THE IMAGE OF WAR IN AMERICA, 1891-1917:
A STUDY OF A LITERARY THEME AND ITS CULTURAL ORIGINS AND ANALOGUES

DISSERTATION

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"Aggression in the American character is seen as response rather than as primary behavior."

Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, 1943

"But to get the real thing!" cried Vernall, the war-correspondent. "It seems impossible! It is because war is neither magnificent nor squalid; it is simply life, and an expression of life can always evade us. We can never tell life, one to another, although sometimes we think we can."

Stephen Crane, *Wounds in the Rain*, 1900
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

In 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt, criticizing Jane Addams' new book *Newer Ideals in Peace*, based his attack on what he considered the *idée fixe* of the book—"the theory that antimilitarism [was] the solvent for all [the] troubles" then disturbing the world. Miss Addams' idea of militarism, said Roosevelt, was "preposterous"; but, he added,

granting that it were right the fact would remain that militarism has no more to do with the <crisis> of American society than, say, eating horseflesh in honor of Thor. The benefits and abuses of militarism are very real in the social and industrial life of the nations of continental Europe; but militarism has been a practically imponderable element in producing the social and industrial conditions of England during the last ninety years, and has not been any element at all in the United States for the past forty years.¹

On the surface, at least, Roosevelt's distinction between the conditions of continental Europe and those of the United States was a valid one. Certainly one did not find in the United States in 1908 the general military atmosphere—marching troops in the streets, uniformed men in the railroad cars, and the like—that one found abroad. Similarly, the problems faced by the protagonist in Henry James' *Owen Wingrave* in rebelling against a family tradition of soldiering that

¹ Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 238.
spread over three centuries were very rarely the problems faced by young Americans of any class. The American tradition was a peaceful tradition, and since the Civil War, Americans had concentrated on such domestic problems as becoming established in the West, finding jobs in cities, and making a living in a society dominated by the Gospel of Wealth. While it is true that many veterans of the Civil War were still alive and many more younger men and women still lived more or less in terms of the traditional memories of that war, the tendency among them was to view it as one of the great integrators of national spirit, the producer of many heroes—even demi-gods—but not as the beginning of any kind of military tradition. Americans, even in 1898, generally assumed peace as normal and lived according to that assumption.

This sense of peace and security, the lengthening tradition of isolation from the World's troubles and concentration on domestic experience, lay, perhaps, behind Roosevelt's statement concerning militarism and America. But it is interesting to note that during this same period Roosevelt could assert to a friend:

The Country that loses the capacity to hold its own in actual warfare with other nations, will ultimately show that it has lost everything. I abhor and despise the pseudo-humanitarianism which treats advance in civilization as necessarily and rightfully implying a weakening of the fighting spirit and which therefore invites destruction to the advanced civilization by some less-advanced type.²

Certainly this view indicates that militarism was a "ponderable element" in America, as in the rest of the world, at the beginning of the twentieth century. And underlying Roosevelt's two statements, one finds an indication of a conflict which markedly characterised
American culture during this period—and gave the question of militarism, and whether or not it existed as a force in America—a special significance for Roosevelt's contemporaries.

One must study this American attitude towards peace and war—and all it might imply for the workings of the intellect and the imagination and for the establishing and expressing of a system of belief—during periods of peace, since Americans have always, during periods of war, put aside their ostensible beliefs and attitudes and rallied both in word and action to support their country's cause. The 1890's—up to the Spanish-American War in 1898—and the first sixteen years of the twentieth century may be classified as years of peace; there is abundant evidence, at least, to indicate that the people who lived during those years felt, even celebrated the fact, that they were at peace with the world. As such, these years offer themselves as a special period for study to the student interested in attitudes toward war and peace.

As evidence one can cite the rapid and energetic growth of peace societies at the end of the century. There were 425 such societies in the world by 1900—15 of which were in the United States. And these years saw the founding, in 1897, of the Nobel Peace Prize, by Alfred Nobel; the creation, in 1910, of the World Peace Foundation, by Edwin Ginn; and the establishment, also in 1910, of the Endowment for International Peace, by Andrew Carnegie. These actions by wealthy pacifists, marking a new kind of interest in the question of World Peace, stimulated other groups—college students, economists, sociologists, politicians—to support the cause of Peace. Most notable were the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the first conferences of their kind to be convened in a period of peace, and the many local conferences, such as those at Lake Mohonk, which had as their goals the ultimate abolition of war in the world.

Running the gamut from narrow, uncompromising pacifists to intelligent, progressive students of international politics and law, these societies flooded the country with pamphlets, books, and other documents. Alfred Love and the Universal Peace Union; Benjamin Trueblood and the American Peace Society (with its publication the Advocate of Peace); the extremely active New York Peace Society, headed by Andrew Carnegie; James Brown Scott and the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes—these were among the sixty-three societies formally dedicating themselves to the cause of peace during the years before the first World War. And they were aided by such men as Andrew D. White, Nicholas Murray Butler, Lyman Abbott, William Jennings Bryan, Joseph Choate, Charles W. Eliot, David Starr Jordan, Seth Low, Brander Matthews, Elihu Root, and William W. Sloans.

In the area of political action, also, Americans seemed to concentrate on ways to achieve peace. The list during these years of America's contributions to international arbitration is long: In addition to the Hague Conferences, there were the Venezuela treaties, in 1899 and 1903; the Pan American Unions, in 1901-02, 1906, 1910, and Elihu Root's trip to South America, stressing the need for peace and security; the Alaska Boundary Settlement, in 1903; the fourteen Hay Arbitration Treaties, modeled after the treaty prepared at the first Hague Conference; the twenty-five Root Treaties completed in 1907-1908
between all the leading world powers except Germany; the General Act of Algeciras, in 1906, signed under the guidance of President Roosevelt; and the thirty Bryan Treaties, with all major powers except Germany, which provided for "cooling off" periods to allow for investigations of difficulties between nations.

Certainly America seemed to be fulfilling the hopes of former President Cleveland when he wrote to a friend in 1893, "The abolition of war, as a means of settling disputes among the nations, at first the dream of philanthropists, now seems to be getting every year nearer and nearer; and it is to be hoped that our nation will do much in the future to hasten the day when the desire for peace shall be more prevalent among the nations of the earth." Certainly one of the strongest forces among the people of pre-war America was that which lay behind their expressed desire for World Peace.

There were, however, other forces at work which vitiated the drive for peace and ultimately destroyed it in April, 1917. Behind the traditional and growing hold of nationalism, national honor, and national interests lay assumptions which accepted war as a means of protecting these essentially American interests; and there were also traditions which we know as Manifest Destiny, Social Darwinism, Christian Expansionism, Economic Expansionism, and Anglo-Saxon Supremacy, which accepted war as a possible necessity in the achievement of their ends. By 1900 America, despite her traditional and declared isolationism, was a world power and was firmly set on her courses of imperialism in the Pacific and the Caribbean and paternalism in South and Central America—courses which necessitated military and naval forces to protect her new
position among the nations of the world. While the forces for peace were achieving their most impressive results in American history, both new and traditional conflicting forces were drawing America relentlessly into armed world conflict.

Even many advocates of peace seemed to sense the inevitability of war. The very force of their protests portended imminent difficulties. A representative appeal (or attack) is the following statement of 1910:

If I should enlist for service in the Department of Murder I should feel thoroughly embarrassed and ashamed of myself. It is all clear to me now.

This is the way of it, brother:

In going to war I must work like a horse and be as poor as a mouse, must be as humble as a toad, as meek as a sheep and obey like a dog; I must fight like a tiger, be as cruel as a shark, bear burdens like a mule and eat stale food like a half-starved wolf; for fifteen or twenty dollars a month I must turn against my own working class and thus make an ass and a cat's-paw of myself; and after the war I should be socially despised and snubbed as a sucker and a cur by the same distinguished "leading citizens" who wheedled me to war and afterward gave me the horse-laugh;—and thus I should feel like a monkey and look like a plucked goose in January.

Indeed I am glad to see it all clearly.

I want you to see it clearly.6

One wonders about the vehemence of this view, especially when public figures at the same time were declaring and praising American security and isolation from war. In 1910, again, Representative Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, addressed the Congress:

The attitude of our sturdy forefathers, that our happy isolation in the Western Hemisphere, relieves us from the necessity of maintaining costly armaments, whether on land, or on sea, is as sound today, as it was in their time, with this added element in its favor, that as an economic proposition, no nation of the civilised world, would dare to risk the bankruptcy that would
inevitably follow a naval or land war attempted to be prosecuted to its ultimate issue against the United States. Our vast resources, our virile, stubborn, and determined spirit, are as well known to our possible adversaries, as to ourselves, and they afford this country without burden, or expense, a greater guaranty against war, and a more steadfast assurance of peace, than the most elaborate, and ambitious scheme of naval expansion.

Against the views of both Kirkpatrick and Saunders were those expressed by Theodore Roosevelt and his followers. "I think," wrote Roosevelt in 1907, "that more nonsense is talked about peace than about any other really good cause with which I am acquainted. Everybody ought to believe in peace and everybody ought to believe in temperance; but the professional advocates of both tend toward a peculiarly annoying form of egotistic lunacy." And he added later, "...the fool who continually screams against war and for peace, without regard to whether one or the other is righteous, is as noxious as the wealthy man in whom the desire to achieve wealth has swallowed up all thoughts of patriotism, and of pride in the exercise of the manlier virtues."

Perhaps the concrete results of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and of the many arbitration treaties mentioned earlier are the best evidence to indicate how these tensions pushed a somewhat refractory America toward war. America, as a new world power, was yet unready to assume the obligations of a world power; and one has a significant key to the difficulty in the first phrase of Article Nine of the Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes: "In disputes of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests [italics mine]...." Time after time, in the conferences and in
the negotiations of such agreements as the Hay Arbitration Treaties and the unratified Taft-Knox Treaties with France and Great Britain in 1911, Americans (usually the Senate) insisted on excepting from arbitration questions affecting the vital interests, independence, or honor of the contracting parties. Americans, it would seem, realized the need for peace, but they were consistently unwilling to recognize that government among nations demanded a sacrifice of some national traditions—traditions which were the heart of national honor, interests, and independence.

It was this attitude which moved Andrew Carnegie to cry, in 1907, "We exclaim, 'Oh, Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!' but these are trifling compared with those committed in the name of 'Honor,' the most dishonored word in our language." Dishonored or no, however, the term was sacred to Americans, and this devotion is crucial here because of the equation which they established between honor and war. By refusing to arbitrate questions of honor, vital interest, or independence and by refusing, at the same time, to define precisely what they meant by these terms, Americans were declaring, "We'll go to war only if we think we have an excuse for it." The dangers inherent in such an equation were clear to the young internationalist Leo Perla, when he wrote, in 1917, that a traditional expression like national honor fills people with an emotional thrill, calls forth not only a spontaneous intellectual approval, no matter in what connection it arises, but also a deliberate moral justification, even though conventional morality must be torn to shreds in the process." And perhaps they were clear to many people living in America during the period
1891-1917; but the fact remains that Americans entered the War in 1917 following their leaders' declarations and decisions that were grounded largely in the "exceptions" noted in previous attempts at establishing international peace.

These emotions developed, in short, out of an apparently irrec-
concilable conflict between the traditional values and beliefs of an
isolated and peaceful America and the obvious, if sometimes ignored,
necessities inherent in America's new expansionist role and her position
as a world power. This change in role was recognized in 1904 by Edgar
Lee Masters, in his essay "The Philippine Conquest":

The trouble is that the theory of our soldiery has
been changed. Small in comparison as it is, it is
the army of an empire and not of a republic. Our
soldiers in the Philippines are not fighting for any
principle. They are not defending their homes. They
are not staying aggression. They are not repelling
an attack upon liberty. There is no sentiment in the
struggle. There is no conscience in the fight. It
is of no consequence to our soldiers whether they win
or lose, except as a matter of honor, advancement and
money. For these they are there to conquer....

And twelve years later the philosopher Ralph Barton Perry could discuss
its implications more generally: "[The] methods [of war] have so altered
that it has almost wholly ceased to be an art or a romantic adventure
which may appeal to the amateur or which a man may follow as a polite
vocation. It is even ceasing to possess a code of honor. It is ugly,
sordid and prosaic, offensive to taste and repugnant to humanity."

Behind these issues of "Peace or War?" "Republic or Empire?"
"Honor or Dishonor?" lay a complex group of assumptions concerning war
itself. Although these assumptions varied, perhaps, among the paci-
fists, the imperialists and the internationalists, they were strong;
and in their strength (and their uniqueness) lies their significance for the cultural historian. These assumptions fall into two categories—both of which are highly colored by emotions and may be present at once in the same person. These categories, stated simply, are (1) War is bad and (2) War is good. This conflict is not subject to logical analysis. It is enough to say that it exists and to see how and where it exists. To understand it finally, however, one must study the imaginative literature of the period and its relations to its sources and analogues in the culture in which it is produced.

For out of such complex and conflicting emotions and attitudes, as Mr. Lionel Trilling has suggested, develop ideas—propositions whose intention is to resolve such complexity and conflict. Such ideas are crucial in the creative process and become vital elements in the literature produced during the period when they are alive. They may appear as explicit subject in works of literature—or they may appear as implicit assumptions, as part of or a reason for themes, complications of plot, development of characters, points of view, settings, symbols, images—even as stylistic devices and characteristics of language. One cannot predict where or in what form he will find these ideas. But in imaginative literature, it seems to me, one is most likely to find, in comprehensible form, the ways in which the paradoxes and conflicts concerning war and peace motivated men in the period under discussion. This is not to say certainly that one can establish a one-to-one relationship between literature and the culture which produces it, but this does say that in the literature one will find, not precisely argument or declared opinions for one side or another, but the contradictions, the
inconsistencies, the paradoxes as they existed in the culture—he will find, in short, on the imaginative level, the projection of emotional conflicts which cannot be understood by "rational" analysis.

An example of the difficulties created by these imaginative projections is the discussion, by the noted pacifist Lucia A. Mead, of "The Martial Type of Character," published in 1910 as a Sunday School lesson. "Distinction needs to be made," she said,

between the doing away with war and the doing away with the admirable qualities of the martial type of character. The latter is not dependent upon the former. Figures of speech, analogies, and symbolisms were taken both by Jesus Christ and the apostles from the life of the times. Moral ideas had to be clothed in bodily form that the people would appreciate. Their Christian ideals had to grow out of the good ideas or mental pictures they already possessed. This would seem to be a sufficient reason for the warlike and soldierly terms found in the Bible. Should these be conserved today? Do the words, 'The Son of God goes forth to war,' or 'Onward, Christian Soldiers, marching as to war,' express our highest ideals? The tunes to which these words are set give inspiration for any noble struggle or any victorious effort, but the words suggest a mental imagery inconsistent with other moral teachings. To seek a spiritual ideal from what is realized today to be an immoral act or condition is a contradiction. Where, outside of the army and the navy, is the martial type of character and life found? Can you think of any soldier business men, or soldier scientists, or soldier professional men in your own community?

In attempting to demonstrate (with her repeated use of the word today) the anachronistic nature of "mental imagery" based upon "the admirable qualities of the martial type of character," Mrs. Mead encountered a difficulty which she could neither resolve nor side-step. She recognised the contradiction implicit in the conveying of spiritual ideals through words based, from her point of view, in immoral acts or conditions, but the rhetorical questions with which she tried to expose or to destroy the contradiction merely emphasise how firmly it was
implanted in the minds of her fellow Americans. As I shall demonstrate later, one can turn to the literature of her period for the answers to these questions. And if Mrs. Mead had turned to this literature, she would have found that writers, like Jesus Christ and his apostles, took "figures of speech, analogies, and symbolisms...from the life of the times." She would have found, moreover, that "warlike and soldierly terms" were employed in relation to business men, scientists, professional men, lovers, and more.

Most obvious, certainly, was the soldier as explicit subject—Henry Fleming, for instance, in Stephen Crane's The Red Badge of Courage (1895). Like many American boys, Henry had "dreamed of battles all his life—of vague and bloody conflicts that had thrilled him with their sweep and fire. In visions he had seen himself in many struggles. He had imagined peoples secure in the shadow of his eagle-eyed prowess." Yet, like Mrs. Mead, in a sense, he thought that battles and thoughts of war were anachronisms in his own time. "He had put them as things of the bygone with his thought—images of heavy crowns and high castles." In the war, however, although Henry sees himself as "an animal blistered and sweating in the heat and pain of war," he leads his company's advance, rescues the flag, heads his company's charge as flag bearer—and emerges in the end as a hero. Only because he has demonstrated personal courage under fire can Henry turn "with a lover's thirst to images of tranquil skies, fresh meadows, cool brooks—an existence of soft and eternal peace." For both Mrs. Mead and Stephen Crane, perhaps, the war in the novel is an "immoral act or condition," yet Fleming's position as hero depends upon this war. Mrs. Mead, it would seem, chose to
ignore the strength of the war-honor-hero association, but it was certainly a part of the contradiction which moved her.

Less obvious, perhaps, were the soldier business men, soldier scientists, and soldier professional men. But the soldier is implied, certainly, in Frank Norris' \textit{The Pit}, when business men Curtis Jadwin and Landry Court are presented as the General and his soldier, held together, in defeat, by the bonds of loyalty and honor that distinguish (one must assume) the military professions.

...Landry Court, loyal to the last, his one remaining soldier, white, shaking, the sobs strangling in his throat, clung to him desperately. Another billow of wheat was coming. They two—the beaten general and his young armour bearer—heard it coming....

And the soldier scientist is implied in Henry James' \textit{The Wings of the Dove} as Milly Theal reacts to Sir Luke Strett:

His large, settled face, though firm, was not, as she thought at first, hard; he looked, in the oddest manner, to her fancy, half like a general and half like a bishop, and she was soon sure that, within some such handsome range, what it would show her would be what was good, what was best for her.

Similarly the soldier professional man—and soldier lover—is implied in Robert W. Chambers' \textit{The Firing Line}, as the title and the following headings from the table of contents indicate:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[I.] A Skirmish
  \item[II.] A Landing
  \item[III.] An Advance
  \item[IV.] Reconnaissance
  \item[V.] A Flank Movement
  \item[VI.] Armistice
  \item[VII.] A Change of Base
  \item[VIII.] Maneuvering
  \item[IX.] The Invasion
  \item[X.] Terra Incognita
  \item[XI.] Pathfinders
\end{itemize}
The Firing Line is a love story and is not about war—yet the soldier is there; he passes through all stages of the battle to the "enemy's" capitulation—and emerges a hero.

Closer to Mrs. Mead's own problem is the following poem by Susan Coolidge which appeared in 1907 and implied some interesting equations concerning the soldier Christian:

**TEMPERED**

When stern occasion calls for war,
    And the trumpets shrill and peal,
Forges and armories ring all day
    With the fierce clash of steel.
The blades are heated in the flame,
    And cooled in icy flood,
And beaten hard, and beaten well,
    To make them firm and pliable,
Their edge and temper good;
Then tough and sharp with discipline,
They win the fight for fighting man.

When God's occasions call for men,
    His chosen souls he takes,
In life's hot fire he tempers them,
    With tears he cools and slakes;
With many a heavy, grievous stroke
    He beats them to an edge,
And tests and tries, again, again,
Till the hard will is fused, and pain
    Becomes high privilege;
Then strong, and quickened through and through,
They ready are his work to do.

Like an on-rushing, furious host
    The tide of need and sin,
Unless the blades shall tempered be,
    They have no chance to win;
God trusts to no untested sword
    When he goes forth to war;
Only the souls that, beaten long
On pain's great anvil, have grown strong,
HIS chosen weapons are.
Ah souls, on pain's great anvil laid,
Remember this, nor be afraid! 23

On this evidence, "Onward, Christian Soldiers, marching as to war"
would not seem to be a lone anachronism early in the twentieth century;
and the equations established between God and war, man and the sword
gain additional significance when they are placed alongside the last
stanzas from Miss Coolidge's poem "Thy Righteousness Is Like The Strong
Mountains":

Strong are the mountains, Lord, but stronger thou!
Immutable they stand from age to age
Though the world rock and empires shift and pale;
So, though the people war and heathen rage,
The safety of thy promise shall prevail,
Nor ever once thy love and goodness fail. 24

Here in two essentially religious poems by the same author one
finds the imaginative projection of the basic paradox which would seem
to have characterized America's attitudes toward war and peace in her
time. The ultimate goal of this study is to establish both the forms
of and the pervasiveness of such imaginative projections in the literature
bound on one end by the appearance in America of Stephen Crane and
other writers of the literature of protest in 1891 and on the other by America's entry into the War in 1917.

I have selected these writers of protest as a starting point for three reasons: They mark a break in the traditional "heroic" treatment of war as a subject in poetry, prose fiction, and songs of the nineteenth century--literature which, while it in a passive kind of way professed an abhorrence of the destruction and death resulting from war, perpetuated the American Guy Livingstone and glorified the course of American democracy through its military heroes; they mark a kind of beginning of a literary tradition in America, one informed by a philosophy of determinism and characterized by a detached, scientific treatment of experience; and they appeared at a time when the question "War or Peace?" was gaining the new significance which I have outlined thus far.

I conclude with America's entry into the War in April, 1917, not because it has special literary significance, but because it marks the breaking point for all the forces working for both war and peace. With "Make the World Safe for Democracy" as their slogan, Americans almost unanimously joined behind President Wilson in his Declaration of War; and from this point on new forces were at work, new conflicts developed—all of which, certainly, were related to the period immediately preceding the War but are the subject for another study. This dissertation examines the period of peace and explains, in many ways, the bases for the profound disillusionment of writers like Ernest Hemingway and John Dos Passos after the War. In between lies the War.

In the following chapters I shall attempt, first, to examine the culture which produced the literature which is both the object and the
subject of this dissertation, to establish the relations of war and peace to some of the significant political events, the political, social, economic, religious, and philosophical ideas, and the popular beliefs and responses. Then I shall explore the literature itself—that in which war appears as a subject and that in which war appears as substance, i.e., as a result of or means to the artist's imaginative creation—relating my discoveries to the cultural patterns which I shall have already established.

To convey the significance of these "discoveries" I can do no better, I think, than use the words of Mr. Henry Nash Smith in his "Preface" to Virgin Land: "I do not mean to raise the question whether such products of the imagination accurately reflect empirical fact. They exist on a different plane. But as I have tried to show, they sometimes exert a decided influence on practical affairs."25
Chapter Two

MARCHING AS TO WAR

I. PATTERNS: 1891-1917

Lying in the popular mood in which ideology often germinates, the seed of imperialism was an inclination toward two emotions akin to the elements of imperialist ideology.... These two emotions, diverse as the olive-branch and the arrow of the American eagle, were humanitarianism and a belligerent spirit of national self-assertion. These were the two components of the new desire for "a vigorous foreign policy," which became widespread as the nation emerged from domestic reconstruction to a keen consciousness of moral and political-commercial interests beyond its borders. 1

Expansion, imperialism, world responsibility—these are the terms that characterize the growth of America in the 1890's and in the years leading up to the World War in 1917. They represent a culmination of forces which, despite the power of the advice inherited from George Washington—"Steer clear of entangling alliances!"—had pushed inevitably toward a greater, more influential America. The tradition of expansion had developed as the frontier moved ever westward, and when the Pacific Ocean was reached, "We must look outward" seemed a logical continuation of the tradition of "Manifest Destiny." This term, created in the 1840's to justify America's tendencies then, particularly in its war with Mexico in 1846-47, worked also to describe the

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 239.
apparently manifest mission of Anglo-Saxons, of Americans, to bear the burden of enlightenment, to carry the advantages of their higher civilization to the less civilized portions of the world:

Along all history, down the slopes,
As a rivulet running, sinking now, and now again to the surface rising,
A ceaseless thought, a varied train—lo, soul, to thee, thy sight, they rise,
The plans, the voyages again, the expeditions;
Again Vasco de Gama sails forth,
Again the knowledge gain'd, the mariner's compass,
Lands found and nations born, thou born America,
For purpose vast, man's long probation fill'd,
Thou rondure of the world at last accomplish'd. 2

The tradition of imperialism, although it was, as Americans knew, anomalous to the ideal of the American constitution, had developed during the nineteenth century—in the expressed intentions to see Cuba, Mexico, and Canada as ultimately parts of America; in the purchase from Russia of Alaska, in 1868; in the attempts to secure San Domingo and Hawaii; in the controversy surrounding British, German, and American control in Samoa; and in the general adherence to the principles set forth in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. And the awareness of a kind of world responsibility was the necessary consequence of the rapid economic and industrial growth of the United States during the nineteenth century, and of her increasing geographic and strategic importance as the shifts in the traditional balances of power in Europe took place. The power of England was declining; the power of Russia and of Germany was growing.

The development of these conditions in America had been slow, often almost completely obscured; but the war with Spain was a kind of catalyst, speeding up the processes of expansion and imperialism, emphasizing America's position of world responsibility, and marking the
apparent defeat of the men who had resisted what seemed to them the trends away from the American democratic system. Between the expansionists and the anti-expansionists there had been, and there remained, the fundamental question, charged with emotion: How could a country whose heritage was a firm belief in self-government justify actions that meant shunning that heritage? 3

The war with Spain was not an imperialistic or expansionist war. That is to say, America was motivated, generally, by the emotion of humanitarianism when she set out to free the Cubans from Spanish rule, or misrule. But it marks, nevertheless, the beginning of the speeded up process of increased world domination that saw America, by 1905, as a country with foreign possessions—Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Puerto Rico—, with a strong navy setting off on a world cruise to display its power, with obligations in Cuba, in South America, in China, and with a general attitude that demanded an acceptance of world responsibilities by the American people. Had it been an out-and-out imperialistic conflict, the war with Spain might not have been fought. 4

If the war with Spain, then, gave America the opportunity to assert itself—to shift, as it did, from an idealistic war in Cuba to a definite imperialistic war in the Philippines in 1898, 1899, and 1900—the presidential elections of 1900 gave Americans their chance to express approval or disapproval concerning the trend toward world responsibility. They clearly supported the Republican policies of imperialism. Or at least they thought they did. But they were to demonstrate, both by their actions and by the actions of many of their elected representatives, that they were not ready to accept fully the responsibilities
that were the necessary corollaries of their acceptance of an imperi­
alistic, expansionist America. They wished, apparently, to become en-
tangled in the affairs of the world, but they insisted, at the same
time, that they cling to their traditional slogans "Steer clear of
entangling alliances." The result was a paradox: America's new im-
perialism produced, or was accompanied by, a new isolationism. As
America became further involved in foreign affairs, Americans' interest
in these foreign affairs decreased. They were not ready, it would seem,
to be internationalists.

The reasons behind this paradox were many. And they extend back
into areas of origin which have occupied the attentions of many histo-
rians during the past fifty years. For the purposes of this study, how-
ever, consequences of the paradox are most significant. When Americans
went to war in 1917, they went for idealistic reasons—for humanitarian
reasons that bear remarkable resemblance to those expressed during the
years immediately preceding the war with Spain.5 After a period of
ostensible neutrality that extended over three years, they went to war,
not as a militaristic force, not, in any sense, as conquerors, but as
saviours of freedom, as crusaders for right and justice in the world.
The events that had occurred between 1898 and 1917, the decisions Ameri-
cans had made, the reservations upon which they based these decisions—
all pointed, as many historians have noted, to the possibility of war
in the future. The threat, in fact, of possible German aggression on
the North American continent was a real one if Germany emerged the con-
queror in Europe and provided a reason for going to war. But Americans,
who were, they believed, non-militaristic and non-aggressive, yet
unafraid and confident, preserved their neutrality, refused to fight until their fight could be a crusade.

This need for, even a demand for, an idealistic cause for war can be traced, at least in part, to the paradox of simultaneous expansion and withdrawal and to its consequences as they marked American legislation, foreign agreements, and international affairs. In the following pages I shall cite and emphasize the political and social events that demonstrate this paradox and suggest a parallel situation that is generated by a basic assumption in this paradox. That assumption says: Since the most important nation in the world is America and since it is Americans' duty and responsibility to honor and to preserve that importance, Americans will fight, if necessary, to accomplish their mission. The parallel is that just as Americans asserted themselves in the world but still eschewed "entangling alliances," so also did they assert their pacifist aims while they eschewed the alliances that would have given their assertions strength.

The chief subjects that I propose to treat are America's relations in the Pacific and Far East, her relations in Latin America, her achievements in the field of international arbitration, her domestic policies, such as expenditures for naval and military armaments, that established the extent to which Americans recognized their world responsibilities, and finally her actions during the period of neutrality that resulted in active war in 1917. And the chief men I propose to treat are William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, the chief executives between 1896 and 1917. Each led his country in his own way; and in the changes from one administra-
tion to the other, one has natural divisions for study. When Theodore Roosevelt succeeded the assassinated McKinley in 1900, he took over President McKinley's established imperialistic, expansionist policies. Although McKinley had been slow, even reluctant, to lead America to an Empire, Americans, impelled by the war with Spain, had led him to this Empire's borders. He had moved up slowly, and by 1899, guided by a divine inspiration, he was in the van of those "who believed that the United States had been summoned to play a larger part upon the world's stage."7

President Roosevelt had been sure for many years that the "larger part" was America's by destiny. He entered the White House as a confirmed expansionist and imperialist who favored a vigorous foreign policy based upon force. His aggressiveness and ambition, colored by a fine sensitivity to matters affecting American honor or vital interest, lay behind all the domestic and foreign developments from 1900 to 1908—perhaps to 1912, for President Taft, in general, stood in Roosevelt's shadow and perpetuated (in weakened form) Roosevelt's policies. It is significant that during the Progressive era there was a declining popular interest in imperialism, in foreign affairs, and a concentration of interest in such internal affairs as labor, local government, wages, trusts, tariff, and conservation. It was the conviction of their President that kept active the assertiveness of the United States in its new world role.

When Woodrow Wilson entered the presidency in 1912, he took over a country already established as a world power and inextricably involved in complex international relations. Unlike Roosevelt, however, he
shunned force as a basis for foreign policy and put his faith in moral power. He came to view himself as the great mediator and led America through the years of neutrality as a conciliator of world difficulties—despite the adverse pressures of his immediate advisers, Theodore Roosevelt and his followers, and of a substantial body of public opinion. As Quincy Wright has shown in his exhaustive *A Study of War*, even in constitutional democracies, where alternatives of policy are discussed before decisions are made, where conceptions of national interest, states of alliances, of military preparedness, of public opinion, and of public finance are all bases for these decisions, "the personality of high officials has ... been important." The importance of McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson must not be forgotten as one moves through the following pages.

II. DEVELOPMENTS: 1895-1912

a. Assertiveness in the Pacific

When Spain asked for armistice terms on July 26, 1898, and brought the fighting in the Caribbean to a close, Americans had reason to sense their own power. Although the United States had entered into the war with Spain largely unprepared, in eighty-seven days it had forced an European power to sue for peace. This success was the kind especially pleasing to men like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt; and it was the kind of success that moved America beyond its original goal to free Cuba from the Spaniards—and urged it to hold
on to all that it had won.

When Senator George Gray, of Delaware, an anti-imperialist; Secretary of State W. R. Day, an inbetween; Senator C. K. Davis, of Minnesota, an imperialist; Senator W. P. Frye, of Maine, an imperialist; and Whitelaw Reid, of the New York Tribune, an imperialist, went to Paris to represent America in the Paris Peace Commission,9 they went for more than a peace treaty. And when the Treaty of Paris was signed December 10, 1898, they returned with Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, and a guardianship over Cuba. When the Treaty went to the Senate on January 1, 1899, that group wrestled until February 6 over the issues involved in taking over these new possessions. Constitutionality, expediency, policy, destiny, duty, opportunity—these and other factors entered into the controversy. At the end the decision was close; but the expansionists won. And in voting fifty-seven to twenty-seven to ratify the treaty, the Senate asserted America's new role. It had acquired an empire. The significance of this action is conveyed in these concluding lines of Professor Pratt's study:

In response to the urgings of destiny, duty, religion, commercial interests, and naval strategy, the United States had utilized the war with Spain to acquire an island empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific. It was now free, even if bound by the terms of the innocuous McEnery Resolution, to use its new power in whatever way would "best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands"—and it is to be noted that the interests of the citizens of the United States were placed first.10

To these acquisitions one must add Hawaii, annexed by a joint resolution of Congress in 1898, after years of vacillation and debate, and Tutuila, in the Samoas, as the result of a tripartite arrangement with Great
Britain and Germany in 1899. All these new responsibilities called for assertive action by America. Administrative and military intervention would be necessary in Cuba until 1909, before Cuba could be judged prepared to rule itself. Military rule would be necessary in Puerto Rico until 1900 when, under the terms of the Foraker Act, Puerto Ricans would become citizens of Puerto Rico entitled to the protection of the United States but not to all the privileges of American citizenship. Military force would be necessary in the Philippines until 1902, and strong administrative and military control would be necessary beyond that.

As American interest and influence spread farther into the Pacific, her interest in the Far East grew stronger—particularly in China, where a manifest weakness acted as an invitation to the major world powers to establish spheres of influence in Chinese territory. France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan acted to establish major spheres around China's important ports. Although the United States had not attempted to get its share of China, the problems facing this country as a result of the actions by the other major powers were serious ones and demonstrated the consequences of an imperialistic course. If these powers should decide to close their ports to all but their own ships, if such a closed port policy should lead to war, might not America's possession, the Philippines, be endangered? and might not America be forced to enter that war?

By a bold stroke of assertiveness, in 1899, President McKinley's Secretary of State John Hay acted to prevent such consequences. He sent his Open-Door policy to the powers concerned, proposing that no country
interfere with any treaty port or vested interest within any so-called spheres of interest or leased territory it had in China, that within each sphere the Chinese government should collect all duties provided for in its tariff treaties, and that each power to which Hay's proposal was sent both approve the proposal and try to persuade the others to approve. Although the other powers were far from unanimous in their consent, Secretary Hay, on March 20, 1900, publicly announced that all the powers concerned had given their support to his proposal. His bold plan worked; none of the other powers objected or complained.

But in June more troubles developed. The Boxers, a group of Chinese nationalists, tried desperately to drive the foreigners from China. They killed several hundred foreigners, besieged the British legation at Peking for many weeks, and drew an international army of twenty thousand troops (two thousand, five hundred Americans from the Philippines) before they were quelled. Again America was forced to assert her power.

Then while the Boxer rebellion was still on, Secretary Hay added another policy to the Open-Door principle—an attempt to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of China. Although the other powers did not formally accept Hay's principles, the integrity of China was preserved by working one country's territorial greed off against another's. Thus America's desire to preserve peace in the Pacific, to protect her territory, and to protect American trade and investors moved her to take the lead in and to force agreement to the Open-Door principle, even though she could not have backed up this leadership with armed force if the other powers had failed to recognize the principle.
America's new world power seemed clear.

After 1900 America, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, was moved to assert herself in Japan to preserve, or to regain, the peace that was essential if American possessions and interests in the Pacific were to be protected. When Japan attacked Port Arthur suddenly in 1904 and began the Russo-Japanese War, the United States maintained an official neutrality, but President Roosevelt took the lead in settling the conflict. The Treaty of Portsmouth was attributed largely to his efforts. These words of Roosevelt indicate the perspective in which he viewed the treaty:

I had certainly tried my best to be the friend not only of the Japanese people but of the Russian people, and I believe that what I did was for the best interests of both and of the world at large.11

Roosevelt had leaned toward Japan during the negotiations and he emerged from them not only with the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts but also with a great respect for Japan's military strength and a belief that to preserve American interests in the Philippines some agreement should be reached with Japan. The result of this belief was the Agreed Memorandum, concluded by Secretary of War William Howard Taft and the Prime Minister of Japan, by which Japan was granted a free hand in Korea in return for her promise that she had no designs on the Philippines. Since this agreement was not according to the principles announced in the Open-Door agreement, it was kept a secret for many years. It marked another assertive step in America's foreign policy—and again it was assertion without the force to back it up if it did not work. Fortunately the assertion worked, but it did not mark the end of America's diffi-
culties in the Far East. Many Japanese resented America's diplomatic
intervention in their war with Russia, felt that they had lost both
territory and financial indemnity in the process. And matters were not
helped at all when the San Francisco, California, schools enacted an
ordinance in 1906 preventing Orientals from attending the regular city
schools. This controversy called for more negotiation, and Roosevelt
again had to intercede, persuade the San Francisco schools to amend
their ruling, and, in 1907, conclude a "Gentleman's Agreement" with
Japan by which Japan agreed to stop her citizens' immigration to the
United States.

All these negotiations indicated, certainly, that the United
States was desperate to preserve amicable relations with the Far East.
President Roosevelt, fearing that Japan would suspect America's uneasiness, sent the American navy on a cruise around the world in 1906-07—in spite of storms of protest from many sides. "I had become convinced," Roosevelt tells us in his Autobiography, "that for many reasons it was essential that we should have it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic, and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other of the two great oceans." He believed that the voyage of the battle fleet around the world was "the most important service that I rendered to peace." 12

This voyage capped, in a sense, the aggressive policies which the
United States had followed in the Pacific and provided a kind of support
for them. Uneasiness and insecurity were common emotions during the
first years of the twentieth century, but the bold assertiveness seemed
to work. It was the bold assertiveness of the President, and the results were pleasing to him. He wrote:

When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a foreign foe. We were at absolute peace [italics mine], and there was no nation in the world with whom a war cloud threatened, no nation in the world whom we had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful an outlook.13

This statement of Roosevelt's is at least poetically true. It does not, however, make the point one should emphasize in reviewing America's activity in the Pacific: As a nation with new possessions and new power in the area, the United States made agreements and decisions that assumed the possibility of war. Armed force could have been needed at any time to protect American possessions and rights. That Roosevelt could make the statement quoted is a kind of tribute to his diplomatic acumen that set up a system of balanced antagonisms and preserved peace, if somewhat tenuously, on that basis.

b. Assertiveness to the South

When one looks to the South and examines American actions and policies there, a pattern emerges similar to that which developed in the Pacific. Not the least of these actions, certainly, was the acquisition of the Panama Canal in Central America, an acquisition which culminated a dream of many years. By terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 the United States and Great Britain had agreed that neither would seek to fortify or exercise exclusive control over any canal built
through Central America. But American sentiment after 1850 drifted away from such an agreement. After the war with Spain, John Hay completed with Britain the First Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1900), which granted the United States the right to build and manage a canal through Central America, provided that the completed canal remain neutralized and unfortified. This concession by Britain did not satisfy the United States Senate, however, which made changes in the Treaty, denying the international character of the canal and providing for America's defense of it. When Britain balked at these changes, Hay negotiated the Second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901), which superseded the Clayton-Bulwer agreement and granted the United States building and management rights to the canal and the right to fortify it and protect its neutrality. The Senate agreed, in ratifying this Treaty, that the canal would be open to the nations of the world on an equal basis, but the Treaty marked a definite step by the United States in asserting its responsibilities and rights in the Western Hemisphere. Fortunately Britain acquiesced to these assertions.

Under President Roosevelt the actual construction of the canal became a major interest. The consequences of this interest are again a tribute to American, or, at this time, Rooseveltian, assertiveness. The construction of the canal began in 1907, but not before a revolution in Columbia, aided by the presence of the USS Nashville and implied American support, led, in November, 1903, to the formation of the Republic of Panama, to American recognition, in November, 1903, of this Republic, and to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, in February, 1904. This treaty guaranteed the independence of Panama and gave the United States a
perpetual lease to a ten-mile-wide canal zone. Again President Roose-
velt's own words provide the necessary perspective:

There had been fifty years of continuous blood shed
and civil strife in Panama; because of my action
Panama has now known ten years of such peace and
prosperity as she never before saw during the four
centuries of her existence—for in Panama, as in
Cuba and Santo Domingo, it was the action of the
American people, against the outcries of the pro-
fessed apostles of peace, which alone brought peace.114

The phrase "the action of the American people" is crucial here,
for it furnishes one with the key to all American action in South and
Central America and in the Caribbean. In applying what has come to be
called the Roosevelt or Big-Stick Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, the
United States asserted its new-found world power and made itself the
father and protector of the Western Hemisphere. In the Venezuelan af-
fair, involving Venezuela, Germany, and Great Britain, the United States
intervened and hastened arbitration between the countries. When the
Dominican Republic, in 1903, was unable to pay debts owed to several
European countries and to America, the United States demonstrated its
implied view that the Caribbean was an American lake and took over the
administration of Dominican custom receipts. This action, in turn, set
the stage for the dollar diplomacy during President Taft's term of office.
Whenever a disturbed or impoverished Latin American country was threat-
ened with possible difficulties with an European nation, the Roosevelt
corollary justified America's setting up a financial protectorate—and
consequently a political and a military protectorate to safeguard the
loans made under the financial protectorate. Thus economic emperialism
took its place alongside political imperialism; and the United States
again assumed obligations that asserted, "We stand behind our decisions,
if necessary, with force." But again force was not necessary.

c. Assertiveness toward Peace

Just as the United States took the lead in the Pacific and assumed the role of forceful protector and father in Latin America, it took definite assertive action both at home and abroad toward the elimination of war as a means of settling international disputes. In 1899, America, along with twenty-five other nations, responded to the circular of Czar Nicholas of Russia and sent a delegation headed by Andrew D. White to the First Hague Conference, the first peace conference of its kind to meet without a war as its immediate cause. The Americans entered readily into the three conventions of the conference: (1) the convention for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts; (2) the convention for the adaptation of the Red Cross to maritime warfare; and (3) the convention for the codification of the laws and customs of land warfare. The results of these conventions were encouraging.

