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FOREWORD

When one considers the important role played by
Corinth in Greek affairs from the earliest times to the end
of Greek freedom it is remarkable to note the paucity of
monographic literature on this key city. This is particularly
true for the classical period where the sources are few
and scattered. For the archaic period the situation has been
somewhat better.

One of the first attempts toward the study of Corinthian
history was made in 1876 by Ernst Curtius. This brief arti-
cle had no pretensions to a thorough investigation of the
subject, merely suggesting lines of inquiry and stressing
the importance of numismatic evidence. A contribution of
similar scope was undertaken by Erich Wilisch in a brief
discussion suggesting some of the problems and possible
solutions. This was followed by a second brief discussion
by the same author. This latter work had the merits of a
more systematic treatment of the subject and its contribu-

1"Studien zur Geschichte von Korinth," Hermes, X (1876),

2"Beiträge zur Geschichte der alten Korinth," Zittau, 1896.

3Geschichte Korinths von der Perserkriegen bis zum
dreisigjährigen Frieden, Zittau, 1896.
tions have been incorporated in the works of more recent writers. The value of Wilisch's researches, however, is limited by the fact that he wrote before the archaeological discoveries made in the twentieth century, which now make necessary serious revisions in the treatment of early Corinth.

A work in greater detail was attempted in 1924 by Thomas Lenschau in his article "Korinthos," in Pauly-Wissowa. Lenschau discusses the entire history of Corinth from its beginnings up to the Roman occupation and brings to the investigation a keen critical sense as well as a broad knowledge of the literary and epigraphic material relative to his subject. His study has the merits that result from an original mind investigating anew the primary sources. Its limitations arise inevitably from the brevity imposed by an encyclopedic article and, more important, from the fact that even as late as 1924 the results of the excavations at Corinth were not yet in published form.

The next attempt at a history of Corinth was made by James G. O'Neill in his doctoral dissertation. The justification offered by O'Neill for undertaking the work was that "The contributions to the history of Corinth made by Wilisch and Curtius in the last century are now in many respects

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4 Supplementband IV, cols. 991-1036.

5 Ancient Corinth, Baltimore, 1930.
out of date, especially in view of the archaeological and topographical information made available by the excavations of the American School at Athens. It is true that he had access to the first publications of the American School on Corinth. Nevertheless, his book was published even before the Necrocorinthia of Humfrey Payne and well before the complete descriptions of the work of the American School. As a consequence, O'Neill's contribution (he worked with David Robinson at the excavation) is largely confined to matters of topography. As to the historical portion of the work, O'Neill relies heavily upon modern works, often to the neglect of the ancient sources. As a result his work is little more than a commentary on the works of his more immediate predecessors. He carries his account down to 404 B.C. and although he expressed the hope that he might one day continue it to 146 B.C., this hope has not yet been realized.

All these works, however, so far as the history of archaic Corinth is concerned, have been superseded by the recent publication of Édouard Will. Making full use of the literary, mythological, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological sources, he has produced the definitive account of

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Corinth before the Persian Wars. In addition to his re-evaluation of the ancient sources, he has thoroughly combed the modern literature on the subject, and the meticulous nature of his research is matched by the completeness of his bibliography. Will, of course, had what his predecessors lacked: the great advantage of using the archaeological discoveries of the American School at Athens.

While Will's Korinthiaka has filled the gap that existed in the history of Corinth from its beginning down to the Persian Wars, the problems of its subsequent history in the classical period have not yet been subjected to the same intensive study. There is no monographic work on Corinth between the Persian Wars and the Macedonian conquest. Indeed, even articles on particular aspects of the period were not to be found until quite recently. H. D. Westlake's article which examines the diplomatic consequences of the Peace of Nicias suffers from its failure to take into consideration the internal structure of the Corinthian government and its effect on foreign policy. G. T. Griffith's study of the

8 The problems which his work raise will be discussed below (pp. 7-30) in a brief account of archaic Corinth.

9 "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," Classical Philology, LXI, (1940), 413-421.

10 Still, Westlake sheds some light on an obscure period; his article is more carefully analyzed below (pp. 31-57).
strange union between Argos and Corinth\(^\text{11}\) is a remarkably perceptive account of that difficult period and shows a good understanding of the economic, social and political conditions that motivated Corinthian actions at that time.

Thus, except for these two articles, which discuss special problems within this period, there is at present no monograph which attempts the history of Corinth from the Peace of Nicias to the rise of Macedonia. This lack is not wholly due to accident or deliberate neglect. The fact is that the scarcity of source material for this period is so great that many scholars have concluded that little more can be said than has already been said. Will himself, in discussing the period subsequent to his own study, writes:

\[\text{Si Corinth a certainement joué un jeu serré dans les conflits Grecs, entre les Guerres Médiques et la victoire finale de Philippe, les textes ne suffisent pas à voir clair dans ce jeu, et, dans la domaine des hypothèses tout avait plus ou moins été dit. Quant à l'histoire intérieure de la cité, à part les troubles qui l'agitaient au début du IVe s. et sur lesquels Xenophon nous donne quelques lumières, elle s'enveloppe dans un obscurité presque totale. Le travail envisagé se pouvait rien apporter d'original.}\(^\text{12}\)

The present work is an attempt to throw more light upon this obscure period. It is true that the sources are few, but further understanding of the basic accounts of Xenophon


\(^{12}\)Will, op. cit., p. 5.
and Thucydides can be achieved, it is hoped, by a careful comparison with them of the information given us by lesser writers such as Diodorus, Plutarch, Nepos and the author of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus. Besides, even though Will has not investigated this later period, his interpretation of earlier Corinthian history naturally helps to elucidate certain aspects of it.

Finally, while such other writers as have studied this period have confined themselves to Corinth's external relations, this study is the first to essay an interpretation of the internal politics during the same period, and through this interpretation, a reinterpretation of Corinthian foreign policy.
The first problem which relates to early Corinth involves the nature of her economy. The idea which has strongly influenced almost all previous writers discussing the Corinthian economy associates Corinth with commercial prosperity and industrial activity to the neglect of agriculture. In part this idea is derived from references in writers of a later period and in part also from a belief in geographic determinism. Corinth is located on a commercially strategic isthmus in the Mediterranean, at the juncture of important land and sea routes; south and north, east and west; obviously it was fated to be an important emporium. Nonetheless, as Will points out, Corinth, "comme toutes les cités grecques, avait une économie fondée sur l'agriculture: l'existence de la cité est inconcevable sans un territoire dont le partage entre les citoyens est la base même de la définition civique."  

1 This chapter is based substantially on Will's Korinthiaka. In it an attempt is made to relate Will's interpretations and conclusions to the account of later Corinthian history which is the subject of this dissertation.  

2 Edouard Will, Korinthiaka, Paris, 1955, p. 73.
Modern archaeology, as Will points out, has made it clear that the agricultural potential of the Corinthian arable was high and that early Corinth was, in fact, predominantly an agricultural community. This fact is sufficient to explain the original settlement of the site and even the city's prosperity in later times. It is not necessary, therefore, to think of Corinth as a merchant-city from the beginning. It began as an agricultural settlement pure and simple, and its external relations in the early period were not significantly different from those of other isolated Greek communities. It was not until the eighth century, and then as a result of colonies established to the west, that Corinth became commercially minded and commercially important. The same conditions of communication and discovery which led to the Greek Renaissance encouraged the rise of Corinth as a mercantile power. Even in the eighth century, when Corinthian commerce was becoming important, the Bacchiad aristocracy which then controlled Corinth was a landed nobility. Indeed, at no time is Corinthian history uninfluenced by the interests of a landed class.

Under the Bacchiads, as under all early Greek aristocracies,

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4 Will, op. cit., p. 18.

5 Ibid., pp. 307-319.
racies, land was not equitably divided. The greater part of the best arable was held by the Bacchiads themselves. The rest was divided in smaller portions between a non-Bacchiad aristocracy and a free peasantry. As a consequence, in time the pressure of population and the narrow policy of the Bacchiads produced a shortage of arable which, in Corinth as elsewhere in Greece, was the chief motive for the colonizations of the eighth century, and helped bring about in Corinth itself the revolt against the Bacchiads led by Cypselus.

Cypselus dealt with the basic economic problem in two ways. Driving the Bacchiads into exile, he seized and redistributed their lands. In addition he levied a ten percent tax on income and used the proceeds to help re-establish the ruined peasantry. He did not, however, break up all the landed estates; only the goods and property of the Bacchiads were confiscated. As a result the arable land of Corinth was now divided between a non-Bacchiad nobility holding large estates and a free peasantry farming small but adequate holdings. This settlement of the agricultural problem con-

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6 Ibid., p. 317.

7 Ibid., pp. 477-481.

8 Ibid., p. 486.

9 The distribution seems to have been equitable and satisfactory for the demand for redistribution is not heard in Corinth after this time, even during the upheavals of the fourth century.
tinued without interruption into the classical period, for the government which succeeded the Cypselids made no attempt to alter it.

The agricultural problem is important not only in itself but also as a motivating force for early Corinthian colonization. At that time, Corinth's economic development was no different from that of other colonizing Greek cities, and the great Bacchiad colonies at Syracuse and Corcyra were ἀνακτίνα in the classical sense of the term and related to the mother-city only by ties of religion and common origin. The conflict between Corinth and Corcyra in the seventh century must not be regarded as a colonial rebellion but simply as a war between two states.

Under the Cypselid tyranny, however, a new group of colonies was founded which presented very different characteristics. These new colonies included Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, Epidamnus, Solium, Molycreon, Chalcis and Potidaea. All but the last of these, it will be noticed, are in the west. Four were founded by the sons of the tyrants, while others were ruled by members of the Cypselid family.  

10 The following discussion is based on the article of Edouard Will, "Sur l'évolution des rapports entre colonies et métropoles en Grèce à partir du VIe siècle," La Nouvelle Clio, VI (1954), pp. 413-460.

11 Leucas by Pylades, Anactorium by Echiades, Ambracia by Gorgos, three bastards of Cypselus; Potidaea by Evagoras, son of Periander. At the same time Corcyra came under Corinthian control and was governed by a son of Periander, and the Cypselid Archinus ruled in Ambracia (Will, Korinthiaka, p. 521).
Contrary to the custom of the Bacchiad government, the Cypselids practiced a dynastic policy in regard to their colonies. Each colony was attached to the mother city not only by common origin and religion, but also by family ties which made the colony in one sense or another politically subservient to the mother city. This explains why, when we again hear of the Corinthian colonies at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, they are mentioned in terms quite different from the ones usually applied to Greek colonies. They are represented as belonging to Corinth: Ἐλλιών τε, Κορινθίων πόλεσι, Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν. The quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra which precipitates the Peloponnesian War is over which state shall give orders to Epidamnus. In the course of the war the Ambracians, Leucadians and Chalcidians appear regularly at the side of the Corinthians without any trace of an alliance or of preliminary negotiations. Likewise, in the Persian War, in the campaigns of Timoleon, the colonial troops fight side by side with the Corinthians, apparently under a Corinthian commander. Again in the fifth century Potidaea receives from

12Thucydides II, 30.
13Ibid., IV, 47.
14Ibid., I, 108.
15Herodotus, VIII, 45; IX, 28; IX, 31.
16Plutarch, Timoleon, 8.
17Thucydides, VII, 7 confirms this at least once.
Corinthian annual magistrate called ἐπιστήμουχος and it is not unlikely that this practice which a chance reference has revealed in one city was also operative in the others. Further testimony of this dependence lies in the fact that when Corinthian colonies which had an independent monetary system began to strike coins, they did so not only according to the Corinthian standard and divisions, but even followed the monetary types current in Corinth. This tie between the dependent colonies and the mother city is more striking when viewed in contrast with Corcyra, the colony which was fully independent and often hostile, and which adopted the Aeginetan standard and coined money according to types different from those of Corinth.

The extraordinarily close relationship between Corinth and her colonies needs to be explained. If the original closeness can be attributed to the personal ties inherent in the Cypselid dynastic policy, the question remains, how did the city maintain this closeness long after the fall of the tyrants? In part, the later colonizations aimed at a solution of the social problem inherited from the Bacchiads, i.e., the shortage of arable land at home. Such colonies as Leucas, Ambracia and Anactorium were used to take care of the surplus population of Corinth in the seventh century as

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18 Will, Korinthiaka, p. 524, n. 3.
Syracuse and Corcyra had been in the previous century. Yet the agrarian problem was now not the only consideration. A glance at the map reveals a definite order and method in the establishment of the Cypselid colonies. If the only purpose had been the settlement of a surplus population, the location of the colonies would have made little difference. The East, Sicily, Italy would all have served equally well. The colonies of the Cypselids, however, were not located at random. They extended from the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth to the entrance to the Adriatic Sea: Molycreon on the strait, Chalcis opposite Patras, Sollium between Ambracia and Leucas, Leucas itself at the junction of Acarnanian and Epirote waters, Anactorium commanding the entrance to the Ambracian Gulf, Corcyra, Apollonia at the entrance to the Adriatic, Ambracia a short distance inland to the north of the Ambracian Gulf and finally Epidamnus on the Illyrian shore.

It is unlikely that such a chain was forged by chance. It was surely planned as a series of steps on the route to Italy and Sicily which had long been centers of Corinthian trade. It might be argued that the Corinthians had been using this route for some time without needing to establish such colonies. It must be recognized that as commerce grew another form of maritime activity developed pari passu — piracy. It must also be recalled that the war with Corcyra

\[19\text{Ibid., pp. 577-578.}\]
in the seventh century had interrupted Corinth's use of this route. It is plain, therefore, that one of the principal purposes of the new colonies was to police the seas on the way to Italy and Sicily and to serve as breasting points chiefly for war vessels on the voyage to the west; they were the equivalent of modern naval bases and coaling stations.

Naturally, the new colonies also had a commercial value to the mother city. When a colony was sent out to a part of the world not yet developed to the level of the mother city, the settlers soon found themselves in need of goods that had been available at home but were not to be had in the neighborhood of the colony. It was but natural that they should turn to their mother city to supply such goods as were needed. The resulting demand led to a growth in Corinthian commerce and industry. Thus, it was after the establishment of the colonies that Corinth became a predominantly commercial and industrial state. In the case of Corinth, trade followed the flag.

Just as the new colonies needed the manufactured articles of Corinth, so, in time, Corinth needed the agricultural products of some of the colonies, particularly of those in

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See Map I at the end.
the grain-producing areas.

On the other hand, neither policing the seas nor agricultural needs explains the colonization of Ambracia, Anactorium and Apollonia. In the first place, there is no evidence that these colonies produced an agricultural surplus; in the second place, they were not located on the route to the west. A ship coming from Leucas to Corcyra would have to go out of its way to touch at any of these places. What then explains the colonization of these sites? They served the mother city as a route to the north, just as the others served as a route to the west. Ambracia is at the head of the continental route to Dodona, a city traditionally connected with Corinth. Beyond Dodona, on the same route, was the Corinthian colony Apollonia and beyond that, Epidamnus. Ambracia's importance was as a stopping place on the land route to Apollonia and Epidamnus; the importance of Anactorium was as a means of approach to Ambracia from the sea.

The coastal termini of Corinth's colonial movement to the north were Apollonia and Epidamnus, and the importance of

\[21\] Will, Korinthiaka, pp. 530-532, is perhaps overly cautious in his treatment of the commercial and agricultural importance of the new colonies. E. C. Semple, The Geography of the Mediterranean Region, New York, 1931, p. 350, says that the colonies of Corinth "supplied the most urgent needs of this populous commercial city." Direct evidence of the value of the northwest as a grain-supplying area is given by Lycurgus, Contra Leocraten, 26: "ἐκ τῆς Ηπείρου μακρὰ κλεοπονέος ἐστὶν Ἀκούσσας γεῖται καὶ ἀνείπεν ἐστὶν Κορινθίων." Although this passage refers to the fourth century there is no reason to doubt the area served the same function in an earlier period.

\[22\] See Map II at the end.
these two ports lies in the fact that they provided access to the land approach to the silver mines of Illyria, where Corinth was getting her metal for coinage.

The suggestion that these colonies served as centers of Corinthian trade with Illyria and northeastern Greece may be true, but such trade was not of sufficient quantity to explain their importance to Corinth.

This conclusion is supported by R.L. Beaumont in his article, "Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea before the Fourth Century B.C.", Journal of Hellenic Studies, LVI, (1936), p. 183 ff.

Historians have been fascinated by the fact that Epidamnus was the point of departure on the future Via Egnatia. It is likely that the Romans followed well-travelled paths in building this road but, as Will points out, (Korinthiaka, p. 534) "ces preuves archéologique ou littéraires, sont si rares et discontinues qu'il ne saurait être question de commerce régulier." Potidaea was certainly not founded, as it is tempting to surmise, in answer to Epidamnus and Apollonia. Again Will argues that, "Potidae ne est pas le point d'aboutissement nécessaire de la route qui part d'Epidamne ou d'Apollonie; Cette route débouche dans la plaine de Macédoine et, de ce débouché, de multiples sites peuvent être atteints, parmi lesquels, entre autres, Potidae. Le point d'aboutissement naturel sur l'Égee serait plutôt Salonique." (Korinthiaka, p. 535, n. 1). On the other hand, Apollonia and Epidamnus were not established to supply Illyria with Corinthian products. There is little evidence of Corinthian commercial penetration into Illyria (Beaumont, loc. cit., p. 182 ff.). The Corinthian colonies of the north were not established as commercial outposts; they may have served that purpose to some extent, but it was not their main function.

The argument in support of the Illyrian mines as the source runs as follows: (1) there is no evidence of Corinthian participation in the exploitation of other important mines either in Thrace, Attica or Spain; (2) in the fifth century Corinth had vital interests in Illyria (Thucydides, I,37); (3) the chronic hostility between Corcyra and Corinth, if not caused originally by a quarrel over the exploitation of the Illyrian silver mines, was at any rate maintained for that reason (Beaumont, loc. cit., p. 185; the first war can quite well have been fought on the independence issue. After the attainment of Corcyrean freedom,
The colonial policy of the tyrants, then, had three goals: an agrarian or social one, tied to the internal policy of the Cypselids, inherited from the Bacchiads; a thalassocratic one, attempting to guard the security of Corinthian navigation against piracy and Corcyrean hostility; finally, a monetary one, to assure free passage to the silver mines of Illyria by land and sea.

The close dynastic and personal ties which existed between colonies and mother city in the time of the Cypselids were broken with their fall. Nevertheless, we find relations still close in the classical period. What were the ties that replaced the dynastic ones? The answer is to be found in

and the adoption of an extremely liberal attitude by the Corinthians, who asked for nothing more than a trifling concession to sentiment, this was a dead issue, and it was to the clear interest of both cities to bury the hatchet. Yet they did not."; (4) in spite of the importance of the sea route by way of Corcyra, the Corinthians knew how to use the land route through Ambracia when a hostile Corcyra barred the way by sea (Thucydides, I, 26).

From these arguments Will concludes: "Il est donc possible que l'activité de Corinthe en ces régions à partir de la fin du VIIe s., époque où Corinthe commence à frapper monnaie pour devenir rapidement une des principales puissances monétaires du monde grec ait été déterminée en grande partie par le souci de l'approvisionner régulièrement en metal précieux." (Will, Korinthiaka, pp. 537-538).
mutual advantage and in the intelligent generosity of the Moderate Oligarchs who came to power after the Cypselids fell. The benefits of Corinth's colonial system did not accrue only to the mother city. The products of Corinth were much desired by her colonies. In time of need the mother city could be relied on for quick and effective military aid. As middle men in the lucrative western trade, some of the colonies derived a profit as ancillaries to Corinthian commerce. Such advantages made it no less desirable for the colonies than for the mother city to continue the close relationship.

