ASPECTS OF THE
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF RECONSTRUCTIONISM
AS SET FORTH BY THEODORE BRAMELD

Dissertation
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By
JAMES WILSON COMER, B.S., M.S.
The Ohio State University
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Approved by:
[Signature]
Adviser
To
Josephine.

This effort is a fruit of her faith
and her devoted assistance.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Occasion for this Study

The appearance of a relatively new philosophy of education, reconstructionism, which has been formulated within the last six years and offered as a theoretical basis of education appropriate to our time, supplies the occasion for this study. Reconstructionism has been articulated in several articles and books, and it has received some examination and criticism in articles and brief references. It has not received, however, any comprehensive analysis. This study proposes to subject crucial aspects of the educational theory and proposals of reconstructionism to a more thorough analysis and appraisal than they have thus far received.


3References in the literature concerning reconstructionism which have come to the attention of the present writer have been noted at various places in the text following.
Reconstructionism presents its challenge to the schools in this period of uncertainty. The turbulent middle years of the twentieth century have been termed, appropriately, an "age of anxiety."4 The schools of the nation have not been spared the pressures, anxieties, and frustrations that are endemic in the culture as a whole.5 Various aspects of public school education, including the theoretical bases of the progressive movement, have been subjected to widespread criticism and attacks.6 These criticisms, some of them searching and constructive, others malicious and destructive, have come at a time when schools were struggling under an unprecedented burden. A teacher shortage,7 inadequate buildings and facilities,8 and some


confusion in purpose, have been coincident with a deluge of pupils born during the years of World War II and after. The philosophy of reconstructionism offers itself as a theory of education appropriate to our crisis culture, and it purports to be the needed revision and successor to "progressivism." Educators would be negligent were they to ignore its proposals, or to accept them uncritically.

B. Organization of the Study

The procedure followed in this chapter was first to outline some of the events leading up to the formulation by Theodore Brameld of reconstructionism as a separate and distinct philosophy, and to give some indication of the materials and methods utilized in this study. The purpose in Chapter II is to define and describe as adequately and objectively as possible the current educational proposals of reconstructionism and the theoretical beliefs on which these proposals are based. The chapter is largely an expository statement utilizing reconstructionist writings, but the descriptions employ limited use of comparison and contrast with alternative positions. Criticisms are withheld from Chapter II except to cite beliefs and proposals which are to be subjected to analysis in subsequent chapters. Chapter III consists of an inquiry into the operation of "prehension" as a method of knowing, and the implications of the assumption of such a method. Chapter IV contains
an analysis of immediate and esthetic experience and the role of emotion in thinking. Chapter V deals with the means-ends relationship. Chapter VI analyzes the ontology of reconstructionism in its relations with experience, and explores the theory of truth by social consensus. Chapter VII consists of an analysis and appraisal of the theory of values in reconstructionism and the concept of "defensible partiality." Chapter VIII, the final chapter, summarizes the findings of the analytical chapters and cites implications of proposals advanced in reconstructionism.

C. Reconstruction and Reconstructionism

The term "reconstruction" as it has been applied in philosophy and social outlook has a much older and broader meaning than the specific "reconstructionist" philosophy which is the subject of this study. Because there is room for confusion in terminology it is important to make some delineation at the outset between the more general application of this term as it has been widely used during the last half-century, and the more specific use of the term to name an educational philosophy at mid-century.

In 1919 John Dewey lectured at the Imperial University in Japan, a nation then still in process of awakening from feudalistic isolation to western ideas. He
pointed out that since the Elizabethan days of Francis Bacon there had been going on in western culture a reorientation in intellectual life which constituted a reconstruction in thought and in ways of coming at life. Dewey's lectures were subsequently published as *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920). In a sense Dewey's monumental work over the first half of the twentieth century, following the seminal thinking of Charles S. Peirce and William James, and supplemented and interpreted by others, culminated the 300 years of released intellectual progress mentioned by Dewey. It is this which constitutes the broader application of the term reconstruction as it applied in philosophy, and what is at issue clearly is a movement within philosophic thought, not a philosophic position. As Dewey himself appraised it twenty-five years after publication of *Reconstruction in Philosophy*:

*Today Reconstruction of Philosophy is a more suitable title than Reconstruction in Philosophy. For the intervening events have sharply defined, have brought to a head, the basic postulate of the text: namely, that the distinctive office, problems and subjectmater of philosophy grow out of stresses and strains in community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and that, accordingly, its specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human history.*

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The specific educational philosophy designated as reconstructionism is a product of only the last twenty years, and only during the past three years have the beliefs and proposals been fully articulated as a separate philosophy. In fact, not until the publication of two books in 1950, *Ends and Means in Education* and *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* by Theodore Brameld, the chief spokesman for reconstructionism, was a specific philosophy put forward and named, and not until this was done was there enough unity or distinctive quality in the position to discern just what was, and was not, reconstructionism in educational theory prior to that time. Since the philosophy is young (and probably still developing) there is some doubt as to what should be included or excluded in an examination of it. Especially is this true when there is an attempt to apply reconstructionist criteria to events and theories in the past. Fortunately, this study needs to make such differentiation only to the extent of indicating when and how reconstructionism had its beginnings in the thirties.

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10 It is doubtful whether Brameld should have employed the term 'reconstructionism'—without qualification—to designate his own particular conception, which—with all that it has in common with those who first used this term—differs in essential factors so radically from it." Isaac B. Berkson. Review of *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* in *Educational Theory* Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 1951) pp. 161-162.
Although it is the purpose of Chapter II to define and describe reconstructionism as accurately as possible, it is necessary to give here a brief indication of what it is. Reconstructionism, as the term is used in this study, is initially defined as that philosophy so named and described by Theodore Brameld in *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* and other writings. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider also like theories, practices and tendencies in schools; in the 1947 policies of the American Education Fellowship; and in certain writings of George S. Counts, Harold Rugg, John L. Childs and others who, on occasion, have expressed views similar to or consistent with those formulated by Brameld.

D. **Beginning of Reconstructionism**

The beginnings of the movement that is now called reconstructionism may be said to date from the dark days of the economic depression of the nineteen thirties. There was then in America, to an unprecedented extent, widespread dissatisfaction with the economic system which was so badly out of joint that abject poverty and want existed in the midst of surpluses and plenty. Breadlines and unemployment were everywhere; the productivity of industry took a downward plunge for the lack of consumer purchasing power; foreclosures and bankruptcy decimated agriculture and small business; and fear drove the "malefactors of great wealth"
and capitalists in general to freeze their assets behind bulwarks of maximum safety and least risk. Pessimism, loss of hope, sharp cleavages in political and economic belief, antagonisms, and rumblings of violence stalked the land.

The western frontier, which had provided a century of pioneering, and had infused the whole nation with an optimistic pioneer spirit, had by the thirties become a dust bowl. Where once the covered wagons of sturdy pioneers trekked westward, the dilapidated jalopies of the migrant "Grapes of Wrath" hordes filled the highways.

Uppermost among the reasons for dissatisfaction with our economy was the great disparity that existed in the distribution of wealth and income. The inequality in income is illustrated by the fact the one tenth of one per cent of the families at the top received practically as much as 42 per cent of the families at the bottom of the scale.11

The bright promise of the industrial revolution had lost its luster. No longer did it seem destined to raise the lot of the common man from medieval servitude to universal plenty with freedom and security for all. Instead, in the

thirties great masses of workers seemed headed toward industrial peasantry. The workers' lot appeared hopelessly geared to economic and social subservience to a new privileged class of Tory "economic royalists" who were gaining an ever larger and tighter grip on both the industrial machine of the nation and the opinion-making and educative media of society, including the schools.

There were those in the country who despaired of the ability of the American way to weather the storm. Others saw in its impending failure an opportunity. Some of these thought that the "wave of the future" called for a firm hand and drastic measures of the kind that Hitler was instituting in Germany. Mussolini was lauded for making the trains run on time and for other "successful" achievements in Italy. The Marxists envisaged the long-anticipated breakdown of the capitalist system, and organized international Communism, with leadership from Russia, seized the movement as an opportunity for "the revolution" to bring on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Conditions were ripe for converts to doctrines both of the "right" and the "left." Most Americans held to the faith, however, that the sick economy could be cured, and the essentials of American democracy, with its individual rights and freedoms, retained.

Between the Fascist and Communist extremes there was
divergence of views, ranging all the way from that of the Tory conservatives, who professed to believe that democratic rights were to be identified with property rights and the traditional laissez-faire system of rugged individualism and free enterprise, to the socialists, who claimed that democracy could no longer survive unless it recognized the changes wrought by the times and brought itself up-to-date by finding a way to move to an economy planned for human welfare around public ownership of the strategic productive enterprises.

It was in such an atmosphere of depression, division, confusion and soul-searching that thoughtful educators were seeking to define further the role the school should and could play. This was the occasion for questions raised by George S. Counts, speaking as a progressive educator to The Progressive Education Association and other groups in 1932. He consolidated, extended, and published these addresses under the now well-known title, *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* At the same time the commission on the social studies of the American Historical Association, of which Counts was research director, made interim reports in 1933 of findings which, when completed, were published in 1934 as *Conclusions and Recommendations*, though not without dissent.

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In one sense reconstructionism dates back to these significant occasions, for it was then that a discussion was set off that raged unabated for almost a decade. The discussion continued intermittently through the war years and the late forties. It was revived by Theodore Brameld in 1950 with renewed vigor and some change of emphasis. What Brameld did was to seize upon the need to reconstruct social patterns and articulate his conception of the reconstructed pattern into a distinctive philosophy. Advocates and critics of reconstructionism are now much in evidence in the current literature of educational theory.

What has here been designated as the beginning of reconstructionism in the early thirties did not at that time appear to have the distinctive qualities of a new philosophy, nor were there advocates or spokesmen who expressed claims or aspirations toward creating a new philosophy. Progressive education was then only about half of its present age. This was thirty-six years after the establishment of the Dewey School in Chicago, but only sixteen years after the publication of *Democracy and Education*. The progressive movement was still in the process of clarifying its aims and objectives and examining them in light of pragmatic philosophy and concepts of democracy. Most of the actual practice of progressive education centered around a few experimental schools. Much of the widely disseminated theory of progressive education was a
protest against traditional practices and authoritarian methods. It is this protest movement that has since been called the child-centered wing of progressive education. All parties to the discussion of "reconstructionism" thought of themselves as progressives, and each disputant conceived of his position as the direction that the progressive education movement should take.

Doubtless it was Counts who spoke out in the early thirties with most persistence, and argued his position with least timidity and firmest conviction. In his call for a reconstructed social order he insisted that,

> If democracy is to survive, it must seek a new economic foundation . . . . If property rights are to be diffused in industrial society, natural resources and all important forms of capital will have to be collectively owned.  

There were many, including William H. Kilpatrick and John Dewey, who in the gloomy thirties could go this far with Counts; yet not many went so far as he in defining the role of the school. Counts proposed that,

> Such a vision of what America might become in the industrial age I would introduce into our schools as the supreme imposition, but one to which our children are entitled—a priceless legacy which it should be the first concern of our profession to fashion and bequeath.  

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14Ibid., p. 54.
Recognizing that progressive education had always placed objectivity and scientific method high on its list of positive values, and had viewed with grave misgivings anything that smacked of indoctrination and imposition, Counts called for a drastic change of direction in which progressive education would "become less frightened than it is today of the bogies of imposition and indoctrination." He accused progressive education of being too much an advocate of the child-centered school, and he insisted that it emancipate itself from the influence of the complacent middle classes and "face squarely and courageously every social issue." As to the issue of imposition, Counts was of the opinion that it was just a question of what kind of imposition the schools were to practice, since he argued, it was inevitable that they practice some kind, either purposely or unintentionally. In this connection he said,

I am prepared to defend the thesis that all education contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend upon it, that it is consequently eminently desirable, and that the frank acceptance of this fact by the educator is a major professional obligation.16

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15Counts, op. cit., pp. 9-10. (Italics in original)
16Ibid., p. 12.
And defend this thesis he did, at some length and with vigor in this book and elsewhere, including the editorial policy of *The Social Frontier*, throughout the middle thirties, but not without challenge from Boyd H. Bode and others, as we shall see.

The crisis of the thirties also prompted a cooperative study, published as *The Educational Frontier*, which explored the impact of the socio-economic situation on education. The findings of the collaborators on *The Educational Frontier* differed significantly from Count's views, however. They recognized the powerful social and economic influences on education, and the role of education in social and economic reconstruction. Their findings constituted a definite shift in the progressive movement. The emphasis on reconstruction of experience was no longer predominantly psychological or "child-centered." The tremendous influence of social and economic conditions on the quality of experiences had by an individual was more explicitly recognized. The authors of *The Educational Frontier* did not join with Counts, however, in his "supreme imposition" conception of the role of education. They rejected propaganda and indoctrination, but also rejected a

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"neutrality" which in effect served to reinforce the status quo. They asserted that

The public school must accept responsibility for the building of intelligence in and for the wise choice between growing and decaying doctrines and programs.18 They also failed to go all out for a preplanned socialized economy.

There is a difference between a society which is planned and a society which is continuously planning—namely, the difference between dogma and intelligence in operation, between suppression of individuality and that release and utilization of individuality which will bring it to full maturity.19

The Social Frontier was organized in 1934 with Counts as editor, Kilpatrick as chairman of the board of twenty-six directors, which included John Dewey, John L. Childs, Sidney Hook, H. Gordon Hullfish, Jesse H. Newlon, R. Bruce Raup, Harold Rugg, V. T. Thayer, Goodwin Watson and Norman Woelfel and others who were to play significant roles in the searching discussion during the hectic thirties. The new publication set out from the beginning to explore the question of how the social order could be reconstructed and the part the schools could play in facilitating this reconstruction.

It soon became apparent that there was no unanimity on the part of contributors to The Social Frontier as to the

18Kilpatrick, Ibid., pp. 146-147.
19Dewey and Childs, Ibid., p. 72.
role of the school, and the searching articles on its pages --which were courageously open to every shade of thought--soon made it appear that more and deeper issues were involved than Counts had first outlined.

Dewey, writing in the initial issue of The Social Frontier, appeared to go along with a reconstructionist view to the extent that the trend of industrial civilization pointed toward a more collectivised economy, but he would not commit the schools to Count's "supremene imposition" and "priceless legacy," and to opposition to the status quo. He pointed out rather that "there is no status quo if by that term is meant something stable and constant," and he significantly underscored the terms "share in" in the theme of his article "Can Education Share in Social Reconstruction?" The effect of Dewey's article seemed to be to call attention to the fact that conflicts in a democratic society are never clear cut differences between two set patterns of belief, and that our society itself is dynamic, not static. And, as to the role of education, he counselled that:

Laying the basis, intellectual and moral, for a new social order is a sufficiently novel and inspiring

ideal to arouse a new spirit in the teaching profession and to give direction to radically changed effort.21

Subsequent discussion in The Social Frontier arrived at a consensus at least that the reconstructed social order should be thoroughly democratic and that the schools should be committed to the democratic ideal. Beyond this there was much confusion as the fundamental characteristics of democracy, and the specific elements of an educational program to promote democracy, were sought. At this point, when progressive education was attempting to define its course, Boyd H. Bode presented a searching and definitive analysis of the ambivalence and ambiguities within the progressive movement. He pointed out that progressive education was at the crossroads.22 He asked it to reexamine the child-centered assumption that values for democratic education could somehow emerge from an examination of the nature of the child, and he questioned the assumption that democracy could be identified with any single economic pattern or doctrine. Speaking for those who could see democracy only in terms of a reconstructed economic system, John L. Childs challenged Bode's "Authentic" democracy by proclaiming:


22In Progressive Education at the Crossroads.
For me, no statement of the meaning of democracy can be considered adequate which fails to recognize that the reconstruction of our economic system is now such an important means that it necessarily becomes one of the controlling ends of democratic effort for our generation.23

Although Bode described democracy as a way of life24 he denied that it was only or even primarily, an economic way. Answering Childs, and at the same time referring to Kilpatrick's statement that "the economic situation defines the moral obligation of today,"25 he said "... it does nothing of the kind," instead "the moral obligation (is) to be intelligent."26 Declining to read out of the democratic picture important non-economic considerations, and likewise refusing to surrender the democratic concept to those with socialistic aspirations, Bode insisted that:

The intellectual outlook is a clear recognition that common interests have the right of way over special interests and that the continuous expansion of our common life is the final test of progress. Social organization of every kind is just machinery for this end.27


Further elaborating on the implication of this point of view for the work of the school and for the wisest course for teachers to follow, he wrote,

There is plenty of room for doubt whether teachers, as a group, have either the qualifications or the mission to provide blueprints for the social order of the future. In any case, when means are mistaken for ends "essential democracy" fades out of the picture.28

A further important point somehow apparently overlooked in the dust of the "crossroads" controversy was brought out by a member of "The Ohio School of Democracy in Education."29 H. Gordon Hullfish reminded his contemporaries on The Social Frontier that the individual teachers' conclusions and an educational program are not one and the same. As he pointed out,

It may be difficult within a profession that has held few commitments in common to avoid stepping from the admission to the right of the individual teacher to hold conclusions on social matters to the belief that these conclusions are, in fact, an educational program. It may be difficult, but avoid this step we must or we are left with no educational test that will be critical of the manner in which conclusions are advanced.30

The "Ohio School" steadfastly refused to abandon the

28Tbid., p. 40. (Italics in original.)

29Title of a further article in the controversy in Social Frontier, Vol. 5, No. 45, (May 1939) by Kenneth Benne and William Stanley.

conviction that education for democracy consisted of more than converting teachers to a social and economic orientation, and that respecting the personality of individuals and developing in them the requisite intelligence and attitudes to build and share values in common in a dynamic society were the ends of which economic and institutional arrangements are only the means. Dewey was not a party to the controversy. When he was called upon to resolve the issue he pointed out that:

The question at issue (between Bode and Childs) is one of fact, not one that can be settled by an analysis of the concept of democracy . . . . (It is) namely, whether or not the economic structure of society bears, under present conditions, an inherent relation to the realization of the democratic idea.

This only partially resolved the issue, for while much light had been shed on the nature of democracy, each person was left to determine for himself whether "under present conditions" the economic structure was such as to bear an inherent relation to the realization of the democratic idea. Some frontier thinkers continued to believe, even after New Deal measures had relieved some of the most urgent strains on the economy, that these were but stop-gap measures that only delayed and obstructed the ultimate change to a socialized economy, and that such a change must be effected, the sooner the better. Others appeared to

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relax their insistence on a socialized economy and to pay more attention to other values in the democratic way of life, and devote their attention to other threats to democracy. Among them was Kilpatrick, who, although never rabid about putting all his eggs in the economic basket, was in 1940 again emphasizing thinking ability as a goal of education.

The work of the Democratic School thus stands clear: to improve thinking, to raise up a new generation able and disposed to deal intelligently with our urgent unsolved problems. The school must build critical thinking, beginning with the youngest but increasing all the way.

... In this critical thinking the teacher is there to help pupils through their problems, not to steer the process to his chosen side. His duty is to build up his pupils so that they can and will think for themselves, not to win converts to his cause.32

Theodore Brameld, destined to become a leader and spokesman for reconstructionism in the late forties and at mid-century, was in the early thirties first heard from as an expert in Marxist philosophy. His dissertation in 193133 and his A Philosophic Approach to Communism34 in 1933, together with continued study and interest, qualified


34 Brameld, A Philosophic Approach to Communism, 1933.
him to dispute with Sidney Hook in 1936 over their different attitudes toward Russian philosophy as described in *Marxism and Modern Thought* and over Hook's dim view of the state of philosophy in the Soviet Union. Brameld was no ivory tower philosopher, even then. He reported on a survey of how "College Students React to Social Issues" in 1934, and analyzed "American Education and Class Struggle" in 1936. Then, in 1938, he advanced a view of metaphysics, which, when it had become "ontology" in 1950, forms an important basis for the reconstructionist philosophy.

All metaphysics is an attempt to discover the basic characteristics of reality. If it has no consistent relationship to our respective social points of view, which assuredly are parts of reality, then the very attempt of metaphysics is a hopeless one.

In fact, as early as 1938, Brameld stated with remarkable brevity the position he later elaborated into the

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35. N. I. Burkharin (Ed) Tr. by Ralph Fox, 1933.


philosophy of reconstructionism:

Out of this analysis ("of weaknesses of our present social, economic and political structure") must then be drawn convincing blueprints of a new social order, adequate enough to eliminate the tragedies of our present system, desirable enough to inspire fervent devotion to fit as an achievable ideal, and implemented by a method powerful enough to reach the objective.  

This, in a sentence, is the theme of his reconstructionism of today.

5. Reconstructionism in the Forties

Five years later, in 1943, Brameld complained that many of the depression-time advocates of a reconstructed social order were too much concerned with other threats to democracy. In the midst of the heat of World War II he said that he still regarded a "thorough-going cooperative and socialized economy," as the "most crucial of all the tasks facing democracy."  

Never was there a more striking understatement than Brameld's assertion that others were concerned with other threats to democracy. Fourteen million Americans in uniform were fighting from the South Pacific jungles to Anzio beach, the air battle for Britain was on, and the Russians were backed up against Stalingrad and crying for a second front.

40Ibid., p. 258.

41Theodore Brameld, "Is the Conservative Right?" Frontiers of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 81 (December 1943) p. 94.
The whole American civilian economy was geared to the war effort, and was producing at a rate that dwarfed all prior accomplishments in history. The Social Frontier had broadened its theme and its title to Frontiers of Democracy, and, having already replaced its pacifist bent with a militant recognition that "democracy . . . is as hostile to one kind of tyranny as another," was preparing with its last issue to melt down its lead font into bullets.

John Dewey, who had been called "pink" by some of the more rabid reactionaries and pseudo-patriots, soon after Pearl Harbor, when even our armed forces were propagandizing for brotherhood with our Russian comrades-in-arms, was calling attention, in the manner of Churchill, to the fact that Russian totalitarianism had not changed its hideous colors overnight just because we happened to have a common Fascist enemy.

Harold Rugg, who during the thirties had been "letting the facts speak for themselves," was documenting the American trend that, as he "listened" to what the facts had to "say," pointed inevitably from the past

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42 Bodé, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 88.
43 Vol. 10, No. 81, December 15, 1943.
individualistic free enterprise system toward a reconstructed
planned society of cooperation and socialized ownership.
But he had not had his say. Just prior to the final issue
he had taken over the editorship of *Frontiers of Democracy*
from Kilpatrick, and he complained bitterly because the
game was being called because of war just as he came to bat.
Rugg's "facts," speaking for themselves, had already brought
down on him a shower of attacks from across the country from others who, mostly conservatives, reactionaries and
super-patriots, wanted a different set of facts to speak
for a different kind of America— one they insisted we had
always had and one they were determined to keep. These
attacks, characterized as they were by yellow journalism,
inspired slander, and near-book-burnings of almost Fascist
proportions, were of course as "Un-American" as they claimed
Rugg's books to be.

Through the later forties Rugg and Brameld stand
out as the reconstructionist torchbearers, as they clarified
and articulated the position in slightly divergent ways.
Rugg contributed the first of the reconstructionist
"additional emphases," additional in the sense that the
reconstructionist claimed that pragmatism stood in need of

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45Harold Rugg, "We Accept in Principle but Reject
in Practice: Is This Leadership?" *Frontiers of Democracy*
Vol. 10, No. 81 (December 16, 1943).

46Harold Rugg, *That Men May Understand.*
supplementary improvements. Rugg chided Dewey (as he first did fifteen years earlier\textsuperscript{47}) for dealing inadequately with "feeling" and esthetic learning\textsuperscript{48} and proposed a new psychology of the "creative act." Rugg also spoke of and "documented" a kind of intuition which he called "primal awareness."\textsuperscript{49} Brameld later applied the name "prehension" to this intuition. These reconstructionist concepts will receive further elaboration in Chapter II and an analysis in Chapter III.

During the forties there appeared no comprehensive statement of the reconstructionist philosophy, however. As early as 1943 Isaac B. Berkson\textsuperscript{50} applied this name to that branch of the progressive movement which concerned itself most with reconstructing the social order, and doubtless identified himself with the movement. Berkson's position was a much more objective and detached form of reconstructionism, however, than that formulated by Brameld later. In 1945, when Brameld and others published Design for America, the experiment described therein, at Floodwood,


\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., Chapter VII, "Psychology of the Act - Reinterpreted."

\textsuperscript{50}I. B. Berkson, Education Faces the Future, 1943.
Minnesota, was based on implicit and partially articulated reconstructionist assumptions. Then as American Education Fellowship delegate to The New Education Fellowship Assembly in Australia in 1947 Brameld sketched the outlines of what he described as the four important educational philosophies in America, Essentialism, Progressivism, Perennialism and Reconstructionism, the last "by no means a finished philosophy" but one which "increasing numbers of educational thinkers in various countries are converging toward . . . ."51

The statement which pointed most clearly and significantly toward the emerging philosophy, however, is doubtless to be found in Brameld's proposals for "A New Policy for the A.E.F." which appeared in November, 1947.52 In this article we find no overt statement of later metaphysical underpinnings of reconstructionism, but the essay obviously proceeds from the implicit assumption that the new policy should be based on a comprehensive worldview. This weltanschauung includes two emphases not stressed in progressivism—namely, (1) the social (including economic)


facets of reality are on equal par at least, if not even
dominant over, the natural traits of existence; and
(2) even a world-view can be more fluid than had been
recognized heretofore by any prior philosophy, that is,
one can be built for a relatively brief cultural epoch
rather than for all time. This first emphasis Brameld
had stated as early as 1938 when he insisted that
"... our respective social points of view ... assuresly are parts of reality."53 Later, in Patterns
of Educational Philosophy, he expressed the second emphasis
more explicitly, noting that all philosophies *including
his own, are expressions of historic and therefore
temporal periods.*54

Thus we can see that it is not merely a method­
ological but an ontological significance that we can
attach to Brameld's call to the A.E.F., "to examine and
specify the main characteristics of this period ... ."55
His own specifications were:

... They (the main characteristics of this period)
gravitate around two fundamental and related facts.
The first is the fact of an unstable and precarious


54Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 425.

economy with its accomplishment of insecurity, inflation, its cycles of boom-and-bust. The second is the fact of national rivalry and hostility with their potential of atomic war . . . .

Later, in Ends and Means in Education and in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, Brameld developed this view more fully, also stating it more tersely. He characterized the age as one of crisis, threatened by the twin curses of war and depression.

The reconstructionist's conception of the role of education follows directly from his view of the "main characteristics of this period." Brameld stated that "the two great constructive purposes which should govern the A.E.F." were:

1. To channel the energies of education toward the reconstruction of the economic system . . .

2. To channel the energies of education toward the establishment of genuine international authority . . . .

He further stated that "these two great guiding principles involve a multitude of specific educational tasks."

Brameld listed thirteen of these tasks. It is necessary to quote at some length under some of them, No. 3 particularly, to depict accurately and fairly the reconstructionist departure from progressive conceptions, and to point the direction of reconstructionist educational

56Loc. cit.
57Ibid., p. 260.
theory in 1947.

1. . . . realistic materials regarding the economic system.

2. To develop consciousness . . . of the meaning and content of values and norms which govern new economic, political and cultural purposes. The import of a value like "self-realization" should be explored and enunciated.

3. In "taking sides" against an unworkable economic system and unworkable nationalism, and with a workable system and internationalism there is need to develop consciousness of a distinction between the conviction already held by those who take such sides and those who do not yet do so. This (is) necessary in order thereby to permit development of new educational techniques which avoid more indoctrination of these convictions. The task is to experiment with techniques of learning through social agreement, not by superimposing pre-judgments. Only thus can majority rule eventually become rule by an informed majority who understand what they want and how, democratically, to get what they want. The school should become a center of experimentation in attaining communities of uncoerced persuasion.

4. There is need for extensive educational practice in building detailed social designs which come to grips with problems arising in, for example, economic planning . . .

5. There is pressing need for a new conception of discipline--intellectual, moral, social . . .

6. . . . Contributions of the arts (to?) social studies.

7. . . . The full import of the concept of "one world" and of "world citizenship."

8. . . . The unsolved problem of intercultural relations within nations.

9. Close co-operation with educational movements of other countries, especially those working toward more or less similar objectives . . .
10. . . . An international N.E.F. conference in the United States within one year.

11. The A.E.F. should involve itself in the work of other educational organizations and seek to influence them to experiment with its new materials and methods.

12. . . . co-operation with the labor movement . . .

13. The title of Progressive Education should now be changed to one expressing the reformulated purposes more clearly.58

With the exception of numbers 10 and 13, which refer to a specific time already past, all of the remaining "tasks" continue as a part of the educational program of reconstructionism as further elaborated by Brameld in 1950.

In appraising the extent of influence of reconstructionism on education it is valuable to follow up Brameld's 1947 challenge. He had written the policy proposal as a member of a committee appointed for this purpose, with Ernest O. Melby as chairman. Later in the same month the A.E.F. National Conference in Chicago, after some revisions, "unanimously" adopted the proposals as the policy of the fellowship. The revised new policy was then published in Progressive Education59 together with an announcement that it was subject to continuous revision at subsequent conventions, and a ballot for

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58Ibid., pp. 258-262.

59In February 1948, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 33, 40-41, 46, 58.
members to vote by mail either for or against adopting it. The editor later announced that balloting was regrettably small, but that it ran well over two to one in favor of the policy.60

A comparison of Brameld's proposals with the policy actually adopted is perhaps indicative of just how much "reconstructionism" the membership of the A.E.F. was ready to accept, for virtually all the major changes that were not merely for clarification were in the direction of "toning down" the reconstructionist emphasis toward a more "progressive" emphasis. For example, the revised and approved new policy no longer included a call "to channel the energies of education"61 as did Brameld's proposal, nor for "a system which should be geared with the increasing socializations and public controls now developing in England, Sweden, New Zealand and other countries."62 Instead of the latter we find "the reconstruction of the economic system in the direction of far greater justice and stability; a system to be secured by whatever democratic planning and social controls

60Progressive Education, Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1948) p. 27.


62Loc. cit.
experience shows to be necessary." While the revised statement is still "reconstructionist," it is stated in terms more conciliatory to "progressives." Also Brameld's No. 3 "task" for education, that which called for the school to "become a center of experimentation in attaining communities of uncoerced persuasion" in "taking sides against an unworkable economic system and unworkable nationalism" was deleted entirely as a numbered task. In its stead a statement introductory to all the tasks beginning as follows, was inserted:

In implementing the above outlook through educational practice there should be no attempt to indoctrinate for any political party or for any given economic system. It is vital to maintain democratic intelligent discussion and decision but also to make sure that the process will lead to conclusions. This can only be done by informed teachers who have convictions of their own—convictions which they do not foist upon students but which at appropriate age levels they share with students.

In the revised policy statement we find sixteen "tasks" for education instead of the thirteen that Brameld proposed, but none of the four added ones (four, since one was deleted) are exclusively "reconstructionist." The new No. 1 calls for the "careful study of evolving economic and political systems characterized by developments both

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64 Ibid., p. 46.
in our own country and in other countries" and No. 2 adds "study of both successes and failures of attempts to move toward genuine world order." The new No. 7 asks us to re-examine "the complex problem of preserving and enriching the qualities of personal and family living," and No. 11 asks for the vital education of the adult population at the "grass roots." 65

Further indicative of the widening schism between "progressives" and "reconstructionists" is the fact that it soon became apparent that even the revised A.E.F. policy was not longer "unanimously" acceptable to the membership, as was the vote at the 1947 National Conference. First several "big guns" were fired saluting the new policy in the pages of Progressive Education. In the January issue John J. DeBoer, President of A.E.F., congratulated the "Progressives" on adopting a policy statement which "marks a turning-point in the history of the progressive movement." 66

Then in the February issue, concurrently with the publication of the new policy, Harold Rugg's address to the conference was printed in which he urged the membership to accept "the two great constructive purposes set forth in

65 Ibid.

the statement of New Policy,"\textsuperscript{67} meantime documenting his statement that

\begin{quote}
Although we . . . may not approve of the socialization of the world we must accept the fact that it has become one of the great trends of modern history.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, in April we find two directors of A.E.F., Lester Ball and Harold Shane, repudiating the new policy and protesting that "these 'authoritarian liberals' sometimes use pressure, even coercion to attempt to force the real progressive to depart from his humanistic position, and accept a patterned, predetermined design for our society."\textsuperscript{69} Concerning the New Policy they said,

\begin{quote}
it appears from study that a particular doctrine or body of dogma has been established which presumably is to be accepted for implementation by members of the Association. It does not seem that this acceptance of a "line" or "position" is compatible with the progressive tradition.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

The controversy between progressives and reconstructionists of which this is a sample of the beginning has continued to the present. The controversial new policy of 1947 continued as the official policy of the A.E.F. until October, 1953 when the officers and directors of the

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 37. (Italics in original.)


\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 110.
\end{footnotes}
Fellowship officially rescinded it. Earlier in the year, the officers and directors voted to change the name of the organization to its original title, The Progressive Education Association. At present (November, 1953) the Progressive Education Association has no official policy, but there is a committee whose assignment is to get a wide expression from the membership as to what policy is now wanted.

Whether the new Progressive Education Association will adopt policies containing reconstructionist tendencies is still undetermined. An unofficial policy proposal by the "New York Working Committee" composed of Miles E. Cary, Chairman, Isaac B. Berkson, John J. Brooks and Harold Rugg has been tentatively formulated and written by Rugg. The reconstructionist tendencies discernible in the document are more like those to be found in Rugg's latest book, The Teacher of Teachers, than those in Brameld's philosophy. For example, the proposal advocates a "mixed economy" of the kind that "will result from inquiry and experience," instead of a socialized economy. Further, dogma and indoctrination are specifically repudiated and a position

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is taken reminiscent of The Educational Frontier, which rejects "neutrality" and advocates objectivity. The most salient reconstructionist tendencies in the document are insistence that enough is now known so that people may be taught what course they ought to follow to solve current social problems, and the implicit assumption that "facts" and materials may be assembled which unerringly "document" certain conclusions.

There are indications that the issue of reconstructionism is still not completely resolved in the ranks of progressive educators. Offsetting the slight reconstructionist flavor in the proposed new policy (which may or may not be approved as it is) are two events that may be interpreted as anti-reconstructionist. First, in 1952 the Fellowship elected as president H. Gordon Hullfish whose views may be characterized as in the tradition of Bode's concept of "authentic" democracy. Second, in favoring a change of the name of the Fellowship back to the original Progressive Education Association doubtless the officers and directors were voicing a desire to return to an emphasis on experimental, democratic education.

The schism within the progressive movement between those who adhered to the individual-intelligence wing of the movement and those in the collectivist-economic, or reconstructionist, wing reached the "point of no return," when reconciliation seemed improbable if not impossible,
in the five-year-long controversy (1947-1952) over policy of the A.E.F. Overt separation into "progressives," mostly pragmatists, and reconstructionists, was further clarified and facilitated with the publication of *Ends and Means in Education* and *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, both by Theodore Brameld, in 1950. These two publications marked the coming of age of reconstructionism as a distinct philosophy of education. Since that time the progressive movement is relieved of some of the strain of attempting to assimilate elements too ambivalent for reconciliation. At the same time the new philosophy, reconstructionism, at least as elaborated by Brameld, who alone has done this, now enjoys an independence that will enable it to swim or sink on its own merits.

F. ** Purposes, Methods and Limitations of This Study **

The purpose of this study is to analyze and to appraise the philosophy of education known as "reconstructionism." A specification of the materials and methods used, and a statement of qualifications and limitations, are needed, however, to render this general purpose meaningful.

The materials used in this study include virtually all of the published works of Theodore Brameld, together with writings of other theorists whose beliefs and proposals
resemble his and writings which have been used by him in formulating reconstructionism. Further, other materials, critical of Brameld directly or relevant to the purposes of the writer, are used. Brameld is taken to be the chief spokesman of reconstructionism, despite the fact that Harold Rugg wrote earlier and more extensively than Brameld on the problem of "feeling" and esthetics. On one point, specifically, that of "primal awareness," Rugg anticipated Brameld's concept of "prehension." This study does not include an analysis of Rugg's position as distinct from that of Brameld, however, nor does it attempt to deal with any of Rugg's views except as they are germane to Brameld's formulation of reconstructionism. Rugg was not engaged, as Brameld has been, in formulating an entire educational philosophy.

The philosophic position most frequently utilized in this study for purposes of comparison or contrast with reconstructionism is pragmatism (known also as experimentalism or instrumentalism). This position is termed "progressivism" by Brameld. The writings of John Dewey, especially, and Boyd H. Bode, William H. Kilpatrick, Max Otto, Sidney Hook, H. Gordon Hullfish, and others are

73 See ante p. 23. Brameld refers to Rugg as an "educational encyclopedist and esthetician" who has "given impetus to reconstructionist tendencies," Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 136. Also see Ibid., p. 521.
turned to as representative of pragmatism. The views or assumptions expressed independently by the writer will be found to resemble or follow, to more or less extent, those of these writers.

The methods followed in analyzing and appraising reconstructionism include the following:

1. In each case where concepts are used that require definition there is an attempt to determine as precisely as possible the meaning of the concept in question. In several cases a genetic approach, in which earlier uses of the concept are examined, is made.

2. Beliefs of reconstructionism are depicted by quoting Brameld's most succinct statements, by exposition, and by comparing and contrasting specific beliefs of reconstructionism with other views.

3. Beliefs of reconstructionism are appraised by inquiry into the facts that sustain them and by an examination of the logic used in deriving them.

4. Proposals are appraised by inquiry into the significance, especially for education, of their implications.

More specifically, certain questions are implicit throughout. They are as follows:

1. Is the philosophy internally consistent? Can one logically embrace all of its beliefs, or do some beliefs preclude others?
2. Are the beliefs sustained by the known facts in the natural and cultural world? When estimates must be used in lieu of facts, are the estimates soundly based on representative samplings, balanced emphases, and unbiased selections?

3. Are the proposals of reconstructionism workable? Do the proposals and methods so conform to necessary natural, human and cultural traits and processes that overt action can be reasonably expected to yield results comparable with those envisioned? Do the hypotheses appear tenable? Are there gaps and breaks in the proposals, which in the actual course of events threaten to produce unwanted results? Are concomitant results accounted for or accurately estimated?

4. Are the values immanent in the proposals and choices of reconstructionism compatible with those that are explicitly stated? Are both the explicit and the implicit values in the proposals of reconstructionism tenable?

The method employed in this study is, then, one of critical analysis. It uses relevant, and numerous, quotations and expressions of views from Brameld and others who may seem to lean toward reconstructionism, as well as alternative or antithetical expressions. It is not assumed that the presentation of a view opposed to a belief or proposal of reconstructionism, however, represents *prima facie* evidence of refutation. These expressions are not offered as "authoritative" in this sense. They must stand on their own merits; the truth of statements is not presumed to reside in the reputation of their authors. When a passage or text by John Dewey is quoted or cited, for example, the intention is to make available the facts or logic which Dewey used so that these
may be applied to the concept, belief or proposal under examination.

A possible objection is that the principal method employed in this study can serve no evaluative purpose, since it is primarily an attempt to appraise one philosophy in terms of another. It may be maintained that, since one philosophy is always "wrong" from the vantage point of another, this study merely confirms what the reconstructionist implicitly claims in formulating his philosophy, e.g., that his is a different philosophy. Nevertheless, in answer to this objection three things may be said.

First, reconstructionism does not profess to be a totally new philosophy. It claims, rather, to be a new formulation which builds on certain accepted pragmatic bases. To the extent that this is true, the new formulation must be such that it rests consistently on its foundations.

Second, the critical effort here is to support any claim of the inadequacy of an aspect of the position under review, or of the position as a whole, by reference to knowledge which bears relevantly upon the idea at hand.

Third, the study may be viewed in part as a response to Brameld's invitation to give "considered reactions" and utmost scrutiny to what, having formulated in detail, he then calls an "emerging philosophy."74

The limitations of this study obviously preclude an equally comprehensive analysis of every aspect of the

74Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. xv.
philosophy of reconstructionism. In Chapter II a balanced and fairly complete over-view of the whole philosophy is undertaken. The careful reader may need to refer, nevertheless, to Brameld's more extensive writings. In Chapters III through VII certain crucial aspects of the philosophy are selected for analysis and criticism. The seven aspects selected are: prehension as a method of knowing; emotion and feeling in experience; the ends-means relationship; the ontology of reconstructionism; the theory of truth by social consensus; valuation in reconstructionism; and the concept of defensible partiality.75

These are the crucial and distinctive aspects of the philosophy which Brameld has selected in his own writing for more extensive treatment. Further, they are the features of the philosophy which reviewers and critics have likewise highlighted. These selected features are dealt with in this study, however, not as isolated aspects but with due regard to their interconnections in the

75 Another distinctive aspect of the philosophy, the role of Ideology and Utopia in a sociology of knowledge, is equally worthy of study. This study does not deal extensively with this problem, however. Such a study is in progress: Siguard I. Rislov, An Examination of the Role of "Ideology" and "Utopia" in the Educational Philosophy Known as Reconstructionism, Ph.D. Dissertation (Professor Williams, adviser), Univ. of Washington, Seattle. The above reported in "Doctors Dissertations Under Way in Education, 1951-1952." Phi Delta Kappa, Vol. XXXIV, No. 6 (February 1952), p. 306.
philosophy as a whole.

The organization and content of this study may appear to show a lack of balance between favorable and unfavorable reactions to reconstructionism. This condition results not from inserted bias or lack of objectivity, but for two more defensible reasons. First, if the nature of the philosophy is such that an analysis of distinctive and critical aspects reveals weaknesses, an honest and objective appraisal must report and describe them as found. Second, if the philosophy is deserving of critical analysis at all, it is inescapable that attention will focus in some measure upon weaknesses. Except for Chapter II, which provides an introductory overview of the philosophy as a whole, this study does not purport to be a review or a reformulation of the philosophy. Brameld's original writings depict the philosophy adequately.

The appraisals of the selected crucial aspects of reconstructionism, and of the philosophy as a whole, will be stated by the writer along with and following each specific analysis as it is made. A summary will be made in the final chapter. The writer, as indicated, tends to express his critical judgments from a pragmatic orientation. It is not his concern, however, to insist that this is a necessary qualification for the utilization of this analysis. The effort has been to make a valid analysis, quite without regard to the presentation of an alternative philosophy.
CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RECONSTRUCTIONISM

The organizational approach followed by Brameld in Part Three of Patterns of Educational Philosophy, and his terminology, are utilized in this expository description of reconstructionism. Brameld utilizes the traditional categories of philosophy, ontology, epistemology and axiology, in the development of reconstructionism. His philosophy does not include, at least at its present stage of formulation, a specific treatment of all of the traditional areas of philosophy, however. For example, there is as yet no explicit cosmology, no separate treatment of ethics, no theory of logic, and no theory of esthetics.

A. View Held by Reconstructionism on the Role of Philosophy

Reconstructionism, like pragmatism, rejects the classic conception of the role of philosophy. It denies Plato's view that the function of philosophy is:

to convert the eye of the soul from dwelling contentedly upon the images of things, upon the inferior realities that are born and that decay, and to lead it to the intuition of supernal and eternal Being.¹

¹Plato, quoted from Dewey's interpretation, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 11.
Nor does reconstructionism accept Aristotle's view that philosophy

has nothing to do beyond itself; it has no aim or purpose or function—except to be philosophy—that is, pure self-sufficing beholding of ultimate reality.\(^2\)

As Dewey has shown, classic philosophy did have a task to do beyond itself, a task of rationalizing Greek culture. Plato and other classic thinkers did this by creating a realm of pure and eternal "being" beyond the reach of the corroding hand of change or practical things. Marvelous as were the accomplishments of the classical philosophers, we can see now that they apparently did not understand the human tendency that James termed the "will to believe." At least, they did not realize that their conceptions of reality were fashioned in part by what they wanted reality to be. Brameld, the reconstructionist, labors under no such illusions. From Dewey and James he has learned that "philosophy is the supreme articulation of man's total environment."\(^3\) He states that "philosophy is held to be the supreme effort of anyone to express his beliefs with utmost clarity."\(^4\) He holds that the "innumerable occasions in history when philosophy has sought to deal with, say,

\(^2\)Loc. cit.


\(^4\)Ibid., p. 413.
ontology in some completely abstract, culture-less form have been misleading.\(^5\) And he further insists, as Dewey has shown, that "all philosophies, including his own, are expressions of historic and therefore temporal periods,"\(^6\) whether or not the philosophers involved realize it.

Reconstructionism is primarily a philosophy of education. At its present stage of development, at least, it is almost wholly a theory of education. Brameld's conception of the role of philosophy is more patently instrumental, however, than was Dewey's.

While Brameld does not differ significantly with Dewey and James as to the temporal and cultural nature of philosophies in general, when he designates the role of his own philosophy, reconstructionism, we find that role quite distinctive and specific. It is specific not only to this age, but specific as to current ills and their remedy. We find "the guiding role of reconstructionism is, then, the enunciation of beliefs demanded by the revolutionary age in which we live."\(^7\) As a philosopher of education Brameld states the "one over-arching

\(^{5}\text{Loc. cit.}\)
\(^{6}\text{Ibid.}, p. 425.\)
\(^{7}\text{Brameld, Op. cit.}, p. 397.\)
conviction that

. . . The one task of education before all others is that of helping to reconstruct the world's cultures to the end that the common peoples shall attain maximum satisfaction of their wants, including the satisfaction of building and ruling their own civilization everywhere on earth—themselves to own, to design and to enjoy.8

In stating that the one task of education before all others, "that of helping to reconstruct the world's cultures," "governs his interpretation of this philosophy at every point" Brameld emphatically denies the objective innocence of reconstructionism, and sharply separates it from Aristotle's notion that "philosophy has nothing to do beyond itself." Reconstructionism distinctly has an "aim or purpose or function" other than "to be philosophy." Reconstructionism knows what its aim is, and it states it unequivocally; it is to reconstruct the social order. It would assign education this "one task before all others." In fact, this aim does not grow out of reconstructionism; rather, reconstructionism seems to grow out of this aim. The whole position is clearly and openly built to sustain the belief that in this "revolutionary age" our "crisis-culture" must be reconstructed so that the common people "own" and "design" their civilization, and through majority rule, manage it so as to avoid the "twin curses" of war

8Ibid., p. 393.
and depression. Through the schools, "interpreting 'objectivity' differently," teachers of this persuasion would practice "defensible partiality" (to be discussed later) so as to secure majority rule for the reconstructed social order.

Even those who cannot accept the aims or the sustaining ground of reconstructionism must admire its candid statements of them. The language Brameld uses in formulating reconstructionism seeks to avoid as much as possible the phrases that put its opponents on guard, such as "class struggle," "socialized economy" and "indoctrination." His position is open and above-board, nevertheless, if one reads him carefully. One must give Brameld credit for the kind of sincerity Dewey mentions in discussing the thought of James:

William James took into account those motives of instinctive sympathy which play a greater role in our choice of a philosophic system than do formal reasonings; and he thought that we should be rendering a service to the cause of philosophic sincerity if we would openly recognize the motives which inspire us. 10

Reconstructionism is not the first philosophy to be formulated to rationalize or sustain a culture or a way

9 Ibid., p. 389.
of life; all philosophies appear to do this to more or less extent. Neither is reconstructionism the first to be deliberately and self-consciously formulated with a view to changing the economic pattern of the social order. This philosophy does appear to be distinctive, however, in the extent to which all its beliefs, including its avowed raison d'être, are deliberately directed toward a program of education designed to accomplish a social orientation.

