the "why" of certain demands of his parents. And the latter cannot make him understand their intentions just through gestures and mimes. They must use words that represent certain values and meanings, serving as points of reference for the child's development. A child can, therefore, only grow properly in a verbal environment.

Let us go back again to the educational situation. When the adult carries out a certain educational action, he does it in relation to the child's situation, this situation of this child. The kind of adult behavior is not only a matter of theory or method, but it originates from the unique total situation itself, including the child's "milieu," his past, the community where he lives, the "being" of the child, his destination, and so on. Understanding this total situation, presupposes a certain body of knowledge and experience, insight, wisdom, and empathy.

Mere knowledge about certain values does not suffice. He should have identified himself with those values. He should not only know that lying is objectionable, but he himself should not be a liar. The educator should not merely act as a spokesman or a translator of the values he represents; he should have realized these values in his own life. Only in this way can he keep his authority. How can he let the child live and experience the values, if he himself has never realized them in his own life?

Concerning the method of education (how to educate), we may say that the educator might know his method very well, but he may act in the wrong way. On the other hand, the adult might act educationally in the right way, without knowing the theory of methods. In matters of educational practice, personality is primary to a theoretical knowledge, although proper knowledge of methods is necessary. But still, it is the personality of the teacher that counts, and not the method as such.

How about the phenomenon of influencing the child? The possibility of influencing the child is based on the fact of belonging to the same species. The phenomenon of influence is a natural measure of safety. Without the ability to influence and to be influenced the species would perish. This influence phenomenon appears sometimes as "sympatheia," the original form of social understanding. When a baby sees his mother, he will welcome her with a
smile. Even a stranger, who is kind to him, may receive a smile, too. This is, according to Charlotte Bühler, the first sign of social contact between the baby and the other. Says Charlotte Bühler:

Three studies have proven definitely that the child’s first smile is a primary and specific social reaction. Only later does smiling occur in response to other situations and stimuli, such as tickling or the presentation of toys. It is of the greatest psychological significance that the infant’s first reaction to other human beings is a definitely positive one. The child’s negative social responses are a secondary development. Throughout the first year of life positive social behavior predominates unless the environment is very unfavourable.  

Learning from others is, in fact, based on the child’s natural ability to imitate. This innate imitation ability, or learning under the influence of others, has three dimensions: a motorical, a cognitive, and an emotional dimension.

The motorical dimension is also called imitation (in a narrow sense, e.g., when mother laughs, the child laughs, too; when another baby cries, he starts crying, too).

The cognitive dimension is also known as suggestion, i.e., perceiving under influence of others. When a father tells his child that he is the strongest man in the country,
the child will accept this statement without criticism. Suggestion plays an important role in the educating technique.

The emotional dimension of imitation takes place through the affective strata of the person. When a mother is in sorrowful mood, the child will also feel-with (sympathy) her sorrow. It often happens through unconscious channels. We cannot, therefore, conceal our moods from the child. Feelings of grief, anguish, anger, disappointment, hostility or hatred are experienced and lived with by the child as well. This fact demands from us the responsibility, with respect to our children, to see to it that our emotions are in good order.

The primary and most natural educational relationship is between parents and child. This is a specific situation that can hardly be imitated artificially, such as in an institution for orphans in spite of the best facilities and care. Parental love cannot be replaced completely.

The appearance of a baby in a family is a wonderful phenomenon. On the one hand, it is a strange appearance: first he was not, but now he is! On the other hand, there is something familiar. He is our child!

This metaphysical sensation implies that the appearance of a child in the family means that the parents are set a certain task that they cannot refuse fundamentally
and carry over to others. They should and will love their child. This love will give them the strength to perform their hard task. It will give them the condition for the willingness and the attachment to the child, to help him grow up. On the other hand, this child is entirely thrown on the love and helpfulness of the parents. This state of needing help of the child sets up the condition to love his parents and to be attached to them. The infant in the state of helplessness is really appealing. There is, however, a significant distinction between a parent's love (for the child) and the child's love (for the parents), though each complements the other. The one cannot exist without the other. A parental love is sacrificing, and giving, and should, therefore, be implicit. The more explicit and primitive this love, the smaller the chance for the child to free himself gradually from the parental attachment. The stronger the parental tie, the harder for the child to become independent and mature. There is a great chance that he, at a given moment, must break his love for his parents deliberately. The youngster may rebel against demanding parents. If so, the rupture is forced.

The more implicit, or the less demanding, the parental love, the easier it is for the child to become free and independent. The adolescence age is the time when the child gradually releases himself from parental bonds:
...an adolescent whose parents have aided the emancipation process or who has achieved independence and self-reliance during the adolescent period, has a much better opportunity to function as a mature individual. It thus becomes the duty of parents and teachers alike to promote emancipation, to give the adolescent an opportunity to function as an independent person in as many areas as possible as early as possible.31

The love of both parents forms the ground for the child to feel secure in his existence. A feeling of security gives a man trust in the future and anywhere. From parents we may, therefore, require a feeling of security in their own existence. This will provide the necessary psychological climate of security and confidence in the child's environment.

But love alone is not enough. It would not afford him the confidence, if there were no authority on the side of the parents. The child wants to know many things from his parents, and some values that can serve him as orientation points in his life. Many things cannot be explained to the child, because of his lack of the necessary experience and mental maturity. These things should be accepted upon authority, for the time being at least. So, authority is an essential phenomenon in the educational situation.

If we survey the whole field of educational practice which furnishes us the necessary materials for a proper educational theory, it becomes clear that we should study the child in relation to the whole process of education. We should see him with the educator's eye, in order to see what is valuable and what is not, for the purpose of education. We wonder, could we see the child as something other than an educational subject? Even, if the child's behavior is outside an educational situation, we still should look at his behavior in relation to his growth possibility, i.e., with respect to his personal destination: being himself, gaining maturity and independence.

Certain phenomena should not be overlooked: the tendency of exploration in every person to break through certain limiting conditions, empathy and understanding, love, the necessity of authority, the personality of the educator, verbal language as an essential educational means, imitation as a basis for educational influence, and, finally, the fact that development is not a "natural" concept, but an educational one.

Educational Theory and Anthropology

The relationship between education and anthropology, or the science of man, should be obvious, as both disciplines are concerned with the same subject, i.e., man
and his problems. As there are many sciences of man, depending on the discipline we are dealing with (each discipline looking at man from a different angle), such as psychology, sociology, history and physiology, we confine ourselves to the science of man which we generally call anthropology. By this term most people understand cultural anthropology, that is, the science of man related to culture. We also have the so-called physical anthropology which studies problems like the evolution of man and the anatomy of various "races," including anthropometry (such as the measurement of the skull, the proportion of other parts of the body).

Montessori first employed physical anthropology in education, though she called this "applied" anthropology. "Pedagogical Anthropology." While many present-day educators as well as anthropologists are not fully aware as yet of the relationship between anthropology and education, Montessori was already far ahead in using anthropological concepts and methods in her theory and practice of education:

Education may contest the characterization of this as an anthropological influence, since Montessori is so clearly a part of the educationist's heritage, but she called her approach a "Pedagogical Anthropology," and used what were regarded, in Italy at least, as anthropological concepts, methods, techniques, and data. Though her cultural anthropology is guilty of what today would be regarded as certain racist errors, and her physical anthropology is now outmoded,
her farsighted anticipation of much of the best of the contemporary art and science of education is impressive. Whether this is true because she had genius or because she had an anthropological orientation cannot be divined. She had both.32

Montessori was one of the first modern educators who applied "individualized education" by taking into account the individual differences of her little pupils in the Case dei Bambini or Children's Houses. The individual differences were related to different social classes and racial groups, manifested in some physical traits, such as skull-index, height, weight, body-proportion. The measurements of these differences must be recorded accurately and regularly.33 Method and technique should be employed accordingly.

In the first days of the use of anthropological concepts in education, one was generally concerned with the problem of race, and the relation between race and intelligence (skull-index!), including the myth of race superiority.


33Maria Montessori, The Montessori Method (trans. Anne E. George)(New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1919), Ch. IV.
This bias still prevails in some educational circles of today (at least in some cultural settings).

In those days, educators said that ethnology should enjoy an increasing popularity in the curriculum of teacher-education, because teachers should know something about "ethnological psychology," since different ethnic groups should be treated or educated differently, in terms of differing psychological structures, and different I.Q.'s! Education should take into account these ethnic differences, and cultures from without should not be imposed on the students. Education should be in accordance with the "development of the race from within."

Taking for granted that the principle of individual differences is educationally true and important, those educators still made the error of taking the wrong premises. They namely assumed that race in the biological sense had something to do with abilities, I.Q., and even with morality.

As the relationship between physical anthropology and education is apparently of no importance, we shall pay more attention to the problem of cultural anthropology as related to education. We shall not explore here the content and problems of cultural anthropology itself (as also related to other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and philosophy), but will consider rather, the relationship between cultural anthropology and educational theory and
practice, especially as related to our main problem, the aim of education.

Most people would agree with the statement that anthropology is a significant contributor to a good education. Some even believe that anthropology should form the core of an adequate general or liberal education curriculum. Spindler has said, for instance, that:

Anthropology as the "Study of man," with its traditional interests in cultural variability, culture history -- both ethnological and archeological -- language, race, and human evolution, is admittedly a prime contributor to a good general education. 34

Some people take it for granted that the process of education is nothing but a transmission process of culture or acculturation process, though some prefer the term enculturation, which means that the child is introduced, either gradually or abruptly, into certain cultural "patterns" in his society. As James Quillen wrote "The essence of education, as I see it, from the cultural point of view is cultural perpetuation, including cultural transmission, socialization, and encultaration." 35 We may assume that he too is of the opinion that education is simply a

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34Spindler, loc. cit., p. 6.

cultural process. Approximately in the same strain, Spindler states:

Education is not this whole process. It is what is done to a child, by whom, under what conditions, and to what purpose. It is the process of transmitting culture -- if we can think of culture as including skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values, as well as discrete elements of behavior.36

These statements may be adequate from the standpoint of the anthropologist, but certainly not for the educator. On closer investigation, it will soon be apparent that this traditional notion is less relevant. Education is more than mere transmission of culture or cultural values. Mere cultural transmission does not include fundamentally important educational objectives such as self-realization, helping the growing individual to understand his self (according to the Socratic dictum "Know thy self"), or self-determination in full responsibility (what we may call psychological maturity). These generally accepted purposes cannot be realized in mere cultural transmission alone, but they might even contradict the cultural process itself.

On the other hand, cultural transmission may suggest that the "receiving" child be a passive participator, accepting passively what the adult suggests.

Finally, transmission would not indicate the possibility of the creation or emergence of something new. Enlightenment as an important dimension of the educational process, would have no place in the acculturation process at all. Acculturation would merely mean inculcating some cultural traditions with their cultural biases, errors and prejudices of a certain ethnic group or of a definite historical period. There is a great chance that the barriers of ethnocentrism (like a national or state myth) can never be overcome.

In fact James Quillen himself is fully aware of the danger of this kind of coercive inculcation. For he says:

In the postwar period there has been some tendency, along with the forces in American society moving toward greater equalization and greater concern with group interaction, to go too far in the direction of group participation, and not enough recognition has been given to the importance of individual thought and individual activity. There are two kinds of coercion: the coercion imposed by the individual on the group and the coercion of the group upon the individual. We've become increasingly sensitive to the coercion of the individual on the group, but I don't think we are sufficiently sensitive to the factor of the coercion of the group upon the individual and the danger of increasing conformity in Western culture, in America particularly, to group pressure.37

These considerations are completely in accordance with Spindler's statement that "The educators must accept the necessity for internal relevance of anthropological material — and yet apply their own criteria for selection and modification of what is offered." This means that education is still primary to anthropology with respect to the educational "application" of the anthropological material. In fact the term "application" is an unfortunate one, since it may suggest that education is a mere application of the findings of anthropology. Also a situation may occur in which the educational relevance may interfere with the internal relevance within anthropology. This is conceivable, since the "internalness" in itself may imply a relativity, i.e., relevant only within its own boundaries, and also relevant within a certain point of view or philosophical assumption:

Neither society nor culture is viewed as comprising the whole of the human situation, and neither is treated "as if" it were a reality sui generis, requiring no reference to the other. Hitherto the study of man in society has suffered from arbitrary philosophical assumptions of the primacy of either society or culture.39

Bidney has stated that culture is related to the psychic "nature" of man. The word "nature" is put within

38Spindler, loc. cit., p. 21.
39Bidney, loc. cit., p. 103.
quotes, since the psychic nature of man is inseparable from his educational situation, i.e., his nature will only manifest within an educational situation or "after" having undergone an educational process. No man can ever escape an educational situation, otherwise he would be no man. Thus Bidney says:

To insist upon the self-sufficiency and autonomy of culture, as if culture were a closed system requiring only historical explanation in terms of other cultural phenomena, is not to explain culture, but to leave its origin a mystery or an accident of time. The view of the superorganicists that culture is independent on the psychic nature of man and that man is but a carrier, or vehicle, of culture leaves unexplained the relation of man to culture.40

In other words, education is a product of culture but equally culture is a product of education, a product of the human mind, in which education is already implied. Both notions of culture as sui generis and as "operational" (as a phenomenon of the human endeavor itself) are relevant, each from a certain point of view.

Philosophical assumptions, moreover, and particularly with respect to anthropology, may find a good test for their validity in education, since education is inherent in the concept of the nature of man himself. In other words, man's nature can only be revealed in the educational

40Ibid., p. 65
situation, a situation in which people -- adults and children -- meet each other existentially, that is when they meet each other face to face, revealing to each other their personal background (problems, personal feelings, anxieties, the past, and ideals). Education is not merely a cultural transmission or encultaration, but it is in its true sense a creative process, in which always something new is "added" or better: is created. Creativity is a priori to culture.

The selection of the anthropological "material" by education for its own purpose -- such as helping the individual to become an adult -- does not concern its "content" alone (as it finds expression in the curriculum), but it touches also the anthropological assumptions themselves. Some anthropological assumptions are educationally relevant, and some are not, such as the notion of the autonomy of culture, or culture as a product of history, independent on psychological and educational processes.

If we consider more closely the relationship between educational theory and anthropology (the science of man), we shall discover that this kind of consideration is not entirely satisfying, if we conceive anthropology as merely a cultorology or cultural anthropology. We still cannot shake off our deep conviction that the only agent of all human processes and products, such as culture and education, is man himself, and that man himself would have
some essential dimensions, irrespective his culture. If education is to make any sense at all, therefore, we should draw those essential dimensions of man into our consideration. In other words, we should connect educational theory in a deeper and more fundamental relationship with philosophical anthropology, though we are also aware of the fact that those human essentials are only recognizable from certain views. The existentialist sees man's "nature" differently than the Catholic or the Buddhist. In the chapter on the problem of man, Bidney says, for instance:

All forms of cultural idealism demonstrate that man is not only a product of cultural conditioning and cultural determinism -- as modern anthropologists are wont to stress - but is also the originator or author of his culture systems, the self-determined creator and efficient cause of his cultural conditions and patterns.\(^{41}\)

Bidney even speaks of metacultural and postcultural freedom, indicating that "beyond" culture there is something causative, something primary -- namely, man's freedom and man's creativity:

In brief, behind all cultural freedom and cultural determinism one must postulate a metacultural, normative freedom without which human nature and culture as we know them would be inconceivable.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{41}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 14.}\)

\(^{42}\text{Ibid.}\)
Actually Bidney is hinting here at something metaphysical in man and culture. When he devotes one chapter (Chapter 6) particularly to the concept of metaanthropology, he is, in fact, hinting at the metaphysics of culture and man. But then arises the problem of the relation between metaphysics and scientific theory.

On this issue Bidney mentions four relationship possibilities. The first one is the positivistic notion (of Comte) that metaphysics is an earlier historical stage in man's thinking than science, and therefore more primitive than science. This is the prescientific notion. The second type of relationship is the postscientific one, which holds that metaphysics is a mode of thought supplementing science, a "stepping in" science. As an example of this view he mentions Kant's discussion of nonempirical knowledge of God and morality in the Critique of Practical Reason. The third view is the so-called superscientific relationship, that is, the irrational intuitive knowledge of the mystics. He writes:

In setting up the dichotomy of metaphysical intuition and intellectual abstraction, Bergson rendered indirect support to the mystics and romanticists who posited super-rational faculties which transcended the evidence of reason and science. From the supposition of a superrational sphere of experience it was a short, though very important, step to the realm of the irrational since in either instance the validity of reason and science is questioned. 43

43 Ibid., p. 163.
As a fourth view (Bidney's view) he uses the term metaanthropology, that is, the ontology of culture and man:

Thus, metaanthropology, for example, is not merely another name for anthropological theory, but refers to a special view of theory, namely, the theory concerned with the problem of cultural reality and the nature of man.\textsuperscript{44}

In the further discussion on the metaphysical aspect of the theory of man, the term philosophical anthropology will be used rather than metaanthropology, since it is not only concerned with the metaphysics of man, but also with the anthropological epistemology. Most philosophical anthropologists, for instance, use the phenomenological method, rather than the usual scientific deductive and inductive reasoning. Every serious educational theorist should take the problem of man (not only the problem of man as related to culture) into his consideration. It is a part of the philosophical questioning itself (since we have stated that educational theory presupposes philosophical knowledge). Kant posited the following philosophical questions to himself: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? (4) What is man? The first question is a metaphysical one; the second is ethical; the third is religious; and the fourth is anthropological.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. 164.
Though Kant essentially hinted at the philosophical questioning on man, according to Buber, Kant does not, however, ask an anthropological question. He holds that Kant in his philosophical career never discussed the essential anthropological questions, but has only touched some peripheral topics, such as egoism, honesty and lies, fancy, fortune-telling, dreams, mental diseases, wit, and so on. In criticizing Kant, Buber states:

But the question, what man is, is simply not raised, and not one of the problems which are implicitly set us at the same time by this question -- such as man's special place in the cosmos, his connexion with destiny, his relation to the world of things, his understanding of his fellow-men, his existence as a being that knows it must die, his attitude in all the ordinary and extraordinary encounters with the mystery with which his life is shot through, and so on -- not one of these problems is seriously touched upon. The wholeness of man does not enter into this anthropology.\(^\text{45}\)

Thus the wholeness of man is here emphasized, in which not only the ontology of man is involved, but, also, the epistemology -- man himself as the knower of his subjectivity, who \underline{reflects} about himself. Without knowing himself, man would never understand the world and the totality of things. So, man is the beginning and end of man's knowledge. This is apparent in Buber's further writing, when he says:

Philosophical knowledge of man is essentially man's self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung), and man can reflect about himself only when the recognizing person, that is, the philosopher pursuing anthropology, first of all reflects about himself as a person.

The principle of individuation, the fundamental fact of the infinite variety of human persons, of whom this one is only one person, of this constitution and no other, does not relativize anthropological knowledge; on the contrary, it gives it its kernel and its skeleton.

He can know the wholeness of the person and through it the wholeness of man only when he does not leave his subjectivity out and does not remain an untouched observer. He must enter, completely and in reality, into the act of self-reflection in order to become aware of human wholeness. In other words, he must carry out his act of entry into that unique dimension as an act of his life; without any prepared philosophical security; that is, he must expose himself to all that can meet you when you are really living. Here you do not attain to knowledge by remaining on the shore and watching the foaming waves, you must make the venture and cast yourself in, you must swim, alert and with all your force, even if a moment comes when you think you are losing consciousness: in this way, and in no other, do you reach anthropological insight.46

Kant's question "What is man," put in the third person, implies that man is considered a piece of nature, without involving himself as a subject in the query. It would sound different when we ask "Who am I?" Here I try to understand myself as a concrete reality in the concrete relatedness to the world in which I live. Here I recognize

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the fact (and thus the right) of my being as a person, not just an impersonal object among other objects. Our reality is objective as well as subjective. We are to accept both dimensions of our reality. The claim of science as the only appropriate method of approach to solve man's problems -- with its claim of objectivity for the purpose of predictability and controlability of events and behavior -- should, therefore, be questioned.

It has earlier been stated that educational theory as an autonomous discipline should select its own philosophical material in its own terms. On the other hand it may not be blind to the relevances from the practices of education itself. In other words, it should draw its practice materials from educational practice or the educational situation. This means that we should analyze the educational situation, looking for educational essentials, without overlooking the "nature" of man himself. Educational theory should be in mutual relationship and meaningfulness with the philosophy of man or the philosophical anthropology. The theory of the educational process, the issue on the aims of education, the problem of the selection of educational material, the requirements of the personality of the educator, all of these issues cannot be separated from the problem of the "nature" of man. In other words, all educational theory should involve
philosophical anthropology. Langeveld calls pedagogics within a certain theoretical discussion "normative practical anthropology":

Once more, pedagogics can never be "applied child psychology." It could be called normative practical anthropology. Outside the scientific-theoretical discussions, however, such an indication is meaningless.\footnote{Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 91.}

But not every kind of anthropology can be employed for educational purposes, since the cause of the child is here primary. An anthropology that negates the interest of the child and that does not see him in his humanness, is inappropriate for educational application. An aspect of humanness is for instance sociality. As Langeveld puts it:

If in any anthropology man is not looked at as a social being, then in consequence he is fundamentally insusceptible of influence and, therefore, ineducable. He can perhaps be tamed or coerced.\footnote{Trans. from Ibid., p. 54.}

Educational theory should, therefore, make its own decision with respect to the selection of the child-anthropological "material" particularly concerning its fundamental assumptions, because in these educational assumptions are implied some indications of the educational aims and processes.
A materialistic evolutionistic anthropology which assumes that the child is but a mechanistic organism that has developed biologically from lower forms of entity, due to "selection and survival of the fittest," is educationally unacceptable. Such point of view, when made explicit, would mean that the child is a human animal. He is thus essentially an animal. As an animal the child must be ineducable, that is to say, when we conceive of education as more than mere drilling and mechanistic conditioning alone, where the new element of insight does not pay any role at all. This kind of "education" can only be implemented by a Pavlovian pedagogics.

In his Essay on Man, Cassirer posits the thesis that man's fundamental difference from the animal is his symbolism. Without symbolism man would be no man:

Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system.49

Thanks to this symbolic dimension, man is able to delay his responses, to reflect about the world and himself, to gain insight instead of mere habituation, to create and use language (as the bearer of values and meanings), to develop a symbolic imagination and intelligence.

(Cassirer), to free himself from the bounds of the here and now (man can live in a symbolic space -- mathematics -- and a symbolic future -- planning). Though animals do have a kind of language to communicate with the same species (among ants, bees, chickens, dogs, and monkeys) and to express their feelings (of anger or anxiety) through the use of signs or grimaces, man's language is quite different. Man's language is symbolic.

Karl Rühler distinguishes three levels of language categories with man, the first two of which are to be found with animals: Auslösung (releases or expression), Kundgabe (communication), and Darstellung (representation). So, human language as a Darstellung has the essential of symbolism, freed from the concrete ties of time and space. It is characterized by the Entstofflichung, i.e., released from its material properties. Human language makes use of symbols, while animals "communicate" with each other through signs, with gestures and muscle movements. Cassirer makes a distinction between symbol and sign, as follows:

Symbols -- in the proper sense of this term -- cannot be reduced to mere signals. Signals and symbols belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is a part of the physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning. Signals are "operators"; symbols are "designators." Signals, even when understood and used as such, have nevertheless a sort of physical or substantial being; symbols have only a functional value.50

50 Ibid., p. 51.
In short, without symbolic language, the child could not be educated: could not be introduced into the symbolic human world of values which we call civilization in its broadest and deepest sense:

Without symbolism the life of man would be like that of the prisoners in the cave of Plato's famous simile. Man's life would be confined within the limits of his biological needs and his practical interests; it could find no access to the "ideal world" which is opened to him from different sides by religion, art, philosophy, science.51

Hendrik Josephus Pos compares symbolic language with Kant's categories of the Reason, and is, therefore, in some sense transcendental in character. Thanks to this symbolic character of language, man is capable of knowing the world:

It is similar to the categories of the intellect, of which Kant showed that they make the sensorial world "possible" for us, that is to say, our knowing, acting and feeling can, therefore, give to this world its form. In this way, all abstract language symbols are in a broader sense "transcendental" with respect to the perception: they retire from the world, in order to make of it the best humanly possible. Intellect and language shape the reality in the specifically human way.52

As to the origin of human language, Pos refers to a theory by Revesz, stating that human language does not stem

51Ibid., p. 62.

from the animals, and that it is of purely human origin:

Revesz refutes the derivation of the human language from animal's sounds, just as he supposes generally an unbridgeable difference in structure between man and animal. This is closely related to the fact that language is thought of, not as an invention of man, but as a given essential characteristic of man. Language does not, therefore, originate from animals, and it has not been "invented." 53

Langeveld makes a clear statement as to the necessity and the possibility of the education of the human child, and concluded that education itself is a part of the philosophy of man or philosophical anthropology:

Without human education the human "young" does not become a man. That man is a being that educates, is educated, and is destined for education, is in itself one of the most fundamental characteristics of the view on man. 54

Langeveld indicates further that there are four fundamental and anthropological presumptions which make education necessary and possible. These assumptions, which will be discussed in a special chapter on Langeveld's pedagogical theory, are as follows:

a. The principle of sociality. Man is a social being, and this dimension makes man's education possible.

53 Trans. from Ibid., pp. 142-143.

54 Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogick, loc. cit., p. 141 (Italics in original).
b. The principle of *individuality*. This principle acknowledges the reality of individual differences. Each individual should be regarded as a worthwhile being. This condition creates the possibility of becoming oneself as a mature person. *Gleichschaltung* or the elimination of differences would be against the reality of man.

c. The principle of *ethical identity*. This means that each individual is to be considered individually and personally able to make ethical decisions. This is the meaning of the phrase that mankind is one. It opens the possibility for education toward self-responsibility and independence.

d. The principle of *being a person*. Each individual differing from each other individual, is in itself a worthwhileness. Our education does not aim at the production of man as a mass-article, as it occurs in modern industries.

Summarizing our discussion on the relationship between educational theory and anthropology, we can state that educational theory presupposes some fundamental knowledge of anthropology, particularly the philosophical anthropology, with the right on the sight of the educational theory to decide for itself what kind of anthropology it should use for its own purposes on behalf of the interest of the child.
Educational Theory and Medicine

Education is the central problem in our discussion on man's being and activities. It should lead us, by further reasoning, to the consideration of other human dimensions, such as medicine which, as a discipline, has especial human consequences. As science -- in the sense of Naturwissenschaft -- of course, this discipline has its own principles and theories and, in consequence, it has its own specific claims with respect to what ought to be done with man and child. Medicine is, like education, a "practical" science, where one must make decisions and take actions accordingly, because human lives are involved. Whether or not the physician's decision is in accordance with the patient's opinion or with his full consent, it may be necessary to perform a serious operation or take other "drastic" measures.

The patient is usually a layman; his opinion does not count much in matters of pathology and therapy, especially when his life is in danger. This is what almost everybody would agree with, because deep in our feeling we are convinced of the trueness of this principle: "Health is better than sickness, and a fortiori better than death."\(^{55}\)

It is, as if for everybody suffering (being sick) and "being no more" have an absolutely negative value, though some people would prefer to die than to remain alive. Moralists sometimes ask this question: Do people have the right to commit suicide? Why should we prevent people from taking their own lives? Is this our moral obligation? In fact, this feeling of being obliged, is a universal urge in man to be concerned with his fellow-man, applying the same principles to them, in which we deeply believe, namely, that to remain alive is better than to die.

The main concern of medicine is, of course, the health of the organism. Usually one means by this, simply, physical health. This is the reason why many doctors, as healers, treat the individual as a mere organism like a plant or animal. This is partly due to the way medical research is carried out, looking for cells, cell structures, biochemical processes, and nervous reflexes. Even sexual problems are usually treated as biological ones, i.e., in terms of anatomy and endocrinology.

It is obvious that education and medicine differ from each other fundamentally. Each starts from different principles. Both are practical disciplines dealing with the same object, however, though with different purposes and methods. Education as a theory is not only descriptive, but also normative and individualizing. Medicine, on the
other hand, is more descriptive and generalizing, without normative taboos.

But now comes the question of psychiatry. This discipline belongs generally to the field of medicine, since specialization in psychiatry is based on general medical study. This might suggest that the prevailing (old) opinion is, that mental illness has a physiological basis, such as the nervous system, blood pressure, muscle-tension, palpitations, and internal secretion (sex and growth!). The use of tranquilizers, sedatives, anticonvulsants (tension reducers), sommifacients (sleep producing drugs), or stimulants (depression reducers) is often practiced. Some drugs are supposed to affect the so-called neurohormones, or the hypothalamus of the brain which is considered to be the seat of the human emergency mechanisms, such as flight or aggression. Sometimes physical therapy, such as electric shock, is administered. One even speaks of psycho-surgery, when one means brain-surgery, employed to treat psychical symptoms.

All of these practices are indications that in medicine, even in psychiatry, the basis of thinking is physiological. Neurosis and psychosis are grouped as mental "diseases." Health is described negatively, as freedom from disease. This might suggest to us that the problem of health, whether mental or physical, is an admitted mystery.
In discussing mental health and tranquilizing drugs Dr. Morris Fishbein quotes a remark from Dr. Harold E. Himwich:

In concluding his address Dr. Himwich wrote, "These new drugs are not a flash in the pan but their therapeutic values have been widely corroborated. However, they are not a complete answer to our therapeutic problem because no one drug is able to ameliorate the condition of all of the patients and none of them is as efficacious for melancholia as is electric shock."56

On the other hand, we have the problem of psychosomatic medicine, which believes that bodily effects of some conditions depend upon the mental state. Some bodily disorders, such as asthma, diabetes, rheumatism, hypertension, coronary artery disease and gastric ulcer, are supposed to be induced by mental or emotional disturbances. Psychosomatic medicine is the reverse of the belief in the physiological basis of mental diseases, the notion that some psychic disturbances would have their basis in brain injuries. The latter may be based on a certain "personality theory," the so-called "brain models" theory as Gordon Allport puts it. He says: "Anglo-American psychologists are currently more interested in "brain models" than are Continental psychologists."57

Psycho-somatic medicine and psychiatry hint at the old metaphysical problem of the relationship between body and mind. And the way this problem is viewed may affect the interrelationship between educational theory and medicine, aside from the differing axiomatic presumptions of both disciplines as noted above.

A certain mind-body relationship conception may result in a certain educational theory, as has been demonstrated by pragmatism and other philosophical trends, such as the dualistic realism in Christian philosophy which believes in the reality of both body and mind united in one entity, the human being. Pragmatism, however, believes in a so-called "field-theory" of mind -- like Einstein's relativity field-theory in new physics -- stating that mind is an interrelationship phenomenon, i.e., an interrelationship between organism and environment. It is important to note that this view questions the "ground" -- namely, the separate "substances" the other views accept. From such a metaphysical view, one may derive epistemological and theoretico-educational implications.

Let us take a deeper look at the relationship between educational theory and medicine -- namely, their bases of thinking. Beets, a Dutch medical doctor who followed a nine year pedagogical "training" in his later years under the direction of Langeveld, the founder of the School
of Utrecht (phenomenological pedagogics), has made a phenomenological-situational analysis of the difference between pedagogical and medical thinking:

The psychical clinic, as the anthropological thinking-bath, in which the student is immersed, before he appears in society as a doctor, is populated with: "that schizophrenic, a paranoid, a hysterical and a compulsion neurotic." The patients are popularly known by the syndrome exposed. In diagnostics, is the issue, to determine as quickly as possible, as to what category they belong. An adequate therapy can only be applied when the diagnosis has been established. Medical thinking is, -- and cannot be otherwise than, -- a thinking in diagnosis and therapy, whereby therapy is thought of as necessarily and logically arising from a diagnosis. We shall see later that in pedagogy that this causal relationship between diagnosis and treatment is not a fundamental principle.\(^{58}\)

Carl Rogers, the founder of "non-directive" psychotherapy has approximately the same opinion, when, referring to the six necessary and sufficient conditions for the psychotherapeutic relationship, states:

Yet the more I have observed therapists, and the more closely I have studied research such as that done by Fiedler and others, the more I am forced to the conclusion that such diagnostic knowledge is not essential to psychiatry. It may even be that its defense as a necessary prelude to psychotherapy is simply a protective alternative to the

admission that it is, for the most part, a colossal waste of time. There is only one useful purpose I have been able to observe which relates to psychotherapy. 59

But school counselors and teachers are generally advised not to work without cumulative records and a testing program:

This record is the important feature of every guidance program that takes its origin from an objective study of the individual. This record ties the loose ends together.

Although the best possible cumulative record cannot in itself insure successful guidance in a school, no plan of advising and counseling student can rise to the level of a thorough guidance program unless it includes a cumulative record which is understood and used by counselors and teachers alike. The cumulative record is at once the main technique for the education of the faculty and the strategic organizational device in the whole guidance program. 60

Both tools are actually used for diagnostic purposes. In fact, by this very act the counselor denies one of his own fundamental principles, i.e., unconditional regard of the uniqueness of the person who cannot be looked at and treated in terms of the Gaussian distribution curve regarding personality dimensions. Each one has the right to be


the way he is, he has even the right to fail! Diagnosis 
followed by therapy appropriate to it -- as generally 
practiced in medicine with the prescription of drugs and 
advises to rest and the like -- may lead to compartmental-
izing personality traits, such as: he is a schizo, he is 
a paranoid, he is possessed by an Oedipus-complex, and so 
on.

There is a difference between pedagogical and 
medical thinking, not alone in its axiomatic presumptions, 
but also in methodology. As Beets puts it:

The primarily pedagogical thinking does not 
have its starting-point in the natural sciences: 
biology, chemistry, physics. It does not go the 
way of anatomy, physiology, general pathology 
in order to arrive at a thinking about man. 
This thinking turns directly to a child in its 
childly existence, in its childly situation. 
This means that the child can only be under-
stood from the much wider relationship (than its 
corporealness) in which it lives...

Pedagogical thinking is a phenomenological 
analysis of being-in-the-world as a child with 
father and mother, brothers and sisters. It 
must be occupied with what "being at home" in 
the world actually means -- why playing outside, 
being-in-the-street, going to school, all in 
the actual living means.

Pedagogical thinking demands phenomenological 
schooling and looking for a home in the modern 
anthropology and existence - philosophy. Here 
with this thinking, that is a thinking about man 
in becoming, has quite a different background 
than the primarily - diagnostical thinking that 
is practiced and found its scientifical home in 
the natural sciences.61

61Trans. from Beets, loc. cit., pp. 62, 64. 
(Italics in original.)
Though both medicine and education differ in their axiological assumptions, the one being more biological in nature (to be alive is better than to be dead) and the other being more spiritual (how to live the "good" life), they have something in common, which originates from the very nature of man himself -- namely, his sociality. Both stem from the universal human desire to help the helpless individual. In one instance, it is the growing child who needs help in order to become a "good" person; in the other instance, it is the sick individual (bodily or mentally) who needs to be relieved of his suffering in order to become a "healthy" person. The following question seems to be logical, therefore: If both kinds of human endeavor stem from the same natural human ground, why should we not be able to start from the same metaphysical and epistemological (methodological) assumptions? This question seems to point to the problem of the proper relationship between education and medicine.

Sanford, in his article, "Creative Health and the Principle of Habeas Mentem"\(^{52}\) (habeas mentem means the right of man to be his own mind), tries to explain the possibility of what he calls "creative health," whereby

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each one of us can potentially become his own doctor. His humanistic optimism asserts that:

a. there will be an increased, and an increasingly effective, concern for positive -- or perhaps better -- creative health,

b. there will be an increasing pressure for the human welfare professions to change the character of their roles,

c. there will be an increasing, and increasingly effective, concern with the psychological welfare, or behavioral health, of the human individual.

Sanford says that there is an historical development of the health-care in positive direction, through the phases of passive acceptance, the phase of cure, the phase of prevention, and, finally, the phase of creativity, where there is raised the level of energy and vigor, spontaneity, creativity, and enjoyment. He holds that health will become somewhat less a matter of urgency and more a matter of thoughtful organized planning. It will become less a matter of life and death (compare with the medical assumption "life is better than death!") and more a matter of real living.

Sanford's ideas suggest a possible change of the role of professions, in the sense of democratization or secularization of the health and welfare professions: one
wants more information rather than preformed answers. He says that the human being must be responsible for himself, and he must be responsible to, not for, his fellow-man. He defines creative health as functioning at its own built-in best, resulting in a behavior of creative vitality.

Referring to the present situation of human welfare in the United States, where there are 700,000 people in the mental hospitals, 7,000,000 living Americans who may be future candidates for admission to mental hospitals, and 70,000,000 who are tied in emotional knots, who cannot handle well their vocations, marital or child-raising problems, Sanford advocates the cause of serious health-care in the direction of creative health. But we are still in the phase of cure, moving into the phase of prevention, and some are active in attempts to promote creative mental health. Probably a cooperative program between education and medicine might result in the most desirable ideal of man's state, a kind of fusion of health and morality, labeled by the new term "creative mental health." This idea, of course, was striven for by Socrates through all his life and philosophizing.

There is, however, another angle of this relationship problem. Because of the possible common ground of both disciplines, as indicated above, we should not be surprised to discover another similarity. This one is
negative in character. Each discipline can be used for the purpose of promoting certain political ends. The Hitler Jugend organization is an obvious example. Not only was good care taken of health of "these individuals of the future," but they were well drilled and trained as well, for the strength and power of the state. Their "education" was more than the literal meaning of "pedagogy." Both health-care and pedagogy were used, not for the benefit of the individuals involved, but for the maintenance and strengthening of the Nazi-ideal.

Educational Theory Related to Psychology and Sociology

Let us consider the relationship between educational theory and psychology-sociology. The latter disciplines are lumped together here, since they are now frequently considered to be behavioral or social sciences. Others prefer to call psychology mere science (in the sense of Naturwissenschaft) rather than Geisteswissenschaft. Since they build on the assumption that the individual is an organism not different from any other animal. Man's behavior, interpreted as a response to a stimulus, is supposed to have a biological basis. Sociology -- a term coined by Comte -- is the study of society, its structure and social reactions. Its original name, Social physics, indicates that it was thought that the methods of the natural sciences
were to be applied to the study of sociology. Most sociologists, however, have accepted a psychological conception of society, assuming that such psychological phenomena as imitation and communication are basic elements in social interrelations.

Whatever conception we have of sociology, we cannot deny the fact that both psychology and sociology are most intimately related to each other. No sociology could do without psychology, and the reverse is true as well. Psychology, as the science of human behavior -- with possible philosophical assumptions of personality theories -- can never detach itself from sociology, since human behavior always occurs (implicitly or explicitly) in a social context. So we can safely state that psychology is basically sociological. Or, it would probably be better to say: Every personality has individual as well as social aspects. As Philipp Lersch, the German psychologist of the stratification personality-theory, puts it:

So gewisz jeder Mensch in solchen Zusammenhängen und damit unter der Forderung sozialer Konformität steht, so gewisz ist er zugleich auch Individualität, ein einmaliges, unwiederholbares und unvertauschbares Wesen der Schöpfung, an dessen innersten Kern keine psychologische Aussage und Bestimmung heranreicht, -- schon deshalb nicht, weil alle Aussagen sich verallgemeinernder Begriffe bedienen müssen.53

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About in the same fashion Durkheim, professor of sociology and education at the Sorbonne University in the first years of this century, said:

Thus the antagonism that has too often been admitted between society and individual corresponds to nothing in the facts. Indeed, far from these two terms being in opposition and being able to develop only each at the expense of the other, they imply each other. The individual, in willing society, wills himself.  

But there are authors who think that psychology and sociology are fundamentally different sciences which deal with distinct objects. In his book, *Educational Sociology*, Francis Brown states:

There is a fundamental distinction also between psychology and sociology. The psychologist begins with the individual. He studies the structure of sense organs and of the nervous system; he is concerned with heredity, both general ability and special aptitudes; he analyzes basic drives; and he seeks to discover and apply the laws of learning, although the latter is basically in the field of educational psychology.

The sociologist, on the other hand, begins with the total social milieu of the individual. He studies the cultural patterns, analyzes the social organization, and seeks to discover the nature and extent of social control through interpersonal and intergroup interaction. He is interested fundamentally in discovering the forces through which the personality of the individual is developed.

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It is against this background that the main concern of this section, the relationship of educational theory to sociology and psychology, arises. Many authors are of the opinion that the proper relationship between these disciplines makes education applied sociology and applied psychology, generally using the terms educational sociology and educational psychology.

Educational sociology is supposed to be concerned with the problem of changing society in a desirable way. What is sought is a kind of "social control." Educational psychology, on the other hand, is said to be concerned with the learning process, having in mind that the learning process is a psychological process, as well as an educational one. Thus Brown states:

Educational sociology is concerned with the problem of personality or behavior as determined by culture. In a phrase, it may be defined as the science of social control. Educational psychology is concerned with the learning process, as between the situation -- response mechanism. These basic conceptions define not only the relationship but also the difference between the two fields.66

Brown thinks of education as nothing but an application of sociological principles and data to the educational process, so as to attain social control:

Educational sociology applies the principles, research data, and techniques of sociology to the educational process, both within the

66 Ibid., p. 38.
classroom and in the total educative experiences of the person. It conceives education in this inclusive sense, as social control.\textsuperscript{67}

In order to attain social control, according to Brown, education has four responsibilities:

a. Analysis of the rich background of our cultural heritage to determine those elements which have proved of worth to the individual and to society,

b. constant appraisal of social change to establish the nature and direction of adaptation to meet new developments as they occur,

c. inculcating into each generation of youth respect for and conviction toward these common elements of our social structure,

d. the development of personality of each individual, within the social milieu.\textsuperscript{68}

These statements of Brown are of importance with respect to our problem of the aims of education. According to Brown, we may consequently make the inference that every sociologist or psychologist will be able to prescribe ready-made recipes for the educator, how the latter should accomplish his task as to the educational aim, as well as the educational process. The aim of education

\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 562-563.
would then be the inculcation of the youth to develop respect for and conviction toward the social values within his milieu. Only in this way could he fashion his personality. The educative process should be according to this frame of reference, nothing but the process of learning, thus narrowly conceived. This view equates education with its conception of the psychology of learning.

That Brown holds the "application-concept" of sociology and psychology with respect to education, is apparent in the following statement:

But if the role of sociology is predominant in the determination of the ends that education should follow, does it have the same importance with respect to the choice of means?

Here psychology clearly comes into its own. If the pedagogic ideal expresses, above all, social necessities, they can, however, be realized only in and by individuals.69

Durkheim's concept of the relationship of education to psychology and sociology is similar to Brown's -- namely, the one of "application relationship." According to this concept the foundations of educational aims should be found in sociology, while the educative process should follow the indications of psychology:

Have we not expressly recognized that we owe to education the best in us? But this is because the best in us is of social origin. It is always to the study of society, then, that

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69Ibid., p. 129.
we must return; it is only there that the pedagogue can find the principles of his specula-
tion. Psychology will indeed be able to indi-
cate to him what is the best way to proceed in
order to apply these principles to the child,
once they are stated; but it will hardly help
us to discover them. 70

When one believes that education should be sociol-
ogically founded (many teacher education institutions now
offer courses in "Social Foundations of Education," rather
than in "Philosophy of Education"), it then would be
obvious to him that the aims of education focus too ex-
clusively upon preparing the individual for social partici-
pation. The latter is for instance apparent in the con-
cclusion of Ross Finney and Leslie Zeleny, when they say:

From all this it follows obviously that the
purpose of education is to prepare the candi-
date for participation in the various insti-
tutions of society. To satisfy the needs of
human nature -- and they can be satisfied only
through participation in one institution or
another -- one must acquire the culture mass
pertaining to the institutions, just as one
must know the cards and the rules of the game
to participate in the game of bridge.

A most helpful way, then, to think about
the problem of educational aims is to realize
that education is for the purpose of getting
young people ready to take their place in
family life, in community life, in industrial
life, in political life, and in the life of all
other major institutions of civilization. 71

70 Durkheim, loc. cit., p. 133.

71 Ross L. Finney and Leslie D. Zeleny, An Introduction
to Educational Sociology (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company,
The relationship between education and psychology is generally indicated by the term "educational psychology." Many authors on educational psychology discuss this discipline as if the meaning and function of it with respect to education is obvious to everybody. They simply assume that educational psychology is psychology applied to education. Sawrey and Telford, for instance, say that: "Educational psychology is an area of application rather than a unique category of subject matter."72

Peel, head of the Department of Education at the University of Birmingham, states:

Educational psychology is an applied branch of psychology. What is psychology? Psychology may be defined as the science of behavior and experience. I include both behavior and experience. Behavior is just what is observed; e.g., the movement of a rat in a maze; the response of the baby when it is dropped; or the action of an adult when he has received news of bereavement or fortune. Observations of behavior are objective in the sense that we may arrange to have any observation repeated or witnessed.73

Peel reveals no understanding of what an educational situation is. To him education is nothing but the application of the results from repeatable psychological experiments with rats, or with babies that can be dropped at will. He


is supposed to be able to arrange an experiment whereby an individual is involved in a conflict situation. Such a situation is for instance the one, in which a boy is in two minds about marrying his girl. The experiment should be repeated several times -- i.e., according to the scientific recipe -- in order to discover some psychological "laws" which can be applied to education.

It is obvious, then, that this "operational" method is inadequate for educational practice. It is appropriate here, with respect to Peel's view, to quote Langeveld's criticism of this operational method:

Operational is a meaning when we do not know what it means but only know how we "operate" with it. In a strict sense this kind of theory would only allow us to do logical calculus with signs inside a context of signs, of which the reference to a situation of immediate action would be that of delay, analysis, hypothesis-construction, trying out, reconstruction of the hypothesis, etc., ad infinitum. But this is a theory only applicable in natural science where time matters little and where "repeatability" is a basic concept of experimental research, whereas education is confronted with the sober fact that one cannot live twice and cannot live on the installment-system of hypothesis only, and that one cannot repeat a number of situations of which education is only one.74

Most textbooks in educational psychology, do not give an account of what they mean by educational psychology. Charles Fox, for example, does not indicate at all what the

main problems and methods of educational psychology actually are (in spite of the sub title "Its problems and methods"). The topics he discusses are unsystematically arranged, such as: (1) Mental Development; (2) Logic of Mental Measurement; (3) Mental Heredity, (4) Sensory Data — Vision and Hearing; (5) Observation and Attention; (6) Mental Imagery; (7) Habit and Human Nature; (8) Memory; (9) Mental Discipline; (10) Suggestion; (11) Aesthetic Appreciation; (12) Mental Tests I; (13) Mental Tests II; (14) Psycho-Analysis; (15) Stages of Growth I — Infancy and Childhood; (16) Stages of Growth II — Adolescence.

Robert Ellis, referring to other authors on the subject, observes that a change in the conception of educational psychology, from the emphasis on the acquisition of intellectual knowledge to the total development of the child, has occurred. At any rate, the authors put the emphasis differently:

Jones continues by pointing out that educational psychology has shifted from being primarily concerned with the acquisition of knowledge and is now greatly interested in personality development, personal and social adjustment, and preparation for community living.

In an analysis of nineteen texts in educational psychology covering the period from 1933

to 1941, Emme found that child psychology, learning, special methods, and personality were generally emphasized. The nine recent texts placed less emphasis on tests and statistical methods. Mental hygiene was omitted by nine texts but was emphasized by five of the later ones. The aims and objectives of teaching were generally treated very lightly, and the qualifications of the teachers ranked next to last in emphasis.

Reporting Hult's findings, which attack the usefulness of courses in educational psychology for teacher education, Ellis says:

In an experimental attack on this problem, Hult finds a correlation of only .15 between the class mark in a course in educational psychology and teaching success, although the correlation between practice teaching and the course mark is .75.

The common topics which many educational psychologies are dealing with, are the psychology of learning, human growth and development, individual differences and their measurement, and mental health. Skinner's Educational Psychology, for example, presents the following chapters:

(1) Human Growth and Development; (2) Learning; (3) Personality and Adjustment; (4) Measurement and Evaluation; (5) Teaching and Guidance.

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77 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Peel discusses the following topics: (1) The Nature of Learning; (2) The Psychology of Individual Differences; (3) Personal Development; (4) Relation of the Individual to Society; (5) School Examinations and School Records. 79 Sawrey and Telford have chosen three main chapters: (1) Motivation and Learning; (2) Growth, Development, and Education; (3) Some Mental Health Implications. 80 Eurich and Carroll center their approach around three general problems: (1) The Measurement of Abilities, achievements and other aspects of personality; (2) Individual differences and differentiated instruction; (3) Learning. 81 Fullagar's excellent book Readings for Educational Psychology has concentrated all educational-psychological approach around the problem of "learning" and the "learner," covering: 1. Learning and Learning Theory 2. Understanding the Learner 3. The Learning Situation. 82

It is obvious that the common topic, discussed in most textbooks, is about learning, and learning theories,

79 E. A. Peel, op. cit.
80 Sawrey and Telford, op. cit.
since there is a strong common belief that the educative process is a learning process. As Eurich and Carroll put it:

The essence of education is learning. Unless pupils learn while they are in school, the educational system is not fulfilling its function.\footnote{Eurich and Carroll, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 308.}

Apart from the learning theory to which the differing authors adhere, we may question the validity of the tenet that education is simply a learning activity. In an article in Fullagar's book -- nota bene the book on educational psychology that approaches the problems from the points of view of "learning" -- Combs doubts the appropriateness of learning theory in solving educational problems. Combs proposes, rather, a personality theory:

Yet, interestingly enough, learning theory has provided little or no leadership in solving problems of educational method. Leadership in education, almost exclusively, has come, not from learning theorists, but from educational philosophers. One looks in vain to find any great educational movement arising from learning theory. As a matter of fact, learning theory in some instances has even had a regressive effect on education. At the very time when education is moving to a holistic concept of teaching, many educators are still hammering away at methods of drill and rote learning growing out of the Ebbinghaus experiments of three generations ago.

Modern education has shifted its emphasis from subject matter to children, from processes...
to people. As a result, the theory of greatest use to educators is not learning theory but personality theory. The mental hygienists have taken over a very large share of the former functions of learning theorists in many a school of education. The unpleasant fact of the matter is that modern schools of education find little that is helpful in the average course on learning for the training of beginning teachers. Teachers have discovered long since that children are people with feelings, beliefs, attitudes, personal meanings, and convictions.

Comb's criticism is justified, when we bear in mind that the prevailing learning theories of educators are the kind of the Stimulus-Response theory and the Conditioned Reflex theory a la Pavlov, including the concept of reinforcement through punishment or reward. Some take no account of the phenomenon of immediate insight, empathy and total understanding, what Fletcher calls non-cognitive experience:

But there is an aspect of experience, particularly important to the problem of growth through creative self-expression, which cannot be subsumed under the concept of simple cognition. It is therefore difficult to define this non-cognitive form of experience in logical terminology, because its distinguishing content is feeling rather than cognition or ideation. It involves an immediate, as contrasted with the mediated, or step-by-step performance characteristic of the knowing and the thinking process.

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Skinner himself is one of the few educational psychologists who does not see educational psychology as applied psychology, but who sees human behavior in an educational context. The child can only be seen and studied and understood by projecting him and on the background of a human situation. The human child, even biologically, acts differently than the rat. He can never be thought of as detached from an educational situation. Says Skinner:

_**Educational psychology** deals with the behavior of human beings in educational situations. This means that educational psychology is concerned with the study of human behavior, or the human personality -- its growth, development, and guidance under the social processes of education. Since education is possible only because human beings can and do learn, human learning is the central core of educational psychology. However, this subject is not confined to the study of human learning as such._

When we consider the child as an educational subject, we can understand its dimensions and its destination only if we try to understand its total situation. As we can never think of the child apart from an educational situation -- every child grows in relationship to adults, in good as well as in a bad educational relationships -- education as such has to consider, with criticism, any

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sociological or psychological material about the child. For educational purposes we should see the child through educational eyeglasses. So sociology or psychology has meaning only for the educator, if it is conditioned by educational values, aims, and means. A sociology or psychology which is reluctant to take educational values and the educational situation into consideration, is, therefore, of little use for educational "application."

Says Langeveld:

If "education" is a practical "science," however unpractical it may often prove to be in its actual forms, it must have to do with a situation, for human action is always action in a situation. It is clear that it would be of fundamental interest to analyse this "situation." This, of course, is a fundamental task of any "pedagogy," and no "psychology or sociology of education" can be developed as long as it is not founded on such an analysis. 87

A psychologist cannot understand the child fully, if he refuses to interpolate educational values into his studies. He may be an expert in experiments with rats or monkeys, but, if he leaves educational values out of his study, we cannot take his notions and advice about child-rearing too seriously. Criticizing the psychologist who considers himself an authority in educational matters as well, Langeveld says:

87Langeveld, "Disintegration and Reintegration of 'Pedagogy'," loc. cit., p. 135.
Any question, it seems, can be solved by psychology. And the less the psychologist is infected by pedagogy the higher his authority, or -- this at any rate -- the less he is considered to be an amateur. Whatever a person's psychological training, whatever the field of psychology -- animal psychology or the psychology of sensory perception -- and whatever his psychological point of view -- behaviorism, psycho-analysis, reflexology, etc. etc. --, often even this psychologist himself feels that he is the expert who is to be consulted on educational matters.

Langeveld suggests that psychological material for educational purposes should be handled by pedagogically trained psychologists who can see the child anthropologically as an "animal educandum" (animal predestined to be educated), so as to purify it from inappropriate "operational" biases:

The reluctance of most of the authors of this collection to develop a positive idea of the role of psychology in education is partly, of course, justified by the fact that psychologists have made so many premature generalitations and partly by the pretentions of a kind of psychology which is alien to educational thought. Partly, however, it is due to a helplessness in the sphere of concrete anthropological thinking about the child as an "animal educandum." From this last point of view it is irrelevant what psychologists have done or said on their own behalf. Psychology becomes then one of the methods of collecting evidence within the sphere of educationally conditioned facts ("child" for example), to be handled only by a person who for this purpose is primarily an educationist.

88Ibid., p. 56.
89M. J. Langeveld, Review of Geist und Erziehung edited by Derbolav and Friedhelm Nicolin on the 75th
In the article titled, "Education and Sociology," Langeveld stressed again the import of the analysis of the educational situation for educational psychology:

Psychology is fully recognized as a field of study in itself, but "educational psychology" or "psychology of education" (etc.) is essentially "pedagogy." This means: within the educational field of study the educational character of the situation is the basis of all other exploration; "psychology" is there a point of view conditioned by educational values, aims and methods.90

Another educationist, Sinai Ucko from Israel, in discussing the relationship between educational theory (Erziehungswissenschaft) and psychology, puts emphasis on the worthwhileness of the individual as a person, i.e., an entity involved in values. Only in his relationship to values and meaning can the person be properly understood in his fullness. If psychology is to be meaningful for education, it must take axiology into consideration:

Der Mensch ist nur verständlich und erforschbar, wenn er in seiner ihm eigentümlichen Frage- und Antwortstellung auf Werte und Lebenssinn gesehen wird.

Heute musz die Psychologie auf die Wertlehre zurückgreifen, um überhaupt auch nur in ihrem Bereich etwas über ihr Objekt aussagen zu können, denn ihr Objekt ist eben die auf die Welt, d.h. auf Werte bezogene Person.


Eine Person ist aus ihren Wertbeziehungen zu erklären, also zu verstehen. Der Begriff der Person hat eine finale Struktur, nicht nur als psychophysischer Organismus, sondern auch als ein eine Ganzheit von Werten einbezogener Gegenstand.\footnote{Sinal Ucko, "Über die Beziehungen zwischen Erziehungslehre und Psychologie, "International Review of Education, III, No. 3 (1957), p. 300.}

Summarizing our present discussion on the problem of the relationship between educational theory and psychology and sociology, which relationship is often expressed by the terms educational psychology and educational sociology, we might say that the problem is not as easy as the usual question about "milieu," "nature" and "nurture" which are supposed to "cooperate" with each other, in order to produce the educated person. In this relationship problem there is an essential dimension of the human growth and development — namely, that the human development is essentially a creative endeavor, only possible through education. While there is, on the one hand, no such thing as "natural" growth — according to the "laws" of nature — there is no such thing, on the other hand, as a pure conformity to certain sociological structures. Education, accordingly, cannot follow either the "wise hints of nature" or the conventional prescriptions of a given society. Education, rather, is a creative
task which requires a full understanding of the human existential situation. This implies that the educationist should be sensitive enough to understand every changing educational situation, situations which often refer to deeper backgrounds -- in the past, present and future -- of human existence. Unless we bear this in mind, we shall not be able to sense the subtle dimensions of the child in a given situation. In other words, neither sociology nor psychology can, in the last analysis, be directive of our educational intentions. On the contrary, these disciplines are fundamentally dependent upon the educational view, as the human being always grows in human situations, in which man's creativity plays a decisive role. In the concluding chapter of a discussion on the nature of educational psychology and the relationship between psychology and pedagogics Langeveld says:

Here with we are supposed to have shown that the conception of "application of psychology" in the usual sense, is meaningless. In the second place, that psychology is never and nowhere able to guide and direct education. But that, in the third place, psychology is on the contrary, according to its origin, meaning and object, dependent upon pedagogics. Since, in the fourth place, psychology is not involved in a peculiar existential situation, it can be no more than an aspect and method within a meaningful order that is not elaborated and even less constituted by psychology itself.\(^2\)

\(^{92}\)Trans. from M. J. Langeveld, Over het Wezen der Paedagogische Psychologie en de Verhouding der Psychologie
Education and Guidance

In previous sections we hinted at the meaning of education. Here it is necessary to consider the problem of guidance. Arthur J. Jones makes the following statement in differentiating guidance from education:

Testing and test results, records, fundamental habits, and skills are all necessary for wise choice, but is only when the teacher, counselor, or other persons uses these in a conscious effort to help the individual in his choices that guidance is present. All guidance is education but some aspects of education are not guidance, their objectives are the same -- the development of the individual -- but the methods used in education are by no means the same as those used in guidance.  

It seems, according to this description, that the crucial point in education and guidance is "help" in "making choices." It is true that education and guidance may so help the individual. This statement implies that every individual is a person with a free will and that guidance and education can take place only when the freedom and the right of the individual to have his own will are recognized. The individual cannot be treated as a serf who possesses no freedom of will. As a free person


the individual cannot be educated by coercion. He is not passive. Education and guidance cannot, therefore, be either coercion or drill. They are a help offered to the individual who needs them, yet the individual is free to accept or to reject them. The help is offered in full awareness, so to say, that the educator or counselor has a certain end in view with respect to the child. He should also be aware of the "situation" of the child, i.e., aware of its abilities, problems, circumstances, past experience and possibilities. He is also conscious of the possible steps or suggestions he may make. He must not lose sight, however, of one thing. He should act solely in the interest of the child as a person. He should watch that he does not project his own problems into the child's psyche.

