THE NEGOTIATIONS OF CLEMENT VII AND FRANCIS I
CONCERNING THE CALLING OF A CHURCH COUNCIL

DIssertation
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the extent of the influence of King Francis I of France on the question of the convocation of a church council during the pontificate of Pope Clement VII. It has been generally assumed that he exerted considerable effort to prevent the council and that there was actual collusion with the pope to the end that the council did not materialize. Since this relationship has been dealt with largely in connection with other phases of the problem, especially with respect to the promotion of the project by the Emperor Charles V, it has been difficult to obtain a clear picture of the situation. By divorcing the issue as far as possible from other developments of this period, a clearer light can be shed upon the reasons for the postponement of the council throughout the eleven years of Pope Clement's reign. The sources dealing with this problem point to the major responsibility of King Francis, yet they also indicate the manner in which he
exerted his influence and enable one to delve deeply into the reasoning behind the actions of Clement.

Pope Clement has been criticized for not convoking a general church council in the face of the serious proportions reached by the Lutheran movement in the early 1530's. It is this criticism which suggested the importance of giving much attention to the relationship between the pope and the emperor, as well as to the responsibilities of the pope as mediator between two belligerents and as the protector of Christianity. Clement's dual role placed him in a precarious position which required the clever handling of a politician and a strong determination to act with resolution. Clement was not suited for such a task. This is a fact which must be taken into account in any criticism of the manner in which he dealt with the problems facing him. Secular affairs prevented him from giving attention to the conciliar problem during the first half of his pontificate (until his return to Rome from exile in October, 1526), and in the later years of his reign he was unable to convince himself that such a project would not result in a schism. In these last years the relationship with Francis became more and more strained, finally culminating in the conference at Marseilles within a year of the pope's death. At the end of his pontificate,
Clement was no more convinced of the feasibility of holding the council than at the beginning; if anything, he was more certain than ever that potentially it would result in greater evil than good for Christendom as a whole. We have the advantage of being able to look back upon this era with the knowledge that the schism came in spite of Clement's attitude and of knowing that while the council was the only solution, it was unable to prevent the very thing that Clement feared -- a schism. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the meeting of a church council during the first years of Clement's pontificate would have resulted in a less extensive break from the church, or that it would have healed the breach.

Although the chief emphasis of this study is placed upon the relationship between Francis and Clement, the complete account cannot be presented without giving extensive attention to the role of the Emperor Charles. For this reason the attempt is made to answer the question whether he acted always in the best interests of Christendom or whether he was somewhat lax in his treatment of the religious situation in Germany, as suggested by a number of scholars. There may have been too much

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dependence on action which he recommended to the pope, whereas greater and more beneficial results might have been obtained had he undertaken to do everything within his power to counteract the movement. After all, during the entire eleven years of the pontificate of Clement, Charles was personally present in his Holy Roman Empire for a total of only a few months!

The Sources

There is no separate treatment of the negotiations concerning the calling of a council during this period. For the most part, the problem has been considered previously in connection with the Lutheran movement and therefore primarily in connection with doctrinal issues.

One of the most important sources of information for this monograph has been the fourth volume of the monumental Concilium Tridentinum, which treats the question largely from the German point of view. While the use of documentary material is extensive in this work, the documents themselves are as a rule quoted only in part or summarized. Much use has been made of a number of collections of sources which will be found listed in the bibliography.

The most important of the secondary materials are Ludwig Pastor's History of the Popes and Hubert Jedin's Storia del Concilio di Trento. Volumes seven,
eight, and nine of the former work have been used extensively for a study of the preliminary maneuvering during the pontificates of Leo X and Adrian VI. Jedin has given a complete and scholarly treatment of the council question in general, but his consideration of the French influence is not extensive. Throughout the monograph there will be reference to other less important sources which offer significant information on specific phases of the problem.
EARLY APPEALS TO A CHURCH COUNCIL (1518-1523)

Beginnings of the Lutheran Movement

Six years elapsed between the date when Martin Luther affixed his Ninety-five Theses to the church door in Wittenberg and the accession of Pope Clement VII to the papacy in 1523. In these years Pope Leo X (1513-1521) and Pope Adrian VI (1522-1523) gave their attention to the development of the Lutheran movement in Germany. Pope Leo was first informed of Luther’s attack on indulgences when the archbishop of Mainz submitted to him a copy of the theses early in the year 1518, whereupon the pope put into effect a type of action considered routine in such circumstances. The Augustinian Order, to which Luther belonged, was requested to dissuade him from erroneous opinions by appropriate means. When it became evident that this action was insufficient, the matter was brought to the attention of the papal Curia, and Luther

1Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898- ), VII, 351-352; Hartmann Grisar, Martin Luther, His Life and Work (Westminster, Md., 1950), p. 95.
was duly summoned to appear in Rome (July, 1618). As an indication of the seriousness of the situation, Silvestro Prierias, Master of the Sacred Palace, was charged with the duty of composing a refutation to the theses which accompanied the official order for Luther's appearance in Rome within sixty days. It was this pamphlet, entitled *In prae sum tuocae M. Lutheri Conclusionses Dialogue*, which brought Luther to the realization that this was a matter of great concern and one which he would be unable to handle without support. He then appealed for assistance to Frederick, elector of Saxony, and also to the Emperor Maximilian. The latter, however, was interested at the moment in the election of his grandson Charles as King of Rome, and his letter to Rome, dated August 5, 1616, made reference to the urgency of taking strong measures against Luther. Frederick adopted the opposite point of view and declared his unwillingness to permit Luther to go to Rome, though he would grant that a hearing might be conducted in Germany.

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At this point the Dominican Cardinal Cajetan, who was attending the Diet of Augsburg as legate of the pope, was brought into the course of affairs. The papal Curia authorized him to call Luther before him personally for an interview, which took place at Augsburg from October 12-14, 1518. Although Cajetan used moderation in pointing out only some of the more important errors, Luther would not retract and requested that the matter be referred to the pope. When he despaired of a further hearing before the legate, Luther prepared to leave Augsburg, apparently believing that he could gain no concessions here. It was at this point that he made his appeal from the "badly informed" pope to the pope to be "better informed." This was followed by an attack upon the authority of the pope to make final decisions in cases of this kind. On November 26, 1518, Luther wrote his appeal to Pope Leo for a general council. By this action he was able to introduce a new issue into the proceedings, one which had not been foreseen by the papal Curia in its consideration of the problem presented by Luther. It was in this appeal to the pope that Luther expressed the principle that the authority of a council

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7 Judaei le Plat, Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio... (7 vols., Lovanii, 1761-1767), II, 37-42.
representing the universal church is superior to the authority of the pope.

During the year 1518 Luther obstinately refused to comply with the papal demands that he retract his errors. Furthermore, he not only refused to submit but ultimately denied the final authority of the pope and declared his belief that the pope was Antichrist. The following year was marked by the flustered attempts of the papal chamberlain Karl von Miltitz to conciliate Luther. Then the death of Maximilian on January 12, 1519, and the importance of the approaching imperial election, commanded much of Leo's attention. The misleading reports of Miltitz, which indicated progress in his efforts to bring Luther to a renunciation of his heretical statements, were followed by the letter of the pope to Luther on March 29, inviting him to Rome to make

8Leon Cristiani, L'Eglise a l'epoque du Concile de Trente, Vol. XVII of Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les origines jusqu'a nos jours publiee sous la direction de A. Fliche et V. Martin (21 vols. in progress, Paris, 1934- ), pp. 14-15. In the opinion of Ehesa, Luther's action at this time was not due to his belief that a general council would be free from errors, nor because he desired to subject himself and his teachings to the consideration of a council, but because he wanted to prevent the condemnation which he understood was impending from Pope Leo. Cf. Concilium Tridentinum, Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatum, nova collectio; edidit Societas Gairresiana promovendis inter germanos catholicos litterarum studiis (12 vols., Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1901-1934), IV, xv.

his retraction. The papal attitude in this case apparently rested on the erroneous reports of Miltitz.

In this period, also, there occurred the Leipzig debate (July, 1519) between Luther and John Eck in which Luther denied the papal primacy and the infallibility of church councils. Yet just a few months earlier Luther had appealed his case to a general council and a few months hence would repeat this appeal. Some scholars believe this apparent contradiction to be due to Luther's desire to delay a final decision. By this time the indulgence controversy had begun to fade from view, and other more fundamental issues which struck at the very foundation of the church were placed in the foreground. The total of topics disputed at Leipzig is impressive, though most of the debate centered in the papacy.

Papal Action

When Cardinal Giulio de' Medici (later Pope Clement VII) took up his residence in Rome in October, 1519, he pointed out to Leo the great danger in the Lutheran movement. Since the imperial election had been

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10 Grisar, op. cit., p. 104.
12 Pastor, op. cit., VII, 386.
decided by that time, Leo found it possible to turn his
attention again to this problem. At the instigation of
Giulio, Leo, early in 1520, appointed a commission of 13
theologians to carry forward the process against Luther.
The culmination of these proceedings was the bull Exsurge
Domini, dated June 17, 1520. The bull condemned the
false teachings of Luther but gave him a period of sixty
days in which to recant before he would be excommunicated.
In it there was also a reference to his appeal to a
general council and a rejection of his denial of the
authority of such a council.

The bull brought forth from Luther his second
appeal to a general council on November 17, 1520. This
was followed by his public burning of a copy of the bull
at Wittenberg on December 10. When more than sixty days
had elapsed since the promulgation of the bull, and
Luther had made no move to recant, Leo issued the
pronouncement of the excommunication of Luther and his
followers in the bull Deceot Romanum Pontificem (January 3,
1521). This was action which called upon the faithful
for assistance in bringing the movement to an end.

13 Hoger Mols, "Clement VII," Dictionnaire
d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique, XII, col. 1178.
14 ManBi, op. cit., XII, 289-294 (Nos. 51-59).
June 17 is the date given here although Grisar, op. cit.,
p. 154, and Cristiani, op. cit., p. 19, give it as
June 16.
The responsibility was placed upon the Christian princes for taking specific action if Luther remained obstinate. Thus Pope Leo made use of the accepted means for dealing with heretics and even recalled the existing prohibition of appeal to a church council on the part of heretics.

The council has been considered as the decisive means for arresting the spread of the movement in the period from 1521 to 1526. There were many requests for such a council for the purpose not only of discussing reform but also of stopping the Lutheran heresy. Yet three popes -- Leo X, Adrian VI, and Clement VII -- could find reasons for not acceding to these demands. Such a meeting, however, could have had a very beneficial effect on the church as a whole. It might have provided not only a basis for the reform which was so badly needed within Christianity itself but also guidance to those who entertained reasonable doubts about points of doctrine which were being brought under attack. To be sure, there were many who recommended this solution to the problem. At the time of the Diet of Worms, Jerome Aleander, special nuncio of the papacy to Charles V, reported in a letter to Giulio de' Medici that there were many demands in Germany for a council to be held in that country.

15 Le Plat, op. cit., II, 79-83.
16 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xv.
But there were also others who believed that the authority of the pope was sufficient in this case, that official condemnation of Luther's doctrine and the papal excommunication should have been sufficient in such circumstances, and that those who cared to investigate would find that previous councils had already condemned many of the doctrinal positions assumed by Luther. Others, however, interested in the demands for reform, believed that this would be the opportune time to undertake such a task. Actually the demands for reform, which increased during this period, offered additional support for the adversaries of the papacy.

To a certain extent, the convocation of a church council was looked upon as a magic formula by which evils and ills of various types within the church could be eliminated. But wiser heads were fully aware of the dangers attendant on such a meeting. From the diplomatic point of view it would be necessary to obtain agreement on controversial issues on the part of representatives from all the nations of Christendom. Those who were wise in the ways of diplomacy were fully aware that success in such a process would be extremely difficult of attainment.

With the arrival of Charles in Germany in 1520 there arose the question of a hearing for Luther before

\[\text{17Jedin, op. cit., pp. 163-165.}\]
the Diet of Worms, to be presided over by the emperor.
The imperial party maintained that Luther could not be
condemned without a hearing and that no German subject
could be placed under the ban of the empire without having
been heard by German judges. Alexander, on the other hand,
maintained that since Luther had been condemned by the
Holy See in the manner traditionally followed in such
cases, he should not be given another hearing. This was
apparently the opinion of Leo also, and it had been
communicated to his nuncio in Germany. Charles gave in
to the wishes of Alexander, but the representatives of the
German states prevailed upon him to summon Luther before
the Diet where he would be offered the opportunity to
retract his erroneous doctrines. There was to be no
discussion of dogma. If Luther admitted authorship of
the works in which errors had been found and did not
retract them, the emperor would pronounce the ban of the
empire on him.

Luther was duly summoned, questioned regarding
the authorship of certain works, and asked to retract.
His refusal led the emperor to pronounce the ban of the
empire, the Edict of Worms, which was signed on May 26, 1521. Charles was now obligated to carry out the

traditional responsibility of the emperor to protect the church against the menace of Luther. Since condemnation and excommunication by the pope had taken place, and since the Diet had also made an official pronouncement, it became the duty of the emperor to resist the heresy. However, further action of an immediate nature on the part of Charles in regard to Luther was forestalled by war with the French. At the same time Francis also made an attack on papal territory in northern Italy. This latter event occupied much of Leo's attention during the final months of 1521. Only at the end of November were the papal forces successful in defeating the French. Then at word of this victory Leo was so overjoyed that he unwittingly risked his health in the celebrations which followed. Within a week after the arrival in Rome of the first news of the fall of the capital of Lombardy to the papal forces, Leo was on his deathbed and expired at midnight on December 1, 1521.

Pope Adrian VI

There were many important considerations involved in the choice of a successor to Leo. The major struggle would necessarily take place between the candidates supported by Francis and those supported by Charles.

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Even before the death of Leo, Francis had considered the question of his successor. He seems to have taken an attitude of strong opposition to Cardinal Giulio de' Medici to the extent of registering a threat to the unity of the church if he were chosen. He could hardly have foreseen that the result of the Conclave would be the selection of the former tutor of Charles, the bishop of Tortosa, and that the Cardinal de' Medici would be more responsible for bringing his name under consideration than anyone else.

Since Pope Adrian VI was in Spain at the time of his election it was several months before his arrival in Rome. He was, however, informed by various means of the conditions and circumstances which would confront him as pope. Perhaps one of the more extensive memorandums received by him came from the hands of Cardinal Campeggio and was received before his departure from Spain. Campeggio referred to the Edict of Worms as the instrument to be used against the Lutheran heresy. Although it was the end of August, 1522, before his arrival in Rome, Adrian held his first Consistory on

21 Ibid., IX, 11.
22 Ibid., 22-23.
23 Ibid., 87-90.
September 1, at which time he indicated that he considered the reform of the Curia of the greatest importance and that this matter would receive his immediate attention.

Adrian also received direct information regarding the spread of the Lutheran doctrines and advice on how to combat them from John Eck, who had arrived in Rome in March, 1523. While Eck recommended a general council he did not feel that the results would be as thorough as might be desired and therefore indicated his belief that the real need was for an extensive program of reform. In regard to heretical opinions he did not place much confidence in the success to be gained from mere condemnation but nevertheless indicated a need for another bull condemning Luther and his followers.

Adrian's attempt to halt the spread of heresy was intimately bound up with the question of reform. As such it became a project of tremendous proportions. The fact that so little was accomplished by him can be attributed primarily to the brief period of his pontificate — only twenty months. Added to this were unusual problems which demanded a considerable amount of his attention, such as the plague which ran wild in Rome for several months.

24 Ibid., 92.
25 Ibid., 108-111.
26 Ibid., 100-106.
As for his direct consideration of the matter of heresy, Adrian appointed Francesco Chieregati, the bishop of Teramo, to undertake a mission to the Diet of Nuremburg where he arrived before the end of September, 1522, and was received in an audience by the Archduke Ferdinand. The major part of his mission was to obtain support against the Turks, but the question of opposition to the spread of Luther's teachings was also to be considered. The pope even dispatched a special letter to Chieregati on November 25, 1522, for presentation to the Diet. In this communication Adrian made direct reference to the failure of Luther to conform to the attempts that had been made to correct his errors. He deplored the fact that there were so many adherents of these beliefs in Germany and that some of them were princes. He exhorted the representatives at this Diet to undertake a correction of this situation. If satisfaction were not forthcoming then it would be necessary to use extreme measures within the limits of the imperial laws and the Edict of Worms. In a further set of instructions delivered to the Diet, Adrian explained the position of Luther and his teachings. He pointed out that nearly all his beliefs had been condemned in the past by proper church authority and that these decisions should not be questioned. The Lutheran party, having indicated its
disrespect for authority by condemning the church
councils and refusing to accept official pronouncements,
should therefore be suppressed before further
disturbances should occur.

It was this Nuremberg Diet that issued the
request for the convocation of a council by the pope and
the emperor to be held within a year on German territory.
The stipulation that this must be "a free Christian
council" seems to have been made in an attempt to prevent
the pope from exercising control over those in attendance.
In addition it was stated that lay persons must be
permitted to attend and to vote. In summary, the demands
of the Diet were such that it is not surprising that
Adrian took no steps toward the calling of a council in
the few months remaining before his death on September 14,
1523. The original form of the request called for the
attendance of lay persons as well as clergy at the
council and freedom from all oaths and obligations on the
part of the delegates.

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27 Ibid., 127-135. The letter of November 25, 1522
is in Mansi, op. cit., XII, 391-394 (Nos. 60-64); the
instruction follows, 394-397 (Nos. 65-71).

28 Jedin, op. cit., p. 161. The question of the
admission of lay persons to the council was not included
in the final form in which this edict was approved in
the Diet on March 6, 1523. Cf. Concilium Tridentinum,
IV, xvi.
It may be that the request was worded in such a way that any offer for the convocation of a council on the part of the pope could have been refused by Luther's supporters. The omission of specific instructions in the bull of convocation with respect to the freedom of the delegates and the attendance of lay representatives could conceivably provide the Lutheran party with objections strong enough to prevent the pope from being able to convok the council.

This petition of the Diet of Nuremburg represented a new definition of a church council. The introduction of the idea of lay representatives, who would presumably be equal to the clergy in making decisions and would have complete freedom of speech and the right to dispute on doctrinal issues, had not yet received full acceptance in church conciliar tradition, although the Council of Constance favored the principle. There can be no doubt that Adrian would have acceded to the holding of a legitimate or a traditional type of council as soon as conditions permitted. His biographer, Gerardus Moringus, reported that Adrian desired to bring about, by means of a universal council, a reform of the state of the church and would have done so once the war had been settled.

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29 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xvi.
30 Ibid.
Two months after the death of Adrian his successor was chosen by the Conclave. Clement VII was destined to control the papacy for the next eleven years, apparently a time long enough to permit the overcoming of at least some of the obstacles to the holding of a council.
CHAPTER II

CLEMENT VII AND THE COUNCIL QUESTION

The Papal Election of 1523

When Clement VII was chosen to succeed Adrian VI as the head of the Catholic Church, he had been a cardinal and archbishop of Florence for more than ten years, having been raised to that rank by his cousin, Pope Leo X. At the time of the Conclave, Charles V gave his support to Cardinal de' Medici and so instructed his representative in Rome, the duke of Sessa. The French party, consisting of twelve of the thirty-nine cardinals in the Conclave, was opposed to the selection of Giulio de' Medici as the next pope, as were the older cardinals appointed prior to the pontificate of Leo X. The Conclave lasted from October 8 until November 19, with the French party finally agreeing to give its support to the choice of the Cardinal de' Medici. Francis I continued to maintain his opposition to the very last, although his agent in Rome, Alberto Pio di Carpi, was apparently permitted some freedom in making a final decision. The French agent modified his position on the
basis of a promise that the new pope would assume a
neutral position in the struggle between France and the
empire.

Giulio de' Medici in Papal Affairs

Pope Clement should have been thoroughly
acquainted with conditions existing within the church,
both in Rome and elsewhere. During the pontificate of
his cousin he had spent much of his time in Rome and had
taken an active part in the later session of the Fifth
Lateran Council. As an indication of his support of the
decrees emanating from this body he convoked, within a
month after its close, a provincial council in his own
archdiocese of Florence for the purpose of applying the
new decrees. This was the first such council to take
this action. 2

As vice-chancellor he was one of the intimate
advisors of Pope Leo and was associated with the mission
of Alexander to the Diet of Worms. He was in charge of
the correspondence with the legate and must necessarily
have been well-informed regarding the progress of the

1 Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from
the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. In progress, St.
Louis, 1898- ), IX, 231-243.

2 Ibid., VIII, 411; Roger Molé, "Clément VII,"
Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique,
XII, col. 1180.
Lutheran movement. At this time there developed a close relationship with Gianmatteo Giberti, the bishop of Verona, who was acting as his secretary and who later became papal datary. Much information on the German affair came through representatives who corresponded with Giberti during the early years of Clement's pontificate.

Clement was also acquainted with the king of France since he had taken part in the meeting between Francis and Leo at Bologna in 1515. The main discussions dealt with the improvement of the relationship between the French church and the papacy, from which there resulted the Concordat of 1516. Giulio was one of the members of a special committee assigned to meet Francis as he crossed into the States of the Church on the way to Bologna, and during the five-day sojourn of the king both were included in many of the ceremonial occasions, such as formal dinners and the like. Clement had also acted as advisor to Leo on the matter of the alliance between the pope and the emperor against France in 1521.

3M. A. Tucker, "Gian Matteo Giberti, Papal Politician and Catholic Reformer," English Historical Review, XVIII (1903), 36.


5Pastor, op. cit., VII, 135-146.

6Ibid., VIII, 36; Mols, loc. cit., XII, col. 1180.
Contemporary Opinions of Clement VII

The opinion of contemporaries and historians regarding the likely accomplishments of Clement on the papal throne indicates a general feeling that the years of his pontificate could not be impressive. The struggle between the empire and France was an important consideration in the selection of a pope to succeed Adrian. A man whose interests could be properly divided between consideration for secular politics and concern over the religious welfare of the church would be difficult to find. To play one role at the expense of the other was bound to result in disaster. For Clement, who was more concerned with politics than religion, the disaster was one which left church unity hopelessly rent by the Protestant movement. As a Medici it was probably to be expected that Clement would do everything in his power to enhance the political fortune of his family and to strengthen the hold on Florence. Once this had been accomplished he would then have the opportunity of giving greater attention to religious matters. At the time of his accession there must have been many persons who looked forward to the end of the military struggle and the settlement of political issues.

From the point of view of outside intervention in Italian affairs, Clement turned his attention to the matter of Spanish and French claims in Italy. At the moment of his accession it appeared that the former provided the greater threat to the security of the Italian Peninsula. The appointment of Giberti to the position of datary is a clue to the attitude of Clement during the early years of his pontificate. Giberti held the upper hand of influence during these years. He interpreted many of the acts of Charles as an indication of his desire to dominate the affairs of Italy and to extend his control over the papacy. The correspondence which reached him from sources close to the emperor convinced him of the accuracy of his observations. Even the failure of Charles to take decisive measures against the Protestant reformers seemed to Giberti to indicate that he was more interested in personal aggrandizement which could be more easily accomplished if he had little opposition from the German princes than through the preservation of the Catholic faith. Thus the attitude of Giberti became the policy of Clement -- a policy of remaining free from definite commitments to the emperor. The correspondents who were the major source of information for Giberti included Jerome Aleander, the archbishop of Brindisi, who served as papal nuncio to
France from October, 1624 to February, 1626; Tommaso Campeggio, bishop of Feltre, papal nuncio to Vienna; and his deputy, Girolamo Rorario.

Three of the Venetian representatives to Rome during the pontificate of Clement have furnished us with detailed descriptions of the pope. Marco Foscarì, whose correspondence dates from 1526, described Clement as "a prudent and wise man, but one who is slow to make up his mind..., a just man, and a man of God." We draw from Foscarì the impression that Clement's habits in food and drink were extremely moderate, and that he demonstrated no desire for such worldly pleasures as jesters and music at mealtime or diversions such as hunting.

Gasparo Contarini in 1530 also mentioned the timidity of the pope and his inability to resolve problems. He found in him a desire to correct the many abuses in the church but a lack of ability to execute such a project of reform. His attitude toward the emperor had not been a favorable one although he believed that the emperor had the best of intentions regarding the necessity for

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8Pighi, op. cit., pp. 19, 138-139.

