LIBERAL CATHOLICISM IN
FRANCE, 1843-1870

DISSERTATION

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the French Revolution the Roman Catholic Church placed itself in opposition to the dynamic historical forces in nineteenth-century France. Pampered and protected by the Bourbons of the ancien régime, dislodged and almost destroyed by the Revolution, the Church after 1815 formed an alliance with those forces to whom the principles of 1789 and the results of 1793 were distasteful. Within the post-revolutionary divisions of French society, a division which Salwyn Schapiro has labelled the "two Frances"—la nouvelle France and l'ancienne France—Catholics decidedly and with deliberation coalesced with the latter, the champions of aristocracy and royalism, to demand a reversion to the spirit of things past. Together they formed a solidly constituted conservative front which deprecated the achievements of the Revolution and anathematised its spirit.

The Church detached itself from the new France of liberty, representative government, and equality. Taking a position far less than catholic, the Church enthusiastically chose the reactionary phase of the French social and political dichotomy. As its
philosophers it selected de Maistre and de Bonald, who sought to identify Catholicism with counterrevolution. The Church thereby divorced itself from the major positive forces in post-revolutionary France in the sense that it sought to negate the achievements of 1789. The religion of the French consequently threatened to become isolated from the social and political attitudes which most Frenchmen had come to cherish. In short, a wide chasm separated the Church from the general movement of French history after 1815 toward the establishment of a liberal state.

To remove that chasm, there emerged in 1830 a group of Catholics who stated that the Church's fortune was not necessarily anchored to a particular political and social philosophy and that the Revolution, far from permanently damaging the Church, had in a sense purified it and left it free to move forward unencumbered with France toward the realization of French Revolutionary principles. Around Felicité de la Mennais¹ a group of young liberals gathered to form a new school of Catholic thought, a school motivated by the desire to harmonize the Church and the ideals of nineteenth-century Liberalism—ideals which had their origin in the French Revolution of 1789 and in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This first Liberal Catholic group was short-lived, for so abhorrent was its ideology to the reactionary French hierarchy and to a counterrevolutionary Rome that it was struck down by Papal

¹After leaving the Church, la Mennais was normally referred to as Lamennais.
encyclicals, Mirari vos and Singulari nos, in 1832 and 1834.

In 1843 a second Liberal Catholic coterie emerged, led by the followers of the discredited Lamennais and sharing his ideas. From 1843 to 1870 these Catholic Liberals sought to convince Frenchmen that the Church was not opposed to their liberties, and coincidentally to find for themselves a freedom of intellectual activity within the Church, which seemed to become more monolithic as Liberal challenges to its traditional position became more evident. Always a small group, their significance lay not in their numbers, but in the fact that they alone in mid-century France sought to direct the course of the Church toward a reconciliation with modern French society and the principles upon which it was based. In short, they were, or sought to be, both Liberal and Catholic—therein lay their importance. It is with that second Liberal Catholic movement that this paper will concern itself.

The Liberal Catholic task was a difficult one and in the final analysis it was doomed to failure. For if the new France distrusted the Church as a force of reaction, the Church's official spokesmen condemned the new France as an insidious and subversive legion flying the banner of irreligion. Catholicism seemingly could not look forward, for it was preoccupied with fond reminiscences. Throughout the century the Church dragged its feet at every turn; thus it fortified rather than weakened the alliance of Liberalism and anticlericalism.

After 1815 the Church lamented the failure to restore pre-revolutionary conditions, for there was not a restoration in 1815,
if "restoration" is taken to mean the return to the institutions of the ancien régime. At best, it was restoration of the constitution of 1791. The Church could no more be restored to its privileged position of the eighteenth century than could the monarch declare himself absolute or the aristocracy reassume its status as the second estate. Almost wrecked by the Revolutionary schism regarding the constitutional clergy, deprived of its wealth, and subordinated to the state by the Concordat of 1801, the Church in 1815 found that its relationship with the state and society was radically changed. The past could not be re-established. What would the Church's attitude be toward the restored regime, which was based on the Charter of 1814?

The more optimistic Catholics looked longingly for a real restoration of the ancien régime. Not only did they hope to regain the Church's wealth and position and to realize the nullification of the Concordat; they also sensed the need to return to an authority which would protect France and the French Church against the recurrence of revolutionary radicalism which, they felt, had subjected the country to twenty-five years of objectionable rule. Rejecting revolutionary doctrines with horror, they even refused to accept the Liberal Charter of 1814, which was, in their opinion, only a diluted form of the ideas of 1793. With de Maistre they went even further, calling for a thoroughgoing reaction to the past, and for the denial of the Enlightenment in general. De Maistre, as well as de Bonald, supported authoritarianism not only in the state...
but also in the Church, both becoming champions of a revivified Ultramontanism which denied any degree of independence of the Church of France. Even though some more moderate Catholic voices were heard, especially that of Chateaubriand, authoritarianism and reaction were the dominant notes sounded by the supporters of the Church during the governments of Louis XVIII and Charles X.

Under the restoration, therefore, the Church allied itself with legitimacy and reaction, and consequently won for itself increased enmity in the ranks of Liberals. Voltaire was right, the Liberals concluded; the Church stood unconditionally against human progress and unalterably opposed to Liberal institutions. The Revolution of 1830 assumed an anticlerical spirit which was violent in nature, and many Catholics began wondering if the Church did not face a total loss of rapport with Frenchmen, who were becoming ever more indoctrinated with liberal and radical ideas. It was to narrow that breach, to re-establish that rapport, that a few Catholics began thinking in terms of the factors which served to reconcile the Church to liberal tenets, rather than emphasize those which separated them. Foremost among those Catholics was the Abbé Lammenais.

The Beginnings of Liberal Catholicism in France

Lammenais wanted to free the Church from its ideological and political association with reaction. His program, summarily stated, called for the separation of Church and state and for support of the
liberties granted by the Charter of 1830. Only by the establishment of a dualism between Church and the state—the mutual independence of the two—could the Church be wholly free from and uncontaminated by association with the powers which might momentarily control the state. By rejecting Gallicanism, he hoped to buttress the Church's independence from political groups and narrow ideologies. To be free from the state meant the renunciation of state financial support. In short, he wanted to terminate the traditional identification of the Church with the reactionary bloc, and thus to end the opposition to the Church by those political and social groups opposed to that bloc.

Furthermore, he saw nothing in the political principles of Liberalism which was necessarily in opposition to Roman Catholic dogma. He could not accept, at least in 1831, the extremism of the French Revolution, but then neither could Guizot nor Thiers. Lamennais gathered around him a group of enthusiastic apostles including the Comte de Montalembert and the Abbé Lacordaire. With their aid, he published L'Avenir, which sought to propagate their ideas. The program of L'Avenir was expressed in its motto "Dieu et liberté" and its purpose was to dispel Catholics' fear of Liberalism. Catholics should not be afraid of Liberalism, they said; Catholicise it, and "society will be born again." Setting out to show that freedom, not the freedom of privilege but the freedom of common rights, was compatible with religion, the editors of L'Avenir insisted that Catholics, as citizens, should demand liberty of the
press, education, association, and conscience. Had not the Belgian Catholics, without denying Catholic principles, cooperated with secular Liberals to form a Liberal State? Liberty, Lamennais insisted, should become the watchword of the French Church as well.

Thus was born in France a Liberal Catholic movement. It aroused the enmity of French Gallican reactionaries and it deviated from the traditional Catholic position so extremely that it was condemned by a papal encyclical, Mirari vos, in 1832. But its condemnation did not mean that Catholic Liberalism was dead in France, that it would not be revived when occasion permitted.

Mirari vos stated explicitly the Roman attitude toward the program of L'Avenir, but to imagine that the program was completely rejected as a consequence by its supporters would be misleading indeed, Lacordaire's and Montalembert's submissions notwithstanding. Underneath the monolithic surface of the Roman Catholic Church is to be found a heterogeneity in constant fluctuation. Certainly there is a hard core of dogma and doctrine which Roman authority imposes upon the Catholic. But in any given period in modern European history there have been at least two, and normally many, movements within the Church, each of them vying for label of "Catholicism", each of them construing the social and political philosophy of the Church somewhat differently, and each stressing different interpretations of Catholic dogma and doctrine. That is, there has been one group which attempts to conserve what it considers to be a more traditional outlook, in the face of another group which strives to
accommodate the Church to the changing needs and attitudes of society.

In the last three hundred years, the Church of France alone has embodied such various approaches as Gallicanism, Ultramontanism, Jesuitism, Jansenism, Mennaisianism, Cuetism, social Catholicism, the Ralllement, and in the twentieth century, worker-priests. One who remembers this diversity will hesitate before giving a hard and fast definition to "Catholicism" in the realm of politics and social outlook. While the Church's theory remains ever constant, perhaps, the Church is in actuality in a state of continual transmutation. The universality of the Church is in part explained by this elasticity. Certainly in any given period in history there are tendencies which might correctly be labelled "Catholic." But it is dangerous for the historian to ascribe rigidly to all Catholics the tendencies which might be applicable to the majority. For example, an attempt to understand Francis Cardinal Spellman in terms of the temperament of the worker-priests would be risky indeed. Although both might accept readily the dogma of the Immaculate Conception or Papal Infallibility, their approaches to twentieth-century social and economic institutions and problems indicate wide difference in attitudes in the realm of "Catholicism." This fact is not essentially altered by Rome's condemnation of the worker-priest movement; they might conform but they could hardly eradicate their previous existence. And only the least skeptical of observers could imagine that the Papal decision caused a revolutionary transformation of their social philosophy and of their own private attitudes.
With lamentable frequency, historians of modern France have failed to recognize this pliability of French Catholicism. They have often simplified the currents of nineteenth-century French development by attributing to the French Church the characteristics of an invariant; they have tended to assume that the position of Rome represented the mind of all Catholics, and thus they have risked overlooking or misjudging ideological and political currents which had, even in post-revolutionary France, a significant impact upon the course of French history. In short, they, if secular in approach, have frequently appraised nineteenth-century Catholicism in terms of bromidic anti-clerical slogans; if Catholic, they have too often served as apologists rather than historians of the Church. There have been exceptions of course, the recent work of Professor Duroselle on social Catholicism being a notable example.

The Second Liberal Catholic Movement

Despite the fact that Rome had spoken the program of L'Avenir lay latent in the minds of Lamennais' followers, especially Montalembert and Lacordaire. In the course of the fight for freedom of education, beginning in 1843, it burst forth with most of its previous energy. Therefore, in the last years of the July Monarchy a second Liberal Catholic group was organized with the Count de Montalembert and the Abbé Lacordaire as its leaders and with Frédéric Ozanam and Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, as their closest associates.
Although they constituted a well-integrated group, the Liberal Catholics were far from uniform in their approach and outlook. Sharing the desire to accommodate the Church to modern society, they were united by their opposition to the intransigent Catholic majority and to anticlerical forces in France. In reality they disagreed as to what modern society was or should be. Shades of opinion among them at times seemed transformed into complete disagreement. Mgr. Dupanloup, distrustful of modern tendencies, often appeared centuries removed from the bourgeois Lacordaire; Montalembert, a member of the nobility, at times seemed to have little in common with the democratic Ozanam. Therefore, even though they shared a common tendency, no precise and logically fixed definitions will do justice to their varying thought and positions.

Certainly the most important of the Catholic Liberals was the Count de Montalembert, the pivotal figure in the movement. He represented a central position; he was a harmonising agent who could claim the support of democratic Ozanam and bourgeois Lacordaire, of theologians like Gratry and Bautain, of Liberal monarchists such as Albert de Broglie, while at the same time retaining the loyalty of a more conservative Dupanloup. During the Restoration, Montalembert's bent was in the direction of English parliamentarianism and away from Metternichian principles; that is to say, he fell within the scope of the Doctrinaire position. He wholeheartedly supported Lamennais' insistence that the Church must break the ill-advised bonds which held it in alliance with the principles of
legitimacy and counterrevolution; that being his attitude, Montalembert became, at the age of twenty, an enthusiastic participant in the publication of *L'Avenir*.

With the censure of Lamennais by Rome in 1832, Montalembert was left without an anchored position. That in which he had believed, with all his youthful fervor, now seemed to be incompatible with his Catholic faith. From 1831 to 1843 he sat in the Chamber of Peers, taking part in the debates, following a program quietly reminiscent of the condemned philosophy of Lamennais. But in 1843, with the fight for "liberty of education," he emerged from the shadows to become the leader of a resurgent Catholic Liberal movement which would veer, in the course of its development, dangerously close to the Mennaisian position. An account of the vacillations of Montalembert's mind, his oscillation between a Liberal position in 1848 and a reactionary frame of mind in 1851, and then a return to his original point of view with his Liberal opposition to the Empire, the horror with which he viewed the publication of the *Syllabus of Errors*, and his pleas against papal infallibility—a account of these attitudes would go far toward explaining the trends of Catholic Liberalism during this years from 1843 to 1870.

More consistent than Montalembert, with perhaps more of an emotional devotion to Liberal tenets, was Lacordaire. Reared in a bourgeois atmosphere in Dijon, the Abbé Lacordaire was more completely in tune with his times than his friend, Montalembert, attached as the latter was to his ancestral seat in Franche-Comté and
influenced as he was by the traditional attitudes of the nobility. Trained for the legal profession, Lacordaire entered the priesthood, became the outstanding Catholic orator during the July Monarchy, and in 1846 re-established the Dominican Order in France. He, too, had been captivated by Lamennais' movement. Along with Montalembert, he wrote for L'Avenir, and in his articles he set forth a clearly liberal program from which he never essentially deviated in spite of his acceptance of Mirari vos in 1832. During the Second Republic he edited, in collaboration with Frédéric Ozanam and the Abbé Maret, l'Œre nouvelle, the most straightforward expression of Catholic Liberalism appearing during the century. With the advent of the Empire, he retired in disgust to become rector of a school near Toulouse, from which he sallied forth periodically to defend his Liberal principles. He died in 1861, "penitent Catholic and an impenitent Liberal," as he stated in his last testament.²

Lacordaire's colleague on l'Œre nouvelle, Ozanam, represented a point of view somewhat more advanced than that of his Dominican friend, and he often advocated ideas which seemed naive and scandalous to Montalembert. Ozanam based his political theory on two assumptions: the inevitability of democracy, and the idea that the Church would continue to exist. He considered that the Church had developed or revivified all the germs of good to be found in the ancient and barbarian worlds; it would have the same kind of influence

on democracy. Christianity was a necessary component in the progress of mankind toward democracy. Far from being incompatible, the Church and Liberal principles were inescapably connected in the process of up-lifting mankind to a higher terrestrial station. These ideas he consistently expounded from his chair in the Collège de France. In arguing the merits of democracy, he was some distance from ground which Montalembert would have found comfortable.

Ozanam's adherence to the social Catholic movement also served to separate him from his Liberal Catholic associates. Agreeing with such Catholics as de Melun that the state and individuals should take direct action to mitigate the social and economic conditions which the Industrial Revolution had forced upon the lower classes, he, in effect, formed a link between the two distinct programs of social Catholicism and Catholic Liberalism. Ozanam founded the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, a charity organization with which the Liberal Catholics were not unsympathetic, but which, on the other hand, was outside the field of their major interests.

At an opposite pole from Ozanam was the indestructible Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, who was representative of the conservative wing of the Catholic Liberal party. Dupanloup, referred to by some as the Bossuet of the nineteenth century and in one respect the most important member of the French hierarchy, gave the party a certain fleeting respectability in Catholic circles. His ardent defense of the temporal power of the Papacy rendered his name dear at Rome, and he was able on several occasions to use his influence
there to gain protection for his Liberal friends against the accusa-
tion of their fellow French Catholics.

His background did not serve to make him a ready champion of Liberalism; on the contrary, he had been among the most vocal in his insistence that the program of Lamennais should be condemned. Natural son of a Savoyard peasant, he rose to importance under the guiding hand of Gallican and legitimist forces in the French Church, and it was only in 1843 with the revival of the education question that Dupanloup condescended to collaborate with the problem children of the French Church, Montalembert and Lacordaire. It would be useless to doubt the sincerity with which he accepted the maxims and accomplishments of 1789, but it is questionable, to say the least, whether he could accept the philosophical premises upon which those maxims were predicated. Certainly he, more than his associates, failed to achieve any real sympathy for the spirit of Liberalism, though his support of most of the Liberal program was warm enough to infuriate intransigent Catholics. Objecting to the Empire as he did, and regretting the Roman Church's attitude toward modern society as it was expressed in the Syllabus of Errors, he became more and more a natural ally of the main core of the Catholic Liberal movement. At Rome in 1870, he was the last hope French Liberal Catholics had to prevent the Church from taking the irrevocable position in favor of organizational autocracy in the form of Papal Infallibility.

The French Church in the nineteenth century was extraordinarily deficient in regard to Biblical criticism and theological studies.
Mgr. Dupanloup, although indisputably the most outstanding French prelate of the century, was especially ill-equipped in this regard. He relied upon polemical outbursts rather than upon sound theological argument. What support the Catholic Liberals had from the ranks of the theologians came in the persons of Auguste-Joseph Gratry and Louis-Eugène Bautain and their small group of associates. Of the two, Gratry is the more significant in view of his close association with members of the Liberal group, but neither should be considered as definite members of the Liberal Catholic movement.

But the fact that Gratry and Bautain were allied with the Liberals at all opens up, perhaps, interesting fields of speculation for the theologian, for neither of them were to any great degree orthodox. Bautain, who had studied under Cousin and Jouffroy at Paris, joined the faculty at Strasbourg in 1820; his ordination into the priesthood in 1828 led to a series of conflicts between his own philosophy and theology and that of Rome. Tending to stress the Protestant and Jansenist arguments that divine revelation is the only source of knowledge and certitude, he was forced to recant in 1835. But his unorthodoxy continued, and in 1844, he again promised not to teach that the knowledge of God and of immortality of the soul is beyond the reach of unaided reason. Gratry absorbed Bautain's ideas while a student at Strasbourg; he too came to the conclusion that God is felt or experienced rather than known through reasoning. Both, however, shied away from a contention that faith and reason were incompatible.
In 1850 Gratry was vicar-general at Orleans under Mgr. Dupanloup, and Bautain was appointed in the same year vicar-general at Paris under Archbishop Guibert, an ally of the Liberal Catholics. Both men became members of the theology faculty at Paris under the Empire, and Gratry lived to participate in the controversy over papal infallibility, which he stringently opposed. Having been one of the original members of the Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception, Gratry was forced to leave the order in 1869 because he had participated, along with Père Hyacinthe, a brilliant Catholic orator and friend of the Liberals, in the meetings of the International League for Peace. That these latter day Jansenists left an indelible mark on the nature of the Liberal Catholic program is not suggested, but their having been attracted to the Liberal movement indicates a community of interests which is not without significance.

Inspired by Dupanloup and Montalembert, the journal, Correspondant, was founded in 1856 by a younger generation of Liberal Catholics. They took their cue from the Montalembert school, but they lacked the militant force motivating the older Liberals and they were unduly hampered by the reactionary attitude of the papacy after 1848 and especially after 1864. Albert de Broglie, Augustin Cochin, and Théophile Foisset assumed the actual work of editing Correspondant, and in their role as molders of French Catholic Liberal thought in the later years of the Empire, it will be of considerable importance to examine their ideas and their connections with the older group.
Issues Involved in the Catholic-Liberal Rapprochement

The intellectual adjustments that Liberal Catholics asked of both the Church and Liberalism were enormous in scope. Before a reconciliation of Catholicism and Liberal principles could occur, harmonious interpretations of Church-state relations, of political philosophy, and of the concept of economic liberty had to be set forth. Perhaps the most glaring obstacle to any agreement was the anticlericalism of the Liberals, which seemed to preclude the possibility of any understanding or common meeting ground between Catholics and Liberalism.

I. The Challenge of Anticlericalism

Liberalism was by nature anticlerical, since it had its foundations in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the outlook of the French Revolution. The men of the Enlightenment had discovered in reason what they thought was "a guide superior to all traditional authority, a guide both potent and beneficent." The test of reason was universally applied, and perhaps the institution which seemed to the philosophes most glaringly inconsistent with rational patterns was the Roman Catholic Church, which they fell upon in an uninhibited and relentless attack. If the Enlightenment was not an age "basically
irreligious and inimical to religion," and if the "strongest intel­
lectual forces of the Enlightenment do not lie in its rejection of
belief but rather in the new form of faith which it proclaims, and
in the new form of religion which it embodies,"\(^4\) certainly it was
manifestly opposed to revealed religion as it was constituted in the
Roman Catholic Church. Catholics could gain little solace from Carl
Becker's analogy between the new "faith" and the faith of the Middle
Ages. That the philosophes substituted for the love of God a "love
of humanity; for the vicarious atonement the perfectibility of man
through his own efforts; and for the hope of immortality in another
world, the hope of living in the memory of future generations,"\(^5\)
was proof in abundance that the Church had not escaped unscathed the
scrutiny of reason.

Furthermore, the philosophes denied the divine nature of the
Church and postulated a new moral system. The Church, they said,
was an anachronism in a society to be ordered by reason. It rested
upon superstition and ignorance, upon miracles which were "breaches
of mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws."\(^6\) Pervading and
consequently corrupting the minds of men, it stood directly in the
path of individual application of reason; it was an obstacle to the
reorientation of men. Clearly, l'infâme, as Voltaire called the

\(^4\) Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, 1950),
135-36.
\(^5\) Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers
(New Haven, 1932), 130.
\(^6\) Smith, History of Modern Culture, II, 501.
Church, must be reduced to impotence. Ranging from the thorough-going materialism of the Encyclopedists, Holbach and Diderot, to the Deism of Voltaire, the philosophers sought to destroy or replace Roman Catholicism. In the place of Christian morality they premised a natural morality. "Nature, being Reason," they said, "has established rational inter-relationships between all things. The quality of goodness is the consciousness of these relationships and obedience thereto. Evil implies ignorance of these relations and the consequent failure to obey them." Morality does not proceed from a deity, and certainly not from the discipline of an organized religion, but "from a power higher still, from Eternal Reason." Or as Toussaint wrote in 1748, "What is virtue? It is constant fidelity in fulfilling the obligations that reason dictates to us."

Therein lay the basic conflict between the Church and Liberalism. To release the individual from the moral discipline of the Church and to postulate a natural, rational religion which presupposed the innate goodness of man, was to strike at the core of Roman Catholicism. The Church of St. Thomas Aquinas was irreconcilable with the world of ideas in which the Encyclopedists existed. As Holbach wrote, "Nature invites man to love himself, to preserve himself, to increase incessantly the sum of his happiness; Religion

8 Ibid., 163.
teaches him that his reason is corrupted." That attitude, the French Revolution instrumented, and Liberals in the nineteenth century inherited. Even if the latter did not always accept the philosophical overtones of anticlericalism, their stand against the Church was none the less staunch. The Church's outlook seemed to justify the Liberal opposition.

Into such a deadlock the Liberal Catholics stepped. They sought to show the Liberal that anticlericalism was but a negative and needless appendage to Liberalism, that the Church was the Liberal's natural ally because it taught men respect for authority, and obligation, without which representative government and political equality would result in chaotic tyranny. Furthermore, they indicated that Christianity had first proclaimed the equality of men. And what greater liberty was there than that guaranteed by Free Will? Anticlericalism was not only an unnecessary component of the Liberal philosophy, it was a source of weakness. To the Church, the Liberal Catholics attempted to maintain that nothing within the political and social outlook of Liberalism was inherently counter to Catholic doctrine and that the Church could only incur loss by continued adherence to its traditional attitudes. Its strength in the nineteenth century would result from its adoption or acceptance of the precepts of modern society. For the most part, neither the Church nor Liberals listened. The Church moved steadily in the direction of complete alienation from nineteenth-century Liberal ideas, a

10 As quoted in Emmet J. Hughes, The Church and the Liberal Society (Princeton, 1944), 76.
movement which culminated in the Syllabus of Errors and Papal Infallibility. The Ralliement during the pontificate of Leo XIII could be at best partial, for by that time the Church and Catholics had too thoroughly identified themselves with reaction. By the same token Liberals could not fail to recognize that the political outlook of the Church was one of reaction, Liberal Catholics notwithstanding, and they continued to equate anti-Church legislation with the progress of Liberalism.

Liberal Catholics, following the pattern set by Lamennais, postulated a new framework for the relations of Church and state. The traditional interdependence of the two was judged insupportable by Liberals, who saw in the close association of the Church and the State dangers to the application of their social and political outlook, and denial of the premises upon which that outlook was based. Furthermore, liberty of conscience and freedom of religion were obligatory in the Liberal system—the eighteenth-century situation of a State Church or the nineteenth-century Catholic penchant toward a retrogression to similar conditions was intolerable to the Liberal. The latter, however, had not come, by 1870, to grasp the pluralistic concept of Church-state relations. He could no more conceptualize a state divorced completely from all religion or accepted moral systems than could the Catholic. Both the Liberal and the Liberal Catholic had a common meeting ground in "dualism" or the mutual independence of the state and the Church. It was a solution whereby the Church would no longer be protected by, or connected with, the
state, but at the same time, the state would not openly flout Christian moral concepts. The Church, on the other hand, would not attempt to subvert loyalty to the state.

II. Church-State Relations

Perhaps the greatest failure of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution had been not to advocate and to achieve a permanent separation of Church and state. The philosophes at times recognized the Church as a beneficial restraint upon the behavior of the unenlightened masses, for, as Voltaire said, "Quel autre frein pouvait-on mettre à la cupidité, aux transgressions secrètes et impunies, que l'idée d'un maître éternel qui nous voit...jusqu'à nos plus secrètes pensées." Voltaire might have considered the Church as a guarantee of the social structure, but other philosophes, Diderot for one, would be satisfied with nothing short of the Church's ultimate disappearance. Yet from the anti-Catholicism of the Enlightenment developed a demand for religious toleration, even if a tolerant spirit was not always discernible in the philosophes' vituperous attacks on the Roman Catholic Church. Voltaire had admired the latitudinarian atmosphere of England and he wished to see freedom of conscience established in France. But opposed to such a liberty stood the authoritarian Church of France, which demanded as its prerogative—a prerogative it claims by virtue of its infallibility—the exclusive right to administer to Frenchmen's souls.

The Church, therefore, by its very nature, required the subversion of liberty of conscience, the philosophes maintained. If, then, the Liberal society was to be realized, the Church would need to be deprived of its monopoly, its privileges, and thus its power. Anti-Catholicism was the result. The Society of Jesus was the central object of the philosophes' attacks, because the Jesuits—in spite of the latitude offered by their casuistry—seemed to represent most perfectly all those features in the Church which the Rationalists most detested: its hierarchical structure, its authoritarian nature, its claims to political influence, and its opposition to the basic tenets of the Enlightenment. The Church's activities should be curbed, and the Jesuits banished from France. By undertaking such an attack, the philosophes did not demonstrate a willingness to allow to the Church a freedom of action, which a pluralistic concept of Church-state relations required. Nor would they admit that the state must develop an indifferentism regarding religious questions. On the contrary, the state should not only detach itself from Catholic domination and cease to protect the Church; it should go beyond that, they suggested, and help establish the Liberal millennium. Banishment of the Jesuits would be the first step. Furthermore, by the belligerent extremities of their anti-Catholicism, the philosophes revealed betrayal of the concept of toleration, ostensibly so dear to the hearts of the champions of liberty.

The essential question, one which was not always asked, was how much freedom should be allowed, in a Liberal society, to an
organization or philosophy which seemed dedicated to an anti-Liberal approach? The French liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries failed to answer this delicate question, and thus they failed to establish in France a workable or compatible rapport between man's religion and his freedom. The materialists, by advocating the Church's destruction, ignored the question. Deists hoped to solve the riddle by educating the French away from Catholicism. A third group, inspired by Rousseau, postulated a re-defined and vague Protestantism, one which accepted the humanistic belief in the goodness of man. But humanistic Protestantism was at best an oblique answer to the problem posed, another attempt at substitution of religions, rather than a forthright and realistic endeavor to determine Roman Catholicism's role in an Enlightened France. Assuming the continued existence of Catholicism, all of those considerations did no more than elude the central issue.

Gorging itself so furiously on anticlericalism and radical religious experiments, the French Revolution failed to achieve a permanent separation of Church and state which a more moderate policy might have ensured. Such a separation—a carefully defined pluralism—would have at least provided the legal and perhaps workable basis for liberty of conscience. Instead, the revolutionaries, after having freed the state from the intertwining influence of the Church and thus having prepared the way for separation, attempted to replace Catholicism by other state sponsored religions. Although those experimental cults might have been more in harmony with
revolutionary principles, they hardly provided any lasting solutions to the problem of Church-state relations and the place of Catholicism within the new order. Only the Directory seemed to seek long-range policies, for it actually attempted, with little success perhaps, the separation of Church and state. But the new arrangement was short-lived, for the Napoleonic Concordat of 1801 simply continued the failure of the philosophes and the Revolution to arrive at concrete workable formulae for Church-state relations. The Charter of 1814 further complicated relations between the Church and Liberalism by giving the Church a somewhat privileged standing. So enmeshed were the fortunes of the Church and the Bourbons, that the Revolution of 1830 was directed almost as much against the Church as it was against Charles X.

Sensing that the Church would continue to bear the brunt of Liberal revolts as long as it clung to its traditional attitudes, Lamennais and the Liberal Catholics postulated the separation of Church and state. By separation, however, they did not mean that the state should cease to be governed by Christian principles; rather they intended that the Church should renounce state protection, and proclaim as its security a regime of common liberty in which the Church—and other religious groups—would be able to proselytise freely without any state interference. They were ready to give up state financial support in return for the abrogation of the Concordat of 1801. They freely accepted freedom of conscience and religious liberty. In short, they sought the emancipation of the Church. The
Liberal Catholics after 1843, in spite of Papal condemnation of the concept of separation, urged basically the same solution. They wanted, as Montalembert stated, "a free Church in a free state."

III. Political Liberalism and Liberal Catholics

In the realm of politics, also, Liberal Catholics attempted a readjustment of the Catholic outlook in order to harmonize it with Liberalism. The Montalembert group asked that the Church not place itself categorically in opposition to the political platform of nineteenth-century Liberals. Arguing that Catholic doctrine did not preclude the acceptability of any particular political creed, so long as it was not inherently immoral, Liberal Catholics stated that men of the faith were free to accept the political achievements of the Revolution of 1789. There was, they said, no necessary incompatibility between the Church and constitutional government, freedom of speech and of press, individual liberty, and the principle of national self-determination. Moreover, they strove to identify the Church with those Liberal concepts which Rome so detested, and which they had sincerely adopted.