During the formative period of reconstructionism critics challenged Brameld's calls to "channel the energies of education" toward this "one task." They questioned his proposals to divert the energies and interests of an institution belonging to all the people, the schools, to a purpose which in their view is narrow and limited. As we shall see later, a question still at issue is whether education, properly conceived, can be based on a philosophy which embraces goals or ends to which both the philosophy itself and education are but means.

B. Historic Roots of Reconstructionism

Reconstructionism is a new philosophical formulation, but like any other cultural product, it has roots that extend deep into the past. Tracing out these roots may have little if any value for appraising the validity or worth of a philosophy, for surely philosophies like other
cultural products should be judged by their fruits—their effects on living. But a philosophy is a complicated and highly abstract thing, and if seeking out some of the roots of a philosophy can help to understand what it consists of, it is well worth doing.

Fortunately, Brameld, in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, has cited many writers whose thought has contributed, in one way or another, to the formulation of the philosophy, and he has mentioned many others whose views or criticisms of our culture are congenial to reconstructionism. A study of the philosophy, too, reveals similarities in addition to those that he has specifically pointed out.

Brameld points to "progressive-pragmatism" as the nearest philosophic relative of reconstructionism, and he acknowledges that it is from this source that the newer philosophy has received its most important philosophic foundations.11 Considering the fact that during the twenty formative years of reconstructionism, described in Chapter I, most reconstructionists conceived of themselves as progressive educators, it is to be expected that reconstructionism would have much in common with pragmatism or experimentalism, the philosophy most nearly

11Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 390, 401, 411, 437.
the basis of progressive education. Brameld also points out that certain aspects of "progressivism" have not satisfied the reconstructionist and, hence, the distinctive phases of reconstructionism have been formulated in reaction against these. Thus it is that reconstructionism, to the present at least, has been dependent upon pragmatism for its distinctive qualities no less than for its accepted pragmatic foundations.

It is a problem for later analysis to determine to what extent reconstructionism, in its distinctive aspects, rests logically and consistently on its pragmatic foundations. There remains here only the task of showing how it has reached out elsewhere to find support.

One of the distinctive qualities of reconstructionism is to be found in its utopian propensities. Complaining even as Hutchins has that progressivism is too much enamoured with the here and now, Brameld has said that one of the major functions of philosophy should be that of vision.12 He has accordingly infused reconstructionism with utopianism, but he is careful to point out that the term does not denote "a mere 'flight from reality' into a realm of totally unrealizable, fantastic perfection."13 Instead he plans to "design

12 Ibid., p. 396.
13 Ibid., p. 397.
novel cultural patterns upon the solid basis of scientific knowledge of the nature and man, and to develop workable methods of achieving them."\textsuperscript{14}

It is as a utopian philosophy that reconstructionism claims the oldest precedents. Brameld points out that Plato's \textit{Republic} is a visionary plan proposed as an answer to the troubles of Plato's day. Likewise, Augustine's "City of God," and Francis Bacon's "New Atlantis," are cited as utopian constructions which enabled men to set goals above the mundane possibilities of their days.

From other sources, such as Sir Thomas More's \textit{Utopia}, Campanella's "City of the Sun," the utopian socialists, Babeuf, Henry de Saint Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, Brameld expresses indebtedness not only for utopian vision, but for examples of collectivized living with communal systems of property.\textsuperscript{15} Other modern utopian thinkers such as Edward Bellamy, H. G. Wells, and Lewis Mumford, who have found much to criticize in modern culture, have been cited as contributors to the emerging philosophy of reconstructionism.

Reconstructionism, too, has roots extending back to the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Two

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp. 396-397.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 398-400.
\end{itemize}
strong qualities of reconstructionism, already mentioned, utopianism and dedication to a socialized economy, find strong support in Marxism. Although Brameld specifically points out that reconstructionism rejects some aspects of dialectical materialism, as well as recognizing that much of modern Communism is but a politburo interpretation (or misinterpretation) of this doctrine, there are other contributions of Marx and Engels which are either accepted by reconstructionism or are arrived at independently by this philosophy. There is some question as to whether or not reconstructionism can be said to utilize the Marxist "materialistic interpretation of history." As Brameld points out, "long debate has waged over the precise meaning of this Marxist concept. It can be stated with assurance, however, that it does attach prime importance to economic considerations in interpreting both the past and the present. Brameld says, "The reconstructionist would agree ... with those interpreters who regard economic interests as more basic than all others." There is a significant difference, however, between "the materialistic interpretation of history" in reconstructionism and in dialectical materialism. The reconstructionist specifically rejects the "dialectical" aspect of Marxist

16Ibid., p. 403.
17Ibid., p. 414.
materialism. He does not attribute to history an ingrained purpose of its own.\(^{18}\) It is not a deterministic philosophy in the sense of accepting a teleological metaphysics nor an explicit theory of monistic causation. The recurrent economic interpretations result, rather, from its "emphasis"—from its attitudes and habits of seeing the "economic" first and almost exclusively, or as Brameld later says, from "recognizing the influence of economic or other social conditions upon cultural events."\(^{19}\)

Another Marxist tenet which is repeated in reconstructionism, but with modifications here too, is the tendency to interpret history and social reality in terms of "the class struggle." The modification that this classic Marxist concept undergoes in reconstructionism is that it becomes one of the important kinds of "group conflicts" to be considered.\(^{20}\) Fortunately, also, the function of violence is omitted. In reconstructionism there is no resort to revolution to achieve a dictatorship of the proletariat; instead, the working classes are to gain control by majority rule.

There are other obvious tendencies and emphases

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\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 426.


\(^{20}\)Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 414-425.
in reconstructionism that are reminiscent of Marxist doctrine, though it is perhaps inaccurate to assert that these were actually derived from this source just on the basis of their similarity, or from the inference that the chief reconstructionist spokesman, Brameld, is expert as a student of dialectical materialism. It must be recognized, however, that the actual source of separate tendencies, that is, whether they are Marxist or not, is not a sufficient cause either to condemn or condone them. In spite of the fact that dialectical materialism as a whole has been converted by Soviet and international Communism into the present totalitarian threat to world peace and human rights, if the doctrine itself should be found to contain worthwhile elements which are extricable from its harmful mass, there should be an attempt to appraise these elements objectively on their own merits. To fall into the all-or-none, or the guilt by association, fallacies would be an error comparable to those which Communism itself promotes. The following tendencies in reconstructionism are similar to tendencies of Marxism but, to repeat, they must stand or fall on their own merits.

1. The tendency to emphasize the economic as a determinant of history, and the current social scene.

2. Adherence to the tenets of a socialized economy.

3. The tendency to stress the "class struggle" in interpretation of society and as a means to social reconstruction.
4. Belief that workers must achieve ascendance by coercive power (in this case; however, power of majority vote instead of by violent revolution).

5. Belief in a more powerful centralized state. (note: Marxism believes that eventually state power will dissolve—that dictatorship is a temporary means.)

6. Belief that the individual must submerge himself in the group will, consensus, and in group action.

The above tendencies of reconstructionism can, in most cases, find other than Marxist roots in our culture. In analyzing them, along with other parts of reconstructionism in a later place, the attempt will be made to appraise them as reconstructionist, not as Marxist, tendencies.

Reconstructionism derives certain of its beliefs, especially particular educational tenets from the positions designated by Brameld as "perennialism" and "essentialism," with perennialism reconstructionism shares the belief in "the need for logical clarity, above all for an unequivocal conception of world order and purpose." Likewise, the belief that a certain amount of inculcation is a necessary and desirable procedure in education is drawn from perennialism. Brameld asserts that from essentialism his philosophy derives a belief in various tools of

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21Ibid., p. 390.
22Ibid., p. 561.
measurement and elements of the scientific movement in education. From both idealism and realism a belief in "the 'givenness', the objectivity of the world into which we are born and upon which we must depend," is derived. From these positions, and from other sources, reconstructionism derives criticism of certain aspects of the progressive movement and of pragmatism.

Individual thinkers and writers who are not spokesmen for a systematic position have contributed richly to certain reconstructionist concepts. Karl Mannheim contributed the concept of a sociology of knowledge in his *Ideology and Utopia*. Sigmund Freud's ideas have been utilized in reconstructionism's concept of the unrational. Harold Rugg, especially in his concept of "primal awareness," contributed to the reconstructionist concept of prehension, and his esthetic theory contributed to reconstructionist ideas concerning "feeling" and the emotions. Others mentioned prominently by Brameld include Harold Laski, Lewis Mumford, Randolph Bourne, and Thorstein Veblen.

C. Theory of Reality in Reconstructionism

The ontological beliefs of reconstructionism are said to be thoroughly naturalistic, and nature is

\[\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 389.\]
\[\text{Loc. cit.}\]
interpreted as:

The world within reach of scientific experimentation and understanding, a world of disorder and order, of flux and stability, of strife and harmony.25

Beliefs about reality are called ontology because the term is said not to prejudge the nature of reality. The reconstructionist is skeptical of the term metaphysics, as are some pragmatists, for the reason that "many people associate it with some sort of elusive, esoteric art--with an attempt to discover 'realms of being' quite outside the realm of everyday experiences."26 Nor does he attempt to construct a cosmology. On the contrary, "It is one of his (the reconstructionist's) major beliefs that all philosophies, including his own, are expressions of historic and therefore temporal periods."27 Nature and experience are key concepts in reconstructionist ontology, as they are in pragmatism. In fact, Brameld cites Dewey's Experience and Nature in lieu of extensive elaboration of these concepts. Experience, however, is briefly defined as:

The pulsating, vibrant stuff of life--"things and ideals" feelings and thought, the whole ebb and flow of personality, society, earth, sky.28

It will be noted that this definition fails to highlight

25 Ibid., p. 411.
26 Ibid., p. 40.
27 Ibid., p. 425.
28 Ibid., p. 411. In fact, this definition of experience bears discernable similarity to passages in Emerson's essay, "Experience."
the interactive or transactive character of Dewey's concept of experience. Since this question is not specifically treated it will be a problem for later analysis of outcomes to determine if Brameld simply substitutes the reference to Dewey's work for a more adequate definition of experience, or if the above definition heralds a departure in reconstructionism from the central interest that pragmatism attaches to experience as a transaction between the individual and the field of his activities.

The ontology of reconstructionism is delineated from what it terms "progressive" ontology by a "sharper concentration" on "social reality" and "group experience." This is done for the reason that the work of Mead and others has tended to emphasize the psychological at the expense of the sociological and has thus tended to "short-circuit the arc of self and society." The problems designated as important to the social interpretation of ontology in our culture are (1) group conflicts, (2) group allegiances, and (3) group conditioners. Group conflicts include wars, with their primarily economic bases; intercultural conflicts; and socio-economic

29Ibid., pp. 411-412.
30Ibid., p. 413.
conflicts, in which the "class struggle" is emphasized. Group allegiance embraces primarily ethnocentric and economic class solidarities. Cultural determinants, operating within and between groups, condition them to behave in ways that are not fully explained in terms of the behavior of the individual group members, and thus explain the paradox of "moral man and immoral society." 31

Other important aspects of the ontological belief in reconstructionism are that both history and the future are basic facts of reality and that society is conceived of as an organic whole. Four beliefs of reconstructionism relating to history can be briefly stated:

1. Men become what they do because of the historic period in which they live.

2. Every period emerges from preceding periods and leads into later ones in such a way as to be influenced by the former and to influence the latter.

3. "There is no metaphysical framework within which the stages of history are compressed."

4. History has no ingrained purpose, no preordained goal for the course it takes and the goals it attains depend wholly upon the choices, the failures and successes that men make as they proceed ever onward. 32

As the reconstructionist focuses his interest on group experience his interpretations of history "assume a coloration" which emphasizes:

31Ibid., pp. 423-424.
32Ibid., pp. 425-426.
The social struggle in history is between the "first constellation of forces," those groups that strive to maintain the established socio-economic system and "the second constellation of forces," including "the great working classes of all nations—especially those sections organized for self-protection and advancement." 33

A second principle of historical interpretation which supplements that of class struggle is that of "contraction and expansion of freedom." Man's relentless effort to win a greater measure of freedom has been directed against the forces and groups that have exercised their power to lessen the freedom of others in order to possess more freedom for themselves. 34 At certain periods, this relentless effort has achieved more success than at others, thus resulting in a pulsating expansion and contraction of freedom. In terms of our present century the "forces of contraction" are characterized by dictatorship, anti-Semitism, and representatives of the inherited "free enterprise" system who insist on

33 Ibid., pp. 426-429.
34 Ibid., p. 430.
preserving their entrenched status. On the other hand, the "forces of expansion" are characterized by those who would complete participation of all groups in determining political and economic policies, extend equality to the Negro and other colored races everywhere, and widen access to the resources of earth and industry, to recreation facilities, and to art and education.

Historic groups are interpreted as exemplifying an organic wholeness, not in the strictly biological sense, but in the sense that the interaction between individuals in the groups has so operated that each individual loses his status as an individual only to regain it by becoming identified with the whole group. In modern society the principle is said to be operating through the greater collectivity that technology forces in this age, and it is deemed desirable because it can reward us with abundance, leisure, and it can help restore the individual's need for a sense of wholeness.35

Reconstructionism as a "future-centered" philosophy gives equal attention to the future along with the past and present. Brameld quotes approvingly "That which is ahead is just as much a condition of what is present as that which is past."36 Future is said to be history

36 Ibid., p. 435, quoted from Frederick Nietzsche, Harry Slochower, No Voice is Wholly Lost, p. 378.
because "history is always a duration of past, present and future," and every event that historians report was likewise so constituted for those engaged in the event. We must also recognize that since the historian always writes in the present, he is, *ever refashioning the past through his role in a temporal process which, paradoxically, is also determined by the future.*

In his emphasis on the future as an important dimension of the "indubitably real" time continuum, Brameld says,

In one sense, indeed, the future is more genuine than the present; for like the past, it is of sufficient duration to provide a degree of coherence which no fleeting present instant can ever provide.

This admonition that we should extend the present in both directions, that is, into the past and into the future, is, in simpler terms, a call to exercise "magnetic" foresight. This the reconstructionist believes will prove efficacious because,

He does not presume that the groove of the future is already mysteriously cut. He does hold that to know what the future should be like is essential to knowing what it could be like and that, if we implement our choices with power and strategy, we can determine what it will be like.

It is thus from the emphases on the future in the ontology

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37 Ibid., p. 434.
38 Loc. cit.
39 Loc. cit.
40 Ibid., p. 435.
of reconstructionism that the philosophy derives its claim as "future-centered," and it is likewise here that its utopian propensities are grounded.

In summary statement, the theory of reality of reconstructionist philosophy places it as a pluralistic naturalism with emphasis on the social. And, "...running through the entire theory of social reality is an insistent recognition that the culture has reached a crucial juncture." Ours is appraised a "crisis culture" which has reached a crucial juncture primarily through the "class struggle" between the "forces of retraction" and the "forces of expansion" pitted against each other over differences, basically economic.

D. Theory of Knowledge of Reconstructionism

The epistemology of reconstructionism like its ontology, starts out by claiming adherence to the foundations of pragmatic philosophy. First, along with pragmatism, reconstructionism proclaims a "knowledge-seeking" process that is entirely natural; it resorts to no esoteric, mystical, or supernatural devices, and it rejects all formulas claiming some proprietorship over final truth. Moreover, the methods and objectives of epistemology are determined by the earthy, experiential practical interests of men.42

41 Ibid., p. 436.
42 Ibid., p. 437.
Reconstructionism also rejects all theories of "extreme psychological mechanism" or mind substance, faculty psychologies, and the neo-Thomist theory of mind and forms of truth "forever present in the bosom of an eternally unfolding reality." The organismic conception of the whole individual responding to his environment in the "living, growing, striving" and learning situation characterizes the fundamental beliefs of both reconstructionism and pragmatism.

Likewise the reconstructionist's conception of mind appears to come directly from pragmatism. The position Brameld sets forth conceives mind as not a thing, it is a name for special ways of dealing with human situations and problems, of which the intelligent or reflective way, identified with scientific method, is one—and one of great importance.

In the above passage the "is one" phrasing in the words "of which the intelligent or reflective way . . . is one," is the key to "additional emphases" in the reconstructionist theory of knowledge which are of such a nature as to change the whole theory of knowledge, and render it more different from, than similar to, pragmatic theory.

The "additional emphases" in the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism, which constitute a change

43 Loc. cit.
44 Loc. cit.
of direction of sufficient extent actually to constitute a new theory, include the role of "goal seeking"; what Brameld calls "prehension" and Rugg calls "primal awareness"; the role of the "unrational"; the roles of "ideology" and "utopia"; "truth-seeking as social consensus"; and the "group mind as end and means." These additional emphases will be considered below.

1. **Goal-Seeking in the Theory of Knowledge of Reconstructionism.** The role of goal-seeking in reconstructionism is an important, even a crucial, one. Brameld assigns goal-seeking the lead-off position in his theory of knowledge, although at first glance it would appear to belong primarily to axiology. By goal-seeking the reconstructionist means, first, just what psychologists --especially organismic or Gestalt psychologists--have long meant by the term, that man is a goal-seeking animal and that goal-seeking is the motivation or explanation for human behavior. But the reconstructionist means more than this. His goals are the ends, both individual and social, and the "seeking" is an employment of means to these ends. The preeminence attached to "goal seeking" in reconstructionism is thus matched by the importance attached to the means-ends relationship, and means-consequences, in pragmatism. Agreement between pragmatism

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and reconstructionism also includes a rejection of supernatural or deterministic ends or "goals (toward which man is propelled) fixed in his being as though they were the inevitable ends of his very destiny."46 But here the agreement between reconstructionism and pragmatism in this crucial area is almost at an end.

The reconstructionist, in speaking of goals or ends, does not insist on a common name for them, accepting under this category a variety of terms including, "wants," "drives," "interests," and even "basic appetites," "necessities of life," "deepest 'wishes'," and "human 'cravings'."47 What is significant is that these ends, by whatever name, are "definable." The argument is that enough is now known that they can be specified in advance. By marshalling enough knowledge in anthropology and sociology, philosophy and social psychology, politics, economics and the like, the goals of "most people in the world of our time" can now be specified and listed. To the reconstructionist this specifying of the goals of most people of our time is not just a dilettante exercise. Instead, Brameld insists that "it has now become imperative to specify the ends of human nature precisely because it has become imperative to specify the goals of our

46 Ibid., p. 441.
47 Ibid., p. 442.
Further elaborating this necessity he writes:

In our modern era men struggle to realize certain purposes — purposes that need not remain forever elusive and undefined but that can and must be "spelled out" as magnetic, definite targets of cooperative human effort. Fused together, they are capable of generating the intense white light of guidance and the heat of concerted democratic action toward a reconstructed culture. Seeking becomes seeking for.

Not only must ends be specified, but so, also, must the means be. Brameld says "second, it is possible to delineate not only the chief goals of most people on earth but also how they ought to seek them."50

While these beliefs of reconstructionism seem clear, it is not so easy to explain why they constitute an important part of its theory of knowledge. True, these goal-seeking beliefs are the reconstructionist's counterpart of the crucial means-ends relationship of pragmatism, the heart of the methodology that has been called the basis of whatever metaphysics one may properly ascribe to that position.51 But here the resemblance ends. Reconstructionism, in fact, reacts against what is described as the too-tentative shaping of ends in

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48 Ibid., p. 441.
49 Ibid., p. 443.
50 Loc. cit.
pragmatism, an act that leads to too great an interest in "the process or method" and too little in "the product." Brameld chides the pragmatist who "can talk about a 'planning' society, but . . . must not talk about a 'planned' society."52

The explanation for structuring the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism on the "goal-seeking process" must be sought elsewhere. We are told that three preliminary answers may be suggested as to the import of this principle to knowledge and its process. First, "how and why men wish to know, . . . (is) what most if not all knowledge is ultimately for"; second, "it is possible to delineate not only the chief goals of most people on the earth but also how they ought to seek them," and third, "goal-seeking is indispensable to knowledge and its process because it is essential to those future political, economic, educational, and other institutions and practices which themselves depend on knowledge."53

Analysis and appraisal of this and other aspects of the reconstructionist theory of knowledge must be deferred to a later place.54 For purposes of exposition it should

52 Ibid., p. 441. Reference is obviously to Dewey and Childs, Chapter II, p. 72, in The Educational Frontier, Kilpatrick (Ed).

53 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 443-444.

54 See Infra, Chapters III, IV, V, VI.
be pointed out that there are here two salient differences between reconstructionism and pragmatism. First, reconstructionism appears to ascribe to groups and to concepts autonomic qualities which pragmatists reserve for individuals and specific acts. Second, the reconstructionist's conception of the function of ends is different from the pragmatic conception, however much the nature of ends may seem to be the same.

2. Prehension as a Method of Knowing. Both Brameld and Rugg advocate and emphasize a kind of naturalistic intuition as constituting an important method of human knowing. Brameld calls this method "prehension," a term borrowed from Alfred North Whitehead. Rugg mentions the term prehension, but prefers the more descriptive term, "primal awareness." Brameld shies away from designating his concept here "intuition," as such, because the term "has too often been used to maintain supernatural and mystical doctrines," and Rugg concurs in this judgment and adds that the "world's contemptuous ridiculing of Adolph Hitler's intuitions" has given the

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word a horrid connotation.

Brameld briefly defines prehension as

The unity, the organic wholeness of natural events. It is a unified kind of awareness that precedes and succeeds apprehension.58

In further elaboration of this concept, which he specifically designates as a naturalistic method of knowing, Brameld says:

... We assert that knowledge has not one but two interdependent aspects: first, the prehended unities that are everywhere around us—in time, in the contours of the earth, or, what is most apropos for us, in the urges of men; second, the apprehensions of intelligence with which we perceive and analyze prehensions themselves.59

Brameld does not elaborate on the process which he designates as prehension sufficiently to specify its precise operation. Reference to Whitehead's use of the term prehension and Rugg's references to primal awareness do not immediately clarify the question. They highlight, rather, a need for incisive analysis into the operation of this direct method of knowing, and its implications.60

Brameld registers no concern about a possible inconsistency in claiming acceptance of the "progressive" formulation of the "experimental method of intelligence" and at the same time supplementing it with an

59Ibid., pp. 445-446.
60See Infra, Chapter III on "Prehension."
"interdependent" prehensile method of knowing. He does not deal with the question of whether the operation of "experimental method of intelligence," as it has been described by Dewey and others, precludes any "supplementing" by prehension or any other alleged method of direct knowing or intuition. Rugg does not so readily assume, however, as does Brameld, that one can both accept the method of intelligence as Dewey described it and intuition also. Instead, he pursues the less vulnerable argument that Dewey has described the process inadequately. On this basis he proceeds to "reinterpret" the "creative act." To determine if Rugg's "reinterpretation" or Brameld's "supplementing" of the method of intelligence is of such a nature as to do violence to the process itself is a problem for later analysis. Our task here has been solely to show that prehension is a part of the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism and to point out that the "future-oriented purposes of reconstructionism" need and utilize this additional method of knowing, although "prehension is itself akin to the unrational" and can serve "men as their partial cultural

62 In Chapter III, Infra.
unities coalesce in a prehended world-wide whole."64

3. **The Role of the Unrational.** In the theory of knowledge held by Brameld "the unrational" assumes a role it does not occupy in pragmatism. The attention that "the unrational" receives in reconstructionism, as one of its seven "additional emphases" in epistemology, appears to be unique to this philosophy. To find where it assumes a comparable importance one must look to Freudian psychology, to which reconstructionism acknowledges debt for much of its emphasis on the unrational.

In explanation of this concept Brameld says, "By the unrational is meant all the powers of individual and social life not circumscribed by man's rational powers."65 He simply means the non-rational powers, or those not attributable to the rational behaviors of individuals (or groups). He states the reason for not using the more familiar term, *irrational*, as follows:

> We prefer to use the term *unrational* rather than *irrational* to avoid the negative connotation that the latter often carries—a connotation of irresponsible passion, of stupid impulsiveness, even of violence . . . . While such experience sometimes possesses the invidious characteristics of the irrational, it is not to be so construed under all circumstances.66

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It is made clear that in giving attention to the unrrational, as the antithesis of the rational, reconstructionism is not here continuing the opposition of modern philosophies, especially pragmatism, against the historic rationalism of Descartes and others, in which "reason" is set up as a separate source of knowledge independent of experience, that is, independent of interaction with the object in the "external" world. Reconstructionism joins pragmatism in rejecting this kind of rationalism.  

In the reconstructionist concept of the unrrational --i.e., not rational--the meaning of the term rational is the ordinary non-philosophic sense of the word. Rational in this case appears to apply to behavior that is examined, considered, self-conscious, reflective; whereas the unrrational is that behavior not under intellectual control. The unrrational includes indiscriminately all such unreflective behavior, without reference to either approval or disapproval of it. Although the culture expresses distrust and disapproval of this kind of behavior, as indicated by the "negative connotation" of the term irrational, the reconstructionist does not, in all cases, condemn it. Instead, an attempt is made to emphasize its potency in human motivation, to understand

67 In portions of Patterns of Educational Philosophy Part Two, dealing with "essentialism" and "perennialism."
and control it. In addition, it is held that there is the need to utilize it in "deepening and vitalizing" the attainment of knowledge, especially that having to do with "the precise nature of wants--of man's restless seeking for goals."68

As indicated above, if the "unrational" of reconstructionism can be said to have a precedent it is to be found in "the monumental work of Sigmund Freud."69 In recalling the Freudian terms id, ego and super-ego, concepts used by Freud in explaining human behavior, the unrational of reconstructionism most resembles the id, in the "wholly unconscious sphere of passions, a cauldron of seething excitement."70 Whether the "unrational" as here referred to is altogether a counterpart of the id, or also includes aspects of the ego, it is, in any case, contained in the Freudian concept of the unconscious.

Freudian comparisons with the unrational of reconstructionism are not fully satisfactory, however. As Brameld points out, Freud's interest was primarily in the individual. His aim was to understand and cure mentally and emotionally sick people, and although he dealt with the family and other aspects of the social milieu,

68 Ibid., p. 447.
69 Loc. cit.
he studied them only as they impinged on the individual and his aberrations.

Unlike reconstructionism, Freud's primary concern was not to diagnose and cure a sick world society, but to deal with its human constituents individually. Although his detractors have criticized the monotonous uniformity of his diagnoses and prescriptions, contrasting these with the infinite variety of symptoms and personalities in patients, at least he modestly restricted his psychoanalyses to individual cases. He did generalize his findings, but refrained from converting them into mass panaceas for groups or segments of society. On the other hand, the unrational of reconstructionism is specifically defined to include both "the powers of individual and social life not circumscribed by man's rational powers." When the unrational operates on the cultural, rather than the individual level, however, it is best explained in terms of the conflict between ideology and utopia, two important concepts in reconstructionism.

4. The Roles of Ideology and Utopia. The reason for including "ideology" and "utopia" as an "additional emphasis" in his theory of knowledge is stated thus by Brameld:

71Ibid., p. 447 (Italics mine).
There is need for a "sociology of knowledge"—a new kind of epistemology built upon the premise that all major patterns of thought may be classified according to what degree they are either defenders of, or critical deviates from, a given culture.72

To the extent that a pattern of thought defends the cultural status quo it is "ideological." Those patterns of thought that critically deviate from current ideology are designated "utopian." Thus the two are in more or less a permanent state of conflict. Brameld defines the former as:

The term ideology means any complex of attitudes, beliefs, ideas, customs, that articulate more or less systematically as well as accurately the structures and practices of the whole or important parts of the culture. It is the prosaic word-picture, fashioned by the people of any tribe, country, or period, on their own level of enlightenment to serve as an ostensibly reliable expression of the dominant institutions, habits and customs of the culture.73

We most often apply the term ideology to patterns of thought of other times and places and assume that it carries a heavy burden of misconception. But this is not always true. Not only did Nazi Germany have an ideology, but, in this use of the term, so does contemporary America. The term as used here approximately designates a prevailing "word-picture" of any culture, whether this picture is more or less complete and accurate or superficial and naive. As Brameld points out: "Clearly, ideology

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72Ibid., pp. 454-455. (Italics in original.)
73Ibid., p. 450. (Italics in original.)
should not be thought of invidiously; it may take the form of a refined and sincere effort to depict an age to itself."74

Two features of ideologies are depicted as especially pertinent to reconstructionism. First, ideologies serve to "rationalize," justify and sanction the cultural practices and habits of a culture to itself, somewhat in the same way that an individual may rationalize his own conclusions and behavior.75 Second, ideologies are historical in that they "emerge, mature and wane," as do the cultures they express. In the youthful period of a culture they accelerate its evolution by pointing ahead, and "at the height of a culture's maturity they tend to reflect its life more accurately than at any other time."76 When cultures are in the aged period ideologies are said to play the role of,

Perpetuating beliefs, attitudes, customs, and some correlative practices, all of which parallel less and less precisely the dominant economic, political, and other structures of the culture itself. This later stage supports the theory of "cultural lag" . . .77

Reconstructionism interprets our own culture as being in the "aged period," in which ideology serves as a "powerful

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74Loc. cit.
75Loc. cit.
76Ibid., p. 451.
77Loc. cit.
device" to preserve institutions that have declined in effectiveness. The reconstructionist argues that those who stand to benefit most by the preservation of the economic order depict it as "sound and sacrosanct" and through ideological means glorify "the shibboleths of 'free enterprise' (and) 'individual initiative,'" meantime building "attitudes of self-righteousness in those who benefit most" and "habits of complacency in those who are its victims."78

As indicated earlier, the significance of ideology for the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism is that of recognizing that ideological forces, including "newspapers, churches, schools," may serve to rationalize cultural practices that are no longer accurate expressions of the culture. In this respect ideology is depicted as an influence so powerful as "to succeed on occasion in dominating, and even prostituting . . . the rational processes," and so must be included "in a broadened conception of knowledge itself."79

The conception of utopia in reconstructionism is like that of ideology in that it, too, is a conception or "word picture" of a pattern of culture. It differs from

78 Loc. cit.
79 Ibid., p. 452.
ideology in that the pattern expressed is one deemed desirable by virtue of its differences from present culture or current ideology. Brameld defines the term utopia as:

any word picture of attitudes, practices, institutions that articulates and supports a conception of culture admittedly different from the culture prevailing. . . . a utopian pattern of expression may look backward . . . more often it looks radically toward the future.80

Utopia, then, is by definition a conception of a culture that neither does, nor may ever, exist. Utopia remains in reconstructionism, as it was when Sir Thomas More wrote of it, the designation of an imaginative scheme of things, designed as a superior alternative to present culture and current ideology. Whether More derived the term from the Greek ou toopia, not a place, or from eu topia, a good place, it is still both of these according to reconstructionism.

How is it then that utopia, a land of nowhere, enters into the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism? We are told that utopia must be "understood in terms of how it operates in historic situations."81 We should recognize that utopias are never, and could not be, built "out of the blue." They always include elements of ideology. More than this, even in their distinctive features, a utopia is designed to remedy undesirable

80 Loc. cit.
81 Loc. cit. (Italics in original.)
features of present culture and ideology. So a utopia is no less a product and an interpretation of a culture—though a negative one—than is an ideology. And, too, utopia and ideology are more nearly separable logically than actually, since the one grades into the other in a "spectrum." Furthermore, "the utopias of one historic period may become the ideologies of the next,"82 and it is toward this self-sacrificing fate that the utopianism of reconstructionism aspires.

We begin to see the role of utopia in the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism when we recognize that this, like other aspects of its theory of knowledge, exists, not because it was just found to be true or to exist, nor "as a dilettante exercise in future looking," but because it was conceived to serve a reconstructionist purpose. Its purpose is to oppose and eventually to replace current ideology. We are told that: "The utopian order that now increasingly demands our commitment is one built by and for the constellation of the forces of expansion."83 It is important that the utopian order be "apprehended" but also it "should be apprehended and inspired by the irrational as well."84 Emotional support and fervor, despite

82See Ibid., p. 453.
83Ibid., p. 454. Note that Brameld means by "the constellation of the forces of expansion," "the great working classes" and their allies.
84Loc. cit.
"controllable" dangers, should be marshalled for the utopian order.

Though antithetic, it seems clear that utopia occupies a comparable position in reconstructionist theory with ideology. Both have been advanced by Mannheim85 as important elements in a "Sociology of Knowledge," and these concepts fit well into the overall purposes of reconstructionism. Ideology consists of a complex of ideas which tend to defend present culture and impede progress toward the goals of reconstructionism. Utopia is a complex of ideas which are built on the basis of the reconstructionist's objections to present culture and ideology and, hence, embodies the goals of reconstructionism. These ideas, although "axiological," as well as "purely epistemological," are not to be judged on the basis of whether they are true or false, so much as whether they advance or interfere with the goals of reconstructionism. Those accustomed to thinking of "knowledge" primarily in relationship to its truth or falsity, can perhaps better understand this changed emphasis in reconstructionism after consideration of the next section on "truth-seeking as social consensus."

5. Truth-Seeking as Social Consensus. One of the

85In Ideology and Utopia.
most distinctive emphases in the theory of knowledge of reconstructionism, and one which significantly affects its value theory and its ontology as well, is its theory of "truth seeking as social consensus." The reconstructionist is not interested in arguing, Brameld tells us, "that social consensus is the criterion of truth," but he does insist that:

The truth of those experiences most vital in the social life of any culture are determined, not merely by the needful satisfactions they produce, but also by the extent to which they are agreed upon by the largest possible number of the group concerned. Without this factor of agreement or consensus, the experience simply is not "true." Brameld's reference to "needful satisfactions" apparently refers to his conception of the pragmatic criterion of truth, while the reconstructionist additional method of truth seeking is through agreement or social consensus. He does not elaborate on the "needful satisfaction" criterion, apparently taking it for granted, but he does offer arguments in support of the role of social consensus. He says that "there is nothing strange about the method. All science presupposes agreement." A quotation from Charles Peirce is cited as offering support for the social consensus:

86 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 456.

87 Loc. cit. (Italics in original.)

88 Ibid., p. 458.
consensus theory of truth, but there is some reason to doubt that Brameld has interpreted Peirce correctly.\textsuperscript{89}

Brameld notes that there are practical difficulties in the operation of social consensus, since "social consensus turns out to be too often the consensus of a part of some group."\textsuperscript{90} He does not, however, appear to doubt the efficacy of the method in yielding a valid form of truth when it operates properly. Emphasizing the importance of the method he says,

\textit{for those crucial purposes of goal-seeking and future making, it should be his (the reconstructionist's) most important single criterion.}\textsuperscript{91}

Brameld refers to the "progressivist method of truth-seeking through experimental intelligence"\textsuperscript{92} as indispensable, but he does not come to grips with the problem of how to resolve the difficulty should the two methods yield conflicting versions of truth. Apparently the social consensus variety of truth is taken to be a more valid or "objective" kind.

The importance of having testimony about evidence is that it takes the prehensions, id-like desires, and goals of men and groups out of their inner personal sanctuaries. Instead of continuing to be purely private, inscrutable, and merely subjective, the

\textsuperscript{89}See analysis in Chapter VI, \textit{Infra}.


\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., p. 457.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p. 456.
aim is as far as possible to make them public, expressible, and in this sense objective. 93

Truth becomes, we might then say, the utopian content of a group mind. It is any social consensus about the dominant goals of, and means to, the reconstructed culture. 94

The reconstructionist's proposed method of truth-seeking by social consensus or agreement appears to call for inquiry, both from the standpoint of its ability to yield truth and the possible dangerous implication of assuming that truth may be created or sanctioned by majorities or groups. 95

The treatment of seeking truth by the method of social consensus, and the supporting arguments, highlight the question of what the reconstructionist may mean by experience. Brameld reiterates his acceptance of "progressive" conceptions of experience and asserts that reconstructionism is a naturalistic, experiential philosophy, based on experiential intelligence. Nevertheless, several references point to the conclusion that the conception of experience on which reconstructionism is based is of a subjective nature, yielding a kind of personalism, and not a genuine experimentalism. Reference was made above to Brameld's reference to truth by "needful satisfaction,"

93 Ibid., pp. 457-458.
94 Ibid., p. 470.
95 See Infra, Chapter VI.
though then Brameld seemed to be leveling a criticism at pragmatism. He also refers to the need of testimony to take "evidence" out of the inner "personal sanctuaries" of individuals, and render it "in this sense objective." Further, he refers to "the truth of experiences," "the experience simply is not true," etc. Obviously he cannot be here using the term experience in a strict Deweyian sense as a name for the transaction between individual and object, for in this sense experience is simply had. It is not had as true or false. Experience is a road to what is true, provided the object side of the transaction is not neglected, but it is not clear how experience itself is either true or not true. The term experience in reconstructionism obviously refers to something else, and calls for inquiry.96

6. The "Group Mind" as Ends and Means. In proclaiming the "group mind" as ends and means the reconstructionist is not advancing still another new epistemological principle. Instead, he is using this method of synthesizing the six principles already advanced: namely, goal seeking, prehension, unrationality, ideology, utopia, and truth-seeking as social consensus. Inasmuch as the term "group mind" is confronted not only in the theory

96See Infra, Chapters III, VI.
of knowledge of reconstructionism, but also in its axiology and elsewhere, it is appropriate here to further identify this concept. The conception of "group mind" is related to the reconstructionist's theory that "history is organic," although reconstructionism recognizes, and specifically points out, that

Societies are not organisms in any literal sense, so the group mind has no meaning as a mysterious entity that exists, in and of itself, and with characteristics totally different from those of individual minds.  

After thus delimiting the conception of group mind, it is further pointed out that although group mind is not "different in kind from the individual mind, the degree of difference achieved is often of far-reaching significance." Whereas individuals can often isolate themselves and analyze,

as objectively as possible, the forces at work within and upon them and thus attain reflective judgments, . . . groups are much less successful in achieving such dispassionate isolation.

Contrasts between the behavior of groups and that of individuals—even of the same individuals that make up the groups—have been pointed out by many students of social psychology. The emphasis has been, however, to stress

98Ibid., p. 466.
99Ibid., p. 467.
100Loc. cit.
101See Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts and Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom.
the unreliability of the judgments reached by the "group mind" and to point out that the lack of "reflective judgments" results in "mob psychology" and behavior often so violent, unreasonable and immoral as to be of a character to which individual members alone would not likely stoop. Although reconstructionism recognizes that the "group mind" is subject to these excesses and dangers, its chief inference is that the group mind need not "submit to such configurations, certainly not those of our own culture." The group mind can be utilized for social reconstruction. In this connection we are told that,

103 Ibid., p. 469. (Italics in original.)
104 Ibid., p. 469. (Italics in original.)
In summarizing, the reconstructionist distinguishes between knowledge and truth. Of the former he says,

Knowledge is a term to designate the body of agreed-upon experiences utilized by past and present cultures. It is therefore, the group mind in the sense of ideological content. . . .

Truth, on the other hand, is "the utopian content of a group mind." As has been indicated above, ideology and utopia are two warring elements in our culture, and so, in a sense, we must infer that the "content" of "the group mind" of each is in opposition to each other. Here, then, we find the interesting spectacle of a theory of knowledge which places truth not only in opposition to the culture in which it exists but to its own conception of knowledge.

E. Beliefs About Value in Reconstructionism

The axiology of reconstructionism concerns itself more with enunciating what its values specifically are than with value theory per se, i.e., how values originate and operate in individual and social behavior. Actually, the belief that the function of value theory should be primarily that of arriving at the content of values that should be held in our time seems to be a constituent part of the reconstructionist's theory of values. One need not be content, however, with simply relating what the

105Ibid., p. 469.
explicitly stated values of reconstructionism are. It is possible to discern something of the method of valuation.

First, in relating the content of accepted values of reconstructionism one can hardly do better than quote directly Brameld's summarization of them. He presents not only their negative counterpart but, also, their positive form.

(a) Most men do not want to be hungry; they cherish the value of sufficient nourishment.
(b) Most men do not want to be cold and ragged; they cherish the value of adequate dress.
(c) Most men do not want uncontrolled exposure, either to the elements or to people; they cherish the value of shelter and privacy.
(d) Most men do not want celibacy; they cherish the value of sexual expression.
(e) Most men do not want illness; they cherish the value of physiological and mental health.
(f) Most men do not want chronic insecurity; they cherish the value of steady work, steady income.
(g) Most men do not want loneliness; they cherish the value of companionship, mutual devotion, belongingness.
(h) Most men do not want indifference; they cherish the value of recognition, appreciation, status.
(i) Most men do not want constant monotony, routine, or drudgery; they cherish the value of novelty, curiosity, variation, recreation, adventure, growth, creativity.
(j) Most men do not want ignorance; they cherish the value of literacy, skill, information.
(k) Most men do not want to be continually dominated; they cherish the value of participation, sharing.
(l) Most men do not want bewilderment; they cherish the value of fairly immediate meaning, significance, order, direction.106

This list of values is presented as a "bare minimum" of those about which he claims there now exists a

106 Ibid., pp. 477-478. (Emphases in original.)
consensus. It is also recognized that this is by no means
the only possible way of stating them, since they can be
specified at both a higher and lower level of generality.
Further, it is recognized that "some of these values seem
contradictory to others."107 This is in part explained by
the fact that human beings may be too complex to be
altogether consistent organisms and further by the fact
that it may be necessary to attain them alternately or
successively. These explanations of the inconsistencies
are not to be taken as evidence of any fault with the
method of listing values wholesale and with a high degree
of specificity. It is recognized that,

It is unnecessary to compress the complex facets of
human nature within a single mold; such would in any
case, be both a forlorn and colorless ideal. Our
task is to build a culture wide and dynamic enough
to allow human nature room for its exciting
multiplicities.108

It is one of the reconstructionist's chief contentions,
nevertheless, that it is a primary need of our times to
determine as precisely as possible what values to achieve.

The twelve reconstructionist values listed above
are raised to a higher level of generality and are said
to be embraced in "one great synthesis," designated by the
"slightly cumbersome" but "supreme" value, "social-self

107 Ibid., pp. 478-479.
108 Ibid., p. 480.
realization." The principal values encompassed in social-self-realization are said to be "demonstrable and accepted by large numbers of individuals and groups," and the "fullest possible evidence of science" can be utilized to support them. The findings of biology and psychology, including both social and industrial psychology, of anthropology and the fine and applied arts are cited as offering support to the operation of social consensus in the establishment of the constituent values of social-self-realization.

The question of where and how the reconstructionist's values originate, implicit in the above discussion, calls for further examination. First, negatively stated, there is explicit denial that values are "absolute, separate, and unique" and opposition is expressed to any theory that sets them off as such. Thus it is that reconstructionism claims agreement with pragmatism in rejecting other-worldly sources, and theories that seek values that are absolute, self-evident, or ends-in-themselves. It may be said that human experience is the source of values for both philosophies, provided we recognize that these positions do not interpret experience identically. Starting out from this common source, the two philosophies seem to hold

109 Ibid., pp. 480-481.
110 Ibid., p. 473.
a distinctly different conception of just how values arise
--at least there is quite a difference in the two
descriptions of the genesis of values. In the first
place, there is the difference, already mentioned, in the
role of value theory in a philosophy. The
reconstructionist sets out first to specify what the values
of most people of our time are or should be, whereas the
pragmatist examines the nature of human experience, first
that of the individual, to determine just how one comes to
engage in valuation in "an on-going stream of events."

Perhaps the most significant difference in the way
values are arrived at and held in reconstructionism and
pragmatism is highlighted in the way they are said to be
tested in each of these philosophies. Brameld says,

As they are tested by evidence, communication and
agreement—that is by social consensus—values come
within the province of truth and falsehood.

The evidence referred to appears to be of the documentary
kind that we are told psychology, anthropology, etc., can
supply. In contrast to testing by documentation,
communication and agreement we shall see that,
according to the pragmatist, values are tested—tested
and revised as need be—in direct action of individuals

\[111\] Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 34.
\[113\] Infra, Chapter VII
in the ongoing stream of events, without the necessity of mediation by the sciences mentioned, though these sciences, working within the stream of events, are highly relevant as they bear upon situations in which valuing is done.

The development of a theory of the source of values is not the chief concern of axiology in reconstructionism, however, nor is it even that of delineating the content of values, though the latter is done perhaps as well as it may be with the method used. The problem of pivotal concern is "overcoming the cultural contradictions and frustrations that prevent them from being realized." Brameld emphasizes that this is a "time for commitment to values." We are told that we should be prepared to take sides now. Thus it is that the axiology of reconstructionism blends into its theory of politics. Here it is that the reconstructionist's conception of majority rule, minority rights and popular government are developed. And it is here that the reconstructionist's conception of democracy finds its chief elaboration.

1. **Democracy and Reconstructionist Theory of Value.**
Reconstructionism differs from pragmatism in that the former does not identify democracy with a way of life, nor does it place the achievement of democracy in any broad

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sense high on the agenda of its proposed reconstructed culture. Instead it is said that "democracy is to politics what social-self-realization is to axiology," and both are said broadly to mean:

Complete self-government, but now (in the proposed reconstructed culture) in the comprehensive sense of the people's utmost control and utilization of the material and non-material resources that are offered by a culture to itself.

After we are shown that the reconstructionist's conception of democracy "broadly means" control and utilization of the material and non-material resources of the culture by the people, we see next what the modus operandi of reconstructionist democracy is to be. Brameld says

We are restating here the principle that, above all others, should distinguish democracy formally from other forms of political order--the principle of majority rule.

Majorities are effected when the widest possible number of citizens hear, see, and otherwise share testimony and then reach a consensus. Majorities are recognized as agreeing on the bases of both rational and unrational grounds, and even though it is specifically noted that majorities are often misled, it is contended, nevertheless, that, if we accept democracy, we must accept also the belief that no more reliable or ultimate criterion of practical social

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116 *Loc. cit.*
judgment can be found than majority rule. The rule of the majority also extends into the realm of values, as majorities are held to be the supreme judge of values.118

The increased power proposed for majority rule by reconstructionism raises the question next as to the rights of minorities. Brameld assigns to minorities the primary function of critic, "to prevent tyranny by the majority," a heavy burden considering the power of majorities and the way their commitments are arrived at and held—by "agreement." It is significant to note here, however, that the more fully the criticism of minorities "is supported by facts and experimentally tested hypotheses" the more dependable will be their attained consensuses. Thus it appears that the reconstructionist proposes for minority proposals a more strenuous, but sounder, test than that to which majority proposals must submit. Majorities are described over and over again as engaging in various verbal forms of reaching a consensus, "communicating," "sharing testimony" and documentary evidence, etc.—but seldom does the reconstructionist suggest the method mentioned for minorities, that of actually trying out to determine what is good or what is true.

It is appropriate here to point up further some of

118Ibid., pp. 485-486.
the distinctions between the reconstructionist conception of democracy and that which has been developed by pragmatic writers. First, Brameld defines democracy in terms of a single specific economic arrangement in which the people control the "material and non-material resources." This conception is not substantially at odds with other materialistic doctrines which make economic considerations the criterion of democracy, such as Marxism or classic socialism, nor does it substantially differ in this respect from doctrines of the right which place "property rights" above "human rights." This points up the fact that in this respect reconstruction is a close relative, though also the avowed enemy, of those who identify the "American way of life" with a limited interpretation of "free enterprise."