The importance of the colonies for Corinth persuaded her government to employ a generous and kindly policy toward them. Her colonies bore no excessive taxes and exercised almost complete self-government. This enlightened policy in addition to the mutuality of economic interests explains why the colonies of Corinth remained loyally and closely attached to the city which had given them birth. It may well be, too, that Corinth after the fall of the Cypselids replaced her dynastic representatives with ἐτέρμανοι, who continued such control as she exercised.

The political situation in archaic Corinth is nowhere set forth explicitly but is implicit in later developments and in the constitution of the sixth century. After the fall of the Cypselids the tyranny was replaced by an oligarchy which ruled without interruption until the democratic
rebellion of 392 B.C. Practically all we know about the new constitution is contained in a passage in Nicolaus of Damascus which is either corrupt or based on a misunderstanding. Busolt's interpretation, which is probably the best of several, is that from each of Corinth's eight tribes one πρόβουλος was chosen to serve on an executive board. Likewise, from each tribe nine council members were chosen, so that the total number of the βουλή came to eighty, seventy-two members plus the eight πρόβουλοι. Undoubtedly, this βουλή is identical with the γερουσία mentioned by Diodorus as controlling Corinthian foreign policy. The presence of πρόβουλος is recognized by Aristotle as characteristic of oligarchic governments and we find it typical of other oligarchies in Greek history. It is clear, then, that the

26 Thomas Lenschau, op. cit., col. 991-1036.
29 XVI, 65.
30 Busolt, op. cit., p. 658 and Gustav Gilbert, Handbuch der Griechische Staatsalterthümer, Leipzig, 1865, vol. 2, p. 87, agree that this identification is legitimate. Although Diodorus is talking about the middle of the fourth century there is no reason to believe that the function of the had changed since its establishment.
31 Politics, 1299b; 1322b; 1323a. Busolt, op. cit., p. 658.
governing body was small in number and that the conduct of foreign policy was in the hands of no more than eighty men. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the actual formulation and execution of policy was in the hands of the eight πρόεδροι who probably only referred general policies to the βουλή for approval and were given a free hand as to execution.

The mildness and equity of the Corinthian oligarchy are attested by Pindar and Herodotus but even more convincingly by the remarkable longevity of the regime. There seems to have been a harmonious arrangement whereby the two leading social classes cooperated in domestic and foreign policy. By the sixth century Corinth had become predominantly a commercial state, but the agricultural aristocracy continued to play an important part in the government. Policy was usually determined by the merchants and manufacturers whom I call the Oligarchs. The landed nobility, however, had representation on the βουλή, though probably not as a majority; this group I have called the Aristocrats. The lower classes had little voice in the government but at the same time had little cause for complaint so long as Corinth remained prosperous. Both peasantry and urban proletariat prospered

33 Pindar, Olympians, 13; Herodotus, II, 67.

34 See below, passim.

35 Plutarch, Dion, 53. At no time before the fourth century is there even a suggestion of democratic influence on policy.
under the benevolent oligarchy, and there was no reason for
the development of a political consciousness within the demos
until Corinth, at the end of the fifth century, faced the
economic consequences of the great Peloponnesian War. It
is not until the end of that war that it is possible to
speak of a Democratic party at Corinth.

36 The question inevitably arises: why did not Corinth
develop democracy as did that other great commercial state,
Athens? The most convincing answer may be found in the reforms
made by the Cypselids. The turning point in Corinthian his-
tory is the tyranny of Cypselus, as the crisis of Athenian
history is the archonship of Solon. Up to these points the
political, social and economic institutions of the two cities
were quite similar. Each was ruled by a narrow landed aris-
tocracy of birth. In each city the small farmer was finding
the pressure of large estates on the one hand and a new money
economy on the other too great to endure. In his reforms
Solon failed to attack the heart of the economic problem,
i.e., the redistribution of the land. As a result social
discontent was permitted to grow and fester. The tyranny of
Peisistratus reflected the depth of these pent-up feelings
by completely breaking up the great estates and destroying
forever the economic basis for aristocracy.

Cypselus, however, attacked the same problem boldly.
He confiscated the Bacchiad lands and used them to reestab-
lish the peasantry. He did not, however, break up the es-
tates of the non-Bacchiad aristocracy. As a consequence,
there no longer existed in Athens an economic basis (viz.
large landed estates) for oligarchy, whereas in Corinth an
agrarian aristocracy (although no longer Bacchiad) continued
to exist.

Again, the Athenian democracy owed much to the nature of
the Athenian Empire which arose after the Persian Wars. The
empire, in the last analysis, was based on force; since it
was a maritime empire, this meant the fleet. It was partic-
ipation by the common citizen as a rower in the navy that
gave the Athenian lower classes their chief claim to a share
in the government, a fact clearly recognized by the Old
Oligarch: "Προστρέψετε, καί την πολιτείαν την πλούσιαν καί
tην πεποίηταν διὰ τούτο καί την ελευθερίαν την πολεμίκην καί
tην δικαιοσύνην την προπίτως καί την απασχολήσεις καί την
δικαιοσύνην την προπίτως καί την δικαιοσύνην την προπίτως καί
The economic, social, and political legacy of archaic Corinth may be summed up as follows. The economy was a mixed one, but as the classical age approaches commerce becomes more important and agriculture slips to a more subordinate position. The class structure reveals an agricultural aristocracy, a well-to-do class of merchants and manufacturers and a demos composed of peasants and city workers. These are represented politically as the Aristocrats, Oligarchs and Democrats, respectively. The colonies, originally intended to absorb surplus population and to police the seas, are becoming more important for commercial and financial reasons.

For a period of over a hundred years (c. 550-421 B.C.) there was no major disagreement in foreign policy between the Aristocrats and the Oligarchs. The history of the sixth...
century shows that in general the Oligarchs guided policy and the Aristocrats acquiesced in it. The attack on Polycrates of Samos which Corinth urged on Sparta and took a leading part in herself was launched to stamp out the piratical raids of the Samian tyrant. Corinth supported Athens in her struggle with Aegina because of the latter's commercial and naval eminence. In each case the motive for Corinthian policy was commercial and of no concern to the Aristocrats, yet there is no evidence that they objected. These activities, however, took place in a period of prosperity and involved no great sacrifice on the part of Corinth. At the same time, the policy of the Oligarchs did not come into conflict with the major goals of Aristocratic policy, which was friendship with Sparta.

The chief aim of Aristocratic policy was alliance with Sparta, which provided agrarian security. The Oligarchs were just as anxious as the Aristocrats for stability at home. They opposed social change as much as the Aristocrats. They were not, however, like the Aristocrats, unalterably committed to Sparta and the League. If they should no longer find the alliance expedient they would not hesitate to drop it.

The history of the fifth century to the Peace of Nicias shows a continuation of the trends already noticed. The
ruling coalition held fast; the Oligarchs decided and executed policy and the Aristocrats usually supported it. During the Persian War there was complete agreement; both Oligarchs and Aristocrats supported the policy of the Peloponnesian League which opposed commitments beyond the Isthmus of Corinth. This policy reflected the disinclination of the agricultural class to defend any land but its own and the lack of interest on the part of the Corinthian merchants in the Aegean area.

The most important result of the Persian War from the Corinthian point of view was the rise to power of Athens. The naval policy of Themistocles had rapidly changed Athens from a state which had to borrow twenty Corinthian ships to fight Aegina in 487 to the leading naval power of all Greece. As long as Athens confined her activities to the Aegean, however, Corinth was not greatly concerned. Pericles, however, unlike his predecessor, did not ignore the possibility of expansion toward the west; his interest extended to Italy, Sicily and the western shore of the Balkan peninsula. The first evidence of these new ambitions was given in 459 when the helots expelled from Ithome were settled at Naupactus, on the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, under the aegis of Athens. Shortly thereafter

38Thucydides, I, 103.
Athens took advantage of a border dispute between Corinth and Megara to make an alliance with the latter and thus gain control of Pegae, an excellent port on the Gulf of Corinth. Athens increased its influence in this vital channel of Corinthian trade when Tolmides took Aetolian Chalcis in 455, and Pericles made an alliance with Achaea in 453. For the merchants of Corinth the situation was intolerable. They were shut up in their own harbor, their commerce at the mercy of Athens. The war which was waged to check this Athenian expansion, known as the "First Peloponnesian War," had the full support of both members of the Corinthian ruling coalition. The Oligarchs were fighting for their economic life while the Aristocrats were glad to oppose aggression on the part of a dangerous democracy, so long as it served the interests of Spartan diplomacy.

In 446 the Thirty Years Peace was concluded between Athens and the Peloponnesians. Under its terms Athens surrendered Nisaea and Pegae, the ports of Megara, and Achaea and Troezen as well. It is true that the Athenians still held Naupactus and may have continued to hold Chalcis, but by giving up Pegae they had ceased seriously to challenge Corinthian commercial supremacy in the west. Without an Isthmian port on the Gulf of Corinth, Athens would have to

39 Idem.
40 Ibid., I, 108.
make the long and arduous circuit of the Peloponnese, an insurmountable obstacle to successful commercial rivalry. After the Thirty Years Peace Pericles adopted a conservative policy which concentrated on the Aegean empire and abandoned the project of expansion to the west. Evidence of the new policy was given in 443, when Athens founded a colony at Thurii in southern Italy. Ordinarily this would have been a cause for alarm for Corinth. Pericles, however, made it clear that this was to be a panhellenic, not an Athenian colony, and sent envoys throughout the Peloponnese soliciting colonists from each state. The conciliatory attitude of Athens must have calmed the Corinthians and determined them to follow a policy equally conciliatory. When Samos revolted from Athens in 440 Corinth opposed intervention on the part of the Peloponnesian League. While Athens did not interfere in the Corinthian sphere of influence the merchant Oligarchs of Corinth were content to give her carte blanche in the east.

Tensions eased and peace continued until the crisis at Epidamnus in 436. Epidamnus was a Corcyrean colony but its oecist and some of its original settlers had come from Corinth. It had developed into a prosperous Greek outpost among the non-Hellenic peoples of the north and, as we have seen, was on the vital route from Corinth to the silver mines.

41 Diodorus, xii, 10, 3.
42 Thucydides, i, 41.
of Illyria. Like many Greek cities Epidamnus was often troubled by civil strife between oligarchic and democratic factions. In 436 a civil war resulted in the expulsion of the oligarchs who joined with some neighboring Illyrian tribes and attacked the city. The democrats within Epidamnus appealed to Corcyra but for some reason were refused. Next, they went to Corinth for aid. The Corinthians offered their assistance without delay. On the one hand they were anxious to assure the safety of their route to the Illyrian silver; on the other, they viewed this as a splendid opportunity to embarrass their traditional enemy, Corcyra. Therefore, they sent an expedition to relieve Epidamnus. The Corcyreans were angered and responded by blockading the city. When they heard, however, that Corinth was making serious preparations for war, they became alarmed and sent envoys to Corinth. They offered to submit the disagreement to arbitration if Corinth would withdraw its troops. Corinth, however, had decided to put an end once and for all to the threat posed by Corcyra and sent a fleet of seventy-five ships along with two thousand hoplites to engage the Corcyreans. Corcyra met this armada with a fleet of eighty ships and won a decisive victory. On the same day Epidamnus capitulated to the Corcyrean forces. Corinth had been humiliated.

For the next two years Corinth armed herself and prepared for revenge. It was not merely a matter of embarrassment and
loss of prestige; a strong and hostile Corcyra was a serious threat to the western trade and to access to the Illyrian silver mines. It was inevitable that Corinth would attack as soon as she was ready. The Corcyreans were members of neither of the great Hellenic coalitions of the fifth century. As the danger from Corinth became apparent Corcyra was alarmed at her isolation. An appeal was therefore made to the Athenians. Corinth learned of the negotiations and sent a delegate to Athens to argue her case. The Corcyrean argument was based on the assumption that a general war was inevitable. Besides pointing out the advantages of an alliance with a state situated on the main route to Italy and Sicily, they argued that Athens, opposed by the Corcyrean navy in addition to that of the Peloponnese would be at a disadvantage. They further suggested that such would surely be the situation if Corcyra were left to the mercies of a fully aroused Corinth. The speech of the Corinthian envoy in rebuttal is somewhat puzzling. It is delivered in a tone that is far from conciliatory; indeed it sometimes seems even arrogant. Furthermore, it makes no effort to counter the realistic arguments of the Corcyreans by showing the practical advantages to Athens of refusing the proffered alliance. Instead the speaker reminds the Athenians of past services rendered by Corinth and stresses the moral opprobrium that would attach to Athens as a state violating the peace. It seems almost as though the speaker does not want
to convince his listeners. Perhaps this was really the case. It is possible that the embassy was only sent as a concession to a peace party in Corinth, no doubt the Aristocrats. The whole prospect of war must have been distasteful to them, especially a war fought for colonial and commercial ends.

The Oligarchs, on their part, had no alternative but war with Corcyra. The defeat of Corcyra was necessary for their continued commercial supremacy, and if the cost of peace with Athens was compromise with Corcyra, that was a higher price than the Oligarchs were prepared to pay. A successful war against Athens, moreover, would remove the threat to their trade posed by Athenian control of Naupactus and Chalcis. Finally, the mounting irritation caused by Athenian rivalry, Corcyrean insult and actual defeat at the hands of their recalcitrant colony must have made the "war hawk" party in Corinth eager to square accounts on all sides.

The negotiations produced a defensive alliance between Athens and Corcyra which soon led to a naval encounter between Athenian and Corinthian forces off Sybota. Shortly thereafter, the affair at Potidaea found Corinthian hoplites in the field against Athenians. In effect, the war was on; it only remained for the fact to be recognized by all concerned. The winter of 432-431 was spent in debate at Sparta on the question of the declaration of war. The Corinthians spoke angrily and eloquently in favor, painting a dark picture of Athenian aggression and the dangers it threatened.
against all the Peloponnese. The decision was finally reached that Athens had violated the peace and that war should be undertaken against her. The question was then laid before a Peloponnesian Congress where a large majority endorsed the Spartan decision. Once again, as in the affair of Polycrates, the Corinthian Oligarchs had enlisted the services of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League as agents in what was essentially Corinthian policy. After this the Aristocrats could be counted on to support the war loyalty.

The Corinth that entered the Peloponnesian War was a strong and prosperous state. She was dedicated and united. The coalition which governed seemed stable and enduring. The underlying contradictions within it, however, were to be revealed by the wars, political upheavals and economic vicissitudes of the next hundred years. In the end, and more precisely at the time of the Peace of Nicias, 421 B.C., the interests of the Oligarchic party at Corinth appeared to be no longer served by friendship with Sparta, and the long domestic tranquillity between Aristocrats and Oligarchs came to an abrupt end.
CHAPTER II

CORINTHIAN DIPLOMACY AFTER THE PEACE OF NICIAS,
421-416 B.C.

One of the most puzzling periods in the history of
Corinth has been the one following the Peace of Nicias
(421 B.C.). Thucydides' account makes it plain that Corinth
played a very important part in the diplomatic maneuvering
of this critical time, but the nature of its aims, tactics
and achievements are far from clear in his narrative.

Modern historians have done little to clarify these
problems, partly because they have failed to approach them
from the point of view of Corinth and partly because they
have paid insufficient attention to the internal politics of
the various cities involved. The best contribution to an
understanding of this difficult time has been made by H. D.
Westlake who is the first to examine the diplomatic negoti­
tiations from the standpoint of Corinthian aims. He is able
thereby to arrive at a more satisfactory explanation than was
previously available. His conclusions may be summarized as
follows:

1See Karl Julius Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, (Ber­
lin, 1922), II, I, 344 ff; Gustave Glotz, Histoire Grecque
(Paris, 1925), II, 2, 658 ff; George Grote, History of Greece
(London, 1884), VII, 1 ff; W. S. Ferguson, "Sparta and the
Peloponnese," Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge, 1927),
V, 254 ff.

2"Corinth and the Argive Coalition," American Journal of
Philology, LXI (1940), 413-421.
1) The goal of Corinth in the period following 421 B.C. was the renewal of the war against Athens.

2) The tactic to be employed to this end was the substitution of Argos for Sparta at the head of the Peloponnesian League.

3) Corinthian policy was a failure, since this substitution was not accomplished.

4) Internal politics were not an influence in the conduct of Corinthian foreign policy.

With the first of these findings it is impossible to take issue. The other conclusions, however, are less compelling, and Westlake's examination of the internal political and constitutional situation at Corinth is less than adequate. When this situation is taken into account it becomes evident that Corinth's tactics were very much more complex than those described by Westlake. The fact is that the Corinthian policy was successful in its primary goal, and the course of Corinthian diplomacy was very much influenced by the internal politics, not only of Corinth, but of the other Greek states as well.

In 421 the Archidamian War had been in progress for ten years with disastrous results for Corinth. Not only had she failed to check Athenian advances and to recover her lost prestige, but also she had suffered severe additional losses. Athenian occupation of Aegina and Potidaea cut off her trade with the east, small as it was. Athenian victories in the
west and north, Phormio's naval triumph off Naupactus and the
democratic success in Corcyra completely destroyed Corin-
thetic trade with the west. The city which depended on trade
for her power and prosperity was shut off from all her areas
of trade. The Peace of Nicias concluded between Sparta and
Athens left Corinth with none of her war aims accomplished
and, indeed, far worse off than before.

With these facts in mind one can only agree with West-
lake that at this time the Corinthians aimed at "nothing
less than a renewal of the Peloponnesian War." The Corin-
thians, therefore, along with the other dissatisfied states
of Elis, Megara and Boeotia, refused to sign the treaty,
and after Sparta and Athens had concluded an alliance, went
to Argos to urge the formation of a defensive alliance under
Argive leadership.

The nature of the Corinthian overtures to Argos reveals
much about the domestic politics of Corinth, yet the signif-
icance of these strange proceedings in this regard has been
overlooked. The proposal for an alliance was made not in
public, in the assembly or the council, but "πρὸς ζύγων θῶν

3Westlake, loc. cit., p. 416. He goes on to say "with
the substitution of Argos for Sparta as the formal leader of
the adversaries of Athens." This statement goes too far.
Corinth never sincerely wanted to replace Sparta with Argos
but merely used the latter city as a pawn to get Sparta to
renew the war. See below.

4Thucydides, v. 17. 2.

5Ibid., v. 17. 2-3.
Moreover, applications for membership in the new league were not to be made, "πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ." Instead the Argives were asked to appoint "ἀνδρὸς διήγους ... ἀυτοκράτορας," in order that "μὴ καταφθανῇς γίνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πεισθεῖς τὸ πλῆθος." Having made these suggestions, the Corinthians went home without having entered into any formal agreement with the Argives.

What motivated the Corinthians to suggest such unusual arrangements? The exigencies of diplomacy do not provide an adequate explanation. Surely Corinth did not wish to keep her plans secret from the other Greek states to which she immediately repaired in the hope of persuading them to join in the projected coalition. Nor did she make any attempt to hide her negotiations from Sparta, for the Spartans were immediately aware of what had transpired. If Corinth wanted to form a new alliance, why, then, did she not announce her plans openly before the Argive people?

The answer is twofold: the Corinthian envoys wanted to keep the negotiations secret from the Aristocratic party in Corinth; and the Argive envoys wanted to keep them secret from the democratic party then in power at Argos. To undertake an alliance with democratic Argos at the expense of Sparta must inevitably incur the opposition of the Aristocratic party in Corinth.

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6Ibid., v. 27. 2.
7Ibid.
aristocratic party in Corinth. With Sparta out of the war and opposed to renewal, and themselves weary with ten years of hard and fruitless war, the Aristocrats surely viewed with disapproval an alliance with a democratic state for the purpose of renewing a mercantile war. The reason for the secrecy of the Corinthian envoys, the reason why they left Argos without striking a pact, is that the Oligarchs needed first to assure themselves of Aristocratic support at home. A similar situation existed in other oligarchic (e.g., Boeotia) states. Any envoy from an oligarchic state appearing in the Argive assembly to request an alliance ran the risk of stirring up an active opposition at home and nipping the project in the bud. One means of acquiring the necessary support would be to bolster the coalition with sound oligarchic or aristocratic members and in this way to remove the odium of democracy from it.