But they, like the Liberals of the Thiers-Guizot school, could not condone the tendencies of the French Revolution to centralize governmental authority. The Revolution, they thought, as it had developed after 1789 had shown that the state, if too powerful and if unchecked by subordinate authorities, could destroy the liberty and dignity of the individual. In Rousseau they recognized the theoretician of the democratic, centralised, and omnipotent state, and like
the "Doctrinaires," they rejected his philosophy. The primary concern of both the Liberal Catholic and the secular Liberal in the
nineteenth-century was insurance of individual liberty against the
threats posed by popular sovereignty and by intensely centralized
government. Both had common antecedents in the eighteenth-century
philosophes and the Revolution.

The eighteenth-century French Enlightenment had developed two
basic answers to the problem of how best to protect individual
rights, to allow the individual to continue the enjoyment of his
freedoms while a member of a civil society. One of these was most
profoundly set forth by Montesquieu. He saw in the British con-
nstitution a system of checks and balances, of separation of powers,
which served as a protector of the individual's liberty. Furthermore,
in the ancient constitution of France, with its theories of
divisibility of sovereignty, Frenchmen could find another guarantee
against usurpation of their rights. In Montesquieu, therefore, is
found a "spontaneous approach to what the French call guarantism,
that is, the conception of substituting guarantees of freedom for
formal and often ineffectual declarations of its essence."¹²

Guarantism implied that political liberty was the freedom of
the individual from the state and in face of the state. An essential
adjunct was the demand for a constitution, providing for representa-
tive government, which would guard against the encroachments of the

state. From the concept of guarantism was derived the anti-statism of the nineteenth-century bourgeois Liberal. The individual stood opposed to the state. To give him the maximum freedom, the state's functions and prerogatives must necessarily be minimized to the greatest extent possible.

Rousseau presented a theory which was manifestly opposed to the laissez-faire concept of the state. His Social Contract "signified a complete departure from the state of independence and an entrance into a commonwealth where all that a man claims as his own and as his right is subject to the law of the whole, the general will." He too stated the essential problem involved: to find a system by which all can unite and still have as much freedom as before. The answer lay in the social contract, which put personalized power under the direction of the general will of which the sovereign state must be the expression. The sovereign state becomes co-equal to or synonymous with the sovereignty of the people. The individual will is subordinated to the general will, but by giving up his right to individualist caprices, the individual was forced, in a sense, to be free. The contract was one between equals, and between free men.

"The contracting parties surrender their natural liberty to the community, to receive civil liberty in exchange, so that, since each surrenders himself entirely to the whole, conditions are equal for all; and since every one obeys the general will which springs from

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13 Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire* (New York, 1940), 233.
the compact of union, he is in reality obeying himself."

The attributes of Rousseau's contractual state were directly opposed to the guarantism as derived by Montesquieu from the English constitution. The concentration of sovereignty in the general will is necessarily the antithesis of the separation of powers and systems of balances, and the divided sovereignty under the old constitution of France. It follows logically from Rousseau's system that no other corporate being or institution can be interposed between the individual and the state. Sovereignty is indivisible, inalienable, unerrant. Citizenship is all absorbing; the government, being the embodiment of the general will and the tangible representative of popular sovereignty, is omnicompetent.

Feeling that the Revolutionary transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the people had not in reality served to preserve individual rights, but rather to decrease them, the Liberals of the nineteenth-century returned to the system of guarantism as the basis for their political philosophy. Popular sovereignty had been discredited by the Revolution, and once more French Liberals turned to England for guidance. Certainly, they felt, it was by the English system of parliamentary monarchy that liberty could best be secured. And by liberty, they meant "the triumph of the individual, as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods as over the masses who seek to render the minority a slave of the

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14 Ruggiero, History of European Liberalism, 61.
majority.\textsuperscript{15} Democracy was not liberty; it was "the vulgarization of despotism.\textsuperscript{16}

To protect that liberty, the Liberals set out to construct a system of guarantees which would insure the individual against the misuse of the sovereignty invested in the monarch and the parliament. The legislative body, they said, alone must have the right to legislate, and citizens should not be obliged to obey any laws but those constitutionally promulgated. The judiciary must be independent, discussion must be free, and there must be freedom of conscience. On the question of divisibility of sovereignty and the interposition of subordinate institutions between the individual and the state, nineteenth-century Liberals disagreed. When Liberal Catholics asked for the free right of association, Liberal governments denied their request. Most Liberals after 1815 could not accept the idea of the right of association or the principle of divisibility set forth by Montesquieu. In spite of themselves, they partially adopted the \textit{étatisme} of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Rather than accept the concept of divisibility and consequently admit the uncurbed formation of associations, they ignored the eloquent pleas of men like Tocqueville, and turned elsewhere for guarantees to bolster the protection of rights given by the Charters of 1814 and 1830. They found those extra guarantees in property, and to insure the rule of property—which, they felt, would assure the

\textsuperscript{15}Harold Nicolson, \textit{Benjamin Constant}, (New York, 1949), 286.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 288.
nation a moderate government—they created the device of the *pays légale*. Essentially it was a return to the 1790 distinction between active and passive citizens; property owners alone would constitute the legal nation since only they would be granted the suffrage.

In eclectic fashion, therefore, the nineteenth-century French Liberal incorporated in his outlook *guarantisme*, which insured him against popular sovereignty and the alleged evils of democracy, and *étatisme* which was acceptable so long as the state was synonymous with bourgeois Liberal preponderance. Inconsistent perhaps, but portfolios were the prize, not philosophical consistency. Liberalism was interpreted to serve bourgeois interests.

Among the victims of their narrow application of Liberalism were republicans and radicals, who by the September laws of 1835 were deprived of their constitutional right to free discussion and free speech. In the opinion of Liberals, apparently, such freedoms did not extend to the right to attack the precepts of the bourgeois regime. More important to this study, however, was the refusal of French Liberals to grant the right of association or organization, not only to workers and radical political groups, but to Catholics. In the name of Liberalism, Liberal Catholics were to demand the free exercise of that right in the face of continued refusals by Liberals to grant it. Furthermore, the Charter of 1830 accepted the principle of freedom of education, but Liberals continued to impose serious restrictions upon the right of Catholics to open and maintain schools.
Liberal Catholics, therefore, felt compelled not only to ask the Church to tolerate Liberalism as a political outlook; they also had to persuade Liberals to grant Liberal principles on an impartial basis, to allow a general liberty equally applicable for all and in which the Church would share only the common right. Should they claim freedom in the name of the "common right," however, Liberal Catholics had to be prepared to grant that right to all. If they demanded free speech and press for themselves, they must be willing to grant it to all. To be consistent and sincere, they had to be willing for all to open schools, if they asked that right for themselves; and they must support the freedom of men of all ideologies to associate, if they demanded that freedom for Catholics. Liberal Catholics, between 1843 and 1870 spoke much of the "common liberty." But could they as Catholics, the Church's attitude being what it was, sincerely and without hypocrisy accept the concept of the "common right?" Both the Church and secular Liberals repeatedly asked this question, and within it, lay the dilemma of Liberal Catholics in the mid-century.

As for the broader issues of their political outlook, the Liberal Catholics were more consistent than their secular counterparts. The Montalembert group saw in the centralization of sovereignty a threat to Liberty, no matter who temporarily controlled the central position. Therefore, they urged the establishment of intermediary institutions which, interposed between the individual and the state, would protect the individual's liberty. They not only rejected the
democratic consequences of Revolutionary étatisme, they refused to accept the theory as well.

Apparently, there was a wide area of disagreement between the Liberal Catholic and the bourgeois Liberal, but they generally coalesced in a common distrust of republicanism and democracy. In their anticlericalism, the secular Liberal often found himself in temporary alliance with Republicans like Quinet and Michelet. But when the bourgeois preponderance seemed challenged by revolt from below, the Liberal was readily willing to join with his Catholic counterpart and even support the claims of the Catholics. The motivation for such an entente was not, however, the desire to fulfill the promises of the Charter, but rather the urgent necessity to form a strong parti d'ordre.

IV. Economic Liberalism and Liberal Catholics

Normally, any study of European Liberalism should have as a point of departure the sociological and economic substructure upon which the ideology was based. No so with the Liberal Catholics, for their Liberalism was grounded in their religion, not in their membership to a particular class or economic interest group. The Liberal principles to which they adhered were not arrived at primarily because of a desire to serve humanity, or to be more skeptical, to benefit a particular class. The Liberal Catholics sought to serve the Church. Two of the outstanding Liberal Catholics, Ozanam and Lacordaire, emanated from the middle class, but their bourgeois heritage had but little effect upon their social and political
philosophies. In truth, they despised the bourgeois mentality. The Count de Montalembert shared the orientation of the old aristocracy, and Jupanloup was the illegitimate child of a peasant. Nor did their principal mentor, Lammenais, fit the sociological framework of nineteenth-century Liberalism. His background was essentially that of the Breton country-gentleman. Therefore, if the Liberal Catholic's economic outlook—to the extent that he had one—at times coincided with that of the secular Liberal, it was not because that outlook stemmed from any basic sympathy with economic Liberalism or from any understanding of the alleged requirements of nineteenth-century industrialism.

If it is an exaggeration to state that Liberalism was primarily a system of thought developed to serve the economic interests of the middle class, certainly it is true that those interests contributed to and benefited from the concept of liberty as it was developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Long held at bay by the legal superiority and privileged position of the clergy and the aristocracy, and hampered as it was by the restrictions upon commerce, the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie adopted the enlightened approach of the philosophes. Just as there were natural laws governing men's political relationships, so was there a natural environment in which the economy would operate best, if so allowed. If artificial restrictions were removed, "natural harmony would ensure peace and prosperity both internationally and within
Economic laws could be discerned from the pre-established axioms of human nature. For example, "Each man will be guided by self-interest, but self-interest will lead him along the lines of greatest productivity... Self-interest, if enlightened and unfettered, will... lead him to a conduct coincident with public interest." Certainly, they assumed, the circulation of money "is as subject to natural forces as is the circulation of the blood." The task of the economist was to discover those laws; the duty of the government was to provide an atmosphere in which the laws could operate freely, and to act as a police force for the protection of private property. "All the rest can be left to individuals. All other intervention is the outcome, like the laws against witchcraft, of popular ignorance or sinister interest." Society, Paine was to say, "is the outcome of our virtues, government of our wickedness."

In that rationalization of the interests of the bourgeoisie an anti-statist is obvious. The bourgeois Liberal demanded economic freedom from the state, rather than within it. He was diametrically

19 Smith, History of Culture, II, 216.
20 Laski, Rise of European Liberalism, 193.
21 Ibid., 194.
opposed, therefore, to granting the state the sovereignty proposed by Rousseau, but rather he looked for guarantees against the encroachment of the state's power, in the tradition of Montesquieu. The state existed not to restrain, but to liberate the individual politically and economically. The state should limit its activities to the protection of property. In such a fashion were the economic and political factors of Liberalism interwoven.

Once the bourgeoisie had actually gained a pre-eminent position in the state under the "King of the French," however, they modified their interpretation of economic Liberalism. In Jean-Baptiste Say the French Liberals had an outspoken proponent of the ideas of *laissez-faire*, competition, and *anti-étatisme*; but Say gained few followers during the July Monarchy. The nineteenth-century Liberals were champions of protection and of carefully defined state intervention.\(^2\) The bourgeoisie not only welcomed the intervention of the state, it expected the state to intervene directly in such matters as railways, roads, and finances, and in matters concerning the granting of concessions in mercantilist fashion. On the other hand, however, the state should not restrain individual enterprise. The way should be left open to the freest development of industry and commerce; restraint in the form of labor combinations and state regulation of hours and wages should be avoided if possible. So free were the bourgeois interests in France

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and so powerful became their influence in government, that Lamartine was to say that "liberty is incompatible with the existence of great corporations within the state. These financial interests even subject free governments to their influence, infiltrating everywhere—in the press, in opinion, and in governmental institutions." He condemned what he called the "new financial feudalism" and stated that never had a government or a nation been threatened by the power of money as France was in 1838. To the bourgeoisie, the state existed largely to promote the general prosperity; it should intervene when that intervention promised to be beneficial to the interests of the bourgeoisie. Otherwise, it should follow a policy of non-interference so as not to place a restraint on the activities of industrialists and financiers. There was no principle involved. It was opportunism, pure and simple.

Against such a background the economic outlook of the Liberal Catholics must be viewed. In general they shared little of the economic disposition of Liberals. The Montalembert group neither sympathised nor was deeply concerned with the economic philosophy of Liberalism, and some members of the group—Ozanam, and to some extent, Lacordaire—can be best placed in a category opposed to the capitalist system as it then existed in France. Montalembert himself oscillated between defense of governmental intervention in economic matters and criticism of such interference. Dupanloup was

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little interested in economic questions, normally curtailing his public and private statements on such issues to discussions of the nobility of charity, a matter which was only obliquely concerned with economic Liberalism.

On one point, however, the Liberal Catholics buttressed the arguments of their secular counterparts. Property, they affirmed, was inviolable. It "is one of the essential foundations of society," Lacordaire declared. "It is the guardian of man's liberty and his dignity."24 Country, family, liberty, religion, "all the great interests of man have in property their first and most solid foundation. He who attacks it," Lacordaire continued, "attacks the very edifice of humanity, and he who defends it, defends with it everything that sustains and elevates human nature." It is the health of the world, a gift from God, "for God alone founded the right of property by giving it to the first man that he might transmit it to his descendents."25 Admittedly, landed property was unequally distributed, but everyone benefited from the existence of the institution for it gave stability to society and to the nation.26 Furthermore, every man possessed property, for labor was a property, he said; the principle of the individual's proprietorship of his own

25Henri Lacordaire, Discours sur la droit et le devoir de la propriété (Toulouse, 1858), 15.
26Ibid., 17.
labor "is a primitive right consecrated by evangelic law."²⁷

Lacordaire spoke for all Liberal Catholics when he said that the transfer of "private property to society would be the establishment of universal servitude."²⁸ Socialists, he declared, argued that society should be the sole proprietor of all and and labor. But what is society, he asked? "In appearance it is everybody; in reality, when it regards administration and government, it is always a very limited number of men...who are called to power...and are made the repositories of all the social elements." Because of this, "It is necessary to oppose to power certain guarantees or limits, without which society would become lost in an autocracy." Property was one of those guarantees, "an invincible force...which enables man to stand erect against power....Take away from him the domain of land and labor, and what will be left except a slave? For there is but one definition of a slave: it is the being who is neither master of land nor of his own labor." Transfer property to society, "That is to say, to certain men who govern and represent society, and what will remain...but universal servitude? The citizen will no longer be anything but the valet of the republic."²⁹

Therefore, the right of private property, established by divine

²⁸Ibid., II, 311.
²⁹Ibid., II, 312-313.
law, was inviolable and immutable. The stability of property was "at once the consequence and the guarantee of general liberty."

In those conclusions all Liberal Catholics concurred. Not even Ozanam, the least susceptible of the group to bourgeois economic interpretation, challenged the right of private property in any sense. Ozanam and the social Catholics, without attacking property thought in terms of the distribution of the profits of property by means of state intervention.

Most Catholics, Liberals included, attached to the right of property, a duty of property holders. The whole of Christianity, they said, compelled man to care for his fellow man. "Jesus Christ

30 Charles de Montalembert, De l'avenir politique de l'Angleterre (Paris, 1856), 112.

31 The best discussion of social Catholicism is presented by J.-B. Duroselle, Les Débuts du catholicieme social en France, 1822-1870 (Paris, 1951). Social Catholicism is a subject completely outside the scope of this paper, since it was a movement formed apart from Liberal Catholicism. Ozanam is the exception, since he spanned both groups. He will be considered in this paper only in so far as he was identified with Liberal Catholicism. The latter sympathized with the aims of social Catholicism, but not with most of its specific program, which included a brand of "welfare statism" designed to place the state constantly as a cushion between the individual and the impact of economic forces. Liberal Catholics, furthermore were preoccupied with politics and political outlooks, whereas the social Catholics, under the leadership of the Viscount de Melun, were almost totally concerned with economic problems. The Liberals sought to serve the Church by harmonizing Catholicism and the newly triumphant Liberalism; the social Catholics attempted to advance the Church's interests by championing the cause of the lower economic class groups and thus winning them to the Church. The relationship between the two groups may be compared with the group around Jacques Maritain on the one hand and the worker priests in the twentieth century. Therefore, though they may have had common interest, their methods were dissimilar and their groups separate.
has taught us that property is not selfish in its essence, but that it may become so by the use which is made of it....The Gospel has established the principle... that no one has a right to fruits of his own domain beyond the measure of his legitimate needs," Lacordaire declared. But this did not suggest economic equality, for "It is true that needs vary according to the social position of man, a position infinitely variable...But wherever legitimate need expires, there also expires the legitimate use of property." 32 Justice, then, lies in charity. "The rich are but the depositaries and administrators of property." 33

The social outlook, therefore, of Liberal Catholics was grounded in a defense of property and the exaltation of charity. Ozanam developed the latter concept more than any other member of the group. He sought to demonstrate that the cause of the proletariat could be pleaded, the plight of the "suffering poor" be improved, and the abolition of pauperism be pursued without identifying oneself with socialist radicalism. Socialism, he declared, was a false doctrine. For amelioration of their living conditions, workers should look to the Church, which "has accomplished much for the maintenance of the rights of property on the one hand, for the right of organization for labor on the other, and for cooperation between the two on the twin base of justice and Christian Charity." 34

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32 Lacordaire, Conference de Notre-Dame, II, 321.
33 Ibid., II, 308.
He regarded the progressive improvement of the moral and material fate of the working class to be the primary objective of society.\textsuperscript{35}

In a series of lectures delivered at the University in Lyons, Ozanam pointed out that the school of economy then in vogue did not take into consideration the human misery resulting from uncontrolled competition and the unrestricted factory system; on the other hand, socialists were erroneous in assuming that the evil lay entirely in a vicious distribution and that by suppressing all competition, an economic utopia could be established. The solution to the economic ills of France lay, he said, in between those two extreme positions. Capital was a necessary element in the economy, but it should not be used at the expense of the laborer. The real problem was, he said, the disproportionate relationship of "natural wages" to "real wages." The natural wage was the salary the worker ought to obtain for his labor; the real wage was the salary he actually received. How to make the natural wage the actual wage was the question. Ozanam rejected the dictatorial intervention of the state as well as the policy of \textit{laissez-faire, laissez-passer}.

Rather, he suggested that the state intervene with legislation

which at once would better the worker's conditions without curtailing excessively the free employment of capital. Also the education of workers and the development of savings banks would elevate their status. The organization of workers' associations would serve as a remedy; without them the worker would stand helpless before the exploitation by the employer. Always, however, the emphasis was upon conciliation of employee-employer interests, which he assumed would prove to be harmonious once the effective moral and legal restraints were imposed.36

But Ozanam was not representative of the Liberal Catholic group. True, there were areas of agreement between him and his associates. For example, they joined with him in supporting the formation of workers' associations.37 "Associations should be the powerful lever of modern society," stated Ére nouvelle, a newspaper established in 1848 by Lacordaire, Ozanam, and the Abbe Maret.38 In economy as in politics, Montalembert wrote, "I have a profound faith in the principle of association."39 Dupanloup shared Montalembert's opinion.40 On the issue of droit au travail, or right of

36 Ozanam, Mélanges, II, 410-595; Ozanam should not be associated with the corporative movement, as discussed by Matthew H. Elbow, French Corporative Theory, 1789-1948 (New York, 1953).

37 cf. Chapter VI, below.

38 Ére nouvelle, February 5, 1848. 39 Ibid., May 24, 1848.

employment, an issue which assumed importance in 1848, there was considerable difference of opinion. Lacordaire and Ozanam in Ére nouvelle supported it, saying that within the concept was the idea of eternal justice, a philosophical and moral truth.\textsuperscript{41} It should not be embodied as a principle in the constitution, however, because the state could not provide work beyond its resources.\textsuperscript{42} Montalembert, for his part, dismissed and condemned the "right to work" as a socialist hypothesis.\textsuperscript{43} Regarding the key question of the national workshops in 1848, none of the Liberal Catholics endorsed them enthusiastically and all, including Ére nouvelle, agreed to their suppression.\textsuperscript{44}

But despite the partial agreement on most of those issues, the main part of the Liberal Catholic group did not share the depth of Ozanam's solicitude for the working class nor did most Liberal Catholics accept his demands for the extension of state intervention. He, like they, emphasized charity, for Ozanam established the Society of Saint-Vincent de Paul. Charity, he felt, was not enough, and as a result his economics were suspect by most Liberal Catholics, who in general joined Dupanloup in deprecating Ére nouvelle as a journal which saw "in the most detestable dreams of

\textsuperscript{41} Ére nouvelle, September 19, 1848. \textsuperscript{42}Ibid. \textsuperscript{43} cf. André Trannoy, "Responsabilités de Montalembert en 1848," Revue d'histoire de l'église de France, XXXV (1949), 177-206, 190. \textsuperscript{44} cf. Ross William Collins, Catholicism and the Second Republic, 1848-1852 (New York, 1923), Chapter III.
socialism the sacred nature of Christian charity. Beyond charity, and the support of associations and the principle of right of employment, the majority of Liberal Catholics would not go. As an associate of the social Catholics, Ozanam pursued the question to the point of advocating a welfare state which would protect the individual from birth to death.

Montalembert, perhaps, was more a champion of bourgeois economy than other Liberal Catholics, but he too fell far short of a Liberal point of view. He had much more in common with the aristocratic paternalism of an English Tory than with the Liberal industrialist. His most thoroughgoing plea for free enterprise capitalism was contained in a speech of June 22, 1848 in the Assembly in which he opposed state ownership of railroads. For the state to absorb the railroads would be an attack on the right of private property, he said; to grant such a measure would pave the way for increased socialization. Real estate would next be attacked, then mines, followed by banks, industrial establishments and the textile industry. If one violation of the right of property was permitted, he stated, no property would be safe.

45 Ami de la religion, March 31, 1849.
46 Charles de Montalembert, Oeuvres de M. le comte de Montalembert, 6 vol., (Paris, 1860-61), III, 20-49, cf. Théophile Foisset, Le comte de Montalembert (Paris, 1877), 236. In Ami de la religion, October 19, 1848, he confessed that he was overwhelmed by the war being waged against the "old society" by those who advocated the "proscription" of capital, the systematic spoliation of property by "progressive taxation," and the redistribution of landed estates.
But Montalembert's approach was not bourgeois. In the Lyons strikes of 1832, he had sided with the workers; the fault lay with the factory owners and the government, he said.\textsuperscript{47} Throughout the July Monarchy he supported state intervention by way of factory legislation. In 1840 he enthusiastically backed the proposal to limit and control child labor in factories. Denouncing "industrial barbarism," he stated that he did not accuse any particular industry as being specifically culpable. The whole system, "the pitiful empire of competition in its entirety" was to blame. The state must intervene to protect the dignity of the individual.\textsuperscript{48}

On the other hand in a parliamentary speech in 1846 against the proposed \textit{livrets d'ouvriers} which were offered as a method of controlling the movement of labor, he criticized the government's "mania for regulating everything." Later, in June of 1847, he condemned the government's proposal to reorganize the medical profession as an attempt to transform another public service into the salaried servant of the state, that is to say, to put medicine on a par with religion and public instruction. "I speak of the state," he said, "but everyone knows that when the Minister of Public Instruction speaks of the state, the state is none other than himself."

He was alarmed, he declared, by the invasion of the state into territory where nothing could justify its intrusion. So great had the

\textsuperscript{47}Léon Cornudet, ed., \textit{Correspondance de Montalembert et de Léon Cornudet} (Paris, 1905), 51.

\textsuperscript{48}Montalembert, \textit{Oeuvres}, I, 203-04.
interference of government become that "at every moment of our lives we are called upon to pay a fine or exhibit a permit in order to act freely."49

If any pattern in his economic outlook can be found, it would be in his attitude that no iron law against governmental intervention was possible, that the state should act to protect workers against the evils of the factory system and of competitive capitalism, but that the state should not assume responsibilities which could be shouldered as well or better by private initiative. In taking such a position, Montalembert was far removed from the social Catholics, who thought in terms of a more extensive protection, and from economic Liberals, who at least postulated even if they did not observe the absence of governmental intervention. Laissez-faire was not characteristic of Montalembert's outlook, despite the anti-statism which was in evidence.

Beyond defending private property, most of the Liberal Catholics placed economics in a secondary position. Lacordaire, by joining the Ére nouvelle editorial staff in 1848, was forced to assume a temporary interest, but he soon exiled himself to the South of France and became almost completely divorced from such problems. The Bishop of Orleans, Dupanloup, was so out of touch with the economic times that he advocated the end "of the spirit of speculation" in industry and a return to the "spirit of family."50

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49 Montalembert, Oeuvres, II, 610-611.
Although Montalembert, as a member of the Chamber of Peers and the National Assembly, took stands on the basic issues, his was not a consistent and systematized economic outlook. In the final analysis, economic questions were not of primary importance to him. Consequently, neither he nor the other Liberal Catholics---Ozanam excepted---troubled themselves to formulate a definite economic program which can be associated with the Liberal Catholic movement. Therefore, in this paper, seemingly little attention will be given to the economic aspects of Catholic Liberalism, those aspects not being of great significance to their system of thought.

Nature and Scope of Study

Upon the questions of anticlericalism, Church-state relations, political ideology, and the absence of economic philosophy, therefore, Liberal Catholics' rapport with nineteenth-century Liberalism can best be viewed. Related attitudes regarding liberty of education, religious liberty, Ultramontanism and Church government, and the conflict of Italian nationalism and Catholicism also had to be fixed before a Liberal Catholic ideology could evolve. The Liberal Catholics between 1843 and 1870 attempted to formulate and activate opinions on these issues in such a manner that the Church and Liberalism, which they considered to be the really dynamic force of the century, could be harmonized.

The year 1870 marked the termination of the particular Liberal Catholic movement under discussion here. As a movement it had
sought to reconcile the Church with modern society; but the society
with which Liberal Catholics as well as secular Liberals of the July
Monarchy were sympathetic was ended by the proclamation of the Third
Republic. The Republic, giving unqualified acceptance to the con­
cept of popular sovereignty, went beyond the definition given to mo­
dern society by the Liberals of the July Monarchy and the Empire.
It remained for a reoriented group of Catholics to seek to harmonize
Church doctrine and republican concepts, to find a new definition of
Liberalism which would be compatible with the new political struc­
ture. Also, the Church, having crippled the Liberal Catholic move­
ment by successive encyclicals from 1832 to 1864, completely dis­
armed it by the definition of Papal Infallibility in 1870. To the
Liberal Catholics the new dogma seemed far more than a threat to
local usages and to flexibility in the realm of theology. In the
opinion of the Montalembert group, it threatened to give divine au­
thority to the pronouncements of the Papacy on questions of social
and political philosophy. For who could say what interpretation
would be given to ex cathedra? Already disillusioned by repeated
Vatican attacks on the Liberal code, the Liberals were further de­
moralized in 1870. Furthermore, of all the original leaders of the
group, only Dupanloup was still living after 1872. The death of
Ozanam in 1853, was followed by that of Lacordaire in 1861, Bautain
in 1863, and Montalembert in 1870. Gratry retired in 1870 and died
in 1872. Dupanloup, although active as a member of the Chamber of
Deputies from 1870 to 1875 and then of the Senate until his death in
1878, was not a strong enough champion of Catholic Liberalism to continue the struggle alone in face of his opponents in France and at Rome.

This study of Catholic Liberalism will confine itself to the period between 1843, when the movement was revived by the apostles of Lamennais, and 1870, the year of the Prussians and of Papal Infallibility. A chronological account of the movement is not intended. Neither will Liberal Catholic movements in The United States, England, Germany, and elsewhere be considered, because they had little in common with the French group. The French Revolution provoked a set of circumstances somewhat peculiar to France, and consequently, the French Liberal Catholic movement has a different orientation. This study will be an attempt to analyze an ideology which sought to reconcile the Church with the Liberalism of the first seventy years of the nineteenth-century, the objective being to examine the fundamental questions and practical considerations which this proposed reconciliation involved and to determine to what extent it was successful.

The question of liberty of education—the Catholic campaign against the Université monopoly—will be considered first because it was around this cause that the Catholic Liberal group first formed itself, and because the problem of freedom in the field of education involved some of the basic issues which recurred in other phases of Liberal Catholic thought. Next, there will be a discussion of the Liberal Catholic approach to the highly significant question of relationship between Church and state, an issue of extreme importance
through the course of the nineteenth-century. Influencing the Liberal Catholic approach to the question, and being influenced in return, was the Montalembert group’s attitude toward Ultramontanism and Gallicanism. Closely connected with that issue was the Italian question which was an especially difficult one for Liberal Catholics for they seemed to champion contradictory institutions—temporal sovereignty of Rome and Italian liberty and nationalism. And since secular Liberalism was so concerned with the quest of a constitutional and political framework which would protect the liberty they had proclaimed, then it will be important to examine the Liberal Catholic’s position on such matters. In this regard, it will be helpful to discuss their attitudes toward governmental forms, an index to which is best provided by their reactions to the events in France from 1848 to 1852. Also consideration will be given to their concept of liberty and the means by which they sought to guarantee that liberty. It will be significant as well to determine how closely Liberal Catholics allied themselves with secular Liberals on such issues as freedom of speech, of the press, and of the conscience. And finally, an attempt will be made to assess their Liberalism and to determine to what extent they succeeded in harmonizing their outlook with that of bourgeois Liberalism.