In contrast, Bode, in describing "democracy as a way of life," points out that it is "no longer a name for compartmentalized political beliefs" nor does it undertake to set predetermined metes and bounds for beliefs and for purposes, but rather provides a basic principle by which these are to be judged. To have life and have it more abundantly becomes a matter, not of conformity to any final standard, but of continuous growth in the capacity to lift this principle of common interests and purposes out of its various and everchanging contexts and to make it the basis of a consistent way of life.

119 Although Chapter II is primarily expository, several paragraphs of the alternative pragmatic point of view concerning democracy are inserted here for the reason that this study does not provide for a more extensive analysis of the concept of democracy in subsequent chapters.

120 Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 51-52.
He points out further that "flexibility in social organization is an essential trait of democracy"\(^{121}\) and elsewhere that

the principle of democracy, respects . . . the best insight that we have, up to date, as to what is required for the fullest development of the individual.\(^{122}\)

It is Bode's contention that "common interests have the right of way over special interests, and that the continuous expansion of our common life is the final test of progress. Social organization of every kind is just machinery for this end."\(^{123}\) Just as Brameld's definition of democracy rules out possibilities that do not embrace a socialized economy, so Bode's conception of democracy (and likewise that of Dewey, Hullfish and others) would seem to rule out as authentic democracy any conception that limits the possibilities in advance to a single social orientation. Thus the pragmatic view seriously questions any theory that appears to treat democracy itself as but a means to a predetermined end such as achieving a socialized economy.

2. Reconstructionist "Normative Blueprints".

\(^{121}\)Ibid., p. 57.


The reconstructionist's blueprints are, as Brameld suggests, "the specific outlines of the institutions and practices--economic, scientific, educational and others--that should be drawn to serve as guides to the culture of the future." Blueprints are proposed not only to serve as "crystallized policies" to be used in political action, but to serve as the framework for its proposed program of education, to be described later.

Although the following quotation is long there appears no fair and accurate way to depict the intent of the reconstructionist's blueprints other than to quote verbatim from Brameld:

1. **An economy of abundance**, to:
   (a) satisfy wants of the consumer rather than to win profits for the producer;
   (b) assure full employment for all citizens, in accordance with their abilities and interests, and under working conditions determined through their own organizations;
   (c) guarantee minimum income for all families sufficient to meet expertly determined standards of adequate nourishment, shelter, dress, medical care, education, recreation;
   (d) utilize all natural resources and all enterprises of monopolistic tendency in the interests and under the control of the majority of the people.

2. **A service state**, responsible for:
   (a) unifying and socializing major industrial and agricultural enterprises of the economy of abundance;
   (b) integrating and supervising transportation and communication systems, utilities, health and other public services;
   (c) maintaining a balance of strong federal authority and direction with strong local or regional administration and participation;
(d) providing legislative, executive, and judicial representation in direct coordination with the chief occupations and purposes of the citizens represented.

3. A scientific society committed to:
   (a) subsidizing pure and applied scientific research as a chief need and interest of the service state;
   (b) making technological, medical, and all other scientific, discoveries available to, and controlled in, the interests of the economy of abundance;
   (c) assuring complete experimental freedom to the scientist, but also assuming his direct concern for and responsible to the public welfare;
   (d) utilizing large numbers of men and women, trained in the social sciences, for democratic leadership and governmental service.

4. A cultural design to:
   (a) allow esthetic participation in remaking the culture by as many creative individuals and groups as possible;
   (b) express organic, functional unity and direction in the planning and reconstruction of homes, cities, agricultural regions, recreation centers;
   (c) encourage artistic talent and reward creative achievement as a public responsibility, but also encourage the same complete freedom of expression that is assumed for the scientist;
   (d) offer tax supported facilities and works of fine and applied arts (music, drama, movies, painting, architecture, decoration and others) to all citizens as a public privilege.

5. An educational system:
   (a) supported heavily by federal taxation, supplemented by local resources, and controlled by the service state;
   (b) offering completely free, universal, education from the nursery school through the university and adult levels;
   (c) gearing curricula, teaching, guidance, and administration to the purposes of the economy of abundance, service state, scientific society, and esthetic order;
   (d) bringing newspaper, radio chains, and other instruments of public enlightenment into direct cooperation with education and under similar controls.
6. A human order, which:
(a) regards sexual expression as a positive value of great power and beauty;
(b) protects and encourages family life (traditional forms of which may conceivably require reorganization in order to achieve maximum fulfillment) as a medium of devotion and belongingness, but also as a way of sharing interests, both within and between families;
(c) provides complete security and rich companionship to citizens old age, and to the helpless or retarded;
(d) guarantees full participation in all phases of cultural life by members of all minority groups.

7. A world democracy, dedicated to:
(a) agreement among the great and small nations that national sovereignty must now be subordinated to enforceable international authority;
(b) inclusion of the exploited peoples of colonial territories within the widening social consensus of peoples committed to the reconstructed culture;
(c) maximum educational, scientific, esthetic, and economic intercourse between nations including a free flow of immigration and emigration;
(d) application internationally of all principles enunciated in the six blueprints above.

It is not strictly accurate to consider the reconstructionist's blueprints, outlined above, as the means to his values or goals, listed earlier. In the first place, there is no very closely geared connection between them, although the blueprints are presumed to be compatible with the values, and are indeed "designed to satisfy" values. Brameld calls attention to the difficulty of equating values with blueprints and attributes this

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difficulty to the greater permanence of the former and the need for allowing a "certain evolutionary flexibility" for the latter. It will be noted that perhaps the greatest connection between the reconstructionist's values and blueprints is that they both are derived from the same source and in the same ways; ostensibly from the findings of "physical, biological, psychological, sociological, and psychological knowledge" about which there is a "minimum of consensus," but actually from the proposals of the reconstructionist for whom Brameld is spokesman.

Should it come to pass that both the reconstructionist's values and his blueprints are accepted by majorities, there is still the question as to whether this is a sufficient connection to satisfy the necessary integrity of a functional means-ends relationship.125

It can be seen that proposed policy is a more accurate characterization of reconstructionist blueprints. The policies are, in actuality, nearer to goals or ends than to means, but since they are ends that are not at the same time very clearly means to something else they become (to some extent at least) ends-in-themselves. They are, in any event, ends to which legislation and education are conceived as means.

125See Infra, Chapter V.
3. **The Cultural Myth.** Reconstructionist axiology considers, as its final important section, the role of the cultural myth, already anticipated earlier in the discussion of the roles of ideology and utopia. In addition to pointing up the potency of mythology in human history and even in present culture, Brameld cautions that it is "over-hasty to conclude that the myth has always been, or need be, an iniquitous devise ..." On the contrary, recognizing that reconstructionist blueprints lack the "magnetism, the warm feeling ... (the) quality of the religious" needed to secure wide acceptance and enthusiastic support, he proposes that reconstructionist values and blueprints be imbued with a consciously and concertedly built mythology. This, we are told, would serve the purposes of energizing the blueprints, would provide the "spirit of commitment, zeal, and emotion" and would serve as a cultural therapeutic by providing "a constructive aim in which we can join and for which we can fight, knowing that we are once more on the side of righteousness." The possible harmful effects of the spurious separation of "warm emotion" from "cool intellect" in reconstructionism are examined in Chapter IV.

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127 *Loc. cit.*
F. Educational Proposals of Reconstructionism

It has been noted already that at its present state of development reconstructionism is primarily a philosophy of education, but this is true in a different sense from Dewey's observation that philosophy may be "defined as the general theory of education." Reconstructionism is primarily a philosophy of education in the sense that its present principal advocates, Brameld and others, are educationists, and as such have directed their attention primarily toward educational problems. Reconstructionism is also principally a theory of education in that schools—the public schools primarily—are envisioned as the instrumentalities, along with politics, of achieving the utopian goals of reconstructionism.

These facts may point to the supposition that the educational beliefs of reconstructionism require more elaborate exposition than any other part of the philosophy, but such is not the case. Although Brameld has written more pages in Patterns of Educational Philosophy and elsewhere on specifically educational problems than on other phases of reconstructionism, it is necessary here to describe those educational proposals that are distinctively

reconstructionist. Much of what Brameld proposes is not distinctive. As he points out, he is willing to accept most of what is practiced and proposed as progressive education, especially in elementary school. There is also the tendency to propose as reconstructionist theory much that is already accepted as desirable "progressive education." It becomes necessary here, therefore, to winnow out that which is distinctively reconstructionist, or to point out the reconstructionist's emphases that are to be superimposed on existing theory and practice. On examination it is apparent that what is distinctively reconstructionist is almost precisely that which is designed to achieve the social and economic goals of reconstructionism. Specifically, the problems thus included are: the school as social vanguard; the role of the propaganda, inculcation, indoctrination and defensible partiality; reconstructionist curricular proposals—primarily for secondary education; and control and administration of education.

1. The School as Social Vanguard. First, Brameld criticizes the schools of today because they are so predominantly controlled by conservative and reactionary elements in our culture, and because they tend to reflect and perpetuate the ideology of an acquisitive and profit-motivated society. He cites and draws support from
spokesmen from Plato to the present who have depicted education as visionary or utopian, and he utilizes the criticism of those who have castigated education for its subservient role. But he does not jump—at least not directly—to the assumption that the schools can proceed to build a social order antithetical to the kind that supports them. We find reconstructionism at this point confronted with a dilemma which, although here oversimplified, can be best shown by these abbreviated statements:

(a) Reconstructionism advocates a planned socialistic social order sharply differing from, and in opposition to, present capitalistic society.

(b) Reconstructionists accuse the present schools—with rare exceptions—of subservience to, and perpetuation of, the present social order.

(c) Reconstructionist educational theory recognizes that schools should and must reflect and support the society in which they are located—even more, they should be in an "organic relationship" with the community even more than are present schools.

(d) Yet reconstructionism proposes to "channel the efforts of schools" in a very direct way into reconstructing the social order so as to achieve the proposed socialized economy, and other reconstructionist goals.

It is interesting, if not altogether logically satisfying, to see how this dilemma is resolved. Although not stated in these blunt terms, the gist of the reconstructionist argument runs somewhat as follows.
School boards, and hence administrators, do not at present represent the people as a whole very well because they are most often chosen from middle and upper income groups with a vested interest in the status quo. There is little if any representation from the "second constellation of forces"—organized labor, farmers and the working classes generally. The latter groups represent a majority and their interests are tied up with the kind of society proposed by reconstructionism. If these groups were properly represented, and if they really knew their own minds and best interests, they would support—even demand—the kind of school program advocated by reconstructionism.

Although the above contains a couple of "ifs," it must be noted that the weakest point in the reconstructionist position here revolves around the question of getting from the present unsatisfactory situation to that future happy state of affairs when the schools help build the recognition in communities that they should support the kind of schools which help them achieve "social-self-realization." The way to cut the Gordian knot between the present and the utopian future is not convincingly shown. There is no apparent "blueprint" specificity here. Yet it must be observed that virtually every distinctive educational proposal advanced appears designed to achieve or further the envisioned reconstructed culture.
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2. Propaganda, Inculcation, Indoctrination, and Defensible Partiality. One of the most difficult areas to understand—and one of the most controversial—in the reconstructionist's aims and methods of education is that in which propaganda and inculcation are accepted with qualification, while indoctrination is rejected, and "defensible partiality" is proposed and defended.

Brameld defines propaganda identically in two places as

A "short-cut" devise for influencing attitudes and consequent conduct. It attempts through colorful symbolization rich with suggestion (advertising displays, music, rhetoric) to persuade some individual or group directly and forcibly that a certain belief, practice, product is either desirable or undesirable. Many of the meticulous arguments and much of the specific evidence that could be mustered are therefore deliberately omitted from effective propaganda.130

The reconstructionist attitude toward inculcation, while not distinctive theoretically, seems to lean more toward "perennialist" education than toward progressive. In this connection Brameld says:

In the earlier years children must absorb some facts and rules by a degree of inculcation, in order to get along with any group. In high school and college, too, wherever group consensus as a principle of learning is divided into its constituent parts, inculcation of evidence (the laws of natural science, for instance) or of communication (skill in writing, for instance) is also needed temporarily.131

130 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 561. Also see his Ends and Means in Education, pp. 90-91.
131 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 561.
While it seems inevitable that some inculcation, as defined, will be practiced, especially temporarily with the young, the theory behind progressive education, to the extent that it is pragmatic, stresses that even the very young should become self-directive as rapidly as possible. Likewise, the interpretation of subject matter as instrumental and functional in problem solving in progressive theory, rather than its consideration as preparation for something later, would seem to place the reconstructionist use of inculcation nearer the "perennialist" educator than the progressive.

In his rejection of indoctrination Brameld defines this process as:

That method of learning by communication that proceeds only in one direction (from the "communicator" to the "communicatee") and is for the purpose of inculcating in the latter the acceptance of some one doctrine or systematic body of beliefs. Moreover, such doctrine is assumed by its exponents in advance to be so supremely true, so good, or so beautiful as to justify no need for critical, scrupulous, thoroughgoing comparison with alternative doctrines.¹³²

The reasons given for rejecting indoctrination are that it assumes

not only that ultimate truths and values are possessed in advance by their exponent but also that neither the sometimes cumbersome and tedious process of exposure to comparative examination nor open construction of majority agreement is essential to their own proven superiority. Hence, by its very

¹³²Ibid., pp. 559-560.
nature indoctrination is in sharp contrast with a philosophy that teaches men to build positive convictions only by public inspection and communication of all pertinent and available evidence and by exhaustive consideration of alternative convictions.133

Later, Brameld states that an additional reason "for opposition to indoctrination is that, "... it, too, stacks the cards by disregarding or underplaying antithetical views."134

In analyzing the reconstructionist's proposed practices to determine if the philosophy opposes indoctrination in fact as well as in theory,135 and in examining them to determine if its reasons for the professed opposition are convincing, we shall need to consider the unique concept of "defensible partiality." This concept is distinguished from indoctrination in reconstructionism and described as an acceptable, even necessary, procedure in reconstructionist method.

Concerning the "paradox of partiality" Brameld says,

What we learn is defensible simply in so far as the ends we support and the means we utilize are able to stand up against exposure to open, unrestricted criticism and comparison. What we learn is partial in so far as these ends and means still remain definite and positive to their majority advocates after the defense occurs.136

He states further that the reconstructionist differs from

133Ibid., p. 563.
134Ibid., p. 564.
135See Infra, Chapter VII.
136Ibid., p. 564. (The complete quotation in italics in the original.)
the "progressive" in that "partiality is just what is sought" but that

partiality paradoxically increases in defensibility only as it is tested by the kind of impartiality provided by many-sided evidence (unrational as well as rational), unrestricted communication by group learning, complete respect for criticism and minority dissent. 137

In practicing defensible partiality we are told that the teachers' own views are to be subjected to as searching an examination as any others, and that both he and his students should make every effort to sift out his prejudices from his convictions.

3. Reconstructionist Curriculum Design. Brameld proposes and elaborates at some length (two chapters) a "curricular gestalt" for the entire secondary school. This curriculum is designed to develop a consensus to the "relentless question," "Where do we as a people want to go?" 138 So completely does this purpose dominate the proposed high school curriculum that there appears to be no facet not permeated with it. It may prove instructive to note a few illustrations of why it is considered so important to get an answer--and the right answer--to this one question that four years of the student's time, between ages 17 and 20, "the crucial period when most young people

137 Ibid., p. 565.
138 Ibid., p. 575.
are crystallizing their plans for mature responsibilities, should deal primarily with this one consideration.

The reconstructionist proposes that the ceiling age for compulsory education be raised to twenty. The "reconstructed" secondary program would then constitute the last two years of the conventional high school and the two years now included in junior college. The school day would be divided into four main periods of one and one-half hours each. The first of these large blocks would be devoted to "discussion groups study" of the "central area" and the third period to "general assembly study of the central area." The other two periods would be devoted to "skill, content, or vocational study," but would not be unrelated to the central area. The curriculum is characterized as the "wheel curriculum," adapted from the core curriculum. Each of the four years is represented by one wheel, but these are held together by the "central theme or carriage." The "hub" is rather large, occupying approximately one-third of the daily schedule and the spokes and rim the other two-thirds.\(^1\) We are also told that "the 'substance' of the hub is identical for all four wheels, in that the theme of the secondary school remains the same from beginning to end."\(^2\)

\(^{139}\)Ibid., p. 570.
\(^{140}\)Ibid., p. 571.
\(^{141}\)Loc. cit.
The first year has two chief objectives: "(1) to provide motivation and orientation to the plan of the entire secondary program, and to build a sense of its importance; (2) to examine the need for, and character of, the goals that are most required in the sphere of economic-political reconstruction." 142 Year two has as its goals: "(1) to specify the main problems, methods, needs and goals of the area of science in its bearing upon the guiding theme of the curriculum; and (2) to do likewise with the area of art." 143 The two-fold theme of the third year is "where do we as a people want to go--(1) in the organization and practice of education, (2) in the organization and practice of our relations to one another as human beings." 144 The goals for the fourth and final year are: "(1) techniques and strategies of attainment, (2) reconsideration of all major areas of study, looking toward final synthesis." 145

No distinctive design for elementary education is proposed. Instead it is suggested that practices are "strongly progressivist," and elementary schooling is extended both downward to include universal nursery schools

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142 Ibid., p. 575. (Italics in original.)
143 Ibid., p. 586. (Italics in original.)
144 Ibid., p. 595. (Italics in original.)
145 Ibid., p. 603.
and upward to include the conventional junior high school.

The reconstructionist's proposals for higher education include building more thoroughly upon the bases established in the secondary school, adding "psychological research in human wants," "sociological research in the substitution of public for private enterprise," "philosophical research in the history of utopianism, or in reconstructionist axiology," and the like. Teacher education is also included, though not in the "obsolete" manner now practiced. Primary concern is given to "the philosophic, sociological, and psychological relations of education--treated always in the context of a revolutionary culture."  

4. Administration and Control of Education. An extensive program of adult education is proposed; to help the organized worker or farmer enunciate the full implications of his own values . . . . to show him where he is under the influence of ideologists—or perhaps demagogic utopians; and to help him develop means whereby he can implement organized consensus that equate majority interests with majority rule.

The educational beliefs of reconstructionism, as outlined by Brameld, advocate that teachers organize into strong teachers' unions and seek affiliation with organized labor. He argues that labor's interests are already

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146 Ibid., p. 616.
147 Ibid., p. 615.
148 Ibid., p. 618.
identified with a reconstructed social order to the extent that these interests are clear and articulate, and that teachers can help organized labor to further clarify, unify and articulate these, its own best interests. In return, the great masses of laboring people who constitute a majority, are just those whose support is needed by teachers in order that they may accomplish the educational goals of reconstructionism.

A distinctive educational proposal of reconstructionism is the advocacy of the federal control of education, in addition to advocating a generous program of federal aid to education. Brameld insists that federal control of education has become a "bugaboo," and contends that it is both a necessary and a desirable concomitant to federal aid. It would enable education to operate under a strong "F.E.A." (Federal Education Authority). Such an F.E.A. could utilize "centralized authority--decentralized administration" somewhat in the manner of the T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Implicit in the argument for strong federal control for education is the recognition that presumably teachers would be better able to withstand the pressure of local recalcitrant "ideologists" provided they had a strong centralized authority.

\[149\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 663 ff.}\]
This expository statement has been over-long but this has been necessary to bring into the open the many relevant aspects of the philosophy of education under consideration. Brameld has engaged in an ambitious undertaking and the emphases he places are worthy of a further, more critical examination, the purpose of the next six chapters.
CHAPTER III

PREHENSION AND EXPERIENCE

I am aware that it is now not unusual to say that the value of experimental method is such a familiar commonplace that it is not necessary to dwell upon its implications; that putting it in antithesis to the theory of immediate knowing is but a case of slaying the dead. I wish this were so. If it were, I should feel that I had accomplished a large part of the purpose I set out to accomplish, and that philosophy would henceforth be free from this phase of epistemological doctrine. But I find the belief in immediate knowledge still flourishing . . . \( ^1 \)

John Dewey, 1939.

Prehension is clearly one of the most distinctive of the reconstructionist's seven "additional emphases" to the theory of knowledge. At first glance prehension appears to be either distinctly more than, or less than, an "additional emphasis" to the pragmatic theory of experiential knowing. There is, therefore, the need to determine as decisively as possible the meaning of this concept and discover how it is assumed to operate as a method of knowing. There is also the question of its compatibility with the method of experiential knowing to which it is an "addition." A further need, if inquiry reveals an incompatibility, or enforces doubt as to the operation of prehension as assumed, is to determine the

results and implications of the assumption of such a method of knowing.

A. Prehension

It will be necessary to note first what Brameld means by prehension. His most succinct definition is:

We shall mean by prehension the unity, the organic wholeness, of natural events. It is a unified kind of awareness that precedes and succeeds apprehension.

Brameld gives the name "prehension," a term borrowed from Whitehead, to the kind of intuition which Rugg calls "primal awareness." Both Brameld and Rugg admit that this special road to knowledge is a kind of intuition, but both give reasons why they "shy away" from using the term "intuition." Brameld says that intuition "has too often been used to maintain supernatural doctrines" and Rugg says:

What I shall call primal awareness—a name suggested by Miss Wild's careful study (Intuition)—has been badly called "intuition." Badly, I say, not only because it has been given a horrid connotation by the world's contemptuous ridiculing of Adolph Hitler's "intuition," but because the pragmatic critics have

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almost invariably assumed that it implies a supernatural source of knowledge, that it is "esoteric," "transcendental" . . . . The approach . . . is based on naturalistic studies of human experience.  

Brameld deals all too briefly withprehension, and much of what he does say relates to the need for such a method of knowing and its use in "the future-oriented purposes of reconstructionism." He neglects the crucial questions of the possibility of such a method and the details of its operation. For that reason we must consider his sources, particularly the ideas of Rugg and Whitehead. Brameld implies, and Rugg specifically states, that prehension is "based on naturalistic studies of human experiences." It will be necessary, therefore, to make some analysis of experience, especially of how knowing does occur. In this attempt the incisive analyses of experience by Dewey will be utilized.

It is important to note, first, that prehension is not proposed as a total substitute for "apprehension" or the accepted reflective methods of knowing. Instead it is a supplementary or additional method. According to Brameld

>This emphasis on the total awareness of prehension does not mean that reflective, scientific analysis is not also, perhaps even more important . . . .

We take occasion here to reiterate our deep regard

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5 Rugg, Foundations for American Education, pp. 218-219. (Italics in original.)
Both Brameld and Rugg insist that they accept the method of knowing that is variously called "intellectual," "scientific method" or "reflective thinking" as it is described, for example, by Dewey in *How We Think* and elsewhere. But both also insist that there is an additional method of knowing. As Brameld expresses it:

> Therefore we assert that knowledge has not one but two interdependent aspects: first, the apprehended unities that are everywhere around us—in time, in the contours of the earth or what is more apropos for us, in the urges of men; second, the apprehensions of intelligence with which we perceive and analyze prehensions themselves.

Rugg states his assumption in a similar way:

> I cannot escape the conclusion that the act of knowing consists of two phases: the primal awareness of the organism as a whole and the documentation via the separate senses with specification and clarification through verbalization.

### B. Some Limitations

Before we attempt to examine "prehension" or "primal awareness" as a direct or primary method of knowing we should specify some limitations. On the one hand, the validity of the method of knowing that Brameld and Rugg

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7Ibid., pp. 446-447.
list second is not here at issue. Brameld calls this "apprehensions of intelligence," Rugg, "documentation." We shall call this "reflective thinking," the method of intelligence, or simply the reflective method. We shall need to examine the reflective method, not in any exhaustive sense, but sufficiently to demonstrate that any valid knowledge alleged to come fromprehension may come from reflection. Further, we shall need to analyze reflective method sufficiently to demonstrate that its operation precludes the existence of any such direct method of knowing asprehension. This delimiting process is necessary because Rugg, in his enthusiastic documenting of primal awareness, includes some interpretations of "intuition" that are but instances or phases of reflective thinking. For example, he cites examples of "insight" and documents examples of mathematicians grasping a difficult solution with remarkable precision. Cases of inventors shouting "Eureka" after flashes of insight, and of composers assembling their masterpieces with almost miraculous rapidity and precision, are cited.\(^9\)

These cases need not be questioned, nor examined. It is known that human thinking can be marvelous and varied, and that is all these cases prove. Our point of emphasis here is the cognitive connection of the individual with

his environment.

The precise operation of "flashes of insight" may still remain an unsettled problem and one deserving further study. Unfortunately, the analysis of such a process is tremendously more complicated than, say, the dissection of a frog in the laboratory, for unlike the frog the process is not dead and static. The material to be studied does not "stay put" during the process, and it is not possible to achieve the objective separation of observer and the observed as is possible in non-human subject matters. The unsolved problem of insight, generalization, and other reasoning processes should not enter, however, into the issue of prehension or primal awareness. Whatever mental processes are involved with insight or reasoning, at any rate they are not "primal"—they do not deal with the initial transaction between knower and know. Instead, these processes deal with the mental elaboration of data which are already possessed in the most rudimentary way. The very fact that insights, solutions, or conclusions frequently come when one is in comparative isolation from the primary data—when one is asleep or in contemplation, for example—is an indication that the subject matter involved is already at that stage possessed by the individual, undoubtedly a product of prior experience. Neither do these facts appear to be those at issue, for both Brameld and Rugg advance prehension (or primal
awareness) as the first method of knowing; it is alleged to happen prior to the method of experiential knowing, which the reconstructionist accepts as described by pragmatists. The question under investigation then is not an analysis of insight, but whether or not prehension or any method of direct intuition whatsoever, can take place prior to, or alternative to, the primary stages of experiential knowing as the latter has been described by Dewey and accepted by the reconstructionist.

On the other hand, we should limit the analysis to genuine methods of human knowing. Rugg documents "feeling," "subjective tone," "set" and other emotional factors that may be included in the general term, attitude. As we shall see presently, these are prerequisites to knowing, but they do not constitute knowing. Nor is knowledge gained directly by the five senses—not even if the member is extended beyond five, as Rugg suggests, in postulating nine sense receptors. Individuals are directly and cognitively connected with the environment by the senses, and only thus, but these are "mechanical" connections and they supply stimuli—"cues," not knowledge. Physics and chemistry adequately explain the "mechanical" connections. Light enters the eyes; vibrations affect the

10 See Rugg, Teacher of Teachers, pp. 181-182 where he lists the senses as: sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, temperature, pain, equilibrium and feeling.
ears; chemicals in the air and in liquids come in contact with the nose and taste buds; touch is sensitive to pressure, friction, warmth, etc. There are no esoteric connections, no mysterious forces involved.\textsuperscript{11} There is an abundance of evidence, some of it experimental, to the effect that the senses supply "cues," but perception is a function of the transactional experience of the individual and the environment. The individual supplies perceptions from prior experience based on his best prognosis of what the cues supplied by the senses reveal about the environment. Based on laboratory findings of the Hanover Institute, Earl C. Kelley reports:

The first of these demonstrations serves to show that we do not get our perceptions from the things around us, but the perceptions come from us. Since they do not come from the immediate environment (the present), and obviously cannot come from the future, they must come from the past, they must be based on experience.\textsuperscript{12}

Findings of the Visual Demonstration Center at Ohio State University are in agreement with those reported by Kelley.\textsuperscript{13} Although these findings are based primarily on

\textsuperscript{11}The experiments with extra-sensory perception at Duke University are inconclusive and controversial at the present stage.


studies of vision, it is safe to conclude that other senses likewise can do no more than provide cues for a prognosis of aspects of the environment. Gardner Murphy reports from experiments on the development of perception in infants and children that increasing ability to differentiate, beginning with "one great 'blooming buzzing confusion'," is primarily an expression of experience rather than neural growth, and he concludes that:

Much of the process of individual perception depends on the force of past wants, the person's need to disentangle and restructure in terms of the situations with which he has had to cope. The fact remains, however, that we have learned to perceive as we do ...

Having set limits on each side of our problem by undertaking to exclude some of the marginal meanings of the ambiguous term "intuition," we can better examine the possibility of the central concept. We need to delineate further just how knowing does arise in experience, utilizing the explanation claimed by both pragmatists and reconstructionists, before we can examine and evaluate intuition, or what Brameld, Rugg and Whitehead tell us about "prehension."

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16 Ibid., p. 339. (Italics in original.)
C. Knowing and Meaning

Dewey describes traits of space and time in terms very much like those used by Whitehead in describing the simpler aspects of "prehension":

Space here is joined to space there, and events then are joined to events now; the reality is as much in the joining as in the distinction.

But Dewey explicitly denies that "the simpler relationships that are by definition termed physical" are or can be directly known. Continuing in the context above, he says

In order to control the course of events it is indispensable to know their conditions. But to characterize the conditions, it is necessary to have followed them to some turn, which is not fully followed till we arrive at something enjoyed or suffered, had and used, in conscious experience.

In denying that we can directly know the existent Dewey points out that "immediacy of existence is ineffable." Before they can be known things first must be "had," suffered or enjoyed. There is no occasion to know any

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"Things are separated by space and are separated by time; but they are also together in space and together in time, even if they are not contemporaneous. I will call these characters the separative and the prehensive characters of space-time."

18 Loc. cit.

aspect of existence as it is "in the raw," so to speak. Knowing is a natural ability developed to mediate those natural events which make a difference to the knower. And those that make absolutely no difference of any kind, need not, and cannot, be known. And of those that do make a difference, the way they make the difference, their being directly had, suffered or enjoyed, precedes their being known, for it precedes their having meaning which is an ingredient of their being known.

More than this, their being had, suffered or enjoyed is the occasion for their being known. In this connection Dewey says:

"Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of sensation of ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with them."\(^{20}\)

We know that man finds himself living in an aleatory world,\(^{21}\) a world of risk; uncertain, unstable, inconstant, sporadic and episodic. But it is also a world containing order, recurrences, repetitions and some stability. Both the instable and the stable traits of nature are the ground for knowledge, for the former make it necessary and the latter make it possible. In general terms, knowledge is an instrumentality developed in nature to mediate

\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 86.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 41.
hazards in such a world. Life is a gamble. The overall purpose of knowledge is to render life less a gamble—or a better gamble—than it could be otherwise.

Feeling is a prerequisite to knowledge. In one definition Dewey says feeling

is a name for the coming into existence of those ultimate differences in affairs which mark them off from one another and give them discreteness.22

The organism simply feels or has those events in nature to which it is in any way related. Following the principle of continuity, of course, it actually has everything, but some events are more direct and some are more remote in space or time. Even inanimate and non-sentient things have or "prehend" other things without feeling. But sentient organisms have some things to enjoy or suffer. The suffering or enjoying of a thing is what dispells its ineffability. This suffering or enjoying need not be the intense or prolonged kind that we often use these words to designate. There are no words to designate the blander or milder kinds of sufferings or enjoyings which nevertheless may be sufficiently intense to raise things and events out of the mist and mass of undifferentiated reality—"pre-reality" in one sense of that ambiguous word—up to the level of significance to the organism.

Only through enjoying or suffering, either mild or intense,

22Ibid., p. 267.
is there a need to attach meaning to the thing or event so that it can be repeated or avoided, ended or prolonged, mediated or controlled in some way.

This attaching of meaning to a thing or event is the first step in the knowledge process. How meanings are built up out of prior experience--impossible with inanimate things and lower organisms which have no prior experience--is a story that has been well told by Dewey, Mead, and others. Meanings grow and ramify each other, are connected with signs, symbols, gestures, and words (although sometimes loosely) and thus meanings enrich the latter and are in turn enriched. Thus meanings become the raw material for reflection and communication, for the sharing of experiences. But when meaning is attached to a "thing in its immediacy" the thing itself may have passed on already or receded into ineffability. But meanings do persist. They are objective or "universal" qualities and so can be shared and communicated, as things in their immediacy cannot. Dewey says:

Immediacy as such is transient to the point of evanescence, and its flux has to be fixed by some easily recoverable and recurrent act within control of the organism, like gesture and spoken sounds, before things can be intentionally utilized.24

23 In Dewey, Op. cit.; Mead, Mind, Self and Society; also see Kilpatrick, Selfhood and Civilization.
The office of meaning is to lift an event from blank ineffable immediacy to the realm of the universal, to objectify it, so that it may be known, communicated, thought of, and perhaps controlled. The term "universal" as used here does not imply any transcendent substance or power, nor does it mean everywhere and everywhen. It does mean that universal qualities like meaning can be extended in time and space—not literally, of course, but metaphorically—and can be thus shared by different individuals, as brute existent "things" cannot. "Things" must remain just where they are (except for physical transporting) and events in their immediate occurrence are chopped off in time by their beginning and ending.

The meanings of "things," their universal qualities, can be shared to some extent by individuals in distant places, and the meanings of events are retained in memory, sometimes long after their actual ending. The fact that meanings can be projected into the future in prediction accounts for much of the difference between intelligent and unintelligent creatures. (In referring to projection into the future and recalling from the past, again one must resort to figurative language. Actually all such projection and remembering is necessarily a function of the organism in the present. No mysterious force is hypothesized which actually permeates time and space). Always, however, it is the thing in its meaning that is known (which is to say,
an object of knowledge) not the thing in its immediacy. Things, as they exist in inference, become "objects" of experience or knowledge. There can be no evidence that they exist otherwise. And this is not a loss, for we have no concern with them otherwise.

In seeking the fundamental roots of knowledge we can dig no deeper than meanings. Beyond and below that is the unknown and unknowable. It is true that in naive experience we behave "as if" the Aristotelian principle of identity, "A" is "A", were literally true; that is, we identify a meaning with its existent referent. When we consider the distinction between a meaning and its referent, that is between an existent thing or event and the object of knowledge derived from it, it is understandable that only the meaning or object of knowledge can be universal and sharable. Only through the intrusion of some esoteric or magic power could the existent referent itself thus be sharable and objective. Even the realist does not conceive of pre-existent or "independent" reality as objective and sharable, and as constituting true objects of knowledge. Instead, he usually constructs a separate rational or universal realm (and even then he is at loss to explain how he connects this realm with the assumed real world).

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The idealist escapes this dilemma by denying the existence of these assumed real things, assuming instead that they are but constructs of mind. He, in turn, escapes solipsism only by constructing a realm of objective mind or pre-existent order.

Our present concern, fortunately, is not the resolution of these difficulties in the area where epistemology and metaphysics meet—an area that has plagued philosophers for generations. The issue under discussion is between reconstructionism and pragmatism, two philosophies which presumably share a common worldview in the context where this problem lies. Brameld specifically rejects both idealistic and realistic assumptions and claims adherence to the "progressivist formulation" of "the experimental method of intelligence." 26

The foregoing paragraphs do not purport to depict a complete theory of the knowing process. The attempt is limited to an outline of a plausible explanation of how the fundamental initial phases of the knowing process originate. There is here no necessity to proceed beyond this stage for it is in the initial stages of knowing—the relation between the knower and material known—in

26 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 445. Brameld's assertion that he accepts pragmatic ontology and the "progressivist's formulation" does not necessarily bind him to the present writer's interpretation, however. Interpretations may vary, but the facts and processes under interpretation constitute an objective meeting ground, could we but reach it.
which prehension (and "primal awareness") are presumed to operate. The above discussion seeks to offer a more plausible explanation of how knowing may originate than that offered by prehension or primal awareness. The theory of experiential knowing described is also submitted as a process so integral in its own operation that, if it is a true explanation of what takes place, it can be seen that the operation of any method of direct knowing or intuition as an alternate or supplement is precluded. This argument may be better understood when the nature of primal awareness or prehension, and the manner in which they are assumed to operate, is better understood.

D. Primal Awareness

In the case for "primal awareness" Rugg marshals a variety of diverse supporting evidence. He says that

The most obvious witnesses are products of the world's history of creative thought and expression. Talented men in all centuries before the "scientific method" became a conscious formulation in the seventeenth, used intuitive methods of creative expression and reflective thought . . . . They produced . . . the Parthenon, . . . the Taj Mahal . . . The Iliad . . . the Sermon on the Mount . . . Shakespearean sonnets and plays . . . throughout fifty generations before they perfected the higher mathematics and that systematic way of experimentation and investigation known today as "the scientific." This was the "intuitive" method of combined thinking and feeling that I have referred to as "primal awareness." 27

It is certainly true that reflective thought did not begin after Dewey and others described it. Had this been so there would have been nothing to describe. What Dewey, for instance, did, was describe what had been happening in increasingly better ways during the fifty generations to which Rugg refers. Rugg seems to advance the argument that reflective thinking began only after it was better understood. When "primal awareness" is nothing more than "combined thinking and feeling," in the absence of any better descriptions of the knowing process involved in these "intuitive" accomplishments, we must attribute it to ordinary experiential knowing and thinking which operated at each stage of history according to the insights available at that time.

Rugg makes much of K. W. Wild's book, *Intuition*, in both his two recent "documentations" of primal awareness. But Brameld, who embraced most of Rugg's "evidence" for prehension, significantly omitted reference to this study, even in the bibliographies. Brameld appears willing to reach out almost anywhere except heaven for support for prehension, and this is precisely where Miss Wild gets most of her support for intuition. Miss Wild studies the works of Bergson, Spinoza, Croce, Jung, Whitehead, and

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others searching out references to: "Religious Intuition," "Moral Intuition," "Aesthetic Intuition," "Genius," "Teleology" and "The Values." While she found plenty of support for her belief in intuition in these writers, much of it required supernatural sanction. Even then her findings in the body of the study appear much less conclusive than are her final conclusions from which Rugg quotes. She follows a logic somewhat similar to that which Rugg himself uses in this case. She has sought out writers who expressed beliefs and opinions of the kind she was attempting to establish, and she has used these to document her case. But she overlooked her most impregnable argument. She could have based her belief in intuition on intuition itself. Instead, she drew her strongest secular support from Whitehead (but as we shall see, this is neither purely secular nor naturalistic).

Most of the remainder of Rugg's "bare sampling of the large body of testimony" is either of the kind where "flashes of insight" or extraordinary genius, such as that displayed by Galileo, Henri Poincare or Charles Peirce, "solved" problems in "one of these intuitive flashes of meaning." While he is documenting both the "new creative


act," to be discussed later, and the "prior method of knowing," he cites and quotes avant garde writers and artists, including some in the "cult of unintelligibility" and those of the "New Criticism." Of these writers Rugg says:

Waldo Frank and the younger exponents of the New Criticism make much of the fact that this pet way of thinking of the pragmatists excludes from their minds the possibility of any other way of knowing than that through the reports of the separate senses. They exclude the prior method of knowing, which a long line of philosophers and psychologists (Spinoza, Bergson, Croce, Whitehead) have accepted, namely the intuitive one. Frank makes a profoundly important point.31

And here and elsewhere Rugg appears ready to follow Frank, as he seems to follow Wild, in grasping for supernatural support. He approvingly quotes Frank: "... the authors accepted and extolled the concept of the individual without the Divine which alone makes him whole and true."

Elsewhere Rugg says on his own account:

The real tragedy is that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the ablest minds of the Great Tradition, while turning their backs on the religious quality in the Great Tradition, created a new religion of their own and spread it around the world . . . we call this modern religion by various names—empirical rationalism, pragmatism, positivism—but all are of the same pseudo—scientific intellectual outlook.33

31 Rugg, Teacher of Teachers, p. 138.
32 Waldo Frank, Chart for Rough Waters, p. 54. Quoted by Rugg, Teacher of Teachers, p. 138.
33 Rugg, Teacher of Teachers, p. 138.
As Rugg's "prior method of knowing" is studied it becomes increasingly clear why "pragmatic critics have almost invariably assumed that it implies a supernatural source of knowledge."34 Indeed, when one distills out the normal reflective aspects of the "prior method," it seems that what remains, if anything, is a hunger—though perhaps an unfulfilled hunger—for supernatural support. It seems appropriate to conclude this examination of "primal awareness," therefore, with the observation that "this modern religion by various names—empirical rationalism, pragmatism, positivism," can do no more, under any of its names, than dismiss Rugg's case for lack of substantial evidence. He can find support, however, in many older creeds. But if he accepts this support he should recognize and acknowledge where it is coming from.

E. Whitehead's Intuitive Knowing and "Prehension"

Whitehead's prehension is less transparent than Rugg's primal awareness; unfortunately, far less so.35

35See Wm. J. Desmond Minogue, The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1960. Among the findings of Minogue's extensive study is the statement: "Whitehead's metaphysics, whether or not it satisfies his own criterion of a coherent logical necessary system of ideas, is full of richly suggestive and profound insights. It is regrettable that for the most part his theory of organism is written in language which is technical and ambiguous. The power and beauty of his ideas deserve a larger audience than the obscurity of his terminology will allow." p. 117.
We must give attention here to Whitehead's conception of intuition, his assumption that "the body as a whole becomes directly aware of the external world," and to his concept "prehension" as well. The two are not synonymous, and it appears that Brameld has borrowed both, all of the former and part of the latter, failing to discriminate between them, and calling all of what he has borrowed "prehension."

First we must notice, as Minogue has done, that Whitehead's philosophy has much in common with that of Dewey. Both philosophies are based on a respect for science and a recognition of change (process). Both replace static conceptions of nature with relativity and field-force explanations of matter in terms of energy. Both attribute the knowing process to experience, and initially at least, both conceive of experience as occurring in like situations with similar constituents. For example, both see experience as the subject-object relation and both recognize the emotional basis of experience. Whitehead says of experience:

This deduction (Descartes') presupposes that the subject-object relation is the fundamental structural pattern of experience. I agree with this presupposition, but not in the sense in which subject-object is identified with knower-known.

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I contend that the notion of mere knowledge is a high abstraction, and that conscious discrimination itself is a variable factor only present in the more elaborate examples of occasions of experience. The basis of experience is emotional . . . . The Quaker word "concern," divested of any suggestion of knowledge, is more fitted to express this fundamental structure . . . . With this interpretation the subject-object relation is the fundamental structure of experience.37

Noting these similarities should not, however, lead one to the false conclusion that there are no significant differences. For example, in the above description of experience there is no description of the "relation" between subject and object. A relation is not necessarily a transaction; a relation can be almost anything, as is well illustrated in Whitehead's philosophy. Perhaps a more significant difference is implied in the above passage. Whitehead's conclusions about experience, and most other aspects of his philosophy, like Descartes', are deductions, whereas Dewey's approach is inductive. Dewey starts his reasoning from empirical observations, whereas Whitehead starts from abstract ideas. This fact is best illustrated in Whitehead's statement:

John Dewey asks me to decide between the "genetic-functional" interpretation of first

In refusing to decide, Whitehead proceeds with an attempt to reconcile the two methods, but what the reconciliation amounts to, in effect, is that the "genetic-functional" is swallowed up into the "mathematical-formal" system. This appears to occur throughout Whitehead's philosophy. To the extent that Dewey's and Whitehead's philosophies appear to coincide the similarities are superficial. Fundamentally they are quite different.

Whatever we may discover that Whitehead means by "prehension," it can be asserted with assurance that he does differ drastically with Dewey in his assumption that knowledge is directly intuited. This assumption is found throughout his writings even when he is not explicitly discussing the knowing process. Whitehead says, for example:

The faith in the order of nature which has made possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper faith. This faith cannot be justified by an inductive generalization. It springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as disclosed in our immediate present experience. There is no parting from your own shadow. 39

Dewey's challenge is reprinted as "Whitehead's Philosophy" in Problems of Men, pp. 410-418.

Dewey insists that immediate present experience is ineffable, yielding first only enjoyment or suffering, as a prerequisite to meaning which is itself a prerequisite to knowing. Elsewhere Whitehead states categorically: "All knowledge is derived from, and verified by, direct intuitive observation." If this were true, it would short circuit the whole process of building up meanings from prior experience through utilization of the cultural environment, and it would shift the burden of the possibility of sharing and objectivity to some natural principle of continuity which operates without benefit of socially derived meanings. This shifting is precisely what appears to happen in Whitehead's philosophy. His philosophy of organism appears to be, among other things, a metaphysical explanation of how direct intuition may take place. In brief, all organisms, from the lowest organizations of protons, electrons, molecules, etc., on to the highest, such as living plants and animals, are organized into "societies" and "societies of societies." Through the doctrine of "immanence" we see how some aspects of "mind" are assumed to permeate the whole of nature, including the non-living. Concerning immanence Whitehead says:

41 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 228.
42 Ibid., p. 246 ff.
This is at once the doctrine of the unity of nature, and of the unity of each human life. The conclusion follows that our consciousness of the self-identity pervading our life-thread of occasions, is nothing other than knowledge of a special strand of unity within the general unity of nature. It is a locus within the whole, marked out by its own peculiarities, but otherwise exhibiting the general principle which guides the constitution of the whole. This general principle is the object-to-subject structure of experience. It can otherwise be stated as the vector-structure of nature. Or otherwise, it can be conceived as the doctrine of the immanence of the past energizing in the present.43

Without further elaborating the philosophy of organism it is of interest to us to note Whitehead's view of the role of his metaphysics:

These metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive. Their justification is to be sought (i) in our direct knowledge of the actual occasions which compose our immediate experience, and (ii) in their success as forming a basis for harmonizing our systematized accounts of various types of experience, and (iii) in their success as providing the concepts in terms of which an epistemology can be framed. By (iii) I mean that an account of the general character of what we know must enable us to frame an account of how knowledge is possible as an adjunct within things known.44

Whitehead's thinking in this instance appears to be thoroughly circular; not in the good sense in which all thinking can be said to be circular,45 but in the sense

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43Ibid., p. 241.
45Dewey, in Introduction to The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, by Sidney Hook, p. 4, "There is an important sense in which all conclusive thinking is circular and is justified by its circularity; it brings us back at its close to the material which formed its starting point, enabling us to see it as a contributing and enveloped member of an inclusive whole."
that two dubious conclusions depend upon each other for support. Abbreviating, it appears here that Whitehead has constructed a metaphysics to support the epistemological theory of direct intuition of knowledge, while the metaphysics itself is justified or tested, in part at least, by knowledge alleged to be directly intuited. Minogue, in his thorough study of Whitehead, concluded:

> It may be said then that the difficulties noted in Whitehead's epistemology may be explained by reference to metaphysical principles (which exist mainly for this purpose), but the price of explanation at one point is contradiction elsewhere.  

Elsewhere Minogue points up four "Conspicuous inconsistencies" and concludes, on the basis of these and ambiguities and "obscurity of terminology" that

> . . . it is fairly safe to predict that the philosophy of organism may not be a sound basis for a theory of education.

Without any pretention that Whitehead's involved metaphysics have been traced to their limit, we can take Whitehead's candid word for where such tracing will lead:

> Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, there is required a principle of limitation. Some particular how is necessary, and some particularization in the what of matter of fact is necessary. The only alternative to this admission, is to deny the reality of actual occasions. Their

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47 Ibid., p. 93.
48 Ibid., p. 117.
apparent irrational limitation must be taken as a proof of illusion, and we must look for reality behind the scene. If we reject this alternative behind the scene, we must provide a ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial activity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation, and his existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality.

In this argument the point to notice is, that what is metaphysically indeterminate has nevertheless to be categorically determinate. We have come to the limit of rationality.49

It thus appears that we cannot take Brameld's and Rugg's protestations seriously when they insist that in borrowing Whitehead's intuition they are embracing a method of knowing which is thoroughly naturalistic and experiential. For, as can be determined from Whitehead's statements, his method of direct knowing rests only on itself and on his metaphysics, and his metaphysics when pressed to the "limit of rationality" depends on God for whose nature no reason can be given.

