PRAGMATISM AND THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN THE WRITINGS
OF BOYD H. BODE, WILLIAM H. KILPATRICK, AND MAX C. OTTO

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE: PRAGMATISM</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PRAGMATISM</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Inception of Pragmatism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of Pragmatism from a theory of meaning to a System of Philosophy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Central Conceptions of Pragmatism</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PRAGMATISM IN THE WRITINGS OF BODE, KILPATRICK, AND OTTO</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyd H. Bode</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Kilpatrick</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max C. Otto</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART TWO: FREEDOM</strong></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV BODE'S VIEW OF FREEDOM</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V KILPATRICK'S VIEW OF FREEDOM</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI OTTO'S VIEW OF FREEDOM</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII ANALYSIS OF THE THREE POINTS OF VIEW</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART THREE: EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE VIEW OF FREEDOM FOR EDUCATION</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX CONCLUSION</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOBIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Thinkers have dedicated themselves to a study of reality in its totality. They have attempted to comprehend it as a whole and to have a total vision of things. How successful have these attempts been in solving the problem of life? In trying to embrace within his system the vast universe in its totality, the individual thinker, though increasing the volume of knowledge, also revealed new problems to be taken over by his successors. No philosopher, however, was philosophizing in a "marble temple shining on a hill" entirely divorced from a social context. Conditions were forcing themselves upon philosophical thinking, giving it a shift here and a new color there. Many forces could not be brushed aside, and the movement of thought had to change its direction.

For example, the birth of science gave a powerful turn to thinking. Many of the new believers were determined to discover truth through the study of the physical world. In the nineteenth century the scientific temper found the time ripe to raise its voice of protest more strongly than ever against many long accepted ideas and established beliefs. The reaction, however, went so far that it reduced man to a mechanical level. In so doing, it aroused an antagonistic outcry from the metaphysical camp that wished to sustain for man his spiritual values. In the second half of that century one can say that knowledge and faith
were at odds with each other. A limitation of science seemed to lie in the fact that it substituted an overruling mechanical law for an overruling Providence. Thus, instead of giving man an opportunity to find himself as a participant in fashioning his world, it pictured the universe as a blind impersonal mechanism. From the mechanistic standpoint, man was, in Haeckel's words, "but a tiny grain of protoplasm in the perishable framework of organic nature."^1

On the other hand, the idea that human problems can be solved by transcending them and by postulating an all-inclusive reality called the Absolute became questionable. Bode described the situation very ably when he said, "The choice between tradition and science was a choice between his Satanic Majesty and the briny deep."^2 What was needed was an interpretation free from the warping influence of the prevailing misconceptions of both absolutism and mechanism. This interpretation was effected with the emergence of pragmatism, which called for reconstruction in philosophy based on the scientific method. It provided the basis for a new interpretation of nature and of human experience. The pragmatists with their strong faith in progress rejected absolutes, which they conceived as stumbling blocks in the way of investigation, experimentation, and inquiry. At the same time they repudiated any mechanistic view of man. Over against this mechanism, they emphasized

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spiritual life by their stress on human values. Yet, in contrast with absolutism, they shifted the spiritual center of gravity from the supernatural to the natural sphere. One can safely say that it was a synthesis of realism and idealism, retaining from each the positive aspects, while abandoning their artificial and unnecessary metaphysical and epistemological puzzles.

The pragmatists believe that by placing their faith in human intelligence they provide for human freedom. They hold that men can maintain his freedom through the exercise of intelligence. Intelligence for them is not synonymous with reason, the highest organ for laying hold of ultimate truth. Intelligence is operationally conceived and is honored in the measure that it proves itself capable of formulating concepts as tools for the furthering and redefinition of human purposes. For them, old values, standards, and truths are proximate and not absolute. Truth is determined not in terms of its genesis but in terms of its reliability when tested in human experience. A basic assumption behind this concept of freedom is that all existences are in a continuous process of change and interaction; that is we live in a "universe with the lid off."

When freedom is conceived as the exercise of intelligence, it becomes a process of growth. When freedom is so understood, the pragmatists believe that the main avenue for achieving it is education. To fulfill its function, education should come to conceive of its responsibility as the transmission and expansion of the cultural treasures of the world. It should develop attitudes of critical thinking and reflection that do not merely absorb these treasures but
continuously re-examine and re-evaluate them to meet the needs of evolving conditions. In sum, the pragmatists believe that the work of education is liberation and the development of intelligence.

Within this frame of reference the writer has endeavored to study the concept of freedom in the light of pragmatism. Three contemporary philosophers who have sought to render the pragmatic view of freedom applicable to education were selected. These are Boyd H. Bode, William H. Kilpatrick, and Max C. Otto. The first two are interpreters of the philosophy of John Dewey. Their major concern is education. Otto, meanwhile, is more of a Jamesian and not primarily an educational philosopher. It is the purpose of this study to examine those three approaches to the pragmatic conception of the educational theory and to give special attention to their various concepts of the nature of freedom.

In order to do this, the work is divided into three parts. Part One comprises two chapters and is concerned with the general conception of pragmatism. Chapter I shows how the idea started with Peirce, and points out his intention of making it simply a theory of meaning. It also points out the role played by James, the changes he introduced, and the extension of pragmatism to a theory of truth. The development of pragmatism as a philosophy in the hands of Dewey and its central conceptions are discussed briefly. Chapter II is confined to the pragmatism of the three men. The first part is a discussion of Bode's concept of philosophy, experience, truth, and thinking. The dual
influence of Thorndike and Dewey on Kilpatrick is taken as a point of departure in the second section. Kilpatrick's theory of thinking and knowledge is discussed, but emphasis is put on the purposeful act which occupies a central place in his whole system of thought, including his idea of freedom. Otto's writings are different from those of the other two educational theorists. Thus, the discussion in his case is centered around his views of the function of philosophy in culture. It includes also his moral theory for its bearing on the nature of freedom.

Part Two includes four chapters. The first three are a discussion of freedom from the standpoint of the three men. The writer attempts, in general, to show how they conceive freedom, and some of the logical implications of their thought as they bear on morality and their idea of democracy. The fourth chapter is an analysis of the views of the three men. It includes their different points of views on freedom, causation, determinism, and morality. These points were not selected casually. The reason for including them came directly from the writings of the three men.

The third part concludes the study with an examination and analysis of the implications of their concept of freedom for education.
PART ONE

PRAGMATISM
CHAPTER II

A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PRAGMATISM

The Inception of Pragmatism

Pragmatism as a new movement was first enunciated and formulated as a method of inquiry in the "humblest souche imaginable." Yet it is connected with the Western philosophical tradition; that is to say, it is rooted in the past. Peirce says:

So much for the past, the ancestry of pragmatism is respectable enough; but the more conscious adoption of it as lanterna pedibus in the discussion of dark questions and the elaboration of it into a method in aid of philosophical inquiry came, in the first instance, from the humblest souche imaginable. It was in the earliest seventies that a knot of us young men in old Cambridge, calling ourselves, half ironically, half-defiantly, 'The Metaphysical Club'--for agnostism was then riding its high horse, and was frowning superbly upon all metaphysics--used to meet, sometimes in my study, sometimes in that of William James.1

Meanwhile the word pragmatism was first p. 5ically used by William James in his enthusiastic address delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California on August 20, 1898.2 In this address James spoke of Peirce's principle, "the principle of practicalism or pragmatism as he called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge in the early '70's."3

1C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5:12. (Citations from this text will here be by volume and paragraph as practiced by the editors.)
3Ibid., p. 410.
Peirce introduced his principle in the *Popular Science Monthly*, 1878, in an article entitled, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Peirce commented on this article, saying:

> Our metaphysical proceedings had all been in winged words . . . until at length, lest the club should be dissolved without leaving any material *souvenir* behind, I drew up a little paper expressing some of the opinions that I had been urging all along under the name of *pragmatism*.

The originality of pragmatism is not absolute. The term, according to James, "applies itself conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective name." As for the concept itself in its original formulation by Peirce or as James applied it or in its present state, it can certainly be traced as far back as Socrates. Peirce and James have admitted on different occasions the connection of their philosophy with the ideas of European thinkers. In Peirce's opinion, no important conception is absolutely original. "Any philosophical doctrine that should be completely new could hardly fail to prove completely false." Peirce repeatedly showed that the suggestion of the idea of pragmatism came to him through almost every significant figure in the field of philosophy. Feibleman remarks that Peirce "felt that all significant figures in the field of philosophy, regardless of place and date, were his philosophical contemporaries warring with him for the settlement of burning problems."

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6 William James, *Pragmatism*, p. 47.
7 Peirce, *op. cit.*, 5:11.
8 James Feibleman, *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy*, p. 23.
In Peirce's words, "the rivulets at the head of the river of pragmatism are easily traced back to almost any desired antiquity."\(^9\) Socrates, Aristotle, and the Stoics are mentioned among the philosophers of antiquity. Duns Scotus seems to have influenced Peirce's theory "of the nature and meaning of signs."\(^10\) In a letter to James, Peirce wrote: "Berkely on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism into philosophy than any other man, though I was more explicit in enunciating it."\(^11\)

The direct influence came, however, through Kant, whom Peirce called a "confused pragmatist."\(^12\) The principle of pragmatism or particularly the maxim of pragmatism came as a result of Peirce's "reflection upon Kant's Critic of the Pure Reason."\(^13\)

According to Peirce, the immediate ancestors of the idea of pragmatism are the members of the "Metaphysical Club," particularly St. John Green, who "often urged the importance of applying Bain's definition of belief, as 'that upon which a man is prepared to act.' From this definition, pragmatism is scarcely more than a corollary."\(^14\)

\(^9\)Peirce, op. cit., 5:11.
\(^10\)Feibleman, op. cit., p. 300.
\(^11\)R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Part II: 425.
\(^12\)Peirce, op. cit., 5:525.
\(^13\)Ibid., 5:3.
\(^14\)Ibid., 5:12.
"But," James said, "these forerunners of pragmatism used it in fragments; they were a prelude only."\(^{15}\)

Pragmatism, nevertheless, is more associated with the thought of the empirical school of British philosophy. Peirce, as well as James, maintained that pragmatism represents the empirical attitude. Peirce said about Green, Wright, James, and himself, "The type of our thought was decidedly British. I, alone of our number, had come upon the threshing floor of philosophy through the doorway of Kant, and even my ideas were acquiring the English accent."\(^{16}\)

The empiricism of James, however, is more explicit in all his writings. The dedication of his book, *Pragmatism*, is a good illustration. He wrote: "To the memory of John Stewart Mill, from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today."\(^{17}\)

Whatever the influence of individual thinkers may be, we must not, amidst the abundant statements of the founders, forget the impact of social context within which pragmatism grows. The pragmatists believe in a close connection between philosophy and culture. Childs comments that

Both Peirce and Dewey have stressed the fact that philosophers deceive themselves whenever they assume that

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\(^{15}\)James, *Pragmatism*, p. 50.

\(^{16}\)Peirce, *op. cit.*, 5:12.

\(^{17}\)James, *op. cit.*
they can wipe the slate clean and develop new systems of truth by rigorous logical deductions from rational premises that are independent of factors of culture and experience.18

The pragmatic conception of experience accounts for this view of the cultural basis and the function of philosophy. Philosophy must take its point of departure from human experience. Its function is the reconstruction of experience for the development and improvement of human life. So conceived, no philosophical theory can be understood when taken in complete isolation from the general culture in which it originally grew. To put it differently, cultural ideas at any given time work as underlying forces in producing philosophical views. Thus the pragmatists treat philosophy as essentially a product of vital needs and basic conflicts within the entire social order. The pragmatists insist upon the applicability of philosophical views or propositions to human conduct. In so doing they look forward and not backward. Meanwhile they do not discard the past. Past experiences are important. There is always a continual marriage of new ideas with old beliefs and customs. Culture advances by this perpetual process. Human experience is a process of moving forward and of continuity. The end-goal for the pragmatists is progress or, simply, growth.

Apparently, the cultural ideas of the age put their stamp on pragmatism. Pragmatism, as mentioned above, started as a movement in the latter third of the nineteenth century when a scientific temper

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prevailed. The development of science played an important role in various realms of life. The greatest contribution of science, however, proceeded from the theory of evolution. Although the thought of evolution is, in fact, an old one, it exercises neither a profound nor a wide influence upon human thought until the publication of the *Origin of Species*. This theory of organic evolution opened new vistas and profoundly influenced the thought of the founders of pragmatism. It is no wonder, in such a scientific atmosphere, that pragmatism placed great faith in the experimental method. Dewey stated that "doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the *Origin of the Species*."

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The Development of Pragmatism

Pragmatism, as shown above, started with Peirce, who formulated it as a theory of meaning. To him meanings denote action and expectation. They are empirical and operational in character. The meaning of anything is to be found in the responses it evokes. Peirce gave a formulation to the principle of pragmatism in his article "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." This formulation came to be known later as the "pragmatic

maxim." It reads as follows: "Consider what effects, what might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."\(^{20}\)

It seems that the first formulation or utterance by Peirce was not precise enough so that it was immediately transformed by James who was very close to him. This transformation led Peirce to write a number of expressions attempting to clarify his concept. When James, in opposition to Peirce, emphasized the particular and the concrete, the latter wrote:

> But of the myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, what is that one which is to be called its very meaning? It is, according to the pragmatist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose.\(^{21}\)

In 1906 he wrote to show that the core of his pragmatism is its theory of meaning: "... pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts."\(^{22}\)

\(^{20}\)Peirce, *op. cit.*, 5:2; 5:402.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., 5:427.

\(^{22}\)Peirce, *op. cit.*, 5:464.
With Peirce, to be sure, pragmatism is a version of his theory of logic. It grew out of his conception of semiosis. His pragmatic criteria were designed to achieve unequivocal communication among groups engaged in philosophical dispute. When observable facts cannot settle a question between two disputants, "Pragmatism maintains that . . . the disputants must be at cross purposes. They either attach different meanings to words or else one side or the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning." Hence the pragmatic method is needed "for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign."

The nature of this pragmatic method is stated explicitly in the following statement. He said:

All pragmatists will further agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings of words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by which all the successful sciences (in which number nobody in his senses would include metaphysics) have reached the degrees of certainty that are severally proper to them today.

In other words, the chief purpose of Peirce's pragmatism is to clarify meanings and ideas through the experimental method, and not to solve problems. He wrote to James, "lamenting the latter's . . . inaccuracies," declaring, "after all, pragmatism solves no real problem. It only shows that supposed problems are not real problems."

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23 Ibid., 5:6.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 5:465.
26 Perry, op. cit., II:430.
27 Ibid.
After Peirce's enunciation of pragmatism, it gained considerable attention; yet it immediately began to be transformed and misunderstood. It is an intriguing question to ask why James, who from the very beginning was close to Peirce and shared with him the discussions of the "Metaphysical Club," was the first to change the pragmatism of Peirce. Was it a mere misunderstanding? Or was it that James, being already of an empirical bent, took from Peirce what suited his germinal ideas best? In the correspondence between the two philosophers we find many statements which show explicitly that James misunderstood Peirce very often. But the question remains, why, with their intimate relations, did such misunderstandings persist? Is it because their major interest was different? Can we say that such statements as the following are inclusive? Peirce wrote to James:

It is very vexatious to be told at every turn that I am utterly incomprehensible, notwithstanding my careful study of language... But when, as in the present case, I am able to show that the accusation is a mere auto-suggestion due to your having told yourself that everything that Peirce says is unintelligible, and really having commanded yourself not to understand, it gives me a certain glee to feel authorized to yield to my actual vexation.28

Meanwhile, we find James writing to Peirce that he does not comprehend some of his views: "This is very likely partly due to my mind being so non-mathematical and to my slight interest in logic."29

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28Ibid., p. 431.
29Ibid., p. 427.
One is tempted to ask, was it a real misunderstanding, or was it intended? That is, was James conscious of it? The evidence shows that James was aware that he was not merely interpreting Peirce in his original formulation of pragmatism. In 1898, when he first introduced the term pragmatism, he said, "I think myself that it should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it."30

Perry remarked: "In any case, Peirce's pragmatism became so different a thing from the pragmatism which James attributed to him that he felt obliged to change its name, although he did not decline the honor."31

Peirce, in 1905, called his philosophy "pragmaticism."32

James' pragmatism, one can say, is a result of both his empiricism and the direct influence of Peirce. It seems that Peirce was an initial influence rather than a controlling master of thought for James. The germinal idea of James' pragmatism can be traced in his early writings.33 Perry remarks "that the idea that pragmatism originated with Peirce was originated by James,"34 and that "James was born a pragmatist as truly as Peirce."35 Perry went on to say that "James and Peirce were no doubt both of them confined by the positivism of Chauncey Wright."36

30 James, Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 412.
31 Perry, op. cit., II:409.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., pp. 4-139.
34 Perry, op. cit., p. 407.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 408.
Pragmatism is, in the mind of the majority, however, associated more with James. A remark from Flournoy in a letter to James is interesting in this connection.

I quite understand your being enthusiastic over the power and fecundity of the pragmatic method, which you handle as its genuine creator's, for the brave Peirce does not appear to me to have been more than the slight push, the occasional cause, which would have had no result without the real motive force. The power to convert potentiality into reality, which you have yourself supplied entirely.\(^{37}\)

In contrast to what Flournoy said, Peirce wrote to James, "... you and Schiller carry pragmatism too far for me. I don't want to exaggerate it."\(^{38}\)

While Peirce intended to make pragmatism a method of inquiry, James extended it to be also a theory of truth. Even as a theory of meaning (which is the heart of Peirce's pragmatism), James' pragmatism differed considerably. To understand the difference, we may give a brief discussion of both men.

Peirce was a logician. His pragmatism was simply an extension of his theory of logic, i.e. a "logical rule."\(^{39}\) Logic for him is the science of signs. In a letter to Ladd-Franklin, Peirce said that

\(^{37}\text{Ibid., p. 456.}\)

\(^{38}\text{Ibid., p. 430.}\)

\(^{39}\text{Peirce, op. cit., 5:465.}\)
"pragmatism is one of the results of my study of the formal laws of signs."\(^{40}\)

According to Peirce, each sign has an interpretant, that is the effect which a sign may produce in the interpreter. This interpretant is of three kinds: the emotional or the immediate, the energetic or the dynamic, and the logical or the final.\(^{41}\) In Peirce's sense, pragmatism is concerned with the logical interpretant. Terms or propositions are meaningful if they have logical interpretants of a certain character. This interpretant, as Peirce says, is not abstract definition, but "... it tells you what the word denotes... denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word."\(^{42}\) Pragmatically, to proclaim any term of some object "is equivalent to declaring that a certain operation... if performed upon that object would... be followed by a result of a definite general description."\(^{43}\) Hence, Peirce holds that a term has meaning if the statement in which it occurs can be substituted by another statement of sensible properties, for propositions have meaning when consequences can be experimentally investigated.

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\(^{41}\) Peirce, op. cit., 5:475.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 2:390.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 5:483.
Peirce observed that James's definition differs from his in that James does not restrict the "meaning," that is, the ultimate logical interpretant to a habit as Peirce does. James "allows percepts, that is, complex feelings endowed with compulsiveness, to be such."[44]

Peirce was concerned with conduct; his pragmatism holds "that the . . . interpretant of all thought proper is conduct,"[45] and the truth of proposition. His pragmatism is concerned with the clarity of ideas. The clearness of an idea requires its being meaningful; that is, communicable. We express our ideas by means of signs. In a genuine situation there must be the thing which functions as a sign-instrument, something to which the sign refers and some possible translation dependent on a mind. A sign may have different translations. The importance of all these translations lies in their consequences and their effect on our conduct. To Pierce, the class of legitimate translations is to be limited to a formula for sensible operation as far as names are concerned, and for a formula for confirmation as far as propositions are concerned.

Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects, and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. . . . It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function,"[46] and "a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that of a second

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[44] Ibid., 5:494.
[45] Ibid., 4:539.
[46] Ibid., 5:401.
conception except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions, it might modify our practical concept differently from that second conception.\footnote{Ibid., 5:196.}

This insistence upon the relation of thought to action implies social and biological considerations, as thought is relative to individuals communicating in a society; hence, human actions are a public affair. But human actions cannot be isolated events, because they develop in an environment. Consequently, concepts may have possible applications to life in general. These possible applications free the concept from being limited to particular cases or from serving narrow interests. This generalization of the meaning of concepts is central to Peirce's formulation of pragmatism. Peirce wrote to James on this point, saying "... it is not mere action as brute exercise of strength that is the purpose of all, but, say, generalization; such action as tends toward regularization, and the actualization of the thought which without action remains unthought."\footnote{Perry, op. cit., II:222.} He went on to say that an individual deed is "the real meaning there is to the concept," yet "it is not the mere arbitrary force in the deed, but the life it gives to the idea that is valuable."\footnote{Ibid.}

The issue of generals and particulars was a point of controversy between Peirce and James. Before discussing James' emphasis on particulars, several points must be mentioned. James was a nominalist, while Peirce recognized that universal concepts have independent logical
status and express a common meaning. So while we find James saying that pragmatism "agrees with nominalism ... in always appealing to particulars,\textsuperscript{50} we meet in Peirce's writing an occasional rejection of this position. This was largely due to Peirce's insistence on the rights of thought as opposed to sensation. When we know that nominalism holds that genuine cognition consists in the reception of sense-impressions and that the intellectual processes are merely convenient devices for the regularization of these sense-impressions, we can understand why James was a nominalist. It seems that James' psychology is responsible for it, because of the emphasis placed on particular sense data. Another fact that accounts for this difference is the rational tendency of Peirce versus the strict empiricism of James.

The emphasis on the particular and concrete is present in James's first declaration of pragmatism in 1898. After exposing the principle of Peirce that the function of thought is the production of belief, that "beliefs, in short, are really rules for action," and that our idea of an object is our idea of its possible effect, he remarked that these principles "should be expressed more broadly."\textsuperscript{51} He then said:

The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires. But it inspires that conduct because it first foretells some particular turn to our experience which shall call for just that conduct from us" and "... the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular

\textsuperscript{50}James, \textit{Pragmatism}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{51}James, \textit{Collected Essays and Reviews}, pp. 410-412.
consequences, in our future practical experience whether active or passive, the point lying in the fact that the experience must be particular, then in the fact that it must be active.\textsuperscript{52}

Dewey pointed out that--

William James alluded to the development which he gave to Peirce's expression of the principle. In one sense one can say that he enlarged the bearing of the principle by the substitution of particular consequences for the general rule or method applicable to future experience. But in another sense this substitution limited the application of the principle since it destroyed the importance attached by Peirce to the greatest possible application of the rule, or the habit of conduct--its extension to universality.\textsuperscript{53}

It is likely that this shift by James from Peirce's original formulation is responsible for the charges that pragmatism makes action the end-all and that it substitutes particular ends for rational activity. Meanwhile it seems that it enabled James to apply his pragmatism to various types of belief and to settle metaphysical disputes on such issues as theism versus materialism, the one and the many, free will versus determinism, etc. by tracing its respective practical consequences.\textsuperscript{54} Perry very ably summed up the difference between James and Peirce in their theory of meaning in the following statement:

According to his own definition, Peirce's pragmatism (or pragmaticism) differs from that of James in two respects. In the first place, the meaning of a concept is construed in terms of conduct and not in terms of sensation, and, in the second place, it is construed in terms of generality and not in terms of particularity.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 412.
\textsuperscript{54}James, Pragmatism, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{55}Perry, op. cit., II:409-410.
\end{footnotes}
The views of both men reflected their interpretation of thought; Peirce regarded it in terms of operation and control. "The function of thought" is "the production of belief." 56 "A belief is an intelligent habit upon which we shall act when occasion presents itself." 57 and "the true meaning of any product of the intellect lies in whatever unitary determination it would impart to practical conduct under any and every conceivable circumstances supposing such conduct to be guided by reflection carried to an ultimate limit." 58 James, on the other hand, interpreted thought in terms of the immediacies to which it leads, i.e., to "particular consequences" 59 and "its practical cash-value." 60

Dewey attributed this position of James to the fact that he was an educator and "wished to force the general public to realize that certain problems, certain philosophical debates have a real importance for mankind, because the beliefs which they bring into play lead to very different modes of conduct." 61

Although James transformed the original principle of Peirce yet his contribution to pragmatism is substantial. He extended it to a theory of truth, which became a leading tenet later on. He built his

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57 Ibid., 2:435.
58 Ibid., 6:490.
59 James, Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 412.
60 James, Pragmatism, p. 53.
theory on the principle of Peirce. In his theory of meaning Peirce maintained that truth is the opinion on which the community agrees, not arbitrarily, but as "the irresistible effect of inquiry,"\(^\text{62}\) that is, the opinion which is "ultimately agreed to by all who investigate."\(^\text{63}\)

Truth is based on empirical science. Science regards a proposition as an established truth if it is confirmed to a high degree. The "established truth" is nothing more than a belief which cannot be doubted as far as the evidence for it is supported by a large and diversified number of perceptual judgments. Any belief remains secure until the growth of our experience again awakens doubt, whereupon a search for belief which meets the demands of our experience commences. The irritation of doubt is thus the reason for the struggle to attain belief. The struggle to attain belief is called inquiry. It follows that the sole object of inquiry is to settle belief or opinion. Truth is agreement and satisfaction; agreement, because it must be confirmed by all who investigate, and satisfaction, because doubt has been dispelled by the method of science. Up to this point there is implicit agreement between Peirce and later pragmatists. The difference, however, lies in his theory of reality which is the fundamental basis for his view of truth. According to him:

There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; these Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our

\(^{62}\)Peirce, op. cit., 5:494.

\(^{63}\)Ibid., 5:407.
sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. 64

The above statement shows that the role of reasoning, or thinking, is important in knowing reality, and that it takes its premises from experience. Although there are other statements of Peirce which show that inquiry should appeal to external permanency which is not affected by human thinking, yet taking his discussion of pragmatism into account, we find that his insistence on experimental method, on the position that truth involves agreement and confirmation, and that the object represented in the true opinion is real, reveals his belief in the crucial role played by man in what is real. To take an example, Peirce said, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." 65 Add to this, another statement, "... by the True is meant that at which inquiry aims," 66 and it is implied that there is approximate and ultimate truth. In other words, there is reality which we cannot know but just approach the knowledge of, because reality in the perfect and complete sense is "something which is constituted by an event indefinitely future." 67 Reality, though independent

64 Ibid., 5:384.
65 Ibid., 5:407.
66 Ibid., 5:557.
67 Ibid., 5:331.
of our opinion, yet "is independent, not necessarily of thought in
general but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think
about it." Even if reality is "... that whose characters are inde­
pendent of what anybody may think them to be" yet this does not contra­
dict the other statements. Independent of thought, to be sure, means
pragmatically, not created by thought but that which can be known by
thought. Two implications may be mentioned here. First, if truth is
approximate, then inquiry is continuous. This continuity is needed
if we look for progress. On the other hand, this view of reality and
truth gives place to Peirce's principle of fallibilism, which insists
on the corrigibility even of perceptual statements and that no belief or
truth can be regarded as finally verified or beyond question. Hence
scientific investigation is in process of constant revision, which again
leads to progress, as evidences from our present conditions show.

To summarize, reality cannot be created by thought, but can only
be known by it. The method of inquiry that should be used is the
scientific method. The results of any investigation are true if agreed
upon by all who are concerned. Truth and reality, which are identical,
according to Peirce, involve community. The process by which the exist­
ent becomes a body of generalized habits and beliefs is a process of
evolution and continuity.

The theory of truth in James is more of a common-sense one. He
emphasized the cash-value of truth and what differences it brings into

68 Ibid., 5:408.

69 Ibid., 5:405.
experiences. For James, "True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. . . . Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.\textsuperscript{70}

Truth then resides in the processes of verification and validation. Verification happens within experience. Verification and validation "signify certain practical consequences" of a given idea; that is, its agreeable leading in experience. "This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification."\textsuperscript{71} Any idea that links our experiences "satisfactorily, working securely, . . . is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally,"\textsuperscript{72} Every idea has just and only as much truth as it has cash value in experience. But are ideas which happen to have cash-value in our experience the only true ones? James says that we hold many beliefs which are never actually verified by us. In practical, everyday life we make use of a credit system of truth.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, our beliefs could be verified in the bank of experience. But we do not have to go there unless the need arises.

Besides, there are "petrified truths." James applies his theory to the common-sense level matter of fact, purely mental ideas and historical ideas.

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{James}, \textit{Pragmatism}, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 206-208.
James calls matters of fact the primary "sphere of verification."\textsuperscript{74} An example of a cowpath in the woods that would indicate human habitation\textsuperscript{75} was used to show that the truth of an idea is not an end in itself, but is only a way of reaching other vital satisfactions.\textsuperscript{76} To say "it is useful because it is true" is identical with saying, "it is true because it is useful."\textsuperscript{77} Truth and usefulness express two aspects of the same process. The idea which starts the verification process is called true and "useful is the name for its completed function in experience."\textsuperscript{78} Truth of an idea about a matter of fact is "a leading that is worthwhile."\textsuperscript{79}

Truth is also "a leading that is worthwhile" in relations among purely mental ideas. We first relate our ideas together into logical and mathematical truth, then we subsume the facts of experience under them. These ideas are useful in arranging the sensible facts of experience. It is for this reason that they are true. James says:

\begin{quote}
Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{74}ibid., p. 203.
\textsuperscript{75}ibid.
\textsuperscript{76}ibid.
\textsuperscript{77}ibid., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{78}ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}ibid., p. 205.
\textsuperscript{80}ibid., p. 211.
This agreement with reality is explained by James on different terms from that of intellectualism. To agree is not to copy, but "can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed." \(^{81}\) Hence agreement means pointings or leadings which must yield satisfaction as this result. For Peirce, a true idea is in a certain sense satisfactory, but he differentiated his meaning of satisfactory from that of James. He remarked, "Mr. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller informs us that he and James have made up their minds that the true is simply the satisfactory. No doubt; but to say 'satisfactory' is not to complete any predicate whatever. Satisfactory to what end?" \(^{82}\) The end for him is the removing of doubt by the superior method of science. A belief which is satisfactory in the sense that it is emotionally comfortable is not a true belief. \(^{83}\)

James's "Will to believe" was probably the main factor in his insistence upon taking emotional and practical results along with the evidential ones as constituents of the test of truth. This view presents an opportunity for many to reject the pragmatism of James.

James explained that "practical" is meant to include all interests and of course that of theoretical cognition. "It is . . . simply idiotic," he said, "to repeat that pragmatism takes no account of purely

\(^{81}\)Ibid., p. 213.

\(^{82}\)Peirce, op. cit., 5:552.

\(^{83}\)Ibid., 5:416.
theoretic interests. All it insists on is that verity in act means verification, and that there are always particulars.84 Such verification meant a sought precept or a sought concept.

A point worth mentioning in James's theory of truth is the relation he made between old and new truths or ideas. He looked upon human life as a total sum of experience. "Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding operations."85 When a new experience arises, the old stock of opinions is put to a strain and the individual starts to modify his opinion "until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance. . . . New truth is always a go-between . . . . It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity."86

Pragmatism reached its highest popularity in the work of John Dewey. Dewey, however, gave pragmatism a new name which goes better with his views; namely, instrumentalism, which he changed later to experimentalism, a more convenient name for the movement in general. As the experimental method is its core, why not name it "experimentalism?"