The first convention established the right of nations to offer their good offices and mediation without having the offer of mediation considered as an unfriendly act by the contending parties; it established a commission of inquiry to ascertain the facts of an international difficulty of great and serious importance, so that the facts of the case might be found impartially by a commission composed of neutrals as well as nationals; and it provided for a court of international arbitration to be created when an international controversy arose and established the
procedures to be followed in utilizing this court. The second and third conventions carried out their missions as indicated in their titles. They mark an important step in the development of arbitration, and the American delegation played a prominent role in their formulation.15

The United States Senate, however, when ratifying the work of the Hague Conference insisted that incidents arising under the Monroe Doctrine were not within the scope of the permanent court. The United States subscribed, then, to the Conference and the principles of a World Court, but would not surrender sufficient freedom of action to make American cases subject to arbitration. One recalls again the phrase: "In disputes of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests ...."16 The issues that might move the United States to war in the present or in the future were summarily excluded from arbitration.

Yet it was the United States, through Theodore Roosevelt, which worked to keep the Hague Court alive. As Roosevelt himself said:

It was under my administration that the Hague Court was saved from becoming an empty farce. It had been established by joint international agreement, but no Power had been willing to resort to it .... On the recommendation of John Hay, I succeeded in getting an agreement with Mexico to lay a matter in dispute between the two republics before the Hague Court. It was the first case ever brought before the Hague Court. It was followed by numerous others; and it definitely established that court as the great international peace tribunal.17

The Second Hague Conference, in 1907, was again important to the United States. On the insistence of Secretary of State Elihu Root, the nations of Latin America were invited to attend. The United States
delegation, this time headed by Joseph Choate and General Horace Porter, was again actively involved along with forty-three other nations in the proceedings. The delegates revised and enlarged the conventions of 1899, according to James Brown Scott, technical delegate from the United States to the Conference, "in the light of experience, in the light of practice as well as of theory, and put them forth to the world in a new and modified form." There were, in addition, eleven new conventions whose significance here stems from the fact that they were rather conventions to regulate war than conventions to establish peace. The First, Fourth, and Tenth Conventions were the expanded ones from 1899. The others were as follows:

**Second Convention.** Contracting powers agreed not to have recourse to armed force for the collection of contractual debts, unless the debtor power refused to arbitrate.

**Third Convention.** Contracting powers agreed that hostilities between them should not commence without either a formal declaration of war or an ultimatum in the nature of a declaration of conditional war.

**Fifth Convention.** Attempted to regulate the rights and duties of neutral powers and of neutral persons in case of land warfare.

**Sixth Convention.** Stated that it was desirable that enemy ships be permitted to leave ports at the outbreak of hostilities. (The American delegation refrained from signing this convention.)

**Seventh Convention.** Provided a series of regulations regarding the transformation of merchant ships into vessels of war, declaratory of international custom.

**Eighth Convention.** Regulated the placing of submarine mines of contact.

**Ninth Convention.** Forbade the bombardment by naval forces of undefended harbors, villages, towns, or buildings, except when military stores were there. Ordered, in such cases, that notice be given of the intention to bombard.

**Eleventh Convention.** Provided some restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war.

**Twelfth Convention.** Attempted to establish an international Prize court. (Mr. Choate was mainly instrumental in bringing the Convention to agreement.)
Thirteenth Convention. Codified the rights and duties of neutrals in case of maritime war.

Fourteenth Convention. Forbade the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons.19

After its usual reservations the Senate endorsed the results of the Conference. One can hardly regard these Conventions as peace conventions, but they made definite certain vague customs concerning the conduct and the pursuit of war in the world.

In other ways, also, the United States asserted itself in the international movement for peace. By mutual agreement with Great Britain in 1903, a joint commission, of which the American members were Senators Lodge and Turner and Secretary Root, settled peacefully the Alaska Boundary question which had stirred Canadians and Americans since 1899. This was, as President Roosevelt noted, the only question remaining between the United States and the British Empire which could not be settled by peaceful arbitration. The commission's decision thus represented America's giving up some freedom of action—although the three American members could be depended upon to hold out for and win the American claims.

In 1906, President Roosevelt sent a delegation headed by Andrew D. White to Algeciras, Spain, to help settle the controversy between France and Germany over France's moves to extend a protectorate over Morocco. His delegation formulated the General Act of Algeciras, accepted by both France and Germany, and succeeded in drawing attention to the United States, and its President, as leader in the movement for peace.

Then there were the many arbitration treaties which I have noted in Chapter I. Although the Hay Arbitration Treaties were never ratified,
the Root treaties were; and both groups indicated at least the leadership of Americans in the field of arbitration. But their big weakness, a weakness which has significance throughout this study, is conveyed in another statement by Roosevelt:

"We concluded with Great Britain, and with most of the other great nations, arbitration treaties specifically agreeing to arbitrate all matters, and especially the interpretation of treaties, save only as regards questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital national interest."20

As leaders in the world moved to supplant war with arbitration, American leaders asserted themselves, made treaties with the major powers, and subscribed to the policies established by the Hague Conferences. But they were just as assertive in clinging to their traditional freedom of action when they refused to consider for arbitration questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital national interest. The question followed: For what other reasons would the United States go to war?

d. Assertiveness toward War: The Growth of the Army and Navy

The following statistical data tell their own story. Excluding the war years when the figures would be misleading, they reveal the Military and Naval development of the United States from 1820 to 1914. To trace the growth of militarism and navalism in a society one must see the trends that led up to or away from wars. These trends are here in Table I.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS: 1912-1917

We fight once more for freedom. For the fifth time in our history we draw the sword in the cause of liberty. The Revolution won the freedom of the nation. In 1812 we fought for the freedom of the seas. The Civil War was waged for the preservation of the Union and the liberation of the slaves. We went to war with Spain that Cuba might be free. Now we enter the Great War to preserve democracy and to insure the freedom of the world. 22

When Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency in 1913, he became the leader of an America almost completely occupied with domestic issues. He went into power with a clear cut program of legislation ahead of him to satisfy the people's needs. The emphases placed on this legislation convey the strong domestic bias of the people: The Federal Reserve Act (1913) established an elastic currency system which put the control of money into the hands of the government and made banks instruments under this control; the Underwood Tariff Act (1913) provided for the first income tax and was the first effective downward revision of the tariff since the Civil War; and the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) worked to control trusts and monopolies and to help the worker break the strong industrial control. These Acts represent the main achievements of the Wilsonian "New Freedom" era; the decline from popular interest in foreign affairs that had marked the Progressive era continued into 1912 and after.

But as I have shown, during the early years of the century the United States had not hesitated to assert itself in dealing with problems involving national interest or national possessions. And when President Wilson took over he inherited the results of the Roosevelt corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, the Open-Door policy and program of balanced antagonisms in the Far East, and the many attempts at establishing arbitration treaties with the major powers of the world. He inherited, then, a strong power very much involved in the affairs of the world, but one whose reservations concerning entangling alliances and whose belief in an America isolated from world turmoil had kept it from becoming aware of the responsibilities apposite to that power.

The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914, however, began a series of events that taught Americans the United States could not forever remain, or even ever be, neutral in a world whose condition depended greatly upon the decisions made in Washington by its leaders. One historian was right when he wrote that "the rank and file of the American people, busied with their everyday affairs, could hardly take seriously the murder of a seemingly obscure assassin in a seemingly obscure town, in an obscure part of the world." They had little reason to take this event seriously in view of the isolationist tradition we have seen. The process of "becoming aware" would have to be a slow one.

There was, however, at this time, in the case of the revolution in Mexico, some cause for taking America's foreign responsibilities seriously. The tradition of Roosevelt's Big-Stick Corollary and of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy should perhaps have pushed the United States into Mexico; but President Wilson, who, as I have said, put his faith in moral power rather than in force, and who was essentially a noninterventionist, adopted a policy of watchful waiting while Civil War wracked the country and various regimes claimed the leadership of Mexico. American lives
and property were endangered and destroyed; and in April, 1914, President Wilson, forced to a decision to protect these and American honor, went before Congress to call "attention to a situation which has arisen in our dealings with General Victoriana Huerta at Mexico City which calls for action." After explaining the situation to the Congress, and declaring that America did "not desire to control in any degree the affairs of our sister republic," he concluded:

I therefore come to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amid the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico.

There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind.

The reasons expressed in the second paragraph are Wilsonian reasons, and could the Americans have projected this attitude into the future they could have forecast Wilson's decisions of the future. Behind it lay a commanding respect for America's powerful role in the world and a faith in America's ability to fill that role. In a speech delivered at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in May, 1914, on "The Heroes of Vera Cruz," President Wilson demonstrated how far he thought Americans should go in filling this role. He pointed out that the United States had gone down to Mexico to serve mankind. He said,

We do not want to fight the Mexicans. We want to serve the Mexicans if we can, because we know how we would like to be free, and how we would like to be served if there were friends standing by in such case ready to
serve us. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is a thing in which it is a proud thing to die.26

The implications, then, of President Wilson's service to Mexico were as assertive in their way as were those of the Big-Stick policies of Theodore Roosevelt. In expressing his conception of the ideals which America seemed destined to nurture and protect in the world, Wilson announced, in a sense, the reasons, he felt, why Americans would go to war. As America grew closer to the European conflict, he would express similar ideals to motivate and to lead Americans to war.

It has been pointed out that the Wilson administration was not generally prepared to deal with the international difficulties of the period 1914-1917. On the one hand there was Wilson whose idealism prepared him for his responses of indignation and shock and contributed to his impatience with complicated legal arguments. On the other, there was his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, who was to be almost passionately neutral and to reflect a pacifism that led him almost to ignore American rights during neutrality while he strove to preserve peace in America. And in between were the President's other advisers: Walter Hines Page, Ambassador to Great Britain, whose pro-British sympathies led him to support from the start America's entering the war on the side of Britain; Colonel Edward W. House, Wilson's confidential adviser and ambassador, whose faith in America's role as mediator was colored by his pro-British sympathies; and Robert Lansing, at first Bryan's assistant, then, in 1915, his successor when Bryan resigned over the Lusitania negotiations, whose belief in strict neutrality became vitiated by his growing pro-British sympathies. "Nowhere in the administration,"
one historian declares, "was there a man with a firm grasp of international politics." Yet these were the men who had to make the hasty decisions which determined the character of American neutrality. And with these men, led always by the singular President Wilson, America, the ostensibly isolated, hopefully neutral nation, faced the great war in Europe.

One must say "hopefully neutral" because there were real obstacles to America's maintaining that neutrality. From the start there would seem to have been no large body of pro-German opinion in America; the weight of a community of language, law, and culture and of strong economic ties was on the side of the British. And adding to this weight for the British, as Miss Morrissey indicates, was America's lack of a national Merchant Marine. Since, after the British blockade of Germany in 1914, neither German nor British ships could carry goods to Germany as they had in normal times, and since the merchant fleets of the northern neutrals were hesitant to do so, Americans found their trade with Germany almost cut off. To dispel the resultant gloom among American business men, President Wilson insisted upon America's right to trade upon the high seas and moved to help American enterprise—by restoring the Market for Bills of Exchange, by insuring ships and cargoes against war risks, and by improving transportation facilities for American commerce. "If, at the outbreak of the war," says Miss Morrissey, "the Americans had had the ships to transport any large part of their goods, their trade might have flowed to both belligerents."28

As conditions were, however, the trend was to Britain; and this trend, in retrospect, manifests itself clearly: (1) When the United
States had to make a decision concerning armed merchant vessels, it tried to distinguish between vessels armed for offense and those armed for defense and to develop an "informal understanding" with Britain to keep armed British ships out of American ports. The result was that Britain got her way. (2) When Great Britain, in November, 1914, declared the North Sea area a military area (a violation of Neutrals' rights), the United States failed to protest. The consequences of this failure were remarkable. As a result of the British proclamation, Germany declared its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Concerning the British violation, America was silent; concerning the German violation, America protested violently. (3) When, late in 1914, Americans began their munitions trade with the Allies, the administration did not want to discourage enterprise, held to legal justification for the munitions trade under international law, and opposed attempts to impose an arms embargo in the United States. (4) And when the subject of making financial loans to belligerent nations came up, the administration made no real attempt to discourage such loans. Thus, by the end of 1914, the pro-British character of American neutrality was established. Although there was little American war sentiment at this time, there was a great deal of sympathy for the Allied cause. From this point on, President Wilson, his advisers, and the American people, despite their many complex efforts to preserve neutrality, seemed to consider their quarrels with Britain as something separate from those with Germany. When one links this difference with the attitudes President Wilson had assumed in his speeches on the Mexican difficulty, when one, in other words, links the attitude of dedication to the service of the world with the
belief in the righteousness of one cause instead of another, the possibility of war, in Wilson's terms, is there. And such a war, in his terms again, would have to be good. Emotionally, politically, and economically, the pattern of American bias was set by 1915. Nineteen hundred fifteen and 1916 saw this pattern become clearer. And although this bias, however strong, would not probably have moved President Wilson and America to enter the war, the actions of the antagonist, when strong enough, could, and did, move the President and his America to join their favorite in the cause against this antagonist. As historians have proved, Germany, by her belligerent actions, made America go to war; Germany, that is, created the kind of situations in which President Wilson, given his ideals and his bias, would feel compelled to fight—regardless of the consequences. The emphasis in this study is on the expression of the ideals, the bias, and the compulsion as history shows them uniting other Americans in his time. Although some historians would disagree with any suggestion that Wilson ever wanted to go to war, history itself is evidence that the compulsion was, in fact, overwhelming.
Chapter Three
WAR OR PEACE: THE PUBLIC RESPONSE

Behind the historical events which led to America's entering the War in 1917 and behind the economic, political, social, religious, and philosophic theories which occupied and motivated thinking men before the War lay the attitudes, the desires, the opinions of the American people—the public whose responses to the declarations of their leaders determined the success or failure of these declarations. On the question of war and peace, certainly, these responses ran from those opposing strongly, almost violently, any actions or declarations suggesting or implying military aggression, to those demanding foreign and domestic policies that portended almost certain war at some point in the future. There is evidence, however, that a statistically normal response might have been predicted by the leaders of America when they made the decisions which carried America first into a war with Spain, then, after many events, into a World War. To chart this normal response is to provide the opinion of those who filled the ranks of a nation marching as to war.

On April 2, 1917, when President Woodrow Wilson appeared before Congress and presented his reasons why America could no longer preserve its neutrality in the great European war, he assumed (correctly) that the heavy weight of American public opinion was on his side. When he

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 241.
expressed America's objectives in entering the war—to protect neutrals' rights to freedom of the high seas; to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world; to fight for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, Germans included; to make the world safe for democracy—he sounded the kind of idealistic note which drew Americans to his cause and gave them reasons for uniting in a common action after almost three years of sometimes frustrating, sometimes hopeful, sometimes confusing and shocking neutrality. His words provided the rallying point from which millions of Americans—self-declared peace-loving Americans—could depart convinced that supporting a war to preserve world rights and justice neither altered nor prejudiced their basic, passionate desire for both a peaceful, free America and a peaceful, free world.

Reflections of this conviction appear many times in the speeches of the peoples' representatives. Representative W. B. Walton of New Mexico told the House on April 5, 1917:

Speaking for my own constituency, I say without hesitancy the people of New Mexico do not want war; but I know that I speak with entire accuracy when I declare that they do not have to be urged to fight for a principle or lay down their lives in defense of national honor.

And Representative Clifford Ireland of Illinois spoke with like conviction:

I have heard it said today that 80 per cent of our people are against war. I am. But the question for decision is not one of preference for or against war as a general proposition. It is a question of upholding American rights which have been violated, of supporting the chosen Chief Executive of these United States and thus presenting a united front to the world.
These men could make such declarations—vague, general, emo-
tional—because they received daily many hundreds of resolutions from
civic groups and organizations declaring their complete support of
President Wilson and his decision. Many of these resolutions were
printed in the Congressional Record; and the uniformity of the reasons
given for going to war is impressive. The following samples are typi-
cal:

Wichita, Kans., April 4, 1917

Senator Curtis,
Washington, D.C.:

The Elks, 1,000 strong, most heartily indorse President Wilson's policy of preparedness and appreciate
your support of him, and strongly recommend any resolu-
tion which tends to protect the honor, glory, and de-
fense of our beloved country.

E. L. Brooks, Exalted Ruler

The citizens of Sheridan and Sheridan County, Wyo.,
in mass meeting assembled on April 5, 1917, unanimously
adopted the following:

"We heartily approve of the acts of Congress in
declaring war against Germany, and the acts of our Presi-
dent in recommending this courage, and we pledge our
loyalty in the defense of the honor, rights, and just
interests of our country ....

"We call upon all young men of this State to come
forward and offer their services to their country. No
nobler sentiment than that of patriotism ever inspired
heroic action; and it ought to be a sacred honor, duty,
and privilege for young men of this Nation to again do,
suffer, and sacrifice for the Nation as our ancestors did
and suffered and sacrificed in its founding and preserva-
tion."
Hon. John Sharp Williams [who spoke in Senate for Wilson's declaration],
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Senator: An American, with American coat of arms and flag to the fore; a Republican; a Roosevelt Republican; a Republican from the middle Tennessee town, Nashville; and white, as the Bryans have been since they landed in 1669 in Isle of Wight County, Virginia.

For your admirable stand yesterday in the Senate, my most hearty congratulations. I believe the ratio of 82-6 holds throughout the country.

You are a busy man: I merely want you to know.

Cordially, yours,

Hardy Bryan,
37½ Wabasha Street, St. Paul, Minn.

Americanism, patriotism, honor, rights, just interests—these abstract ideals were the stimulants; and they would seem to have passed from President Wilson and other leaders down to the people.

Important as the disseminators of these abstractions and as molders of public opinion were the newspapers. They too followed their leaders. Russell Buchanan, in his essay "American Editors Examine American War Aims and Plans in April, 1917," has studied sixty-eight newspapers, representing every state in the Union, and has concluded that, in general, these newspapers seem almost to be propaganda agencies for the administration. Like those thousands of people and agencies who urged their governmental representatives to support their president, the press assimilated quickly the war aims expressed by Wilson, accepted world liberty and world justice as America's objectives, and saw America as the champion of human rights, the natural and honorable protector of the world.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of these views taken by the leaders, the people, and the press is the absence of any marked aware-
ness or fear that American security was in danger. Deeply concerned with what they termed matters of honor, patriotism, and other vital interests, Americans were not, it would seem, either prepared or willing to recognize that they were going to war motivated at least in part by a desire to protect themselves and the nation's shores. This sense of security, of isolation from the destructive forces of the European war, marks most of the responses one encounters to America's entry into the conflict.

When Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota spoke, in April, 1917, concerning the safety of Americans' "liberties" and their "firesides," he said, "Thank God .... Neither are at stake in this controversy ...." And at the same time Representative John R. Connelly of Kansas was able to ignore all signs that America was not at peace with the world when he said:

I have cherished the hope that in some way this Nation, the last great power upon this earth that is at this time at peace with all the world, might have the blessed privilege to minister to the bleeding people of Europe and lead them again into the paths of peace.

The epitome of this view, perhaps, is this statement by Representative John A. Elston of California: "We must follow the ideals and traditions of the fathers of our Republic, and stand for justice and humanity." The question remains—how, in a period of marked world insecurity, could Americans preserve the vision of their country isolated from the troubles of the world.

Mr. Walter Lippman has referred to this view as the "persisting illusion" of isolation, an illusion which developed during the period 1823-1898, which "made it appear falsely that our foreign commitments
rested securely upon our geography, our inherent virtues, and our own isolated military strength. 12 Doubtless there is truth in this observation. But to this "illusion" of isolation, of uniqueness, in a sense, one must add the intense patriotism which moved Americans to regard their traditions, their rights, and their actions as somehow sacred. The belief that foreign powers would not dare to attack America was a strong one between 1898 and 1917. The words of Representatives Elston, Connelly and Knutson emphasize this belief and reflect a persistent idealism, a national pride and honor, and a belief in America's unique position in the world—politically, geographically, and ideologically. Americans were, somehow, too proud to fight a war; they insisted upon a crusade. By insisting on a crusade they could, as I have indicated, preserve their reputations as "peace-loving Americans" and yet advocate and pursue the most heroic of activities—sacrificing one's personal life for the cause of America, and of the world.

To support this assertion one must go back to 1898 and trace the popular responses to the actions America took in assuming the role of liberator in Cuba and the role of imperialist in the years following this war. In 1898 Americans were certainly not prepared for war. "Like the people," wrote Theodore Roosevelt, "the government was for a long time unwilling to prepare for war because so many misguided men believed that the preparation itself tended to bring on the war."

The people neither thought war nor prepared for it; they were concerned with another activity. "The United States," Gregory Mason writes in Remember the Maine, "had had [in 1898] no war since the Civil War. You could hardly count a few scraps with the Apaches. Ninety-nine per cent of the
men of the country did most of their talking and thinking about a
matter...which they called 'business'.

Yet, when the call went out for volunteers to fight with Spain
over the independence of Cuba, the response was overwhelming. Stimu-
lated and goaded by American newspapers which for at least three years
before the Spanish-American War had been exploiting the Cuban revolt
against Spanish rule and supporting the cause of the rebels, Americans
assumed the role of crusaders for freedom and rushed to destroy the
last ties of Spain in the Western Hemisphere. Professor Marcus M.
Wilkerson has observed, concerning this action:

The story of how the people of the United States,
embroiled with political and economic issues following
the severe financial depression of 1893, were led to war
with a third rate European power in behalf of a group of
Cubans, many of whom were illiterate and about whom little
was known except what had been published in newspaper re-
ports of insurrections, resembles in some respects an ac-
count of the Crusades of old.15

The people got their cause when the battleship Maine exploded.
The newspapers built up the significance of the explosion—employing
rumors, faked dispatches, and half-truths. And the government, "sens-
ing the popular tide," says Mr. Wilkerson, "...egged on by a 'jingo'
Congress, proposed war with a nation already on the verge of collapse
from internal strife and rebellion."16

The questions, however, of Spain's world position, of the signifi-
cance of the Maine's explosion, or of the "jingo" attitude of the Con-
gress or of the people were, from the point of view of those directly
involved, subordinate to the reasons given and stressed for America's
entry into a war with Spain. This was not a war to preserve national
unity; nor was it a war of aggression or expansion. The public expressions of the time were full of declarations that the war with Spain was not a "war for war's sake," not a "war for revenge or acquisition," but a "war for freedom and humanity," a moral obligation of the United States to secure peace, order, and freedom in Cuba. The crusading spirit was there; it was the strongest motivator. That the yellow press manufactured much of the basis for the crusade has been established, but the effect of such a process was real and determined the course of public response to the war in Cuba.

The emotional response is clear in almost every word uttered by the public leaders speaking for Cuban independence. "Mr. Speaker," cried Representative A. M. Dockery, of Missouri, in 1898,

The story of cruelty, duplicity, turpitude, famines, pestilence, and hell on earth in Cuba under the barbarous warfare of Spain is repeated in the self-same horrified tone, though in different tongues by the whole civilized world. It is so appalling in its horrors that humanity stands aghast at it. The recital of its details would put the Comanches of our Western plains to the blush. The atrocities of Spain are the most iniquitous in history. They shock the conscience of humanity, and the Christian world unites in the demand for the expulsion of Spanish power from Cuba.... The ravening Spanish tiger must be driven to its native jungle across the seas.17

"We intervene," declared Senator John C. Spooner, of Wisconsin,

...not for conquest, not for aggrandizement, not because of the Monroe doctrine; we intervene for humanity's sake; we intervene to gain security for the future; we intervene to aid a people who have suffered every form of tyranny and who have made a desperate struggle to be free. We intervene for our own permanent peace and safety. We intervene upon the highest possible ground, Mr. President; and upon this case we may, although with the utmost reluctance—for we are a people devoted to the arts of peace—go into the war, if it must come, confidently invoking the considerate judgment of mankind and the blessing of Almighty God.18
"We do not go to war for conquest," declared Representative Theobold Otjen, of Wisconsin, "we do not go to war for gain, but for the oppressed of another race and for the cause of humanity."19

In speech after speech, declaration after declaration—the responses were the same: Americans were ready to face all the problems of recruiting and fund raising, death and destruction to fight in a crusade for the cause of humanity and justice, confident that in pursuing such action they had the blessings of God.

For the purposes of this study the most significant indication in these speeches and declarations is their remarkable similarity to the responses that characterized America's entry into the first World War almost twenty years later: Americans could emphasize their devotion to peace and make this devotion one of the reasons for their going to war. Honor was the big word—and behind it lay all the reasons Americans could cite for taking up arms against a foe. As one man expressed the battle cry, "Our soldiers and sailors to battle go vigorous, strong, and healthy, animated and impelled by the sense of humanity and the vindication of their country's wounded honor—the strongest of human propulsive forces."20 Irrelevantly idealistic as these words sound, they were, nevertheless, the words Americans used in April, 1898, to express their motivations; they were the words in terms of which Americans understood their motivations and believed in themselves.

There was, on the other hand, the fact that these same Americans, because they were declared lovers of peace, and because they had their minds on other things, were not prepared to go to battle to vindicate their country's honor and to win freedom for the Cubans. When war did
come, a kind of panic ensued—a panic which sheds light on the nature of the inner conflicts disturbing the American people. Theodore Roosevelt has pointed out that when the people awakened to the fact of their perennial unreadiness for war, the resulting confusion of confidence and fear was alarming. "Our people," he said,

had for decades scoffed at the thought of making ready for possible war. Now, when it was too late, they not only backed every measure, wise and unwise, that offered a chance of supplying a need that ought to have been met before, but they also fell into a condition of panic apprehension as to what the foe might do."

One state governor declared, Roosevelt recalled, that he would not permit his National Guard to leave the state, said that it had to be retained to repel a possible Spanish invasion. And so many Boston business men hauled their securities to Worcester that there were not enough safe deposit companies in Worcester to handle them. In Roosevelt's own neighborhood on Long Island, clauses were put into leases declaring that if the property were destroyed by the Spaniards the lease should lapse.

These and many more activities underline the difficulties Americans had adjusting to a war; they could not have adjusted at all, probably, had not their declared aims centered almost entirely on the ambiguous, yet highly charged, terms—honor, justice, humanity, freedom.

Given, then, these aims, motivations, and conflicts that characterized the popular response to America's entry into war with Spain, one must see how the people viewed the roles and responsibilities of the men who were to fight this war. For from these views emerges a distinction which points toward an explanation of the tensions which developed during the next decade concerning the question "Peace or War?" in
America. The tradition of soldiery, of military glory, of heroism in America, one gathers, was one, in 1898, of volunteers—of free citizens answering the call to battle whenever the need arose. In referring to this tradition, leaders were fond of citing America’s war history—from the Revolutionary war through the War of 1812, the Indian wars, the Mexican War, and the Civil War—to prove the brilliance, the effectiveness, the heroism of volunteer forces. Their statements imply, at least, that the kind of war America would fight needed the virility and courage of groups of patriotic men untainted by the influence of professional soldiery.

When President McKinley finally gave in to the pressures surrounding him and announced America’s plan to intervene in Cuba, the crusading spirit that marked Americans’ response fitted into this “volunteer” tradition. One sees this tradition expressed in the words of Representative Adolph Meyer, of Louisiana, when he spoke in 1898 to the House against a proposed resolution “for the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States”:

The policy of the country is for volunteers when we get into deep water. Our people have always been jealous of large standing armies from 1776 until now. I am aware that there is a class of persons of late days who desire a strong military government and a large standing army; but I adhere to the instincts of liberty and the wise traditions of the Democratic party, which knows how to combine a just regard for national honor and security with proper devotion to the free institutions which are the crowning glory of the American Constitution. [Applause] 23

This view and such spirited expressions as “Remember the Maine,” “...the American heart is ready and fired for the ordeal of battle whenever it shall come,” “The American people will respond to the cause of
justice and right," "The American people are ready to fight, and they want to fight," provide impressive evidence of the force of American tradition and American pride in motivating American action. And it is this evidence that enabled one observer to say, in 1899:

The paradox of believing war, in general, to be savagery, and our own particular war to be righteous, is found with us, if we may judge by the attitude taken, not only by the mass of the people of the United States, but also by their leading papers, even to the religious periodicals.

I have emphasized in this chapter the marked similarity between America's declared reasons for going to war in 1898 and those in 1917. Both wars were, in the popular view, at least, righteous wars—crusades. And the crucial ideas and attitudes motivating these crusades have included most frequently the word honor, usually with the implication of American honor—national honor. The significance of this word (perhaps concept is a better term) cannot be overlooked in any analysis of popular response to national actions. When the American leaders, the American press, and the American people used honor or national honor either in 1898 or in 1917, emotional response was guaranteed, almost regardless of the specific connections in which it was used. Leo Perla, whose book What Is "National Honor"? is an exhaustive analysis of the tyranny of this phrase, pointed out clearly, in 1917, that when Americans used the term honor, specific associations of the moment disappeared and were virtually submerged in a wave of emotional respect for honor as an abstract principle. In this way, approving the principle meant approving a particular application without any decision as to whether the particular issue raised really involved honor or not. "We do not," he wrote,
judge each case on its own merits but on the merits of the great national imperative which has come down to us as a beautiful tradition. All our thought and feeling seem to go not to an analysis of this dispute but to a worship of the ethical dogma. 26

Thus when the term national honor was used, the resulting emotional thrill called forth not only intellectual approval but also a deliberate moral justification when our reason seemed compelled to support that approval. As a sacred phrase, it could be the key phrase in a crusade; and as Americans generally connected honor or national honor with war—either aggressive or defensive war—to use the phrase was to imply, to advocate, to praise war. Perla wrote, concerning this phenomenon:

When a country connects honor with aggression, the unthinking patriot feels only the honor and is blind to the aggression. The term has become hallowed and consecrated by the centuries of blood and suffering which it has called forth since men first began to fight for honor. The vehemence of hatred caused by repeated wars, the sacrifice in life and money, the intensity of pain and suffering, the glories, and the progress of civilization which is attributed to war, have been transferred to the term honor and have filled the phrase itself with an intense fervor and a sacred glamor. In the face of these emotional ramifications reason is paralyzed. 27

Evidence that Americans connected honor with war is the fact that they normally were not motivated by considerations relative to honor. In the course of their day-by-day activities Americans found little reason to cite honor as a basis for action. Only when they became emotionally aroused, when they felt somehow outraged, hurt, or shocked, proud, fierce, or angry, did they draw upon the concept as a source of motivation. Whatever honor meant or represented as an abstraction or whatever
it meant in any specific case can never, perhaps, be precisely deter-
mined, since it was, and is, an emotional rather than a rational ideal, but that it represented the heart of the American crusades in 1898 and 1917 can be safely asserted.

One must, however, ask and attempt to answer an important ques-
tion: Was the emotional ideal different in the times of McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson from the emotional ideal of earlier times? In discussing what he calls the subjective variable of honor, Perla noted that since the abstraction of honor has never been even approxi-
mately defined or clearly conceived, it has never been accurately handed down from generation to generation. "Each generation," he says, "re-
ceived a set of traditional notions about honor and unconsciously modi-
fied them so that the succeeding generation inherited somewhat differ-
ent traditions." Perhaps Theodore Roosevelt came as close as possible to a definition of the emotional ideal in 1898 when he wrote, concern-
ing the Spanish-American War, that although America's direct interests were great, as in Cuban tobacco and sugar and in Cuba's relation to the projected Isthmian canal, even greater were "our interests from the standpoint of humanity." Cuba, he pointed out, "was at our very doors." "It was a dreadful thing," he declared, "for us to sit supinely and watch her death agony. It was our duty, even more from the standpoint of National honor than from the standpoint of National interest, to stop the devastation and destruction. Because of these considerations I favored war...." And perhaps President Wilson's speech of April 2, 1917 (and the responses to it with which I introduced this chapter), in-
cludes a definition of the emotional ideal in 1917. Again one must em-
phasize their similarity rather than their differences. But the parallel is especially notable in face of the essential changes in the role and the position of America in the world between 1898 and 1917. Americans would seem to have clung to an ideal, to have repeated a response—even though the situations behind the responses were different.

The changes that need to be examined here are those involving the role and the nature of the soldier and those involving war itself. That Americans were aware of these changes is indicated in these words from Representative Charles L. Knapp, in 1903:

Mr. Chairman, the United States during the past five years has had new duties to perform and problems to solve by reason of the war with Spain. The results accomplished in performing those duties and solving those problems have been greater than were ever accomplished for a similar purpose and during an equal period of time by any other nation.

The war with Spain created a new era in history, gave a new rank to the United States, added a new glory to the flag, taught other peoples how to make war for humanity's sake, and awoke the nations of the Old World to the fact that the United States was a world-wide power.

Chauvinistic though this statement may be, as it reveals intense patriotism, pride in America's new world role, it reflects the idea that war in the twentieth century was somehow different, that righteous war might in some way become the responsibility of America in future years. If the role of war was to be different, then would the role of the soldier be different. In this latter difference lay a source of the conflict that moved Americans in 1898, as I have noted earlier, to prefer volunteers to regular troops and, in succeeding years, to cling to a traditional soldier hero, even though he no longer existed in the new kind of war.
This new kind of war followed upon the heels of the war with Spain (or began with this war, if one considers that it was a foreign war and that it was not quite the "war for humanity's sake" that the peoples' voices indicated). It was recognized by Edgar Lee Masters, who deplored the imperialistic policies practiced against the Philippines—the same policies and methods of war which Americans had earlier ascribed to Spain. He declared:

At the very outset of the scheme of conquering the Filipinos it was known that the theory of the army had to be changed. Conquest cannot be left to a citizen soldiery, because volunteers fight for a principle. They fight for their rights and their homes. Such were our soldiers before imperialism became a national dream. With the volunteers we had twice driven back the hosts of monarchy. With volunteers we had met and defeated the greatest Anglo-Saxon army that ever took the field. And yet for the purpose of conquering a people armed in part with primitive weapons the creation of a regular soldiery many times its former size was demanded.31

When one combines this view with Masters' theory of soldiery that fits this army,32 one finds the characteristics of the "police action" force, the kind of force which lacks the traditional inspirational elements and fails to produce the responses which move nations wholeheartedly into war. Surrounding the phrase "police-action" (this phrase was used by Theodore Roosevelt and others) were connotations of brutality, force, aggression, and professionalism. Honor, glory, heroism are difficult terms to apply to such action, and the equation honor = war is almost non-applicable. Another writer, Sherwood Anderson, recalling, in 1924, the Spanish American War, observed concerning the change in soldiery:

At the time of which I am writing America had not learned as it did during the World War that in order to
stamp out brutal militarism it is best to adopt brutal militarism, teach it to our sons, do every thing possible to brutalize our own people. During the World War I am told boys and young men in the training camps were made to attack with the bayonet dummy figures of men and were even told to grunt as they plunged the bayonet into the figure. Everything possible was done to brutalize the imaginations of the young men, but in our war—"my war" I find myself calling it at times—we had not yet carried our education that far. There was as yet a childish belief in democracy. Men even supposed that the purpose of democracy was to raise free men who could think for themselves, act for themselves in an emergency. The modern idea of the standardization of men had not taken hold and was even thought to be inimical to the very notion of democracy.\footnote{33}

Anderson's view emphasizes the broad view, the American view, and projects the changes which Masters noted and predicted into the World War itself. But there is, in addition, his significant observation concerning democracy and war. The feeling that in 1898 men (volunteers) were fighting as free citizens of a democracy whereas in 1917 they were fighting as captive automatons in a standardized, autocratic military force reflects directly the problem Americans faced in perpetuating the crusading war as an ideal while they saw what was happening to their soldiery.

Related to this feeling are further changes concerning the nature of the fighting man in the twentieth century. Professor Alvin Saunders Johnson noted in 1914 how the common soldier had little of the opportunities that had been open to him in the Civil War and, to a lesser extent, in the war with Spain. After the Civil War almost all communities could point to men who had risen from the ranks to positions of high esteem. The distinction they achieved through war was much greater than they could have achieved in times of peace. So long as the war lottery offered splendid prizes, the common soldier had reason to be
eager. But, as Professor Johnson pointed out, in the twentieth century the working class soldier who entered the war as a private would probably remain a private to the end of the war. "War," he said, "...becomes less and less of a lottery with every advance in its technique." And he pointed precisely to a change in soldiery which affected American men:

The military campaign of today does not consist, as formerly, of long marches over a strange territory, leisurely sieges, interminable garrisoning of captured cities. The modern campaign is short and sharp; the armies are hurried on fast trains to battle, like cattle to the abattoir. The private soldier's game of life and death is played quickly to its end, and he returns half-dazed to his home, or returns no more. Warfare is becoming mechanical, like a large-scale industry. Its chief distinction is its appalling accident rate. Accident? How does death on the battlefield, nowadays, differ from death in a mine explosion or a railway collision?

The significance of this change is clear; and that many Americans were aware of this change is indicated in Professor Johnson's statement that "the statesman of today [1914] wisely bases his hopes of military predominance upon universal service," and his conclusion that "...with conscription official recognition is given to the fact that war is no longer worthwhile, from the point of view of the class that furnishes the private soldiers—the working class."36

Another significant change in the status of war in the twentieth century was noted by Randolph Bourne when he declared that "...signs seem to indicate that the world is losing both its imagination and its taste for war."37 To most people, he noted, war was almost unimaginable. "Here in America," he said,
it is true, our comic-opera Spanish War did excite martial fervor for a time, but it was too fantastic to last. The Dewey furor seems almost grotesque now in the light of the complete oblivion which has descended upon the leaders of that war. In a military age, they would have been called to places of honor and power in the State, but the hollowness of it all was too much for our common sense.38

The pertinence of both Professor Johnson's and Mr. Bourne's observations is clear. One cannot doubt either their sincerity or their accuracy. They were views of war and peace during a period of peace. That succeeding events proved certain of their observations to be wrong is true; but as I shall soon show, they had reason to be wrong. They did not comprehend the nature of "martial fervor" in America. Certainly most Americans in 1914, or in 1906 or 1910, felt that they wanted peace, were devoted to peace, and could see the dangers and the anachronistic features of war.

As Theodore Roosevelt pointed out in 1913:

There are nations who only need to have peaceful ideals inculcated, and to whom militarism is a curse and a misfortune. There are other nations, like our own, so happily situated that the thought of war is never present to their minds. They are wholly free from any tendency improperly to exalt or to practice militarism.39

As a result of this peacetime freedom from thoughts of war, Americans were uneasy concerning steps toward making America a military or naval power. Between 1897 and 1910, for instance, military and naval appropriations more than quadrupled; and President Roosevelt sent the American fleet around the world in 1906-07. These facts disturbed the American people who did not agree wholeheartedly with the President's belief that this cruise of the battle fleet was not the least of the causes which enabled him to finish seven and a half years of administra-
ation during which "not one shot had been fired against a foreign foe."\(^{10}\)

A look at the military and naval appropriations during this period, as I have noted, is interesting in view of the fact that Americans were so profoundly convinced of their peaceful aims.\(^{11}\) Interesting and enlightening also is a typical objection to such increases by Representative Atterson W. Rucker, of Colorado, who noted that the size of the Navy was, according to tonnage figures, second only to that of Great Britain. "It is my desire," he said,

to call the attention of Congress, as well as that of the country, to the present condition of our navy as compared with that of other nations of the world and to demonstrate, if I may, that there is not even the shadow of a war cloud discernible in the world's horizon with which we have the slightest concern, and that therefore in this profound state of peace this legislative extravagance is, in my judgment, wholly unjustified.\(^{12}\)

Much of the force of this objection may be attributed to economic causes and needs, but beneath these is implied, at least, the opposition to a larger naval force because it meant a larger regular navy, greater chances of becoming involved in world troubles, and, in general, a more militaristic America when there was no reason for America to be militaristic.

As I have shown in Chapter II, the foreign policies which America followed on the way to the first World War, the decisions she made, the reservations she kept, the prejudices she revealed and followed—all, tended to assume, in their various ways, an inevitable conflict. The people, then, who assumed that there was not even the shadow of a war cloud discernible in the world's horizon with which Americans need have the slightest concern were ignoring, or evading, the significance of the
steps America was taking. Similarly, the people who assumed that
American policies were those of a nation devoted to and striving for
peace were ignoring, or evading, the motivations behind her decision,
her prejudices, and her reservations. Despite what one sees now as
evasions in these views, however, the evidence is convincing that by
1914 the general consensus among the people was that the forces for
peace had overcome the forces for war, that the kind of war one would
have to fight in the twentieth century was inimical to the American tra-
ditions of freedom, democracy, honor, and soldiery.

The question remains: How, then, could the American people—
busy with domestic issues concerning labor, big business, tariffs, and
government control—change so completely by April of 1917? Some of the
answers lie, it seems to me, in the public utterances concerning the
events and decisions between 1914 and 1917 that resulted in America's
entering the war on the side of Great Britain.

I have noted earlier in this Chapter that Americans went to war
in 1917 as crusaders; they seemed to want, somehow, to avoid references
to any other kind of war. Such terms as physical danger, economic
necessity, security, war machine, and war spirit were not, apparently,
apposite to the motives which carried Americans into the conflict. A
persistent and traditional idealism, it would seem, a sense of national
pride or of national honor, comparatively dormant in the peace years,
reasserted itself and became a strong emotional force behind the people's
decisions. The history of this reassertion is enlightening.

In a book bearing the suggestive title How We Advertised America.
The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public In-
formation that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the
Globe, George Creel, the chairman, tells of his committee's efforts in
1917, 1918, 1919 to make this assertion unanimous. His statements con­
cerning America between 1914 and 1917 provide a helpful introduction to
this period.