Thus far this examination of Whitehead's direct intuitive knowing has made no specific reference to Whitehead's term "prehension" borrowed by Brameld to designate the intuitive method of knowing. An examination

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of Whitehead's writing, by no means exhaustive, discloses that Whitehead in using the term "prehension" intends not a single meaning, intuition, but nine. These follow:

(1) "Prehension" or "togetherness" of natural events without reference to knowing processes.

(2) rudimentary types of "knowing" by lower types of organisms such as plants and simple animals.

(3) to designate connectedness of occasions or entities in experience without regard to consciousness.

(4) feelings.

(5) non-sensory perception or direct intuition.

(6) uncognitive perception.

(7) prehension of sensory-perception, "sensa".

(8) in combinations or unspecified selections of the above seven.

(9) in senses other than the above.

Sample illustrations of the above uses of the term "prehension" by Whitehead keyed to the numbered meanings above are as follows:

(1) Things are separated in space and are separated in time; but they are also together in space and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these characters the separative and the prehensive characters of space and time.50

(2) The Philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into components with equivalent completeness of actuality.

50 Whitehead, Science and The Modern World, p. 64.
The cell can be considered genetically and monophyletically . . . In the genetic-theory, the cell is exhibited as appropriating, for the foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of which it arises. Each process of appropriation of a particular element is termed a prehension.

Accordingly, on the Leibnizian model, I use the term "prehension" for the general way in which the occasion of experience can include, as a part of its own essence, any other entity, whether another occasion of experience or an entity of another type. This term is devoid of suggestion either of consciousness or of representative perception.

Feelings are the positive type of prehension. In positive prehension the datum is preserved as part of the final complex object which "satisfies" the process of self-formulation and thereby completes the occasion.

Thus the mental cognition is seen as the reflective experience of a totality, reporting for itself what it is in itself as one unit of occurrence. This unit is the integration of the sum of its partial happenings, but it is not their numerical aggregate. It has its own unity as an event. This total unity, considered as an entity for its own sake, is the prehension into unity of the patterned aspects of the universe of events. Its knowledge of itself arises from its own relevance to the things of which it prehends the aspects. It knows the world as a system of mutual relevance and sees itself as mirrored in other things.

I will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive.

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53 Ibid., p. 301. Also see p. 297 "I analyze Feeling (or prehension) into . . . etc."
55 Ibid., p. 70.
(7) "Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you see here are those real ones which you suppose exist at a distance." Accordingly there is a prehension here in this place, of things which have a reference to other places. 56

(8a) An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object; and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a subject. Such a mode of activity is termed a "prehension." Thus a prehension involves three factors. There is the occasion of experience within which the prehension is a detail of activity; there is the datum whose relevance provokes the origination of this prehension; this datum is the prehended object; there is the subjective form, which is the affective tone determining the effectiveness of that prehension in that occasion of experience. 57

(8b) The philosophy of organism in its account of prehension takes its stand upon the Cartesian terms "realitas objectiva," "inspectio" and "intuitus." The two latter terms are transformed into the notion of a "positive prehension," and into operations described in the various categories of physical and conceptual origination. A recurrence to the notion of "God" is still necessary to mediate between physical and conceptual prehensions, but not in the crude form of giving a limited letter of credit to a judicium. 58

(9a) The notion of the prehension of the past means that the past is an element which perishes and thereby remains an element in the state beyond, and thus is objectified. That is the whole notion. 59

56 Loc. cit.
58 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 78.
(9b) Here I am saying that rejection is a form of prehension.60

The possibility is recognized here that these separate meanings of "prehension," when taken in larger context and from the orientation of Whitehead's philosophy of organism, could possibly be synthetized into the same overall meaning. Surely when Whitehead continued to use the term with apparently varied meanings he was not simply being perverse. But in its variety of uses a common firm meaning is far from obvious. Here one is at loss to explain why Brameld would have "borrowed" from Whitehead a term with such illusive and varied meanings—if he were seeking to clarify this "additional emphasis" in the Reconstructionist theory of knowing. Indeed, if his purpose had been to hide or obscure the precise operation of the "additional method of knowing," it is doubtful that he could have found a better cloak in which to hide it than to call it "prehension."

F. Prehension in Reconstructionism

In embracing "prehension," "a term coined by Whitehead" as a direct or "immediate" kind of awareness, Brameld does not tell us how much of its Whiteheadian

60Ibid., p. 99.
meaning he also embraces, nor does he analyze the method sufficiently for us to determine how he assumes it to operate. Instead of clarification, in fact, he further obscures his meaning of prehension by saying that:

Dewey himself approaches it with his concepts of "immediate experience" and the "consummatory." 61 Dewey certainly approaches nothing that could be construed as a method of direct knowing in "immediate" experience. He has clearly pointed out that immediate experience is ineffable, and that the "consummatory" quality which follows any experience, whether reflective or otherwise, consists of feeling, not awareness. Feeling does dispell ineffability, it supplies the need or the occasion for a search for meaning. If Brameld is referring to this process, he should not confuse the issue by reference to prehension. Elsewhere he says "time, for example is prehended before and after it is apprehended" and he also mentions "The contours of the earth, or, what is more apropos for us, the urges of men." 62 He says that

Prehension plays the important role not only of grasping single unities, such as time or hunger, but of binding each one with other unities. 63

It is difficult, to say the least, to assume that one may directly know, without benefit of meanings from

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61 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 445.
62 Ibid., pp. 445-446.
63 Ibid., p. 446.
prior experience, an aspect of the external environment such as "the contours of the earth." But to assume that one may directly prehend a high abstraction such as "time," is a bit incredible. This is an example of the reconstructionist's semantic confusion mentioned earlier.

It is true that Whitehead believes that one directly intuited time, but Whitehead is in this sense a realist, and to him the abstractions in his "mathematical-formal" constructions are no less real than existent things. They are, indeed, more real. He explains things (all organisms) in terms of the "mathematical-formal" structure in the philosophy of organism.

Brameld's assumption here of the pre-existence of abstract entities is entirely incompatible, not only with his acceptance of "the progressivist's formulation" of the method of intelligence, but with many of the most cherished aspirations of reconstructionism.

If one can directly prehend, without intervention of learned meanings, an abstraction such as "time," this implies pre-existent objects in nature. If these can be mirrored, intuited or prehended, they must have a separate existence; they are not abstractions at all in that case. If they are pre-existent in nature, merely waiting an act of "prehension," what then happens to the reconstructionist's penchant for building shared purposes in "goal-seeking," valuation, and truth by social
consensus? Is this process one for merely bringing to light objects of knowledge which already permeate nature? 

The reconstructionist cannot have it both ways. Either abstractions are human constructions or they are pre-existent in nature. If they are human constructions they cannot be mirrored or intuited by any process short of magic—not even by "prehension," mysterious as that process seems to be.

If, on the other hand, objects of knowledge are all abstractions, built up by the individual through experience as a result of feeling and socially derived meanings (as pragmatists hold, and as reconstructionists ostensibly believe) where does prehension fit into the picture? Would not direct intuition of certain entities eliminate the necessity for a quest for meaning, thereby disrupting or short-circuiting the process? If prehension operates in some instances and experiential knowing in others, what principles determine which is to operate in particular cases?

The reconstructionist should recognize that whatever entities he relegates to pre-existent nature, to that extent, if he is at all consistent, his philosophy becomes more conservative. Those entities which are assumed to be pre-existent realities of nature are beyond hope of change except through natural evolutionary processes which are indifferent to reconstructionist goals.
or humanistic purposes of all kinds, except through the manipulation of physical materials in nature. Logically, such an assumption results in a fatalism rather than a "reconstructionism."

An examination of Brameld's treatment of prehension leads to the conclusion, however, that he has paid much less attention to the actual possibility of such a method of knowing, and to its ultimate effects if it were possible, than to the grasping of a scheme that appears at first sight to further "the future-oriented purposes of reconstructionism."64 We shall need to examine in another chapter the reconstructionist notions about truth-making, but it appears here that a means has been accepted to "galvanize" into action "the countless millions of young people all over the earth,"65 without examining too closely the context in which another, Whitehead, advanced it.

If more of the logical implications of prehension were grasped and weighed, doubtless the reconstructionist would reject it. Many philosophers have sought to establish some kind of intuition or direct knowing, as Dewey has shown—and as Rugg continues to document. Historically many of these have been forced by their

64Ibid., p. 445.
65Ibid., p. 740.
prior assumptions of what is mind or what is real to construct some method of direct knowing to explain how knowing exists at all. But neither Brameld nor Rugg are in this position, for both claim to understand and accept, in some areas, the very kind of knowledge process which Dewey has described as a general process applicable to all knowing.

Dewey has taken pains to show that this crucial point of transaction between knower and known is the stone over which many philosophies have broken themselves into dualisms between "internal" and "external," between subjective and objective, between mind and matter. In attempting to resolve the intolerable dualism they have almost invariably done so by encompassing all of reality either into the subject (the idealisms) or into the object (the realisms). In so doing they have made either mind or the existent a mystery which required the supernatural to solve, or have established pre-existent systems of order. Even Whitehead's ingenious philosophy of organism appears to be an elaborate logical structure, requiring the supernatural, constructed to explain the content of one word, the "relation" between subject and object. But Brameld in his claim as an experiential philosopher has denied and rejected, he says, all such structures of

66In Experience and Nature, especially.
pre-existent order, along with his denial of the supernatural. It would be consistent, therefore, were he to deny prehension, as well as all other methods of intuition or direct knowing. Dewey has warned in this connection that an assumption that the act of knowing is simply

one of recognizing or noting is certain to lead the mind astray; dialectically it breaks upon the impossibility entailed of instituting an initial act of knowing; it commits its holder to a Platonic prior intuition in the realm of eternity.®

If prehension were possible, what purpose could such a direct method of knowing serve the reconstructionist that the established method of building and sharing of socialized meanings could not equally serve? The reconstructionist places a direct social emphasis in all of his thinking, and he believes in advancing collectivity. It is difficult enough to reach genuine consensus when meanings are conceived as originating socially. How much more difficult would it be if each individual could "prehend" aspects of reality individually and directly? The difficulties in communication would be multiplied beyond hope of success. Even the reconstructionist's incessant attempts at communication and consensus, unnecessary and ineffective as they are since shared meaning does operate effectively when properly

understood, would not suffice to bridge the gap between individuals if each could directly prehend pre-existent "realities."

Only two possible explanations present themselves as to the purposes prehension may serve that shared meanings do not. Neither of these, if applicable, puts reconstructionism in a favorable light. The reconstructionist is interested in reform and, in his view, time is running out. It takes time to establish meanings; they must be built socially, and out of the complex and diverse material that constitutes human experience. Consequently, meanings are notoriously diverse and fluid, as any semanticist or student of philosophy must know. If they could somehow be made more stable, could be standardized, they could be "spelled out" and fixed with greater assurance. A simpler world would be easier to control, obviously. But, of course, this will not work completely. Things in their immediacy remain to be suffered and enjoyed whether or not they ever fully come to be known. And man, the only product of nature capable of becoming fully alive, because the only one with reflective ability, should dare to become fully alive in his world, however complex it is. Life, however aleatory, is preferable to death, however orderly, peaceful, or perfect.

The other possible explanation for the
reconstruction's need for a more direct method of individual knowing than that provided by the social explanation of meanings throws that philosophy in a poor light as an aspirant for acceptance in a democratic culture. Brameld himself is among those philosophers who have justly and accurately criticized philosophies which claim a private road to truth or knowledge. He has shown what may happen in any philosophy when individuals are presumed able to divine knowledge, either from a supernatural source or from an objective system of nature not open to all jointly in shared experience. Such alleged knowledge may be diverted by some to purposes of exploitation and subjugation of their fellows. And it appears that the exploitation and subjugation is not necessarily less ruthless and more humane when it is done in the name of liberation or some other alleged benefits for the exploited.

We must conclude that if perception is experiential it is an inexplicable kind of experience. The transaction between knower and known is veiled in mystery; and, further, it seeks to operate without the third party to meaning, the "other" of the self-other process, the objectifying witness. It places every man at the mercy of what his

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68 See Patterns of Educational Philosophy, Part II. Also see "Education as the New Reaction" in which Brameld makes an incisive analysis of Hutchin's position, Ends and Means in Education, pp. 19-31.
neighbor may later testify that he prehended in private. And it places all men at the mercy of those who may pretend that they prehend most and best.

In sum, if prehension is appropriately a part of a purely naturalistic philosophy, it is so only by virtue of imputing to nature some traits not obvious in ordinary experience. Although many have professed ability to see such traits in nature, always it has been done at the expense of distorting nature so that full-blown experience, yielding the maximum of intelligence, may not flourish.
CHAPTER IV

EMOTION IN RECONSTRUCTIONISM

The reconstructionist's departure from pragmatism in the area relating to the emotions is older than any other distinctive aspect of reconstructionism, provided one regards Harold Rugg's early descriptions of "the creative act" and his "new esthetics" as the potential basis of this aspect of reconstructionism. Rugg insisted as early as 1931 that Dewey and other pragmatists had dealt inadequately with "creative" acts, and with the "feeling" aspects of experience. Since that time he has continued to describe what he insists is a distinction between "how we think when solving problems" and the "appreciative" and "creative" activities of "man as artist." In keeping with these distinctions, Rugg has developed his "new esthetics" as an alternative theory to Dewey's esthetic theory set forth especially in Experience and Nature and Art as Experience.

On the other hand, Brameld has thus far said little specifically about esthetic theory. He has cited Rugg as an "educational encyclopedist and esthetician" who is

Rugg's esthetic theories. Brameld has, nevertheless, utilized Rugg's distinction between "how we think when problem solving" and "feeling" or emotion in non-reflective aspects of behavior. Even though Brameld's elaboration of reconstructionism contains no explicit theory of esthetics, and though Brameld cannot be held responsible for Rugg's theories in this or other respects, Brameld's reconstructionist philosophy does nevertheless make use of a concept of emotions which is compatible with, if it is not actually derived from, Rugg's ideas in this area. The use of detached emotions constitutes so important a part of the reconstructionist philosophy that a specific study of the role of the emotions in reconstructionism seems justified. This use is illustrated in the treatment of the concept of the "unrational," in "the cultural myth," in firm "commitment" to reconstructionist ends, goals and blueprints, and in the concept of truth and "defensible partiality."

This chapter utilizes a genetic approach, first giving the highlights of Rugg's dissenting arguments which began twenty years ago, and which he has extended and elaborated, to the present, including his latest book

\[2\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 521.}\]
in 1953. The primary purpose, however, is not to appraise Rugg's "new esthetics," but to analyze and appraise the separation of "warm emotion" from "cool intellect" as this separation has entered into current reconstructionist philosophy. The following story of Rugg's dissent necessarily gives some indication of Dewey's views against which he is dissenting, and immediately following a somewhat more systematic picture of the pragmatic position on the emotions as they enter into reflection and esthetics is presented. This presentation is offered in contrast to the treatment of emotions in reconstructionism which follows. The final section of the chapter inquires into the implications and concomitant effects of the reconstructionist's treatment of emotions.

A. Origin of the Theory of Detached Emotions

Rugg voiced his dissatisfaction with pragmatic philosophy, especially in the area of esthetics, more than twenty years ago. He charged Dewey with having neglected the "Feeling-Import" aspect of experience and demanded "a place coordinate with intelligence" for "creative desire." Rugg went on record in April 1931, with his


4Prior to the publication of this article he had expressed these views, according to a statement made to the writer by Hullfish, at an educational conference and had had their adequacy challenged by Hullfish and others of pragmatic orientation.
view which splits experience into two "coordinate" parts:

But the cultured person is both pragmatist and artist; a maker and doer and a creative appreciator of life. The complete educational program, therefore, must embrace the attitudes, concepts, and techniques of the creative and appreciative individual as well as those of the problem-solver. Now to develop the instrumental values and activities of life a monumental library has already been produced under the leadership of Mr. Dewey. But of the criteria for the education of the Man as Artist little has been said.\(^5\)

The argument pursued in this article is to the effect that Dewey's complete act of thought, described twenty years earlier,\(^6\) was limited in its application to the "problem solving" type of thinking. Rugg found this inadequate and sought to develop a description of the "creative act," using both parallels and contrasts with Dewey's description of reflective thinking, insisting always that the "creative act" is different from the act of "problem solving." Somewhat later, speaking at Nice, France, to the New Education Fellowship, he more explicitly widened the schism between his view and that of the pragmatists. At the same time he highlighted the duality which his gratuitous split in experience signified.

Our search for a new theory of life and education appropriate to the new and changing culture reveals the inadequacy of the pragmatic theories which are


\(^6\)In How We Think, first published in 1910.
subscribed to by educators generally in the west. Indeed careful study shows that the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey is not a philosophy; it is essentially a method of thought. It is a conspicuously fine phrasing of the experimental method of inquiry. It is an exposition of "how we think" when solving problems. It is an intellectual test, not a theory of life, and hence of education. We need a philosophy, the loyalties of which shall be so inclusive as to guide men in all situations of life. Our theory must embrace two attitudes, two outlooks on life. The first is the scientific attitude, the scientific outlook that has enabled men increasingly to master nature. It is education in this attitude that will enable men to devise economic government and to master social relations.

The second attitude is that of appreciative awareness. It is the all-embracing attitude of receptivity. These two attitudes are fundamentally different, and the techniques of mind that spring from them are equally different. Yet they are not different in that they oppose each other; they are different in the sense that they complement each other.

These views have been retained and repeated by Rugg down through the years; and, as later analysis will show, they constitute weaknesses and dangers in current reconstructionist philosophy.

Rugg has somehow failed to perceive that Dewey's analysis of the complete act of thought does not exclude "appreciative awareness." This analysis is not limited to an intellectualistic concept which excludes emotional quality, "Feelings-Import" or the "Creative." On the contrary, Dewey shows that reflective thought is an

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integration of emotional and logical or "purely intellectual" factors. It is only for purposes of analysis that we may separate them. Thought of all kinds both originates and terminates in the realm of the emotional. It operates throughout under the warmth of the need to resolve a doubt, relieve perplexity, or resume the interrupted ongoing process. Dewey shows that it is always in a "state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty" that "thinking originates."® In an effort to illuminate the "emotional" nature of the origin of all thought Dewey suggests:

Go through your own experience and you will not find a case where thinking started up out of nothing. Sometimes the train of thoughts will have taken you so far away from the starting point that you will have difficulty in getting back to that prior something out of which the thinking arose, but follow the thread far enough and you will find some situation that is directly experienced, something undergone, done, enjoyed, or suffered, and not just thought of.⁹

Dewey makes it equally clear that all thought ends, as it begins, in the realm that Rugg calls "feeling." And, as we shall see later, these objects which are directly enjoyed or suffered in experience are also precisely those which are the objects of genuine esthetic experience. Concerning the ending or completion of a successful act

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⁹Ibid., p. 99.
of thought Dewey says:

In the final situation the doubt has been dispelled; the situation is post reflective; there results a direct experience of mastery, satisfaction, enjoyment. 10

Dewey specifically warns against the kind of false assumption that Rugg and Brameld make in sharply separating emotional and esthetic experience from that which is intellectual or scientific:

Human beings are not normally divided into two parts, the one emotional, the other coldly intellectual—the one matter-of-fact, the other imaginative. The split does, indeed, often get established, but that is always because of false methods of education. Natively and normally the personality works as a whole. There is no integration of character and mind unless there is fusion of the intellectual and the emotional, of meaning and value, of fact and imaginative running beyond fact into the realm of desired possibilities. 11

Although Dewey did not turn his attention specifically to art as the theme of a major work until 1931 when he delivered the William James Lectures at Harvard University, 12 there were nevertheless numerous implications in his earlier writings that any experience—including reflective or scientific thinking—which proceeds to a successful fruition, contains elements of the genuinely

10Ibid., p. 107.
11Ibid., p. 278.
12Published in 1934 as Art as Experience. John Herman Randall, Jr. reports that Dewey remarked before going to Harvard to deliver the James Lecture that he would show them that he was not interested in means only. Although Dewey appears never to have mentioned Rugg specifically nor his theories in his writings, doubtless Rugg was among those who were to be shown. See Randall, John Dewey, 1859-1952: Journal of Philosophy Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1953) pp. 5-15.
esthetic. There is no warrant, in Dewey's view, to split
experience into two distinct kinds--instrumental or
"problem-solving," on the one hand, and esthetic or
artistic, on the other, as the reconstructionist theory
seeks to do. This was true even before 1925, when in
Experience and Nature Dewey "spelled out" more explicitly
in the chapter on "Experience, Nature and Art" the integrity
of both of these "phases" in all conscious experience.
Here Dewey clarifies the fact that the only legitimate
distinctions we can make between these phases are those
that result from analyzing conscious experience, or
distinctions based on emphasis or degree.

When criticism and the critical attitude are
legitimately distinguished from appreciation and
taste, we are in the presence of one case of the
constant rhythm of "perchings and flights" (to
borrow James' terms), characteristics of alternate
emphasis on the immediate and mediate, the con-
sumatory and instrumental, phases of all conscious
experience.\(^{13}\)

It is clear in Dewey's discussion that in mention of the
"immediate" and "mediate" he does not distinguish two
different kinds of experience; rather, he analyzes a single
experience into two phases. It is his intention that we
should not be "misled into ignoring the omnipresence in
all observations and ideas of this rhythm"\(^{14}\) between the

\(^{13}\)Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 399-400.

\(^{14}\)Loc. cit.
Immediate and mediate.

The rhythmic succession of the two modes of perception suggests that the difference is one of emphasis, or degree. Critical appreciation, and appreciative, warmly emotionalized criticism occur in every matured sane experience. After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection. 15

There is beyond question sufficient evidence in Dewey's writings prior to 1930 to sustain Irwin Edman's statement that

Up to his seventieth year Dewey had written nothing directly or specifically on the subject of "aesthetics." Those who had read him with care, however, knew from his essay on "Quantitative Experience," from more than hints in his early "How We Think," from the whole central theme of realized individuality in Democracy and Education, that he had been alerted to the aesthetic implications of his leading ideas . . . . It was clear from his earliest writings that what interested Dewey about that experience about which he wrote so much was its vital consummation, its sustained freshness, its ordered and dynamic fruition. 16

Rugg was evidently mistaken in the early thirties when he insisted that pragmatic philosophy, and especially Dewey's writings, excluded "creative appreciation" or "appreciative awareness" in dealing with "how we think when solving problems." Two other questions arise, however. The first is how and why Rugg should have so misinterpreted

15 Ibid., p. 401.

Dewey's writings, even after the publication of *Art as Experience* in 1934; the other concerns the adequacy of certain aspects of Rugg's distinctive theory of the "creative act." Rugg repeated in 1947:

John Dewey, . . . neglecting, or at least failing to emphasize, throughout his fifty years of writing the concept that Peirce and James had regarded as prior—namely Feeling . . . . This has led to the acceptance in colleges and schools of a thoroughly intellectual, problem-solving psychology. It has emphasized thinking and thinking of only one type, at the expense of feeling and body response . . . .

Again, in the same vein, Rugg said in 1952:

Moreover, John Dewey, whose influence in the progressive education of teachers has been deepest, consciously and consistently devoted his life work to the "scientific method of inquiry," to intelligence, to "thinking" of the problem solving variety; it is rare indeed to find any discussion in Dewey of the response of the body.18

One of these statements appeared twenty-two years, the other twenty-seven years after Dewey had, in his chapter on "Nature, Life and Body-Mind" in *Experience and Nature*, established a role for "feeling" so significant as to make it virtually the distinguishing characteristic between the inanimate and the living, and the basis of mind as well as esthetics. It is impossible to shed any light on Rugg's continued insistence that Dewey did not do what his writings

17 Rugg, *Foundations for American Education*, p. 84. (Italics in original.)

18 Rugg, *Teacher of Teachers*, pp. 92-93.
show him to have done. Fortunately, however, this is not our need here; rather our concern is to depict the basic issue between Rugg's conception of "feeling" as distinct from "thinking," and Dewey's conception of "feeling" as basic to all experience. Clarification of this issue is prerequisite to an adequate appraisal of the role of emotion in Brameld's philosophy of reconstructionism.

Rugg's penchant for drawing sharp contrasts is not limited to his separation of "feeling" from "thinking." His writings contain many concepts depicted in dichotomous relation, such as "Things vs Forces," "the scientific vs the Esthetic," "Sensate Culture vs Organic Culture," "Pragmatism vs Poetry," "Intelligence vs Imagination," "The Thing People vs The Force People," and the like.\textsuperscript{19} The dichotomy that interests us at the moment is "The Conforming Way" and "The Creative Path."\textsuperscript{20} Utilization of this technique is a dramatic mode of expression, but it is confusing in several ways. For example, in some contexts we find Dewey represented in "The Creative Path" and elsewhere we find him in "The Conforming Way." It is not clear whether this situation represents a periodic metamorphosis of Dewey, or if the categories themselves possess a remarkable flexibility. Rugg himself is,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19}Rugg, \textit{The Teacher of Teachers}, p. 142 and elsewhere.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{20}Loc. cit.
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nevertheless, consistently depicted in "The creative path."
Even this consistency is not entirely logically satisfying, however. For example, Thorndikian S-R bond psychology is represented as the very epitome of "the conforming way." Yet Rugg continues an attempt to define "feeling" in a connectionist manner. Rugg's latest definition of "feeling" characterizes it as a kind of ninth sense.

Our theories to date rest upon the accumulation of information acquired via the traditional sense organs—sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell and other recently added ones, such as temperature, pain, and equilibrium. These, it seems to me must be accompanied by the conception of a hypothetical organ that can account for the explosive general matrix—set, attitude, grasping the problem, poised attention, expectancy, anticipation-of-what-follows-what.

For some students the concept of kinesthesia suffices . . . . . tensile sense of the body . . . I give it no new name. I call it Feeling. But one important caution! It is to be sharply distinguished from emotion, which is primarily the product of the endocrines in the blood stream . . . .

While Rugg's descriptions appear as accurate as introspective psychology can get them, after all he has said in criticism of the "conforming way" it would appear that he would be content to leave the sense organs and their connections to experimental psychologists and neurophysiologists, and describe "feeling" empirically. In his attempts to establish "feeling" as a separate unity and

\[21\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. } 181-183.\]
tear it from its integrity in all experience. Rugg embraces diverse theories and proposals that appear to lend support to his notion, even when his document includes "evidences" that are inconsistent with one another. In more than one place he appears to reach out for supernatural and mystic support. He approvingly quotes Waldo Frank's criticism of those who have "accepted and extolled the concept of the individual without the Divine which alone makes him whole and true." and then he proceeds to describe the "Tragic Paradox":

The real tragedy is that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the ablest minds of the Great Tradition, while turning their backs on the religious quality of the great tradition, created a new religion of their own and spread it around the world . . . . We call this modern religion by various names--empirical rationalism, pragmatism, positivism, but all of them have the same pseudo-scientific intellectual outlook.

Rugg, rejecting the "new religion" in other passages, appears to reach back with nostalgia to an "authority" in somewhat the manner of the old religions:

Through five centuries science has brought us one disillusioning concept after another. Has man, in his brilliant conquest of ideas, merely succeeded in breaking his own heart? Our professors of philosophy, and some professors of education steeped in positivism, anser at the sense of the mystic significance of man. As the Authority of Aristotelian Thomist loyalties, and past romantic Puritan allegiances have been given up, modern scholarship

22 Ibid., p. 138.
23 Loc. cit.
encounters great difficulty in building a substitute Authority from current human experience. Certainly philosophic leaders are not now successfully guiding our quest for certainty. The pragmatist give us only the open universe and the experimental method.24

If Rugg now wishes to embrace some measure of "Authority" or religion he is, of course, free to do so. He should not import any "mystic significance of man," however and confuse it with "feeling," since feeling must serve as the basis of all genuine experience. If Rugg is both sincere and unconfused in his efforts to find a firm naturalistic explanation for feeling as it constitutes a part of human experience, he must eschew all forms of authoritarianism, whether supernaturally or mystically based. Dewey, throughout his writings, has been at some pains to show that any form of authoritarianism whatsoever is incompatible with reliance on human experience for philosophic and psychological beliefs. It is likewise inconsistent with a firm faith in intelligence.

B. Emotion and Reflection

Feeling occupies an integral place in all experience, in the pragmatic view. The conception of life held by pragmatism is not one which can be readily divided into some aspects dominated by emotion and others dominated

24Ibid., p. 255.
by intellectual interests. In contrast to the reconstructionist view, Dewey conceives feeling as basic to experiences of whatever kind, and emotional force is seen to permeate all experiences including alike those designated intellectual and those designated esthetic.

As life is a character of events in a peculiar condition of organization, and "feeling" is a quality of life-forms marked by complexly mobile and discriminating responses, so "mind" is an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication.25

In defining feeling Dewey shows its further role on the object side of interaction. Without feeling, things or events could not gain that quality, or mode of actuality, which fits them to be objects of meaning, and hence they could not be known.

"Feeling" is in general a name for the newly actualized quality acquired by events previously occurring upon a physical level, when these events come into more extensive and delicate relationships of interaction. More specifically, it is a name for the coming into existence of those ultimate differences in affairs which mark them off from one another and give them discreteness . . . .26

Not only does "feeling" form the basis of Dewey's esthetic theory, it is the basis of his theory of knowledge as well. More accurately, Dewey shows that there are no grounds for separate theories of esthetics and knowledge; both are but parts of the same theory. This explains how it is that

26Ibid., p. 267.
experience yields both esthetic enjoyment and knowledge, the product of meaning. Different experiences, of course, yield different proportions of these products, depending both upon the different external objects of the experience and upon what the individual brings to experience from prior experience. Dewey points out that,

There are, therefore, common patterns in various experiences no matter how unlike they are to one another in the details of their subject matter. These are conditions to be met without which an experience cannot come to be. The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives . . . interaction of the two constitutes the total experience that is had, and the close which completes it is the institution of a felt harmony.27

As shown both here and earlier in How We Think, any experience that is "an" experience "runs its course to a fulfillment."28 The emotional consummation of this "felt harmony" or fulfillment is the basis of all that is genuinely esthetic. Even "an experience of thinking has its own esthetic quality . . . esthetic cannot be marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself experience."29 Nor can experience which is primarily practical, consisting

27 Dewey, Art As Experience, pp. 43-44.  
28 Ibid., p. 35 ff.  
29 Ibid., p. 38.
mostly of overt action, be isolated from esthetic quality. If the experience consciously comes to a close or consummation—as contrasted with blind habit or skill—it, too, will contain an "esthetic stamp." This view of the integrity of emotions in all experience is in sharp contrast with the reconstructionist's view of "feeling" occupying a place "coordinate" with intelligence.

We should note here a distinction between "esthetic" and "artistic," a distinction in point of view rather than in kind. "Esthetic" is the term of the consumer, referring as it does to perception and enjoyment; "artistic," on the other hand, refers to the producer. Dewey notes that it is unfortunate we do not have one word to encompass both meanings.30 We understand readily how in most simple experiences the two are combined, but, in the case of the fine arts, which yield a more or less permanent product, we may see, nevertheless, how it is that the productive and consumptive phases get separated to some extent. This is not to say that artists do not get esthetic enjoyment from producing their works of art. They do, if the so-called art is not just a product made for sale like any other commodity. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the "producer" has exactly the same esthetic enjoyment from the doing as is called up in

30Ibid., p. 46.
the "consumer" in the form of appreciative enjoyment. Indeed it is unlikely that any two "consumers" derive exactly the same aesthetic pleasure from any example of art. The "consumer" or appreciator of art, is able to perceive or appreciate only what his prior experience has educated him to appreciate.

Because objects of art are expressive, they are a language. Rather they are many languages. For each art has its own medium and that medium is especially fitted for one kind of communication. Each medium says something that cannot be uttered as well or as completely in any other tongue . . . .

Language exists only when it is listened to as well as spoken. The hearer is an indispensable partner. The work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others than the one who created it. Thus language involves what logicians call a triadic relation. There is the speaker, the thing said, and the one spoken to.31

It is thus apparent that "universal" quality in art is limited, as it is in other realms of meaning or communication, since it is dependent upon the ability of the artist to evoke "meanings" (or more accurately perhaps, appreciation), in others more or less like his own. This ability is in turn dependent upon a common bond of experience between artist and audience. The fact that both artist and audience have lived in a more or less common world is no assurance that they have experienced it identically, or even with a high degree of commonality. The fact that the classics, after centuries and changes of

31Ibid., p. 106.
culture, continue to have some measure of "meaning," although surely not identical to that had in their own age, attests to the existence of some universal quality in art. Yet the fact that so many moderns fail to appreciate the classics illustrates the limits of "universality." Different "schools" of art, the variety in tastes and preferences, and the "pros" and "cons" concerning abstract art, all illustrate the same limitation.

Neither art criticism nor aesthetic theory can supply distinctions between what individuals will or will not enjoy from the arts. While critics can discuss meanings, materials, techniques, and various objective aspects of an art work which may contribute to its ability to evoke enjoyment, the feeling of enjoyment itself must be empirically determined. Since "feelings" or enjoyments are fundamentally "immediate experiences" we know that they are not objective in the sense that they can be shared as meaning is shared. As Dewey has noted "things in their immediacy are ineffable." They can be pointed to but not communicated in the true sense of that word. Feeling gives rise to meaning, but it is not itself a meaning. These facts highlight a limitation of art and of art criticism, but, fortunately, art criticism is not altogether at the mercy of caprice. It need not abandon its efforts simply because we must take at face value an
individual's assertion of what he does enjoy (recognizing, obviously, the influence of snobbery, "status" and the like).

There may be no objective test to apply, yet the experts may, nevertheless, predict what large numbers of different segments of the population will like on the basis of what may be called consensuses of what others have liked, and on the basis of "objective" qualities of a work of art. This kind of consensus operates more or less in history to establish the classics in literature, sculpture, art, music and the like. More than this, critics can separate the consensus of those of wide and rich experience to create so-called standards which represent the canons of "good taste." Insofar as art criticism deals with immediate enjoyment, as contrasted with objective criticism of the arts, there is no real communicable objectivity of the kind that applies in reflective thinking, for there are no meanings involved and no "consequences" that must be taken into account. We may note here that the reconstructionist's methods of achieving consensus,32 while inadequate in the areas of valuation and theory of knowledge where he seeks to apply them, would work if restricted to determining what people

32See ante, p. 75 ff.
enjoy, or prefer, or other "immediate" experience.

In the nature of the case, the difficult attempts to communicate what one feels "inside"—the striving to speak the unspeakable—is a natural limitation in the field of art and art criticism. Experts in art may develop more or less exact classificatory categories, and make sophisticated observations about the arts. But none of this sophistication should disguise the fact that the fundamental feelings and enjoyment of art cannot truly be verbally communicated through shared meaning. To the extent that it is communicated it is done through art itself. Through the use of materials and meaning the artist can invoke in others feelings which may be more or less like his own. The technique which the artist uses in this "pointing to" a feeling through shared meaning, whatever his materials or mode of expression, is what constitutes artistic expression; the enjoyment evoked, if any, is immediate and unsharable.

This brief excursion into esthetic theory is not an attempt to elaborate a theory of esthetics, nor is it intended to be extensive enough to provide a basis for appraisal of Rugg's "new esthetics." Since reconstructionism as proposed by Brameld does not contain an explicit theory of esthetics, and since Brameld neither specifically accepts nor rejects Rugg's new esthetics, it is not appropriately a part of this study to deal with
esthetic theory. The foregoing brief discussion of esthetics is intended to indicate, as Dewey has shown, that a theory of esthetics does not require the separation of emotional from other experience, and that feeling and immediate experience are integral parts of all experience, they are not limited to the esthetic. Those experiences which are purposely of an artistic nature differ from those which are primarily of a reflective nature only in degree. The former are deliberately designed to accentuate the proportions of immediate fulfillment, whereas the latter concentrate on objective meanings and intellectual conclusions.

While Rugg has utilized his distinction between "feeling" and "how we think when problem solving" as the basis for his new esthetics, Brameld has used the split or distinction in quite another way. It is Brameld's use of the separation with which we are concerned.

C. Emotion in Reconstructionism

Brameld's treatment of the emotions in his philosophy has much in common with Rugg's treatment, but unlike Rugg he has not utilized the theory of autonomous emotions to formulate a theory of esthetics. He has cited Rugg as one "deeply interested in esthetics," but he does not express himself further on Rugg's "new esthetics." Brameld pays tribute to Dewey's "great study of esthetics"
Art as Experience, and in his discussion of "the pragmatic approach to art" he shows an understanding of esthetic experience as the consummatory or immediate phase of all conscious experience. Unlike Rugg, nowhere does Brameld question the adequacy of Dewey's interpretation of art. This appears to be the one instance where he seems to accept pragmatic theory without criticisms, modifications or additions.

Brameld's expressions concerning esthetics appear to be limited to discussing art in the curriculum and asserting that the proposed "service state" should subsidize artists in order to encourage artistic talent and reward creative achievement as a public responsibility, but also encourage the same complete freedom of expression that is assumed for the scientist.

As a model of this procedure the depression-time W.P.A. art projects are mentioned. Art is utilized in the proposed reconstructionist curriculum, but here we notice a distinct difference between Rugg and Brameld on the social function of art. Rugg insists that in esthetic expression one should always ask

Has it been said my way? Not your way, my way. Not the family's way, or the Dean's way, or the faculty's way, or the community's way—my way.

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33 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 124-125.
34Ibid., p. 521.
35Rugg, Teacher of Teachers, pp. 114-115. (Italics in original.)
Brameld, on the other hand, proposes to utilize art, like other aspects of the curriculum, to achieve commitment to reconstructionist social values and goals. The kind of freedom of expression he advocates takes a different turn. He says in one place, for example,

First period groups study whatever arts their members prefer. The problem, for instance, of whether radio and television can be transformed into publicly-owned and controlled channels . . . . 36

Students are free, it seems to study "whatever arts their members prefer" provided the outcome will serve the purposes which the reconstructionist describe as the overall goals of the school, 37 in this case promotion of the reconstructionist belief in public ownership and control. One may wonder how it is that Brameld, while recognizing the integrity of the esthetic in experience, asks art to serve as a handmaiden to reconstructionist social designs. The answer does not necessarily imply a misunderstanding of esthetic experience, for art occupies no unique position in this respect. Instead there appears to be a willingness to sacrifice not only artistic fulfillment but consummatory experience of all kinds in the furtherance of reconstructionist purposes.

While Brameld does not utilize a separation of the


37See Chapter II, p. 102 ff, where the theme of the whole secondary school is described.
emotions from reflective experience to construct a distinctive esthetic theory, he does utilize this separation in his proposals concerning "the cultural myth" and in his advocacy of other techniques to inspire fervent devotion and firm emotional commitment to reconstructionist utopian ideology, and its plans and proposals.

The purposes to be served by "the cultural myth" advocated by reconstructionism is to "breathe into" reconstructionist blueprints "the warmth of emotion and faith and beauty."38 He recognizes that his list of proposed blueprints

Lacks the magnetism, the warm feeling, the flesh and blood, even the audacity that it must possess in order to serve the crucial role for which it is intended. Or to put it differently, the outline lacks perhaps the quality of the "religious."39

Recognizing that mythology is hazardous, that it has been identified with "superstitions and doctrinaire dogmas of the past or with fanatical sectarian faith and uncritical tradition—worship," he indicates nevertheless that this need not be the case.

It would be overhasty to conclude that the myth has always been, or need be, an iniquitous devise to distort reality, conceal truth or pervert values.40

In pursuing this question Brameld asks

39Ibid., p. 501.
40Loc. cit.
In warning us properly against the fanaticism and bigotry that sometimes accompany commitment to social purposes, does liberal-progressivism disavow also that esthetic fervor or religious dynamic without which men never create greatly or hope boldly?

The reconstructionist proposes that the "cultural myth" should be deliberately created and cultivated and utilized for cultural reconstruction. In reaction to what is described as a too tentative and cautious attitude on the part of "progressives," Brameld says that reconstructionists are "most concerned" to

energize blueprints with the spirit of commitment, zeal, and emotion that progressivism too greatly lacks and that perennialism futilely seeks to engender by reincarnating often obsolete and sometimes dangerous beliefs. The myth to be created is a cultural therapeutic: first, to lessen the tensions and bewilderments from which too many of us suffer; second to substitute for these a constructive aim in which we can join and for which we can fight, knowing that we are once more on the side of righteousness.

The reconstructionist appears all too accurate in his appraisal of the potency of "religious" zeal and the enthusiasm—even fanaticism—with which men can be made to fight for a doctrine to which they are emotionally but unreflectively converted. The fervent conviction that they are "on the side of righteousness" appears to be an essential ingredient of such fanaticism. This can be documented from the study of historic phases of any number

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41 Ibid., p. 203.
42 Ibid., p. 503.
of fervently held doctrines, including Islam, Christianity, Leninism, or National Socialism (Nazi brand). While reconstructionism advocates the creation and utilization of detached emotions, recognizing "controllable dangers," it must be noted that the position is widely infused with suggestions for unleashing emotions, but is weak in its assertions that they are "controllable." Just how they are to be controlled is not convincingly shown. As indicated in Chapter III, in the reconstructionist theory of knowledge the reconstructionist assumes "prehension," a method of knowing "akin to the unrational," that can operate independently of, and supplementary to, the control of the method of intelligence. Reminiscent of Rugg's insistence of a separate position for the "feeling-import" aspect of experience "coordinate" with intelligence, is Brameld's assertion that the characteristics of utopian order should be

\textit{prehended} as fully as possible, and therefore scientifically tested. But it should be \textit{prehended} and inspired by the unrational as well.\textsuperscript{43}

The reconstructionist clearly does not wish to dispense with "prehension" or scientific methods of intelligence, but he does appear to relegate it to a position coordinate with that which is "inspired" by

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., p. 454.
independent "unrational" emotions. He does not come to grips with the problem of which coordinate partner is to control which.

D. Appraisal of Reconstructionist Theory of Emotions

The reconstructionist position here appears to differ with the pragmatic view that all experience starts with the emotional, or as Dewey expresses it, with an "impulsion."

Impulsion from need starts an experience that does not know where it is going; resistance and check bring about the conversion of direct forward action into reflection; what is turned back upon is the relation of hindering conditions to what the self possesses as working capital in virtue of prior experiences. As the energies thus involved reenforce the original impulsion this operates more circumspectly with insight into end and method. Such is the outline of every experience that is clothed with meaning.44

Thus in the pragmatic view the whole role of intelligence is to serve as a control or a mediating influence on emotionally based "impulsions." Emotion and reflection are partners here also, but not in the sense that there is a division in their spheres of authority. They are partners in that emotion supplies the impulsion or motivation and the consummatory fulfillments for every experience and reflection supplies the enlightened control. Intelligence cannot operate without emotions.

44Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 60.
Unfortunately emotion, since it is prior, can and does operate without the control of reflection as an added ingredient, or without sufficient control. Herein lies the danger of the reconstructionist's position, in which emotions appear to be granted a license to operate in some experiences independently of the "conversion of direct forward action into reflection."

Brameld appears to differ from Rugg in that his emotional importations, "the cultural myth" and "the unrational," while of dubious experiential origin, contain no hint of supernatural sanction. Instead, they appear to depend upon propaganda, frustration, and other perverted and incomplete kinds of human experience for their origin. There is evidence that when human impulse lacks the opportunity for adequate interaction with the environment and lacks the objectivity of shared meaning it tends to become perverted and yields the spurious emotions typical of frustration. As Dewey says in this connection:

"Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it."

By the same token, emotions are attached to events and objects in their movement. They are not, save in pathological instances, private. And even an "objectless" emotion demands something beyond itself to which to attach itself, and thus it soon generates a delusion in lack of something real. Emotion belongs of a certainty to the self. But it belongs to the self that is concerned in the movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked. 45

The reasons why reconstructionist mythology and the "unrational" are questionable, and tend toward fanaticism if not also pathology, is that the events and objects of these emotions are in the distant utopian realm. While they are not strictly private, for all the arts of propaganda, reconstructionist "education," "consensus" and the like are to be utilized to communicate them, they are nevertheless doomed to remain virtually private because they have no objective basis for meaning in ongoing experience. Apparently the reconstructionist recognizes the difficulties in promoting and fanning to a fervid heat the kind of emotions which have no tangible objects more concrete than ideals in a future utopian realm, for he proposes that the "channelled energies of education" be devoted to this effort. Apparently he does not recognize that a rampant "objectless emotion demands something beyond itself to which to attach itself," and the objects of strong positive and negative emotion found will be those readily available in the environment—often other people or groups. T. V. Smith says in this connection,

Intolerance is man's worst inhumanity to man. Some men may dominate others now and then out of sheer cruelty, but not many nor for long. Most men dominate because they're just so right that they spill over the hot stuff of their inner convictions and are glad to see it burn its way down the other fellow's throat. 46

In the same vein Bertrand Russell observes,

Speaking psychoanalytically, it may be laid down that any "great ideal" which people mention with awe is really an excuse for inflicting pain on their enemies. Good wine needs no bush, and good morals need no bated breath.47

It is upon such grounds as these that liberals, whether pragmatist or not, object to the creation and unleashing of strong emotions that are not under the fullest possible control of reflection. It is the liberal's view that any plan or proposal worth considering needs the light of intelligence as well as the warmth of emotion, and that both should be an integral and inseparable part of any normal ongoing experience.

Dewey has said in this connection that "the separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy."48 Human beings appear all too susceptible to prejudice, bigotry and fanaticism, even when philosophers and educators do all they can to discredit "mythology" (whether described as "good" or "bad") and "objectless" emotions of all kinds. The faith of the liberal is that there is no substitute for intelligence, though it may appear to operate without sufficient dispatch at times. The remedy for this inadequacy is not a repudiation of

47 Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy of the Twentieth Century" in Twentieth Century Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes (Ed).

48 In Human Nature and Conduct, p. 258.
intelligence in favor of unharnessed emotion that runs impetuously ahead without the circumspect caution tempered by prior experience and an estimate of consequences. Nor is the remedy to set up emotion as an alternate method coordinate with intelligence, for the latter is needed to guide all experiences, not just some proportion of them.49

The faith of the liberal, including the pragmatist, is that there is no substitute for intelligence, and the progress already made under its light during the long struggle of mankind toward a humane civilization seems sufficient to justify this faith. In this connection it should be understood that any "retreat from reason," any longing for a new or old "Authority," as a substitute for intelligence, any importing of emotions not integrally a part of experience, is, in effect, a regression.