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84James, The Meaning of Truth, pp. 211-212.
85James, Pragmatism, p. 224.
86Ibid., p. 61.
Dewey stressed two points in his views; namely, the psychological and the logical. Dewey stated: "As far as the historical antecedents of instrumentalism... two factors are... important, over and above this matter of experimental verification... The first... is psychological, and the second is a critique of the theory of knowledge and of logic." 87

Although Dewey was a Hegelian in his early days, he started as early as 1884 to write about the relation between philosophy and psychology. He was also concerned with methods of inquiry. 88 His interest in psychology came through Hall, who was almost a propagandist for experimental psychology. 89 The attraction was the experimental bent. This was reinforced to the extent of discarding Hegelianism through the study of Darwin. Modern psychology was influenced by biological theories, and these theories influenced pragmatism. It was closely related to behaviorism, which took its point of departure from the conception of the brain as an organ for the coordination of sense stimuli. Dewey's functional psychology which he started at Chicago was in fact influenced by James "with his conviction that... every sensation or feeling besides its mere existence has a function." 90 Also influential was James's substitution of the stream of consciousness for the ideas, sensations,

89 Ibid., p. 38.
90 Robert S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, p. 31.
Another important view of James was the criterion that mind is an instrument for realizing ends, all ideas being regarded by him as "purely teleological weapons of mind." Dewey believed that James's psychology is more a source of pragmatism than his book, *Pragmatism*. Dewey remarked:

"It is particularly interesting to note that in the *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), which was their first declaration, the instrumentalists recognized how much they owed to William James for having forged the instruments which they used, while at the same time, in the course of the studies, the authors constantly declared their belief in a close union of the 'normative' principles of logic and the real processes of thought, in so far as these are determined by an objective or biological psychology and not by an introspective psychology of states of consciousness. But it is curious to note that the 'instruments' to which allusion is made, are not the considerations which were of the greater service to James. They precede his pragmatism and it is in one of the aspects of his *Principles of Psychology* that one must look for them."

It is true that James contributed to instrumentalism, yet Dewey must be given major credit for it. It was he who first viewed mind as an instrument; as a function of establishing control over the environment. Thus Dewey's view emancipated philosophy from the classical dualism of mind-body.

Dewey, in his instrumentalism, laid down a criterion for democracy which became a tenet in pragmatism. Otto pointed out that "One cannot read the writings of instrumentalists without sensing the depth of their democratic convictions. They think of pragmatism as the philosophic...

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counterpart of the democratic movement in modern society, and it would not be wrong to say that for most of them Democracy is Religion."\(^93\)

It must be remembered that Dewey had ventured into different fields of knowledge: psychology, anthropology, politics, etc. Add to this his knowledge of the philosophic tradition of the West. This combination gave him insight into the nature of man. Man is an emergent within a natural evolutionary process. He is not one thing, but a blanket term for the immense variety of specific reactions, habits, dispositions, and powers of human nature that are evoked and confirmed under the influence of associated life."\(^94\)

The essential elements of Dewey's philosophy are derived from modern science, particularly biology. His abiding faith in human intelligence, continuity and interaction between the individual and his environment, scientific analysis of experience and moral responsibility make his philosophy, one may say, a bio-social empiricism. Hook called the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey social and scientific. Hook also believed that the pragmatism of the two is closely connected, "although most of Dewey's ideas were arrived at independently."\(^95\) This seems clear when we know that Dewey took his point of departure from logic. His philosophy is

\[\ldots\text{an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the}\]

\(^{93}\)M. Otto, "Instrumentalism," Philosophy Today, p. 46.

\(^{94}\)Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 156.

experimental determination of future consequences. That is to say, it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or mediative function described to reason. It aims to constitute a theory of the general forms of conception of reasoning, and not of this or that particular judgment or concept related to its own content, or to its particular implications.96

It seems appropriate, first, to suggest here that the idea that pragmatism can never be a metaphysic is overestimation. Childs maintained that "...the method and test of experimentalism is not as innocent of metaphysical consequences as some of its advocates have at times assumed."97 First one would wonder if the above quotation is completely free from metaphysical notion. Second, in his introduction to Hook's The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, Dewey disagrees only with the rigid definitions of both terms, "metaphysics" and "pragmatism." "But," he said, "the reader who permits his idea of the meaning of these words to grow with and from the actual subject-matter of the following pages will find in them, I am confident, a penetrating and illuminating union of the basic ideas in the newer movement with those of the classic philosophic tradition."98 Third, the use of the term "experience" to cover the whole continuum of situations and reflection, and the description of these situations with such terms as social, aesthetic, moral, etc. give the word experience some metaphysical connotation. Fourth, when the pragmatist uses the intellectual apparatus of the evolution hypothesis rather

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97Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, p. 46.

than the Mendelian theory to reflectively construe experience he employs critical speculative metaphysics. Childs pointed out that: "In certain of his writings Dewey seems to recognize frankly that experimentalism is not only a philosophy of method, but is also a philosophy with a world view." These examples are not meant to exhaust the metaphysical notions in pragmatism but to show that the divorce is not complete.

The denial of metaphysics that is attached to pragmatism, it seems to me, stemmed not from disregard or disbelief in metaphysics but from an abiding concern to change philosophy from dealing merely with abstractions that sidetrack it from everyday life. Pragmatism meant to make it

... rather a criticism, a critical viewing of just those familiar things (ordinary beliefs, knowledge, action, enjoyment, and suffering). It differs from criticism only in trying to carry it further and pursue it methodically. If it has disclosures to offer it is not by way of revelation of some ultimate reality, but as disclosures follow in the way of pushing any investigation to familiar objects beyond the points of previous acquaintance. ... As soon as anyone strives to introduce definiteness, clarity, and order on any broad scale (concerning beliefs and inspirations relating to them), he enters the road that leads to philosophy. He begins to criticise and to develop criteria of criticism, that is, logic, aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics.

In brief, to the pragmatist, philosophy is the ability to employ intelligently the findings as well as the method of modern science in

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99Childs, op. cit., p. 48.

100A good example is found in Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism.

101Dewey, Construction and Criticism, pp. 22-23.
the province of human relations. For Dewey, the notion that philosophy attempts at a disclosure of an Absolute or deals primarily with eternal problems:

... is obstructive, tending to be of one chiefly in defense of the practice of continually rehashing issues which were timely in their own social condition, but that are no longer urgent, save from the standpoint of historical scholarship. The latter is as important in philosophy as in other fields. But when it is permitted to monopolize philosophical activities it chokes out their life. Eternity that is permitted to become a refuge from the time in which human life goes on may provide a certain kind of consolation.102

It must be noted that Dewey's influence in the field of education has been great. In the main his work was based upon the conviction that modern science is a challenge to the whole traditional mode of thinking. In applying this conviction to the field of education he arrived at certain underlying assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that thinking tends to grow out of confusion and uncertainty, and ensuing reorganization comes about through creative endeavor. Second, the entire school program should be based upon the importance of intelligence in human living. The school should be a miniature social organization. Third, the encouragement of attitudes of creativeness, experimentation, and cooperation is essential. Fourth, conceptions such as duty, discipline, and citizenship are derived from an appreciation of intimate social relationship.

Dewey's philosophical speculations carried him far away from the majority of his academic colleagues. It is known that Dewey, like any

great philosopher, was subject to criticism. One can discern that he is partially responsible for that, because of the ambiguity of his terminology in particular terms such as nature, experience, and growth. In many instances Dewey was obliged to transmute his technical terminology. On the opening page of his logic, he remarked:

'Pragmatism' does not, I think, occur in the text. Perhaps the word lends itself to misconception. At all events, so much misunderstanding and relatively futile controversy have gathered about the word that it seemed advisable to avoid its use.\(^{103}\)

On the other hand, it must be remembered that Dewey's philosophy emerged from Neo-Hegelianism. If we apply to him the pragmatic notion of continuity in terms of the importance of past experience to the present, we may understand the ambiguity which occurs occasionally in his thought.

**Central Conceptions of Pragmatism**

In the foregoing brief exposition of the development of pragmatism, we find that the movement started originally as a method of philosophic inquiry and/or for clearing ideas in philosophical disputes. In the hands of James it became also a theory of truth, in which James repudiated the idea of truths as given or eternal and established the instrumental character of truth. The truth of a thing depends on its workability in experience, which seems to deal with truth relations rather

\(^{103}\)Dewey, *Logic, the Theory of Inquiry*, pp. iii-iv.
than truth, that is, with the trueness of things. Dewey, however, made it a system of philosophy which is basically social. He took the workability of any idea as essential in determining validity, and he held that the true impact of philosophy manifests itself through the reconstruction of human experience.

The empirical, practical, and experimental character of the new philosophy called for new considerations regarding the critical problems of philosophy. In the next section an attempt will be made to outline the pragmatic explanation of some of these problems, particularly those which have some bearings on the problem of freedom. Such problems as knowledge and value, body and mind, and the meaning of experience are given principal consideration.

The defining emphasis of the pragmatic point of departure is the primacy of the practical; hence the importance of means, methods, and instrumentalities. "It brings," Mead says, "the process of thought, of knowledge, inside of conduct." Accentuation is placed on general consequences or rules, not on special interests or particular outcomes. In spite of James's attachment to nominalism and sensations, pragmatism is committed to belief in the objective existence and physical efficiency of habits, tendencies, and universals.

The pragmatist's key word is experience. For him experience is all-inclusive. Dewey holds that experience should include "something at least, as wide and deep and full as all history on the earth," and

104 G. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, p. 352.
"The whole wide universe of fact and dream, of event, act, desire, fancy and meanings valid or invalid can be set in contrast to nothing. And if what has been said is taken literally, 'experience' denotes just this wide universe." Kilpatrick gives three conceptions, which seem to make up the experimentalist outlook and show the importance of experience in the pragmatic doctrine: (1) Ideas mean only their consequences in experience. (2) Experience is essentially social in origin and predominantly social in purpose. (3) Our expectations in life can be determined by studying experimentally the uniformities within experience.

What, then, does experience mean? Dewey gives different expressions in this respect in which we can find two distinctive aspects; namely, experience as subject matter and experience as method. The general notion in these expressions, however, is that experience is not a stuff or a mental appearance of a different order of reality, but rather a relation of naturally conditioned events to an organism within a complex organized whole of natural objects. To put it differently, experience denotes the interaction of a living organism with his environment. Dewey says: "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creatures and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living."

107 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 35.
On another occasion he stated:

Experience becomes an affair primarily of doing. . . . The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence, the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. . . . This close connection of doing and suffering or undergoing forms what we call experience.\textsuperscript{108}

We find the same meaning in the statement that experience is "the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment natural and social."\textsuperscript{109}

To be on guard against misconceptions of the word interaction, Dewey used the word transaction. Interaction may precipitate in the mind a distinction between knower and known or mind and matter; thus the word transaction can save experience from any notion of dualism and keep to it its continuity. In this transaction the two meanings of experience as a subject matter and as a method are inherent. Experience, in the former sense, indicates an appearing character within an event. In the latter sense it requires that knowledge be concerned with that which appears. And knowledge should be the method by which one experience is made available in giving direction and meaning to another. Experience is regarded as a context and, whatever knowledge is acquired, must be acquired within this context. There is a difference, however,

\textsuperscript{108}Dewey, \textit{Reconstruction in Philosophy}, pp. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{109}Dewey, \textit{Creative Intelligence}, p. 36.
between an experience and the general and primitive flow of experience.

Dewey says:

Often times, however, the experience had is inchoate. Things are experienced but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience. In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. . . . It is an experience.\textsuperscript{110}

This fulfillment requires reflection and implies adaptation.

This point is well explained by Childs in these words:

. . . experience in its primary mode is an affair of doing and undergoing--of acting and trying out something and of suffering or enjoying the consequences of our acts and our trials. And these acts are never of the organism alone. They originate, they are sustained, and they terminate in relations of the living creature with environmental conditions. It is within the matrix of these organic-environmental adjustments or transactions that thinking originates.\textsuperscript{111}

There are two important implications that follow from this view of experience. First there is no need to assume a substantive mind that "seeks to know and to have intercourse with a world that is external and alien to its own function."\textsuperscript{112} Second that thinking process "as intelligence" is "the means of intentional reconstruction of experience" is inside conduct and not a mere self-consistent train of meanings remote from practice. The first point, the pragmatic theory of mind, is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{110}Dewey, \textit{Art as Experience}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{111}Childs, \textit{American Pragmatism and Education}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., p. 56.
Dewey attributes the new conception of experience and the place of reason in it to two factors. "The primary factor is the change that has taken place in the actual nature of experience, its contents and methods, as it is actually lived. The other is the development of a psychology based upon biology which makes possible a new scientific formulation of the nature of experience." 113

The belief in organic evolution exercises a profound influence on thought. Dewey said in this effect that "... the development of biology has been to reverse the picture. Where there is life, there is behavior, activity. ... In the interest of the maintenance of life there is transformation of some elements in the surrounding medium." 114

With this transformation, experience becomes a cumulative process of doing and undergoing and a matter of learning. Transformation implies adaptation, which is a basic category for Dewey. Hence there is no need for the supposition of a mind waiting for the external world to leave its imprints upon it through the gateway of the senses, a mind which, as the empiricists believe, is merely the place or support of ideas with no power to supply ideas. Pragmatism can accept only that sensations are "provocations, incitements, challenge to an act of inquiry which is to terminate in knowledge." 115

113 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 81.
114 Ibid., p. 82.
115 Ibid., p. 85.
Pragmatism holds that if the subject of experience is to be brought in line with modern biology and psychology, there is no basis for supposing a substantive mind; an "immaterial that capable of continued and independent existence and analyzable into qualities and a substratum which has relations and supports these qualities without itself being relation or quality or sum of qualities."\textsuperscript{116}

Pragmatism contends that in traditional dualism lies the real source of the present dilemma. As long as thinkers insist upon adhering to theories which maintain the separation of mind and matter, they will be unable to solve their most fundamental problems. When, however, this dualism is rejected, it is possible to become concerned only with the distinctions within experience and not with a hypothetical opposition between experience and a reality that lies beyond this experience.

Pragmatism precludes the dualism of mind and body by a positive analysis of man as a bio-cultural being. It regards mind as a function "when we take the standpoint of human action, of life in operation, body presents itself as the mechanism, the instrumentality of behavior and mind as it is function, its fruits and consummation,"\textsuperscript{117} The individual is a part and parcel of the course of events. "It becomes a mind in virtue of a distinctive way of partaking in the course of events. The significant distinction is no longer between the knower and the world, it is between different ways of being in and of the movement of things, between a brute physical way and a purposive-intelligent way."\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}C. W. Morris, \textit{Six Theories of Mind}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{118}Dewey, \textit{Creative Intelligence}, p. 59.
Mind is a function in a situation, the effect of which is the transformation or reconstruction of the experiential situation. Dewey defines mind in these words, "mind is a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they turned in joint or shared situation and mind in this sense is the method of social control." In terms of behavior Dewey defined mind as "the ability to anticipate future consequences and to respond to them as a stimulus to present behavior." In these definitions we see the practical view which is characteristic of pragmatism. Regarding mind as a function, pragmatism emphasizes intelligence, Dewey stated:

The net conclusion is that acting with an aim is all one with acting intelligently. To foresee a terminus of an act is to have a basis upon which to observe, to select, and to order objects and our own capacities. To do these things means to have a mind—for mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationship, is to have a plan for its accomplishment, ... it is to have a plan which takes account of resources and difficulties. Mind is the capacity to refer present conditions to future results and future consequences to present conditions.

Mind, then is not a substance, but a way of action. The emergence of mind proceeds in terms of social conditions wherein it gets its expression and import. In other words, pragmatism stresses the importance of the cultural ingredient. Mead said,

... if mind is socially viewed, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far as the social

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120 Dewey, Creative Intelligence, pp. 39-41.
121 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 120.
activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends, and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs.  

Mind "is essentially social phenomena; even its biological functions are primarily social." This social character is imbedded in the continuous interaction between the organism and his environment. In this interaction the organism behaves as a whole as well as an integral part of a still larger whole, the situation. It must be noted that this interaction is reciprocal; the organism and the environment undergo transformation together.

The character of this function, nevertheless, is the intelligent response to the meanings of things. In other words, mind (especially in the tradition of Dewey and Bode) corresponds to the process of thinking. Man is essentially experimental in character. He follows any promising lead that appears on the scene. When he cannot reach a satisfying solution through that lead, he starts to look for the solution somewhere else. It is this experimental inquiry which is called thinking. In other words, thinking is the instrument of restoring equilibrium in life. "Indeed living may be regarded as the continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The higher the organism the more serious become the disturbances and the more energetic (and often prolonged) are the efforts necessary for its reestablishment." This is another way of saying the individual lives in and is

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122 Mead, Mind-Self and Society, p. 223.
123 Ibid.
a part of an on-going environment. When the ongoing is blocked, there arises a problematic indeterminate situation which calls for thinking to settle doubt and fix belief by affecting a relative stability in experience. Thus thinking is mediate in nature and operation. And "the thought situation is only a constant movement toward defined equilibri-um," In such situations thinking acts upon what is immediately given. At the same time it is conditioned by certain structural organizations in the situation; that is, the process of thinking is guided in the direction of an outcome which the fact of natural structure must support. Thought cannot determine its choice, yet there is reciprocal influence between thought and the signs and data with which thought operates. This reciprocal influence extends, modifies, and tests meanings. Thinking differs from other organic behavior in that signs are its proper evocative and the drawing of consequences its peculiar function or reaction. Its ultimate end is, as intimated earlier, "intentional reconstruction of experience."

The process of thinking, upon analysis, breaks up into definite steps, the succession of which is adaptable in some instances of its exercise. At this point a brief statement about these steps may be needed. In a problematic situation a person formulates an hypothesis which, to repeat, is conditioned by the structure of things. He observes facts, makes inferences, traces out the implication of meanings. In this manner a person reaches a state where the nature of the problem

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is defined. To determine the problem is to force home a definite sense of what the difficulty is. In Dewey's words, it is "to clarify the disturbed and confused situation that reasonable ways of dealing with it, may be suggested."\textsuperscript{127} In proceeding from observational data to hypothetical assumptions the "if-then-logic" is needed. An hypothesis then must be tested with reference to its functional fitness.\textsuperscript{128} The process is completed when it has warranted assertion; that is, when no reasonable doubt may be entertained as to the validity of the hypotheses. Thayer said, "A warranted assertion is a statement or formulation of that plan and action which have brought inquiry to a close."\textsuperscript{129}

Viewing thought as a process loaded with consequences as they affect desires and purposes may enable us to see its relation to logic from the pragmatic point of approach. According to Dewey, logic is "an account of the procedure of thought."\textsuperscript{130} Logic, as purely formal, is not adequate to account for good thinking. In formal logic any logical conclusion is valid logically. Logical validity is not synonymous with actual validity. That is to say, it may be wrong or not true. According to formal logic "the forms of thought" are said to be antecedent to thinking itself, thus confining experience, so to speak,

\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., p. 119.  
\textsuperscript{129}H. S. Thayer, \textit{The Logic of Pragmatism}, p. 64.  
\textsuperscript{130}Dewey, \textit{Reconstruction in Philosophy}, p. 114.
to the syllogism. According to pragmatism, thinking—that is, experience at the reflective level—cannot be so confined. Logic is practical and empirical and as such is very important as a method of intelligent guidance in experience.

Pragmatism maintains that theories, any theory, may be evaluated in terms of the consequences flowing from such theories. In terms of thinking, the product of thinking is evaluated on the basis of its consequences. If thinking occurs in a disturbed situation, to reconstruct it and unify certain of its dissonant aspects, it seems unintelligible to judge the truth of it without reference to the specific purpose it (thinking) fulfills or subserves. The purpose, it must be remembered, is to be read from the characters of the objective situation in which the problem is set for solution, not from particular interest or personal motives. Here another important distinction between pragmatic criteria of good thinking and formal logic may be emphasized. In the former, thought or inquiry has a life, an end which it seeks to attain. This fact, instead of requiring, as in formal logic, an analysis of the forms of thought into syllogism, requires the understanding of the process of thinking as a flight from a state of tension and doubt through more or less organized guesses to a state of settled belief. The formal consistency of the idea is never sufficient to the pragmatist, although it may be necessary for the establishment of truth. What he insists upon is its denotative effects and the production of satisfying results.

The pragmatic theory of truth is based upon this satisfaction of an idea. To put it differently, the pragmatic criteria of truth are agreement and satisfaction. The idea that the true is the satisfactory
was subject to severe criticism even within the household of pragmatism. Dewey, nevertheless, answers the question of satisfaction saying, "But the satisfaction of question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problems out of which the idea, the purpose, and the method of action arises. It includes public and objective conditions. It is not to be manipulated by whim or personal idiosyncrasy."\textsuperscript{131}

Agreement from this point of view seems to mean successful functioning of the idea; that is the idea becomes a means in the preservation and redirection of the ongoing of experience. Reisner stated the pragmatic theory of truth in the following words:

In a more comprehensive sense, the instrumentalist insists that truth is a meaning which develops only in connection with the contact of a knower with the world of experience. Truth is the conventional designation for those awarenesses, those theoretical explanations, those practical trial judgments, which are sustained by the further events of experience.\textsuperscript{132}

The pragmatist's test of truth seems to imply that what is considered is truth relation rather than truth per se, or truth with a capital T. Truth is important in so far as it helps in the reconstruction of experience and the continuity of the life process. Dewey stated that, "truth is an experienced relation of characteristic quality of things and it has no meaning outside of such relation."\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131}Dewey, \textit{Reconstruction in Philosophy}, p. 129.


\textsuperscript{133}Dewey, "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," \textit{Mind N.S.}, XV (July, 1906), 305.
Verification and truth are two names for one thing. Verification is concerned mainly with the meaning we hold of existence. Meaning is constituted and tested by the effect or consequences an idea can bring about when put into operation. Hence knowledge is operational and experimental which is a flat denial of correspondence and of a priori reals. Dewey said: "Knowledge then does not encompass the world as a whole. But the fact that it is not co-existent with experienced existence is no defect or failure on its part. It is an expression of the fact that knowledge attends strictly to its own business."\(^{134}\)

This business is the "transformation of disturbed and unsettled situations into those more controlled and more significant."\(^{135}\)

Through this dialectic, pragmatism passes over to Bode, Kilpatrick and Otto. It created in them, however, a stir only where its implications seemed to impinge directly upon matters of public interest like education.

There is reason to believe that they being more of disciples added little in the way of fundamental thought, and at times some of its basic constructs lost plausibility through their extravagance. Kircher describes discipleship very aptly when he said:

Much good work is done by disciples and much necessary work but much evil ensues from the very deception that they are philosophers who have inherited the authority


\(^{135}\)Ibid.
that originally attached to an intellectual enterprise of great scope and integrity. They do not know how to wear the authority, for their power stems from their commitment, and their commitment denies them the privilege of fundamentally reconstructing the philosophic source of their authority.  

Bode and Kilpatrick are more educational theorists than systematic philosophers. They tried to make use of the concepts of Peirce, James, and Dewey in the field of education, leaning more towards the latter. After Dewey, they emphasized the need for reconstruction in the philosophical scene. They took their point of departure from the significance of philosophy to education and the role the latter can play in putting philosophical thought into operation. Believing that pragmatism is the philosophy of freedom, they tried to apply it to the educative process with the conviction that one compliments the other. Otto, another camp follower of pragmatism, so to speak, differs from the other two in that he adheres more to James. Yet, in the last analysis, and in spite of existing differences, there is profound agreement among the three men on basic ideas. To understand their position an attempt is made in the next chapter to present and analyze their central ideas and points of views.

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CHAPTER III

PRAGMATISM IN THE WRITINGS OF BODE, KILPATRICK, AND OTTO

One of the perennial problems of modern philosophy is well expressed by Reichenback:

The early period of empiricism in which an all around philosopher could dominate at the same time the fields of scientific method, of history, of philosophy, of education, and social philosophy has passed. We enter into a second phase in which highly technical investigations form the indispensable instrument of research, splitting the philosophical campus into specialists of various branches. We should not regret this unavoidable specialization which repeats on philosophic grounds a phenomena well known from all other fields of scientific inquiry.*

Although there are many discussions of the significance and place of philosophy in modern education, there are apparently no summary statements based upon research findings to indicate what are the primary emphasis in this field. This observation is exemplified in the writings of our three philosophers. In Bode's thought, for one, the relation between education and philosophy is reciprocal. Hullfish remarked that when Bode joined the Ohio State University "... for the purpose of turning philosophical thought upon educational practice, he conceived that in the interaction of education and philosophy each would benefit, one by a better sense of direction, the other, by grounding its

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generalizations in the ongoing experience of those who learn."^2
Kilpatrick, for another, makes the whole range of education and educational theory the focus of his study. While Otto looks at education as one among other fields where philosophy can work without giving the educational process special interest. This difference on points of emphasis affects their approach to the problem of freedom. Therefore, to understand their ideas about freedom it is advisable to have an overview of their general outlook and then a discussion of a concept of freedom based upon their general theories.

Boyd Henry Bode

In an attempt to knit together different aspects of the movement called pragmatism, we have attempted to show that it was formulated by Peirce, popularized through James, and developed into a system of philosophy by Dewey. Of the three, Dewey was the most influential on Bode's thought.

Boyd Henry Bode, a former student of Craighton, a pronounced idealist, escaped the absolute clutch of idealism to probe deeper into its assumptions and reach his own conclusions. The impact of science and the skeptic attitude is brought to metaphysics, together with the influential writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey contributed to the change in Bode's position. He was not a mere echo, however. It is a

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^2Gordon H. Hullfish, Philosophy and Education in Interaction, p. 3.
surprising fact that a subjective element never escapes the interpreter's mind. He who reads a philosophy, a thought, a point of view, sees in it something of himself. A genuinely creative mind inevitably modifies what it assimilates. This was the case with Bode. His intellectual journey was arduous and on his own. His deep, profound insight did not let anything pass without evaluation and scrutiny. He described this intellectual experience in a letter to Child, saying:

My home training was fundamentalist and that involved all kind of collisions. What I did not see was that our cultural patterns had both a supernatural and a naturalistic source... Educationally speaking, what ails the modern man is, I think, the fact that his cultural heritage is a mess of which he is unaware. That is what ailed me, and I think I am in this respect fairly representative. I got myself straightened out pretty well—I think so anyway—because I had extraordinary advantages. One was a light teaching schedule in high-grade universities. Another was that I could take years and years to reconstruct myself which is an unbelievably slow process when a person does it on his own.3

This personal experience led to two important convictions in Bode's thought. On one hand he was convinced that man must maintain a functioning unity within his culture, for it is in this man-made environment that he grows, lives, and prospers. On the other hand, he was convinced that education is the most effective force in culture, and it must make the theme and nature of its program the study of the cleavage within the culture. This cleavage, Bode believed, is between two contrasting outlooks: the traditional outlook concerning life and man, and the scientific

3John L. Childs, Teachers College Record, LV (October, 1953), 4.
approach to nature. He believed that in such a conflict the educational problems come into focus. The proper function of education is to make provision for the continuous remaking of basic beliefs and attitudes in terms of their social consequences. Conflicting ideologies should be set into sharp contrast in order to prepare intelligence to function within a social perspective.

Unless this contrast is clearly seen, intelligence is frustrated, and our loyalties either operate blindly, or they become paralyzed. It is not the business of education to lay down the pattern for a new synthesis, but it is emphatically its business to create the insight that a new synthesis is needed and to provide favorable conditions for a critical and independent reconstruction of these conflicting beliefs or dispositions into a unified outlook or attitude.4

Bode appealed to professional philosophers to return to human problems which have been lost sight of in the traditional quest for certainty. He himself was not content to permit his philosophy to become merely a metaphysic in which his major theories could come to rest. He constantly endeavored to construct a consistent yet plastic program which would be responsive to the discovery of new data and meet the demands for changing conditions. He regarded with utmost suspicion and meticulously rejected a priori postulates. Instead he regarded it the function of philosophy to employ intelligently the findings as well as the method of modern science in the area of human experience.

On one occasion he commented on the method of science and that of philosophy, saying:

In science we find a steady progress from generation to generation; facts are not accepted as facts until they have been rigorously tested and verified. . . . In philosophy. . . we have only a series of individual attempts, each of which begins by overthrowing the conclusions of its predecessors. The same problem recurs again and again, and the outstanding feature of the whole industry is the disagreement of the experts. There is considerable motion but no progress.5

Bode, to be sure, did not intend philosophy to use methods of measuring and weighing nor to employ test tubes and laboratories. What Bode emphasized was scientific thinking and critical inquiry. In philosophy assumptions are to be scrutinized in the light of available facts and alternate assumptions.6

In accord with James and Dewey, Bode believed in the need for drastic reconstruction in philosophy. His quarrel with academic philosophy, particularly idealism, was that it retained a dualism between a knower and a known and between a sensible reality and supersensuous immutable reality. This separation between man and nature, Bode felt, must break down under the impact of the scientific method and democratic ideals. As he phrased it,

When a system of philosophy loses contact with life and becomes absorbed in a set of purely professional problems there is ground for the suspicion in that it no longer serves the needs which called it into being. To keep an


6For more details, see "Where does one go for fundamental assumptions in education?" Educational Administration and Supervision, XIV (September, 1928), 366 ff.
eye on social situations in which a problem has its origin, to bear in mind that it is the function of philosophy to recognize the conflicting interests in life, is indispensable if philosophy is to protect itself against the danger of losing itself in problems that are the product of historic accident.\footnote{Bode, "Why Do Philosophical Problems Persist?" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, XV (March 28, 1918), 177.}

Instead, "philosophy is under obligation to furnish an insight into the relation of the individual to his world which will be of service in the attainment of specific ends and means. A philosophy that ignores the needs and demands for better adaptation of our human life, here and now, forfeits its claim to consideration."\footnote{Bode, "Ernest Mach and the New Empiricism," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method, XIII (May 25, 1916), 289-290.}

Philosophy, according to Bode, must address itself to the cleavages in our culture. His main emphasis was that education is the answer to this problem. He indicated that a theory of education at its best is a philosophical theory. In Dewey's words, Bode "felt that philosophy as an end in itself was too remote from human life to commend his \footnote{Dewey, "Boyd H. Bode: An Appreciation," Teachers College Record, XLIX (January, 1948), 166.} full energy and regard, he felt that education was the focal and strategic field in which the truths in the possession of philosophy could come to life in human affairs. . . . Boyd Bode has always seen both philosophy and education as expressions of human life, in terms of their joint opportunity and responsibility for contributing to the advancement of that life."\footnote{Dewey, "Boyd H. Bode: An Appreciation," Teachers College Record, XLIX (January, 1948), 166.} With this emphasis on the relation between philosophy and education and on considering scientific findings in dealing with the problems of philosophy, he constructed his system.
The central theme in Bode's thought, however, is continuity, which is based in the last analysis on accepting the organic revolution seriously. He accepted without discount the scientific method on which his faith in progress rested. He recognized that all conclusions are corrigible and should be open to scrutiny, a view which is in firm opposition to absolutism. In his call for reorientation and reconstruction of our thinking, he emphasized the release of intelligence. The free use of intelligence will help the individual to reconstruct his pattern or say his way of life. Two main views in Bode's thought are worth further consideration: first, for their importance in his system and second, for their bearings on the problem of freedom. These two are his theory of mind and his conception of democracy.

Childs pointed out:

From the standpoint of the development of the pragmatic theory and practice of education two of his contributions are outstanding. One of these is his creative and suggestive analysis of the implications of the functional theory of mind for the conduct of education. He was convinced that a conception of mind is implicit in every educational program, and he believed that one of the best ways to help teachers grasp the nature of the cleavage in contemporary civilization would be to introduce them to the contrasting conceptions of mind associated with these divergent cultural patterns.¹⁰

The second in Child's account is also related to the cultural cleavage; that is, a conception of democracy as a way of life as opposed to any authoritarianism or absolutism.