While America's summons [to war] was answered
without question by the citizenship as a whole, it is
to be remembered that during the three and a half
years of our neutrality the land had been torn by a
thousand divisive prejudices, stunned by the voices of
anger and confusion, and muddied by the pull and haul
of opposed interests. These were conditions that
could not be permitted to endure. What we had to have
[in 1917] was no mere surface unity, but a passionate
belief in the justice of America's cause that should
weld the people of the United States into one white-
hot mass instinct with fraternity, devotion, courage,
and deathless determination. The war-will, the will­
to-win, of a democracy depends upon the degree to
which each one of all the people of that democracy can
concentrate and consecrate body and soul and spirit in
the supreme effort of service and sacrifice.**3

There was, then, much confusion of opinion in America in the years be­
fore the war, but there was, nevertheless, a characteristic trend among
the individual actions and decisions.

In July, 1914, after the assassination in June of Archduke Ferdi­
nand, the general feeling among the people was, as indicated in the
American press, that there was very little reason for apprehension. A
kind of optimism would seem to have developed, as in the New York Sun,
in August: "In more ways than one the folly of warfare which Europe has
long been threatening to commit and at last seems determined to perpetu­
ate must spell opportunity for the United States."**4 America had, the
Sun asserted, "permanent cause of gratitude in its insulation from the
worst."**5 A survey of American opinion by the Literary Digest on the
subject "How the War Affects America" produced the general view that those who would feel the effects most were the hundred thousand American tourists abroad. As one analyst has noted, "It is difficult to name a single figure, even among those who almost immediately became violently pro-Allies, who wrote or said anything which could be interpreted to mean that the United States should take part in the war. Theodore Roosevelt, Walter Hines Page, Colonel House, Henry Cabot Lodge and others of similar standing were all glad that America was standing clear."

But between this time and May 7, 1915, when the Lusitania was sunk with 124 Americans aboard, the war fervor stirred. As America, under the guidance of President Wilson, pursued its dual course of neutrality, striving on one hand to keep out of armed conflict and carrying on trade, on the other, under a broad interpretation of neutral rights, those international events drawing most protest were the blockades of Britain and the counter submarine blockades of Germany; Germany's sinking, in March, 1915, of the British Falaba, with the loss of one American; the bombing of the American ship Cushing, in April, by a German aviator; and the torpedoing, in April, of the American oilship Gulflight, with the loss of three Americans. The responses to these events clarified the pro-ally tendencies of many Americans--both leaders and followers--and revealed shock and anger, but not fear, that aroused the warlike emotions.

The Lusitania catastrophe, however, produced stronger, more emotional responses. The entire first page of The New York Times, May 8, 1915, for instance, was devoted to this event; it dominated the thoughts of American leaders, the press, and the people. Some idea of the sig-
nificance of the Lusitania sinking both to the people and their leaders can be inferred from the way the event influenced the thinking of President Wilson:

The sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915, began to work a change in the President's mind. He knew that the war spirit had not yet been kindled in the United States and he was confirmed in that feeling by careful analysis of the editorials of newspapers large and small from coast to coast. It is a singular thing that while a few people on the Eastern seaboard were clamoring for war, a careful examination of the editorials showed that out of 1,000 compiled by telegraph in the three days after the Lusitania was sunk ...less than one-half dozen indicated a belief that war should be declared.49

Even though President Wilson gathered that America was not yet ready to go to war, as David Lawrence has indicated, he thought he recognized hints in the popular responses that Americans would follow him in the future if he found that war became necessary.50 "Mr. Wilson's reasons for hesitation," says Mr. Lawrence, "were due entirely to his belief that the United States must enter the war, if at all, with a united public opinion.51 Although many historians would question Lawrence's analysis of Wilson's motives, few would disagree that even though the people, in 1915, were far from being welded into "one white-hot mass instinct," their temperatures were rising.

Certain tendencies were clear whether the views were those expressed in the Philadelphia Press: "America is suddenly brought into the maelstrom of this gigantic war by this villainous blow..." and "we have a right to expect that our Government will take some quick and decided action on this foul deed of enormous barbarity";52 those of the New York Commercial: "It is ridiculous to believe that we can be dragged
into the European struggle; or those of the Providence Journal: "Self interest, apart from higher motives, will prevent war between the United States and Germany." Fear for American safety or security was not developing; the attitude toward Germany expressed itself with greater frequency in such terms as villainy, barbarity, and foulness; and the course of neutrality began to seem, somehow, an offense against America's honor and her traditions of freedom.

The next crucial test of Americans' response to world events was the torpedoing of the Sussex in March, 1916. Evidence is abundant in the press that this act increased greatly the people's anti-German sentiments. It brought forth many accusations against the word, the intentions, and the integrity of Germany. And it drew from President Wilson the declaration that "unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether." Wilson's words received primary attention in the American press; and this war threat had its effect. According to surveys published in the Literary Digest, the East and South were solidly behind Wilson's ultimatum to Germany, and the Middle West and Far West were only relatively unenthusiastic. What, precisely, they were supporting and why they were supporting it is conveyed in these words from President Wilson's ultimatum: "This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations." The essential elements of a crusade are here and they
recall, certainly, the public utterances of 1898. Behind this ultimatum was a real event, but the general nature of Wilson's declaration tends to de-emphasize the event and to emphasize the rights of humanity and of neutrals. Fear, insecurity, danger are not there, and they are not in these words from his speech to Congress in which he justifies his stand against Germany:

We owe it to a due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the utmost solemnity and firmness.58

From this point on, the pattern of Americans' responses was set. They generally followed and supported their President's actions and decisions—excluding, of course, the extremists who clamored for all-out war immediately or who stuck to their peace-at-any-price attitudes.

When on January 31, 1917, Germany announced her intention to prosecute an unrestricted submarine campaign and President Wilson, on February 3, severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the emphases were the same:

"We wish," said President Wilson to a joint session of Congress,

to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people...seek merely to vindicate our rights to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany.59

When, on March 1, 1917, President Wilson released the text of the Zimmerman note, with its proposals to Mexico against the United States, he could predict, certainly, the people's response. Their war fervor from this point on is a matter of public record. As one authority has said, "...the rising war spirit of the nation was obvious to all ob-
servers.

The flood of protests and exhortations poured into Washington. American rights and honor, democracy, and the cause of humanity were the motivations; and even the cautious messages could not veil the force of these emotional ideals. For instance:

New York
[March, 1917]

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
Washington, D.C.:

Representing Groton School, wish to assure you of support of masters, boys, and graduates in your effort to place this Nation on footing of cooperation with allies in determination to establish freedom and justice in the world. Please wire, collect to Groton, informing me if we can do anything to help now.

Endicott Peabody

When, then, President Wilson delivered his war message to America on April 2, the American people, very close to "white-hot," grasped easily and acted upon the ideals and motives declared by the President. They wanted war. Concerning this response David Lawrence has written:

No one led the United States into war with Germany. The sinking of American ships by submarines, the loss of American lives on the high seas, the plotting of the German foreign office of an alliance between Mexico and Japan against the United States, the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in defiance of the laws of war and the rights of neutrals, all of these played their influential part, but when Woodrow Wilson read his message to Congress on April 2, 1917, he idealized the war—he said it was to make the world safe for democracy through the defeat of militarism and autocracy.

In idealizing the war, in knowing that the people needed these general, idealistic motives for entering the war, President Wilson demonstrated notable insight into the emotional constructions and resulting responses of the American people. He struck the note that enabled them
not only to preserve their often declared aversion to, even hatred for war or the militarism that comes with large regular military and naval forces, increased armament programs, and world commitments necessitating armed power for their effectiveness, but also to march eagerly off to war certain that their cause was righteous, heroic, and honorable.

This reversion to the impulses that carried America into the Spanish-American war in 1898 is remarkable. But even more remarkable, in light of this reversion, is the pervasive belief between 1898 and 1917 that Americans had lost the war fervor—had, in view of the changes in the nature of war and the role of the soldier, come to see war of any kind as both anachronistic and futile.

Between the two wars the emphases were for peace; before and during the wars the emphases were for war. Although the two wars were different in almost all respects, although nearly twenty years intervened, the emotional ideal—the abstraction involving honor, tradition, patriotism—produced the same verbal and physical responses. Americans were proud, certainly, of this emotional ideal; and they were proud, certainly, of their devotion to peace. That these two ideals were incompatible only the wars themselves could show.
Chapter Four

WAR AND SOCIAL THOUGHT

Behind the assertiveness of America and its leaders and the complex patterns of public response that made this assertiveness possible, ideas of social reform fermented in the minds of many men. By 1895, when the United States, as we have seen, was becoming self-consciously imperialistic, when Populists were manifesting their strongest opposition to the reign of laissez faire and the gospel of wealth, when Progressive reform was beginning to show results, economic, political, religious, and philosophical thinkers directed their attention to the predicaments of the society in which they lived. Their inheritance was the great body of both traditional and revolutionary thought of the nineteenth century; and to this inheritance they added the zest of reform, marked generally by a growing concern with the problems of the individual in a society that seemed to lose the individual as it became more urban, more wealthy, and more complex. One of these problems, certainly, was war. How these men treated this problem as they developed their systems of social thought and how their treatments reflected the influences of the culture that produced them have a direct relation to the development of the image of war as it appears in this study. To explain these how's, one must begin with the theory of evolution.

The impact of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) had

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 214.
been greatest, perhaps, in the field of science, but it had given rise to the new advances in the empirical technique of discovery that characterized most areas of intellectual activity. Through such influences as the very religious and learned John Fiske, who accepted evolution and based his teachings and writings on Darwinian theories; the writer and botanist Asa Gray, who found himself the acknowledged interpreter of American scientific opinion and a leader of the Darwinian movement; the writer and lecturer Edward L. Youmans who founded Popular Science Monthly, the "signal journalistic accomplishment of the scientific revival," and planned and supervised the publication of Appleton's famous International Scientific Series; the many controversial articles in the Atlantic Monthly and the Nation; and the writings and teachings of Henry Ward Beecher in the Christian Union and of Lyman Abbott in the Outlook—the various interpretations of natural selection and the survival of the fittest had become inextricably bound into the fabric of American thought.

The chief variant of the Darwinian doctrine had appeared in the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer. In applying the biological scheme of evolution to society and suggesting that principles of social structure and change had, in his terms, to be the same as those of the universe at large, Spencer created an optimistic theory of social change that appealed to Americans and became an essential ingredient of their thought. Societies, said Spencer, like other organisms, progressed from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and their ultimate condition would be, in his terms, one of equilibration—after periods of struggle and militance. By natural selection a society would develop from a militant community
into a peaceful, industrial one—the evolutionary stage of equilibra-
tion. The process of selection would be slow—but sure and rewarding.

As a result,

there emerges the industrial type of society, a regime
of contract rather than status, which unlike the older
form is pacific, respectful of the individual, more
heterogeneous and plastic, more inclined to abandon
economic autonomy in favor of industrial cooperation
with other states. Natural selection now works to pro-
duce a completely different individual character. In-
dustrial society requires security for life, liberty,
and property; the character most consonant with this
society is accordingly peaceful, independent, kindly,
and honest. The emergence of a new human nature has-
tens the trend from egoism to altruism which will solve
all ethical problems.²

So pervasive were the doctrines of Spencer in the last forty years or
so of the nineteenth century that John Dewey wrote, "He has so thorough-
ly imposed his idea that even non-Spencerians must talk in his terms
and adjust their problems to his statements."³

With the work of Darwin and Spencer as rationale, the philosophy
of laissez faire underlay much of the social, political, and economic
thought of the late nineteenth century. Natural development and sur-
vival of the fittest supported the idea that absolute freedom for the
individual was the best way to increase the wealth and health of the
United States, and refuted the idea that some kind of planned economy
was necessary for the welfare of the country. Supported by the spirit
of the frontier, the wealth of land, raw materials, and labor, the
ideals of freedom and of rugged individualism, the philosophy of laissez
faire justified for wealthy Americans like Andrew Carnegie the idea that
millionaires were "natural" because they had survived according to the
law of competition. This law, said Carnegie, in 1889,
...is here; we cannot evade it; no substitutes for it have been found; and while the law may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best for the race because it insures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the race.4

Even as Carnegie was making this declaration and emphasizing his kinship with Darwin and Spencer, however, the reformists were at work. Henry George, in his Progress and Poverty (1879), had pointed to the existence of extreme poverty in a time of great wealth and had developed a theory that land as a whole belongs to the people as a whole and that rise in the value of the land belongs to the people as a whole and should go to them. And Edward Bellamy, in his utopian novel Looking Backward (1888), had advocated a form of state socialism in which the state would dominate all industrial and commercial activity but at the same time be beneficent and democratic—eschewing any kind of regimentation—and assure a system to guarantee security from the cradle to the grave. Henry Demarest Lloyd was working on his Wealth vs Commonwealth (1894) in which he would point out that the laissez faire system was nurturing its opposite—monopolistic control—and that the men and women who were doing the work deserved the benefits of their labors. And Lester Ward, in his Dynamic Sociology (1883), had emphasized that laissez faire was both inconsistent and insincere, that it suppressed the individual and begged help from the government while it continued to preach free enterprise. His attack stands, in a sense, as the mark between Darwinian pessimism and Spencerian optimism—both of which he
considered apologies for the acceptance of social oppression; and the
attacks of all these men on the popular philosophy of laissez faire
mark the coming of the reformist ideals of the 1890's and the twenti-
eth century Progressivism and New Freedom. In religion, in economics,
in politics, in sociology, in history; in religion, in philosophy the
trend was to what has come to be called social thought: The social
gospel, the social reforms, pragmatism—all tended to concentrate on
the people and on real experience.

Into these currents, also, flowed the traditional ideals and at-
titudes—nationalism, honor, manifest destiny, Anglo-Saxon supremacy,
isolationism, American freedom, pride, and spirit—which influenced all
American intellectual activity, distinguished it, in fact, from such
activity in the rest of the world. And out of the whole stream one
can draw these ideals and attitudes—not, certainly, as separate, iso-
lable entities, but as partially amorphous units that have significance
only as they are related to the whole. Given the predominant philosophy
of a society and the dominant opposition to that philosophy, one can,
by examining the expressions of these opposites, distinguish their form
and write their history.

The task here is to give some form to the part of the whole in-
volving the question "Peace or War?" And one can begin with a conclusion
that the possibility of a good or beneficent war is an underlying as-
sumption in the Darwinist and Spencerian views and in most of those tra-
ditional ideals and attitudes enumerated above. The ways in which this
assumption manifests itself are, of course, many; and they appear, at
appropriate times, throughout this study. It is the period of reform,
of protest, of Progressivism, and the intellectual activity that it produced that requires attention here. When educators, ministers, philosophers, historians, politicians, and sociologists were concentrating on the improvement of society and the lot of the individual in that society, they had to face the question "Peace or War?" And how they answered it provides the matter from which one draws the form.

The answers are not simple ones; and one cannot conclude, in any sense, that either the reformist or the traditional thinkers hated war in proportion to their opposition to the survival-of-the-fittest, natural-selection, laissez-faire point of view. Spencer, for instance, was a pacifist; so were John Fiske, William James, Washington Gladden, and others. One can do no more than examine the words of the men themselves and draw his conclusions from them. This I propose to do.

I. THE BIG STICK

a. The Philosophy of Gain

At a time when the people of the United States were concerned chiefly with domestic issues—when Muckrakers, trust-busters, Socialists, Progressives, and others were attempting to make America a better nation in which to live; when the Pujo Report was exposing the shades and shadows of financial maneuvering in big business—the terms profit and loss loomed large in their thinking and in their planning. With the Andrew Carnegies appointing themselves as stewards of the nation's wealth, responsible for the adequate handling and distribution of this wealth; with the financial success of these men standing as the ultimate
goal among the millions striving to live and to get ahead; and with the general worship of enterprise and the power that financial wealth could bring, the American people tended to express all values in forms or terms of economic profit and loss. Anything that could somehow show profit could not be all bad in their society; and similarly anything that represented loss could not, certainly, be all good.

Directly involved in this drive for profit was the question "Peace or War?" Did war represent, in the economic thinking of Americans, profit or loss? or both? There is abundant evidence to indicate that among militarists and pacifists, imperialists and anti-imperialists, alike, there was a distinct feeling that war could be financially profitable to the victor. A reason for this is provided by Quincy Wright when he says, "Before the period of international capitalism, war had been traditionally regarded as an economic instrument, and the complex conditions of capitalistic economy, which made it no longer such, were difficult for the average man to understand."6 This average man, it would seem, felt that a war successfully prosecuted could, somehow, improve economic conditions; and he was generally receptive to the propaganda of philosophies of violence, however unlikely such philosophies might be to yield profit, if that propaganda stressed amelioration of existing economic conditions. That this average man did not go to war either in 1898 or in 1917 for such a reason I have shown in other parts of this study, but behind his motivations lay always, it would seem, the gnawing thought that something "good," i.e., profitable, would result if he was on the winning side. That he was uninstructed in the complex conditions of international capitalism and that an occasional voice
told him that war could not, in any way, be profitable has little to do with the conditions as they existed. Perhaps he hated war and begged others to join him in that hate; perhaps he wanted war and exhorted others to join his side. In either case what he thought concerning war and profit and loss is crucial—since he did go to war in 1898 and 1917 willingly.

This tendency to see war as profitable, the economist Norman Angell pointed out in 1912, was the great weakness in the exhortations of the pacifist movement. "The peace advocate," he wrote,

pleads for "altruism" in international relationships, and in so doing admits that successful war may be to the interest, though the immoral interest, of the victorious party. That is why the "inhumanity" of war bulks so largely in his propaganda, and why he dwells so much upon its horrors and cruelties. In his argument the pacifist, then, implied the profit—but argued against the immoral gain. The difficulty inherent in this attitude is pointed up in the following:

When the pacifist, in these circumstances, falls back upon the moral plea as opposed to economic considerations, he does not seem to realise that he has not met the militarists'—which is here the common man's—moral case, a case for war which is undoubtedly valid if one accepts the economic assumptions that are usually common alike to the pacifist and the militarist.

Thus the declaration of war, in Angell's terms, would not be a question of moral or immoral intent, but one of intellectual error in the interpretation of Right. To one who worships profit, a profitable war can be morally right. After close examination of the words of journalists, politicians, and of scholars in all fields, Angell concluded that among all of them there persisted the underlying assumption
"that military force if great enough can be used to transfer wealth, trade, property, from the vanquished to the victor, and that this latent power so to do explains the need of each to arm." And he set as his task in The Great Illusion to show that this "all but universal idea" was a gross and "desperately dangerous" misconception.

This book is significant not only because it establishes convincingly the predominance of this "misconception" among the people but also because its influence was great during the period preceding the great war. It changed the appeals of many pacifists; and although it did not change the opinions and feelings of the American people, it represents an influence among economists and other thinkers of the times. It exposed the scapegoat tendencies of the people—who blamed profiteers, militarists, politicians and the like for our excursions into war while they implicitly supported the very end which they were attacking.

Angell said,

So long as we take the line that "the People" (i.e., we ourselves) are innocent of error, then we might hang every war profiteer in existence, and find, on the morrow, human society as helplessly as ever in the grip of some new folly, stimulated by a new group interested in exploiting it.

But Angell, like "the People," had his weakness too, and it became a part of his argument: The "story and the paraphernalia" of warfare, he admitted, stirred his emotions and sent the blood tingling through his veins and appealed to "I know not what remote instincts to say nothing of our natural admiration for courage, our love of adventure, of intense movement and action." And there is even a tinge of regret in his statement, "But this romantic fascination resides to no small
extent in that very spectacular quality of which modern conditions are depriving war." As an economist, then, he knew what he wanted to say and said it; but even he saw rewards in war.

If one accepts the analysis of this Britisher in America, one has the crucial assumption which underlay economic thought both in the United States and elsewhere before the war. There was, however, at least one possible exception in the field of economics to the "all but universal misconception" which Angell exposes. That exception was Thorstein B. Veblen, the so-called bad boy of American economics. It would seem probable that Veblen labored under no misconceptions—particularly concerning war and peace and profit and loss; but an examination of his work suggests otherwise. In The Theory of the Leisure Class, in 1899, Veblen saw and discussed a parallel between the social characteristics of barbarian societies and those characteristics which determined social behavior in America in 1899. In the struggle for accumulation of wealth which surrounded him, Veblen saw modern aristocrats manifesting the same "virtues" that characterized barbaric warriors and priests—ferocity, self-seeking, clannishness, disingenuousness, and a free resort to force and fraud. "The characteristic feature of leisure class life," said Veblen, "is a conspicuous exemption from all useful employment." And its motive is not an increase of wealth by productive effort. Of his own time Veblen said,

The normal and characteristic occupations of the class in this mature phase of its life history are in form very much the same as in its earlier days. These occupations are government, war, sports, and devout observances.

And concerning the first two he added that "At this stage as at any other
cultural stage, government and war are, at least in part, carried on for the pecuniary gain of those who engage in them; but it is gain obtained by the honourable method of seizure and conversion. To Veblen, then, war was bad—did not represent his ideal of useful employment; but even he could suggest, as he has done above, that pecuniary gain was a result of war. The employment, however, is predatory, not productive, and any wealth gained as a result of war is not real wealth, in Veblen’s terms. With this attitude toward the nature and the function of war in modern society established, one can examine the later works of Veblen to see whether the approaching war affected his theories. *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (1915), a major work, provides the observations that reflect this influence. In this book Veblen explained the difference in strength of the German and the British economies, their political systems, and their roles in world politics. He saw Germany’s superior economic strength as a result of her borrowing the British technology but shunning the British form of government, her using this new technology with her old dynastic state to produce a dynastic imperialism aimed at world conquest. In Veblen’s view Germany would have to attempt this conquest soon because people under the new machine technology would not accept for long Germany’s system of privilege and authority based on social status and military caste.

As he developed his indictment against Germany, Veblen criticised also America and England and their institutions. In speaking of the Imperial State he could often easily have been referring to any of them. And concerning the relation of war to these imperial states, he said:
Personal dominion is essentially incongruous with the logic and perspective of this modern culture, and is therefore systematically incompatible with its ascendancy. Warlike experience is experience in personal rule, spoliation, loyalty, hate, subordination and duplicity. Therefore, whatever may be the nominal balance of profit and loss in the way of what is called the "fortunes of war," the net consequences will be much the same; and these consequences can not but be of the nature of retardation to Western civilisation in those respects that mark it as Western and modern.18

The power, thus, of the modern imperial state is transitory insofar as it is militaristic: "...whether the Imperial State wins or loses in the contest for the hegemony, the movement of cultural reversion for which in substance it is contending stands to gain at least to the extent of a substantial, though presumably temporary, impairment and arrest of Western civilisation at large."19

But Veblen, who saw the consequences of warlike enterprise through application of his theories of pecuniary emulation, conspicuous leisure, conspicuous consumption, and conspicuous waste, was forced to support war, to oppose pacifists, since, unlike government, sports, and devout observances, active participation in war tended to help him achieve the ends which he set up for a good society. He accepted the views that emphasized the waste of property and life involved in warfare and the impoverishment of countries at war, but he felt that "dispassionate scrutiny" of the question was necessary.

On the question of destruction of property, he noted that although material equipment is greatly damaged in war, "...the immaterial equipment of technological proficiency—the state of the industrial arts considered as a system of habits of thought—will have suffered relatively slight damage...."20 In times of peace and "commonplace prosperity"
over fifty per cent of the customary consumption of the population consisted of articles whose use was only conventionally necessary. Consumption of these articles could be discontinued without physical hardship and without lowering the productive capacity of the population. In times of war, said Veblen, this unproductive consumption would be greatly reduced, and the conventionally "decent" avoidance of productive work among the leisure class would fall into abeyance. In "seasons of general stress,"

...the net production of the community rises nearly to the level of its gross productive capacity, or at least comes much nearer that level than in piping times of peace.21

And Veblen found, also, that there were certain "economically mitigating" circumstances surrounding the loss of life incident to the enterprise of war. He recognized that the severest damage to personnel was the loss of morale, of the frame of mind for peace, due to the discipline of the service, to "incidental dissipation and 'irregularities,'" and to "exposure to the vicissitudes of a vocation made up of those things that would in private life be called arson, treason, murder, larceny, and the rest of what the decalogue forbids."22 These things, like disease and exposure, said Veblen, lowered men's industrial serviceability. But there is a margin between gross and net loss in his view. The loss of economically valuable personnel is not the same as the aggregate loss. Many men, especially officers and those others who volunteer for service, are "peculiarly fit for warlike enterprise and so presumably unfit for the arts of peace." And officers, who are "gentlemen" in the several senses that the word conveys, have thus no industrial value. On this point Veblen's own words are crucial:
Indeed, as bears on the net industrial efficiency of
the community they have appreciably less than no
value, being typically unproductive consumers. The
mortality among the officers may therefore be set
down as net gain, in the economic respect; and since
they will at an average be highly efficient consumers,
their demise should count as an economic relief to the
community at large, and count at something more than
a mere per-capita rating. 23

To Veblen, then, there was little validity in the view that war
destroys the best of the male population and leaves "dependents, de-
linquents, and defectives to continue the breed." One can, at this
point, predict his answer: "The best," as contemplated by this propo-
sition, are the best for the warlike purpose, not necessarily for any
other." 24 And one can conclude, reasonably, that while he did not
praise or advocate war, Veblen found himself supporting war as a means
of improving the industrial effectiveness of a population and ridding
this population of many of its economically inefficient persons. Even
after one allows for the ironic undercurrents in this work, the support
of war still emerges at the end.

b. The Philosophy of Violence

Equally as significant as the philosophy of gain in the minds of
thinking Americans was the philosophy of violence. Those men who wrote
in praise of violence—Alfred Thayer Mahan, Homer Lea, Theodore Roose-
velt—and those who deplored it, yet accepted it as characteristic of
individuals and of society, were the men who guided the affairs of the
nation and set the direction of its intellectual activity. Among the
former the dominant figure was Theodore Roosevelt. It would not be an exaggeration, in fact, to say, "As Roosevelt went, so went the nation." When he said, in 1897, "Peace is a goddess only when she comes with sword girt on thigh," and, in 1899, "Again, peace may come only through war," he expressed the heart of his philosophy. No nation, in his view, was worth anything unless it was prepared always to fight. The big stick in politics was the "sword girt on thigh"; any other philosophy was despicable. "No national life," he said, "is worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need shall arise, to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament of war, and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and its tears like water, rather than submit to the loss of honor and renown." That he was passionately, even religiously, devoted to this ideal is emphasized by the following passage:

To men of a certain kind, trade and property are far more sacred than life or honor, of far more consequence than the great thoughts and lofty emotions, which alone make a nation mighty. They believe, with a faith almost touching in its utter feebleness, that "the Angel of Peace draped in a garment of untaxed calico," has given her final message to men when she has implored them to devote all their energies to producing oleo margarine at a quarter of a cent less a firkin, or to importing woolens for a fraction less than they can be made at home. These solemn prattlers strive after an ideal in which they shall happily unite the imagination of a green-grocer with the heart of a Bengalee baboo. They are utterly incapable of feeling one thrill of generous emotion, or the slightest throb of that pulse which gives to the world statesmen, patriots, warriors, and poets, and which makes our nation other than a cumberer of the world's surface.

Roosevelt was, then, dedicated to this philosophy of the "militant angel" of peace. He could think and express himself to the people only on this basis. As a thinker and a leader he declared,
Scant attention is paid to the weakling or the coward who babbles of peace; but due heed is given to the strong man with the sword girt on thigh who preaches peace, not from ignoble motives, not from fear or distrust of his own powers, but from a deep sense of moral obligation. 29

Roosevelt made certain, both in speech and in action, that he was not a victim of scant attention—and he did his best to spare his country from a similar fate. 30

Because he was such a dominant power in America from 1895 to the Great War, Roosevelt's philosophy is important, but he was by no means the only one who saw peace as a benevolent angel only when she carried a sword. His friend and teacher Alfred Thayer Mahan in his The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897), his The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890), and his Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles (1899), preached continually his doctrine of violence. In 1898, for instance, he not only advocated a policy of power, in the militaristic sense, but justified in his terms the breaking of international law "in order to reach an end eminently beneficial to the majority of those concerned." 31 He approved the ideal of arming for peace, approved even that we "persuade ourselves that we cherish" this ideal, but he did not think that the United States should act according to that ideal. "It is better," he said, "honestly to profess a high standard, even if we fall from it at times, than wilfully to adopt a lower ideal of conduct." 32 And the fall could easily be justified; for, said Mahan, "law is simply an invention of mankind to secure justice, and when justice, the natural right of the great number, is prevented by the legal, not the natural, rights of a few, the latter may be set
Another philosopher of violence who went beyond both Roosevelt and Mahan in advocating militarism as the only means of national survival was General Homer Lea: In his view nations must have war and should admire war. He said:

National entities, in their birth, activities, and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life—plant, animal, or nation—the law of struggle, the law of survival...

That idea of international arbitration as a substitute for natural laws that govern the existence of political entities arises not only from a denial of their fates and an ignorance of their application, but from a total misconception of war, its causes, and its meaning.34

To General Lea war has no beginning and no end so long as men or nations bring themselves together in individual or political contention. He voiced the heart of the militaristic view when he said, in 1912,

Whether it is for good or for evil, this everlasting struggle forms the necessary motif of human aspiration. Between a spider slipping his web from twig to leaf and a man threading his nets from threshold to threshold, between a nest of ants by the roadside and a tribe of men upon a greater way, there is no difference.35

In this environment, said Lea, confederations of states cannot survive. Autonomous military power is the only answer. If America, in the beginning, had been subject to the same dangers facing all nations in 1912—the result of intimacy of intercourse and shortness of distance—the Republic, he said, would not have survived a single generation. To support this declaration, General Lea reviewed what seemed to him the political trend of the American Republic. The substance of that review is crucial:
...as we examine the progress which marks the evolution of its [America's] political system, we find that almost in exact proportion as science has brought it into closer contact with the rest of the world, augmenting its responsibilities and dangers, it has altered its political system, taking away the sovereign rights of the states; now silently, now with turmoil and noise, sometimes in convention halls, and sometimes upon fields of battle, the struggle to survive forced the American Republic to abandon a confederated form of government.  

For General Lea, his and the other militarists' millennium was inevitable and, perhaps, imminent.

In contrast with these out-and-out militarists were those social thinkers represented by the very influential sociologist and teacher William Graham Sumner. A Darwinist and Social Darwinist, Sumner developed (paradoxically) during the vital years 1895-1917 definite objections to the expansionist course the United States was following.

He liked the America of 1896 when, in his words, "it enjoy[ed] a privileged position such as no other community of men [had] occupied in the world's history." He said:

We have no strong neighbors. We are under no obligation to maintain great armaments. We have no heavy debt.... No enemy will attack us. We can live in prosperity and enjoy our security if we choose. Our earth hunger is satisfied for the present, and we can enjoy its satisfaction. It is also provided for far into the future.

As America's earth hunger grew, so did Sumner's wrath. And as his objections became more vehement they grew more paradoxical. His views on war were unequivocal. In his terms the competition of life arises between groups, not between individuals. Members of in-groups are allies and joint-partners in one interest while they share an antagonism toward outsiders. On this basis he could declare, in 1903, "It is the competition of life...which makes war, and that is why war always has existed..."
and always will. It is in the conditions of human existence.\(^{38}\) And he explained further why war is inevitable. Since each group must regard every other group as a possible enemy, because of the antagonism of interests, there is always occasion for suspicion and distrust although actual hostilities occur only on specific occasions. Thus, said Sumner:

Every member of another group is a stranger; he may be admitted as a guest, in which case rights and security are granted him, but if not so admitted he is an enemy. We can now see why the sentiments of peace and cooperation inside are complementary to sentiments of hostility outside. It is because any group, in order to be strong against an outside enemy, must be well disciplined, harmonious, and peaceful inside; in other words, because discord inside would cause defeat in battle with another group. Therefore the same conditions which made men war-like against outsiders made them yield to the control of chiefs, submit to discipline, obey law, cultivate peace, and create institutions inside.\(^{39}\)

And not only is war inevitable, in Sumner's philosophy, but it is good. Of the four great motives—hunger, love, vanity, fear—that move men to social activity—to war—none is either grand or noble. But motives from which men act have nothing at all to do with consequences. In the cases of war, said Sumner, "while men were fighting for glory and greed, for revenge and superstition, they were building human society..., learning cooperation, perseverance, fortitude, and patience."\(^{40}\)

The paradox, then, arises when one places this philosophy alongside Sumner's continuous objection to American policies. In a bitter essay "The Conquest of the United States by Spain" (1898) he saw expansion and imperialism "at war" with the "best traditions, principles, and interests of the American people."\(^{41}\) Then he could ignore, perhaps, the "naturalness" of the action America was taking. But his words show that
he was objecting to himself.

Through Roosevelt, Mahan, Lea, Sumner, then, one can see the pattern of influences that informed the thoughts of many men between 1895-1917. This pattern appears in many ways in many areas of expression. Professor Charles Horton Cooley, for instance, influential social philosopher at the University of Michigan, confessed, in 1902, in a discussion of leadership and personal ascendancy, that leaders like Darwin had none of the "dramatic or visually imaginative kinds of power" that military heroes had for him. He could see Grant and Nelson "at the head-quarters of their armies, or on the decks of their ships, and hear the roar of their cannons." And he knew that their power was the great power. He said:

...for my part whenever I think of any occasion when a man played a great deal before the eyes of mankind, I feel a thrill of irrational enthusiasm. I should imagine, for instance, that scarcely anyone could read such a thing as "Sheridan's Ride" without strong feeling. He witnesses the disorder, uncertainty, and dismay of the losing battle, the anxious officers trying to stay the retreat, and longing for the commander who has always led to victory. Then he follows the ride from "Winchester twenty miles away," and shares the enthusiasm of the army when the valiant and beloved leader rides forth upon the field at last, renewing every heart by his presence and making victory out of defeat. In comparison with this other kinds of power seem obscure and separate.

Given this enthusiasm, Professor Cooley could admire also the power for social good in war itself. "It was easy to see," he said,

during the Spanish-American War, that the eager interest of the whole American people in the military operations, and the general and enthusiastic admiration of every trait of heroism, was bringing about a fresh sense of community throughout the country and so renewing and consolidating the collective life of the nation.
In 1907, the Christian Socialist Josiah Strong began a Mission Study Course in *The Challenge of the City* with the generalization:

"We all delight to honor the men who fought the battles of our country and who risked limb and life in its defense. Many of them nobly proved, what Horace sang, that 'It is sweet to die for one's country.' And the philosopher Josiah Royce justified the presence of war in his system of individualism, loyalty to loyalty, and the "higher provincialism."

He pointed out, in 1914, that modern wars are in many cases "deliberately and thoughtfully planned by patriots who love their country's honor, who are clearly conscious of well-formulated ideals which they think righteous, and who fight in the name of the freedom of the people, and in the service of what they suppose to be the highest human culture." He recognised that no opinions prevent "warlike passions from seeming to many who cultivate them not only necessary but morally indispensible; not only honorable, but holy; not only fascinating but rational." And he showed that it is "natural" to have these passions:

...the deepest reason why what is best in individual men does not destroy but often inflames the warlike spirit, lies in the fact that the best in individual men depends upon their loyalty to their own groups, upon their patriotism, and also upon their interest in groups which are not mere pairs. In such interest in groups which are larger and richer than pairs, consists men's very desire for human solidarity. For human unions can become stable and fruitful only through the establishment of relations which are very different from the dangerous dyadic relations of lovers, of rivals, and of warriors.

Even Washington Gladden, the pacifist advocate of the social gospel, based his primary arguments for a disarmed peace, in 1915, on the following argument [italics his]: "But every nation on the earth which might be such a foe, knows today that we are not now and cannot be for
twenty years in any danger from her. His was the kind of view forecast in his expressed philosophy, in 1897, "The day is not far off when the world will see that the way of love is the only way of life."

There remains, however, the dominant philosophy of this period of change and reform—the philosophy of pragmatism. The pragmatists, in asserting that the only test we have for the truth of any proposition is confirmation by experience of its concrete circumstances, provide an excellent insight into the status of the question "War or Peace?" among the thinkers of the period.

Mr. Quincey Wright has pointed out that pragmatism should not have supported war or revolution. Pragmatism holds, or held, that truth does not come from the application of any method but only from the application of methods which have, in experience, yielded results which were predicted and were consistent with the general body of truths. And it is manifest that such violent methods as war and revolution do not, generally, yield results which have been predicted or are consistent with the body of social values which have been tested by experience. As Mr. Wright says, "Resort to war or to violent revolution, as distinguished from the employment of an overwhelmingly powerful police force, is resort to chance, not the application of scientific method and is, consequently, the reverse of pragmatism." How, then, the pragmatists answered the big question is crucial; and William James answered it, in 1910, in his essay "The Moral Equivalent of War."

He declared himself a devout believer in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of a socialistic equilibrium. The militarists' and social philosophers' fatalistic view of the war-function
seemed to him nonsense. For "I know," he said,

that war making is due to definite motives and sub-
ject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms,
just like any other form of enterprise. And when
whole nations are the armies, and the science of
destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the
sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd
and impossible from its own monstrosity.52

But in 1910 there was, James saw, a special problem involved in using
the terms peace and war. He agreed, in a sense, with the Leas and the
Sumners when he declared, "'Peace' in military mouths today is a synonym
for 'war expected.'"53 And he extended his remarks to include more than
just the "military mouths":

The word has become a pure provocative, and no govern-
ment wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be
printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date Dictionary
should say that "peace" and "war" mean the same thi'ng,
now in posse, now in actu. It may even reasonably be
said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation
for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, un-
ceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public
verification of the mastery gained during the "peace"-
interval.54

In this way, then, James established the condition of war and peace in
his own time. He saw little chance, apparently, of a change. Concern-
ing what he called the double-personality—the peace-party and the war-
party—he believed the dichotomy would continue because the "militarist
imagination" had such a strong case against the pacifist imagination.
"It is but one utopia against another," he said, and asserted that any
suggestions he made toward reform would be in the nature of "utopian
hypothesis."55 Such, then, one must consider his search for a moral
equivalent of war. James should have, it seems to me, called his search
"A Moral and Esthetic Equivalent of War" because the strong case of the
"militarist imagination" is based both on morals and on esthetics. He, like Professor Cooley, could see the vitality and power in the military leader. He said,

Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the dacher, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which everyone feels that the race should never cease to breed, for everyone is sensitive to its superiority. The duty is incumbent on mankind, of keeping military characters in stock—of keeping them, if not for use, then as ends in themselves and as pure pieces of perfection,—so that Roosevelt's weaklings and molly coddles may not end by making everything else disappear from the face of nature.56

With the military imagination's moral and esthetic power established, James constructed his utopian hypothesis so as to transfer these values to some other institution. He proposed an army enlisted against Nature, composed of men drafted to work for a period of time in coal and iron mines, on freight trains, in foundries, and the like. The results, he felt, would preserve the hardihood and discipline he admired. Such converted soldiers, he asserted,

would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature, they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation.57

Because James constructed this Utopia, the peace advocates published his essay. But he emphasized that he had no hope for his plan; he knew, in fact, that the esthetic and moral appeal of the "militaristic imagination" would be vitiated in the equivalent.
II. THE OLIVE BRANCH

William James offered an appropriate transition from the social thought symbolized by the Big Stick to that symbolized by the Olive Branch. His "Moral Equivalent" leads one into the remarkable congeries of organized movements for peace that achieved their greatest hour in the period preceding the Great War, yet suffered, at the same time, their most crushing defeat. And it takes its place among the expressions of systems of belief that characterize the leaders of these movements. In expressing their desire for peace, they said much about war. And what they said is important here because their words represent what might be termed the "crucial years" in the American struggle for peace.58

The Spanish-American War in 1898 and America's new adventures in imperialism, while they shook these peace movements to their foundations—foundations that had been building since the birth of the American nation—gained them new converts and workers. Many men who considered imperialism unAmerican and undemocratic, who felt that the new impetus given to militarism and navalism was both dangerous and inhumane, who feared, in general, the new kind of American position in the world turned to the official organizations of the peacemakers for their support.

The histories of these organizations, their activities, their supporters, their scope, have been treated at length by Professor Curti and, in their relationship to world peace organizations, by A. C. F. Beales in The History of Peace.59 Both men have established what Curti refers to as the "unparalleled growth of the [peace] cause which aroused
much enthusiasm and hope in the years between the war with Spain and the great conflict of 1914. He says:

So universally popular was the cause, and so near did victory seem, that young college idealists regretted they had been born too late to devote their lives to the work which was being so successfully carried on about them. Even the more cautious and realistic believed that the dawn of peace could not be far off, if it was not already at hand.

There was, then, certainly, in America a shared feeling of satisfaction and of optimism among those thousands of people who dedicated themselves officially to the cause of peace. They assumed the role of reformers and worked to convert other Americans and their government to their proposed solutions for international peace. That they were, apparently, so remarkably successful up to 1914, at least, Mr. Curti has noted, can be attributed to several causes: In an era when reformers of all kinds were attacking vice and corruption in the cities, the ethics and practices of big business, child labor, and many other social and political ills, the cause of world peace exerted a great appeal; in an era when, officially, navalism and militarism were expanding, when such organizations as the Navy League, fostered by such men as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Richmond P. Hobson, and the American Legion were winning wide notice, the forces for peace had crucial objects for attack; in a period when the Hague Conferences received much favorable publicity, when many arbitration treaties were being completed, and when America's role seemed to be, in Venezuela, in Alaska, at Algeciras, that of world peacemaker, the cause of world peace seemed to fit the pattern of official political tendencies.

