MATTHEW ARNOLD AND EDMUND BURKE

DISSERTATION

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"Burke," Arnold writes in the Preface to his edition of the *Letters, Speeches and Tracts on Irish Affairs*, "greatly needs to be re-edited; indeed, he has never yet been properly edited at all." Burke still has not been edited, and neither has Arnold himself. I use the twelve volume Boston edition of *The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke* (1880). In referring to Burke, I give the short title of his speech or letter and the volume number. All references to the 1852 edition of *The Works and Correspondence ... of Edmund Burke*, the edition Arnold uses, are noted as *Works* (1852).

Since the Edition de Luxe of Arnold is rare, expensive, and incomplete, I use the regular trade editions except for the school reports, which have not been reprinted elsewhere. All first references are complete, but for subsequent references I use the following abbreviations.

- **Popular Education of France with Notices of that of Holland and Switzerland. London, 1861.**
- **Popular Education**

- **EG1**

- **On the Study of Celtic Literature and On Translating Homer. London, 1893.**
- **Celtic Literature**

- **Schools and Universities on the Continent. Edition de Luxe. London, 1904.**
- **Schools and Universities**

- **C&A**

St. P. and P.


FG

Literature and Dogma. New York, 1902.

L&D

God and the Bible. New York, 1883.

G&B


ME

Mixed Essays, Irish Essays, and Others. New York, 1899. (All references to the Irish Essays are from this collection).

ME, IE, and Others


DIA


EC2


Civ. in US


Marvin, Reports


EC3


Oxford Essays


Russell, Letters


Unpubl. Letters


Letters to Clough

The Note-books of Matthew Arnold. eds., Howard Foster Lowry, Karl Young, and Waldo Hilary Dunn. London, 1952.

Note-books
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CHAPTER I

PHILISTINISM OR SLAVERY
REVOLUTION OR TYRANNY

In a letter that Matthew Arnold submitted to the Pall Mall Gazette and published in Friendship's Garland, he answers a French critic who berates him for not extolling the "blessings" of English liberty and publicity. Arnold readily grants the beauty of "true political liberty," but he cannot praise a blessing if having it obscures serious defects. Not only does the self-satisfied Englishman ignore the fact that his liberty is often a subterfuge for mere publicity, but he desires to extend that freedom with little thought of the weakness that it already entails. The Englishman has not the head, although he generally has the heart, to know what to do with his liberty. This lack of intelligence, a lack conspicuously evident in the middle class, Arnold seeks to remedy. It seems to him that two obvious means might serve to supply intelligence for this newly emerged social force: the Englishman could be left to "do as he likes" in the hope that value will emerge from the "multitudinousness" of his life, or the Englishman could hope to find a Patriot King, a Frederick of Prussia or an
Emperor of the French, to impose upon him a standard of value. Neither extreme can satisfy Arnold:

And for this class (i.e., the middle class), I want to work out a deliverance from the horrid dilemma in which 'Horace' (the French writer) and others try to fix us; -- liberty and Philistinism, or else culture and slavery.¹

Liberty and Philistinism, or culture and slavery! Just a century before Arnold wrote, Edmund Burke faced the identical dilemma. At the beginning of his political career he fought, in Thoughts on the Present Discontents, the culture and slavery that the self-imagined patriot king, George III, attempted to impose. At the end of his career he engaged the proponents of liberty and Philistinism who made the French Revolution and who hourly threatened, Burke thought, "the ancient, inbred integrity, piety, good-nature, and good-humor of the people of England."²

In two of his minor essays and one of his major essays, Arnold uses Burke as a standard of the thinker who steers a middle way between the Scylla and Charybdis of Philistinism and slavery. In "The Function of Criticism" Arnold declares that Burke's "greatness is that he lived in a world which neither English Liberalism nor English Toryism is apt to enter; -- the world of ideas, not the world of

²"Letter to a Noble Lord," The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, 6th ed. (Boston, 1850), V, 204-205.
catchwords and party habits."\(^3\) The two minor essays are "Renan," originally published in *The Academy*, III (15 February 1872), 61-64, and "The Incompatibles," the first essay in the collection *Irish Essays*. In the essay reviewing Renan's *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France* Arnold finds parallels between Burke and Renan and commends Burke's "masterpieces of thinking and eloquence" on the French Revolution, although they can never be acceptable to common liberalism, to the serious politician of his own day.\(^4\)

In "The Incompatibles," first published in 1881, Burke is invoked some fifty times to support Arnold's view of the political crises in Ireland. In many of his essays, however, Arnold cites the Irish Parliamentarian and his pronouncements on British affairs to clarify, support, and illustrate his own thought on political and social affairs (see Appendix).

It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the men who have written about Arnold, and especially those who write of his criticism and social attitudes, notice the relationship between his thought and that of Burke. Lord John Duke Coleridge, for instance, speaking not as a critic


\(^4\) *Essays in Criticism: Third Series* (Boston, 1910), pp. 154-155.
but as a friend recalling his association with Arnold, first remembers a seven-year-old Matthew Arnold reciting part of Burke's "Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts." Sir Joshua Fitch, G. W. E. Russell, E. K. Brown, Robert H. Murray, J. Dover Wilson, Benjamin Lippincott, and W. F. Connell all make statements nearly identical to Lord Coleridge's assertion that Arnold "was greatly influenced by Burke." A German scholar, Otto Elias, in a study of Arnold's basic political principles calls Burke the most important influence on Matthew Arnold after Thomas Arnold. Lionel Trilling briefly notices the relationship between Matthew Arnold's and Burke's concept of the state and the relationship between their ideas of history. Arnold's criticism, Trilling declares,


"was, in effect, his refusal to move forward until Burke and Voltaire compounded their quarrel, bowed to each other and, taking him by either hand, agreed on the path to follow" (p. 188). Trilling, however, does not consider Burke himself as a medianist, nor does Russell Kirk. Kirk omits Arnold from his study of *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana* because Arnold was not a "true conservative," but he does call Arnold one of the "interesting disciples of Burke" in the nineteenth century.⁹

No study of the relationship between Burke and Arnold has ever been made. Elias' analysis of Arnold's basic political principles devotes only three pages to Burke; Trilling does go beyond the easy statement that Arnold read Burke, but the scope of his study cannot include the relationship between their thought. Trilling calls his book a biography of Arnold's mind. He is not interested, specifically, in Arnold's use of institutions -- the basis of the comparison between him and Burke. I know of no study, in fact, which looks at the significance of institutions in Arnold's prose. To Arnold the important institutions are the state; the church, and education, but all institutions are comprehended under the State itself. Arnold borrows his

definition of the State directly from Burke. The definition of the State, however, and the concept of the function of institutions depend upon the basic assumptions on the mind in experience, the use of the past, and the idea of change. And for each of these dependent areas of thought, parallels in thought are apparent.

Neither Burke nor Arnold reaches any fixed and absolute conclusion about the use of the mind, history, or change. Arnold often follows Burke in his understanding of the basic assumptions of the mind, for instance, but even when he disagrees, Arnold seeks a Burkean median. For an obvious example, Burke objects to the abuse, or the misuse, of the rational mind. Rather than throw man entirely upon the resources of rationality, Burke extols habits and customs, prejudices and feelings in addition. Arnold follows Burke in decrying rationalism; but Arnold, conceiving that customs,"

10"The State is properly just what Burke called it: the nation in its collective and corporate character." The sentence is inserted in the 1879 publication of the essay, "Democracy," in Mixed Essays, Popular Edition (London, 1903), p. 42. The essay was first published as the "Introduction" to Popular Education in France which states the thought but does not use the Burke quotation. See the Appendix for Arnold's use of the phrase sixteen times in his prose. Although Burke employs the words corporate and collective in his definition of the State in the Reflections, III, 359, 361 and in the Appeal, IV, 169-170, he does not use the exact phrase that Arnold attributes to him in his published works. See Wilson Mathis Hudson, Jr., "An Index to the Works of Edmund Burke," Unpubl. diss. (Chicago, 1947)."
habits, and settled modes of behavior have become baneful, shifts slightly but perceptibly towards a greater freedom of the mind. To achieve order between the opposing forces -- a task which makes Arnold the typical Victorian critic -- Arnold found in Burke the idea of the State to serve as the median between oppositions. "The nation in its collective and corporate character" is the median, and the quiet, intelligent, cultured men in the State wield a third force in this median to express the actual corporate and collective character of their particular nation.

By why should Arnold go to Burke for a definition of the State and why should this be so important to reading a literary critic? Burke finds a slow evolving, in time, toward an ideal which is expedient for a particular human society. His past is not a separate corpus of musty records and old sentiments, but a vital continuum incorporated in institutions. Both writers call institutions sacred and consecrated because they express the civilization of man who slowly, patiently, and rationally constructs them. By means of institutions, man escapes from his time and achieves a type of immortality. The British State and the Christian religion impel the man living under them, more than any speculative opinion, because these institutions have developed naturally not from one mind but from many minds. Man has built them over a period of time by constantly adjusting them to the conditions which he finds in nature. Man,
individually and separate from his experience, does not think; he accepts his institutions and changes, adjusts, modifies and develops them according to his experience and his rationality. Arnold's contemporaries make either one of two capital errors: they accept uncritically and complacently what exists, or else they essay construction on the basis of speculative opinion. Arnold turned to Burke, therefore, as a thinker who grasps, and states with rigor and compulsion, the idea that institutions comprehend rational thought in time and permit both construction and critical study. Burke has a method of understanding institutions — especially the State — which Arnold finds fructifying and useful in his social and political, his religious, and his literary criticism.

Carl Becker has discussed the matter of relationships between writers. He declares, "...if Mr. Jones hadn't already had the idea, or something like it, simmering in his own mind, he wouldn't have cared to read Mr. Smith's book, or having read it, would very likely have thrown it aside, or written a review to show what a bad and mistaken book it was."¹¹ Arnold, of course, did not write a review to show what bad and mistaken books Burke wrote. The closest he comes is in advising a Frenchman to write an

article on the Reflections constraining him, however, to look carefully at Burke's judgment of the "events" of the revolution. 12 Arnold objects to the lack of taste in Burke's prose (EC 1, pp. 71-73), but he always holds Burke's thought as an example to his own age. His edition of Burke's Speeches, Tracts, and Letters on Irish Affairs sought to make that thought more readily available. However, there is evidence that he had ideas like Burke's simmering in his own mind before he began to read Burke seriously. The meager records of Arnold's thought outside his poetry disclose only the slightest reference to Burke before 1860. The letters to Clough do not mention him; he does not allude to Burke in the pamphlet, England and the Italian Question (1859); the notebooks do not quote him until 1869; Burke titles appear but twice in the reading lists for the 1850's. 13 One critic says, however, that Arnold's letters in the years 1848-1850 already show "The liberal and yet conservative — in a word Burkean -- trend of his thought." 14 Especially on Irish affairs, an area where the Burkean relationship is most


apparent, Arnold's letters to Clough "predict his later essays on that subject." According to Arnold in these letters the source of his idea of the State was a play of Corneille's, Polyeucte, which suggested "the right of large bodies of men to have what article they liked produced for them" (Ibid.). In short, it is impossible to claim that Burke provides the only source for the ideas which Arnold shares with him.

But Arnold's references to Burke are numerous enough to suggest that a definite relationship exists. The quotations are found in the greatest numbers at the beginning of each decade of Arnold's career as a critic. In the early 1860's, Arnold quotes Burke in "The Function of Criticism," "The Literary Influence of Academies" and the book which at times seems to be an early version of Culture and Anarchy -- i.e., A French Eton. Both Friendship's Garland and Culture and Anarchy contain references to Burke but the Burkean thought pattern has been more thoroughly woven into the warp of Arnold's thought. At the beginning of the 1870's Arnold uses an epigraph from Burke in Literature and Dogma, and his review of Renan's book contains direct reference to Burke. Although the religious books, all but one of which were published in the first part of the 'seventies, do not overtly

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refer to Burke, in these books the idea of a community expressing the historical movement of mind, especially the community of Christians, is fully developed along with Arnold's insistence upon moral definition from the experience of the race. These ideas, as I will show, are intensely Burkean even if Burke's name is not employed in support of them. The Mixed Essays, first published in 1879, show a return of the use of Burke's name culminating in the edition of Burke in 1881 and the collection of Irish Essays in which Burke is repeatedly alluded to. In the four essays printed in Nineteenth Century, in 1886 and 1887, the Burke references are few but again the Burkean thought pattern is apparent (see Appendix). The continued references to Burke in the prose and in his notebooks and letters after 1860 show that Arnold read nearly everything that Burke wrote except for his essay on The Sublime and Beautiful and the protracted speeches on Warren Hastings and the affairs of India.

The method of the essay is to study nine areas of Arnold's thought where the Burkean relationship is most evident. I divide these areas into six chapters since four ideas -- the attitude toward the individual and the Established Church, the definition of the leader, and the concept of colonial management -- depend upon the definition of the State which is the pivotal idea of the relationship. First, I show that both men make similar critical assumptions about
the world and about the mind which interprets the world. Second, on the basis of these critical assumptions, both attempt to make the past viable. Third, both writers have a concept of progress which lies between the extreme doctrine of materialistic, rationalistic progress and the extreme doctrine of primitivism. Fourth, to achieve a consistent understanding of mind, history, and change, both writers consecrate the State as a tangible representation of thought, of the past, and of growth. Fifth, since the State incorporates society and civilization, both writers subordinate to it the individual, the Established Church, the leader, and colonial management. Sixth, Arnold seeks a third force of reflective intelligent men like Burke who will exercise a balance of power in the State to express the collective and corporate character of the nation.

16 This organization is an expansion and a particular application of the four major Burkean ideas which Frederick L. Mulhauser cites in his essay, "The Tradition of Burke," in The Reinterpretation of Victorian Literature, ed. Joseph E. Baker (Princeton, 1950), pp. 153-168. On p. 158 Mulhauser lists the following as the chief Burkean ideas in Victorian literature:

(1) A new concept of the past "which led (the Victorians) to an attitude toward history completely different from that held by the eighteenth century writers."

(2) "A conception of the state and its function which helped them to reconcile progress and permanence in political affairs, and to build a new state within the framework of the old social order."

(3) Defense of the Established Church and "an exposition of the relationship which ought to exist between Church and State."

(4) "An ideal of colonial organization and management which guided them in building the second English empire."
To discuss these ideas I break each into five separate sections. In the first section (with the exceptions of Chapters VI and VII) I discuss factors in Arnold's life and in Burke's life which affect the ideas. I do this not to disprove any possible relationship between the two writers, but to show that each shares a tradition of thought and to show that the sharing itself has significance in the relationship. Although Burke more nearly merits the title than Arnold, neither writer can be called a scholar; nevertheless, each seeks to escape from the limitations of his own time and each is conscious of his membership in a community which exists not only in the present but in time. Burke writes in the Reflections, "I give you opinions which have been accepted amongst us, from very early times to this moment, with a continued and general approbation, and which, indeed, are so worked into my mind that I am unable to distinguish what I have learned from others from the results of my own meditation" (Ref1, III, 362). Arnold does not make a similar admission, but his constant reference to Greek thought, to Latin thought, and to his own English background is for his reader an implicit admission. Also interposed between Edmund Burke and Matthew Arnold are Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Thomas Arnold. Some careful consideration must be given, therefore, to other factors in the intellectual make-up of Arnold and Burke.
The largest part of each chapter I give to discussing the similarities between the thought of Burke and Arnold. Following, I discuss the dissimilarities. The differences arise from Arnold's interest in political and social affairs as against Burke's primary interest in political affairs. Burke's problem is to define the nature of government; Arnold, going further, seeks to understand more specifically than Burke did the effect of the State in society. Arnold's major cares in the State are education, equality, and local government; although Burke considers these matters also, they relate to the executive branch of government, not the legislator concerned with the broad principles of governmental action. But since Arnold, like Burke, seeks to empower a third force between extremes, even in the areas where Arnold seems to diverge most from Burke, he follows the Burkean method.

The fourth section of each chapter attempts, on the basis of the comparison, to elicit Arnold's political and social attitudes. In this section I use the words Liberal and Conservative, not as a precise but as a general appellation for tendency. Clinton Rossiter has suggested that we understand the shades of political opinion not as to the left or right of a line from an imaginary central point, but as a circle. At the top of the circle, twelve o'clock on a timepiece, is the point where the Liberal and Conservative
meet. At the bottom of the circle, six o'clock, the Radical and the Reactionary also meet. The pure Liberal, then, should occupy a position approximately at nine o'clock, but the whole point of Rossiter's image is that both extremes shade into one another and the nine o'clock position itself is not the conventional extreme of Liberalism. I start with Harold Laski's definition of the Liberal which appears particularly relevant since Laski uses it in an essay on de Tocqueville in which he comments on the relationship between de Tocqueville and Burke:

To be conscientious about facts which tell against your desire, to be calm and detached in the presence of events by which, within yourself, you are deeply moved, to admit the inevitability of change and, as a consequence, the impermanence of all matters of social constitution, to recognise that history gives no sanction to any dogmas which claim an absolute value -- these I venture to think, are the very heart of the liberal temper. 17

Arnold acquiesces to a similar declaration of liberalism but remarks that the Liberal Party he knows does not measure up to such an ideal (ME, pp. 105-106; below, pp. 310-311). A somewhat more specific definition is given by a contemporary apologist for liberalism, Charles Frankel. Frankel finds four central theses upon which liberalism can be defended:

1. A belief in human progress as measured in secular terms.
2. Acceptance of the doctrine "of the indefinite perfectibility of man."
3. A belief in rationalism in history and human society (i.e., the social contract does explain the origin of government satisfactorily).
4. The conviction that "...society can be approached in terms of its parts...and does not have to be understood or remade all of a piece and all at once" (i.e., a belief that reform is not made "by spiritual conversions, moral appeals for a change of heart, or the sudden intervention of external powers").

With Frankel's description and as a transition to the other side of the clock, we may put Russell Kirk's more caustic and, admittedly, extreme characterization of radicalism since 1790: (1) belief in "The perfectibility of man and the illimitable progress of society," (2) contempt for tradition, (3) political levelling, (4) economic levelling, and (5) a refusal to define the function of the State (Kirk, p. 9).

Against these errors, for such they are in Kirk's polemics, are the six canons of conservative thought:

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1. The belief that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience. Political problems, therefore, are religious and moral problems.

2. An affection for the variety and mystery of traditional life (as against the narrowing uniformity, equalitarianism, and utilitarianism of radical world-views).

3. A belief that society requires orders and classes.

4. The belief that property and freedom are inseparably connected.

5. A faith in prescription, tradition, and sound prejudice.

6. A recognition "that change and reform are not identical, and that innovation is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress." (Kirk, pp. 7-8).

Arnold, I am sure, had he been faced with such a "half a dozen intellectual propositions, and half a dozen moral rules deduced from them," would have instantly bridled as he does when faced with a pat definition of liberalism. Both of these writers hunt for an essence which would lead man to his full humanity. Reducing either, as

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Burke has been reduced by Kirk, to a set of propositions does not reveal the essence of their political ideals, for as Montesquieu, Burke, and Arnold knew, the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. I use these definitions to show that now Arnold and Burke lean, in their spirit, toward one letter and now another. Their leanings, however, are not as important as the fact that they both conceive of a State which will encompass such leanings.

The final section of each chapter attempts some brief notice of the effect of the comparison upon Arnold's criticism. Culture, a term understood in Culture and Anarchy by the vigor of its opposite, acquires more solid meaning when it is seen in terms of Burke's prescription and his idea of the continuity of history. Arnold's idea of reason and his idea of the State likewise acquire deeper meaning when they are compared to Burke's use of these concepts.

To approach the whole problem of the third force in politics and social action, I begin with a comparison of the basic assumptions which Arnold and Burke make.
CHAPTER II

THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1

The basic assumptions which Arnold shares with Burke are a major premise of a god-ordained universe, a belief in the reality of experience, a median view of the function of reason, and a conviction of the necessity of moral judgment. Arnold and Burke also share, obviously, a long history of western civilization; therefore, before we study specifically the relationship in their assumptions, we ought to examine first how much they share a common background. My object is not to show how thoroughly each mined his tradition, but to show, succinctly and generally, that each had common sources. Two writers who thought without system but by intuitions, prejudices, and unconscious absorption require such a survey.

They share a common background primarily because they share a common education in classical writers and a common training in the Anglican church. Within the Christian and Western European complex of ideas, both were conscious, although Arnold seems more overtly conscious, of European thought after the fall of Rome. Burke, too, is
part of that "indispensable eighteenth century" which Arnold admired. More narrowly, by the very accident of being British, the writers share a national tradition. Finally, the very critical assumptions listed here for study passed from Burke to Lessing, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Thomas Arnold.

It is apparent from A. P. I. Samuels' study, The Early Life of Edmund Burke, that Burke had the conventional school-boy's small Latin and less Greek. Indeed, the purpose of Samuels' book is to show that the education that Burke received in Ireland and at Trinity College parallels exactly the classical training in English schools in the eighteenth century, a training that Arnold received in the early nineteenth century. But in Burke's speeches there is nothing to parallel Arnold's ideal of Hellenism. Burke's ideal of the unity between Church and State resembles the Greek ideal, but nothing indicates that he drew it directly from Hellenic civilization. Burke quotes the Poetics in his essay on the drama (VII, 153), and in his essay on the Sublime and Beautiful (I, 123), but his direct references to Greek thinkers are few.  

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writers against metaphysics suggests that Plato would not receive unconditional acceptance from either. Burke speaks respectfully of the Republic (I, 454; II, 154), but he might have written, one feels, a "Reflections" on Plato's Republic. The common Greek background is probably the least important, except as Greek thought had filtered down to become an integral part of European culture.

Arnold's essay on Marcus Aurelius and his other references to the Stoics have led to studies of his relationship to these thinkers, but the Stoic qualities that John Hicks finds in Arnold's attitudes toward "the universe and God," toward "God's Monitor, the higher self," and toward "culture, salvation, and religion" may with equal justice be applied to Burke. Burke speaks of Aurelius as an ideal of the ruler in the Appeal (IV, 79). His distrust of French license resembles the Stoic refusal to submit to the demands of the flesh. He writes,

I am well aware that men love to hear their power, but have an extreme disrelish to be told their duty. This is of course; because every duty is a limitation of some power (Appeal, IV, 163).


The apparent Stoicism in Burke may grow from the Christian use of the Stoics in St. Augustine and St. Thomas which continued to his own day.\(^3\)

Another common source is the Christian tradition as understood by the Anglican church. The origin of Burke's thought, a critic has said, lies in two directions: English jurisprudence and "in the tradition of Anglican theology, the via media of rationalism and revelation."\(^4\) In Arnold the influence comes from such Anglican divines as John Smith, Thomas Wilson, and Joseph Butler, but in his religious books he also refers to Hooker and to the Cambridge Platonists.\(^5\) Critics have placed Burke and Arnold, too, in the Christian humanist tradition with its submission of human affairs to God.\(^6\)

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\(^3\)Moorhouse F. X. Millar, "Burke on the Moral Basis of Political Liberty," Thought, XVI (1941), 79.

\(^4\)Victor M. Hamm, "Burke and Metaphysics," The New Scholasticism, XVIII (1944), 9. Hamm's essay is a defense of Burke against the charges of Robert M. Hutchins that Burke's writing has a value only as a source of certain expressions about the art of government.


\(^6\)See James Wright Frierson, "The Genesis of the Arnoldian Critique," Unpubl. diss. (Stanford, 1953), p. 4. Frierson's thesis is to show the philosophical basis of Arnold's critical essays "in the Christian humanist tradition and to demonstrate their consistency with classical literary precepts." The Fordham critics, Hoffman and Levack, Millar, Hamm and others emphasize Burke's connection with the Christian humanist tradition. See "Introduction:
E. K. Brown finds it astonishing that "Arnold should praise a thinker who was ... [sic] proudly insular" as Burke, but Burke, despite his apparent insularity, knew more of continental thought than Brown's phrase might indicate. Fletcher, in his study of *Montesquieu and English Politics*, shows that Burke knew and absorbed Montesquieu's thought better than any other Englishman. Burke's judgments of Rousseau and Voltaire are more than imitations of fashionable attitudes toward these two writers; in fact, when Arnold recommends Burke to his contemporary English statesmen and recommends that they read the *Reflections*, the *Appeal*, and the *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly*, he quotes Burke's judgment of Rousseau as an example of Burke's "thinking and eloquence." In fairness to Burke, his nation was a cultural export country; he did not have the need for continental thought that Arnold did. If

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9. *Essays in Criticism, Third Series* (Boston, 1910), pp. 154-155. The "Renan" essay was published first in 1872. Arnold, who is a bit quick about seeing insularity in Englishmen, never accuses Burke of the same fault. In Celtic Literature Arnold praises Burke for his "largeness of view and richness of thought" (p. 93).
Burke's statements on affairs in Ireland, America, and India have a bit of the air of the noble Roman considering the distant provinces, they still are made with a largeness of understanding that belies any epithet of insularity. Burke recognizes that British law, custom, and institutions deserve praise because they so exactly suit the conditions of British life. He refuses to prescribe constitutional institutions for the French, for instance; he explains: "When I praised the British Constitution, and wished it to be well studied, I did not mean that its exterior form and positive arrangement should become a model for you or for any people servilely to copy" (Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, IV, 47). Burke would do the same in regard to continental thought -- read it and study it but not use it as a model to be copied servilely.

Arnold and Burke share also a British tradition. Burke's empiricism manifestly partakes of the general stream of English thought. Mario Einaudi, in his study of the British background of Burke's political thought, lists Locke, Butler, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, Josiah Tucker, and Bolingbroke (in reaction) as the chief influence on Burke's thought.10 Burke was almost

10 Mario Einaudi, "The British Background of Burke's Political Philosophy," Political Science Quarterly, LXIX (1943), 576-598.
in conscious revolt against Locke's political ideas (Burke's prescription, for instance, is the very opposite of Locke), but since Locke was the St. Peter of the Holy Apostolic succession of Whig philosophers, Burke could hardly be overt in his antagonism. Arnold does not quote Locke in his Notebooks, and I recall no mention of Locke in his prose; but in a letter to Clough, dated 23 October 1850, Arnold speaks of reading the Conduct of the Understanding, and he praises Locke as a writer "who has cleaned his mind of vain repetitions, though without the positive and vivifying atmosphere of Spinoza." Of the other writers in Einaudi's list, only Joseph Butler, whose last six sermons Einaudi considers the most influential on Burke, exerted a strong influence on Arnold too. Possibly the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophers, of which Hutcheson, Reid, Ferguson, and Tucker were disciples, had completely dissipated by Arnold's time, but critical assumptions that Arnold might have received

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11 Howard Foster Lowry, Karl Young and Waldo Hilary Dunn, eds., The Note-books of Matthew Arnold (London, 1952). The index contains no entry under Locke's name. For Burke on Locke see Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century (London, 1929), Chap. 2.


13 Arnold calls the six "the most entirely satisfactory productions of Butler." St. Paul and Protestantism (New York, 1898), p. 286. Burke's Vindication employs the same methods as Butler's Analogy; in 1785 Burke praises the Analogy. See Hamm, New Scholasticism, XVIII, 16, 22.
from Burke could also have come to Arnold through the Scots. Arnold read Hume's History as early as 1855. Trilling points to the difficulty in relating too closely Arnold's own type of empiricism with Burke's when he notices that "It is surely significant that Hume, not only as a religious skeptic but as the father of skeptical empirical science, suggested a formulation of religion very similar to Arnold's." As to Bolingbroke, the last man on Einaudi's list, Lord Coleridge asserts that "Arnold did not become acquainted with Lord Bolingbroke's work till late in life; ...and though he was fascinated...by (his) faultless style, he observed that the general neglect of Lord Bolingbroke as an author is to be explained by the temporary and partisan subjects on which he employed his splendid powers." Burke had made nearly the same observations in the Reflections (III, 349) when he asked the question, "Who now reads Bolingbroke?" a question that Arnold rephrased to read, "Who now reads Burke?" (in "Falkland," ME, p. 225).

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had imitated the style of Bolingbroke so well that on first publication, *The Vindication of Natural Society* passed as Bolingbroke's own until Burke added a preface explaining his purpose. Arnold's reading lists for the years 1865, 1866, and 1867 include works of Bolingbroke, and Arnold used Bolingbroke for an historical insight in the "Falkland" essay. Once more, the British background of both writers can very well serve as a common source of critical assumptions.

It is fashionable, especially of Liberal writers, to say that Burke had little influence, but Burke did have some influence on writers like Lessing, Kant, Reynolds, and Wordsworth and Coleridge. Lessing, for instance, translated the *Sublime and Beautiful* before he wrote the work which Arnold memorializes in his "Epilogue to Lessing's *Laocoon*." Little in Arnold's poem is identifiable as Burkean except for the conclusion that poetry is more sublime than the other arts. Although the *Sublime and Beautiful* was highly praised in the late eighteenth century, the work "lost prestige as the century came to a close," and Coleridge dismissed it as a poor thing. Coleridge could dismiss it so cavalierly, one feels, because so many of its salient

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17 See W. G. Howard, "Burke among the Forerunners of Lessing," *PMLA*, XXII (1907), 609 (608-632).

features -- its respect for experience and the spirit of a work -- had passed into romantic theory and become commonplace. Kant and Reynolds, for example, incorporated and modified Burke's thought. Although Arnold knew little of Kant, he did read and admire Reynolds' work on aesthetic theory. And one dare not forget the potent names in Arnold's prose--Goethe and Wordsworth.

Furthermore, in writing his essay on the Sublime and Beautiful Burke joined the Longinian tradition, a tradition into which critics place Arnold without any reference to Burke. According to M. H. Abrams, Arnold, because of his grand style and his touchstones, "belongs among the left-wingers of the Longinian tradition." Arnold joins the ranks honorably. John Keble, his godfather and predecessor in the chair of poetry at Oxford, "was the only important romantic critic to refer frequently to Longinus." Arnold includes in his reading list for 1857, doubtless in preparation for his own lectures at Oxford, Keble's lectures and also the lectures of Bishop Lowth, another critic Abrams places in the Longinian school.

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19 For Kant see the Note-books, p. 214. Arnold quotes Kant's definition of metaphysics from the Dictionnaire de la langue francaise. For Reynolds see Ernest Hartley Coleridge, Life Correspondence of John Duke Coleridge (London, 1904), II, 159-160.


21 Abrams, p. 78; Note-books, p. 561.
Finally, the Zeitgeist and their reaction from it impels them toward the same tradition of thought. Both attack non-believers, both decry rationalism in its extreme forms, and both prefer moral writers.

Therefore, had Burke's speeches never been printed or had Arnold never read a word of them, Arnold's conclusions might have been no different. Arnold did read Burke, however, and did employ his thought. Even when he is not apparently using the eighteenth-century Parliamentarian, the resemblances in their thought are striking; consequently, comparing and contrasting the thinking of Burke and Arnold clarifies, for instance, the latter's valuation of experience.

Arnold and Burke have five basic assumptions in their thought upon which they ultimately posit their ideas of history, change, and the State. First, both assume that God exists in the universe and reveals himself through the world and human attempts to understand the world. Second, since God is in experience, by careful study of experience man discovers the traces of God's law. Third, he must study his own mind and its workings because man himself is part of experience. Fourth, to study experience man needs to employ not only his rational faculty but also his non-rational
feelings. Fifth, the actual judgment each makes on experience is, in effect, a moral judgment which is a median between the rational and the non-rational.

(a)

Burke typifies eighteenth-century thought in the belief that the course of history is the "known march of the ordinary providence of God." He commends man to "the whole ancient order of the world" because this order has the stamp of divine influence by its very length in time. His law of nature consequently is one part law of God and one part law of man, and the aim of man is to keep his own laws in conformity to the laws which God reveals in his visible world. God has "disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will, but according to His" (IV, 165-166). Burke is even more explicit in his Reflections on the Revolution in France:

Persuaded that all things ought to be done with reference, and referring all to the point of reference to which all should be directed, [the wise and the masses] think themselves bound, not only as individuals in the sanctuary of the heart, or as congregated in that personal capacity, to renew the memory of their high origin and cast, but also in their corporate character to perform their national homage to the Institutor and Author and Protector of civil society, without which civil

society man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it. They conceive that He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection: He willed, therefore, the state: He willed its connection with the source and original archetype of all perfection (III, 361-362).

Burke, of course, is justifying a state religion, but the justification is possible because of his belief that man shapes the law of God from the march of history.

In the "Conclusion" to Culture and Anarchy, Arnold repeats the same idea:

But for us,—who believe in right reason, in the duty and possibility of extricating and elevating our best self, in the progress of humanity toward perfection,—for us the framework of society, that theatre on which this august drama has to unroll itself, is sacred; and whoever administers it, and however we may seek to remove them (the Philistines) from their tenure of administration, yet, while they administer, we steadily and with undivided heart support them in repressing anarchy and disorder; because without order there can be no society, and without society there can be no human perfection.23

Arnold, too, accepts Burke's critical assumption that God willed the State, that man is marshalled by a divine tactic. Arnold repeats himself just a few pages later: "Thus, in our eyes, the very framework and exterior order of the State...is sacred" (p. 204). T. S. Eliot says that Arnold spoke in a "hasty moment" of the will of God as the ultimate

sanction of the State. However hasty Arnold was in his assertions about the sanction of the State, he did base the thought of his religious books on the conviction that God could be perceived in experience. St. Paul, in asserting the existence "of the natural moral law," finds its source "not merely [in] God in conscience, the righteous judge, but [in] God in the world, and the workings of the world, the eternal and divine power from which all life and wholesome energy proceed." In *Literature and Dogma*, Arnold writes "...that in us which is really natural is, in truth, revealed." God is in the world, revealing Himself in experience, if we will but attend to that experience and discover His meaning in it. In truth, just as "The ethical principle which (Arnold) has evolved...takes its validity from a divine order of the universe," so Burke's theory of the State and Burke's ethical theory derive their validity from a divine order of the universe.

The connection between experience in the community and the God of the universe is seen in Arnold's poems and in his use of a quotation from Burke which reflects the idea explicitly. "The Sick King in Bokhara" exclaims,

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But hear ye this, ye sons of men!
They that bear rule, and are obey'd,
Unto a rule more strong than theirs
Are in their turn obedient made (ll. 187-190).

The third and fourth stanza of the "Fragment of an 'Antigone'"
raise the community of men above the "primal law,/ Which
consecrates the ties of blood" (ll. 29-30). And finally,
Arnold uses a quotation from Burke in "The Function of
Criticism at the Present Time" and as the epigraph to

I conclude, therefore, that Arnold makes the same critical
assumption that Burke had made -- the working of the state
and experience itself are valid reflections of the workings
of God and Providence. This assumption has a major effect
on Arnold, who lived in an age in which the boldest thinkers
declared that the idea of Providence had been replaced by a
natural law or a law of Progress.

(b)

Although critics have ignored the affirmation of God
in the universe in both writers (Morley ignores it in Burke
as Trilling ignores it in Arnold), no one can ignore each writer's emphasis on experience. The thesis of the essay on the Sublime and Beautiful is to discover what observable effect the sublime and beautiful experience may have on the mind. Burke writes in his introduction to this essay, "My point in this inquiry is, (sic) to find whether there are any principles, on which the imagination is affected, so common to all, so grounded and certain, as to supply the means of reasoning satisfactorily about them" (I, 81-82).

We could almost insert Burke's sentence into Arnold's religious books: "...the scientific sense calls upon St. Paul to produce the facts by which he verifies what he says; and if he cannot produce them, then it treats both St. Paul's assertion, and Calvinism's assertion after him, as of no real consequence" (St. & P., p. 7).

Because each thinks deductively from the premise of God in the universe, from the premise of Providence, each turns to experience. "When we go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth," Burke writes. As an empiricist he refuses to pronounce on French political solutions.

I must see with my own eyes, I must, in a manner, touch with my own hands, not only the fixed, but the momentary circumstances, before I could venture to suggest any political project whatsoever (Letter, Member, National Assembly, IV, 43).

In God and the Bible, Arnold contends that "experience (is)
the source of all our knowledge." Experience is the key word, to be sure, in Arnold's religious writing, but it is also the key behind his desire to spread the best that has been thought and said, for culture seeks the answer to the question of how to live "through all the voices of human experience" (C&A, p. 47).

This emphasis on experience follows naturally from the eighteenth-century idea each has about nature and its relationship to God. "As Bacon said (and Sir Thomas More before him), science was the study of the works of God, and this should be almost, if not quite, as pious a pursuit as the study of his word..." God provides two channels of revelation--Scripture and Nature. Nature is God's creation; therefore, the study of it and the use of it insures man's own happiness. As Cobban succinctly says,

...what has been must have been ordained by God, and so (Burke) gave precedence to the empirical element. His faith is something more than the ordinary philosophic idealism which believes in the existence behind the phenomenal world of a real world of noumena; Burke, like his friend, Dr. Johnson, has no such doubts as to the reality of things sensual. He sees the divine plan in the actual appearances of the world, in the positive events of experience (Cobban, Revolt, p. 92).

Neither does Arnold doubt the reality of the senses. In

God and the Bible, he writes:

It is true, the doubts which trouble Descartes and which have troubled so many philosophers -- doubts, whether this world in which we live, the objects which strike our senses, the things which we see and handle, have any real existence -- are not exactly the doubts by which we ourselves have been most plagued. Indeed, to speak quite frankly, they are doubts by which we have never been tormented at all (G&B, p. 67).

This same refusal to doubt the reality of the senses also appears in Arnold's rejection of the thought of the eighteenth-century divine, Butler. For Butler the spiritual reward is deferred; we can only find happiness on the assumption that we may find spiritual reward in some other world. But for Arnold, "The spiritual reward of righteousness is... experienced, here and now, positively and on a certain ground." 28

But is not this what is typical and expected of the British empirical tradition, much of which would derive from the inherent British habit of thinking? Burke, however, gave this habit a character. As Sir Philip Magnus, Burke's latest biographer, says, "Burke's genius...first gave shape and direction to what had formerly been little more than an inchoate mass of ideas, floating in the English mind." 29

For a writer convinced that "Science, in the widest sense of sense of the word, (means) a true knowledge of things as the

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basis of our operations" (Russell, Letters, I, 285) and con-
vinced of the necessity to use experience, Burke is the out-
standing social thinker who put empirical truth into the
active affairs of life. In "The Incompatibles," it is pre-
cisely Burke's ability to search for the thing as it really
is, "The nature of things" which Arnold praises. 30

Such a general emphasis upon experience precludes 
either Arnold's or Burke's establishing a metaphysic. Indeed,
both attack classical metaphysics at every opportunity.
Arnold praises Joubert for avoiding metaphysical language
and concern in order to concentrate on the sensible and
concrete. (EG1, p. 327). The right-minded metaphysician,
Arnold seems to say, is no more than a poet in a false garb.
Arnold finds even Descartes too much the metaphysician and
makes an effort in the second chapter of God and the Bible
to show that the Cogito, ergo sum can be put on to a sound
experimental basis, but if it is, it becomes a meaningless
anthropomorphism. Burke writes,

Nothing can be conceived more hard than the heart
of a thorough-bred metaphysician. It comes nearer
to the cold malignity of a wicked spirit than to the
frailty and passion of a man. It is like that of
the Principle of Evil himself, incorporeal, pure,
unmixed, dephlegmated, defecated evil (Noble Lord, V,
216).

30 "The Incompatibles," Mixed Essays, Irish Essays, and
Others (New York, 1899), pp. 276, 300. Arnold quotes
"Speech at Bristol Previous to Election," II, 382.
Arnold doesn't suggest that a metaphysician is the devil himself, but he comes close:

At the mention of that name metaphysics, less essence, existence, substance, finite and infinite, cause and succession, something and nothing, begin to weave their eternal dance before us! With the confused murmur of their combinations filling all the region governed by her, who, far more indisputably than her late-born rival, political economy, has earned the title of the Dismal Science (G&B, p. 84).

If the attitude toward experience forces a denial of metaphysical thought in both Burke and Arnold, it also forces a denial of abstract theory. Arnold defines Jacobinism, as Burke does, as an addiction to an abstract system (Letter, Member, National Assembly, IV, 16). Arnold's remark in Culture and Anarchy that "Culture is always assigning to system-makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human destiny than their friends like" (C&A, p. 66) becomes more explicit when read in conjunction with his educational report for 1878: "The worst of such doctrines (abstract ideas of education) is that everything depends upon the practical application given to them, and it seems so easy to give a practical application which is erroneous."31 In his late essay on Count Leo Tolstoi Arnold objects to the Russian's codification of Christianity

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into "any series of maxims...as the ultimate sum and formula into which Christianity may be run up."32 Arnold makes clear the connection between such a statement and the practical, mundane world by citing a political example in the very next paragraph: Politicians "push or slacken," he writes, "press their points hard or let them be, as may best suit the interests of their self-aggrandisement and of their party" (EC2, p. 296). The system becomes an end in itself, a *porro unum est necessarium* which culture, in Arnold's terms, and history or prescription, in Burke's, must deny. Abstract theory is too dangerous; it is fully as dangerous as the metaphysician-devil himself.

(c)

The interest in experience naturally carries the two writers to an interest in the mind. Man thinking is not a machine observing apart from experience; since his mind is in the experience which he studies, it too must be observed as any other phenomenon in experience. John MacCunn, in his *Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke*, specifies four psychological assumptions in Burke. Arnold follows Burke in making each of these assumptions himself. These assumptions are (1) that man is a religious animal as well as a political

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animal, (2) all ordinary men are creatures in whom feeling, habit, and even prejudice are apt to be stronger than reason, (3) men act on motives relating to their interest far more than they act on theories, and (4) men are much quicker to feel grievances than to find remedies. 3

A writer whose essays need to be divided roughly, but never exactly, into religious, political, and literary productions accepts the first of these generalizations—man is a religious and political animal. Indeed, it is difficult to separate the religious from the social and political in Culture and Anarchy. Furthermore, the foundation of Arnold's theology, Trilling contends, lies in the belief that "religion insofar as it is rooted in human emotion cannot be dismissed or destroyed" and the belief that "every religious concept has some grain of truth because (it was) created by human need" (Trilling, p. 305).

Despite the seeming intellectualism of his religious books, Arnold knows that "the feeling and habit" of men are stronger than reason and that this feeling and habit should be employed for the proper ends of society (see Appeal, IV, 202). "Arnold felt that by taking the emphasis off theology,

off the cognitive and intellectual, and by putting it on the emotional and imaginative, he was taking religion off its apex where it had been standing and putting it on its base where it belonged" (Trilling, p. 305). Arnold justifies religion on the grounds of its poetry, its appeal to the habits and feelings of men. "The power of religious ideas over us," Arnold avows, "does not spring up at call, but is intimately dependent upon particular names and practices and forms and expressions which have gone along with it ever since we can remember, and which have created special sentiments in us" (St. P. and P., p. 216). Such a statement is like Burke's, "The moral sentiments are so nearly connected with early prejudice as to be one and the same thing." (Appeal, IV, 205). We can feel the poetry of the Apostle's Creed and the Nicene Creed "even when we no longer take them literally, (and) as approximations to a profound truth, we can use them" (St. P. and P., p. 219). Arnold delves into the matter and circumstances of a witch trial to show how an intelligent judge can be governed by his habits, feelings, and prejudices (St. P. and P., pp. 191-197). His examples show the negative effect of prejudices, but Arnold recognizes the use of prejudices here and in his discussion of the State. Arminius, in Friendship's Garland, ridicules the Englishman because he has none of the Geist of the German, none of the admirable habits, feelings, and customs which his European counterpart does have and does use.
Arnold's attack on Bishop Butler's psychology demonstrates his using Burkean psychological observation—men act on motives relating to their interests far more than on theories. Butler had attempted to evolve a non-experiential "conscience" rather than accept the truth, in Arnold's thought, that man could evolve his best self "on motives relative to his interest" far more easily than he could act on an abstract idea of conscience such as the Bishop's. Arnold advises the middle-class to discover that their own interests would be advanced by rejecting their personal interest in governmental non-interference. Arnold constantly attacked the Non-conformists for their narrowly interested motives and their failure to see that the wider interests of the nation would be served by their joining the national body.