The justification for his concern about the problem of mind is that it connotes more than academic interest. What we choose to think about the mind is related to our whole philosophy of life, particularly of our theory of knowledge, of how we think and learn and of our values. It also constitutes a basic problem in educational theory, as it influences all subsequent educational outlook and practices. Hence it becomes all-important to the educator whether "the learning process centers in habit-formation, or in the cultivation of 'insight,' or the untrammeled development of original tendencies." The solution of the problem of mind can be looked for in the domain of two fields, namely, psychology and philosophy. The nature of the problem, however, renders it difficult to depend exclusively on one rather than the other. It is true that the appeal to experimentation has resulted in the development of a body of facts which have encouraged the promulgation of theories, yet it is just as true that the data obtained have not demonstrated the exact nature of some fundamental problems. These problems being primarily concerned with criticism of basic assumption required philosophic approach as an attempt to understand the nature of mind.

The history of thought has registered different attempts to explain the nature of mind, but most of these took the dualistic assumption as a starting point. The beginning of this century was marked by a strong rejection of dualism between mind and body. In psychology the

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school of behaviorism rejected the mind-body problem and identified consciousness with a form of behavior. Regardless of the fact that it was an advance beyond the former major theories and depended on science, it still failed to take into account mind, purpose, and intelligence. It can be said that it simply substituted traditional matter for traditional mind.

The fundamental position of behaviorism was based upon the assumption that all human behavior could be explained in terms of physical reaction. The neural processes become the basis of all learning. The concept of "conditioning" or "conditioned reflex" suggests the way in which learning takes place. Hence, habit formation becomes the chief goal. This theory implies that the role of education in general and the teacher in particular is not more than the push-button, once the pupil responses have been built. Learning is reacting to situation and is present in the strengthening and weakening of S-R connection. Bode believed that this S-R bond psychology does not give adequate place to conscious choice and intelligent behavior. To leave this out is to leave the essential and distinctive human aspect out of psychology. "In other words, we find no recognition of mind or purpose or intelligence as a distinctive mode of behavior."^{13}

Although Bode agrees with behaviorism in denying the theory of substantive mind or any dualism between body and mind, he strongly

^{13}Ibid., p. 173.
rejects its mechanistic outlook. He looks upon mind as a function. One may say that the behaviorist regards mind as a function, but there is a world of difference between the function of behaviorism, which is a mode of performance, "a mechanical function" and that of pragmatism, "the intelligent function."

Bode regards mind as the way the organism deals with its environment. In Child's phrasing, "As against the physiological reductionist he [Bode] has held that mind is not a substance or entity, but a kind of purposeful functioning in the environment through which means are consciously used for the attainment of anticipated outcome." Bode defines mind in these words: "The term mind is a name not for a substance, or mental state but for a function of the environment."

On the sub-human level behavior is almost universally explained in terms of spontaneous activity and simple habit formation growing out of successive adaptation to changing situations. While this adaptive behavior is essentially mechanical, man is involved in the adjustment of conditions not simply in adjustment to them. On the human level behavior takes place in terms of ideas and purposes which is much higher than mechanical habit. In this view consciousness becomes nothing more than the future operating in the present. To put it

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15 Bode, How We Learn, p. 224.
differently, it is an organization of behavior with regard to future consequences.

The environment provides a new stimulus by undergoing a certain kind of change, i.e., by exercising a peculiar function of control. The control is seeing, and the whole mystery of consciousness is just this rendering of future stimulations or results into terms of present existence. Consciousness, accordingly, is a name for a certain change that takes place in the stimulus; or, more specifically, it is a name for the control of conduct by future results or consequences.¹⁶

This applies to perception as well as judgment, "to every form of quality and relation."¹⁷ When consciousness is no longer perceived as a thing but a mode of behavior, its characterizing trait is the relationship of the present to the response of the next moment. In Bode's reinterpretation of the psychological distinction of "focus and margin," there is a correspondence between his account of consciousness and Dewey's account of judgment. According to Dewey, what judgment terminates in is a thing known and not knowing. According to Bode, what is at the focus is a thing in the physical world, a thing perceived, and not consciousness. Consciousness is the "margin" where control is in the making, where the stimulus is changing. The moral of what has been said thus far is that all experience becomes a kind of intelligent behavior with reference to future adjustment.

The relatively unorganized responses of the present moment, in becoming reflected in the experienced object, reveal their outcome or meaning before they become overt.

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¹⁷Ibid., p. 244.
and thus provide the conditions of intelligent action. In other words, future consequences become transformed into a stimulus for further behavior.  

The explanation of purposive behavior requires a peculiar relationship between stimulus and response. Bode argues that a stimulus arises because there is already a response going on. This fact insures a continuity of activity, since the stimulus provides for its own progressive development. The peculiarity of "purposive behavior" lies, then, in the progressive making over of the stimulus.

Purposive behavior requires a sort of continuity that gives to the successive acts the status of means to an end. Consequently the final act must somehow be foreshadowed in the beginning, the whole series must be a progressive coordination of activities and not just a sequence. This continuity is provided by the introduction of a changing stimulus, i.e., a stimulus which leads to a successful conclusion by securing its own progressive transformation.  

The importance of purposiveness does not preclude the part played by habit in human behavior. Habit is the tool of intelligence. As long as habits remain flexible enough to meet the exigencies of changing circumstances, they will abet and not hinder intelligent behavior. The flexibility of habit implies thinking, which seems to coincide with what Peirce termed habit change. Thinking in its analytic and synthetic aspects emerges when we face new situations for which our established habits prove inadequate. Thinking is a matter of "finding and testing meanings" for the construction of new and more adequate habits in such a manner that they are formed into wider systems of response

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18 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
and finally into the order of concepts adaptable to a wide variety of situations.

In considering the problem of mind from Bode's standpoint, it becomes apparent that "meanings" play an important role in intelligent behavior. Bode's concept of meaning includes two fundamental types. On one hand "meaning" applies to the change that has been made in experience as a result of previous observation or reflection; i.e., a child burnt by matches sees them thereafter in a different light. In this sense meaning has an immediate quality.

On the other hand, a thing acquires meaning when it points to something else. In this instance there is a process of inference, for the thing pointed to is said to be the meaning of the thing that does the pointing. In this sense meaning becomes a distinctive feature of human experience by developing into concepts. Concepts, in turn, become tools for remaking the experienced situations, that is to say, tools for intelligent behavior.

Meaning is always a prospective matter, a leading, which gets made and established, originally at least, in the active process of choice and discovery when the originally presented responses to the given situation are incompatible courses of action. "The process of organization is as much a process of securing a stimulus" (i.e., meaning), "as it is a process of securing a response"\(^{21}\) (i.e., agreement).

\(^{21}\)Bode, "The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin," Philosophical Review, XXIII (July, 1914), 403.
In this view meaning is accounted for without appeal to a "substantive mind" or "mental states."

In this connection we may touch upon another concept with a long history, namely, transfer of training. Once the nature of "concepts" is understood in this manner transfer of training becomes a matter quite different from mere mechanical transmission. Its meaning lies in the appreciation of the significance of the concept, for it will be recognized that the concept represents a wide range of possible behavior in concentrated form; it epitomizes for immediate use the past and the future. The pretension of the concept may be said to set the limits for the operation of "transfer," which means that the problem of transfer is a matter of how concepts may be enriched. Henceforth transfer becomes a conscious activity synonymous with intelligent behavior. "For education theory the real problem is how intelligence can be made more effective, and the answer to the problem lies in determining the right development of concepts." 22

This functional theory of mind and the rejection of traditional dualism makes concepts operational. It precludes the authority of absolutism and gives experience its due status in life, whose most distinctive problem is that of the transference of the future into the present, namely, "reconstruction of experience," or intelligent behavior.

22Bode, "What is Transfer of Training?" School and Society, IX (January, 1919), 44.
The study of behavior constitutes a mode of approach that holds out the hope of deliverance from questions that should never have been asked. We are on a different and, let us hope, a higher level when we cease to ask how consciousness can lay hold of passive objects, or how knowledge überhaupt is possible, and concern ourselves rather with the wondrous activity whereby this plastic dance of circumstance that we call the universe transcends the domain of mechanism and embodies itself in the values of conscious life.22

In this concept of mind knowledge and truth become functions in the control of experience. All knowledge is postulational in character; hence there is one road to truth. Truth is dependent on experience; that is, there is no absolute or eternal truth. Bode regards as more important the method of pursuing truth: "... the sciences are pointing to a theory of truth which is divorced from those ghostly absolutes of the past."24 In Bode's opinion,

It maintains that man's future is in his hands; that social and ethical and aesthetic principles are neither handed to him ready-made nor so embodied in the structure of things that he need but look in order to discover them. He must create and recreate them for himself, in the course of social history, out of the raw material of experience. . . .25

Truth, according to Bode's view, as indeed in the domain of scientific inquiry, is never final. When truth is regarded as immutable and final, it ceases to be a means of acting intelligently and becomes instead

25Ibid., p. 35.
a means to justify any kind of conduct. Furthermore, truth as goodness and beauty have a unique social function—that of enhancing everyday life.

... truth does not consist in conformity to a hypothetical absolute system, but is a name for control over experience, in terms of expectation or predictability. It is never final, but varies with growth in knowledge as measured by increase in dependability. In parallel fashion standards for conduct are judged in terms of their contribution to the enrichment of life and standards of beauty are determined by the effectiveness of artistic products for the enhancement of appreciation. In every case standards are relative to time and place and circumstance.  

With this dialect Bode attacks the problem of democracy. For him democracy is not a form of political organization but a way of life which cuts across the whole mass of traditional standards and habits of thinking. It is an ideal to be struggled for.

It calls for a reconstruction of beliefs and standards in every major field of human interest and thus takes on the universality of philosophy and of religion, which is to say that it becomes a generalized or inclusive way of life.  

Bode believed that if democracy has any one general meaning it is faith in the possibilities and potentialities of the common man. The term "common man," however, does not designate a biological concept in this view, but a cultural one. Thus the supreme task of democracy is to release human energies and to direct them intelligently to the end.

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27 Bode, Democracy As a Way of Life, p. 51.
that all cultural ingredients are cooperatively guided toward the building of common concern. The recognition of the common man does not mean mere extension of privilege but the right of the individual to grow up to the full stature of his being. Says Bode, "It is the right of the common man to share in common interests and, moreover, it is his right to share without having some outside authority define for him what these common interests are to be."\(^{28}\) He is "entitled to have a share in deciding how the area of common interests is to grow."\(^{29}\) The common man, nevertheless, has his responsibility of observing that "his activities must be of such a kind as to make for the continuous widening of the area of common interests and concerns."\(^{30}\) This is a safeguard against "rugged individualism" and at the same time, according to Bode, "is the only road leading to the maximum development of the individual."\(^{31}\) The statement "the only road" may raise the suspicion that what is involved here is another form of authoritarianism. But Bode warns us that it is not an authoritative command, "but an invitation to the individual to grow up to the full stature of his being."\(^{32}\)

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\(^{29}\)Ibid.

\(^{30}\)Ibid.

\(^{31}\)Ibid.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 111.
For him to be democratic is to seek "maximum development for the individual through the cultivation of a common life and to make the continuous extension of common interests our final test of what is right and wrong or what is called progress."  

He advised that this "continuous extension of common interests" be in terms of a "pattern" or scheme of values or an inclusive philosophy of some kind. These patterns, Bode emphasized, require continuous revision if we are to be democratic. This revision must be based on the exercise of intelligence. "The faith in the power of intelligence to create new standards and ideals in terms of human values and in accordance with changing conditions entitles it to consideration as expressive of the spirit of democracy."  

The moral of all this is that this concept of democracy is a challenge not only to what has gone before but to what exists at the present time. This means that existing traditions and values should be reexamined and reinterpreted in the interest of better control over and enrichment of experience, in a word, of better living. This reconstructive process is to be based upon cooperative effort rather than upon any program worked out by established authority. In consequence, it would not be possible to construct an arbitrary social criterion or a predetermined schedule of social change, for the maximum intellectual and spiritual development of the common man would, at all times, be the

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34Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 66.

central point of reference. Any social organization or institution that claims to be democratic must embrace the viewpoint that the standards which govern its direction are not absolute or rigidly fixed but are subject to change in the light of evolving conditions and in accordance with new scientific discoveries; that is, takes its clue from the doctrine of operational concepts which is a denial to absolutism. To bring this section to a close we quote from Bode.

Our clue to democracy lies in its quarrel with absolutes. Democracy stands for the common man and for the application of 'operational' procedures in the construction of ideals or purposes, as well as in the determination of means for achieving predetermined goals. The great obstacle to democracy down to the present day is the platonic philosophizing which left purposes or value out of the realm of everyday living and places them where 'operational' procedures cannot reach them.

William Heard Kilpatrick

William H. Kilpatrick is one of the outstanding leaders in American education today. He is frequently referred to as the "Dean of American Teachers" in recognition of his outstanding work as a teacher and in token of his influence upon the teaching profession of America. Kilpatrick makes the whole range of educational theory the focus of his study. This interest in educational theory started as early as his

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37 Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 112.
first job as a teacher of algebra and geometry in a combined elementary
and high school at Blakely, Georgia. Childs remarks:

From the standpoint of the development of Kilpatrick's
educational point of view, three events which occurred
during his four years as classroom teacher and school
administrator are noteworthy. They show that he early
achieved an interest in the welfare of the whole child,
that he was interested in all the learnings—moral as
well as intellectual—that resulted from his teaching
and that education for the development of character
carly became one of his primary concerns. 38

His years at John Hopkins with its influential atmosphere which
can be traced in many other eminent thinkers, strengthened his view about
education in its different aspects.

It is of interest to indicate that Kilpatrick's home background
is very similar to that of Bode. His Orthodox Baptist father wanted
him to be a minister. Moreover, it seems, from the writing of Tennen-
baum 39 that the whole atmosphere around him was traditional in the strict
sense. Kilpatrick, though, felt aloof and distant from his milieu, yet
showed his respect to other's beliefs. This is how he put it. "I
observed all the regulations that people laid out; there's no doubt about
that." 40 He read widely his father's religious books, and joined the
church as early as fifteen years of age, but in the course of time his
religious outlook differed radically from his father's.

His early pursuasion was mathematics, which did not impress him
as much as the development of the young souls he taught in his early

38Childs, American Pragmatism and Education, p. 182.
39Samuel Tennenbaum, William Heard Kilpatrick, Trail-blazer in
Education.
40Quoted by S. Tennenbaum, op. cit., p. 5.
years. Hence he discarded it as a career to take education as his first concern and make its cause his life career.

Kilpatrick's alliance to the pragmatic school seems to be largely the result of two factors, his work in educational psychology with its new experimental outlook and his knowledge of the logic of experimental inquiry. His early writings show a combined influence of both Dewey and Thorndike, which subjected him to the criticism of both his opponent as well as exponents. His famous book, *Foundations of Method*, is based on Thorndike's psychology and at the same time subscribes to the philosophy of Dewey. In his opening chapter of the above-mentioned book he sets up two conceptions of the term, method, a narrower, that is, direct, intentional, or primary learning and a wider, that is, associate or concomitant learning. One can entertain the notion that his "narrower" view is more or less a matter of fixing a given response to a particular stimulus, which apparently is based on Thorndikian psychology. The "wider" method which is one of "How to treat the learning child, seeing that he is willy-nilly learning not one but many things all at once" seems to involve everything concerning the educational situation. It includes such matters as how to manage the children, the teacher, the subject-matter, etc. So conceived, it apparently entails a conflict of values, which is a philosophical problem, and Kilpatrick, seemingly unaware of the inconsistency, bases it on Dewey's philosophy. Kilpatrick, however, attempted to harmonize

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the two views. In order to follow Thorndike, he subscribes to method as a means of teaching subject-matter which does not agree with what Dewey says: namely, "Method means that arrangement of subject-matter which makes it most effective in use. Never is method something outside of the material." To line up with Dewey, Kilpatrick apparently introduced his wider view.

In writing his Foundations of Method, it seems that he tried first to lay the fundamental psychology and then to develop a philosophy of education that lines up with this psychology. Unfortunately, he set up at first a strict S-R bond psychology and then proceeded, as though there were no conflict involved, to transcend the mechanical S-R basis by injecting concomitant learning, which he described in these words: "The concomitant is, typically, of slower growth, requiring perhaps many successive experiences to fix it permanently in one character." That Dewey's philosophy and psychology is quite in disagreement with the S-R bond theory of Thorndike is too well known to require elaboration at this point. It is worth mentioning, however, that the organism for Thorndike is fundamentally passive, awaiting stimulation from without, whereas, Dewey based his philosophy of education upon the dynamic conception of the organism which is an ongoing concern. That Kilpatrick failed to see the incompatibility of the two views is demonstrated in the following quotation:

Children when awake are inevitably and incessantly active. They will set up ends. They will strive to attain these ends. To do merely nothing is impossible

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42 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 194.
43 Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 103.
with them. To keep children from activity, to make them do nothing, is a foregone failure and is, moreover, irritating to them in the degree that it succeeds. We start then not with a child waiting to be aroused, but with one incessantly active. Only a child already spoiled or already starved into inaction wants to be amused. It is opportunity they crave, opportunity to receive stimulation and opportunity, then, to respond. 44

It is evident here that there is a shift from Dewey to Thorndike. From the organism who "sets ends and strives to attain these ends" to the organism who "craves opportunity to receive stimulus and 'then' respond." This psychology of S-R bond, as indicated earlier, is rejected by Bode, who is more consistent in following Dewey's position. For Bode the S-R bond is a simple transformation for the old mind-body dualism which haunted philosophy for centuries. As pointed out earlier, he regards stimulus and response as integral parts of a large whole. In his words:

Mechanism separates stimulus from response by making the stimulus come first, to be followed by the response in a temporal sequence. . . . According to the present point of view, stimulus and response mark a distinction within a larger co-ordination or 'field.' The entire field operates as a writ, and so stimulus and response cannot be separated from each other temporally. But they can be contrasted in terms of functions. 45

In the course of time it seems that Kilpatrick felt the inconsistency in his position and started to lean more and more on Dewey's side. For example, in 1931 he said, "This 'mechanistic' response to a recurring element in the experience taken as the sole unit of

44 Ibid., p. 150.

45 Bode, How we Learn, p. 230.
description and explanation seems the inadequate basis of such current psychology, referring here to the S-R bond. The more striking is a statement in his foreword to Childs' book:

Critical also is the study on opposition and attack. In active opposition, various positions are examined which this philosophy would correct, . . . the tendency toward an atomistic psychology, a too narrow S-R bond theory, "conditioning" as the unit element in learning.

In fact one can say that Kilpatrick, in his later writing and teaching tried to avoid Thorndike's psychology and limit himself to some points in the latter's theory of learning, and aligned himself completely to the pragmatic school. Thus the following discussion will be based mostly on his later writings.

Becoming more interested in philosophy of education he proposes some situations, which, when they operate, help education to attain a better position than otherwise it would. These are (1) criticizing the assumptions used by educators; (2) clarifying educational aims; and (3) evaluating critically the various educational methods as they bear on the selected aims. At any rate he looks upon the function of philosophy as essentially that of criticism: "... philosophizing is the critical turning of thought back upon the life process."

From his point of view philosophy of education is to criticize various

47 Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.
49 Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 15.
practices and their underlying assumption so as to render them intelligible as far as possible.

The responsibility of education as he conceives it, is to take in charge the actual world of experience in which children and adults live together. The reconstruction of experience and education are almost the same. If we cannot help educating ourselves according to a defensible conception of what the good life is, we cannot help reconstructing experience toward progress and development. In other language, an adequate educational program must be concerned with helping children grow and develop their latent potentials from their state of initial dependence into full participation in the richest available group life. It has to help them to be able to share fully in the active management of common interests in group affairs. This does not mean that any program would limit itself to the existing status quo, but it should help in improving the group culture and bring progressive change into the life of the people.

For Kilpatrick the word "experience" simply states the content of the process of living. Any human knowing stems from experience. In his words:

Any human knowing of whatever degree or kind, must go on within human experience. Whoever asks any question about knowing asks it out of his own experience as this has gone forward within the social setting of his group. The noun experience as here used is to be taken as the inner object of the verb to live (as a human). . . the noun experience simply states, possibly more explicitly, the content of the process of human living.  

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The constituents of any experience, however, appear to be a fusion, so to speak, of three elements: organism, community, and physical environment. The three elements, to be sure, are not regarded as separate entities but as parts of a larger whole. The experience of the organism, therefore, is not a special affair or external condition imposed upon him, but it is intrinsically transactional in nature. It follows from this that "the true unit of study is the organism-in-active-interaction-with-the-environment." Things with which an individual apparently interacts in the process of experiencing belong to a situation. "The process of experiencing, since it is a process of living, implies organism and environment—often better stated for us here as person and situation." The substitution of the word "situation" for "environment" can be accounted for by the fact that, according to Kilpatrick, not everything that surrounds a person is a part of his environment. Only the things with which the individual may interact constitute his potential environment, while his actual environment involves those things with which he does interact.

Any experience has a carry-over to a subsequent experience. This is true in the life of the individual as well as in the group life. That "... man alone is in any full sense self-conscious" accounts

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53Ibid.
for this carry-over of experience. The self as empirically conceived is the enduring effect of this continuous interaction. It is constantly in the making, reconstructed again and again from those events consisting in experience. As far as the environment consists of social as well as physical elements, then, according to Kilpatrick, "The formation of selfhood goes forward only by increasingly shared communicative living within a social group in which the older members have already achieved a more adequate self-hood." The social character of experience is, therefore, significant and, more than that, it is essential for making experience educative. In social relationships the individual emerges, develops, and dies. In this process he, by virtue, shares, directly and indirectly, the social life of the group. The accumulation of the group culture plays a significant part in molding of the growing mind. It is through culture that he becomes aware of others as well as himself. Others are always involved in his feelings, thinking, imagination so that any separation between the individual and the society seems suicidal. "The resulting characteristic of selfhood is a being able to think of itself in terms of what he knows of others and to think of others in terms of what he knows of himself." This knowing comes through language, which is, in effect, the symbolizing of events or experiences; i.e., it substitutes words for meanings inherent in situations. Through describing in words the observed happenings, man accumulated a wealth of acquired knowledge.

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
Kilpatrick maintains that the Greeks were the first to self-criticize their accumulated knowledge through their cultural contacts. He observed that, "It was in and through this consciously critical process that personal individuality in its fuller sense was first conceived and the self-criticism of the culture by the culture itself achieved." This self-criticism of the culture produces a dynamic vigor and releases the culture from dead closure. It is responsible for the development of the scientific method and the reliance on tested thought. Kilpatrick believes that the only access to knowledge is the experimental approach.

"The experimental method furnishes an ever increasing amount of ever more usable knowledge. No alternative plan or proposal is, in comparison, worthy of consideration." Every type of knowledge should be held tentatively and experimentally. It should be tested objectively and scientifically. "Critical experience is the final test of all things—experience criticized on its bearing on other experience. From this point of view, knowledge and 'principles' are hypotheses for guiding experience." Although Kilpatrick is giving the scientific method a sort of finality, yet the knowledge obtained through it is never final but always open to possible scrutiny. Any knowledge is to be tested by its consequences in action.

Analogous to this is his theory of meaning, which is influenced by Peirce: "... any term shall mean its consequences in experience." In other words, he believes in the operational character of terms which, for him, limits inquiry and knowledge to the actual ongoing experience. He indicates:

On this basis terms attain validity according as they indicate observable distinctions within experience, distinctions on which other phases of experience seems to turn, such distinctions, of course, as different competent observers can verify and accept in the same sense. Relations thus are relations observed within experience. Propositions are propositions asserting relationships observable within experience.

Kilpatrick puts his faith in human experience to develop from within its process, its own meanings, values, and standards. Thus truth is evolved as men live and have experience in a "universe with the lid off." The universe, for Kilpatrick, is an ever developing one. There is not fixity nor predetermination of happenings. As long as man uses his intelligence and reconstructs his experience there will be no limit to change and to growth and to the universe's becoming better. Education has a specific function in meeting the demands of a changing world which can be summarized in teaching the pupils how to act intelligently and think reflectively.

Kilpatrick emphasizes the notion of purposeful behavior. "All organisms," he declares, "are goal-seeking," but with man the process

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59 Kilpatrick, "Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook," *op. cit.*, p. 44.
of "goal-seeking" becomes a conscious striving for better life; that is, it becomes transformed into a deliberate purposeful act. This is to say human actions are guided by an end-in-view. In all his experiences the organism is faced with something that stirs him to action. This something Patrick describes as felt need, a want or purpose. This purpose pushes the individual to work, to "activity" or "effort," as he calls it. When the work is successful and functional equilibrium is brought into experience, then there is what he terms "satisfaction."

Man as a "self conscious being" can set his goals and deliberately try to attain them. Setting goals presupposes choosing. Choosing underlies values. In Kilpatrick's phrasing, "... human values come out of human choices, choices that build character at the same time that they assign values." In choosing, man rates some experience as better than other in terms of satisfying his wants. This satisfaction gives the first approximation of the good life. A want when "critically evaluated and found worthy of choice" becomes a value.

The choice of values is a moral issue. It is a matter of what to do in facing a situation when a conflict of values arises. Kilpatrick points out that "The moral problem of finding within the situation that holds the conflict a course of action which promises the greatest net of the resulting good life to all concerned."

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62 Ibid., p. 53.
63 Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 15.
64 Kilpatrick, "Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook," op. cit., p. 49.
The moral problem is essentially social; that is, so far as there are human relationships there is a moral problem. Generally speaking, morality in its negative sense means that the individual interest or good cannot be allowed to jeopardize the good of others. In other words, any individual act is judged as moral or otherwise by its consequences in the life of the group. In its positive sense, however, it is far more than mere recognition of others' rights or interests. It is to help others to promote and maintain good life: "... each person is under moral obligation so to act as negatively, not to hurt the good life of others and positively, to foster the good life for all."\(^{65}\)

To say this is to beg the question. What is a good life, and what are our means and criteria for judging any life as good or bad?

Kilpatrick regards morality as basic for any good life. In its broadest sense, a good life is "the life good to live."\(^{66}\) "The word good," he says, "means the consummatory good, good to the consumer for its intended purpose."\(^{67}\) A good life, in this respect, is the life that satisfies the various demands of actual living. He puts a tentative list of what he thinks to constitute the good life. Included in this list are physical health and mental wholeness, i.e., a well-adjusted personality. The latter implies satisfying relationships with others; thus he regards human relations as essential ingredients of

\(^{65}\)Ibid., p. 54.

\(^{66}\)Ibid., p. 47.

\(^{67}\)Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 147.
the good life. What he means by good human relations is expressed in these words: "We mean by good human relations exactly those ways of mutual human behavior which by common consent are recognized as essential to promoting and safeguarding the desired quality of human living."68

Another item in the list is the chance to choose as a responsible self, which seems to mean, as his discussion goes, freedom of choice. He believes that meaningful work, which he describes as "Purposeful activity with which one does identify himself,"69 gives life a full meaning. A meaningful work entails creativity. Kilpatrick describes the act of distinction as one type of creation. The good life should involve the chance to create, i.e., conditions conducive to creative activity. The list includes the principle of "leading-on," which seems to correspond to the concept of growth in Dewey's thought. A "leading-on" that opens new vistas and new possibilities in richness of life so as to promise increasing good life to all. Consequently a wide range of interests adds to the effectiveness of the good life. Any good life, however, must involve the aesthetic side of human experience, such as art and music together with religion, which he conceives as "a unifying of one's self and one's life on the basis of some supreme and inclusive outlook and consequent program of action."70

70Ibid., p. 157.
Taking collectively these constituents of the good life seem to designate growth. Engrossing interest, activity leading to further activity, challenging activity becoming ever broader and wider, and stirring interests that grip and overshadow life and make life rich and worthwhile, this is the good life. Above all each individual should decide what is his best and highest good and should accept responsibility to effect it and put it into action. In these terms, the individual is intelligently pursuing ends that he has in common with others. In accordance with what has been said thus far concerning the good life, morality becomes something different from a code of ethics put once and for all, to be followed blindly. For Kilpatrick, conscious morality is the obligation "so to act as to promote the life-good-to-live in all affected by one's acts."\(^{71}\) Since life situations or individual experiences differ, then moral situations differ. What is needed then is ability to judge intelligently, giving a definite place to reflective thinking. In Kilpatrick's words: "The process is much the same as that of the complete act of thought."\(^{72}\)

For Kilpatrick, as most of those of the pragmatic persuasion, gives reflective thinking an overwhelming role in human action. He wants thinking to eventuate in action and action into further thinking. Thinking for mere contemplation is a luxury that turns in on itself and becomes dialectic in no useful sense. He entertains the idea that

\(^{71}\)Kilpatrick, *Philosophy of Education*, p. 159.

\(^{72}\)Kilpatrick, *Foundations of Method*, p. 337.
biological evolution assigned for thinking a different place in life. Thinking is to help the individual in controlling his environment. Man thinks to effect a change in affairs. The character of thinking depends on the complexity of the situation. But in any thinking situation, however, the "means-consequences" relationship is essential. Moreover, knowledge and effective intelligence are necessary in selecting means and weighing consequences. In describing the process of reflective thinking, Kilpatrick follows very closely the steps suggested by Dewey, which he calls, "A Complete Act of Thought." This "Complete Act of Thought" is the basis for his "project-method" of teaching. The process can be described in these words of his:

Thinking—all that the organism (agent) does in advance of overt action to size up the confronting situation and make plans for dealing with it; during action, to evaluate the process and shift the means, if need be, in order better to effect the aim, and after action to draw lessons for the future from the whole experience.73

In harmony with other leaders of pragmatism, Kilpatrick repudiates the substantial theory of mind. The mind is not the thinking organ that moves the body which it inhabits, but is unable to effect change in observable phenomena. His functional conception of mind makes a highly important element in human experience and in building moral character. He declares:

The dualistic separation of thought and emotion, of impulse or action, following Kant and Hegel, sunk deep into European thought. . . .

73Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 21.
To separate thought and action is dangerous in the degree that it is done. To act without thinking carries its own condemnation. ... To think without intending to relate thought and action is, first, to reject the only final basis we have for testing and correcting thought, viz., by the way it works out when tried. It is, second, to build an immoral character, for the disposition to think before acting and to act upon one's best thinking—these are the essence of the moral character.

To avoid acting or to postpone it unduly is not only futile, but criminal. It is thought and action, an act and thought, in indefinitely mutual interaction that we need—thought and action joined in closest ties together. That is our only safe rule.74

This is, in effect, a rejection of the notion that to know is to have, knowing is the power in terms of instrumental value. It is the power of controlling one's action. Learning, therefore, should show itself in some change in the person. Kilpatrick formulates his idea of learning in these words:

We learn what we live. ... We learn our responses, only our responses, and all our responses; we learn each as we accept it to live by, and we learn it in the degree we accept it.75

One of the most influential notions in Kilpatrick's theory of education is the concept of democracy. In harmony with Bode, he believes in democracy both as a form of government and more essentially as a way of life.