Certain theological positions will need to be entered into the discussion, although this is not intended to be a study of theology in any sense. Papal pronouncements will be taken without argument to be the Roman Catholic position. Only when differences in theology
between Rome and the Liberal Catholics seem to have a direct influence upon the latter's social, economic, and political thought, will such matters be taken into consideration. Such an arbitrary delineation is made possible by the fact that the Liberal Catholics themselves considered their social and political doctrines to be outside the scope of Catholic theology; they introduced into their own thinking, by necessity perhaps, a kind of pluralism which demanded independence for Catholics in the realm of social and political philosophy, while at the same time recognizing the authority of Rome in matters of faith. The exclusion of theology from this study is justifiable because the Liberal Catholics, not being well equipped for theological argument, normally did not invoke the aid of theology. Even Dupanloup did not oppose Papal Infallibility on theological grounds, but rather he argued that the definition was inopportune. Strictly speaking, therefore, this will be a study of the attempts of Liberal Catholics from 1843 to 1870 to develop grounds for a rapprochement between the Church and a society based on the principles of 1789.
Chapter II

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UNIVERSITÉ

French Liberal Catholics, silent for a decade after the Roman condemnation of Lamennais, revived themselves in 1843 to make a concerted attack on the French Université, which in principle at least, exercised a legal monopoly in the field of education. In this effort they were joined by a vast majority of the French episcopate, which accepted, however hesitantly, the leadership of Lamennais' former apostle, Montalembert. Out of the militant spirit engendered by the fight for liberty of education, a Catholic party was formed, a party which reached out horizontally and vertically to comprise Catholics of all viewpoints. Temporarily the party was loosely held together by a common objective—the destruction of the university "monopole." It was, however, a marriage of convenience, and the objective had no sooner been stated than the fundamental differences between the several Catholic camps reappeared.

Questions immediately arose which made Catholic unity difficult. On what grounds, for example, would the attack on the Université be based? If the "monopole" was destroyed, what would
replace it? A new monopoly directed by the Church was the hope of many Catholics, and the fear of most anti-clericals. The Liberal Catholics, on the other hand, challenged the Université on the basis of Article 90 of the Charter of 1830 which had promised the instrumentation of liberty of education. The right to teach, they said, was a common right—the right of all. And it was upon this platform that they based their campaign. But how thorough was Catholic respect for the "common right?" Were Catholics not obligated to accept the Church's assumption that education was the prerogative of the Church? Furthermore, did not acceptance of the "common right under the Charter" imply the recognition of other liberties granted by that document, liberties which had been condemned by Mirari vos in 1832? The answers which Montalembert, Dupanloup, and others posed to these questions in the last years of the July Monarchy provided the theoretical foundation for a new Liberal Catholic movement. The majority of vocal Catholics took violent exception, thus ripping asunder the newly-formed Catholic unity.

Out of the French Revolution emerged two divergent trends of thought regarding the role of the state in public education. These same attitudes were posed one against the other in the discussions of French public education throughout the nineteenth century. One was best represented by Condorcet, who assumed that the state should accept the responsibility for public education. With that responsibility came the right of surveillance. But public education should
not entail, he said, the teaching of nationalism or the inculcation of political doctrines. His principle was that there should be complete freedom of opinion. "Education must be independent of all political power," the goal being the formation of the individual and not the molding of uncritical supporters of a system. He envisaged a national system of education, or a state Universite, but he was opposed to a state monopoly. "He distinctly favored the maintenance of private schools as a means of correcting the evils of public education and of sustaining the zeal of the public teachers through competition." Rivalry between private schools would result in higher standards in the public schools. Anti-clerical as he was, Condorcet viewed religion as a private matter which should not be taught in the schools; but he granted to parents the right to educate their children in whatever religion they desired.

Opposed to this concept was the program of the Jacobins in the National Convention. Imbued with Rousseau's philosophy, they insisted on a state monopoly in education. As Lepelletier said during the education debate in the National Convention, the old institutions corrupted mankind, and it was the duty of the Revolution to create a new people. "Dans l'instruction publique la

1 Salwyn Schapiro, Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism (New York, 1934), 204-05.


3 Schapiro, Condorcet, 212. 4 Weis, Historisches Jahrbuch, 387.
ne sort jamais du moule; aucun objet extérieur ne vient déformer la modification que vous lui donnez." Charles Duval, lawyer and Jacobin, charged correctly that it was not a scholar, but a citizen that the Convention wanted to shape. The concept of the monolithic state required a national morality and conformity to national values; such an assumption presupposed a state monopoly in education which would naturally exclude clerical instruction.

Those were the two positions generally represented by secular Liberals in the debate over the Université which began in 1840. Guizot, Salvandy, and Tocqueville on the one hand believed that state supervision of education was necessary, but they did not hold that the needs of the state required a Université monopoly. Not only did they recognize the clergy's right to teach; they held that clerical supervision of instruction in morality was desirable on the elementary school level. On the other hand Thiers and Cousin, well reinforced by Edgar Quinet and Jules Michelet from their chairs in the Collège de France, exaggerated the prerogatives of the Université. If they did not insist upon an absolute monopoly they seriously questioned the right of the clergy to teach by demanding that all education, private or public, must be under the strict surveillance of the Université. They would not agree to two systems—the Université and a private system—both under the supervision of the state.

5 Weis, Historisches Jahrbuch, 389.
It was this latter group which provided the staunch support for the Napoleonic Université. By the law of May 10, 1806, Napoleon created the Imperial University, which instrumented the basic ideas of the Convention Jacobins. The aim was to "secure the means for directing political and moral opinions," for "so long as one grows up without knowing whether to be republican or monarchist, Catholic or irreligious, the state will never form a nation; it will rest on uncertain and vague foundations." On the Université Napoleon conferred the monopoly on public instruction; all phases of education, from elementary through university training were subjected to its control. With the decree of March 17, 1808, the Université, which had the "sole responsibility for public teaching and education throughout the Empire," was centrally organized. At its head was a Grand Master, who later was also Minister of Education, a Chancellor, a body of thirty Councillors, and ten Inspectors. The latter served as liaison between the Grand Master and the Councillors and the schools throughout France.

Even under Napoleon, however, the existence of the Université did not preclude activity on the part of the clergy in the educational system. The clergy not only served as instructors under the Université system, but the petits séminaires, designed to

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provide pre-seminary training for future priests, were placed in a privileged position. By a decree of 1809 these schools were given great latitude in planning and administration independent of the Université. Such concessions, however, did not render the system more dear to Catholics. The religious indifference postulated by the Université was nothing, they said, but disguised atheism.

Catholic opposition notwithstanding, the Université was preserved by the Restoration government. From 1815 to 1830 Catholic opinion of the educational system depended largely upon the varying attitudes and policies of the successive Grand Masters of the Université. Royer-Collard, who held that position in 1816, defended the Université, but being a "Doctrinaire," he applied a compromise whereby he attempted to satisfy the needs of the state while allowing as much freedom to Catholics as consistency would permit.

With the political reaction after 1820, came the installation of Mgr. Frayssinous as Grand Master of the Université and Minister of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction. Although he did not seek to change radically the form of the system, he profoundly altered its nature by putting clericals at the heads of colleges and by sharing university chairs between priests and laymen, eliminating among the latter all "mal pensants." Private institutions remained under the surveillance of the Université, but the petits séminaires escaped it completely. Before 1828 the number of such

9Weill, Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France, 45.
10Ibid., 56.
schools was greatly increased, and at least seven of them were administered by the banned Society of Jesus. Furthermore, the *petite séminaires* were allowed to admit students who did not intend to take orders. "Thus, side by side with the state Université, and organized with the purpose of subverting it, a system of clerically controlled secondary schools was brought into existence."  

With the collapse of the Villèle ministry in 1828 came also the fall of Mgr. Fraysinous. The new Martignac ministry promulgated ordinances which prohibited Jesuits from teaching and which limited the number of students in the *petite séminaires* to twenty thousand, a limitation which remained effective until the Falloux law of 1850. A special ministry of public instruction was created, thus emphasizing the role the state should play in education. The new minister, Watismeenil, set about restoring the secular spirit to the Université.

In short, the Université had survived the period of the Restoration, but its continued existence did not go unchallenged. In principle the monopoly was opposed to the concept of liberty of education, a concept supported warmly by many "Doctrinaire" Liberals as well as by the Abbé Lamennais, who was then plunging to the leadership of a new Catholic movement. Liberty of education implied in the first place, the right which all men were assumed to possess to transmit that which they believed to others. As such it was a corollary to liberty of thought and of the press. Secondly, liberty

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of education was claimed as a necessary consequence of liberty of conscience—the right of parents to have a voice in the type of education which their sons were to have, and the right of the individual to receive his education under the guidance of professors who shared his religious faith. More graphically, it meant the right to open schools independent of the sanction of the Université though not necessarily of the state.

During the administration of Frayssinous the Université had been vehemently challenged by some secular Liberals. Loath to recognize any form of governmental constraint, they were particularly critical when the clergy gained control of the means of constraint. Furthermore, logic required "Doctrinaires" like Constant, Broglie, and Guizot to demand liberty of education. "In education," wrote Constant, "as in everything else, it is necessary for the government to remain neutral." La Société de la morale chrétienne, of which Guizot and Constant had served as president, La Société pour l'instruction élémentaire, and La Société des méthodes d'enseignement all demanded the extreme modification of the Université system. One of Guizot's colleagues in the Société de la morale chrétienne declared that "the unity of education is the chimera of all political, religious, and scientific despotisms."

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In a prize-winning essay sponsored by the three societies, Vinet stated the case for religious freedom and insisted on a neutral position for the state in matters of education. The Université might continue in operation, but the state ought not to repress other schools; the monopoly of the Université must cease.16

**Lamennais vs. the Université**

Ironic it was, therefore, that the publication of Lamennais' *Des progrès de la révolution et de la guerre contre l'Église* in 1829 placed the most outspoken champion of the Church in affiliation with the ideas of the leading Liberals of the day. Liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, liberty of education—these were his demands.17 Thus was born the Liberal Catholic movement and specifically the campaign for liberty of education. To conquer those liberties, Lamennais established in October, 1830, the newspaper, L'Avenir. Two months later the Agence générale de la liberté religieuse was founded to organize support for the program. Throughout the life of L'Avenir Lamennais' most outstanding followers were the Count de Montalembert and the Abbé Lacordaire.

"There is one law which I respect, which I love, by which I will stand," wrote the Abbé Lacordaire in 1831. "It is the Charter of France, which I support not because I sympathize with the results of each revolt and cling always to the shifting forms of representative...


government, but because the Charter holds out freedom, and because when the world is in anarchy, men have but one country—freedom.  
Freedom, as Lacordaire and his associates understood it, implied not only liberty of conscience and of religion, and the right of association, but also freedom of the press and of speech. Freedom of education, however, was but a corollary of the liberty to think, to speak, to act; without the liberty to provide a Catholic education for their children, Catholics would have little reason to believe that their children's salvation was secure and would not be threatened by secular instruction. Of what value is freedom to have opinions if men are not free to express them? Article sixty-nine of the Charter of 1830 had promised liberty of education. Liberal Catholics now demanded the implementation of that promise.

"If the state reserves to itself the exclusive privilege of education, then religion, mores, and even belief in God are subject to the will of the government," wrote Lamennais. By what right is the government the master of education, he asked? Does the government have the prerogative of legislating beliefs and administering them? Not at all, he believed. "Beliefs and morals are the domain of religion; the rest is within the domain of the individual. The prerogatives of the government are limited to counselling, to directing, and to offering to all, without constraint the means of instruction. The government should superintend the free

18. L'Avenir. February 8, 1831.
19. Ibid., November 6, 1830.
establishments.\textsuperscript{20}

Clearly, the right to teach, wrote Lamennais, is a natural right just as are the right to think and to know. "If a man has the right to know, to develop his mental capacities and faculties, then he must logically have the right to give free play to that mental development"---that is, to communicate his thoughts and knowledge. The education of human minds, he said, is by its nature essentially free.\textsuperscript{21} Liberty of education, wrote Lacordaire, "is a right which God, nature, and the Charter assure to Catholics. Liberty and progress in every sense require the freedom of education,"\textsuperscript{22} since in the final analysis almost all liberty is the liberty of teaching. It was, he said, a contradiction to open the tribune to all and close schools to some.\textsuperscript{23}

What, then, did the editors of L'Avenir demand and upon what did they insist? Without compromising their belief that the Church alone was the valid interpreter of truth, they held that liberty of conscience was incompatible with monopoly in education, whether under the Université or the Church. Divided in religious matters as France was, the Church could not expect to exercise a monopoly; to do so would be to violate the Free Will of the individual. Rather, the Church should share in the common freedom granted by the Charter. They denied that to the state belonged any exclusive privilege in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20}Fèvre E. LeCAMust, Montalembert d'après son journal et sa correspondance, 3 vols. (Paris, 1895-1902), II, 196.
  \item \textsuperscript{21}Félicité de Lamennais, De l'éducation considérée dans ses rapports avec la liberté (Paris, 1830), 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{22}L'Avenir, October 17, 1831.
  \item \textsuperscript{23}Ibid., October 25, 1831.
\end{itemize}
education or that the child should be given over to the state to be made in the state's image. Such a precept would deny the rights of parents. And it would be "execrable for Christians who cannot accord the exclusive right of education to a human authority, and execrable for Liberals who cannot recognize the right of any authority to place men's minds under such a yoke." Furthermore, freedom of education, if it was to be complete, necessitated freedom of association. The government could not reconcile liberty of education, they said, with the denial of legal status to associations in the Church, particularly the Jesuits. To do so would be hypocrisy.

L'Avénir, therefore, adopted the program of liberty. Its editors refused to admit as final the supposed chasm which separated la nouvelle France from the Church. Rather, the Church should invoke and support the liberties which were the basis of the new France. The Church, being universal, need not or could not be out of tone with the times. Under the motto of "God and liberty," L'Avénir would seek to lead the Church to the support of modern liberties. In an atmosphere of freedom the Church would thrive. Instead of rejecting the modern state, the Church should proclaim it and recognize its independence from the Church. In short, the Church should seek to ally the two great forces of the French genius, Catholicism and Liberalism. Thus, the program of L'Avénir was dynamic and inclusive.

24 Articles de l'Avénir, 4 vols. (Louvain, 1832), I, 112-115.
25 L'Avénir, January 14, 1831.
were only cases in point.

So great was the enthusiasm of Lamennais and his followers, and so complete was their faith in the truth of their views and the efficacy of their program, that they could scarcely believe that their mission to Rome in 1832 to gain papal support for their position had produced, instead, their condemnation. In Mirari vae Rome disavowed the whole of the Menneaisian program—separation of Church and state, freedom of press and speech, and freedom of conscience. Education was not mentioned. It was clear, however, that the basis upon which L'Avenir had fought for liberty of education—the acceptance of competition and the denial of a monopoly either to the Church or the Université—was within the scope of the papal condemnation. Liberty, as Montalembert, Lacordaire, and Lamennais understood the term, had been denounced. And there ended the first Liberal Catholic movement.

Did Mirari vae and the subsequent Singulari nos, however, preclude the possibility of a Liberal Catholic program in the future? This question was uppermost in the minds of men like Montalembert after 1852. In the final analysis they concluded that it did not. In the case of Belgium they saw a concrete example of the implementation, with the support of the Catholic hierarchy, of their ideas. The Belgians had established a liberal state in 1831 with the participation of Roman Catholics. After Mirari vae they continued their loyalty; furthermore, the Belgian Catholic hierarchy urged Belgians to continue their support of liberal institutions. And no
censure was forthcoming from Rome.\textsuperscript{26} Liberal Catholics in France glanced admiringly at the harmony between the new Belgium and the Roman Catholic Church. The Belgian experience seemed to make their own program permissible, even orthodox.

Moreover, the Mennaisians presupposed a dualism of Church and state, a separation between matters spiritual and temporal, which tended, so far as they were concerned, to place their own political philosophy outside the scope of Roman authority. In temporal matters, they said, the Catholic should be left free to adopt a personal attitude, as long as his philosophy did not endanger the work of the Church, which was the salvation of souls. The Ultramontanism of Lamennais did not go so far as to assume that the papacy possessed full authority over every phase of men's lives. In purely temporal affairs or in matters of social and political philosophy Lamennais would recognize the right of no authority to impose opinions upon him; he would not abdicate the independence which came to him, he declared, by virtue of the heritage of humanity. "My conscience will not allow me to abandon the traditional doctrines of two societies, each distinct in its own sphere," he wrote to Montalembert. "I cannot submit to any declaration which even implicitly abandons it."\textsuperscript{27} His followers chose to submit to the will of Rome; in the end Lamennais could not. But dualism as

\textsuperscript{26}cf. Cardinal Stercks, \textit{La constitution belge et l'enseignement de Grégoire XVI} (Malines, 1864).

\textsuperscript{27}Éugène Forgues, ed., \textit{Lettres inédites de Lamennais à Montalembert} (Paris, 1896), 219.
Lamennais stated it, and as Montalembert was much later to declare it, was an essential part of the Ultramontanism of the early Liberal Catholic school. "I hold that I have the right to have an opinion about the dangers with which the Church is menaced," wrote Montalembert in 1845. To Théophile Fosset he wrote that it was necessary to be "an arch-Catholic as I am to understand that one can and ought to risk displeasing Rome in order to serve the Church and Rome itself." The disciples of Lamennais, therefore, tended to distinguish between the two spheres, temporal and spiritual. The distinction becomes apparent upon examination of their political outlook and their belief in common liberties. Never would they so confuse issues, as they accused intransigent Catholics of doing, so as to assume that Jesus Christ died to keep the Bourbons on the throne and to suppress the freedoms introduced by the French Revolution.

The Liberal Catholic movement did not disappear after Mirari vos and Singulari nos. Although it was shocked into inactivity for a period, it was evident, as Ozanam wrote in 1840, that "this movement, corrected and modified to suit circumstances, begins again to participate in the destinies of the century." With the appointment of such sympathetic men as de Bonald as Archbishop of Lyons, "the long quarantine that our ideas, a little suspected, has had to

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29 Ibid., 265.

30 Salwyn Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, 1815-1870 (New York, 1949), 171.
undergo has been raised. Having such outlets as the journal, Université, and the Annales de philosophie chrétienne, as well as the "conferences" of Lacordaire in Notre-Dame de Paris, the Liberal movement had not expired, even if it had lost much of the vitality which it had known under Lamennais. With the fight against the Université monopoly beginning after 1840, the forces regathered themselves, took steps to avoid isolation within the clergy by attempting to unify Catholics of all political bents, and in the process of justifying their anti-Université position, set forth in graphic terms a rejuvenated and only slightly altered Mennaisian outlook. Once the implications of the Liberal Catholic attitudes became clear, however, the newly-found unity disappeared, and the birth of a narrowly constituted Liberal Catholic group took place.

The Université under the July Monarchy

Before considering the Catholic campaign against the Université, however, it will be useful to examine the nature of the monopole universitaire which so antagonized the Catholics, and to trace the attempts of the Guizot ministry to alter the Université system. Elementary education was not essentially involved in the question. The Education Law of 1853, passed while Guizot was minister of education, allowed clerical participation in the lower levels of instruction. But in the fields of secondary and superior education, the Napoleonic system was still in force in 1840. All schools, the petites séminaires

excepted, were directly controlled by the council of the Université at Paris. To insure a certain standard of teaching, instructors in private schools had to pass examinations given by the Université. To provide against violations of Université authority, a student could not be admitted to the baccalauréat unless he could prove he had attended either a public school or a Université authorized private school. By such means all secondary education in France was subordinated to the rule of the centralized Université.

Article sixty-nine of the Charter of 1830 had indicated the willingness of certain Liberals to alter the exclusive control of the Université by promising a law to provide for liberty of education. There were indications in 1840 of a certain pliability on the part of Universitaires and the ministry; from 1841 to 1847 four different proposals to remedy the situation were presented by the ministry to the Parliament. All proved unacceptable. 32 Villedain, Minister of Public Instruction, introduced his projet on public instruction in 1841. Although it retained the requirement of Université certificates for teachers, insisting that only such uniformity would maintain high standards of teaching, it removed all restrictions on the number of students in petits séminaires. Previously, the maximum number had been set at twenty thousand. At the same time, however, the projet placed those schools under the supervision of the Université. So great was the Catholic outburst against the proposal that it was dropped almost immediately.

The organization of forces and arguments for and against the 
status quo ensued. Quinet and Michelet in the Collège de France 
and Cousin and Thiers in the Parliament were matched against Monta­
lember and the Catholics, both Liberal and intransigent. Against 
the Courrier français, the Constitutionnel, and the Journal des 
débats was posed the Catholic Université, revitalized in 1843 under the 
editorship of Louis Veuillot. Seemingly every articulate Frenchman 
terintened in the debate, in the middle of which were caught 
Liberals like Guizot and Salvandy.

A second projet presented by Villemain in February of 1844 
containecl a clause refusing to Jesuits or members of any other 
unauthorized Catholic order the right to teach. This clause reflec­
ted the anti-Jesuitism of the recent campaign, and its inclusion 
foretold the opposition of Catholics to the projet. The proposed 
true granted the right to establish private schools, but judgment on 
the qualifications of teachers rested with the state, or state 
appointed boards. Although the limit on the number of students 
in petits séminaires remained at twenty thousand, those schools were 
to be allowed a privileged extra-Université position.

In the Chamber of Peers Montalembert and his associates held 
that under such a system the so-called "private schools" would be 
controlled by the Université. He asked for the formation of a 
superior council of education, independent of the Université, to

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33 Louis Grimaud, Histoire de la liberté d'enseignement en France 
depuis la chute de l'ancien régime jusqu'à nos jours (Paris, 
1898) 329-335.
which the right of inspecting private institutions would belong.

Finally, he demanded that such a council should share with the Université council the duty of choosing candidates for Université chairs.34 His opposition to the proposed law, however, was actually provoked by the anti-Jesuit clause. In spite of the pleas of Cousin that the adversaries of the Université sought to divide France by setting up two systems of education, thereby compromising the moral unity of the country, the projet was passed in the upper chamber on May 24, 1844, but only after several amendments were added representing at least a partial victory for the Catholics.35

The projet did not fare as well in the Chamber of Deputies. Thiers was chosen by the committee considering the projet to act as reporter, and in his report he stated that the proposed law did not maintain the rights of the state in education, that it was inconsistent with the spirit of the Revolution. The spirit of "our Revolution," he stated, "requires that the youth of France be trained by their equals, by laymen animated by French sentiments, moved by love for the laws of the country...If the clergy, as all citizens, want to compete in education under the common laws, nothing would be more just than to allow it—but as individuals on equal conditions, and not otherwise." Thiers insisted that the right

34 Charles Montalembert, Oeuvres de M. le comte de Montalembert, 6 vols. (Paris, 1860-61).
of surveillance, inspection, and of jurisdiction of private schools remain in the hands of the Université council and that the petits séminaires should be subject to the Université as well. A vote on the Villemain proposal was not taken in the Chamber of Deputies.

The feud raged on, though it was partially assuaged, as far as the Catholics were concerned, by the resignation of Villemain and the appointment of Salvandy as Minister of Public Instruction in 1845. Salvandy attempted to gain peace by suspending the course in the College de France given by the anticlerical Mickiewicz, who in 1833 had had Montalembert as his champion, and by asking for the resignation of Quinet from his chair in the same College. Guizot attempted to help prepared the way for the final settlement by negotiating with the papacy for the dispersion of the Jesuit order in France. In January, 1846, Salvandy's projet was presented to the Parliament. It sought to soothe the universitaires by maintaining a centralized control of education and to appease the Catholics by abolishing the old Université council. For it would be substituted another composed of thirty members, twenty of whom would be appointed each year. Few were pleased with the new proposal. Thiers shouted that the Université had been betrayed, whereas the Catholics found the projet unacceptable because they were not assured representation on the new council and because the Jesuits were not given authority to teach.

37 Allison, Church and State, 150-51.
Although the Salvandy projet was not voted upon, it was obvious that the status quo had been forsaken by the ministry. The government's attitude was well stated by Guizot in January, 1846, when he said that in matters of education, the child belongs to the father of the family before belonging to the state, and that the Université monopoly was irreconcilable with this principle. The Université was thus in opposition to the principle of religious liberty. 38

A new projet du loi would be presented, the ministry promised, after the elections which were to be held in the summer of 1846. To insure the election of Catholics favorable to liberty of education, Montalembert organized a highly effective campaign. Of 226 "Catholic" candidates, 146 were elected. 39 The Catholic position was now strong. In April, 1847, the new Salvandy proposal was presented, and it too failed to please many. Omitting the question of Church orders, it maintained the form of the Université while relaxing its control. The students of the petits séminaires, for example, were to be granted the baccalauréat without interference from the Université. The law proved unacceptable to Catholics, but they had gained ground. They were to win a complete victory for their program in 1850.

Throughout the discussions of the education question, the

38Debidour, L'Eglise et l'Etat, I, 471.

39Henri de Riancey, Compte rendu des élections de 1846 (Paris, 1846), 11.
position of both parties in the debates was consistent. The defenders of the Université refused to accept members of certain Catholic congregations, especially the Jesuits, as teachers, nor would they admit the principle of a dual system of education, public and private, under the superintendence of the state. If private schools were to exist, they must be controlled by the Université. Catholics answered that such control violated the principle of liberty of education. Two separate but equal systems should be allowed; both should, many Catholics granted, be under the surveillance of the state. But above all, Catholics refused to accept the exclusion of particular categories of Catholics from the teaching ranks. Between the two positions there was little room for agreement, although Guizot and Salvandy consistently sought grounds for reconciliation.

After 1840 all Catholics spoke and wrote in terms of "liberty." But there was considerable disagreement among Catholics as to what "liberty" meant. To most Catholics liberty of education prescribed the establishment of a Church Université along side of the Université of the state; to them it implied the extension of the total liberty they had enjoyed in the operation of the petits séminaires to cover a vast clerical system of education over which neither the state nor the Université would exercise restraint or supervision. A majority of Catholics aspired to a privileged position in the name of

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40 Université and state indicate the difference between control of all schools by the Université council and control of both the Université and private schools by a bi-partisan council established by the government.
"liberty." Liberal Catholics were a distinct minority.

Catholic and Université Extremism

In pursuit of privilege the Catholics embarked upon a campaign against the Université, a campaign so marked with bitterness, vituperation, and exaggerations as necessarily to provoke a vociferous counterattack by the enraged defenders of the Université. With the appearance of a pamphlet by the Abbé Garot in May of 1840 the attack was underway. Garot charged that the aim of the state system of education was to de-Catholicize France. The Université monopoly foretold the death of religion. Two years later, Clauselet de Montals, Bishop of Chartres, accused the Université of making "a horrible carnage of souls;" it authorized implicitly by its doctrines, "theft, the overthrow of society,...and the most infamous voluptuousness." Another wrote that the professors in the Université were "transforming children into unclean animals and ferocious beasts."

With the publication of the Abbé Desgaret's Le Monopole universitaire, destructeur de la religion et des lois in 1843 the attack reached its apex. The consequences of the state monopoly of instruction, the Abbé Desgaret wrote, were "suicide, parricide, infanticide, duels, rape, abduction, seduction, incest, adultery,...insurrections,

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42 Abbé F. Garot, Le Monopole universitaire dévoilé à la France libérale et à la France catholique (Paris, 1840), 51.
43 Ibid., 36
44 Debidoir, L'Eglise et l'Etat, I, 448.
tyranny, revolutions,...the violation of everything that might be called a law.\textsuperscript{46} The government, wrote the Curé Vedrine, worked systematically to make France protestant, and the Université had for its principles "the philosophy of Voltaire,...the politics of Hébert, and history in the manner of Pigault-Lebrun." Teaching belonged to the clergy by divine right.\textsuperscript{47} Between the Université and Catholicism, he said, there could be no coexistence. Either one or the other must yield.\textsuperscript{48}

The defense of the Université against such irresponsible charges was stated in its most extreme form by Quinet and Michelet from their chairs in the Collège de France. In the Parliament Cousin and Thiers expressed similar ideas although in a much more moderate fashion. Actually Cousin would have liked to maintain peace between the Université and the Church. He insisted that no class of philosophy in any college in France taught propositions which directly or indirectly attacked the Catholic religion.\textsuperscript{49} Nor should such be taught, he added. Prodded by the militant attack against the Université, however, he stated plainly in 1844 that the state in every modern country has reserved the right to supervise and direct education. The Université should control the education of

\textsuperscript{46} Abbé Nicolas Desgarets, \textit{Le monopole universitaire, destructeur de la religion et des lois} (Paris, 1843), 528.

\textsuperscript{47} François Vedrine, \textit{Simple coup d'oeil sur les douleurs et les espérances de l'Église aux prises avec les tyrans des consciences et les vices du xixe siècle} (Paris, 1843), 91.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., 104.

\textsuperscript{49}Weill, \textit{L'idée laïque}, 79.
Frenchmen. Only thus can the unity of France be assured, "because it is above all a moral and political institution which impresses on all its establishments a common spirit and directs them toward a common end—the service and love of the country which our ancestors have built for us."\(^5\) If the clergy was allowed to give instruction, the direction of it would be ceded to the Jesuits, and France would know "two essentially opposed educational systems, the one clerical and fundamentally Jesuit, the other laic and secular. There would emerge two groups of youths...impregnated at an early age with opposite principles; thus separated one from the other, they possibly would become future enemies.\(^5\) Thiers agreed. Perhaps the state should not impose its 'marque' on all students, he said, but it should at least provide for the unity of the state. It should not allow young Frenchmen "to be taught that the Revolution was a lengthy crime, that Napoleon was a usurper, and that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a salutary measure.\(^5\) Only by the Université supervision of private schools could the rights of the state be protected.

Anti-Jesuitism was the dominant note struck by Quinet and Michelet in the defense of the Université. They let loose a barrage of polemic against the Church, but they always centered their attack on the Jesuits, who were more easily condemned by public opinion as


\(^5\) Ibid.
champions of reactionary Ultramontanism and opponents of the sovereign, Liberal state. The Jesuits, they said, were the real enemy. But as Heinrich Heine wrote, "We have too high an opinion of the good sense of the professors of the Université to believe that they seriously sustain a polemic against the dead Chevalier Ignatius de Loyola and his deceased contemporaries." It seemed to him as if "the Jesuits had been themselves a little Jesuitically treated," and as if the "slander of which they are sometimes guilty had been repaid to them with usury." The real meaning of the quarrel, he said, was nothing "save the primeval opposition between Philosophy and Religion, between knowledge guided by reason and belief in revelation." In the course of Quinet's and Michelet's campaign the terms "Jesuit" and "Catholic" tended to become synonymous in their minds. In the final analysis the struggle was between the Church, as they saw it, and the state, as they wanted it to be.