On the other side, he must try to understand the child's problems, and try to be sensitive to its needs and difficulties. This is possible only when he can identify himself with the child, in the sense that he should act on behalf of the child's concern. This phenomenon of sensitiveness, understanding, and identification may be called empathy.

In a study of empathy, Clyde Parker cites a definition by Dymond which seems to be accepted by most authors:
Empathy will be used...to denote the imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another, and so structuring the world as he does. 94

Without empathy the educator cannot really help the child adequately. Empathy is freedom from ego-centeredness as well. On the importance of empathy for the cause of education Parker concludes as follows:

Although the causal nature of empathy has not as yet been adequately demonstrated, a reasonable conclusion to make in this regard would be that persons are good leaders, warm friends, effective in relationships with others because they have the ability to empathize with other persons. It is possible that empathic ability develops because of the above, but the rationale of the concept would lead to the conclusion that empathy is a cause more than an effect of good interaction with people.

At present the greatest need for research on the concept is a demonstration of its causal nature. Related to this is the need for a demonstration of how empathy is, or can be, developed. 95

The basic point in providing help, of course, is to facilitate the "making of choices" and the concept of "choices" is related to values. The range and quality of values vary with the individual -- namely, his aptitudes, abilities, experience, environment, education, his past, acceptance or rejection by the environment, the difficulties


95Ibid., p. 93.
he has met, and the individual situation of the moment. It is not always easy to make adequate choices. No one can tell in advance, how the child is to make and can make its choice. Intelligence plays an important role in the act of choosing. The process of life is to a certain extent a sequence of making choices. Every choice has its consequences. Making a choice implies, therefore, an overview of and insight into, the possible and probable consequences. But no one other than the child itself should make the decision, for the consequences of its decision are personal.

The insight of the child on many matters, however, is limited, so its responsibility for its own decision is equally limited. The adult should protect the child, therefore, against wrong decisions. He may do this by providing it with some suggestions, hints, or explanations. But the adult does not make the choice for the child. It must learn to make its own choices. The function of the adult is helping only, without any pressure. The range and quality of values are ever-changing with the change of experience and the growth of abilities. Education and guidance can improve both the range and quality of values.

This consideration of choice-making and its relation to values, makes sense, however, only if we believe in the existence of a realm of values. As a matter of
fact, this is not an easy axiological and metaphysical problem. We can still, philosophically speaking, question the reality of values (thus, also, the necessity of the use of them in our life). We may ask: Do we really need values for our self-realization or integration of our personality? Original thinkers and artists are very creative in their own way, not thanks to, but rather in spite of, existing recognized values. Edward Spranger's six types of cultural values or Lebensformen (Science, economy, art, society, politics, religion)\(^{96}\) are more a theoretical classification than a reality in life.

In Jones's description above, we find the phrase "All guidance is education, but some aspects of education are not guidance." This statement is an admission that guidance is a specific form of education. Both have the same objectives. We had better say that guidance is a tool of education and, hence, serves the objectives of education, having none specifically of its own. The specificity of guidance lies in the fact that the situation of the individual to be guided is more specific, that is to say, that the individual involved -- because of the insufficiency of the more general method used in

\(^{96}\)Eduard Spranger, Lebensformen (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1925), Chapter 2.
education -- should be regarded in his uniqueness. The methods used in guidance take more into account the specific individuality of the child, his specific problems and interests. This is the justification for Jones's phrase, "but the methods used in education are by no means the same as those used in guidance." In fact, there is no fundamental difference between the educational method and the method used in guidance. The difference is, simply, that the one is more specific than the other. Jones, in fact, admits that guidance is not easy to define. He describes guidance as:

Guidance was described as the personal help that is given by one person to another in developing life goals, in making adjustments, and in solving problems that confront him in the attainment of his life goals. It is a service rendered but not necessarily by any one group of workers. 97

In this phrase Jones's description is vague and indefinite. The main points are "help" with respect to "developing life goals," "adjustments" and "solving problems." "Developing life goals" means the same, obviously, as "developing values." These values are goals to be attained and, in the process of achieving them, the individual has to meet some problems. "Making adjustments" means solving

97J. Jones, loc. cit., p. 85.
problems concerning social relationships. It seems that for Jones, the clue of education -- thus also of guidance -- is values and problem solving. He sees life as a series of development values and solving problems, in which intelligence plays an important role. This is a pragmatic view. We may wonder, whether anxiety and self-integration have something to do with values. It is possible that anxiety, fear, and disintegration cannot be met by solving problems and developing values alone. These two phenomena, anxiety and disintegration, are actually the fundamental issues in guidance work. Salvation of the soul, in the religious sense, is another important aspect of man's life.

Let us take a look at another definition of guidance, given by Cowley:

Cowley defines student personnel work as follows: "Personnel work constitutes all activities sponsored by educational institution, aside from curricular instruction, in which the student's personal development is the primary consideration."98

This formulation does not say anything positive. It simply means that guidance is education minus curricular instruction. There is actually no difference at all between education and guidance, save the difference in extent. The goal as defined in this formulation is personal

98 Ibid., p. 86 (Italics in original).
development. This indication is still too vague for our theory and practice. Personal development may mean everything that has anything to do with the growth of the individual. In fact, guidance should not keep aloof from school instruction. Many students have difficulties in learning curricular subjects, though the cause of those learning difficulties usually lies in the deeper layers of their personality, such as lack of a feeling of security, the search for love, friendship, and understanding. On the other hand, there are technical and methodical difficulties as well. Sometimes the classroom teacher does not realize -- lacking empathy or psychological insight -- where the difficulties are, so that he does not use adequate methods to provide the student with the appropriate information. In this case, the help of a school counselor will be very welcome. Technical dexterity, skill, adequate knowledge, and expressive ability will sometimes help students to overcome their inner problems and feeling of inferiority. These "technical conditions" will certainly promote and encourage the "personal development" in a sound direction. The definition given by Cowley is insufficient and too general. He does not indicate explicitly what he means by "personal development."
Wrenn speaks more definitely about personnel work, without being too specific:

Wrenn would include as personnel work "all the services that are provided for students, directly or indirectly, that will contribute to their balanced and wholesome growth toward maturity and social competence." This description is more satisfactory. Wrenn limits himself to guidance for students. The goal he has in view is more in concurrence with the goal defined by an adequate educational theory -- namely, that he puts more emphasis on the importance of "balanced and wholesome maturity," in which "social competence" is already implied. Every educator should accept this as a fundamental condition for man's adulthood, since every child in time becomes an adult. The addition of "social competence" is not a superfluous exemplification because it indicates and affirms sociality as a fundamental characteristic of man. This is one of the principles of Heidegger's existentialism, in which he says that "Mensch-sein ist mit den Menschen sein." (Being man is being with men.)

The words "directly" and "indirectly," in Wrenn's phrasing, relate to the methods of counseling. "Directly" means that the counselor immediately and confidentially talks with and to the student, concerning his problems.

\[99\text{Ibid.}\]
"Indirectly" means that the counselor creates better environmental conditions for the student, material as well as social. He provides the student with better learning aids (books, audio-visual material, instruments, examples, models and the like), and promotes social relations by introducing group-projects, extra-curricular activities, intramural sport programs, and so on.

A different explanation of guidance is given by Blaesser and Hopkins:

Student personnel work consists of those processes and functions undertaken by an educational institution which place emphasis upon:

1. The individual student and his intellectual, social, emotional, and physical development.

2. The building of curricula, methods of instruction, and extra-classroom programs to achieve the preceding objective.

3. Democratic procedures in working with students in order to help bring about their greatest possible self-realization.

4. The performance of student personnel functions rather than dependence upon specially designated individuals to perform them.100

In the above explication, the authors have designed a systematical classification of the work of the counselor. The first point comprises the goal the counselor has to
have in view, i.e., the development of the individual with his many aspects, intellectual, social, emotional, and physical. The second point contains the means and method by which the objectives may be achieved. The third emphasizes the process of dealing with students -- namely, in a democratic way -- in order to help them attaining self-realization. This self-realization is conceived of as the development of the personality in all respects. Hence the use of the words "their greatest possible." Democratic means that every individual should be given the same opportunity, in order to be able to develop himself, according to his abilities and interests.

The fourth point suggests the method of "learning by doing."

All of this is seemingly much more specific but, unfortunately, Blaesser and Hopkins do not indicate the difference between education and guidance. What they say about guidance may be said about education as well, for institutional education uses the same methods to attain the same goals.

Crawford, to consider a further definition, speaks of guidance as follows:

Student personnel work, as a whole may be regarded as a means whereby the individual's total educative experience may be most
effectively related to his personal needs and potentialities. 101

Crawford thus regards personnel work as a method or means to assist the task of education, with the presumption that the individual’s educative experience will be insufficient without the help of guidance. Guidance could make the educational task more efficient and more effective. This statement implies a slight depreciation of the educational possibilities. Theoretically, the educational task -- if properly executed -- should be enough for the growing individual.

Guidance work is supposed to promote the effectiveness of the educational (= instructional?) experience, to attain the goals of the individual. These goals are, according to Crawford, not too remote, because they originate from the individual’s needs. This view sounds a little too biological, with a hedonistic touch, similar to the noted Freudian pleasure-principle. Values are supposed to spring from one’s needs. The possibility to satisfy the needs, depends upon the potentialities one has. In this light, guidance purports to be able to promote the efficiency of one’s educational experience in satisfying one’s needs.

101 Ibid., p. 87.
Humphreys and Traxler present yet another explication of guidance, as follows:

Guidance services make up a major part of student personnel services. Guidance services embrace the cluster of activities or experience that assist the individual student to grow in self-understanding, to make wiser decisions, and to do increasingly effective planning.¹²

In this concept the most important moments of guidance are supposed to be: assistance, self-understanding, wiser decisions, and effective planning. "Assistance" and "decisions" are also used by the authors on guidance mentioned before. Self-understanding is necessary to know one's own self. Self-knowledge is the characteristic of wisdom. Self-integration implies self-knowledge as well. Self-knowledge is necessary to understand others. And conversely, one needs others to understand oneself better. Planning, in fact, has something to do with ideals and values. Planning is a rational action, previewing the possible consequences of one's behavior in the present with respect to the future. Actions in the present are means to attain an end which is not yet present. Intelligent behavior sees the relationship between means and end. Yet the authors could be more specific.

The relationship between the terms used, is not too clear. Moreover, they do not indicate the difference between guidance and education. Adequate education has, and should have, the same objectives as guidance.

A definition of guidance by Clifford P. Froehlich, which follows, will complete our consideration of what authorities in this field say of their work.

Counseling provides a situation in which the individual is stimulated (1) to evaluate himself and his opportunities; (2) to choose a feasible course of action; (3) to accept responsibility for his choice; and (4) to initiate a course of action in line with his choices.103

Froehlich indicates the function of guidance as stimulation. This term is more specific than the concept of help or assistance. He brings a relationship between the self-evaluation and the opportunities. By this he means that the individual, being aware of himself, has to evaluate his environment, in order to make the necessary adjustments to it and of it. In point two, he mentions the choice of a feasible course of action. This is the stage of thinking -- a delayed action, as the pragmatist would say -- before the individual starts his action. Responsibility is here a novel aspect. Responsibility is

very important, indeed, because the individual shows through it his moral side. Responsibility refers always to norms, to an "ought," by which things and behaviors are judged. With responsibility, the individual binds himself in a contract with society, which, on the other hand, may call him to account for his decisions and behavior. Point four is the transition of the individual's choice to a real action with full responsibility. The only objection to be made against Froehlich's explication, is that he does not indicate the difference between guidance and education. What he has indicated is applicable to education as well.

After having viewed briefly these concepts of guidance, we can now look at its relationship to education.

First of all, we might say that guidance has a marginal position, somewhere between education and psychiatry. The distinctions between education, guidance and psychiatry are not quite clear, especially in practice. They are overlapping each other. The reason is that there is no clearcut demarcation line between normal and abnormal, between mental health and mental illness. This issue involves, of course, the problem of normalcy which will be discussed in Chapter IX. The most obvious concept of normality and abnormality is the one of a continuum, in which the extremes fade into each other.
The most general concept is the one of education. Education occurs wherever there are adults and youngsters. Every stage of man's culture holds an educational activity. This activity starts with the onset of an individual's life -- with the birth or, as some suggest, with the conception. One talks about prenatal child care, for instance by avoiding much emotional stress by expectant mothers, since it may influence the biochemical equilibrium of the physiological system:

Strean and Peer reasoned that since stress increases the amount of circulating hydrocortisone, and since excess of this hormone inhibits fibroplastic proliferation and produces histochemical changes in collagen fibers "it is possible that the threshold for such catabolic effects in the developing embryo is lower for pregnant women in whom a predisposition to cleft palate exists. In the absence of such genic influence severe stress between the 8th and the 11th week of pregnancy may produce an abundance of hydrocortisone capable of initiating teratogenic effects."104

In short, education in a specific sense, ends with the advent of maturity. At this moment the individual is completely responsible for his further development. He may continue, however, the work started by his educative experiences concerning his development, in the form of self-education.

Strictly speaking, if education is a deliberate process between an adult and a child, whereby the adult purposively tries to influence the child to reach a certain end, then, in this light, self-education cannot be called education. In the same manner, adult education should be regarded as having a different characteristic than education in this strict sense (communicative process between adults and children). About education and self-forming (self-education) Langeveld says:

The transition to adulthood has become noticeable long before, through the independent choice of motives, to which the educand will form himself; according as concerning the choice more can be left to the judgment of the educant, the self-forming is taking the place of -- though it may be very active -- a participation in the educative process. The broad -- and vague -- German term "Bildung" comprises the one as well as the other, and brings in this way the cognate but fundamentally distinct characteristic under one word, but not under one concept. For self-forming takes place under complete self-responsibility, while the active participant in the educative process, is placed finally and decisively under the authority of the educator. Self-forming is undoubtedly the close analogy of the active participation in the educative process, and there are, therefore, undoubtedly many striking analogies between the adult who, while forming himself recovers "back maturity," or recovers his faulty general education, or provides himself with mental food -- for example by attending courses at the university extension classes --, and the child that attends school or even a university, that is still a pupil, however

\footnote{105 Cf. p. 85.}
and accordingly conditionally responsible only for himself.\textsuperscript{106}

In the light of this reasoning, education in the specific sense, occurs only between the advent of the individual's life and the moment he has become an adult. Adulthood should not, however, be conceived of merely in a biological sense, nor in a juridical one. Nor should it be conceived in a social sense only. Social maturity means that the individual has become an independent member of his society, able to take social responsibilities. Pedagogical maturity is a more total maturity, whereby the individual's psychical and social functions have been developed and integrated unto a "personality." Its most important characteristic is, that the individual has defined himself as he is, as this person, with full self-responsibility. He alone is responsible for his deeds and for the kind of person he has made of himself. Any person should be free to take responsibilities. For this reason, one main aspect of the aims of education, is developing the sense of responsibility. As Langeveld puts it in an article on guidance:

If this is the "freedom of the child," it is incompatible with the educator's responsibility. For, even when all goes well -- that is, without accidents -- the child's life goes by.

\textsuperscript{106}Trans. from Langeveld, Reknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., pp. 72-73.
And education must come to an end, for one day the child has to take over the full responsibilities of social and personal life. The wisdom of "find out for yourself" depends upon the period available for education in the life of a human being in any culture. The folly of evasiveness and vageness in the pursuit of the aim of education shows itself most clearly. Educators who have not sufficiently recognized this point have produced infantile adults.107

Guidance is partially included in education. It does not start, however, as early as education does (namely, with the advent of the individual's life), but it starts when the individual is ready to be directed. Guidance is only possible when the individual has the ability of understanding, i.e., when he begins to understand and to use the human language. This does not occur until the age of one to two years. At this stage, the child begins to manifest its own will, and often times against the will of its parents. No wonder that in this period there occur many conflicts between parents and child, which often become the seed of future conflicts. The period before this is more one of habit formation, generally on the basis of conditioned reflexes, and which is necessary for the maintenance of the vital life of the infant, such as feeding, elimination, sleep, and hygiene.

The part of education that is dealing with this early age, cannot possibly be called guidance, as guidance is based on the assumption that the individual to be guided, can make and should make his own decisions. The counselor's task is only guiding, directing, and helping the individual who is not slavishly passive, but creatively active and self-decisive concerning his own destination:

To guide means to indicate, to point out, to show the way. It means more than to assist. A man falls on the street; we assist him to get up but we don't guide him unless we help him to go in a certain direction.

The synonyms of to guide are to lead, to conduct, to regulate, to direct, to steer. 108

But Jones remarks:

In general, to guide implies help that is more of a personal nature than either to steer or to direct. We speak of steering a ship, a boat, an automobile, or a bicycle. In all of these the thing steered has no volition in itself; it has no desire, no mind of its own. 109

The essence of guidance is thus the recognition of the individual as a self-defining person and the recognition of his uniqueness, that is to say, the recognition that he has his own characteristics and his own problems, that he is different on each count from other individuals. Guidance is, therefore, more a help than an influence, for

108Jones, loc. cit., p. 70 (Italics in original).
109Ibid. (Italics in original).
help implies the recognition of the right and freedom of one's existence. This recognition is finally the basis of democracy. Guidance cannot properly be carried out without the admittance of this democratic principle. John Locke calls this essence of man, man's "state of nature."

Locke puts the difficulty in his famous essay Of Civil Government as follows: "If a man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other?"

It is from the basis of individual freedom that Jones describes guidance as:

Guidance involves personal help given by some one; it is designed to assist a person in deciding where he wants to go, what he wants to do, or how he can best accomplish his purpose; it assists him in solving problems that arise in his life. It does not solve problems for the individual but helps him to solve them. The focus of guidance is the individual, not the problem; its purpose is to promote the growth of the individuals in a group or directly to the individual alone, but it is always designed to assist the individual.

Guidance does not end with the onset of adulthood. Adults sometimes want and need advice and help in meeting

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111 Jones, loc. cit., p. 71.
their life problems. Each stage of man's life has its own type of problems. Many people, adults no less than children, have difficulties in meeting their problems and need, therefore, the help of wiser persons. This is the difference between guidance and education in the pedagogical sense. While education is theoretically concluded with the advent of adulthood, guidance may provide help to grown-ups, even through to the end of their lives. Persons who are committed to a religious belief, sometimes need help for the salvation of their soul. Here the counselor is more in place than the educator. But the help offered to the individual should not be endless, for the essence of every act of guidance should be that the person helped will finally be able to help himself:

If guidance is to mean anything at all, we are probably free to help the helpless. Yet there are conditions and limitations, which can be summed up in one sentence: help -- to be real help -- should not result in greater helplessness of the one whom we try to help. It cannot always result in the complete elimination of helplessness, but this should be its general aim. Consequently, help should aim at the self-reliance of the one helped, who should learn to help himself or should acquire the material means and courage to do so.112

This same conception of the essence of help is expressed by Jones as follows:

The counsel given is necessarily as varied as the nature of the problem and the need of the individuals for help. The point of view is always the same, to give such assistance as each individual may need and to give it in such a way as to increase his ability to solve his problems without assistance.113

There is another distinction between education and guidance. As was said earlier, education occurs in some form in the relationship between every child and adults. It is a vital necessity for every child. If education produces the desirable result, then, guidance is no longer necessary. So, it might be said that guidance has a supplementary function in respect to educational practice. Education does not need the help of guidance, when it functions perfectly. In this sense, guidance cannot substitute for education; it has merely a supplying and completing function.

In any society, where education is not conceived of and accomplished in a holistic sense, then, it would be necessary that guidance work be developed. This is the case, for example, when formal education or school-instruction puts too much emphasis on mere academic or intellectual knowledge; when it arrogates to itself the

113Jones, loc. cit., p. 97.
responsibility for completely "informal" home education; and when teachers presume to consider themselves, by profession, as the only expert educators. There is nothing worse in education than this last attitude, leading as it may to a common belief among the parents that they are but laymen in matters of education and should, accordingly, shift their educational responsibilities to the formal educational institutions. The teachers, of course, consider themselves experts, because of their theoretical knowledge of human development, instructional methods, and testing techniques; and as we must admit, in these areas are to be found the weakness of the parents' knowledge of educational issues. As long as there is no complete cooperation between parents and teachers, and only a separate notion of the cause of education -- instead of a total approach --, there will occur personality problems on the part of the growing youngsters, which have their repercussions in their "academic achievements."

On the one hand, teachers should give up their pride in monopolizing the educational profession and recognize the fundamental right and necessary competence of parents in educating their own offspring. On the other hand, parents should be more aware of their educational right and responsibilities. They should not disclaim their responsibilities, shifting them to the shoulders of teachers, though this repudiation of responsibilities is quite
often a form of rationalization of their own failures in organizing their own lives adequately. They usually hide this failure under the cloak of sociality -- being occupied with social affairs and social responsibilities of all sorts, such as church organization, charities and the like -- or of economical necessity. As a matter of fact, in most instances, boredom and loneliness, and lack of happiness, are more basically the causes than anything else. Parents who are troubled by life problems and who have not attained emotional maturity will create an unsound psychological climate in the home and, in consequence, are apt to reject their children:

The rejectant home is described as a maladjusted one characterized by conflict, quarrels, and resentment between parents and children, and remarkably lacking in "warm sociable relations either between members of the family or between the family and the outside world." Living in such a family setting, the adolescent discovers that his interests and desires tend to be ignored or considered unimportant, and in so far as he endeavors to bring them to the attention of his parents, or endeavors to assert himself, he encounters arbitrary denials, coercion, and even actual physical punishment. The attitude of the parent is seen as one of "general resentment and hostility toward the child which reveals itself in expressions of disapproval and constant carping." The parent neither understands nor sympathizes with the child, nor does he make any attempt to do so. Fundamentally the child is unwanted in the home and is continually made to feel so. The parents may not fully realize the degree of their rejection, nor the reason for it. They tend to be constantly irritable in dealing with their child and hence may be unreasonably harsh when the child becomes overtly annoying. As Baldwin indicates,
"Their hostility pushes them to frustrate the child needlessly or to ignore him when a friendly interest would cost them nothing."\textsuperscript{114}

Thus, in brief, in a society where there is a cleavage between home and school education, or between informal and formal education, as to the concept and approach of educational problems, there must emerge guidance work as a "historical" necessity. In such a society the young people lose their feeling of "being at home" in both milieus, on the one hand, through the unconcerned attitude of their parents, and, on the other hand, through the cold and stern sifting and selecting processes. The test scores and cumulative records are the "cruel" sieves! Within this frame of reference, we might say, \textit{cum grano salis}, as a kind of pedagogical paradox: "Guidance is a necessary evil!"

Education, as heretofore suggested, should not be conceived of merely in the academic formal sense. It fundamentally includes both formal and informal education, at home as well as at school. And the education of the home, of course, lays the fundaments of a person's life career. The kind of education one has at home determines in large measure, whether or not he will succeed in the academic field or in the community at large. In an

\textsuperscript{114}Horrocks, \textit{loc. cit.}, pp. 45-46.
intensive study by the Gluecks on delinquency, the authors conclude that they can make predictions on future delinquency with great probability, only on the basis of the data in the early years of life, that is, before children enter school:

It seemed reasonable to assume that among factors most markedly distinguishing true delinquents from true non-delinquents were some that were operative prior to the time of school entrance, i.e., before six years of age; and that predictive devices based on such factors might make it possible to determine in advance of the actual onset of clearly defined antisocial behavior those children who are or who are not in danger of developing into delinquents.  

The chances of predictions based on the family situation factor, the authors state, are rather high:

If, for example, Johnny is always harshly disciplined by his father, he would be scored 72.5 on this factor. If the mother generally leaves him to his own devices, letting him run around the streets and not knowing what he does or where he goes, her supervision would be rated "unsuitable" and the score on this factor would be 83.2. If it is learned, further, that the father dislikes the boy, Johnny would be scored 75.9 on this factor. If the mother is shown to be indifferent to her son, expressing little warmth of feeling for him, or if she is downright hostile to him, the score on this item would be 86.2. Finally, if it is found that the family is unintegrated because, for example, the mother spends most of the day away from home, giving little if any thought to the doings of the children, and the father, a heavy drinker, spends most of his leisure

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In bars and cafes, ignoring his family, the score on this factor would be 96.9. Addition of these scores results in a total of 414.7.\(^{116}\)

A boy scoring 250 or more is considered having more than an even chance of becoming a delinquent. The above citation indicates how important the interfamily situation is in the total educational scene.

Sometimes guidance cannot accomplish its task in respect to a certain student, the problem being unsurmountable for the counselor. This is the case when the individual's problem or conflict has become a neurosis or psychosis. The treatment of these cases is up to the clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Many psychiatric cases, however, are the consequences of a wrong or a bad "education." Many youngsters are rejected by their parents or by the school for lack of competition abilities. When the counselor does not feel competent to help a "serious case," then, the "client" should be referred to the psychiatrist for "deep therapy." While the function of counseling is psycho-prophylactic or psycho-hygienic, the task of psychiatry is more curative or therapeutic. When guidance work is considered to be more psycho-prophylactic — i.e., applied only in cases when education "stops" --, we may say that education, in its general and real sense, has a more formative and creative task.

\(^{116}\)Ibid., pp. 118-119.
Though it is not hard to determine the guidance function in connection with its position in education, it is still a difficult task to render a precise and generally acceptable definition of guidance. The reason is that guidance -- like education -- is inseparable from life itself, from life values and life philosophy, especially the anthropological philosophy. A different philosophy of man will result in a different philosophy of guidance. Hence, there are many definitions of guidance. There are certainly some common characteristics of those definitions, but these common characteristics are comprised in a different context, subject to the Weltanschauung of the specialist in guidance. But no matter what our philosophy may be, there is one certain common "guide" of our guidance work, and that is the salvation of the individual's soul, whatever salvation and soul may mean.

Says Langeveld:

To become this right man a person has to begin walking along this right way at an early age. For this way, too, is narrow and it, too, leads to safety. Secular priests, not in black but in white gowns, attend the layman all along this road to his unanticipated benefits, which result in his secularized salvation. At the end of both roads angels flap their wings. Angels from Heaven or from Holywood. "Come into my heaven," they sing, offering eternity or, alternatively, a life of comfort. In short: happiness in one "frame of reference" or in the other. Some frames of reference are socially conditioned, it does not matter in
the least whether people take their happiness with or without metaphysics. 117

On the last issue, however, Langeveld holds the necessary proper reserve by saying:

There is indeed a reservation to this last point: happiness should not disturb other people's happiness...this brings other people in. They can be easily disturbed. But who decides whether they are reasonable or not? On the horizon of these considerations the shadow of conflict looms: he who has the strongest muscles or the greatest hysterical talent may develop into the man whose happiness is most easily disturbed. Such a man is a tyrant. The man Hitler was one. He had very personal tastes and extremely definite opinions about...guidance. 118


118 Ibid., p. 32.
CHAPTER III

WHAT KIND OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY?

Classification of Educational Theories

One of the profound characteristics of man is that he seeks order. Without order, he cannot orient himself in the world, i.e., he cannot maintain his existence. He must have some kind of "a frame of reference" on which he can always fall back, when he gets lost in the chaos of the world. If he is to feel at home in his life, he must order the world, his world. He designs his own world, in which he will feel secure and at ease, for he needs security in order to live. But every order is by definition humanistic, i.e., according to human biases, and thus is never free from errors. We may even radically say that every order one makes is uniquely individual, subject to one's personal structure:

It has been said that form, order, and arrangement dominate mental life from first to last. But the individual always has a personal order, which may or may not conform to other peoples' ideas. "Disorderly" may mean only "different from my idea of order." And there may be warrant for saying that the "Mental" activities of the person are those which have to do with organizing meanings into useful patterns, patterns which enable the transfer just described.

This organization involves the whole person.¹

Each person has his own outlook of the world and life; thus, each person has his own kind of order, no matter how primitive it may seem to be. Nobody can claim that there is and should be only one kind of order of absolute trueness, though some people think there is such thing as a universal way of ordering of things, the only true philosophy. These people live under the obsession that there is, as a logical consequence, only one true philosophy of education, and that other philosophies of education are false.

I do not say "applied to the culture in question," because I do not believe with Mead that the principles of education vary from one society to another. Rather do I agree with Adler, that the underlying philosophy of education must be universally applicable in order to be valid; that there cannot be more than one "philosophy of education." And, since every principle is guided by an underlying philosophy, if the philosophy is universal, the principles must be likewise.

From another philosophical corner we hear about the same voice:

In contradiction to this group, and other similar groups [naturalism and instrumentalism!] that shine by reflected light, Catholic philosophy recognizes and emphasizes unchanged and unchanging absolute truth. It offers education definite goals and ends built upon fundamental principles. Based on logic and common sense, this philosophy offers unfailing guides for intelligent living.

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If there were really only one true philosophy, and thus only one true philosophy of education, then to talk about "classification of educational theories" would not make any sense at all. We could make, simply, this dichotomic classification: (a) The true philosophy of education; (b) false philosophies of education. But by doing this, the classification would, at the same time, lose its philosophical character, and will consequently give up its acceptability. It is a too simple way of ordering things.

The problem of classification is baffling, for the simple reason that the world in its totalness is multiplex in its manifestations, and that we, in the limitations of our knowledge, cannot possibly comprise all dimensions, under one infallible logical order.

As we cannot assume that there will be only one true philosophy of education, we must admit many possibilities of classifying educational theories. One can for instance, make the following classification: general education and professional education, with the corresponding educational theories. He can do this with good reason--namely, that man's life (and thus also the organization of society) can be viewed from two angles which supplement each other: commonality (general education) versus individuality (specialization or differentiation because of the existing individual differences among men with respect to abilities and interests).
But this kind of classification is not the usual way of thinking. If one talks about educational theories, he generally means theories of education derived from certain philosophical positions, such as idealism, realism, naturalism and pragmatism. He does not account for why he takes these four philosophies. He does not also make clear why he makes this philosophical classification. Is it, because these four philosophies are the most important philosophical trends? Is classification based on importance -- a matter of consensus actually -- philosophically justifiable? What about existentialism? Butler has selected as the major philosophies: naturalism, idealism, realism and pragmatism, arranged in this order historically:

They are named here in the same order in which they will be taken up later for full discussion, the order in which they have arisen historically.

While naturalism and idealism have persisted as distinctive philosophies since early in history of human thought, realism is a more recent viewpoint, arising in early modern times.  

If realism is supposed to have arisen in modern times, why does he bring Catholicism under realism? Aristotle is known as the earliest realistic philosopher and Catholicism -- in fact, Thomistic in its philosophy -- emerged before the early modern times.

4Butler, loc. cit., pp. 44, 45.
In the Introduction of the Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (N.S.S.E.) Brubacher has announced that the Yearbook will discuss five main schools of educational philosophy -- namely, pragmatism, realism, idealism, Aristotelianism, and scholasticism or Catholicism. Butler's topic of naturalism disappears in the Yearbook's selection. Brubacher, too, admits that

These have been chosen because of their generally admitted prominence in contemporary educational thought and practice.5

In this Yearbook, Catholicism is not grouped under realism because of its theocentric character.

The common basis of classification -- idealism, realism, naturalism, and pragmatism -- is not too clear. According to the traditional aspects of philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology, it would appear to be better to take one of these aspects as a basis of ordering.

We could for instance make this **metaphysical** classification: **idealism** and **materialism** (including naturalism), giving pragmatism a middle position. Idealism postulates that the nature of entity in the universe is idea, mind or

spirit; that what we call matter is merely the sensorial aspect of this spiritual entity. Materialism, on the other hand, believes that the essence of the world is material substance. What we call psychical phenomena are nothing but epiphenomena, emerging out of matter through the process of evolution. Natural processes take place according to certain laws which we must try to understand. To understand nature (the universe) is to understand her laws. For this metaphysical framework, pragmatism has again a middle position, because to the pragmatist, the nature of nature is neither matter nor spirit, but there is only mind as a field-concept, an interrelationship phenomenon. Man will never be able to disclose the essence of nature.

In the second place, we could base a philosophical classification on epistemology, i.e., with respect to the problem of truth. When truth is considered a correspondence between knowledge and the objective world that constitutes the facts, then we have realism. Realism postulates the existence of a knowing subject and an objective world. Idealism, however, assumes that truth is nothing but a systematic coherence in man's knowledge, so that there are no contradictions and inconsistencies in it. Here, pragmatism takes a particular position -- pragmatism is an epistemological philosophy rather than a metaphysical one -- namely, pragmatic truth lies in the satisfactory working of
a hypothesis. A proposition is true insofar as it works or satisfies, though the meaning of working or satisfying is interpreted differently by various exponents of the pragmatic view. The truth of a proposition should be checked through experiences. This is called the verification of the truth.

We may add here that the position of existentialism as a powerful modern philosophical trend is hard to locate with respect to either metaphysics or epistemology in the traditional academic sense. We probably could bring existentialism under both metaphysics and epistemology, since the main concern of existentialism is the ontology, i.e., the metaphysics of Being. But at the same time, in the quest of the nature of Being, it refers and goes back directly to man's very own existence, which man is supposed to be able to sense, to live, and to understand phenomenologically. Phenomenology is a much used epistemological method in existentialism. Man and his existence are the beginning and end of the quest for truth.

When men first awaken to the need of reflection, they begin usually by directing their sight on the things farthest removed from themselves. Only as they return disheartened to the starting-point, rich in the knowledge of nonpurpose objects but poor in self-understanding, do they sometimes come to look squarely on their own human condition -- on the fact that is of their own existence. Like Socrates of old they then resolve to concern themselves no longer with
"things on the other side of the moon," but to pay attention to themselves. Then only do they seek to know themselves.°

Kneller, in his study on Existentialism and Education states that there are some similarities between existentialism and pragmatism, because of the "open-ended" and dynamic character of both philosophies:

Yet in some respects existentialism and experimentalism come close to agreement. Morris speculates that if pragmatism had delineated its ontological notion of man as thoroughly as have other philosophies, it might have emerged with a close facsimile of the existential man. Both doctrines embrace a dynamic, "open-ended" view of the universe, postulating reality as a process of becoming rather than a state of being...

There is also a striking similarity between the existentialist's concept of transcendence and the experimentalist's understanding of growth; in this instance, self-transcendence is perhaps the more accurate term. Both traditions grant that the very function of living is to grow, "to transcend one's present self and become something more"; in other words to seek self-realization.7

Finally, with respect to axiology we could have two contrasting possibilities, two types of qualities which we attribute to our attitude toward the totality of things. We may have a naturalistic outlook upon the world; that is, we judge the world in terms of truth or illusion, detached from


any feeling, value or emotion. Facts are bare facts, and man does not have any right to ascribe value-judgments to them. This is generally the attitude of the scientist. Man is considered merely a piece of nature, like other "natural" objects.

The opposite possibility is the personalistic attitude; that is, the view of the world in which man uses value-judgments in terms of course, of his own value systems. Things are not only true or false, but also moral or immoral, aesthetic or ugly, warm or cold, sympathetic or uncongenial, etc. Man can never free himself from certain feelings and values. Things have their meanings related to man, and man is actually inseparable from other objects than himself. Most philosophies of education are personalistic rather than naturalistic. Behaviorism of the Pavlovian kind is one of the exceptions. Again, pragmatism is both naturalistic and personalistic in its axiology. Values, according to pragmatism, are ambiguous, since they are both intrinsic (the value in itself and for itself, and, thus, also personalistic) and instrumentalistic (used as a means to reach an end, i.e., the tentative value judgment), both emerging from experience processes of the organism with the environment (and, therefore, having their naturalistic character).

William E. Hocking in his book *Types of Philosophy*, makes a classification of philosophy based on metaphysics
(Type I: Naturalism), epistemology (Type II: Pragmatism; Type III: Intuitionism), and on both metaphysics and epistemology (Type IV: Dualism; Type V: Idealism; Type VI: Realism; Type VII: Mysticism), and comes to the conclusion that each of us should have a personal philosophy, i.e., a personal way of integrating the various aspects of reality:

There is but one way to be adequately hospitable without being eclectic, that is by discovering the single principle which shows how the various parts of truth belong together. Your philosophy is not your collection: it is your principle.\footnote{William Ernest Hocking, Types of Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. 489.}

In the final chapter, Hocking reveals his own philosophical commitment, stating:

To this extent, I believe that idealism is not so much a separate type of philosophy as the essence of all philosophy, an assumption whether recognized or unrecognized of the philosophic enterprise itself. I take idealism, then, so far as this argument carries us, as the centre of my metaphysics. And I take this as a point of certainty, established by the dialectical method of which we were speaking. One who should say "The world has no objective meaning" would, as I see it, contradict himself.\footnote{Tbid., pp. 495-496.}

It would appear that Hocking should have gone further with his classification -- namely, by elaboration of possibilities in the area of axiology. This is centrally important for educational theory, since education is
primarily concerned with the ought of man's conduct, with
the pursuit of happiness or of the good, and not with the
"bare facts" alone. Hocking hinted at this problem in the
first chapter of his book:

But philosophy also seeks wisdom in regard to
conduct of life: it would be hard to say which
is the more primitive interest, the theoretical
or the practical. Hence in the second place:

7. Beliefs about better and worse, right
and wrong: the theme of ethics.

We have been speaking of the pursuit of
happiness or of the good. But what of "duty"?
Is that the same as the general obligation to
use discretion in the pursuit of good? Or are
there rules which, like the rules of a game,
give structure to our conduct without altering
its objects, and qualify some ways of reaching
our end as definitely right or wrong? If so,
what is the source of these rules or standards
of right and wrong?10

From the preceding discussion of philosophical posi­
tions -- metaphysical, epistemological, as well as axiologi­
cal, we may conclude that it is always possible to derive
our educational concepts from such positions, at least if
educational theory should be understood in the sense of
educational inferences from philosophical stances. Which
one we should choose, is rather a matter of personal taste
and difference in psychological structure of the person, so
that each characterological disposition has a definite "out­
look upon the world" accordingly. There is a certain

10 Ibid., pp. 11-14 (Italics in original).
relationship between personality structure and the way of looking at things. To be sure, this notion might possibly lead to an absurd inference — namely, that the classification of philosophies must be based on the typology of characters.

Another approach to classification may be made by focusing on educational theories rather than on educational philosophies. Since educational theory is a "practical" discipline — it is primarily concerned with man's conduct, we had better look for another basis of classification than mere philosophy, a basis that could serve as a maxim for human conduct. This maxim is supposed to be the "authority," upon which the educationist bases his theoretical and practical judgments. This "authority" may rest with science, philosophy, religious belief, or with socio-political power and conceived either as a derivative or "application," or as an independent discipline in itself. Thus, we may have the following classification:

a. Descriptive-scientific approach
b. Philosophical approach
c. Religio-traditional approach
d. Power-political approach. The descriptive scientific approach is an objective description of what has actually been going on in education through the centuries and among various cultures. This kind
of approach attempts to free itself from any subjective value-
judgments and interpretations, because no interpretation is
ever free of cultural or philosophical biases. This group
of educational scientists claims that the only genuinely
scientific approach is objective, uninterpretative descrip-
tion. This is, of course, a scientific fallacy.

The descriptive method usually studies the history
of education and comparative education, to ascertain factual
phenomena of how people educate at different times and in
different places of the world:

Die positieve Beschreibung der tatsächlichen
Vorgänge der Regeneration, der kulturellen
Eingliederung der Aufwachsenden bei allen
Volkern der Erde und in allen Gebieten der
Tradition, dann vergleichend in der Absicht
einer Zusammenschau des Typischen: das ist das
Arbeitsfeld einer positiven vergleichenden
Erziehungswissenschaft, die neuerdings wieder
gefordert wird.\textsuperscript{11}

The philosophical approach starts from a certain
philosophical proposition, and then makes educational infer-
ences. One may put more emphasis on metaphysics, while
another more on epistemology or on axiology. Different
philosophies will usually lead to different educational
theories. Most educational theories are of this kind, as we
have indicated earlier. As Frank Wegener puts it:

The problems of epistemology like those of value
theory and metaphysics cannot be resolved

\textsuperscript{11}Wilhelm Flitner, \textit{Allgemeine Pädagogik} (Stuttgart:
Ernst Klett Verlag, 3 Auflage), p. 36.
experimentally! These are unique philosophical functions; and to the extent that educational philosophers must translate these theories into educational first principles, they constitute the bases for the unique functions of educational philosophy.12

Axiology is probably the central point in philosophy, where philosophizing is primarily a human endeavor, a human activity in a total personal climate, in which the philosopher is personally and totally involved. Both metaphysics and epistemology are already implied in axiology. This seems to be the main distinction between philosophy and science, though some scientists claim to have their own philosophy, a "philosophy of science," as well. What the scientists mean, of course, is but the rules of the game of pursuing knowledge, the so-called scientific method. In this sense the philosophy of science is only concerned narrowly with the problem of epistemology, detached from all philosophical flavor:

Hence we must conclude that metaphysics are built either on air or on quicksands -- either they start from no foundation in facts at all, or the superstructure has been raised before a basis has been found in the accurate classification of facts. I want to lay special stress on this point. There is no short cut to truth, no way to gain a knowledge of the universe except through the gateway of scientific method. The hard and stony path of classifying facts and reasoning upon them is the only way to ascertain

truth. It is the reason and not the imagination which must ultimately be appealed to.\textsuperscript{13}

While the epistemology of science is exclusively rationalistic, and its objective is merely the pursuit of cold objective knowledge by ascertaining and classifying the facts, thus free from value-judgments, the philosopher cannot free himself completely from giving meaning to the world and to his own existence. In philosophizing, the person of the philosopher is always involved. For this reason a later chapter will be devoted to the discussion of an educational theory which is based explicitly on an axiological proposition (the Theistic personalism of Kohnstamm). As Kohnstamm puts it:

The characteristic of pedagogics as science should not, therefore, be sought in the demand that it have binding results for each rational being, but that it should show the validity of the coherence between certain positions and a definite system of axioms. In this way, immanent criticism and reciprocal understanding would be possible among persons who eventually differ from each other in their final valuations, provided their basis-of-living-through does not differ in such a way that they live in separate worlds. And of course, this does not apply to educational theory only, but to all scientific elaboration of super-theoretical truth, i.e., all truth that has transgressed the field of observations and has reached the realm field of value-systems.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14}Kohnstamm, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 27.
The religio-traditional position is based on a certain religious belief, represented by persons or institutions, the authority of which is recognized through tradition or a personal a-rational belief. The tenets of such religious faiths purport to be immutable and immune from scientific criticism:

With this ultimate aim of Catholic education, there never has been, there can be no change. Given the Church's teaching about man's nature, and supernature, and man's supernatural destiny, it is impossible to see how there could be any change. Into this ultimate aim every type of Catholic educational institution must fit from kindergarten to graduate school; otherwise it has no right to be called a Catholic school. For no matter how poor the intellectual training, it imparts, no matter how badly equipped academically the teachers may be, that school is a Catholic school which holds fast to its philosophy of supernaturalism.\(^{15}\)

The fourth group, the power-political approach, advocates that the teaching profession should wield power in order to guide the course of a society or nation in the interest of the welfare of the masses. In criticizing the weaknesses of progressive education as too much child-centered, and, therefore, too soft, too nice and sentimental, and designed only for the liberal-minded upper middle class, Counts spoke up for a power policy in education:

That the teachers should deliberately reach for power and then make the most of their conquest

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is my firm conviction. To the extent that they are permitted to fashion the curriculum and the procedures of the school they will definitely and positively influence the social attitudes, ideals, and behavior of the coming generation. In doing this they should resort to no subterfuge or false modesty.

If all of these facts are taken into account, instead of shunning power, the profession should rather seek power and then strive to use that power fully and wisely and in the interests of the great masses of the people.\(^\text{16}\)

This tone and mental climate of educational concept is not too foreign to us, since we have enough examples in the history of education -- namely, in theory at least in Plato's *Republic*, and in actual practice in the totalitarian states of Nazi-Germany and Fascistic Italy and, currently, in Communistic Russia and China.

Another example of the power-political trend is the reconstructionism movement of Theodore Brameld. Brameld's basic belief is that the democratic way of life is the most adequate one. His conception of democracy puts more emphasis on the well-being of society as a whole, than on the interest of individuals. For him the "social self" is primary to the individual self. Decisions should be made by social consensus, based on the so-called majority-rule. Once a decision is made, everybody should abide by what has been

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\(^{16}\)George Sylvester Counts, "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" Joe Park (ed.), *Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 144-145.
agreed upon. The function of the minority is to criticize. But the criticism should be based on sufficient evidence to be discussed on a public forum. No facts should be suppressed and no opportunities for open communication should be limited. The power of a decision lies in the agreement of the majority. Only in this way the solidarity of the group can be guaranteed:

In this perspective discipline becomes the agreed-upon acceptance of orderly procedures through which the members of a group unite in systematic efforts to articulate and to attain their goals. It is not super-imposed but it is, in a sense, imposed -- imposed by the majority upon itself and upon any minority as well. The minority, although it is free to advocate, to criticize, and to persuade if possible, is required to accept whatever rules of action are established by the group in the belief that they are necessary to group solidarity and accomplishment.17

An Attempt at a Multi-dimensional Approach

We recognize, on the one hand, that the differing philosophies and theories of education have something relevant to offer, on the other hand, we are looking for something general, since the issue of the present writing is the search for a general aim of education. We should try, therefore, to find a modus which would combine and integrate the common elements as well as the opposing ones, so as to enable us to arrive at a general agreement on the general

aim of education. The nature of the topic itself -- general aim -- might have suggested this very idea of finding a common modus, in other words a broad topic would as a matter of course, lead us to an "all-inclusive" view. We have a deep faith that there must be something in common which we strive for in our educational efforts and on which we ground our educational activities. Otherwise we would persist in acting at cross purposes, with a great probability of interfering with each other. This does not mean, however, that our common aim is a formulation of a positive objective that should be attained at the end of our educational activities, and when the educand has once attained it, we can take rest in self-complacency with the thought that we have reached the ultimate aim of life. If this were true, life would present no problem, and we would have created a paradise on earth.

Giles has summed up five desirable and possible conditions for the description of a behavioral theory so that it would be acceptable from many view, as follows:

a. It should provide a common reference for relating the findings of diverse disciplines,
b. Without losing the value of individual emphases and methods,
c. So that the research of a variety of theorists can be employed without the necessity of accepting the researcher's often partial or skewing theory,
d. so that the common reference will facilitate popular understanding of patterns of scientific, philosophic, and artistic thought,
e. so that there is a common reference for the interpretation of both individual and group behavior.18

What we are looking for is a common reference which would be acceptable, theoretically at least, to those of differing views. This would mean, however, that we should be willing to include in our theory contrasting philosophical and psychological views, such as the oneness and manifoldness of things, mind-body opposites, commonality and uniqueness of things, sociality and individuality of man, wholeness and differentiation, dynamics and structure, the adequacy of religion, philosophy, science, and arts, growth versus self-consistency, the problem of heredity versus environment. We should also include differing epistemological concepts, such as sensorial experience versus reasoning and intuition, and in the field of the psychology of learning such opposing views as conditioning versus insight, objectivity versus subjectivity, absolutism over and against relativism, and so on. No single theory, however, can have a claim to the absolute trueness of its one-side view. On the other hand, opposing views may both contain some relevant meaning. Is this in general probably the way things manifest themselves? Could it be that opposites are seeming properties of reality, due to our own human categorical way

18Giles, Education and Human Motivation, loc. cit., p. 2.
of seeing and treating things? Could we do otherwise? There is no other way of seeing and explaining things, in reality, than through paradoxical opposites.

Nevertheless we should not be able to comprise all kinds of educational problems under one theory, however all-inclusive our theory purports to be. We simply cannot be all-inclusive enough. A limited view on educational problems would, at the same moment, contradict itself, since educational problems are fundamentally man's very own life problem. We should face this dilemma in our educational theorizing, admitting that life is paradoxical. At the same time we have to confess as well, that we cannot answer all fundamental problems, because these problems are inherent in our humanness. Problems such as, What is the sense of life? What is the sense of history? Does man have a free will? What is real freedom? What is absolute truth? will remain unsolved.

We need only note certain examples to see how intricate human problems really are. Touching upon the problem of heredity and environment Giles, for instance, states:

It has since been discovered, however, that the children of outstanding parents are not numerically the most outstanding second generation. It is the average families which contribute the great bulk of "superior" people to the world. And actually, there is no evidence that environmental restrictions operate equally. For this reason it is impossible to predict the limits of
growth of any individual. It is also increasingly evident that changes in environment can lead to great changes in an organism during one lifetime. The implications of this probability for parents and educators are obvious and tremendous.\textsuperscript{19}

A few pages later Giles admits that:

The problem of instinct and motive, of heredity vs. environment as factors in growth, are still unsolved.\textsuperscript{19}

In criticizing the inadequacy of science to understand man's subjective being (objectivity vs. subjectivity), Fallico declares:

This is because such an outlook [scientific outlook!] can take no recognition of man's subjective being which is exactly the same thing as his freedom. Such a thing fits neither in its method nor in the fundamental assumptions upon which it is built. Purposiveness as such has never been its concern, and its knowledge about man is in principle patterned exactly on the unpretentious descriptions that reputable science tentatively offers about white mice.\textsuperscript{21}

Fallico has indicated some essential elements for an educational theory:

What might be called the foundations for an educational theory include most prominently a theory of intelligence, of what it is, how it works to guide conduct, and how it changes; a theory of the self or of personality as that which bears the educative changes; a theory of the culturation process, of how cultures mingle and conflict with one another; and finally, a theory concerning the

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 30.

nature of reality as object of knowledge and how it is known, and what powers a greater knowledge of reality confers upon those who have it as against those who have less. 22

An objection to Fallico's opinion is the preference for the prevailing role of intelligence in human life. Since intelligence is nothing more than a function -- however important -- of man's life, it could not be a "fundamental" issue, at least in the common meaning of the word. More fundamental would be the problem of life-organization, in which other dimensions than intelligence are included, such as motivation and feelings. Intelligence is not the only factor of individual differences. Intelligence is so much conditioned by many other factors, that it would be a real bias to assume that intelligence should be the only basis for our educational endeavors. The great import of intelligence is more a matter of traditional assumption, based on a life of competition, productivity and efficiency. But at the same time this assumption is the cause of many mental conflicts and much misery. Conflicts in people and among people are in fact more fundamental problems in man's history than the problem of intelligence and gaining knowledge, since these are intimately related to the problem of personality organization.

If we would find some concepts which could be included in any theory, then, we could possibly bridge the

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.
gaps between opposing views. Such a concept is for example the concept of creativity and growth. The scientist would probably immediately raise his objections to such nebulosity. The concepts of gravitation, relativity, and nucleus are, however, no less nebulous, though these theoretical constructs have proved to be very fruitful. The more general a construct, the more evasive its tendency and the more unassailable it is to criticism. The more specific a theory, such as the reflexology-type of psychology, the easier it is to be refuted. Neal Miller states that "the great power of good theoretical constructs comes from their generality." Krech and Klein advocate that a theory on man should be all-inclusive, holistic, and unitary, in order to be adequate:

The very descriptive units which we use in dealing with our observable behavior must be derived from and oriented toward a unitary concept of behavior, and the explanatory principles must be all-inclusive.

Perhaps all we need do from the outset is to refuse to split man up: The dictum "the whole is simpler than the sum of its parts" may be applicable here.

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Krech and Klein see that the construction of a scientific theory is more a matter of personality organization, i.e., as a manifestation of an adaptive response in a personal way, so that any scientist may start from more or less "arbitrary" assumptions, so as to arrive at meaningful final conclusions, at least meaningful for his "personality":

Seeing the scientific effort as just another kind of adaptive response to a special problem, one easily sees that there can be no rules or presumptions that will be invariant from scientist to scientist; effective solution of this problem may be tried via manyfold routes. In a sense the scientist sets his own rules, since he tends to follow the preferred course of adaptive response indicative of what we here call his "personality."  

Thus, in this frame of reference, we might relate Comte's neo-positivism to Comte's personality structure. He considers the history of humanity running through three stages of development—namely, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive stage of factual knowledge, with the implication that the religious stage is supposed to be more primitive than the scientific one. But may another not say, however, with the same right, that man's development in general, phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically, goes through just the reverse order? At the dawn of man's existence on earth, he began his life with the observation

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25 Ibid., p. 15.
of events and phenomena surrounding him. From these observations he made inferences in terms of regularities of events. He made theories as to the nature of regularities of events or laws, in order to enable him to anticipate similar events. He assumed, for instance, four fundamental elements as the origin of the world. He studied the stars, constellation and planets with the aid of mathematics in order to study the nature of climate changes. These astronomical studies were vital for the maintenance of his life. He explained events according to a certain frame of reference, though modern man usually calls his world-image "primitive." He designed his own world, so that everything became meaningful and worthwhile. This is what science basically does.

The human individual, just after his birth, starts his life in the same way as "primitive" people. He begins to reconnoitre his immediate environment, particularly his mother and measures her with his eyes. Very soon the infant discerns his mother sharply from other people and even from other women. This kind of development is simply a measure of precaution and self-protection. No other mother can take care of him better than his own. This is the reason why the death percentage of "motherless" infants in institutions with the best medical care, is still high:

The experiences after the First World War with parentless babies in special homes (experiences
that were confirmed after the Second World War) show that many of the children die even if the care for them is, biologically speaking, excellent. They need more. Consequently "guidance only," guidance as an activity, a skill, and an organization can only be secondary and subordinate to home education.  

Gradually, the infant's environment grows broader and broader, from the tiny crib via the larger bedroom, his house, the garden and, finally, the whole universe. He too makes discoveries as the scientist does, looking for regularities and relationships. He orders the world, his world. His knowledge and understanding about the world is, however, but a function and a means of a more fundamental tendency in himself -- namely, the need for security and comfort in the world. This is also primarily the driving motivation in science; to raise the level of security and comfort. Knowledge and wisdom as such are secondary. This is about the general climate of the scientific endeavor. The main characteristics of science are observation and analysis, in order to describe the events and phenomena in a meaningful order. It makes use of certain symbols. Semantics is, therefore, indispensible in science. For, through the use of symbols, science can formulate its findings, so that its discoveries can be comprised in a conveniently arranged form.

But science does not stand still. The field of discoveries has no limitations. Science designs theories in order to expand the field of knowledge, it makes systems that can cover fields of knowledge as broad as possible. Science tries to be all-inclusive as possible, i.e., tries to include problems and phenomena within one theory. The theory becomes a system of thought. Sometimes a system of thought is elevated to a belief, a faith or a kind of religion, such as the Marxian historical materialism, Darwinian evolutionism, etc. The main concern of science is the physical world, since its conviction is that through better understanding of the material environment, man can control "nature" more adequately. The control of the physical world is aimed to raise the conditions of life, for a better living. Man is viewed as a complicated machine, as a mechanical-dynamical system, subject to the same laws as the material world, and which needs some repair at times. If there is something wrong in the human organism, it is said, there is something wrong in the bio-chemical processes within the body.

And so, in the quest for a better understanding of the world in order to promote man's conditions of living, the scientist is ever in search of general laws, for causalities, because his conviction is that to solve problems is to look for causes of the emerging problems. The
main characteristic of science is its striving towards gen-
erality. This tendency to search for generality, however,
is not the monopoly of modern scientists alone. The primi-
tive man, too, is endowed with this drive for generality. 
Only the methods are different. Methods finding is merely 
a matter of technique, of experience rather than an innate 
principle. The object of science remains the same, i.e., 
the "objective" world.

As science moves further, while making progress, 
especially in the field of technology as the application of 
scientific thought, man is beginning to wonder about him-
self, and is becoming aware of the primary cause of his 
troubles, that is man himself. Not the discovery of nuclear 
energy itself is a hazardous adventure, not the hydrogen 
 bomb itself is dangerous, but the way man uses it. Man him-
self is his own enemy. He can hardly control himself. The 
problem of world peace, lies not so much in the problem of 
disarmament or to stop the armaments race, as in the banning 
of hostility. Hostility is actually man's problem. It is 
quite a problem, because it is a form of deterioration of 
man's essential nature. Love is the fundamental basis of 
man's very own existence. Eros is still primary to Thanatos, 
creation is more basic than destruction, or production is 
earlier than consumption. In comparing love-prejudice with
hate-prejudice Allport states that the former is more basic than the latter. Says he:

Now there is a good reason to believe that this love-prejudice is far more basic to human life than its opposite, hate-prejudice (which Spinoza says "consists in feeling about anyone through hate less than is right"). One must first over-estimate the things one loves before one can underestimate their contraries. Fences are built primarily for the protection of what we cherish. Positive attachments are essential to life. The young child could not exist without his dependent relationship on a nurturant person. He must love and identify himself with someone or something before he can learn what to hate. Young children must have family and friendship circles before they can define the "outgroups" which are a menace to them.27

In criticizing Darwinian evolutionism which is based on the "natural" law of the "survival of the fittest," Montagu defends in about the same fashion, the proposition that human nature is originally peaceful and cooperative in order to preserve himself:

Life in the state of nature, the Darwinians showed, is a struggle for existence, characterized by ruthless competition. Conflict and combat is the rule, indeed, the law of nature. In the social-economic context of the day, the survival of the fightingest (or anyone with an income of over $2500 per annum); the weakest, it was asserted, went to the wall and the strongest took all the prizes. Nature was red in tooth and claw and though it shrieked against the creed of man, man was still a part and a product of nature.28


28Montagu, loc. cit., p. 32.
And a few pages further Montagu states positively that human nature is fundamentally good, because goodness is the very basis of man's existence:

Indeed, it may unequivocally be stated that every human being is born good, good in the sense that every infant is born with all its energies oriented in the direction of conferring and receiving of exchanging creativity enlarging benefits. The purposes of the infant are constructive -- not destructive. He desires to live as if to live and love were one.29

In the attempt to control nature for security and comfort, in order that he will be at home on this earthly planet, man has "gone too far," so that he hardly can find his way back through the maze of troubles and conflicts which he has inflicted upon himself. Man wants now to understand himself better than before, by reflecting on himself and his condition, so as to solve his troubles. This is the main reason why psychology has emerged at a later date than natural science.

The development of philosophical thought has followed about the same course, i.e., from dualistic realism (even Plato's idealism is realistic and may be called "transcendental realism"), to monistic subjective idealism or psychologism. In an attempt to remain purely objective, in spite of the belief in psychologism, Husserl has developed

29Ibid., p. 40.
a new trend in philosophy, better known under the name of phenomenology. Some notes from the Dictionary of Philosophy on Husserl's phenomenology are instructive.