49 An illustration of this false separation is Rugg's call for a "50 per cent moratorium on thinking" voiced in his address in University Hall, Ohio State University, on the occasion of the Sixth Annual Bode Conference, July, 1950.
CHAPTER V

MEANS, ENDS AND RECONSTRUCTIONISM

Educationally, we should agree as far as possible on where we are to go, as a prerequisite to learning how to get there.¹

Theodore Brameld -- 1950

I think far the most important "category" of philosophy is that of means-consequences, and that the commonest serious mistake is to take ends-in-view as destinations to be reached which serve as standards of value instead of as guiding intellectual directing instruments of what is to be done.²

John Dewey -- 1951

Reconstructionism is in agreement with pragmatism with respect to the importance of the problem of means-ends. It is perhaps significant that the first book in which the emerging philosophy of reconstructionism was articulated was entitled Ends and Means in Education.³ Agreement as to the importance of the problem does not imply agreement on solutions, however; nor does it imply agreement on what constitutes the problem. On the contrary, we find in their differing conceptions of means and ends, and in their distinctive views of the means-ends relationships, what is

²From a letter to H. Gordon Hullfish, March 17, 1951. (Emphases in original.)
³By Theodore Brameld, 1950.
doubtless the most crucial issue between reconstructionism and pragmatism. Indeed, it can be said that reconstructionism owes no small part of its distinction as a separate philosophy to the fact that its advocates have been dissatisfied with pragmatic conceptions of the means-ends problem and have, as a result, based their new philosophy on a firm commitment to "crystallized" goals. Historically, we have seen⁴ that reconstructionism can be said to date back to the thirties when some educators advanced the view that:

> the reconstruction of our economic system is now such an important means that it necessarily becomes one of the controlling ends of democratic effort for our generation.⁵

This view, crystallized and itself made a "controlling end" and a criterion for judging other principles, came in conflict with the pragmatic conception of plural and hypothetical ends and an integrated and reciprocal means-ends relationship. Recognizing the impasse, most progressive educators tempered their determination to secure economic reconstruction at any cost,⁶ but others, more devoted to this "controlling end," have chosen instead to relinquish and challenge the adequacy

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⁴See *Ante* Chapter I, p. 18 ff.


of the pragmatic view of the hypothetical nature of ends and the integrity of the means-ends relationship. 7

Reconstructionism thus has been confronted with the necessity of formulating a theory of ends and means more amenable to its bent for social reconstruction. It can be said, initially, that the resultant theory is characterized by ends or goals that are more specific, more comprehensive, and relatively fixed, 8 and means are more in the nature of "strategy." 9 The relation or connection between means and ends in reconstructionism appear to be more Aristotelian than pragmatic. 10 It is apparent that any adequate critical analysis of reconstructionism must include an examination of its ends and means and of their relationship. The technique utilized in this examination will compare and contrast reconstructionist views with pragmatic views, since the latter are said to be partly retained and partly rejected.


8Brameld says that "it has now become imperative to specify the ends of human nature because it has become imperative to specify the goals of our culture." Op. cit., p. 441.


10"When there is one thing that is means and another thing that is end, there is nothing common between them, except in so far as the one, the means, produces, and the other, the end, receives the product." Aristotle, Quoted by John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 369. (Italics in Dewey.)
The reader, then, may be better able to decide if the reconstructionist reformulation is in workable harmony with natural requirements and limitations, and if concomitant fruits of the reconstructionist theory are acceptable.

More specifically our study will involve an examination of reconstructionist goals and "goal-seeking," including the methods of arriving at "ends" and how they are held and utilized, and reconstructionist "means," including educational theory, and other "strategy." Brameld's criticism of pragmatic means-ends theory must be noted. Then consideration must be given to some of Dewey's descriptions of means, both "procedural" and "material." We shall need to distinguish between varieties of ends, both genuine and spurious, including aims, objectives, goals, ends-in-view and ideals; and consequences, effects, fulfillments, consummations, closes, natural and esthetic ends. We must examine also fixed ends, final ends, absolutes, "relative absolutes" and utopian ideals. Most important, we must distinguish between the kinds of relations that exist between means and ends.

A. Reconstructionist Criticism and Divergence

Among the obstacles standing in the way of achievement of the proposed utopian pattern of culture the
reconstructionist sees alongside entrenched ideological beliefs and the self-interest of "forces of contraction" the complacency induced when pragmatism "focuses too much upon means at the expense of ends." Reconstructionism insists that pragmatism (usually called "progressivism"), like liberalism, was well adapted to a "culture in transition," but at the present "critical juncture" in civilization

the (pragmatist's) method has the paradoxical effect of complacency - of resting content with short-range and ambiguous goals rather than with long-range and specifiable goals of the sort required by a revolutionary culture. In short, it is now imperative that we know as clearly as we can where we want to go. The reconstructionist grants that the pragmatist's description of the "means-ends process is in accord with psychological experience" but insists that "The need is to broaden the time continuum to embrace a much wider segment of the future." He adds, "A stable culture can be satisfied with a fairly narrow continuum; a culture such as our's cannot." It is asserted that the goals needed for an age of crisis are much more far reaching. "Progressives" are chided for approving a "planning" society but refusing commitment to a "planned" society.

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12 Ibid., p. 440.
13 Loc. cit.
14 Loc. cit.
15 Ibid., p. 441.
Brameld joins Rugg in dissatisfaction with Dewey's "emphasis" on "How We Think" which, they say, has "insufficiently helped us to discover for what we should think"; or, as Brameld expressed it,

Let us say that the "what" is always contained in the "how," the product in the process, commitments in hypotheses.

As a result, as the reconstructionist sees it, the pragmatic emphasis never results in commitment to specific social goals but, instead, results only in commitment to such indefinable ends as continuous "growth," "intelligence," "respect for personality," "democracy" and the like.

Brameld complains that

Such an astute disciple as Bode, after an impassioned plea for fresh cultural direction or purpose, concludes with little more than a restatement of experimental method as the ideal democratic end.

While it should be noted here that the reconstructionist is accurate in depicting "growth," "intelligence," "experimental method," "democracy" and the like as "ends" of high value in pragmatic theory, the depreciation of these ends as indicated by such phrases as "little more than" is a reconstructionist appraisal of

17 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 192.
18 Ibid., p. 192. Reference here is to Bode's Progressive Education at the Crossroads.
these "ends." For example, "growth" means to Brameld something entirely different from what it means to Dewey. The reconstructionist view is that growth which leads to but more growth is an illustration of the kind of "short-range and ambiguous goal" which diverts attention from clear-cut and magnetic future-looking goals. In his exposition of "progressivism" Brameld quotes, but does not fully accept, Dewey's statement that "growth itself is the only moral end,"\textsuperscript{19} although he gives a part of Dewey's supporting context. He treats growth as if it were merely an "end appropriate to a "culture in transition," which now needs to be superseded by "mature cultural designs."\textsuperscript{20} Though he recognizes that "maturity" and fixed ends tend to cut off the growing which insures continuing growing, described by Dewey as "the aim of living," Brameld, nevertheless, would introduce the specific and more stable utopian goals of reconstructionism. Since the reconstructionist's goals are all in the future, and none is yet achieved, he has not been forced to face up to the fact that "nothing is ever final." It is not clear what would next happen were a reconstructionist goal realized.

\textsuperscript{19}John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948) p. 177. Quoted in Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 123.

The reconstructionist also rebels against the pragmatic conception of novelty or uncertainty as a genuine trait of the future. He does not, to be sure, attempt to deny all aspects of change or contingency, but he does complain that in pragmatism

the correct statement that we cannot in clairvoyant fashion "foretell" what the future will be easily comes to imply that we must not try to foresee too concretely what the future could or should be.\(^{21}\)

The reconstructionist calls for "magnetic foresight" and asks that we "broaden the time continuum to embrace a wider segment of the future." Concern with the future appears to be just as essential a part of pragmatic philosophy, as it is in reconstructionism. There is a difference between these theories, however, in their conceptions of how the future operates in present behavior.

The most salient difference appears to be in the extent to which we may exact requirements of the future. The pragmatic view, in brief, is that there is no control over the future except through the role of intelligence in predicting the consequences of action. Obviously this kind of control does not constitute a very binding guarantee. Consequently, the reconstructionist is dissatisfied with the degree of contingency recognized in the pragmatic view of the future. As we shall see, his conception of the role of ends is an attempt to structure

\(^{21}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 194-195.}\)
the future in a manner that the pragmatist denies is either possible or desirable. Stated differently, the pragmatic view conceives the future as instrumental in the present, whereas reconstructionism tends to invert this emphasis, making the present instrumental to the future.

B. Reconstructionist Ends and Means

Reconstructionism is characterized by Brameld as a philosophy of magnetic foresight—a philosophy of ends attainable through the development of powerful means possessed latently by the people. As a philosophy of ends attainable through the development of powerful means possessed latently by the people.

It is Brameld's contention that in our modern era men struggle to realize certain purposes—purposes that need not remain forever elusive and undefined but can and must be "spelled out" as magnetic, definite targets of cooperative human effort. Fused together, they are capable of generating the intense white light of guidance and the heat of concerted democratic action toward a reconstructed culture. Seeking becomes seeking for. Growing becomes growing toward.

Not only does Brameld insist that "it is possible to delineate . . . the goals of most people on the earth," but he has done so in broad outline. The ends of reconstructionism are stated mostly as "supreme aims" or "values," if at the individual level, or as

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22Ibid., p. 82.
23Ibid., p. 443.
24Loc. cit.
25See Ante Chapter II, pp. 76-77 or Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 477-478.
"future-oriented" goals or "cultural blueprints," if at the social level. Throughout his discussion are dispersed specific, "spelled out" goals of the culture, aims of education, or definite economic or political policies to be achieved. One such statement at a high level of generality and perhaps lacking the "spelled out" specificity toward which the reconstructionist strives is as follows:

The world of the future should be a world which the common man rules not merely in theory but in fact. It should be a world in which the technological potentialities already discernable are released for the creation of health, abundance, and security for the masses of people of every color, nationality and creed. It should be a world in which national sovereignty is subordinated to international authority.

Other more specific statements of purposes embraced by this philosophy include:

It (reconstructionism) is infused with a profound conviction that we are in the midst of a revolutionary period out of which should emerge nothing less than control of the industrial system, of public services, and of cultural and natural resources by and for the common people.

Inasmuch as reconstructionism is primarily a philosophy of education it is to be expected that most of its "ends" will be encompassed in its aims of education. Its overall

26 See Ante Chapter II, pp. 91-93 or Brameld, Ibid., pp. 498-501.
27 Brameld, Ends and Means in Education, p. 15.
28 Ibid., p. 17.
aim of education which "is, first of all, a cultural aim" is to "crystallize" the "purposes that are needed to dispel the vacillations and confusions so chronic to our civilization." Stated differently, the educational purposes of reconstructionism are twofold:

Purposes . . . focus attention upon the blueprint of a planned democracy within a country such as America in which every essential institution is organized and systematized in the interests of, and under control of, the majority of the people.

And second,

To expose the absurd contradiction between national sovereignty and responsible international order, and to commit ourselves unequivocally to world government and world citizenship, is not only one of our high educational obligations; it is the most urgent.

Translated into a curriculum design, the theme of the entire secondary school, supported by the elementary, and continued into higher education and expanded adult programs, is built around seeking the answers to,

Where do we as a people want to go? Every specific issue, every bit of study of history, science, or literature, every hour of practice in skills or vocation is permeated with this relentless question.

The primary distinction between reconstructionist values and "blueprints" is that the former are stated in terms of

29 Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 528.
30 Loc. cit.
31 Ibid., p. 530.
32 Loc. cit.
the individual, whereas the latter are formulated as their cultural counterparts. Brameld notes that there can be no exact correlation between values and blueprints because values are more pervasive than any specific blueprint. He indicates also that the two do not have the same degree of durability, values having much greater permanence, and blueprints having a greater degree of flexibility. Reconstructionism utilizes a similar method of arriving at values, aims, purposes, blueprints; in fact, in formulating all of its "ends." Its approach to values is said to be "inductive," but, as we shall see when values and truth are examined more specifically in Chapter VII, the inductive method requires some qualifying before it can be accurately said to apply to reconstructionist valuation. If values were arrived at as the reconstructionist proposes they should be, they would emerge as groups reach a consensus on the "definable wants" that man now "struggles to satisfy" and would "come within the province of truth or falsehood" as "they are tested by evidence, communication and agreement—that is, by social consensus."  

Actually, since education and society are not now

33Ibid., p. 496.
35Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 473.
organized so that consensus can operate as proposed, the values specified by Brameld have been derived "with the aid of research in anthropology, social psychology and other sciences, as well as philosophy." There is no doubt expressed, however, that the values now specified by Brameld are those, in general, that would be agreed upon if consensus operated as it should. In fact, he says that

We can now contend with a great deal of support that many individuals and groups throughout the world and in our present period of culture are attaining increasing agreement upon what they do and do not want.

The values which Brameld is now able to list "with a great deal of support" are as he says, "obviously a bare minimum consensus." The implication is that there are others with somewhat less support that it would be safe to list, nonetheless.

"Ends" other than values are arrived at in reconstructionism in much the same manner. In answer to the question, "What do we at this time and this place, seek as our fundamental goals?", groups are to achieve a consensus on, and commitment to, cultural designs

36 Ibid., p. 442.
37 Ibid., p. 477.
38 For list see Ante, Chapter II, pp. 76-77.
expressed as "blueprints." The reconstructionist claims at present, however, neither the stability, the consensus, nor the wide commitment to blueprints that is claimed for values, for he recognizes that blueprints are now only proposals of the "radically democratic minority."\(^{40}\)

In this connection Brameld says:

> Implicit in the need for flexibility of blueprints is the precaution that they should never be regarded as ends utterly divorced from means. The psychology of goal-seeking that bolsters reconstructionism is one of both goals and seeking. This psychology is applicable not only today while reconstructionists are acting as the critical minority, but equally tomorrow if and when their institutional proposals are tested on a grand scale by the culture itself. The evolutionary ontology that is always presupposed will, in itself, sufficiently dispel any notion that blueprints can be completely fixed or static or that they lack provision for the modus operandi by which institutions are actively to realize human ends.\(^{41}\)

Reconstructionism stresses no less than magnetic ends "the development of powerful means possessed latently by the people."\(^{42}\) It is held that "means without ends are blind" and that "ends without means are empty."\(^{43}\) It appears that the two most significant connections between means and ends are (i) means are to be powerful enough to accomplish the ends, and (ii) both are to be products of social consensus.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 498.
\(^{41}\)Ibid., pp. 496-497.
\(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 82.
\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 468. (Italics in original.)
If ends are, especially in our culture, crucial determinants of the group mind, means are the strategies by which it attains its ends . . . . Means, in other words, are equally based upon social consensus and all that this implies, just as they are affected powerfully by the conditioners of social reality. Here again the great problem of our time is one of reaching the widest possible consensus about means--of building a strategy by which those who agree upon the goals of a new order may concertedly, aggressively, act.44

Means in reconstructionism appear to differ from ends, however, in the extent to which they can be specified in advance. Many specific suggestions are offered concerning means, but the assumption appears to be that if ends are sufficiently specific, magnetic, and are held fervently enough, means to their accomplishment will be found.

The more fully students achieve strong consensus about the blueprints of the culture they desire, the stronger will be their eagerness to discover the necessary procedures by which that culture can be achieved.45

Since means are conceived as "strategy" it is to be expected that constituents of this military concept, such as timing and logistics, would be important considerations in achieving reconstructionist goals. This is the case.

This problem is complicated by the ticklish issue of when and where action should take place. Surely we should lose no time in agreeing about our ends, for history is standing at a grim juncture of

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44 Loc. cit. (Italics in original.)
45 Ibid., p. 604. (Italics in original.)
opposing choices. But this still leaves uncertain the moment of commitment, the moment of action. To reach it prematurely is dangerous; for it may produce weak strategies that only boomerang by generating more hostility or a stronger counter-strategy than prevailed before. Yet to reach active commitment tardily is just as dangerous; the utopian group mind can be destroyed, as it sometimes has been, by ideological groups whose own ends and means have crystalized earlier.46

Specific suggestions of means for the achievement of the goals of reconstructionism are found in its proposals concerning politics, organized labor, and most important, the content and method of education. Examples of the more clearly political type of means—in a sense reconstructionism is "a philosophy of education-as-politics"47—are advocacy of federal control of education, an "F.E.A." (Federal Education Authority) along with federal aid,48 teacher affiliation with organized labor,49 and alliance with all "progressive" groups in society constituting the "forces of expansion."50

46 Ibid., pp. 468-469.


48 Ibid., p. 73 ff, also Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 66, 663.

49 See Brameld, Ends and Means in Education, p. 95 ff and Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 686 ff.

50 Ibid., p. 669.
In a sense it can be said that the whole of reconstructionist method and content in education constitute means to the ends of reconstructionism. Although reconstructionism devotes most attention to secondary education, "the fulcrum of public education," some suggestions are made concerning elementary education.

Reconstructionism is insistent upon high standards of literacy and vital content, for example, because these are necessary tools of social power for people struggling to attain the dominant purposes demanded by our age. Once these purposes are clear the elementary school is endowed with a direction that governs every step of the way— not only with regard to inculcation but also with regard to social discipline or the need for more relevant propaganda as typified by songs, posters, and other emotionally-toned shortcuts to learning.51

Problem-solving as a method of learning as it has been advocated and practiced in progressive education is also advocated by reconstructionism, especially at the secondary level, but there is a proviso.

This is only to say that continuous practice in problem-solving is advocated, but with the proviso that such practice is never confined by the aim of problem-solving for its own sake. It follows that the same rule holds for the familiar dictum of "learning by doing" or "learning by critical thinking." Similar questions may be asked of each dictum: "Doing" for what? "Critical thinking" for what? We have argued that the answer in terms of "living" or "growing" is no longer sufficient.52

51Ibid., pp. 612-613. (Italics in original.)
52Ibid., p. 553.
The question of what subject matters to exclude or include in the curriculum centers primarily here: What should students know and experience in order that they may, as concretely as possible, agree upon and seek to achieve the institutional and behavioral goals demanded by our age? Specific topics, problems and problem areas in the curriculum are mentioned as affording the opportunity to achieve the goals of reconstructionism. Briefly, some of these are as follows:

History, Science, Art, and other areas are drawn upon again, but with the question of how we can learn from them the task of turning our national and international blueprints into living cultural experiences. The role of persuasion, for example, demands careful study of communication as an instrument of social change. Also . . . the revolution effected by technology—by radio, television, airplanes, . . . political parties, trade unions, churches, schools, civic organizations are all considered as media of collective action . . . the practical uses of group dynamics—these are typical of subject matters in the area of means.

It is also stressed that "knowledge of means also includes practice with means" and for this reason it is advocated that reconstructionist education should be an activity program in which students participate while they are still in school in "affiliation with economic and political organizations, such as consumer cooperatives, trade or farm unions, and progressive political groups."

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53 Ibid., pp. 555-556. (Italics in original.)
54 Ibid., p. 557.
55 Loc. cit.
56 Ibid., p. 607.
Reconstructionism is concerned much more with its specific ends and means themselves than with their theoretical nature and the technical relationships between them. There are a few references, however, to the theory of means-ends. It is reiterated over and over that both means and ends should result from social consensus, and be given fervent emotional commitment. Both should be "thoroughly democratic" in that they are majority sanctioned. Ends are most often described as "utopian," "specific," "magnetic," "future-looking," "designed," "definable," "spelled-out," "definite," "concrete," and "necessary" in our critical age, but it is specifically denied that they are "absolute," "final," or "transcendental" or "inevitable ends of his (man's) very destiny." The means of reconstructionism are most often described as "powerful," as "strategies," or as "effective" or "necessary."

Some reciprocity between means and ends is recognized, for it is noted that "means continually modify ends" and that

The method we succeed in developing will have important effect upon the content and form of the goals we succeed in achieving.

57 Ibid., p. 605.  
58 Ibid., p. 441.  
59 Loc. cit.  
60 Brameld, Ends and Means in Education, p. 8.
The recognition of the reciprocity between means and ends, however, appears primarily to be with a view of selecting the ends first and then selecting the means best fitted to achieve those ends. Brameld says in this connection:

Since means help to shape the kind of ends that finally emerge, it is important for the former always to be in accord with values inherent in the latter.\(^{61}\)

Nowhere in reconstructionism does there appear to be any clear recognition that ends-in-view are different from actual consequences, or results; different both in kind and in purpose, and nowhere does there appear any clear recognition of how both goals and means are forged out of the problematic situation in ongoing experience. In order to appraise this view of ends and means properly, as they are advocated in reconstructionism, it is necessary, therefore, to consider further the means-ends relationship in experience.

C. Means-Ends in Experience: Dewey's Conception

According to the pragmatic view the means-ends relationship, like the origin of knowing and valuation, is firmly based in human experience. We have outlined earlier\(^{62}\) how it is that feeling results from a break or

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\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 605.

\(^{62}\) See Ante Chapter III, p. 127ff and Chapter IV, p. 172 ff.
interruption in the ongoing process of a sentient organism, and how, under these circumstances, knowing originates when the organism is able to attach meanings to things and events in an attempt to remedy the break or resolve the difficulty. Here, too, are found the firm bases of the means-consequences, and means-ends relationships. We can only assume that in brute nature one event follows another in bare succession. 63 Although there is continuity in nature, there is no way to single out some event and designate it as "cause" and some later event as "effect" unless a connection is perceived between them. In case of an intelligent organism not only is there a preference for some events over others, but there is a deliberate choosing and ordering of causes so that they tend to produce the desired effect. When causes are deliberately chosen and managed and their effects are perceived, the causes become means and their effects are consequences. 64

When certain preferred consequences are conceived in advance, that is, when they are projected into the future, they are ends of a certain kind; they are ends-in-view, aims, or goals. Here it is important to note


64 Ibid., p. 1055. Dewey says, "A 'cause' is not merely an antecedent; it is that antecedent which if manipulated regulates the occurrence of the consequent."
the distinction between actual consequences or perceived effects and ends-in-view or goals. As we shall see later, the reconstructionist apparently fails to make this distinction. Concerning ends-in-view, their origin and role, Dewey says:

In fact, ends are ends-in-view or aims. They arise out of natural effects or consequences which in the beginning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any purpose is concerned. Men like some of the consequences and dislike others. Henceforth (or until attraction and repulsion alter) attaining or averting similar consequences are aims or ends. These constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes under deliberation. Meantime of course imagination is busy. Old consequences are enhanced, recombined, modified in imagination. Invention operates. Actual consequences, that is effects which have happened in the past, become possible future consequences of acts still to be performed. This operation of imaginative thought complicates the relation of ends to activity, but it does not alter the substantial fact: ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course. They are in no sense ends of action. In being ends of deliberation they are directing pivots in action.

In distinguishing between actual consequences or effects on the one hand and ends on the other (or goals, aims, objectives, or ends-in-view) several important differences can be noted. In the first place, consequences and ends are not even in the same dimension of time. Consequences, are present actualities, or they are recalled from the past, whereas ends as aims or goals are always viewed

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as in the future. It may appear that as the future enters
the present these future aims become actualities, but
strictly speaking, they do not. Actual events do occur
in the present and they may be related to--may even result
from--the aim one had, but they are not the same. An
aim or goal, or end-in-view, is of ideal quality; it is
abstract or mental. It does not physically involve the
concrete aspects of the environment, so long as it is only
a goal; it has no irretrievable consequences. But actual
consequences, no matter how much they may differ from or
resemble the goals anticipated, differ most in that they
are tied to the natural chain of continuity. They affect
the environment in ways that spread out in space and
persist in time. Those effects which are perceived; that
is, consequences, have the ability to influence desire and
give added control of future goals and hence to future
consequences. Thus they are experiences, and in this way
they enrich subsequent experiences. The perceived
consequences of an act or occurrence need not, however,
exhaust all of its effects. An occurrence is all too
likely to have many side effects that may go unperceived.
Even less so is an end projected into the future likely to
include a picture of all of the implications of the event
anticipated and, even if one could foretell with fidelity,
the forecast would still be only a projected picture of the
event; not the event itself, nor even the meanings of the
event which are retained after the event. In this connection, Dewey says:

The action of deliberation, as have seen, consists in selecting some foreseen consequence to serve as a stimulus to present action. It brings future possibilities into the present scene and thereby frees and expands present tendencies. But the selected consequence is set in an indefinite context of other consequences just as real as it is, and many of them much more certain in fact. The "ends" that are foreseen and utilized mark out a little island in an infinite sea. This limitation would be fatal were the proper function of ends anything else than to liberate and guide present action out of its perplexities and confusions. But this service constitutes the sole meaning of aims and purposes. Hence their slight extent in comparison with ignored and unforeseen consequences is of no import in itself.66

Thus it is seen that ends-in-view not only differ from actual consequences, they serve, in fact, a different purpose. In brief, the chief office of future ends is to stimulate and liberate present action, whereas the chief office of consequences is to enlighten experience. This enlightenment of experience is accomplished by enabling one to project better goals into the future and to manage "causes" better so that they give issue to better consequences. The fact that consequences do not duplicate or copy projected ends does not detract from their worth. In fact, if consequences did automatically follow from goals or ends-in-view, magic would be involved. Under these circumstances learning would not be possible,

66Ibid., p. 261.
since learning results from noting the discrepancies between end and consequence, perceiving unforeseen consequences, projecting more realistic ends in subsequent experiences and controlling a wider variety of causes.

It is a commonplace that one learns from mistakes as well as from success. Strictly, this learning is all of one kind because success and failure are both appraisals after the fact and their difference is a difference of degree of discrepancy between goal and actual event, or it is an evaluation based on new goals projected after an event. It is not unusual for one to miss his mark but hit upon something better. In spite of this fact, however, goals serve their purpose best when they can be kept in line with possibilities and when means are managed so that actual occurrences eventuate in as many as possible of the envisioned possibilities. The extreme opposites of this are trusting to luck or acting on blind impulse. Further highlighting the distinction between ends and consequences Dewey tells us:

This is the origin and nature of "goals" of action. They are ways of defining and deepening the meaning of activity. Having an end or aim is thus a characteristic of present activity. It is the means by which an activity becomes adapted when otherwise it would be blind and disorderly, or by which it gets meaning when otherwise it would be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-view is a means in present action; present action is not a means to a remote end. Men do not shoot because targets exist, but
they set up targets in order that throwing and shooting may be more effective and significant. 67

In addition to Dewey's target analogy, perhaps a personal illustration will further delineate goals from consequences and show their different office. Recently enroute from Georgia to Columbus, Ohio, the writer and his wife visited Quebec, Canada. From the vantage point in Georgia, Quebec was a goal, an aim, a destination-to-be-reached. We knew in advance that it was a quaint old city, a point plotted on the roadmap; we knew that and very little more. But hazy as this goal was, it served its purpose; it provided the incentive to order the necessary means and get us there. Having arrived, the actuality was, of course, very different from the goal in many ways. Obviously it was less hazy; more important, it provided for immediate experiencing, fulfillment, satisfactions which goals (even when less hazy) can never provide. Concrete consequences flowed from actual events and provided educative material. Goals must be built from the material of prior experience, including vicarious experience. Should we plan to make this trip again the goals would be very different, as will any similar goal we shall have in the future. The fact that the actuality differed so much from the goal is no condemnation of either,

67Ibid., p. 226.
for both served well their different purposes. Actual events are always different from aims.

One thing more needs to be said about the above illustration. Quebec City was not the end of the road (except that it was the end of the road to Quebec). We followed another road that led to the next objective after Quebec. Had we stayed there, goals of other kinds would have followed one after another as one city follows another on a trip. Nothing is ever final. This brings us to the distinction—and the connection—between means and ends-in-view. We shall see that ends-in-view are more firmly connected to means than are either to consequences. Both means and ends-in-view are products of deliberation and instrumentalities in deliberation, whereas consequences or effects issue from prior events whether or not the prior events are known or controlled. Their function thus defines the connection, and the only legitimate distinction, between means and ends when the ends are of the kind that we have designated as goals, aims, objectives, or ends-in-view. "Means are means; they are intermediates, middle terms . . . . The 'end' is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one." Dewey further elaborates the connection:

68Ibid., p. 34.
Means and ends are two names for the same reality. The term denotes not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment. Without understanding of this fact we cannot understand the nature of habits nor can we pass beyond the usual separation of the moral and non-moral in conduct. "End" is a name for a series of acts taken collectively--like the term army. "Means" is a name for the same series taken distributively--like this soldier, that officer. To think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act to be performed. It means to look at the next act in perspective, not permitting it to occupy the whole field of vision. To bear the end in mind signifies that we should not stop thinking about our next act until we form some reasonably clear idea of the course of action to which it commits us. To attain a remote end means on the other hand to treat the end as a series of ends. To say that an end is remote and distant, to say in fact that it is an end at all, is equivalent to saying that obstacles intervene between us and it. If, however, it remains a distant end, it becomes a mere end, that is, a dream. As soon as we have projected it we must work backward in thought. We must change what is to be done into a how, the means whereby. The end thus re-appears as a series of "what nexts," and the what next of chief importance is the one nearest the present state of the one acting. Only as the end is converted into means is it definitely conceived, or intellectually defined, to say nothing of being executable. Just as end, it is vague, cloudy, impressionistic. We do not know what we are really after until a course of action is mentally worked out. Alladin with his lamp could dispense with translating ends into means, but no one else can.69

The fact that the ends we have been discussing are only means at an early or remote stage--one that is not yet translated into "hows" with taut connections--should not give the impression that there are no other kinds of ends. We need to distinguish between ends-in-view

69Ibid., p. 36.
and other kinds of ends that are not translatable into means. There are ends in nature, natural ends, endings and closes which mark off events. These are numerous, for every existence is an event of long or short duration. When natural events are perceived and are infused with purpose these natural closes yield immediate experience the qualities of which are felt, sometimes as suffering or enjoyment. These ends are final; they are the only final ends, they are aesthetic ends of the kind discussed in Chapter IV. They are final in the sense that they are not means, and they are worthwhile even if they pointed to nothing in the future. They do, of course, leave a residue for future experience, but that is an extra bonus. They are enjoyed (or suffered) in their immediacy, and in their immediate qualities there is no future. As Dewey points out, we cannot even think of them, only the conditions under which they are had. These "things that are most precious, that are final, being just the things that are unstable and most easily changing" are those which "Directly we can do nothing with . . . save have, enjoy

70 This evolutionary view of the universe is not restricted to pragmatism, but appears to be a part of all modern thought that takes into account the theory of relativity and the field-force concepts of physics and astronomy. See Whitehead's Process and Reality and Lincoln Barnett's The Universe and Dr. Einstein.
and suffer them.\textsuperscript{71} Having discussed esthetic experience in Chapter IV it suffices here to point out that esthetic ends are final, as ends-in-view are not. As we shall see, the assumption of "final ends," other than esthetic ends and genuine natural closes, is harmful. Finality or fixity when attached to ends-in-view detracts from their flexibility and hinders their use as procedural means in deliberation.

The distinction between final or esthetic ends and those which are translatable into means is important because, as we have seen, reconstructionism seeks to fix relatively stable ends which are not, and cannot become, esthetic ends, for the reason that they are imported from outside ongoing experience. They are abstract, sociological, long-time goals and cannot either dramatically occur or fail to occur like most events in ongoing experience. If the reconstructionist's goals are achieved at all, their achievement will most likely come about in evolutionary or piece-meal stages, not as a dramatic revolutionary change. They do not possess the qualities, say, of a football game which is either won or lost at the final whistle, to be suffered or enjoyed, as the case may be. Most peaceful revolutions are not fully perceived, much less enjoyed, until a generation later. Properly

conceived, the reconstructionist's goals are but ends of the ends-in-view type. Hence if anything is to come of them they must be translated into means. And if this is done they cannot remain fixed or stable, for as Dewey has said a goal is not fully conceived so long as it is hazy, impressionistic. Discounting the possibility of a miraculous conception of ends, or an Alladin's lamp type of means, an end must undergo some transformation before it becomes a series of tautly connected "hows" at the means stage. In this connection Dewey warns:

The plans which are formed, the principles which man projects as guides of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expounded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires. We may call them programmes of action, but since they are to be used in making our future acts less blind, more directed, they are flexible. Intelligence is not something possessed once for all. It is in constant process of forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment. 72

The fact that ends must be translated into means before they are acted upon should be sufficient evidence that the notion of fixed or stable ends with means contrived to achieve an unchanging end is a fiction. Ends are as flexible as means, for eventually ends become means; they are in a sense means from the beginning.

72 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 96-97.
Ends are hypotheses, and as hypotheses they may require revision after every new bit of evidence, that is, at every stage of deliberation or action. The distinction between the notion of static ends and hypothetical ends can be illustrated by the concept of "feed-back." Some machines, for example, are so constructed that they can perform certain operations "automatically" but there are two different types of automatic performance. In a machine without feed-back control the kind of performance is limited in its scope to "ends" that are set in advance. A vending machine or a slot machine is an example of this kind. When the coin is inserted and a lever is pulled it can do just what it is set to do and nothing more. The die is cast in advance. It either does, or fails to do, just whatever it is set to do. It can make no adjustments along the way. It is as simple as a row of bricks set on end four inches apart. Tip over the first brick and each one in the row is in turn tipped over, unless there is a missing brick or some other obstruction. But the series is linear and operates in one direction only. It is in no sense self-corrective.

In contrast, a tractor or lawn mower with a "governor," does not just stall on hard pulls nor does it "run away" when the load is light. The "governor" is in part, at least, a "feed-back" mechanism which enables the machine to adjust itself to contingencies. There are
now many "robot" machines that utilize self-corrective "feed-back" techniques. Mauldin reports (exaggerating, of course) that Paris taxi drivers just aim their vehicles, using the projectile system. The normal and preferred method is for drivers to guide their vehicles with a view to their destinations, meantime mediating to avoid the obstructions and blocks to their progress found in the traffic. The difference here between aiming and guiding is that "feed-back" operates in the latter. The means-ends relationship is a guided operation with a self-corrective "feed-back" operating all the way from remote, hazy, impressionistic end to completed action. Ends are hypothetical and flexible and undergo change, as do means. This fact precludes the possibility of fixed or even "relatively stable" ends of the type envisioned by the reconstructionist. To the extent that reconstructionist ends are stabilized and fixed by commitment, just to that extent are they inflexible and incapable of translation into means that take into account the contingencies of ongoing experience. The notion of flexibility in means to make up for inflexibility in ends is a fiction. It ignores the fact that ends must either be translated into means or they remain just what they are.

in the beginning, hazy and impressionistic.

Even when ends are conceived realistically, and are treated hypothetically as they are translated into means, the consequences may still vary from those anticipated. To deny this is to deny the principle of contingency and the novel nature of the universe. But these discrepancies are not chaotic and mysterious. Even they can be explained and brought under some control. Of this Dewey says:

There always exists a discrepancy between means that are employed and consequences that ensue; sometimes this discrepancy is so serious that its result is what we call a mistake or error. The discrepancy exists because the means used, the organs and habits of biological behavior and the organs and conceptions employed in deliberate inquiry, must be present and actual, while consequences to be attained are future. Present actual means are the result of past conditions and past activities. They operate successfully, or "rightly" in (1) the degree in which existing environing conditions are very similar to those which contributed in the past to formation of the habits, and (2) in the degree in which habits retain enough flexibility to readapt themselves easily to new conditions.74

When ends are translated into means it is apparent that means are of two kinds; elsewhere, Dewey calls the two kinds referred to above "material" means and "procedural" means. Material means are those available in the environment and procedural means are those brought

up from prior experience. It is clear that habit, skills, abilities, disposition and the like are important aspects of the latter. This is an important consideration in judging what are good ends. Ends-in-view yield means which yield consequences, which in turn yield new ends and purposes. Thus it is that means as "middle terms" are to be judged or evaluated two ways; by their efficacy in achieving their ends, and in terms of their consequences. Likewise, the function of ends gives the clue as to how they are to be judged. Since they are stimuli to action, that is to the institution of means both material and procedural, ends should be judged on the basis of the availability of means and the kind of means into which they can be translated. An end which has no available material means is not truly an end; nevertheless, its assumption, especially if fervently held, will eventuate in consequences of some kind, if not the desired ones. One inevitable consequence of its assumption is that it calls forth procedural means of some kind, such as attitude, habit, or disposition. An end which does have means must be judged by the kind of means which are available, including the kind of procedural means to which it gives rise. Dewey, refuting the commonly held idea that means only are to be judged, and in terms of ends "already settled upon," insists that ends, too, require judgment:
Judgment which is actually judgment (that satisfies the logical conditions of judgment) institutes means --consequences (ends) in strict conjugate relation to each other. Ends have to be adjudged (evaluated) on the basis of the available means by which they can be attained just as much as existential materials have to be adjudged (evaluated) with respect to their function as material means of effecting a resolved situation. For an end-in-view is itself a means, namely, a procedural means.  

The recognition that ends are to be judged in terms of the means available to their achievement, including procedural means such as habit and disposition, points to the conclusion that ends have an educative effect and should be so judged. Since all ends, if they are seriously entertained, call up some kind of procedural means, such as habit, attitude disposition and the like, it can be said that all ends have an educative effect. As we shall see, some ends eventuate in good habits, attitudes and disposition; others in bad habits, harmful attitudes and undesirable disposition. For example, it is a commonplace that some ends (or the way they are held, which is a part of the end) produce a dogmatic and doctrinaire attitude, while others produce a scientific, objective or open-minded disposition. Likewise, the procedural habits produced or reinforced by some ends tend toward fantasy, day-dreaming, escape, procrastination and the like, while others may encourage methodical and

75Ibid., p. 496.
meticulous work, patient care and the like. All ends are, strictly speaking, educative in some sense, but for the sake of brevity, we are designating those which eventuate in good habits as educative, and those yielding bad habits, including undesirable attitudes and disposition, as miseducative.

In judging ends we need also to recognize that those more pervasive ends called ideals are not exempt from judgment. Although the term "ideal" has a eulogistic connotation, this does not preclude the existence of ideals which are harmful.

Every end that man holds up, every project he entertains is ideal. It marks something wanted rather than something existing. It is wanted because existence as it now is does not furnish it. It carries with itself then, a sense of contrast to the achieved, to the existent. It outruns the seen and touched.76

Dewey says in this connection, however, that common sense revolts against including all such ideal projects or ends when designating an ideal, without regard to quality. There are ideals and ideals, and they, too, should be judged by their educative effects. "Means are tools--tests for differentiating genuine aims from merely emotional and fantastic ideals."77 Ideals that are educative can be distinguished from those that are

miseducative, but the division line is not sharply marked; the former grades off into the latter.

Desire for flowers comes after actual enjoyment of flowers. But it comes before the work that makes the desert bloom. Every ideal is preceded by an actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner image of the actual. It projects in a securer and wider and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting way.78

Clearly ideals which project in wider and fuller form goods which have been experienced in a precarious fleeting way are of the educative kind. They can be tested by the means to their achievement. Elsewhere Dewey illustrates what he designates as "the genuine import of ideals and idealism."

In a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import. The little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is continuous with the rest of the world . . . . The consciousness of this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal. When a sense of the infinite reach of an act physically occurring in a small point of space and occupying a petty instant of time comes home to us, the meaning of a present act is seen to be vast, immeasurable, unthinkable. This ideal is not a goal to be attained. It is a significance to be felt, appreciated.79

Ideals in this broad sense are not strictly ends-in-view, and are not directly testable by means as are ends; nevertheless, in the end, they can be said to be educative, rather than the contrary, for the attitude and

79 Dewey, Ibid., pp. 262-263.
disposition produced by this kind of idealism—especially if equally balanced by the testable type of ideals—would tend to prevent dogmatism. Elsewhere Dewey mentions the kind of ideals that grade off into what we have termed the miseducative.

If a bird in the hand is worth two in a neighboring bush, an actuality in the hand, is worth for the direction of conduct many ideals that are so remote as to be invisible and inaccessible. 80

Throughout Dewey's philosophy he has shown the falsity and the harm of fixed or absolute ends and of ultimate or transcendental ideals, a question not at issue with reconstructionism. But Dewey also speaks out against those ends which, while not claiming finality, grade into what we have termed the miseducative:

Yet the most obvious conclusion would seem to be the impotency and the harmfulness of any and every ideal that is proclaimed wholesale and in the abstract, that is, as something in itself apart from detailed concrete existences whose moving possibilities it embodies. 81

One harm that comes from embracing ends without regard to means, or committing oneself to ends on the theory that the means can be contrived later, is the habit or attitude that this procedure leads to.

To profess to have an aim and then neglect the means of its execution is self-delusion of the most dangerous sort. Education and morals will

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81 Dewey, Reconstructionism in Philosophy, p. 129.
begin to find themselves on the same road of advance that say chemical industry and medicine have found for themselves when they too learn fully the lesson of whole-hearted and unremitting attention to means and conditions—that is, to what mankind so long despised as material and mechanical. When we take means for ends we indeed fall into moral materialism. But when we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into sentimentalism. In the name of the ideal we fall back upon mere luck and chance and magic, or exhortation and preaching; or else upon a fanaticism that will force the realization of preconceived ends at any cost.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 72-73.}

The attitude embodied in the determination to achieve preconceived ends at any cost raises the old question of "the ends justifying the means." Few people now openly subscribe to this doctrine, including the reconstructionist who does so only with qualification.\footnote{Brameld, \textit{Patterns of Educational Philosophy}, p. 605.} Dewey shows, however, that the real issue is not so much whether one subscribes to the doctrine, but whether he proceeds as if he did so.

Common sense revolts against the maxim, conveniently laid off upon Jesuits or other far-away people, that the end justifies the means . . . . Certainly nothing can justify or condemn means except ends, results. But we have to include consequences impartially . . . . It is willful folly to fasten upon some single end or consequence which is liked and permit the view of that to blot from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences . . . . Not the end—in the singular—justifies the means; for there is no such thing as the single all-important end . . . . It is not possible adequately to characterize the presumption, the falsity and the
deliberate perversion of intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural effects that flow from any act, a refusal adopted in order that we may justify an act by picking out that one consequence which will enable us to do what we wish to do and for which we feel the need of justification.

Yet this assumption is continually made.84

Every man works upon it (the maxim that the end justifies the means) so far as he permits himself to become so absorbed in one aspect of what he is doing that he loses a view of its varied consequences, hypnotizing his attention by consideration of just those consequences which in the abstract are desirable and slurring over other consequences equally real. In general, the identification of the end prominent in conscious desire and effort with the end is part of the technique of avoiding a reasonable survey of the consequences. Thus the doctrine of the isolated, complete or fixed end limits intelligent examination, encourages insincerity, and puts a pseudo-stamp of moral justification upon success at any price.85

Since the procedure in reconstructionism does undoubtedly contain symptoms of "ends justifying means" it is worthwhile to note one other aspect of this doctrine, its logical analysis:

The idea that "the end justifies the means" is in as bad repute in moral theory as its adoption is a commonplace of political practice. The doctrine may be given a strictly logical formulation, and when so formulated its inherent defect becomes evident. From the logical standpoint, it rests upon the postulate that some end is already so fixedly given that it is outside the scope of

85Ibid., p. 230.
inquiry, so that the only problem for inquiry is to ascertain and manipulate the materials by which the end may be attained. The hypothetical and directive function of ends-in-view as procedural means is thus ignored and a fundamental logical condition of inquiry is violated. Only an end-in-view that is treated as a hypothesis (by which discrimination and ordering of existential material is operatively effected) can by any logical possibility determine the existential materials that are means. In all fields but the social the notion that the correct solution is already given and that it remains only to find the facts that prove it is so thoroughly discredited that those, who act upon it are regarded as pretenders, or as cranks who are trying to impose some pet notion upon facts. 86

There remains one other serious effect of the kind of separation of ends and means that results from selecting firm ends first and then seeking means to their achievement. This last distinction is of greatest importance in a democratic and ideally classless society such as our own. When ends are chosen and fixed in advance then means become, at best, drudgery and onerous work, and, at worst, exploitation and slavery of those who must execute (or become) the means. Plato, who understood and approved the institution of slavery, defined a slave as one who executes the purposes of another. 87 Slavery, thus interpreted, is an extreme example of this separation where one person or one class supplies the ends and another the means. Exploitation of

86 Dewey, Logic, pp. 496-497.
87 See Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 77.
a somewhat milder sort results when one is able to wish his purposes off on another in a less coercive way. Even one who is led to "freely choose" and become committed to distant ends that are not in "strict conjugate relation" to the means that lead, supposedly, to these ends will find the means uninspiring and unenlightening. The derivation of the word "interest" yields a significant insight into how genuine interest may replace the drudgery that sometimes characterizes "mere" means. "Interest," in its Latin form is inter - est, that which "is between."88 So long as means are, as Dewey characterizes them, "middle terms" in ongoing experience, they are infused with their own interest as an integral part of that experience.

D. Pragmatic Criticism of Reconstructionist Ends-Means

Reconstructionism, still a young philosophy, has, nevertheless, already received incisive attention from several critics. It is obvious that much of what Dewey has said about the means-ends relationship is applicable to reconstructionism, yet it must be noted that everything quoted from Dewey in this chapter, with the exception of the quotation at the chapter heading, was written before

reconstructionism was formulated as a distinctive philosophy. It is significant, however, that much of the criticism with which reconstructionism has been favored has centered around ends and means.

Apparently the only specific reaction to reconstructionism which Dewey made after publication of *Patterns of Educational Philosophy* in 1950, is contained in the letter referred to above. The full reference, of which that quoted is a part, is as follows:

> When I see the desire of a whole group of educators to get some fixed principles, goals, standards back of educational procedures I can't but think there is still a need for an old fashioned proclamation of faith in experience and for the implications of the latter for the work of education. . . . I think far the most important "category" of philosophy is that of means-consequences, and that the commonest serious mistake is to take ends-in-view as destinations to be reached which serve as standards of value instead of as guiding intellectual directing instruments of what is to be done.  

Dewey may not be referring here to reconstructionism, specifically; he is implying, however, that the desire of the reconstructionist to set up "some fixed principles, goals, standards back of educational procedures" is a violation of "faith in experience." Reference to the remainder of the quotation, and to Dewey's position outlined earlier in this chapter, helps to specify how

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the reconstructionist's treatment of fixed goals constitutes a lack of faith in experience.

When goals are fixed as standards, as the reconstructionist proposes his "blueprints" should be fixed by commitment, they do not serve as hypothetical ends-in-view, arising in ongoing experience and subject to revision and transformation into means. Instead, such goals are imported from outside the experience in question. Dewey has shown that ends-in-view are never identical to the destinations that are reached, and that they serve a different purpose. Ends-in-view are " pivots in deliberation," they are "procedural means" and as such they are flexible. They are not fixed. Destinations that are reached are actual, present, and produce consequences. Ends-in-view, on the other hand, are future, and abstract. They serve as logical and psychological instruments in deliberation. As such, they are unfit sources of values, and undesirable objects of emotional commitment. Values should be derived from consequences in the present and past, not hopes for the future—values project hopes into the future but it is an inversion to derive them from such hopes. The attachment of spurious imported emotion to ends-in-view only adds to their inflexibility. The need is to adapt and translate ends-in-view; it is not to embrace, preserve, and revere them. Dewey's whole treatment of means-ends and means-consequences is an
empirical analysis of how these factors operate in experience, and how they must operate if experience is to be free, enlightened and educative. The reconstructionist, on the other hand, brings to experience fixed, preconceived, inflexible ends for which means are to be contrived. Such a procedure prevents reciprocity, ruptures integrity between ends and means, and renders resultant experience narrow and less educative, or on occasion miseducative.