At the same time secrecy was necessary for the Argive negotiators too. They were ambitious magistrates, eager to seize the opportunity of increasing Argive power and prestige, but in their plan they were pursuing a new policy. An alliance with such oligarchies as Corinth and Boeotia was certain to encounter opposition on the part of the democrats. An open debate in the assembly would very likely put an end to negotiations before they were fairly started.

Thus, the machinery for secret application for membership in the proposed league had a threefold purpose. In the
first place it enabled states to apply, secure in the knowledge that their applications would remain secret if unsuccessful. Secondly, it made it possible for Argos to negotiate without the embarrassment of public debate. Finally, it permitted envoys of oligarchic states to negotiate without having to face domestic criticism beforehand. Underlying the entire plan was the notion held by all parties that the chief necessity was to produce a new coalition. Each party felt that when this was done the fait accompli would silence opposition at home. Each hoped to direct the league into channels of its own choosing once it had been formed, but speed in getting under way was of the utmost importance.

The Argives, therefore, accepted the Corinthian suggestions and carried them out with alacrity. They chose twelve men empowered to conclude an alliance with any Greek state except Athens and Sparta. These latter states were not expressly excluded from the alliance but, unlike the other states, they could not enter merely by negotiating with the Argive board of twelve. For them, a vote of the Argive demos was necessary for admission. At this point we get a glimpse of the extremely complex nature of the negotiations. What had brought together these states, having little in common, some even traditionally hostile, was a common belief in the desirability of creating a third force in the Hellenic world. The nature and purposes of this force, however, were viewed differently by each party. The goal of Argive foreign
policy from time immemorial had been the hegemony of the Peloponnese. She had lost this hegemony to Sparta in the sixth century and had been forced thereafter to accept a subordinate position. The situation in 421 seemed a golden opportunity for revanche. Sparta was weakened by the strain of the Archidamian War and by the defection of her chief ally, Corinth. Moreover, as Thucydides makes clear, the Argives were moved by the fact that their truce with Sparta was about to expire, and, if war should ensue, they would be in need of allies:

Argos expected, therefore, that the new coalition would be directed against Sparta and hoped to use Corinth for its own purposes.

The Corinthians, on the other hand, had wholly different intentions. Frustrated by their defeats, they were eager to resume the war against Athens. Their traditional policy had been to involve Sparta and the Peloponnesian League in their behalf. In 421, however, Sparta was war-weary and a peace party was in control. It was the Corinthian plan, therefore, to create a third force in coalition with Argos. By enrolling

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8 Ibid., v. 28, 1-2.
other oligarchic states they hoped to set the tone of the new coalition and to turn it against Athens. Argos, despite the ascendancy of the democratic party, could be moved to support the Corinthian policy by the overwhelming weight of the oligarchic allies. Such were the Corinthian aims.

Westlake sums up the situation as follows:

The Spartans would probably be ranged [in the event of a war between the coalition and Athens] on the Athenian side, but if all the principal states of the Peloponnesian were brought into the Argive coalition, Sparta would be hemmed in by a cordon of enemies and would be unable, as well as perhaps unwilling, to prevent invasion of Attica and attempts to break up the Athenian empire. Whereas the Argives at present regarded the war with Sparta as the chief objective of the coalition, the Corinthians probably hoped to reduce this to a purely defensive character.9

The hypothesis in back of this analysis (viz., that if war came Sparta would ally herself with Athens) is extremely doubtful. It was much more likely that, if the new coalition should attack Athens, Sparta would join it. The sight of Argos leading such a coalition would be too much for the Spartans to bear. Confronted with such a likelihood, Sparta would surely reassert her own hegemony rather than permit it to fall to Argos by default. This must have been the reasoning of the Corinthians from the very first. The overtures Corinth was making openly masked her ultimate purpose. From the beginning she intended to create a third force only as a last resort.

9 Westlake, op. cit., p. 416.
The Corinthian negotiators, therefore, were playing a highly subtle and complex game. In negotiating the new coalition they found it necessary to deceive not only the aristocratic opposition at home but the democratic faction in Argos as well. They were confident that, as soon as enough oligarchic states were drawn in, the Corinthian Aristocrats would support their policy; and that the presence of the oligarchic allies would serve as a check on Argive ambitions.

It is clear, then, that both at home and abroad Corinth's first interest was to induce the oligarchies to enter the coalition as soon as possible. This need became more urgent when democratic Mantinea became the first state to ally itself with Argos. At this point the Spartans, by no means ignorant of what was happening and quite aware that the Corinthians were the instigators (διδασκάλους) of the whole affair, sent envoys to Corinth in the hope of preventing the new coalition. They charged the Corinthians with provoking the whole movement and of violating their oaths by not accepting the peace of Nicias, since they had sworn to accept the majority decision, "ἡν μετὰ θείων ἡ ἡρωίων καλήματα ἡ." 12

10 To undertake such a delicate task bespeaks great confidence and diplomatic experience on the part of the Oligarchs of Corinth, a confidence that came from years of unchallenged and successful control of foreign policy. The skill of Corinthian diplomacy brings to mind another merchant oligarchy, equally adept in the diplomatic art and for the same reasons, i.e., Venice of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.

11 Thucydides, v. 29. 1

12 Ibid., v. 30. 3.
Thucydides' account of the Corinthian reply is interesting. He points out that the speech was made in the presence of those allies who had not yet accepted the Peace of Nicias, for the Corinthians had summoned them to be present. It must also be remembered that all this took place at Corinth, no doubt in the boulē, so that the Aristocrats must also have been present. The speech, therefore, was directed toward both these groups. Thucydides at this point makes his only claim to a knowledge of the secret motives of the Corinthians, for he realizes that their purpose is propaganda and that their true motives are suppressed:

\[
\text{'антέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονισί, ἀ μὲν}
\text{ἡμικοῦτο οὐ δηλοῦτες ἀντικρούσ \ δὲ}
\text{οὔτε στόλιον σφίσειν ἀντέλεγον παρ',}
\text{Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον ἔτε τι ἄλλο}
\text{ἐνόμιζεν ἐλαστοῦσθαι πρόσημα \ δὲ}
\text{ποιοῦμεν τοὺς ἐπὶ ἔρθες \ μηδηδέωσεν.}
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Thus, the Corinthian argument seems to have run something like this: "We have given our oaths to our Chalcidian allies. If we abandon them now it will be an affront to the gods and heroes. We are not unjust, but it is rather you who are cooperating with the enslavers of Greece who are breaking your oaths." The new coalition was made to appear as a continuation of the struggle against Athenian tyranny,

13 Ibid., v. 30. 2.
not a tool of Corinthian policy. Such an argument was calculated to impress the uncommitted oligarchies whose representatives were present but it was likewise aimed at the Corinthian Aristocrats.

This domestic situation helps to explain what followed. After the Spartan envoys left, their task unaccomplished, the Argive envoys who were present urged the Corinthians to put an end to delay and join the Argive league. Even at this late date, when the Corinthians had already made public their break with Sparta, when indeed Corinthian adherence to the new coalition would have helped convince hesitating oligarchies to enter, the Oligarchs who made policy delayed their decision and told the Argives to come again to their next assembly. The delay must have been caused by domestic opposition. As yet the Aristocrats had not been won over to a coalition with the democratic states of Argos and Mantinea. The power of the Aristocratic party to check the ruling merchant oligarchy is nowhere better demonstrated than at this point. If the Oligarchs were to carry through their policy it was imperative that they ensnare other oligarchic states immediately.

The first such state to make an overture toward the new coalition was Elis. Its enmity for Sparta derived from a

\[\text{Ibid., v. 30. 5.}\]
private quarrel and the Eleans determined to break with the Lacedaemonians. Significantly, the Elean embassy stopped first at Corinth. There they concluded an alliance with the Corinthians, after which they proceeded to Argos and concluded an alliance with the Argives. This action on the part of oligarchic Elis seems to have quieted the protests of the Corinthian Aristocrats sufficiently to permit Corinth to enter the league. They were followed immediately by the loyal and fiercely anti-Athenian Chalcidians.

With oligarchic Elea and Chalcidice in the fold the Corinthians next approached the Boeotian and Megarian oligarchies, likely candidates who were dissatisfied with the Peace of Nicias and had refused to ratify it. These, however, reflecting the sentiments of most Greek oligarchs, refused: "νομίζοντες σφόδρα τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὁλιγαρχομένοις ἀναύων εἶναι τὰς Λακεδαίμονίων πολιτείας." Disappointed but still hopeful, Corinth now turned to Tegea, a bulwark of the Spartan league whose defection would have been disastrous. This was the crisis for the Corinthian Oligarchs who needed to secure

15 Westlake, loc. cit., p. 417, says, "Whenever the Chalcidians are mentioned by Thucydides in this period, they appear in close association with the Corinthians who evidently represented themselves as the champions of a people betrayed by Sparta and likely soon to be subjected to Athenian attacks."

16 Thucydides, v. 31. 6.
more oligarchic support in the new coalition to counterbalance the influence of Argos and Mantinea. To be sure, the entrance of Elis had quieted Aristocratic opposition at home but only as a promise of things to come. The refusal of Tegaea to oppose Sparta, therefore, was a serious blow to the Corinthian scheme. As Thucydides says, "οἱ Κορίνθιοι μὲν τούτον προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνείσαν τῆς φιλονίκιας καὶ ύπρωδησαν μὴ οὖσις σφίσιν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων προσχερή." 17

Nonetheless, one last effort was made to save the entire plan. The Corinthians approached the Boeotians again, asking them to join in their Argive alliance. They further asked the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and procure for them from the Athenians the same ten-day truces which were the basis of relations between Boeotia and Athens. They further stipulated that if the Athenians refused, the Boeotians were to renounce the armistice and make no further truce without the Corinthians. In the matter of the Argive alliance the Boeotians asked for a delay; they did, however, go to Athens and request the extension of the truce to Corinth. Athens of course refused, since to make a separate peace with Corinth would be an admission that the Peace of Nicias was not binding on the Corinthians, a wholly untenable

17 Ibid., v. 32. 4.

18 Ibid., v. 32. 5.
position for the Athenians. Corinth must have anticipated this refusal and counted on it to bring Boeotia into the new coalition. But Boeotia failed them, and refused to break off relations with Athens in spite of Corinthian recriminations.

In this way the first attempt of Corinth to form a new coalition and renew the war seems to have come to an unsuccessful end. Westlake concludes that "Corinthian diplomacy thus failed utterly." This conclusion goes too far, as a careful investigation of the subsequent maneuvers of the Corinthians will show.

The Corinthian attempt to create a third force had, it is true, collapsed. Political and ideological ties with Sparta on the part of their own dissident Aristocrats and the Peloponnesian, Megarian and Boeotian oligarchies had proven stronger than dissatisfaction with the treaty of Nicias. It was clear now that Corinth's only hope for renewing the war was to approach Sparta directly. Thus Corinthian machinations entered their second stage.

The new policy aimed at restoring Spartan hegemony and persuading Sparta to resume the war against Athens. One of the great difficulties facing the Corinthians was the fact that the very ephors who had concluded the Peace of Nicias were still in office and seemed to have the support of the

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19 Westlake, loc. cit., p. 419.
citizens in their peace policy. Corinthian efforts, therefore, were directed toward producing a change in the government of Sparta. They backed the Spartan war party headed by Xenares and Cleobulus which was then out of power and, as the opposition, clamoring for a renewal of the war. As the Corinthians saw it, the best way to bring them to power and thus to lead Sparta into war was to confront the Spartans with an external threat. A menace from abroad would surely overcome her war weariness and natural conservatism.

As for the Aristocrats of Corinth, it was not difficult for the Oligarchs to persuade them to rejoin the Spartan coalition, since they had favored it all along. They could, moreover, be counted on to support a renewal of the war if Sparta were also involved. When, in the winter of 421-420, Xenares and Cleobulus, the leaders of the war party, were elected to the ephorate, the Corinthian aim seemed about to be achieved.

Corinth differed from the Spartan war party in regard to the means whereby Sparta would be induced to renew the war with Athens. Corinthian policy was based on the premise that, in spite of the strivings of the war party, Sparta could only be induced to renew the war if she felt herself

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It is not unlikely that the Corinthians used their influence to procure their election, for Thucydides makes it plain that henceforth the new ephors regularly worked in concert with the Corinthians and Boeotians (Thucydides, v. 36. 1).
seriously threatened. Since the obvious source of such a threat was Argos, it was the aim of Corinth to bring about an estrangement between Sparta and Argos even if that should lead to an alliance between Argos and Athens. Here again the diplomatic talents of the Oligarchs were tested. Xen­ares and Cleobulus and their supporters were anxious to renew the war against Athens, but by other means. They were confident that they could carry through their policy without outside help. They were, therefore, anxious to conciliate Argos, possibly even draw the Argives into an alliance, in order that they might be able to engage Athens without fear of Argive hostility. The Corinthians, however, judged the political situation in Sparta differently. They felt that the war party was too sure of its ability to persuade the Spartans to resume the war unless Spartan safety were threatened. Only by presenting an Argos hostile to Sparta could the Corinthians hope to induce the majority of the Spartans to support Xenares and Cleobulus and go to war.

Their cunning was put to an immediate test. Cleobulus and Xenares, not lacking in cunning themselves and anxious to create the most powerful coalition possible, contrived a clever scheme for throwing all these states under Spartan leadership. First, the Corinthians and Boeotians were to make an agreement; next Boeotia was to persuade the Argives to join. Finally, the Boeotians were to throw the whole group, including Argos, into the lap of Sparta.
It happened that, as the Boeotian and Corinthian envoys were leaving Sparta, they were accosted by two Argive officials who, unaware of the Spartan plot, were anxious to bring Corinth and Boeotia into the Argive coalition. The leaders of Argos, unlike the Corinthians, had not yet given up hope of creating a third force with their own state at its head. Mindful of their previous failure to enroll oligarchies, they implied that the new coalition would not necessarily be employed against Sparta. The Boeotians were most pleased at this opportunity to carry out the policy just agreed upon with the Spartans. They reported the matter to the boeotarchs who were equally delighted and immediately made arrangements to negotiate an alliance with Argos.

This turn of events must have caused consternation among the Corinthians. Were this alliance to be concluded the danger to Sparta would be removed, the war party would fail to carry the day and the war would not be resumed. To avoid this without giving away her position was now the aim of Corinth. The scheme she hit upon was simple but one that required a remarkably acute understanding, not only of the foreign policy of the Greek states but of their domestic politics as well. The account of Thucydides must be examined

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21 Thucydides, v. 37. 2: ἡνωμένης λέγει τοῦτον πρὸς ὅστις ἢμας ἔχει καὶ πολέμεως ἂν ἔχεις καὶ ἔπενεσθαί καὶ πρὸς ἀκεφαλίσθηκεν τοῦ μυρωμάτος, ἐν ἀδικία τούτου κοινώ λογίς χρημάτων, καὶ εἴ τινα πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι.
very carefully to understand its full significance:

Although Thucydides does not reveal who initiated the plan for a preliminary agreement between Corinth, Argos and Boeotia, it was certainly to Corinth's advantage to prevent the projected alliance between Boeotia and Argos. On the other hand, there was no good reason why Boeotia, and, for that matter, Megara, should seek to fortify their already existing friendship with Corinth by a formal treaty. The agreement by all the signatories not to engage in diplomatic negotiations without the common consent of the other parties made certain that any further agreements by any of these states would require ratification by all of them, including Corinth. In addition, since this treaty itself required ratification by the home governments, the Corinthians were successful in delaying the completion of the Spartan scheme.

The Corinthians were aware that the Boeotian constitution required ratification of such agreements by the four of the Boeotians. Generally such ratification was a mere formality, and the boeotarchs anticipated no difficulty

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22 Ibid., v. 38. 1.
In the present instance. In these troubled times, however, the conservative **bouλαι** were anxious to stay in the good graces of Sparta, and were wary of the tricky Corinthians. The latter were aware of the suspicions and anxieties that existed in Boeotia and made clever use of their knowledge. The overconfident boeotarchs simply presented the proposed agreement with Corinth, not daring to reveal that it was Sparta which had urged them to ally themselves with Corinth and, what is worse, with Argos as well. Much to the amazement of the boeotarchs, but quite naturally in view of the Boeotians' lack of knowledge, the **bouλαι** refused ratification:

"δεδιότες μη ἑναντία Λακεδαιμονίων πολέσωσι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι Κορινθίως βουλεύσαντες." 

The Corinthians, who were present at Thebes and remained there until ratification was denied, now departed for home, confident that the Spartan scheme had collapsed and the danger of a Spartan-Argive alliance was lost. As long as

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23 Ibid., v. 38. 3.

24 The foregoing reconstruction of the thoughts and actions of the Corinthian Oligarchs takes for granted an unusual insight on their part into the domestic politics of the various states. It will not, however, place too great a strain on credulity to grant such insight if an analogy is again made to Venice. The Venetian diplomats of the fifteenth century often knew more about the internal political conditions of the European states than did the native politicians. The long, uninterrupted experience possible under a firm oligarchy made for experienced diplomats who were keen and shrewd observers. Likewise, the information gained through commercial intercourse proved immensely valuable in assessing the political situation. The Corinthian policy was based on a close appreciation of strength of the war party at Sparta, an appreciation which very likely was more realistic than that party's own estimate.
Sparta feared a coalition between Athens and Argos the seeds of war were likely to take root.

Once again, to understand the maneuvers that take place it is necessary to have a clear picture of the political situation in each of the important states. Athens was divided between the peace party led by Nicias and the war party led by Alcibiades. It was to the interest of Corinth that Alcibiades should be in the ascendant, for the keystone of his policy was an alliance with Argos and a joint attack on Sparta. Argos, too, was divided politically. At this time the government was democratic and therefore anti-Spartan. The Argive democracy had recently taken the dangerous step of selecting and paying out of public funds a corps of one thousand troops to be trained as an elite military force, dangerous because most of its members, naturally, came from aristocratic families. The aristocrats were at any rate in the present circumstances philo-Laconians, and favored a Spartan alliance as much as they opposed an Athenian one.

The Corinthian task was made much easier by Alcibiades. After Corinth had wrecked the alliance between the Megarians and Boeotians on the one hand and Argos on the other, the Argives became alarmed at their isolated position and offered to make an alliance with Sparta. At the same

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25 Ferguson, loc. cit., p. 258.
time, however, Alcibiades came with an offer of a treaty with Athens which was more in accord with the desires of the Argive democrats, still in power, who readily accepted. It is a tribute to Corinthian subtlety that even at this point the Argives asked Corinth to join the alliance with Athens. The Corinthians, of course, declined, for the time for secrecy was past. Corinth's first goal had been achieved since Sparta was now confronted with the dreaded alliance of Athens and Argos. Now Corinth could come out into the open and urge the Spartans to resume the war.

In the summer of 419 the Argives invaded Epidaurus in the hope of bringing it over to the new alliance and keeping the Corinthians occupied with a threat on their flank. This played directly into the hands of the Corinthians who were eager for an opportunity to involve Sparta in hostilities. Epidaurus was a staunch oligarchy, a member of the Peloponnesian League, and under the protection of Sparta. If the war were permitted to continue Sparta would surely be drawn in and Athens might be involved as well. Fearing just such a possibility, the Athenian peace party called for a conference at Mantinea in a last-minute attempt to save


27*Idem., v. 48. It is here that the purpose of the Corinthians is clear to Thucydides, who says, "καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πάλιν τὴν γνώμην ἔχον.