9Eugenio Alberi, Le relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo XVI (15 vols., Firenze, 1839-1863), Ser. II, III, 128-127. Marco Foscarì was the Venetian ambassador in Rome during the first three years of Clement's pontificate and wrote his opinions in 1526.
maintaining peace in Italy. For the king of France he did not seem to have any great love, but there was evidence to indicate that the relationship in this case was better than that which existed between the pope and the emperor. Giberti's influence in favor of France was several years in the past at this time, and Clement himself had perhaps not yet completely recovered -- if indeed he ever would -- from the shock of the sack of Rome in 1527 by the imperial forces.

The observations of Antonio Soriano are of a later date in the pontificate of Clement. He reported the pontiff to be "very temperate and modest in all his human actions, in both food and drink." While this example of great continence, extremely moderate for this period, brought some opposition to him, it was expected that the regularity of his habits would result in longevity. Clement was found to have great patience and to be very religious and ceremonious in carrying out his duties in ecclesiastical observances. He demonstrated an interest in arts and letters with special attention to music, which he believed most appropriate in church

affairs. Soriano also observed him to be of a timid nature but not excessively so and described this as a common trait in the Florentines. This timidity, nevertheless, was ascribed as the cause of the irresolution of the pope and his slowness in making decisions.

Clement's indecisiveness was bad for him and for the church. Unable to seize the initiative when conditions favored him, he spent so much time in discussions and in temporizing that in the end he attained the reputation of a man who did not keep his word. In this way he brought down upon himself the opposition of his friends as well as his enemies. Throughout his pontificate Clement seemed to act or to withhold action in such a manner that he was condemned for situations that were not his fault. This was no doubt due to his characteristic of postponing action for long periods of time until he had uncovered so many obstacles that they seemed overwhelming. Decisive action on his part from time to time, even at the risk

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11Alberi, op. cit., III, 277-278. Antonio Soriano served as the Venetian ambassador in Rome during the later years of Clement's pontificate and continued in that capacity until 1535.

of doing the wrong thing, could have changed the attitude of many toward Clement.

In general, the emperor received from his agent in Rome, the duke of Seasa, a description of Clement similar to that given by the Venetian representatives -- "reserved, irresolute." Charles was also informed of the possibility that the new pope might not give his support to the imperial policy. Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, also an imperial agent in Rome, reported to Charles just a few days earlier that the new pope desired to support Charles against Francis since this appeared the better method of accomplishing his major tasks. While these reports were not in direct conflict there was at least the implication that Clement's policy was not a decisive one. He was still far from taking a determined stand in favor of either France or the empire, and there was no reason to believe that he had adopted this policy as a diplomatic move. This position rather clearly indicated the weakness and the indecision that characterized the pontificate of Clement from beginning to end.

13 Calendar of Letters, Dispatches and State Papers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives of Simancas and elsewhere (9 vols., London, 1862-1904), II, 600 (No. 619).

14 Ibid., 598 (No. 617).
The Issue of a Church Council

The question of calling a church council to consider the Lutheran issue was by no means a new idea at the time of the accession of Clement. Leo X had heard the appeals of Luther as well as those of staunch Catholics for a council not only to settle the religious dispute in Germany but also to consider the crying need for reform within the church. Leo took no positive action along this line during the later years of his pontificate, but he did express papal opinion regarding the Lutheran movement through the medium of official bulls. Yet the question of reform was still to be considered, and it was apparent that the reform of abuses in the church was intricately associated with the Lutheran question. Leo was not a reforming pope and therefore did not associate the two issues.

Adrian VI appeared desirous of giving his main attention to the matter of reform since he was well acquainted with that problem. His brief pontificate -- so disturbed by extraneous matters -- hardly permitted him to consider possible measures for eradicating the heretical movement. His good intentions were demonstrated, however, when he sent Chieregati to the Diet of Nuremburg. He may also have realized the widespread effect of any concerted effort on these two problems and undoubtedly
knew that there might be a reciprocating effect upon the
church and even upon himself. He realized the importance
of French revenues to the papacy, and while that may not
have been sufficient reason to deter him from decisive
action, it is apparent that it had a delaying effect
which was not set aside prior to his death. The opinion
has been expressed that if Adrian had lived it is quite
possible that he might have succeeded in convoking the
council. Thus, the Council of Trent, actually held in
1545, could have become a reality some years earlier.
What the effect of a council held in the 1520's would
have been on the spread of Lutheranism can be nothing
more than conjecture.

At the time of his accession to the papal throne
Clement was faced with the full responsibility for
carrying out a program of reform and for determining the
basis for a settlement of the Lutheran issue. This
"timid, indecisive" pope was unable to undertake decisive
action through the eleven years of his pontificate.

15 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 201-202; Judoci le Plat,
Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum
Illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio... (? Vols.,
Lovanii, 1781-1787), II, 171-172.

16 Leon Cristiani, L’Église à l’époque du Concile
de Trente, Vol. XVII of Histoire de l’Église depuis les
origines jusqu’à nos jours publiée sous la direction de
A. Fliche et V. Martin (21 vols. in progress, Paris,
1934- ), p. 22.
Perhaps it is significant to add that it took his successor, Pope Paul III, another eleven years to bring to culmination the movement for a general council. By that time the breach was so extensive that it could not be completely healed -- only its continued spread was stopped. Most important, however, were the reform measures emanating from the Council of Trent.

At the beginning of his pontificate, Clement was generally opposed to the idea of an ecumenical council. Many reasons have been advanced for his assumption of this attitude, one of which concerned the circumstances surrounding his birth. Little was known of his mother except her name, but his father was Giuliano de' Medici who was murdered in the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478. The question of the illegitimacy of his birth must have been of considerable concern since Leo issued two special dispensations in an effort to remove the stigma. The first was issued in 1513 upon the granting of the cardinal's hat to Clement and his appointment as archbishop of Florence. The second resulted from an investigation which declared his birth legitimate on the grounds that his parents had contracted valid matrimony.

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Of greater significance in the postponement of the council are the events of the era of Clement. The wars of Francis and Charles, which began before his pontificate, centered in Italy and proved an obstacle to the holding of a council in this territory where councils had been held traditionally. From within the church itself there was much opposition to a council because one of the major considerations of such a body would be a reform of abuses. Those who held multiple benefices, those who held foreign benefices and had not taken up residence, members of the families of former popes, and many others who would lose positions of advantage did not wish to change their affairs. The forces of opposition were certainly many and powerful, but at first glance it would appear that there was considerable strength on the side of the forces favoring a council. Yet when these are analyzed there is evident some form of threat or some form of weakness in each case.

Martin Luther's appeals for a council were cause for concern in Rome. The papal position as it was stated by Leo in the bull Exsurge Domini was one of condemnation of the false teachings of Luther. But to Clement the request for a council might well mean a discussion of the primacy of the pope, a question which had arisen in earlier councils. Furthermore, the demands for a council
coming from Germany emphasized that it must be a "free, Christian council." Such could be interpreted to mean a definite lessening of the influence of the pope over the representatives of the church at the council. The question of the admission of lay persons to the council presented another problem, as did the suggestion that the council might even be national in its scope. These and other suggestions were bound to arouse opposition since they would have the effect of changing the traditional methods for the formation of a council. For a man of Clement's timid nature these factors of uncertainty must have been strong deterents.

French and German Influence
in Italy

There was also the situation in which Charles held considerable control over the affairs of the Italian Peninsula as a result of Hapsburg domination in Milan and Naples. In the beginning of his pontificate it seemed advantageous to Clement to support Francis in opposition to Charles in order to counteract the Hapsburg influence and perhaps even to establish some sort of equilibrium which would result from French control in Milan. His ultimate objective was entwined with the question of

Medici influence in Florence. All such plans were upset when Francis went down to defeat at Pavia and was taken prisoner by Charles (February 24, 1525). As a result of this catastrophe Clement was faced with the necessity of reconciling himself with the Hapsburgs. However, upon the release of Francis, after he had agreed to the Treaty of Madrid (January 14, 1525), the opponents of Charles united against him in the League of Cognac (May 22, 1526) with Pope Clement as one of the signatories. Within a year the wrath of the empire was felt by the papacy in the Sack of Rome (May 6, 1527) and the imprisonment of Clement in the Castle of Sant'Angelo from which he gained his freedom as late as December 7, 1527. He then fled to Orvieto and did not return to Rome again until October 6, 1528. The only alternative remaining to the pope was to come to terms with the emperor. Negotiations led to the Peace of Barcelona (June 29, 1529) between Clement and Charles, followed by the Peace of Cambrai (August 5, 1529) between Charles and Francis.

In such disturbed conditions and in these circumstances it is quite evident that the holding of a church council was impossible. The three men who would be most vitally concerned in the matter of a council -- Francis I, Charles V, and Clement VII -- were unable

\[19\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 198-199.}\]
until 1629 to make a concerted effort to begin preparations for its convocation. There was actually little if any thought that could be given to this question by the pope from the date of the Battle of Pavia until his return from exile. Nevertheless, there were some references to the council question during the first six years of the pontificate of Clement, and to these we now turn our attention.
CHAPTER III

THE COUNCIL QUESTION IN GERMANY AND IN FRANCE

(1523-1529)

The Problem in Germany

At the first Consistory held by Clement VII (December 2, 1523) there was appointed a commission to consider what action should be taken in regard to the question of Luther. On January 17, 1524, Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio was sent to Germany as the papal legate to take part in the Diet of Nuremburg. His acquaintance with the problem of reform and with the Lutheran movement was extensive since he had been concerned with these issues during the pontificate of Adrian VI. He arrived in Nuremburg just as the Diet was about to open and appeared formally before the assembly in one of its early meetings. Campeggio expressed the opinion that the pronouncements of the Edict of Worms should be executed, and in a later letter to the Emperor Charles V he maintained a similar position. It was his belief that this type of action offered the greatest possibility for correcting the...
religious disturbances in Germany. Although he spoke also of the matter of holding a universal church council, it was his opinion that such a move would not produce as rapid results since it would take some time before such a body could be called into session.

The German representatives at the Diet of Nuremburg did not support Campeggio's project for the enforcement of the Edict of Worms; instead they came forth with a strong plea for a council, with approval for such a meeting to be held on a national basis. To this suggestion of a national council, which would deal with matters of reform as well as other religious questions, Campeggio offered strong opposition. He argued that a council on a national scope would establish the dangerous precedent of encouraging other nations to undertake similar action with the result that one nation would soon differ from others on matters of faith, thus bringing about a schism. A development of this type would be clearly inadmissible since there would soon be no such thing as a universal church. Campeggio could only agree to the calling of a council if it were to be handled in the traditional manner through the pope.

A further suggestion which resulted from the Diet of Nuremburg concerned the attendance of lay members at the proposed council. Campeggio offered resistance to this proposal, stating that matters of faith would be
under discussion at such a meeting and that it was
traditional that only designated clergy and doctors of
the church would be concerned in making decisions of this
nature. Even the argument that there would be opposition
to the acceptance of the decisions of the assembly unless
lay representatives were permitted to take part did not
convince Campeggio of the desirability of a modification
of the traditional conception of church councils. He
merely took the stand that since there had not been
submission to the decisions already made by the pope
and the emperor, there was little hope that this
condition could be improved by the acceptance of the
principle of lay participation in church councils.
Campeggio understood fully the implication of this move
and attempted to frustrate it.

When the final statement was made regarding the
decisions of the Diet it was clear that the arguments of
Campeggio had not been successful in modifying the
original position of that body. While there was general
agreement on the necessity of convoking a general,
universal, free council by the pope as soon as possible,
it was decided to call an assembly of the German nation
at Spires on the feast of St. Martin. At this meeting
there was to be a discussion of the measures to be taken
until the general council could be held. Apparently
Charles recognized the danger inherent in such a
meeting since on July 15, 1524, he notified the German
princes that the projected meeting should not be held.
He added, moreover, the suggestion that the decisions of
the Diet of Worms should be observed.

Three days later Charles dispatched briefs to his
representative in Rome, the duke of Sessa. He referred
to earlier dispatches he had sent to the German princes
in regard to the projected meeting at Speirs but appeared
doubtful of his ability to prevent such an assembly. He
suggested, therefore, that the pope should take the
initiative and attempt to forestall this movement by the
announcement of the convocation of a general council to
begin its sessions in the spring of 1525. For the first
time it was suggested that the council be held in the city
of Trent, although Charles added that the location of the

\[1\] Concilium Tridentinum: Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum, nova collectio; edidit Societas
Georresiana promovendis inter germanos catholicos
litterarum studiis (12 vols., Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1901-
1934), IV, xvii-xviii; Hubert Jedin, Storia del Concilio
di Trento, Vol. I: La Lotta per il Concilio, tr. by
Clara Valente (4 vols. in progress, Brescia, 1949- ),
pp. 182-184, has given this matter full treatment.

\[2\] Giovanni Domenico Mansi, Annalium
Ecclesiasticorum Caesaris Baronii (20 vols., Lucae,
1740-1743), XII, 466-467 (Nos. 21-22).
meeting might be changed later to an Italian city if the pope so desired.

In the meantime the information sent by Campeggio was discussed in Consistory meetings. It was decided to send briefs to the kings of France and England as a means of influencing the position they would assume in regard to the decisions of the Nuremburg Diet. Clement also wrote a letter to Charles declaring very strongly his attitude concerning the Spires conference and the question of the enforcement of the decisions of Worms. It was probably as a result of this communication that Charles forbade the Spires meeting.

It became clear at this time and also in the following years that Charles was one of the strongest forces promoting the cause of a general council. Clement was considered as having little inclination for a council and of placing obstacles in the way of its convocation rather than trying to remove them. On the other hand, the king of France has been singled out as the one person


4Mansi, op. cit., XII, 463-466 (Nos. 15-17, 20).

5Cristiani, op. cit., p. 23.
upon whom rests the main responsibility for preventing the council during the pontificate of Pope Clement. Yet Clement handled the problems of his time in such a way as to make it appear more his responsibility than that of anyone else. His timid character has been called the cause of his temporizing. Perhaps it led to his attitude of always appearing ready for a council but always finding reasons why the time was not appropriate.

Until 1529 there were political and military events of such magnitude that Clement could readily explain, as indeed he had already in 1525, that there was such division and so much hatred and enmity in Christendom that it would be impossible to bring together a sufficient number of clergy to carry out a successful general council. In a brief of June 2, 1525, to King Sigismund of Poland, Clement outlined the problems facing him in regard to the convocation of a council. This, of course, was after the victory of Charles at Pavia and when Francis was a prisoner in Madrid. Considering this situation the prospect for the holding of a church council

6Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898- ), X, 162.
7Jedin, op. cit., p. 193.
8Jacobi Sadoleti, Epistolae quotquot extant proprio nomine scriptae nunc primum duplo auctiores in lucem editae (Romae, 1760), pp. xx-xxiii.
to be representative of all Christendom was certainly anything but encouraging. The main issue for the moment was for Clement to determine what sort of relationship he could maintain with Charles. Had he been able to foresee the events of the next two years he would indeed have despaired of the very existence of Christianity itself.

As for papal representation in Germany, Cardinal Campeggio was recalled within a short time following the suppression of the Peasants' Revolt. Girolamo Rorario, however, who had been sent to the court of Ferdinand just prior to Campeggio's mission, now became the principal representative in Germany. The continuing seriousness of the religious situation seems not to have been realized in Rome once the social revolt had subsided, and formal papal representation in Germany was not renewed until 1629 with the appointment of Gian Tommaso Pico della Mirandola on a mission to the Diet of Spires held in that year.

In the meantime, important developments had taken place in the Diet of Spires of 1526. It was the intention of the emperor to bring about the enforcement of the Edict of Worms at this meeting, but he was unable to attend. Although many of the Catholic princes maintained that no changes should be made in ecclesiastical affairs as they
stood at that time except through a general council, there were others who believed that certain conditions could not continue to be upheld until the meeting of a council. It was even suggested that a national council should be the vehicle by which the more important reforms should be put into effect since military conditions would necessitate a long delay before a general council would be able to convene. In opposition to the making of such a decision at this Diet was the prohibition of the emperor himself of any changes prior to the decision of a council. The result of the meeting was the publication of a recess designed to permit each state to decide for itself what changes were necessary in religious matters, giving consideration only to the responsibility of each to God and the emperor.

At the next Diet of Spires in 1529, Mirandola presented the papal position on the most pressing issues. By this time the threat of the Turks had become serious; consequently, one of the major propositions was the papal offer of assistance to Germany in repelling the Turkish menace. Clement, through his nuncio, also promised to work for peace and to call a council for the following summer. One main issue of this Diet dealt with the decision of the Diet of 1526 which had permitted each

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state to act on its own initiative regarding religious matters. Charles requested the present Diet to rescind this act. When the majority of the states complied there were others that drew up a protest to the order.

The final decision of the Diet was in the form of a request directed to the emperor and the pope. They were called upon to arrange for the announcement within one year of the convocation of a free and general council to be held on German soil. It was further desired that the sessions of such a council should begin within two years. Doubt that there would be compliance with this request was implied in the suggestion that if a general council could not be convened then a national meeting should be substituted. The Diet of Spires was unable to accomplish any greater satisfaction than the earlier requests regarding the desire for a council.

Heretical Movements in France

France in the 1520’s was certainly disturbed by heresy but not in the same manner as Germany. There was punishment of heretics as may be seen in the cases of Jean Leclerc, Jacques Pavannes, Wolfgang Schuch, and Louis de Berquin. But here the situation was entirely different from that in Germany, and as a result we find that the dealings of Clement with religious problems in

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\[10\] ibid., pp. 213-214.
France were not at all similar to those applied in the German situation. There were appeals made to the pope during these years for assistance in combatting heresy; at the same time, the French made use of measures of their own to keep the developing religious interpretations under control. An early example of the application of such special procedure is the condemnation of Luther's doctrines made by the faculty of theology of the Sorbonne in April, 1521.

The French movement of the 1520's entered in the activities of Lefèvre d'Étaples who gathered around himself at Paris a group of men interested in pursuing "sacred studies" through reliance on Scripture. As this group developed it attracted the attention of the bishop of Meaux, Guillaume Brignonnet, and the sister of King Francis, Margaret of Angoulême. In the so-called "Cenacle of Meaux" there developed many valuable reform ideas. Within the group were some "evangelicals" who carried their pursuit of reform to the extreme and broke away from the church. William Farel was one of these; others, such as Brignonnet and Lefèvre, had no intention

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in their reforming tendencies of turning to heresy.
Even the latter, however, were called to task by those
who insisted on maintaining strict orthodoxy. In 1523
the Sorbonne condemned Lefèvre's commentary on the
Gospel, and during the absence of Francis in 1525
proceedings were started against him. He managed to
remain in exile until the return of the king and was
then taken back into the royal court. Briçonnet, too,
was accused of heresy by the Cordeliers but successfully
defended himself and was declared innocent. Although he
did support the work of some of the Meaux group who
turned to Protestantism, still he condemned the works of
Luther and prohibited the preaching of Lutheran doctrines
within his jurisdiction.

In regard to his attitude toward religious
reform and heretical opinion Francis seems to have
followed a policy of undertaking whatever action seemed
propitious at the moment. In his opposition to the
hegemony of the House of Hapsburg he could at one time
offer assistance to the Lutheran princes in opposition
to Charles; at another time he could just as readily
enter into agreements with the Turks who threatened the

12Roger Doucet, Étude sur le Gouvernement de
François Ier dans ses Rapports avec le Parlement de
Paris, Tome I, IIe Sér. of Publications de la Faculté
very existence of Christianity. From the French point of view the success of Charles in suppressing the Lutheran movement would mean an increase in Hapsburg authority as much as would the defeat of the Turkish menace. For Francis any action which would assist him in reducing the Hapsburg position in Europe was of prime importance. He seems to have overlooked the threat that either of these two forces could be to his own position should one or the other succeed in gaining its objective.

The convocation of a church council could also be viewed by Francis as a major obstacle in his struggle against the Hapsburg authority. In addition to church reform the two major objectives of a council were to oppose the spread of heresy and to unite the forces of Christianity against the Turks. Should success along either of these lines follow from a council, the French position in Europe would suffer a major setback, and the Hapsburg hegemony would be in the ascendancy.

Within France itself there appeared no urgency for a council to suppress heresy. Measures were taken by one group or another whenever controversial opinion appeared. Before any really decisive action could be forthcoming in France it would be necessary to make a clear distinction between heresy and orthodoxy. Bishop

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13Jedin, op. cit., pp. 196-197.
Brigonnnet, and indeed Francis himself, acted in such manner as to give encouragement to those who had heretical leanings or at least were adjudged later in life to have had such opinions. Witness the protection given by Francis in the case of Louis de Berquin who was condemned and imprisoned in 1523 only to be freed by the king. Yet in 1529 Berquin was burned at the stake as a heretic.

Francis was opposed to the spread of Lutheran ideas in France, but he gave his support to theological studies that were being made in such centers as that of Meaux. He seemed to believe that while Luther's work was definitely of a heretical nature the French theologians were speculating within the realm of the orthodox. His mother Louise of Savoy adopted a similar attitude though in the absence of her son in 1525 she called upon Clement to clarify the means for determining heresy. The Parlement of Paris was particularly interested in making some definite arrangements regarding heretical opinion since the royal family had interceded in many cases. The bull issued by the pope on May 17, 1525,

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14 Doucet, op. cit., pp. 163-165.
16 Doucet, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
authorized the appointment of four commissioners to carry out a program of opposition to heresy. Three of the four commissioners were to be members of the Parlement, and the fourth was to be one of the **scurés** of Paris. The work of this commission was to search for heretics and take necessary action against them. The importance of this bull lies in the assignment of the work of ferreting out heresy to a specific commission, thus shifting this responsibility from the bishops, the theological faculty of the Sorbonne, and Parlement where there was a lack of uniformity of action.

Within a short time after the promulgation of this bull, action was taken by the commission against some members of the Meaux group. Upon being informed of these proceedings Francis directed Parlement to suspend the action until his return from Spain. The king was released in March, 1526, following the signing of the Treaty of Madrid and the exchange of his two sons as hostages for the fulfillment of the terms of the agreement.

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18 *Doucet, op. cit.*, p. 171.

Upon his return to Paris he began negotiations which resulted in the formation of the League of Cognac against the empire in May, 1526, with the papacy as one of the contracting parties. From the papal point of view political considerations now outweighed all threats of religious schism. Clement and Giberti prepared for an all out effort to drive the imperial forces from Italian territory and to raise Italy to a position of importance in European affairs. As a justification of such action Clement prepared on June 23, 1526, a long summary of his grievances against the empire. At this time the influence of Giberti over papal affairs reached its zenith. The wording of this letter is an indication that Clement was trying desperately to justify his joining with the opponents of the empire in undertaking a war of self defense. He related at length his grievances against the empire in an attempt to show that his own efforts at peace and reconciliation had been consistently rebuffed. Finally, he offered specific instances of the failure of the imperial representatives to fulfill their obligations to him. This brief was followed two days later by a much shorter letter which announced that he was sending Baldassare Castiglione to explain the conditions that had

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led to the resort to arms. This was no doubt an attempt to mollify the harshness of the earlier brief, but it actually had little effect on Charles who must have realized that Clement had opposed him for some time.

The raid on Rome by the Colonna was taking place at almost the same time that Charles was drawing up his answer to Clement's letter. The pope was forced to take refuge in the Castle of Sant'Angelo in mid-September and was released only upon the signing of humiliating terms presented to him by Ugo Moncada, the imperial envoy.

The reply of the emperor to the letter of Clement was dated September 17, 1526, and consisted of forty-nine propositions, the last of which was the threat of an appeal to a general council of Christianity to settle points of dispute. Although Charles also answered the shorter brief of Clement by a reply dated the following day, he still maintained his position regarding the appeal to a council. There was apparently some misunderstanding of the position taken by Charles in regard to the authority for convoking a council since in a

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21 Judoci le Plat, Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio... (7 vols., Lovanii, 1781-1787), II, 240-247.
22 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 328-336.
23 Le Plat, op. cit., II, 284-288.
24 Ibid., 289-290.
letter of September 26 he definitely stated that this right belonged only to the pope. Yet on October 26 he addressed a brief to the cardinals in which they were requested to arrange for the calling of a council should Clement fail to do so.

