ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF JOHN DEWEY AND BERTRAND
RUSSELL AND THEIR RELATION TO EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

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By

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Approved by:

[Signature]
Adviser
To My Wife
For Her Patience and Encouragement
And
To My Children
For A Brighter, Sounder World
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INTRODUCTION

The most general setting of this dissertation is the wide, troubled scene of our times. It is difficult to view this scene with more hope than misgiving, and yet it seems equally difficult to view it with more misgiving than hope. In the perspective of history, our age stands as but a moment in mankind's transitions. History has had its share of crises. It is easy, in retrospect, to see the hope that should have pervaded the gloomy days and excited apprehensive mankind. It is easy, too, to see the gloom that should have pervaded happy days and depressed optimistic mankind. Some find it difficult to be optimistic; some find it difficult to be pessimistic. Most find it difficult not to be on or the other. Still, we are haunted by a faith that things will get better, even though we qualify that faith by noting that they'll get worse before they get better. Our lives are often balanced on the "sharp edge of hypothesis."

John Dewey and Bertrand Russell have much to say about history. What they have to say ought to be useful to the educator. Each has delved deeply and richly into the formative periods and theories of history, drawing from his experience there the concepts that are themselves formative and suggestive. From each comes significant and fundamental attention to education. Each sees in the enterprise of education a hope for the development of dispositions calculated to overcome what each sees as the chief difficulties of the age. This is not to argue that there is fundamental philosophic agreement
between them, however. We shall be much concerned to discover where and how there is fundamental disagreement between them.

Russell touches something of the "balance on the sharp edge of hypothesis" in his remark that a disinterested observer might conclude that destruction of humanity and its civilization is the more desirable outcome, considering man's long record of cruelty and folly. Eschatologies, of course, are common to mankind. What is significant in the present is that humanity's destruction is now technologically possible, the possibility undergoing constant refinement technologically and attitudinally as well.

Yet Russell leans a bit in the midst of his doubts. He is virtually driven to express hope, to proffer a key. In this he is fascinatingly akin to Dewey. This, in spite of the fact that he considers Dewey's philosophy akin to "cosmic impiety" and thinks it capable of fostering the "self-assurance" of impending disaster. And so, in his kinship with Dewey, Russell is yet his everlasting opponent.

One great concern to be considered centers upon the possible emergence of a government which, as it were, "lives always in airplanes," reigning over people as "underlings" from some far-off tower of bureaus. A powerful organization without contact with humanity, treating human beings as if they were of the stuff of its machines, it would govern them according to its whims. Bureaucracy has this danger in it. George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four admires...
ably presents such a society and, in Russell's view, a society of this character would be an expression of Deweyianism.

Thus, we must consider the presence of totalitarianism and use of force and violence in the resolution of problems among us. We are a country in a position of great responsibility. But another country also considers itself destiny manifest. The difference between us is profound; yet it must be wondered whether there is not in the people of each something of that which is essential to and expressed by the country or the government of the other. In each of us who inhabits a country of democratic institutions, there breathes a spirit which would bring the machinery under control, subverting it to private gain and ends. Seemingly, if we press too heavily for success in this direction, something called the "Government" takes over, at least, in part.

On the other hand, the persons of a totalitarian regime breathe a sigh of relief (not always, but apparently it is the rule) with the passing of the oppressive regime. But throughout its reign, as the history now being written by Russia attests, it is found that people have to be "educated" to its particular brand of slavery, submission, unflagging allegiance, and obedience.

Dewey and Russell join hands in the rejection of totalitarianism. This is undeniable. They do not join hands in the conclusions of their analyses of it. This is equally undeniable. The basis of rejection is common to them, insofar as one finds a basis in belief
in freedom for men. But their philosophic outlooks upon Russia are quite different. They reject for the same and for opposite reasons. Yet Russell rejects Dewey's philosophy for the same reason that he rejects totalitarian Russia. Russell is rejected for some of the same reasons that Dewey rejects Russia.

We are always of the midst of phenomena and ideologies that shape us. It is, therefore, to our interest—if only this—to be sensitive to and aware of these phenomena. To speak of the "power of ideas" is in a sense to misname the event. But it is not to misname anything simply to speak of and point to the current scene as one in which dialectic and other argumentation, historical support and refutation, scientific appeal and scientific rejection, persuasion and intimidation, fear, fanaticism, faith, fact, religion, agnosticism, and atheism advance (sometimes indiscriminately) a steady stream of claim and counter-claim.

And so it is advisable that teachers come to see themselves and their students, the community and its leaders, critics, and friends, as "bearers" of faith, fact, fancy, idea. The task of fostering and maintaining an awareness of principles implicit and explicit in human affairs is no easy one; yet it would seem incumbent upon the teacher to come as clean as possible as to the principles of living and their bearing upon the social scene. In one sense or another, the teacher is called upon to pass along the principles. Whatever more than transmission is desired, transmission
there has been and must be. It can hardly occur effectively where those charged with its administration are not fully articulate, with respect both to the general heritage of the culture within which the teaching act is to go on and to the character of the individuals involved in the teaching situation.

Whatever one's stand with respect to metaphysics (even when a metaphysic is instrumentally conceived rather than ontologically taken), it is senseless to quest for the role of the school in the social order apart from a quest for a grasp of the social order itself. Moreover, the teaching act carries with it effects, will it so or will it not. It proceeds within and through the context of attitudes and understandings of the situation of which it is and moves, and because it does so, this dissertation has been undertaken as an effort to understand the situation. If the dissertation unfolds some articulate state of a problem constituted by the presence of two giant tendencies in thought, moving as the dissertation does by and with Dewey and Russell who represent the tendencies; and if, in accomplishment of this unfolding there is communicated a sense of the significance of the strongest of individual efforts, sometimes born of the humblest of prejudices, there will indeed be gain.

It is a major task of this writing to see if these two philosophies must engage in a pull-haul for allegiance, through persuasion (for rarely, if ever, is it otherwise with them), moving to a domination
of the scene for fear of the consequences of the other's domination. Perhaps they are compatible, if the urge to stand alone is laid aside. Above all, can we secure the two strains in such a way that they release and mature each other? Freedom, progress, peace, democracy, and sound education—Devey and Russell say and imply—rest in the balance of the times. The dissertation is ambitious in scope, for it seeks to grasp Russell and Dewey at points of basic difference, inquiring into them in the areas of formal philosophic thought and social and educational concerns. There is an effort to catch the "unity of view" of each philosopher, seeking at the same time to unravel the tangled skein of polemic between them.

There are four parts of the dissertation. Part I presents specific concern with the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Part II turns to desire and metaphysics. Part III focuses upon social philosophy, and Part IV upon education. There is an introduction to each part, and the first three parts include a chapter titled "Concerns," in which are presented materials and a brief analysis to set forth some of the philosopher's thinking on the question at hand so that certain specific dispositions and concepts may be seen. Secondly, there is in each part a chapter titled "Discussion," taking off from the materials presented but moving in such a fashion that the bearing of each position upon the other is reflected and adjusted to. This discussion is really a fuller exposition of each view, then, and is virtually an "over-view"
of the philosopher's thought at the specific points considered. Covering comments are presented at points of a shift of emphasis.

It remains here only briefly to sketch the over-arching "problem" that develops, for the rift revealed is pervasive. It is one which has persistently given trouble in the consideration of the views of Russell and Dewey's. In the pages that immediately follow, a sketch of this rift is presented in the hope that it will aid the reader in moving through the dissertation itself.

The covering aim is to provide a comparison of the philosophies of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. These two philosophers have reached deeply into the course and the character of events. Each has been deeply moved, deeply determined, and deeply absorbed by the scientific "strain" in history. Each has entered the course of the events he articulates. To this writer, one of the most fascinating facts of philosophers is that, however much events may be taken up for examination, for articulation, and interpretation, these efforts, in the form of philosophies, enter the course of human history in such a way as to become themselves part of its events, its course, its constituents. The philosopher does not take a conception to be human history, for to do so would be to bring an end to the life of philosophy. Still, some "settling down" is necessary or, at least, occurs.

Where would we be were there not men who reached deeply, extensively, and richly into life and articulated their sense of it in a systematic, comprehensive way? Where would we be without the efforts
to embrace a totality, the effort to articulate and communicate a "unity of view"? It has been said that one "cannot predicate action on no word at all," but, obviously, to do otherwise is to predicate action on some "word." It is to organize—however consciously or unconsciously—what one does. To read among those who have through history been successively "classic" is to discover all phases of life to have been touched by them. Sometimes, of course, the touchings have been abandonings. Dewey and Russell admirably illustrate this, with respect both to the past of philosophy and to themselves as present to each other.

While the writer does not judge their respective views of past systems of philosophy, this need not stand in our way. The warranted-ness or truth of their judgments is one thing, the nature of their judgments another. We may be concerned with the latter without being concerned with the former. Dewey and Russell are themselves in disagreement as to the proper bases of judgment, as we shall discover. This is a fundamental point of difference between them, at least, where theory is concerned. It is not clear that they are as far apart as they seem in attitude, concern and aspiration. Nevertheless, their assertions and insistences have to be honored, even though at the outset or conclusion no way of resolving the conflict is present.

Russell has persisted in his concern for our knowledge of the external world. It has been a question, at times, whether the existence or character of knowledge has been the object of his concern. Sometimes both have seemed to be. At times he does seem to explore the
possibility of proof of the external world's existence; at other
times only our knowledge of a believed-in external world is in
question. He has at times abandoned the concern that physics pur-
port to say anything about such a world, yet he is convinced that
physics which does not so purport is an "intellectual game."
Belief in a world of "facts," a world largely outside the control
of human beings, is critical. It is critical as a widely held belief
and is critical as one to which "knowledge of" is addressed. His own
analyses have been, as just said, related to human belief in, and
concern with, such a world. His discussions arise in an ontological
context and we shall attempt to see, in as broad terms as possible,
the possible import, negative and positive, of retaining or abandoning
this traditional context of controversy, analysis and exploration.
Russell retains it (with some renewed vigor after his scepticism).

Dewey removes conflicts from the ontological context and examines
them in another light, for other purposes. He early leveled at
Russell on this point, just as Russell early leveled at pragmatism
on the same point. Dewey was once of the opinion that an effort to
call into question the existence of the external world would wind up
finding itself caught in self-contradictions. It would find the
question answered before it was (or while it was) asked. "Self-
contradiction" faded, however, as a basis of judgment on the matter,
and other points gained dominance. Roughly put, Dewey has come to
stand on the "autonomy of inquiry," putting speculations about the
nature and possibility of knowledge of the "external world" aside,
and leaving theories in their use and service in the context of inquiry. Thus, what would ordinarily be taken as propositions about the nature of nature, or Nature, are now to be taken as suggestions and considered in their role in Inquiry, achieving status as ideas. Their "instrumental meaning" is basic and sufficient. The "autonomy of inquiry" is the Deweyian alternative to a "belief in a world of fact," the pursuit of truth.

What is certain is that Russell and Dewey join hands in brooking no attacks upon human inquiring, although it must be said that Dewey's position brushes aside the ontological area of controversy and interest—an area in which inquiry has heretofore occurred extensively. It is not, honestly, as if the struggle between the views is as to whether Inquiry is to be autonomous or subordinate, although the meaning of "autonomous" is quite different for the two men. On the one hand, it means for Dewey that all propositions are considered in terms of the "use performed and service rendered." Logic is inquiry into inquiry, for example, and inquiry in the latter sense (as that to which use and service is made) is never to be subordinated to a particular theory—is never to be subordinated to a proving of its "truth." On the other hand, Russell maintains an autonomy through pressing, persistent skepticism. "Uncertainty" is in question here, the "penumbra of uncertainty" surrounding situations which "do not of themselves" occasion doubt. Nothing is so "holy" as to avoid the searching finger of "critical reflection," and this disposition is
perhaps best exhibited in the challenge hurled at the most common sense beliefs.

Each man is a philosopher of freedom, and each is generally liberal in his political orientation. Each has addressed himself quite extensively to the conduct of education, to the principles, practices, and aims of that enterprise. Just how much different would be a society or a school "conducted in accordance with" the one philosophic orientation as over against the other? Does either view represent checks upon human freedom? If so, what are the checks? Does either view represent the expansion of freedom? If so, in what ways? What is the dominant concern, explicit, or implicit, where development of attitudes and abilities is concerned? Are those persons who indoctrinate, intentionally or not, more likely to be the "issue" of one of these orientations or the other? What of the resolution of human conflict? Upon what grounds may resolution most likely occur? Upon what grounds may it best be achieved? What will happen? Will there be a continuation or an increase or a cessation of the "arbitrament of the big battalions"? Is authoritarianism, is an ethic of "might make right" riding in the van of pragmatism's "cosmic impiety"? Or does it ride (also?) in the van of Russell's view?

Neither philosopher enjoys the spectacle of mankind on the brink of destroying itself. Neither enjoys the spectacle of totalitarianism in our day or any other day. Yet conceivably, if we honor their judgments of each other, each philosopher opens the
door to these possibilities in human affairs. The writer seeks to keep his own "views" from distorting the positions in presenting them. Yet it is perhaps too much to hope, even though it is the hope, that the only subjectivity present is the direction that interest in the conflict has taken.
PART I

THE EXTERNAL WORLD
INTRODUCTION

In Chapter I, the two sections set forth on the basis of extensive quotation from the writings of the philosophers themselves a development of the difference that has existed between Russell and Dewey relative to concern with the "external world." Only as much comment by the writer as seems to provide continuity and illustrative material is provided. It is hoped that a sense of the vast difference in direction of attention will be gained. Actually, as in Chapter II, the differences between the philosophers sometimes will seem to be overdrawn—especially to one fully acquainted with the positions of both men. An attempt has been made to remain faithful to their respective emphases, however, and to locate points at which "balance" is seemingly needed—without actually devoting much time to the establishment of the balance possible.

Certainly no small amount of confusion will attend such an effort, since interpretations by the one philosopher of positions he does not share become part and parcel of one's thinking about and reaction to those positions. This is particularly the case when much time is spent with a single position before turning to another. One is forced to "stand within" one position at times and "outside" it at other times in order to state objectively the case between them and with them respectively.

Certainly the difference in concern with the nature of our knowledge, and with what we appropriately turn our attention to in the
acquisition of that knowledge, is part of important philosophic con­
troversies. Different positions address themselves to the nature of
knowledge and the processes by which it is attained in varying ways.
In fact, the origin of the problem to which they address themselves
may be accounted for differently, in some instances. Thus, a full
reading of Russell would suggest that his scepticism relative to
the senses as a source of knowledge has developed sometimes into a
belief in a world radically different from the senses, on the one
hand, and into reliance upon "intuition" or "pure reason" as the
instrument of knowledge, on the other hand. Actually, such a notion
as this seems based upon historical belief in a mind "substance"
with aspects and attributes. Dewey, on the other hand, suggests
that the origin of the problem about the external world is generated
by converting traits of experience into qualifications of reality or
into real entities, conflicting "reports" generating the problem as
to what the external world, as to what Nature, is like and, indeed,
as to what must be known or accepted as known about it to account
for some of the events of experience.

The section on Russell carries through his statement of the
problem, noting especially his heavy emphasis upon the extent to
which inference and belief permeate our lives. It terminates with
the "dissolution" of the "solid, real, persistent world," leaving
us sceptical as to its existence but not in a position really to
deny its existence. In a sense Russell has questioned its existence
and in another sense he has only exhibited the difficulties involved in supposing ourselves to have knowledge of it. While the chapter ends with "certainty" being confined to the existence of sensations and their correlation with each other, and with these "hard data" accepted as the basis of our knowledge, it is not to be thought that solipsism is proffered as the "true" belief. We are merely left with a deep sense of the privacy of our experience and, thus, our lives. We are left with belief in the reality of a world that most take as certainly real, although for various reasons.

After realizing the scepticism inherent in Russell's analysis, we turn to Dewey and find that he early turned directly against the "intellectual game" Russell "exhibits." Actually, both analyses focus upon a question of the "existence" of the external world, although, as noted above, Russell could well be interpreted in the other sense. In relation to the first writing considered, Dewey is found to advance a "charge" of self-contradiction against Russell's effort. But we find that in the long run there seems little basis for the charge, even though belief in the external world turns out to be all that is at hand in Russell. Further, Dewey later turned more to the "fallacy of conversion" as the basis of polemic against the "ontologists."

There is reason to share Dewey's long-standing view that Russell is engaged in an "intellectual game," but in a different sense from that suggested by "self-contradiction." Russell does seem to play
a game with problems of knowledge of a hypothetical real world. Yet the game may be significant. Fundamentally, of course, insofar as he is a philosopher, Russell plays no more a game than does Dewey. Philosophy has a "game-like" quality about it. But to have carried these introductory remarks so far is to have moved toward what is contained in the "Discussion," constituting Chapter II.

Chapter II also has two sections, the first devoted to Russell and the second to Dewey. An attempt is made, in each case, to develop from and in relation to the "Concerns" a discussion designed to give a more detailed analysis of the problem of the Part I and to indicate the place of the emphases in the larger setting of the philosophers' thinking. It serves as a kind of "overview," if you will, culminating in a direct introduction to Part II. Actually, exposition of Russell embraces a large range of his concerns. The concern with knowledge of the external world, of events we do not experience, and of our dependency upon our knowledge of those events, together with the suppositions we make with respect to them, remains central, however.

Also in discussion of Russell, in Chapter II, there is introduced, as relevant to the notion of a "larger natural world," the polemic that has centered upon the "philosophy of organism" or those who are "organicists." Russell centers attention on the isolated events that have their own "free development," a chain of events constituting a "thing," a "person," a "photon," or something in
the universe. It is upon "causal lines" that our knowledge and inferences turn, and knowledge of events in isolation from each other prevents an arbitrary assignment of their nature on the basis of their function in a "whole." It further develops, then, that the determination of such events and their connections with each other is critical. The implicit notion seems to be that the "structure" of the chain of events (the way they are linked together) is critical to an understanding of them and of inference. This retains the emphasis upon isolates. Even were we to turn attention (as we must) to conditions of interaction, our understanding of interaction rests upon determination of the isolates—in part, if not completely.

The section on Russell closes with a long quotation from a recent writing in which there is the suggestion of "de-personalization" of the inference principles—a removal of "unnecessary accretions" from them. This is an improvement of their "form." But the application of "logical techniques" suggests, to some, the existence of a "pure reason" or "infallible intuition."

Although the introduction to Dewey begins with a quotation in which he points this finger at Russell, the dominant concern is with their different emphases and with the "problem of knowledge" set in a context of the "ontological" as over against that of the "function in inquiry." The section on Dewey first considers his rejection of atomism and then investigates passages which set forth roughly the pragmatist view of "reality." This leads to a basic concern for
the place of "isolates" in Dewey's position. It is a particular concern to know whether Dewey places any importance upon the "in itself" character of an existent as having anything particular to do with inference or knowledge generally. There certainly is, in Dewey, a place for the determination of existences. These are "obstacles-resources" in problematic situations. Yet he does not seem to be concerned whether knowledge of their function is or is not due to what they are in themselves, to what they are as "free developing" events, things, existences. Nevertheless, it seems the case that unless "things" are described in terms of their qualities, or unless some coherent set of qualities is "frozen," so to speak, it is not possible to talk about "re-qualification" as Dewey does talk about it. And this seems ultimately to rest upon a simple statement of original existences, however much they do not, as a set of qualities, "cohere." In any event, it seems certain that "innate development" is not to be troubled with except as we may note something about the duration of the "thing."

What has been—and in part remains—the most perplexing aspect of Dewey, and of the differences between him and Russell, centers in the matter just mentioned. For there is, for a reader of the two, a clear-cut similarity between them as regards determination of "objective fact." Russell clearly demands attention to such fact, and Dewey joins him, although for the former there is no discussion of "facts of the problem," or "obstacles-resources" in the conduct of
life. Perhaps to the detriment of Dewey's position, for some, not much attention is given this beyond what has been suggested here. What is obviously a matter of difference between them is that of taking it to be significant, on the one hand, to believe in events upon which we depend and which are presupposed in the inferrings and believings we do, and in taking the reals of the world in their function in "inquiry," i.e., as "obstacles-resources," or as "to be known."

It will be discovered that the writer places increasing emphasis upon the notion put forward by Dewey, of a "fallacy of conversion." This notion is given introductory consideration in the discussions, and it is contrasted with Russell's emphasis upon belief in the world of fact. As Part X closes, attention is turned directly to considerations that also bear upon the conduct of life—namely, Russell and Dewey's respective stand upon the question of "Desire and Metaphysics."
A. Russell

Russell seems to address himself to three questions in relation-ship to existence of an external world. It is one thing to suppose that what is present "in our experience" exists apart from our experience. It is quite another, however, to suppose that something making itself felt in our experience does (or can) exist apart from our experience. It is still a third question to ask whether any-thing at all exists apart from our experience. The latter question concerns the existence of an external world in the broadest state-ment of that question. It does not suppose existence of such a world either definitely or possibly like our experience or in some way efficacious in our lives.

The following passage suggests clearly that the alternative to accepting the problem occupying Russell is equivalent to a denial of "external causation."

.... If I believe that there is such a place as Semipalatinsk, I believe that there is because of things that have happened to me; and unless certain substantial principles of inference are accepted, I shall have to admit that these things might have happened to me without there being such a place. (1)

It is necessary here to beware of absurdity. If one eats green apples, for instance, and then dreams that there are black-green cows with orange goblins riding them, one has certain events happening
"to him." He might then conclude that believing there are such cows and goblins follows from the fact of "certain events." The point of the passage, however, in the less limited sense, is that some events must have occurred, whether or not "real" cows were experienced. But all we want from the passage is a suggestion of concern. It offers alternatives: (1) belief in the existence of certain places to entail inferences enabling us to pass from events happening to us or (2) belief that certain places and events giving rise to belief entail no such place—existent—as is believed to exist. This is a matter of the existence of places.

The following passage offers a slightly different matter for consideration. In it there is no reference to "happenings without such a place"; there is, however, a supposition of "events I do not experience."

In view of certain events in my own life, I have a number of beliefs about events that I do not experience—the thoughts and feelings of other people, the physical objects that surround me, the historical and geological past of the earth, and the remote regions of the universe that are studied in astronomy. For my part, I accept these beliefs as valid, apart from errors of detail. By this acceptance I commit myself to the view that there are valid processes of inference from events to other events—more particularly from events of which I am aware without inference to events of which I have no such awareness.... (2)

The unexperienced events are admitted, attention being drawn to beliefs about them.

The first passage shows what rejection of belief in the principles of inference involves; the second shows why the principles are involved.

This double-edgedness is a tricky affair to articulate, and caution
must be exercised against an unconscious shift from the one frame of reference to another. Russell is at least concerned with our knowledge of the external world. This is no real solution, however, since we do not know whether it is knowledge of the existence or knowledge of the nature of an external world that is the concern.

It is the purpose of the present chapter to throw some light on this confusion and to provide some clarification of it. The following discussion is based upon a chapter of one of Russell's major writings. In it, we shall find that what is for most of us a "hard datum" is a "soft datum" in the hands of one dedicated to "critical reflection."

In the Schilpp volume on Russell, the latter remarks that much contained in Our Knowledge of The External World he no longer believes. Nevertheless, the concern remains, as the previous quotations, taken from a writing published more than thirty years later, attest.

The distinction between "hard" and "soft" data permeates Russell's philosophic life:

..... But this distinction is a matter of degree, and must not be taken too seriously, and if it is not, it may help to make the situation clear. I mean by "hard" data those which resist the solvent influence of critical reflection and by "soft" data those which, under the operation of this process, become to our minds more or less doubtful. The hardest of hard data are of two sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the general truths of logic. The more we reflect on these, the more exactly we realize what they are, and exactly what a doubt concerning them means, the more luminously certain do they become. Verbal doubt may occur when what is nominally being doubted is not really in our thoughts, and only words are actually present to our minds. Real doubt, in these two cases, would, I think, be pathological....(3)
It is pathological for one to doubt that when he sees green he sees green, that when he hears a loud bang, he hears a loud bang, or that when he burns his hand he feels the burning. To sit typing and doubt that I feel the keys at my fingertips is pathological. Others may doubt that I feel them, but I cannot. I might have difficulty proving to the others that I feel the keys. But this is different, just as it is different to assume, should I fall asleep, that the typewriter seen upon awakening is the one I typed upon when awake.

Certain common beliefs are undoubtedly excluded from hard data. Such is the belief which led us to introduce the distinction, namely, that sensible objects in general persist when we are not perceiving them. Such also is the belief in other peoples minds: this belief is obviously derivative from our perception of their bodies, and is felt to require logical justification as soon as we become aware of its derivativeness. Belief in what is reported by testimony of others, including all that we learn from books, is, of course, included in the doubt as to whether other people have minds at all....

It is worth noting, in light of the confusion about what is in question, that Russell includes the above beliefs under "soft" data.

We are now in a position to understand and state the problem of our knowledge of the external world, and to remove various misunderstandings that have obscured the meaning of the question. The problem is really: Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data? (5)

And here, of course, Semipalatinsk's existence is called into question.

...The immediate object of sight, the colored surfaces which make up the visible world, are spatially external in the natural meaning of this phrase. We feel them to be "there" as opposed to "here"; without making any
assumption of an existence other than hard data, we can more or less estimate the distance of a colored surface. It seems probable that distances, provided they are not too great, are actually given more or less roughly in sight; but whether this is the case or not, ordinary distances can certainly be estimated approximately by means of data of sense alone. The immediately given world is spatial, and is further not wholly contained within the sense-data which constitute what we perceive of our own bodies. Thus our knowledge of what is external in this sense is not open to doubt. (6)

The passage is free of any assumption of the permanence, persistence or independence of anything. We do not confuse our bodily sensations with the non-bodily ones. This distinction is not open to other than verbal doubt. Walking is not confused with seeing bookcases, for example, while we walk. The full nature of the distinction appears later.

Another form in which the question is often put is: "Can we know of the existence of any reality which is independent of ourselves?" This form of the question suffers from the ambiguity of the two words "independent" and "self." To take the Self first: the question as to what is to be reckoned part of the Self and what is not, is a very difficult one. Among many other things which we may mean by the Self, two may be selected as specially important, namely (1) the bare subject which thinks and is aware of objects, (2) the whole assemblage of things that would necessarily cease to exist if our lives came to an end....(7)

Of course, if the "Self" were to mean the complex or set of bodily sense-data, and the not-Self the complex or set of non-bodily sense-data, we might have an instance of "knowing" of something "independent" of ourselves. Yet we must not confuse a "real and radical" difference in hard data with real and radical distinctness and independent
existence. And we should not confuse "externality" with "independent." Thus, beginning with the givenness of externality, we might ask whether either element or set passes with the passing of the other. This raises the question of "independence." Just how are two—"two"? What is meant by "a pair"? Recalling the two meanings of "Self": (1) "the bare subject" and (2) "the whole assemblage of things necessarily ceasing to exist if our lives came to an end," we may note:

...The bare subject, if it exists at all, is an inference, and is not part of the data; therefore, this meaning of Self may be ignored in our present inquiry. The second meaning is difficult to make precise, since we hardly know what things depend upon our lives for their existence. And in this form, the definition of Self introduces the word "independent" which raises the same questions as are raised by the word "dependent." Let us, therefore, take up the word "independent" and return to Self later.

Two views of "dependent" are introduced: (1) "Logical dependence" and (2) "causal dependence." Russell says that "so far as I know, one thing can be logically dependent upon another only when the other is part of the one." Thus, the question: "Can we know of the existence of any reality of which our Self is not part?"

... In this form the question brings us back to the problem of the definition of the Self; but I think, however, the Self may be defined, even when it is taken as the bare subject, it cannot be supposed to be part of the immediate object of sense; thus, in this form of the question we must admit that we know of the existence of realities independent of ourselves. (8)

The "bare subject" thinking and aware of objects is not part of the complex of objects of sense. Assuming that this is not one of the objects of sense, assertion of such a subject is an assertion of
something not given to sense, and we are driven to state that inference is involved.

The key consideration that "senses" and "sensations" are basic in our knowing appears. Our experience is thinking, feeling, and the presence of sense-objects. Thus far, however, there has been only reference to existences, with no reference to "cause" and the second meaning of "dependent."

To know that one kind of thing is causally independent of another we must know that it actually occurs without the other. Now it is fairly obvious that, whatever legitimate meaning we give the Self, our thoughts and feelings are causally dependent upon ourselves, i.e., do not occur when there is no Self for them to belong to. But in the case of objects of sense, this is not obvious; indeed, as we just saw, the common-sense view is that such objects persist in the absence of any percipient. If this is the case, then they are causally independent of ourselves; if not, not. Thus, in this form the question reduces to the question whether we can know that objects of sense, or any other objects not our own thoughts and feelings, exist at times when we are not perceiving them. This form, in which the difficult word "independent" no longer occurs, is the form in which the question was stated a moment ago. (9)

The question, as stated above (the form in which it was stated earlier, then) is reduction to a "lowest common denominator." While there is thinking and feeling, there are not thoughts and feelings in the universe, waiting to be thought and felt. They are not there for discovery. With this position, then, there remains the question as to whether anything else exists apart from our perceiving. Here begins, then, the question of concern.

Does the greenness of grass, the brightness of the sun, or the
hardness of the stone exist when there is no Self for them to belong to? Are they "real"? In *Inquiry Into Meaning And Truth*, Russell sets forth the paradox that physics begins with naive realism or, more exactly, that naive realism leads to physics. The naive realist takes the greenness, brightness, hardness, to be "experience of reality." Yet physics assures us that the grass, sun, and stone of our experience are quite unlike the grass, sun, and stone of reality. It seems to be a toss-up whether the naive realist's or the physicist's world is the "world of poetry." Insofar as the physicist's world is (in some important respects) quite radically different from that of our everyday experience, the physicist is akin to the mystic.

Russell, however, refuses to let either pronouncement pass unchallenged. His question derives from this circumstance of "rivalry." There is the "lowest common denominator" question. "Can we know that objects of sense, or any other objects not our own thoughts and feelings, exist when we are not perceiving them?" The question raises two distinct problems:

... First, can we know that objects of sense, or very similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them? Secondly, if this cannot be known, can we know that objects, inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them, exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any other time? This latter problem arises in philosophy as the problem of the "thing-in-itself" and in science as the problem of matter as assumed in physics. (10)

If we cannot know that hardness-of-stone or roundness-of-sun or something like that hardness or roundness, or that the objects in experience have, apart from experience, some of the traits (or one of them) as
discoverable in experience, can we infer from the experienced the objects not necessarily resembling them? Can this inference be only to objects existing simultaneously with our experience or can it be either also or only to objects which existed at times other than now?

The following passages clearly indicate that Russell's line of inquiry calls the "external world" into question. One cannot assert on the basis of the passage that its existence has been denied; nevertheless, the second and third sentences below indicate that it has been called into question.

Owing to the fact that we feel passive in sensation, we naturally suppose that our sensations have outside causes. When I speak of sensations or sensible objects, it must be understood that I do not mean such a thing as a table, which is both visible and tangible, can be seen by several people at once, and is more or less permanent. What I mean is just that patch of color which is momentarily seen when we look at the table, or just that particular hardness which is felt when we press it, or just that particular sound which is heard when we rap it. Each of these I call a sensible object or sensation. Now our sense of passivity, if it really afforded any argument, would only tend to show that sensible objects must have outside causes, and both the thing-in-itself of philosophy and the matter of physics present themselves as outside causes of the sensible objects...

In each case, I think, the opinion has resulted from the combination of a belief that something which can persist independently of our consciousness makes itself known in sensation, with the fact that our sensations often change in ways which seem to depend upon us rather than upon anything which would be supposed to persist independently of us.... (11)

Acknowledging our feelings of passivity and our feelings of causal
efficacy, what warrant is there for supposing them more than that? What warrant, beyond the simple fact that we do so believe, is there for believing that passivity feelings result from activity of the something which can persist independently of our consciousness? It is not easy to accept feelings of passivity without accepting real passiveness to be our condition. Yet this is what Russell seems to proffer. The belief in external causation is found to be derivative from the combination mentioned, just as is the "thing-in-itself."

Philosophy and physics have their answers to passivity. Russell cuts under them. While questioning feelings as evidence, Russell does not question their presence.

Now let us see what is more exactly involved in the above reference to a "table" and to "sensible objects."

A table viewed from one place represents a different appearance from that which it presents from another place. This is the language of common sense, but this language already assumes that there is a real table of which we see the appearances. Let us try to state what is known in terms of sensible objects alone, without any element of hypothesis....

The solid, causal, persistent world seems to evaporate. Belief in it succumbs to solvent critical reflection:

.... We find that as we walk around the table, we perceive a series of gradually changing visible objects. But in speaking of "walking around the table," we have still retained the hypothesis that there is a single table connected with all the appearances. What we ought to say is that, while we have those muscular and other sensations which make us say we are walking, our visual sensations change in a continuous way, so that, for example, a striking patch of color is not suddenly replaced by
something wholly different but is replaced by an insensible gradation of slightly different colors with slightly different shapes. This is what we really know by experience, when we have freed our minds from the assumption of permanent things with changing appearances. What is really known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations. (12)

In short, when we are devoid of the prejudice of permanent things with changing appearances, experience in the above case is a matter of "table-old" patches of color. Left without even external causation, the individual is alone. His is a world of touchness, see-ness, etc. It is not at all his world and some other upon which it "depends."

When "minds" are "mental events," and when this means "events which I know or of which I am aware without inference," as such events as suggested in the foregoing, it becomes quite clear that certainty is confined to one's own experience and that it is solely the certainty of existence of sensations, of sensible objects. All that we are warranted in saying is that there is walking, change in color, shape, etc.

We could readily agree that Russell is seen to call into question various views about the common sense world, but his question, "Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" seems clearly to go far beyond simply asking what similarity between a persisting world and the data exists. Is the "all the world" the all that is my experience? When we take the common sense outlook that there is an external world and remove it from a statement-of-fact category, and when we
then examine carefully what we do know introspectively, we find, indeed, our experience. Are we confined to it? Is it all the experience there is? Is metaphysical solipsism the correct hypothesis? Is it the truth? But even if one "admits" that there are other experiences than his own, are we epistemologically confined to our own? Is epistemological solipsism the truth? Further, if we deny metaphysical and epistemological solipsism, then we have to ask how it is that we know others' experiences, know other experiences or other events.

It seems quite clear that one does not need to assume the existence of an external world in order to have a problem with respect to it. Indeed, Russell has not assumed the existence of such a world. It is quite obviously the case that he considers carefully the plight of those who do in fact assume that world's existence. But this is a far cry from his assuming it. One cannot deny that people suppose it to exist. It cannot be denied, either, that people purport to know what it does, know that it does exist, know what it is like.

It is understandable, in this view, that the presence of terms such as "sense object," "sense" and "sensation" could occasion difficulties. The word "sense" could hardly have meaning without something that is "not sense." And if one uses the word "sense" meaningfully, then one must already have in mind some not-sense. And if this is the case, there is then no question of inference involved. One begins implicitly with what one purportedly is to arrive at by
inference. But what of the questions: Are sensations all that exist? Are we confined to sensations? The fact that one has to begin with two things in order that a term applied to either may be meaningful does not involve, in human life, the supposition that both things exist. People do have sensations. They do believe they perceive realities, do believe there is more than sensation. There is a something seen, not simply a seeing. The something is believed in, the seeing undeniable. Can the belief be taken from the realm of hypothesis?

Summary

The distinction between "hard" and "soft" data was noted in this section. The former resist the solvent influence of critical reflection, while the latter do not. Among the "hardest of hard data" are the "particular facts of sense" and the "general truths of logic." Among the "soft data" are these: (1) belief that sensible objects in general persist when we are not perceiving them; (2) belief in existence of minds other than our own; and, (3) belief in what is reported by testimony of others. With this distinction and these soft data at hand, we found the question: "Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" The inclusion of the above beliefs under the heading of "soft data" goes hand in hand with the question, of course.
There were next set forth phrasings of the question which Russell takes to have obscured the meaning of the problem. The question is not whether there is or is not some externality: we do not confuse our bodily sensations with non-bodily ones. The former are "here" and the latter are "there." This is an affair of externality not involving a question of persistence apart from sensation or apart from experience, perception. "Independence" is not a consideration.

The next phrasing, however, contained the word, "independence," and led to the distinction between "logical independence" and "causal independence." The former involved the view of one thing being a part of another, and gave rise to the question: Can we know of the existence of any reality of which our Self is not part? Russell believes that, whatever legitimate meaning be given "Self," it is not the case that the Self is part of the immediate object of sense. The view that the Self is "bare subject" either admits awareness of the bare subject or has to admit knowledge of something not given to sense or in sensation. Russell holds that such a bare subject is not part of the immediate object of sense. One does not have as a sense datum that which has sense data. This speculation also seems not necessarily or inherently to involve "persistence," although it might. At any rate, persistence seems more surely involved in the question of causal independence.

Causal independence refers to a thing's occurring without another thing. Thoughts and feelings, "it is fairly obvious," do not occur when there is no Self "for them to belong to," but the case is "not
so obvious* where "objects of sense are concerned." The common-
sense view is that they are causally independent, i. e. do not
depend upon us for their existence. This view that leads to the
question: "Can we know that objects of sense, or any other objects
not our own thoughts and feelings, exist at times when we are not
perceiving them?" "Independence" does not appear here, and we are
free from both "logical" and "causal" kinds. Relative to the
"external world," it was suggested that Russell is "non-partisan";
that he points up a "lowest common denominator."

Two questions, which "it is important to keep distinct," were
then underlined: (1) Can we know that objects of sense, or very
similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them?,
and (2) If we cannot know this, can we know that other objects,
inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them,
exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any
other time? It is important to note here that the existence of
"objects of sense" is not in any way in question, doubt concerning
them being pathological, although verbal doubt is possible.

The second question above gives us the problem of the "thing-
in-itself of philosophy" and the problem of "matter as assumed in
physics." Both of these involve belief in outside causes of the
sense object. But for Russell this belief is derived from a com-
bination of the belief that something outside our experience (existing
independently of our consciousness) makes itself felt in sensation
with the belief that sensations change in ways that depend upon us
more than anything that might be supposed to exist independently of us. Passivity and efficacy were suggested to be just feelings and not, therefore, necessarily adequate or accurate ways of thinking.

Against this background we came to the point at which the common-sense "solid," "causal," and "persistent" world evaporated. The beliefs mentioned earlier succumbed to the "solvent influence of critical reflection." We found that we live, in a quiet startling way, in a very lonely way. All that we seem warranted in asserting, when the soft-data beliefs are critically examined, is that the "bare outcome" of experience is the correlation of sensations. More exactly, the "bare outcome" of critical reflection in this affair is that we seem warranted in asserting, at the most, the fact of correlation of sensations.

Russell, then, has come to call into question, in a very inclusive sense, certain views of the question of the external-as-apart-from-experience world. In doing this, he has come to call into question the external world. He asks: "Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" He has given us, too, a pretty good picture of what anyone else would take as "hard data," though it is not likely that many would join him in placing under "soft data" all that he does.

We have encountered the "external world" at three points: (1) the common-sense way of viewing it; (2) the "thing-in-itsel" of philosophy; and, (3) matter as assumed in physics. The scope of
Russell's question is large, indeed.

Actually, in light of later writings, some qualification of the emphasis upon questioning the existence of the external world is appropriate. He has himself said that he has been less concerned to exhibit its existence than with exploring the difficulties involved in supposing knowledge of its existence. It must be admitted that he has dealing with "belief." Critical reflection operates in this context. But the question as to the possibility of inferring from hard data anything other than those data is a question of different emphasis from that of what is involved in the supposed fact of inferring other-than-hard data from those data.

The grounds upon which it may be asserted that the existence of the external world is in question and just how it is in question have been set forth in the preceding pages. There does not seem to be any "self-contradiction" involved where one critical analysis shows what is directly given and what is not. Analysis brings forth awareness of what is definite and what passes beyond definiteness. The kind of question raised by Russell and which his analysis has left, therefore, has been our chief concern and remains so as we turn to Dewey. However, the deeply private character of existence as Russell views it is of fundamental significance. It expresses a problem implicit or explicit in most or all else that Russell has set himself to saying.
26

B. Dewey

In none of Dewey's writings is there to be found an analysis of the problem of the external world such as we find in Russell. The existence of the common sense world is never called into question by Dewey, nor is its existence ever a question he speculates about. The most elaborate expression of concern by Dewey with this problem appears in his Essays in Experimental Logic. There Dewey directs himself specifically to Russell, a fact that makes it difficult at times to focus attention upon what Dewey himself believes about the common sense world he assumes. These difficulties must be put up with to understand the difference between them. The following is Dewey's conclusion on Russell's analysis.

.... The material fallacy lying behind the formal fallacy... is the failure to recognize that what is doubtful is not the existence of the world but the validity of certain customary yet inferential beliefs about it, about things in it. It is not the common-sense world which is doubtful, or which is inferential, but common-sense as a complex of beliefs about specific things and relations in the world. Hence, never in any actual procedure of inquiry do we throw the existence of the world into doubt, nor can we do so without self-contradiction. We doubt some received piece of "knowledge" about some specific thing of that world, and then set to work, as best we can, to rectify it.... (13)

Dewey is willing that we continue believing in the "common-sense world" and is further willing that we continue believing about that world. This is the stage at the moment. It is not so much the case that the existence of that world is proved for Dewey. Yet the place of "self-contradiction" raises some questions: Does Dewey
mean that if raising a question involves self-contradiction, the existence of that questioned is proved? How is there self-contradiction involved in Russell's concern and effort?

It is hoped, of course, that further analysis will aid us in gaining understanding in relationship to these questions. Concern focuses, however, directly upon the attitude toward a problem about the common sense world.

After rejecting certain familiar formulations of the question because they employ the not easily definable notions of self and independence, Mr. Russell makes the following formulation: "Can we know that objects of sense... exist at times when we are not perceiving them?" Or, in another mode of statement? "Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?"

I shall try to show that identification of the "data of sense" as the sort of term which will generate the problem involves an affirmative answer to the question—that it must have been answered in the affirmative before the question can be asked. And this, I take it, is to say that it is not a question at all.... (14)

Dewey proceeds on the grounds that "sense" and "sensory," to have meaning, need existence of another kind. A "sense" object or "sense" datum is simply object or datum if "sense" is not in the presence of "non-sense." It is not meant simply that "sense" involves supposition of physiological conditions. Many persons would have difficulty imagining what "sense," "sensory," and "sensation" could possibly mean without there being physiological conditions. Dewey's point seems to go beyond the conditions of sense, sensory, and sensation, however. It is a matter, basically, of these meaning...
anything if something other is not assumed. This appears to be the only basis for the statement that before the problem can be stated, there is assumed that which is brought into question and which, thus, is only professedly brought to question. The charge of self-contradiction rests here. In these terms there is ground for Dewey's view that the only matter in hand is one of playing an "intellectual game." He wouldn't mind the procedure, he indicates, if this is what is wanted, but the approach is seriously out of place in what professes to be fundamental philosophic inquiry, especially when this is conducted in a context of presumed logical rigor and concern.

The above instance ending up in self-contradiction, is but one instance of the fundamental principle involved. The other way of phrasing the question about the existence of the common sense world shows this. This mode of statement is: "Can we know that objects of sense...exist at times when we are not perceiving them?" Russell alludes to "a 'patch of color which is momentarily seen!" Dewey observes and then asks:

> How is it that even the act of being aware is describable as "momentary?" I know of no way of so identifying it except by discovering that it is delimited in a time continuum. And if this is to be the case, it is surely superfluous to bother about inference to "other times." They are assumed in stating the question--which turns out thus to be no question....

In this way, then, the speculations about and concern over the existence of the common sense world are dispensed with—and they were dispensed with, for Dewey, apparently once and for all. In no other writing than that quoted from does Dewey touch upon any question
of the existence of the common sense world. His conclusion of 
this chapter apparently stood for him:

...Never in any actual procedure of inquiry do we 
throw the existence of the world into doubt, nor 
can we do so without self-contradiction. We doubt 
some received piece of "knowledge" about some 
specific thing of that world, and then set to work, 
as best we can, to rectify it....(15)

In opening the chapter Dewey wrote of the carefulness and 
"commanding importance" of Russell's formulation of the problem. 
His "final effort" is expressed in the following: "If my point 
can be made out for Russell's statement, it will apply, a 
fortiori, to other statements....I take the liberty of throwing the 
burden upon the reader and asking him to show cause why it does not 
so apply." (p. 282)

Now let us shift to another approach in this context of con­
cern. Dewey tends to drop the term "epistemological." This, 
however, is more a matter of verbal concern than otherwise. The 
fundamental rift is between an "ontologico-epistemological" concern 
and a "non-ontologico-epistemological" one. The former is the 
traditional context, the one which the latter abandons. The former 
is non-Deweyian, the latter Deweyian. We find again that Dewey 
attaches no special importance to belief in the external world. 
The quotations which follow will show Dewey's orientation more 
sharply. In them we find reference to a problem "allegedly" 
existing in the discrepancy between perceptual material or subject-
matter and the scientific material or subject-matter; and, in them,
we approach a principle more deep-running than "self-consistency."

...On the ground of the position taken in this treatise, there is no general problem involved in the fact that the content (material and procedural) of scientific subject matter is very different from that of the fields of direct perception and of common sense. It must differ in specified respects if it is to satisfy the conditions of controlled inquiry in resolution of problematic situations. Problems do arise. But they are specific problems of inquiry; they have to do with the particular transformations that need to be effected in respect to the material of particular problems. But on the ground of any other theory than the one set forth there is a general problem to which the name epistemological is usually given. Hence, I shall state some reasons for holding that the philosophical problems to which the name of epistemology is given, are (when epistemology is regarded as anything else than a synonym for logic) gratuitous and artificial; that such "problems" disappear when the characteristic features of scientific subject-matter are interpreted from the standpoint of satisfaction of logical conditions set forth by the requirements of controlled inquiry.... (16)

Dewey then presents an exemplary case for discussion, pointing to what he takes to be the source of the "alleged" problem, the source of the epistemological (what we have called an "ontologico-epistemological") context. "General" problem refers to a taking of a particular discrepancy, opposing the discrepant factors, setting them in an ontological pronouncement context, and then seeking to determine "the fact." But let us quote from Dewey's Logic again.

Within the field of direct perception there are points of light seen in the heavens. By means of telescopic instruments, other dots of light, not ordinarily perceptible, are disclosed. In both cases, there is the specific problem of drawing
Inferences from what is perceived in order to account for what is observed by placing it in an extensive temporal-spatial continuum. As a conclusion of inquiry, these specks of light are finally affirmed to be suns of systems situated so many light-years away from the observer on this planet. Now, in itself, or immediately, the speck of light is just the quality which it is. The alleged epistemological problem arises when the quality in its immediacy is set in opposition to the object (subject-matter), the distant sun, which constitutes the scientific conclusion. It is pointed out, for example, that the speck of light exists here and now, while the object, the sun, may have ceased to exist in the period which has elapsed since the light left the sun and "arrived" at the observer. Hence, the "problem" arises of a radical discrepancy between existential material and scientific objects—this particular case being taken as strikingly exemplifying the difference found between them as a result of every scientific undertaking.

When the theory of knowledge is framed on the ground of analysis of the method of inquiry employed in scientific practice, or on logical grounds, the alleged problem simply does not exist, does not present itself. The visible light is taken as an evidential datum from which, in conjunction with other evidential data, a grounded inferred proposition is to be drawn. It, the light now existing, does not purport to be a sun or to "represent" a sun; it presents a problem. An elaborate system of techniques of experimental observation, directed by an equally elaborate conceptual structure, results in establishing an extensive temporal-spatial continuum, and by placing the light in a definite position in this system, solves the problem presented by the existing datum. Within this inferred continuum, a sun, so many light-years distant, is determed to be the initial constituent. There are many special problems and specific inquiries arising in the course of this determination. But there is no general problem of the alleged epistemological type.*** (17)

There is nothing here of "conflicting claims to reality" or to "knowledge of reality." It is as if the "scientific conclusion"
were a "free construction," permitting "ordering" of the "experiential data" of human experience. It is as if the scientific conclusion, as a "world," were one of poetry, not of "fact" or of "reality."

Now we shall see that the "experiential" sets and checks inferences "drawn." "Checks" is not a "proving," apparently. Pursuance of this would lead us necessarily into the question of the nature of truth, however, and this is a direction in which we need not and do not want to move. Suffice it to note again the place of "ordering."

...From the standpoint of inquiry and its method, the problem and its method of solution are of the same sort as when a geologist, on the ground of the traits of a rock here and now existent and here and now perceived, infers the existence of an animal of a certain species living so many hundreds, of thousands of years ago. No inference is possible from the observed rock in isolation to the object inferred. But when it is ordered, by means of a complex conceptual structure, in conjunction with a multitude of materially independent data, the inferred proposition is taken to be warranted. In both of the instances given, the difference in subject-matter between what is observed here and now and the subject-matter of the scientific object is inherent in satisfaction of conditions of controlled inquiry. A general philosophical problem of the "epistemological" type could and would arise only if they were not different in subject-matter. (18)

The point is a striking one. There is no problem between existences now and existences then. The present, the now, the given, the here are, so to speak, "to be accounted for." But there is no problem of the non-existent's existence. There is no problem of the truth of the inferred non-existent which connects with the existent, i.e., no problem or question of the inferred non-existent's having existed. It is not its having existed which is involved. The "difference in
subject-matter" of what is "observed here and now" and that of "the scientific object" is the difference between a perceptual apparatus functioning to determine conditions, say, and inquiry—superestere moving to what is not given in this operation. In short, inquiry embraces a moving beyond, a getting at something new, something not given. If the two were not different, they would certainly conflict with each other, would be set in, or simply would "naturally" be in, opposition, and the general problem that Dewey avoids and rejects would be generated. This is the problem of the "epistemological type," as Dewey calls it. The contrast has, in our terms, since Dewey himself presents a "theory of knowledge," been put in terms of an ontological versus a non-ontological context. The following even more clearly indicates the appropriateness of the latter way of phrasing the distinction.

There is clear intimation of non-preoccupation with a "character-analysis" approach and controversy. Emphasis is upon function, and this observation requires a "qualifying" of the statement above about perceptual apparatus determining "conditions." The statement is appropriate only if one does not fall into a "perceiving truly" context. In short, concern is with Inquiry, and this involves de-emphasis and abandonment of the ontological emphasis. The affairs of living are understood as they function in Inquiry. Philosophy, Logic, and understanding of affairs in their function in Inquiry mesh.
(There is) necessity for a system of related conceptions...for discriminative institution of relevant data and for ordering them...The instance now to be discussed involves interpretation of these conceptions on the basis of the logic of inquiry in its contrast with the epistemological interpretation. The "problem" which occasions the epistemological interpretation. The "problem" which occasions the epistemological interpretation arises when and because it is supposed that conceptions, in general and in particular, ought to be in some fashion descriptive of existential material. The idea that they should be descriptive is the only view possible when the strictly intermediate instrumental function, operatively realized, of conceptions is ignored.... (19)

Dewey then quotes Planck, on a difference of dimensions between the conceptual and the existential, to point up that the physical definitions of color, sound, and temperature, are in no association whatsoever with immediate perceptions traceable to the senses. Dewey remarks that the stated contrast between physical definition of temperature as, say, a matter of kinetic energy of molecular motion and the immediate-perception definition as a feeling of warmth, holds universally of "scientific conceptions in their contrast with the subject-matter of existential material."

The conclusion is that unless the conceptual subject-matter is interpreted solely and wholly on the ground of the function it performs in the conduct of inquiry, this difference in dimensions between the conceptual and existential creates a basic philosophic problem. For the only possible alternative interpretations are either the (highly unsatisfactory) view that the conceptions are mere devices of practical convenience, or that in some fashion or other they are descriptive of something actually existing in the material dealt with. From the standpoint of the function the conceptual subject-matters actually serve in inquiry, the problem does not need to be "solved"; it simply does not exist. (20)
If, say, the immediate-perception approach is taken as indicative of reality, then the conceptual materials can be only "convenient fictions." They help us "make sense" out of the complex of sensations, etc. They "order" our sense-data and are, thus, something on the order of Kantian categories impressing upon the intuitions of sense—but without all the "trappings" of necessity, etc., attending Kantian exposition and conclusion. Both subject-matters are to be understood in their function in inquiry.

Thus Dewey is neither occupied with the existence of the external world nor with ascertaining that we have any knowledge of it. What are traditionally "opposites" are for Dewey present—but not as opposites. They are involved with each other in a process. The "Autonomy of Inquiry" is a key expression, if not the key expression in Dewey. What has been taken as one or another term in a traditional area of concern and "inquiry" is "subordinate" to Inquiry. This is the destruction of traditional philosophic pre-occupation and the inception of fundamental controversy. It is the birth of another philosophy. Significantly enough, Dewey observes in the introduction to the new edition of Reconstruction in philosophy that "reconstruction of philosophy" better indicates what is called for. So much is in part anticipation, but as it is also in part summarization of the implications of the preceding concern, and since we now have to move to a different emphasis out of the foregoing, it is included here.
Our excursion into quotation from the Logic was to include in its results an intimation of a principle that would replace "self-consistency." That "principle" is the "fallacy of conversion." If expressed briefly in relation to the above, especially to the last quotation above, it means simply that subject-matters properly conceived in terms of their function in inquiry have been converted into antecedent realities. To take conceptual materials as descriptive is to convert a function in inquiry into a description. The principle will be observed repeatedly in the course of providing an exposition of Dewey's philosophy.

The reader will have noted that the task of the inquiry, whatever it is, is the achievement of "ordering." Without going into the details of the nature of inquiry, it may be observed that whatever given object—a geologist's rock, say—is in question, there is no inference to be drawn from this rock in isolation. What is needed, as the quotations above suggest, is an ordering of this rock in conjunction with other, "materially independent," data. Any inference based upon "this" rock "alone," is warranted only in the case of "consistency" of the inference from it with that rock in the "whole," consisting of the full range of materially independent data. The conceptual structure "enables" this ordering, functions in the ordering, however simple or complex it may be. The inference is then taken to be warranted. In this way "self-consistency" is a factor in warranted assertibility, though warranted assertibility is not the same as the truth. In Essays in Experimental
Logic, Dewey referred to the significance of changed modes of apprehension and comprehension as factors in the improvement of inference. If we take these earlier essays at this point and then consider the Logic, the "modes of apprehension" are the present "orderings" of materials. But we should not lose sight of the fact that inference is included in the "ordering."

So significant is the place of "order" and the "unified" in the view under examination that Dewey offers the following as the "most highly generalized conception of inquiry which can be justifiably formulated."