On at least two occasions Sidney Hook has addressed himself to reconstructionism, "a position which is marked by basic theoretical confusion." Writing on "authoritarian attitudes in education," Hook refers to "a type of educational philosophy which would make it easier, despite its own professions of democratic allegiance, for authoritarian attitudes to develop." Hook is concerned with what he refers to as reconstructionism's confused methodology, or what may be termed its repudiation of methodology. He includes reconstructionists with those who usually profess impatience with the ideals which John Dewey has made central to his educational philosophy--individual growth, participation, and

91 Loc. cit.
the supremacy of critical intelligence. For them this is insufficient. In an amazing mixture of pedagogy and poppycock, they contend that emphasis on critical method prevents human beings from solving problems and achieving goals. As if the methods of scientific inquiry did not recommend themselves precisely because they were better ways of reaching reliable solutions than other alternatives. 92

Hook points to the inconsistency of "committing a system of education to a program in advance" of specific inquiries and then "blandly to deny that indoctrination is intended," saying that this "simply does not add up." 93 He emphasizes the distinction between commitment to specific programs and commitment to "a method or to the ideal of the inquiring mind," for as he shows:

Critical method is self-corrective. It is self-corrective in that it can formulate alternatives to itself . . . . To be committed to this method does not exclude the consideration of other methods. But to be committed to a doctrine or program, if it means anything at all different from critical analysis of hypotheses, is in practice to exclude other doctrines as species of error known in advance. For if these errors are not held to be errors in advance, but only after inquiry, there is no more commitment involved than there is in any genuine discovery of truth. In that case we are not committed to programs but only to the process of finding out. 94

It is Hook's view that the schools cannot harness themselves with any "grand designs" or political programs, no matter how self-righteous or apparently benevolent, without handing over the reins to drivers "who have other

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92 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
93 Ibid., p. 189.
94 Ibid., p. 187.
goals than the development of emotional and intellectual maturity. It appears that Hook is correct insofar as reconstructionism is concerned, for this philosophy admits to—in fact, insists upon—other goals which it would place ahead of, or substitute for, those of "growth" and "critical method." Reconstructionism characterizes the latter goals as innocuous values of an "age of transition."

Hook's criticism is pertinent to the means-ends problem. He shows that commitment to relatively fixed goals "simply does not add up" with the use of those goals as ends-in-view or hypotheses for use in critical inquiry. If they are hypotheses, then commitment in advance is misplaced. It unfits them for use as "procedural means." If they are not hypotheses, but are accepted in advance of inquiry to be valid goals, then any attempt at critical inquiry is but an empty pretense. In that case, education becomes merely the routine manipulation of servile means to ends already set.

In an article entitled "Is Reconstructionism in Education a Flowering of Progressivism?", E. V. Sayers concludes that reconstructionism is "not a supplement or a fulfillment of the progressive viewpoint but a denial of it." Sayers focuses his attention on two points of

95 Loc. cit.

difference between pragmatism and reconstructionism: the nature of the revolution to which education owes allegiance and the problem of method and goals, the means and ends problem. On the latter problem Sayers shows how Dewey and others have emphasized the "centrality of method" and how methodology, broadly interpreted, is shown to be the foundation of education and the growth of democracy. He says

Wherever democracy, as we understand it in the western world, has taken root and grown, it has done so correlatively with improved methods of inquiry . . . . Democracy assigns new and crucial significance to human relations and cooperative experience . . . until such a rationale, centering in methodology, is developed and becomes widespread there can be little hope that such democracy as we have will become more than a precarious city of refuge in a barbarous world, or to change the metaphor, an isle of the blessed that is subject to inundation by every "wave of the future."

When the reconstructionist rejects the emphasis of the progressive upon method, he refuses to participate in the great reconstruction of our era . . . .97

Sayers questions the reconstructionist emphasis on majority rule and stresses that in America "Rule neither by mass nor by class has as yet obtained a foothold,"98 since we are still, "in spite of a sensational history of violations," a reasonable people, who follow a method of democratic deliberation. Sayers asks:

97 Ibid., p. 216.
98 Ibid., p. 217.
Why does the reconstructionist focus attention upon "majority rule" as a meaning of democracy? Is it not because, in the showdown, this, supplemented by propaganda, is what he recognizes as the method? Taken alone, majority rule is, on occasion, as readily mob rule as any other kind. Method has to be lifted to the level of reflective inquiry before it is worthy of the name. Is our quest really for majority rule, or, instead, for a proper method of achieving majorities? The reconstructionist lets democratic method go by the board in thus emphasizing majority rule, for the latter is but a useful device for registering the results of reflection and closing a stage of the process by designating a hypothesis to be tested in action. . . . . Education's clue is in the fact that what we want more than anything else, in our aspiration to be democratic, is to achieve a method by which we can make changes without resort to coercion either by ballots or by bullets.

The progressive rests his faith, according to Sayers, in the centrality of method in resolving difficulties, confusions, and uncertainties in personal and social matters, from the simplest to the most profound, and in this connection

The ends of education so viewed are peculiarly matters of perspective, attitude, intellect and skill. They affect the foundations of construction and reconstruction in all realms of experience, including economic and political. They are methodological standards.

Sayers concludes that "the reconstructionist does not appear to supplement the progressive's emphasis upon method by setting up his specific goals for education; he appears to discard the method." 101

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99 Ibid., p. 216.
100 Ibid., p. 215.
101 Ibid., p. 217.
The most sympathetic critic of reconstructionism, aside from Rugg, who has said that his own outlook "is most approximately represented" by the reconstructionist view, is Isaac Berkson, who considered himself a reconstructionist of the original and more authentic kind long before Brameld "employed the term 'reconstructionism' --without qualification--to designate his own particular conception." While commending much of Brameld's reconstructionism, he questions "truth making by social consensus" in which empirical inquiry "gets lost in the press of group dynamics." Questioning utopianism, he also asserts that as we face the future it should be "the emerging future, not the millenial 'end of days'," and he suggests that "the term 'reconstructionism' itself implies that we must rebuild on existing foundations." Berkson's sharpest criticism of reconstructionism, apart from its theory of truth, is directed towards its departure from empiricism and scientific method in setting up

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102 Harold Rugg, The Teacher of Teachers, p. 294. Also see his comment: "for thirty four years nothing as definitive as Dewey's Democracy and Education appeared in its field. Then in 1950 came Theodore Brameld's Patterns of Educational Philosophy; this, I am convinced, will mark a new era in thought and practice." p. 61.


104 Ibid., p. 160
105 Ibid., p. 162.
utopian goals. He says

Professor Brameld's one-sided interpretation of Peirce is symptomatic of his general trend. He has moved away from the emphasis on "critical common sensism" and "scientific method" which permeates the writing of Peirce and Dewey . . . . Occasionally he seems to wander off into the wilds of romantic idealism where the concepts of truth, value, and meaning lose their distinctive significances . . . . The high regard for the dionysian, the mythical, the utopian, lead him away from the empirical ground on which any sound structure of a philosophy of experience must rest.106

Berkson further points out that reconstructionism contains "much wishful thinking" and he cites reconstructionism's uncritical tolerance of communism and the naively optimistic view of Soviet education as an example of failure to make a proper estimate of facts that lie at his feet while he gazes at the horizon.

This section deals chiefly with the pragmatic criticism of reconstructionist ends and means. Others have questioned this philosophy, also; indeed, the most severe criticisms have been advanced by two transcendental realists, Wegener107 and Mosier.108 The latter notes that

106 Ibid., p. 161. Brameld's interpretation of Peirce is discussed in Chapter VI.


reconstructionism resorts to "a prior separation of the means-ends relation" which ignores one of the chief strengths of pragmatism, "the permanent linkage of the means-end relation in the activity of knowing."

Apart from John Dewey's own trenchant two-sentence indictment of reconstructionism in its present form, perhaps the pragmatic criticism which has most incisively called attention to the effects of preestablished goals and the means-ends problem are to be found in references to that philosophy by Hullfish. In the article in which Dewey's letter was first published, Hullfish, referring to our debt to John Dewey for resources, says

Among these none seems more useful, nor more relevant to our present need, than his insight that to set forth fixed ends towards which the growth of young people is to be directed is to say at the onset of the process where it is to be halted. And, further, it is to admit that some among us, by virtue of whatever authority they manage to establish, may properly place limits upon the development of the rest of us. A generous faith in human intelligence will be replaced by a narrow faith in the intelligence of a few and, as the history of man would seem to show, this way disaster lies. Freedom is not to be so had.

Here it is apparent that Hullfish's reference to the limiting and narrowing effect of fixed ends applies alike to all authoritarian doctrines, and it is to authoritarianism and fixed ends in general that Dewey's

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109 Reference is to Dewey's letter to Hullfish quoted on p. 234.

The whole philosophy is a liberating alternative. The fact that he does include reconstructionism among those philosophies that tend toward authoritarianism, as does Sidney Hook, is apparent in a further statement:

It ought here to be noted that not all of the pressure upon schools comes, in these days of hysteria, from those whose interests are not primarily educational. Educators themselves apply pressure which is no less questionable. Perhaps they reflect the anxiety of our day; perhaps they are impatient, knowing that they know what is right, with those of lesser wisdom; perhaps their sense of certainty that the truth is in hand will not permit them to tolerate error. In any case, they would set their goals before us, build a teaching profession committed to these goals, and develop a program in school and set out to achieve them.111

Here, in addition to the narrowing effect of fixed ends and predetermined goals and their debilitating effect on "a generous faith in human intelligence," there is the pointed implication that possession of the "right" ends in advance, while one seeks merely the means, has also a concomitant effect, the production of intolerance and fanaticism. In an earlier article, Hullfish cites two further educational effects:

... today some who are satisfied with their analyses of democracy ... are frankly willing to lean partially, educationally, in order to make their ends prevail more widely. Ends so conceived, however, have about them a quality of finality. They are not themselves objects of further scrutiny ... Two serious

111Ibid., p. 18.
consequences result. The battle over ends grows apace; and the battle in its final term is one for the control of education. In the midst of the conflict, education is forgotten; . . . A second consequence is that the ends are held so much as ends—in-themselves that they are no longer tempered and shaped by the events which initially gave them being. And when this point is reached we may argue one with another but we have put aside our chance to communicate. 112

In his further discussion of ends in their role of means used in discovering ends, he denies the reconstructionist charge that pragmatism is without the ends needed for education in our time. Concerning the concept that "ends are directing instruments to be further forged as they function as means to find out what the end of a given situation should be," he says:

This is not, as some would have it, to be without ends. It is to view ends in their proper status, as aids to thought, not substitutes for it. 113

An additional commentary on the reconstructionist's criticism of pragmatic means-ends, and an analysis of some of the effects of reconstructionist proposals can be derived from a more recent statement of Hullfish; in fact it seems clear that the beginning phrase, "There are those . . .," and subsequent referents to "those," is primarily, if not exclusively, in reference to reconstructionists:

113 Ibid., p. 247.
There are those, further, who insist that such a conception of ends (as the pragmatist's) is, at this critical hour, an approach from weakness. These critics introduce no factor of transcendence. They are quite willing to remain within human experience; in fact they insist upon doing so. They are simply sure that we now know enough so as not to waste time arguing about the validity of certain ends (from economic form to patterns of world government) over others. Here, too, there is a measure of truth. Man has learned through experience. This, indeed, is why he is always confronted with the need to choose among ends; otherwise, he would merely repeat experience—he would not reconstruct it, and be concerned to do so. Yet this accumulation of knowledge does not mean that he may at some moment of time (perhaps to be judged to be the right moment by those who know that we do now know enough) strike off the blueprint for the future with full assurance in the infallibility of his judgment. If it means this, an invitation is issued man to fall back upon repetitiveness, to forego the agony of thinking about that which others have already solved. What is properly at issue is that the ends we bring to situations of choice serve as means to help us choose. They serve us; they do not command us. At the social level this process serves to keep our plural culture a vital culture, elevating it above the possibility of jelling in accordance with the blueprint of either the wise or the vicious.114

The elaboration of the pragmatic means-ends relationship of which this statement is a part is to the effect that the function of ends described earlier by Dewey is applicable no less to our present culture. For our "crisis culture" Hullfish would seem to prescribe courage and a zest for living in lieu of a retreat to the dubious security of static goals. He says that "the direction flag still

114Hullfish, "Education in an Age of Anxiety," Education Freedom in an Age of Anxiety, H. Gordon Hullfish (Ed.).
flies . . ." so long as we "live with courage in a world of plural ends." We have not yet "reached the end of the road," pace the reconstructionist, or any "from whom the spirit of questing has fled." He asserts that "the quest on man's part for better ends is an unending one," for "no end that is worth its salt stays put."¹¹⁵ For those who would cower after security via settled and static ends there is both a warning and a challenge, because freedom itself is "not a preconceived answer, a predetermined end."

Such certainty as men may achieve is the consequence of learning to test ends through the service they render as means in making life more intelligible and humane. This is a considerable certainty. On it we may build with a growing confidence and yet always refrain from the overconfidence that is a prelude to dogma.¹¹⁶

E. **Summary Appraisal of Reconstructionist Ends-Means**

The foregoing descriptions, criticisms, and references to ends and means in reconstructionism, as they are projected against their pragmatic alternatives, provide the bases for a summary appraisal of this important aspect of reconstructionism. A more concise synthesis of the evidence, however, appears to be needed. It is submitted that the following eleven generalizations, although

¹¹⁵Loc. cit.
¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 218.
insufficiently qualified in their abbreviated form, are in their central meaning, sustained by the foregoing evidence:

1. The reconstructionist's proposed ends are conceived independently of the means to their achievement. They do not arise directly and integrally from ongoing experience, but are instead conceptual products of derivations and interpretations from studies such as psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, philosophy, and the like. Presumably the reconstructionist's ends are to be confirmed by majority consensus, but as yet they do not possess this "objectivity." There is no indication that "consensus" will appreciably change reconstructionist ends; the primary role of consensus is to supply firm emotional commitment to the ends as they are proposed, not to revise them.

2. The reconstructionist's proposed ends are firm, stable, relatively fixed. Any flexibility they possess will have to operate against preconceived ideas concerning what is "real," what is good, and what is necessary in our crisis culture, and against the proposed firm emotional commitment of devotees and partisans of the proposals.

3. Means are conceived primarily as "strategy."
Education, the subject matters and procedures in the public schools, together with politics and organized workers are envisioned as the sources of means. Democracy, in a sense, is a reconstructionist means, but democracy is conceived primarily as majority rule after consensus has been reached by techniques of group dynamics, "defensible partiality" and desirable methods of propaganda.

4. The continuity between means and ends is inadequate. The continuity is limited to that in which the means, which are to be developed after commitment to ends, are to be "powerful" enough to accomplish the ends. The continuity is all a one-way transaction. There is no reciprocity or "feedback" between ends and means. Means do not appreciably modify ends, and ends arising and existing independently of means, do not operate effectively as "procedural means."

5. The reconstructionist's ends do not appear to operate as ends-in-view, but more in the nature of ends-in-themselves. The reconstructionist's conception apparently fails to distinguish between the role of an end, goal, or aim as a pivot in deliberation, and the accomplished end or close of action which yields consequences. Hence the educative effect of inevitable discrepancies is lost in the
reconstructionist's procedure.

6. The reconstructionist fails to gear his proposed means-ends relationship to the empirically observed processes of human experience, which yields at the same time both knowledge and values for future experience.

7. The reconstructionist's ends and means proposals will not operate to produce desirable results—-not even the advocated results—-both because they deny the contingent and novel qualities of existence, and because they do not conform to the necessary requirements revealed by an analysis of human experience. But to attempt them will produce other, undesirable, concomitant effects.

8. The reconstructionist's proposed means-ends relationship contains some of the dubious quality of "the ends justifying the means" in that there is a narrow selection and preoccupation with certain ends which tend to ignore the multiplicity of consequences that flow from any event.

9. The reconstructionist's proposals would produce a kind of servile experience robbed of much of its educative value, and virtually devoid of "immediate" fulfillments. The separation of ends from means has
the effect of depriving the latter of genuine interest. This effect follows whether the ends or purposes are imposed upon those who execute (or who constitute) the means, or equally so when genuinely voluntary activity consists of manipulation of "means" too remote from ends or purposes. These types of activity are devoid of "immediate" or consummatory experience, because genuine fulfillment of the esthetic kind results only from accomplishing ends or goals that are an integral part of the activity.

10. Reconstructionist means as proposed would operate to debilitate human purpose and intelligence, and to impair human relations by dividing people into partisan, antagonistic non-communicative groups of those who embrace reconstructionist "ends" and "those who do not yet do so." This result could be avoided under the recommended procedures only if "universal" consensus could be achieved. The reconstructionist, even, is not this optimistic about the success of his proposals.

11. Aside from considerations of workability and concomitant effects of reconstructionist ends and means specified above, another effect would be to "jell" and hypostatize our dynamic civilization at
whatever level reconstructionist proposals should come into full influence and operation. In spite of the reconstructionist's claim that his ends are "magnetic," they would, nevertheless, operate as a brake on further progress and make further experience repetitive and devoid of fulfillment. The nature of the evidence presented supporting this conclusion is that although proposed reconstructionist ends are distinctively different from those of present culture, they are of a firm and stable nature, and emotional commitment is designed to perpetuate their fixity and finality. Reconstructionism envisions the achievement of currently held ends but it does not envision progress beyond those ends. Its ends cannot be truly dynamic and at the same time "stable."
CHAPTER VI

REALITY AND TRUTH IN RECONSTRUCTION

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.¹

Charles S. Peirce

Reconstructionism does not purport to be a totally new philosophy. Brameled insists that all philosophies, including his own, are products of the culture, and as such they reflect the beliefs that are indigenous to the times and to the cultural milieu.

In this sense reconstructionism follows the philosophic theme advanced by William James in The Will to Believe and that in Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy.²

Brameld claims to have borrowed much more than this from these thinkers, however. The world view or weltanschauung of pragmatism is claimed by reconstructionism as the basis of its "ontology," and delineation is claimed only in the area of "social reality." Brameld also claims adherence to what he designates as the pragmatic conception of truth, but here again he "supplements" what he accepts.


²See Ante, p. 5.
He places a greater emphasis on social reality through his theory of truth by social consensus.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reconstructionist distinctive additions to ontology and theory of truth in order to appraise their validity. This purpose is pursued primarily by an examination of how consistently the reconstructionist's delineations and supplements rest on their pragmatic foundations. A further criteria, congenial to both pragmatism and reconstructionism, is an inquiry into the possible effects and implications of holding and acting on the kind of beliefs held by reconstructionism in these areas.

A. Reconstructionist Ontological Beliefs

Brameld asserts that reconstructionism accepts a number of the progressivist's most cherished beliefs in the philosophic division called ontology. He insists that his is an experiential philosophy, accepting what he interprets to be "the naturalistic this-worldly ontology of progressivism" in which "experience and nature constitute both the form and content of the entire universe." By experience is meant the pulsating, vibrant stuff of life—"things and ideals," feelings and thought, the whole ebb and flow of personality,

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4Loc. cit.
society, earth, sky. By nature is meant the world within reach of scientific experimentation and understanding, a world of disorder and order, of flux and stability, of strife and harmony.\(^5\)

In lieu of further elaboration Brameld cites Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, Krikorian (Ed.), *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* and Max Otto's *Things and Ideals*. He states that

The reconstructionist, too, is hostile toward other-worldly philosophies, certainly toward any metaphysics that tries to establish the primacy of any realm of super-nature over that of nature. Equally he is hostile to objective systems of pre-established order, whether these be of the realist or idealist variety.\(^6\)

Brameld devotes only two paragraphs, the major part of which is quoted above, to what he terms "the universal characteristics of reality." This is not for the reason that he considers this area unimportant, but he turns his major attention to aspects of reality which are "insufficiently considered by alternative philosophies of education."\(^7\)

Reconstructionism's area of sharper concentration begins to be delineated when it analyzes and interprets social reality—particularly group experience. It holds that the progressivist has not given satisfactory interpretations of such group experience.

Reconstructionism accepts the importance of the progressivist viewpoint (of selfhood and language

\(^5\) *Loc. cit.*  
\(^6\) *Loc. cit.*  
\(^7\) *Ibid.*, p. 413.
as socially derived and socially directed) and acknowledges indebtedness, but it still insists that in Mead and others the temptation has been to short-circuit the arc of self and society. In drawing our attention so forcibly to the self, it emphasizes the psychological process .... Too often it de-emphasizes, even misinterprets, the import of sociological forces upon the individual.

The aspects of reconstructionist ontology which are advanced as distinct, in degree at least, from pragmatic philosophy are (1) the cultural determinants of human experience; and (2) history as reality. Brameld gives "reasons for dealing with matters that so often seem political, economic, social and moral, rather than 'purely' ontological." Without these considerations, he asserts that "characteristics of a more abstract sort would be empty and useless." 

The heart of the answer is to be found in one belief to which we shall give repeated attention--namely, that the world is at a perilous juncture in its evolution, and that it stands between two vast constellations of forces, those leading to world-wide tyranny, and those leading to world-wide democracy. A corollary is the belief that the road civilization chooses to take will depend upon whether the inherited economic system under private and minority control is retained, or is corrected by a system of social enterprise under public and majority control.

The cultural determinants of human experience which the reconstructionist asserts are genuine traits of reality of our culture at least are (1) group conflicts,

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8Ibid., pp. 411-412.
9Ibid., p. 413.
10Ibid., p. 421.
(2) group allegiances and (3) group conditioners. War, intercultural conflicts and socio-economic strife constitute the chief aspects of social reality treated by the reconstructionist as group conflicts. Although a variety of causes of conflict are recognized,

The reconstructionist would agree, however, with those interpreters who regard economic interests as more basic than all others.\(^\text{11}\)

Group allegiances are for the most part "correlative with group conflicts" in that "both are largely the product of economic forces."\(^\text{12}\) Allegiances considered are nationalistic, class, or ethnocentric, and are largely solidarities created by conflict. Group conditioners cited are not all directly economic in nature, but they are all cultural, with economic factors impinging in a more or less direct way.

The second distinctive attribute claimed for reconstructionist ontological theory is its conception of history as reality. Brameld denies that history is conceived as operating according to some preestablished pattern or design, and he states four premises which he asserts the reconstructionist can share with the pragmatist.

(1) Men become what they do, in no small part,

\(^{11}\text{Ibid.}, p. 414.\)
\(^{12}\text{Ibid.}, p. 417.\)
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because of the characteristics of the historic period in which they live;

(2) every such period emerges from preceding periods and leads into later ones in such a way as to be influenced by the former and to influence the later;

(3) there is no metaphysical framework within which the stages of history are compressed; rather men hammer out their own history through their own thought and struggles; and

(4) history has no ingrained purpose, no preordained goal, for the goals it attains depend wholly upon the choices, the failures and successes, that men make as they proceed ever onward.13

He then describes aspects of his philosophy which "assume a coloration somewhat different from that of the typical progressivist's." Concerning social struggle he says

It would be proper to generalize the situation by contending that social struggle has been a central phenomenon of all ages--that conflicts of varying degrees of force have been characteristic of groups within nations as well as of relations between nations throughout recorded history.14

Viewed in the perspective of the great span of history dating back to the Renaissance, conflict has waxed and waned between "two tremendous constellations of forces." "The first constellation of forces" consists of those groups that strive to maintain the established social-economic system.

13Ibid., pp. 425-426.
14Ibid., p. 426.
They embrace, first, those whose profession it is to invest money for profit—the capitalists; second, the increasingly important managerial class that directs and controls the industrial machine; third, certain military castes, as in fascist Spain where, leagued with theocrats, capitalists and managers, they protect and enforce the power embodied in privately controlled commerce and agriculture; fourth, the agencies of public opinion—newspapers, radios, movies, advertising, the schools, which are often (though by no means invariably) allied with these other agencies.  

"The second constellation of forces" is "too complex to characterize fully in a general statement," but in general it consists of the great working classes of all nations—especially those sections organized for self-protection and advancement. It includes, despite the "brass hat" hierarchies so chronic to armies, many rank and file members of the military forces. It includes professional workers, some doctors, lawyers, and teachers; many newspaper journalist, many novelist and other artists, together with various middle class elements.  

The reconstructionist position also interprets history as exhibiting "a contraction and expansion of freedom." In this concept the periods of struggle are interspersed with periods of relative quiescence in which those groups struggling for a greater measure of freedom have either temporarily achieved their goals or have been hopelessly thwarted.

A third principle of the reconstructionist concept of the cultural reality of history is the interpretation

15 Ibid., p. 427.
16 Ibid., pp. 428-429.
Society is not assumed to be an organism in a literal biological sense because often "its parts do not hold together or cooperate." The organic principle is held to be desirable, to the extent that it can operate at the societal level, however, and "properly understood and directed," "dangerously totalitarian" tendencies can be avoided. The principle is said to serve the individual in that

It gives to him, as an individual, something of the profound sense of worth and satisfaction that Rousseau long ago saw to be salutary for the members of any social organism grown to maturity . . . .

His Social Contract is an attempt to prove how, in the good society, each individual loses his status as an individual only to regain it by becoming identified with the whole sovereign people.17

The reconstructionist concept of "history as future" is the final distinctive ontological deviation advanced. It is based on a belief that "time is indubitably real" and may be "defined as a continuum or duration of endless movement from the past, into the present, and toward the future."18

The reconstructionist does not hold that by analyzing future trends it is possible to answer in advance the question of whether mankind is inevitably bound; he does not presume that the groove of the future is already mysteriously cut. He does hold that to know what the future should be like is

17Ibid., pp. 432, 433.
18Ibid., p. 433.
essential to knowing what it could be like and that, if we implement our choices with power and strategy, we can determine what it will be like.19

Concerning the role of the future Brameld quotes with approval Friederick Nietzsche's statement, "That which is ahead is just as much a condition of what is present as that which is past."20 It is an important point in the reconstructionist philosophy of historical interpretation that, since every historian writes in the present, "he is ever refashioning the past" through his role in the temporal process. And since the future impinges on the present as does the past, paradoxically, the future has its influence in refashioning the past. This, in brief, is what the reconstructionist means by asserting that both history and future are "real." This concept provides the theoretical basis for the reconstructionist's "coloration" in historical interpretation illustrated above in his theory of economic causation, "contraction and expansion of freedom" in history, interpretation of history as social struggle, division of historic groups into "forces of contraction," and "forces of expansion" and the like. The reconstructionist builds a strong case for his contention that the historian must inevitably

19 Ibid., p. 435. (Italics in original.)
20 Loc. cit. (Brameld's Italics.) Quoted from Harry Slochower, No Voice is Wholly Lost, p. 378.
"refashion" the past since he writes in the present, and from his current vantage point as this is influenced by the future. Whether this argument is an adequate justification for the reconstructionist's admitted and deliberate "coloration" and "refashioning" of the past so as to lend support to his future utopian goals is a question at issue. The question hinges in part, at least, on the nature of truth, to be dealt with later in this chapter.

B. Effects of Reconstructionist Ontology on Experience

The first problem of this chapter is to determine how human experience fares when it must operate within the prescribed limits of the reconstructionist's beliefs about social reality and group experience outlined in the preceding pages. In reconstructionism the kind of beliefs that are commonly advanced as economic and political opinions and policies are given the status of ontological beliefs. As such, they are held to be genuine traits of existence on par with the "universal characteristics of reality." Indeed, the reconstructionist attaches such importance to his beliefs about social reality in "our culture" that "without them, other characteristics of a more abstract sort would be empty and useless."21 The

21Ibid., p. 413.
present problem, then, is to inquire into the
reconstructionist's method of ascribing to social
"reality"--to ontology--beliefs which are, by the very
fact that they are controversial and disputed, clearly
unsettled.

Reconstructionism is not the first philosophy, to
be sure, to concern itself with ontology, or with the
question of what is "reality" or true "being." Nor is it
the first to include in its theory of reality questions
that are unsettled and open to dispute. In fact, Dewey
and others have shown\textsuperscript{22} that except for pragmatism and
possibly other related radical empiricisms, the well-nigh
universal preoccupation of modern philosophy has hinged
around disputation and speculation as to the nature of
"reality," and the resultant mysteries as to the
possibility of knowledge. It is understandable that
under such conditions ontology, metaphysics, and cosmology
would be subjects of perennial dispute and disagreement,
for the very nature of the kinds of reality assumed has
been such that settlement could not come through an appeal
to commonly available evidence provided by primary

\textsuperscript{22}See Joseph Ratner in "Introduction" to
\textit{Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy},
(New York: The Modern Library, Published by Random House,
Inc., 1939), and Dewey, \textit{Quest for Certainty}. Also see
Dewey's "Introduction" in \textit{Problems of Men}, and his
\textit{Reconstruction in Philosophy}. 
experience or objective scientific findings. Indeed, empirical evidence as the final arbiter was most often ruled out by relegating it, in advance, to a status of inferior knowledge, and by subjugating the findings of science to the requirements of a priori theory or reason, or to a superior type of "science." As a consequence, it can be said that one of the over-all purposes of Dewey's lifetime effort has been to rescue philosophy from fruitless speculation and endless controversy and to devote the philosophic enterprise to clarification and solution of the problems of men. Throughout Dewey's writings he has asserted that only a genuinely empirical philosophy based on human experience and a respect for the methods and findings of science could serve this purpose.

It is no accident that Dewey's philosophy does not begin with, nor does it concentrate on, the building of an "ontology" on which to base derivative beliefs. In fact, the term "ontology" is seldom found in Dewey's writings except in discussion of alternative systems which he rejects, or in explanation of the fact that it

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23 Ratner asserts that every philosophy since the time of Galileo has been obliged to take science into account, but most often this has been done by assuming a type of science superior to mere experimentation. See Ibid., p. 90 footnote.

is misleading to attempt to interpret his statements in an ontological frame of reference. Dewey holds that one of the most crucial differences between an empirical and a non-empirical philosophy is a difference in what is taken as original material, the "given." Dewey says "the question of whether we should begin with the simple or the complex appears to be the most important problem in philosophic method at the present time..."

Elsewhere he says that

Non-empirical method starts with a reflective product as if it were primary, as if it were the originally "given." Dewey says "the question of whether we should begin with the simple or the complex appears to be the most important problem in philosophic method at the present time...

In drawing the contrast between philosophic methods that assume the ultimately basic data to be the "refined, derived objects of reflection," instead of the "gross microscopic crude subject matters in primary experience," Dewey does not deny that philosophy should or must deal principally with refined products. He does insist, however, that any philosophy that deserves to be called empirical must recognize that the refined products are derived products, and like experimental science, it

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25 See his letter to "My Dear A---," Appendix, Knowing and the Known, and references to "ontology" in Logic.


must be willing to refer its conclusions back to primary experience for test.

What empirical method exacts of philosophy is two things: First, that refined methods and products be traced back to their origin in primary experience, in all of its heterogeneity and fullness; so that the needs and problems out of which they arise and which they have to satisfy be acknowledged. Secondly, that the secondary methods and conclusions be brought back to the things of ordinary experience, in all their coarseness and crudity, for verification. 28

The question as to whether reconstructionism qualifies as an empirical philosophy hinges on the extent to which its conclusions are traced back to primary experience and the disposition that is shown to give these conclusions a fair test in ordinary experience. Unlike many historic philosophies reconstructionism does not deliberately transcend human experience to derive its first principles; likewise, it denies any teleological or objective system in which forms of necessity are ingrained in historical sequence. Human experience and nature "within reach of scientific experimentation and understanding" are cited as the sole sources of its conclusions.

There is, however, the question of the connection between reconstructionist beliefs and conclusions about "social reality," "group experience," with the primary experience from which they were presumably derived, and to which they should be referred for testing. For example,

28 Ibid., p. 36.
the reconstructionist asserts that in history social reality is characterized by "group conflicts" primarily between the "first constellation of forces," and the "second constellation of forces." Further, history is interpreted in terms of group or class struggle over questions primarily or ultimately economic, and is characterized by a period of "contraction and expansion of freedom." Both history and the future are "real" and, in the reconstructionist concept of "history as future," the future is shown to influence the present even as does history. Just as the past is ever refashioned in the present, the history of the past, "paradoxically, is also determined by the future."

Without attempting to appraise the validity of these reconstructionist ontological concepts, and without here analyzing what appears to be a theory of almost monistic causation, it is, nevertheless appropriate and necessary to raise the question of the manner in which these concepts are related to primary experience. It is obvious that the reconstructionist's concepts and conclusions are not derived very directly from primary experience. There are, to say the least, several levels of interpretation between primary experience and the

29Bremeld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 413-429.
30Ibid., p. 429.
31Ibid., pp. 433-435.
generalities which are advanced as derivative from primary experience. Each level of interpretation provides opportunity for greater refinement and universality, but each also provides the occasion for errors that may creep in through faulty selection, omission, and misplaced emphasis. This fact alone is no condemnation of reconstructionist concepts or conclusions. All philosophy --and all science--must of necessity deal with generalizations and "refined products." Both science and philosophy must provide the channels for tracing down the connections between primary experience and general concepts, however, if they are to yield valid conclusions.

In comparing empirical philosophy with science, Dewey says:

A scientific work in physics or astronomy gives a record of calculations and deductions that were derived from past observations and experiments. But it is more than a record; it is also an indication, an assignment, of further observations and experiments to be performed. No scientific report would get a hearing if it did not describe the apparatus by means of which experiments were carried on and results obtained; not that apparatus is worshiped, but because this procedure tells other inquirers how they are to go to work to get results which agree or disagree in their experience with those previously arrived at, and thus confirm, modify and rectify the latter. The recorded scientific result is in effect a designation of a method to be followed and a prediction of what will be found when specified observations are set on foot. That is all a philosophy can be or do.32

32Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 36.
Reconstructionism claims that its beliefs are derived in part from the sciences such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics and the like, and from direct experience via the consensus of "increasing numbers of people." Yet reconstructionism concentrates on products, on "ends," and disparages methodology. One of the chief criticisms of pragmatism by reconstructionism is that the former, in emphasizing method, never arrives at stable conclusions. The crucial question here is: can it be determined if reconstructionist generalizations are well grounded in the sciences cited, or in primary human experience of any kind, without more specific attention to methodology and in the absence of taut connections?

The influence of the future on reconstructionist generalizations adds a further complication. The reconstructionist appears to be altogether correct in his appraisal of the important role that the future plays in deliberation and intelligence. When future goals and possibilities are utilized to validate present generalizations, however, a function which can be done properly only by experienced consequences, this seems to be a perversion of the role of the future. In fact, a

\[\text{33See ante, Chapter V, pp. 194-199.}\]

\[\text{34See especially Bode's discussion in Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, pp. 242 ff, where he shows that a "sharp" knife means one that "will cut" when past experience and present facts are translated into future possibility. Also see the discussion on means-ends, ante, Chapter V.}\]
process which proposes to utilize the future in testing the very generalizations on which future possibilities themselves are to be estimated appears to be circular and thoroughly confused, and one which, if pursued, abandons the firm experiential ground which should support deliberation.

Examination of reconstructionist ontology reveals that its beliefs about social reality—about group experience—utilizes many very general terms, such as "forces," which it is all but impossible to trace down and equate with primary referents with any degree of precision or exactness. For example, how accurately can one determine what constitutes the "forces of expansion" and how precisely can one designate the "forces" they exert. What precisely does "society as organism" mean for purposes other than vague generalization? Doubtless one could assemble an array of equally convincing facts which would show disparity and diversity in society. In this respect reconstructionism appears to exhibit traits which it is more accurate to characterize as conceptualism than empiricism.35

Questioning of the validity of conceptualism does not appear to be restricted to pragmatic writers. Indeed, it appears to be at odds, not only with empiricism, but

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35See Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 137.
with naturalism as a whole. George Santayana says naturalists

may find room for every sort of psychology, poetry, logic, and theology if only they are content with their natural places. Naturalism will break down, however, as soon as words, ideas, or spirits are taken to be substantial on their own account, and powers at work prior to the existence of their organs, or independent of them.36

Some statements that Dewey has made in criticism of other theories appear applicable, in part at least, to reconstructionism.

Were it not for the inertia of habit (which applies to opinion as well as to overt acts) it would be astonishing to find today writers who are well acquainted with the procedure of physical science and yet appeal to "forces" in explanation of human and social phenomena. For in the former case, they are aware that electricity, heat, light, etc., are names for ways in which definite observable concrete phenomena behave in relation to one another, and that all description and explanation have to be made in terms of verifiable relations of observed singular events.37

Various theories suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want light upon is this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationship to one another . . . . Hence they do not assist inquiry. They close it.38

37 Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 32.
38 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 188-189.
The solemn reiteration of categories . . . detains thought within pompous and sonorous generalities wherein controversy is as inevitable as it is incapable of solution. 39

After many centuries of struggle and following of false gods the natural sciences now possess methods by which particular facts and general ideas are brought into effective cooperation with one another. But with respect to means for understanding social events we are still living in a pre-scientific epoch . . . . The generalizations are so general in the sense of remoteness from the events of which they are supposed to apply that they are matters of opinion, and frequently the rallying cries and slogans of factions and classes. They are often expressions of partisan desire clothed in the language of intellect. As matters of opinion, they are batted hither and yon in controversy . . . . They differ at practically every point from scientific generalizations, since the latter express the relations of facts to one another, and as they are employed to bring together more facts, are tested by the material to which they are applied. 40

The net result is that in a fully empirical philosophy no beliefs should be accepted and held as true in advance of inquiry, and, even after inquiry has yielded a "warranted assertion," a belief should be utilized as operationally and tentatively true until such time as change or additional evidence calls it up for further study. As Dewey has phrased it, "... there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry." 41

39 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
This, in brief, is the method that has led to the development of science.

We have been considering science as a body of conclusions. We have ignored science in its quality of an attitude embodied in habitual will to employ certain methods of observation, reflection and test rather than others. Some of its obvious elements are willingness to hold beliefs in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is obtained; willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as hypotheses to be tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems.42

The question at issue is the appropriateness of the reconstructionist's method of including in "ontology" conclusions which are obviously unsettled and untried, and that appear to stand in need of additional evidence and testing before they can be either accepted or rejected. It is true that the reconstructionist calls for testing his economic and social proposals "on a grand scale by the culture itself," and designates his ontology as "evolutionary." A test presupposes, however, the utilization of doubt, the precondition to reflective thought, and requires suspension of judgment and the disposition to follow wherever the emerging evidence leads. The very fact that reconstructionist conclusions

43Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 497.
are included in "ontology," the theory of "being" or true reality, contains grounds to suspect that the liberating spirit of doubt has been crowded out by an attitude of unquestioning certainty.

Human experience is cited as the source of reconstructionist ontological beliefs, and presumably the improvement of human experience is the ultimate goal with which these beliefs are concerned. To this extent there is no disagreement between reconstructionism and pragmatism, or indeed any other naturalistic humanism. It must be recognized, however, that the term "experience" designates a variety of kinds and qualities of behavior. Experience can be "the richest and fullest experience possible," or, at the other extreme, it can be narrow and poor. Just as life varies in quality under the various conditions that prevail, and with the manner in which it is lived, so, too, does experience vary in quality. What experience yields depends upon its quality, and this in turn depends upon the conditions under which the experience is had. This analysis of the effect on experience of reconstructionist ontology which prescribes certain beliefs in advance is, at the same time, an analysis of the kind of beliefs that such circumscribed experience is expected to yield. Justification of the circularity implied is to be found in a further analysis of the nature of experience. Experience, like life and history,
is "double-barreled" in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in unanalyzed totality. "Thing" and "thought" as James says in this connection are "single-barreled"; they refer to products discriminated by reflection out of primary experience.**

To limit the possibilities of either analyzed constituent of experience, "thing" or "thought," is, in effect, to impoverish the resultant experience. Reconstructionist ontology threatens to impoverish both constituents. The nature of experience is such that on any particular occasion the total resources available for dealing with a situation consist of the "material means" available in the environment and the "procedural means" brought up from prior experience.45 The total resources of the environment are actually never wholly available. The means available to an individual for use are actually only those that can be recognized as possibilities, and the ability to recognize means—indeed to perceive at all—is itself a procedural means fashioned by prior experience.

The dark and the twilight abound. For any object of primary experience there are always potentialities which are not explicit . . . .46

In all primary experience we operate on the basis of our assumptions of what the situation consists and of what it

45Reference is to the discussion on "means" ante Chapter V.
46Ibid., p. 20.
calls for—ultimately on the basis of what we assume the world is like. Thinking could not go forward if all elements in the situation were in doubt, if in each situation all assumptions had to be recreated or examined.

Possession of reliable knowledge, beliefs and assumptions derived from prior experience and held ready for use or revision as need be is very different, however, from strict adherence to beliefs such as those which constitute reconstructionist "ontology." Flexibility in beliefs and assumptions provide for the enrichment of experience, for in this case beliefs are used as instruments. In the case of a more inflexible "ontology" experience is stunted for the reason that the possibilities in each new situation face a censorship which permits the entertainment of only such ideas as jibe with the firmly held assumptions of "reality." Some elements of this limitation doubtless operate in practically all experience, but it is disastrous only when the "ontology" cannot be reconstructed in the light of ongoing experience, or if "ontological" beliefs are extended to include unsettled questions where suspension of judgment ought to prevail.

There is not only the question of how accurate are one's assumptions, but more important is the disposition to reexamine and reconstruct prior assumptions as experience shows the need. The effect of more or less institutionalizing assumptions into "reality," "true
being," or "ontology" is to limit their flexibility. This does not promote the disposition to subordinate them to the findings of ongoing experience.

The conclusion concerning reconstructionist ontology is that as proposed it will have a deleterious effect on experience. Reconstructionist ontological beliefs are not clearly and directly products of primary experience, nor are there adequate provisions for referring high level generalizations to direct experience or scientific experiment for test. The effect of the prior assumption and firm emotional commitment to these beliefs in advance of the opportunity for overt testing in actual experience will be such as to impoverish subsequent experience. The resultant impoverished experience cannot then yield the most valid beliefs, habits and attitudes, but will, instead, yield the disposition to adhere to untested beliefs, and dogmatic and divisive attitudes. Social controversy will be a concomitant effect.

C. Truth By Group Consensus

The reconstructionist begins elaboration of his theory of truth by asserting that he derives "his beliefs from his closest compatriot--the progressivist." He

47Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 437. Note: Brameld uses the term "progressivist" as a synonym for pragmatist, experimentalist, etc.
rejects, with the pragmatist,

esoteric, mystical, or supernatural devices, and
. . . rejects all formulas claiming some
proprietorship over final truth . . . . He
rejects all theories of extreme psychological
mechanism or mind substance, and all faculty
psychologies. He equally rejects as both
absolute and obsolete, the neo-Thomist theory
that mind and its forms of truth are forever
present in the bosom of an eternally unfolding
reality.48

The reconstructionist is not content to accept as
sufficient and adequate the pragmatic theory of truth as
it has been developed by Dewey and other "progressivists,"
however, but asks consideration of "whether or not the
emerging philosophy has begun to contribute any additions
to our beliefs about knowledge."49 The seven additions
proposed are the roles of goal-seeking, prehension, the
unrational, ideology, utopia, and group mind as end and
means.50 The proposed additional road to truth under
examination here is "the role of truth-seeking as social
consensus."51

Truth-seeking by social consensus is "defined in
preliminary fashion," as follows:

The truth of those experiences most vital in the
life of any culture are determined, not merely by

48 Ibid., pp. 437-438.
49 Ibid., p. 438.
50 Ibid., p. 438 ff. Also see Ante Chapter II, p. 72
and Chapter III for a discussion of "prehension."
51 Ibid., pp. 438, 456-471.
Here Brameld is undoubtedly attributing the "needful satisfaction" criterion of truth to the pragmatist, and is advancing the "agreement or consensus" criterion as a reconstructionist refinement or addition to the pragmatic criterion of truth. His interpretation of the pragmatic criterion of truth, as well as his additional method, must be examined after the later is more fully elaborated.

Brameld asserts that he is not interested in arguing that "social consensus is the criterion of truth," for he has "repeatedly emphasized the progressivist method of truth-seeking through experimental intelligence as indispensable." Concerning social consensus he does contend that,

The criterion needs to be much more greatly emphasized and clearly explicated and that, for those crucial purposes of goal-seeking and future making, it should be his most important single criterion.

Brameld asserts that "there is nothing strange about this method. All science presupposes agreement about, and hence the ability to communicate, the evidence appropriate to a

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52 Ibid., p. 456.
53 Loc. cit. ("the" italicized in original.)
54 Ibid., p. 457. (Italics in original.)
given field." In developing the argument that the "act of agreement" is "indispensable to truth," he states that

... however far we use scientific evidence, however cautious we are in self-examination and communication, there is always a point at which we must stop and either agree or disagree upon the testimony that has been offered as to the nature of our goals.

The indispensability of the act of consensus follows from the assumption that truth must be derived from "our goal-seeking interests." However much we utilize "the help of logicians," sematicists, and clinical psychologists, Brameld asserts that our goal-seeking interests defy such aid.

They are too prehensive, too un rational, too immediate, too qualitative in their basic character. Like awareness of time or hunger for food, they are grasped as direct awarenesses.

The reconstructionist obviously needs social consensus to objectify the kind of knowing he assumes to be the result of immediate experience.

The importance of having testimony about evidence is that it takes the prehensions, id-like desires, and goals of men and groups out of their inner personal sanctuaries. Instead of continuing to be purely private, inscrutable, and merely subjective, the aim is as far as possible to make them public, expressible, and in this sense objective.

55 Ibid., p. 458.
56 Ibid., p. 458.
57 Ibid., p. 459. See Ante Chapter III, on "Prehension" for a criticism of the reconstructionist's assumption of "direct awareness."
58 Ibid., pp. 457-458.
Social consensus as a method of truth-seeking is also advanced as a remedy, or as an alternative, to "solipsism, which holds that . . . there is no actual way of guaranteeing that my experience is identical with yours" and likewise as an alternative to "anarchism in political philosophy," the "be-all and the end-all of the individual."\(^{59}\)

Reconstructionism recognizes practical difficulties in achieving social consensus that truly represents the group or groups concerned. For example, it is pointed out that "social consensus turns out to be too often the consensus of part of some group."\(^{60}\) In spite of the obstacles, however, the reconstructionist offers evidence to the effect that social consensus will work, and he gives reasons why it is necessary that it should work in our culture "which, left unconstructed, suffers chronically from conflicts and disintegrating pressures."\(^{61}\)

A distinction is drawn between knowledge and truth, which is, in a sense, the distinction between "ideology" and "utopia."

Knowledge is a term to designate the body of agreed-upon experiences utilized by past and present cultures. It is, therefore, the group mind in the sense of ideological content--an

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 459.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 462.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 465.
indispensable reservoir from which to draw in building any new content.  

Thus it is that agreement or consensus contributes to both "knowledge" and "truth," but each represents a consensus of different groups. As a result of cultural lag and the propaganda and apologetics of ideologists, ideology is "discolored by large blotches of falsity."

Truth becomes, we might then say, the utopian content of a group mind. It is any social consensus about the dominant goals of, and means to, the reconstructed culture . . . . In short, truths are achievements of the group mind (1) conceived as means, in active process toward its goals; and (2) conceived as end, in possession of its goals.  

D. Appraisal of Truth by Social Consensus

The reconstructionist conception of truth, based in part of social consensus, and in part on "experimental intelligence," appears to be open to serious question on three counts: (1) in the reconstructionist's insistence that scientific truth itself depends upon agreement, there is a question about the role that agreement plays in such truth; (2) there is the question of compatibility of the reconstructionist additional road to truth with the professed acceptance of pragmatic or "progressivist" bases; (3) and there is a question of the implications and

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62 Ibid., p. 469.
63 Ibid., p. 470.
practical results that can be expected to issue from the assumption that consensus is a valid source of truth, and the policies and practices which follow this assumption.