The conviction that men "are much quicker to feel grievances than to find remedies" (the fourth of MacCunn's generalizations on Burke's psychology) Arnold also shares. Arnold attacks Bishop Colenso not only because the Bishop destroys meaningful poetry—meaningful feeling, habit, and even prejudice—but because his book reflects only the grievance and none of the remedy. Colenso, in effect, behaves precisely as Burke sees the French revolutionaries behaving. The French could have remedied, Burke feels, the errors of their monarchy, but in choosing to eliminate grievances by destroying the body of society, they merit
Burke's chastisement. Colenso could only see error: Arnold, in seeing some of the same grievances, anxiously seeks to preserve a structure of the church and at the same moment remedy the grievances from the illness of the Zeitgeist. In politics, the Liberal Party frittered away its time on such grievances as the deceased wife's sister Bill rather than concern itself with actual improvement. The Hyde Park rioters deserved the Tarpeian rock treatment that Arnold recommended in the first version of *Culture and Anarchy* because they violated the structure of society and seemingly had no interest in correcting or improving that structure.

(d)

The net effect of these psychological assumptions—that man is a religious and political animal, that abstract reason is not a strong motive for human actions, but interest is, that men feel grievance more than they find remedies—might be a crass utilitarianism. It is not, of course, but at this incomplete stage, it looks as if Burke and Arnold are anti-intellectual and anti-rational. On the other hand, the words *reason, rational, intellect, intelligence* appear frequently in both writers. To say, however, that either sought to enshrine rationality or irrationality is false: they sought rather to comprehend human experience. Since human experience cannot be encompassed in an *a priori* formula, Burke and Arnold seek another method of reason.
The quality of reason is the ground of Arnold's praise of Burke. "Reason is to be hazarded," Burke professes in his *Letter to a Member of the National Assembly* (IV, 5). He is even stronger in the *Letter to a Noble Lord*:

I have ever abhorred, since the first dawn of my understanding, to this its obscure twilight, all the operations of opinion, fancy, inclination, and will, in the affairs of government, where a sovereign reason, paramount to all forms of legislation and administration, should dictate. Government is made for the very purpose of opposing that reason to will and to caprice, in the reformers or in the reformed, in the governors or in the governed, in kings, in senates, or in people (V, 189).

The basis for action is reason, as Burke understood the term, and it was his ability to see reason even in the French Revolution, in his worst enemy, that Arnold finds worthy of praise when he speaks of Burke in "The Function of Criticism":

...still to be able to think, still to be irresistibly carried, if so it be, by the current of thought to the opposite side of the question... I know nothing more striking, and I must add that I know nothing more un-English (EC1, pp. 17-18).

In "Renan" and "The Incompatibles," the two essays where Burke's thought is most evident, Arnold recommends Burke for the same reason. He is the greatest English statesman because "he is the only one who traces the reason of things in politics and who enables us to trace it too" (*ME, IE, and Others*, p. 283).

By the "reason of things" Arnold means that he attempts to get a full grasp of the events and the previous practice of a particular event. Arnold does not mean, of
course, that Burke had a creative reason which remakes and reorders experience. Burke has the "right reason" which Arnold speaks of in Culture and Anarchy—the reason that enables him to discover the principles of actions. John MacCunn writes that Burke would have us distinguish two things. "The one, which he distrusts, is to act upon theory; the other, which he commends, to act upon principles" (MacCunn, pp. 43-44). Burke, in attacking the misuse of deduction by much eighteenth-century thought, desires a mind alive to the activity of men. A principle is that which is directly derived from experience, but a theory is that which the mind of the schoolman proposes to the world. Having little knowledge or contact with actual affairs, his mind constructs with no connection to the world about him. A principle derived from immediate experience is constantly subjected to the test of experience, and is therefore constantly modified. In Cobban's representation, "Theories ...are only to be regarded when they have been arrived at inductively from the fact and hence are not liable to the charge of abstractness" (Cobban, p. 76). Burke, on the invitation of a member of the National Assembly, refuses to aggravate, "by the infusion of any speculation of mine, the evils which have arisen from the speculations of others" (IV, 42). He could only supply France with the wisdom she so desperately needed by becoming a Frenchman, but since
such a transmutation is impossible, he cannot advise the French except to tell them to follow his method. Arnold's critical method, especially in the "Last Words on Translating Homer," is exactly the same. Arnold here is attempting to evolve a general principle of translation and yet eschew the rigid formulations such as Newman had used to justify his translation. The distinction Arnold makes between a formal and a substantial criticism stems from his aim to achieve a criticism based on the principles of living practice with a work of art.  

"I dislike," he remarks, "to meddle with general rules" (p. 368), for they are the work of a formalist who pays insufficient attention to principle. The whole burden of his lectures demonstrates his dislike of literary theory and his preference for a principle which will meaningfully carry the thought of general literary experience.

I make five generalizations about the use of mind in the two writers: (1) Thinking is the tracing of the reason of things in society and not an assault on experience to reconstitute it according to a theory in the mind; (2) Thought must precede action; (3) The critical intelligence, a term including the psychological assumptions and the power of the analytic mind, restrains the threat of arid rationalism;

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The rational mind makes the separation of the best self from the ordinary self; (5) The reason of things tells man to support what Burke calls "reasoned prejudice" and what Arnold calls the "poetry of life."

The thinking which traces the reason of things in society might be called free-thinking as distinguished from free-thought. I have already pointed out that both Burke and Arnold inveterately oppose metaphysics and abstract thinking because of its lack of connection with human experience. Free-thought produced the English Revolution of 1688; free-thinking produced the French Revolution of 1789.

Thought operates by an unostentatious reflection upon experience; gradually and almost without effort the principles of the experience emerge. "My aim," Arnold writes in his 1861 essay, "Democracy," is "to invite impartial reflection upon the subject, not to make a hostile attack against old opinions, still less to set on foot and fully equip a new theory" (ME, p. 3).

Facing a dualism of thought and action, both writers prefer that thought be given the superior position. Why is England threatened with anarchy? "The fundamental ground is our preference of doing to thinking" (C&A, p. 129).

Arnold defines Hebraism as "the valuing staunchness and earnestness more than (the) free play (of the mind), the entire subordination of thinking to doing, (which) has led to a mistaken and misleading treatment of things" (C&A,
p. 157). Burke opposes the French Revolution because it rushed into action without the principle to guide its action. His answer to the Member of the National Assembly who suggested that Burke's reason gave aid and comfort to his enemy is: "can false political principles be more effectually exposed than by demonstrating that they lead to consequences directly inconsistent with and subversive to the arrangements grounded upon them?" (IV, 7). Because thought had not been given its necessary superior position, action ran on unheedful of any control but its own inertia.

The critical intelligence which both writers employ restrains the threat of intellectual aridity inherent in rationalism, for the critical intelligence is not a thing looking only at the intelligence of an action but a method which seeks to understand the total event--its rationality and its humanity. Both Arnold and Burke knew quite well that human life cannot be reduced to an intellectual system. "Mind must conspire with mind," Burke says, but he adds, "I have never yet seen any plan which has not been mended by the observations of those who were much inferior in understanding to the person who took the lead in the business" (Reflections, III, 456). On the other hand, in proportion as a metaphysical statement is true, it is morally and politically false (III, 353). As Burke felt that the failure of the revolution stemmed from the fact that those
in Paris had insufficient knowledge of right reason, so also Arnold feels that mid-century Liberalism could not govern because it lacks sufficient culture, intelligence, or reason to do the job. The Liberals have a system, a machine, which cannot include all of life, but Arnold desires them to look at all of life fully and impartially (C&A, p. 67). He praises Burke for rejecting the blind authority of his party and for admitting at the end of his *Thoughts on French Affairs*, "If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it" (EGL, p. 17).

Arnold's whole critical attempt was to join the rational with the feeling, to let the critical intelligence work upon all aspects of human life.

Both must praise the rational mind, for it alone enables man to separate, in Arnold's terms, the best self from the ordinary self and to insure the rule of the best self. Arnold makes quite clear in his essay on "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist" that the best self grows by the action of the mind upon human experience. "In morals, we must not rely," he declares, "just on what may 'have the appearance' to the individual" (St. P. and R, p. 280); we must use the general rationality of the human race rather than the rationality of a particular mind. Burke draws the same distinction between natural appetites (or the ordinary self) and the controlling power of the rational mind. The
purpose of government and society is to exert "its pressure to free (man) from the despotism of his own blind and brutal passions."35

Both Burke and Arnold use the rational mind to support the reasoned prejudices of a people. Burke writes in the Reflections,

We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of specula-
tion, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, (and they seldom fail,) they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence (III, 246-247).

The same idea is seen most clearly in Arnold's religious criticism, but it applies also to his literary and social criticism. "A company of Cornish revivalists," he writes in St. Paul and Protestantism, "will have no difficulty in tasting, seeing, hearing, and feeling God, twenty times over, tonight, and yet may be none the better for it to-morrow morning" (p. 63). Since this is true, the Non-conformist had better align himself to an Established Church, which devotes itself to continuing and developing the

35 H. J. Laski, ed., Selected Letters (London, 1922), p. 269. Cf. also Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, IV, 16; Appeal, IV, 162; Appeal, IV, 163-164; Reflections, III, 310-311.
religious prejudice. The Nonconformist wastes his energy in "exploding general prejudices" and has no time to study the latent wisdom which prevails in them. It is better to have been a Christian for the last fifteen hundred years than a Jew or a Socinian, for the Christian can avail himself of the general bank and capital rather than trust himself to "any speculative opinion which he may hold or think he holds" (C&A, p. 30). "Under the direction of reason," Burke writes, "instinct is always right" (V, 209); if we substitute for instinct the word tact, the sentence easily fits Arnold's criticism. In his social criticism, although he attacked the baneful effect of customs and habits, he sees the value of Geist under the direction of human intelligence (FG, pp. 5-10).

It is apparent that the five uses of the rational mind diverge from the normal understanding of the "rational". But, to turn to the other side of the question, more striking than their desire to see the rational mind given its full sway is the insistence of each writer on the value of the nonrational. As mentioned in the discussion of the psychology of the two writers, both knew that habits, feelings, and prejudices play an important part in the affairs of men and that any system which ignores them is ignoring what is its function not to ignore. Facing an antithesis between habits and sentiments without ideas, and ideas
without sentiments and habits, Burke prefers to go without the ideas rather than to go without the sentiment (MacCunn, p. 72). In the Reflections, on the other hand, he hopes that the nineteenth century will learn something not only from the extremes of rationality in the French revolution itself, but from the extremes of nonrationality in the St. Bartholomew massacres (III, 422). The two extremes of French history will teach posterity, Burke hopes, "not to make war upon either religion or philosophy for the abuse which the hypocrites of both have made of the two most valuable blessings conferred upon us by the bounty of the universal Patron, who in all things eminently favors and protects the race of man" (Ibid.).

Arnold, again poised between two worlds, saw that "The analytical reason has yielded such melancholy results that it is certainly worth while to look for another instrument of intellectual discovery" (Trilling, p. 241). Arnold praises Saint Paul for his "piercing practical religious sense" which enables him to be "at once mystical and rational."

The world of reason and duty has an excellent clue to action, but wants motive-power; the world of sympathy and influence has an irresistible force of motive-power, but wants a clue for directing its exertion. The danger of the one is weariness in well-doing; the danger in the other is sterile raptures and immoral fanaticism. Paul takes from both worlds what can help him, and leaves what cannot (St. P. and B, p. 63).
This imaginative fusion is surely very much like that which Burke seeks when he makes reason not a dominant factor but an equal factor in human life. Arnold objects to the rational critics of Scripture who could not balance the rational and the edifying in their criticism. On such ground he objects to the work of Colenso (in contrast to that of Stanley), to *Essays and Reviews*, to Strauss, and even to Sainte-Beuve.

The humanist, shocked by the activity of the analytic intellect, fears that the rational mind may destroy the essential mystery of life. Unable to deny the intellect he seeks a third point of view to preserve the human values, the amenities, he so much admires. Burke and Arnold fear the rational mind, for it may go counter to the basic premise of a God-ordained universe in its partial view; they also distrust its abilities to satisfy the human need. "What would become of the world," Burke asks, "if the practice of all moral duties, and the foundations of society, rested upon having their reasons made clear and demonstrative to every individual?" (*Vindication*, I, 6-7). Cobban quotes F. D. Maurice as saying that Burke could not look at the root of institutions for fear that he might discover they had no root at all, but Cobban modifies the

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statement to say that Burke had "a religious awe of uncovering the subterranean processes of nature, a fear of severing the root in rash ignorance" (Cobban, p. 89). Burke's reasoned prejudice and prescription and Arnold's culture defend the poetry of life and these subterranean processes, for these are the motive-power to life itself.

In the lecture "Literature and Science" Arnold is concerned with the inability of science (i.e., rationalism) to satisfy the human need. He remarks that "...those who are for giving to natural knowledge...the chief place in the education of the majority of mankind, leave one important thing out of their account: the constitution of human nature." But in a letter to Clough written in 1853, Arnold makes the same comment as that which Cobban makes about Burke: "I for my part think that what Curran said of the Constitution of the State holds true of individual moral constitutions: it does not do to lay bare their foundations too constantly."

I have discussed five similar uses of the rational mind and pointed out Arnold's and Burke's justification for pulling away from it. A trial balance cannot emerge until it is apparent how much of what each writer calls

rationality is actually ethical judgment. Two critics, speaking independently, underline the difficulty in giving shape to the thought of these two writers.

When Burke attacks the "philosophers,"...the "philosophers of vanity," "sophists," "logical fanatics," he is not opposing reason, but extremist rationalism; he is setting the raison raisonable against the raison raison ante...Burke would have been a sounder thinker, and perhaps a more influential one, had he based his political philosophy on the explicit formulation of a true metaphysics, and not merely the repudiation of a false (Hamm, New Scholasticism, XVIII, 17).

Robert Shafer says almost exactly the same thing about Arnold that Hamm says about Burke:

The result (of Arnold's attack on metaphysics), of course, was simply that an unconscious and largely unexamined metaphysics was substituted for a conscious one, which was an advantage from no point of view save, perhaps, that of journalistic controversy.39

We can hardly expect to find that unconscious and largely unexamined metaphysics, but we can see that in lieu of a metaphysic, the two writers utilize moral judgment to decide the questions which metaphysics might settle. If experience is a paramount criterion, and if the rational mind is chiefly employed to discover experience, then the only possible judgment that can be made on experience is a moral judgment.

The first and most apparent restriction each would make on reason emerges in Burke's statements about America and in Arnold's discussion of Spinoza. Burke, bringing to a close his argument for granting America the right to taxation which she demands, seeks to mollify the possible fear in his hearers that he proves too much. He faces the same fear in answering the Member of the National Assembly, who thought that Burke's reason gave too much aid and comfort to the enemy. My reason is not intended to become speculative truth, Burke says, and my common sense tells me that it is not complete enough for general application.

There is a further consideration beyond logical reasoning (Conciliation, II, 167-169). That consideration is the moral consideration. Burke concludes, "Aristotle, the great master of reasoning, cautions us, and with great weight and propriety, against this species of delusive geometrical accuracy in moral arguments, as the most fallacious of all sophistry" (Ibid., 170). The arguments of logic and reason ultimately exhaust themselves against a blind wall beyond which reason cannot go. Here moral

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40 I take the evidence for Arnold deliberately from the first of the Essays in Criticism in full acceptance of Robert A. Donovan's argument in "The Method of Arnold's Essays in Criticism," FMLA, LXXI (December, 1956), 922-931, that the whole book represents Arnold's perfect tact in balancing the forces of intelligence and morality. In later writing Arnold made conduct three-fourths of human life and not the balancing force.
judgment must take over.

Arnold comes to the same wall and his answer to it (or, properly speaking, the answer he discovers in Spinoza) is the same as Burke's. He is speaking of the conflict between faith and reason. The "universal Divine law" revealed in the Scriptures has always existed, but the Scriptures constructed "precepts identical with those of this inly-written and self-proving law" (EC 1, p. 371) in man. The Scriptures gave order to what the insufficient reason "knew not." Arnold continues, "Reason gives us this (original divine) law, reason tells us that it leads to eternal blessedness, and that those who follow it have no need of any other" (Loc. cit.). As in Burke's speech, we find the same insistence that reason is only partially sufficient. "But reason could not have told us that the moral action of the universal divine laws, -- followed not from a sense of its intrinsic goodness, truth, and necessity, but simply in proof of obedience,...can lead to eternal blessedness, which means, for reason, eternal knowledge" (Ibid., 371-372).

Arnold then, it seems to me, shifts his meaning of reason to that of "metaphysical speculations" in the pejorative connotation of Burke's statement that "Man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest, and not on metaphysical speculations" (II, 170). "Of the truth," Arnold continues, "of the promise (of the universal divine law) thus made to
obedience without knowledge, we can have no mathematical certainty; for we can have a mathematical certainty only of things deduced by reason from elements which she in herself possesses" (Loc. cit.). Like Burke, Arnold sees that reason must stop at its own limit. But we can have a moral certainty of this truth which is actually superior to the reasoned truth because it has the support of reasoned truth. The truth is "rendered possible for us by its contradicting no principles of reason" (Loc. cit.). Arnold takes comfort in this nonrational, moral proof of truth "because 'as it is only the very small minority who can pursue a virtuous life by the sole guidance of reason, we should, unless we had this testimony of Scripture, be in doubt respecting the salvation of nearly the whole human race'" (Loc. cit: Arnold is quoting Spinoza). Arnold goes on to say, "The truest speculative opinion about the nature of God is impious if it makes its holder rebellious; the falsest speculative opinion is pious if it makes him obedient" (Ibid., p. 373).

It is this attitude toward moral truth that I want to examine in this section. That the examination needs to be made is apparent from the moral tone inherent in nearly all of the quotations I have included in the discussion of the use of reason. Ethical judgment intrudes in all of them. To both Arnold and Burke moral truth is higher than
any other truth. Since the moral truth is higher, man's duty (which his moral truth determines) attracts the attention of both writers. And following this concern for moral truth, each writer probes the question of means to the true moral end. To Burke government itself is an ethical activity (Cobban, p. 48). To the French thinkers of the eighteenth century government was an intellectual activity; the shift in emphasis, therefore, made those thinkers immoral in Burke's eyes. Burke insisted that the platform of the Rockingham Whigs include a statement on the ethical obligations of rulers (Cobban, p. 49). As we have seen, he justifies his reasoned prejudice and his use, in political affairs, of the habits and feelings of a people on the grounds of moral utility. The attempt to pervert these habits and feelings for the sake of an intellectually derived theory he cannot condone. Burke undertook, almost single-handedly, the impeachment of Warren Hastings to support his moral belief that the British in India and Hastings in particular vitiated the ethical function of government. And the same penchant is observable in his attitudes toward literature; "The whole tenor of Burke's opinion of a literary composition was usually determined by what he saw as the ultimate effect—the moral bias..."41

41 Donald Cross Bryant, Edmund Burke and His Literary Friends (St. Louis, 1939), pp. 218, 246. Bryant refers to Burke's fugitive comments on literature in his letters to his friends and not to the essay on the Sublime and Beautiful.
Arnold's familiar statements about conduct being three-fourths of human life indicate the high value he placed on ethical considerations. The Englishman's praiseworthy qualities derive from his "strong sense for the chief power in the life and progress of man,—the power of conduct" ("Equality," ME, p. 76). Renan is false to the Burkean ideal, Arnold finds, in suggesting that France needed more science rather than more morality. And Arnold cites evidence from Burke himself to show that Renan's conception of human perfection is insufficient without this needful morality.

In his essay on Wordsworth, Arnold finds the chief quality of English poetry to lie in its imaginative discovery of moral truth. "A poetry of revolt against moral ideas," Arnold affirms in that essay, "is a poetry of revolt against life; a poetry of indifference towards moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards life" (EC², pp. 141-143, 144). And, as Trilling notes, Arnold fought against the moral assumptions of the Revolution, just as Burke had, even though

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EC³, p. 164. Arnold quotes from the Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, IV, 37; Burke represents Charles II as having only one of Arnold's four powers leading to perfection—"a pleasant temper and the manners of a gentleman"—but otherwise he had no sense of "his duty as a prince" and "he was dissolute, false, (and) venal." Science, Renan's recommendation to the French who do have the power of "social life and manners," would have helped Charles just as much as it would help the French. The fact that Charles granted the Royal Society its charter lends a certain irony to Arnold's use of Burke here.
Arnold fought for the social principles in the Revolution which Burke could not abide. In the same vein speaking of Heine, Arnold writes, "To his intellectual deliverance there was an addition of something else wanting, and that something else was something immense: the old-fashioned, laborious, eternally needful moral deliverance" (EC¹, p. 223).

But can any writer who puts pen to paper not be a moralist? Is not the act of writing a moral act? And is it not superfluous to insist that a nineteenth-century writer held moral concerns to be higher than any other? "A large sense is of course to be given to the term moral," Arnold announces in his essay on Wordsworth. "Whatever bears upon the question, 'how to live,' comes under it" (EC², p. 142). Arnold seeks a morality which transcends immediate experience on the one hand, but yet will be in close contact with that experience at the same time. It is a morality of "principles" therefore, and not an absolute morality. Such a morality will be "in the grand style" when it is in a Spinoza (EC¹, p. 397) or a Wordsworth. Under the aegis of the imaginative reason, man derives the moral ability to take the essence of moral truth from a speculative truth or from experience and make it operative. Arnold's advice specifically on criticism, may be adapted for his meaning of morality:
(Criticism) must not hurry on to the goal because of its practical importance. It must be patient, and know how to wait; and flexible, and know how to attach itself to things and how to withdraw from them. It must be apt to study and praise elements that for the fulness of spiritual perfection are wanted, even though they belong to a power which in the practical sphere may be maleficent. It must be apt to discern the spiritual shortcomings or illusions of powers that in the practical sphere may be beneficent (EC1, pp. 39-40).

Any attempt to define morality as understood by Burke and Arnold is fated to receive the same treatment Arnold gave to Tolstoi's attempts to codify Christianity: Christianity is a source and not a set of rules (EC2, p. 295). Burke likewise declares that since moral liberties and restrictions vary, "they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle" (Reflections, III, 310-311). As I have noticed (Above, p. 30), Burke recognizes two laws—a law of God and a law of man. If the law of God has a final truth, the law of man is partial, and man can only strive to keep a just balance between his life and his understanding of the law of God. He can never be sure that he is approaching the true ideal; therefore, Burke must deny the possibility of an absolute moral rule. Man remains in contact with the "world and the workings of the world" in order to keep his own law accurate. Arnold makes the distinction himself when he writes about St. Paul. St. Paul's repute grows from his ability to pass from the law of God to the law of man and
keep the two in balance. "The voluntary, rational, and human world, of righteousness, moral choice, effort, filled the first place in his spirit. But the necessary, mystical, and divine world of influence, sympathy, emotion, filled the second" (St. P. and P., p. 50. My italics). The attempt to penetrate into the "necessary world" to establish abstract rule is an impiety, an attempt not only to reduce and codify into a system but to become God. To Arnold the moral law could be in part, although not finally, determined just as it could be for Burke. For what is Arnold's right reason but an insistence that moral truth exists? The next chapter will show how right reason, culture, and prescription arise from man's historical experience.

If morality cannot be defined, man's duties can. On the necessity of submitting to duty, both Arnold and Burke agree. The phrase, of course, is familiar in Wordsworth and Coleridge, and Arnold need not have gone back to Burke to employ it. The Liberals whom Arnold castigates so fiercely in Culture and Anarchy declared that a child has a moral right to an equal share of his father's estate. To Arnold the argument lacks compulsion because "...the deeper I go into my own consciousness, and the more simply I abandon myself to it, the more it seems to tell me that I have no rights at all, only duties" (C&A, p. 175). The idea of moral right in the Liberals derives from abstract
reasoning and from a failure to understand human duty to human society. "It is unsafe and misleading," Arnold contends, "to say that our children have rights against us; what is true and safe to say is, that we have duties toward our children" (C&A, p. 176). Burke had used the same figure of the child in his own apologia, The Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs:

...the force of all the pacts which we enter into with any particular person or number of persons amongst mankind depends upon...prior obligations. In some cases the subordinate relations are voluntary, in others they are necessary,—but the duties are all compulsory. When we marry, the choice is voluntary, but the duties are not matter of choice: they are dictated by the nature of the situation....(O)ut of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able perfectly to comprehend, we are bound indispensably to perform. Parents may not be consenting to their moral relation; but, consenting or not, they are bound to a long train of burdensome duties towards those with whom they have never made a convention of any sort. Children are not consenting to their relation; but their relation, without their actual consent, binds them to duties,—or rather it implies their consent, because the presumed consent of every rational creature is in unison with the predisposed order of things. Men come in that manner into a community with the social state of their parents, endowed with all the benefits, loaded with all the duties of their situation (IV, 166).

Burke opposes duty to will and gives duty the uppermost position: "Neither the few nor the many have a right to act merely by their will, in any matter connected with duty, trust, engagement, or obligation" (IV, 162). Burke's sentence could serve as an epigraph for the chapter on "Doing as One Likes" in Culture and Anarchy. Burke adds, "The
people are not to be taught to think lightly of their engagements to their governors; else they teach governors to think lightly of their engagements toward them" (IV, 162). Arnold approaches from the other side but still insists on the paramount consideration of duty: "It cannot be too often repeated: peasants and workmen have no natural rights, not one. Only we ought instantly to add, that kings and nobles have none either" ("Equality," ME, pp. 61-62). The effect of mid-century individualism, to Arnold was "to subject," as Burke declares, "the sovereign reason of the world to the caprices of weak and giddy men" (IV, 163). A natural comprehension of duty cannot arise when the ordinary self appeals to its own satisfaction.

Having no restrictive, codified, or abstract morality and being convinced of the necessity of human duty, each writer is constantly concerned that man's thought be used to examine means and ends to see that they conform to the true morality and to man's duty. "In all moral machinery," Burke says in his speech on the reform of Commons, "the moral results are its tests" (VII, 96). The National Assembly of France felt that by eliminating the bad means, the proper ends would naturally appear. Nothing could be so false to Burke. By showing that the methods of the Assembly lead to false ends, Burke shows the error of the French: "The practical consequences," he argues,
of any political tenet go a great way in deciding upon its value. Political problems do not primarily concern truth or falsehood. They relate to good or evil. What in the result is likely to produce evil is politically false; that which is productive of good, politically true (Appeal, IV, 169).

As Arnold often says, the good, the end, the goal toward which man strives is human perfection. "The only absolute and eternal object prescribed to us by God's law, or the divine order of things," he writes in Culture and Anarchy, "is the progress toward perfection,--our own progress towards it and the progress of humanity" (C&A, p. 197). Arnold continues, echoing Burke's statement, a thing "is to be counted good or bad, not in itself, but with reference to this object and progress toward it" (Loc. cit.). Arnold speaks of a moral end conducing to the joy and happiness of mankind by satisfying his human instinct (his natural end) for conduct, intelligence, beauty, and social life and manners (ME, p. 65).

The concern for morality evident in both writers, then, grows naturally out of their rather tentative attitude toward the use of reason. Moral truth has a greater validity than abstract or speculative truth, and because it does, moral interests lead them to considerations of the duty of man and to the ends of society.

In summary, both Arnold and Burke thought from the major premise that God exists in the universe and in the
activities of man. Therefore both sought to make the thought of their contemporaries more clearly related to experience since experience is the record of the "divine tactic" in human events. Because of this interest in experience, both make psychological assumptions about man's motivation. The interest in experience and psychology leads them to the conclusion that the nonrational element in human thought must be considered equally with, if not superior to, the purely rational and theoretic. Since they deny the supremacy of the human intellect, they tend toward an anti-rationalism; but since they insist also that man use his critical intelligence to determine the proper ends--the proper morality--of his action, their reliance upon irrationalism becomes not a defect which impels them toward an absolutism, but a laudable effort to see, in Arnold's famous phrase, "life steadily and (to see) it whole."

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My purpose, of course, is to show how much Arnold follows Burke in these critical assumptions, but Arnold does differ from Burke. G. M. Young says that all men may be divided into horses and dogs. Burke has the complacent acceptance of the horse and none of the curiosity and inquisitiveness of the dog. Sainte-Beuve's attractive quality is his curiosity, his interest, his "profound naturalism," but Arnold never speaks of this quality in
Burke. True, Burke did live in a world of curious men seeking new intellectual solutions and visions. Arnold however feared more that complacency would prevent mankind from discovering value in the new thought and would destroy all, as a consequence of restraining that thought, that society needs to preserve. In his use of the mind, Arnold inclines, therefore, toward more flexibility.

Burke and Wordsworth, Arnold writes, are figures in an age of concentration seeking to consolidate an expansion which had outrun its usefulness. He who goes against the movement of mind of his age, however, risks becoming ineffectual, for those "who persist in opposing...(the) mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself, than the mere design of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate" (EC¹, p. 17; Thoughts on French Affairs, IV, 377). Burke "carried his country with him" at the time of the Revolution, and therefore he was "in some sort a providential person." But Burke did harm, "for he made concentration too dominant an idea with us, and an idea of which the reign was unduly prolonged" (Russell, Letters, II, 192). In his own age, Burke was right, but in the second half of the nineteenth century, the mighty current in human affairs is for greater expansion.

The attractiveness of science produces the new current in human affairs. In Arnold's time it had become a
visible benefit to thousands of people for whom, in Burke's
day, science was nothing more than an esoteric consideration.
Especially in the middle of his career, Arnold feels that a
scientific detachment would aid the Englishman by making
him more flexible, by making him more apt to see that his
narrow little British Philistinism with its peculiar ideas
of the world defies all fact. Science, then, is merely the
extension of experience which Burke sought. In his school
reports, Arnold urges the use of Natur-kunde as a technique
of awakening the minds of school children to the diversity
and richness of the world (Dudley, PMLA, LVII, 292). But
Burke urges that science, the exploration of experience, be
limited to buttressing the social habits already known.
Clearly Arnold goes beyond Burke, for he employs science
"or its equivalent Wissenschaft to designate the opposite
of irrational prejudice, which he regarded as one of the
great failings of his countrymen" (Ibid., 276). The
British justified their policy in Ireland on prejudice,
Burke knew, but he does not say that the prejudice should be
destroyed; they should only find better prejudices. Burke
could not have followed Arnold to praise Heine and Goethe
for their naturalism and freedom, their scientific detach­
ment, for he could not condone these qualities in the French
writers.
Arnold had, however, a second attitude toward science which, although closer to Burke, still shows Arnold's greater willingness to admit the operation of the mind outside of custom and habit. The only scientists in Burke's prose are the social scientists who, as Arnold quotes Burke, "have industriously destroyed all the opinions and prejudices, and as far as in you lay, all the instincts which support government" (Ec^3, p. 155). We see Arnold approaching this attitude in his lecture "Literature and Science," which asserts that since science proposes ends of its own, it detracts from the Arnoldian aim of humanizing man. Although the scientist does ease life by easing the material demands, he leaves out one important thing--"the constitution of human nature" (DIA, pp. 100-101). Man acquires scientific knowledge, but presently there "arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge to our sense of conduct, to our sense of beauty" (DIA, p. 103), and science cannot do this. Arnold allows the scientist, then, if the society possesses, and he believes that it can, the ability to add the necessary corrective understanding which literature supplies. Arnold would have literature and science; Burke would have literature with an ancillary science contributing toward it.

In addition, Arnold fought against the type of local prejudice which Burke condones. Arnold's whole mind, with its insistence on knowing the best that has been
thought and said, worked toward a wider understanding to supplement the purely local and provincial habits of thought. An example from the "Preface" of the Irish Essays illustrates Arnold's cosmopolitanism very well. "The 'traditional, existing, social arrangements,' which satisfied before, satisfy no longer; the conventions and phrases which once passed without question are challenged" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 269). Burke, of course, leaps to the defense of social arrangements and conventions. He attempts to know the reason of existing arrangements, and he does not challenge them unless they create obvious grievance. To Arnold the grievance, middle-class education is an obvious example, may not be realized by the sufferers. Burke does not use his reason except for solution. Arnold's greater cosmopolitanism, his wider interests, shows him grievances undreamed of in Burke.

It is necessary to see these broad differences at this time, although each impinges upon more specific problems of change or the state. Arnold's use of experience is complicated by the philosophical questions of modern science which Burke does not envision and which, let it be said, Arnold himself does not see with great clearness. However, Arnold tends to trust the mind more than Burke does, and he doubts custom and habit sacred to Burke.
The major effect of these ideas on Arnold's politics will be more distinct in the discussion of the purely political matters, but I note here that Arnold's premise of God in the Universe does make the Established Church a necessity. If the world is a record of the "divine tactic," then the element in the state which binds man directly to the Divine must receive major consideration in any political system. Patently, then, Arnold aligns himself opposite the Liberal who sees no need for an Established Church, except as a general moral force without any official sanction or support (see ME, p. 136).

The premise of a God-ordained universe enables both Burke and Arnold to accept, without necessity of proof, an idea of authority in the universe. Arnold justifies his authority by right reason, and Burke, who can be more direct than Arnold, by his conviction that God is the divine Author of all human experience. The major premise makes such belief in authority necessary and natural. Thus Arnold can ridicule the Philistine Alderman-Colonel in Culture and Anarchy to whom force was philosophically impossible. "Till right is ready, force, the existing order of things, is justified, is the legitimate ruler," Arnold asserts in "The Function of Criticism" (EC¹, p. 14). Arnold thus places himself in a position foreign to philosophical Liberalism.
The concomitant reliance on experience as the source of knowledge and value to man also directs Arnold away from Liberalism. To the pure Liberal, I suppose, any mind is capable of performing the functions of mind; the intelligence has only to be put into operation. To Arnold a man must read much, experience much, and know much before he can begin to read his Bible, make a political speech, or translate Homer. The mass of men, he says, have no great need for ideas; for them habits and feeling are enough (Ed1, p. 29). Paralleling Burke, Arnold speaks of the "remnant" who actually carry on the thought and methods of society. Clearly both writers are working toward placing as much power as possible in the hands of an intellectual elite, or a natural aristocracy, who have the experience not only to govern but also to see behind habitual actions to use them for the ends of right reason.

The reliance on experience causes both Arnold and Burke to reject, on the same grounds, a concept of abstract rights in civil society. No civil right is worth anything to Burke unless it receives the sanction of expediency.43 Arnold declares emphatically in his essay on equality, "If it is the sound English doctrine that all rights are created by law and are based on expediency, and are alterable as the

public advantage may require, certainly that orthodox doctrine is mine" (ME, p. 62). Such orthodoxy induces both writers to depart from what is often an equally orthodox liberal idea of the rights of man.

The moral concern of both writers affects their politics by making them more desirous of ends and means as pure as conceivably possible. Furthermore, definitions of conservatism stress its moral interest; therefore a writer must be a conservative by his insistence rather on necessary moral duties than on possible freedoms. Unlike the Liberals of their own day, the two writers are more concerned with the end of society as a whole than with the individual himself. The individual exists as part of a structure, but he does not exist as an exact center. To be sure, no humanist can quite advocate a monolithic society which ruthlessly subordinates the individual, but neither dare he assert as a crowning principle the doctrine of complete individual freedom.

I deliberately hesitate to say that any of these observed effects on politics merit Arnold's being ticketed as a Conservative or a Liberal, with appropriate background music from Gilbert and Sullivan. The stage of the investigation is too rudimentary to permit classification anyway.

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^44 See Chapter 6, The Individual.
but I am convinced that the accurate placement need not use these fluid words. Critics who have discussed Arnold's political position have ended using straddling phrases like Liberal Conservative or Conservative Liberal. Arnold himself uses the expression "third host" when he speaks of Falkland's political decisions (ME, p. 234); Arnold's term is more accurate, I believe, but his justification for its use cannot be made here.

Patently, these basic assumptions discussed affect Arnold's criticism. Because he thinks deductively from the major premise of a God-ordained universe, the attitude toward experience and the conviction of its reality permit him to see poetry as a common denominator between God and the world; and since experience is but the reality in which God works, Arnold's "poetry" contributes, in its contact with the visible world, as much to our knowledge of God as religion can. Thus Arnold can posit his definition of religion as morality infused by emotion and can recommend that poetry replace religion. His position may be logically impossible (as F. D. Bradley shows), but from Arnold's assumptions, it can have a meaning.

Its contact with the wholeness of the universe, with the wholeness of human experience, in turn, gives poetry its value to society. In "Literature and Science" Arnold explains that literature has the power, which science has not, of enabling us to relate "what we have learnt and known to the sense which we have in us for conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty" (DIA, p. 105). Literature is the all-embracing discipline of human thought which uses as its material the reflection of the "divine tactic." By doing so, it has a consummate value to human beings.

Arnold has thus established a chain of being from the ultimate source, through experience, to the human intelligence. If the eternal problem of philosophical politics is how to unite reason and power, the eternal problem of philosophical criticism is the same. A reasoned and close explication of a poem may have all the strength and power of reason behind it and still not convince its reader. Newman had the erudition to translate Greek, but he had no quality beyond his erudition to translate Homer. The French have the reason to set up a model state, but in denying the culture out of which they grew as a nation, they could not make a government. "No man, who knows nothing else, knows even his Bible," Arnold remarks testily to the Puritan who felt that his feeling was sufficient for an intellectual life (G&A, p. 154). Between the extreme of
erudite analysis and the extreme of pure feeling Arnold (like Burke) seeks a reasoned medium.

The emphasis on experience yields a similar logical difficulty in Burke and Arnold. Samuel Monk has remarked that in Burke's essay on the Sublime and Beautiful there is a hopeless confusion between the practical and the aesthetic. On the one hand, Burke seems to be speaking wholly on the question of practical effect, but at the same moment aesthetic judgment is necessary. Burke cannot always bridge the gap, in other words, between the experience he wants to use and the principles which he wants to establish. At one end of Arnold's critical work, in the "Preface" of the 1853 Poems, he insists that form is the paramount concern to the writer and to the critic. But near the end of his career he advocates a touchstone method which seems to vitiate the whole concept of form. Arnold writes, "The most important matter, however, is the contents of the poem, not the form" (ME, p. 260), but in the same essay on Milton he also writes that "...English literature, full of vigour and genius as it is, is peculiarly impaired by gropings and inadequacies in form" (ME, p. 268).

The touchstone method is natural for Arnold. It says, in effect, abstraction and definition are impossible (see "Introduction," Sublime and Beautiful, I, 81), and since they are impossible, the immediate experience of poetry in
the grand style is all that can be supplied. By implication the reader will consistently enlarge his knowledge of the best that has been thought and said until he can establish his own touchstones for the comic style or any of the other styles that Arnold forgets to mention in "The Study of Poetry." To this denial of abstraction we attribute also Arnold's penchant to write a criticism of reaction.\(^46\) He cannot establish a poetic theory; he could not write an essay on theory of literature. He must react to French critics or English Philistinism to make his own criticism. Arnold's contribution to criticism was not the establishment of abstract rules, but rather the establishment of a method of looking at the literary experience and discovering, by the means of a rich cultural background, its full meaning.

Relevant to his interest in experience is Burke's distinctive contribution to aesthetic theory, the idea that the effect of a work on a reader is a valid judgment. Arnold, while he does not make this impressionism a major standard, does employ the technique. We see it in his essay on Milton: a work should prove "its own virtue by powerfully and delightfully affecting us as we read it" (ME, p. 247; also p. 272). Arnold praises Wordsworth, Byron, and Goethe because of their effects on their readers, and he undertakes

the lectures *On Translating Homer* to show what true effect a translation should have.

Following Burke's refusal to grant meaning in rationalistic attempts to explain life, Arnold denies the possibility of rationalistic attempts to explain poetry and reacts against (what he calls) rationalistic poetry of the eighteenth century. That poetry (which provides delight by its subtle play of intellect and wit) left Arnold unaffected; it is measured prose. Burke has little to say explicitly on eighteenth-century poetry, but the whole tenor of the essay on the *Sublime and Beautiful* runs counter to the predominant Augustian poetic theory. Eighteenth-century poetry may be beautiful (in Burke's sense), but it lacks sublimity. He says of Pope that he "cannot bear every truth. He has a timidly which hinders the full exertion of his faculties, almost as effectually as bigotry cramps those of the general herd of mankind."\[47\]

47 *Vindication*, I, 46-47: Burke's irony demands caution in treating any statement from this work, but I think this may be fairly accurate of his opinion of Pope. His quotations from Pope in *Reflections*, III, 291 and the first letter on the *Regicide Peace*, V. 389 are innocent uses of Pope's lines. Actually if Burke quotes any poetry, he is more apt to quote the Latin poets than the English. In his "Hints for an Essay on the Drama," probably written before 1765, Burke says that he is living "at a time when almost all kinds of poetry are cultivated with little success" (VII, 147). The sensibility of the age, he continues, "degenerates into a false refinement, which diffuses a languor and breathes a frivolous air over everything which it can influence" (148).
The interest in moral problems in Arnold's political and social criticism naturally carries over into his literary discussions. The comparison of Eugénie de Guérin with her English counterpart exhibits not only the particular lack of a sense of beauty and social life in the English woman but also some of the unique moral lapses of the French.

Some moral qualities seem to be connected in a man with his power of style. Milton's power of style, for instance, has for its great character elevation; and Milton's elevation clearly comes, in the main, from a moral quality in him,—his pureness.

...In this elevated strain of moral pureness his life was really pitched; its strong, immortal beauty passed into the diction and rhythm of his poetry (ME, pp. 269, 271).

I cite Milton particularly since both Arnold and Burke (see Bryant, pp. 12-13) ranked him in the forefront of English poets.

Out of the critical assumptions which Arnold shares with Burke—the premise of God in the universe, the reality of experience, the interest in psychology, the use of reason, and the emphasis on moral judgment—come some of the characteristic features of Arnold's criticism. Even though Arnold seems not to have read Burke's Sublime and Beautiful nor his very fragmentary "Hints for an Essay on the Drama," his sharing with Burke these assumptions affects Arnold's own literary judgments.