The kings of France and England also must have been in doubt concerning the exclusive right of the pope to convocate a general council. While Clement was held prisoner as a result of the sack of Rome in May, 1527, they issued a joint declaration in the form of the Treaty of Amiens (August 18, 1527), in which it was declared that they would not approve of the convocation of a council so long as Clement remained a prisoner. While this agreement does not specifically refer to any other authority than that of the pope for calling a council, such may have been the sense of the agreement. Before this treaty was concluded Charles had sent letters to Clement in which he again referred to the necessity of the convocation of a council (August 3, 1527). On November 26, 1527, the final agreement was arranged for

25 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xxv.
26 Le Plat, op. cit., II, 290-294.
27 Jean du Mont, Corps universel et diplomatique du droit des gens (6 vols., Amsterdam, 1726-1731), IV, Part I, 494-496.
the release of the pope from the Castle of Sant'Angelo. The pope agreed to assume a position of neutrality, to work for peace, to pursue the matter of the Turkish war, and to convene a council for the consideration of both reform and heresy. In return for these and other conditions Clement was granted his freedom and on December 7 withdrew from the castle and took up his residence at Orvieto, later moving to Viterbo and then returning to Rome on October 6, 1528.

On December 14 Clement wrote a letter to Francis from Orvieto in which he made reference to the difficulties imposed upon him during the period of imprisonment. Although he expressed appreciation for the assistance rendered him by the king he did not hesitate to point out that it had been inadequate, and that even the troops under Lautrec had not fulfilled his expectations. He explained the agreement made with the emperor as due to the force of circumstances, but it appeared that he intended to continue his neutral position rather than show favor to France. In the months that followed he refused to accept the overtures of the League and maintained his position of aloofness while the French and imperialists carried on their struggle in the Italian

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29 Roger Mole, "Clément VII," Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique, XII, cols. 1194-1195.

30 Pastor, op. cit., X, 6-7.
When finally the French were overcome and began their withdrawal the pope once again was in a position to turn with favor toward Charles. Thus by the end of the year 1528 it was possible to reconsider the problems of reform and heresy.

French Attitude Toward the Council

During the years from the accession of Clement in 1523 to the end of the year 1528, there were few references to the matter of a church council in the relations between the pope and the French king. Nikolaus von Schönberg represented Pope Clement on the subject of peace in a brief mission to the courts of Spain, England, and France in April and May, 1524. This mission was without significant accomplishment. At the same time, in April, 1524, Clement wrote a reassuring letter to Francis to indicate that he did not intend to give his complete support to Charles. His position was rather to be one of neutrality, as he explained in his correspondence to the latter, by way of supporting his intention not to continue the alliance which had been entered into by Adrian VI.

31 Ibid., 24-27.
32 Ibid., IX, 257-260.
33 Ibid., 259.
Jerome Aleander, the archbishop of Brindisi, was the first nuncio of Clement to France. His appointment extended from October, 1524, to February, 1525. Aleander had served earlier as the representative of Pope Leo X at the Diet of Worms in 1521. He had also submitted a memorial to Pope Clement at the time of his accession to the papacy in which he advised various actions to be taken in regard to both the reform of the church and the matter of heresy. He was likewise responsible for drawing up the memorandum used by Cardinal Campeggio in his mission to the Diet of Nuremburg in 1523.

The main reason for the appointment of Aleander at this time appears to have been the advance of the French into the territory of northern Italy. Clement was interested primarily in bringing about peace between the French and the imperial forces which would remove a threat to the Italian states and also permit him to give greater attention to the settlement of religious problems. At this time, however, Francis must have been more interested in a successful prosecution of the war against Charles than in the question of negotiating terms of peace or in trying to halt the spread of the Lutheran movement. Clement was interested in an agreement with Francis to the effect that his aggression in Italy would be satisfied with the acquisition of Milan. He could then make an approach to Charles with an offer regarding
the situation concerning Naples, thereby establishing a
kind of balance of power.

Aleander was not an advocate of the council. Rather he believed in making use of devious means of diplomacy and of resorting to the use of force when such measures had failed. In his report to Clement concerning the first meeting with Francis, he indicated that the king was aware of the dangers in the Lutheran movement and that he would not permit such doctrines to make headway in France. There was some discussion of particular religious problems in France as well as a reference to French support in the struggle against the Turks. On the latter point Francis gave his assurance that he would continue the promise he had made on this matter to Leo X.

In the meantime, as a result of the French occupation of Milan, Clement dispatched Giberti on an extraordinary mission to France. He was to negotiate a treaty of peace and alliance. Negotiations proceeded in such a manner that on December 12, 1524, Francis had concluded an alliance with the papacy and Venice. The

35Jedin, op. cit., p. 165.
36Jules Paquier, Nocciature d'Aleandre auprès de Francois I: Annales de St. Louis des Francais (Paris, 1897), pp. 45-49.
latter agreed not to give assistance to the emperor,  
while Francis agreed to maintain the control of the Medici in Florence and to protect the Venetians. By an agreement of January 6, 1626, the pope and the king of France made certain settlements regarding Italian territory, clearly indicating their opposition to Charles. Clement had thus cast his lot with the French. Then on February 24, 1626, came the disastrous defeat of the French in the Battle of Pavia which resulted in the imprisonment of Francis. The mission of Aleander ended abruptly with this event. He too was made a prisoner but was released after negotiations which resulted in a ransom payment.

In the months following the Battle of Pavia until the return of Francis in March, 1526, Louise of Savoy acted as regent. It was during this period that Clement issued the bull referred to above which established a commission in France for the purpose of regulating the proceedings against heretics. In a special letter of December 29, 1525, he approved the action taken against a preacher of Lutheran beliefs in Lyon.

38 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 267-268.
39 Paquier, op. cit., p. 40.
Negotiations for the release of Francis culminated in the conclusion of the Treaty of Madrid on January 14, 1526. It was two months, however, before Francis was again in France. He wasted no time in indicating his contempt for the obligations of this agreement. By May he had repudiated his promises and entered into the League of Cognac with the papacy, Venice, Florence, and Milan as a means of preparing for a renewal of the struggle against Charles. Clement had sent Capino da Capo to France for the purpose of discussing the means of protecting Italy from the emperor and obtaining the support of the king for the League. Francis did not provide the troops necessary for the protection of Italy, and in May, 1527, there occurred the sack of Rome by the imperial forces, followed by the imprisonment and exile of Pope Clement which did not end until October, 1528.

In the meeting at Amiens between Cardinal Wolsey and the king of France, which resulted in the Treaty of Amiens, there was some discussion of a general council. On August 16, 1527, Wolsey reported to Henry VIII that the French king had responded favorably regarding the council. The two sovereigns then signed a mutual

41 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 300-305.

agreement that they would not approve the holding of a church council so long as the pope remained a prisoner.

Further action was taken in France in 1526 by way of opposition to the progress of heresy. There were several provincial councils, the most important of which took place in the provinces of Sens and Bourges. Specifically these councils were designed to bring about reform of the church in France. The former was held in Paris under the direction of Cardinal Duprat, the archbishop of Sens. Considerable attention was given to the matter of heresy and the spread of Lutheran doctrines. Strong penalties which were already in effect were given approval. The secular authority was charged with the responsibility of meting out punishment. There were also statements of dogma conforming to the beliefs of the universal church. On the matter of reform the Sens council drew up a list of decrees the effect of which, if carried to their conclusion, would be to bring about a beneficial transformation of the discipline of the French church. Many abuses were condemned, and bishops were given complete authority in granting permission to preach in their territory. The council of Bourges was similar in its results. There seems to be reason to believe that these councils represented sincere efforts on the part of the French not only to correct abuses but also to take a
definite stand on the matter of heresy. One of the most important results was the attempt to indicate just what was to be considered heresy and to point out the erroneous beliefs of some of the developing sects of that time.

With such measures as these being undertaken in France, there was not so much need for a general council as there was in Germany. Indeed, the French may very well have realised that a general council, with its attendant uncertainties, could easily be detrimental to the cause of religion in their own country. Had there been some strong force in Germany to undertake a real effort for reform and to support definite measures for the repression of heresy, the Lutheran movement could have been effectively counteracted. It might even have been well if Charles had taken more direct action along these lines. But with his absence from Germany during the years from 1521 to 1530 he was unable to do much more than appeal to Clement for assistance by way of calling a general council. Even the Edict of Worms was not seriously applied. In the early 1520's it would have been much easier to take action against Luther than to wait a decade until the movement had spread through nearly all of Germany and even beyond its borders to other European countries. In France the spread of heresy seems to have been kept under control as

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43 Cristiani, op. cit., pp. 368-373.
a result of the activity of certain groups such as the provincial councils, the theological faculty of the Sorbonne, and special commissions appointed to discover heresy and heretics. These efforts went ahead in spite of deterring measures on the part of the king and his sister and even in spite of the absence of the king during his year in prison.

On the other hand, Charles in the Treaty of Madrid attempted to obtain the support of Francis in the work of suppressing heresy. It was the intention of Charles to take advantage of the peaceful conditions that he thought would follow this agreement to enforce the Edict of Worms and to make use of the support of the French sovereign to eradicate heresy. He gave his approval to the Catholic League of Dessau, formed in May, 1525, to carry out opposition to heresy. The Lutherans, however, indicated their stand against such efforts by forming the League of Torgau to protect themselves. This action on the part of the Lutherans was given impetus when Francis repudiated the promises made in the Treaty of Madrid and began preparations to take up again the war with Charles. It appears from this point of view that upon Francis must fall the responsibility for not carrying out his promises.

Yet the terms of the treaty which resulted in his release from prison were unreasonable, and Francis did not give assistance to Charles in a campaign against heresy. Instead, the political situation appeared to him as the foremost problem, and thus he made every effort to counteract all the attempts of Charles to correct the various issues at stake. Indeed he eventually sought even the support of the Lutheran princes and the Turks. Thus the Machiavellian principles of Francis in his political dealings took precedence over his attitude toward religious uniformity.

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45 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 298-300.
CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE OF OPPOSITION TO THE COUNCIL

Clement's Return to Rome

Several events of importance to the papacy occurred in the years 1529 and 1530. Clement VII expressed his concern over the condition of the city of Rome when he wrote to Charles V on October 24, 1528, offering him a description of the destruction that had occurred. He made an appeal for the peaceful conditions necessary to undertake the work of the reconstruction of the city, expressed his trust in the promises made by the agents of the emperor, and requested assistance in the task before him.

The most immediate problem of a political nature which was of much concern to Clement was the recovery of control over Florence by the Medici family. But apparently he also gave much consideration to the question of whether the emperor or the members of the Holy League

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1Giovanni Domenico Mansi, Annalium Ecclesiasticorum Caesaris Baroni, (20 vols., Lucae, 1740-1748), XIII, 55-56 (No. 16).
could be of greater assistance in this project. For the
time being he assumed a position of neutrality, although
upon hearing rumors that the emperor was preparing for an
invasion of Italy, he made offers of a personal mission
to both Spain and France in order to bring about peace.
It was during this period that Miguel Mai represented the
emperor in Rome. His main efforts were directed toward
bringing about an alliance between the pope and the
emperor.

In the meantime, the pope had been informed of the
urgency of the Lutheran situation in Germany by the
cardinal elector of Mainz. In his communication with the
Vatican in December, 1528, two possible remedies for the
religious difficulties were offered: One was the calling
of a church council; the other was "a convocation to be
attended by deputies from every province of
Christendom...." The Diet of Spires which was soon to be
held in Germany was certain to consider this same problem,
and Clement would again receive information on the status
of the movement. Charles had sent a communication to

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2Calendar of Letters, Dispatches and State Papers
relating to the negotiations between England and Spain,
preserved in the archives of Simancas and elsewhere (9

3Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating
to English affairs, existing in the archives and
collections of Venice, and in other libraries of northern
Italy (18 Vols., London, 1854-1912), IV, 179 (No. 378).
this meeting in March to the effect that an attempt at reconciliation of the two opposing sides would be made in order to dispel any problems with the pope and to facilitate the holding of a council. This Diet is best known for the protest of the Lutheran estates to the action taken by the Catholic majority in repealing the decision of the previous Diet of Spires in 1526. It further charged the emperor with the work of attempting to have a council convoked within a year. Here then was another appeal to a council, this time from the representatives of the Catholic estates. This was something of a reversal of the trend favorable to Lutheranism which had been established earlier. Now, however, if these decisions were carried through they would have the effect of at least halting temporarily the spread of Lutheranism since no further changes were to be introduced until a council could actually be convoked.

4 Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatum, nova collectio; edidit Societas Goerresiana promovendi inter germanos catholicos litterarum studiis (12 vols., Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1901-1934), IV, xxvi.

5 Edward V. Cardinal, Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio, Legate to the Courts of Henry VIII and Charles V (Boston, 1925), pp. 138-139.

6 The recess is in Judoci le Plat, Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio... (7 vols., Lovanii, 1781-1787), IV, 201-321.
The Venetian representative, Gasparo Contarini, held several conversations with the pope in 1629 in attempting to persuade him to make the welfare of Christendom the major concern of his actions at this time. It was suggested that the temporal possessions of the church were of minor concern and that the pope should not act in the same manner as secular rulers. Although Contarini drew upon Holy Scripture to remind Clement of the value of high ideals, he was unable to convince the pope that he was more concerned about the welfare of the Italian states generally than gaining favor for his own republic of Venice. Clement admitted that Contarini's point of view was a proper one but he was not prepared to turn the Italian Peninsula over to the emperor. He was still intent on maintaining a neutral position, having not yet determined how to attain his objective. The imperial representatives were advised to continue their efforts in spite of the protracted illness of the pope during the first months of the year 1629. On February 16, 1629, Charles wrote to Muxetula, his agent in Rome, urging him to continue working with Cardinal Santa Croce and Miguel Mai to gain papal approval for the imperial plans.

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7Crescens Ferrara, Gasparo Contarini et ses Missions, tr. from the Spanish by François de Miomandre (Paris, 1956), pp. 120-133; Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898-_), X, 35-38.
Another letter of the same date notified the cardinal of the emperor's intention to extend his protection to the College of Cardinals should Clement die and the election of a new pope become necessary. Within two weeks the pope was informed that Charles would visit Italy on his way to Germany. Further negotiations led to the Bologna meeting.

Prior to this meeting Miguel Mai carried on constant correspondence with the emperor regarding his negotiations. Mai seems to have been a keen observer of Clement's weaknesses, even explaining to Charles his suspicion that Clement might have been feigning illness in order to permit himself greater latitude in making decisions and to postpone others as long as possible. He also expressed the opinion that Clement had an extraordinary fear of a council because of the possibility that it might turn out to his detriment. Because of this attitude of the pope, Mai admitted that he had attempted to avoid discussing the subject. He then reported a meeting between Clement and Andrea da Burgo, the envoy of Ferdinand, in which the latter explained that the main

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8Calendar of Letters, III, Part 2, 896-897 (Nos. 626-627).
9Pastor, op. cit., X, 49.
10Calendar of Letters, III, Part 2, 911 (No. 636).
objective of the emperor was peace but admitted that unusual circumstances might arise from a council. It was suggested that rather than resort to a council there should be held a meeting of representatives appointed by the pope, the emperor, and the German nation in order to resolve the question of the Lutheran troubles. Although Clement agreed that such a plan might have potential benefits, he seemed not to have taken the suggestion too seriously, and the talks ended at this point. An assembly of this type could result in just as many difficulties for Clement as a formal church council. Later on in the discussions concerning the Lutheran problem there would be papal opposition to the holding of a national council on grounds that it might set the precedent of permitting too much local influence in the settling of a religious matter. Although it probably was not fully realized at this time, the movement was already beginning to spread beyond the borders of the German states, and innovations were being accepted by the peoples of other nations. Under such conditions it was quite conceivable that several such national assemblies would have to be held with the result that decisions might be such as to destroy the unity of Christendom.

1Ibid., IV, Part 1, 23-24 (No. 6).
Negotiations Concerning the
Bologna Meeting

In May Clement wrote to Charles concerning his appointment of Girolamo da Schio, the bishop of Vaison and Master of the Papal Household, to succeed Baldassare Castiglione, who had died in February, as nuncio to the imperial court. The pope indicated that his appointee was well acquainted with his most intimate secrets and was completely deserving of the imperial confidence. Since Charles had already communicated his intention to come in person to Italy there seemed little reason to believe that this appointment was made with particular attention to the question of the council as Miguel Mai has indicated in his correspondence. Both Mai and Burgo placed too much emphasis upon Clement's opposition to a council. In his opinion a council was a last resort in attempting to solve the doctrinal problems that had arisen, and if a less impressive method could lead to a solution, such would be his choice. The two ambassadors carried on their operations in a manner to indicate that it required masterful maneuvering to convince Clement of the necessity for a council. Clement was assured by them that he could receive imperial support for his various

12 Girolamo Ruscelli, Delle Lettere di Principi, le quali o si scrivano da principi, o a principi, o a giovano di principi (3 voll., Venetia, 1581), II, 162.
projects without agreeing to the convocation of a council and even that means other than a council could be used to reach a settlement of the religious troubles. The extreme to which they carried their efforts was indicated in the withholding of information from Clement regarding the support of the Diet of Spires for the calling of a council. All this diplomacy was hardly necessary to bring the pope to the support of the imperial position. Actually the operations of the members of the Holy League would almost single-handedly bring about this result. France continued to interfere in Italian affairs to the point that Clement made his decision.

Sohio undertook negotiations with the imperial representatives upon his arrival at Barcelona, and by the end of June the Treaty of Barcelona had been concluded. Essentially the victory was Clement's since he was to be assisted in regaining not only the loss of prestige which he had suffered as a result of the sack of Rome and his imprisonment but also territorial claims against the Holy League. While this agreement made no reference to the convocation of a council, it was agreed that peaceful means for solving the religious problem in Germany had been exhausted, and the emperor and his brother Ferdinand were now to make use of force to gain the same end.

13 *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, xxvii.
The major gain for Clement was the assistance promised in returning the Medici to control in Florence -- this project to be sealed by the marriage of Charles' daughter Margaret to Clement's nephew Alessandro de' Medici, the illegitimate son of Lorenzo II.

In this agreement there was no mention of the convocation of a council. Charles was certainly more in favor of a council than Clement, but he hoped soon to have an opportunity of promoting this cause upon his personal meeting with Clement in Italy. In the meantime Francis became so exhausted by the war that he came to terms with the emperor in the Treaty of Cambrai, thus turning his back on his allies in the Holy League. Apparently Francis had no intention of giving up the struggle. In true Machiavellian style his government would suppress the followers of Luther at home while he supported the German Lutheran princes in their opposition to Charles. In this period, too, it was quite possible for him to give encouragement to the Turkish horde threatening central Europe, since any success on the part of this element would contribute to the weakening of the imperial strength. It would thus seem quite likely that with Charles supporting and encouraging a move for the convocation of a council, his rival Francis would

\[\text{\textsuperscript{14}}\text{Pastor, op. cit., X, 56-58.}\]
necessarily assume the opposite position. A council which could conceivably settle the religious strife of the German states would certainly contribute to the strengthening of the authority of the emperor. As long as this strife was not settled Germany would remain divided -- a condition most desirable to the king of France.

The Treaty of Cambrai reaffirmed many of the conditions of the earlier Treaty of Madrid which was repudiated by Francis. From this point of view it was humiliating to him, and yet there was little opportunity for him to continue the military struggle actively. Far better for France that he should make the semblance of favoring peace and at the same time continue sniping at his powerful adversary by the encouragement of his enemies. It was in this way that Francis did more than anyone else to prevent the convocation of a council.

On his way to Germany for the opening of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530 Charles traveled by way of the Italian Peninsula. Following his arrival at Genoa in August the imperial forces fought their way through central Italy as far as Florence where they met a stubborn resistance which enabled the city to hold out for more than nine months. Finally, however, in the latter part of 1530 the Medici were restored in their
control of the city with Alessandro taking the title of duke under a constitution effective in 1532.

The Bologna Meeting

In the meantime Charles and Clement had held their four-month meeting at Bologna. They met for the first time on November 5 -- the emperor not yet thirty years old and the pope past his fifty-first year. The outstanding event of the Bologna conference was the coronation of Charles by the pope on February 24, his thirtieth birthday. Contarini has expressed the opinion that the attitude of Clement toward Charles at the opening of this meeting was one of distrust, perhaps even one of hostility. But their conversations over a period of several months seem to have had a very favorable influence on Clement. On various occasions the pope spoke to Contarini about the favorable attitude of the emperor with respect to the question of the peace of Italy. The impression has been given by this observer that the attitude of Clement must have undergone a modification due to his close association with the emperor.

15Ibid., 100-105.

One of the projects which Charles wished to take up with Clement at Bologna was the question of a council. There must have been several conferences on this matter. Charles himself, when he wrote a short account of his reign some years later, recalled the decision made at this time:

At the same time the Emperor asked his Holiness to convolve and assemble a general council, as most important and necessary to remedy what was taking place in Germany, and the errors which were being propagated throughout Christendom. To this effect his Holiness appointed a legate to attend the Diet at Augsburg, and there to adopt all such resolutions as might seem best suited for such an object. 17

That Charles had little hope for a council which might result from this action is clear in the letter to his brother dated January 11, 1530, in which he declared that he was not himself in favor of a national council. He also realized that while a general council would be displeasing to Clement he would be more amenable to such a project in times of peace. The expression of this opinion on his part was the result of extensive discussion on the matter with Clement.

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18*Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, xxxi.
There was continued discussion on the council project after the letter to Ferdinand had been written, and in the final deliberations Charles made strong representations to the pope regarding the need for a general council to bring to an end the "serpentlike errors" in Christianity. It was toward this end that Clement agreed to send a representative to Augsburg for the purpose of obtaining further information with regard to the present conditions in Germany and the possibility of pursuing this objective.

In agreeing to take this action Clement was still protecting himself from the danger which seemed to be inherent in the convocation of a council. There was the ever present threat of France and the possibility that Francis might find occasion to gain advantage for himself at the expense of the papacy or Germany. Contarini was of the impression that while Clement seemed not to realize that Francis had taken a somewhat hostile attitude toward him, yet he had no particular affection for the French king. At the same time it was almost inevitable that the king of England would find this a most propitious moment for pressing his demand for an annulment of his marriage.


20 Alberi, op. cit., III, 266.
Within Germany itself there was the danger that the Lutherans would demand the discussion of certain dogmas and might even be able to gain a more advantageous position for their movement. These were definite pressures upon Clement and would be present in varying degrees until the end of his reign. Both Clement and Charles departed from Bologna in March. This conference of over four months had produced no tangible results as far as a general council was concerned. Clement would now carry out his part of the agreement by sending Campeggio as legate to Augsburg; but this would accomplish nothing since it would be another effort to settle the religious question without resort to a council.

Campeggio's Mission to Germany

Considerable attention was given to the matter of the council as Charles proceeded from Bologna to Augsburg. From Innsbruck, where the emperor remained for several weeks in consultation with his brother and other German dignitaries, Campeggio wrote to the papal secretary in Rome that the situation in Germany was such that Charles wanted the opportunity of obtaining information on the problem before making any decisions. The

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discussions had reached the point by May 4, the date of
the letter, that Campeggio expressed an opinion
unfavorable to a national council although the dukes of
Bavaria had indicated that such a meeting would be
beneficial. Still there were reasons for opposing a
national council and Campeggio gave assurance that he
would undertake the necessary action regarding the
question of a general council.

A few days later he clearly expressed himself to
the emperor in favor of the use of strong measures, such
as the enforcement of the Edict of Worms, but he was
opposed to discussions concerning the holding of a
general council. He had little hope of obtaining the
cooperation of the Protestant princes and believed that
they were interested in a council only to the extent that
such negotiations, as long as they continued, would
prevent the emperor from taking decisive action. They
knew also that while the emperor might remain in Germany
for some months he could not remain for years. Charles
was inclined to place some blame for the present
difficulty on the kings of France and England who had
encouraged the Protestants in their stand. While Charles
recalled that Clement at Bologna had given him assurance
of a council if general peaceful conditions could be
attained, Campeggio must have been following papal
instructions when he presented a list of the dangers to be confronted if such a council should become a reality. These arguments he presented not only to the emperor but also to the other Catholic German princes who had come there to discuss the affairs of Germany.

Following the presentation of the Augsburg Confession to the Diet in June, 1530, long negotiations took place between Campeggio and the emperor regarding the next step to be taken. Since the Confession presented a demand for a council it fell to Campeggio to present the emperor with a summary of the arguments against such a proposition. From this position Charles appealed to Clement himself, and in the ensuing correspondence between these two as well as others vitally concerned in this matter many things were brought to light.

Campeggio, in a memorial addressed to the emperor and dated June 28, expressed his opposition to a council and was thus directing his efforts against the requests for a council which had been submitted at both Diets of Spires and were now presented again. It was his own opinion that these appeals were not submitted with a sincere desire to reach a compromise, but rather that they had been designed to gain time and to postpone the reaching of a final solution. He had therefore taken

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22 *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, xxxii-xxxiv.
this opportunity to dissuade the emperor from giving consideration to the question of a general council. The suspicion of Campeggio that this was an insincere appeal was based on the fact that Philip of Hesse, perhaps the most radical of the Protestants, was responsible for placing the request for a council in the preface of the profession of faith which was presented to the emperor a few days after the formal opening of the Diet of Augsburg.