In the first edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, phenomenology was defined (much as it had been by Hamilton and Lazarus) as descriptive analysis of subjective processes *Erlebnisse*. Thus its theme was unqualifiedly identified with what was commonly taken to be the central theme of psychology; the two disciplines were said to differ only in that psychology sets up causal or genetic laws to explain what phenomenology merely describes. Phenomenology was called "pure" so far as the phenomenologist distinguishes the subjective from the objective and refrains from looking into either the genesis of subjective phenomena or their relations to somatic and environmental circumstances.30

On the later development of Husserl's phenomenology we read:

Because the difference between phenomenological pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology depends on a difference in attitude towards "the same" subject-matter, their contents are widely analogous. Husserl maintained, however, that genuine philosophy is possible only as transcendental phenomenology, because it alone is knowledge of that non-worldly nucleus of subjectivity in which everything intendable as immanent or as transcendent is constituted (produced, generated) as an essentially intentional object. 31

Phenomenology is a philosophical method of inquiry to help us understand the essence of being or subjectivity. Within it objectivity and subjectivity are merged into what Husserl called "transcendental-phenomenological idealism."


31 Ibid., p. 234.
Through phenomenology the philosopher tries to understand more deeply the essential phenomena of man, his essential psychic possibilities, impossibilities and necessities, in any possible world, i.e., he tries to understand himself in any concrete situation. A situation is a total of experience possibilities covering not only the present, but also the background of one's past and future. A situation is always unique, einmalig and thus unrepeatable. And yet the uniqueness should be understood in its totalness. This is the difference between scientific method and phenomenology. Science is analytic, and is looking for similarities and regularities, in order to arrive at generalizations. Phenomenology is total, direct and recognizes the uniqueness, and newness of each situation.

The main concern of phenomenology is man's very own existence, i.e., "man in a situation." This is one of the reasons, why existentialism in general makes much use of phenomenology:

Existence philosophy is concerned with a particular man. Nevertheless, it is not individualistic insofar that it isolates the individual. On the contrary, it only sees the human in a concrete situation, in which he is connected with the world and with other people. He is never an isolated abstract idea. Human being is being in the world, In-der-Welt-Sein, and it is always being with others, Mit-Anderen-Sein.32

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The concrete man is always man in a situation, that is the totality of experience possibilities. We can interpret a human situation only by referring to man's own existence, i.e., to his very own existential ground. To understand human existence means to understand man's problems and this, on the other hand, will give us a meaningful overview of all phenomena of the human and "natural" history, of man's attempts to organize his view of world and life, an overview of man's knowledge about what is known and what is knowable. To understand the world, one must understand his own self first, and conversely, man comes back to himself after having reconnoitred the whole range of the objective world (from mathematics, through physics, chemistry, astronomy, to biology and finally psychology). The difference between the so-called Oriental attitude and that of the Occidental, is the starting point from which one sees reality. The Western cultural tradition is "realistic--objective," and analytic, i.e., it starts with the study of the objective world looking for the "laws of nature" outside the human consciousness. The Oriental cultural tradition is "idealistic-subjective" and holistic, identifying the world with the Self, as is sometimes expressed in the formulation Atman is Brahman. Atman is the microcosm and Brahman the macrocosm. But the two are identical:

The Self (atman) both evolves the phenomenal realm of matter (prakrti) and simultaneously enters into
it under the form of the life-monads, or individual selves (jivas, purusas). In other words, all things, in all their aspects, are but reflexes of that one eternal Self -- Atman-Brahman -- which is in essence beyond all definition, name and form.33

Commenting on the meaning of Zen for the West, William Barrett says in the Introduction in Zen Buddhism by Suzuki:

The next step would be to recognize the essentially paradoxical nature of reason itself.

This step has been taken by some modern philosophers. The most original and influential philosopher now alive on the European continent is the German Existentialist Martin Heidegger. A German friend of Heidegger told me that one day when he visited Heidegger, he found him reading one of Suzuki's books. "If I understand this man correctly," Heidegger remarked, "this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings." . . . For what, after all, is Heidegger's final message but that Western philosophy is a great error, the result of the dichotomizing intellect that has cut man off from unity with Being itself and from his own Being. This error begins (in Plato) with locating truth in the intellect; the world of nature thereby becomes a realm of objects set over against the mind, eventually objects to be manipulated by scientific and practical calculation. Twenty-five hundred years of Western metaphysics move from Plato's intellectualism to Nietzsche's Will to Power, and concurrently man does become in fact the technological master of the whole planet; but the conquest of nature merely estranges him from Being itself and from his own Being and delivers him over to an ever ascending, ever more frantic will to power.34


The Western man starts with the objective world and arrives sometimes at an existential psychological attitude. But most people get stuck in the affairs of the objective world, so that they have difficulties in finding the way back, i.e., to reorganize their own personal affairs. The Oriental man is sometimes too busy with his own mental well-being that he sometimes forgets social responsibilities and production, but he is, at least, not too much troubled by inner problems, because he is willing to face life problems with a mysterious smile.

So we may conclude that psychology in the existential sense, is the beginning (for the Oriental) and end (for the Occidental) of man's "quest for certainty." Psychology tries to understand the motives and meaning of man's behavior. It is a kind of practical anthropology, while anthropology may be regarded as theoretical psychology in its broadest sense. Psychology is a theory of man's behavior while education may be looked upon as a theory and practice as to how man should behave and live. On the other hand, man's behavior can only be understood existentially, i.e., when related to the meaning of human existence. Otherwise it would be merely a superficial understanding:

Man is not a centaur, he is man through and through. He can be understood only when one knows, on the one hand, that there is something in all that is human, including thought, which belongs to the general nature of living creatures, and is to be grasped from this nature,
while knowing, on the other hand, that there is no human quality which belongs fully to the general nature of living creatures and is to be grasped exclusively from it. Even man's hunger is not an animal's hunger. Human reason is to be understood only in connexion with human non-reason. The problem of philosophical anthropology is the problem of specific totality and of its specific structure.35

Genuine understanding is only possible when we meet a person existentially, that is to say, when we meet him in his concrete situation. If we are to understand, why a person laughs, we should meet him personally, intimately, and totally, through a phenomenological approach. We cannot describe meaningfully the phenomenon of laughing merely in terms of reflex responses of certain muscles of the face. We can understand his laugh through identification and empathy only. For, with antipathetic feelings we shall never be able to understand completely the "what" and the "why" of his laughing. At this stage we leave the sphere of intellectual analysis and controlled experimentation, and transcend the intellectual-analytical level of knowing. At this very moment of ego-transcending, we become another personality, we are more ourselves than before. This kind of approach is intuitive. Existentialism as a non-traditional philosophy, rejected by pragmatism, realism, and dualistic supernaturalism, may lead us to a direct insight

35Buber, loc. cit., p. 160.
about the totality of life more immediately than will the
laborious intellectual analysis of the fragmentary elements
of things, the number of which is, by the way, infinite.
One might object, however, that existentialistic language
is nebulous, loose, and without any realistic anchorage.
If one is to account for his insight about world and life,
to another person, both should seek genuine communication or
internal dialogue. Only in this way may one's insight be
understood in its totalness, by experiencing the essentials
of the total situation in the dialogue. While words are no
more than media of communication pointing to something else,

Nevertheless, even he who lives the life of
dialogue knows a lived unity: the unity of life,
as that which one truly won is no more torn by
any changes, not ripped asunder into the every­
day creaturely life and the "deified" exalted
hours; the unity of unbroken, raptureless per­
severance in concreteness, in which the word is
heard and a stammering answer dared.\footnote{ibid., p. 25.}

But one may decline to account for his insight to
another, when the latter is not willing or not able to com­
municate intimately. If for many reasons the person has no
opportunity to communicate genuinely, then for him two ways
are left open. He may become a skeptic by stalemating
another's statements or ridiculing them. He may, on the
other hand, resort to the "mystical way," by accepting com­
pletely his "given," his being-there and his being so (his

\footnote{ibid., p. 25.}
Dasein and his So-sein, because he understands the why and the what for (the sense) of his own existence -- at least for himself. He does not have to account to other people for the way he understands life, and the way he straightens out his issues with the totality of things. Of course, he sometimes seeks to "explain" the why of his so-doing and so-being, if he is invited to do so. Otherwise he keeps silent, or he answers, like the classic Chinese, with a "wise smile."

The consideration must be seen in the light of the following. One may be skeptical by criticizing every position someone else takes, looking for its weaknesses. Or he may give account for his notions "in the name of science as 'shared' experience," thus solely for communication purposes. But then, he should meet other people existentially and explain to them phenomenologically his insight of world and life. If the skeptical way or the "existential sharing" is not necessary or not possible, then, he may take resort to the "mystical way," by referring man to himself, for himself.

The preceding discussion may be summarized as follows. Recognizing the value of differing philosophical and theoretical positions on matters of education, we should find an integrative approach by accepting some essentials of those views, even when those views are contradictory to each
other, being convinced about the unity of life. This, however, does not mean, that we become merely eclectic or "synthetic," because eclecticism is a bad kind of choice, based on a sentimental preference for one thing or the other, while synthesis is a kind of compromise which is generally necessitated by the circumstances of the moment or by the "moral" pressure of consensus based on a majority-rule.

The integrative approach is multidimensional, because it recognizes the multiplicity of a life which cannot possibly be compartmentalized into pigeonholes. Both unity and differences must be accepted. In the light of this notion, Comte's standpoint that the history of man's thought and culture should take the course of "from religion to the final stage of science," must be considered a scientific fallacy, since man's adventures are fundamentally directed by the desire to look for himself and to find himself, in order to make sense out of his life.

The following chapters will be devoted to the discussion of educational propositions which are deemed meaningful for the purpose of this writing.
CHAPTER IV

SOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL MYSTICISM AND
PLATO'S EDUCATIONAL POLITICS

Plato and Socrates

We cannot talk about Plato's philosophy without relating Plato to his master, Socrates. In all of his dialogues, Plato uses Socrates as the translator of his thoughts. But it is difficult to determine, whether Plato, in his dialogues, is projecting his own ideas by putting them into the mouth of his master, or he is really presenting Socrates' own thoughts. In the Symposium, for instance, we may be sure that Plato is portraying Socrates' personality, narrated by Alcibiades, who says:

Is he not like a Silenus in this? To be sure he is; his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companion in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within! Know you that beauty and wealth and honour, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are utterly despised by him; he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them; mankind are nothing to him; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a moment whatever Socrates
commanded: they may have escaped the observa-
tion of others, but I saw them.¹

In the Apology, when Socrates is defending himself
in a trial charging him for "engaging in inquiries into
things beneath the earth, and in the heavens, of making the
weaker argument appear the stronger, and of teaching others
these same things,"² we seem to find the real Socrates.
These words are not likely the projections of Plato's con-
vincions.

If we compare the Protagoras with the Republic, we
discover a difference in the "mental climate," in the way
Socrates converses. In the Protagoras, Socrates' attitude
of reasoning is rather skeptical. When he talks with his
opponent, the sophist Protagoras, about the problem "can
virtue be taught?" no positive conclusion is reached. The
problem is left as an open question. Says Socrates:

For if the argument had a human voice, that voice
would be heard laughing at us and charging us:
"Socrates and Protagoras, you are strange beings;
there are you, Socrates, who were saying earlier
that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting
yourself now by your attempt to prove that all
things are knowledge, including justice, and
self-control, and courage -- which tends to
show that virtue can certainly be taught; for

¹Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, ed. Scott Buchanan

²Plato, Euthyphro, Apology and Crito, trans. F. J.
if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught.3

The Republic is written in a different strain. Here Socrates is rather apodictive and positive with his arguments. He is apparently rendering Plato's convictions. Nevertheless, many ideas in The Republic originate with Socrates himself as the original inventor. The method of reasoning, known as the Socratic dialectic method, is the form in which The Republic is written. Dialogue is the highest type of art which students are to learn, after they have studied arithmetic and mathematics, to attain the ultimate truth. The dialectic method starts with a hypothesis. The other speaker poses some questions related to the hypothesis, to examine whether or not the hypothesis is adequate. Through this process of questioning and answering, the participants of the discussion come to certain inferences. The Phaedo furnishes us a good example of this dialectic method. In it Socrates says:

Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead,

then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again?[^4]

We may say that the dialectic method deals with the epistemological aspect of Socrates' (Plato's) philosophy. It tries to answer the question "how do we acquire true knowledge?" The final conclusion is, however, not necessarily evident. The proof of the truth in a discussion lies in its own inner consistency or in its coherence within its own context. This is the idealistic view of truth; it differs from the pragmatic view which proposes that "the hypothesis that works is the true one."[^5] The realistic view says that truth is the correspondence between knowledge and fact.

In this frame of reference, we may say that Platonism is idealistic in its methods:

Thus the assumption of the method is simply that truth is a coherent system, and that nothing which conflicts with a true principle can be true. We must note, of course, that the assumed principle which Socrates calls his hypothesis is not taken to be hypothetical in the sense of being a "pure proposal." Socrates takes it as the starting point of an argument because he presupposes it to be true, or because it is common ground to himself and the other party to the discussion.[^6]

Taylor puts forward the arguments that many of Plato's ideas (even in the Republic) are inspired by his master, Socrates. From this standpoint we may say that Plato is the transformer, rationalizer, defender, and propagator of Socrates' ideas, and that Platonism can safely be taken for Socraticism. Besides, in all of his dialogues, Plato uses Socrates as the leading figure.

Since the "soul" is considered to be the central concern of philosophy, it is important to note that the idea of the soul conceived of as the self, originates also with Socrates. The problem of soul as an immortal individuality with divine qualities and the implications of this idea for man's conduct and for the problems of life and death, is originally Socratic. In Homer psyche means ghost:

In Homer, the psyche means quite literally the ghost. It is something which is present in a man so long as he lives, and leaves him at death. It is, in fact, the "ghost" which the dying man "gives up." But it is not the self; for Homer the "hero himself" as distinguished from psyche, is his body. Though a man cannot live when his psyche has left him, the psyche is never thought of as having anything to do with the "mental life," as we now call it.7

Heraclitus regarded the "soul" as a temporarily detached portion of the cosmic element "fire." In the Orphic religion, the psyche is more important, since it is

7Ibid., p. 134.
considered a permanent individuality and a temporarily "fallen," and exiled divinity. But

it is not the soul, if by the soul we mean "that within us" -- to use the words of Socrates in Plato -- "in virtue of which we are pronounced wise or foolish, good or bad." 8

Taylor is of the opinion that Plato's notion about the soul is in fact from his master:

The soul, as he conceives of it, has all the importance and the permanent individuality of the Orphic psyche. For reasons already given, it seems plain to me that we must believe Plato's representations about his master's firm conviction of the soul's immortality, and in the mouth of a Greek, this means its essential divinity. This is the real justification of a mission to preach to all men, in season and out of season, the single duty of "tending the soul," and "making it as good as possible," whatever the cost to one's fortunes or one's body. 9

Further Taylor defends the belief that the father of the theory of Ideas is actually Socrates, and not Plato. Says he:

Most of them may decline to take the further step of accepting as fundamentally true to fact what the narrative of the Phaedo goes on to say about the nature of the particular hypothesis adopted by Socrates himself as the basis of his thinking. This it is said, is nothing but the famous "Theory of Ideas," and it is commonly assumed, without proof, or with no proof, but a few ambiguous expressions in Aristotle, that this doctrine was discovered by Plato for the first time after the death of Socrates. For my

8Ibid., p. 136.

9Ibid., p. 138.
own part, I feel with Burnet that it is inconceivable that any thinker should introduce an eminently original discovery of his own to the world by representing it as something which had long been familiar to a number of living contemporaries who are certain to read his work and detect any misrepresentation. ¹⁰

This theory of Ideas, as related to the theory of immortality of the soul (the latter is presumably from Socrates, as indicated by the courage and calmness with which he faced death, with the greatest confidence that his "soul will be safe," as "for the Good is anything good, even death"), has its implications for the theory of knowledge and learning. Knowledge is according to this theory nothing but a "recollection" or "recognition" (anamnesis) of realities, or universal forms which are transcendent. Knowledge of universals is therefore a prioric, "before experience." To prove this, Socrates gives "lessons" in geometry to a slave-boy who never has learned this science. That the slave-boy finally can find the solution is an indication that he has knowledge of universal principles, not, however, by "induction" as Aristotle taught. Inasmuch as this anamnesis-theory of knowledge is implicit in the theory of immortality and the theory of ideas, we must assume that

¹⁰Ibid., p. 161.
this "recollection" theory originated with Socrates as well. As Taylor puts it in his notes:

In the *Phaedo* (loc. cit) the doctrine that "learning is just recognition" is expressly said by Simias, speaking to Socrates, to be "the doctrine you are so constantly repeating." Unless we are willing to regard the *Phaedo* as a gigantic and unpardonable mystification, this seems to me proof that the theory really belongs to Socrates. 11

The idea of the most adequate organization of society as expounded in *The Republic*, must be of Socratic origin, also. Again Taylor remarks:

From the Socratic point of view, the proper organization of society would be one in which every man's social status and functions, as statesman, soldier, or producer, is determined by the nature of the work, his aptitudes, understanding, and character fit him to discharge. This is precisely the ideal which is embodied in outline in the account of the ideal city which fills the earlier books of Plato's *Republic*. So far, the scheme may truly be said to be directly of Socratic inspiration.12

What significance lies in the comparison between Socrates and Plato? There are certain fundamental differences between the real Socrates and the real Plato. There is also a turn in Plato's philosophical view during his life, especially after the tragic death of his master whom he admired and honored -- witness the central role Plato assigned to Socrates in his dialogues. The Plato of the *Apology* and the *Protagoras*, prior to Socrates' death (399

B.C.) and the Plato of the Academy (387 B.C.), then about forty years old, with the Republic completed in 374 B.C., twenty-five years after Socrates' death, are different philosophers. In the Socratic period he was intimately related to his master and fell under the spell of Socrates' personality in spite of the outward ugliness of the latter: "His outer mask is the carved head of the Silinus."

Plato regards himself as the philosopher-king, the philosopher politician, who is concerned with the welfare of the state of the people of such a state. The main problem is, then, how can there be justice in the state. Justice can be attained not only through the right administration, but also through the right education. The true statesman should be able to apply the best results of education to the organization of the state. The statesman should be philosopher (with wisdom), ruler (with power), and educator (to guide people to the right "place"). For the wise ruler, education and politics should be merged. This is, at least, what Plato proposed. We might say that Plato is the philosopher of educational politics.

Socrates, on the other hand, was more concerned with the well-being of the individual soul. All his life is, so to speak, devoted to the search for the "salvation" of the individual soul, with the soul conceived of both metaphysically and psychologically. He is not concerned in the first
place, however, with his own soul — he considered himself invulnerable in this respect — but with the individual soul of others, when he tries to help wherever possible, even at the risk of his own life. In this respect, Socrates is a true educator, one who tries to help individuals to find themselves, through self-disclosure. Traits such as courage, honesty and temperance are apparently seeming realities. The only true reality, however, according to Socrates, is one's own Self.

Socrates is, therefore, the mystic who is ever in search of his real Self, inspired by the Delphic Oracle: "Know your Self." This dictum is oftentimes inadequately interpreted as "know yourself," in which "yourself" means the empirical ego, and sometimes it is explained as self-knowledge, or the knowledge of the knowledge itself, as one uses it in epistemology.

When Socrates, however, in moments of revelation — often conceived of as "absenteism" — has "rapport" with his daimon, who gives him a "supernatural sign" or warns him of coming events, we may assume that he is in a period of mystical enlightenment. Socrates talks also about the Sun with its irresistible light, as the ground of all being, about the Good as the only reality. In the Apology Socrates says:

It is that I have a certain divine guide, which is what Meletus has caricatured in his indictment. I have had it from childhood. It is a kind of voice which, whenever I hear it, always
turns me back from something which I was going to do, but never urges me to act. It is this which forbids me to take part in politics.\textsuperscript{13}

When Socrates sees the Good in his metaphysical Self as the ground of all being -- hence "know your Self" -- and when we must explain his "knowledge" to the people, he can only say that "man knows everything, except that he actually knows nothing." This dictum is conceivable when we know that to talk and explain, one must use a language as the form of expression of his intellect, the agent which analyzes and orders the knowledge. Human language is symbolic, a medium of communication and, therefore, it is never "culture-- and convention free." In this sense, language does not say anything about experience of truth and reality, unless the listener has the same experience at which the words are hinting. This statement has its import for the consideration of virtue in connection with the problem of its teachability. This reminds us of an odd phrasing from the \textit{Tao Te Ching} (the classic Chinese book on Taoism) cited by Burtt:

\begin{quote}
The tao that can be tao'd is by no means the real tao;
The name that can be named is by no means the real name.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13}Plato, \textit{Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito}, loc. cit., p. 38.

The early Plato, through the radiation of Socrates' personality, is a mystic, also. Many authors consider him the great mystic whose influence is tracable in a later philosophical movement in the third century A.D. — namely, the school of Neo-Platonism or the Alexandrian school of Plotinus. Plotinus is one of the great mystics in the early centuries.\textsuperscript{15}

When Plato talks about Ideas and explains the Allegory of the cave, he actually talks about his mystical experience with the Good. As Heidegger puts it:

\begin{quote}
Das "Gleichnis" [allegory] nennt die Sonne als das Bild für die Idee des Guten. Worin besteht das Wesen dieser Idee? Als Idee ist das Gute ein Scheiendes, als dieses das Sichtgebende und als dieses selbst ein Sichtiges und daher Kennbares.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

About in the same style Inge sees Plato as the visualizer:

\begin{quote}
He saw his generalized Ideas -- saw them as the Greek sculptors saw their ideal types of beauty and copied them in marble from the mental picture. They were for him so clear and concrete that they made the visible world pale and dim by comparison.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

The later Plato -- the "mature" Plato -- is disclosed in the \textit{Phaedo}, and especially in the \textit{Republic}, where he


\textsuperscript{17}Inge, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 73.
develops the theory of Ideas, and the immortality of the soul. Both writings deal with the philosophy of life, though from different points of view. The Phaedo deals with the preparation for death, while the Republic deals primarily with this world and its problems. But both rests on the metaphysical dualism presented by the allegory of the cave, the fate of the soul, the world of Ideas and the world of raw facts (the latter supposed to be represented by the dull mass). The "mature" Plato is the rationalist, the humanist, and the realist. Though his metaphysics is idealistic (the real things are always Ideas), he is in the epistemological sense a realist. This means that the truth must lie in the harmony or correspondence between the ideal Forms and the sensible facts. In the humanistic sense, Plato is a realist as well. That is to say, he faces the realities of the world. He cannot escape the worldly problems. His chief concern is how to solve the problem of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." The solution he proposes, is expounded in the Republic. This matter will be dealt with in another section.

It is important to distinguish the mystic Socrates (with his young disciple Plato) from the rationalist Plato in the Republic in his later years for this reason: the evaluation of the crucial conception of virtue and education, whether or not virtue can be taught, and whether or
not education is a "myth." Virtue and education are related to each other, and in any concept of education -- in its general sense at least -- the issue of virtue is always implied. Whether or not education is merely a "myth," depends on the conception of education itself. If education is to be a "learning process," i.e., to acquire knowledge, whatever knowledge means (and is always related to some theory about world and life), then, we can boldly state that education is a myth. This conclusion will be considered in a later section. Immediately, it is necessary to consider the problem of virtue.

The Problem of Virtue

The crucial aspects of this problem are: "Can virtue be taught?" and Socrates' conclusion that no one will knowingly do evil. Interpretation here will depend upon our own Weltanschauung and upon our conception of knowledge. Socrates held that Virtue is identical with knowledge. Is it not strange, then, that the hero of virtue himself also states: "I do not know anything." What could he mean by this? Does it follow that, if man really knows nothing, he cannot be possibly virtuous? Is this a contradiction in the man, who has left us an "evangelium," or does the contradiction exist in our own interpretation? It is obvious, then, that the term knowledge in the seeming contradictions "knowledge is virtue" and "man knows nothing," is interpreted
inadequately. Knowledge in "virtue is knowledge" is not mere intellectual knowledge, a theory, a philosophical framework or a nomological network of science, so that we can teach other people. It is, therefore, not to be understood as knowledge in the Cartesian rationalistic sense: If we knew everything, i.e., knew all laws of nature and all relationships of the world at this very moment, we could do no wrong, since we could anticipate all possible events. Wrong and evil are here interpreted as errors in the utilitarian and social sense. In this sense, nobody can possibly be virtuous, then why worry about the world and education in which the central problem is the one of virtue, since any knowledge already implies errors?

If virtue is knowledge, in the sense of a meaningful ideal or theory so as to make our life purposeful, then virtue should be teachable. But then, at the same time, we become naive in the belief that the increase of the number of schools must be attended with the decrease of the number of penitentiaries. And when indoctrination of the good knowledge will not help, we must organize a totalitarian state, in which everybody can get his due. The dull mass is appointed the third class in the social order. Some unbelievers must be compelled to make a choice.

If we agree with the logical development of the proposition that knowledge is virtue, we shall also make the
mistake of concluding that the possession of knowledge will necessarily guarantee the practical use of that knowledge for man's virtuous conduct. Nothing could be more naive. The transfer of the theoretical knowledge of virtue to practical virtuous conduct has never been proven. Socrates probably does not mean to suggest this by saying "Knowledge is virtue." He means, rather, that knowledge is the mystical unification of the individual with the Good, the ground and essence of all existence. This oneness with the whole is beyond words. Words, as the expression of a construct, will be hollow, if they do not originate within the necessary mystical experience. Hence, man knows nothing. Here, by knowledge is meant a theoretical construct, a symbol, a tale, that would make our life more "meaningful." For Plato, therefore, there is left but one way to educate people, who "are not made of gold," -- namely, to make them believe the meaningfulness of life, to guarantee "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." This can only be done by indoctrination and coercion. This notion does not differ from the commitment of the Christian church as an institution that purports to save the greatest number of lost souls.

It is perhaps for this reason Nietzsche says, "Plato is a Christian before Christ!" There is this difference, however, Plato is not concerned with lost sheep; he is...
realistic and humanistic enough to deal with worldly matters only. The individual soul is not the concern of the state. The interest of the state lies rather in the welfare of human relationships. It means that the total community as a whole must come first. In this sense, virtue can be formulated in terms of a social order and, therefore, is teachable. Indeed, it must be taught, for the mass man is credulous and mediocre, because of his lack of nobility and inability to think for himself. Only a few are suited for "heaven." But the state cannot help it. It is the individual soul's fate. Only privileged souls have a chance to enter this "heaven." These are the individuals with a golden core. If we are to be realistic and humanistic, the ideal state must be an aristocratic one. It is a natural and logical necessity. But such a state must remain a Utopia, however "realistic" it may be. This idealistic state must come to nothing, because of the real fact that some people are really hard-headed and prefer to think for themselves. With Christianity it is not different, for there are also hard-headed souls that do not want to believe, except to believe for themselves, to believe that their substantial self is the only reality.

There are many skills, such as that of the carpenter, the painter or the soldier. Each of these skills can be taught and learned. If virtue is a kind of art of life --
skill or knowledge how to live well -- why can the skill how to live well, not be taught?

There are, as a matter of fact, many virtues. This is apparent in the dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates -- in the *Protagoras* and in the *Republic* -- such as honesty, courage, helping friends and harming enemies. These various virtues are not identical with one another. And yet they all have something in common. There is the virtue of all virtues. This super-virtue cannot be otherwise than the art of politics, the art of governing a state. This art can be performed only by the philosopher-king, the one who is supposed to know everything. This is of course traceable to the postulate that knowledge is virtue in the rational sense.

But let us take a look at Socrates' own words. In the *Protagoras* Socrates puts the question of the relationship between the common virtue and the partial virtues:

> Now I want you to tell me exactly whether virtue is one whole of which justice and self-control and piety are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing. That is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.18

After several questions and answers, Socrates comes to this conclusion:

> Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like courage, or like self-control, or like piety? [and Protagoras answered "no"].19

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At the end of the dialogue, Socrates and Protagoras come to this inconclusive conclusion. Socrates thinks that virtue cannot be taught. But by saying so he contradicts himself, since he holds that things, including justice, are knowledge. Protagoras attempts to prove that virtue is something different from knowledge, but is of the opinion that virtue can be taught. So he also contradicts himself.20

Here we arrive at a dead-end alley. To have a better understanding of what Socrates actually means by "virtue" and to avoid the antinomy implicit in the common notion of "virtue is knowledge," it is necessary to look at other indications expressed by Socrates in the Protagoras and in the Republic. In the Protagoras, Socrates puts these rhetorical questions:

Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good? -- they would acknowledge that they were not.21

In the Republic, we find the following passage dealing with the same problem of virtue related to pleasure, when Socrates says:

Of the three kinds of pleasure, then the sweetest will belong to the part of the soul whereby

20 Cf. note 3 in this chapter, p. 191.

21 Plato, Protagoras, loc. cit., p. 59.
we gain understanding and knowledge, and the man in whom that part predominates will have the pleasant life.\textsuperscript{22}

Says Socrates further:

There are many such cases in which you find the sufferer saying that the height of pleasure is not positive enjoyment, but the absence of pain.\textsuperscript{23}

The fragments above state that Socrates' view of virtue is inseparable from "pleasure," with pleasure conceived not in the vulgar sensual sense of the word, as in the Freudian "pleasure principle," but as a peaceful state of mind. Pleasure is the state of the absence of pain, as well as the absence of positive sensual pleasure. Some people, however, impute to Socrates a hedonistic conviction of ethics. Taylor speaks of the hedonistic inclination of Socrates in the \textit{Protagoras}, as follows:

This is the real point of the argument in Plato's \textit{Protagoras}, where Socrates appears at first sight to be talking Hedonism. He wants to prove to the "many" that, even on their own theory that good and pleasure are the same thing, it is not a paradox to identify the courage of the virtuous man with knowledge, since they will admit that the coward who runs away from danger is making a false computation of the "balance of pleasures and pains."\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 309-310.

\textsuperscript{24}Taylor, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 143.
The identification of virtue with happiness is reminiscent of the notion of morality and character presented by Washburn. He says:

Thus "integration of personality" becomes greater total personal happiness, "morality" becomes greater group happiness, and "strength" the ability to pursue a greater happiness at the expense of a lesser.

The definition: the degree to which one possesses character is the degree to which one identifies one's own happiness of others and to which one can control and subordinate impulses which are contrary to one's chief purpose.\(^{25}\)

We would not charge Washburn for hedonism. Virtue is here considered a psychological state, a state of happiness, rather than a trait or attribute of a person. Virtue regarded as an attribute will lead to the assumption of various traits, such as courage, honesty, generosity, and the like. In the dialogues, Socrates tries to expose this notion. He proposes the notion that there is but one goodness of the Good, common to all virtuous traits, as there is but one indescribable total physical state of health, as opposed to an almost infinite number of diseases. That Socrates relates virtue to good health of the soul, according to its very nature, and that evil is conceived as a mental disease, is apparent from the following:

It appears, then, that virtue is as it were the health and comeliness and well-being of

\(^{25}\) Horrocks, _loc. cit._, p. 526.
the soul, as wickedness is disease, deformity, and weakness.26

He draws the same parallel between good health and wisdom:

Take the effect on the body of food and drink or of exertion, or the effect of sunshine and wind on a plant; the healthiest and strongest suffer the least change. Again, the bravest and wisest spirit is least disturbed by external influence.27

It is thus obvious that Socrates adheres to the psychological view of virtue. Virtue is the state of the healthy soul; but it is also the state of happiness. The happy and mentally healthy man will do no evil. He is also wise (with "knowledge" of the Good). He, therefore, will knowingly do no evil. With another variant, we may also say: No man will happily do evil. The virtuous man is, according to Washburn, the integrated man with "character"; he has attained the most "efficient" happiness. But the happiness of others is also his own happiness. The virtuous individual is a healthy, mentally mature person, who has already crossed the boundaries of his egoistic or egocentric attitude. He is not subject to psychical spasm, for his self is invulnerable. He does not trouble about honor, power, fame or death, as Socrates showed us in his life.

27 Ibid., p. 72.
These considerations about virtue are fundamental for education, since the problem of virtue and its teachability and the aims of education are inseparable from one another.

**Plato as a Rational Philosopher, Educator, and Politician**

The addition of the adjective "rational" to the complex of the various professions is an unnecessary pleonasm. If a philosopher is simultaneously an educator and a politician, he must be a rational realist. This is particularly true for Plato in the later years of his life, when he made his theory of Ideas meaningful. The Republic is a great concept, because the concept is one total wholeness and covers any problem, theoretically as well as practically, which may arise in the ideal state. The concept is so great, that it must remain a utopian dream, too ideal to be true. But, therefore, it is humanistic, supported by an optimistic hope that man alone can solve all of his problems.

The central problem of man -- in this world -- is his greatest welfare. For him it is above all a sociality and productivity (and efficiency) problem. For the ruler, however, the greatest concern is the welfare for the greatest number of citizens. This is a political problem. But an ideal political blueprint cannot be accomplished without the help of education. Political aims can only be fulfilled through education. Within the political framework, the task
of education cannot be otherwise than conservation, selection, and information. The cultural heritage should be preserved in order to keep the integrity of the community. This can be done through the channels of education, through encultaration. As individuals are different from one another as to their abilities and interests, and in order not to waste much time, energy, and human material, there should be an adequate selection process to get the right people in the right places. This can be done through education. In this sense, education is by and large a kind of sieve of competencies, with the sieve holes progressively getting smaller and smaller.

These are necessary procedures for an effective and prudent statesmanship. For the success of the plan, the concept must be total, integrated, and universal. Then, one cannot possibly fail, if one follow only the ideal pattern, at the same time being realistic. The realistic attitude consists of the recognition and study of the real facts in a society. People are not the same. There are many differences and variations. These differences and particulars cannot be comprehended at once. Factual history is inconceivable. The bare facts must be ordered meaningfully, so that it makes sense for the people. The best way of ordering the "chaos" is to arrange it after an ideal pattern. This is possible because there are eternal and universal Forms, called Ideas, not subject to change and corruption.
But only a few can "see" these ideal Forms -- namely, the philosophers. The meaningful order of the sensible reality follows the Gestalt principle, the principle of isomorphism, that is when there is similarity between the order in this world and the order of ideal Forms, functioning as prototypes.

There is also an upper-order, the unifying order among all Forms. The common order among all parts of the ideal state is justice. Justice is the common virtue in the state which unifies the other virtues, i.e., wisdom, courage, and temperance. These sub-virtues are the proper attributes of each part in the state organization. Wisdom is the virtue of the rulers (including, to be sure, the other two virtues below their own class). Courage is the virtue of the guardians, those who must guard and maintain order against enemies and trouble-makers. Temperance is the virtue of the workers and money-makers, whose greatest concern is gaining pleasures. They must see that they are not mastered by their pleasures.

If everyone does his work as he ought to do, then, there is justice in the state:

You remember how, when we first began to establish our commonwealth and several times since, we have laid down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him. Well, I believe that that principle, or some form of it is justice. . . . Yes, and surely we have often
heard people say that justice means minding one's own business and not meddling with other men's concern; and we have often said so ourselves.28

Justice, in the sense as stated above, as "the right way to behave" for every part of the society, is the universal condition of the ideal state. It means that there is a vertical hierarchy, with the philosopher-king at the top. If everyone could potentially be a philosopher-king, who does not corrupt and who does not use his excellence and supremacy for power and personal benefit, then we can get a horizontal or democratic organization of the state, where we can trust each other. But the factual reality is that not all people "are made of gold." The conclusion is obvious. We must select the people according to their abilities and qualities. The selection, however, is not arbitrary and despotic. It is based on a meaningful concept, that is to say, meaningful for the whole state, to get and maintain the greatest welfare for the greatest number. This principle must prevail over the individual interests. To maintain this principle, there must be a power to impose the ideals on all citizens. The problem is, how can we be sure that the holders of power do not corrupt their positions? We must have the most virtuous among the people. This can only be the people who have perfect knowledge. For the perfect knower can do no wrong.

Concerning the aim of the greatest welfare for the greatest number, the problem may arise, Who sets the limits or range of welfare? There are actually no limits in this respect. The limits are determined by the situational conditions of the community, the ability and the productivity of the people involved. The more able and productive people are, the more right they have to the common goods of welfare, at least, material welfare. The amount of welfare one is entitled to is in proportion to one's ability, work, and responsibilities. Material welfare, however, does not necessarily imply mental welfare, the welfare of the soul. This should be the same for everybody, regardless of ability and work. This is each individual's responsibility and business, because the mental state is a subjective feeling. So far as the state is concerned, it can only demand from its citizens the proper accomplishment of the responsibilities assigned to them. At least, wiser persons can hint at some inadequacies in the way one lives. This is actually the task of education in its basic sense, as was obviously shown by Socrates throughout his life.

The process of selection and retention is the task of education in the institutional sense, at least as Plato proposed it in the Republic. Since the state must account for this action of selection, the principle of selection should be made meaningful. This is the task of teaching in
public schools. Teaching is providing people with knowledge, for knowledge is the only guarantee of virtue in its political and social sense. Inasmuch as the qualities of people are different in their ability to learn, we have to appoint people to master one special part of knowledge, a special skill suited to the person's ability. Only thus may they do their work properly. This is justice.

Education is not only concerned with justice in the state; it tries, also, to take care of the welfare of individuals. There is virtue in the individual, when every "part" of the soul functions well, not hindering each other. Then, there will be harmony in the individual soul.

The structure of the individual soul reflects the structure of the proper state. There is, in the first place, a function for wisdom, for the seeking of knowledge. This is the function of mind or reason which is, according to Plato, located in the head. What the students have to learn in the first stage are "grammatic" (reading and writing), "music" (reciting poetry, lyre-playing and singing, elementary arithmetic and geometry), and "gymnastics." Then two years of military training, which consists of a great deal of physical training, including a life of simplicity, because it is necessary for bodily health and cultivating temperance of the soul, follows. "Music is good to promote an acquaintance with "forms" of beauty in
the visible world. At higher stages, the students, i.e., the guardians who are selected to become the prospective rulers, learn true knowledge of universal things, such as mathematics, arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonies. The highest stage of learning is the dialectic method. This method opens the way for getting acquainted with the universal Forms (Ideals). This is the greatest concern of the philosopher-king. He needs it to govern the state, to have a clear picture of the ordering pattern in the "heaven." Only the best will reach the vision of the absolute Good. The super-students, or the rulers, who will form the supreme council, will then spend their time between study and governing:

Then, when they are fifty, those who have come safely through and proved the best at all points in action and in study must be brought at last to the goal. They must lift up the eye of the soul to gaze on that which sheds light on all things; and when they have seen the Good itself, take it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and of the individual, themselves included.  

The second aspect of the soul is the spirit. The spirit or the "sense of honor" is the part of the soul which is responsible for the courageous trait of the individual. When this spirit functions well, it performs justice. The "spirited" element is the central element in the guardian's

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29 Ibid., p. 262.
soul. It is located in the chest. The guardian has to see that his "spirited" element functions properly.

The third part of the soul is the appetite, lodged in the stomach. Its main objective is gain. This is necessary for the satisfaction of bodily desires. The people in the lowest class are only concerned with these bodily activities.

If we can "educate" the citizens for justice (individual justice), then we are pretty sure that we shall have a just state. Justice within the individual means that every "part" of the soul is functioning properly. There is harmony and integration in the individual soul.

The philosopher-king occupies two worlds, the world of appearances and the world of intelligence. In this sense, Platonism, like Christianity, is dualistic. Both picture an ideal state. The utopian world of Plato is the world of justice, where everything is "running well," because it is modeled after the ideal pattern in the "heaven." The philosopher-king represents and symbolizes the Good for the people in this world. The Christian ideal state is the kingdom of God, where love prevails. Plato's world of appearances is divided into two divisions, the world of images (the shadows on the wall of the cave) and the world of visible things (the figures on the track behind the parapet). The intelligible world contains mathematical objects.
and Forms, with the Good as the "common denominator" of all Forms. The states of the mind correspond with the world of objects. Knowledge about the world of appearances is called doxa (opinion or belief). Knowledge about the intelligible world is obtained through thinking and dialectic reasoning. It is closer to reality and more true than the doxa. Our world consists of a gamut of knowledge, ranging between unreality and reality.

That Plato is basically democratic, is apparent from two positions he takes. Firstly, he gives all individuals the same chance to become a philosopher-king. The only maxim he uses for selection is the natural capacity and performance. Children from the upper class that cannot meet the standards, are moved to the lower class. Secondly, he considers women and men equal. The so-called aristocratic state is a historical necessity, because the historical facts ask for differentiation and ordering. Justice is deduced from this reality. Education cannot change people in respect to their native qualities. We can only change their views. This is the task of education and philosophy. Philosophy is not an activity that tries to know the truth, i.e., reality, but an activity that orders our views to a more inclusive order, so that it becomes more meaningful for our lives. Knowledge has its boundaries. It is the task of philosophy to shift these boundaries to still wider
spheres, so that our knowledge may become a wider and multi-
dimensional totality. The Einsteinian world, for instance,
has wider boundaries (is more meaningful) than the Euclidean
or Newtonian world. This is the only thing man can do about
himself. What we teach is these more meaningful views. We
do not teach real knowledge about the real reality. In
this sense, education leads people to believe some views.
There are many beliefs and views, however, and the problem
becomes one of, how to choose the best view among the many
alternatives. This choice is not a matter of logical
reasoning; it is, rather, an emotional decision, in which
one's total personality is involved.

When a decision should be made on the basis of logi-
cal reasoning, then, one should consider the question
whether one view is more inclusive — and thus more meaning-
ful — than the other.

Plato's belief, like the Gestalt-concept, assumes
that the totality is more meaningful and more important than
the parts (the individuals). The nomological network of the
Gestalt is formed by the eternal Ideas. This network is
transformed to the human world through the principle of iso-
morphism. According to both Plato's Idealism and the prin-
ciple of isomorphism, there is supposed to be a similarity
between the order in the "heaven" and the order in this
world. If we are to obtain the greatest welfare for mankind,
we have to copy this heavenly order. This order is perfect and unchangeable. The question is, how to know this eternal order. This can be done by the philosopher-king. He is the one who has wisdom and who can rule. But governing demands power. There is, however, the hazard of misuse of this power. To prevent the state from this possible danger, power must be laid in the hands of the philosopher, because he is the one who knows the truth. The perfect knower will not corrupt, since he is by definition a just man.

Cultural values are valid, if they fit in with the eternal order. When they are not, they are unsuited to the purpose of education. Homeric poetry is good, for instance, only when it portrays the virtues of the Gods. Censorship must be performed on myths and poetry, therefore. Vices of the Gods are not meaningful for justice either within the individual or within the state.

Plato lived in the time of the sophists who held differing, and often contrasting, views. This situation is unsuited for the ideal state, because the security of all would be at stake. There should be a common belief, therefore, which would be acceptable for everyone for the benefit of all. According to Plato, the solution would be the acceptance of the conception of justice. Justice is doing things in the right way. Then, it must follow that the only logical
necessity for the establishment of the just state (the state that operates in the right way), is the hierarchically stratified state.

The aristocratic state stands between the democratic (according to Plato, the state that is ruled by the ignorant mass), and the despotic one (run by a tyrant, a ruler with power, but without wisdom). There are also individuals with a democratically structured soul and persons with a despotic soul. Oligarchic men are parasites, like drones. They have a "money-loving spirit of sensual appetite." These inferior types of men (democratic, despotic, and oligarchic) do not possess justice. These values should not be taught, because they pose a great risk for the security of the state.

Plato's belief, thus, is that justice can be taught, since it is identical with knowledge. It must be taught, because it is a political and educational necessity.

Pedagogical Comments

In this chapter we have discussed two opposing views of education, the Socratic view and the Platonic one. This controversy actually touches two crucial problems in education. The first involves the question, whether education is for the welfare of the individual or the state. The second question, whether or not education is a "myth." These
two problems are closely related to the main question that concerns us: the aims of education.

Very often one puts the question: Is education primarily for the individual or for society? Some believe as Rousseau did, that education cannot be otherwise than for the individual and, hence, see no relationship to society at all. Others (like Plato and totalitarian leaders) are convinced that the pursuit of education should be for society at large. It should benefit the whole of mankind as one homogeneous world order, through the realization of the ideal state, even without considering the worthwhileness of its members, i.e., the individual persons involved. The former is an individualistic view, while the latter is a totalitarian one. Both views, however, are "unrealistic," i.e., without taking into consideration the essential reality of man's existence. Man is neither individual alone, nor society alone. He is both. Individuality and sociality are aspects of the same entity which we call man. Each aspect is complimentary to the other.

Plato tends to stress the totality, the state, in which the individuals are but parts to be governed and arranged hierarchically. We might call him an educational politician -- i.e., one whose major concern is about the organization of the state, and making use of educational means. Education in this respect is not an aim in itself,
but merely a means to realize certain political concepts. To make the concept meaningful, it should be grounded philosophically, as, of course, Plato did.

In Plato's terms, the aim of education is to bring justice in the state by appointing the right people to the right places. The justice in the individual soul must correspond with the justice in the state, and the latter, of course, must reflect the eternal order in the world of Ideas.

Socrates tends to emphasize the import of the individual with his existential mysticism. Probably many people would judge him to be an individualist. But this view would do injustice to a man who devoted his life to the enlightenment of people, from market place to market place, without pay. He also revealed himself to be a model soldier on the battlefields. In the Symposium we can read a narrative by Alcibiades praising Socrates for his "courage" in the battles at Potidaea (432 B.C.) and Delium (424 B.C.). Says Alcibiades:

All this happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvellous when, being cut off from our supplies we were compelled to go without food -- on such occasions, which happen in time of war, he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him.


[At the battle of Delium] and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped -- for this is the sort of man who is never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong.30

In the Crito we can find evidence of Socrates' loyalty to parents, country and law. Says Socrates to Crito, while he is in prison two days before the well-known execution of the death sentence:

You must not give away, nor retreat, nor desert your station. In war, and in the court of justice, and everywhere, you must do whatever your state and your country tell you to do, or you must persuade them that their commands are unjust. But it is impious to use violence against your father or your mother; and much more impious to use violence against your country.31

Considering these facts, it would be inadequate to say that Socrates is an individualistic mystic. His view is neither totalitarian nor individualistic, nor is it a kind of the middle of the road position. It is not of the primitive kind of logic either, what people call a "synthesis" between individualism and totalitarianism. It is a view based on a fundamentally different principle. It is the

one that sees man anthropologically and existentially, con-
sidering each man unconditionally as a worthwhile person in
himself and for himself. In all matters man finally has to
fall back on himself. The question is not what man is, but
"who am I?" Man would not lose his "manness," if we acknowl-
edged his uniqueness and his full individuality, in all mat-
ters. If he has pleaded guilty for first degree murder,
for whatever reasons, by whatever fatal circumstantial
"causes" (e.g., caught by mammaistic overprotection, economic
or social circumstances which have "forced" him to commit the
crime), he still should "pay" for his debts, he should -- in
his loneliness -- undergo his own suffering or not-suffering:
life sentence, the electric chair or a life-long guilty
feeling. No one else, other than himself, can act as a
substitute or pay for his errors by whatever means.

He has also to come to terms with the cosmic total-
ity -- on problems of life, death, and immortality -- in his
own terms according to his way of looking at things and his
own way of making decisions. He is the only person in the
world who can decide and determine the kind of person he is
or should be. In doing so, nobody can blame him for solip-
sistic individualism.

Considering man from this view, we might raise the
question "what about society?" How can man's wealth and
health be realized, if society is not properly organized?
To face this question, we should say that, to be sure, we must take the role of society into consideration. But society is still a secondary concern, because society is no more than a factor -- though a very important one -- which man can use to realize his very self. The adequate organization of society -- in its deepest and broadest sense -- is a necessity, not a necessity for itself, but a necessity for something else -- namely, in this instance, for man's personal existence. Being concerned with society at large -- means, in the last analysis, being concerned with the individuals involved. Otherwise, a "good" society (society for society itself) would lose its meaning, as is the case with many totalitarian states. Communism for communism itself as a pure idea, would be meaningless. But in considering the problem in this way, would mean the death for communism as a system in itself, since communism by its very nature poses the primacy of the total state to the individual interests. Even democracy for democracy as a pure ideal, would be without meaning at all, if we forget the personal life.

On the other hand, one whose personal life is meaningful, would never take an attitude of being either from the world (society) or against it. He recognizes the reality of the world, and is, therefore, always with the world, with the possibility, however, of being against is, but not in the
same sense as the pathological "against." He will, however, never be "from" the world, as has been shown by Socrates throughout his whole life:

I went, instead, to each one of you privately to do him, as I say, the greatest of benefits, and tried to persuade him not to think of his affairs until he had thought of himself and tried to make himself as good and wise as possible, nor to think of the affairs of Athens until he had thought of Athens herself; and to care for other things in the same manner.32

Being with the world is a dimension of the mature person who accepts his own existence wisely, feels responsible to the world. Responsibility implies "always - being with - the world." This, however, neither means conformity with the world nor being against it. There would be real wealth and health in the world, if each individual person would accept his personal existence with full responsibility for the welfare of others, but always with the understanding that one should not interfere with the personal integrity of others.

This view has little to do with the ideal of democracy which is, as a matter of fact, chiefly concerned with social relationships and which takes into account individual rights and freedom. The view as was exposed by Socrates' life, is primarily concerned with the human individual existence, and less with the problem of social relations. It deals more with the problem how one interprets the totality of

32 Ibid., p. 43.
things, including the fate of one's own self. In this respect, society is something "given," which man cannot discard and which he has to take into consideration in seeing his existential problems. Society and culture are factors in man's existential field. We may even say, that society -- as a national or cultural necessity: compare with Rousseau's *Contrat Social* -- is no more than a means and through which man has to see his existential problems. By "means," we do not mean in the utilitarian Machiavellian sense, without any further concern and responsibility toward that "means," but merely as a necessary way of realizing things.

In the light of these considerations we might say that Socrates is one of the first and greatest educational existentialists:

Socrates, more than any other philosopher, is endeared to the heart of the existentialist. First, he stirred the youth of Athens simply by being himself. He persuaded them to question their existence and made them dissatisfied with it. Next, he brought them to the shattering realization that philosophies they had accepted uncritically were meaningless to their life, and to life's great purpose. He was literally the embodiment of an existentialist ethic. The fact that he did not teach, and did not preach, but relied upon dialogue, was alluring to youth who had been brought up on precepts. The fact, too, that Socrates wrote no books forced him and his hearers to rely upon direct communication. His teaching was personal, intimate, an I-Thou
affair, in which knowledge and wisdom were achieved through the mutual interaction of two living beings. 33

When we turn to the second aspect of our problem, whether or not education is a "myth," we discover, to be sure, that the concept of education we hold is the critical factor. If the function of education is regarded as teaching and learning (of knowledge), in order to make our life in this world more meaningful, then we must accept the view of Plato. Teach people meaningful knowledge, and there will come justice. Teaching means with Plato: make the people believe that there are ideal eternal Forms, which serve as prototype patterns for our conduct. We do not know whether or not this Platonian view of "idealism" (better: Idea-ism) is true. No one can check it out. We have either to accept this or to reject. If we reject, then we must advance another concept which will be more meaningful than Idealism.

The pragmatic view, for instance, believes that life would be more meaningful, if based on the reconstruction of experience, so as to anticipate coming events. There must be an adequate relationship between means and ends. Our life would, then, be more pleasant and more secure, because we have, through continuous reconstruction of experiences, raised the conditions of living. Or, as Dewey has said, we have improved and extended the quality of human experience.

33Kneller, loc. cit., pp. 133-134.
According to Platonism, however, pragmatism would not be meaningful, because it does not provide people with clearcut truth. It does not order the world. The world of the pragmatist, according to Platonism, is an as-if world of doxas, based on hypotheses, while the Platonic world is the world of real Forms. Using the cave-allegory, the pragmatic man lives in the cave, with chains on hands, neck, and legs, and with no opportunity to get out to see the Sun. "Real" knowledge would be impossible. In the first place, the pragmatic world is dynamic in nature; and in the second place, its world is one of hypotheses. Both the pragmatic and Platonic views of education aim at "learning," though with different meanings because of differing contexts. Contemporary education is for the most part pragmatic in view.

But "learning," as the essence of education, is questionable. If we follow the Socratic view, we should change this common concept of education. Socrates' fundamental standpoint is -- that "man knows nothing," while his greatest concern is the "good state of man's soul." He holds that one does not have to worry about the salvation of his soul, if it is healthy. Besides, the soul is immortal, and for the Good, everything is good, even "death." Nothing can happen to the soul of a good man:

... believe this one truth, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. His affairs are not neglected by the gods; and what has happened to me today has not
happened by chance. I am persuaded that it was better for me to die now, and to be released from trouble; and that was the reason why the guide never turned me back. And so I am not at all angry with my accusers or with those who have condemned me to die.34

The notion of education in this Socratic frame of reference, however, would imply that cultural ("worldly") values are seeming values, since they have little to do with the good state of the soul. Training, learning, and knowledge are not necessary for the salvation of the soul. Arete as the essence of education cannot be taught, if one means by teaching providing people with merely intellectual knowledge. Teaching knowledge will rather be a hindrance than an aid for the "fair journey of the soul." Socrates would rather use the dialectic method as a face-to-face confrontation, to free people from knowledge, which they are very proud of, as the sophists were. How can teaching be a learning process, providing people with knowledge? Knowledge is no more than a convention that binds the soul of man. Man must be freed from his ties, so that he can see the Good. What Socrates did was to frustrate people, by opening their eyes for the seeming things in which they were engaged throughout their lives. In this frame of reference, politics, as is the case with Plato's system, would have nothing to do with

34Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, loc. cit., pp. 48-49.
education. In the Socratic sense, education would be, then, no "myth" or "lie," but it would rather be a stripping process to remove illusions. To many people, however, this stripping process seems to be disillusionizing and frustrating, since it means the abandonment of much honor, power, and dignity of the beloved "ego." Thus, Socrates fights the lie not with another lie which others would claim as truth, but with the frustrating admission that the lies we hold can be destroyed one at a time. And, therefore, Socrates as a mystic, cannot educate others into a lie.

We conclude that for Socrates, the aim of education is to help people in the search for the Self, in order to attain the best possible state of mental health as a primary condition for self-realization. As William Burnham puts it, although with some variant:

Thus Socrates stands out as a mental hygienist and one of the first great teachers of the world, because instead of attempting to teach others he gave them the opportunity, because he saw that the teacher's function is merely that of suggestion and stimulus, and that the important thing in education is to gain a clear view of reality, and ensure the health of the mind and the integration of the personality.35

Catholic Philosophy and Anthropology

One can hardly withstand the temptation to discuss Catholicism as it is related to educational theory, since its philosophy and anthropology have been accepted by millions of people throughout the centuries. The Catholic philosophy of education is a supernaturalistic philosophy; it has many similarities with Plato's educational and political views. Both are realistic and at the same time transcendental. There is the belief in the existence of an eternal and objective reality to which all terrestrial things are pointed. This objective reality is transcendental, however, beyond sensorial experience. It is thought of as the cause and ground of all being, the "unmoved mover" of all phenomena in the world. This First Being is spiritual in nature, omniscient, and omnipotent.

Only a very few people are supposed to have the privilege, or the grace, to know this perfect Being, the absolute Truth, which is God. God is perfect and infallible, only man is, by inheritance, a sinner. This is, according to the Catholic belief, because Adam and Eve, the first man
and woman on earth, violated the heavenly law, by eating the "fruits of the tree of knowledge." From this moment on, man has not been allowed to see "heaven." He has been driven away from "paradise" and shall further "eat his bread in the sweat of his face."

But God is forgiving. He sent His Son to help "fallen" man and to redeem him from his sins. This Son was Jesus Christ. This man from Nazareth is the God-Man, the incarnate God, who preached the *evangelium* of love and brotherhood among men, and promised the *millenium* of peace and beatitude to those who were willing to believe that He was the only true Son of God, the way through whom man could know God. "Blessed are the merciful: For they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart: For they shall see God," were Jesus' words when He was preaching the Sermon on the Mount.

Catholicism reached the top of its power and influence in the Middle Ages. It was as if Plato's utopia in his *Republic* were fulfilled in all reality. Says Will Durant:

Much of the politics of Catholicism was derived from Plato's "royal lies," or influenced by them: the ideas of heaven, purgatory, and hell, in their medieval form, are traceable to the last book of the *Republic*; the cosmology of scholasticism comes largely from the *Timaeus*; the doctrine of realism (the objective reality of general ideas) was an interpretation of the doctrine of Ideas; even the educational "quadrivium" (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) was modeled
on the curriculum outlined in Plato. With this body of doctrine the people of Europe were ruled with hardly any resort to force; and they accepted this rule so readily that for a thousand years they contributed plentiful material support to their rulers, and asked no voice in the government. Nor was this acquiescence confined to the general population; merchants and soldiers, feudal chieftains and civil powers all bent the knee to Rome. It was an aristocracy of no mean political sagacity; it built probably the most marvelous and powerful organization which the world has ever known.¹

The philosopher-king, to follow Plato's pattern, of this Holy Roman Empire is the Pope. It is an empire of which Voltaire sarcastically said: "It is neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire." Nevertheless we should not overlook its power and influence, culturally as well as politically.

Catholic philosophy which is essentially the philosophy of Thomism -- also known as scholasticism -- is based on Aristotelian metaphysics, whereby reality is divided into three types of entities: the anorganic world (nature), the organic world endowed with the principle of life called anima or soul, and the spiritual world (the world of the Angles and God). The organic life is to be divided into three stages -- namely, plants (with the anima vegetativa), the animals (with the anima sensitiva), and man (with the anima intellectiva). So man, being created by God, includes

all the properties of the lower entities. He is thus an animal as well, but one endowed with supernatural properties through which he can know the supernatural Truth. Man is the only animal that can live through the use of his reason. The rational soul whose function is mainly thinking (seeking the truth), is, according to Aristotle, immortal.

This Greek metaphysics, and its deductive method of reasoning, is primarily a theology ("philosophy is but the servant of theology"). As a philosophy it is basically a system of dogmas acquired through revelation. The truth, as laid down in the Bible, is revealed truth, and has thus absolute validity. The Church as an institution has absolute authority in matters of revealed truth. She is by definition infallible and inviolable. A human priest may be a sinner, but his judgment ex cathedra in behalf of the Church is free of errors and the sacraments he administers are still valid. The belief that opposes the infallibility of the priest -- even if he is unworthy and sinning -- is known as the Donatus heresy. About the infallibility of the Church, Pope Pius XI declares:

Hence it is that in this proper object of her mission, that is, "in faith and morals, God Himself has made the Church sharer in the divine magisterium and, by a special privilege, granted her immunity from error; hence she is the mistress of men, supreme and absolutely sure, and she has inherent in herself an inviolable right
to freedom in teaching." By necessary consequence the Church is independent of any sort of earthly power as well in the origin as in the exercise of her mission as educator, not merely in regard to her proper end object, but also in regard to the means necessary and suitable to attain that end.²

The Church is considered the representative of the supernatural order as manifested in the social (natural) order, and, for this reason, supreme to any other human order. She is also the "mystical body of Christ," the "immaculate spouse of Christ," and at the same time the supernatural mother and the only perfect teacher of man:

And first of all education belongs pre-eminently to the Church, by reason of a double title in the supernatural order, conferred exclusively upon her by God Himself, absolutely superior therefore to any other title in the natural order.