These assumptions of God in the universe, the reality of experience, and the necessity of rational and
moral judgment shape the particular views which Arnold and Burke have toward institutions, but even separately they show that Arnold finds in Burke basic assumptions which do temper his Burkean attitude toward the State. The pattern of greater freedom for the mind revealed here will follow in each chapter, for in the use of the past, my next area of investigation, the subject is again experience, but experience in time rather than particular individual experience and judgment. The rational conservative political judgment also will follow in each subsequent section. And while Arnold does not use Burke to support his literary conclusions, Arnold's method—the touchstone, the grand style, the moral interest—follow naturally and easily from the basic assumptions Arnold shares with Burke. In his book on Arnold, Trilling writes, "it will be apparent that it is much more with Arnold's method that I am in agreement than with his conclusions" (p. 14). But Arnold's method is not unique; it has its parentage in the critical assumptions of Burke.
CHAPTER III

THE USE OF HISTORY

1

Discussing the use of the past, prescription in Burke and culture in Arnold, requires an unnatural separation since Burke's prescription always carries along with it a paralleling doctrine of expediency and Arnold's culture has expansion, progress, Zeitgeist, or expediency. For the sake of the discussion, I separate prescription and culture from their corollary ideas, even though in the practice of the two writers the two concepts are not separated. Burke's expediency and Arnold's many terms I save for the following chapter, where I discuss their attitude toward change, progress, and reform.

The most apparent difficulty in discussing the relationship between Arnold's use of the past and Burke's use is that Burke stands before an historical movement which he may have affected and Arnold stands after it, affected by it. The Liberal Anglican historians, of whom Thomas Arnold is the chief representative, learned the "new" history from Vico, the Italian historian, and Niebuhr, the German author of a History of Rome, but because they belonged to the
tradition of Burke and Coleridge, they were open to the influence of Niebuhr and the German school of historians who read and applied Vico. While it is fairly easy to show that the Liberal Anglican historians (Thomas Arnold, Stanley, Hare, Thirwall) read Niebuhr and Vico, it is almost impossible to show sound evidence that Thomas Arnold read Burke and knew his thought. The chief evidence for Thomas Arnold is his life. The Works of the Irish Parliamentarian were first published in full during Thomas Arnold's youth. The prior Life of Burke, still considered the standard, was first published in 1822 at the time when Thomas Arnold was forming his own historical ideas. Alfred Cobban has shown to what extent Burke influenced Wordsworth and Coleridge, and Thomas Arnold, after he built Fox How, his summer home in the Lake District, was a close friend of Wordsworth.

Coleridge Arnold would have known from his college days when he knew Coleridge's nephew. There is no mention of Burke, however, in the Stanley Life and Correspondence, and Thomas Arnold quotes Burke only once in his own published work. 2

Whatever Matthew Arnold might have learned of Burke from his father, aside from his recitation from Burke's

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"Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts," the son did have an unparalleled opportunity to learn the best of what had been thought and said in history at Rugby. Thomas Arnold, for instance, used Guizot's *Civilization in France* as a textbook at a time when most English schools used only classical historians (Barksdale, p. 86). No one, I think, will need to study Matthew Arnold, as Thomas Arnold has been studied, for his distinct contributions to the history of history, but at the same time Matthew Arnold cannot be called an historical novice. Any peculiarity in his attitudes toward historical problems and the uses of history deserves attention. Also any attempt to connect Burke's use of history with Arnold's use of it must take into account his Rugby education and the influence of his father, who was one of the leading historians of England.

Arnold would also have learned of the Greek historians from his father, the editor of Thucydides. R. G. Collingwood considers Herodotus and Thucydides the only important, original historical thinkers before the eighteenth-century interest in history.  

Arnold knew the Greek historians well, as his lecture "On the Modern Element in Literature" shows. Although critics have found a parallel between Burke's concept of history and the Greek concept, no

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evidence shows that he deliberately used Greek thought as his source. Burke's own historical writing, however, takes him to the Roman historians.

In addition to the immediate background of similar historical thought from the Liberal Anglican tradition and from the ancient historians, Burke and Arnold oppose similar historical attitudes of their contemporaries. First, both reject primitivism. We cannot avoid the challenge of democracy, Arnold writes, by hoping that "all democracy wants is a vigorous putting-down; and that with a good will and strong hand, it is perfectly possible to retain or restore the whole system of the Middle Ages." Arnold has a sentiment for "the last enchantments of the Middle Ages" whispering from Oxford's towers and he holds up ancient Greece as an ideal for his own time, but he does not urge a return to these times, for they have their Aberglaube which is just as objectionable as the catchwords and cant of his own day. Burke, too, refuses to become a "historiographer royal of feudalism" (Arnold's phrase for Scott) in his Abridgment of English History. The period of the Middle Ages is neither conspicuously benighted nor wholly enlightened. Like the ages following it, the Middle Ages

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are a source of prescription and culture. 5

Second, from the evidence of his writing, Arnold has no taste for the painstaking grubbing in the past to re-discover its facts. In his lectures "On the Modern Element in Literature," for instance, he relies on two pieces of evidence to support his idea that the Elizabethans had a taste for the fantastic and for excessive personal adornment—the contemporary portraits and Scott's Kenilworth (Oxford Essays, p. 460). Arnold uses Burke as a major source of information of Ireland, but Burke apologizes for his own lack of recent and accurate experience on Irish affairs. 6 Like a Philistine himself Arnold writes of Darwin's Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872),

...the first thing for any sane man to do is to make a proper use of (the emotions), and to know how to make a proper use is not difficult—but all this we never think of, but investigate zealously how they arose! Such persons are just like those learned inquirers the Cynic laughed at, who were so busy about the strayings of Ulysses, so inattentive to their own. 7

5 See St. Paul and Protestantism (London, 1898), pp. 121-126; Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress in English Popular Literature of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, 1934), pp. 193-205. Miss Whitney's point is very nearly that since Burke is not a primitivist, he must be a progressivist.


Burke, although his speeches show evidence of prodigious re­
search (e.g., the nine-day speech on Hastings), belittles
the value of historical minutiae as merely a "repertory of
cases and precedents for a lawyer" (Policy of the Allies,
IV, 468). Burke employs little original historical research
in his Abridgment; since he relies on the older historians
for his evidence, one reads the book essentially for its
interpretation.

Third, both reject the rationalistic school of
history which attempts to set up general law on the basis
of historical evidence. Historians, Burke says, "are often
prejudiced, often ignorant, often fonder of systems than of
truth" (Policy, IV, 468). In "The Study of Poetry" Arnold
spurns historical criticism of literature because the
historical critic becomes fonder of systems than of the
truth or the spirit of the literature itself. Trilling
calls it a chief disposition of Arnold's mind to accept
human history. His acceptance "prevented him from the
Protestant and Liberal readiness to stamp much or all of
what had gone before as error, pure and simple" (Trilling,
p. 304). We see Arnold's acceptance in his definition of
Jacobinism as "Violent indignation with the past, abstract
systems of renovation applied wholesale, a new doctrine
drawn up in black and white for elaborating down to the
very smallest details a rational society for the future"  
Fourth, Arnold and Burke also oppose a developmental history such as Cardinal Newman's. Arnold, for instance, rejects Renan's desire to reinstate the French monarchy after the defeat of 1870; in Burke's time, it might have been revitalized, but the channel of development has been disrupted and the monarchy which once existed cannot be resurrected merely on the strength of its being in the line of development in the past (BC, pp. 160-161). Feudalism had a function to perform, but once its usefulness is past, it disappears. It cannot be revived, for new development has taken place. "Human society...follows a law of progress and growth," Arnold writes; "and this law may be trusted, in a well-governed, sound, and progressive community, advancing in intelligence and culture, to clear away the accretions and the superstitions" (ME, p. 118). Arnold censures Newman for his concept of straight-line development which must include everything in the present that was once in the past (St. P. and P., pp. 121-126). The past does make errors as Burke recognizes in the Reflections when he shows that the rule of the French kings since 1614 is not reasoned prescription.

The similarities, then, which I point out in the following section are based upon a similar tradition of historical thought. Neither writer may be called an historical novice, for each did have experience with history
as history. Furthermore, both reject typical attitudes toward history which their age offered them. The past is not a golden time from which all subsequent history has seen a decline. Neither is the past to be looked upon as a source, alone, of fact and event, upon which rational and abstract systems of historical interpretation may be based. Finally, although each has a concept of development (as I will show), both reject the inclusive development that absorbs all that was once in the historical continuum.

ii

In his Speech on Conciliation with America and in the Reflections Burke depends upon principles derived from historical record. His use of the past is apparent to any reader of Burke, but early in his career, Burke started to write An Essay Towards an Abridgment of English History, which he broke off when he heard that Hume was writing such a work. The history was not published until after Burke's death. Acton said that, had the work been finished, Burke "would have been the first of our historians." 8 Considering Burke's work as a whole, however, a critic still may say that Burke gave "the most complete expression of the historical method in England." 9 Or, to put it more

forcibly, Burke "exerted the presiding influence over the historical movement of the nineteenth century, at least in respect to the...development of the right imaginative approach and the cultivation of what we call historical mindedness" (Butterfield, p. 18).

The first title of Burke's listed in Matthew Arnold's reading list is the Abridgment of English History in April of 1853. Arnold first refers to Burke as an historian in the lecture "On the Modern Element in Literature," which was given at Oxford in 1857. After quoting Thucydides' apology for his description of Troy, Arnold asks,

What language shall we properly call this? It is modern language; it is the language of a thoughtful philosophic man of our own days; it is the language of Burke or Niebuhr assigning the true aim of history.

But critics have claimed that Arnold has little or no "concept" of history. H. W. Garrod remarks that Arnold customarily crossed out some of the material on his reading list, presumably as read, except in the reading lists for 1852-1862. He employs the method on a list for 1854 headed "At Fox How." On the list is "English History. Henry iii to James's accession," which is crossed off. Since Burke's Abridgment breaks off with Henry III's reign, the list suggests that Arnold had finished Burke's history. Howard Foster Lowry, et al, The Note-books of Matthew Arnold (London, 1952), p. 553.

Essays by Matthew Arnold, Oxford Edition (London, 1914), p. 462. Although the lecture was given in 1857, it was not published until February of 1869 to illustrate the idea of Hellenism in Culture and Anarchy.
not only shows no interest in, but in fact deprecates the use of, the historical method—the master discovery of his own age."12 Geoffrey Tillotson rigorously attacks Arnold for lacking "the very rudiments of the historic sense" (Tillotson, Criticism, p. 97). "It is no business of the historian," Tillotson claims, "to deal in abstractions so near to no meaning as many that Arnold dealt in" (Ibid., p. 66). There are times, Tillotson says, "When one feels that Arnold knew as much about the English past as a foreigner does" (Ibid., p. 57). But Garrod and Tillotson are talking about a "concept" of history; what Arnold has is a feeling or sentiment of history.

The same criticisms might be levelled at Burke. His contribution is an imaginative approach to history rather than a method. E. K. Brown accuses Burke of being "incurious as to the right data."13 John MacCunn in his study of Burke's political philosophy comes to the conclusion that Burke's thought ultimately failed because he does not construct a positive historical philosophy but merely reacts against incomplete historical philosophy.

Neither Arnold nor Burke has a reasoned philosophy of history, but rather an ideal of prescription or culture,

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the origin of which lies in the historical experience of man. Although the attitude toward the past resembles history, it is rather a method to use the experience of man over a period of time. It needs to be shown, therefore, that Arnold's "principle" of culture parallels Burke's "principle" of prescription. These principles provide an order which rationalistic theories of the past cannot supply. Thirdly, in addition to providing order, the past provides an ideal of conduct rather than theories of conduct. There are five reasons why these principles may be developed from the past. This ideal is possible because (1) each writer sees the past as a flat plane of experience from which the ideal or principle is derived. The principles of experience may be discovered in the past because (2) the past reveals the attempts of others to comprehend the principle in their experience. The discovery of these principles (3) arises naturally from the examination of experience which excellent minds in the past make. Furthermore, the past provides an ideal because (4) the principles of history are superior to the actual event from which they are derived. And since the principle from action is superior, (5) an event in the present may be compared with a similar event in the past in order to discover if the principle applying in the past is still operative in the present. Finally, a knowledge of the whole corpus of the past as it exists in civilization
enables man to acquire, in Arnold's words, "the experience of the race to happiness" which will lead him to the realization of the best self.14

(a)

History reveals the "ideal" of culture and prescription rather than the "idea" of human thought, conduct, and institutions, for the idea, in its Platonic sense, goes beyond what the human mind is capable of. The idea may be an absolute, and both Arnold and Burke are unwilling to suggest that the human mind dare posit absolutes, or the idea may become abstract by its very statement. Idea tends to solidify, in other words, into a letter of the law, to become an intransigent statement.

Thus Arnold refuses to define Culture any more than to say that it is a comprehension of "the best that has been thought and said." He can only define it by saying it is not rioting, it is not establishing "hole-in-corner" churches, or it is not the average Englishman's idea of architecture. Neither can Burke define precisely what he means by prescription. One may learn political wisdom in history, but "as a habit, not as a precept (and) as an exercise to strengthen the mind, as furnishing materials to

enlarge and enrich it, not as a repertory of cases and precedents for a lawyer" (Policy of the Allies, IV, 468). A society had better use prescription than offer itself to the rational thinkers of the Revolution. As Culture and Anarchy shows us most distinctly what culture is not, so Burke's Reflections shows us what prescription is not.

We can best see the connection between Arnold's culture and Burke's prescription by looking at a phrase from Burke which Arnold repeats fourteen times in his published essays and eight times in his notebooks as a touchstone for the tradition, the culture, the prescription of the English. Arnold repeats the italicized words in the following quotation from Burke's Letter to a Noble Lord:

It was my endeavor by every means to excite a spirit in the House, where I had the honor of a seat, for carrying on with early vigor and decision the most clearly just and necessary war (i.e., the war against France) any nation ever carried on, in order to save my country from the iron yoke of its (France's) power, and from the more dreadful contagion of its principles,—to preserve, while they can be preserved, pure and untainted, the ancient inbred integrity, piety, good-nature, and good-humor of the people of England, from the dreadful pestilence which, beginning in France, threatens to lay waste the whole moral and in a great degree the whole physical world, having done both in the focus of its most intense malignity (V, 204-205).

Arminius uses Burke's phrase to check a harangue by Mr. Frederick Harrison "on the enervation of England, and on

15 See Appendix for Arnold's use of Burke.
the malignancy of all the brute mass of us who are not
Comptists," by saying,

Enervation! ...depend upon it, yours is still
the most fighting people in the whole world.
Malignancy!— the best character of the English
people ever yet given, friendly as the character
is, is still this of Burke's; "The ancient and
inbred integrity, piety, good nature, and good
humour of the people of England." Your nation is
sound enough, if only it can be taught that
being able to do what one likes, is not sufficient
for salvation. Its dangers are from a surfeit of
clap-trap, due to the false notion that liberty
and publicity are not only valuable for the use to
be made of them, but are goods in themselves, nay,
are the **summun bonum!** (FG, pp. x-xi).

Arnold uses the phrase again in "Falkland" to oppose it to
the grossly imperfect, and false, conception of righteous-
ness in the Puritans which led to the moral anarchy and
profligacy of the Restoration (ME, p. 227). To Arnold the
words are a touchstone for the basic culture of the English
people, a culture which denies Puritanism, Jacobinism, and
all systems attempting to mechanize English life. It is the
"collected wisdom of the ages" which Burke is obliged to
accept "by an infinitely overbalancing weight of authority"
rather than the rational systems of thought (Regicide Peace
III, v, 403).

For Arnold the word prescription has acquired a
hard and absolute meaning and he rarely uses it. He does
use the term in its honorific sense in "The Function of
Criticism" when he commends the French in their revolution
for "making the prescriptions of reason triumph" (EC, p. 16),
and he also declares in that essay that "the prescriptions of reason are absolute" (EC, p. 15). On the other hand, in the essay "The Literary Influence of Academies" he writes that genius needs freedom from "authority, prescription, and routine" (EC, p. 58); and in "Heine" he writes, "Goethe himself was a minister, and the visible triumph of the modern spirit over prescription and routine seemed as far off as ever" (EC, p. 187). In Culture and Anarchy, however, and the religious books, Arnold has settled on a meaning of prescription which is quite opposed to the sense in which Burke uses the term. The Hebrew notion of felicity, for instance, would not let him rest until "he had at last got out of the law a network of prescription to enwrap his whole life, to govern every moment of it, every impulse, every action" (C&A, p. 131). The strictness of Hebrew thought ultimately divorced it from actual life, until Christ restored the balance between the spirit and the old Hebrew reliance on the letter. In the religious books prescription wholly denotes that Hebrew adherence to the old law which Noncomformity had adopted in nineteenth-century England. We see Arnold, then, abandoning a word which, probably as a result of Burke's use of it and a misunderstanding of Burke's use, had acquired almost an absolute meaning.
Arnold begins using the word again in his essays on Irish problems, but in a restricted sense. He laments that in Ireland "the sense of prescription, the true security of all property, never arose." Burke uses the word prescription to denote acquired property rights, and Arnold, in fact, copies into his "General Note-books, No. 1," a paragraph from Burke's correspondence in which Burke defines the prescription of property as being indissoluble; it is "that grand title which supersedes every other title." To Burke the keystone of prescription is property right, since all other rights must grow from the possession of property in Burke's rather medieval view of right. Property is not sacred to Arnold, but he recognizes that unless property in Ireland becomes a settled and stable thing, the Irish difficulty will continue.

Although the word prescription has a primarily political meaning in Burke, throughout his work it also has a liberal connotation. Defending the English Church in the Reflections, he writes, "We thought that our old religious institutions were capable of receiving and meliorating, and above all of preserving, the accessions of science and literature, as the order of Providence should successively

17 Notebooks, p. 441; Correspondence (1852), I, 577-578.
produce them" (*Reflections*, III, 364). English arts, sciences, and literature, he continues, have illuminated and adorned the modern world because the English have not despised "the patrimony of knowledge" which their forefathers left. He defends the prescription of the monastic institutions in France on the cultural grounds that these institutions have provided a "power or purchase" to effect great ends in the State:

> In the monastic institutions...was found a great power for the mechanism of politic benevolence. There were revenues with a public direction; there were men wholly set apart and dedicated to public purposes, without any other than public ties and public principles,—men without the possibility of converting the estate of the community into a private fortune,—men denied to self-interests, whose avarice is for some community,—men to whom personal poverty is honor, and implicit obedience stands in the place of freedom....(These institutions) are the instruments of wisdom...The perennial existence of bodies corporate and their fortunes are things particularly suited to a man who has long views,—who meditates designs that require time in fashioning, and which propose duration when they are accomplished (III, 440-441).

Again Arnold's use of this passage from Burke serves to illustrate the connection between prescription and culture. Arnold writes in a letter to Cobden in 1864, "I most entirely agree with you that the condition of our lower class is the weak point of our civilization and should be the first object of our interest, but one must look, as Burke says, for a power or purchase (i.e., a leverage) to help one in dealing with such great matters, and I find it
Arnold's power or purchase is, of course, a middle class possessing the disinterestedness and the culture which Burke finds in the monasteries in France. Later Arnold uses the expression in "Falkland," praising Falkland's historic sense in siding with the King.

He thought the Parliament a less available power or purchase than the Crown. He thought renovation more possible by means of the triumph of the Crown than by means of the triumph of Parliament. He thought the triumph of Parliament the greater leap into chaos (ME, p. 231).

The word chaos here links the idea with Culture and Anarchy.

Granting Burke's particular rhetorical objective, and taking the definition of prescription out of the context of the monastic institutions, Burke's power of prescription here is strikingly like Arnold's power of culture. "Never may we become," Burke writes in his Thoughts on the Present Discontents, "...wiser than all the wise men and good men who have lived before us" (I, 528), and since we never can become wiser, culture tells us to accept the prescription of institutions, to see how establishments tend to give us a sense of historical life of the human spirit, outside and beyond our own fancies and feelings; how they thus tend to suggest new sides and sympathies in us to cultivate; how, further, by saving us from having to invent and fight for

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our own forms of religion, they give us leisure and calm to steady our view of religion itself,—the most overpowering of objects, as it is the grandest,—and to enlarge our first crude notions of the one thing needful (C&A, pp. 20-21).

Burke's prescription is a political term that constantly spills over into literary and intellectual meanings; Arnold's culture is a literary term that constantly spills over into questions of political action. Or, as Trilling says, Arnold's culture "is a method of historical interpretation which leads to political action" (Trilling, p. 247). Cobban defines Burke's prescription as the "title having for its sanction the eternal order of things; it is the master and not the creature of positive law, it is the decree of nature, it is the law of God" (Cobban, p. 79). Arnold writes that culture is "a study of perfection" which will make "reason and the will of God prevail" (C&A, p. 45).

(b)

Not only are culture and prescription similar in definition, but they also have a similar function. First, they provide institutions and establish the rights of the individual in society. Also, they establish the order requisite for the complexity of modern life. Critics ordinarily see Arnold's culture as a "method of historical interpretation," but it is intimately connected with institutions. It is a means of making historical experience vital in institutions such as the State.
To the rationalist, institutions may be created at the present in society on the basis of his a priori assumptions of the rights which man naturally possesses. Burke and Arnold turn this intellectual scheme upside down by maintaining that the rights of man are the rights which his institutions give him. In support of his contention that Renan's book directly reflects Burke's thought, Arnold finds that the two writers believe "That the rights of its history do more for a society than the rights of man" (EC^3, p. 156). For instance, Burke defends himself against a possible charge that he leans "too much on the claims of the people" by saying that his thought on the rights of the Americans is "the genuine produce of the ancient, rustic, manly, home-bred sense of this country" (II, 156). Thus culture opposes the Jacobin's "violent indignation with the past" and offers instead the rights of the past as comprehended in institutions.

Michelet begins his summary of Vico's Scienza Nuova by writing, "Humanity is its own work. God acts upon it, but through it" (Barksdale, p. 76). Vico thus strikes at an idea which both Burke and Arnold incorporate in their ideas of prescription and culture. "Human thought," Arnold writes at the very end of his essay on democracy, "...made all institutions," but this same human thought "inevitably saps them" until they rest "only in that which
is absolute and eternal" (*ME*, p. 47). Any institution, therefore, which continues in history must have value.

Arnold learned from Burke, according to Trilling, the "test of survival, by which the correctness of a social order is marked by its continuation and by which insufficiency is signalized by defeat" (p. 249). Thus the incompleteness of Hellenism caused its defeat and demonstrates the impossibility of reviving it in the nineteenth century without Hebraism. Arnold follows Burke himself in objecting to Renan's call to revitalize the French monarchy. "The republicanism of men...like M. Quinet," Arnold writes, "...is a reasoned and a serious faith, and it grows not out of a stupid insensitivity to the historic life and institutions of a nation," but since it does grow out of sensibility, it has the prescription, the cultural value which guarantees its right to continue. The defeat of the monarchy in the revolution only demonstrates that the "absolute and eternal" order is not monarchy itself. In a late essay on political affairs, Arnold turns on Burke and accuses him of making a particular institution the absolute which history reveals.

After all, our country as it is, as the past has made it, as it stands there before us, is something; it shall not lightly be imperilled by the bungling work of rash hands. Burke from such a motive threw himself on the conservative forces in this country to resist Jacobinism. But no solution of the
problems of national life is to be reached by resting on those forces absolutely.19

Thus culture gives man his institutions as these institutions continue into the present; they are the "tentatives," the "approximations" of eternal and absolute order which man accepts.

Culture and prescription, then, provide the order of society. Arnold writes in *Culture and Anarchy* that in the world "outside us" we find a lack of sure authority and we find the same lack in "our own inner world." The only remedy for this lack of authority is the fuller development of our humanity which right reason provides for us (*C&A*, pp. 162-163). Arnold is following Burke, who saw the French Revolution spreading a contagion in the minds of man and throughout Europe to overthrow the sure principles of authority in institutions which prescription had established. Burke must uphold therefore the "noble and venerable walls" of the French Constitution, even if these walls had fallen into disrepair and disuse, because they provided a foundation of order upon which the French might have built (*Reflections*, III, 277). Arnold cries for criticism to establish, through the operation of time, "an order of ideas" which will be true by comparison of the ideas which it replaces (*EC*, p. 7). The order will be established by the

19"Nadir," *Nineteenth Century*, XIX, 659. Trilling does not use either of these references to Burke to support his comparison.
critic's knowing "the best that has been thought and said," by preferring "the collected wisdom of ages." Arnold, in particular, looked to Greek culture for this order. After a long explanation of the history of the varying use of the words eutrapelos and eutrapelía, Arnold says, "...now see how the varying use gives us a clue to the order and sense... of all that Greek world so nearly and wonderfully connected with us, so profoundly interesting for us, so full of precious lessons" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 417). His lecture "On the Modern Element in Literature" seeks to show the "noble and venerable walls" of Greek literature as a valid foundation upon which the modern writer might build in order to represent and interpret his own age.

(c)

I have shown in the previous chapter that both Arnold and Burke place greatest stress upon experience as a best source of man's knowledge. Culture, we might say, is experience in time. Arnold writes in the "Porro Unum est Necessarium" chapter of Culture and Anarchy that culture "is simply the enabling ourselves, by getting to know, whether through reading, observing, or thinking, the best that can at present be known in the world, to come as near as we can to the firm intelligible law of things, and thus to get a basis for a less confused action and a more complete perfection than we have at present" (C&A, p. 163).
At the beginning of his "Preface to First Edition of Poems," Arnold quotes from a writer in the Spectator whom he calls "an intelligent critic." "The poet who would really fix the public attention," Arnold quotes him as writing, "must leave the exhausted past and draw his subjects from matters of present import, and therefore both of interest and novelty" (ME, LE, and Others, p. 489). Aside from the confusion in grammar, the critic reflects what must have been highly characteristic of nineteenth-century periodical criticism. Even though there are portions of Arnold's writing in which he seems to reject some part of the exhausted past (see "Heine"), more typically Arnold believes, as in the 1853 "Preface" and in "The Modern Element in Literature," that the past has created an ideal (in addition to the order which it supplies) which the nineteenth century needs. Burke, too, attempts to show that the past has created an ideal which Parliament should follow in its deliberations on America and an ideal which the French should follow rather than the abstract theorizing of the rationalists. Man has not exhausted his past; there is always that great fund of "ancient inbred integrity, piety, good nature and good humor of the English people" to be drawn upon.

To draw upon this fund both Burke and Arnold tend to see history as a flat plane with little concern for the
denominator of time. Fletcher, discussing Burke in relation to Montesquieu, declares that Burke saw "society with all its history, past, present, and future, spread out flat before his gaze. History ceases to be a mere enchainment of events in time: it becomes the very pattern of human nature, eternally the same, eternally complete" (Fletcher, Montesquieu, p. 112). Arnold's desire, on the other hand, to see the object as it really is, Tillotson affirms, "brought all objects on the same mid-nineteenth-century footing whether they were old subjects or new, whether they were poems of Milton or poems of Browning" (Tillotson, p. 94). These two generalizations can easily be proved for each writer. A statesman should study history, Burke writes, not in the leading strings of any historian, but by looking "steadily on the business before him, without being diverted by retrospect and comparison" in forming his judgments (Policy of the Allies, IV, 468). In the Speech on Conciliation with America, he makes his recommendations on the basis of four comparable incidents in British constitutional history. When Arnold answers a review of his religious books, written by a man with "a philosophical system of history,—a history ruled by the law of progress or evolution," he declares that the ideas of the eighth and ninth century before Christ were of more value and had more pertinence than later ideas. The Sermon on the Mount, he
continues, has more truth than the Athanasian Creed. Considered as historical events, their time position is irrelevant. What is important is the degree to which they approach the ideal.

Since history is a flat plane which reveals the ideal and since history is the record of the "divine tactic," history is the attempt in time to discover the ideal. The statesman, in Burke, reads history in order to discover the ideal of action in his tradition. Thus Burke looks to the Parliamentary laws for the governing of Wales to discover the ideal of action to apply in the case of the colonists. The constitution of a people, he writes in his "Speech on the Reform of Commons," is made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social habits of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. It is a vestment which accommodates itself to the body" (VII, 95). Burke seldom turns, therefore, to Roman history since it has none of the circumstances and occasions which have made the British Constitution. But he does study his own history for the perceptions of reason that he can find; nearly all of

his speeches and tracts reveal a full knowledge of the "becoming" of an ideal. As Vaughan says, Burke realized the "impossibility of arriving at speculative truth...by any method which is not founded upon a searching study of man's history in the past."  

Arnold paraphrases from Spinoza the statement that the law was in the world before the doctrine of Moses or the doctrine of Christ (EC1, p. 371). He uses the idea himself when he finds in Marcus Aurelius "that substratum of right thinking and well-doing which in all ages must surely have somewhere existed, for without it the continued life of humanity would have been impossible" (EC1, p. 415). The Roman discovered right thinking and preserved it just as the Greeks discovered and preserved sweetness and light as an ideal. Arnold praises Coleridge and Joubert not only for their impulse to search out genuine truth, but for their gift of finding it (EC1, pp. 318-319). The law exists; we have to find it, and if we cannot, we must trust those who have found it. Burke did the same thing, in a more restricted sense, when he searched in history to find his law.

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The question arises, how do we know that the law, the idea, the truth is actually the truth. Arnold in *God and the Bible* asks the question of how we can know an idea exists. "We have the idea of perfect good; yet this idea cannot be given us by experience," people say, "because in nature there is no such thing as a perfect good" (p. 115). Arnold answers, "But experience gave us the ideas, and we have no need to invent something out of experience as the source of them" (Ibid.). To understand Arnold here we have to go back to the belief of Burke and Arnold that experience is the reflection of the divine. Burke distinguishes between a transcendent natural law which corresponds with ultimate truth, and a social law which is, under providence, the guardian of present good (Fletcher, p. 256). Burke recognizes, that is to say, two distinct laws—the laws of God and the laws of man—and the effort of his thinking was to reconcile as much as possible the laws of man with those of God. He did this in the conviction that experience revealed the ideals which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. When Arnold says that experience gives us ideas, he means the experience in time and not particular experience of the individual. Arnold represents the Catholic Church as "the whole human race...discovering truth more complete than the parcel of truth any momentary individual can seize" (*L&L*, p. xxvi). Because it is an
institution above the individual, it constantly absorbs new perceptions which individual men have made and incorporates them into its growing, developing idea of truth.

If history, then, is a record of the "divine tactic" and the record of the human attempt to discover the ideal, history itself is not a collection of facts, but rather a sum of meaning which the human being has discovered in the facts. Burke calls the French punishment of the incumbent Archbishop of Paris for crimes committed in the sixteenth century a "perversion of history." It is a perversion because it sees two facts and cannot distinguish the ideal arising above the fact. The right view is the view of those "who will stand upon that elevation of reason which places centuries under our eyes and brings things to the true point of comparison, which obscures little names and effaces the colors of little parties, and to which nothing can ascend but the spirit and moral quality of human actions" (Reflections, III, 421). Surely Arnold means the same thing when he writes in "On the Modern Element in Literature" that the modern deliverance will come

when our mind begins to enter into possession of the general ideas which are the law of this vast multitude of facts. It is perfect when we have acquired that harmonious acquiescence of mind which we feel in contemplating a grand spectacle that is intelligible to us; when we have lost that impatient irritation of mind which we feel in presence of an immense, moving, confused spectacle which, while it perpetually excites our curiosity, perpetually baffles our comprehension (Oxford Essays, p. 456).
Also in Culture and Anarchy Arnold, like Burke, attacks the perversion of history which only desires unity and thoroughness of organization around a fixed or abstract idea rather than the "spirit and moral quality" of human actions. Burke seldom specifies who has this quality of entering into the possession of the general ideas; he generally believes it to be possessed by his forefathers. "Never may we become," he writes, "...wiser than all the wise men and good men who have lived before us" (Present Discontents, I, 528). Arnold finds the quality in St. Paul, in the author of the Imitation, in Spinoza, Joubert, Coleridge, and Goethe; but as with Burke, he too trusts to the general idea as unfolded by history and retained by institutions. It is culture that he refers us to and not to any one man.

Because of their major interest in the spirit and moral quality of human actions, lifting the idea above the actual event enables them to use a type of historical relativism. Arnold prints his selections from Burke for the relative value which the speeches, tracts, and letters on Ireland in the eighteenth century had in connection with the events in Ireland in the 1860's. Also Arnold's idea of the modern element in Greek literature rests on his conviction that the ideals of the classical period could be of use in the nineteenth century. Burke cautions against such relativism in his first Letter on a Regicide Peace (V, 234-235), but his caution is essentially against any absolute
relationship. Although he advises care in making comparisons, Burke used the method himself in comparing Britain with France in the Reflections.

(d)

History, therefore, enables man to discover "the spirit and moral quality of human actions." Cobban writes that Burke "would say that truth is not an extra-mundane thing stored up in some philosophic or religious heaven, but is a vital principle ever at work in the life of mankind and only to be found in studying that life" (Cobban, p. 86). The normal Christian procedure is to use the truths of religion to judge history, but Burke sees truth to be coming not from religion but from history itself (Loc. cit.). As I have shown in the previous chapter, both Arnold and Burke lay the greatest stress upon experience as the source of knowledge. When this experience is seen as not merely present experience but the experience of the past too, then the truth must be discovered in the vital principle ever at work in history and only to be found in studying that life to know the prescription and culture. Thus Arnold recommends culture to the Nonconformists. As he writes in "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist,"

In morals, we must not rely just on what may "have the appearance" to the individual, but on the experience of the race as to happiness. To that experience, the individual, as one of the race, is profoundly and intimately adapted. He may much
more safely conform himself to such experience than to his own crude judgments upon "appearances;" nay, such experience, has, if he deals with himself fairly, a much stronger hold upon his conviction....The transient individual must not cut and carve in the results of human experience, according to his crude notions of what may constitute human happiness (St. P. and P., pp. 284-285).

The species is wise, Burke writes, "and, when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always acts right" (VII, 95). Thus Arnold in his religious books always trusts the historical process in the Established Church. Puritanism, because it concentrates only on the individual, "is thus opposed to that development and gradual exhibiting of the full sense of the Bible and Christianity, which is essential to religious progress" (St. P. and P., p. 120). The institution, because it transcends ordinary human life, has a paramount interest for society. "He that cannot watch the God of the Bible, and the salvation of the Bible, gradually and on an immense scale discovering themselves and becoming (i.e., through history, culture, and institutions), will insist on seeing them ready-made, and in such precise and reduced dimensions as may suit his narrow mind" (L&D, p. xiii).

Arnold and Burke knew that this sense of the "experience of the race as to happiness" could not come from the
"swinish multitude." But in institutions men seek this happiness of the race by instinct. The human heart, Arnold quotes Amiel, "is, as it were, haunted ... by aspirations towards a harmony of things which every day reality denies to us." The splendor and refinement of high life, Arnold continues, is an attempt by the rich and cultivated classes to realize this ideal and is a form of poetry. "In short, what Goethe describes as...that which holds us all in bondage, the common and ignoble...is notwithstanding its admitted prevalence, contrary to the deep seated instinct of human nature, and repelled by it." It was this instinct which the French destroyed in making their revolution.

The demonstration of culture which Arnold makes in his religious books, therefore, bears a close relationship to Burke's thought. In these books, the idea of a community expressing the historical movement of mind is clearly and even intensely Burkean even though the only use of Burke is in the epigraph for Literature and Dogma and in the "Preface" of the book, where Arnold uses, but does not identify, Burke's definition of the State as "the nation in its

23 Oxford Essays, p. 141; Arnold's language here recalls Burke's language in the Reflections when he scoffs at the French notion of turning power over to the swinish multitude in the State. Reflections, III, 335.

24 Civilization in the United States (Boston, (1868)), p. 172.

25 "Renan," EC3, p. 155; Reflections, III, 527.
collective and corporate character" (L&D, pp. iv, x). And these essays show,

it would still have been better for a man, during the last eighteen hundred years, to have been a Christian and a member of one of the great Christian communions, than to have been a Jew or a Socinian; because the being in contact with the main stream of human life is of more moment for a man's total spiritual growth, and for his bringing to perfection the gifts committed to him, which is his business on earth, than any speculative opinion which he may hold or think he holds (C&A, p. 30).

iii

The two chief differences between Arnold and Burke are more a matter of method than a difference in actual use of history. Arnold does not use history, as Burke has been accused of doing, merely as a justification of present institutions. Secondly, Arnold's past is a more consciously European past than Burke's is. Finally, Burke tends to look upon the past as a party writer.

Burke most apparently uses his history to justify the institutions of the present. The best that he can say of the British Constitution is that it is not a document on paper but the living continuation of British thought over a long period of time. It is almost a commonplace of Burkean criticism to say that his "historical sense was so strong that it came in the end to devour almost all the rest of his principles." Arnold himself writes that Burke threw

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himself on the Conservative forces in this country because of his fear of the bungling work of the rationalists. "But no solution of the problems of national life is to be reached by resting on those forces absolutely. Burke would have been more edifying for us today if he had rested on them less absolutely."27

Among the institutions which Burke justifies on the basis of his historical sense are the monarchy and the aristocracy. Even in his bitter "Letter to a Noble Lord" Burke declares that his whole life's interest has been to preserve the very position of the Noble Lord who so ungraciously attacked his pension. Burke has harsh things to say about the aristocracy, and Arnold quotes him in part in "Equality" (*ME*, p. 87; *Reflections*, III, 366), however generally he defends their usefulness in society. Sir Ernest Barker suggests that an absolute monarchy is "the one logical issue of [Arnold's] teaching,"28 but Arnold never consciously uses the British past to justify monarchy. In *Culture and Anarchy* he objects that the English royalty has been turned "into a kind of grand advertising van, meant to give publicity and credit to the

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inventions...of the ordinary self of individuals" (C&A, p. 118); immediately after such a comment, however, he notices that the Prussian Crown schools have succeeded in giving "credit and authority" to schools which are not merely the reflections of the ordinary self (Ibid.). Arnold does not object to Sainte-Beuve's defense of the empire, and he finds value in the Prussian land reforms because they do express the character of the nation. On the other hand, he uses Burke to reject Renan's call for the revival of a monarchy in France after the Franco-Prussian War (EC, p. 150), and Arnold believes that aristocracy has outlived the usefulness which Burke saw it possessing. Arnold can wish for the extinction of the title after the death of the holder (Civ. in US, p. 147), and say that English democracy will almost certainly "throw off the tutelage of the aristocracy" (ME, p. 26). Still, one is often conscious of Arnold's admiration of the aristocracy, especially the eighteenth-century aristocracy. His ideal was to transfer the function of the aristocracy to a third force of intelligent, perceptive individuals who could, by their thought, make the nation "the collective and corporate character of its people."

Arnold could also differ from Burke in urging the inclusion of institutions for which the British experience gave no prescription. Arnold's ideal of a social action
community is modelled on the example of France and Prussia rather than on English prescription. Arnold wanted a criticism "which regards Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great federation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have, for their proper outfit, a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another." Burke would possibly accept such general ideals, but he would insist first on the special, local, and even the temporary manifestations of culture and criticism before going to the European or the ancient. Although Burke "always had a lofty conception of the part which England was called upon to play in the politics of the world," MacCunn writes, his conception "was always under the influence of a spirit of locality" (MacCunn, p. 35). Still Arnold did admit that England could never hope for an academy precisely because English history offered no prescription for such a body (EC1, pp. 72-73).30

Finally, critics have claimed that Burke looked to history with the jaundiced eyes of a party historian.


30Arnold objects that Burke's prose is tasteless and provincial because of a lack of an academy. But Burke did belong to a type of academy, if The Club may be considered as such, which objected to these same qualities in Burke. Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. George B. Hill and L. F. Powell (Oxford, 1934), IV, 104, 275-276.
Burke's *Reflections* did alienate him from his own party, but it did not suffice for his entrance into the Tory party either. Arnold never accuses Burke of being a party man--his greatness is that he lived in a world of ideas, not in the world of catchwords and party habits--and he cites Burke's own statement in one of his Irish letters that he had no influence in the government after his split from Fox and Sheridan (VI, 416). But Burke did harm, according to Arnold, in supporting the Tories and thereby making concentration too dominant an idea in England (Russell, *Letters*, II, 192).

As in the discussion of their critical assumptions, Arnold is much more liberal in his use of the past than Burke. He never makes Burke's mistake of allowing the past to become pure prescription, the pure letter of the law. Arnold is more curious than complacent.

Arnold's attitude toward the past and his use of the past clearly places him more on the side of conservative political theory than on the side of the liberals. "The most obvious feature of political conservatism," a recent writer on the political ideas of British conservatism says, "everywhere is a defense of traditions."3¹ Nowhere does

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this attitude toward the past, however, cause Arnold to call himself a conservative. The Conservative Party of his day did not look toward the traditional values of the past, but it was "merely a general indisposition to let the middle-class spirit, working by its old methods, and having only its old self to give us, establish itself at all points and become master of the situation" (A French Eton, p. 74). Arnold's conservatism, inherent in his use of the past, dare not attach itself to a practicing conservatism that saw no further than holding the line at the last Reform Bill. These Conservatives follow the strangle hold of "prescription and routine," not the prescription and culture which Arnold, and Burke, desire.

Because of their belief that the process of history unfolds meaning, Burke and Arnold are far from the reactionary and radical theories of history. In both Vico and Marx man makes history. Both Arnold and Burke believe that man makes history too in the slow process of time. But the difference between Vico and Marx is that Vico sees history as theoretical, a constant attempt in time to discover meanings in actions of the time process. Marx, on the other hand, took the theorizings from the flux and translated them into ends. All effort of life, then, is for the purpose of the end perceived in history. Marx stops the historical development at one point and converts every
other end into a means to attain that end. If Arnold's terms culture and perfection were understood as ends, he would be close to the school which turns Marx upside down and makes spiritual and moral ends (as Marx makes material ends) the absolute end. But like Burke, Arnold keeps these terms as ideals which, as the next chapter will show, can change according to the demands of expediency. Since we can say that Arnold looks for ideals in the past, we must call him a conservative, but since he never translates those ideals into absolute ends, his conservatism is not a reactionary conservatism which translates spiritual or moral ends into permanent ends of society.

The definitions of conservatism and liberalism in the first chapter of this study single out the belief in the reforming power of moral and spiritual qualities as

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32 See the very interesting and suggestive article by Hannah Arendt, "History and Immortality," Partisan Review, XXIV (Winter, 1957), 11-35.

33 Richard Powers, "The Degradation of Aristocratic Dogma," Partisan Review, XXIV, 155-159, shows, by judicious selection of quotations from the Reflections, that Burke's politics, despite all the eager young men who are for taking Burke neat, leads inevitably to a Southern-White-Supremacy brand of Fascism. If we see Burke only by selection in the Reflections, a Burke whose thought is "often disfigured by the violence and passion of the moment" (EC1, p. 15), then we may show that the "spirit and moral quality" in history becomes an absolute end. But, on the other hand, Burke writes in the Reflections that moral restraints as well as liberties "cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle" (III, 310-311).
distinctive of conservatism. The moral interest that Arnold finds in history, then, would place him on the conservative side of the political scale also. Lacking the strictly rational assumptions of the liberal upon which he can judge history, Arnold resorts to the ethical judgments of the conservative.

But again, Arnold is so consciously seeking a balance of contending forces, that calling him either Liberal or Conservative has little actual value. His culture attempts to incorporate both the Liberal and the Conservative tendencies. By the very act of holding up culture as an ideal, however, he places himself on the conservative side of the circle of political qualities.

v

Most apparently Arnold uses the past to establish his standards of literary value; and yet Arnold also attacks historical criticism. From the apparent paradox we see the effect of Arnold's use of the past in his literary criticism.