75 Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 244.
In our day he declares the meaning of democracy, while thus taking its start in government, is increasingly widened beyond government to indicate a way of life, a quality of associated living based on active respect for human personality, and this along all the lines that consistently go to make up desirable living. In this sense democracy becomes, practically, the effort to run society on the basis of ethics and respect for human personality.\(^7\)

It is a mistake, believes Kilpatrick, to identify democracy with political democracy alone. Democracy is an ideal which permeates all areas of living. Political democracy is important, not in itself, but as a means to help maintain democratic living. Democracy, for Kilpatrick, must take its clue from the "respect for personality." It is therein the individual comes into his own through to intelligence and intelligent relations with others. The measure of any institution's fitness is the total effect it brings in the life of individuals. Democracy means that social institutions foster the highest development and expression of each of all the members within itself. Democratic living means that the people must have access to whatever is known. Kilpatrick argues for full discussion of social problems and controversial issues. "Democracy," he said, "may be defined as that kind of society which lets no outside voice, not even its own previous thought, stand in the way of the continual rethinking of its own position."\(^7\)

Democracy itself must, then, be continually re-examined and revised.

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\(^7\)Ibid., p. 126.

Max Otto

Now we turn to the "homespun" philosopher, the philosopher of the people, as he is often referred to in the Midwest. The reason for this qualification, according to Lindeman, is that Otto speaks with clarity and directly to "consumers." In the preface to *Science and the Moral Life* Lindeman said, "Otto says what he has to say in straight-forward unequivocal sentences. Because he is wholly unaffected and speaks with clarity his prose frequently emanates as a warm and friendly rhythm. As a writer, therefore, he belongs in the Emersonian tradition." In fact, Otto writes philosophy like literature to the extent that a casual reader may lose sight of his philosophical intention. This applies more to his book *The Human Enterprise* than his other writings. As for the philosophy he espouses, one can say that it is eclectic within the limits of the pragmatic tradition. (This puts him in a unique position.) It even seems that he prefers to call his philosophy scientific humanism or realistic idealism rather than any of the popular names of the pragmatic philosophy. He himself does not believe that any philosophy can speak with finality. He contends that to "comprehend all things in their totality or to dig through appearances to the ultimate nature of being" is "the vice, not the virtue, of philosophy."  


79 *Loc. cit.*

Otto rejects the idea that philosophy is superior to everyday affairs in their practicalities. That "is a wish, not a fact," he said; consequently, "Philosophers are thereby tempted to regard philosophy as an enterprise apart from daily concerns, and unsuspecting laymen are misled to believe that the philosopher is untouched by the world's appeal and the world's strife, and so in a position to gain superworldly wisdom." He writes, taking a phrase from Marcus Aurelius, "that when we discourse of men we should look down as from a high place." He comments that "it is a wise saying. We need on occasion to look from a height, to see men in relation to the human story," but "We need to look from a hill. Let it be a hill rising out of the topography of daily experience, high enough to afford a good prospect, yet not so high that the everyday scene is lost from view." Otto, like others in the pragmatic school, wants to relate philosophy to daily life. All through his writing it appears that he believed in the possibility of articulating a philosophy whose postulates and principles could safely be imparted to the commonwealth of man. If philosophy is to guide human life, it has to take its subject matter from daily concerns and from actual human experience. He contends that "the philosophical systems that lay claim to all inclusiveness are not remarkable for what they include but for how much they leave out," because "universality of knowledge is no longer attainable.

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83 Ibid., p. 17.
by any mind. The accumulation of human experience and the specialization of knowledge make it extremely difficult for one mind to take a comprehensive vision of reality in its totality.

Here and there one has arrived at significant generalizations dealing with a particular domain of knowledge and has been recognized by specialists in that domain to have spoken with authority. But the claim to a 'revelation of the whole universe, which shall be as coherent and complete as we can obtain' can hardly rest its case upon these achievements, great as they are.

Philosophy should stop moving around and around in the same helpless circles, pursuing eternal truth. Then Otto asks: "Suppose we admit, then, that the day is gone when a man might legitimately hope to act as umpire of ultimate truth. Does this leave any function for the philosopher to perform?"

Otto's position seems ambiguous on this point. The function of philosophy is guidance; guidance in two ways, practical and spiritual. "The spiritual collapse is the philosopher's opportunity," he said. "It is everywhere conceded that the forces and institutions which heretofore served to rationalize endeavor have lost their grip upon men. With a united voice we are declaring our spiritual bankruptcy." To enrich the spiritual life philosophy should function as a source of ideas and suggestions of moral inspiration and power. Taken by itself, this means that no system of philosophy could be represented as

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84 Otto, Things and Ideals, p. 8.
85 Ibid., p. 9.
86 Ibid., p. 10.
87 Ibid., p. 12.
88 Ibid., p. 11.
properly directive of a whole way of life. Its role becomes suggestive and liberating. Otto's demand of philosophy does not stop at that point; he wants "a view of life which at the same time is . . . a workable concept based upon a rigorous study of relevant fact." In studying the above statements more closely we may distinguish between the function of philosophy per se and the duties or the function of the philosopher when he philosophizes. The philosopher's duty is to make facts, scientific facts, his beginning, not his end, and to make finite experience his guidance. In Otto's words, the philosopher "may be prophet of an appealing possibility, rather than judge of ultimate truth." Accordingly, the philosophers must escape the suffocation of deadening closure. They must aim to help men to liberate themselves from the parochialism of the past into a rich diversity of entertained possibilities. On the other hand, philosophy at its best is a function or a theory of life and not a theory of absolute reality.

He distinguishes between lay and technical philosophy. In early writings he regards the lay philosophy as a "job-lot of odds and ends in Tom Sawyer's pocket," and "calling it a philosophy is to take unwarranted liberty with language." At this point, the question may arise: if philosophy is a theory of life, has not each of us a "more

89 Ibid., p. 17.
90 Ibid., p. 15.
91 Ibid., p. 3.
92 Ibid., p. 4.
or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means," as James said? Can't we call that, with James, a philosophy? Otto himself at a later date maintained that all philosophies grow out of biographical and historical facts, "of wants and needs and frustrations, of hopes and fears." Does not this reflect the life of the layman as well as the philosopher? In his essay "Professional Philosophy and the Public" he recognizes the lay or nonprofessional philosophy--as he sometimes calls it--as a philosophy, but of second-rate grade. Moreover, he attaches to it the quality of being alive with "the impulses and ambitions that keep man going" and with "the human urge to make sense of things," thus giving the lay philosophy deeper meaning than mere "job-lot of odds and ends." He also makes the refinement of this philosophy the function of the professional philosopher.

Comparing his early and late writings, it seems plausible to conclude that there is a considerable change, the latter leaning more toward the reformative role rather than the suggestive role of philosophy. Now he is urging us to put philosophy to work in the community. Philosophy should be "relevant to the problems and struggles of the men and women who cannot step out, and do not want to step out, of their involvement in the actualities and excitements of everyday."

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93William James, Pragmatism, p. 18.


95Ibid., p. 147.

He wants the philosopher to be a kind of social worker, to go to the "commonwealth of man" and discuss philosophy. He is hopeful that good results will follow from such discussions. Here the question arises, should every view be given a hearing? There are so many different world-views, each of which makes the claim to objective validity, and to have the final truth. Furthermore, some condemn the others as inadequate of comprehensive vision. At the same time each has its consequences in practice and offers guiding principles. It is more fair and democratic to give every view a hearing. Yet, won't it be a confusion for the layman to go from one public forum to another just to fish for a view that suits him best? It is good to give public lectures as a part of a program for adult education or mass media, but that cannot solve the problem of philosophy as a guide in human life. It is profitable to establish closer relations between the professional philosopher and the public, but this should not be counted as a genuine solution for what philosophy is for.\(^{97}\)

At any rate such a proposal of Otto seems to be just a spell of enthusiasm and not congenial to his ideas. His main emphasis is

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\(^{97}\) Otto, in his essay "Philosophy in the Community," wrote, "Is there any justification for expecting good results to follow from the establishment of a closer relationship between professional philosophers and the commonwealth of men? Certainly there is, provided that it is inspired by mutual faith and is guided by reasonable good sense. In fact, a promising start has already been made. Numerous experiments in bringing philosophers and laymen of all sorts together for philosophic study have been successfully conducted." "Philosophy in the Community," op. cit., p. 279.
upon the instrumentality of philosophy. From the twentieth century vintage philosophy has a far-reaching role to play in settling the problems of life in their multifarious aspects. Otto suggests that the task of philosophy is to ascertain the causes of the completing aims and standards, instead of offering ready-made answers, and study the issues in their social context, taking into consideration the existence of possible alternatives. This means that problems should be intellgently analyzed, and suitable solutions should be collectively formed and carried into action. The people concerned should create an atmosphere for what Otto calls "creative bargaining," which

... does imply a 'getting together' ... for a specific purpose. ... to wrestle with a controversial situation in order that it may yield the largest return of good for all who have a stake in the outcome. Through such an approach men gain in their understanding of a difficulty or controversy in the process of trying to remove or settle it. The understanding sought, and the only understanding of use then and there, is an understanding relevant to the problem that is to be solved.98

Is this a return, the objection may arise, to the "particular and concrete" of James, which evoked a host of protests from different sides? "This means," says Otto, "an honest attempt to appreciate the aims in conflict and their relation to the circumstances responsible for just these aims. The search for a new set of aims in which the conflicting ones may be absorbed. The invention of a workable program through which the new set of aims can come to fruition."99 It is also

99 Ibid.
an invitation to make philosophy a joint enterprise not limited to a
group of intellectual experts. "The so-called practical people must be enlisted in its formulation together with our so-called spiritual
guides." It is no wonder then that Otto is referred to as the
philosopher of the people.

The sum of what has been said thus far is that the task of
philosophy is to carry its teaching beyond the limits of "professional
philosophy" and to use them to solve the problems of men wherever
philosophy can be of constructive use in their solution. Otto differs
from Bode and Kilpatrick in not making education the major route
through which the insights of such philosophy are to be incorporated in the on-going process of experience. Why all this insatiable
yearning for philosophy after all? The problems of cooperative living
loom very large indeed in our day. It is not impossible to entertain the idea that a nihilistic spirit of skepticism is among us. The
source of this evil seems to be located in the wide gap between our
opinion concerning the nature of the world we live in and our moral
standards and social relationships. Many of the old conceptions and
moral standards look obsolete and no longer stimulate a response in the present generation. Speaking about this generation, Otto said:

Every thinking youth is accustomed to the view that the physical world of which he is an integral part is a vast machine which moves according to mechanical principles having no reference to human wishes or worths...

\[100 \text{Ibid., p. 163.}\]
Faith in human initiative is weakened; moral distinction appears of doubtful validity; idealism becomes apologetic; and men simply do not feel as responsible for their acts as formerly.101

The truth in the above description lies in its indication of a "deep-going" difference in emotional commitment. This problem is deeply seated in the big gap between a fixed conception of morality handed down from the past, which lags far behind, and the advancement of our knowledge of human nature. Otto argues against the acceptance of moral codes in a spirit of literalness, in utter disregard of the circumstances which gave rise to their formulations and the changed conditions which they no longer fit.

This gets us into his theory of ideals. Life process is characterized by the passing of the old and the coming of the new. This double process is not of two distinct elements but a continuance ever operative. The life of a particular person or nation or even race is no more than events in the larger stream of life. And "man is the only creature capable of exercising purposive will in the making of himself and of his environments."102 In this self-making man makes demands upon the future; "such demands are ideals." These ideals are imaginative possibilities for the enrichment of life. They "grow out of the activities of the period."103 And as everyday "interests and activities changed, new ideals come into view, old ideals dropped out

102 Otto, The Human Enterprise, p. 75.
103 Ibid., p. 79.
of sight.\textsuperscript{104} To put it differently, there is an evolution of ideals just as there are evolutions in biology. Every ideal can be said to have a life history that is connected with its time and circumstances, because ideals are always coexistent with life in all its ramifications. Ideals are man-made guiding principles. The responsibility of formulating them, however, is not to be delegated to experts in "higher values," but should fall on all human beings alike. Moreover, "If the times unfolding before our eyes are to be managed in the human interest, ideals must be native to the practical world which no one can escape except in appearance."\textsuperscript{105}

It is clear that Otto does not agree with the view that held ideals as final and ready-made entities. Fixed ideas that are handed down from the past place undesirable restrictions on progress and stunt human growth. He distinguishes between a scientific approach to the problem of ideals and that of a religion. The latter, from Otto's standpoint, seeks repose for its perturbed spirit in the everlasting arms of the Absolute. It desperately hunts for a shelter in a fixed structure. The gulf between the scientific spirit and institutionalized supernaturalism is a paramount cause of many current difficulties and decay. The ideals that are based on prevailing religious institutions are indeed archaic and remote from life. If such ideals are remote and archaic, why do they persist?

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 89.
The answer is that we are not permitted to. Habits, customs, institutions outlast the views and conceptions of which they are the embodiment. And habits, customs, institutions strive, not only to perpetuate themselves but to prevent the development of any outlook which threatens them... Although supernaturalism has lost ground as a world-view especially in recent decades, and may confidently be expected to continue to lose ground, it remains deeply imbedded in individual and social practice...\textsuperscript{106}

Otto's opposition is not limited to supernaturalism; he includes among other forces that abrogate the good life such factors as war and the economic system in which "the exploiter of human natural resources is rewarded for disregarding the evil consequences of his ambition."\textsuperscript{107}

These forces directly or indirectly work to undermine a naturalistic way of life which he feels basic for a good life in a good world. The naturalistic way of life, as he sees it, is that in which the scientific spirit and faith in democracy are united. What this means can be understood from the following quotation:

\begin{quote}
Man is thought of as belonging with all other creatures to the great web of life, exalted above the rest by hungers and abilities which enable him to seek and achieve what no other living being we have knowledge of can approximate; hungers and abilities which place in his keeping the progress of intelligence and moral idealism on this planet. Wisdom of life is thought of not as something brought from a realm outside, but as issuing from the process of living, from the daily, hourly lives of men and women who make good use of their mental and aspirational potentialities. And the method of investigation and demonstration relied on as being harmonious with these basic principles, is the method developed to high perfection by men of science.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 146.
Otto simply calls this the *scientific democratic* view. In this view is implicit his rejection of any transcendental conception of man, his rejection of dualism, his reliance on the scientific method, and his conception of experience as the basis for human knowledge. Truth and knowledge are very related. "Truth, ideals, and reality—the three are inseparable." He related ideals to tested knowledge, which he sometimes calls truth.

What does Otto think about truth? He seems to distinguish between two kinds of truth. In some sense one is abstract and the other is functional. "There is then," he said, "a kind of knowing in which the object known is universal and abstract, and the knowing process is a form of intellectual grasping. When you have reached truth in this way you have arrived at the end of the path." "The other kind of knowing," he said further, "is radically different. In it the object known retains its original concreteness and the process of knowing is the enrichment of that object through the discovery of its interconnections in the wide spreading fabric of human experience. When you have reached truth in this way you have not arrived at the end of a path. You have set out to go places. You seek...to put it to work."

Apparently he is in agreement with the latter kind of truth. He objects to what he calls contemplative truth, truth which is autonomous,

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based on pure rationality and abstraction. In other words, he rejects the idea of absolute truth. Truth is relative and dependent. "The truths men live by are as true as the tests by which they are established as reliable: no more true, but also no less true." Since the true is that which measures up to the test by which it is distinguished from the untrue in different situations, it is more accurate to talk about truths and truth situations than truth. There is no such thing as independent truth. Otto asks, "has a scientist ever produced any 'pure and unadulterated truth? Has a rationalist ever demonstrated that he had obtained even a glimpse of 'truth in itself'? Have they not over and over shown up one another's failure to procure any such truth?"

The scientist walks up to his laboratory with some hypotheses, puts them to a devised test. Truth in so far is obtained, as far as he is concerned, when these hypotheses stand the test. The rationalist does the same, but uses different techniques. For both, the true is that which meets the test successfully. Tests of truth differ with different people. What is emphasized is "the will to truth." And what is needed is not crowding nearer to truth by venerating it in the abstract, but securing reliable measures. "It is the determination to use only the best available tests of the true whatever the subject matter, the refusal to play fast and loose with these in response to extraneous demands, and the persistent endeavor to perfect the technique whereby the tenability of a proposed belief is decided."
He suggests that the best test is the scientific that exemplifies the ideal of objective verification. Objective verification is not to be obtained merely, however, by material devices, but it is broader than that. In its broadest sense it is rigorous thinking. Otto put five requests for such verification analogous to the five steps of reflective thinking in Dewey's theory. (1) Formulation of only such problems as can be solved by an appeal to facts in the external world. (2) Gathering of facts and, so far as possible, all obtainable facts pertinent to the problem. (3) The subjection of facts, inferences, hypotheses, generalizations to a test admitted to be decisive, publicly applicable, open to the scrutiny of friend or foe. (4) Progressive building up of verification in which different investigators participate. (5) Recognition of the provisional result of even the most exacting demonstration, hence the relativity of all knowledge.

In the last analysis knowledge and truth are series of approximations never absolute or final. They are always in the process of construction and reconstruction. They are public, hence communal. The argument against this method is that although it looks promising, yet it cannot be applied to all human problems with their irreducible complexity. This point, although admitted by Otto, is by-passed without a clear solution. In discussing objective verification Otto insists on particulars. In so doing, factors transcending any given situation are liable to be miscounted. The writer is inclined to suggest that

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the past, the present, and the future encompass any event, that in
certain problems incalculable factors are involved; that is not to
invalidate the scientific method, but to ascertain the corrigibility
and fallibility of any given inquiry. This fallibility, however, is
the basis for the on-going of the "quest for certainty," and conse­
quently leads to progress. To accept the relativity of knowledge and
truth is simply to reject any absolutism or any claim for fixed beliefs.
This in no sense means a negligence of the cumulative authority of
the great tradition, but it surely means a re-examination and scrutiny
of our traditions, customs, and beliefs in the light of changing
conditions and new facts. In the interest of such goals the past, the
present, and the future cooperate in the sense that the wealth of
tradition is fused and modified by present facts for a better future.
In this case "a theory of the good life which has come down to us by
tradition, and a theory of success resulting from the circumstances
under which we labor, stand in the way,"\textsuperscript{116} says Otto. The solution
of this problem is to bring the work of the world and the art of living
into a mutually helpful relation. The clue is in our hand. The
division of man into a soul and a body put us in the dilemma of dividing
the world into tangible things and intangible ideals, into physical
objects and spiritual belief. The separation between the two realms
led to intellectual aristocracy; that is, to a higher order pregnant
with authority and a lower order that becomes debased. The moral of all

\textsuperscript{116}Otto, The Human Enterprise, p. 85.
this is that wants and desires are looked down upon, whereas moral principles are defined and vitalized "from on high." It is true that "The good life involves more than desires intelligence, knowledge, imagination, and at its best, creativeness of a higher order. But desires are the life of the whole business."\(^\text{117}\)

Desires are ephemeral in character and with no discoverable limits to their number, there are good as well as bad desires. For Otto, the difference between the good and the bad desires is the presence in the former of scrutiny and appraisal with regard to the effect of desires on the good life, or what he terms "all-over satisfactoriness." He, in harmony with Bode and Kilpatrick, cannot tolerate a wholesale prejudice against desires. It is true that there is close affinity between morality and desires: "... the raw material of moral conduct is the impulsive life of man."\(^\text{118}\) Yet morality does not rest upon the inhibition or debasement of desires. For Otto,

\[\ldots\text{the measure of moral personality is sensitiveness to the consequences of desiring what is desired.}\ldots\]

The ideal is that desires shall spring up spontaneously, freely, and differently in response to the richest, most various goods and that dynamic exuberance shall be matched by well developed habits of critical appraisal and intelligent choice.\(^\text{119}\)

So far there is no reference to a community or social life where morality is exercised. Otto emphasizes, on different occasions, the communal life of man and its significance for any good life. He says,

\[^{118}\text{Otto, Things and Ideals, p. 114.}\]
\[^{119}\text{Otto, "Scientific Humanism," op. cit., p. 163.}\]
'... no one can attain his moral growth—except in reciprocal relationship with other human beings.' Thus the morality of desires involves social relationships, where the drive of individual ambition and the conflicting diversity of wants give rise to the sharpest competition. "Interrelated as the lives of men are, some form of give and take is forced upon everyone."

In other words, the demands of others upon life have a direct bearing on the demands we make. The struggling of the multitudinous desires of others and of our own necessitate choice. In this inevitable choosing lies the foundation of morality. This is to beg the question of how we can secure the right choice. According to Otto, this is the culminating function of intelligence in morality. This may seem an unsatisfying answer, because one may act intelligently, yet not morally. Otto's answer to such objection can be taken from his words, that the goal of the moral life is the richest possible attainment of satisfied wants. To which had better be added at once that by this is meant not a settled, fixed quantum, but a progressive approximation, changing and growing with times and conditions to the fullest realization of personal potentialities and the completest possible participation in the appealing interests of life. This he said 'should naturally be taken with its context, and therefore in a collective sense. If wants are their own justification, the accidental fact that they are the wants of diverse people can make no

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theoretical difference. But the wants of others must be included in the moral aim, along with one's own wants, not only for theoretical reasons, but because they actually form part of every one's wants.\textsuperscript{123}

The relation between desires and ideals is obvious. Ideals are the projection of desires. Ideals are means to the attainment of the good life, or, taken collectively, are means of prospective approximation of the good life. As a phrase, "the good life" becomes a taboo handed down from the Greek. In the Greek sense it is a final standard that everyone should strive for. Otto repudiates such a static conception of "the good life." For him it is a continuous reconstruction on the basis of sensitiveness to all human values. So conceived, "the good life" is always in the making.

After representing very briefly the points of view of Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto, it seems clear that the three are committed to the scientific method of thought and the attested findings of experimental science. The scientific spirit they espouse requires that intellectual beliefs, standards, and values be judged by their consequences in action. Truth, therefore, in the possession of man is not an ornament. Its importance lies in its instrumental value, in how much it helps in the enrichment of human life.

The three believe that we live in a changing universe, which implies that truth is evolving. Beliefs and scientific findings must

\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 132.
be subject to continuous testing whenever developments or advances in knowledge make this desirable.

There is a fairly unanimous agreement among them that in seeking standards for guidance of conduct, it is necessary that we look to social relations. Morality and moral standards are essentially social; hence they must be flexible and operational in character. Human experience has the capacity to develop its own moral foundations and formulate and reformulate the means and ends of human existence. According to these pragmatists, the reconstruction of conditions to attain these ends are indicative of intelligence, an intelligence disciplined by consideration of consequences in choice and disciplined by reflection in action.

The principles underlying their philosophy are continuity and interactivity. Both principles stem and emerge from their acceptance of the organic theory of evolution. It led them also to reject without discount the dualistic theory of mind. The nondualistic theory of mind as a distinctive function of interaction with the environment led them to believe in the significance of the role of intelligence in shaping human life.

The three are committed to a concept of democracy that is not limited to political aspect. For them democracy is a way of life whose standards must be those which people set up as a result of those experiences which have proved themselves reliable. In its most significant sense it stands for the application of procedures which are
operationally instituted in constructing ideals and goals. It means also a recognition that the people themselves are the ultimate authority in matters where standards are concerned.

From the consideration of the power of intelligence as the highest authority in directing human actions emerges their concept of freedom. They all agree that freedom is an attribute of intelligence. They bring it back from its metaphysical realm in traditional philosophy to practical situations. One may venture to say, however, that there is some vagueness in what they subscribe for intelligence and scientific method. In the writers' opinions, no matter how comprehensive and detailed science is, it is to assume that it will enable us to know fully the nature and behavior of man. That is not to discredit the importance of science or scientific method but to warn against too much involvement. At the same time, one can justify the pragmatic emphasis on scientific approach in solving our problems, since it saves us from falling into the deadening closure of absolutism and gives sanction to freedom of thought. In their approach to freedom they emphasize the sociality of men, of beings who voluntarily make themselves the source of their actions. They defy all dogmas and absolutes, yet one would wonder if their philosophy is really free from it. They constantly speak of the incomparable excellence of a life of experimentation and urge the scientific method as the universal solvent of all problems whether ethical, logical, political, or philosophical. They extol the democratic way of life over all competitors. One may
ask, "Do not the aforementioned principles constitute a dogma favorable enough to escape scrutiny?" At any rate the pragmatic concept of freedom has the advantage of being more social, more inducive to change and progress, and more humanistic than other traditional concepts. This is true in the case of education through which it becomes pregnant with vitality and effectiveness.
PART TWO

FREEDOM
CHAPTER IV

BODE'S VIEW OF FREEDOM

Philosophical conceptions of freedom are implicit in the various conceptions of human nature. When man is regarded as a part of a rational process of universal development, his freedom is in this teleological process. Freedom is then based on the conformity to the immutable truth that rules all things. It is not a region of choice but the ability to choose the right and the good which is fixed and eternal. In other words, it is the control of impulses and desires by reason. Thus freedom becomes a moral postulate. When man is regarded as the product of strict natural laws whose regularities may be known by science, freedom turns out to be mechanical determinism. Man's actions are governed by these laws. With the advancement of technology science attained a new outlook. Scientific findings are corrigible and must be treated as working hypotheses. While there are natural laws, contingency is real. Man is no more a mechanical being subject to strict laws but a purposeful intelligent being who can induce change. The development of man himself is the result of reflective thought in the solution of problems. Freedom is the ability to plan and carry on this planning deliberately and intelligently. Bode is in line with the last conception.
Two important principles in Bode's thought contribute to his conception of freedom: his functional theory of mind and the principle of continuity and interactivity of experience.

Over against any dualism, Bode regards mind as a function in the environment. The function of understanding or forecasting is what is meant by mind. The implication of such a conception on concept formulation is significant. If mind is not a substance or an entity separate from the body, as was held before, then there is no place for the notion that mind is the storehouse of ideas or endowed with some tangible part of our ideas before birth. For Bode, experience provides the content of our concepts. These concepts are not antecedent or a priori but are definitions of consequences in operation. In Bode's words, concepts "are objects of a new kind, which men themselves create and use for the effective control of behavior."\(^1\) The relation between concepts and mind, accordingly, is clear. Mind denotes the symbolic functioning of events. Or, in Bode's phrasing, "The function of pointing or leading is what is meant by mind. . . . It is something that things do."\(^2\) Things acquire meanings when they point to some further thing. When these meanings are detached and marked off, they are called concepts. This means that concepts are the assimilation of experiences and the substitution of a word for this assimilation. Concepts constitute our intellectual stock which links the past with the present and the future to make a continuum.

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They, however, are constantly in a potential process of amendment. That is to say, there is always a reconstruction going on.

If we apply this operational character of concept to the concept of freedom it becomes practical and dynamic and not lodged in a metaphysical realm. The metaphysical notion of freedom is, one can say, a product of the old dualism between body and mind. The mind substance theory which conceived mind as independent from matter (body) assumed that mind is a creative source of concepts. Accordingly, in a concept like freedom we can scarcely assume to derive it from immediate experience. In Wickersham's words, "In every direction the intuitions of the Reason overlap the boundaries of experiences, and furnish, at least, a ground for enlightened faith."\(^3\) It is needless to repeat that Bode rejects any a priori or transcendental character of concepts and freedom as one. He believed that such a notion leads to absolutism, which robs man of his active and creative nature.

How can the concept of freedom be said to emerge from human experience? The behavior of the organism is selective in character. This means that any course of action which the organism may follow involves some sort of selection. This selective ability is said to be the characteristic of all things. What concerns us at this point, however, is human behavior. Selectivity implies the presence of alternatives or different possible courses of action among which man makes choices. From this aspect of experience develops the concept of freedom. More than

\(^3\)Quoted by Bode, *How We Learn*, p. 30.
that, freedom was oftentimes considered as choice. That freedom is freedom of choice brought a strong affinity between morality and freedom. The center of moral need and cause was the fact of choice. Can man be held responsible for his acts? The answer to this question raises a long controversial issue which has resulted in the development of a doctrine known as freedom of will. This will was conceived as a force outside the individual person, which is the real ultimate cause of his acts. Its freedom, however, was precisely in the ability to make choices that are unmotivated by desire or impulse. In theology the freedom of the will was demonstrated by submission to the supernatural. In rational philosophy it was the allegiance to the moral law, which is itself transcendental. The moral of the concept of free will as a matter of fact is that man is not free, because, if his freedom is limited solely to the framework of the Supreme law or a priori moral law, then the element of choice is eliminated, for action must be in terms of the status quo; that is, it does not emerge from deliberate choice. When action is deliberate and purposive and when there is an intelligent awareness of direction and probable outcome, choice becomes worthy of the name.

To speak of freedom solely in terms of free will gives sanction to absolutism, which is expressed in the so-called eternal verities. Bode observed that, "When some one value or set of values is arbitrarily selected as final and absolute, we have the principle of dictatorship." Over and against this absolutism, he maintains that... the content

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4 Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 119.
and guiding principles of a rich and abundant life must come from our social surroundings, not from a remote and supersensuous realm. He argues that absolutism and the belief in eternal verities deflects attention from the issues and the obstacles involved in the struggle for an intelligent living.

From looking inward to a native capacity to be free or outward to a sort of cosmic sanction, Bode turns to recognizing freedom as something to be achieved as a result of a certain growth. He recognizes that it must be sought in consequences rather than in antecedents of action. Freedom for Bode is "synonymous with the exercise of intelligence." Freedom through intelligence is a commitment. It "centers precisely in the ability to go through with an undertaking by the discovery of appropriate means, by the surmounting of obstacles, and by the modification of the original plan in the light of new facts." Here choice becomes an attempt to select a mode of behavior which will serve to satisfy a need and at the same time remove so far as is possible the element of uncertainty in terms of the consequences of such choice. Therefore, the free play of intelligence results not merely in denying absolutism, but in applying operational procedures in the construction of ideals or purposes as well as in the determination of

5Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 60-61.

6Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 97.

7Bode, "The New Education Ten Years After--Apprenticeship or Freedom," New Republic, LXXII (June, 1930), 61-64.
means for achieving predetermined goals. "If intelligence is to become
genuinely free," says Bode, "it must understand its own procedures with
reference to the 'operational' character of concepts and with reference
to the nature of evidence and truth."8

Implicit in what has been said thus far is the assumption that
freedom is an attribute of intelligence. Intelligence here is not
synonymous with "Reason" in traditional philosophy, but it is a process
of development. In Dewey's phrasing, "... the word names something
very different from what is regarded as the highest organ or "faculty"
for laying hold of ultimate truth. It is a short-hand designation for
great and ever growing methods of observation, experiment, and reflec-
tive reasoning."9 In this sense, freedom becomes the ability to per-
form a clear function which holds meaning and value. The main function
of intelligence is the initial installment in freedom which becomes
and gradually develops into control over the physical environment. The
ability to adapt the environment to his needs is man's great achieve-
ment. Because, in Bode's words, "... the problem of existence is a
problem of securing increased control over natural and social agencies,
so as to use them for human ends."10 This control over the environment
comes through reflective thinking and tested knowledge. To translate
this into freedom, it becomes the reflective thinking leading to valid

8Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 96.
9Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 10.
knowledge of ourselves and the world and attested to by our everyday activities.

If freedom is inherent in intelligent behavior, which is directed by the meanings of things, then we can say that freedom connotes novelty, discontinuity, and activity. Does novelty exist in the external world? It seems more reasonable, according to Bode's thought, to assume that novelty consists in the rearrangement of experience. The reality of the thinking process presupposes a whole body of established facts, which is brought to bear on the reconstruction of our experience. In other words, unless there are some facts that are already settled, we cannot undertake to settle others. In any thinking process we infer from previous warranted assertions in order to reach others and build up or reconstruct our intellectual stock. "Columbus, for example, on the basis of certain facts, made the inference that the earth is round."12

The word, reconstruction, re-occurring time and again in Bode's writings, means in itself rearrangement of something that at least partly exists. This does not mean that Bode intends to exclude causation once and for all, but what he insists on, all through, is change. Novelty and change imply discontinuity. At first it may seem ridiculous to infer discontinuity from any pragmatic conception, as continuity is a central principle in this philosophy. The reply to this is that, first, discontinuity does not involve the absence of all continuity. Second,

11Bode, Modern Educational Theories, P. 199.
the opposition of continuity to discontinuity is due to abstractionism. It is rather inconceivable, so to speak, to assume absolute continuity. Bode's theory of mind and of the thinking process preclude such an absolute position. On the contrary, the thinking process occurs when the ongoing; that is, the continuity, of experience is blocked. That there is a carry-over from past experience does not mean a complete absence of novelty. Moreover, absolute continuity, we may say, implies predetermination; hence freedom becomes a myth.