The first title is founded upon the express mission and supreme authority to teach, given her by her divine Founder: "All power is given to men in heaven and in earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatever I have commanded you, and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world."³

Earthly and transitory life is considered to be of less importance than the life in the herafter. All activity must be directed, therefore, to the eternal life in God's


³Ibid., p. 6.
Kingdom. But the way to heaven is narrow and difficult. Only the pure in heart can enter an eternal life of beatitude. Education that is provided to serve only the earthly pleasures for the gratification of the desires of the flesh is wrong and inadequate. In other words, education should include religion as a fundamental subject and this can only be done by the Church. The Church is, hence, the only authority that can provide complete and perfect education.

The Church as the symbol of a perfect order serves thus two worlds, the material and the spiritual. Actually, the whole Catholic philosophy is based on a dualistic cosmogony and anthropology. The universe was created by God out of nothing (ex nihilo); it consists of form or spirit (morphe) and substance or matter (hyle). Man as the microcosm reflects the structure of the big universe, consisting of body (hyle) and soul (morphe). This hyle-morphism is actually Aristotelian in origin. Man is therefore an ambivalent entity: on the one hand, he is of supernatural or divine origin; on the other hand, he is an animal. He is a sinful creature. But he can elevate himself through the use of reason and will, which can control vulgar instincts. Says Jacques Maritain:

In answer to our question, then, "What is man?" we may give the Greek, Jewish, and Christian idea of man: man as an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with
God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love.

His very humanity is the humanity of an animal, living by sense and instinct as well as by reason. Thus man is "a horizon in which two worlds meet."^4

But on the cross-road between two worlds man cannot remain standing in hesitation about the direction in which he should go. Actually, there is only the alternative between salvation and damnation. So, he should take the immortal way. Since he is by nature wicked, he should be helped in the making of the proper choice. And the help comes from a supernatural realm, handed him by an authority who has received the grace from above. Only a supreme Power can lift up man from his fallen state. For this reason Max Otto calls supernaturalism a philosophy of might, because the absolute authority of the Church is based on the assumption of a Supreme Power that works beyond the sensorial world. Says Max Otto:

The heart of it is reliance upon a Supreme Being, or Power at work within or behind the world of the senses. The Christian church is its accredited representative, although there are numerous other organizations and movements that adhere to the same position. According to this view human beings are by nature wicked.

If left to themselves they are incapable of making a proper choice among desires, and if they could, they have not the will to master their baser natures. Any respectable pattern of behavior must therefore be introduced from a supernatural region, which must also provide the power to live by it in preference to natural inclinations.5

Though man was created in the image and likeness of God -- he is, therefore, endowed with supernatural gifts, i.e., reason and will -- he is by birth and inheritance a wicked creature through the fall of his first ancestors. His intellect was darkened and his will weakened by that first violation of the law of God, leaving him inclined to evil rather than to good. But since God is forgiving, He promised him a Redeemer who came on earth in due time in the person of Jesus Christ. Through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the Cross He restored man who wanted to believe his gospel. Through His life and teachings, He gave man an example of how to live the good life. No other can liberate man from his fallen state than this the only Son of God.

This tenet is in complete opposition to Rousseau's which posits man's natural perfection: man is good as he comes from the hands of the Creator! "Such a theory, "says the Catholic educator," fails to recognize the absolute need for self-repression and discipline in the life experiences of the individual."6

5Max C. Otto, loc. cit., pp. 63-64.
6Redden and Ryan, loc. cit., p. 49.
In brief, Catholic anthropology proclaims that man's origin and nature is Godlike (made to the image and likeness of God), composed of body and soul, but his natural condition (as a result of original sin) is that his intellect is less able to attain truth and his will is less able to seek good. His fallen nature is consequently subject to bodily corruption and more inclined to evil. He was created, however, to praise and serve God, and by so doing he will attain eternal happiness in heaven:

God made man, a creature composed of body and soul in the image and likeness of his Maker. And why? God made man to know Him, to love Him and to serve Him here on earth so that he would be happy with Him forever in heaven. We lisped the concentrated wisdom of the ages in those answers. They contain the fundamental truths of man's origin, nature, and destiny, and on those fundamental truths the universe hinges.7

Catholic education is not only based on Catholic catechism, but also on Catholic ethics, as it was handed down to Moses on Mount Sinai (through revelation) and as exemplified in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ:

. . . Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, et., etc.

This moral law is supposed to be universal (encompasses all persons, actions, and conditions), immutable

(admits no change or variation), **absolute** (provides no dispensation), **evident** (binding in conscience and is knowable by any normal person who has reached the age of reason), **obligatory** (binding on all under the penalty of sanctions), **authoritative** (derived from the divine authority and is made known to man through conscience), and **permanent** (it remains operative in the face of all denials or violations). 8

Ethics should regulate man's duties and relationships to God, his neighbor, and himself. Lying and dishonesty are held to be and remain universally evil things, because these traits are against man's rational and social nature. Says William McGucken:

Difficult as it may be to indicate all the duties of man to God, his neighbor, and himself, this is nevertheless simplicity itself compared to the attempts made by some of the character educators who put before us a changing norm of morality. In the scholastic system there is a yardstick, fixed and unchanging, suitable for all ages and all countries. Granted that it may be hard in certain circumstances to determine what is lying, what is dishonesty, the fact remains that in the scholastic system lying and dishonesty are evil things. 9

The ideal of the moral law is virtue. Virtue is manifested by self-control, self-sacrifice, and strength of character or virility. Any deviation from the standards of the moral law is considered morally wrong. One of the aims

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of education consequently is the building or molding of "character," i.e., to let reason and will master the inclinations to evil.

Educational Ideas

It is obvious that Catholic education is based on certain theological and philosophical assumptions. These are: the spiritual origin of man (man has a soul), the freedom of the will (to make choices) and the doctrine of original sin. Assumptions which are contradictory to these tenets are supposed to be false and erroneous:

It makes a great difference in the theory and practice of education whether or not one admits the existence of the soul — that is, the soul as the one, abiding, substantial, indivisible, spiritual principle in man — the freedom of the will, and the doctrine of original sin. If such postulates are denied, false premises are set up, false conclusions are reached, and false theory and erroneous practice are the results.10

Because of the dualistic nature of man -- he is both a natural animal and a supernatural and spiritual being -- the whole process of Catholic education is centered around the problem of the integration of both natures, in order to make the spiritual nature finally prevail, since his destination is a happy life in heaven. Life on earth is a preparation -- and often a probation -- for the future heavenly

10Ibid., p. 22.
life with God. The task of Catholic education cannot be otherwise than to prepare young people for the beatitude in the life after death. It is clear that the basis of Catholic education is religion and morality, and that their importance far outreaches that of intellectual instruction.

For it is true, as Leo XIII has wisely pointed out, that without proper religious and moral instruction "every form of intellectual culture will be injurious; for young people not accustomed to respect God, will be unable to bear the restraint of a virtuous life, and never having learned to deny themselves anything, they will easily be incited to disturb the public order."

Will and reason are supposed to be the highest faculties which guide to the life of truth and virtue. It is no more than logical that the first things the educator is to do, then, is to develop in the young people these higher potentialities. Intellectual instruction, however, is for the Catholic child of great importance. This is in accordance with the tendencies of the scholastic philosophy, since truth can be attained not only through revelation but also by reason.

Aristotelian logic has a special place in the Catholic educational system, because through logic man is supposed to be able to know the eternal truth. Even philosophy, according to the Schoolmen, is able to demonstrate

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11 Pope Pius XI, loc. cit., p. 10.
the existence of God. Aquinas formulated five ways, by which God's existence can be demonstrated: as prime motor or the unmoved mover (theological argument), first cause or the cause of causes (cosmological argument), pure act (existence without act is an impossibility), necessary (noncontingent) being in which existence and essence are one, and as summit of the hierarchy of beings (the so-called ontological argument).

The will should be trained and strengthened to enable man to resist evil temptations. A way to train the will is a life of simplicity and renunciation of worldly affairs. In the strengthening of the will, the intellect should be the guide, in order to know what is right and what is evil. A man whose conduct is controlled by his will and reason is called a man of character. Character formation is an inseparable part of Catholic education. Character is the realization of the universal moral principles. Redden and Ryan define character as

*the deliberate control and regulation of one's conduct through the recognition and acquisition of unchanging moral principles which are strictly exemplified in conduct, and consistently applied in every aspect of life's experiences.*

According to this definition, character means a will strengthened, disciplined and developed under the enlightening guidance of unchanging moral principles of conduct.\(^\text{12}\)

Closely related to the doctrine of original sin and to the conception of marriage, is the Catholic notion of co-education and sex education. Since instinct is inherent in the fallen nature of man, sex should be brought under control of the will and reason, through discipline and morality. Sexual relationships, conceived of as to gain merely passion and pleasure, should be condemned, since the main function of sex life is simply and solely reproduction. This is supposed to be the natural order of the creation.

As Pope Pius XI puts it:

God directly communicates to the family, in the natural order, fecundity, which is the principle of life, and hence also the principle of education to life, . . . 13

In this light, co-education is considered not only unnecessary, but even harmful, since it promotes the opportunity to repeat the "sinning." Says Pope Pius XI:

False also and harmful to Christian education is the so-called method of "co-education." This too, by many of its supporters, is founded upon naturalism and the denial of original sin; but by all, upon a deplorable confusion of ideas that mistakes a leveling promiscuity and equality, for the legitimate association of the sexes. 14

Cunningham equally deems it dangerous when both sexes are educated together freely:

It is the theory of many educators that if young people are thrown together daily in

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13 Pope Pius XI, loc. cit., p. 12.
school life, any training necessary for social adjustment will automatically take care of itself. This method, particularly in the adolescent age, is equivalent to bringing high explosives closely together and expecting them to fuse.\textsuperscript{15}

Since the ideal of chastity must be exercised at any cost -- at least before marriage, which itself must be sanctified by the Church -- and since experience is not deemed the proper way of getting acquainted with sexual issues, the problem of sex instruction may arise in order to prevent the young people from getting the wrong information from friends and laymen. According to the teachings of Catholic faith, only priests -- who have the grace of state -- have the right to instruct the young men and young women on matters of sex. Pope Pius XI has suggested:

In this extremely delicate matter, if, all things considered, some private instruction is found necessary and opportune, from those who hold from God the commission to teach and who have the grace of state, every precaution must be taken.\textsuperscript{16}

The ideal of the education of women is, of course, toward motherhood, but this motherhood -- fallen through Eve's sin -- must be elevated and sanctified, through the belief in Mary, the symbol of holiness and pure motherhood.


Says Sister M. Chrysantha:

"That there is mother God, but no human father of God, is the most high privilege of the female sex," asserts Father Ketter in Christ and Womankind. Mary's fiat raises all women to the heights of spiritual motherhood and restores the sanctifying dignity they had lost through Eve. Mary's submission displaces Eve's rebellion; Eve had caused loss and punishment; Mary restores grace and salvation. Through the Incarnation, a woman becomes the first co-operator in God's plan of redemption, just as a woman had been the first disturber of the divine plan of salvation.17

Let us take a look at a spiritual aspect of Catholic education, which is considered to be important -- namely, aesthetic education. Since within man is presumably a profound desire for truth, goodness, and beauty, aesthetic education should not be neglected. Since all of Catholic education -- from its religious to its moral aspects -- is basically intellectual, it is not surprising that, according to the Catholic notion, the education for aesthetic appreciation is rational as well. This conclusion is deduced, of course, from the assumption that the spiritual quality of man lies in his rationality. Emotions are considered lower instinctive functions. Redden and Ryan state:

Full and complete appreciation of beauty is, nevertheless, essentially rational. Proof of

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this truth is seen in the absence of aesthetic appreciations and tastes in all irrational animals.\footnote{Redden and Ryan, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 245.}

Since aesthetic education has something to do with values, the problem of values should be briefly considered. Parallel to the notion of the ontological and authoritative hierarchy in the world, there is a hierarchy of values also. When there is a conflict between two values, say, between man's duties to God and to his neighbor, the inferior right must cede to the superior. Charity is a good thing but it must not lead to the impoverishment of one's dependents for whose lives one is responsible. For the Catholic believer, it is a matter of course, that supernatural values are more important than the natural; spiritual values of greater import than the physical; and, eternal values of more significance than temporal. Education is consequently a continuous attempt to show the obviousness of this kind of evaluation of values. This is not surprising, if we bear in mind that the basis of the Catholic educational system is theocentric and supernatural in character, with the Church held to have the pre-eminent right to take the task of education upon herself. As Pope Pius XI puts it:

Hence it is evident that both by right and in fact the mission to education belongs pre-eminently to the Church, and that no one free from prejudice can have a reasonable motive
for opposing or impeding the Church in this her work, of which the world today enjoys the precious advantages. 19

The Church should permeate every aspect of life; thinking, conduct, politics, marriage life, arts, social relationships, and education. Everything, so to speak, should be interpreted Catholically, because

the key of the Catholic system is the supernatural. Not only Catholic theology, but Catholic practice, the Catholic attitude toward life, and most of all, Catholic education are insoluble mysteries if we exclude an understanding of the supernatural. The Church holds that she is divinely commissioned by Christ to carry on His Work, to do what He did. 20

Consequently education is not only confined to the school and home, but also -- and primarily -- to the Church. The objectives of education in the schools, as well as in the homes, are subordinated to the objectives of the Church, i.e., to baptize the people for the supernatural life. The supernatural man is thus the ultimate ideal. All other ideals are but secondary. As McGucken has expressed it for the aims of the secondary education in America:

The Catholic secondary school in American must find its objectives within the frame of reference that is common to all Catholic institutions -- the supernatural. Therefore, its aims are a further and richer development of those knowledges and skills, habits and appreciations that will fit the pupil to be . . . . 21

19 Pope Pius XI, loc. cit., p. 11.
21 Ibid., p. 267.
Of higher education, he states:

The Catholic university, as all universities, is devoted to the pursuit of truth, has an obligation to further and deepen the intellectual life of its students, to raise the cultural standards in the community and region wherein it is situated. For the Catholic university above all, the thing of ultimate importance is not here but hereafter. This world has genuine value only in so far as it leads to the next.22

The aims of Catholic education are thus clearly, and rather easily, stated. They are supernatural and universal. All educational effort must finally lead to this only -- the ultimate goal. The goal of education is identical with the goal of life. This is for the Catholic believer as true as the notion that man is composed of body and soul. Redden and Ryan have formulated the ultimate and proximate aims of Catholic education as follows:

. . . the primary and ultimate aim of all education is identical with the purpose for which man was created: to know God and to enjoy eternal happiness with Him in heaven. . . . The purpose of secondary aims is to supply those essentials which help to achieve the primary aim of education. They are aids or means employed to realize the primary aim. These secondary aims imply conscious efforts so to form a youth by instruction, guidance, and discipline that he will be well fitted and determined to carry out his life's work with the interest and zeal in conformity to unchanging moral principles.23

22 Ibid., p. 273.

23 Redden and Ryan, loc. cit., p. 133.
Pedagogical Comments

Since the basis of the aims of Catholic education is theology and is closely linked to the Catholic philosophy, ethics, and anthropology, we should consider these issues as they are related to the central problems of education.

The main characteristics of the Catholic philosophy of education are: supernaturalism, the dominant role of authority, and universalism.

The concept of supernaturalism implies logically a dualistic point of view, since it recognizes tacitly the existence of its opposite -- namely, the so-called naturalistic order. The indication "super" suggests necessarily the existence of a higher order, a higher value in the hierarchy of values. This notion consequently will raise the metaphysical problem, how to account for the relationship between the two realms, since the theocentric point of view sees the universe as one, as a unity, of which God is the origin and end of everything?

But why can God -- who is omnipotent and omniscient -- not destroy evil in the world? Since God is perfect, the blame should be laid on man himself. In consequence, the devil must be the invention of man and not of God. Man himself should be responsible for his own deeds. But why has man invented the devil?
Could it be that the devil — and hell — have been invented by man, in order to justify the existence of free will in man, and also to enable him to experience the good?

And the Catholic might answer "yes." For man, would be no man, if he had no free will. Free will makes choice possible. Choice implies the assumption of good and evil.

If so, we would infer, that good and evil were already in the world, before man could make his choice, since things to be chosen must exist earlier than the deed of choice itself. Thus, the devil should have existed before man. Who is then to blame for the invention of the devil, if it is neither God nor man? Someone must be the author, according to the Aristotelian logic! Here we are confronted with an (epistemological?) antinomy.

And, unfortunately enough, Adam and Eve made the wrong choices, because they succumbed to the temptation of the devil. They did not, of course, realize the catastrophic consequences of their wrong choice with the whole mankind after them inheriting their sins.

Since God is Love and He is forgiving, He has sent His Son, the God-Man to liberate the fallen mankind from their sins. An unbeliever may ask (or may he not?), why did God send His Son to earth so late, and not immediately after driving Adam and Eve away from Eden? By doing so, those who lived before Christ had not the opportunity and good
luck to be redeemed. Only those after Him could have the chance to be helped from their fallen state. Why should God be so unjust? 24

Would this consequently mean that the meaning of Jesus' appearance on earth is but relative, -- i.e., only valid within the frame work of a limited circumstance of time and place? If the latter is meant -- which the writer personally believes -- then the indication of God's Son is no more than a symbol -- namely, of man's very own metaphysical aspect, or man's metaphysical Self which the Hindus call the Atman-Brahman.

Then, consequently, man's metaphysical principle has been always (and will always be in man) from the "beginning." In the Gospel of St. John we find the same meanings:

Because I live, ye shall live also. At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you.

Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.

But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, he shall testify of me: and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning.

And these things I said not unto you at the beginning, because I was with you. 25

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24 Note: When the writer one day posed the same problem, a priest answered: "The redemption by Christ is retroactive." 25

The only conclusion we can draw from the above, is that the biblical stories (in their literal sense) of Adam and Eve, of original sin, and of Jesus Christ as the only Son of God in the history of man, including the necessary belief in the Virgin birth and the bodily resurrection of Christ from the grave, are no more than myths. Myths which are acceptable only to men who cannot believe for themselves, but only on the authority of others who consider themselves to have received the grace through revelation or to be privileged in the native endowment of intellectual capacities.

The biblical realist, Niebuhr, in his article Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith, says:

But we do not believe in the virgin birth, and we have difficulty with the physical resurrection of Christ. We do not believe, in other words, that revelatory events validate themselves by a divine break-through in the natural order. There is a great spiritual gain in this position which is in accord with Christ's own rejection of signs and wonders as validations of his messianic mission ("This wicked generation seeketh a sign.").

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Thus we reject the myth of the fall of man as a historical fact. With that rejection we can dispose of all nonsense about a biologically inherited corruption of sin. But we also easily interpret human evil as an inevitable condition of human finiteness and stand on the edge of Platonism, . . .

The literal belief in the original sin and in the inevitable necessity of liberation solely through the sacred institution, and the authoritative belief in "sanctified" persons, would necessarily lead to an unsatisfactory conception of education. How could the Church be the mystical body of Christ, since it is represented by human beings capable of errors? How could persons solely through intensive study be able to fortify people with sacraments in matters of life and death? How could people merely through institutional ordination meddle with man's personal relationship to the metaphysical totality of things?

In this particular frame of reference, education would be nothing more than a "gentle" spiritual coercion, made possible only through the use of an illusion or an option between a glorious life in heaven and a condemnation in hell after death. Since people are usually fearful in their nature, no choice, in fact, is thus presented.

It is the general understanding that all people are equally sons of God and are basically of the same origin. And consequently they are individually responsible for the way they organize their lives toward this origin. In other words, religion is a personal responsibility rather than a social or collective affair, because the genuine meaning of religion is the personal responsibility and relationship of man to God.
People who are supposed to be more enlightened, can guide others in these problems of relationship, but only by way of hinting at some possibilities, instead of talking in terms of absolutes and superlatives. They cannot teach people through coercive conversion, by way of deductive method of logistic reasoning or through the proclamation of the so-called revealed truth and very often enforced by either fearful or cheerful hopes in the hereafter. The way to God is not paved with pebbles of intellectual knowledge or belief upon authority, but, only according to the Sermon of the Mount, with genuine deep belief and pureness in heart: "Blessed are the poor in spirit: For theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are the pure in heart: For they shall see God."

The assumption of original sin in man and the necessity of intellectual knowledge for the relationship between man and God, may lead to a difficulty in the fundamentals of education in general and of religious education in particular.

In the first place, the child, at birth, is looked at as a fundamental sinner, so that every manifestation of inclination should be repressed from the beginning. There is no real freedom for the child to develop his potentialities fully. For Redden and Ryan say:

In order to overcome the efforts of original sin, constant, systematic directions from early child-
hood is required for the purpose of influencing the development of good tendencies, and of correcting disorderly inclinations. In view of the child's inherent weaknesses, the utter fallacy of allowing him complete freedom in his actions, as advocated by the extremists of modern progressive education, is obvious at once.27

Secondly, hammering on the evil inherited tendencies within the child, may result in the development of inferiority, complexes or guilt feelings which may in turn strengthen the conditions of neurosis. Any form of succumbing to instinctive inclinations may be interpreted by the child as a sinning, a transgression of the moral law inspired by the devil, and will consequently be associated with infernal punishment. In this way, very early the child may develop feelings of fear even of God (who is by the way supposed to be the God of Love and Forgiving), and of eternal condemnation.

That the use of fear and repression is practiced in Catholic education, is apparent from Marique's proposal:

Repress at once, any undesirable trait that the instinctive tendency may develop, lest it become a deep-rooted habit. Repression or inhibition, as it is more commonly designated, can be accomplished through fear of immediate punishment of any kind, if the undesirable tendency is but transitory.28

27Redden and Ryan, loc. cit., pp. 56-57.
28Marique, loc. cit., p. 279.
Thirdly, morality imposed by an authority outside the child will never lead, pedagogically speaking, to the development of genuine moral sensitiveness, since the basis is, simply, coercive discipline. No real choice among possibilities is present. The alternative is only survival or condemnation of the soul. Real love can never develop in the face of threat or anxiety. Psychiatrists know this. Says Niebuhr:

It might be added that a good deal of modern Christian teaching about Christian love may be by comparison very loveless. For the preacher chides his congregation endlessly for not meeting the most ultimate possibilities of the law of love, such as sacrifice, forgiveness, and uncalculated freedom from self, as if these were simple possibilities of the will.²⁹

Fourthly, there is, in fact, fundamentally no possible release of the child from his inherited biological sin, since man is by definition (thanks to the original sin), a sinner, unless by fortune he will meet a Catholic priest who can convert him to the belief in the Catholic doctrine. A plain secular educator is supposed to be unable to help the fallen child. In other words, a secular educator cannot guide the child truly. For Rev. John P. Whalen says:

It is unnecessary to deny the existence of God, or to resort to pantheism, or to become a

materialist or an idealist. It is necessary only to become Christian.30

Fifthly, the above quotation also suggests a life of exclusiveness, excluding the possibility of other beliefs, since the child is guided along one narrow matrix of behavior and expectations. His life and that of others can only be seen and estimated through slanted glasses which the child will never dare to take off, on penalty of excommunication. Not only will the child grow under a moral or psychological stress, in all probability, without being aware of it, he may also become exclusive and intolerant toward the beliefs of others. Says Allport on the prejudiced person:

For one thing, research shows that the prejudiced person is given to two-valued judgments in general. He dichotomizes when he thinks of nature, of law, of morals, of men and women, as well as when he thinks of ethnic groups. For another, he is uncomfortable with differentiated categories; he prefers them to be monopolistic. Thus his habits of thought are rigid. He does not change his mental set easily, but persists in old ways of reasoning -- whether or not his reasoning has anything to do with human groups. He has a marked need for definiteness; he cannot tolerate ambiguity in his plans.31


Finally, the assumption of the original sin as part of man's nature may imply a kind of moral determinism, opening the possibility of throwing the moral responsibility upon others -- in this case upon Adam and Eve -- for the sins one may have committed. Besides, it implies also a possible cheap belief that one may redeem himself from his sins solely through confession to specially authorized people. It is also naive to believe that one may clean himself from sins simply through faith in a historical person -- i.e., Jesus, and through "eating and drinking" God. These notions run counter to the elementary principles of education, i.e., to help growing people to develop their sense of responsibility for committed evils. No one else can take over this personal responsibility. He should go alone, bearing his own cross -- as Jesus Christ has shown to us, literally, as well as symbolically --, and find in his own way how to straighten out his existential issues with God. All people are basically able to set right a broken relationship with the totality of things, in order to restore the disrupted wholeness. This is what Langeveld calls the principle of moral identity. On the basis of this principle only, we can educate people to a moral life. The assumption of inherited evil in man leads to a pessimistic educational outlook, since man is distrusted from the
beginning, before he can show his positive qualities. As Ashley Montagu puts it:

The belief in the inherent selfishness of man, his innate naughtiness, inborn evil, aggressiveness and hostility, has taken many forms, and in each of its forms it has done untold personal and social damage. In the first place that belief has conditioned our attitude towards our fellow men, and not only to our fellow men, but to those utterly defenseless and dependent potential time-binders of the classes of babies, infants, children, and adolescents. Our belief in the inherent naughtiness of man has caused us to make out of the restraints and frustrations, which has had the effect of seriously crippling and distorting most human beings who have been exposed to it. There is pretty good reason to believe that most of the personal and social tragedies which mankind has created and suffered from have been due to this erroneous belief and the consequences flowing from it as a result of the child-rearing processes it has conditioned.32

As to the ultimate aim of Catholic education formulated by Redden and Ryan (see p. 252) -- namely, preparation for the life in the hereafter, it is significant to note that the dualistic separation between the earthly life and the life in the hereafter, with the latter given precedence over the former, is contradictory to the eternity of God's reality itself. Both the revealed reality of God as it is manifested in the myriads of phenomena in the world, as well as the unrevealed essence of God's Himself, are aspects of eternity itself. Only the limitedness of our senses

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32 Montague, loc. cit., p. 48.
prevents us to grasp the real meanings of phenomena, since these phenomena can only be understood in terms of time and space. This limitation is inherent in our humanness. But this fact is no reason for us to degrade the meaning of the revealed life (the "temporal" life) of God's reality itself. That God has "created" the world, must have in itself somehow a certain meaning. The cosmos is not a chaos, but a total system, a wholeness. Chaos is a human term, whereby the terms good and evil, happiness and misery, order and disorder have specifically human connotations. If God is said to be eternal, then, He must not only "exist" "after" death, and "there." He is always, here and now and forever.

In this frame of reference, then, the term "salvation of the soul" should have a different meaning, broader, deeper and more total — as was exemplified in Socrates' life and that of Jesus himself — since there is no separation between the now and the hereafter. There is no reason any more for existential anxiety and anxious preparedness for the probable life after death, and no threat of an infernal torture or reprobation. If the "salvation of the soul" can be accomplished in the here and now, we shall have less conflicts, tensions and controversies in the world. This is the real meaning of a moral and healthy life. This would be a life of wholeness, acceptance of the cross and a philosophical Bejahung (assent) instead of a life of Verneinung (negation). Then life would be worthwhile to live in gratitude, and could be accepted as a grace.
Kohnstamm's Personalism

The significance of Kohnstamm's educational theory lies in its emphasis on some essential ideas which are not found in the theories discussed in the preceding chapters. Kohnstamm was one of the prominent Dutch educational theorists who late in the nineteen twenties built a complete educational theory systematically arranged and consistently elaborated from a personalistic point of view. His main work is embodied in the noted trilogy, titled Schepper en Schepping (Creator and Creation), consisting of three separate books. The first book is a philosophical treaty, titled Het Waarheidsprobleem (The Problem of Truth), the second is a theory of education, titled Persoonlijkheid in Wording (Personality in Becoming), and the third is on theology, dealing with the relationship between man and God, of which the title is: De Heilige (The Saint). Kohnstamm planned to complete the trilogy with a supplementary fourth book on Sociology, in which man is understood as a social being, but never finished it.
This chapter will deal exclusively with the second book of the series, *Persoonlijkheid in Wording*, with its subtitle *Schets ener Christelijke Opvoedkunde* (*Sketch of a Christian Pedagogics*). It was written in 1928. The second printing, the reference for this writing, was published posthumously in 1956. His comprehensive erudition may be apparent from his professorial career which covered more than one field of knowledge. In the first years he taught physics with a specialization in thermodynamics. Later on he taught educational theory, didactics, philosophy, and also theology. We may say that the scientist and philosopher-theologian are integrated in the person of Kohnstamm as an educational theorist.

He is one of the pioneering advocates of educational theory as an autonomous discipline which bases its principles on certain axiological assumptions. Kohnstamm's philosophy is a theistic personalistic one, formulated, as he said, "on a biblical basis."

Personalism is a philosophical trend that emerged in the beginning of this century. Albert C. Knudson (a pupil of the first American personalistic philosopher Borden Parker Bowne) has said:

In 1903 the veteran French philosopher Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), published a book entitled

\[1\] Kohnstamm, *loc. cit.*
Le Personalisme. His philosophy had previously been known as "neo-criticism." But "personalism," he now says, "is the true name that fits the doctrine hitherto designated by the title neo-criticism."

In 1906 there appeared in Germany the first volume of a work called "Person und Sache" (Person and Thing) written by a young philosopher by the name of William Stern, who in the subtitle describes his system as "Critical Personalism." The second volume was published in 1918, and the third and concluding volume in 1924.

In 1908 the name "Personalism" appeared for the first time, so far as I know, on the title-page of an English book. The author was Borden Parker Bowne. In it he gave a compact but fresh restatement of the philosophic system which for the thirty years past he had expounded in various books and journals and in his classroom lectures in Boston University.

Thus within the brief period of five years we find these representative and independent thinkers of France, Germany and in America adopting the term "personalism," as the proper designation of their respective systems of thought.2

In spite of many significant differences among various personalistic systems (Renouvier's is relativistic, Stern's is pantheistic, and Bowne's is theistic), there is one central common idea underlying them, i.e., the belief in the reality of the "person," the self, or the "soul" as a unique wholeness, capable of knowing. Personalistic philosophy is opposed to materialistic impersonalistic naturalism. As Bowne puts it:

On all of these accounts, then, we affirm that impersonalism is a failure whether in the low

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form of materialistic mechanism or in the abstract form of idealistic notions, and that personality is the real and only principle of philosophy which will enable us to take any rational step whatever. We are no abstract intellects nor abstract wills, but we are living persons, knowing and feeling and having various interests, and in the light of knowledge and under the impulse of our interests trying to find our way, having an order of experience also and seeking to understand it and to guide ourselves so as to extend or enrich that experience, and thus to build ourselves into larger and fuller and more abundant personal life.³

William Stern defines person in his Person und Sache as:

Eine Person ist ein solches Existierendes, das, trotz der Vielheit der Teile, eine reale, eigenartige und eigenwertige Einheit bildet, und als solche, trotz der Vielheit, der Teilfunktionen, eine einheitliche, zielstrebige Selbsttätigkeit volbringt.⁴

For Stern, everything can be a person, a tree, a dog, a man, the Absolute, since the essential characteristics are: individuality as a purposive (zielstrebige) wholeness, consisting of parts; each "individual" is unique, i.e., different from any other individual. Stern's term "person" is indeed confusing, for in his General Psychology he defines person as:

The "person" is a living whole, individual, unique, striving toward goals, self-contained

⁴Kohnstamm, loc. cit., p. 80.
and yet open to the world around him; he is capable of having experience.  

Stern, in fact, means by "person" a unifying principle that abides in every entity, and by "thing" (Sache) is meant mere matter. "Person" and "thing" cannot exist separately. These conceptions denote about the same meanings as Aristotle's terms "form" and "matter." The Absolute is the all-embracing entity that unifies the cosmos while anorganic things are the lowest forms of "person." Says Knudson about Stern's personalism:

Every concrete object, insofar as it is a unified whole, is a person. But a person is made up of parts, and these parts, insofar as they are wholes, are also persons, and these "persons" again have their "personal" parts. There is thus a hierarchy of persons. Every finite person is not only made up of parts but is itself part of a higher person and in this sense a "thing." "Thing is thus a relative and to a certain extent negative term. It expresses the bare fact of plurality and potentiality, implied in all existence. Person is the positive term. Every actually existing being is a person, whether it be an atom, a molecule, a cell, a family, a nation, mankind, or the Absolute.

Stern's personalism is thus pantheistic, with God conceived, not as a self-conscious spirit apart from the world but as a Self-Person, who embraces the totality of the universe. All other "persons" are parts of him.

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6Knudson, loc. cit., p. 28.
Together they form a pyramid of being, with God at the top, encompassing the totality of life, functioning as the unifying principle. He differs from other beings, solely as the Absolute Person that includes all others in himself. He does not exist independently of the world, therefore God is only the unity viewed from "above," while matter is the being viewed from "below."

Kohnstamm, as a deep Protestant-Christian believer, is opposed to Stern's pantheistic view, since he regards the I - Thou relationship between Man and God as fundamentally important:

But the deepest distinction will nevertheless come out -- as a matter of course -- with the last question. For Stern, God -- Whom he calls "die Gottheit" -- lacks self-consciousness. A religious person-relationship, in the sense of the I - Thou-relation, is for Stern an impossibility; he calls himself an adherent of a "personalistischer Pantheismus" [a personalistic pantheism]. I have already indicated in Book V of the "Problem of Truth" the ground of which facts in my own experience I cannot agree with this point of view."

Kohnstamm's philosophical starting point is:

...that this world is God's Creation, and, therefore, can only be understood scientifically from the idea of Creation.  

7 Trans. from Kohnstamm, loc. cit., p. 81.
8 Trans. from Ibid., p. xiii.
In accounting for the reasons why he chooses this position, particularly in educational theory, he holds that the human personality -- the object of educational reflection -- can only be understood in the framework of the Creation, and thus, in his relationship with God. This I - Thou relation can never be discovered in the infra-human world. In consequence, Kohnstamm is opposed to the evolutionistic view of man, since the latter does not recognize basic differences among beings. Pedagogical phenomena can only be adequately looked at from a personalistic (theistic) standpoint, since education is solely dealing with human beings, with persons. Says Kohnstamm:

And the central idea, the category that is constitutive for this realm of essentials, is that of personality, of abiding in the I - Thou relationship, that never can be found in the infra-human world.⁹

According to Knudson, the great contribution of Christianity in the history of philosophy is the concept of personalism, since in Christianity God is conceived of as a Person who appeared among men in the person of Jesus Christ, who is called the Son of God. This religion brought to mankind the gospel of love, emphasizing the worthwhileness of the person as an individuality. The recognition of the individual means the recognition that

⁹Ibid.
he has a free will. He is also free to know and to feel. These are the underlying elements in every sort of personalism. Says Knudson:

We would find in personality four, instead of three, fundamental elements: first, individuality, which includes unity and identity; second, self-consciousness in the sense of power to know as well as to feel; third, will or free activity; and fourth, dignity or worth.\textsuperscript{10}

These elements which Knudson talks about are also to be found in Kohnstamm's pedagogics, as we shall see.

In talking about God's personality and the great influence of Christianity on personalism, Knudson states:

That the personality of God and the sacredness of human personality express the genius of the Christian religion, whatever may be said of its theology, is hardly open to question; and that these beliefs have received their completest philosophical justification in modern personalistic metaphysics, would seem equally clear. Personalism is par excellence the Christian philosophy of our day.\textsuperscript{11}

Why is God called a Person? Because He is capable of communication with His creatures. God is omnipresent and omniscient, so that man who is willing to experience His presence, and who is sensitive enough, will understand Him. Man is the only creature that is capable of this religious communication and that can understand God's visual language, i.e., nature:

\textsuperscript{10}Knudson, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 80.
In affirming that God is personal we mean that the fundamental Power of the world -- the Cause of existence and the Source of value -- is a Being capable of communication.

God, too, makes use of a physical medium of expression -- nature. As Berkely put it, "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" is a divine visual language. It is a medium which God employs both for communication and for the realization of value. Through nature we discover God's will and learn his attributes. In the broadest sense, nature is to God as body is to mind in man.\footnote{12}

Kohnstamm's personalism is theistic and primarily axiological, since he brings the dignity of man in his relationship to God to the fore. Education, in his view, is mostly concerned with the ethical aspect of man, character formation, and conscience. Education is more normative -- as a "practical" discipline -- than descriptive. It is, in consequence, related to values, to man's attitude and judgment with respect to the totality of things. Education should be based, therefore, on axiological positions, instead of on biological interests. Human values are supravital, i.e., beyond the "preservation of the biological life." As he says:

...the issue for education is quite another thing; it is concerned with the whole realm of values, and the very structure of that

realm is highly complicated, the conflicts are countless, and the proper task of education is in fact to help the pupil to find his own way in that realm that is full of dangers. Hence, what for the physician is a field of minor importance, becomes the central problem, i.e., the formation of conscience and character, is completely dominated by axiological considerations.¹³

Kohnstamm especially warns the educator not to confuse education with instruction. In general, public instruction does not need axiological reflection. It is rather a matter of meeting the needs of a given society:

The misunderstanding that I mentioned, is for the practical school teacher conceivable. For his daily work, it is indeed the big question: how do I impart to the children under my direction in the best way the knowledge and insight, that they, their parents, and the community expect to find here? And those expectations are during a lifetime comparatively constant.¹⁴

This does not mean that the task of a statesman should not be axiologically based. He, too, should have a social ideal, an image of an ideal society. But for the educator, the smaller communities, on which society at large -- the state -- rests, are in many respects more important. In other words, educational theory, should take into consideration the ideal of human life in all of its relationships, not only to other human beings, but also the relationships to the totality of things.

¹³Trans. from Kohnstamm, loc. cit., p. 100.
¹⁴Trans. from Ibid., p. 100.
Kohnstamm sees the main problem as one of how and what to choose from the enormous number of possible "Weltanschauungen." A choice implies having a general view of systems of axiologies. Without a system of axiologies one cannot "make a choice." The making of a choice, however, is not a matter of logical reasoning. One cannot account logically, for one's philosophical decision. "The acceptance of a certain basis of life," says Kohnstamm, "is supra-logical in character."¹⁵

In search for the right place of his own axiological system among other systems, Kohnstamm brings to the fore Dilthey's way of classification of axiological systems. According to Dilthey, there are three fundamental types of axiologies:

1. Positivistic systems.
2. Objective Idealistic systems.

The first type is represented by: Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, the Encyclopaedists, Comte, Mill, Spencer. These systems are supposed to be primarily intellectualistic.

¹⁵Trans. from ibid., p. 104.
The second group has representatives such as Heraclitus, the Stoics, Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, Goethe, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel. These people are predominantly emotional.

To the third group belong Plato, the church-fathers, the scholastics and the Reformers, Kant, Fichte, Schiller. These figures are generally people of the "will." 16

But Kohnstamm criticizes this way of grouping axiological systems. He wonders how to classify Schopenhauer the "voluntarist." If he is incorporated by the group of "idealists of freedom," such as Augustine, Luther, Kant, and Schiller, he would be a strange bedfellow.

In fact, Kohnstamm himself, before he read Dilthey's works, was confronted with the same problem of the typology of "philosophies of life." In his attempts to deal with this extremely complex problem, Kohnstamm's attention was caught by Grünbaum's work Herrschen und Lieben als Grundmotive der philosophischen Weltanschauungen (Ruling and Loving as Basic Motives of Philosophical World-views). Grünbaum based his typology of world-views on the notion that the essential characteristic of a world-view should be sought in the relationship in which the "I" is confronted

16 Trans. from ibid., pp. 106-107.
with the Totality of things; in other words, in man's attitude toward the "World." This attitude may be one of "Loving" (Lieben), or born out of the will to "Rule" (Herrschen).

According to Kohnstamm Grünbaum's approach is more adequate and of a higher order than Dilthey's, because the latter is based on "psychical" functions alone, such as intellect, emotion, and will. Grünbaum's notion does not mean that "Ruling" is more the characteristic of science and "Loving" is closer to the attitude in religion. One must, however, grant that the religious realm is one of "loving" rather than of "ruling." Both realms, science as well as religion, may be based either on "Ruling," or "Loving." Everything depends on the attitude of the person involved in either religion or science. Even in religion one may assume a "Ruling" attitude, if the religion is used as a means to gain social power, or to control heavenly powers as is often practiced in magic. If one is completely absorbed in the cause of science, he "loves" science, not as a means to "rule," but solely as an expression of "love" toward science. "Love" is an attitude of reverence, modesty, humility, a feeling that the "World" is still greater than the knowing "I."

Grünbaum's way of classification is, therefore, very basic for the characterization of one's axiology. But
Kohnstamm questions Grünbaum’s dichotomy from a personalistic point of view. In the religious realm, the personalistic I - Thou relationship is quite different from the state of "being lost in" or "being absorbed in" the Totality of things, as is often practiced in Oriental religions and in mysticism. He holds that Grünbaum’s scheme should be supplemented by a third dimension, Absorption. There are, thus, three possible types of axiological attitudes and combinations. We may depict these possible types with triangles of which every angular point represents a certain type.

In figure A, the "Loving" attitude is primary to the other two; in B the "Ruling" attitude is primary; and, in C, the "Absorption" attitude is primary. In D the "Loving" and "Absorption" attitude are equally preferred to the attitude of "Ruling." In real situations, however, there is no scientist or artist whose attitude can be classified precisely according to one of the fundamental attitudes. In most instances it is a matter of emphasis, closer to or farther from the angular points or sides of the triangle of axiologies.
According to Kohnstamm, it is even possible to mark the Dilthey scheme in the R-L-A triangle, as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{L} \\
\text{G} \\
\text{A} \\
\text{F} \\
\text{R}
\end{array}
\]

Fig. E

The RFG-line is the so-called Dilthey-line in Kohnstamm’s typology. R corresponds to the positive-naturalistic system of Dilthey, since the positivist’s attitude is that of "ruling" and control. One is in search of truth in order to control nature. The "ego-strength" of the positivist is at its maximum. The point G indicates the place of Goethe who is neither a "Loving" personalist, nor a mystic; he is "Absorbed" in the universe. Goethe does not worship a Personal God, but is talking about "die All-Natur," the totality of nature. He is thus rather a pantheist. He believes, however, in the mortality of the individual soul. This implies the acceptance of differences in nature as independent phenomenal beings, the acceptance of individuals as worthwhile entities, which brings him close to point L. Yet his pantheistic tendencies push him in the direction of point A. In consequence, his place is in the middle of the L-A-line (G). G is thus the
point of the objective idealistic system in the Dilthey classification. Fichte, according to Dilthey a subjective idealist or an "idealist of freedom," is in fact an anthropocentric idealist. As an idealist he is close, therefore, to point G on the LA-line, but as a subjectionist, concentrating his point of view around the "I," he must find his place in the direction of R, the "Ruling"-type, the power-type, the type that worships the power of the ego. F (Fichte) lies, therefore, between G and R. The GRF-line is thus the Dilthey-line in Kohnstamm's triangle of axiological classification. This categorizing of philosophers of life is called the "descriptive phenomenology of world-views." Any type of world-view can be plotted out in the triangle.

A descriptive educational theory, as theory, should be able, consequently, to build up a complete educational system based on every point of the triangle. Every educational system, hence, will be different. Says Kohnstamm:

...that we will get a quite different pedagogics, according as we view the world from R, A or L*, viz. according as we see the desirable situation in the gain of Power by the "I" over the universe, in the loss of the personality of the "I," his absorption in the Eternal Nothingness, or in the purification of the personality from the sin and the restoration of the original relationship of Love between the "I" and the Creator. And again the character of pedagogics becomes quite different if we place ourselves at an intermediate standpoint as indicated above by G or F.17

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17 Trans. from ibid., p. 119 (* in the original text indicated with H, O or L).
Kohnstamm is fully aware of the fact that there is an indefinite number of philosophies, and that the phenomenological typology of world-views is merely a matter of overview and theoretical convenience. He states:

If each point on the sides of the triangle RLA and within, were equally "important" from the standpoint of pure description, there could be possibly no phenomenology of worldviews and in consequence also no "practical philosophy" and thus also no pedagogics. All of these disciplines are based on the assumption that the individual cases are grouped in such a way, that they form definite "types," and that the description of those "types" -- though the "typical case" occurs nowhere in reality -- is after all sufficient to recognize, to classify and to understand each case.18

Kohnstamm, in fact, wonders whether in practice one can really develop a complete educational system based on any of the existing worldviews. According to him Occidental philosophy Is on the whole either idealistic or positivistic. Since the intuitive attitude in life, ethos, and educational practice is deeply rooted in the Christian belief, positive or idealistic educational systems have never been fully developed, however.

While the European philosophy was impersonalistic, the intuitive life attitude, thus the ethos and education are in Europe so deeply rooted in Christianity, that purely positive and idealistic educational systems cannot easily develop. They meet with inner resistance.19

18 Trans. from ibid., p. 120.
19 Trans. from ibid., p. 121.
Also in Oriental wisdom of "being one with the universe" has never been elaborated for educational use in the sense of a logical system of thinking. Moreover, Kohnstamm questions the possibility of the development of an educational theory based on any type of worldview. This has been done only with the philosophical types according to the Dilthey-line RFG. There have been in history, purely naturalistic-positivistic epistemologies, natural philosophies, metaphysics, even naturalistic-positivistic "ethics" and "politics," but no one has attempted to build up a purely naturalistic educational theory. No one has ever tried to attribute an absolute Power to the individual "I," though there were cases where man worshiped the Power of a collective "I" -- as we have seen with the systems of Plato, Fichte, Nazism and Communism. This means that the Power of the "I" is bound to certain norms; in other words, the exclusive standpoint of R is abandoned and moved in the direction of the "idealistic" LA-line. The educational system in Plato's Republic is an unmistakable example. Kohnstamm even wonders: Could it be, that the standpoint of R, by its very nature, does not permit the possibility of developing an educational system? In other words, an educational system can only be developed on two basic assumptions: first, the worthwhileness of the individual as a person; and second, the possibility of self-transcendence, i.e., the growth of the individual in
the direction of a certain ideal. The acceptance of these assumptions means for Kohnstamm taking the stand of personalism:

...attempt to sketch an educational system that presents itself to whom that tries to see World and Life as purely as possible from point L of our triangle. We try, therefore, to develop a personalistic pedagogics as consistently as possible, although we do not disguise from ourselves that we can only approximate the purely personalistic standpoint, and never can attain it completely.20

Kohnstamm's Educational Principles

First of all, the worthwhileness of the person as a unique individuality is the central idea in Kohnstamm's position, since the personalist sees individual entities as differentiations of the phenomenal world, unified by the Absolute Person. Accepting the multiplicity of the world within a certain order, includes the recognition of existing hierarchies in the world order. The individual person, too, has a hierarchical organization. In other words, the individual is a stratified personality. Kohnstamm distinguishes five layers of the personality, of which the "higher" levels include the "lower." Personality layers should be understood, however, not as static entities, but as active functions, manifesting in certain

20Trans. from ibid., p. 124.
types of behavior. The various strata of personality can be discerned by the behavioral manifestations. The five levels of behavior are: anorganic level (falling through the working of gravitation); vegetative level (metabolism and growth); animal or psychic level (the possibility of "experience" and "learning," but only at the level of perception instead of apperception, and conditioning instead of insight); the human level (the use of norms -- theoretical, ethical and aesthetical -- , and self-awareness); the religious or absolute level (total integration of the personality, and being aware of a relation to the "Original Ground").

About this absolute level Kohnstamm says:

But in All of this, a summary toward a synthesis has not taken place as yet, the highest level of personal life, the deepest kernel of the personality is not touched upon in such a "living-through." This does not occur until the "I" becomes aware of the relationship not to this or that particular piece of reality, not to some realm of values, not functioning with one or the other of his faculties, but is aware of his relationship to the Original Ground, the totality of Things, with all of his faculties simultaneously, in thinking, reflecting and willing. Such a living-through can only be expressed in a religious language.21

Kohnstamm states further that all essential educational problems are related to the "human" and "absolute" realms of behavior, in which the "lower" levels should be

21 Trans. from ibid., p. 49.
integrated adequately. Drilling, habit formation, conditioning, and regulation of the "instincts" make sense only, if these preliminary forms of learning do not end in themselves, but are unified by the "human" and "absolute" functions. A personality is an individual in which the latter functions are positively active. Pedagogics is, therefore -- according to the personalistic standpoint -- the theory of the regulation of human behaviors. In other words, pedagogics is a personality science ("science" broadly conceived as Wissenschaft).

That a stratigraphic theory of personality is very important, is apparent in Albert R. Gilbert's statement: "Stratigraphic theory coordinates the great thoughts of all 'schools' that have evolved since the advent of scientific psychology."22 Commenting on the possibility of the assumption of a superconscious level (similar to Kohnstamm's Absolute level), he says:

The concept of stratification (overlapping intentions) involves "openness" inasmuch as new strata (intentions) are conceived as emerging from the old ones. The "highest" intention so far assumed by the stratification theorists is of a cognitive-volitional, conscious nature. The hierarchy of intentions need not, however, end there. One may

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indeed postulate a superconscious intention transcending the personal self and its phenomenal experience by communing with absolute existence. There is no scientific evidence of superconsciousness, as there is for subconsciousness. On the other hand, there is no evidence against its existence; that is, we do not know how much experiences and motivations are coterminous with absolute existence. 23

Personalistic educational theory recognizes also the fundamental identity of all persons, regardless of race, social status, and abilities. They are equally from the same Absolute Origin. Any educational system, moreover, which advocates power policy, must be condemned. According to Kohnstamm:

Just because he is a personalist, he cannot place the one human person as an unrestricted ruler over the other, but should he treat them as equivalent magnitudes. Neither should one be allowed to disturb his fellow-man in order to attain his destination, nor may he be a burden to his community for his subsistence. 24

The equal right of individuals to exist properly implies the recognition of their free will and their ability to bear responsibilities. This means that the individual is essentially able to see and apply norms or "oughts," because responsibility always refers to an "ought." Responsibility has a normative quality. It belongs, therefore, to the "human" level. Any education

23 Ibid., p. 227.
24 Trans. from Kohnstamm, loc. cit., p. 142.
that does not take responsibility into consideration in its program will be, by definition, inadequate. Responsibility is the bridge between the person and the realm of values or ideals. Personality includes responsibility. "When responsibility is denied, the person ceases to exist."\textsuperscript{25}

The ability to see, understand and apply norms is called by Kohnstamm conscience.

The inner eye can open for higher values, the will can consciously abandon the lower and follow the higher values, the steadfastness with which the choice once made is held, can increase.\textsuperscript{26}

Conscience is man's dimension that is capable of breaking through the limitations imposed on his behavior by habit formation or instinctive passion. Conscience enables man to elevate himself above the animal level of behavior. It is thus an aspect of the "human" stratum. In consequence, it is essentially the main problem in education. Man is educable only because of his conscience. It is also related to the responsibility, discussed earlier, since responsibility refers to the realm of norms or values. Without conscience one cannot conceive norms. The possibility of character-formation -- character in the sense of the steadfastness of behavior according to higher

\textsuperscript{25}Trans. from \textit{ibid.}, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{26}Trans. from \textit{ibid.}, p. 95.
values — implies the assumption of man's conscience. That the formation of conscience is fundamental in Kohnstamm's educational system, is apparent from the following statement:

One cannot -- of course -- prove in the pregnant sense, that there exists such thing as conscience, that can break through habits, and can create new ones. For, it is not a derived certainty, but a ground-axiom, that helps to support all certainties. And he who does not have that certainty, should not engage in pedagogics anyhow; this will remain for him, under all circumstances, a book with seven seals. Yes, if he not only says it, but also means it, he may not also call himself an educator.

For, the central problem of education is that of the formation of conscience.27

Here lies the difference between education and mere habituation. While in education the educator attempts to affect the child's conscience, in mere habituation conscience is not necessarily touched.

There is a fundamental distinction, therefore, between an habitual action and a conscientious action. According to Kohnstamm, there are four characteristics in a conscientious decision.28

1. It is taken with the involvement of the total personality. This kind of action is opposed to the so-called "short-circuit" action, whereby one acts in hot temper.

27 Trans. from ibid., pp. 68-69. (Italics in original).
28 Ibid., pp. 64-67.
2. A conscientious decision is supra-rational, meaning that the totality of motives that have lead to the decision, is unformulatable in words, although it contains rational elements as well. Each unique situation, in which the decision is taken, is indescribable in a finite number of judgments: individuum est ineffabile.

3. The conscience-decision is, therefore, concrete and individual. It means that the decision taken, cannot tell us anything about what another person, under other circumstances, should do, or even -- if it were possible -- what another under my circumstances should do. It tells only what I in my concrete circumstances should do. It is, therefore, quite different from the general "ought" of a moral law. It is, however, not the concreteness of the individual arbitrariness and caprice of the "short-circuit" action.

4. The conscience-decision may be considered a "gift," not only concerning its "it" but also its instantaneous "when." Luther's "Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise" is an obvious example of the "gift" character of the conscience-decision -- namely, being-unable-to-do-otherwise. It is as if there is an inner "coercion" from the deepest kernel of the personality.

Another significant point of Kohnstamm's personalistic educational system, is the recognition of individual differences. The individual differences will naturally
manifest themselves in the course of one's development from the onset of life. Individual difference is a growth-concept rather than one of immutable capacities. The title of Kohnstamm's book *Personality in Becoming* hints at this dynamic notion.

The role of family is considered by Kohnstamm of the greatest importance in education. This is because the family, as the smallest social unit, is unique and unreplaceable. Public institutions are established solely on behalf of the parents who want to extend the educational opportunities which they, as separate individuals, cannot afford. Only on this basis can the individual be protected from coercive arbitrariness of certain power groups. On the other hand, the school has the right -- on behalf of sound educational principles -- to protect the child from cruel and malevolent neurotic parents. Kohnstamm holds that:

The primary and most important task rests undoubtedly -- in the personalistic conviction -- on the narrowest community: the family. It is a unit, deeply rooted in the essence of things, that, according to the striking word of Gunning, documents its irreplaceability through the indissolubility of its tie.29

Kohnstamm's view of child play with respect to education is of interest, also. According to Dilthey's

29 Trans. from *ibid.*, p. 147.
subjective idealism, which regards the unlimited subjective freedom of the individual as primary, play should be considered all-embracingly important. The latter notion is unambiguously expressed by Schiller: "Der Mensch ist nur ganz Mensch wo er Spielt." (Man is real man only when he plays.) This worship of the idealism of freedom as the highest value in man is opposed to Kohnstamm's personalism. The latter puts service above freedom, since the I - Thou relationship is the clue of man's life. It does not follow, however, that play in itself has no value at all in the life of the child. Play does have its pedagogical value. It should, however, make room for labor as a service gradually. Labor gives to man a more lasting and deeper satisfaction than play does. We should not overestimate the value of play according to Kohnstamm:

It follows, that Christian personalism is more remote from nothing but the cult of the All powerful I. Service is for that conviction a state of higher value than Freedom, and in consequence, Labor represents a higher life value than Play, the neglect of labor a grosser mutilation of life than that of play. It does not, however, mean at all, that we take the utilitarian stand, for although one does not attach the highest value to play, by this one does not say or mean least of all, that it should not have its own value, but only a value as a means for something else.

Because play forms a life atmosphere with its own value, everybody has a right to play and a fortiori the child, for whom the highest spheres of life are not open as yet.30

30 Trans. from ibid., p. 273.
Of great importance is for Kohnstamm, as a theistic personalist, the role of religion in education. Religious education should have its particular character. It should be less intellectual and in consequence less public. An intimate relationship between educator and educand is necessary, because religion is more concerned with the deeper layers of one's personality. One must see that religious education does not become socialized, since the I-Thou relationship to God has little to do with public social relationship. Religious education should be accomplished in a religious atmosphere. As Kohnstamm puts it:

Everything, therefore, that belongs to the religious education, calls upon unity of life atmosphere; religious education is exclusive. This is a shortcoming only in the eyes of the monist, who considers, by its very nature, uniformity to be desirable. For the personalist, however, the exclusiveness of the religious atmosphere is a consequence of the fact that we do not remain here in the comparatively peripheral strata of life, but must penetrate into the deepest ground of the soul. Religious education can only be provided in an atmosphere of intimacy, of the opening of the soul in mutual trust, that family life attains only in its best and highest moments. And how great the significance of social life and everything pertaining to it, may be, just this intimacy is not to be found there, and one should not seek it there either.31

31 Trans. from ibid., p. 424. (Italics in original).
Kohnstamm is also aware of the occurrence of the so-called "Zusammenbruch der Kindheitsreligion" (the collapse of childhood religion) in the individual's life, particularly in adolescence. It is a kind of crisis in one's religious development. This crisis is usually necessary and sound. Kohnstamm mentions four possible causes of this religious crisis:

1. Theoretical doubt. The adolescent may ask: "Is it really true, what I have believed as a child? Is the way of representing the world on which I based my belief and my prayers as a child tenable?"

Kohnstamm comments on this theoretical doubt as follows:

It is also obvious, that nobody can come to a really independent, mature religious life, that has known nothing of such doubts. There would be also not a single reason to call this normal process of growth a "conflict," at least for a Christian, who is convinced that the Truth is from God, and that being a Christian is something else than the acceptance of the ancient or medieval world-picture, if Christianity were not lacking in its task toward science during the last centuries. Now it comes home to roost to the youth.

.......

He who until his 20th birthday has never doubted the content of representations, he has taken in as a child without criticism, is doing more weakly than he who had understood early that all of our formulations are but stumblings to approach something ineffable. \(^{32}\)

\(^{32}\) Trans. from ibid., p. 556.
2. "Enttauschte magische Erwartung" (disappointed magical expectation). Because of the too great emphasis put on rituals and sacraments in religion, one is generally disappointed when the ritual magic, such as a prayer, does not render the expected results. For many people prayer is considered a magical deed, whereby one can influence God's disposal by praying. The belief, that one can force God according to one's will, is in itself a godlessness. One mistakes religious faith for an egocentric prayer-expectation.