On July 4 Campeggio composed a longer memorial for Charles in which he again expressed himself as opposed to a council. This time he recommended the use of force if the Protestants refused to submit to the justice of his imperial majesty. He took the attitude that since the Lutherans rejected the decisions of earlier councils there was no reason to believe that they would give assent to the decisions of a new council. He even maintained that it would be dangerous to hold a council since such a meeting would offer the opportunity of an even greater diffusion of their errors. While he saw no advantage in a council he suggested that the emperor, should he so desire, pursue the matter further with His

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23Ibid., xxxvi.

Holiness. For the time being, Campeggio recommended that the emperor and other Catholic princes maintain their intention of enforcing the Edict of Worms. He believed this to be the one type of action that would forestall the spread of Lutheranism since it was an indication of a desire to act with firmness.

Charles, however, continued to think in terms of the council and was therefore interested in bringing about the peaceful conditions required by the pope for his consent. In his eyes these peaceful conditions could be procured through the observance of the Edict by the Protestants and their agreement to return to Catholic practices until a council could be convoked. Apparently the emperor was sincere in believing that he would be able to bring about this ideal situation. This was in agreement with the recommendation made to him by his Council on June 30. What Charles overlooked was the requirement that the Protestant princes would have to be convinced that his proposition was a sincere one and not just another attempt to gain time. While Clement, who was far from the scene and not fully familiar with the actual situation, could agree with Charles on the calling of a general council on these conditions.

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25 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xxxvii-xxxix.
Campeggio, who was much more familiar with the actual conditions than Clement, remained adamant in his 26 opposition to the council.

On the day following the receipt of Campeggio's memorial Charles set forth a program which called upon the Protestants to submit the question of their heresy to the judgment of the emperor, or to prepare themselves for the calling of a council by agreeing to forego any religious innovations in the meantime. If these two options were refused then there remained only the alternative of using force. Thus in his communications with the Catholic princes on July 5 Charles offered the same program that he had discussed with Campeggio on June 30. Compromise was still a possible solution to the problem, and toward this end the princes desired to postpone consideration of a council until all other possibilities had been exhausted. It would be the task of this group to make an attempt to bring the Protestants back to the fold.

The three weeks from the opening of the Diet of Augsburg to the sending of a communication by the emperor

26Jedin, op. cit., p. 216.
28Jedin, op. cit., p. 216.
to the pope on July 14 constitute a crucial period in the
development of Protestantism, even aside from the failure
of the Augsburg Confession to result in compromise. The
emperor was now in Germany for the first time since the
Diet of Worms. Nine years had elapsed, and the Protestant
movement had become much more than a reform movement, much
more than the reform preaching of one man. Although
Charles was fully informed of the progress of the heresy
while he resided in Spain, he could now see for himself
what changes had taken place and how much more widespread
was the movement. It was evident to him that drastic
action was necessary, and even before he had allowed
sufficient time for his previous suggestions to be
carried out fully, he had written to Clement in a tone
which indicated the hopelessness of the situation.

Before taking this action, however, he had covered
thoroughly the various facets of what he considered to be
the means for bringing unity to the church in Germany.
In communications on both July 7 and July 13 the Catholic
princes agreed with the suggestions of the emperor
regarding the kind of action to be taken before resorting
to a council. On the latter date it was clearly stated
that the council should be considered as a measure to be
used only if all other means had been exhausted. This
attitude should not be considered as one of opposition to
the council, but rather as a support for such action.
It was also on this date that Charles wrote Clement a strong recommendation for the calling of a council. Nicolò Perronèt de Granvelle, minister of the emperor, was sent to Campeggio to inform him of this decision. The discussion was reported in a letter from Campeggio to Cardinal Giovanni Salviatus dated July 14. In this communication Campeggio made one of his strongest appeals against the council, which he was told would be requested of the pope on the advice of the emperor and the Catholic princes of Germany. Campeggio referred to his previous stand in opposition to a council and to his opinion that the Protestants were using this method for the purpose of gaining the advantage of time and that through the resulting delay they would appear to have won their struggle. But Granvelle assured him that there would still remain the requirement that there be no further innovations and that the Protestants who desired a council must return to their former state. This condition he believed would have a very beneficial effect. Campeggio, on the other hand, felt that there was no possibility of obtaining agreement to this latter condition. He seemed intent on maintaining that the request for a council was only a delaying tactic of the Protestants which they were using for their own advantage.

29 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xxxviii-xxxix.
He could see no possibility whatsoever that the Protestants would give up their new opinions and practices even temporarily, because many of them would not accept such an offer as a sincere proposal.

In his letter to Clement on July 14, Charles complained alike of Protestants and Catholics in Germany. The former he found to be intractable, and the Catholics, including the electors, princes, and people, were insincere when it came to rendering assistance in bringing the Protestants back to the fold. His stand at this point was that there could be no further delay in the calling of a council. Such a meeting should have the effect of bringing out into the light the errors of Luther and of halting their spread. Charles made reference to the difficulty of obtaining from the heretics an agreement to give up their beliefs because of the length of time required before a council could be convened. The emperor was ready to take action and requested Clement to suggest the time and the place for a council so that he could discuss the matter with the estates of Germany. The present peaceful condition of Europe was used as an additional argument why this would be the proper time to take action. He referred to the agreement made at Bologna and believed that both he and the pope would receive credit for all the good that would follow from their decisions. But if the council should
fall on evil days because of a renewed outbreak of war, then the perpetrator of the disturbance would have to take the blame for interfering with peaceful conditions. While he strongly urged the council, Charles submitted again to the decision of the Vicar of Christ as he had done formerly at Worms.

Clement was advised of the content of this letter, even before its arrival in Rome, through communications which had been received from Mai and Salviatus containing many of the same ideas. In a meeting of the cardinals appointed to deal with German affairs held on July 18 there was a general agreement on the question of calling a council provided the Lutherans would consent to return to the Catholic faith in the meantime. Still the cardinals had misgivings about the efficacy of this solution to the problem and indicated their preference for the acceptance by the Lutherans of the emperor as an arbitrator. There was likewise a reference to the difficulty of obtaining the agreement of the Christian princes regarding the time and place for the council. In the final analysis it was feared that the Lutherans would not accept the mediation of the emperor, and thus the only solution would be the use of force.

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30 Jedin, op. cit., p. 217.

31 Concilium Tridestinum, IV, xl.
Upon the receipt of this letter in Rome further attention was given to the position taken by Charles. The French Cardinal Gabriel da Gramont entered the proceedings and attempted to assume a position of influence through the enumeration of a list of obstacles in the way of the convocation. The shift of attitude on the part of the cardinal was interpreted as an indication of pressure being exerted by Clement through the French representative. Indeed there was reason to question why within the matter of a few days there should have been such a complete change of opinion regarding the council. Cardinal Garcia de Loaysa, former confessor of Charles V, reported, apparently as a result of a private conference with Clement following a meeting of the cardinals which Loaysa did not attend, that Gramont probably assumed an attitude of opposition to the council because it was desired by the pope. The position taken by Gramont was accepted as having been suggested by Clement in order to gain support for his own point of view. This information was submitted to Charles in a letter dated July 31, and may be the reason why the emperor assumed an attitude of uncertainty with respect to Clement's reaction to his proposal. It also caused him to adopt a somewhat skeptical attitude when interpreting the meaning of the

pope's letter. Loaysa had already taken the position that Clement was opposed to a council in spite of his public utterances to the contrary. In his correspondence with Charles, as will be seen, this attitude was definitely important in shaping the emperor's opinion of Clement.

The pope's letter of July 31 to Charles was a direct answer to the latter's communication of July 14. Clement stated that, in consultation with the cardinals designated to consider matters of faith, it had been determined to agree with the emperor that a council should be convoked but only upon the acceptance of the conditions which had already been presented to the Protestants at Augsburg. If such conditions were not met it would be scandalous and a bad example to call a council. It was also necessary to make certain that if these conditions were accepted, some secure means should be provided to prevent a return to the former errors because unless this were done there would be slight expectation that the council would bring about a reformation of the erroneous beliefs. Clement agreed to convoke a council as soon as the emperor satisfied himself that these conditions had been met by the Protestants.

This letter has been interpreted by some as a clear indication on the part of the pope that he had no
intention of calling the council. It must be remembered, however, that such an undertaking constituted a milestone in the history of the papacy. Few popes would care to involve themselves so intricately in a matter of such importance if a solution could be reached by another means. Church councils have always been considered as action of a last resort since they require a great amount of preparation and necessitate the absence from their sees of a great many church leaders. If proper control over the council were not exercised it could very well get out of hand. The issues to be presented must necessarily be limited only to those of utmost importance, otherwise such a convocation would become impossibly long. At this moment there was an indication that Henry VIII desired to present his problem to such an assembly if the opportunity arose. This was an issue which had many repercussions, religious as well as secular and political. The hesitation of Clement and his demands for the existence of proper conditions before the convocation of the council should be regarded as only normal precautions. There can be no doubt, of course, that Clement was by nature shy and timid, as already indicated, and this personal characteristic may easily have led him to an even greater degree of precaution than would be expected under such conditions. But to state definitely that he
opposed the council, as Loayza did in his correspondence with Charles, is clearly to take advantage of Clement and to give an interpretation contrary to Clement's statements in the letter to Charles.

At this time there were many reasons for believing that a council would not become a reality in the near future. In the first place, there was sufficient opposition to a council on the part of those opposed to the reform of abuses to indicate that great effort would be necessary to bring about its convocation. Secondly, there was doubt concerning the sincerity of the Protestants in calling for a council since there was some feeling that this was an attempt to delay action of any kind, thus giving them greater opportunity to become stronger. Thirdly, the conditions requiring the return to Catholic beliefs and practices by the Protestants before a council would be called indicated a demand almost impossible of attainment. In this third proposition there was involved the question of whether a new council would have any effect on the Lutherans who had already refused to accept the decisions of previous councils which had condemned as errors some of the beliefs and practices to which they now adhered. This meant that those who supported the decisions of a council could not see the efficacy of a new convocation unless the authority of
previous councils was accepted. From the point of view of the Lutherans there must have been some reason to believe that if they returned to their former condition of accepting strictly Catholic practices, then the obvious need for a council to settle the problem would no longer exist. This latter demand appears to have been a major obstacle to the holding of a council. Yet from the point of view of papal authority it would be a much easier task to attempt compromise with a group still conforming to accepted practices than to sit down to a discussion with a group that would have to be recognized as already schismatic.

The letter of July 31 from Clement to Charles also made mention of the possible location for the council. Clement maintained that it should be held somewhere in Italy and that in his opinion Rome should be given first consideration since it had been the seat of so many councils in the past and because of the possibility that even further ruin might come to the city should the Curia be absent for a long time. Still, recognizing that there might be opposition to Rome as the site for a council, Clement suggested Bologna, Placenza, and Mantua as acceptable. Had he been desirous of producing as many obstacles as possible, Clement could easily have insisted on Rome as the only location which
he would accept. Furthermore, the alternate suggestions
made by Clement were not such as to be entirely
unacceptable to the emperor. Campeggio even reported on
a conversation which he had had with Charles in which
mention was made of the city of Mantua. He seemed to
have realized that a German city was out of the question
because there would be considerable opposition on the
part of other nations. Thus it was reasonable that an
Italian city would provide the most generally acceptable
site.

On August 11 Campeggio, in a letter to Salviatus, reported on his audience with the emperor upon the
occasion of the presentation of the letter from Clement.
Charles immediately perceived the hesitation of Clement in
agreeing to the council, but he expressed no doubt
regarding the sincerity of the pope. When he raised the
question about the demands for the return of the Lutherans
to Catholic beliefs and practices, Campeggio replied that
this should cause no wonder since the emperor himself had
suggested such action. He then connected this matter with
the need for insisting that there must be recognition of
the authority of the decisions of earlier councils and
implied that condemnation of heresy by a council must be

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33 Hugo Lämmer, *Monumenta Vaticana historiam
ecclesiasticam saeculi XVI illustrantia* (Friburgi
Brisgoviae, 1861), pp. 46-49.
accepted as final since it would cause much confusion if such decisions could be questioned by later councils.

The question of the time for calling the council also arose in this audience. Charles was of the opinion that not more than six or eight months should elapse between the date of the issuance of the notification and the actual meeting, but Campeggio maintained that it would take more nearly two years. It had been the hope of the emperor that a much shorter time would be involved in the preparations for a council, otherwise he would be obliged to return to Spain in the interval. It was evident that this situation might lead to further delay.

In all this conversation there was a definite overtone of certainty that the council would materialize. Charles was still thoroughly convinced of the need for a council though he had begun to realize the impossibility of obtaining conformance of the Lutherans to the conditions demanded. He now prepared to take the position that the council must be held under any conditions and that the most important issue was the welfare of Christendom itself. He was not yet to give up his effort to obtain Lutheran conformance to Catholic beliefs and practices and on September 7 he again offered the

\[34\] Ibid., pp. 49-54. This letter from Campeggio to Salvius is here erroneously dated August 10. Cf. Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xliii, note 4.
possibility of a council should the Lutherans accept these conditions. Upon their refusal Charles insisted on a council even without the agreement of the Lutherans. This change of attitude was evident in the conversation with Campeggio on September 23. By that time the possibility of compromise at Augsburg had to be abandoned, and now the council offered the only hope for bringing religious peace to Germany.

In this discussion with Campeggio, Charles revealed the influence of Loaysa in convincing him of Clement's insincerity. He now insisted that the council should be called regardless of the attitude of the Lutherans, but he still offered his obedience to the pope and agreed to submit to his will on this matter. He expressed the opinion, however, that it would be better to have the pope take a firm stand on the matter than to have the king of France exercise an influence on the decision. He was prepared to place the major responsibility for preventing the council on Francis, and desired that the French position be made so clear that there would be no danger of unjustly blaming the pope.

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35 Pastor, op. cit., X, 139.
36 Lämmer, Monumenta, pp. 56-58. An omitted part of this communication will be found in Stephan Hees, "Kardinal Lorenzo Campeggio auf dem Reichstage von Augsburg 1530," Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte, XI (1905), 56-7.
Communications with Francis I

Regarding the Council

In the meantime Clement had sent information to Francis informing him of the decision to hold a council and asking that he agree to be present or at least that he promise to send representatives. According to the tone of this communication it had been decided to hold the council in Italy, and the purpose of the meeting was to bring a halt to the spread of heresy. In a letter of instructions drawn up by Charles for Monsieur de Noircarmes, who was sent to the court of Francis, reference was made to the attitude to be taken should there be discussion of the council question. The emperor's representative was to pay special attention to the proposals presented on this issue, and if they appeared favorable then it was to be made known that Charles was willing to consult with both the French king and the pope on this matter. A letter from Muxetula informed Charles that the French appeared to be making an effort to gratify the pope by indicating the obstacles which would prevent the calling of a council. This report

37Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 1, 669 (No. 392).
39Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 1, 670 (No. 395).
could do nothing more than add to the impression already conveyed to the emperor by Loaysa. Similar indications were given by Miguel Mai in a communication sent to Francisco de los Covos, the High Commander of Leon. While admitting that the pope had consented to the calling of a council he explained that both the French and the English representatives were exerting an undue amount of influence and had brought up a number of problems which would result from the council. Although Mai was not yet certain as to the objective of this activity he intended to maintain a watchful vigilance. Mai may not have been able to discover in Rome the information he desired, but he received a dispatch from the emperor dated September 23 which informed him that the attitude of Francis toward the council project seemed to be a good one. Charles dispatched this information to his representative in Rome at the same time that he indicated to Campeggio that Francis was the one guilty of preventing the council.

The Diet of Augsburg came to an unsuccessful conclusion, and Charles had decided to make use of force as a weapon against the Lutherans. In a letter to Clement on October 4 he indicated this intention and requested

40Ibid., 674 (No. 397).
41Ibid., 727 (No. 434).
42Pastor, op. cit., X, 139-140.
financial support from the pope. The hesitation of Clement to grant the requested monetary aid and the reasons for his attitude have been summarised in a letter from Francesco Gonzaga, the envoy of Mantua, to the duke of Mantua. When the Italian states, and particularly the republic of Venice, indicated a lack of interest in rendering support to Charles in his struggle against the Lutherans, Clement adopted a similar attitude. Charles also realised the hopelessness of maintaining this position and, after abandoning his plans to use force, he again appealed to the pope for a council. This appeal was made in a letter written at the end of October which was presented to Clement by the imperial ambassador. Charles formulated his strongest arguments in this communication. He was now nearing the end of his sojourn in Germany and realised that if definite action were to be decided upon, it would have to be forthcoming at this time. He overrode various objections to the council, particularly that of the Turkish threat, by indicating that this one danger could very well be the means of uniting Christendom in opposition to both the Turkish infidel and the Lutherans. Charles begged the pope to consult with the other princes of Christendom and to

43Ibid., 143-146. The letter of Francesco Gonzaga is in the Appendix to this volume, 496-497 (No. 14).
obtain their support for a council. He could see no other way of meeting the crisis and feared even greater evil unless decisive action were taken. Thus the question of the council was again placed in the hands of the pope. Pedro de la Cueva, who had been appointed by the emperor as a special representative to the pope, sent a communication to the emperor regarding the papal reply. He reported that Clement had definitely assured him that the council would be convoked as the emperor desired and that the only obstacle was to remove the objections on the part of some of the cardinals. He expressed confidence, however, that this would be accomplished.

Further Consideration of the Council in Rome

Clement dispatched his own message to Charles on November 18 in which he stated that if this were a matter which concerned only himself he would certainly take action, but since the question of a council involved the church universal and the affairs of all Christendom, it was necessary for him to present the matter to a deputation of cardinals. He met first with this

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44 *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, xlvi-xlvii.


46 Ruscelli, *op. cit.*, III, 3 (2).
deputation and then with the Consistory. There seemed to be considerable difference of opinion as Clement realized there would be. After two meetings of the deputation had been held it was agreed to give support to the opinion of Charles that greater evil would result if a council were not held. It was recommended, however, that there must be consultation on this matter with the other Christian princes before any action could be taken. In a meeting of the Consistory the opinion favoring a council was arranged in such a manner that all the cardinals were able to indicate their approval of the project. A number of documents were presented at this time in support of the imperative argument. The question arose as to what was the true situation in regard to the decision made in Consistory. The official report of the meeting indicated that there was complete agreement, but almost immediately following information was being dispatched to Charles to indicate that there was not such unanimity.

47 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xlvi-xlviii.

48 Jedin has accepted this picture as passed on to us by observers. He has expressed the opinion that most of the cardinals did not approve of the council project since it would adversely affect the position of many of them. When the vote was taken, however, approval was given to the council because the cardinals did not wish to give the appearance of opposition to the imperial request. Cf. Jedin, op. cit., pp. 223-224.
On the very day of the Consistory Mai dispatched a letter to Charles in which he reported the existence of the divided opinion among the cardinals. This letter was written before the full Consistory had discussed the council issue and therefore referred to the disagreement which appeared in the earlier meetings of the deputation of cardinals. A few days later he submitted a report that the pope was complaining bitterly about being forced into calling a council by Charles. Yet some of the cardinals were willing to wager that a council would not be held. In a letter of the following day Mai reported that a council was to be held unless something occurred to prevent it, although there were many who did not approve of it. Pedro de la Cueva likewise offered the information that as a result of talks with the cardinals he had determined that they were fearful of it and that even Clement did nothing more than sigh when the subject was discussed. Again in a dispatch to the emperor concerning conversations with Clement, he reported that the pope complained of the opposition of the cardinals and that some of them even attempted to influence his opinion. In a series of dispatches to the emperor,

49 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 1, 822-824, 834-837 (Nos. 512, 523, 524).
50 Ibid., 828 (No. 517).
51 Ibid., 840-841 (No. 530).
Muxetula continued to maintain that Clement was well-disposed toward the council in spite of the presentation of objections on the part of the cardinals and the representative of the king of France.

On December 1 Cardinal Santa Croce wrote to the emperor his opinion that there would be no council. He based his belief partly on the unfavorable attitude of Francis, believing that unless his consent were given a council could not be called. As early as November 28 Mai reported in a dispatch to the emperor on information received by Clement that there existed an attitude of opposition to the council in France and that apparently Francis would do all he could to prevent it. Again Mai informed the emperor that the pope had received word from his representative in France that Francis had approved the holding of a council but desired that it be held in a more convenient place and suggested the city of Turin. This was in contrast to the November 27 dispatch from Eustace Chapuys, the imperial ambassador to England, who reported to the emperor the opposition of the king of France.

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52 Ibid., 841, 843, 850-861 (Nos. 531, 534, 545); Part 2, 17, 19 (Nos. 591, 594).
53 Ibid., IV, Part I, 831 (No. 520).
54 Ibid., 824 (No. 512).
55 Ibid., 836 (No. 523).
France to the council. Two weeks earlier in a letter which was mainly concerned with the position taken by Henry VIII, Chapuys had reported relaying the information to Henry that Francis had spoken against the council. To this statement the English king replied that he did not believe it, but that he could see no hope for ecclesiastical reforms since it would require the loss of so many temporalities.

The Venetian representative in France reported in a dispatch dated November 18 that upon receiving the information from Germany of Charles' desire for a council, Francis had written to the pope exhorting him to approve the request. This must have been the letter dated November 21 from Blois in which Francis gave almost unequivocal approval of the council and suggested only that the location be a convenient and accessible one in order to permit attendance from all nations. He was concerned that it be a city with sufficient accommodations for the large number of delegates that would be present.

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56 Letters and Papers, IV, Part 3, 3036 (No. 6738).
57 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 1, 797-803 (No. 492).
and that the necessary amount of time be allowed for those who desired to attend to settle their affairs and make the journey. It was his understanding that the council would be held for the purpose of destroying the Lutheran sect, to prevent the Turkish threat, and to correct certain abuses. His representative, the duke of Albany, had instructions to treat on this matter.

Certainly the tone of this letter was clear enough to indicate that Francois would support a council. Yet a communication to Henry VIII from the English representative at Blois indicated that Francois was not strongly in favor of the council but that he did not think it proper to give an outright refusal. It has been maintained that the letter was written in such general terms in order to permit Francois at a later date to present obstacles on questions relating to time, place, and procedure. In the Consistory held on December 5 the pope and cardinals expressed satisfaction and considered it an act of Providence that the two great rulers of Christendom should be in agreement on such an important matter. On December 13 Clement sent a letter to Francois in which he praised him for taking this position.

59 *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, 1.
60 *Letters and Papers*, IV, Part 3, 3034 (No. 6733).
61 *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, 1.
In the meantime the work of preparing the briefs to be sent to the Christian princes got under way. On December 6 Clement wrote to Charles that he had decided to undertake the preliminary steps toward the holding of a council by dispatching letters of notification of his intention to the princes. In order that the emperor might have further information regarding the progress of this undertaking Clement announced the appointment of a nuncio extraordinary to Germany.

Thus at the end of the year 1530 there was every appearance that preparations for a council were much further along than they had been at any other time during the pontificate of Clement. There were rumblings, as noted, that all was not well, and there were contradictory opinions regarding the attitude of the pope, the cardinals, and the king of France. But from official documents, such as the reports of the Consistory of November 28 and the correspondence of Clement, it may be concluded that the work of preparing for a council had begun at last. There remained to be considered, however, the attitude of the Christian princes and the question as to whether agreement could be obtained regarding such matters as the location for the meeting, the date of its convocation, and the topics for discussion.

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62Ibid., xlix.
Examination of Campeggio’s Position

It was at this point in the developments that Clement received an important communication from Campeggio dated November 13. This letter did not reach Rome until January and therefore had no effect upon the attitude of Clement until the beginning of the year 1631. Campeggio had many times expressed himself in opposition to a council and in favor of the use of force. It is not possible to determine whether this position was adopted by him as a result of instructions from Clement at the time of his appointment to accompany Charles to Augsburg, or whether he became more and more convinced of the necessity of maintaining such a stand because of his contacts with the Lutheran attitude at the Diet of Augsburg. At any rate his was certainly an obstinate position; even when Clement was demonstrating official approval for a council, albeit with almost impossible conditions, he did not waver in expressing his opinion that a council would not solve the Lutheran problem and that only the application of extreme measures by the emperor could hope to succeed.