The inconceivability of discontinuity is maintained by the mechanical theory on the ground of the universality of casual law and by rationalism, by assuming that in a logical system each part must be conditioned by its relation to the whole. Bode rejects such a mechanical view which affords "... no room for human purposes and desires." He believes that the relation of particulars to a whole is a residue of the Platonic "essence," which is in effect a separation between theory and practice. What is meant by continuity here is different from Bode's conception. In fact the continuity imbedded in the idea of a Reality of orderly character waiting for a spectator mind to disclose it is a tragic discontinuity between a knower and a known. Bode repudiates such a dualism between the external world and a mind, or between appearance and reality. He remarks, "The creation of this transcendental world was at the same time one of the most brilliant achievements and one of the major tragedies of human civilization."\[14\]


According to the above view, freedom is, we may say, the dialectic process imbedded in reality itself according to which each part ultimately transcends itself within the whole. This whole in the philosophy of Royce, for example, is the infinite Self which is free, and "We are . . . conscious bits of the Self. Our wills are part of his freedom."\(^{15}\)

Again in Bosanquet we find a similar position, and freedom is described as "the passage of a being or content beyond itself."\(^{16}\) Such conceptions have to presuppose absolute continuity or betray themselves in their household. This rationalistic notion concerning the universe seems to have rendered many rationalists aloof from the vicissitude of life. This kind of philosophy takes refuge in a fortress of "principles" too far beyond human inquiry. Consequently, it transfers the burden of responsibility from man to a transcendental source. This conception of the Whole is incompatible with the spirit of modern science.

Bode, taking the theory of evolution and the scientific spirit seriously, shies away from any absolutes. He does not trust this industry of metaphysical concepts. He vindicates the need to treat concepts as working hypotheses and as ultimate in carrying thought forward; hence concepts like continuity and discontinuity acquire different meanings.

Continuity in Bode's system is a continuity of and interaction between the organism and its physical and social surroundings. This continuity is a conscious one on the part of the individual; that is to


\(^{16}\)B. Bosanquet, *The Principles of Individuality and Value*, p. 60.
say, it is not a mechanical or predetermined and fixed one. It is dy-
namic and changing because it is continuity of experience. This con-
tinuity seems to have two phases: psychological (continuity of conscious-
ness) and physiological (a process of habit forming). On one hand, con-
ciousness "is just a future adaptation that has been set to work so as to bring about its own realization." That is another way of saying the future is made present. Habits, on the other hand, are "the outcome of previous experiences." In this sense every experience modifies to some degree the effects of past experience, and the modifications thus affected abide to be modified by later experience. These changes, however, are not a mere series of effects or habits, or a sequence of experiences. It is a process of growth or reconstruction of experience.

Reconstruction of experience assumes that every experience does something to enrich the depth and significance of another. It takes place only when experience at a given time goes back into the past and expands into the future. It is quite clear that the experience of any individual is influenced by the time factor, but also by what is present in a particular situation. The individual is a factor within experience. The experience belongs to a situation where the individual and his environment are involved equally and mutually; the meaning of the one

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17 Bode, "Consciousness and Psychology," Creative Intelligence, p. 244.

18 Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 199.
changes in terms of the meaning of the other. All this supports the idea that continuity in Bode's conception is not absolute but functional and leaves room for discontinuity.

Bode's concept of freedom connotes also contingency. He says that "In proportion as conduct is directed by the meanings of things we say that is intelligent"; 19 "... meanings or concepts are ... 'total responses' or 'complexes' or systems of responses." 20 Consequently, "instead of rigid predetermination, we have alternative courses of procedures." 21 If concepts mean a wide range of possible behavior, then any new situation calls for a variety of suggestions among which we have to make choices and adapt our behavior accordingly. This means the existence of possible alternatives; that is to say, contingency is real. Bode points out that in situations of uncertainty and expectancy "the present moment embodies a future that is contingent." 22 This same idea is found in another statement about experience, which goes as follows:

Experience ... has a marvelous flexibility and capacity for growth. The whole mass of human achievement has its origin in the fact that experience constantly suggests new possibilities, new ventures. ... We do not come into the world with a set of antecedent aims, but we develop aims and devise means for the realization of these aims as we go along. 23

19Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 199.
20Ibid., p. 201.
This kind of contingency, however, is operational and functional, because future possibilities work as guiding factors in behavior. Continuity, interactivity, or contingency imply selectivity. That experience is modifiable and flexible signifies choice. In every decision made there must of necessity be an element of chance. If the outcome of a particular choice were known absolutely, it would not properly be called a choice. The greater the degree of contingency the more important becomes the role of choosing. It then entails a careful weighing of issues, a sizing up of possible consequences, and contrasting of those consequences against other ones in order that the element of chance is reduced to a minimum.

The moral of what has been said thus far is that a person is free in as much as his actions are the outcome of liberation and reflection directed by an intelligent chosen standard of value. This means that an action is not free because it has no limiting restraints, but because something restrains it that is a standard, a moral code, or a philosophy of life. This means that freedom is in need of an operationally evolved framework; it needs to be clarified with respect to the significance to be attached to the consequences of such operation. This carries the discussion into the moral issue.

The relation between morality and freedom is an old one. It is a known fact in philosophy that freedom as a moral postulate was firmly established by Kant. Freedom for Kant was the foundation stone for the

whole structure of morality. It is necessary for the operation of
the moral law. The controversy between the free-willist and determinist
is largely a moral one. What is wrong and what is right? How much is
the person responsible for his action? These were pertinent questions
in philosophy.

This great concern about moral life is justified through its
significant influence upon human relations. It is no wonder that Bode,
interested in societal relations, pays heed to this problem. He does
not agree on the interpretation of morality in traditional philosophy.
He comments:

The moral factor in life, so it is assumed, must be
derived from some theory regarding the nature of the uni-
verse or the cosmic order, or from what we may call for
convenience the eternal verities.

Men have always tended to take for granted that the
pattern for right living, the pattern for right and wrong
is set for them by the unalterable nature of things which
they must recognize and obey.25

For Bode the function of morality is to serve as a guide in
conduct. In defining moral conduct Bode quotes Dewey with approval in
that moral conduct is "activity called forth and directed by ideas of
value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible
as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is
entered upon."26 The net conclusion is that moral life is inherent in
ideals.

25Bode, "Education for Freedom," Teachers College Record, XLIX
(January, 1948), 279.

26Quoted by Bode, Fundamentals of Education, p. 73.
The development of ideals, then, is a case in point. Ideals do not come from the blue. They emerge from human experiences. They are no more than concepts converted for the guidance of conduct. In this case they are subject to the direction of intelligence, or should be. For Bode they are "the forces that for good or bad, move the world." In this fact lies their moral value. As Bode observes, the development of ideals is the self in the making. They are never completed. "Ideals grow or they are hardly ideals." In short, ideals are not a fixed quantity or a static thing; they are not an inherited possession, but an achievement. The important thing about ideals in Bode's thought is that they are regarded as working hypotheses. They cannot operate unconditionally under all circumstances. So conceived they become relative with groups as well as within the individual himself.

The idea of relative standards when taken by itself may mean a return to individualism which is in contradiction to Bode's social attitude. When taken, however, within his system, relative standards are the condition of freedom. And the question becomes a moral one. What kind of standards shall the individual seek to reach? What criterion is he to take for a guide in his judgment? If standards, ideals, or purposes are created by man for a more abundant life, "they can have no other reference or function than to serve as guides

27Ibid., p. 63.

28Frederick Lumley and Boyd H. Bode, Ourselves and the World, p. 194.

29The reader is referred to Chapter XXX (Principles and Persons) in Ourselves and the World, pp. 544-556.
for continuous growth in intellectual, social, moral, and aesthetic capacity, which is the only final justification for living at all."\textsuperscript{30}

Intelligence, meanwhile, makes its appearance in judging ideals. Moral life is full of complexities. Moreover our acts usually have wide bearings and these must be taken into consideration if we are to pass intelligent judgments. In taking a decision there is no guarantee that our decision is right. To put it differently, we can neither avoid the responsibility of taking a decision nor can we avoid wholly the possibility of error. Intelligence serves here in judging any act in terms of its foreseen consequences.

Ideals, however, must not be obeyed blindly, that is, without reference to other values involved in a given situation. "When ideals are used in this way, they cease to be a means of acting intelligently and become a sort of fetish. Which may be used to justify almost any kind of irrational conduct."\textsuperscript{31} It is not a matter of substituting a set of beliefs or absolutes by another. They must be acted upon as guiding principle; guiding not in the authoritative sense, but in terms of perceiving the different possibilities and meanings in any given situation. Bode insists that they must be flexible and subject to continuous scrutiny. The moral issue, nevertheless, is more than what ideals we choose to adopt and how much we conform to them. It is in the usefulness of such ideals and the extent they accelerate growth. Bode repudiates the morality of absolutes because he believed that

\textsuperscript{30}Bode, "William James in the American Tradition," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{31}Bode, \textit{Fundamentals of Education}, p. 70.
morality is based on "empirical" or secular grounds and therefore requires no theological or metaphysical basis. \(^\text{32}\) He argues that the view of two-worldism accounts for absolutism and transcendentalism in morality. The conception as to the meaning and value of the moral life has suffered from disagreement among philosophers. One position, for example, says Bode, insisted that desires should be controlled. Another, meanwhile, contended that we must accept them as they are. \(^\text{33}\) His argument is "that desires are subject to the direction of intelligence, and that the progressive building up of a moral order is man's finest achievement and highest ideal." \(^\text{34}\) So understood, by what standard can this direction or control be evaluated? Historically the answers given to this question have usually been based on the belief that the standards for conduct must be obtained from a supersensuous world. He blames ethical systems for assuming a sharp cleavage between the world of nature and the world of moral conduct. "If morality and the things of spirit are set apart in this fashion, the conclusion is natural that the spirit of man must be fed on a special diet, and equally natural that the bill of fare should be presented by tradition." \(^\text{35}\)

Bode's rejection of such dualism is based on the fact that it shifts the emphasis from "growth" to something else. He argues that

\(^\text{34}\)Ibid., p. 236.
\(^\text{35}\)Ibid., p. 237.
historically such separation afforded a sanction for the cultivation
of the values in terms of abstract duty not of a realization of social
significance. He admits, nevertheless, the difference between man and
nature because this gives room for morality. Making morality a thing
of the present world and not a supersensuous or abstract virtue to hope
for, does not rob it of its integrity. It only means "a different
attitude with a different emphasis upon moral values; and the attempt
to generalize this attitude leads to another system of philosophy."36
For him this emphasis should fall on the concept of growth.

Constant focussing of attention upon fixed standards and recourse
to eternal verities can mean only a static concept of ideals. But to
conceive morality as social in its origin and in its validity means
that ideals are working hypotheses subject to further scrutiny and
reconstruction. It means also that man is responsible for his action
and that freedom is a commitment.

The solution of the moral problem lies in the future
and not in the past. . . . Its reliance is not on con-
formity but on method, so as to secure the liberation of
intelligence for the continuous improvement of human life
through the medium of social relationship.37

The net conclusion is that freedom is an ideal, a guiding prin-
ciple for the continuous reconstruction of social relations in complete
reliance on intelligence and scientific method. It is not achieved by
consulting the eternal structure or by the simple process of removing

36Ibid., p. 238.

restriction. "Freedom must be achieved inside of a system of a social control and not outside of it."38 "Social control" simply means the exercise of reasonable measures necessary to ensure that the activities of some persons do not conflict with a deeper and fuller experience for a larger number of people. There is no antithesis, it must be noted, of individual versus society. There is only an integrated whole of associative living. Freedom in this associative living emerges only from the release of human capacities in order that they may develop to their maximum in social situations. Only an examination of changing conditions, the formulation of tentative revisions, and the carrying out of plans and activities guided by a consideration of their consequences in this associative living, can guarantee outcomes that will be beneficial to the individual as a social being.

If freedom consists in the power of acting with reference to a 'widening circle of considerations' then the fact that a person is held to accountability for what he does is not inherently an interference with his freedom but may become a means for the realization of freedom.39

Bode's understanding of freedom looks to both individual and society, each of which has its distinctiveness while constituting a whole that have a distinctive way of life which he calls democracy. For him democracy as a political creed does not any more quench the thirst of people for effective freedom. Freedom is not merely a

38 Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 8.
39 Ibid., p. 82.
process of removing restrictions. Freedom is growth; it is the development of human potentialities to secure increased control over natural and social agencies so as to use them for human ends.

In early days the accent was put on the individual freedom. It was based on the motto that men are "free and equal." Freedom meant, then, absence of restraints, while equality seemed to mean that all differences among men should be ignored. To achieve this purpose people tried to limit governmental interference, which meant largely legal and police duties. On this basis the frontiers of America were determined to keep the management of their affairs in their hands. The paradox in such conditions was that the individuals fell under what we may call the tyranny of the community. But restrictions placed upon the individual from his community were accepted unquestioningly. Presumably because such controls were generated within the community and did not represent an authority reaching in from outside. Another reason may be that the individual felt that he was a part of the community by which he was controlled, sharing its life and affairs with an approved equality. Thus freedom was absence of constraints, not any constraints, but specifically governmental. In this latter sense the community as well as the individual were free, but the finality of community pattern was in fact a curtailment of personal freedom. In spite of its limitation this kind of freedom has its significance. The individual felt free because he was sharing in a pattern or a way of life, though unaware of its authoritative character. On the other hand, if a pattern of a community was not suiting to him, he was able to select a more congenial
one to live in. Bode observed that, "Whatever its defects, democracy, as understood and practiced by the American people in the past, seemed fairly well suited to the conditions of the time."  

Implicit in the above statement is what Bode emphasizes time and again, namely, the need for reinterpretation of the concept of democracy. To limit democracy to "the rule of the majority" or to define it in terms of governmental set-up is to limit it to a political sphere and to put it on a very shaky, unsecure basis in the face of conflicting ideologies of the world.

In this century with its multifacet complexities, with the old communities growing faint, with the endless diversity of associations, and with the development of a mass of conflicting interests, governmental regulations are needed. The function of government comes to mean much more than political maneuverings. The government becomes one with the governed if it is to be democratic. This means it becomes the instrumentality through which the people can operate intelligently. In other words, if the concept of democracy is broadened to include an entire way of life, then there is no area in which it fails to function. Governmental interference is not opposing or limiting to freedom if, in Bode's words, it keeps open "the door of opportunity for all, to keep vested interests and pressure groups from trampling on people who get in their way and to foster the spirit of wider understanding and wider cooperation on the basis of wider common purposes."  

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40Ibid., p. 28.

41Bode, "Reorientation in Education," Modern Education and Human Values, pp. 10-11.
The concept of democracy has become an urgent problem for us because conditions have changed. The simplicity which characterized American life in an earlier day has passed away. We have become industrialized and urbanized and interdependent; we have developed a mass of divergent and conflicting interests which would inevitably lead to anarchy and jungle warfare if the government did not intervene with positive and extensive regulation. The surest road to the loss of liberty and equality would be to withhold such regulation. No one wants to be left alone these days. Whether we like it or not, the functions of government continue to increase in number and importance, and there is nothing we can do about it. Custom and tradition, however, are becoming increasingly inadequate as guides to readjustment.42

This line of thought led Bode to suggest that the difference between democracy and totalitarianism is not in the amount of regulations and interferences, but the difference is in the standard or purpose in terms of which these regulations are applied. This is to say it is a difference in the source from which the standards are derived.

Democracy, as Bode views it, shies away from all absolutes that in the long run lead to dogma and regimentation. Establishment of standards of conduct for all ages assumes that human nature is fixed. This attitude pushes questions of practical nature aside and ignores external conditions in matters of basic behavior. The placing of authority in a realm of eternal verities results in a discrepancy between thought and action and in a removal of power from the people. Democracy in its significant sense represents the common man; hence it seeks, or it should seek, "maximum development for the individual through the

42Ibid., p. 11.
cultivation of a common life and to make the continuous extension of common interests our final test of right and wrong or of what is called progress."43 This test collides with the so-called eternal verities; hence it may be rejected by many people, because, to quote again from Bode:

Men have always tended to take for granted that the pattern for right living, the pattern for right and wrong, is set for them by the unalterable nature of things which they must recognize and obey... .

If this is the case, then the road to salvation does not lie in throwing off restrictions, but in getting into line with eternal verities. By a kind of paradox, liberty turns out to be a surrender to the authority of the eternal laws of the universe... .

Truth, then turns out to be a demand for conformity. The conformity which is demanded may consist in obedience to the will of God, or a loyalty to a certain tradition, or the cultivation of 'Reason' as the supreme good, or--more recently--dedication to the idea of racial supremacy or the class struggle.44

From the standpoint of Bode's view it is hard to understand how "authentic" democracy can come into being on the basis of such a theory of morality. If democracy has faith in the common man to make decisions independently which he can act upon in terms of the social framework, then the solution of the moral problem does not lie in the contemplation of cosmic order. Its reliance should be on the method of intelligence.


"Democracy demands faith—faith that if intelligence is really liberated, and if people are encouraged in the system of thinking about basic matters... then in the end the ideal of democracy will prevail."^45

The democratic position thus differs from the authoritarian in that the individual realizes his selfhood through intelligence and his contribution to community living and not through birthright or social status. In other words, the real distinction of the democratic way is that its destiny lies in the hands of men. Their goals and standards emerge from the means employed in resolving the conflicts facing them at any given time. This defines the moral meaning of democracy as the product of men and women living in association, sharing a common experience, and arriving at ideals of group life through cooperation and participation. The moral obligation is to be intelligent. "To be intelligent we must come to grips with the basic issue of the conflicts among our standards."^46

The heart of the problem of living is then the liberation of intelligence. Yet if we take the exercise of intelligence as the supreme good, doesn't this become another absolute? The answer is clear—the method of intelligence, like that of science, is based on the principle of fallibilism. The morality of this method is to recognize all conclusions as corrigible; hence it should be held open to revision in


the light of new evidences. Bode's faith in intelligence is in its power "to create new standards and ideals in terms of human values and in accordance with changing conditions."^47

It can be concluded that the concept of freedom as conceived by Bode means that freedom means much more than freedom of action or freedom of choice. It is a development and growth. Liberation of intelligence is not a gift; it is an achievement which every generation must attain for itself. It is not static or fixed, but continuous and flexible. It is also social. It requires that each individual take part in reshaping and revising the social fabric to the end that society will better serve the interests of the individual and thereby establish conditions conducive to sound growth and greater freedom. This concept of freedom gives education a significant position and a more definite role in shaping human life. The significance of freedom as conceived by Bode will be discussed later in this work.

Kilpatrick in his recent book, Philosophy of Education, has elaborated the idea of freedom more than in any other of his writings. The writer feels that this book, in general, is one of the best, if not the best, of Kilpatrick's writings. In it he developed the cream of long years of intellectual labor. Hence frequent reference will be made to this book as the discussion proceeds.

Kilpatrick appears to distinguish between two kinds of freedom: freedom to act (freedom from external constraints), and freedom from ignorance and prejudice (freedom of the highest self to control one's choices).  

To signify freedom to act as freedom for external constraints raises the question of what constitutes these external constraints. Since there is no general agreement among the different theories of freedom on what constitutes these external constraints, then it seems that an attempt to give a full answer will go beyond the present undertaking. It suffices to say that some philosophers of freedom, such as Rousseau and the classic liberalists, found in political institutions, Kingdoms, and Churches an obstruction to individual actions. Lord Acton in his book History of Freedom counted ignorance, superstitions,

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1William H. Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 118.
disease, and hunger among external constraints. According to Kant, the "compulsory Will of another" was a limiting factor in freedom to act. Kilpatrick does not seem to identify himself with any of these theories, yet he does not explicitly define what he means by external constraints. It is clear, however, that he does not mean that each and every person be left alone to act as he pleases. He quotes Norman Angell as saying, "When all demand complete freedom, none has any." This is agreed upon by almost every student of the problem of freedom regardless of what theory he holds. Rousseau, the father of the laissez-faire theory, recognized this fact.

Classic liberalism maintained that each person is to be free to act as he chooses so long as he does not interfere in others' freedom. In other words, the maximum freedom of the individual should be consistent with his not interfering with like freedom on the part of other individuals. It is obvious that this is pure abstraction. It is also individualistic and external in nature. To maintain such freedom there must be some set of regulations, yet these regulations may constitute a body of strong obstruction and interfere with individual actions. To solve this dilemma the advocates of such freedom entertained the idea that the function of social institutions must be limited as far as possible to secure the freedom of behavior of one individual against

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2 Quoted by Richard McKeon in Freedom and History, p. 51.
3 Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 119.
interference proceeding from the exercise of similar freedom on the part of others. This essentially meant that the function of government as a controlling agency would be limited to legal and police duties. The same philosophy extends to the economic field, and the test of institutions was based on its relation to the unobstructed play of wants in industry and commerce. The absurdity of such freedom is that it helped vested interests and served some classes rather than human beings impartially.

Kilpatrick asserts his disagreement with this conception of liberalism. His quarrel with this form of liberalism is with the assumptions that underlie it. Liberalism so conceived assumed that men are endowed with certain inalienable rights. Kilpatrick rejects this assumption on the basis that rights "have invariably been interpreted at any one time to fit the accepted doctrine of that time." For him, on the other hand, any right is a principle of action which has been built inductively from experience. It is a hypothesis and must be worked upon as such. The concept of natural rights implies that human nature is fixed and freedom is best attained through the removal of external restrictions which obstruct the free operation of man's fixed and ready-made capacities. For Kilpatrick the potentialities of the individual develop through his interaction with his environment, social or physical. For any efficient living, then, this interaction must not be checked by any obstructions that render sound growth difficult.

4Ibid., p. 53.
Kilpatrick observes that, "If one is to live in any full sense, if he is to be himself and act accordingly, he must have freedom to act. Denial of such freedom or limitation upon it (save as demanded by justice to others) is by so much a denial of the right to live, to be one's self, and by so much a denial of respect for one's personality."  

Although the statement "freedom to act" implies to some extent the absence of interference with external agencies or persons, yet identifying it with respect for one's personality in the above quotation gives a different meaning. When we know that respect for personality means to Kilpatrick "to help each to grow by his own active efforts into the best that in him lies, specifically to help him to make, of his own volition, choices towards ever better ends," then we can conclude that he means much more than just a laissez-faire attitude or mere absence of control. Action, in this sense, involves the whole "organism-in-active-interaction-with-the-environment."

The second kind of freedom makes the distinction arbitrary, because "freedom of the highest self" to control choices is complementary and essential to action. Likewise any choice cannot assume significance until it has been acted upon. Ability to choose is the first step, but unless such an ability can be acted upon it remains an ability in the abstract. Thus freedom is not to act or to choose, but it is both. It is in action built on intelligent choice. In any decision made there

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5Ibid., p. 118.

6Ibid.
must be of necessity an element of contingency. The greater the
degree of contingency the more important becomes the role of choice,
because it requires then a careful consideration of the issues
involved and the consequences expected. The intrinsic connection
between choice and action becomes apparent when it is considered that,
in so far as the resulting consequences of choice are taken into con­sideration in the process of choosing, the choice made is rendered
intelligent and meaningful, and to the extent that deliberation and
choice have preceded action, the range of action is enlarged and the
variety of possible action is increased.

In choosing resides man's moral and also social responsibility.
The relation of moral responsibility, of man's freedom to act ethically
to "causation," is a case in point. Kilpatrick in discussing the law
of causation and determinism asks: "If the 'law of causation' holds
universally, does it not follow that the whole future has in fact
already been determined and this in every detail? If so, is not moral
freedom, after all, a delusion?"^7

One would wonder what difference can it make how great the effort
if our actions are already determined by mechanical laws of cause and
effect? The physical and biological sciences have made great strides
in interpreting nature on the basis of mechanical laws involving cause
and effect. In Kilpatrick's words: "The fundamental belief of

7Tbid., p. 189.
scientists expressed in the 'law of causation'" is "(i) that each event is determined by the action of preceding 'causes'; (ii) that these prior determining causes fix exactly what the resulting effect shall be; and (iii) that like causes always produce like effects."  

If we accept the notion that the world is one of law and that a completely deterministic set of laws applies to man's actions, does it not follow that man is an automaton? If man's actions submit to laws and necessity, then the strife for mastery over environment is meaningless and man is not free to choose his action. Here the question may arise, does not the absence of causal law permit the occurrence of miracles and sheer chance? If the law of causation does not prove adequate, does this mean that the foundations of science are being shaken? Does it exclude any causation in any sense? Is the existence of necessary connection a myth? One may safely entertain the idea that happenings and occurrences in the universe cannot be merely a display of blind chance. What makes the "law of causation" a limiting factor is believing in it as an ultimate, which defies the scientific spirit. 

Determinism is different from predeterminism or, in its exaggerated form, fatalism. Determinism as accounted for by the law of causation finds every effect to be due to a chain of antecedent causes, while fatalism attributes everything to a single original Cause. That

8Ibid., p. 184.
there are natural laws in the universe does not interfere with man's freedom. If these laws are regarded as tools in the hands of a Supreme Being who rules the world, then freedom becomes an illusion. From a scientific point of view, causation can be taken as a working hypothesis subject to revision and examination. In many instances it has nothing to do with the ultimate nature of the universe or the spiritual nature of man. On the other hand, when the laws of science are taken as working hypotheses and are not proved, their value is not destroyed. It is in fact the very essence of the scientific method that hypotheses are valuable as working bases even though they are not proved. So if the law of causation is incapable of proving, that does not preclude its value. The scientist who believes blindly in this law still looks for the possibility of a certain amount of control over the environment. If man looks for control over the environment, does it not imply the effective role of intelligence in bringing change? Can't we call that freedom?

Kilpatrick goes on to discuss the effect of the law of causation on moral responsibility and free will. He asks: "Specifically then we ask here whether the 'law of causation' holds for man's mental and moral processes as truly as for material things. And if so, what becomes of 'free-will' and moral responsibility?"  

9Ibid., p. 185.
Assigning to man the ability to think, he differentiates between man as free agent and moth or brick.\textsuperscript{10} Man's freedom lies in his ability to learn, think, and accumulate wisdom through which he can live a better criticized life. In other words, man's freedom lies in his intelligent behavior.

By learning and thinking man thus accumulates practical wisdom so that he now can behave more intelligently. \ldots He can now better choose his goals and means, and perhaps take steps next time to avoid a repetition of this time's misfortune.\textsuperscript{11}

This gives him freedom; \ldots he has freedom not only to act but so to profit by the successive result of action as to be able to plan and realize a happier life.\textsuperscript{12}

How the law of causation is related to moral responsibility is a point at stake. Kilpatrick does not exclude causation as a factor in human action. What he is against is predetermination. He defines causation in different terms, however. He said, \ldots 'causation' is the combined effect of all factors that enter into an event to determine what it shall be.\textsuperscript{13}

Can we say that the difference between causation as assumed in the "law of causation" and that suggested by Kilpatrick is a difference of propositions? The former is concerned with the order of nature and the latter is describing empirical relations among things. When so

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 186.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
conceived the former can be said to be of speculative and problematic nature, while the latter is secured through experience which is more fitting with pragmatism. In the latter the cause need not produce the effect because it is not assumed to be given in the cause. It might or might not issue in the present experience. In the latter sense, likewise, there is no antinomy between freedom and causation.

What has all this to do with morality? Proceeding from his definition of causation Kilpatrick says, "When a moral decision is being considered, it is the influence of thought on thought and feeling, and of these on decision. The result is caused precisely by the interaction of such factors."\textsuperscript{14} In that case any decision "is a true and effective case of causation,"\textsuperscript{15} because it is determined by intelligent understanding of the situation. Such decision "is as inevitably caused-determined at the time, not predetermined."\textsuperscript{16}

For Kilpatrick, man's freedom is inherent in these intelligent decisions. It is obvious that this view of freedom supports the conclusion that selectivity is an important feature of educative experience, otherwise there can be no problem of this kind.

To follow his discussion further, when a person is able to "... study and learn, he is free to act intelligently, as intelligently as his thinking and choosing will allow. Freedom thus to act

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 186.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 187. (Italics not in the original.)

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
intelligently, and so responsibly, when a situation of moral doubt is the only kind of moral freedom we wish or need.  

Here an observation may be made. Activities may be intelligent in terms of results but not intelligent when the quality of results is considered. In other words, to qualify an act as intelligent is problematic. In terms of reflective thinking an act can be described as intelligent when it is based on warranted assertions. So far so good. But this does not qualify an act as moral. Morality comes through making the person responsible for his actions. This accountability becomes a factor in making decisions. Kilpatrick describes this accountability as "the obligation to act according to the best." It seems, however, that intelligent choice as conceived by Kilpatrick is not identical with successful choice but includes as an essential characteristic the moral factor.

Now we may turn to the old cherished term "freedom of the will." Kilpatrick argues that, on one hand, modern psychology shies away from the notion of substantive mind, and the faculty psychology which considers "will" as a faculty has its separate existence. He remarks, "To ask whether 'the will' is free, is accordingly to use an out of date term, now no longer acceptable." On the other hand to say that the will is free is to make it independent from "causation." This,

\[17\text{Ibid.}\]
\[18\text{Ibid., p. 187.}\]
\[19\text{Ibid., p. 188.}\]
he maintains, destroys both prudence and moral responsibility. We notice that Kilpatrick could reconcile freedom with causality and show how they are related to moral responsibility and moral decisions. These moral decisions are not choices of a will, per se, but according to his view they are caused—determined by the whole situation including both individual and things or facts involved. The individual freedom is dependent and inherent in his ability to make judgment and decide intelligently, which in turn depends on his knowledge and thinking. Knowledge of the conditions under which a choice is to be made is potentially a guide in forming intelligent choice. If freedom is that much a condition of human intelligence, then it is an achievement and a form of growth. It is always in the making so far as the selfhood is in the making.

Having all this faith in human intelligence Kilpatrick naturally would shy away from the doctrine of predetermination. He believes that predetermination is a threat to morality. It lessens the sense of responsibility which is the bedrock for moral behavior. He thinks that it destroys faith in either the necessity or wisdom of effort. He declares: "... any doctrine that distracts attention from the positive effects of what one does or does not do, distracts attention by so much from one's duty to others, from one's duty positively to make this a better world."20

20Ibid., p. 192.
He flatly refutes predeterminism and supports his position in five points built on his whole system.

1. On a common-sense basis, man acts and reacts to his immediate situation in order to satisfy his wants. Man thinks and plans and changes his plans in the light of their consequences. Whereas, if man goes by the theory of predeterminism, all his efforts become meaningless and his feeling of responsibility vanishes. Predeterminism, Kilpatrick points out, "would explain away the whole behavior situation on which life is based." He urges that the notion of a present that is merely unrolling what was fixed at the beginning must be rejected. Effort must count.