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (21)

Inquiry, thus, is such controlled or directed transformation. Inquiry is thought. Inquiry and thought are two names for the same thing. But an important and fundamental point is the "is" in the statement. There is not thinking which transforms. Thinking, Inquiry, Thought is this. "Reification" is the alternative to such phrasing. Recognition of this at once retains emphasis upon "conversion fallacies" and focuses upon the aspect of "unity" in our exposition. It is appropriate, then, to shift from one exhibition of attitude toward the "external world" to another.
Summary

This analysis of Dewey relative to the "external world" began with reference to passages from Essays in Experimental Logic, with attention focused upon the place of "self-consistency" relative to Russell's way of putting, and attending to, the problem. The chief point throughout was that what is brought into question is assumed in the stating of the problem. Therefore, the "what" is only "professedly" brought into question, and the problem thus turns out to be "no problem at all." It is not yet clear just how fundamental the principle of self-consistency is in the Deweyian polemic. Certainly it is obvious that the principle was fundamental in the passages considered. In any event, we rested with it for the time being, moving next to a much later writing which seemed, it was held, to place emphasis upon a different principle.

Relative to the latter, the passages selected dealt with it directly in terms of the "experiential" (the immediate-perceptual) and the "non-experiential" (the scientific). The passages laid open the traditionally prevalent mode of apprehending the common sense and scientific subject-matters as these are in "opposition" to each other. This opposition was seen to arise in the event that the two "dimensions" are taken in terms other than their "office" in the conduct of inquiry. It developed that the fundamental basis of controversy resides not so much in affairs of knowledge of the external world (what Dewey calls the "epistemological" and what we called the "ontologico-epistemological") as in the fact
of conversion of function into antecedent realities or into views of reality. Whereas the employment of the principle of self-consistency could have been an effort toward "reductio ad absurdum," the principle of the fallacy of conversion is, so to speak, a philosophic principle rather than a logical principle. It is an expressed basic outlook, a philosophy.

Attention has to be given to the place of the immediate-perceptual (which "is what it is in its immediacy," i. e., which is not a referrent to a reality) and to the conceptual, the scientific. The subject-matters were seen to be different, and this in turn meant that there is in the one an "experiential" character not present in the other. This is all one, in the last analysis, with taking them in function in inquiry—the one sets the problem, the other moves in relation to this to solution. The one "springs from" the other and involves the "inferential leap." The difference in subject-matters is essential. Otherwise, i. e., if there is no difference in subject-matters, the two do come into opposition. The "general philosophic problem" of the "epistemological type" is then generated. The generation of the problem, once more, is escaped by the avoidance of the "fallacy of conversion." The emphasis and the sufficiency is upon the function in inquiry of dimensions. The alternative to this is either that the "conceptual materials" are merely "convenient fictions" or that they are descriptive of traits of reality. The former is "highly
unsatisfactory," and the latter, especially, is the traditionally-held-to ontological controversy.

Thus, the expression, the "Autonomy of Inquiry," is of the essence of the Deweyian position. What has been conceived in ontological terms is lifted from that context. Inquiry is not subordinated to the determination of reality, is not subordinate to reality (traditionally conceived, at least). Rather, what is usually taken as reality is to be considered in its function in inquiry. Its function is what it does. Its service rendered and use performed are it, and it is the use and service.

The above conclusion coincided with a new emphasis, the notion of "order," of "ordering," of "unifying." An analysis of the significance of "ordering" in Dewey's view revealed that the "most highly generalized conception of inquiry which can be justifiably formulated" is "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole."

Throughout attention has been given to the "external world" and specifically to it as a "problem." It is clearly the case that Dewey does not operate in a context of ontological considerations. He will not be found to have engaged in any such formulation as was encountered in Russell, and he will not be found to be pre-occupied with anything but a Russellian pre-occupation with such a
problem. It is in this conflict with traditionally oriented philosophy that Dewey lives, moves, and has his being, just as it is within that context that Russell lives, moves, and has his being. The split is basic; it is also permeative. It is its permeability that is of dominant interest here.
(Chapter I Notes)

A. Russell

1. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, p. xii. (Footnotes appear at the end of each chapter throughout the dissertation. Unless otherwise noted in a footnote, the work cited is by the philosopher whose views are being considered. Thus, a work by Dewey, cited in a section on Russell, will be noted as Dewey's, and one by Russell, cited in a section on Dewey with be cited as Russell's. Full titles are given throughout.)

2. Ibid., p. xii.
3. Our Knowledge of The External World, p. 75.
4. Ibid., p. 77.
5. Ibid., p. 75.
6. Ibid., p. 78.
7. Ibid., p. 78.
8. Ibid., p. 79.
9. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
10. Ibid., p. 80.
11. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
12. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

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15. Ibid., pp. 301-302
17. Ibid., pp. 465-466, ital. mine.
18. Ibid., p. 466.
20. Ibid., p. 467, ital. mine.
CHAPTER II

DISCUSSION

A. Russell

The conclusion of Section A of the preceding chapter was that Russell has questioned the existence of an "external world." That world becomes hypothetical in character. The conclusion at the end of the section on Dewey was that he considers such questions an "intellectual game." What we want to find out is the import of the difference. Dewey and Russell may not be as far apart as controversy would seem to show them to be, yet it must be admitted that the one exhibits interests the other does not. This much is clear at the beginning. Russell moves in relation to the fact of our believing in an external world and of our believing ourselves to have knowledge of it. Dewey certainly does not deny the existence of the external world, yet he does not become concerned with what that world is like, especially in the sense that possibility of knowledge of it apart from experience is a matter of concern.

The section on Russell showed what the "bare outcome" of experience is. Yet we constantly move in relation to what is beyond experience, beyond the bare minimum noted. Russell is concerned with "events we do not experience" and, specifically, with our supposed knowledge of those events. He takes a stand on the conditions of knowing them, and one may differ with him on this stand without
repudiation of his efforts to determine those conditions. He has an answer, too, to questions of what makes "private" experience private and "public" experience public. Dewey, of course, has his answers to questions of knowledge, privacy, and publicity. No experience, in either philosopher's terms, is "pathological," even though they mean something different by the latter. No one is cut off from the world, then. Yet each repudiates the other.

It is impossible to rescue Russell from the charge that he is dealing with a hypothetical real world—one just plain believed in, just plain assumed. It is obvious to him that we know certain things happen to others. Admission of the testimony of others involves belief in the existence of minds other than our own, but it remains belief. Short of acceptance of testimony, and even upon the examination of the fact of communication, there is analogy. Out of our own lives we may infer. What we infer when we are reflective makes us more aware of what is implicit in our own lives. We understand better "principles of inference" when we discover what inferences are made. Yet the inferred is but believed in. Inference is to events. This hypothetical element is practically important in understanding and improving our own lives. So much, however, is anticipatory.

Events determine the truth or falsity of beliefs. The "world of fact" playing such a role in Russell's thinking is doubly functional. On the one hand, it serves as a kind of "check" upon inarticulate certainty, placing articulate hesitation to the fore in
its stead. On the other hand, this fact is itself practically im-
portant to human living, enabling us to move in awareness of the
vast pennumbra of uncertainty surrounding our lives and "insuring"
us against error. It is in the "patient, plodding, and piecemeal"
scientific approach that security is to be had. And in the very
application of critical reflection to human beliefs there develops
the awareness of the pennumbra of uncertainty. Scientific truth-
telling, inspiring a way of life, leavens the dead hand of the
insistence of subjective factors and makes us aware of the particular-
istic. To seek out the "objective," the less personal and thence
to move forward is a basic task. Dependency upon unexperienced
events demands much. To attempt to know those events demands much.
The following pages are an attempt to show specific concepts that
are involved, for Russell, in the attempt.

A great deal of "de-personalization" is expected in the disci-
pline of this concern. The distinction between the "psychological"
and the "physical world" is one of the occurrence of particular
kinds of events. There are private events and non-private ones and
inferences from the former to the latter. Further, there is the
world of privatenesses—showing persons, percepts, brains, and all
to be "regions" in physical "space-time." There are events among
events. Never, however, is it believed that the whole universe is
an event in any one region. No one "monad" mirrors the whole. This
notion of "mirrorings" and of the interpretation of affairs in
terms of "space-time" events is critical enough to consider somewhat
more fully. It is said by Russell, for example, that "psychological" space and time must not be confused with "physical" space-time:

"... Everything that occurs in one person's experience must, from the standpoint of physics, be located within that person's body... If we define a piece of matter as a set of events, the sensation of seeing a star will be one of the events which are the brain of the percipient at the time of the perception. Thus every event that I experience will be one of the events that constitute some part of my body. The space of (say) my visual perceptions is only correlated with physical space, more or less approximately: from the physical point of view, whatever I see is inside my head. I do not see physical objects; I see effects which they produce in the region where my brain is. The correlation of visual and physical space is rendered approximate by the fact that my visual sensations are not wholly due each to some physical object, but also partly to the intervening medium... (1)

Or:

"... Two events which are simultaneous in my experience may be spatially separate in psychical space, e. g., when I see two stars at once. But in physical space these two events are not separated, and indeed they occur at the same place in space-time... (2)

While we usually believe things to be as we see them, the above puts individual experience in the same kind of private terms as those with which Section A of "The Concerns" closes. There is here, however, the "introduction" of the world of physics. Attention is invited to the way in which what are supposedly public objects become simply certain events occurring at a particular place in space-time. This does not deny causal events, of course. What it does is to set off as but a portion of a complex certain data normally taken as "real in their own right." Even if we move
beyond attention to "qualitative" affairs of experience, turning to characteristics of structure, the partiality or approximate correlation remains. No one body, no one person, inhabits the whole universe at any given time. It "mirrors" that universe only in part and mirrors it from a particular point, moreover. The individual is thus a "perspective" and is put in perspective.

It is difficult not to take all this as a "looking out upon" the world. But to do so is to get into difficulty. It generates, in the long run, scepticism as to the value of the sense as sources of knowledge and, when it is supposed that the seeings are "aspects," the notion of the "thing-in-itself" of philosophy is generated. Private experience is proffered instead of scepticism as to the reality of the world of sense; the correlate of scepticism (some "thing-in-itself") is private experience. (3) De-personalization involves an escape from this privacy. When we come to questions of "social philosophy," this matter may be dealt with more fully, more directly. For the moment, attention remains upon "our knowledge of the external world" as a question of philosophic import and effort.

Perhaps it will help to note that much of what Russell has written is set against a background of critical attack upon mysticism. He rejects the notion that the world of experience is radically different in kind from any real world or from the real world. He has said that he admits the possibility of the mystic's insight into a world totally different from the world of experience.
He will not—if only because he has not had the mystic’s experience—agree to the conclusion or postulate of mysticism. Indeed, he is suspicious that traces of the human linger in the supposedly other-than-human, other-than-experiential, world into which insight is claimed. (4)

There is something “mystical” in the notion of the world of physics being unlike the warm, sense world we know so intimately, yet physics assures us of the “subjectivity” of sensations. Physics begins with naive realism but ends up remarking that naive realism is false. This means that “naive realism, if true, leads to physics which says naive realism is false; therefore, naive realism, if true, is false.” The conclusion is that it is false. It need not be supposed that naive realism is totally false, however; it is not necessary that a thing be wholly true or wholly false. The two things need not be set in disparaging contrast with each other, although their contrast at some points may warrant examination of both to see if there are not some points at which they are similar, identical or in some fashion reconcilable. The “certain abstract characteristics of structure” are discovered to be the point of reconciliation.

If we ask how it has come about that physics has achieved its remarkable success, we learn that it has achieved it through increasing indifference to the world of sense and privateness generally. It has managed liberation from that world, largely through the development of mathematics and logic, and it is underwritten
by quest for the world as it really is. Yet due to differences in "perspective," subjectivity infects even pronouncements on space-time structure, on predictive affairs—except where "de-personalization" has reached its highest level. There is thus never exact verification, for the most part, since so many factors constitute the "medium," giving detail to the inferences, reflecting their limited origin.

The unverified, it should be said, is not necessarily the false. A belief may never be verified in experience (the only place it can be verified) and yet may be true. General principles, further, are never verified in their generality but only in the particular cases to which they apply. At any rate, it is the presence or the absence of believed-in events, not the presence or absence of verification in experience that determines truth. Experience, being a private affair, is not taken as the basis for judgment upon the truth or the falsity of beliefs. That events are not experienced does not prove them non-existent. That beliefs about events are not always beliefs about experienced events does not prove the beliefs false. Were it otherwise, we would be confined simply to the stating of the status quo. Belief in events we do not experience serves us as a stimulus to inquiry, promising us the possibility of enlarging the expanse of our lives. Such belief is not a solving of a difficult epistemological problem by recourse to what is merely certain, a refusal to acknowledge the anticipatory flavor of most of life.

In the process of de-personalization, on the contrary, there is
promised some awareness of possibilities of the future, some consideration of what things may be, not what they must be. There is honesty in confronting the world with our beliefs in what we do not experience and determining whether the world has the traits forming the foundation of the inferences. What must we be able to discover; what must we assume; what must we be able to know, supposing certain of our beliefs true? These are not questions of the existence of an external world. They are questions that follow from inferring—a doing that rests upon certain events in our experience, and supposition of others related to these.

What has just been said is not an excursion from the main line of our inquiry. On the contrary, it is an integral part of that inquiry. It seems to make little difference whether or not the existence of an external world is in question. The critical consideration is that the belief in it is central in human life and that, even if one turns one's back upon controversy about the what of it, the practical value of assuming it is clear. It is believed, for example, that science's believing itself to be saying something about an external world is its provision against degeneration. Thus, the belief turns out to be central practically, just as it is common to humanity. It is this that shapes up in the long run as basic.

It has been said that there is no disparaging contrast between the world of physics and the world of sense. There are different kinds of events, not some kinds that are set in opposition to each
other. Some events are known without inference, and other events are known only by means of inference. The distinction between the "mental" and the "physical" is thus epistemological, the former being uninfurred, the latter inferred events. Psychology and physics proffer different accounts of the universe, yet each stands in close relationship to the other. Each is infected with the fact that none inhabit the entire universe; yet permits some "quasi-publicity." While Russell may have been harsh on those who have treated the world of physics with impunity, it is they, not he, who have put the two realms in disparaging contrast. The reconciliation of the world of psychology and the world of physics may be said, correctly, to be a major motivating force in Russell's effort.

While it is interesting to pursue Russell's discussions of the relationship of psychology and physics, the suggestive and liberating effect of the technical inquiry is best realized by direct acquaintance with his writings on these affairs. One is made to realize the radicalness of the transformation in outlook that comes from the notion that the basic stuff of the universe is simply that of "events." What is ordinarily taken as some all-embracing space and time "disappears" becomes the subjectivity of human life, and there is little to be said for taking psychological space and time as metaphysically real. We learn by experience to correlate events and to build up an all-embracing space and time, but under the development of modern physics this becomes a matter simply of what human beings have learned
Physics has abandoned the notion of space and time and replaced it with space-time. There is some shock, perhaps, when "stars" that are spatially separate in perception are taken to occur at the same place relative to physical space-time. And there is a vivid realization of the "temporalness" of one's life when the tremendous sweep of a "universe" is laid hold of. We are most certain of what we do experience, but that chain of events, the succession of complexes connected with each other and to others beyond it, is swept up in physical space-time as particular occurrences with some persistence. It is embraced as if but a moment in eternity. Russell, indeed, can write of man's entire civilization, with its rash use of resources, as but "a brief moment of riotous living."

A disparaging contrast of "worlds" is not indicated here, for the contrasts are caught up in a large "sphere." It is as if always a world were a-building, there being a care for accuracy, for precision, together with tolerance of the essentially vague and an awareness of the need for the admission of other new notions and testimony, however vague. Russell does not turn his back upon experience. On the contrary, he makes experience the source of what larger knowledge we may have, even though this involves as much de-personalization as we may hope to achieve through "improvement of form" of principles of inference, the causal principles. Freedom from practical affairs and tradition and of local temperament
and bias are called for. But this does not move us to some grand
and glorious Whole.

The identification of particular things demands that they have
some "intrinsic causation." Events may be going on "atomistically,"
having a period of "free development." A chain of events proceeds,
like a billiard ball, until impinged upon or until impinging upon
another chain, like one billiard ball striking another. A deter-
mination of particular "things" in a condition of interaction depends
upon an ability to determine the effect, in the consequent of the
"collision," of one or the other of the "interactive" elements (or
of both of them) in producing the particular consequence. The "line
of movement" of the thing in question, the particular connection of
its successive events, has to be known apart from the interactive
situation, apart from the moment of interaction. This is indicated,
for example, in the following:

There are some who hold that the fundamental
concept in biology should be that of "organism," and
that, on this account, biology cannot be reduced to
chemistry and physics. This view is derived from
Aristotle and was encouraged by the Hegelian philosophy,
though Hegel himself does not use the world "organism."
It is, to my mind, an erroneous view, and one which,
insofar as it prevails, is a barrier to scientific
progress. But as it still is fairly widely advocated,
it will be well to examine it.

...It holds that the body of an animal or plant if a
unity, in the sense that the laws governing the be-
havior of the parts can only be stated by considering
the place of the parts in the whole...An eye removed
from its socket...cannot...see...but this is not a
peculiarity of living things: your wireless cannot
tell you the news when the current is switched off.
And properly speaking, it is not the eyes that see;
it is the brain, or the mind. The eye is merely a
transmitter and transformer of radiant energy. But the "organic" view would hold that the way in which the eye deals with radiant energy cannot be understood without taking account of the rest of the body, and of the body as a single whole.

The opposite view, which I should regard as correct, would say that to understand what an eye does, you need to know, in addition to its own structure, only the inflow and outflow of energy... (6)

And the same notion is present in the following:

Modern physics and physiology throw a new light upon the ancient problem of perception. If there is to be anything that can be called "perception," it must be in some degree an effect of the object perceived, and it must more or less resemble the object if it is to be a source of knowledge of the object. The first requisite can only be fulfilled if there are causal chains which are, to a greater or less extent, independent of the rest of the world. According to physics, this is the case.... (7)

This is pluralism and the problem given attention in the passages is roughly, at least, that put above in terms of "interactive" situations. There is no telling what role any billiard ball plays in the situation at the moment of and beyond the point of collision if there is no way of discovering what each ball was prior to the collision. Something of the "antecedent" nature of the balls has to be known, or supposed, at least. Otherwise one is in the position of attempting to determine, from an "A" on a report card, just what affect the teacher and what effect the child had in the interaction producing the "A." If we cannot manage such "isolation" of the participative elements, then we are confined to "inferences" concerning their "intrinsic" character. What is worse than this, of
course, is to let "pride and prejudice" govern our estimate of the respective efficacies of child and teacher.

Pluralism holds, as one of its basic tenets, that things may be "real" and "living" in their own right. The above considerations, then, are significant relative to it. The following passage is a still more explicit statement of what is involved.

The conception of "causal lines" is involved not only in the quasi-permanence of things and persons but also in the definition of "perception." When I see a number of stars, each produces its separate effect on my retina, which it can only do by means of a causal line extending over the intermediate space....

A "causal line" as I wish to define the term, is a temporal series of events so related that, given some of them, something can be inferred about the others whatever may be happening elsewhere. A causal line may always be regarded as the persistence of something—a person, a table, a photon, or what not....

That there are such more or less self-determined causal processes is in no degree logically necessary, but is, I think, one of the fundamental postulates of science. It is in virtue of the truth of this postulate—if it is true—that we are able to acquire partial knowledge in spite of our enormous ignorance. That the universe is a system of interconnected parts may be true, but that can only be discovered if some parts can, in some degree, be known independently of others. It is this that our postulate makes possible. (8)

And, further: "When 'substance' is abandoned, the identity, for common sense, of a thing or a person at different times must be explained as consisting in what may be called a 'causal line.'"

The determination of the isolates is for the improvement of inferring, to ground factually our lives. (Loc. cit.)
Those who insist or seem to insist upon the "primacy" of wholes over parts, or who less preferentially confine understanding of a thing to its place in connections with all other things, are likely to be overly ambitious or, just as perplexedly, are likely to be trapped. They may get trapped in the difficulty of finding the function of any part. Any part may have any function in a whole, and there is thus an arbitrary assignment of function to any part or an endless circle with the constant reminder that, in effect, any part may be the whole. These latter observations may be taken as giving added meaning to Russell's position and to the notion of "external."

In our effort to catch Russell "in himself," the concern with an "external world" has remained in focus. Whether there is such a world, or whether there are such "worlds," the particular hypothesis that there is is of critical importance, just as it is important to try to say how we know, when we suppose ourselves to know the world. It is little wonder that Russell would turn briskly and persistently, even flippantly, upon the position he assumes Dewey to advance—the position that takes belief out of the context of events which make those beliefs true or false, and especially the position which is assumed to take the concept of "organism" as a fundamental concept. It is little wonder also that the enormous weight of the relativity of human beings in the scope of physical space-time, the individualized character of human experience, the atomistic character
of "perception," and the things of this world in their interactive state would function to make one way of a philosophy which sets forth the theory that the principles governing inquiry and human life generally are developed in the course of experience.

Before we discuss Dewey, let us examine briefly, at least, the following passage from Russell:

"...All particular facts that are known without inference are known by perception or memory, that is to say, through experience. In this respect, the empiricist principle calls for no limitation.

Inferred particular facts, such as those of history, always demand experienced particular facts among their premises. But since, in deductive logic, one fact or collection of facts cannot imply any other fact, the inferences from fact to other facts can only be valid if the world has certain characteristics which are not logically necessary. Are these characteristics known to us by experience? It would seem not.

In practice, experience leads us to generalizations, such as "Dogs bark." As a starting point for science, it suffices if such generalizations are true in a large majority of cases. But although experience of barking dogs suffices to cause belief in the generalization "Dogs bark," it does not, by itself, give any ground for believing that this is true in untested cases. If experience is to give such ground, it must be supplemented by causal principles such as will make certain kinds of generalizations antecedently plausible. These principles, if assumed, lead to results which are in conformity with experience, but this fact does not logically suffice to make the principles even probable.

Our knowledge of these principles—if it can be called "knowledge"—exists first solely in the form of a propensity to inferences of the kind that they justify. It is by reflecting upon such inferences that we make the principles explicit. And when they have been made explicit, we can use logical techniques to improve the form in which they are stated, and to remove unnecessary accretions."
The principles are "known" in a different sense from that in which particular facts are known. They are known in the sense that we generalize in accordance with them when we use experience to persuade us of a universal proposition such as "Dogs bark." As mankind have advanced in intelligence, their inferential habits have come gradually nearer to agreement with the laws of nature which have made these habits, throughout, more often a source of true expectations than of false ones. The forming of inferential habits which lead to true expectations is part of the adaptation to the environment upon which biological survival depends. But although our postulates can, in this way, be fitted into a framework which has what we may call an empiricist flavor, it remains undeniable that our knowledge of them, insofar as we know them, cannot be based on experience, though all their verifiable consequences are such as experience will confirm. In this sense, it must be admitted, empiricism as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate, though less so than any other theory of knowledge. Indeed, such inadequacies as we have seemed to find in empiricism have been discovered by strict adherence to a doctrine by which empiricist philosophy has been inspired; that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever. (9)

Here, then, at the end of considering the pursuit of knowledge of events which we do not experience, and at the end of brief consideration of details of a particular philosophic position and perspective, there is expressed the view that the general principles upon which so much depends in experience are such as not to be derived or known by experience. Such statements seem surprising when they come from one who seems to hold so fully to the place and efficacy of human experience—if efficacious only in the sense of contributing the "partiality" flavor of and the complicating of the "medium" of "knowledge." Yet they are not surprising in light
of the comments upon removal of "unnecessary accretions." Experience is of particular facts. We need to get at what "details" are essential to certain happenings. In doing this, we also get at the general principles.

It is to be noted on the "intellectual" side that the inferential phase is the dominant point of attention. It is also to be noted that inferences rest upon "causal principles" and these upon "causal lines." It may then be noted that our initial knowledge of these principles consists in a "propensity" for inferences that they justify. The existence of the propensity points to the principles. We tend to make inferences and to make them correctly, yet caution must be exercised. The "form" of the principles of inference, once more, is improvable through use of "techniques of logic," after the determination that there are such causal lines, such events and chains of events as are presupposed in the inferences. Over a number of cases we may give more "general form" to the inference. If we manage improvement of form in an a priori fashion, our living is more flexible.

We anticipate, expect. What we expect will enable us to know more fully, enable us to render explicit the causal principles "inherent" in the given predictive, anticipatory situation. Our inferences are indices of the present. Determination of the existence of certain "causal lines" is accomplished. We learn to drop from these the particularism of life. Logic has its origins, so to
speak, in the practical exigencies of human circumstance, the demand for the more "public." It also has its value, again, in rendering life more flexible. But it is the existence of events believed in that makes believing true or false. The world of fact "largely outside human control" remains significant, and it is this that the improving provides for, making principles available over a wider range. There is always the chance that the principles may be controverted by experience, but to the extent that "de-personalization" is achieved, the availability is greater or less.

The inferred is, once more, "instrumental" in aiding explicit determination of our suppositions. Whenever we pass beyond the moment, there is occasion for extracting the factual referent part of the moment. It is discovered that we know what is happening to us, but it is also discovered that we suppose events happening which are not happening to us. It is upon the latter that inference is grounded. If there are such events, then our inference will hold. We learn this as we reflect upon what is involved in correct inferences. We find they are grounded upon true beliefs as to occurring events. At least, it is Russell's notion that this is the case.

Determination of the extent events, then, becomes critical. When we cannot ask a person the question, "Are you thinking what I believe you to be thinking?", or "Do you intend what I think you intend?", we have no check upon the suppositions. Through careful analysis of all that we do and have known about the person in question, however, some probability is possible. We operate on the
hypothesis that the person thinks thus and so or will behave thus and so or that there are such and such events occurring. Recognition of the limit of our certain knowledge, i.e., that what is happening to us—what we say, think, feel, read, etc.—makes us aware, indeed, of the vast amount of supposition that pervades our lives.

The fact that we infer, at any moment, has two aspects—the anticipatory and the objective referrent. The inference as anticipatory presupposes objective referrent. By examining the inferences we make, we find the presupposing certain objective conditions, certain events happening that are not happening to us. In conversations we sometimes seek to "forestall" a question or comment by another person. We sometimes are aware that we are "planning" a future comment. At other times, also, we anticipate a conversant's next comment and frame a reply. In all these instances and others like them, we address ourselves to supposed objective conditions which his words refer to, or to reactions we suppose our words, gestures, and facial expressions to generate in him. We watch his expressions and gestures to gauge our own comments and behavior. We often say "I knew he'd say that" or "Before you say what you're going to say..." and we thus show ourselves presupposing events not given (even though we treat them operationally). They are effective as supposed existents.

Sometimes discussion (or life in any other "form," of course) gets lost in a maze of wandering commentary and bewilderment. The need is to untangle this issue. Thus, at one level, an analysis of
the conditions into the antecedent events with a search for the suppositions and inferences made by the various discussants is called for. We learn thus to recognize instances of failure to understand, of mis-supposition, mis-belief and are able to say "I was supposing that...," "I took you to mean that...," or "I believe that you are...." Actually, the bare given is the presence of feelings, sounds, etc. These become indicative of, become correlated with, each other and events. But the critical consideration focuses upon getting at the factual events to which they purportedly refer and the connections supposedly existing between these events. We become aware, then, of our presuppositions when we examine our inferrings, needing to determine the presence or absence of the supposed events and the correlations which fail our inferrings or which support them.

Certainly Russell believes in the existence of external events, and the belief itself turns out to be critical, moreover. It may be true only if there are such events, but this is not to say that it is not a significant belief. These events represent a check upon and possible alternative to confinement to the "subjective." As a philosopher examines history, he may come to the conclusion, as Russell has, that believing is sometimes correct and sometimes not. He may, then, set himself to discover, and to state, what he thinks is "implicit" in this fact. Russell concludes that reliance upon the past as a determinant of our outlook upon the world may govern the theoretical referrent, the referent to extant conditions.
Basically, the condition is that we do believe ourselves to have a knowledge of the external world. We do believe in that world's existence. Belief in our dependence upon the world having certain traits and belief that that world, in its traits, is therefore efficacious in our lives and in our successful control over life, and thus over natural forces, serves as a check upon the insistence of the subjective factors. Beliefs of this kind are practically effective even if not factually grounded.

There may not be an external world. It is not the same to say this, however, as to say that our believing in its existence has no effects. It is obvious that we may respond to things absent as if they were present, as Dewey has insisted. The "softening" effect of belief in events outside our experience and largely outside our control, in its action upon what we believe about them, is a response to a belief. Whether it is possible to take this notion out of a realm of belief and show it at any point to be knowledge is another question. But it remains important to believe in the events. The inquiry into processes of improving our knowledge raises a critical question: "When may we be said to have knowledge of the external world?" This is left to science, which proceeds through de-personalization, in the utilization of mathematical-logic. Science, at any rate, whether using the instrumentalities of logic or not, is committed to eradication of the subjective in determination of what events occur.

It is not difficult to see that taking belief in an external
world as an important hypothesis, which then operates to check subjective factors, may be considered a playing of an intellectual game. Yet the "gymnastics" seem important. If the game does nothing more than leave a person with an awareness of the amount of supposed knowledge he has, it is significant, for it provides him with an indication of the direction in which he needs to move to determine the factuality of the events now found only to be believed in. Determination of the character of things and events about which little is known or about which something is only supposed opens a great door to an enlarged life. It brings one closer to one's world and enlarges one's life at the same time, and it enables life to move forward with greater assurance.
As we turn to Dewey after noting Russell's remarks on the "achievement" of general principles of inference, we come upon what is apparently a fundamental point of controversy. The following passage may enable us to keep in relation to Russell at the point of controversy, while gaining insight into Dewey relative to his view on an "external world."

Atomistic empiricism and rational a priorism are correlative doctrines. Postulation of self-evident existential "facts" requires postulation of self-evident rational "truths."

A strictly logical formulation of this state of affairs is given by Bertrand Russell. After stating that "in every proposition and every inference there is, besides the particular subject-matters concerned, a certain form, a way in which the constituents of the proposition are put together," he gives the following example of what is meant by form: "If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has this other property."

The proposition cited as an example of form is said to be "absolutely general; it applies to all things and all properties, and it is quite self-evident." Moreover, it is a priori: "Since it does not mention any particular thing, or even any particular quality or relation, it is wholly independent of the accidental facts of the existence world, and can be known, theoretically, without any experience of particular things or their qualities and relations." This conclusion follows from its being laid down as a logical truth that "General truths cannot be inferred from particular truths alone, but must, if they are to be known, be either self-evident, or inferred from premises of which one at least is a
general truth. But all empirical evidence is of particular truths. Hence, if there is any knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical evidence, i.e., does not depend upon sense-data... I shall not repeat the reasons... for rejecting the clause which postulates atomic existential propositions as primitive in independence of their function in inquiry. Nor shall I rehearse the reasons for doubting the existence of a faculty of pure reason independent of any and all experience, a faculty gifted with the power of infallible intuition. (10)

To grasp the issue centering upon "externality," we need not attempt a general exposition of Dewey's theory of inquiry, even though the particular issue turns upon points basic in an analysis of inquiry and, in spite of all, upon a view as to the nature of the universe. It would ordinarily be taken that Dewey obviously does not have any implicit or explicit concern with what is not in and of the world we live in. Only if knowing anything apart from human experience would make a difference to that experience, would Dewey have concern with inquiries into "events we do not experience." This is not to say that they would be within experience. What is meant by "inquiry into" events we do not experience is search for what is not given in experience. This is a point we shall come upon a little later in this discussion. For the moment, the grounds of opposition to "atomistic empiricism" receive our attention.

In the Logic (as elsewhere), grounds of opposition to "atomistic empiricism" are emphasized. We are shifted away from references to anything permanently existing in the universe. There is no attention to the purportedly external causes of the events of life, just as there is no interest in speculation as to whether the things found in human experience are, apart from that experience, what they are in it. It suffices to say that things
are given. But they are not given in isolation. This leads directly to a consideration of "reality."

It is often said that pragmatism, unless it is content to be a contribution to mere methodology, must develop a theory of Reality. But the chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, "überhaupt," is possible or needed. It occupies the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thorough-going naive realism. It finds that "reality" is a denotative term, a word used to designate indifferently everything that happens... Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science; for science finds all such events to be subject-matter of description and inquiry—just like stars and fossils, mosquitoes and malaria, circulation and vision. It also takes its stand with daily life, which finds that such things really have to be reckoned with as they occur interwoven in the texture of events. (11)

The following continue this emphasis:

..... Experience includes dreams, insanity, illness, death, labor, war, confusion, ambiguity, lies and error; it includes transcendental systems as well as empirical ones; magic and superstition as well as science. It includes that bent which keeps one from learning from experience as well as that skill which fastens upon its faint hints. This fact convicts upon sight every philosophy that professes to be empirical and yet assures us that some especial subject-matter is experience and some other not.

..... Were the denotative method universally followed by philosophers, then the word and the notion of experience might be discarded; it would be superfluous, for we should be in possession of everything it stands for. But as long as men prefer in philosophy (as they so long preferred in science) to define and envisage "reality" according to esthetic, moral, or logical canons, we need to have the notion of experience to remind us that "reality" includes whatever is denotatively found. (12)
...Why talk about the real object in relation to a knower when what is given is one real thing in dynamic connection with another real thing? (13)

Things are, then, important in their "dynamic connection" with each other. In this way pragmatism lines up with common sense, it is said. If the world we know is the only place in the universe in which things are in this connection, then so be it. Our world would be much like the agitator of a washing machine into which separate pieces of clothing are dumped. Inside the agitator the clothing is in "dynamic connection." To refer to life in "atomistic" terms is to refer to the separate pieces of clothing even as they are within the agitator. To convert their uniquenesses into the separate items for purposes of movement (as if we were within the agitator, moving about among the melee) is one thing, but to take the isolates as significant in isolation and to convert them into things-in-themselves and into separate, distinct, and independently real and living entities is quite another thing. To convert the meaning of things in the dynamic connections into the properties of the things supposedly put into the whorl is unwarranted and unnecessary. Indeed, it is a block to the control of human life to do so.

It is just such converting that has so often—and at critical points—been done. Things have been "taken out of," or conceived apart from, their functional status. Whatever analysis occurs, for Dewey, occurs for the purpose of better "fixing" a particular in its functional status or, rather, for better determining its
functional status. The "isolates" serve to set and to aid in resolution of problematic situations. They become objects of knowledge.

The preceding passages have contained the word "reality," and it has been a central term. "Reality," in the following, marks off traits of things that accrue in the course of experience. We are presented again with caution against or restraint from a conversion. (14)

...Now reality is...more than a double-barreled word...for there is definitely a pragmatic meaning, in addition to other for "dependence" and "derivation," which affects the meaning of that most dangerous of all philosophical words, "reality." The objects of knowledge, when once attained, exercise, as I have said, the function of control over other materials. Hence, the latter in so far depend for their status and value upon the object of knowledge...But this interpretation of dependence is strictly functional. Instead of first isolating the object of knowledge or judgment and then setting it up in its isolation as a measure of the "reality" of other things, it connects the scientific object, genetically and functionally, with other things without casting the invidious shadow of a lesser degree of reality upon the latter.

...Instead of there being isolation of the material of knowledge, there is its continual interactions with the things of other forms of experience, and the worth (or "reality") of the former is judged on the basis of control exercised over the things of non-cognitive experiences and the increment of enriched meaning supplied them....The final test of the value of "contents of judgment" now attained is found not in their relation to the content of some final judgment...but in what is done in the living present, what is done in giving enriched meaning to other things and in increasing our control over them. (15)
The things of the world exist as objects only as a result of inquiry, but even as objects they are not "ultimates" and standards to which subsequent things and objects must or should conform. Things as "denotatively founds" come as close as anything could to being "events we do not experience" except possibly the things of the "larger natural world" which, to be a world, must have things. Even so, there is no interest, apparently, in things as existent apart from experience of them. This indifference seems expressed in what we have been considering and also in the statement that "there is, of course, a natural world that exists independently of the organism, but this world is environment only as it enters directly and indirectly into the life—functions of the organism. The organism is itself part of the larger natural world and exists as an organism only in active connections with its environment." (Logic, pp. 33–34).

One may wonder about how easily "of course" is introduced into the above sentence. It is obvious that Dewey here goes beyond "whatever is denotatively found," that he goes beyond the "agitator" where there is simply "doing and undergoing." The admission of knowledge of any world that is supposed to exist "independently of the organism" is a cause of wonder. Is this knowledge of something or of some kind in no wise given or discoverable in experience? Even though just such a world is involved in questions of "externality," Dewey would not trouble with the question. It is difficult to see what difference to experience would be made by some world
existing independently of the organism. In any event, it is the world in which organisms do exist that is of basic concern for Dewey. If there is need for postulating a "larger natural world," that need is to account for the fact that we interact with different things and those things do not seem issuances from prior interactions. It is possible environment, then. (16)

If there is in Dewey anywhere a concern with the demonstration of the existence of a "larger natural world," I have never found it. That world is something more than just "believed in." It exists for him. Russell may "chide" him on his having a "certain metaphysic" at this point, but one is at a loss to discover why Dewey should have to prove what Russell takes as a considerable prejudice anyway. Dewey could just have left out "of course," and he and Russell would perhaps not be at odds, at some points. If a "hypothetical real world" is essential to Russell in checking the urge to power, etc., there is no reason why a hypothetical real world as the conditions of the possibility of a plurality of problematic situations may not be held by Dewey. What Dewey admits is, I think, comparable to Russell's "hypothetical real world." This may not be true in the matter of a dynamically interconnected world versus an atomistic one, but in the sense that man is a part of nature, Russell and Dewey are in agreement. Furthermore, they are in agreement that no one person's "experience" is an experience of the Whole. No one has the experience of being all
experience, whether this is the "conscious certainty of being all reality" (Hegel) or whether it is unconscious certainty of the same order.

Whatever the outcome of criticisms and speculations on Dewey's assertion of the existence of a "larger natural world" that exists independently of the organism, there remains the question of "atomism," of actually isolated "reals" (and primitive existential propositions about them) that are "isolated in independence of their function in inquiry." This invites further observation that the "organism is part of a larger natural world" and that it is in "interconnected action" with that world. The following sets forth the basicness of the notion of "interconnected action" and leads directly to the notion of "function in inquiry."

There is no mystery about the fact of association, of an interconnected action which affects the activity of singular elements. There is no sense in asking how individuals become associated. They exist and operate in association. If there is any mystery about the matter, it is the mystery that the universe is the kind of universe that it is. Such a mystery could not be explained without going outside the universe. And if one should go to an outside source to account for it, some logician, without an excessive draft upon his ingenuity, would rise to remark that the outside would have to be connected with the universe to account for anything in it. We should still be just where we started, with the fact of connection as a fact to be accepted. (17).

But, even granting interconnectedness and interconnected action of things, how is this to deny the things inherent traits and peculiarities retainable when not, or if not, in interconnection? Does Dewey mean to deny things such traits or to ignore them?
Things are what are understood in their function in inquiry, being the constituents of problematic situations, serving as resources, etc., in them. They become objects. "Things" refers to bare existentials, in or out of association with each other. Our question is whether what these things are in their bare existentiality is not a factor in the way in which they effect other things.

Would there be no constancy, for example, in the character of interactive situations in which some given thing appeared? Would there be no constancy in the close of a transactive situation as compared with several others when some given thing is involved in all? Could we ever say: "Whenever this, then that?" And, is it not important to consider whether the constant is not, after all, due to what the thing is, i.e., that its "objectness" is due to its "thing-ness"? Dewey wants, of course, attention to the functioning of things in interaction with other things—attention to means-consequences relations. He does not seem, however, to give much attention to any "character" that a given thing might give to a number of interactive situations. On the other hand, he does seem to do so, since the "control object" (see quote p. 69), besides being an object in reference to a prior situation, has status only as a thing in the proposed or active but not concluded new situation. Determination of a constant, however, calls for considerable experimentation and comparison of situations.

There is a sense in which the questions are trivial, yet there is also a sense in which they are basic. On the one hand, it seems
obvious that we do not identify portions of our world just by reference to "function." It is impossible to build a typewriter simply on the information that the typewriter is something that prints letters on pages of paper. It may be agreed that all the constituent parts of a typewriter may be interpreted solely in terms of their function in that over-all activity, but there would come the discovery that parts made of light wood would break, splinter, warp, etc., while those made of metal or hardwood, etc., would not break, splinter, or warp. How reduce these facts to "functional interpretation"? The "nature" of the parts, the nature of the materials, becomes an object of interest and examination. Certain things may be said to happen "functionally" because of what the constituent elements are in bare existentiality. It may be that simple enumeration of bare existentialities is boring, but it can hardly be ignored that determination of them as bare existentialities (as "sets of qualities") is meaningful. Whether there is ultimately reference to "function" or not, there will be attention to the thing as it exists barely. We obviously need to see what it is that functions as we see it functioning. The polio virus has to be isolated. Its consequences may be noted, but the way "it" interacts with other things to produce the consequences involves, obviously, a supposition and determination of an "it." One may not know if the sought-after "it" is discovered if one cannot put it in such interaction with other conditions that its being the polio virus cannot be determined, but the "it" is
abstracted, nevertheless; it is available and has to be available in "raw" form to see what it will do under varying conditions.

The point of the above is not that Dewey turns his back upon the determination of the "its" of the world, ignoring them fully and saying that we never understand things or search for things except in their interconnection with other things. What is developed is that "isolation" is an act of isolating, not a determination of isolates. In their "natural" state, things are in interaction. There is thus in the processes of isolation a "falsification" of nature, though this "falsification" may be necessary to a transformation of knowledge from that of the simple observation of consequences into an ordered whole of its in their interaction with each other, in their functioning. In any interconnection situation, any one "thing" may become a focal point of attention. The attention demands, if the thing is to become an "object," its isolation and placement in interaction with other things.

Consideration of a passage on "substance" will help us lay hold of this better. The following is from the Logic.

"Substance" represents...a logical, not an ontological determination. Sugar, for example, is a substance because through a number of partial judgments completed in operations which have existential consequences, a variety of qualifications so cohere as to form an object that may be used and enjoyed as a unified whole. Its substantial character is quite independent of its physical duration, to say nothing of its immutability. The object, sugar, may disappear
in solution. It is then further qualified; it is a soluble object. In a chemical interaction its constitution may be so changed that it is no longer sugar. Capacity for undergoing this change is henceforth an additional qualification or property of anything that is sugar. The condition—and the sole condition that has to be satisfied in order that there may be substantiality is that certain qualifications hang together as dependable signs that certain consequences will follow when certain interactions take place. This is what is meant when it is said that substantiality is a logical, not a primary ontological determination.

It is a form that accrues to original existence when the latter operates in a specified functional way as a consequence of operations of inquiry. It is not postulated that certain qualities always cohere in existence. It is postulated that they cohere as dependable evidential signs...When it was discovered that wood-pulp could be used for making paper if its material was subjected to operations in which it entered into new conditions of interaction, the significance of certain forms of lumber as objects changed. They did not become entirely new substantial objects because old potentialities for consequences remained. But neither was it the same old substance. The habit of supposing that it is the same all the time is the result of hypostatizing the logical character of being a sign or having significance into something inherent. Being a substantial object defines a specific function.

An object, in other words, is a set of qualities treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences...(18)

This is critical, and strange, enough to examine in some detail. Let us see, first of all, how it is that any thing can be "further qualified." In the first place, the only way in which to find room or ways of mentioning "further qualification" is to suppose that there is on hand a quantity of particular "stuff" or "thing." Let us suppose, for example, that in walking through a grocery an individual comes upon a quantity of "sugar." He may put a bit of
it into his mouth and experience a very pleasant taste. Now obviously he cannot take what he has put into his mouth and subject it in its "purity" to other kinds of interactions, perform other operations upon it. He may take a spoonful from the pile of white "stuff" and put it in a glass of water. It disappears into solution. He may step on some and discover that when it is stepped on there is a crunching noise. Now what is it that gets "further qualified"? It is not, in the case of the crunching noise, the pleasant tasting somewhat. It is obviously the "white stuff" that he has come across—if the operations performed are always performed upon the same stuff.

It certainly seems the case that "further qualification" requires the supposition of some quantity of something available under different conditions of interaction, of operations upon it, of interconnections. Otherwise, it is impossible to say that "that" is part of this interactive condition producing this consequence. Diversity of qualification may obtain, but unless some identity of that which is qualified and re-qualified can be established, "that which" and "diversity of qualification" or "qualifications" and "further qualified" mean nothing. (19) What is being argued for is virtually a specie of "fundamentalism." Statement that "it did this in this circumstance" calls for reference to prior states of affairs. "This object is that thing" as "that thing" has been subjected to these operations, under these circumstances.
The above leaves out the fact that the original existences may already be objects, i.e., may already be understood in their potentialities for producing certain specified consequences under certain conditions of operations performed and interactions participated in. It may be, then, that after some qualification of the original existences, we have always to refer to "them" as thus once qualified before we speak of them in other connections. We may have no name for the original existence until it has been somehow qualified, but "re-qualification" implies the original existence as now an object, not just the object it now is. (20) There cannot be any checking of the findings of another's inquiry if there are not the conditions we have been setting forth. Unless, then, what went into a situation or, more exactly, unless a situation is repeatable, it is not possible (and is not necessary) to know the findings of another. It is neither possible nor necessary to check another's findings. One condition emerges, at this point, that has to be noted. It is that the preceding comments hold only where there is more modification or qualification of original existences than their transformation from non-cognitive to cognitive existences, i.e., from sets of qualities to cohering qualities. The comments hold, then, only in the event of physical transformation. This consideration seems obviously to necessitate return to "things," i.e., to bare existentialities. It is obvious that if a person who is entering manufacturing of a particular by-product of coal has not coal, he is not going to manage to manufacture that by-product. If he insists on having something to do with that particular by-
product, he can only manufacture what the by-product is a requisite for. Also, if he wishes to explore the possibility of other by-products being manufactured from coal, he has to have coal. Otherwise he is stuck with manufacturing by-products of a by-product.

Both repeatability and determination of diversity of function, wherever there is physical modification, demand this "quantity" or "identity of substance" (to use "substance" in a non-Deweyian sense, here).

None of the above, however, gets us involved deeply in the question as to the independent existence of original existences. They may be individual and original only to processes of inquiry. They may be isolates from an interactive context without therefore being taken as independently existent. None of the above brings critical attention, then, to the supposition of an independently existent world, a world of things beyond the particular problematic situation in question. One matter mentioned, however, does bear upon the question. That is the search for original existences, as in the case of a "virus," in polio research or some other medical inquiry, say.

What is "causing" some given illness at a given time may be unknown. (21) This may mean that not all the interactive elements are at hand or thought to be at hand. Whatever the interpretation in terms of "interactive elements" in their number, it is still supposed that some existent not observed, but nonetheless determinable, is involved. There is "belief" in the existence of the
factor, then, even though its presence is not yet determined. We do not explain the disease by enumerating its characteristics. It is not alterable, eradicable because the nature of it is known. It is its presence that is of concern, its eradication that is wanted. We come to know that some things cause difficulties when in interaction with other things. This leads us to try to determine the thing in question. We want to know what existent "is" an object in the present situation. We may say that our believing is directed toward an existent not known and that our believing is true only if there is such an existent. We may also infer something of the nature of that existent, and our inference will be correct only if the existent is of that nature. It may be that the inferred existent, even if discovered, is not the critical one relative to the conditions occasioning the concern, the search. It may be, of course, a factor, but this is not to say that it is the one without which the disease does not occur. It may not be the one which, when "paralyzed," or removed, leaves a body well. Or, from the side of remedies, the drug, or what-have-you, may not be the one which, when added to the interactive conditions, so modifies them as to make them "well."

The possibility of isolating has to exist. It is a fact. And, it must be also be admitted that more than what is the present scope of observation, more than what is at present given and isolable, is existent. If this is not the case, then we must suppose
that the operations which terminate in the presence to us of a virus or a clinker in the eye were themselves the producer of the virus and the clinker. Perhaps there is ultimately nothing wrong with this conclusion but its unreasonableness (as "unbelievable"). Common sense handles the matter otherwise, however, and manages adequately. The point is that inquiry cannot be just a matter of determining significances or, if it is, something directed to the what that is significant, whether called "inquiry" or something else, is essential. It cannot be just a matter of observing interactions.

There is nothing, of course, that seems to lead us anywhere to a consideration that a critical factor in a situation's being what it is is something not interactive with the conditions. That is, there is nothing that leads us to consider that an isolate, in its isolatedness, somehow is a factor in other isolates being what they are found to be as a "group" or in themselves. An ultimately discrete and independent thing's being a factor in the nature of another ultimately discrete and independent thing is difficult to believe in. It is not difficult to believe that the intrinsic character of things, the qualities present, is in a measure a part of the situation having the character, the issue, that it has. Indeed, it is difficult to see how, unless an unmodified or modified original existence in its constituent qualities is pursued for its own sake, its diversity of functioning, its enriched meaning and ability to enrich meanings of other things
will ever be discovered. Yet pursuit of a thing for its own sake need not mean just a contemplation of it in its state as an original existence. Rather, it may be pursuit of its efficacy in a number of situations. There is a "generalizing" of the "it." A thing's or object's availability and functioning are matters of exploration, of inquiry. Nor is this to say that "interaction for the sake of interaction" is to be indulged in but rather that the exploration, the inquiry, moves from and with reference to some indeterminate situation. "Reality," we may suppose, will still be whatever "original existences" are found. There is concern with these "founds." It is not concern with them as they might be apart from experience, and our beliefs are not directed toward them except as this means concern with them as being obstacles—resources—constituents of a problematic situation. (22)

We have not found, then, anything that indicates Dewey to have more than an "autonomy of inquiry" as a basic notion, unless that be the notion of the interconnectedness of things. Actually, perhaps this interconnectedness of things is the more basic philosophic postulate. It is a "postulate" because of the opposite view that reality is essentially "atomistic" in character, even though things may be admitted to exist in experience in interconnection with each other. Conversion of isolates into atomistic realities leads to difficulties of various kinds. While we need not explore these difficulties fully, it remains significant to note the "functional" character of "selective discrimination" of original
existences, or of objects. Furthermore, the reader will perhaps have realized the absence of suggestion of the ultimate privacy of experience, since Dewey has not reduced our certainty to sensations and their correlations with each other. As an earlier quotation mentioned, pragmatism occupies the position of "an emancipated empiricism" or a "thoroughgoing naive realism." We are in interaction with a physical world, and the interaction at least has to be dealt with.

There is, of course, a vast difference in emphasis between a position that takes "inference" as the central concern and one that takes inference up into a larger context. Russell deals with inference as central. Dewey does not make it central, in this sense. Russell admits atomism and the ultimate privacy of experience that lead to the "application of techniques of logic," i.e., remove the "unnecessary accretions" involved in the "propensity" to inferences—their infection with the circumstances of time and place. Dewey, on the other hand, seems not to suppose any such "techniques of logic," but the rendering available in a number of different situations of some discovery or invention, discovery as either an original existence or as an object, demands, as was seen, some "prior state," so to speak. Either an original existence prior to any inquiry involving it or an object prior to some inquiry involving it is implicit in the notion of "enrichment of meaning," of the "reality of an object," and in "further qualification."
This reference seems a pragmatist equivalent of the removal of "unnecessary accretions." (23) It is possible to generalize, then, in this fashion. There are "dangers" involved in "moving" an existence (original or object) to other situations just as there are dangers involved in the notion that we may not in fact have removed all unnecessary accretions.

Finally, with respect to the "hypothetical" character of an "external world," there seems little problem about asserting its existence as over against making it hypothetical. One does not have to prove knowledge of that world's character, for one may be still concerned with the interactions of life, the "external world" standing as the possibility of further experience. One may, however, significantly treat of the external world's asserted existence as a problem. Russell and Dewey obviously stand in this relationship of a difference in problem—attention to each other. It may be, indeed, as Russell says, that we become aware of the principles of inference as we reflect upon the inferences to which they give rise, the privateness of experience serving as a caution to the partiality and vagueness, the incompleteness, of all our knowledge. Furthermore, this external world of "fact" and "events" serves for him as a kind of check, in relation then, to the privacy, partiality, the "subjective" character of our experience. It renders the removal of accretions an enterprise to be considered seriously, to be engaged in seriously. Reflection upon the inferences we make serves to make
our living intelligible. The examined life is one in which we reflect upon the bases of the inferences involved in life. Examination shows life to be one of inferring in two directions, so to speak. We "point" to the future, but this is derivative from the events we do experience at a moment, which events are caused. Thus, the one pointing entails the other. One is toward an is, the other toward a to be.

For Dewey, then, there is uncertainty, too, although it cannot be said that it is uncertainty of the same kind, of the same order. Doubtfulness or indeterminacy of the issue of an interaction is a doubtfulness and indeterminacy different, indeed, from that of the inferences we make, though Dewey certainly does not insist that the inferential phase of inquiry is a matter of certainty. It is not, because it is part and parcel of indeterminate situations which occasion inquiry. Not "principles of inference" are to be formulated, but the operations and the elements, the behaviors and their conditions, which terminate in knowledge are to be formulated.

From the ultimate privateness of experience, one may argue to the eradication of the personal, the private, in the conduct of communal life. Further, one may thus argue for the elimination of the weight of habit, custom, tradition, and the subjectivity of desire from theorizing about the world. This, in fact, is what Russell seems to do. Life is marked off into two significant spheres—the ethical and the scientific. A prime concern is to
keep these sufficiently clear to enable intelligibility with respect to each. He suspects too much of an "inharmonious blending" of these in the history of philosophy. This is a matter of attention in the formal, social, and education areas, particularly as education may be its beneficiary through the technical and social areas—"beneficiary" whether or not the blending is "harmonious."

But Dewey is not without concern for habit, tradition, custom and desire in the theoretical area—even though this does not, and especially as it does not—involves some qualification of Reality. The notion of "conversion" seems to have, indeed, a most fundamental meaning when it is considered in relation to preference, choice, custom, habit, tradition. Dewey suspects that the dialectical arguments which have developed in the course of history as to the Nature of Reality, of an "external world" (real or hypothetical), as questions of its existence or character, have developed because preferential attachment to traits of experience has perhaps "fostered" the conversion of these traits into qualifications of, or into, realities. The danger, as once has been said, is that of loving one thing, for we tend to love one thing too much.

The emphasis upon the interconnectedness of things is, then, directly related to the notion of conversion. This does not, of course, necessarily involve a notion of a systematic interconnectedness, whole or Whole. What isolating occurs remains, however, an act of isolating, and this is in turn understood in its function in "inquiry." Any reference to a set of qualities
(not attributes of a substance) or cohering qualities (object, substance) is at once a part of an inquiry that aids in the accomplishment of inquiry. The set is an original existence which is to come to cohere. Determination of the unknown (unknown because not yet cohering, not yet a potential) is the determination of the problem. The problem is to determine the effects of the set in interaction. Sugar or anything else is but a set of chemical properties until operations are performed involving it. And indeterminate situation, then, is one in which the issue is in doubt, quite as much as the kinds of original existences are.