Comprising these peace organizations were efficient leaders and
loyal, devoted followers. I have noted in Chapter I some of these leaders and organizations, but some closer observation of them is necessary if one is to establish what constituted their views toward war and peace. In the histories one has the facts of their views and their careers; in their words one has the substance of their views. It is their words, therefore, that are important here. In attacking the war preparations and in defending steps toward peace they gained strength two ways, but at the same time they revealed conflicts within them that were, as one views them in retrospect, irreconcilable.

Concerning their influence in 1907, for instance, President Roosevelt wrote,

...our danger...is not of too brutal and warlike a spirit, but of a curious indifference to, and inability to grasp, the future on the part of our people as a whole, and the growth of a foolish peace spirit which is not merely harmless, but fraught with the possibility of mischief. In this country I encounter people who strenuously object to our keeping up our navy, and at the same time hamper me in coming to a satisfactory arrangement with Japan, for instance; that is, they invite trouble and refuse to prepare the means which would avert disaster if trouble came.... These people are always denouncing armaments, but are capable at any time of demanding or embarking on a policy which will shortly land us where we have to face the alternative of a humiliating backdown or of a disastrous war unless we are already armed.62

President Roosevelt was, as a militarist, essentially prejudiced against the methods and ideals of those who had the peace spirit. But his opposition provides an insight into the paradox of the pacifists' position. They wanted peace, international peace, at almost any price; yet they were Americans, products of a tradition, already discussed, in which honor, patriotism, and freedom were held worth defending at what-
ever cost. In a letter, in 1907, to Andrew Carnegie, a leader in the peace movements, President Roosevelt implied this paradox when he wrote:

I beseech you to remember that tho it is our bounden duty to work for peace, yet it is even more our duty to work for righteousness and justice. It is "Righteousness that exalteth a nation," and tho normally peace is the handmaid of righteousness, yet, if they are ever at odds, it is righteousness whose cause we must espouse.63

Yet the peace advocates were unwilling or unable to follow this opposition view; and one sees, in retrospect, that they had little reason to respect it. They wanted peace; and military preparedness programs, expansionist policies, and general aggressiveness seemed to them strange means to achieve their goal. Motivated by what they believed to be a genuine hatred for war, they acted to reform the world. If, as both Beales and Curti suggest, their idea that the way to peace lay in reform was incompatible with the existing system of international relations,64 they worked for peace on this basis and believed that their efforts were successful. International arbitration of disputes was their goal, and they became firmer in their demands as they grew more successful.

In 1895, for instance, Dr. Benjamin F. Trueblood, a standard-bearer in the peace movement, told a group of followers that disagreements concerning the value of war should not deter them from their pursuits of peace. Some people, he noted, saw war as a divine institution, to be perpetuated because of the benefit and glory of it; others believed that war may sometimes be necessary, in certain extreme cases (the majority view, he indicated, in 1895); others believed that war is always and everywhere wrong ethically. "You will be glad to know," he
told the group, "that in the great peace movement of our time...people holding both [sic] these views meet in the utmost harmony, and discuss all the great questions pertaining to international peace without any clashing whatever."65

But, in 1895, Dr. Trueblood was not at all certain that such a peace would ever bless the earth. He noted in another address two obstacles in the way of securing a permanent treaty of arbitration. In confessing the obstacles, he qualified his case for peace:

We are having at the present time a harvest of the hereditary warlike instincts which were the outgrowth of the period of 1860-1865. Whatever good things we may say about the Civil War, it has, as all know, left warlike instincts among our people, that just now, a third of a century later, are beginning to bear fruit. I remember to have heard in the days of the war the prophecy of an intelligent peace man, who said, "Woe be to the nation that treads upon our toes twenty-five years hence!

The jingoism of the present time, which I think has its root chiefly in these hereditary instincts, takes two different lines; first it manifests itself in an extreme disposition to take offence at everything and everybody, and secondly, in what Mr. Godkin has called "intense Americanism,"—that is, the feeling that the United States can thrash the whole creation if necessary, and that she ought to have the Sandwich Islands and Cuba and Hayti and Jamaica and Mexico and Canada and all the rest of the world around about, whether the rest of the world wants to have the lion lie down with the lamb in that way or not.66

In analyzing what he believed to be characteristics, even hereditary instincts, of his contemporaries, Dr. Trueblood implies, at least, an acceptance of a pervasive militaristic spirit that would reduce the effect of the attempted peace reforms. For better or for worse, he would seem to say, we (as lovers of peace) must temper our demands so as not to offend the many Americans with warlike instincts. In dedicat-
ing ourselves to peace, we must recognize, at the same time, that a course of imperialism supported by a citizenry whose attitudes toward American tradition and honor are emotionally charged suggests, even portends, war.

By 1899, the year of the first Hague Conference, the peace movement had gained new converts and new support from such sources as the Nobel Peace Prize, the Prize Essay Competitions, and the wealth of published materials concerning the Hague Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences. The leaders of the movement could, presumably, speak with more firmness and authority. Yet an examination of their words reveals, rather, the prophetic nature of Dr. Trueblood's analysis in 1895. Ardent, even explosive, in their appeals for reforms leading to world peace, these professional advocates seemed also under the influence of the jingoism which Dr. Trueblood had both accepted and lamented.

An address before the Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference in 1899 reveals this pervasive dualism:

I do not pretend to bring forward any views as to how these great questions of arbitration should be decided. I only speak as a woman who believes that peace will come, because it should come; and who at the same time glories in the wars which have gone by in the past. It is no paradox that the society in New York City over which I have the honor to preside should have recorded itself, as it did three years ago, as ardently in favor of the principle of international arbitration, while at the same time that body bears the title of Daughters of the American Revolution. Our honor lies in being descended from men who fought, but they fought that peace with honor might come; and though I stand here to-night longing for the dawn of peace, I pay my tribute to the heroes who died in the last century, the last generation, the last month—the heroes who spilled their blood for their country's flag.
This speaker denied that her position revealed a paradox, but her glorifying the heroes who were dying in the Philippines in "the last month," spilling their blood "for their country's flag" would seem to underline a paradox. In declaring her faith that peace would come because it should come, she was, quite sincerely, one must emphasize, begging the question of peace. In her terms war could not easily be abandoned as an American institution.

A similar problem exposes itself in much of the peace literature of 1899. In the work of Reverend Lyman Abbott, another energetic leader of the peace movement, the paradox is crucial, particularly in the terms of this analysis. He sensed that those devoted to peace had committed an error in making, in Mr. E. W. Stead's terms, "War against War." He refused to believe that war itself is wrong, even though he based his arguments for peace upon the Christian doctrine. "I cannot think," he asserted, "that the universal instinct of mankind plays false." And he added:

I cannot think that it is a desirable thing to erase from our national records the names of Bunker Hill and Brandywine, Antietam and Gettysburg, or from the roll of our great men the names of Putnam and Perry and Farragut and Grant and Sherman, and consign them to oblivion as men that lived unworthily. There are some things worse than war. I know that General Sherman said: "War is Hell." But there is one conceivable thing worse than hell, and that would be crime and iniquity going unrestrained and unpunished. War that emancipates, war that defends, war that protects, may be the very war of God Himself.68

In proposing to abolish war by reforming its causes instead of attacking war itself, Reverend Abbott presented a convincing argument; but in emphasizing his point, he emphasized also a kind of admiration
for the crusading war—the war of God Himself. What he overlooked, however, was the problem surrounding the words emancipates, defends, and protects: American would seem definitely to be the grammatical subject of these verbs, and the world their objects. Given the proper emphasis, the correct stimulus, any war could be fitted into his holy war. He, like Mrs. Maclean, had faith that peace would come, but he would not abolish war in the process.

By 1903, these peace advocates had a stronger basis for faith. The moderate success of the Hague Conference, the establishment of a working Hague Court to arbitrate international disputes, the successful completion of the Pan-American Congress, the de-emphasis of the problem of the Philippines, the five years' elapsed time since the war with Spain—all stimulated the peace societies, moved them to see the end of international armed disputes. In a time when emphasis was placed on the proximity of nations, their recognition of the need for community interests and solutions to problems, spirited peace leaders could view the abolition of war as a foregone conclusion. They tended to avoid the qualifying statements that characterised their views in 1899 and concentrated on the spreading of their reform doctrines. That they were more than hopeful is indicated in the following statement by one of their group:

How irrelevant [in 1903] ...appears war! These tendencies [toward peace], these great root forces that are underground and out of sight, are nevertheless producing such growths that war and conflict and bloodshed are made not only irrelevant but impertinent, not only impertinent but incongruous, not only incongruous but impossible.69

Impossible though war might be to Dr. Burr, however, he implies
later in his address the same kind of acceptance that one finds in 1895 and in 1899. Even though this acceptance is less distinct, it is in a way more remarkable. In exhorting the advocates of peace to work harder, he draws upon historical incident:

When General U. S. Grant stood viewing the British troops, he said, "They march with the swing of centuries of conquest." There was something in the rhythmic beat of those triumphant feet that made him think of the centuries of British supremacy. So it seems to me there is quivering in the atmosphere about us as we look back over these one hundred years of conquest in this great cause [peace], a clarion note which summons us to "Advance!" ...

My good friends, and friends of international arbitration, may we not catch the rhythmic beat of the century of splendid conquest, and move on to a nobler advance? 70

The ironic nature of this metaphor marks the gradual change that is noticeable in the appeals of the peace advocates in the new century. As war somehow seemed more and more an impossibility as far, at least, as America was concerned, the marching army, the volunteer hero, the courageous military crusader became symbols around which these professional peace advocates built their exhortations for peace reforms.

In 1906, for further example, the pacifist leader Lucia Ames Mead recommended to peace advocates Jean DeBloch's The Future of War in these terms: "His great book...will remain the chief armory from which the men of the twentieth century who are warring against war will continue to draw until their sure victory comes...." 71 This figure employed by Mrs. Mead is interesting here because it reflects directly the tension that I referred to earlier in this work. 72 She, as a peace lover and a teacher, recognized the problems of her time involving the conflict between peace and the hero, as the hero appeared to students in
1900. She instructed teachers to be careful about songs that were sung in schools, no matter how hallowed by custom or tradition they had become. The words, for instance, "Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just," disturbed her—she pointed out that the idea expressed there was not justified either by history or by common sense. Similarly, when children sang "The army and navy forever!" they were to be shown that the writer of such words did not mean "War forever!" Yet she in turn seemed compelled to draw upon the military arsenal for her praise of the DeBloch's work.

One must emphasize at this point that the peace advocates were explicitly aware of the problems surrounding the perpetuating of American traditions and the teaching of American history without glorifying war, honor through destruction, and the military or naval hero. They took, in fact, quite practical steps to counteract the force of these influences; but in taking these steps they admitted at least partial defeat, especially in the light of their general decision that war per se was a departed evil.

In 1905 the American Peace Society appointed a committee "to ascertain and report upon the instruction given in History in the Public Schools of the United States with Special Reference to War, Battle, and Militarism." The results of this survey were encouraging to the Society. The committee discovered in the more than seventy history textbooks, in use for periods ranging from sixty to two years, that the quantity of war material in the books had steadily diminished, the more recent books having about half as much as those of the 1850's. And the committee drew the conclusion that "the public pulse has begun to beat in favor of peace
and arbitration." This substantiated the general view of the peace societies that by 1906 they could look back on war, not forward to it.

But they had another problem, one which was tangible and obvious—the fact that America was increasing her armaments year by year, despite the efforts of the many peace conventions, the Hague Conference, and the thousands of peace advocates to forestall such activity. As I have shown earlier, it was the peace advocates' opposition to this "arming for peace" that roused such a militarist as Theodore Roosevelt to wrathful opposition. And in basing much of their argument for reform on what they called the weak logic in arming for peace, these same advocates professed more support and confidence than the facts indicated. In their own words one has the reason for their difficulty, as in the following statement by Justice of the Supreme Court David P. Brewer:

In the Civil War were some of the greatest battles of history and a terrible loss of life on either side. In the Spanish War, outside of two brilliant naval engagements, there were only a few skirmishes. The two wars taken as a whole compare about like a twelve-inch rifled gun with a small pistol; and yet, as we have seen, after the Civil War there was no cry for an increase in armament, no call for a navy to challenge the fleets of the world, a steady payment of the national indebtedness, a devotion to the pursuits of peace, and a magnificent enlargement of our industries and business, while after the Spanish War we increased our army, and we have been steadily building ironclad after ironclad, until now our navy stands second among the navies of the world.

Putting the matter in another form: During the ten years prior to the Spanish War the expenses of the army and navy, omitting pension charges, were five hundred and seven millions; for the ten years following that war, $1,626,000,000, or $1,119,000,000 more than in the prior ten years.... Is it not strange that so small a war has wrought such a change in the thought and action of the country, when the mightiest of wars wrought so little? Certain interests which profit by naval construction have been active and clamorous. And
a not inconsiderable part of the press has filled the
air with calls for a larger navy. A little soap and a
little water with a great deal of wind will make a
large and beautiful bubble. But shortly the bubble will
burst, the beauty be gone, and nothing left but soap and
water.75

The ambiguous analogy at the end of Justice Brewer’s statement,
his use of the words greatest and brilliant in referring to battles and
naval engagements, and his attempting to lay the blame for startling in-
creased military and naval expenditures on the Spanish War all indicate
the difficulty of the peace advocate in 1911 in opposing war expendi-
tures, showing why they were illogical, and attempting to explain why
the armaments expansion should even be proposed in a time of peace. In
expressing admiration for heroic action in wars, in opposing, at the
same time, all steps that might lead to war, and in wondering why anyone
should expect or anticipate war in the twentieth century, Justice Brewer
revealed the dilemma of the peace advocate. And his case, along with
that of many others, projects for us a working illustration of a gener-
alization formed by A. C. F. Beales:

The bitter tragedy of the years that followed the Hague
Conference lies in that the idea of World Peace was be-
coming more practically futile as it grew more theoret-
ically axiomatic.76

But as the idea of World Peace became more practically futile,
the forces for peace grew in numbers. The Second Hague Conference in
1907, the many more peace conventions, the establishment in 1910 of the
ten million dollar Andrew Carnegie Peace Fund—"to hasten the abolition
of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization"77—drew
more and more converts to the cause. And with the change in American
military and naval might came also a change in the exhortations to re-
form. One of the most ardent and vocal peace leaders, and a founder of the New York Peace Society, Reverend Charles Jefferson, conveys a sense of this change—with its perpetuation of the difficulties that had plagued his kind since, at least, 1895:

Much has been written about the horrors of war; the time has come to write of the horrors of an armed peace. In many ways it is more terrible than war. War is soon over and the wounds heal. An armed peace goes on indefinitely, and its wounds gape and fester and poison all the air. War furnishes opportunity for men to be brave; an armed peace gives rise to interminable gossip about imaginary goblins and dangers. In war, nations think of principles, but in an armed peace the mind is preoccupied exclusively with devising ways of increasing the efficiency of the implements of slaughter. War develops men, but an armed peace rots moral fibre. [Italics mine.] 78

Reverend Jefferson here finds himself in the position of a defender of war because, in his terms, war develops men, encourages bravery, and motivates nations to consider principles rather than methods and techniques. In opposing the nature of peace in America in 1909, he justifies a kind of war—the kind, evidently, that America fought in 1776, in 1812, in 1848, in 1861-65, and in 1898, the only kind, in fact, that Americans, both professional peace advocates and the others, ever, in their opinion, fought. A difficulty facing Reverend Jefferson and the other peace advocates was, certainly, that although America and the other leading nations of the world were building up their armed strength, none dared to give as its reason the desire for aggrandizement at the expense of other nations; none dared say it was arming, in any sense, for offensive war—or for war of any kind. To attack war in a time when war on a large scale seemed impossible called for special technique, of which Reverend Jefferson's is an example. That they saw in this "peace
spirit evidence that they had won much of their "battle" is clear:

As late as June, 1914, Randolph Bourne wrote:

This swing of international opinion from the tacit conviction that armaments were for offence, to the general assumption that armaments are for defence merely, is tell-tale evidence of an enormously significant character that militarism itself has been gradually forced back, since the growth of the Peace Movement, to a defensive position, to a trial for its own life. Militarism itself has awakened to the fact that it needs apologists, and it is setting itself to work thus to make itself respectable.79

But against this negative kind of militarism, accompanied by greater and greater military and naval expansion, the peace leaders felt compelled to push on. They could use the methods of Reverend Jefferson and end up defending war; they could use Bourne's method and consider the victory almost won; they could attack, as many did attack, armaments expansion on the grounds of economy, or on the grounds that armaments were entirely pointless when America was isolated from danger and the example of peace to the world; and they could perpetuate the "war against war" argument, acknowledging virtual victory but emphasizing, still, the need for further reform. The prize winning oration of the Intercollegiate Peace Association in 1914 indicates a desire to perpetuate this tradition:

The day of triumph is not far distant. Already the moving finger of Time points on the wide horizon, in the roseate tints of the dawn, the picture of Peace--Peace the victory of victories, beside which Marathon and Gettysburg pale into insignificance; victory without the strains of martial music, unaccompanied by the sob of widowed and orphaned; victory on God's battlefield in humanity's war on war.80

When this speech was made the war in Europe had begun; but Mr. Broido and many others were justified in seeing, in America, at least,
the victory to which they referred. Concerning the Mexican incident, for instance, which drew the American navy to Tampico, Vera Cruz, and Mazatlan, put five thousand American regulars in Mexico, and forced the assembling of all available forces for possible war with Mexico, former President William Howard Taft could see that the American attitude revealed a growing love of peace. "The people," he declared, "are determined to do their duty should that duty involve a war, and go into it with faces stern and teeth set, and to clean up the job as promptly as it can be done; but they have at present little enthusiasm for it."\(^{31}\) That he de-emphasized the fact of "the absence of those soul-stirring issues which arouse warlike enthusiasm" detracts from his convictions as a leader in the peace movement, but in 1914 he reflected the general attitude of the peace advocates.

So, too, did President Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, when he addressed his student body on the subject of the great war in Europe:

...the moral judgment of the American people as to this war and as to the several steps in the declaration and conduct of it, is clear, calm, and practically unanimous. There is no beating of drums and blowing of bugles, but rather a sad pain and grief that our kin across the sea, owing whatever allegiance and speaking whatever tongue, are engaged in public murder and destruction on the most stupendous scale recorded in history. This of itself proves that the education of public opinion has proceeded far, and, whatever the war traders and militarists may say, that the heart of the American people is sound and its head well-informed.\(^{82}\)

To support President Butler's view one further kind of evidence is helpful at this point: the emotional literature that followed the opening of the Great War in Europe. With the literature itself I shall deal in the next chapter, but the words of John Erskine, who collected
for and introduced some war poems to the peace societies, add weight

to a conclusion that the year 1914 was not disturbing to these peace
groups, who still maintained that peace for America was real and,
apparently, lasting. Professor Erskine noted that he was interested
in the "emotional attitudes" of America in December, 1914, but cautioned
that he knew that they might cease to represent the national feeling be-
fore they got into print. He was impressed that the "glamor of war"

had not "touched the poems." He said:

...even yesterday, as it seems, William Vaughn Moody
could imply in his beautiful and otherwise enlightened
"Ode in Time of Hesitation" that a war is just, even
morally alluring, if it rises from generous impulses
and is made to serve some high end....but clearly the
verse-writers who have been expressing the emotional
judgments of the United States in the last few weeks
do not agree with them. The battle passages in...
Moody's eloquent peroration have suddenly become anti-
quated, and Christianity is invoked, not in the images
of discipline and strategy, but in the figure of the
widowed and the orphaned and the slain.83

There is the kind of confidence in these lines that marks suc-
cess and the attitude of the peace advocates in 1914. And in a further
statement, Professor Erskine acts as seer into the years 1916-1917:

There can be little question that if the United States
were actually in the conflict this humane attitude
would largely disappear, and the glamor of war would
return upon much of our verse; yet never before has so
general a condemnation of war been voiced even by a
nation at peace.84

As American neutrality became in 1915 and 1916 more and more tenu-
ous, and, as America's entry into the war on the side of the allies be-
came more easily predictable, the bubble of a peaceful America burst in
the faces of the peace advocates. As we know now, however, this could
not have been a complete surprise. It demonstrated to them that when
they believed themselves strongest they were, perhaps, weakest. And they could do little else but support President Wilson and follow him and his expressed aims and goals as he led America into the conflict. Instead of reformers crusading for peace they became reformers crusading for peace through a war that was, from the American point of view, right and just.

The peace societies assumed an attitude of quiet submission, as the following Resolutions of the Annual Meeting of the Trustees of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1917, indicates:

**Peace Through Triumph of Democracy**

Resolved, That the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, assembled for their annual meeting, declare hereby their belief that the most effectual means of promoting durable international peace is to prosecute the war against the Imperial Government of Germany to final victory for democracy, in accordance with the policy declared by the President of the United States.

. . . . . . . .

**Services Tendered to the Government**

Resolved, That the Endowment offers to the Government the services of its Division of International Law, its personnel and equipment, for dealing with the pressure of international business incident to the war.85

Although the peace advocates submitted in this same way, they were neither so quiet nor so unemotional. In Professor Erskine's words, "glamor of war" had somehow returned. The traditional "war against war" argument, which the peace advocates had used to seemingly good effect, became actually war against war, and gave a new application to Brodie's "victory on God's battlefield in humanity's war on war."86 This is no better demonstrated than in the words of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, of the Free Synagogue of New York, as he commented on America's role in the
Toward the Valley of Decision

They shall go down to the Valley of Decision, multitudes of young Americans from East and West, from North and South, some slow to have gone into the war but none ever to go out until a Decision shall have been reached.

Into the Valley of Decision,—for a Decision final and irrepealable we are battling. Not a decision as to the victor in the war, but a Decision that shall give us victory over war, its defenders and glorifiers! For the German Empire which wars made this war shall unmake.

We go down to the Valley of Death for a Decision whether the world shall be ruled by Germany or by civilization, be subject to Prussianism or master of its own fate and freedom.

And America knows the cost, which it refuses to count,—knows its sons must be slain if liberty and justice are to live.

To the God of Justice, America lifts its heart in prayer, beseeching not security for its beloved sons but vowing that the sun shall perish out of the heavens ere we and our Allies surrender our liberty, the freedom of the least of men, to the barbarism of force and the forces of barbarism.

Out of the Valley of the Shadow of Death shall emerge the Decision,—Never again. The war against war has brought freedom to nations, and secured peace to them that seek public right as the law of mankind.

With such a goal in sight pacifist activity dwindled almost to nothing. Following the lead of the American Peace Society, the many state and local peace organizations ceased functioning as reform units, and individuals went their separate ways to fight the war against war.

Their attitude is conveyed in five sentences from the credo of the American Peace Society published in May, 1917:

This Society believes that the United States Government, in its wisdom, has been honest in its declaration of a state of war with Germany, in that it regarded this as a necessary measure which it could not avoid. We believe that our allegiance to our Government calls for our support in this action. We believe that as an American institution we can be of service to our country in this
emergency, while at the same time recognizing our allegiance to the cause of humanity at large. However we may long for the things which might have been, the time for the discussion of these things is past. The time for action has come.68
Chapter Five
WAR: FROM FACT TO FICTION

Ideas of tradition and reform, juxtaposed, underlie the words, the decisions, and the actions that comprise the matter of the preceding pages. Among American leaders, social thinkers—from militarist to pacifist—and the people as a whole, the answers to the question "Peace or War?" grew out of conflict and were, in a sense, reconciliations between their pride in and reverence for the America of the eighteen nineties and their firm belief that this same America would and should become better and better. These answers have been charted in some detail, from a perspective in which they appear to be unique. A complete chart, based upon this view, has been and will continue to be the goal of many kinds of historians; but that goal must be projected far into the future. One must be content, in a study of this nature particularly, with pointing out certain assumptions that determined the answers to the big question and with showing the kinds of individual and group action that resulted from such answers and the assumptions behind them.

Thus far we have seen action in the assertiveness of an America "marching as to war," in the decisions and recommendations of political leaders and of social thinkers, and in the popular response to the

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 249.
changes in America that marked the period before the Great War. There is, however, another kind of significant action—action on the level of the imagination. On this level, the remainder of this study will concentrate; and the point of concentration will be literature. The terms tradition and reform will prove to be appropriate to characterize this institution of literature as it existed in America between 1891 and 1917.

Before then, American writers had always, certainly, been interested in the subject of war, probably at least to the extent that America and Americans had been interested. When Stephen Crane began his *The Red Badge of Courage* in 1893 his work marked another step in the already established tradition of war literature. There had been since the Civil War a surge of good and bad novels, stories, poems about the war or based on the war. John Esten Cooke’s trilogy, *Surry of Eagle’s Nest* (1866), *Hilt to Hilt* (1869), and *Mobun* (1868), had been popularly received and reflected, perhaps, a general interest in war as a subject of fiction. Yet, one must admit, these novels were far removed both in method and in point of view from the war fiction of Ambrose Bierce, Hamlin Garland, Harold Frederic, Edward Bellamy, and Stephen Crane in the eighteen nineties. They were melodramatic, filled with dramatic contrivances and improbabilities, and loaded with references to the fine spectacle of battle and the fine heroism (particularly among the Southerners) that marked that spectacle.

From 1863 to 1869 there had been an almost continuous pouring forth of war fiction, most of it partisan in nature and sentimental and romantic—in the sense that traditional heroes, heroines, and villains
were merely reset into wartime conditions, the color and the spectacle or war were assumed, and the plots were allowed to develop to suit the fancies of the storyteller. Many of these war stories were forgotten by 1895—Epes Sargent's *Peculiar* (1863); Jeremiah Clemens' *Tobias Wilson* (1865); James R. Gilmore's *Among the Guerrillas* (1866); Lydia Maria Child's *A Romance of the Republic* (1867); Louisa May Alcott's *Hospital Sketches* (1863) and *On Picket Duty* (1864); Elizabeth Stuart Phelps Ward's "*My Refugees*" (1864); Augusta Jane Evans Wilson's *Nacaria; or, The Altars of Sacrifice* (1864), and Henry Ward Beecher's *Norwood* (1868)—to name a few. And others, like those by Cooke, Henry Morford, Rebecca Harding Davis, and John William DeForest, continued to be read and enjoyed, perhaps because they represented definite attempts to depart from the extremely personal, generally sentimental efforts of their contemporaries. In general, one who has studied the period carefully has concluded, by 1870

the Civil War as a theme for fiction had engaged the attention of a large and representative group of American writers. Romantic and sentimental novels had been written, although with less power than early in the century; the new realistic mood had experimented tentatively and inconsistently, chiefly with the objective aspects of the struggle.

The 1870's, the period of a radical program of reconstruction, had seen a decline in interest in war as a subject of literature. Current political conditions seemed to push patriotism and the war into the background. And those whom we have come to view as the major writers—Henry James, Mark Twain, William Dean Howells—drew very little upon war and war experiences, Howells, perhaps, because as editor of the *Atlantic* and as a reviewer he had to read much inferior fiction
about the war and could not fit war into his doctrine of the commonplace; James, perhaps, because he was not interested in the historical novel or the subjects usually treated there;\(^3\) and Twain, perhaps, because he was not ready to fit war into his literary efforts.

By the eighteen eighties, however, a new group of writers had added to the tradition of war literature. The war was by then "history" and could be viewed more objectively and, in a sense, more patriotically. Dime novels by the score dwelt on phases and heroes of the war. The Century Magazine began, in 1883, the series now known as "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" (1884-1887)—a large, popular collection of personal narratives that furnished materials for later drama and fiction.\(^4\) In general these narratives are quite graphic about the life of soldiers in the war and about the nature of battle, but at the same time they emphasize the patriotic ideals, the honor, the military glory that marked the conflict in retrospect. Also in 1883, E. P. Roe began, with His Sombre Rivals, his series of sensational, sentimental novels that presented what he considered the northern view—the Civil War as a national blessing, settling through love and enterprise the problems of America. He established a pattern that was to flourish twenty years later, after the Spanish-American War: A soldier hero, a Union officer, noble and gallant, fights well in the battle of First Manassas but appears more and more as the story progresses, not as soldier-hero but as soldier-lover-hero whose troubled course toward marriage to the heroine dominates the scene and rewards him finally with the heroine, with money, with religion, and with an understanding of right in the conflict. Writing at this time, also, were Charles King whose Kitty's Conquest (1884)
and A Wartime Wooing (1888) have officer-lover-heroes who pursue their ladies more often than they fight; and S. Weir Mitchell, whose In War Time (1884) departs from the pattern and presents a cowardly wartime surgeon who ends up in disgrace, but also follows the pattern by avoiding battle scenes or battle moments and concentrating on the surgeon as a person set in a military scene.

War and the effects of war had been subjects, also, for the local colorists. Thomas Nelson Page, Joel Chandler Harris, and George W. Cable show, respectively, war as destroying the gracious way of life of the ante-bellum South, war as an influence on the point of view of the poor southerner, and war as a disenchancing factor among Louisiana folk.

Page's "Marse Chan" (1884) and Cables' Dr. Sevier (1885) and "Carancro" (1887) are illustrative. And to these one can add the humorous Corporal Si Klegg and His Pard (1887), by Wilbur F. Hinman, the Scottian Katy of Cococtin (1886), by George A. Townsend, and many other local color tales that drew variously upon wartime incidents and consequences for their effects.

These few works cited serve to illustrate certain facts about war narratives and war fiction before 1890. Most of the battles and the leaders in these battled had been presented in some form; most of the geographical localities of the war had been used for settings; generally these leaders, battles, and settings had been made subordinate to the patterns of hero-heroine adventures. Certain literary practices had become stock: lovers from opposite sections, generally achieving happiness and understanding at the end; divided kinsmen facing the problem of allegiance; magnanimous foes performing gallant actions; transvestites fac-
ing crucial situations; noble negroes (from the Northern view) perform-
ing noble deeds; faithful slaves (from the Southern view) serving their
benefactors; and poor whites, appearing as good or bad depending upon
the view of the author. Intense patriotism had been prevalent. The
fiction had been generally optimistic. Faithfulness to fact had been
generally confined to matters of geography, manners, and military events.
All of these characteristics and more comprise the tradition that came
to the writer of the nineties.5

But while this tradition was strengthening itself, it was being
modified by reform. And it was reform which fitted the general pattern
of intellectual, social, political, and religious activity. In litera-
ture the terms realism and naturalism came to have special meaning to
describe the changes that were taking place. These changes involved
both selection of materials and method of presentation—realism stressing
human experience as it seemed to be and avoiding the impossible, the im-
probable, and the sentimental; naturalism employing a materialistic,
fatalistic view of experience both as a basis for selection and as a way
of giving meaning to the persons, places, and situations comprising the
work of art. As the restlessness of the American people grew in a kind
of revolt against the repressions of laissez faire capitalism, the liter-
ature manifested greater reflections of this restlessness—of this con-
flict. And war became an element in these reflections.

Hamlin Garland, a reformist and war writer, perceived this change
in 1894 when he called the veritist, or realist, of his time an optimist
or dreamer. Such a writer, said Garland,

...aims to hasten the age of beauty and peace by de-
lineating the ugliness and warfare of the present; but
ever the converse of his picture rises in the mind of
the reader. He sighs for a lovelier life. He is tired
of the warfare and diseased sexualism, and Poverty the
mother of Envy. He is hagard with sympathetic hunger,
and weary with the struggle to maintain his standing
place on this planet, which he conceives was given to
all as the abode of peace. With this hate in his heart
and this ideal in his brain the modern man writes his
stories of life. They are not always pleasant, but
they are generally true, and always they provoke thought.

This element of sad severity will change as con­
ditions change for the common man, but the larger ele­
ment of sincerity, with resulting contemporaneousness,
will remain. Fiction, to be important and successful,
must be original and suited to its time. As the times
change, fiction will change. This must always be remem­
bered.

Equating beauty with peace, ugliness with warfare seemed natural,
perhaps even traditional, to Garland. These equations, however, com­
bined with his dwelling on the terms warfare, struggle, severity lead
one into the center of his attitude toward both the nature of literature
in his time and the means of making fiction "original and suited to its
time." He was not discussing war, either particularly or generally,
but in striving to convey how the serious writer of his time should give
meaning to the society and the universe which surrounded him, he drew
upon language—upon picture—that reflects emotions, hence ideas, in­
volving what he and, perhaps, his society felt concerning the nature and
the value of war. And since he was writing in a time of what his fellow
Americans considered to be "profound peace," the above equations have
special significance. They represent his employing the past as it has
come down to him to explain the present. Wars of the past furnish, in
a way, the materials for capturing his responses to experience. The
writer becomes, for him, a kind of soldier. This past is a forceful
past, not a noumenal past, and it has great bearing upon any attempt to
gain insight into a culture at some particular time. It exerts force, influences the thoughts and acts of men in their own time. In the terms of one historian "...nothing changes more constantly than the past; for the past that influences our lives...does not consist of what actually happened, but of what men believe happened. It is not upon the event that we act, but upon our belief about that event." The past, in short, exists only as it is reflected in the mind of the present. And, one must note, it is not only reflected but refracted, with an angle of refraction that is never exactly the same in two successive generations.7

If one projects this theory into the words of Hamlin Garland, the result is that his approach to life and that of other writers whom he included in his generalization must, to the extent that it involves war and peace, involve a refraction of the past that is peculiar to his time. In striving for realism, naturalism, veritism, these writers projected what was real to them in the forceful past. How they imaged war, discussed war, created war, therefore, becomes important in this study. Despite their desire to "reform" fiction, they were bound to draw upon tradition whenever they utilized the past.

When one views the 1890's from the point of view which emphasizes the connection between war as a part of a forceful past and war, thus, as a means of explaining the present, one senses a need to append a footnote to much of what has been written concerning war literature of the eighteen nineties and the early twentieth century. The following statement about trends in war fiction serves as example:

Running counter to the old romantic spirit is the new realistic impulse, an impulse observed spasmodically
in Simms in the first period and more thoroughly in DeForest and Lanier in the second. The Novels became gradually more faithful to reality, if not in the descriptions of war and the soldier's life, at least in the delineation of character and the recreation of manners, dress, and speech. They tend to use less violent action and to glamorize the warrior a trifle less. In short, they drift slowly away from the war romance to the war novel. Still utilizing many of the time worn techniques, they are less chauvinistic and they glorify less the violence of combat. More and more war is displayed for what it is rather than for what people would like to think it is; and the common soldier and the average civilian, for whom war often means misery and starvation, receive more and more attention. As a generalization Mr. Weber's statement has validity, except that what he considers the strongest period for war fiction, the eighteen nineties, could hardly display war "for what it is rather than for what people would like to think it is." Both the reflection and the refraction must be considered. The "realistic impulse" would demand war "displayed" for what it is in the eighteen nineties, but that war must come from the past.

Analyzing Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*, another writer has observed: "What Henry [Fleming] sees, hears, thinks, says, and does conveys to us a graphic—if somewhat overly feverish—picture of fighting and fighting men, as they would be seen not by the historian or the military expert, but by the participants themselves." Here again the writer has assumed an author-subject-work relationship that could not have existed in 1894. The words graphic and picture are themselves keys to evidence which qualifies the observation. One must remember that what happens in the novel—what Henry Fleming and his fellowmen see, hear, think, say, and do—is what a person (a realist?) living in the nineties would think had happened as he viewed a warlike episode through the
traditions, the legends, and the literature that were his inheritance. When one admits this, one recognizes also that Elconin's word picture should be pictures, for the continually shifting projections in The Red Badge of Courage would seem to represent various impressions—portraits—that function not as story, not even as observations on war, but as the images through which the artist conveys, in 1895, his significant (or insignificant) responses to life—to experience. The participants themselves (and what happens to them) are integral parts of the images, but there is a measurable distance between their observations and actions and the observations and actions of the eye of the novel. The suggestion follows, then, that Crane's novel, on this level, is not a novel about soldiers in the Civil War, nor is it a novel about military war at all; it is a novel about individual human experience, about struggle for freedom of action and belief, about, in fine, the struggle to exist, to be, in a society and in a universe which seem always to construct re-doubts, one beyond the other, to confuse and confound the struggle. Viewed in this way, the novel more than fits Hamlin Garland's credo and character of the veritist: "Fiction," one recalls, "to be important and successful, must be original and suited to its time." As I shall later show, Crane's novel, in these terms, is doubly important. At this point, however, it functions, along with Garland's observations, as a kind of literary doorway through which one enters into the whole culture which produced it. Just as the question War or Peace? manifested itself in many ways on many levels of public and private discussion and expression during the period of peace before the Great War, so too did it appear in many levels of creative writing. As we know, war was and had been a
popular subject of literature. In such works the difference in treatment of subject is of value. But often, as I have noted earlier, war enters into literature purely as substance rather than subject--i.e., patterns of thought, action, and emotion surrounding the question Peace or War? become a means of imaging experience, a factor motivating formal and stylistic characteristics. In other works both the subject and the substance are a product of these patterns.

Although it is difficult, even sometimes impossible, to distinguish subject from substance, I shall attempt to do so in the following pages. For to the cultural historian the ways in which the patterns appear provide the variety which reflects both the complexity of the society which he is examining and the pervasiveness of the idea which is his point of concentration. The distinction between war as a subject of literature and war as a substance of literature, then, is the basis for the formal division of the concluding chapters of this study.
Chapter Six

WAR: A SUBJECT OF LITERATURE

I. The Backward Glance

Old Glory

Let others boast of clique of clan,
There is no prouder boast of man
Than this: "I am American!"—
The nation great in story—
Where one can rise from any grade,
And few are warriors by trade,
But all are soldiers ready made,
To fight for dear Old Glory. 1

Lee to the Confederate Flag

The "Stars and Bars" came down—
The certain cause of fratricidal war—
The "Stars and Stripes" they raised and shouted for;
Then back through field and town,
As proudly as the victors, bore it thence,
To be the first to die in its defense. 2

The surge of interest in the American past which marked the eighteen nineties showed itself most conspicuously in the historical fiction of the period—dominated by what came to be called the historical romances, stories of love and adventure set in historical backgrounds that were in general factually accurate. The pervasiveness of this urge to recreate and to read about the past puzzled even its contemporaries and gave rise to conjectures concerning both its nature and

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 250.
its future, and to many discussions concerning the quality and the quantity of the works produced. One point was clear to all observers: War periods in American history were the exciting periods for the writers and, apparently, for the reading public.

In 1894, Bret Harte remarked to an interviewer that he considered the Civil War the "great field" for American writers. He believed that

...the war of Rebellion was and is our own. Its dramatic and emotional aspects are infinite; and while American writers are coming abroad for scenes to picture, I am in constant fear that some Englishman or Frenchman will go to America and reap the field in romance which we should now, all local feeling having passed away, be utilizing to our fame and profit.3

But, as we know, Harte need not have feared that Americans would ignore the Civil War or, for that matter, any of the wars in America's history. The problem for his contemporaries became, rather, one of selecting something of value from the hundreds of historical romances and other historical narratives that appeared in the years that followed. By 1900 William Dean Howells was moved to lament that too many writers had been utilizing history to their fame and profit. "In our own country," he wrote,

where every genuine talent, young as well as old, is characterised by the instinct, if not the reason of reality, nothing of late has been heard but the din of arms, the horrid tumult of the swash buckler swashing on his buckler.4

And he attempted to explain to himself and to his readers why this din of arms was continuing to be heard over the voices of those writers of, in his terms, genuine talent. He rejected the views that the accumulation of riches had vulgarized the American mind or that explosions of war had brutalized it. He believed, rather, that
our race, having more reason than ever to be ashamed of itself for its lust of gold and blood, is more than ever anxious to get away from itself, and welcomes the terradiddles of the historical romancers as a relief from the facts of the odious present. It is a race which likes a good conscience so much that it prefers unconsciousness to a bad one....

Howells' final observation here is a telling one. One can link it with what I have established earlier as the apparent need of Americans, in the case of war, to fight crusades for freedom, for honor, and for the world. But his was a voice among few; the historical romance was to have at least five years more of success before American tastes turned to other types of literature. Paul Leicester Ford's Janice Meredith (1899) reached a sale of 275,000 copies by the summer of 1901; Irving Bacheller's D'ri and I (1901) sold 125,000 within three months after publication; Winston Churchill's The Crisis (1901) went through seven printings and 320,000 copies between May and September of that year. All of these were war romances, the first subtitled "A Story of the American Revolution," the second, "A Tale of Daring Deeds in the Second War with the British. Being the Memoirs of Colonel Ramon Bell, U. S. A.," the third, not subtitled but devoted to a chronological presentation of the events of the Civil War. When The Crisis appeared, in fact, it was called "the first attempt of any writer to employ in a large way the causes, the incidents, and the controlling personalities of the Civil War for purposes of fiction." As romances they were, in a sense, reversions to earlier works; but they were also outgrowths of much that had been written earlier in the nineties. Besides the work of such writers as Bierce, Kirkland, Garland, Frederic, and Crane, many tales and novels of the local colorists and other writers had dwelt in
some way on the events and consequences of the Civil War. But these best sellers are representative of the popular romance in its most successful period; they are what many Americans were reading and enjoying; they are the backward glance when looking backward was a favored activity. As such they arouse our curiosity and become subjects for examination: To what extent did the traditions of war, of honor, of disguised aggressiveness, of military glory, of national military heroes occupy the authors of these popular works of fiction? How did they use them to create their impressions of a forceful past at work in the present?

In Janice Meredith, The Story of the American Revolution, one discovers who the heroes of 1774-1776 were. The novel is primarily a love story between Janice, the heroine, and John Brereton, an indentured servant of royal English blood who rises from Captain to General and becomes a leader in America's fight for freedom. The war itself establishes the framework for the romance. And as Janice and John struggle through the war, they meet and come to know such men as Light Horse Harry Lee, the Marquis de Lafayette, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton (as soldier hero), General Rufus Putnam, and, most thoroughly, General George Washington, whose considerate actions preserve the hero's life and bring the lovers together. "I tell you," says the hero to a minor figure in the novel, "General Washington is the honestest, bravest, most unselfish man in the world...." And every speech and action by or about the General supports this assertion. He is first of all a great soldier, and because he is a great soldier, he must be in all ways a great man. He, as officer, serves almost as the epitome of the American
spirit as it appears in "The Liberty Song."