3. The moral conflict. This occurs when one begins to doubt God's justice and goodness: "Why all this suffering? How can one conceive that this world was created by an omnipotent and loving God, when there is much suffering in it?" Wars are no illusions in the history of man. In time of war and afterwards youth suffers most: Why does God allow innocent young people to suffer? Questions of this character may make a person waver in his religious belief. In Kohnstamm's view we "...are faced here with the deepest mystery of Christendom, the acceptance of the cross. And it is well to understand, that the twelve-year-old, who without help is confronted with it, cannot find the way-out."33

33Trans. from ibid., p. 560.
4. A religious crisis as a result of a psychological "protest." The protest may be individually directed against demanding parents, or it may be a social rebellion against ruling powers in state and society, including the Church. We must see this protest as an attempt of the youth to emancipate himself from the moral and spiritual oppression of those who consider themselves knowing everything about God and life.

After this "Zusammenbruch" of the child faith, there appears usually a period of regeneration and integration. This is, above all, due to deeper experiences with one's personal psychical life. In many cases, however, the help of wiser personalities cannot be neglected. According to Kohnstamm:

Only a person is capable to form a person, only in a personal relationship can we understand God, only through a personal life can personality grow and become mature. And the power of Christian education lies there in, that the educator does not speak in his own name, but hints at One, who is more than he is, at One, who bears and who offers strength.34

Kohnstamm's Search for the General Aim of Education

Kohnstamm is actually one of the few educational theorists who explicitly and systematically searches for

34 Trans. from ibid., p. 567.
the formulation of the general aim of education, in accordance with his personalistic notion. Kohnstamm states that the aim of education cannot possibly be the quest of happiness. He considers the possible meaning of happiness, finding it, in any event, to be related to the emotional life of the individual. He notes that various words, such as pleasure, joy, well-being, beatitude, delight, and the like, hint at a similar positive feeling.

Referring to Sheler's "Schichten des Emotionalen Lebens" (layers of emotional life), Kohnstamm makes the following classification and illustrations on emotions.35

1. Sensory emotions. These may be qualified as pleasure and pain, or as comfort and discomfort. They can be evoked through certain stimuli, and can be localized in certain parts of the body. Their occurrence can be controlled arbitrarily, since we can dispose of the stimuli that cause the emotions. In these sensory emotions is the "I" only indirectly involved. In the saying "I have a sore throat," is the "I" less involved than in "I am sad" or "I am glad."

2. Vital emotions. These emotions are the ones of well-being, freshness, health, or weariness. They cannot be clearly localized, and the "I" is more intimately

involved. In "I feel healthy," both the physical body and the psychical "I" are represented. The negative and positive emotions of the various "realms" may remain separated: I can possibly at the same time have a sore toe, "feel healthy," and "be sad." The vital emotions are total, but cannot be controlled completely by our will. The emotions will change only if the total physical condition is changed.

3. **Psychical emotions.** They cannot be localized at all, since motives lie behind these feelings. We are glad or sad because of something. We even regard it as a critical or morbid symptom, when motives are lacking. The connections with motives means, that we can keep these emotions more or less under control. By recalling the motives we may evoke sadness or gladness in ourselves and in others. Because of this arbitrariness of these emotions, we are responsible for the occurrence of them.

4. **Geistige or Persönlichkeitsgefühle** (Spiritual or personality-emotions). To this type belong the feelings of beatitude, despair, or absolute depravity. These emotions involve the total personality. We do not say: "We have the feelings of beatitude, but we are the beatitude itself." "Wir können nur selig oder verzweifelt 'sein,' und nicht Seligkeit und Vezweiflung- im strengen Sinne - fühlen, geschweige 'uns' so fühlen." These highest and
deepest feelings -- a cosmic emotion, says William James -- happen to us, come upon us without obvious causes. They cannot be evoked arbitrarily at any moment.

The above analysis of emotions is necessary to determine whether or not "happiness" as the educational aim can be justified. If by "happiness" is meant a "positive" emotion, then "happiness as educational aim" can only mean Scheler's first and third type of emotions, since the other two are independent of the effort of the will. In other words, we should advocate bodily pleasure as the most desirable thing in life. This is not in accordance with the personalistic standpoint that puts service above the hunt for pleasure.

The second alternative is the "happiness" at Scheler's third level: the psychical stratum. If one makes this choice, he stands on the point "R" of the axiological triangle -- namely, the adoration of power. Here the powerful "I" is emphasized. But this is opposed to the personalistic view that stresses the "Loving" relationship. Moreover, "loving" often implies the readiness to accept a possible suffering. "Loving" is not identical with "being happy."

It is clear that, for the personalist at least, happiness cannot possibly be the aim of education. Nor can the aim be the "avoidance of unhappiness," since this
would consequently mean the breaking of every contact with life, with our fellow-men. He who wants to avoid suffering and responsibility, must leave society, retiring as hermits do to a solitary life. But this would violate the essence of human existence itself. "Being a man, is being with other men," a fact that leads us to the problem of "individual-and-society," with respect to the aim of education.

Proposing happiness as the aim of education means the advocacy of the purest individualism. In diametrical opposition is the notion that the aim of education should be determined by the collective interest of society, as was practiced in Sparta and, is practiced currently in Communistic countries.

If the educational aim is neither purely individualistic, nor purely collectivistic, then the solution should be found in a "synthesis" between the two opposites, a kind of compromise between individual and community. Jonas Cohn in his Der Geist der Erziehung has tried to formulate this synthesis as follows: The child should be educated in order to become an autonomous member of historical culture-communities, to which he will belong. There are many relevant points in this formulation that the personalist can accept.
A personalistic point in this formulation is the use of the term "autonomous," which indicates the emphasis on the personal responsibility and the recognition of personal conscience. The term "autonomous" should not be confused, however, with the Kantian notion of autonomous, according to which a conscientious decision is made through an abstract general Reason, instead of by an individual conscience.

Personalistic also is Cohn's use of "historical," since this implies the recognition of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, and the individual differences, and thus the pluriformity in education as well. Opposed to the latter view is the standpoint of "R," as was expressed by Plato's educational system, communism, and the Catholic universalistic system that adhere to uniformity in education.

The use of the plural "communities" (instead of society) is personalistic, too. The idealist (on the Dilthey-line) acknowledges but one ideal community: the ideal state or the ideal mankind. The latter denies the possibility of the autonomy of, and in, smaller groups.

Kohnstamm has but one objection to Cohn's formulation. It does not indicate the manifoldness of ends within the very historical culture-communities. The word "autonomous" does not necessarily imply this multiformity
of ends. In this respect, Kohnstamm prefers Häberlin's formulation of the educational aim, which is: Education is the aid rendered to a child for his inner unfolding in order to fulfil his personal destination.

The personalistic view of education sees it as essentially self-education. Education is no more than the rendering of help to the growing individual. This is thus in opposition to the notion of education as conditioning and drilling. The use of "destination" is also personalistic, since the normative character of education is admitted. The very use of the word personal is also personalistic. It indicates the uniqueness of one's personality and objective. There is, however -- according to Kohnstamm -- but one slight objection against Häberlin's formulation, though not against his implicit intention -- namely, the dimension of community is not made explicit by the word destination (although it may be assumed).

In fact, Kohnstamm himself does agree with the inner intention of the indication "happiness," in the educational aim, because he says:

When I try now to find a positive formulation, for what obviously is rightly meant but poorly expressed by "happiness," then I agree with a formulation that is found with Pestalozzi.36

36 Trans. from ibid., p. 136.
Pestalozzi sees the supreme end of education as what "der Mensch bedarf um zur inneren Zufriedenheit zu gelangen." "Zufriedenheit" is, however, understood by Kohnstamm not as "contentment" or "satisfaction" -- since this may lead to an unfavorable association with egocentric self-sufficiency -- but as "inner peace." Everybody should be able to find "peace of mind." This means for the personalist, that one should find peace in God's Love. The "absorptionst" (point A in the triangle) may find it, if he can keep "in tune with the infinite." But for both, "inner peace" includes harmony with the "voice of the conscience," for an action in disagreement with one's conscience will result in a disturbance, not "peace of mind." The "inner peace" is thus the demand of the individual. On the other hand, we must not overlook the minimum demands of the community which may not interfere with the individual "peace of mind." With this in view, Kohnstamm attempts to formulate the aim of education as follows: To educate is to help a man in becoming, in order to find the deepest, for him attainable, inner peace, without troubling others or being a burden on them.37

This personalistic formulation involves many significant educational points. First of all, it expresses

37Cf. footnote p. 286.
the deep respect for the personality of another, one's fellow-man. Education is not an effort to impose our will on the child, but one of aiding him to grow according to his personal destination. Since, all real growth is self-actualization, we can only help the child, we cannot do the work for him.

In the second place, it expresses the view that the "peace of mind" one may find will differ from that found by another, in quality, as well as in depth. Here, too, the educator should be on his guard against self-deceit. What we offer to the child, is not our demand, our wish, according to a universal norm of truth. Morality is not a uniform law, but -- as Kohnstamm puts it -- "an individual-personal-normation."

In the third place, it expresses the conviction that the demands of society should be limited to a minimum. This is in fact, related to the problem of "achievement" and "being" (Leistung und Sein). On the latter problem Kohnstamm says:

What I hope to have made clear is, that there exists indeed such a thing as a struggle for the priority between Being and Achievement. One could also call the contrast thus indicated, one of Oriental and Occidental mentality or one of Feminine and Masculine mental attitude. It is clear, therefore, that under presumably equal circumstances, the Orient and the female pay more attention to the Being, the element of something personal, the Occident and the male more to the objective Achievement. By this is at
the same time already indicated, that there can be no question of finding a solution through complete repression of one element; both belong unbreakably together.38

According to Kohnstamm, modern societies with their highly complicated technology, science, high speed traffic, mass-production, industry and commerce, put more stress on "Achievement" than on religion, ethics, character, and personality, on "Being."39

Since Kohnstamm believes that in modern times the danger for overestimation of "Achievement" is too great, he limits the demands of society upon the individual -- i.e., the element of "Achievement" -- to a minimum. There is, on the other hand, no danger at all that most people will withdraw from all responsibility for the constructive upbuilding of society. Most of them -- with the exception of relatively a few individualistic artists -- will find their destination in society.

Pedagogical Comments

Kohnstamm's personalism is certainly a great advantage for educational theory and practice, since it stresses the fundamental worthwhileness of each person. This is

38 Trans. from ibid., p. 141.

39 Note: When one speaks of the underdevelopment of countries, one generally means the "Achievement" dimension. These countries are actually "underachievers."
finally the basis for all education, and for human inter-
relationship as well. Without this basis, the educative
process and mutual understanding among people of differ-
ent social classes and cultures, would be an impossibil-
ity. Moreover, the acknowledgment of the person is the
best guarantee for the realization of one's vocation.
Only by following one's calling, may one attain "peace of
mind."

Though Kohnstamm explicitly does not agree with the
notion of "happiness as an educational objective," he
actually adheres to the underlying intention of this
objective, i.e., "inner peace." There is essentially no
difference between the two meanings. They differ only in
the words used. Each means, also, what Socrates meant
by the term "the healthy state of the soul." The Catholics,
too, could have meant the same idea by their objective of
"the salvation of the soul," had they not associated
these notions with Purgatory and Paradise. If we believe
in "Grace," we need not be afraid of our soul's fate,
neither here nor in the hereafter. Real confidence in
life does not need myths, because myths are mere means
to make people believe artificially, either through luring
or threatening. But confidence itself is real, because
the self of a person is a reality in a Reality.

Personalism is also educationally realistic, since
it recognizes the pluriformity of the phenomenal world,
and consequently individual differences, the uniqueness of the individual. The latter is, as a matter of fact, already implied in the worthwhileness of the person. This is also the strength of the Rogerian view of counseling and psychotherapy, known as nondirective or client-centered therapy. Rogers introduces three basic unifying concepts: (1) the need for positive regard, (2) the need for self-regard, and (3) conditions of worth. 40

There is, however, one point in Kohnstamm's view that bears watching. He sees the ideal man in the historical figure Jesus Christ:

When I say that we must bring our children early into contact with Jesus Christ, this does not mean that we must teach them early the knowledge about Him and his Work, but that He should appear for them in plastic vision, as the gospels show Him to us. 41

This kind of formulation, which may lead to the universalization of worshipping a person, is in itself contradictory to the personalistic view that recognizes and adheres to the pluriformity of truth. For however it may be, Kohnstamm advocates in his formulation of the educational aim the personalness, i.e., the uniqueness, of one's destination.

40 Hall and Lindzey, loc. cit., p. 488.
41 Trans. from Kohnstamm, loc. cit., p. 422 (Italics in original).
In any form of worship or idealization of a historical figure, and in any attempt at molding personality after an historical model, the danger of intolerance, exclusiveness, and fanaticism is ever present. Historical records give plenty of evidence of the latter, in the form of conflicts among religious and racial groups, under the slogan "Up for Christianity!" This is in itself un-Christian intolerance.
CHAPTER VII

DEWEYIAN INSTRUMENTALISM

Philosophy and Educational Theory

Many philosophical and educational ideas meet in Dewey's pragmatism. Big philosophical issues, such as the nature of self and mind, the problem of knowledge, the problem of morality, the nature of nature, are temporarily settled by Dewey's pragmatic approach, known also as instrumentalism or experimentalism. The most difficult question in philosophy -- which has been a problem through the centuries -- is: Is the universe a being or a becoming? This problem arose as a philosophical one in the 5th century B.C. -- the pre-Socratic period in the history of Greek philosophy. It was expressed by these opposing figures, Heraclitus and Parmenides. "Everything flows and nothing is permanent; One can never step twice into the same river; we are and are not," said Heraclitus. The antithesis was expressed by Parmenides when he said: "Only Being is, Not-Being is not and cannot be thought." From these two alternatives, Dewey has chosen the Heraclitean concept of ongoingness. This is for Dewey a self-evident fact. The development of this idea has gone through many transformations.
Dewey sees the problem of philosophy as a general attitude or disposition of man rather than as mere knowledge or system. As Dewey puts it:

Hence philosophy cannot be defined simply from the side of subject matter. For this reason, the definition of such conceptions as generality, totality, and ultimateness, is most readily reached from the side of the disposition toward the world which they connote. In any literal and quantitative sense, these terms do not apply to the subject matter of knowledge, for completeness and finality are out of the question.\(^1\)

The sense of philosophy is thus closely related to man's conduct. Philosophical questions arise from life problems:

We have already virtually described, through not defined, philosophy in terms of the problems with which it deals; and we have pointed out that these problems originate in the conflicts and difficulties of social life.\(^2\)

On the other hand, philosophy reciprocally influences man's behavior. Dewey says: "Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life."\(^3\) But Dewey pushes the interdependence between philosophy and life even further, boldly stating:

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 378.

\(^3\)Ibid.
fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.\textsuperscript{4}

The central idea of both philosophy and education is "experience." Says Dewey about philosophy:

Philosophy might also be described as thinking which has become conscious of itself -- which has generalized its place, function, and value in experience.\textsuperscript{5}

He defines education as follows:

It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.\textsuperscript{6}

It is thus clear that, in Dewey's view, education and philosophy are identical.

Nevertheless, philosophy does have -- generally speaking -- its own theoretical problems. It is from this angle that we are to explore the essential characteristics of Dewey's philosophy:

The problems are such things as the relations of mind and matter; body and soul; humanity and physical nature; the individual and the social, theory -- or knowing, and practice -- or doing.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{From Idealism to Instrumentalism}

In order to understand the background of Dewey's philosophy we should first take stock of the historical

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 383 (Cf. footnote 23 of Chapter I).
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p. 381.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., pp. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 378.
development of his thinking. In this respect we may turn to Morton White's *The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism*.

In his undergraduate work Dewey became acquainted with the Scottish realist, Torrey. But soon in his graduate studies, he came under the influence of the idealist Morris at John Hopkins University, the anti-Kant Hegelian who sympathized also with the English idealists Edward Caird and Thomas Hill Green.

His [Morris'] concern was the critical biographical discussion of major figures in the history of philosophy. For this reason his greatest effect upon Dewey, apart from directing him to a study of the history of philosophy, was to predispose him to certain brands of philosophy— to provide him with allegiances and antagonsisms. Morris had a deep-seated preference for German thought and a rabid dislike of British thought before Green.

Dewey tells us of Morris' influence in several places. In his article "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" he points out that Morris led him to Hegel.°

Dewey criticizes the dualism of Kant from the standpoint of Hegel's organic idealism and notes that Kant's philosophy is to him a formal logic. Kant's dualism consists in the antagonism between a prioric knowledge and knowledge through sensual experience; between "das Ding an sich" (the noumenal world) and the world of appearances

(the phenomenal world); between analytic a prioric knowledge and synthetic a posterioric knowledge (within the limitations of thinking forms or categories); between moral "good will" and real conduct.

In two basic respects Morris influenced Dewey's thinking -- namely, concerning the dialectical method of Hegel's idealism and the dualistic views of the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

In the early years of his philosophical career, Dewey was positively an idealist. Dewey has always rejected the dualistic views of philosophies, which assume a substantive mind or a bundle of faculties separated from a realistic, "objective" world on the "other side." These dualistic philosophies hold the view that there is a knowing subject and a known (or knowable) object. White, speaking of the anti-dualistic view of Dewey, says this about Morris' influence:

The contention finally made is that empiricism is guilty of the worst kind of abstraction; "its mutilates man, tearing the organic whole of his living experience into miserable shreds. Here we have an expression of Morris' Hegelian organism, one of the most important theses Dewey absorbed in his youth. Put roughly, Morris' assertion was that experience is an organic, living whole, which is rendered lifeless by the dissecting process of analytic empiricism. Ultimately this dissection is said to lead to
dualism, against which Morris savagely inveighs. This anti-dualism was perhaps the first variety adopted by Dewey himself.  

Hegelianism shaped Dewey's thinking in two other respects -- namely, the organismic concept and the open-ended continuity of reality. Organismic means the total interdependence and interrelatedness of the organism and the world, so that the two realities are inseparable from each other for their existence. In Hegel's thinking it is the continuous process of thesis -- antithesis -- synthesis, in the sense that the synthesis is not the closed end, but may become a new thesis that leads, in Dewey's thought, to the thinking process of problem-hypothesis-prediction-test-tentative solution, until there arises further fact or situation that calls the solution into doubt and creates a new problem.

The social interrelationship among individuals may lead to an open-minded attitude, that is to say, being "open" and ready for a verbal or intellectual meeting within which each individual may transcend himself, thus leading to an agreement or common meaning. This same idea of self-transcending is found originally in the idealistic view of Hegel, in which the thinking subjects (thesis -- anti-thesis) transcend their limitations, and come into a new order, the

\[9\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 30-31.}\]
synthesis. In doing so the participating parties gradually come into the universal mind (Geist) and partake of its activities. In his early writings Dewey adheres to this concept of universal consciousness:

But these consciousnesses which are empirical consciousnesses, the consciousnesses of particular men, are different from universal consciousness. Universal consciousness is that third thing which embraces empirical consciousness and the objects of knowledge. Since both empirical consciousness and objects are imbedded within this larger, living whole, they partake of a common spirit, or life. Universal consciousness is the living unity stressed throughout Morris' writings. For Dewey it was the most influential concept in his early writings. Here we have not only an epistemological device for unifying the subject and object of knowledge, but a unity which is alleged to exist throughout the world. ¹⁰

As Dewey himself puts it:

It means that mind or intelligence is necessarily universal in its nature, and that the construction of the universe of knowledge is the necessary manifestation of this universal character of intelligence. Since the mind is universal, the world exists in the same universal or real sense with it; it is a permanent objective reality, because intelligence is a permanent objectifying activity. ¹¹

Organismicness and open-endedness are the necessary aspects of total world in which all is interrelated. We may say that in his attempts to reject the dualism of empirical logic, Dewey took at this early stage the alternative of the

¹⁰Ibid., p. 31.
¹¹Ibid., p. 55.
Hegelian view of transcendental logic. "Only transcendental logic could furnish what Dewey sought in 1891."\(^{12}\) On the other hand, it was just this theory of two kinds of mind -- universal and individual -- that caused Dewey to surrender the idealist conception of reality and logic. Says White:

> The break with idealism or the nature of thought as expressed at that time, marked the closing of Dewey's attachment to idealist philosophy. For ten years he had been trying to untie difficult transcendental knots. In 1900 he gave up the job and cut the slender strings that tied him to Morris, Green, and Caird. By 1903 he was an ex-idealist in ethics, psychology, and logic.\(^{13}\)

Another element of Hegelianism which influenced Dewey's thinking is the concept of "struggle." The conception of the dialectical method implies a blocking moment in the process of thinking -- namely, the anti-thesis. The emergence of this anti-thesis evokes a response from "the other side," which response may also challenge another idea or problem, so that the continuity of the thinking process is maintained. The idea of struggle through the vicissitudes of life in Hegel's philosophy was found long before the rise of Darwin's concept of evolution, in which the conception of evolution involves the idea of "struggle" as well. In Dewey's pragmatism we find again this idea of

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 92.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., pp. 147-148.
blockage in the shape of a problem. When a problem arises, the continuous process between organism and environment is hindered and the organism goes into a delayed action, and reflective thinking starts. The "idea" (thesis) comes under consideration (the anti-thesis):

As yet, Dewey thinks, "contradictions" are not perceived. "But there is at least the shock of unrealized expectation, and the feeling of the necessary adjustment to the new idea." But "as the mind's power of holding its ideas fixed greater, the new idea will not simply drive out the other, substituting itself for it, but will struggle with it for the possession of the mind." Here, of course, are the beginnings of Dewey's doctrine of conflict and tention as the origin of thought. We have a "struggle," according to Dewey, between the "actual idea" and the idea which the mind is endeavoring to project into actuality. This struggle, Dewey holds, leads the mind "to the hitherto unentertained recognition of an idea as only ideal, as a mere idea." 14

Morris' acceptance of Hegelian idealism was not a mere philosophical choice. It was, rather, a weapon to be used to attack the idealistic views of the Kantian idealism, as well as those of the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and John Stuart Mill. Says White:

Morris subjects Berkeley and Hume to attacks no softer than those he leveled against Locke. The chapter on Hume is the occasion for contrasting the traditional British conception

14 Ibid., p. 81.
of consciousness and that held by Morris and his idealist ideas.\textsuperscript{15}

He says further:

When we examine Dewey's book we shall observe how Morris influenced Dewey on the British-versus-German issue. Morris' book on Kant makes it easy to understand Dewey's remark that Morris came to Kant through Hegel. Morris' book on Kant concentrates its attack on dualism, whereas the one on British thought was more concerned with destroying theories invoking a passive mind. \textit{British Thought and Thinkers} and \textit{Kant's Critique on Pure Reason}, together, supply a wonderful picture of the origins of the two central doctrines of Dewey's instrumentalism, activism, and anti-dualism.\textsuperscript{16}

Morris' influence on Dewey results, on the one hand, in the latter's inclination to the organismic — dialectical Hegelian idealism, and, on the other hand, in his rejection of the dualistic views of the British empiricists which are extensions of the French rationalism launched by Descartes (the thinking entity, -- \textit{res cogitans} --, and the existing entity -- \textit{res extensa} --). This metaphysical dualism states that there is the thinking subject and the object of thought. The British empiricism is rather a dualistic epistemology, that is to say, knowing is merely a sensual perception of the objective world, with the mind forming images of the outer world. Truth is to be defined as the correspondence

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

between the things outside the subject and the images of the mind. Here the mind is conceived as a passive faculty. Dewey calls this kind of logic, empirical logic.

Despite these attempts on the part of the empirical logicians to formulate a methodology of science, Dewey opposed them. For not only did he believe, as we have seen, that their formal logic was useless, but he also held that their empirical logic made no advance. "Empirical logic," he says, "virtually continues the conception of thought as in itself empty and formal, which characterizes scholastic logic."

In one aspect of the British empiricism, Dewey does not follow the view of Morris. Although Morris criticizes Herbert Spencer's evolutionism, Dewey's thinking is definitely evolutionistic. Says Dewey:

It is astonishing that in the face of the advance of evolutionary method in natural science, any logician can persist in the assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin and nature; between genesis and analysis; between history and validity.

Dewey's sympathy for evolution, as started by Darwin and further developed by Spencer, is one of the reasons, why he finally abandoned Hegelianism, though the latter's concept is organismic equally:

On the one hand, there was the organism he got from Hegel, the organism he expressed in his paper on Kant. On the other, there was his interest in the concept of organism as that was used by biologists. The Hegelian theory

17 Ibid., p. 91.
18 Ibid., p. 144.
of organic relations was, Dewey thought, confirmed by the organismic direction of biology. Later a thoroughgoing Darwinism forces Dewey to surrender Hegel.19

This was, in short, the significance of Morris' influence on Dewey. At the same time, Dewey studied psychology under the direction of G. Stanley Hall, the first experimentalist in America in the field of psychology. This new trend in psychology was started by the German Physiological psychologist Wundt, who had established a laboratory for psychological research in Leipzig. An important paper on psychology was soon published by Dewey, "The New Psychology." This was in 1884, when he published, also, his "Kant and Philosophic Method." Dewey occupied thus an ambiguous position:

The first was an expression of his idealism, the second an eloquent appraisal of the latest developments in psychology. The first testified his allegiance to Morris, while the second aligned him with Hall. Thus Dewey was both the idealist philosopher and the follower of the new psychology. However, he did not rest easily in both these positions, for he saw problems that neither side dealt with.20

Ten years later he synthesized these contrasting positions, thereby giving a new direction to his thinking. He then gradually turned to experimental pragmatism or instrumentalism.

The kind of continuity which exists between Dewey's early work and his later work simply

19Ibid., p. 39.
20Ibid., p. 34.
illustrates the continuity between his idealism and his experimentalism. They share, as we have emphasized frequently, activism, organicism, and opposition to formalism and dualism. This is correctly shown by the fact that Dewey continued to call his philosophy "idealism" in 1894. But by this time it was very special and new kind of idealism, for "experimental idealism" is Dewey's new label.21

The spirit of the new psychology was characterized more by experimentation than by introspection, the "tireless study of the secrets of nature" and "counting nothing unclean." This is the so-called scientific spirit.

The third influence available at John Hopkins was Charles Sanders Peirce, the coiner of the term "pragmatism," but whose formal logic was rejected by Dewey.

Other figures who influenced Dewey's philosophical development significantly, were Franklin Ford, Thomas Hill Green, and Alfred Lloyd. About Franklin Ford's influence, Dewey says:

I got it from Franklin Ford to whom I refer in the Preface. By some sort of instinct, and by the impossibility of my doing anything in particular, I was led into philosophy and into "idealism," -- i.e., the conception of some organism comprehending both man's thought and the external world. Ford, who was a newspaperman (formerly Editor of Bradstreet's in New York) with no previous philosophical training, had been led by his newspaper experience to study as a practical question the social bearings of intelligence and its distribution.22

21 Ibid., p. 111.
22 Ibid., p. 101.
From Green, Dewey extracted his ethical idealistic view -- namely, that man's moral ideal cannot be other than self-realization. Dewey's notion of self, however, is quite different from Green's. Green's concept of self is a rational entity as a part of the absolute universal mind, of which the world-process in its totality is the experience. Dewey, on the other hand, contends that self is realization itself. Self is not a self-existence reality in itself. In his paper, "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," Dewey says:

The notion which I wish to criticize is that of the self as a presupposed fixed schema or outline, while realization consists in the filling up of this schema. The notion which I would suggest as a substitute is that of the self as always a concrete specific activity; and therefore (to anticipate), of the identity, of self and realization.23

The concept of self in Dewey's thinking is rather the concrete and empirical self inseparable from experience within the environment. But self-realization is still Dewey's moral ideal. As White describes it:

The ethical ideal in Green's system is the complete realization in man of the universal self. According to Dewey self-realization is still the ideal, but it takes on a completely new significance. "The identity of agent and act has been our guiding principle," Dewey says. Therefore the agent or self, is no remote universal mind, nor is it some individual ego. It is simply a mode of the human being's behavior. The concept

23 Ibid., p. 106 (Italics in original).
is never sharpened as much as it should have been, but enough to make clear what Dewey did not intend by the term "self." The term is thoroughly empirical according to Dewey's intention, and it is to be construed as meaning something like "social organism."^24

This idea of the self as an activity in continuous relationship to the world, as both agent and act, is actually from Lloyd's dynamic idealism. Just in this relationship to Lloyd's idealism it becomes apparent that Dewey's instrumentalism is closely linked with idealism. As White puts it:

The notion of ideas as plans appearing in a work as idealist in outlook as Dynamic Idealism is a perfect illustration of what is meant by saying that instrumentalism originates in idealism.25

The idealism Lloyd had in mind was dynamic, just as Dewey's was experimental. And Lloyd's idealism, like Dewey's, took as its first principle the idea that the self was not separated from the world. For Lloyd, the self is something always identified in activity with the world or "in a common phrase," he says, "adjusted to the world." This relation of adjustment between a self, or an organism, and the world is called a dynamic relation, according to Lloyd.26

It is thus clear that Dewey's instrumentalism has idealistic aspects, particularly when we consider the common characteristics of both idealism -- especially of

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24 Ibid., p. 112.
25 Ibid., p. 118.
26 Ibid., p. 114.
the Hegelian type — and instrumentalism: organismic, monistic, dynamistic, dialectical, and . . . "mind"-centered.

**Basic Characteristics of Dewey's Instrumentalism**

The most basic characteristic of Dewey's philosophy is certainly his concept of the world as a flux, an ongoingness, as was mentioned earlier. This idea has many significant consequences. Man's knowledge can only be tentative. No single truth is fixed and absolute. Nobody can claim to possess either a prioric knowledge of the "true" world or revealed absolute truth. There are no eternal principles, neither moral nor theoretical. The principles man uses in exploring his world are merely hypotheses.

In fact, situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create new principles. Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ceases to apply. Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification by the event; and the time honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics is only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority, or putting a new one upon the throne of the old. But the experimental character of moral judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment.27

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Every event occurs but "once" or einmalig. There cannot possibly be a repetition of the former event. Events are not single and separable parts in themselves, but are, rather, inseparable moments in a context which is called situation. Each situation, therefore, is unique. Present situations are connections between past occurrences and possible ones in the future. In consequence, we can understand each situation only in relation to the past and to a possible future. Since every future is uncertain, we can have a grip of the situation only by using "meanings" and hypotheses. Hypotheses are no more than tentative ways of dealing with situations. Whether the hypothesis we apply to a given situation is adequate or not, will be apparent from the outcome of our predictions. If it is not, we must look for another hypothesis. Hypotheses are necessary tools with which we tackle situations or problems. Theoretical and moral principles are equally hypotheses, because of their tentative character.

No two individuals are identical. The self is not a fixed substantive entity, an agent separate from its actions. Agent and action cannot exist without each other. They are complementary dimensions of one dynamic system. The self is always changing and developing in continuous interrelationship with the environment. It is a function of the organism with its environment. The growth of an
organism is an open-ended process in mutual interrelation­ship with the environment.

Learning is a process or growth rather than a pos­session of subject matter or being possessed passively by the object of knowledge. It is inseparable from action, whether the latter is deliberate or not. Learning and thinking are also one, at least if we do not mean by learning mere mechanical habituation. Thinking is an organic and dynamic process instead of a static and passive association among elements of the contents of thought. There is no such thing as thought in itself. There is only thinking as a process that is not separated from the actions of the organism. Action is always in connection with something in the environment, present or suggested. Thinking is delayed action, while action is the implementation of a tentative thinking result.

The thinking process is a dialectical process, one of dynamic tension between problems and tentative solutions, between "ideas" and "facts," and between hypotheses and predicted results, between old meanings and novel ones. One should not, however, interpret this dialectical process in the sense of the Hegelian idealistic philosophy, but as a process of continuous and progressive reconstruction. In Dewey's view of the thinking process, there is a continuous reference to or "checking with" actual events. In Hegelian
philosophy truth lies in the internal coherence within the ideas themselves, between hypotheses and conclusions. In Dewey's experimentalism the truth lies "in the making" -- i.e., in the concordance between the hypothesis and the verification test. A solution is "true," when the hypothesis "works," at least for the time being, until another event or situation calls for reconsideration of the tentative solution.

... conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see whether the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur. If it is found that the experimental results agree with the theoretical or rationally deduced, results, and if there is reason to believe that only the conditions in question would yield such results, the confirmation is so strong as to induce a conclusion -- at least until contrary facts shall indicate the advisability of its revision.28

The logic of the pragmatist is an empirical or instrumental one. It is a tool or instrument that can meet more adequately changing situations than the formal logic of the scholastics, the British empiricists, or the Kantian idealists. Pragmatical logic is a process, a method rather than a static thinking pattern as a product of reflective thinking. Dewey noting the distinction between formal logic and thinking process, says:

The distinction between process and product of reflective inquiry is thus not fixed and

absolute. In calling the process 'psychological' and the product 'logical,' we do not mean that only the final outcome is logical or that the activity that goes in a series of steps in time and that involves personal desire and purpose is not logical. Rather, we must distinguish between the logical form, which applies to the product, and the logical method, which may and should belong to the process.29

The concept of on-goingness has certain implications for Dewey's ethical ideas. We may state briefly that Dewey's ethical view is based on democratic principles that (1) respect other individuals as persons, with their own rights of being and doing; and that (2) individuals have to keep open the channels of communication for intelligent sharing of ideas. For Dewey, being moral is identical with having a democratic disposition.

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity.30

Of morality Dewey says:

As a matter of fact, morals are as broad as acts which concern our relationships with others. And potentially this includes all our acts, even though their social bearing may not be thought of at the time of performance.

29 Ibid., p. 75 (Italics in original).
The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical with each other. 31

The second fundamental aspect of Dewey's philosophy is the concept of experience. Experience is the only basis for knowledge and wisdom. This does not mean, however, that experience is primarily cognitive. Experience includes the total activity of the individual. Mind or consciousness as such does not exist, unless it is connected with the physical organs of activity. Dewey notes that experience has an active and passive aspect:

On the active hand, experience is trying -- a meaning which is made explicit in the connected term experiment. On the passive, it is undergoing. When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return; such is the peculiar combination. The connection of these two phases of experience measures the fruitfulness or value of the experience. 32

Knowing without experience is a contradictio in terminis. In consequence, Dewey will have nothing to do with metaphysical speculations, or rigid and closed-minded dogmatical beliefs, or uncheckable mysterious mysticism. The metaphysical-transcendental world of idealistic philosophies and the supernatural of the Catholics, are not the concern of the instrumentalist. In his realm of thinking,

31 ibid., pp. 414-415.

32 ibid., p. 163 (Italics in original).
mystical questions do not make any sense at all, such as "Who am I," "What is my origin," "What is life after death," "Is the self immortal," "What is the sense of prayer?" These questions are by definition unanswerable. If there were any form of answer, the answer would be uncheckable through experimentation.

The pragmatist's concept of experience is not the one of the empiricist who holds that the senses are the only "gates" of knowledge to the mind — mind conceived as a passive receptor — in which the impressions are inculcated. Such a "mind" is neither active nor creative. The instrumentalistic view, however, conceives mind as a creative interrelationship between organism and environment, social as well as material. This interrelationship is a process in time and space and, therefore, historical. The present situation implies the past and the future. With respect to the past, experience is conserved in certain meanings, indicated by symbols. Human behavior, therefore, is essentially symbolic. It refers to meanings, the quality and the extent of which are known only by the individual himself. Meanings have their own history. Experience is a concept of growth. The experience of the moment is not solely constituted by the past, but refers also to the future, to the expectations and ideals of the individual.
Instrumentalistic thinking, therefore, is not only causalistic, but also purposive. Every experience is rather a novel reconstruction and redirection, subject to the momentary situation, since the latter is a flux. Experience implies the ideas of means in relation to a certain end. Means and end do not exist in themselves, but are inseparable from one another. They have meaning only in the context of an action. Every end-in-view is potentially a means.

This is the origin and nature of "goals" of action. They are always of defining and deepening the meaning of activity. Having an end or aim is thus a characteristic of present activity. It is the means by which an activity becomes adapted when otherwise it would be blind and disorderly, or by which it gets meaning when otherwise it would be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-view is a means in present action; present action is not a means to a remote end.33

Intelligent behavior differs from mechanical and capricious behavior. The former is characterized by these features of experience: taking into account all possibilities within the limitations of the individual's ability and the unpredictable moment of "beyond reasonable doubt."

Logic and knowledge are rooted in experience; they are not isolated from experience as they are in the idealistic views. Morality is not to be isolated from experience. Values of life are no isolated magnitudes. They are

related to the experiences of day-by-day living. On the one hand, they are media for the enjoyable moments of man's life, like art and religion; the latter, however, not in the institutional sense of the word. On the other hand, they are means for judgment of events and other experiences. These two kinds of values are called intrinsic and instrumental.

A third essential characteristic of Dewey's philosophy is its anti-dualism. This aspect of Dewey's thought was, in fact, implied in the conception of reality as an on-going-ness. Dewey's pragmatism is anti-dualistic in many respects, metaphysically, epistemologically, and axiologically. His metaphysics is non-dualistic. It opposes the Cartesian rationalistic dualism (a conscious subject and a spatial-temporal objective world); Lockeian empiricistic dualism (a tabularasa mind and an objective sensible world); Kantian idealism (a noumenal world characterized by the "thing in itself" and a phenomenal world as it is conceived by the senses, implying the a prioric thinking categories); and the Christian dualistic realism (a spiritual eternal world and a corruptible material world).

The problem of the dualistic view is how to explain the relationship between the two qualitatively different entities? Any relationship is inconceivable, since the two entities differ from each other fundamentally. In fact,
this problem of relationship of spirit and matter is metaphysically unsolvable.

Dewey proposes a monistic world of interrelationships. This world is no more than a hypothesis or idea. It is, however, one with which we can work effectively. The world which Dewey represents is neither material nor spiritual. In fact, man does not know what "matter" is. Matter is not a substance consisting of solid, particles as the atomists earlier imagined. Matter, represented as a field of vibrations or as concentrations of energy -- as the neo-physicists "explained" it --, is no more than a mere idea. Since this idea is a usable one with which we can work, we accept this as a fact.

In the theory of knowledge, dualism appears as the belief in the correspondence theory. Alonzo Church said:

According to the correspondence theory, a proposition (or meaning) is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds, if it expresses what is the case. For example, "It is raining here now" is true if it is the case that it is raining now; otherwise it is false.34

Bertrand Russell said about this "correspondence":

A belief is true when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and false when it does not.

\[\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\]

What makes a belief true is a fact, and this fact does not (except in exceptional cases) in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief.35

Idealistic logic bases its truth on the coherence theory. Coherence means, then, inner consistency of all our judgments:

Since we cannot directly compare our ideas and judgments with the world as it is, the coherence theory places its trust in the consistency or harmony of all our judgments. A judgment is true if it is consistent with other judgments that are accepted or known to be true. True judgments are logically coherent with other relevant judgments.36

Quite different is the pragmatic notion of truth. An idea is true, if it becomes a fact, if it works after having been put into practice or after having been checked out. The quality of this kind of truth is tentative, but it is not subjective; nor is it relative to an individual's private interests, since the "checking-out" must be done in the public situation by others. The result is shared or common knowledge, accepted as evident fact when it is beyond challenge by reasonable doubt. Says White about Dewey's phrasing:

If we are to test our ideas by their correspondence with the world, he says, then we

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assume that "this real world, the actual facts, are known." But if they are known, why do we go to the trouble to form a hypothesis about him? he asks.37

In the field of ethics Dewey avoids every form of dualism. If we accept the dualistic views, we confront an unsolvable problem of antinomies. The moral system of Stoicism and Christianity are based on the assumption that morality lies in the inner possession and cultivation of ideals. The external world is morally indifferent and not worthwhile considering. The right motive is the norm for judging a person's morality. The same principle is found in Kant's theory of the categorical imperative, the general commandment in man's "practical Reason" that calls for du sollst. Here is the norm also the inner motive of "meaning well." Morality is considered a duty, an "ought." If it is an "ought," then it must be a dictate from outside, and the question may arise: "Why should I obey this commandment?" It is thus clear, that the moral theory of Kant creates a dualism and an antinomy. Some people object to this moral theory of "inner good motives" and respond with the hedonism of the Epicurians or with the utilitarianism of the materialists. Inner morality is considered sentimental, arbitrary, dogmatic, and subjective.

37White, loc. cit., p. 80.
The dualism in morality can only be eliminated when we assume the pragmatic view, based on experience, organismic interrelationships, and the on-goingness of situations. It has been stated above that man's purpose is self-realization (self not conceived as a self-existent entity), and that this self-realization can only be attained through action, experience, and sharing with others. Man's morality is not dependent on fixed isolated principles; it emerges rather, in his active functioning in his life with others:

The principle of a physician's conduct is its animating aim and spirit -- the care for the diseased. The principle is not what justifies an activity, for the principle is but another name for the continuity of the activity. If the activity as manifested in its consequences is undesirable, to act upon principle is to accentuate its evil. And a man who prides himself upon acting upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having his own way without learning from experience what is the better way.38

**Dewey's Educational Ideas**

The educational implication of the concept of continuity and organismicness is summarized in Dewey's statement as follows:

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents this means (i) that educational process has no end

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beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming. 39

It is obvious that for Dewey education is identical with growth and development, in which intelligent behavior and the process of learning are essential. Learning, however, means more than the possession of subject matter or being possessed passively by the object of knowledge. Learning is not a merely cognitive experience, but it is inseparable from action and deliberate and active behavior. It is a total activity in which the functioning of physical organs are involved.

Since the educational process is an open-ended one, it is meaningless to talk about ultimate aims in education. Aims are never aims in themselves as fixed ideals in the remote future; aims are mere principles which guide our action. We act with an end-in-view, to use Dewey's phrasing, but if this guiding principle is realized, it is a means, also. Each end is thus potentially a means, or conversely a means is a realized end. This is the reason, why the educational process has no end beyond itself: it is its own end. In the process or growth the educational aim is realized. Or we may say, that the educational aim is self-realization or self-actualization; the self, however, as we have noted, is not thought of as a substantive entity. The

39Ibid., p. 59.
self is the realization itself. Since this realization can take place only in the presence of others, the concept of the self already implies the association with the social and material environment. In other words, the self is a product of involvement with the environment. Involvement means "struggle" and its outcome. Learning is thus not only cognitive; it is a total process of continual growth. This total process of action is experience, active as well as passive.

We have seen that experience is in Dewey's philosophy a basic concept. This implies that the aim and method of education cannot possibly be "outside of" experience. Aim and method of education are involved in experience itself; we may even say that education is identical with experience. To avoid the occurrence of experience by accident or by mechanical habituation, educators should deliberately and purposively provide the growing individual with the appropriate environment, such as the family and the school. The appropriate environment should prevent the child from developing an emotional and intellectual disposition which evolves capricious or stereotypical behavior. Growth and education are thus identical. About growth in education Dewey says:

But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards
growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines?^40

Thus what we expect from every individual is intelligent behavior — i.e., behavior that implies anticipation, foresight, expectation, and sensitiveness for the situation of the moment, material as well as social. In this sense, education is an open-ended process, throughout the life of the individual. The best method of education may be formulated as "learning by doing," in which doing is not exclusively interpreted as mere physical activity. Sharing and participation are better terms. The educator is not an isolated element of the experiential situation, since he is not assigned to inculcate the individual's mind with ready-made knowledge. If he does, his educative activity is authoritarian.

The democratic educative process suggests that the educator should share the total experience of the educatees. The instructor should not be "the only one who knows," he is also learning. By the same token, the most adequate teaching method would be the one of creating problematic situations; and not just providing the students with informative

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knowledge by decree. There is no one uniform teaching method. Any method would be adequate, if it meets the conditions of sharing and problematic situation, since these factors are inherent in the concept of experience. Every method should be "situational." This means that the teacher should be sensitive of the situation of every moment, in which the factors of time, space, physical conditions and . . . the individuals themselves, are the constituting factors. As Dewey puts it, in commenting upon older concepts of methodology:

"Methods" have then to be authoritatively recommended to teachers, instead of being an expression of their own intelligent observations. Under such circumstances, they have a mechanical uniformity, assumed to be alike for all minds. Where flexible personal experiences are promoted by providing an environment which calls out directed occupations in work and play, the methods ascertained will vary with individuals, for it is certain that each individual has something characteristic in his way of going at things.41

The problem of subject matter is also of great importance in Dewey's view, though many critics seem not to realize this. As subject matters are not isolated from each other and must be functional for the totality of life, there are certainly subject matters which are so complex in their nature and structure, that they can cover many aspects of life at one time. For these very reasons, Dewey stresses

41 Dewey, Democracy and Education loc. cit., p. 198.
the import of history and geography for educational purposes:

While history makes human implications explicit and geography natural connec­tions, these subjects are two phases of the same living whole, since the life of men in association goes on in nature, not as an accidental setting, but as the mater­ial and medium of development.42

In other words, history and geography are appropriate sub­ject matters to provide the growing individuals with the conditions within which they may develop an "intellectual­ized and socialized" disposition. The most important aspect of history -- usually neglected --, is the so-called "intel­lectual" history, that is, the historical development of mind. This is inherent in Dewey's conception of mind and experience -- namely, sharing with other minds. Scientific discoveries are not the monopoly of single individuals, but the adventures of the whole mankind.

Perhaps the most neglected branch of history in general education is intellectual history. We are only just beginning to realize that the great heroes who have advanced human destiny are not its politicians, generals, and diplo­matists but the scientific discoverers and inventors who have put into man's hands the instrumentalities* of an expanding and con­trolled experience, and the artists and poets who have celebrated his struggles, triumphs, and defeats in such language, pictorial,

*And today, "the instruments of total annihilation."

42 Ibid., p. 255.
plastic, or written, that their meaning is rendered universally accessible to others.\footnote{ibid., p. 253.}

The idea of monism and totality applied to education will wipe out all contradictions and opposites, such as between knowledge and thinking, between inner and outer, higher spiritual values and lower physical matters, mind and body, action and learning, character and conduct, character and knowledge, duty and interest, work and play, emotion and intellect, ends and means, habit and knowledge, individuality and sociality, theory and practice, man and nature, objective and subjective, particular and general, and so on. This row of opposites has, in fact, no end; we find them in every aspect of life.

If, for example, we separate knowledge from thinking, or thinking from experience, then our educative provisions will be inadequate and less effective. The school as a particular institution will be separated from the actual life situations, of which the characteristics are continuity and over-all interrelationships, whereby man has continually to readjust and reconstruct his experiences.

Pedagogical Comments

We must admit that pragmatism has many relevant basic assets for the practice of education.
Its dynamism is certainly a point to be regarded as significant. Thanks to its dynamic character, pragmatic education has contributed to the promotion of progress, materially, socially, and spiritually. The material conditions of human life have been raised quantitatively and qualitatively. The involvement of a greater amount of people in the betterment of their life-conditions is the logical consequence of a democratic way of life. The dynamical attitude of man leads to the increase of his "achievement" capacity. We recall that Kohnstamm touched upon the problem of "achievement" and "being," restricting the "achievement" aspect to a minimum. Promoting the "achievement" aspect, however, need not necessarily lead to a depreciation of the "being" aspect, the so-called spiritual values. We must bear in mind that "achievement" and "being" are related to each other as "means" to "ends," or as "condition" to "realization":

And disparagement of effective means is practically synonymous with disregard of the things that are termed, in eulogistic fashion, ideal and spiritual. For the latter terms if they have any concrete application at all signify something which is a desirable consummation of conditions, a cherished fulfillment of means. The sharp separation between material and ideal good thus deprives the latter of the underpinning of effective support while it opens the way for treating things
which should be employed as means as ends in themselves.\textsuperscript{44}

A second significant point of pragmatism for education is the conception of the "sharing" character of experience. This is basic for education, since the educability of people depends primarily on this principle. Without the sharing of experience, people cannot be educated in the true sense, since there is no communication between educator and educand. Besides, the possibility of sharing calls for open-mindedness on both sides. Without open-mindedness, there is no possibility of mutual understanding and confidence, the conditional factors for maintaining peace and order, ideals for which man has always striven along the centuries.

Sharing of experience provides also the opportunity to intensify the living-through of "the enjoyable moments of life," so as to promote the worthwhileness of life. Sharing may reduce anxieties, which have always been the plague of mankind. This concern of pragmatism with the "enjoyable" as human good, in fact, hints at the aspect of "inner peace" in human life; at the same ideal upon which Kohnstamm touched in his formulation of the educational aim; at the same meaning of Socrates' strive for the state of "well-being of the soul."

The practice of sharing of experience may also lead to a better guarantee against malevolent subjectivism and advance the public interest and welfare:

The subjective attitude is much more widespread than would be inferred from the philosophies which have that label attached. It is as rampant in realistic philosophies as in any others, sometimes even more so, although disguised from those who hold these philosophies. Indeed, a life of sharing will reduce egoism and egocentrism, and is thus a great contribution to better mental health.

A third asset of pragmatism is its experimental and, therefore, its tentative character. This is a good guard against absoluteness -- as is practiced by the Catholic educational system --, although without being arbitrary and subjective. Ideals, aims, and principles are never fixed, immutable, and absolute. They are merely tentative guides for our actions. The results of our actions will prove whether the principles are adequate or not.

Instead of being rigidly fixed, they would be treated as intellectual instruments to be tested and confirmed -- and altered -- through consequences effected by acting upon them. They would lose all pretence of finality -- the ulterior source of dogmatism. It is both astonishing and depressing that so much of the energy of mankind has gone into fighting for (with weapons of the flesh as well as of the spirit) the truth of creeds, religious, moral and political, as distinct from what has gone into effort to try creeds by putting them to the test of acting upon them.  


46 Ibid., p. 277.
A fourth highlight of Dewey's pragmatism is the stress on organismicness, so that contradictions can be eliminated by integrating them into a wholeness of higher order. Knowledge and action are not separate functions of the individual. Action implies a cognitive aspect, while knowledge is obtained through actual experience. This fact is important for the method of teaching and learning.

A fifth point of pragmatism is, that it brings theory and practice into intrinsic connection (pragma means things done or facts). Theory in itself without reference to practice is meaningless. Theory and practice are not separated. They are two aspects of human behavior. There has been much depreciation of handwork, while theoretical knowledge has been considered of higher order. This issue is not only important for the method of education, but it is also significant for vocational education. A professional school cannot exist without a proper appreciation of practice. Practice means also the consideration of a theory in its consequences. This is finally the meaning of science.

Our depreciatory attitude toward "practice" would be modified if we habitually thought of it in its most liberal sense, and if we surrendered our customary dualism between two separate kinds of value, one intrinsically higher and one inherently lower. We should regard practice as the only means (other than accident) by which whatever is judged to be
honorable, admirable, approvable can be kept in concrete experienceable existence.\textsuperscript{47}

Pragmatism is not without weaknesses, however, and these we need to examine. We have seen that the general aim of pragmatic education is growth itself, since Dewey states that "education has no aim beyond itself." This formulation is, of course, inherent in pragmatism. It views everything as an on-goingness. The formulation is hardly manageable and tangible for the guiding of our educational actions, however. The conception of growth is too general. Plants and animals grow, also. A more definite guiding principle, even tentative, should be indicated. Terms such as "intelligent behavior," "reconstruction," "adjustment of and to environment," "enjoyable moments of life" should be more clearly defined. Or, are these features the essentials of the "good" life? Good is, according to Dewey, the experience of a situation in which a conflict is resolved. The quality of the good differs from moment to moment:

The recognition of the true psychology also reveals to us the nature of good or satisfaction. Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action. This human good, being a fulfillment conditioned upon thought, differs from the pleasures which an animal nature -- of course we also remain animals

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.
so far as we do not think — hits upon accidentally.

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In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation. For it marks the revolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself.  

The concept of on-goingness renders the practicing educator no definite guiding principle that may prevent him from getting lost in the march of events. The guiding general ideas are left to the change of circumstances and situations. Readjustments to situations should occur with a more general but definite objective in view, such as "maturity." Of course the pragmatist would observe that the conception of "maturity" is dynamical too, and that it is equally an open-ended process.

But to this pragmatic notion of "maturity," one may bring to the fore that human life is characterized by an increase, and a decrease after middle age. In nearing the end of one's life, one cannot endlessly apply the same pragmatic recipe of readjustment and reconstruction of the environment. He will realize that reconstruction of the "environment" will be of no meaning, at least for the fact of his continual decrease. This is one of the reasons why

some people have troubles with the process of aging. In this respect, our main problem is then: How to face the process of aging and death -- namely, the certainty of its "it" and the uncertainty of its "when" -- with a pragmatic view?

In consequence of the pragmatic view -- education is a continuous on-goingness -- the educative process should start with the birth of the "organism" and end with its death, the dramatic end of the organism.

In the framework of pragmatism, therefore, the general aim of education cannot possibly be formulated explicitly and precisely -- provided there is such a thing as general educational aim -- otherwise than with the formal indication of "self-realization" (this is, however, a self-perpetuating concept). The only thing we can do is, to provide the growing individual with the necessary conditions of his growth. And pragmatism means by "necessary conditions" the social and economical efficiency of the individual. It must be understood, however, that this "provision of conditions" does not mean primarily a "passive giving" of a favorable material and social environment to the child in order to grow, but the "provision of conditions" consists in the active involvement of both adult and child in what we call education. We shall see later that this pragmatically
bio-social concept of condition is not sufficient for the human self-realization.

The second point which we should consider is the naturalistic and biologistic view of pragmatism, holding that man is a part of nature. By this, the pragmatist cannot mean, of course, physically, since each man is an independent unit. If he means that man is, psychologically, a part of nature, we may also say that nature is, psychologically speaking, a part of man, since man's psychological structure includes all of his projections and interjections about "nature."

The pragmatical view is said to have biological basis, because it sees man's full growth only on the basis of his material conditions. The material conditions are supposed to be the means to attain a human end. The human condition is supposed to be solely physical and biological in nature. As Dewey puts it, in criticizing spiritualism:

The final source of the trouble is, however, that moral and spiritual "leaders" have propagated the notion that ideal ends may be cultivated in isolation from "material" means, as if means and material were not synonymous. While they condemn men for giving to means the thought and energy that ought to go to ends, the condemnation should go to them. For they have not taught their followers to think of material and economic activities as really means. They have been unwilling to frame their conception of the values that should be regulative
of human conduct on the basis of the actual conditions and operations by which alone values can be actualized.\textsuperscript{49}

Indeed, the latter phrase sounds very modern and progressive. Art and science can fully be realized only, if the material means (conditions) are ample. Dewey's statement is thus that values can be realized only on the basis of material and economic conditions. This statement, however, covers but half of the truth, for the problem of existential anxiety cannot be solved solely through material wealth. Material wealth alone is no full guarantee for the realization of "values." There is still much misery -- and crime -- in the world, even among prosperous people! This is an indication that the meaning of "condition of realizing values" should not be sought solely in the -- by man himself created -- environment. The human condition lies also within himself, within his own psychological organization. He should not put his confidence solely in the "favorable environmental" circumstances, but also in his own "existential ground," his own Self. This Self is not just an idea, but the very Reality on which his own reality rests. Otherwise he should deny his own reality, or he must assume that his reality is merely an "organism" that falls apart when the bio-chemical components "refuse" to cooperate with each other properly.

\textsuperscript{49}Dewey, \textit{The Quest for Certainty}, loc. cit., pp. 280-281 (Italics in last sentence mine).
The Gluecks, experts in the problem of delinquency and crime, found that:

... offenders whose childhood homes were of poorer economic status turned out to be the better risks under various forms of penal-correctional treatment than those who came from more comfortable homes. Thus, poor economic influences in childhood do not necessarily affect adult behavior and adversely.  

It is clear that the realization of "moral values" has little to do with material conditions. It is generally known that film stars -- who "swim in the millions" -- have difficulties in keeping their matrimonial state unbroken and wholesome. Nor can we blame them for their failure because of lack of sociability. It seems that the problem of human misery lies deeper than merely in the material and social conditions of the individuals.

Pragmatism is characterized by Santayana, as representing the world as being "all foreground." It does not recognize the all-embracing reality which is the background for every experience and for all human activity. 51 Though experience is, in Dewey's view, an on-going process embracing "past-present-future," it does not recognize the timeless metaphysical ground on which it is finally based. Experience is not a process of or in a vacuum.

50 Sheldon and Eleazar Glueck, loc. cit., p. 84 (Italics in original).

Santayana's phrasing, when translated in plain language, means that pragmatism lays too much emphasis on the physical and social condition of the human cause. Being agnostic, it loses sight of the significance of metaphysical or religious affairs. Religion is more than a social affair, and it is more than a reconstruction of experience with "nature."

In the search of a common faith Dewey did not recognize the adequacy of religions (in human history) or of a religion (as a personal belief), but talked rather about the "religious" quality of man's experience with his fellow-men and the universe. For him "God" is no more than a human idea that unites all other ideas or values in man's endeavor. "God" is the unifying idea of thought and action, of man and universe.

For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God." I would not insist that the name must be given. There are those who hold that the associations of the term with the supernatural are so numerous and close that any use of the word "God" is sure to give rise to misconception and be taken as a concession to traditional ideas.

Whether one gives the name "God" to this union, operative in thought and action, is a matter for individual decision. But the function of such a working union of the ideal and actual seems to me to be identical with the
force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a spiritual content; and a clear idea of that function seems to me urgently needed at the present time.\textsuperscript{52}

To Dewey the conception of "God" seems to be merely an idea instead of the "existent" metaphysical ground. In consequence, God's "Being" is supposed to be constituted only by the existence of man. He is, then, the creation of man's imagination. There is, accordingly, a universal order, \textit{only} because man creates it. Thus before man's appearance on earth there "was" not such a thing as a universal order. Dewey's conception of "God" can be compared with the "reality" of a shadow that owes its existence to the light that has real being. The shadow is, then, the idea, and the light is man, the creator of ideas. Is this the humanistic "pride?"

Although many philosophical knots have been unraveled by Dewey's pragmatism, it would be unphilosophical to say that "Dewey has the answer to all questions." It would be unphilosophical, too, to question propositions through a pragmatical glasses only. Nothing could be more misleading. There are still unanswered problems.

If Dewey's concept of truth is the integration between "idea" and "fact," and if the "factness" means the

adequacy of the hypothesis (idea) with its actualization — the fact that "it works" —, there still remains the epistemological question of the meaning of "adequacy." In this frame of reference, we may ask, what is the basic difference between the idealistic concept of truth — namely, the coherence theory — and the pragmatic concept — namely, the smooth relationship between idea and fact without contradictions? "Without contradictions" means the same as "being in coherence." A fact is also an idea that is accepted after consideration in relation to its realization. Thus, in fact, the pragmatist believes in the coherence theory — namely, coherence among ideas (though the way how to seek "coherence" may differ). And this is exactly the belief of idealism. Idealism and pragmatism are thus epistemologically speaking, the same, since both adhere to the "coherence" theory of the truth — namely, coherence among ideas — "man is the measure of all things."