A problematic situation is one in which the kinds of original existences (the sets of qualities or mixture of objects and sets) have been discriminated. The resolved situation is one in which the process of interaction of the discriminated objects and sets of qualities have moved to an issue. The elements of the situation are then understood in the ways in which they interact and the issue to which the interaction moves. The objects are further qualified original existences; the sets of qualities become objects.

The function of either object or set of qualities, however, is not converted into a property of the object or the set in question.

The consequence into which the object or set enters is a "function" of the field with which it interacts and the way in which the interaction proceeds. "Science is a pursuit, not a coming into possession."

The adduction of "facts" in support of claims, etc., thus is in reference to a particular indeterminate-problematic situation.
There is a plurality of problematic situations, and thus the "facts of the case" are just the facts of a particular case.

Of course the above is far different from a contemplation of isolates. It is intended to be. Dewey's emphasis upon the dynamic interconnectedness and the unified whole, however, could lead some astray and give the impression that he is inattentive and even insensitive to the aesthetic (insofar as contemplation is, in fact, aesthetic). This is hardly the case. Understood in dynamic interconnections, the enjoyed things become objects of enjoyment, objects of beauty, etc. But it is obviously the case that Dewey does not hold a brief for a view that is atomistic at the roots. Further, even though Russell agrees to the necessity of connection between events if there is to be inference from some events to others, Dewey does not hold to the properties of the events (original existences may be called events), however chemically durable, etc., as governing anything that may be called "inference." Indeed, "inference from some events to others" is alien language. There is, further, no explanation of inference beyond the fact that inferences occur, that inference is defined by the sign-significance relation (that of things to each other) and that the materials of a situation function in the inferring and in the testing of the inference. This is to say that one does not find in Dewey the notion that inference depends upon any similarity (whether that of structure or anything else) between "events" from which one infers something about one event from another.
There is, then, no attention to inference from some events to other events. Our beliefs, thus, are not in question as pointing to the existence of certain events. Further, there is no atomistic concern. Dewey is not concerned with the ontological implications or pretensions of physics and does not take theories, inferences, hypotheses as purportedly descriptive of traits of the external world. They function in the resolution of objective problematic conditions—else they are dialectical games. Dewey, for example, has said that Russell seems not to be occupied with a genuine problem. (24)

Epistemologically, at least, Dewey and Russell are certainly quite far apart. But to leave the difference between them as one of "epistemology" is hardly sufficient. The broader, the more inclusive rift shapes up as this difference with respect to the traditional context of controversy. However, for purposes of further inquiry and exposition, as well as for the further development of an understanding of their differences, the Russellian "pressure" for a belief such as will serve as a check upon the insistence of desire, habit, custom, and tradition and the Deweyian notion of conversion are central. But because of the emphasis of the foregoing discussion, not much attention has been given directly to these concerns of the philosophers in relation to the factors just mentioned. For example, there is no necessary emphasis upon the subjective factors in a general concern with the belief in an external world, but when we ask the grounds upon which the
belief is held central, then the specific attention to the "subjective factors" is appropriate. We shall see, for example, that Russell does little to remove from the realm of hypothesis—as a matter of definite knowledge—the belief in an external world upon which the truth of our beliefs depends. But we shall see at this point that "desire for beliefs" is a significant consideration and that desires are of critical importance. Our problem thus shapes into one of the relation of desire to "theory."

On the other hand, the foregoing discussions of conversion have been in connection with "inquiry." There is no necessary connection between conversions of substantiality (as the outcome of inquiry) into inherent traits or into properties of the existences and the impact of emotion, habit, custom, tradition. Nor is there such a connection when the isolates or atomistic events are in question. Yet certain conversions, at least, may be interpreted in terms of emotional impact, of preference, of choice. Treatment of things as "realities" is a way of disguising or is just a disguising of "choice" or preferential, differential selection. It is to "desire" and metaphysics that we turn, then.

It is hoped that the present chapter has enhanced a grasp of the deeply-rooted rift between the two men. The difference is not a problem only in terms of one position or the other. It is a problem between them, not foisted upon the other by the presuppositions of the one. In short, genuine contradictories seem to be at hand.
A. Russell

2. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
3. Space-time does not hold introspectively (psychologically) but does hold between experiences, apparently. The essential privacy of experience is the critical point.
4. This, however, is a suspicion directed against the claim to knowledge that is of a radically different kind from that open to daily life. It is not directed against claims that the world is in some way or ways different from experience.
5. Russell has said that he has been less interested in calling into question the existence of an external world than with examination and determination of the difficulties of knowing and in supposing ourselves to know that world. Sometimes physics, for example, is not considered importantly purporting to say anything about an external world, and such a problem as Russell faces does not exist. This, however, may serve to let prejudice, custom, habit, and tradition or desire rule the arena, making science subordinate to "practical" concerns. It is held by Russell that physics may be assumed to be true, i.e., that it tells us the truth about events we do not experience, tells us something about the world. It is taken ontologically to be true, however much the verifiable aspects of it depend upon experience, for their origin. To do less than this is to invite disaster—as will be clearly intimated and stated when we consider "desire and metaphysics" (Part II).
7. A History of Western Philosophy, p. 833.

B. Dewey

10. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 154-156. The quotation from Russell obviously did not mention a "faculty of pure reason," especially one gifted with the "power of infallible intuition," although this is not to say definitively that he believes in such a faculty. What he did say about principles of inference was that we can use logical techniques to improve the form in which they are expressed, removing unnecessary accretions. Failure to do this makes the principles incommunicable, unusable in general. Russell has made
"inference" central in human life, and the reference by Dewey to existential propositions as primitive in independ­ence of their function in inquiry is a way of rejecting the abstraction of the inferential "phase" from the total context of inquiry. This is reference to a "conversion" of the existential, discriminated for better control and determination of problematic situations, into antecedent existences.

11. Creative Intelligence, p. 55.
14. "Experience" is actually the more inclusive term, however, and "reality" has come to have something of a different meaning for Dewey. As the terms used is a verbal matter, however, we need not dwell upon the shifts and distinctions in meaning.

16. It is not critical to our text, but I believe that an argument for the existence of the "larger natural world" develops adequately from the notion that either there is such a world extant or what we do interact with (since we interact with different things) must be somehow supposed to issue from prior interactions. The latter is equivalent to saying that my eating sugar is possible because I once drank milk, sugar being present to be eaten as an outcome of the drinking of the milk. Such an argument is not proof of a "larger natural world," but certainly the alternative is rather unreasonable.

19. This is not to say that the "thing" further qualified is a "substance" because of some identity it has apart from the various interconnections in which it is found. It is possible to go along with Dewey and say that substantiality accrues to original existences, while emphasizing what is, perhaps, but a minor matter, namely that "enrichment" of a thing as to meaning(s) or any reference to "further" qualification terminates, finally, in the determination that it was the "same thing" upon which the various operations were performed. Otherwise there is simply qualification of an already qualified. Whether "substantiality" refers to the original existence or to the cohering of qualities as "evidential signs" is a verbal matter. What is important is that a "further qualified" is an original existence available in quantity and prior to operations—whatever their number—performed or to be performed upon it. The name given the "constant" is a matter of preference, a verbal matter.
20. One should not overlook the fact that it may be a "scientific object," in the sense of the "unified whole" it is as a complex of interactive qualities in interaction with another or other complexes—an object apart from practical or environmental concerns and life-functions.

21. That is, determination and examination of the "immediates" may not reveal anything present that could be said to "cause" the disease in question. What is an interactive factor producing the conditions of illness has to be found.

22. Either "invention" or "discovery" may be the "method" of getting at the means, but since our concern has been with "events we do not experience," with a "larger natural world," etc., "invention" has not been dealt with in the foregoing.

23. Apparently, however, when the attention is to an already qualified original existence, there is no removal of "accretions" but a statement of the qualities originally existing and the conditions of qualification. To communicate the meaning of the world "hammer" as more than just something to pound with, it is necessary to list its constituent materials, shape, and what these make possible under certain conditions, also enumerated.

24. There are two senses in which this is meant: (1) There is the game played with the hypothetical real world; (2) there is attention to general traits and to general relationships, not to particular, to genuine problematic situations. These two are related to each other, but this need not be discussed here.
PART II

"DESIRE" AND METAPHYSICS
Introduction

In Part I we came upon diverse interpretations of the methods of keeping desire from interfering with the life of inquiry. Reality has been a neat "propaganda word." In the face of innocent credulity, in the face of uncritical guidance by impulse, desire, and tradition, views taken as descriptive of what is "Real" have held sway over many. But, even apart from the propaganda value of the prestige accorded Reality, the lessons Russell and Dewey teach are significant, for they aim at attempting to prevent exclusive sway of one factor over another. Each seeks more "harmony."

This part of the dissertation considers then, a difference in "problem interest" and analysis of the source of some human problems and struggles. The presentation of "Concerns" (Chapter III) serves to set the contrast of the emphases and the continuity of the respective emphases in the writings of the two men, closing, in each instance, with a suggestion as to the "liberalism" supposedly accruing to the emphases. The "Discussion" moves from and in relation to the "Concerns" and against the epistemological rift and metaphysical disparateness previously noted. Once the "Discussion" is brought to a close, we shall be in better position to sum it up as we move directly to "social philosophy."

While only rather cursory attention was given to the question of the "organic" in the preceding chapters, the discussion of Dewey in Chapter IV moves off from a quotation by Russell on Dewey relative to "making the world more organic." An effort is made to
discover in Dewey the bases upon which the comments are made and, along with this, to know what it is that Dewey's stand entails. As a reader of Dewey would discover, it is impossible to tag him with the notion that inquiry is a revelation of the true organic reality as over against the world of appearance—the fragmentary world. Achievement of a termination of inquiry in a "unified whole" may occur without one troubling as to whether this achievement is a reflection, in general traits, or in specific content, of Reality. It cannot be denied, of course, that Dewey holds to a world that is dynamically interconnected, but this is not to say that the world, inclusive or exclusive of organisms, is systematic in character. It is not atomistic, but the alternative to atomism is not systematic order. It is drift, not regulation in accordance with a principle, however subjectively or objectively conceived.

The notion that Dewey's is a position which expresses a preference for the metaphysical reality of an organic situation over the desparate, the fragmentary, is a notion that can occur only as one believes that a philosopher must take traits discoverable or, rather, extent, as due to or in some way, at least, reflective of, the whole or Universe, or of some portion of what lies beyond our experience. Were one to suppose Dewey to have a preference for the fragmentary, an equally legitimate interpretation (if misinterpretation is to be followed through), his emphasis upon the "confused," the "obscure" or the "conflicting" as the traits of
problematic conditions could be considered a preference for a metaphysical reality of that kind. He does not, however, harbor such a preference. What is a starting point for inquiry could hardly be taken as preferred over what is its terminus, and what is its terminus could hardly be preferred over what is its initial starting point. This, at least, seems to be Dewey's view. He is no more insensitive to the need for organization, nor is he more sensitive to it, than is Russell. Both men, in fact, seek to keep away from over-emphasis upon either the fragmentary or the organic. That they do not both do this in the context of controversy about the nature of reality is another matter.

Thus, the discussion of Dewey seeks to discover the place of the "unified whole." It seeks to discover whether there is emphasis and, if so, in what sense there is. But this is only part of the concern, since the quotation from Russell, as we shall see, refers to "making" the world more organic. What we attempt to discover, then, is whether there are or are not grounds for the use of this term. There seem to be, and considerable attention is given to possible meanings for a particular passage from Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct.* What is discovered is that the human being is efficacious in the conditions of experience, being a factor in the interaction situation, and that there is choice available as to lines of action that may be taken by the organism. Here again there is encountered the emphasis upon a "unified whole"—one that is "balanced," or "integrated." This means, then, that selective
emphasis upon some factors as over against others in a situation
is to be avoided. This is to say, the kind of situation desired
as the basis of action is one in which the respective factors in
it, the elements involved, including, of course, the organism, are
so in interaction that each is "released and matured." But, again,
while such a condition is wanted, just as Russell may consider the
excellence of the whole to depend upon the excellence of the parts
(i.e., turns to consideration of a whole on the basis of and in
terms of parts), it is in no wise clear that such a whole is taken
to be nature of Reality. Dynamic interconnection sets the conditions
under which elements of culture, human nature, and the physical
world may be "partial and competing," but this is not to say that
the fact that they are such is a matter of our ignorance of their
"really" compatible interconnectedness.

Attention is turned to the notion of "fallacy of conversion." We
discover that Dewey takes Rationalistic Idealism to have con-
verted the orderly progression of existential inquiry, discoverable
in a plurality of problematic situations, into a description, into
a generalized statement, of Reality at large. Thus, problematic
conditions and their resolution is the basic unit for concern.
Beyond this, there is no concern about Reality—except as other
positions force reassertion of the charge of conversion. "Choice"
is disguised when one purports to describe Reality, purports to
have the trait of the world around which activity is to be modeled.
Isolation of some one trait or another, or several, as the deter-
ominant and pattern of others is rejected, therefore.

It is only, however, as we move to "Social Philosophy" that the bearing of a significant conversion may be examined. In "Social Philosophy" the notion of an a priori extant whole is considered along with, for example, the difficulties which accrue as a result of taking, in Marxianism, some one "aspect" of experience, in the interaction of its elements, as determinant of all others.

Finally, an effort is made to discover what is implied in the charge that there is a "fallacy" of conversion exhibited in the course of philosophy. Some responsibilities seem to accrue to the notion that conversions are "fallacies," but the writer's reaction to Dewey at this point may be only one of sensing on Dewey's part some presumption which is not followed by acceptance of responsibility. To accept the responsibility would entail speculations not provided for in Dewey's "system." These are hinted at when it is suggested that, operating under the presumption that "fallacy" is correct is one thing, but that simply postulating that conversions have occurred is another. In the latter case, there may be a field for inquiry into the conditions under which such conversions occur. Perhaps inquiry into the origin of the "epistemological" problem is in order. Perhaps, on the other hand, nothing would be gained by this inquiry.

It is hoped that the termination of discussion by Dewey and of Dewey will leave the reader with a sense of the way in which Dewey seeks to free theories from the grip of desire and to provide
for their "conjugate" functioning in human life, to provide for persons who accept the variety of traits of the world and human life in their functioning in life. To avoid the belief that Reality is fragmentary or Organic, etc., that it has these or those special traits of a more limited nature, is to avoid converting preferences into models. It is to recognize, again, the dependency of some upon others for their own release and maturation.
Russell refers often to philosophy as marked on the idealist side, especially, as marked by an exhibition of a "certain self-absorption." The notion of the "oneness of all things," as held by the "mystic tradition," stems from an ethical concern characteristic of all mysticism, for the mystic does not admit the reality of ultimate division. Especially division of the world into two camps, the good and the bad. A certain feeling of "infinite peace" accompanies relaxation from everyday life, and there is a sharp fading of the divisiveness of the sense world. Russell suspects that the feeling of peace produces, "as feelings do in dreams," the mystic metaphysical creed. Our normal sense world gives us no rest or peace. It is marked with "spots and jumps" and a considerable absence of regularity and incoherence. The feeling of peace is not one belonging to the world of sense and is therefore considered awareness of a larger world of unified reality. There is, moreover, a certain reverence expressed in this notion, a deep-running reverence that is of the finitude of human experience. Perhaps it is better described as a reverence before a transcendent world, a humility before the cosmos at large. In any event, the mystic turns swiftly upon the world of sense and condemns it to being at best a world of appearance. Things in their separate-
ness are things in the world of everyday experience, the sense world.

Russell may accept mysticism in its attitude toward life, but not as a metaphysical creed. He thus produces a distinction between the ethical or the feeling and the theoretical. Plato, he thinks, allowed a legislative function to The Good and thus produced a divorce between "science and philosophy from which both have suffered ever since." Not through insistence of desire and ethical preferences will we understand the world, for this can only lead us to say what the world is not. Or it will lead us to say what the world must be. In either event, we shall be trapped by our acceptance of a world compatible with the local temperament and bias we happen to have.

There is the distinct possibility that the mass of mankind may be "duped" in some instances by the cloak of objectivity that covers the deeply rooted, the subtly hidden, demands of human desires. In instances, to be certain, elaborate arguments have been developed to demonstrate the "objective" character of a truth already decided upon. The Western mystic, said Hegel, is caught up in a rationalization of what must have been a "mystic insight," since there is no ground that will hold solidly the imposing edifice that is the philosophy of the Oneness of the Absolute.

In "Mysticism And Logic," there is a fundamental problem and outlook on philosophy:
Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict between two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging men towards science. But the greatest of men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism; the attempt to harmonize the two was what made their lives, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion. (1)

It is suggested that mysticism as a metaphysical creed is likely to be wrong, while as an attitude toward life it may be commended. The doctrines of modern science had taken hold of Russell, and the essay is a point by point rejection of the doctrines of the mystic orientation. Elaboration would show what was hinted as strongly in the preceding chapter—namely, that it is with special reference to space-time that the older orientation is found wanting. This was a doctrine of a Whole in which are caught up all things, while the modern scientific orientation, especially in physics, holds to the relation between events.

Now it is true that the mystic may be one who has a deep feeling of peace that comes from his "acceptance" of the world or, rather, of "life." In the freedom from moral dispute as to the bad and the good, the mystic attains a kind of objectivity much like that of the physicist and the scientist generally. What may be termed a "spirit of reverence" fosters the scientific enterprise and the mystic senses a comparable spirit in the realization of the partial insignificance of the affairs of daily living. But the mystic has no patience with the method of science in its piece-
meal, analytic approach. Something more swift characterizes his thought. He is impatient with the scientific method. Yet the method of science may be fostered by the spirit of reverence and a certain detachment from practical affairs characteristic of the mystic. It is at the point of theory and method that science and mysticism split. The "ethical" good that is the mystic feeling of peace and oneness conflicts with the "good" of science that holds to relations between events rather than to their absorption in a Whole. As Russell has put it:

> It is my belief that the ethical and religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth. Science, originally, was entangled in similar motives, and was thereby hindered in its advances. It is, I maintain, from science, rather than from ethics and religion, that philosophy should draw its inspiration. (2)

...Human ethical notions...are essentially anthropocentric, and involve, when used in metaphysics, an attempt, however veiled, to legislate for the universe on the basis of the present desires of men. In this way they interfere with that receptivity of fact which is the essence of the scientific attitude toward the world...[This] is essentially pre-Copernican [and] is to make man, with hopes and ideals he happens to have at the present moment, the center of the universe and the interpreter of its supposed aims and purposes. Ethical metaphysics is fundamentally an attempt, however disguised, to give legislative force to our own wishes. (3)

...as compared with science, [non-scientific philosophy] fails to achieve the imaginative liberation from self which is necessary to such understanding of the world as man can hope to achieve,
and the philosophy which it inspires is always more or less parochial, more or less infected with the prejudices of a particular time and place.... (4)

Russell's *Power*, too, includes among the closing remarks the statement that man has too often allowed ethical and theoretical bents to intermingle in a way that places the former in command. Certain philosophies, in his view, seem the very rationale of the urge to power, the urge to production of intended effects, to mastery, to make the world conform to our wishes. Pragmatism is taken to be largely, if not exclusively, a power philosophy. It is characterized by a certain irreverence. A notion of "progress," bound with the notion of "evolution," is a troubling point. In a recent writing Russell has said:

"..... Philosophers...have professed to discover a formula of progress, showing that the world was becoming gradually more and more to their liking. The recipe for a philosophy of this type is simple. The philosopher first decides which are the features that give him pleasure, and which are the features that give him pain. He then, by a careful selection among facts, persuades himself that the universe is subject to a general law leading to an increase of what he finds pleasant and a decrease of what he finds unpleasant....The man who first fully developed this point of view was Hegel...(5)"

The above and the following are intended simple to add to the analysis of the problem of the external world. The heavy hand of subjectivity to be guarded against. All that Russell has written on the subject-predicate logic tradition is quite directly related to this question of ethical bias. The tradition and the metaphysical context in which it operated seem to have "aimed"
at the retention of biases as rooted in the nature of the universe, in Reality. In any event, Hegel did in fact settle upon Germany as the vehicle for the dialectic process at that moment in history. Marx, on the other hand, settled for the agency of the proletariat by way of moving the world to an ethical close. Perhaps, were it not for the infectious nature of human preference, something grand and glorious could be said for the Hegelian view of things, yet it seems to urge us either to abandon the world of sense and the ethical and cultural realities of life or to commit ourselves to the determination of the issue of the dialectic.

.....In advocating the scientific restraint and balance, as against the self-assertion of confident reliance upon intuition, we are only urging, in the sphere of knowledge, that largeness of contemplation, that impersonal disinterestedness, and that freedom from practical preoccupations which have been inculcated by all the great religions of the world. Thus our conclusion, however it may conflict with explicit beliefs of many mystics, is in essence not contrary to the spirit which inspires those beliefs, but rather the outcome of this very spirit as applied in the realm of thought. (6)

.....Insistence on belief in an external realization of the good is a form of self-assertion, which, while it cannot secure the external good which it desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power, and destroy that reverence toward fact which constitutes both what is valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper. (7)

But the great tradition of "self-absorption" has another aspect. In it we discover that it is hardly formal argument which has thrust aside the "classical tradition." The tradition replacing the classical one "fancies itself more virile and more
vital. Russell is not willing, apparently, to succumb to other kinds of "subjective desires."

...To the schoolmen, who lived amid wars, massacres, and pestilences, nothing appeared so delightful as safety and order. In their idealistic dreams, it was safety and order that they sought: the universe of Aquinas or Dante is as small and neat as a Dutch interior. To us, to whom safety has become monotonous, to whom the primeval savageries of nature are so remote as to become a mere pleasing condiment to our ordered routine, the world of dreams is very different from what it was amid the wars of Guelf and Ghibelline. Hence William James's protest against what he calls the "block universe" of the classical tradition; hence Nietzsche's worship of force....The barbaric substratum of human nature, unsatisfied in action, finds an outlet in imagination. In philosophy, as elsewhere, this tendency is visible; and it is this, rather than formal argument, that has thrust aside the classical tradition for a philosophy that fancies itself more virile and more vital. (8)

One might say with Learned Hand that many issues are not resolved. They simply become unimportant, insignificant, or a belief now disbelieved, irrelevant, uncared for. The "Dutch interior" and "block universe" philosophies are vestigial structures of the ages of scientific ignorance, social ineptitude, and vulgar anarchy.

Russell's appeal for the habit of scientific "truth telling" has permeated every aspect of his polemic in the field of philosophy. It is hardly ever the case, at a critical point in the development of an analysis of a problem that Russell fails to link the theoretical considerations to ethical notions and the insistence of human desire, the urge to power. Philosophic outlooks congenial to ethical preference, to matters of local temperament and bias, to hopes and aspirations for the future reach out and ensnare and
enslave the unwary. The unwary are overwhelmed it seems, by elaborate intellectual structures, grand and imaginative as they may be, and by a "certain dryness" of insight and argument evident in the presentation of them. Our theories of the universe tend to be "beliefs that promote success," and it develops that the truth of a belief is largely determined by our ability to accept the universe as it really is seen to be—by ourselves. The subtle fashion in which the reflective person becomes enmeshed in private desires and lets, however unwittingly, the notion of "self-consistency" govern the theoretical elaboration of his thesis, ending with a "desirable" universe, is something to behold. Acceptance of theoretical formulations rests upon argumensi ad populi, not upon formal argument or careful adherence to and reverence before fact.

Traditional logic put thought in fetters, for it moved to what the universe must be from the notion that it could say what that universe is not. Coherence has no appeal for Russell, though cohesion does. Perhaps it has been the case that those who have held to the coherence theory have developed a logic of the universe, a logic of thought and learning, of attainment of truth, that is compatible with a notion of the Absolute as One, but it develops that this subject-predicate logic, this great tradition, is rooted in, at best, a sense of a oneness with mankind, a feeling of infinite peace, mistaken for a grasp of Reality, and rationalized into a demonstration of the supposed insight. The world of
scientific understanding, however, turns in another direction. It
is piecemeal, pluralistic, plodding, patient. It manages a life
that deals with things in their separateness, in their relations
to each other, and apart from the notion of system. Determinism
is fading rapidly, indeed, yet this does not preclude our passing
from events to events.

The conclusion that the idealist is in immediate and constant
touch with Reality is not easily denied. As Hocking has written:
"Whoever ... conceives the universe as an edifice of truth to which
our momentary thinking and feeling are responding has touched as
surely as life itself the garment of the living God." It is the
deep and the sympathetic sense of kinship with The Absolute which
characterizes idealism; in this view one knows almost exclusively
and constantly through intuition that an Ultimate manifests it­
self in all moments of its Life and of the individual's life.
Hegel, of course, had this sense of a cosmic sweep of destiny, a
moving of lives, in the Great Life, to a grand close, to a summa­
tion and ordered Reality where things are found in their true
place in the Totality. "Glimpses" only, perhaps, are given to
us, the Totality to no one man. In this latter case, there is
no difference between Russell and Hegel or Hocking. But Russell
will not speak in the words of the others. There is obviously
in his thought a cautioning against the sense of certainty of
kinship, attachment, closeness to the real world. A kinship with
that world has to be sought. It may not be taken for granted.
The deep-running question of our knowledge of the external world persists, underlies the entire concern and effort. There is no supposition that self-consistency, or order and coherence, and system, exhibit our intuition or achievement of reality. But it is not denied, of course, that we may have, in our experience, traits of the real world. Not coherence, but determination of the facts implied in our behaving, believing, then, are Russell's concern.

Who shall say how the world really is? How shall we know that we are in it and of it? Is this a question worth raising? It would seem to Russell that it is, and it would seem to Dewey that it is not. Yet Russell, it must be observed, and it should be evident from the preceding, deals with the question as one belonging to science. He insists upon the strictest separation of the theoretical nature from the ethical nature of mankind. It is not given to science to determine that the world has this or that desirable characteristics. Even were men disposed to submit to the court of science their ethical pronouncements on the theory of the world of reality or Reality, they would be "tossed out of court." There is no place, in his view, to consider the "ontic status" of values; there is no intention of submitting the question of good and evil, for example, to scientific inquiry. Science has to do with the nature of the world, with its character and structure. It has nothing to offer in the way of resolution, through the presentation of traits of the world, of the conflict of desires.
Thus, it is not just from emotional conviction that the world has certain desirable traits that Russell turns. It is rather to a release from a concern that the world have certain desirable traits that he turns. He addresses to mankind the request to take responsibility for the governing of themselves, for the realization that the world is indifferent to the party prejudices, petty customs, wishes, and habits that accrue to us because of the fact that we are human, born in a locality and of a temperament. The philosopher of science may be a politician, but the philosopher of politics may not also be a philosopher of science.

Human life has been tremendously enriched through the advancement of science, and the advancement has been made possible by the restraint from the weight of habit, custom, tradition, and desire. Submitting to the full magnetic pull of the vast cosmos that honest men realize to exist, the scientific temper is free from the "practical affairs" of mankind. It is not enmeshed, not caught in the web, of private affections and public hopes and aspirations. It is dedicated to the desire to know. This is its driving impulse. Russell sets forth sharply the fears he has for mankind if science resists the notion that it is in the pursuit of a world of fact, a world of reality; if it abandons the notion that it is saying something about the world of fact, the world as it really exists.

The following from The Scientific Outlook, is pertinent:
Until quite recently men of science have felt themselves the high-priests of a noble cult, namely, the cult of truth; not truth as the religious sects understand it, i.e., as the battleground of a collection of dogmatists, but truth as a quest, a vision faintly appearing and again vanishing, a hoped-for sun to meet the Heraclitean fire in the soul. It was because science was so conceived, that men of science were willing to suffer privations and persecutions, and to be execrated as enemies of established creeds. All this is fading into the past; the modern man of science knows that he is respected, and feels that he does not deserve respect. He approaches the established order apologetically. "My predecessors," he says in effect, "may have said harsh things about you because they were arrogant, and imagined that they possessed some knowledge. I am more humble, and do not claim to know anything that can controvert your dogmas." In return, the established order showers knighthood and fortunes upon the men of science, who become more and more determined supporters of the injustice and obscurantism upon which our social system is based. In the newer science, such a psychology, this has not yet happened; there the old ardour still persists, and the old persecutions continue. Homer Lane, for example, who was at once a sage and a saint, was deported by the British Police as an "undersirable alien." But these newer sciences have not yet been touched by the cold breath of skepticism, which has destroyed the life of physics and astronomy.

The trouble is an intellectual one; indeed, its solution, if there is one, is to be sought in logic. For my part, I have no solution to offer; our age is one which increasingly substitutes power for the older ideals, and this is happening in science as elsewhere. While science as the pursuit of power becomes increasingly triumphant, science as the pursuit of truth is being killed by a skepticism which the skill of men of science has generated. That this is a misfortune is undeniable, but I cannot admit that the substitution of superstition for skepticism advocated by many of our leading men of science would be an improvement. Skepticism may be painful, and may be barren, but at least it is honest and an outcome of the quest for truth. Perhaps it is a temporary phase, but no real escape is possible by returning to the discarded beliefs of a stupider age. (9)
This is an interesting observation, one to give panic to those who are concerned with current affairs of the world. That science has become enmeshed in skepticism seems undeniable. For the world does not, in its vastness seem so to have the regularity, the order and continuity, the unity and system it might be thought to have. It seems increasingly clear that it is indeterminate in character, that it is full of "spots and jumps." It has not the "Dutch interior" or the "block universe" characteristics it once was thought to have. It turns out to be more like the "mad dance of fantastic shapes and fantasms" that a mystic may describe the world of sense to be. The notion that underlying the surface phenomena of the sense world our knowledge is human knowledge and not that of the orderly universe is shaken, by the skepticism the investigations of physics have led to. We are found, in our own lives, to be "balanced on the sharp edge of hypotheses."

Science, in its realization of the vastness of the universe and its unpredictability in so many ways, has kicked back upon itself in such a way as to be skeptical indeed. This means it may become the sanction of the established order. It may not refute that order, for the order is too entrenched, the scientist too skeptical. He knows of the prestige accorded him, but he knows of the ignorance he has.

To prevent this, it is necessary, therefore, that he not abandon the faith in the pursuit of truth. For his abandonment is the first step in the return to the dominance of the desires of men, to the dominance of those who may retain power, for whatever
reasons and through whatever means they hold that power. Hence, Russell believes that we must somehow keep the vision of the pursuit of truth before us, somehow keep the doubts that beset us from letting us seek release in the habitual and customary, somehow manage this tentative, courageous, piecemeal, patient, and resolute tread between irrational skepticism and equally irrational dogmatism. The habit of scientific truth-telling, the application of critical reflection and analysis to the beliefs we have leads, he believes, to an awareness of our vast ignorance with respect to certainty. Yet it is in this that value resides. To accept the vastness of our ignorance and to render intelligible the minuteness of our certainty, while moving with a faith in the possibility of knowing that we know and knowing more than we now know—such is the picture proffered us by Russell as we move forward to consideration of Dewey and, then, to social affairs and concerns.

The softening of the insistence of desire, of habit, of custom, tradition and the familiar opens to us the door of the vastness of the universe. It makes us wonder about that vastness, makes us pause to consider the extent to which "truth" is ours. We confront ourselves with the fact that we believe in the existence of what we pursue as a "haunting vision." We confront ourselves with the task of knowing when we have attained the vision, all the while aware of the vastness of our ignorance. The vision is critical, and the pursuit of it essential. In this lies the heart of Russell's concern with our knowledge of the external world.
His knife cuts deep as one follows him through his life of inquiry, of faith, of imagination, and concern. Somehow it seems wrong to abandon the question he raises with us and which occupies him. Somehow it seems tragic for mankind to abandon the notion that his life is somehow related to an external world; tragic beyond comprehension to leave the world of faith and courage and inquiry for the "security" and "obscurantism" of "old night." Skepticism, for Russell, is not the decay of happier days. It is the threshold of a new world, and we are standing on the threshold of its transition. "If there is some non-human truth which one man may know while another may not," Russell has said, there is then at least a theoretical ground upon which to resolve the conflict between them. The alternative is a virtual struggle to death. Not dogmatism but inquiry is the requisite for the resolution.

To turn from the haunting vision of the Truth and from the pursuit of it need not be tragic. Indeed, it may be precisely in the turning that the grandest of achievements of life are managed. It may be that the opposition of human desire, the maintenance of things of zest and meaning of the more "mundane world," do indeed operate to foreclose the taking seriously of the notions of the past. It may be, then, that they do operate to keep potentially fruitful insights from providing release from habit, custom and tradition. Russell seeks the minimization of desire in the realm of metaphysics, while Dewey seeks the minimization of the role of desire in the judgments upon ideas, systems,
theories. They share a common ground with the concern to give ideas a play, a concern that the prejudicial shall not rule. This may become clear as we examine what Dewey has had to say about "desire and metaphysics."
B. Dewey

In the first chapter of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* there is perhaps the most extensive and ordered exposition of the pretentious and traditional office of philosophic endeavor, in its metaphysical aspect at least, that appears in Dewey's writings. The chapter is a background against which the position stated in the rest of the volume may be understood, although the chapter itself sets forth a kind of view. Our concern here, of course, is with only the parts which bear most directly upon the question of the impact of desire, custom and tradition upon human thought of a philosophic nature.

Briefly stated, the event in human history is this: the emergence of critical analysis, of genuine efforts at inquiry, came into conflict with the "conservative" tendency or character of human living. The former, or "positivistic" aspect, was aloof from allegiance to the group, to ancestry, etc., and the latter consists in just such "emotionally surcharged" human living as the former avoids.

...The conservative is shocked beyond measure at the idea of teaching military art by abstract rules, by science. One does not just fight, one fights for one's country. Abstract science cannot convey love and loyalty, nor can it be a substitute, even upon the more technical side, for those ways of and means fighting in which devotion to the country has been traditionally embodied.
To attempt to derive abstract rules from a comparison of native ways of fighting with the enemies' ways is to begin to go over to the enemies' traditions and gods; it is to begin to be false to one's own country.

Such a point of view vividly realized enables us to appreciate the antagonism aroused by the positivistic point of view when it came into conflict with the traditional. The latter was deeply rooted in the social habits and loyalties; it was surcharged with the moral aims for which men lived and the moral rules by which they lived. Hence it was as basic as and as comprehensive as life itself, and it palpitated with the warm, glowing colors of the community life in which men realized their own being. In contrast, the positivistic knowledge was concerned merely with physical utilities, and lacked ardent associations of belief hallowed by sacrifices of ancestors and worship of contemporaries. Because of its limited and concrete character it was dry, hard, cold. (10)

Yet some men could not help thinking and the growth of the positivistic enterprise continued. Those who moved to the newer modes sometimes were persecuted for their efforts. Socrates, no mean skeptic, of course, died of hemlock poisoning for his inquiries. And the sophists suffered no small measure of persecution because they became entangled in the pressure of the developing, emerging conflict. Plato, of course, joined the vanguard, although not so fully, not so thoroughly.

The more acute and active minds, like that of Plato himself, could no longer be content to accept, along with the conservative citizen of the time, the old beliefs in the old way. The growth of positive knowledge and of the critical, inquiring spirit undermined these in their old form. The advantages in definiteness, in accuracy, in verifiability were all on the side of new knowledge. Tradition was noble in scope but uncertain in foundation. Man must search out the reason of things, and not accept them from custom and political authority. (11)
But the major question, of course, was which way to turn?

If the tradition was to be preserved, however purified, what would be the vehicle of the preservation? There were signs that the weight of custom, habit, tradition and desire was being lightened. What new foundations, then, should tradition rest upon?

... Develop a method of rational investigation and proof which should place the essential elements of traditional belief upon an unshakable basis; develop a method of thought and knowledge which, while purifying tradition, should preserve its moral and social values unimpaired; nay, by purifying them, add to their power and authority. To put it in a word, that which has rested upon custom was to be restored, resting no longer upon the habits of the past, but upon the very metaphysics of Being and the Universe...(12)

It was thus that metaphysics came into its place as

... a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of higher moral and social values—that is the leading theme of the classic philosophy of Europe, as evolved by Plato and Aristotle—a philosophy, let us always recall, renewed and restated by the Christian philosophy of Medieval Europe. (13)

Philosophy, then, had its work cut out from the beginning.

"It had a mission to perform, and it was sworn in advance to that mission." Philosophy became an apologetic for custom and tradition, "justifying on rational grounds the spirit, though not the form, of accepted beliefs and traditional customs." It was this apologetic spirit that was peculiarly manifested in the twelfth century when Medieval Christianity used classic philosophy to justify itself to reason...gaining "intellectual status."
A not at all unsimilar occurrence characterizes the chief philosophic systems of Germany in the early nineteenth century, when Hegel assumed the task of justifying in the name of rational idealism the doctrines and institutions which were menaced by the new spirit of science and popular government.

The great systems have not been free from party spirit exercised in behalf of preconceived beliefs. Since they have at the same time professed complete intellectual independence and rationality, the result has too often been to impart to philosophy an element of insincerity, all the more insidious because wholly unconscious on the part of those who sustained philosophy.

It is obvious, then, that Dewey has not been blind to the force of habit, custom, tradition and desire in the development of philosophic endeavor, especially, of course, of the metaphysical kind. Driven from the realm of "definiteness, accuracy and verifiability," or, at least, jeopardized by these as they belonged to the positivistic inquiry, custom, habit, tradition and desire found a refuge in another realm. The realm of reason would show that these cherished were rooted in the very nature of being. Greek philosophy exhibited the essence of what it meant to be Greek. So has it been the case at other places, other times. There is, however, an especially interesting aspect to this development, the splitting of the world into two realms, that left to science and that left to "intuition."

The one realm corresponds to the religious and supernatural world of popular tradition "which in its metaphysical rendering became the world of highest and ultimate reality."

"The absolute
and supreme reality of philosophy afforded the only sure guaranty of truth about empirical matters, and the sole rational guide to proper social institutions and individual behavior.... While over against this absolute and noumenal reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline of philosophy itself stood the ordinary empirical, relatively real, phenomenal realm of everyday experience. It was to this imperfect and perishing world that matter of fact, positivistic science referred.... (15)

The claim has been that philosophy "was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge than is employed by positive science and ordinary practical experience, and that it is marked by a superior dignity and importance—a claim...undeniable if philosophy leads man to proof of and intuition of a Reality beyond that open to day-by-day life and the special sciences."

None who read Dewey will find him sanctioning philosophic thought as an apologetic for custom, habit, tradition, desire or local temperament and bias. It is not the intention of Dewey to continue or to permit to continue an enterprise which has shown itself to be shallow, devoid of sincerity, the harbor of vested interests in the continuation of the spirit of hallowed tradition. Philosophy has too long been the refuge of challenged authority, periodically gaining new respect but doing so when new tendencies present themselves in such a way as to challenge fundamentally the established tradition.

There is, of course, no request for a "softening of the insistence of desire," and there is no reference to any "absorption
in self, just as there is no pointed, emphatic repudiation of a "demanding in advance that reality accord with our desires, wishes."

There is, nevertheless, sharply set forth an outlook which puts grandiose schemes, plans, pretentions, ambitions back into the context of human life, back into a picture of human beings and the character of their living.

It is obvious, too, that Dewey moves against the assignment of science to an inferior realm of being. He takes his stand upon the sufficiency of experience and of science working within that field. It is what things lead to in experience, not what experience leads to in conflict with custom, habit and tradition, that is of central concern. We shall encounter, in connection with Karl Marx, a particular reference to the notion expressed here relative to the weight of habit, the weight of a traditional orientation toward the world. Dewey, like Russell, follows the progress of modern science in its progressive release from the weight of habitual modes of looking at the universe and finds it significantly free of "metaphysical encumbrances."

At a much later date of writing, Dewey presents a thought well worth considering carefully, and we shall have recourse to it soon as a matter of critical concern. At least it seems to warrant such treatment, especially as we have already encountered references to the notion of the place of "desire" or the "familiar" and the "cherished." The quotation is from one of the last writings Dewey shared in.
Newton had carried his abstraction to a point which was shocking to many of his contemporaries. They felt that it took away the reality which gave point and zest to the affairs of life, moral and aesthetic, as well as practical in a utilitarian sense. In so doing they made the same mistake that professional philosophers made after them. They treated a use, function, and service rendered in conduct of inquiry as if it had ontological reference apart from inquiry. (16)

Here seems to be again a full recognition of the weight of human feelings, dispositions, desires in the judgment of ideas, especially those of a scientific nature. The resolution of the difficulty is, clearly, to abandon the ontological context. It is to take ideas as other than having ontological reference. The Autonomy of Inquiry is preserved. Ideas are taken in "use, function, and service rendered" in the "conduct of inquiry." No more need be said here about the connection and contrast of Dewey and Russell relative to the concern with the enterprise which may be called, to cover both men, the "Autonomy of Learning." That task of trying to pull the men together significantly while setting the scene for the social and education tasks they set and see belongs to our next section. It is to it that we turn.
(Chapter III Notes)

A. Russell

2. Ibid., p. 98.
3. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
5. Unpopular Essays, pp. 9-10.
7. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
8. Our Knowledge of The External World, p. 11.

B. Dewey

11, 12, 13. Ibid., pp. 15-17.
15. Ibid., p. 20.
CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

A. Dewey

The analysis and discussion stem from and are directly related to the materials briefly presented in the preceding pages. There is much common ground, as has been noted, between Dewey and Russell as they are concerned with the impact of custom, habit, tradition, desire, and preference in shaping philosophic thought. There are, however, apparently fundamental differences between them about certain aspects of tradition. What is virtually the heart of this dissertation centers in almost exclusive measure on the attitudes toward inquiry into the nature of the world and toward the place of human desire in the philosophers' approach to that question.

"Organicism" or "organic philosophy" (and thus "system" and "coherence") in human affairs is a major concern in Russell's writings. Russell may be quite incorrect in the "inferences" he draws from the writings of Dewey, yet there is need for those concerned with the differences between these men and their general orientations to understand the bases of difference and the possibility of achieving clarity with respect to them.

Nominaly, the issue is one of the nature of "truth," but little is to be gained from examining it in those terms. While
examination might move forward in terms of "truth," this is different from calling the issue one of the nature of truth. Actually, the difference between them was forecast in the Introduction and first Chapter of Part I. It is this to which attention is now directed. The heading "Desire" And Metaphysics turns attention directly to the issue in its bearing upon some basic conflicts, issues, and conditions of our present world. The presence of desires in human beings is as distinctive a trait as we may observe. It is because of this, perhaps, that the two philosophers are so attentive to its place and role in history, especially at the level of philosophic thought.

The following from Russell suggests that a critical point, if the differences are to be explored, is the notion of "organism." Reference to "inquiry" is necessarily included and discussed, since the "autonomy of inquiry" (Dewey) is as basic as the "autonomy of logic" (Russell).

Dewey makes inquiry the essence of logic, not truth or knowledge. He defines inquiry as follows: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." He adds that "inquiry is concerned with objective transformation of objective subject-matter"....

It is clear that "inquiry" as conceived by Dewey is part of the general process of attempting to make the world more organic. "Unified wholes" are to be the outcome of inquiries. Dewey's love of what is organic is due partly to biology, partly to the lingering influence of Hegel. Unless on the basis of an unconscious Hegelian metaphysic, I do not see why inquiry should be expected to result in "unified wholes".... The notion that such a procedure is legitimate can only be justified by a Hegelian distinction of appearance and reality: the appearance
may be confused and fragmentary, but the reality is always orderly and organic. Therefore, when I inquire I am only revealing...true eternal nature. But this part of the doctrine is never made explicit. The metaphysic of organism underlies Dewey’s theories, but I do not know how far he is aware of this fact. (1)

In light of all that has been written in discussion between the two men, it would seem unnecessary to rescue Dewey from the charges of an implicit harboring of Hegelian metaphysics; yet, in fact, there is nothing to do but examine the source of difficulties. Dewey nowhere in his writings suggests that reality is ordered and settled while the unreal is disordered and unsettled. If what comes later is more real than what comes earlier, then a unified whole, as the issue of successful or terminated inquiry, is more real than the conditions which occasioned the inquiry. As for the state of conditions, there is in Dewey’s position an obvious difference between the ordered and the disordered. It is not, however, an obvious difference in the "material" of the whole. It is one of a difference in the state of the "world." There is objective transformation of objective subject-matter, but the materials or elements of a situation, both as it is problematic and as it is resolved, are the same. (2)

That Dewey presents an "appearance-and-reality" position may be the case. In fact, it clearly is the case, as a reading of "Appearing and Appearance" attests. But the distinction is not one of difference in realms of being, of "true reality" as over against "experience."
The general notion of "appearance" we have broken up into a number of meanings, each distinctive in a particular contextual situation. The elimination of traditional misconstruction is procured when we keep these meanings definite, each in its proper place, and do not transfer and mix traits of one with those of another. Four distinctive situations are stated in such propositions as the following: (I) The sun appears (rises, or emerges from a cloud)—the primitive and neutral meaning. (II) The sun's appearing at this place and time is a manifestation of the structure of the system to which sun and earth belong; a type of proposition which states the conclusion of any inquiry accepted as valid knowledge. (III) The sun seems to move (apparently moves) from east to west across a stationary earth; the statement of an inferred object with an intimation of suspense and doubt concerning its correctness, or as preliminary to its rejection and the statement of another inferred total object such as "In reality, the earth rotates and its rotation, while the sun remains stationary with reference to the earth, accounts for the appearing objects which were used (wrongly) as the basis of the other inference." And finally (IV) The sun looks to the eye about the size of a twenty-five cent piece—a statement of a fact which is to serve as part of the matter of an inference as to its actual size, or in inference about its distance, etc.

In denying the metaphysical interpretation of appearance as an inferior order of being, it is not meant, of course, to deny all metaphysical implications in a certain sense of "metaphysical." On the contrary, the argument rests throughout on the fact that existential subject-matter in each of the four types of propositions is a series or temporal order of interrelated elements forming an inclusive whole of which the appearances are members. If this existential fact be denied, some form of bad metaphysics is bound to result. Nor is it implied that no general theory of knowledge is involved. On the contrary, the analysis points to the fact that knowledge requires as its precondition an appearing object which results from an integrated interaction of all factors, the organism included, and that the completed object of knowledge is precisely such an interrelated and self-manifesting whole as includes an appearance. (3)
Russell remarks that "it is clear that 'inquiry' as con­ceived by Dewey is part of the general process of attempting to make the world more organic." This follows reference to objective transformation of objective subject-matter. "Making" is quite literally taken by Russell, of course. It is a matter of actually "giving " to the world whatever order it has. Dewey seems to mean that the world does not have order beyond that which inquiry term­inates in. So interpreted, he embraces a deep power concept. It is a matter of our direct participation in the making of the world. This does not mean that the world is some objectification of thought. One may say we accomplish order in our world without saying that the world is dependent upon us for its existence, its manifestation. (4)

We encountered remarks on "need for a general theory of reality" in Chapter II (p. 67) and found the claim to "emancipated empiricism." We may, therefore, dispense with the notion that Dewey's "making" conceives the "objective world" as a secondary or derivative affair. "Transformation" is just that. The following suggests fundamental, primary, genuine "making."

Whether or not indeterminateness, uncertainty, actually exists in the world is a difficult question. It is easier to think of the world as fixed, settled once for all, and man as accumulating all the uncertainty there is in his will and all the doubt there is in his intellect. The rise of natural science has facilitated his dualistic partitioning, making nature wholly fixed and mind wholly open and empty.
Fortunately for us we do not have to settle the question. A hypothetical answer is enough. If the world is already done and done for, if its character is entirely achieved so that its behavior is like that of a man lost in routine, then the only freedom for which man can hope is one of efficiency in overt action. But if change is genuine, if accounts are still in the making, and if objective uncertainty is the stimulus to reflection, then variation in action, novelty and experiment, have a true meaning. In any case, the question is an objective one. It concerns man not in isolation with the world but man in his connection with it. A world that is at points and times indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and to give play to choice to shape its future is a world in which will is free, not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable, but because deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors. (5)

One may read this and conclude that deliberation and choice make a difference in the world, that they transform that world. Yet "deliberation" is "a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action. It starts from the blocking of efficient overt action, due to...conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse" (p. 190) while "choice," in contrast, "is the decisive direction of action." (pp. 192-193) Neither of these meanings itself reflects the "making." Finally, "choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences." (p. 193)

The last statement leaves us again confronted with "unified." It also bears upon the longer quotation above. "Will" as "inherently vacillating and unstable" would be the will of "emergence of prefer-
ence out of indifference. It would be arbitrary selection of one element out of a complex. The selection is "subjective," or governed by habit, custom, tradition, after some presumed "objectivity" of indifference. Clearly, the conception of unity, the unified, persists. In the same volume, "desire" is presented in relation to a "disruption" of ongoing activity. It is the forward surge of life toward re-unification.

... Desire is the forward urge of living creatures. When the push and drive of life meets no obstacle, there is nothing which we call desire. There is just life-activity. But obstructions present themselves, and activity is dispersed and divided. Desire is the outcome. It is activity surging forward to break through what dams it up. The "object" which then presents itself in thought as the goal of desire is the object of the environment which, if it were present, would secure a re-unification of activity and the restoration of its ongoing unity. The end-in-view of desire is that object which, were it present, would link into an organized whole activities which are now partial and competing. It is no more like the actual end of desire, or the resulting state attained, than the coupling of cars which have been separated is like an ongoing single train. Yet the train cannot go on without the coupling.... (6)

In the revised edition of Ethics (Dewey and Tufts), "desire" is handled somewhat differently, but the notion of a "whole" is retained.

... The conflict is not between desire and reason, but between a desire which wants a near-by object and a desire which wants an object which is seen by thought to occur in consequence of an intervening series of conditions, or in the "long run"; it is a conflict between two objects presented in thought, one corresponding to a want or appetite just as it presents itself in isolation, the other corresponding to the want thought of in relation to other wants.
Fear may suggest flight or lying to a man as ends to be sought; further thought may bring a man to a conviction that steadfastness and truthfulness will insure a much larger and more enduring good. There is an idea in each case; in the first case, an idea of personal safety; in the second instance, an idea of, say, the safety of others to be achieved by remaining at a post. In each case also there is desire; in the first instance a desire which lies close to natural impulse and instinct; in the second instance, a desire which would not be aroused were it not that thought brings into view remote consequences. In one case, original impulse dictates the thought of the object; in the other case, this original impulse is transformed into a different desire because of objects which thought holds up to view.

In other words, there is nothing intrinsically bad about raw impulse and desire. They become evil in contrast with another desire whose object includes more inclusive and more enduring consequences. What is morally dangerous in the desire as it first shows itself is its tendency to confine attention to its own immediate object and to shut out the thought of a larger whole of conduct. (7)

Just prior to this it is observed that "deliberation and inquiry, on the other hand, take time; they demand delay, the deferring of immediate action. Craving does not look beyond the moment, but it is of the very nature of thought to look toward a remote end." The checking of impulse is the conjugate occurrence for emergence of thought, the end being, obviously, the determination of a "larger whole of conduct."

These passages make it clear that "unified wholes" are the termination of deliberation and inquiry. The most critical passage relative to a "metaphysic" and "objective transformation" is that in which "preference" is expressed for a world at points and times indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and choice.
Dewey seems, again, to take the stand that there is literally a "making" of the world in the human act—a making in some sense. This raises the question of the efficacy of the human being. In what sense may the human being be efficacious in the issue of events?

The question of "efficacy" is included because of related concerns with "system" and "determinism" that exist in philosophy and the views of the philosophers we are examining. It is curious that Dewey remarks that "if the world is already done and done for... if change is genuine..." certain things would be the case. And it is curious, too, that he says: "Fortunately for us we do not have to settle the question." These are curious comments because of the suggestion that if we conceive the world in certain ways, certain things follow, while if we conceive the world in other ways, certain things do not follow. But how does it possibly follow that because we take the world "at points and times indeterminate enough to call out human deliberation and choice" human deliberation and choice have a genuine part to play? Why do we not have to settle the issue? Is it not possible, fundamentally, that life is as difficult as it is, as confused and precarious, as tortured, dominated and denominated as it is, because men have increasingly "sensed" participation, sensed efficacy? Have sensed more power than they have?

One may agree that there is a certain genuine, deep-running satisfaction to be gained from the belief that one makes a difference in the course of life and that one may make a difference. It might also seem that this implies a struggle between organism and external
world, physical or social, the one imposing itself upon the other. No reader of Dewey, however, would conclude that he advances the view of a "humanity" set over against "the world." Thus a world indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and choice "at points and times" is not necessarily one in which there is to ensue some struggle. The organism and the physical world are in interaction. This is indubitably Dewey's stand. The two "poles" are in interaction at a kind of mid-point in an experience. The "interactive situation" is an "interim," one between an earlier and a later "unified whole."

"Integration," Dewey says, "is a more fundamental term than interaction," for the latter is indicative of a partial prior breakdown of a state of balance. Now "interaction" suggests, as was said, some "self-active" reals, self-active "reals," the notion of things colliding, like billiard balls on a table. While Dewey has come to rely upon the term "transaction" rather than upon "interaction," the fundamental outlook and dominant concern seems unaltered. Situation as embracing "both terms" of the "world," the organism and an environment, has come to dominance along with transaction. The point here is that if "organism" is to be a notion underlying a theory, it would have to underlie it in some sense in just this way. There is no sense in talking about "organism" if there aren't some "parts" in it. If all that "organism" refers to is some things caught up with each other in movement toward an issue, then Dewey is quite indubitably an "organicist." He is at
least one who takes things to be caught up with each other. (8)

If one can stand off for a moment and get a "picture" of any organism in interaction with an environing world, then one has the kind of situation about which one may ask whether the interaction and issue are "foregone conclusions." There is a question of the necessity of what interactions occur. It seems, however, to be quite clear that the modes of interaction are matters of choice, perhaps it is in this that the freedom of human beings exists. The consequences of an interaction are irretrievable, though this is not to say that a given interaction has to occur or, having occurred, must reoccur. Were this the case, we would be like things "lost in routine."

As for the presence of a "personal doubter," one may conclude that if existential conditions are unqualifiedly determinate, experience as doubtful or indeterminate requires a "personal doubter" only in the sense that experience involves an organism and the existential conditions. Existential conditions may or may not be indeterminate, but a situation is indeterminate, whether they are or not. A situation extends into the future, of course. It is temporal, not cross-sectional. The world situation applies to organism-in-interaction for Dewey. Those not confining its referent to this may use it in connection with the physical world out of reference or bearing upon an organism. The opposite may also be a conversion. The doubtfulness of a situation may be a conversion into a personal doubt. That Dewey avoids the conversions is critical relative to any question of "change." (9) Change
in human life is considered metaphysically real. Life is not a realm of inferior being, a realm of "appearance." Dewey does not relegate the world of "spots and jumps" to "illusion" or our flaccid selves. The issuance of a situation that is indeterminate into one that is a "unified whole" is not an expression of a metaphysical preference for the latter over the former. Nor is it an expression of any preference of the latter over the former. It is a recognition of the place of both in the course of change and inquiry, although the statement that inquiry is to terminate in a "unified whole" does conceivably, to some minds, express a preference—until one discovers that no such whole is ultimate, an end in itself, a terminus par excellence.