Come join Hand in Hand, brave Americans all,
And rouse your bold Hearts at Fair Liberty's Call;
No tyrannous Acts shall suppress your just Claim
Or stain with Dishonour America's Name—
   In Freedom we're born and in Freedom we'll live.
   Our Purses are ready—
   Steady, Friends, Steady—
   Not as Slaves, but as Freemen our Money we'll give.

Then join Hand in Hand, brave Americans all!
To be free is to live, to be Slaves is to fall;
Has the Land such a Dastard, as scorns not a Lord,
Who dreads not a Fetter much more than a Sword?
   In Freedom we're born, and, like Sons of the Brave,
   We'll never surrender,
   But swear to defend her,
   And scorn to survive, if unable to save. 10

and in Brereton's eulogy on his behavior:

When he rose up, not one of us but thought the day lost,
but the general, with a quickness and decision I never
before saw in him, grasped the situation, rallied the
broken regiments, seized on a strong piece of ground,
and not merely checked the British advance, but drove
them back on their reserves, where, after nightfall,
they were glad enough to sneak away, leaving their
wounded and dead behind them. 11

The battles themselves are scarcely described and cursorily disposed of,
but always the courage of Washington is emphasized. When all others,
under a hail of enemy fire, take cover behind trees (again Brereton tells
the story), the commander-in-chief stands firm: "... he, apparently un-
moved by the danger, calmly continued observing the enemies' works, and
though directly in their view, for some reason they did not fire again."12

This kind of immunity from enemy fire, an immunity which Ford, all un-
consciously expands into a metaphor of the condition of America's exist-
ence, is emphasized. At another point when the shots are thick and a
Colonel says to Washington, "Sir, you are too much exposed here. Had
you not better step back a little?" the general is offended. "If you are afraid, Colonel Cobb," quietly answered Washington, "you have liberty to step back." That what he is doing he is doing not for himself but for an America which cannot ever be conquered. As Colonel Brereton says of himself, "I am not scared on my own account.... A dozen bullets, whether in battle or standing blindfold against a white wall, are all the same to me. I'll take the gallows itself, if it comes, and say good quittance." He is, of course, scared on Janice Meredith's account, but his words could serve as well in reference to his country, except that, from the point of view of the novel, there is no need to fear. The revolution must be won, by soldiers who are heroes, to create an America that will never be overcome or dishonored. God is on the side of the revolutionists, and one receives the impression that God has continued to be on the side of America through the one hundred twenty-five intervening years.

As Tabitha Drinker, one of the love interests in the novel, declares, "If God is just, He must want Washington to beat them, and so every man would be doing God's work who went to help him." Here the pattern is clear: Washington is equated with America; and there is no doubt concerning on whose side God has cast his blessing. The Declaration of Independence of 1776, the nobility of the cause of the Americans over that of the British, the superiority of the American soldier over the British and the Hessian, the completely heroic position of the American generals, other officers, and, implicitly, the enlisted men—all are assumed and presented as already accepted facts and accomplishments—the necessary background for an America that is influential and ag-
gressive in the world. And the whole tone of the story is one of optimism. The reasons for fighting were good; the results were good. And just as the war had made America a free country, it had made men out of her citizens.

The best example is Philemon Hennion, a pleasant but weak son of the traitorous Squire Hennion, who fights with the British but fights well and long. Toward the end of the story the effects of soldierly on Philemon are clear:

There was a greater change in the officer than of rank, for his once long and ungainly frame had broadened and filled out into that of a well-formed, powerful man. His face, too, had lost its lankness, to its great improvement, for the features were strong, and, with the deep tan which the Southern campaigns had given it, had become, from being one of positive homeliness, one of decided distinction. But the most marked alteration was in his speech and bearing, for all trace of the awkward had disappeared from both; he spoke with facility and authority, and he sat his horse with soldierly erectness and ease.16

With different heroes and heroines, Irving Bacheller's D'iri and I (1901) conveys a similar kind of America, except that the soldier's role is even more knightly, American nationalism is even stronger, and war and the desire to fight are even more firmly established as American traditions—when the true need arises. Captain Ramon Bell and his ever present enlisted aide, D'iri, like Janice Meredith and Captain-General Brereton, meet all important people and engage in all the important activities during the War of 1812; and the point of view of these ostensible memoirs is established early. Bell's father, one learns, was a hero of the Revolution. He had in him none of the fatal folly of the poet. "He was," says Ramon, "a mountaineer of Vermont—a man of steely
sinews that took well to the grip of the sword. He cut his way to fame in the Northern army when the British came first to give us battle, and a bloody way it was. I have now a faded letter from Ethan Allen, grim old warrior, in which he calls my father 'the best swordsman that ever straddled a horse.'\textsuperscript{17}

Ramon, one soon learns, takes after his father. To this influence is added one equally as strong—the tales of "knights and ladies" his mother used to tell him, "also those adventures of her own knight, my good father, in the war with the British. My love of arms and a just quarrel began there."\textsuperscript{18} This final sentence characterizes the heroic Americans and their actions in the novel and such actions are subordinate only to the love story that develops between Captain Bell and two French sisters, Louise and Louison de Lambert, wards of the Baroness de Ferré.

From the time Ramon enlists in the army, after seeing a troop march in parade, he loves soldiery. "My delight in the life of a soldier began that hour," he says, "and has never left me."\textsuperscript{19} From the tense of his statement one knows he has the same delight in 1901; and it is clear in the novel that he means "life of the officer." The distinction between him and D'ri is always there—both in the eyes of the hero and in those of the heroines. When they call upon homes on official business for General Brown, D'ri is escorted away with the horses, Ramon to the dining room or to the drawing room. They go through duels, near drownings, deliberate tortures, and battles with the British together, but the honor and glory, in the eyes of the world, are Ramon's. He is a knight without armor performing an American's noblest duty.

To Louise, when he speaks as lover, he draws himself up to his
full height and says, "with a mighty uplift in my heart that seemed to
toss the words out of me, 'I have a strong arm and a good sword, and
the love of honor and fair women.'"²⁰

"'It is a beautiful story,' she said thoughtfully; 'and you--
you are like a knight of old.'"²¹ To prove this assertion Ramon con-
ducts himself according to the code of the knight (and of the officer).
When he and D'ri are attacked by what seems a regiment of Britishers,
he repulses them with his sword (and a bit of strategy). He explains,

I have saved myself many a time by strategy, but
chose the sword always if there were an even chance.
And, God knows, if one had ever a look at our bare bodies,
he would see no sign of shirking on either D'ri or me.²²

And later he can declare to his love, "I have nothing but my sword and
my honor."²³

From this viewpoint one can expect almost certainly, that the
knight's profession will be honored. In D'ri and I, from the perspec-
tive of the writer of memoirs--seeing both the past and the present at
once--the conviction that war is good colors almost every page. Some-
times it appears in the words of the heroines, like those of Louise
when she protests to Captain Bell that she is not allowed to help the
troops: "Men and women are fighting and dying to make the world bet-
ter, and I--I am just a lady, fussing, primping, peering into the look-
ing glass! I should like to do something, but they think I am too good
--too holy."²⁴ Other times it is in the words of older advisers, like
those of the Comte de Chaumont who advises Gray, "My boy, you should
join Perry on the second lake. It is your only chance to fight, to win
glory."²⁵ But most of all it appears in the Captain's responses to
these statements. Following the Comte's exhortation Gray says, "I had read of sea-fighting and longed for a part in it. To climb on hostile decks and fight hand to hand was a thing to my fancy."26 And later when he is describing a brave action he and D'ri have performed under Perry at Put-in-Bay, he epitomizes much that one has learned of at least one position of war in the mind of the narrator, war "the American way":

I have seen no better show of pluck in all my fighting, nor any that ever gave me a greater pride of my own people and my country. War is a great evil, I began to think [in 1901?], but there is nothing finer than the sight of a man who, forgetting himself, rushes into the shadow of death for something that is better.27

With this praise the narrator combines a fervent nationalism and a worship of the flag as symbol of that nationalism, and then, on the basis of these, arrives at a conclusion that sees America as supreme conqueror. For bravery in action on the Lawrence D'ri receives a silver medal "from the emperor—the great Napoleon...a mark of his pleasure."28 From the conversation that ensues between D'ri and the Captain the nationalism and the patriotism emerge:

"All, by Judas Priest!" said D'ri, "I wouldn't jump over a stump over a stun wall t' please no emp'ror, an' I wouldn't cut off my leetle finger fer a hull bushel basket of them air. I hain't a-fightin' fer no honor."

"What then?" said I.

His face turned very sober. He pursed his lips, and spat across the ditch; then he gave his mouth a wipe, and glanced thoughtfully at the sky.

"Fer liberty," said he, with decision. "Same thing my father died fer." ....

Now I began to feel the great passion of the people, and was put to shame for a moment.

"Liberty—that is a grand thing to fight for," said I, after a pause.
"Swap my blood any time fer thot air," said D'ri. "I can fight sassy, but not fer no king but God A'mighty. Don't pay t' git all tore up less it's fer suthin' valleyble. My life ain't wuth much, but, ye see, I hain't nuthin' else."29

One is prepared for these assertions and knows the essence of D'ri's bravery, for on the Lawrence his final, supreme action had been to save the American flag from the sea. He had leaped into the dangerous waters, grabbed the flag in his teeth, and returned to the Lawrence with the white of the flag "laced with his own blood":

"Ready t' jump in hell fer that ol' rag any day," said he, as we all cheered him.

Each grabbed a tatter of the good flag, pressing hard upon D'ri, and put it to his lips and kissed it proudly. Then we marched up and down, D'ri waving it above us—a bloody squad as ever walked, shouting loudly.30

Again, as in Janice Meredith, the culmination of the love story symbolizes, in a sense, the reward of patriotism, of devotion to the flag, of gallant, heroic fighting, and of a belief in the superiority of America to all other countries. When the war is over and President Monroe comes before the heroes of Chippewa, Lundy's Lane, Lake Erie, and Chrysler's Farm, the united lovers—Captain Bell and Louise de Lambert—appear to the cries, "Hurrah fer love an' freedom! An' the United States of Ameriky."31 Her father, after having battled against the marriage, declared, "You Americans are a great people. I surrender; I am not going to be foolish."32 And to the peal of what seems a "million voices" singing "Hail, Columbia, happy land!" Louise turns to the Captain:

"Sweetheart," she whispers, "I was never so proud to be your wife."

"And an American," I suggest, kissing her.

"And an American," she answers.
A Bugle sounds; the cavalcade is coming.
"The President!" they cry, and we all begin cheering.

And then we all sing loudly with full hearts:

O land I love! --thy acres sown
With sweat and blood and shattered bone--
God's grain, that ever doth increase
The goodly harvest of his peace.33

On a similar note of optimism ends Winston Churchill's *The Crisis* (1901), but not before the author faces the new problems created by the presence of the expansionist Mexican War of 1846 and the Civil War of 1861-1865. Presented, as the author says, from no side but that of Abraham Lincoln, who "loved the South as well as the North," the novel is a story of the Civil War as it affects, chiefly, the northern hero, Stephen Brice, and the southern heroine Virginia Carvel. Again, as in *Janice Meredith* and *D'ri and I*, the happy culmination of an irregular course of love symbolizes definitely a similar culmination of the bloody battles between the North and the South. The heroes are Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Lee; the war is evidence of God's will that America become the greatest nation on earth; in fighting the war the soldiers perform man's noblest function--because the cause is right in the eyes of God. At a crucial point in the middle of the war, the hero, Captain Brice, has a kind of vision:

There came to Stephen a flash of that world-comprehension which marks great statesmen. Was it not with a divine purpose that this measureless force of patriotism and high ideal had been given to this youngest of the nations, that its high mission might be fulfilled?34

That this is also the vision of the narrator is clearly established in the novel, for the point of view shifts occasionally and sees the whole
war as an observer in 1901 would see it—after, even, the experience
of the war with Spain. At a point in the story, before the outbreak
of the Civil War, the narrator makes a speech:

In the city by the Father of Waters [St. Louis]
where the races met, men and women were born into the
world, who were to die in ancient Cuba, who were to be
left fatherless in the struggle soon to come, who were
to live to see new monsters rise to gnaw at the vitals
of the Republic, and to hear again the cynical laugh
of Europe. But they were also to see their country a
power in the world, perchance the greatest power.
While Europe had wrangled, the child of the West had
grown into manhood and taken a seat among the highest,
to share with them the responsibilities of manhood.35

This perchance greatest power in the world, one learns also from
the narrator, as on another occasion he slips away from 1863 to 1901,
must always be prepared for war, else the profiteering that plagued the
Civil War will continue. "Such things," says the narrator,
always have been, and always will be unavoidable when
this great country of ours rises from the deep sleep
of security into which her sons have lulled her, to
demand her sword. We shall never be able to realize
that the maintenance of a standing army of comfortable
size will save millions in the end. So much for
Democracy when it becomes a catchword.36

These formal intrusions underline for the reader the point of view of
the novel. The author cannot, it would seem, under the pressure of over­
whelming feeling, refrain from saying what he thinks and knows. And
even though, early in the novel, he has Stephen ask, "Will war ever be
painted with a wart?,"37 he never masks the idea that America's wars—
including the war with Spain—had been noble wars. He calls the Mexi­
can War, for instance, "a black war of conquest," then continues,
"which, like many such, was to add to the nation's fame and greatness."38

Strongest of all, however, in the story and in the words of the
narrator is the concentration on the Destiny of America, a destiny the progress of which has been measured by the successful prosecution of war. The battles themselves, just as in Janice Meredith and D'ri and I, get relatively little attention. The power of the afterglow, the after-observation, is made to carry the weight of the battles. But the importance of their role seems only to be emphasized by this technique. It is as if the words war and battle and soldier carry their own special excitement and need no further comment. To become the greatest nation in the world is the destiny of America; and in the novel the Civil War provides the means to the holy sacrifice necessary for the fulfillment of that Destiny. Stephen Brice and Virginia Carvel can become one only through shedding many tears of misunderstanding. The North and South can become one only through shedding life's blood. The war thus has even a sacramental significance.

The center of this view appears in the words of the greatest hero of the novel—Abraham Lincoln—when he tells Virginia what the war has meant to her people and to his. Using the two flags, the stars and stripes and the stars and bars, to teach his lesson and to make his predictions concerning the future of America, he notes that early in the war he could look across the Potomac at the white houses of Alexandria and see the Confederate flag in sight of the place where George Washington lived and died:

"I used to watch that flag, and thank God that Washington had not lived to see it. And sometimes,—sometimes I wondered if God had allowed it to be put in irony just there." His voice seemed to catch, "That was wrong," he continued. "I should have known that this was our punishment—that the sight of it was my punishment. Before we could become the great nation
He has destined us to be, our sins must be wiped out in blood. You loved that flag, Virginia. You love it still. I say in all sincerity, may you always love it. May the day come when this Nation, North and South, may look back upon it with reverence. Thousands upon thousands of brave Americans have died under it for what they believed was right. But may the day come again when you will love that flag you see there now—Washington's flag—better still."39

To complete the absolution and to effect a perfect resolution of "the crisis," the author uses the death of Lincoln. When, in the final scene, the news of the assassination comes to Stephen and Virginia, they recall in their minds how Lincoln had lived in sorrow, "how he had died a martyr on the very day of Christ's death upon the cross." And they know that "Abraham Lincoln gave his life for his country even as Christ gave his for the world." Then the author, in his final statement, shifts the point of view from theirs to his own and concludes: "And so must we believe that God has reserved for this Nation a destiny high upon the earth."40

This faith in the destiny of the nation, then, a destiny planned by God and made manifest through bloodshed, is a dominant motif in the historical fiction. It moves through the war romances and provides the solid basis on which the stories are built. Between 1901 and 1917 American writers never tired of the backward glance; it was always a part of their perspective on the present and on the future. And one can find "destiny manifested through war" wherever he looks.

In 1910 the novelist Frederick Landis looked back to the Civil War and wrote The Glory of His Country, the story of a man, Milton Shanks, who has suffered since the war because he has been mistakenly accused of cowardice, when, actually, he had been one of Lincoln's chief
aids. In 1910 Shanks is called upon to make a political speech in favor of a candidate for office. Shanks, the narrator tells the reader, is "flintlock to the core; he seemed a kinsman of the Liberty Bell."  And the address he makes to the people of Happyville is a further development of the destiny motif. He begins with the observation that tyrants are sent to the world to wake nations up. "We know," he says, "that without the fellers we hate, we wouldn't 'a'bin worth our salt--we wouldn't 'a' had no spunk." Then he turns to American history to support his assertion:

"I'm glad England wuz terrible. I thank her fer the fire an' sense o' '76. I thank her fer Washin'ton, in whose eye hungry fellers could see a country o' their own. An' so I'm glad the Union had to be saved! It's not for us to ast empty sleeves if they was sincere ner women 'at prayed ag'in' each other—but off with our hats to all that had grit."

Thus did America come to be worth her salt; and in 1910 Shanks tells the people how they can continue to be so. They want, he tells them, a government that will do its part as the people do theirs; a tariff that will protect them, not rob them; a dollar worth a hundred cents; and the following kind of protection:

"We want an army like we've got—one 'at raises corn between wars—not a standin' army—'at jist stands around. We want a navy big enough to let us sleep in peace; I'd ruther see ships rust than have a chimbley shot off o' any hut by the sea—I'd give my 'establishment to wipe out the burnin' o' my Capitol a hundred year ago."

Here, in two sets of statements, are the horns of a dilemma that accompanies the idea of America's destiny made manifest through bloodshed: How can a nation, now in a position to prove that her Destiny is being
fulfilled, depend upon the traditional spunk of the volunteer for its protection? And how can a nation whose destiny has developed through heroic actions in wars that are noble expect that destiny now to be furthered in some entirely different way?

One can see the same problem at work—reduced to the dilemma of one individual—in the novel Virginia (1913) by Ellen Glasgow. In the story Parson Gabriel is called upon to protect an innocent Negro from almost certain annihilation at the hands of some bullies. When he makes his decision to intervene and calls to them sharply in the name of God, "that flash of time," the author relates, "had been long enough to change the ordinary man into the hero. The spark of greatness in his nature flamed up and irradiated all that had been merely dull and common clay a moment before." His demonstration of the spark of greatness epitomizes the problem:

There was going to be a battle, he saw, and in the swiftness with which he discerned this, he made his eternal choice between the preacher and the fighter. Stripping off his coat, he reached down for a stick from the roadside; then spinning round on three of them he struck out with all of his strength, while there floated before him the face of a man he had killed in his first charge at Manassas. The old fury, the old triumph, the old blood-stained splendour returned to him. He smelt the smoke again, he heard the boom of the cannon, the long sobbing rattle of musketry, and the thought stabbed through him, "God forgive me for loving a fight!"
II. Face to Face

Say, Aguinaldo,
You little measly
Malay moke,
What's the matter with you?
Don't you know enough
To know
That when you don't see
Freedom,
Inalienable rights,
The American Eagle,
The Fourth of July,
The Star Spangled Banner,
And the Palladium of your Liberties,
All you've got to do is ask for them?
Are you a natural born chump
Or did you catch it from the Spaniards?
You ain't bigger
Than a piece of soap
After a day's washing,
But, by gravy, you
Seem to think
You're a bigger man
Than Uncle Sam.
You ought to be shrunk
Young fellow;
And if you don't
Demalayize yourself
At an early date,
And catch on
To your golden, glorious opportunities,
Something's going to happen to you
Like a Himalaya
Sitting down kerswoot
On a gnat.
If you ain't
A yellow dog
You'll take in your sign
And scatter
Some Red, White and Blue
Disinfectant
Over yourself.
What you need, Aggie,
is civilizing.
And goldarn
Your yaller percoon-skin,
We'll civilize you
Dead or alive.
You'd better
Fall into the
Procesion of Progress
And go marching onto glory,
Before you fall
Into a hole in the ground.
Understand?
That’s US—
U. S. 47

If the backward glance revealed optimism, pride, and conviction
of the world destiny of the United States—all based heavily on the
tradition of American wars as they came down to the end of the nine-
teenth century—the face to face experience with war gave many writers
a chance to focus these feelings and beliefs on new and precise heroes,
battles, and causes. What I have quoted above is a happy, optimistic
verse by a conveniently anonymous writer—happy, because it speaks from
above, from a peak of tradition supported by a history that recognises
no failures; optimistic because it sees a procession of progress, led
by U.S. marching on to glory. It presents in its partly vulgar, partly
arch prose an image of an American looking to the twentieth century,
bearing his burdens aggressively, asserting his conviction of his supe-
riorit. Freedom, inalienable rights, the American Eagle, the Fourth
of July, the Star Spangled Banner—all stand for him as symbols of a
tradition qualifying him to be Palladium of the liberties of the less
fortunate.

That he is marching on to glory comes as no surprise; in the pic-
ture one can see him progressing in no other way. He has always marched
on the way to his destiny and has always been right in the eyes of God
whose plan he has been fulfilling. This poet would agree with another,

Two strokes sublime Columbia’s hand
Hath dealt in war—one stroke to save
From foreign sway our native land—
One stroke to free the negro slave.
Now, once again the great sword awes
The despot—flames o'er land and sea—
A volunteer in Cuba's cause;
Spain falls, and Cuba rises, free! 11

But now God's plan has shifted. "Right [America] to vanquish
Wrong [Spain]" is beating "pruning hooks into spears." 149—but in this
case to help Right establish foreign sway. Combined with the backward
glance and the forceful stare into the present is the glance abroad.
Wrong exists there and must be destroyed; and a united America is neces-
sary if Right's march of progress is to continue. To unite America had,
as we know, been the role of the Civil War. Now the new kind of war
gives the marching American his chance to cement, to prove that unity.
He is a kind of hybrid conqueror. And he dominates the verse called
forth by the war. One writer declares:

A Century of peace has dawned;
The North and South are plighted,
And all their lovers' quarrels have been
forever righted.
There is no North there is no South, no
Johnny Reb to bandy;
No feud, no scores to settle up—no Yan-
kee Doodle Dandy.

What have we, then? A land serene,
United, heart-to-hand, sir.
Which, like a sum of numbers, never
yields but one true answer.
Who have we, then, in this great land,
above its bonded boodle;
With Northern pluck and Southern nerve?
His name is Dixie Doodle!

Then hip, hurrah! for this brave youth,
unbought of bond or boodle—
The conqueror of future worlds—the grow-
ing Dixie Doodle! 50

The hero in Cuba and in the Philippines thus seals the strained bonds
of an earlier period; and one gathers that only through unity in battle
could the oneness of America become manifest. The following is representative of the many expressions of this belief:

Time's greatest armies fought;
    Then stood the world amazed,
Forced to digest the thought:
    That we both armies raised.

Those quondam foes are friends;
    One flag the country through.
The world now comprehends
    The gray fights with the Blue.

So firm the bond is tied.
    Between these men to-day,
The Blue would now divide
    Their pension with the Gray.

This new war brought also new heroes; they too are God's chosen men to mark epochs in America's march to her rendezvous with destiny. Again it is a combination of the backward glance and the present view that provides the matter for the writers of literature. Farragut moves over to make a place for Dewey, for a time, at least, the greatest hero of them all;

Said the Goddess of Fame to the pedestalled shade
Of Farragut looming on high:
'Move over a bit on your pedestal, man,
For a twin-born of Fame draweth nigh;
Move over a bit, give him room at your side,
A trifle of space you must spare
For the first of the sons of the sea of our day,
So make room for Dewey up there.'

'And who is this Dewey?' the gray shade replies.
'He is one of your sailors,' said Fame;
'And the sea-winds that blow on both sides of the world
Are loud with the sound of his name.
Without losing a ship, or a gun, or a man,
Spain's navy he sunk in the sea.'
Said Farragut then to the new son of Fame:
'Approach, and come up here with me!'
That "Dewey was a dandy" one learns over and over again. He would seem to stand, for most of the popular writers, as a symbol of all the men who fought against Spain. In dedications, in songs, in long poems on the war, Dewey is the large hero—with the soldiers and sailors following behind:

Dewey! Dewey! Dewey!
Is the hero of the day.
And the Maine has been remembered
In the good, old-fashioned way.

Yankee Dewey, keep it up,
You certainly are handy,
With men and guns and cruisers, too,
Oh, Dewey, you’re a dandy.

Manila Bay! Manila Bay!
How proud the song on our lips today!
A brave old song of the true and strong
And the will that has its way;

Of the blood that told in the days of Drake
When the fight was good for the fighting's sake!
For the blood that fathered Farragut
Is the blood that fathered Blake;

And the pride of the blood will not be undone
While war's in the world and a fight to be won,
For the master now, as the master of old,
Is the man behind the gun.”

And on and on the tributes run. Although the nature of the hero dictates the form of these songs, verses, and other dedications and makes the naval wars the dominant ones, the army in Cuba inspired many writers to take up the pen in its cause. The same defiance, the same optimism, the same conviction permeate the popular literature on this subject whether they appear in the quietly patriotic lines of the female writers or in the lines of such an American chauvinist as Richard Hovey. In his
poems "The Word of the Lord from Havana," "The Call of the Bugles,"
"Unmanifest Destiny," and "America," all written in 1898, he defines
very completely the image of America, of Right, marching in battle
under the guidance of God, certain of final victory. The following
sonnet, "America," is the shortest of the four, but it reveals clearly
the soldier-God-America image.

We came to birth in battle; when we pass,
It shall be to the thunder of the drums.
We are not one that weeps and saith Alas,
Nor one that dreams of dim millenniums.
Our hand is set to this world's business,
And it must be accomplished workmanly;
Be we not stout enough to keep our place,
What profits it the world that we be free?
Not with despite for others, but to hold
Our station in the world inviolate,
We keep the stomach of the men of old
Who built in blood the bastions of our fate.

We know not to what goal God's purpose tends;
We know He works through battle to His ends. 56

For a complete presentation of this image of God's chosen soldier-
America, however, one must turn again to the novel where ideas of unity,
destiny, and tradition and words of optimism, assertion, and pride can
come together in story to project for the reader how many Americans
viewed themselves and the world at the end of the nineteenth century.
The most extensive and popular novel whose subject was the war with
Spain is Crittenden, A Kentucky Story of Love and War (1900), by John
Fox, Jr. In it the traditions of war, of race, of honor, of patriotism,
of the flag, of military glory, of freedom converge upon the Spanish-
American War and provide the reasons for Clay Crittenden's going into
the war, for his becoming a hero, and for his winning the heroine,
Judith Page.

The name of Crittenden is a name famous in wars, the reader is
told, and the greatest destiny of all belongs to Clay, even though he has lived in a time of peace.

He had been born among the bleeding memories of one war. The tales of his nursery had been tales of war. And though there had been talk of war through the land for weeks...it had no more seemed possible that in his lifetime could come another war than that he should live to see any other myth of his childhood come true.57

Yet he is immediately prepared and ready to go to war when the call for volunteers goes out, and he is thrilled when he learns that the Kentucky Legion, "that had fought in Mexico, had split in twain to fight for the North and for the South, and had come shoulder to shoulder when the breach was closed...was the first body of volunteers to reach for the hilt."58 He is not, in the beginning, however, in love with America: Honor is his motivation—honor plus a native zest for battle. He feels good to be "alive at the breaking of such a day [of war]—good to be young and strong, and eager and unafraid, when the nation called for its young men and red Mars was the morning star."59

And his response to the stimulus is violent and immediate:

The blood of dead fighters began to leap again in his veins. His nostrils dilated and his chin was raised proudly—a racial chord touched within him that had been dumb a long while. And that was all it was—the blood of his fathers; for it was honor and not love that bound him to his own flag.60

What he means by honor he is not completely certain; but he knows immediately why he must fight. He sees the war with Spain as the first war of its kind in history. It marks "an epoch in the growth of national character since the world began," and as an American he believes that "no finger of medievalism" should so much as touch the western hemisphere. He hears the cries of starving women and children in Cuba and
wants their fathers, brothers, and husbands to have the freedom to earn
bread. He wishes to ignore the Maine, to "put out of mind the Ameri-
cans blown to death at Havana—if such a thing were possible— but he
yet believed with all his heart in the war." Pride in his state, his
region, and his country, and honor inherited from his ancestors make
him see first that he must fight and then that "the time has come for
the South to prove its loyalty—not to itself, nor to the North, but to
the World." From this position he marches gladly to Tampa and sails
forth to Cuba, leaving Judith, his family, and his beloved Bluegrass
state behind him.

Love for America starts blooming soon—marked first by his new
feeling for the stars and stripes, a feeling that is a part, even, of
his subconscious mind:

...he moved in his sleep—dreaming of that brave
column marching for Tampa—with his mind's eye on the
flag at the head of the regiment, and a thrill about
his heart that waked him. And he remembered that it
was the first time he had ever had any sensation a-
bout the flag of his own land. But it had come to
him—awake and asleep—and it was genuine.

The long wait at Tampa disturbs him; he is anxious to get into
battle. But there another event adds to the love for America which his
new army experiences are creating in him. The Rough Riders come march-
ing by; the sight is impressive because it represents his new vision of
a united America led by great men.

At the head of it rode two men—one with a quiet
mesmeric power that bred perfect trust at sight, the
other with the kindling power of enthusiasm, and a
passionate energy, mental, physical, emotional, that
was tireless; each a man among men, and both to-
gether an ideal leader for the thousand Americans at
their heels. Behind them rode the Rough Riders—-
dusty, travel-stained troopers, gathered from every State, every walk of labor and leisure, every social grade in the Union—day laborer and millionaire, clerk and clubman, college boys and athletes, Southern revenue officers and Northern policemen; but most of them Westerners—Texas rangers, sheriffs, and desperadoes—the men-hunters and the men-hunted; Indians; followers of all political faiths, all creeds—Catholics, Protestants, Jews; but cow-boys for the most part; dare devils, to be sure, but good-natured, good-hearted, picturesque, fearless. And Americans—

And Crittenden, spurred to great heights, gives up his chance for a Captain's commission, becomes a private in the Regular Cavalry, sails off to Cuba. He discovers that a soldier's life is a worthwhile life, "a clean change in his life." And in this surge of new feeling he turns to self-contemplation, to analysis of the role and the destiny of himself and of America in the world. In a shipboard scene the narrator, working under the pressure to comment upon his hero, makes a significant shift in point of view, turning from Clay's self-examination to his own examination of the significance of Clay's presence there. What he says brings the soldier-America image into sharp focus. He puts Crittenden, the soldier-hero, on the plunging bow of the American ship, where

...he might have stood to any thoughtful American who knew his character and his history as a national hope and a national danger. The nation, measured by its swift leap into maturity, its striking power to keep going at the same swift pace, was about his age. South, North, and West it had lived, or was living, his life. It had his faults and his virtues; like him, it was high-spirited, high-minded, alert, active, manly, generous, and with it, as with him, the bad was circumstantial, trivial, incipient; the good was bred in the Saxon bone and lasting as rock—if the surface evil were only checked in time and held down. Like him, it needed, like a Titan, to get back, now and then, to the earth to renew its strength. And the war would send the nation to the earth as it would send him, if he but lived it through.
Here, then, war appears as the benevolent phenomenon providing life-
giving energy to Crittenden and America as it does to the sun in the
Titan story. And, in the end, its effects are those good effects of
the soldierly existence. The battles with and the defeat of Spain
make Crittenden a "new man forged with dross by the fire of battle and
fever and the fire of love," with "much humility in the face, a new fire
in the eyes, a nobler bearing...a nobler sincerity, a nobler purpose."66
They place "the nation high among the seats of the Mighty," increase
"our national pride, through unity, a thousand fold," and "show to the
world and to ourselves that the heroic mould in which the sires of the
nation were cast is still casting the sons of today."67

Thus, in the eyes of the popular novelist and in the eyes of
the hero, the heroine, and the other Americans in the novel, America,
clad in the blue of the soldier, marched into the twentieth century and
on to fulfill her destiny.

III. Over There

We who are neutral (yet each lip with fervor
The word abjures):
Oh, England, never name us the time-server!
Our hearts are yours;
We that so glory in your high decision,
So trust your goal;
All Europe in our blood, but yours our vision,
Our speech, our soul! 68
Go, Western Warriors! Take the place
The ages have assigned you in a strife
Which to have died in were enough of life;
For you there waits a quest
    Such as no paladin or hero knew
Of all who lifted sword or wielded mace
Since George the Dragon slew;
For you a sacramental feast
Too rich, too happy, too fulfilled
Of all that man e'er craved or God hath willed,
    Too blessed to be offered save to you. 69

. . . what will you say
To the grandson sitting upon your knee,
As he shows you his book, saying, "Grandpa, see!
Here is where in the great world war
We lost a thousand soldiers or more."

And when he turns and looks up at you,
Saying, "Tell me, grandpa, what did you do?"
Slacker, you'll sit in your big arm-chair,
Wishing that you had been over there,
And you'd give your life for the right to say,
"I fought for God and the U.S.A." 70

When the war broke out in Europe in 1914, many Americans were caught between their image of the soldier—America marching to deserved glory and what had come to be very powerful, if vague, image of war as a kind of demon to be eschewed at all costs. As I have observed in writing of popular statements, of pacifists appeals, and of the apparently anachronistic nature of war talk and war fears, between 1900 and 1914 the first image did not, certainly, disappear, but it became relatively obscured by the clouds of confidence that surrounded the peace advocates and overshadowed by the disproportionate bulk of domestic issues that occupied Americans' minds.

Thus, one might judge, when the great war came to the world in 1914, American writers could not at first see the marching soldier—America, but could see the demon war as a kind of abstraction—only
vaguely related to their own country and to their own problems. This outbreak of war stirred many verse-writers, who produced many lines of verse concerning war; but unlike those songs, sonnets and other verses of 1900, they project abstract hatred rather than precise forms of admiration or adoration.

The initial response was shock. That a world at peace could allow evil war to intrude seemed inconceivable. And no one, it seems, cared to point to or draw upon the traditional ideas with which one examining the earlier period becomes well acquainted. In the following lines,

And well may smile the pagan Mars
And grin the bloody Juggernaut:
Christendom rends its Saviour's scars
With weapons Judas-bought. 71

and in Witter Bynner's poem "War,"

Fools, fools, fools,
Your blood is hot to-day.
   It cools
When you are clay.
It joins the very clod
Wherein your foe shall be,—
Wherein you look at God,
Wherein at last you see
   The living God,
   The loving God,
Which was your enemy. 72

there appears the kind of disbelief that characterized the verse. Seemingly the writers could view with doubt, and with perspective, their own traditional feelings and beliefs, could see that somehow they were condemning something that they later might be forced to defend. Percy Mackaye, for instance, in two sonnets, "Doubt" and "Destiny," could see
So thin, so frail the opalescent ice
Where yesterday, in lordly pageant, rose
The monumental nations—the repose
Of continents at peace!

and could warn, with regret, that

Dreams of slaughter rise to slay,
And fate itself is stuff that fancy breeds.
Mock, then, no more at dreaming, lest our own
Create for us a like reality.

Appeals, exhortations, expressions of surprise, awe, and indignation—
these were the characteristics of the immediate literary responses.
The Hague Conferences, the arbitration treaties, the men of peace all
stand in these responses as evidence that what is happening could not
happen. And on top of all came the women's appeals, the mothers' ap-
peals, to the world to avoid, for their sake, the evil demon war:

Come, let us stand in the Judgment Place
And take an oath for the human race,
An oath our daughters, and theirs, shall take,
An oath no trumpet or drum can shake.
We hate no sinner, we hate the sin,
Not those who lose, not those who win.
We, the makers of flesh and bone,
We have one foe, one hate alone—
WAR!

This is not war, it would seem, as Germany would fight it, or Britain,
or France, or the United States. It is war in general; and it is vi-
cicus and evil. But such it would not long remain.

As the verses at the head of this section indicate, by 1917, the
soldier-America had returned, ready to march into the conflict to ful-
fill her destiny, to act properly in the sight of God. By 1915 the
bias of Mrs. Swift's verse was a determinant in literature. Owen Wis-
ter, attacking maxims of low prudence masquerading as Christianity,
warned against the "feeble arm." It was not, he said, the feeble arm
that helped Washington survive at Valley Forge, or Lincoln to win through to Appomattox. If the Fourth of July and the Declaration meant anything, he declared, it was to let our arm be strong—for our own sake and for the sake of mankind: "...if this war brings home to us that we now sit in the council of nations and share directly in the general responsibility for the world's well-being, we shall have taken a great stride in national and spiritual maturity...."75 Such a view represents the pattern that was to follow. As neutrality weakened, as the war spirit increased, so did the literature lead and follow. From the poet's

O country mine!
Who shall seduce thee to such mad design?
A nobler vision, happier fate be thine! 76

of 1914; or another's, of 1915,

For the man who should loose me is dead,
Fighting with the Duke in Flanders,
In a pattern called a war,
Christ! What are patterns for? 77

the tone and perspective shifted. As each world event occurred, the familiar [to us] ideas returned. After the sinking of the Lusitania, William Dean Howells could plead, in July, 1916, for America's avenging the slaughter in these terms:

The Massacre of the Innocents

The Ghosts of the Lusitania Women and Children

Oh, kind kin of our murderers, take us back when you sail away;
Our own kin have forgotten us. O, Captain, do not stay!
But hasten, Captain, hasten! The wreck that lies under the sea
Shall be ever the home for us this land can never be. 78
And by 1917 the soldiers themselves could view their role in terms of the image of soldier-American destined to save the world as they marched forward:

The day is come! The die is cast!
We sally forth in Titan mold,
With Titan strength from first to last,
The Rights of Mankind to uphold.79

Or as they flew forward—flyer-Americans soaring to their destiny:

We'll always be flying and flying,
We'll always be shaking the dice,
We'll always be taking new chances,
With never a thought of the price.

For somehow the fever has got us,
The old life seems dull and tame,
And we long for the new adventure
Where the trails are never the same. 80

But whether they marched or flew, by 1917, there was little doubt in their minds as to the eventual outcome of their struggle or as to the question of who was right in the eyes of God. The backward glance assured them, the present view inspired them, and they assumed the task of saving the world for peace and for democracy. The optimism, the assertiveness, the sense of destiny—all were revived; and America marched on, again the Palladium of world liberties. In the words of Mary E. Wilkins Freeman the destiny is clear:

Wake Up, America!

America wakes! The White Christ has called her;
She has seen the devils abroad in the world;
Evil vaunting himself has appalled her;
To the War-wind of Heaven her flag is unfurled!

America wakes—with his murder and lust
Let the Hun take the path he has carved into hell.
No longer blasphemying the Cross with his trust.
America wakes, the sick world shall be well.
America wakes--God's last peace-lover,
   God's fighter to death, when her peace is assailed.
Shout, sing, fling out the flags, War is over;
When America battles, right has prevailed!
Chapter Seven

WAR: A SUBSTANCE OF LITERATURE

I. The Image and the Literature of Protest

In 1891 Ambrose Bierce, a Union officer during the Civil War, published a volume of stories entitled Soldiers and Civilians; Joseph Kirkland, "Late Major and A. D. C., U. S. Volunteers," won first prize in the Detroit Free Press Competition for his novel The Captain of Company K; and Hamlin Garland published Main-Travelled Roads, a collection of stories among which was "The Return of a Private." In 1893 Henry James published, in The Wheel of Time and Other Stories, a long story of the supernatural entitled "Owen Wingrave," and Stephen Crane had his Maggie printed privately and offered to the world. All of these writers were, in Hamlin Garland's terms, modern men writing their stories of life—with kinds of "hate in their hearts" and "ideals in their brains," "sighing for a lovelier life." Each, excepting Crane, based his story on war; yet each, including Crane, drew upon war in a distinctly separate way. Motivated by a desire to deal honestly with their experiences, all these men saw war—either precisely or generally—as a means of projecting in literature their ordered responses to their America and to their world. And for each the history with which they chose to deal, and the perspective from which perforce they had to

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 254.
deal with it, was similar: forces derived from a warring American past determined their viewpoints. But they were individuals approaching the creative problem separately, or artists of differing and different genius, and they applied this sense of force deriving from this warring past to suit their own conscious or subconscious needs. Hence one is impressed by the apparent variety of perspective, a variety which, since it derives from a unity, exhibits the richness of meaning latent in the idea of war in the period.

The case of Ambrose Bierce is notable. Cynical, ironical, obsessed with horror and death, he drew upon the Civil War, utilized his own Civil War experiences as he remembered them to serve as the whole within which he framed his contrived plots, pictures of horror, and bitter, ghastly endings. "A Horseman in the Sky," "An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge," "One of the Missing," "The Story of a Conscience," "An Affair of Outposts," "One Kind of Officer," "One Officer, One Man," "The Mocking Bird," and others—all lead the reader into the war, and show how war seemed to be to those involved in it; then they lead him further into plots which see a son shooting his father, another shoot his brother, another shoot himself needlessly, another passed up for dead in the battle ruins, and the like. The writer's concentration upon the immediate effect of the tale and upon the ironical nature of the participants' existence shoves war, the Civil War, into the category of the useful rather than the essential. Bierce seems to sense that the war is a good background for such stories, but he also shows the reader, in his non-war tales, that he can achieve similar effects without it.

This is not to suggest, however, that the presence of war is not
significant in his stories; it suggests, rather, that if one take the
tales, in a sense, as commentaries on the society which helped moti-
vate them, they emphasize an attitude toward or ideas about war that
give Bierce an opportunity to construct his patterns of bitter irony.
That Bierce was a cynic is axiomatic. And this very cynicism conveys,
both in his stories and in his essays, that he could believe in mili-
tarism and despise the warlike spirit, could hate his society for at
once being warlike and shunning militarism.