(1) In support of the claim that "there is nothing strange about this (social consensus) method," and the claim that "all science pre-supposes agreement," Brameld says that

It is possible that the great pragmatist Charles Peirce anticipates this conception more clearly than Dewey.64  

In support of this view, Brameld quotes as below (actually, he slightly mis-quotes) a part of Peirce's famous sentence concerning truth:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate is what we mean by truth. . . . (Italics ours) [Brameld's] 65

Peirce's statement as it appears in several sources is as follows:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.66

The effect of Brameld's slight mis-quotation (omission

64Ibid., p. 456, footnote.
of "to" following "agreed," and omission of "the" modifying "truth") is probably of considerably less importance than his overall misinterpretation of what Peirce undoubtedly meant by the statement. Brameld has emphasized "agreed by all who investigate" by italicizing that phrase, whereas, Peirce himself emphasized "fated" by saying in a footnote:

Fated means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be avoided.67

Dewey, in one discussion of Peirce's view, refers to this sentence and italicizes the phrase "who investigate" to emphasize both his and Peirce's view that investigation by competent observers is the key to the firm establishment of truth, and that ultimate agreement is only the confirmation that is sure (or "fated") to follow such investigation. Dewey continues:

Peirce expressly draws the conclusion which follows from this statement (No. 66 above); viz., that this conception of truth and reality makes everything depend upon the character of the methods of inquiry and inference by which conclusions are reached. "In the case of synthetic inferences we know only the degree of trustworthiness of our proceedings. As all knowledge comes from synthetic inference, we must also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions," true conclusions, once more, being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries.68

Brameld has either misinterpreted or misrepresented Peirce's view of the role of agreement in "truth-seeking." It seems clear that Peirce assigns to competent investigation, using methods that "generally have led to true conclusions," the role which Brameld seeks to assign to the "act of agreement."

The fact that agreement is sure to follow when reliable methods are used by competent investigators should in no way disguise the fact that it is the investigation, not the agreement, that supplies the true conclusion. Agreement does serve to confirm and establish the truth, but when investigation produces conclusions that are of such reliability and firmness that they are "fated to be agreed to by all who investigate," then such conclusions possess this reliability in advance of subsequent confirmation or agreement. Peirce seems to hold that the fact of ultimate agreement after competent and sustained investigation is the best evidence that a conclusion is true. This is very different from the reconstructionist's assumption that the "act of agreement" or any kind of consensus can itself somehow confer truth upon a proposition.

Berkson, a critic who, as noted earlier, is on the whole sympathetic to reconstructionism, chides Brameld
for his "one-sided interpretation of Peirce." Berkson points out that "as usually understood, the sentence quoted signifies just about the opposite of what Professor Brameld implies." Not only does Berkson challenge Brameld's attempt to construe Peirce's views as giving support to the reconstructionist's social consensus theory of truth, but Berkson shows no sympathy for Brameld's notions in which

He evidently believes that the truth itself is, somehow, determined by the process of social communication.

Berkson asserts that Brameld "has moved away from the emphasis on 'critical commensensism' and 'scientific method' which permeates the writings of Peirce and Dewey." It is, of course, true that "all science presupposes agreement," but not in the superficial and almost superstitious sense that Brameld apparently means it. It is also true that agreement and consensus are important. All science does pre-supposes agreement in the sense that if an investigator keeps his bias and bent out of his descriptions and his conclusions, and if he faithfully relates the procedures and apparatus that he uses, another investigator using like procedures and

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70 Loc. cit.
71 Loc. cit.
apparatus will be able to duplicate his findings. Should the second investigator turn up new evidence this is likely to constitute an extension of the findings, if not a total refutation of the proposition under test. Agreement is important, also, because the meanings employed in any investigation are of necessity socially derived meanings, and the findings contribute to the enrichment of meanings available for subsequent inquiry. All inquiry is in this sense cooperative inquiry, for no modern investigator starts from scratch, so to speak. There is both division of labor (specialization and teamwork) and utilization of the funded experience of the culture.

The history of science probably presents the best examples of how consensus or agreement is not a reliable road to truth. Almost always until the past two centuries individual investigators had to operate against a consensus, a hard crust of false presuppositions. Then on those rare occasions when, through genius or luck, a new scientific insight was grasped, acceptance and application of the new had to face opposition--and often persecution--from those with an entrenched and vested interest in the old.\textsuperscript{72} Even in this modern "scientific age," with

all our "open-mindedness" and "objectivity," who knows the extent to which our own presuppositions blind us to new and more extensive scientific truths? We do know the effect on scientific truth when there is an official "consensus" such as existed in Nazi Germany and now exists in Soviet Russia.73 It seems that the appropriate role of consensus in scientific truth-seeking is for it to be free to follow, not lead—to follow wherever the facts lead or point. When consensus attempts to lead, it is all too likely to force the pace and get ahead of the facts or ride roughshod over them.

The inefficacy of the method of consensus for arriving at truth, when unaided by concrete inquiry into conditions, is perhaps best epitomized by Bode.

It has been a habit with us, when we are puzzled by a problem, to consult others who are equally puzzled or who perhaps have not reflected on the problem at all and to evolve a solution out of our collective ignorance.74

Perhaps the most revealing inadequacy of the reconstructionist theory of truth by social consensus is that the reconstructionist himself cannot consistently

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73 Ibid., pp. 77-78. Also see George S. Counts and Nucia Lodge, The Country of the Blind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949) "Yet no investigator can be sure that his findings and conclusions are in harmony with the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin until the party has spoken. Its word of course is final, unless it changes its mind and places its stamp of infallibility on some new interpretation." p. 194.

74 Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 82.
hold to the theory. For example, belief in the "free enterprise" economic system which the reconstructionist claims is now "discolored by large blotches of falsity" undoubtedly actually enjoys a consensus. Thus according to the reconstructionist criterion free enterprise beliefs must then be "true." The sophistry involved in designating this belief "ideology" or "knowledge" as distinguished from "utopia" or "truth" does not resolve the inconsistency, nor does the reasoning that if the public but knew its own mind and best interests it would embrace the true "utopian" beliefs.

(2) The reconstructionist's repeated professions of allegiance to "the Progressivist method of truth-seeking through experimental intelligence," while at the same time advancing and advocating an additional method based on truth by "act of agreement," raises the question of whether the method of "experimental intelligence" is properly understood by the reconstructionist. His assumption that he can ride the two horses at once--or to change the metaphor, follow two roads to truth--raises this question. Moreover, the question of how well Brameld understands the autonomy and the integrity of the scientific method, or pragmatic truth-seeking, is raised by his statement that

75Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 456.
The truth of those experiences most vital in the social life of any culture are determined, not merely by the needful satisfactions they produce, but also by the extent to which they are agreed upon. . . . 76

In this quotation and its surrounding context it appears that Brameld is assuming that the "progressivist" test of truth is based on "needful satisfactions," whereas his additional method objectifies such truth when it is "agreed upon." Further credence is lent to the probability that he thus misinterprets the pragmatic method by his statement that

The importance of having testimony about evidence is that it takes prehensions, id-like desires, and goals of men and groups out of their personal sanctuaries. Instead of continuing to be purely private, inscrutable, and merely subjective, the aim is as far as possible to make them public, expressible, and in this sense objective. 77

If the pragmatic variety of truth were based on only such "needful satisfaction" as can be derived from "id-like desires," and immediate, purely private, and subjective "evidence" as is to be found in "personal sanctuaries," then indeed it would stand in need of testimony and public objectification. Even then it would be as frail as the crowd is fickle, indifferent, or uninformed. It rests on a firmer base, however, than either private desire or public testimony of subjective belief.

It is true that during the formative days of

76 Loc. cit. (Italics mine.)
77 Ibid., pp. 457-458.
pragmatism there was much discussion of the meaning of James' "cash value" concept of pragmatism and likewise of "the will to believe." It is beyond the scope of this study to trace the development of pragmatism and determine if "needful satisfaction" ever was considered an adequate criterion of truth. Our present purposes require only that we appraise the reconstructionist "additions" against mature pragmatic philosophy. Dewey specifically repudiated the "needful-satisfaction" concept of truth, indicating that "objective conditions" constitute that which must be satisfied by truth.

Too often, for example, when truth has been thought of as satisfaction, it has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need. But the satisfaction in question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problem out of which the idea, the purpose and method of action, arises. It includes public and objective conditions, it is not to be manipulated by whim or personal idiosyncrasy.78

He elaborates further the requirement which the pragmatic concept of instrumental truth must meet.

That which guides us truly is true—demonstrated capacity for such guidance is precisely what is meant by truth. The adverb truly is more fundamental than either the adjective, true, or the noun, truth. An adverb expresses a way, a mode of acting . . . . The hypothesis that works is the true one; and truth is an abstract noun applied to the collection of cases, actual, foreseen, and desired, that receive confirmation in their works and consequences.79

79Ibid., p. 156.
His insistence on "demonstrated capacity" for guidance and "confirmation in their works and consequences" should forestall the notion that an individual, or any group through consensus, can elevate an untried hypothesis into truth by simple embracing it or agreeing upon it.

A part of the difficulty of the reconstructionist conception of truth—and a part of his need for incessant testimony and agreement—appears to rest on his assumption that knowledge and beliefs are "grasped as direct awareness" or "prehensions" by individuals. As indicated in Chapter III ante, the reconstructionist is not the first to make this assumption, but earlier theories that assumed direct intuition also assumed some manner of pre-existent order or authority. The reconstructionist rejects pre-existent systems of order and likewise external authority. It is understandable that he should fear the utter chaos and anarchy that would result if truth were the product of individual whim and fancy, and it is altogether commendable that he should wish to hem it in and control it with public testimony, consensuses, group action, increased collectively, majority rule, and the like. In this fear he is in the same boat with the supernaturalist who believes that man would be actually free "to do as he pleases" and otherwise behave irresponsibly without a given external authority. Both of these theories make experience a purely subjective
matter. Both fall into the error of a false personalism, because both fail to appreciate that experience is "double-barreled," involving "material" as well as "act"; it has a mediate as well as an immediate phase; it is not only a doing, but an undergoing of the consequences. Once an act occurs its consequences flow inevitably. Consequences at this stage are as indifferent to public will or "consensus" as to private whim or fancy. Bad consequences are like many infectious diseases; they cannot be cured, though they could be prevented were one to know enough in advance. The only way to control consequences is to anticipate the "truths" involved and so order the means that will produce desirable consequences.

Truth of the pragmatic variety can be neither flouted nor suborned, nor does it require any special pleading. Neither can it be created subjectively, without due regard to conditions and operations.

This is not to deny that there are "immediate" phases of experience, nor to say that the immediate or subjective is not significant. On the contrary, immediate experience is the source of the esthetic; it is thus the source of all that is of final worth to the individual. But immediate experience, as pure immediacy, is pre-reflective (or post-reflective), and is, at that stage,

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80 See Ante, Chapter V.
81 See Ante, Chapter IV.
devoid of meaning. As Dewey says, it is unspeakable and has no concern with knowledge. Likewise it is not concerned with truth, which Dewey has called "warranted assertibility." It is true that there have been theories of mind which held that truth may be purely subjective, and there have been theories of truth that required no objective sanction. Various religious cults still engage in sharing "testimony" as to their "spiritual" experiences. Since such experience is purely subjective and "immediate," when for some reason there is need to constitute it into "evidence," there appears to be no better method than to utilize such public testimony. The reconstructionist proposals to testify as to one's "id-like desires" and inner prehensions appear to be of the same order, thus the "objective" evidence derived would be of like quality and validity.

If the reconstructionist were content to leave the "id-like desires" and all immediate and subjective experience within "their inner sanctuaries," he would find plenty to do discovering the truths that relate more directly to "what is to be done." The only kind of "truth" with which the public has any legitimate concern is that which has, or is in some way related to, concrete observable consequences. Truths that make a difference of some kind can be tested, they can be adequately established operationally through the observance of
scientific method. If they cannot be tested they need not concern us. Admittedly, such truth is relative. As Max Otto says, the truths men live by are as true as the tests by which they are established are reliable; no more true, but also no less true.²² Yet this pursuit of these truths that men live by is a more fruitful quest for certainty than is offered by the alternative methods. It is more fruitful than the theoretical certainty derived from the manipulation of a priori principles, or from deductions from self-evident or intuited first principles or formal-logical systems. And it is a more fruitful source of certainty than the "id-like desires" or subjective "inner personal sanctuaries" suggested by Brameld.

The compatibility of the reconstructionist "social consensus" method of truth-seeking with that of the method of "experimental intelligence" or scientific method is precluded on two grounds. First, does the method of experimental intelligence or scientific method admit of any modification by the adulteration or addition of some other method? Descriptions of the scientific method and its implications permeate all of Dewey's writings, but Max Otto gives what is perhaps the most concise statement:

Here are five requirements of objective verification: (1) Formulation of only such problems as can be solved by an appeal to facts in the external world. (2) Gathering of facts and, so far as possible, all obtainable facts pertinent to the problem. (3) The subjection of facts, inferences, hypotheses, generalizations, to a test admitted to be decisive, publicly applicable, open to the scrutiny of friend or foe. (4) Progressive building up of verification in which different investigators participate. (5) Recognition of the provisional result of even the most exacting demonstration, hence the relativity of all knowledge.83

If Otto's five requirements of objective verification are, in fact, always requirements, it is clear that Brameld's method of social consensus cannot meet the first of these requirements, for "consensus" is designed to establish the "truth" of the reconstructionist utopian social order. This utopian order exists, admittedly, only in a "future" which cannot be construed as existing in the "external world." Thus, it exists only in inference; it is a "construct," a hypothetical projection. There is unquestionably enough evidence to support the inference that there will be a future, but what events will occur in it is, at any particular moment, an untested hypothesis. The reconstructionist's claim that both history and the future are "real" and can thus contain actualities appears to be an example of semantic confusion.

83 Ibid., p. 155.
All of the facts that are needed to establish the kind of truths that Brameld proposes are not clearly in the "external world," and he openly admits that subjective wants and "prehensions" are the strongest support for his utopian goals which constitute "truths." The reconstructionist is willing to submit his "evidence" openly to friend or foe, the third requirement set forth by Otto, and he is willing that majority rule be considered decisive, but as we have pointed out already, there is the serious question of whether or not the type of testimony and group dynamics techniques envisioned constitute anything that should be considered a "test." A test should be a demonstration of workability (or its lack), utilizing actual conditions, not just what people believe or hope. Concerning Otto's requirement that even the most exact knowledge be viewed as relative, the reconstructionist, in theory at least, would insist that his truths are provisional and relative. His insistence on stability and a strong emotional commitment to utopian "truth," however, is hardly a direct route to the formation of an attitude of flexibility.

Second, a more difficult question is whether or not these five requirements of objective verification preclude the use of an additional method of verification which does not meet these requirements. In actual practice we know that our society, and most individuals in it, have
been highly eclectic, using varying degrees of precision or "scientific method" and mixing up the "method of intelligence" with various other methods. To the extent that people have acted on the basis of other methods it appears that they have failed to achieve verification. Dewey, in the initial paragraph of *How We Think*, says "the better way of thinking that is to be considered in this book is called reflective thinking."84 This passage and the context following show that there are other ways that are commonly used, though not successfully. Both Ratner85 and Conant86 make the point that even in the case of scientists there is no guarantee that when they are outside their laboratories or fields of specialization, they always observe the spirit of scientific inquiry. Einstein warns that even in case of a scientist's work it is better to examine his achievements than to listen to his words.87

There is, nevertheless, the widely held belief that, although men do not universally use the "method of intelligence," to the extent that they have been willing to use it, success and humane progress have been the result. Otherwise, "prejudices and vanity" have "proved

stumbling blocks to progress."\textsuperscript{88} This fact is most easily demonstrated in the history of science, but there are many who insist that scientific method, with its faith in intelligence, is just as important, even if more tardy and difficult of application, in the human and social sciences and in all the aspects of living. In a sense, the significant contribution of Dewey's philosophy is his insight and demonstration that human experience is an adequate source of both truth and values. His philosophy is a continuous polemic against those theories which attempt to exempt certain aspects of life from the liberating light of intelligence. Boe, too, has spoken clearly in the same vein, asserting that the essential moral obligation is "to be intelligent." He has identified democracy as a way of life with faith in intelligence and his contention is that democracy "rests its case on the appeal to intelligence," saying that "democracy must survive on these terms or it cannot survive at all."\textsuperscript{89}

The net result appears to be that the reconstructionist, in his call for the use of a method of consensus in truth-seeking in addition to the method of


\textsuperscript{89} Boe, \textit{How We Learn}, p. 278. Also see his \textit{Democracy as a Way of Life}. 
experimental intelligence, is, in effect, demanding a continued division of allegiance between the method of intelligence and an alternative method. In this sense reconstructionism is reactionary, reacting against an undivided allegiance to intelligence as the prime objective of liberal thought and the overall goal of pragmatic philosophy. It is clear that in this sense, not only is reconstructionism incompatible with what it claims as its "progressivist" bases, it is in open opposition to these bases.

(3) Some of the possible implications, and effects of the theory of truth by consensus have been mentioned already: its inefficacy in reaching firm objective "warranted assertions" and the concomitant drag on progress, and its tendency toward divisive and dogmatic attitudes that will have a deleterious effect on human relations, common interests, and cooperative efforts. One other possible implication requires examination. Bode's identification of the method of intelligence with democracy raises the question of the effect of this additional method of truth by consensus on democracy.

Berkson says that "The spirit of Rousseau's 'general will' hovers over Brameld's proposal," and Rousseau's

"general will" has been called the "stalking horse of dictatorship.\textsuperscript{91} This implies a charge too serious to go unexamined, and yet one that should not be made on the basis of loose association. Indeed the use of conceptual reasoning of this kind is to fall into the same error of which reconstructionism has been accused. It is necessary to inquire if reconstructionism itself, in some of its specific proposals and methods, harbors tendencies which we should reasonably fear will encourage dictatorship.

Two aspects of reconstructionism are suspect—namely, the assumption that consensus or agreement can in any sense be considered the final arbiter in the determination of truth, and the inordinate power ascribed to majorities. Reconstructionism appears to ascribe to majorities the authority to determine truth and values, and to assume a "finality" in matters thus sanctioned. This is an unwarranted extension of the accepted role of the majority in a democracy, which in brief, is to serve as an arbiter in the determination of policy which is necessary in public or group action. That these two aspects of reconstructionism bear greater resemblance to practices in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia than to American and British conceptions of individual and minority rights, is obvious. It is an unsettled question

just how influential was the post-Hegelian dialectic weltanschauung in disposing Germany to dictatorship, and the same is true of the "inverted" Marxist materialistic dialectic in Russia. It does seem altogether reasonable, however, that a theory that truth can be established and stabilized by consensus will mitigate toward a uniformity in thought and a tendency toward monistic theory and generalized ideas. In fact, this is explicitly one of the purposes of reconstruction, since pragmatism is held to be too relative, too tentative, and too indecisive in our crisis culture. And, as Dewey points out

It is no accident that the final effect of uniformity of ideas is to set up some selected body of persons above the theoretical generalization. Those who determine what the theory signifies in terms of the one important thing—namely, what should be done—are supreme over the theory even when they claim to act in subjection to it.

Scientific method in operating with working hypotheses instead of with fixed and final Truth is not forced to have an Inner Council to declare just what is the Truth nor to develop a system of exegesis which rivals the ancient theological way of explaining away apparent inconsistencies. It welcomes a clash of "incompatible opinions" as long as they can produce observed facts in their support. 92

This does not, of course, prove the case that the adoption of the reconstructionist theory of truth by consensus would tend toward dictatorship. It does provide warrant, however, for further inquiry into the implications of the theory.
VALUES AND DEFENSIBLE PARTIALITY IN RECONSTRUCTIONISM

The theory of valuation of reconstructionism, the specific values embraced by this philosophy, and the concept of "defensible partiality" through which these values and the goals of reconstructionism are to be promoted constitute the problems to be analyzed in this chapter.

A. Reconstructionist Values and Valuation

Values and the process of valuation in reconstructionism have much in common with the theory of truth and truth-seeking in this philosophy. Values, like truth, are said to depend upon social consensus.

Values are want-satisfactions; hence they are rooted in the goal-seeking proclivities of individuals and groups. Further, as they are tested by evidence, communication, and agreement --that is, by social consensus--values come within the providence of truth and falsehood.¹

Yet if values are determined in the same way, what distinction is left between them and truths, as such? The distinction, although operationally important, is in cultural experience one of degree only.²

The degree of distinction between truth and values is

²Ibid., p. 476.
Illustrated in the extent to which each can be specifically outlined and stated. The reconstructionist does not attempt to make any comprehensive statement of the content of reconstructionist truth except as it is embodied in "the utopian content of a group mind . . . the dominant goals of, and means to the reconstructed culture." Yet it is the reconstructionist view that "we are obliged to determine as precisely as possible what values to achieve." This can be done, indeed it has been done.

Through widening knowledge in such psychological and social sciences as anthropology, through the arts and philosophy, above all through growing skill in the practice of social consensus in politics and other forms of group life, we can now contend with a great deal of support that many individuals and groups throughout the world and in our present period of culture are attaining increasing agreement upon what they do and do not want.

As a concrete illustration twelve values are listed. These, in abbreviated form, are as follows: sufficient nourishment; adequate dress; shelter and privacy; sexual expression; physiological and mental health; steady work, steady income; companionship, mutual devotion, belongingness; recognition, appreciation, status; novelty, curiosity, variation, recreation, adventure, growth, creativity; literacy, skill, information;

3 cited, p. 470.
4 Ibid., p. 477.
5 Loc. cit.
6 Ibid., pp. 477-478. See ante, Chapter II, pp. , for a complete listing.
participation, sharing; fairly immediate meaning, significance, order, direction.\(^7\)

These values are said to "overlap and ramify" each other and Brameld indicates that his classification is by no means the only possible one, since "both more specific and more general ones could be substituted for some of those selected."\(^8\) All of these values are said to be encompassed in the "supreme" all-inclusive value, "social-self-realization." Further, it is recognized that "some of these values seem contradictory to others." In explanation of this Brameld says

One answer to such apparent contradictions is that human beings may be too complex to be altogether consistent organisms. Another is that no individual can attain all want-satisfactions simultaneously; despite their interfusions, it is often necessary to attain them successively or alternatively. But it is equally true that man's behavior has often been due as much or more to inconsistencies and struggles within the culture as within himself. Certain values are thus frustrated by the pressure of others. This is particularly true of our culture. We have taken some pains to note how it is shot through with moral, economic, religious, and other conflicts, and how these are reflected in values which in turn, seem incompatible.\(^9\)

The reconstructionist does not claim for the specific values he embraces any absolute, "eternal," "fixed" or

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\(^8\)Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, p. 479

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 479-480.
universal quality. They are offered as applicable to "most people in the world" in "our present period of culture." They possess a degree of temporal flexibility just as does truth.

Not only do testimony and agreement even in the most exact sciences change from period to period; human-nature-living-in-culture also changes. Likewise, "the values to which he is committed have themselves been crystallized—not as an a priori faith—but as the product of living cultures." As such, reconstructionist "values and their cultural compulsions are openly cooperative, empirical and naturalistic."

The reconstructionist concern with values, however, is not simply a matter of stating what the crystallized values of most people are.

The problem of pivotal concern, then, is not merely one of determining exactly what our values are and should be, but also of overcoming the cultural contradictions and frustrations that prevent them from being realized.

The present is described as "a time for commitment to values." But in this call to commitment the reconstructionist makes it clear that he does not refer to values that have long been high on the pragmatist's list.

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10 Ibid., p. 482.
11 Ibid., p. 490.
12 Ibid., p. 478.
He is not interested merely in more growth, more change, more method, more process, more indecisiveness. On the contrary, he desires more specificity, more testimony, more convictions about the minimum values already accepted by sufficient numbers of people so that a nucleus of social consensus—indeed much more than a nucleus—is already crystallized.  

The reconstructionist theory of valuation, then, is not so much concerned with an analysis of how values arise in human experience as with specifying a list of values that can obtain wide commitment. Neither is there any detailed examination of how values operate in individual conduct. Instead, it is asserted that "we should be prepared to take sides now. The moment of commitment is at hand." The call is to embrace the values "epitomized by social-self-realization" and "its cultural correlate of a future-centered, designed, world-wide democracy."  

The reconstructionist value theory includes as well—grades off abruptly into—its theory of politics and public policy; its conception of democracy as majority rule; and its "normative blueprints for a reconstructed culture." In brief, reconstructionist values serve as  

13Ibid., p. 483.  
14Loc. cit.  
15Ibid., p. 484. (Italics in original.)  
16Ibid., p. 495 ff. Also see Ante, Chapter II, p. 100 ff, for a list of blueprints and more adequate description of "majority rule."
bases for their "cultural correlates," the reconstructionist's blueprints. These in turn are to be implemented by the "powerful means" of education and politics, thus assuring the utopian reconstructed culture envisioned by reconstructionism. Commitment, also to be achieved by social consensus, is a necessary condition at each stage of the process, from the specific values which are said to enjoy a wide consensus now to the accomplished utopian culture which will claim the allegiance of a world-wide majority sometime in the future.

B. Pragmatic Theory of Valuation

The value theory of reconstructionism has little in common with the pragmatic theory of valuation. Far from presuming to be able to specify the values that are or should be held almost uniformly by most people of our time, the theory of valuation in pragmatic philosophy examines the nature of experience in an attempt to describe how values arise and how they operate in individual and group behavior in specific situations. Dewey observes that

... Valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions.  

When things are going completely smoothly desires do not arise, and there is no occasion to project ends-in-view, for "going smoothly" signifies that there is no need for struggle. It suffices to let things take their natural course.18

This description of the origin of valuation as human experience should not be construed as a superficial phenomenon, nor as an incidental or optional activity which floats merely on the surface of behavior, so to speak. It is embedded deep in human experience, and valuation is a necessary constituent of any experience that is distinctively human. Dewey has noted how in inanimate nature events simply occur in bare sequence. Where there is no feeling there is no meaning, and without meaning there is no knowing and no purpose or desire.19

Many definitions of mind and thinking have been given. I know of but one that goes to the heart of the matter: —response to the doubtful as such. No inanimate thing reacts to things as problematic . . . . It makes no difference, so to say, to a stone what are the results of its interactions with other things. It enjoys the advantage that it makes no difference how it reacts, even if the effect is its own pulverization. It requires no argument to show that the case is different with a living organism.20

Even in case of sentient organisms there is no total awareness; feeling results when there is a break or

18Ibid., p. 33.

19See Ante, Chapter III, pp. 127 ff, for a more adequate description of the knowing process.

discontinuity in ongoing existence. Such breaks call attention to a fractional part of the possibilities or existences of nature; the remaining aspects of indiscriminate reality remain unknown and unknowable. The fact that there are such breaks and that there are sentient organisms able to respond to them—the fact that "going smoothly" does not characterize the whole of nature—is the basic reason why human experience, including valuation, is possible. Dewey notes that a world that consisted entirely of stable objects directly presented and possessed would be a world in which life and experience could not exist.

A purely stable world permits of no illusions, but neither is it clothed in ideals. It just exists.  

It is precisely the peculiar intermixture of support and frustration of man by nature which constitute experience.

The process of valuation takes place in the same kind of situation in which reflective thinking occurs; namely, a troubled, confused situation, one in which there is doubt. Dewey shows further that the two processes, thinking and valuation, (two processes instead of one only for purposes of analysis) are integral parts of the


22Ibid., p. 421.

23See How We Think, pp. 100-101 ff.
Individual's attempts to cope with the situation. So integral are they, in fact, that strictly speaking neither can take place without elements of the other.

These facts are related here to show the contrast with the reconstructionist's method of valuation. The reconstructionist clearly recognizes that positive values are set over against their negative counterparts. He even states them so. For example, he says "most men do not want to be hungry; they cherish the value of sufficient nourishment." What he does not recognize, apparently, is that the negative counterpart, the lack, privation or doubt, is a necessary constituent of the value. In fact, what one states as the "negative" aspect is actually primary, and the "value" itself is nothing more than an end-in-view projected as a remedy for an unsatisfactory situation. What the reconstructionist's attempt to specify and generalize the "values of most men of our time" amounts to, in actuality, is the cataloguing of a presumed uniformity of conditions and situations that prevail, supposedly, almost universally. More than this obvious impossibility, the attempt also presumes that different men, and the same men in different times, will project the same "values" or ends uniformly as remedies to the conditions and situations. Not only

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24Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 477. (Italics of "do not want" supplied. Others in original.)
do these reconstructionist assumptions fail to conform to the empirically observed facts in the case, but the analysis of the process of valuation shows that they could not so conform. Dewey's observation, that "practically all the fallacies in the theories that connect valuation with desire result from taking 'desire' at large," appears to apply to reconstructionism. He shows that

It follows that valuation in its connection with desire is linked to existential situations and it differs with differences in its existential context.

The content and objects of desire are seen to depend upon the particular context in which they arise, a matter that in turn depends upon the antecedent state of both personal activity and of surrounding conditions. Desires for food, for example, will hardly be the same if one has eaten five hours or five days previously, nor will they be the same content in a hovel and a palace or in a nomadic or agricultural group.

Elsewhere Dewey says that "values are as unstable as the clouds. The things that possess them are exposed to all the contingencies of existence, and they (the "things") are indifferent to our likings and tastes." Perhaps no better example could be given of the fact that values are as varied and ephemeral as the conditions under

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26 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
27 Ibid., p. 16.
which they arise and as diversified as the individuals who have them than an analysis of the dozen "uniform" values the reconstructionist lists. It can be seen that the reconstructionist's values are high level composite generalities which doubtless possess some validity as a general description of how men in our culture behave, but the generalizations bear but slight relation to the multiplicity of actual conditions and situations with which concrete individuals must cope if they are to realize their goals. For example, "sufficient nourishment" would hardly be the same, as Dewey points out, if one had eaten five hours before or five days, nor is it the same in a hovel and a palace. The generalization "sufficient nourishment" obviously reflects a universal need, but why is not "sufficient oxygen" or breathing likewise listed as a value. Is it not because there is ordinarily no scarcity of air and we are not normally called upon to give the matter of breathing any conscious attention? Happily also under most conditions we can take the need for water for granted, but under certain conditions, such as isolation in the desert or on a raft, the need for water can loom so large as a value as temporarily to blot out all others.

The term "sufficient nourishment," in short, means practically nothing, operationally, unless it is identified
with an individual or a homogeneous group of individuals in a specific situation. "Sufficient nourishment" is a matter for medical inquiry in case of a diabetic patient. It is a case for nutritionists to study in the school lunch program of a backward school community. It is a matter of counting calories and substituting proteins for those who grow too heavy. It is a question of population trends, ecology, agricultural technology and economics for experts on the Point Four program in undeveloped parts of the world. With a Secretary of Agriculture it is a problem complicated by high consumer prices and agricultural surpluses, with a few political aspirations thrown in. With the typical well-fed American, "adequate nourishment" is a value at meal time, and possibly when shopping and at other odd times, but between meals other values legitimately take over. This value could become uniformly specifiable in a meaningful way only were conditions such that all men were uniformly hungry. At present the value does not approach such validity except possibly in undeveloped and overpopulated parts of the world, or possibly behind the Iron Curtain where it is reported that the Communists have devised means of utilizing systematic hunger and starvation as an instrument of coercion. 29

The same qualities of unhelpful generality can be noted in the other reconstructionist "specifiable" values. In an attempt to achieve universality by applying these "values" to all men in all situations nothing very useful about any man in any situation is specified. "Adequate dress" is not the same in Samoa as in Siberia, nor is it precisely the same on Fifth Avenue, New York City and on Fifth Avenue, Columbus, Ohio. Neither is a Bikini bathing suit very like a Dior original frock, although there may be elements in common in their design and purpose. A house painter does not wear the same clothes to work as does a jet pilot, and one is likely to dress differently for winter and summer, for golf or a banquet or for sleeping. The value one attaches to "adequate dress" and the conception one has of it may hinge on many factors. A mink coat is not appreciably warmer than one of rabbit, and a professor may (and often must) wear clothes too slouchy or too antiquated for a department store junior executive. When one takes in all of the factors of custom, fashion, and status as well as the utilitarian facets of "adequate dress," to say nothing of such "instrumental" values as those that "dress" shares with perfume and cosmetics, the net result is to question the sense in which "adequate dress" can be called a "specific" value. "Shelter and privacy" are values that currently
loom large doubtless because an apex in the population and marriage graph coincides with a time when so much wartime construction was diverted from residence building. Even now, millions of Americans who are comfortably situated in living quarters, do not share with the others any specific value called "shelter and privacy." Having achieved that "value," they now have dozens of other things on their want lists, from a television set to a trip to Bermuda. In any event, lumping the housing problems of all of us together under the value "shelter and privacy" appears to be of little service to any particular person in his attempts to solve his own concrete problem. It is just about as helpful as is the lumping of all these under the "supreme" value, "social-self-realization," in solving the "human" problem, whatever that is.

Two recent extensive studies on "sexual expression" seem to show that even in this "universal" value not only is there considerable variation between different individuals and classes in our own American culture, but there are also significant differences between the sexes, and tremendous differences between the values

expressed and the behavior engaged in. Both of these studies confirm the not altogether new fact that age has more than a little to do with this "value." And hardly a teen-ager is too naive to grasp the extent to which this value "depends upon the antecedent state of both personal activity and surrounding conditions."

Such values as "adventure," though they are undeniable in the abstract, vary so widely in their objects, and among the individuals who exhibit them, that they are of little use in assisting an individual to order the means to any specific goal he may have. For example, we may assume that a spirit of adventure motivated the climbers of Mt. Everest even as it does the scholar doing historical research. So also is adventure an element when a student has a blind date, or when he graduates and accepts a new job. But what kind of "blueprint" is to be utilized to marshal and order the means toward these diverse ends? So it is with each of the reconstructionist's values. As Dewey says

Standardizations, formulae, generalizations, principles, universals have their place, but the place is that of being instrumental to better approximation to what is unique and unrepeatable.33

32Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 16.
33Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 117.
Essentially, values are but idealized and more persistent forms of ends-in-view. As Chapter V showed, such ends legitimately serve only as instruments in deliberation in particular problematic situations. The consequences of choices or action in particular cases constitute the real tests of the choices or action, and these consequences also serve to test, and to reinforce or perchance to revise, the values held. The two great dangers of holding vague and highly generalized forms of values are, (1) when needed they are too remote from the actual situation to perform adequately their office of shedding light on specifically what is to be done in that case, and (2) this failure of values to perform their deliberative function leaves open a gap where snap judgments, unconsidered choices, or lethargic indecision may prevail, or where those with invidious motives may sneak in their version of the operational meaning of the values ostensibly held.

The reconstructionist method of valuation, far from assisting in discovering the particular means that are needed to resolve specific difficulties, instead tends to obscure not only the specific connections between means and ends-in-view, but more harmful is the fact that the method tends to obscure the necessity of instituting means...

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34See *Ante*, Chapter V for a more adequate discussion of the Means-Ends relationship.
"in strict conjugate relation" to one another, and to ends.

The reconstructionist recognizes, but fails to come to grips with the fact that "some of these values seem contradictory to others." This fact would be even more obvious if the values were stated at a lower level of generality. Indeed, if they were reduced to concrete situations it would be apparent that the resolution of the conflicts in values that impinge upon one in making each choice and decision is the mediating role of intelligence. Having discussed the means-ends and means-consequences relationships in some detail in Chapter V, it suffices here to point out that the projection of ends-in-view is perforce a struggle between competing values. The ends projected for trial are hypothetical, and are remade in the crucible of action under the white light of consequences. The values which are instrumental in the projection of these ends are likewise refined and revised, and the more intelligent the action the more valid is the revision.

It is an inadequate disposition of the crucial problem of the conflict of values to wish it off on conflicts in our culture. Conflicts of values do arise in our culture; they would arise in any situation above the dead level of inanimate nature or blind non-perceptive plant or animal life. Existence without such conflict, and the resultant discriminations, would surely be an
existence without civilization, for it would be one
without choice, without intelligence.

An environment that was always and everywhere
congenial to the straightforward execution of our
impulsions would set a term to growth as surely
as one always hostile would irritate and destroy.
Impulsion forever boosted on its forward way
would run its course thoughtless and dead to
emotion. For it would not have to give an
account of itself in terms of the things it
encounters, and hence they would not become
significant objects. The only way it can
come aware of its nature and its goal is by
obstacles surmounted and means employed; means
which are only means from the very beginning
are too much one with an impulsion on a way
smoothed and oiled in advance, to permit of
consciousness of them. Nor without resistance
from surroundings would the self become aware
of itself; it would have neither feeling nor
interest, neither fear nor hope, neither
disappointment nor elation.35

If reconstructionism aspires toward the time when
its designed pattern will actually somehow eliminate
conflicts in value this millenium will not be quite as
it is envisioned. It will be more like the conditions
that obtained before homo sapiens evolved to the stage
where he introduced problems and intelligence on the
scene. Paleontologists report that the dinosaurs and
certain other reptiles who dominated the earth during the
Mesozoic age had very small brains but larger sacral
ganglions near the posterior end of their spines.36

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35 Dewey, Art as Experience, pp. 59-60.
Presumably, discriminatory ability was not so much a trait with them as was locomotion and ability to capture and devour the lesser creatures on which they were predatory. Meantime, anyway, humans are stuck with conscious problems, with choice and a mediating ability called intelligence, for better or for worse. It would seem prudent and wise to learn to use these tools as best we can, forsaking all formulæ that parade as short-cuts or substitutes.

The reconstructionist denies that his philosophy involves any dialectic comparable with that of the Hegelian philosophy of organism or that of "inverted" dialectical materialism. When it is assumed that concepts which are themselves composite creatures of an elaborate system of generalization, however, can somehow eventuate in an equally general pattern of ideal results through a procedure of achieving consensus, commitments, and the like—all at an abstract level—the practical distinctions between dialecticism and conceptualism are trivial and academic. We can solve real problems only by meticulous attention to details and means at the level of operations, however diverse, varied, and tedious this process may be. Only when a value is the reflex of actual deprivation in a specific situation can it serve instrumentally in marshaling the necessary means to its own destruction. The proper role of a value is not to be
conserved, stabilized and perpetuated. Its proper role is to perish along with the unsatisfactory condition of which it is a reflection. Each value should function so as to eventuate in a resumption of the "going smoothly" state which obtained when the value arose. In actual ongoing experience, other further-enriched values will, of course (and fortunately), arise to take the place of the satisfied and perishing ones, so long as life endures. The satisfaction of all values would be a state of Nirvana which exists (in the Western World) only in death, or possibly in certain types of insanity, or after a lobotomy operation. Values that persist unchanged are symptoms of "arrests." They are a "sign either of insanity, immaturity, indurated routine or of a fanaticism that is a mixture of all three."38 Otherwise they are reflections of recurrent or persistent lacks or evils in the external environment. In either case the goal should be to get rid of them, to fulfill and liquidate them, making way for new ones. They should not be stabilized and perpetuated by incessant propaganda, agreement, listing, and emotional commitment.

This is not to deny that in a certain form generalized values do occur and serve a beneficial purpose. Dewey says in this connection:

38Dewey, *Theory of Valuation*, p. 44.
Generalized ideas of ends and values undoubtedly exist. They exist not only as expressions of habit and as uncritical and probably invalid ideas, but also in the same way as valid general ideas arise in any subject. Similar situations recur; desires and interests are carried over from one situation to another and progressively consolidated. A schedule of general ends results, the involved values are "abstract" in the sense of not being directly connected with any particular existing case but in the sense of independence of all empirically existent cases. Dewey specifically points out, however, that the proper use of these generalized values is "as intellectual instrumentalities in judgment of particular cases as the latter arise; they are, in effect, tools that direct and facilitate examination of things in the concrete while they are also developed and tested by the . . . cases." He warns against their use in a "dialectic of concepts," and elsewhere he shows the fallacy involved in forcing particulars into a scheme of general notions.

Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent situation. This ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else. Consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified. It cannot intelligently be injected into the situation from without yet it is the part of wisdom to compare different cases, to gather together the ills from which humanity suffers, and to generalize the corresponding goods into classes . . . . But the value of this systematization is intellectual or analytic.

39 Loc. cit.
40 Loc. cit.
Classifications suggest possible traits to be on the lookout for in studying a particular case; they suggest methods of action to be tried in removing the inferred causes of ills. They are tools of insight; their value is in providing an individualized response in the individual situation.41

Dewey notes that "remote and abstract generalities" promote jumping at conclusions, "anticipations of nature." He asserts that no past decision nor old principle can ever be wholly relied upon to justify a course of action and that no amount of pains taken in forming a purpose in a definite case is final. The consequences of its adoption must be carefully noted and a purpose held only as a working hypothesis until results confirm its rightness.42

One other aspect of the reconstructionist method of valuation requires comment: his utilization of "consensus" in somewhat the same way that it is used in reconstructionist truth-seeking.43 Because the reconstructionist tends to ignore specific external conditions (except of an economic and related nature) that give rise to values, his values appear to be largely subjective products. To a degree, this is legitimate, for any conception of a generalized value which analyzes it from the conditions which give rise to it reveals that

42 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
43 See Ante p. 254 ff Chapter VI, (A). 
the resultant value in its form of desire or want is immediate and subjective. That is, the desire itself, as distinguished from the object of desire, is subjective. At this stage, however, it is also ineffable, like all immediate experience. One can know or say nothing about the desire itself; only the object of desire can be communicated, and this only to a limited extent. Strictly speaking, objects of desire by definition exist only in the future, and as such only the hypothetical conditions which contain them and the means projected for their realization, are sufficiently stable for sharing.

Any theory of values is perforce entrance into the field of criticism. Values as such, even things having value, cannot in their immediate existence be reflected upon; they either are or are not; are or are not enjoyed. To pass beyond direct occurrence, even though the passage be restricted to an attempt to define value, is to begin a process of discrimination which implies a reflective criterion. In themselves, values may be just pointed at; to attempt a definition by complete pointing is however bootless. Sooner or later, with respect to positive or negative value, designation will have to include everything.44

When the reconstructionist attempts to establish immediate subjective values by the method of social consensus, without regard to the specific occasions and situations in which they arise, he is there again struggling to get

people to speak the unspeakable. His incessant "communicating" is an attempt to tie men together with bonds that do not actually exist.

I have pointed out that one person cannot communicate an experience as immediate to another person. He can only invite that other person to institute the conditions by which the person himself will have that kind of situation the conditions for which are stated in discourse. Even if this difficult condition is fulfilled, there is no assurance that any one will so act as to have the experience. The horse led to water is not forced to drink.\(^45\)

At first glance it might appear that no harm except failure, tedium and waste of time could result from the reconstructionist's fetish for communicating "prehensions" through the techniques of group dynamics. Although people cannot be led to communicate the immediate and ineffable, that is, to speak the unspeakable, they can be led to speak something. Under these trying conditions people are particularly susceptible to having words put in their mouths—and notions put in their heads. If one is led to believe that he ought to feel something, and if neighbors testify that they feel a certain thing or way, almost any vague palpitation is sufficient to confirm to one that he, too, is "normal" and feels this thing--whatever it is--also. Youngsters who cannot quite see a ghost in the dark can see one when it is pointed out.

Semanticists and demagogues both show the same fact; when

groups have no more solid food for thought than glittering generalities and vague catch-all concepts they can be manipulated into believing any number of absurdities. And as Carlisle remarked, men will continue to commit atrocities as long as they believe absurdities.

C. Reconstructionist Intercultural Value Theory

The fundamental weakness of reconstructionist value theory is illustrated in Brameld's discussion of intercultural values. His approach to intercultural values is called "inductive," but, as we shall see it is in fact a "consensus" approach which tends to ignore consequences in its preoccupation with an interpretation and manipulation of how majorities feel, and how they would feel if they felt other than as they do. In defining the problem he asks:

If you and I say that we regard as immoral the exploitation, discriminations, and segregations suffered by Negroes or Jews or Mexican-Americans, why most basically do we do so?46

In elaborating the need for a firm theory of intercultural values Brameld points out that no matter how firmly convinced we may be of the immorality of such discrimination, if we can give no satisfactory answer

to "why" discrimination is immoral we are actually holding our beliefs or values as a prejudice. In this event our prejudice possesses no more validity than those held by others who believe in discrimination.

Brameld appears to be altogether correct in his view that an intelligible basis for intercultural values cannot be clearly derived and strictly demonstrated from such general concepts as "the brotherhood of man," "the dignity of personality," the "great democratic tradition," nor from a doctrine of innate rights nor from scholastic reasoning.

The reconstructionist substitute for these inadequate methods is another inadequate method; his typical interfusion of the findings of science and his interpretations of the will of the majority— or what the majority would believe if the majority knew what the reconstructionist knows.

Even little children are capable of probing into their own drives, needs, and wants, and of answering in their own terms. Surely it is not impractical for older students and adults to do so. Without going beyond our own experience, we can, if we try, articulate at least certain of our own deepest desires, and by communicating these we can refine our meanings to ourselves. 47

Next Brameld gives the four steps in the reasoning process through which majorities are deemed able to arrive at true values.

47 Ibid., p. 42.
First, then, science, especially anthropology, again assists enormously in showing that, among all our differences, we do possess a striking number of similar wants and of similarly organized efforts to satisfy them.

Second, these common denominators, however few in different periods of history, tend to multiply today as acculturation and assimilation accelerate through the impact of communication and transportation. In other words, as more and more people learn more and more about one another they come closer to a minimum pattern of similar wants.

Third, the equally evident fact that disagreement about wants is still widespread by no means proves that this disagreement is insoluble. Rather, all it may prove is that civilization has failed to provide facilities by which agreement might be achieved.

Fourth, and following more or less directly from the above three points, the assertion that our wants and their satisfaction are therefore also common wants claims no more than that they are, or probably could be, those of the majority.

We come, then, to the inference that the final criterion of intercultural values is the social consensus that can be attained about them. 48

Scrupulous examination of Brameld's "points" quoted indicates that the conclusion stated in the fourth point does not follow from the first three, nor does the inference concerning consensus. The first three points do not include all of the facts which impinge on a valid conclusion. For example, even though acculturation, assimilation, communication, transportation and the like, do increase the opportunity for common wants and shared values, these same things also increase the opportunity for

48 Ibid., pp. 43-45.
diverse wants and a variety of new desires. If they produce "a minimum pattern of similar wants," they also produce an ever-widening pattern of diverse wants. The third point, that civilization has failed to provide effective facilities for agreement does not dispose of all of the adverse facts standing in the way of the reconstructionist conclusions. In fact, the impossibility of communicating immediate experience probably means that "effective facilities" in the sense that the reconstructionist desires them do not and could not exist.

The conclusions that "our wants and their satisfaction are therefore also common" and that "they are, or probably could be, those of the majority" is unwarranted by the reasoning given. This conclusion is refuted by the facts, but worse, it contains the germs of vicious doctrines.

First the assumption that "our wants" are or probably could be the "common" wants, provided adequate communication prevailed, is actually an assumption of "our" infallibility or rightness. By implication it assumes that "our wants" ought to be made to prevail over the various species of error entertained by those who differ, and here there is no demonstration or test of their rightness except that they are "our" wants. Historically, this view and attitude has resulted in interminable strife, and the resolution of differences only through
Second, the supposition of what "probably could be" the wants of the majority, if it is anything more than idle speculation, invests in someone the power or authority to decide what the majority would or should want. The power of the majority to decide on matters of value, in the absence of objective test or demonstration, is dangerous enough, for it creates a situation where differences can be resolved only by superior force or coercion of some kind—preferably by ballots, but sometimes by bullets. When decisions are made on the basis of what majority consensus "probably could be," however, this has the earmarks of a behind-the-scenes struggle. Ultimately it will result in a struggle for power, with no holds barred by objective conditions and consequences.