Quinet and Michelet, as well as many of the more "Doctrinaire" type Liberals, had not the faintest concept of pluralism. Far from being ready to divorce the state from a particular moral and religious system, they postulated religious and moral premises which they said the state ought to incorporate. Those premises being at times outside the scope of Roman Catholicism, Quinet and Michelet


54 Ibid., 428.
consequently recognized in the Church a threat to their ideal state. After all, Quinet insisted, the state has within itself a religious life, a divine right of existence, without which it would not subsist one day.\textsuperscript{55} As a result of the French Revolution the nation had freed itself from the bonds and limits of traditional Christianity; the nation had ascended directly to the source of the law of life. It entered into communication with the God of all the churches; it communed directly with the universal spirit, conversing with God Himself, "face to face, amid the thunder and lightening of a trembling universe!"\textsuperscript{56} And now it was proposed that the nation subject itself again to Catholicism, to "creep crest-fallen into the fold, that is, into a spirit of sect, which far from widening, grows ever more narrow!"\textsuperscript{57} The sentiment of "universal religion," he declared, "pervades France rather than Rome."\textsuperscript{58} Catholicism, "by its principle of exclusion is diametrically opposed to that social creed and that religious universality which are inscribed in the constitution as a result not only of the Revolution, but of the whole of modern history."\textsuperscript{59} And Michelet insisted that the "religion de la patrie"

\textsuperscript{55} Edgar Quinet, \textit{L'Ultramontanisme ou l'Église romaine et la société moderne} (Paris, 1844), 270.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, 251-52.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, 269.

\textsuperscript{58} Edgar Quinet and Jules Michelet, \textit{Des Jésuites} (Paris, 1845), 135.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}, 132.
was destined to replace Catholicism in France. It was evident that if the new "religion" was to be taught to Frenchmen, the Université as the propagator of the new faith must control education, and the Church's activity must be curtailed if not excluded.

The incompatibility between the Church and the new France, Quinet and Michelet said, was an inescapable truth. In the talk about the reconciliation of Catholicism and Liberalism, they declared, black meant white. Accord between the Church and liberty was as impossible as harmony between the circle and the square. A victory of Catholicism would mean the "rapid corruption of all free institutions," since the ideal of Jesuits was theocracy. Spokesmen for the Jesuits asked for liberty in order to destroy it.

"While one voice among them advocates liberty, thousands are decrying it. Whom do they think to deceive by so clumsy an artifice?" Surely, Catholics do not deserve to share in the liberty of education, they said, for liberty "does not mean the right easily and with impunity to destroy liberty." The new France being founded upon a set of moral principles suitable to a regime of freedom, "to baptize

61 Edgar Quinet, La Révolution religieuse au dix-neuvième siècle (Brussels, 1857), 55.
62 Ibid., 81.
63 Quinet, Des Jésuites, 264. 64 Ibid., 135.
65 Jules Michelet, Du prêtre, de la femme, de la famille (Paris, 1845), vi.
66 Quinet, Révolution religieuse, 14.
a child into the Church is to bury it, scarcely born, into moral
slavery!" In such chains the individual could not share the free-
doms offered by Liberalism. To give to the Church the unrestrained
right to teach was to sell the youth of France into moral serfdom.

The Liberal Catholic Campaign

In contrast to the extremism and the narrow partisan spirit of
both Catholics and Université defenders, Mgr. Parisis, Bishop of
Langres, and Montalembert published pamphlets in the autumn of 1843
which put the campaign on a new level. In his pamphlet Montalembert
declared that Catholics could not accept the humiliating position
offered them by Cousin and the universitaires—a clergy lowered
to the rank of a moral gendarmerie, a Church which administered
pomp funerals. If the government deemed it impossible to take
religion as the foundation of teaching, it must at least accord to
Catholics the liberty inscribed in the Charter. The remedy was not,
however, to "destroy the Université, nor even to seek to Christianize
it—the remedy is to suppress its monopoly." 68

A month after the appearance of Montalembert's brochure, Mgr.
Parisis published his Liberté de l'enseignement. As a citizen and
as a prelate in the Church, he asked simply, he said, for the reali-
ization of the rights accorded to all Frenchmen by the Charter. "Men

67 Quinet, Révolution religieuse, 106.
68 Charles de Montalembert, Du devoir des catholiques dans la question
de la liberté d'enseignement (Paris, 1843), 65. cf. Georges Weill,
insist that we defend only the cause of the clergy; it would be well to understand that we defend the cause of all, even of those who agitate against us.\textsuperscript{69} He, then, set forth the plan of attack for Liberal Catholics—the demand and respect for the "common right."

Writing in the \textit{Univers} in 1844, Montalembert stated the program more precisely. "It is no longer a question of the petites \textit{seminaires} alone...as it was three years ago." Now the issue was one of "liberty of education, but a sincere liberty, that is to say, free competition, subordinated to the state, but entirely independent of Université authority." To withdraw private or free establishments from the "jurisdiction, not of the state, but of the Université; to diminish the impact of hindering stipulations regarding teacher qualifications and regulation of standards and curriculum; and to nullify the declaration relative to the religious congregations: those are our demands."\textsuperscript{70}

In a speech before the Chamber of Peers in April of 1844 Montalembert said that the clergy was no longer a political body or a proprietor. In return for having given up those two great positions it had received the common right, and it claimed nothing else. "If the clergy were given a monopoly like that of the Université, I am

\textsuperscript{69}Pierre L. Parisie, \textit{Liberté de l'enseignement. R esumé de la question du point de vue constitutionnel et social} (Paris, 1845), 47.

\textsuperscript{70}Univers, March 6, 1844.
convinced that it would be one of the most fatal gifts one could make to it." The clergy wanted liberty for all, Dupanloup said, and that was best achieved by moderation and disinterestedness on the part of all the groups concerned. Even the Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. Affre, seemingly accepted the Montalembert-Parisian leadership. Liberty of education, he said, was a consequence of all the other liberties, and particularly of liberty of conscience. He warned Catholics that they, by constantly repeating that the Université and the state were but one and the same thing, were encouraging the idea that the state should turn over all education to the Church and, failing that, that Catholics must choose between their religion and their government. Catholics should not demand a monopoly or the exclusion of state supervision, he said. But it was clear that a change from the present system must occur. Either the thirty-eighth article of the Constitutional Decree of 1806 must be re-established, with all its consequences, or in virtue of the sixty-ninth article of the Charter of 1830, liberty of instruction must be granted with all its consequences—that is, "with free competition, the abolition of all monopoly, and entire independence of

\[71\text{Montalembert, Oeuvres.}\]

\[72\text{Félix Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse (Paris, 1845), 17-18.}\]

\[73\text{Memorial of the Paris Bishops, "Dublin Review, XVI (1844), 37-42, 38-39.}\]

\[74\text{The article stated that the schools of the Université should have as the basis of their teaching the precepts of the Catholic religion.}\]
Université control." The second was the better choice, he argued, since by the enforcement of the thirty-eighth article, "both sides will be enslaved. In the second case, there will be liberty for all. The Université will be free to diffuse her doctrines as she understands them; but the believer will be free to prepare the antidote; the bishops will be able to protect Catholic families against the seductions of a corrupt education." Therefore, Liberal Catholics, as well as others, did not ask for a Church monopoly.

On the contrary, "The state has the right to offer a national education, but it certainly does not have the right to impose it," Montalembert told the Chamber of Peers on April 16, 1844. Since education is so inevitably connected with conscience, the principle of a national education is inseparable from that of a national religion. But the constitution of France did not recognize a national religion, Montalembert pointed out; rather it postulated freedom of conscience. There should be, he said, a corresponding freedom of education, for the Université control offended liberty of conscience because of the fatal effects of its teachings on Catholic faith. "We are neither conspirators nor are we complacent. ...It is true that liberty is not our work, but it is our property." But Montalembert did not construe "liberty" to mean that the state

75 Dublin Review, XVI, 42.
76 Montalembert, Oeuvres, I, 390.
77 Ibid., 394.
should be excluded from the ranks of educators and scholarship.

To gain support for his program Montalembert founded the Committee for the Defense of Religious Liberty, which had a central office in Paris and affiliations throughout France. Essentially, he was following the example of Lamennais' *Agence* of 1830-1831. What he planned was a Catholic party which would seek the election of deputies favorable to liberty of education. "Catholics, as well as all other citizens, are invested with the right and duty to intervene in the political activity of the state." The Committee, however, had but "one aim, and no other. It seeks to rally Catholics ...around the Church and in favor of religious liberty." He asked for the support of Catholics of all political affiliations. "We should not exclude any candidate who is pledged to defend and fortify this liberty set forth by the Charter of 1830. We ask no one to abandon his political opinions." In the summer elections of 1846, 146 who had been supported by the Committee were returned. The Committee, having proved itself, remained intact and contributed heavily to the electoral victories of the Catholics in 1848.

In short, it was the ideas of Lamennais and the program of L'Avenir, as well as the organizational structure of the earlier Liberal Catholic movement, which Montalembert adopted after 1843.

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79 Comité électoral pour la défense de la liberté religieuse, Circular No. 7, (Paris, 1846).
By pointing to Belgian Catholic support of Liberal institutions—a situation condoned by the papacy—the Montalembert group skirted the question of the Roman condemnation of their program. There were differences, however, between the Liberal movement of 1843 and that headed by Lamennais. The later campaign was originally waged on a precise issue, and its scope did not include, in the beginning at least, a complete reconsideration of the relations of Church and state as in the case of L'Avenir. "A new tactic was proposed, but not a new principle." 80 Another difference of considerable importance was that the movement of 1843 had at least the tacit, if temporary support of the French bishops. Rome said nothing openly, but Gregory XVI indicated to Mgr. Parisis that the Holy See preferred that French Catholics ask for liberty only for Catholics and not for other religious groups, "not in the name of the Charter, but in virtue of the divine words, *Ite, docet, etc.* (sic)." 81 Whatever differences there were between Rome and Paris, however, were cleared away with the election of Pius IX in June of 1846. Pius IX immediately proclaimed a liberal program; he promised reform in the Roman administration and the establishment of representative institutions in the Papal States. Catholic Liberals everywhere felt that they now had a champion at Rome, and his presence there probably was as important as any other factor in softening the struggle on the

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education question in France after 1847.82

There was an air of unity among French Catholics during the earlier stages of the education campaign, despite the fact that the neo-Mennaisians were at the helm of the Catholic force from 1845 to 1847. This artificial unity, however, was belied by the fundamental, though sub-surface, opposition to the Mennaisian tendencies of the Liberal Catholic leaders. Some Liberal Catholics, Lacordaire for example, were misled by the absence of controversy in the Catholic camp. "Have you noticed," he wrote to Madame Swetchine, "that for the first time since the League, the Church of France is not divided by quarrels and schisms? Fifteen years ago there were Ultramontanes, and Gallicans, Cartesians and Mennaisians, Jesuits and non-Jesuits, royalists and Liberals, coteries, nuances, and rivalries." Now, Lacordaire continued, all were in agreement. "Bishops speak favorably of liberty under the common right, of liberty of the press, and of the Charter and of the present times. Montalembert shakes hands with the Jesuits, and the Jesuits dine with the Dominicans."83 All was not, however, as cheerfully amiable as Lacordaire imagined.

Ozamam was closer to the real situation when he wrote in 1844 that the "Catholics have never been more united as to the end, but never more divided as to the means..." He spoke of the enfants

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perdue of the Université, which under the editorship of Louis Veuillot was being transformed into a party to the scurrilous attacks on the Université. True it was that all Catholics wanted "liberty of education, but further from reality was the notion that they had accepted the implications of their slogan. The discussion, Ozanam continued, was no longer one between "pedagogues and beadle; it was not even a discussion between collèges and the petits séminaires. Rather, what is involved is the grand question of the relations between Church and state, the priesthood and the Empire, which is never terminated." The question was now again being stirred up between statesman and churchmen, "and it may compel the former to study religion and the latter to practice liberty." Ozanam hoped the debate over the Université would engender a more mellow attitude on the part of the clergy toward liberty, but he viewed the possibilities of such a transformation with a certain skepticism.

No doubt, Ozanam watched with satisfaction the appearance of the Abbé Dupanloup's De la pacification religieuse in 1845, for here was a concrete example of a priest of royalist and reactionary orientation, who in 1832 had called the Liberals of L'avenir "poisoned men," but who was ready in 1845 to state unequivocally the case for Liberal Catholics. In the spirit of compromise, Dupanloup, then rector of a petit séminaire in Paris, wrote his De la pacification religieuse.

"We proclaim the power of the laic society; we recommend respect for it and obedience to it; we regard it as the exterior expression of

84 Ozanam, Lettres, I, 211.
the providence of God." 

Recognizing the two "allied, but separate, powers---spiritual and laic," he insisted that there should be agreement between them. Always careful to use the term "laic" instead of "secular," when speaking of the state, Dupanloup no more than Quinet or Montalembert thought in pluralistic terms. A "laic" state implied a state free from clerical participation, but not divorced from the precepts of the Christian religion.

The Charter of 1830, Dupanloup wrote, was the supreme law of the laic society, and this he accepted. As for liberty of education and of religion which had been proclaimed by the Charter, he invoked them. But, he continued, those liberties had not been established in France. "The professors of the Université alone have profited by the liberty of conscience proclaimed by the Charter...Catholic fathers have been obliged to deliver their children up for instruction by the state...There has been liberty to teach error, but no liberty to eschew it." 

"Mistrust!" Dupanloup wrote, "There is the evil!" It was generally recognized that the Charter and the liberties it promised "are for the clergy as well as for others, but men fear that liberty, once given to the clergy, would become a fearful weapon." Frenchmen were afraid, he ascertained correctly, that the clergy invoked the letter of the Charter only in order to violate its spirit, that

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85 Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 6.
86 Ibid., 5.
87 Ibid., 92-93.
88 Ibid., 205.
the clergy was neither true to the country nor in sympathy with the times, that it was an enemy of the Revolution and a stranger to the national spirit, and finally, that the clergy invoked liberty as a means to instrument despotism. All those charges, Dupanloup denied. In actuality he could deny them only for himself and his Liberal Catholic associates, for those charges were at least partially justified by the activities and opinions of the French clergy at large throughout the century.

During the debate Thiers had insisted upon a "national education" for Frenchmen, and with this Dupanloup agreed, if by "national education" was meant the inculcation of love of country and respect for the nation's institutions and laws. But Dupanloup accused Thiers of desiring a system of education which would produce stereotyped minds conforming strictly to the attitudes currently expressed by the state, a system which would "cast youth into a common mold to be coined like money, in the image of the state." Such a system, Dupanloup said, would require an absolute conformity, and this he rejected. "I have never considered," he wrote, "youth to be a raw material which I ought to fabricate into a product bearing the imprint of my own will." In the doctrines put forward in defense of the Université Dupanloup saw a "political pantheism, an idolatry

89 Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 206.
90 Ibid., 229.
91 Ibid., 215.
92 Ibid., 237.
of the state which tends to absorb all—a state in which the individual, the child, the parent, and the family are nothing, in which the Church is nothing, in which the conscience and the soul are ignored. The state is all; it consumes everything. If such an attitude became accepted in France, individual liberty would disappear.93

The critics of the Church said that the youth of France ought to be educated in a manner which conformed to the spirit of the times. To that Dupanloup answered, "Which times?...You know well the lack of stability and the perpetual mobility of the spirit of the times in which we live."24 Against the accusation that the Church was a countermovement to the revolutionary forces, Dupanloup uttered a rather blithe denial. What was meant by the spirit of the French Revolution, he asked? Does it imply the "social upheavals, violences, disorder and all that comes with such a situation; does it mean, in the words of M. Thiers himself, the errors and excesses of the Revolution?" If so, Dupanloup agreed that he could not accept it. Or "are we to understand by the Revolution the realization of free institutions, liberty of conscience, political liberty, civil and individual liberty, liberty of families, freedom of education, liberty of opinion, equality before the law, and the equal distribution of public tax burdens?" All those principles, he said, "we not only honestly accept, but in the broad daylight of public discussion we call for—

93Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 265-66.
94Ibid., 233.
their realization. These liberties...we champion. We ask them for ourselves as well as for others.95

Dupanloup denied that the Church aimed at domination, which, he said, was not possible much less desirable. Much later, he was to say to the Assemblé nationale after the fall of the Empire that "Catholics ask for no monopoly. They ask simply for the common right."96 In 1845 his program was similar. Speaking for the Church, perhaps unrealistically and without authority, he insisted that the liberties written into the Charter should not be denied to the clergy, for they belonged to the Church by the "common right." The Church in turn would accept them sincerely on the same basis on which they were granted. If the state continued to deny liberty to the clergy, "words have lost their true sense, words do not express ideas, liberty is but a lie, public laws of the French and fundamental laws are deceptions, and all that which transpired fifty years ago was a brutal and bloody game in which force counted for all and law, justice, and truth counted for nothing."97

Perhaps the best statement of the Liberal Catholic position on education was Dupanloup's De la liberté d'enseignement. État actuel de la question, published in 1847. Its appearance stimulated the

95 Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 263.
97 Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 286.
spontaneous opposition of the intransigent Catholics, and it served to widen the breach between the two schools of Catholic thought, a breach which had existed as early as 1843 and which by 1850 reached chasmal proportions. In this later publication Dupanloup reiterated much he had said in his De la pacification religieuse. "What is needed," he wrote, "is a law which realizes the vows of the Charter, a law which, while conserving the authority of the state and its right of tutelary intervention, also respects the primitive and inviolable rights of the family, and at the same time one which maintains the sacred rights of the Church in matters of religious education."99 Liberty of education was regarded as a "natural right" and as the essential consequence of liberty of conscience; "it is even a literary and intellectual right, a consequence of freedom of the mind."100 According to Dupanloup's plan, the Université would be maintained, but the heads of families would have a true liberty in matters concerning their children's education. The Church establishments must be independent of the Université; otherwise, he said, there would be no liberty, "for what would the right to teach be if the Université had the mission of inspecting and censuring private schools? It would be equally ridiculous if the Université were to continue to control the baccalauréat and to decide who will teach, or to set the standards for examinations."101 Liberty is nothing "if it is not a

98 Univers. March 14, 1847.
100 Ibid., 9.
101 Ibid., 10.
free and loyal competition between the different institutions."
The state "may continue to favor the Université," but along side the
Université schools there should be other schools, more varied in
their program, more supple in their methods, and "more accommodating
to the particular wills of families and to certain exigences of
modern society." Between the different school systems there ought
to be a "noble rivalry, a generous emulation, and consequently free
competition under the surveillance of the state."\textsuperscript{103}

Montalembert, too, accepted such a point of view. Speaking in
the Chamber of Peers in 1845, he defended the right of Quinet and
Michelet in the Collège de France. He pointed out that the real abuse
lay not in the freedom to teach enjoyed by the Universitaires but
in the fact "that liberty of education is permitted only to those
who propagate error."\textsuperscript{104} In a letter to Mgr. Parisis, who by 1847
was already beginning to cool to the ideas he had expressed in 1843,
Montalembert defended Dupanloup against the Bishop's attack. At the
same time, however, Montalembert admitted that Dupanloup had the
state's right to intervene in extreme terms.\textsuperscript{105} Certainly, Montalembert's position was Liberal enough to cause the legitimists at Nîmes
to say that they preferred an irreligious and unbelieving republican
to "a Catholique juste milieu. Rather M. de Robespierre than M. de
Montalembert!"\textsuperscript{106} When, after 1850, the division between Catholics

\textsuperscript{102} Dupanloup, De la liberté d'enseignement, 14.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{104} M.M.O. Oathrop, Two Catholic Social Reformers: Lacordaire and
\textsuperscript{105} Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 322.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., II, 236.
became clear-cut and it was necessary to choose between the Liberal and the intransigent position, Montalembert had little trouble in deciding in favor of the former.

The Jesuit question, around which the universitaires had built their anti-Catholic campaign, was an embarrassing one to Liberal Catholics. Revealing a brand of neo-Gallicanism, they were far from being unanimous in their appreciation of the Society of Jesus. Especially Lacordaire feared that to insist upon the recognition of that unpopular order would jeopardize the future of Catholicism in France as well as the cause of liberty of education. Actually, his opinion of the Jesuits ranged not too far from that of Quinet.

"The Jesuits," Lacordaire wrote to Madame Swetchine in 1847, "are persuaded that modern society is an unrealizable chimera and that Europe would sooner or later revert to a regime of absolute power. The Society has been motivated since 1614 by this fundamental idea." Earlier he had written to Madame Prailly that he feared a rapprochement between the legitimist party and the clergy, which was in his opinion "a very grave danger for the future and one which has already begun to be realized." Should this occur, he continued, it would largely be the responsibility of the Jesuits, since their presence in France would have forced the union between the government and the anti-religious forces, which in turn would tend to re-ally

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Almost alone among the leaders of the religious movement, however, his anti-Jesuitism was so extreme that he was pleased with the Roman decision to disperse the Order in France.

Although Montalembert defended rigidly the Jesuits's right to exist in France, he too had misgivings about the political philosophy of the Society of Jesus. In a letter written in 1845 to the Père de Ravignan, head of the Jesuits in France, he accused the Order of not being modern enough in its approach, of not having taken into account the new situation in Europe, of not having mixed well enough with the movement of ideas. "How is it that the Jesuits," Montalembert asked, "owing everything to liberty, are always and everywhere the enemy of liberty?" It was necessary to choose, he warned, between the système russe and the constitutional system. If the Society of Jesus attaches itself to the former anchor, its submergence is assured. Furthermore, in regard to education, schools should not only form Christians, but "Christian citizens." In that manner he echoed Lacordaire's premonition that it was not useful to the Church of France or the Universal Church for the Jesuits to have a large share in Catholic education. In answer to such charges against the Jesuits, Père de Ravignan published

110 Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 272.
111 Ibid., 274.
De l'existence de l'Institut des Jesuits in which he maintained that it was false that Jesuits renounced their country and their century. Nevertheless, Montalembert was displeased by the general political outlook of the Society; he was, however, equally disturbed by the Holy See's dispersal of the French Jesuits in 1845. He felt that he could say with St. Thomas of Canterbury, "I do not understand how it is that Rome always prefers Barabas to Christ!"

The right of association, however, was too integral a part of the Liberal Catholic program to be disallowed by distrust of the Jesuits. Not to have insisted on the Jesuit right to teach would have been logically inconsistent and would have left them open to the same charges they made against the defenders of the Université. Either a "right" is to be universally applied, or it is not a "right" but, rather, a privilege. The defense of the right of religious associations to exist and to be active led the Liberal Catholics to champion the right of association in general; and in their acceptance of such a concept they came nearer to a pluralist position than most French Liberals had theretofore expressed.

Speaking in the National Assembly in 1875, Dupanloup restated the position of Liberal Catholics concerning associations. All of them, if the law be just, must have the same career opened to them;

113Père de Ravignan, De l'existence de l'Institut des Jesuits (Paris, 1844), 41.
114Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 268.
115cf. Chapter VI.
all associations, whether religious or laic, must be granted freedom on the same conditions; they must be able to compete for public esteem and confidence. Catholics could not accept the Villemain projet of 1845, Dupanloup stated, because it violated the right of association. To disallow such a right would make mockery out of the freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. Thiers had said that the denial of teaching privileges to unauthorized religious congregations was the "least of exigences." To that Dupanloup answered that "if, under the Restoration a declaration had been required of you, M. Thiers, that you did not belong to any unauthorized political association, would you have found it was 'the least of exigences?'" When the government required that a prospective teacher sign a declaration of his faith and refused him the right to teach on the basis of that declaration, then the state, said Dupanloup, has interfered with the liberty of conscience, with religious liberty, and with all the liberties of priests and of citizens.

Catholics, therefore, could not compromise on the question of the Jesuits. To submit to the exclusion of one order would jeopardize the legal existence of all. To allow one violation of the right of conscience would open the way to other violations. The

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116 LaGrange, Dupanloup, III, 312.
117 Félix Dupanloup, Des associations religieuses. Veritable état de la question (Paris, 1845), 42.
118 Ibid., 31-32.
119 Ibid., 33.
anticlerical opposition to the Jesuits, consequently, became for Catholics "the sign of ralliement; it must be the battle cry." Upon the question of unauthorized religious congregations hinged clerical opposition to the government's projects. The clergy was to gain its point in the Falloux law of 1850.

While Liberal Catholics applauded warmly the ideas set forth by Dupanloup in his pamphlets, most Catholics received them with reserve if not with hostility. In a letter to Montalembert an ally of the Liberal Catholics in the Chamber of Peers, Beugnot, wrote that Dupanloup's De la pacification religieuse would result in his being regarded as the "organ of the French clergy." Nothing could have been further from the truth. Although he had won the respect of Liberal Catholics, Dupanloup now merited only opprobrium in the eyes of most Catholics. At all times, even during the apparent unity of Catholics in 1845, he represented only a very small group of Catholics. Dupanloup had stated the Liberal Catholic position clearly, and having done so, he shocked the majority of Catholics by his apparent affinity to the ideas of Lamennais.

Indeed, the program of the Montalembert group was readily identified with that of the condemned L'Avenir. That being the case, Catholic unity in the last years of Louis Philippe's reign was a short-lived fiction, for the majority of Catholics would not suffer

120 Dupanloup, Des associations religieuses, 37.
being associated with the heretical Lamennais, whose name was odious in orthodox Catholic circles. As Veuillot wrote to Montalembert, "There is a quantity of men who gleefully shriek L'Avénir as one cries assassin!" Because "one cock crows too loudly, those detractors of L'Avénir ask that no Catholic should be anything more than a capon."\(^{122}\) Certainly the similarities between the new Liberal Catholic movement and the ideas of Lamennais were obvious to those who would see, and most of those who saw immediately protested. The lack of harmony in the French Church—the disagreement on the extent to which a Catholic should or could accept the implications of the Catholic campaign for the "common right"—was readily surfaced by the criticism of Dupanloup and his associates.

One aroused Catholic wrote that "Dupanloup has spoken of concert, of an entente cordiale between the episcopate, unconstitutionally deprived of its rights and its liberties, and the fils de Voltaire, incorrigible propagators of all the errors and all heresies....If Dupanloup had lived in the time of Arianism, he would probably have had hard words for Saint Athanase and comforting and pacific phrases for the prelates who were so benevolent toward the Arian sect."\(^{123}\) An ardent defender of the Church "vis-à-vis modern society to the point of negotiating with the free thinkers,"\(^{124}\) Dupanloup was later accused of having possibly desired the "death of


124. Mourret, Mouvement catholique, 224.
the Church" because he had advocated competition instead of a Church monopoly in the field of education. 125 "Ah, Monseigneur, there is within you a germ of revolution which the hammer of M. Veuillot has not been able up until now to eradicate," said the Abbé Borde of Dupanloup. 126 And the same Veuillot who in 1843 had minimized the danger of the new Mennaisian movement was later to call Dupanloup a fils de Voltaire. 127

It was strange indeed that Dupanloup should have been the outstanding spokesman for compromise, for recognition of the state's right to superintend education—that is, for acceptance of the full implications of "liberty of education." Although he did not share the Mennaisian background of Lacordaire and Montalemberg, he became by 1847 the most effective advocate of the re-activation of L'Avenir's program. Having borne the full impact of Mirari vos, Lacordaire and Montalemberg perhaps felt the need to be cautious. Also, Montalemberg, the recognized head of the campaign for liberty of education after 1843, might well have chosen to modify his statements in order to mollify the intransigents and maintain himself as the liaison between the extremes in the Catholic party. Lacordaire was in the process of re-establishing the Dominican Order in France and was therefore somewhat preoccupied. His "conferences" from the pulpit of Notre-Dame de

125 Abbé F. Borde, Qu'est-ce que la liberté de l'enseignement? Réponse à Mgr. Dupanloup (Paris, 1875), 24.
126 Ibid., 24-25.
127 Hubert Texier, ed., Correspondance de Montalemberg et de l'abbé Texier (Paris, 1899), 354.
Paris, however, became a series of instructions in the Liberal Catholic creed. Being a member of the Université as professor in the Collège de France, Ozanam's position was tedious at best, although he did defend the Université against the charges of extreme Catholics. In 1844 he wrote in the Correspondant, a Catholic paper with Liberal tendencies, that it was not true that in the Université system Catholics were exceptions to the rule; on the contrary, he said, "they are, as almost everywhere in public office, a considerable minority." And he denied that he had protested against the continuation of any of the courses in the Collège de France, an obvious reference to the lectures of Quinet and Michelet. 128 There were three groups of Catholics in 1845, Ozanam said. One was headed by the Univers, which by then had become extremist; another was headed by Montalembert, who "had too much talent not to be just" but who presented the Catholic position strongly; and the third group, centering around Dupanloup, "which believes in the possibility of a compromise, in the power of the times, and in moderation." 129 Ozanam's sympathies were with the latter.

Therefore, in the earliest period of the revived Liberal Catholicism, Dupanloup—the previously Gallican, legitimist, anti-Mennaisian Dupanloup—carried the standards. He not only invoked Liberal principles; he "put his confidence in them and hoped for their

128 Correspondant, October 21, 1844.
129 Ozanam, Lettres, II, 88-89.
triumph. The liberty which had seemed so perilous was now courted. "What had seemed war were now the conditions for peace. Liberty for all under the common right was the supreme resource of and the best protection for the Church....Desiring the end, he also wanted and respected the means."

Taking up the cries of Michelet and Quinet, the proponents of the status quo suggested that the Université was a bastion of defense against a clerical monopoly in education, that what the Catholics wanted was not a regime of liberty under the common right, but one of privilege. Catholics would make use of the freedom granted, it was charged, to gain strength to eliminate their rivals. Catholic doctrine could not admit a multiplicity of school systems. These were the accusations that the Liberal Catholics had to answer. Probably they did not succeed in convincing the advanced corps of Liberals of their sincerity, because the secular Liberals could distinguish only with difficulty between the different segments of the Roman Church; they could not differentiate between a Jesuit and an Ozanam. They exaggerated the conformity demanded of Catholics by the Church. The lack of consistency among Catholics served, in the minds of the secular Liberals, to fortify their suspicions of Catholic duplicity.

130 Émile Faguet, Mgr. Dupanloup, Un grand évêque (Paris, 1914), 162.
There can be little doubt that the French Catholics, in accepting the leadership of Liberal Catholics in the education question, were led to support a program which was odious to most of them. But so far as the Montalembert group was concerned, there is a consistency in its attitude toward liberty of education which tends to dispel doubts of insincerity. As opposed to most Catholics the Liberal Catholics never assumed that liberty of education should entail the abolition of the Université, of state supervision, or the silencing of all opponents of clerical instruction. In 1832 Lacordaire had said before the Chamber of Peers, "It is clear, in effect, that the Université exists independently of the question of monopoly." Its destruction was not requested. And in his eulogy of O'Connell in 1847 he said, "Catholics, you must understand that if you want liberty for yourselves, you must want it for all men everywhere. If you demand it for yourselves only, it will never be accorded to you; grant it when you are masters, in order that it will be given to you when you are slaves." 