2. Kilpatrick has great faith in science. Meanwhile the law of causation is a scientific law and is used in favor of predeterminism. To clarify this point, he remarks:

Although this law is even now widely, if not generally accepted, certain facts should be stated in connection with it; (1) the term 'law' has recently shifted its scientific meaning; an accepted scientific 'law' is not now counted as necessarily or finally true but only as the best foundation yet made by man for describing the known related factor. . . . (iii) it has all the while been true that certain philosophers, along with certain moralists and theologians, have doubted that the 'law of causation' as scientifically understood holds in regard to human choice and conduct.22

This seems to show that the justification of predeterminism through the "law of causation" is groundless. Scientific inquiries

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21 Ibid., p. 193.
22 Ibid., p. 28 ff.
carry with them the assumption that creative thinking in formulating hypotheses and suitable devices in experimenting will effect results. If effort affects results, then it follows that predeterminism is meaningless.

3. Kilpatrick believes in contingency. Unless there is a contingent situation, there is no sense in the idea that effort affects results. Novelty is real. "Our world of affairs develops in ever novel and precarious fashion." Each event is unique. And the "uniformities of nature" are not the events themselves but constituent parts of events. Thus men work on probable terms. They can predict but can never be certain. Things may be determined here and now but cannot be predetermined.

4. His fourth point in the argument comes from the "Existence and Need of Morals." He takes his proof for this need from the notion that morality has been recognized ever since early human societies. He firmly believes that the acceptance of predeterminism confuses and obstructs moral behavior; therefore, it is safe to reject it. His argument at this point cannot be taken as a logical refutation. It is a matter of value judgment.

5. His last point is that the universe is composed of an infinite number of discrete physical objects; that it is rather inconceivable to think that cosmic determinism can hold. His evidence for this assumption seems to lie in this, that any scientific inquiry is

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limited by virtue of the fact that it deals with certain objects and never with the whole universe; and we can never tell when outside forces, from somewhere within our infinite universe, might interfere and upset the results. What is clear, however, is that Kilpatrick does not accept any view that the universe is the product of blind material forces.

In the last analysis there is a genuine difference between Kilpatrick's theory of freedom and the classical theories of free-will and predetermination. The theory of freedom of the will defines freedom on the basis of something antecedently given; something already possessed. Kilpatrick's theory, like that of Bode, seeks freedom in something which comes to be. The two theories of free-will and predeterminism conceive the universe as fixed and static. Kilpatrick believes in change and that our universe is evolving. Thus he looks for freedom in a developing course of action, in becoming rather than in static being. Kilpatrick's theory of freedom denotes that the possibility of freedom is one with sound development. It is deeply grounded in our unique individuality, yet its actualization is dependent more or less on the interaction with objective conditions. This brings home the importance and obligations of social institutions. It may be conceded that social institutions may interfere with the freedom of individuals. But they are necessary for organizing human situations and without them effective or objective freedom is at stake. If, however, the relation of individual freedom to social arrangements and institutions is regarded as a necessary relationship, then social institutions may be considered as experimental affairs; that is, to serve for the testing of new methods, new ideas, and the eliciting of better
human relations. It must be remembered that the relation between individuals and social institutions is reciprocal. Just as individuals need the power and instrumentality of social arrangements so social institutions require the force of intelligence which can emanate only from individuals. In other words, if intelligence is necessary for freedom, then it must be a genuinely socialized intelligence. The justification of social institutions lies in establishing conditions conducive to progress. They should provide for the participation of all members in a continual examination and revision of standards and precepts in terms of common purposes and interests. This is the democratic attitude or way of life when society is based on active respect for human personality and continual rethinking of its own standards and values. The democratic attitude is faith in the scientific spirit, which implies the testing of any idea before it is given the right of way; it is a faith in the ability of groups to arrive at decisions which shall govern the group with justice for all; and it is an attitude of faith in human intelligence, in the release of human potentialities and capacities to achieve the common good.

This theory of freedom is calling for self-directing personalities that can carry forward life efficiently in an ever-changing world. This puts a great responsibility on education. What education can do will be discussed in the last section of this work.
Otto in his writings has not tackled the problem of freedom in any special form save his essay on freedom of speech in *Freedom and Experience*,¹ yet his philosophy bears on the subject from different angles. He emphasizes throughout his writings the part that temperament plays in the construction of philosophical systems. He does not, however, regard any philosophy as capable of all-inclusiveness. He pleads time and again for a frank recognition of the genuineness of the human struggle. This interest in human activities and human experience makes freedom an infinitely desirable character of human life. Apparently such an interest does not coincide with any mechanistic view of man which is blind to many of the facts of human experience, to which freedom seems but an absurd superstition. Likewise it opposes any notion that makes human action dependent on any one superhuman. Otto contends that—So far as the course of human life testifies, there is no indication that anything or anyone superhuman is bent upon the triumph of humane or ethical principles. It seems to be up to us and us alone.²

This emphasis on human activities stems from Otto's pluralistic view of the universe. He believes that reality exists distributively rather than collectively, and that it must therefore be described as

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¹Sidney Hook and M. R. Kinvitz, *Freedom and Experience*.

realities rather than Reality. Yet he recognizes some sort of unity in the universe. "The world we see and touch spreads out into a larger togetherness of things in space and in time." He maintains, nevertheless, that there is no valid reason for believing reality to be supersensible or holding that the experimental forms of it extend into a supersensible realm. Reality is continuous with the substance of human experience; hence it is personal and impersonal in interaction. Each one of the strata of human experience is authentic and must have a place in the sum of realities. "Whatever it is that command a man, to which he gives himself up, in which he invests his energies, and for which he fears and hopes, this is his reality."* This view in Otto's opinion has the advantage of improving "Man's chances of finding his way among life's facts and values."  

The experienced world has a way of adding to itself or of being added to. In other words there is a more of some kind, an infinite realm of possibilities. These possibilities are not "some hybrid kind of being inhabiting a mysterious realm between existence and non-existence," but are present actualities when co-ordinated with other actualities form new characteristics and powers.

A possible invention is an actual human being in an actual situation working upon some actual concrete material to bring about some new contrivance. A possibility in physical nature is some process now going on which will arrive at an anticipated destination, providing other processes also going on, the influence of which we do not know, do not interfere with the expected outcome.  

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3 Ibid., p. 191.  
4 Ibid., p. 183.  
5 Ibid., pp. 177-178.  
6 Ibid., p. 190.  
7 Ibid., p. 182.  
8 Ibid., p. 183.
This is a roundabout way of saying that events and happenings can be accounted for without an appeal to any extra-experiential realm. For Otto the postulation of a Reality is created by abstract thinking, then transformed into a pure Being to account for these possibilities. His objection to the notion of placing the "exhaustless possibilities" in a supersensible realm rests on two points. On one hand, if we place reality somewhere outside experience, we still have to distinguish between the real and the unreal inside experience. On the other hand, what we may consider outside experience is actually inside it. It is always, Otto seems to say, a continuation of what has gone before. "Every invention, every discovery, every scientific or speculative advance, is the extension or elaboration of the known. It is a novel occurrence resulting from a newly established relationship between things or ideas within experience." 

This pluralistic view of reality attempts to describe the particular and concrete unities found in experience; thus it makes life interesting by leaving room for human activity and human choice. If reality "is that composite of things and forces human and non-human by means of which we live," then we can select from among the several realities those combinations that may eventually lead to the best life: "best when judged by the satisfaction it brings, and best when judged by the quality of excellence attained through the release and investment of human potentialities of nature." The choices made by man are built into the

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9Ibid., p. 182.

10Ibid., p. 192.
world of the next generation which conserves it and adds to it. So far as intelligent insight enters into it, these choices signify a capacity for deliberately changing preference. This assumes the individual's inherent ability to choose and the possibility of putting choice into action, hence individual participation which constitutes a factor in freedom.

Thus understood, a choice is not an oscillation between several fixed alternatives, because, as Otto's view implies, alternatives are constantly changing and developing through the process of choice. An action based on choice seems to require, as Petrunkevitch says, 1) perception of existing alternatives; 2) evaluation of each alternative; 3) decision in favor of one of them; and 4) translation of the decision into action. If we translate this into the meaning of freedom, the term "intelligent choice" might well be substituted for it.

The pluralistic view of Otto implies novelty and contingency. If reality is continuous with the substance of daily experience then it is always in the doing. This doing brings new relationships between things or ideas within experience, which result in novel occurrences. Novelty here does not assume a rearrangement of fixed pre-existing parts of a whole which is absolute and immutable, nor does it assume the arising of a particular fact out of nothing. It does consist in creativity or, we may say, the ability to modify or change the expected influence of precedent events.

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The presence of alternatives is a prerequisite for choice. As Perry says, "Choice involves either/or, it is a selecting from among alternatives." It is also a prerequisite for the operation of chance. Meanwhile there is a clear difference between choice and chance. The element of chance can be accounted for through the fact of the multi-facet complexities of human life. Otto perceives the occurrence of chance. Contemplating on this fact, he says:

If human existence were free from hazards and everyone by taking pains could be sure of securing what he desires, and if all things desired proved to be desirable, there might be no lifting of wistful eyes beyond the nearest goals. But man is blocked by circumstances and by himself. He is subject to accident and hindered by weakness and disease. Besides, whatever the achievement, whatever the triumph, there is always the longing that will not be satisfied. Finally death cuts every man down and time brings the noblest enterprise to an end.

The above statement pictures man as a hopeless, helpless creature, victim of sheer chance and play of circumstances, whereas Otto declares that man is active and refuses passively to accept the world as offered. He tries to master the mysterious forces around him. Here one can venture to say that Otto starts with a universal scheme. This is a significant difference between Otto and the other two. This notion of world purpose is apparent in such statements of Otto as, "Everywhere the passing away of the old and the coming of the new are inseparable phases of a larger process active in both," or "... that unfathomable mystery we call nature, that complexity of being into which

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12 R. B. Perry, "What Does It Mean to be Free?", Pacific Spectator, 7, No. 2 (1953, 126.


14 Ibid., p. 68.
every living thing sends its roots.\textsuperscript{15} Is this a detour to determinism? Is there an active force behind this "larger process" that constitutes a "final cause?" Or is it regulated by fixed natural laws which assumes that every cause has its effect and that cause and effect are bound to each other by necessity? If we believe that the future has already been determined, then nothing can be different from what is going to be, and man's efforts are accordingly futile and useless. The important difficulty that encounters such a position is the postulation of opposition between freedom and causation. Recently, however, different thinkers seem to reject any notion that opposes freedom to causation. Taube asserts the compatibility of causation with freedom.\textsuperscript{16} Kadish agrees that "human behavior has a causal dynamism which makes part of the natural world, in principle, predictable."\textsuperscript{17} Petrunkevitch's Principle of Plural Effects assumes the non-opposition of causation to freedom.\textsuperscript{18} The problem of causation is of such significant importance to freedom that it makes an intelligible discussion an arduous task at this point.

It suffices, here, to mention that Otto does not deny causation. He does not treat the problem at length. He holds, nevertheless, that man's activities are not predetermined in the sense that they do not depend on a so-called "final cause." There are, meanwhile, calculable

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 67.

\textsuperscript{16}Mortimer Taube, \textit{Causation, Freedom, and Determinism}, Ch. VII.

\textsuperscript{17}Mortimer R. Kadish, "The Location and Dislocation of Freedom," \textit{Twelfth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion}, p. 626.

"secondary causes." Man, using his intelligence, can understand these secondary causes and thus increase his power to exercise control over the conditions of life. Likewise, he does not accept causation as assumed in the "law of causation." Instead he concedes to the idea that problems should not be reduced to the terms demanded in a physicist's laboratory. Although he believes in the importance of applying the scientific method and in extending disciplined intelligence exemplified in science to every field where problems need to be solved, yet he warns against the substitution of the scientists' simplified picture of things for the wealth of reality given in experience. This, he maintains, violates both facts and values and may promote invested interests and class benefits. "To make man's quest for a satisfying meaningful life subservient to the advancement of science, either theoretical or applied, is no more rational than to surrender the human venture into the hands of men whose supreme interest is the promotion of industry and trade.\(^\text{19}\)

The reality of contingency can be explained through Otto's view of "an open universe." The changes that take place are interactions. These interactions are complexly interrelated and continually changing in those interrelations. This means that in any given situation each actuality plays diverse roles in its relations to some of the other actualities, thus providing a host of possibilities. These possibilities must not be overestimated, however. For two factors must be considered.

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In the first place, in any situation the individual is limited by the potentialities of the things involved. And in the second place he is confined to his knowledge of these potentialities and the techniques for exploiting them. This makes freedom contingent upon the materials at hand and their specific potentialities, and on his ability to use his knowledge intelligently in elaborating and mastering these materials. Freedom thus resides in the interaction between man and his environment. This puts freedom in its practical context within limitations relative to contingencies in nature. It may be objected that man acts the way he does because he is and was produced by antecedent forces. But we must remember that such a position conceives life not as a dynamic process but as an ordered succession of events from which calculated results can be foreseen. Man's acts certainly stretch into the past, but this is not the whole story. As a thinking being he projects into his future and induces change.

With regard to scientific laws, we must remember that a scientific law does not by itself bring about events. It is not a force but a working hypothesis. Scientific laws serve as guides in experience. Knowledge of them helps in anticipating consequences of alternative choices which lead more or less successfully to desired outcomes. In this case knowledge of the laws is a means of increased freedom rather than a restriction of actions to inevitable destinies.

Thus far the discussion has centered about the implication of Otto's philosophy for the concept of freedom. We may now turn to an examination of the relation between morality and freedom in his thought. The
notion of human choice is very significant to moral life. Man is an active being, aware of what he wants. If not always, and that is the case, we can say frequently enough to become involved in deciding what he wants most. The concept of values seems to originate in making decisions of this sort and in his preference for one object rather than for another. How can the satisfaction be related to morality, or what determines a want to be right or wrong, good or bad? Human wants, impulses, and desires are diverse and unlimited. As Otto puts it: "Human life may ... be said to present a 'howling mob of desires, each struggling to get breathing-room for the idea to which it clings.' The result is that choice is made inevitable, and this, the necessity of choosing, lays the foundation of the moral life."20

The above statement implies that wants are bound to come into conflict with one another. Not only so, but occasions may arise when one has to compromise between his wants and those of others. Morality depends not only upon settling the conflict between impulses but also upon intelligence. The importance of intelligence lies in its effect upon making choices. Without intelligence "the exercise of choice, in any proper sense of the word, cannot take place."21 To safeguard against any ambiguity of the word "intelligence," Otto uses it with three qualifications: i) acting with awareness of the action; ii) acting deliberately or purposively; and iii) acting from a desire for remoter ends, the attainment of which is dependent upon the present action as means. So

21Ibid., p. 117.
conceived it becomes an instrument in evaluating ends and discovering ways and means for bringing about the desired consummation. The function of intelligence in morality is more than finding a way out of conflict by finding a new end in which the conflicting wants or desires can find some manner of adjustment. A person is potentially moral when, aware of his actions, wants, and conflicting interests, he can manipulate the situation with reference to a projected goal. We say "potentially" because this potency can become functional only when a person, faced with conflicting desires and impulses, proposes to make some sort of adjudication. What Otto proposes at this point is a positive devotion to a way of life. "To be moral," he says, "is to have a program of life." To say this is to beg the question of whether morality involves facing the promptings of life with the purpose of fashioning them to an ideal. What is that ideal then?

Otto flatly rejects any notion of a transcendental set of ideals or fixed "catalogue of virtues." He believes that wants antedate moral life. Wants in themselves are not good or bad, but they simply are. If all desires can be satisfied without later dissatisfaction of interference with one another, concepts such as right or wrong, good or bad, would be meaningless. Hence, there would be no moral problem. Otto puts it this way: "If impulses were insulated from one another so that the satisfaction of one had no bearing on the rest, if impulses were not 'members of one body,' mutual sharers in a common destiny, determinable to some extent by each, what would a moral problem be?"

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22Ibid., p. 114.
With these two points in mind, the primacy of desires and the im-
possibility of satisfying them all, it can be said that the goal of the
moral life is not in settling the conflict between them but in securing
the richest total of satisfied desires. What is meant here is not a
"fixed quantum but a progressive approximation, changing and growing with
times and conditions, to the fullest realization of personal potentialities
and the completest possible participation in the appealing interests of
life."23 This is the ideal that should guide moral choices. Otto be-
lieves that it can be applied individually as well as collectively.
Human beings are so involved in each others' lives that the wants of
others must be included along in any program of life. This is to say
that human relations are so interdependent that choice becomes a
problem for every thoughtful person; hence there have developed various
theories of right and wrong and of the good life. To delve into these
theories is to venture into almost every field of philosophical inquiry.
Due to the intrinsic relation between morality and freedom, it is needed,
however, to look into some bearings of these theories on human conduct
from Otto's point of view.

The first of these theories is that which espouses the notion
"that might alone is and must be the arbiter."24 Otto's rejection rests
not on the doctrine as such but on the meaning that is attached to the
word "might." He points out, "If we use the word for all those forces,
whatever they may be, which cooperate in bringing about a moral outlook,

23Ibid., p. 122.

24Otto, The Human Enterprise, p. 139.
then might is indeed responsible for the moral ideals a people may, from
time to time, espouse." He does not object to power exercised through
persuasion because "it is a power in which the ideal functions signifi­
cantly, not a power external to the ideal which enforces its adoption
willy nilly." The objection may arise that persuasion in itself is as
dangerous as coercion or force of arms. Does not the appeal to persuasion
lead to indoctrination? Or to submission to fixed standards? It seems
possible that persuasion may endanger intelligent insight into the moral
situation. Otto, however, does not rely on persuasion but seeks for
intelligent understanding of human desires and of the means to achieve
the completest life for every human being. He intimates that a philosophy
of might

...is incapable of furthering the most liveable life. For
it is its very genius to construct, not to enlarge, apprecia­
tion of values. Whenever it rules it paralyzes social imagination,
intensifies and spreads a destructive spirit...and consequently
is not directed toward but away from the attainment of the
general welfare.

The other point of view which is attacked by Otto is super­
naturalism. He maintains that supernaturalism, in relying upon a Supreme
Being or Power, leaves the individual with the feeling of incapability
of making a proper choice among desires. In spite of some merits such as
its devotion to human good and its defined ethical authority, it suffers
from serious defects. It concentrates on a piece of man, which it calls

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26 Ibid., p. 87.
"soul," rather than man as a whole. Thus it brings about a tragic discrepancy between the "spiritual" and the "practical." Over against this supernaturalism which attempts to give facts and events a supernatural interpretation and which regards, "the sensible world as 'a disheartening whirlwind of vain and fragmentary facts,' utterly without meaning unless converted, through the laborious use of reason, into a hieroglyphic of divine purpose or an apparition of God," Otto believes that plain human nature and the surrounding world are sufficient for the realization of individual and social greatness. He asks: "Why not admit that for the practical realization of the good life we are obliged to act as we do in tilling the ground or baking bread, that is to rely upon experimental knowledge to find out what it is we want and how we got it." Otto, Things and Ideals, pp. 280-281.

28 Otto, Things and Ideals, pp. 280-281.


Man, for Otto, has to depend upon powers discoverable in himself and in his environment, social or physical. These powers will come to full actualization when they are developed within a system of mutual interaction and sharing of valuable experience of man for worthy ends. He declares "inspiration and guidance rise out of inner human resources to elevate the level of human interests." A good life cannot be attained through the elevation of the so-called spiritual over the material or vice versa. The two are co-equal aspects of the experienced reality. The good life is built upon their happy interrelation and on finding the richest quality of experience in daily occupations, associations, and enjoyment.
Otto substitutes faith in man for faith in any superhuman which gives man power. His faith is clearly expressed in these words:

It is my conviction that the happiest and noblest life attainable by men and women is jeopardized by reliance upon a superhuman, cosmic being for guidance and help. . . .Reliance upon God for what life does not afford, has, in my opinion, harmful consequences. It diverts attention from the specific conditions upon which a better or a worse life depends; it leads men to regard themselves as spectators of a course of events which they in reality help to determine.\textsuperscript{31}

For him:

It is thus, a constructive social suggestion that we endeavor to give up, as the basis of our desire to win a satisfactory life, the quest of the companionship with a being behind or within the fleeting aspect of nature; that we assume the universe to be indifferent towards the human venture that means everything to us; that we acknowledge ourselves to be adrift in infinite space on our little earth, the sole custodians of our ideals.\textsuperscript{32}

From all that has been said thus far, it seems possible to conclude that Otto can be understood to mean that theism threatens freedom. With this goes the defying of the doctrine of free will, which is related usually to teleology and divine causality in the world.

The important implication of Otto's view is that man is made responsible for his action. To say that a person is responsible for his action implies that he could have chosen otherwise. If we say that the act was caused by a series of factors transcending the individual as is held by scientific determinism, then it seems to follow that those factors and not the person should be held responsible.

Otto holds that it is true there are many actions of human beings that are machine-like, yet there are many others which are not. He reminds

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 313

\textsuperscript{32}Otto, \textit{Things and Ideals}, p. 289.
us that scientific concepts and generalizations are not literal transcripts of reality but highly selective constructs of the human mind. Man is not a machine; he reacts upon himself and transforms the nature of his operation. In this transformance he consciously selects certain aspects of his environment upon which he acts deliberately. Man reflects on his actions, evaluates and judges and changes plans. Instead of forcing these features of human actions into a conceptual scheme fitting to the behavior of atoms and molecules for the betterment of man, we consider these features at the human level. In this way, "We put ourselves in the way of gaining ends to be reached neither by blind adherence to nor blind rejection of the highest specialization of human intelligence which science undoubtedly is."33

By the same token, if we say that human actions are predetermined by a divine Will, then responsibility should fall on that Will and not on the person. It may be objected that the divine Will is good and man's moral responsibility lies in conforming to this Will. Some determinists, however, assume that man's freedom is maintained only when he conforms to that Will. This seems to give responsibility a very limited meaning. It also makes man a mere passive entity in a larger process. To hold this position is to reduce higher life, to use Otto's metaphor "... to some form of trance induced by sitting on a peak of mystical abstraction gazing into the fact of a oneness that is everything though nothing."34 To lodge ethical principles outside man is a retreat which

33Ibid., p. 222.
34Ibid.
robs them of their vital form. If we regard ethical interest as "... a way of stepping out of the actualities of social conflict," the higher life is likely to be doomed. Our responsibility is in seeing the problems of life in their social context. Our moral obligation is to commit ourselves to a belief in the function of intelligence and setting worthy standards of conduct. Otto quotes Dewey as saying:

The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying, and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. . . .

In conclusion, Otto believes, as do Bode and Kilpatrick, that the valuable achievements of civilization are and can be produced through the work of human intelligence. In emphasizing the moral life he maintained that moral principles must be taken from the actualities of life, from concrete situations. Although man is hampered by circumstances, he can induce change. "We can do something, if we will, to decide whether our ideals shall advance the human cause or

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35 Otto, "Shall We Quit or See it Through," Christian Century, 56 (January 11, 1939), 62.

36 Quoted by Otto in The Human Enterprise, p. 368.
set it back." Not only so, but man in setting ideals makes demands on the future and works for the realization of those demands. Freedom is not absence of external control but the active part played by man. Socially speaking, man is the victim of social calamity because he never starts from scratch. "Experience writes upon him before he is aware of it." The existence of others impinges upon his existence. The lives of men are so interrelated that some form of give and take is forced upon everyone. From early life the person is exposed to customs and habits that infect him before he gains any immunity. This mortgages man's freedom. To be free, however, is not to recast this accumulated wealth of experience but to borrow from it and add to it. Man can draw upon the capital stock of knowledge and use it intelligently to better his lot and control his environment. Two things stand clear in Otto's thought. The authenticity of particular experience is the road for understanding reality most deeply, and valuable information can be got from the examination of things in their particularity. Particular situations are not, meanwhile, separate instances of events. They are interwoven. Any given situation reaches out into the past and future and around itself. On the other hand, man's freedom is limited because he is bound up with others, with his physical environment, with his

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37_ibid., p. 75._

38_ibid., p. 135._
past, and with chances inherent in future possibilities. What freedom he has is dependent on him, that is on his knowledge and his intelligence.
CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF THE THREE POINTS OF VIEW

The last three chapters were an attempt at an explanation of how Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto conceive freedom. The attempt was centered more or less on the main features and is something of a survey. Now an analysis with a consideration of the problem in general and as viewed by other writers seems helpful in rendering an intelligible comprehension of the position of the three writers.

This chapter is an attempt at such analysis. A major difficulty encountered by the writer is that the three philosophers do not attack the problem of freedom as a major issue. The nature of their writings, in the writer's opinion, is not concentrated on philosophical assumptions per se. They are more concerned with practical matters on a common sense level rather than speculative presumptions or dialectical arguments. Thus traditional questions usually connected with the problem of freedom, such as causation, necessity, etc. in their scholastic formulation, are seldom tackled. This makes a comparison extremely difficult, yet an inclusion of some of these issues, however brief, may be illuminating.

Historically the problem of freedom is a corollary to that of the mind-body problem in the sense that the free-willists based their premises on the supremacy of mind over body, while the determinists were more concerned with supposed fixed laws of matter and motion. The problem is an old one, and full elaboration upon it would carry us far from the present concern. It suffices, therefore, to point out some of the distinctive features of each of the two doctrines mentioned above.
The doctrine of free will, we may say, involves two questions—what is free and the nature of its freedom. Those who speak about a will that is free or not free assume that the mind is an entity that moves the body. Such a mind has a will that is independent and has an almost universal existence. For them the freedom of the will is a natural attribute and a potentiality which is ipso facto natural to man. The problem as a living issue seems to arise in Christian theology in the hands of St. Augustine. For Augustine freedom lies in subjugation to the Supreme Law which is above the rational mind. The will is always free but does not possess freedom; that is, the will is always free in terms of making choices. But freedom does not consist in free choice because the latter leaves open the possibility of doing evil. Freedom of the will, therefore, consists in choosing the good.

Augustine, through his principle of election, however, robbed man of even the ability of choosing good. Man is sinful and capable of good only through the grace of God. This naive freedom is, in effect, nothing more than predestination. This view of freedom was not peculiar to Augustine. It was common, though disputed, and found its way into Protestantism through Calvin. It, however, raises the question of man’s moral responsibility. The principles of God’s foreknowledge and election raise different important questions. How can man be held responsible for his actions? How can we account for the evils in the world? What is the nature of God’s will? McKeon comments on Augustine’s conception, noting that it relates "freedom to concepts which in
some fashion transcend theoretical knowledge and rational processes."¹

The theologian's notion that God is the final cause and that everything follows from his activity puts the destiny of man in His hands. The business of man, therefore, is to act according to what is assigned for him, and if he has any freedom, it is in the conformity to the Supreme Law. Here one can use an analogy from Kallen.

He is like a person tied to a moving automobile. So long as he wants to go to another place than that the automobile is headed for, he resists its motion but goes with the automobile nevertheless... He is a slave because he resists. To become a free man he needs only to cease resisting. Let him instead hop on the car, and permit it to carry him; let him ride like a prince instead of running reluctantly backward like a pauper.²

It must be noted that many modern theologians seem to have released themselves from many of the dogmas of scholastic religion. Meanwhile they still hold that moral freedom lies in doing everything that is not forbidden by the precepts of Revelation. And the most liberal of modern theologians consent to the notion of eternal verities and absolute truth, which mean in terms of moral freedom, blind allegiance to these absolutes. How, one may ask, do Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto react to the above position? At the outset the three repudiate any dualism, hence reject the notion of "a will" that has any separate existence. They base their theory of mind on modern psychology, which regards will in a different precept, namely, volition that is not separate from the organism as a whole. It follows that freedom is not assigned to a separate part of man.


They also shy away from absolutes. Moral standards are conceived as working hypotheses subject to change and relative. Likewise they do not attend to predestination. Kilpatrick intimates that "... a theory of fate, which fixes events in advance despite whatever actions may intervene, runs exactly counter to all common sense and all sciences in that it denies every accepted theory of causation." Otto is more explicit in denying any notion of "first cause." He goes further and sustains a faith in the non-existence of God, maintaining that "Not believing in God has worked ... better ... than believing did. It is responsible for a realistic acquaintance with our world and a better understanding of human nature." He believes that for human benefit, it is better to depend on "Cooperative faith in the intelligent use of natural and human resources" which "has provided a sufficient incentive to high minded conduct." The essential difference in supernaturalism and the pragmatic view of our three philosophers is wherein they place their faith. They put great faith in human intelligence with the conviction that intelligence is sufficiently general so that each individual is able to better his lot and contribute to the welfare and progress of the social whole.

The growing importance of science brought an important change in the attitude toward freedom of the will. How did this change come about? The Enlightenment dethroned the theistic God of the scholastic philosophers


5Ibid., p. 330. (For a better understanding of Otto's position on the existence of God, read Is There a God?)
and raised human reason to the highest authority in His stead. They substituted for God a sensible deity who had planned a well-ordered universe and a rational race of men, then sat back and watched the consequences. In Deism, the eighteenth century man found the basis of both his science and his morality. The application of science comes first, for the physical universe must be proved to be a consistent product of a reasonable God before man could hope to discover reason in human affairs. As one should seek to understand the laws of physical science in order to establish basic truth, so one should explore the moral laws which govern human behavior in order to improve man's condition by bringing his conduct more nearly into line with immutable reason. Consequently, final causes have been more and more supplanted by the over-mastering power of causality. In sum, there started a process of secularizing God into the laws of nature. In the hands of Kant the task of secularizing God's power into the law of nature seemed to have been completed. How did this affect the problem of freedom of the will?

The question of whether the will is free was treated through the relation of the will to ideas supplied by reason. The prominent question was: is the true world one of rigid necessity or is it a world of free spiritual ideals? Is it a world of a moral order or is it a world of mechanistic laws as empirical science claims it to be? For the rationalist the world is of ideal truth and of mind. Most of those philosophers did not deny science its importance, but limited its function to the physically real which, according to Royce, "... we experience
and can describe. These philosophers ascertain the spiritual realm which transcends immediacies and fleeting elements of experience. For them the spiritual world is the Ultimate Reality.

This distinction between two realms of existence contributed to the problem of freedom. Freedom became of two kinds: metaphysical, dealing with causation and necessity, and ethical freedom which admits of degrees, and in its highest degree, is characteristic of God. Leibnitz seems to have made such a distinction. Kant in distinguishing between the phenomenal and the noumenal or the temporal and the non-temporal differentiated between temporal necessity and non-temporal freedom. Our freedom is not that we choose this or that thing in time, but help to determine what world this temporal world shall eternally be. Kant's affirmation of freedom was on the ground of the demands of the moral life, which makes freedom necessary for the operation of the moral law. It is the causal principle of moral action without which true morality would be impossible. As a principle of causality it can operate only in the intelligible realm of which the self as a noumenon is a part, for in the phenomenal world, the world of nature, everything is determined by an endless chain of mechanical causation with no break open for the operation of freedom. Thus freedom is a postulate of moral life. It is known a priori because it is the condition of the fulfillment of the moral law which we also know a priori because morality cannot justifiably be derived from examples.

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7Ibid., p. 433.
For each example of morality which is exhibited to me must itself have been previously judged according to principles of morality to see whether it is worthy to serve as an original example . . . By no means could it furnish the concept of morality. 8

The idea of moral perfection consequently is formulated a priori by reason, and it is inseparably connected with the concept of free will. Kant conceived the will as the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws, and "Since reason is required for the derivation of action from laws, will is nothing else than practical reason." 9 The freedom of such a will is in its subjugation to the moral law, which in turn is given by the will. In other words freedom is autonomy. The moral responsibility of man is in acting according to the will which must be in harmony with itself and not influenced by extraneous forces that arise from experience. The moral law is a categorical imperative in the sense that it is a form whose content is supplied by the concrete situations in experience. It is universal, necessary, and a priori valid. In other words, Kant made a point of the idea that moral action is necessary in itself without reference to the effects of the action. In making freedom a causal principle of the moral law, Kant gave it operational character.