In an essay "Warlike America" (1899) Bierce provided some en-
lightening footnotes to his Soldiers and Civilians. Written after the
war with Spain in the spirit of "I told you so," they show his cynicism
applied to real events in the present. He compares America with Europe;
"In European countries that have universal conscription," he said,

> the years that the young men pass in the army are the
best spent years of their lives. Those who enter the
service as ignorant peasant lads, brutally stupid,
leave it well set up in body and mind—with better
health, better morals and better intelligence. The
American peasant is of course perfect in respect of
all that, but perhaps his refining society would be
of advantage to his officers.\(^1\)

He took issue with President McKinley's statement: "We are not a mili-
tary people. We are not dedicated to arms. We love peace, and the
United States never goes to war except for peace, and only when it can
have it in no otherway." What McKinley meant to say, Bierce asserted,
was that we are not warlike. The Germans, he said, were military; the
North American Indians were warlike. To be warlike was to be fond of
war; to be military was to cultivate the arts and sciences of war and
to make the arts and sciences subservient to them. America, he said,
lacked the element of restraint, but happily lacked also many of the
hereditary animosities that influenced the jealous peoples of the Old World. But, he added,

...when the fire is kindled it burns; there is nobody to quench it. We have always a hand upon the sword, and if we do not more frequently strike it is because, in the first place, it is not much of a sword, and in the second, the enemy is commonly out of reach.\(^2\)

In the future, he said, as in the past, America would have wars—of honor, of conquest, of hatred, of revenge. And her duty was to learn from mistakes of the past and be prepared for the inevitable wars of the future. On the basis of this reasoning he drew his forceful conclusion: "Let us cease our hypocritical cant, rise from our dreams of peace and of love of it, confess ourselves the warlike people that we are, and become the military people that we are not."\(^3\)

The stories themselves, of course, are not hortatory; they aim rather at shock or at revulsion. But by using war as the very general and teeming landscape behind them, Bierce relies, in a sense, upon his readers' assumptions concerning the force of war in the past and its meaning in the present. And an essential part of the irony of his tales is lost unless one sees the society around Bierce as one guilty of, proud of, or, at least, characterized by the accusations he was later to make. Ironical truth is the material of the cynic; Bierce knew this and exploited war accordingly.

In the case of Joseph Kirkland, however, the Civil War would seem to be the basic reason for the existence of the novel \textit{The Captain of Company K}. Although it contains many of the elements of a historical romance—Grant as great hero, a love story that sometimes overshadows
the war, a happy, optimistic ending that sees all the living charac-
ters with "more to be glad of than to be sorry for"—the emphasis,
generally, is upon the daily experiences of the hero and his men in
the War. The author strives to convey, through his war story, the im-
portance of the little man, the individual, as he works in the army
machine, receiving small credit for his heroism. The book is dedicated
"To the SURVIVING MEN OF THE FIRING LINE, the Men who could See the
Enemy in Front of Them with the Naked Eye while they would have needed
a Field-Glass to see the History-Makers Behind Them." And Kirland
works this attitude into the novel by constructing metaphors aimed at
revealing the unhappy, if heroic, position of the ordinary soldier
caught up in the machinations of the history-makers.

In two cases (among others) the author shifts his point of view
from the eighteen sixties to the eighteen nineties and thus equates his
observations with the dedication. "God knows," he says during a lull
in a battle by Company K, Sixth Illinois,

A private soldier is like a blind horse in a quarry;
a precipice on every side and a lighted blast under
his feet; his only comfort the bit in his mouth and
the feeling of a human hand holding the reins over
his back.5

At another point, when Captain Fargen's men grow weary of tense
waiting and express wonder that the "high mukkemuks" don't give them
the word to move on, one of them says, "I wouldn't care if they didn't
start us for a month!" Here the author intervenes:

Some of the men talk thus lightly and bandy
jests; but the majority are pale, stern, sad, and
silent. They are not the ideal soldiers; machines
indifferent to death; fatalists with their "Kismet";
pious zealots mumbling prayers and glorying in any sacrifice "for God and Czar." They are common-sense, thrifty American citizens; fathers, brothers, sons, husbands; full of the hopes of peace and prosperity; regretfully though resolutely risking them all at the call of patriotic duty, with the inexplicable self-devotion of the man-at-arms.6

This emphasis on "the American way" of fighting, one recalls, was a characteristic of the popular literature up to 1917; here Kirkland makes it almost the foundation of his work. That even American heroism is different is shown when Company K leaves Donelson for another battle area, and again the author intervenes to say goodbye to "the scenes of agonizing effort, of devoted courage, of bright victory and black defeat." He calls the battle at Donelson "a small, second-rate struggle (although with great results)" but stresses that many acts of heroism went unheralded—"some because of the insignificant standing of the actor; some because of his dying in the doing of them—the torch of glory quenched with the blood of the hero." Then he makes, within brackets, his big point: "In any European army the victory would have been followed by the distribution of a thousand 'orders' and 'decorations.'"7

The concentration, thus, is on the American soldier (the volunteer) fighting an American war with what is assumed to be typical American results. In relation to this, two "regulars" appear in the novel as chief characters—Lieutenant McClintock and Sergeant Mark Looney—and they are brave, wise, and honorable. But they remain always something less than Fargson, lacking the qualities necessary to demonstrate the courage that stems from a combination of innocence of battle and the desire to do well.
Yet beneath all this runs the disturbing suggestion that despite the heroism of the common soldier—both regular and volunteer—and despite the fine uniqueness of the American way, the disinterestedness of the policy-makers and of the American people vitiates the glory. There is protest implicit throughout and explicit at crucial moments—as in the narrator's attitude toward the nature of modern war in general. The old art of war, he says, has come down to simple, mechanical, dull, dogged machine-work.

No more "gaudium certaminis," no more crossing of swords or "push of pike," no more blow and ward, lance, shield, battle-ax, spear, chariot-and-horse; no more of the exhilarating clash of personal contest. Nothing left but stern, defenseless, hopeless "stand-up-and-take-your-physic"—fortuitous death by an unseen missile from an unknown hand. With this established, then, the narrator can make his protest against even the American way of war—and at the same time make his protest against the society that produces it and either enjoys or suffers the consequences:

Is not the time coming when the rank and file, the stepping-stones on the road to fame, will call a halt on their own account? When they learn good sense they will cry with one voice: "It is enough. We will have no more of it."

Reduced to the view of a single private in the ranks, this protest takes the form of, for instance, a metaphor uttered by a former miner: "Them nospaper colyumes is like a coalsbute. The big chunks go thunderin' down on top of the screen whilst the little ones slip down through, 'most out of sight in the lists of killed and wounded." And reduced to the view of the hero, Captain Fargeon, it takes the form of class conflict: "A rich man's war and a poor man's fight—a rich man's war
and a poor man's fight. Yes; that's it—the soldiers are opening and shutting the gate, like the man in the fable."

These protests, made precise and graphic by the characters and events of war, determine the final outcome of the novel. Captain Fargeon marries Sara Penrose, Lieutenant McClintock marries Lydia Penrose, Mark Looney becomes an orderly sergeant in "Mac's" infantry company in the regulars. Yet all are victims of a society which forgets the hero, except in songs and stories, and rewards skulkers like Caleb Dugong with the profits of conflict. The soldiers carry always with them symbols of their heroism, symbols that hinder rather than help them as they move into the future. Through the story of the Civil War, then, presented from the distinct point of view of the eighteen nineties, the author presents his criticism of life by making the experiences he seems to know best reflect what is wrong with that life. The common soldier's heroism in war is the highest heroism; the bitterness comes from the inadequate rewards for that heroism.

Kirkland's final conclusions embody both sides of the idea. In retrospective lines he shows what has happened to the people in the novel since the war. The hero (and, one gathers, the narrator) is particularly sorry that he has no son: "...it would be pleasant to think that the uncommon name of Fargeon was not to die out, in his branch, with him. Half a dozen stalwart boys would keep alive for a few years the knowledge that their ancestor fought among the rest at Donelson and Shiloh."12 But in general he hides his regrets and makes small jokes with his daughters concerning his "symbol" of war—a wooden leg—and whether he should get a new leg fitted or get a new man fitted to the
leg. Thus he moves (marches?) toward the future; and the final sentence of this novel tells the reader how: "So he treads through the world the ever tenor of his way; step—clump--; step—clump; step—clump; step—Finis."13

Hamlin Garland's story "The Return of the Private," like The Captain of Company K, needed a war before it could be written. Unlike Kirkland, however, Garland does not use the Civil War itself but presents it in retrospect, seen through the eyes of the small group of veterans—Smith, Saunders, Cranby—as they find their way home in La-Crosse County, Wisconsin, after the war is over. The war is always there in the background, but knowledge of the battles is assumed and used to show how Private Smith, the central figure of the story, resumes the hard life of the small farmer. The story's distinctiveness as a war story is that it depends upon a reader's knowledge of the war but does not attempt to deal specifically with the war.

The effects of the war upon the returning comrades is good. Their comradeship is of the kind, one gathers, made possible only by the sharing of war experiences: "The Solitary Climber [Smith] in blue walked on for a time, with his mind filled with the kindness of his comrades, and musing upon the many wonderful days they had had together in camp and field."14 And Smith is proof for the narrator that the war itself was somehow good. He looks back upon Smith's efforts before the war to make a success of his farm—working "nights and Sunday" to clear the farm of its brush and of its "insatiate mortgage." Then he attempts to tell why Smith went to war.
In the midst of his Herculean struggle came the call for volunteers, and with the grim and unselfish devotion to his country which made the Eagle Brigade able to "whip its weight in wild-cats," he threw down his scythe and grub-axe, turned his cattle loose, and became a blue-coated cog in a vast machine for killing men, and not thistles.

While the millionaire sent his money to England for safe-keeping, this man, with his girl-wife and three babies, left them on a mortgaged farm, and went away to fight for an idea. It was foolish, but it was sublime for all that.15

Here then is the protest of Kirkland, the irony of the social conflict between rich and poor; but here also is a kind of patriotism that gives Smith dignity and status as an individual. That Smith went away to fight for an idea was both a foolish and a sublime action; yet what, precisely, that idea is, neither the narrator nor Smith himself ever says. The conclusion of the tale, however, implies certainly the image embodying the idea.

When Smith looks on his return at the tattered rundown farm, the narrator enters into the scene:

   His farm was weedy and encumbered, a rascally renter had run away with his machinery (departing between two days), his children needed clothing, the years were coming upon him, he was sick and emaciated, but his heroic soul did not quail. With the same courage with which he had faced his Southern march he entered upon a still more hazardous future.16

And as if his point is not yet clear, the narrator concludes by setting the image even firmer: "The common soldier of the American volunteer army had returned. His war with the South was over, and his fight, his daily running fight with nature and against the injustice of his fellow-men, was begun again."17

This "daily running fight" and the manner in which Garland projects it links his treatment of war with that of Henry James in "Owen
The distinguishing feature of James's story, however, is the absence of a war as a reason for its existing. The basis of all action, rather, is Owen Wingrave's complete rejection of warmaking as a life's profession in spite of a family tradition of soldierly three centuries old and in face of his family's, his tutor's, and his friends' implications that to reject such a career is to demonstrate cowardice. The hero, then, is not a military hero in any sense; he is the exact opposite. And on this turn, James develops his ironic, supernatural tale in which Owen's society rejects and destroys him by failing to recognize that he is demonstrating all the true courage of a soldier in refusing to be one. The tradition of war is there, but it performs as antagonist rather than as a part of the protagonist; it functions as a symbol of a society which hates individualism and change. The parallels are Owen-Conscience-Self versus War—his aunt, Miss Wingrave ("...she represents the might, she represents the traditions and the exploits of the...army")—his family—Kate Julian (the catalyst in the catastrophe). And the story is quite explicit in stating Owen's position. To his tutor Mr. Coyle's question, "What is it he despises?" Lechmere, Owen's roommate, answers, "Why, I think, military glory. He says we take the wrong view of it." The position of Coyle, Lechmere, et al., is that Owen must be saved, must be made to see the error of his ways. Owen's scruples, the narrator tells the reader, are founded on an overwhelming conviction of the stupidity, the "crass barbarism" (in Owen's words) of war. His great complaint is that people have not invented something cleverer, and he is determined to prove that he is not such an ass. In a conversation between Lechmere and Coyle the whole
motivation for Owen's future actions is revealed. Owen thinks all the
great Generals should have been shot, that Napoleon, the greatest, was
a criminal, a monster for whom language has no adequate name. How has
he arrived at this decision?

He told me [Lechmere] when it was that the
question began to strike him in that light. Four or
five years ago, when he did a lot of reading about
all the great swells and their campaigns—Hannibal
and Julius Caesar, Marlborough and Frederick and
Bonaparte. He has done a lot of reading, and he says
it opened his eyes. He says that a wave of disgust
rolled over him. He talked about the "immeasurable
misery" of wars, and asked me why nations don't tear
to pieces the governments, the rulers that go in for
them.21

The most shocking aspect of this view (to Lechmere), besides its depar-
ture from the "religion" of Owen's family, is that in the eyes of those
surrounding him it makes him a coward. He lacks the military tempera-
ment; ergo he lacks courage. The irony of this non sequitur, as I have
suggested, makes the catastrophic conclusion possible. To pleadings
that there is nothing so splendid as pluck and heroism, that there is
no type so gallant, so fine, so magnificent as that of a soldier doing
his duty, Owen is unmoved. But to accusations that he is a coward he
cannot remain aloof. From this kind of pressure, alone, especially when
it comes from Kate Julian, Owen is moved to prove his courage by spend-
ing a night in the room in which ghosts of military heroes remain—es-
pecially that of his great-great grandfather, whose picture stirs on
the canvas when Owen, the coward, comes near it. When he climbs the
great stairway, he must pass the glances of the military heroes of his
family. Of this experience he shows the strain:

It's what my aunt calls the family circle. It's all
constituted here, it's a kind of indestructible pres-
ence, it stretches away into the past, and when I came back with her the other day Miss Wingrave told me I wouldn't have the impudence to stand in the midst of it and say such things. 22

Thus it is that the hero, opposed both by the "indestructible presence" of the past and the immovable force of the present, goes to his death in the haunted room to prove his courage. And only then do Kate, Miss Wingrave, and the others realize what they—his society—have done to "the victim of [their] derision." The final words are these: "Owen Wingrave, dressed as he [Spencer Coyle] had last seen him, lay dead on the spot on which his ancestor had been found. He looked like a young soldier on a battle-field." 23 In refusing to be a soldier in a society whose religion was soldierly Owen died like a soldier to prove that he had the courage of a soldier.

In contrast with these works of James, Garland, Kirkland, and Bierce, Stephen Crane's Maggie is not about war at all; that is to say he neither uses war in the Biercean manner nor makes war, either specifically or generally, a reason for the existence of his story. But it does create the metaphor of war and construct an image of war as it presents the story of Maggie in a society and in a world where external forces already determined regulate her life and lead her finally to her death beneath the waters of the river Acheron. The difference here is best conveyed by comparing the use Ambrose Bierce makes of the Civil War in his tales and the existence of war in Crane's Maggie. In both writers war is a means of imaging experience in such a way that the per-
ceiver comprehends the meaning of the work of art; and both writers assume, naturally, that the perceiver will have shared this experience. But in Crane's Maggie war is general and appears not explicitly, but implicitly in the telling of Maggie's struggle with life. It is a vital element in Chapter I.

This chapter stands alone as a picture of the society, reduced to an area along the waterfront, in which Maggie's struggles will take form and have meaning. It is a battle scene between Jimmie Johnson, the champion of Rum Alley, and the children of Devil's Row, and it establishes the tone of the story, foreshadows the kind of antagonism which Maggie, Jimmie, Pete, and others must fight against. To project these antagonisms Crane draws upon his imaginative understanding of war as at once of the forceful past and of the active present.

At the beginning Jimmie's countenance is "livid with the fury of battle" and his small body writhes "in the delivery of oaths" (oaths that Crane was later to make a consistent ingredient of battle). Words of challenge pass between the "small warriors" who swear "in barbaric trebles." It is fighting "in the modes of four thousand years ago" and its climax produces "ecstatic awe" among the spectators. Reduced to the level of children, the battle takes on a kind of Lilliputian air, emphasized by the sudden arrival of Jimmie's father. Old Johnson fights into the "chaotic mass," kicks Billie and Jimmie, and leads Jimmie home from battle: "They departed.... The boy followed a dozen feet in the rear. He swore luridly, for he felt that it was degrading for one who aimed to be some vague kind of soldier, or a man of blood with a sort of sublime licence, to be taken home by a father."
Thus in the chapter the animosity, the bitterness, the ecstasy of conflict, the shame of the little warrior—all are projected in part, at least, through the metaphor of actual war. Later, to get along in a world "no worse than he thought he had reason to believe it," Jimmie clads "his soul in armor" and his opposition becomes, vaguely, the opposing army, especially the opposition of authority, symbolized by the charging fire engine:

A fire-engine was enshrined in his heart as an appalling thing that he loved with a distant, dog-like devotion. It had been known to overturn a street-car. Those leaping horses, striking sparks from the cobbles in their forward lunge, were creatures to be ineffably admired. The clang of the gong pierced his breast like a noise of remembered war.25

Not only Jimmie but Pete is presented through the means of the warrior image. In the deeply ironic passages in which Pete declares his affection for Maggie, Pete expands: "He walked to and fro in the small room, which seemed then to grow even smaller and unfit to hold his dignity, the attribute of the supreme warrior."26 And to Maggie, after Pete leaves the house, he is the embodiment of knightly power: "He was a formidable man who disdained the strength of a world full of fists. Here was one who had contempt for brass-clothed power; one whose knuckles could ring defiantly against the granite of law. He was a knight."27

Later, after Maggie has been seduced by Pete, these two warriors battle it out in the bar; and the narrator sees them as soldiers on a battlefield:

The arms of the combatants whirled in the air like flails. The faces of the men, at first flushed to flame-colored anger, now began to fade to the pallor of warriors in the blood and heat of a battle.
Their lips curled back and stretched tightly over the gums in ghoul-like grins. Through their white, gripped teeth struggled hoarse whisperings of oaths. Their eyes glittered with murderous fire.

It should, first of all, be emphasized that irony underlies all these instances of the warrior and battle images; but it should also be emphasized that the irony is effective chiefly because the points of reference—battles, soldiers, knights—taken unironically do, in the narrator's view, have dignity, honor, and historical significance. One must use the phrase "in the narrator's view" because in the story the images as they appear can be only those of the narrator. In the first chapter Jimmie cannot know even vaguely what the soldier's feelings are; and later the clang of the gong piercing his breast like a noise of remembered war cannot be his remembered war, even though the point of view is his. In the warrior images referring to Pete the point of view is definitely the narrator's; and in Maggie's vision of Pete as a knight, the vision is believable only in terms of narrator comment: she has had little opportunity to learn about knights. So also is the case in the battle in the bar.

The reader receives, then, projected ideas about war to the extent that the narrator senses or determines that such ideas have substantial aesthetic relevance within the whole framework of the story. And to a great extent, one might suggest, the force of impact of a story on a reader depends upon his feeling and agreeing with this relevance. To a reader of Maggie, certainly, the war image is just one element among many others; it might even be so embedded in the whole work that it escapes notice in the whole reading. But whether it appears in one line or in every line of a work, it is there to be reckoned with.
In the writers just examined war appears as a part of or a basis for protest. Bierce saw the Civil War as an occasion the nature of which gave rise to possible (if generally improbable) ironical events resembling the plots and surprise endings he chose to develop. To this extent his stories are protests against such a war. Kirkland saw the Civil War as a means of projecting protest against a society in which the ordinary individual of courage and valor seldom received a fair break. Garland saw courage and achievement in the Civil War as a means of describing the kind of superhuman effort necessary for the lowly farmer to eke out a living in a society that helped the rich and seemed to ignore the poor. James saw war in general as a means of projecting social pressure and its devastating effect on an individual striving to keep his individuality. And Crane saw war in general as one of the means of showing the kind of effort necessary for one to survive even for awhile in a society and in a universe marked by antagonism and indifference. On the surface, then, these would seem to be stories and novels protesting, either explicitly or implicitly, against war. To say this, however, is to ignore the essential irony that pervades these works—irony whose effect stems in part, at least, from the assumption that courage, devotion, valor, and heroism achieve their highest expression in the soldier performing his duties according to the established traditions of the soldier. In the works presented in the preceding chapter irony generally was not an element to be considered. The image of soldier-God-America was unencumbered by doubt. So here where doubt and protest are dominant, it is significant that the writers would draw upon ideas about war which in other hands carry no signs of protest at all.
II. The Image and the Weakened Protest

Harold Frederick, another protestor, followed Bierce and Kirkland when he published *Marsena and Other Stories of the Wartime* (1894). Combining at least part of Bierce's cynicism with Kirkland's authentic first person narration of events of the Civil War, "Marsena," particularly, offers itself as evidence in the development of the war story as it moved from a kind of bare protest of 1891 to the historical romance of the late 'nineties and early nineteen hundreds. It is the story of Marsena Pulford who, through the influence of a woman, Julia Parmalee, and the intense patriotism which pervaded his hometown of Octavius, New York, goes into war and meets death at Malvern Hill. And since it is definitely a story of the eighteen nineties (revealed, again, through the shifts in the point of view of the narrator), it shows a sympathy with the common soldier and develops its bitter irony out of his failure to get the recognition or the rewards that he deserves.

The indifference of society is shown in two chief ways: through the character of Julia Parmalee as she shifts her affections from first one then another of the men surrounding her; and through Newton Shull, the "lukewarm patriot," whose view of the war is revealed in the sign he designed for his and Marsena's photography shop: "PULFORD & SHULL. Empire State Portrait Athenaeum and Studio. War Likenesses at Peace Prices," and in his reaction to the false peace hopes aroused when it appeared that McClellan would take Richmond in 1862: "'They needn't hurry on my account,' he said. 'It would be kind o' mean to have the whole thing fissle out now, jest when the picture business has begun"
to amount to something." And the futility of individual sincerity 
and heroism is revealed through what happens to Marsena Pulford in the 
war.

When, in 1862, the citizens of Octavius, under the direction of 
Julia, have their Field Hospital and Nurse Fund Fair, Marsena notes a 
coolness in Julia's attitude and senses that he is losing her. He then 
asks her a big question:

"Would you," he began boldly—"I never spoke of 
it before—but would you—that is, if I was to enlist 
and go to the War—would that make any difference?—
you know what I mean."

She looked up at him with magnetic sweetness in 
her dusky, shadowed glance. "How can any able-bodied 
young patriot hesitate at such a time as this?" she 
made answer, and pressed his arm.

With this stimulus combined with the citizens' patriotism, Marsena goes 
to war; and he is forgotten by Julia and by his partner Shull almost as 
soon as he is gone. They even think in terms of how to use his property 
after he is dead. But this indifference reaches its peak when Julia 
travels South after Malvern Hill and visits the scene where hundreds 
of wounded men, including Marsena and his friend Dwight Ransom, are 
waiting for surgical aid. The wounds, says the narrator, are horrible 
to contemplate. "The clouds hung thick and close above, as if to keep 
the stars from beholding this repellent sample of earth's titanic beast, 
Man, at his worst. An Egyptian blackness was over it all." And the 
response of the citizens of Octavius to the news is memorable: "The 
whole community seemed to have but a single face, repeated upon the 
mental vision at every step—a terrible face with distended, empty eyes, 
riven brows, and an open drawn mouth like the old Greek mask of trag-
edy." But these genuine signs of sympathy, grief, and revulsion
merely serve to underline the essential cruelty of the chief "sympathizer," Julia Parmalee, now a member of the Sanitary Commission.

She runs only to Colonel Starbuck, a political appointee of little courage who has seen no action, and turns her back upon the dying Marsena, whose final act before going to war has been to will his possessions to her. She turns, as the narrator implies, to care for the traditional military hero—the officer and gentleman, the staff officer—and shuns the truly brave and valorous hero. The irony of this treachery is the basis for the following dialogue between the Colonel and Julia when Marsena, in a final plea for recognition, grasps the hem of Julia's dress:

"The man behind me has taken tight hold of my dress," she whispered, hurriedly. "I don't want to turn around, but can you see him? He isn't having a fit or anything, is he?"

Colonel Starbuck lifted himself a trifle, and looked across. "No," he whispered in return, "he appears to be asleep. Probably he is dreaming. He is a corporal—some infantry regiment. They do manage to get so—what shall I say—so unwashed! Shall I move his hand for you?"

Miss Julia shook her head, with an arch little half smile.

"No, poor man," she murmured. "It gives me almost a sense of the romantic. Perhaps he is dreaming of home—of some one dear to him. Corporals do have their romances, you know, as well as—"

"As well as colonels," the staff officer playfully finished the sentence for her. "Well, I congratulate him, if his is a thousandth part as joyful as mine."34

This banter, exchanged as Marsena dies not a foot away from them, would seem to represent an attack against the nature of and reasons for war—the Civil War—and renders futile any individual's attempts at genuine patriotic heroism. The story ends on this note of futility and comes very close to being a complete rejection of the motives which lead men
to war—regardless of their apparent traditional value. Yet there remain two qualifying elements—one, the point of view of the narrator, and, the other, the implication throughout that true heroism in war is noble, the paradox being that such heroism goes unrecognized.

The point of view is revealed in the distinct backward glance, as in the following history of the changing attitudes of the citizens of Octavius: "In after years Octavius got so that it could cheer those sinister names of Gaines's Mill and Malvern Hill, and swell with pride at the memories they evoked. But that evening no one cheered. It was too terrible"; and in the narrator's review of the developments in the hospital service:

The day of intelligent and efficient hospital service had not yet dawned for our army. The breakdown of what service we had had, under the frightful stress of the battles culminating in this blood-soaked Malvern Hill, is a matter of history, and it can be viewed the more calmly now as the collapse of itself brought about an improved condition of affairs.

It is here almost as if the narrator is apologizing for being too critical of the hospital service—and he finds himself in the position of defender, in 1894. Yet these intrusions and the tacit praise of the role of the common soldier are not strong enough to destroy the impact of bitter, cynical irony at the story's end.

At this point, then, Harold Frederic appears as an almost perfect example of the veritist of Garland's Crumbling Idols who, like the others, made his ideas of war a substantial element in his fiction.

With this established, he appears also as an example, between 1894 and 1898, of a shift in ideas, or emotional ideals, roughly equivalent to the shift in the citizens of Octavius who came finally to view with
swelling pride events of war that in the beginning had been viewed with
dismay and revulsion.

In another long story "The Deserter," written in 1898, Frederic
again was drawn to the Civil War for the substance of a narrative
centering on the problem of the common man in his fight against wealth
and privilege. But by 1898 the bitterness seems to have disappeared.
Presented in the form of first person memoir and brought up to date by
the narrator, the tale uses the practice of hiring substitutes during
the Civil War for its basic plot. Mose Whipple, the poor, honorable
son of Asa Whipple, after substituting for the wealthy, cowardly Elisha
Teachout, deserts from the front lines so that he can care for his fa-
ther. After near capture by Norm Hazzard, the Deputy Marshall and army
detective, Mose and Asa retire to the secluded forest to wait out the
war.

But honor and sense of duty bother them; and Mose finally, upon
the advice of his father, decides to turn himself in and return to the
war—even though it means the death of the aging Asa. As Norm Hazzard
knows, however, and Asa suspects, Mose, in the hands of Elisha, will be
a dead deserter as soon as he hits civilization. For this reason Norm
shuns his appointed task and persuades Mose to remain a deserter and
return to his father in the wilds of the forest. His words of exhorta-
tion are significant:

"The fact is, he [Asa] and you ain't got any business
to live outside the woods. You're both too green and
too soft to wrestle 'round down amongst folks. They
cheat you out of your eye-teeth, and tromple you under-
foot and drive you to the poorhouse or the jail. Jest
you and Asa stay up here where you belong, and don't
you go down any more foolin' with that buzz-saw that
they call 'civilization.'"37
The results of Mose's return to the woods on this basis are all good. Since the war, one is told, Hazzard, the narrator, Mose, Asa, and Job Parshall (who helped Mose escape) have gone hunting together and have had reasonable success in the world.

By equating desertion with individualism, and Elisha Teachout with the kind of war Mose deserted from, the narrator would seem to be criticizing war in the same terms on which he criticizes the society which it represents. But the whole story is an optimistic one; it uses the war in a pleasant way; and it contains none of the tension resulting from the bitter irony of "Marsena." Although it is not like The Crisis it comes much closer to it in tone and retrospective point of view than did Frederic's work of five years earlier.

This tendency is clear in another story of the same period, "An Echo of Antietam," by Edward Bellamy (1898). In looking backward to the war Bellamy saw, like Stephen Crane, battles and soldiers as pictures--viewed armies as single images. And he made these pictures the basis for a story of death in which the hero, Lieutenant Philip King, falls "...in a charge at the head of his men" and leaves his sweetheart, Grace Roberts, to grieve for him. The point is, however, that she does not grieve but finds a kind of supernal happiness through a realization of his heroism and his sacrifice. And the author makes her reaction believable by presenting the battle of Antietam and Philip's participation in it as preparation for the final scene by Philip's coffin.

From the narrator one learns especially something of the sublimity of the heroic spirit of war as compared with the quaking peace spirit.
The heroic instincts of humanity with its high contempt of death is wiser and truer, never let us doubt, than superstitious terror or philosophic doubts. It testifies to a conviction, deeper than reason, that man is greater than his seeming self; to an underlying consciousness that his mortal life is but an accident of his real existence, the fashion of the day, to be lightly worn and gayly doffed at duty's call.

What a pity it truly is that the tonic air of battlefields—the air that Philip breathed that night before Antietam—cannot be gathered up and preserved as a precious elixir to invigorate the atmosphere in times of peace, when men grow faint of heart and cowardly, and quake at thought of death.39

And one learns also how the American people, in the eyes of the narrator, view, with him, the warrior going into battle. As the troops march away, one is told, the hearts of the lookers-on swell fast:

An afflatus of heroism given forth by this host of self-devoted men communicates itself to the most stolid spectators. The booming of the drum fills the brain, and the blood in the veins leaps to its rhythm. The unearthly gayety of the fife, like the sweet, shrill song of a bird soaring above the battle, infects the nerves till the idea of death brings a scornful smile to the lips. Eyes glaze with rapturous tears as they rest upon the flag. There is a thrill of voluptuous sweetness in the thought of dying for it. Life seems of value only as it gives the poorest something to sacrifice. It is dying that makes the glory of the world, and all other employments seem but idle while the regiment passes.40

Thus does the narrator convey the emotion which supports Grace's final vision. Through her own contemplation and through the words of Reverend Morton, during his funeral sermon for the dead lieutenant, Grace sees the reason for war and sacrifice:

As the minister discoursed of the mystic gain of self-sacrifice, the mystery of which he spoke was fulfilled in her heart. She appeared to stand in some place overarching life and death, and there was made partaker of an exultation whereof if religion and philosophy might but catch and hold the secret, their ancient quest were over.
Gazing through streaming eyes upon the coffin of her lover, she was able freely to consent to the sacrifice of her own life which he had made in giving up his own.\[1\]

Here, by 1898, then, one finds himself very close to the attitudes of the romancers about whom Howells wrote in 1900. These attitudes appear less explicitly and have more depth in writers like Frederic and Bellamy, but the soldier-God-America stands at attention behind the story, making the personal sacrifice of Grace not only possible but also meaningful in the context of her conscience and of the society in which she must spend her future—alone.

III. The Image in Howells, Davis, and McCutcheon

In 1894 William Dean Howells published A Traveler from Altruria, a declared "Romance," in which Mr. Homos, a visitor from the Utopian republic Altruria, spends his vacation at an American summer resort and, through discussions with the narrator, Mr. Twelvemough, and other Americans, applies a kind of naive Christian socialism to the American society that is constructed out of these discussions. From the statements by the wealthy Americans two dominant figures emerge: Life in America is revealed as the "battle of life"; and the successful American type, "the business man," is revealed, in this figure, as a victorious soldier, the conqueror. Yet war per se is never dealt with directly as a failing of the society exposed to this citizen of the world, Mr. Homos.

In a brisk exchange of ideas with the banker in the novel, Mr.
Homos is moved to declare: "Then in your system...the great majority of those who go into what you call the battle of life, are defeated?" and the banker answers: "The killed, wounded and missing sum up a frightful total...." This war, he has already declared, has an especial American flavor, however:

"In our business battles, we don't take off our hats to the other side, and say, 'Gentlemen of the French Guard, have the goodness to fire.' That may be war, but it is not business. We seize all the advantages we can; very few of us would actually deceive; but if a fellow believes a thing, and we know he is wrong, we do not usually take the trouble to set him right, if we are going to lose anything by undeceiving him. That would not be business."

But he must, it would seem, draw upon military war as a means of imaging the battle of life so that Mr. Homos can understand it. Just as the millionaire, the "American ideal," is a successful general, the enemy, the working class, is a defeated body of soldiers. This is revealed again in the words of the banker—one of the conquerors. In the case of a worker's revolution, he says, the millionaires would beat the enemy; and he explains the reasons why they would "beat":

"Well, all the good jingo reasons: we have got the materials for beating. Those fellows throw away their strength whenever they begin to fight, and they've been so badly generalized, up to the present time, that they have wanted to fight at the outset of every quarrel. They have been beaten in every quarrel, but still they always want to begin by fighting."

In these terms, then, through the battle image, Mr. Homos learns about the American character in 1894. There is no military war about which he can comment; but he must see war before he can see the America that is projected for him.

Even, however, if America had been at war recently, Mr. Homos,
as critic, could not regret such activity. For in his view, as it appears at the end of the novel in the long address to the people of America, war is the means of proving what he calls "the law of all life, that nothing can come to fruition without dying and seeming to make an end. It must be sown in corruption before it can be raised in incorruption." Truth itself, he says, "must perish to our senses before it can live to our souls; the Son of Man must suffer upon the cross before we can know the Son of God." Thus when someone in the audience asks Mr. Homos about war in Altruria, although he can say that the very name of his country implies the absence of war, he can point to the fact that war was necessary for the evolution of the now altruistic nation. When nations earlier attacked his republic, Mr. Homos says, "Their forces were met at the frontier by our entire population in arms, and full of the martial spirit bred of the constant hostilities of the competitive and monopolistic epoch just ended." Such martial spirit, such war—in the competitive and monopolistic epoch equatable with America of 1894—are then forces for good even though they in themselves are not good. They are the necessary means to the achievement of the kingdom of heaven on earth which has come to the republic of Altruria.

In Mr. Homos' summary of what Altruria has achieved, "perpetual peace" heads his list. America, one gathers from him, could also reach such a goal. But now, in 1894, war must be normal and, in terms of means and ends, good. And the author has made this American martial spirit manifest, not by discussing it or accusing America of being warlike, but by projecting the American battle of life in part, at least,
Through the images of battle and of the soldier.

In the sequel to *A Traveler from Altruria*, *Through the Eye of the Needle* (1907), an "Introduction" by Howells sets up an interesting perspective. The sequel picks up the story of the first novel in 1894; yet Howells writes from the point of view of 1906 and makes subtly ironic observations to prove, ostensibly, that what Mr. Homos says about America is no longer applicable. America has progressed beyond Mr. Homos' ken since he returned, with his American wife, to Altruria. This introduction, thus, is an integral part of the novel itself, and it is valuable here for the distinct change it shows in relation to America and war. Unlike *A Traveler from Altruria* it is quite explicit in its observations. "The Altrurian Emissary," says the narrator,

visited this country when it was on the verge of the period of great economic depression extending from 1894 to 1898, but, after the Spanish War, Providence marked the divine approval of our victory in that contest by renewing in unexampled measure the prosperity of the Republic.*

And the narrator shows that Mr. Homos' "good-through-evil" theory has already proved itself in America by the consequences of the Spanish War. If Mr. Homos could only revisit us, he says,

...we are sure that he would have still greater reason to congratulate himself on his forbearance, and would doubtless profit by the lesson which events must teach all but the most helpless doctrinaires. The evil of even a small war (and soldiers themselves do not deny that wars, large or small, are evil) has, as we have noted, been overruled for good in the sort of Golden Age, or Age on a Gold Basis, which we have long been enjoying. *

Here the irony is less than subtle; and it depends for its effect upon a condition of society in its ideas about American wars—a condition
which in Churchill's *The Crisis* saw the Civil War as a necessary, even beautiful, form of absolution and which in Howells' novel would seem to see the Spanish War as a similar kind of divine imperative leading to the new Golden Age. In either case the soldier-God-America throws his shadow over the columns of Americans marching on to the future.

Since everything written in the 'nineties, however, was not, certainly, ironic, no examination of the image of war at work can ignore the kind of writers, for instance, who treated straightforwardly the kinds of social phenomena toward which the "protesters" directed their attention. This includes, as I have shown, the historical romancers and other popular writers; but it includes also such writers as George Barr McCutcheon and Richard Harding Davis, the latter of whom, especially, would seem to epitomize in his works the whole pattern of emotional ideals resting beneath America's military assertiveness and its spirit of acceptance which motivated many serious writers. In Davis' *Soldiers of Fortune* (1897) one finds expressed and imaged almost in complete outline the marching America that has been the subject of this study. In it the engineer takes precedence as hero over the soldier, and it would seem to be essentially anti-wealth and anti-laissez faire; but it takes for granted American enterprise, both at home and abroad, made possible only by capitalistic wealth and military power.

Intense patriotism, implied militarism, the assumption that America must lead the world and bear the burdens of the leader—these and more are the characteristics that make *Soldiers of Fortune* significant here. Robert Clay, the hero, goes to the South American country Olancho to develop the mountains of iron for the Langham enterprises; and in the
course of events one has love, revolution, intrigue, and final success. But before Robert can marry Hope Langham and Olancho can settle down as a wise country cognizant of the power and beneficence of America, many events must take place.

Trouble with Olancho begins when Langham's enterprise begins to look profitable and the Olanchoan authorities wonder whether the United States has the right to move all the ore home for development. When the corrupt leader, General Mendoza, attempts to scare Clay into making an unsavory deal, Clay tells him why the United States (i.e., Langham enterprises) is in the right. He shakes his finger in the officer's face and dares him to try to break America's concession:

It was made by one Government to a body of honest, decent business men, with a Government of their own back of them, and if you interfere with our conceded rights to work those mines, I'll have a man-of-war down here with white paint on her hull, and she'll blow you and your little republic back up there into the mountains. Now you can go.51

This assumption concerning America's power and right to back up private enterprise abroad permeates the novel. The narrator does not emphasize it because he does not have to: It is a completely accepted right.

During the uprising by the dark peoples of Olancho (whose role is to become civilized under the tutelage of the United States), the reader is told,

There was an American man-of-war lying in the harbor of Truxillo, a seaport of the republic that bounded Olancho on the south, and Clay was in favor of sending to her captain by Weimer, the Consul, and asking him to anchor off Valencia, to protect American interests. The run would take but a few hours, and the sight of the vessel's white hull in the harbor would, he thought, have a salutary effect upon the revolutionists. But Mr. Langham said, firmly, that he would not ask for help until he needed it.52
With this acceptance of American strength one gets, of course, the kind of disdain for the dark men of Olancho and the kind of American chauvinism that accompanies it. When a Marine lieutenant, seeking to identify Clay after the revolution has been broken, asks, "Are you from the states?" Clay answers, "I am, thank God." And accompanying this attitude is the background of American military action that, it would seem, made such chauvinism right and reasonable. This is revealed through incidental allusions to the American past and in such striking statements as the following by Clay, when, on the morning of battle, he addresses the British Captain Stuart, "...a soldier and a gallant gentleman..." who aids the Americans and dies for them to help quell the revolutionists: "God has given us another day. Seven battles were fought in seven days once in my country. Let's be thankful, old man, that we're not dead, but alive to fight our own and other people's battles." Other people" in this case is ambiguous, however, for Clay considers it beneath his role, somehow, to fight the Olanchoans, perhaps "to lose [his life] in a silly brawl with semi-savages." But he moves ahead, nevertheless, by leading his soldiers against the enemy, by following in the steps of his father who as a filibuster on the "Virginius" worked to free Cuba and was shot against a stone wall, and by becoming in the eyes of his men a hero and a commander-in-chief of American forces. And his and his men's success leads them to desire further "battles for mankind."

MacWilliams, Clay's trusty aide, expresses what would seem to be the attitude of the soldier-America when he hears that the Macedonians are being mistreated by the Turks. In spite of the gentle jibes of
Clay, he wants to go immediately to save the Macedonians.

"Think of them all alone down there [he said] bullied by that Sultan of Turkey, and wanting to be free and independent. That's not right. You [Clay] as an American citizen ought to be the last person in the world to throw cold water on an undertaking like that. In the name of liberty now?"

"I don't object; set them free, of course," laughed Clay. "But how long have you entertained this feeling for the enslaved Macedonians, Mac?"

"Well, I never heard of them until a quarter of an hour ago, but they oughtn't to suffer through my ignorance."