28Ibid., v. 53.
the peace. The Corinthians, of course, were present to make sure that the conference would fail of its purpose and the war continue. Euphamidas, the Corinthian, arose and remarked that it was absurd to talk peace while the armies were in the field and fighting. As neither side was willing to withdraw its troops the meeting broke up. The peace party at Athens, however, did not give up hope and later persuaded the Argives to withdraw their troops. The reconvened assembly, however, was unable to reach an agreement, and the envoys returned to their respective cities having accomplished nothing. Thus, Corinth was able to keep the spark of war alive.

In the summer of 418, since the thirty years' peace with Argos had lapsed, the Spartans marched against Argos in order to defend Epidaurus. Here was the opportunity Corinth had been hoping and working for; she sent two thousand hoplites to serve under King Agis. At this point, once again, internal politics enter into foreign policy. Just as the two armies were ready to meet, two of the Argives, the general Thrasyllus and Alciphron, the latter the proxenus of the Spartans, went out to parley with Agis. Amazingly, they returned with a four-months truce and the battle did not take place. The agreement had been made solely by the

29 Ferguson, loc. cit., p. 268.
30 Thucydides, v. 55.
Individuals concerned, without any consultation with the Ar-
give democracy on the one hand or the Spartan magistrates
on the other. The action was unpopular with both sides, for
each army felt confident in its superiority. What is
the explanation for such strange and unusual behavior?
Subsequent events suggest that the two Argives, certainly
the leaders of the aristocratic faction, promised Agis that
a coup d'etat was forthcoming which would overthrow the
democracy and bring to power a government favorable to
Sparta. Such a development would make war unnecessary.
Naturally, Agis could not make this information public, but
the leniency shown him at home suggests that the ephors
were privy to the scheme.

Once again the Corinthian policy seemed to have been
thwarted and a renewal of the war avoided. Here again, how­
ever, Alcibiades came to the aid of the Corinthian policy.
He arrived at Argos with a thousand hoplites and three hun­
dred cavalry, gave support and encouragement to the war par­
ty, and led an expedition against Orchomenus in Arcadia.
The capture of Orchomenus infuriated the Spartans, who at
this time appointed a board of ten ευμβούλων as a check

31Ibid., v. 60.
32Agis was severely criticized and threatened with pun­
ishment. When he promised to atone for his error, "διὰ
τῶν καλῶν ἐργῶν " he was let off but was saddled with a
board of ten military advisers to watch his movements in the
future. The two Argives were stoned by the citizenry and
were lucky to escape with their lives; their houses were
razed and their property confiscated (Thucydides v. 60;
Diodorus, xii. 78).
on Agis. If the Spartans were angry with Agis, greater still was Agis' fury against the Argives who had embarrassed and betrayed him. At the battle of Mantinea which followed, Agis raged against the Argives and would have destroyed them all but was prevented by one of the συμβούλου, Pharax, who ordered him, "τοῖς λογίσαι δῶνει σίδανον." The ephors at Sparta had not yet given up hope of a successful aristocratic coup at Argos which would avert war and break up the dangerous alliance with Athens. The elite corps of aristocrats was therefore allowed to escape.

The calculations of Pharax were accurate, for in the winter of 418-417 the Argive aristocrats gained control of the city. Sparta's victory at Mantinea had damaged the prestige of the democrats of Argos and discredited their policy of cooperation with Athens. By sparing the aristocratic Thousand, the Spartans created a situation in which their partisans possessed the only military force in Argos. The Spartans took advantage of the situation to lead an army to Tegea on the Argive border and dictate terms of peace. With the threat of an aristocratic army at home and a Spartan

33 Thucydides, v. 63.
34 Diodorus, xii. 79.
35 Ibid. The text reads ἀρκουρίον which makes no sense. Reiske amended this to read λογίσας, which must surely be correct. The Teubner and Leeb editions accept his reading.
36 Thucydides, v. 78.
force on the frontier confronting them, the Argive demos was forced to acquiesce in the treaty.

Shortly thereafter, in accordance with their new commitments to Sparta, the Argives renounced their treaties with Elis and Mantinea and became, in effect, a Spartan satellite. The Argive aristocrats were rewarded for their efforts when the Spartans helped them put down the democracy and establish an oligarchic government in Argos.

Once more Corinthian hopes had been disappointed but again they were favored by fortune and the political instability of the Hellenic states. Seizing their opportunity while the Spartans were engaged in the celebration of the Gymnopaediae, the Argive democrats revolted and overthrew the recently established oligarchy. The revolution was marked by the familiar slaughters and exiles. The successful democrats immediately prepared to renew the Athenian alliance and to build long walls to the sea, a project in which they were aided by Athenian carpenters and masons. The Spartans finally realized the gravity of the situation in the winter of 417-416; they summoned their allies and marched out against Argos. Conspicuous by their absence were the Corinthians. They did not lend their support

37 Ibid., v. 82.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., v. 83.
to the expedition because they wanted it to fail. Its purpose was to restore the oligarchy and renew the Argive-Spartan alliance, the very opposite of what the Corinthians wanted; they therefore stayed home.

If the Spartans calculated on help from the Argive aristocrats they were disappointed, for the aristocrats were too weak to be of any use, and the expedition failed. In March Alcibiades arrived in the Argolid with twenty ships and deported the remaining oligarchs. The Argive democracy was saved, and saved, too, was the Corinthian plan for renewing the war. As long as Argos remained friendly with Athens and hostile to Sparta war was inevitable. Only a spark was necessary to set it off and the Sicilian expedition was to provide that spark.

It is clear from the foregoing account that Corinthian diplomatic operations did not cease when the original plan of an Argive coalition failed; on the contrary, only a shift in tactics took place. After failing to lure the Boeotians, Megarians and Tegeans into the new league, the Corinthians performed a volte-face and attempted directly to restore the hegemony of Sparta and to maneuver the Spartans into war. Their evaluation of Spartan politics convinced them that only the threat of an Argive-Athenian coalition could keep the war party in control. They therefore employed their diplomatic skill in preventing a coalition between Sparta and Argos which might have avoided war indefinitely. Their
efforts in this direction were decisive at crucial moments. A state of hostility was kept alive until war finally broke out. Thus, in no sense can the foreign policy of Corinth between 421 and 416 be considered a failure.
The Sicilian campaign of the Athenians offered the Corinthian Oligarchs another opportunity to achieve their goal, renewal of the war against Athens. There was no doubt now that Sparta would have to take up arms, however reluctant she was to do so. Alcibiades and the Athenians would seem to have played right into the hands of the Corinthians. In one sense this is true, since war now followed. In another sense, however, Corinth could well have wished that the Athenian attack had been less immediately directed against her own interests in the west. The Sicilian expedition, after all, was a full-scale threat to Corinthian mercantile economy.

Once the expedition had been undertaken, the Corinthians, of course, took a leading part in resisting it. Hermocrates

1Plutarch tells us that the rumor was current that the Corinthians had been guilty of defacing the Hermae, "ὅδε τοὺς Συρακουσίους ἐπολεκόμενος ἄντες, ὡς ἐπισκέψεως ἐσομένης πρὸς τῶν οἰλωνῶν ἢ μεταγενίσεως τοῦ πολέμου." (Alcibiades, 18, 3.) There is no proof of this charge and the Athenian populace in general did not believe it. The fact, however, that it could be put forth and gain credence is evidence of the general opinion that Corinth was dismayed by the threatened Athenian attack on Sicily and was prepared to take extraordinary measures to prevent it.

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the Syracusan urged that envoys be sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth begging for help. They arrived first in Corinth and found the Corinthians zealous for their cause; not only did they vote to send aid to Syracuse but even volunteered to send envoys to Sparta along with the Syracusans. These envoys were to help in persuading the Spartans not only to prosecute the war at home, "σαφέστερον...πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους," but even "ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ὠφελήσαι τενά πέμπειν." As it turned out the Corinthian help was not needed, for Alcibiades, now an Athenian renegade, appeared at Lacedaemon and his speech persuaded the Spartans to take action. Their decision was to send Gylippus as commander of the Syracusan forces. So great was Spartan military prestige that the mere sending of a general was considered to be a sufficient contribution. Gylippus ordered the Corinthians to send two ships to him immediately and to prepare the rest of their contingent for immediate action.

The importance of the quick action of Gylippus and the Corinthians cannot be overrated. Alarming reports came in that Sicily was already lost. Hoping only to save Italy, Gylippus set out with two Laconian ships while Pythen, with

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2Thucydides, vi. 34.
3Ibid. vi. 88.
4Ibid. vi. 93.
two Corinthian vessels, sailed quickly to Tarentum. The rest of the fleet, consisting of ten Corinthian, two Leucadian and three Ambracian ships, was to follow later. This early expedition was of the greatest importance for it won over to the alliance the Himerians, the Geloans and the Sicels. These peoples were to provide the bulk of the manpower to resist the Athenian attack and without the encouragement provided by the early arrival of Gylippus and the Corinthians, they might well have succumbed to Athenian power.

The most signal contribution to the Dorian cause in these early stages was made by the Corinthian commander Gongylus. He had been at Leucas with the rest of the fleet but had set out with great speed and was the first to arrive at Syracuse. There he found the Syracusans about to hold an assembly to discuss the abandonment of the war. His arrival and the promise of more aid to come averted the meeting and encouraged the Syracusans to continue their resistance. Shortly thereafter the remaining Corinthian ships evaded the Athenian blockade, crossed to Syracuse and their crews helped to build the crosswall that played such an important part in the battle for Syracuse. By this time it

5 Ibid. vi. 104.
6 Ibid. vii. 2.
7 Ibid. vii. 7.
was clear that a greater effort than had been expected would be required of both sides. The Athenians had sent home for fresh troops while Gylippus had gone out seeking reinforcements in Sicily. A set of Syracusan envoys was sent out at the same time to Sparta and Corinth asking for more troops.

In Corinth the Syracusan ambassadors were greeted as the bearers of good tidings, for they reported that the accounts of disaster in Sicily had been much exaggerated, indeed that the situation there had improved. This news seems to have emboldened the Oligarchs who took it to mean that their strategy in regard to Sicily had been well-advised. It also helped to convince the Aristocrats that a serious war-effort would now be justified. The Corinthians now agreed to send a force of hoplites to Sicily to be transported on merchant ships. They also manned twenty-five war ships to engage the Athenian patrol ships and thus permit their troop carriers to slip by the blockade.

Thucydides' account of the army sent by the Peloponnesians to Sicily makes it plain that the Corinthians played a leading role. The Spartans sent six hundred hoplites but they were either helots or neodamodes, the only Spartiate being the commander Eceritus; the Boeotians sent three hundred, the Sicyonians two hundred. The Corinthians sent 500 hoplites, although some of them were Arcadian mercenaries

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8 Ibid. vii. 17.
paid for from Corinthian funds. The twenty-five warships which permitted the army safely to reach its destination were, as has been stated, Corinthian.

It is also clear that the Corinthian contribution to the naval tactics of the Peloponnesians was decisive in withstanding the Athenians. Off Naupactus they engaged the Athenian fleet and, by thickening the prows of their ships, came off almost on equal terms. For the Corinthians, not to be beaten decisively was to win, as Thucydides remarks. The new tactic was later employed with great success in the harbor of Syracuse. Again, at this latter battle it was the Corinthian Ariston who devised the stratagem of providing the crews with dinner right at the seashore, thus enabling them to make a second attack upon the unsuspecting Athenians on the same day. This second engagement was the turning point in the Sicilian campaign.

The significance of the Corinthian contribution is made clear by the résumé of the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance at Syracuse. The Sicilians themselves, of course, provided the greatest force. Among the non-Sicilians, the Spartans furnished a commander-in-chief but no troops except

9 Ibid. vii. 24.
10 Ibid. vii. 39-40.
11 Ibid. vii. 41.
neodamodes and helots; the Sicyonians served under compulsion and the Boeotians made but a small contribution. The Corinthians alone supplied both a land and a sea contingent; moreover, the Leucadians and Ambraciots both fought "κατὰ τὸ Ἐννεάν" to Corinth, while the Arcadian mercenaries were hired and paid by the Corinthians.

In view of their zeal, their imaginative tactical innovations, and the importance of their military and naval contingents, it is not too much to say that the Corinthians made the most significant contribution to the defense of Sicily of any of the Peloponnesian states. Yet it is interesting that the resources of Corinth are small compared with what they were during the Archidamian War. At that time the Corinthians had gotten together a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships of which fully ninety were her own; in the Sicilian campaign the largest fleet gathered was twenty-five. Even as late as 418 the Corinthians could reluctantly send a contingent of two thousand hoplites to the Battle of Mantinea. To Sicily they sent only five hundred hoplites, some of whom were Arcadian mercenaries. Surely the differences in these figures cannot be attributed to lack of interest. Sicily and the west were the very basis of Corin-

12Ibid. vii. 58.
13Ibid. i. 48.
14Ibid. v. 57.
thian war aims. Her initiative and the size of her effort in relation to that of the other allies likewise make it clear that she was vitally interested in Sicily. The explanation for the smallness of her contribution must be that she was unable to do more. The fact is that she had already suffered severe economic damage from the Archidamian War. The Sicilian campaign is now taxing her resources again so severely that from 413 to 404 she is exhausted and takes little part in either the Deceleian campaign or the naval war in the Aegean. An indication of the weakness of Corinth at this time is the quota set for it by Agis when he was gathering a fleet of one hundred ships to engage the Athenians in 413. The Spartans and Boeotians were required to furnish twenty-five ships each, the Phocians and Locrians fifteen between them, the Corinthians fifteen and other minor states to fill out the rest of the quota. Here it is recognized that Corinth, a great naval power at the beginning of the war, cannot supply as many ships as either Sparta or Boeotia, both states without a naval tradition, and only as many as Phocis and Locris, two totally insignificant states.  

The causes and nature of Corinth's decline in power need to be carefully examined. In the period 421-404 B.C. the Corinthian military shortcomings were twofold: ships and hoplites. Her naval decline is clearly due to economic weakness. It cost money to man ships with rowers since the

15 Ibid. viii. 3.
Corinthian fleet was manned by mercenaries or by citizens of the lower classes who had to be paid for their services. The expense of building ships and fitting them out, moreover, was also great. At the start of the Peloponnesian War the financial situation of Corinth was sound. Trade with the west was lucrative and an ample supply of silver came from the mines of Illyria. The Archidamian War, however, changed this picture sharply. Athenian victories in Aemricia and Acarnania along with the naval victories of Phormio off Naupactus gave Athens control of Corinth's passage to the vital areas of the north and west. Corinthian trade and industry must have been severely curtailed if not altogether destroyed. Coupled with this disaster was the fact that Corinth no longer had easy access to silver. This combination of circumstances fully explains why Corinth could easily man fleets of seventy-five and ninety ships in the period 436-431, but could hardly provide twenty-five in 415 and be assessed at only fifteen in 413.

The inability to provide hoplites appears on the surface to be a manpower problem, but it too resolves itself upon analysis into one of economics. Certainly there may have been some depopulation such as accompanies many wars, but it is unlikely that it was significant at Corinth at this time. In the first place military encounters between

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16 See Chapter I.
hoplite armies were not usually productive of large casualty lists; furthermore, Thucydides tells us of only one major military engagement in which the Corinthians were involved and in this battle they lost only two hundred and twelve men from their entire army. It is unlikely, therefore, that Corinth suffered a major manpower loss at this time. Nevertheless, we are told that in 432 the Corinthians sent one thousand six hundred hoplites to raise the siege of Potidaea, while for the crucial battle for Sicily, seventeen years later, they could provide less than five hundred of their own hoplites.

The answer, of course, lies in the economic decline of Corinth. A hoplite soldier is one who can supply himself with a panoply, therefore a man of some means, at least in the "middle class." The bulk of this group derived its income from trade and industry and therefore suffered serious financial losses during the war. Many of them, apparently, suffered so severely as to sink below the hoplite level and fall either into a twilight area between hoplites

17 Thucydides, iv. 45.
18 Ibid., i. 29.
19 It is perhaps this hoplite class which possessed political rights under the oligarchical constitution of Corinth. This suggestion and others equally perceptive are made as obiter dicta by G. T. Griffith in his article, "The Union of Argos and Corinth," Historia, I (1950), pp. 234-256.
and demos or into the demos itself. The military result of these changes was the depletion of Corinth's hoplite army.

This economic decline among the well-to-do had its political consequences. The stability and the renowned moderation of the Corinthian oligarchy lends support to the idea that it was not a narrow one. The Cypselid reforms did not destroy a landed class, and this landed class continued to exist after the fall of the tyranny and to be one of the bases of the hoplite census. Now, however, the number who qualified for full citizenship was seriously diminished; the unity and solidarity of the moderate Oligarchs was dissolved. The déclassé must have been bitter over their economic, political and social degradation; they could no longer be counted on as loyal supporters of the status quo; indeed they may have felt that their interests now lay with the less privileged lower classes.

The lower classes themselves no doubt underwent some changes. Previously they had been docile and leaderless, seemingly without the desire or ability to better their position. Their docility was due in part to the general prosperity of the state. The damage to trade caused by the war, however, must have produced unemployment and hardship among the city demos. Hard times must have made them far less docile. At the same time they saw their numbers growing as the déclassé hoplites joined their ranks. These very newcomers could provide the leadership which the lower classes,
untrained and inexperienced in politics, had not been able to provide for themselves. Finally, the war had the effect of making the lower classes aware of their own importance. Corinth's main contribution had been naval and in the navy a mere rower was a significant individual. During the war Corinth's navy was bigger and in more frequent service than ever before in its history. It is very likely that the experience of regular service in the fleet made the demos aware of its importance to the security of the state and helped generate democratic ideas and sentiments. The result of all these circumstances is that there now arose for the first time an articulate democratic movement and it is from this time that it is possible to speak of a Democratic party at Corinth.

Finally, we must consider the Aristocrats. Of all the groups in Corinth they suffered least from the effects of war. Depending on land for their wealth, they were not hurt by the curtailment of Corinthian commercial activity. Moreover, the territory of Corinth was not periodically ravaged as was that of Attica so that their source of income was not seriously impaired. As a result they probably gained influence as the power of the Oligarchs was diminished. It is possible that the Corinthian inactivity in the latter

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20Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, l. 2. The Old Oligarch has pointed out the significance of a navy for the growth of Athenian democracy.
half of the war was due not only to the lack of resources of the state but also to the opposition of the Aristocrats as well.

Such then was the internal situation from 421 B.C. to the end of the war. It was a period of political realignment and uneasy tension. During the years 404-395 the Oligarchs remained in power, but it is obvious that the basis of that power was much narrower and that their hold on it was less secure than before. They now found themselves in an uneasy situation between two growing forces. Naturally the struggles between the two extreme groups concerned internal questions as well as matters of foreign policy. About these internal struggles both Xenophon and Diodorus tell us nothing; but the anonymous author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia makes one revealing statement. Indescribing the motives of the anti-Spartan groups at the start of the Corinthian War he writes that the hostility of the governments of Argos and Boeotia, and of the Democrats in Corinth, to Sparta derived from Sparta's support of the opposition in these several cities:

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 11. 2-3.
This passage states openly what has been conjectured on the basis of likelihood and supposition from later evidence, i.e., the fact that there was a revolutionary party, "οἱ μετασμέναι καὶ πράγματα ζητοῦσι" in Corinth before the outbreak of the Corinthian War. This group must have been the Democratic party. We are also told that the Spartans supported its political opponents, who must have been the Aristocrats. Beyond this we learn nothing of the domestic concerns of the parties. It is likely that these included attempts on the part of the Democrats to revise the franchise downward, to strip the aristocracy of some of its privileges, perhaps even to undertake economic reforms. About these we can only conjecture. Indeed, we must derive our knowledge of the political struggles within Corinth from their manifestations in foreign policy.