Dewey himself touched upon this problem of "adequacy" in considering the problem of the "Logic of Verification." But what is the guarantee that the verification is adequate, that the verification itself has the trueness-quality? Should this judgment of the "last" trueness not be submitted again to a verification? What is the verification of a verification? One must persistently be a skeptic. This
seems to be an inevitable consequence of philosophizing.
Or one must take resource in his first "evident" axiom.

Philosophizing must admit to bottomless scrutiny. If it does not, it has to fly to instinctive belief to find
security. Security as a feeling, avoids the scrutiny of the holy belief on chance of losing the last anchorage of man's
existence. The last grip of philosophy might be wiped out by posing the question: "Should I have a philosophy to live
(adequately) by?" This is probably the crucial problem and the source of all unsolvable questions around every philoso-
phy. And pragmatism is no exception. With respect to prag-
matism we may launch such critical questions as: Is experi-
ence the only basis for behaving adequately (and, therefore, for knowing)? Is the essence of the self immortal? Does this question have no sense at all? If the answer suggests this, why is it that every person is somehow impressed by seeing a dying man, especially when this dying "organism" is his nearest relative? We hope that pragmatism some time may be able to answer these crucial questions relevantly, even in its own framework.

There is another pragmatic point that is critical of pragmatism itself -- namely, its character of tentativeness. This notion might lead to "self-annihilation." It might nullify its own system with all of its implications and
ramifications. We find, for instance, Dewey's phrasing as follows:

Any belief as such is tentative, hypothetical; it is not just to be acted upon, but is to be framed with reference to its office as a guide to action. Consequently, it should be the last thing in the world to be picked up casually and then clung to rigidly.53

This dictum of Dewey, when applied to pragmatism itself, could be self-destroying. What would be the answer? It is, however, true that it can be applied to any philosophical position with the same result of possible nullification of the system. In consequence, any philosophical position as a system, is by its very nature critical. Should we, then, return to Socrates' belief "man knows everything except that he actually knows nothing"? This means that we should take the one alternative left -- i.e., mysticism.

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Position of Educational Theory

In Chapter II we explored the relationship between educational theory and other adjacent disciplines. We found that the general trend is that educational theory is a derivation of a certain philosophical position, applied to educational thinking and practice, and that other adjacent disciplines, such as sociology, psychology and anthropology are but "by-disciplines" which furnish educational theory with some useful informative material as an aid, so as to enable education to function more properly. We noted, however, that John Dewey's position is an exception. For him educational theory and philosophy are one. Even psychology -- such as on the thinking process -- is inseparable from the philosophy-education wholeness. This point of view is inherent, of course, in Dewey's non-dualistic instrumentalism, in which everything is functionally interrelated.

Langeveld was one of the first educational theorists to advocate educational theory as an autonomous discipline which should determine for itself which philosophical position it wants to take and what kind of psychology, sociology,
and anthropology it wants to select for its own use. In other words, the philosophies and psychologies to be used, are viewed through the glasses of the educational theorist. Langeveld states clearly: "Pedagogics, therefore, determines in its own house which values of life or reputed values of life are pedagogically acceptable."¹ He takes this position for the simple reason that theoretical pedagogics is not philosophy but pedagogics, in the same manner that theoretical linguistics is linguistics and not philosophy.² Educational theory is the meeting point between philosophical reflection about man and the universe and empirical educational research. It is, therefore, not a deductive speculative system derived from certain axioms.

This theoretical standpoint has significant implications for the building of an educational theory. The start is from education itself -- i.e., education which cannot exist without empirical knowledge. Educational theory is thus both empirical and philosophical. It is distinct from educational philosophy, which is basically a philosophy (a purely speculative reflection) that deduces certain implications for education from certain metaphysical, epistemological or axiological axioms.

¹ Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., pp. 51-52.
² Ibid., p. 136.
In taking this theoretical position, Langeveld argues that there is but one adequate method to elucidate fundamental educational relationships and essential educational phenomena meaningfully -- i.e., the phenomenological method. Langeveld's educational theory, therefore, is phenomenological. He may be said to be the father of the phenomenological School of Utrecht in the field of pedagogics.

For him educational theory is both the beginning and end of pedagogics. He states:

On the one hand it assumes philosophy and empiricism as being known -- and is, therefore, an end, a closing --, on the other hand, it shows in outline the entrances, the starting points of the problems and the coherent handling of these problems -- and in this way it is a start, a preparation, an introduction.3

To understand education fully, so it is argued, with all of its implications, ramifications, assumptions, and possibilities, one must study the educative process phenomenologically. This is a conclusion we must examine.

Langeveld's Phenomenological and Anthropological Assumptions

In Chapter III (pp. 180-182) we indicated the meaning and importance of phenomenology in philosophy. Langeveld has applied this phenomenological method in the field

3Trans. from ibid., p. 137.
of education in order to understand more deeply the structural educational relationship between the educator and the educand. In doing this he obtains valuable educational-psychological material to use for the building and refinement of an educational theory. This is the "empirical" aspect of the theory. It is tacitly assumed, of course, that the phenomenological elucidation of educational phenomena implies certain philosophical presumptions. On the other hand, these philosophical assumptions are not the result of an eclectical arbitrariness according to one's personal philosophical taste. They result, rather, from a comprehensive understanding of totalities and relationships, with continuous reference to relevant and essential empirical material. Both philosophical reflection and empirical research meet at the point of educational theory. Educational theory is thus a consequence of the contemplation about the "experiencing" (Dutch: beleving, German: Erlebnis) of the educational situation, involving both educator and educand, without tearing apart the existential unity of the situational phenomena. The next moment after this phenomenological contemplation, the reflective thinking splits artificially into two problems: one philosophical, and the other empirical.
It is thus clear that the central moment of educational theory is the phenomenological description. As Langeveld puts it:

That is just the task of theoretical pedagogics and on the analogy thereof; that of theoretical linguistics, history, sociology, etc. etc. And it is completely identical with what we already express in other terms as follows: it is concerned with the phenomenological elucidation of structural fundamental relationships, and in consequence also with the essential determination of the most basic phenomena in the totality of the field of study (in this instance: education).\(^4\)

Thus, in order to understand what education is, one should analyze the educative process in its totality, with all its implications. And this is just the intent of phenomenological analysis. Educationists and educational researchers meet each other in the same object of study -- i.e., the educative process. In a theoretical and empirical study about The Basic Situation of Adolescence Education, DeKlerk states that the phenomenological analysis is becoming a more and more prominent method of understanding the totality of the educational situation:

\(^4\)Trans. from *ibid.*, pp. 137-138 (Parentheses in original).
in approaching these problems the phenomenological analysis of this total-situation is primary and essential.\textsuperscript{5}

Phenomenology is thus a necessity in all fields where we are to understand others and ourselves:

To say it in more general terms, there is no understanding ("Verstehen") either of oneself or others, without phenomenology. There is not only one's own experience, but also the mirrorings of other experiences, in what may be called "expressive experience."\textsuperscript{6}

One, however, should not conclude from this that phenomenology is a subjective method of understanding people. This method may be misused, of course, as can any other method.

In relating phenomenology to operationism, Albert Wellek says:

To state this in more general terms: the phenomenological method, if used correctly, is well able to produce objective, inter-individual knowledge, as does any other "objective" method. There is a difference only in that the danger or temptation to use this method purely subjectively or capriciously seems to be greater and more acute in phenomenology than in most other fields. The "subjective" misuse, however, does not lie in the nature of the phenomenological method. Operational methods can also be misused, as frequently occurs, for instance, when validity,


\textsuperscript{6} Albert Wellek, "The Phenomenological and Experimental Approaches to Psychology and Characterology," Perspectives in Personality Theory, loc. cit., p. 287 (Parentheses in original).
which has not been clearly established, is ascribed to a test.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 284.}

Wellek states further that phenomenology and operationism may even be combined:

Descriptive phenomenological psychology and measurement may very well be combined to assist each other. This has been amply demonstrated in my two books on hearing and musical talent and also in my recent article summarizing the psychology of hearing, all of which included many figures, correlations, graphs, and other quantitative data.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 295.}

Since phenomenological description -- in fact, any other description -- implies some philosophical assumptions, it is no more than natural, that pedagogical phenomenology has its suppositions about philosophical anthropology, in general, and child anthropology, in particular. This is of fundamental importance, since general-anthropological material, including the theory of values, should be viewed and "screened" according to pedagogical adequacy. Langeveld mentions three criteria to be fulfilled by a theory of values in order to be adequate pedagogically:

1. What is left to the child of the "dignity of man?"

2. is the distance between what pedagogics demands and the system of values that is operative in this anthropology, in such a way that it can be bridged (or is it for instance an anthropology that makes the human dignity conditional on a natural or supernatural selection)?
3. in what way is this system of values prepared in the realm of values of the child, respectively how can we create points of contacts for this?9

The criteria suggested above imply that the educationist possesses some theory about the "nature" of the child. The latter is surely not the kind of Descartes's concept in which the child is represented as a machine.

For Descartes it must remain a problem what a young child, an infant, philosophically speaking is. For, as long as it does not speak, Descartes has no clear proof that this creature is essentially different from a young animal. And consequently, it may be a small machinery. For the Cartesian animal is by definition a machine.

On the other hand, the infant is born from man. So it might be more than "res extensa"; it might turn out to be "res cogitans." So what is a child? Either an "infra-human" or a "supra-animal" creature, but nothing in itself.10

The Cartesian child is consequently not educable, unless one equates education with drilling and reflex conditioning. For this reason alone education cannot possibly be "applied child psychology." Since the child is an educational subject rather than a psychological object, it depends on education only to decide what kind of conception of the child it wants to use. It applies its own anthropological

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9Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 52 (Parentheses in original).

standards to the concept of child psychology. What these standards are, will be discussed below.

Langeveld's statement on the proper conception of child anthropology is in short:

...: childhood represents its own value; one can have the disposal of the child objectively only as far as in this respect he cannot be harmed in his personal development; thus a "disposal" which is always executed as a substitutive action of conscience.\(^\text{11}\)

Langeveld, however, warns us that the recognition of the child's rights does not mean at all that it is a "vom Kinde aus" (out of the child) pedagogics. The ethical and the social nature of man precludes such a conception.

Langeveld poses four basic principles which are necessary if an anthropological system is to be acceptable for educational theory. These anthropological-pedagogical assumptions are:

a. Sociality  
b. Individuality  
c. Ethical equivalence  
d. The individual worthwhileness of each person.

The principle of sociality is fundamental, since it implies the educability of the individual. The educative process occurs in the interaction between adults and children. This means that the educative process is a social phenomenon.

\(^{11}\)Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 53 (Italics in original).
An anthropology that does not recognize man as a social being suggests that man cannot be influenced and is thus basically ineducable. He can probably be tamed and coerced, but not educated. The principle of sociality, however, may not be driven so far that one arrives at a collective conception of man, in which the uniqueness of the individual is absorbed and disappears. In this light, the second principle is of compensative importance.

The principle of individuality recognizes the fact and necessity of individual differences. Man is not a collective mass. When man is considered to be a mechanical part of a collectivity, then, education can mean nothing but a mechanical reaction and absorption of what exists in the collectivity. But this kind of interaction is not education, since there are no creative activities, novelties, and inventions. Everything would be a dead mass.

On the other hand, the recognition of both sociality and individuality may imply the notion that people can be classified as "superior" and "inferior." Says Langeveld: "An educational system based on such a fundamental discrimination is pathological."\textsuperscript{12} The discrimination may be attributed to a "natural" selection, with some races considered to be superior to others on the basis of "blood"

\textsuperscript{12}Trans. from \textit{ibid.}, p. 54.
inheritance, or through supernatural selection -- some groups consider themselves to have the privilege to receive the grace from God. Langeveld calls such an educational system "pathological" because it does not accept fundamentally the pedagogical principles of "ethical equivalence and worthwhileness of the individual." In other words, one group is allowed to rule absolutely over another group, without the obviousness of the moral superiority of the former. The latter's fate is not taken into the former's field of responsibility. This is one of the reasons for conflicts among racial, cultural, and religious groups.

Thus, in order to prevent the educational system from becoming morbid, one should accept the other pedagogical principles -- namely, the moral equivalence and the worthwhileness of each person in his uniqueness.

The principle of moral equivalence is the basis for the unity of mankind. Biologically speaking, the human race forms one species consisting of different sub-races. We cannot deny these facts, but we still believe that mankind is one. And this oneness is based on the moral equivalence of every person, though we must recognize that there are different levels of morality manifested by various peoples. Langeveld means by moral equivalence this:

Mankind -- i.e., the human being in his full diversity -- possesses, however, a ground of unity in the fact that each man is basically
capable of making a moral decision and behaving accordingly.\textsuperscript{13}

When this principle is ignored, the individual is theoretically and practically ineducable. This ineducable individual will act either according to a \textit{seeming} spiritual independence, or out of pure individualism. The latter implies an egoistic attitude of the individual who lives solely on the basis of the pleasure principle or the urge to power. An educational measure -- a prohibition or a request -- will have no effect on the individual, unless this educational measure is convenient to his egoism and lust to power. Says Langeveld: "Alternative of this drilling system with sweets-and-whip is pure coercion."\textsuperscript{14}

The principle of moral equivalence is intimately related to the principle of sociality. As a matter of fact, one who is not capable of making a moral decision, and acting accordingly -- for many reasons -- is not able to take responsibilities. Although he may be called to account, he will not accept them.

Accountability is the social actualization of moral responsibility or moral independence. Moral independence means that one is ready and able to make a moral decision

\textsuperscript{13}Trans. from \textit{ibid.}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{14}Trans. from \textit{ibid.}
and to behave accordingly. The willingness to do so is actually an appeal of the person to his social environment to recognize his moral independence. The fact of accountability implies thus the recognition of the right of others, whose authority he acknowledges, to admonish him to his responsibility. In consequence, he acknowledges the right of others to pass judgment on him. It is thus clear that sociality and moral responsibility are related to each other. Though responsibility might be not realized socially, the person involved remains potentially accountable. This means that there is obviously an authority that addresses man directly and personally. Some people call this authority "conscience" and the religious believer calls it "God who is talking to us." We have found that the theistic personalist Kohnstamm pointed out the same basic aspect in education; he said: "The kernel of education is the formation of conscience." Langeveld words are about the same: "In the personal living of the responsibility lies the kernel of our being-a-person." He adds: "Here lies thus a ground neither for individualism that neglects the sociality, nor for collectivism that ignores the being-a-person of man."  

15 Trans. from ibid., p. 56.  
16 Trans. from ibid.
The fourth anthropological-pedagogical principle is "the admission of the individual difference as far as they are significant for the being-a-person of this man." The emphasis is here on the uniqueness of this concrete man. Each person is unique in his manifestations. There are even no monozygotic twins who are identical to each other. This pedagogical view of the uniqueness of each person stands in opposition, of course, to the anthropology of "biologists who see 'human beings' (plural) as specimens of one species." 

The recognition of the uniqueness of each person corresponds, according to Langeveld, to three essential conditions of the educability of man. These are:

1. **The sociality of man.** This is to be understood to mean that individuality may not be dissolved in a collectivity.

2. **The moral equivalence of all men.** This implies that one just cannot want each man to have the same judgment and deed. A moral deed is not mechanical in the sense of the Stimulus-Response theory. Each moral judgment and deed is different. It depends on the psychical structure.

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17 Trans. from *ibid.*
18 Trans. from *ibid.*, p. 57 (Parentheses in original).
19 See *ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
of the person, on the way in which and level on which he employs his own intellectual and emotional tools, and on other factors of time, place, and the circumstances of the moment.

3. The theory of authority in education. There is educational authority only when it is assumed that there is a difference in moral quality among personalities. The "bearer" of authority must be of better moral quality than the "follower" of authority, because the former is more mature, more experienced, and has more knowledge about the "ought" of things.

Finally, the negation of the uniqueness of each person "would reduce the educative process to a mere technical production process of basically identical mass-articles."

It is thus clear that the four anthropological-pedagogical principles are closely related to one another, so as to form a pedagogical foundation. One, of course, may rank the four principles in order of importance according to one's own view. This may result in the upbuilding of different types of pedagogical systems, but the fact still holds that these four principles are necessary conditions for any pedagogical system that believes in the educability of man.
On closer scrutiny, the principle of moral equivalence (i.e., the basic capability of each person to make a moral decision) appears to imply two other principles. The first one is: each person is capable of seeing moral differences. There is really moral difference. The second is that one is able to act according to the norm one knows, although it sometimes happens that one does not behave as he should.

Langeveld assumes apodictically that there is indeed moral difference: there is good and evil. One, however, may differ in his view concerning the origin of morality. This does not alter the fact, however, of the existence of moral differences. This is the minimum condition for any education, since one cannot consider morality to be merely arbitrary inventions or merely pure conventions.

Knowledge of morality is, hence, necessary for any pedagogical system . . . "Concerning the knowing pedagogics demands that good and evil should be known."20 It does not matter, however, what view one holds about the way of knowing good and evil (pragmatic, idealistic or supernaturalistic), provided one recognizes the "binding character" of a moral decision -- i.e., one does not ignore responsibilities.

Concerning the relationship between moral insight and moral deed, there are two opposing views. The one is

20 Trans. from *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
that man is capable of moral insight but is unable to behave in accordance with that insight. The other is that man is capable of moral insight and always acts accordingly. The first view exaggerates the experiential fact that men, possessing moral insight, may not act accordingly. This element is not found in the second view. The second view, however, contains too much of the right element that is lacking in the first view -- namely, another experiential fact that men are capable of behaving according to their moral insight.

The first view implies that any attempt at education is meaningless, since one knows in advance that one's efforts will have no results. The second view suggests that education in the real sense is unnecessary, except in the sense of providing the young people with merely intellectual information about morality.

Langeveld's position is that pedagogics presumes a third view -- namely, that man is capable of moral insight (though he may not so act), and that he is also capable of behaving according to that insight. And these things cannot be obtained by the youngsters just through an arbitrary and subjective "feeling" about matters of morality. An educative process is necessary, which means the involvement of adults.

Concerning moral educability, there is a further point to be made. There is a philosophy that considers man
to be a part of "nature," in the sense that man is deterministically subject to "objective natural laws," the same laws that rule physical objects. This naturalistic view reduces human reason and will to merely "natural" phenomena. A moral decision is consequently regarded as an obedience to natural laws. Education cannot do anything, of course, with human beings that are completely subjected to deterministic natural laws. Men may, of course, differ in their views concerning the way the human mind can withdraw from the ties of natural laws but this does not alter the fact that man, when regarded as a "natural" object, cannot possibly be educated. How can man as a natural object behave independently and take responsibilities? Besides, one would never be able to "understand" (verstehen) his fellow-man, if the latter is but a natural object. In criticizing Kant's naturalistic position with respect to man, Langeveld says:

Kant has, accordingly, no access to the "understanding" of his fellow-man. "wie alle anderen Naturdinge" -- he argues -- has the person also "einen Charakter, d.i. ein Gesetz ihrer Kausalität, ohne welches sie gar nicht Ursache sein wurde." Character is thus the "cause" of certain effects, "Wirkungen," -- as falling drops are the "cause" of the hollowing out of a stone. The "Wirkungen" are -- nota bene -- the actions of man. The cause is constant, the "Wirkungen" may vary according to the circumstances. One knows the cause from its effects, but for this the "rule" which they obey must be read from these effects. The "empirical character," then, is derived from this rule. Kant
remains here rightly -- unaware of the self-irony in it -- about his way of arguing: "In allen diesen verfährt man, wie überhaupt in Untersuchung der Reihe bestimmter Ursachen zu einer gegebenen Naturwirkung." Understanding the fellow-man is thus a simple thing: he is a natural object as another one, and "understanding" is thus a form of knowledge of nature. So there occurs an absolute separation of "without" (the exterior, the "Wirkung") from "within" (the cause, the interior), implying that the essential unity of "within" and "without" in the utterance and wording, in the expression, is nowhere visible for Kant. By this he, consequently, bars the access to all "geisteswissenschaftlicher"* knowledge.21

We may briefly summarize by noting that man, according to the four anthropological-pedagogical principles discussed above, is fundamentally educable. We say "fundamentally," since man's ideals are basically susceptible for realization, or at least the realization may be close to the ideal. If we doubt this possibility, then we must assume that the world and man are organized in such a way that whatever is inherent in man's nature is incapable of realization. This conclusion is unacceptable, however, since it negates our own humanness.

Besides the fact of the educability of man, we must also recognize that education is theoretically and practically a necessity. Not accepting this fact implies the

21 Trans. from ibid., pp. 140-141 (All punctuations in original).

*For lack of the English equivalent I use the German term, in the third case feminine.
the assumption of man's "born maturity," i.e., the belief that the newly born child is capable of taking full responsibilities. This is, of course, absurd. Another probable assumption is that man -- without help -- would be able to direct his life adequately and morally as a matter of course. This conclusion overlooks the fact that an individual without education would merely follow his instinctive drives without any moral brakes. One might also negate the positive value of maturity by denying the necessity of education but, then, to do so would remove the ground for objecting to the worthwhileness of maturity.

When the educability of man and the necessity of his education are accepted as pedagogical axioms, there remains one problem related to these two principles -- i.e., the problem of the limitations of education. This is actually a problem that is connected with what one purports to attain with education and is a matter of educational aims, which will be explored in another section.

**The Pedagogical Situation**

For the phenomenological educationist it is basic that he starts from the pedagogical situation, from which he tries to elucidate essential educational phenomena and structures with their implications. Situation is a very basic concept in phenomenology. We have indicated earlier,
what is meant, phenomenologically speaking, by situation.22

An educational situation is one where the educative process occurs.* At all times and everywhere, education has taken place among peoples under different circumstances of nature and culture. Although the form in which the educative process occurs differs with the change of time and place, there is one characteristic common to all forms of education — namely, education always happens between adults and children. Were all people born as adults, education would be unnecessary. All that would be needed among pedagogically mature adults would be to get more information from one another about everything known and knowable. This kind of information would be needed only for better production and for better social relationships and organization, because as adults they would already know responsibilities.

Since people are born as infants, they must start their lives as helpless beings and grow in the direction of adulthood. They become adults only through the help of adults. So, infancy and adulthood must have different

*Note: I do not want to interrupt the phenomenological analysis which follows, with too many quotations, in order to keep its wholeness.

qualities. The help provided by adult to the child in order to grow to adulthood is called education.

Education is thus a particular kind of "involvement" between children and adults. This social involvement in the field of education has two characteristics: (1) one is exercising influence; (2) this influence radiates from adults to non-adults.

Langeveld refutes the notion that education is both a "social" relationship between adults and children, as well as between adults and adults. The latter implies that the educative process is endless; it ends only with the death of the "educand." Langeveld does not agree with this instrumentalistic notion of education:

Education comes not only to an end, but it must come to an end. . . . unless we renounce to see maturity as the primary and natural destination of man. Here we have thus a matter-of-fact starting point and pedagogics accepts this without accepting the burden of proof, or even to consider it. It is for it an evident axiom: it is for the sake of maturity; education is not for education itself.23

The influence of adults on the young people alone does not yet make them educators. They may mislead the youngsters for their own benefit. The characteristic of the educator is:

. . . , that his influence and direction, his protection as well as his attempt to make the

23 Trans. from Langeveld, ibid., p. 51.
pupil independent, in short, that the whole of his educative action is focused upon helping the child to become mature, "helping to become capable of accomplishing his life task independently."  

Education is thus the exercise of the kind of influence meant above. It is, however, not sufficient to describe the exercise of this particular influence from its formal aspect alone. For it is even possible that though the educator tells the right things to the child, he himself acts in the wrong or opposite way. The influence has its "content" aspect. By "content" is not meant, however, merely the object of knowledge that the educator attempts to teach to the child but, rather, the concrete realization of some ideals which he depicts. The most concrete example for a certain ideal is, of course, the educator himself. In other words, the educator himself should have realized in his own living the ideals he proposes to teach. The most genuine educative method is the "personalized" method but this does not mean at all that the adult should try to mold the child after his ideals, because the less independent the child, the more likely his imitation of adults. So the acceptance of the principle of self-realization by the educator is more a matter of using a "personalized" method. Otherwise, he would apply more impersonal general methods of

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24 Trans. from ibid., p. 21.
teaching and not get involved in the personal uniqueness of the educational situation.

The self-realization or the realization of certain ideals on the part of the education is obviously a condition sine qua non for the positive effectiveness of every educative process.* In this light it is clear that sexual "education" cannot possibly be executed by a sexual villain. Nor can an immoral individual provide moral "education." The "education" toward good citizenship cannot be furnished by an a-social citizen either. Nor can we entrust the religious "education" of a child to a hypocrite. In all educational activity the personality of the educators, including the realization of ideals, is of fundamental importance. He is the active exponent of all ideals, all cultural values, all methods of education which are unified in his person, this concrete person.

There is, however, another aspect of the realization of the educational aim in the personality of the educator. This is the so-called unintentional factor that is very

*Note: In this frame of reference we must consider the so-called Donatus heresy to be an error. Bishop Donatus (± fourth century) taught that sacraments administered by an unworthy minister were invalid, and that known sinners should be denied membership in the Church. The Catholic Church regards this statement as a heresy.
important in the educative process. If the educator is too emphatic and intentional in the involvement with the child, because he deliberately holds himself up as an example, then, he irritates the feelings of the educand. This is an experiential fact. This phenomenon hints at another essential aspect of the educational situation — namely, the child is a person who wants to be himself. Though he takes over many things from others, imitates others, is influenced by others, he is still a person who wants to choose for himself, who may reject something he does not like, who has his own feelings, who may keep "distance" from others' attempts at interference. All influence from outside is digested in a strictly personal way, so as to create something new. All this should remind us to be more modest, patient, and tolerant. We should not be too optimistic in the estimation of the "results" of our "educational meddling," if we respect the "being-a-person" of the educand. On the other hand, we should not fall into another kind of optimism, the belief in the child's ability to educate himself completely without our help. This is the well-known naturalistic optimism. The right educational relationship between educator and educand lies thus in the opposite self-confidence of the adult with respect to his ability to help, and in the confidence in the child with recognition of the latter's "being-a-person."
Not all "social" relationship between adults and children, however, is educational. There is also a possibility of misleading or misleading. The cause of it may be an inadequate theory of education, or the using of the wrong method or technique, or the wrong application of a good method. Or the cause may also be the bad intentions of the adult, using the right techniques to carry them out. This demonstrates that education operates under normative judgments. It is not solely concerned with just the use of the right technique.

An adult-child relationship may also be educationally "neutral." The parent may talk with the child merely out of need of companionship. In other words, the child is not always and everywhere an "educand."

"But the relationship," says Langeveld, "may turn any moment into education and is thus a 'pedagogically pre-formed field.'"25 The change from a "neutral" to a pedagogical relationship occurs, for instance, when the child does something "educationally inadequate," that is to say, the child does something unallowable. The adult may respond with a request or a prohibition. This is a "negative" response, since the educational measure is taken in connection with a negative behavior. The educational action, on the other hand, may be sometimes of positive nature. This

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25 Trans. from *ibid.*, p. 27.
is the case when the adult changes his role of "neutral" participant -- not being involved yet in a "negative response" -- to a "concerned educator."

Too much intrusiveness, however, will easily evoke a "protest." In a protest relationship both educator and educand can hardly find and meet each other again. A too strong deliberateness may be the result of over-love of the parents (overprotection), or of a too great demand of the child's independence.

In most instances, the child does not notice the change from the "normal" adult-child social relationship to an educational one. This fact shows us that it is natural for the child to be guided by adults. It is for mature adults natural, too, that they, in the presence of children, moderate themselves in word and deed, if "guidance" is to be understood as meaning the provision of help without interfering with the child's integrity.

The educational situation creates the opportunity for the child to be himself and to become himself (or, differently, to become someone). This concept of self-assertion and "freedom" is basic in human life. The individual always wants to be himself. This notion of Langeveld about the need of the individual to be himself is similarly found in Allport's statement:

Scarcely anyone ever wants to be anybody else. However handicapped or unhappy he feels himself,
he would not change places with other more fortunate mortals. He grumbles over his misfortunes and wants his lot improved; but it is his lot and his personality that he wants bettered. This attachment to one's own being is basic to human life. I may say that I envy you. But I do not want to be you; I only want to have for myself some of your attributes or possessions.  

On the other hand, the child wants guidance from adults. This implies that he is dependent upon help from elder people. There is need of dependence. The child wants ties with people or groups with which he can identify himself. It seems that freedom and relatedness, being-one-self and identification with others, belong together, are compensatory to each other. They are inherent in every proper human relationship. The educational situation creates thus for children possibilities to become themselves, as well as to form social ties which may be manifested in loyalty, helpfulness, liberality, modesty, reverence, devotion, and so on.

The social intercourse between adult and child is thus extremely important for the latter's development. It is important, being valuable for the child, but, since it can be a menace, too, its character and quality is of equal importance. "It can be a stealthy poison or a steady grace," says Langeveld. The "poison-danger" will be

27 Trans. from ibid., pp. 28-29.
present when the adult lays too much emphasis on control, supervision, and deliberateness. This may result in a negative response from the child. He escapes an open meeting with the adult through concealed protest and takes resort in dishonesty, backstairsness, mendacity, meanness, and the like.

The danger is also real, when the confidence-relationship between educator and child is insufficient. In fact, confidence is a fundamental principle for any adequate social relationship. Through confidence the educator can influence the child's actions which fall beyond his own control. Confidence is thus a "technical" condition for education. Confidence will create self-confidence. And this is especially important for the existential feeling of security which rules the further development throughout the individual's life. Lack of security may lead to emotional conflicts and neurosis. The child always needs active care, and guidance. But care and guidance ask for self-acquaintance on the part of the educator. Without adequate, realistic self-knowledge, the educator is incapable of understanding the world and others. Langeveld says:

The more man realizes "himself" in self-knowledge, the more deeply he appears to understand "the world," and the more clearly he seems to realize a plan that is arranged for him: all his life seems to withdraw from
arbitrariness, while at the same time it [his life] is highly aware of its freedom. 28

Self-acquaintance is the basis for the upbuilding of a life-plan that includes necessarily moral values, of which the formation of conscience is essential. Conscience is thus built on self-acquaintance and man's relationship to a "judging agency." In the educational situation the educator appears temporarily as this agency. This can only be done when he has realized moral ideals in his personality. In other words, the educator represents a "moral" authority.

Authority is thus an essential phenomenon in the educational situation. We may say that an educational relationship is an authority-relationship. Without authority one cannot educate people:

Why is education a work that implies authority? Because trust put in authority creates the possibility to help the child that is not fully grown. Authority points out certain modes of behavior, prevents other ones. If this occurs solely through proof, on the basis of personal boundness or coercion, then, the child remains un-educated. Authority is thus the inevitably necessary condition of education: the condition sine qua non. 29

We must bear in mind, however, that with too much of authority, one cannot educate either. Unless this is progressively

28 Trans. from ibid., p. 31.

29 Trans. from ibid., p. 45 (Italics in original).
and deliberately reduced (a purpose that should guide adults) the child is destined to remain in a state of dependence. This is what Langeveld means by pedagogical authority, as we shall see in the further development of his ideas on this issue.

Authority implies obedience. Without obedience the child cannot be helped in his growth to adulthood. Educational obedience is not passive, however, not the kind of a "cadaver-discipline" yielding to a stronger physical power. Real obedience is active, guided by moral insight and the awareness that one is morally independent.

We have seen over and over again how authority occurs in a double polar tension: that between obedience-claim and independence-obligation, and that between independence-claim and independence-ability. The educator demands obedience to his authority, but recognizes the independence-obligation of the educand... and demands thus together with obedience also independence (i.e., assuming responsibility), the latter [independence], however, occurs in a tension-relationship to the independence-ability of the child.30

Educational authority is only present, however, if the suggestions, indications, prohibitions or requests of the educator are actively obeyed. This is only possible, when the educator himself has realized in his own personality and behavior the values, norms, or ideals which he

30 Trans. from ibid., p. 45 (Italics and parentheses in original).
represents and which he suggests to the child. He should be literally the realizer, and mediator of values, and not just a translator-at-a-distance of these values. He is not just a preacher or orator of ideals. Only genuine ideals -- those which are one with the personality of the educator -- have "convincing power," that is to say, will be obeyed.

The bearer of authority as the mediator of authority meddles so much with the exercise of authority, that one hardly accepts authority of a man who himself does not live up to it ("Look at yourself"). The bearer of authority loses his title to speak, when he keeps so much outside of the authority-relationship, that he is merely an informant of norm-knowledge. This points out that the personalness in the authority relationship is more than an objective instrument. The exercise of authority in education presumes a personal realization of norms.31

Only through obedience can we help the child to become independent and mature. Active obedience implies the possibility or the right to question certain requests. The educator cannot evade questioning. He has to motivate the actions of the child, so that the latter can understand the reasons why he must do some things and why he is not allowed to do other things. Real obedience is not directed to the person of the educator, because he wants it, but to "the ought" he represents. It may sound paradoxical if we say: "In order to obey one must be able to disobey."32 But this

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31 Trans. from ibid., p. 39 (Parentheses and italics in original).
32 Trans. from ibid., p. 34.
is the case. There must be choice based on understanding. The child should have the opportunity to ask for clarification.

Both the question and the clarification imply the knowledge of language. Real obedience is, therefore, only possible, when the child begins to command language.

With the young child there is no question of obedience as yet, there is only such thing as being contaminated with the initiatives of the educators and thus a spontaneous participation. The child is not ripe as yet for the most elementary kind of an authority-relationship. He does not become so until he is attainable for a more accurate indication of what the educators want and do not want, for a simple though (already) personal meeting of educators and children in language. 

Before the age of three years, there can be no real obedience, therefore. The child cannot understand as yet the reasons of the request of the educator. He can only obey "passively." The first years of "training" are more habit formation and conditioning. The latter is very important, however, since it facilitates the further development. In consequence, real education actually starts when the child is able to ask for an explanation of an action, that is, when educator and child can meet each other meaningfully. Verbal meeting between parents and children is thus very important in education. Only in this way can children

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33 Trans. from ibid., pp. 33-34 (Italics in original).
become morally independent. . . . Some shy and timid parents try to evade this verbal meeting with their children, while superficial, uneducated or hot-tempered parents are incapable of such a meeting. Children of such parents easily become disobedient. Their disobedience manifests in unapproachableness, "strangeness," surliness, and tyranny. On the other hand, some parents are apt to "explain too much," so that the children feel insecure, and become disobedient, manifesting this in protest, postponement, escape and "detour," wanting to do differently, etc. . . . Such parents who do not keep the channels for verbal meeting and communication open, undermine very early the growth of real obedience. (But, of course, this is true of all human interaction in general. When the channels of communication are closed, the human situation is in peril.)

Assignments should be brief and clear, and warranted. They should not be given merely for the benefit or interest of the parents. There is real authority, when the educator is willing to explain his requests, has the basic intention to act solely in the interest of the child, and gives the child much time and freedom to digest the motives. These are the first steps toward helping the child to become morally independent.

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34 Freely paraphrased from ibid., p. 34.
Obedience is thus the first condition for the ability to acknowledge authority . . . and to assume authority, when the time comes. This happens when the mature man or woman decides to build a family, in which both basically agree to take responsibilities of the care of a possible new life. Assuming authority is thus an essential dimension of maturity.

Before we go further and characterize maturity more closely, we point out only one of the most essential actions of one who becomes a "commander" [= "bearer of authority"] himself: the choice of a mate [male or female]. For through this choice one accepts the responsibility of new life, and at any rate one accepts co-responsibility in behalf of the spouse.35

An educational relationship is thus, basically, an authority relationship. This authority relationship "ripens" gradually. This happens, when the obedience of the child changes step by step from "personal" obedience to a "normative" one, in which the personal tie matters little. The child obeys, then, the norm that is represented by the educator. On the other hand, the person of the educator may hamper the recognition of the authority, if he makes authority too much a personal issue.

Sometimes an authority is but seemingly genuine. One may overestimate a person's authority, because of wrong or misleading information. And sometimes "authority" is

35Trans. from ibid., p. 36 (Italics in original).
based on a strong personal tie between educator and child, so that the child's obedience is not the one that is supported by norms. It is merely an imitation of the adult's behavior:

The sentimentally spoilt child is, therefore, not always a typical "indocile" child, but his docility is never based on full authority-experience. It does what the educator wants him to do -- this seems very fine. He is really obedient only, if he would also do differently when his own norm-consciousness would demand it. But this norm-consciousness does not come out above the "norms" of selfishness.

It is, however, not enough, when the bearer of authority behaves in exemplary manner according to the norms which he is preaching, because the norms which regulate the children's behavior, vary with their individuality. The educator should apply the norms "situationally," that is to say, he should take into account the uniqueness and the particularity of this child in this situation.*

... he knows not only the objective data with respect to which the child must act or must act together with others, but he gets acquainted with the child himself from his deeds and expressions. The educator certainly sees the being-a-child and this child, and does similarly adulthood according to his view. The social intercourse indicates, to be sure, groundpatterns of modes of behavior in relation to this social

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*Trans. from ibid., p. 40 (Italics and quotes in original).

*The use of the conception of situation might be reminiscent to pragmatism. The phenomenological meaning of "situation" is slightly different from the pragmatically one, however (Cf. p. 410 and note 52 of this chapter).
partner, in this case the educand, but for the
determination of the concrete educational action
he presumptively has the knowledge about the
situation and the child.37

The authority-relationship between parent and child
is also an identification* relationship:

The educator identifies himself with the interest, the well-feeling and the well-being of the educand. He acts for the child, when the latter
cannot act out of himself as yet, he chooses
thus for him, he assumes thus in his place a
responsibility. The educator is as a substitu­
tive conscience, a spiritual representative.38

The form of the child's identification varies with the edu­
cational situation and his age. The identification may be
a complete surrender of the child to the educator. There is
no resistance, no disobedience, only a passive obedience.
The passivity of obedience might be the effect of an "emo­
tional contagion" from the enthusiasm and passion of the
educator that carries the child with him. The child might
also conform actively to the expectations of the adult,
because of very strong personal ties. A step further is the

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37Trans. from ibid., p. 129.

*Note: Identification is originally a psycho­
analytic term. It may be defined as "the method by which a
person takes over the features of another person and makes
them a corporate part of his own personality." (Hall and
Lindzey, loc. cit., p. 46.) In psycho-analysis this phenom­
emon is usually regarded as a form of defense-mechanism. In
our current discussion the term is not used in the latter
meaning.

38Trans. from ibid., p. 41 (Italics in original).
phase, when the child himself is voluntarily willing to bear authority, that is, when he obeys the norms as these are personalized by the educator. When the child is older, there is a phase in which the parents are compared with other people outside the family. This may lead to a disillusion, especially when in adolescence other heroes outside his own parents are proclaimed. The parents are critically examined in their moral quality. After a period of refutation of "old-fashioned" norms, the adolescent returns to the norms he rejected slightly before. But now he accepts them under full responsibility as his personal possession, for

the identification with the bearer-of-authority takes place now on the basis of the recognition that the bearer-of-authority also represents values which are acceptable for the follower-of-authority and in which he to a greater extent apparently takes a part. 39

Authority is thus a "technical" necessity in education. It creates trust in the child. Trust is essential in every adequate human relationship. Without trust we cannot possibly help the child. We are also confident that the child is capable of independent obedience. If we do not, he will never become independent.

Education without authority may imply that the child is already able to obey, out of experience as well as out of

39Trans. from ibid., p. 42 (Italics in original).
his own insight. If so, education would be unnecessary; moreover, it is against the simple facts. Children are not adults who have obtained moral insight through their own thinking. If the child has no trust in the educator, the latter cannot really help him. In the last analysis, the child should trust the good intentions of the adults and the adequacy of their suggestions. These things cannot always be proved to the child. How do we prove to the child that we are trustworthy people? We cannot endlessly look for proofs of our dependability. And, moreover, ... the child cannot wait any longer, since he needs help ... in time. Langeveld says:

Here it is most obviously apparent, how much authority is realized in a trust-relationship: the educator must show confidence, because he must demand independence. The child must show his confidence, because he must venture to obey what he himself cannot judge; further he must show confidence, because he himself must venture to try out the independence demanded from him (to try his capability of independence).\(^{40}\)

Further, the courage to trust, to exercise authority, and to follow authority with both educator and educand, rests actually on the love-relationship that binds them together. In this love-relationship, the child shows trust because of his natural helplessness. And reversely, this confidence of the child elevates the educator so that the

\(^{40}\) Trans. from ibid., p. 45 (Italics and parentheses in original).
latter finds inspiration, courage, and self-confidence to take up his educational task. But the child-love (for his parents) is qualitatively different from the parent-love (for his child). They are complementary to each other. The one needs the other. The parent-love (for the children) is rather "giving," and feels the personal tie with his child as his offspring. The child-love (for the parents) is more "asking," but is at the same time the source of inspiration, courage, and confidence of parents. Since the parent-love is more "sacrificing," the parents should not keep the love-ties too tight, so as to open the way for the children to become independent. If the love from the side of the parents is too "explicit" or demanding (motherly overprotection or patriarchal control), then, the child will break off the love-ties deliberately and forcibly, in order to force independence and "freedom." This usually happens with many pains and misery on both sides. In the case of a wisely controlled and sacrificing parent-love, the liberation of the youth proceeds smoothly without a scratch.

The Educational Aim

The problem of the aim of education is intimately connected with other essential educational issues, such as the boundaries of educability, anthropology, and the meaning of education itself. If it is believed that the child is
ineducable — as some biologists purport to believe —,
then talking about the educational aim is senseless. Edu-
cational theory as such, assumes that the child is edu-
cable. What this means, is related to our understandings
about the meaning of education itself, and about the mean-
ing of man. It was found above, that in order to pose the
question of the educability of the child, the educationist
should submit the findings of philosophical anthropology to
basic educational criteria. (Sociality, individuality,
ethical equivalence, and the unique worthwhileness of the
person.) Some philosophies (such as Cartesian naturalism,
Darwinian evolutionism, supernaturalism, and Kantian natur-
alism)* cannot apparently comply with these criteria, and
are, therefore, considered to be educationally inadequate.
Hence, educational aim implies a certain type of philosophi-
cal anthropology that is manifested in the person of the
educator. The educator has certain ideals that are realized
in his total personality. The personality is thus the
particularized ideal, actualized in all of his educational
work. In other words, the educational aim cannot be thought
of separately from the educator's involvement with the
child. We have seen, that the child acquires his human-
ness only through the guidance of adults. The child is

*vide pp. 364, 367, 374.
thus a human child only in relation to adults. This involvement with adults who have realized certain ideals, is called the educative process. It is clear, that the educational aim can be inferred from the educative process through phenomenological elucidation of the "educational situation." The latter has been explored above and analyzed into its essential characteristics and implications.

We have understood that the educational situation is a situation in which a child is helped by a mature person in his growth until a certain point, -- i.e., until he does not need help any more. From this moment on the individual has become morally independent. He has become an adult. There is thus only one answer with respect to the problem of educational aim from the phenomenological standpoint, -- i.e., adulthood. Langeveld says:

... education takes place not for the sake of itself. Education comes not only to an end ... unless we give up the idea of seeing adulthood as the first and natural destination of man.41

This notion is just the opposite of Dewey's view, when the latter said: "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end." It is thus clear, that for Langeveld education is not for the sake of education itself as a kind of art pour l'art (art for the sake of art itself), but it is accomplished with an end-in-view. This end-in-

41 Trans. from ibid., p. 51.
view is called adulthood. The educational theory accepts this as an axiom without further deliberation. Without this axiom as a *conditio sine qua non*, the phenomenological description of the educational situation, in which child and adult are educationally involved, would have no meaning at all. Without the idea of adulthood the characteristics of the description, such as responsibility, moral personality, authority, child-adult love relationship, will automatically drop out. Phenomenological pedagogics stands or falls together with the idea of adulthood. It only remains for phenomenology to describe what the idea of adulthood contains.

Adulthood appears to us as a more or less closeness when compared with the unconcluded, dynamical disposition of the youth, which is directed to a continuous change -- namely, "wanting to become great." It does not mean, however, that adulthood has no dynamical moments in it, but it still lacks the playfulness and plasticity of youth. A childish playful adult is a critical phenomenon, generally indicated by the terms infantilism, puerilism, or puberilism. The child has no social status as yet, and still needs "protection." But in the dynamism of the adult we see planning, defining an objective, a line of action, a boundness to a task that the adult himself has put on his shoulders, in short, there is: *selfresponsible selfdetermination*. The
adult has defined himself, with responsibility, as the kind of person he is. He has an "inner stature," a "personality with character." The adult has commitments and beliefs he attempts to realize. He bears full responsibility for his being and doing. Every moment he is ready to account for his deeds to any respectable authority who represents a certain cultural society to which the adult belongs. Adulthood implies thus moral and social commitments. His society does not allow too many changes in his personality structure and plans. Incalculability is an undesirable -- for society at least -- character trait. Society wants stability and certainty in all professions and vocations, morally as well as professionally: married life, family, jobs in institutions or clubs, etc. It is desirable, too, that the adult not only has this stability, but also is aware of it. The latter does not mean, however, that he should be explicit in all his intentions and deeds, with respect to others as well as to himself. He should only be aware of who he is, what he is capable and incapable of, what others may and may not expect from him. In other words, he may not be dependent on the judgment and estimate by others. Only a child needs continually the judgment and appraisal of others, especially of adults. Adulthood is thus a form of self-realization. Langeveld says:

Adulthood is thus a form with two meanings: as individuation, as form of this concrete man,
and as a unity of moral norms with which this man identifies himself, respectively tries to identify.\textsuperscript{42}

On the other hand, adulthood is not only an inner form and structure, but it is also outwardly perceivable — namely, "in the degree of constructive membership of social life."\textsuperscript{43} The word "constructive" implies, of course, certain sociological ideals that are inseparable from a certain philosophy of world and life. This implicit Weltanschauung, however, may lead to theoretical and practical complications. For some might conclude that people with differing philosophies should be considered to be immature, so that those differently-structured persons should be viewed as "objects" of education. That this possibility is not an illusion, is apparent from educational systems in totalitarian states, in which everybody should be converted to the only one true socio-political ideal.

But this does not mean that a certain society has no structure at all. The results of one's education are put to the test, when one is called to account for his deeds. In other words, the adequacy of educational theory and practice is tested by society. One can be punished for a "wrong" deed, when one has turned the age of legal majority. He cannot plead his innocence by appealing to a "pedagogical immaturity."

\textsuperscript{42} Trans. from ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{43} Trans. from ibid., p. 37.
Thus, the meaning of adulthood includes in its concreteness the possibility of testing it through a legal action. This, however, does not mean that maturity is merely social conformity, or freedom from legal involvement. We may not exclude the possibility, that all people (the entire society) could be basically against us, against our moral conviction. We may respond with protest or rebellion by words of mouth or by published writing, or by overt action against the existing order. Or we may leave the country. This is an indication, therefore, that we actually acknowledge a higher authority than the social one, that our decision is not always socially determined.

We have indicated that the educational aim is connected with certain anthropological principles, such as sociality, individuality, moral equivalence, and "personality." These four aspects should be implicitly or explicitly indicated in the aim. Langeveld has formulated the general aim of education as follows:

...: to help the educand as the someone-who-is-himself to live his life independently as it should be.44

This is a very terse and general formulation. It implies many dimensions. The idea of maturity can be sensed in the indication of moral independence in the wordings "the

44 Trans. from ibid., p. 64.
someone-who-is-himself," "independently," and "as it should be." We can also trace in it the four anthropological principles. The idea of "sociality" can be found in the words "help," "life," and "should," and even paradoxically in the word "independently."

And it is a purely logical conclusion from all of the foregoing that this "independence" consequently implies the recognition of sociality, that it thus at the same time can recognize the self-esteem of other persons, that it has nothing to do with a detached individual but is inherent in the moral person.45

"Help" implies the possibility of social relationship, of social influence, while "life" refers to the involvement with others. One cannot have a life outside a certain society. "Should" indicates a social precept, a social "ought" that cannot be ignored completely. The idea of "individuality" or uniqueness is found in the wording "someone-who-is-himself" with the emphasis on "himself."

The principle of "moral equivalence," which means the capability of making a moral decision, is implicit in the terms "help," "independently" and "should." "Help" suggests the recognition of the ability of others with regard for the person as a capable agent. "Should" contains the moral aspect. "Someone" implies the recognition of the individual as an "equivalent" person. The "someone" also includes the recognition of the worthwhileness of the person (He is someone!).

45Trans. from ibid. (Italics in original).
In brief, the above formulation of the aim indicates "adulthood" or "maturity" as the general objective. The characteristics of maturity are already suggested: independence, morality (should), responsibility, stability in planning or self-consistency ("who is himself"), social and individual competence. Langeveld does not preclude the possibility of implying a religious aspect in his formulation that puts emphasis on "selfhood."

Some people teach that moral education is the highest thing, others maintain that religious education touches the "heart" of man, and in consequence, should determine the entire education. While by "heart" as a metaphor is meant: our full self-hood, thought of as an eternal essential core created in us by God, through which we are able to know God, and through which alone we are really a creature. The entire education in all of its facets finds therein its guiding principle and ground. Again others moralize religion or religionize morality. In this way they acquire a two-in-one realm, hierarchically the highest of the incomplete aims, yes: a two-in-one realm, in which all incomplete ends find their integration, so that in that two-in-one realm the ultimate, complete educational aim is realized.46

While sociality is recognized as a conditional principle for educational theory and practice (assuming the educability of man), the principle of individuality is equally necessary. But the latter may not be understood as an arbitrary recognition of every particularity in the

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46 Trans. from ibid., p. 109.
individual. Not all individual traits have the same significance for society and the individual alike. Langeveld says:

His individual features which have no significance for the person, may not assert a pretension to social recognition. They can be tolerated, but they must play no role in the life of others. The pedagogy of dearnesses that expresses itself in astonished interest in every, arbitrary child's manner, and that thinks everything interesting without discrimination, mistakes the casual-individual features for the specific-personal characteristics.47

The anthropological principle of moral equivalence can also be realized in Langeveld's formulation of the educational aim, as it is apparent from the word "should." The principle of "personal worthwhileness" is realizable in the words "someone-who-is-himself."

Further Langeveld discusses in his theory the inacceptability of certain educational aims. Some people believe that the aims of education is to help the child to develop "all" of his innate potentialities. This idea implies that man is believed to be fundamentally good or to become good. They overlook the fact that man has shortcomings.

Happiness as an educational aim is inadequate according to Langeveld, since it can hardly meet the three

47 Trans. from ibid., p. 65.
criteria of morality, sociality, and personality. The conception of happiness is very often interpreted as individual prosperity or as having no desires. Both connotations are individualistic. To Kohnstamm's interpretation of happiness as "the deepest inner peace of the social person with conscience," Langeveld raises no objections.

Another generally accepted aim is that of good citizenship. Of course, there is no one who will educate children to be bad citizens. Moreover, "good citizenship" may imply conformism or collectivism, in which the "moral self-determination" has no place at all. Hence, one should be allowed, if necessary, to be against the existing social order.

Pedagogical Comments

Phenomenological pedagogics, as a holistic method, is apparently able to bridge the gap between science and philosophy, between operational method and speculation. Both methods find their integration in the phenomenological elucidation of essential educational phenomena. The phenomenological method is a necessity to understand human phenomena in the educational situation, since human "nature" itself does not tolerate the exclusive use of the operational method. The reason is simply this: man is, in his situational definiteness, unique. His psycho-physical structure changes every moment with the change of the
situation. Situation is not to be conceived of as solely his social and material environment, but also as his own psycho-physical condition. His uniqueness is thus a uniqueness in space and time. Time in the chronological sense is different from the phenomenal time in the growth of an individual. This is the reason why growth patterns of different individuals are different. Each individual has his own phenomenal time, his own growth pattern. Organismic growth is unpredictable. In its seeming predictability the human "organism" includes much scope and tolerance. In this light, tests, test results and experiments with human beings have only relative value. Most scientists are apt to see results of tests and experiments as clear evidences of the rightness of their hypothesis. They base their predictions on their statistical material that is accepted as factual. They forget that facts have a past-dimension only. The human being is always "present," in which are included not only his past, but also his "future."

The continuous change of the present is due to an essential dimension in man's nature, his creativity. This is what Langeveld calls the "exploration principle":

Yet we must miss something in our reasoning, because we cannot understand, how any being can be organized by the Creator in such a silly way, that it, out of its state of complete safety and security in its pure helplessness, can ever venture, to wish to go away and to want to try everything new (such as grasping
and walking), with which it in its state of out of harm's way can only deteriorate. This fourth principle that we for the time being shall call the "tendency towards exploration," is of the greatest import and one cannot understand the physical development without this fourth principle. 48

Both creativity and situational-personal uniqueness are dimensions which make man essentially different from physical objects which are completely controlled by the fixed natural law of cause and effect. Experiments with physical objects may be repeated arbitrarily, in order to find predictable properties. This cannot be done, fortunately, with human beings. The operational method is insufficient to understand human nature with all of its possibilities. The phenomenological method seems to be a more appropriate approach, especially in education, where creativity is an essential aspect. Langeveld ways about the educational action:

The action of authority is a creative action with respect to an object, that itself wants to be someone. It is an action with respect to a human person, and the preceding discussion shows us that it is apparently something quite particular. 49

Another point important to note is the holistic concept of man and education. The educability of man and the


49 Trans. from Langeveld, Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek, loc. cit., p. 103 (space in original).
necessity to educate him are both inherent in man's nature. This is apparent in Langeveld's statement, that man is an animal educandum (an "animal" that should be educated).

Langeveld states:

That man is an "animal educandum" should now, therefore, be understood differently. For this "animal" is through his spirituality a unique being, and we had better speak of "h o m o educandus." But -- is it not a tautology? For does "educandus" not mean: that should and can be placed under non-biological but spiritual objectives that determine this being? And it can only be the case with man. Indeed, "homo educandus" cannot be otherwise than a tautology.50

In another writing Langeveld says the same thing, with a little variant:

Just because there is so much scope in the human development, is man designated to be educated; just because there is this scope, can he grow up into anything and everything (among which "ending on the gallow"); just because there is this scope, can he also arrive at morbid ways of development; just because there is this scope, can a child also not become mature at all, is his adulthood expectable but not predictable and is it in consequence wrong to want to see in the child a minature edition of the prospective adult.51

The idea of the inherence of education in man is analogously found also in Dewey's philosophy which equates philosophy with education, at least within the frame of

50 Trans. from ibid., p. 146.
51 Trans. from Langeveld, Ontwikkelings-Psychologie, loc. cit., p. 40 (Parentheses and italics in original).
reference of the meaning of knowledge, experience, learning, and the educative process in pragmatism (see Chapter VII).

Also important is the conception of situation in the educative process which has -- in Langeveld's phenomenology -- an existentialistic meaning, in which "existential" meeting, experience-possibilities, intuition and empathy, phenomenological description, and totalness are the essential points. Slightly different is the pragmatic view which puts more emphasis on "piecemeal," "concrete particulars," ambiguity, and problematicness:

Thinking is inquiring. Logic is a study of the conditions which lead to success and failure in conducting inquiry. All thinking originates in some specific affair. It is a piecemeal, not a wholesale, activity. It starts in a situation of ambiguity; its business is to get rid of that ambiguity. Problematic situations which occasion thinking are of all sorts. A situation has been defined by one experimentalist as "anything that needs attention." Concrete particulars are the ends; ideas, conceptions, general principles are means which help us to explore these perplexing particulars of experience.

Another important aspect which has been brought to the fore by Langeveld is the emphasis on the worthwhileness of the "person." This sounds personalistic. Langeveld's conception of "person," however, has more fundamental


relief or embossment than Kohnstamm's view does. According to the latter, the "person" gets his prominence in the "I-Thou" relationship, in the personal confrontation with a personal God. Langeveld means by person the "moral" person, the one who has realized and personified ideal values in his life, through which he has moral (thus also educational) authority. Responsibility as a willingness to accept consequences of one's deed, is inherent in the conception of the moral person. Closely related to authority and responsibility with respect to the "pedagogically pre-formed field" is the phenomenon of love-relationship between educator and educand, particularly between parents and child. All these essential characteristics of the "person" are integrated in the concept of "maturity." Maturity and authority, love, morality, personification of values and responsibility are one. These dimensions are essential in the general aim of education. Though the educational aim is intimately connected with "the aim of life," Langeveld keeps the two conceptions separated. Educational aim is not identical with life-aim:

Since we here, in pedagogics, have only to do with the educational aim, it is none of our business, here to set forth the life aim, the human destination. If one, however, wants a definition, then, the following may be presented:
it is the destination of man to live as God's child (John I:12). 54

A highlight of Langeveld's educational system is the extremely important role of the family as a basis for the total process of education. The educational authority of the parents with respect to the child is a "natural" one, mainly based on a certain kind of love-relationship and trust. The educational relationship between parents and children is grounded in the original helplessness of the child, and the "natural" love and responsibility of parents towards their children. Langeveld says:

The educational authority is rooted in the being-a-child-and-the-parenthood. It is rooted in the being-a-child as accepted authority, in the parenthood as necessary help to the child in his natural helplessness. 55

About the characteristics of the relationships in the family he says:

The family has thus three aspects: it is a definitive matrimonial-and-life community of the parents as spouses, it is a "declining" natural community for the growing educand, it is permanent natural community for the mature children with the parents and among themselves. There is thus besides a contrast in the aspect of the duration (declining-permanent), a

54 Trans. from *ibid.*, p. 168 (Italics and parentheses in original). Note: Langeveld uses as motto of his *Beknopte Theoretische Paedagogiek* the simple letters: *John I: 12.*

55 Trans. from *ibid.*, p. 40 (Italics in original).
contrast between (definitive) choice and the (declining or permanent) natural community.56

Concerning Langeveld's anthropology -- but apart from the four pedagogical-anthropological principles of sociality, individuality, moral equivalence, and personality -- we want to note three points which do not necessarily follow from the phenomenological analysis of the educational situation. Nevertheless they are anthropological-philosophical assumptions which finally shape the background of Langeveld's educational system.