In defining poetry as the true criticism of life, Arnold makes a Greek distinction between history and poetry. To the Greek, poetry was superior to history because it discovered in events principles of life. History merely recounts events, but poetry finds the meaning in these events. As such it makes a criticism in the sense that it
evaluates experience to discover the permanent in the change. History, then, is the material for poetry and the use of history in poetry is the same as the use of history in civil life. The great poet continuously gives us this meaning in experience. "What distinguishes the greatest poets," Arnold writes in his essay on Wordsworth, "is their powerful and profound application of ideas to life..." (EC², p. 143). Here Arnold seems to suggest that the idea is attached to life by the poet, as if he fastened it to his material. The great poet recognizes and uses these ideas inherent in the material. "Nature herself seems, I say, to take the pen out of his hand, and to write for him with her own bare, sheer, penetrating power" (EC², pp. 158-159). Arnold objects to Wordsworth's attempt to poetize a statement about God's being behind the universe: the idea may be true, Arnold says, but it is not poetically true since we cannot see it arise from its materials. The lesser poets, on the other hand, merely give an accurate imitation of events; they give us only the history of a time. Thus a Chaucer has magnificent powers of imitation (he has God's plenty, Arnold quotes Dryden as saying), but he only rarely finds the meaning behind his experience.

Trilling says that Arnold's "poetry had probed the spiritual lacks of modern life; his critical effort undertakes to help the growth of a life molded to a nobler style"
Arnold finds his nobler style in accepting human life and institutions to discover the inherent order and ideals in them. He attacks Macaulay’s criticism for wrapping in the “robe of rhetoric the thing it represents”; it should rather wrap it with “the soft play of life following and rendering the thing’s very form and pressure” (ME, p. 238). Arnold’s statement in "The Function of Criticism" makes his method most explicit:

Again, judging is often spoken of as the critic’s one business; and so in some sense it is; but the judgment which almost insensibly forms itself in a fair and clear mind, along with fresh knowledge, is the valuable one; and thus knowledge, and ever fresh knowledge, must be the critic’s great concern for himself. And it is by communicating fresh knowledge, and letting his own judgment pass along with it,—but insensibly, and in the second place, not the first, as a sort of companion and clue, not as an abstract lawmaker,—that the critic will generally do most good to his readers. Sometimes... criticism may have to deal with a subject-matter so familiar that fresh knowledge is out of the question, and then it must be all judgment; an enunciation and detailed application of principles. Here the great safeguard is never to let oneself become abstract, always to retain an intimate and lively consciousness of the truth of what one is saying, and, the moment this fails us, to be sure that something is wrong (EC, pp. 43-44. My italics).

The critic, Arnold says, is to consider the past as source material of experience or knowledge. What does he mean by knowledge, but the same knowledge that the poet uses in constructing his poem? It is the material, the history, in which the critic will find the meaning. Criticism, then, is creative just as poetry is creative, but it operates
more distinctly in history than poetry. The critic's function is to give his knowledge, his history, full play. Even the "detailed application of principles" is nothing more than the application of ideas which have emerged from the flux to give meaning. If he becomes abstract, he denies his critical truth as Wordsworth denied poetical truth when he asserted in *The Excursion* the idea that God is in his universe.

Arnold saw history as material and experience from which the critic discovered meaning. The mind does not impose it; it is there for the critic to find. Arnold defines criticism as "a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world" (**BC^1**, p. 45); that is, the critic has to discover what history and meaning have made clear. In "Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment," Arnold says, "...the great art of criticism is to get oneself out of the way and to let humanity decide" (**EC^1**, p. 251). In other words, the standards will arise naturally from the past and its institutions.

Arnold's criticism, then, is intimately connected with his society. Burke speaks of the necessity of a wide view of history in avoiding calamities of a nation: "I think I can trace all the calamities of this country to the single source of our not having had steadily before our eyes
a general, comprehensive, well-connected, and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings and relations" (Nabob of Arcot, III, 16). What Burke asks for in politics, Arnold asks for in criticism. Arnold writes much the same thing in the "Preface" to Literature and Dogma: "To understand that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and literary, not rigid, fixed, and scientific, is the first step towards a right understanding of the Bible. But to take this very step, some experience of how men have thought and expressed themselves, and some flexibility of spirit, are necessary; and this is culture" (L&D, p. xiii). "Gradually getting a notion of the history of the human," Arnold says at the end of that book, "...enables us (the 'Zeit-Geist' favouring) to correct, in re-reading the Bible, some of the mistakes into which men of more metaphysical talents than literary experience have fallen" (L&D, p. 350).

Knowledge of the past in the critic, the writer, and the public, creates an order in literature as it does in political affairs. The Celt lacks the true art; "the architectonicé which shapes great works, such as the Agamemnon or the Divine Comedy, comes only after a steady, deep-searching survey, a firm conception of the facts of human life" (CL, p. 79). Arnold is certain that if England can partake of the great growth of criticism which he finds
beginning to stir on the continent since Goethe, increasing numbers will see "that it is their business to learn the real truth about the important men, and things, and books, which interest the human mind" (ME, p. 246). When this happens, the vulgar and ordinary in the middle-class life will begin to abate and the new "power or purchase" will assume the civilizing task which a materialized aristocracy has abandoned. The hard unintelligence which is the Englishman's bane will be conquered and "reduced by culture, by a growth in the variety, fulness and sweetness of our spiritual life" (CL, p. 137). "Of course no one can be sure that he has fixed any such rules; he can only do his best to fix them. But somewhere or other, in the literary opinion of Europe, if not in the literary opinion of one nation, in fifty years, if not in five, there is a final judgment on these matters, and the critic's work will at least stand or fall by its true merits" ("Last Words," Celtic Literature, pp 241-42).

The use of the past does not mean that Arnold advocates an historical criticism. In the "Study of Poetry" he calls the historical estimate of poetry a fallacious estimate (Ec², p. 6). "Arnold does not reject the historical method," a critic has pointed out, "or even the formula of race, milieu and moment; he simply points out that such things are machinery, not ends." 34 The statement seems

accurate. The historical criticism, as such, tends to make abstract generalizations which it immediately applies to literature. The critic, the proper historical critic, rather seeks to absorb as much as he can from the whole world of literary experience and let the standards of judgment grow out of them. Arnold's attack on historical criticism is more properly an attack on the schools of Positivistic and Utilitarian criticism, which did not include the imaginative experience in the ideas of history but concentrated rather on the mere facts.

But how far more of the blundering to be found in the world comes from people fancying that some idea is a definite and ascertained thing, like the idea of a triangle, when it is not; and proceeding to deduce properties from it, and to do battle about them, when their first start was a mistake! And how liable are people with a talent for hard, abstruse reasoning, to be tempted to this mistake! And what can clear up such mistakes except a wide and familiar acquaintance with the human spirit and its production, showing how ideas and terms arose, and what is their character? And this is letters and history not logic (L&D, p. 8).

Thus the knowledge of the past is vitalized (rather than restricted by men fonder of system than truth), and thus it is intimately conscious of the whole range of human interests.

For both Arnold and Burke, I conclude, the past has a value as a source of experience; but as no absolute rational law can encompass experience in the present, neither

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can it encompass experience in time. The ideal develops, rather, from the contributions of many minds who derive from experience the order and ideals of prescription and culture. According to R. G. Collingwood, such an attitude is not a concept of history because it accepts rather than investigates (Idea of History, p. 18). The true historian studies the past to answer questions: he is a scientist probing. Neither of these men looks to the past to answer his own questions: each looks to see how circumstances have evolved principles and expressed them in institutions.

The difference between Arnold and Burke arises, again, from Arnold's greater freedom of mind. He accepts more of the past than Burke does. And, once more, the conclusion leads to a conservative direction to Arnold's politics since institutions absorb his attentions. In the institution the extremes of absolutism are avoided. Finally Arnold's poet and critic follow the method of absorbing both the work and its principles from the past. On the basis of culture and prescription is found that "harmonious acquiescence of mind ... in contemplating a grand spectacle that is intelligible."
Faith in the idea of progress marks the nineteenth century as nothing else quite does, but J. B. Bury's study of The Idea of Progress and Ernest Lee Tuveson's more objective Millennium and Utopia demonstrate that the nineteenth century saw actually the capping of a long, slow, methodical historical growth of an idea. Whatever the idea of progress is, neither Burke nor Arnold can quite avoid it; they must consider, even subconsciously, the whole question of the meaning of change, for the Zeitgeist demands it and culture and prescription contains it. Burke in his passionate opposition to the French Revolution and the mind which it represents, necessarily denies the faith in progress which the revolution (and the revolutionists) confidently asserted. As Burke's latest biographer says of Burke, "...it was his life's work to raise the flag of revolt against the main intellectual currents of the century in which he lived. Theories of progress or enlightenment meant nothing to Burke."\footnote{Sir Philip Magnus, \textit{Burke} (London, 1939), p. 300.}
was represented by the positive and assured middle-class liberalism of his own age. Yet even Burke speaks of the "perfection of which [man's] nature is capable" and perfectibility is one of the key words of Arnold's prose: an organic view of society characterizes Burke's political attitudes as the idea of expansion characterizes Arnold's political thought. In the system of thought which each dimly possesses, change has a real function, and each accepts the necessity of change, but neither, I think, embraces a conventional idea of progress.

Arnold could have learned of a necessity of change directly from his own father, whose thought in the subject is not original. To Thomas Arnold "conservatism...was not merely the watchword of an English party, but the symbol of an evil...[containing] the spirit of resistance to all change." He called himself a believer in Liberal principles, according to Stanley, because of his "belief in the constant necessity of applying those principles of advance and reform, which, in their most perfect development, he conceived to be identical with Christianity itself" (Stanley, Life, I, 201). Therefore to Thomas Arnold change is "perfectibility

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in the moral sense, a sense in which religion and intellectual development are in perfect harmony. In the seventeenth century, however, writers conceived of salvation as gradual improvement of human personality; man makes a spiritual evolution by enlarging his knowledge and by greater application of the truth in religion.

Also, Thomas Arnold (and the Liberal Anglican historical movement) conceived of historical growth as an organic change distinct from some eighteenth-century rationalist's concepts of an exterior progress of society. The Utilitarians specifically distrusted the idea of development because of its mysticism; as a consequence, their concept of history was static and inadequate. Both Burke and the romantics likened change to human growth. Thomas Arnold interprets "the development of a society in terms of its growing mental life." Therefore, in the idea of an organic society, clearly present in Burke, we find Arnold and Burke once more in a common tradition.

The word progress is a "catchword" of Arnold's time. An illustration of the power of the word may be taken from

5 Ernest Lee Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (Berkeley, 1949), pp. 96-99. Tuveson's thesis is that the nineteenth century idea of progress is chiefly a materialization of spiritual ideals conceived by the Cambridge Platonists and continued in many eighteenth-century thinkers.
6 Forbes, pp. 20, 127, 131, 129.
Arnold's friend, John Morley (who wrote two books on Burke):

One word of sovereign power is to be noted. We all know the fire and enthusiasm that spread with splendid flame in France in 1830, or a little later, by half a dozen eternally noble, vibrating, farsounding words—Right, Justice, Equality, Fraternity, Progress. The last of these five beacon lights had a profound difference from its companion phrases. Progress went further into "the deep heart of man." Belief in Progress has become the basis of social thought, and has even taken the place of a religion as the inspiring, guiding, and testing power over social action. It is mixed idea, hope, emotion; on many lips no better than a convenient catchword, as little able to bear anything like penetrating analysis as the seventeenth of the Thirty-Nine articles...when you have shown if you can, that it is all chimera and illusion, yet let us remain invincibly sure that Progress stands for a working belief that the modern world will never consent to do without. 7

Truly, as Duncan Forbes says, "Progress became the credo of triumphant Victorianism with the development of the purely material side of civilization" (Forbes, p. 6). The ordinary man could easily hold his belief in material growth because he saw it around him all the time. If he were a member of the middle class, he had only to look back to his parents and compare his position with theirs. He could afford to neglect God because of his satisfaction with himself while outwardly conforming to a belief in Providence. Burke, the

Liberal Anglicans, and Matthew Arnold all oppose an attitude of mind such as that reflected in Viscount Morley because of its stress on the outward appearances of things, on the satisfaction of the ordinary self of mankind.

The previous chapter shows the similarity in the ideal of culture and prescription, an ideal which is not static or absolute but which is constantly growing and becoming. Since prescription has been modified in the past, by "peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time," then these same circumstances must modify the ideal in the present. Critics of Burke and Arnold can hardly agree what term to use to describe this modification. Although the word progress has been used, both writers deny, I believe, the conventional idea of progress. Therefore, we must examine their definitions of change (change that will keep the past but modify and improve it), their attitudes toward some common ideas explaining historical change, and their application of their concepts to make present historical institutions more efficient and more able to meet the demands of the particular time—a revitalization of institutions for the occasions, tempers, and habitudes of a people.
Critics have discussed, incidental to other problems, the exact position which Arnold and Burke take toward the idea of progress. The result is only confusion. J. Dover Wilson writes, "I do not think that Arnold liked the word 'progress' either. Certainly he does not appear to use it." I have counted some fifty occurrences of this word in Arnold's prose and my count is not nearly complete. He does use the word. Trilling declares that Arnold shared an assumption of human progress with John Stuart Mill. A doctoral dissertation analyzing Matthew Arnold's use of history reports that "Arnold combined the desire to come to satisfying terms with life with the historical assumptions that he had learned from Burke." Arnold's effort to combine the two led "directly to his theory of progress." On the very next page, however, the author declares "As a matter of fact, Arnold did not go along with nineteenth century progressivism" (p. 85). Writing from a Liberal point of view Benjamin Evans Lippincott calls Arnold's belief in progress a basic assumption affecting his attitude

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toward democracy. But also writing from the Liberal point of view, Leonard Woolf, in his *After the Deluge*, accuses Arnold of being one of the chief nineteenth-century instigators of twentieth-century reactionary collectivism.

Burke criticism reflects the same confusion. C. E. Vaughan says that Burke has no concept of Progress, and Alfred Cobban writes that "Burke's theory does not at all imply the doctrine of progress." Cobban allows that Burke has a concept of change and even revolutionary growth in his organic view of society (p. 91). Although Lois Whitney in her analysis of *Primitivism and the Idea of Progress* does not doubt that some "strains of Burke's thought are conservative," she nevertheless feels that he "lines up with the best progressive thought on the subject of society and government." And she compares Burke's concept of progress with Priestley's and Bentham's, showing the harmony of their ideas. She feels that Burke's concept of progress is more

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11 Cited by Wilson in Hearnshaw, p. 192.


consistent than the concept of the radicals of the late eighteenth century (p. 198). She concludes, however, that the idea is not as obvious in Burke as it might be. Burke's concept of progress is not as clear "because he was too occupied with refuting... (the) notion of progress and the methods which (the radicals) were advocating for attaining it" (p. 205). Other critics, from Lord Morley to Russell Kirk, could be cited for divergent view of Burke's actual attitude toward the idea of progress.

Both writers do use the word, but it is fairly easy to cite sentences where each opposes the concept. In a letter written to Clough in 1848, Arnold says that the events in France "must be disheartening to the believers in progress—or at least in any progress but progress en ligne spirale which Goethe allows man—though from him I scarcely understand this concession." 15 The idea of progress involves a philosophical system of history, and Arnold with his deep-seated distrust of system could hardly do anything but oppose it (St. P. and P., p. 176). Because it does tend to be a system it cannot give "the inexhaustible judgment" which cultured change gives, nor the "consideration of circumstances" nor make "the severe judgments of actions

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joined to the merciful judgment of persons" (C&A, p. 68). In an essay written the year before he died, Arnold quotes with approval Tolstoi's rejection of a theory of general progress (EC, p. 288). But the words progress, change, expansion, growth, development, and perfectibility appear so often on Arnold's page that we must ask what he means by them. Burke, too, speaks of a "slow, but well-sustained progress" (III, 457) which grows out of careful consideration to the matter of reform. But it will be the contention of this chapter that Burke and Arnold use these words, not in the sense of a doctrinaire progressivist; but in a sense to indicate a distinct type of historical change which is counter to the "triumphant progress" of much nineteenth-century thought.\footnote{See also Burke's statements on change in Reflections, III, 259, 361, 456; Appeal, IV, 82; Abridgment of English History, 475-488. In his early attempt to abridge English history Burke finds two objections to make against English attitude toward the law. He objects to the notion that English law has not changed since antiquity and the notion that the law is peculiar to England. The law was "compounded, altered, and variously modified, according to the various necessities which manners, the religion, and the commerce of the people have at different times imposed" (VII, 479-480).}

Arnold nearly always uses the word progress to denote a personal growth of intellectual, moral and spiritual power in the individual. The consequence of this individual growth to a society as a whole is, of course, immense, and Arnold never suggests that this progress of the
individual is possible "while the individual remains isolated" (C&A, p. 48). "To be humanised is to make progress toward...our true and full humanity," he writes (ME, p. 64). And to be civilized is "to make progress toward this in civil society; in that civil society, 'without which,' says Burke, 'man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it.'" (Ibid.; Reflections, III, 361). But if humanity requires society for its perfection, the perfection arises by the individual's progress in reaching his own moral, intellectual, and spiritual perfection. For its nearest relative, we have to go back to the writing of Thomas Burnet and More and Cudworth.  

(b) 

Too much has been written on the idea of progress and the idea is too complex for cursory summary. If critics find it difficult to make objective analyses, they also shy away from nineteenth-century illustrations: nearly all studies stop at the year 1799, if not earlier. What before was an isolated phenomenon in the writing of philosophes, obscure publicists, or philosophical radicals is now common change so that even the most resolute and independent nineteenth-century writer cannot avoid overtones of its meaning.  

17 Tuveson, pp. 181-182, 194.
While a final definition of the idea of progress is impossible, the leading ideas do stand out. Possibly in no case would any one Victorian hold all of these ideas as of equal value. Indeed, the ideas I list are not of equal value. Lois Whitney, for instance, places high on the list of necessary ideas for her definition of progress the recognition that change leads to complexity, and yet she must admit that notable apologists for progress have not seen that it leads to increasing complexity. Nevertheless, a belief in a scientific law of progress does include, I believe, the following leading ideas to explain historical change:

1. The idea of progress accepts the belief that the progress of man may be measured in secular terms (thus, the present is in some respects superior to classical antiquity because of its objective material improvement).

2. Progress is made possible by the recognition of the invariability of the laws of nature, the sequence of observable causes and effects; the Laws of Nature are substituted for what formerly was known as Providence.

3. The ultimate aim, purpose or goal of man can never be known; the idea of progress assumes "...a gradual movement forward, as gradual as you please,
toward an end that need not to be too precisely
defined" (Becker, Progress, p. 5).

4. Since the aim can never be known, the idea of
progress recognizes that all change takes place
by parts.

5. The idea of progress ignores the idea of man's
native depravity, the idea of original sin.

6. The idea of progress rests on man's faith in the
unlimited potentiality of his own intelligence.

7. Reform, therefore, is possible by remaking society;
intellectual insights may dissolve and reconstruct
the social contract.

8. Progress thus leads to an increasing complexity of
human life.

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18 The following books and articles are the sources for
this outline of the idea of progress:
Hannah Arendt, "History and Immortality," Partisan
Review, XXIV (1957), 11-35.
Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth
Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1942).
Progress and Power (New York, 1949).
Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York,
1956).
F. C. Green, Rousseau and the Idea of Progress (Oxford,
1950).
(Chicago, 1954).
Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, "Prolegomena" to
Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore,
1935).
Ernest Lee Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia (Berkeley, 1949).
Lois Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress
(Baltimore, 1934).
If we take these eight characteristics of the idea of progress as generally valid, Burke and Arnold oppose the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth of these. Although each places value on experience as a source of knowledge, we have no warrant to assume that the materials created out of experience have any facility in aiding man's own spiritual and moral growth, the real interests of the two writers. The laws of nature are not a separate body of rationally derived generalizations, but rather the tentative attempts to understand the laws of God and Providence. Ultimately, as Arnold realizes in his essay "Literature and Science," the question of humanization arises which the scientific Laws of Nature do not and can not consider. The previous chapter has shown that to each writer the past contains worthy ideals which man and society can entertain. The idea of perfection envisioned in Arnold's culture and Burke's prescription may not be a proper aim for society to the scientific sociologists, but on a general idea of expansion of man's spiritual and moral faculties, they can posit ideals "in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned" (III, 313). This ideal, I have shown, is not achieved by specific action of the rational mind upon concrete experience, but rather the "history of the race" in pursuance of its own instinct for beauty, knowledge, conduct, and manners. The rationalist proposes
certain specific aims; Ezra Cornell, for instance, founded a university for the purpose of making miners, engineers, or architects, not for spreading sweetness and light (C&A, p. 22). The rationalists' theory of progress, aside from its undoubted material benefit, merely multiplies the means of material enjoyment which, Arnold fears, will succeed only in vulgarizing the middle class as the enjoyment of these means have vulgarized the upper classes (A French Eton, p. 71). Although Arnold murmurs under his breath "Wragg is in custody" (recalling the newspaper story of the woman who murdered her own child after she was freed from a workhouse) to the enthusiastic expounder of England's commercial progress, his idea of "beneficence acting by rule" (the phrase is Burke's) cannot be limited to the low and material standard of well-being of socialistic and communistic schemes of social arrangement (ME, p. 70). The Englishman's faith in material progress is only another example to Arnold of the Englishman's willingness to accept machinery and to be blinded by the lure of immediate ends as the French were blinded by the immediate end of confiscating church lands.

But if the acceptance of increasing complexity is a hallmark of progress, then Arnold and Burke do at one point join the ranks of those defending progress. Lois Whitney shows that Burke surely accepts an idea of progress because
of his belief in the growing complexity of society, a growing complexity that any rational system of government could not undertake to reconstruct in the mind alone (Whitney, p. 204). Arnold too acknowledges that developing spiritual, intellectual, and moral abilities "is a very hard matter," but the very difficulty

is the sign and condition of each new stage of spiritual progress,--increase of task. The more we grow, the greater is the task which is given us. This is the law of man's nature and of his spirit's history. The powers we have developed at our old task enable us to attempt a new one; and this, again, brings with it a new increase of powers (St. F. and P., pp. xxxii-xxxiii).

Arnold longs for order and even simplicity from the multitudinousness of mid-nineteenth-century life, but a retreat to a simpler life is not a solution found in Arnold.

In another respect Burke and Arnold may seem to bend toward the Idea of Progress. Radical theories of progress implicitly hold to the belief that man is not natively depraved, that once he could lose his sense of sin, his perfection might be possible. Arnold's recognition of the ordinary self, and the corollary idea in Burke that government is made to control the passions of man, his ordinary self, insure that neither of these writers takes any sentimental view of mankind's goodness. But the better self is to control the ordinary self and government is to exercise its control over the passions of men. Are they not suggesting an idea of perfection, then, which is adjustable to
milder forms of progress?

A discussion of their attitude toward man's corruption requires considerable tact. Critics diverge in their opinions, and again, the aim for a "sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned" restricts easy judgment. Cobban writes,

For Burke the operation of Providence may be beneficial and God be justified of all His works, but in man is the root of evil. If conservatism be, as it has been called, distrust in human nature, then is Burke the arch-conservative. In his thought, ever religious at bottom, man is a creature bearing the taint of Original Sin—that frowardness, pride in self, and lust after innovation that came into being with Lucifer, prime father of Jacobins (Cobban, pp. 83-84).

On the other hand, another critic declares that Burke would have nothing to do with the overemphasis on original sin produced by the Protestant and Jansenistic theology and by what he considered the antirationality of some eighteenth-century thought. "It was precisely because of this firm conviction of the fundamental soundness of human nature as the real dynamic and true principle of genuine progress that Burke, throughout his life, protested with vigor and at times vehemently against all attempts at what he deemed hasty or ill-considered innovations."\(^{19}\)

The argument on Arnold's concept of sin is couched in different terms, but it comes to the same thing. Does Arnold accept the positive

revolutionary morality or does he accept a morality which represses mankind? Trilling claims that Arnold believes morality is essentially a check, a bridle, a renunciation (Trilling, p. 312). On the other hand, another critic declares we cannot "characterize the Arnoldian morality as repressive and narrow." 20

Burke saw the revolution releasing the baser elements in man, which require control, and making these its new virtues. The problem of the National Assembly, Burke writes, was to find a substitute for all of the moral principles which hitherto had regulated the human will and action. They found these in Rousseau's free and unrepressive morality. Burke has the reasoned conviction that man needs society to keep his animal nature in check. Thus all talk of rights leads only to the destruction of society. In his early Thoughts on the Present Discontents, he declares, "we must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt" (I, 471). On the basis of such wickedness in the world, George III and his cabal rationalized the king's attempt at a Stuart-type rule. Burke answers, "Men are in


21 Letter to a Member of National Assembly, IV, 26-27; Arnold quotes from this section in "Renan," EC3, p. 155, "Rousseau was your canon of holy writ," as an example of Burke's thinking and eloquence.
public life as in private, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other are the first objects of all true policy." Because he had faith in true policy, Burke has no overpowering sense of wickedness until the revolution shows him Rousseau's vanity, his holy writ, converted into a pattern of action. He writes against the French that "...men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of themselves, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue." Burke has little faith in man himself except when he acts in numbers and in time, but he also has none of the Protestant compulsion that all is predestined to utter destruction.

The sense of sin in Puritanism is, for Arnold, another facet of a Puritan fastening onto the letter of the law. Puritanism has never properly gone beyond a mechanical "sense of sin" (St. P. and P., p. 46) to see Saint Paul's true experiential conception of sin; rather it seizes upon his late, particular, and subordinate adaption of Genesis (Ibid., pp. 79-80). It is more correct to see that Paul

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22Reflections, III, 310. One cannot but wonder if this is the source of Arnold's highest moral power, the not ourselves in the matter. See L&D, p. 17.
"starts with the thought of a conscience void of offense" (Ibid., p. 36). In Culture and Anarchy Arnold wonders whether man is indeed a gentle and simple being, showing the traces of a noble and divine nature; or an unhappy and chained captive, labouring with groanings that cannot be uttered to free himself from the body of this death" (C&A, p. 136). But since the Hellene idea of nobility and divinity disappeared, the Hebrew idea of captivity must have greater reality. However, sin is "an impotence to be got rid of" rather than a "monster to be mused on" (St. P. and P., p. 46), as it is to the Puritans. On the other hand, the Just must expiate the sins of all men since man is habitually unrighteous and breaks the moral law carelessly and with a hard heart. The Just undergo hatred and persecution and step between man and his shortcomings "to save the ideal of human life and conduct from the deterioration with which men's ordinary practice threatens it" (Ibid., p. 92). Thus Arnold's morality never denies the necessity to repress the ordinary self as the Rousseauean morality did. The freedom of Arnold's moral doctrine is more properly his objection of the Puritan codification of the idea of sin into an absolute law.

Change can never, therefore, release man from his own propensity to do evil. Evil is present and a powerful force, no matter what extreme doctrines of progress
propound. But as moralists, Burke and Arnold believe that man has the choice to do good.

But if change does not acquire value by improving man's material condition, if the Law of Nature is not a superior thing as revealed by change, or if change can never hope ultimately to free man from his own sin and pride, Burke and Arnold do speak of change, reform, even progress of society. The next section shows why Burke and Arnold do need change in their view of society.

(c)

Both writers recognize change as a part of their understanding of society. In the first place, they see obviously that change has existed in the past. The change in the past, however, was not a rational operation of the mind but a growing and becoming by the continuous work through long stretches of time. They actively need change because "...liberties and (moral) restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications" (III, 310); or, in Arnold's language, the Zeitgeist is always a shifting factor. Since the time and circumstances are infinite, fixing oneself to an idea eventually destroys that idea, no matter what value it might have had in terms of its original circumstances. The old idea becomes the mere letter and no longer the spirit.
The ideas of prescription and culture presume an organic society which, since it has changed in the past, must continue to change. Burke recognizes that civil society does not exist merely as an instrument for realizing rights existing in the human mind. Society is an "institution of beneficence." It is made for the advantage of man, and it fulfills its task by the gradual comprehension of the conditions of civilized life as these have appeared to men in successive generations and as men have learned to translate conditions into the permanent record of institutions. Burke speaks of prescription as a principle of inheritance which not only gives to man the construction of the past but provides "a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement" (III, 274-275). By this use of the best that has been thought, and said, and done, man obtains "the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race[;] the whole, at one time is never old or middle-aged or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus...in what we improve we are never wholly new, in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete" (Ibid.).

Arnold's first quotation from Burke and one of his last (see Appendix) are used in support of the idea that
"We must all obey the great law of change" (IV, 301). In the essay "Democracy," (1861), Arnold begins his argument for State action of a type that is foreign to the immediate experience of his English audience. The great law of change requires, however, that the English lose their former concept of government's function.

For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the policy and character of governments and nations, as those which have been marked by the tumult of public revolutions.23

In his essay "The Zenith of Conservatism," published in January of 1887, Arnold once more urges change in the Burkean acceptance of the idea of change.

But vital and constructive reforms, such as may come from the party of stability and prominence --reforms which possess, as Burke finely says, "All the benefits which may be in change without any of the inconvenience of mutation," these the Conservatives must produce, or must at least show themselves capable of producing.24

The "great law of change" is included, of course, in Arnold's culture, for it consists "not in resting and being, but in

23ME, p. 2; Thoughts on the Present Discontents, I, 442. Burke's syntax causes confusion. He means that the silent lapse of events has brought as many alterations as have public revolutions.

24Nineteenth Century, XXI, 154; the quotation is from Burke's "Letter to Sir Hercules Langrish on the Roman Catholics of Ireland," IV, 301 (1792). Burke writes, "We must all obey the great law of change. It is the most powerful law of Nature, and the means, perhaps of its conservation. All that we can do, and that human wisdom can do, is to provide that the change shall proceed by insensible degrees. This has all the benefits which may be in change, without any of the inconveniences of mutation."
growing and becoming" (C&A, p. 90). The church likewise has reflected this law of change "in the natural evolution of its life and growth" (St. P. and P., p. 136).

Such an attitude toward change is required since, in both Burke and Arnold, time and circumstances created law in the first place. The time does not remain the same. Arnold speaks of the Zeitgeist, the time-spirit, which breathed upon Bishop Butler's Analogy, weakening its original power. Thus in both Burke and Arnold the word expediency acquires its meaning, that present circumstances must adjust and make their own law. Burke derived from Montesquieu the idea that if the letter of the law is not kept in spirit of current circumstances and modes of behavior, then stagnation and death result. The historical examination of Roman law taught Montesquieu that the laws should lie as near as possible to the actions to which they relate, but since the law cannot always do this, it must be changed from time to time. Burke, following Montesquieu, objects strenuously that the post-revolution Constitution in France was considered a fixed and final thing; it contained no principle of improvement to adjust to new conditions (Appeal, IV, 82). In the Reflections Burke does not justify the French

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25 Fletcher, Montesquieu, pp. 38, 77-78; for Arnold's discussion of expediency see "Equality," ME, pp. 62-63, but the point of the essay is that English inequality is no longer expedient.
monarchy but the old French constitution which was susceptible to change (Member of the National Assembly, IV, 47). We find Arnold objecting to the resistance to change just as Burke does. The middle classes attached themselves staunchly to "some fixed law of doing" which they could not relinquish to obtain "spontaneity of consciousness" to enlarge and enrich their understanding (C&A, pp. 145-146). They are no longer open to the new spirit of the time, to what is expedient to them in the nineteenth century. Since general human law cannot be fixed because the "human mind and human affairs are susceptible of infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly new and unlooked-for" (Policy of the Allies, IV, 469), then both writers must include an idea of change not only because it is in culture itself but because circumstances themselves change.

Furthermore, if an idea is fixed to a set of circumstances, it will be destroyed when the circumstances disappear. Or to state it in more specific terms, Burke saw that a State "without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation" (III, 259). Hanging grimly on to an idea will mean that it will be completely destroyed in a great cataclysm; thus the English changed in 1688, retaining the fabric of the society but changing the line of succession to the crown. Arnold, who considered his own time to be a time of change, of expansion, therefore urges
as "the first of virtues" in such a time "the openness and flexibility of mind" to admit change. The intelligent citizens will "recognize a period of transformation when it comes and...adapt themselves honestly and rationally to its law" (ME, p. 47). Burke calls the law of change "the most powerful law of Nature, and the means, perhaps, of its conservation" (IV, 301); in Arnold the Catholic Church has "followed a true instinct" in her idea of continuous development and her willingness to accept new growth as the time requires it (St., P., and P., p. 131).

This natural idea of change in Burke and Arnold involves, however, two corollary ideas. One is that the intervention of individuals or even a single individual may change the movement. The other is that such natural change is not an excuse for quietism (MacCunn, pp. 62-63). Both Falkland and Goethe illustrate these two corollaries. Both of them threw themselves into the task of changing the seeming movement of society. Neither wholly succeeded and yet each in his attempted intervention kept the way of natural development open (ME, pp. 232-233; EG 1, pp. 186-187). Goethe succeeded more than Falkland in changing the course of events but both illustrate the possible influence of the single individual. Both men, of course, represent the very opposite of quietism: Falkland gave his life, and Goethe became a minister of State. Opposition to quietism is
especially evident, too, in Arnold's late essays on politics, where his purpose is to enjoin the "quiet reflecting people" to exert an influence in government.

To both of these writers, then, change is part of the natural law of society. It is not, of course, a change of material things, but a change of the growing "spirit and moral quality" to adjust to new circumstances. As Burke writes in his 'Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,' a number of faults arise from the one source of "considering general maxims, without attending to circumstances, to times, to places, to conjunctures, and to actors. If we do not attend scrupulously to all these, the medicine of to-day, becomes the poison of tomorrow" (IV, 46).

(d)

The change which Burke and Arnold desire can only be based on recognition of the order and law existing in society. They distrust rational means of "innovation upon speculation" (IV, 237). Change, however, seems to make more efficient the institutions and principles that already exist. The power which enables man to adjust the demands of the present with the law of the past Burke calls prudence. In Arnold the adjustment is made by disinterestedness, the critical intelligence, or even, in one of its aspects, by culture itself.

The method of change demands, first, respect for the existing regulations of society. Both writers have a
profound respect for order. In "The Incompatibles" Arnold specifically connects his idea of change with that which he found in Burke.

For my part, I do not object, wherever I see disorder to see coercion applied to it...I do not agree with the orators of popular meetings, and I do not agree with some Liberals with whom I agree in general, I do not agree with them in objecting to apply coercion to Irish disorder, or to any other. Tumultuously doing what one likes is the ideal of the populace: it is not mine. True, concessions have often been wrung from governments only by the fear of tumults and disturbances, but it is an unsafe way of winning them, and concessions so won, as Burke has shown us, are never lucky. Unswerving firmness in repressing disorder is always a government's duty; so, too, is unswerving firmness in redressing injustice. It will be said that we have often governments firm enough in repressing disorder, who, after repressing it, leave injustice still unredressed. True; but it is our business to train ourselves, and to train public opinion, to make governments do otherwise, and do better. It is our business to bring them, not to be irresolute in repressing disorder, but to be both resolute in repressing disorder, and resolute, also, in redressing injustice.

Because the idea is so familiar in Burke, pinpointing an exact reference is difficult. In the Speech on Conciliation with America, Burke pleads for granting concessions in good time and warns that they cannot be granted at a late date:

The superior power may offer peace with honor and safety. Such an offer from such a power will be attributed to magnanimity. But the concessions of the weak are the concessions of fear. When such a one is disarmed, he is wholly at the mercy

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of his superior; and he loses forever that time and those chances which, as they happen to all man, are the strength and resources of all inferior power.27

Concession is made to preserve order; the preservation of order is as familiar in Arnold as in Burke. The very phrases that Arnold uses in "The Incompatibles" recall Culture and Anarchy. The phrase, "Tumultuously doing what one likes is the ideal of the populace: it is not mine," might be a sentence in the earlier book. In "The Function of Criticism" Arnold speaks on a text from Joubert and uses it as a transition into his comment on Burke: "C'est la force et le droit qui règlent toutes choses dans le monde; la force en attendant le droit" (FC1, p. 14). What Burke sees in the revolution is that the moral right of "le droit" is not ready. It is not ready in Ireland, and until it is, coercion must be applied to the disorder that exists.28

The right method of change is not a rational renovation but a renovation made by improving what already exists.

27II, 108; see also II, 117-118. In his speech on economic reform Burke says a wise government is one that knows "the best time and manner of yielding what it is impossible to keep" (II, 278-279); or, he writes, "Early reformations are amicable arrangements with a friend in power; late reformations are made under a state of inflammation" and are therefore unsuccessful (II, 280).

28For other evidence of the concept of order in the two writers see Cobban, p. 80; Fletcher, p. 79; in Arnold see C&A, pp. 82, 139-140; EC1, p. 54; "Obermann," EC3, p. 116; and "Renan," EC3, p. 155, where he quotes Burke on the idea.
The method of change might be called "efficiency change" since it aims at making more operative the existing order of things. Burke writes, for instance, that a good patriot 

"...always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of his country" (Reflections, III, 440). Thus, in the spirit of true reform, the English revolutionists of 1688 did not "dissolve the whole fabric" of their society but rather "regenerated the deficient part of the old Constitution through the parts which were not impaired" (III, 259). In his Letter to a Noble Lord Burke asserts, "Reform is not a change in the substance or in the primary modification of the objection, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is removed, all is sure. It stops there; and if it fails, the substance which underwent the operation, at the very worst, is but where it was" (V, 186). Burke is convinced that the French Revolution might have been prevented, or at least its extreme might have been prevented, had the French made an economic reform under their old system. Preserving their old constitution, with its venerable foundations, they might have built upon those foundations.

This same respect for the fabric of society and a reform which will not damage that fabric but make it more efficient and more useful is characteristic of Arnold's conception of change. For instance, at the very beginning of the essay on "Democracy" where he begins his argument
for State action, Arnold admits that he is going "counter to an opinion firmly held by a great body" of Englishmen, and he takes for granted "that for any opinion which has struck deep roots among a people so powerful, so successful, and so well worthy of respect as the people of this country, there certainly either are, or have been, good and sound reasons" (ME, pp. 1-2). His desire is always to preserve what exists and only change it when change is necessary for the very preservation of the old order. Great subversive changes in education, for example, would be out of place. The English very properly keep their old public establishments for education; what is required is an "addition of new" and "not a demolition of old" (French Eton, pp. 44-45). Arnold's hero Falkland was a "born constitutionalist, a hater of all that is violent and arbitrary" (ME, p. 213). Falkland changed from the Puritan side of the struggle during the Commonwealth to the Court side because he thought the Crown had a greater power or purchase for "renovation" than did the opposition (ME, p. 231). Even Arnold's specific social reforms--wider education, spread of local government, and equality--are little more than attempts to make reform by making more efficient what already exists.

The reform, then, which Burke and Arnold desire is made by a fine balance between the principles which come from the past and the expediency of the present. It is not
chiefly a rational change, but it certainly contains qualities of mind which only a few men can possess. In Burke the adjustment is made by prudence. In Arnold a disinterested study precedes judgment to create "a current of true and fresh ideas" (EC¹, p. 23). Prudence also requires such study. The critical intelligence created by culture makes adjustment which prudence makes in Burke.

Prudence first and simply, as we would expect from an English political figure, "is founded on compromise and barter" (Conciliation, II, 169), but it is not entirely compromise and barter on practical things as Arnold makes clear his idea of disinterest in "The Function of Criticism" (EC¹, p. 24). Burke defines the criteria of prudence as "purity and disinterestedness in politics" (Economic Reform, II, 280-281). As the first in rank of political and moral virtues, prudence "would be neuter" (Appeal, IV, 80; Reflections, III, 443). It attempts chiefly to see things as they really are (to use Arnold's phrase) and to understand them in order to make judgment. Falkland looked at the wars of the Commonwealth with prudence and Arnold looks at mid-century England in the same way.

A second quality of prudence is the knowledge which it obtains by its disinterested study of politics. It may be allowed to the temperament of the true lawgiver who has prudence, Burke writes, "to catch his ultimate object with an intuitive glance" but "his movements towards it ought
to be deliberate" (Reflections, III, 456). Burke says further that the decisions of prudence "are determined on the more or the less, the earlier or the later, and on a balance of advantages and inconveniences, of good and evil" ("First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe," IV, 251).

Arnold claims that right ought to govern change but that until it can, force must. "But right," he continues, "is something moral, and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will" (EC*, p. 14). In his less disinterested criticism, his remarks on Bishop Colenso's tract on the Bible, Arnold makes perfectly clear that his critical intelligence is the ability, which few individuals have, to tell what is prudent in right, what should have the free assent of the will (Oxford Essays, pp. 441-442). This ability to tell whether information or knowledge is truly edifying, that is whether it depends on a balance of advantages and disadvantages, few men have because they do not have the prudence to make deliberate movements toward the ultimate object of change. Spinoza and A. P. Stanley for Arnold have this prudent intelligence to make the adjustment of ideas with information.

Prudence, disinterest, and the critical intelligence produces a reform which is fully cognizant of the value of institutions. Burke speaks of the revolution that he desires for Ireland as "a revolution in the nature of a
restoration." Change and reform are little more than stating the principles of the past in terms of the new conditions. Vaughan protests that Burke's reform means no more than "Propose nothing but what is already in practice" (Vaughan, II, 24). The statement is not quite accurate since Burke did propose reforms for Ireland—toleration of the Catholics, for instance—which were not in practice and rarely had been; but the tendency in both these writers is to make reform a matter of adjusting to experience and therefore a matter of proposing what is in practice. Any other means is reform on a priori grounds, a change like that of the proponents of the Idea of Progress.

iii

Although the concepts of change which Burke and Arnold possess are similar, there are, of course, conspicuous differences between the two writers in emphasis. Burke's prudence never becomes a motto for change as Arnold's kindred disinterestedness, critical intelligence, and culture do, and this circumstantial lack in Burke signalizes the most apparent difference between the two writers. Burke lived in a world rioting with change; therefore his effort was to keep change within the bounds of experience. Arnold, on the other hand, conceived his enemy as the average Englishman with the mission "of keeping things settled, and much as they are...instead of leading himself to the
onward-looking statesman and legislator" (French Eton, p. 60). As a consequence, Arnold preaches culture, disinterestedness, and critical intelligence as qualities which would produce change. Burke's prudence, although he calls it the most important of political virtues, is almost totally obscured by his aim to force violent change back into bounds. Since Burke succeeded too well, Arnold seeks a disinterested evaluation of customs and habits in the light of the critical intelligence and culture to see which customs must be abandoned. Arnold, in short, must use prudence to test the new and old as Burke never had to.