The weakness of the reconstructionist method of valuation by social consensus is illustrated by the fact that when the method is applied to intercultural values the outcome is a denial of intercultural values. Logically applied it yields grounds for continued discrimination. Science shows, it is said, that there is some commonality of wants. If these wants were scientifically surveyed, or if they were tested by seeing what people do, they would doubtless reveal that what majorities of people want to do is precisely what they are doing. Over most of the world what "majorities" are doing is to discriminate against
out-groups, those of other races, other creeds, other classes. These practices are written into majority sanctioned state laws, and they are supported by customs, folkways and ingrained caste, from Georgia to India, via New York and Detroit. These facts cannot be wished away by saying majority wants would be otherwise if some other condition prevailed (such as better communication). This is simply an instance in which the majority is clearly wrong, as majorities often are.

Although Brameld's "why" as to the immorality of discrimination appears to deny rather than support his thesis, this does not mean that there is no possibility of firm support. If he had looked to either of two obvious sources he could have discovered an adequate basis for belief in the intercultural values in question. First, a study of the consequences that follow from discrimination or, on the other side, the consequences of refusal to discriminate, would without doubt, reveal which it is better to do. Secondly, one can appraise the effects of discrimination on experience, utilizing a fundamental analysis of the nature of experience, and arrive at the same conclusion, that discrimination is immoral.

Obviously, it is beyond the scope of the present writing to make either of these studies. In reference to the second suggestion, however, it can be noted that in Dewey's lifelong attacks on dualisms of all kinds he
repeatedly pointed out how they impoverish human experience. This fact is epitomized in his two criteria for democracy.

The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups . . . but change in social habit--its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse.49

There are, of course, many practical objections to discrimination, but all of these are but examples of the pervading implications of what has been said already about the truncating and impoverishing effect of discrimination on experience. This is not a trivial objection, nor one that is general and academic. Indeed, Dewey asks if we can find any reason for a preference for democracy itself that does not ultimately come down to the belief that

Democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one that is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life.50

It appears that nothing in the reconstructionist philosophy is more contradictory and less convincing than the professed belief in intercultural values and the

49 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 100.
50 Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 25.
rights of racial and religious minorities, while at the same time advocating a theory of truth and values which assign an inordinate power to majorities. The philosophy also opposes segregation of races while, at the same time, advocating and seeking to promote divisions between economic classes, advocating struggle between the "forces of expansion" and the "forces of contraction."

D. "Defensible Partiality" and Indoctrination

The reconstructionist beliefs in the efficacy of social consensus in truth-seeking and in the role of agreement in the establishment of values are related to the reconstructionist's conception of "defensible partiality." The reconstructionist advocates what are described as desirable techniques and degrees of propaganda and inculcation in education, but rejects indoctrination as he defines it. At the same time, the reconstructionist distinguishes between indoctrination and an attitude and method which he designates as "defensible partiality" which he advocates and defends.

Reconstructionist education takes sides. It encourages students, teachers, and all members of the community not merely to study knowledge and problems crucial to our period of culture but also to make up their minds about the most promising solutions and then to act concertedly. Its emphasis on commitment to agreed-upon, future-looking goals thus raises the old problem, once more, of bias and indoctrination.51

51Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 558. (Emphases in original.)
The reconstructionist advances arguments in defense of his beliefs that certain amounts of inculcation and propaganda are both necessary and desirable in education. Concerning inculcation Brameld says,

In the earlier years, children must absorb some facts and rules by a degree of inculcation, in order to get along with any group. In high school and college, too, wherever group consensus as a principle of learning is divided in its constituent parts, inculcation of evidence (the laws of natural science, for instance) or of communication (skill in writing, for instance) is also needed temporarily.52

In describing propaganda and defending its limited use in education, Brameld continues:

The present theory also distinguishes between indoctrination and propaganda. The latter is defined as a "short-cut" devise for influencing attitudes and consequent conduct. It attempts through colorful symbolization rich with suggestion (advertising displays, various kinds of music, and rhetoric) to persuade some individual or group, directly and forcibly, that a certain belief, practice, product, is either desirable or undesirable . . . . There is no reason why learning for worth-while ends should not be warmed with the persuasive qualities that advertisers so often exploit for deleterious ends. More forthrightly, however, than other philosophies, (with the possible exception of perennialism), reconstructionism believes that, if education is to be a great cultural force in shaping of attitudes and inciting to actions, it should become colorful and dramatic in the way that propaganda can be colorful and dramatic.53

While defending controlled amounts of inculcation and propaganda, and advocating "defensible partiality,"

52 Ibid., p. 561.
53 Ibid., pp. 561-562.
Brameld defines indoctrination and gives reasons for his opposition to it.

Opposition to indoctrination follows from definition of that term. In brief, it is that method of learning by communication that proceeds only in one direction (from the "communicator" to the "communicatee") and is for the purpose of inculcating in the latter the acceptance of some one doctrine or systematic body of beliefs. Moreover, such doctrine is assumed by its exponents in advance to be so supremely true, so good, or so beautiful as to justify no need for critical, scrupulous, thoroughgoing comparison with alternative doctrines.54

In rejecting indoctrination Brameld asserts:

Hence, by its very nature indoctrination is in sharp contrast with a philosophy that teaches men to build positive convictions only by public inspection and communication of all pertinent and available evidence and by exhaustive consideration of alternative convictions.55

"Defensible partiality" is distinguished from indoctrination, however, and is advocated as a desirable and necessary attitude and procedure in education. Brameld states,

First, that the reconstructionist does not support indoctrination; second, that he does support academic freedom in the sense of impartial and thorough study of all kinds of evidence and alternatives; but, third that the vital utilization of each principle is compatible with the development of clear social convictions and concerted action upon them.

In short, he believes in a kind of "partiality" that is at the same moment "defensible."56

What we learn is defensible simply in so far as

54Ibid., pp. 559-560.
55Ibid., p. 563.
56Ibid., p. 559.
the ends we support and the means we utilize are able to stand up against exposure to open, unrestricted criticism and comparison. What we learn is partial in so far as these ends and means still remain definite and positive to their majority advocates after the defense occurs... . . . here the progressivist's caution against undue haste or rigidity is well taken. The accent, however, is again different from his. Partiality is just what is sought. But partiality paradoxically increases in defensibility only as it is tested by the kind of impartiality provided through many-sided evidence (unrational as well as rational), unrestricted communication by group learning, complete respect for criticism and minority dissent.57

Critics of reconstructionism have called attention to an inconsistency in its rejection of indoctrination while at the same time advocating "defensible partiality." For example, Sidney Hook says

To beat the air with demands that the school commit itself to one program rather than another, and then blandly to deny that any indoctrination is intended, simply does not add up. Such a position, if it is not a form of spoofing or does not testify to a lack of ingenousness, is muddled from beginning to end.58

"Defensible partiality" is a new concept invented by, and distinctive to, the reconstructionist. Inasmuch as it is of tremendous importance to seek out both the similarities and the distinctions that are said to exist between "defensible partiality" and indoctrination it is necessary to examine not only what the reconstructionist and his

57Ibid., pp. 564-565. (Italics in original.)
critics say about it, but what the reconstructionist proposes to do about it in his projected educational program.

The reconstructionist's curriculum design devotes some attention to all levels of education but it concentrates on "the center," secondary education, "the crucial period when most young men and women are crystallizing their plans for mature responsibilities."59

Traditional summer vacations are abolished . . . . The schools remain in operation, even during these [winter and summer] periods of recess, in the sense that they continue to provide expert assistance to a wide range of activities having integral relationship with the whole plan of study.

The formal schedule of seven and one-half hours, five days weekly, features four large blocks of time -- one and one-half hours each . . . . The responsibility of the school is not, however, confined to this schedule; its program extends into the late afternoons and evenings and into Saturday and Sundays. During at least the first two years, half the day . . . . is devoted to the central area . . . .60

This, then is the broad design of the curriculum . . . . It is a "curricular gestalt" . . . . Its governing aim is, of course, utopian. It seeks to answer one fundamental question, which is also the common denominator, the "carriage," of the entire secondary school: Where do we as a people want to go? Every specific issue, every bit of study of history, science or literature, every hour of practice in skills or vocation, is permeated with this relentless question.61

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60 Ibid., p. 572.
61 Ibid., p. 575. (Italics in original.)
quite as deliberately integral are the extracurricular activities . . . .62

The first year has two chief objectives: (1) to provide motivation and orientation . . . (2) to examine the need for, and the character of, the goals that are most required in the sphere of economic-political reconstruction.63

We tap John's well-springs of interest by beginning with his uncertainties, tensions, instabilities, confusions, and those of his family and of the Centerville where he lives. We relate these to whatever certainties, stabilities and clarities constitute, by contrast, the present aims of John, his family, and Centerville.64

Meantime, the reconstructionist teacher, governed though he is by his utopian values and hence critical of many such practices and plans, will not impose his convictions upon anyone. He directs this initiating period of study chiefly by making sure that his students penetrate deeply enough to disclose the actual, rather than the merely ideological, picture of the community. He lets the picture speak for itself.65

The aim is to widen the analysis as rapidly as possible, both geographically and historically; to consider, for example . . . the entire national and world economy and how this dependence emerges directly from the forces of recent history.66

They [students] recognize the achievements of capitalism or liberal democracy . . . . But they weigh these achievements side by side with such stubborn realities as depression, insecurity, and war—in short with group conflicts, group allegiances and group conditioners. Thus they begin to detect something of the irrational power seething within these realities. The whole tone of the study, indeed, is indicated by our earlier interpretation of the reconstructionist ontology.67

62Ibid., p. 574.
63Ibid., p. 575. (Italics in original.)
64Ibid., p. 576.
65Ibid., p. 576.
66Ibid., pp. 576-577.
67Ibid., p. 577.
The more this motivation takes hold, the readier are students to consider the question of what would be better by comparison with what now is.68

Since the search for values is thoroughly inductive, any imposition by the teacher of his own value system is unnecessary and undesirable. The value of social-self-realization, or some verbal equivalent, while it is more than likely to emerge as a generalized ideal from reconstructionist methods of learning, is not to be understood in exactly the same way by any two groups. It is a goal too rich, too multiple, too dynamic for such exactitude.69

The reconstructionist believes that such a consensus can be won as his kind of education reaches more and more people. The extent to which students agree with him will vary, depending upon their own socio-economic position . . . (etc.).70

The above quotations describe only a part of the first year of the reconstructionist's proposed secondary program, but that depicted is typical of the remainder of the "curricular gestalt" and representative of the method and intent advocated throughout the four years. It is clear that the reconstructionist teacher is to utilize propaganda and "defensible partiality" to get students to "agree with him" and become committed to reconstructionist utopian designs, even though it is recognized that the process will not be successful with all students. This process does not involve indoctrination for the reason that the reconstructionist has utilized the simple

68Loc. cit. (Italics in original.)
69Ibid., p. 578.
70Ibid., pp. 578-579. (Italics in original.)
expedient of defining this term so that it does not include the methods employed in "defensible partiality." Indoc trination, as defined "proceeds in only one direction, (from 'communicator' to the 'communicatee')" and it avoids critical, scrupulous, thoroughgoing "comparison with alternative doctrines." The purpose of "defensible partiality" is to be achieved largely by utilizing techniques of group dynamics to do precisely what indoctrination is said not to do, that is, by extensive discussion in which "communicatees" express their "prehensions," and by incessant "comparisons with other doctrines," students are to arrive at a commitment to reconstructionist utopian designs.

There appears to be no precise way to determine just what does and what does not constitute indoctrination, for the reason that the term does not have a single unequivocal meaning that must be accepted. Michio Nagai in his study, The Problem of Indoctrination, found several generally accepted meanings of indoctrination, including:

1. A special kind of teaching, instruction in doctrines;

2. Synonymous with teaching; and

3. "In a derogatory sense, to mean something which should not be confused with teaching . . .; an expression of a partisan point of view."

Brameld uses the term in the sense of Nagai's third meaning, but with additional special provisions. Likewise, in this study, the term indoctrination is used in the sense of Nagai's third meaning.

The question of whether the reconstructionist is justified in defining indoctrination in such a way that it does not include the procedures he advocates is of less importance than the question of whether "defensible partiality" will itself yield objectionable consequences of the kind that indoctrination yields. It is necessary, therefore, to make some analysis of indoctrination by inquiry into why indoctrination is objected to by writers who have expressed opposition to it.

John Stuart Mill in his classic defense of freedom of thought and expression was concerned primarily with the fact that any type of suppression is likely to conceal or prevent truth.

The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by collision with error . . . . To refuse a hearing to an opinion because they (those who desire to suppress it) are sure it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty.
All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.\textsuperscript{72}

Of course indoctrination does not always utilize the overt suppression of alternative views. More often it practices a "positive approach" of so inculcating the chosen doctrine that alternative views are in effect suppressed, by being rejected in advance. Techniques of indoctrination utilize various procedures. As Brubacher points out,

There are several possibilities. Issues might be presented as if they had but one side to them. This is variously called education by imposition, authority, indoctrination, or propaganda. This method is an admirable instrument in the hands of those who know in advance the kind of social order they want, whether it be an old or a new one. Another possibility is to present contrary viewpoints as well but assure a favorable outcome for a predetermined point of view. This sort of teaching registers some uneasiness about minority opinion but makes only a feeble gesture in its direction. Its long-term effect is but a slightly more circuitous route to regimenting a preconceived social order.\textsuperscript{73}

Brubacher further notes that alternatives to the preconceived view may not be just tolerated or treated with a "feeble gesture." They may be used as a resource or foil against which to construct or inculcate the preconceived view when alternatives are "considered, but only to be mowed down by the official rebuttal."\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 202.
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Brubacher then lists two kinds of objections to indoctrination.

The critics of indoctrination have attacked it from several sides. Those impressed with the basically changing and unsettled nature of the world look very skeptically at any teaching bottomed on absolutism, whether that absolutism be political, religious, or scientific. Inflexible viewpoints in a flexible world are unrealistic. In a contingent universe, there must be room for the critical weighing of alternative possibilities. This also implies a theory of intelligence as an instrument for reconstructing the social order, in preference to one which views mind as a mirror of immutable and unquestioned truth.

Some critics think the teaching methods of indoctrination and propaganda are positively unethical. These methods, they say, treat the child as a means rather than as an end. 75

One uniform element in all indoctrination appears to be that the indoctrinator assumes that he knows in advance the truth or desirability of whatever views he seeks to indoctrinate and intends, in his teaching, to hold this truth beyond the reach of critical examination. Without this element there could be no systematic indoctrination, of course. This uniform element of an assumption of prior knowledge distinguishes indoctrination from genuine inquiry; since the latter utilizes doubt which is absent in indoctrination. Marchette Chute reports from her studies of the tangled strands of fact and fiction in biographical and historical research that

75Ibid., pp. 203-204.
"getting at the truth" is far from simple, and she concludes:

To put the whole thing into a single sentence: you never succeed in getting at the truth if you think you know, ahead of time, what the truth ought to be. 76

The Jeffersonian opposition to suppression and imposition was based in part on his faith that truth would prevail if the channels of communications were left open so that truth could combat error, but his greatest interest was in individual liberty and the development of democracy.

I have sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man. 77

Changes since Jefferson's time require revision of some of his ideas about the bases of the "rights of man" and conditions that promote democracy, 78 but the methods invariably employed by Twentieth Century totalitarian regimes appear to confirm his insight that free inquiry is correlative with human freedom and that "tyranny over the mind of man" is a prelude to more overt forms of slavery. Pragmatic criticism of


indocrtination is in the Jeffersonian tradition, for it, too, views indocrtination as infringement on human rights and as deleterious to democracy. Bode repeatedly pointed out the incompatibility of indoctrination with the prime role of education in a democracy, the development of intelligence, and he pointed up the inconsistency of attempts to indoctrination for democracy.

The uniqueness of democracy lies in the fact that indoctrination or inculcation would defeat its own purpose. Something must happen to the pupil other than the docile acceptance of a point of view.\(^7^9\)

To decide in advance that certain things are inherently good or bad is to discourage thinking and hamper development.\(^8^0\)

The reconstruction of experience is something that the individual must do for himself. There must be no indoctrination in the sense that the outcome is prescribed. A democratic philosophy of education rests on the faith that if the oncoming generation is given an opportunity to see the basic issue, democracy will win. It must win on these terms or it cannot win at all.\(^8^1\)

Kilpatrick refutes the notion that education must avoid controversial and unsettled issues in order to avoid indoctrination. At the same time he mentions two undesirable effects of indoctrination.


It should also be repeated that no suggestion is here made to give the pupil or student "the correct" answer to any of these (controversial) problems. The omission is intentional. In no controversial issue should the teacher assume to give "the answer" and so close off the necessity for further study. Instead the aim is to encourage each learner to do his own thinking, to grow in disposition and ability to think for himself. We do all we can to help his thinking but not in such a way as to direct the process toward our answer. No indoctrination truly educates to democratic independence of personality. And it is this true democratic education that we seek.82

When competent opinion differs as to what to believe, for parents and teachers to take advantage of the child's ignorance and docility to fasten in him beyond recall their own chosen views is to enslave this child to those who thus teach him. Democracy and a proper respect for the child's personality must reject such enslavement as partisan exploitation of the individual's right to be educated to do his own thinking and make his own decisions.83

Kilpatrick's reference to taking advantage of the child's ignorance and docility is obviously a reference to Dewey's criticism of the kind of education which he called "the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young."84 Dewey's writings reveal a hostility to fixed ends, to preconceived and static beliefs, and to the exploitation of individuals as means to externally imposed ends. This position is in sharp opposition to

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83 Ibid., pp. 122-123.
84 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 64.
blind imposition and indoctrination. He repeatedly noted the harmful effects of prejudice and bias and a priori beliefs and systems on scientific methods of inquiry, on intelligence, and on experience.

Hullfish has voiced what is perhaps the most recent and most unequivocal statement of the pragmatic position concerning indoctrination.

One thing follows here as certainly as night follows day. The pragmatic philosophy can have no truck with indoctrination. It can no more indoctrinate than science can insist that experimentation must yield given results. The scientist must be free to follow the lead, even the faintest hint, of ideas. He must be free to find ways to check into the promise of ideas, in short. There can be no freedom in intellectual life where this opportunity is denied him. In the same way, the student must be free in relationship to teachers and to knowledge. Disrespectful of neither teacher nor knowledge, the student must, nevertheless, be free to question either as—emulating the spirit of science—he must be responsible to each in the conclusions he finally achieves. Practices of indoctrination hold no such promise of freedom. It is their function to hold students responsible to conclusions achieved by others; their purpose is, in the final analysis, to enslave.85

It appears that all of the preceding adverse criticisms of indoctrination can be applied as well to "defensible partiality." From these criticisms one is able to derive an outline of the kinds of undesirable consequences which may be expected to issue from the

practice of indoctrination—or "defensible partiality":

1. Indoctrination interferes with the attainment of valid conclusions and objective truth:
   (a) by limiting the possibilities of knowledge or beliefs to the preconceptions or assumptions of the preferred system or doctrine;
   (b) by proceeding so that alternative beliefs are not considered, or do not receive a fair test;
   (c) by shutting off inquiry and substituting acceptance of objects of prior belief or hasty commitment;
   (d) by denying to nature the traits of contingency and change, and by embracing an invalid theory of knowledge.

2. Indoctrination violates personality; at best it exploits and at worse it enslaves:
   (a) by taking unfair advantage of the young, the ignorant or the gullible, or those in no position to get the grounds for alternative views, by imposing preconceived ideas on them, thus robbing them of the opportunity to grow, to differ, and to think for themselves;
   (b) by imposing alien purposes on the victims of indoctrination, thus suborning their freedom
by imposing an internal coercive power—a tyranny of mind—over them.

3. Indoctrination has a deleterious effect on the development and operation of democracy:

(a) by inhibiting the thinking ability and independence of purpose and action of individuals;

(b) by promoting controversy, discord and conflict by dividing society into partisan factions, at the same time discouraging the peaceful means to the resolution of differences; the appeal to objective "external" facts and tests involving concrete conditions and operations.

Analysis of the concept of "defensible partiality" as it forms a part of the proposed educational program of reconstructionism indicates that, whether or not it should be distinguished from indoctrination, it can be expected to yield undesirable consequences of the same three kinds that indoctrination yields.

First "defensible partiality" will interfere with the attainment of valid conclusions or objective truth. The reconstructionist's proposed educational program is designed so as to result in the student's acceptance of, and commitment to, reconstructionist beliefs. If there is any truth outside these beliefs, or if there is any
possibility of valid conclusions other than those of the reconstructionist, these will be virtually lost under the successful operation of the process. Further, doubt and suspension of judgment, are disparaged by the reconstructionist. Since the emphasis is on acceptance and commitment to values and beliefs that are already formulated, the incentives for inquiry are thus eliminated.

The pressure on students to reach a conclusion, "to make up their minds" while still in school, on political and economic matters in which they may have few opportunities for concrete overt action until later, in itself reduces the opportunity of actual testing and appraising in terms of consequences. When students are pressured into making decisions and commitments on the basis of primarily theoretical "evidence" far in advance of the time when there is a full operational need for such decisions, they are all too likely to decide on the basis of partisanship, teacher or classmate approval, and other factors that are more influential in the "learning" situation.

Another aspect of "defensible partiality" that will interfere with reaching valid conclusions by that method is that, unlike scientific method, defensible partiality is not "self-corrective." Instead, even if and when any
reconstructionist proposals are put to test, the
reconstructionist has, in advance, incapacitated himself
to learn from any adverse experience. Reconstructionism
has a built-in alibi. Failures can be attributed, as
are already the ills of present society, to obstructionist
tactics of "ideologists" and the "forces of contraction."

Sidney Hook has called attention to confusion in
the reconstructionist position, and the incompatibility of
prior commitment with genuine scientific inquiry:

Unless it is to impose a conformity of belief, the
school must leave the processes of inquiry open.
And some planners of the grand design assure us
that, of course, this is what they propose to do.
They do not advocate indoctrination but at most
a kind of harmless propaganda. Well, then, if
all programs are subject to critical evaluation,
with the possibility of individual rejection left
open, then what point is there in committing a
system of education to a program in advance of
specific inquiries? If anything is worth
believing, honest pursuit of the proper method
will lead to it. 86

The processes proposed for "defensible partiality,"
no less than indoctrination, promise to violate
personality; at best to exploit and at worse to enslave.
Young people still in school are to be given the
opportunity to examine and compare social and economic
theories so controversial, unsettled, and complicated
that they defy settlement by our wisest scholars and
statesmen and find little complete agreement among them.

Yet students are to be expected to "make up their minds" and become committed to proposals, preferably agreeing with the reconstructionist teacher, who presumably agrees with the reconstructionist philosopher. These commitments are to eventuate in "powerful means" in which majorities are to own and control the resources of the proposed reconstructed culture.

The term "defensible partiality" does not appear in the 1947 American Education Fellowship policy statement. The process described there is one in which "informed teachers," who have convictions should not foist them upon students, but should share them with students. Berkson appraises this "nothing but a semantic cosmetic; absolutists could certainly go so far."88

Although the goals to be achieved through defensible partiality are ostensibly for the benefit of those on whom the designs and commitments are to be imposed, there is still the question of whether the reconstructionist is more interested in the people concerned, or in the abstract ideas and proposals and the envisioned social

87This statement has been rescinded by a vote of the Board of Directors, and, in September, 1953, the organization returned to its earlier name, The Progressive Education Association. See Ante, pp. 35-36.

and economic institutions. Indeed, there is sufficient warrant to inquire if the advocate of defensible partiality differs significantly from the "doctrinaire reformer" referred to by Hullfish:

His is not an interest in education. His is an exclusive interest—to make his ideas prevail, at whatever cost to individuals and ideas that stand in opposition. 39

The widespread habit of looking with suspicion at schemes that are to be imposed on people "for their own good" seems to be based on a good bit of human experience. Reformers need not be insincere nor malicious for their plans to yield only highly dubious benefits for the "reformees." As Lindeman has noted

Extremists are notably careless about methods. They are so firmly convinced of the rightness of their ends that they are tempted to the belief that these ends actually justify the use of any means. 90

The reconstructionist openly disparages methodology, (while introducing one,) and he advocates greater collectivity and an organic society in which "each individual loses his status as an individual only to regain it by becoming identified with the whole sovereign people." 91

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91Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 432.
doubt, in the operation of such a society many mere individuals may get hurt, and all would be exploited in that their own thoughts, hopes and purposes would be subordinated to the grand designs.

It is equally clear that defensible partiality would operate to the detriment of democracy. Aside from the debilitating effect on creative intelligence and individual purpose, the reconstructionist openly advocates partisanship of the "forces of expansion" against the "forces of contraction." Beliefs are to be formed and loyalties and commitments are to be cultivated in advance of actual tests of proposals in concrete situations. The coercion of arbitrary majority will would replace "democracy as a way of life" that now operates, at least to some extent.

The conclusion that follows from an analysis of "defensible partiality" is that this process embraces the main faults of indoctrination, and thus it is, in fact, indefensible. The distinctions between "defensible partiality" and indoctrination—that in the former communication proceeds in both directions and that "communicatees" consider, but reject, alternative positions—does not relieve the process of its primary fault--

92 In a similar situation about 10 million Russian peasants are said to have perished when the Stalinist interpretation of Marxist doctrine was applied to the collectivization of agriculture.
that of imposing predetermined ends and purposes on "learners." On the contrary, under modern conditions "defensible partiality" would probably accomplish the aims of indoctrination even more efficiently than do older methods of inculcation, utilizing as it does, the modern techniques of group dynamics and the latest psychology of salesmanship and propaganda. Older methods of indoctrination depend upon a degree of ignorance, gullibility and naivete, but "defensible partiality" probably would achieve some success even with the sophisticated.

Reconstructionism appears to be caught up in a dilemma in which the theme and purpose of the whole philosophy seems to require that it inculcate its beliefs and commitments without indoctrinating them. It would seem that any doctrine which is committed to fixed beliefs and predetermined ends and goals, and is dedicated to the accomplishment of these through education, is in the very nature of such a situation committed to indoctrination under some name or guise. Reconstructionism appears to have utilized the only expedient available without abandoning its preconceived ends; that of substituting a less offensive name than indoctrination and changing the "house rules" of the process somewhat, without sacrificing, however, its overall effectiveness.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The new philosophy of education, reconstructionism, which has been formulated during the past six years by Theodore Brameld has roots which extend back twenty years, but not until Brameld formulated it in two books in 1950¹ was it distinctive enough to be distinguished from the progressive education movement of which it was a part. The philosophy as now presented by Brameld, however, contains enough distinctive quality to designate it separately, and to appraise it as a distinctive theory of education. In this study certain crucial aspects of the philosophy have been analyzed: namely, "prehension"; the emotions, means-ends; ontology; truth; value; and "defensible partiality." The purpose of this chapter is to restate briefly the conclusions derived from an analysis of each of these aspects, and to synthesize these separate conclusions into more general ones applicable to the philosophy as a whole.

Reconstructionism advances a new method of knowing called "prehension" as a part of its theory of knowledge. This method is advanced, not as a comprehensive theory of knowledge, but as one assumed to operate in addition to, or as a supplementary to, "the experimental method of intelligence" long advanced by pragmatic theorists, and also accepted by Brameld. He has borrowed the term "prehension" from Alfred North Whitehead to designate his new method of knowing, but the operation of the method has more in common with Harold Rugg's concept of "primal awareness." It is impossible to determine the precise operation of prehension in reconstructionism from an examination of Brameld's writings, or by reference to his sources in the works of Whitehead or Rugg. Prehension appears to be consistent with Whitehead's philosophy of organism as the latter uses the term, but it is impossible to apply Whitehead's meaning of the term to the reconstructionist's use of it. Rugg, on the other hand, fails to give a clear and consistent explanation of "primal awareness."

By prehension Brameld means "the unity, the organic wholeness of natural events. It is a unified kind of awareness that precedes and succeeds apprehension." It is a kind of intuition, a "total awareness" "akin to the
unrational," which is alleged to operate in addition to "reflective, scientific analysis."

Although it is impossible to determine the precise manner in which prehension is assumed to operate, its assumption, as this study shows, is inconsistent with the method it is alleged to supplement, reflective experiential knowing. The assumption of prehension as an intuitive or direct method of knowing ruptures the integrity of the method of reflective experimental knowing, and, in effect, leaves no satisfactory experiential explanation of how knowing originates. Prehension cannot occur as an "additional" method, because if it occurs at all, the method to which it is an addition is irrelevant.

Reflective method is instituted by the organism in a problematic situation in an attempt to resolve a difficulty that blocks an ongoing process. Reflection utilizes feeling, resulting from a break in the felt harmony with the environment, together with meanings derived from prior experience, in order to elevate existent things or events into objects of knowledge. These objects are instrumental in a resumption of the process which was blocked. Prehension, or any method of direct intuition, would make reflection unnecessary, since it would remove a necessary ingredient of knowing. It would eliminate, indeed, its very raison d'être.
Neither could prehension operate as an alternative method to the reflective method. Without the reflective method, prehension, or any method of direct intuition, would contain no principle of selection. Whitehead recognized, and clearly stated, this limitation as it applied to his method of direct intuition. Whitehead realized, however, that his philosophy of organism had reached the "limits of rationality" and utilized the principle of God, "for whose nature no reason can be given," as an explanation of the principle of selection or particularity. Neither reconstructionism nor the pragmatic weltanschauung on which reconstructionism is based, utilizes God as an explanatory principle in this manner. Prehension, therefore, on its own philosophic foundations, could not subsist alone; that is, without reflective experiential knowing. Prehension without a principle of selection or particularity would simply result in the direct intuition of reality indiscriminately, which, in effect, amounts to the way inanimate objects and events are related to each other. Discrimination is the essence of knowing and hence of intelligence.

Prehension, therefore, cannot operate as a supplement to reflective knowing, nor can it operate without it. The conclusion is reached, therefore, that, in the term in which it is assumed by the reconstructionist,
it does not exist.

The assumption of prehension, however, does have undesirable implications. The belief that individuals are able directly to intuit objects of knowledge will result in discouragement of efforts toward the establishment of conditions in which genuine knowing may occur. Specifically, the effect of the assumption would be to take emphasis away from the building of shared meanings, inquiry into experience for meanings, and the testing of hypotheses so as to constitute and validate objects of knowledge. Further, the assumption of a direct and private road to knowledge or truth, which short-circuits the test of action and shared meaning, provides too dangerous an instrument that may fall in the hands of the unscrupulous.

Prehension as a method of knowing does not operate as assumed by the reconstructionist. Were educators to embrace this false assumption, however, neglect and impoverishment of the legitimate means of acquiring knowledge would result. Further, the confusion of valid tested knowledge with that alleged to be "prehended" would ensue.

B. Emotion in Reconstructionism

In reconstructionism the emotions are assumed to operate independently of reflective or intellectual
Harold Rugg originally advanced a theory of "feeling-import" as distinct from and coordinate with "how we think when problem solving" and used this as the theoretical basis for a "new esthetics." Brameld utilizes this same theory of relatively independent or detached emotions as the basis of his proposals relating to his concepts of "the un rational" and "the cultural myth." He also rests other aspects of reconstructionism, including theory of values, theory of truth, the means-ends relation and defensible partiality, upon it.

Brameld insists that questions of value and truth are finally decided by social consensus and that goals and policies should be likewise determined. He proposes that social consensus does and should operate on non-reflective emotional bases, "utilizing the un rational," as well as on a reflective base. He advocates that the un rational be utilized to promote a commitment to reconstructionist utopian goals and that a "cultural myth" be deliberately created and promoted to further this purpose.

The conclusions reached in this study are that the reconstructionist's proposals concerning the utilization of detached emotions to influence behavior are possible psychologically, but are socially and educationally undesirable because of the consequences that would follow.
their adoption. The reconstructionist theory fails to recognize that all conscious experience is based on emotions, on feeling, for the reason that all experience begins with an impulsion. Feeling likewise permeates all conscious experience, resulting, at the close or fulfillment, in a consummatory or immediate experience which is the basis of esthetic experience. While all experience, including reflective or knowing experience, has feeling or the emotions at its base, it is nevertheless possible, since feelings are prior, for behavior to be based on non-reflective emotion. Such behavior is uncontrolled and unguided by reflection, and hence is dangerous.

The office of reflection is to guide and control emotional impulsions, and a theory which places the emotions in a role coordinate with intelligence, in effect, subscribes to uncontrolled behavior. Such separation of "warm emotion" from "cool intelligence" also tends to detract from the effectiveness of intelligence. It fails to recognize the necessity of an emotional basis of intellectual experience, and removes the theoretical basis, which should be integral with reflective experience, from genuinely esthetic enjoyment.

Were educators to accept the reconstructionist's beliefs and proposals concerning the detachment of the emotions from the intellect the results would prove
harmful. Sanction of "the unrational" and "the cultural myth" together with proposals to attach non-reflective emotional commitment to goals, values and "truths" would, in effect, subscribe to behavior devoid of intellectual control. An additional result would be the development of habits and a disposition to act without reflection.

The encouragement of uncontrolled emotions, together with "prehension," would turn the school away from the central task of building individuals who, through the development of a progressively more effective reflective ability, are increasingly able to share common meanings and insights. Faith in intelligence, it would seem, is restricted by the almost blind faith that reconstructionism seeks for the prehended meanings and "unrational" commitments individuals are asked to cultivate and use in the guidance of behavior.

C. Means-Ends

Reconstructionism differs most from pragmatism in its conception of ends and means and of their relationship. In fact, in this distinction is to be found the critical factor in the new philosophy. It was against the contention that the pragmatic conception of ends is too tentative and too relative that reconstructionism was formulated. The reconstructionist view is that our civilization has reached a critical
juncture, and, in consequence, "it is now imperative to know as clearly as we can where we want to go."

Brameld further asserts that "it is possible to delineate not only the chief goals of most people on earth but also how they ought to seek them."

Reconstructionist philosophy is committed not only to a theory of firm, relatively stable, ends but the specific ends themselves, stated as values and utopian goals, are designated. These consist of a dozen statements of "values," alleged to be well-nigh universal. "Blueprints" of policies and institutional arrangements, designed to "satisfy" these values, are set forth. These "blueprints" hinge around a reconstructed world order in which "national sovereignty is subordinated to international authority" and in which

The common peoples shall attain maximum satisfaction of their wants, including the satisfaction of building and ruling their own civilization everywhere on earth—theirs to own, to design and to enjoy.2

At this level of formulation these are worthy ends, but of course, one has to go beyond this level. Brameld does, and discusses means which are conceived primarily as "strategy." His various educational proposals are so conceived. A "curricular gestalt" is

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 393.}\]
advanced in which "defensible partiality" and desirable forms of propaganda and inculcation are designed to achieve commitment to reconstructionist ends. Politics are viewed as another means of achievement. In a sense education and politics are conceived as partners operating together to achieve the ends the reconstructionist proposes.

The reconstructionist theory of means-ends has been found to be inadequate and unworkable in several respects. First, the reconstructionist fails to recognize the instrumental nature of ends as they serve as "pivots in deliberation." His insistence on fixity and stability of ends, and the inflexibility contributed by prior emotional commitment, together with the fact that ends are conceived independently of the means to their achievement, render these ends incapable of serving as "ends-in-view." As conceived they have little or no capacity to serve in an integral and reciprocal relationship with means.

In the reconstructionist theory there is no recognition that ends are but means viewed from a more remote vantage point. Thus, the point is missed that before ends can be "realized," they must be translated into means, "intermediate terms" between the remote, hazy and impressionistic goal and the concrete action which yields consequences. There is also no clear recognition of the
distinction and inevitable discrepancy between ends as aims or goals and the ends which represent a natural close of completed action. This distinction is vital. The two kinds of ends serve different functions. The former, ends-in-view, serve as "procedural means," while the latter yield consequences and a "final" or potentially esthetic experience. Confusing the two, as the reconstructionist seems to do when he derives truth and values from the former instead of the latter, engenders further confusion as the problems of truth and values are considered.

Lack of integrity between ends and means in reconstructionism also threatens to render means servile and uninspiring. Lack of interest in an activity results from lack of reciprocity between ends and means. This result follows when discontinuity results from having the purposes of another imposed upon those executing the means, or when ends or purposes are deliberately and willingly imported from a source too remote from the ongoing process.

When means are contrived to promote a single inflexible end selected and adhered to without regard to the means to its achievement, as the reconstructionist's procedure tends to do, undesirable concomitant results follow. The procedure, in preoccupation with "the" end selected, leads to a disregard of the multiple character
of consequences that flow from any act. This myopic disposition results in the dubious quality of "ends justifying means."

Acceptance by educators of the reconstructionist's misconceptions of the means-ends relationship would result in educational practices involving preoccupation with ends lacking integrity with the means, and with means contrived without sufficient continuity with ends. Further, undesirable "procedural means," such as bad habits, and undesirable disposition—possibly fanaticism—would ensue.

Here again intelligence is side-tracked to a dangerous degree. Ends, instead of serving as means in situations where one seeks the more intelligent way of behaving, are views as controls. Thus the role of learners becomes merely that of contriving means to achieve ends that are already determined. Consequently, in educational practice the emphasis is shifted from the development of thinking ability to, as Brameld phrased it, determining *what we should think.*

D. Ontology

In the philosophy of reconstructionism beliefs that are ordinarily entertained as historical, political or economic beliefs are elevated to ontological status and are thus held to be traits of "true reality." Both history and future are asserted to be "real" and the
reconstructionist utopian goals of the future exert an influence both on the interpretation of history and the present. This procedure is defended as both inevitable and desirable, as it is argued that all history is "refashioned" in the present, with the future impinging on present interpreters.

History is characterized as containing an intermittent struggle between the "forces of expansion," which seek to expand their freedom and opportunity, and the "forces of contraction," which seek to preserve their privileged and entrenched status. This struggle over questions that are primarily economic results in wars and other conflicts; and, in the long view, in the "expansion and contraction of freedom."

These and other reconstructionist beliefs concerning "social reality" result in a conceptualism which is not fully empirical. Reconstructionism specifically denies dialecticism, asserting that all of its beliefs are experiential and naturalistic; yet there are in reconstructionism many concepts and beliefs set forth which are so general and remote from concrete experience as to be virtually untestable. The utopian goals of reconstructionism, which are contained in the "indubitably real" future illustrate aspects of "reality" which are embraced in advance of an opportunity for
testing. Likewise "forces" that are alleged to operate in society, such as "the forces of expansion" the concepts of "struggle," "contraction and expansion of freedom," "society as organism," and the like, are of such a general nature as to defy definition or confirmation. Adherence and firm emotional commitment to such beliefs yields undesirable concomitant results, and has a deleterious effect on experience.

Embracing the reconstructionist's ontology, which includes many untested and untestable concepts would have a deleterious effect on educational experiences by tending to encourage the acceptance of such concepts in lieu of experientially grounded concepts of reality.

E. Truth

The reconstructionist claims adherence to the pragmatic method of truth-seeking by "experimental intelligence" but advances in addition the method of truth by "social consensus." He asserts that all truth presupposes agreement, but he insists that "for those crucial purposes of goal seeking and future making" social consensus should be "the most important single criterion."3

Brameld apparently interprets "needful satisfaction"

3Ibid., p. 457.
to be the pragmatic criterion of truth, and his method of "social consensus" is an additional criterion designed to "objectify" the pragmatic method. His misinterpretation is based on the fact that "satisfaction" in the pragmatic view applies not to personal desire, but to objective conditions involving demonstrated performance and consequences. The social consensus criterion is inadequate without the test of objective conditions; even as would be that of "needful satisfaction" were no demonstrated test included. The assumption that "truth" may be validated simply by social consensus is unsound, and the personal and social results that would follow upon the acceptance of this assumption are undesirable.

Pursuit of the reconstructionist's invalid method of truth-seeking by social consensus would result in the educational use of alleged "truth" of dubious veracity. The acceptance of the method would also result in the neglect in education of tested objects of knowledge. It is here especially that the lack of faith in the critical use of intelligence is made evident. This may be seen more specifically in the conclusions which follow concerning values and "defensible partiality."

F. Values

The reconstructionist theory of values consists primarily of enunciating the specific values held by most
people of the world in our time. Specifically, and in brief, these "crucial" values are "nourishment, dress, shelter, sexual expression, health, work, devotion, appreciation, creativeness, literacy, participation and direction." All of these are said to be encompassed in the "supreme" value, "social-self-realization."

The reconstructionist has derived his list of values from the study of psychology, philosophy, economics, sociology, anthropology and the like but it is asserted that "as they are tested by evidence, communication and agreement—that is by social consensus—values come within the province of truth and falsehood."

Valuation in reconstructionism is ostensibly a process of social consensus. Social consensus, however, is not now operative in reconstructionist terms, hence Brameld, in advance of consensus, has set forth the values that should and would be directive in life were consensus possible to achieve. Thus commitment to the values Brameld holds is what the philosophy as now stated seeks.

The reconstructionist's theory of values is inadequate in that it does not recognize an implication of the fact that values arise only as a reflection of need, lack, deprivation, or blocks in the existing situation

4Ibid., pp. 480-481.
5Ibid., p. 473.
or the ongoing process. Values which arise thus are not
given as the ends that action should reach as if they
were, in Dewey's terms, destinations. They may be
idealized, however, and held as relatively permanent
ends-in-view. In this function they may serve an
instrumental role in deliberation, choice and action.
To do so they must be specific enough to operate in
concrete situations, and they, like other ends, flexible
enough to be remade in the light of the consequences of
choice and action.

Conflicts in values are recognized by the
reconstructionist, but these conflicts are attributed
largely to "inconsistencies and conflicts within the
culture" which presumably will be eliminated or minimized
in the proposed reconstructed culture. The role of
intelligence in mediating conflicts of value, the prime
function of intelligence, is neglected.

An attempt to achieve stability through an
emotional commitment to values which are stated at a high
level of generality, would doubtless succeed were the
techniques of achieving group consensus advanced by the
reconstructionist put into operation. Such a commitment
to a scheme of general values, however, would not shed much
light on questions of "what is to be done" at the level
of specific operations. In the absence of specific
guidance from values the procedure would invite arbitrary
decisions; either "snap judgments" or direction from those with facile, or "authoritative" suggestions. This procedure, in turn, would invest too much power in those who decide what the values mean in terms of specific choices and concrete action. If these questions are to be settled by social consensus, also, endless controversy would result in the attempt to settle issues with no appeal to specific consequences possible. If specific facts and consequences are utilized as the basis of making choices, as they must be if action is to be intelligently directed, there is no point in the prior commitment to general values which the reconstructionist advocates. In fact, such a commitment will serve to inhibit, not aid, the making of choices based on empirical tests. Further, the function of values as instruments to help one gain control of specific situations, can not be realized.

The acceptance in education of the reconstructionist's method of valuation, and his values, would result in the substitution of a scheme of general values that possess scant ability to assist in deliberation, for the use of intelligence as a mediator between conflicting values. The utilization of the school to secure the emotional commitment to the reconstructionist's scheme of values not only is a perversion and misuse of the learner's time, interests and personality, but here again reconstructionism substitutes a faith in his
predetermined values for a faith in the learner's ability to develop, refine and revise values through their intellectual use in deliberation.

G. **Defensible Partiality**

The reconstructionist, denying the legitimacy of indoctrination, advocates and describes an attitude and procedure which he designates "defensible partiality." He also believes that "children must absorb some facts and rules by a degree of inculcation," and asserts that education "should become colorful and dramatic in the way that propaganda can be colorful and dramatic."

Brameld takes advantage of the fact that the term "indoctrination" has many meanings and defines it so as to distinguish indoctrination from "defensible partiality." Indoctrination is defined as "learning by communication that proceeds only in one direction" (from "communicator" to the "communicatee") and is for the purpose of "inculcating in the latter the acceptance of some one doctrine or systematic body of beliefs." The

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6Ibid., p. 561.
7Ibid., p. 562.
reconstructionist, on the other hand, "believes in a kind of 'partiality' that is at the same moment 'defensible.'" He asserts that "what we learn is defensible simply in so far as the ends we support and the means we utilize are able to stand up against exposure to open, unrestricted criticism and comparison," and that "what we learn is partial in so far as these ends and means still remain definite and positive to their majority advocates after the defense occurs."10

This study appraises defensible partiality not alone on the basis of the reconstructionist's definitions and statements about the concept but also on an analysis of procedures advanced in writings relating to curriculum and method in education. Defensible partiality is distinguished from indoctrination by Brameld but the distinction he offers does not relieve defensible partiality of objectionable consequences. Defensible partiality is subject to the same objections that adhere to indoctrination and the additional one that it doubtless is calculated to be more efficient than indoctrination in inculcating a pre-determined point of view.

Undesirable consequences that can be expected to result from the use of "defensible partiality" are:

10Ibid., p. 564. (Entire quotation italicized in original.)
(1) Interference with the attainment of valid conclusions and objective truth;
(2) Violation of personality; at best it would exploit, and at worst it would enslave; and
(3) It would have a deleterious effect on the development and operation of democracy.

Reconstructionism, a philosophy of "stable" predetermined ends, which envisions education as a means for promoting these ends, confronts a dilemma. Either it has to relinquish its predetermined ends or embrace indoctrination, whatever it may be called. "Defensible partiality," in the final analysis is indefensible, if one insists, as does Brameld, that intelligence is to be given work to do in the school.

"Defensible partiality" is actually indefensible in education for the same reasons that indoctrination is indefensible. Both procedures violate the personality of learners by imposing ends and purposes on them, thereby shutting off inquiry and limiting their opportunities for growth. Defensible partiality, like indoctrination, assumes that ends already known or accepted by the reconstructionist are more worthy of achievement than is the development of abilities by learners to choose worthy ends and to use intelligence in making choices.
H. Summary Conclusion

The total effect of these conclusions concerning reconstructionism is this: were the philosophy of education of reconstructionism accepted as the basis of education the role of the school would be diverted from its chief goal, which should be the development of intelligence on the part of each student. Instead of this goal the school would be used as an instrument designed to serve the ends or values which Brameld has decided are the values men would agree to were they to follow the procedures for valuation which he advocates. The general conclusion of this study is, therefore, that reconstructionism is an unsuitable theoretical basis for education.
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I, James Wilson Comer, was born in Jones County, Georgia, February 16, 1914. I attended elementary school at one-and two-teacher schools and graduated from Jones County High School, Gray, Georgia. I attended the University of Georgia where I received the degree Bachelor of Science with majors in Agriculture and Education in 1935. I attended Cornell University the summer of 1940 where I took courses in landscape architecture. I received the degree Master of Science in Education from the University of Tennessee in 1946, after attending the summers of 1942, 1943 and 1946.

My teaching experience includes five years in high schools in Georgia, a year of teaching in the Army, and teaching at the Georgia State College for Women since 1940. My present position there is Associate Professor of Home Economics and Education and Director of General Extension.

I began study toward the doctorate at Ohio State University the summer of 1948. I spent the year January-September, 1950, in residence study, and I have devoted the summers of 1951 and 1952, and the summer and fall of 1953 to completion of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.