This is a handicap, but not such a serious one as might be thought. In Greek history the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, especially in the fourth century, is very close. Because of Sparta's championship of the cause of oligarchy, implemented after the fall of Athens by her policy of installing decarchies and harmosts where she ruled, and supporting oligarchic factions elsewhere, the relationship is easily discerned. Oligarchic parties of necessity favored a pro-Spartan policy, while democratic groups opposed it. It is, therefore, usually the case that when the foreign policy of a state supports
Sparta, the oligarchs are in the ascendent; when an anti-Spartan policy is pursued, the democrats are influential. With these principles in mind let us examine the policy of Corinth between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the beginning of the Corinthian War.

In 405 at Sellasia a congress of the Peloponnesian allies was held to determine the fate of the Athenians who were beaten and suing for peace. The Corinthians and the Thebans championed the point of view that Athens should not be permitted to negotiate at all but should be destroyed. This reaction no doubt reflected the unanimous opinion of all Corinthians, for all had good cause to be bitter against the Athenians. The Oligarchs, moreover, still ruled and they, perhaps more than any other group, had suffered from the war at the hands of the Athenians. Their desire for revenge was a natural one but they may also have been moved by the desire to be rid of a dangerous trade rival. The Spartans refused to destroy Athens, partly as a beau geste but perhaps more because they preferred to keep Athens a Spartan satellite and to use it as a threat to keep Corinth and Thebes in line.

In 403, however, the situation in Athens was no longer to the liking of the Spartans. The Thirty had been overthrown and the city was held by Thrasybulus and his dem-

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22 Xenophon, Hellenica, ii. 2. 19.
ocrats, a group hostile to Sparta. King Pausanias, therefore, led an expedition against the Athenians accompanied by all the allies except for Thebes and Corinth. These gave as an excuse their view that Athens had done nothing to break the treaty, but Xenophon points out that their true motive was the fear that Sparta would make Athens a mere instrument in Spartan policy.

Again in 399, Sparta undertook an expedition against Elis accompanied by all her allies, including even the Athenians; the Boeotians and Corinthians once again refused to take part. In neither case was Corinth's policy openly anti-Spartan, but rather one of protest and disassociation. The Oligarchs were not eager to resume fighting after the suffering their class had experienced in the late war. In the first place their present resources were not great. Secondly, their only sure ally was Thebes. Thirdly, the cost of a war would further diminish the economic power of their own class and strengthen the forces of aristocracy and democracy. Finally, an anti-Spartan policy was strongly opposed by the Aristocrats who were receiving support from the Spartans. Thus, internally as well as externally the Corinthian Oligarchs, though annoyed, were not willing to

23 Ibid., ii. 4. 30: "ἔστρετον δὲ τῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι ἐξεύρων ἀλκεδυναμίαν ἀνθρωποῖς τῆς τῶν Ἀθηνῶν κυρίων ἐποίησεν καὶ μετὰ πολέμουν.

24 Ibid., iii. 2. 25.
risk a war with Sparta at this time.

In 395, however, these same Oligarchs went to war against Sparta; obviously conditions must have changed in the elapsed period. In the first place the Thebans provided a casus belli by their invasion of Phocis in 395; secondly, the arrogance and imperialism of Sparta, even toward her former allies, had become much more unbearable in the last several years; finally Persia, eager to benefit by the discord between Sparta and her allies, had despatched its emissary, Tithraustes, with money to sow discord.

There were, of course, more remote causes for the revolutionary change in policy which now occurred in Corinth. At Plataea in 479 B.C. the Corinthians fought with an army of five thousand hoplites; at Nemea in 395, in a battle right on their own doorstep, in defense of their own city and while not engaged elsewhere, they could muster only three thousand. Moreover, at this same battle the Corinthians were represented by light-armed troops, a novel and significant development. The presence of a substantial

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25 Diodorus, xiv. 82. 2: "μεσομένην ἦν τῶν ἔλκαδαμων ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων διὰ τὸ βάρος τῆς ἐπιστασίας ἔστω ἐγγίζων καταλύσας ὑπὸ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως συμφωνούσας ἑξελεῖται.

26 A fuller account of the mission of Tithraustes may be found below, pp. 86-87.

27 Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 2. 17.

28 Ibid.
body of light-armed troops indicates the growth in importance of the lower class, who had up to now played but a small part in the military affairs of Corinth. (In only one previous battle do we hear of light-armed troops from Corinth: at Potidaea, where only four hundred were involved.) It was only now that valuable service in the army began to give the demos a realization of their importance to the state and a desire to share in its government.

Even the navy, which the Old Oligarch tells us was the cradle of Athenian democracy, had not served that purpose for Corinth. The Corinthians did not keep a sizeable navy in being in peace time, partly perhaps to avoid the expense, and partly to prevent the growth of democratic sentiment that accompanies regular service as an oarsman. In any case, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War they could put to sea with only thirty ships; this total was shortly brought up to seventy-five and finally to a total of ninety. Quick defeats at the hands of the Corcyreans make it plain that the crews were not well trained nor the fleet in good fighting trim. Moreover, in straining to man a fleet as quickly as possible, they were compelled to send to the rest of Greece for mercenary rowers who were offered high bounties. There are only two possible explanations for

29Thucydides, 1. 28.

30Ibid., 1. 32.
such measures: either the Corinthians had an insufficient number of skilled rowers at home or even at this time they preferred not to give their own lower class a chance to serve in the navy. Either alternative makes it clear that hitherto the Corinthian demos had little experience in naval service. The Peloponnesian War, however, especially the Sicilian campaign, had provided such an experience.

By 395, then, these changes had taken place: the lower classes had increased in number and importance; they had achieved military experience, while leadership was provided by the disgruntled men who had fallen from the ranks of the hoplite census. As the Democratic faction they were, of course, violently anti-Spartan. The leaders of the movement burned to regain status and power and realized that their cause was hopeless so long as a powerful Sparta supported the Aristocrats. They therefore embarked upon a demagogic program of agitation for war against Sparta.

The Oligarchs, however, were still in command. No doubt they were under pressure from the demagogues, but they would not have undertaken the war unless it suited their purposes and unless chances for success seemed good. The position of the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia was that Spartan support of the Aristocrats was the reason for the demagogues' hatred of Sparta. The demagogues, however, were not in power, so that we may dismiss this as only a contributing factor. It is also true that the Corinthians were
disappointed with their share of the booty of the Peloponnesian War. This, however, was as true in 404 as it was in 395, and so, while a contributing cause of the war, could not have been the basic motive in 395. The basic motives were, in fact, just two: first, the desire on the part of the Oligarchs to recover the prestige they had lost as a result of the unsatisfactory peace; secondly, their determination to regain the economic ascendency which the destruction of the Corinthian trading empire had taken from them.

Such a war, moreover, was in complete accord with the tradition of Corinthian foreign policy. Herself limited in military strength, she could never hope to dominate, yet she was strong enough to preserve the balance of power by throwing her weight on one side or the other. As early as 507 she had checked the advance of Cleomenes on Athens, fearing, perhaps, the rapid growth of Spartan power. In 492 she aided Athens in her fight to subdue Aegina, for the Aeginetans at that time had the most powerful fleet in the Greek world. In the so-called First Peloponnesian War she had opposed the growing power of Athens, and we have seen that she was the prime mover in molding a Peloponnesian coalition against Athens before the second Peloponnesian War. It was therefore perfectly consistent with traditional

31 Justin, v. 10. 12; Xenophon, Hellenica, iii. 5. 2.
Corinthian foreign policy to seek to prevent Spartan hegemony over Greece at this time.

Anxious to restore their lost prestige and economic stability, determined to revenge themselves on Sparta for its neglect of their claims and for its support of the Aristocrats, urged on by the demagogues and buoyed up by hopes of success and the promise of Persian gold, the Corinthian Oligarchs plunged their state into a war which, contrary to their expectations, was to put an end to their long period of control.
CHAPTER IV

REVOLUTION AND UNION WITH ARGOS,
395-386 B.C.

The significant and exciting events that took place in Corinth between 395 and 386 B.C. are crucial for an understanding of the internal political struggle in that city and of its foreign policy as well. Briefly stated these events consist of an internal upheaval, a political massacre on a holy day, the expulsion of a body of citizens from the state, the willing submission of proud Corinth to a neighboring state, the forcible restoration of the exiles and two complete reversals in foreign policy. Many of the problems raised by these events have not yet been adequately treated by modern historians. Curtius and Beloch exhibit the best basic understanding of the situation, but even they neglect to press their inquiry deeply enough into the circumstances and their meaning.

Cary dismissed the period with a brief comment:


By 393 B.C. the Corinthian land owners began to agitate for peace. But the Corinthian war-party met this clamor by instituting a massacre among its opponents and calling in a garrison from Argos. For the rest of the war Corinth remained under Argive control; nominally it was even absorbed into the Argive state and stood to Argos as Acharnae or Marathon stood to Athens. Some Corinthian dissentients nevertheless contrived to admit a Spartan force within the Long Walls.\(^3\)

This account leaves all the problems unsolved, and some indeed unstated. What was the "war-party"? Why did it resort to massacre to obtain its ends? How was it that a free and independent Corinth voluntarily entered into a subservient relationship with Argos? Who were the Corinthian "dissentients" who plotted to betray Corinth to Sparta? Finally, what were the motives of the different parties involved?

Bury goes into more detail:

In Corinth itself there was a considerable party favorable to Sparta. This party seems to have arranged a plot for violently overthrowing the oligarchy which was in power; but the design was suspected and prevented by the government who caused the friends of Sparta to be massacred in cold blood, in the marketplace and theatre, on the last day of the feast of Euclea. The Corinthian government at the same time drew closer the bonds which attached it to the enemies of Sparta. By a remarkable measure Corinth and Argos united themselves into a federal state; the boundary pillars were pulled up; the citizens enjoyed common rights.

Thus, Bury identifies the government in power as an

\(^3\) Cary, op. cit., p. 48.

\(^4\) Bury, op. cit., p. 546.
oligarchy and Cary's "dissentients" as a pro-Spartan group, without further elucidation. He also recognizes that the union with Argos was a "remarkable measure" but makes no attempt to explain it.

An even fuller explanation is attempted by Grote. First, he enumerates the motives that might have affected the peace party, viz., the loss of the cultivable plain between Corinth and Sicyon due to the ravages of war; the burden of constant military service; the fact that the damage had been done exclusively to Corinth as the major theatre of war; the fact that Corinth served as a garrison for the allied forces; the fact that the Spartan defeat at Cnidus removed a major motive for continuing the war; the rebuilding of the Long Walls at Athens, which again made that power a threat to Corinth; and, finally, the war around Corinth which must have diverted trade from Corinth to the peaceful Piraeus. "Fostered by this pressure of circumstances," Grote continues,

the discontented philo-Laconian or peace party which had always existed at Corinth, presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with sufficient publicity, to give much alarm to the government. The Corinthian government had always been, and still was oligarchical. In what manner the administration or the council was renewed, or how long individuals continued in office, indeed we do not know. But of democracy, with its legal popular assemblies, open discussion and authoritative resolves, there was nothing. Now the oligarchical

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5 Grote, op. cit., p. 387.
persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliances with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the sentiment towards Sparta.

Grote goes on to point out that under oligarchic government there is no legal means for a powerful opposition to make its wishes effective nor is there any peaceful means of influencing public policy. The oligarchic administrators, therefore, when informed of the designs of the opposition, could only anticipate a plot. With this in mind they resorted to a coup d'état and, with the aid of the Argives, fell upon their opponents on the last day of the festival and murdered some one hundred and twenty of them.

Grote proceeds to give an account of the union with Argos which followed:

The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the two territories were pulled up, and the city was entitled Argos instead of Corinth (says Xenophon). Such was probably the invidious phrase in which the opposition party described the very close political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian mercenaries under Iphicrates and some Boeotians as a garrison in the port of Lechaeum. Most probably the government remained still Corinthian, and still oligarchical as before.

This interpretation presents some serious difficulties.

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6The number given by Diodorus, xiv. 86. 1 and accepted by Grote as "very credible."

7Grote, op. cit., p. 390.
The first of these concerns the massacre of the conspiratorial peace party. Grote would have us believe that a reigning oligarchic government, having at its disposal not only an army in the field, but the armies of the Argives, Athenians and Boeotians as a garrison within the city, would find it necessary to resort to a pollution of a sacred festival with mass murder in order to put down a conspiracy, as yet only suspected, and involving fewer than seven hundred active plotters.

The second difficulty arises over the union with Argos. Grote's account seems to indicate that the Corinthian government which was and had always been an oligarchy and which had just strengthened its position by destroying the opposition on the right now permits itself, for no apparent reason, to sink to the level of an Argive satellite. The motive for such an action remains a mystery which Grote has not solved.

A key to the solution of all these problems may lie in a brief passage in Diodorus Siculus:

8Diodorus' figures of 120 slain and 500 exiled are also accepted by Grote.

9Diodorus, xiv. 86. 1. The manuscript reading here is ἐπὶ θεότητα φόνον ἐποίησαν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιθρώνον τὴν πόλιν, an obviously corrupt reading. Wurm's emendation, ἐπὶ δημοκρατίας ἐπιθρώνον, is here accepted.
Here, if Wurm's emendation is correct, Diodorus states that the slaughter was perpetrated not by the ruling oligarchy for the purpose of suppressing a coup d'etat and keeping the peace, but by "certain men" who were making a revolution in order to achieve democracy.

Beloch, obviously on the basis of Wurm's emendation, writes: "Kam es in Korinth zu einer demokratischen Revolution; die angesehensten Männer der oligarchisch-lakonischer Partei wurden getötet oder verbannt; Korinth verzichtete freiwillig auf seine Autonomie und trat in dem Argelische Staatsverband ein." Curtius also recognizes the affair as a democratic revolution, and goes further than Beloch by explaining that the party of Argolizers was formed from the democrats.

The explanations of Beloch and Curtius are good, so far as they go. They do not, however, go far enough. This inadequacy lies in the fact that they, like their English colleagues, continue to describe the situation in terms of just two political parties. According to Bury these are "a party favorable to Sparta" and "the oligarchy" or "the government"; for Cary they are "the war party" and "the dissentients"; Grote speaks of the philo-Laconian or peace party.

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10 Apparently Cary, Bury and Grote do not accept Wurm's emendation.

11 Beloch, op. cit., p. 79.

12 Curtius, op. cit., p. 258.
and the anti-Laconian oligarchy; for Beloch they are "die oligarchisch-lakonische Partei" and the democrats; even Curtius, whose understanding of these events is very penetrating, speaks only of the Democrats and the Aristocrats.

Moreover, while each sees two parties, they differ in defining them and in distinguishing between their policies. All agree that there is a pro-Spartan, oligarchic or aristocratic party which favors peace. Here, however, agreement ends. For the English, the other party is the governmental oligarchy which was in power before the massacre, committed the massacre, and stayed in power afterwards. For the Germans, the other party is the Democratic, which carried out the slaughter and took over the government as a result of it. The English err in ignoring a democratic party which existed; the Germans in ignoring an oligarchic group which was in power at the time of the massacre, but which, unlike the aristocratic peace party, favored the war.

The difficulty disappears as soon as one assumes the presence of three political parties in Corinth at this moment. These were: (1) the Democrats, who favored the war against Sparta and a democratic government at home; (2) the Oligarchs, who favored the war but supported oligarchy at home; and (3) the Aristocrats, who favored peace, an alliance with Sparta and Aristocratic control in Corinth.

Ibid.
In the light of this hypothesis, Xenophon's account of these events (the most complete that we possess) becomes more intelligible. First, he tells about the plot of the peace party:

According to Xenophon, war casualties and devastation of farm land are the chief causes of discontent. Those primarily affected, and thus in favor of peace, are two groups, identified as οἱ πληστοὶ and οἱ βέλτιστοι. The former are undoubtedly the peasants and a part of the city demos. The agricultural lower classes were badly hurt by the damage to their property resulting from the war which had also caused them to lose sons and brothers in battle. The city demos had also suffered war casualties and the destruction of Corinthian trade had made them experience economic privation too. The combination of these troubles had made the lower classes war-weary.

Οἱ βέλτιστοι, of course, refers to the aristocrats.

14 Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 4. 1.

15 In discussing Greek society and politics the term has a technical meaning and is equivalent to and interchangeable with καλὸς κἀγαθὸς. As Gomme puts it, "καλὸς κἀγαθὸς," in fact, like nobleman, is an exclusive term applied to a small body of "οἱ βέλτιστοι ἀγαμέμνονες." A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Oxford, 1956, III, 731.
As landowners and friends of Sparta, they were, of course, opposed to the war from the start. Now they were anxious to use popular discontent to unseat the Oligarchs and end the war.

Next, Xenophon undertakes to describe the group that undertook the prevention of the Aristocratic coup:

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Rhodian with money to be distributed where it would do the most good for the purpose of fomenting trouble for Sparta. Timocrates went to Thebes where he chose as the men most suitable for the task Androcleides, Ismenias and Galaxidorus; at Argos he turned a sum over to Cylon and his party; at Corinth he entrusted a fund to Timolaus and Polyanthes. These men were the leaders of the popular parties in their respective cities; at Corinth, for instance, Timolaus and Polyanthes were the demagogues who led the revolutionary faction. It stands to reason that the Persian diplomat would choose to bribe those men who had good reasons of their own to want war with Sparta. Indeed, in this as in other cases of Graeco-Persian intrigue, the money is less a bribe than a subsidy for the instigation of hostilities.

In Corinth, the demagogues at this time were of necessity anti-Spartan. They knew that oligarchy was secure. 

17Ibid., iii. 5. 1.

18Compare the sum received by Demosthenes from the Great King to stir up war against Philip.

19Plutarch (Agesilaus, 15. 6.) corroborates this judgment: 

He does not mention Corinth but it is clear that the pattern was a general one and must have held good in Corinth too. Two facts are made clear by this passage; in the first place it was the popular party in each state which was counted on to oppose Sparta and in the second, it was the leaders of that party, the demagogues, who were entrusted with the Persian gold. One must distinguish between the demos and the demagogues. The Corinthian demos was, if not entirely inarticulate, at least politically immature. We find it, for instance, in alliance with the Aristocrats against the war.
in Corinth as long as Sparta, with her system of decarchies and harmosts, held the hegemony in Greece. Timolaus and Polyanthes, the leading demagogues, could be trusted to use the funds as effectively as possible, for in furthering the aims of Tithraustes they were helping their own cause as well. Their job was to agitate and propagandize for war among the ruling Oligarchs, who were not so closely attached to the Spartan alliance as were οἱ θεσπολισταί, and they did it well.

There were three groups, then, who took part in the massacre, and each group had different motives. The Argive, Theban and Athenian allies were interested primarily in preventing a coup which would deliver the gateway to Central Greece into the hands of the Spartans. Besides, they were glad to support a democratic movement. Athens had long been the champion of democracy; Argos and Thebes, too, were under democratic governments at this time.

The Oligarchs feared for their personal safety and their position of honor in the state. The aristocratic plot was aimed at them, but even if they could escape destruction at

The demagogues, on the other hand, were political adventurers (Timolaus is a good example -- now pro-Spartan, now anti-Spartan) who sought to throw political power to the demos in order to achieve political leadership for themselves.

Xenophon, Hellenica, iii.5.2.
the hands of the Aristocrats, the restored power of Sparta could only result in disaster for those who had to bear the responsibility for entering the war against the Lacedaemonians.