First of all is the anthropological assumption that "man's destination is to become God's child." This is implicitly apparent in the motto in Langeveld's book: John 1; 12.57 Though this religious belief should be separated from educational issues from the phenomenological standpoint,58 Langeveld sometimes cannot refrain from interpolating his religious belief about the nature of man in his educational elaboration. The latter may be apparent in the following statement:

Man, to be sure, does not belong exclusively to society, but also to himself, and as a whole and as such: to God. Not a single gift

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56 Trans. from ibid., p. 86 (Parentheses in original).
57 Ibid., p. 3.
58 Cf. footnote 54 on page 412.
of man can, therefore, ever exclusively become the possession of society. 59

A second inconsistent conception of Langeveld may be his statement about the notion that the authority of the church is not derived from the parental authority, as it is with the authority of the teachers at school. The school acts with respect to the child on behalf of his parents. So school authority is a derived parental authority. As Langeveld puts it:

But the essence of the natural educational relationship does not include, that the family forms at the same time a salvation-community. As a salvation-community the church has its own educational duty and right and authority, no authority derived from that of the parents. 60

This statement seems to be inconsistent with the phenomenological analysis as such, as well as with Langeveld's view on philosophical anthropology. Langeveld, to be sure, poses the anthropological principle of the basic unity of mankind (the moral equivalence of man) as fundamental for any educational system. Moreover, he states his belief of the destination of man as "to become God's child" (John I; 12). The latter belief implies that man (every man) is potentially God's child (=son?). Otherwise he cannot possibly become God's child. In other words, each man is basically able to "meet" God personally without any

59 Trans. from ibid., p. 85.
60 Trans. from ibid., p. 82 (Italics in original).
mediation, not even the church as an institution which is represented by the same human beings who may potentially become parents of children in a family. If the educator does not believe in this basic potentiality of each man, then, he should drop the belief in the fundamental equivalence of man (i.e., he should believe in the basic superiority of certain people over others). Men would be classified into "supermen," "less men" and "no men." This is against Langeveld's own educational principles. If we do believe that all men are potentially children of the same God, we also believe that the founder of the Christian Church, -- i.e., Jesus Christ -- is also God's child, because he is the child also of Mary, since Mary is also God's child.

A third point made by Langeveld which is not directly derived from the phenomenological analysis of the educational situation, is his monistic conception of the metaphysics of man:

Man is no union of two substances, but one compound substance, owing, however, its substantiability only to one of its constituting principles. Man is thus neither his body, since the body exists only through the soul, nor is he his soul, since it would remain contentless without the body. He is the unity of a soul, which gives life to his body as such, and the body in which the soul exists.61

61Trans. from ibid., p. 143.
Summarizing Langeveld's educational thought, we may conclude that the phenomenological method applied exclusively to the problems of education, is indeed adequate, theoretically as well as practically. But it is still insufficient -- phenomenologically speaking -- to bridge the gap between educational aim and life aim, unless this method is able to derive, phenomenologically, the metaphysics of man and world from the educational situation. This is the reason why Langeveld separates parental authority from church authority, overlooking of course, that even the church as an institution is through and through human -- i.e., it is supposed to meet human existential needs.

Besides, can we derive the educational aim from the "educational situation," since the educational objective -- according to the phenomenological recipe -- is to pull the child out of the educational situation -- namely, the child-adult relationship? As long as the child remains in this child-adult relationship, he still remains a child. How can the aim -- which is outside the educational situation -- be derived from the educational situation itself? A logical riddle indeed!
CHAPTER IX
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

Methodological Approach

The "object" of educational theory is not identical with the "object" of education. The latter is concerned primarily with the child and the child cannot be treated arbitrarily as an "object," in the way natural science treats physical objects. The basic difference is, that the educationist views the child with unconditional regard as a worthwhile person in itself. This idea is especially emphasized by the personalistic view.

The object of educational theory, on the other hand, is the educative process itself. As a constructive human activity, the educative process is purposive and meaningful. We try to interpret this process in terms of meaningful totalities and backgrounds, as they are explored and speculated about by anthropology and philosophy. Educational theory has a broader and deeper meaning, therefore, than the philosophy of education. In educational theory as many disciplines as possible are meaningfully included and taken into account, so as to describe this human enterprise as completely as possible.
The question might be raised, of course, as to whether we may apply the experimental method used in natural science to educational theory. Since the "objects" of study are different, the methods should be different, also. Human behavior as manifested in the educational relationship to other people, is of different quality and "level" from events of purely "physical" nature. Physical events in themselves -- without human interference -- obey exclusively the "natural" law of causality. We are able to predict physical events, provided we know the complex of factors and causes that may affect them, provided also we may exclude the human factor. The human factor, however, is the unknown X. In human behavior the laws of cause and effect interfere with unpredictable human factors -- such as spontaneity and creativity -- or the other way around. In all human behavior there is always something creative, something unpredictable. Even with the most psychotical individuals in their so-called stereotypical or compulsive repetitive behaviors, we may discover creative activities. The number of ways the sick individual builds or "creates" defense mechanisms, is inexhaustible. This kind of creativity is, however, morbid, since it will finally lead to more misery and disintegration.

In "normal" behavior man usually makes use also of simple repetitive, routine, mechanical actions, such as handwriting or typing. These behavioral mechanisms are
actually more tools to be employed by the creative behavior, such as writing a book or a letter. The use of routine behavior is more a matter of efficiency -- i.e., to make the creative behavior more productive and more effective.

Creativity is thus a basic dimension in human life. It implies growth, development, and differentiation in any possible direction. Thanks to this creative factor human life reveals itself in an infinite number of manifestations. The theorist and the philosopher try to understand this myriad number of appearances by ordering them according to certain points of view. A specific point of view about "reality" leads to a specific system of knowledge. Views of the same problem from opposite angles, however, result in opposing theories and philosophies.

All philosophies, however contradictory they may be to each other, have one tendency in common, i.e., the search for the truth, the only one possible order in the universe. Some philosophies claim to have discovered the truth, this order. These are the philosophical optimists. Others are more skeptical and contend that the real reality or truth is unknowable. The world order of the idealist differs from that of the realist. The pragmatist sees the universe differently than the supernaturalist. And yet, these differing philosophies always tell us something relevant and something important. There is no single
philosophical system which is totally meaningless. We learn something worthwhile from each philosophy.

When a philosophical point of view is universalized, that is to say, applied in all its consequences to all aspects of life, then, we may run into troubles. The German phrasing "alle Konsequenz leitet zum Teufel" (every consequence leads to the devil) certainly applies to philosophizing as well. There is, whatever the claim, no such thing as an all-embracing philosophy. The philosopher's stone which is supposed to unravel the mystery of life will remain a fata morgana. But this is no reason for man to stop his quest for the "truth," although he knows in advance that the truth he is going to find is no more than a way of ordering knowledge about man and the world so that it makes sense to him.

What does this mean for educational theory? We have explored some significant educational systems sufficiently to make it apparent that many systems oppose each other fundamentally. Pragmatism and Catholic supernaturalism, for instance, stand in opposition to each other:

It is accident that the conflict between the philosophies of Thomism and Pragmatism comes into sharpest focus in education; for education deals with man and no education can proceed until it determines what man is. And secular and Catholic educational programs differ precisely because they see man in two different ways. It is for these reasons that any differences in educational theory between
secular and Catholic points of view will ultimately have to be resolved at the philosophical level, for every theory on how to educate a human being inevitably rests upon what it means to be a human being.¹

In spite of the quite contradicting views of pragmatism and Catholicism, we may find some common conceptions at the anthropological level, particularly when the problem of man is approached from the "humanistic" angle: man can elevate himself through cooperative effort by using his intelligence. The following statement of Jacques Maritain may sound pragmatic as well:

If man is a naturally political animal, this is so in the sense that society, required by nature, is achieved through free consent, and because the human person demands the communications of social life through the openness and generosity proper to intelligence and love as well as through the needs of a human individual born naked and destitute.²

Kohnstamm's educational system, based on axiology, is completely different from Langeveld's phenomenology. Nevertheless these systems have something in common, particularly concerning the importance of responsibility in defining the aim of education. Socrates' conception of educational aim and his concern about the "soul" of man is quite distinct from the Catholic ultimate aim of education.


Both, however, are concerned with the same issue — namely, the salvation of the human soul, though each interprets the meaning of the "salvation of the soul" differently.

Seeing, on the one hand, the fundamental differences of various educational systems and accepting these differences as relevant "facts," and, on the other hand, admitting — in spite of diversities — that there are still commonalities, we might wonder about a theoretical possibility of finding a modus through which the fundamental gaps might be integrated under a higher order. Of course, the possible common aspects should be retained and interpreted under a new vision. Such an approach may be called multidimensional. It is based, of course, on the view that reality is multiplex in its manifestations and assumes that these manifestations may be understood through their dimensions. The assumption of multidimensionality of man and the world may raise a question that asks about essential concept that is primary to multiplicity itself: How does the multiplicity of the world come about? The answer to this question may be indicated with the term "creativity." Dewey's concept of "on-goingness" hints at the same idea. Bergson, too, developed his philosophy on the basis of the same principle in his noted book L'évolution Créatrice (Creative Evolution). The essence of reality is, according to Bergson, "duration." All things are tensional forms of duration.
Behind this duration is the original life force which he called élan vital (life energy). The supposition of "creativity" without assuming the idea of something metaphysical, however, would be meaningless. It is meaningless, if we do not believe in the existence of some kind of order in the universe.

... practically all philosophers agree that there is some order in life and the universe. Part of their task is to discover this order. While philosophers cannot agree among themselves as to the meaning of the process in the midst of which they live, they are all striving to interpret or to understand the process as fully as possible.3

Edgar S. Brightman stated also that the assumption of unity in the world is a necessary postulate of science:

... the interaction of all parts of the universe seems to be a necessary postulate if science is to be true or if "matter" and "mind" (whatever "matter" and "mind" may be) are to affect one another. ... The postulate of interaction is, then, another hint that the source or value experience is a cosmic unity of some kind.4

Multiplicity and flux in the universe without "order" is chaos, although some believe that the world originated from a "chaos." Multiplicity, however, implies the possibility of opposites, such as dark and light, cold and hot, matter

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and spirit, small and big, good and bad, and so on. We know the world only by its opposites. But opposites in themselves would be without meaning and incomparable, if there are no similarities. So, as a logical and factual necessity, we must accept both opposites and similarities at the same time. The reader may be reminded of the motto of this writing, originating from Lao Tse. . . "True words always seem paradoxical, but no other form of teaching can take its place."

In consequence, we may propose a concept of man and the world, in which both opposing and common views are accepted and integrated under a new concept. This approach, however, is not a kind of a compromising synthesis, or a middle-of-the-road position, but an integration of differing positions. Hence, it is of higher order -- more inclusive -- and thus more meaningful than the separate positions.

The attempt at integration of opposites may sound paradoxical indeed, especially to the rationalistic logician.

Suzuki, in his Zen Buddhism, describes the state of mystical enlightenment or satori as the mental state in which all opposites and contradictions are resolved in an integrated whole:

Satori may be defined as an intuitive looking into the nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical or logical understanding of it. Practically, it means the unfolding of a new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically-trained mind.
Or we may say that with Satori our entire surroundings are viewed from quite an unexpected angle of perception. Whatever this is, the world for those who have gained a satori is no more the old world as it used to be; even with all its flowing streams and burning fires, it is never the same one again. Logically stated, all its opposites and contradictions are united and harmonized into a consistent organic whole.

Even in science one begins to accept contradicting properties of the same physical phenomenon as facts. This is apparent in the phenomenon of isotopes and in the double character of light. Light is apparently both waves and particles, though waves and particles are fundamentally different phenomena. Instead of talking in terms of ether-waves only, scientists use also the term "light parcels."

Both the undulatory theory of Huyghens and Maxwell, and the quantum theory of Max Planck are equally valid. James Jeans, the great British astronomer and mathematical physicist said:

In this way it appears that the seventeenth century, which regarded light as mere particles, and the nineteenth century, which regarded it as mere waves, were both wrong -- or, if we prefer, both right. Light, and indeed radiation of all kinds, is both particles and waves at the same time.

And it is the same throughout nature; the same radiation can simulate both particles and waves at the same time. Now it behaves like particles, now like waves; no general principle yet

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known can tell us what behaviour it will choose in any particular instance. 6

In philosophy the importance of contradiction is also stressed, as is apparent in Whitehead's writing:

In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat; but in the evolution of knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards a victory. This is one great reason for the utmost toleration of variety of opinion. Once and forever, this duty of toleration has been summed up in the words, 'Let both grow together until the harvest.' The failure of Christians to act up to this precept, of the highest authority, is one of the curiosities of religious history. 7

Parallel to the pluridimensionality of the world and the inherent order (unity in diversity) is the pluriformity of truth, consisting of opposing views which may be integrated under a unifying order. Thus, in spite of differing views, we may still have commonalities which underlie the opposites.

In science one looks for general principles and constancies which cover differences and varieties. The concept of relativity implies, in fact, both variety and constancy. Although time and space measurements vary with the velocity — according to the so-called Lorentz-


transformation principle -- there is constancy and unity in nature, which is found in the velocity of light.

But these "relativizations" are not in contradiction with the doctrine of the constancy and unity of nature; they are rather demanded and worked out in the name of this very unity. The variation of the measurements of space and time constitutes the necessary condition through which the new invariants of the theory are discovered and grounded. Such invariants are found in the equal magnitude of the velocity of light for all systems and further in a series of other magnitudes, such as the entropy of a body, its electrical charge or the mechanical equivalent of heat, which are unchanged by the Lorentz-transformation and which thus possess the same value in all justified systems of reference. But above all it is the general form of natural law which we have to recognize as the real invariant and thus as the real logical framework of nature in general.

The relationship between the unity of the world and its multifariousness, or between the essence of Being and the multiplicity of its manifestations, or between "being" and "becoming," has always been the main concern of philosophy. Whitehead meant the same thing, when he used the terms infinitude and finitude.

The notion of the essential relatedness of all things is the primary step in understanding how finite entities require the unbounded universe, and how the universe acquires meaning and value by reason of its embodiment of the activity of finitude.

Among philosophers, Spinoza emphasized the fundamental infinitude and introduced a subordinate differentiation by finite modes. Also

conversely, Leibniz emphasized the necessity of finite monades and based them upon a substratum of Deistic infinitude. Neither of them adequately emphasized the fact that infinitude is mere vacancy apart from its embodiment of finite values, and that finite entities are meaningless apart from their relationship beyond themselves. The notion of "understanding" requires some grasp of how the finitude of the entity in question requires infinity, and also some notion of how infinity requires finitude. This search for such understanding is the definition of philosophy. It is the reason why mathematics, which deals with finite patterns, is related to the notion of the Good and the notion of the Bad.\footnote{Alfred North Whitehead, Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1948), pp. 114-115.}

We may wonder, Could not we transfer Whitehead's notion of philosophy -- i.e., the search for the "understanding" of the relationship between infinitude and finitude -- to the educational scene? Since education is primarily concerned with the development of the personality-in-becoming, we should have at least some conception of personality, "understood" as a system, parallel to the universal concept of reality proposed above -- namely, in terms of "creativity," multiplicity, and reintegration. Since the educative process is one of development of the personality, we should be able to describe this developmental process in terms of "differentiation" and "integration" of the personality. The problem of educational aim should, then, find its solution in the "understanding" of the interrelationship between "differentiation" and "integration,"
between realization or actualization and the underlying agent of this realization process. This is an analogy of Whitehead's notion of "understanding" cited above. What this actually means to the problem of educational aim, will be obvious in the course of our further discussion.

Since educators have tried to realize the differentiation-integration relationship in the so-called general education system, a discussion of general education is appropriate here.

The Problem of General Education

General education must be seen as the human effort to integrate diversities in order to realize the general aim of education by providing the youngster with the unifying elements of a culture.

The terms, liberal education and general education, are often used interchangeably. The term liberal education is associated with the "classical formation" that originated with the ancient Greek tradition. Its purpose is to furnish the student with a culturally broad and refined education, so as to become the "ideal man," with broad, civilized understanding. This ideal is generally connected with scholarships and in many instances, it still holds the tang of aristocratism:

Whatever the validity of the distinctions considered above, general education is opposed, as it has been conceived and developed in most instances, to the aristocratic view that liberal education should be either the special privilege of a leisure class, the exclusive
possession of an intellectual elite, or the distinguishing hall-mark of those who practice certain professions instead of engaging in occupations which carry lesser social prestige.10

McConnell points out that liberal education is chiefly concerned with a body of subject matter, as a heritage from the Western cultural tradition, while general education is more concerned with the person of the student as a human being. Or put differently, liberal education is more "content"-centered, while general education is more "adjustment"-centered. It follows that in liberal education, the curriculum should be organized systematically according to a strict logical order while the general-education curriculum is composed with taking full account of the student's interests, needs, and abilities. On the one hand, one makes the distinction that liberal education is more directed to an intellectual development, while general education is based more upon the total development of the individual on a broader scale -- not only an intellectual development but also emotional, social, and moral. On the other hand, many defenders of liberal education aim at the ideal of the well-rounded and harmonious person. The distinction between liberal and general education is obviously vague.

Another distinction is that liberal education emphasizes contemplation, while general education pays more attention to action. But this distinction seems to contradict other notions, as is apparent in McConnell's remark: "The trend in the liberal arts seems to have been from liberalizing to specializing features; general education has attempted to reverse the direction."

It is clear that the experts do not agree with each other. The issue may be put this way: Liberal education has something to do with the liberation of the human mind from various ties, such as cultural tradition, materialistic and utilitarianistic tendencies, rigidity of the curriculum, even from intellectualism, and puts more emphasis upon emotional harmony and liberal attitudes. General education is planned for a broad general body of knowledge, so that the individual as a modern man can keep up with the time. As McConnell notes, the term "liberal" is older than "general," yet the latter is more and more in vogue. Most of the literature now uses the term "general education." hence, this practice will be followed here.

The general education movement has arisen, on the one hand, as a reaction against an intellectualism that has been pushed too far and, on the other hand, as a compensation for over-specialization and over-differentiation. There is a great need for unity and integration of the school curriculum. Some see in general education a
counterpoise to an increasing formalism in liberal education. As Sir Richard Livingstone puts it humorously:

Salt can lose its savour; the humanities can lose their humanity. Education continually tends to degenerate into technique, and the life tends to go out of all subjects when they become technical. . . .

There are as many definitions of general education as there are experts. What general education means and what aim is it, is inseparable from the general aim of education. And this again depends upon the Weltanschauung of the educational expert.

The Report of the Harvard Committee makes the following statement about general education:

Since no one can become an expert in all fields everyone is compelled to trust the judgment of other people pretty thoroughly in most areas of activity. I must trust the advice of my doctor, my plumber, my lawyer, my radio-repairman, and so. Therefore I am in peculiar need of a kind of sagacity by which to distinguish the expert from the quack, and the better from the worse expert.

From this point of view, the aim of general education may be defined as that of providing the broad critical sense by which to recognize competence in any field. William James said that an educated person knows a good man when he sees one.\(^\text{13}\)

McConnell cites a passage from The Problem of General Education by Clarence H. Faust, in which the latter

\(^\text{12}\)Ibid., p. 3.

indicates the aim of general education as the preparation of youth to deal with general personal and social problems in a democratic society.

Its function is to prepare young people . . . to deal not with special problems parceled out in our society to the members of the various occupations and professions -- to the chemist and the carpenter, the architect and the accountant, the merchant and the housewife -- but with the problems which confront all members of our society alike. . . . General education appears from this point of view to be the preparation of youth to deal with the personal and social problems with which all men in a democratic society are confronted.14

He quotes also Earl J. McGrath's writing in Toward General Education in which is apparent that the aim of general education is still the search for a unifying principle in the human life:

General education . . . is that which prepares the young for the common life of their time and their kind. . . . It is the unifying element of a culture. It prepares the student for a full and satisfying life as a member of a family, as a worker, as a citizen -- an integrated and purposeful human being.15

We see from the above notions that there seems to be some common agreement as to what general education is supposed to mean. The consensus is that general education is opposed to special education or vocational education. There

14 McConnell, loc. cit., p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 4.
is a tendency to attain some form of integration, while at the same time preparing students to become broad-minded and well-rounded adults with understanding.

The consensus above, however, is but a formal and ostensible agreement. When we analyze the meaning of these formulations, we get differing interpretations... What do we mean by "integrated person"? What is a broad-minded adult? The meaning of these terms depends upon the philosophy and personality theory to which one adheres.

The difference in interpretation of an agreed upon concept of general education may also be manifest in the curriculum structure and the method to carry out the program.

The authors of the Harvard Report distinguished five types or trends of general education: (a) distribution requirements, (b) comprehensive survey courses, (c) functional courses, (d) the great-books curriculum, (e) individual guidance. 16

By distribution is meant the adequate spreading of the various course-units through the curriculum, distributed through the college years. The problem here is, then: Is the distribution rigid, or does it leave room for electives? This type of approach is widely used.

The comprehensive survey courses provide an introduction to the general problems and principles of various fields, such as the humanities, social sciences, and

physical and biological sciences. The students learn how to observe, how to tackle problems in general.

Functional courses are designed to meet the students' interests and needs. The General College of the University of Minnesota is an example of this type.

A great-books curriculum prescribes a sample of the world literature, such as the works of Plato, Shakespeare, or Goethe. It means spending four years in the study of approximately one hundred great books. An example of this type is St. John's College.

Individual guidance activities make provisions for individual problems of the students concerning programming, adjustments, study-difficulties, and orientation. The first year or two is spent in a number of elective courses chosen by the students as a try-out of the student's genuine interest.

As to the content and the degree of distribution of general education courses, the opinions are divided. Some believe that the intellectual processes are the most important of all. Others put emphasis on the total development of the individual's personality: intellectual, social, emotional, and physical. Some others concentrate on the cultural heritage, because they believe in some general eternal values which are also applicable to the present time. Some other groups, however, are of the opposite opinion; they organize student learning around present-day problems.
As to the sources of study, some people prefer the use of textbooks, while others refer the students to the original sources. Some instructors use the lecture method, and others place emphasis on discovering methods.

It is thus obvious that the term "general education" is a collective noun for various meanings covering a certain common feeling — namely, opposing vocationalism or overspecialization.

We may ask now: "What should be the underlying foundations of general education?"

In every educational system, there are three fundamental questions involved in the organization and presentation of the curriculum to the student, namely, the "why," the "how," and the "what for." These questions, in fact, refer to certain backgrounds, with which they originate. The "why" refers to a philosophical ground, the "how" to a psychological, and the "what for" to a socio-cultural basis. In other words, education in general (thus also general education) should be organized and administered with reference to three kinds of "foundations" — philosophical, psychological and socio-cultural. Harold Taylor calls education "the name we reserve to designate the formal means a society takes to submit its members to a common set of intellectual and social experiences."17

The reference to philosophy needs to be considered. There are as many philosophical systems as there are philosophers with original ideas. Philosophical ideas do not float in the air isolated from their origin. They are manifestations of an individual's disposition and they often reflect, to a certain extent, the Zeitgeist or the spirit of the time. As Taylor puts it:

The philosophy of an age, a culture, or civilization consists of a set of general ideas about the ends of human life and the principles of nature to which most people give tacit or spoken assent and upon which the intellectual content of the educational system rests.¹⁸

He says further:

The philosophy of education is that extension of philosophy into practice which has to do with sustaining a set of values within the society. It is also responsible for lending guidance to those whose task it is to make schools and colleges.¹⁹

Taylor distinguishes three contemporary trends in American philosophy about man's nature and intelligence. These philosophical issues are related to education and curriculum building. The first trend is that of the naturalism and instrumentalism of William James and John Dewey, related to the movements in Europe expressed by the evolution theories of Darwin and Spencer and the organismic

¹⁸Ibid., p. 21.
¹⁹Ibid.
philosophies of Hegel and Bergson. This trend is represented by Antioch College and Sarah Lawrence College. The second type is that of rationalism, which goes back to the Greek philosophy of Aristotle and to the medieval period of Thomism. Its main characteristic is the absolute reliance upon Reason as the only knower of universal truths. St. John's College is a representative of this type. The third trend underlying the curriculum building for general education is the eclecticistic neo-humanism, represented by Harvard College and Columbia College.

For the instrumentalist there are no absolute truths and values. Truth is a process of being and the aim of education cannot be other than growth toward maturity. The values are to be seen in the context of the "momentary" situation of the individuals within the framework of their society. The momentary situation, of course, includes both the historical background and the possible future couched in the ideals of the culture. Truth and goodness are to be found through scientific inquiry, on the basis of experience. Human reason is a part of nature. The logic is instrumentalistic logic, that is to say, discovered truths have tentative value. They are to be used to find better truths. The moral element in instrumentalism is, therefore, the value of free spontaneous growth and the democratic way of life. The democratic notion of life's aim is: A richer personal life and a stronger but freer social order.
The instrumentalistic view places major emphasis on social philosophy. Taylor quotes Sidney Hook's statement on the educational objective in a democratic society as follows:

The philosophy of progressive education had from the outset been committed to the belief that only in a democracy, and in a continuously expanding social democracy, can the end of individual growth be achieved. This follows the concern with which the needs of every child were to be considered, the necessity of harmonizing these needs to permit their fruitful expansion, and the recognition that genuine quality of educational opportunity demands social democracy at one end and industrial democracy at the other.20

This type of philosophy exists in practice -- as Taylor says, in the operation of a great many of the state universities. Their main concern is the promotion of knowledge of biology, chemistry, agriculture, physics, mathematics, engineering, law, medicine, and social science as a necessity in the growth of an organized society. Professional education is an inseparable part of that necessity.

All kinds of subject matter have their functional role in the framework of the aim of education -- namely, for the "use and enjoyment" of life. The Learning of French is not only for use in ordinary life, say, the need to call a taxi in Paris, but also for cultural refinement. As Taylor puts it:

The factor which determines whether or not an art or a science is liberal is whether or not it

20Ibid., p. 39.
relates to the enrichment of the life of the individual who learns it. Enrichment in this sense goes beyond the practical use made of it in earning a living or in altering the physical or social environment, into its use as serving the interests and needs of the individual.

It is for this reason that the instrumentalist believes that any program of general education which is intended to develop liberal qualities in the student must be related to the needs and interests of the student.21

The second trend is the rationalistic view, championed by Jacques Maritain. It has built programs for general education based on theological and metaphysical assumptions, especially in the field of religion, and the classical humanities. These programs are based on absolute truths concerning the nature of man, his relation to God, and the hierarchy of being in an ontological sense. The tendency of colleges with such programs is a return to the classical unity of the medieval university -- namely, the study and discovery of those eternal principles which can be applied to all events, relations, and objects of the external world.

In the ontological hierarchy of man in relation to God and other beings, man is the only being with Reason. This is their metaphysics. The aim of education, equated with the aim of life, cannot be other than the "cultivation of man's Reason." Since Reason is considered to be a

21 Ibid., p. 41.
separate entity, detached from its social and physical setting, and is everywhere the same, education must, in consequence, as Robert M. Hutchins has insisted, be everywhere the same. The universal values and truths are to be found in the texts of the Western tradition. The program of general education is, therefore, based on a serious study of this past. "The medium of liberal education" says Mark van Doren, "is that portion of the past which is always present. It consists of the liberal arts, literary and mathematical, because they control thinking whenever thinking is done . . . ."22

The general education program of the rationalist, has, according to Taylor, the following positive and negative characteristics:

The presence of rational principle in the mind is not only the mark of the highest human value but is also a value intrinsic in the universe. Accordingly, empirical social science, the concern with contemporary issues, the intimacy of theory with practice and action, and the creation of new works of art as an educational means have little place in general education for the rationalist.23

These rationalistic educators form an ethnocentric group which is somewhat exclusive, with their own belief in the universal value of the Western tradition. This group, forming its own class system, is convinced that only those

22 Ibid., p. 28.
23 Ibid., p. 29.
who show talent for the comprehension of abstract truths are capable of learning the materials in higher education.

The third trend is that of neo-humanistic groups which are eclectic in attitude. They adhere to the Western traditional dualistic view that mind and body are separate entities. There is no specific and rigid philosophical faith which supports their program. They believe in the pluralism of the culture and the diversity of knowledge. Values are relative, in the sense that there are many conceptions possible. They have one tendency in common -- namely, their anti-vocationalism. These groups are, for instance, represented by the Harvard College. In the Report of the Harvard Committee it is apparent that the authors adhere to the traditional division: The Humanities, the Social Studies, Natural Science and Mathematics. The term neo-humanistic is used, because their faith is "rational guidance of all human activity," and the fact that "the tradition which has come down to us regarding the nature of man and the good society must inevitably provide our standard of good."\(^{24}\) The neo-humanist is more genial, flexible, open-minded, and tolerant than the rationalist.

Their reference of thought is based upon the classical philosophical and literary Western traditions rather than upon social history. The progress of science is to be

\(^{24}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 32.}\)
regarded as a welcome implementation of the classical and Christian humanism. The realm of science is fact-finding, while that of humanism is evaluation in terms of moral and aesthetical values.

As to human nature, the neo-humanists assume that there are special faculties of the intellect to be educated, such as the faculties of reason, imagination, and memory. They assume further that the development of the personality may be attained through the study of subject matters in the curriculum. Their belief is that good knowledge implies necessarily good will. In consequence, the performance of arts is not deemed necessary in the curriculum. It will suffice if the curriculum prescribes merely the study of the history and appreciation of arts. They believe that the study of the Western literature, philosophy, science, arts, and cultural institutions will consequently promote a commitment to democracy and Western-cultural ideas. The aim of general education may briefly be characterized as the "cultivation of a sense of values" and the "development of clear thinking."25 This neo-humanistic statement is the most common form of the philosophy of general education.

A general educational program should also be founded on certain psychological assumptions. These are chiefly concentrated around the problem of learning and the

25 Ibid., p. 34.
change of behavior, and the relationship between them. Two questions are pertinent: What curriculum will advance effective learning and an adequate change of behavior? Should it be "content-centered" or "student-centered"? The answers to these questions are closely related to philosophical assumptions.

Though the instrumentalist does not make a sharp distinction between content and method, he would rather recommend a "student-centered" program:

The instrumentalists advocate curriculum flexibility and provision for wide differences among college students with respect to many variables in addition to the time required to complete the general-education program. Attention is constantly called to the needs of students and to the importance of developing a general education is appropriate to these needs.26

The neo-humanist would prefer the discipline of the human mental faculties, while the rationalist would use the training of logical reasoning. The creation of a problem-situation is a method much used by the instrumentalist.

As to the problem of effective learning, Corey stated that there are three factors to be considered: (a) Intention to learn; (b) motivation to learn; (c) the problem situation of the learning process.27

27Ibid., pp. 51-52.
Since the learning process is intentional, the first condition for effective learning is that the student wants to learn. In this light, the function of higher education should be the improvement of the student's intention to learn, so that he can improve himself.

The second necessary condition for learning is that the student should be strongly motivated — i.e., he should have a clear goal in mind. This objective is generally conceived as a certain "better-state-of-affairs" which will render satisfaction to the student. Many students, however, are inarticulate about their goals. Counseling may help them in defining their goals.

A third condition for better learning is the existence of problems or obstacles. This happens when the goal is not easily attainable. The student should conquer the obstacles through exertion and perseverance. His efforts must be rewarding, however. He must be also aware of the worthwhileness of the hurdles to be overcome, such as the study of foreign languages or mathematics. He should understand that these obstacles are necessary tools for further learning in certain fields.

Motivation is not only related to the goals, but also to the "interests" of the students. Corey made a distinction between "purposes," "interests," "wants," and "needs."

A distinction that seems crucial psychologically must be made between "wants" and "interests" on
the one hand and "needs" on the other. Whenever the word "need" is used, reference is to what a student should learn and implies some normative convictions. This seems to be recognized by most of the authors of books and articles on general education.28

According to Corey, instrumentalists consider the interests of students very important. They hold that the students' academic program should be their own, as a result of a joint faculty-student planning. Counseling is a necessary part of helping the student in bridging the gap between college-requirements and student interests.

Dewey attached three meanings to the term interest: (1) the whole state of active development, (2) the objective results that are foreseen and wanted, and (3) the personal emotional inclination.29 He stated: "Interest means that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation." This means that interest is an important condition for learning, since interests unifies the learner and the object of learning. As Dewey put it in a summary:

Interest means that one is identified with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its realization. Any activity with an aim implies a distinction between an earlier incomplete phase and later completing phase; it implies also intermediate steps. To have an interest

28 Ibid., p. 54.

Another important educational-psychological issue is, that of individual differences. Individuals differ from each other, in native ability, in background, experience, aspirations, needs, age, sex, attitude, and so on. These differences of the learners must be taken into account when a curriculum is to be designed for a general education program. This sounds paradoxical. General education suggests unity and integration but the learners are individually different. The demand for unity and integration implies actually another problem — namely, the problem of transfer.

The problem of transfer refers to three educational issues:

a. The question whether there is an adequate relationship between the aims striven for in a general-education program and the experiences suggested by the curriculum

b. The relationship between knowledge and conduct

c. The relationship between training in a certain field and the applicability of this training to another field. Whether a curriculum is effective, that is to say, whether it answers to the expectations of the program, depends on many factors, such as the ability of instructors, facilities, cooperative efforts, leadership of the staff,

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 161.
and the capacities of the students themselves. The results should be evaluated at regular times.

The second type of the problem of transfer boils down to this question: Is there a positive relationship between knowledge and conduct? In other words, Is the "right" knowledge a sufficient guarantee for proper behavior? This problem is crucial for the "developmental task" of the educator . . . How to change the student's behavior and attitudes? In fact, the problem of teaching conduct transfer seems to be theoretically unsolvable, since in any human behavior, the separateness of the native potentialities of the individual and environmental influence can never be demonstrated.

The third type of transfer is that of training which is to mean that training in one field, e.g., mathematics, will promote the learning of other disciplines, such as geography or physics. That transfer is important in teaching, is apparent in the following statement:

The clue that is important to locate, in any learning situation, is the mode of conceiving, the direction of approach, for the practical question is the question of transfer. The teacher is required to know whether the categories he is teaching and the modes of classifying, which his pupils are learning, are the ones that will prove useful to those being trained.31

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The belief in the quality and degree of transfer constitutes the distribution of the curriculum: Should it be a core-curriculum, applied to all students regardless of their special interests, or a curriculum with a "broad" basis? These two types of "curricular" thinking have differing underlying principles, through the same purpose: unity and integration. Some believe in a general factor theory connecting special factors (Spearman's g-factor and s-factor). Spearman concluded that the prevalence of positive correlations among various performances was due to the existence of general ability common to all kinds of separate abilities. This g-factor was supposed to be the individual's intelligence. It could happen, for instance, that the ability to learn French is positively related to musicality, and that each ability has a specific factor in it. Both the g-factor and the s-factor are supposed to constitute the student's I.Q. which in turn will primarily determine his academic career. One with a high quality of a g-factor supplemented with certain s-factors has no preference for special subjects, since "any subject matter will be O.K."

On the other hand, there are many intelligence-tests designed on the basis of factor-analysis. This is the belief in groups of factors which are supposed to be independent of each other. Such groups of factors are, for instance verbal ability, numerical capacity, sense for
abstraction, for spatial and time-relationship, and motor abilities. Both the two-factor theory of Spearman and the factor-analysis theory of Thurstone are still in use for the construction of tests:

British psychologists, most of whom follow the Spearman tradition, still believe that g accounts for most of the correlation among tests. Although recognizing the presence of several group factors, such psychologists tend to relegate them to a relatively minor role. The majority of American psychologists, on the other hand, consider group factors to be of major importance, and the g factor to be secondary. There is also some evidence to suggest that abilities become more clearly differentiated into group factors with increasing age and education.32

Since almost every general education program employs psychological testing, and since the student's future may be determined by the basic assumptions of the tests to be used, it is of great import to know whether the tests are based on a g-factor or on a factor-analysis theory.

Related to the problem of individual differences in terms of learning abilities, interests, adjustment, and purposes, a general education curriculum usually provides also a guidance program to help students with their "learning and adjustment problems."

An adequate general education program should also be based on certain socio-cultural assumptions. This is especially the belief of the instrumentalists. No student

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can be separated from the sociological or cultural situation of his time. The program should also be appropriate for the student's future. General education is supposed to promote the welfare of society at large and of the students themselves as individuals. There is a close relationship between the progress of the students (and the increase of their number) and that of the socio-economic level of the community. As Havighurst expressed it uncommonly:

But the number of college students had multiplied fourfold since 1915, while the number of horses had fallen away to one-tenth of the 1915-number. The same social forces which reduced the number of horses increased the number of college students. Technological development reduced the need for brute power but demanded more trained power. 33

According to Havighurst, there is a continuous increase in formal education for the following reasons:

a. Education has been recognized as a responsibility of the political community (the state). The state establishes some minimum general standards to be met, in spite of the diversities of cultural and religious faiths.

b. Extension of education has always been welcomed by the people. This is a sign of an improving society.

c. Expansion of education that has brought the opinion that general education must be available for all.

d. More "brains" are needed [the point Havighurst makes above].

Although the formulations of the aims of general education are different — subject to the philosophical beliefs — there are some common basic agreements with respect to the sociological basis. We may cite some formulations of representatives of different beliefs:

Robert M. Hutchins [the rationalist] says, "The great problems of our time are the right use of leisure, the performance of the duties of citizenship, and the establishment of a community in this country and the world."

The Harvard Committee on General Education [neo-humanists] speaks of general education as "education for an informed responsible life in our society."

Two Sarah Lawrence College faculty members [instrumentalists] refer to "the modern reality that colleges do not exist solely to breed scholars but to educate." 34

These differing formulations, however, have one objective in common, i.e., education for good citizenship.

There are indeed, according to Havighurst, some basic agreements among educators concerning the adequate aims of general education. These are:

1. To develop critical intelligence, capable of being applied in many fields.
2. To develop and improve moral character.
3. To develop and improve citizenship.
4. To create intellectual unity and communion of minds among as large a population as possible.
5. To equalize opportunity, as far as is possible through education, for individual economic and social improvement.35

34Ibid., p. 74.
35Ibid., p. 73.
To attain these common aims the various philosophical trends use different programs and sometimes different methods, because they evaluate the social and cultural values differently. The rationalists regard the present social values as ephemeral forms of permanent principles and problems. A proper general education will furnish the students the knowledge of these permanent principles and problems, so that they can apply their knowledge to the present situation. The instrumentalist, however, tries to improve the social conditions by actual participation in the solution of real problems, through the use of intelligence and experience. The neo-humanist would rather improve the social situation by understanding first the society of the highest cultures through the use of their critical intelligence.

Some people extent the conception of citizenship to world citizenship, holding as their ideal the attainment of universal brotherhood.

There is also a relationship between the improvement of general education and the rise of a society, in terms of a shift of the lower "classes" upward. The upward social mobility can be promoted by the improvement of the talent, the ability, and the personality of people. It does not mean that the number of "manual" jobs should be decreased, for it is socially and culturally possible that the carpenters of the future will be college graduates.
The ideal is a "classless" society in which all minority problems disappear.

A real general education program should also include a liberal financial-aid program, for many students are handicapped merely by lack of resources. A financial weakness should not be permitted to hinder one's academic career. It follows that the university must have an adult education-program to help adults to continue their study, because of lack of finances in their early years.

It seems, then, that the problem of general education in terms of "Which philosophy is the right one?" and the problem of a core-curriculum or a broad-basis-curriculum, are theoretically unsolvable. General education has to face and to accept two contrasting principles. On the one hand, there must be somewhere or in some form a unity and integration, because there are some standards to be met, in order to attain the ideal of the generally educated man. Educational subject matter is not just a conglomerate of all kinds of subject matter mixed together. There must be a certain order, forming a certain standard. On the other hand, we must recognize diversities among people in terms of interests, capabilities, environment, race, and purpose. Recognizing this, we cannot use just one and the same curriculum for all students. Nor can we provide each student individually with his own curriculum. The solution seems
to be "the middle of the road." But where is this middle? How much "general" and how much "special?"

The problem seems to lie at another level. A person may be well informed, may know all kinds of subjects -- be an all-round person -- but there is still the possibility that his broad knowledge will not guarantee virtuous conduct. Here is the old problem of the relationship between knowledge and conduct, or between wisdom and virtue. And in the last analysis we must admit that the issue is that we educate people not merely for the knowledge and wisdom as such, but for the virtue, for "the good life." Wisdom without proper conduct would be meaningless. Or are we supposed tacitly to believe that the "right" knowledge would automatically imply the right conduct? If we do so, then we would believe in the right transfer. But this is no more than a belief, since the evidence has never been shown.

Summarizing we may say that the crucial problem of general education comprises two fundamental issues:

a. The problem of how to accept two contrasting phenomena at one time, unity and diversity (general education and specialization)

b. The problem of transfer:

1. Among general fields of study (because we have to make our choice, with the belief that
our knowledge of one field would favor the 
learning of other fields)

2. Between knowledge and conduct: Can virtue be 
taught?

If we do believe in the benefit of a general educa-
tion program -- we believe intuitively rather than intel-
lectually -- then, in the first place, we have to accept 
that which is logically impossible, the possibility of inte-
gration of two contradicting phenomena. This is only possi-
ble if we conceive of this integration as a psychological 
phenomenon, rather than as a logical conclusion. In the 
second place, we must abandon the old belief that knowledge 
would cover the related virtue. In other words, we must 
accept -- pushing it more fundamentally -- that for a good 
life no system of values or a certain philosophy is neces-
sary . . . there is not any "good" philosophy!

These "unusual" inferences have their implications 
for the practical curriculum problem, since we ought to 
have a curriculum, regardless of the basic unsolvability of the problem: What kind of curriculum, then, is best?

We may approach this dilemma from two aspects. One 
aspect is that we are to have a curriculum in terms of the 
"needs of the present time." This aspect is no more than a 
social demand, not a demand of absolute truth or eternal 
principle. Every attempt in the direction of absolutism 
must be considered to be a form of indoctrination or imposing
beliefs authoritarianly. There is only one way to deal with this aspect of the curriculum problem, and that is: A detailed discussion with representatives of social groups since it is a social demand. And frequently, this part of the curriculum will cover mere biological and social needs.

The other aspect is the psychological integration meant above. This is concerned, of course, with the "method" part of the curriculum problem. The value of this aspect of the curriculum is no more than "suggesting" or "hinting at," instead of indoctrination of agreed upon concepts. Its meaning would be to "facilitate" psychological integration, the integration of all of the experiences of the student.

The "integration" should cover many essential relationships. What kind of courses would be appropriate for this "facilitative service"?

In the first place, the integration should include the insight into and the understanding of the totality of things, in terms of fundamental problems. The insight into fundamental problems will facilitate the understanding among people about essential issues -- e.g., the problem of time and space, relativity, the conception of "matter," the problem of causality, and the like. This group of courses may be called The Philosophy of Nature.

In the second place, for greater understanding of man himself as man, his place in the cosmos -- and to
understand other men — is needed in a group of courses that can be called "The Philosophy of Man" or "Anthropological Philosophy."

In the third place, in order to understand one's self and that of others at the level of total "feelings" and anxieties — this is an all-important problem — there must be a course "Psychology and General Psychiatry." The sound as well as the insane man is studied psychologically. We might expect constructive results from this course since man's problems — including learning difficulties — are in many cases projections of man's own anxieties. In this way much more understanding and sensitivity among people may be expected. Lack or inability of integration is generally a matter of anxieties.

Fourthly, the problem of the eternal concern of all people, regardless of their faith or belief — unbelief is also a kind of belief — is religion. The concept of religion should not be necessarily understood in the traditional institutional or social sense. Religion is a total feeling and attitude rather than a system of beliefs, a feeling of confidence and faith in the ground of things. Religion in this deeper sense may help people to reduce their anxieties and, therefore, may increase their mutual understanding, because of the attitude of confidence. The course may be called The Phenomenology of Religion.
Fifthly, there must be a "course" or service for individual guidance activity to help students to understand their problems and anxieties.

These courses should be taught meaningfully and not merely as a kind of passive information. It would be meaningless, if the teachers were to treat these courses merely rationally. It is more a matter of attitude than of knowledge. Many educational practices depend on the personality and maturity of the instructor, and less on his bookish knowledge.

It seems that these five groups of courses would open the possibility to bridge the gap among various people with different beliefs, for it is not the good philosophy as such that makes life a virtuous one, but rather understanding, integration, and readiness for self-transcending.

A Concept of Personality

Since the educational aim is closely related to the concept of personality, we are to explore the meaning of personality.

All human behavior can be related directly or indirectly to man's very existence. All he does or thinks about, has, to a certain extent, something to do with the problem of his own life: Who am I?, What is the world?, What should I do?, What can I Hope? These questions are anthropomorphically colored. Man asks these questions as a human being,
"thrown" into existence without actually knowing from where and what for. Man is originally a humanist, viewing the world from his existential standpoint. He is in fact an autobiographer who is telling a story about himself and his problems. The problems he is considering are not those of the world outside him, but of the world within him, usually projected to the outer world, using material from the "objective" world he is continuously dealing with. Man and world form one existential totality, being for each individual, however, a personal uniqueness:

The existential reality does not depend upon our sense organs or upon any agreement with our fellow men. Everything is existentially real that becomes functional in an individual, challenging his existence with growth or with destruction.36

Growth and destruction are two alternatives man has to face when he takes up the challenge of his existence. He has only this alternative, however: to be or not to be! Growth means being with the world, with reality, including his own reality. Destruction means being separated from the world, escaping the world, or rejecting the world. This means that man and the world are enemies or strangers. Usually, he tries to recover his relationship with the world. He seeks a new form of integration between the world and all his dimensions. Since integration is impossible without

dropping certain aspects of his "world" for the sake of a new totality, integration is frequently attended with disintegration of other units of his personality structure. The new integration assumes a new structure. The new organization is supposed to be more meaningful than the old one. Man's life is a continuous process of integration and disintegration, a process of shifting centers of organization, a process of shaping new forms of equilibrium around certain points. If man refuses to accept this necessity, he must face his own destruction, physically or mentally. This sometimes occurs, when he finds no way to rescue the wholeness of his existence.

In this frame of reference we may describe human behavior as an attempt at integration at a certain level.

This formulation has the following implications:

a. Attempt includes the possibility of failure, i.e., man does not attain the desired result of integration but its opposite, or some kind of destruction.

b. There exist points of contact with alter-ego and non-ego entities. There is no integration without differentiation.

c. There are certain centers of integration or organization.

d. The differentiation takes place in certain directions (multidirectional differentiation).

e. Because of the differentiation, there is a tendency toward expansion of the "field unit" of the individual
entity. The individual unit is not limited literally within the physical body of the individual involved; rather, the individual unit is a field covering, psychologically, other individual units and also non-ego entities.

f. The individual field unit contains other units of various "levels," overlapping each other, ranging from "most physical" to "most metaphysical," thus forming a continuum.

g. There is a possibility of movement from one center of integration to another. A disability to move to another level of integration may lead to a narrowing of the personality, as is apparent in neurotic or psychotic behavior. This may result in a disintegration of the personality.

A brief consideration of these implications may be helpful.

a. Attempt and Its Implications

Man's behavior is always an attempt. This attempt may be the result of a long and painful deliberation or reflection. Attempt implies a purpose, intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, since it refers to a future with the wish of a success. It is, therefore, purposeful and meaningful. It may seem meaningless to other individuals but for the person involved his behavior, or his attempt, is meaningfully connected with his
being-this-way. A man is hostile to his fellow-men because such behavior fits into his disposition, his personality, his interpretation of the world. For him hostility is more meaningful than friendliness and being in peace with the world. At times he may be very friendly, but this friendliness is a temporary form of hostility, for behind the mask of friendliness he hides hatred and aggression. An attempt, therefore, is related to man's personal past, because he attempts in terms of his own ground, his property, his experience in the past, and the results of his efforts in the past.

An attempt is a momentary action projected into the future with a view to a certain purpose one wants to attain; but it always refers to one's own past. A behavior is, thus, at the same time causalistic and finalistic. Man is literally the maker of his own future and fate, whether this be good or bad. When attempts are a failure, the individual may still interpret the failure as his success. A series of failures without moments of recovery, however, may result finally in a disintegration. He can hardly fall back to a point where he can reorganize his issues and problems, so as to put together the pieces in a new kind of wholeness. In most cases, the help of others for recovery is needed. Once being involved in an existential conflict, one can hardly get rid of it. Many failures in marriage
are due to the inability to integrate opposites and conflicting issues.

Failures are usually unavoidable, but man should be able to recover from his failures and errors. Man's growth depends a great deal upon his ability to recover from his failures. Recovery means finding new points of integration. If a student appears to be unable to base his future on his aptitude in mathematics, he should look for other possibilities. He had better change his life plan and life style, and organize them around another unit which does not require much knowledge and ability of mathematics, for instance in the field of literature or physical education.

b. Contacts with Alter-ego and Non-ego Entities

Though integration takes place within the individual, it is meaningful only in its relatedness to other individuals and other entities -- things, plants, and animals -- since integration is necessarily attended with differentiation of biological and psychological functions. Every living is characterized by growth. Growth implies differentiation of functions, for growth occurs only through "contact" with the environment, through living with, living from and living against it. Through these contacts the living individual must use his functions in order to grow. These functions grow concomitantly by using them. Use promotes growth. Because of these contacts, the individual extends his psychical boundaries, since he cannot live isolated from the rest of the world.
Contact necessitates differentiation, since the quantitative and qualitative increase of contacts is attended with the increase and refinement of functions. Functions are necessary media of contacts -- perception, feelings, thinking, language, motorical skills, metabolism, and the like. The differentiation and refinement of functions is endless. Nevertheless the individual is not a divided entity. Unity and structure are shaped into a structure. Structure is a characteristic of the "unity in diversity." Each individual is structured differently, because of the differing ways of differentiation -- in number and in direction -- and the differing centers of organization. An individual is an organized structure, a dynamic synthesis between unification and differentiation. Structure, organization, and differentiation are three inseparable essential aspects of every living being. There is no organization without differentiation, and reversal. On the other hand, there is also no organization without structure. The individual who maintains contacts with alter-ego and non-ego entities should continuously differentiate himself, and at the same time organize and reorganize himself, in order to maintain himself in growth. Otherwise he will be destroyed.

A rock may possess structure, but it does not have organization. Through contact with water certain parts are eroded. Though the rock keeps its specific structure, it is
continuously exposed to the destructive powers of temperature and humidity. It cannot organize itself through the use of certain functions, so that it cannot utilize the elements surrounding it.

A plant can make use of minerals, water, temperature, and light with which it is in contact — it can organize itself. Animals and human beings do the same. They differ, however, in the way they organize themselves.

**c. Frames of Organization**

It was stated that man should be able to organize himself after a failure — namely, for a new attempt, or to meet new situations and purposes which demand new organization. He organizes his behavior according to certain frames of reference. Anything can serve as a center of organization or integration — people, his wife, his father, historical figures, pleasure, power, physical health, a good name, honor, possession, love, devotion, religion, convention, group morality, law, knowledge, and even insanity or neurosis. In the course of his development man can intensify and differentiate one or more centers of integration, such as love, power, or pleasure. He builds his personality structure around one of these frames of integration. Other layers and dimensions of his personality become meaningful only when they are connected with these frames of integration. To him life makes sense only when it is viewed from these centers of organization. When one builds his personality
around power as his core of personality, all other functions and values will be subordinated to the single ideal of power. Knowledge, society, health, and even love must be sacrificed to the only central life plan -- namely, power. This typifies his personality which gradually becomes rigid-stereotypical and tense, and incapable of reorganization. In order to increase the efficiency and the realization of power, he develops and differentiates as many bio-psychological functions as possible, such as motorical skills, perceptions, feelings, memory, thinking, and even creativity. All of these functions, however, are centralized around the one main function -- i.e., the exertion of power.

Another basis of integration may be pleasure. The gain of pleasure prevails throughout his life. The realization of the pleasure principle occurs through the medium of various drives, since pleasure means the gratification of desires and drives. It may be concentrated around sex, or eating, or even around destructive drives, such as sadism, murder, and vandalism. The individual may be one who has developed intellectual capacities. But these functions are only to serve the single concern of his life -- namely, the realization of the pleasure principle. Pleasure has become his life goal, his center of integration. Of course, he frequently meets with difficulties and disappointments. He cannot bear pains and disappointments, however, since it is
contradictory to the pleasure principle. His life becomes more and more tense and unbearable, since he is continually looking for an outlet. He is, however, unable to switch to another frame of organization. All functions are subordinated to the only one purpose in his life — namely, pleasure. He becomes more irritable, for his view is getting so narrow that he does not see many possibilities to reorganize his life. Irritable individuals are those who can respond only in a stereotypical way regardless of the situation. Every challenge coming from this situation is interpreted as a threat for his pleasure hunting personality. He cannot see that life is an alternation of pleasure and pain.

Since sex is one of man's strongest drives, it is frequently used as a means of pleasure seeking. This may lead to many possibilities and ramification, since certain subfunctions of sex become more and more specified — fetishism, sadism, perversion, homosexuality, and the like. In order to realize the pleasure principle, the sex functions are often linked with other functions or drives, such as the gastric drives — alcoholism, epicurism — crime, or adventurism — hunting, gambling. Don-Juanism is one deteriorative form of sexual realization, and sadism another.

d. The Development of Integration in Various Directions

Differentiation is growth during which the individual becomes more and more a complicated manyfold. The
splitting and refinement of units and organs — physiological as well as psychological — is endless. It is, however, not a chaotic multiplication without any structure. One can always detect a specific structure in any individual or in any partial unit of it. The infant develops in the course of his growth certain motor skills (sitting, walking, talking), habits (the way he eats, sleeps or eliminates), and sensorial perceptions (touching, hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting). The thinking functions grow and develop concomitantly.

But no one can know in advance which way and how far the individual will develop. Everything is possible. The way and the direction of the development which oscillates between differentiation and integration depend a great deal upon the individual's "native" capacities, experience, interest, self-determination, education, and chance or coincidence. Some individuals develop the skills of fighting and self-defense to the highest degree, and others become very skillful in love making, and again others are masters in exercising power over millions of people. Some others devote their lives to research work for different purposes. There are philosophers alike who find happiness in the hunt for the truth through speculations. Adventurers find satisfaction in breath-taking dare-devilries in which they gradually develop a very sharp sense of observation, quick reaction, alertness, and endurance.
The way of differentiation is generally a matter of individual interest and ability to realize certain ends. The environment and education may influence the quality and direction of the functional ramification. In each individual case the functional ramification is uniquely meaningful, i.e., it is always in view of a certain purpose. This is the reason why in every theory of education the most crucial problem is that of the aim of education: What is the purpose of our educational endeavor? The aim of education -- though interpreted by the growing educatee in a personal way -- determines the mode and structure of the functional ramification. If the aim of education is defined as "scientific living," then, all attempts of the individual will be directed to the one central idea, How to live the scientifically justifiable way? He should read many books or articles about the latest findings of science and learn how to apply these modern findings to the day by day living: How to sleep, how to care for health, how and what to eat, how to relax, how to deal with people, how to cope with problems, how to make adequate choices, and so on. Rationality and efficiency are regarded as the only avenues to a good life. Irrationality, living without planning, and superstitious belief are deemed unscientific and illogical, hence, meaningless. Life can be lived meaningfully only when it is in accordance with scientifical findings.
Education should, then, be directed to an objective which is related meaningfully to these rational findings. In consequence, the child must develop certain skills, habits, and thinking capacities. He must learn how to criticize, to analyze, and to make adequate inferences on the basis of observations and experiments.

The growing individual develops according to a certain frame of differentiation and psychical organization. As illustrated above, the frame of organization is a great deal influenced by the suggested aim of education, whether explicit or implicit. Hence, education may be interpreted as a suggestion of how to organize one's personality according to certain frames of reference. Since there is an infinite number of references, there is an infinite number of aims of education alike. These aims may be individually different, culturally different, and temporally different — according to the spirit of an historical period, the so-called Zeitgeist.

Inasmuch as every education is an attempt to help other individuals in the organization of their personalities — and, in the way as an indirect attempt to organize the human society — it implies also the possibility of failure, for some "frames of reference" seem to be inadequate to meet various existential problems. The value of truth is, hence, relative. "Truth" is no more than a frame of reference, a frame of organization. Some educators are
so self-conscious about the adequacy of their "frame of reference" that they literally impose their views on others, assuming or really believing that their views are the only adequate and true ones. They are not aware of the fact that their frames of reference are specific human dimensions which have become centers of personality-organization. As any differentiated function or any idea may serve as a frame of integration, every form of organization may deteriorate into a rigid pattern of organization, giving the individual no possibility to switch to other patterns of references. Some educators believe that the idea of "organism" is a sound basis for their philosophy, and speak of the human animal which must make appropriate adjustments or adaptations to the changing environment. The scientific way of organizing one's life is a refinement of the biological basis of their belief.

But let us ask these educators: What is wrong with the educated person who suffers from anxieties which, in the last analysis, are of existential origin? According to Emil Froeschels anxiety is unconsciously rooted in the fear of death, while death itself is considered to be co-existent with life itself:

In einem sehr angeregenden Aufsatz schreibt Merlan über die Angst: "In der Angst stellt sich uns der Tod dar in seiner vollen Unbestimmtheit, was sein Wann und in seiner vollen Sicherheit, was sein Dasz angeht (Heidegger), oder von einem andern Gesichtspunkt, nicht als ein zeitliches
Although the "educated" person has everything, is well to do, has a big account in the bank, is well informed, is well adjusted socially, he may still be unable to organize his personality. The problem of his existential anxiety cannot be solved with the biological concept of education. This conclusion hints at the probability of the existence of levels of integration which are more "inclusive" -- more meaningful -- than other layers of the personality. This may be pointed out in anticipation of the discussion of "the continuum of levels of the personality" in point "f" of the implications of our statement.

Some educators believe in a learning theory as the basis of their educational philosophy, since they believe that education is a matter of learning. This seems to them very obvious, as the process of education is supposed to be one of influencing people so that they may learn from others' experiences in the hope that they make less mistakes and errors in their further life. The problem of education seems to be: What is the best way to learn new things and

to unlearn errors? The learning theory, then, boils down to a Stimulus-Response theory, though with some refinements, such as that developed by Miller and Dollard in which they included Freudian concepts -- unconsciousness, influence of early childhood, and displacement phenomena. In fact, this learning theory is based on the principle of reinforcement through reward and punishment.

Miller reasoned that both psycho-analytic theory and s-r theory assume that a given response may be generalized not only from one stimulus to another but also from one drive to another. Freud very early postulated a considerable amount of interchangeability or substitutability between drives or instincts and for the s-r theorist drives are only one kind of stimulus, therefore, it is perfectly natural that there should be drive generalization as well as stimulus generalization. In order to test this prediction, a group of rats was trained under the motivation of thirst, and with the reward of drinking, to run down an alley.