Thus does author Davis image America; thus, also, does he both imply and assert war and the soldier as the crucial components of the image—even though the battles in the novel are minor in comparison with the love story and other personal relationships. Fortunately, Davis provided, in 1902, a significant counterpart to Soldiers of Fortune when he wrote Captain Macklin, a story of war and revolution in Honduras, in the eighteen eighties, featuring the career of Royal Macklin, grandson of Major General John W. Hamilton, U.S.A., and last male in a family whose whole tradition has been soldierly. I say fortunately because Captain Macklin presents an actual soldier in a situation comparable with Clay's and thus changes the image—makes the implicit soldier-America of Soldiers of Fortune an explicit personification who acts and fights according to the traditions of the past and present as they appear to him. That his motives are American motives is clear on every page of the novel; and they are based solidly on the urge to fight that proves more powerful than the urges to love and to achieve financial success. In an introduction to the novel by Theodore Roosevelt, the former President said, of Davis, in 1918, "His writings form a text-
book of Americanism which all our people would do well to read at the present time." 58 Certainly this Americanism in Captain Macklin is militarism, for Royal, ousted from West Point after his third year for some peccadilloes with local girls, becomes a captain in an element of the French Foreign Legion and represents America only as a particularly valorous and fair hero among all kinds and types of men in the Legion.

This "Americanism" appears first in the words of Royal's sweetheart, Beatrice, who sees him off to Central America and tells him what she expects of him:

"...Royal...I cannot bear to think of you doing anything in this world that is not fine and for the best. But if you will be a knight errant, and seek out dangers and fight windmills, promise me to be a true knight and that you will fight only when you must and only on the side that is just, and then you will come back bringing your sheaves with you." 59

And Royal keeps his promise. When others are in Honduras seeking self-glory or pecuniary gain, Royal is there to further the cause of progress—"to fight for the sacred cause of liberty." 60 Courageous, idealistic, fierce defender of his honor, he proves himself the true soldier and defender of high principles. Except that he is an American, he is like his hero in the novel, the French General Laguerre, leader of the Legion forces. He almost described himself when he said of the general,

He was entirely apart. In any surroundings I would have picked him out as a leader of men. Even a civilian would have known he was a soldier, for the signs of his calling were stamped on him as plainly as a sterling mark on silver, and although he was not in uniform his carriage and countenance told you that he was a personage. 61

And to this he would add that he himself was free, white, and proud.
when, during the Revolution, an American ship captain on whose ship Royal has sought protection threatens to turn Royal over to the opposition, Royal shows his attitude: "Protect your owners, and yourself, damn you!" I cried. "You're no American. You're no white man. No American would let a conch-nigger run his ship. To hell with your protection." And with this he beats back the "conch-niggers" single-handed.

Throughout the novel he lives by the traditions he has come to know and learn; and he finds his new power in the world is what he enjoys and must continue to possess. Only through war, he decides, can he achieve this power permanently:

I wanted the kiss and caress of danger, the joy which comes when the sword wins honor and victory together, and I wanted the clear, clean view of right and wrong, that is given only to those who hourly walk with death. And in choosing war, symbolized for him by the presentation sword of his grandfather, Royal knows he can best live up to his role in the world. His words declaring his purpose leave no doubt of his conviction:

"It's a tradition. It's handed down to me. My grandfather was Hamilton, of Cerro Gordo, of the City of Mexico, of Gettysburg. My father was 'Fighting' Macklin. He was killed at the head of his soldiers. All my people have been soldiers. One fought at the battle of Princeton, one died fighting the King at Culloden. It's bred in me. It's in the blood. It's the blood of the Macklins that has decided this. And I--I am the last of the Macklins, and I must live and die like one." When his hands touch the hilt of the sword of tradition, his blood leaps through his body. And as he turns in the end from successful achieve-
ment in Honduras to new fields in the Far East, he can picture himself returning later to America—admittedly a kind of soldier of fortune, but the American kind, one who would do honor not only to West Point but to all the people. In a final flash the scene of the future becomes clear:

...when the battalion is drawn up at retreat [at West Point] and the shadows stretch across the grass, I shall take up my stand once more on the old parade ground, with all the future Grants and Lees around me, and when the flag comes down, I shall raise my hand with theirs, and show them that I have a country, too, and that the flag we salute together is my flag still.65

In the work of George Barr McCutcheon, Royal appears as Grenfall Lorry, who in the view of Princess Yetive of Graustark "comes nearest my ideal of what an American should be."66 He is the American she has come to know through books and legends—"big, strong, bold and comely"67—and he lives up to all her expectations. He saves her Graustark from land hungry neighbors, proves himself a soldier of the highest quality in battle, and, by asserting American ideals in an European monarchy, teaches the world the benefits inherent in being in the special category of "American." In the end he weds Yetive, now queen of Graustark, and consummates a union of European and American interests: The gain, one learns, is Graustarks's.

The remarkable point here is that Lorry, as an individual, assumes in the novel the same American proportions as Robert Clay and Captain Macklin. He is America; and his distinguishing features are those that are by now familiar. When he, with his American friend Harry Anguish, discover a plot by the enemy to usurp the throne in Graustark, Lorry wants them to destroy the enemy the American way—alone. When
Harry asserts that such action is impossible, Lorry exclaims: "Come on! Come on! We'll take 'em ourselves, as sure as fate. Have you no nerve? What kind of an American are you?" and Harry answers, "You are right! Come on! I'll risk it with you." After this, when they enter the Graustarkian palace grounds to intercept the enemies as they attempt to kidnap the princess, Yetive offers to call the palace guards to help them. "By no means!" says Lorry. I want to catch those devils myself." "'An ideal American,' she surprised him by saying. 'Follow me.'" And when, the enemies captured, Lorry appears before the princess, her response completes the picture: "'You were very brave—oh, so brave!' she whispered in his ear, her hand touching his hair caressingly. 'My American.' He is, one knows, "My American" chiefly because he is a "big, strong, bold and comely" soldier American; for later in Yetive's chambers in the palace, when she commands him to stand before her "that she might see what manner of soldier he was," he leaps to "attention," and she responds:

She leaned back among the cushions and surveyed him through the glowing, impassioned eyes which slowly closed as if to shut out temptation.

"You are a perfect soldier," she said, her lashes parting ever so slightly.

This perfect soldier, then—this ambassador from America—winds the respect, admiration, and love of all good Graustarkians. As they tell him, "You are the soul of honor, of courage, of manliness."

And he is these things because he represents America. He is not a prince, he tells them, but a free American:

...every born American may become ruler of the greatest nation in the world—the United States. His home is his kingdom; his wife, his mother, his sisters are
his queens and his princesses; his fellow citizens are his admiring subjects if he is wise and good.... We recognize little as impossible.72

Thus to Europe, as to South and Central America and to the Far East, the soldier—American—always big, always strong, always bold, always comely—spreads his heaven-blessed influence.

IV. The Image: After 1900

When William Vaughn Moody wrote, in 1900, "An Ode in Time of Hesitation," he did not lament that America was big, strong, bold, and comely; he was, rather, proud of these attributes—celebrated them, in fact, in constructing his picture of the America which was in danger. He could write:

We are our fathers' sons; let those who lead us know;
'Twas only yesterday sick Cuba's cry
Came up the tropic wind, 'Now help us, for we die!'
Then Alabama heard,
And rising, pale, to Maine and Idaho
Shouted a burning word.
Proud state with proud impassioned state conferred,
And at the lifting of a hand sprang forth,
East, west, and south, and north,
Beautiful armies. Oh, by the sweet blood and young
Shed on the awful hill slope at San Juan,
By the unforgotten names of eager boys
Who might have tasted girls' love and been stung
With the old mystic joys
And starry griefs, now the spring nights come on,
But that the heart of youth is generous,—
We charge you, ye who lead us,
Breathe on their chivalry no hint of stain!
Turn not their new-world victories to gain! 73

As their fathers' sons, Americans were proud soldiers: "The wars we wage are noble," says the poet. They are American wars—our loftiest
heritage"—in no way resembling conventional stooping to cheat and scramble "in the market-place of war."

The poet's lament was that such a nation whose "forehead wear-eth yet its solemn star" could contemplate the kind of imperialistic aggression that was developing in the Philippines. This was to prostitute "our loftiest heritage"; this was to soil the American tradition of battle, symbolized in the poem by the statue of Robert Gould Shaw who was "killed while storming Fort Wagner, July 18, 1863, at the head of the first enlisted negro regiment, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts." 74

The progress of America, Moody would seem to say, was measurable by the noble wars Americans fought for the sake of freedom. America has, then, marched to 1900 and can march on to greater glory—but, in this instance, cannot do so by subjugating the people of the islands. It has been and must continue to be America's role to set peoples free, not to capture them.

On this point Moody is the anti-imperialist; and he had, as I have shown, many associates. But like even his opponents, the imperialists, he draws upon the noble tradition of war to support his appeal. To them war in the islands is justified because America has marched rightly and honorably up to the present; to the poet his view is justified because he doesn't want to see interrupted this noble march. Both, however, could see, could feel, the basic image underlying their exhortations: the American soldier fighting America's wars in an uniquely American way. And both could expand this soldier into America itself.

Here one encounters again, at the beginning of the new century, the strongest manifestation of the idea of war as it motivated Americans
to action in this century.

I have shown how it worked in the popular literature, in the topical literature related to the Spanish War and to the Great War, in the war literature devoted to the backward glance, and in the works of selected writers devoted to writing of America truthfully as they saw and felt it. War as subject, war as substance, war as both subject and substance—through these instances has emerged the remarkably steady, consistent image of the soldier used both for his own intrinsic merit, and as a means of imaging the various writers' responses to and impressions of experience—of life—in America.

Between 1900 and 1917 this image became quite generalized. Man—the individual, the common man—and his struggles against trusts, monopolies, systems captured the attention of men like Frank Norris and Upton Sinclair; and general war metaphor seemed an effective means toward imaging such a struggle. Theodore Dreiser in Sister Carrie (1900), Jennie Gerhardt (1911), and The Titan (1914) alluded occasionally to his male protagonists as soldiers struggling against opposing forces, but there is little that is isolable as working image. Carrie and Jennie, for instance, did not lend themselves to such imagery.

The generalization follows that, between 1900 and 1917, in the literature not devoted specifically to war there is widespread substantial use of the soldier as he has been developed to image the experiences of the fictional characters. The allusions, the references, the metaphors are there, certainly; they are as abundant as the literature itself; but mere reference to them conveys little of their pervasiveness. One profits most, it would seem, from continuing the fairly close exam-
ivation of selected works that has been a practice in this study.

How this image became generalized is revealed in Frank Norris's *The Octopus* (1901), in which the "fight" between ranchers and the railroad informs the action. Presley, still alive at the end of the novel, can look back upon the whole battle. And he sees in his mind a picture of the railroad. Forces, not men, he says, comprised the war, but men of the ranches, not men of the railroads suffered.

Into the prosperous valley, into the quiet community of farmers, that galloping monster, that terror of steel and steam had burst, shooting athwart the horizons, flinging the echo of its thunder over all the ranches of the valley, leaving blood and destruction in its path.75

This ambiguously imaged, attenuated monster, the antagonist, does, indeed, wreck havoc: Harran, Osterman, Hooven, Broderson are killed; Magnus, Lyman, Dyke are corrupted; Mrs. Hooven starves to death; Minna becomes a prostitute:

Men--motes in the sunshine--perished, were shot down in the very noon of life, hearts were broken, little children started in life lamentably handicapped; young girls were brought to a life of shame; old women died in the heart of life for lack of food. In that little, isolated group of human insects, misery, death, and anguish spun like a wheel of fire.76

These are the victims of a war against a monster--the octopus--the railroad. The consequences, for the protagonists, one suspects, is devastation. But such is not the narrator's conclusion. Such a war is, in fact, reassuring to him. Just as the wheat remains after the battle, so also does the battle itself foretell other permanencies:

Falseness dies; injustice and oppression in the end of everything fade and vanish away. Greed, cruelty, selfishness, and inhumanity are short-lived; the individual suffers, but the race goes on. Annixter dies, but in a far distant corner of the world a thousand lives are saved.
The large view always and through all shams, all wickedness, discovers the Truth that will, in the end, prevail, and all things, surely, inevitably, resistlessly work together for good.**

In *The Pit* (1903) and in *A Deal in Wheat* (1903) Norris uses battle imagery similarly. As I have indicated earlier, the Curtis Jadwins, fighting their wars of the pits, were projected as kinds of soldiers fighting against odds insuperable from the outset. That they were generals and that they fought courageously, however, marks them as Americans, engaging in special American wars the essence of which seemed to require war imagery to achieve coherence.

A similar case was that of Upton Sinclair whose *Manassas* (1904) reflected the view which I have characterized as the backward glance. Protesting and sardonic in nature, this novel, a kind of copy of Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage*, ends with the first battle of Manassas (1861) and carries a soldier through his first battle experiences. But with all its bitterness, there emerges a sublime ecstasy in battle, an ecstasy the consequences of which never, however, appear since the story remains incomplete.

Although this novel would seem to have established Sinclair's impulse to use war as a means of imaging experience, he did not continue in this vein. *The Jungle* (1905) concentrates on Jurgis Rudkus and his family and their struggles to survive in Packingtown, Illinois. But even the struggle, which sees all the Rudkus family, except Jurgis, destroyed, draws forth little soldier imagery. In concentrating on the evils of the packing industry, Sinclair uses war chiefly as a basis of comparison; and he draws upon America's most recent war. When Jurgis learns about "steerly" cattle, those covered with boils which burst and
sprayed the men butchering the steers, the narrator intervenes:

It was stuff such as this that made the "embalmed beef" that had killed several times as many United States soldiers as all the bullets of the Spaniards; only the army beef, besides, was not fresh canned, it was old stuff that had been lying for years in cellars.

This is, like much in Sinclair, merely topical reference, seemingly the first reference to come to his mind. But the situation changes near the end of the novel when Jurgis, being "delivered from slavery" by the words of the impassioned Socialist orator, gets much of his inspiration from the orator's plea against war. Here the picture of an America motivated by warlike instincts appears as an anomaly since the references to it previously have been slight. But at the crisis of the novel the author, to convey what is wrong with a society that crushes the Jurgises and sees the capitalists forge ahead, attacks his conception of warlike America: "Working men, working men—comrades! open your eyes and look about you!" cries the orator. And Jurgis responds. If there is a question as to why he responds, it stems, probably, from the anomalous nature of the appeal against war. Sinclair did not seem to have a consistent means of protest.

The same is true with his A Captain of Industry, Being the Story of Civilization (1906) and King Coal (1917). In the first, written in 1901 before, as Sinclair notes in a "Preface," the literature of exposure appeared, the struggle of the Captain, Robert van Rensselaer, is couched, like Norris's The Pit, in military terms to denote the heroic struggle—"the battle of the giants"—which takes place. When Robert, at the age of forty, is reintroduced to the reader as a highly successful financier, the narrator says: "He had always been a man of
distinction—you would have taken him for a diplomat, or a general, at the very least. 81 And it is as a general that Robert fights his battle to corner Transatlantic and Suburban Railroad. Early "...he meant that T and S was to go down on Wednesday, the first real day of battle." 82 And the battle was to be profitable. It "...was the market, the spectators of the battle, who were to award the prize of victory at the end. And as we have said, our hero had, or believed he had, the 'eternal laws of nature' on his side." 83

That this battle disappears during the crisis of the "battle of the street" is, perhaps, a reflection upon the author. As Robert moves on to collapse he becomes a "man," not a soldier. His indomitable spirit which made him a "general" worth a hundred million dollars gets lost, perhaps because the author is not certain of his point of view, has not, in fact, determined whether he is writing a parable, a story, a novel, or an essay. In the end, one gathers, the life of a Captain of Industry is pointless; yet while he is a Captain, maneuvering his forces against the opposition, there is a spirit equatable only with the spirit of the battlefield.

So too does war appear in Sinclair's later novel King Coal (1917). Set in the image of a monarchy (the books are "The Domain of King Coal," "The Serfs of King Coal," "The Henchmen of King Coal," and "The Will of King Coal"), the whole story is one of battle against, again, insuperable opposition. The protagonist Hal Warner, son of one of the coal kings, disguises himself as Joe Smith and works with the miners to help them toward unionization and better working conditions. He learns early of the espionage system set up by the kings: "Before long Hal had a
chance to see this system of espionage at work, and he began to understand something of the force which kept these silent and patient armies at their tasks. And these silent and patient armies, he knows, are at war: "Hal was going in the same direction, and it affected him like the music of a military band; he too wanted to throw his head up and square his shoulders and keep step."

He finds that he must get used to sickness and pain that at first bother him: "...but finally he overcame this weakness, telling himself that this was a war, and that a man must be ready for the hospital as well as for the parade-ground." All these are crucial points in a story that sees in the end the army of workers aroused against King Coal. Someone starts to sing, and others join him in the familiar lines,

To arms! to arms, ye brave!  
March on, march on, all hearts resolved  
On victory or death!

and on this note the story ends.

With this note, too, one can hazard a suggestion. In these novels there is the kind of alarm that motivated William Vaughn Moody. He could not see his image of America functioning honorably or reasonably in what was to him an anomalous situation in the Philippines; and the authors just discussed could not see an equivalent image as a means of projecting struggle that was essentially fruitless. Only, as in Norris, when at the end hope for good is in sight, or, as in King Coal, when the marching spirit moves toward victory does the image serve this kind of narrator or author. It was wrong to fight except for freedom; it was wrong, also, to show the soldier fighting towards certain defeat.
Only freedom and victory, it would seem, pointed toward progress and the Golden Age in America.

When the orator in _The Jungle_ is most appealing he cries for a "...man who will never more be trapped—whom no blandishments will cajole, whom no threats will frighten; who...will move forward, and not backward, who will study and understand, who will gird on his sword and take his place in the army of his comrades and brothers."88 To set up his contrast he draws upon an actual war, even though he must shift his attention to Manchuria, where, he says, a million human beings may be hurled at each other's throats. "And this," he cries,

in the twentieth century, nineteen hundred years since the Prince of Peace was born on earth! Nineteen hundred years that his words have been preached as divine, and here two armies of men are rending and tearing each other like the wild beasts of the forests! Philosophers have reasoned, prophets have denounced, poets have wept and pleaded—and still this hideous monster roams at large! We have schools and colleges, newspapers and books; we have searched the heavens and the earth, we have weighed and probed and reasoned—and all to equip men to destroy each other. We call it War, and pass it by—but do not put me off with platitudes and conventions—come with me, come with me—realize it! See the bodies of men pierced by bullets, blown into pieces by bursting shells! Hear the crunching of the bayonet, plunged into human flesh; hear the groans and shrieks of agony, see the faces of men crazed by pain, turned into fiends by fury and hate! Put your hand upon that piece of flesh—it is hot and quivering—just now it was a part of a man! This blood is still streaming! it was driven by a human heart! Almighty God! and this goes on—it is systematic, organized, premeditated! And we know it, and read of it, and take it for granted; our papers tell of it, and the presses are not stopped—our churches know of it, and do not close their doors—the people behold it, and do not rise up in horror and revolution.89

This frenetic plea the orator uses to show that similar events are taking place at the same time in Chicago. And to the extent that these
people of Chicago are beaten, down-trodden, the hopelessness of the war suits his needs. But if they are to arise and beat off the master class, they must, the orator repeats, put on sword on thigh and fight a noble war. "Will they [the masters]," he asks, "forge you the sword of your deliverance, will they marshal you the army and lead it to the fray?" No, the workers must arm themselves, break the fetters of slavery, and find "...a new-born exultation" in the battle— an American battle for the cause of liberty. Thus can they found the "new religion of humanity"—a kingdom of heaven on earth.

In another kind of author, Henry James, victory or defeat was not a major question. But in the novels The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904) there is a concentration on the American and the impact of his Americanism upon European culture. While spiritual growth would seem to be James's major concern, he presents, during this process of growth, impressions of the America which produced Milly Theale, Lambert Strether and Adam and Maggie Verver. In none of them is there the ironical use of the war tradition that informed "Owen Wingrave" in 1893; but these are occasions, as I indicated early in this study, when James draws upon the soldier-america image to project character and to reveal motivation. Milly Theale could determine quality by seeing something of the military general in a man; from her point of view, an American's point of view, this was important. In The Golden Bowl, however, the image is clearer because the narrator feels called upon to show what constitutes an extremely successful American man—Adam Verver—before he can launch him into the psychological and physical game involving Prince Amerigo, an
Italian nobleman; Maggie, his daughter; Charlotte Stant, later Adam's wife; and Colonel and Fanny Assingham, the interested observers who help explain the developments leading to the final outcome of the novel. All realize, somehow, that Americans are different. And this difference, as the narrator tells the reader, shows up first of all in their way of viewing Maggie's fiancé, Prince Amerigo. To them he is beautiful because he is a tradition:

It was as if he had been some old embossed coin, of a purity of gold no longer used, stamped with glorious arms, mediaeval, wonderful, of which the "worth" in mere modern change, sovereigns and half-crowns, but as to which, since there were finer ways of using it, such taking to pieces was superfluous.91

And his physical appearance supports the impression:

His look itself, at such times, suggested an image—that of some very noble personage who, expected, acclaimed by the crowd in the street and with old precious stuffs falling over the sill for his support, had gaily and gallantly come to show himself: always moreover less in his own interest than in that of spectators and subjects whose need to admire, even to gape, was periodically to be considered. The young man's expression became, after this fashion, something vivid and concrete—a beautiful personal presence, that of a prince in very truth, a ruler, warrior, patron, lighting up brave architecture and diffusing the sense of a function.92

Inextricably bound, then, with their reasons for choosing the Prince is the fact that he is for them, in the best sense, a soldier. And this is better by far, again the narrator implies to the reader, than his being actually a soldier. The only real soldier in the novel is Colonel Robert Assingham; and his tradition the narrator can treat almost humorously. Given to loud oaths, to "extravagant language" in general, Colonel Bob is merely, one learns, perpetuating the military
tradition. Like a retired General playing with toy soldiers, "fighting and winning battles, carrying on sieges and annihilating enemies with little fortresses of wood and little armies of tin," the Colonel's "exaggerated emphasis" is "his box of toy soldiers, his military game":

It harmlessly gratified in him, for his declining years, the military instinct; bad words, when sufficiently numerous and arrayed in their might, could represent battalions, squadrons, tremendous cannonades and glorious charges of cavalry. It was natural, it was delightful—the romance...of camp life and of the perpetual booming of guns. It was fighting to the end, to the death, but no one was ever killed.93

This view toward the Colonel is significant in the novel because when the American hero, Adam Verver, is introduced one finds that his indulgence, his extravagance, is a similar one. "When he took a rare moment 'off,' he did so with the touching, confessing eyes of a man of forty-seven caught in the art of handling a relic of infancy—sticking on the head of a broken soldier or trying the lock of a wooden gun."94 It is a sign of a special genius. "The spark of fire, the point of light, sat somewhere in his inward vagueness as a lamp before a shrine twinkles in the dark perspective of a church; and while youth and early middle-age, while the stiff American breeze of example and opportunity were blowing upon it hard, had made the chamber of his brain a strange workshop of fortune."95 Adam began his march to the top at the age of twenty and is now on a platform "with standing room for but half a dozen others." And to reach this point Adam has "had to like polishing and piling up his arms."96 Presented as an "incredible little idealist,"97 and as a typical great American, Verver is frequently appealing (and, indeed, so is his daughter) because he evinces this touch of the soldier
which has been for the author a means of projecting his character for the reader. And this touch is a part of the impression made on Prince Amerigo when he comes to an analysis of Adam Verver:

Those people—and his free synthesis lumped together capitalists and bankers, retired men of business, illustrious collectors, American fathers-in-law, American fathers, little American daughters, little American wives—those people were of the same large lucky group, as one might say; they were all, at least, of the same general species and had the same general instincts; they hung together, they passed each other the word, they spoke each other's language, they did each other "turns."98

This American aggressiveness, merely suggested at the beginning of the novel, manifests itself more clearly as Adam and Maggie are forced to assert themselves to preserve their social integrity and their marriages. The emphasis shifts gradually to Maggie, and as she formulates her intricate plan of psychological warfare, her success is often measured in terms of war. She knows that Charlotte is her antagonist; and when, early in Book Second, the four principal characters are gathered at Eaton Square, Maggie effects her subtle campaign:

She had not less promptly kissed her stepmother, and then had bent over her father, from behind, and laid her cheek upon him; little amenities tantamount heretofore to an easy change of guard—Charlotte's own frequent, though always cheerful, term of comparison for this process of transfer. Maggie figured thus as the relieving sentry, and so smoothly did use and custom work for them that her mate might even, on this occasion, after acceptance of the password, have departed without irrelevant and, in strictness, unsoldierly gossip.99

As Maggie works at keeping the Prince and Charlotte apart, she begins to see herself as soldier: "There were hours, truly, when the Princess saw herself as not unarmed for battle; 100 and her opponent
assumes the image of a soldier on guard. Maggie sees her "on the rampart, erect and elegant, with her lace-flounced parasol now folded and now shouldered, march to and fro against a gold-coloured east or west." But, says the narrator, "Maggie was at any rate under arms. She knew what she was doing and had already her plan." And as her plan of force nears victory, as she gets Charlotte placed in relation to the Prince and to Adam, Fanny Assinghahm, the observer, can see her as a soldier in full uniform:

...she admired her little friend, in whom this announcement [of her success thus far] was evidently animated by an heroic lucidity. She stood there, in her full uniform, like some small erect commander of a siege, an anxious captain who has suddenly got news, replete with importance for him, of agitation, of division within the place. The importance breathed upon her comrade.

If at this point the commander is anxious, it is the anxiety of one who sees victory in the offering and wants nothing to jeopardize it. Maggie, in the end, keeps her husband; Adam keeps his wife; and nothing happens to destroy the external complacency that befits persons like the Prince and the great American capitalist.

Thus does war the American way appear on two levels in the novel and serve the novelist as a means of justifying the actions of the two chief Americans. Adam, as an individual, is presented as a cigar-smoking, suspender-grasping man; but as a representative of America he takes on soldierly qualities that add to his stature. Maggie, as a calm, unimaginative bride at the beginning of the novel, is an attractive woman, the doting daughter of Adam; but as a forceful wife, fighting to save a marriage and a family name in spite of the deceptions of her husband and her mother-in-law, she too becomes the soldier who pushes on, almost
Quite unlike The Golden Bowl, Mark Twain's The Mysterious Stranger (1916) is pertinent here because it concentrates, for Satan's criticism of human beings and their actions through world history, on the history of wars. Although it is set in 1590 in Austria and though the people of the village in which Theodor Fischer, Nikalous man, Seppi Wohlmeyer, Father Peter, and the others dwelled are not, the story, at war with anyone, the "progress" of the human race is insured by wars: Wars are Philip Traum's means of showing the pathos inherent in man's relative insignificance and his childish pomps.

On one of Theodor's conducted tours of the world Satan takes to a French village and exposes the poverty of the workers, the wealth of the proprietors, the cruelty of the rulers. But when consions are drawn beyond the application of the Moral Sense, Satan ns to war:

Then he dropped all seriousness and just overstrained himself making fun of us, and deriding our pride in our warlike deeds, our great heroes, our imperishable names, our mighty kings, our ancient aristocracies, our venerable history—and laughed and laughed till it was enough to make a person sick to hear him....

Later when the boys ask Satan to do a show for them, he presents history of the progress of the human race. After enumerating the like events—from the Garden of Eden through Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Christian wars—Satan says, "Now...you have seen your progress down the present, and you must confess that it is wonderful in its way. must now exhibit the future." By indulging his power to construct future, Satan shows the boys more terrible slaughters, more devas-
tating machines of war than anyone in their time has dreamed of. Then he concludes, "...a few centuries from now he [Man] will have so greatly improved the deadly effectiveness of his weapons of slaughter that all men will confess that without Christian civilization war must have remained a poor and trifling thing to the end of time." Thus when Satan looks ahead to the nations of the future— to monarchies, aristocracies, and religions—he brings his views up to the twentieth century. He sees all based upon the individual's distrust of his neighbor and his desire to stand well in his neighbor's eye; and he sees a minority of leaders always leading the majority which is opposed to such institutions as war. By allowing exceptions to his general condemnations, even Satan can see the possibility of good wars, but his prescience concerning the workings of a nation approaching war in the twentieth century is remarkable. "Look at you in war—what mutton you are, and how ridiculous!" he says to Theodor. "In war? How?" answers Theodor. Satan's answer provides the pattern:

There has never been a just one, never an honorable one— on the part of the instigator of the war. I can see a million years ahead, and this rule will never change in so many as half a dozen instances. The loud little handful—as usual—will shout for war. The pulpit will—warily and cautiously—object— at first; the great, big, dull bulk of the nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war, and will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is unjust and dishonorable, and there is no necessity for it." Then the handful will shout louder. A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded; but it will not last long; those others will out—shout them, and presently the anti—war audiences will thin out and lose popularity. Before long you will see this curious thing: the speakers stoned from the platform, and free speech strangled by hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with
those stoned speakers—as earlier—but do not dare to say so. And now the whole nation—pulpit and all—will take up the war-cry, and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth; and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception. 108

Perhaps in his disinterestedness Satan has, like the orator in The Jungle, here misjudged the nature of the individual of the majority; perhaps his picture of the lamb made ferocious by the influence of rapacious leaders ignores the rapaciousness in all men which is always implied, at least, in The Mysterious Stranger. The story is nevertheless significant here because the author has drawn, in the twentieth century, upon his ideas concerning war to develop his indictment against human beings. And if, as Satan says at the end, life is only a vision, a dream, and the individual is "but a thought," a strong figure in the vision and in the thought is the figure of war. Through man's actions in war one is led to comprehend man's actions in all this dream called life.

With this application of the generalized war image of soldier-America one can come to at least a tentative conclusion concerning "warlike America" between 1891 and 1917. In the optimists (using the term broadly), in those who saw in the assertiveness of America the golden path to future greatness, the image of the soldier-America or
the soldier-God-America seemed nearest at hand to state, or imply, or to image various manifestations of that progress. In the cynics, the pessimists, the protesters, the pervasiveness of the image in the minds of Americans provided them with the material for irony, for hate, for protest. Both groups tend in general to emphasize the depth of feeling among Americans in an idea whose chief image involved an American soldier marching through war toward his destined future. The nature of the destiny varied, as we have seen; consequently, the nature of the way to their destiny varied with all. But whatever Americans might want, in the deepest areas of their beings, they admitted war as a condition of getting it.

Perhaps the words of the parson in Ellen Glasgow's *Virginia* (1913) provided the best perspective on the ideals—the ideas—whose manifestations have been studied in these pages: "He smelt the smoke again, he heard the boom of the cannon, the long sobbing rattle of musketry, and the thought stabbed through him, 'God forgive me for loving a fight!'"109 Perhaps, in 1916, Edgar Lee Masters enlarged on this perspective:

**MANY SOLDIERS**

The idea danced before us as a flag;  
The sound of martial music;  
The thrill of carrying a gun;  
Advancement in the world on coming home;  
A glint of glory, wrath for foes;  
A dream of duty to country or to God.  
But these were things in ourselves, shining before us,  
They were not the power behind us.  
Which was the Almighty hand of Life,  
Like fire at earth's center making mountains,  
Or pent up waters that cut them through.  
Do you remember the iron band  
The blacksmith, Shack Dye, welded
Around the oak on Bennet's lawn,
From which to swing a hammock,
That daughter Janet might repose in, reading
On summer afternoons?
And that the growing tree at last.
Sundered the iron band?
But not a cell in all the tree
Knew aught save that it thrilled with life,
Nor cared because the hammock fell
In the dust with Milton's Poems. 110

And perhaps, having established the strength, character, and
pervasiveness of this image, one can gain deeper perspective into the
disillusionment that followed the Great War, can see more clearly why
such lines as the following, written after the war ended, have meaning
beyond this disillusionment:

Died some, pro patria
non "dulce" not "at decor"...
walked eye-deep in hell
believing in old men's lies, then unbelieving
came home, home to a lie,
home to many deceits,
home to old lies and new infamy;
usury age-old and age-thick
and liars in public places. 111
Chapter Eight

CONCLUSION

The Case of Stephen Crane

It is certain, I say, that, although I had made a start before, only from the occurrence of the Seces­sion War, and what it show'd me as by flashes of lightning, with the emotional depths it sounded and arrous'd (of course, I don't mean in my own heart only, I saw it just as plainly in others, in millions) —that only from the strong flare and provocation of that war's sights and scenes the final reasons—for—being of an autochthonic and passionate song defi­nitely came forth.

I went down to the war fields in Virginia (end of 1862), lived thenceforward in camp—saw great battles and the days and nights afterward—partook of all the fluctuations, gleam, despair, hopes again arrous'd, courage evoked—death readily risk'd—the cause, too—along and filling those agonistic and lurid following years, 1863-'64-'65—the real parturition years (more than 1776-'83) of this henceforth homo­geneous Union. Without those three or four years and the experiences they gave, "Leaves of Grass" would not now be existing.¹

In 1888, Walt Whitman, the septuagenarian, reviewing the birth and growth of his Leaves of Grass, saw the American Civil War as the final raison d'être of his autochthonic song. The war years were the parturition years of America: To exist as a homogeneous union America needed its bath of blood, needed to be reborn through the struggle of war. Neither the United States nor the indigenous poem about this nation could have existed, he declares, without the fact, the events,

Footnotes to this Chapter will be found beginning page 258.
the consequences of the war between the states. This belief, forcefully expressed by Whitman, became, as I have shown, a part of the basis among Americans for the image of a marching America, a soldier with sword girt on thigh pacing forward on the road of progress into the twentieth century. And, again, this image was for American writers—of many kinds and of many levels—a means of showing their responses to life in America and to America's impact upon the rest of the world. One image among many, one means among many, it remains, nevertheless, as a significant manifestation of a society that viewed itself as at once a nation at peace with itself and with the world, a nation devoted to the achievement of perpetual peace in the world, and a nation responsible for protecting the liberty and property of less progressive peoples of the world.

The plan of this study has been to trace, record, and expost the idea of war as it existed in America during a time when many Americans considered peace a permanent achievement of their time; to reveal this idea as it functioned in the verbal and oral expression of the people and of their political, social, religious, and intellectual leaders; and then to turn to the imaginative literature of the period in order to establish the extent to which American traditions, attitudes, emotional ideals, and visions concerning war became for American writers a substance in the experiences, the dreams, the plans that constituted their natural or contrived means of imaging life and experience in their works.

The search has led me into many areas of thought and expression,
and it has been, I believe, rewarding. I began with an idea of war so general that it could be a cultural phenomenon of American society during any given period of time in its history; my task was to particularize this idea, or, rather, to find the particularization as it characterized the period I selected to examine, then to isolate the image, if it existed, that seemed to epitomize, or to project, this idea. This I have tried to do. Beginning with a broad area of focus, I have reduced it gradually to the individual works of individual writers—assuming that the ultimate definition of an idea must come from an individual's imaginative production, particularly if these results are found to follow the patterns of the products of other imaginations. I have tried to keep before me always the words of Henry Nash Smith which I quoted early in this study: "I do not mean to raise the question whether such products of the imagination accurately reflect empirical fact. They exist on a different plane. But as I have tried to show, they sometimes exert a decided influence on practical affairs." My humility has increased steadily as I have become increasingly aware that in a study of this kind all expression during the period being studied is pertinent to that study. I have come also to a firmer realization that any conclusions I have reached will have ultimate value only when they are related to or used to explain other periods—other ideals, other images. I know, in short, that years of work are necessary before I can experience the satisfaction that must result from one's knowing that he has made a significant contribution to knowledge. I feel, nevertheless, that I have taken at least a step in that direction.

One indication, for instance, of the pervasiveness of the image
which has emerged from this study is the fact that I have been able for the most part to proceed this far without drawing upon the war literature that has come to represent, to be, the war literature of the eighteen nineties—the work of Stephen Crane. Except for references in the Introduction and the appearance of Maggie in Chapter Seven, Crane has been deliberately shunned—because he is the one writer between 1891 and 1917 who made war either the subject or the substance in almost everything he wrote. As such a writer, he becomes a figure appropriate to the climax and conclusion of this study.

In his own time, apparently, whenever people thought of Crane, they thought of him in terms of war. When William Dean Howells, for instance, introduced Crane one evening to some guests, he said, "Here is a writer who has sprung into life fully armed." This figure gains significance when one learns that Howells was merely referring to Crane's reputation (since refuted) as a writer who worked purely by inspiration—one who did not have to rework his prose. Yet he saw Crane in the image of a soldier ready for battle. One gathers, in fact, that by the time of his death in 1900 his reputation was based upon this image. When his last work, Great Battles of the World, appeared in 1901, Crane's publishers considered these eight objective reports of what Crane considered "great battles" to be a fitting end to a career born in the public eye in 1895 with the publication of The Red Badge of Courage: An Episode of the American Civil War. In a prefatory "Note" to Great Battles, Harrison S. Morris, attempting to convey the significance of Crane's last work, began with 1895 and worked forward:
We were aroused by that startling drumbeat to the advent of a new literary talent. The commonplace was shattered by a fresh and original force, and everyone heard and applauded. Then came the varied fiction, always characteristic and convincing, and then, at the end, this return to the martial strain.

It was agreed that the battles should be the choice of the author, and he chose them for their picturesque and theatrical qualities, not alone for their decisiveness. What he could best assimilate from history was its grandeur and passion and the fire of action. These he loved, and hence the group of glorious battles which forms this volume.

The talent of Stephen Crane was mellowing under the tutelage of experience. He lost none of his dash and audacity even in the sedater avenues of history. He was a strong and native growth of our wonderful soil, and the fruits of him will last while courage and genius are revered.

Crane, then, could be seen both as a fresh and original force whose characteristic talents were revealed through his assimilation of the grandeur, the passion, and the fire of action and as a force whose dash and audacity marked him as a strong and native growth of the wonderful soil of America. In the eyes of his countrymen he assumed, somehow, the proportions of the characters in his war stories.

Remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that Crane, selecting his "great battles" for their "picturesque and theatrical" qualities as well as for their decisiveness, ignored the Civil War and turned, for his American battles, to the Battle of New Orleans and the Battle of Bunker Hill. This was fresh territory for him: his specific wars had been the Civil War, the Greco-Turkish War, the Spanish-American War; and his other war had been the general picture of war which became a basis of the imagery in his stories about American life and society—The Sullivan County Sketches, Maggie, "The Open Boat," "The Monster," The Third Violet, and others. Remarkable, also, is the fact that, despite Mr. Morris's
declarations, the objective reports of these great battles are flat and lifeless, compared to the literature of war that stimulated Mr. Morris's encomiums in his "Note" to the battles. That war loomed large in Crane's imagination is indisputable; evidence indicates that only on the level of the imagination, only as artist, could Crane project what war meant to him as an American living in an era of peace.

Recently a writer asked concerning Crane, "Why did the child born belatedly into a peaceful Newark parsonage on November 1, 1871, spend his life imaging, chasing, reporting, remembering war?" The question is an interesting one, for many reasons, but it is also misleading. It suggests that the case of Crane is somehow unique, that Crane was the only writer of "peaceful" background in the eighteen nineties who imaged, chased, reported, or remembered war. This study, it is hoped, has shown that Crane was not unique in these respects. That his case is different, however, cannot be denied; and perhaps the critic who asked the question above conveys that difference when he concludes, concerning Crane: "By a margin he is probably the greatest American story-writer, he stands as an artist not far below Hawthorne and James, he is one of our few poets and one of the few manifest geniuses the country has produced." The connection between the question and the conclusion implies, at least, that the artist's predilection for war (he spent his life at it) is a major factor in his success as an artist. One comprehends, then, much of the work of Crane by sensing the relevance of war as a means of imaging the experiences that comprise Crane's stories. But war is relevant because it is not unique, because, as with Garland, Bierce, James, Davis, Churchill, Ford, Frederick, and others,
it emerges as a natural means of imaging kinds of experience: natural to them because the forceful past of American progress was measured by wars; and natural to their audience because the individual American seemed most readily comprehensible when imaged as a kind of micro-America—sword girt on thigh, and all.

In method and in intention Crane linked himself with Garland's "battlers." He said,

I renounced the clever school in literature. It seemed to me that there must be something more in life than to sit and cudgel one's brains for clever and witty expedients. So I developed all alone a little creed of art which I thought was a good one. Later I discovered that my creed was identical with the one of Howells and Garland and in this way I became involved in the beautiful war between those who say that art is man's substitute for nature and we are most successful in art when we approach the nearest to nature and truth, and those who say—well I don't know what they say. They don't, they can't say much but they fight villainously....

Like Garland Crane saw himself as a soldier engaged in a beautiful war—a war beautiful because he, as a veritist, was fighting on what he knew was the right side: He strove to approach the nearest to what he called nature and truth; and out of this striving emerged war and the soldier—imaged by a soldier.

This characteristic of Crane revealed itself in his earliest sketches—those set in Sullivan County, New York. In "The Octopush," when the Little Man, the Pudgy Man, the Tall Man, and the Quiet Man are fishing for pickerel, the narrator sees the dusk as soldier, fighting against the light of the sun: "The sun slid down and threw a flare upon the silence, coloring it red.... Dusk came and fought a battle with the flare before their eyes." In "Killing His Bear," when the Little
Ian goes hunting for bear during the winter, the narrator says, "The yell of the hound grew until it smote the little man like a call to battle." And in "The Holler Tree," to convey his impression of a tall dead tree which has withstood the elements, the narrator again sees a soldier: "It was a tall, gaunt relic of a pine that stood like a yellow warrior still opposing an aged form to blows in storm battles." These are at least minor manifestations of a characteristic, but added to Crane's war pictures in Maggie, written at almost the same time, they lead one into his other works prepared to find contrasts, struggles (real and psychological, social and universal), heroism, and growth conveyed through battle and soldier imagery, both on the small scale similar to that in "The Octopush" and on the grand scale which is The Red Badge of Courage.