Powerful as these motives were, the motives of the demagogues were still more compelling. There was, of course, the same threat to the personal safety of the democratic leaders for their part in fomenting the war. For them, however, unlike the Oligarchs, the situation also presented an opportunity. Ordinarily the chances of the demagogues to seize power in Corinth would be small. Oligarchy was the only form of government associated with Corinth since the fall of the Cypselids. The presence of a well-disposed allied army which could be used to overawe the ruling classes offered a golden opportunity for the demagogues to gain control. Finally, they were moved by the anger and resentments of a déclassé group, embittered by their loss of status and eager for revenge.

The demagogues, then, supported by the Oligarchs and

21. The situation is closely analogous to the one that prevailed in Greece at the time of the civil war at Corcyra, during the Peloponnesian War. The remarks of Thucydides in that connection are appropriate here too: οὔτως ἦν ὁ στόχος προμηθήη καὶ ὑδαιμόνι, ὥσπερ ἐν τούτῳ πρώτῳ ἱερεῖ, ἢ μεν ὅστις τε καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερών ἐκείνων, διὰ διεργασίας ὑποκείμενων τε τῶν δήμων προστάτων καὶ ἀθηναίων ἐπίσκεψις καὶ τοῖς ὀλυμποσ καὶ ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἐν μέν εἰρήνῃ ὥσπερ ἐν ἱερεῖς πρόφατος ὡδ' ἑτοιμοῖ περικλῆι τοῦτον τολμήσαντες δεῖ καὶ συμμετέχει ὑπὸ ἱεράς τοῦτον τὸν ἑσφαλήν καὶ σφαλῆν συνέχει ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσπομηθής ρήτορος ὡς ἐκ παρακόπτως ταῖς νεωτεριζέν τι βολημένων ἐταχείοτο.
the allies, took the lead in planning and executing the massacre. The frightfulness and terror of the slaughter bear the unmistakable signs of long-repressed class hatred bursting forth with a fierce and sudden passion. The day chosen was the last day of the festival of Artemis Euclea; to commit murder on such a day was among the Greeks truly το πέντεν νοσιώματον. The victims were unarmed, some standing and talking with their friends, others in the theatre, one acting as a judge in a dramatic contest. When the situation became known, the Aristocrats fled to seek safety, some to the statues of the gods in the market place, others to holy altars, for these places were recognized sanctuaries under the Greek religion. Xenophon, with the righteous indignation of a pious gentleman and aristocrat, gives a vivid account of the proceedings:

Some of the younger Aristocrats had apparently been informed of the massacre beforehand and were in hiding while it was taking place. When they heard the uproar they came out to give assistance to their comrades but were intercepted

22 Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 4. 2.
23 Ibid., iv. 4. 3.
by an Argive force and compelled to take refuge outside the city limits. After some deliberation the more reactionary of them and, therefore, the ones most hated by the Democrats, chose exile in Sparta, while the more moderate of them yielded to the entreaties of their families and a promise of amnesty, and returned to Corinth.

What followed was the remarkable union of Argos and Corinth. The nature of the union has been and remains something of a mystery. The Corinthian motives have likewise been difficult to explain, but they become clearer in the light of the present analysis. In this respect, the brief account of Xenophon is very illuminating. He tells us that the Aristocrats were outraged:

That a free state should voluntarily give up its identity and autonomy requires explanation, especially in the light of the Greek passion for self-government. What then was the political situation in Corinth that brought about such an extraordinary step?

After the massacre of the Euolea the extreme right of the Aristocratic party was in exile. Some Aristocrats had

24 Ibid., iv. 4. 6.
been wooed back by the amnesty, but their voice in the conduct of affairs must have been small indeed. The Oligarchs remained, but their relative position of power was weakened. Previously they had served as the mean between the extremes of democracy and aristocracy and had maintained the support of the majority on that account. Now, with the Aristocrats either exiled or of no account in the state, this balance was upset. The demagogues, furthermore, had successfully instigated and carried out the coup d'etat. To them, no doubt, went the greatest share of the credit for saving the state from the Laconizing conspiracy. They were also backed by the troops of the allies who favored them because they were democrats and were most loyal to the anti-Spartan cause.

Under these conditions power must have gone to the leaders of the democratic faction. This is what Xenophon means when he says "Τοὺς ἐν συνάμει ὄντος τυραννεύοντες ." In Greek politics tyranny was closely connected with the lower classes. In Corinth, in Argos, in Athens, tyranny had represented the attempt of classes out of power to destroy a narrow ruling oligarchy. Later ages might applaud tyrannicides but the period of tyranny had served the necessary purpose of doing away with entrenched oligarchy. In the passage cited above Xenophon is giving the reasons for the treason of those aristocrats who returned to Corinth after the massacre. From their point of view the new rulers of
Corinth were ruling like tyrants, that is, attacking oligarchy. The obvious implication is that the demagogues were masters in Corinth after the massacre.

Indeed, Xenophon only states what logic demands. If the demagogues were not in power the union is inexplicable; if they were, it becomes intelligible. The union was brought about by the leaders of the democratic party to insure their continuance in power. It was a drastic step but one amply justified by the political experience of Corinth. Democracy was never strong there, as evidenced by the universal recognition that its government had always been oligarchic and by the fact that this government of the demagogues had been imposed by means of a violent massacre in time of war and under the aegis of foreign arms. The Democratic leaders could not but believe that a government so established would be ephemeral and must collapse as soon as the foreign troops were withdrawn. The union with Argos, therefore, was a device to protect the new regime. Subordination to a foreign state was much to be preferred to the certain fall from personal power that must follow the failure to take such a step.

The attitude of the Oligarchs must have been one of half-hearted support. As leading citizens of proud Corinth they could not have been pleased to see their city sink to the level of an Argive satellite; yet the alternatives were not appealing. To oppose the union openly would have been
futile so long as the demagogues, supported by the allied troops, were in control. To plot secretly with the Aristocratic émigrés may have been even more dangerous. The most obvious danger was that the Oligarchs had incurred the hatred of the Spartans by entering the war against them. But even if they received promises of amnesty from Sparta and the Aristocrats, the moderate Oligarchs of Corinth might well have remembered with a shudder the fate of Theramenes.

The Democrats, then, with or without the support of the Oligarchs, accomplished the synoecism. The Aristocrats, however, both at home and abroad, did not meekly acquiesce in the new arrangement. Those in exile at Sparta were from the first dedicated to the overthrow of the new regime and the establishment of an Aristocratic government; their brothers in Corinth had even stronger reasons for overthrowing the demagogic tyranny. Xenophon's statement that the Aristocrats now had less power than resident aliens indicates the depth of their degradation. Specific references are scarce but it seems likely that this was not the only change of a social or economic nature carried out by the new rulers of the state. Many Aristocrats must have reconsidered

25 See Xenophon, ii, passim.

26 Ibid., iv. 4. 6: "Ιν δή τῇ πόλει μεταξὺ μεν ἔλεγεν δυνάμεις."
It is true that a similar complaint is made by the Old Oligarch (Constitution of the Athenians, i, 10) where the aristocrats had not lost the franchise. The Athenian democracy, however, was the product of evolution, not revolution; the bitterness of both demagogues and Aristocrats makes it seem likely that the Aristocrats were stripped of their political rights.
somewhat ruefully their decision to return to Corinth, and the union with Argos, with its promise of maintaining the regime of the demagogues indefinitely, made them regret that they had not joined their friends in exile. Xenophon expresses their feeling that life under demagogic rule would be unendurable. He tells of their determination, "τὴν πατρίδα, ὥσπερ ἦν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Κορινθών ποιήσας καὶ ἔλευθεραν ἀποδέχονται καὶ τῶν μὲν μεισθόνων καθαρῶν, εὐνομίας δὲ χρωμένην."

27 Ibid. A useful clue to the nature of the political struggle and of the polity they planned to restore is supplied by the term εὐνομία, which can be translated "orderly government" but often also has a technical sense. It is precisely the term used by the "Old Oligarch" to describe the regime advocated by the aristocratic party at Athens. He says: "'εἰ δ' εὐνομίαν ζητεῖ, πρῶτα μὲν θείας τῶν δεξιωτῶν αὐτοῖς τῶν νόμων τεῖχεν: ἑπέτεια κολέσσον τοῖς λαλομοι τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ βουλεύσωσι τεχνοτρόποι περὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὖν οἰκοδομῆς μελομένως θυσίαν του πειράσοντα βουλεύειν οὐδ' λέγετι οὖδ' ἐκπληρεῖται. (Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1. 9). From this it is quite clear that to the Athenian aristocrat, at least, εὐνομία meant oligarchy of the strictest sort. The same word is used by Herodotus to describe the Spartan polity set up by Lycurgus (1. 65) and by Pindar (Olympian, xiii) to describe the Corinthian polity of his time, each without doubt an oligarchy. Xenophon as an Athenian aristocrat may even have read the Old Oligarch's pamphlet, but in any event he must have been aware of the oligarchic connotations of εὐνομία and used the term advisedly. It is plain that one of the major aims of the Aristocrats after the revolution was to restore some kind of oligarchy, probably a narrower one than before. If this were not possible they would at least suffer an heroic end: "τῶν γὰρ καλλίστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἄρχομενοι ἀρετομοντᾶς τελευτᾷς εὐχείν..." (Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 4. 6).
The first move of the Aristocrats in Corinth was to attempt to betray the city to the Spartans. Accordingly two of them, Pasimelus and Alcimenes, crept out of the city and met with Praxitas, the Spartan polemarch, who was at Sicyon. They promised to give him entry to the Long Walls which connected Corinth to Lechaeum, its port on the Corinthian Gulf. When Praxitas was ready, the two conspirators contrived to be sentinels at the proper gate. The Spartans entered by night and seized Lechaeum and its dockyards. On the next day they were attacked by an allied force under the Athenian Iphicrates which they repulsed with great loss. This attack deprived Corinth of its great commercial port, and was a serious blow to an already damaged economy.

Thereafter, the war lapsed into a series of skirmishes carried on indecisively in the neighborhood of Corinth. Neither side employed large numbers of citizens but each used mercenaries based at Corinth and Sicyon. While the demagogues were waging war as fiercely as possible, the émigrés did their utmost to help the Spartans. In addition to serving with the Lacedaemonian army they were in an excellent position to advise their allies how best to damage the Corinthian state. The attack on Lechaeum was designed to squeeze the democratic regime economically. With the Corinthian economy already damaged by the destruction of the fertile plain between Corinth and Sicyon and the western trade completely cut off by the loss of Lechaeum, the city
was left with few resources. Conditions in Corinth must have become difficult indeed; nonetheless, the war went on with no sign of defection from the democratic cause. In fact, the war was concluded not by a military victory on either side, but by the King's Peace (386 B.C.). The Persian government was finally persuaded by the Spartan diplomat Antalcidas that a revived Athens was a greater threat than a Sparta, chastened by Conon at Cnidus and Iphicrates at Corinth. Artaxerxes threw the entire weight of Persia on the side of a general peace that restored the status quo ante bellum, and, by implication, Spartan leadership of Greece under the aegis of the Great King.

28 How thorough the émigrés were is shown by their advice to Agesilaus to attack the Pelopaeum. This was a mountainous peninsula on the northwestern side of the isthmus; it was of no strategic value but the émigrés knew that the Corinthians had moved their cattle thither and that it was an important source of food to them (Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 5. 1). Agesilaus led an expedition which met little resistance; he seized the cattle and the crops, turned over all who had been involved in the massacre to the wrath of the émigrés and sold the other citizens into slavery.

29 The treaty stated: Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δέκαν τὸς μὴν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ πόλεις ξανοῦν εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων κληρονόμων καὶ κυριακῶν, τὸς ἐκ ἐλλήνων Ελληνίδος πόλεις καὶ μυκηνῶν καὶ μεγάλας εὐκομίους ἐδέσεις πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Μυλησίας καὶ Σάμου τοῖς δὲ μίσοις τῷ ἀρχαίῳ εἴναι Ἀθηναίων, ὀνείροις δὲ πεπήρεν τὴν εὐθυράχνην μὴ δέχοντας, τοῦτος εἰς πόλεμον μετὰ τῶν τοῦτο μετα φυλακᾶς καὶ περὶ καὶ κατὰ ἁλαττάν καὶ νευρικώς καὶ Χρήμασιν. (Xenophon, Hellenica, v. 1. 31).
Small wonder that this became known as the King's Peace. The Spartans had not won the war, but with the aid of Persia they had won the peace. For Corinth the peace meant separation from Argos, the end of democracy and the restoration of the exiles. The prospect was not one to gladden the hearts of the demagogues who ruled at Corinth. The Thebans were very reluctant to accept the peace, for it meant renouncing their hegemony over Boeotia, but even Thebes yielded more readily than Corinth. As Xenophon says, "οἱ δ' αὖ Κορίνθιοι οὐκ ἔστησαν ἡν τῶν Ἀργείων φρουράν." The demagogues realized their danger and clung tenaciously, if hopelessly, to their control of the city. Agesilaus, however, threatened both Corinth and Argos with war, and the Spartan power backed by Persia could not be resisted. The Argives withdrew and Corinth regained her autonomy: "αἱ μὲν σφυγεὶς καὶ οἱ μετατείχοι του ἐργου αὐτοῖ γυναι οἡλθαν ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου." The two groups alluded to were, of course, the demagogues and the Oligarchic leaders, neither of which could expect mercy from the restored émigrés; it was now their turn to taste the bitter fruit of exile. Their going was not generally mourned, for their outrages and the

30 Xenophon, Hellenica, v. I. 34.
31 Ibid.
failure of their war policy had made them unpopular. The return of the Aristocrats was welcomed by the populace. As Xenophon says, "οἱ δ' ἅλλοι πολίται ἐκόντες κατεδίχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν θέψοντας." The majority of Corinthians was glad to see the Aristocrats return. They had opposed the war from the beginning and the issue had proven them correct. The demos was war-weary.

All the manuscripts support the reading ἐκόντες. Keller in the Teubner text and Marchant in the Oxford, however, suggest the emendation ἐκοῦντες. Marchant, in support of his emendation, calls attention to what Xenophon says in the Aresilau, ii. 21: "Ἰππαθή δεὶ σφηνος ἐπικημάτων ἐπὶ πολέμου ἑπεξερεύνοντο Λυκοῦσιοι ὀντεὶν τῇ σφήνῃ ἔως τοὺς ἐν Λεχεσσονίοις φυγόντες Πολιτικῶν καὶ Θυμιάν νηκύκες τὰς πόλεις σιδάς καταδίχονται." In spite of this the manuscript reading is preferable. The apparent contradiction is resolved by a correct understanding of the party division in Corinth. When Xenophon says that the Corinthians had to be forced to accept the exiles he is referring to demagogues who still controlled Corinth and, of course, were against accepting their enemies. When he says that the Corinthians accepted them willingly he refers to the general sentiment of the people; the majority of Corinthians were war weary and accepted the returning Aristocrats ἐκόντες, for they seemed to represent peace, recovery and stability.
CHAPTER V
ARISTOCRACY, TYRANNY AND THE END
OF CORINTHIAN INDEPENDENCE

The half-century between the Peace of Antalcidas and Philip's conquest of Greece was a tumultuous one for the Corinthians. In that span of time they experienced three different forms of government: aristocracy (386-366), tyranny (365-364), and a restored moderate oligarchy (364-336); this in a state which previously had not known constitutional change for almost two hundred years.

The Peace of Antalcidas restored Spartan hegemony by breaking up hostile combinations among the Greek states and by establishing friendly oligarchies within them. In Corinth the Democratic leaders were driven into exile once again and found refuge in Argos and Athens. For the time being, at least, oligarchy was unchallenged in Corinth. The returning Aristocratic leaders were willingly received by a war-weary people who were glad to see the period of foreign war and domestic terror come to an end.

The nature of the new oligarchy, however, was different from that of the one destroyed by the Democratic coup. The men placed in power in 386 B.C. were, in fact, the Aristocrats,

1Diodorus, xv. 40; Demosthenes, In Leptinem, 52-54.
i.e., those extreme oligarchs who were, for the most part, from the landed nobility. They were firm in their distaste for democracy and equally unswerving in their loyalty to Sparta. In short they were the party which had suffered execution and exile at the hands of the Democrats in 392. It was this group which now dominated the Corinthian government. Their prestige was enormously enhanced by their constancy in support of victorious Sparta. They could boast of being the patriots who had restored autonomy to their native city, an autonomy that had been snatched from it by the Democratic cabal with the cooperation of the Oligarchs.

At the same time the political fortunes of the rival parties were at low ebb. The Democrats, of course, were so weak that they may safely be ignored. The Oligarchs, who for almost two centuries had governed Corinth, were badly discredited. They had cooperated with the demagogues in bringing about the disastrous war just ended. They had departed from the traditional policy of cooperation with Sparta, and all Corinth had suffered as a result. Their economic position, moreover, was severely weakened by nine years of war centering in Corinth, and the consequent cessation of commerce. Finally, the Aristocrats enjoyed the firm backing of Sparta, itself supported by Persia.

With the Aristocrats in control, the foreign policy of Corinth becomes more predictable than at any time since the
fall of the Cypselids. As Lenschau puts it, "segelte Korinth wieder im spartanischen Fahrwasser, doch bemühte es sich, mit allen Frieden zu halten, um weiter Schädigung seines Gebiets zu vermeiden." In all the military campaigns from 386 to 371 Corinth is mentioned only once.

After the decisive Spartan defeat at Leuctra, however, when Sparta itself lay open to attack, the desire of the Corinthian Aristocrats for peace came into conflict with their loyalty to Sparta. Besides, the Thebes of Epaminondas was a democratic state. A victorious Thebes might be expected to support the enemies of Sparta, i.e., the democratic parties, in attacks on the laconizing oligarchies.

\[2\] Thomas Lenschau, "Korinthos," Pauly-Wissowa, Supplementband IV, Stuttgart, 1924, p. 1028. Evidence of the devotion of the new Corinthian regime to Sparta is amply supplied by both Xenophon, Hellenica, v. 3, 27: "καρακαρειαρχών ήμας απηγούσαν και ευπροσβέβησαν τον εαυτόν τον τεσσαράκοντα." Here, incidentally, is a good example of the importance of comparing Xenophon's account with another source. By his use of μετατενάχοι Xenophon indicates a willing subordination on the part of the Corinthians, while the wording of Diodorus suggests that the compliance of Corinth was constrained. Xenophon is doubtless correct in reference to the ruling group, but Diodorus, who is following Ephorus, indicates that the zeal of the Aristocrats was not shared by all the Corinthians.

\[3\] The occasion is the Spartan naval attack on Corcyra under Mnasippus in 374 when Sparta levied a total of sixty ships to be collected from Sparta itself, Corinth, Leucas, Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaea, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione and Lalie (Xenophon, Hellenica, vi. 2. 3). The Corinthian contingent could not have been large nor was the engagement protracted. Yet this small contribution was the entire extent of Corinth's involvement until the battle of Leuctra.
of the Peloponnese. Thus, a combination of loyalty and Realpolitik was now more compelling than the desire for peace. It is not surprising, therefore, that, when the Spartans appealed for help after Leuctra the Corinthians followed Archidamus the Spartan king "μάλα προθύμως."

Sparta, aided by Corinth and her other loyal allies, was successful in preventing a Theban conquest of the Peloponnese; it was now clear, however, that Spartan hopes of Hellenic hegemony were shattered. Leuctra, moreover, shook the foundations of Spartan supremacy even within the Peloponnese. As a matter of fact, discontent with Spartan rule had been growing for some time. The Peace of Antalcidas, the very instrument of Spartan domination, pronounced as its guiding principle the autonomy of the Hellenic states. It was only natural for the cities of the Peloponnese to think that this principle should be applied not only to the union of Argos and Corinth and to the Theban hegemony of Boeotia but also to their own relationship with Sparta. Accordingly, in 386 there were revolutions in some of the Peloponnesian cities resulting in the ejection of the supporters of Lacedaemon and the establishment of autonomy. These move-

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Xenophon, Hellenica, vi. 4. 18. They also showed their zeal for the Spartan cause by manning ships to ferry the Spartan army across the Gulf of Corinth and by using their good offices in securing the help of Sicyon in the same task.
ments, to be sure, proved abortive, for Sparta immediately stepped in and stamped them out, restoring the philo-Laconian faction. The desire for autonomy, however, had not been crushed but was merely held in check. With the Spartan disaster at Leuctra this check was removed and once again there were revolutions in the cities of the Peloponnese against the supporters of Sparta. In each case it is clear that the desire for autonomy was linked with a desire for democracy. The revolutions, where successful, were accompanied by the establishment of democracies, exile of oligarchs, confiscations and mob violence.