This theory based on the belief in the Freudian principle of pleasure as the only factor that determines the direction of the functional ramification. The pleasure principle directs the individual's personality development and organization according to the principle of seeking and maintaining pleasure and avoiding pain. As a matter of fact, man's life cannot always be reduced to this all controlling

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38 Hall and Lindzey, loc. cit., pp. 424-463.
principle of the stimulus-response pattern, based on the pleasure principle. This psychology cannot explain why man sometimes has existential anxieties, having no confidence and feeling of security in his life, although the circumstances are "rewarding." Also the religious phenomenon cannot be explained in terms of the rat-type stimulus-response pattern. Both existential anxieties and religious phenomena are not fully based on experience patterns in the past.

e. Psychological Expansion of the Field Unit of the Individual Behavior

Through functional differentiation and contacts with entities outside the individual and through identification with these other entities, the individual unit is not limited, psychologically speaking, to the boundaries of the individual's physical body, but includes the whole world, i.e., his world or Umwelt. The totality of his functions includes experiences with other egos and non-ego entities. He represents not only his own individual self, but also other selves and other things through the process of identification . . . My individual self covers my home, my house, my country where I have been brought up. My ego and my home become a oneness. I have also identified myself with the books I have read, with the animals I have been scared of, or with the pets I have learned to love. I have also identified myself with certain aspects of my father, my
mother, and other important people I have met or read about. In my "I" resounds also the voice and opinion of my family which I love, of my country with which I feel one.

My home thus means not only my individual self plus the house, but it includes also the whole psychological climate, its history, my dreams, about the future, the furniture which has given me much cosiness and comfort, the garden with the nice flowers, the family, and all pleasant and unpleasant events. In other words, my individual ego may cover everything with which I have identified myself and out of which my ego has been built up. Sometimes my mind creates ideas about supernatural powers which I worship or with which I identify myself. I can create, for instance, an image of God or a godhead as an extension of myself which I worship and love. In other words, my life is individual as well as universal.

The relational world is individual, yet it is universal. If the self were solely the individual's, it could not be true. At the same time, if it were not intimately his, it would not be real. The oneness of each individual realizes itself by uniting with others. There is no concept of man or human nature in which every person is not a part. Love is indivisible between objects and one's own self, and love of one person implies love of man as such, recognizing and nurturing oneself not only for oneself but for all of life. These two elements of selfhood, uniqueness and universality, grow together, until at last the most unique becomes the most universal.40

f. The Individual Unit is a Continuum of Units of Various Levels

Usually we speak of body and mind as forming an inseparable whole that we call individual. It is incorrect, however, to say that I have a body, and a mind, in the way I can possess a book or a house. I can give my book to my friend without losing its function as a book. I cannot do this with my body or my mind. A dead body is no longer an individual.

Assuming that there is a body and a mind, there arises the problem of the relationship between the two entities, without knowing what body and mind really are. The pragmatist would say that mind is a relationship concept, a relationship between organism and the world, without indicating, however, what he means by organism. But to speak of an organism without assuming that there is a organizer or integrator, is an impossibility. The great German expert in theoretical biology Hans Driesch called this organizing principle in the organism, entelechy (a term already used by Aristotle):

The character of all the properties or faculties the living individual organism is endowed with is such that the organism cannot be conceived as a constellation of inorganic parts which is inorganic qua constellation. There is something in the organism's behaviour -- in the widest sense of the word -- which is opposed to an organic resolution of the same and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or an aggregate of its parts, that it is insufficient to call the organism "a typically combined body"
without further explanation. This something we call entelechy. Entelechy -- being not an extensive but an intensive manifoldness -- is neither a kind of energy nor dependent on any chemical material; more than that, it is neither causality nor substance in the true sense of these words. But entelechy is a factor of nature, though it only relates to nature in space and is not itself anywhere in space.41

Moustakas called this integrating agent the true self or being:

The self emerges in appropriate patterns of experience or being, which incorporates truth, the inherent truth of the organism. Being refers to this concrete, holistic patterning of self in immediate living, as well as the unyielding, absolute, and unique qualities of the individual person. The individual self, or being, is an ultimate core of reality which remains unchanged throughout changes of its qualities or states. To be, a person must be true to himself; not in terms of others but only to his inner nature, in real experience. The sources for the assertion of human potentialities are deep within the personal experience of the one who asserts them. And one can discover his real self only in true experience, as an autonomous and self governing entity. Being is good only as itself and can be understood only in itself alone, as a whole; not in terms of attributes. It is an indivisible unity.42

Andras Angyal, a psychiatrist in Boston, has about the same idea:

This process, the life of the person, is an organized, patterned process, a Gestalt, an organization. A true organization presupposes an


organizing principle, a unifying pattern. All part processes obtain their specific meaning or specific function from this unifying overall pattern. Therefore it seems plausible that a tentative phrasing of the nature of this total pattern -- the broad pattern of human life -- may serve as an adequate model for the formulation of the problems pertaining to the study of personality.

The overall-pattern of personality function can be described from two different vantage points.43

In our statement it is assumed that body and mind are different modes of being-there, originating from the same entity that we call the metaphysical Self. This assumption is quite distinct from the so-called "epiphenomenalism" of the materialist, or the "emergentism" of the evolutionist, or the pragmatical conception of mind as an organism-environment relationship.

The metaphysical Self is the very creator of its various forms of being that range from our most physical mode of being -- to the most metaphysical form, such as the ego-Self in Zen Buddhism. Radhakrishnan, the present vice-president of India, distinguishes quite clearly the difference between this metaphysical self (the true subject) and the empirical self:

The true subject or the self is not an object which we can find in knowledge for it is the very condition of knowledge. It is different

from all objects, the body, the senses, the empirical self itself. We cannot make the subject the property of any substance or the effect of any cause, for it is the basis of all such relations. It is not the empirical self but the reality without which there could be no such thing as an empirical self. The individuals are able to have common experience, know a real world as identical for all because there is an ideal self operative in all.

While the empirical self is always correlated with a not-self, the universal self includes all and has nothing outside to limit it. The Hindu thinkers call it the atman as distinguished from the empirical self of the jivatman.

On the other hand, we know that in our individuality exists a kind of vegetative life that is active under its "own" autonomous system, such as the sympathetic nervous system. This operates outside our will. It regulates the metabolism, the beating of the heart, the functioning of the lungs, and so on. There are individuals who after injuries live a vegetative life, without becoming conscious about themselves and the environment. These individuals live on the basis of this vegetative form of life.

The characteristic of this merely vegetative living is self-activity or automotion, including the possibility of organic growth and reproduction. This vegetative life is conditionally determined by the physical and chemical elements of the body. Condition, however, should not be confused with origin, agent or cause. The vegetative life in

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turn forms the basis or condition for a "higher" form of life in our Self, our biological or animal aspect. Because of this animal stratum of life there are in every individual primary drives which are closely connected with the vegetative functions. For example, the functioning of the sex drives is inseparable from physiological functions, such as the hormonal system, the pulse, breathing, transpiration, pupil reflex, etc. There seems to be four basic drives in the individual at this "animal" level: sex drives, gastric drives, possessive drives, and drives of self-defense. Any of the drives can develop certain functions to serve these drives in their realization, and they may work concomitantly or combined. The functions of self-defense, such as fleeing, hunting, destroying, and fighting, may serve the sex drive as well. In this sense, the function to be served should be of "higher" (more inclusive) order than the function that serves. Eating is of "lower" order than the more general gastric drive of the total process of nutrition, including also some affective functions.

The functioning of the biological drives is controlled by the pleasure principle which strives for gratification of the -- at the moment -- prevailing drive. Because of this striving for gratification many activities can be instigated. Even the learning activities can be mobilized to develop certain habits or mechanisms. The learning function is already included in the biological functions
and can make use of sensorial abilities. The biological layers (the animal stratum, including the lower strata) of the personality form a condition for the higher layers which we may indicate as the psychological functions. The main characteristic of the psychological function is awareness (of various degrees)—namely, awareness of itself and of the environment in the broadest sense (including the physical and biological body). The psychological activity is aware of its own situation, that is to say, it is aware of the conditions under which it is placed, including its own condition.

The center of this total awareness we call Ego. It includes both the "I" and the "me." The "I" emerges, when there is a point of reflecting about the awareness-process. The awareness-process is, then, focussed as the object of reflection. In this instance, we speak of the "me." In the first beginning there is more awareness, what Sartre called the pre-reflective stage. Here follow some phrases out of Sartre's book Being and Nothingness by the translator, Bazel E. Barnes:

Secondly, the pre-reflective cogito is non-personal. It is not true that we can start with some such statement as "I am conscious of the chair." All that we can truthfully say at this beginning stage is that "there is (il y a) consciousness of the chair." The Ego (including both the "I" and the "Me") does not come
into existence until the original consciousness has been made the object of reflection. 45

About the Ego in Sartre's conception, Barnes says:

My Ego stands as the ideal unity of all my states, qualities and actions, but as such it is an object-pole, not a subject. It is the "flux of consciousness constituting itself as the unity of itself." Thus the Ego is a "synthesis of interiority and transcendence." The interiority of the pre-reflective consciousness consists in the fact that for it, to know itself and to be are the same; but this pure interiority can only be lived, not contemplated. By definition pure interiority cannot have an "outside." When consciousness tries to turn back upon itself and contemplate itself, it can reflect in this interiority but only by making it an object. The Ego is the interiority of consciousness when reflected upon by itself. Although it stands as an object-pole of the unreflective attitude, it appears only in the world of reflection. 46

On the same page he says further: "As for the "I" and the "Me," these are but two aspects of the Ego, distinguished according to their function. The "I" is the ideal unity of actions, and the "Me" that of states and qualities." 47

In this frame of reference, we may say that the individual is literally an Ego-centric being, because he can pursue self-reflective activities and formulate them in language. This cannot be said of the animal. This is a fundamental difference between the animal and the human being.

46Ibid., p. xi.
47Ibid.
The Ego is the unity of all processes of consciousness. It organizes and integrates all other psychological processes, including the unconscious and the subconscious. It can make use of certain unconscious mechanisms (usually unconsciously) to build and maintain the Ego-structure. Otherwise the Ego would be destroyed. Even the Freudian concept of Super-Ego is in essence the Ego itself. It is the extension of the Ego; it is the idealized and projected Ego, on the background of which the Ego can be maintained and cultivated in honor and dignity. The Ego organizes its materials from the lower layers of the personality -- the biological, the physiological, and the physical processes -- and utilizes these materials. The pleasure principle is a much used principle by the Ego. It can reflect -- likes to reflect -- on the pleasurable experiences it has. Sometimes the Ego may completely be absorbed by the emotions of pleasure, such as in voluptuousness.

The Ego is the one who brings order in the materials of his world; he differentiates and classifies. He is the one who makes plans and designs a map of the world, in short interprets the world in his own terms, according to a nomothetic network, a construct. This is the only way the Ego can make sense out of the world and himself. But he is also the only one who is responsible for all of his decisions and deeds. He is the maker of himself using the materials he has at his disposal.
The pre-reflective awareness is actually the main aspect of the most essential part of the personality -- namely, the metaphysical Self or the real Self. The Self is the essence and origin of one's being, and of all being and, therefore, of all activities. This is actually the "substance" which the oracle of Delphi means by saying "Know your Self." The Hindus call this essence of all being Brahman. In the Chandogya chapter of the Upanishads we find:

Brahman is all. From Brahman come appearances, sensations, desires, deeds. But all these are merely name and form. To know Brahman one must experience the identity between him and the Self, Brahman dwelling within the lotus of the heart. Only by so doing can man escape from sorrow and death and become one with the subtle essence beyond all knowledge.48

In the same book we find also:

No, my son, in the beginning there was Existence alone -- One only, without a second. He the One, thought to himself: Let me be many, let me grow forth. Thus out of himself he projected the universe and having projected out of himself the universe, he entered into every being. All that is has its self in him alone. Of all things he is the subtle essence. He is the truth. He is the Self. And that, Svetaketu, THAT ART THOU.49

In the Bhagavad-Gita (a part of the Mahabharata Epic) we find the Self regarded as the Knower -- Sartre's


49 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
pre-reflective consciousness -- and the individual is indicated as the Field. Sri Krishna who is talking toward his pupil Arjuna, is the symbolization of the Self:

Sri Krishna:
This body is called the Field, because a man sows seeds of action in it, and reaps their fruits. Wise men say that the Knower of the Field is he who watches what takes place within this body. Recognize me as the Knower of the Field in every body. I regard discrimination between Field and Knower as the highest kind of Knowledge.50

Suzuki states that the problem of the "person" is reducible to that of the Self:

I referred before to de Rougemont's recent book, *Man's Western Quest*, in which he names "the person" and "the machine" as two of the features distinguishing the nature of the Western quest after reality. According to him, "the person" was first a legal term in Rome. When Christianity took up the question of the Trinity its scholars began to use it theologically as is seen in such terms as "the divine person" and "the human person," which were harmoniously reconciled in Christ. As we use the term now, it has a moral-psychological connotation with all its historical implications. The problem of the person is finally reducible to that of the Self.51

Suzuki indicates the metaphysical self as being different from the psychological self: "The real Self is a kind of

metaphysical self in opposition to the psychological or ethical self which belongs in a finite world of relativity."

Shri Ramana Maharshi, the great sage from India indicated the Self as light-in-itself, as "pure self-awareness" (reines Sich-Selbst-Innesein), and as "heart."

Das Selbst ist Licht aus sich Selbst in Herzen als reines Sich-Selbst-Innesein, einig ohne ein anderes neben sich. Es offenbart sich weltweit als ein und desselbe in allen Wesen und wird der Höchste Geist genannt. "Herz" ist nur ein anderes Wort für diesen, weil ER in aller Herzen ist.

The Self is thus the very essence and origin of man's being, of all being. While man's Ego is empirical, his Self is metaphysical. It is the stream of consciousness on which the Ego floats. Therefore, the Ego can never catch the stream as long as it does not transcend its own boundaries of time and space:

Wer das Selbst erfahren will und dabei den vergänglichen Leib Bezärtelt, gleicht einem, der auf Krokodils Rücken über den Strom fahren will.

Referring to Rougemont, Suzuki holds that the inability of the Occidental to understand the true meaning of the Self

52 Ibid., p. 32.

53 Heinrich Zimmer, Der Weg zum Selbst (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1944), pp. 207-208.

54 Ibid., p. 192.
is due to his inability to transcend the dualism in the man-God relationship:

... it is impossible for Western people to transcend the dualism residing in the very nature of the person as long as they cling to their historico-theological tradition of God-man or man-God. It is due to this dualistic conflict in the unconscious and its resulting sense of uneasiness that they venture out into time as well as into space. They are thorough extroverts and not introverts. Instead of looking into the nature of the person inwardly and taking hold of it, they strive objectively to reconcile the dualistic conflicts which they discern on the plane of intellect.55

The metaphysical Self, the psychological Ego, the biological organism "containing" a complex of drives, and the physical conditions form one wholeness, a psychosomatic unity. Some call this unity organism, others call it individual, and again others indicate it with person. The difference in name is an expression of the difference in emphasis—which aspect of the personality is emphasized. Person implies the emphasis on the metaphysical aspect, while the term individual is more referring to the psychological aspect (Ego). Organism puts more stress on the biological aspect. All of these views, however, imply the assumption of a certain organization or integration principle. In "person" we think of certain values—which could be ego-transcendent—of the possibility of knowing the truth,

and the possibility of having insight and enlightenment. In the "individual" we find the undivided and indivisible psychological unit in the sense of Alfred Adler's "Individual Psychology."

It seems hardly possible to recognize in the psychic organ, the soul, anything but a force acting toward a goal, and Individual Psychology considers all the manifestations of the human soul as though they were directed toward a goal. Knowing the goal of an individual, and knowing, also, something of the world, we must understand what the movements and expressions of his life mean, and what their value is as a preparation for his goal.56

Freud indicates this individual unit as the Ego and Super-Ego, in relation to the Id (das Es).

Organism refers to an organismic approach in the sense of McDougall's instinct psychology with its aspect of intentionality.

At all events, we must assume that the various aspects of the personality mentioned above, are not of the same quality. Though these various modes of behavior are quite distinct from each other, they are inseparable from each other. They rather overlap each other. But we can still distinguish one behavior from another. They are at different "levels." Praying is quite different from thinking about a mathematical problem, and of course different

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from a sexual act or from eating. Since all things man is doing are in some sense related to one another, we must assume that there is some point of reference around which all behaviors are organized. Men differ from one another, not only because of the difference in the extent of differentiation of the functions, but also in the way, or around which point, the functions are organized. The religious type of person who is much concerned in his metaphysical Self, is a quite different person than the thinker who develops all kinds of mental abilities of criticism, analysis, and reflection. The enjoyer or the sensualist is also quite distinct in structure from the body-builder who is more concerned about the shape and strength of his muscles. These types develop in various directions according to the center of functional interest.

g. Flexibility of Organization

The most common form of personality organization is around the Ego and the pleasure principle. Both principles are affecting each other, and make use of each other. We may say that man's common behavior oscillates from the "Ego-centric" type of integration to the bio-centric type, and reversely. The Ego-centric behavior normally takes the shape of anthropocentrism. It is the behavior concentrated around power and dignity or honor. The human pride is in fact the humanistic pride. In this sense man is a "sinner,"
for he regards his knowledge, his ability, his performance, as his (the Ego's) possession, as his conquest, and his merit. He is not aware of the fact that the Ego is but a moment in the stream of pure consciousness, is but a crystallization of the Self, the only real ground of his existence.* We may also say that man is an "original" sinner, because of this humanistic pride, of this "Ego-centric" attitude. Because of this pride, too, man tries to justify himself with rationalization of his behavior, and he rather speaks in more refined terms of humanistic, intellectual, sophisticated, or culturally conscious behavior. This he says consciously as a sinner, without being able, however, to escape from a continuous and unconscious undercurrent of existential or metaphysical anxiety. Rationality is a kind of escape from irrationality. In these modes of behavior he still dwells -- under the name of "educated man" -- at the Ego-level. As Sartre puts it: "Man is the being 'who is what he is not and who is not what he is.'"57

In his existential loneliness man easily resorts to the pleasure principle, taking in a psychological sedation, by "working" in the field of the biological drives. For such a man wine, woman, and wager may be "integrated" under

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*Cf. footnote 54 on p. 487.

57Sartre, loc. cit., p. xix.
one concept — pleasure. He may get stuck in this adventure without seeing any possibility to get rid of it. In him may awake "the beast in man." He may become a sexual pervert, a drunkard, or a criminal, manifesting some tendencies of destruction. Instead of integration he actually attains self-destruction. This is always the dilemma man has to face: he should differentiate himself in order to grow but in every differentiation lurks the menace of disintegration. In order to avoid this danger of destruction, he should be able at any instant to be aware of his momentary psychological situation. He should be capable of reorganizing himself around various points so that the newer modes of integration be more meaningful than the former. This is his task and his assignment, if he does not want to be destroyed by his own powers. In this endeavor of self-actualization and growth, he utilizes various ways to bring integration in his personality, by means of religious behavior, work, play, social communication, and their combinations. On the other hand, these media of integration may become centers of integration. In this case, the center of integration is shifted from one of the layers of the personality to one of these "accomplishment-activities," so that man may literally lose himself in play activities, such as gambling, courtship, football, etc. If man does not look out, he may
get stuck in one of these "displacement" forms of behavior.
What he, then, attains is but a seeming integration.

The maximum state of integration would be a total
integration, i.e., integration around man's own Reality,
that is man's very own metaphysical Self. The normal
development would be the development in the sense of the
search for the Self:

Alle heiligen Schriften haben die Ergründung des
Selbst zum Gegenstand, sie erklären: die
Vernichtung der Ich-Vorstellung bedeutet
Erlösung.58

The latter phrasing means that redemption or salvation can
only be attained through the negation of the imaginations of
the Ego.

Richard de Martino describes the state of ultimate
and total Self-ego integration -- sounding nonsensical for
the Western ear -- as follows:

In its awakened Self-awareness and fulfillment
as Self-ego, it is and has the form of itself
as Self-ego. As ground-source, however, it is
never simply the form of itself as Self-ego.
Itself and not-itself as form in space ego-
Self is its own being and its own non-being as
existence in time. It is, indeed, realized
ecstasis, beyond itself and not-itself beyond
its being and its non-being. It may assert
in unconditional affirmation, "I am" and "I
am not," "I am I" and "I am not I," "I am I
because I am not I," "I am not I, therefore
I am I." Unconditional Self-affirmation is,

58 Zimmer, loc. cit., p. 197.

The Indonesian psychotherapist Sumantri Hardjoprakoso calls the state of complete integration that of collective consciousness or Liberation:

As a consequence of this fading of the consciousness of the ego the individually unconscious disappears at the same time, and the individually conscious will become increasingly collective.

This principle it is which forms the basis of this Indonesian psychoprophylactic, the psychotherapy and the psychohygienics. The final debouchement of the individual development into the collectively conscious is called Liberation or Redemption. As in Liberation or Redemption the consciousness of the ego disappears, the inner relations in the human psyche also undergo a radical change. Polarity between conscience and the drives becomes dissolved. Conscience no longer exists, as the biological has subjected itself to the spiritual, the lustful has been replaced by the free-of-lust, individuality has dissolved itself into collectiveness.\footnote{Sumantri Hardjoprakoso, \textit{Indonesisch Mensbeeld als Basis van Psycho-therapie} [The Indonesian Concept of Man as a Basis of Psychotherapy], Dissertation, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1956, p. 230.}

In summary, we may conclude that the idea of the highest level of integration, as the dissolution of the Ego in the all-embracing metaphysical Self, is adhered to by many authors and philosophers, though worded differently, such as: Knowing the Self, personal meeting with God, the
state of Nirvana, Tao, satori, being one with the Self, the state of collective consciousness, the state of individuation, Liberation, and so on, and so on.

Normal Personality and Maturity

As the educational aim, as a matter of fact, is closely related to the concept of the "ideal" man, we are to explore here the problem of normalcy and maturity.

The concept of normal personality is an almost unmanageable problem, because of its complexity and, besides, it refers to a philosophical anthropology, a philosophy of man. This asks not only what man is, but also what man should be. Normality refers to a "norm," to an "ought," to an optimum, or even to a maximum. Some people propose an "ought" in terms of a maximum productivity or creativity. This is apparent in the term "self-realization."

Because of the nature of man himself -- at least from the standpoint of the philosophical anthropology -- the concept of normal personality must have biological, psychological, social, and ethical aspects. Some may add the religious aspect. These aspects can be deduced from man's relationships with his very own "given" subjective conditions -- namely, the dependent variables of himself, and his universe -- i.e., the material and social environment, the world of ideas, the totality or the ground of all things, and his very being -- namely, the independent variables. The demand
of adaptability is a biological concept. Cognitive adequacy is for instance a psychological ideal. Social adjustment indicates its social origin, while integration of moral values refers to an ethical concept. E. J. Shoben states:

> It is at this point that the behavioral sciences and ethics meet and merge, and it seems unlikely that any conception of normality can be developed apart from some general considerations that are fundamentally moral.  

Arnold W. Green thinks that religious adequacy is desirable for some of his patients. He states: "A specific religious form, tailored to the needs of the individual patient must be discovered."

The conception of normality with most authors is biological-psychological-social. They differ in emphasis only. Some put more stress on the biological aspect, and others on the social. The final formulation of what a normal personality is, is determined by which of the various personality theories to which one adheres. Freud's concept of normality would be different from Lewin's, and Jung is different from Erich Fromm.

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Lawrence E. Cole devotes the last chapter (Chapter 24) of his extensive book on human behavior to the discussion of the conception of normal personality. Cole’s notion is that the conception of personality is culturally relative and, more generally, it is humanly relative, because "man is the measure of all things":

Our search for truth, for the truth about human beings, has taught us that the only truths extant are "modes of conceiving" which are embedded in a culture. Basically, the discoveries we can make about the world around us -- the only discoveries we have made -- are those that emerge when, living out our hopes and hypotheses shaped under local gods and myths, we test their validity with our very lives.65

Cole considers the problem of maturity from three psychological aspects, in which biological and social conditions are implied: (1) affective, (2) intellectual, and (3) social-volitional. These three dimensions are to be considered in their dynamic wholeness.

1) The affective-emotional development of the mature person includes: (a) persistent emotional tone; (b) emotional attitudes towards people; (c) the capacity to give and to receive love; (d) the ability to relax and to be "gay," and to express hostility appropriately; (e) emotional attitudes towards the self.

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64 Cole, loc. cit., pp. 816-863.
65 Ibid., p. 824.
a) A persistent emotional tone is a tone that expresses a sense of security, confidence, and of courage that can sustain the individual in moments of stress or frustration. This implies a ready support from the underlying energy stream that guarantees health and vigor of body, and a regimen of work, play, and rest. This tone includes also homeostasis or dynamic equilibrium, i.e., balance between needs and abilities on the one hand and environmental pressure on the other hand — capacity-pressure-need balance.

b) The emotional attitude towards people is a sense of community of interest of belongingness, of being at home and being accepted, a we-feeling, no indifference, no withdrawal, no hostility and suspicion. Here lies a dilemma: the choice between the conformity to the culture to which one belongs and the original uniqueness of the personality.

c) The phrasing, "the capacity to give and to receive love," is obviously from Erich Fromm. By love is meant the wholesome giving-and-receiving love, not the highly romanticized type, not the love of the overprotective mother, not the excessively dependent love based on anxiety and fear of loss of the beloved object, not the fantastic love that would "completely solve" all of life's problems, and not a completely surrendered love either, which will dissolve one's very own personality. This is
the kind of love that "nourishes us as we give, enriches us as we spend, and permits ego and alter to grow in mutual harmony." 66

d) The ability to relax and to be "gay" and to express hostility appropriately means that the mature person has some good humor, even being able to laugh at jokes directed toward himself. He acts in a relaxed way, and is sensitive without anxiety, rigidity, and overreaction. If necessary, one must be able to express hostility and anger, though without overdoing it, and without suppressing his objections unnecessarily.

In the emotional attitude toward the self, one possesses the "fulness" of his own capacity, of being his own man, and of going somewhere. There is an inner harmony between the person's ideals and his actual performance, doing the best possible, being able to face his own limitations with a philosophical "yes," facing life problems with reasonable equanimity, without being egoistical, complacent and fatuous in conceit and guilt-ridden. In short, he possesses self-assurance, combined with self-acceptance. Accepting himself, he can also accept others.

2. The intellectual development, according to Cole, includes: (a) The achievement of insight; (b) an accurate

66 Ibid., p. 832.
knowledge of men and affairs; (c) social skills; (d) powers of synthesis; (e) philosophy of life.

a) By insight is meant that the intellectually mature person has an insight into his own self, his own structure of assets and liabilities. He understands his motivations for the optimum achievement of self-realization. He must know his abilities and needs. He may not have a distorted picture of himself, i.e., an idealized or despised self which forms only his persona or mask. In this self-insight lies a dilemma -- namely, an option between a struggle to achieve and maintain insight with all the consequences and a dependence upon external authority and tendency toward adjustment and conformity.

b) A concept of the self is inseparable from a concept of the world which evaluates him also. The ego-alter relationship provides a certain "life space" in which he lives. This life space must be correctly conceived. Participation in the life space means active participation in the cultural stream as a part of his own life history. He participates in various cultural memberships and understands what philosophers, artists, and scientists have to tell. It does not mean merely bookish participation, but real actualization.

c) The person with social skills is able to realize his motives toward the alter. This means the establishment
of rapport with others, the understanding and insight into others. Rapport does not necessarily mean verbal communication, for sometimes we have to keep ourselves silent and permissive toward others. This enables us to discover the deeper layers of human personality.

d) The power of synthesis covers the whole background of integration on which our skills, insights, experience, and understanding are projected. In fact, this is not merely an intellectual power. Intellect certainly plays an important role in it. This integrative power lifts us from the limitations of the "here and now" and indicates, therefore, the range or width of our psychical "field," on which we project the objects and persons in a meaningful context. But our wide and deep field is flexible, and permits much tolerance and adaptation, subject to the momentary situation.

e) An adequate philosophy of life enables man to see life in its whole, integrated in all of its relationships, in which religion forms the central core of meaning for life. Wholesome religious attitudes, insight, and understanding are natural outgrowths of a healthy life-style, because all insight about the world and the self is integrated into a toti-related whole, giving him support, confidence, and creative power. In this sense, religion can hardly be called a form of escape or compensation.

3) Cole's conception of the social-volitional aspects of the mature person includes: (a) the productive
character; (b) self-realization and the participation in socially significant purposes; (c) ego-alter relationship; (d) ability to plan.

a) A person with productive character realizes and actualizes his potentialities without collision of the functions within him and with others. Productivity makes life more enjoyable, free, and mentally healthy but it requires organizations of functions. Productivity may be hampered by obstructing mechanisms in the individual which Freud called the principle of "mechanically operating repetitive compulsion." This may cause neurosis. This is a splitting force in the personality. The mature person must, therefore, have a psycho-analytic insight to be more productive. This is the psycho-analytic approach. A moral approach, such as with Gandhi, makes the individual free from limitations. This is a subjective feeling. The moral force is more than mere intellect or mere organic strength. The individual must surrender his egotism and live according to the principle of truth and love. Many people project the responsibility of their failures upon others, upon outside conditions, instead of upon themselves.

b) Self-realization means the actualization of certain ideas and purposes. These ideas are real in the sense that they originate with the life history of the person, with socio-cultural values, and with the self which Fromm calls "conscience." A supernaturalistic idea is unreal, and
may cause neurotic disturbances in the feeling of guilt or sin. Self-realization is, therefore, a realistic concept, giving us a support, a wholeness, a kernel, and self-consistency.

c) The self-realization may raise a difficulty in our relationship with others. The latter demand loyalty, love, altruism, and participation. The problem of balance in the ego-alter relationship is: How can we reach a maximum development of the ego with a minimum of damage to the other? This means that we must free ourselves from frustrations that may lead us to aggression against others. Aggression is a kind of escape from self-responsibility, by laying responsibility on external conditions -- material and social -- a kind of social retreat. Aggressive powers are not only destructive for others, but also for one's own self. "There are those who, thwarted so severely, experience a hate that is only describable in the analytic lingo as death wish." 67

d) Self-realization in the fullest possible measure, requires not only an ability to plan in terms of fatigue-minimizing schedules and efficiency, but also in terms of the possibility to reorganize or even to retreat. Plans are no deadlines, but merely guiding schedules to be adapted to the situation of the moment. This is the

67 Ibid., p. 858 (Italics in original).
realistic life in a full sense. Plans are not to confine us, but to free us, to transform ideas into reality. We must, however, watch for rationalization, for vain busy-keeping of ourselves with many trifles, for an escape to good fellows for gay conversation only to keep our conscience silent, for dreaming of the perfect but blind lover to adore our wrong super-ego, or for an escape to alcoholism, to gambling, and to sex, in order to drown the painful realization of our shortcomings.

This, then, is an outline of Cole's notion about normal personality. We may consider now E. J. Shoben's view on normality. In his article "Toward a Concept of Normal Personality," Shoben rejects the statistical conception of normal personality. This is the notion that normality is a minimal degree of pathology. This is a negative concept, while "statistical" implies a cultural conformity and relativism. It may lead to fundamental difficulties, since an individual may, consequently, be evaluated against a sick cultural background or a gang. Besides, a particular culture or even the group itself would be beyond evaluation.

Family and school do not exist for the minimizing of inevitable pathological traits, but their function is rather

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positive -- namely, the development of the youth. Shoben says: "If conformity to social rules is generally considered more desirable than criminality, it is not because of its consequences for both society and the individual."\(^{69}\)

If we are to judge group standards, we must do this in terms of values. The problem of value is psychological as well as moral. Behavior is, according to Shoben, "positive" or "integrative" to the extent that it reflects the unique attitudes of the human behavior, that is to say, uniquely human in comparison with animal behavior. The characteristics of this uniqueness are:

a. Man is capable of symbolization through the use of propositional language which enables man to deal with things not physically present and to project experience into the future in the form of planning. This is man's "attitude toward the merely possible."\(^{70}\)

b. The human being is a social animal. Social dependency implies a reliance on other people. The latter is supposed to have some form of authority which lays responsibilities on their shoulders and demands altruism. The socialization process is a progressing process from childhood dependency through independence to adult dependability.

\(^{69}\)Ibid., p. 183.

\(^{70}\)Ibid., p. 185.
According to these human aspects the normal person should have the following traits:

1. He is able to live beyond the here and now -- is more free -- to attain more remote rewards. This is only possible through symbolization.

2. The increase in self-control makes man more autonomous; he may conform with or rebel against external authority. He acts on "considered grounds," not because of pathological rebellion expressed in hostility or an escape in rationalization and projection.

3. Non-conformity is attended with the essential acceptance of possible consequences. This indicates an interpersonal responsibility. This means that the individual wants "to be himself," trustworthy and altruistic in the sense of being dependable and acting out of a genuine concern for the welfare of others.

4. The normal personality is democratic toward others, because this is the most direct way leading to the welfare of both the individual and others.

5. He does not purport to attain perfection, but strives to act in accordance with the best possible principles of conduct that one can conceive. There is an optimum between one's self-concept and one's ego-ideal.

In another article, Shoben considers work and love
as two main characteristics of maturity. It is not always easy to integrate these two seemingly conflicting aspects of man. These characteristics are related to the role of being-a-man and being-a-woman because of cultural-traditional concepts: "We are persons before we are men and women."

R. P. Hinshaw regards the normal mature person as the well-adjusted person. There are, however, two meanings of adjustment -- namely, descriptive (its opposite is non-adjustment), and ethical (its opposite is mal-adjustment). The adjustment in a descriptive sense may be viewed from the individual's standpoint (personality psychology), and from the standpoint of social psychology. This descriptive approach implies the biological aspect (of which the criterion is "tension reduction"), and the psychological aspect (of which the criterion is "integration"). Integration means the harmonious cooperation among the various levels of the personality. Integration in an ethical sense means a minimum of discrepancy between what is and what should be.

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R. Tyson\textsuperscript{73} has explored the nature of "good adjustment" and mentions four dimensions: adaptability, balanced life, frustration-tolerance, and satisfaction.

Adaptability is the ability to adjust to all varieties of relationships. This requires flexibility and the adequate use of experience.

A balanced life is attained by the avoidance of similarity between recreation and work, so as to break up emotional tensions. There is also a balance between extroversion and introversion.

Frustration-tolerance is the joyful acceptance of the fact of success, but also the graceful acceptance of failure. Disappointment and strains are faced with humor, constructive ideas and fighting spirit rather than with fear, rage, hopelessness, or suspicion.

Satisfaction means self-acceptance, self-confidence, a feeling of normality. The person is oriented to his life situations to the extent that his capacities permit.

P. M. Symonds, in Chapter 21 of his \textit{Dynamic Psychology}, discusses the meaning of normality under the following characteristics: balance of life, adequate functioning, compromise, and good adjustment.\textsuperscript{74}


Balance of life means balance between the drives, the ego-restraints, the super-ego restraints or urges, and the defenses against anxiety. It also means the balance between the demands of society and the individual's wishes.

Adequate functioning means the degree of hardship and strain a person can undergo and adjust to successfully, without disorganization.

The mature person must have the ability to compromise between inner and outer demands. He must be able to practice renunciation of desires without feeling deprived or becoming emotionally disturbed in the process.

Good adjustment includes integration, ego development through effective intelligence, acceptance of reality -- particularly the reality within -- taking self-responsibility independently with the possibility of saying "no" if necessary, freedom of emotional expression (happiness, sense of well-being, ability to play and relax, ability to love, but also ability to show anger when necessary), adequate social relationship.

Jung's conception of normality, is rather mystical and religious. The maximum self-realization is called individuation -- i.e., when all opposites in the physical structure are dissolved. There is integration between the

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consciousness and unconsciousness, between introversion and extroversion, and between the four psychical functions, such as thinking, perception, emotion and intuition, and between persona and Self.

The individuation process is the one that leads to the discovery of the Self -- i.e., man's very own original wholeness:

The meaning and purpose of the process is the realization, in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm; the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness. The symbols used by the unconscious to this end are the same as those which mankind has always used to express wholeness, completeness, and perfection: symbols, as a rule, of the quaternity and the circle. For these reasons I have termed this the individuation process.76

We may say, in summary, that the problem of normal personality and maturity, is a very complicated and complex one. Cole bases his concept of maturity on biological-psychological grounds, while Shoben is apt to put more emphasis on the biological aspect of man in the uniqueness of his being, when compared with the infrahuman animal. To him, however, man is still an animal, though of a particular kind, possessing certain characteristics which give him the possibility to become a normal personality. This is just opposite Nietzsche's notion that man is "das kranke

Tier" (the sick animal). It is true, on the other hand, that most animals are seldom disintegrated or insane.

Hinshaw's notion is also biological-psychological -- with sociological implications -- but he touches also upon the problem of morality and values. Normality is a kind of evaluation or judgment. Any judgment refers to a norm, thus implying something normative. We say sometimes: He has a good character or a normal character. Character implies to some extent an ethical connotation. Hinshaw does not, however, indicate the relationship -- or integration -- between adjustment and norm. What would this integration be? He indicates integration merely in a psychological sense.

Tyson states positively that the normal person is the well-adjusted person. By this he means the broad biological sense of adjustment, i.e., he confines himself to the well-being of the individual as such, without indicating the sense or aim of his being-this-way or doing-this-way. The characteristics creativity and constructivity cannot be derived from his principle of "good adjustment." Indeed, good adjustment as such does not necessarily imply constructivity and responsibility.

Symonds does not differ fundamentally from Tyson's view. All demands are centered around the egocentric well-being of the individual. This may lead to self-complacency and over-awareness that may prevent the person from breaking
through the boundaries of his egocentricity, including all of his biases, ideas, theories, and views.

It seems that the only way-out of the dilemma of contradictions is, when one accepts a concept of wholeness which assumes that the person is a wholeness in a greater wholeness, a reality in a Reality. The extent of the greater wholeness, however, has no limits. Wholeness reminds us of the concept of integration, mentioned by several authors. Self-realization was also often suggested. This means, then, the realization of the wholeness of integration. The latter was suggested also by Jung, who called the process of integration with the wholeness an individuation process. The wholeness is, then, a condition as well as an aim, an aim to be attained. Without the wholeness in view — the condition on which the integration should ress -- the integrated wholeness can never be attained.

We may formulate the optimum condition of a person, in a varied way, as follows: The normal person achieves an optimum psychohygienic state -- so as to be able to realize his wholeness or integration. This mentally healthy state covers all of the person's interrelationships, including his relationship to the material and social totality, as well as to his own existential ground, the ground of all things and his very own being.

The relationship to the social order and his material environment or the ties which bind him with this environment,
may be called the horizontal responsibility — including all the intellectual, emotional, and volitional developmental tasks that were particularly emphasized by Cole. The relationship to the existential ground is the "vertical" responsibility, which some people call "religious" relationship, and some others "metaphysical" relationship.

Responsibility implies the existence of the individual and his autonomy — the dignity and pride of the person's autonomy. But it implies also his concern, his ties, and his "ought" with respect to "the other side." Responsibility is, therefore, ambivalent, since in its resounds the voice of both the ego and the alter. Responsibility contains the individual person, society, and the total Reality. Horizontal responsibility gives the individual a social status of acceptance, well-adjustment, giving and receiving love, social security and cooperation, and a feeling of belonging. The vertical responsibility renders the individual existential commitment which in turn furnishes him existential anchorage and confidence, freedom and security, life-acceptance and a philosophical "yea." Vertical responsibility will prevent him from existential anxieties and miseries. The feeling of confidence is experienced as a feeling of wideness and roominess, a positive constant feeling of un-sought happiness. In this respect we may
refer to Erich Fromm's description of the meaning of Zen:

Zen is the art of seeing into the nature of one's being; it is a way from bondage to freedom; it liberates our natural energies; it prevents us from going crazy or being crippled; and it impels us to express our faculty for happiness and love. 77

In this frame of reference, we may formulate the normal or mature person as the one who poses a total psycho-hygienic state as a minimum condition for self-realization, referring the latter to responsibilities, conceived of in the broadest and deepest sense. This formulation will apparently be useful for our search of a formulation of the general aim of education which is primarily concerned with the well-being of the personality.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

After this long journey through a variegated jungle of ideas and experience, in search of the general aim of education, we finally get to a point of rest, a pause, where we can overview our adventures in ideas and summarize them briefly.

At the beginning of our exploration we came to crossroads between philosophy, science, and educational theory. After having reconnoitred the possibilities of these three roads, we finally chose the third one. In doing this, we have taken the risk of all consequences of this choice. We do not forget, however, all of the experiences we have gained from the explorations of the two other roads.

We may pass now in review the contributions the various educational approaches made to our search for the general aim of education.

Socrates' main concern was the salvation of the individual soul. He taught us that the soul can be "saved" only when man lives a "virtuous" life. Virtue or arete does not mean, however, the sum of many "good" traits.
Virtue is a total state of well-being of the "soul," a state of invulnerability -- indifferent to honor, power, pleasure and pain -- a state of total happiness, and of wisdom. For Socrates virtue, happiness, wisdom and mental health are identical. The wise man concedes that he actually knows nothing, for he knows that his real Self is the only source and cause of enlightenment and knowledge.

According to Socrates, there is no essential difference between the soul's life on earth and in the hereafter, since the soul in itself is invulnerable and immortal. Man need not be anxious, therefore, about the fate of his soul if he lives a "virtuous" life.

Socrates' life was devoted to the teaching of others about the "good" life. Through the use of the dialectic method he convinced others that they actually knew nothing, and that their knowledge was merely seeming knowledge.

Plato, on the other hand, was more concerned about the well-being of the state, i.e., the welfare of the greatest number of people. There is "virtue" in the state when all people are virtuous, that is to say, when each people does his job properly according to his ability. Since people differ in the extent and quality of their abilities, they should be assigned different "levels" of responsibilities. Each responsibility must be in accordance with one's ability. And this is justice. To bring
Justice in the state is the duty and right of the "philosopher king," that is the one who knows the truth, who will not corrupt, and who is endowed with the power, wisdom and ability to rule and to guide. This attempt of Plato to bring justice in the state, in spite of the differences among people concerning their ability and interest, is actually an attempt to integrate differences under an all-embracing concept of order so that life is meaningful. Plato called this concept of order justice. Justice is supposed to be able to integrate diversities, to solve life problems, and to make life meaningful.

As to Catholicism we may say that the great emphasis laid on the fate of man's soul, indicates that the main concern of man -- consciously or unconsciously -- is his very being. The strongly universalistic tendencies revealed in Catholic policies and practices point to another fact -- namely, that man's life, lead in seriousness, is filled with the concern about others. In other words, a serious moral life is always filled with a sense of responsibility.

Another significant point worth mentioning is the stress on the important role of faith in life. The records of the life histories of many Catholic fathers and other Catholic believers demonstrate that life in complete faith is frequently a main source of courage, sacrifice,
moral strength, release, and enlightenment. Faith is apparently of great value in the highest moment of affliction. Faith renders hope for a better future.¹

Kohnstamm's approach is theistic-personalistic. The concept of theistic personalism implies two significant points. In the first place, the worthwhileness of each person is a condito sine qua non for every adequate concept of education. Secondly, the self-actualization of the person can reach its fulness only in the I-Thou relationship, that is when the person is fully aware of the ground of his existence. The I-Thou relationship is manifest in man's "conscience," which is -- according to Kohnstamm -- the source of morality and intelligence. Conscience is the agent that understands norms and applies them to practical conduct. A "conscientious" life is a life guided by a sense of responsibility. The latter implies one's serious concern about the fate and well-being of others, but it refers also to one's own conscience. Hence, responsibility is ambivalent. It is both related to one's fellow-men and to "conscience" or a "personal" God who speaks to him, a personal God to whom he renders an account of his deeds. Responsibility is, in consequence, both religious or moral and social in nature. To Kohnstamm

¹Cf. note 34 Chapter IV on pp. 231-232.
education means the "formation of conscience" which will lead to the formation of the sense of responsibility in the ambivalent sense meant above.

On the other hand, Kohnstamm is also much concerned about the "peace of mind" as an aspect of the educational aim. He does not mean, however, that "peace of mind" should lead to a hedonistic and individualistic attitude in life, since he immediately connects the "inner peace" with the sense of responsibility and society-directedness.

Another point which is personalistic alike, is the view that individual differences must be unconditionally recognized. The latter follows from the personalistic notion that truth is pluriform. In consequence, the diversities among individuals (concerning abilities, interests, destination, view of life, and development patterns), as well as among cultures (historical and geographical), must be recognized.

The essential dimensions of an adequate way of life must find expression in Kohnstamm's personalistic formulation of the general aim of education. These dimensions are: "inner peace" or "happiness," morality and responsibility, sociality, the worthwhileness of each person, and the pluriformity of truth.

If we look at Dewey's educational view, we find that Dewey's instrumentalism is through and through a-dualistic. He does not even separate educational theory from
philosophy. The educative process is equated with the reconstruction of experience, i.e., the improvement of the quality of experience. The educative process qua process has no final end, since life is an on-goingness in which everything is interrelated. The aim of education, according to the instrumentalistic view, is in the educative process itself: education is its own end. In other words the aim of education is the promotion of self-actualization. This means that the educator has to provide the growing individual with the most adequate social and material environment which may provoke the reconstruction of experiences. The assumption of reconstruction implies the recognition of the creativity of the individual. Each individual and each situation in which the individual is involved, is unique. Only intelligent behavior and reconstruction of experiences can deal with the unique situation adequately.

In spite of the monistic view of Dewey, he still sees the diversities and the uniqueness of situations as facts that cannot be denied. It seems that Dewey's concept of the continuity of reality, on the one hand, and the reconstruction of experience, on the other hand, is an attempt to bring the manifoldness of things under one meaningful order.

In the instrumentalistic view, morality is not a fixed concept. Moral values are both intrinsic and
instrumentalistic, viz., they form not only the enjoyable moments of man's life, but they serve also as guiding views of man's conduct. Something is morally justified when it satisfies the situation in which the interest of other people are also involved. So morality is "situational" as well as social. Sociality is also situational.

In Dewey's view, too, the worthwhileness of the person is recognized, since the educative effort takes the uniqueness of the individual into full consideration. In order to understand the uniqueness of the person, the educator should assume an attitude of understanding, acceptance and open-mindedness. Hence, the educative process is that of continuous involvement, interest, and reconstruction. In this frame of reference, the creation of problematic situations is educationally meaningful.

The last approach we discussed was Langeveld's phenomenological pedagogics. Educational theory is, according to Langeveld, an autonomous discipline which presumes much philosophical reflection, particularly on the meaning of "man." It is, however, not blind to the importance of experimental material about man, particularly about the child. With both philosophical and psychological knowledge about man and the child, the educative process can be studied and described adequately. The "educational situation" is the most crucial moment in the educative process. From the analysis of the "educational
situation" can be deduced the obvious aim of education, i.e., maturity. Maturity has biological, social, psychological, and moral -- also religious -- qualities, in short maturity should be interpreted pedagogically. Pedagogical maturity means moral independence, viz., capable of assuming full responsibilities concerning one's own determination, and co-responsibilities with the life partner in a matrimonial partnership.

The concept of maturity is, of course, not the end of life in general. But it forms the minimum condition for an adequate life, in order to realize certain aims or destinations, whatever these life aims may be. It is not the concern of education, as such, says Langeveld, to determine the aim of life. In this light, the aim of education has but a tentative character with respect to the life aim.

It is thus clear that the various views we discussed differ considerably from each other, and that they even seem to contradict each other. Nevertheless these differing views have still certain characteristics in common with respect to the educational scene.

We may wonder now: Could not we make an attempt to integrate all of the contradictions and similarities of the multicolored ideas we encountered? We are confronted with the fact of diversities, but deep in our feeling is a faith that there is somehow an all-embracing
order in the universe, through which only the differences have meaning.

Men have differing aims for their educational endeavors, nevertheless we are looking for something general, for some common purpose. Without a common objective, there is a great chance of working at cross-purposes, of hindering each other, so that people stand in each other's light.

If we cannot possibly find each other, we should not also say to each other: Each of us can go his own way! As human beings of the same origin, we are tied to each other. We are people as "man between man." We are bound to each other with responsibilities which are apparently inherent in man.

On the other hand we are "proud" of having responsibilities. We will be glad to be allowed to take all the consequences of our deeds on our own shoulders. We want to be autonomous. We want to be ourselves. We shall never desire to be someone else, in spite of our own sufferings, troubles and problems. Although we are sometimes jealous of the good fortune of someone else, we never want to be someone else.

Moreover, we want also to be happy. This indicates that we are always concerned -- consciously or unconsciously -- with the fate or the state of our "soul."

The psychologist-scientist, who "does not have a soul,"
who explains the human animal's behavior in terms of motivations and muscle—or sense organ-reflexes, is not less concerned with his own "happiness," with his own inner life than the most dedicated priest.

The Catholic believer who walks along his path of life with sin-complexes, and with paradise- and inferno complexes, is essentially concerned with the fate of his soul. Why should we grudge him the way he leads his life? Jedermann kann nach seiner Façon selig werden! (Everybody can be happy after his own fashion or style!).

Whether or not one believes in metaphysical entities and in the immortality of the soul, the fact remains that one's fundamental issue is one's own self and the selves of others, as far as they are related to one's faith or conviction.

The five main educational approaches we explored, have some essentials in common. These may be indicated by the terms morality, intelligence, and happiness, usually combined, and sometimes differently emphasized.

Socrates worded the integration of the three dimensions with arete or virtue. By this he meant a total state of well-being, in which morality, insight, and happiness are fused into one total state of integration. This is the way Socrates "realized his Self."

The Catholic believer equates religion with education. Education is supposed to be the means through which
the religious ideals can be realized. And his religious ideal is the salvation of the soul, his soul and that of others. Though we may not agree with the methods he uses -- because he cannot leave another's soul undisquieted through his universalism and his belief, we may agree with the idea of the "salvation of the soul" as such. We do not agree, however, with the way the Catholic interprets this salvation idea and the universalistic way he consequently accomplishes his educational task, with respect to other "souls." Jesus' saying "Go and sin no more" is frequently interpreted by Catholic authorities as "If you are going to sin (=violate our universal tenets), we will excommunicate you!" This, of course, must be considered to be uneducational, since it deprives the "prospective sinner" from any chance for further face-to-face communication. Exclusivism is an inadequate kind of educational practice.

Kohnstamm with his theistic personalism hinted also at the desirability of a "peace of mind" in his formulation of the general aim of education. His concept of "peace of mind" is not purely individualistic, however, since he connected the concept of happy maturity with that of responsibility. The latter implies at the same time conscience, morality (referring to norms), and sociality of man. Responsibility asks for intelligence as well, since one who has the sense of responsibility, is
supposed to have sufficient insight and foresight so as to minimize the probability of errors.

Dewey the instrumentalist, in spite of his ongoingness philosophy, had no less an eye for the highest spiritual values, called the "enjoyable moments of life" — of course, in the instrumentalistic sense. The enjoyments or values include not only morality, but also beauty and intelligence. Dewey employed also the term "taste" to indicate what he really meant:

The word "taste" has perhaps got too completely associated with arbitrary liking to express the nature of judgments of value. But if the word be used in the sense of an appreciation at once cultivated and active, one may say that the formation of taste is the chief matter wherever values enter in, whether intellectual, esthetic, or moral.

Taste, if we use the word in its best sense, is the outcome of experience brought cumulatively to bear on the intelligent appreciation of the real worth of likings and enjoyments. There is nothing in which a person so completely reveals himself as in the things which he judges enjoyable and desirable. Such judgments are the sole alternative to the domination of belief by impulse, chance, blind habit and self-interest. The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste with respect to what is esthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of experience.2

We found also that, In Dewey's view, the meaning of education is the provision of the individual with the appropriate

social and material milieu -- since the aim of education
is in the educative process itself -- so as to enable the
individual to accomplish his growth, his self-realization.
The task of the educator is to contact the individual with
the best possible social and material conditions, so that
the educand may promote actively the quality of his ex-
perience.

We concluded, however, that this pragmatical bio-
social concept of condition is insufficient for the human
self-realization in its broadest and deepest sense (see
Chapter VII, Dewey's Educational Ideas). It does not
necessarily include the existentical-psychological con-
dition of man himself -- i.e., his own total state of
well-being. Without this primary condition -- the psycho-
hygienically integrated personality -- one can never
accomplish his self-realization adequately, no matter how
adequate the material and social provisions are. This
psychological-existential condition should finally be
accomplished by the individual himself: man is the maker
of his own condition. He is creative and constructive
enough to maximize his own existential condition. In
Chapter IX, A Concept of Personality, we indicated that
the maximum degree of integration -- with the maximum
degree of creativity -- can only be attained when the
integration occurs at the highest ontological level, i.e.,
at the level of the Ego-Self integration.
The educator helps the young people with this developmental task. Only on this primary condition of an "existential wholeness" -- which is, in turn, partly conditioned by the material and social environment -- the person can accomplish the fullest possible self-realization.

Langeveld, too, hinted at this necessary condition, in order to enable the person to attain his life aim (whatever the content of this life aim may be). This necessary condition was termed "maturity" by Langeveld. This is, then, according to him, the aim of education. His concept of maturity implies also responsibility and self-determination. Determination refers to a further end. This further end, however, is no more the responsibility of the educator. It is the full self-responsibility of the educated person himself as a mature adult. No one has the right to deprive him of this self-responsibility.

If we may interpret Dewey's educational endeavor as the provision of the growing individual with the most appropriate bio-social condition in the reconstructive (creative) sense, in order to facilitate the attainment of self-realization, we may say that Dewey, in this frame of reference, does not differ fundamentally from Langeveld. The latter, to be sure, held similarly that the "aim" of education is to help the individual to become mature (in its broadest and deepest sense). Maturity may be then,
interpreted as the necessary condition from which the individual can start in realizing his life goal. The latter may, in a certain sense, be interpreted as self-realization.

Langeveld's concept of maturity, however, does not imply (at least not explicitly in his explanations) the quality of creative mental health, since he puts the emphasis on morality -- there is good and evil -- rather than on the total mental state, as it was suggested by Socrates.

Summarizing, then, our conclusions concerning the general aim of education, we may present them in the following formulation:

The general aim of education is the facilitation of creating the personal maximum condition for Self-realization.

Let us analyze the implications of this statement. "Facilitation" -- instead of imposition, indoctrination, or drilling -- implies the respect of the worthwhileness and autonomy of the person involved in the educative process. Facilitation implies also a help to be rendered to the person who needs help. The meaning of help is that the person to be helped will be able later to be independent in making decisions in consequence of the character of the aid provided. Without this objective
in view, all of our educational efforts would be meaningless.

"Creating" indicates the creative process in the human growth. It is not a passive one. It is a constructive and reconstructive growth. Creativity implies the possibility of the emergence of novel dimensions. It is not a novelty for its own sake, but for a further aim -- i.e., "Self-realization." In novelty, the uniqueness of each personality structure and of each "situation" is acknowledged. Creativity points also to differentiation and development. It is, however, not a purposeless and capricious creativity, since it should serve as a "maximum" condition, in order to attain a further objective.

"Personal" in "personal maximum condition" implies the personalness or uniqueness of one's demands, interests, and needs, in short, of one's total condition. Any development is based on certain conditions. If these conditions are not met, the goals -- whatever these may be -- cannot be attained.

"Condition" is a kind of dynamic state of equilibrium, not only "within" the person himself, but also a dynamic balance between "person and world." The "world" is not conceived of only as existing "outside" the person, as the "objective" world, but includes also his own "existential ground" on which he rests. The condition
includes, thus, all of the relationships of the person to the world, his world, "horizontal" as well as "vertical."

The "horizontal" relationship is the "foreground" relationship of the biological being to his material and social environment. This relationship is spatial as well as temporal, forming thus a space-time continuum of cultural relationships.

The "vertical" relationship is the "background" relationship, the metaphysical relationship to the totality of things, including values, feeling, and beliefs. Since this metaphysical relationship is "timeless," it may be "culture-free." It is for this reason that one's religious belief is not necessarily "public" in character; one does not have to account for his religious belief to others.

"Maximum" means that the task of education is to "maximize" the person's growth. It does not mean, however, "in all possible" directions, since man -- because of his creativity -- lodges within himself not only "good" potentials, but also "bad" ones. The "bad" meaning of it can never be included, since the conception of condition as such precludes such a negative meaning -- i.e., condition may not be self-destructive. Morbidity or insanity is a self-destructive kind of condition.
"Maximum condition" means the most comprehensive possible condition, at least within the framework of the potentials of the person involved. "Maximum" refers also to the concept of personality as a totality, to a total state of well-being, including morality, intelligence, happiness, and physical health. It is the integrated state of personality which is called maturity and optimum normality. It involves also responsibility. These issues were discussed in Chapter IX.

"Self-realization" has many connotations, of course. It means first of all the actualized self, the empirical or phenomenal self. At the same time it implies the recognition of the existential or metaphysical ground of the actualized self. This is the origin, the positive metaphysical "condition" on which the "I" and the "Me" -- both "synthesized" in the Ego -- rest. The Ego is the human aspect of the Self which is aware of itself, of its own ability and dignity. Self-realization without assuming the reality of a metaphysical entity would be an empty idea.

Self-realization is a purposive activity, is pointing to something meaningful and worthwhile. Self-realization refers also to a certain ideal. But this ideal is for each person different. Each person is free to choose his own ideal of Self-realization, only under one
condition -- namely, that he may not lose contact with his own existential ground, because his own ground is the source of his symbolic creativity, such as language, arts, science, and philosophy. The metaphysical Self is also the source of his religious activity, if he prefers to shape his Self-realization this religious way.

It is also the inexhaustible source of his creative being, which source Whitehead called the Infinitude (Cf. note 9, Chapter IX). In Whitehead's frame of reference, Self-realization means also the activation of the contact between the person's metaphysical ground and the objective world, including his fellow-men. This contact is a dynamic tension between the Self and the Mitwelt (fellow-men) and Umwelt (objective environment). Through this contact the person becomes more and more aware of the world surrounding him, but also of himself. The Ego is then the center of both kinds of awareness. The Ego itself is elusive. Its structure follows the growth and the unfolding of the personality. Personality is thus, the total Self-ego-world interrelationship.

The more adequate the contact between the personality and the world (more extensive and more intensive), the more adequate or intelligent his behavior. Intelligent behavior promotes the richness and adequacy of the person's total "condition." Instruction is chiefly concerned with
this person-and-world contact, and contributes, therefore, to the richness of the "human condition."

Self-realization includes also the fullest integration of all human dimensions, since it falls back on its own existential ground. Since the Self is recognized as the only real ground in which man puts his trust, he can confront life with full confidence. And this, in turn, reduces existential anxiety and increases the total well-being.

One may wonder: Should education be really necessary for the creation of the most adequate condition of the individual? Why could not he rely solely on his own creativity? The help of mature persons is indeed "technically" necessary, since the creation of the "personal maximum condition" is attended with many troubles and obstacles. Moreover, the world of realized Self, is the world of mature adults. In order to be admitted in the adult world and to be able to communicate with this adult world, children should be helped by mature adults. Children should be, therefore, educated.
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