Another distinction between the two writers in this idea of change is that Arnold is more optimistic about change than Burke. Arnold has his doubts about the confidence of "our liberal practitioners," but since he does see some possibility of instituting the rule of right reason and culture, he appears to be more optimistic than Burke, who saw no great result from general social change except preservation. Burke doubts, for instance, that any governmental change will really succeed in helping the lot of man. Did the Revolution help the Frenchman? Burke shows in the Reflections that French wealth has actually declined because of attempted management of finances. Arnold did see social advantages from the changes effected by the French Revolution. Changing the laws of primogeniture, instituting local
government, and improving the school system would signifi-
cantly aid, according to Arnold, the humanization of man in
society. Arnold, in short, sought improvement in social
welfare laws. Burke, on the other hand, has a record of
temporizing in the reform movements with which he was
connected and in keeping reform as much as possible in the
realm of present practice. The plans for economic reform,
for extension of the franchise, for relief of dissenters,
for abolishing the slave trade—in all of these movements
Burke exerted a braking force. He would go no further than
present circumstances demanded. Arnold is not so much con-
strained by the demands of present circumstances as he is
impelled by present intelligence. Burke would be horrified,
one feels, at Arnold's plan to expropriate the bad Irish
landlords even though Arnold justifies the suggestion on the
Burkean grounds that only through such expropriation could
a true and lasting prescription take hold in Ireland.

Although Burke's expediency (that is, his recogni-
tion of present change) worked well as long as he was will-
ing to interpret expediency in the light of "reason,
humanity, and justice," he did lose sight of his higher and
humane principle, according to C. E. Vaughan, to fight for
a system (Vaughan, II, 23-24). Or, to put it in other terms,
if truth may be conceived as a fire within a temple, Burke
(especially in reaction from the Revolution) valued the
temple more than the fire itself (Fletcher, pp. 78-79).

Although Arnold praises Burke for his freedom from the pedantry of English politics (*ME, IE, and Others*, p. 296), he maintains, "The old order of things had not the virtue which Burke supposed" and the Revolution, on the other hand, "had not the banefulness which he supposed." Burke represents concentration, and he harmed English thought by making "concentration too dominant an idea." He is, therefore, "of little help" in a time of expansion (Russell, *Letters*, II, 192).

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A comparison of the ideas of change held by these two writers shows that Arnold leans toward a Burkean notion of change and away from nineteenth-century Liberalism's idea of it as represented in the idea of progress. In the first place, Arnold's change is a change based on existing and operating law rather than a change based on a law by hypothesis. We see this most clearly in *Culture and Anarchy* when he excoriates the Liberals who failed to uphold the existing English law. According to the rational thinking of Liberalism, an Englishman has a perfect right to do as he likes. But Liberalism in failing to say that an Englishman has the right to do what he likes as long as his doing is in keeping with "right reason, authority, and light" is relying not on true existing law, but law which exists only
on the basis of a rational affirmation of a *priori* truth. Arnold's willingness to use coercion in Hyde Park and in Ireland further support the contention that he tended away from Liberal ideals in his respect for existing law. Arnold's attacks upon Liberalism regularly stem from this two-handed Burkean objection: they neither enforce nor do they reconstruct on the solid ground of experience.

His belief that coercion and force must be paralleled with "healing measures" (to use a phrase derived from Burke) impels him toward some aspects of the Liberal movement. In opposing the Liberals, he notes that they do not supply the "healing measures" any more than the root and branch conservative who conceives that in keeping order all is satisfied.

Also, Arnold's willingness to grant weight to the past in making change separates him from the Liberal willingness to abandon institutions for the sake of rational schemes. We will see this especially in Arnold's opposition to Liberal programs for the Church. We see it also in his opposition to Home Rule for Ireland. Arnold's favorite argument, and it was a common argument, was that Wales and Scotland could just as easily be given home rule as Ireland. The past does not justify such action. In his political program Arnold is empirical rather than rational. He must rely on past experience as the Liberal never does.
While Arnold does admit the possibility of forming and directing change by means of culture and right reason, his refusal to make history in the light of rational principles takes him away from the Liberals. Thus, Arnold objects to the Member of Parliament who regrets that youth is now no longer willing and anxious to remake society and its institutions on the basis of first principles (EO, p. 41). He refuses to accede to rational plans for remaking English church laws. He rejects Renan's attempt to resurrect the Bourbon monarchy on rational grounds. Therefore, he is convinced that the English people will work its way out of its problems by "those great qualities which it has at bottom,—piety, integrity, good-nature, and good-humour" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 301; Letter to a Noble Lord, V, 204-205).

Since the change that Arnold and Burke envision retains its forms, each has, therefore, a somewhat conservative impulse to call all real reform an actual reform of the individual. This may be called conservative because of its assumption that nothing is wrong with society itself but with the individual. Arnold's use of progress to signify individual growth rather than historical change admits this attitude. At the beginning of "An Unregarded Irish Grievance" Arnold quotes a long paragraph from a letter Burke
wrote to a Catholic priest in Ireland in 1797. In this letter Burke advises the middle class of Ireland to concern itself more with reforming itself than with reforming its mode of government. Such a reform "will be sure and slow in its operation, but...certain in its effect." Arnold uses the quotation at the head of an essay in which he continues his argument for a broader educational system for the middle class; the Irish grievance is the poor educational system.  Arnold's educational goals, his desire to humanize and and civilize the middle classes in both England and Ireland, stem from this somewhat conservative attitude that real reform grows not by changing the forms of society but by changing the men in the society. Later I will show (in chapter VI) that the concept of the individual is that of an individual subservient to the State; this emphasis that Burke and Arnold place on the individual is not the Liberal emphasis which gives the separate personality freedom to operate in every direction of its ordinary self. Arnold, rather, seeks to develop the individual for his

29The letter appears in Volume IV, 400 of the 1844 edition of Burke's Correspondence. Arnold quotes the letter also in his "General Note-Books, No. 1," The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold, p. 491, and he prints it in his edition of Burke.

30"An Unregarded Irish Grievance," ME, IE, and Others, pp. 334-335. The title is somewhat misleading. The grievance is only contemporaneously unregarded since Burke's "First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe" covers exactly the same ground and points out that the real injustice of the English Penal Laws is their effect on Irish education.
role in society.

Ernst Cassirer in his *The Myth of the State* brilliantly explains that modern totalitarian conservatism results from the conviction of a people that rational means can no longer provide for the organization of society. Therefore, a people turns to a mythical concept which relieves it of the necessity of choice or thought. Cassirer has nothing to say about a conservatism which, reacting also from "arid rationalism," turns rather to a cultivation of individual perfection. The change will thus be reflected in society by the influence of the man of culture who realizes that "very inadequate ideas will always satisfy" the mass of mankind (p. 29), but who attempts to spread his idea of culture, admitting its rational and irrational qualities, ever more broadly through a society. Especially in his poetry, Arnold yearns for a myth to encompass the multitudinousness of life, but in his criticism he seeks a resolution. As the next chapter will show, Arnold achieves his resolution in the State, but it is not a mythic state in the sense that Cassirer is using the term. It is a state which incorporates the collective best self of its people; its mythic self is merely an expression of the collective ordinary self given a spiritual aura of grace.

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The most apparent literary effect of Arnold's concept of change is that he must reject human and rational ends for literature as he must reject human and rational ends for society. The reader sees this most clearly in Arnold's Lectures on Homer, but the idea is apparent in his criticism of Wordsworth and the Wordsworthians. The Wordsworthians have an end for their idol—a philosophic poet—and they will exert every effort to effect that end.

In a note to his "Last Words on Translating Homer" Arnold answers a critic who can "comprehend revolution in this meter (i.e., the hexameter), but not reform" (Oxford Essays, p. 406). Arnold sounds very much like Burke on the French who comprehend revolution but not reform. Arnold continues, also in a characteristically Burkean manner, to suggest that English hexameters should be governed not by a theory of hexameters but by actual English practice. Hexameters should "read themselves" (Ibid., p. 407).

But here too the same balance is needed as in a discussion of his political attitudes. Change must be accepted. The Greek and Elizabethan styles are models of excellence, but no writer can servilely copy them. Ruth Goldmark has severely criticized Arnold's own attempts to recreate the Greek forms in nineteenth-century England because they use so many non-Greek elements as to be
Arnold regularly introduces a nineteenth-century introspection into his characters which is inappropriate to the Greek form and which is actually a little bit ludicrous. Without defending Arnold's poetic failures, I feel that Arnold himself might have been pleased with the criticism. He did not attempt an ultra-conservative recreation of ancient means; he used ancient forms for his nineteenth-century ideas. In addition, he criticizes English drama for its over dependence on the Elizabethan. The Romantics, as a school, needed a better criticism to give them a fresh current of new ideas. As with political questions, change and development is necessary in literary work also; therefore, no writer can merely imitate what his predecessors have done. "The present has to make its own poetry, and not even Sophocles and his compeers, any more than Dante and Shakespeare, are enough for it," he writes (EC¹, p. 257). We notice, also, his statement in his essay on "Johnson's Lives":

It is a people's growth in practical life, and its native turn for developing this life and for making progress in it, which awakens the desire for a good prose—a prose plain, direct, intelligible, serviceable... (Thus) the eighteenth century accomplished for us an immense literary progress. (EC³, pp. 203, 209).

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The changes brought upon inexplicably by time itself must always govern the writer in time: that writer is best who is fully conscious of the organic nature of literary practice. His literary theory is made by knowing the best that has been thought and said, and by this knowledge he forms the standards and principles of his own practice.

In summary, although the mechanistic and materialistic idea of progress repels both Burke and Arnold, their organic view of society includes change. Their change aims to make more efficient the existing institutions of society by adjusting the institutions to new circumstances. The power to adjust to change is prudence in Burke and culture, the critical intelligence, or disinterestedness in Arnold. Because prudence is a constraining force but Arnold's terms liberating forces and because Arnold imports more into the vortex of experience, Arnold allows more change than Burke. However, since both "propose nothing that is not already in practice," Arnold is still conservative in his change. His literary method also reflects his conservatism, for it opposes rational ends for literature and criticism. Significantly, Arnold says little about literary experimentalism; his literary form and his criticism are based on practice rather than on theory or experiment. As with his use of history and his basic assumptions, Arnold's thought is permeated with Burkean parallels, and it looks toward the institution as the stable unit in society to handle change.
CHAPTER V

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE STATE

An idea of the State or Community dominates Arnold's political and social criticism. The State visibly embodies the past; the State is the organ of change. The State controls and expresses the Church and the individual. Arnold's concept of the leader and his ideas about colonial management depend on his definition of the State. But most important, Arnold defines the State, in Burke's terms, as the "nation in its collective and corporate character."¹

Despite Arnold's repeated use of the Irish Parliamentarian's definition of the State, he could have gained his concept of the State from sources other than Burke. Most apparently, Arnold's father and the Liberal Anglican school of historians have an idea of the State which is analogous to Burke's idea. G. W. E. Russell and Benjamin

¹Arnold uses the phrase some sixteen times in his essays. Although Burke uses both the words collective and corporate in describing the State, he nowhere uses the exact phrase that Arnold credits him with here. The closest statement comes in the Appeal, IV, 169-170 and in the Reflections, III, 359, 361. For Arnold's use see Appendix.
Lippincott declare that the classics strongly influenced Arnold's understanding of the State. If Arnold was shaky in his knowledge of history (as G. Tillotson claims), he did know his own time; therefore, he might have gained an idea of the State from reading Renan, de Tocqueville, or Hegel. And finally, Arnold's own experience on the Continent taught him something about State action.

Thomas Arnold is manifestly a source for his son's idea of state action. Writing to his mother in February of 1864 just after the first two parts of A French Eton had appeared, Arnold maintains, "In my notions about the State I am quite papa's son, and his continuator" (Letters, I, 263). Trilling states that Arnold picks up his father's great theme of the State in "Democracy" (1861). Duncan Forbes finds that the element separating the Liberal Anglican historians from the Enlightenment is their "finding political salvation in emphasizing the unity of all aspects of the nation's life. The nation for them was a whole, not a collection of individual units, nor divided into lay and clerical departments."2

Burke and Arnold have been called Christian humanists; as such they share a tradition of thought in England since the sixteenth century. Arnold refers his readers to

Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* in *Culture and Anarchy* and the religious books allude to the Cambridge Platonists. How much Burke actively imbibed from this tradition, it is almost impossible to tell since the use of authority to buttress arguments is foreign to Burke's method. In a speech on Protestant Dissenters he refers to "Hooker and all the great lights of the Church" to support an Erastian argument (VII, 30), but such references are not typical.

On the other hand, the Fordham critics place Burke's sources in medieval political thought. Millar finds strong similarities between Burke and Suarez, the last of the medieval philosophers, and Burke quotes Suarez in his early "Tract on the Popery Laws" (VI, 325). From the evidence of his *Abridgment of English History*, Burke knew the political life of the middle ages, but he does not speak of political theory specifically in that book. On the other hand, Arnold's knowledge of the middle ages seems limited to the *Imitation* and a few religious writers. Again, firm generalization is impossible because of the penchant of both writers to rely upon experience rather than authorities.

Furthermore, the concept of the State in three continental writers, Renan, de Tocqueville and Hegel, resembles Burke's concept. Yet G. M. Young alleges that Burke is a

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provincial writer whose thought had no influence outside of England. Nineteenth-century intellectuals searched for a means to bind up the splintering effects of the French Revolution and post-revolutionary democratic movements since the age demanded an antithesis to the "vulgar democrat's...

principle réduisant tout à contenir les volontés matérielles des foules" (EC³, p. 177). Fortuitously the antithesis resembles Burke in some cases (even though Burke thought of his own work as a synthesis). Arnold finds in Renan a "similarity of the point of view (with Burke which) strikes the reader in almost every page" (EC³, p. 154), but Arnold has no evidence that Renan ever read Burke beyond the fact that both believe the rights of history do more for society than the rights of man, that the mere will of the majority is an insufficient basis for government, and that France needs aristocratic and monarchic institutions (EC³, pp. 156-157). Quite clearly Renan need not have "held Burke in his hands" to express such Burkean ideas. But the idea of a State exists in Renan, and Arnold's reading lists show that he read Renan throughout his career as political and social critic.

The possible relationship between Arnold and de Tocqueville is more interesting. Harold Laski writes that

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⁴Spectator, 5 July 1940, p. 18.
de Tocqueville "goes back to Burke, and particularly to that
side of Burke which Montesquieu so profoundly shaped."
Laski compares the Reflections and the Democracy in America
and maintains that, although different in temperament,
"Burke and de Tocqueville would have agreed in basic
desires." J. Dover Wilson offers the hypothesis that "it
was probably de Tocqueville who sent (Arnold) back with re-
newed zest to Burke." Unfortunately, although the
hypothesis is tantalizing, little evidence supports it.
Arnold twice quotes Democracy in America in "Democracy,"
but in making the statement Wilson ignores Arnold's comment
in "A Word more about America":

It is now a long while since I read M. de Tocque-
ville's famous work on Democracy in America. I
have the highest respect for M. de Tocqueville;
but my remembrance of his book is that it deals
too much in abstractions for my taste, and that
it is written, moreover, in a style which many
French writers adopt, but which I find trying--
a style cut into short paragraphs and wearing an
air of rigorous scientific deduction without the
reality (Civilisation in the United States, pp.
111-112).

The book is not in Arnold's reading lists until 1885, but
the notebook for 1883 contains two quotations from the
chapter on "Why the Americans are so restless in the Midst

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Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw
of Their Prosperity." The reading lists for 1853 and 1854 include de Tocqueville's *Louis XV,* and in 1862 Arnold listed the *Ancien Régime* and the *Memoirs.* But the most persuasive evidence is that offered by the tone of the first two of the *Mixed Essays,* "Democracy" (1861) and "Equality" (1878). The two essays almost restate the opening pages of de Tocqueville's book on America. Both writers argue for and accept the historical growth that leads toward democracy; both demand a middle way between a return to the past and acceptance of Liberal speculations; both see the necessity of education to train the democracy to its new task; and both see the State as the power to replace the vanishing aristocratic and monarchic institutions. The need of propertied equality (not in Burke) which is virtually the thesis of de Tocqueville is repeated in Arnold's essay "Equality." And finally, in a letter written to Richard Cobden early in 1864, Arnold links both names in a way to suggest that the men were connected in his mind.

I most entirely agree with you that the condition of our lower class is the weak point of our civilisation and should be the first object of our interest, but one must look, as Burke says, for a power or purchase to help one in dealing with such matters, and I find it nowhere but in an improved middle class.

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I believe, with de Tocqueville, that the multitude is most miserable in countries where there is a great aristocracy and I believe that in modern societies a great aristocracy is a retarding and stupefying element, but our aristocracy will not modify itself and English society along with itself.

The relationship between Burke, Hegel, and Arnold is even more baffling than these other two. As with Kant, the only mention of Hegel in Arnold's notebooks comes from a French encyclopedia. Ernst Cassirer, unfortunately, seems not to have read Burke. His discussion of Hegel in his *Myth of the State* does not include Burke at all. Although a critic declares Hegel's "emphasis on the organic growth of the State was quite analogous to certain theories developed by Burke in England" (Barksdale, p. 101), direct

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8. W. H. G. Armitage, "Matthew Arnold and Richard Cobden in 1864: Some Recently Discovered Letters," *RES, XXV* (1949), 251-252. The Burke allusion is to *Reflections, III*, 440. For the de Tocqueville reference see Phillips Bradley's edition of *Democracy in America*, I, 24. Arnold quotes the sentence in "Democracy," *ME*, p. 12. To Arnold the French have succeeded better in organizing democracy than the English or Americans. To the French writer, the Americans have succeeded at least in organizing their society. De Tocqueville, however, while he is interested in the human problem, devotes most of his space to the technical problem of government. Arnold finds the human problem his greatest concern. Arnold makes the distinction himself in "A Word More About America," *Civilization in the United States*, p. 152, when he writes, "the human problem, at least, is not well solved in the United States, whatever the political and social problem may be."

intellectual connection between Burke and Hegel is impossible to establish just as an intellectual relationship between Hegel and Arnold is impossible. Cassirer writes, in his discussion of "Hegel's Theory of the State," that "if reality must be defined in terms of history rather than in terms of nature, and if the state is the prerequisite of history, it follows that we have to see in the state the supreme and most perfect reality. No political theory before Hegel ever proposed this." If no theory had proposed this, Burke's practice, with his emphasis on experience as the revelation of the divine tactic, suggests much the same thing. While Burke never explicitly calls the state the "supreme and most perfect reality," much of his practice (as the following chapter will show) leads in that direction. Cassirer even objects to Hegel's rejection of philosophy as a method of reform in much the same way that a modern might object to Burke's theory of change. According to Hegel, philosophy "has simply to accept and to explain the given historical situation and to bow down before it. In this case philosophy would be nothing but a sort of speculative idleness" (Cassirer, p. 372).

With Hegel, as with Renan and de Tocqueville, the evidence chiefly points to the fact that the age discussed

the idea of the State in many forms. Had Arnold not read
Renan, de Tocqueville, or Hegel, he might have caught their
ideas from the periodicals he read. Renan, for instance,
sanctifies Hegelian into an honorific adjective.

Discussing the influences which shaped Arnold's
criticism of democracy, Benjamin Lippincott argues that
Arnold's concept of the State derived as much from his educa-
tional missions to the continent as anything else. 11
Arnold's school reports, however, for the years 1852-1858
show an awareness of state action in the schools before his
first educational mission in 1859. In his report for 1853
Arnold writes, "But it is my firm conviction, that education
will never, anymore than vaccination, become universal in
this country, until it is made compulsory." 12 The "Fragment
of an 'Antigone'" and "The Sick King in Bokhara," both
published in the 1849 collection of poems, echo "Burke and
Wordsworth commenting on democratic rationalism" and the
belief that the "man who is linked to family or group stands

11 Benjamin Evans Lippincott, Victorian Critics of
Democracy (Minneapolis, [1938]), p. 102. For Arnold's
ideas of democracy, Lippincott specifies Thomas Arnold, his
knowledge of the classics, Oxford, and his aristocratic
contacts in addition to Burke. He also suggests that Mill
and de Tocqueville may have strengthened his ideas.

12 Matthew Arnold's Reports on Elementary Schools, 1852-
not only with other men but with divine forces."\(^{13}\) Arnold, on the other hand, himself supports Lippincott's contention that he learned his concept of the State on his educational missions. Nothing struck him more than the lack of English governmental organization, Arnold writes, "on my return to England after seeing the Continental schools for the people, and the communal basis on which everything rested" (ME, p. 141).

Again, both Arnold and Burke lie in the same general tradition of thought on the state. From Burke the thought runs to Coleridge and Wordsworth, to Thomas Arnold, to Matthew Arnold. Both have a common background in classical studies of the state. Whether Burke had any influence in shaping continental ideas in the State is unclear, but Arnold does see the connection between continental practice and Burke's practice.

Both Burke and Arnold define the State in the same way and both see it to have a similar function. To consider first the nature of the State, they define it first as the expression in time of the whole character of its people.

Second, to use Arnold's term, the State is the best self of its people. But the question arises, who are the people? Although Burke describes the State as the representative acting force for the whole people, he limits the actual "people" in the State who have the right to direct its action as somewhere between 35,000 and 400,000 individuals. Arnold has no numbers, but since the will of the people is not determined by a mere telling of heads, his attitude implicitly restricts the direction of the State, just as Burke does, to those who have sufficient culture to direct State policy. Because it is the best self, the State establishes the ideal of action in time against the particular desires and wants of the isolated individual, the ordinary self. It is the institution, therefore, through which change can be made. Third, in addition to the very practical reason discussed in the previous chapter that change cannot be made unless the changer fully respects the changes and institutions of the past, the State merits its strong authority because it defines the area where thought functions. Since the State is the collective best self of its people, its thought should be directed, therefore, toward that institution from which the people derive their liberty and perfection; the idea of liberty in the State is, consequently, an idea of duty. To achieve its perfection and the citizen's liberty, the State must represent and
dominate, by definition, all of its elements—the Church, education, and all other subordinate corporations.

But in addition to speaking of the nature of the State, Burke and Arnold also speak of the positive function of the state. Fourth, continuing the numbering from the previous paragraph, the State educates its people by its very action. It gives them contact, for example, with the larger affairs of life. Fifth, the State has as its function the control (but not the direction) of the formal education provided by the subordinate corporations. And sixth, the State serves as a disinterested court of review.

(a)

Although both writers define the State as the expression of the whole character of a nation, they praise the community rather than any abstract formulation of the state. The distinction must be observed since totalitarian states have rationalized and justified their existence on the grounds that they truly expressed the will of the people. As Arnold writes in *Culture and Anarchy*, we must "rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community; the State." Burke, too, uses the word *community* for *State*. In his famous justification of the State as that element which prevents men from being "as the flies of the summer," Burke writes that men are not at liberty "on their speculations of a contingent improvement...to separate and tear asunder
As these statements imply, the community is contributive rather than dominative. It is made up from its elements; it is not constructed by an application of ideas to materials. Its form grows out of its very contents ("Speech on Reform of the Commons," VII, 95). "It consists," Burke asserts, "in a great measure, in the ancient order into which we are born. We may have the same geographical situation, but another country; as we may have the same country in another soil" (Appeal, IV, 166-167). In the Reflections Burke says that if society is a contract, it is a contract quite unlike that for "a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern." It is rather "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (Reflections, III, 359). As a partnership it takes its validity from the materials out of which it is made. The State, Burke contends,

is wholly artificial, and made, like all other legal fictions, by common agreement. What the particular nature of that agreement was is collected from the form into which the particular society has been cast. Any other is not their covenant. When men, therefore, break up the original compact or agreement which gives its corporate form and capacity to a state, they are
no longer a people,—they have no longer a
corporate existence...They are a number of
vague, loose individuals, and nothing more.
With them all is to begin again. Alas! they
little know how many a weary step is to be
taken before they can form themselves into a
mass which has a true politic personality
(Appel, IV, 169-170).

On the basis of these statements from Burke, Arnold declares
that "The State is properly just what Burke called it; the
nation in its collective and corporate character" (ME, p.
42). It is the natural and historical Geist which a middle
class must substitute for its claptrap.

In Arnold the community, or the State, represents
the collective best self of the people. In the Reflections
Burke sees it as a power to achieve great human ends. The
Englishman has not been able to use the idea of the State
"as a working power" because the Englishman habitually
lives in his ordinary self. Therefore, he fears, quite
properly, the ordinary self of any one of the classes. The
ordinary self of the Barbarian has no covenant. "But by our
best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony. We are in
no peril from giving authority to this, because it is the
truest friend we all of us can have" (C&A, p. 96). The
partnership in all science, art, and in every virtue and
perfection becomes, Arnold says, the organ of the collective
best self, and of the national right reason; it is therefore
the growth from the minds of its citizens and not an object
imposed upon them.
Although the State reflects the growth from the minds of its citizens, it does not operate by mere ballot. Burke writes in the *Reflections* that "All contrivances by ballot we know experimentally to be vain and childish to prevent a discovery of inclinations" (III, 507), and Arnold finds the similarity between Burke and Renan to be the realization that "the mere will of the majority is an insufficient basis for government" (pp. 156-157). The attitude is necessary since the function of government is to express the best self and not the will and appetite of the ordinary self which a ballot is apt to record. The method of discovering the inclinations of a people Burke uses is a virtual representation "in which there is a communion of interests and sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose names they act" ("Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe," IV, 293). He defines those who can represent the people of a nation first as 35,000 (*Policy of the Allies*, IV, 421-422) and later as 400,000 (*Regicide Peace I*, V, 284-285). Such a representation cannot exist, however, unless it has "a substratum in the actual representation" and his prime objection to the English Penal Laws against Irish Catholics is that they wholly keep the Irish from having any actual influence in government (IV, 293). The people as a whole have a very accurate judgment
of practical oppression, Burke writes, but they ought to
be excluded totally from the council of men who seek to
find the appropriate remedy for oppression since they have
little reason, their passions are ungoverned, and they lack
information and property to grant them a right to speak in
the nation's assembly (IV, 281-282).

Arnold does not indulge in Burke's arithmetic, but
implicit in his political writing is a limitation upon those
who construct the positive policy of government. The
Minister of the Crown, who in effect represents the collec-
tive best self of the people, acts under the "control" of
Parliament "aided by the suggestions of public opinion"
(ME, p. 43). He is, then, the virtual representative of
the people as a whole, but he is a member of that cultured
group of men whom Arnold is desirous of elevating to power
in the State. Arnold often doubts the ability of the mass
of men to absorb and use the ideas which he recommends for
his culture and criticism, but he believes the right reason
will guide even the masses that have not the reason, the
governed passions, or the information to rule, if they trust
their superiors. His educated middle class may acquire
sufficient of that power to exercise a third force in the
State to insure the right ideals.
(b)

The State, as the collective best self, establishes the ideal of best self in time against the particular demands of the individual. By its definition, the State serves the people, enabling them to bring to maturity "designs that require time in fashioning, and which propose duration when they are accomplished" (III, 441). The State connects the individual to time and it contributes to that same individual the advantages from time. Thus the principles of rational action become habits of the people.

Because the community reflects and expresses the whole character of the nation, it establishes the collective wisdom or the collective best self of a people in time. To Burke the state is ordained by God for establishing it, and Arnold, too, uses the words consecrate and sacred when he speaks of the State. We consecrate the state, Burke writes, "to avoid...the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice" (Reflections, III, 358). The state is the core around which tradition or culture builds. Arnold calls the state sacred because it does express our best self and because it avoids the "vulgar, and unstable, and contentious, and ever-varying" (C&A, p. 204). It is this power which links man not only with other men but with divine forces. Arnold has such respect for his national
tradition that he will not go contrary to it to argue for one of his favorite ideas, the academy. England will not have an Academy because "nations have their own modes of acting, and these modes are not easily changed; they are even consecrated, when great things have been done in them" (EC1, p. 90).

In the conclusion to Culture and Anarchy Arnold contends the state is requisite in a modern society "if man is to bring maturity anything precious and lasting now" (C&A, p. 204). Under the aegis of the state, criticism establishes the best that has been thought and said in a nation's history. This idea is another expression of Burke's prescription, his idea that long usage mellows a practice and modifies it to form it into law. The idea regularly appears in Arnold's statements about education. He argues that giving the schools for the middle classes a public character "can bring the instruction in them under a criticism which the stock of knowledge and judgment in our middle classes is not of itself at present able to supply" (ME, pp. 34-35). Giving the schools this national character will enable them to bring to maturity a precious and lasting benefit. The "Literary Influence of Academies" has as its great theme the utility of a national criticism which no one individual can supply for himself. Culture has a use in politics because it persuades men "to allow their thought and
consciousness to play on their stock notions and habits disinterestedly and freely" (C&A, p. 206) and because a nation's place, whether it shall wither away and die or continue to grow by meeting the demands of modern life, depends upon its having reached the very highest rank in the very highest lines of endeavor—spiritual, moral, social, and intellectual. The State can only reach this rank by its collective effort over a period of time. For it is only through the State that "this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence" can establish itself (Reflections, III, 360).

The State, therefore, by its continuity, enables the criticism and experience of its history to become habits: it becomes "our best self's powerful, beneficent and sacred expression and organ" (C&A, p. 205), and is truly "beneficence acting by rule" (French Eton, p. 65; Reflections, III, 308). Echoing Burke's statement that the State is necessary for all designs "which propose duration when they are accomplished" (III, 141), Arnold writes that the State is necessary "to found anything precious and lasting for the future" (C&A, p. 204). Thus Arnold continuously holds up France as an example because of the French ability to establish an interrelation of parts and to create centrality and order for future growth. It might be said that Arnold's educational aim was to establish not
just an academy on the French model, but to translate all of England into one academy preserving and continuing a better culture than realized before. Connecting the State with culture makes culture then a habit, for "What the State, the collective permanent nation, honours, the passing people honours; what the State neglects, they think of no great consequence" (Higher Schools in France, Edition de Luxe, p. 289). Even in Ireland, given a modicum of education and government, the "national sense," if it is truly the national sense of the Irish and not just an English domination, "may be trusted to assert itself" to no disadvantage of the community as a whole, for the habit of national thought will eliminate the danger of Ultra-montanism (ME, p. 117).

(c)

In the last chapter I pointed out that to both Burke and Arnold change can take place only on the basis of order. In the definition of the State, this prerequisite of order allows thought, for it defines the area where thought can operate. At the same time the State can effect change because of its superior position of power. Therefore, it deserves the duty of its citizens since it channels the operations of the rational mind into the activity of men. To achieve this, the State includes all of its elements in order to obtain the benefit of all.
To Burke the State has power for the one reason that it has the prescriptive right to it. It has had it in the past; it therefore should continue. In *Culture and Anarchy* Arnold supports a state that is impotent and ineffectual. He must sustain it, for the State exists as "the appointed frame and prepared vessel of our best self" even if it is not used for that purpose now (*C&A*, p. 205).

Having this authority, the State is the seat where inquiry may operate and yet preserve the authority so necessary for society ("Petition of the Unitarians," VII, 57). In the *Thoughts on the Present Discontents* (1770), Burke mediates between the ideas of popular government and the reality of an arbitrary kingship. George III, claiming himself a Patriot King, usurped certain prerogatives formerly held by the Parliament as the representative of the people. Burke refuses to discuss the rational excuse for the action; he defends, rather, the parliamentary system on the basis of the practice up until the time of the discontents. To reduce it in brief, speculation and innovation are not sins when they are used to correct a grievance in the State. Arnold, therefore, asks that the dissenting sects be brought within the focus of the national life where their thought, rather than being idle speculation or opinions, might be employed to contribute to the national ideal. The dissenters have energy enough, both Burke and
Arnold admit, but their energy is wasted in hole-in-corner thought. It is better for one's spiritual development, Arnold says, to have been a Christian for the last fifteen hundred years than a Socinian or a Jew, for outside of the tradition one is eternally trying to construct the universe without the advantage of having a form of thought, which the state or a religion supplies, upon which he can truly exercise his thought. Thus the State in its history permits freedom of thought, since it defines the place where political, moral, and intellectual thought, and its resulting change, takes place.

Further, from its position of power, the State may use its power for measures which will be, in the word that Arnold uses from Burke, healing. "God and nature," Arnold quotes Burke as writing, "never made (the rank and file) to think or to act without guidance or direction." The definition of the State which Arnold gives in "Democracy" (1861) is a government which can think and act for the rank and file of men. The aristocracy once set a high standard of value which showed the democracy how to think and act, but the aristocracy has lost its power. The substitute will be the State itself in its collective and corporate character. Between the Glorious Revolution and the Reform
Bill of 1832 England was ruled by two aristocratic parties; in the fashion of aristocracies, the ideal of these parties was to administer as little as possible. Following the Reform of 1832, this laissez-faire administration continued, but such lack of administration is no longer expedient; therefore, the State must reclaim from the aristocracy the ideal of administration which it lost in the Revolution. Arnold quotes, therefore, as an epigraph to Popular Education of France, Burke's statement, "I know that, since, the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many useful powers of Government have been weakened." The power of government that Arnold wishes to strengthen is the power to direct and guide; specifically he sees the direction through education, but the State itself has the function of providing this guidance (see section d below). With its immense advantages, the State, therefore, contributes to the citizen just as it receives from the citizen. It contributes back the collective best self which is greater than any individual best self.

Because the State is the center of authority working for the benefit of the community, it follows, then, that

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the idea of liberty becomes an idea of duty to the communal ideal. To benefit from the ideal, the citizen must contribute toward it. "Duties are not voluntary," Burke writes. "Duty and will are even contradictory terms" (Appeal, IV, 165). Duty requires obligation to an idea outside of the individual which the individual follows because he conceives a benefit from the collective people. In the State, will is merely the expression of his ordinary self. From the State one receives the benefit of his liberty, but he cannot receive this liberty unless he exercises his duty. Arnold, therefore, writes, "we know that the only perfect freedom is...a service" (C&A, p. 182). Both writers, to illustrate their meaning, use the common image of the family. Only when the duty to the family has been performed may the family member expect the liberty which his membership in that organization grants him; we can only collect our liberty from society when we have contributed our duty to make that society.

If only because of this emphasis on duty, all elements in the State, as defined by Burke and Arnold, are subordinate to the State since it alone includes all. We might take Arnold's four powers, "the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners" (ME, p. 132) and point out that certain parts of the state have a primary
interest in any one of them. The church, obviously, concerns itself chiefly with the power of conduct. The power of intellect and knowledge, the universities and the other literary and scientific corporations of the state exercise. But these can only be coalesced into the state. "The good of the commonwealth is the rule which rides over the rest," Burke maintains; "and to this every other must completely submit" ("First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe," IV, 258).

A citizen's relation to the State, Arnold writes, is "that of a member in a partnership to the whole firm. The citizens of a State, the members of a society, are really a partnership; 'a partnership,' as Burke nobly says, 'in all science, in all art, in every virtue, in all perfection.' Towards this great final design of their connection, they apply the aids which co-operative association can give them" (A French Eton, p. 50; Reflections, III, 359).

Arnold repeats this idea throughout his social criticism. The genius of the English nation, Arnold contends in an early essay, "is greater than the genius of any individual, greater even than Shakespeare's genius, for it includes the genius of Newton also" ("Democracy," ME, p. 166). In Culture and Anarchy he avows, "The State is the religion of all its citizens, without the fanaticism of any of them" (C&A, p. 166).

16 For further statements of this same idea see C&A, pp. 75, 81; "Joubert" EC1, pp. 348-350; "Spinoza," EC1, p. 379; "The Future of Liberalism," ME, IE, and Others, pp. 385, 386.
(d)

If the nature of the State or Community (its definition) is that it expresses the character of a people, that it establishes the collected wisdom of these people, that it is the center of authority, and that all elements are subordinate to it, the function of the State is to educate its citizens not only by means of schools but by means of its action. It exercises its power therefore for the good of its people.

For both Arnold and Burke the State, itself, fulfills an educative function in providing a noble ideal in action. Burke makes this failure to utilize the ideal a political program in his *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, but he rarely attacks (as Arnold does) English government or society for failing to "engage the affections on the part of the commonwealth" (*Reflections*, III, 333). Post-revolutionary France destroyed manners, law, reason, and beauty, but Arnold, writing seventy years later, finds the situation reversed. For him the French have some of these qualities, at least, which the English society no longer has but must have. The French schools, for instance, represent "in a striking visible shape" the collective community; such a "noble and civilising" shape "gives the people something to be proud of...and it does them good to be proud of (it)" (*Higher Schools in France*, pp. 268-269).
Aside from Oxford, Arnold finds little comparable in British society, but the "grand name without the grand thing." Arminius pours scorn on the ignoble and uncivilized attempts of Viscount Lumpington, the Reverend Esau Hittall, and Bottles, Esquire, to represent the land, the church, and commerce (FG, pp. 46-47). Francis Newman, one feels, did not merely make a bad translation of Homer; he symbolizes the lack of nobility of the British middle class. By Arnold's negatives—the provinciality, arbitrariness, eccentricity of English life—we must understand his positive ideal of a State's function to combat the evil by providing the ideal of the collective best self. "There ought to be," Arnold quotes from Burke, "a system of manners in every nation which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish" ("Equality," ME, p. 68; Reflections, III, 334).

The State educates also by giving the mind contact with large affairs. In the Reflections Burke cites a verse from Ecclesiastes in support of his belief that a man whose life is consumed by the business of bullocks and the plow cannot be assumed to have the knowledge and wisdom to manage the affairs of a society. Certainly any man who has reflected on a broad experience in society knows that even common sense, in its most modest form, is not always prevalent in all men. A man who governs his own affairs with apparent common sense may have the most violent of
prejudices and superstitions beyond his own experience. Nature does not supply the ability to judge the affairs of society nor, as any teacher knows, will it come from books or from the lecture room. If it comes at all, it comes through the practice and the actual conduct of life. The function of the state, consequently, is to supply this contact.

Speaking of the American colonial governments, Burke asserts that the share of the people in their ordinary government "never fails to inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a strong aversion from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance" (Conciliation, II, 122). The sense of participation in large affairs is also most characteristically reflected negatively in Arnold. To their great peril, the dissenters had cut themselves off from the national life. Arnold speculates whether Goethe's failure to have the "quickness and sureness of perception" of Shakespeare or Cicero, might have arisen from qualities of race or whether it comes from the absence of "a long practical conversance with great affairs" (L&D, p. xii). Both the Italians and the Germans lack a clear prose for the same reason: "the want of the pressure of a great national life, with its practical discipline, its ever-active traditions; its literature, for centuries past, powerful and incessant" (ME, p. 282). Arnold justifies the
right of the Minister of the Crown to represent the collective nation because, even if his mind is not above the average order, he does have the experience of acting with large affairs. This experience comes not only to the Minister in government, but to the cultured man who participates in a national life. The state, therefore, exercises an educative function of its own by bringing the mind into contact with great affairs.

Quite apparently in Arnold, and to a lesser degree in Burke, the State replaces a function which the aristocracy formerly had: that of giving leadership and a dominant tone and character to a people. In his first essay on general political criticism Arnold declares that "...a disinterested looker-on might often be disposed, seeing what has actually been achieved by aristocracies, to wish to retain or replace them in their preponderance, rather than commit a nation to the hazards of a new and untried future" (ME, p. 16). Since the Barbarians no longer have the talent for ideas that they once had, they must be replaced. And rather than replace them with a new idea, he substitutes for them the State and makes the aristocracy a function in the State (ME, p. 27).

Arnold thus follows Burke when he writes, "I hold their order (the aristocracy) in cold and decent respect. I hold them to be an absolute necessity in the constitution,
but I think they are only good when kept within proper bounds." In both writers the aristocracy functions only as an organic element in the State itself. *Culture and Anarchy* shows that neither the Barbarians, in Sir Thomas Bateson, the Philistines, in the Rev. W. Cattle, nor the Populace, in Mr. Bradlaugh, are capable of governing in themselves. But each of these men could contribute to the idea of the State by contributing the best self of the class that each represents. Neither writer, however, specifies how this can be done.

The State also educates by serving as the channel through which the enlarging force of time can best operate on the individual. In addition to the participation which enlarges mind, the state makes mind. Left to itself the British middle class has accepted an ugly religion, has lived toward its ordinary self. Had the middle class a tradition of State action, had it the concept of the state as a "working power," it might receive from it a concept of real beauty just as it might have made that concept of beauty by utilizing its energies for that purpose (*ME*, p. 134). We can understand Arnold's idea of the educative function of the State by comparing it to Cardinal Newman's idea of the Church. The Church does not merely absorb and

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in its absorption make its own development, but it also
gives back to its communicants the understanding, the belief,
the truth that it has originally taken. In a more restricted
sense, it is Burke's meaning when he writes, "The nobility
and the clergy...kept learning in existence, even in the
midst of arms and confusions, and whilst governments were
rather in their causes than formed. Learning paid back what
it received to nobility and to priesthood, and paid it with
usury, by enlarging their ideas, and by furnishing their
minds" (Reflections, III, 335). Not only is this paid to
nobility and clergy, but to the citizen of the state as
well.

The eternal problem of philosophical politics is
how to unite reason and institutions. Arnold and Burke
unite them, in effect, by calling them one. The state
supplies the working power to fuse the element of power and
the element of reason: when they are one, they are the State.
Arnold admits the belief that France "remodelled her insti-
tutions with an eye to reason rather than custom and to
right rather than fact" (MF, p. 15) is part truth and part
delusion, but the part of truth attracts him consistently
and explains his praise of French government over English
government. A nation is not great merely because it in-
cludes a large population, or because it has certain
freedoms which it actively engages in, but it is great when
all of its elements are employed in the service of an ideal \((\text{ME}, \text{pp. 26-27})\). It is great, in other words, when it acquires the power of all of its reason and its institutions. It is great because it is the collective and corporate character of its people.

Since the State unites reason and institutions, it is, therefore, the tool to achieve perfection. Civilization, Arnold writes, means "to make progress towards our true and full humanity," but this movement cannot be made without civil society. Following that comment, Arnold quotes Burke from the \textit{Reflections} on the necessity of a state to achieve human perfection.\(^{18}\) In "The Function of Criticism" Arnold speaks of two powers which create literature—the power of the man and the power of the moment (\textit{EC}, p. 6). The power of the man institutions have no control over, but the power of the moment is the province of human actions. A writer may create a "kind of semblance" of his moment out of books, but it is never equivalent to "the nationally diffused life" such as that enjoyed by Shakespeare or the Greek poets (\textit{EC}, p. 9). The ideal of perfection, too, requires both the man and the moment. In creating the moment, the State contributes to perfection. The great error of the French Revolution stems from "its

rushing furiously into the political sphere" (EC1, p. 15) without insuring that the moment for such reform had arrived. Both Goethe and Luther failed, in Arnold's eyes, because they had no State to provide the moment for their actions—they had only their own genius and that was not enough.

(e)

To Arnold certainly, the means which the State should use to achieve perfection is education. Hutchins says of Burke that he "cares no more for the education of the people than he does for supplying them with leisure or rescuing them from poverty." In the Reflections Burke has little to say about English education except to praise it, but Burke's purpose most apparently is to justify English institutions and deride the new French institutions. Education is in the hands of the ecclesiastics and it is properly so (Reflections, III, 363). In making his statements on Burke's indifference to education, Hutchins is reading Burke only on the subject of the Revolution. As

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19 Robert M. Hutchins, "The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke," The Thomist, V (January, 1943), 72. The full article includes pages 61-78. See also Hutchins, "The Theory of the State," Review of Politics, V (1943), 139-155. Both of these articles are brilliant, but superficial and wilful attacks on Burke. Burke did not have a concept of the state, but "a series of specious arguments, theoretical flourishes, and quotable lines which Tories of all later generations have hurled at the heads of those who sought social improvement" (R. of Politics, 155).
Arnold advises, we must read Burke on Ireland, for "on Ireland, which he knew thoroughly, he was always the Burke of the best time" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 283). Burke had but superficial contact with British education. Even in the Reflections, though, he declares (and Arnold quotes him) that men have the right in civil society "to the improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life" (III, 308-309; French Eton, pp. 50-51). In his "Letter to a Peer of Ireland on the Penal Laws Against Irish Catholics" (1782), Burke discusses the effect of English law on Irish education and finds it bad. Like Arnold, he objects that the Irish have no way to educate their own clergy, and he objects to the resultant vulgarizing and brutalizing effect on Irish society. He also denies the right of Dublin Castle to control Irish education in accordance with English prejudices (IV, 226-237).