Naturally this democratic movement asserted itself also in Corinth. The apparent weakness of Sparta lent encouragement to the exiles in Argos and their supporters within Corinth. With the connivance of their friends inside the city the exiles were introduced within its walls. The success of the undertaking depended on surprise and an expected rally of the citizenry around the revolutionary

5Diodorus, xv. 5.

6Ibid., xv. 40; Isocrates, Archidamus, 64-68. Diodorus assigns these events to the year 374 but most modern scholars agree that they belong in 371, after the battle of Leuctra. The argument of Grote is most persuasive (History of Greece, X, 199, n. 1). In agreement are Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, III, 1, 174, n. 2; Glotz, Histoire Grecque, III, 151, n. 22; and Cary, "Thebes," Cambridge Ancient History, VI, 87-88. Curtius, History of Greece, IV, 439, takes the opposite view.
standard; neither of these hopes was fulfilled. The revolutionaries were quickly discovered, denounced and surrounded. Fearing maltreatment if captured, the trapped insurgents chose suicide instead. The victorious Aristocrats, having put down the uprising, took ruthless and effective steps to insure their safety by resorting to the usual executions and exiles.

This attempt at another coup indicates that the exiled Democrats had not given up hope of returning to Corinth and that they were not without support from within. They exaggerated, however, the effects of Leuctra on Corinthian sentiment. The Corinthians knew that what Leuctra ended was Sparta’s extra-Peloponnesian control only, and not her hegemony within the peninsula. They also knew that a government of anti-Spartan democrats would mean war with Sparta, and at this time war itself was unpopular with all classes in Corinth. As a matter of fact, the Democrats were still in disrepute because of their unsuccessful war policy, whereas the Aristocrats had enhanced their reputation by a successful peace program. The abortive plot, therefore, left Aristocratic control of Corinth established as firmly as, if not more firmly than, before.

The Aristocratic regime which had proved successful in time of peace was now to undergo a more arduous test in war.

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7 Diodorus, xv. 40.
Once again Corinth's key position on the isthmus designated her as the center of fighting. To enter the Peloponnese Thebes had first to pass through the territory of Corinth. Inevitably Corinth became the base of the anti-Theban coalition; the results included sieges of the city and devastation of its fields. Such occurrences could not have been unexpected, and yet the Corinthians still chose war on the side of Sparta. In fact the Aristocrats had no other choice, and they may well have been supported by the Oligarchs.

There were good reasons why the Oligarchs should support this war no less than the Aristocrats. After the many years during which trade was interrupted, the years of peace and of Spartan hegemony since 386 B.C. must have been welcome indeed to the Corinthian merchants. The Spartans, as always, put no barriers in the way of Corinth's trade with the west and a commercial recovery was under way. Thebes, on the other hand, represented a new and unknown force on the scene. As the ruler of central Greece she controlled the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf; should she succeed against Sparta she might control the

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8 The alternative was neutrality, for alliance with Thebes was unthinkable. Neutrality, however, was impossible since the geographical position of Corinth made it necessary for the contending armies to enter or march through her territory.
southern shore as well. Such a development would be disas­
astrous to the western trade of Corinth. The Theban democ­
racy, too, must have troubled the Oligarchs. The excesses
of the Damagoues in 392 B.C., the synoeism with Argos,
the recent unsuccessful coup, were enough to turn the bur­
ghers of Corinth against democracy. At the same time, as
their numbers were depleted by economic difficulties and
resulting déclassement, they must have drawn closer to the
Aristocrats with whom they shared increasingly common in­
terests.

In 371 the Thebans, urged on by the eager Arcadians
9 and encouraged by Sparta's lack of manpower, decided to
invade Laconia and take Sparta itself. Facing an army of
more than 70,000 the Spartans were short of men, so
short indeed that they adopted the extremely dangerous
measure of proclaiming to the helots that all who volun­
teered to take up arms to defend Sparta would be freed.
Over 6,000 helots took advantage of the opportunity. The

9 The wave of democratic unrest that hit the Pelopon­
nese after Leuctra no doubt troubled the Oligarchs as much
as it did the Aristocrats. The restoration of a powerful
and spirited democratic state in Arcadia under the leader­
ship of Mantinea was particularly threatening. In 370 even
Tegea fell into democratic hands. At this juncture, an
alarmed Sparta sent an army to support oligarchy in Orcho­
menus, and the Corinthians permitted Polytropus to collect
a mercenary army in Corinth to serve as a garrison (Xen­
ophon, Hellenica, vi. 5. 11.).

10Ibid., vi. 5. 23.
11Diodorus, xv. 62. 12Xenophon, Hellenica, vi. 5. 28-29.
anxiety which this caused the Spartans was relieved by the
confidence engendered by the staunch support of her allies, 13
including Corinth.

The help came in time to save Sparta, but a Theban
army was still in the Peloponnese. It was thought neces­
sary to obtain the help of Athens if Thebes was to be
checked. Envoys were therefore sent by Sparta to a meeting
of the Athenian assembly. The speeches of the Spartans
were received with little favor, and indeed, the current of
opinion at Athens seemed to be running against cooperation
14
with Lacedaemon. At this point Cleiteles of Corinth
arose; his speech was short and to the point: The Corin­
thians, totally guiltless, had been the victims of the
15
Theban army. Clearly Corinth had been wronged and the
Athenians would be in violation of the oaths taken at the
peace congress of 371 if they did not come to their aid
16
now.

The speech was received with shouts of approval and the
tide was turned. There followed other favorable speeches

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., vi. 5. 33-36.

15 Ibid., vi. 5. 37: "εἰς τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν ἠλθόντες καὶ
δένδρα ἤπεκεφάσαν καὶ οἰκίες κατασκεύασαν καὶ χρήματα καὶ
πρόβατα διηρήσαντες."

16 Ibid.
and the Athenians voted aid to Sparta, putting Iphicrates at the head of their forces. Once again Corinthian diplomacy had proven no less effective than her military assistance.

Corinth was again at war. The conditions of this war were only slightly different from those of the Corinthian War. It is true that the one was fought to keep Sparta shut up within the Peloponnese and the other to keep Thebes out of it. Nevertheless in both cases Corinth remained the base of operations.

The details of the war are far from clear as there are omissions and conflicts in the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus. It seems, however, that the Corinthians made notable contributions, particularly with their cavalry. A sudden sortie by the Thebans against the gates of Corinth was repulsed by a body of light troops, and the Corinthians set up a trophy. The Corinthians along with Chabrias and the Athenians had established a blockade against the Argives which the Arcadians had broken. The cruel realities of war were brought still closer to the Corinthians.

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17 Ibid., vi. 5. 49.
18 Ibid., vi. 5. 52; vii. 1. 20.
19 Ibid., vii. 1. 18-19.
20 Ibid., vii. 1. 24-25.
by Epaminondas who invaded their territory, defeated a
Corinthian force and drove the citizens back inside their
walls. A party of troops even broke into the city, thor­
oughly terrifying the Corinthians, but the Athenians under
Chabrias drove them out.

In the winter of 367-366 B.C. the Thebans persuaded
the king of Persia, always ready to interfere in Greek pol­
itics, to issue a decree, supported by threat of war, that
Messenia should be independent of Sparta and that the
Athenian army should be withdrawn. Thus the Thebans hoped
to use the same tactics to insure their hegemony that the
Spartans had employed in 386, and they called a congress of
the cities in 366. The tactic was unsuccessful. The Greek
states knew that the Great King was in no position to en­
force his decree, and the congress broke up without result.
Hoping to employ the tactic divide et impera with more suc­
cess, the Thebans sent ambassadors to the cities singly.
They directed them to swear to observe the King's decree.

21 Diodorus, xv. 68-69. The next few years found the
center of activities shifted to Arcadia, but the Corinthians
were not to be left in peace long. Between 368 and 366 B.C.
a war took place between Corinth on the one hand and Argos
and Cleone on the other (Plutarch, Timoleon, 4). Perhaps
Argos seized the occasion of Corinth's war-weariness to try
to restore her former position of mastery, but the attempt
was a failure.

22 Xenophon, Hellenica, vii. l. 35-36.

23 Ibid., vii. l. 40.
Once again the Corinthians showed their staunchness in the Peloponnesian cause. The first to be approached by the Theban envoys, they replied that "οὐδὲν δίσωμεν πρὸς βασιλέα κοινῶν ὃς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν." The other cities followed suit, the scheme collapsed, and the war continued.

Corinth had now been the scene of warfare for over five years. Throughout that time she had been the base for the allied forces, particularly for the Athenians. Athenian garrisons were located at key spots in the city and it was an Athenian force under Chabrias which had saved the city. Now, however, a plot was conceived at Athens to seize Corinth. It is likely that the Democratic exiles in Athens urged this course on the Athenians. They might well have argued that the situation in Corinth had changed. It was now the Aristocrats who were responsible for the war which was destroying trade and revaging the fields of Corinth; the war-weariness of the Corinthians was now a weapon in the hands of the Democrats. Besides, as in the time of the successful coup of 392 B.C., there were Athenian garrisons within the city which could overcome the resistance of the government. For Athens, a bold stroke could have the merit of replacing a cautious, Aristocratic Corinth,

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., vii. 4. 4-6.
26 Demosthenes, In Leptinem, 52-54.
whose true loyalty was to Sparta, with an enthusiastic, Democratic one, whose ties were with Athens. In any case, Athens decided to make the attempt.

At this point the Athenians blundered. This project, relying heavily upon surprise for its success, was revealed in the open Athenian assembly. After the discussion of an alliance with the Arcadians, Demotion arose and said,

 Naturally, the Corinthians got wind of the plot and took measures to forestall it. They promptly sent garrisons to every place where the Athenians were stationed and told them to leave: "οὐδὲν εἰτε φεύμην φρασάμην." The Athenians were assembled in Corinth before leaving and treated with exemplary courtesy. The Corinthian Aristocrats did not want to irritate Athens beyond what was required by the exigencies of safety. A proclamation, therefore, was made that if any of the Athenians felt that he had been invidiously wronged, he had only to make a written complaint and justice would be done him.

Meanwhile, the Athenians were unaware that their plot had been detected and had sent a fleet under Chares to aid in the capture of the city. Chares arrived at the port of

27 Xenophon, Hellenica, vii. 4. 6.
28 Ibid.
Cenchreae after the Athenian hoplites had been relieved of their posts. He tried to cover his embarrassment and to explain his presence by saying that he had come to help, having heard that there was a plot against the state. The Corinthians, perhaps amused by the irony contained in his statement, politely thanked him but forbade him to enter the port. Together with the hoplites, he and his ships returned to Athens, their mission unaccomplished.

For the time being, at least, Corinth had been saved. It was apparent, however, that the city, which had been overmastered on land even before this incident, was in the greatest danger now that Athens had become unfriendly. The Athenian garrison had served the double function of guarding the city and taking the offensive against enemy units located in the neighborhood of Corinth. It was necessary that measures be taken to replace the departed Athenians.

It was decided, "ἀθροίσθητι καὶ πεζοὺς καὶ ἐπίπεδος μισθοφόρους." 29

This passage is an eloquent testimony to the depletion that had taken place in the ranks of the upper classes of Corinth. Not only hoplites, but cavalry as well were now hard to come by. No doubt some of the Corinthian forces were occupied elsewhere in the Peloponnese, probably in Arcadia. Nevertheless, the fact that Corinth could not

29 Ibid.
spare enough infantry and cavalry for a home guard and had to rely on mercenaries makes it clear how great were the economic effects of two serious wars within a generation. The merchant Oligarchs, no doubt, suffered most severely because of the interruption and, from time to time, the cessation of trade. The landed Aristocrats, on the other hand, although hurt, were not so badly hurt, for their arable was not disturbed between 386 and 371. The lower classes must have continued to increase in number and their standard of living must have dropped in proportion to the decline in the fortunes of Corinthian commerce.

This situation is clearly reflected in an examination of Corinthian military engagements in this period. In general the hoplites may be identified with the Oligarchs, the cavalry with the Aristocrats and the light troops with the lower classes, although there must have been some Oligarchs in the cavalry and some Aristocrats in the hoplite force. The striking fact is the decline in importance of the hoplites in relation to the other two branches of the military forces. At Platea and Nemea the only Corinthian force we hear about is composed of hoplites: 5,000 in the former case, 3,000 in the latter. In the period 386 to 256, however, there is no specific reference to hoplites anywhere, although they may be presumed to have been present

Herodotus, ix. 28; Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 2. 17.
where reference is made to σεφατωτα. There are, however, references at significant times to ἐπιμελής and φίλος.

The changes, then, which had put the Aristocrats in control had also made it difficult for them to defend their city. When they turned to a mercenary force they must have been aware of the inherent dangers of such a decision. Such an army, loyal only to its commander and not to the state, might prove inimical to the safety of the regime. At the head of the four hundred mercenaries, therefore, they put a man whom they regarded as a safe adherent of the Aristocratic cause: Timophanes, son of Timodemus.

So protected, the Aristocrats breathed somewhat more easily. The city was now secured against sudden attack, but the basic problem of continuing the war remained unsolved. The resources of Corinth were clearly not adequate. What is more, the arable of the city had now been subjected to the ravages of war for five years (371-366 B.C.), and the war's economic effects were now being felt by the

31 Xenophon, Hellenica, vi. 4. 18.
32 Ibid., vi. 5. 52; vii. 1. 23.
33 Ibid., vii. 1. 18-19.
34 Plutarch, Timoleon, 2-3; Diodorus, xvi. 65, gives the name as Timaenetus. Diodorus, xvi. 65, refers to him as "προέχων τῶν Κορινθίων πλατών τε καὶ τόκμη," and as such he must have seemed a perfect man for the task.
Aristocrats themselves. Under these pressures the decision was made to seek peace with Thebes.

Messengers were sent to Thebes asking for a peace par­ ley. The Theban answer was favorable, whereupon the Corinth­ thians offered to act as intermediaries in persuading their allies to make peace as well. The Thebans, of course, were quite willing to accept this proposal, and the Corinthians went first to Sparta. The Corinthian Aristocrats had two motives for serving as general peacemakers: the first was their genuine desire for a lasting peace. Withdrawal from the war in the role of a neutral would still have left Corinth between the hostile powers and her territory open to belligerent armies. The second reason was the inability of the Aristocrats to make a separate peace without con­ sulting Sparta. They owed everything to Sparta: in partic­ ular, their own position of power in Corinth. There was, moreover, a true bond of loyalty and friendship between the Aristocrats and Spartans. It was, therefore, a humble and solicitous address that the Corinthians made in the assembly of their Spartan allies:
The Spartans rejected the peace offer on their own behalf since the Theban sine qua non was Spartan surrender of Messenia, a condition that was wholly unacceptable. In the Corinthian request for permission to make a separate peace, however, the Spartans acquiesced with such good grace as they could muster.

The Corinthians then sent ambassadors to Thebes to negotiate the peace. The Thebans, trying to make full use of the breach in the ranks of the Peloponnesians, asked the Corinthians to strike an alliance with them. To this the Corinthians answered that, "Ἡ μὴν συμμαχία σύν εἰρήνη, ἀλλὰ πολέμου μπαλλαγή ἐστιν." Xenophon represents the Thebans as seized with admiration for the pluck of the Corinthians who, in the greatest danger to themselves, would not fight against their benefactors. In fact there was nothing else the Corinthians could do: they had sued for peace because of their inability to continue the war. It would have been

35 Xenophon, Hellenica, vii. 4. 8.

36 Ibid., vii. 4. 9. Xenophon presents the Spartan response as a generous one; Isocrates (Archidamus, 91), however, suggests that the Spartans did not accept the withdrawal with equanimity.

37 Xenophon, Hellenica, vii. 4. 10.
ridiculous merely to change sides. In any case, the
Thebans offered a peace on the basis of neutrality, in
which the Corinthians were joined by the Phliasians and the
Epidaurians.

The Peace with Thebes did not end the difficulties of
the Corinthian Aristocrats. Athens and Argos remained poten­
tial enemies; the Spartans, moreover, always bulwarks of
the Aristocratic cause, could no longer be relied upon to
put down internal revolution. For this reason the rulers of
Corinth were forced to rely all the more upon the mercenary
band under Timophanes. They were confronted with the clas­
sic dilemma facing all oligarchies in time of external
danger: now to create an adequate armed force without
undermining their own authority.

The reliance on mercenaries was particularly perilous
in view of the economic and social condition of Corinth.
As the war continued, Corinth's vital trade was cut off and
with it the prosperity of an important part of the hoplite
census. The consequent political and social déclassement
produced a discontented revolutionary group which sought to

38 Ibid., vii. 4. 11. He does not mention the Epidaurians. They are, however, included in the Archidamus (91) of
Isocrates.

39 This particular situation is taken by Aristotle
(Politics, 1306a) as the paradigm for the danger to an ol­
igarchy inherent in hiring a mercenary force.
overthrow the Aristocracy. Since 392 this group had tried political massacre, Anschluss with Argos and military coup d'etat; each had failed, and the execution and exile which followed had weakened the revolutionary party. Now the presence of a mercenary corps under the ambitions Timophanes presented an opportunity to try another means, tyranny. It seems that soon after the Aristocrats had given him the command Timophanes began to conceive ambitious designs. He soon realized that a tyranny based on four hundred mercenaries would be ephemeral, and made a bid for the support of the propertyless and discontented. These he armed and took into his service. In addition to his mercenaries he now had the support of the lower classes. Therefore, he instituted a reign of terror against the Aristocrats. The demand for terror must have been based not only on the tyrant's need to destroy the leaders of the opposition, but also on the hatred and desire for revenge felt by the revolutionaries. When at last he felt safe, Timophanes declared himself tyrant.

40 Diodorus, xvi. 65.
41 Ibid.
42 Diodorus in the same passage is not explicit, saying merely that Timophanes went about "τὰ δὲ τῆς τυραννίδος ἥργα ἐκπολεμοῦσαν." Plutarch (Timoleon, 4) is more exact, saying that Timophanes took the city into his power: "συγκνοῦσιν ἐνελὼν ἐκρίνεις τῶν πρώτων πολιτῶν."
43 Plutarch, Timoleon, 4.
The Aristocrats, ousted by one of the time-honored devices of Greek political action, retaliated with one equally venerable: tyrannicide. The group chosen to deliver Corinth from the tyrant was made up of Timophanes' brother Timoleon, his brother-in-law Aeschylus, and a friend. Such a group would be assured easy access to the victim. The three, admitted to the presence of Timophanes, argued with him in an attempt to make him give up his tyranny. At first he treated their pleadings lightly but ultimately lost his temper and became violent. Seeing that their cause was hopeless, Timoleon stood aside while the other two dispatched his brother.

The tyrant was dead and with him the tyranny (364 B.C.). No one appeared either to avenge him or take his place. This is not to say that the tyrannicide was greeted with universal applause. Indeed, the act became the occasion of a great controversy, which gives us an insight into the political situation of the time. When the assassination became generally known there was an uproar and a dispute over what should be done with Timoleon. The

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44 Ibid.