Dupanloup was indignant when he was accused of being a partisan of liberty only in order to be able later to deprive it to others. And in a letter to the Abbé Texier written in 1849, Montalembert said, "I am too much the adversary of all monopoly to abandon the

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liberty of education even to the profit of the Church. What occurred under the Restoration should encourage us Catholics not to enter such a path. Furthermore, this was written when Montalembert's distrust of Liberalism was greatest. During the Empire, when his co-religionists were abandoning Liberal principles, Montalembert accused them of wearing Liberalism as a mask. "That very liberty of instruction, which served as your banner for a quarter of a century, is eagerly disclaimed by you now that you have caught the first glimpse of a privilege, which you hope to enjoy alone in the bosom of a resuscitated monopoly." Montalembert accused Veuillot, the new champion of Catholic reaction after 1850, of adopting a policy of begging for liberty when he was feeble because such was the principle championed by his opponents; after his party was stronger, Montalembert charged, Veuillot rejected the concept of liberty under the common right and "construed liberty to rest within the Church's privileged position." What was true of Veuillot was equally applicable to the majority of Catholics in France.

Further proof of the sincerity of Liberal Catholics was provided when Michelet's course in the Collège de France was suspended in February of 1848. In connection with that incident the Univers

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135 Texier, ed., Correspondance de Montalembert, 274-75.
printed a statement written by the Count de Falloux and others with the approval and adherence of Montalembert. "We cannot see justice and liberty violated," the statement declared, "even vis-à-vis our adversaries, without protesting. It is, then, as Liberals and as Catholics that we ask for the re-opening of the course closed by an arbitrary act of the government. We join in signing the petition of our frères des écoles. We sometimes disagree with their opinions, but we are in agreement with them on the sacred principles of liberty and justice."138 In the same vein, Lacordaire wrote in L'Es nouvelle that "we regard the Université as a necessary ingredient of the scientific and literary life of France. We defend its rights as our own, and we hope that it will defend ours in the same spirit."139

Even granting the sincerity of the Liberal Catholics, there could be few points of agreement between them and those who shared Michelet's and Quinet's attitudes. If the Liberals of the Quinet type continued to insist that the modern state must pre-empt all prerogative and all sovereignty, that the state was the embodiment of liberty instead of being merely its essential guarantor, that the state was based on a "universal" and exclusive religion as Quinet held it was, then the grounds for reconciliation would be difficult

138 Univers, February 8, 1848.
139 As quoted in Michel Salomon, Mgr. Dupanloup (Paris, 1904), 38.
to find. Liberal Catholics might recognize the sovereignty of the people, the institutions resulting from the revolutionary tradition, and the modern liberties, but to do so was not to go far enough to establish a rapprochement with the Quinet Liberals who postulated a state and an étatism unacceptable to Catholics.

Liberal Catholics, however, did not admit that this "idolatry of the state," which they associated with Quinet and those of similar mind, was anything but a foreign, logically unnecessary, and devastating appendage to Liberalism. Lacordaire, who so admired Liberalism in the United States that he seriously considered going there after the condemnation of L'Avenir, agreed with Tocqueville that the American experience had shown that democracy was not necessarily incompatible with Catholicism. "The American democrat," Lacordaire said, "gives to the unity of his country only that which is necessary to constitute a unified whole. The European democrat, on the other hand, is willing to oppress every man in order to create, in the name of la patrie, a narrow prison—he prepares for France the frightening alternative of a demogogy without base or a despotism without limits."140

The differences, therefore, between the advanced corps of Liberals, a group represented by Quinet and Michelet, and the Liberal Catholics were deeper than a mere misunderstanding. They were rooted in essentially opposite concepts concerning

140 Lacordaire, Oeuvres, VIII, 339.
the nature of Liberalism, the prerogatives of the state, of human purpose and fundamental values. Catholic Liberals shared the conviction that the Church was an apostolic society whose mission was the preparation of the city of God. The state might be endowed with a special and separate purpose, but as compared with the Catholic interest in the Christian eternity, the state, in the Liberal Catholic's frame of reference, could not be the end within itself.

But between the Montalembert group and the "Doctrinaire" Liberals there was, on the eve of the February Revolution, an extensive area of agreement. So effective had been the Church's campaign on the platform of liberty that the revolution was not anticlerical. From February to June, 1848, the planting of "liberty trees" was a universal practice. Ére nouvelle, edited by Lacordaire, Ozanam, and the Abbé Maret, had as an editorial objective the cementing of that alliance between the Church and the Revolution. With the "June Days" this short-lived union was ended. The erection of Parisian barricades and the radical menace brought with it reflection on the part of the July Liberals as well as Liberal Catholics, and if Ére nouvelle continued its flirtation with republicanism, the main core of both Catholic and secular Liberals spontaneously became more interested in discovering a system which could maintain order. In the Constituent Assembly and later in the Legislative Assembly, the July Monarchy Liberals and Liberal Catholics coalesced to form a party of order, the purpose
being to save France from democratic republicanism and the "collapse of morality." The years, 1849 and 1850, witnessed the strange alliance of Thiers and Montalembert, Cousin and Dupanloup. Out of that alliance came the Falloux law which granted to Liberal Catholics the coveted "liberty of education."

Far from ceding to the Church the control of public education in France and subordinating the Université to clerical supervision, the Falloux law of 1850 continued state supervision of education in France. The change it effected was to establish a bi-partisan control superior to both the Université and the clergy. The pendulum still swung decidedly in the direction of laic control, but the Church gained the right to open schools, subject to restrictions uniformly applicable to all. The law created a Superior Council of Public Instruction of twenty-four members, eight of whom were selected from the Université Council as permanent members. The Church was represented on the Council by four members of the French ecclesiastical hierarchy, who took their place beside representatives of the Protestant faiths and the French Jewish population. In each department there was to be an Academy Council, which was subordinate to the Superior Council. The same cross section of interests was represented on the eighty-six Academy councils. Such questions as the opening of new schools, and the examination of prospective teachers were decided by the Academy Council. In general, however, the law established the principle that any person or association—the Jesuits were not specifically named by the law—could open a
school, provided that the necessary qualifications were in evidence. The councils were to appoint inspectors who would inspect both public and private institutions, thus ensuring a certain standardized level of instruction.

The Church, therefore, was not given a free hand; all public and private education was still controlled by the state. No longer, however, was the Université Council both the rival and the legal superior of Church schools, for both were now to be governed by a bi-partisan hierarchy of councils established by the state. By the Falloux law, therefore, the Church was neither given control of French education nor was it placed in a privileged position. On the contrary the law established the principle that liberty to teach was a right, curtailed only by uniform restrictions concerning qualification of teachers and inspection to insure educational standards. The Church by the law gained the right to teach on an equal basis with Université and other schools, providing it could meet the standards required.

The law was drawn up by a parliamentary commission nominated by Falloux, the Minister of Public Instruction. It was composed of moderates from both the Catholic and the Université parties, and Thiers, Cousin, Montalembert, and Dupanloup were its most prominent voices. During the 1849-1850 debates of this commission these four and subsequently the other members came to common agreement. 141

141 No extensive discussion of the debates of the commission is intended here. Montalembert and Dupanloup set forth the same ideas which they had expounded since 1843. A compromise was reached, and the
Abolition of the Université or the creation of a clerical monopoly of or control over education were not the questions involved. Rather, the issue was the relaxation of controls so as to give the Church and religious associations greater freedom in establishing and maintaining schools in competition with Université schools. Dupanloup and Thiers as well as most members of the Commission were in agreement that the Université ought to be decentralized and that the Church should have representation on the governing council if Church schools were to be subjected to its supervision. Liberal Catholics agreed also that the state should establish standards to insure certain minimum qualification for teachers, but they objected to any stipulation that teachers must necessarily have attended state institutions for the baccalauréat. A rapprochement of interests as they were represented by Thiers on the one hand and Montalbert on the other was so complete that Thiers defended the law in the Legislative Assembly against its anticlerical opponents, and Montalbert assumed the same position in regard to Catholics who opposed the law. The debates of the commission are contained in Georges Chenesseau, ed., La commission extra-parlamentaire de 1849: Texte intégral des procès-verbaux (Paris, 1957), and Hilaire de Lacombe, ed., Les débats de la commission de 1849, Discussion parlementaire et loi de 1850 (Paris, 1879). Cf. Henri Michel, La loi Dalloux, 4 janvier, 1849-15 mars, 1850 (Paris, 1906); Georges Weill, Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France; Ross W. Collins, Catholicism and the Second French Republic, 1848-1852 (New York, 1923), Chapter VII.

142 Lacombe, Les débats, 77; Chenesseau, La commission, 245.
143 Chenesseau, La commission, 215.
144 Lacombe, Les débats, 110-11, 293-94; Chenesseau, La commission, 210.
145 Lacombe, Les débats, 220.
system of inspection of all schools by the state was easily agreed upon; even the petits séminaires were to be subjected to state inspection. The Church's influence in primary education was increased, for it was decided that municipal councils could choose members of religious congregations to teach in the public primary schools. But the spirit of the law in this respect was little different from that of the Law of 1855 drafted by Guizot. The most difficult point in the commission's debates concerned the Jesuits. No member of the commission would defend the absolute right of association, for to have done so would have been to sanction the radical clubs which seemed a threat. The question of the Jesuits, however, did not involve, Dupanloup declared, the recognition of any absolute right of association, but rather "whether members of a congregation, in this case the Jesuits, can live in France as simple citizens and enjoy the rights of citizens." Furthermore, the Jesuits in Dupanloup's opinion were not guilty of the charges brought against them. Thiers and Cousin submitted, and the law contained no reservations regarding the Jesuits.

In summary, the law provided for the continuation of the state supervision of public and private education by means of Superior and Academy Councils on which the Catholics would have representation. Catholics would be free to open and maintain schools providing they could satisfy the requirements regarding qualification and

146 Cheneau, La commission, 239.
147 Lacombe, Les débats, 291.
and preparation of teachers and upheld certain standards of
instruction which were to be ascertained by state inspectors. As
such the law met the demands made by Liberal Catholics in the
campaign for liberty of education after 1843.

Reaction to the Falloux law on the part of Catholics only
served to distinguish better the Liberals from the intransigents.
Whereas some secular critics of the law said that it made the Church
the absolute master of primary and secondary education and that its
objectives were the fight against democratic and "social" ideas,148
most Catholics asserted that the law had not given the Church
enough power and therefore opposed it. "We persist in our opposi­
tion to the law," Veuillot wrote, "because it consecrates false and
dangerous principles which are contrary to the rights, to the liberty,
and to the independence of the holy Church."149 Mgr. Parisis, the
erstwhile Liberal Catholic, attacked the proposed law because it
allowed to the state too much interference in clerical schools.150
Rather than effecting a compromise, remarked the Dom Guéranger, the
law had "declared war" between the Church and the Liberals.151 "What
have we demanded?" asked the Univers. "Liberty. And we have been
granted instead a feeble part of the monopoly."152

148Jean M.A. de Lanesson, L'Etat et les églises en France depuis les
origines jusqu'à la séparation (Paris, 1906), 166-67.
149Univers, February 25, 1850.
150Mgr. P. Parisis, La vérité sur la loi de l'enseignement (Paris,
1850), 14.
151Léon Ollé-Laprune, La vitalité chrétienne (Paris, 1901), 42.
152Univers, June 29, 1849.
"Liberty" evidently meant to those Catholics complete independence of state supervision, if not a privileged position. Against such a point of view, the Liberal Catholics had to defend the law. They did so in the same spirit in which the compromise had been made. They sought not privilege or control, but the right to teach on an equal basis with the Universitaires; they asked for liberty as a common right, not as an exclusive prerogative. In short they sought a compromise which would give the Church the liberty to open schools without destroying the Université or state supervision. This they obtained.

The account of the fight for liberty of education by an appeal to the "common right" raises more questions than it answers. To what extent, for example, did the Liberal Catholics accept, either philosophically or pragmatically, the "common right?" How completely could they or did they surrender to the ideas of 1789? As Dupanloup indicated in his *De la pacification religieuse* Catholics had to be

153 A paper edited by Dupanloup.

154 *Univers*, March 27, 1950.
ready to cope with other tenets of the Liberal hypothesis if they were going to insist on the "common right." That is, they had to reconcile their position with the philosophy of 1789 on such issues as liberty of conscience, relationship of Church to state, freedom of the press and of speech, and parliamentary institutions. In short, their acceptance of the concept of "common rights" served to suggest that the Roman Catholic Church did not have exclusive rights; it presupposed the admission of other "rights" to be enjoyed commonly by all. Furthermore, they, and their newly found Liberalism, were going soon to be severely tested by the advent of the Republic and the institutions it proposed. Would they succumb to the temptation to yield their philosophy of Liberalism in return for a guarantee of order and defense against the rising radicalism? How well would they support the common rights and its philosophical adjuncts during the Empire—-an Empire which held out protection to the Church and the restoration of its privileged position?
Chapter III

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

The essential question raised by Liberal Catholicism was not, of course, liberty of education, but rather the larger and more fundamental issue of the relationship of Church to state. During the campaign against the Université monopoly the issue had arisen, for the differences between Quinet and Montalembert were in reality lodged in their opposite attitudes regarding the nature of the state and the place of the Church in the state. Harmony between the two positions they expounded was hardly possible. Between the Liberal Catholics and the July Monarchy Liberals, however, a reconciliation was reached in 1848. This rapprochement resulted not from an increased appreciation of Catholic theology by the group around Thiers, but from the apparent necessity for all forces of order to unite in a defensive alliance against the radical forces so in evidence in 1848. Liberals of the Thiers school, in spite of their anticlericalism, re-estimated the prerogatives of the state in a manner which would not preclude the possibility of the Church being endowed with certain freedom of action within the state. It was, therefore, primarily between the Catholics and the future founders of the Third
Republic that the differences in attitudes toward Church-state relations lay.

What was, after all, the Liberal Catholic's concept of Church-state relations? To what extent did he or could he support the Revolutionary settlement regarding such relations? If he recognized the independence of the temporal from the spiritual realm, could he accept an unprivileged position for the Church; that is, could he advocate the cessation of state protection? How was he to regard the rapport between an infallible Church and a laic state, once freedom of conscience or religion was admitted? These and other questions the Liberal Catholics posed and attempted to answer in their efforts to reconcile the Church and modern society. All of them involved difficulties for the Catholic, and none of them was made easier by Church tradition or by the interpretation of doctrine by nineteenth-century popes.

Traditional Attitudes

The problem of Church-state relations was not a new question in French politics. With the Gallicanism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a stalemate had been reached. But the Revolution with its Civil Constitution of the Clergy and its attempt to apply the philosophy of the Enlightenment, had destroyed that balance. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which had as its objectives the creation of a clergy loyal to the precepts of the Revolution and subordinated to the will of the state, was followed
by a systematic drive to eradicate Christianity, or at least Catholicism. With the laws of 5 Ventôse, Year III; of 11 Prairial, Year III; and of 7 Vendémiaire, Year IV, an effort toward separation of Church and state was made. But the separation was not complete, since the state refused to relinquish its assumed rights to intervene in religious matters.\footnote{Alphonse Aulard, \textit{Christianity and the French Revolution} (London, 1927), Chapter IV; Fredrik Nielsen, \textit{The History of the Papacy in the XIXth Century} (New York, 1906), I, Chapter VI.}

In short, the French Revolution, imbued with anticlericalism and faced with various dangers with which the Church seemed allied, was inexorably moved in the direction of an anti-Church radicalism. The Revolution singularly failed to solve the riddle of Church-state relations— one of the basic problems inherited from the old regime— because it was blind to the idea that if the liberty of the individual was to be insured, the state must constitutionally establish the mutual independence of Church and state, an independence which would disallow state intervention in religious matters.

The Revolution, however, had at least predicated new ideas concerning the place of the Church in the state, even if it had not acted upon them. Any society founded on the precepts of the revolutionary tradition would demand a laic, if not secular, state; it would demand the recognition of two spheres, civil and spiritual, which would be mutually independent. Logically at least, modern society would require the separation of Church and state, although it was not until the Third Republic that separation gained many
adherents. Independence would mean that the Church should not exercise undue influence upon the state or enjoy a privileged position within it. On the other hand the Church should logically be endowed with freedom from state intervention. In both cases the ideal had many opponents: Catholics who would not admit the concept of the laic state, much less the secularized state, and Liberals who, theorizing the state to be a concrete unity, viewed the prerogatives of the state to be so inclusive as to disallow the Church's freedom of action. In reality neither Liberal nor Catholic was ready to accept "pluralism" in the strictest sense of that word. Even a policy of "dualism"—mutual independence—could not be agreed upon as long as Catholics sought a return to the privileged position of the old regime, and as long as Liberals failed to realize that religious liberty with all its consequences was not necessarily inimical to other freedoms.

Although in the last analysis it contributed to Ultramontanism, the Napoleonic Concordat established a revised Gallicanism, whereby the Church was subordinated to the state, the latter making the Church a "department in the civil service, whose officials were appointed and paid by the state."\(^2\) Ostensibly, liberty of conscience was recognized, for the Roman Catholic Church was not set up as the state church but merely as the "religion of the great majority of Frenchmen." Even though other religions were tolerated, however,

Catholicism was re-established in its dominant position. Whatever the Concordat might have accomplished, it did not solve satisfactorily the basic problems in Church-state relations. If anything, it aggravated the confusion between Church and state.\(^3\) Neither did it please many Frenchmen. Ultra-Catholics, not objecting to the alliance of the civil and spiritual powers, asked for exclusive rights for the Roman Catholic Church; with the Restoration of the Bourbons, their demands became more vocal and urgent. A small group of Ultramontanes refused to accept as final a system which allowed state interference in religious affairs. Anticlerical Liberals regarded the influence of the clergy on civil affairs, especially strong during the Restoration, with jealous anger. In short, the Concordat was ardently supported by few.

One of the interesting post-Concordat phenomena was the rise in France of Ultramontanism to oppose the rationalized Gallicanism. Moreover, two distinct groups of Ultramontanes had emerged by 1830. One, best represented by Joseph de Maistre, was characterized by a traditionalist attitude toward Church-state relations, with a veneration of the Pope as the head of the Church superimposed. The other, formed around the Abbé de Lamennais, became important in 1830 and stood firmly opposed to Gallican trends, believing that the Church constituted a unity formed in centripetal fashion around the Pope. Between the Pope and the Catholic there should be no intermediate force, especially not the state. The interplay of Gallican and

Ultramontane forces in the history of nineteenth-century Liberal Catholicism is of such significance that it must be treated elsewhere in full, but it is important to indicate that most Catholics attached themselves to the de Maistre point of view or to a more traditional Gallican approach. Against that background the Liberal Catholic theories on Church-state relations can best be understood.

Rejecting the precepts of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and of the French Revolution, de Maistre refused to admit constitutional government, the freedoms advocated by Liberals, or the independence of Church and state. Absolute monarchy was the divine plan of government, and any stable society would need be based on supernaturalism and traditionalism. The best model of government was the Roman Catholic Church, of which the pope is the natural head, the most powerful protagonist, the great god of universal civilization. His powers have no limits except those set by the blindness and evil willfulness of princes. The rule of the pope within the Church should not be hindered by Church councils and Gallican liberties, and in the realm of the state, the Church should be given a predominant influence in the conduct of civil affairs and the shaping of governmental policies. What he advocated was, therefore, the alliance of the Church and state under the leadership of the papacy. Another Catholic philosopher of the Restoration period, de Bonald, did not essentially disagree.

4 Of Chapter IV, below.

5 Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, 166.
Under the guidance of such a philosophy Catholics during the Restoration allied themselves closely with the Bourbon dynasty in an attempt to undo the Revolution. As Schapiro has pointed out, clerical influence in government was not new. "What was new was the formation of a 'Parti prêtre' which consciously and deliberately used Christianity to preach loyalty not merely to established government but also to a particular regime and to a particular dynasty." Catholic priests and aristocratic reactionaries together would restore the traditional regime in France.

The Program of L'Avenir

In opposition to such clerical servitude and to the traditional Catholic attitude regarding relations of Church and state, the group formed around Lamennais projected a new concept. The monarchy of the ancien régime and of the Restoration, they declared, had discredited religion by using it as a political weapon. "They used it as a means against that democratic regime which is always incompatible with monarchy; and they bought its compliance by the gift of money, of dignity and of power." The editors of L'Avenir asked for the complete independence of Church and state. The protection of kings, they declared, always means servitude—"it means religion administered as if it were a matter of customs and duties; it results in a degraded clergy, a ruined discipline, and in oppression of the

6 Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, 171.
7 Harold J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven, 1919), 236.
right to teach." State protection crippled the communications between the clergy and its chief, the pope, and it entailed consistently submission by the Church to the caprices of the temporal power. It ended with the complete subordination of the Church to the state, the latter fashioning the Catholic usages, laws, and even its doctrines. Such were the consequences of a Gallican or traditional relationship between the two institutions.

What the Church needed, Lamennais wrote, was liberty of action, "complete and absolute independence in the spiritual order." There could be no privilege, no special help from the state. The state had only one obligation to the Church, and that was to insure and respect liberty and the common right of the Church. The young United State provided the example which they wished France to emulate. In America the Church prospered under the regime of independence and freedom. The Charter of 1814 and the Concordat, by grafting the Church of France to the political structure of the state, hindered the Church's growth and influence rather than increased it. Because of this the Memmaisians were "anticoncorditaires." The secular nomination of bishops "by laics, Protestants, Jews, and atheists," incensed Lacordaire. Under those conditions, he asked, who could expect the Church to be respected?

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8 *Articles de L'Avenir*, 4 vols. (Louvain, 1832), I, 27.
9 *Ibid.*, I, 23
11 *L'Avenir*, December 3, 1830.
In short, Catholics should understand that religion "needs only one thing—liberty. But it is necessary for Catholics to accept liberty with conviction and resolution." That entailed the acceptance of "entire and absolute liberty of opinion,...of conscience and of cults, as well as all the civil liberties, without privilege and without restrictions." The best means of guaranteeing the liberty of the Church was, following the example of the United States, to support wholeheartedly "full and universal liberty of religion."^14

But did granting equal rights to all religions indicate a denial of the infallibility of the Church? Not at all, Lacordaire argued. The editors of L'Avenir did not intend to state that religious beliefs had equal claims to truth and utility; nor did they believe necessarily in theoretical equality between sects in respect to the submission of the individual's conscience. But in so far as the civil power was concerned, they proclaimed the freedom of conscience to be "a natural and sacred right."^15

Furthermore, they differentiated between civil tolerance and dogmatic intolerance. While stating that a divine law proscribes some beliefs, "this proscription is radically independent" of all civil sanction and coercion. "In order to promote the profession of the true religion, the Church possesses a power of jurisdiction at once external and spiritual, a coercive force, over the members of

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^13"Prospectus" of L'Avenir in Articles de l'Avenir, I, 1.
^14Ibid., II, 164.
^15Ibid., II, 167.
the faith. But the Church exercises only moral constraint. She can impose spiritual punishments...but not civil restraints." This, the Abbé Gerbet wrote, was Catholic doctrine. Civil power, "once its separation from religion has been accomplished, could not in any sense intervene in matters of faith; in a constitutional state, where there is not unanimity in religious beliefs, civil law should be equal for all—that is to say, no one religious faith should be protected or privileged." Supposing, however, that the unity of belief be re-established in France under a regime of common liberty, would the state have the duty to accord its material support to the Church, if that support were solicited? In other words, should the social order of the Middle Ages be reconstructed? The Menmaisians answered by saying that if the faith was re-born in a system of liberty, it would be a "crime to renounce liberty, since to do so would be to destroy the force which had produced the triumph of religion." Therefore, their support of religious liberty was not relative to circumstances; they accepted without reservations the principle of freedom of religion.

Did the editors of L'Avenir, then, accept the concept of the secular state, that is, the absolute separation of Church and state? So far as the constitutional or legal aspects were concerned, the answer is positive, for as Laski has pointed out, Lamennais' sense

16 L'Avenir, July 2, 1851.

17 Ibid.
of antagonism to secular things caused him to insist in "every particular upon the distinct and corporate life of the Church—its self-sufficiency." As Lamennais wrote to Montalembert, his conscience would not permit him to abandon "the doctrine of two distinct and independent powers and, consequently, two societies." In reality, however, the "Church and state are not separate," Lamennais wrote. "They ought to be united as a soul and a body are united, with the Church animating and inspiring the state." The laws of the state ought to reflect the influence of Christian morality and the Decalogue. The Church being, in Lamennais' opinion, the legitimate interpreter of Christian morality, the Church ought to cooperate with the state in promoting that morality. Ideally, the Church and state should be unified spiritual forces. If, therefore, the "secular state" implied a divorce between civil law and moral law, the Memmaisians were opposed to the secularized state. But if it was a question of a state religion, Lamennais and his followers rejected such a solution in favor of a complete and universal religious freedom.

Complete freedom could not exist, however, so long as the clergy was supported financially by the state. Believing this, the Memmaisians insisted upon the abolition of the Budget des cultes.

18. Laski, Authority in the Modern State, 239.
for being paid by the state, the clergy would always be reduced to the rank of a common salaried fonctionnaire. Granting that the confiscation of Church property by the Revolution entitled the clergy to an indemnity, Lacordaire charged that the "worst of it is that the state, although our debtor, has come to believe that it is bestowing alms upon us, and alms which it is absurd to pay."\(^{21}\) The clergy accepted "pay from our enemy," he declared. "We are salaried by those who regard us as hypocrites and imbeciles. Our pay costs us all our dignity, honor, and moral force."\(^{22}\) He therefore renounced the principle of a clergy supported financially by the state, saying that "our only salary is our independence."\(^{23}\)

Against the doctrines of L'Avenir and amidst the applause of the vast majority of the French hierarchy, Gregory XVI directed his Encyclical, Mirari vos. A sweeping censure of Liberal Catholicism, it confirmed what Mgr. Fevre later wrote and what most Catholics at the time believed: "The state, according to Catholic law, cannot be separated from or made independent of the Church...The laic state, as Liberal Catholics have called it---that is, a state independent of any union with the Church---may be the Liberal-Catholic state, but it is not the Christian state. Sooner or later, it will become the state without God."\(^{24}\) Catholics in 1832 would have agreed with the Père Ventura when he wrote that all power ought to be the

\(^{21}\) L'Avenir, December 8, 1830  
^{22}\) Ibid., November 15, 1830.  
^{23}\) Ibid., December 8, 1830.  
^{24}\) Justin Fevre, Histoire critique du catholicisme libéral en France jusqu'au pontificat de Léon XIII (Saint-Dizier, 1897), 188.
servant of God, that equal protection should be given to all cults is a falsehood. "Power is able to tolerate false religions where they exist, but it owes its sympathies and its serious and efficacious protection only to the truth." Government, if it does not obey the Church, is condemned to submit to the sovereignty of the people. Only by union of Church and state can political, social, and religious stability be achieved. Such were the attitudes of the majority of Catholics, and with the appearance of Mirari vos, the Papacy gave these theories its blessing.

To those intransigent Catholics, to those apostles of de Maistre, Montalembert declared that "your ancien régime, both political and religious, has disappeared and will not return. You mourn it while others, like myself, would not recall it if they could. But one way or another, it is dead. The Church, on the other hand, is neither deceased nor mortal, and society is very much alive." A rapprochement between the Church and society was necessary. Everywhere, in Germany as well as in France, the old system of Church and state was breaking down, as the Count de Carne pointed out. Certainly the men of the nineteenth century, whether under a republic or a monarchy, did "not want to governed by

27 Count Louis M. de Carne, Souvenirs de ma jeunesse au temps de la restauration (Paris, 1872), 331.
religion.28 The state and the Church were the two supreme forces which presided over men's lives, and it was the "mission of the nineteenth century to make them live together, and live in peace."29

With the advocates of a Liberal creed in a position of power in Paris after 1850, the Church, if it was to prosper and win the respect of Frenchmen, would need to reassess its traditional doctrines regarding the relations of Church and state. *L'Avenir* had accomplished such a re-evaluation, only to find itself condemned by the Rome it had sought to serve.

The Montalembert Formula: Mutual Independence but not Separation

The second Liberal Catholic movement asked *Ménaissian* questions. The program formulated by this second group sought to remain within the pale of orthodoxy without relinquishing the essentials of the *L'Avenir* formula. In the final analysis this second attempt to solve the puzzle of Church-state relations to the satisfaction of both Liberalism and the Church also failed. Never did the Liberal Catholic ideas command the respect of most French Catholics, and in 1864 Rome again spoke out against Liberal Catholic flirtations with separation of Church and state. Moreover, those ideas never


29 François Guizot, *Meditations on the Actual State of Christianity and the attacks which are now being made on it* (London, 1866), 100-101.
really achieved the harmony between Liberalism and Catholicism which the Montalambert group sought. As Liberalism gave way to the radicalism at the end of the century, the Church's doctrines regarding the state seemed more anachronistic. The result of the Church's failure to recognize the century in which it then existed was the final separation of Church and state, realized in the midst of a spirit which was essentially anti-Catholic. 30

At the Congress of Malines of 1863, an international conclave of Liberal Catholics sponsored by Liberal members of the Belgian hierarchy, Montalambert struck the phrase which best summarized the Liberal Catholic formula for Church-state relations—"A free Church in a free state." Suggesting something short of separation, he declared that in modern society there was little place for a state Church, and he indicated that Catholics should be prepared to accept, or even advocate, complete independence of the spiritual and temporal powers. Catholics, he said, should reject a privileged and protected position for the Church within the state; they should recognize, indeed, they should champion liberty of conscience and the concomitant freedom of religion.