The notion that any termination of inquiry is the exhibition of "eternal and true reality" where Dewey is concerned seems possible as an interpretation of Dewey only as one supposes a conversion of just that kind that Dewey has objected to. (10) The very dichotomization or bifurcation that has been mentioned so frequently in the present chapter and so much alluded to also in the preceding chapter is the result of a conversion, in Dewey's terms. This is a difficult notion to develop. Yet an understanding of Dewey that does not result in some half-way house born of natural disposition, and a sense of the practical in admixture, is dependent upon this point.

"Conversion" expresses the notion of an "imputation." It is not a mistaking of the traits that a thing or event does have but
is giving to it a status that it does not have. Something is "superadded," "imputing," and "converting," however, suggests an agent, an active agent that converts. There is basis in Experience and Nature for suspecting an active converter presupposed. There is, indeed, an intimation that Dewey engages in the fallacy of conversion.

The operation of choice is, I suppose, inevitable in any enterprise into which reflection enters. It is not itself falsifying. Deception lies in the fact that its presence is concealed, disguised, denied. An empirical method finds and points to the operations of choice as it does to any other event. Thus it protects us from conversion that may be said to be the philosophic fallacy, whether it be performed in behalf of mathematical subsistence, esthetic essences, the purely physical order of nature, or God... (11)

Does Dewey mean that we are kept from committing the conversion? In light of all that Dewey has written against the notion of "personal doubter" and "personal knower," it is highly unlikely that there is intended any notion of an agent of conversion. Far from there being any "agent" which is "guilty" of some "fallacy of conversion," there is some conversion that has occurred. This statement, nevertheless, runs counter, seemingly, to the force of the words used. Let us try to lay hold of this matter by putting forward a couple of instances, as illustrations, of conversions as Dewey sees them to have occurred.

Consciousness is always in rapid change, for it marks the place where the formed disposition and the immediate situation touch and interact....
Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation. The current idealistic conception of consciousness as a power which modifies events is an inverted statement of this fact. To treat consciousness as a power accomplishing the change, is but another instance of the common philosophic fallacy of converting an eventual function into an antecedent force or cause.... (12)

Idealism fails to take into account the specified or concrete character of the uncertain situation in which thought occurs; it fails to note the empirically concrete-nature of the subject-matter, acts, and tools by which determination and consistency are reached; it fails to note that the conclusive eventual objects having the latter properties are themselves as many as the situations dealt with. The conversion of the logic of reflection into an ontology of rational being is thus due to arbitrary conversion of an eventual natural function of unification into a causal antecedent reality; this in turn is due to the tendency of the imagination working under the influence of emotion to carry unification from an actual, objective and experimental enterprise, limited to particular situations where it is needed, into an unrestricted, wholesale movement which ends in an all-absorbing dream. (13)

With these before us, let us consider another instance of conversion. It is one of considerable importance to those not directly interested in such technical matters as the above.

The teachings of Christ are authoritative to a Christian because of the notion of the Divinity of Christ. It is sometimes said that if, in Christ, God and man are not One, then the teachings of Christ are but what one great man has said and will have no—indeed, cannot have—enduring meaning for men everywhere and always. On the other hand, one may say that these teachings are gleanings from the experience of men; they express principles developed and
rendered explicit in the course of human living. To treat them as divine in origin and as thus authoritative is to convert evaluations, judgments, into manifestations of the "superior" or the "eternal and true." This latter view, of course, need not be taken as rejecting the principles and teachings in question. Its "source of authority" is different. It expresses a relativism of the kind expressed in the last passage quoted above. It notes a "plurality" of investigations, etc. It does not shudder at the possibility that the teachings are "only what one great man has said." It would, however, "shudder" at the conversion which puts the principles, presumably, beyond the pale of experience and refutation (or, barring polemic, beyond examination of their function).

These illustrations of conversion are but several from many that may be noticed. Yet another one points to the doctrine of "natural rights," this being an instance of the protection of cherished privileges, etc., through embodiment of them in the "nature of things." The question of an "agent" is not resolved, of course, by noting instances of what are conversions. If one supposes an agent, however, one supposes that the entire history of philosophy, insofar as it is marked by conversions, is but the reflection of the devilish ingenuity of mankind in the enterprise of insuring himself against onslaught and in precipitating upon others his own will and prejudice. Philosophy of the "traditional kind" stands, in these terms, as but a propaganda effort. One
becomes, however, enmeshed in the difficulties of judging the earlier because of the difference between it and the later—a matter itself one of preference, perhaps. It is because of the seeming conclusion one is driven to if one begins with the notion of an "agent" that the writer feels constrained to explore the consideration and concern. Some "objectivity" seems in order, and the supposition of an "agent," especially in light of what is emerging relative to "disguise" of choice, leads to something other than an objective outlook upon philosophy. The difference is one of attitude, then, in one context. It makes a difference whether the linking of disguised choice and agent—converter occurs or whether "disguised" has a less insinuating tenor. If one takes conversions as occurring under the "impact of emotion," that is another matter. There are conversions, not convertings. Conversions become objective events in the course of history and may, perhaps, be examined as to the conditions under which they occur. This leads us to a further consideration.

Dewey charges that men commit the "fallacy of conversion." It hardly seems possible for one honestly to charge that a fallacy has been committed unless there is some ground or way of demonstrating that the truth lies in not making the conversion. If functions are affairs of experience and that only, then it seems a bit difficult to charge any fallacy of conversion to have occurred without accepting some responsibility for showing that things taken as real in their own right or as superior reality or models, etc.,
do not so exist. By what method may it be demonstrated that the idealism mentioned earlier (p.143) is guilty of a fallacy? If such an effort or, rather, condition, as this does not generate the question of existences we do not experience, then there seems to be no way to generate it. We may ignore the question, but it hardly seems legitimate to do so if fallacy is a charge seriously put forward.

One may legitimately suppose that conversions have occurred and proceed in ways which avoid conversion, and one may do this as a matter of the legitimacy of operating with and "within" hypotheses. All that is said to follow from failure to avoid conversion may indeed follow from that failure and all that is said to follow from avoiding conversion may follow (degrees of specification both as to consequences and the kind of conversion, it should be said, being appropriately involved) without controversy as to independent existence of anything, without any controversy as to whether a conversion has or has not occurred. It may also follow without concern with charging—implicitly or explicitly—a "propaganda" effort. But it is clear that Dewey offers an account of a tradition in his notion. He at the same time, then, puts selections in perspective.

From the standpoint of those working in the most general framework of the "ontological context," the position that charges "conversion" and thus correlativebely dispenses with the question
as to what, and the question as to whether anything, exists apart from experience will, of course, turn to "functions" as sufficient meanings for things. (14)

On the other hand, those considering the "functions" as sufficient will, of course, consider some "conversion" to have occurred on the part of those who would make the charge or express the fear of superficiality, narrow practicality, etc., and would, further, suppose there to be the "delights of a dialectical problem" involved in controversies relative to the nature of "reality" or Reality. The most general notion of the ontological context mentioned above is that of the existence of some world, independent of the organism, controversies about which are rife but which may be but the tug and haul of preference and prejudices vying for dominance. The only alternative, apparently, is to consider traits and functions converted into status in their function in inquiry, their place in the scheme or pattern of inquiry.

When Russell writes of the Deweyian position that there is an "Hegelian distinction of appearance and reality; the appearance may be confused and fragmentary, but the reality is always orderly and organic," this cannot possibly mean opposition of the ordered to the disordered. It cannot even be a correct view of Dewey concerning "attempting to make the world more organic." The passage which mentioned "points and times," at which the world is indeterminate, recognizes that not all lives are problems at one
and the same time—hence "points." It recognizes that not a single life goes problemless—problemless at any point, hence "times."

The Chinese may have worked out an adjustment while the French may not have, to speak. A plurality of problematic situations is involved. There may be a making of some part of the world, some point in it, more organic at some time in the world, but this is not literally a making of the world more organic. If Russell means by "making the world more organic" some progression of a situation to some issue, a unified whole, that is one thing. If he means a making of the universe more organic, that is another. Even should he intend to say making the "world"—as—a—whole, rather than Universe, more organic, this is a misunderstanding.

Rationalistic idealism claims that the world is rational through and through since science is the disclosure of an order of uniform, because necessary, laws. Leaving out of consideration the fact that laws of uniform relations are ultimately instrumentalities for control of individualized situations, and taking the claim in its own terms, the alleged rationality of the universe as a whole is another case of generalization beyond the limiting conditions of grounded inquiry. That problematic situations are resolvable (though the means of attaining solutions may not be practically available at a given time) is certainly a working postulate of inquiry, and it is true that such resolutuion renders intelligible what was previously unintelligible. But extension of these principles beyond the bounds of a plurality of problematic situations has no warrant. The existence of problematic situations is a challenge to inquiry—that is, to operative intelligence. The idea that intelligibility affected by scientific or controlled inquiry proves the antecedent existence of an a priori rational world puts the cart before the horse. Moreover, it renders the
appearance of blind and unordered situations an insoluble problem save by drawing a hard and fast metaphysical line between the world of phenomenal appearances and the world in its reality. Finally, the challenge to make the world more reasonable is one that is ever renewed, since it is a challenge to execute the concrete operations at definite places and times. The working scientific faith is the belief that concern for objective continual inquiry, with assiduity and courage in its performance, is capable of becoming habitual with an ever-increasing number of human beings. The idea that the faith of science is a belief that the world is already in itself completely rational is not so much inspiration to work as it is a justification of acquiescence. (15)

What is critical in our inquiry may be summed up briefly by saying that the notion of conversion centers, in its most basic aspect, upon the subjective factors of selection and isolation in the course of philosophy and, indeed, in the everyday life of the world. The various theories of the nature of reality and the epistemological problems related to these controversies could not have arisen were it not for the fact that "raw impulse" tends to seize upon its object at the expense of a wider, more inclusive range of objects. We have, thus, a relationship between the fact of "desire" and "raw impulse" and metaphysical views exhibited in the history of philosophy. This suggests that "theories of knowledge now called epistemologies have arisen because knowledge and obtaining knowledge have not been conceived in terms of the operations by which, in the continuum of experiential inquiry, stable beliefs are progressively obtained and utilized." (Logic, p. 534) Thus a vast preoccupation of philosophers turns out to
be a dialectical concern with the reality—qualifying selections of custom, habit, tradition, and desire. Whether we focus attention upon "logical" traits, either as relations between "events" or as "general traits" of the universe, or upon particular things in the course of our lives, the autonomy of inquiry stands as the indication that these findings are established in the course of inquiry. Their isolation from each other is an act of isolating a practical enterprise in the conduct of inquiry.

From the standpoint of the impact of emotion in the course of life, the fact of conversion—if it is a fact—may be expressed by saying that we tend to love one thing too much if we love it at all. There are those moments when we wish to cling to a moment and to say, as Faust thought he would never say, "Linger awhile, so fair thou's art." Challenged, then, by a world of people who cling to other moments, we seek refuge in the "true and eternal." Soon, then, we fall to arguing and, rational persuasion failing, we resort to infallible intuition and the consequent, use of force in order to prevail, or in order simply to persist. Only as we abandon this disposition and give ourselves to the application, with assiduity and courage in its performance, of the scientific method; only as we recognize the fact of conversions and avoid the commission of them, may we hope for an issue from the deep reptures that pervade our waking hours and, in times like the present, the sleeping hours as well.
From the standpoint of the emphasis upon the "organic," we find Dewey pointing persistently to the "more inclusive whole," and this, as well as the effect of conversions, will come into full play and force in the later discussion of "Social Philosophy." We have, indeed, found "desire" defined in terms of a re-uniting of life that has been obstructed, or, differently, diversified in a disunited way. Things that once gave support to each other in an integrated fashion compete. Life seeks a restoration of unity. There is thus a challenged life; a life that is the moment and point of indeterminacy. As inquiry occurs here, it is genuinely a part of the making of "the world" more organic. Only by ignoring Dewey's emphasis upon situation as meaning the interaction of organism-environment may the interpretation of Dewey as embracing either explicitly or implicitly an Hegelian metaphysic of appearance and reality be made. Only by ignoring the objective, existential (as experiential existence) character of problematic conditions may the supposition that Dewey contrasts appearance and reality be avoided. It is asserted, of course, that things exist in inter-connection with each other. Even those who controvert other doctrines of Dewey admit the necessity of connections between events if there is to be inference from some events to others.

Finally, Dewey holds the position that human beings are efficacious in the "organizing" of the world, i.e., that there is genuine determining and stabilizing on the part of human de-liberation and choice. That problems are resolvable is a working
postulate, it is said. This can only mean, in light of the emphasis upon a "unified whole," that Dewey takes as an essential trait of problematic conditions that they are not balanced and harmonious units. Drift, or the maintenance of force and its utilization, are the alternatives, perpetuating the extant subjugations or, perhaps, establishing the subjugation where before there was unity. It is expected that the move toward balance, toward the conditions in which present competing factors release and mature each other, is capable of becoming a more universally held disposition toward action and that the method of its achievement will become universalized.

Russell has without doubt focused attention upon a matter of central concern. He has increasingly emphasized the notion of "organism" in his writings directed to Dewey's position. His criticisms have ranged from those pointing to "oppressive organization" to the inadequacy of "coherence" as a criterion of "truth." We could find many instances where Russell may appropriately suspect Dewey of holding a coherence theory of truth. Chapter I mentioned one instance, and the termination of inquiry in a unified world, when set in the context of a concern with the real world of objective existential fact, leads to suspicion of an underlying coherence theory, even though it be maintained that truth depends upon inquiry.

Whereas the notion of conversion is central in Dewey, it does not appear in Russell. Yet, as "The Concerns" show, Russell joins Dewey in the critique of the impact of habit, custom, and tradition,
desire in the course of philosophy and everyday living, however affected or unaffected by philosophy that living may be. It remains, then, to turn attention from Dewey to Russell, seeking the basic concepts that seem to establish polemic and those that seem to stand as indications of the way or ways in which peace and intelligence may prevail among men.
Our discussion of Dewey began with a consideration of Russell's indication that Dewey held certain conceptions. It is only fair and fitting, then, that the discussion of Russell begin with a consideration of Dewey's contention that Russell holds certain conceptions. Certain of Russell's observations were born out by the preceding analysis and certain were not. The same may be found true in the following discussion of Russell.

The first part of the following quotation is set in a context of Russell's critique of Dewey. The second paragraph expresses a Deweyan notion of Russell.

In an earlier writing, a passage of which is cited by Mr. Russell, I stated my conclusion that Mr. Russell's interpretation of my view in terms of satisfaction of personal desire, of success in activities performed in order to satisfy desires, etc., was due to failure to note the importance in my theory of the existence of indeterminate or problematic situations not only as the source of, but as the control of inquiry. A part of what I there wrote reads as follows:

"Mr. Russell proceeds first by converting a doubtful situation into a personal doubt... Then by changing doubt into private discomfort, truth is identified upon my view with removal of this discomfort...(but) 'Satisfaction' is satisfaction of the conditions prescribed by the problem." (16)

Thus, as Russell suggests that Dewey holds an Hegelian metaphysic, so Dewey suggest that Russell is guilty of conversion. But the following comment goes further.

As far as cosmological speculation on the indeterminate
situations in astronomical and geological epochs is relevant to my theory (or my theory to it), any view which holds that man is part of nature, not outside it, will hold that this fact of being part of nature qualifies his "experience" throughout. Hence the view will certainly hold that indeterminancy in human experience, once experience is taken in the objective sense of interacting behavior and not as a private conceit added on to something totally alien to it, is evidence of some corresponding indeterminateness in the process of nature within which man exists (acts) and out of which he arose. Of course, one who holds, as Mr. Russell seems to do, to the doctrine of the existence of an independent subject as the cause of the "doubtfulness" or "problematic quality" of situations will take the view he has expressed, thus confirming my opinion that the difference between us has its basic source in different views of the nature of experience, which is in turn correlated with our different conceptions of the connection existing between man and the rest of the world. Mr. Russell has not envisaged the possibility of there being another generic theory of experience, as an alternative to the pre-Darwinian conceptions of Hegel, on the one hand, and of Mill, on the other. (17)

There are occasions when Russell speaks as if there were personal doubters and personal doubt. The following gives a hint of this belief:

...One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled with doubt and indecision. I do not think this is necessary.... (18)

Yet this is only a mention of the feeling of certainty and of those filled with doubt. It is not a clear-cut statement that would lead one to suppose a belief in "personal doubt" or in personal doubters. Let us note a passage bearing more directly upon habit, custom, tradition, and desires.
When ... we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge, it is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude of the complete skeptic, placing ourselves outside all knowledge, and asking, from this outside position, to be compelled to return within the circle of knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our skepticism can never be refuted... Against this absolute skepticism, no logical argument can be advanced. But it is not difficult to see that skepticism of this kind is unreasonable. Descartes' "methodical doubt," with which modern philosophy began, is not of this kind, but is rather the kind of criticism we are asserting to be the essence of philosophy. His "methodical doubt" consisted in doubting whatever seemed doubtful; in pausing, with each apparent piece of knowledge, to ask himself whether, on reflection, he could feel certain that he really knew it. This is the kind of criticism which constitutes philosophy.... (19)

One thing seems certain; insofar as our experiences are different, the knowledge that we have will be "personally" doubtful, although there will be some knowledge that is commonly doubtful. As a result of my experience, I know with certainty some things that others do not know. They may make inferences about my experience, about what I feel and about what events are part of my life. I may do the same with respect to their feelings and the events of their lives. What is certain for me is inference for others and vice versa. On the other hand, any two persons may have to make inferences about the experience of a third person, thus having some knowledge that is commonly doubtful. This plurality of doubtful knowledge is roughly equivalent, at least, to a plurality of problematic situations. It is not clear, however, that there is, in the case of personal doubt, a personal doubter. Is there
some "doubting entity"? Russell does say "in pausing... to ask himself," and this suggests a personal doubter. It is in any event clear that persons are doubtful, are filled with doubt, whatever develops as the stand on a personal doubter. Our analysis of Russell's concerns about desire and metaphysics may aid in the determination of Dewey's interpretation.

In the preliminary presentation of Russell's remarks on custom, habit, desire and metaphysics, it was noted that he holds "mysticism" commendable as an attitude toward life but not as a theory about the world. Further, this conclusion bore directly upon the abandonment of the world of sense in favor of a supersensible world of reality. This, in turn, was suspected to occur as a result of dwelling upon "worn inward passion." In the course of the dwelling, the individual loses familiar objects of daily life; hence, they take on an air of unreality. The Western mind, habituated to reasoning, may grasp at logical grounds congenial to the mystic insight it is supposed to have. It is thus not quite impartial and disinterested. It results, specifically, in the denial of the "reality of space and time." Hegel, for example, is charged with providing an intellectual elaboration of mystic insight into the oneness of the Absolute. The general polemic against the subject-predicate logic moves against a background of such considerations as this.

In "Mysticism and Logic," Russell observes that Plato succumbed to the notion of "the good."
Throughout most of Plato's teaching, there is an identification of the good with the truly real, which become embodied in the philosophic tradition, and is still largely operative in our own day. In thus allowing a legislative function to the good, Plato produced a divorce between philosophy and science, from which, in my opinion, both have suffered ever since and are still suffering... (20)

And it is observed that "the man of science, whatever his hopes may be, must lay them aside while he studies nature; and the philosopher, if he is to achieve truth, must do the same." (21)

Further, the divorce produced in permitting the good to dominate and become legislative is the reverse of the Russellian position or a confusion of the aims of logic and concerns with the "best way of life." But

...the question of the goodness or badness of the world is one for science rather than for philosophy. We shall call the world good if it has certain characteristics that we desire. In the past philosophy professed to be able to prove that the world has such characteristics, but it is now fairly evident that the proofs were invalid. It does not follow that the world does not have the characteristics in question; it follows only that philosophy cannot decide the problem... (22)

"Good" and "bad" are matters of human judgment upon the world as science discovers it to be. But whether there are realms of essence, the "dyes" of which we catch in the flux of experience, is a question. Are there two realms: one of spirit, the other physical? Is there a truth of an ethical nature and one of a physical world? Russell answers the question in the negative.

There is no event called the "goodness" of a person. There is only our judgment about events. There is a world of events apart from
our experience, it may be believed, but Russell does not believe that "good" or "bad" do more than tell our attitude toward those events. If there are events that are desirable, i.e., which satisfy a desire, then the events are "good"; if there are events that prohibit satisfaction of desire, then the latter are "bad."

We may come to know what events satisfy what desires, but where we do not know this, there is belief as to what ones will satisfy. We shall come upon this latter concern a little later. For now we may give more full attention to "doubt" generally.

In another consideration of philosophy, Russell notes how a "mixture" of the "religious" and "scientific" are embraced in "philosophic" conceptions of life and the world:

The conceptions of life and the world which we call "philosophical" are a product of two factors: one, inherited religious and ethical conceptions; the other, the sort of investigation which may be called "scientific"; using this word in its broadest sense. Individual philosophers have differed widely in regard to the proportions in which these two factors entered into their systems, but it is the presence of both, in some degree, that characterizes philosophy.

"Philosophy" is a word that has been used in many ways, some wider, some narrower. I propose to use it in a very wide sense, which I will now try to explain.

Philosophy, as I shall understand the world, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy.... (23)
This attack from both sides, is suggested in the following passage:

...Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little, and if we forget how much we cannot know we become insensitive to many things of very great importance. Theology, on the other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where in fact we have ignorance, and by so doing generates a kind of impertinent insolence towards the universe. Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them. To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it. (24)

There is nowhere an indication of indeterminate or determinate universe effecting us to make us "doubtful." There is obviously, further, no mention of "interaction" of an organism with a physical world presumed to exist independently of the organism. Virtually nothing with which we were familiar at the end of our analysis of Dewey's views has appeared thus far in our consideration of Russell. There is, however, an emphasis upon "doubt" that is as great as in Dewey.

It is not to be thought that Russell advocates the eradication of the "subjective" from life. He does not intend that matters of feeling should be cast aside in favor of the cold, harsh, and brutalizing "scientific," as "The Scientific Society" in The Scientific Outlook, and Huxley's Brave New World (the populariza-
tion of the chapter), shows. Russell is not, then, advocating the suppression of all that makes life vivid, of what gives zest and meaning to it. But he does recommend the approach which leads to a separation of the ethical from the theoretical, so that we may see the world as it really is rather than through the distorting medium of our desires. There is not to be a moratorium on science, nor on ethics. Theology holds in its bosom a whole host of questions—about immorality, teleology, mind and matter, etc.—that have captured the imaginations, the hopes, aspirations and desires of mankind. In these areas definite knowledge is not ascertainable. On the other hand, science is divested of these considerations and concerns. It confines itself, in broadest measure, to what is discoveres—and admits no more. It is a "habit of careful truth-telling."

In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of the few unifying forces is scientific truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings. To have insisted upon the introduction of this virtue into philosophy, and to have invented a powerful logical technique by which it can be rendered fruitful, are the chief merits of the philosophical school of which I am a member. The habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical method can be extended to the whole sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding. In abandoning part of its dogmatic pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and inspire a way of life. (25)
While we are not doubtful because situations are doubtful, in every instance, we are doubtful about more than we ordinarily suppose ourselves to be. Were we to cast aside the "swift certainty" of the "mystic," a matter ultimately of reliance upon the past anyway, life would be enhanced many fold. It would be enhanced—yet it would be troubling to us because of the "arduous uncertainty" of it. This uncertainty develops under the impact of "careful truth-telling," and the technique of logical analysis is the "powerful logical tool" which operates in this effort. It is because we so much operate uncritically, though sometimes conditions force this upon us, that we experience the restlessness and misery we do experience. But there is a "deeper" notion involved here.

We can no longer act with the comforting feeling that the universe is akin to our fondest desires. The critique of science, the careful, active, persistent examination of the world, leads to an upsetting of our certainty, of our faith in the progress of the world to a better day. Yet this is not to say that progress toward a better day is impossible to us or for us. It is to say that this progress is not assured in the nature of the world. We can no longer expect the embodiment of our fondest hopes in the world of which we are a part. And we are a part of that world. This is clear. There is no warrant for the suspicion that Russell cuts us off from the world. Rather, we are in and of the world. But we are the hoping, wishing, desiring parts of that world. We are at least that. We dare suppose, at times, however, that the world of which we are part is an embodiment of those wishes. We
go beyond our experiences of it and allow ourselves the "luxury" of taking these wishes not only as part of the world but as embodied in the very workings of it, rooted in its very nature. It is this penchant for "some external realization of the good" that has been of so much concern to Russell.

The notion of the Oneness of the Absolute, with all that this means in its bearing upon science—where space-time is concerned, say—in denial of the "reality of relations," and the correlative concept of the "real and radical distinctness" of events, turns out to be an ethical bias. It is mystical in tenor, in metaphysics. But more than just an expression of an ethical bias for "cohesion" (which is all that "unity" is for Russell, apparently), Hegel's position as representative exhibits the very antithesis of reasonableness.

... Philosophers7 have professed to discover a formula of progress, showing that the world was becoming gradually more and more to their liking. The recipe for a philosophy of this type is simple. The philosopher first decides which are the features of the existing world that give him pleasure and which are the features that give him pain. He then, by a careful selection among facts persuades himself that the universe is subject to a general law leading to an increase of what he finds pleasant and a decrease of what he finds unpleasant. Next, having formulated his law of progress, he turns on the public and says: "It is fated that the world must develop as I say; therefore those who wish to be on the winning side, and do not care to wage a fruitless war against the inevitable, will join my party." Those who oppose him are condemned as unphilosophic, unscientific, and out of date. Those who agree with him feel assured of victory, since the universe is on their side. At the same time the winning side, for reasons which remain somewhat obscure, is represented as the side of virtue.
The man who first fully developed this point of view was Hegel. (26)

Belief in the "external realization of the good" is, then, not what Russell wants. "The good" is a matter of human bias, of human preference. The effect of scientific efforts, over the long haul, has been to destroy belief in the external realization of the good except as we believe the world may have certain characteristics we desire. But that it has such characteristics is a matter for science to determine, and the rise of science has been due to its indifference to our hopes, desires and aspirations. Russell and Dewey would agree that certain "commonsense" beliefs carried over into and along with the developments in science. In Mysticism and Logic, Russell wrote of a "wholly unwarranted" retention of the notion of "substance" in the law of the conservation of energy, and Dewey, in Freedom and Culture, observes the following shift in scientific thought:

"...The doctrine of the conservation of energy represents, for example, an exceedingly comprehensive generalization. In terms of the now discarded philosophy of science, it would be said to set up a force which is at once electrical, mechanical, thermal, etc., and yet none of them, but a kind of nondescript thing-in-itself back of all of them. In actual scientific procedure, it is a formula for converting any one of these forms of energy into any other, provided certain conditions are satisfied. (27)

There is here, then, recognition of the weight of certain commonsense notions of the nature of things and explanations of the world in which we live and of which we are part. While not difficult, it would require considerable discussion of details to follow through
this notion of substance and attributes, of a thing appearing different under different circumstances, and the supposition that the world is an organic unit of which the things of experience and we are in some sense parts, analogous to its attributes. Russell's polemic against the subject-predicate logic is directly related to this and, hence, to the "Absolute is One" view. Such a logic may be said to be the logic of the insistence in and upon "external realization of the good," the particular "good" being the ultimate unity of all things, the ultimate reconciliation of contradictions. The "mystic emotion" of "oneness" plays into metaphysics here. For Russell, the world is more atomistic, one of "spots and jumps."

But, it may be wondered, just what does all this have to do with the question of "doubt" and "personal doubters"? It must be admitted, at first glance, that it seems to have very little to do with it. Yet the rise of skeptical science, the rise of the habit of careful "truth-telling," of confinement to certain knowledge, and the development of logical analysis to demonstrate with what certainty we may take the occurrence of events we do not experience, all cast doubt upon the ethical surety of human life. Science has come to doubt whether the world is determinate, whether it is a vast and comprehensive system, etc. It has become aware of the great amount yet to be known. It has possibly opened the door to a resurgence of older ways of viewing the world—has possibly opened the door to the "old night" of viewing the world
in the ethical terms of other ages. Only as it maintains itself as a pursuit of an external world does it shelter itself against the weight of habit, custom, and tradition, along with desires and aspirations, surging to fill out the world in terms congenial to these. It has come into skepticism and into danger at the same time. Its investigations have brought it and us to a critical point. There is no guarantee that the world is indeterminate nor that it is not. The only guarantee, in the last analysis, is that much of our supposed knowledge about the world is doubtful. There are "situations" that do not in themselves occasion doubt yet, even here, upon careful analysis, we become aware of the vast penumbra of uncertainty pervading them. (28) We anticipate parts of the world, and our anticipations rest upon the supposition of events, and it is the existence of these events that is a critical—if not the critical—consideration in life. The existence of these events is not a matter of ethics but a matter of science, though their existence may be a matter of concern for ethics.

Doubt issues from careful analysis. If there is any "doubting," as a beginning for analysis, it is the doubt that rides with the desire to know things as they really are. It is cautiousness as to the certainty of our experience, of our hunches, of our a priori notions of the normal and novel in life. There is no "conversion" of a doubtful situation into a personal doubt. There is no setting of man over against the rest of the world; "over-againstness" has to be determined, not presupposed. There is no fundamental dis-
paraging contrast between a knower and the known or the to be known. Man is a part of Nature, but he is a believing part, referring regularly to more than is in and of his life. This is shown upon the analysis of his experiences. He is, of course, a reflective part of Nature, able to reflect upon the inferences to which the causal lines and the events of his experience give rise. In both the development of logical analysis and the rise of modern science—the latter dependent upon the former, especially in physics—there is the persistent cautioning, on Russell's part, against the attachment to "practical affairs."

In advocating the scientific restraint and balance, as against the self-assertion of a confident reliance upon intuition, we are only urging, in the sphere of knowledge, that largeness of contemplation, that impersonal disinterestedness, and that freedom from practical preoccupations which have been inculcated by all the great religions of the world. Thus our conclusion, however it may conflict with the explicit beliefs of many mystics is, in essence, not contrary to the spirit which inspires those beliefs, but rather the outcome of this very spirit as applied in the realm of thought. (29)

And, relative to "the good" and "desire":

The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our power to create—the good in our own lives and our attitude toward the world. Insistence on belief in an external realization of the good is a form of self-assertion, which, while it cannot secure the external good which it desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power, and destroy that reverence towards fact which constitutes both what is valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper. (30)

The quotation with which we began this discussion read in part as follows:
Mr. Russell proceeds first by converting a doubtful situation into a personal doubt. Then by changing doubt into private discomfort, truth is identified (upon my view) with removal of this discomfort. (but) "Satisfaction" is satisfaction of the conditions prescribed by the problem.

The preceding pages have helped to throw some light upon what is at least one aspect of doubt and doubtfulness in Russell's view. If "doubt" is personal, it seems to be so only in the sense that we are believing organisms and in the sense that we have different experience. It does not mean, necessarily, the presence of any "actively doubting agents." The very long footnote might, under other conditions, have been included as part of the main text. But it is in fact not critical to the text since the main outlines of the problem of doubt and doubters remains soundly grounded in the notion of the privacy of experience and in the fact that we do believe in events beyond what we actually experience.

Any person who speaks on political affairs to a friend or relative can have the "experience" of checking the extent to which his pronouncements rest upon events of his own life and the extent to which they depend upon the testimony of others. Inference that is based on these. To examine the bases upon which supposed knowledge rests is to become aware of the inferences we make and the vast field of inference surrounding our lives, even though we may infer correctly. This is sometimes a depressing experience, especially as it terminates with the awareness of the small niche of positiveness that a single life is. The area of certainty may
turn out to be quite small.

We need now, however, to turn our attention more fully to "desire" and metaphysics. This means that we turn attention specifically to Dewey's statement that Russell "by changing doubt into private discomfort (after converting a doubtful situation into a personal doubt) identifies truth (on Dewey's view) with removal of the discomfort. If doubt is changed into discomfort, then Dewey has perhaps pegged Russell correctly at this point. It remains to be seen whether "doubt" and "discomfort" are equated in Russell.

There is a suggestive passage in Analysis of Mind. There is a hint at the nature of desire, although we shall have to rely upon other passages for a clearer picture.

What may, with some propriety, be called self-deception arises through the operation of desires for beliefs. We desire many things which it is not in our power to achieve: that we should be universally popular and admired, that our work should be the wonder of the age, and that the universe should be so ordered as to bring ultimate happiness to all, though not to our enemies until they have repented and been purified by suffering. Such desires are too large to be achieved through our own efforts. But it is found that a considerable portion of the satisfaction which these things would bring us if they were realized is to be achieved by the much easier operation of believing that they are or will be realized. This desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for the actual facts, is a particular case of secondary desire, and, like all secondary desire, its satisfaction does not lead to complete cessation of the initial discomfort. Nevertheless, desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for facts, is exceedingly potent both individually and socially. According to the form of belief desired, it is called vanity, optimism, or religion. Those who have sufficient power usually imprison or put to death any one who tries to shake their faith in their own excellence or in that of the universe; it is for this reason that seditious libel
and blasphemy have always been, and still are, criminal offenses.

It is very largely through desires for beliefs, that the primitive nature of desire has become so hidden, and that the part played by consciousness has been so confusing and so exaggerated. (33)

This passage indicates that there is a fundamental connection between the position on "desire" and "desires for beliefs" and our concern with "metaphysics." We shall return to it for fuller attention later, though it should be kept in mind as we continue attention to "desire and discomfort." The following clearly establishes a connection between desire and discomfort. (34)

...We may presume that hungry animals experience sensations involving discomfort, and stimulating such movements as seem likely to bring them to the food which is outside the cages. When they have reached the food and eaten it, their discomfort ceases and their sensations become pleasurable. It seems, mistakenly, as if the animals had had this situation in mind throughout, when in fact that have been continually pushed by discomfort. And when an animal is reflective, like some men, it comes to know what situation will bring satisfaction, so that in fact the discomfort does bring the thought of what will allay it. Nevertheless the sensation involving discomfort remains the prime mover. (35)

"Discomfort" is not the same as "pain." It is the "feeling-tone" directly opposed to pleasure. After noting the distinction between discomfort and pain, Russell considers the opposites (pleasure and discomfort) in terms of "causal properties." He understands them in terms of the "behaviours" to which they give rise.

"Discomfort" is a property of a sensation or other mental occurrence, consisting in the fact that the occurrence in question stimulates voluntary or reflex movements tending to produce some more or less definite change involving the cessation of the occurrence.
"Pleasure" is a property of a sensation or other mental occurrence, consisting in the fact that the occurrence in question either does not stimulate any voluntary or reflex movement, or, if it does, stimulates only such as tend to prolong the occurrence in question. (36)

And the "initial mental occurrence involving discomfort is called a 'desire' for the state of affairs that brings quiescence." (p. 75)

The "discomfort" is the causal character, the causal property of the "sensation or other mental occurrence" which is the "desire."

If we were to give a word for this state of "movement toward cessation," then perhaps "longing" would be appropriate. The word may not be applied to replace "desire," for the latter is whatever initial "mental occurrence" involves the discomfort. "Pleasure" and "desire," then, are also discrete, for the former does not stimulate movements which move toward cessation of the mental occurrence. If we know that movement is directed toward cessation of a mental occurrence, then we know that there is "desire" as the initial mental occurrence. If we know that movement is toward prolongation of a mental occurrence, we know that there is "pleasure."

If we do not know the "aim" of the movement, together with the initial mental occurrence, of course, we cannot say whether there is pleasure or desire. So much is obvious.

It is clear, then, that "discomfort" and anything that may be called "desire" go hand in hand. A mental occurrence from which there "issues" activity leading to change of that occurrence is "desire." "Discomfort" is the initial occurrence considered in its "causal property" of stimulating the activity. This is a rather
meager achievement for our analysis, which appears to end with the question of what is to be called what. It is almost a "verbal matter."

"Desire" defined as above, however, is not "desire" as we found it defined by Dewey. To be certain, there is in each case reference to some terminus of desire. For Dewey, "desire" is the "forward surge of life" that seeks to "break through" the objects that "dam it up." It is present when activity becomes dammed up and dispersed, diversified. Unity and continuity is what desire aims at. Thus far, there does not seem to be such a notion in Russell's statements. Dispersal and disunity have not been touched upon. There is no explicit reference to a "damming up," although something would seem called for as a "threat" to "pleasure" (else why would pleasure give rise to a movement to prolong the occurrence it is?) or as the cause of the "desire" (unless, of course, mankind is "inherently" a desiring being, in which case "discomfort" comes naturally). But we have not come to see how "discomfort" may be the equivalent of "doubt." This, it is recalled, is what Dewey says of Russell, i.e., that there is conversion of a doubtful situation into private doubt and identification of doubt with discomfort.

Earlier we quoted a passage on "self-deception" in which Russell mentioned "desires for beliefs." Strictly speaking, in light of what we have just discovered about his use of "desire," it seems the case that "beliefs" may be the "states of affairs" that bring a quiescence. That is, the presence of beliefs (or
only of some beliefs?) is an "answer" to desire, the demand for quiescence of some discomfort, the termination of activity. Since the writer takes this consideration of "desire for beliefs" and "secondary desires" to be critical relative to "desire and metaphysics," it is necessary to pursue it in some detail.

In the first place, "conscious" desire is defined as follows:

"Conscious" desire...consists of desire in the sense hitherto discussed, together with a true belief as to its "purpose," i.e., as to the state of affairs that will bring quiescence with cessation of the discomfort. If our theory of desire is correct, a belief as to its purpose may very well be erroneous, since only experience can show what causes a discomfort to cease. When the experience needed is common and simple, as in the case of hunger, a mistake is not very probable.... (37)

Only if the state of affairs "thought" or "believed" to be that which will bring quiescence does bring quiescence, can there be "conscious" desire. The source of "mistakes" in life is two-fold. The one is in the absence of a "precedent" for a desire, i.e., the initial mental occurrence is novel, unprecedented. The other source is in the simple fact that civilized life makes it necessary, to a great extent, to inhibit impulses, thus giving no experience of what does or does not lead to quiescence. There is no need for a Freudian "censor" here. The "mistakes are perfectly natural" mistakes. (p. 72)

There is "doubt" then as to what will bring cessation of the "mental occurrence," this being doubt as to what the activity will terminate in as a quiescent state of affairs. "Discomfort" is not...
the doubt or the doubtful. Thus, where "discomfort" is the property of the initial mental occurrence, causing (stimulating) activity toward cessation of the occurrence, doubt is not a mental occurrence. To take it as such would be to call "doubt" a property of the initial mental occurrence. There may be nothing wrong with this, but it is not what Russell has in "mind." However, whatever is to bring cessation to the initial mental occurrence may be called the "satisfactory." "Satisfaction," then, refers to this cessation, to the terminal state of affairs bringing to a close the activity. When, as we saw, there is true belief as the state of affairs bringing quiescence, "desire is conscious."

Insofar as Dewey takes Russell to advance the notion that whatever brings quiescence is satisfactory, he is correct. When he takes Russell to identify discomfort with doubt, he is incorrect. When he takes Russell to have a notion of "personal doubt," he is correct insofar as this means that initial mental occurrences may vary (always do vary in some degree) from person to person. When this is taken as a conversion of a doubtful situation into a personal doubt, he is incorrect since "conversion" can be pointed to only from the bases of Dewey's position. It is more nearly correct to describe Russell's position as one concerned with believing organisms in situations. As for "conditions of the problem," Russell's view of our problem is that it is one of knowing what will bring cessation to the discomfort. This can be stated in terms of "indeterminacy as to issue," but so stating it would
probably only serve to create considerable confusion. A central point is that the matter at issue is what will bring cessation of the discomfort.

But while "conversion" is an appropriate term only from Dewey's position, the notion that some "flaccid" reliance upon flimsy "whatevers" as removing doubt follows Dewey's view seems to have its bases in Russell's premises. The following, are of import from the standpoint of the conflicts between Russell and Dewey as well as in our larger inquiry as to the philosophers' respective views on "Desire and Metaphysics." Attention is turned to "mistakes" and, especially, to "secondary desires." The latter are "derived from...false judgment as to a primary desire." (p. 74)

There is a kind of "sublimation" of primary desire and impulse under some circumstances. A "conflict" of impulse and inhibition results in resolution of the conflict through a behavior that intends to resolve the restlessness and discomfort. It is believed that a certain state of affairs will end in quiescence, but the quiescence is never fully achieved because of the "avoidance" of the basic conflict. There is a "genuine" source of some behavior and a "secondary" source of it. "The belief that something is desired has often a tendency to cause the very desire that is believed in." (p. 72)

When we believe that we desire a certain state of affairs, that often tends to cause a real desire for it. This is due partly to the influence of words upon our emotions, in rhetoric, for example, and partly to the general fact that discomfort normally belongs to the belief that we desire such-and-such a thing that we do not possess. Thus what was originally a
false opinion as to the object of desire acquires a certain truth; the false opinion generates a secondary subsidiary desire, which nevertheless becomes real.... Suppose you have been jilted in a way which wounds your vanity. Your natural impulsive desire will be of the sort expressed in Donne's poem:

When by thy scorn, O Murderess, I am dead,
in which he explains how he will haunt the poor lady as a ghost, and prevent her from enjoying a moment's peace. But two things, stand in the way of your expressing yourself so naturally: on the one hand, your vanity, which will not acknowledge how hard you are hit; on the other hand, your conviction that you are a civilized and human person, who could not possibly indulge so crude a desire as revenge. You will therefore experience a restlessness which will at first seem quite aimless, but will finally resolve itself in a conscious desire to change your profession, or go round the world, or conceal your identity and live in Putney, like Arnold Bennett's hero. Although the prime cause of this desire is a false judgment as to your previous unconscious desire, yet the new conscious desire has its own derivative genuineness, and may influence your actions to the extent of sending you round the world. The initial mistake, however, will have effects of two kinds. First, in uncontrolable moments, under the influence of sleepiness or drink or delirium, you will say things calculated to injure the faithless deceiver. Secondly, you will find travel disappointing, and the East less fascinating than you had hoped—unless, some day, you hear that the wicked one has in turn been jilted. If this happens, you will believe that you feel sincere sympathy, but you will suddenly be much more delighted than before with the beauties of tropical islands or the wonders of Chinese art...

And the conclusion:

....A secondary desire, derived from a false judgment as to a primary desire, has its own power of influencing action, and is therefore a real desire according to our definition. But it has not the same power as a primary desire of bringing thorough satisfaction when it is realized; so long as the primary desire remains unsatisfied, restlessness continues in spite of the secondary desire's success. Hence arises a belief in
the vanity of human wishes: the vain wishes are those that are secondary, but mistaken beliefs prevent us from realizing that they are secondary. (38)

The fundamental notion here is that of a more or less unintentional avoidance of a world of "fact." Initial mental occurrences are "sublimated," are transferred, in their object, to some action that is socially sanctioned (in the above case, at any rate). This transference has the effect of creating the desire appropriate to it, but it obviously leaves untouched the source of the advent of the initial mental occurrence.

The initial impulse is checked; the self-imposed checking (perhaps derivative from social sanctions) is not, obviously, an eradication of the impulse. The impulse remains "underground" and will be a source of disturbance. The secondary desire thus stands as an alternative to the original impulse but is unsuccessful in the long run. Just this same process may occur in many cases of recurrent or persistent uneasiness, unhappiness. And one of the chief sources of unhappiness is the aspiration to more than is possible. This is another case of "checked" impulse. To repeat a portion of an earlier quotation:

...We desire many things which it is not in our power to achieve; that we should be universally popular and admired, that our work should be the wonder of the age, and that the universe should be so ordered as to bring ultimate happiness to all, though not to our enemies until they have repented and been purified by suffering. Such desires are too large to be achieved through our own efforts. But it is found that a considerable portion of the satisfaction which these things would bring us if they were realized is to be achieved by the much easier operation of believing that they are or will be
realized. This desire for beliefs, as opposed to desire for the actual facts, is a particular case of secondary desire, and, like all secondary desire, its satisfaction does not lead to a complete cessation of the initial discomfort. (39)

It does not require much imagination to see that the conversion of a terminal state of affairs into the cause of the desire, the conversion of the object that brings quiescence into the cause of the activity that terminates in its occurrence and the quiescent mental state, is perhaps an outcome of the insistence that the world conform in advance to our desires. Actually, this conversion is possible only with the occurrence of experience. Only after the occurrence of quiescence is experienced following achievement of an object through activity can one legitimately say that that object is the object of that particular desire. It cannot be guaranteed at all that the world in which we live is itself of such character or contains objects or such character that termination of our restlessness is possible. The fact that the world has thus far been such as to enable the cessation of some desires is no guarantee that generalization of the world's hospitableness to our fondest hopes and wishes is a sound generalization. It may lead, through several channels, only to tragedy. The tragedy may be individual or collective. It may be the tragedy of annihilation or that of enslavement of others or of self. At its best it leads to "sublimation," but as a secondary desire may induce a real desire, leading to activities which bring about the realization of the state of affairs believed to be the genuine object, tragedy
may ensue. We may say that in the long run it fails, for it does
not have the "subjective adequacy" required. It is likely to be
all too personal in character and, though temporarily enforceable
upon men, it lacks the appeal of their own genuine or sublimated
desires. Appeal may be made to a desire to be on the "winning
side" in the tug-haul and conflict of the universe. Thus, Russell
has put Hegel in the terms expressed in the quote presented earlier
(p. 158).

It is relatively easy to see the connection between the above
and Russell's view that philosophic conceptions are typically a
mixture of "inherited religious" conceptions and the kind of
investigations which are scientific. There is a mixture in
philosophy of what he sometimes calls "theories as to the best
way of life" and theories as to the nature of the world, of the
universe. Sometimes the impulse toward science has dominated, and
sometimes the other has dominated. Sometimes we have permitted
theories as to the best way of life to become theories of the
world, to replace science in this realm. We have passed unabashedly
beyond what is given in experience, and the desires, habits, customs,
and traditions have, in sublimation or in conformity, presumed to
legislate for the world. There is a permitting of the "legislative
function of the good." It is thus not difficult to understand,
directly in relation to the "believing that such congenial conditions
as we depict are or will be realized," how Russell might turn
on the "evolutionist" notion, especially under his interpretation
of Hegel.
Perhaps, in moments of deep skepticism, Russell takes the belief in an external world to be itself linked with the limitations of our experience. Perhaps that world is but a belief, necessary as a correlate of desires we find in ourselves, of our restlessness. But it is more usually the case, and more fundamentally the case, that he takes men necessarily purporting to say something about the world—men as men of science. To have abandoned that world as a determinant in truth is to have opened the door to the insistence of desire; it is to have succumbed to the urge to power; it is to reflect the reaction to our limitations of power. One may deny that world or one may ignore it. A philosophy which denies it exhibits a kind of madness, a certain insanity. One which ignores it stands upon the realization of our increasing mastery over it. Each is guilty of a "cosmic impiety."

The "love of the organic" may so react as to generate the activities which lead to systematizing of the disunited and competing. And yet "competing" is but insistence. The love of the organic, moreover, may serve only to repudiate the connections between things as they exist. Or it may be that the principle of organization is merely a personal one, subjective, private. It may be some "common purpose," to be certain, subordinating activities to itself. But "social cohesion" is a question, not a foregone conclusion. What is to be the principle of cohesion is to be determined. Shall there be a single doctrine? Is social cohesion possible without a community of persuasion? Philosophy may be
viewed as seeking, on the bases of rational argument, to induce cohesion. Yet there has been too much insistence of desire, and beneath the rational arguments, especially those of the monists, of the long tradition of subject-predicate logic, there lies an ethical bias. Caution is needed lest the desire for beliefs which are edifying be camouflaged by the elaborate intellectual structures in which they are presented. There is always reason to wonder if the apparent objectivity is not but apparent.

Enduring cessation of restlessness and conflict is what is wanted, not sublimation which gives but momentary peace. And, even granting the legitimacy of "desires for beliefs" as Russell does, there remains the question of what beliefs will give peace of an enduring kind. The following serves to capture many considerations, among them the one just mentioned. Its social implications provide us with a transition to Dewey and Russell in their speculations, assertions, and conflict on some important social problems.

Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand a theory as to the nature of the world, on the other an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much confused thinking. Philosophers, from Plato to William James, have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophistical, to prove that these beliefs are true. For my part I reprobate this kind of bias, both on moral and intellectual grounds. Morally, a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except a disinterested search
for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery. And when he assumes, in advance of inquiry, that certain beliefs, whether true or false, are such as to promote good behavior, he is so limiting the scope of philosophical speculation as to make philosophy trivial; the true philosopher is prepared to examine all preconceptions. When any limits are placed, consciously or unconsciously, upon the pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes paralyzed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government censorship punishing those who utter "dangerous thoughts"—in fact, the philosopher has already placed such a censorship over his own investigations.

Intellectually, the effect of mistaken moral considerations upon philosophy has been to impede progress to an extraordinary extent. I do not myself believe that philosophy can either prove or disprove the truth of religious dogmas. Doubt, for Russell, is a matter of beliefs, not of situations, it seems. It does not follow, of course, that tragedy or anything like it ensues upon adherence to such a position. Doubt is not a matter of discomfort. And, if it is personal, it is so only in the sense that human experiences vary. Believing, doubting, etc., are states of an organism, the objects that satisfy desires varying as experience varies. If any resolution of the differences between Dewey and Russell is to occur, if any is possible, it is to be sought only after one recognizes that the genuine problem they may be said to "occasion" is one between philosophic differences as to what our problem is. This is more than a play on words. They do not address themselves to the same world, and they explain each other only from the worlds in which they live. At least it is true that what "refutations and concerns" develop and are exhibited by them relative to each other and others seem to be
governed, in their expression, by their own presuppositions. If there is any deeper problem than either sets for us, it is the difference in the problem they see for us. No effort is made in this dissertation to resolve the split. But we may at least hope that something of the difference between them is increasingly sensed at fundamental points. More than this, as an effort to understand two comprehensive "systems" of philosophy, was and is not intended. But we have already in part fulfilled the aim to discover how freedom, progress, peace, happiness, and generosity for men, for their ideas, and in their lives are to be achieved. To fulfill this aim further, we turn to the bearing of identical, similar, and analogous considerations in the realm of "social action."
A. Dewey

1. A History of Western Philosophy (Russell), pp. 823-824.

2. "Same" is, however, ambiguous. When we touched upon "re-qualifying in Chapter II, it developed that "same" could apply only with reference to some time prior to an interaction of any kind or to a number of further interactions, an original existence being already and object. We need not go into detail on this here. The more general concern is that the materials which set inquiry also enter into the termination of inquiry; that they be, in modified form, the materials of the resolved situation. The "givens" of the problem are thus the "givens" of the resolution.

3. Philosophy and Civilization, p. 76. There is no reference here to "reality." Were one forthcoming, we could surmise it to refer to that "interrelated and self-manifesting whole" which "includes an appearance." We are, still, less concerned with finding what word goes where than with conceptions presented. The suggestion that "reality" may attach to the "unified whole" is simply a matter of moving ahead in relation to Russell's comments, attempting to gain insight into his meanings and Dewey within a possible identity of terminology. Actually, in the reply to Hocking (see ante p. ), Dewey presents a meaning for "real" and "reality" related to inquiry but not quite that just suggested. We may, however, hold to the distinction between "ordered" and "disordered" using "reality" to cover the former and "appearance" to cover the latter. We may then turn to further consideration of the question at hand; the notion that some Hegelian metaphysic underlies Dewey's theories or, at least, that some notion of "organism" underlies them.

4. When Dewey says there is "of course a physical world that exists independently of the organism," he affirms his "realism." But he also affirms his "empiricism" in doubtfulness about the nature of that world apart from experience(s). But when he emancipated empiricism from attention to the world beyond our experience of it, he affirms his pragmatism. There is wholesale abandonment of the concern with this epistemological problem of traditional empiricism and rationalism.


6. Ibid., pp. 219-250.


8. Beyond that there is a question mark. It may be that the "interactional" or "transactional" process is one that proceeds according to some laws of the universe, whatever the particular or individual situation is; but, if this is the case, Dewey does not suggest it.
9. How the bifurcation of nature occurred initially was suggested for us in Dewey's exposition of the conflict between "positivistic" and "traditional" areas of "knowledge."

10. Nothing is more fundamental, to this writer's mind, than that Dewey has been misread, not read, and misunderstood or misconstrued at many points simply because of certain fundamental notions expressed in Essays in Experimental Logic and Experience and Nature.


14. Thus Russell, in turning to consider the "human being," may say what Santayana once said: "...In Dewey, as in current science and ethics, there is a pervasive quasi-Hegelian tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions, as well as everything substantial and actual into something relative and transitional...." (Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 827.) It is a curious affair that one believing in the substantial and actual could fear or suspect a philosopher capable of "dissolving" it into anything. This, however, may be but a case of playing with words. The comment stands as an outlook, self-contradictory or not.


B. Russell

16. Problems of Men (Dewey), p. 348. This obviously is set in a context of concern with "indeterminate situations," the italicizing emphasizing that "we are doubtful because the situation is doubtful." We are part of the situation, and while there is a locus of feeling, this is quite different, in a quite specific sense, from a personal doubt or a personal doubter.

17. Ibid., p. 351


22. Philosophy, p. 298.

23. A History of Western Philosophy, p. xiii.

24. Ibid., p. xiv.

25. Ibid., p. 836.


27. No doubt "forms of energy" means simply converting mechanical energy into electrical energy, etc. The language used in Dewey's final sentence tends to perpetuate the notion repudiated.
I have before me a comment by a reader, Dr. Hullfish. The comment is as follows: "You do have to satisfy the situation Dewey creates by his emphasis upon the 'conditions, prescribed by the problem' (the situation). If this is ignored by Russell, where does he turn; and, in view of his criticisms of Dewey, where does he seem to turn?" As I understand Russell, I do not doubt that he requires fulfillment of conditions. In fact, determination of the fact and nature of events is definitely a condition, the fulfillment of which leads to factual grounding of inferences and involves the elimination of subjective factors of desire, bias, etc. It is critical to the control of, cooperation with, and adjustment to conditions. This makes the chief epistemological problem and a philosophic position one of critical attention to the possible presuppositions of the predictive and inferential elements in life. "Causal laws," "causal lines," and "principles of inference" are of basic concern and nature in Russell's position. There is, then, satisfaction of the conditions, the determination of existence of events. In the last analysis, there is connection between events, this connection being, in the beginning, inarticulate—a "propensity" for inferring. At a later stage, however, mankind becomes articulate, expressing the connections. There are "reactions" in the presence of sensible stimuli, at either the earlier or later stages of mankind's development. The following passages indicate the kind of "satisfaction of conditions" position common in Russell:

...An idea is or involves (I will not argue which) an impulse to a certain kind of action. When the impulse is uninhibited, the idea is "believed"; when inhibited, the idea is merely "entertained."