Campeggio addressed a long communication to Clement in which he gave extensive treatment to the

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council question. His attitude was obviously one of opposition, but at the same time he presented other possible means of action to the pope. In the first place, he pointed out that if Clement sincerely desired to fulfill his promise to convocate a council it would be necessary to begin with the actual announcement of the convocation and then to proceed in regular order with all the additional details, keeping in mind those things which would be of particular benefit to Christianity as a whole. Campeggio gave the impression that there was a definite possibility that Clement would carry through the project. He was more brief, however, in his discussion of this particular kind of action on the part of the pope than of the other two alternative plans which he offered.

A second possibility was for Clement to make an outright refusal to convocate the council. At great length Campeggio set forth various reasons for presentation to the emperor as arguments why it would not be expedient to hold a council. First of all, he mentioned the danger that there would be controversy regarding the authority of past councils. This could result in some question as to whether the pronouncements of former councils could be given renewed discussion. Then he launched into a strong argument against the council by making reference
to the problem of the primacy of the pope. He feared that those who wanted a council might succeed in having it convoked by claiming to recognize the superior authority of the pope while in truth they wished to use the council for the purpose of questioning this principle. According to Campeggio there could even result the creation of an anti-pope or a schism under such conditions. Circumstances similar to those which had occurred at the Council of Basel might arise with all the difficulties associated with a schism.

While councils had been convoked in the past for the purpose of determining heresy, there had also been instances in which heretical doctrines had been condemned by papal pronouncement. Indeed, it had been impossible for church councils to keep up with all the modern doctrines, and hence there arose the question of whether a council was now necessary or whether simple condemnation was sufficient. The implication was that the latter method could be undertaken with much less delay and that haste in this case would seem to be advisable. It was strongly recommended that some method of punishing the heretics and using force against them should be considered without delay since it was evident that they would attempt to propagate their beliefs and even to fortify themselves in order to prevent such action.
This appeared to be the most expeditious manner of bringing
the heretics to their senses before an untold number of
souls were lost. Concerning the holding of a council for
the purpose of uniting opposition to the Turkish menace,
Campeggio was unable to see how this could be proper
cause for a council and believed that it would necessitate
undue delay since everyone would be inclined to postpone
action while the preliminary preparations were being
carried out.

In regard to the calling of a council in order
to bring about the reform of ecclesiastical abuses,
Campeggio offered the advice that this was greatly needed
but that it should be considered possible for the pope
and the emperor to bring about the necessary corrections.
While it might even be admitted that a council was
necessary for this purpose, it could be maintained that
attending to the problems of punishing the heretics and
preparing to meet the Turks were of much more importance,
especially since these two matters would be held in
abeyance if there were expectation of the convocation of
a council. These two important considerations might be
delayed as long as a year and a half or even longer
should some of the Christian princes find that they would
not be prepared for attendance at the opening of the
council within that span of time. It was conceivable
that such a delay could be considerably longer than a year and a half. In the meantime there would be no action whatsoever regarding the heretics and the Turks.

These objections to a council offered by Campeggio to Clement may have been of some importance in determining the position taken by the pope, but the document had not yet appeared in Rome when the next important communication to Charles was in preparation. This consisted of the instructions dispatched with Uberto da Gambara, bishop of Tortona, which reached Charles at Liège about the middle of January and which contained a list of conditions which would have to be fulfilled before a council could be held. This letter, as will be seen later, showed a definite stand on the part of Clement regarding the council and contained some of the same arguments presented by Campeggio in his letter to Clement.

As a third possible course of action for the pope, Campeggio suggested using the devious means of appearing to favor a council but always finding some reason for postponement. The first means for delay would be to refer to the necessity of obtaining the consent of all the Christian princes and to refuse to take action until their agreement had been secured. Then the matter of determining the date for holding the
council could be used as a deterring factor by insisting that there must be general agreement of all the princes. Calling attention to the difficulty of deciding on the location for the council was another means of delay. The pope could insist on the desirability of Rome and maintain that it would be more difficult to provide the necessary freedom from outside forces in another location. When all these issues had been settled then there was still the opportunity of postponement because of travel difficulties; or a reason could be found for transferring the meeting to another place; and during all this time the Lutherans and the Turks would offer such threats that additional reasons would undoubtedly arise for postponing the council. Campeggio apologized to Clement for offering this third proposition since he did not believe such action to be worthy of the Vicar of Christ. He again urged the use of force against the heretics lest the problem become increasingly serious.

It is interesting to note that both the pope and the emperor, within the short span of a few weeks, received advice which no doubt had some effect upon their future decisions. The document of Campeggio covered many of the points which Clement would use in the future when faced with decisions concerning the council. It does not

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seem possible to assume that by the end of the year 1530 Clement had made up his mind that there should be no council during his pontificate. All his activity may be interpreted as an attempt to foresee the issues that would confront him in such an undertaking. While these problems faced him as very real ones there came the letter from Campeggio suggesting even greater obstacles. Taken altogether and after due consideration, these obstacles must have seemed formidable to Clement, and hence in the years to follow he was unable to make progress against them.

Imperial Interpretation of Clement's Acts

Charles' opinion of Clement underwent a modification following their discussions at the Bologna meeting. The letters of Loaysa without doubt gave him reason for believing that the pope was insincere. It was after the receipt of this communication that Charles gradually shifted his opinion with regard to the requirement that the Lutherans must return to obedience to the church before the council could be called. This was one of the points upon which there seemed to have been apparent agreement at Bologna, but now, faced with almost overwhelming obstacles, Charles was ready to give way, and while still agreeing to follow the dictates of the pope,

See supra, p. 88.
he wished him also to dispense with the requirement placed upon the Lutherans for the council. At this point Charles for the first time expressed his belief that the king of France was exerting an influence on Clement which was detrimental to the council project. At almost the same time Charles issued instructions to one of his representatives to determine the attitude of the French king. Later he informed his representative in Rome, Miguel Mai, that apparently the attitude of Francis toward the council was favorable.

In this atmosphere of confusion at the close of the year 1530 the misunderstanding on the imperial side of the objectives of the papal element would have an important bearing on future determinations. On the other hand, Clement himself would now be subject to an ever increasing amount of advice, the tone of which would be in opposition to the council. If the obstacles to a council were already imposing for Clement, they would increase in stature as the months proceeded, and by the end of his pontificate it appeared that Clement would never be able to consent to the holding of a council.

Charles arrived in Augsburg on June 15, 1530, for the Diet and before the end of November was on his

66 See supra, p. 96.
67 See supra, p. 97.
way again, soon to be beyond the borders of the German states. Either there were very pressing matters demanding his presence elsewhere, or he did not believe that the situation in Germany was of such a proportion as to require his further personal attention. But with the Lutheran problem such as it was and with the Turks still presenting a threat, it is difficult to determine those more important issues that required his attention for all of the year 1531 in his Netherland territories. Perhaps he felt that he had completed his part in the process of bringing the Lutherans back into the fold and that any further action was now the responsibility of the pope.
CHAPTER V

FRENCH INFLUENCE UPON THE GERMAN POSITION

Gambara's Mission to Germany

In order to maintain more direct contact with the emperor, Uberto da Gambara, the bishop of Tortona, was entrusted with a special papal mission to Germany. He carried with him two important documents. One was an instruction dated December 19 which had been drawn up by Cardinal Cajetan for the purpose of summarizing the papal objections to the holding of a council. These were not new objections but were undoubtedly quite familiar to the emperor. Four of them concerned the attitude of the heretics and the effect this would have upon the success of the council. There was some doubt in the mind of the pope as to whether there should be discussion of beliefs already condemned by previous councils. If this were permitted a dangerous precedent would be established while a prohibition of such matters would lead the Protestants to insist that they had been condemned without a proper hearing and to refuse their submission to the decrees of the council. Indeed it might even be questioned whether
the heretics would accept the decisions of a new council as authoritative since they refused to acknowledge the decisions of previous councils. Should such an eventuality occur the result could very well be that decrees issued by the council would be ineffective. The Protestants then would insist on standing by a strict interpretation of the Bible and would refuse to accept the councils and even the Fathers of the church as authoritative. The manner of their actions at the Diet of Augsburg indicated that their demand for a council included the right to maintain their beliefs and practices up to the moment of the convocation and thereby to gain time and possibly to disrupt the council itself.

The last two objections of the pope concerned papal primacy, the possibility of a schism, the attendance of the other Christian princes, and the Turkish threat. An attack on the theory of the supremacy of the pope over the council might lead to a schism even more dangerous than that of the Council of Basel. This would be injurious to both the pope and the emperor. Clement insisted that the protection of the emperor be assured because otherwise he would not desire to preside over the council. Yet even if this protection were given there was some doubt as to whether the other Christian princes would attend, and without their participation a council
could not be held. Finally, it was questioned whether the Turkish threat was not urgent enough to demand that action be undertaken much sooner than would be possible through a council. This communication, consisting of objections to the council, was submitted to the emperor on January 16 or 17, 1531, at Liége.

A few days later Gambara carried out a second part of his mission by presenting to Charles a list of five conditions for the holding of a council. These included the requirement that the council limit its discussion to the matter of the Turkish war and the Lutheran problem; that the emperor agree to be present in person; that the council be held only in an Italian city; that a limitation be placed on the right to vote; and finally, that the Lutherans make a formal request for the council and invest their delegates with full authority.

Two months passed before Charles submitted an answer to the conditions presented by Clement. In the meantime it was difficult to determine the exact status of the council question since there were various opinions being expressed on the matter. Early in January, 1531,


2Ibid., lvii.
before Charles had received the communication from the pope, information was being disseminated that King Francis had written to the cardinals for the purpose of requesting a delay in the matter of deciding about a council until there could be held a conference of the three rulers involved. On January 11 and 12 Muxetula's dispatches to the emperor reported the attitude of the pope regarding the council. The French position as explained by the duke of Albany, the French representative, favored delay until this meeting could be held. Clement, however, desired to go ahead with the plans for a council in spite of the French objections, although he did express some fear that it might become a source of greater evil than good in the Lutheran situation. Before making a definite decision he wished to obtain further information from the emperor.

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4Ibid., 17, 19 (Nos. 591, 594).
While delaying his answer to Pope Clement the emperor took two actions. First, he sent a representative to Francis to determine his attitude toward the council. This was Louis de Praet whose mission began early in the month of February. Louis de Praet did not receive from Francis the information desired until near the end of the month of March. This procrastination on the part of the French king was directly responsible for the delay of the emperor's reply to Clement. The second action of the emperor was to submit to his brother Ferdinand and the other Catholic princes in Germany the objections to the council which had been given in the letter from the pope. Apparently his purpose was to determine their attitude in regard to the council. When he found them to be in favor of such a project, then he was ready to submit his answer to Clement.

Charles was of the opinion that Francis opposed the holding of a council, but he desired specific information on this point. Louis de Praet was instructed to deal as diplomatically as possible with Francis and yet was to use his influence to obtain the agreement of the French to the convocation of the council. He was not

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5 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lix.

6 Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898- ), x, 154.
to appear to be supporting the council to such an extent that he would arouse fear or suspicion that the French interests might be compromised as a result of such a meeting. Francis delayed some two months before he finally agreed to send a reply to the emperor. His answer was not a satisfactory one from the point of view of Charles because it appeared extremely noncommittal. Francis proposed the holding of a special assembly in Rome at which there would meet representatives of all the countries of Christendom. The purpose of the conference would be to determine the location for the council and the protocol for discussion and procedure. There was to be no limitation on the subjects that could be brought into the discussion except that the decisions of former councils were not to be questioned because this action might become a restraining influence on the deliberations of a new council. At the same time, however, this body would determine what issues could be presented in the council and would therefore limit its authority in this way. There seems to be a suggestion that the Lutherans should not be given the advantage of being able to question the pronouncements of former councils. Perhaps

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7Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lix.

François did not yet feel strong enough to indicate clearly that he intended to support the Protestants against the emperor. The detailed consideration which he gave to his plan for a meeting in Rome is impressive enough to indicate that he expected serious consideration of it. One wonders whether at this point he was acting from weakness or whether he felt himself strong enough to be able to carry through the preliminaries to the council without compromising his own political position in Europe. On the other hand, in the light of later developments it is possible to interpret this action as only another attempt to prolong the settlement of the religious issue and to conclude that François was fully aware of the opposition which his suggestions would meet.

After there had been agreement on these matters the question of whether or not there was to be a council would depend on the reply of the Lutherans. Charles drew up a letter in which he refuted point by point the recommendations that were made by Francis. There was further correspondence between the two rulers at this time but without any agreement. The net result was that Francis in the end gave up his recommendation that there should be an assembly of diplomats as a preliminary step, and then he simply recommended that there be the earliest possible convocation of a council. Now Francis demanded
that a proper place be chosen so that all the representatives of Christendom would be able to attend; otherwise the council would turn out to be something other than a general council. Apparently Charles was making an honest effort to conform to the French desires for he suggested that Francis should indicate his choice of location, considering only that it should be a convenient place and that it must respect the wishes of the pope. When Francis ignored this request by not sending an answer there was no further progress in the matter. The responsibility for breaking off the negotiations at this point rested definitely with Francis.

The Question of Limiting the Council

In the meantime Charles prepared an answer to the dispatches of Clement which had been delivered by Cambrai. This reply, dated April 4, was designed to give an answer to the five conditions for holding a council which had been presented by the pope. In each instance the emperor agreed to conform to the conditions except that in connection with the first one, in which Clement suggested limiting the council to the two matters of the Turkish question and the problem of heresy, Charles was of the opinion that there should be no such limitation. He

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would prefer that the council should be convoked, and after the sessions were under way then it would be possible for the pope to bring about certain limitations in regard to the subjects to be discussed. This question of restricting the work of the council was an important one since Gambara felt that it was necessary for him to confer with the emperor once more on this matter. It was at this point that he drew up a document in which he explained that it would be better to restrict the work of the council to certain definite objectives than to make no specific limitations at all. Gambara had delayed for approximately two weeks his departure for Rome in order to deliver Charles' letter to Clement while he made further contact with the emperor and submitted his own recommendations.

This document made a strong appeal in favor of limiting the council to a discussion of the two points of the Lutheran problem and the Turkish threat. Gambara pointed out the danger inherent in a council called for general purposes. The question of papal primacy was such an important issue that it would arise immediately. If the decision favored the pope over the council then he foresaw the withdrawal of the Lutherans from the council to the detriment of all concerned. But if a decision

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10Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxi, lxiv.
should be rendered in favor of the supremacy of the council then there would arise the many evils of which he had already spoken. He maintained, however, that this could not be a proper decision even though the principle involved might be derived from the determinations of the Council of Constance. It would have to be understood that in this case there existed a most unusual condition which required that kind of decision. One reason, therefore, for convoking the council for specific purposes would be to escape the inevitability of this dispute. Furthermore, he argued that it would not be possible to begin the council within less than two years after the decision to convene it had been made. It appeared that Gambara was proposing this length of time because he realized that in a matter of two years many changes could take place which might even necessitate a further delay. After this information was passed on to Charles at Brussels, Gambara made his way to Rome where he presented the reply of the emperor to Clement.

In the meantime there had been received in the papal city word of the attitude of Francis in regard to his conversations with Louis de Praet. The interpretation of the delay of Francis in making an answer was that this would effect the postponement of the council. Miguel Mai sent a dispatch on March 28 to the emperor in which he
reported the existence of the rumor in Rome that there would not be a council. He added that Clement became angry upon being informed that Francis had given the impression that there existed papal objection to the council while the French were willing to give their approval. Again on April 14 Mai informed Charles that Francis and Clement might be planning to hold a meeting in Milan or Nice and that its objective would be to put off the council and to prevent a meeting between Charles and Francis. A dispatch of the same day from the Cardinal of Osma indicated that the position taken by Francis, namely, that all the Christian princes give their consent, was tantamount to preventing the meeting. It was his advice that Charles should inform the pope that he had the best of intentions and that he could not now be held to blame for a worsening of the Lutheran situation. He had been told by the pope that papal influence had not determined the attitude of the French. The dispatch of Mai, dated April 21, reported the result of the discussion of Charles' letter by the pope and the cardinals. The position adopted at this time was in favor of the calling of a council provided there could

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11Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2, 107 (No. 669).
12Ibid., 119 (No. 668).
be obtained the approval of the Christian princes including Francis. Mai was of the opinion that such conditions would result in no council at all, and he so informed the pope. From Cardinal Sanga he had received word that Clement did not want the council but that he had desired to conform to the wishes of the emperor and had thus approved its convocation. Mai was unable to foresee any hope for the council and therefore recommended that some other action be taken in regard to the Lutheran problem.

An interesting opinion was expressed by Muxetula in his correspondence with the emperor on April 24. A less positive attitude was adopted in so far as Clement's role in preventing the council was concerned. More blame was placed upon Francis since Muxetula could see no reason why the king of France should wish to do anything of favor for the pope unless there were a decided advantage for France. Rather he believed that the French position had been adopted principally because Francis was opposed to the interests of the emperor. The pope's objections were accepted as valid, particularly the fear that on the basis of the position assumed by both France and England there was a definite possibility that a schism might occur should these nations disagree with some aspect

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14 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2, 130-132 (No. 700).
of the council and decide to hold a meeting of their own. He did not, however, minimize the influence of the French position on the pope. The implication was that Clement found himself located between two opposite points of view, and while he wished to fulfill the desires of the emperor, he realized that a favorable attitude on the part of Francis was an absolute necessity.

This was essentially the position maintained by Clement in his letter of April 25 to the emperor. He agreed that if the consent of Francis could be obtained, then the council would be called; if his approval could not be obtained, then it would be better not to hold the council. Further explanation was given in a letter written by Salviatus to inform Campeggio of the transactions in the Consistory. While the cardinals maintained the position explained by Clement there was also a recommendation for the use of other means to suppress the Lutheran heresy should it be decided that there would be no council.

The Mission of Cardinal Gramont to Rome

The efforts of Charles to exert an influence on Francis continued until the month of May when, at last, the French king made no answer, indicating in this way

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15Ibid., 137-138 (No. 704).
16Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxv.
that the discussion was at an end. Francis sent a special representative to Rome in May for the purpose of explaining his position. Cardinal Gramont delivered to Clement what could have been considered as sufficient reason for discontinuing any further discussion about the council. Francis demanded that the council be held at Turin and that his presence was mandatory. It would be acceptable for the emperor to attend also provided both were accompanied by an equal number of troops. He refused to accept Piacenza or Bologna as possible sites because he would not consent to a trip that required him to pass through the duchy of Milan unless it were under his control. He declined also to send representatives rather than to attend in person because such action would imply the superiority of the emperor.

Following the appearance of Cardinal Gramont in Rome it became clear in the dispatches of Charles that there was now very little doubt about the opposition of the French king and that there remained little hope for the council. Even Muxetula, who was not as yet so completely convinced that the obstacles were serious, found it necessary to admit that Francis was determined to prevent the council. He realized that the kings of France and England held a determining position because if

17Ibid., lxvii.
they did not consent to any one of the requirements for
the council, there was little possibility that it could
be held. On the other hand, if the council were called
without the agreement of these two sovereigns they might
call their own meeting and would receive support from
those who maintained some doubt regarding the extent of
papal authority. This was serious enough to forestall
the pope from calling the council because a schism would
be almost inevitable under these conditions. He suggested
that the emperor attempt to work out a compromise with the
Lutherans by determining their position exactly and
proposing to the pope certain necessary reforms which
would restore the unity of Christendom. If this could be
accomplished then there would be no need for a council.

About the same time Mai had communicated his
opinion to the emperor that although the kings of France
and England might give their consent to a council, there
would still be resistance from Rome. But it was clear
that the main obstacle was the king of France. In his
eyes the settlement of the religious question in Germany
by a council or any other means would enhance the
imperial authority and constitute a threat to French

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18 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2, 178-179 (No.
741), 182-183 (No. 742).
19 Ibid., 185 (No. 745).
claims in Italy. As long as Charles remained occupied with the Lutheran problem he would be unable to present a united front to France. The formation of the League of Schmalkalden in February, 1531, was quite in line with the position of Francis and tended to keep the empire divided.

There is no evidence to indicate that Pope Clement had exercised any influence on Francis to induce him to adopt an attitude of opposition to the council. Evidently the opinion was current that Clement was not satisfied in his relationship with the emperor and had therefore shown favor toward Francis by indicating a desire to do his bidding. Salviatus maintained that this information was entirely erroneous in a letter which he wrote to Campeggio on July 31. Cardinal Gramont was actually responsible for the existence of this opinion regarding the dealings of Francis and Clement. He reasoned that France would be acting in a manner favorable to the papacy by impeding the council and that it could be made to appear that there was almost a conspiracy between the sovereigns by the offer of a marriage union between the pope's niece and the son of the French king. It was just at this time that Clement

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21 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxviii.
sent instructions to Cesare Trivulcio, his nuncio in France, that the French king should be reminded to approve the council project. In order to make the suggestion even more appealing he presented two additional locations for the council which would be acceptable to him. Apparently this move was not successful because in later negotiations Francis made it quite plain that the only acceptable place for the council was Turin. This was in spite of Clement's attempts to appease him by the offer of other sites. It now became evident that Francis was aware of the advantages to be gained by taking action which would be interpreted as an indication of close association with the pope and also as evidence of his influential position on the question of the council. Indeed this was exactly the situation that resulted since even Charles had become suspicious of this association and seemed to believe that there was a secret arrangement connected with the marriage proposal. Yet Cardinal Loaysa, who was formerly of the opinion that Clement was obstructing the council, now informed the emperor of the integrity of the pope on this matter. He explained that Clement was still faithful to his friendship with the emperor and that the marriage arrangement was not yet much more than a mere proposal.

22Ibid., lxv; Jedin, op. cit., pp. 231-232.
23Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxix-lxx.
In a letter of July 21 to his brother Ferdinand, Charles gave vent to his feelings regarding the responsibility for obstructing the council. He clearly indicated his conviction that the pope was determined that there would be no council and that Francis encouraged him in this attitude. The emperor also expressed his feeling of hopelessness in regard to the council and was now to place his concern for an improvement of the situation in the work of the next Diet.

Developments in Germany

The Diet of Augsburg had closed with the demand that the Lutherans must return to the Catholic Church by April 15, 1531, or the emperor would undertake forceful measures against them. In the meantime he was to use his influence to bring about the convocation of a general council. April 15 came and passed without any particular progress along either line. Charles, however, at that time was in no position to commence a military campaign against the Lutherans. They had organized the League of Schmalkalden, and there was even the possibility that Francis might give them assistance in order to further his own ends against the emperor. Actually the French king now appeared as the most imposing obstacle since his

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24 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2 (supplement), 908-909 (No. 1172).
support was for the Lutherans against Charles, and he was also influential in preventing progress toward the calling of a council. It was thus that Charles made up his mind to return to Germany for the holding of another imperial Diet even though he was not certain that the result would be particularly beneficial.

On being informed of the emperor’s decision to hold a Diet at Spires (actually to be held at Regensburg) upon his return to Germany, Clement expressed his elation in letters written at the end of July. He gave his approval to further consideration of the two problems of the religious situation in Germany and the Turkish threat. In order that Charles might be able to give much of his attention to the latter issue, the pope suggested that some concessions be made to the heretics of Germany as long as these would not be prejudicial to the faith. He was not making a new suggestion since this principle had been expressed earlier. While Clement was writing in this favorable tone to the emperor, the latter’s representative in Rome, Miguel Mai, informed him that the pope was uneasy regarding this new Diet because of fear that there would be more discussion about the council.

25Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxix.
26Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2 (supplement), 911 (No. 1173).
Campeggio had again expressed to Salviatus his stand that the only effective means of wiping out the heresy was by the use of force, but he now realized that it was not an easy matter to convince the emperor of this opinion. The answer of Salviatus offered the belief that the emperor would act with caution and that he had held back in taking this action because of the danger to Germany from the Turks, since it seemed to be a lesser evil to tolerate the situation as it existed in Germany than to despair at a time so threatening as this. Nevertheless Campeggio saw greater danger to Germany in such an attitude and believed that if action were not taken one way or the other there would be great ruin in Germany and a great part of Christendom would be taken over by the movement. This was a condition to be feared more than the threat of the Turks.