The term "secular state" was not used by Montalambert nor would such a concept have been acceptable to him. It was not even an issue, either to the Liberal Catholics or, in reality, to most contemporary secular Liberals and radicals. Montalambert could have

no more imagined a state secularized in the sense that it ignored or openly rejected the Decalogue as the basis of moral procedure, than could an apostle of Rousseau divorce the state from the morality provoked by his own particular religious fervor. Nor was "pluralism," strictly defined, acceptable to the Liberal Catholics anymore than it was to Liberals and republicans. "Dualism" was more palatable terminology. A dualism recognizing the mutual independence of the temporal and spiritual orders was far removed from the absolute separation of Church and state. Furthermore, such a separation was beyond realization, since the tremendous, if indirect, influence in the state of such an important institution as the Roman Catholic Church was inescapable. Separation of Church and state in the young United States did not entail "pluralism" or the "secular state;" rather it indicated a situation of mutual freedom symbolized by the "laic" state, by the absence of constitutional ties between the state on the one hand and a religious sect on the other. In the United States there was a dualism of two forces, independent but at the same time coordinated by a set of principles and a system of morality commonly held. To Liberals as well as Liberal Catholics this was the goal to be worked toward in France. To achieve such a dualism, however, the Church as well as the state must be free, and Liberal Catholics never ceased to accuse their secular counter-parts—sometimes with perfect justice—of sabotaging the existence of such a dualism by attempting to hold the Church in tutelage to the state instead of setting it free.
The formula which Montalembert set forth in his speech at Malines was not new, even if it was dynamically rephrased. From the earliest attempts to revive Mannaisianism after 1840 the Catholics realized that to demand liberty and freedom under the "common right" was to admit the necessity of a redefinition of Catholic attitudes vis-à-vis the state. The acceptance of the "common liberty" presupposed the abdication of a privileged position within the state, that is, the renunciation of a state religion in favor of religious liberty. To readjust Catholic ideas concerning Church-state relations to coincide with nineteenth-century Liberalism required, first of all, a reinterpretation of Catholic teachings, especially those set forth in *Mirari vos* in 1852.

*Mirari vos* was the most immediate obstacle in the path of such a reinterpretation, and Liberal Catholics sought to mollify its condemnation of Liberal ideas. Gregory XVI, wrote Cazales, had not condemned, "in the rigorous sense of the word, the doctrines of *L'Avenir*....The Encyclical condemned liberty of conscience and of opinions in so far as they proceeded from poisoned sources of indifferentism. *L'Avenir* should not be classified as such a source." Catholics could subscribe to modern liberties as long as they "abstained from the realm of the absolute and did not represent intellectual anarchy as the ideal in every epoch and in every country."31 The Abbé Lacordaire agreed with his friend, Cazalès.

The Abbe assured Montalembert as early as 1655 that the Pope had not completely condemned Liberal Catholicism; it was the alliance of Christians with men without religion for the purpose of obtaining liberty for the Church that the Pope had disallowed. Rome had not supported a theocratic system, but had simply pointed out that the "Church and the state are naturally united" and that Catholics should consequently not seek "separation" of the Church and the state. 32 In 1845 Mgr. Parisis published his *Cas de conscience*, in which he reassured Catholics that they could with good conscience "accept a government constituted without any religion. A state religion is not made necessary by Catholic doctrine."

Furthermore, if Catholicism were the official religion of France, "we could no longer insist that the government lacks the right to interfere in religious matters; the Church would become a branch of the government, its ministers would be regarded as state fonctionnaires, and religion would be an institution of the state." Rome could not have desired such a result.33 A Catholic can," Mgr. Parisis said elsewhere, "demand the separation of the Church and state understood in a restrained sense and in a way which does not violate the Concordat. The type of separation which is both licit and desirable is less absolute; it maintains the pact between the state and the Church. The independence of the state is recognized by the Holy See, and the Church, on the other hand, is free in matters of


discipline and doctrine." The spiritual authority, he continued, should respect the rights of the civil authority. "This reciprocal independence of the two powers is indispensable if the mutual agreement desired by the Pope is to be effected." Much later, a Belgian, Cardinal Sterok, was to insist that Rome had not intended to deny the distinction between the civil and spiritual orders; the concept of reciprocal independence had not been condemned. Complete separation of Church and state was not allowable, for the state should continue to be benevolent toward the Church and the Church ought to go to the aid of the state if necessary.

Reassured in such fashion, the Liberal Catholics proceeded to develop in relative freedom their ideas on Church-state relations. Reciprocal independence of the two orders was the key to their approach. The state should not be subordinated to the Church any more than the Church should be subordinated to the state,Montalembert said in 1845. "They are two collateral powers, both sovereign and independent in their own domains. The Church is allied to the state, but not its subject." The independence of the civil power and the distinction between the spiritual and temporal served as a basis for the social organization of Europe; Catholics, said

Montalembert, applauded that organization. Proclaiming the power of the laic society, Dupanloup declared that the problem of the relationship of Church to state would be solved only by "accepting reciprocal independence, that is to say, by a regime of true liberty." Such, asserted intransigent Catholics, "was the terrible and disastrous error of Dupanloup and his friends."

It goes without saying that reciprocal independence entailed a mutual respect for liberty and freedom of action. Not only was it the formula by which the Church and modern Liberalism might be reconciled, but it had always served as the best guarantee of the Church's strength. "A free Church in a free state" was the program which Montalembert suggested for Liberal Catholics. "It serves to distinguish us clearly from the intolerant Catholics who do not want a free state, and from inconsistent Liberals who do not want to free the Church." He understood by "free" a freedom founded on the public liberties, on the common right. He did not intend to suggest that the Church ought to be subordinate to the state. Rather, the two were societies which should coexist on an equal but separate level.

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37 Charles de Montalembert, Pie IX et la France en 1849 et en 1852 (London, 1859), 32.
40 Charles de Montalembert, "Note explicative sur la formule 'L'Église libre dans l'État libre,'" Correspondant, XXIV (1865), 417-418.
41 Ibid., 417.
42 Ibid., 418.
state subjected to tyranny—as well as an unfree Church in an unfree state, which he said was the situation in Russia—he viewed with equal horror the notion of a Church deprived of its freedom by a Liberal state. The latter, he accused, was the objective of Liberals. Freedom and independence must be reciprocal, he asserted. Only thus could the Church be reconciled to the Liberalism of the nineteenth century. 43 Montalembert's formula became the program of the Liberal Catholics and in 1862 the leaders of the movement gathered at la Roche, Montalembert's ancestral estate in Franche-Conté, and there Albert de Broglie, Augustin Cochin, Falloux, Montalembert, and Dupanloup pledged their support to it. 44

In his speech at Malines in 1865, for which he was reprimanded by Rome, Montalembert seemed to state the position more strongly than before, and Cochin commented to Foisset that Montalembert had presented the Liberal Catholic position so positively that he seemed to be guilty of speaking in terms of "absolute ideals" and thus be in danger of violating the encyclicals of Gregory XVI, even as they had been interpreted by Liberal Catholics. 45 Always, however, Montalembert attempted to steer clear of the idea of complete separation. "No one will take me for an apostle of the modern

43 Montalembert, Correspondant, XXIV, 416.


dream of the absolute separation of the spiritual and civil spheres," Montalembert wrote in "L'Espagne et la liberte," his last political testament. "I believe it to be scarcely desirable, and in most cases, impossible. But I do not hesitate to say that separation in its most extreme form would be a thousand times better, in spite of its perils and excesses, than the absorption of the state by the Church or the Church by the state. It would be better to have complete separation than their mutual identification and exploitation as in Spain since the sixteenth century." 46

The same was equally true of Lacordaire, even though he as well as Montalembert had agreed with the Abbé Gerbet in 1852 that there was no other "possible defense for the Church except complete separation of the spiritual and civil orders." 47 Separation did not constitute Lacordaire's ideal. Such a solution, he wrote, "is so metaphysically false that it will never be accepted." 48

Alone among the Liberal Catholics, Ozanam, hesitatingly perhaps, called for separation in a complete form; the prosperity of the Church, he wrote, depended upon admitting the principle of "separation." 49 But he, too, interpreted "separation" to mean something other

46 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LV, 21.
than the secular state. As for the others associated with the Liberal Catholics, Falloux was convinced that "separation of Church and state would lead society to barbarism," and Dupanloup stated that those who preach separation "are in inconceivable error." What they demanded—and in actuality Ozanam concurred—was not complete separation, "for that absolute severance had been formally condemned by the Holy See; what Catholics desire is the end of interdependence between the Church and the civil government...The state, as Mgr. Parisot wrote, should only protect the liberty of the Church, and the Church on the other hand should not participate in civil legislation or share civil power with the government." There, then, was the formula—independence but not separation.

The detractors of Liberal Catholics both within the Church and among secular Liberals tended to see in such a position either heresy or hypocrisy. What, in the eyes of Liberal Catholics


51 Alfred F.P. Falloux, De la contre-révolution (Paris, 1878), 18.

52 Félix Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, 7 vols. (Paris, 1873-1874), II, 408.

53 Abbé de Cursen, "Cas de conscience à propos des libertés exercées au réseau des catholiques," Correspondant (December, 1847), 839-65, 849.

were the differences between complete separation and reciprocal independence? Under a regime governed by the latter, what would be the relationship of Church to state?

Realizing the apparent confusion, Albert de Broglie admitted that such questions were among the greatest that "Providence has posed to torment our minds." The solutions, however, are not impossible to imagine, he added. "It is not impossible to formulate theoretically a society in which religion would have, without the aid of any apparent force, such an empire over the consciences of individuals that all their acts, even political acts, would instinctively harmonize with the spirit of Christianity."^55 Liberal Catholics' goal, then, was the realization of the alliance between the Church and the state, the latter accepting the moral direction of the Christian religion. This alliance was to be achieved without constitutional ties between the two institutions, and its achievement would not entail the formation of a state Church. It was to be realized and sustained in the midst of complete religious freedom.56

The Liberal Catholics presumed a natural harmony and a necessary connection between society and religion; their faith in moral progress and their acceptance of modern society rested largely upon that premise. The interests of the Church, they assumed, were the

^55 Albert de Broglie, Études morales et littéraires (Paris, 1853), 173.
^56 Haussonville, Lacordaire, 185; cf. Bernard Chocarne, ed., Lettres de Lacordaire à Mme. la baronne de Frailly (Paris, 1885), 147.
interests of humanity. They also presupposed modern society to be
the expression of the needs of humanity and consequently of the needs
of the Church.\textsuperscript{57} The reconciliation of religion with society by means
of a reciprocal respect for their separate rights was Lacordaire's
goal, and his faith that such a harmony would be realized led him
to believe that he was a "citizen of the future," since he believed
that he personally had accomplished that reconciliation.\textsuperscript{58} The Church
should be for modern society what faith is for reason, wrote Broglie.
"It should not be the enemy which fights back modern society, but
rather its complement."\textsuperscript{59} In a word, "these two societies, parallels
rather than rivals, were made to be able to live side by side without
confusion of prerogatives."\textsuperscript{60} Church and state, "two allied but
distinct forces, the union of which form human society, must be in
'accord if the good order of human affairs is to be insured."\textsuperscript{61} There
were only two parties in existence, said the Abbé Maret, Lacordaire's
associate on \textit{L'\oe uvre nouvelle}. Those parties were the people and Jesus
Christ. If they were separated, humanity was lost; if they acted in
concert, society would be saved.\textsuperscript{62} Christianity, declared Lacordaire
from his pulpit at Notre-Dame, is not opposed to modern society. "The

\textsuperscript{57}Henri Lacordaire, \textit{Éloge funèbre de Daniel O'Connell} (Paris, 1948),
34.
\textsuperscript{58}Henri Lacordaire, \textit{Œuvres du R.P.H.-D. Lacordaire}, 9 vols. (Paris,
1898-1907), III, 287.
\textsuperscript{59}Albert de Broglie, "Des caractères de la polémique religieuse
\textsuperscript{60}Dupanloup, \textit{Des associations religieuses}, 6. \textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, 5.
\textsuperscript{62}Georges Weill, \textit{Histoire du catholicisme liberal en France} (Paris,
1909), 94.
Gospel has not passed over the world like a violent tempest, tearing up institutions by their roots; it has gently poured out over civilization, like a healing stream which penetrates to the sources of life to purify and to reinvigorate it. In Ozanam's opinion religion would constitute the cohesive element in the state; the Church would create the band of unity which would enable society to govern itself.

Independence of the two orders, therefore, did not imply to the Liberal Catholics the type of separation suggested by a "secular state"—that is to say, a state which was indifferent to Christian morality. It was "indifferentism," not independence of Church and state, which had been condemned by Rome. The Liberal Catholic formula was opposed in theory to any form of Gallicanism, whether in its traditional form, or as it was practiced by the majority of Catholics under the Second Empire. Liberal Catholics agreed with the majority of the Church that the state ought to be propelled and governed by Christian precepts, but whereas most Catholics desired constitutional or at least political ties with the state, ties which would have given the Church a privileged position, the Liberal group insisted upon the mutual independence of the two orders.

Such a relationship presupposed the absence of state protection

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64Kathleen O'Meara, *Frédéric Ozanam. His Life and Works* (Edinburgh, 1876), 267.
of the Roman Catholic Church by means of coercive force or privileged position. Liberal Catholics demanded only the freedom to form associations, to teach, and to administer the Church without interference from the civil government. Essentially, they were following the program of L'Avenir. In the opinion of Mgr. Sibour, a Liberal Catholic ally, the state could only protect the liberty of the Church. For it to do more would entail oppression. Dupanloup declared that he had never had great confidence in the protective arm of the secular power.  

"I reiterate the words of Fenelon: 'The protector has too often been the oppressor.' With protection was certain to come servitude of the Church to the state, they felt.  

The Church, after all, was a purely spiritual society, adherence to which was voluntary. Dupanloup asked only that the existence of God be recognized and that "Jesus Christ, if not believed in, be at least respected." Considering his rejection of the secular state, Dupanloup's request was not inconsistent. In a Mémoire written by Lacordaire in connection with the re-establishment in France of the Dominican Order—a work historically fragile but indicative of Lacordaire's attitude—the author declared that "the Catholic Church does not demand of the civil power 'le passage' as

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65 Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 314.  
66 Dupanloup, Nouvelles oeuvres choisies, II, 418.  
67 Courson, Correspondant (December, 1847), 845.  
68 Félix Dupanloup, Paroles prononcées à son retour de Rome (Paris, 1867), 23.  
Bossuet said, but 'le passage libre.'... The Church is a persuasive force rather than a domineering one."70 Catholics had to choose, Montalambert warned, between protection and freedom, between subjugation and independence. 71

Furthermore, protection by the state had never been useful to the Church. Catholics owed everything to liberty and nothing to temporal authority. 72 The true grandeur and strength of the Church in the Middle Ages lay not in her wealth and power, but in her freedom. "She was free by the right of the general liberty, such as was comprehended and practiced in those days, which belonged to all corporations and proprietors. She enjoyed the largest amount of freedom known, because she was at the same time the greatest corporation and largest landowner in Europe."73 Recalling the hostility against religion under the Restoration governments when there was much confusion of interests between the throne and the altar, Ozanam was convinced that the protection by civil authorities would be as dangerous as it was ephemeral. The Church, it seemed, prospered most where governments were "strangers" to the faith. 74 In short, it was the Liberal Catholic opinion that everywhere the old order subsisted, the Church was oppressed and impotent. "Wherever the new order---civil

70Henri Lacordaire, Mémoire pour le rétablissement en France de l'ordre des frères prêcheurs (Paris, 1839), 218.
71Lecanuet, Montalambert, II, 272.
72Charles de Montalambert, De l'avenir politique de l'Angleterre (Paris, 1856), 182.
74Breton, Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique (1913), 113.
and religious liberty—has been introduced," wrote Lacordaire, "the Church has gained ground...because nothing equals the horror which modern generations have for religious oppression. The reign of the priest is execrated; he is accepted only as a man of faith who inculcates his beliefs by means of persuasion."75

By far the most passionate plea for independence of Church and state came from Montalembert in his "L'Espagne et la liberté," which, written a year and a half before his death, represented the summation of his political outlook. As he saw it, political and religious decadence was the natural result of too close a union between Church and state. The too intimate and absolute union between the throne and the altar caused the collapse of Spain, he said. "The day when the throne, with the aid of an Inquisition, has absorbed everything, disaster results. When the victorious Church, on the other hand, desires to abuse its victory by excluding and prohibiting first the Jews, then the Moors, and then Protestants, and finally all discussion, examination, research, initiative, and liberty—when the Church does this, all has been lost. The victors descend to the equally and alternately abject roles of persecutors and slaves."76 In Spain, he said, the Church—and it "is impossible to deny it"—had been the accomplice of one of the worst despotisms that Europe had known.77 "The Inquisition, horrible vampire that it was, ended by engulfing the whole of

75 "Lettres du P. Lacordaire à M. de Falloux," Correspondant, CVII (May-June, 1911), 625-647 and 848-873, 640.
76 Montalembert, Bibliotheque universelle et revue Suisse, LV, 16.
77 Ibid., 17.
society. That monstrous institution ceased to function only when there was nothing else for it to do—when it had substituted emptiness, death, and annihilation for the life, force, and glory of the first of nations of the Middle Ages."

Let Spain be a lesson, Montalembert said, to those in France who desired a close legal and constitutional connection between Church and state and to those unwilling to accept the reign of liberty in modern society. He did not deny that the ideal relationship of Church and state would be the pacific superiority of Catholic faith and truth; but he insisted that superiority should be gained only by the reciprocal and unanimous respect for all consciences, by the reconciliation between past and present, and by the spirit of good will and of mutual support which should be evidenced in the relationship of Church and state.79

To achieve those adjustments to modern liberty, the Catholic needed latitude to reshape his political attitudes, and Montalembert pleaded with the hierarchy of the Church to become cognizant of the views, the needs, and the obligations of Catholics who wanted to live the "life of their country, of their people, and their times...and who want to be citizens of their nation and their century."80

78 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LV, 19.

79 Ibid., LVI, 102-03; Fundamentally the same position was taken by Albert de Broglie in the preface to his Nouvelles Études de morale et de littérature (Paris, 1865).

80 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, XVI, 101.
Catholics, he declared, were not questioning theology or dogma.

"They demand simply that the hierarchy not render their lives impos-
sible. They do not intend to prevent anyone from living according
to the manners of the twelfth or the seventeenth centuries if any-
one so desires; but Liberal Catholics want to live as men of the
century in which they were born, with the rights, habits, and ideas
of their time." They do not condemn anyone and they ask that they
not be condemned. "The Liberal Catholics ask that they not be
chastised for having two morals, one in theory, another in practice--
the one for the confessional and the other for civil life...They ask
that they not be required to choose between the alternatives of the
gradual abandonment of the Catholic faith or the absolute exclusion
from all public functions (except for petty positions in the Imperial
household) and from all participation in the municipal, intellectual,
social, and political life of their country."81

The Liberal Catholic concept of the state was, therefore, that
the civil government constituted a sphere outside the jurisdiction
of the Church. Stating it more strongly than his associates, Lacor-
daire said that the state "is man at his highest earthly power; it
is the moral force which protects the rights of men; it is a living
justice, which, at every moment, watches over millions of men and
takes care that they should not be wrongfully harmed...The state is
the unity and the solidarity of the great human family called the

81 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LVI, 102.
nation; it is a sublime and sacred institution and Christianity has never thwarted it.®2

There were limits to the state's prerogatives, however. Liberal Catholics could not participate in the "idolatry of a state which tends to absorb everything, of a state in which the individual, the child, the family, the Church, and men's consciences stand for nothing."®3 Since all sovereignty emanates from God, the state should be governed by God's laws; in that sense there should be no separation between the state and religion. But civil power is not an emanation from ecclesiastical power; consequently, the state should not be subjected to the Church's rule. The state has sufficient authority vested in it to make laws which should command respect. Its powers, rather than being limited by the direct intervention of ecclesiastical authorities, should be restricted only by the dictates of reason and Christian moral law.®4 Civil society, dealing only with temporal affairs, was necessarily inferior to the spiritual order, concerned as it was with men's eternal lives.®5 It did not follow, however, that the Church should dominate civil government or that the state should grant protection and privilege to the Church.®6

82 Lacordaire, Conférences de Notre-Dame, I, 516.
83 Félix Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse (Paris, 1845), 265-66.
84 Léon Godard, Les principes de 89 et la doctrine catholique (1st ed., Paris, 1861), 96-97. The first edition having been placed on the Index, a greatly modified second edition was published in 1862.
85 Haussouville, Lacordaire, 185.
86 Courson, Correspondant (December, 1847), 840.
Viewing Church-state relations in such a manner, it did not seem inconsistent to Montalembert to support a proposed law in December, 1650, which prohibited work on public projects on Sunday and permitted municipalities to close cabarets during Church services. Nor did Ozanam sense that he was violating the independence of the state by insisting that the government take a stand against divorce. Democracy had no greater champion and any form of theocracy no greater enemy than Ozanam, but he so closely identified progress of moral law with the growth of democracy that he felt compelled to protect the democracy of 1848 from being submerged by an anticlerical flood and from being "sabotaged by the old liberalism which always had more hate for religion than love for liberty." In those and other similar cases Liberal Catholics stood for the alliance of moral law and civil law and against the negation of one by the other. On the other hand, both Ozanam and Montalembert looked back at the Restoration "sacrilege laws" with disgust, for they felt that such laws were violations of the natural relationship between Church and state. The "sacrilege laws" were, in effect, a form of state protection, whereas the issues of divorce and the profanation of Sunday were questions of public morals. A narrow differentiation, perhaps, but it was one consistently made by Liberal

87 Montalembert, Oeuvres, III, 486-90.
89 Ibid., 182.
90 Lecanuet, Montalembert, I, 359; and Lettres de Frederic Ozanam, II, 134.
Catholics. If Dupanloup expected the state to respect the existence of God, he certainly did not require that a particular religious sect be protected; and when he said that the liberty of public education "does not include the right to teach that there is no God, no soul..., no moral responsibility," he again felt that he was not attacking the principle of the laic state. He was, he declared, defending public morals.91

As for payment by the state of the clergy's salaries, there was unanimity of opinion among Liberal Catholics. They reversed L'Avenir's position and said that the state ought to subsidize religion, both Catholic and Protestant. The subvention was not a gift; rather, it was compensation for confiscated Church property.92 Lacordaire, who had argued vehemently for an end to the Budget des cultes in 1831, had changed his mind by 1848. In Ére nouvelle he wrote that under a system of independence of Church and state, it seemed logical, perhaps, to halt state payment of clerical salaries. "The question of the subsidy, however, is not one of life and death, but one of justice,...of equality between the poor and rich,...of mutual help on a matter requiring that men help one another."93 The Budget des cultes was justified because religion is a "general need of all families and of society itself." Freedom of thought and of belief "does not diminish the duties of society toward religion, 

92 Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 312.
93 Ére nouvelle, April 18, 1848.
since religion remains the primary basis for all human institutions, and for all rights and duties. There was no contradiction between the maintenance of the Budget des cultes and freedom of religion, Lacordaire said, because each individual was free to accept any religion he pleased or to reject them all, and, in the second place, clergymen of all religions were paid by the state.

In answering charges that the Church lost dignity and independence by accepting payment by the state—charges that he himself had made when writing for L'Avenir—Lacordaire admitted that the mode hercique was the American system. But, he declared, if the Church had in the past been servile to the state, it was not a result of the payment of salaries by the state; it had resulted from "laws and practices which, completely independent of the Budget, had restricted the natural religious development of France." After all, the Church in Belgium, although financially supported by the state, was not less free than in the United States.

In short, the Liberal Catholic attitude concerning the Budget des cultes was that the state should subsidize religion because, in the first place, the state owed the Church compensation for property confiscated during the Revolution, and secondly, by giving to religion a part of the public treasury, the state was responding to a social improvement.

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94 Le nouvel, April 20, 1848.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., April 30, 1848.
97 Ibid., April 26, 1848.
need. The ideal was for the state to subsidize the Church without oppressing it, without denying its independence. Perhaps such an ideal presupposed a "holy" state, as Émile Faguet has suggested, but to men like Dupanloup, such a supposition was not unreasonable since they thought that the state should be very moral, if not "holy." Contra­dictions and false suppositions notwithstanding, Liberal Catholics continued to support the Budget des cultes.

If the Church and state formed two distinct and separate spheres, what should be the attitude of the Catholic citizen and clergy toward political activity? On this question there was a great degree of agreement between Liberal Catholics. Under the leadership of Lamennais they had founded the Agence-générale pour la défense de la liberté religieuse with the expressed purpose of propagating their opinions and exercising pressure upon the government. With the advent of the campaign against the Université in 1843, Montalembert had led in the establishment of a Comité pour la défense de la liberté religieuse, the objective of which was to influence elections of deputies. To Montalembert, Catholics not only had a right but a duty to partici­pate in politics, and when necessary, to form a Catholic party. Such a party should not be allied with older political groups but should be dedicated, he said, to the idea of securing for the Church the freedom it needed. In 1843 he wrote that "sovereignty no longer resides in a single monarchy but in the entire nation. The nation

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is Caesar and each citizen is a part of this 'Caesar.' In a word, the state is Caesar and we are the state. God has placed in our hands a portion of the sovereignty of this great Christian country, and we have not only a right but a duty to exercise our authority.\textsuperscript{99}

Catholics as a party, however, should not attach themselves to a narrow political group; they should not support as a collective whole the Orleanists, the Bourbons, democrats, republicans, or any other such group, although Catholics as individuals should be free to do so. Rather, Catholics should maintain a political independence.\textsuperscript{100} At times an independent position proved difficult to establish. For example, under the Second Empire "independence means opposition," Montalembert wrote. "It is an opposition against the odious hypocrisy of the official publicists who pretend that the present regime is liberal."\textsuperscript{101} In the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1848 Montalembert asked all departmental branches of the \textit{Comité pour la défense de la liberté religieuse} to formulate "lists of the most honorable and most religious men of the respective districts, regardless of what party they supported whether it be legitimist, Orleanist, or republican." It would be ridiculous, he said, to imagine that the "votes of Catholics are impotent to modify, transform and ameliorate the lists of other parties. The essential


\textsuperscript{100}Correspondance de M. le comte de Montalembert (Paris, 1887), 127.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., 128.
thing is to discipline Catholic votes. To vote was the "sacred, national, and Christian duty" of all Catholics. Montalembert, therefore, clearly did not construe the independence of the spiritual from the temporal order to mean that Catholics should not organize politically to exert an influence on the elections, even though that influence should not be channelled to the support of a particular political group. Catholics should use their individual political strength to insure the election of men who supported principles which Liberal Catholics held essential. In such a way was the political activity of the Liberal Catholics distinguishable from the earlier "clerical" party. The latter had been identified perfectly with the Bourbon cause.

Lacordaire did not essentially disagree, even though he feared that political activity by Catholics as a party, and especially by the clergy itself, would serve to disrupt the independence of the Church and to enfeoff it to a particular political position. He was himself a candidate for the Constituent Assembly in 1646 and was elected to represent Marseilles. In his opinion, however, the political role of the clergy during the revolutionary period of 1646 would and should be only a transitory phenomenon. "Once the Republic is established and a constitution is written, the priest will find himself faced with a nation jealous of the distinction between the

102 As quoted in Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 388.
103 *Univers*, February 26, 1848.
spiritual and temporal powers." Under such conditions, Lacordaire wrote, "the clergy of France would be harmed by exposing itself to political passions." During the transitional period from one government to another, however, he felt that "to abstain from political activity would be to abdicate one's duties, to desert the military service at the hour of battle." Therefore, he hoped that the French clergy would take its place in the Constituent Assembly and "Act there as the mediator between extreme parties without taking the side of any one of them." 

After the invasion of the Assembly by a mob on May 15, 1848, and as a result of the general growth of radicalism, Lacordaire came to believe that his place was not in the midst of those political tempests and that it was no longer possible for him to maintain his independence. Consequently, he resigned his position. When he entered the Assembly, he had taken his place in the upper benches on the extreme left of the assembly hall, thus failing to place himself in the position of mediator, as he had suggested that the clergy should. He was not prepared for the events of May and June. With the advent of Paris radicalism came Lacordaire's political retrenchment and his reversion to his original position regarding the political activity of the clergy. Thereafter he remained consistent.

in his abstention from politics as such. "The true Liberal Catholic," he wrote in 1861, "is neither a Legitimist, an Orleanist, a Bonapartist, or a republican; he is above all the friend of civil liberty and of political and religious freedom...Political parties should be placed in a subordinate position in his mind." Lacordaire thereby set forth the point of view held by Montalembert.

**Freedom of Conscience and Religion**

Having postulated the independence of Church and state and thus disavowed state protection of the Church, Liberal Catholics presupposed the acceptance of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. Those freedoms had been the core of L'Avenir's program, and if *Mirari vos* had not condemned religious liberty specifically and by name, the Encyclical had certainly indicated that freedom of religion was outside the scope of orthodoxy. Gregory XVI had agreed with St. Augustine that there was no "worse death for the soul than the freedom of error." When restraint is removed, the "already disordered nature" of man "plunges headlong to disaster." Could Liberal Catholics, therefore, sincerely ask for freedom of conscience and religion—two cardinal points of their program?

*Mirari vos* notwithstanding, Liberal Catholics considered freedom

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of conscience to be an integral part of Catholic doctrine, unanimously supported by the Church fathers. The law of God, they said, could not be imposed on the individual; if it is accepted by a Catholic, it is affirmed, as Karl Adam has put it, "in the light of his practical reason and by the free choice of his will he makes it his own, so that it becomes his own law, an act of his moral freedom, a determination of his moral conscience...There is no room here for the arbitrary." When an individual has failed to recognize God's will plainly or when he is involved in "invincible error," Adam continued, he is not "bound to the objective law, but to that which appears to his conscience to be God's will, although the judgment of his conscience be objectively false. No less an authority than St. Thomas stresses this obligation of the erroneous conscience." 110

In the opinion of Liberal Catholics, the Church was the infallible teacher of revealed truth and the only effective means of salvation; being conscious of this, the Church could never admit that Catholics are in the same condition as non-Catholics in regard to moral truth. There was not equality between religious sects since only the Roman Catholic Church was infallible. But when an individual rejects the infallible truth, should the Church still respect his liberty of conscience? "It is especially here," Adam wrote, "in this extremest conflict between authority and conscience, that we realize again the intense earnestness with which the Church guards

110 Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism (New York, 1941), 225.
the rights of conscience, even of an erroneous conscience." The Church seeks to convince the conscience, not overpower it; but she always recognizes the right of the conscience not to heed Catholic truth.