In the former case we may call the idea "active," in the latter "suspended." Error is only connected with active ideas. Thus there is error when a subjective sign produces an active idea, although there is no such sequence between the sign and the object of the idea.

...An organism O has an "idea" of a kind of object B when its action is appropriate to B, although no object of the kind B is sensibly present. This, however, requires some limitation. An "idea" need not produce all the reactions what would be produced by the object; this is what we mean by saying that an idea may be faint, or not vividly imagined. Thus we shall say that the idea of B is present to O whenever O shows some reaction appropriate to B and to nothing else.
We can now say that A is a sign of B when A causes the "idea" of B.

We have used the word "appropriate," and this word needs further definition. It must not be defined teleologically, as "useful to the organism" or what not. The reaction "appropriate" to B is primarily the reaction caused by the sensible presence of B, independently of acquired habits. " (HKSL, pp. 184-185). He later remarks that the ultimate "evidence for any scientific law consists of particular facts, together with...principles of scientific inference..." (p. 189).

It will be noted that there may be several reactions appropriate to B, only one (or several) appropriate to B and to nothing else being the determinant of the presence of an idea of B. This, then, is toward an atomistic condition, so to speak. There is, of course, not much likelihood that we respond to just one thing at a given time, but this only means that we may respond to A and B when only one or the other is present. That is, in a combination of reactions, when both A and B are present, either one may cause the reaction appropriate to both. In fact, something of this kind is involved in semantic difficulties. For example, one may use the word "doubt" over a period of time in conversations with others with the explicit observation that Dewey's notion of "doubt" is what is intended, i.e., the whole of the position or "indeterminate situation," etc., may be "present" at the moment of the use of the word. However, one may later use the word "doubt" in Russell's terms, shifting to matters of "our knowledge of the external world," etc. Other conversants, unaware of the shift, respond to the word (A) as if connected with Dewey (B). They respond to something as if it were there. When the prior association operates thus, it is "subjective"—A is "subjective sign," causing the idea of B. It is "objective"—A is "objective sign"—when there is B. Whether or not B is present is a matter of concern. There may be a "breakdown" of the sufficiency of "habit." The presence of the "presupposed" is critical, then. We respond to what the thing in question is supposed to point to. We infer from events to other events. If there is such an event as one supposedly points to, that is one thing. If there is not, that is another. We may let prior association reign; the "idea"
is then "believed." It may be inhibited; the "idea" is then "entertained." We need, then, to be critical of the inferences we make, to see if there is not some reason which makes the connections supposed more likely dependent upon the past than upon the present. "There is error when a bird flies against a pane of glass which it does not see. We all, like the bird, entertain rash beliefs which may, if erroneous, lead to painful shocks. Scientific method, I suggest, consists mainly in eliminating those beliefs which there is positive reason to think a source of shocks, while retaining those against which no definite argument can be brought." (p. 185)

In light of these remarks, it seems that a failure to fulfill conditions leads to "shocks," so to speak. It is not, however, clear that Russell has "conditions prescribed by the problem (situation)" in mind. "Problem" is not much mentioned in Russell. We may surmise, in light of the heavy emphasis upon and concern with the inferential, that if there is a "problematic situation," the inferential element in life is problematic. There is reliance upon particular facts. A situation may be indeterminate or it may not be. There is, in either case, a problem of inferring. There is, in either case, a dependency upon supposed events, this area of supposition being in question. Russell, then, seems definitely to provide adequately for doubt without having to move to an indeterminate world, in whole or in any part, at any point or time. Further, there is no need to cut the organism off from the world. Pursuit of him relative to "conditions" to be satisfied, doubt about existence of certain inferred events, etc., leads to "personal" as a clear-cut notion only in the sense that our experiences vary, that we inhabit diverse portions of the world, and that we develop into critical, articulate, reflective human beings, just as, for Dewey, ideas may come to be functional. That is, there is the pre-scientific and the scientific in each position. Once Dewey has come upon the operational status of ideas, that status is sufficient, while Russell maintains orientation to the presence or absence of believed in events, the human being becoming reflectively critical, analytical, in attention to the inferrings it does, aware of its presuppositions, and has developed an enterprise (science) that gives it knowledge of the world upon which it depends. At this point of "inquiry"
and "reflection," there is no difference between the supposition of persons inquiring and the supposition of persons reflecting. The difference is between one for whom "facts" are constituents of indeterminate (and, as factually described, problematic) situations and one who, on the other hand, terms fundamental the determination of the particular facts upon which successful inference, and the achievement, in the last analysis, of principles of inference.

33. *Analysis of Mind*, pp. 74-75.

34. I do not know that Russell has basically modified the position expressed in these passages from *Analysis of Mind*. Discussions in the Schilpp volume turn upon this writing, and Russell's comments are not addressed to his theory of desire where he replies to and for those who discuss desire in that volume. What seems clear is that the organism remains for Russell a "basic unit," although the notion that physiology is reducible ultimately to the laws of physics clearly points to the fact that the organism is not isolated from the rest of the world. This matter could have connection with the nature of desire. Whether desire is basically physiological is not perfectly clear to the writer. If this shows up (as it seems not likely to) as a major matter, it will have to be considered. In any event, the discussion proceeds from *Analysis of Mind*, though it has been in part checked against "desire," as this is mentioned in *Human Knowledge*.

35. Ibid., p. 68. There is, it may be noticed, reference to "conversion" here. There is sometimes "conversion" of a terminal state into the impetus for the action which terminates in the achievement of that state. An outcome is converted into a cause. This is not, however, to be confused with conversion of an outcome into an antecedent reality, or conversion of a trait of experience into Reality. Reflection amounts to establishment of connection between events, in Russell (as when animal inference becomes scientific inference), and the determination of connection might possibly give the impression of antecedent "consciousness" of the terminal state, i.e., of the cessation of discomfort, the fulfillment of desire.

36. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

37. Ibid., p. 72.

38. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

39. Ibid., p. 74.

PART III

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION

Whereas in the preceding two parts attention focused almost exclusively upon affairs and problems having little setting in a social context, the following chapters turn directly to the meaning of some assertions in connection with social theory and events.

Selection of Hegelian-Marxian theory as a focal point of certain more critical concerns appearing in preceding chapters is based upon several considerations. In the first place, Marxism obviously has been a moving force in the world. Also, Marx was indebted to Hegel. Furthermore, Russell and Dewey find in Marxian theory the conditions of dictatorship and totalitarianism. The principles of objection to the doctrine do not apply to it alone, of course, and in this sense the selection of Marxism as a focal point for the bearing of concepts upon social theory is arbitrary. The wide attention given at the present time puts selection on a less arbitrary basis. The selection thus serves a dual purpose. It enables us to focus attention upon a critical doctrine of our age, and it enables us to examine the bases taken by Dewey and Russell to be those of the use of force and violence and establishment of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.

Analysis in the "Concerns" is rendered especially difficult in Russell's case because of the fact that the grounds of rejection are highly varied. The grounds are more "clean-cut" in Dewey's case, on the other hand, yet even here some difficulties are encountered. In each case, however, it will be seen that the roots
of difficult lie in the Hegelian philosophy, Russell considering
the Marxian doctrine the heir to a kind of vicious evolution theory
begun by Hegel. Russell also, as might be expected, objects to the
fact that the philosophy of Marx is rooted, in the class conflict
angle, in hatred of one group for another or, if not rooted in
this, reaps this in focusing upon class consciousness. There is
another pair of objections, however. The one of the pair centers
upon the utter disregard for fact exhibited by Russian propagandists.
The external world becomes almost purely a symbol of an inner state
of the country or, rather, those who administer the society. The
other of the pair focuses upon the conviction of "cosmic destiny"
and is closely related to the evolution doctrine mentioned above.
There is a direct connection, I think, between this and the limita-
tions of "self" that accrue to adhesion to a dogmatic and narrow
direction and directing of human life. It is Russell's opinion
that Marx could have dropped the "Hegelian trappings to advantage."
The fact is, of course, that Marx did not, and there is more or
less general agreement that the source of difficulties lies in the
adhering to and use of the "trappings."

Dewey seems not to have written much that is directly an
analysis of Marxism. His interest in the developments in Russia,
from the outset through to recent years, however, is well known.
He was skeptical of the issue of the efforts, though he was
sympathetic to the social orientation of justice and alleviation
of human misery and backwardness that "motivated" the movement. His criticisms of Marxism turn upon its isolation of a single factor as the determinant of all others and also upon the failure to utilize a theory in a "research function" manner, i.e., to aid in the location of difficulties, of problems to be dealt with, etc. Instead of so using Hegel, Marx fell (or his followers fell, certainly, and Marx seems clearly to have preceded them) into the pit of taking the Hegelian framework virtually in toto, giving it the same "ontic status" that Hegelians had given it. It was taken as descriptive of the world, not as functional in the understanding of the world and providing directions for experimental resolution of the difficulties discovered and articulated by means of the theoretical framework. The counterpart of Hegelian nationalism seems to be the Marxian class orientation. Furthermore, the Hegelian notion of an Absolute Experience requires, as much in Marxism as in Hegelianism, a "fixing" in advance of the pattern of things, of experience. It demands the arrangement of a hierarchy of social classes. It fixes boundaries in advance, precludes the recognition of conditions as problems. Perhaps the most basic point of criticism to be found in Dewey's analysis of Marxism is that of the "conversion" of a factor of culture into the regulator of culture, of the total context, of all other aspects of culture.

After the above considerations have come to the fore more fully and explicitly, we turn to discussion of Dewey and Russell in a more positive vein. That is to say, we consider each of them in
light of positive recommendations, in which their basic concepts serve as positive bases of movement beyond and away from the conditions they jointly deplore. Once more the "autonomy of inquiry" and the "pursuit of truth" develop as of basic, permeative, and, in fact, "supreme" concerns. Each recognizes that unless the disposition to accept the challenge of difficult times and to turn one's self to expansion and enrichment of life are present, there is little hope that the world will get beyond the conditions it presumably deplores.

It is in the course of discussion that the rift relative to the generalization of the scientific method appears. This rift and the difference in positions with respect to it is not done the justice it deserves. The broad outlines of the split are presented, however, and attention to what has previously been said and what is to come in the immediately following pages will lead the reader to see what is at issue. Briefly put, the issue seems clearly to be one as to whether "value" is so subjective, so private and personal, that it cannot be brought under scientific observation. For Dewey, for example the alternative to critical and scientific scrutiny of attitudes, say, in what they portent in interaction under and with varying conditions, is the simple "having whatever desires, attitudes, and feelings" one "happens to have." In short, a life of "drift" is possible only as one ignores the consequences of action predicted upon feelings. There is no guard against or provision on behalf of circumstances. Unless the consequences,
together with the "participative factors" of the situation, are examined, there is no "knowledge" of situations. There is, thus, only drift. Changed conditions demand a re-examination of one's attitudes, for example, since one is living in a different environment from that under which the "performed disposition" was acquired.

Russell, on the other hand, would not be found to deal with the problem of desires and values, attitudes and feelings, in the same way. There is concern with the fulfillment of desires, of course, and there is movement away from present conditions of social injustice. But for Russell the source of difficulty lies less in the absence of a satisfactory scientific-method-application approach than in the narrowing dispositions and influences of life. That one's actions affect others is maintained, but the notion is that all should realize their desires if they do not interfere with the desires of others. What is needed is moderation in the realization of one's desires. What is needed is a shift from attitudes of hostility to those of love, of generosity, of warmth toward other human beings. There is a sense, however, in which Russell may hold forth a "science of ethics and value." Where ethical and value statements or attitudes have an objective referrent, the determination of the existence of the referrent is critical. The "habit of careful truth-telling" is one that is significantly believed in by Russell at this point. By a process of translating normative statements (should statements) into the factual pre-
suppositions, there is possible a resolution of some conflicts of this normative kind. (1) One does not rest with factual pre-suppositions but has to determine the existence or non-existence of the facts presupposed in the statement. Or, if one desires (or thinks he desires) a certain state of affairs, one may "translate" this into the kinds of conditions which would enable the state of affairs to exist and thus ground one's desires in factual conditions. Largely, however, much of life is based upon persuasion, for Russell, for there are many matters of deep ethical concern, closely or fully related to theological and non-theological religious speculations, where definite knowledge does not exist and where there seems little hope, in the immediate future or in the future at all, of gaining definite answers. It is one thing to be "reasonable" in the face of our uncertainty with respect to these concerns, and it is quite another to allow them to govern scientific theory, to govern beliefs as to the nature of the world.

Whatever their differences with respect to a "science of value" or to the resolution of social conflict through the generalization of scientific inquiry, Russell and Dewey both look to a "harmonizing" of desires. That is to say, both look to generosity with respect to the desires that other persons have, neither one allowing exclusive domination of others by one or the many by the few. Russell refers to the chief social problem of our time as being one of finding the amount of social organization that is compatible with the greatest possible amount of individual initiative. Dewey, on the other hand,
seeks the "more inclusive activity." These are not identical concerns, yet it is obviously the case that each man has the "release and maturation" of human beings at heart. Each is determined not to let subjective factors go unchallenged. Each has his own way of handling this concern.
"Power" is a familiar concept to those who read Russell. Sometimes it seems the only basic concept. There is a "sense of humanity" (as Russell himself calls it) in A Free Man's Worship. This stems from the realization of the ease with which mankind's highest hopes and aspirations may be reduced to nothing by the whoosh and sweep of an impersonal reality. There is always, in Russell's soberer moments, an acknowledgement of the limits of our knowledge, our understandings and our abilities. He finds in Dewey at times a disposition that seems to rest upon success of man's abilities to control the universe and bend it to his ends. The following is illustrative.

...Dr. Dewey's world, it seems to me, is one in which human beings occupy the imagination; the cosmos of astronomy, though of course acknowledged to exist, is at most times ignored. His philosophy is a power philosophy, though not, like Nietzsche's, a philosophy of individual power; it is the power of the community that is felt to be valuable. It is this element of social power that seems to me to make the philosophy of instrumentalism attractive to those who are more impressed by our new control over natural forces than by the limitations to which that control is still subject. (2)

And he wrote, a little later in the same volume, in the same connection, that he feels a grave danger.

...the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of "truth" as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of
the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated
the necessary element of humility. When this check
upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the
road towards a certain kind of madness—the intoxica-
tion of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and
to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are
prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the
greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy
which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is
increasing the danger of vast social disaster. (3)
The skepticism of the existence of an external world seems passed,
though "truth" as Russell takes it is a concept. Even as he attacks
seemingly and purportedly ambitious philosophies, he seems not to
asser the existence of an external world. Perhaps belief in a
world of facts "largely outside human control" is only belief, having
a certain pragmatic value of serving as a caution and a challenge to
inquiring human beings. Yet is must be admitted that in the following
there is at points more than speculation at hand.

The reality of what is independent of my own will
is embodied, in philosophy, in the conception of "truth."
The truth of my beliefs, in the view of common sense,
does not depend, in most cases, upon anything that I
can do. It is true that if I believe I shall eat my
breakfast tomorrow, my belief, if true, is so partly in
virtue of my own future volitions; but if I believe that
Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March, what makes my
belief true lies wholly outside the power of my will.
Philosophies inspired by love of power find this
situation unpleasant, and therefore set to work, in
various ways, to undermine the common sense conception
of facts as the sources of truth or falsehood in beliefs.
Hegelians maintain that the truth does not consist in
agreement with fact, but in the mutual consistency of
the whole system of our beliefs. All your beliefs are
true if, like the events in a good novel, they all fit
together; there is, in fact, no difference between truth
for the novelist and truth for the historian. This
gives freedom to creative fancy, which it liberates from
the shackles of the supposed "real" world.
And, with this observation, he puts forward the view that

The love of power is a part of normal human nature, but power philosophies are, in a certain precise sense, insane. The existence of the external world, both of matter and that of other human beings, is a datum, which may be humiliating to a certain kind of pride, but can only be denied by a madman. Men who allow their love of power to give them a distorted view of the world are to be found in every asylum: one man will think he is Governor of the Bank of England, another will think he is the King, and yet another will think he is God. Highly similar delusions, if expressed by educated men in obscure language, lead to professorships of philosophy; and if expressed by emotional men in eloquent language, lead to dictatorships. Certified lunatics are shut up because of their proneness to violence when their pretensions are questioned; the uncertified variety are given the control of powerful armies, and can inflict death and disaster upon all sane men within their reach. The success of insanity, in literature, in philosophy, and in politics, is one of the peculiarities of our age. And the successful form of insanity proceeds almost entirely from impulses towards power. (4)

Prior to the above, Russell observes that "human life, being a perpetual interaction between volition and uncontrollable facts, the philosopher who is guided by his power-impulses seeks to minimize or decry the part played by facts that are not the result of our own will." (pp. 254-255)

The contention that the "existence of the external world, both that of matter and that of other human beings, is a datum, which may be humiliating to a certain kind of pride, but can only be denied by a madman" is far from the skepticism expressed in the question of knowing the existence of anything other than our own hard data. Why the shift? What is it that has brought about the change? Why not conclude in favor of solipsism?
Let us begin with solipsism. When Fichte maintains that everything starts from the ego, the reader does not say: "everything starts from Johann Gottlieb Fichte! How absurd! Why, I never heard of him till a few days ago. And how about all the times before he was born? Does he really imagine that he invented them? What ridiculous deceit!" This, I repeat, is what the reader does not say; he substitutes himself for Fichte, and finds the argument not implausible. "After all," he thinks, "what do I know of past times? Only that I have had certain experiences which I chose to interpret as related to a period before I was born. And what do I know of places I have never seen? Only that I have seen them on the map, have read of them or have heard tell of them. I know only my own experience; the rest is doubtful inference. If I choose to put myself in the place of God, and say that the world is my creation, nothing can prove to me that I am mistaken." Fichte maintains that there is only Fichte, and John Smith, reading the argument, concludes that there is only John Smith, without ever noticing that this is not what Fichte says.

In this way it is possible for solipsism to become the basis for a certain kind of social life. A collection of lunatics, each of whom thinks he is God, may learn to behave politely to one another. But the politeness will only last as long as each God finds his omnipotence not thwarted by any of the other divinities. "I am Wotan!" says Hitler. "I am Dialectical Materialism!" says Stalin. And since the claim of each is supported by vast resources in the way of armies, airplanes, poison gases, and innocent enthusiasts, the madness of both remains unnoticed.

It is as if men had taken only half the mystic's experience, resting in the dwelling upon an "inward passion" giving the feeling that the "soul seems, in utter loneliness, to bring forth, out of its own depths, the mad dance of fantastic phantoms which have hitherto appeared as independently real and living."

A situation such as Russell describes would be bad at best. Under the present conditions of man's destructive know-how, any solipsism is a luxury "therapy" we can ill afford. An H-Bomb, feelingly
called "Lulu" and "city killer," reportedly has been exploded, destroying a mile-wide island. Some scientists say they don’t know what the ThirdWorld War will be like, but if it comes, they predict, the Fourth will be fought with clubs. Even were no such destruction to ensue, still little is to be hoped for from solipsism but the enslavement of mankind under the rule of the powerful.

...And when one of the two contestants have achieved victory, he will have to keep proving his right to the title of hero by continuing in power. In order to do this, he must create a vigorous secret police; he will live in fear of assassination, everyone else will be terrified of deletion, and the cult of heroism will end by producing a nation of trembling poltroons. (6)

Insist that the world be a creation of will, and one becomes ingenious in persuading others that it is as one wills—if one has the power. Secondary desire, too, involves action and may "induce" a real desire, fostering the activities that lead to its realization. In a sense, all other forms of "power" may be considered instruments of the all-embracing lunacy of solipsism. It is possible to create in the minds of persons, especially the young, a picture of the world congenial to the purpose of those who master the techniques required. This we know and acknowledge daily by our references to "brain washing" and "brain re-washing."

Thus is established, in a general way, a connection of concern for the external world and social conditions and problems. Solipsism may be defined as "taking as a principle of living the practice of seeing through the distorting medium of desire." It is underwritten by an urge to power. We turn directly to Hegel and Marx, not assuming
necessarily that these embrace solipsism except in the sense suggested by Russell when Stalin presumably remarks: "I am Dialectical Materialism." Russell means that Stalin "is" the full personification of the process, from formula to progress, of the universe. He is the Absolute manifesting itself in the direction and dictates issuing from him. Two threads of concern difficult to disentangle from each other appear in the analysis of this social concern we have entered into. The one involves imputing of certain purposes, traits and characteristics to the cosmos. The other involves the "vehicle" of "agent" through which this process is to be realized.

Thus, a philosophic orientation, carried over into one realm from another, may have effects as disastrous in the second as in the first. This happened where Hegel's theory was put to work where "men really live, move, and have their being." The theory of the dialectic, with all the notion of "evolution" toward an ideal state and ultimate synthesis, carries on its work in the economic life. Commitment to the general position entails the rise of the "solipsistic effect," the rise of the treatment of the external world as symbolic, not as really seen in its own terms. The world is made a creation of the will. The minds of men are controllable, and their actions can be predicated upon and be successful in spite of the inaccuracy and outright reversal of the "facts of the case."
A State can be built, can operate, upon a careful disregard for fact. Where a view is held of some external world, it may indulge in careful disregard for those facts incompatible with the prime view, the end it stands for. It becomes necessary to drop an "iron curtain," keeping the world of actual facts from taking effect in the lives of men dependent upon others for their sources of information or to regulate the effect of the imputed or the actual facts. Orwell's 1984 admirably illustrates such conditions and the same suggestion of a "solipsist" approach is present in the following quotation from Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority:

There is a very natural tendency in the West to interpret...accusations and denunciations as nothing but political rhetoric. There is abundant evidence that the particular charges made in the trials of the Old Bolsheviks, of sabotaging the railway system, of putting glass in the butter, or of espionage for foreign intelligence services, were palpably untrue. But what Stalin (or Vishinsky, in the trials) is saying is that those who are not totally for us are totally against us. The accident that they have not committed the particular extreme act which is used illustratively in accusing them is irrelevant.... American spokesmen waste their energies in getting angry at the inaccuracies of Soviet accusations and spend heat and time in denying and disproving particular points. When a Soviet speaker in the United Nations accuses the United States of particular acts of espionage, warmongering, etc., he is saying, in effect: We are at present classifying you as a total enemy who is, if serious, undoubtedly doing, or should be doing, everything in your power against us; as we, when we classify you as a total enemy, are doing everything in our power against you. If this is recognized, the accusations can be taken as a catalogue of the hostile acts which the Soviet Union is either engaged in, or wishes us to think it is engaged in, or wishes it were able to execute.... (7)
The Soviet "external world" is but a kind of agglomerate or conglomerate of emanations governed by The Line. We may, of course, push this point of "solipsism" beyond all bounds of reason. It must be remembered that in these last passages we are considering the operation of the totalitarian state from within. The enslaving effects are upon those within the scope of control, though it seems true, of course, as the footnote suggests, that the move to enslavement is improved with the techniques of persuasion and charges that exhibit the direction of doctrinal development and which thus move to the gaining of adherents. The move is always such as to create a desired picture of the world or of certain portions of it, a picture conducive to the goal intended. That some success is possible is clear.

Since so much of the critical present stems from Hegel, we turn to fuller analysis of Hegel's position as Russell sees it. (8) The most basic point is that we should be skeptical about embodiment of the ethical in the processes of the universe. Throughout, the carry-over from Hegel is especially of interest. Russell observes, in his history of philosophy, that

Marx fitted his philosophy of history into a mold suggested by Hegelian dialectic, but in fact there was only one triad that concerned him: feudalism, represented by the landowner; capitalism, represented by the industrial employer; and Socialism, represented by the wage earner. Hegel thought of nations as vehicles of dialectic movement; Marx substituted classes.... (9)

This is only another way of saying that while Hegel, in viewing history, saw "behind every rampart of history" an animating idea,
a cultural determinant, defining principle, or animating force, Marx rather saw in history "modes of living," self-expression. There are "animating principles," then, in either instance. Russell continues:

.... (Marx) disclaimed always all ethical or humanitarian reasons for preferring Socialism or taking the side of the wage-earner; he maintained, not that this side was ethically better, but that it was the side taken by the dialectic in its wholly deterministic movement. He might have said that he did not advocate Socialism, but only prophesied it. This, however, would not have been wholly true. He undoubtedly believed every dialectical movement to be, in some impersonal sense, a progress, and he certainly held that Socialism, once established, would minister to human happiness more than either feudalism or capitalism have done. These beliefs, though they must have controlled his life, remained largely in the background so far as his writings are concerned. Occasionally, however, he abandons calm prophecy for vigorous exhortation to rebellion, and the emotional basis of his ostensibly scientific prognostications is implicit in all he wrote. (10)

And, certainly, there was more than a tinge of call to rebellion in the Marxian orientation.

It must be admitted...there are certain respects in which the rationalism of Marx is subject to limitations. Although he holds that his interpretation of the trend of development is true, and will be born out by events, he believes that the argument will only appeal (apart from rare exceptions) to those whose class interest is in agreement with it. He hopes for little from persuasion, everything from the class war. He is thus committed in practice to power politics, and to the doctrine of a master class; though not of a master race. It is true that, as a result of the social revolution, the division of classes is expected to disappear ultimately, giving place to complete political and economic harmony. But this is a distant ideal, like the Second Coming; in the meantime, there is war and dictatorship, and insistence upon ideological orthodoxy. (11)
There is doubt, apparently, as to the value of the Hegelian framework to Marx, even though it seems perfectly clear that the dialectic is highly significant in the entire orientation. It provided an "animus," contained the "activistic" orientation and put an increasingly important and prevalent portion of mankind in a movement of cosmic "destiny." This is what Russell seems to mean by suggesting that Marx might have dropped, "with advantage," the Hegelian trappings.

Perhaps the philosophic dress that Marx gave to his Socialism had really not much to do with the basis of his opinions. It is easy to restate the most important part of what he had to say without any reference to the dialectic. He was impressed by the appalling cruelty of the industrial system as it existed in England a hundred years ago, which he came thoroughly to know through Engels and the reports of Royal Commissions. He saw that the system was likely to develop from free competition towards monopoly, and that its injustice must produce a movement of revolt in the proletariat. He held that, in a thoroughly industrialized community, the only alternative to private capitalism is State ownership of land and capital. None of these propositions are matters of philosophy, and I shall therefore not consider their truth or falsehood. The point is, that if true, they suffice to establish what is practically important in his system. The Hegelian trappings might therefore be dropped with advantage. (12)

But Marx did not drop the "Hegelian trappings," and their disadvantages accrued to subsequent developments. Two disadvantages have been mentioned in the above. There is the "disadvantage" of a belief in cosmic destiny, in the dialectical movement toward some grand "higher synthesis." (13) Closely related to this disadvantage is the necessity for "vehicles" through which the dialectic movement
expresses itself.

For Hegel, the vehicles were nations, there being behind the ramparts of history animating ideas, the simple factual recounting of empires by "empirical" historians notwithstanding. For Marx, on the other hand, "classes" were the supposed vehicles, though the process is not so readily grasped in the dialectic terms as it is in Hegel. We need not enter into detailed discussion of the two positions, except to consider some parts of Hegel by way of noting the "justification" of war, of struggle.

In quoting Hegel, Russell remarks as follows:

"Reason," Hegel says, "is the conscious certainty of being all reality." This does not mean that a separate person is all reality; in his separateness he is not quite real, but what is real in him is his participation in Reality as a whole. In proportion as we become more rational, this participation is increased. (14)

Any movement toward discreteness, some "ultimate independence" or in any event, movement or attention to the particular, becomes a "selfness" and "toward-self" orientation. It is what may be called a lack of "social realism" in Party terms. It is, in any event, a lack of social intelligence—in either Hegelian or Communist terminology. In the sweep of history, nations are the vehicles.

....History is merely an incessant struggle between States of the past and those of the future....The ideal State is everywhere and nowhere; everywhere, because it tends to realize itself in historical states; nowhere, for as an ideal, it is a problem to be solved by the future. History is the progressive solution of the political problem. Every nation adds its stone to the building of the ideal State, but each people has also its original sin, which brings it into opposition with idea, and sooner or later encompasses its ruin. Each
State represents the ideal from a certain side; none realizes it in its fullness; none, therefore, is immortal. Like the logical notions, which are absorbed by a more powerful rival, and by virtue of the same law, the nations, one after another, succumb to each other, and transmit to their successors, in a more developed and enlarged form, the political idea of which they have been the depositaries, the civilization of which they have been guardians. (15)

And from Russell the following:

Duty being, for Hegel, solely a relation of the individual to his State, no principle is left by which to moralize the relations between States. This Hegel recognizes. In external relations, he says, the State is an individual, and each State is independent against the others. 'Since in this independence the being-for-self of real spirit has its existence, it is the first freedom and highest honor of a people.' He goes on to argue against any sort of League of Nations by which the independence of separate States might be limited. The duty of a citizen is entirely confined (so far as external relations of his State are concerned) to upholding the substantial individuality and independence of and sovereignty of his own State. It follows that war is not wholly evil, or something that we should seek to abolish. The purpose of the State is not merely to uphold the life and property of the citizens, and this fact provides the moral justification of war, which is not to be regarded as an absolute evil or as accidental, or as having its cause in something that ought not to be.

Hegel does not mean only that, in some situations, a nation cannot rightly avoid going to war. He means much more than this. ....War, he says, is the condition in which we take seriously the vanity of temporal goods and things.... War has positive moral value: 'War has the higher significance that through it the moral health of peoples is preserved in their indifference towards the stabilizing of finite determinations.' (16)

There is no one-to-one correspondence between Hegel and Marx, apparently. For while in Hegel there are nations that have no idea, that have lost their raison d'être, and that are thus "dead" to history, it seems that in Marx the very group to be the "vehicle"
of the movement of history is one that has no "humanity." It is the group that "has nothing to lose but its chains." This is at one and the same time the source of transition and the expression of the disposition of landed groups to maintain the "finite determinations." "Class consciousness" replaces the consciousness of nationalism, loyalty to class replaces loyalty to State. Intensification of class consciousness facilitates development of the higher synthesis. The areas of religious, political, and of "cultural" character generally, are a "battleground" for the waging of economic class-war. Rather, the economic struggle is reflected in the cultural areas, being resolvable only in the transformation of the economic arrangements.

It is difficult to understand how class hatred could fail to arise under the conditions of the Marxian orientation, and it is difficult to understand how national hatred for other nations could fail to arise under the conditions of the Hegelian orientation. Whether or not hatred is a factor, it seems assured that a full understanding, a full intellectualization of the Hegelian framework, either on a national or a class basis, would serve to generate some enthusiasm in the adherents of either. Nothing more brutal, more immoral, more dastardly in its deeds can be discovered than a group whose dominance is fated by the dialectics of the universe—in the face of all those who are of "poor mental health," who seek the "stabilization of the finite determinations," who lack "social realism," "social intelligence." This is as true, of course, of political
the conventions where clergymen invoke God and politicians inform Him as it is of any other event in human life where there is belief in the sanctioning of one's preferences by the universe. It is not clear, of course, that Hegel left military might as the arbiter or right and wrong, good and bad. On the contrary, there was much culturally at stake in the conflict, but it is clear that the challenge to combat is present, just as is the challenge to combat present in the class struggle.

Men become devilishly ingenious in the imparting of their prejudices to others. We have devised shrewd and effective methods of inculcating choices in others, and have created ways of making them impotent where we fail to captivate them completely. The final stage in dialectical movement tends to be the ideological captivation of an opponent. It tends to successful conquest only as the ideological animus of physically conquered groups is eradicated. "Brain washing" has become a technique of considerable import. Enslavement of the mind is essential to successful subjugation of the intended subjects. It is possible so to fix conceptions, of course, that only tragedy follows upon the impact of untoward and unusual conditions upon those conceptions. It is possible so to fix them, also, that untoward and unusual, novel conditions have no effect upon them. This is "suppression." We become increasingly skilled in the suppression of the untoward and unusual, and as we do so, the effects of the "brain washing" and increased.
There are definite subtleties underlying the impact of either an Hegelian or an Hegelian-Marxian orientation in its appeal to mankind. When Russell spoke of the readers of Fichte he noted that the particularism of the philosopher was laid aside, the broad general conception substituted, and into this empty form the particularism of the person doing the reading was poured. But whatever the processes by which one person's particularism is substituted for another's, there seems little doubt but that the notion of a cosmic evolution, of a cosmic dialectic, whether in terms of nations or classes, reaches an emotional peak in those who have some special and inward passion upon which they dwell. It may well be, indeed, that in manifestation of Hegelianism there is explicit truth of the notion that men turn to the embodiment of the hopes, aspirations, and ideals in the nature of the cosmos. Perhaps, then, this philosophic orientation is but the acquiescence to the insistence of desire, giving it outlet in the destiny of the world. Some distortion of Hegel seems necessary to reach this conclusion, although it is one clearly suggested as an appropriate conclusion from what we have encountered in Russell.

The Hegelian position is a power position, precisely in its supposition of cosmic dialectic and destiny. The assurance of victory rests upon the instrumentalities of power, and men today have developed these to the fullest extent ever developed. It is not accident or whim that leads Russell to renounce and to repudiate the Italian "pragmatist," Papini, who urges the cessation of the imitation of Christ and the assumption of the imitation of God.
B. Dewey

Here, as in the preceding, attention is upon Hegel and Marx, and also, of course, upon the foundations of totalitarianism, the matter to be discussed in the succeeding portion of this chapter. Actually analyses of the sources of the outcome of totalitarianism are so varied as to be disconcerting to one interested in the fact of their existence. Yet both Russell and Dewey trace the character of the Communist state to a common origin: somewhere in the thinking of Hegel, and most assuredly in the character of the period in which Hegel developed the influential concept of the Dialectic and which saw increasing attention to organicism—a "monistic" and "monolithic" bent set in opposition to pluralism.

In Freedom and Culture one finds what is apparently the only extensive discussion Dewey has engaged in relative to Marxianism. He has been charged varyingly with a lack of scholarship relative to Marxian doctrine and with considerable acute insight and analysis into its basic evils and weaknesses. In the first chapter of the writing just mentioned, Dewey states the central question which, as we shall shortly see, is the question as to whether the scientific hopes of the early part of the preceding century or the scientific tenor of the present era shall prevail.

Is there any one factor or phase of culture which is dominant, or which tends to produce and regulate others, or are economics, art, science, and so on only so many aspects of the interaction of a number of factors, each of which acts upon and is acted upon by the others? In the professional language of philosophy: shall our point of view be monistic or pluralistic? (17)
"Monism," then is taken to signify rendering absolute some one aspect of human culture. This kind of "cultural" monism is apparently a counterpart of the "logical" monism involved in a "violent separation" of experience into the complete, ordered, and systematized, and and the partial, the disordered, fragmentary. There is emphasis upon the former as the "truly real" or "true reality." It is a matter of committing a fallacy of conversion. Some one aspect of the total cultural scene has been selected from that total and has been converted into the pattern for the rest. Just as idealistic logic converted the issue of inquiry as a settled, ordered whole, in abstracting the logical trait of coherence and (converting it into) the model for experience, converting it into the character of Reality, so in Marxism there is selection of the economic processes with development and conversion of these into the regulator of all other aspects of human life. This "simple conversion" is not to be confused, however, with the conception of an "absolute goal." It is not to be confused with either the selection of and preference for an absolute goal or the belief in the issue of processes in an absolute goal. This latter has a somewhat different import. The Hegelian conversion, closer in kind to Marxism, is selection of the cultural. But let us turn directly to Dewey's writing.

...Criticism is not aimed at denying the role of economic factors in society but aims to show what happens when this factor is isolate and treated as the cause of all social change.
Marxist isolation of one factor... takes the form of holding that the state of the forces of economic productivity at a given time ultimately determines all forms of social activities and relations, political, legal, scientific, artistic, religious, moral.... (18)

Dewey suggests that what captured the imaginations of men was the "scientific" aspect of the doctrine presented by Marx. After observing that "social movements that have a new direction are accompanied by simplifications," Dewey notes, as a point of definite appeal to "those who accept it in its extreme form," that the Marxian doctrine combines with the romantic idealism of earlier social evolutionaries what purports to be a thoroughly "objective" scientific analysis, expressed in formulation of a single all-embracing law, a law which, moreover, sets forth the proper method to be followed by the oppressed economic class in achieving its final liberation. For the view went far beyond presenting a point of view to be employed in historical and sociological investigations. It claimed to state the one and only law in accordance with which economic relations determine the course of social change. This law is that of the existence of economic classes which are economically determined, which are engaged in constant warfare with one another, the outcome of which is direction of social change toward the liberation of producers from the bonds which have kept them subjugated in the past. Final creation of a classless society is to be the outcome. (19)
The law was not scientific, if by that is meant something derived from direct observation and investigation from study of historical events. It was, rather, 

... derived from Hegelian dialectic metaphysics....

Marx converted dialectic idealism into dialectic materialism—where the dialectic of conflict as the means of ultimate union and harmony is preserved, while the moving forces are economic classes, not ideas....

But the law was scientific if by that is meant the notions which were dominant and governing at the time both Hegel and Marx were developing. Especially as it referred to a law, Marxism was scientific.

In lieu of one type of romantic absolutism, Marxian doctrine developed another type more in harmony with the prestige which science and scientific law were gaining. It was a wonderful intellectual achievement to formulate laws for all social phenomena; it was still more wonderful to set forth one law working with absolute necessity, grasp of which enabled men to observe the "contradictions" in existing bourgeois capitalism, while it indicated with certainty the goal to which the contradictions by their own dialectic were carrying society. The law of history became the law for revolutionary society. The law of history became the law for revolutionary action: — and all was accomplished that can be possibly accomplished in behalf of a clear vision of a goal and the concentration of emotion and energy in its behalf.

The idea of causal necessity in social phenomena... [was] ... in the intellectual atmosphere a century ago... Kant had taught that the idea of causal necessity is a prerequisite for natural science... Hume's criticism of the idea of necessity was unwelcome... because of association with skepticism.

In almost every quarter attempts were made to create a science of social phenomena, for which undertaking the idea of necessary law was deemed indispensable....
There was a period in Germany when Hegel's philosophy was so dominant that all important differences were those between wings of the Hegelian school. All of these circumstances put together, it is not surprising that Marx saw in the Hegelian dialectic, a principle which, when it was given economic interpretation, provided a sure basis for a science of social changes, while at the same time it furnished the revolutionary movement as supreme directive for its practical activities. (20)

The totalitarian character of Soviet Russia is directly traceable to these traits in their complex interweaving and inter-support. We shall return later to consideration of the "touchstone law," while for the moment we examine somewhat more carefully the nature of the "method" or, rather, the "law," which occasions the "method" of class struggle.

It may be wondered how and why a particular class should be chosen as the class ultimately to gain supremacy, to be given preferred rank, at least, over certain or all other classes. No answer to this is given by Dewey in Freedom and Culture. That is, there is no clear-cut statement as to what occasioned the establishment of a "hierarchy" of classes. There is a hint only. Furthermore, no special concern or attention is given the fact that in Marxian doctrine one class is the vehicle for the dialectic at the "present time." There seem understandable reasons for the selection of the particular class when one reads Marx at this point. It is generally agreed, however, that a hierarchy was established, and Dewey gives an Hegelian background for the establishment, noting in Democracy and Education that since
Hegel was haunted by the conception of an absolute goal, he was obliged to arrange institutions as they concretely exist, on a stepladder of ascending approximations. Each in its time and place is absolutely necessary, because a stage in the self-realizing process of the absolute mind. Taken as such a step or stage, its existence is proof of its complete rationality, for it is an integral element in the total...Against institutions as they are, individuals have no spiritual rights; personal development, and nurture, consist in obedient assimilation of the existing institutions. Conformity, not transformation, is the essence of education. Institutions change, as history shows; but their change, the rise and fall of states, is the work of the "world-spirit." Individuals, save the great "heroes" who are the chosen organs of the world-spirit, have no share or lot in it.... (21)

The effect of the absolute goal, then, is the arranging of economic classes in their proper places in the past, present, and process. That is, this is the effect if claims advanced are to make good in experience. The fact that each group (whether national or economic) is a stage or integral part in the development of the whole preserves its value, its rationality. It is given a feeling of "pride," if you will, a feeling of belonging to the cosmic process, while it has at the same time to be recognized that the particular class is but a stage, a point. What follows after the present is necessarily a higher stage in the process, since it is in that stage that the "contradictions" are to move to resolution. There has to be some vehicle for the expression of this development, and while Hegel settled for Germany—for probably no small number of nationalistic reasons and prejudices—Marx settled for the urban worker class, and yet it was in Russia that action took place!—
for probably a number of reasons, many of them humanitarian in character. In any event, the groups were such as to embrace and epitomize the transformations.

... According to the theory, the members of the agricultural class, as far as they own land, belong to the bourgeoisie, although of the "petty" subdivision. Only factory workers, congregated in cities, belong to the proletariat. By theory, then, class war exists between city workers and most of the rural population. There is a genuine psychological and political problem involved in getting these two groups of human beings together for common action. But the wholesale or monistic character of the theoretical premise prevents exploration of the problem as a problem. It is settled in advance that the class conflict is of such a nature that success of the revolutionary movement is bound up with domination of the urban wage worker over the rural population.

Another example is the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country at a time when the state of forces of production is international.... The all-or-none theory led in Russia to a complete political break-up in the formation of two completely hostile factions within the original Communist Party. Negotiations, compromise, working out of a policy on the basis of the study of actual conditions was ruled out in advance.... The most effective way of proving (the point of those who won out) was to behead all those who took a contrary view as traitors and counter-revolutionaries. (22)

Dewey offers about as basic and concise a statement of the Theory of class was as one could hope to find. He points to the economic determinism of Marxism, in relation to the "scientific" tenor of the nineteenth century, noting, of course, that the cultural areas are but reflections, are but the economic life become conscious of itself. It is then pointed out that the practical technique derived involves an intensification of the class war in as great a
variety of ways and on as many occasions as is possible.

...For the essence of the theory, according to the dialectical method, is not recognition of class conflict as facts—in which respect is provided a needed correction of early nineteenth century notions of universal harmony and universal interdependence. Its distinguishing trait is that social progress is made by intensifying the conflict between the capitalistic employing classes and the proletarian employed class....

The physical analogy is about like this: suppose that there has been a theory that "nature abhors friction." It is then discovered that no mechanical work is done without resistance, and that there is no resistance without friction. It is then concluded that by abolishing lubrication and magnifying friction, a state of universal friction will, by its own inner dialectic, result in an adjustment of energies to one another which will provide the best possible conditions for doing useful work....The idea of obtaining universal harmony by the greatest possible intensification of conflicts would remain analogous to the physical illustration given.... (23)

It is perhaps in this that ultimately a dictatorship is involved, since the essential need is for one who believes himself to be a manifestation of the cosmic process to gain control of the situation. The dictatorship may seem to be in direct contradiction to what the theory points to. It would seem to be enough to intensify the conflicts at as many points as possible in order to let the cosmic process develop. But since it is known in advance that a particular class is to be supreme, etc., that a particular state of affairs is to prevail, the "short-cut" approach seems appropriate. It is a priori that the development will be such-and-such. Actual revolution and maintenance of control is taken as the appropriate approach. All suppressions of "individuality" accrue
to the "monolithic structure" of the theory.

...A monistic theory is accompanied in its practical execution by one-party control of press, schools, radio, the theater, and every means of communication, even to effective restrictions on private gatherings and private conversations....

...This suppression of freedom of belief and of speech press and assembly is not among the facts about Soviet Russia in dispute for it is of the essence of the dictatorship which in turn is of the essence of the doctrine the Revolution claims to have put in force.... (24)

The control of things will be always in the interests of consistency with the movement of the "dialectic." Whatever is to be judged is to be judged and directed in the interest of the "assured" issue of the process. A lack of "social realism" will be the charge against the persons and groups which show tendencies to deviate from the Line. It is thus, no doubt, that the germ warfare charges, the charges against "counter-revolutionaries," the kinds of charges mentioned in the quotation from Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, are expressive of the "real" facts, i.e., they stand in the position of "as ifs," being a kind of "convenient fiction."

Reports from Korea concerning the conduct of communist prisoners of war are full of the descriptions of a "favorite game" of the prisoners called "thwarting the Americans." It consists in doing everything possible to keep opposition from being in any way effective. Actually, the "all or none" character means that whatever cannot be used in the carrying on the development to which there is total commitment will be considered an obstacle. No
more. Neutrality is impossible. We need not, however, dwell upon these matters. We will do better to continue consideration of the character of the Marxian background ideologically considered. Some interesting insights are prof erred by Dewey that are readily seen to be related to the concerns advanced in part when we considered the impact of the positivistic element upon established social customs.

For example, it will be recalled that in Chapter II, reliance for fundamental insight into Dewey's stand on "desire" and metaphysics was upon Reconstruction in Philosophy. It will also be recalled that the chief conflict of ancient Greece was seen to be that between the developing positivistic approach and the customary, the traditional. It was observed that perhaps the only resolution of the conflict possible was the bifurcation of nature which eventuated, philosophy taking precedence over science in the way of dealing with Reality, thus reducing science to dealing with "appearance." But, it was said, the weight of "habit," "custom," etc., was so great and so pervasive it was perhaps natural that the scientific element should also aim at some comprehensive understanding. The pervasiveness of the customary reacted in such a way as to foster the notion of some "comprehensive" understanding. A dualism was almost inevitable. In our present discussion, however, there is less emphasis by Dewey upon the pervasive character of tradition than upon gaining "prestige."
When natural science was first struggling to achieve its independence, and later when an attempt was made to take social phenomena out of the domain of arbitrary free-will, those who wanted to promote the new struggles borrowed from dominant theology the idea which the latter had made familiar, that of a single-all-embracing causal force. The nature of the force and the way it worked were radically altered in the new apologetics for science. But the requirements of habit were satisfied in maintaining the old forms of thought—just as the first horseless carriages kept the shape of the carriages they displaced. The void left by surrender first of a supernatural force, and then of Nature (which replaced Deity during the periods of Deistic rationalism) are thus made good. Only gradually did the work of science and the specific conclusions it reached make clear that science was not a competitor with theology for a single ultimate explanation, so that the justification was no longer resorted to.

The surrender does not mean that search for broad generalizations has been given up. It means that the nature and function of these generalizations have changed. They are now, in effect and function, formulae for effecting transformations from one field to another, the qualitative difference of the fields being maintained. The doctrine of the conservation of energy represents, for example, an exceedingly comprehensive generalization. In terms of the now discarded philosophy of science, it would be said to set up a force which is at once electrical, mechanical, thermal, etc., and yet none of them, but a kind of non-descript thing-in-itself back of all of them. In actual scientific procedure, it is a formula for converting any one of these forms of energy into any other, provided certain conditions are satisfied. (25)

Thus the criticism turns upon, once more, the selection of some one factor in accordance with which the character of all other aspects of human life develops, this one factor serving the purpose once served by "substance," i. e., the explanation of phenomena in terms of some multi-manifest "thing." The reader of Dewey's Logic will soon discover that scientific theories are not to be taken as
descriptive of existential materials, i.e., are not taken in an ontological context. In general terms they are just what the "law of conservation of energy" is—a formula for converting situations, for transforming situations. They are understood as sufficiently set forth when stated in these terms. They are "rules" of procedure, of operations, according to which specifiable consequences accrue as a result of the operations performed. They are this in instances of completed or terminated inquiry. They become formulated and thus become "rules." In the instances where inquiry has not been terminated but is anticipated or in progress, the theories are instrumental in a different sense. In these instances they are suggestions which, when used to govern operations of inquiry, aid in the determination of the conditions and the operations governing and participating in the inquiry itself.

The failure to consider theories in their function as aids to observation and investigation leads to one of two consequences. Either the theories become involved in the epistemological-ontological context of controversy, being questioned as to their "factual descriptiveness," so to speak, or they are taken unquestioningly as descriptive and become on their face the warrant for the operations in human life that are in accord with them. The Marxian use of the Hegelian orientation, the dialectic of cosmic movement, especially, was a use that was non-instrumental, being governed by a switch of attention from the "mental" to the "material." The unquestioned supremacy of Hegelianism in the field of philosophic thought, coupled
with the "scientific prestige" concern Dewey mentioned, conspired to produce a dialectical determinism, the economic factor being the regulator of all other aspects.

Deweyian criticism of rationalistic idealism has been mentioned in connection with a plurality of problematic situations. It was observed that rationalistic idealism unwarrantedly generalized traits and postulates of inquiry, in a plurality of problematic situations, to the universe as a whole. This is but another way of saying that a fallacy of conversion has been committed. When this criticism is coupled with that of the notion of a substance, the "destruction" of Hegelian-Marxian doctrine is completed. The notion of "substance" is taken by Dewey to have derived from the conversion of a "logical function of being a sign" into something that is "inherently the same."

One puzzling matter relative to polemic has yet to be explored more fully. There is some difficulty for the writer in Dewey's criticism of the economic determinism of Marxian theory. The difficulty is not in the notion of a single-all-embracing law. It is rather with the notion of "interaction" as advanced by Dewey as an alternative. Presumably Dewey takes Marxian doctrine to hold that no ideological or cultural changes may occur unless the economic conditions are first transformed. At least this would seem to be the only way in which "economics" as regulators of the cultural would be sensibly regulators. Let us requote the passage with which this
Is there one factor or phase of culture which is dominant, or which tends to produce and regulate others, or are economics, morals, art, science, and so on only so many aspects of the interaction of a number of factors, each of which acts upon and is acted upon by others? In the professional language of philosophy: shall our point of view be monistic or pluralistic?

More specifically Dewey comes to the point in:

...Marxism systematically neglects everything on the side of human nature with respect to its being a factor having efficacy, save as it is previously determined by the state of the forces of production. In claiming to replace Utopian socialism, Marxism throws out psychological as well as moral considerations. Whether the theory is in fact able to live up to this claim—without which its "materialism" is meaningless—is another matter. For it would seem that certain organic needs and appetites at least were required to set the "forces of production" moving. But if this bio-physiological factor is admitted, then it must interest with "external factors," and there is no particular point at which its operation can be said to cease.

The point involved has a practical as well as theoretical force...

The fact is that Marx and every Marxist after his unconsciously assumes the existence and operation of factors in the constitution of human nature which must co-operate with "external" economic or "material" conditions in producing what actually happens. Explicit recognition of these factors would give the theory a different practical slant. It would have put the things emphasized by Marx in a different perspective....(26)

It must be concluded that Dewey addresses himself in this to the notion that human beings, in Marxian terms, are limited by the "environment," I. e., are subject to that environment. This is its "environmentalist-materialist" aspect. Human beings are subject to and molded by external conditions. They are literally shaped and confined by those conditions. The Deweyian position,
on the other hand, would be that the other factors mentioned (organic needs and appetites) would be factors in the interaction. That is, they would be in participative state as far as the nature of the economic conditions are concerned. Just as breathing is as much a matter of air as it is of lungs, so economics is as much a matter of organism as it is of external conditions. The shift to inclusion of the efficacy of the organism, of human nature, does set affairs in a different perspective. It takes attention away from an obsession with the modification of external conditions and turns to release of an imprisoned organism, and it puts the nature of the organism and the "mode of interaction" into the picture. This properly puts the organism, in part, at least, in a position of control, since its modes of interaction are in some measure governable. It also requires that the conceptions of the organism that are held by governed by inquiry into that organism, not by a political or philosophical theory.

If the shift is made, Dewey, it must be said, has set a very difficult and stimulating problem. That is not to say that the notion advanced in the following is peculiar to his polemic relative to Marxianism. For that is not the case. The application to Marxianism of a principle repeatedly advanced in other connections is, however, unusual, since Dewey has not devoted much time to Marx. At any rate, the perspective change is one which would result in our seeing that the human problem is

...that of securing the development of each constituent so that it serves to release and mature the other... (27)
Or, to put it in slightly different terms, the

...problem is to find out the way in which the elements of culture interact with each other and the way in which the elements of human nature are caused to interact with one another under conditions set by their interaction with the existing environment. (28)

Dewey was once quoted to the effect that the world is a "wall, a map, and a vehicle." When "world" takes into account the organism, this phrase admirably expresses the problem mentioned, putting it in terms of the "stages" of inquiry, practically considered. There is a fundamental indeterminism in Dewey, of course. This seems incontrovertible in light of all that we have seen of his thinking on this point. His is not a rampant "free will" theory. There is no supposition of an "agent" that manipulates the environment at will, repudiates it when he cannot, considers our inability to manipulate it due to our ignorance, etc. It is impossible in this portion of our inquiry to give an elaborate exposition to the meaning of "will," etc. We may, however, recall the passage quoted earlier relative to indeterminism.

...A world that is at points and times indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and to give play to choice to shape its future is a world in which will is free, not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable, but because deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors.

It is not pretended that these pages have done more than set Dewey forward in his polemic upon Marxianism, showing at the same time certain aspects of his criticism of Hegel. The products of the use of the Hegelian system and the pseudo-scientific notion of
a single-all-embracing causal law conspired to produce tragedy in the human scene, for the various reasons mentioned. We have been interested primarily, in these pages, with setting forth the "Concerns." The presentation, as in past chapters, has been largely in terms of the negative. It remains now to consider Russell and Dewey in relationship to their common enemy and to each other.
(Chapter V Notes)

A. Russell


2. A History of Western Philosophy, p. 827.

3. Ibid., pp. 827-328.


Perhaps some peculiar or, at least, particular, meaning for "datum" keeps the statement from a "demonstration" of the existence of the external world. In no place, however, does Russell either consider the existence or non-existence of such a world demonstrated. Speculatively, relative to our knowledge of that world, skepticism may be prevalent and appropriate, but this is the world as a something believed in, something as a matter of knowledge of it. It would appear that where action is involved, the existence of that external world is indubitable. It hardly seems possible that "external," as used in the above passages, refers to what is simply "outside our perception of ourselves." It means much more than that.

5. Ibid., pp. 259-260.


7. Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, Margaret Mead, p. 414.

The passage continues with the following observation: "Answering speeches can be directed to the issue in dispute, while specific denials of charges can be made for the benefit of those other peoples who, like ourselves, think it necessary to deny false charges from any national group, with which they are not actively at war. Such denials are, of course, exceedingly important in countering Soviet Anti-American propaganda outside the Soviet Union."

8. There is no attempt at an extensive commentary upon the critiques. Our task is to present concerns, not an overview of Russell's position. Some of the following passages will compare aspects of Marx with those of Hegel, while others are addressed to the separate positions and emphases. Connections are sometimes unambiguous, sometimes not. Nonetheless, dominant emphases are present. Since Dewey and Russell have both had important things to say about the Marxian-Hegelian alliance; since the present age is one of struggle and tension, of the balance of freedom on the sharp edge of wildfire orthodoxy and power, it seems inescapable that an inquiry into the nature and philosophic foundations of freedom should explore, however sketchily, an outstanding abandonment of the sanity of a life of freedom.