These are the great themes (except for the middle class) of Arnold's writing on Irish education. Burke's statement, that the Irish ought to have an "education fitted to each order and division of men, such as they are found, will be thought an affair rather to be encouraged than discountenanced" (IV, 233), harmonizes with Arnold's contention that the State should provide not only compulsory education for Diggs (the representative of the Populace in Friendship's Garland), but should equally
require that the sons of the Land, the Church, and Commerce be given a fine education "as a public service...for which the State, the nation in its collective and corporate character, is responsible" ("An Unregarded Irish Grievance," ME, IE, and Others, p. 345). Certainly we can say, without objecting to Burke's failure to enter into the province of the executive and prescribe how education should be administered, that both Burke and Arnold conceive of education as a means by which the State, and society, can achieve perfection. It is the function of the State to do so since the State represents the collective and corporate character of its nation.

(f)

As Frederick Harrison attacked Arnold for failing to indicate how culture would instrument its action, how it would function, so Robert Hutchins has attacked Burke for failing to show precisely how political perfection might be achieved. Burke conceives, as all his speeches and tracts show, his purpose as a Parliamentarian to supply the principles for action, not the method, which is the province of the executive branch. Arnold cannot provide a set of cultural doctrines to be applied to the governing of a people. He knows that what is expedient may change from moment to moment. Burke, too, cannot succumb to the evil of the Revolutionists and put down in black and white the
precise function which a government should perform. It would be just another fixed idea upon which people might unnaturally fix themselves.

Since its precise function cannot be denominated, the State better serves as a disinterested court of review. Arnold specifically advises the English "to make the central government that mere court of disinterested review and correction, which every sensible man would always be glad to have for his own activity" (French Eton, p. 63). To the casual reader, Burke seems to rationalize the old French government; a closer analysis of the Reflections discloses that he damns both houses. His passion is aroused against the revolutionaries, for they have destroyed the "disinterested" court of review and correction which existed in the French monarchy. This application of disinterestedness not only is relevant to Arnold's literary criticism but to his politics also. The real base of Arnold's politics is to create a body of men who can serve as a court of review, a third force in political affairs.

If in their concept of the State Arnold and Burke show the closest resemblance, here also they show the most conspicuous differences. The first difference arises from Burke's emphasis on the State as a political phenomenon and Arnold's emphasis on it as a social one. Arnold because of
his social interests, defines the people in a much wider sense than Burke, although there is a basic similarity in their attitude. Arnold's idea of the people leads him to an understanding of equality foreign to Burke. Also a difference may arise from their positions: one a member of Parliament and the other a civil servant. Arnold, an educational administrator, envisions a state educational system far beyond that which Burke could have imagined. And because his experience as a civil servant brought him into contact with local government, Arnold modifies the concept of local government of a man who knew little of the actual operation of local affairs although he speaks passionately on the idea. Whether these differences grow from the fact that Arnold recognized democracy as a fait accompli or whether they grow from the fact that he had a social consciousness unlike Burke's, the fact remains that Arnold accepts a more democratic form of government than Burke does. Arnold's State is expanding; Burke's State is essentially static.

(a)

Burke's references to the British Constitution have the tone of awe. Arnold, on the other hand, is only perfunctory in mentioning the Constitution at all. Indeed, at one point he suggests that it is nothing but a colossal machine for the manufacture of Philistines. Arnold's three
interests in politics are education, local government, and equality. Burke is as casual in his handling of them as Arnold is in handling the Constitution. In fact, Arnold attacks the purely legal character of English revolutions and notices the "absence from them...of all aim at social renovation" (ME, p. 176). Burke is proud of the purely legal character of the Great Revolution; indeed, he is blind to the condition of the French peasant although he has some sympathy with the condition of the Irish tenant. Arnold had absorbed the nineteenth-century belief in social action and his belief separates him from Burke: Burke is yet in the legal tradition of English politics.

Burke doubted whether the state could have any positive effect on economic and social questions. "To provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do it. The people maintain them, and not they the people" (Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, V, 133-134). Burke's mind, so opposed to most eighteenth-century thought, accepted eighteenth-century economic theory.21

20 Arnold uses Burke's statements about the Irish tenant in "The Incompatibles," to support his views of the new Irish land act. In supporting the Irish tenant, Burke did not consider the peasant or laborer.

21 See Reflections, III, 535-536, for his praise of contemporary economics.
Economic and social amelioration could only come by a system of distribution of a static amount of wealth; the only means of distribution is the free play of the market place. Certainly the wealth of a community cannot be expanded. If labor as a commodity is in no great demand, then labor can do nothing but wait until the moment when the demand will become greater. Burke's apologists do well to ignore this facet of his writing. Arnold does.

Arnold's definition of the people and his idea of equality permit a wider sharing in the State than Burke's definition. Burke believes that a restricted and limited people has the leisure to consider the whole, not merely their own interests, since the whole determines their own good position. Having no fear of losing their own power (except by wilful indulgence), they exercise control over the separate corporations in society which ministers to them and which they minister to. Burke separates, in advocating such a system, the two primitive instincts in man: the one to command and the other to obey. The power of right reason and the duty to obey right reason prevents Arnold from blurring them, but Arnold refuses to grant that the ability of command is lodged in one segment of society and that it is wholly the function of society to insure that the power of command is kept in its pristine purity. Furthermore, Arnold suggests that the power of
command may not ennoble man but may rather concentrate his attention on the means of his command. Since economic power may be vulgarized by the material, Burke's faith in primogeniture is not conducive to the humanization of man in society.

In "Equality" Arnold attacks the very principle of the State which Burke had considered so necessary. He removes the power of permanence in property (in Burke's economic system the only wealth is landed wealth) and places it in the State. He restricts corporation of property in his scheme. Burke writes,

Nothing is a due and adequate representation of a state, that does not represent its ability, as well as its property. But as ability is a vigorous and active principle, and as property is sluggish, inert, and timid, it can never be safe from the invasions of ability, unless it be out of all proportion, predominant in the representation. It must be represented, too, in great masses of accumulation, or it is not rightly protected. The characteristic essence of property, formed out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is to be unequal (Reflections, III, 297-298).

In Arnold the idea of property is an anachronism and inexpedient (Civ. in US, p. 123; C&A, p. 177). It is only when property is widely diffused that it is truly safe and truly defensible by the State. Only when it is widely diffused may ability, the true principle of corporateness, express its nature.

It is a commonplace that Arnold rejected the idea of class as a positive factor in society. "In modern time,
we are living with a system of classes so intense, a society of such unnatural complications, that the whole action of our minds is hampered and falsened by it" (Civ. in US, p. 145). To Burke society obtained its unity by its "orders," by its classes. Burke has little to say, otherwise, about class, except that by inference the evils of the French revolution have been propagated by a bourgeoisie which, under the guise of the rights of man, attempts to exercise a tyranny of the same stripe as that suffered under the monarchy. Although he never justifies class, as such, a tone of class derives from his sense of hierarchy in society. The difference may be seen in what Arnold includes when he quotes Burke. In the essay on "Renan" Arnold quotes with approval Burke's statement that he can neither condemn nor approve of republics or monarchies in the abstract. He has studied both forms, Burke says, and he has studied them with a mind undisturbed by affection or prejudice.

....But the result in his mind from that investigation has been and is, that neither England nor France, without infinite detriment to them, as well in the event as in the experiment, could be brought into a republican form; but that everything republican which can be introduced with safety into either of them must be built upon a monarchy (Appeal, IV, 109-110; EC, pp. 153-154).

Arnold does not continue Burke's sentence;

...built upon a monarchy,—built upon a real, not a nominal monarchy, as its essential basis; that all such institutions, whether aristocratic or democratic, must originate from their crown, and
in all their proceedings must refer to it; that by the energy of that mainspring alone those republican parts must be set in action, and from thence must derive their whole legal effect, (as amongst us they actually do,) or the whole will fall into confusion (Appeal, IV, 110).

This appeal to a monarchy is wholly absent in Arnold. He once describes the Crown as the center of English government (C&I, p. 118), but he does not utilize it as a symbol of the state action he desires. Whereas Burke disparages a particular aristocrat to support an aristocratic theory (Letter to a Noble Lord), Arnold derides the class to support particular members of the class who have functioned to establish a standard of virtue and honor. To Arnold, the function of the aristocracy has passed away; to Burke the function need always be fulfilled.

(b)

As his economic system is static, so is Burke's educational system static. Burke declared that the state should "encourage" rather than discourage Irish education. He opposes the interference of the British government in Irish education, but he makes no effort to expand Irish education beyond freeing it from British interference. Arnold, on the other hand, demands a compulsory education controlled by the State. Although Arnold cannot always follow the logic and lucidity of the French, the French system of public secondary education "is one of the real,
one of the best conquests of 1789 and of the Revolution" (ME, pp. 175-176). He endeavored not only to supply popular education (i.e., education for the populace), but a state-controlled education for the middle and upper classes. The Upper Classes, in some sense, have it in Rugby, Eton, and Harrow, but these schools are too much dominated by the class which patronizes them. To change them he would substitute the State as a working power rather than class as a working power. However, the expanding schools that Arnold envisions, it must be noted, are based on the Burkean foundation of history and experience. Arnold keeps the present institutions, but his perception that the sweetness and light of the few must be imperfect until the raw and unkindled masses of humanity are touched with it expands the present institutions. Again the nineteenth-century passion for social action provides a distinction between the two writers.

(c)

The local government that Burke recommends is exactly the local government which Arnold castigates so thoroughly throughout his career. Burke's local government is a representation of classes and corporations. "We begin our public affectations," he writes, "in our families. ...We pass on to our neighborhoods, and our habitual provincial connections" (Reflections, III, 494). Thus local
government is a natural product of local customs and habits. The small corporations—the merchants, land, the clergy—may very well be obstacles to reform through their vested interests, but they also are strong barriers against the growth of any despotism. They are jealous of their power. And they are more true representatives than any mob because they more accurately represent the individual's interest.

"Do you suppose we should tolerate in France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, your London corporations and London vestries?" the foreigner in "My Countrymen" asks (FG, p. 140). English local government, in Arnold's eyes, is nothing more than "chance private association" and for this very reason it is ineffective. It is only the "feudal and ecclesiastical organization of the Middle Ages" (ME, p. 141), and it cannot cope with the increased complexity of English life. As an official in the Education Department Arnold especially notices this. In his "Report for 1878," for instance, he declares that the local school boards are "in the air" without a municipal government: "They have not, and cannot well have, a due sense of scale and proportion; they proceed as if they were educationists in Utopia" (Marvin, Reports, p. 199). What Burke had praised, Arnold condemns.

In the area of local government Arnold, oddly enough, is more of a legalist than Burke. His essays on
Ireland recommend the establishment of genuine local government for Ireland that will in turn be subservient to Parliament. Arnold despairs of ever attaining such local government in England, but the Irish problem offers an excellent opportunity for him to recommend an emergency program of local legislatures for Ireland rather than Gladstone's Home Rule. Arnold, in his educational writings, urges the very type of French local government that Burke had excoriated as being no more than "a description of square measurement..." "a checker" number, a badge-ticket (see *French Eton*, p. 60). But Arnold's corporations, in distinction from Burke's, are legal corporations. The immediate comparison—Arnold used it in arguing for local government in Ireland—is the American federal system. Rather than the "chance private associations" so dear to Burke, he proposes local assemblies to take over business handled at his time in the House of Commons and the local business that the chance associations have been so inept in handling. From these legal corporations for local government, for the Church, for education grow Arnold's collective and corporate state. And what finer training, Arnold

22"A Word More About America," *Civ. in the US*, p. 139. Arnold outlines in this essay a system of state governments for Great Britain. His favorite argument against Home Rule was to compare the suggestions for Ireland to the Confederate Congress. Home Rule makes as much sense as a Confederate Congress would make in America.
can ask in the late nineteenth century when the franchise is being extended regularly, is this local government for the new democracy? Or, to use Burke's language against himself, "Perhaps (local government) is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards by which alone men come to be affected, as with their own concern, in the prosperity of a kingdom so extensive as that of France" (Reflections, III, 494).

It would be difficult to determine whether Arnold's social interest grows from or depends upon his view of the structure of society. Burke's structure is a natural hierarchy growing out of the individual's interest. The land laborer informally expresses his interest to the tenant. The tenant expresses his interest to the farmer. And so up the scale to the Commons and Peers, to the Ministers and the King. Balancing this interest from the bottom up (Burke uses the term grievances for these) is the interest expressed from the top down which overweighs the interest from the bottom because it has the power of reason and the power of position. Burke fears no unbalance. Is not the tenant concerned that he should have good horses who can perform well? Therefore, he will also be interested to have well-cared-for, happy, industrious laborers. The tenant will not exploit the laborer unduly since it is not to his reasoned and landed interest to do so (see the
Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, V, 131-170). Outside the common law of custom and practice, this structure has no legal existence, except at the very top of the scale, where particular interest is refined to reason and deliberation.

Arnold on the other hand rejects the voluntary organizations at the bottom which will eventually rise to the legal corporations at the top. Instead of the voluntary associations in the parish, he desires a mirror of the national legal government down at that level. If nothing else, the increased franchise demands such an extension of legal government. The voluntary local organizations, Arnold feels sure, only express the ordinary self of the men constituting them. Indeed, the voluntary middle-class schools merely express the ordinary self of the Benthamite or the Licensed Victuallers (C&A, p. 118). The voluntary corporations had the opposite of the disinterestedness Burke assumes them to have. Only when they have been legally incorporated and have, thereby, a national character can the members truly think disinterestedly. In an age when ideas "are powerfully fermenting in a society, and profoundly changing its spirits" (ME, p. 17), legally constituted corporations must replace the voluntary corporations (including the aristocracy) to express the "collective and corporate character of a nation." Otherwise, the mob seizes the ideas and, having no means of expressing
them in a legal manner, tears down the fences in Hyde Park and justifies itself that it is only exercising the Englishman's right to do as he likes.

Arnold, it must be pointed out, penetrates society with his concept of legal corporations no further than the middle class. Even when delivering a lecture to a working-men's college, the lecture "Ecce, Convertimur ad Gentes" in the Irish Essays, Arnold talks about the legal establishment and the intellectual training which the middle class needs. Arnold fears the mob, as Culture and Anarchy shows, just as Burke did, but not to the extent that he despairs of it. Once the middle class could be brought to participation in the national government through a legally constituted local government, then the lower classes could learn from the middle. Arnold accepts, then, political democracy as a fait accompli.

From the Revolution Arnold derives a belief in ideas and the belief that ideas themselves are not restricted to one segment of society. He acquires a belief that if popular sovereignty can be channeled through the corporations of the state, it can be a healthy state. Although Arnold quotes Burke's epigram "Rousseau is your canon of holy writ" as an idea which the Liberal politician should ponder, Arnold had learned enough from Rousseau and the Revolutionists to approve of their idea of a reasoned people and a reasoned State.
A further difference, in the same area as his recognition of political democracy which Burke could not visualize, grows out of Thomas Arnold's view of history. Like Burke, both of the Arnolds conceive of the necessity of development, but they define a facet of development not in Burke—that historical movement shows that the commons must and will acquire an increasingly larger measure of power.

In the first volume of his *Thucydides* Thomas Arnold attacked entails, as Matthew Arnold does specifically in "Equality," as an artificial restriction on the populace in the struggle between the populace and the governing classes.23 Burke's thought, although it moves toward such an idea, finds no immediate room to include it, except in the recognition at the end of the *Thoughts on French Affairs* that

> If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate (IV, 377; Arnold quotes in EC1, p. 17).

He is not quite ready to admit the democracy into a political democracy. But he did not consider the social goals that Arnold did to insure that a political democracy would

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be an historical and reasoned entity.

iv

Since the question of the State is more intimately bound to practiced Liberalism and Conservatism, the conclusions here on Arnold's position are a bit more apparent. With most Liberal movements in the nineteenth and twentieth century Arnold denies the right of landed and inherited property as a major influence in the state. To be sure, it has a right to a corporate influence if it is truly a corporate interest and not actually a vested interest. Arnold's motives, however, differ slightly from the usual Liberal's. The stereotype of the Liberal, at least, tends to consider the disbursement of property throughout the state not as a means, as Arnold would have it, but often as an end in itself.

Although Arnold praises the ideas which democracy naturally or ideally includes, he fears in practice that it will not include them. His objections to the American democracy derive from his apprehension, on the one hand, that it represents little more than the middle-class materialism of his England, but also from his fear that it actually cannot admit the nourishing ideas which such a government must constantly demand. It is a stereotype of small ideas rather than the grand ideas which a democracy ideally must
have. His belief in education and equality he founds on the Liberal conviction that man must "be conscientious about facts which tell against (his) desires,... calm and detached in the presence of events by which, within (him)self, (he) is deeply moved,... (and he must) admit the inevitability of change,..." To achieve such a Liberalism education and equality must enable the individual to use his full ability. The key to his writings as an Inspector of Schools lies in his conception of a State education which will enable the citizen to participate in his own corporation disinterestedly and as a member of the national tradition which only a national education can give him.

Arnold and Burke both, with the Liberals, assert a principle of central authority which some modern Liberals have embraced.

From whence can have arisen in this country, such contemptuous disparagement of the efficiency and utility of State-action? Whence such studied depreciation of an agency which to Burke, or, indeed, to any reflecting man, appears an agency of the greatest possible power and value? (French Eton, p. 54).

Arnold has almost acquired the tone of the intellectual socialist in his question. He had to defend himself against the epithet of socialism, and his response is to accuse his critic of using the word as a cover-up for the catchwords

of the "Englishman's right-to-do-as-he-likes" variety. G. W. E. Russell, confounded by Arnold's politics, says that he is more "in harmony with Collectivist Radicalism than with orthodox Liberalism" (Russell, M. Arnold, p. 122). And Arnold has been attacked as the first prophet of the "Authoritarian democratic great State." J. D. Wilson calls Arnold a Liberal because he anticipates twentieth-century English socialism. Arnold almost merits the praise once in a statement on including Protestant Dissent within the State. "It is not too much to say that the chief hope of progress, in the next five years, for true Liberalism, lies in the conversion of the Protestant Dissenters; or to speak more correctly, as well as, perhaps, more agreeably, in their nationalisation." 26

Lastly, Arnold's belief in social action, while marking him as a part of his age, also marks him with the Liberal belief in the efficacy of co-operative social effort. Arnold never suggests that poverty can be abolished nor that Wragg will never again murder her child on Mapperly Hills, but steps can be taken and must be taken to reduce poverty and to make life more humane.


Notwithstanding, certain characteristic features of Arnold's attitude toward the State may with equal justice be called Conservative. Certainly his conception of the State as a deliberate repository of the past is more familiar in the mouth of a Conservative despite the fact that intellectual socialists have also used it. But Arnold's notion that the form of the state and its historical growth must be considered as inviolable goes beyond the intellectual socialist with his penchant for the great experiment. Like the Conservative, Arnold insists that rights can come only from the society which man himself has created, and in creating his society he has limited his rights for the better functioning of that society. Among these rights he has cast off is the right for individualism although twentieth-century conservatives appropriate this right from nineteenth-century Liberalism. Thus, there is a strong sense in which Arnold denies man the right to a free political will (despite his assertion of a free moral will). The only right that a man has is his duty to his society.

His conception of the function of the State to keep order can certainly be labeled as Conservative. Benjamin Lippincott in his *Victorian Critics of Democracy* (and Lippincott does not mean merely evaluators when he uses the word critic) finds this the major element of Arnold's rejection of democracy. Arnold differs from the reactionary
conservative, of course, in coupling with his demand for order the concomitant demand that action be taken to heal the disorder in the State. His desire for order and harmony leads him to restrict popular power in the State. Arnold does not urge the extension of the franchise in any manner; he worries that those who already possess it are not able to use it. He does not see any harm, however, in granting full household suffrage for local elections, but he cannot recommend it for the nation even though he ruefully notes the tendency in that direction. The power in the state must be restricted to the executives in the state, the Cabinet Minister and his civil servants, who will be guided by public opinion but who will also guide that same public opinion in its proper and humane direction. The state's function is to do so. When it does guide, we have the State as a "working power" and not just as a necessary evil to be endured.

Finally I would call Arnold's belief that conditions rather than the freely-operating mind should guide and control the mind of the statesman an essentially conservative belief. Once the political thinker is bound to conditions, he cannot escape into the realm of thought. No philosophy of politics, in other words, exists. The statesman can only look back, and in looking back, he commits himself to a conserving tendency.
In Arnold's essays from the time of the lecture "On the Modern Element in Literature," he sees a distinct relationship between the State and literature. In that inaugural lecture in the chair of poetry Arnold begins characteristically by pointing out the two kinds of "deliverance" possible to man—the moral and the intellectual. Immediately after making his distinction between Adam and Prometheus, Arnold begins to show that the deliverance of Prometheus is the modern deliverance. "And those nations are said to be imbued with the modern spirit most eminently in which the demand for such a deliverance has been made with most zeal, and satisfied with most completeness" (Oxford Essays, p. 455). Even in his later criticism, when he insists more on the moral deliverance than the intellectual deliverance, he expresses his goal not in terms of the individual but in terms of the collective individuals or the nation. He twice copied into his notebooks (once in 1875 and once in the "General Note-books, No. 2") an almost Prussian statement of this relationship. "What is culture other than a higher comprehension of political and military relationships? As far as the nations are concerned, what matters is the art to behave in the world and to strike according to necessity."²⁷

As with all other elements in the State, literature too is a corporation which has a utility in its creation of the spiritual ideal of the state. Because it has such utility Arnold asks for an academy, if not in corporate and legal fact, at least in a body of literate and intelligent readers who can function as an informal academy. Lacking this central authority in the State (whether formally or informally established), a literature will be provincial and incomplete. By conscious effort and conscious realization the expression, the style, can be made or at least assisted by the individual. Thus Luther is "touched with the Gemeinheit which is the bane of his nation" (CL, p. 106), and thus the incompleteness of Luther, Bunyan and Cobbett, and even Goethe. Because Palgrave "feels himself to be speaking before a promiscuous multitude, with the few good judges so scattered through it as to be powerless,...he has no calm confidence and no self-control" (EC 1, p. 86). Arnold's idea, on the other hand, is to reestablish, as "in the Greece of Pindar and Sophocles, in the England of Shakespeare," a current of animating and nourishing ideas. This current can only appear when "society" itself is permeated by consciousness. Society cannot be penetrated fully through books (EC 1, p. 9), for literature depends not upon the effort of the individual working with books, but it depends upon the effort of a whole unit. The state
makes this unit by giving the mind contact with large affairs, by its educational system if the system is animated by the national ideal, and by expressing in itself the highest ideal of its people. The State adds dignity and distinction to the work of any individual and makes it not merely an effusion of individual genius but a genuine reflection of national thought and life. Literature then is the organic growth from the State, and while literature cannot be made to grow, it can be assisted by a society permeated with consciousness. Such consciousness the State can make.

The State makes this consciousness, first of all, by producing the civil and intellectual order to make creation possible. A writer cannot, Arnold seems to say, merely reflect the world. If he does he reflects only the Englishman's "want of sureness of taste," and his eccentricity which derive from his lack of a "fixed, fatal, spiritual centre of gravity" (CL, p. 131). Arnold's object in writing his lectures on Celtic Literature is to show that the Englishman can use the diversity of his condition to exalt that position and make it more than its parts. Having a chair of Celtic Literature at Oxford would at least contribute to the order, the center of gravity, and it would contribute as a nation and not as an individual. This order of the State would prevent English culture from
falling victim to the error of German culture, for German culture is "so wide, so impartial, that it is apt to become slack and powerless, and to lose itself in its material for want of a strong central idea around which to group all its other ideas" (EC1, p. 201).

Thus we can say that an effective literature can best arise from an effective state. Only through the aegis of the State may all of the elements in that State express themselves without turning more and more in upon themselves. The Celt has turned; the German has never quite learned to escape. At least in Goethe's time he had not; his work lacks the form which a national life could give him. Since Arnold cannot, in terms of his own assumptions, advocate a legal corporation like the French Academy to insure that the elements in the State have the advantage of this centrality of purpose, he must accept a third host of disinterested, critical, intelligent readers who will exercise a balance in the State to mediate among the multitudinousness of modern life.

The nostalgic, elegiac tone of so much of Arnold's poetry derives not only from his romantic yearning in the

28 Arnold was saying this to Clough in a letter which Lowry dates as late in 1847 or early 1848. See Lowry, Letters to Clough, pp. 64-65. But in the early letter Arnold sees this being "thrown upon themselves" as an advantage since it forced the Germans to "make the fulness of the content of a work atone for deficiencies in form." But in the essays, the form, especially as it is a matter of style, becomes a predominant interest.
pathos of distance but from the real desire, expressed in his essays, to connect the value in that past with the fact of nineteenth-century life. This union could be effected by the State in its institutions—its Oxford, its Church of England, its body of quiet, reflecting people. It gives the artist that current of nourishing ideas he so desperately needs. The State becomes an unwritten essay which internalizes, and provides a visible archetype for, the order upon which any structure in a culture must be made—be it poetry, art, music, or just the natural magic of the Celt.

In summary, then, the State which Arnold envisions follows directly from Burke's State. Both conceive the nature of the State to be the expression of the community which it represents. It does not merely represent a mass of individuals, but the best self of the whole nation. Since its nature is to represent the best self, then the State determines the area in which thought takes place for the benefit of the whole community. The State's function is to educate its people by its forms and actions and by guiding education. The State also functions as a center which absorbs and directs the thought it has made.

The principal difference between the two is found in Arnold's greater emphasis on the social function of the State. Arnold's social emphasis, however, arises from his
attempt to create a legal structure to a society which, to Burke, had a natural structure. His interest in social legislation does not violate the Burkean State, but rather it expands that concept to ensure the operation of the institution which they both would retain as a permanent basis upon which change and thought are recorded.

Although Arnold's arguments for equality, education, and local government strike sympathetic chords among Liberals, his idea of the State as a deliberate repository of thought leads him to a conservative conclusion. His desire for order and his reliance on conditions also cause him to conserve rather than liberate.

As Arnold erects his State as a canopy over the individual and over the corporations inferior to the central government, so also his literature is subservient to the goals of the State. Arnold admits the restrictive dangers of such a corporation, but since the benefits to literature are greater than the absence of direction without the corporation, Arnold desires as much of a literary corporation as the English history and tradition will allow.
CHAPTER VI

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CHURCH, THE LEADER,
AND THE COLONIES

Dependent upon the concept of the State are four other areas of political and social judgment: the role of the individual and the Church in the state, the function of the leader, and the extension of the State in colonial management. Since these four areas are dependent, I break the pattern which I have followed and do not discuss at the beginning other possible sources which Burke and Arnold might have shared. The Victorians had many theories of individualism, church, government, leadership, and colonial management, but each separate theory must depend upon the theorist's attitudes toward the State, toward change, toward the past, and upon his individual critical assumptions. Therefore, it seems most expedient to look immediately at how much Arnold's attitude toward individualism resembles Burke's attitude. The discussion of the similarity between their attitude toward Church government, political leadership, and colonial management follows. Again I break the pattern and reduce the sections on dissimilarities, political effect and literary effect to brief comments.
The Individual

Respect for the corporate nature of the State causes both writers to deny individualism and to assert a type of cultural collectivism. Both believe that the individual can express himself only through his society. Also the idea of perfection requires that the individual deny emphasis on the self to live for the collective ideal. Since the organic concept of society, however, does presume that growth will derive from the individual, both writers thoroughly respect the individual and the contribution that he can make to the ideal. Neither, in other words, conceives of a monolithic society in which the individual has no purpose other than that of fulfilling a particular function. To state the idea positively, the demands of the society require greater attention than the demands of the individual. Both writers go counter, then, to the prevailing thought of their Zeitgeist.

(a)

To the most casual reader Burke and Arnold place the blame of anarchy in their time on individualism. Both refuse to grant the prerogative of the ballot because they believe that telling of individual wants can never effectively express the character of a people. Burke, for
instance, defending himself to his electors at Bristol, boldly affirms that "Frenzy does not become a slighter dis­temper on account of the number of those who may be infected with it" (Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, II, 215). Arnold denies that Noncomformist electoral support guarantees the Liberal party a right to represent the true character of the English nation. In the Reflections Burke declares that in the new French State "the commonwealth itself [will]...crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality..." (III, 358). The barbarian, Arnold says in Culture and Anarchy, properly had individualism, but transplanting this individualism to the Philistine and to the Populace makes unbearable "enisledness" of modern life (C&A, p. 102). He attacks as a perversity Herbert Spencer's "promulgating the extremist doctrine of individualism" at a time when "past neglects and present needs are driving men to co-operation, to making the community act for the public good in its collective and corporate character of the State" (Civ. in US, p. 135). Individualism, Burke and Arnold both recognize, leads to the anarchy of le homme moyen sensuel.

Individualism they both feel employs the dubious doctrine that the ordinary desires of man are a tool of divine providence. The economists accept the assumption that every man acts in his own private interests and Burke
follows them, but Burke did not confuse economy with government. Government is more than contract made for the bartering of calico and pepper; it is a moral control on the individual will and passion, both in the governed and in the governing, and the ordinary self cannot possibly determine this community good. Arnold specifically denounces Bishop Butler for his attempt to put morality on such a basis. "The transient individual," Arnold writes, "must not cut and carve in the results of human experience, according to his crude notions of what may constitute happiness" (St. P. and P., p. 285). Individualism produces only "caprice and eccentricity" and not true growth (1854 "Preface," Oxford Essays, p. 507).

(b) It follows, then, that if the individual's living for himself yields only caprice and eccentricity, the individual can only express himself through his society, through the particular social relationship to which he belongs. To accomplish his fulfillment as an individual he must do two things: (1) he must accept the society, and (2) he must contribute toward it. Both of these demand a subjection of individual will.

First he must accept his society. To Burke man is from the very outset caught in a web of relationships which bind him inseparably to his fellow man and to the whole of
reality.¹ He conceives of the individual as a moral and rational being in a society which shapes him, conditions him, and endows him with a moral personality (Cobban, p. 52).

We see Burke accepting his web when he stops in the Reflections to write, "I assure you I do not aim at singularity" (III, 362); he aims, rather, to fuse his own meditations with what he has learned from his culture. The good of the commonwealth, Burke asserts, must ride over all other considerations, and all rules of individual thought must completely submit to the web of relationships (IV, 258). If a man refuses to respect the dictates of his social conscience or his right reason, he renounces obedience not merely to a particular code but to all moral law. The result is an atomistic society and not a coherent society which attempts "designs that require time in fashioning and which propose duration when they are accomplished."

Arnold, at the very end of his career, berates Huxley for telling the English public that the chief good in English society is the freedom of the Englishman "to say what he pleases, when he pleases." Arnold replies to Huxley in a tone characteristic of all the essays: "For my part, as I grow old, and profit, I hope, by the lessons of

experience, I think the chief good, that which above all makes life worth living, is to be of use." 2 Discussing the heresies in Church history, Arnold declares that the individuals in a church "are bound to sacrifice their fancies" to the ideal of Christian union (St. P. and P., p. 139).

His justification for this immolation is the same as Burke's, for "The individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and, when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always acts right" ("Reform of Commons," VII, 95). Arnold demands this sublimation of the individual to the common ideal even on the matter of language. Respecter of the Celt that he was, Arnold still feels that the individualist argument for preserving the Welsh language is insufficient. The experience of the race shows that a government must render its dominions homogeneous and must break down the barriers to free intercourse between the parts. 3

(c)

The position is neither one of the two modern extremes: complete and mass conformity to a vague and inchoate

2 "Up to Easter," Nineteenth Century, XXI (May 1887), 629.
standardization nor an individualism that becomes a stereotyped eccentricity. These writers demand a standardization which is "not a tumultuary and giddy choice," which applies to both alternatives above, but "a deliberate election of ages and of generations" ("Reform of The Commons," VII, 95).

They ask a standardization, a wholeness or perfection, based on a continuum of historical process such as that which Arnold found in Maurice and Eugénie de Guérin. The excellence of Eugénie de Guérin was that, in distinction to her English counterpart, she had a fine standard to conform to. At best the Englishman only gains "the grand name without the grand thing."

To obtain the grand thing, to achieve the ideal of perfection in society, is the goal for which these writers sacrifice the individual. This sacrifice in preference to a "solidarity" of his society most characteristically appears in Arnold's religious books, but it is apparent also in his social and political criticism. In Burke the idea of solidarity in the State stands as the main bulwark of excellence in England to be put against the Revolutionaries. This "moral excellence," for it is such, gives Burke's political writing its fire. Arnold could have learned this solidarity from the Anglican Divines or from his father,4

4See David R. Stevens, "Matthew Arnold and Some Anglican Divines," Unpubl. diss. (Texas, 1954), pp. 242 ff. This Christian solidarity Stevens uses as one of his major points of influence from the Divines. Richard Barksdale,
but the particular societal direction of his thinking resembles Burke. Even in his first use of the term *solidarity*, in the book on Saint Paul, the Victorian critic gives the term a societal, rather than a religious, meaning. Arnold praises two qualities in Paul: his concept of charity and "the force with which he dwells on the *solidarity* (to use the modern phrase) of man,—the joint interest, that is, which binds humanity together, the duty of respecting every one's part in life, and of doing justice to his efforts to fulfill that part" ([St. P. and P.], pp. 31-32). The "private contracted affection" must always bow to the collective, "for men are solidary, or co-partners; and not isolated" ([St. P. and P.], p. 280). This wholeness is Arnold's perfection, and the Englishman's "right to march where he likes, meet where he likes, enter where he likes, hoot as he likes, threaten as he likes, smash as he likes" have no part in perfection whatsoever ([C&A], p. 76) since they cannot contribute to the "developing all parts of our society" ([C&A], p. 11).

Furthermore, even though Arnold himself speaks much of this perfection by culture, the ideal cannot be a matter of individual determination but must rather be determined by

"Thomas Arnold as Historian," Unpubl. diss. (Harvard, 1951), pp. 147-148. Thomas Arnold declares in his *History of Rome* that both Hannibal and Napoleon illustrate the defeat of individualism by a corporate nation. Napoleon, we might say, went counter to the "solidarity" of the French nation and therefore suffered defeat.
man in wholeness, his solidarity. Arnold's phrase, for instance, of seeing "the object as it really is" is designed for rescuing the object from the clutches of the individual and putting it into a position beyond individual fancy into a realm of reason, community, and even history. "Seeing the object as it really is" means seeing it in terms of culture. Burke had made the same point in talking about the true reform which the French might have followed. In choosing the way of the individual, they have chosen wrongly. "In a question of reformation, I always consider corporate bodies, whether sole or consisting of many, to be much more susceptible of a public direction, by the power of the state, in the use of their property, and in the regulation of modes and habits of life in their members, than private citizens ever can be, or perhaps ought to be" (Reflections, III, 447-448). Could the Englishman have this sense more widely, he could indeed draw ever nearer to a sense of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming (C&A, p. 50). Or, to translate Arnold's language back into Burke's more political language, by the means of such collective ideal, the true reformation is made possible. All the voices of human experience would aid in the solution of the human problem (C&A, p. 47).

Obtaining the grand thing, the perfection in society, requires the individual to deny his own self because the
mass of men cannot think sufficiently to be true individualists. The mass, as individuals, cannot establish the reasoned values which a society will need and create. As Burke says, "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages" (Reflections, III, 346). It is Burke's conviction that the "less inquiring" would receive from authority his opinions and not be ashamed to rely upon it (III, 360). Arnold makes this same distinction when he attacks Bishop Colenso's book, for it tends to reduce the authority and make the common man ashamed to rely on the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.

Arnold states the idea directly, in a discussion of moral rules, in his essay on Marcus Aurelius:

> But moral rules, apprehended as ideas first, and then rigorously followed as laws, are, and must be, for the sage only. The many of mankind have neither force of intellect enough to apprehend them clearly as ideas, nor force of character enough to follow them strictly as laws (ECL, p. 402).

For this reason Arnold prefers the State to a democracy and praises the eighteenth-century aristocracy. Also Arnold therefore recommends a uniformity in instruction. "Wide ranging, and the multiplication of matters to be investigated, belong to private study, to the development of special aptitudes in the individual learner" and not to a public
education designed for the masses of men ("Johnson's Lives," EC3, p. 185). No one individual can lay out such uniform lines of instruction, but by constantly working toward the ideal the mass of teachers and educators can gradually work toward such uniformity which would have the advantage of authority of much experience (EC3, p. 186).

(d)

But with all of the emphasis on the collective rather than the individual, the organic view of society presumes that growth in the society itself springs from individual effort. Arnold's individual grows out of the collective ideal. He first submits to it and grows from it. Thus the dissenter by submitting himself to the legal hierarchy of the Church, acquires the form of his religious thought; instead of contributing to the "dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion" he aids the growth of the Established Church. From the collective ideal even the genius can profit. The free activity of genius, Arnold admits in "The Literary Influence of Academies," cannot be learned in any school.

So far as routine and authority tend to embarrass energy and inventive genius, academies may be said to be obstructive....But then this evil is so

5St. P. and P., p. xvii. The phrase is Burke's, Conciliation, II, 123, but Arnold does not credit him with it. He calls it "Mr. Miall's standard-maxim," and he uses it only to ridicule it. Miall is one of Arnold's Non-conformist whipping boys.
much compensated by the propagation, on a large scale, of the mental aptitudes and demands which an open mind and a flexible intelligence naturally engender, genius itself, in the long run...greatly finds its account in this propagation (EC1, pp. 59-60).

Arnold does not deny the quality of genius its individuality—indeed, he praises the quality of individuality in the Celt but the Celt was ineffectual because he had only his individuality. He had no collective society.

Arnold always insists that the culture he wishes to instill in his Englishmen is an inward operation and not a sum of fact to be imposed upon society. He must therefore resist the critics who demand that he leave his pouncet box "to propose practical improvement" for modern society. The improvement must grow from the individual in his society; Arnold can do nothing but point out the culture that will yield this improvement and show how it works. It is the individual, burdened with his culture and freed by his culture (just as the genius is), who will make the change or the reformation. We may say that both recognized individualism, such as that which Burke recommends to the Irish of the middle ranks, if it were clearly bounded by the framework of society and if it exerted a pressure from its inward position to shape that framework of society.

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6 See Burke's "Letter to Reverend Doctor Hussey," Works and Correspondence (1852), II, 341-352; ME, IE, and Others, pp. 334-335.
The quality of the individual is not wholly sublimated to the ideal of the state, especially in Arnold, because of his essential humanism. Arnold praises America for its solution of political and social problems, but he excoriates America's solution of the human problem (\textit{Civ. in US}, p. 151). In insisting that the two "problems" are not identical, Arnold once more removes himself from the extreme form of mechanistic collectivism. Machinery is ever to be feared, even if it is the machinery of an academy or an education office. The only alternative to machinery, especially the machinery of politics, is the "inward working" of culture itself, which can determine when "routine and authority" obstruct rather than free the creative man in politics, in literature, or in the church. Burke, also, finds the quality of the man a greater consideration than the "machinery" under which the man works (\textit{Appeal}, IV, 202).

The anti-individualism of both is further redeemed by their clear awareness of French centralism and its evils. French centralism generated some of Burke's most violent and passionate outbursts—a centralism which he thought was composed of "litigious attorneys and Jew brokers" and "shameless women of the lowest condition, by keepers of hotels, taverns and brothels, by pert apprentices, by clerks, shop-boys, hair-dressers, fiddlers and dancers on the stage"
(Letter to a Member, IV, 4). Arnold was convinced that the native British individualism would balance any possible over-centralization; even the French had their culture and open mindedness to redeem their centralism.

(f)

The attitude toward the individual clearly affects Arnold's political judgment. To the doctrinaire liberal the voice of the people is sacrosanct and the voice of the people is the voice of the separate individuals. Lord Morley, for instance, in his Recollections, asserts that the root tenet of all Liberalism is "Respect for the dignity and worth of the individual." Arnold could hardly disagree, but he would disagree with Morley's black-and-white distinction in saying that the opposite of such Liberalism is Militarism. Arnold, of course, respects the dignity and worth of the individual, but what that individual is determines the type and even the amount of respect that he deserves. The gallery of portraits in Culture and Anarchy shows Arnold disinterestedly impaling a number of contemporary figures who did not have the requisite dignity and worth as individuals.

Arnold, could he have read Morley, would have recognized in the term militarism another catchword, more

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claptrap. With Burke and the conservative tradition, Arnold knows that the individual may be easily corrupted if he is controlled by his passions. Burke himself is not above rousing the ordinary feelings. The Reflections might have been a better book had Burke's taste been better or had he not appropriated the technique of his enemy to vanquish the enemy. Despite his own lack of purity, and Arnold bears his stains, Burke denounces the French for appealing to the passions of the individual Frenchman just as Arnold denounces the Liberal party of his own day for pandering to the ordinary passions of certain of its electorate. The rejection of an individualism expressing man's ordinary self for a collective, moral better self is conservative. The political Liberal denies any possibility of two selves—the idea sounds too mystical—and he must trust the ordinary self. As a result, Arnold says, the Liberal party contributed nothing to English political life.

Arnold's idea of expanding equality bears on his concept of the individual. Arnold never reduces all men to one level (he accuses the Americans of accomplishing just this intellectual mediocrity), but rather he raises greater numbers of men to an ideal. A man cannot "get" culture if his life is spent behind the bullock in a plowed furrow. Only when the nation is freed of the artificial restraints of inequality may the individual have that inward working
to produce his own culture. Then the Socrates in every man's breast may operate. The idealistic Liberal would recognize in such a desire a kindred fellow, but again the practicing Liberal, Arnold saw, seldom recognizes the cultural ideal: he concentrates rather on disestablishing an Irish church, on enabling a man to marry his deceased wife's sister, on building larger and uglier truss manufactories on the grandest site in Europe.

The literary effect of Arnold's anti-individualism is chiefly seen in his belief that the genius, individual though he is, can benefit from the establishment of a center. To Arnold, the Romantic poets suffered from the lack of a functioning criticism, an order of ideas, which might have saved them from some of their own eccentricity (EC¹, p. 6). Goethe too suffered from this lack of the unwritten essay in his society, suffered from his extreme individuality of his imagination, and although English poetry needed this magic, it did not need the diffuseness and lack of form that imagination alone may yield.