This, too, was the Liberal Catholic concept of freedom of conscience. Liberty of conscience and religious liberty, that is, freedom of cults, were inseparable from a logical point of view. If an individual's innately free will led him away from the Catholic faith, and if the Church recognized his freedom to stray, then must not the Church also recognize his freedom to join others of similar consciences? To grant him this freedom was not to deny Catholic truth or to admit that Catholicism was not superior to other faiths. Freedom of religion, that is, civil tolerance, did not contradict dogmatic or theological intolerance—the right of the Church to expect all Catholics to accept and respect the authority of the Church on theological questions. In their opinion, however, civil intolerance was incompatible with Catholic theology regarding respect for freedom of conscience.

Essential to the Liberal Catholic support of religious liberty was the distinction between civil tolerance and dogmatic intolerance, for only by establishing such a differentiation could the Montalembert group hope to escape censure on the charge of "indifferentism." Cardinal Antonelli, Papal Secretary of State, made it clear to

111 Adam, Spirit of Catholicism, 226.
Montalembert that Catholic doctrine expressly disallowed the "liberty of error," that is to say, "indifferentism." In Antonelli's opinion French Liberal Catholics, by championing freedom of conscience or religious liberty, seemed to be compromising with "indifferentism." 112 Montalembert had, in reality, already answered this complaint in a letter to the Cardinal written in December, 1865. "It is not a question of knowing whether error has rights and should be given liberty," Montalembert said. "Rather, it is a question of deciding whether men who are in error have liberty. I have said that they have the right...not to be persecuted, the right to be tolerated by the civil government. Considering the actual state of Europe, to demand liberty for others while demanding it for the Church is to recognize, not the rights of error, but the inevitable and invincible exigences of the Church's adversaries. To ask for liberty for the Church in order to refuse it to others is to lose and dishonor the Church's cause in advance." 113 As Foisset said, "Rationally, it is impossible to support the theory that error is equal to truth, that society should remain indifferent to error and truth." 114 To such an argument, Montalembert answered that "dogmatic intolerance is inseparable from eternal truth; it is necessary to the Church just as civil tolerance is necessary to modern society." Insisting that he was speaking not as a theologian since he was unqualified for the

112 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 371. 113 Ibid., III, 368.
114 Boisseard, Foisset, 195.
role, but as an "homme politique;" he went on to say in his Malines speech that in his opinion, "liberty of conscience is the most precious, the most sacred, the most legitimate, and the most necessary of all liberties." 115

In his *Principes de '89* the Abbé Godard made a complete analysis of the Liberal Catholic attitude toward freedom of religion. First of all, he stated that they did not reject the infallibility of the Church, but he said that it was possible to advocate liberty of conscience without being guilty of "indifferentism." Liberty of error was not a natural right as the Constitution of 1793 seemed to state. A Catholic, however, might support religious liberty, not as a natural right, but as a positive human right, subject to restrictions; he might advocate it as a constitutional right, but not as an unlimited liberty. 116 Unlimited liberty of cults had never been admitted by any people, he continued. Religions which prescribed human sacrifice, sexual promiscuity, the abolition of property, for example—these had not been tolerated by civil governments. 117 Theologians as well as statesmen agreed that a limited liberty of religion was good and legitimate, conforming always to the needs of political society as it was manifested in a given situation and to the rights and liberties acquired by the possession of liberty.

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116 Godard, *Principes de '89*, 98.
117 Ibid., 100.
Itself. Some theologians, therefore, as well as Liberal Catholics recognized that political or civil tolerance, which consisted of allowing each to profess the religion he preferred, was not only licit but necessary. In the opinion of Liberal Catholics, Godard said, the law ought not to be regulated by the intrinsic truth of religions, but according to the proper aim of civil society which is the promotion of the temporal welfare of the community and of the individuals who constitute that community. The Church's concern was with the spiritual welfare and happiness in another life, a fact which placed its interests in a different realm than those of the state. Liberal Catholics were convinced that the truth would triumph all the more gloriously without the protection of the civil power, and consequently, it was better that the state allowed complete religious liberty.

Whether Liberal Catholics were able to reconcile completely their support of religious liberty to what seemed to most to be Catholic doctrine is a matter for theological speculation. That all Liberal Catholics believed in religious liberty as a positive good is a concrete fact. Religious liberty, wrote the Abbé Meignan, an associate of Gratry, "was the natural and inevitable fruit of the dissidence between Christian communions. When Christianity became divided, it was necessary to choose between reciprocal persecution which would have been dangerous for all, and an honorable liberty for both strong...

118 Godard, Principe de 89, 104.
119 ibid., 106.
120 ibid., 107.
and weak." In the prospectus for the reorganized Correspondant, Albert de Broglie wrote that that journal would ever stand for freedom of conscience and of religion, "precious liberties written into all our constitutions over the last sixty years." Was the regime of religious liberty the ideal, the only good? "We have never said so," wrote the editors of the Correspondant, "but it exists and we like it." Another time, Broglie wrote that if "Catholic faith is incompatible with religious liberty, it would be a tragedy."

Lacordaire went even further. He admitted that religious liberty, taken in an absolute sense, would signify indifference in matters of theology. Such extremism would be absurd, he said. He, too, made the distinction between civil toleration and dogmatic indifference, adding that the state had a duty to grant religious toleration. So great was his respect for religious liberty that he praised the eighteenth-century philosophes for having retrieved the spirit which promoted the Edict of Nantes. The philosophy of the eighteenth century, "even though it was the enemy of Christianity, was founded on the desire to return to a system of

121 Abbé Maiznan, "D'un mouvement antireligieuse en France," Correspondant, X (1859), 225-250, 244.
122 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 116.
124 Broglie, Correspondant, I (1856), 508.
125 Lacordaire to Falloux, July 27, 1859, Correspondant, CCVII (1911), 858.
126 Lacordaire, Oeuvres, VII, 286-87.
equitable toleration. It prepared for the enfranchisement of all consciences in the centuries to come."  

Even Dupanloup, the most hesitating member of the group of Liberal Catholics, seems to have accepted religious liberty without reservation. Speaking of the reactionaries among the clergy, he stated in his diary that there were three or four phrases which he detested—"Inquisition, Saint Bartholomew, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and intolerance." When he opposed the election of Littre to the French Academy in 1662, he was accused of denying liberty of conscience. To the accusation he answered that "the liberty of the Academy consists in voting for or against. And my liberty, and that of each of my colleagues, consists in fighting for, or opposing, according to my convictions, a candidate." Liberty, after all, "is the use of public discussion to defend or oppose an idea or movement." When in 1678 he so bitterly opposed the observance of the centenary of Voltaire's death, he again assumed that he was not challenging liberty of conscience, but rather that he was exercising his own liberty and freedom to oppose what he despised so much.  

As might be expected, the most eloquent plea for liberty of conscience came from Montalambert, first in his speeches at Malines and later in his "L'Espagne et la liberté." At Malines in 1865 he

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127 Lacordaire, Discours funèbre de O'Connell, 15.
129 Lagrange, Dupanloup, II, 414.
said, "I support liberty of conscience without qualification or reservation. All of its consequences which public morality allows and which justice demands, I accept...But can one ask for liberty for truth and refuse it to error, that is, refuse it to those who think differently? I answer unequivocally: No. Everyone, if he is in good faith, believes he holds the truth." He declared that he felt a horror for any violence against humanity made in the name of religion. "The stakes set afire by Catholics cause me as much pain as the scaffolds where so many Catholics have been sacrificed by Protestants. A gag placed into the mouth of anyone who preaches his faith with pure heart causes me to feel that it is placed between my own lips, and I quake with sorrow." The Spanish Inquisitor, "who said to the heretic, 'Truth or Death,' is as odious to me as the terrorist of the French Revolution who said to my grandfather, 'Liberty, Fraternity, or Death.'" The human conscience, declared Montalembert, "has the right to ask that these terrible alternatives not be posed." To a Protestant minister, Montalembert wrote, "I deplore and reprove as much as you any violence committed in the name of religion." The revocation of the Edict of Nantes with its cortège of "hypocrisy and inhumanity," he regarded as the principle cause of the outburst of eighteenth-century profanation. 

Montalembert, as well as other Liberal Catholics, was charged

130 Charles de Montalembert, L'Eglise libre dans l'Etat libre, (Brussels, 1863), 7-8.
131 "Lettres inédites de Lacordaire, Montalembert, et George Sand," L'Amateur d'autographes, XXXV (1900), 2-17, 15.
with accepting religious liberty with reservations. Georges Weill has written that "for Montalembert, liberty is a natural right, while civil tolerance is a simple laissez-passer accorded to evil and to error because of the circumstances of a particular time." The accusation is hardly just, even admitting that the Catholic ideal was a religious unity which would obviate the necessity for toleration. Until the unforeseeable time when such unanimity was achieved Montalembert and his associates pleaded for liberty of conscience not on a laissez-passer basis, but as a freedom based upon right. Montalembert made this clear when, in his treatise on Spain, he said that "once implanted or simply proclaimed, religious liberty cannot be extirpated. Just as in the case of printing, it can be used for good or bad, but it cannot be abolished. It is the same with universal suffrage; once it is introduced, it is inexpugnable." Again he declared that he was discussing neither theory nor abstractions. "I pose neither thesis, antithesis, nor hypothesis. I speak of the liberty of religion, pure and simple."

Nothing could have been more forthright than Montalembert's letter to the Journal de Paris in 1868. "Liberty of cult," he declared, "consists of the right of every man and every citizen to leave the cult in which he has been reared to embrace another;"

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132 Weill, Revue de synthèse historique, XV, 325.
133 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LV, 201.
134 Ibid., 198.
it includes his right to choose between all the religions established in his country, to introduce new ones, to propagate in their behalf by writing and speaking, to open churches without any restrictions. Such was religious liberty as he understood it. His approach to liberty of conscience and freedom of religion, therefore, was essentially positive. His failure to label those liberties as "natural rights" to be held eternally valid may be viewed either as an attempt to comply with Catholic doctrine, which held that the ideal and "natural" goal was religious unanimity, or it may be seen as the realization that unlimited liberty of religion, taken in an absolute sense, was impractical from a purely political point of view. His acceptance of religious liberty, however, was none the less real.

The Syllabus of Errors

Against the tenets of Liberal Catholicism, including its interpretation of Church-state relations, Pius IX directed the Syllabus of Errors and the Encyclical Quanta cura in December, 1864. Seemingly, it promised to deal a death blow to such formulas as "a free Church in a free state," for it described as errors the propositions that the Church lacked the power to employ direct or indirect force upon any temporal power and that the Church ought to be excluded absolutely from all charge and dominion over temporal affairs. Apologists of Pius IX have since sought to show that the

125 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LV, 209.
Pope did not intend the Syllabus to be a sweeping condemnation of modern liberties and the precepts upon which they were founded. Some\textsuperscript{136} have indicated that Rome meant the Syllabus to have specific reference to Italy and the threats there to the Papacy. These explanations notwithstanding, it was abundantly clear to French Liberal Catholics, and particularly to Montalembert, that their political doctrines had been placed outside the pale of orthodoxy. Montalembert was so convinced that such was the case that he immediately proposed to cease publishing the \textit{Correspondant}, since its program was now condemned.\textsuperscript{137} Having so recently been reprimanded by the Holy See for his Malines speeches of 1865, he could have hardly thought otherwise. Furthermore, French Liberal Catholics had reason to believe that their former associate and now their arch opponent, Mgr. Gerbet, had formulated the list of errors upon which the Syllabus was based; and they could only assume that the list was directed as much at them as at the Italian situation.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover, if the Montalembert group needed further confirmation, it was supplied by Mgr. Pie, Bishop of Poitiers and special favorite of the Pope. In 1865 Mgr. Pie said, in a letter to his clergy, that it was true that the Syllabus had been directed against the adversaries of

\textsuperscript{136} cf. especially E.E.Y. Hales, \textit{Pio Nono} (New York, 1954), Chapter VII.


the Church outside the faith, but "more especially against those within the Church." The next year Louis Veuillot published, with the Pope's blessing, his *Illusion libérale* in which he said that the Syllabus proved that the Liberal Catholic school had been opposed to Catholic doctrine.

The publication of Dupanloup's *La Convention du 15 septembre et l'encyclique du 8 décembre* served to counteract the sweeping condemnations made by the Syllabus and to provide at least a *modus vivendi* for Liberal Catholics. In his pamphlet Dupanloup first defended the Pope's temporal sovereignty in Italy; then he proceeded to give a more palatable interpretation of the Syllabus. For his efforts he received the thanks of 630 bishops and the approval of the Pope. The Roman Pontiff's approval, according to Cardinal Antonelli, resulted from Dupanloup's brilliant defense of the Pope's temporal power rather than strict agreement with Dupanloup's interpretation of the Syllabus.

In his commentary on the Syllabus Dupanloup stated that it "is an elementary rule of interpretation that the condemnation of a proposition does not necessarily imply the affirmation of its opposite." Furthermore, the condemnation of a proposition might

142 Dupanloup, *Nouvelles œuvres choisies*, IV, 323.
imply that it was false only when stated as an absolute truth. For example, the Syllabus stated that it was an error to say that "it is necessary to proclaim and observe the principle of non-intervention.... In condemning such a proposition did the Pope mean to make intervention the absolute and universal rule? It would be absurd to answer in the affirmative." Most important to Dupanloup's interpretation, however, was the distinction between the "thesis" and the "hypothesis" which theologians had used in the past. The thesis represented the Catholic ideal in a society wholly Catholic; the hypothesis was what was possible or just in society as it then existed. "That which is admissible in the hypothesis is often false when stated as an absolute truth, that is, as a thesis." So when Rome condemned the proposition that the Church should be separated from the state, and the state from the Church, it was condemning the notion that separation in an absolute and complete form constituted the ideal toward which Catholics should work.

Rome was not, on the contrary, insisting that the state and the Church should not be mutually independent; nor was it supporting a theocratic or Gallican system. In the condemnation of the proposition that everybody should be free to give public utterance, in every possible situation and by every possible means, to all his opinions whatever they might be, the Pope was not condemning the

143 Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 325.
144 Ibid., 327.
145 Ibid., 346.
concept of freedom of speech except in so far as that freedom was construed to be an absolute liberty. But what government, Dupanloup asked, no matter how liberal, has ever undertaken to guarantee absolute freedom of speech without restrictions—that is, in the sense of the thesis rather than the hypothesis? Likewise, freedom of the press was nowhere accepted as a thesis—an absolute. So by condemning propositions that such freedoms be held absolute and universal, the Pope was doing no more, Dupanloup said, than the most liberal governments did when they passed laws against abusive uses of the press.

The apparent condemnation of the concept of religious liberty was analyzed by Dupanloup in similar fashion. "Liberty of conscience—how many erroneous ways there are of understanding this expression! If it means doctrinal indifferentism or the equality in itself of the true and the false, should not the Church condemn it? And if we are to understand this liberty to mean that conscience is sovereign and superior to Divine Law, is this not to place man above God?" The Pope and the Church had an ideal of religious unity, he said, and men do not have the right to ask them to transform relative or temporary necessities into absolute truths, to make dogmatic principles out of the divisions in the realm of Christianity, although those divisions were tolerated. Without doubt, the Catholic Church "wishes that there was no need for liberty of

146 Dupanloup, *Nouvelles œuvres choisies*, IV, 349.
147 Ibid., 343.
cults. It desires the unity of the human race in the Church. That is the ideal, the thesis; harmony of minds, not anarchy, is the goal."

In the absence of such unity, however, did the Pope indicate in the Syllabus that Catholics should impose their discipline by force? Not at all, Dupanloup declared. "The Pope did not intend to condemn governments which, because of the lack of religious unity, have written religious toleration into their constitutions. Nothing could be further from the truth. Pius IX told me last year in Rome: 'Jews and Protestants are free in Rome; the Jews have their synagogue and the Protestants their chapel.'" 148 A Catholic could, therefore, support sincerely a constitution which proclaimed religious liberty, Dupanloup said. Such a "hypothesis" had not been condemned. In short, what had been condemned was the proposition that unlimited liberty of religion was a universal ideal, absolute and obligatory in every century and in every country. To admit to such would be to accept the multiplication of religious sects as a positive good. Such a concept ran counter to the Church's ideal of unity, that is, to the thesis. 149

With the publication of his analysis of the Syllabus, Dupanloup "became the Pope of Liberal Catholicism." 150 No doubt his precept- torial modifications of the spirit of the Syllabus served to make Liberal Catholicism a practical possibility, but the fact still stood that the pontifical pronouncements of Pius IX had further

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148 Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 344. 149 Ibid., 347.
differentiated between the spirit of Catholicism and the spirit of modern Liberalism. As a consequence the goal of Liberal Catholicism—a rapprochement between the Church and Liberalism—was placed even more out of reach.

The distinction Dupanloup made between the thesis and the hypothesis drew criticism from all sides. By Liberals he was accused of hypocrisy; by intransigent Catholics, of heresy; and even Montalembert credited him with being a master of "eloquent subterfuge." Far from being an analysis of the Syllabus, wrote a hostile Catholic critic, Dupanloup's pamphlet was basically an anti-Syllabus. Dupanloup threw upon the papal document a shadow and a veil instead of full light, it was charged. "Changing totally the sense of the Encyclical, Dupanloup sacrificed Catholic truth to public opinion, over which he exercised a veritable empire." To many intransigent Catholics Dupanloup had not just demanded the admission by the Church of the hypothesis. He had instead insisted upon the "acceptance, without reserve of any kind, of modern society, of 'indifferentism,' of liberty of thought, conscience, press and of religion." Dupanloup was, in their opinion, truly the "anonymous Arius of the nineteenth century." 

153 Maynard, Dupanloup, 136.
155 Fevre, Centenaire de Dupanloup, 174. 156 Ibid., 51.
On the other hand, Dupanloup's formula of "thesis" and "hypothesis" left the Liberal Catholics unguarded against charges that they always reserved the "anterior and superior rights of the Church" in its relationship to the state, and that they accepted religious liberty only as a necessity of the times. His formula, continued Pressense, was merely an ingenious device by which the Church could invoke liberty in fact, while rejecting it in theory. No doubt the distinction between the thesis and hypothesis exposed Liberal Catholics more than ever to the criticism that they did not accept liberty as a positive good, but only as a means by which the Church could regain its lost strength.

Certainly Liberal Catholics, after the condemnation of Lamennais and especially after the Syllabus, were plagued by contradictions in their position. Perhaps it was true, as Veuillot declared, that after the Syllabus, "a Catholic no longer could be a Liberal or call himself one." At least the Liberal Catholic's position was more difficult. Proponents of the reconciliation of the Church and society were tormented by self-contradictions, which they never succeeded in harmonizing. It was this fact, stated one Liberal, that gave Liberal Catholics "an appearance of insincerity. In reality they do not deserve the imputation; it was their position which was...

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157 É. de Pressense, "Dupanloup," Revue bleue, XV (1884), 58.
158 A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Les catholiques libéraux (Paris, 1885), 212; cf. Boissard, Théophile Foissart, 197.
159 Monde, February 18, 1865.
false, not themselves. Their position was at best difficult.

Dupanloup, after 1864, became increasingly less Liberal; following the debacle of 1870 and later the triumph of republicanism, he was more and more removed from his times. The other remaining champion of the Liberal Catholic group originating about 1840, Montalembert, became consistently more adamant in his support of Liberal principles. Montalembert's last pamphlet, "L'Espagne et la liberté," was in such discord with the spirit of the Syllabus that his friends, the editors of Correspondant, refused to print it. They felt that it would be expressly condemned by Rome. Given by Montalembert to the charge of Père Hyacinthe, who became Protestant in 1870 in reaction to the definition of Papal Infallibility, it was first printed in a Swiss journal. Following the publication of "L'Espagne et la liberté," there ensued litigation against the journal for having published it without the consent of Montalembert's heirs. Ownership of the manuscript was awarded to the latter, and the pamphlet was never printed in France. Since then his Catholic admirers have attempted to show that Montalembert never violated the spirit of the Syllabus, that he always distinguished between the thesis and the hypothesis, and that his outlook was exonerated and verified by the Holy See during the pontificate of Leo XIII. Whether Leo XIII's Encyclical, Immortale Dei, accepted the philosophy of Liberalism as

160 Presse et L'Espagne et la liberté, Contemporaine Porrates, 144.

161 cf., for example, Mgr. d'Hulst, Le quatrième congres de Malines, Correspondant, CXXVIII (1891), 976-989, 982.
thoroughly as did Montalembert is at least questionable. Certainly, the spirit of "L'Espagne et la liberté" was altogether alien to that of the Syllabus. In the final analysis, however, any judgment on the completeness of Montalembert's Liberal faith must be at best subjective.

Speaking of the reasons for his resignation from the National Assembly in May, 1848, Lacordaire wrote, "I embodied two distinct characters, that of the religious and that of the citizen. It was impossible for me to separate them. Both were called upon to prove worthy of the other, so that the acts of the citizen should never cause any pain to the conscience of the religious....In spite of myself, I saw that it was impossible to keep the balance." This personal dilemma was in reality the larger problem of Church and state in miniature. Although the Liberal Catholics postulated the mutual independence of the spiritual and temporal spheres—a free Church in a free state—they could not separate them, any more than a Quinet or later a Jaurès could divorce his concept of the state from his own personal moral, social, and religious convictions. The Liberal Catholic could not accept anymore than Rousseau could have accepted—and for precisely the same reasons—the absolutely secularized state. There remained always a subtle but powerful and provocative interfusion of interests in regard to civil law and Christian moral law and of social ethics and Catholic teaching.

162 Chocarne, Lacordaire, II, 225.
Because of their convictions, the Liberal Catholics could not admit wide-scale discrepancies between the state's procedures and the moral doctrines of the Church. Being fully enfranchised citizens, they would not abdicate their right to hold those convictions. They felt that modern society and the reign of liberty should grant them the right to seek the realization of their own private utopia—a France in which Church and state were independent of one another, but in which all Frenchmen were Catholic and therefore motivated by Catholic principles and doctrines. In reality they sought only what any philosophical or political movement desires if it is convinced of its own validity: to win followers and thus insure the application of a particular program.

In return for freedom Liberal Catholics pledged themselves to respect the institutions under which they enjoyed freedom. That is to say, they championed freedom of religion because they fervently believed in the individual's liberty of conscience and because experience and history seemed to indicate that only by observing others' rights to opinions would their own rights be respected. In accepting such a position they seemed to stand opposed to the Church's proclamations and definitions. To escape censure and to formulate a position which they believed would harmonize their personal convictions with the doctrines of Rome—or at least make it possible for them to hold their opinions and remain in the Roman Church—they devised, under Dupanloup's direction, the rather shallow distinction between the thesis and the hypothesis. Thus they were able to agree
that the ideal, the "thesis," of Catholic unanimity would obviate the necessity for liberty of cults, but that as long as there was a multiplicity of religious groups, the "hypothesis" or practical point of departure would allow full Catholic support of the principle of religious liberty. They rejected, then, the Church's traditional claims for a privileged position in the state, as well as the efficacy or desirability of a policy of coercion, and accepted sincerely, if illogically, the principles of religious liberty and of the laic state.
Chapter IV

GALICANISM AND ULTRAMONTANISM

Integrally associated with the question of Church-state relations in nineteenth-century France was the trend, on the part of the French clergy, away from Gallicanism in the direction of Ultramontanism. Gallicanism, a term given to the preference for a French Church controlled by the national monarch and ecclesiastical hierarchy as opposed to the supra-national direction by the papacy, rested historically on the Concordat of 1516 and the Four Articles of the Gallican Church of 1682. These gave the king the right to appoint principal ecclesiastical officials, affirmed the independence of the French monarch in his relations with the Papacy, and denied the Pope's right to restrain the temporal power of rulers. They had the effect of limiting papal power by stating the superiority of council over the Pope and by emphasizing the prerogatives of the bishops. Even if it is an exaggeration to state that the "liberties of the Gallican Church" were only liberties against the Papacy and a mask for the servility of the Church to the monarch, certain it is that the Gallican Church and the monarchy were complemental and that they coalesced to form the core of the old regime.

They were the twin victims of the French Revolution. In their
previous forms, both became anachronistic and superannuated after August of 1789. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy, by emphasizing the state's supervision of clerical affairs, pointed out the folly of the Gallican formula for Church-state relations. Subordination of Church to state or the mutual dependence of the two was a relative good for the Church, depending upon the nature and philosophy of the state. The Gallicans had assumed the continuation of a Christian monarchy, an assumption which was ill-founded. With the revolution and later the Concordat of 1801 the obsolescence of the Gallican tradition was foretold, for Gallicanism rested upon premises—especially the presupposition of the continuation of a propitious monarchy—which the Revolution and Napoleon destroyed.

The Concordat especially doomed the Gallican tradition. Giving the bishop greater power over the priests in his diocese, the Concordat stipulated that the bishop should name "cures" to the principal towns of the different cantons and that they should be irremovable. But in the less populous parishes, the "desservants" or "succursales" were named by the bishop and could be dismissed by him.\(^1\) Furthermore, no priest could leave the diocese or carry out official functions in his parish without the authorization of the bishop.\(^2\) According to some estimates, three-fourths of the priests were "amovible" at the


bishop's pleasure. The resulting defection to Rome caused the Abbé Darboy, later Archbishop of Paris and recognized leader of Gallican forces, to charge that the priests praised 'the pope at a distance in order to insult the bishops who are close.' The priest in the nineteenth century, therefore, became the natural proponent of Ultramontanism, for it was to Rome that the priest looked for a counterbalance to the episcopal power.

Far from re-establishing the Church-state relations of the old regime, the Concordat negotiated by Napoleon subordinated the French hierarchy to the state to a degree not previously known. Against the encroachments of the state, the bishops too would demand papal protection. Therefore, the Concordat not only restored the Church in France, but by it, "Rome gained a victory in a land, from which up until now had gone forth the most energetic protest against the absolute power of the papacy." The process by which the Pope forced the resignation of all bishops and installed new ones increased the papal power over the French clergy. It was accomplished in a manner which "could only be defended on Bellarmine's theory of papal supremacy. In spite of his Gallicanism and his studies of Bossuet,


Bonaparte inflicted by his action a deadly wound on the liberties of the Gallican Church, and Roman Ultramontanism could congratulate itself on having got the French government to accept the Ultramontane theory of the supremacy of the Pope over the episcopate, and to silence every appeal to the old Gallican canon law. Furthermore, the toleration by the Empire of other religious groups deprived the clergy of its ancient predominance in the state; as a result, the clergy naturally strengthened its ties with the head of the Church in Rome in an attempt to buttress its own position vis-à-vis the state. In short, as Dansette has written, the Revolution destroyed the Gallican Church, the Bonapartist settlement inadvertently sanctioned that destruction, and Ultramontanism commenced its triumphant career. The Empire delayed the course of that triumph by only a decade.

Ultramontanism: De Maistre and Lamennais

Ultramontanism embodied both a political and social philosophy as well as a theology. Theologically, supremacy of the Papacy was the central core of Ultramontane doctrine. The Pope was intrinsically the spokesman of an infallible Church, and it followed logically—and as

7Weill, Revue de synthèse historique, XV, 320.
8Dansette, Histoire religieuse de la France, I, 187.
the Vatican Council of 1869 was to show, historically— that the Pope himself was the embodiment of the Church's infallibility. Consequently in matters of theology and doctrine, the Pope possessed absolute rights, subject only to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. If institutions such as the Gallican tradition had evolved to challenge the authority of the Papacy, those institutions worked not only against Catholic truth and God's intentions, but also they served to hinder the Church's mission of saving souls by impregnating minds with Catholic discipline, for such fallacies as the Gallican Church, by weakening the central leadership, diluted Catholic doctrine to the pleasure of local political influences. The strength of the Church was proportionate to the Papacy's strength, or as Lamennais wrote, "No Pope, no Church; no Church, no Christianity; no Christianity, no religion, at least for all peoples who had been Christians; no religion, no society."\(^9\)

As a political and social philosophy, Ultramontanism ranged, previous to 1830, almost uniformly within the scope of conservative traditionalism fringing upon theocracy. De Maistre, Bonald and the young Lamennais were its spokesmen. Despising the doctrine of natural rights and the autonomy of the individual, which were "an insurrection against God,"\(^10\) De Maistre shaped his Ultramontanism as a theological guarantor of reaction. In matters of Church-state relations, temporal affairs would be subordinated to the supreme authority of the Church. Against


the charges that they prepared for a theocracy, the Ultramontanes issued not a denial, but a solemn warning that justice and order could only be assured by the influence of a strong Church headed by an infallible pope—only those conditions would provide the respect for authority and the moral fiber upon which a sound social system could be based. There was, therefore, within the Ultramontanism of De Maistre a curious affinity with the older Gallicanism in so far as both tended to ally themselves with the political and social status quo. In any case, during the Second Empire the Gallicans and the intransigent Ultramontanes joined in supporting Napoleon fervently, accepting the deprivation of the Church's independence as a seemingly natural condition. In Rome, Mgr. Darboy, the Gallican archbishop of Paris, and Mgr. Pie, the Ultramontane bishop of Poitiers, might be beset with theological differences; but in Paris they joined to praise a political situation which promised to restore the Church to its favored position.

After the advent of Lamennais' Liberal Catholic movement, however, French Ultramontanism was divided against itself, for opposed to the traditional political and social philosophy of the French Church was ranged the revolutionary proposal to ally the Church with the ideas of 1789. Liberal Catholicism did not cease to champion the cause of the papacy, but it became more and more estranged from its Ultramontane forebears. It might agree with De Maistre's exaltation of the papacy, but it could not possibly share his general philosophy.
Nor did Bossuet provide guidance. In reality, the French Liberal Catholics were isolated completely; alliances with Gallicans here or with intransigent Ultramontanes there could be no more than a fleeting expediency. As Pius IX became increasingly reactionary Liberal Catholics became less Ultramontane in direct proportion. At the Vatican Council they opposed infallibility, thus seeming to identify themselves with Gallicanism. But in Paris, they objected vehemently to Gallican reverence for political power. In short, Liberal Catholicism cannot be intelligently associated either with Ultramontanism, connoting as it did political reaction and denial of the principles of Liberalism, or with Gallicanism. Liberal Catholics felt that both were superannuated, and they sought to provide the Church with a completely fresh approach to contemporary situations.