10. Ibid., p. 790.

11. Ibid., p. 790.

12. Ibid., p. 734.
13. Dr. Hullfish writes: "Synthesis need not imply a terminous; if one remains with the dialectic, is not the notion of terminous odd?"

It is not odd of one does not "implement." That is, it is virtually required by the task of "placing" or of "assigning" the stages and thus the representative institutions, nations, etc. To "make good" in experience, specification is required. Conviction of specification leads to "closure" or to terminus, whether or not the terminus is actualized. For example, Dewey remarks in a quotation following in the text that "the law of history became the law for revolutionary action; — and all was accomplished that can possibly be accomplished in behalf of a clear vision of a goal and a concentration of emotion and energy in its behalf."

14. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

B. Dewey

17. Freedom and Culture, p. 16.
18, 19. Ibid., 77-79. One may wonder if there is not, in the reference to the view going "far beyond presenting a point of view to be employed in historical and sociological investigations," a clearly stated outcome of Dewey's inquiry. The instrumentalism element is present here, reacting to the use of a "metaphysical theory" (Hegel) as a description of Reality. Dewey, however, confines his remarks above to his reference to the "economic." He would seem to have taken only the special character of the Marxian concern instead of the theoretical framework provided by Hegel. If this is the case, he could be objecting to an economic theory being taken as more than instrumental in the service of inquiry. The distinction thus provided, however, is not apparently of significance. For it seems to make little difference to criticism whether one focuses upon Marx taking Hegel instrumentally or whether one considers Marx after he takes Hegel, focusing then upon the failure of Marxian followers to take the theory "Hegel-Marx" instrumentally in the context of inquiry. So much, however, is in part apart from consideration of the "scientific" character of the doctrine.

20. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
23. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
24. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
25. Ibid., pp. 84-85. In its fight to be recognized, then, science long after Ancient Greece, was still battling the "entrenched" customary, the "monistic" or the pervasive, as Dewey mentioned it.
26. Ibid., pp. 88-100.
27. Ibid., p. 22.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

A. Dewey

"Power" is defined by Russell as "the production of intended effects." Since Hegel and Marx consider struggle essential to the working of the dialectic, their doctrines may be construed as a manifestation of power urges. What for them is essential in the cosmic process—what is the very vehicle for, on the one hand, the preservation of "mental health" by human "indifference toward the stabilization of finite determinations" (Hegel), and, on the other hand, the very medium through which a classless society is to emerge (Marx)—is for Russell the very rationale of the urge to or love of power. Quite apart from the fact that development of the instrumentalities of power ("arbitrament of the big battalions"—atomic and hydrogen equipped ones, today) has made it madness to maintain war as "preservation of mental health," the urge to and love of power are repudiated—with qualifications. Discussion of the qualifications may wait while attention is given to power in relation to Dewey's philosophy. Dewey is not explicitly considered a Communist by Russell in the sense of state ownership of the means of production and distribution of goods, but there are repudiations of theory at points of "power" concerns.

The following quotation is from The Impact of Science On Society by Russell:
...Science used to be valued as a means of getting to know the world; now, owing to the triumph of technique, it is conceived as showing how to change the world. The new point of view, which is adopted in practice throughout America and Russia and in theory by many modern philosophers, was first proclaimed by Marx in 1845, in his Theses On Feuerbach. He says:

The question whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question of theory, but a practical question. The truth, i.e., the reality and power, of thought must be demonstrated in practice. The contest as to the reality or non-reality of a thought which is isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question....Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it. From the point of view of technical philosophy, this theory has been best developed by John Dewey, who is universally acknowledged as America's most eminent philosopher.

And:

...Most men's desires are of various kinds. There are the pleasures of sense; there are aesthetic pleasures and pleasures of contemplation; there are private affections; and there is power. In an individual, any one of these may acquire predominance over the others. If love of power dominates, you arrive at Marx's view that what is important is not to understand the world, but to change it.... (1)

There is need to consider the interpretation expressed and implied in the foregoing remarks, especially as there is any possibility that some "arbitrament of the big battalions" ensues, however unwittingly, from the Deweyian orientation. Is it in its own way a kind of rationale, an opening of a door to, surge of the urge to or love of power? Does it succumb to the "desire to produce intended effects"? Does it terminate, practically, in a "might-makes-right" ethic?
Dewey undoubtedly urges inquiry into the efficacy of "elements of human"nature." He has also maintained the notion of efficacy as against the environmentalist-determinist orientation, setting it sharply against such a position as Hegelian-Marxian theory presents. Nor is there any doubt that Dewey considers theories in light of their function in inquiry, for we have already seen that relative to the role of desire in judgment of theoretical affairs, he seems to urge the abandonment of the ontological context as a remedy for the excessive pressure of desire, preferences, tradition. The abandonment of that context is critical, of course, but the function-in-inquiry alternative is not confined, exactly, to "scientific theory" in history. Whether the abandonment of the context does itself remove a check upon human "impetuosity" and human "love of power" is a basic question. It is such, not on the supposition that beliefs and concepts function as expressions and limitations of moderation and humility, necessarily, but it is a basic question where inquiry is centered upon the place and function of philosophic concepts and assumptions in securing peace, moderacy, humility and freedom. The dissertation is such an inquiry, and present concerns thus are related to both general and specific concerns as set forth in the Introduction.

Whatever else may be said of Russell's criticisms of Deweyian philosophy for its supposed emphasis upon and conscious or unconscious glorification of power, it may be doubted that Russell has paid much attention to the notion of power as developed by
Dewey and that he has perhaps especially overlooked some respects in which he and Dewey agree basically on ethical ends appropriate to the present stage of man's technological development. On the other hand, consideration of some passages from Dewey suggests ground upon which one may take pragmatism as a philosophy that "considers itself more virile" than the metaphysically hopeful "schoolmen" who sought peace in a world as "neat as a Dutch Interior."

We have already, in the final portion of Part I, encountered Dewey's aspiration toward causal efficacy on the part of "human deliberation and choice." The present pages are in part a development of this concern, in conjunction with other theoretical postulates, aspirations, and interpretations, more directly in terms of the meaning of "power" and the notion of efficacy and control, specifically in connection with social behaviors.

The following quotation is from Human Nature and Conduct, and it sets forth rather succinctly the stand Dewey has, in general, taken and maintained relative to human beings and their development and problems. The discussion of "power," then, is set directly in relation to other persons, and it is thus of basic value to us in our present concerns.

....The reduction of all impulses to forms of self-love is worth investigation because it gives an opportunity to say something about self as an ongoing process. The doctrine itself is faded, its advocates belated. The notion is too tame to appeal to a generation that has experienced romanticism and has been intoxicated by imbibing from the streams of power released by the industrial revolution. The fashionable unification of today goes by the name of the will to power.
In the beginning, this is hardly more than a name for a quality of all activity. Every fulfilled activity terminates in added control of conditions, in an art of administering objects. Execution, satisfaction, realization, fulfillment are all names for the fact that an activity implies an accomplishment which is possible only by subduing circumstance to serve as an accomplice of achievement. Each impulse or habit is thus a will to its own power. To say this is to clothe a truism in a figure. It says that anger or fear or love or hate is successful when it effects some change outside the organism which measures its force and registers its efficiency. The achieved outcome marks the difference between action and a cooped-up sentiment which is expended upon itself. The eye hungers for light, the ear for sound, the hand for surfaces, the arm for things to reach, throw and lift, the leg for distance, anger for an enemy to destroy, curiosity for something to shiver and cower before, love for a mate. Each impulse is a demand for an object which will enable it to function. Denied an object in reality it tends to create one in fancy, as pathology shows.

So far we have no generalized will to power, but only the inherent pressure of every activity for an adequate manifestation. It is not so much a demand for power as a search for an opportunity already existing. If opportunities corresponded to the need, a desire for power would hardly arise: power would be used and satisfaction would accrue. But impulse is balked. If conditions are right for an educative growth, the snubbed impulse will be "sublimated." That is, it will become a contributory factor in some more inclusive and complex activity, in which it is reduced to a subordinate yet effectual place. Sometimes, however, frustration dams activity up, and intensifies it. A longing for satisfaction at any cost is engendered. And when social conditions are such that the path of least resistance lies through subjugation of the energies of others, the will to power bursts through into flower.

This psychology is naive but it is truer to facts than the supposition that there exists by itself as a separate and original thing a will to power. For it indicates that the real fact is some existing power which demands outlet, and which becomes self-conscious only when it is too weak to overcome obstacles....(2)
And in *Freedom and Culture* there is the following:

It would be hard to find a better illustration than Plato of the fact that any movement purporting to discover the psychological causes and sources of social phenomena is in fact a reverse movement, in which current social tendencies are read back into the structure of human nature; and are then used to explain the very things from which they are deduced. Something of the same kind exists at present when love or power is put forward to play the role taken a century ago by self-interest as the dominant "motive"—and if I put the word motive in quotation marks, it is for the reason just mentioned. What are called motives turn out upon critical examination to be complex attitudes patterned, under cultural conditions, rather than simple elements in human nature. (3)

There are two significant portions of the above remarks. The one is exhibited in both quotations, while the other, more nearly a confirmation of the doctrine of "changing the world" as over against that of "understanding the world," is exhibited in the first alone. What is implicit in each passage is a charge of conversion. There is suggested a conversion of an outcome of an interaction situation into a cause of the situation itself. The move to power—the outcome—being converted into a "drive" of the organism. A "trait of experience" is converted into a constituent of the organism, just as, so Dewey contends, Plato reasoned from the nature of the social order to the elements of human nature, converting the social scene into elements of human nature which were then taken to have produced the social order. (4)

In terms of the first passage quoted, the conversion is one of the issue of a prior interaction, seeking a manifestation, into some "inherent" trait of the organism. In the case of a power
concern, there is a conversion of the demand of an impulse for adequate manifestation into a desire to manipulate and to subjugate the "energies" of the environment, to bend them to will, to gain their conformity. As a result of interaction with an environment, acquired dispositions, being those of active organisms, seek manifestation, utilization,—a propensity for putting to use and to expression or manifestation what one has "learned." When this trait is noted, it is converted (sometimes) into a generalized notion of a will to power, and it is attributed to the organism as a "motive." There are, however, some shades of meaning present that require a more careful consideration of the first quotation above.

It would seem that any time there is an impulse to manifestation, there is some "power" notion present. However, this is not what Dewey holds. He says that there is no desire for power until there is no opportunity for adequate manifestation of some activity. There is initially some search for an "opportunity already existing." At least, one would suppose that in the interests of "efficiency" or the "path of least resistance," one would first search for opportunities for manifestation of the activity. "What in the present state of affairs provides opportunity for the manifestation?" If, after termination of the search, no conditions are present, then some desire for power may arise. There is the desire for conditions which will enable the manifestation of the impulse. Conditions as they exist, in their very incapacity to permit manifestation, seem
to become obstacles to that manifestation. This way of putting it, however, borders upon the "all-or-none," the "either for us or against us," notion. This does not have to be the interpretation, however. Yet it has to be considered, since it is critical to the power and especially the totalitarian concern.

An earlier quotation pointed to the behavior of an organism that is charged with potentiality, this leading to a converting of the energies of the environment into resistances. The passage is worth re-quoting here. It is from Philosophy and Civilization.

...We will admit...that spontaneity of action describes a peculiar type of action, one which, instead of following the physical principle of equal and opposite reaction, merely diminishes the real efficacy of the influences that it encounters. But even so, we have only a real action, of a peculiar and unusual sort, in this reduction of the efficacy of the objects. If, however, spontaneity mean that the organic act is already charged with potentiality, its manifestation might convert the energy of the environment into a form that would involve the inhibition, for the time being, of its usual mode of efficacy. But suppression through conversion into a different form is a radically different thing from suppression by mere diminution. This latter might, by lowering the resistance that it would otherwise encounter, give a better chance for some subsequent organic activity to express itself, but this would be the limit of its significance. Such a state of affairs would involve no indetermination, and there is no sense in calling the subsequent action a possible action. It is simply the postponed action, bound to occur if the spontaneous action intervenes. It is simply the real future action of which we have spoken. In short, it does not fulfill the conditions for the emergence of the unperceived into the perceived. (5)

It is clear that in the discussions of "power" and of "perception"
as just quoted there is reflected the same basic notion of the "inhibition" of an impulse because of extant environmental conditions. However, one has to be careful in so considering the matter, for the danger lies in imputing the presence of inhibition simply to the fact that extant environmental conditions are what they are. When one does so, environmental determinism is strictly the outcome.

The view then taken is that the organism is not efficacious in the conditions of frustration or of inhibition. It is held simply that it is limited by external factors. It becomes a "creature of fate."

We have seen in the remarks on Marx that Dewey believes there is no point at which interaction, once it is admitted, may be said to cease. It is obviously his notion in the last paragraph quoted above that the organism at the moment of "impact" upon the environment is charged with potentialities, meaning that this charge is a factor in the character of the situation of frustration or inhibition. (6)

If the passage from *Human Nature and Conduct* is examined closely, there seems to be nothing to conclude, but that the "all or none" notion is involved, for there is the clear-cut reference to an activity involving the subduing of circumstance to serve as an accomplice in achievement, and this is the only way (except by accident) that there can be fulfillment. Furthermore, there is the intimation that modes of expression possible under extant conditions are not to be considered sufficient. There seems clearly to be the intimation that the "habitual mode of efficacy" is to be given
expression, that there is to be a "subduing of circumstances."

One apparently does not search extant conditions for what opportunities for activities they provide. One searches for the opportunity for the established potentiality to manifest itself and subdue circumstances where they do not provide that opportunity. Extant conditions that do not provide the opportunity are, in effect, obstacles to the "charge." Yet, it is worth noting, they are obstacles only as there is the potentiality. They are not in and of themselves obstacles. In addition to the external factors, the charged organic act is itself a factor in the situation.

Presumably, since Dewey will hold to the appropriateness and, indeed, apparently to the inevitable and continual efficacy of the organism, one does not modify behavior and attitude to fit the conditions extant. It is an odd conclusion that shapes up, but it seems that the "all-or-none" notion is appropriate when the organism is considered appropriately a factor in conditions' being obstacles. Its very presence converts the conditions of the environment into obstacles accordingly as these do or do not provide opportunity for the manifestation of the organic act. In the long run, however, this puts the individual in conflict with his environment. In the case of the social environment, this means he is in "inter-opposition" with other individuals. "All or none" is generally taken as the notion that what is not with us is against us, and this would lead, one would think, to exclusion of those factors in a situation which most fully inhibit the conditions wanted, i.e., the one enabling
and serving as accomplice in the achievement or manifestation. It leads to the analysis which determines the oppositional, indifference, or positive relevancies of extant conditions, paralyzing the first, passing by the second, and giving a "pat on the back" to the third. One phrase used to express this in social matters comes from a recent writing on ends and means in education. There is call for analysis of the conditions in order to determine the forces opposing the development of certain social conditions with the resulting recommendation that these forces be utilized or paralyzed, accordingly as they do or do not, can or cannot, further the purpose established. Perhaps this is only intelligence operating—in isolation from realizing that there are conflicting purposes in terms of which the objects in question will varyingly appear as indifferent, in opposition, or helpful and sustaining. Where there is associated living, however, the matters become exceedingly complex.

If ideas are instrumentalities in the process of aiding action in the sense of the fulfillment of activity when impulse is balked, if they are instrumentalities for the resolution of a problematic situation of the kind we have been considering, it is difficult to see how they are not to be considered definitely in a "power context." When they arise, i. e., when suggestions or hunches arise, they are used in their function in aiding the resolution of the problem at hand. They are then ideas, considered and examined in their potentiality for "unlocking" and for "releasing" the "dammed up" activity, the transformation of the indeterminate situation into a determinate one. A "theory," then, is considered in its
adequacy with respect to the problem that is at hand, the problem itself being a second stage in the inquiry process. The situation is at first "indeterminate," its problematic character being exhibited when the factors and the relations of those factors are determined—determined in the indeterminateness of their interactive issue. If there is no desire for power, where conditions permit adequate manifestation, then there is no demand for "ideas"—except as these aid in the stabilization of the condition. Where there is no adequate manifestation provided for, then the demand is for ideas that will release the balked impulse. The ideas are aids in "subduing of circumstances." Considered in this light, any kind of human activity, from parent-child relationships to that of the human race in relation to the physical world, may be exhibitive of a power-centered behavior. The conditions are those of a preformed disposition meeting and interacting with a present set of circumstances. What is needed to resolve the problem is to be determined, but the fact remains that the production of intended effects, as far as we can discover thus far, is central. It seems that the real task is to alter the world, not for the sake of alteration, but for the sake of adequate expression, fulfillment.

None of the preceding discussion is brought in from outside the Deweyian writings, of course. Anyone reading Dewey will encounter the passages quoted. He will also encounter the interpretation of ideas in their function of aiding in inquiry, and the discussion relative to desire and metaphysics has already shown the extant to
which certain notions of efficacy are central. It is not insisted—as will presently be discovered—that any "arbitrament of the big battalions" or substitution of "bullets for ballots" will ensue from the acceptance of the Deweyian orientation. But it is obviously clear that the passage we have been reading and considering embodies just the kind of notions which enable thoroughgoing justification of "power" as the appropriate norm of human behavior. If there is a genetic fallacy involved, it should be discovered and corrected. If there is not, then that should also be shown. It is important to know whether Dewey consciously or unconsciously has so emphasized certain matters that he provides a rationale for the kind of "cosmic impiety" and "power-struggle" or "might-makes-right" ethic that is at times charged against him. The preceding discussion occasions no shift of attention from the individual as imposing upon others transformations and sacrifices he is not willing to demand of himself. It can hardly be that Dewey, who ridicules class-conflict method as increasing friction which would "by its inner dialectic" and in harmony, justifies the increase of conflict so that the more skillful manipulator manages the fulfillment of activity, manages to get his ideas accepted, his impulses released. That Dewey harbors such a notion might be the case, but it is not likely.

The notion that Dewey's philosophy leads to the might-makes-right ethic and thus, finally, to the kind of condition that exists in Russia at the present time where "truth" is understood by Russell to mean the beliefs that can be precipitated by effective public
and secret police, seems to be a sound notion until one encounters just that kind of observation we have deliberately ignored for purposes of speculation on sources of misinterpretation and determination of meanings. The observation is:

If conditions are right for an educative growth, the snubbed impulse will be "sublimated." That is, it will become a contributory factor in some more inclusive and complex activity, in which it is reduced to a subordinate yet effectual place.... (7)

The concept of a "more inclusive whole" seems to fit nicely with what is pointed to here. There is clear recommendation that some more inclusive activity is to be engaged in and that the activity be one such that the particular impulse valued, so to speak, be participative, not determinative, except in the sense of being included in the activity sought for. There may arise a question as to whether any such impulse should be included at any given time, but this is another question even though it is one which, as a question of worth and value, has also to be answered relative to and through the examination of, and estimates achieved about, the issue for the particular actual or possible interactive situation at hand.

Where the might-makes-right ethic enters critically is in conditions in which impulses of various persons conflict with the conditions and thus conflict with each other. There are conditions and times when the extant conditions are adequate for some manifestations and not for others. There is a struggle, then, for the balked impulses to gain manifestation, and there is thus a need for
modification of the circumstances so that the impulses now balked may be included. If there are those in power who are able to maintain the conditions conducive to manifestation of their impulses, or who are capable of achieving conditions conducive to manifestation of their impulses, the balked impulses may be so dammed up that there is generated an "end justifies the means" approach, an out and out brutality.

Apparently what is wanted in such a situation, is a disposition on the part of all concerned to provide conditions under which the established and manifest impulses may be maintained but also such that the balked impulses may be included. The activity is to be of a more inclusive nature, and modes of organization and modes of interaction have to be considered in relation to the achievement of this kind of activity. For the need is for the kinds of conditions in which the elements of the situation release and mature each other.

To set this goal removes the simply manipulatory, suppressive, and oppressive notion of "subjugating the energies of others." It suggests that the appropriate conditions are those of inclusion and mutual reinforcement. It is not supposed a priori that this or that class, this or that idea, this or that end, this or that purpose, etc., is to subordinate others to itself or that they are to be sacrificed to it.

The very fact that Dewey refers to the presence of "conditions for an educative growth" is suggestive, for one does not find Dewey referring to anything as "educative" unless it is something that he
takes of paramount value in human life. And it is hardly an accident that the world appears in relation to this "sublimation." The business of reflection is to enable us to project imaginatively conditions in which inclusive activity is possible of realization. Whether this goes hand in hand with some "common end," some "common purpose," is another question of some import. If there is some common end in mind, it seems to be the mentioned: an activity, organization, determination, proposal, planning, etc., in which the protection of a maximum of ends involved in each situation is possible.

In philosophy, for example, Dewey purports to represent a kind of synthesis of prior determinations by philosophers, by philosophic systems. In the underlying concept of "fallacy of conversion," there is the notion of "synthesizing," in the sense that no trait of experience (in Deweyian terms) is to be converted into the pattern of all other traits of experience. The abandonment of the ontological context seems to Dewey, apparently the only way in which the specializations represented by philosophic systems may be utilized in a mutually operative, reinforcing situation and condition. Just as it seemed significant to abandon the ontological context in relation to philosophies, it has seemed important to abandon it in social affairs, for the disputes that turn upon ontological questions tend to ignore the problems extant. But, more than this, the disputes are perhaps all too dialectical—a correlative of the ignoring the historical problems and conditions under which they developed.
Sometimes this ignoring of the historical affairs and conditions of men in their bearing upon philosophic and scientific theories has given an "air of unreality" to the enterprise of philosophy. Sometimes the disputes have been subordinated to special political, economic, or other prejudices and preferences. Philosophy has been an apologetic for vested interests. It has, through its "conversions" and its "disguised preferences and choices," then, served to leave untouched the manipulative and the power-struggle scene of human life. Sometimes philosophic issues don't get resolved. They become unimportant. Sometimes they are the battleground, indeed, of vested interests. Conversions have occurred and resolution of the difficulty with conversion is in making theories stand in their value and function in the course and context of inquiry, the problems to which they are addressed being themselves of import, of course.

It is realized that this is an abrupt shift of attention from a rather intensive consideration of "impulses" and "power" and the "subjugation of energies," etc. Yet the abruptness is not nearly so great as on the surface it may seem to be. Life is an "inquiry situation," so to speak, and this means that the autonomy of inquiry is of fundamental importance in Dewey's philosophic position. It also means that the matters we have been considering are considerations of conditions under which the need for inquiry, i.e., the inception of problematic conditions, occurs. If there is a "power" concept, as control, it does not mean that "controlled and directed trans-
formation" of an "indeterminate situation" into a "determinate one" (the partial general definition of "inquiry") refers to some "agent" that, dictator-wise, sits somewhere pulling the strings of a puppet universe and populace. "Control" is wrongly taken, in Dewey's terms, if taken to mean the latter. It means for him only that hypotheses, that ideas, are present in the conduct of inquiry, in the conduct of life.

Dewey does not view a theory, a concept or a suggestion as something to foist upon others in behalf of what one hopes to gain for one's self. The ideas will function, rather, in the role of "releasing" situations, of opening them up, of gaining access to them, in their problematic character in order to gain insight into their potentialities or, rather, their possibilities. There is no supposition of a unified whole that is antecedent to inquiry and which, realized in the termination of inquiry, is to be patterned after. But there is, in the comments we have encountered both in questions of "desires" and in the present context of discussion, the recommendation of the termination of inquiry in a unified whole. The urge to power "bursts into flower" when conditions do not permit some "educative growth." It bursts into flower when there are not the conditions which enable the perception of the portent of organism and present conditions in their interaction. Learning takes place, if it takes place at all, under these conditions. The scientific method, as exhibiting the best method of inquiry yet achieved, is recommended
in all areas of human life. Inquiry is not subordinate. It is autonomous. There is no more a priori certainty, necessity, immutability to the social claims, aims, ends, and purposes than to canons of logic, scientific theory, or "theories" generally.

It is, of course, the case that problems are objective. That is, there is objective uncertainty, indeterminateness. This is, as we have seen, a matter of the organism in interaction with either an indeterminate or a determinate set of existential conditions. The basic concern is, in either case, the problem as a matter of interaction.

It seems to be true that if conditions are not in and of themselves determinate, there is greater possibility for subduing them, where this means modification of them, in behalf of the more inclusive activity would seem to be related to the character of the constitutive elements of a situation. Modification, existential modification, a preparation of the materials, is one way of moving toward the more inclusive whole. "If conditions were such and such, then perhaps the more inclusive activity could exist." This calls for the possibility, then, of modifying the conditions, of transforming them, of making them other than they are. On the other hand, the determinateness of existential conditions would seem a definite limiting factor upon the achievement of a more inclusive activity. It would still be the case that human choice and deliberation could have a definite and genuine role to play, since activities that are more inclusive would still be in question.
In the first case, there is, in addition to the nature of the
more inclusive activity, the question of what preparations are
possible and needed. It is a question of qualifying the "objects"
extant, of altering them. It is also supposed that the issue of
their involvement (this referring to conditions in-and-of-themselves,
while interaction refers to the organism's operation in connection
with the conditions) is not a necessary one. In the second case,
it is supposed that involvement is a matter of laws. A question
may be asked as to whether the presence or absence of determinateness
of existential conditions in and of themselves makes a difference to
the issue of an interactive situation. There is no personal doubter
in either event for Dewey. If existential conditions are in and of
themselves indeterminate, there may still be interaction with the
existential conditions. If existential conditions are in and of
themselves determinate, there may still be interaction with those
conditions. In short, there is in either case a doubtful situation.

It must be that "points and times" at which the world is in-
determinate enough to call out deliberation and choice are signifi-
cantly those when there is interaction. Dewey's thinking seems,
relative to the determinism or indeterminism of existential conditions,
to be that the character of events apart from interaction with an
organism—the character of them as indeterminate or determinate—is not a question of practical import.

The fundamental matter, relative to power (as production of
intended effects) is not one of imposition of an isolated will upon
conditions. It is one of the perception and achievement of more
inclusive activity. The discovery of the existential conditions, of "things in and of themselves," is a matter of the possible enrichment of human ends, of their expansion, of their transformation in the issue of the problem they are part of. If there is conquest for the purposes of subduing, then this purpose stands as that of the more inclusive, not that of continuous subordination to the momentary, the limited. This is obviously something very different from a might-makes-right ethic. It is obviously, also, not a forsaking of changing the world.

That problems are objective is held as a fundamental notion. That problems are resolvable (see Logic, on Rationalist Idealism) is a "working postulate of scientific procedure" (even though the means of resolution are not available at present) and is fundamental. A lack of faith in the resolvableness or resolvability of problems is an addiction to drift. For this reason, apparently, Dewey holds that the alternative to experimentation is not, "as the dogmatists assert," some fixed conception, but rather is drift. The effort to maintain a fixed point of view ends up in failure to "keep abreast of the times." It results in the isolation of the view from the factual transformations that occur. It thus leaves the practical affairs to the "fortuitous" consequences of unguided or, on the other hand, shrewdly manipulated, engineered, subversively and secretly controlled conditions.

We have come virtually "full circle" on our discussion, moving out directly in relation to the notion of changing things from the
suggestion that the function of ideas, of theories, of hypotheses in their role in "releasing" a situation, of aiding in the accomplishment of changed circumstances is a "power" notion. There are notions repeatedly advanced by Dewey which carry on their surface grounds for the conclusion that there is a commitment of some genetic fallacy. Analyses of the conditions under which a love of and an urge toward power may and do arise could be taken to be a justification of the emergence of the urge and love. But the critical notion of the "conditions of educative growth" prevents the assured development of "love of power."

We have seen, also, the position which holds stringently to the functional interpretation of ideas, and this has not been found to be compatible with the a priori insistence upon their manifestation in social affairs, and it has not, therefore, been found compatible with the simple secret-police state procedures by which some ideas may be made dominant on behalf of fixed ends or in which fixed ends may be made to dominate in such a way that they regulate the ideas. Ideas and ends will function in their dual role of enabling understanding of the possibilities of present interactive conditions and in enabling some direction for experimentation. The "release and maturation" of the interactive elements is what is needed, wanted.

The discussion undertaken here is perhaps best brought to a close with quotations from Dewey's *Logic*. The passages are from the chapter on "Social Inquiry." The first passage sets forth neatly
the repudiation of the subordination of inquiry to the determination of means on behalf of fixed ends. It is thus an outright denial, of course, of the view that holds Dewey to sanction the governing of theory on behalf of desires, etc. Inquiry is autonomous, not subordinate. The good life is intellectual and not prejudicial, supported by happy development of an instrument of power that uses disposition in the cause of a priori notions of the best way of life—to which the instrumentality is then subordinate.

...Any hypothesis as to a social end must include as part of itself the idea of organized association among those who are to execute the operations it formulates and directs.

Evaluative judgments, judgments of better and worse about the means to be employed, material and procedural, are required. The evils in current social judgments of ends and policies arise, as has been said, from importations of judgments of value from outside of inquiry. The evils spring from the fact that the values employed are not determined in and by the process of inquiry; for it is assumed that certain ends have an inherent value so unquestionable that they regulate and validate the means employed, instead of ends being determined on the basis of obstacles-resources. Social inquiry, in order to satisfy the conditions of scientific method, must judge certain objective consequences to be the end which is worth attaining under the given conditions. But, to repeat, this statement does not mean what it is often said to mean: Namely, that ends and values can be assumed outside of scientific inquiry so that the latter is then confined to determination of the means best calculated to arrive at the realization of such values. On the contrary, it means that ends in their capacity of values can be validly determined only on the basis of the tensions, obstructions, and positive potentialities that are found, by controlled observation, to exist in the actual situation. (8)
Then, with respect to "facts" in the realm of social inquiry, Dewey observes them in relation to the matter of ends-as-hypotheses, pointing up, thus, their lack of finality and their functional status.

In social inquiry "facts" may be carefully ascertained and assembled without being understood. They are capable of being ordered or related in the way that constitutes understanding of them only when their bearing is seen, and "bearing" is a matter of connection with consequences. Social phenomena are so interwoven with one another that it is impossible to assign special consequences (and hence bearing and significance) to any given body of facts unless the special consequences are of the latter differentially determined. This differential determination can be affected only by active or "practical" operations conducted according to an idea which is a plan. Social phenomena are not unique in being complexly interwoven with another. All existential events, as existential, are in a similar state. But methods of experimentation and their directive conceptions are now so well established in the case of physical phenomena that vast bodies of facts seem to carry their significance with them almost on their face as soon as they are ascertained. For prior experimental operations have shown what their probable consequences will be under specified conditions to a high degree of accuracy. No such state of affairs exists with reference to social phenomena and facts. A like state of affairs can be brought into existence, even approximately, only as social facts are related together and hence understood, on the basis of their connection with differential consequences that are effected by definite plans of dealing practically with phenomena;—the plans, once more, being hypotheses directive of practical operations, not truths or dogmas. (9)

It is simply wrong to interpret the strictly functional outlook upon ideas, hypotheses (whether in the physical or social realms) as conducive on its face to the development of a power or a might-makes-right ethic. It does not follow that because ends or plans are utilized in the course of concern with facts that they
regulate the factual propositions that are used to guide human life. The relation between hypotheses and facts is not that of coming up with the facts that support the hypothesis, whether or not the "facts" are the facts. To recognize that this propagandistic feat and effort exists is a valuable recognition, leaving us with a question, possibly in any instance, as to what the facts are. The "external world" becomes a symbol of, a means of diagnosing the current Party Line, for example. As was said in Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, one may take the charges issuing from Russians as indicative of current plans, proposals, hopes, and aspirations. The might-makes-right view rests ultimately upon the finality of the ends taken, not upon the presence or absence of concern with facts, unless it be held that the use of an hypothesis to determine the facts is impossible, i.e., unless it be held that the hypothesis itself is a factor in the perception. If this is held, then intelligence is enhanced by the utilization of a wider or larger range of hypotheses, and this hospitality to a wider or larger range of hypotheses is quite the antithesis of commitment a priori to the given end. It is quite the antithesis to power as a notion confined to the service of solid commitment. It is of the essence of intelligent, democratic, and fruitful social relationships, as well as of the happy issue of indeterminate situations, either in the physical or social realm.

The alternative to the utilization of theoretical formulations
in their function of aiding in the conduct of inquiry is that of taking them in some ontological context, of taking either the theoretical or the factual, or the theoretical and the factual, apart from their function in inquiry. The use of "or" and "And" actually marks off to us two alternatives, not appositives. For, to take either the theoretical or the factual in ontological context, i.e., as descriptive of reality, is to leave the other some "convenient fiction," some "expedient." Theories have been taken at times to be such "mental constructs." Russells, for example, has at times so considered them. The alternative, of course, is to guide one's facts by the theories, making the factual symbolic of the theoretical. Where the theoretical and factual are taken as descriptive, certain epistemological problems are developed. The problem need not develop, however, if one rests with the factual simply as a matter of determination of problems and data-for-testing, while the theoretical, the conceptual, functions in aiding the organization and determination, by which experimentation may proceed.

Actually, if some epistemological problems do not develop, there is a prejudging of existential conditions. The Marxian "hypothesis" is not taken in the conduct of inquiry. It is taken as descriptive of conditions. Relative to current social theories, such as "the supposed issue of 'individualism' versus 'collectivism' or 'socialism,'" or the theory that all social phenomena are to be envisaged in terms of the class-conflict of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat," Dewey observes that
from the standpoint of method, such conceptual
generalizations, no matter which one of the opposed
conceptions is adopted, prejudge the characteristic
traits and the kinds of actual phenomena that the
proposed plans of action are to deal with. Hence
the work of analytic observations by which actual
phenomena will be reduced to terms of definite
problems that may be dealt with by means of determinate
specified operations is intrinsically compromised from
the start. The "generalizations" are of the nature of
all-or-none contradictory "truths." Like all such sweeping
universals, they do not delimit the field so as to
determine problems that may be attacked one by one,
but are of such a nature that, from the standpoint of
theory, one theory must be accepted and the other
rejected in toto. (10)

The result is that a state of rigid
alternatives of which one must be accepted and
the other rejected has held in place of a welcoming
of a plurality of hypotheses. The plurality of
alternatives is the effective means of rendering
inquiry more extensive (sufficient) and more flexible,
more capable of taking cognizance of all facts that
are discovered. (11)

Finally, and specifically with respect to power there is the
following:

With respect to social subject-matter in
particular, failure to translate influential con­
ceptions into formulated propositions is especially
harmful. For only explicit formulation stimulates
examination of their meanings in terms of the
consequences to which they lead and promotes
critical comparison of alternative hypotheses. With­
out systematic formulations of ruling ideas, inquiry
is kept in the domain of opinion and action in the
realm of conflict. For ultimately the only logical
alternative to open and above-board propositional
formulation of conceptual alternatives (as many as
possible) is formation of controlling ideas on the
ground of either custom and tradition or some special
interest. The result is dichotomization of a social
field into conservatives and progressives, "reaction­
aire" and "radicals," etc. (12)
The latter passage especially is critical in light of the total emphasis upon the autonomy of inquiry. It is critical also because of this concern with the autonomy of inquiry in relation to the issues of "desire and metaphysics." It seems, indeed, that "autonomy of inquiry" is critical in many respects. It is, therefore, no abandonment of concern with a power concept to consider briefly the passage such as was just quoted. On the contrary, it is to be directly and specifically concerned with that notion.

The terms "reactionary," "radical," "conservative," etc., are applied, as Dewey sees them, precisely when only the social bents, the social preferences, the social habits, customs, and traditions, and human desires, are focused upon. The terms express the very opposite of inquiry concerns. Taking ruling ideas in their explicit formulation is one stage in the abandonment of the useless name-calling that generates heat but no light. But the deeper meaning of the passages is that the ruling ideas have their bases in objective problems. If "symbolic" at all, they are symbolic of problems. Fundamentally, for Dewey, they are not matters of social habit, custom, and tradition. They are rather representative of problems and rather stand as kinds of "prior outcomes" and seek to be that sole determinants. They may be converted into archetypes for the governing of human life. At the basis, this conversion is the conversion of a problem into the problem. Failure to convert is the only way in which progress may be made for the several theoretical formulations may then be seen in their functional
interrelationship with each other, avoiding a power struggle between the adherents of either one or the other of the number of alternatives.

To have extended the notion of the autonomy of inquiry to include social theories is to have confronted the neophyte, such as the writer, with a new dimension relative to Dewey's general position. To some, no doubt, the stand is familiar, yet there are times when writings on and about Dewey seem rather to stem from just the kind of social scene in which the terms already mentioned are the general rule rather than the exception. It may develop, of course, that in the examination of some current social scene, "vested interest" is the applicable term. This is matter for inquiry to determine, not some opposite social prejudice which then engages in a power operation, with all of them apparatus of spying and of secret police.

It is well to recall at this point that Dewey's writing in Knowing and The Known contained the following:

...Whatever relative novelty may be found in my position consists in regarding the problem as belonging to the context of the conduct of inquiry and not in either the traditional ontological or the traditional epistemological context.....

.... Newton had carried his abstraction to a point which was shocking to many of his contemporaries. They felt that it took way the reality which gave point and zest to the affairs of life, moral and esthetic as well as practical in a utilitarian sense. In so doing they made the same mistake that professional philosophers made after them. They treated a use, a function, and service rendered in conduct of inquiry as if it had ontological reference apart from inquiry.

When viewed from the standpoint of its position in the conduct of inquiry, the relativity theory rendered space and time themselves subject matter of inquiry instead of its fixed limits.... (13)
The point of the first paragraph of the latter passage is the injury done when theories are judged ontologically, while the latter refers to taking the "hitch" that occurred where Newton's theory was concerned and using it to develop the theoretical side. Thus, theory and problems have a conjugate relationship to each, and they function in the "release and maturation" of each other.

No more needs to be said on the question that gave us a start into the analysis of some of Dewey's basic notions relative to social affairs. The preceding pages may have seemed to wander in and out of the social field, but in a reading of a philosopher such as Dewey or Russell, this is inevitable. Yet some continuity, some pervasiveness, some fundamentalness of certain basic concepts emerge and develop. It cannot be claimed that the exposition given in these pages forestalls the use of a philosophic position on the behalf of the furthering of some personal prejudice. It cannot be claimed that a reading of Dewey as given exposition here, or as he himself writes at times and places, on its face prevents a notion that his is a rationale of the might-makes-right ethic. He has himself conceptions of the source of a love of power, of an urge to power. He has also, obviously, definite notions as to what precludes the entertainment of alternative hypotheses, and of what, in this way, precludes a reasonable approach to the determination of a unified whole, of a more inclusive activity.

No recapitulation of the dominant threads of analysis and of major concepts is here attempted. What was sought was simply some notion of the way in which fundamental philosophic conceptions
are embodied in social affairs and, specifically, in relation to a prime impact of certain past theorizing. It was not possible here to discuss in detail Dewey's theory of inquiry, in our present emphases and analyses, although certain of his notions are obviously present. Yet we have managed some grasp of the bearing of the most basic concepts. Actually, of course, we have taken a step beyond some matters handled—either in the question of our knowledge of the external world or that on desire and metaphysics. We have come to a point at which the utilization of the scientific method in all areas of life is recommended. This could hardly have been achieved earlier, since the application of the method in these areas seems ultimately to depend upon the theory of philosophy mentioned first in relation to our knowledge of the external world and then in relation to desire and metaphysics. Although Dewey suggests the generalization of the scientific method beyond the traditional spheres of scientific inquiry, it does not seem that he is guilty, as Russell suggests, of rationalizing an urge to or love of power. The very antithesis is his claim. On the other hand, he does not believe that Russell is free of such "rationalization." It is necessary, then, to turn to Russell.
It is exceedingly difficult to lay hold of Russell, through Dewey, in such a way as to exhibit a suggestion of similarity between Russellian views and those of Hegel-Marx. The writer knows of no place in which Dewey has pointed to connections between Russell's theory and Marx's. The reader of Russell will encounter several kinds of similarities between Hegel, Marx and Dewey asserted, in addition to the one given extensive consideration in the foregoing discussion of Dewey. But Dewey has not pointed to similarities between Russell's views and those of Hegel or Marx. It is possible to discuss Russell in relation to a certain problem in such a way that there is, however, perhaps only "implicitly," a bearing of his views upon the question of the "power" struggle and the use of "external authority" or "force" in the providing of social cohesion. There is nothing for Dewey which is incapable of subordination to inquiry. This means, of course, that there is nothing that is incapable of being approached scientifically. It has been suggested that except as this is so for Dewey, the alternative is resolution of differences through the use of force; and it is certainly a blind reliance upon habit, custom, and tradition as the guides to behavior and choice in human life. It is in relation to this concern that we may begin to discuss Russell, turning to Dewey for comments that seem to open up a basic point of departure.

The passage quoted first is long, but it states concisely the critical point of difference between Dewey and Russell. In the
"Introduction" to Problems of Men, Dewey wrote:

Under present conditions scientific methods take effect in determining the concrete economic conditions under which the mass of men live. But they are not employed to determine freely and systematically the moral, the humane, ends served by engrossing practical conditions, the actual state of ends and values. Hence the more important things are left to decision by custom, prejudice, class interests, and traditions embodied in institutions, whose results are mostly fixed by the superior power in possession of those who manage them. Under these conditions, a recent movement in philosophy demands especial notice. It retains the notion that philosophy's concern is with superior reality, taking its cue in search for it, mainly from mathematics and quasi-mathematical symbolisms, but completely repudiating that aspect of philosophy that has gone by the name of search for wisdom. It converts the practical neglect by modern philosophies of political and moral subjects into systematic theoretical denial of the possibility of intelligent concern with them. It holds that the practical affairs of men which are of highest and deepest significance are matters of values and valuations, and that therefore they are by their very nature incapable of intellectual adjudication; of either justification or condemnation on rational grounds. The movement retains in the most emphatic form possible the ancient Greek conception according to which "theory" is intrinsically superior to any and every form of practical concern—the latter consisting of things that change and fluctuate in contrast with the eternity of Being. But the movement in question goes, so to speak, the classic doctrine one better. The latter held that practical affairs were the material of inferior sorts of knowledge. The present movement holds that moral affairs, concerned as they are with "intrinsic" values, or "ends-in-themselves," are wholly outside the reach of any sort of knowledge whatever.

A distinguished member of this school of contemporary thought has recently written that "the actions of men, in innumerable important respects, have depended upon their theories as to the world and human life, as to what is good and evil." But he has also written that what men hold about "what is good and evil" is wholly a matter of sheer likes and dislikes.
They, in turn, are so completely private and personal—in the terminology of philosophy so "subjective"—as to be incapable of having "objective" grounds. Likes and dislikes are immune to modification by knowledge since they dwell in inaccessible privacy. Values that are "extrinsic" or "instrumental" may be rationally estimated. For they are only means; are not ends in any genuine sense. As means their efficacy may be determined by methods that will stand scientific inspection. But the "ends" they serve "ends which are truly ends) are just matters of what groups, classes, sects, races, or whatever, happen irrationally to like or dislike.

...What is the probable destiny of man on earth if regulation of the concrete conditions under which men live continues to increase at its present rate, while the consequences produced by them are necessarily left at the mercy of likes and dislikes that are, in turn, at the mercy of irrational habits, institutions, and a class and sectarian distribution of power between the stronger and the weaker? However technical the "theoretical" view of this school about ultimate reality may be, the truth or falsity of this part of their doctrine is assuredly of public concern. (114)

And at another point, Dewey has criticized Russell, the "distinguished member of the school" referred to on similar grounds. The emphasis of the following is upon the "privacy" of experience, it being the case, according to Dewey, that for Russell the "privacy of experience" and the "subjectivity" of value are intimately connected with one another.

The point at issue is concerned with the "privacy" of perception and experience generally, and with the "subjectivity" of value, the two doctrines being intimately connected with one another. Mr. Russell believes that "seeing," perception generally, is a private event and that "each person's experience is private to himself." No two persons can see or remember or experience exactly the same thing; since physical science consists of inferences from what is perceived and remembered, "the data of physics, when closely examined, have the same kind of privacy as those of psychology," while it is added that those of psychology...
may have the same kind of "quasi-publicity" that belong to those of physics. The reason given by Mr. Russell is that when we say we perceive an object, say, the sun, the object is only a remote cause, and what we perceive is dependent upon the intervening medium and upon certain processes in the body, especially the brain. I am unable to see what this has to do with the privacy of perception or with its "mental" character. The argument would seem to show that perception is a complex objective event taking place in the objective world through the interaction of a variety of conditions. It is more a complex event than that which we call, say, the shining of the sun. But save by carrying over without question the conclusions of traditional dualistic psychology I cannot see how it is different save in the complexity of its conditioning factors. Moreover, its very complexity is the ground of our ability to make certain inference as to the part that different objects—"sun," "medium," and "nervous system"—play in its production. As for the argument that experience is private because no two persons have exactly the same experience, I suppose it is also true that exactly the same physical event does not occur twice. But unless individuality of occurrence is defined in advance to mean being private, a purely verbal matter, I do not see how the rich diversity of existence proves its privacy.

I should not have engaged in these comments if they did not have a direct bearing upon the question of the social function of science. It is difficult, it seems to be logically impossible, to unite a plea for its authority in determination of the beliefs that hold men together in conjoint action with the doctrine of the inherent privacy of its procedures and conclusions. If the latter doctrine were substantiated, we should have to accept it, whatever its unfortunate consequences. But if it is not valid and yet is accepted, it tends to strengthen the idea that in a conflict of private views we must have recourse to external authority and force in order to effect a semblance of communal order. The issue involved comes out even more clearly in the case of the nature of value in its connection with morals. (15)

There is no question that Russell takes experience to be a private affair. The following passages, from the "Introduction"
and Chapter I of a recent writing by Russell, are instructive on this point. They are especially helpful here because of the sharp contrast they provide between "scientific" and "non-scientific" matters. The first passage deals with the problem of the "subjectivity of knowledge."

The desire to escape from subjectivity in the description of the world (which I share) has led some modern philosophers astray—at least so it seems to me—in relation to theory of knowledge. Finding its problems distasteful, they have tried to deny that these problems exist. That data are private and individual is a thesis which has been familiar since the time of Protagoras. This thesis has been denied because it has been thought, as Protagoras thought, that, if admitted, it must lead to the conclusion that all knowledge is private and individual. For my part, while I admit the thesis, I deny the conclusion.... (16)

Then, later:

The community knows both more and less than the individual: it knows, in its collective capacity, all the contents of the encyclopedia and all the contributions to the proceedings of learned bodies, but it does not know the warm and intimate things that make up the color and texture of an individual life. When a man says, "I can never convey the horror I felt on seeing Buchenwald" or "No words can express my joy at seeing the sea again after years in a prison camp," he is saying something which is strictly and precisely true: he possesses, through his experience, knowledge possessed by those whose experience has been different, and not completely capable of verbal expression. If he is a superb literary artist, he may create in sensitive readers a state of mind not wholly unlike his own, but if he tries to use scientific methods the stream of his experience will be lost and dissipated in a dusty desert. Language, our sole means of communicating scientific knowledge, is essentially social in its origin and in its main functions.... Differences which do not affect the truth or falsehood of a statement are usually of little practical importance and are therefore ignored, with the result that we all
believe our private world to be much more like the public world than it really is.

...It is true that education tries to depersonalize language, and with a certain amount of success. "Rain" is no longer the familiar phenomenon, but "drops of water falling from clouds toward the earth," and "water" is no longer what makes you wet, but H2O. As for hydrogen and oxygen, they have verbal definitions which have to be learned by heart; whether you understand them does not matter. And so, as your instruction proceeds, the world of words becomes more and more separated from the world of the sense; you acquire the art of using words correctly, as you might acquire the art of playing the fiddle; in the end you become such a virtuoso in the manipulation of phrases that you need hardly ever remember that words have meanings. You have then become completely a public character, and even your most thoughts are suitable for the encyclopedia. But you can no longer hope to be a poet, and if you try to be a lover you will find your depersonalized language not very successful in generating the desired emotions. You have sacrificed expression to communication, and what you can communicate turns out to be abstract and dry.

And:

... Pure mathematics, throughout, works with concepts which are capable of being completely public and impersonal. The reason is that they derive nothing from the senses, and that the senses are the source of privacy. The body is a sensitive recording instrument, constantly transmitting messages from the outside world; the messages reaching one body are never quite the same as those reaching another, though practical and social exigencies have taught us ways of disregarding the differences between the percepts of neighboring persons. In constructing physics we have emphasized the spatio-temporal aspect of our perceptions, which is the aspect that is most abstract and most nearly akin to logic and mathematics. This we have done in the pursuit of publicity, in order to communicate what is communicable and to cover up the rest in a dark mantle of oblivion. (17)

It is unnecessary, for our present purposes, to draw out in
detail the general view sketched in the above, nor is it necessary to go into detail with respect to any part of it. The basic distinction between science and the world of sense, on the one hand, and the privateness of the world of sense, and the public character of the world of science, specifically in the latter's close connection with mathematics, is clear. It is in the public, the communication aspect of life, that the normal living of the present age, through increasing socialization, rather resembles the character of the basically "scientific." Science aims at an "objective" world, not an amassment of subjectivities. It is for this reason that Russell comments upon the elimination of subjectivity in the description of the world. We have already seen him urge the elimination of notions of a good life from the theorizing that we and philosophers have done. There is not to be any "seeing through the distorting medium of our own desires," and there is certainly not to be any determination of theory, therefore, in accordance with any desires, with habit, custom, and tradition.

The "practical demands" of our living are different, however, from the "theoretical demands" of science. That is to say, there is a difference between the fact of the elimination of the personal in the enterprise of science and the elimination of the personal in the enterprise of living together. Life loses its poetic, its literary, its artistic qualities in both the theoretical pursuits of science and the social demands of life. Mankind's development into social units has enforced the development of "common" ground,
of "de-personalized" living. We are in danger of becoming a "people of a single face" (Orwell), or the "things of" the "Bokanovskification" process (of Huxley's Brave New World.) The point is that this consideration of the private and public, the subjective and objective, the description of the world and its "taste," the scientific and the "mystical," is set also in direct relation to definite social concepts and notions.

Sensations are private, ultimately, and the events of our lives will, upon close examination, be shown not to have the kind of public character that our language makes them seem to have. It is obviously the case that words have different meanings for different persons, and it is also obviously the case that we may readily proceed, in many instances, only because personal judgments are laid aside, because some "generalization" is the basis of operation. It is not likely that the adult person will fail to obey a request to open a door simply because the doors of a given room are of steel rather than of wood, simply because person's familiarity with doors is confined to those made of wood. We regularly treat of affairs in such language without much difficulty. In a like manner we may become cold and unfeeling in our relationships with each other. Men, says Russell, who are accustomed to handling large organizations, machines, etc., may come to have the same attitude toward human beings that they have toward the organizations and the machines they control so admirably. They lose the quality of life that comes from the intimate contact with persons. The larger the organization, the more difficult the control, and the more impersonal the attitude.
We become immune to feeling, yet feeling persists. These feelings are private and this fact tends to set the impersonalness of life in contrast with and, indeed, often in conflict with, the personalness of life. We are thus confronted with the dual insistence of the personal and the public demands of life. When the personal gains the upper hand, there is danger of seeking to make the world conform to our desires. There is then the danger in philosophy considering the world in terms most congenial to us. We may even deny that a real, substantial world exists. When the public world gains the upper hand, the rich diversity of life is overridden and we become the "people of a single face" or become simply the creatures of submission to the omnipotence of the world.

It is not difficult to see, then, how Dewey might fear that a doctrine which left experience fully private, which isolated the basic unit of life, the individual, in such a fashion that only some "falsification" of life could provide harmony, would enforce the hand of those who recommend a constant pull and haul between individual liberty and the authoritarian control of that liberty in behalf of the demands of social living. To set up the situation of life in terms of the ultimate privacy of values, and to conceive life in terms of the constant struggle in life of individualities, is to welcome, in the interests of some peace among men, authoritarian control of human lives. Human beings demand, says the theory in question, some stability in life, and this stability is largely, if not exclusively gained, only through the sacrifice of individual
value and initiative. The subjective adequacy doctrine is suggested clearly in the following:

"...Traditional systems of dogma and traditional codes of conduct have not the hold that they formerly had. Men and women are often in genuine doubt as to what is right and what is wrong, and even as to whether right and wrong are anything more than ancient superstitions. When they try to decide such questions for themselves they find them too difficult. They cannot discover any clear purpose that they ought to pursue or any clear principle by which they should be guided. Stable societies may have principles that, to the outsider, seem absurd. But so long as the societies remain stable their principles are subjectively adequate. That is to say they are accepted by almost everybody unquestioningly, and they make the rules of conduct as clear and precise as those of the minuet or the heroic couplet. Modern life, in the West, is not at all like a minuet or a heroic couplet. It is like free verse which only the poet can distinguish from prose..." (18)

Thus, the "stable society" may be considered one in which there is a kind of "basic minimum of belief," giving some unity and purpose to the group it pervades. If the principles of any given society appear "absurd" to the outsider, they may be "subjectively adequate" nevertheless to its members. In the same fashion, the principles of one person's life may look absurd to another person; so long as they give stability to the one person, however, they remain "subjectively adequate." Were we to focus upon the notion of "stability," we could come to questions of judgments of "good" and "bad." These would be seen to be judgments upon the principles considered in their providing or failing to provide stability. Were we to recur to considerations of "discomfort" or a "restlessness," then we would perhaps consider the termination of the activity as the achievement of "stability." There may be "desires for beliefs," as we
saw, and these "beliefs" may provide the stability. As long as they do so, they are "subjectively adequate."

This "working" of principles of stabilization, in their inception and dissolution, is a basic part of Russelian thinking on social affairs. He addresses himself to the problem which Dewey's comments pointed up, that of the possible increase in reliance upon external authority to provide "communal order." There is a mixture of "pessimism" and "optimism" in his development of the problem. It is difficult, in a fundamental sense, not to see in his outlook an abandoning of mankind to external authority. Yet it is not clear that he has abandoned hopes for a free world. The following paragraphs are from the "Introductory" of A History of Western Philosophy.