On August 10 and 11 the papal Consistory considered the attitude now to be adopted regarding the council and what arrangements should be made in preparation for the approaching Diet. On the first topic it was decided that if the council were to be convoked at all it would be necessary to remove all the obstacles standing in the way of its convocation and to obtain the

\[27\text{Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxi.}\]
approval of all the Christian princes. That these were conditions unattainable for all practical purposes is no indictment of the cardinals or of Clement for maintaining this stand. Their position necessitated that they judge carefully any such action and give their approval only when it became evident to them that the result would be beneficial for the whole of the Christian Church. While there may have been other reasons why this position was taken by many members of the Consistory, the dangers inherent in acting without proper foresight were such as to justify the exercise of caution. Had a council been convoked in spite of these objections and with the result that France and England acted in such manner that a schism resulted, the judgment of history certainly would have been harsh. There then would have been no end to the criticism of Clement and the cardinals for having acted without due consideration of the hazards involved and without the exercise of reasonable caution. Indeed Henry VIII of England was certainly in a position to resort to drastic action. His actions of the next few years are evidence of the extreme measures to which he was willing to resort in order to gain his ends. The result of such a policy would be difficult to foresee. But there is no need for conjecture on this point since

for the period under consideration there was not to be a council, and when finally the succeeding pope was able to convoke the meeting, the situation in England had already taken a sharp turn for the worse, and the Lutheran problem in Germany had reached the point of no return. By 1545 conditions were such that there was much more need for the council and much less danger of greater evil. The one problem that remained without important modification during these years was that of the need for reform within the church itself. But the holding of a council to deal with this issue was necessarily connected with the Lutheran issue and the smoldering English situation during the pontificate of Clement. It seemed preferable to retain a sort of "status quo" than to subject so much of Christendom to these potential dangers.

On the second point, regarding the imperial Diet, the Consistory approved the appointment of a special nuncio to represent the papacy. Clement assigned Jerome Aleander to this task, and by the end of August he was on his way to Germany with instructions and briefs to be delivered to Charles and the other princes of Germany. This was the same Aleander who had been the representative of Pope Leo X at the Diet of Worms. He was now returning to Germany after ten years, and it seemed hardly possible that he could fail to realize the changes that had taken
place in the past decade. The instructions to Alexander were to support the emperor on the matter of the council and to be extremely cautious regarding any concessions that might be made to the Lutherans. Clement indicated that the major concern was to do nothing which might cause scandal or which might lead other nations to make demands for similar concessions.

It was only in November that Alexander delivered his messages to the emperor at Brussels. The report of this interview is contained in a letter to Sanga, the papal secretary. Alexander reported that Charles reacted favorably on being assured that Clement still desired the convocation of the council and that he was happy to learn that the reports he had received to the contrary were false. Clement, however, wished to make certain of the fulfillment of specific provisions before he would approve further plans for the council. For one thing he wished to be assured that the emperor would be present throughout the meeting. To this condition Charles indicated his willingness to comply. Other conditions insisted upon by the pope included these: the Lutherans would first have to return to the practices of the Catholic Church; there must be some assurance that a schism would not result from the meeting; and there must be reasonable expectation that the council would result
in reform within the church both in head and in members. While these demands were such that Charles could make no guarantee of their fulfillment, he expressed the opinion that it did not seem reasonable to postpone the calling of a council so vitally needed for correcting the Lutheran problem primarily because of the failure of other nations to give their support. He favored the dispatch of information to them concerning the true nature of the situation with emphasis upon the belief that the Lutheran problem could only become worse. If this were done he was convinced that the consent of those nations to the council would be forthcoming.

Alexander joined Campeggio at the imperial court. As already noted the latter had taken a strong stand in opposition to the council and maintained that the only effective means of counteracting the Lutheran situation was in the use of force. Alexander brought with him the assurance of Pope Clement that the council was still under consideration but that it would first be necessary to ascertain whether favorable results might be expected. He was of the opinion that Campeggio was largely responsible for the failure of compromise measures which had been attempted up to this point, and now he was

29 Hugo Lämmer, Monumenta Vaticana historiam ecclesiasticam saeculi XVI illustrantia (Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1861), pp. 66-68.
charged with the responsibility of finding some other means of solution. Thus he would be looked upon as one of the strongest supporters of the council, and as such he would have many opponents. He realized, however, that a council was not the solution to all the problems and maintained that the reform of the church might very well be accomplished without a council. This could be undertaken on authority of the pope alone.

Charles once again requested the council on the ground that the Lutheran problem in Germany was becoming more serious. He had anticipated that the promise of a council by the pope might cause some Lutherans to return to the church, but now it appeared that the result had been otherwise. It was his feeling that worse conditions would result without the council than with it and that the Turkish threat was no reason for postponement since this threat could result in greater unity for the defense of the empire.

There continued to be spread the reports that Clement was decidedly opposed to the council and even that he was involved in some sort of conspiracy with the kings of France and England designed to bring him their

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30 Jedin, op. cit., p. 234.
31 Lämmer, Monumenta, pp. 86-90.
32 Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2, 206 (No. 846).
support in this proposition. One of these reports was based on so-called forged documents; it became so widespread that Clement made special effort to deny his complicity. Both Miguel Mai and Loaysa had been told by Clement of letters supposedly in the hands of the duke of Ferrara which indicated that the papal nuncio in France had received orders to encourage the kings of France and England to do all in their power to oppose a council. On September 21 Clement wrote a letter to Charles in which he reported the existence of these rumors and denied that he had made any sort of agreement with the two kings regarding the council. Indeed if such documents existed he expressed an interest in seeing them in order to determine in whose hand they had been written. He had made reference to this matter in the documents dispatched with Aleander, but since Charles had decided to remain in the Netherlands longer than expected this information was delayed. The pope must have been fearful that this situation could result in an important misunderstanding with the emperor; therefore he drew up a separate letter in which he made clear his own position.

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33 Ibid., 241-243 (No. 790); Letters and Papers, V, 205 (No. 420), 206-207 (No. 422).
34 Girolamo Ruscelli, Delle Lettere di Principi, le quali o si scrivano da principi, o a principi, o a giovano di principi (3 vols., Venetia, 1581), III, 7.
A matter of great importance to Germany and to Christendom as a whole was the threat of the Turks. They had been forced to give up their attack on Vienna in October, 1529, but they continued to represent a threat since it was realized that they would again undertake their drive toward the west as soon as the opportunity appeared. The problem of obtaining sufficient military support against them had to be considered by Charles. The religious division that existed in the empire was certainly not conducive to a solution to this difficulty. Following the formation of the League of Schmalkalden Charles felt himself opposed not only by the Turks but by the Lutherans as well. Upon his return to Germany to open the Diet of Regensburg it was evident that he would have to negotiate with the Protestants on both issues. Although they had not obeyed his demand at the Diet of Augsburg that they return to the church by April 15, he was in no position at this time to carry on from that point. It would be necessary to begin all over again, and now the Turkish threat was an even more important issue than it had been earlier.
CHAPTER VI

FRENCH OPPOSITION

The Turkish Threat

By the end of the year 1531 the Turkish question was a burning issue for the papacy itself. The Italian Peninsula was just as vulnerable to Turkish attack as Germany. The concern of Clement VII was demonstrated by the consideration of this matter in Consistory and by means of ambassadors sent to the Christian princes. The result was assurance from the German representatives and uncertainty on the part of the representatives of France and England as to the exact nature of the support which these countries would give. It became evident that there were certain elements within Christendom that preferred to remain inactive on this matter rather than to give their support to the papacy and the other rulers involved. Venice, for example, insisted on maintaining peace with the Turks even when expressly called upon by Clement to promise assistance against them. Francis I tried to take advantage of the situation to obtain for himself an extra portion of the ecclesiastical revenues of France, but
Clement, although at first he gave his consent, demanded naval assistance, and when Francis refused the pope withdrew his consent. Francis complained bitterly of this change of mind on the part of Clement as seen in his instructions to Cardinals Tournon and Gramont. He made it very clear that the kings of France and England were of one mind and were determined to obtain their own objectives even if it meant undertaking drastic action against the papacy. Reference was made to the possibility of a demand for the holding of a council if they were not favored by proper reparation. Then there was issued the threat that if the pope would not hold such a council, they would do so themselves and would receive support from the German Lutherans. This position of Francis was of strategic importance because the Cardinals Tournon and Gramont made their first contact with Clement at Bologna where he was meeting with the emperor and attempting to compose the differences between the two Christian rulers. The threats of Francis were definitely not conducive to a continuation of this effort.

1Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898- ), x, 192-202.

The Diet of Regensburg

Charles V returned to Germany where he opened the Diet of Regensburg on April 17, 1532. In anticipation of this meeting Clement had dispatched a message to the emperor on March 7 in which he expressed his concern about the proper disposition of matters to be discussed here. His primary concern was that all considerations be undertaken for the welfare of Christendom and that the emperor take precautions to bring such matters to a firm conclusion before leaving for Spain. The pope invited him to come again to Italy but also reminded him that much damage might be done unless he were to leave matters in Germany in proper order. Clement made no direct reference in this letter to the question of a council. However, at the Diet there was to be a good deal of discussion on this matter, and in the end Charles had again committed himself in this regard.

The Lutherans remained absent from the conference at Regensburg though there was some negotiating with them. In order to obtain their support in the Turkish struggle the religious peace of Nuremburg was concluded on July 23. The emperor agreed that peace should be maintained publicly between himself and all the estates of Germany.

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3 Girolamo Ruscelli, Delle Lettere di Principi, le quali o si scrivano da principi, o a principi, o a giovano di principi (3 vols., Venetia, 1581), III, 12.
both secular and ecclesiastical, until there could be held a general, free, Christian council. In the meantime the princes also agreed not to undertake warlike measures against one another, either because of religion or for any other cause. The emperor agreed to undertake to have a council called within one year and to have the meeting begin within another year. The suspension of hostilities was designed to permit the Protestant princes to grant aid to the emperor against the Turks without fear of an attack upon their own lands. This agreement concerned the Protestants and the emperor and was promulgated after the Regensburg Recess was concluded.

At the urging of Clement the emperor made an attempt to work out a compromise. The pope had his theologians considering the Augsburg Confession in order to determine what was acceptable and what changes would be necessary. He was hopeful of being able to find some basis for concessions and promised to send such information to the emperor. The pope's communication of

4 Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatum, nova collectio; editit Societas Coerresiana promovendis inter germanos catholicos litterarum studiis (12 vols., Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1901-1934), IV, lxxx.

May 10 made reference to the difficulty of holding a council unless the approval of the king of France had been obtained. He encouraged Charles to do what he could to induce Francis to approve the council as the pope and the emperor desired it. If, however, he did not want the council or continued to raise objections, then it would seem to be impossible to convvoke it because such action would merely make the Lutherans more persistent. On June 1 Campeggio submitted a memorial to the emperor in which he summarized many of the points which he had discussed verbally. He advised caution in regard to the council and referred to the instances in which the heretics had refused to obey decisions, such as the condemnation of their beliefs by Pope Leo X and the Edict of Worms. It was his belief that a council would be able to accomplish little more in this regard. He was also critical of the proposal that the heretics should agree not to make any further changes until a council could be held since this would offer the opportunity to many of them to evade the council as long as possible. It would likewise be the cause of the ruination of numerous churches and monasteries.

On the same date Campeggio had written to Salviatus about the proceedings of the Diet. Already there had been discussions about the council and even a suggestion that if a general council could not be convoked under the conditions as stated, then at least there should be a national one. According to Campeggio the emperor gave the impression that he was convinced that the pope and the Holy See would not consent to a council to be held in Germany and that he did not favor such a location himself. Neither would he consent to the holding of a national council. The princes and estates represented at the Diet requested information from Charles as to what progress had been made with the pope on this question since the Diet of Augsburg. If the pope had not been amenable to this effort they would request the emperor to congregate such a meeting, and if he did not do so then they would make an effort to hold a national council together with representatives from the neighboring provinces of Germany. At this meeting they would attempt to regulate the matters of faith in such a way as to end the religious division.

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8 Hugo Lämmer, *Monumenta Vaticana historiam ecclesiasticam saeculi XVI illustrantia* (Friburg Brisgoviae, 1861), pp. 120-122.

In his response to this petition the emperor reviewed the situation. He had sent representatives to the pope and the College of Cardinals for the purpose of obtaining approval for the council. Clement had then sent Gambara who conferred with the emperor at Liége to inform him of the decision in favor of the council and to ask about the place and the time. The emperor then corresponded with the king of France in order to settle the matter with him, but nothing definite could be decided upon. It was also his desire to present the matter to the Diet, and after receiving approval he hoped to go in person to meet the pope and to discuss the issue with him. He also planned to send his representatives to the French king and the other Christian princes to obtain their agreement. The reply of the German estates was mainly a repetition of their earlier demand that the council must be called by the pope within six months, or his majesty should do so himself. There was evident in this reply of the Catholic estates their refusal to be content with the same promises which had been made before. They complained that no action had been taken in regard to the promises made at Augsburg about ecclesiastical abuses. This time they tried to obtain from Charles his promise to convocate a national council if his other efforts

10 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxvi-lxxvii.
failed to produce results. There was now a new situation that had entered the developing council question. Unlike the request advanced at the Diet of Nuremburg, the Catholic estates were alone in the request at the Diet of Regensburg since the Lutherans had remained away from the assembly. No specific recommendation was made in regard to location, and no reference was made to the questions of representation and the method of voting. Thus it would be up to the pope to determine the regulations to govern these issues.

When the Regensburg Recess was drawn up on July 27, the emperor had promised to make an effort to induce the pope to approve the calling of a council within six months and to prepare for the opening of the assembly within the period of one year. Failing in these efforts Charles agreed that he would hold another Diet in Germany in order to indicate to the estates why this program could not be accomplished and to consult with them on some other means for bringing about the convocation of the council. If this appeared to be impossible then some other action would be discussed. According to Alean

11Ibid., lxxvii-lxxviii.
13Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxx.
the emperor had not committed himself to the extent desired by the princes of Germany since he would not agree to call a general council on his own authority or to convoke a national assembly.

The Second Meeting at Bologna

Following the close of the Diet of Regensburg, Charles began his journey to Spain by way of Italy. His second meeting with the pope took place again at Bologna and lasted for two and one-half months. This interview was a direct result of the decisions made at the Diet of Regensburg and was designed more or less as a showdown with Clement on the matter of the council, though there were a number of other important issues to be considered as well. Charles was determined this time to reach a solution even if it meant going ahead with the project without the support of the kings of France and England.

Shortly after the arrival of the emperor at Bologna on December 13, 1532, the two principals got down to the business of attempting to settle certain issues. Clement held the opinion that one important objective of this meeting was to bring about an understanding between Charles and Francis. It was not long, however, before he became convinced that this was not to

14Lämmer, Monumenta, pp. 143-144.
be an easy task. One major obstacle concerned the marriage of his niece Catherine de' Medici. Francis had proposed his second son Henry, duke of Orléans, as a suitor and requested certain territorial adjustments in northern Italy as proper consideration. Although Charles was not convinced that this was a serious offer, his counter proposal of a marriage between Catherine and Francesco Sforza received a rebuff from Clement. As it became more evident that Francis was willing to see the marriage proposal carried out, Charles took a defensive position, and on February 24 an agreement was signed between the pope and the emperor in which one of the provisions was in the form of pledges that neither would enter into alliances with other states. To this extent Charles was able to obtain some assurance that Milan would not become a French possession.

As in the first meeting between Clement and Charles at Bologna there were no specific records maintained of the discussions, particularly those that were held in private. Much of our knowledge of what transpired at this meeting comes from reports of those who were in attendance and the information which they were able to obtain verbally. Two days after his arrival at Bologna, Charles spent two hours in consultation with

Clement on the question of the council. When Charles pressed for determining the manner of convoking the council and the place where it should be held, Clement replied that it could be held only upon the approval of the other Christian princes. He added that the decrees of the council would have to be obeyed by all. Charles reviewed for him the situation as it stood in Germany, and on the following day the pope held a Consistory to obtain the opinion of this body. Some of the cardinals in attendance approved the calling of a council at once while others -- Campeggio was one of them -- felt that it would first be necessary to bring about peace and to obtain the agreement of all the princes. On December 20 there was further discussion of the matter in Consistory where it was determined that there were two possible means of dealing with the Lutherans -- either by means of a council or by using force against them. The latter method was favored by only a few, and while the majority approved of the council, opposition was expressed to holding it in Germany as well as to a national council, both possibilities that had been suggested to Charles by his subjects. Again there was expressed the fear that an attempt to convoke the council would only result in opposition from the kings of France and England which might lead to a schism. This situation could be overcome
only by determining a place for the location of the
council which would be convenient for all concerned and
by obtaining the approval of all the princes of Christen-
dom. Essentially this decision meant that unless Francis
gave his consent and agreed on a location which would be
acceptable to both the emperor and the pope there was
little possibility that the council could be convoked.
At this stage in the discussion the emperor had been
unable to bring about any significant change in the view-
point of the pope and the cardinals.

In regard to the location for the council there
was no difficulty in obtaining the consent of the emperor
that it should be in Italy. As the next step in the
conference the pope sent briefs to the kings of France,
England, Poland, Dacia, Portugal, and others, asking them
to consent to the council and requesting them to be
present. The letter to Francis referred to the failure
of the Diet of Augsburg two years earlier to find a
satisfactory remedy for the heresy and stated that as a
result of much deliberation with the cardinals it had
been decided to convvoke a general council to be held in
Italy. After explaining the need for the council
Clement stated that he had written as well to the emperor
and the other princes in order to obtain the consent of

16Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxxI-lxxxII.
all of them to the council. He expressed his belief that all the other princes of Christendom would be present if the French king indicated his intention to attend the assembly. This brief was dated January 2, and it was on the following day that there arrived at Bologna the Cardinals Tournon and Gramont as the representatives of Francis.

There was some discussion regarding the advisability of sending similar briefs to King Ferdinand I and the other princes of the Holy Roman Empire. On the insistence of Alexander it was decided to dispatch such notifications on January 10. These letters were designed to indicate that the emperor had undertaken to persuade the pope to convocate a council as he had promised to do. In the letter to Ferdinand, Clement simply indicated that the calling of a council had been considered, and he explained the necessity for obtaining the agreement of the Christian princes. Since he had not received this approval it was impossible to proceed with the convocation. But in the meantime he had made a special effort to obtain the consent of the Christian princes by dispatching letters and nuncios to them.

18 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxxiv.
Following the dispatch of these briefs, Charles continued to urge through his deputies the immediate convocation of the council, and just as steadfastly Clement insisted that the reply of the princes must be awaited. It was of no particular importance to the pope that Charles had made a promise at the Diet of Regensburg and now desired to carry it to fruition. As the delay wore on, the papal deputies suggested sending nuncios to Germany, France, and England who would be able to explain at greater length the affair of the council and to obtain a response in person. For this purpose Ugo Rangoni, bishop of Reggio Emilia, was appointed to undertake the mission to Germany. He was accompanied by Lambert von Braierde, an official of Mechlin, who had received special instructions from the emperor. Ubaldino da Ubaldinus, papal chamberlain and protonotary, was sent as nuncio to France and England. Specific instructions were drawn up which were to be presented to the monarchs concerned.

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Ibid., IV, lxxxv. Jedin, op. cit., p. 236, has referred to this situation as a playing of the diplomatic game on the part of Clement, and he is convinced that the pope had now given up all hope of convoking the council. The moment had not yet arrived when he would feel himself able to make a break with the imperial authority because the relationship with France had not been worked out. Hence this stalling for time.
The answer of Francis to the January letter of Clement was exceptionally brief. There was no reference to the working out of the details for the council. Rather he indicated his dissatisfaction by maintaining that affairs concerning religion should be decided in a manner that would please all those taking part in such a council and that there should be no question of anyone refusing to adhere to the decisions. It would be impossible for the pope and the emperor to take any decisive action regarding the council on the basis of this reply. It was probably just as well that it had already been decided that a special nuncio would be sent to obtain greater satisfaction. It was clear that Francis was not in favor of the council. This was one certain way of presenting an obstacle to the project and causing continued delay since he knew full well that his consent would be necessary before the pope could undertake further steps.

There was no reference to the decision to hold the council in Italy, nor was there any indication whether Francis himself would be present or would even send representatives. Clement's letter had been clear enough on this matter of attendance. His statement was that if Francis agreed to be present, there would be no difficulty.

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20 Judocii le Plat, Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio... (7 vols., Lovanii, 1781-1787), II, 514-515.
in obtaining the consent of the other Christian princes. This was also tantamount to saying that if Francis refused to attend the council, there was very little prospect for its convocation. Furthermore, his correspondence included the statement that matters of a private nature should not be given consideration by the council but only affairs concerning religion. This particular clause puzzled the emperor and his advisors since they were not able to determine just what were these private affairs to which Francis had made reference. It was their judgment that such a phrase must have been used for some devious purpose.

There is a striking similarity in the treatment rendered by Francis on this occasion and in the earlier instance of his correspondence with the emperor when Louis de Praet undertook a special mission to France. In the latter case it had been impossible to obtain a specific response from Francis regarding the conditions he considered necessary for his agreement to attend the council. While at first he made evasive answers to the imperial requests for information regarding his position, he finally brought the diplomatic mission to an abrupt end by refusing to reply. In the more recent case, now

21Letters and Papers, VI, 90-91 (No. 201).
22See supra, pp. 119 ff.
under discussion, his answer was in a form which indicated almost a refusal to give any consideration at all to the necessary preliminary determinations for the council. With the council depending so completely on the assurance of the attendance of the French king, it was evident more than ever that he was the major obstacle. Clement had taken his position with strong arguments on his side. Even the emperor had not significantly questioned this stand in spite of pressure from his German subjects. Thus the adoption of the silent method in one instance and the evasive method in the other placed Francis in a favorable position with respect to diplomacy concerning the calling of a council.

Having obtained almost no satisfaction from Francis, and with Charles wishing not to delay longer his return to Spain, the pope and the emperor drew up an agreement on February 24 in which they expressed themselves on three major issues: the convocation of the council, the defense of Christianity against the Turkish menace, and the question of peace for the Italian Peninsula. There was further agreement in this document on the projected council with the pope pledging himself to send representatives to the various Christian princes. A special nuncio was to be dispatched to Francis I and Henry VIII for the purpose of urging them to give their
support to the project. To the princes and the estates of Germany there were to be sent a nuncio and an imperial representative with instructions in regard to the action about to be taken in this matter. All the Christian princes were to be informed that as soon as the proper assurances were obtained, especially that of the French king, the council would be convoked. Should there be difficulty in obtaining support among the Germans, some other methods would have to be undertaken but in such manner that there would be no danger to the faith. If further difficulties were encountered the pope and the emperor would confer on other means which might be used. The pope agreed to use his influence to prevent Francis from interfering with either the convocation of the council or the development of a substitute program designed to counteract the spread of Lutheranism.

It was then agreed that if there were further consultations regarding the marriage of Catherine de' Medici and Henry, duke of Orléans, the emperor would be informed of the progress of such negotiations. Although Charles had earlier believed that Francis was not sincere in his proposed marriage agreement, by this time he had given up hope of negotiating with a candidate of his own. His main interest was to prevent Italian territory from falling into French hands, and now that
he perceived that the union was a definite possibility, his objective was to provide precautionary measures by requiring the pope to keep him informed of the progress. In any event the pope agreed to exert his influence to obtain French support for the council and assistance against the Turks.

Missions to Germany, France, and England

On the completion of this agreement the instructions for the nuncios were drawn up. The two appointees to Germany, Ugo Rangoni and Lambert von Braierde, conferred first of all with Ferdinand I, then with the electors and some of the more influential princes of the empire. There were two parts of these instructions which led to difficulty. Although there was general agreement that there should be a council, the conditions set down by the pope led to disagreement. This became evident when Elector John Frederick of Saxony was consulted. He declined a definite answer until the problem could be discussed at the meeting of the members of the Schmalkaldic League to be held in June. In due course the question was submitted to a group of theologians,

24Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lxxxvii-lxxxix.
25Ibid., lxxxix-xciii.
one of whom was Melanchthon. The major objection was to the requirement that there must be submission to the decrees forthcoming from the council since this appeared to be a clear indication that the council was not to be "free." There was also objection on the grounds that there was no guarantee that the decisions of the council on controversial issues would be based solely on Holy Scripture. Thus it was clear in this formal reply of the elector of Saxony and other princes of Germany drawn up at Schmalkald on June 30, 1533, that there was now serious objection to the council on the part of the German Protestants. When this response and other documents were published by Johannes Cochlaeus in the following year, he made the remark in the preface that the Protestants would now give their consent to the council only on condition "that the pope submit to the emperor, the cardinals and bishops to the princes, the priests to the lay people." This was the point at which the Lutherans separated themselves from the Catholics on the question of the council. Until now they had been one with the Catholics on this issue and had been just as strong in their requests for the meeting. This would be one more obstacle in the way

26 Ibid., xvii-ci.
27 Jedin, op. cit., p. 243, note 51. Cochlaeus was a humanist and a bitter opponent of Luther.
of regaining unity within the church. If the Lutherans refused to attend a council and even to accept its decisions, except upon their own terms, it was now necessary to readjust the objectives of the papacy and to prepare for the holding of a council under different circumstances. It would be comparatively easy to carry out such a project under the conditions formerly laid down, but with an even greater amount of obstinacy being demonstrated by the Protestants it would be almost necessary to recognize that permanent damage had been done and that a council would have to be convoked on this basis. After all, that is essentially the position which had to be taken when the Council of Trent was finally convoked.