Crane's The Third Violet (1897) underlines the pervasiveness of war in his imagination, for it is not about any great struggle at all. It develops, rather, around the artist Billie Hawker's unusual attempts to woo Grace Fanhall and concludes with their finally recognizing their love for each other. Vacillation and timidity in the extreme characterize the actions of Billie; and he is not presented to the reader as any kind of soldier. True, his friend Hollenden says to him early in the novel, "Say, your rivals must number enough to make a brigade of militia." And later, when Billie is to visit Grace, she, her friends the Worcester girls, Hollenden, and Billie's rival Oglethorpe are shown facing "to the front like soldiers," implying, perhaps, that Billie, too, is one. But these are isolated instances. Only as the feelings of Billie get stronger, only when his every action becomes a crucial de-
terminant in whether he will win Grace's love does Billie, in Crane's way, assume the role of soldier fighting a crucial battle. Like the artist that he is, Billie turns to his painting as a means of enduring life without Grace Fanhall. And as he sits on a stool before his easel, the narrator describes his action:

He seemed engaged in some kind of a duel. His hair dishevelled, his eyes gleaming, he was in a deadly scuffle. In the sketches was the landscape of heavy blue, as if seen through powder-smoke, and all the skies burned red. There was in these notes a sinister quality of hopelessness, eloquent of a defeat, as if the scene represented the last hour on a field of disastrous battle. Hawker seemed attacking with this picture something fair and beautiful of his own life, a possession of his mind, and he did it fiercely, mercilessly, formidably. His arm moved with the energy of a strange wrath. He might have been thrusting with a sword.

Thus does Billie Hawker appear during crisis. And a similar pattern appears in other stories by Crane. In The Blue Hotel (1899), the crisis between Swede and Johnnie Scully is seen as war, both from the point of view of the narrator and from that of the indifferent playing cards on the floor of the hotel:

...through the smoky air, above the swaying bodies of the peace-compellers, the eyes of the two warriors ever sought each other in glances of challenge that were at once hot and steely.

Of course the board had been overturned, and now the whole company of cards was scattered over the floor, where the boots of the men trampled the fat and painted kings and queens as they gazed with their silly eyes at the war that was waging above them.

And for the observers the heat of combat arouses new passions: "Suddenly a holocaust of warlike desire caught the cowboy and he bolted forward with the speed of a broncho. 'Go it, Johnnie! go it! Kill him! Kill him!'"

Similarly in "The Monster" this battle passion appears to project
the kind of ecstasy felt by the large boy, Willie Dalzel, when, to the taunts of the youthful crowd, he dares to dash forward and touch the monster, Henry Johnson. He is like a young Henry Fleming in *The Red Badge of Courage* during the charge:

Suddenly the lad gathered himself together, made a white and desperate rush forward, touched the monster's shoulder with a far-out-stretched finger, and sped away, while his laughter rang out wild, shrill, and exultant. 15

And after he and young Jimmy have made their charge, heroic in the eyes of their observers, "They were people of another class. If they had been decorated for courage on twelve battle-fields, they could not have made the boys more ashamed of the situation." 16 They are victorious soldiers fresh from the heat of the charge and of victory; and as such they fit into the pattern of crises in Crane's stories.

Also in "The Monster," however, is the remarkable character, Martha Goodwin, a spinster living with her sister in Whilomville and "a woman of great mind." She is not, certainly, a soldier, but as she is presented to the reader, she is in a way, America itself, with whatever military qualities we have come to regard as appropriate. The narrator's description of her is revealing:

She had adamantine opinions upon the...duty of the United States toward the Cuban insurgents, and many other colossal matters. Her fullest experience of violence was gained on an occasion when she had seen a hound clubbed, but in the plan which she had made for the reform of the world she advocated drastic measures. For instance, she contended that all the Turks should be pushed into the sea and drowned.... In fact, this woman of peace, who had seen only peace, argued constantly for a creed of illimitable ferocity. She was invulnerable on these questions, because eventually she overrode all opponents with a sniff. This sniff was an active force. It was to her antagonists like a bang over the head, and none was known...
to recover from this expression of exalted contempt.
It left them windless and conquered. They never a-
gain came forward as candidates for suppression.
And Martha walked her kitchen with a stern brow, an
invincible being like Napoleon.17

In projecting both crucial action and distinguished character,
then, Crane reveals the pervasiveness of war and the soldier—generally
American war and the American soldier—in his imagination. It should
be noted here, however, that the instances just presented appear as com-
parisons; that is, they convey the strength of non-military events and
persons by existing in the stories as kinds of similes. The direction
of the reader’s response is always from the event or the person to the
war or the soldier and then back to the event or the person. Thus are
these stories essentially different from The Red Badge of Courage: An
Episode of the American Civil War, in which war, as the announced sub-
ject, is the starting point of one’s response. Henry Fleming’s experi-
ences and those of the army of which he is a part—or a piece—can
never be likened to war: They are war and he is a soldier. As subject
and as substance, then, war informs the novel; this fact produces some
striking consequences.

One of these is the reversed metaphor in which events and char-
acters of war are projected through domestic, or civilian, phenomena—
toys, sports, animals, jobs, and the like. This reversal occurs fre-
quently. When, before Henry’s first battle, the soldiers are readying
themselves for battle, they pull every available cartridge box around
them: “It was as if seven hundred new bonnets were being tried on.”
As the battle begins, their captain directs them, coaxes them “in school
mistress fashion, as to a congregation of boys with primers,” and Henry’s
perspiration-streaked face is "soiled like that of a weeping urchin."

He is at a task:

He was like a carpenter who has made many boxes, making still another box, only there was furious haste in his movements. He, in his thought, was careering off in other places, even as the carpenter who as he works whistles and thinks of his friend or his enemy, his home or a saloon.18

And as Henry begins to feel the effect of the "war atmosphere," he develops "the acute exasperation of a pestered animal, a well meaning cow worried by dogs." Around him men drop "like bundles," and as the enemy renews its fire, the shells look "to be strange war flowers bursting in fierce bloom."

Then he flees from the battle. And on the way back he sees a general of a division who has "the appearance of a business man whose market is swinging up and down." When the general learns that his troops have held, he holds "a little carnival of joy on horseback." Later during his private retreat, Henry gains consolation from seeing the "crying mass" of wagons, teams, and men rushing to the rear, "the white-topped wagons strain[ing] and stumbl[ing] in their exertions like fat sheep." And as he and his doubts struggle in debate over his apparent loss of courage, he can predict to himself that "many men of courage" would be "obliged to desert the colors and scurry like chickens," When these other men start to fall, they charge "down upon him like terrified buffaloes."

On the morning after Henry returns to his regiment, he hears the bugles call "to each other like brasen gamecocks." And in his new-found importance, Henry becomes a kind of spokesman for his regiment, complaining bitterly against his superiors as the regiment moves again to battle:
"Good Gawd," the youth grumbled, "we're always being chased around like rats. It makes me sick. Nobody seems to know where we go or why we go. We just get fired around from pillar to post and get licked here and get licked there, and nobody knows what it's done for. It makes a man feel like a damn' kitten in a bag."

But when Henry finds himself again in battle, he gets so "engrossed in his occupation" that he continues to fire his rifle after the others have ceased. The forest ahead of him contains the enemy, and "each distant thicket seem[s] a strange porcupine with quills of flame." The officers, faced with the task of marshalling their men, are seen as "critical shepherds struggling with sheep," and the lieutenant, violent in his persuasiveness, strings "oaths with the facility of a maiden who strings beads." As a result, the regiment, "involved like a cart involved in mud and muddle," starts "unevenly with many jolts and jerks." Then comes the great charge in which Henry becomes color bearer. To avoid enemy bullets he "duck[s] his head low like a football player" and hurls himself forward, gets the flag, and returns to the regiment. After this charge, and before the next, the raging lieutenant becomes curiously silent; he is "like a babe which having wept its fill, raises its eyes and fixes them upon a distant toy."
Then when the enemy comes again, the two bodies of troops are seen "exchang[ing] blows in the manner of a pair of boxers." Henry becomes exultant at the fierce defense his side is putting up:

As he noted the vicious, wolflike temper of his comrades he had a sweet thought that if the enemy was about to swallow the regimental broom as a large prisoner, it could at least have the consolation of going down with the bristles forward.

When the climactic battle comes, when shells are "thrown in
handfulls over them," the regiment fights enemy regiments "as if upon a wager," and, "apparently...oblivious to all larger purposes of war," slug each other "as if at a matched game." In the heat of conflict secure positions are wrangled over "as gold thrones or pearl bedsteads. There [are] desperate lunges at these chosen spots seemingly every instant, and most of them [are] bandied like light toys between the contending forces." And the swaying bodies are "like strange and ugly friends jiggling heavily in the smoke." In the end, after the battle, Henry discovers he is a man. He comes "from hot plowshares to prospects of clover tranquilly, and it [is] as if hot plowshares were not. Scars faded as flowers."

Crane in these and other similar instances feels called upon, seemingly, to clarify the pictures of war by relating war to objects, feelings, and events that he knows are familiar to his audience. Another consequence attributable in part, at least, to the problem posed by the reversed metaphor is Crane's dwelling constantly upon pictures and visions concerning war. Not only does the novel The Red Badge of Courage itself unfold before the reader as a series of related impressions, or pictures, but also the development of Henry Fleming, its hero, from an unininitiated youth, before the battle, to a man, after the battle, comes clear both to Henry and to the reader through the pictures and visions that impress him during his experiences.

The first paragraph of the novel, for instance, establishes the impressionistic nature of the whole novel. As the curtain of fog retires, there is revealed the giant figure of an army stretched out on the hills. As day breaks, this giant stirs alongside the amber-tinted
river at its feet and trembles with eagerness at the noise of rumors. This giant speaks no word but looks along the roads leading from the river and recalls, the narrator suggests, the parting night when the river is black and separates him from another giant, the enemy, seen as Argus—"the red, eyelike gleam of hostile campfires set in the low brows of distant hills." With this scene the pattern of impressions in the novel is set: the moving river of experience, the two giants at war, and the relentless movement of time as night changes to day, and day changes to night to mark the progress of the struggle.

With the introduction of the youthful private, Henry Fleming, begins the pattern of pictures and visions that reveal Henry to himself and to the reader. The emphasis is always upon the words see, vision, picture, imagine, and the like. Henry encounters and assimilates experience in a manner similar to that demanded of a reader encountering and assimilating *The Red Badge of Courage*. The following passage demonstrates this point. It occurs just after Henry has crawled through an intricate hole that served as a door to his hut so that he can be "alone with some new thoughts that [have] lately come to him":

He had, of course, dreamed of battles all his life, of vague and bloody conflicts that had thrilled him with their sweep and fire. In visions he had seen himself in many struggles. He had imagined peoples secure in the shadow of his eagle-eyed prowess. But awake he had regarded battles as crimson blotches on the pages of the past. He had put them as things of the bygone with his thought images of heavy crowns and high castles. There was a portion of the world's history which he had regarded as the time of wars, but it, he thought, had been long gone over the horizon and had disappeared forever.

From his home his youthful eyes had looked upon the war in his own country with distrust. It must be some sort of a play affair. He had long despaired of
witnessing a Greek-like struggle. Such would be no more, he had said....

He had burned several times to enlist. Tales of great movements shook the land. They might not be distinctly Homeric, but there seemed to be much glory in them. He had read of marches, sieges, conflicts, and he had longed to see it all. His busy mind had drawn for him large pictures extravagant in color, lurid with breathless deeds.

On two distinct levels of impression, then, The Red Badge of Courage comes to the reader. Within the narrator’s pictures occur Henry’s pictures, and together they comprise almost the entire substance of the novel. In the beginning the army is an untested giant; and Henry is an uninitiated soldier. He must exist on his untested visions—those that have come to him second-hand through the traditions, the feelings, the beliefs, the literature, the history, the prejudices that characterize his society. As he looks forward to battle he sees “hideous possibilities.” He contemplates “the lurking menaces of the future” and fails in his “effort to see himself standing stoutly in the midst of them.” He recalls his “visions of broken-bladed glory,” but as war approaches he suspects “them to be impossible pictures.” He is launched into the middle of a totally new experience, armed only with his visions and his knowledge of life without war.

He felt that in the crisis his laws of life were useless. Whatever he had learned of himself was here of no avail. He was an unknown quantity. He saw that he would again be obliged to experiment as he had in early youth. He must accumulate information of himself, and meanwhile he resolved to remain close upon his guard lest those qualities of which he knew nothing should everlastingly disgrace him.

I have underlined the sentence above because it has here triple significance: Henry, the narrator, and the reader are all unknown
quantities—entering into a series of events the consequences of which cannot be predicted. As Henry moves through the scenes that comprise the novel, the narrator interprets Henry’s responses for the reader. The narrator’s impressions, then, determine the reader’s response—determine whether Henry’s growth through battle and blood will be honest and believable. In short, the success of the novel for the reader depends upon how relevant the pictures of war are both to the struggle of a youth forced to find his place in society, the world, or the universe and to the nature of that society, that world, or that universe. In 1894 (a time of peace) Stephen Crane chose a famous battle from the most American of wars for his picture of life—for his attempt, as he said, to “approach the nearest to nature and truth.” He began with the episode of war, then by means of the non-military, or familiar, metaphor emphasized the relevance of the war picture to the everyday life of society of which he was a part. In doing this successfully he demonstrated the inextricable presence of American war and the American soldier in the imagination of that society. They serve as a means of Henry’s initiation and discovery, as the narrator’s means of interpreting Henry’s responses, and, consequently, as the reader’s means of comprehending and accepting the whole story of Henry Fleming.

In *The Red Badge of Courage* Henry begins as an unknown quantity, a youthful private marching toward a kind of destiny. He is eager to begin this march.

He finally concluded that the only way to prove himself was to go into the blaze, and then figuratively to watch his legs to discover their merits and faults. He reluctantly admitted that he could not sit still and with a mental slate and pencil derive an answer.
To gain it, he must have blaze, blood and danger, even as a chemist requires this, that, and the other. So he fretted for an opportunity.

The opportunity soon comes. Through blaze, blood, and danger he begins the discovery not only of himself but also of the world surrounding him. In his first skirmish he experiences many new emotions. He learns what it means to lose concern for himself. With his companions he becomes "not a man but a member." He feels "that something of which he [is] a part—a regiment, an army, a cause, or a country—[is] in a crisis. He [is] welded into a common personality which [is] dominated by a single desire."

There was a consciousness always of the presence of his comrades about him. He felt the subtle battle brotherhood more "potent even than the cause for which they were fighting. It was a mysterious fraternity born of the smoke and danger of death."

As a member of this mysterious fraternity, he learns, through its officers, something about the fierce hand of authority. He learns about death (with the cold impersonality of a soldier). He discovers how insignificant are his role and his "war" in comparison with the eternal processes of Nature who goes "tranquilly on with her golden process in the midst of so much devilment." And with all this, when he catches glimpses of American flags during battle, he feels "the old thrill at the sight of the emblem. They [the flags] were like beautiful birds strangely undaunted in a storm." By the end of his first skirmish, then, his growth has begun; and the means by which he will develop further are well established.

By witnessing the poses and hearing the oaths of his officers, by sensing the distance that exists between him as an individual and
the army as a large machine, or monster, he will learn about the power of authority, the profanity, and the disinterestedness that characterize this new world he has entered. By facing the monstrous enemy, he will learn more and more about opposition, death, violence, and disillusionment that further characterize this world. And he will learn, as a result, what it means to falter, to grow afraid, and to attempt withdrawal from that world.

But with his fellow soldiers—the tall soldier, the loud private, the tattered man, and others—he will discover companionship, friendliness, oneness that are attainable in no other way; and through these fellow men he will learn to know himself, to know that withdrawal and retreat are not the means toward a satisfactory existence among them. When the tattered man dies, Henry will sense the evil of his retreat.

The simple questions of the tattered man had been knife thrusts to him. They asserted a society that probes pitilessly at secrets until all is apparent. His late companion's chance persistency made him feel that he could not keep his crime concealed in his bosom. It was sure to be brought plain by one of those arrows which cloud the air and are constantly pricking, discovering, proclaiming those things which are willed to be forever hidden. He admitted that he could not defend himself against this agency. It was not within the power of vigilance.

He will lose respect for himself, and this will be part of his growth. But then he will "overcome obstacles which he had admitted to be mountains"; they will fall "like paper peaks"; and he will experience a surge of overconfidence, of cockiness, that also will be part of his growths.

In the present, he declared to himself that it was only the doomed and the damned who reared with sincerity at circumstance. Few but they ever did it.
man with a full stomach and the respect of his fel-
lores had no business to scold about anything that he
might think to be wrong in the ways of the universe,
or even with the ways of society. Let the unfortunates
rail; the others may play marbles.

He did not give a great deal of thought to these
battles that lay directly before him. It was not es-
ential that he should plan his ways in regard to them.
He had been taught that many obligations of life were
easily avoided. The lessons of yesterday had been
that retribution was a laggard and blind. With these
facts before him he did not deem it necessary that he
should become feverish over the possibilities of the
ensuing twenty-four hours. He could leave much to
chance. Besides, a faith in himself had secretly blos-
somed. There was a little flower of confidence grow-
ing within him. He was now a man of experience. He
had been out among the dragons, he said, and he as-
sured himself that they were not so hideous as he had
imagined them. Also, they were inaccurate; they did
not sting with precision. A stout heart often defied,
and defying, escaped.26

not sting with precision.
and defying, escaped.26

New experiences will emphasize again
to him his insignificance. And as the officers "bustle among the men,
pushing them into a more compact mass," the strength of authority will
again be impressed upon him. When the battle resumes again, however,
he will find his place at the head of the charge. With the other men
he will pitch forward insanely, "burst into cheerings, moblike and
barbaric, but tuned in strange keys that can arouse the dullard and the
stoic." And the narrator will say of this charge: "There was the de-

delirium that encounters despair and death, and is heedless and blind to
the odds. It is a temporary but sublime absence of selfishness."

Then Henry will know more. The charge, after a pause, will resume, and
this time he will have a cause for his daring and heedlessness—that
cause will be the flag and from the charge a new Henry will emerge:

Within him, as he hurled himself forward, was
born a love, a despairing fondness for this flag which
During the remainder of the battle he will stay at the head of the men, leading more wild charges. And he will be happy. He will learn that the battle, from the General's view, has been a failure; then with the men he will return to the river and be able to say, "Well, it's all over." He will get a chance to "study his deeds, his failures, and his achievements," "to look upon them in spectator fashion and to criticize them with some correctness." He will regard his "procession of memory" and feel "gloeful and unregretting." He will see his performances, witnessed by his fellows, marching "in wide purple and gold." He will enjoy viewing the "gilded images of memory"; and he will see "that he was good." But he will have also a "vision of cruelty," darkening the "blue and gold," a vision in which looms "the dogging memory of the tattered soldier."

Gradually, however, he will muster "force to put the sin at a distance," will gain conviction and assurance. Then he will be able to draw his conclusions:

He felt a quiet manhood, non-assertive but of sturdy and strong blood. He knew that he would no more quail before his guides wherever they should point. He had been to touch the great death. He was a man.

And the narrator will be able to say:

So it came to pass that as he trudged from the place of blood and wrath his soul changed. He came
from hot plowshares to prospects of clover tranquilly, and it was as if hot plowshares were not. Scars faded as flowers.29

At the end the rain will be falling and the procession of weary soldiers, despondent and muttering, will march "with churning effort in a trough of liquid brown mud under a low, wretched sky." Yet Henry will smile, for he will see "that the world was a world for him, though many discovered it to be made of oaths and walking sticks." Rid of "the red sickness of battle," he will turn, then, "with a lover's thirst to images of tranquil skies, fresh meadows, cool brooks—an existence of soft and eternal peace."

And the narrator will conclude: "Over the river a golden ray of sun came through the hosts of leaden rain clouds."

Henry's parturition days will then be over.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

2Ibid., VI, 871 (letter to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, Dec. 21, 1907).
4Ibid., p. 244.
8Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 699 (letter to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, July 1, 1907).
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

MARCHING AS TO WAR


The emotional nature of the question is revealed in the following speech by Representative E. W. Carmack of Tennessee in June, 1898:

"And this...is the boasted 'imperial policy' which dares to flaunt itself here in the closing years of the nineteenth century—a policy which finds its parallel in the jungle or in the slums, which delights to compare itself to a drunken ruffian who pummels a cripple for the mere 'joy of fighting' or to a tiger mad with the taste of blood. Such is the spirit which swells the bosom of our imperialist friends, which so exalts them above the vulgar level of their fellow-countrymen. So far from being a high and noble aspiration, it is simply the desire of the savage, it is the appetite of the beast. It is the triumph of the most ignoble passions over the purest aspirations of the human heart. Well may the imperialist say that 'we are face to face with a new destiny.'" (Cong. Rec., 55th Cong., 2d Sess., App., p. 573.)

Representative George B. McClellan of New York epitomized the whole question when he addressed the House during the same month:

"It is said that ambition is one of our national faults, and yet without it we would never have been a nation. We are prosperous, we are rich, our lives are safe, our liberties are secure. It would seem as though as a nation we had nothing more to ask, and yet we are still ambitious. Why deceive ourselves? Our people have dreamed the dream of empire and on awakening have been unable to shake off that most alluring and fascinating of all forms of national intoxication.

"It may be possible in the present crisis of our history to avoid territorial aggrandizement and to retain, as we have in the past, our national isolation and to confine our efforts, as we have done hitherto, to the further development of our country upon this continent.
It is possible, but not probable. We are being hurried along in the swift current of the broad river of national ambition, that is destined sooner or later to carry us to the open, world-wide sea of empire.

"You and I may never live to see the day when the destinies of the world will be in our hands, when the flag of the Union will float from its possessions in every quarter of the globe, when vast tracts of Asia and of Africa and of South America will be governed from Washington, when white and black, red and yellow, will be able to say with equal force, 'I am an American citizen.'

"If this be our ultimate destiny, if this is what the course of events is leading us to, then it is magnificent; then is our empire destined to be supreme. But before it is too late, before we resolve to leave national isolation and contentment behind, is it not well to stop a moment and ask ourselves is it best for the country we all love, is it best for our people, is not empire the beginning of the end?" (Cong. Rec., 55th Cong., 2d Sess., App. p. 571.)

As one historian has pointed out concerning the resultant drive for annexation of territory: "Had it not been for the enthusiasm, the hysteria, the reckless ambitions awakened by the war, the question might conceivably have been decided differently. As it was, the anti-imperialists were fighting against a current which in the mood of 1898 they were powerless to block." (Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston, 1938), p. 247.)

5See Chapter III for a fuller discussion.

6This Chapter is not intended to be an analysis of why America entered the World War; nor is it to be a comprehensive or exhaustive examination of events leading up to this war. There is already an overwhelming number of studies devoted to this complex problem. Walter Millis, Road to War. America 1914–1917 (Boston, 1935); Charles Seymour, American Neutrality, 1914–1917 (New Haven, 1935); Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York, 1935); Charles C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938); DeWitt C. Poole, Conduct of Foreign Relations (New Haven, 1921); G. Hartley Crattan, Why We Fought (New York, 1929); Alice M. Morrissey, The American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939); Walter Lippman, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943); and Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944) are works that I have examined during the course of my thinking about this problem. But there are many others. My intention is to arrange some significant events to provide a frame of reference for the other Chapters in this study and to show that behind these events were the assumptions concerning war and peace to which I frequently refer in this study. Neither the facts themselves nor the arrangement of them represents original research on my part. I have used a standard text, Oscar T. Barck, Jr., and Nelson W. Blake, Since 1900. A History of the United States in Our Times (New York, 1952), for these facts, have supplemented them as the need has arisen, and have arranged them so as to provide the essential frame for future analysis.

7Dulles, America in the Pacific, p. 247.

8Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), I, 274.
9Cf. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898. The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936) for a discussion of these men and their objective, pp. 330-360.
10Ibid., p. 360.
12Ibid., p. 548.
13Ibid., p. 557.
14Ibid., p. 525.
19Ibid., pp. 12-27. Condensed from materials in these pages.
21Wright, Study of War, I, 670.
25Ibid., p. 102.
26Ibid., p. 104.
27Alice M. Morrissey, The American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), p. 4. Chapter I, "Bending the Twig" develops the characteristics of these leaders. I have used this source in preparing these pages on America's problem of neutrality.
28Ibid., p. 18.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

WAR OR PEACE: THE PUBLIC RESPONSE

3Ibid., p. 31.
There were, of course, many expressions of opposition to President Wilson's declaration; but they were few by comparison. Church groups, private citizens, and peace organizations would seem to comprise the greatest number who spoke in opposition. For example, this letter to Senator Charles Curtis: "Fearing that you will be misled by our silence, we, the St. John's Evangelical Lutheran congregation, of Topeka, Kans., numbering 380 communicant members, all loyal American citizens, unanimously resolved to appeal to you to keep us out of war." (Cong. Rec., 65th Cong., Spec. Sess., p. 511)


Gregory Mason, Remember the Maine (New York, 1939), p. 4.


Ibid., p. 301.

Ibid., p. 341.


Ibid., p. 215.


Ibid., p. 281.

Harriet Bradbury, "War as a Necessity of Evolution," Arena, XXI (1899), 95.


Ibid., p. 141.

Ibid., p. 86.


32 See Chapter I, p. 9, for Masters' theory of soldiery.
35 Ibid., p. 349.
36 Ibid., pp. 349-50.
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 557.
44 Literary Digest, XLIX (July 11, 1914), 47.
46 Ibid.
47 C. Hartley Cruttant, Why We Fought (New York, 1929), p. 36.
50 Ibid., p. 198.
51 Ibid., p. 201.
52 Literary Digest, L (May 15, 1915), 113b.
53 Ibid., p. 1135.
54 Ibid.
56 Literary Digest, LII (April 29, 1916), 1201.
57 Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties (European War No. 3) (Washington, D.C., 1916), p. 245.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

WAR AND SOCIAL THOUGHT


2Ibid., p. 29.


5Mr. Quincey Wright, records the efforts that modern governments have made to develop patriotism and nationalism among the people subject to their control: Through popular education, commemorative festivals, popular participation in political activities, patriotic organizations, fostering of national art and literature, and the honoring of strategic and important individuals (often military men), the United States, like many other nations of the world, had, by 1900, certainly, developed strong patriotic and nationalistic sentiments among the people. "These methods," says Mr. Wright, "have usually been so effective that a large percentage of the adult population has come to feel a powerful disposition to support war when the symbols of the nation-state are affronted. The maintenance of the security, honor, prestige, and power of the nation have become dominant values in the minds of most modern populations. The conviction that readiness for
war, and, on occasion, war itself are necessary to realize these values has probably occupied first place among the motives which have induced peoples in the recent stage of modern history to accept war. The popularity of war is similar to the popularity which the duel has enjoyed at times when personal honor has been regarded as a major value which can be maintained only by manifestation of willingness to risk life for honor." (A Study of War, I, 280-81.)

6 Wright, A Study of War, I, 282.
8 Ibid., p. 69.
9 Ibid., p. 87.

10 This is not to say, however, that the philosophy of gain could, in itself, move Americans to war. They had to have, it would seem, some cause other than self-interest to move them to war. Quincey Wright, after careful study, has observed: "It...appears that, while appeals to self-interest may be suitable to stir up an aggressive spirit and even a willingness to assume considerable risks for a suitable reward, only appeals to ideals or impulses can create the abandoned spirit of self-immolation which may be necessary for certain military undertakings in modern war. For this reason economic motives which in the nineteenth century were treated as the major interests, and which have been adequate to induce the mercenary or professional soldier to undertake the risks of his calling, have not been able to create a genuine willingness of the modern masses to die in battle. To a man of reason war is a thing to be avoided. (A Study of War, I, 289.)

12 Ibid., p. 244.
13 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 262.
20 Ibid., p. 263.
21 Ibid., pp. 264-5.
22 Ibid., p. 267.
23 Ibid., p. 269.
24 Ibid.

The results of this philosophy appear throughout this study; the consequences for Roosevelt himself, however, merit attention here. Before the Spanish-American War he could view it as a kind of sport; he wrote, 'It will be awful if the game is over before we get into it.' (To Anna Roosevelt Cowles, May 8, 1898, Letters, II, 829.) And after the war he wrote to a friend, 'We had a bully fight at Santiago, and though there was an immense amount that I did not exactly enjoy, the charge itself was great fun.' (To Douglas Robinson, July 27, 1898, Ibid., II, 860.) Another consequence appeared later in his writings. In a discussion in which he expressed a desire for woman's suffrage, he drew upon the rifle for his analogy: 'A vote is like a rifle: its usefulness depends upon the character of the user. The mere possession of the vote will ho more benefit men and women not sufficiently developed to use it than the possession of rifles will turn untrained Egyptian fellahmen into soldiers.' (An Autobiography, p. 163.) In a passage praising Admiral Dewey's dependability, he wrote, 'I knew that in the event of war Dewey could be slipped like a wolfhound from a leash....' (Ibid., p. 213.) And in a description of a Major General Schofield, whom he had chosen to break, if necessary, the great coal strike of 1902, he exposed the complex associations that motivated his philosophy: 'He was a fine fellow—a most respectable-looking old boy, with side whiskers and a black skull-cap, without any of the outward aspect of the conventional military dictator; but [Italics mine] in both nerve and judgment he was all right....' (Ibid., p. 475.) It is small wonder, then, that Roosevelt found himself admiring Germany in 1907: '...we of the United States suffer in aggregated form from all the evils attendant upon our luxurious, pleasure-loving, industrial, modern civilization. In Germany you have universal military service, so that there is at least a partial offset to some of the unpleasant tendencies of our modern civilization; but in the United States, while there are many tendencies for good which I do not for one moment ignore, and while the people have, I believe, fundamentally the same great qualities that they showed in the Civil War, there are nevertheless certain ominous signs of frivolity, of a lack of sense of proportion in ideals, and of inordinate love of ease and of pleasure, and an over emphasis upon merely material well-being.' (Letter to Hermann Speck von Sterburg, July 16, 1907. Letters, V, 721.)

Alfred Thayer Mahan, 'Current Fallacies upon Naval Subjects,' in Lessons of the War with Spain and other Articles (Boston, 1890), p. 281.

Ibid., pp. 284-5.

Ibid., p. 284. The influence of this kind of philosophy on Theodore Roosevelt is indicated in his following eulogy for Mahan:
"Captain Mahan, than whom there is not in the country a man whom we can more appropriately designate by the fine and high phrase, 'a Christian gentleman,' and who is incapable of advocating wrong doing of any kind, national or individual, gives utterance to the feeling of the great majority of manly and thoughtful men when he denounces the great danger of indiscriminate advocacy of peace at any price...." (The Strenuous Life, p. 23.)

33 Ibid., pp. 240-1.
36 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
37 Ibid., p. 15.
38 Sumner, War and Other Essays, p. 326.
40 Ibid., p. 291.
41 Ibid., p. 293. It is interesting to compare the tone of this view of a philosopher with that of a reputable politician four years earlier: "It is, indeed, worth much sacrifice both of blood and treasure to see veterans upon both sides of the Civil War fighting shoulder to shoulder for a common country and under the same flag. For the first time for more than one generation can it be truthfully said that there is no North, no South, no East, no West, but one great and united American people. We are going into this war with every star upon our glorious flag undimmed and unsullied and brothers as we have not been for many long years; and God grant that this shall be the beginning of a new era of American patriotism and harmony, to continue for many long generations to come." (Cong. Rec., 55th Cong., 2d Sess., App. (speech of Rep. Samuel S. Barney of Wisconsin), p. 362.)
42 Josiah Strong, The Challenge of the City (New York, 1907), p. 73.
44 Ibid.
46 Washington Gladden, A Plea for Pacifism (Columbus, Ohio, 1915?), p. 13.
51 Wright, A Study of War, I, 187.
52 William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War" in International Conciliation, No. 27 (February, 1910), p. 15.
53 Ibid., p. 6.
54 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 9.
57 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
60 Curti, Peace or War, p. 196.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid., V, 639 (April 5, 1907).
64 Beales, The History of Peace, p. 243; Curti, War or Peace, p. 194.
66 Ibid., p. 50.
70 Ibid., p. 18.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

WAR: FROM FACT TO FICTION

1 See Rebecca Washington Smith, The Civil War and Its Aftermath in American Fiction, 1861-1899 (Chicago, 1937), for extensive lists and discussions of the war literature of this period.

2 Ibid., p. 17.

3 James' first published story, however, "The Story of a Year" (1865), deals with the effect of the war period upon a woman and her lovers, one of whom is a soldier; and another, "A Most Extraordinary Case" (1868), is a psychological analysis of a wounded Union officer who cannot face life after his return from the war.
Within six months from the appearance of the first of these battle papers, the circulation of the Century advanced from 127,000 copies to 225,000, or to a reading audience estimated at two millions. (Rebecca Washington Smith, *The Civil War*, p. 32, fn. 1.)


Hamlin Garland, *Crumbling Idols* (Chicago and Cambridge, 1894), pp. 52-3.


See Chapter I.

**FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX**

**WAR: A SUBJECT OF LITERATURE**


Ibid., p. 119.


Ibid.


Rebecca Washington Smith, in "The Civil War and Its Aftermath in American Fiction, 1861-1899" (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1937), lists dozens of such works, some of which are Alice French, *Expiation* (1890); James Lane Allen, "Two Gentlemen of Kentucky"
(1891); Alice French, Otto the Knight and Other Trans-Mississippi Stories (1891); Sarah Orne Jewett, "Decoration Day" (1892); Kate Chopin, Bayou Folk (1894); Virginia Boyle Fraser, Brokenburne. A Southern Auntie's War Tale (1897); Albion W. Tourgee, A Son of Old Harry (1891); Rebecca Harding Davis, Silhouettes of American Life (1892); Albion W. Tourgee, "The Grave of Tante Angélique" (1898); W. C. Bartlett, An Idyl in War-times (1890); Emma Lyon Bryan, 1860-1865, A Romance of the Valley of Virginia (1892); Augustin Thompson, A Waif in the Conflict of Civilizations (1892); Mrs. Florida P. Reed, Vesta; or, The Hidden Cross (1894); H. L. Piner, Ruth, a Romance of the Civil War (1895); Capers Dickson, John Ashton. A Story of the War between the States (1896); Vance Wilson, God's War (1899).


10 Ibid., p. 117.
11 Ibid., pp. 385-6.
12 Ibid., p. 485.
13 Ibid., p. 488.
14 Ibid., p. 183.
15 Ibid., p. 234.
16 Ibid., p. 456.
17 Irving Bacheller, D'ri and I (Boston, 1901), pp. 15-16.
18 Ibid., p. 16.
19 Ibid., p. 67.
20 Ibid., p. 127.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 140.
23 Ibid., p. 261.
24 Ibid., pp. 121-5.
25 Ibid., p. 220.
26 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
27 Ibid., p. 242.
28 Ibid., p. 265.
29 Ibid., pp. 255-6.
30 Ibid., p. 246.
31 Ibid., pp. 355-6.
32 Ibid., p. 357.
33 Ibid., pp. 361-2.
35 Ibid., p. 177.


W. H. Venable, "War" in Life and Heroic Deeds, p. 419.


Fred Emerson Brooks, "The Blue and the Gray" in Pickett's Charge and Other Poems, p. 207.

Sam Walter Foss, Songs of War and Peace (Boston, 1899), p. 43.


Richard Hovey, "America" in Along the Trail (Boston, 1899), pp. 17-18. It is this same image which underlies many of the dedications to popular histories and other works on the war with Spain. The following example is typical of many more:

Inscribed
To the Soldiers and Sailors
of
THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES
With Admiration for Their Achievements
In the War With Spain;
Gratitude for the Glory They Have Gained for the American Nation.
And Congratulations That All the People of All the
Country Rejoice in the Cloudless Splendor of Their Fame
That Is the Common and Everlasting
Inheritance of Americans

(Murat Halstead, The Story of the Philippines (Chicago, 1898), p. 10.)
57 John Fox, Jr., Crittenden, A Kentucky Story of Love and War (New York, 1900), pp. 3-4.
58 Ibid., p. 4.
59 Ibid., p. 7.
60 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
61 Ibid., p. 22.
63 Ibid., p. 67.
64 Ibid., p. 105.
65 Ibid., pp. 137-8.
66 Ibid., p. 236.
67 Ibid., p. 237.
72 Witter Bynner, "War" in Ibid., p. 10.
73 Percy MacKaye, "Doubt" and "Destiny" in Ibid., p. 22.
74 McLandburgh Wilson, "Motherhood's Chant" in Ibid., p. 42.
79 Private Clifford B. Crescent, "Our Mission" in Gibbons, ed. Songs from the Trenches, p. 3.
81 Raemaekers, America in the War, p. 34.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

WAR: A SUBSTANCE OF LITERATURE

2Ibid., pp. 95-6.
3Ibid., p. 96.
5Ibid., p. 187.
6Ibid., p. 223.
7Ibid., p. 259.
8Ibid., p. 83.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 217.
11Ibid., p. 327.
12Ibid., p. 351.
13Ibid.
16Ibid., p. 193.
17Ibid., p. 194.
18The society, in this case, is England; and the tradition is England's. But James, in 1893, cannot be ruled out of a discussion of this nature. As one learns from his later writings, one of the most memorable experiences of his life occurred at Portsmouth Grove, Rhode Island, when, as a young man, there was "...a visit paid, or a pilgrimage, rather, ever so piously, so tenderly made...to a vast gathering of invalid and convalescent troops, under canvas and in roughly improvised shanties...." The heart of the experience follows: "Vagueness at best attends, however, the queer experience I glance at; what lives of it, in the ineffaceable way, being again, by my incurable perversity, my ambiguous economy, much less a matter of the 'facts of the case,' as they should, even though so dead and buried now, revive to help me through an anecdote, than the prodigiously subjective side of the experience, thanks to which it still presumes to flush with the grand air of an adventure. If I had not already so often braced out my confession of the far from 'showy' in the terms on which impressions could become indelibly momentous to me I might blush indeed for the thin tatter dragged in thus as an affair of record. It consisted at the time simply of an emotion—though the
emotion, I should add, appeared to consist of everything in the whole world that my consciousness could hold. By that intensity did it hang as bravely as possible together, and by the title so made good has it handed itself endlessly down. (Notes of a Son and Brother (New York, 1914), pp. 309–10.)

20 Ibid., p. 156.
21 Ibid., pp. 172-3.
22 Ibid., p. 189.
23 Ibid., p. 220.
25 Ibid., p. 16.
26 Ibid., p. 20.
27 Ibid., p. 21.
28 Ibid., p. 42.
29 Harold Frederick, Marsena and Other Stories of the Wartime (New York, 1894), p. 7.
30 Ibid., p. 46.
31 Ibid., p. 63.
32 Ibid., pp. 79–80.
33 Ibid., p. 66.
34 Ibid., pp. 90–91.
36 Ibid., p. 82.
37 Harold Frederick, The Deserter and Other Stories (Boston, 1898), pp. 134–5.
39 Ibid., p. 46.
40 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
41 Ibid., pp. 57–58.
42 William Dean Howells, A Traveler from Altruria (New York, 1894), p. 204.
44 Ibid., p. 209.
46 Ibid., p. 256.
47 Ibid., p. 299.
Ibid., p. 310.

50 William Dean Howells, Through the Eye of the Needle (New York, 1907), p. ix.

51 Ibid., pp. xi-xii.


52 Ibid., pp. 202-3 [Italics mine.]

53 Ibid., p. 181.

54 Ibid., p. 180. [Last italics mine.]

55 Ibid., p. 290.

56 Ibid., p. 170.

57 Ibid., p. 344.


59 Ibid., p. 49.

60 Ibid., p. 71.

61 Ibid., p. 118.

62 Ibid., p. 293.

63 Ibid., pp. 325-6.

64 Ibid., p. 327.

65 Ibid., p. 329.


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., p. 138.

69 Ibid., p. 155.

70 Ibid., p. 160.

71 Ibid., p. 339.

72 Ibid., pp. 385-6.


74 Ibid., p. 455.

75 Frank Norris, The Octopus (New York, 1901), p. 650.

76 Ibid., p. 651.

77 Ibid., pp. 651-2.


79 Ibid., p. 296.

80 Upton Sinclair, A Captain of Industry (Girard, Kansas, 1906), p. 80.
81Ibid., pp. 32-33.
82Ibid., p. 82.
83Ibid., pp. 82-83.
84Upton Sinclair, King Coal (New York, 1917), p. 35.
85Ibid., p. 52.
86Ibid., p. 101.
87Ibid., p. 294.
89Ibid., pp. 296-7.
90Ibid., p. 299.
92Ibid., p. 29.
93Ibid., pp. 44-45.
94Ibid., p. 88.
95Ibid.
96Ibid., p. 101.
97Ibid., p. 197.
98Ibid., pp. 206-7.
99Ibid., pp. 309-10.
100Ibid., p. 364.
101Ibid., p. 391.
102Ibid., p. 401.
103Ibid., p. 439.
104Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger and Other Stories (New York, 1922), p. 53.
105Ibid., p. 110.
106Ibid.
107Ibid., p. 119.
108Ibid., pp. 119-20.
109See Chapter Six, p. 144.
CONCLUSION

5Ibid., p. 292.
6Ibid., pp. 52-53.
8Ibid., pp. 52-53.
9Ibid., p. 74.
11Ibid., p. 68.
12Ibid., p. 159.
14Ibid., p. 142.
15Ibid., p. 87.
16Ibid., pp. 87-88.
17Ibid., p. 78.
19Ibid., p. 160.
20Ibid., pp. 196-7.
21Ibid., pp. 5-6. [Italics mine.]
22Ibid., p. 14. [Italics mine.]
23Ibid., p. 18.
24Ibid., p. 56.
25Ibid., p. 106.
26Ibid., pp. 150-1.
27Ibid., p. 187.
28Ibid., p. 232.
29Ibid.
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