.... From 600 B. C. to the present day, philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them. With this difference others have been associated. The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in a greater or less degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically. They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that "nobility" or "herosim" is to be preferred. They have had a sympathy with the irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion. The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passion, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion. This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of what we recognize as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought. In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

It is clear that each part to this dispute—as to all that persist through long periods of time—is partly right and partly wrong. Social cohesion is a necessity,
and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments. Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation impossible. In general, important civilizations start with a rigid and superstitious system, gradually relaxed, and leading at a certain stage, to a period of brilliant genius, while the good of the old tradition remains and the evil inherent in its dissolution has not yet developed. But as the evil unfolds, it leads to anarchy, thence, inevitably, to a new tyranny, producing a new synthesis by a new system of dogma. The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insure stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community. Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine. (19)

The nature of the alternative to excessive individualism and the opposite evil of too much discipline and reverence for tradition is suggested by Russell's reference to western life as resembling "free verse," rather than "the heroic couplet" or "minuet." But Russell is less optimistic than many, though he shares their preference at a critical point. As he views the current world scene he notes that the hydrogen and atom bombs have made nationalism and the "organized party spirit" the greatest dangers of our time. Their roots, however, are deep in the make-up of mankind. There is one side of us that abhors the conflicts of our lives, while another enjoys the conflicts, finding a certain exhilaration in "combat." But the deepest troubles of our times come from the awareness that we can no longer count upon Nature for support. What goodness we can manage is the goodness that we can create. This we
need to realize. There is a romanticism in Russell. It is not the romanticism of some cosmic destiny, however, but only the romanticism of human achievement. But the notion of the "ingrained" habits of conflict haunts the prospects of peace. States have become powerful agents of coercive force, and while it is toward some uncoerced community of persuasion that we look hopefully, still the leopard has its spots.

Nationalism is in our day the chief obstacle to the extension of social cohesion beyond national boundaries. It is therefore the chief force making for the extermination of the human race. Everybody is agreed that nationalism of other countries is absurd, but the nationalism of one's own country is noble and splendid, and any man who does not uphold it is a lily-livered cur.... (20)

And just as the substitution of orderly government for anarchy in the Middle Ages depended upon the victory of the royal power, so the substitution of order for anarchy in international relations, if it comes about, will come about through the superior power of some one nation or group of nations. And only after such a single Government has been constituted will it be possible for the evolution toward a democratic form of international government to begin. This view, which I have held for the last thirty years, encounters vehement opposition from all people of liberal outlook, and also from all nationalists of whatever nation. I agree, of course, that it would be far better to have an international Government constituted by agreement, but I am quite convinced that the love of national independence is too strong for such a Government to have effective power. When a single Government for the world, embodying the military supremacy of some nation or group of nations, has been in power upon law and sentiment rather than upon force; and when that happens, the international Government can become democratic. I do not say that this is a pleasant prospect; what I do say is that men's anarchic impulses are so strong as to be incapable of yielding in the first place to anything but superior force. This would not be the case if men were more rational, or less filled with
hatred and fear. But so long as the present type of national sentiment persists, any attempt to establish a really vigorous international Government would be countered by an irresistible propaganda: "Would you rather live as slaves than die as free men?"... I will not say that there is no hope of a better method of ending the international anarchy; what I do say is that there is no hope of this unless and until individuals are much changed from what they are now. It will be necessary that individuals shall have less feeling of hostility and fear towards other individuals, more hope of security as regards their own lives, and a far more vivid realization that, in the world which modern technique has created, the need of world-wide co-operation is absolute, if mankind is to survive. Can a leopard change his spots? I believe that he can, but if not, terrible calamities must befall him. (21)

The chief basis for doubt as to the feasibility of efforts to establish a World Government through persuasion or, rather, by co-operative and voluntary alliance, is the fact that new forms of association, new forms of cohesive arrangements, lack "traditional respect." This means that the new arrangement "is not likely to be allowed enough power to enforce respect." These observations seem to lead to the conclusion that Russell's belief carries with it a reliance upon coercive institution of changes. At this point, however, there seems less emphasis upon the uniquely private character of experience than upon the weight of tradition, even though the two factors may not be fully separated. For these reasons, then, the notion of the development of a new form of social cohesion rests in part upon the perception of an inception of need for it but also, in part, upon the availability of enough power to enforce its demands, until the dispositions adequate to sustain it have been developed.
It is not, then, with the utilization of the scientific method
that one rests in the pursuit of the peaceful and just resolution
of the conflicts that beset us. Rather, it is with efforts that are
to be addressed to the feelings of mankind for mankind. The developments of modern science have made the determination, the acceptance, and the inculcation of these dispositions imperative. Upon our success in perceiving the need for and the nature of these attitudes may well depend the survival of our civilization.

Yet, even as we have seen, Russell doubts the possibility of securing an uncoerced community of persuasion as the starting point for effective determination and inception of new modes of social organization. Dewey, apparently, has other hopes. His faith is in the method by which the conflicts of human life may come under control. Russell seems fully dedicated to the inculcation of attitudes and aspirations which will make unnecessary the evils of violence in the resolution of conflict and the regulation of conduct. It were better, indeed, that law, a way of organizing and concentrating force, were substituted for it. This is not to say, of course, that Dewey looks beyond the necessity of social organizations and the development of laws. But the way in which, in Dewey, social theories, preferential ends in life, and moral considerations become instrumentalities for realizing their possibilities is quite different from the way in which Russell subjects the theories to factual analysis, on the one hand, and through the emphasis upon the subjectivity of experience, custom, habit, and tradition, opens
the door to more expansive human beings, on the other.

Because of the attachment of men to their experience the judgments of each other are judgments of similarity and dissimilarity. The dead hand of the past promises, if we heed it not, a disastrously lively future for all. It is Russell's conviction that man's earliest phase was one of struggle against the physical world, as he struggled for survival. The development of science has given man a tremendous mastery over the physical forces of his world. It has lightened the load of life and is capable of being the agency of sufficiency of much that makes life increasingly an abundant one. But with this mastery has come increasing attention and concern with the struggle of man against man. This is the struggle of community against community, of society against society, of nation against nation. It is in this phase that we are at present pretty much involved, though certain present facts push us into the third stage. These facts relate to the development of science in ways that make war horrible in its traits. The efficiency with which we kill has increased. On the other hand, the increase is skill in healing has taken some of the cruelty from the enterprise of war. It is this paradox, more than anything else, which has put mankind in a position of struggle with himself.

The good life, for Russell, is a life inspired by love and based upon knowledge. Men are to be cherished for themselves, not for their potentialities in the armies of those whose special interests and special control of the instruments of power make of them men able
to treat as underlings those who disagree with them. The privacy of value, the privacy of experience, the deep cherishing of the individual for his own sake hardly seems a rationale of the force of conflict and of conflicts of force among men. It cannot be held, further, as the rationale of the continuation of submission and subjugation. On the contrary, it is an appeal to the opposite. If power is needed to introduce the more inclusive organization, then such power must be exercised; yet it were better that the powers be granted, that the community a-borning be uncoerced. Under the present conditions of life, considering the present dispersal of force and the attitudes of men toward each other, little is proffered as hope that the folly of atomic war may be averted.

Can the leopard change his spots? Russell believes he can. He believes he must, if there is to be a leopard at all. To make room in one's life for the traditions of others, and to share with others the benefits of modern science, and still to maintain the aims of individuality and of individual initiative—these are the beliefs that govern Russell's thought in this matter. Man may rebel against his precarious life and tumble into the abyss his frivolous acts lead him to think he is avoiding. Yet the fact is that a life balanced upon the knowledge that there is conjugate hope and despair, conjugate opportunity and frustration, conjugate peace and potential warfare, enlightened by and lived in the spirit of a disinterested pursuit of knowledge and justice, is possible of achievement. We have moved, it is hoped, away from reliance
upon external authority and upon the inculcation of common doctrines for the provision of social cohesion.

Modern life, in the West, is not at all like a minuet or a heroic couplet. It is like free verse which only the poet can distinguish from prose. Two great systems of dogma lie in wait for the modern man when his spirit is weary: I mean the system of Rome and the system of Moscow. Neither of these gives scope for the free mind, which is at once the glory and the torment of Western man. It is the torment only because of growing pains. The free man, full grown, shall be full of joy and vigor and mental health, but in the meantime he suffers....

Most people...do not murder or steal as a rule, because it would not be to their interest to do so, but one cannot say as much for their obedience to the Seventh Commandment. They have, in fact, no wish to conform to the ancient pattern. The Publican thanks God that he is not as this Pharisee, and imagines that in so doing he has caught the point of the parable. It does not occur to him that feeling superior is what is reprehended, and that whether it is the publican or the Pharisee who feels superior is an unimportant detail. (22)

Russell, of course, is concerned with the "uncertainty" that pervades so much of life. There is hardly anything in his recent writing that has come so often to the fore. With the "old principles of stabilization" broken down, the new world is not yet known and scarcely conceivable, we may stumble into the "old night" of prior ways of living, as we long for "good old days." Or we may turn to the wildness of the superficial, focusing upon momentary frivolities for release from the tensions and doubts that beset us. A further alternative leads to elimination of what is zestful in life. We become thoroughly scientific, unfeeling, cold, impersonal.
The generalization of science is tragic, in the long run, for this is, in its metaphysical aspect, indifferent to human hopes and aspirations. To live a thoroughly scientific life is to live a life devoid of feeling. Even though we need to be scientific in order to ground our lives intelligently, this is not to say that feelings have no legitimate place in the lives we lead. It is only to say that we should ground our lives in fact and not in what our hopes and desires would have the facts be. But science, impersonal and powerful, is even more tragic, for its power is unguided. Its knowledge guides human life only in the sense that the production of effects is that production and whatever production is possible. This is a "pure love of power," a tampering with anthills because the tampering is possible.

Russell fears the expansion of a purely scientific approach to life, therefore, and emphasizes that life should be inspired by love and guided by knowledge. Inspired by love, the good life utilizes the fruits of scientific pursuits for the benefit of all. Guided by knowledge, the life inspired by love is capable of producing mutual respect and love.

The generalization of the method of science as technique, the, is insufficient. It cannot be taken, without disastrous effects, to be the sole basis upon which life is grounded. In these terms, life is manipulative. Thus, when Russell reads Dewey, it is not surprising that, in light of the heavy "instrumental" and heavy "functional" and heavy "control" emphasis in the latter's
writings, he wonders if the position does not provide a basis for
the control of human beings, for their manipulation and their
enslavement. Even where, as in *Power*, Russell acknowledges that
pragmatism is a philosophy of power over nature, not over human
beings, he goes on to say that it is possible to base control over
human beings on control over natural forces. In this sense, he
sees pragmatism without a basis for direction, without an ethic
of any kind. But at other times he seems to focus upon the notion
of control, of technique, and to recognize Dewey's plea for the
acceptance of the scientific method in all areas of life. When
he so reads Dewey, it appears, he fears the cold, impersonal, in-
human, brutalizing world that would accrue—in his terms—from
this transfer.

We have seen that Dewey expresses the opposite notion, however.
In his view, our attitudes toward people, our attitudes toward
objects, and thus toward all the things that are "strictly private"
for Russell, take on an objective air when they are considered as
governing our interactions. They are thereby "public" and the so-
called objective. In this way, then, it seems his hope that the
values Russell holds dear will be and can be grounded in the very
processes of life. It may be wondered, however, just as Dewey says
the attitudes Russell holds highest are surely not ones Russell just
happens to have, whether the preference for those modes of inter-
action which "release and mature" the constituent elements, is not
one that Dewey "just happens to have." It is a question as to
just what to "release and mature" anger would amount to, for example. What would it mean to "release and mature" hatred? These questions do not suggest, of course, that Dewey holds only to the release and maturation of whatever, on the human side, occurs as an initial constituent in the interaction. Rather, the "carry over" or "pre-formed disposition" has to be examined in the way it enters into the situation and what the interaction issues toward. Alternative ways of "coming at" an environment, then, have to be examined. Apparently, then, it is the faith that attitudes of live, mutual respect, generosity, and respect for knowledge, will be discovered to produce the most satisfying consequences and that this satisfying situation will be one in which the activities of all are "released and matured."

Perhaps, then, if examination of the consequences of hatred, anger, love and generosity occur, it will be confirmed that this "larger whole" is the appropriate termination of "inquiry."

The above, it is recognized, is only a cursory commentary upon a critical concern. Our attention to this particular affair was for the purpose of showing that in each man's terms the other is incapable of bringing to life the qualities that each agrees are so much needed. Our larger concern with the two men is with the respective "disciplines" expected in the course of education. In what sense, if any, would they vary in their recommendations? Where might emphases be placed? Such questions, however, rather pale, in the writer's mind, beside the need to keep education free from domination by particular forces of the culture. Yet it must also
be considered whether and how education, in the midst of life yeasty with the totalitarian bent, can develop people who will, in the future, leave education free. The "distinctive" emphases that characterize the "intellectual life" need to be sought out. It is to this task that we turn next.
Chapter VI Notes

A. Dewey

1. The Impact of Science on Society, Bertrand Russell, pp. 79-80. Russell goes on, as in other volumes to say that Dewey substitutes "warrented assertibility" for "truth." Since Dewey (and others) have several times pointed up what he means by these terms, and since Russell has repeatedly passed over the replies to his criticisms and interpretations, we shall not here take the time or make the effort to discuss these matters.


4. Whether or not the notion of the social order as reflective of the make-up of the organism occurs concurrently or antecedently to the conversion in question is not basic to the conversion itself in particular instances. Dewey's notion is that there is an interactive situation and that the presence of two elements in their interaction and issue of this have been taken rather as the expression of one of the factors. Whether one reads from human nature back into the environment or from the environment back into human nature does not alter the picture. The point is that the reading back is, in either case, a conversion of an issue into a cause, it being a fairly tweedle-dee, tweedle-dum matter, then, which occurs first. The opposite conversion is designed to correct the excesses of the first.


6. It will be recalled that Dewey expressed some indifference to whether existential conditions are in and of themselves indeterminate, for the question is, in any event, of their portent for the organism in its interaction with them. The same suggestion is present in the above, apparently, for the interactive presence of the organism converts the energies into inhibitions of "its usual mode of efficacy."

7. Ante, p. (italics mine)

8. Logic, p. 503.

9. Ibid., pp. 511-512.

10. Ibid., p. 506.

11. Ibid., p. 507.

12. Ibid., p. 508.

13. Knowing and the Known, pp. 317 and 320.
15. Ibid., pp. 176-178.
17. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
21. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
22. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
PART IV

EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION

In the belief that it would be unnecessary to set forth the "Concerns" of Russell and Dewey about education, such a chapter has been omitted in Part IV. The reader will already have noticed that increasing attention to "pursuit of knowledge" and "autonomy of inquiry" and both men's rejection of confining life to a single facet or interest suggest direction for educators. A certain freedom from narrowly practical concerns is called for by each philosopher. Deliberate exploration has a place in the scheme of things according to each man. Indeed, the more expansive, growing, critical and inquisitive life is a root interest and concern of each. Perhaps more than anything else, this is critical for men. We need to be inquisitive about the world, about what is obvious and what is not. That life may be better controlled, as it is enriched, we need to know the conditions under which significant knowledge is achieved. We need to know how to gain independence of mind, reflectiveness, ability to generalize, to inquire, to experiment.

A comprehensive survey of the educational writings would include much that is not here of interest, however significant. While limitations have had to be set, the following chapters are faithful to the concerns of the preceding ones. From the outset of the dissertation we have been seeking the pervasive concepts of each philosopher. We have sought a comprehensive view of the two men in this sense. Hence, comprehensiveness of the treatment of education...
is the comprehensiveness of the treatment of the positions. Certain basic concepts are considered in their bearing upon education. There is a sense in which each of the following chapters is more ambitious than other chapters. Each one contains reference to the dominant ideas of the preceding three parts. Each one, then, is partially a summarization of the findings of the preceding three parts. Each part is brought into relation to education directly in relation sometimes to the teacher, sometimes to the pupil, and sometimes to both.

No attempt has been made to discuss "curriculum practices" or to go into detail about methods. But it will be obvious to those who deal at all with educational "theory" or "philosophy of education" that some connection exists between what men think in one area and what they think in other areas. However difficult it may be to argue or to prove connection between metaphysical theory and educational practices, it is at least clear to one who reads Dewey and Russell that certain points of concern show up in all the areas into which they inquire. Whether "connections" are logical or psychological is not a matter of much concern. If they exist, they exist. If they do not exist, they do not exist. When the philosopher himself thinks that education could be transformed from an agency of indoctrination into one of freeing minds, he proffers reasons. He finds connections between what a former philosopher thought and what education has been or promises to become under the aegis of that system or speculation. He is chary of those who move in
different ways at the "same" problem. What is pervasive as a matter of concern for Russell and Dewey has been the point of our attention.

It would be impossible to deal in a single chapter with the special problems education confronts, such as concern with religion in the public schools or the relationship of the school to the community, i.e., its active, direct participation in and reliance for guidance upon the activities of narrower or wider community conditions and environment. It is enough to attempt to bring clear the dominant directions of attention and emphasis Russell and Dewey represent, together with their "agreement" upon the autonomy of the expanding self, the autonomy of intellectual pursuits, for each one takes life's enrichment basically to rest upon the dedication to learning, to inquiring, to inquisitiveness.

Since it is not often that the connection between technical thought and the educational significance of that thought is explicitly brought out by the philosopher, the writer's effort is a "pioneering one," if only for himself. One does not read Essays in Experimental Logic, for example, and find Dewey announcing that certain of the areas presented there were expressed thus and so in a writing on education. One does not read in Experience and Nature or the Logic and find him noting that in Democracy and Education this or that concept or polemic appeared. Perhaps all that is involved is a multiplicity of vocabularies, yet this does not really seem to be the case. On the other hand, Russell sometimes explicitly points to a problem as significant in several areas. The problem of the
one and the many is such a problem, for example. Yet neither man has combined in a single writing his technical, social, and educational principles. To ask him to do so is no doubt to ask him to do too much. Dewey's Democracy and Education is as nearly such an effort as one will find. The importance each attaches to philosophy may be undue importance. Nevertheless, the importance attached is attached, and each has seen fit to consider education in light of certain basic philosophic emphases.

In educational theory at the present time, certain conflicts are so pervasive that they form the dominant concern of any educational thought that pretends to be philosophic in character. These concerns are these: Is not modern education too narrowly practical? Do schools so teach that a continued interest in learning is an inevitable outcome for the student? Are the students sufficiently disciplined in the "process of thought" or the "process of inquiry" so that a disposition toward continued learning bears the greatest possible fruition? What conditions must prevail or be extended generally in a community or a culture in order for education to achieve the "zenith"? How shall "individual" and "community" be held most fruitfully to bear relation to each other? In an "age of anxiety," as our age has been called, by what methods, attitudes, and dispositions may that age have its happiest issue and, indeed, be tolerable at all?

The way in which Russell and Dewey each deals with independence of mind, with thinking, with the improvement of human, individual and social life is also clear. Whether the claims of each, or of
one or the other, hold more true, are more effective, or deserve more concerted exploration is something outside the scope of this dissertation. The difficulties that beset one attempting to determine the truth or appropriateness of two philosophic outlooks, whether on factual, normative, or predictive bases, will become clear at any time one attempts the demonstration. Whether the claims against the other that each makes are claims that can be validated is a question of genuine import and interest. It is not a question that one can go into briefly. It is mentioned here because so much of life today confronts people with the necessity of choosing some one position as over against another. But upon what basis is choice to be made? Upon what basis may one choose between Russell and Dewey in light of their convincing arguings of their respective cases? Is it necessary or even appropriate that education be conducted under the wing of one or the other? It is hoped, then, that the following pages will give a picture of the findings of the preceding analyses—findings in the sense of the observation of emphases in the field of philosophic thought, in both technical and social areas, as these appear in writings on education.
CHAPTER VII

RUSSELL

Apart from some technical considerations of Chapters I and II (in which we considered fundamental differences between Russell and Dewey relative to the external world as a problem of knowledge and general concern with their respective emphases upon what is in question in human life), we have found Russell embracing an emphasis upon the expansiveness of the universe, and emphasis upon the "multitude" of human experience—either individual or collective. Our first concern in the present chapter is, then, with the expanding self.

Enlargement of Self as a Goal for Education

Russell urges recognition of the essential partiality and privateness of human experiences, even (as was found in Part III) to the point of holding our genuinely scientific pronouncements to be "quasi-public." That no one "monad" mirrors the whole and thus becomes engulfed in the world of physics stands as a fundamental concern in social and, therefore, educational affairs. The following emphasizes this in direct relation to tasks of educators.

...Civilization, in the more important sense, is a thing of the mind, not of material adjuncts to the physical side of living. It is a matter partly of knowledge, partly of emotion. So far as knowledge is concerned, a man should be aware of the minuteness
of himself and his environment in relation to the world in time and space. He should see his own country not only as home, but as one among the countries of the world, all with an equal right to live and think and feel. He should see his own age in relation to the past and the future, and be aware that its own controversies will seem as strange to future ages as those of the past seem to us now. Taking an even wider view, he should be conscious of the vastness of geological epochs and astronomical abysses; but he should be aware of all this, not as a weight to crush the individual human spirit, but as a vast panorama which enlarges the mind that contemplates it. On the side of the emotions, a very similar enlargement from the purely personal is needed if a man is to be truly civilized....To the man who views the procession as a whole, certain things stand as worthy of admiration. Some men have been inspired by love of mankind; some by supreme intellect have helped as to understand the world in which we live; and some by exceptional sensiveness have created beauty. These men have produced something of positive good to outweigh the long record of cruelty, oppression, and superstition. These men have done what lay in their power to make human life a better thing than the brief turbulence of the savage. The civilized man, where he cannot admire, will aim rather at understanding than at reprobating. He will seek rather to discover the impersonal causes of evil than to hate the men who are in its grip. All this should be in the mind and heart of the teacher, and if it is in his mind and heart he will convey it in his teaching to the young who are in his care. (1)

Fifty years or so earlier, Russell wrote:

The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. It will view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only those who are judged useful or admirable. Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and affections; it makes
us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears....

...through the greatness of the universe philosophy contemplates, the mind is also rendered great, and becomes capable of that great union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. (2)

Thus, never to seek out the world beyond is to remain imprisoned in the narrow world of one's own experience. It is tragically to limit the life of mind and action and to be alien in the universe we live in and upon which we depend. For factual knowledge of what lies beyond us warms the soul in union of Self to not-Self. Knowing it contemplatively, we are at once freed and warmed. Prejudices, habits, customs, traditions, and the insistence of our desires do not govern in the search to know truth. Perhaps no more than belief in events beyond us and a search for what those events are is required. Or, as most often is the case, we may find ourselves with beliefs about those events. Then search for the truth or falsity of our beliefs is the quest. Inferences to and desires for the future are translated into beliefs about present events which lie outside the scope of our experiential knowledge. While the practical value of true beliefs is a matter of concern in other contexts, attention is directed for the moment to the liberating effect of knowing and seeking to know the world as it exists in itself.

Life is greater even when the unadmirable is sought out and understood. Otherwise, "goodness" is but the "goodness of innocence."
Too often, perhaps, we shelter our youngsters from the "unedifying." Russell seems to recognize a mysterious appeal in what is not present to examination. Everyone knows that youngsters "sneak behind the barn." They will know about things, despite parents' and teachers' efforts to keep the "unedifying" from them. Sheltering may itself serve to make it more attractive. At least it will probably lead to cynicism when the "rose-colored world" is brought tumbling down about the innocent "idealist." The teacher's plight was well shown in a cartoon that noted that when a teacher shows a child how to keep from being taken in by a shyster lawyer, he runs the risk that the child will become a shyster lawyer. But the greatest danger remains in fostering the false belief that there is no evil in the world, that there are areas to be left untouched, unaltered, unexplored.

But, as we consider the Self and its expansion, shall we adopt the notion that "evil" is personal? The civilized man, it is said, "will rather seek to understand the impersonal causes of evil than to hate the men who are in its grip." This asserts the evils of the world to be genuinely "in and of" the world. They result from conditions of life, not from the inherent ungovernability and sinfulness of the human being. Social living, for example, foists upon us suppression of impulses, those that are creative along with those that are destructive. These smoulder but seek ever anew to break out and turn into hatred of the "conditions" which supposedly are their cause. They turn into a hatred of persons or, perchance, demand a moratorium upon science which has brought rapidly and
forcefully upon us daily crises of associated living. To speak
this of our attitudes, reactions, and behavings is far from
speaking of a "flaccid" or "sinful" human being as cause of disasters
besetting us. We need to seek out the conditions of evil, not re­
probate those who are in its grip. To this task, in a sense, educa­
tors are alone assigned.

Russell has been a foremost leader in the crusade against war,
and or any other form of cruelty is equally opposed. He advocates
a life of love, guided by knowledge. Few, if any, would disagree
with him in his intent, but it is difficult to understand him when
he views ethics as a personal matter, in the final analysis, leaving
to individual judgment the determination of what is "good" and what
is "evil." Perhaps, after we have pursued the bearing of the life
of contemplation and pursuit of knowledge of things as they are in
themselves, something in the way of understanding will develop.
All of the above comments are but emphases relative to expansion of
the Self, the enrichment of life, turning upon a freedom from one's
own narrow practical pursuits and the limited circle of one's extant
life. Questions of "good" and "evil" are intricately interwoven
with any concern with expansion of Self, the civilized man's seeking
to understand the impersonal causes of evil rather than hating those
in its grip being a case in point. Likewise, it is difficult to
separate "enlargement of Self" from one process by which such
enlargement may be achieved. The separation is possible, however,
without violence to unity of factors in their connections with
each other. Hence, we may turn to consider concern with continued
learning, emphasizing less the privateness of experience than an
attitude toward certain events and affairs of life.

Doubt and Learning

As one who has "traveled the liberating path of doubt" knows, it must be admitted that expansion and enrichment of life go hand in hand with gain of knowledge of the unknown. The writer's experience with this dissertation may be understood in these terms. Acquainted with a philosophic position, he came to doubt that the character of another position was such as it was said to be. In examining the second position, he was led to doubt that the first was such as said to be. Perhaps the impact of the two gave rise to doubt as to the case with either. All know of times when attention was focused only upon what one person said about another, not explicitly upon what one person said about himself. Then, with this information at hand, the approach is reversed. From these "cross pronouncements" there may begin an inquiry into what is the case with either of the two persons, be they neighbors, politicians, religionists, or philosophers. (3) In this way there may be stimulated attention to what each is in himself.

Conflicting pronouncements may be of another kind. What is said about one person or thing may be compared with what that person says about himself or what that thing actually is. It seems possible, sometimes, in focusing attention upon the pronouncements of two persons on each other, to infer something of what each is and
actually has been, or perhaps only to infer what has happened at some time in the past. Taking a "survey" of beliefs about things, we "infer" what has happened, may infer the existence of other events from these. Sometimes it is not necessary to have the cross-charges (so to call them). One can sometimes tell what has happened between two persons simply by knowing what the one has said or does say about the other. This may or may not be linked with a knowledge of the speaker.

The above is introduced because of the relevance of "doubting" to gaining a knowledge of things as they are and the place of conflicting claims in engendering and in functioning instrumentally in inquiry. Also, it is introduced because the existence of such events as are inferred is basic to grounding one's self in truth or, at least, the solidest possible speculation. A "problem" is suggested, then. It is that of determining events giving rise to the pronouncements in question. In the preceding chapters we sometimes began with a comment by Russell about Dewey and a Dewey comment about Russell. We proceeded to examine the bases of comments and to determine whether the judgments seem warranted. We have sought the "truth" about Dewey and Russell, so to speak. In this sense, there is a stimulus to inquiry, a stimulus to discover what is true of and between the two men. (5) The following passage from Russell is suggestive in its education methodology.

Modern propagandists have learnt from advertisers, who led the way in the technique of producing irrational beliefs. Education should be designed to counteract the natural credulity and the natural incredulity of the
uneducated: the habit of believing an emphatic state-
ment even when accompanied by the best of reasons.
I should begin in the infant school, with two classes
of sweets between which the children should choose:
one very nice, recommended by a coldly accurate state-
ment as to its ingredients; the other very nasty, re-
commended by the utmost skill of the best advertisers.
A little later I should give them a choice of two
places for a country holiday: a nice place recommended
by a contour map, and an ugly place recommended by
magnificent posters.

The teaching of history ought to be conducted in
a similar spirit. There have been in the past eminent
ators and writers who defended, with an appearance of
great wisdom, positions which no one now holds: the
reality of witchcraft, the beneficence of slavery, and
so on. I should cause the young to know such masters
of eloquence, and to appreciate at once their rhetoric
and their wrong-headedness. Gradually I should pass
on to current questions. As a sort of bonne bouche
to their history, I should read to them what is said
about Spain (or whatever at the moment is most controver-
sial) first by the Daily Mail, and then by the Daily
Worker; and I should then ask them to infer what
really happened. For undoubtedly few things are more
useful to a citizen of a democracy than skill in detect-
ing, by reading newspapers; what it was that took place.
For this purpose it would be instructive to compare the
newspapers at crucial moments during the Great War with
what subsequently appeared in the official history.
And when the madness of war hysteria, as shown in the
newspapers of the time, strikes your pupils as incredible,
you should warn them that all of them, unless they are
very careful to cultivate a balanced and cautious judg-
ment, may fall overnight into a similar madness at the
first touch of government incitement to terror and blood
lust. (6)

Russell would not limit concern to incitement to war. Whatever the
area, "careful truth-telling" is central. What remains beyond the
pale of definite knowledge serves as the area in which further investiga-
tion needs to move.

Absence of opportunity for recipients of "information" to check
claims made is, of course, a major factor in getting accepted claims presented with force, rhetoric, and rational argument. Where evidence is not available (whether suppressed or absent), claims may also be effective through rhetoric and rational argument. Claims should be examined in light of the evidence present, and indeed, should be examined for whatever factual basis they have. What a child would learn, Russell thinks, would be to lead a life that is "somewhat skeptical and wholly scientific."

...Just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics, and to this end we should seek to produce independence of mind, somewhat skeptical and wholly scientific, and to preserve, as far as possible, the instinctive joy of life that is natural to healthy children. This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendor which some few have shown that it can achieve. (7)

Of course, Russell does mention that it is "instructive to compare the newspapers...with what subsequently appeared in the official history." Presumably this means (in light also of his reference to rhetoric in behalf of witchcraft, slavery, etc.) that through a study of later knowledge the subjective factors of earlier times can be detected. In a sense, then, a later development has the effect of rendering an earlier supposition of factual knowledge into rhetoric, superstition, habit, prejudice, flimsy explanatory ejaculation. No one would disbelieve in witchcraft were there not initially reasons to doubt it. Or let us say, no one would have come to disbelieve it had it not be doubted. But
except as one takes "new knowledge" to be more true than the
established beliefs—active beliefs (ones leading to action)—upon
what grounds call witchcraft or Hegel's view or anything else "habit,
custom, prejudice, superstition," etc.? Upon what basis mark off
the desired from the realm of the matter-of-fact? What shall be
called "official"?

The scientific approach, not colored by emotion, the customary,
habitual, and/or purely personal, and free insofar as possible from
the very fact of human limitation to the particularism of experience,
would be the accepted approach. There is a basic "de-personalization"
that occurs in the scientific approach, a removing of "unnecessary
accrretions." There is a vast difference between the glowing poster
that idealizes a mediocre vacation spot and the cold, hard, im-
personal, unglowing contour map that gives nothing of the verbal
and pictorial temptations of the poster. Nevertheless, the hard and
cold, impersonal, colorless contour map, in being understood, is
capable of aiding selection. It tells one what traits the country-
side has, not what some persons desire vacationers to think it has.
Here again is reliance upon development of "careful truth-telling,"
and from the "hard" world of experience of ugly places visited because
of rhetoric and of pleasant places discovered through objective
description there is learned the value and need of careful examina-
tion of facts, claims, and appeals to see whether these accord with
the facts. There are many stories of people who have bought real
estate that turned out to be under several feet of water and
Hollywood's use of the adjectives is well-known. In short, the world is full of the kinds of conditions against which Russell moves. The chief concern always is with the incitement of persons to war or other acts of violence in behalf of some presumed righteousness or traditional orthodoxy.

To have viewed human life in the above terms is to recognize the numbers of chances for the individual to lose himself, to "go over to the enemy" or to pass from one orthodoxy, from his own limited sphere, to another through the insidious working of "persuasion" that is merely emotive appeal, appeal to emotions, to hopes, to aspirations or, indeed, to the established.

We have moved, then, to consideration of beliefs as true or false as they are directed to or presuppose the nature of the world. Moving to this has occupied our attention where ways and means of fostering independence of mind is a concern. Where disciplining them to mid-point between security of adherence to the established and security of tumbling to the alternative is a concern, therein lies also the concern with independence of mind and the utilization of doubt and critical analysis as the essence of the educative disposition. A desire to expand the self is not fruitful, except by accident, where this discipline is not commanded.

Perhaps the most fundamental doubt that one can raise, then, is the doubt as to whether one's leanings, whether in political affairs, economics, philosophy, religion, human relations, or in the simpler matters of vacation spots, rest upon the "objective
"rounds" of "scientific truth-telling." There is only a "desire to be edified" or a "desire to perpetuate the extant" until this doubting has come into habits. Simple untrammeled freedom in a school, as a whole or as a single classroom, is hardly justifiable as a general principle. Dewey is said to have remarked that children must be allowed freedom if they are to be seen as they are rather than as the artificial beings strict authority creates. Russell would provide for the same chance for youngsters. If their "whims" and "fancies" are not allowed expression, there is obviously little chance that critical examination will touch them. The "intellectual" life of the school is "academic" in character simply because it is "unreal" in character. It may be said properly that the "desire to know" is the desire that informs all other desires. Indeed, it informs life generally. The chance to learn that life is richer when this desire is translated into the disciplines that make the education experience fruitful is a chance that must be given those in the charge of educators.

In addition to caution because of the danger of allowing one to be persuaded through efficacy of subjective factors, one confronts the world sometimes disposed to allow one's desires to govern actions, in the sense of seeking to make that world conform to one's own desires. Thus, quoted comments on avoiding destruction of one's self by propaganda recommend also the refusal to force conformity of the world to personal wishes and avoidance of self-aggrandizement dependent acceptance of one's own theory, "objectively"
presented and argued. The drive for a life tempered with skepticism and wholly scientific precludes enslavement of some by others. The habit of "careful truth-telling in life" replaces suppression of pertinent factual information or keeping the factual from effectiveness in the lives of those to be controlled.

**Cohesion, Its Dissolution, and The Evil Inherent in Its Dissolution**

A certain amount of "conformity" is essential to social life, certainly, but it can be or can become oppressive to the creative impulses of individuals and lead to dissatisfaction when the "subjective adequacy" of patterns of conformity is no longer experienced. With the progressive dissolution that occurs when the dissatisfaction (whatever its causes) develops, there may emerge a new drive for a cohesive belief, a common core of doctrine around which human beings may cluster and through which new stability is achieved. (8)

When the notion is gained as to what is individually a stabilizing state of affairs, a stabilizing belief, or a stabilizing way of living, there is too often a tendency to get it generally to prevail, to have it the rule, not the exception. As long as reliance upon orthodoxy for stability continues, and as long as demand for cohesion through common doctrine continues, there will emerge with every dissolution of cohesion the evil "inherent" in the dissolution.
In the midst of a time of troubles, education becomes a storehouse of sacrificial victims for the priests of "universal prevalence." It becomes a springboard and vantage point from which to move to some pervasive orientation designed to render into a unified whole the claims that are now competing, the "souls" that now are lost, adrift and rudderless. It will render these souls whole by replacing their present views with its own or by filling the void of their opportunity for independence of mind with its own load. It will chip steadily at points of difference, seeking to paralyze them, to render them ineffective, to turn attention from them in behalf of supposed "common ground."

Here, then, after considering the liberating effects of "doubt" and "uncertainty," we come to wonder about its possible disastrous effects. When what has been terminal for an earlier state of discomfort is upset, there is a period of restlessness when what was once the stabilizer is sought (the case in which pleasure has a causal property of action). But, on the other hand, the breakdown of a stable condition may lead to quest for a new state of stabilization. In the first instance, there is some uncertainty as to whether the state may be maintained (anticipating a threat) or re-achieved (once it has been destroyed). In the second case, there is doubt as to what will bring cessation to the discomfort, i.e., remove the condition of "push." A restlessness prevails, and the individual in the society is a reflection of the disruption of the social cohesion. "But what, then, are the ends of life, the reader
will say. I do not think that one man has a right to legislate for another on this matter. For each individual the ends of life are those things he deeply desires, and which if they existed, would give him peace. Or, if it be thought that peace is too much to ask this side of the grave, let us say that the ends of life should give delight or joy or ecstasy."

Yet there is danger in the persistence of restlessness, since the spirit may grow weary and uncertainty as to what to believe, a feeling of impotency before the vast sweep of the events of life, develop. An outlet for the uncertainty, coupled with the restlessness of the spirit (the two seem correlative), may lead to submission in seeking rest from uncertainty. In the midst of rival claims to loyalty, in the weariness from maintaining a certain skepticism and an aloofness from the claims that are advanced, one may long for acceptance of an orthodoxy, and almost any orthodoxy that presents itself may be accepted. "Two great systems of dogma like in wait for the modern man when his spirit is weary: I mean the system of Rome and the system of Moscow. Neither of these gives scope for the free mind, which is at once the glory and the torment of Western man. It is the torment only because of growing pains. The free man, full grown, shall be full of joy and vigor and mental health, but in the meantime he suffers."

Neither of the two systems is loose enough. Each is altogether "too high-chokered." They do not allow for loopholes and exceptions, pretending to legislative function for Man. "Modern life, in the West, is not at all like a minuet or a heroic couplet. It is like
free verse which only the poet can distinguish from prose." To teach how to live a life that is like "free verse" is the fundamental task for education.

One has so to live that he "legislates" for himself, not for the whole. One shall not seek to subvert the lives of others, to take advantage, when he can, of others' plights. It is not for one to take advantage of the inability of others to check the claims that he makes. Nor is it the place of the individual to reserve for himself the information that is pertinent to the issue at hand.

...Dogmatists the world over believe that although the truth is known to them, others will be led into false beliefs provided they are allowed to hear the arguments on both sides. This is a view which leads to one or another of two misfortunes: either one set of dogmatists conquers the world and prohibits all new ideas, or, what is worse, rival dogmatists conquer different regions and preach the gospel of hate against each other, the former of these evils existing in the middle ages, the latter during the wars of religion, and again in the present day. The first makes civilization static, the second tends to destroy it completely. Against both, the teacher should be the main safeguard. (9)

...to tell lies to the young, who have no means of checking what they are told, is morally indefensible. (10)

Thus, what is perhaps the major task of education stands to the fore.

The aims of education merge into concern with the development of independence of mind, a measure of skepticism and full measure of being scientific. It is part of this development to enable young people to guard against undue emotional appeal for their
loyalties and, above all, the alignment of themselves with one or another party over against some or all others. Their minds will be expansive, tempered by examination of the sweep of history "not as a weight to crush the human spirit," but "as enlarging the mind that contemplates it." It shall lift them from the narrow confines of the accretions of time and place, letting full play to their own potentialities and dispositions but bringing both under critical examination. It is essential that they learn to "abstract" the factual-referent aspect of those believings and attitudes. In learning this they recognize the role of subjective factors in their own lives and guard themselves and others against injustices. Nor is this to destroy the "natural joy of living" that belongs to healthy children. Indeed, it is the opposite. It accepts the healthy attitude of the child who, mystic-like, fails to separate the world into two ultimate divisions—the "good" and the "bad." It is, obviously, to develop an attitude of generosity and understanding, and in the awareness of ways of achieving stability of belief and behavior, the sources of much aggressive behavior and frustration is eradicated, for human life is conducted, fundamentally, in full awareness of the role of subjective factors and the temporary release one's views, based upon the insistence of desire, provides.

We shall return in a moment to further consideration of "uncertainty" and "doubt." When we do so, it will be directly in relation to the notion that lives, to be anything but whimsical and restless,
have to be grounded in something genuinely substantial. For the moment let us turn briefly to note that "doubt" can be vapid, that it can be meaningless, complete skepticism. Complete skepticism, seeking for a standpoint outside life from which one may force all knowledge to submit is unreasonable. Hence, a "measure" of skepticism is recommended, and hence, also, the fact that the fruitful skepticism moves where some knowledge challenges other knowledge, where some knowledge claims challenge other knowledge claims.

There is little room for the "complete skeptic." In fact, there is no room for the one who sits "disillusioned" and "doubts ad infinitum" and thinks that thereby he has showed his mastery of the hang of learning. Only as "knowledge" contacts "knowledge" can doubting and criticism move significantly and fruitfully. The "I doubt-er" looks for a standpoint outside all supposed knowledge. It is an unreasonable position, far too mystic in its intent. It may be handled by encouraging search by the skeptic or by drawing out the grounds and lack of grounds upon which the skepticism rests. Working in this way, the skeptic is brought into a realms of "reality" and is put in perspective. The vapid unreasonable questioning passes, but it is essential for educators to know the conditions under which such unreasonable doubting has developed, where it does develop. To keep from giving rise to unwholesome skepticism of this kind, while giving the understanding of the deeply rooted insistence of human desires and the "authoritarian"
or "totalitarian bent" in life is to tread a difficult middle ground. But Western man, full grown, will not suffer. To help Western man to full stature beyond his growing pains is the task education has to perform. It is possible for social conditions of dissolution of cohesion to foster the unreasonable skepticism we have denounced.

The Individual and The Whole

As Western man comes to full stature, it will be discovered that it is in the excellence of the individual life that the excellence of the whole is to be found. We have already moved, in our discussion, well into consideration of the qualities that make for individual excellence, but the full meaning and scope of the task of education has not yet developed.

In turning to the individual as a source of the excellence of the whole, Russell reverses what he and others take to be the general pattern of history, i.e., stability of society expressed in the subordination of individual to the whole, whether this means that subordination of a given kind is to be retained or whether there is periodic disruption which, when "reasonable" or "logical," terminates in a new order—perhaps a new hierarchy. Russell's reversal relates closely to what was discovered in Chapter II. We found there a concern to lay hold of the "intrinsic" character of events, leaving understanding of the whole of which they are part to the ability to understand them in themselves rather than to
arbitrary assignment of the function on the basis of some supposed insight into a whole in accordance with which there is then "rationalized" the nature and function of the participative elements. This is the technical complement of the notion of "social cohesion" and "individual initiative." The notion of events in "associated" action is a complement of the notion of individuals in the social situation, the social scene. This concern with the individual and whole needs to be considered somewhat more fully, then.

A reader sensitive to present social conditions will perhaps have noticed that in an earlier quotation from Russell, he described the philosophic mind as viewing its purposes and desires "as parts of the whole, with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments of a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds." This is ambiguous, for it is not clear whether absence of insistence or insistence is the result of the seeing. Insofar as the functioning of a part affects the whole, however, it seems to follow that Russell means the insistence occurs from not seeing them as parts of a whole. Concern with "individual liberty" is present, the same suggestion of "interdependence" and "association" being expressed in the following:

The diminution of individual liberty which has been taking place during the last twenty years [the book was published in 1931] is likely to continue, since it has two continuing causes. On the one hand, modern technique makes society more organic; on the one hand, modern sociology makes men more and more aware of the causal laws in virtue of which one man's acts are useful or harmful to another man. If we are to
justify any particular form of individual liberty
in the scientific society of the future, we shall
have to do it on the ground that that form of
liberty is for the good of society as a whole, but
not in most cases on the ground that the acts con­
cerned affect nobody but the agent. (11)

In the preceding chapter, we found, in quotations from Human
Knowledge, that there has been an increasing "sciencizing" of life,
with the loss of much that is highly individual. Our terms of those
of "broad generalizations," of "abstractions," giving at least a
"quasi-public" character to our language and, directly and indirectly,
to our lives generally. Absolute "objectivity" may be impossible,
but there can be an "over-correction" of the isolation, of the
inherent uniqueness, individuality, and particularity of life.
In the interest of associated, "civilized" living, the richness of
diversity is lost, and what makes life "full of zest" is smothered
in the cold, hard, impersonal life of the "objectivity" of science.

Since it is in the excellence of the individual that the
excellence of the whole consists, it is thus the task of education
to discover and, where possible, to foster individuals of such
excellence. Independence of mind certainly is one mark of excellence,
and there is thus a significant relationship between the liberty of
the individual and the best "whole" that may develop through indivi­
duals. To arm youth against incitements to war and against prop­
aganda of modern "advertising" stands, thus, as the prime task of
education. In this way, then, we are brought from the task of
enlarging the Self and providing the conditions of its union with
the not-Self to the fact of specific procedures and concerns, i. e.,
the bases and formulations of bases of inferences together with the
eradication of subjective factors, to the individual in a world
that is cohesive but which is doomed, apparently, to be a world
that is disrupted, dispersive. But what we note, also, is that less
a return to some "systematic whole" is proffered than is the life
of "free verse" quality. Not the heroic couplet or minuet but a
life of "free verse" is proffered. Achievement of such a life, in
the disciplines it exacts, is not a simple achievement. Formulation
of the conditions of its achievement, when life is recognized in
these terms, as being this problem, is not less difficult.

It is at this point that we may return to matters of "doubt"
and "uncertainty," considering them less as utilizable and valuable
in the search for cessation of whimsical restlessness and drift
than as conditions articulable and "dangerous" in the very texture
of history. How to gain stability in an "age of anxiety" is a
significant question, indeed. How to manage peace and security
in the midst of full and fluid cosmos becomes a matter of deep
concern. The early chapters of the dissertation brought to the
fore the significance of inference in human life and of beliefs as
to the external world, leaving us with emphasis upon these. They
showed also the extent to which science takes the normally "naive
realist" conceptions and puts perceptions and human experience
generally in the larger context. This, in turn, led directly to
considerations of "desire" and metaphysics. It remains for us here, then, to consider the meaning of the discussion on desire and desires for education. We continue without direct reference to actual classroom procedures, seeking only to discover the task(s) of education in light of the philosophic concepts and polemic advanced in preceding parts. To begin, let us consider a passage from Russell’s most recent writing.

The present time is one in which the prevailing mood is a feeling of impotent perplexity. We see ourselves drifting towards a war that hardly anyone desires—a war that, as we all know, must bring disaster to the great majority of mankind. But like a rabbit fascinated by a snake, we stare at the peril without knowing what to do to avert it. We tell each other horror stories of atom bombs and hydrogen bombs, of cities exterminated, of Russian hordes, of famine and ferocity everywhere. But although our reason tells us we ought to shudder at such a prospect, there is another part of us that enjoys it, and so we have no firm will to avert misfortune, and there is a deep division in our souls between the sane and the insane parts. In quiet times the insane parts can slumber throughout the day and wake only at night. But in times like ours they invade our waking time as well, and all rational thinking becomes pale and divorced from the will. Our lives become balanced on the sharp edge of hypothesis—if there is to be a war one way of life is reasonable; if not, another. To the great majority of mankind such a hypothetical existence is intolerably uncomfortable, and in practice they adopt one hypothesis or the other, but without complete conviction. A youth who finds scholastic education boring will say to himself: "Why bother? I shall be killed in battle before long." A young woman who might live constructively thinks to herself that she had better have a good time since presently she will be raped by Russian soldiery until she dies. Parents wonder whether the sacrifices called for by their children’s upbringing are worth while since they are likely to prove futile. Those who are lucky enough to possess capital are apt to spend it on riotous living, since they foresee a catastrophic depreciation in which it would become worthless. In this way uncertainty
balks the impulse to every irksome effort, and generates a tone of frivolous misery mistakenly thought to be pleasure, which turns outward and becomes hatred of those who are felt to be its cause. Through this hatred it brings daily nearer the catastrophe which it dreads. The nations seem caught in a tragic fate, as though, like characters in a Greek drama, they were blinded by some offended god. Bewildered by mental fog, they march towards the precipice while they imagine that they are marching away from it. (12)

In our examination of "desire and metaphysics," we found Russell pointing up "sublimation" in which an original impulse to revenge, say, is checked. The state of affairs that would satisfy the desire is prohibited, shunted aside. As a consequence, the desire is sublimated and "seeks" an outlet in socially accepted activities. The quotation above reflects very similar concepts, though this is not perfectly obvious because of the context in which mention of a "tone of frivolous misery mistakenly thought to be pleasure" occurs. Let us see, however, how the earlier discussion on desire bears relation to the above. Education has a task here, too.

In the first place, attention is called to possibility and, in fact, movement toward a Third World War. Then it is observed that "although our reason tells us we ought to shudder at such a prospect, there is another part of us that enjoys it." That reason moves us as it does is based upon the fact of development of instruments of war such as science has accomplished. In short, the movement of science, just like the impact of pride and civilized impulses in the earlier chapter, acts as a deterrent to engaging in war. On
the other hand, there is the insistence of an impulse such that the prospect of an out-and-out struggle is welcome to us. In this conflict, then, we are caught. Reason moves us one way; our impulses move us the opposite way. Out of this, to which the "horror stories" are added, there is generated the attention to the "frivolous," to the momentary, to the same kind of superficial cessation of discomfort felt in drink and riotous living in China, until the person who had jilted him was in turn jilted or had died. There is superficiality as long as the supposed "cause" of the discomfort, those who precipitate war and movement toward it (in the present case), have been annihilated or in some way have suffered from revenge.

To turn from a "classic education" or from a constructive life, or to wonder whether sacrifices involved in the upbringing of children are to be futile, or, in the other instance, to rest with supposition of the demise of the value of money—each of these is succumbing to the "easy way out." At the core is the fact that "uncertainty balks the impulse to every irksome effort." The outlets are accompanied by a "tone of frivolous misery mistakenly thought to be pleasure, which turns outward and becomes hatred of those who are felt to be its cause." Here we may see more clearly what is meant by saying that the civilized man will seek rather to understand the impersonal causes of evil than to reprobate those in its grip. "Impersonal" does not mean "not of my own making," but it means, rather, that they are not attributable to human beings, to
the thing "mistakenly called 'human nature' which needs someone to hate." Nor is the passage a vapid belaboring of the attractions of the "temporal" and mundane pleasures of the "evil flesh."

However, there is some "human nature" in question here. Russell seems to believe that, under conditions of doubt, uncertainty, the dead hand of the past rather than critical intelligence guides behavior. This is tragedy par excellence under the present knowledge of how to use natural forces for destruction. Specifically, the "part of us that enjoys" the prospect of war, more than just being governed by our habits, customs, and traditions, is the part that has been formed under earlier conditions of man's struggle for existence. It is the part that enjoys the struggle only in the sense that the combative disposition, based upon an overestimate of power, born of success thus far achieved, is a "dumbsense" assurance of victory. Set in a background of struggles with nature, man's accomplishments are many, indeed. But the awareness of success is not assurance of success, even though the assuredness is what gives potency to the impulse to struggle, the urge to power. What has become natural, then, lies in wait for a chance to manifest itself. We hang balanced between the knowledge of the disastrous consequences of another war and the knowledge that we may master the world, physical and human. Our condition of frustration is intensified because of our sense that hardly anyone could profit in any way from the engagement.
That uncertainty lies at the root of the outbursts of frivolous misery mistakenly thought to be pleasure and at the root of aggressive behavior and falsification of the ways of life of others is the fundamental consideration. Balanced upon the sharp edge of hypothesis, we seek the states of affairs that bring cessation to the restlessness of our lives. Thus, the sublimations, hatreds, and frivolous misery, then. There is, however, still another basis for "aggressiveness." This is the "desire to dominate," a desire which we have already touched upon when we looked at the elimination of subjective factors as bases of appeal to allegiance or to acceptance of any viewpoint or plan. This desire has its roots in "thwarting" and, indeed, may be called the "desire for power."

Thwarting and Its Effects Upon Attitudes

Whether or not children are, in modern schools, allowed too much freedom of expression is a matter seemingly endlessly debated. When we discussed briefly the analysis of decision-making procedures and noticed the critical point to center upon the determination of the subjective factors and the deliberate discounting of them in order "logically" or "scientifically" to ground decisions, we observed that both Dewey and Russell had solid reasons for granting "license" to children, although that grant is seen not to be taken as the end educators seek. Something of the same grant is present as Russell turns to "thwarting" of the young.
If license is not to be the end of free education, of education in which children are free, then the impulses he shows have, in some instances, to be channeled. Where the very aggressive, combative impulses appear, they may be shifted to areas in which they are essentially harmless. Outlet for them in sports of various competitive kinds may be provided. Under purely coercive conditions, the thwarted impulses remain underground, waiting the chance for manifestation, for there is "intellectual" acceptance of the less harmful way of life without emotional dedication. There are, obviously, oppressive weights to the human spirit. The highly organized and the totalitarian state are such oppressive weights, succeeding the long run in thoroughly crushing all that is best in man, turning the promise and possibility of peace into disastrous distrust, from the betrayal of parents to the false trials of adults. The inability of individuals to find outlet for their initiative and desires, an inability fostered by the established "channels of grace," foments irresponsible but often shrewd moves to gain power and, in the absence of a clear-cut goal, may foment the love of "pure power," i. e., the utilization of whatever instruments are at hand for the production of the effects they allow. Those who are rebuffed in their efforts to "make themselves felt" may turn to robbing others of the joys they are themselves incapable of experiencing. It is a major task of educators, then, carefully to recognize the disastrous effects of thwarting—especially the thwarting of the
natural creative impulses, the urge to self-expression, and the "natural joy of living that belongs to healthy children." This is not the granting of license, but it is an appeal to recognize the dangers that come from thwarting, while recognizing also that the certain impulses, framed in a context of thwarting, may be channeled, alleviated, and, indeed, transformed.

The Forces Blocking Constructive Educative Effort

Desire, with its property of causing activity, haunts naturally into the future for that which will give cessation to the wearying restlessness of a world in flux. For teachers to have sensed the grandeur of the emerging reality of the life of free verse is for them to have allied themselves with the spirit of the scientific West in the careful pursuit of the "vision of truth to meet the Heraclitean fire in the soul." It is to have discovered the grandeur and promise, as well as the disappointment and torment, of mind skeptical in a measure, but scientific in full. In the following, which opens to us the final emphasis in our discussion, Russell has succinctly set forth the spirit in which life is most happily, most successfully led. He has set forth his "personal reasons" for the pursuit of answers to the questions that philosophy asks. Whether only in the study of philosophy the spirit can be developed is another question. We may say that it at least can be developed there, but certainly the task assigned the teacher suggests it may be developed elsewhere and communicated as well.
Uncertainty, in the presence of vivid hopes and fears, is painful, but must be endured if we wish to live without the support of comforting fairy tales. It is not good either to forget the questions that philosophy asks, or to persuade ourselves that we have found indubitable answers to them. To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it. (114)

Powerful forces interfere with the accomplishment of this task, and our analyses of the problem of the external world, especially as we have considered desire and metaphysics, leading directly to consideration of the totalitarian state, have provided us with a clue to the nature of those forces. The preceding pages have given us the persistent concern with the "larger natural world" of which we are a part. They have shown the need for children to learn at once the value of the unemotive scientific approach and the dis-value of the emotive one. The highest possible union of these is what is sought. Especially will there be need for emotional dedication to the spirit of the free West. Intellectual dedication tumbles without that transforming of impulse which makes it enduringly effective. In the hearts of teachers there has to be the dedication, coupled with sheer love of the pupils. These dedications of the teacher will be communicated to the pupils only if they are present in that teacher. Yet even if the teacher is herself dedicated, there is no assurance that the community will permit her expression. In an age of anxiety, whether it manifests the effects of thwarting or only exhibits the insistence of desire as seeing opportunity in the "free" condition of dissolution of the older stabilizing principle
and states of affairs, desire may rush into the breach.