And yet Arnold's criticism, although it frequently mentions the word form, has little to say about the corporate ideal of literature itself. One can rationalize the lack of solid description of literary form in several ways. In the first place, Arnold himself has no prerogative to prescribe a form. He is but one individual, and the concept of form
grows from a practicing literary art. Concept of form cannot arise in a society which lays such value in individual merit as the English society. All that Arnold can do is to provide the climate of culture in which a concept of form becomes important. The society gives it to the creator—the poet, the dramatist, even the historian—and no critic can make it himself. In the second place, form merely exists. It has its own touchstones, and all that the critic can do is point to the touchstones of form as Arnold does when he holds up Milton and Dante and his Greeks for the sake of the modern writer.

11
The Church

Any Arnold bibliography shows that Arnold's religious feeling has fascinated a great number of writers. On the other hand, I know of no specific analysis of Burke's own particular religious feeling. He was accused in his own time of being a Jesuit in disguise, but any critic who would attempt to determine Burke's religious belief would have more than a difficult time since his religion is so inexorably bound with his politics. Burke rarely talks about particular belief, but he has much to say about the function of religion in the state. Arnold does talk about belief, but even in Arnold the question often becomes not "what to believe" but rather "what to believe for what purpose." The question of actual belief, therefore, need not
concern us here: the real question is the relationship between belief and government and the question of the form which religious government should take. In short, to use that long word, both were "antidisestablishmentarianists" and both justify the State Church.

In both writers State controls the Established Church. The Church, as a function of the state, serves as a channel, a tradition, into which the religious thought of a nation might flow. To achieve this function, the Church, by its nature, educates a people under the direction of the State. Burke and Arnold therefore both mistrust the Dissenting sects although each grants certain qualified excellence to the Dissenters. As a consequence of their views of church government, both writers lean toward the Anglo-Catholic group in the English Church.

(a)

Burke lived much in the tradition of as little government as possible, but he did set down certain areas where the State properly should control. The State ought to control "the exterior establishment of its religion... (or) in a word, to everything that is truly and properly public."\(^8\) The question of state control of religion also comes up in

\(^8\) Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, V, 166; Arnold refers to this passage in Popular Education in France (London, 1861), pp. 234-235 in support of his argument for state-controlled religious educational system.
a discussion of the right of Irish Catholicism. In any question of church government, Burke writes, "The good of the commonwealth is the rule which rides over the rest; and to this every other must completely submit" ("First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe," IV, 258). Ideally the Church and the State should be one and the same thing as integral parts of the same whole, but since this ideal cannot be realized in England where Baptist and Quaker sects have a prescriptive right to be outside of the particular state church, then the State itself acquires a superior position. "The object of the state," Burke writes in the same speech, "is (as far as may be) the happiness of the whole" (VII, 47). The state, consequently, is "of the religion of all its citizens, without the fanaticism of any" (Pop Ed, p. 220).

In his "Preface" to Literature and Dogma Arnold makes one of his many statements to the effect that religion does not encompass his entire view of human perfection. The Bible has little to say about art, science, and manners (L&D, p. viii). Arnold rejects the suggestion that the Irish Bishops control the Irish Catholic education on the grounds that no hierarchy may claim to "stand as the

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proctor and plenipotentiary of the whole community... The proctor for a nation is the national government" ("Preface" (1874) to Schools and Universities, pp. 121-122). Religion follows, like human society itself, a law of growth that is manifested "in the whole community rather than in any religious hierarchy" (Ibid., p. 121). Therefore, the state, as the only representative of the whole community, must exercise control over the Church: "the State, the corporation which contains all others, ought not to be governed by one of the corporations which it contains" (Ibid., p. 123).

In the "Preface" to Culture and Anarchy Arnold gives three reasons for an Established Church:

1. Establishments "tend to give us a sense of a historical life of the human spirit, outside and beyond our own fancies and feelings."

2. They "tend to suggest new sides and sympathies in us to cultivate."

3. By saving us "from having to invent and fight for our own forms of religion, they give us leisure and calm to steady our view of religion itself" (C&A, pp. 20-21).

The first and the third of these I would like to discuss together to show that to Arnold and Burke the Church is a channel, a tradition, into which the collective religious thought of a nation may flow. To these two writers the
Church of England was not a sect, but an expression of the national religious feeling, "the historical life of the human spirit, outside and beyond our own fancies and feelings." Through the church, growth and development toward religious perfection is best possible since having the form "gives us leisure and calm to steady our view of religion itself."

The first of these ideas, that establishment gives the human spirit life outside of human fancies, Burke discusses at the very beginning of his Reflections. With complete astonishment Burke finds Dr. Price in his "Sermon in the Old Jewry" calling for a rejection of "the old staple of the national church" in favour of the rich variety to be found in individual fancies and feelings. Price has urged not the propagation of any one opinion but all opinions (III, 246-248). Later Burke devotes a whole section to justification of church establishment. While his discussion is continually distracted by the spectacle of the French disestablishment under the Assembly, the theme of the whole discussion is the fact that the English in their establishments "continue to act on the early received and uniformly continued sense of mankind."^{10}

^{10}III, 352-353; for the whole discussion, 352-374.
Arnold repeatedly uses this traditional justification of the establishment. In *A French Eton*, he says that the Establishment provides a shelter and a basis for culture (pp. 77-78). If thought and speculation are eminently individual matters, worship and devotion in the church is a "collective" matter not only in space but in time (*C&A*, pp. 170-171). He has no patience with "the want of historic and philosophic sense shown" by the Noncomformists (*St. P.* and *P.*, p. xvii). The theology of a national or historic Church may incorporate Aberglaube, or superstition, from the *Zeitgeist*, but precisely because it is a national or historic church, it will also excrete useless material. The Puritans, in putting religion on an individual basis, virtually required that Aberglaube become solidified since the individual can not judge it. In preventing the collective life by their individualism they also prevented collective growth in church doctrine.

The belief that through the Established Church religious development is possible because it gives the leisure and quietness to keep a steady eye on religion itself is found principally in Burke's notion that the prudent man will choose the belief which builds society rather than those which destroy. The monastic institutions, for instance, had a great power for benevolence in France precisely because of their steady foundation. Arnold finds it a
pity, rather than a boon, when a Midland county manufacturer praises the establishment of an independent chapel in his community and the resultant "sharp contests" (C&A, p. 21).

Arnold has no faith in the dialectic process resulting, for in the "swelling and spreading" of contention, the disputants lose all sight of the objective to dispute on the ground on which they stand (French Eton, p. 78). Lacking the forms of religion, the individual Puritan brings the form down to his own level; he is not drawn up to the beauty which the historical establishment creates. Worse, he wastes his energy on these forms which express only his ordinary self rather than devote the same energy to modifying, improving, developing the establishment so that the nation might have a higher stage of insight into religious truth (St. P. and P., p. 105).

It follows that if the Church is the tradition into which and from which the collective religious thought of a nation flows, the Church itself must express that national thought and not any outside authority. Both Burke and Arnold therefore maintain the perfect right to modify from within the establishment. Burke rejects outside influence in the speech on "The Acts of Uniformity," and Arnold

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objects when it comes in the form of the Liberal recommendation that the Church be separated from the State. The dilemma of nineteenth-century religion cannot be solved by separating "the nation in its collective and corporate character from religion," Arnold writes (L&D, p. x) and his reason follows Burke's reason; for the people must "in their corporate character...perform their national homage to the Institutor...of Civil Society" (Reflections, III, 361).

(b)

When Arnold justifies Establishments on the grounds that they "tend to suggest new sides and sympathies in us to cultivate," he strikes at another idea which he shares with Burke, that, by its nature, the Church has a function in the education of its people. In its ceremonies and its slowly realized expression of Christian ideal, the Establishment provides the standards of morality and conduct. It also provides an ideal of beauty, and since the Church has the function of educating the young, it contributes directly to the cultural values of the nation. Or, as Murray puts it in his English Political and Social Thought, Arnold "affirmed with Burke that without (a national church) there would be no perfect culture, no complete civilisation" (p. 172). Complete culture, Arnold affirms, comes by the cultivation of four powers: the power of conduct, the power of beauty, the power of knowledge, and the
power of social life and manners. To both writers the Establishment suggests new sides and sympathies in these four areas, but the influence in social life and manners is chiefly by indirection.

That the Establishment provides the standards of morality and conduct is almost a basic assumption in Arnold. He objects to English overemphasis on conduct, but clearly he would not destroy, especially as it comes from the Establishment, this excellence. If Renan differs from Burke, when Arnold compares them, the difference is the Frenchman's fatal lack of the moral conscience (EC, p. 166). In a sense Renan, despite his many virtues, suffers from the very fault which Burke had prophesied in the Appeal. After the constitution haters of France and England have succeeded in separating Church and State, "Then will be felt, and too late will be acknowledged, the ruin which follows the disjoining of religion from the state, the separation of morality from policy, and the giving conscience no concern and no coactive or coercive force in the most material of all social ties, the principle of our obligations to government." This "coactive force" has, of course, a

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12 Appeal, IV, 202. Arnold quotes from Burke's discussion of establishments, Reflections, III, 366-367, in "Equality," ME, p. 87, but Arnold has slightly shifted Burke's idea in using the material. Burke speaks of "our often unhappy brethren," the aristocracy, and points out that the Establishment has great value in relieving them from the oppressive burden of "things" which their position demands. Arnold, however, forgets Burke's purpose and uses his
positive service in the national life. Looking at the Church in Europe in the past, Arnold declares that it did "ennoble and elevate the sentiment of the European masses." The Church, because it was above the individual, served as a beacon to the imagination of the masses of men "in whose daily avocations there was little that was vast, little which was grand" and it also "preserved these masses from any danger of overrating with vulgar self-satisfaction an inferior culture...by the exhibition of a standard of dignity and refinement still far above them." Arnold, like Burke (see Reflections, III, 419-420), does not deny that the Established Church often has "lacked the sanctity or the refinement ascribed" but the lack in the past does not justify abandonment of an institution today. It still retains the positive value of suggesting "new sides and sympathies" in the individual's conduct during these later times. Because the Church indeed "offers an ideal which is noble and attaching," it does affect the morality, the conduct, of a nation and it must be retained by the nation itself. Unless this attaching quality is contained in a

language only to support his mid-nineteenth-century idea that these people are "unhappy" because inequality has materialized them. Arnold is "disposed to marvel that human beings, in a position so false, should be so good," but he says nothing here to the effect that their goodness comes from their close association with the Established Church. Arnold seems anxious to avoid any connection between the Church and the aristocracy. See his letter to Newman, 29 November 1871, Arnold Whitridge, ed., Unpublished Letters (New Haven, 1923), pp. 57-58.

national establishment, the quality falls into the dust of individual thought and preference.

Arnold's four powers are so inexorably connected that it is difficult to talk about one without impinging on the territory of the others. Already in talking about the Establishment's ability to foster moral excellence, the question of beauty has entered in his suggestion that the Church provides nobility. This power to provide beauty Burke also recognizes in the Established Church. The Church offers a standard of beauty "in buildings, in music, in decoration, in speech, in the dignity of persons" (Reflections, III, 361). Although Arnold has little to say about music or decoration, he feels strongly about the standards of beautiful speech offered in the Establishment. In arguing the merits of "Irish Catholicism and British Liberalism," Arnold repeatedly states that the Catholic Church gives its communicants "the beauty, the richness, the poetry, the infinite charm for the imagination" that the Nonconformists and their Liberal friends cannot give (ME, p. 118). Not only does the Church provide religion, it gives its communicants "their art and poetry and culture" (ME, p. 116). Dante and even Shakespeare benefited from such Establishment because it is "unconscious, popular, profoundly rooted, all-enveloping" as only an established and historical church can be.
Then too the Church provides for growth, by suggesting new sides and sympathies, in its direct function of education. Burke boasts, in the Reflections, that English education "is in a manner wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics, and in all stages from infancy to manhood" (III, 363). As a result of the Church's education, the English "may put in claim to as ample and as early a share in all the improvements in science, in arts, and in literature, which have illuminated and adorned the modern world, as any other nation in Europe" (III, 364). Burke extols "the Gothic and monkish education" (Loc. cit.) in England, and Arnold extols Oxford "whispering from her towers the last enchantments of the Middle Age...calling us nearer to the true goal of all of us, to the ideal, to perfection,—to beauty, in a word, which is only truth seen from another side...than all the science of Tübingen" (Ec1, p. xiv).

Burke goes even further than Arnold in suggesting that the Church can develop new sides and sympathies in social life and manners. Burke praises the connection between the English ecclesiastic and the nation's gentleman and notes that the connection continues even beyond the formal education. When a young man goes on his tour after his schooling "to link experience and study together," his companion is not a domestic but rather a Churchman who may be as well born as his gentleman companion. "By this
connection," Burke writes, "we conceive that we attach our
gentlemen to the Church; and we liberalize the Church by
an intercourse with leading characters of the country."14
Eton and Harrow, with "their Barbarians all at play" did
teach, Arnold allows, their students manners and behavior.
Regretably these schools could not also supply the culture
that the Philistine's son needed. (ME, p. 148).

(c)

Two writers who defend the Establishment in such
terms cannot but oppose the dissenting sects. In the first
place, the individualism of the dissenting sects expresses
the ordinary self of their communicants and this individual-
ism diffuses the religious energy which they contain. In
Burke this opposition takes a political character, for he
could not accept the secularization of politics which dis-
senting individualism demanded. In Arnold the triumph of
Puritanism would simply be the triumph of the ordinary
self (St. P. and P., p. xxi) and would result in the same

14 Reflections, III, 363. Arnold, it should be remember-
ed, had also picked up from the Reflections, III, 334, the
idea "There ought to be a system of manners in every nation
which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish. To
make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely." Arn
68. While Burke does not specifically mention the church
in this context, he does use it to justify English institu-
tions against French individualism. "...our institutions
can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in
persons,—so as to create in us love, veneration, admira-
tion, or attachment."
political diffusion that Burke had feared. In other words, although conceiving different means being employed by the dissenters, the objective of complete dissenting control would be the same (Cf. C&A, p. 16 and Petition of Unitarians, V, 41-57). Also, the dissenting sects constitute a tradition outside of the national framework and in some sense hostile to it. Arnold does not accuse the dissenters of subversion but the weight of dissenting opinion tended to cripple effective State action. Arnold makes this charge especially when the dissenters force the Liberal Party to retreat from healing measures for Ireland and when they influence foreign policy. Because they constitute a tradition outside of the national framework, Arnold writes, "they have offended, what Burke calls 'the ancient and inbred integrity, piety, good nature and good humour of the English people.' We shall not affect to regret this, for we have long said ...that they are an obstacle to civilisation. They are indeed; our greatest."15 What happened at Delphi but that the place existed only in name "and what continued to exist there was merely a number of forms" (G&B, p. 130). Non-conformity was turning England into a Delphi.

Both writers, however, tolerate the dissenting sects because of an unwillingness to admit that any...

15"Preface"(1874), Schools and Universities, p. 130; Letter to a Noble Lord, V, 204-205. Arnold uses the phrase at the end of "A Last Word on the Burials Bill," St. P. and P., p. 378, for the same purpose.
particular religious body has a full and final account of
religious truth. Burke writes to his son that "the body
and substance of every religion I regard much more than any
of the forms and dogmas of the particular sects" (IV, 401).
There is, Burke writes, "a reasonable worship" in all re-
ligion and he would not allow diversity of form to destroy
religion ("Speech on Relief of Protestant Dissenters," VII,
36). Both the Catholic and the Protestant, Arnold writes,
have the germ of religious truth, but neither can claim the
whole truth (ME, p. 130). Particularly after the Revolu-
tion Burke insists that all forms and dogmas of the sects
be sublimated to the question of religion itself as a power
against the contagion spreading through Europe from France.
Arnold attempts to recast religion itself, but his enemy
was the contagion of science and the contagion of French
philosophical principles. 16 Therefore, Burke recommends at
the end of the eighteenth century that the Irish Catholic
religion be established in Ireland on the same basis as the
Anglican Establishment in England. 17 Burke conceived of

16 "The Incompatibles," ME, TE, and Others, pp. 286; "A
Letter to William Smith, Esq., on the Subject of Catholic

17 See Burke's "Letter to Richard Burke, Esq., on
Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland," VI, 401, and also the ex-
tact from Burke's Correspondence (1844), IV, 10, which
Arnold copied in the first of his two "General Note-books,”
Lowry, Note-books, p. 444.
separate establishments for England, Scotland, and Ireland, but Arnold went one step further and suggested that, once England had established true local government, the matter of establishment could be determined by each local government. Thus the Welsh establishment might be a Methodist and the Protestant sections of Ireland would have a Protestant establishment along with the Catholic establishment in the rest of Ireland (Civ. in US, pp. 148-149).

This discussion has primarily concerned itself with the methods of Church establishment, but it may not be out of place to observe here that both Burke and Arnold leaned toward the Catholic. Burke, if anything, was a High Church Anglican. The dissenting churches were negative; only the Anglican and the Catholic communion had a positive doctrine of belief. The Anglican Church, he writes, is the true national form of the Roman Catholic worship. Arnold, in his essay written after his religious books, writes,

I persist in thinking that the prevailing form for the Christianity of the future will be in the form of Catholicism; but a catholicism purged, opening itself to the light and air, having the consciousness of its own poetry, freed from its sacerdotal despotism and freed from its pseudo-scientific apparatus of superannuated dogma. Its forms will be retained, as symbolising with the force and charm of poetry a few cardinal facts and ideas, simple indeed, but indispensable and inexhaustible, and on which our race could lay hold only by materialising them (ME, pp. 120-121).

Such Catholicism is, perhaps, just the historical Catholicism of the English church which Burke so vigorously supports in the *Reflections* and the *Appeal*

(d)

Apparently, from this discussion, both Burke and Arnold look upon church government and the church itself for its utility to the State. Much as both admire the Church and religion, in justifying it on the grounds of its use to the State each contributes toward the death of that which he loves. For, as the history of the church since the nineteenth century particularly shows, the minute that any organization is rationalized on the basis of its utility, it immediately signs its own death warrant. If the church is the bulwark of the State, more effective bulwarks can be found. The religion of the State itself, i.e., nationalism, serves the State directly without any intermediary. A Ministry of Propaganda or a Minister of Education more directly serves the State than any subordinate corporation. If "the State, the corporation which contains all others, ought not to be governed by one of the corporations which it contains," then the larger corporation may easily usurp its subordinate on the grounds of inefficiency and inutility.

In conclusion, both Burke and Arnold find a necessity for the State Church as a subordinate corporation in
the government which has as its function the preservation and enlargement of religious truth. Since they go counter to the larger institution, however, the dissenting sects must either be nationalized themselves or forget their differences and enter the national church. Both writers do tolerate the sects, on the other hand, as approximations of the truth, but each prefers the positive doctrine of the Anglo-Catholic group of the English Church.

III

The Leader

To the historian a cause célèbre has an undoubted value in settling attitudes of the men who lived at that time. A court trial of a Hastings or a Dreyfus, with all of its evidence and publicity, demands judgment by each individual concerned with his society. Because the concrete facts are so bruited about and emotions so aroused, judgment itself becomes the excrescence of long sublimated attitudes that, in a flash, reveal motivations obscured in the ordinary hubbub of mundane politics. George H. Ford has made an admirable use of the Governor Eyre case as a touchstone for high Victorian political and social belief, but he errs in placing Arnold with Carlyle, for Arnold's

concept of the leader, a concept he shares with Burke, cannot be bracketed with Carlyle's concept without damaging and even perverting Arnold's thought.  

The Governor Eyre case may serve as a touchstone for Arnold, too, but not by Arnold's participation on one side or the other, but by Arnold's aloofness, his disinterestedness precisely at a moment when all men were choosing sides.

In the fall of 1865, Eyre, the English governor in Jamaica, suppressed a Negro revolt and declared martial law in the county where the revolt originated. A month after the revolt, martial law was lifted, but in that month 586 natives had been killed or executed, 600 flogged, and over 1000 houses destroyed. Eyre arrested a Negro agitator in Kingston, where martial law had not been declared, and transported him to the revolt area, summarily trying and executing him. When news of Eyre's brutal suppression reached England, John Stuart Mill formed a committee, which included Thomas Huxley, Goldwin Smith, Frederic Harrison, Thomas Hughes, Herbert Spencer, and John Bright, to urge

20 Frederick L. Mulhauser, in "The Tradition of Burke," Reinterpretation of Victorian Literature, p. 165 says that both Arnold and Mill derived a concept of the leader from Burke. Robert E. Murray in English Social and Political Thinkers (London, 1928), p. 151 writes, "When men tell the beardless of Mill's disciples, they commonly omit (Arnold's) name, yet it deserves inclusion." Trilling, on the other hand, says that Culture and Anarchy "may be understood as in large part an indirect answer to On Liberty," p. 237.
Eyre's prosecution. He also had the support of Charles Darwin, A. R. Wallace, Leslie Stephen, John Morley, Sir Charles Lyell, and Fitzjames Stephen (Ford, 223-224). After the initial success of Mill's committee in having Eyre relieved from his post, Carlyle formed a defense committee to defend Eyre (a disciple of the Scot's theory of the leader) in the criminal prosecution that Mill undertook. The committee to defend Eyre included Ruskin, Samuel C. Hall, John Tyndall, Sir Roderick Murchison, and Charles and Henry Kingsley. Even before Carlyle formed his committee, Lord Elcho, the Liberal Conservative peer, defended Eyre. Carlyle's committee received support from Dickens, Tennyson, J. A. Froude, and, Ford suggests, "even Matthew Arnold seems to have given his more discreet blessing to it" (Ford, 226).

Ford justifies his placing Arnold in the group on the grounds that in this case, as nowhere else, the words "reason" and "feeling" so clearly divided nineteenth-century writers into two groups, "the one stemming from the romantic conservatives such as Burke and Scott, and the other from the Philosophical Radicals who had supported the French Revolution" (Ford, 227). He places Arnold in the "feeling" group on the strength of *Culture and Anarchy*.

The public mind, Ford alleges, connected the Hyde Park riots with the Jamaican revolution. The riots did
have their share in impelling Arnold to write *Culture and Anarchy*, but Arnold's interest in Hyde Park differs from Carlyle's interest in Jamaica. Arnold quarrels not with the rioters but with the failure of administration which the riot revealed: had Arnold written on Jamaica, Eyre would have been his object of attack as the Alderman-Colonel and other ineffective administrators are his object in *Culture and Anarchy*. To be sure, Arnold does quote his father on the Roman treatment of rioters—"flog the rank and file, and fling the ringleaders from the Tarpeian Rock!"—but to assert that this statement (it was removed in the second edition in 1875) epitomizes Arnold's thought is to misread the book. Ford also quotes Arnold's statement that the best self, or right reason, "enjoins us to encourage and uphold the occupants of the executive power, whoever they may be, in firmly prohibiting [riots and demonstrations]" (*C&A*, p. 97; Ford, 233). To Ford the phrase "whoever they may be" is especially interesting, for he interprets it to be support of any administrator, even an administrator of Eyre's stripe. But in Arnold's text, the phrase means that the best self enjoins us to support existing and legal authority. Eyre had no law. The Philistine Alderman-Colonel failed to do what the law required him to do. Mill was incensed because Eyre went beyond the law, and Carlyle was incensed because the English refused to let Eyre go beyond the law to handle the "nigger question" in his own
heroic way. No matter how the public might have connected Hyde Park and Jamaica, Arnold's subject differs in considerable degree from Jamaica and Governor Eyre.

Ford admits that there is little direct evidence for placing Arnold in either group. He denies Trilling's assertion that the final paragraph of *Celtic Literature*, with its plea for a Celtic Chair at Oxford to counteract Philistine culture and to send "a message of peace to Ireland," refers directly to the Eyre case because Trilling cannot cite Eyre's name to justify the connection. 21 "Indeed, to the best of my knowledge," Ford continues, "in none of his writings does Arnold ever speak of Governor Eyre directly--a rather surprising omission..." (Ford, 233); the omission is not surprising, however, if we remember Arnold's impatience with Clough for mingling too much in public affairs.

While Arnold does not mention Eyre, he refers to the case in "A Courteous Explanation," a letter printed in *Friendship's Garland*, dated 19 March 1866, which Arnold wrote at the same time he was delivering his lectures on *Celtic Literature*. The letter answers a French republican who has reproved Arnold for not diffusing "the knowledge and love of true political liberty" as he should. This

21 On the Study of Celtic Literature, pp. 136-137; Trilling, p. 222; Ford, 232.
freedom Arnold characterizes as the "tail" which French republicans have lost. He sympathizes with the French in their loss, but since the English still possess their own tails, he need not praise them for having this "beautiful, bushy object." Arnold is interested in other things,

...hearts, for instance, and head. In hearts we are (except when we find ourselves in India or Jamaica) very well off; but in heads there is always room for improvement (FG, pp. 162-163).

Surely in the spring of 1866 Arnold refers explicitly to the Eyre case, and he puts himself squarely on the opposite of where Ford has placed him. The important things is not "feeling," but "the improvement and decoration of our heads" (FG, p. 164). Since the hard unintelligence, which is the Englishman's bane, "cannot be conquered by storm," then it must be reached by "studying things that are outside of ourselves, and by studying them disinterestedly" (CL, p. 137). The Eyre case was neither "outside of ourselves" nor could it have been studied "disinterestedly." The omission of Eyre's name from Arnold's writing, then, is not surprising at all.

Furthermore, to say that Arnold "was instinctively on the side of Carlyle" (Ford, 233) and his group is to overlook certain apparent attitudes of Arnold's. Arnold had friends and enemies in both camps, but he called Carlyle a "moral desperado" before the Eyre case broke and after Carlyle's death he said that Carlyle, in preaching
earnestness, was carrying coals to Newcastle. Carlyle's earnestness and compulsive moral interest the Eyre case only magnified. Arnold treats Lord Elcho, the Liberal Conservative peer who also defended Eyre, somewhat more gently in *Culture and Anarchy* than others. Lord Elcho "was exactly the perfection, or happy mean, or virtue, of aristocracy," but he still lacks "light," as Arnold makes perfectly clear in *Friendship's Garland* ("the mere cock of his lordship's hat is one of the finest and most aristocratic things we have") and in *Culture and Anarchy*. Politics does make strange bedfellows, but putting Arnold with the Kingsleys is equally as difficult as putting him with Bright and Herbert Spencer, who were on Mill's committee. If the Eyre case is a touchstone for Arnold, it is not a touchstone because "instinctively" he belongs on the side of Carlyle. "Instinctively" he belongs in a third group of quiet, intelligent, disinterested, cultured men to whom he spoke at Oxford on *Celtic Literature*. Neither Carlyle nor Mill fully encompassed Arnold's ideal of the leader (and his ideal of colonial management). For his true ideal, we must go back to Burke, but not to the stereotype of Burke as the precursor of romantic conservatism nor of the Burke who opposed the French Revolution and, therefore, all truth and light.
To Burke and Arnold the leader expresses the corporate character of the nation in its reason and in its feeling. The leader does understand the temper of his nation, but in following it he does not go contrary to the requirements of his own right reason or culture. Essentially, the leader is not committed to the machinery of party, to feelings, or to interests (as Carlyle was), but to his own imaginative reason. Arnold's heroes as politicians--Burke, Falkland, and even Sainte-Beuve--perfectly illustrate this disinterested view of affairs. At the proper moment, they throw their weight into the balance, but only after a careful and intelligent examination of the reason and feeling.

(a)

The leader expresses the corporate character of his nation because he has been educated at the national universities by the national church. Therefore he has a disinterested knowledge of his past as it continues into the present, and he is thoroughly alert to the expediency of modern times. He is the visible representation of the nation's best self and its best standards of value. He forms, as a consequence, a natural aristocracy.

In the Reflections Burke extols the connection of the English educational system with the Church and national life. In his "Letter on the Penal Laws Against the Irish Catholics" he vigorously supports the right of the Irish to
a national system of education to discipline and form the mind of the citizens (IV, 227-235) because the Penal Laws, barbaric in their repression, keep Ireland in the state where "feeling" alone is the basis of human action. Arnold's educational writing, of course, echoes this penalty which the English have paid in their own citizens' lack of training. Positively, Arnold commends the Prussian educational system for requiring that "a man who exercises an important public function...should exercise it with the light, help, and discipline of the best culture which the nation has to give. This culture is given by the national universities."22 The concluding paragraph of Celtic Literature reflects this theme too.

As a result of this education, the leader will be a disinterested man of the broadest culture. Burke deprecates the French National Assembly because it contains, by choice, members who cannot be disinterested. The majority of its members were trained as physicians or lawyers; the one group can have little knowledge of governmental affairs and the other has only an interested knowledge. His old enemy, Lord North, had a "mind most perfectly disinterested" even if he lacked a sense of command that his time required (Noble Lord, V, 182). Since Burke refused to speak on French

22 "Preface" (1874), Schools and Universities, p. 95.
affairs without direct contact and excused his judgment on Ireland because of the lack of recent contact, the disinterestedness is not removal from the world of affairs. Concern with affairs, as Arnold and Burke both point out, is requisite to develop right reason and culture itself. Arnold admires just this quality of intelligent disinterest in Burke. 23 The true leader, Arnold contends, "should see clearly how the world is going, what our modern tendencies and needs really are, and what is routine and fiction in that which we have inherited from the past." 24 Arnold bases his grudging admiration of the aristocracy on the "relative standard of elevation, refinement and grandeur" which the class exhibits, but he rejects it for the failure to see clearly how the world is going. As a class, it lacks disinterest. 25

That the leader is a visible representation of a nation's best standard of value is seen only indirectly in Burke himself, but Arnold saw Burke as representing the


24 "The Nadir of Liberalism," Nineteenth Century, XIX (1886), 653. In the same essay Arnold remarks that Gladstone fulfills this ideal better than Newman or Mill. The statement quoted here also recalls the "Heine" essay in EC1.

nation's best standard. Burke has comparatively little to say about the personality of a leader, but the *Letter to a Noble Lord* is his apology for himself as a leader. Burke, of course, was not "Swaddled and rocked and dandled into a legislator" (V, 193), but rather he obtained his position and the pension of George III on the basis of his service to the whole nation. He represented the nation and the nation had rewarded him for it. He labored to preserve "pure and untainted, the ancient, inbred integrity, piety, good-nature and good-humor of the people of England" (204-205).

The leader attaches himself to the thought and strength of the nation. Burke, Arnold wrote, "is to be conceived as the great voice" of his epoch, and "he carried his country with him, and was in some sort a providential person" (*Letters*, II, 192). During the Napoleonic Wars the aristocracy managed to express all of England's force, managed to lead her consummately, but the aristocracy had lost its touch and the touch could not be regained by a violent assertion of aristocratic prerogatives from the feudal periods as Carlyle suggested when he defended Eyre (*FC*, pp. 148-150). The aristocratic leadership, Arnold feels, was a natural product of the social forces that enabled these people to lead: it cannot be reestablished by fiat.
The leader, as a consequence, establishes a natural aristocracy. Burke uses the term and justifies the right of such a natural aristocracy, the *virtute et honore majores*, to govern those who are *numero plures* (Appeal, IV, 174-175). This natural aristocracy has the qualities of high breeding which Arnold subsumes under the term aristocracy, but it also includes qualities that we would recognize in the savant and the merchant. The natural aristocrat in Burke bears a distinct resemblance to the "remnant" Arnold finds in America or in any commonwealth. In the essay "Numbers" in *Discourses in America*, Arnold asserts the doctrine of the creative minority (to use the acceptable modern phrase) in the very heart of the symbol of the mass-mind, for such America is in Arnold's prose. Arnold attempts to find in the "remnant," in the man of culture, a natural aristocracy wider and fuller than Burke's, for Arnold seeks to limit, by his cry for equality, the restrictive emphasis of property. Surely Governor Eyre and Carlyle, for all of their belief in a natural right to govern and suppress, reveal "the want of soul and delicacy" of the majority. Eyre had followed action for its own sake, without troubling to make reason and the will of God prevail (C&A, p. 46). He is not true "épanouissement de

A second quality of the leader is that not only should he express the culture of his nation, its corporate character, but he should understand the temper of his nation. Burke defended himself against his electors at Bristol for not following their own particular wishes in the national assembly but following, what to Burke is higher, the temper of the nation. As a leader, Burke says, he represents the nation and not the particular corporation of Bristol. A nation may be corrupted into believing its temper is a certain thing; the temper of the French people "was far from discovering any sort of dissatisfaction with the power and prerogatives of the crown" (Appeal, IV, 107), but the French intellectuals instilled a new temper into the people and made the Revolution. Arnold, in his cries against publicity, objects that the Liberal Party understood only the temper of the ordinary self which the Party catered to. Stein's land act reflects the Prussian ability to understand the true temper, and the French success in binding the Alsatians closely to the corporate whole.

27DIA, p. 51; see Arnold's praise of Napoleon for establishing the Legion of Honor to do homage to "those distinctions of rank...salutary and necessary to society...the essential distinctions of nature herself," Popular Education, p. 236.
shows the continental success just where the English leadership has been most unfruitful. The English have not bound the Irish but rather made them isolates and driven them to alien Jacobinism. 28

The leader follows the temper of the people, but he does not go contrary to the requirements of the nation or the requirements of his own culture to do so. In other words, he is a true leader. As a leader, he unites himself to the force or the strength of the whole nation rather than to any particular group, party, or interest. As a leader he is under no compulsion to accept any majority rule since he governs in terms of a total view which his electorate or his reader (in the case of the artist) cannot possibly see. The leader has, in Arnold's terms, imaginative reason.

The quality of imaginative leadership is observable in Burke's remarks on change in the "Speech on the Plan for Economic Reform":

But as it is the interest of government that reformation should be early, it is the interest of the people that it should be temperate. It is their interest, because a temperate reform is permanent, and because it has a principle of

28"The Incompatibles," ME, IE, and Others, p. 288. "Finally, we have today,...the Irish people, if not yet 'whole Jacobins,' as Burke said we were making them, at least in a fair way to become so." The Burke quotation is from the "Letter to William Smith, Esq.," VI, 371. Arnold is not using the term Jacobin here quite in the sense that Burke is. To Burke, the English were driving the Irish directly into the French camp; to Arnold the term here chiefly means opposite to the Union which he desires.
growth. Whenever we improve, it is right to leave room for a further improvement. It is right to consider, to look about us, to examine the effect of what we have done. Then we can proceed with confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence. Whereas in hot reformations, in what men more zealous than considerate call making clear work, the whole is generally so crude, so harsh, so indigest, mixed with so much imprudence and so much injustice, so contrary to the whole course of human nature and human institutions, that the very people who are most eager for it are among the first to grow disgusted at what they have done. Then some part of the abdicated grievance is recalled from its exile in order to become a corrective of the correction. Then the abuse assumes all the credit and popularity of a reform. The very idea of purity and disinterestedness in politics falls into disrepute, and is considered as a vision of hot and inexperienced men (II, 280-281).

The leader guides slowly and with full intelligence operating. He makes concessions at the right time, but he refuses concessions which are the demand of interests. His function is to enlarge men's ideas, to allay inveterate prejudices, to restrain the vulgar passions, and to soothe popular absurdities. The leader has sweetness and light, even though the majority of people may say that the "world wants fire and strength," wants to make clear work, that "things are for the most part to be settled first and understood afterwards" as Eyre attempted to do in Jamaica (C&A, p. 205). The duty of the leader is not so much...

...to work away at certain crude reforms of which we have already the scheme in our own mind, as to create, through the help of that culture which at

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the very outset we began by praising and recommending, a frame of mind out of which the schemes of really fruitful reforms may with time grow...We...must still decline to lend a hand to...practical operations, until we, for our own part at least, have grown a little clearer about the nature of real good, and have arrived nearer to a condition of mind out of which really fruitful and solid operations may spring (C&A, p. 200).

As Burke says, in any other type of reform, "The very idea of purity and disinterestedness...falls into disrepute."

(c)

To achieve his ends, the leader attempts to unite himself with the force, or strength, of his nation rather than any particular party. Burke defends party in his early Thoughts on the Present Discontents, but if in his later work he seems to grow away from party organization and the party machine, he has no faith in single individuals accomplishing any worthwhile aims in the community. If the historian views Burke as essentially a party man, Arnold does not see him that way. In "The Function of Criticism" Arnold praises Burke's above-party position (ECI, p. 17), when he is writing "The Incompatibles," the absence of pedantry in politics (Goethe accuses the English of being pedants) is a quality which Burke alone has. The leader must go behind that account of things "which it suits our class, our party, our leaders, to adopt and to render current." And once more Arnold brings forward his desire to
see the object as it really is and quotes Burke in his
support. 

During the eighteenth century and up until 1815, the English aristocracy had the "secret of the era" because it united itself with the force of the nation (FG, pp. 128-130), but the force no longer requires the sense of fact, which the aristocracy had, but the sense of intelligence which the middle class and its leaders must develop. In Arnold's eyes, Burke has intelligence and not just feeling.

Although the leader is under no absolute compulsion from either Arnold or Burke to accept majority rule, he cannot wholly deny the feeling of the people. "Numbers in a state," Burke writes, "...are always of consideration, but they are not the whole consideration" (Appeal, IV, 174). Writing about Ireland, Burke declares that a wise government may "keep the leading parts of every branch of civil and military administration in hands of the best trust; but a total exclusion from the commonwealth is a very different thing" ("Letter to a Peer of Ireland," IV, 222). In his letters to his constituents at Bristol, Burke demands his own right to judge the rightness and expediency of governmental policy. He is their representative and therefore concerned with their interest, but he is not a delegate who

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"The Incompatibles," pp. 276-278. "We must see the matter as it really stands; we must cease to ignore, and to try to set aside, the nature of things; by contending against which, what have we got, or shall ever get, but defeat and shame?" "Speech at the Guildhall in Bristol," II, 382.
moves to every ruffle of wind. The representative has an independence denied to a delegate, an independence which the statesman will use, along with his concessions to the prejudices of his constituents, to try "to slip in as much of what he judges to be really right and expedient as he can" (Schools and Universities, p. 89). In 1864 Arnold extols the effectiveness of Prussian government for "regarding the ideal side of things in all its efforts for change" rather than the bewildered, timid, torpid multitude (EC, p. 193), but in Friendship's Garland, especially in the sections written after the Franco-Prussian War, he retracts some of his enthusiasm. To both men the leader should be free to act, "aided by the suggestions of public opinion" (ME, p. 43). Again, the Eyre case offers an instructive parallel; to Carlyle, Eyre had the perfect right to act and the attempt to bring him to correction only evinced the stupidity of the English nation. He has the right to act to Burke and Arnold if he has right reason and law to support his actions, but Eyre had neither.

(d)

In a most characteristic passage of Arnoldian prose, Arnold speaks of Falkland's great lesson to the nineteenth century--his disinterest. Arnold's language here recalls Burke speaking in the Appeal and defending his view of the Revolution. Burke, speaking of himself, discusses the
uncommonly large view which a critic of the actions in France needs. If the critic's subject has great faults, the critic will strive to see its good qualities. If the subject is generally treated favorably, then the critic will point to the errors which must be remedies (*Appeal*, IV, 111). His purpose is to determine the actual right in a case without lapsing into extremes. Arnold says the same of Falkland:

Shall we blame him for his lucidity of mind and largeness of temper? Shall we even pity him? By no means. They are his great title to our veneration. They are what make him ours; what link him with the nineteenth century. He and his friends, by their heroic and hopeless stand against the inadequate ideals dominant in their time, kept open their communications with the future, lived with the future. Their battle is ours too; and that we pursue it with fairer hopes of success than they did, we owe to their having waged it and fallen. To our English race, with its insularity, its profound faith in action, its contempt for dreamers and failers, inadequate ideals in life, manners, government, thought, religion, will always be a source of danger. Energetic action makes up, we think for imperfect knowledge. We think that all is well, that a man is following "a moral impulse," if he pursues an end which he "deems of supreme importance." We impose neither on him nor on ourselves the duty of discerning whether he is right in deeming it so (*ME*, pp. 232-233).

Arnold finds the same quality in Burke (*EC*, pp. 16-17); between the insane upholders of the Revolution and the insane upholders of the older order in England, Burke still retained the faculty of thought. Sainte-Beuve can correct a judgment of de Tocqueville, for his language and point of
view "is that of man who seeks the truth." Near the end of his life he made a speech on free thought in the French Senate, but Sainte-Beuve himself is not a defender of free thought. "He did but follow his instinct...of opposing, in whatever medium he was, the current of that medium when it seemed excessive and tyrannous"; given a different situation he would "oppose the heady current of a medium where Liberalism reigned" with the same force and vigor (EC, pp. 148-149). The typical Arnoldian hero is a man caught between two extremes. The hero in the poem can never reconcile the confusing demands of the two poles, but the hero in the prose finds some repose in occupying and vigorously defending his middle position. The anti-hero, the extremist, has seized upon a party, a program, an idea, a class—in a word, an interest—and pursued it for its own end.

(e)

Is the Arnoldian leader a Liberal or a Conservative? He is neither. As Burke says, the true critic of political affairs will defend the man who needs defense and attack the man who is smug and satisfied in his position. A Sainte-Beuve will defend free speech and free thought in a corporation where free thought has little consideration, but he will attack it in a corporation where free thought is everything. Chiefly he keeps his society from the chaos
and old night of extremism by the force of his own intellect.

In a sense he is a conservative because of his unwillingness to go to any extreme. He is a conservative because his power of leadership is limited by the right reason, the culture, the awareness that he possesses. He is conservative because he cannot go into action until he has considered and thought to discover "the thing as it really is." But no matter his success or his ill success he is never enshrined, as the Carlylean hero seems to be, in any special moral sphere which makes him immune from the criticism and censure of others.

The Romantic poet, E. D. H. Johnson says, still conceived victory possible. He retained his right to speak for his age even if his age refused to listen or understand. But the Victorian poet had no such faith; Arnold's poetry shows this sense of alienation to the point of being its chief illustration. In Arnold's criticism the poet is no longer the leader; the critic has taken over his function to explain and justify, to order and direct, to speak to his age. Arnold never raises criticism to the level of poetry, but it is a creative act just as poetry is, albeit on a

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lower level. The critic prepares the groundwork, opens
the new ideas, fosters "high, correct standards in intel-
lectual matters" and "the severe discipline necessary for
all real culture" (EC1, p. 66). Poetry can no more be
written where order has not been established than a Burke
can govern where there is no order. The critic as a
leader supplies the coercion, to make comparison with
Arnold's writing on Ireland, to establish order so that the
"healing power" of the poet may follow.

The critic of literature is axiomatically as dis-
interested as the political leader in political affairs.
He has no axes to grind, no interest to foster; he dis-
plays the literature and appreciates it so that its insight
the reader more fully recognizes in himself.

But the disinterest of the critic clearly is no re-
treat from life. Arnold castigates nearly the whole school
of romantic poets for being aloof from their epoch:

The gravest of them, Wordsworth, retired (in
Middle-Age phrase) into a monastery, I mean, he
plunged himself in the inward life, he volun-
tarily cut himself off from the modern spirit.
Coleridge took opium, Scott became the historiog-
grapher royal of feudalism. Keats passionately
gave himself up to a sensuous genius, to his
faculty for interpreting nature; and he died of
consumption at twenty-five. Wordsworth, Scott,
and Keats have left admirable works; far more
solid and complete works than those which Byron
and Shelley left. But their works have this
defect;—they do not belong to that which is
the main current of the literature of modern
epochs, they do not apply modern ideas to life
(EC1, p. 206).
It is the task of the leader as critic to supply these main currents for the artist, to interpret the "modern epoch" in terms of the past and the present.