45 The account followed here is that of Plutarch. There are differences in detail in the accounts of Nepos and Diodorus. Diodorus says that Timoleon killed his brother with his own hands as he was walking in the market place. (xvi. 65). Nepos agrees with Plutarch that Timoleon himself did not commit the murder but says that at the time of the deed Timoleon was some distance away, keeping guard, "ne quis satellis posset succurrere." (Timoleon, 1. 4.)

46 Diodorus, xvi. 65.
Aristocrats (οἱ κράτεισι), of course, applauded him as a tyrannicide. Their opponents, however, took the view that he had perpetrated an impious and abominable deed and should be made to pay the penalty prescribed by law.

The source of this opposition is not immediately apparent from the available accounts, but by a careful analysis of the texts it is possible to identify it with a high degree of probability. Diodorus and Nēpos are no help at all, but Plutarch is better. The pro-Timoleon group he identifies as οἱ κράτεισι; the anti-Timoleon group he calls, "οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνόμενοι ζην ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας ἀποβλέπειν εἰσθήτες τῷ μὲν θανάτῳ τοῦ τυράννου προσεποίησαν καὶ τὴν."  

It is clear that the authors Plutarch follows throughout his life of Timoleon admire Timoleon and take the Aristocratic position. The description, then, of this enigmatic party is from the point of view of the Aristocrat. He sees these attackers of Timoleon as hypocrites who, although they could not live in a democracy, only pretend to applaud the death of a tyrant and hound poor Timoleon until he is driven to despondency. Clearly, then, they are neither the Democrats nor the Aristocrats. They must have been the Oligarchs who had been quiet if not acquiescent.

48 Plutarch, Ibid.
since 386 B.C. The excesses of the demagogues and the triumph of Sparta had reconciled them to a subordinate position under the Aristocrats. As long as there was peace and Sparta remained the arbiter of Peloponnesian affairs they made no protest. The Aristocrats, however, committed Corinth to the Spartan cause in 371 and the succeeding years of war sapped the economic resources of the city still further. As the war dragged on the prestige of the Aristocrats declined until, at last, they sealed their own fate by making a separate peace and alienating Sparta. The Oligarchs were now free to capitalize on popular discontent without fear of Spartan intervention. They probably took no part in the tyranny of Timophanes whose support came from the Democrats; they were, no doubt, sincerely nappy to see the tyranny ended. For all that, it provided them with the opportunity they needed to regain power. Why not exploit popular revulsion against the fratricide? The Oligarchs could attack the impiety of the deed and at the same time the Aristocratic party, whose instrument Timoleon was.

The attack of the Oligarchs was successful. Timoleon

49 Even Timoleon's mother condemned him for his deed and shut her house to him (Plutarch, Timoleon, 5).
was not charged with a crime, but he was hounded out of public life and for twenty years took no part in public affairs. The defeat of the friends of Timoleon was the victory of the Oligarchs -- it was on this occasion that the moderate Oligarchs were restored to power in Corinth.

The Battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. put an end to Theban hopes of pan-Hellenic domination. The subsequent period from 362 to 338 is dominated by the attempts of Philip of Macedon to bring all Greece under his sway. It was a crucial time for Greek freedom, indeed for the Greek way of life in general. For Corinth, however, it was a period of comparative peace. Most of the fighting took place north of the Isthmus, and Corinth was able to remain aloof from the struggle for the most part. As a consequence, the government of the Oligarchs was able to conduct its internal affairs under less pressure from the external situation than had been possible for some time. Naturally, they used this respite to renew their commercial activities and with this came a renewal of interest in the west.

50 Ibid., 7.

51 Certainly it is clear that in 346 B.C. the government of Corinth is a moderate Oligarchy, and since we know of no internal upheaval in Corinth between the assassination of Timophanes in 364 and the year 346, the return of the Oligarchs must have occurred in 364 B.C.

52 According to Diodorus (xvi. 60) she did take a minor part in the Sacred War for which Philip punished her by taking away the presidency of the Pythian games.
The first opportunity for action in the west arose in 358 B.C. when Dion attempted to raise a revolt against the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse. He appealed to Corinth to help him save the Syracusans from tyranny. The Corinthians permitted him to make their city his headquarters and recruiting center. Corinth, of course, was the natural place to approach. Not only was it the mother city of Syracuse and its commercial interests in Sicily well known, but the Oligarchs who now ruled it could be counted on to support the Academic oligarchy proposed by Dion. Dion's campaign was a success, but his rule in Syracuse was met with serious opposition on the part of democrats and supporters of the exiled tyrant. Forced into excessive and unpopular measures, he was murdered in 354 B.C. Tyrant followed tyrant until in 347 Dionysius II returned after ten years of exile. The Syracusans were in a wretched plight; in the civil war of the past ten years they had experienced only poverty, destruction and tyranny. The prospect of life under the despotic Dionysius was so appalling that the Syracusan people appealed for help to a former Syracusan Hicetas who was currently ruling at Leontini. At the same

53 Ibid.

54 When Dion did set up his government he sent to Corinth for "Συμβούλους και Συνερχόμενος.

(Plutarch, Dion, 53.)
time the Syracusans faced a foreign threat, for the Car­
thaginians had landed a force on the island. Finally, the
depopulated Greek cities in Sicily were swarming with
Italian mercenaries who readily accepted the tyrants.

Once again, as in 358, the Syracusans turned to
Corinth for aid. Since they were aware that the Corinthians
were not in a position to send any considerable force of
their own, they asked only for a general. The Corinthians
accepted the opportunity with eagerness, and began to
deliberate on a suitable man to send. The magistrates
were in the process of enrolling those interested when one
of the common people arose and offered the name of Timo-
leon. It was a surprising nomination, for Timoleon had
been living under a cloud since the assassination of his
brother, and had not taken part in public affairs for
almost twenty years. He was nevertheless approved; in part
this must have been due to his recognized valor in battle,
but it is also possible that it was part of the Corinthian
policy of limited commitment. If any important figure

55 So great was the threat to the Greek way of life in
Sicily that Plato (Epistles, viii. 353E) expresses a fear
that the Greek language would fall into disuse and be
replaced by Oscan or Carthaginian.

56 Diodorus, xvi. 65: "ἐν ἑπιμεληθομενον τῆς πόλεως
καὶ καταλύσαντες τῇν τινι τυραννιν ἐνυβαλομένην πλεονεξίαν.

57 Plutarch, Timoleon, 3. 58 Ibid., 4.
were sent and became involved in difficulties, a rescue force would be necessitated. If, on the other hand, Timoleon became embroiled, the government might leave him to his fate without embarrassment. Accordingly, his nomination was approved, and he was exhorted to noble deeds by the diplomat Cleiteles, who said that if his mission were successful he would be regarded as a tyrannicide; if not, a fratricide.

If the urgency of the Sicilian cause was not appreciated by the Corinthians at first, it was soon to make a deeper impression. Hicetas had been a party to the original request for help from Corinth. Now, however, he felt that the arrival of a general from Corinth might present a formidable rival. He therefore attached himself to the Carthaginians and sent a letter to the Corinthians informing them that there was no need for them to go to the trouble and expense of an expedition to Sicily. It might prove perilous, he said, for he had been forced to make an alliance with the Carthaginians because of the delay of the Corinthians. The Carthaginians, moreover, he continued,

59 Perhaps the attitude of the Oligarchs of Corinth toward Timoleon the Aristocratic champion was the same as that of the Athenian peace party toward Cleon when he went off to Sphacteria. Either they would be rid of him, or if not, he would defeat their enemies.

60 Ibid., 7.
had forbidden the Corinthian expedition and were on watch for it with a large fleet. The effrontery of Hicetas' tone was enough to excite the Corinthians to greater efforts, but the content of his letter was more seriously disquieting. The overthrow of a Sicilian tyrant may have appealed to the sentiment of Corinth as a mother city and a moderate oligarchy. The mention of Carthage, taking an active interest in Sicilian affairs was, nevertheless, a matter of much greater urgency. The greatest mercantile state of the Western Mediterranean could not be permitted to dominate Sicily and thereby exclude Corinth from its most important area of commerce. The letter stirred the merchant oligarchs who guided Corinthian policy to more vigorous action.

The Corinthians were unprepared for a serious effort on short notice, since, unlike imperial Athens, they kept no fleet in being in peace time. As a result Timoleon was sent out in 346 with a fleet of only ten ships: seven from Corinth, two from Corcyra and one from Leucas. The next summer, however, encouraged by Timoleon's initial success and given time to prepare, the home government sent him reinforcements of two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry. The size of the contingent, the largest since

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 8.
63 Ibid., 16.
Nemea in 394, indicates the importance of the Sicilian campaign in the eyes of the Corinthians. It also gives evidence that the years of peace under the rule of the Oligarchs had produced an economic revival which permitted the levying of such a force.

Timoleon's campaigns were successful. The forces of Carthage were checked and those of Hicetas were crushed by the summer of 343. Timoleon had succeeded in his first task. There remained, however, the threat of a further menace from Carthage and the problem of the resettlement of depopulated Syracuse. These two tasks were intimately connected, for the best safeguard against a Carthaginian advance was a large and flourishing Greek population. That Syracuse had suffered a serious decrease in the number of its citizens is manifest. Plutarch tells us that the wars both foreign and civil had made a wasteland of the city; grass grew in the streets, deer and wild swine roamed freely and the suburbs were used as hunting preserves.

When the Syracusans decided to send an invitation for new settlers it was only natural that they should send first to Corinth, their mother-city and the savior of

64 The details are described in Plutarch, Timoleon, 9-21, Diodorus, xvi. 66-70, and summarized in the Cambridge Ancient History, VI, 285-293.

65 Plutarch, Timoleon, 22. This situation was common in other Sicilian cities as well at this time.
Sicily. The Corinthians received the request with eagerness and enthusiasm and embarked immediately upon a campaign of public recruiting. They went to all the great games and festivals where they announced that they had overthrown the tyranny in Syracuse. They then invited all Syracusans and other Sicilian Greeks who had been driven out to return and ὀίκεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἠλευθέρους καὶ ἰσόν καὶ δικίως τὴν χώραν διοικήσαντες. Next, they sent representatives to Asia Minor and the Aegean Islands where other Sicilian exiles were living. These they invited to come to Corinth, promising that they would be given leaders and provided with transportation at Corinth's expense. The expatriates, when they arrived at Corinth, felt that they were too few in number and begged that they be joined by colonists from Corinth and the rest of Greece. The Corinthians responded by sending five thousand of their own population. The total that finally sailed for Sicily from Corinth was about ten thousand. Timoleon then proceeded to an equitable distribution of land among the citizens and the establishment of a constitution.

66 Ibid., 23.
67 Ibid.
68 Diodorus, xvi. 82. 3.
69 This was later swelled to 60,000 by the arrival of settlers from Sicily and Italy (Plutarch, Timoleon, 23).
70 Diodorus, xvi. 82. 3.
Timoleon now took up the war with Carthage again and succeeded in engaging the Punic army in a pitched battle in the summer of 339. The result was a decisive victory for the forces of Timoleon, and the Carthaginians sued for peace. A treaty was struck in which it was agreed that the Halcyus River should remain the boundary between Punic and Greek Sicily and that Carthage should recognize the independence of all Greek cities to the east of the boundary. Carthage also promised to refrain from future alliances with Sicilian tyrants. Timoleon was now free to turn his attention to those Sicilian despots who still remained in power in the Greek cities, and by 338 he had crushed the last of them. His work finished, he retired once again from public life, but this time under conditions far different from those surrounding his earlier withdrawal. He had freed Sicily from despotism and averted the threat of Punic domination. On his death the Syracusans honored him with a decree which recorded his deeds simply but with eloquence. We have no record that the Corinthians matched this tribute, but they might well have done so, for his services were no less valuable to the mother-city than to its colony.

71 Ibid., xvi, 82, 7.
72 Plutarch, Timoleon, 39.
The behavior of Corinth throughout this episode was remarkable for its generosity and magnanimity. Based upon enlightened self-interest, it reflected the statesmanship of the Oligarchs at its best. The West, as always, was the center of Corinthian trade and Sicily represented the most important part of the western commerce. It was necessary to save it from economic devastation and Carthaginian domination. When the interested motives of Corinth have been exposed, it is still necessary to recognize her enlightened statesmanship. A healthy, flourishing Greek Sicily would check Carthaginian expansion and support Corinthian trade. But it was not Corinth alone that benefited. Syracuse and the other Greek cities were given new life and strength as a result of Corinth's intervention, and it may not be too much to say that, at this moment, Corinth saved the Greek cause in the West. For this reason, she richly deserved the praise of the Greek world at this time. Indeed, her ability to combine self-interest with generosity may be a clue to the excellent relations which generally prevailed between her and her colonies.

There is reason to believe that the Sicilian affair provided an opportunity for a return to that concordia ordinum that had existed in Corinth from the fall of the Cypselids to the Peloponnesian War. The successes of the

73 Ibid., 23.
Aristocrat Timoleon were more than welcome to the Oligarchs who came to his support wholeheartedly. Moreover, the departure from Corinth of five thousand colonists must have been of great help in reducing domestic tension. Colonization continued to be, in Bury's phrase, the palladium of aristocracy. Obviously, the five thousand settlers were for the most part from the landless, the propertyless and the politically discontent, and since these groups represented the bulk of Democratic support, with their departure the Democratic party ceased to be significant.

While Timoleon was completing his work in Sicily, however, events in Greece were taking a shape more ominous for the future of Corinth. Philip of Macedon was pursuing a policy which aimed at nothing less than the domination of all Hellas. Except for a brief episode in the Sacred War, Corinth was not deeply involved in the mainland events. Indeed, as long as Philip confined his activities to the north and east, Corinth could ignore him. In 343, however, Philip turned his attention to Epirus. From Epirus he threatened Ambracia, Acarnania, Leucas and Corcyra. The ancestral Corinthian trade route to the West as well as the route to the silver mines in Illyria was in deadly peril. Unable to face the threat alone, Corinth turned to Athens which was then organizing an alliance against Philip.

74 See Note 52.
inspired by Demosthenes. Under the terms of this alliance a Corinthian contingent was present at the Battle of Chaeronea which decided the fate of Greece in Philip's favor. In 338 Philip called a congress of all the Greek States to meet in Corinth where they were to recognize his hegemony. It was at Corinth too that he established one of the three garrisons that were the "fetters of Greece." It seems a stroke of irony that the city which had long opposed the hegemony of any one state should become the administrative center of the first master of all Hellas. The assassination of Philip in 336 brought no relief, for his son showed himself more than competent to keep the dominion his father had won. The history of Corinth as a free and independent city-state had come to an end.

75 Demosthenes, Philippic, iii. 34: De Corona, 237; Plutarch, Demosthenes, 17; Justin, 13. 4. Some doubt has been cast on the authenticity of this treaty (Wust, Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland, p. 94, n. 1, cited by Silvio Accame, La Lega Ateniese del Secolo IV A.C., Rome, 1941, p. 212). Accame, however, sees no reason to doubt it. "Siffatta alleanza in tale momento viene respinta da alcuni critici, significando per esse il luogo di Demostene Phil. III, 34: ἦν κορινθίων Ῥωμαίων ἱππησίαις ὑπάρχει (κόπ. Φ. 212) solo che Corinto e non Filippo può avere pretese mitiche su questo territorio senza implicare che Ambracia allora dipendesse di Corinto. Ma simile interpretazione cavillosa è in contrasto col senso ovvio di tutto il passo di Demostene, e d'altronde, non spiega perché Ambracia, Leucade e altre città delle isole ionie non abbiano mai aderito all' Atene, mentre la maggior parte di esse vi entro poco dopo il decreto di Aristotele del 378/377. Non è probabile che quelle città ed isole siano rimaste lontano della lega senza l'appoggio di qualche potenza maggiore interessata ad osticolare nell' Ionio il predominio ateniese; e questa potenza evidentemente era Corinto." Accame must surely be correct about the relationship between the cities and Corinth but it is not necessary to go to such lengths to
prove the authenticity of the treaty. The passage in the De Corona,” "ἐγὼ συμμάχους μεν ὅμια ἐποίη-... ἐκπαιδεύοις." must prove it sufficiently. Such a statement spoken before the Athenian people could hardly have been made were it not true, for it would have been easily refuted by an audience of men who could remember the period under discussion full well.

76 Strabo, ix, p. 414.
## APPENDIX I

**CORINTHIAN MILITARY AND NAVAL CONTINGENTS**

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<th>Hoplites</th>
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<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>Total of those away on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas</td>
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<td>Hoplites</td>
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<td>Cavalry</td>
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<td>345</td>
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<td>Fleet sent to Sicily with Timoleon (accompanied by 2 Corcyrean and 1 Leucadian ships)</td>
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<td>Reinforcements for Timoleon</td>
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x -- number present not known

? -- number of each class present not known
APPENDIX II

CHRONOLOGY

c. 550 - Fall of Cypselids

c. 525 - Attack on Samos by Sparta and Corinth

507 - Spartan invasion of Attica checked by Corinth

492 - Corinthian loan to Athens of twenty ships for use against Aegina

435 - Sea victory of Corcyra over Corinth

433 - Alliance of Corcyra and Athens; Battle of Sybota

431 - First year of Peloponnesian War; Athens attacks Corinthian position in West.

429 - Sea victories of Phormio in Corinthian Gulf

425 - Democratic victory on Corcyra; Athens takes Anactorium

421 - Peace of Nicias; disappointment of Corinth and her attempt to form new coalition

415 - Mutilation of Hermae at Athens; Athenian expedition to Sicily

414 - Arrival at Sicily of Gylippus and Gongylus

413 - Corinthian naval assessment set at fifteen ships

405 - Congress of Sellasia

404 - Surrender of Athens

403 - Pausanias' expedition against Athens; Corinth refuses to participate

399 - Spartan expedition against Elis; Corinth refuses to participate

395 - Mission of Tithraustes; Confederation of Athens, Thbes, Argos and Corinth against Sparta; Corinthian War
392 - Aristocratic conspiracy at Corinth; massacre at the Eucleia; demagogic coup; union of Corinth with Argos

391 - Capture of Lechaeum by Sparta

390 - Capture of Peiraeum by Sparta

386 - King's Peace; establishment of Aristocratic control of Corinth; union with Argos dissolved.

374 - Corinthian naval contingent with Spartans at Corcyra

371 - Battle of Leuctra; unsuccessful democratic coup at Corinth; Corinthian military contingent at Sparta

367-6 - Corinthian rejection of Theban peace offer

366 - Attempted seizure of Corinth by Athenians;

366-5 - Enlistment of mercenary garrison under Timophanes at Corinth

365-4 - Tyranny of Timophanes

364 - Assassination of Timophanes; restoration of Oligarchs

358 - Attempt of Dion to overthrow Dionysius II

346 - Peace of Philocrates

345 - Syracusan request for help from Corinth

344 - Expedition of Timoleon to Sicily

343-2 - Epirote expedition of Philip

341 - Alliance of Corinth with Athens against Philip

338 - Completion of Timoleon's work in Sicily; Battle of Chaeronea; Congress at Corinth under Philip

336 - Macedonian garrison at Corinth; Philip murdered, succeeded by Alexander
APPENDIX III

MAPS

I

CORINTH'S COLONIES IN THE WEST
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CORINTH'S COLONIES IN THE NORTH
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CORINTH AND HER ENVIRONS
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I, Donald Kagan, was born in Lithuania, May 1, 1932. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of Brooklyn, New York, and my undergraduate training at Brooklyn College which granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1954. From Brown University I received the Master of Arts degree in 1955. While in residence there I held the Wilbour Fellowship in Latin during the year 1954-1955. In October, 1955, I was appointed a University Fellow at The Ohio State University, where I specialized in the Department of History. In October, 1956, I was appointed teaching assistant in the Department of History, a position I held for two years while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.