This transcendental freedom by which man as noumenon legislates for objects of choice and with respect to them he is free but has no choice,


9Ibid., p. 72.
is apparently different from the pragmatic freedom which is found in the capacity to choose between alternatives. It is noteworthy to mention that what is required in the pragmatic conception is intelligent choice. In other words, freedom is not merely the right to choose, but it is the ability to choose the best as judged by intelligence. Man legislates his own ideals and principles and then follows them. The genuine difference is that the pragmatists do not appeal to any transcendental realm for such legislation. The only source for them is human experience. By appealing to experience, they claim, we avoid absolutism which mortgages human freedom. How much do they adhere to this?

It can be said that Kilpatrick proposes some ethical principles which are more or less a paraphrasing of some moral maxims of Kant. The former says that "Each person is to be treated always as end never merely as means. In this ethical respect all men are to stand equal." Conversely, each person is under moral obligation so to act as, negatively, not to hurt the good life of others and, positively, to foster the good life for all."\(^{10}\)

Kant's maxim reads as follows: "Act so that you treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another always as an end, never as a means only."\(^{12}\)


The similarity is clear. Kilpatrick in using "always" and "never" is giving his principle the universality required by Kant for moral law. In so doing Kilpatrick is violating one of his other principles, namely, "We know no absolute principles."¹³ Does this mean that exceptions can be allowed in respect to the first principle? Kilpatrick maintained that the good life for man, his chief end, morality itself, lies in the above mentioned principle, which is impossible unless the principle is held inviolate and permits no exceptions.

The pragmatists part from Kant in his maxims "Thou shalt. . ." and "Thou shalt not. . .", which he intended to be followed under all circumstances. Kant cited as an example the maxim "Thou shalt not lie," maintaining that we could never will that a lie should become a universal law; therefore we should never under any circumstances lie. Our three pragmatists are explicitly against that. Bode in Ourselves and the World points out that ideals and principles cannot operate unconditionally. In Otto's case, life has taught him something different: "... to take the particular situation as authentic, to interrogate it for light and leading."¹⁴ The question for them is not so much whether man is going to have moral principles as whether these principles are to be considered as flexible means for a better life.

We may turn to another philosophy of free will which led eventually to the political form of the problem of freedom. This philosophy has


been referred to as classical liberalism, whose author, it has been said, is John Locke. It regards freedom as power to act in accordance with a choice. It reserved the assumption of a will that has a separate existence. Yet Locke objected to the term "freedom of the will" on the ground that freedom belongs to the agent and not the will. He said: "So far as man has power to think to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his mind, so far is a man free.\(^{15}\)

This empirical freedom, being more accessible to direct observation, was held in many instances to constitute the very essence of freedom. Thus the term came to have the negative connotation of absence of external constraints. Almost a century after Locke, Rousseau shifted attention from power to execute choice to power to carry wants into effect. He regarded freedom as an absolute good; therefore, there should be no limitation on human action beyond that which nature itself imposes. Nature for Rousseau "consists of the immediate total energy of life, spontaneous development, rather than the restraints and complexities which civilization so readily brings with it. Man has a natural tendency to assert himself, to develop aptitude and compulsion."\(^{16}\) In this sense freedom of man consists in absence of imposed constraints. This kind of negative freedom is found also in Kant: "Freedom is Independence of the compulsory Will of another; and in so far as it can co-exist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole, original, inborn Right belonging to every man in virtue of his Humanity."\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\)John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Ch. 21, p. 377.

\(^{16}\)H. Hoffding, A Brief History of Modern Philosophy, p. 125.

For Rousseau freedom is what distinguishes man from the brute. It consists also in the capacity to choose between the lawful and the unlawful or between the good and the bad. Man is good by nature; thus if he is left to his pure nature he eventually chooses the good. But man cannot return to the state of nature because he is already corrupted by the artificialities of civilization. Therefore he can establish a rule of administration in which all members of the society agree to submit their individual wills to the general will. That is to say, the individual loses his natural liberty in gaining civil liberty. On this basis Rousseau developed his political theory and his educational theory.

One can understand that the only hope for freedom from the above point of view is in a new social order consistent with the demands of nature. These demands are to be found directly in the desires, wants, and impulses of the individual. Henceforth there is no necessity for the imposition of standards from without, because this will subject the individual, particularly the young, to the greed of others. Bode comments on this view saying, "From the standpoint of modern psychology the trouble with Rousseau's point of view lies in the doctrine that minds are provided with fixed inner patterns which will direct development if they are permitted to do so." Against such a laisser-faire attitude Bode believed that "Sound development requires constant restraint, regulations, direction, which must be supplied by the individual as a matter of conscious effort and through the exercise of intelligence."19

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18Boyd H. Bode, How We Learn, p. 42.
19Loc. cit. (Italics mine)
So we see that Bode does not reject Rousseau altogether. He disagrees about isolating nature from environment. To hold that the individual looks for his standards of direction within himself rather than within his environment with which he interacts is artificial. Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto all agree that the interactivity of the individual with his environment is present in every experience. This interaction seems to be taken for granted in such conceptions as "reconstruction of experience," "growth," and "the remaking of life" which Bode and Kilpatrick have developed.

The logical implication of the laissez faire theory is that the individual is to be free to act in accordance with his desires; hence he must be free from imposition. Thus rules and regulations of all sorts must be abandoned, and the only standards that have any justification are the individual's desires. It is true that if the individual is to be free, he must be free to choose his own course of action. Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto agree on that. What they oppose, however, is following desires indiscriminately and uncritically because this makes us slaves to our inclinations and whims. The difference in the two principles seems to lie in the method by which the sphere of choice and conformity is to be decided. Rules and regulations are not to be ruled out but should represent a consensus, as far as possible, of what is desirable, individually and collectively, and should, by all means, be respected. However, the question of what is desirable is so vital a one, especially in ethics, that a general agreement seems illusory. The difficulties that encounter the pragmatic position, in this respect, can scarcely be brushed aside by
an appeal to intelligence. This difficulty will be further elaborated later in this section.

Now we may turn to the other side of the question, namely, determinism. Traditionally determinism refers to the assumption that the universe is subject to rigid laws of matter and motion. The idea was intensified after Newton and the formulation of the law of causation. The law holds that every cause has its effect, that cause and effect are bound to each other by inexorable necessity, and that the same cause produces only the same effect. Accordingly there exist some groups who deny that man possesses any freedom. They maintain that man is the inevitable product of forces determining his every thought and act. The notion of freedom is a product of our ignorance of all the laws governing the world. They offer, as an advantage of their position, predictability. They defy the existence of alternatives, hence the impossibility of choice. Haeckel, a recent exponent of the theory of determinism, states his belief in these words:

The great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist, between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended today, after more than two thousand years, completely in favor of the determinist. The human will has no more freedom than that of the higher animals, from which it differs only in degree, not in kind. We now know that each act of the will is as fatally determined by the organization of the individual and as dependent on the momentary condition of his environment as every other psychic activity.20

Bertrand Russell's statement that "The two dogmas that constitute the essence of materialism are: first, the sole reality of matter;

secondly, the reign of law,"^21 applies emphatically in Haeckel's case. The argument of determinism rests on the fact that human activities are the result of uniform series of cause and effect. Interesting enough that the free-willist did not exclude causation. Jonathan Edwards concluded that man's conduct is necessarily caused. He stated:

... I assert that Nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause. What is Self-existent must be from Eternity and must be unchangeable; But as to all Things that begin to be, they are not Self-existent and therefore must have some foundation of their Existence without themselves--That whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first Dictate of the common and natural Sense which God hath implanted in the Minds of all Mankind and the main Foundation of all our Reasonings about the Existence of Things, past, present, or to come.

Kant's usage of the word "causality," Taube observes, means, in effect, determinism, "since by 'causality' Kant did not intend to denote any observable relation of phenomena, but the disposition of the mind to regard the succession of phenomena as necessary."^23 Kadish believes that the freedom of metaphysical will, to leave room for accountability, asserts that freedom is negative and positive--negative for the knowable universe and positive for the transcendental will. He points out:

Once again the effect of a question which refuses empirical meaning to its subject makes itself felt. For if all events are indeed caused, then any instance of human freedom, if we are to salvage that freedom, automatically becomes some sort

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^21 Quoted by M. Taube, op. cit., p. 192.


^23 Taube, op. cit., p. 154.
of non-event. Hence one approach may designate freedom as 'noumenal' rather than 'phenomenal' and mean by this, presumably, that only the non-experiencing mind as such can experience freedom. The doctrine of metaphysical freedom amounts, therefore, to the allegation that any choice freely made is necessarily groundless—and that I will be held strictly responsible for it.\textsuperscript{24}

To identify freedom with causelessness waives any explanation for choice; hence, choice is meaningless. So conceived, freedom of the will reaches absolute determinism. Recent writers on the subject try to escape this dilemma, maintaining the compatibility of freedom to causation. To do that they advance theories of causation which asserts its importance to freedom. Scientifically the law of causation as held by the mechanistic theory was challenged by the 'Quantum Theory' and 'The Principal of Uncertainty' of Heisenberg. The universality of mechanism claimed by the determinists cannot be proved. Experience cannot show that mechanical causation is universal and necessary. Taube attacks universal determinism on the basis that the concept of determinism involves absolute foreknowledge, which is unattainable save to God. To say that the law of causation is absolute is to say that we have observed every natural phenomenon in its detailed activities, which is inconceivable. Hence the law should be taken as a working hypothesis.\textsuperscript{25} The objection to universal determinism is based on the grounds that it fails to account for many important facts of experience. It cannot explain the existence of values, purposes, and ideals as well as other things.

\textsuperscript{24} Mortimer Kadish, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 624.

\textsuperscript{25} Taube, \textit{op. cit.}, Ch. V.
Recent writers on the problem avoid the sharp either-or imbedded in traditional arguments. They do not see any antithesis between freedom and determinism, provided that the latter takes the meaning of determining factors. What is commonly called determinism in science is only a postulate, or working hypothesis as to the uniformity of natural processes. This kind of determinism seems indispensable for freedom. If human choices and actions can make any difference in the future, then the future cannot be fully determined and there are different possibilities. To make a choice worthy of the name is to have a preference among preferences. To prefer one action or course of action requires calculation and insight into different possible consequences, otherwise the choice is nonsense. Fruitful calculation requires knowledge of the potentialities of things involved. Unless things are determined, unless each thing with which we interact has its own definite nature and operates according to laws, knowledge is meaningless and choice is futile.

Are human choices and human actions predictable? Those who believe in determinism answer with an emphatic "Yes!" Some groups, however, argue that if human actions are wholly predictable this means that they are not free. The idea holds good if taken to the extreme. That human actions are wholly predictable is not demonstrable. The fact is we never can predict with complete certainty the behavior of any human being. Complete prediction requires full knowledge. In so complex an organism as a human being the probabilities seem to favor the conclusion that knowledge required for certain predictions is unattainable. The possibility is that we can deduce some future behavior of any human being from the
behavior that has been observed up to the present time, but we can never be certain.

At any given situation our decisions have a selective character. This selectivity takes into consideration, or it should, the three dimensions of time: past, present, and future. These factors, though limiting, give meaning to our actions. Kadish describes the individual as a chooser very ably when he says, "... a chooser whose 'nature' consists in a complex motivation—intelligence dynamism operating within a milieu defined by genuine potentialities." 26 This brings to mind the point that choice is more than settling a conflict between motives in which the stronger wins because motives are inseparable from the personality as a whole.

The net conclusion of what has been said thus far is that freedom is not opposed to causation in a wholesale fashion or to constraints indiscriminately. If we believe in free choice that is based on an evaluation of perceived alternatives and deliberation, then a person is responsible for his choices and actions. Responsibility assumes right and wrong. But to what standard can we refer our action? The answer may be that we refer our actions to some standard of universal value that is not limited to one person or group of persons. The answer is sound. But what has happened is that in religion and philosophy such a standard seems to inhere in the concept of God, or a priori principles, or eternal verities. To lodge it in such realms is to rob it of its vital practical value because this ignores the changing conditions and the vitality of human

26 Kadish, op. cit., p. 626.
experiences. The result is that "Guiding principles have a status absolutely distinct from the life they are to guide."\textsuperscript{27}

This question of standards is a prominent one in the thought of our three pragmatists and is related to the issue of the static or of the changing nature of truth. This issue, in turn, is contingent upon how we conceive the nature of the universe. In traditional philosophy truth is fixed and the same at all times. What was needed was to enter "into the sacred realm of pure knowledge, to attain to pure rationality to woo truth in detachment from the senseless earthly struggle."\textsuperscript{28} Of course it is clear that this notion of truth is different from the pragmatic doctrine which holds that truth evolves as men live and have experience in a "universe with the lid off." In terms of freedom, in a closed universe, any expression of freedom must necessarily be limited by the very nature of things. That is to say, freedom, according to such a static concept is circumscribed by the physical environment beyond the limitation of which man cannot go. Over against this, the pragmatic conception of a changing universe unlimits man's freedom. Though related to education the following quotation from Bode seems fitting.

Our educational system is in a state of endless confusion because it gives aid and comfort to two conflicting types of philosophy. It continues the tradition that the universe is a 'closed system' and it also accepts the doctrine of a 'wide-open universe' as sponsored by such spokesmen as William James and John Dewey. Between these two points of view there can be no final compromise. It is mere verbiage to say that we must educate for freedom. Every system of Education can claim to be education for freedom, since it claims to be truth and the truth is what makes us free. Freedom in the abstract is an empty concept, its

\textsuperscript{27}Otto, \textit{The Human Enterprise}, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
meaning derives from the philosophy or world-view that lies back of it. The issue confronting us is basically a moral issue; it has to do with the meaning of liberty and democracy. 29

Certainly there is a world of difference between adopting a doctrine of fixed standards and immutable truth which is authoritative in essence and fostering an ability to exercise the power of choice and intelligence in terms of a world-in-the-making.

In effect, the pragmatic concept of freedom amounts to something like this: the actualization of an individualized self, which at the same time is contributing to and enjoying the outcome and fruits possible only in associating with others. Freedom is attained through the exercise of intelligence; that is, meanings obtained from shared joint experience are discerned and taken into account. Our ideas and ideals are to be considered in terms of their consequences and how they affect and impinge on the lives of others. In this way freedom can be understood as a method of social control.

Freedom is objective in the sense that it results in the contiguity of environment with human needs which can be met through the exercise of intelligence. Accordingly Milton's statement that "All men naturally were born free" 30 does not hold ground. William James once remarked that a baby is not free but is owned and controlled by his environment. An individual can be said to be free when he acts reflectively, when he

29Bode, "Problem of Liberal Education," School and Society LIX (June, 1944), 433.

30John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, p. 152.
learns to hold the impulse of the moment to see in the meanings of immediate conditions future results. For only upon operations which are reflectively, scientifically, and socially grounded can freedom in the above sense emerge and function successfully. In this respect a person who is hemmed in by prejudice and dogma is not free; on the contrary, he is a slave to ideas to which he is inflexibly committed.

The net conclusion, we can say, is that reflective thinking is indispensable to human freedom. Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto believe in the reality of alternatives. If so, then in complex situations we have to make choices. The results of such choices are not predetermined; or if they are, they have not issued from choices but impositions. Freedom entailed in choice is not, in this case, freedom from causation. On one hand, if man is a goal-seeking being, as Kilpatrick insists, then any choice has a causal relation to a goal, hence is partly determined. On the other, in any single event immediate as well as mediate factors intervene in its occurrence. With this in mind, freedom lies not in ignoring these factors but in deliberately accounting for them. This is, apparently, what makes Kilpatrick attain to causation, but not to mechanical causation as expressed in the law of causation. In this case freedom is not opposed to determinism, but it is the intelligent consideration of the determining factors.

It has been mentioned earlier that complete prediction implies determinism. It seems that the pragmatists do not see any contradiction between predictability and freedom. Prediction, according to their theory for the thinking process, is to be built on hypothetical assumptions. These hypotheses are built on our stock of concepts and meanings, our
accumulated knowledge. This means, as Hook puts it, "A life of human freedom is one determined by knowledge, a life of human bondage is one not so determined." Thus the existence of physical necessity or a natural law does not curtail freedom. Knowledge of these laws, of uniformities and fixities, of uncertainties of nature as well as of our nature enables us to predict and control. And freedom is the consequence of such knowledge attested to in our experiences.

It is true that if there is an order in the nature of things, if there are natural laws, there is hope for freedom, for how can we attain freedom in a world of chaos and blind chance? But this is exactly what the determinist would say. He would say that past possibilities seem real only because of our ignorance, and future alternatives seem real only because of our lack of understanding. The two parties would agree, however, that in any complex situation the human mind at its best can calculate the factors within his actual or potential environment. But to account for any interference from outside factors is beyond human possibility. The determinist would say that what we call chance is no more than incalculable occurrence. It seems plausible to observe that freedom as held in this pragmatic conception is explained through predictability which is used by the determinists to explain their position. The pragmatist, to safeguard against such a charge, maintains that it is not enough to know or to predict; what is important is to use this knowledge in reconstructing the experience or remaking life, a point that does not seem to impress the determinists.

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A remark or two may be added to the discussion of freedom as conceived by our three philosophers. The three agree on something like this: intelligence is the center of gravity in freedom. But the work of intelligence depends on formidable laws or established facts. Kilpatrick among the three acknowledges the law of causation. Bode and Otto seem to agree that the universe follows some orderly rules or laws. To assume that man can have control over his environment through the exercise of his intelligence is to presuppose some regularities or laws upon which we build our future plans. Despite their rejection of metaphysics, the acceptance of natural laws cannot escape metaphysical notions altogether.

Whitehead assents to the importance of intelligence in human life and freedom and at the same time retains metaphysical explanations. In his book, *Adventures of Ideas*, he develops the notion of imminent law, which suggests a metaphysical scheme that provides insight into the creative process of growth and experience and the central place of intelligence and freedom in that process. According to Whitehead, nature is profoundly social in character, and freedom is the expression of this sociality. He explains this sociality through the idea that individualities in nature embody associations which undergo modification. Each individuality, meanwhile, occupies a perspective from which it originates its relations. Individuality is not static but undergoes continuous change; thus it must be understood as a process of creative growth. According to this point of view, freedom is a process of creative expression of character. Whitehead holds, as do the pragmatists, that it is a process of reflective choice, judgment, and discrimination, as well as of organization in the pursuit of common ends. Although Whitehead seems to assign freedom to
other patterns of individualities, yet on the human level, reflection, intelligence, participation, and communication are central in freedom, because the subtleties and complexities of relations are lifted to a conscious and social level. This organized relation is dynamic in the sense that it involves a state of continuous development, which puts a heavy burden on the intellectual and creative resources of the culture. In short, to be free, according to Whitehead, means the continuous growth of experience in meaning and control, both individually and collectively. To exercise control means to know the character of things, hence their natural laws. It is apparent that the difference between both views is that Whitehead explains the advancement of science, the character of association and sociality, and the creative process of growth through the notion of a metaphysical scheme.

To make freedom primarily dependent upon human intelligence per-\footnotesize{force} raises the question of degrees. In other words, if freedom is achieved through the exercise of intelligence, then some people are more free and others are less free. Likewise, if a portion of human intelligence is dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the enrichment of experience, then the social status of the individual comes into the scene. Generally speaking, those of more material possessions would have access to a richer experience than those of less. Which suggests a return to Plato's Greece where the leisure class was the free class because they had enough time to contemplate and develop their intellectual abilities. Of course there is a distinct difference between the pragmatic concept

\footnotesize{32} Alfred N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, pp. 142-144.
of intelligence and the Greek concept, yet both parties assume the existence of variation among individuals. It must be remembered that what is meant here is not that the rich per se are more intelligent than the poor, but what is suggested is that economic conditions as well as psychological factors affect the enrichment of experience and the exercise of intelligence.

The pragmatist might say at this point that this is a separation between thought and action. This separation is the outcome of the old dualism of mind and matter, which resulted in a discrepancy between the intellectual and the practical. This discrepancy is responsible for the emergence of a body of authorities to safeguard the intellectual and spiritual heritage and the "eternal ideals" which "re-embry themselves essentially the same" for all times. It may be agreed that allegiance to fixed principles without recognition of conditions from which they emanate led to institutions actually hostile to independent thinking, hence hindering freedom. This authoritarian scheme rests in a belief that the ability to control the course of social action is inherent in the select few. It may also be agreed that we must have faith in human capacities and potentialities and help to develop these capacities in the young so that they become free persons, --free to plan, to construct their ideals and to devise plans for achieving these ideals.

But does all this really exclude the control of the course of social action by the select few? Isn't it just transference from some kind of select few to another? If we put our faith in intelligence, does not that mean that the more intelligent are more favored to direct social actions than the less intelligent? Does not this agree in some way with the idea of the "philosopher king" of Plato? If so, then we
are led to intellectual aristocracy. If not, does it mean that mediocrity should be the rule?

It must be admitted, nevertheless, that developing human capacities and liberation of intelligence is the noblest aim and an indispensable one for any sound freedom. The pragmatists should be credited for their emphasis on the operational character of freedom, for bridging the gap between the practical and spiritual which was created by traditional philosophy. Educationally speaking, their concept of freedom gives a better sense of direction to the educative process, which in turn makes its proper function the provision for the continuous development of reflective ability to help the individual achieve his freedom. The relation between freedom and education in the pragmatic perspective will constitute the text of the next chapter.
PART THREE

EDUCATION
CHAPTER VIII

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF FREEDOM FOR EDUCATION

The word "education" is as broad as life. It is a process which goes on through life. Dewey defines education as the "... reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."1 If growth, as the pragmatist is apt to define it, is that continuous reconstruction of experience which adds new meanings to life, then education becomes synonymous with the process of growth. Such a conception is misleading unless it is specified what kind of experience is educative or what the word "growth" means. Bode says, "Perhaps the most desirable and significant educational ideal for us to adopt is that of fostering intellectual and spiritual growth."2 Dewey clarifies what he means by growth in the following statement:

But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth, the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or hinders growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines?3

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1John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 89.
3Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 29.
The very meaning of growth and reconstruction of experience lies in the principles of continuity and interaction. Continuity of experience means that the effects of experiences are preserved and serve as a link between what has gone before and what has to follow. Interaction suggests that every given experience has been modified to a certain degree by previous ones and in turn does something to enrich the depth and significance of future ones. The objection may arise that interaction and continuity are as much in evidence in an undesirable as a desirable experience, and neither one in and of itself distinguishes the educative from the mis-educative in the above sense. Both Dewey and Bode admit that not all experiences are educative.

Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting the growth of further experience. An experience may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted. Again, a given experience may increase a person's automatic skill in a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; the effect again is to narrow the field of further experience.

Concerning the continuity of experience, Dewey went on to say:

Again, experiences may be so disconnected from one another that, while each is agreeable or even exciting in itself, they are not linked cumulatively to one another. Energy is then dissipated and a person becomes scatter-brained. Each experience may be lively, vivid, and 'interacting' and yet their disconnectedness may artificially generate dispersive, disintegrated, centrifugal habits. The consequence of the formation of such habits is inability to control future experiences.

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5 Ibid., p. 14.
Kilpatrick, Bode, and Otto endorse these principles of continuity and interactivity through which the experience of the individual is reconstructed. They also agree that education is a process of growth that helps to release and socially direct the maximum potentialities of the individual.

What implication has the concept of freedom, as presented in this work, on education?

The three philosophers almost agree that freedom is not conceded merely in absence of constraints, but it is essentially, to use Dewey's words: "... the part played by thinking—which is personal—in learning; it means intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them."

That is to say, in any given situation, a person is free in so far as, unhemmed by dogma and prejudice, he understands and reflectively sees future consequences and deliberately acts upon them.

That freedom is inherent in the exercise of intelligence is based on the pragmatic conception of mind as a function. In fact the words mind, thinking, and intelligence are so interwoven in the philosophy of pragmatism that sometimes they are used to mean the same thing. A basic assumption behind this concept of freedom is that all existences are in a continuous process of change and interaction in a "universe with the lid off." This does not mean that there are no uniformities in the world, but that they do not hinder freedom.

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Constant and uniform relations in change and a knowl-
edge of them in 'laws' are not a hindrance to freedom, but
a necessary factor in coming to be effectively that which
we have the capacity to grow into... Freedom has too
long been thought of as an indeterminate power operating
in a closed and ended world. In its reality, freedom is
a resolute will operating in a world in some respect
indeterminate, because open and moving toward a new
future.7

This idea of change gives impetus to freedom. In the meantime

it is significant for education. At present the educational system

... is in a state of endless confusion because it gives
aid and comfort to two conflicting types of philosophy.
It continues the tradition that the universe is a 'closed
system' and it also accepts the doctrine of a 'wide-open'
universe as sponsored by such spokesmen as William James
and John Dewey. Between these two points of view there
can be no final compromise. It is mere verbiage to say
that we must educate for freedom. Every system of educa-
tion can claim to be education for freedom, since it
claims to be truth and the truth is what makes us free.
Freedom in the abstract is an empty concept; its meaning
derives from the philosophy or worldview that lies back
of it. The issue confronting us is basically a moral
issue; it has to do with the meaning of liberty and democ-

There is a world of difference between teaching the children
in terms of an inherited doctrine of fixed principles and immutable
truth and in fostering in them the ability to act intelligently, to
reflectively set their ideals and standards and form their independent
judgments with respect to beliefs and values. For Bode, "Sound educa-
tion does not seek to prescribe belief or conduct, but to provide for

7Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 298.
8Bode, "Problem of Liberal Education," School and Society, LIX
(June 24, 1944), 433-436.
the creation of new standards in accordance with new conditions and new
needs." The tendency to separate time-honored values and place them
above everyday needs results in our beliefs and our practices getting
further and further apart. To cling to such a state of affairs that
is fraught with contradictions and paradoxes perpetuates a state of
educational confusion. Bode comments on this by saying:

Our way of life has become a house divided against
itself. In such a situation the question of freedom in
the schools takes on a special meaning. If the school
is not to become the tool of any special interest, it
must bring to light the confusion, in order that the
oncoming generation may form intelligent and independent
judgments with respect to beliefs and values. Otherwise,
the individual will of necessity react in turn to the
various component elements in his tradition without a
realizing sense that taken collectively, these elements
do not add up to a sum total that makes sense. If he is
a reflective person, he gets confused and bewildered; he
does not know what it is that he believes. He lacks a
sense of direction because his cultural heritage is at
odds with itself.10

In this state of disturbed equilibrium, education has to develop
in the students a critical attitude toward our social heritage, that
is, to focus the light of intelligence upon it. The central emphasis
of any educational program should be in developing the human power of
reflection. Every school activity should be based on its contributory
value in building up a faith in the responsibility of human intelli-
gence in effecting progress.

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9Bode, Modern Educational Theories, p. 238.

10Bode, "What is the Meaning of Freedom in Education?", Educational
Freedom and Democracy, pp. 5-6.
Making freedom dependent on the exercise of intelligence lifts it from the metaphysical realm of traditional philosophies, to a social, workable concept. Thus, instead of being something that can be handed down from generation to generation, it becomes something to be achieved. It is not only an achievement but a process, a process of growth. "Freedom for an individual means growth, ready change when modification is required."

This takes us back to education as a process of growth. In the ideal of growth the educator is provided with a significant aim for directing the entire teaching program. The term "growth," however, is ambiguous. Taken as an abstraction to which any interpretation may be attached, it becomes empty and can furnish no functional guidance. Or if it is understood as development in any direction, it becomes nothing more than sheer chance and hinders rather than promotes all-round growth. Consequently there must be a distinction between the kind of growth to be achieved and the kind to be avoided. What is desirable growth?

Bode suggests that the test for desirable growth is whether it leads to still further growth; education is a process of growth which has no end beyond itself. "Education is for the sake of further education." This answer seems to be pregnant with difficulties since the term "growth" may mean either that the initiative comes from within the pupil or that the pupil responds to what comes from the teacher.


12Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 73.
On this point, Bode has this to say:

As a consequence of this ambiguity teachers of the progressive persuasion are exposed to two evils. One is a superstitious reverence of 'inner growth' which makes them encourage ignorant guessing and tedious fumbling on the part of pupils, when the situation calls for guidance. Another is the disposition to regard the pupils' activity to understand and accept the teacher's personal opinions and prejudices as evidence of 'inner growth under wise guidance,' and not as the thing that it really is.\(^13\)

What is needed is a clear-cut conception of growth in terms of growth toward a plan for living intelligently. Such a plan requires an appeal to some standards of values. These standards are to be looked for in a social context.

Kilpatrick endorses the conception of growth, reconstruction, and the remaking of life. He, however, indicates the kinds of reconstruction and the quality of good life in terms of character formation, meaning by "character," "not simply moral character, though that is a proper part, but inclusive character—all of one's ways of thinking, feeling, and acting with reference to one's self and others in the world."\(^14\) The important thing, therefore, becomes the ability to re-examine our standards continuously and be willing to discard whatever proves inadequate. "We know no absolute principles; that is, none

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 78.

\(^{14}\)Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 220.
which now stand properly above criticism or which may not conceivably be modified.\textsuperscript{15}

Bode, meanwhile, feeling that growth in itself is more or less a psychological conception, seeks direction in democracy as a way of life, which he defines in terms of continuous widening of the area of common interests and concerns. He says that growth "\ldots  must have reference to the issue of democracy, which, in one form or another, is cropping up everywhere and which is, by all odds, the most important issue confronting us at the present time."\textsuperscript{16} As a way of life, it "\ldots  calls for a reconstruction of beliefs and standards in every major field of human interest and thus takes on the universality of philosophy and of religion which is to say that it becomes a generalized or inclusive way of life."\textsuperscript{17} This conception of democracy, held by Kilpatrick as well,\textsuperscript{18} necessitates a new social outlook, which has a direct bearing upon the work of the school; for, according to Bode: "The school is, \textit{par excellence}, the institution to which a democratic society is entitled to look for its clarification of the meaning of democracy. In other words, the school is peculiarly the institution in which democracy becomes conscious of itself."\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{17}Bode, \textit{Democracy as a Way of Life}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{18}Kilpatrick, \textit{Philosophy of Education}, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{19}Bode, \textit{Democracy as a Way of Life}, p. 95.
\end{flushright}
Bode's conviction of democracy as a way of life seems not to mean merely "a comprehensive plan for the organization of both individual and collective conduct, which is essentially what is meant when we speak of a way of life." For this definition can apply to any totalitarian philosophy as well. To give it a distinctive meaning, Bode points out that "... democracy means the continuous extension of common interests," which will be the final test of progress. Believing in the operational character of guiding principles, Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto reject the notion which regards democracy as absolutely valid in and for itself, because to do this is to substitute a new set of dogmas for another. Democracy must take its point of departure from the fact that the basic social patterns are in a constant process of change. It must face the whole question of absolutes versus relative standards; that is, it must center upon the free exercise of intelligence.

"The faith in the power of intelligence to create new standards and ideals in terms of human values and in accordance with changing conditions entitles it to consideration as expressive of the spirit of democracy." Kilpatrick agrees with Bode on the importance of intelligence for democracy. He quotes Dewey with complete consent when he says that

20Ibid., p. 7.


22Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 40.
"... intelligent action is the sole ultimate resource of mankind of every faith whatsoever." Kilpatrick, however, suggests that it is not merely the use of intelligence which is important, but "... the best known way of using" it, meaning the method of modern science. Although Kilpatrick's definition of intelligence as "... the capacity to learn and use this learning in behalf of ends sought" does not show his social and moral intention, yet in his "second sense" of democracy, he emphasizes these two points.