The result of the mission of Rangoni and Braierde to Germany was one of failure in spite of the optimism which had attended their earliest efforts in their conferences with the German princes. The mission to France and England was also to experience disappointment though in this case it seemed to be much more deliberate. The instructions issued to Ubaldinus were substantially the same as those of Rangoni except that they were not so specific on the calling of the council within six months and its actual convocation within the period of one year.

28 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, 61.
The information available regarding the mission of Ubaldinus consists almost exclusively of the reports of representatives at the courts of the kings of France and England. Upon his arrival at the court of Francis, Ubaldinus was instructed that he should proceed to England in order to obtain the answer of King Henry VIII to his proposal. Then he was to return to France where there would be another interview with Francis in which the French position was to be explained. The objective of Francis seemed to have been an attempt on his part to determine the position of the English king and to force him to make a practical demonstration of his support of France on this matter.

Instructions with respect to the English reaction to the mission of Ubaldinus were dispatched by Francis to his representative in England on May 5, 1533. It was suggested that Henry VIII should reply to Ubaldinus that the question of the council was of too great importance for him to make an immediate decision, and having thus stalled the process, the papal representative would then have to return to France. At this point Francis assumed the position that he wished to take up the matter with the pope personally at their meeting which was being arranged for later in the year. As soon as the English king had approved this method of confounding the mission,
the representatives of France and England in Rome would be instructed to so inform the pope. This was certainly a most effective way of giving absolutely no support to the project which had been worked out by the pope and the emperor at Bologna. It was reported to the emperor that the English advisors of the king were of the opinion that Clement was not sincere in this attempt to remove the obstacles to the council and that actually he had no more desire of holding the council than the English themselves.

If the objective of Francis was to indicate to both the pope and the emperor that he and Henry VIII were of one mind on this matter, he was completely successful. The proposed meeting of Francis and Clement was being negotiated at this time. On June 23, 1533, Francis replied to a letter of the pope on this matter in which he indicated what he considered to be the main subjects for discussion. While there was a reference to the council project it was obvious that the seriousness of the proposition had little effect on the French king. He could still speak only of discussions concerning the time and the place for holding the council. Beyond that point he did not go. There was no indication that he intended

29Letters and Papers, VI, 200 (No. 444).
30Calendar of Letters, IV, Part 2, 682 (No. 1073).
to carry the discussion to the more technical points with respect to the questions of representation at the council and the limitation of the scope of the meeting. It was obvious that unless there were decisions on these issues the pope would not consider it possible to give attention to the matter of setting the date for the convocation. On this point particularly, there was great difference between the two rulers, Francis and Charles. The latter in his talks with the pope gave much more emphasis to the details of the council. But then, of course, there was pressure on him from his German subjects, and there was even the threat that unless he composed the religious troubles he might even be faced with the eventual loss of some of his empire.

The major obstacle to the council was still the French, and now it was known that there was complete understanding on this point with the English. There came then the determined stand of Henry VIII as a result of which papal authority in England was eventually brought to an end. He despaired of receiving papal assistance and finally procured the decision from the ecclesiastical court of the archbishop of Canterbury that his marriage to Catherine had not been legal. Already he had married Anne Boleyn. The hand of Pope Clement was now forced, and he could no longer postpone a definite decision.
The sentence of excommunication was pronounced, effective on the failure of Henry to correct the situation by taking Catherine back as his queen. By the time of the Marseilles meeting between Clement and Francis this process was of such proportion that it was to be one of the subjects under discussion.

The religious conditions that existed in England had a definite bearing on the council question even after the pope clearly indicated to Henry that his actions were seriously in error. Since the loss of England to the papacy would not be recognized, there must necessarily be representatives from that country if all the major areas of Christendom were to be present. It was inconceivable that a church council could now be held which would not have to give consideration to the English movement. The stage to which it had progressed was a clear indication that any discussion concerning the general welfare of Christendom could in no way omit this problem. In the place of a single movement away from the papacy, Clement could now see himself faced with two separate revolts. His concern about the ability of a council to give appropriate attention to the Lutheran movement, without first obtaining agreement on specific limitations, must have compounded itself with the development of the opposition of Henry VIII. The bull dealing with the
errors in the Lutheran movement had not been successful in stemming that flood, and there was every indication that a similar bull in the case of the English situation would fare no better. It is possible that a stronger, more determined pope could have undertaken decisive steps by calling a council regardless of the opinions of the secular leaders. But Clement, rightly or wrongly, recognizing his own weaknesses and foreseeing so many obstacles to this solution, continued his policy of vacillation. The meeting at Marseilles would accomplish nothing along these lines except to enhance the position of Francis, the very prince who consorted openly with the troublous elements, both in England and in Germany.
CHAPTER VII

THE MARSEILLES CONFERENCE

Negotiations for the Marseilles meeting between Clement VII and Francis I were conducted in a stormy atmosphere. A good deal of opposition was demonstrated on the part of some of the cardinals, particularly those who favored the position of the Emperor Charles V. Pope Clement, however, insisted on going through with the meeting. There was even opposition from the French. When the threat of excommunication was issued against the king of England in July, 1533, even François appeared to be willing to call off the conference. But Clement remained adamant, and, although it was necessary to postpone the date and even to change the location from Nice to Marseilles, he began the journey on September 9. The conference opened upon his arrival at Marseilles on October 12 and continued until November 12, 1533. ¹

¹Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. in progress, St. Louis, 1898- ), I, 227-232.
The Marseilles Meeting

The private meetings of Clement and Francis were conducted in such great secrecy that it was difficult to determine the extent of agreement or disagreement on many of the issues under discussion. It was to the detriment of the pope that certain acts on his part, which could not be concealed, gave the appearance of catering to the king to a greater extent than to the emperor in the Bologna meetings. In the first place, four new cardinals were created for the French, and they were formally received in the Sacred College of Cardinals in a full Consistory meeting at Marseilles. In the second place, Clement performed on October 28 the marriage ceremony for his niece Catherine de' Medici and Henry, duke of Orleans, the second son of Francis. These two events were of outstanding significance since nothing similar had taken place at Bologna. The creation of four cardinals of one nationality at one time was an important event, and this, combined with the fact that it took place outside Rome, could only result in the feeling that Clement was outdoing himself to obtain French good will. Although Charles had offered a marriage proposition at

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Bologna he was unsuccessful, so the Marseilles ceremony might be construed as further evidence of the drawing together of the pope and the French king against the imperial position.

Since the conferences between Clement and Francis were all held in the greatest secrecy, and only the two men were present, it is necessary to depend largely upon diplomatic dispatches of this period and any other information which was later put into written form by the two principal participants. This situation, however, has not prevented a considerable amount of conjecture regarding the probably objectives and points of view expressed by both the pope and the king. There need be no uncertainty with respect to the main topics discussed. Clement had tried at Bologna to compose the differences between Charles and Francis, or at least to establish some common ground for compromise, but without success. In the meantime there had been no lessening of the importance of the matters in this dispute. The pope was now interested in determining with Francis whether he might be willing to compromise. There is no evidence that any progress was made on this topic in the secret discussions. Clement was interested in bringing about peaceful conditions because such a situation would pose

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3 Pastor, op. cit., X, 234, note 3.
a lesser threat to the territories of the Italian Peninsula. His own secular interests in this area were certainly strong enough to lead him to the adoption of this position. Neither is there reason to suspect that Clement desired to maintain the condition of an active rivalry between Francis and Charles in order to make use of this situation as a major obstacle to the holding of a council. In a letter to Clement dated June 23, Francis made mention of his desire to establish peaceful conditions, and he indicated that this should be one of the subjects to be discussed at their forthcoming conference. It is in this same letter that Francis indicated his desire to discuss also such matters as the council and the Turkish situation.

In the series of private talks that took place over the period of one month many other topics were touched upon. As for the question of holding a council, this subject was undoubtedly one of the most important; it may even have been the first to be discussed. Only two days after the formal entry of Clement into the city, a dispatch to the emperor from Count Cifuentes, the imperial ambassador, indicated that there seemed little hope for significant progress. The pope had informed

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4Girolamo Ruscelli, Delle Lettere di Principi, le quali o si scrivano da principi, o a principi, o a giovano di principi (3 vols., Venetia, 1581), III, 24.
the imperial representative after the first meeting that it was the feeling of Francis that the only basis upon which there could be hope for success in the council would be the existence of perfect agreement between the emperor and the king. As long as this situation could not be attained the council could only produce more evil than good, and therefore it would be unwise to hold the meeting. Furthermore, the French king objected to attending a council which would be held on German soil as the Germans desired. There is no reason to believe that Clement was not reporting correctly the sentiments of Francis in spite of the fact that this was so early in the conference. The pope had more complete information in regard to the demands of the emperor and the Germans, and he knew that Charles would consent to holding a general council in an Italian city. It must therefore have been the opinion of Francis rather than of Clement that he would not consent to a council to be held in Germany according to the imperial wish. This was the demand of the German Protestant and Catholic princes rather than the emperor, although he reflected their position. Francis must have known that placing emphasis on this particular demand of the princes would give Clement one more argument against the council, however improper his reasoning might have been.
Francis was mainly concerned with gaining advantage for himself as a result of these discussions with Clement. This attitude was evident in all the references to the question of determining the basis for the establishment of peaceful conditions between France and the empire. He had arranged this meeting with the pope on the basis that such a conference was due him since there had already been two meetings with the emperor, and now he intended to do his utmost to arrange matters in his favor and to inflict as much damage as possible on the cause of Charles. What he understood by speaking of a "conformity of ideas" with Charles was the relinquishment of the imperial claim to the duchy of Milan. The extent to which he was willing to force his own desire made Clement realize that he would also compromise the Catholic position in Germany by hindering any action that might be taken toward a settlement of the Lutheran problem and even by interfering with the building up of opposition to the Turkish threat. To be sure, Clement had attempted at Bologna to work out a solution to the question of Milan with Charles, but the position maintained by the emperor was to prevent Francis from gaining an entry to the Italian Peninsula in this manner. Clement was so much more favorable to the French side in this issue, apparently believing that a compromise would not hold
great danger for further disturbances in Italy, although this was a condition that he feared very much.

When Clement approached the French king at Marseilles with the request that he should give his support to the convocation of a council for the purpose of composing the religious difficulties and that he should render support in the struggle against the Turks, it was clear in the French answer that neither proposition would receive even the slightest assistance from the French. The point of view of Francis was that the settlement of either issue would lead to concentration of effort against the other. With these two large problems settled Charles would hold a much stronger position in upsetting the European balance of power. As long as the strength and the attention of Charles were divided he was a much less formidable foe of the French. For this reason the answer of Francis was one in which he indicated that it would be his greatest desire to support such propositions, and that he was envious of anyone able to do so, but that there were mitigating circumstances in his case which prevented him from committing himself. He was outspoken in praising himself as a man of honor and one who had great love for God, but he insisted that he was unable to determine how he could assume such a

5Concilium Tridentinum, IV, ciili.
position without suffering a blow to his pride. It was this situation, not a very clear one at that, which prevented him from making the promises desired of him. Again there was every indication that Francis would not give in to these demands, but he also tried to give the impression that he was not at fault. He was definite enough in his refusal to support the proposition of a council, so definite that there seemed to have been no agreement on such questions as the location for the council, the matter of representation, or limitations on the subjects to be discussed. Francis was clearly opposed to holding the council on German soil and would not consent to any of those cities of Italy which were involved in the discussion with Charles at Bologna.

Repercussions of the Marseilles Talks

Just how strongly Clement spoke in favor of the council cannot be determined, and without specific evidence to the contrary it has been generally assumed that the pope was complacent. Yet Francis certainly had good reasons, at least from his point of view, for not conceding a single point on the council proposition because it appeared that any action or agreement along these lines would result in a worsening of his position in Europe so far as the imperial power was concerned.

6 Ibid., ciii-civ.
The consensus seemed to be that Clement had joined with Francis on this matter, thereby refusing to support the imperial request. Indeed contemporaries looked upon the marriage agreement and the creation of the four French cardinals, compared to one at Bologna, as clear evidence that the pope was now securely in the French camp. The result was the adoption of an attitude of distrust where the papal-imperial relationship was concerned. There was little that Clement could do by way of denying this position since it was so easy to point to the visible accomplishments of the meeting while the basic verbal communications were an unknown quantity.

In order to determine the attitude of both Clement and Francis with respect to the accomplishments of the Marseilles conference it is necessary to draw from communications of a later date which were written by them for certain specified purposes. Clement attempted to justify his action at Marseilles in a letter addressed to the circles of Germany and dated March 20, 1534. The purpose of this letter, as he explained it, was to assure the German dignitaries that he had fulfilled his promises.

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8Concilium Tridentinum, IV, cvi-cviii. The letter is quoted here in its entirety.
to them and to the German emperor to do all within his power to bring about the council. He was apparently fearful lest they be misinformed regarding his true attitude and lest they be influenced by some of the unfavorable opinions being circulated about him. There was an indication that he had been erroneously accused of delaying or prolonging the processes leading to the council. Clement recalled his efforts toward this end in the past by carefully pointing out the letters he had written over a period of three years in his attempt to convince the Christian princes of the necessity of their attendance at such a meeting. When this action seemed insufficient he even dispatched nuncios for the same purpose. The answers received from the emperor and the King of the Romans supported his proposition, but the replies from other princes were not in agreement. Generally they offered their support for the idea of promoting peace and religious uniformity though it had been impossible to obtain unanimity regarding the particular arrangements for the council. He was here referring to the specific demands of the princes which varied so much that the entire affair seemed to be one of confusion. A similar opinion must have resulted from the treatment of the nuncio Ubaldinus by the kings of France and England. In spite of the disappointing
reception of his nuncios, Clement had undertaken the
strain of a journey to Marseilles to meet the French
king in person in order to persuade him of the urgency
of the council. Clement was very careful at this point
to indicate that this trip was undertaken before he had
fully recovered from the Bologna journey and that the
voyage by sea was anything but pleasant. At every
opportunity he attempted to place his own efforts for
the council in the most favorable light in order to
indicate his fulfillment of promises to call a council.
But at every turn he had been met with opposition.

At Marseilles the French king, in spite of the
urging of Clement, replied as he had earlier to the
nuncios, that he did not favor a council and that it
should be delayed until a more agreeable time when there
would be a more peaceful state of affairs and when the
princes would give their support. Such an answer could
well be construed as an effort to prevent the holding of
the council, but not so with Clement. He did not con-
sider the Marseilles meeting as a failure; instead he
believed that there was still hope that the council could
be held. There was no clear indication of extreme dis-
satisfaction with this attitude of the French king,
probably because it was his own belief that a council
under these circumstances would only produce evil results.
Neither was there evidence that Clement had undertaken a concerted effort to change the mind of Francis. Had he made such an attempt it would seem only reasonable that he would have indicated it in this letter. His only argument was by way of summarizing his work as consisting of letters, the sending of nuncios, and his conferences with both Charles and Francis, and to claim that in this way he had fulfilled the obligations of his office. He did not accept the responsibility for the postponement of the project and even offered the prospect of its being held in the future. Thus he continued to speak favorably of the council and gave assurance of his support, but he was never able to think constructively in terms of actual accomplishment.

There was an indictment of the German princes contained in this letter because of their failure to respond favorably to the mission of Bangoni. Clement implied that although this lack of support weakened his position he had gone ahead with his plans for the meeting with Francis at Marseilles in order to fulfill his promises to the emperor. There was almost an indication that he wished to place some of the blame on the German side and to show that in spite of this attitude he had still continued his work to bring about the council. Although he exercised much caution in this matter it
brought forth a rebuke from the duke of Saxony, a strong supporter of the faith, who complained that the methods used by Clement were those which had been found inadequate in the past and this time had led to the loss of approximately 100,000 souls. Clement's associations with Francis were blamed for continued inaction since the French king was known to be determined to bring about the ruin of Germany even at the expense of grave injury to Christendom.

Clement wrote at the same time and in a similar tone to the emperor's brother Ferdinand. Again he repeated that his efforts in the Marseilles meeting were directed toward the attainment of peace and the accomplishment of those things which would be of benefit to all of the Christian world. He explained that while the king of France approved the council it was his opinion that in the present state of affairs in Christianity there would be too many disturbances from various causes, and it would not be possible to undertake the work in tranquil surroundings and to reach voluntary agreements. Thus it was determined that the project should be delayed until a more agreeable time since such circumstances would not result in decisions beneficial to the faith. Once

Ibid., oviii. These opinions were expressed by Duke George in a letter to the papal nuncio Vergerius. Francis I referred to this attitude in his letter to the German princes. See infra, pp. 183 ff.
again he referred to the responsibility placed upon him for postponing and delaying the council. To prove otherwise he pointed to the many letters and special nuncios which had been a part of his efforts to bring about the council and gave his assurance of a continuation of this policy.

The general tone of these letters of Clement was to maintain his own innocence in the matter of obstructing the council and to indicate that the major responsibility rested on the French king. Nevertheless he did not indicate his disagreement with this attitude; rather he demonstrated what could easily be and actually was interpreted as an approval of the French position by agreeing with the argument that this was not a propitious time for a council. He appeared to give small heed to the demands of the Diet of Regensburg and of the emperor, simply giving the French position a predominant place in deciding the issue. Why did Clement not make a plain statement that he was at odds with the French king and that at Marseilles he had used all the means at his disposal to obtain the royal assent? The answer to this question is that he did not take such a stand; nor could he do so in the circumstances. It was first necessary to

compose the differences between Francis and Charles, and upon being made cognizant of the impossibility of compromise there was no reason for him to take a strong stand on the council question. He was firmly convinced that without a settlement of the territorial disputes a council, even if it could be brought about, would have slight chance of success. In the first place, Charles and Francis would be unwilling to take part in such a project without almost excessive safeguards for their own interests. Even assuming that agreement could be reached on this matter there was the problem of determining which issues were properly topics for discussion. In other words, Clement was justifiably worried about his ability to maintain control over such a council. In the second place, there was doubt about the attitude of the English king and whether his special problem might disrupt the council. This issue involved the balance of power, and there was good reason for Clement to believe that Francis and Henry would support each other. This was more important for France than for England. If Henry insisted that the council must give consideration to his own dispute with the papacy he would undoubtedly receive the support of Francis. It had already become obvious that these two nations would stand together and that the two rulers would support projects which were mutually beneficial.
Francis had, after all, obtained a concession from Clement at Marseilles with respect to the English situation. A settlement of the religious issue in Germany would make greater than ever the French need for English support. With such an imposing array of obstacles facing him at Marseilles there should be no great wonder that Clement made no mention of special effort on his part to induce Francis to support the council.

On the other side of this question there is the information to be gathered from letters of Francis to the German princes in which he offered his own version of the conference with Clement. In February, 1535, he addressed himself to the German princes and especially to the members of the Schmalkaldic League. In justifying his own actions Francis was obviously making an effort to place much of the responsibility on the pope. In the first place, he expressed his sorrow at the passing of Clement and then offered his opinion of the progress that he had made with respect to the council project. In a few more years Clement might have succeeded in regaining

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11Clement had agreed to withhold for one month the effective date of the excommunication of Henry VIII. Cf. Pastor, op. cit., X, 237.

12Melchior Goldast, Politica imperialia (2 vols., Francofurti, 1614), II, 903-905. A copy of the letter will be found here under date of February, 1534, but since there is mention of Paul III as the Roman pontiff the date must be 1535 as given in Concilium Tridentinum, IV, civ, where the letter is quoted only in part.
the unity of Christendom since there was almost agreement on his part with the pope regarding the council. The one major impediment concerned the agreement made with the emperor for holding the meeting in Italy. Francis would not agree to this location because the emperor maintained strong forces in the area which would constitute a threat to him. He insisted upon a place which would offer the ultimate in security for him, but he did not specify his choice of location. In the second place, there was an indictment of Clement when Francis forecast that Pope Paul III would be able to accomplish what Clement could not because he had no fear of the judgment of a council. The implication was clear: Francis desired to make it appear that the full responsibility for the postponement of the council rested upon Clement and that his own requirement for a proper location and one acceptable to him was fully justified.

Apparently there was a feeling on the part of Francis that this earlier letter was not sufficient evidence in his favor. It was also brought to his attention that information was being disseminated about his opposition to the council. In order to further clarify his position Francis sent a dispatch to the princes of the empire dated February 25, 1536, in which he made a
determined effort to convince them of the propriety of his intentions. He claimed that even the cardinals had been witness to his efforts to persuade the pope of the necessity for holding the council. In spite of the many attempts he had made to deny the false rumors about his attitude on this matter, they continued to persist. Now, however, with a new pontiff, he was merely awaiting a decision on the measures to be taken for the holding of a council and stated that the pope had sent a representative to him in the person of Rudolfo Pio, with whom he had promised to cooperate. But until this time he denied having received specific information from Paul III with respect to the time and place for the council. While Francis thus attempted to quiet rumors about himself, he offered no specific evidence that he had been working in favor of the meeting. He was interested primarily in attempting to shift from himself the responsibility for preventing the calling of a council.

This was a most curious communication and one which indicated a guilty feeling on the part of Francis. He was virtually making accusations against himself when he summarised the so-called calumnious reports which had been disseminated about his actions in regard to the

13Ibid., ev-evi. This letter is erroneously dated 1534 in Judocil le Plat, Monumenta ad historiam concilii tridentini potissimum illustrandas spectantium amplissima collectio... (7 vols., Lovani, 1781-1787), II, 517-518.
council. Actually he made a very weak attempt to defend himself by offering what he considered as evidence that he had given support to the council in the past and still continued to do so. The most important evidence he could have offered, had his past actions been as sincere as he insisted, would have been in the form of a statement with regard to the consultations with Pope Clement at Marseilles. If he had expressed his support for the council project at this time, either the pope would have gone forward with the project, or Francis could now argue that in spite of the French attitude Clement had not taken advantage of the opportunity, and therefore the burden of responsibility must be assumed by the papacy. But there was not the slightest reference in this communication as to what actually transpired at the Marseilles conference. May we not assume that Francis thought it advisable to withhold any mention of it in this case since that would only add to the damning evidence which he was attempting to disprove? In an apparent effort to distract attention from this matter he quickly introduced his relationship with Pope Paul III by making reference to his intention to adopt a most favorable attitude toward the mission of Rudolfo Pio. At this point he did not indicate what his attitude would be except to state that he would await specific infor-
mation through the papal representative and to assure
the recipients of this letter that he intended to work
only for the good of Christianity.

This is an amazing letter from another standpoint
since François referred to the extensive exhortations and
requests he had made to the pontiff on these matters,
even to the extent of claiming that he had been attending
14 to these affairs "daily." The communications between the
French king and the Roman pontiff were certainly not
frequent enough in this period to be regarded as "daily"
in any sense of the word, whether his reference was to
Clement VII or to Paul III. On the basis of this state-
ment he implied that this matter had been brought to the
attention of the pontiff so often that he could not be
accused of interference in any manner. He then went on
to suggest the possibility of a representative being sent
either by him to the German princes or by the princes to
him in order that they might be better informed about
the whole affair and in that way to come to some agreement.
François certainly made every effort to bring about a
favorable judgment on his own actions, but in so doing he
actually argued against himself.

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14 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, cv.
"...commentaturus [communicaturus] videlicet una cum
his ipsis de rebus, ad quas eundem ego Pontificem suapte
incensum natura meis quotidianiis precibus et flagitat-
tionibus inflammarum."
An indictment of Francis for not supporting the council project was in no sense to reduce the censure which rightly belonged to Clement. Had he made strong representations to Francis for the purpose of obtaining his support for the council, undoubtedly such information would have been used by him in his later communications with Charles. There is no evidence that he made use of the marriage agreement and the creation of the four new cardinals to gain the support of the French king for the council. He seemed rather to have realized that the obstacles to the holding of a council were so many that there was little need for urging French support. Nevertheless, he still needed the French on his side, and with Henry VIII of England moving rapidly in the direction of a breach with Rome, it would have been a grave error for Clement to have pressed Francis to the point of deserting him completely. The letters of Francis and Clement offer no reference whatsoever to the English affair, but it would be folly to assume that this problem had no bearing on the development of future events.