Education may become fair game, then, for those "priests of universal prevalence," under whatever banner they appear. It is taken as the most appropriate and powerful agency serving to enlist the young under the banner. Russell obviously condemns the partisan approach to young people, and it is inevitable that he denounce roundly all those teachers or lay persons seeking to turn the schools into sources of partisan followers. Just those things to be avoided in the educating of the young are the very things which stand in the way of avoiding them. The following passage obviously acknowledges the possibility of "militarizing" the young, and it points up once more the results of doing it.

.... An educator should think of a child as a gardener thinks of a plant, as something to make grow by having the right soil and the right amount of water. If your roses fail to bloom, it does not occur to you to whip them, but you try to find out what has been amiss in your treatment of them. If your children fail to bloom, you should treat them as you would the roses. With few exceptions, what is wanted is positive, not negative. The important thing is what the children do, not what they do not do. And what they do, if it is to have value, must be a spontaneous expression of their own vital energy. You can, if you think fit, prepare children for a military life by teaching them all to do the same thing at the same moment when they hear a word of command. If you do, they will grow up thwarted and stunted and full of deep-seated anger against the world—no doubt useful emotions if they are to be soldiers employed in killing, but not if they are to be happy citizens of a world at peace. (15)

As we turn toward the grass-root pluralism, giving attention to the "whole" and "part" as Russell considers them, there is reflected a continuation of emphasis upon a "totality" which is
considered generally to be grounded in a "bias" of some one person or group. Its "publicity" is only "quasi-publicity." That is to say that the

highest activities are collective, whereas I should maintain that we all reach our best in different ways, and that the emotional unity of a crowd can only be achieved on a lower level.

This is the essential difference between the Liberal outlook and that of the totalitarian State, that the former regards the welfare of the State as residing ultimately in the welfare of the individual, while the latter regards the State as the end and individuals merely as indispensable ingredients, whose welfare must be subordinated to a mystical totality which is a cloak for the interest of the rulers... (16)

Here, then, is expressed the practical bearing of the repudiation of a block-theory approach to the universe, and here is the opposition to conceive the world as a totality, as ultimately a vast system, an organic whole. It may be that the world is such a systematic whole, and Russell has admitted as much. In the absence of any one person's being the "conscious certainty of being all reality," there is at least as much evidence against the conception of the world as a systematic whole as there is for it. Yet it is not so much against the harmonizing of activities that Russell moves as it is against the dictation of those activities in accordance with some subjective principle. Those who take the highest activities as collective ones are more apt to be those whose spirit has wearied. They conceive or conduct themselves in the spirit of those obsessed by power urges or, still more exactly, in the spirit of those obsessed
by desire for the instrumentality of power. To them the world is considered a "function"; to them the individual is "resolved into his social functions." They have abandoned the respect for the "thing" in itself. They view and appraise individuals about them in terms of their potentialities for entering into and carrying on the activities designed to make live and secure the "mystic totality"—the cloak for their own interests.

....Love of power is the chief danger of the educator, as of the politician; the man who can be trusted in education must care for his pupils on their own account, not merely as potential soldiers in an army of propagandist for a cause....(17)

Science, in its "technique" aspect, becomes the focal point of attention, since it is science as technique which reflects the control and the manipulative power. Russell requires understanding science as more than an instrumentality of power. Were we in life and in schools, specifically, to foster this instrumental attitude, we would perhaps in the long run leave the young the most destructive worshipers of power—those who adapt their purposes to the means available. They may grow to utilize, simply because utilisable, the instruments at hand. They may, in the constant and over-emphasized scientific atmosphere, come to treat human beings in the same impersonal functional manner in which they look upon the brutal grandeur of science, taught as technique. They may come to be intolerant of the freedoms for which they themselves see no need. To treat life about one impersonally is not to lose one's sense of identity as a person. It is only to deny implicitly the reality as persons of the "shapes and fantastic phantasms" that "dance madly."
Subjects of a curriculum, perhaps, viewed eternally in the "functional" and "instrumental" light, in being so viewed, may come to encourage the very opposite of a "disinterested pursuit." The danger is great enough in a world "gone mad" in the sense of "functional-minded," let alone development of an education which, however unwittingly, lends itself to the "scientific technique" age. Viewed against the disposition to embrace a totality, disaster is assured.

The "turbulence of our times," the period of dissolution of cohesive principles and the period in which some call for a new "symbolism" stands as the source of difficulties that beset us in the form of movement to engulf the world as a single all-embraced whole, under a single all-embracing orientation. The time of troubles is the time in which uncertainty gives rise to fanaticism, to the organized party spirit. The fanaticism is unnecessary, given an adequate method of coping with the world and given the disposition to confront the dissolution with a democratic, with a humane, attitude. Yet the fanaticism and organized party spirit prevail, and they bear down directly upon the teacher.

...Dogmatists the world over believe that although the truth is known to them, others will be led into false beliefs provided they are allowed to hear the arguments on both sides. This is a view which leads to one or another of two misfortunes: either one set of dogmatists conquers the world and prohibits all new ideas, or, what is worse, rival dogmatists conquer different regions and preach the gospel of hate against each other, the former of these evils existing in the middle ages, the latter during the wars of religion, and again in the present day. The first makes civilization state, the second tends to destroy it completely. Against both, the teacher should be the main safeguard.
It is obvious that the organized party spirit is one of the greatest dangers of our time. In the form of nationalism it leads to wars between nations, and in other forms it leads to civil war. It should be the business of teachers to stand outside the strife of parties and endeavor to instill into the young the habit of impartial inquiry, leading them to judge issues on their merits and to be on their guard against accepting ex parte statements at their face value. The teacher should not be expected to flatter the prejudices either of the mob or of officials. His professional virtue should consist in a readiness to do justice to all sides, and in an endeavor to rise above controversy into a region of dispassionate scientific investigation. If there are people to whom the results of investigation are inconvenient, he should be protected against their resentment, unless it can be shown that he has lent himself to dishonest propaganda by the dissemination of demonstrable untruths. (18)

And later, in the same essay, the theme is presented again:

The only way to prevent totalitarianism in our highly organized world is to secure a certain degree of independence for bodies performing useful public work, and among such bodies teachers deserve a foremost place.

The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and the man of letters, can only perform his work adequately if he feels himself to be an individual directed by an inner creative impulse, not dominated and fettered by outside authority. It is very difficult in this modern world to find a place for the individual. He can subsist at the top as a dictator in a totalitarian state or a plutocratic magnate in a country of large industrial enterprises, but in the realm of the mind it is becoming more and more difficult to preserve independence of the great organized forces that control the livelihoods of men and women.... The turbulence of our times is inimical to the fine flower of culture. The man in the street is full of fear, and therefore unwilling to tolerate freedoms for which he sees no need. Perhaps we must wait for quieter times before the claims of civilization can again override the claims of party spirit. Meanwhile, it is important that some at least should continue to realize the limitations of what can be done by organization. Every system should allow loopholes and exceptions, for if it does not it will in the end crush all that is best in man. (19)

Those who seek to make the world "more organic" tend to re-
inforce their claims with niceties of Hegelian-like metaphysic and dialectic. Or, perhaps, they more subtly embrace the notion that "inquiry" has as its goal the transformation of the desperate into a "unified whole." It is thus, then, that Russell may turn upon Dewey, the "Hegelian strain" in Dewey and upon the strictly "functional" interpretation of scientific theory, as well as the functional interpretation of the things of the world. Russell, it must be said again, is not adverse to harmony of desires. Yet this is not to place the whole in a position of priority. Rather, as we have noted, it is in the excellence of the parts that the excellence of the whole is to be found. This calls for an "excellence" of desires, and the dominant desire that may be called excellence is that of desiring to lead and attempting to lead the life that is "based on knowledge and inspired by love."

The insistence of private life is set in perspective, even as the space and time of our experiential perception is but a single event in space-time, in the exploration of the larger world. In the sweep of history, the vastness of the diversities of human life, the tacit (and now explicit and articulate) acceptance of the reality of the world that, under pressure of inward passion, has come to be a "mad dance of fantastic phantasms; in the recognition that men may be caught in the grip of evil rather than be its cause, and in the urging of openness and permissibility of healthy doubt as the cutting edge of inquiry and stability; in these factors, then, lies the
key to education, the key for educators and the key to freedom for the performance of the education task.

Not much as been said, obviously, about totalitarian Russia as we have opened the "meaning of education." On the other hand, the lesson that Russell would have us learn is that which we have encountered throughout. Today, as some thirty years ago, Russia stands for Russell as the epitome of what follows from adherence to a doctrine of struggle and a doctrine of ultimate realization of human destiny in the course of the workings of the cosmos. It is a doctrine seemingly ultimately grounded upon the presumption of man's kinship with the universe in its dedication to his desires, and it is seemingly also grounded upon the instrumentality of hatred necessarily engendered on the part of one group for another. Under the aegis of the presumptions of Nature's solicitousness for man's moral preferences; under the structural framework of an emphasis upon dynamic interconnection of events proceeding under the supreme law of self-consistency; underwritten by belief that struggle is appropriate to the issue of destiny; and holding that movement toward individuality is the antithesis of the proper direction of movement, human life is transformed into a struggle of partialities, each seeking intensely to prevail, each giving itself whole-heartedly to the struggle. It knows that in this human beings "preserve their mental health" by exhibiting "indifference to the stabilization of finite determinations." Their social intelligence rests in aligning themselves on the side of this doctrine, and they are charged with
a lack of "social realism" for failure to hew closely enough to the determinant principle. Not to have recognized Dialectical Materialism as but another theory, in its own terms, is to succumb to it because of the subversion it may provide or because it appeals to that side of us that enjoys a struggle, confident of victory, fated in the moral law of the cosmos, yet tittered with the realization that only the destruction of what is held dear and desirable may occur.

There is a constructive spirit in which life may be lived, and this is the spirit that may be fostered by philosophy. We need to learn to live unparalyzed by fear and undisturbed by uncertainty in the face of vivid hopes and desires. Nor is this, certainly, to say that we may rest assured, however unconsciously, of the victory of man over the forces that beset him out of the past, manifest in the present, or of the victory of man over himself. It is in the following passages that we find succinct statement of the emphasis in which Russell places his faith. Present times and events make the contrast between Russia and the West especially meaningful.

The Russian Government thinks the individual to be of no importance; he is expendable. What is important is the State, which is regarded as something almost divine and having a welfare of its own not consisting in the welfare of citizens. This view, which Marx took over from Hegel, is fundamentally opposed to the Christian ethic, which in the West is accepted by free-thinkers as much as by Christians. In the Soviet world human dignity counts for nothing. It is thought right and proper that men should be groveling slaves, bowing down before the semi-divine beings who embody the greatness of the State....
It is this conception that we have to fight, a conception which, to my mind and to that of most men who appreciate what the Western world stands for, would, if it prevailed, take everything out of life that gives it value, leaving nothing but a regimented collection of groveling animals. I cannot imagine a greater or more profound cause for which to fight. But if we are to win a victory—not only on the battle field but in the hearts of men and in the institutions that they support—we must be clear in our own minds as to what is it that we value, and we must, like Boethius, fortify our courage against the threat of adversity.

While Russia underestimates the individual, there are those in the West who unduly magnify the separateness of separate persons. No man's ego should be enclosed in granite walls: its boundaries should be translucent. The first step in wisdom, as well as in morality, is to open the windows of the ego as wide as possible. Most people find little difficulty in including their children within the compass of their desires. In slightly lesser degree they include their friends, and, in time of danger, their country....But it is not enough to enlarge our sympathies to embrace our own country. If the world is ever to have peace it will be necessary to learn to embrace the whole human race in the same kind of sympathy which we now feel toward our compatriots. And if we are to retain calm and sanity in difficult times, it is a great help if the furniture of our minds contains past and future ages. (20)

And

...in the West we see man's greatness in the individual life. A great society for us is one which is composed of individuals who, as far as human possible, are happy, free and creative. We do not think that individuals should be alike.... We believe that each individual should have his proper pride. He should have his personal conscience and his personal aims, which he should be free to develop except where they can be shown to cause injury to others. We attach importance to the diminution of suffering and poverty, to the increase of knowledge, and the production of beauty and art. The State for us is a convenience, not an object of worship. (21)

Then,

Systems of dogma without empirical foundation, such as those of scholastic theology, Marxism, and fascism, have the advantage of producing a great degree of social coherence among their disciples. But they have the dis-
advantage of involving persecution of valuable sections of the population.

Empiricism, finally, is to be commended not only on the grounds of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds. Dogmatism demands authority rather than intelligent thought, as the source of opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it asks of its disciples that they should inhibit natural kindness in favor of systematic hatred. Since argument is not recognized as a means of arriving at truth, adherents of rival dogmas have no method except war by means of which to reach a decision. And war, in our scientific age, means, sooner or later, universal death.

I conclude that, in our day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with democratic socialism) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of this or that party or creed. Our confused and difficult world needs various things if it is to escape disaster, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the nations which still uphold Liberal beliefs, these beliefs should be whole-hearted and profound, not apologetic toward dogmatisms of the right and of the left, but deeply persuaded of the value of liberty, scientific freedom, and mutual forebearance. For without these beliefs life on our politically divided but technically unified planet will hardly continue to be possible. (22)

And, finally, it will be recalled that Russell said at the end of a long and difficult analysis of human knowledge and its scope and limits:

But although our postulates can, in this way, be fitted into a framework which has what we may call an empiricist "flavor," it remains undeniable that our knowledge of them, insofar as we do know them, cannot be based on experience, though all their verifiable consequences are such as experience will confirm. In this sense, it must be admitted, empiricism as a theory of knowledge had proved inadequate, though less so than any other previous theory of knowledge. Indeed, such inadequacies as we have seemed to find in empiricism have been discovered by strict adherence to a doctrine
by which empiricist philosophy has been inspired: that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever. (23)

The lives we lead when we are full grown, are lives that are full but unfinished. They are fluid and they are repugnant to those whose stability depends upon adherence to a creed, to behavior on principle, and it is repugnant to those for whom stability is not sufficient apart from the stability of the whole. They are ill-equipped, these persons, to let persons live lives of free verse, for, not sensing the "inherent" unity and continuity of lives of others, they would only render these lives intelligible to themselves. The other persons know the poetic quality of their lives in the midst of their fluidness, the apparent prose of their continuity of experience. Only the "poet" may distinguish a life of free verse from the prose-like life. A sense of identity pervades the process, a sense of unity belongs to it. Those who lead the life of free verse might well be tempted to join Faust and meet the challenge of Mephistopheles. Never to say to a moment "Linger awhile, so fair thou art" is to have caught an appreciation of the moment without succumbing to it alone.

The excitement of impersonal contemplation, the stimulus of merging in the flow of events with a sense of the significance of one's self as a part of the whole but never a reflection of it in its specific or its general traits, and the joy of living that accompanies this sense of self in union, if only in part, indeed,
with not-Self; these, together with the vision of a world in which
to expand, in which to absorb the crushing "defeats" of impersonal
forces, even as one sees the vision of what might be in the midst
of what might have been is to have grown to full stature in a world
that would keep us subordinate and stamp out what in children is
the best in healthy man--its everlasting curiosity. That curiosity
has to be voided of natural credulity, and educators have the task
of providing the disposition of balance and, at once with that, the
source of independence of mind. Stability and process pose challenges
to each other. Perhaps no greater challenge confronts those dedicated
to the nourishment of the young in a free culture, toward a free
world at peace.
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(Chapter VII Notes)

1. Unpopular Essays, pp. 117-118.
3. Actually, I think, the getting of the "cross pronouncements" is a second stage or step in the inquiry, the occasion may be in any one of several. For example, there may be a desire to reconcile two persons or two views. Sometimes, however, the cross pronouncements come unexpectedly and, unsolicited, give rise to curiosity as to their grounds (basis in fact, past occurrences, etc.)

4. As was pointed out at the end of Discussion of Russell (Chapter II) the inferences we make, when reflected upon, make us aware of the principles. Thus to infer an event necessitates a check on the inference (the fact of the event) aiding the determination that we knew a principle.

5. One may begin an inquiry either because he always suspects some bias and is interested to know the truth or because he has some "grounded" doubt, i.e., understands Dewy or Russell to say other than to say what each says of the other. Or, to shift to a different basis of inquiry, one may be aware of the impact (interaction) of two strains of thought and seek to know the issue of those two strains. This latter is a shift of "indeterminate situation" (Dewey) to efficacy of philosophic positions. The shift may not be appropriate but I believe it may be defended.

6. Power, pp. 300-301.
7. Ibid., p. 305.
8. Conformity due to demands of modern life, of course, is different from enslavement, though it is true that the wish for some stability in a diverse and chaotic world may be an arguing point for acceptance of some one orientation. This point comes out more fully in what follows.

10. Ibid., p. 121.
13. We have been encountering an understanding of these "imperonsal causes" of evil, in the sense that the destructive impulses are those of struggle thwarted by the disastrous consequences to which they must lead under the present conditions of our technical knowledge. We are able, more than ever before, to shape human life. Orwell's question is appropriate: "If the world be but a creation of the human mind and the mind be controllable then what?" Thus, in the moments of struggle, there is the natural desire for efficacy, the ultimate wish to bend the human beings about us to the desires we have.
Discussion of Russell began with concern for expansion of "mind," the expansion and enrichment of "self." The point turned upon the notion that such a mind will

...view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable.

The passage continued:

...Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears....

...through the greatness of the universe philosophy contemplates, the mind is also rendered great, and becomes capable of that great union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. (1)

To many an emphasis upon the "functional" is equated with the "instrumental," and becomes identified with concern with what is "only useful" or, relative to tastes, with what is "admirable." It either degenerates into or is the very rationale of narrow practicalism and exaltation of the individual experience, hope, aspiration, and purpose. Yet, however "strangely" he does so, Dewey most certainly is attentive to this problem. He is not given to san-
tioning the "limited self" and the narrow practicalism that hasty translations of "pragmatic" and "instrumental" and "functional" seem to convey. Our first point of emphasis, then, is the way in which "expansion of self" is understood, argued for, and provided for in Dewey's philosophic orientation.

The Enlargement of Self

The following sets the direction in which expansion is needed, and it suggests the way in which it is to be sought—the fundamental "intellectual disposition" called for.

... (i) The generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range of relationships implied in its activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) it readjusts and expands its past ideas or itself to take in new consequences as they become perceptible.... The wider or larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to assume previously unforeseen ties.

... It is the nature of habit to involve ease in the accustomed line of activity. It is the nature of a readjusting of habit to involve an effort which is disagreeable—something to which a man has deliberately to hold himself. In other words, there is a tendency to identify the self—or take interest—in what one has got used to, and to turn away the mind with aversion or irritation when an unexpected thing which involves an unpleasant modification of habit comes up. Since in the past one has done one's duty without having to face such a disagreeable circumstance, why not go on as one has been? To yield to this temptation means to narrow and isolate the thought of the self—to treat it as complete. Any habit, no matter how efficient in the past, which has become set, may at any time bring this temptation with it.... (2)
This is different from turning aside from one’s own experience and activity in a contemplation of the vastness of the world and history. Yet it is also far from satisfaction with an established activity. The next to last sentence is especially interesting in taking "thought as complete" to be identical to resting with established activity. Thought is a concern with the bearing of one’s actions in interaction with the environing "set" of conditions. Habit, in the above, refers to a "settled routine." The bearing of activities under regular environmental conditions and thus, the modes of interactions appropriate, are repetitious, virtually undeviating. They are established. The "disagreeable" condition is one demanding new modes of interaction because of new conditions. There is an "upsetting" or a "block" of activity due to changes in environmental conditions. Yet this is to center upon the negative aspect of the conditions of growth (apart from the disposition to grow). It is to consider the "upsetting effect" of changes. Dewey has something more positive in mind. For one sentence states: "The wider or larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to assume unforeseen ties." This suggests a searching out of the bearings of one’s activities. It suggests an exploration to determine the bearings that one's activity has or may have upon other activities and other conditions. What is often offered as an alternative to narrow practicalism and the instrumental interpretation of things and persons is the "interest in knowing." Some-
times it is phrased as "knowing a thing for its own sake," this being what expands, enlarges the self. What is of interest here, then, is what provision Dewey has for the "intellectual." He writes:

....If the self is something fixed antecedent to action, then acting from interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for the self—whether in the way of fame, approval of others, power over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure....(3)

Again there is the notion of a "fixed antecedent." But "fixed" can apply only to the fact that it is settled, else the challenge to growth is overlooked. In the one sense, "fixed" refers to the notion that further connections and understandings than are already had are not welcome and will be avoided, rejected, if occurrent. The other meaning of "fixed" is that of a settled outcome of a prior situation. It is especially as the latter enters that the "positive" element enters. Only as one is willing to enter into or go beyond "given" interactions will the meaning of things not already in interaction or not seen to be so be determinable. The meaning given "reality" by Dewey will help us here:

....There is a definitely pragmatic meaning of "dependence" and "derivation" which affects the meaning of that most dangerous of all philosophical words, "reality".... The interpretation of dependence is strictly functional. Instead of first isolating the object of knowledge or judgment and then setting it up in its isolation as a measure of the "reality" of other things, it connects the scientific object, genetically and functionally, with other things without casting the invidious shadow of a lesser degree of reality upon the latter.... Instead of there being isolation of the material of knowledge,
there is its continual interaction with the things of other forms of experience, and the worth (or "reality") of the former is to be judged on the basis of the control exercised over the things of non-cognitiye experiences and the increment of enriched meaning supplied to them. Inquiry produces such cumulative verification and stability that the prospect of future modification is an added value, just as in all other affairs of life those accomplishments that open up new prospects and new possibilities are enhanced, not depressed, by their power in this respect... (4)

It may be recalled that in Chapter II (where "atomism" was discussed), there was some difficulty centered in the question of "original existences" and the original existences that have become objects because of prior inquiry relative to a prior situation. The following gives a meaning for things and objects "isolated" in the sense of being "held" aloof from particular situations:

The term "abstract" has a rather bad name in popular speech, being used to signify not only that which is abstruse and hard to understand, but also that which is far away from life. But abstraction is an indispensable trait in reflective direction of activity. Situations do not literally repeat themselves. Habit treats new occurrences as if they were identical with old ones; it suffices, accordingly, when the different or novel element is negligible for present purposes. But when the new element requires especial attention, random reaction is the sole recourse unless abstraction is brought into play. For abstraction deliberately selects from the subject matter of former experiences that which is thought helpful in dealing with the new. It signifies conscious transfer of a meaning embedded in past experiences for use in a new one. It is the very artery of intelligence, of the intentional rendering of one experience available for guidance of another.

Generalization is the counterpart of abstraction. It is the functioning of an abstraction in its application to new concrete experiences,—its extension to clarify and direct new situations. Reference to these possible applications is necessary in order that the abstraction may be fruitful, instead of barren formalism ending in itself.... (5)
Now we may see more fully what Dewey means by "particularism" and by generalization. The latter, of course, is very close in what it signifies to abstraction. Russell seemed to rely upon an "improvement of form" and the "removal of unnecessary accretions." Dewey's emphasis is somewhat different, indeed, however much adherence to particularistic elements is also repudiated by him.

Generalization is essentially a social device. When men identified their interests exclusively with the concerns of a narrow group, their generalizations were correspondingly restricted. The viewpoint did not permit a wide and free survey. Men's thoughts were tied down to a contracted space and a short time, limited to their own established customs as a measure of all possible values. Scientific abstraction and generalization are equivalent to taking the point of view of any man, whatever his location in time and space. While this emancipation from the conditions and episodes of concrete experiences accounts for the remoteness, the "abstractness" of science, it also accounts for its wide and free range of fruitful novel applications in practice. (6)

Obviously, this is not to turn aside from or to pass beyond concern with "enlargement of self." It introduces, rather, a new dimension to it. For, at the outset of this chapter, attention was given to a willingness to grasp and to include the wider range of connections "implied in" one's activity. We have already seen, both in relation to desire and metaphysics and ethical principles, especially as power was discussed, that there is a narrower and larger self. The larger self identifies itself with the full range of interests, desires, concerns, impulses. It will not take its own as a pattern to which others are to be subordinate.

To say that the range of connections is "implied in" one's activity is to suggest a range of interconnectedness of things and
activities larger than what is grasped or what is supposed or given at a time. "Abstraction" and "generalization" are procedures in the utilization of one's established knowledge in the diversity of situations. There is a willingness to enlarge the self, then, a willingness to "take the point of view of any man, whatever his location in time and space." Enrichment of a self, of an object, or of an original existence—the "re-qualification" of either or all—demands a diversity of "experience." What has been learned, furthermore, seeks expression, utilization—if the conditions are "healthy." That is to say, the healthy "mind" is active, eager background, the active and eager, but sympathetic and careful experience of the healthy, intellectually alive person.

The preceding pages have already hinted at the way in which Dewey might understand "social" dissolution, the break down of cohesion, for he has pointed directly to the narrow range of interests and the fact that acceptance of intellectual responsibilities and social generosity demand the acceptance of the "anxiety" accruing ordinarily to the breakdown of prior modes of response, of settled routine, and of limited generalization of ideas within the narrow range of interests of one's group.

The active, eager, growing self, filled with social sensitivity and alive to the opportunities for expansion rather than self-aggrandizement or the lethargy and comfort of routine, virtually seeks out the interactions that place the lethargy and comfort in
jeopardy. It is exploratory, and it is adaptive, reconstructive. Its own insistence, the sheer weight of itself, may tend to make it the governing factor, subordinating other factors to itself. It will not as easily be subordinated, perhaps, as it will tend to dominate. It will accept, usually, a balance between factors and constituents before it will accept subordination or suppression. The conditions of dissolution are the emergence of novel conditions, the introduction of factors into the field of interaction. If the functioning of these factors is to be determined and if their appropriateness be admitted, then the balance may be striven for. That is to say, one's life has to be modified to include, not suppress, the activity or function of the novel. The emphasis upon the wider range of application, the experimental and exploratory "trying out" of the knowledge, of the activity, of the self in the new context is, besides significant to expansion of self, significant to conduct with respect to dissolution. It seems unnecessary to place especial emphasis upon this in light of the foregoing, hence we shall not discuss it further and shall exclude a separate section to deal with it. We shall, however, turn directly to the notion of the more inclusive activity, a matter of the "individual and the whole."

The Individual and The Whole.

Dewey does not directly address himself to the problem of guarding against "enlistment of children in a cause" in the way in which Russell does so through the "experience" of consequences
of action based upon "emotional appeal" and that of "scientific analysis." Yet it is obvious that Dewey places "thinking" to the fore in the development of "intellectual qualities." It is equally certain that he holds to the view that unless the child has himself wrestled with problematic situations, he neither thinks nor understands solutions told him. The points thus far considered suggest, however, a point where "subordination" and "proselytizing" is perhaps implicit. Those who take the functional view of social ends, theories, and findings will not be fooled into accepting them as patterns to be conformed to. This notion, of course, should be familiar to readers of Dewey. However, polemic against the doctrinaire usually proceeds against the general idea of "absolutes," etc. Rarely does one find explicit the notion of "conversion." In any event, the emphasis is not usually upon the fact that beliefs are matters of inquiry, however deliberate and controlled. There is a shift in direction of the "anti-proselytizing" concern.

It is one thing to argue against those seeking to proselytize and to observe that one's life is impoverished by being tied down to a constricted space and a short time. Yet this is an appeal to enrichment of self and not a notion of ways of guarding against being impoverished by others. When attention turns to those seeking to escape enslavement, we have a situation in which the disposition to think is not present on the part of one party, though it is present on the part of the other. Defense against enslavers rests with a willingness to abstract and generalize what is proferred as
the measure of all possible values. This, in its turn, rests upon
the realization of the particularist flavor of life, a realization
of the fact that there is a plurality of problematic situations.
What is offered out of a limited background as the general basis
and as the pattern to which other forms of experience and other
situations must conform is taken, among the wise and independent,
as a notion, as an idea, useful, perhaps, in the conduct of one's
own affairs. No matter how settled the conclusion is in one
situation, it remains hypothetical for all others. Thus, in the
face of those who urge allegiance to this or that political platform,
party, economic approach, religion, religious "insight" or "intuition"
or manners, etc., these appeals could be taken as bases of the
expansion of one's own insight into conditions. They are occasions
for the enrichment of life. The multiplicity of interpretation and
involved facts of the direction of concern thus opens up a wider
range of possible activities and consequences of activities.

What does not somehow get into the lives of young people in
such a way as to enable this "functional" interpretation of the
rival claims to loyalty and the hatred they explicitly and implicitly
recommend leaves them torn between an attempt to do justice in their
lives to all others and the fact that their own distinctive life
unaided by this expansion that is possible to them places them in
conflict with others. Either they succumb to a more powerful
group or they conquer. The more judicious approach is to treat
the standards to which allegiance is sought as instrumental, as
hypotheses. Yet this is not enough where the individual and the
whole is a question. It places too much emphasis upon avoiding enslavement in the context of life where enslavement is sought for one. On the other hand, the individual, "where conditions are right for educative growth," seeks to sublimate. (7) He seeks to find in the context of his life, a place for himself which is effective but which is not dominative. Thus, the individual is neither regulative of the total context nor subordinate to some other aspect of it, some other "part" of it. He is in balance with the rest, contributing along with them, modified, adjusted. This may mean that there is a "unity of ideal ends" or, perhaps, there is the unity of parts of a machine. There seems to be nothing intrinsic to the "parts" which renders them incompatible initially, creating a problematic situation. It is the simple fact of novel context that occasions inquiry, reflection, it is not a lack of "excellence" of the parts—except as this means a willingness to accept the challenge to grasp the wider range of connections "implied in one's own activities."

Unless there is concern with the outcome of interactive events, there is not likely to be any "excitement" on the side of the organism. There may be a feeling of "doubt," but one may adopt the whimsical wait-and-see approach to life. Yet, just to the extent that there is direct involvement in and concern for the issue of a situation, so to that extent is there difficulty in dealing in logical fashion with the situation.
From this dependence of the act of thinking upon a sense of sharing in the consequences of what goes on, flows one of the chief paradoxes of thought. Born in partiality, in order to accomplish its tasks it must achieve a certain detached impartiality. The general who allows his hopes and desires to affect his observations and interpretations of the existing situation will surely make a mistake in calculation. While hopes and fears may be the chief motive for a thoughtful following of the war on the part of an onlooker in a neutral country, he too will think ineffectively in the degree in which his preferences modify the stuff of his observations and reasonings. (8)

And, then:

There is, however, no incompatibility between the fact that the occasion of reflection lies in a personal sharing in what is going on and the fact that value of the reflection lies upon keeping one's self out of the data. The almost insurmountable difficulty of achieving this detachment is evidence that thinking originates in situations where the course of thinking is an actual part of the course of events and is designed to influence the result. Only gradually and with a widening of the area of vision through a growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to include what lies beyond or direct interests; a fact of great significance for education. (9)

Presumably, where others' claims are concerned, the same sort of provision has to be taken into account. One must guard against accepting them because of congeniality to one's own hopes, aspirations, and desires. And, perhaps even more critically, one must learn to be somewhat distrustful of others, though this means only that one is to recognize the extent to which the subjective factors do in fact enter into judgments about conditions and, hence, their issue. What is going on. Again the background of considerations Dewey and Russell both present at this point, our distaste for suppression of evidence, for the "half-truths" of investigations
and charges, or for the skillful prosecutor or defense lawyer
who "builds" a case on subjective appeal, is projects sharply.

The place of the individual in the whole is what has to be
discovered, and identification of one's self with the fullest
possible range of interests is the "minimal" demand where one turns
to this particular problem. If there is a general answer in Dewey's
writings to the general problem of this relationship, that answer
seems clearly to be that efficacy shall be allowed, though dominance
shall not be allowed.

It must be clear that Russell and Dewey both have a deep-seated
respect for the development of the discipline of "de-personalization"
of conclusions. Life has to be an informed life. Where a person
is indifferent to the issue of circumstances, one may freely allow
desires to interpret events and provide supposition as to what
events there are. But only as one is concerned about the issue is
there demand for depersonalization. Thus, Russell and Dewey have
both recognized the paradoxical flavor of life relative to this
point. Each, indeed, recognizes that our life is most difficult
virtually proportionately to the stake that we have in it at any
given time. Each recognizes, then, that it is precisely at these
times where much is at stake that the weight of the factors of
subjectivity must be taken into account and then discounted.

The conditions of dissolution of prior modes of activities and
of prior ranges of interest, of self, then, are also those of
opportunity for those who are the field of interaction. The occasion
for thinking is that occasion when on-going activity, whether routine or whether the issue of a prior learning situation, meets a new context, an altered field. The general formulation of the goal of such conditions is that one shall seek a balance of the factors, of the persons, interests, activities, objects, or original existences of the field. What balance means, however, has to be discovered, provided for, invented. That is to say, the specific conditions are conditions of inquiry. In the conditions of dissolution lies also the challenge to avoid thwarting or, to put it otherwise, to avoid suppression.

**Thwarting and Its Effects Upon Attitudes**

As we discussed power urges—as Dewey conceives them in their nature and their origin, we encountered what was briefly summarized in the immediately foregoing discussion. We found that they arise under conditions in which an impulse, developed antecedently to a given situation but not inherent in the sense of belonging to the organism prior to all situations, seeks an outlet. It searches for a way of manifesting itself, of making itself effective. Also, as we discussed the question of making the world more organic and the question of an Hegelian metaphysic underlying Dewey's orientation, a quotation from _Philosophy and Civilization_ pointed up the notion that an antecedent impulse may convert objects of the environment into obstacles. That is, these objects (not using the term in Dewey's sense, here) are, prior to the impact of the impulse, but
original existences. What object status they achieve is achieved by virtue of the organism's being the embodiment of an impulse. The original existences, then, are given their status as, say, obstacles to that manifestation. Whether the original existences are other persons' activities or physical world is of no consequence to the basic principle, however complex the difference might render other factors in resolution and problem involved. What is of basic interest here is the fact that the pre-formed disposition is active, ongoing. Let us consider this in relation to learnings.

The "learned" or "pre-formed" seeks engagement. It seeks something with which, in interaction, it gains meaning beyond itself. So, for example, the child seeks at many times to bring into a conversation—wherever he can—what he has discovered in the past. It is not a question whether the "break in" is simply a desire to participate or whether it is the "compulsion" to use, where possible, what is already known, understood. Sometimes, a child's questioning is seemingly more indicative of a "desire to participate," in the sense of gaining acquaintance with the unfamiliar. At other times, however, a child may listen to adult conversation and, at the mention of "car" or "bus" or "radio" or "records," break in with some "irrelevant" comment. What is clear is that the exploratory flavor of life is conscious importation, is deliberate importation, of something learned or, even, supposed, into conditions. When the "natural" break in is nourished carefully—and certainly sympathy and patience are required—this
"primitive" and "cut and try" spontaneity may develop into intelligent operations. The discovery of the use to which things may be put, attention to the distinction between contexts, i.e., the child's and the adult's, and attention to possibility in order to determine potentialities become as critically significant as determination of the use to which they are put. Under such conditions, increasingly stable beliefs develop. It is availability of discoveries, whether this is the potential, as object, or an organization of behavior under varying existential conditions, for producing certain specified consequences, that defines "stability."

It is less against stability than against inattention to the conditions under which beliefs are attained that Dewey, especially in the Logic, has turned. Drift, not adherence to a single point of view, is the alternative to experimentation, since it is only through experimentation that stable beliefs may be achieved.

Examination over an ever increasing range of connections and in an increasingly wider range of situations is of the essence of achievement of stability of belief. The chance to "break in" and acceptance of the responsibility to examine the entry is what is necessary in order for the child to learn to become reflective and to reflect in advance of the break in, however speculatively repugnant the delay involved may be. This is one aspect of concern with thwarting. There is another, however.

As and when an impulse encounters environing circumstances, we have said, those circumstances gain meaning as obstacles or,
as we earlier considered the "external world," they gain meaning as "obstacles-resources." They seek this manifestation we have mentioned, also, and thwarting means simply that there is no chance for expression. One is not "allowed," so to speak, and the constant disallowance, the constant rebuff in the face of efforts to participate or to be effective dulls the disposition to participate. When this is the experience of an individual over a wide range of areas, he is generally driven to an urge to power or to passivity. All must know that in certain circumstances he has taken the liberty of introducing into conversations some idea that turned out to be the point of "no return" where freedom to participate and to grow is concerned. All must have learned in the presence of some persons not to go beyond a certain point in disagreeing or in behaving. Each of us tends to set limits to others' "impulses" and interests and concerns, knowledge and speculation. The expansion of the limits or, if you will, the removal of the limits, is sought. Only under these conditions may another be known, may he become reflective, may mutual adaptation be achieved. The "odd" child or adult must lose his "oddity." That is to say, he must be accepted lest the latent or active curiosity turn back upon him and others in a destructive manner. At the very least, considering disastrous effects, a potentially reflective, creative, and contributory "mind" is lost. I say this is the "least" because it is not connected with physical destruction. From another standpoint, it is the greatest of tragedies. Thwarting, of course, is a concern not only where the presence of potential development of thinking is at hand.
Thwarting of particular impulses may be considered under the same general bases. But, when it is seen that particular impulses have to be brought under examination to determine their meaning in the present set of conditions, it will be seen, obviously, that impulses of a specific kind must be "thwarted," i.e., delayed in their manifestation. Otherwise there is no controlled inquiry. The initial impulse is checked, and the check is welcome, and, indeed, the check is desired. There is no occasion for reflection if there is no check, and there is only drift or a "bouncing bunny" approach of cut and try character, if there is no check.

Thus, in examining both Russell and Dewey, we are taken "inevitably" (but also for basic reasons) to be caught in the recurrent establishment and dissolution of "principles of stabilization" or, if you will, the cessation of "restlessness," of peace and quiet. On the other hand, the interpretation seems to suggest that only as one seeks out an enlarged scope for activities and their bearing in that enlarged scope will there be any such uncertainty. However, it must be clear that Dewey recognizes the virtual—if not complete—inevitability of the "upsetting." For he does posit the dynamic interconnection of things and cultural elements. The continued sense of "uncertainty" and of "adjusting" with exploration and inquiry is virtually assured. At least, the continued sense of uncertainty is assured. It is not assured, of course, that there will be inquiry. The continuing need for, not the continuing fact of, inquiry is what is assured.
Each philosopher, in his own way, calls for the acceptance of the tentative quality and character of human life. Each, then, turns directly against the "superficialities" that are clung to in face of the "irksome effort" to live in peace with restlessness. Yet, while for Russell the acceptance of the uncertainty of all our knowledge seems to stand as the way of making peace with the world and opening the door to the future and to harmonious living with others, it is acceptance of the activity of enlarging one's life, of accepting the challenge to growth that is Dewey's emphasis.

It is difficult to know in such a study as this when there is a difference in emphasis that may make a difference and when there is fundamental difference in concept. Yet there seems, where "doubt" is concerned, a difference that is clearly significant, whether it is one of emphasis, in the long run, or one of concept. At one point in discussion of Russell, we touched upon the "skeptic." It was concluded to be unreasonable simply to doubt for the sake of doubting. It was said that only as some knowledge clashes with other knowledge is there proper occasion for doubt. Thus, the rise of physics, for example, turns back upon us and clashes with what our "religious" and ethical" suppositions about the world have been. The larger connections of this have, of course, been explored relative to desire and metaphysics, though the "conflict of science and religion" is not quite specific enough to phrase the point of contention. For Russell, this is caught up in the larger notion of addressing concepts as theoretical in import, i. e., as purporting
to say something about the world. A conflict of beliefs occurs, occasioning need to determine what is the truth, when what is claimed is put into terms that are theoretical in import, if it is not already so put. Conflicting reports, whether the theoretical is derived from the form in which belief is stated or whether the belief is initially theoretical in import and form is the center of conflict.

Doubt and conflict seem less a question of clash of beliefs—if it is such a question at all—where Dewey is concerned. It is more one of impact of pre-formed activities and dispositions with other conditions and dispositions. That is, the interaction is what is indeterminate in its issue. Where the this and that—thus, these—move, in accordance with what they are and the way in which they are involved, is what has to be determined. Because each factor is already moving in a direction, one tends to convert the other into an obstacle to itself. What the factors portend and import in this interaction, not what they portend for each other, except as this means as factors in the interaction, is what is to be discovered. This is, in other terms, the achievement of the "unified whole," and it is the "organic element" which so much occupied us in our earlier discussion of "inquiry" and "determinacy." Proposed activities in a classroom, the role of an administrator, moments of conflicting behaviors, directions or interest, or moments of conflicting community pressures, then, may be examined and understood in these terms. What they portend for each other is what is called for as the "press against" each other. Unless there
is some sublimation, there is no concern for a unified whole, and
there is no concern for modification of activities, of interests,
of type and direction of pressures, of beliefs and attitudes.

What is not somehow grounded in an actual point of conflict is
rejected by both Russell and Dewey. There is implied always duality,
plurality, even if not a dualism. The fact remains, however, that
it is clearly one thing to refer to the "stupidity of earlier times"
and quite another to refer to the fact that the stupidity was un-
avoidable and appropriate under the conditions, e.e., in light of
the problem extant. To repudiate earlier knowledge in the light of
later knowledge, to repudiate the religious view of the world in
favor of the scientific view of it (to criticize the one theory
on the basis of another) seems to leave certain authority to the
one enterprise and speculation. The alternative is to avoid the
controversy and the whimsical governing of life by considering
both enterprises in their conjugate functioning and to make a
method autonomous with respect to both. It is necessary to consider
science and the findings of science interacting with extant moral
and ethical conditions, and they with it, in what they portend and
import. Somehow to get this tenor of inquiry into the schools
is what is needed.

That the problems and indeterminateness have to engage the
student has already be asserted. The paradox proves to be that the
more engagement, the least personal the situation must become. One
has to press where it "hurts the most." Yet the pressing cannot
always be a plunge. This is governed by the presence or absence of disposition to inquire at all and also, obviously, by the presence or absence of factors making sublimation more or less difficult. Still, personal identification with a belief, an activity, a group, etc., seems the root factor in the two concerns. To those most willing to accept the challenge, one may address the most "cutting" of insights and provide the most "upsetting" of situations. To those least disposed to do so, however, and to those most likely to "react" only, one has to move more cautiously. Perhaps the greatest challenge to "method" lies in recognition of the way in which inquiry may be precluded because of the inception of its conditions, antecedents. There may be only a lethargy that keeps one from accepting the challenge to understand one's activity (teaching, for example, in its wider connections).

Certainly we are in this orientation quite far from a "narrow practicalism" and a narrow "instrumentalism." Certainly we are far from resting with limited extant interests. Certainly, also, we are far from so focusing upon desires, etc., that "what pleases" or "what satisfies" is sufficient. It must be admitted, however, that students encountering educational theory often get the notion that it is just what satisfies that is sufficient—as a matter of vapid personal pleasure and comfort. There is present a view, advanced by Dewey, of a constantly re-newed challenge to growth. To get this exploratory notion, both with respect to generalizing ideas and with respect to the understanding of a diversity of...
situations, is to develop intelligence. To bring the earliest "cut and try" undertakings up to the level articulate and conscious inquiry is the task that educators have to perform.

The Forces Blocking Constructive Educative Effort

Those who envision the school as the agent for the inception or the perpetuation of some special tradition rarely do so apart from some more or less complete notion of the pattern of the whole to which educational activities are to lead. There is some kind of "organization" or "systematic whole" which is taken to be the appropriate pattern for the arrangement of institutions relative to each other. Any claim for an "organized whole" which is taken to be the appropriate pattern for the arrangement of institutions relative to each other. Any claim for an "organized whole" which does not "make good in terms of experience," i.e., in terms of actual and yet-to-be institutions, activities, attitudes, and allegiances, is empty claim except as it leaves open the nature of that organization. Since an ideal state of affairs is usually what really gives impetus to organized action, the character, in considerable detail, is set forth. Yet, however detailed or vague, specific direction is provided, a leaning or bias is present. This means eventual subversion of all else. Even the general "love of order" may be inculcated or, at least, may accrue out of the simple disagreeableness of the restlessness and the arduous uncertainty of chaos and the yeastiness of life. Sometimes it seems to make no
difference what the organization is. "Just let me settle down without so much trouble." The "love of what is routine" is, as we have seen before, the very antithesis of the disposition toward educative growth as the enlargement of self. It is this, in spite of the fact that a "unified whole" is the termination of inquiry.

A love of order and regularity is far different from the recognition that in the indeterminateness of life there is the challenge to expansion of self and the release and maturation of others as well. We have already seen what is involved in ignoring the partiality of one's own situation, be it that of family, community, state, or nation. Thus it is, apparently, that Dewey's notion of conversion of a trait of experience into the model of experience at large or, more accurately, the conversion of a trait of experienced world into the model for the "larger natural world," conveys his antipathy for subordination of some to the pattern of one. We are here, then, attempting to meet Russell, relative to sympathetic treatment of the child, in terms of the preceding emphases of various chapters.

Our problem, in instances of pressure by groups or persons, seems less one for Dewey as a problem of the world having or not having certain traits. Rather, the problem is one of avoiding conversion of the traits the world has into models for all others. This concern with forces blocking the constructive educative effort is capable of translation into the appeals by cultural forces for
allegiance to their character. That is to say, the notion of a fallacy of conversion enters the picture in terms of cultural forces, pressure groups, etc. Cherished privileges, congenial directions of movement, desirable social conditions, and emphases upon the "social" and "individual" are all proffered as the traits the world is to have, the society is to have. They are partial judgments. Offered as regulatory, they pre-judge. There will be arguments as to whether "property rights" or "human rights" are to be regulatory, whether one or the other shall set the conditions. There will be squabbles over appropriations, tensions between offices of government, branches of the armed forces, cherished projects in the field of core curriculum, languages, mathematics, the basing of life on theological or experiential grounds, etc., etc., ad infinitum. If it can be shown that the arrangement of chairs in a circle as over against putting them in rows has bearing upon the future of Chinese rice markets, assuming a concern for that, there is likely to be argument that chair arrangements are critical to the world's welfare.

Such instances, however, are not directly related to "metaphysics," of course. Sometimes there are apparently devious routes by which budget preferences are ultimately rooted in "natural rights," etc. This is not always the case, of course, and the metaphysical implications of anything are difficult to trace in many instances. The point is simply that "reality" apparently has had a certain "propaganda" effectiveness. Conviction that this or that is reflection of what lies rooted in the universe, in its innermost
being and workings, has a certain way of capturing imaginations. Perhaps the conversions taken to have occurred are only ways of securing or attempting to secure something cherished but challenged. It may be only a reflection of secludedness in the midst of threatening diversity and transition. Whatever the origin of the conversions, there is the suspicion on the part of many that what is not underwritten by the authority of Divinity is doomed to disaster, however much men agree to its worth. This latter, of course, is one of the better known examples of "conversion." What those who "have converted" say may, of course, be quite accurate—and may hold true universally. To answer the question thus implied, however, is a task of enormous magnitude, however significant.

Dewey writes as follows:

"...Since Hegel was haunted by the conception of an absolute goal, he was obliged to arrange institutions as they concretely exist, on a stepladder of ascending approximations. Each in its time and place is absolutely necessary, because a stage in the self-realizing process of the absolute mind. Taken as such a step or stage, its existence is proof of its complete rationality, for it is an integral part of the total, which is Reason. Against institutions as they are, individuals have no spiritual rights; personal development, and nurture, consist in obedient assimilation of the spirit of existing institutions. Conformity, not transformation, is the essence of education....Institutions change as history shows; but their change, the rise and fall of states, is the works of the "world-spirit." Individuals, save the great "heroes" who are the chosen organs of the world-spirit, have no share or lot in it...." (10)

The "subjectivity" of any such absolute conceptions is perhaps most pointedly set forth by Dewey in the following:
The contents as well as the form of ultimate Absolute Experience are derived from and based upon the features of actual experience, the very experience which is then relegated to unreality by the supreme reality derived from its unreality. It is "real" just long enough to afford a springboard into ultimate reality and to afford a hint of the essential contents of the latter and then it obligingly dissolves into mere appearance. If we start from the standpoint of the Absolute Experience thus achieved, the contradiction is repeated from its side. Although absolute, eternal, all-comprehensive, and pervasively integrated into a whole so logically perfect that no separate patterns, to say nothing of seams and holes, can exist in it, it proceeds to play a tragic joke upon itself—for there is nothing else to be fooled—by appearing in a queer combination of rags and glittering gew-gaws, in the garb of the temporal, partial and conflicting things, mental as well as physical, or ordinary experience.... (11)

The notion of conversion appears so central in Dewey's writings, and especially so in light of the abandonment of the ontological context and the speculative concerns and analyses of "how we know" reality and so forth, that it is worth pushing as it has here been pushed. The basic argument is that what have purportedly been theories of reality shall be considered in their functioning in the context of other notions. None shall be taken to qualify reality, to reflect it, to represent it and leave others "pathological." Rather, the determination of the problem to which the views are a response and the determination of the responses in their interaction constitutes the prime problem for philosophic inquiry.

Under emotional impact, any social theory, any social outlook, may become converted into descriptive traits of reality, leaving open either the use of force or presumably dialectical delights.
The functional value of theory, under the conditions of the problem it is addressed or relative to, serves as a potentially significant orientation for teacher and pupil alike. Generalized, it turns into being the "genuinely scientific" approach, since science, in Dewey's terms, has forsaken attention to being simply descriptive of reality. We noted that Dewey viewed Marxism as "scientific" in the sense that science took over from religion the quest for a single all-embracing causal law. It took over the notion that this law was a law of the universe, then. Yet one does not have to focus upon Marxism to find instances of theories which would fain govern and instances of activities, enterprises, institutions which would fain be determinative and which seek sanction and convincingness in transcendental or supernatural authority. Wherever the disposition is present, in adult or child, a way of turning from it is needed. Given the notion that what is worthwhile must be what is "real," then what is worthwhile will be taken as real, whatever the bases upon which it is taken as worthwhile. The acceptance of the discipline of the inquiring mind, the expanding life, seems for Dewey to rest fully on the conjugate functioning and necessary modification of the elements of life that must and interact. The world is wall, map, and vehicle. He writes of "obstacles-resources." Peace, harmony, and stability of belief depend in the long run upon this acceptance.

In the long run, Dewey would leave life dominated by the "desire to know," put in his terms as "autonomy of inquiry." Unless life
is conceived in these fundamental terms, educators and pupils alike stand perhaps to succumb to and to perpetuate the very conditions which allow for conversion and which leave institutions struggling agasint each other and for the dominance of a particular way of life. Yet this is not all that "conversion" bears upon, for we have noticed that an appeal to the authority of reality is involved. The source of authority for Dewey obviously bears direct relationship to the problems of people in the course of history.

Education has a fundamental intellectual underwriting, and it is through assimilation of the "lesson" of an inquiry that a self may be expanded and, perhaps, a culture and a world enriched. The usefulness of a child or an adult in enriching life through expansion of that life is far from narrow conception of human beings as useful to one's own limited aims, purposes, desires. Those who are considerate of ideas and lives but who are now awed by authority may appropriately be said to be those whom Dewey would like to see issue from the schools of the world. It is not to the end of producing community of outlook that the schools shall be turned, although perhaps it is to the achievement of conditions and abilities which permit the achievement of genuine community that schools should turn. One last comment and quotation is needed, since both Russell and Dewey are well aware of some of the tensions and dispositions of human beings under the dissolution of older stabilities and in a culture of high diversity. The quotation appears in a context of discussion of difficulties of communication.
While all language or symbol-meanings are what they are as parts of a system, it does not follow that they have been determined on the basis of their fitness to be such members of a system; much less on the basis of their membership in a comprehensive system. The system may be simply the language that is in common use. Its meanings may hang together not in virtue of their examined relationship to one another, but because they are current in the same set of group habits and expectations. They hang together because of group activities, group interests, customs, and institutions. Scientific language, on the other hand, is subject to a test over and above this criterion. Each meaning entering into the language is expressly determined in its relation to other members of the language system. In all reasoning or ordered discourse this criterion takes precedence of that institution by connection with cultural habit.

The resulting difference in the two types of language-meanings fundamentally fixes the difference between what is called common sense and what is called science. In the former cases, the customs, the ethos and spirit of a group is the decisive factor in determining the system of meanings in use.... A word means one thing in relation to a religious institution, still another thing in business, and a third thing in law, and so on. This fact is the real Babel of communication. There is an attempt no making to propagate the idea that education which indoctrinates individuals into some special tradition provides the way out of this confusion. Aside from the fact that there are in fact a considerable number of traditions and that selection of some one of them, even though that one be internally consistent and extensively accepted, is arbitrary, the attempt reverses the theoretical state of the case. Genuine community of language or symbols can be achieved only through efforts that bring about community of activities under existing conditions. The ideal of scientific-language is construction of a system in which meanings are related to one another in inference and discourse, and where symbols are such as to indicate the relation. (12)
No analysis of this point will be undertaken. It is best explained by Dewey himself in a letter to a friend. He remarked that in the midst of current efforts to provide a single orientation for education, he longed for a "good old-fashioned faith in experience." If stability is to be had, and if genuine community it to be had, it will have to be under and properly only through the resolution of extant conflicts, partialities, arbitrarinesses. The way to this is long, for it involves basic reconstruction of our dispositions with respect to what we believe and with respect to our attitudes toward the appropriateness of the lives of other, each accepting responsibility to see what the particularism of his life means in relation and interaction with others. Not the weight of custom and already shared interests, habits, desires but the meaning of the impinging novel in the context of interaction with the established is the basis of judgment upon fitnesses.

Given a complex world, and given a moving world, the life of man is that of a full grown human being when he has adequate command of a method of dealing with the complexity and the transition. Dewey believes deeply, indeed, that the philosophic orientation he is identified with manages the preparation of the ground so that this life of peace and stability, together with the acceptance of diversity, may come into being.
(Chapter VIII Notes)

3. Ibid., pp. 407-408.
6. Ibid., p. 265.
7. See discussion of "power" by Dewey. See Chapter V.
10. Ibid., p. 69.
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Note: Works by Dewey and Russell are presented first. They are arranged chronologically by date of publication, of volume used. Other works are alphabetical by author.


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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Roderic Clark DuChemin, was born in Middletown, Ohio, April 16, 1920. I received my secondary school education in the public high school of the city of Middletown, Ohio. My undergraduate education was obtained at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, where I received the degree Bachelor of Arts in 1942. I entered military service in June, 1942 and served until December, 1945. I enrolled at The Ohio State University in March 1946. In the fall, 1946, I received appointment as Graduate Assistant in Philosophy of Education and have served successively as Assistant and Assistant Instructor, since that time, while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.