On the other hand he said it means a way of life, a kind and quality of associating living in which sensitive moral principles assert the right to control individual and group conduct... in this sense the control is internal, the demand of intelligence and conscience upon the individual himself to obey and serve the varied calls of social morality.

Repeatedly Kilpatrick so affirms his concern about ethics that he regards democracy as essentially "ethical life." It "... is the effort to found society on ethics." His consideration for ethics is not in terms of established authority or eternal verities but in terms of an evolving why and self-criticism.

23Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 143.
24Loc. cit.
25Ibid., p. 422.
26Ibid., p. 127.
27Kilpatrick, Education for Changing Civilization, p. 28.
28Ibid.
It is reasonable to conclude that a democratic society would be committed to the method of continuous reconstruction of its basic outlook in the light of conflicts existing within its order. This reconstruction must be done in terms of cooperative effort rather than upon any program worked out by established authority. If education is to adopt this democratic ideal, then it has to help each individual to develop a personal philosophy of life. This means that the school becomes an agency for developing individuals who will possess a reflective and coherent attitude toward social living.

"To be truly democratic, education must treat the individual himself as an end and set itself the task of preparing him for that intellectual and emotional sharing in the life and affairs of men which embodies the spirit of the Golden Rule."  

Kilpatrick and Otto make the same emphasis on the worth of the individual as a part of a social whole. The basis for this concern for the social aspect in human life is expressed in these words of Otto: "... individual potentialities will in the future be compelled to realize themselves along with, rather than over against, community of effort with others."  

Otto carries the sociality of the individual, so to speak, a step further, assuring that "Individuality will either become communal or in any liberal sense it will disappear."  

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31Loc. cit.
The moral of what has been said thus far is that the exercise of intelligence should over-arch all human activities if they are to be meaningful. This defines the work of education; viz., liberation and development of intelligence.

The significance of a definite aim or an end in view is proportionate to the extent to which it can be translated into a program of action. On the other hand, the success of such a program is measured by actualizing and meeting the aim proposed. If education is to help individuals to realize their freedom through the exercise of intelligence, what program has it to offer?

Education for freedom cannot be approved merely as a process of transmitting the cultural heritage, because such a function, though necessary, taken in itself will deprive education of its influential role in effecting change; "... education is not just the task of handing on the achievements of the past; in some way or other it must also make provision for the readjustment of old values to the living present."32 Such provision can be ensured through the development of attitudes of critical thinking and reflection that do not merely absorb culture but continuously re-examine and re-evaluate the ideals and standards in the culture to meet the needs of evolving conditions. "Real education humanizes men. It does so, however, not by moulding them into unthinking acceptance of pre-established patterns, but by

stimulating them to a continuous reconstruction of their outlook on life." To fulfill its function for freedom education must stress "... the importance of keeping intelligence free for the continuous remaking of beliefs. The justification for this emphasis is the conviction that intelligence should function as a means to the attainment of 'abundant life' and not as a means to the discovery of eternal and immutable truths." Hook puts the chief reason for emphasizing the role of intelligence in these words:

By enabling us to react to the future as if it were already present, to recognize the general in the specific, to unravel the chains of cause and consequences, we can to some extent overcome the natural barriers and limits of human perceptibility.

The quarrel with traditional education is its lack in developing habits of reflective thinking. Effective education should so arrange its program that it provides opportunity for the young to engage in situations which call for the exercise of reflective thought. In the classroom the teacher must provide an atmosphere where there is a continuous thread of reflection. He has to create situations in which students have the obligation to carry activities forward reflectively and develop the disposition of wanting to do so. He has to provide them with enough experiences that work as "moving forces." The so-called "progressive movement" was an attempt to make provision for

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34 Bode, "What is the Meaning of Freedom in Education," op. cit., p. 15.

35 Sidney Hook, "Intelligence and Evil in Human History," Freedom and Experience, p. 29.
such aims as growth or maximum development of the individual. Lacking a clear-cut sense of direction, it failed to achieve its purpose. Instead it brought confusion into the educational scene, and what really happened was that most of the old habits of thinking were preserved under a new name.

Superficially the progressive movement in education was a more serious threat, since it attacked the fundamental assumption or contention that educational processes should be controlled by a set of fixed or eternal values. In fact, however, this movement did not lead to a rival social philosophy, but spent itself largely in a not altogether healthy cultivation of sweetness and light. In a vague kind of way it was assumed that guiding clues for education could be had from an inspection of the individual pupil.36

It identified increased measure of physical activity with freedom. Whereas the traditional school emphasizes conformity to fixed standards, the progressive has too often been guilty of emphasizing conformity to no standards, apparently believing that conditions of freedom automatically follow an unrestricted expression of childish impulse. If education for freedom is in liberating intelligence, then the question is not between fixed standards or no standard at all; it is a matter of encouraging reflective thinking and creativity.

While Bode sets an inclusive aim of education as the liberation of intelligence, Kilpatrick stresses building character as an aim for education: "As to aim, because thinking and education must be for behavior, education must adopt character building as its fundamental goal."37

36Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 71-72.
37Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 220.
To clarify what he means by "character," he goes on to say, "By character is here meant not simply moral character, though that is a proper part, but inclusive character—all of one's self and others and the world." 38

Bode approaches his aim through problem-solving, while Kilpatrick, almost exclusively, relies upon "whole-hearted purposeful activity" of the child's own choosing. For Bode, ready-made solutions cannot be handed out to the students. Transmitting of knowledge is not enough if education is to help the individual to reach his optimum growth. We want individuals that can solve their problems efficiently and can meet any life situation with confidence and courage. In this respect the schools have to take charge of the cultivation of reflective thinking. Deliberate education should, therefore, so arrange its program as to enrich the pupil's experience. Experience, as very often stated, is essential in any educational process. It has been so since the early days, and all philosophers assure its importance, but they differ in their conception of it. For the pragmatists, educative experience is that which provides interaction and continuity. According to Dewey:

Only very recently has any positive provision been made within the school room for any of the modes of activity and for any of the equipment and arrangement which permit and require the extension of original

38 Ibid.
experiences on the part of the child. The school has literally been dressed out with hand-on-down garments with intellectual suits which other people have worn. 39

The traditional teaching could hardly provide any opportunity for reflective thinking. This passing on of knowledge in the hand-on-down garments was identified with thinking. Of course there is nothing wrong with factual knowledge. On the contrary, facts are used in methods of control, but the trouble with traditional education is that it used them as ends in themselves. Moreover, there is no way to escape transmission of knowledge, because it serves as a basis for continuation and progress. There must be transmission to bring the newcomer into the culture in which he was born, or else the life of man would be as that of animal with no past. The important thing, however, is that transmission should not be identified with a "hand-on-down garment," else we would be in the same state as primitive man with no progress. What is needed is critical insight into our cultural heritage. To achieve this the pupil must be introduced to problems that induce reflection. This means that in the school the child must get beyond his immediate experience. "The appropriate distinction is between the experience of the learner as it actually occurs and the wider potential experiences for which the present experience is a stepping-stone and which stand for 'maximum development' or true selfhood." 40


40 Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 43.
In providing the children with problems, these problems must come out of natural situations. They must be real ones to evoke interest and lead to purposeful activity. This does not mean to go outside the school in search for problems or away from knowledge. The discussion in the classroom gives the teacher a good opportunity to put children in problematic situations. In the course of questions and answers much thinking can be done. The answer to a question is to be a starting point to thinking and not an end in itself or a place to stop. The teacher can start from what the children says; this makes the problem the child's and not the teacher's.

The experience of the child should be in continuation. Experiencing denotes an active process of doing and undergoing, of acting and interacting with the environment. We learn to think in this interaction when we connect what we do with the consequences that follow from our doing. In this process of connecting, we reconstruct our experience. "This is exactly what happens in the life of every individual, in so far as new experiences are brought into relation with former experiences through the process of thinking." 41

Bode's emphasis on the principle of continuity is pertinent to his thought. The distinctive factors of his educational theory all follow from it:

According to this principle... school experiences are educative only in so far as they serve to modify or reconstruct, the background of experience which the pupil

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41 Bode, How We Learn, p. 141.
brings with him when he comes to school. This reconstruction goes on in any case, but our chief reliance in this connection is on thinking. A school operating on the basis of this thing will protect the continuity of the school with the life outside of the school and will provide various kinds of experiences both with things and with social relations, so as to serve the over-arch­ ing purpose of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{42}

For Kilpatrick, education is "... for life and by and through life, and life is of and for education."\textsuperscript{43} We learn what we live. So conceived, he emphasizes activities in a somewhat exaggerated way. For him, emphasis must be put upon the whole child, giving him rich experiences which will involve necessary formal subject matter incidentally. The old type of education wherein subject matter was learned no longer suffices. It tends to perpetuate existing conditions, whereas a dynamic sort, with a free play of intelligence is increasingly needed. To quote:

In a former day vital activity surrounded the child on all sides. His life was filled with purposeful activities of real worth and he saw and felt the worth. Now the usual home has for the child few of such vital activities. His life is largely reduced to mere play, which does not have all the needed educative values. The school as usual must make good the deficit. The school accordingly must introduce activities, purposeful activities, in order to give the child the vigorous living that he needs. This of course is method in the broader sense.\textsuperscript{44}

It is clear that the one thing that concerns Kilpatrick is the whole-hearted purposefulness of the child. He wishes the activity of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 251-252.
\item \textsuperscript{43}Kilpatrick, \textit{Foundations of Method}, p. 283.
\item \textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 269.
\end{itemize}
the child to be characterized with such purposefulness at all times. As a result he conceives all educations on the basis of the purposeful act which is exemplified in the project method. He puts it thus:

A number of considerations support the purposeful act as the typical unit of school procedure. In the first place the purposeful act is the typical unit of the worthy life. In the worthy conduct of every walk of life we conceive purpose, we weigh them in the light of their bearings, and we approve or disapprove. If we approve and will these purposes, we proceed to plan and execute them. It is the purpose which gives unity and character to what we do.

If then the purposeful act be made the typical unit of school procedure, we are at one and the same time giving to education the quality of life and offering therefore the best preparation for after-school life.⁴⁵

So far there is no disagreement between Bode and Kilpatrick in terms of emphasis upon purposiveness in education. With this no one should find fault. Indeed, activity that is not purposeful is not likely to be very highly educative. It does not follow, however, that any purposiveness of whatever sort is all that is required. The fault with Kilpatrick, in Bode's opinion, lies in his emphasis on students, initiation, and activity, which suggests a kind of faith in a process of "inner-development" which requires nothing from the environment. Another point worth mentioning is that although Kilpatrick's theory of education has as one of its bases the principle of continuity, his project method does not guarantee such continuity. Bode believes that there should be a list of minimum essentials of a priori subject-matter

⁴⁵Kilpatrick, "Problem-project Attack in Organization, Subject-matter, and Teaching," National Education Association, 56 (1918), 528-529.
that will help to keep logical organization in fields of knowledge.\textsuperscript{46}

One can agree with Bode that Kilpatrick's project method can become a means of evading rather than facing the problem of educational guidance, for the teacher is actually divested of any planning. He comments that "Kilpatrick's recent book, \textit{Remaking the Curriculum}, however does not, despite its numerous excellences, get beyond the familiar oscillation from inner growth to wise guidance and back again."\textsuperscript{47} Bode prefers to limit the concept of the "project" to its original meaning of incidental learning.

The purpose of activity is to enable the pupil to participate in the solution of problems which emerge from the situation he finds himself in. The activities should not be determined solely by the child or imposed upon him, but should arise from genuine situations provided by the teacher. The significance of activities lies in this, that it puts thought into action. If it fails to do that then it intensifies rather than mitigates educational problems. When Dewey and Bode emphasized learning by doing, they did not mean sheer activity. What was meant is that doing when properly directed becomes a method for testing ideas. So conceived, it becomes a fundamental part of the learning process. And thinking becomes a meaningful activity to the extent it brings about changes in attitude.

\textsuperscript{46}Bode, \textit{Modern Educational Theories}, pp. 161-165.

\textsuperscript{47}Bode, \textit{Progressive Education at the Crossroads}, p. 79.
Kilpatrick in proposing the project method seems to have in mind freedom as a major aim. How much does the project method fulfill this aim? If freedom means "liberated intelligence," then mere increased activities cannot be identified with it. To maintain such freedom there must be direction of activity into socially desirable channels, and action must be preceded by thought. To follow sheer interests and whims of the individual learner is almost fatal to thinking. Meanwhile arbitrary problems imposed from without do not furnish a necessary cue to reflection. What is needed is satisfactory conditions for securing situations favorable to effective thought; the freedom naturally can follow.

Although Kilpatrick built his project method on the 'Complete Act of Thought,' following closer the steps suggested by Dewey in the thinking process, yet thinking in his "project" is largely lost from view. The emphasis upon "whole-hearted purposeful activity of the child's own choosing," upon the interests of children and self activity, seems to indicate that freedom comes to mean absence of external imposition in any form. Bode has pointed out the weakness in this conception of freedom in the following words:

... The freedom theory, though always facile in quoting Dewey to its purpose, seems never to have acquired an understanding of Dewey's conception of freedom. According to Dewey freedom is achieved through the exercise of intelligence, whereas the less discriminating of his disciples understand him to mean that intelligence is achieved through the exercise of freedom. Taken in this latter sense freedom means the absence of external
restrictions; and it seems to be taken for granted that this type of freedom leads automatically to effective, disciplined thinking.48

It seems that such criticism from Bode as well as similar ones from within and from without the pragmatic camp forced Kilpatrick to clarify his position to some extent in later writing. For example, he said, "... for the man fortunate enough to have developed previously the needed intelligence and character, there is true freedom. ..."49 Further on he said, "Being able to study and learn, he is free to act intelligently."50 The second statement together with the following shows his inclination to retain the concept of freedom as absence of external constraints. He says: "We find, then, the 'law of causation,' 'freedom to think' (freedom to study and decide accordingly), and 'moral responsibility' all present in one and the same instance of honest search and decision and act."51

Bode, apparently, is more precise in regarding freedom as achieved through the exercise of intelligence. He observes:

The other meaning of freedom centers precisely in the ability to go through with an understanding by the discovery of appropriate means, by the surmounting of obstacles, and by the modification of the original plan

50 Loc. cit.
51 Loc. cit.
or conception in the light of new facts. This calls for sustained effort in the presence of distraction and for the exercise of discrimination and constructive imagination—in short for real thinking. It may be added that if we may trust the example of scientific thinking, the possession of a body of scientifically organized subject matter is of inestimable value, not only as a resource in later life but as a basis for present thinking. Where subject matter is absent we rely less on thinking than on guessing and more or less random experimenting.\(^5^2\)

This brings us upon a basic issue in education, namely, the question of "logical" versus "psychological" organization in the curriculum making. In solving this problem educators sometimes commit the mistake of emphasizing one rather than the other to the extent that two movements emerged: "The scientific movement," which stresses logical organization, and the "child-centered," which takes the child as its frame of reference. Since each is one-sided, each falls into the limitation that keeps it from helping the cause of freedom. One attitude seems to derive its objectives from present-day occupational pursuits, while the other is concerned only in speaking loosely of "self-activity" and "the whole child."

Bode apparently agrees on logical organization of subject matter with the maximum development of the individual as an end in view. He points out:

This is not to say that traditional education is to be given a clean bill of health. Its procedure all too often has been to transmit the organized results of science as something to be learned, without seeing to it that the concepts of science actually function for the organization

\(^5^2\)Bode, "The New Education Ten Years After," loc. cit.
of the experiences of the pupil as they function in
the experience of the research specialists. . . and since
this teaching took no account of the question of abso-
lute standards, of what is really meant by evidence and
truth, one is tempted to say that it had nothing to do
with education either.53

Bode's favoring of "logical organization" is due to the fact
that it develops habits of reflective thinking, which helps the pupil
to see to it that his hypotheses are operational concepts and how much
they account for scientific facts. The value of an organized body of
subject matter is important because:

If intelligence is to become genuinely free, it must
understand its own procedures, with reference to the
operational character of concepts and with reference to
the nature of evidence and truth. Subjects in the field
of natural sciences afford an invaluable opportunity for
showing how 'truth' is related to the way a new fact
fits into the body of previous knowledge may be revised
or reconstructed without assignable limit, not by any
reference to absolutes but solely in the interests of
better control over experience.54

Bode, meanwhile, is not against psychological organization, but
he conceives it in a different way from Kilpatrick. He believes that
the curriculum makers must see to it that:

The ideal of democracy calls for an active concern,
as the dominating principle of conduct, in making our
social organization an embodiment of the spirit of good
will and cooperation. . . . Every subject in the curricu-
lum gives opportunity for widening the pupils' outlook in
this direction, and this is the form of psychological
organization of subject matter required by a democratic
program of education.55

53Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, p. 95.
54Ibid., p. 96.
If schools are to educate for freedom, relatedness of every area of study to that ideal should pervade the entire structure of learning. In order that such expectancy be realized, there will first have to be a thorough-going revision of teaching procedures. As Bode suggests:

In the natural sciences the 'postulational' character of scientific thinking must be made prominent if the significance of science for our present day civilization is to be understood. In history, the point of reference must be placed in present-day problems, which must be understood in terms of their origin and of their significance for the future. In literature and art, which are concerned primarily with the enhancement of appreciations, the achievements of the past must be treated, not as models for imitation, but as resources for the artistic expression of our endlessly varying experience.

In curriculum making a unifying principle may be based on the assumption that the change which has developed from scientific discoveries is a desirable one. In terms of teaching this means that every effort will be made to translate the findings of science into the broader principle of a democratic way of life. The curriculum may be organized:

. . . so as to make sure that the next generation will perform its daily round of tasks and duties in the light of historical perspectives with an appreciation of the means by which man can exercise control over his physical and social environment, and with a realizing sense of social interdependence in the struggle for the improvement of human life.\(^5^6\)

\(^{56}\) Bode, "The Problem of Liberal Education," \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{57}\) Bode, \textit{Modern Educational Theories}, p. 260.
The importance of logically organized subject-matter as a contributory factor in the liberation of intelligence is clear in Bode's thought. It is also apparent at this point that such an organization represents that arrangement of knowledge which best serves the aim of reflective thinking in the solution of problems in a particular field. The individual's frame of reference is evolved as he develops. This frame of reference must be such as to give free rein to intelligence in the solution of all problems of life. The liberation of intelligence, henceforth, implies the problem approach to education. One can safely say that Bode is clear and justified on this point.

Kilpatrick is less concerned for logically organized subject-matter. One can attribute this attitude on Kilpatrick's side to two reasons. First his definition of logical organization implies that the logical order is the order of arranging for subsequent use what has already been learned. Second, he seems not to care for knowledge in extensive form, and education, for him, should not be exclusively intellectual, "or even primarily so." He regards the psychological organization as the order of experience of discovery and consequently of learning. In short it is the total living of the child. He favors the latter, whole-heartedly calling it "new curriculum." Kilpatrick repeatedly emphasizes children's needs and

58 Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 313.
59 ibid., p. 220.
60 ibid., p. 314.
interests, which may account, also, for favoring psychological organization of the curriculum.

One can easily inspect two different trends in Kilpatrick's educational theory. On one hand, he emphasizes reflective thinking and the complete act of thought. On the other hand his concern of wholehearted purposeful activity, the reliance on children's felt needs and interests, and his project method give but an "elbow room" for any sufficient reflection. The problem of children's needs is important but should not be the basis for curriculum content. This view, one may say, attributes to mediocrity in education. Bode comments on this point saying:

The failure to emancipate ourselves completely from Rousseauism and the instinct psychology is responsible for most, if not all, of the weaknesses of the progressive movement. The attitude of superstitious reverence for childhood is still with us. The insistence that we must stick uncompromisingly at all times to the 'needs' of childhood has bred a spirit of anti-intellectualism, which is reflected in the reliance on improvising, instead of long organization in the over-emphasis of the here and now, in the indiscriminate tricks against 'subjects,' in the absurdities of pupil planning, and in the lack of continuity in the educational program. 61

To solve the problem of needs the school has to supply conditions of intelligent choice. The educator should pay heed to the environmental pattern from which the pupil derives his scheme of values. It is the social and physical environment that offers alternative conceptions of needs to choose among them. The same thing applies to children's interests. Those who regard interest as an

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61 Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads, pp. 59-60.
end in itself have eventually neglected its true nature and function in the educative process. Unless they view interests in terms of social responsibility, both for conserving past achievements and meeting future demands, they will find themselves following a blind alley. As Bode declares, pupils' interests should become

... a process centering on the continuous reconstruction of experience in the direction of a total pattern which derives its warrants, not from externally imposed authority but from the exercise of the pupils' own intelligence.  

In a look back upon what our three philosophers mean by freedom and what educational suggestions they propose for the achievement of such freedom, we can see the consistency between Bode's concept of freedom and his educational program. In Kilpatrick's case there is inconsistency, so to speak, between what he conceives of freedom and what he proposes for education.

Freedom in their philosophy, as we have seen, is first of all intellectual. It resides in the trained power of thought; in the ability to make decisions built on judging the different evidences at hand, and examining the various facets of propositions. In short, it is the ability to weigh reflectively the different possibilities involved in any situation. One can entertain the idea that man's actions, if not directed and guided by thoughtful conclusions, can easily fall victim to chaos and to whims and selfish desires. To foster in the pupil the ability of reflection, experimentation and deliberation in

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62ibid., p. 59.
planning, deciding and carrying decisions and plans into a program of action, education has to provide situations where the pupil can practice and exercise these activities. In other words, Bode's emphasis is on problem-solving as a method of instruction, especially as it entails emphasis on the subject-matter not as an end but as a means for the development of reflective thinking. Kilpatrick leans towards "child's needs" and "child's interests" to the extent of letting the pupil determine his own curriculum. This is what Bode calls a reversion to Rousseau. To depend on the needs of the individual learner in constructing any program for education means, on the negative side, that educational ends cannot be predetermined in the sense of adherence to fixed values. But the real crux of the issue is not between eternal, fixed principles and the individual nature of the child, but, rather "... between discovery or inspection on the one hand and invention or creation on the other."

Bode criticizes such an attitude because it fails to emerge in clear cut sense of direction. He observes:

In a vague kind of way it was assumed that guiding clues for education could be had from an inspection of the individual pupil. The crucial issue was thus effectively covered up. The choice between deriving guiding principles from an inspection of the universe and deriving them from an inspection of the individual pupil is a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 72.

Ibid., pp. 71-72.
As pointed out earlier, Kilpatrick's educational program falls short of providing genuine opportunities for reflective thinking. Thus it can hardly satisfy the requirement for freedom as intelligent choice, as he maintains it to be.

Freedom as the exercise of intelligence requires what Dewey calls "formal freedom," that is absence of direct external obstructions. Dewey remarks that "Exemption from restraints and from interference with overt action is only a condition, though an absolutely indispensable one, of effective freedom." One wonders if this is what was in his mind when Kilpatrick emphasized the wholehearted purposeful activity of the child's own choosing. His enthusiasm for the child's free choice and free activity is, apparently, at the expense of reflective thinking. It may be suggested that such an exaggerated notion of freedom is partly responsible for the errors that have been committed in the name of Progressive Education. One can fully agree with Bode that methods and procedures of control are necessary if learning is to have direction and purpose. Control here must not be taken to mean authoritative discipline. In terms of freedom the concept of discipline in schools changes its meaning from mere appearance of order and obedience to the authority of the teacher to the exercise of practical judgment, of intelligence as it is brought to bear upon human conduct. In other words, discipline is that self-restraint which

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66*Loc. cit.*
ensures habits of observation and judgment culminating in intelligent desires. It means a shift in emphasis from the area of outward action to the area of critical judgment, because, in that disciplined judgment, choice which has been subjected to vigorous scrutiny of consequences, lies genuine freedom.

In conclusion, freedom inheres in the exercise of intelligence which is perceived as a form of development. Hence freedom is a process of growth. What is needed for such development is an increase in the range of adaptive possibilities and in diversity and power in human planning. This planning is the root of change and civilization.

How can this increase in the range of adaptive possibilities come about? There are two sides to this question, namely, from the standpoint of the individual and from the standpoint of society. These two, to be sure, are not separate phases but essentially continuous, for one shades into the other. It is the potential possibilities of the individual in its interaction with other potentialities around him.

In terms of experience the answer rests on intelligent selectivity. This means, generally speaking, that what counts is not objective products or quantitative achievement of results. In other words, we should not take our measure from mere success but from deliberation and reflection. Success may be achieved automatically through blind submission, while deliberation may result in failure. Yet we learn from our failures. Every act which can properly be termed "free" entails a step in the dark. What is needed is efficiency in sizing up situations, in judging and weighing evidences, in grasping meanings and foreseeing consequences. This is the chief justification for the use of
intelligence. This demands serious cognizance for scientific findings and factual knowledge. Schools, therefore, should make it their measured duty to introduce to the young the accumulative wealth of knowledge. They should provide the young with problematic situations where they can see the power of knowledge in controlling their environment.

We may ask, does the use of intelligence ensure freedom? Any concept when taken in a social context acquires different meanings. Individual experiences do not occur in a vacuum but in a social context. The pragmatists believe that the value of experience depends for a considerable extent upon the number, variety, and complexity of associations and connections it involves, that is, its sociality. Observations and facts show that the individual, from his early start, shares directly and indirectly the life of social groups. Thus any concept of freedom must involve this social aspect of experience. So if intelligence is indispensable for freedom, it must be genuinely socialized intelligence to enable the individual to grapple more effectively with social problems. The general means for such attainment is education. Dewey very aptly states this fact in the following words:

It is true that the aim of education is development of individuals to the utmost of their potentialities. But this statement in isolation leaves unanswered the question as to what is the measure of the development. A society of free individuals in which all, through their own work, contribute to the liberation and enrichment of the lives of others, is the only environment
in which any individual can really grow normally to his full stature.\textsuperscript{67}

The school is the chief social agent for education. But the weight of tradition may stand in the way of the realization of such socialized intelligence, for tradition means habits and customs which have a way of becoming rather comfortable. To maintain its function successfully, the school is to become a proving ground for new ideas, rather than simply a storehouse for old ones. When the school comes to be recognized as the very crucible of freedom, as a means of testing in practice the findings of science and those ideas which seem socially most beneficial to communal living, then it will have begun to emerge as the chief agency for social progress.

\textsuperscript{67}Quoted by Gail Kennedy, "Education as Socialized Intelligence," Freedom and Experience, p. 134.
The pragmatic point of departure is experience which is the total flow of all events and reference points. In experience the individual acts according to his own situation upon his surroundings and produces changes which in turn affect and modify the individual and his activities. In his doing and undergoing, the individual, through differentiation, assimilation, and abstraction, achieves the modification of objects in his experience. That is to say, the process is not one of disclosure but achievement. In other words, the subject and object evolve in the transactional process of the ongoing experience.

The continuity of experience is made possible by means of knowledge. This implies that there is educative and non-educative experience. The former is that in which fulfillment is reached. In this fulfillment reflection originates which, in turn, is the instrumentality for reconstructing experience.

There are two important implications that follow from this view of experience. First, knowledge is operational in character because it is derived from experience and refers to actual or possible experience. The truth of such knowledge depends on its workability in
reconstructing our experience. Although there seems to be no definite statement among pragmatists on what this workability refers to, yet there is general agreement that knowledge is always in the making, hence relative.

Second, the method of intelligence which is exemplified in science is the only reliable means of knowing. Scientific knowledge is always provisional and ever liable to reconsideration and scrutiny. Thus science knows no absolutes. For the pragmatists, man has no needs which in principle cannot be supplied by the exercise of intelligence whether in theory or practice. Through intelligence, human nature has the possibility of regeneration without any appeal to superhuman sources. Human values have no source other than those attested to within human experience.

In some such terms our three pragmatists view freedom. Freedom for them is not a moral postulate or lodged in a metaphysical realm. It is an operational concept. For them freedom is the exercise of intelligence.

To say that freedom is the exercise of intelligence is to believe in a "universe with the lid off," which means also the existence of inexhaustible possibilities. These possibilities do not pre-exist but they evolve in the differentiating transactions of the ongoing experience. Our choices from among these alternatives cannot be called free unless they emanate from reflection and deliberation. To reflect, as has been shown earlier, means to foresee the possible consequences of our choices in action, which implies ability to predict. Prediction
requires knowledge of the potentialities of things involved. It is a process of induction and deduction. In other words, we start with a hypothesis, a theory, or a principle and deduce from it.

This process presupposes some uniformities in nature. Unless each thing with which we interact has its own definite potentialities and operates according to laws, prediction is meaningless. Our three pragmatists agree on this presumption. They believe, moreover, that science in reaching for these uniformities in the nature of things seeks to discover certain patterns of relatedness by which it may gain the power of predicting and controlling natural occurrences. To accept this thesis, one may suggest, is to employ critical speculative metaphysics.

Most philosophers who believe in the existence of operative laws account for them through metaphysics. However, Bode, Kilpatrick, and Otto appear to treat the problem by turning their backs on it. Otto, alone, seems to be reluctant to ignore metaphysical notions and admits the presence of "a larger process" active in nature. It must be said, however, that these three pragmatists, like Dewey himself, do assume the burden of categorically denying the existence of a metaphysical scheme. Since no convincing demonstration can be performed on their terms which would prove the absence of the ding an sich, they profess to be open-minded about the possibilities of existence.

If we agree on the existence of uniformities in nature, then the urge for the exercise of intelligence is justifiable. For knowledge of such laws or regularities and intelligent use of them enable man
to have control over and induce changes in the environment. The exercise of intelligence frees man from the hazardous interferences that block his actions and hinders his development and progress.

The pragmatic view of freedom has the advantage of giving man an active part in fashioning his life. It gives him the happy privilege of being responsible for his activities and commitments. This enhances his feeling of dignity and integrity.

This view, in spite of its merits, raises the question of degrees. To say that freedom can be attained by all men and yet depends upon the exercise of intelligence, implies that intelligence is relatively uniform and constant in all men. Since this is patently untrue, the pragmatic theory of freedom must leave men with widely varying degrees of freedom. This theory would appear to lay the ground work for Plato's republic rather than Dewey's. The pragmatists attempt to meet this difficulty by maintaining that some portion of intelligence is inborn. However, they also insist that intelligence is dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the richness and range of experience. Consequently, they insist, justifiably, that the function of education is to develop intelligence through the enrichment of experience. But here a second question arises. If the development of intelligence depends on an enriched experience, then those who have a rich diversity of experiences will have more intellectual resources for the attainment of a greater degree of freedom. Clearly, those with the leisure and resources for travel, diversity of social intercourse, homes stocked
with enriching conversation and cultural opportunities would tend to provide children with a wider range of experience. All of which again suggests a return to the Greek where the leisure class was the free class because its citizens had more opportunity to develop their intellectual ability.

The pragmatists customarily attack any authoritative scheme that rests on the belief that the ability to control the course of social actions is inherent in the select few. One may reasonably ask, however, whether the exercise of intelligence saves us from the control of the select few. Who will control if we take intelligence as the measure—the intelligencia or the mediocre? If we put our faith in intelligence, does not this mean that the more intelligent are more favored to direct social actions? If so, then we are back again to the "philosopher king" of Plato, to intellectual aristocracy.

The net conclusion is that the pragmatic concept of freedom cannot in itself guarantee a democratic social order. If democracy takes its point of departure from the worth of the individual as a social being, then it needs the sanction of a workable moral theory much more than freedom attained through the exercise of intelligence. This does not shift the work of education as fostering in the children reflection, deliberation, and experimentation. It adds to it an equally important burden which is the development of a moral sense of an ethical responsibility in terms of humanity at large.
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