The ideal of the leader in Arnold is Burkean, but it is not an ideal of a romantic cloud-topper instinctively seizing a mode of action from the flux. He is a natural aristocrat, but not a self-imagined hero. He is not, in other words, a Governor Eyre. He does have the quality of feeling, but his quality of intelligence directs his feeling. He makes his decisions by a disinterested study of experience from which he derives ultimate judgment. Because he is the best self of the collective and corporate nation, his moral judgment of experience can be trusted, for it arises from the collected wisdom of the ages. He sustains his institutions, with their historic laws and practice, and develops them by modifying and changing them according to the expediency of his own time. He is a leader, but he is a leader in an institution.

iv

Colonial Management

Arnold prepared three editions of English writers--Wordsworth, Byron, and Burke. The editions of Wordsworth and Byron present a selection of the best of their author's work, but the items for the edition of Burke were selected
for their political relevance. To be sure, Arnold justifies his edition on the grounds that the English should not lose Burke from the mind's circle of acquaintance any more than they should lose Swift, for "inacquaintance shuts us out from great sources of English life, thought, and language, and from the capital records of its history and development, and leaves us, in consequence, very imperfect and fragmentary Englishmen." But the apparent justification of the edition is to present Burke's thought on Irish affairs and to encourage thought in the English government.

In general, our Governments, however well-informed, feel bound, it would seem, to adapt their policy to our normal mental condition, which is, as Burke says, a non-thinking one. Burke's paramount and undying merit as a politician is that instead of accepting as fatal and necessary this non-thinking condition of ours, he battles with it, mends and changes it; he will not rest until he has "put people in a mood a little unusual with them," until he has "set them on thinking" (Preface, p. x).

Thus Arnold actually is not so much concerned with Irish affairs as with English affairs. The theme of the limitations of English thought is recognizable to any Arnold reader.

During his college days the Irish question agitated Arnold and his friends (Lowry, Letters to Clough, p. 20) and the letters to Clough show continued concern with Irish affairs (Ibid., p. 78). In the lectures On the Study

of Celtic Literature, Arnold justifies his interest in the literary matter of Celtic poetry on the grounds that, by studying the Celt, England may learn better to govern Ireland (CL, p. xiv). The lectures end with Arnold's hope that a Celtic chair at Oxford will "send...a message of peace to Ireland." His interest in Irish affairs reaches a climax in the early 1880's with the publication of the edition of Burke and the Irish Essays. In "The Incompatibles" Arnold quotes Burke some forty-eight times (see Appendix). In the political essays of his last decade, such as "The Nadir of Liberalism" and the "Zenith of Conservatism," Irish affairs inevitably occupy his attention, and Burke is the authority for his pronouncements.

Arnold never visited Ireland. His closest association was through his brother-in-law, William Forester, who for a short period of time served in Ireland. But the Irish difficulty to Arnold is an English difficulty; English Non-conformity, English education, English insularity, English lack of thought produced the Irish problem, and on these Arnold felt himself eminently well qualified to speak.

In his discussion of Ireland, Arnold shares with Burke three ideas for handling colonial affairs. In the first place, colonial management requires not only a sensitiveness to the national tradition of the governing nation, but also a full awareness to the traditions of the
governed. Secondly, colonial affairs require firmness and even coercion, but along with repression, the colonial administrator must use the "healing power" to redress the grievances which demanded the original firmness. And finally, colonies cannot be governed by the internal pressures of the ruling country.

None of these ideas operated in the Governor Eyre case. Eyre's action was a travesty on the English tradition of law, and he had no respect for the Negroes in Jamaica. He used coercion, indeed, but his coercion was not paralleled by any healing action to prevent further outbreaks. And if Carlyle's defense may be termed a particular effusion from the Englishman's feeling of his protestant moral superiority, then internal wishes and desires did improperly direct the decisions in the case (Mill's attempted criminal prosecution was dropped as a result of Carlyle's effort).

(a)

To both Burke and Arnold, the failure of the tradition of the superior power produces the colonial difficulty. Certainly Burke makes this idea perfectly lucid in writing about America, but he also makes it clear in writing about Ireland. Burke is lavish in his praise of the English Constitution and English manners in the Reflections, but
the Englishman in Ireland merits only loathing.

All the penal laws of that unparalleled code of oppression, which were made after (the Irish Revolution of 1641), were manifestly the effects of national hatred and scorn towards a conquered people, whom the visitors delighted to trample upon and were not at all afraid to provoke. They were not the effect of their fears, but of their security. They who carried on this system looked to the Irresistible force of Great Britain for their support in their acts of power. They were quite certain that no complaints of the natives would be heard on this side of the water with any other sentiments than those of contempt and indignation. . . . Indeed, in England, the double name of the complainants, Irish and Papists, (it would be hard to say which singly was the most odious,) shut up the hearts of every one against them ("First Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe," (1792), IV, 274-275).

Arnold quotes Burke to support his own contention that "Irish misery and discontent have been due more to English misgovernment and injustice than to Irish faults." The cant in England was that the Irish could not be controlled without the denial of English liberty, without this unparalleled code of oppression. English injustice reduced the Catholics of Ireland "to a miserable populace, without property, without estimation, without education" (Ibid., p285; IV, 246-247). And the English have added to the injury by parading their injustice over all of Europe and abandoning all pretext of, what to Burke is the primary purpose of government, "the general good of the community." 34

Confiscation is a normal event following a conquest, but whereas in other continental countries prescription has hidden and covered the wounds, in Ireland, where the English have deliberately continued to irritate the old wounds, English prescription, culture, tradition has utterly failed.

The nation's representative in a colonial area should be the leader described above. Burke can say nothing for English leadership in Ireland. "We found the people heretics and idolaters," Burke writes; "we have, by the way of improving their condition, rendered them slaves and beggars: they remain in all the misfortune of their old errors, and all the superadded misery of their recent punishment." The Englishman has failed because he has not offered the Irish anything "attaching" in his leadership. The typical Englishman in Ireland is the northern Murdstone or Creakle, for whom the Irishman, with his quick Celtic imagination and fine sense of manners, can only have contempt. The French have succeeded in binding Alsace, Provence, and Brittany to their governments because the government in Paris has made the interest of these people its interest. As Burke writes, "The question...is not whether you have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your interest to make them happy." And that can

be accomplished by doing what "humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do" (Conciliation, II, 140-141). Burke's writing on Ireland, Arnold says in his "Preface" to his edition of Burke, is a history of the failure of English leadership to provide humanity, reason, and justice between the years 1760 and 1797 (pp. vi-vii).

Warren Hastings failed, in Burke's eyes, to value the customs and habits of India; the English failure in Ireland and America arose from the same source. After centuries of effort to extirpate Catholicism in Ireland, it still remains as strong as ever. "It is not your fond desire or mine that can alter the nature of things," Arnold quotes Burke; "by contending against which what have we got, or shall ever get, but defeat or shame?" The Englishman is too fond of his catchwords of party and class that may work in England but are not necessarily potent in the rest of the world. Thus, he continues into the nineteenth century to deny the Irish their right to a Catholic establishment, Catholic schools, and Catholic universities. The Englishman cannot understand "the nature of things," he cannot see the thing as it really is, that Ireland is Ireland and not England. He must accept the customs and habits he finds, and if his own culture is superior and has

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36 Ibid., p.276; "Guildhall in Bristol," II, 382.
the "attaching" power that the Englishman believes it to have, then he need have no fear.

The Englishman as governor in a colonial area cannot deny the native the rights which the ruling power gives its own people. As Arnold remarks ironically in *Culture and Anarchy*, "it never was any part of our creed that the great right and blessedness of an Irishman, or, indeed, of anybody on earth except an Englishman, is to do as he likes; and we can have no scruple at all about abridging, if necessary, a non-Englishman's assertion of personal liberty" (*C&A*, p. 79). The Englishman may extend his rights to others out of sheer love and kindness, but he finds "no real divine law" constraining him to extend them. Of the Englishman's rights, doing as he likes is the last thing that Arnold would urge as policy for Ireland, but tenant right should be extended. Burke complains that the landlord in Ireland "never takes upon himself, as it is usual in this kingdom," to improve the land and provide his tenant with a completely furnished farm. Irish land tenure is, by law, short term tenure in contrast to that in England.37 To remedy the Irish Land Laws Arnold advises a policy of

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37 "Tract on Popery Laws," VI, 353; *ME, IE, and Others*, p. 293.
land confiscation and justifies himself on the grounds that a right of the State guaranteed by English prescription can and should be applied in Ireland. \(^{38}\) Since the governor cannot refuse the privileges which his own nation enjoys, the Irish also have a full right to education and an endowed church (ME, p. 102).

In all questions of colonial management, the central government has the power, as a State, to override the demands of the natives. Burke always supports the right of the central government against any of its parts. Arnold cites the French behavior in prohibiting a Breton Eisteddfod in Brittany. "Acts like those of the French Minister are attributed to reasons of State, and the Government is held blamable for them, not the French people" (CL, xvi-xvii). Whereas the French government suppresses an Eisteddfod for "reasons" of State, the English government does nothing, but the English newspapers make unamiable and boorish judgments which lead the Welsh or the Irish to lose their faith, if they have any, in the English culture.

What is an expression of State policy in France becomes an effusion of individual crochets and national prejudices in England, and becomes, therefore, unattaching.

The Englishman's lack of "light"—and it is not inappropriate to use this word in describing Burke's pronouncements on the English failure in Ireland—inevitably leads to misgovernment and disorder. At this juncture Burke is sure that power is needed to restore order. The colonial power must have strength in its domain but it cannot use its strength merely to repress. The strength must also be used to redress the errors. Arnold is quite willing to admit that a Crimes Act is needed in Ireland. He is even willing to accept "yet more stringent powers of repression. For a given period, yes!--but afterwards?" (Civ. in US, p. 133). Can the English learn to give concessions in Ireland at the proper time so that a prescriptive government may be constructed? In the essay "The Incompatibles," Arnold uses a phrase from Burke that epitomizes the whole tenor of Arnold's advice on Ireland. Burke, in the source, is writing to "that worthy Philistine at Bristol who remonstrated with (him) against making concessions to the Irish" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 286). Burke writes,

There is a dreadful schism in the British nation. Since we are not able to reunite the empire, it is our business to give all possible vigor and soundness to those parts of it which are still content to be governed by our councils. Sir, it is proper to inform you that our measures must be healing. Such a degree of strength must be communicated to all the members of the state as may enable them to defend themselves, and to cooperate in the defence of the whole. Their temper, too, must be managed, and their good affections
Arnold refers to this paragraph nine times in "The Incompatibles," but the idea is in Celtic Literature and Culture and Anarchy. He ventures into Irish affairs to demonstrate that if the Englishman acquire culture, he could find the healing power to settle his trouble in Ireland.

(c)

The third point on which Arnold parallels Burke is that the colony, and specifically, Ireland, cannot be governed by purely internal English pressures. To Burke the mellifluous word ascendancy means simply "pride and dominion on the one part of the relation, and on the other subserviency and contempt" ("Letter to Richard Burke," VI, 393). Burke fears that the internal demand of the English to establish the Protestant power in Ireland would in fact drive the Irish to Jacobinism and away from religion altogether. Burke did not have to contend with English Nonconformity, as Arnold did, but he did content with what is in effect the bigotry of factions and cabals in Ireland and England who under the guise of religion sought their own interests ("Letter to R. Burke," VI, 397). In Arnold's time the Liberal Party, with its support of the dissenters, succeeded in abolishing the Established Church in Ireland,
but it refused to countenance an Irish Catholic endowment. The way was opened then for the Jacobinism that Burke feared would enter between the religious disputants and take the field. Burke and Arnold both underestimated the strength of Irish Catholicism, but in seeing that English religious prejudices prevented necessary concessions to the Irish, they both prophesied accurately that England was in grave danger of losing her Irish interest altogether. England could not manage Irish "temper" and Irish "affection" because of her own internal interests.

(d)

Arnold's position is foreign to both political parties of his own day. The Liberals could not countenance the Establishment of an Irish Church, and the Conservatives could not accept Arnold's recommendations on the Land Act. Nor do his Irish essays reveal a hint of a Prussian or Carlylean "Might is right." If force is used, it must be followed by the healing power of tempered and intelligent policy. At the same time Arnold has none of the "let them do as we do" of genteel and sentimental Liberalism. In fact, Arnold strongly suggests that Fenianism has more English than Irish origins. The Irish problem cannot be solved until the English forget their party catchwords and attempt to see the situation as it really is and not as their catchwords tell them it is (ME, IE, and Others, p. 309).
Nor could Arnold accept the argument he found in *The Times* and in many of the Liberal orators that since the Englishman has accomplished great ends (railroads, factories, living standard of the middle class), the solution to colonial problems is to force colonial people to follow English practices. He has too great a sense that conditions (or to use his word and Burke's, expediency) create the laws for a people to recommend that the Irish imitate English customs, habits, and party words. Expediency had created English laws and expediency must create Irish laws. In fact, the very problem in Ireland is the English failure to allow an Irish prescription to grow and develop.

Arnold is conservative in insisting on the primacy of the English central government. His object is to bind the Irish more closely to the English connection. Although he does urge a local government for Ireland, it is but a local government within the domination of the central government. His familiar comparison of Home Rule to the Confederate States of America shows his concern for keeping Ireland within the Empire. Although Burke is somewhat equivocal on the matter of actual union (it occurred after Burke's death), Arnold has no trouble finding justification for Union in Burke (*ME, IE, and Others*, p. 286). For all of his stric­tures against English civilization, Arnold has a high re­spect for it himself, and he has no desire to see its
influence limited or restricted by having its empire reduced. His optimism always brings him back to the conviction that "after all the English people, with 'its ancient and inbred piety, integrity, good nature, and good humour,' has considerable merits, and has done considerable things in the world." He could hope therefore that England might bind Ireland just as it had bound Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall.

The question of colonial management has little effect in Arnold's criticism except indirectly as he felt that literature and the critic could contribute to that cultural enlightenment so necessary for the creation of a genuine attaching culture which the Irish could admire. Also, Arnold tends to call all English language literature English literature. There is no such thing as an American literature. He judges Emerson not as an American poet but as a poet among English poets. The poetry of Scotland is only an adjunct to English tradition. But such considerations are not vital to Arnold's criticism except as they limit or circumscribe his view.

These four sections have shown the consequence of Arnold's definition of the State on his view of the individual, church government, leadership, and colonial

39 ME, IE, and Others, p. 275; Noble Lord, V, 204-205.
management. In each, Arnold, following Burke's concept of the State, finds focus for the "multitudinousness" of his time. The individual is not to live for his ordinary self but for his best self as it is expressed in the State. His Church does not express his own limited conscious, but the historical and national development of his nation. The leader, too, ideally acts not for any personal whim or the desires of any group, party, or faction in his State, but for the collective and corporate character of the whole people temporally and spiritually. In the extension of the State in colonial management, this same goal must guide the nation's policy.

To effect this union in the State, Arnold posits a third force of quiet, cultured men to control the balance of power in the State. His third force is not a party but a spirit. To Arnold, Burke symbolizes this third force mediating between extremes in the State.
CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF THE THIRD FORCE

On the question of defining Arnold's political position critics fall into word quibbling. One dismisses his politics as being merely whimsical; another calls him a Conservative Liberal; a third a Liberal Conservative. But in attempting to encompass him in a general term, we oversimplify and falsify Arnold. At the beginning of his essay on *The Sublime and Beautiful*, Burke says:

I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of this disorder (confusion about the idea of taste). For, when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us; instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner of combining (I, 80-81).

A definition, Burke continues, must follow practice and not precede it. Arnold, for the same reason, refuses to commit himself to any definition of political action or behavior; he will not add to "our stock notions and habits, which we ...(may) follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them
Arnold's political beliefs can be understood but not in the conventional shibboleths. A satisfactory exposition grants his political interest but defines it without recourse to terms which may "circumscribe nature within the bounds of our own notions." Arnold's politics is a politics of a "third force," a term which does not avoid the issue nor does it replace disinterest. The instant that we grant Arnold the word disinterest, as we must, the question arises, what are we to do with Arnold's apparent interest? The problem is partially solved, at least in relation to politics, when we use the term third force. The politics of the third force is not quietism; it does take action and within the framework of existing political relationships. The third force seeks a creative politics, as the politics in the time of Elizabeth, and not the instrumental politics that Arnold found in mid-Victorian government (C&A, p. 34).

Arnold's politics of the third force is based upon two suppositions: (1) that the Liberal and Conservative party cannot in themselves govern reasonably or well, and (2) that since the actual power is balanced between these two, a third force can affect the ends of the State.

(a)

Although Arnold consistently calls himself a Liberal, he qualifies the term whenever he applies it to
himself to make it almost meaningless, and he consistently attacks Liberal ideals. He knows, for instance, that the Liberal Party supports the evils against which he fights; its most precious offering, "the right to do as one likes," is Arnold's most apparent enemy. He has little to say about the Conservative Party except to disavow it also. Party has become an immediate end, a mechanical thing, to which the citizen devotes himself rather than the true goal of human life. Party becomes not an association to obtain human ends, but a faction to obtain immediate objectives. Arnold calls himself a Liberal, however, because he lives in an age of expansion, an age of Liberalism. If Arnold were to go contrary to the expanding and liberal desires of his age, his age would annihilate him.

Despite his own designation of himself, however, his ideal is "a Liberal of the future" who may exist in heaven for he does not exist on earth ("The Future of Liberalism," *ME, IE, and Others*, p. 381). "I am a Liberal," he writes at the beginning of *Culture and Anarchy*, "yet I am a Liberal tempered by experience, reflection, and renouncement" (p. 41). Arnold thus changes the Liberal slogan "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform" into something else entirely. Critics of Burke have said that the eighteenth-century writer became a conservative by committing himself to experience rather than to the a priori thought mode of his
contemporaries. Arnold recognizes his own commitment to a type of conservatism when he argues that experience goes counter to all idea of right (ME, p. 61). "Reflection" (his use of the word recalls to mind Burke's title) is contrary to the Liberal propensity for action; the great fault of the Liberals is their lack of thought. "Renouncement" strikes at the stoic rejection of the ordinary self; the Liberal, on the contrary, conceives his primary aim to relieve the mass of mankind from material wants. Therefore Arnold's conclusions are not those of the Liberal faction of his own day.¹

Arnold turns his irony and his direct exposition against the Liberal Party. In "The Function of Criticism" he imagines a Philistine inspired by fervor for culture. The Philistine cries, in the mode of the Liberal Party,

"...let us have a social movement, let us organize and combine a party to pursue truth and new thought, let us call it the liberal party, and let us all stick to each other, and back each other up. Let us have no nonsense about independent criticism, and intellectual delicacy, and the few and the many. Don't let us trouble ourselves about foreign thought; we shall invent the whole thing for ourselves as we go along. If one of us speaks well, applaud him; if one of us speaks ill, applaud him too; we are all in the same movement, we are all liberals, we are all in pursuit of truth." In this way the pursuit of truth becomes really a social, practical, pleasurable affair, almost requiring a

¹William Harbutt Dawson, Matthew Arnold and His Relation to the Thought of our Time (New York, 1904), p. 391. Arnold pleases both parties at the same time—"the liberals by his arguments, the Conservatives by his conclusions."
Such an ideal of perfection Arnold refuses to follow. It is the narrow and shallow foolishness of vulgar modern liberalism with its consuming interest in the surface and its unconcern for the meaning of life (EC, p. 318). The troubled state of mid-century life, Arnold maintains, results from the "thirty years' blind worship of Liberal nostrums" (C&A, pp. 18-19). Therefore Arnold feels himself vindicated in 1874 by the Liberal defeat at the polls: "...the actual policy and principles of our Liberal friends," he writes, "do seem...to be profoundly uninteresting to the country." When the Liberals accept the middle class as it is and praise Nonconformity, they uphold precisely that which Arnold himself saw to be the "main obstacles to our civilisation" (ME, p. 95). One of his final essays, "The Nadir of Liberalism," shows the complete inefficacy of Liberal Party ideas. In short, from "The Function of Criticism" to the very end of his life, Arnold finds good and sufficient reason not to be attached to the Liberal Party.

Although he devotes less space to it, he is equally harsh with the Conservative Party. He derides a so-called

2"Preface" (1874), Schools and Universities, p. 129.
Conservative reaction in the early 1860's as "a general indisposition to let the middle class spirit, working by its old methods, and having only its old self to give us, establish itself at all points and become master of the situation" (French Eton, p. 74). Evidently someone had accused him of conservatism before Culture and Anarchy, for he refuses to admit the criticism. "It is clear," he writes, that the Liberals,

have no just cause, so far as regards several operations of theirs which we have canvassed, to reproach us with delicate Conservative scepticism. For often by Hellenising we seem to subvert stock Conservative notions and usages more effectually than (the Liberals) subvert them by Hebraising (C&A, p. 198).

If British Nonconformity is one obstacle to civilization, the Conservative acceptance of aristocracy is another (ME, p. 95). Arnold answers the Liberal charge that he has occupied himself only with the "Radical and Dissenting Bottles" (the Philistine in Friendship's Garland) by saying the Tory Bottles exists too in great numbers and great force. Since the Conservatives cannot "really profit the nation, or give it what it needs" (ME, IE, and Others, pp. 382-383), any more than the Liberals, both parties are equally culpable, and the nation can only fluctuate between the two poles of imperfection.

But in view of his opposition to both parties, what can Arnold mean by calling himself a Liberal? The country
is profoundly Liberal, Arnold writes in 1874, "it is profoundly convinced that a great course of growth and transformation lies before it" (Schools and Universities, p. 129). Ideologically Arnold must believe that such growth—he often calls it expansion—"is the basis which man's whole effort to civilise himself requires and presupposes" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 286). The growth which Arnold desires in intellect, in beauty, in manners could not take a place under Conservatives because "their principal appeal is to the love of order, to the respect for what they call 'our traditional, existing social arrangements'" (Ibid., p. 386). Because the aristocracy (whom the Conservatives represent) has only a sense of fact and because the modern age requires a greater sense of intelligence to meet the challenges of such growth, the Conservative, in effect, denies the movement of his age. The man of the nineteenth century can no more deny expansion than a man in the eighth century could have denied feudalism. He must contribute to that growth for the same reason that a Nonconformist must contribute to the national life rather than use his energy to find reasons for disagreement. The being in contact "with the main stream of human life is of more moment for a man's total spiritual growth...than any speculative opinion which he may hold" (C&A, p. 30); if the statement may be made of his spiritual growth, it may also be made of his social, political, and intellectual development. Whether Arnold
was right or wrong in interpreting the direction of his age, he could not violate what he considered to be the path which the age follows. Neither the solution of Empedocles nor the solution of the Scholar-Gipsy satisfies because each rejects "the thing as it really is." To Arnold the liberal, the expanding and the growing are the nature of things.

(b)

"I serve and would fain follow," Arnold writes, "the Liberal ideal" (ME, p. 109). That ideal a Liberal had expressed for Arnold: "The ideal of the Liberal party consists in a view of things undisturbed and undistorted by the promptings of interest or prejudice, in a complete independence of all class interests, and in relying for its success on the better feelings and higher intelligence of mankind" (ME, p. 105). But that ideal, Arnold conclusively shows, the Liberal Party has never followed and actually can never hope to follow. Neither can the Conservative. The nation is divided into two vast camps of Simpletons and Savages. Falkland's tragedy depends upon the fact that he could not fight for a sound cause because there was none in England in 1642. Arnold optimistically believes that in the mid-nineteenth century a sound cause may be found. It is notorious, Arnold writes, that a sound cause is "always led by aliens to the sort of people who make the mass of the movement,—by gifted outsiders..." Therefore, "what we have
to do is to raise and multiply in this country a third host, with the conviction that the ideals both of simpletons and Savages are profoundly inadequate and profoundly unedifying, and with the resolve to win victory for a better ideal than that of either of them" (ME, pp. 233-234). What England needs, then, is a third force, "a disinterested class of observers, who, with no organised and embodied set of supporters to please, set themselves to observe honestly and to report faithfully the state and prospects of our civilisation" (ME, p. 108). Their purpose is not to hold "for either the Conservative side or the Liberal, not to make certainties where there are none; but to try and put him (the mass of men) in the way of forming a plain judgment upon the plain facts of the case, so far as they can be known" (G&B, p. 172).

Falkland failed because he did not have this third host. Wordsworth retreated into a monastery. The inescapable facts of German disunity prevented Goethe from finding unity. Sennencour, in despair, turned away from the world to his mountains in Switzerland, but when Arnold visits Glion the second time, the huts change to cottages and his mentor advises him to labor in the valley of men. The references to Burke, however, from the early prose until his last essays, praise the parliamentarian for striking a balance in action between the simpletons and the savages.
"His greatness is that he lived in a world which neither English Liberalism nor English Toryism is apt to enter;--the world of ideas, not the world of catchwords and party habits" (EC¹, p. 16). It is Burke's judgment he trusts to find a way between the Liberal and Conservative.

There is justice in seeing Burke not as a Conservative nor as a Liberal, but as a third force. Cobban says that Burke fortunately had at the outset of his career a party which he could shape, but toward the end of his life he drifted totally outside of party categories. "Whigs and Tories, Liberals and Conservatives went on in their own way, leaving him to plough his lonely and despised furrow, which in later years both parties were proud to look back upon as their own" (p. 39). The Liberal John Morley wrote two books on Burke; Disraeli became Lord Beaconsfield, the title Burke chose for himself. But Burke always followed an independent path. The satirical Vindication of Natural Society attacks a view of the world which would subsume all life under one neat "program." Defending himself against the charge that in the Reflections he "passed from extreme to extreme," Burke claims rather that "he has always kept himself in a medium" (Appeal, IV, 108-109). He opposes the power of the King in his Thoughts on the Present Discontents; in some measure he fights both the King and Parliament in his speeches on America. But when the power of the people,
a power he defends in these earlier works, becomes dominant, encroaching, baneful, he turns against it to protect King and Parliament. "There is in all parties," he writes, "...a middle sort of men, a sort of equestrian order, who, by the spirit of that middle situation, are the fittest for preventing things from running to excess" (Appeal, IV, 190). Burke asks for a third party himself in one of his letters discussing the emancipation of the Irish Catholics, an emancipation which he favors. The opposition always connects with those schemes of reform which however argumentatively specious, would go practically to the inevitable ruin of the kingdom. The gentlemen who enforce that opposition to Emancipation, are, in my opinion, playing the game of their adversaries, with all their might; and there is no third party in Ireland (nor in England neither) to separate things that are in themselves so distinct,—I mean the admitting people to the benefits of the Constitution, and a change in the form of the Constitution itself ("Letter on the Affairs of Ireland," VI, 418).

The only third party, or third force, however, was Burke himself who strove valiantly but unsuccessfully.

(c)

Throughout this discussion of Burke and Arnold, Burke has appeared solidly in the center of oppositions. He commends neither the reason nor feeling alone. He finds value in the feelings, prejudices, habits and customs of mankind, but he will not dismiss reason completely for feelings. He recommends the study of history and is counted as a force in the revival of interest in history, but Burke's
history is not absolute history which sets up rational and universal laws based on limited historical evidence. He does accept a law of change, but not a law of change for the sake of change alone. Despite his characterization of the state as the "nation in its collective and corporate character," he is no fullblown centralist. Neither can he be called a pure localist although he knows the value of local affections. The State, the tertium quid, reconciles in itself the demands of the individual, the church, and all elements of the State for the benefit of society and civilization.

Arnold follows Burke in seeking this middle ground between oppositions. Even as he differs, though, Arnold still seeks for the Burkean balance. In the late eighteenth century, Burke sought balance by defending the habits and customs of the people; in a nineteenth century which is surfeited and bound by usages, Arnold seeks a greater emphasis on reason. The master discovery of his age, the use of history, is not a panacea to Arnold but another dominating idea that must be resisted because it drives man "beyond Aurora and the Ganges." A scientific law of progress compels man to believe that the Athanasian Creed, because it came later, must be superior to earlier creeds; it leads him to a smugness and satisfaction with his own position since being later, he has fuller insights and no longer needs the leavening power of Greek culture. Man needs not science,
but science and literature; he needs not Hebraizing alone, but Hebraism and Hellenism; he needs not liberty but liberty and order. Arnold find his median with Burke wherever Burke was unsuccessful (e.g., in attacking abstract system); he opposes Burke wherever Burke achieved his goal (e.g., the inequality of English law; the acceptance of custom and habit as inevitable). Arnold seeks completion. He tells a story of a tailless fox in Culture and Anarchy and in Friendship’s Garland. The moral action for the fox is not to urge that all other foxes lose their tails but to grow a tail for himself. In commending the French Arnold is not wishing for the English to become like the café-haunting, domino-playing French, but he wishes them to be “rather some third thing, neither the Frenchmen nor their present selves” (FG, p. 161). When he could find the third thing in Burke, Arnold uses Burke for it, but even when he could not find it in Burke, he seeks the mean just as Burke himself had done.

Between any two Englishmen of any two periods we expect to find a relationship in sharing the via media. The word has become a cliché, even a meaningful cliché, of English intellectual life. Arnold and Burke, however, in sharing the ideal of the via media share a similar method of realizing the ideal: the State as the representative acting power of a nation and its people. Since the State
incorporates all the perfection of its civilization, it alone can work for the achievement of its own perfection. The subordinate corporations of the State work toward their perfection by the aid of the State. Thus the State gives direction to education, but the education itself is in the hands of the people in the state. In Burke the State works by a system of virtual representation. The members of Parliament may not in effect be elected by all the electors in their districts, but the member himself makes a conscious endeavor to represent his whole nation. Thus he expresses the sense and opinion of the nation—directly for those who have the leisure and the money to pursue the knowledge of state affairs and indirectly for those whom his duty places in his charge. Arnold, living in a day of expanding franchise, can hardly recommend a restricted suffrage to solve the dilemma of his time. But in effect Arnold's cultured man in his political action will achieve this virtual representation. Arnold says that for the Irish University the people want "professors of their own faith, chosen, however, not by any closed corporation (i.e., the Catholic Church and its hierarchy), but by the whole nation in its collective and corporate character, by the State acting through a responsible minister" (Schools and Universities, p. 98). A decade before he wrote this, he had speculated on what would fill the vacuum left by the
disappearing aristocracy; who, then, is to "find and keep high ideals"? (ME, p. 26-27). The State must supply in the future what aristocracy had supplied in the past; thus Arnold is almost compulsive in his desire to impress upon the middle class that it must forget its antipathy to state action. This State must serve as the virtual representative for this rising class and power; the only alternative is the dust and powder of their own individuality which served the middle class so badly at the time of the Hyde Park riots.

Arnold justifies his virtual representation on the same ground that Burke does. Burke's concept of a "natural" order of society does not permit the idea that all men can think on high policy of government. God and nature never made the mass of men "to think without guidance or direction" (ME, IE, and Others, p. 311). Arnold makes the same objection in "The Function of Criticism" to support his argument for disinterest. "The mass of mankind will never have any ardent zeal for seeing things as they are; very inadequate ideas will always satisfy them" (EC₁, p. 29). Therefore the critic, the critic who makes his civilization, leads and serves as the virtual representative so that adequate ideas may be preserved and used in a society sadly in need of them.

Arnold conceives of two methods of increasing the State's ability to express its people. The first, the characteristic method of the educational reports and the
political criticism up until his last decade, is through a greater realization of the middle-class spirit itself. Looking back on Culture and Anarchy Arnold claims that his advice to his young intellectual and literary friends was "not to be rushing into the arena of politics themselves" but to get at the real mind of the middle class and make it work honestly. "For from the boundedness and backwardness of their spirit, I urged, came the inadequacy of our politics; and by no Parliamentary action, but by an inward working only, could this spirit and our politics be made better." Through education and through the effort of the literary and intellectual corporations in the kingdom, the middle class will become a cultured third force which the democracy, when it has been fully franchised, can follow.

The second method, more apparent in his criticism of the last decade but present in Culture and Anarchy, was through the direct influence of the cultured men on the existing political parties. We may speculate that the sight of the Irish Members trading their support now to one party and now to the other suggested to Arnold that the third force of cultured men act as a balance of power. He notes, for instance, that the Conservative victory in 1885 depended upon the support "of the far greatest, most civilized, and

3 "Hadir of Liberalism," Nineteenth Century, XIX (1886), 645.
most influential part of the country, the part, too, where
the mere trade or game of politics least absorbs men, where
there is to be found the largest number of people who think
coolly and independently..." Arnold has some faith that
the Conservatives, with this support, may establish for
England a governmental policy that benefits from this associ­
ation with the quiet intelligent people in the nation as the
Liberal policy, the foreign policy in particular, has
suffered from the influence of the Philistine third force.
His last two essays on politics—"Up to Easter" and "From
Easter to August"—document a continuing disenchantment with
the alliance. The Conservatives do not take proper cogni­
zance of the margin of support which guaranteed them their
election.

Or, to look at it another way, Thomas Arnold attempt­
ed to bring the world into the school room at Rugby. His
scholars saw their school world not as a school but as a
microcosm of the world outside of the walls. Matthew Arnold,
however, sees the macrocosm as another Rugby with his quiet,
cultured men as the sixth form and the government as the
schoolmasters. In his first school report, a report that as
much argues for his own view of state-action as it reports
what he has seen on his tour of the continent, Arnold writes,

4"The Zenith of Conservatism," Nineteenth Century, XXI
(Jan., 1887), 149.
The proud day of priesthoods and aristocracies is over, but in their day they have undoubtedly been, as the law was to the Jews, schoolmasters to the nations of Europe, schoolmasters to bring them to modern society; and so dull a learner is man, so rugged and hard to teach, that perhaps those nations which keep their schoolmasters longest are the most enviable (Popular Education in France, pp. 168-169).

France has found a way to perpetuate her aristocracy, her schoolmasters, "to meet the best demands of the modern spirit." Nineteenth-century France has "an aristocracy the choicest of its class in the world: she has the Institute... a true aristocracy of the intellect" which rigidly tempers "in the domain of intellect, science, arts, and letters, the natural self-confidence of a democratic society" (Pop. Ed., p. 171) She has her sixth form recognized and supported by the power of a central state behind it. In England the State admits too readily its powerlessness and "resigns itself to believe that there exists no such thing as a party of reason, capable of upholding a government which should boldly throw itself upon it for support" (p. 236). In his final essays, Arnold calls for the Conservative Party to rely upon just such a body of men. A state constituted as a schoolmaster and relying on the sixth form for its support and administration would find the way between the modern dilemma of liberty and Philistinism or culture and slavery.

The Liberal of the future envisions the Third Force as having grown into something stronger and more powerful
than a critic's desire to educate the middle class. Arnold hopes that the "insignificant people detached from classes and parties and their great movements, people unclassed and unconsidered, but who are yet lovers of their country, and lovers of the humane life and of civilization" may at least "perish in the light" rather than in a cloud of pedantry. The pressure of his critical dicta nevertheless is to make the more conservative side of the scale of political belief have the greater influence. Sainte-Beuve, Arnold writes, "described himself as being, in his own single person, 'the gauche of the empire,' and the description was just."5 The description, might also be applied to Arnold with justice. His respect for culture, his emphasis on experience, his desire for a strong central state government reflecting the spirit and thought of the people all would put Arnold on the top of the conservative side of Clinton Rossiter's circle of political feeling (the Liberal and Conservative joining at twelve o'clock and the radical and reactionary joining at six o'clock). But Arnold belongs high on that circle because of his insistence upon education, his demand for equality, his call for a more truly representative local government. But wherever we place Arnold in the political circle, above him is the concern for civilization itself which is more important than any speculative

political opinion. Civilization is served by the nation in its collective and corporate character.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In a graceful letter to Newman, Arnold asserts that he is conscious of having learned habits, methods, and ruling ideas from four men — Goethe, Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, and Newman himself. Whatever he may have learned from these men, Arnold's reader more readily sees their incompleteness. Goethe's naturalism asks too much of individual reason. Wordsworth retreats into a monastery. Sainte-Beuve stops short with the curiosity he naturally has and does not press on to the various and immense applications of his knowledge. Newman's concept of development keeps man always in a childhood stage.

Arnold does not affirm, however, that he learned from Burke. Why not? Possibly because Arnold admits the influence of men whom he knew personally — as he did know Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, and Newman. Arnold's thorough reading in Goethe's literary works, letters, and conversations almost makes it possible to say that he knew the German poet by personal experience. I am not intimidated by the fact that Arnold does not include Burke in such a list of men who influenced him. He does not include his father nor the author of the Imitation. What Arnold finds in Burke in the way of particular ideas, he could find in other sources, but in reading Burke, he finds a general
theory or principle (not in these other four, for instance) enabling him to see life steadily and to see it whole.

While Goethe, Wordsworth, Sainte-Beuve, and Newman are incomplete, Burke too has faults which Arnold recognizes. His books on the French Revolution would have been more edifying had he thrown himself less absolutely on the prescriptions of history. His prose is occasionally tasteless and florid. He represents a concentration that has become too dominant in English intellectual life. Furthermore, his concentration cannot serve in Arnold's age of expansion. His observations on French affairs need correction, for the old order had not all the good that Burke imagined, and the new order had not all the bad.

Burke's incompleteness, however, is not radical, for he does unite qualities which Arnold's four heroes do not have, and he possesses many of their merits. Burke desires to see things as they really are -- as Goethe and Sainte-Beuve -- but he adds to Sainte-Beuve's curiosity a moral sense and to Goethe's naturalism a national and historic sense. Burke, unlike Wordsworth, actively participates in "the large affairs of life": Beaconsfield is closer to London than Rydal Mount. Burke has Newman's understanding of historical development, without Newman's dogmatic insistence that all which development has once absorbed must continue to affect human behavior. Burke is more complete than Goethe, Newman,
and Sainte-Beuve in perceiving that institutions, especially
the State, give stability to human thought. Burke sees life
steadily when he sees the ancient inbred integrity of the
English people as a power or purchase.

Burke gives character to the instinctive British
impulse to think from experience to principles, an instinct
which Arnold too possesses. Burke conceives of a God, a
divine tactic, behind all human experience; therefore he
studies experience to draw from it the principles of intel-
ligent human action. Most important, his principles are
moral, acknowledging the relationship between principle and
human concerns.

The experience of the present is extended by consid-
ering it equal to experience in the past. History requires
the same attention that present experience does, and it
requires moral perception rather than rational judgment.
The principle or ideal thus derived is a changing essence
rather than an absolute law. Thus, since change has occurred,
it will continue. Each writer, consequently, has an idea of
the Zeitgeist or expediency which modifies law by subsequent
experience. Change modifies and develops what human society,
or civilization, has created over the span of centuries.
Because of the culture and prescription of institutions, the
transient individual derives benefit from change and adds to
the moral and spiritual growth of his own society and his own
thought.
Burke's major contribution to Arnold's thinking is the idea of the institution as a power outside of and superior to the rational mind of the individual. In the institution the discoveries of history and the modifications of expediency achieve a natural codification to become the laws or principles of human life. Only in institutions may man meditate designs that require time in fashioning and designs that will last when they have been realized. In institutions culture becomes more than belletristic trifling; in institutions it makes and perfects order and law. There the individual finds a form through which he can express his individual genius. He finds also a church which incorporates and modifies his thought. From the institution, too, he acquires the collective wisdom of the ages permitting him to lead his own people and colonial people by intelligent means.

To construct this institution, for it always needs construction, the quiet and cultured men mediate between the opposing factions in a nation. These men serve as the true natural aristocracy or elite to create the State-ideal which is attaching and which the great mass of men will want to follow.

We might conceive of the law of man to be a decorative fountain. The form of its masonry outline represents the prescription or culture, and the form of the spray represents the changing and adjusting play of expediency. In the
Image, the water is the spirit of the law and the fountain itself is the letter. Burke consciously seeks to keep these two forces in balance, to prevent the spirit from sending off irrelevant jets of spray in undisciplined exaltation, but Burke's major attention goes to the fountain itself (as Thomas Paine's attention is absorbed by the spray or the spirit). If, especially in his writing on the Revolution, Burke is more attracted by the fountain, Arnold always seeks a balance. He does respect the order and duty in society, but he also acknowledges the Zeitgeist. As a consequence, Arnold gives the mind more freedom; he trusts less absolutely the dictates of history; he prefers the possibility and even the desirability of change; and his State works more for social benefits. And because Arnold's own Zeitgeist differs from Burke's, his resolution of the spirit and law differs. The pattern, however, made by Arnold's fountain is true and not just an imitation of the masonry under it. Although we lack the positive evidence of an immediate political decision to test Arnold's tact in adjusting the spirit and the letter, he avoids the extremity of both in the Governor Eyre case. Like Burke, it would seem, Arnold refuses to participate directly on the grounds that disinterestedness is of more moment than passionate commitment to a mode of action.

The comparison of Arnold and Burke demonstrates that Arnold's own political conclusions are essentially conservative; he is committed to experience, to tradition, and to
institutions. Also, he believes, as a Conservative, in an inward moral reform rather than a reform by changing machinery. But his arguments for experience, tradition, and institutions grow from a Liberal readiness to use the mind for the solution of political problems and not rely merely on previous practice. Because Arnold's politics so consciously seeks a median between factions, a more meaningful description is the politics of the third force. The quiet, cultured men of the third force have a Conservative reliance upon tradition and institutions, but a Liberal alertness to contemporary thought.

Since Arnold's culture is so closely connected to the institutions expressing culture, he naturally sees a relationship between the State and literature. Without a great state, Goethe did not find his own completion. Wordsworth would have been a greater poet had he not removed himself from society. Genius, in other words, cannot be made, but society can make the conditions which will aid genius when it appears. A society can give the writer a sense of form and order so that he need not expend his energy to create the architectonic of his art. And further, the institution provides him with a critical audience to appreciate and correct him.

I conclude, therefore, that the relationship between Arnold and Burke -- for all the separation of the two in time, for all the difference of purpose, and for all the difference in their lives -- is a meaningful and valid one. It is a
meaningful and valid relationship not only because it provides Arnold with a theory of institutions, but because it provides Arnold's reader with the tools to understand what Arnold means by culture, by disinterestedness, by reason, and by change. Arnold's abstractions acquire significance when they are seen in the theoretical tradition to which Burke belongs -- a theoretical tradition which, I believe, is acquiring even greater value in the writing of T. S. Eliot, Karl Mannheim, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Ortega y Gasset.
APPENDIX

A CATALOGUE OF ARNOLD'S REFERENCES TO
AND QUOTATIONS FROM BURKE

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Young, G. M. [Review of Annie Marion Osborne's Rousseau and Burke]. Spectator, 5 July 1940, p. 18.
I, Richard Clark Tobias, was born in Xenia, Ohio, October 10, 1925. I received my secondary school education at Beavercreek High School, Beavercreek Township, Ohio. I began my undergraduate training at Miami University, and, after serving two years in the United States Army, I entered The Ohio State University, where I received a Bachelor of Science degree in August, 1948. Following two years of teaching in the public schools of Pomeroy, Ohio, I returned to The Ohio State University, where I received the Master of Arts degree in 1951 and began work toward the degree Doctor of Philosophy. From 1952 to 1955 I held the position of Instructor at the University of Colorado. In October, 1955, I was appointed Assistant at The Ohio State University in the Department of English. I held this position two years while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.