The End of an Era

At the close of the Marseilles meeting with Francis, Clement returned to Rome, arriving there on December 9, 1633. There would be no concerted effort in favor of the council up to the time of the death of
Clement, which occurred within a year, but the question was bound to remain before the papal authorities. In Consistory meetings Clement continued to express concern over the matter though he was never able to determine the means for obtaining the consent of all the Christian princes. In a Consistory meeting in June, 1634, there was expressed the danger of a schism which would inevitably result from the calling of a general council since the disapproving elements would undoubtedly form their own meeting. It was decided to inform the emperor of this problem in order that he might determine what action should be taken.

In a letter of June 14, 1634, Vergerius, the papal nuncio to the court of Ferdinand I, reported an appeal to the emperor from the German princes urging him to exercise his influence on the pope for the holding of a council by whatever means necessary. This was followed by a report in July that the princes were dissatisfied with the delay in this matter. Then when Count Cifuentes

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16Hugo Lämmer, Monumenta Vaticana historiam ecclesiasticam saeculi XVI illustrantia (Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1661), pp. 162-163.

17Ibid., pp. 166-168.
reported to the emperor that pressing the matter with Clement produced no results, it was decided to withhold such action in deference to Clement since he appeared little inclined to move forward in the matter as long as the situation in Germany remained so disturbed. In a dispatch to the High Commander, Cifuentes made the indictment that Clement would never give in to the council and that the emperor would do well to consider that he had pressed the matter as far as possible along these lines and to undertake some other means for the accomplishment of his objective. There was to be little opportunity to influence Clement further in the matter of the council since illness had overtaken him in June and he was not to recover. Death came on September 25, 1534.

18Calendar of Letters, V, Part 1, 207 (No. 72). The date of this dispatch is July 21, 1534.
19Ibid., 218 (No. 74).
CHAPTER VIII

CLEMENT VII AND FRANCIS I IN CONTRAST

The Attitude of Clement Toward the Council

The reasons for the opposition of Pope Clement VII to the holding of a church council during his pontificate have been summarized under the following headings: that a reform in head and members would result in a reduction of papal authority; that there would arise embarrassment from an exposition of the circumstances surrounding Clement's birth, in spite of the official papal explanation that a valid marriage had been contracted secretly between his mother and father; that an attack would be made on Clement accusing him of simony in his relationship with Cardinal Pompeo Colonna and others at the time of his election to the papacy; that there would be an accusation of collusion on the part of Clement with the emperor in the struggle which resulted in the return of Florence to the control of the Medici family. These were

the arguments set forth by the enemies of Clement in his own time, and they have been accepted by others as valid deterring factors, but they were not of sufficient magnitude to deter him from calling a council in spite of his tendency toward vacillation and the other weaknesses in his character. The inactivity of Clement has been criticized in this way, but it still does not explain why he assumed the position he did in regard to the council. Only with a thorough understanding of the problems involved and the issues at stake will it become possible to draw specific conclusions with respect to the decisions made by Clement during his pontificate in so far as the council is concerned.

There can be no doubt that certain personal issues, the question of his birth, for example, did play an important role in many of the decisions of Pope Clement. There is, however, a tendency to overemphasize such issues and in this way to obscure the more fundamental principles involved. It may be assumed that Clement was fully aware of the extensive good results that could be forthcoming from a successful council and that it was most necessary to have full and complete support for its decisions if they were to have the desired effect. This was the attitude which he had adopted some years earlier in regard to the pronouncements of the
Fifth Lateran Council while he was archbishop of Florence.

This type of support for the decrees of a council was highly desirable; indeed it was necessary if such formal decisions were to continue to be rendered in this manner. Conciliar doctrines had crystallized by this time in church history, and while there had been some attacks on these theories in the previous century, Clement would certainly not want to be the pope responsible for a modification or a weakening of these principles. It would be preferable, from his point of view, to forestall the calling of a council until he could be sure that the results would be beneficial for the church as a whole. The possibility of a schism was a thing to be feared more than anything else; such a danger had appeared at the time of the last general council. At that time it had required almost extreme measures to regain the composure of the papacy and to avert the schism.

There are three conditions of prime importance in explaining the attitude assumed by Clement, though these are by no means the only forces acting upon him. In the first place, Clement was made to realize the great responsibility resting upon him as a result of the events of the first five years of his pontificate. These were troubled years, filled with disappointment and

\[2\text{See supra, p. 23.}\]
disillusion, tempered by war, the sack of Rome, and his own exile, and disturbed by his unsuccessful efforts to bring about peaceful conditions in the realm of secular affairs. Events of such great importance were bound to weigh heavily upon him and to force him to realize the immensity of the responsibility attached to the papal office. The events of the first five years of his pontificate must have made such an impression upon him that they were to condition many of his acts in the last five years of the period. He may have realized the great burden of his position to the extent that he almost feared every decision that had to be made, particularly those which were of such a nature as to have a lasting effect upon the affairs of the church. If he felt in the least responsible for any of the disturbing events prior to 1526, he must have understood only too well that an erroneous decision with respect to the council could well throw Christendom into a schism of greater proportions than ever before. He would not want to be a party to a disturbance of this kind, and as long as he could see no other result in the calling of a council, he could only conclude that Christendom was better off in its present condition. After all, he could not foresee that the eventual result would be a permanent schism if he did not act, but it was evident to him that a council held
during his pontificate would almost certainly bring about a schism. He was not prepared to assume the responsibility for such an eventuality.

In the second place, Pope Clement was not able, at any time in his reign, to understand clearly the potential danger involved in the Lutheran movement. It is true, of course, that some of his representatives in Germany, notably Aleander and Campeggio, had a greater conception of the importance of the movement than he did, but they were not concerned with the myriad other affairs of the church and could not understand what reaction there would be to the methods recommended by them for combating the heresy. Even in these circumstances Campeggio recommended the use of force by the secular arm rather than the calling of a council to settle the religious disturbances, while Aleander supported the council and the probability of compromise. Basically this second proposition rests upon the fact that Pope Leo X had made use of the traditional methods for counteracting a heretical movement of this nature. At another time and in another place the papal bulls of 1520 and 1521, together with the decision of the Diet of Worms, would have been sufficient to control such a movement. Clement must have known by the time he assumed the papal throne that exceptional action would be necessary in this case,
though he also realized the importance of not undertaking a project which could prove to be beyond his ability. It was not until the year 1530 that he became thoroughly convinced of the need for drastic action. His correspondence with Charles V only then indicated that he had arrived at the point where he was willing to make concrete proposals. Even at this time he recognized the need for caution and thus determined certain specific conditions which would have to be fulfilled before a council could be called. Clement's letter to the emperor, dated July 31, 1530, has been interpreted as a indication that Clement really did not favor a council but at the same time felt that he must give official approval to it. Yet if it may be assumed that Clement was only now convinced of the need for action, then this letter may be interpreted as his method of safeguarding Christendom from the evils that might result if he should act without due caution. He was protecting himself and Christendom from a potentially worse evil than undertaking no action at all. The judgment of history has

3Giroldo Ruscelli, Delle Lettere di Principi, le quali o si scrivano da principi, o a principi, o a giovani di principi (3 vols., Venetia, 1581), II, 197-199. There is an Italian version in Concilium Tridentinum, IV, xli-xlili.

been harsh on Clement, but it is mild compared to the judgment which might have been rendered had Clement called a council and then found himself unable to maintain control. Clement's fears may not have been fully justified but there is no reason to question the validity of the efforts of Clement to insure that his actions could be reasonably expected to produce beneficial results. He was influenced by a recognition of his own lack of ability, but this must be accepted as a condition over which he had no control. It is to his credit that he recognized his weaknesses and made efforts, however unsuccessful, to compensate for them.

A third circumstance which had an important bearing on Clement's attitude was his dual role of spiritual leader and secular prince. This was a condition which was more fully understood and accepted in Clement's time than by later historians and critics. It was not, of course, possible to separate completely the two roles -- one must inevitably condition the other -- but at the same time it was necessary for Clement, and other popes as well, to assume one position when acting as a secular prince and another when dealing with spiritual matters. The two were not separate by any means in this period of history. Even secular rulers, such as Charles V and Francis I, for example, were also invested with certain
religious responsibilities which were associated with their secular positions. It may have been unfortunate that Clement permitted his secular role to dominate his actions in certain areas and that he used his religious position to further his secular ambitions, but such was the spirit of the age that any other program might have led to an even greater loss for the church. It was a recognized dual position that he held, and any loss of prestige on either side would have subjected him to criticism, if not to a worse fate.

Since the first five years of his pontificate were taken up by certain issues which demanded his attention and were not of his choosing, it is worth while to ponder the fact that Clement was allowed only a five-year period (1529-1534) in which to give serious consideration to weighing all the factors involved in the holding of a council. Pope Paul III took over the papacy within less than a month after the death of his predecessor. Among his earliest pronouncements were statements made in Consistory that he intended to carry through the project of calling a council. Yet in spite of his early determination even Paul III, and he has been recognised as a more successful pope than Clement, required a period of ten years before bringing the

Ibid., p. 245.
project to fruition. He did actually issue a bull in 1536 proclaiming the council, but after several postponements it was realized that the opposition of Francis, Charles, and Ferdinand was such that the council could not be held at this time. Again the major issue influencing this decision was the determination that peaceful conditions between the emperor and the king would be a necessity before such an assembly could be successfully convoked. This was exactly the position of Clement in the last years of his life.

It is to the credit of Clement that he did not give up his efforts toward the council project; as a matter of fact he was still very much concerned with this problem until he was stricken with an illness in July, 1534, which permitted him only slight participation in papal affairs for the remaining months of his life. Yet in the months of May and June he was giving very serious consideration in Consistory meetings to the most recent events taking place in Germany -- the restoration of the Protestant Duke Ulrich of Württemberg and the disturbances of the Anabaptists -- and to the depredations of the Turks in the Mediterranean area. In the latter month he took special note of the effect of the

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6Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (42 vols. In progress, St. Louis, 1895— ), xi, 78-79, 180.
German situation on the rest of Christendom and called
upon the members of the Consistory to determine a course
of action which was to be given consideration at a
future meeting. In the Consistory of June 10 it was
reported that the most efficacious means for counter-
acting the Lutheran heresy appeared to be in the calling
of a general council, but that such a proposition could
not be successfully undertaken until a condition of
peace and quiet could be established among the principal
secular rulers. At this point the work of Clement for a
council came to a conclusion. Sometime during the month
of July his illness incapacitated him to the extent that
he was no longer able to attend the Consistory meetings.

It was unfortunate for Clement that his pontificate came between those of two popes who have been given
a favorable verdict in history. The short era of Pope
Adrian VI was marked by a definite advance in the direc-
tion of reform of the abuses in the Curia. How much he
might have been able to accomplish along these lines
before meeting impossible obstacles will never be known,
but it is quite possible that at the time of his death
strong opposition was about to develop. Then with the
disturbances of the election of a new pope a reversal of

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7 Concilium Tridentinum, IV, cx-cxi.
8 Pastor, op. cit., VII, 7-8.
the trend took place, and Clement was unable to continue the process of reform. Nevertheless there is no evidence that Clement had even considered so vigorous a policy as had been demonstrated by his predecessor. The result is that by comparison with Pope Adrian VI, Clement has appeared as an inferior pope.

The successor of Clement has gone down in history as the pope who brought about the Council of Trent and thereby halted the spread of the Protestant movement. In the light of the accomplishments of Pope Paul III the pontificate of his predecessor offers little that can evoke praise. Yet this pope continued the work of Clement toward the calling of the council. He followed in Clement's footsteps by immediately undertaking arrangements for the project and indeed had been closely associated with all the issues on this matter as a member of the College of Cardinals in the years preceding his election as pope. He was fully aware of the opposition he would meet from all sides though he must have felt himself capable of overcoming it. The proclamation of the bull of convocation in 1536 was followed by the most determined action to carry the project through to the end. After repeated postponements extending over a period of almost three years, Paul III was finally convinced of the impossibility of his task and notified the secular
princes of the decision in Consistory to suspend the efforts for a council. There were indications that this was progress, though in reality it was a matter of two steps forward and one step backward each time. If persisted in long enough this kind of policy would bring about the actual convocation of the council. Time was on the side of Paul, though he was ten years older than Clement, and gradually he was able to surmount the obstacles and bring about the council, but only after ten years of his pontificate had passed. One wonders if Clement might not have accomplished as much, given another ten years in which to carry out the project.

The Opposition of Francis I to the Council

The greatest opposition to the holding of a council came, during the pontificates of both Clement VII and Paul III, from the king of France. Francis was determined from the very beginning to oppose any and all projects which might give the advantage to his enemies, the Hapsburgs. He could see that the disturbed religious condition in Germany weakened his rival, the Emperor Charles V, and in order to maintain that condition he was prepared to promote even heresy. The secular rivalry

9Ibid., XI, 120.
between Charles and Francis placed Pope Clement in a precarious position where he was bound to maintain the balance of power because the defeat of one side by the other would subject the Italian Peninsula to possible attack. The diplomacy of this period indicates that Francis was a greater threat to Italy than Charles because he lacked principle and was willing to make use of Machiavellian methods to gain his ends. The Hapsburg threat was not so great, if only because Charles had much more extensive possessions to administer which kept him busily occupied. The treatment accorded Francis after his capture in the Battle of Pavia was an indication that the Hapsburg threat was not so serious as the Valois threat. What might have been the Hapsburg destiny had the Battle of Pavia gone the other way, and had Charles found himself the prisoner of Francis? It is doubtful that Francis would have released him under conditions similar to those agreed to in the Treaty of Madrid. Thus with France posing such a real threat to the security of the Italian Peninsula, Clement was bound to give more attention to the attitude of Francis than to that of Charles. Unable to bring about peace between the two rivals, the only alternative was to protect to the limit of his ability the charge that had been entrusted to him, both secular and religious. The effect
of this situation was that many of the projects of Clement had to be undertaken on the basis that the reaction of Francis was of vital importance, and unless his approval and support could be obtained there would be slight chance of success. This was the situation especially during the last years of the reign of Clement and has direct application to the council proposal.

Francis exercised extreme care in disguising his real attitude toward the council during the pontificate of Clement. The earliest direct contact with Francis on this matter might have resulted from the mission of Aleander in 1524-1525 except that military matters interfered before the mission was concluded. The report of Aleander to Pope Clement does not touch on the matter of the council, so it is impossible to determine whether the topic was even discussed. The conversation did dwell upon Luther and his heresy and the attitude of Francis on this matter. It was indicated that Francis did consider the movement dangerous, though perhaps not for France, since he had no intention of permitting the spread of such ideas in his own country. The reference in this case was only to the early part of the mission, and therefore it is quite possible that at a later date the discussion may have turned on the question of a council. Any later dispatches from Aleander are not
available and presumably were destroyed during the Battle of Pavia, when Alexander was held as a prisoner for a time, or during the sack of Rome.

There arose an opportunity for Francis to give important assistance in the matter of combating heresy when he was released from captivity under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid in 1526. He promised to assist the emperor in repressing the heretical movement, but upon his renunciation of the treaty this matter was not given a second thought. Then in the formation of the League of Cognac the pope threw in his lot with the French. It must have appeared to him that this was a necessary action in order to maintain the balance of power and to overcome the threatening position assumed by Charles as a result of his victory at Pavia. The recommendation of the Diet of Spires (1526) that the emperor should persuade the pope to call a general council for the consideration of the religious conditions in Germany was made at a time when there was little possibility of support from France. For the time being, at least, Francis would be interested in nothing but revenge against Charles.

Francis and Clement had hardly adjusted their relationship to one of opposition to the emperor when the sack of Rome placed the pope in a position where he could do little more than appeal for assistance in his own predicament. The period of his imprisonment and exile from Rome lasted for a year and a half. It was only after the return of Clement to the Holy City at the end of the year 1528 and the conclusion of peace between Charles and Francis in the Treaty of Cambrai in the following year that the question of the convocation of a council could be given serious consideration. Francis was now placed in a situation where he would have to give his attention to this question, and although he would still withhold any definite statements as long as possible, he was eventually forced to indicate his decision. In the meantime he had many opportunities to survey his own position and to determine just how he could best counteract every move of Charles. This was the game of power politics being played to the hilt. Not even Christendom was to be really safe.

There are several instances which demonstrate the attitude adopted by Francis toward the council question in the last years of the pontificate of Clement. One of the earliest occurred in connection with the mission of Louis de Praet who was to determine for
Charles the position of Francis on this matter and was instructed to influence him to favor the council. It was on this occasion that Francis delayed for two months his answer to the imperial request for information and then made a counter proposal which involved the gathering of a preliminary assembly at Rome to consist of delegates representing all the countries of Christendom for the purpose of deciding such major issues as the place for holding the council and drawing up a program of procedures to be followed. This was such a thinly veiled excuse for delay that Charles immediately dispatched his reply, refuting all the points held by Francis as necessary preliminaries and strongly advising him of the urgency of the project. When finally Charles placed the issue squarely before him and suggested that Francis select the site most acceptable to him, there was no answer from the French king. There are two possible interpretations of this action, both of which lead to the same conclusion. Either Francis was so disinterested in the council that his reply was such as to indicate his lack of knowledge about the stage to which the negotiations had proceeded up to this point, or he was already so opposed to the project that he intentionally raised unimportant issues in order to block progress.

\[11\textit{Concilium Tridentinum, IV, lviii-lix.}\]
The first interpretation is within the realm of the reasonable since in this period of his life Francis was spending much of his time in the hunt and similar diversions while affairs of state languished or depended upon someone else. On the other hand, he was vitally concerned with counteracting the Hapsburg influence in Germany, and in support of this policy he would be opposed to the holding of a church council since a settlement of the religious dispute would strengthen the position of Charles. A critical examination of this attitude on the part of the French king seems to indicate that he would not hesitate to sacrifice the pope or even the church to promote his own political aggrandizement. It was enough for him to know that Charles favored the council to realize that it would be to his advantage to oppose it.

Another instance of the use of delaying tactics on the part of Francis is evident in the mission of Ubaldino da Ubalduino to France following the second conference between Clement and Charles at Bologna. The method used by Francis at this time was to dispatch the nuncio to England to obtain from Henry VIII his attitude on the council. In the meantime instructions had been sent to England to insure that the proper response would

12 Pastor, op. cit., X, 203.
be given to Ubaldinus. This strategy gave the French king the opportunity to advance further his plans for a personal meeting with Clement, and upon the return of Ubaldinus from England he was informed that the matter would be given attention at the Marseilles conference. The mission of the papal nuncio accomplished absolutely nothing except to further the policy of Francis. The question of the convocation of the council was now very effectively postponed until the meeting of Francis and Clement at Marseilles several months later.

A final example of the attitude of King Francis may be discovered in the results of the conference at Marseilles. Until this meeting took place it was quite evident that the convocation of the council rested, in the final analysis, upon the assurance of Francis that he would give his approval and that he would attend in person. The personal interview which was to take place at this time was the ideal arrangement for working out a compromise on this problem. Anyone perusing the documents of this era and attempting to discover the key to the council question during the pontificate of Pope Clement eventually reaches the conclusion that all the answers should be found in this one event. A consideration of the difficulties evident in the correspondence of the previous three years indicates that this meeting
should offer the solution to the major obstacle to the
council -- the failure of Francis to give his support.
Decisions important to the history of the church were
certainly in the making at this time. But without a
record of what actually transpired at this meeting we
are able to do little more than surmise what took place
in the conversations. There is almost nothing that can
be offered by way of concrete evidence to be interpreted
in favor of the position of Clement. Indeed it seemed
that the very fact of silence was detrimental to the
extent that Clement was even accused of giving his
approval for the French support of the German Protestant
princes and the Turks in their opposition to the Hapsburg
power. While there was never produced any definite
evidence that this was actually the position assumed by
Clement, the absence of any visible opposition on his
part was taken as a sign of approval to be used against
him. It is unfortunate that there was no mention of
this part of the negotiations in the letter which Clement
wrote to the German circles on March 20, 1534. Yet the
very fact that he did not see fit to touch upon the
subject at this time is certainly no indication that he
was retaining the cloak of secrecy over some dark phase
of the discussions. It must be admitted that Clement was

13 Ibid., 235-237.
not using the devious means of Francis, that is to claim
to have given his support to the project while failing
to make use of the best evidence in his favor which
would consist of a recapitulation of the actual
discussions about the council project as they had taken
place in the Marseilles meeting. On the other hand,
there was no reason for Clement to take up in this
letter, even by way of denial, the question of the
French attitude toward the German Protestants and the
Turks, because he had made no commitment to Francis on
these points. The strongest indictment that can be made
of him is that if Francis actually requested papal
support, and even this may be denied on the basis of no
evidence, Clement did not object so strongly as might
have been expected.

The Importance of the French Position

In the final analysis then, the most effective
opposition to the council came from Francis, even though
it was Clement who held it within his power to issue the
necessary instructions convoking the council. Each time
that Clement was subjected to pressure to call a council,
he fell back upon the excuse that there must first be
peace among the secular powers and that the approval of
the French king must be obtained. These were two
conditions which it was within the power of the secular
authorities to attain. Even Charles might have put forth greater effort toward the establishment of these conditions; Francis was specifically and unalterably opposed to their attainment. On Clement's side it should be stated that he had much to gain from the secular point of view by encouraging the efforts to bring about peaceful conditions. If one forgets for the moment his secular role, it was certainly to his advantage as a spiritual leader, and to the advantage of Christendom as a whole, to promote the cause of peace. There was perhaps no other condition so vital and so basic for the settlement of the religious issues of the era. If Clement could not accomplish this objective there was really little possibility for the successful convocation of such an assembly. If he were to undertake the project and then fail, surely he would be blamed for not having foreseen the necessity of insisting on peaceful conditions in the first place.

Clement is open to severe criticism for many acts of omission and commission during his pontificate, but his strategy with regard to the council is deserving of greater understanding than it has had in the past. It is not sufficient to interpret every act involving a religious matter in terms of the influence it would have in the secular field. There is no denying that such
results were important and had to be given proper consideration, yet the very act itself must also be understood in the exclusive light of the religious problem with which Clement was concerned. In these circumstances Clement can be supported in his reasoning that the holding of a council under conditions far from ideal would only result in great evil for the church. Even though one admits the personal obstacles which faced him -- the question of his illegitimate birth and the charge of simony in connection with his selection as pope -- certainly there were important reasons of a religious nature why he should take a strong stand against the council.

With the restoration of Medici control in Florence in 1530, Clement had accomplished one of his major political ambitions and was then able to give more concern to religious issues. There was a noticeable increase in the attention given to the council question from this date to the end of his pontificate. His major consideration was to maintain the unity of Christendom. It was of the utmost importance, therefore, that the support of the two strongest political forces be assured before convoking the council. According to tradition church councils had received the support of secular rulers; without that support there could develop a schism.
of major proportion which might make permanent the division now in existence. Any act on the part of the pope which could be construed as jeopardizing the welfare of Christendom would result in severe criticism of Clement. Unless both Charles and Francis could be induced to give unqualified support and approval to the council, it would be a serious mistake to undertake such action.

Clement should not be criticised for having withheld the convocation of the council, but rather for his laxity in not making greater effort and in not using more extensive pressure to convince Francis of his moral obligation toward the project. Even if he had attained success by this means -- and that would be highly improbable because Francis had little respect for moral duty as seen in his repudiation of the Treaty of Madrid -- there could still have been no guarantee of the success of the council. From a purely religious point of view Clement was unable to determine that a council held under conditions somewhat less than satisfactory could produce results beneficial to the unity of the church. On the contrary, it seemed to him that such a council would have the effect of increasing the defection from the church if either Charles or Francis withheld approval. Clement may have been more fully aware of this threat than any of his contemporaries.
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I, Wilfred Joseph Steiner, was born in Mallard, Iowa, February 9, 1916. I received my secondary school education in the parochial schools of Mallard, Iowa, and Mason City, Iowa. My undergraduate training was received from Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa, and the degree of Bachelor of Arts was granted to me in 1936. From Harvard University, I received the Master of Arts degree in 1938. In February, 1946, I was appointed Instructor in History at the University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio. I was granted a leave of absence during the year 1947-1948, at which time I began studies at Ohio State University leading to the degree Doctor of Philosophy. A Fulbright grant for the year 1953-1954 enabled me to undertake research in the Vatican Library, Vatican City, and to obtain the necessary material for a dissertation. While completing the requirements for the doctorate I advanced to the position of Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Dayton.