Just as the discredited Lamennais was the spring through which mid-century Liberal Catholics' political, pedagogical and social philosophy flowed, so did he provide their basic attitudes regarding papal power. He had exalted papal authority in an unprecedented measure, almost as if to escape the conservative attitudes so ingrained in the French hierarchy. The pope and the people would embrace one another, papal blessings would flow out on nineteenth century institutions and the people would turn to the bosom of the Church for protection from their ecclesiastical and secular oppressors. It was, therefore, to an infallible pope that Liberal Catholics must look for the establishment of Liberalism. As Louis Blanc said, "it was Ultramontanism summoned to the aid of liberty; it was the despotism of kings
immolated, by order of Heaven, to those two great powers, the Pope and the people. "11

When the ideas of L'Avenir were struck down by two successive Papal blows, Mirari vos of 1832, and Singulari nos of 1834, it became necessary for Lamennais and his followers to choose between obedience to the Church or to their political and social philosophy, which had been condemned. Lamennais himself refused to make this choice, insisting in a letter to Montalembert that the question was not one of submission to the authority of the Church as the emanator of theological truth—this submission he had dutifully made—but whether a Catholic, obedient in spiritual matters, does not have the right of intellectual independence in non-spiritual affairs. The upshot of the matter was whether there existed two societies, spiritual and temporal, which were separate and independent. In a word, "whether the Pope is the sole sovereign of the universe, in both temporal and spiritual fields, and whether absolute theocracy is, according to the Church, the only acceptable government."12

After the second condemnation of his ideas, accomplished by Singulari nos, he declared, in a letter to Montalembert, that the encyclical had no doctrinal authority. It was only a political document; it was nothing more than "personal opinion of Mauro Capellari."13


So convinced was Lamennais of the delimitation placed on papal authori-
ty by the separation of the temporal and spiritual spheres that for a
time after his condemnation he continued to argue that the Catholic
Church required an infallible head, although he was more ready to con-
cur with Gallicans that safeguards were needed against the misuse of
apal authority. In the final analysis he was forced to admit the
impossibility of his position, since Gregory XVI interpreted his own
power as he did.

The Second Liberal Catholic Movement

The Lamennais affair boded ill for the future of Liberal
Catholicism in France. His followers submitted to Papal will, but
only with difficulty and then with private reservations. "I had to
violate my most profound convictions in order to submit to a pronounce-
ment such as the August 15 encyclical," Montalembert wrote. "It con-
flicts with my own convictions in the most positive way. But this is
preferable to finding myself outside the Church, which can offer me
solace for those intimate difficulties which political or intellectual
activity cannot relieve." Montalembert's dilemma was clearly estab-
lished. Was he to sacrifice the Church or liberty? In the long run
he could no neither. He was an "homme d'entre-deux." Montalembert

15 Letter of December 13, 1843, G. Goyau and P. de Lallemand, eds.,
Lettres de Montalembert à Lamennais (Paris, 1932), 265.
16 Ibid., Letter of August 14, 1834, 244; cf. Andre Trannoy, Le Ro-
manticisme politique de Montalembert avant 1843 (Paris, 1942),
210-215.
submitted, but it would seem that he never fully agreed, even in those critical years, that papal sovereignty extended to the personal political and social philosophy of individual Catholics. After learning of Mirari vos, he wrote that "the encyclical fortunately does not apply to our consciences as Catholics; it does not necessitate laying down our arms."\(^{17}\) And only a little later, he drew the distinction between "spiritual Rome" and "political Rome."\(^{18}\) The Abbe Lacordaire was more equivocal, but even he assured Montalembert in a letter of December 14, 1833, that "the Encyclical does not include the doctrine which you repulse with so much fear. It does not prescribe a definite political philosophy which a Catholic must follow. It is not a question of becoming a legitimist or a partisan of the Czar Nicholas or an enemy of liberty."\(^{19}\) Later both he and Montalembert were to give adequate proof that they had not forsaken the distinction which, if granted, gave to individual Catholics freedom in intellectual spheres outside theology.

Therefore, the Liberal Catholic movement which emerged after 1843 had as its heritage an Ultramontanism severely tempered by an insistence upon the separation of Church and state and the concommitant demand for independence from Rome in political and social matters.

\(^{17}\) Letter of August 14, 1834, Goyau and Lallemand, eds., Lettres, 184.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., Letter of October 7, 1832, 196.

\(^{19}\) Théophile Foisset, "Le Père Lacordaire," Correspondant, LI (September, 1872), 985-1007, 997.
Against the reactionary French ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Bourbon restoration, which tended to identify all Catholicism with counter-revolutionary principles, Lamennais and his followers had appealed to Rome. To escape the stultifying subordination of Church to state, they exalted papal power and declared war on Gallicanism. When Gregory XVI rejected their proposals for the revivification of Catholicism, and then went further to deny their right to independent judgement on political and social doctrine, their Ultramontanism receded. Only after the election of Pius IX, with his apparently liberal proclivities, did their Ultramontanism revive. In their campaign for Catholic freedom based on the common right and on a regime of liberty, they appealed for and received the support of the Holy See. But with the reaction following the revolutions of 1848, the papacy again became hostile to the Liberal Catholic school, this hostility culminating in the Syllabus of 1864. The Liberal Catholics were again faced with the dilemma of 1832 and 1834. A nearly omnipotent Pope threatened to make their liberal position impossible. Once again they were reminded of the need for safeguards against the intrusion of the papacy into political or temporal affairs. Their Ultramontanism subsided in direct proportion to the degree that Pius IX embarrassed their political philosophy. Between 1852 and 1870 the papacy came more and more to insist upon a degree of Ultramontanism theretofore unknown. The encyclical of 1853, "Inter multiplices", which exonerated the stand taken by Univers, praised the bishops who had reintroduced Roman liturgy, and condemned the idea of separate national churches held together by doctrine but particularistic in discipline, was but a
prologue to defining infallibility in 1870.  

The Liberal Catholics opposed papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1869 and 1870, not so much on theological bases as on a fear that the definition of the dogma would erase any possibility of a Catholic freely thinking and breathing in a modern liberal society. They found themselves in temporary alliance with Gallicanism, but for it they could have little respect, for had not the Gallicans rendered the French clergy ludicrous and hypocritical by their attachment to Napoleon's anti-liberal regime?

Liberal Catholics, therefore, were neither Gallican nor Ultramontane in the usual meanings of the words. In actuality, their attitude toward papal power depended upon or fluctuated with the freedom granted them by the Papacy to champion the alliance of Christianity and modern society, that is to say, to believe in and act upon the principles they had learned from Lamennais.

The Liberal Catholic attitude toward Gallicanism was determined by their firm belief in the mutual independence of Church and state. There were dangers inherent in the Church's "bargaining," as Dupanloup put it, with the temporal power. Almost innate within the Liberal Catholics' approach was dislike of governmental influence. The Church fared better when it remained free of all commitments, they said, or as Dupanloup stated directly after the establishment of the Second Empire,


"The favors of princes and the acclamations of peoples have never found
us ungrateful, but at the same time, never too confident."22 On another
occasion, the Bishop of Orleans, objecting to the interference of the
Imperial government with clerical discussion, explanation, and circula-
tion of the highly controversial Syllabus of Errors, pointed to a long
history of abuses of the Church's independence which dated from the
"Gallican mischief-making."23 The law being applied in this case was
"a special law, containing special penalties, against a particular
class of citizens, by virtue of a special liberty which is called
Gallican. This liberty was invented by two particularly liberal
sovereigns, Louis XIV and Napoleon I. What admirable logicians are
these liberal corruptors of the French language."24

If Dupanloup, educated as he was in the Gallican tradition, had
been weaned away from the influence of Bossuet, the anti-Gallican
spirit of Montalembert and Lacordaire was even more pronounced. Their
opposition to Gallicanism rested upon Lamennais' criticism of the Con-
cordat of 1801, which might have increased the papal power over the
French clergy, but it nevertheless rendered the clergy subordinate to,
or identified with, the state. After the defection of their leader,
they did not cease their detestation of the subordination of Church to
state in Gallican fashion. Furthermore, the old traditions of the
Church of France were self-defeating in any post-revolutionary society.

22 *Airi de la religion*, December 9, 1852.


IV, 232-33.
Gallicanism was disappearing, they thought. As Montalembert said in the Chamber of Peers in 1847, "Gallicanism is nothing more than a mummy. This does not prevent it from having idolators, for as you know, the Egyptians embalmed the animals which were their gods, and then worshiped them more after having embalmed them. The idolators of Gallicanism are few in number and not very dangerous, but sometimes they are troublesome and vicious." 25

Lacordaire was of the same opinion. "These unfortunate Gallican laymen," he said in a letter to Foisset on July 19, 1844, "will end by becoming museum curiosities." 26 Contemporary society, which had produced the downfall of absolutism, had also reduced Gallicanism to nothingness, Montalembert stated. "We love the present time," he said, "because it is grinding to dust the frightful spirit of Gallicanism, that slow and treacherous schism which divides while appearing to unite, which leaves the devil at his ease, and the conscience contented." 27 Defining Gallicanism as an "alliance between throne and altar whereby the latter was exploited for the benefit of the former," 28 Montalembert wrote Les intérêts catholiques au dix-neuvième siècle in 1852 to combat the clergy's subservience which


he called a poorly disguised neo-Gallicanism. He declared that Gallicanism, in so far as the term referred to the Articles of 1682, was dead. "We need not any longer...refer to those Gallican, Germanic, and Spanish Churches, founded on the pride of a few bishops and the false science of certain doctors, the wretched accomplices of the encroachments of the temporal power and the Jansenist heresy." Gallicanism, "perhaps the most formidable and the most inveterate of all our errors, is at its last breath."^29

In the opinion of Liberal Catholics, the unholy alliance between the Second Empire and the Church threatened the gains made by the destruction of the older Gallicanism. Just as the clergy in the old regime was used in the foundation of absolute power, so were the French Catholics after 1852 contributing to the success of a regime opposed to liberty. This turn of events could be criticized from three directions. First, it placed the Church in opposition to the movement of human history toward a liberal system; second, it restored the privileged position of the Church, whereas the Church needed independence and freedom. "When once reduced to a state of privilege, the Church falls sooner or later into the position of a client, a protege, with all the shackles and humiliations of such a condition."^30

Third, history had shown that "the subjection of the Church and the decline of her influence have been in direct proportion to the progress of


^30Ibid., 174.
despotism." And of all despotisms, the most intolerable of all is that which seems to be sanctioned by religion. "It calls into rebellion the noblest sentiments of our souls, because we feel that it is using something sacred for the advantage of a profane interest." Under such conditions, the Church gradually "loses her empire over souls; at first she is the dupe, but then by degrees she assumes the air of an accomplice. She always ends by being the victim." 

Furthermore, "that close alliance of the Church with absolute power, which Bossuet and his successors had made in some degree an article of faith among us, was a novelty dating only from the seventeenth century." Against it stood a thousand years of opposite traditions and precedents in the history of the Church.

Lacordaire agreed. Subserviency of Church to state, he said, "eats into souls, and enfeebles them. It gave vertigo to Bossuet himself. It produces a cowardly episcopate, worshippers of power, who transmit to the rest of the clergy a timidity, mingled with ambition." It was a fearful poison, from which resulted "baseness, and before long, apostasy. And I admit that I would despair did I not believe that the present progress of the world has no other end than that of the final enfranchisement of the Church by means of the universal

31 Montalembert, Les intérêts catholiques au dix-neuvième siècle, 94.
33 Ibid., 72-73.
downfall of despotism." As early as 1832 he had joined in the declaration of policy for the new Catholic publication, *La Tribune, Gazette du Clergé* which promised to divorce the Church from politics and to repudiate Gallicanism as well as absolutism."

Surely, then, it would be incorrect to place the label of Gallicanism upon Liberal Catholics, if by Gallicanism is meant an approach to Church-state relations whereby the Church is in any way subordinated to the state. Their opposition to Gallican principles was recognized by most champions of the Church of France. For example, the Abbé Guettée charged that the Gallicanism of the Broglies and the Dupanloups retained only the scantiest tinge of Bossuet's theology. Much more accurate than the sweeping accusation of Gallicanism hurled at the Montalembert group by such intransigents as Mgr. Févre, the Abbé Jules Morel, or Louis Veuillot was the criticism of Mgr. de Ladoue, Bishop of Nevers, who said that "Catholic liberalism has formulated its principles on the basis of the first article of the Declaration of 1682—absolute independence.

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34 Count A. de Falloux, Correspondence du R. P. Lacordaire avec Mme Swetchine (Paris, 1876), 465.
35 Mgr. Louis Baunard, Frédéric Ozanam (Paris, 1912), 58.
36 R.F.W. Guettée, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de l'Église de France pendant le xixe siècle, Vol.1 (only one appeared) (Paris, 1881), ix.
in civil and temporal affairs, and the resulting intellectual freedom.

If Ultramontane philosophy connoted the blind acceptance of papal leadership in all matters, both spiritual and temporal, the Montalembert group, by 1855, could not be classified as Ultramontanes. As Ollivier judged, what Montalembert had originally sought in the Ultramontane propaganda was simply the removal of civil constraints and the liberty of the Church. But when men succeeded in linking him with the infallibilist doctrines of Joseph de Maistre, he found that he had unconsciously promoted the very opinions which he abhorred. Absolute monarchy of the Pope he simply disbelieved and rejected. The more the Papacy tended to use its power to sponsor reactionary social and political attitudes, the less Montalembert and his fellow liberal Catholics were willing to advocate the extension of that power. When Pius IX, in issuing his encyclicals, consistently and completely ignored the frontiers between matters spiritual and temporal, the Catholic Liberals inadvertently relied upon the distinction made by the first of the articles of the Gallican Church. Falloux was correct when he pointed out that Montalembert and Lacordaire were the oldest Ultramontanes in their group. "They were not merely Ultramontanes, however. They were no less the friends of political liberty, and it was their championing of liberty which neutralized their devotion to

\[38\] Tolra de Bordas, Mgr. de Ladoue (Paris, 1878), 114.

Ultramontanism. Thus were their attitudes conditioned.

Liberal Catholic reaction against Ultramontanism began only after the collapse of the 1848 revolutionary movement and the subsequent conservative papal policy. It increased with the coup d'etat of December 2, 1852, after which Pius IX heaped praise and pontifical blessings upon the French intransigents who had taken a stand against liberal institutions in favor of the Empire and who preoccupied themselves with vociferous attacks on the persons and principles of Liberal Catholics. Under the leadership of Louis Veuillot of the Univers and Mgr. Pie of Poitiers, this group erased the shadows between Ultramontanism and Gallicanism. It became a matter of black and white. Anyone who failed to accept without question the viewpoints of the Holy See, "would not really be faithful to the Papacy and would be veiling...a Gallicanism akin to rebellion." It was against this brand of Ultramontanism and the use of papal power for those ends, that the Liberal Catholics reacted.

It is easiest to trace that reaction in the development of Montalembert's attitude toward the papacy. In a letter to Montalembert written on September 10, 1853, Mgr. Sibour, Archbishop of Paris pointed to that group of intransigent Catholics who anathematized liberty, deified absolute power, glorified governments which suppressed political freedom, and in philosophical discussion, denied any place to human reason. "These attitudes are the result of Ultramontanism."
montanism, which leads us to a double idolatry: idolatry of temporal and of spiritual power." Twenty-five years before, he continued, "when we made a profession of Ultramontanism, it was a school of liberty, advocating the mutual independence of the spiritual and temporal powers and guarding freedom against the encroachments of a temporal government. We did not advocate the disappearance of all intermediate powers in the Church—the prerogatives of the hierarchy, of reasonable discussion, of all individuality,...of councils with real authority." The new Ultramontane, on the contrary, "puts everything in the extreme, subordinates every concept to the notion of power...both of the state and the church." Montalembert expressed his complete agreement, saying that the Ultramontane "school of liberty has been transformed into a school of servitude...Men servile in the temporal order and insolently oppressive in the spiritual order have established within Ultramontane catholicism an abominable solidarity. By refusing any liberty to bishops or civil tolerance, by denying the rights of men and the force of reason, they are overturning the fundamental laws of society and the Church." Without contesting the spiritual prerogatives of the pope:

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42 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 104-5.
43 Montalembert to Mgr. Sibour, September 23, 1853, Ibid., 105-6.
44 Note: The definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, accomplished without a Church council, resulted in few if any objections on the part of Liberal Catholics. They assumed this action to be within the scope of the pope's prerogatives. cf. Georges Weill, Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France (Paris, 1909), 151-52; and Adrien Dansette, Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine, 2 vols. (Paris, 1948), I, 414-415.
Montalembert did not want the Church transformed into an absolute monarchy which would threaten liberty of discussion on temporal questions.45

That Montalembert presupposed a generous quantity of freedom to discuss matters related to the Church is evidenced by his statement, made in a letter to Foisset on July 28, 1845, that "it is necessary to be an arch-Catholic as I am to understand that one ought and can risk displeasing Rome in order to serve the Church and even Rome itself."46 The same idea was reflected in a letter from Foisset to Montalembert in a letter of October 16, 1852. Speaking of Montalembert's Les intérêts catholiques au dix-neuvième siècle, he said, "You have displeased Rome, I am sure. But it is better to serve the Holy See than to please it."47 The publication of the Syllabus of Errors following Montalembert's speech at Malines in 1864 revealed to the Liberal Catholics the full scope of papal power, as it was now interpreted by the Holy See. Catholics would need submit, it was felt, to political attitudes of Rome as well as to its theology.

Montalembert then began to retreat swiftly from his Ultramontane position, and by 1869 he had taken a stand against the definition of Infallibility. Taunted by the Univers (February 14, 1870) for his

45 Montalembert to Foisset, May 31, 1869, Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 430.

46 Ibid., II, 263.

47 Ibid., III, 75.
changed attitude toward papal sovereignty, Montalembert replied, "Who would have expected, in 1847, that the liberal pontificate of Pius IX acclaimed by all the liberals in two worlds, would become the pontificate represented and personified by the Univers and La Civiltà?" In the midst of unanimous cries for liberty emitted by the clergy, liberty "en tous et pour tous," who in 1847 could have divined this "unbelievable about-face by almost the same clergy in 1852?" Who could have foreseen "the enthusiasm of most of the Ultramontane doctors for the renaissance of caesarism?" Who would have believed possible "the harangues of Mgr. Parisis, the pastoral letters of Mgr. de Salinis, and especially the triumph of the laic theologians of absolutism who have made litter of our liberties, of all our principles as an offering to Napoleon III and as a holocaust to the idol which has been erected in the Vatican?" He finished by heaping praise on Mgr. Dupanloup, "that most eloquent and intrepid priest," who was opposing at the Vatican Council the "torrent of adulation, imposture, and servility which threatens to engulf us." Writing to Döllinger, the Munich ecclesiastical historian at the request of Dupanloup, who wanted the anti-infallibilist Döllinger to attend the Vatican Council, Montalembert again deplored the "abyss of idolatry into which the French clergy had fallen...I do not know of any mystery in the history of the Church to equal the promptness and completeness with which the

48 Gazette de France, March 7, 1870.
French clergy has transformed itself into a vestibule of the ante-chamber of the Vatican. Fortunate it was, perhaps, that Montalembert died before the publication of the new dogma, thus escaping the need to sacrifice his principles once more in order to remain in the Church.

The position of the other Liberal Catholics was not essentially different from Montalembert's. "The old Gallicanism is obsolete," Lacordaire wrote to Montalembert in 1847. "But the Gallicanism which consists of fearing unlimited power...is a living force, since it is founded on a natural and even Christian instinct." Lacordaire's Ultramontanism, like that of Montalembert, was founded originally upon the desire to free the French Church from its vassalage to the French State, but he too was alienated by the Ultramontanism of the intransigent Catholics who would have the pope omnipotent in all matters without regard to the separation of the temporal and spiritual realms, and who were willing to recognize, as Veuillot put it, that the "Pope is able to impose on Catholics the most inviolable submission to his will." In a speech made on behalf of his candidacy in 1848 for the National Assembly, Lacordaire admitted that the lines between temporal and spiritual matters could not be clearly distinguished, but

49 Letter of November 7, 1869, published in Univers, October 28, 1875.
50 E. Spuller, L'Evolution politique et social de l'Église (Paris, 1893) 137.
that at best the Church should have only an indirect influence on political affairs.  In his mind the two were separate, and consequently he assumed a great deal of liberty for himself in formulating his political opinions. He could, then, have but little respect for the intransigents who were glorifying absolutism both at home and in Rome after 1852. He spoke of their fanatical love of despotism, and commented that "they think themselves the leaders of Christendom, and they are but a horde of Scythians." Probably Albert de Broglie's estimation of Lacordaire was correct when he said, "To paint him faithfully he should be simply called a Catholic, for he did not go as far as Montalembert towards Roman traditions, while keeping quite clear of royal Gallicanism and parliamentary Jansenism." Whether Lacordaire would have been as repelled as Montalembert by the Pope's policy after 1864 is a matter of speculation, for Lacordaire, already bitter because of the servility of the French hierarchy toward Pope and Emperor, died in 1862, before the full impact of papal retrenchment was apparent.

As for Dupanloup, Gratry, Augustin Cochin, and Albert de Broglie, all of them veered toward a less Ultramontane position than that taken by Montalembert and Lacordaire. None of them denied the spiritual authority of the papacy, but they reserved for the French Church certain

52 Henri Villard, ed., Correspondance inédite du P. Lacordaire Lettres à sa famille et ses amis (Paris, 1876), 545-56.

53 Montalembert, Lacordaire, 252.  54 Palloux, Mémoires, II, 416.

55 The same might be said for Ozanam who died in 1853.
individuality and for French Catholics, intellectual independence. For example, when Pius IX attempted to substitute the Roman liturgy for the remnants of the traditional liturgies, still observed in fourteen French dioceses, Dupanloup opposed him. 56

For this opposition, the Orleans bishop won the epithet, along with Mgr. Mathieu of Besancon of Gallicanism. In Rome, the Pope called Dupanloup and Mathieu "the two popes of Gallicanism: il Motore e il Mobile." 57 Such a reputation was hardly deserved, for Dupanloup was consistently the greatest apologist for the Holy See in France in the nineteenth century. On one difficult occasion after another, he defended Pius IX and mollified French public opinion when it was irate against the Pope, even though he did state, in an unguarded moment of bad humor, that the pontificate of Pius IX was the "reign and triumph of calumny." 58 His position was, then, not one of Gallicanism, as Pressense and others have stated so categorically. 59

No doubt Émile Faguet was correct in assuming that Dupanloup's monarchism in civil affairs was transferred to this attitude toward Church government. "The Church, in Dupanloup's opinion, was and


57 Fevre, Histoire du catholicisme libéral, 341.

58 R. Aubert, Le pontificat de Pie IX (Paris, 1952), 281.

ought to be a monarchy," advised but not unduly limited by Church councils.  

But all objected, along with Cochin, to the papacy being transformed into a "Court of Louis XIV, only more virtuous."  

The Vatican Council

When it was a question of defining the dogma of infallibility at the Vatican Council in 1869, Catholic Liberals united with the Gallicans in opposition, thus winning for themselves a reputation of French particularism which their past record did not justify. Dupanloup's was among the voices raised against the definition. Contrary to the Gallican Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. Darboy, however, Dupanloup did not vocally question the theological or historical justifications for infallibility. Rather, he based his opposition on the grounds that the definition of the dogma would be inopportune, that it would alienate modern society and civil governments, and make impossible the reconciliation of protestant groups to the Church. Whether his opposition was theologically grounded, and his insistence on the inopportunity of the decision merely a cloak, has been subject to great quantities of speculative treatment. Probably no concrete evidence can be given for such a supposition, but certain it is that if he was not already the most controversial member of the French

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60 Emile Faguet, Mgr. Dupanloup, un grand évêque (Paris, 1914), 150.

hierarchy, he became so in 1869 and 1870.

In this discussion of Dupanloup's role at the Vatican Council and the Liberal Catholic attitudes toward infallibility, a history of the Council or even the most general summation of its activities is not intended. That story has been well told in numerous accounts. Of interest here will be the particular attitudes of the Catholic Liberals in France, especially those of Dupanloup and Montalembert, as well as of the editors of *La Correspondant*, Augustin Cochin and Albert de Broglie. Some attention will be given to Père Gratry, not because he had taken an active part in the Liberal Catholic movement, but because he became associated with that movement in 1869 and 1870.

Mgr. Dupanloup, upon first hearing of the convocation of a general Church Council, was filled with hope that the conclave would reunite the Church. The *Correspondant*, prompted by Dupanloup, showed the same joy and confidence. It was only with the suggestions of "intransigent" French and Italian newspapers, and the publication of a pamphlet by Cardinal Manning in which the English prelate assumed optimistically that the Council would define infallibility, that

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Dupanloup realized that the Council would consider the new dogma. Then, in successive literary skirmishes with Veuillot of the Univers, Cardinal Manning, and Cardinal Deschamps, Archbishop of Malines, and in letters to the clergy in his diocese and to the German bishops who were drawing up the declaration of Fulda in opposition to the definition of infallibility, Dupanloup disclosed his "anti-infallibilist" position. He insisted always that he did not question the theology of infallibility, but only the "opportunity" of its definition. In the course of the almost year long debate, however, he divulged objections to infallibility which were dangerously close to theology in nature. Hence, the controversy over his position.

Referring to Dupanloup and his group of supporters, the Count de Falloux said in his Mémoires that "In all sincerity we could only concern ourselves with the opportuneness of the definition of infallibility. We not only did not combat Ultramontanism, but we expressly said, 'Today everybody is Ultramontane!" True, this may have been, but the same Falloux had said at the conclave of Liberal Catholics at Malines in 1867 that he regretted to see the government of the Church being transformed more and more into an absolute monarchy, although he reiterated his respect for the spiritual prerogatives of the pope. Furthermore, without more than a slight taint of Gallicanism, he did not view the Church as an absolute monarchy which allowed Catholics

64 Falloux, Mémoires, II, 419-420.
little or no freedom to formulate their own opinions and principles.

This was exactly the attitude of Mgr. Dupanloup of Orleans. He too had disavowed Gallicanism and was willing to accept the Pope's authority in spiritual matters. This position he had taken in regard to the dogma of Immaculate Conception, when he did not so much as question the Pope's right to define it. But practically and theologically, it was another matter to grant to the Holy See the prerogatives inherent in the dogma of infallibility, officially defined. So they might all have been Ultramontanes, but all Ultramontanes were not necessarily "infallibilists."

In his pastoral letter concerning the future ecumenical Council, circulated on September 13, 1868, Dupanloup assured his clergy that the Church can accommodate itself to the times, the institutions and the needs of the generations and centuries in which it exists. The Council would be further proof of that fact. This was the Council's value, he declared. Moreover, there was no question of dogma, since the mission of councils, in matters of faith, is not to create new dogma, but to clarify and define. An earlier pastoral, of July 5,


67 Félix Dupanloup, "Lettre de Mgr. l'Évêque d'Orléans au clergé et aux fidèles de son diocèse, sur le futur concile oecumenique," September 13, 1868, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 472.

68 Ibid., IV, 464.
1867, is further indication that Dupanloup had not seriously considered the possibility that the Council would define infallibility. The sole purpose of the Council, he said, was to clarify misunderstandings and to prepare the path for the elimination of discord within the Church. Only when it was evident that many were determined to define infallibility at the Council, and especially after the publication of Cardinal Manning's Pastoral Letter, did Dupanloup feel compelled to take a stand, and even then he was cautious.

His first public protest appeared on November 11, 1869, when he published and circulated to all bishops his Observations sur la controverse soulevée relativement à la définition de l'infaillibilité au futur concile. "It is natural," he wrote, "that filial devotion should want to adorn a father with all gifts and all prerogatives, ... but the definition of a dogma demands other considerations than sentiment alone." And as if not to finish a sentence, he did not go forward to completely outlining those reasons, except to say that the infallibility "de fait" which existed was sufficient and that the proclamation would offend

69 F. Dupanloup, "Lettre de Mgr. l'Evêque d'Orléans au clergé de son diocèse à l'occasion des fêtes de Rome et pour leur annoncer le futur concile oecuménique," Ibid., IV, 454.


71 Félix Dupanloup, Observations sur la controverse soulevée relativement à la définition de l'infaillibilité au futur concile (Paris, 1869).
governments, intellectuals, and dissenters and was therefore inopportune. He expressed amazement that some were actually teaching—the reference was probably to Cardinal Manning—that the pope was infallible "aside from the episcopal body whether united or dispersed."

There had appeared only shortly before the publications of Döllinger and Mgr. Maret expounding the particularist doctrine of Church government. Previous to that the popular Paris priest and associate of Liberal Catholics, Père Hyacinthe, had defected from the Church because the "papacy had assumed an absolutism" which his "Christian and historical conscience" would not allow him to admit. Louis Veuillot chose to discredit the arguments of Dupanloup by associating them with the Gallicanism of Maret, and the defection of Hyacinthe, which allowed him to state that Liberal Catholicism was not far removed from schism. All those opponents of infallibility, Veuillot announced, now had found a leader in the Bishop of Orleans.

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72 Dupanloup, Observations sur la controverse, 16.

73 Ibid., 20.

74 Note: five articles in the Allegemeine Zeitung of Augsburg, re-published under the pseudonym of Janus, Der Papst und das Konzil (Leipzig, 1869); and Mgr. Maret, Concile général et la paix religieuse, 2 vols. (Paris, 1869).


76 Univers, November 18, 1869.
Not able to contain his anger, Dupanloup replied by his pamphlet, 
Avertissement à M. Louis Veuillot, in which Veuillot emerged as the 
equivalent of Satan, put in Biblical terms, the "accuser of the brethren." The Bishop stated that Veuillot was wrong in stating that 
Councils had never had as much authority as the proclamations of the 
papacy. Furthermore, Dupanloup insisted that Veuillot misinterpreted the text, "Lo, I am with you always." Veuillot assumed the 
"you" to be singular and to refer to the pope, whereas the pronoun, 
the Bishop declared, meant "you" collectively.77

Dupanloup, therefore, was well advanced in the formulation of 
a theological opposition to infallibility by November 1869, even 
though he continued to protest that he was opposed to the definition 
only because it was inopportune. Early in 1870, however, he further 
developed his theological considerations in a pamphlet directed at 
Mgr. Deschamps, Archbishop of Malines. Certainly it is necessary, 
Dupanloup wrote, "that the Church have an infallible authority, but 
is it necessary that this authority be vested in the pope alone? Is 
it not sufficient that this authority be centered in the pope and the 
bishops in combination?" The necessity supposed by De Maistre, "based 
on a priori reasoning—for it is a priori, a premise reached independ­
ently of all texts—does not exist. The argument thus falls to 
the earth, meaningless."78 Nothing could be clearer than the con-


78 Félix Dupanloup, Réponse de Mgr. l'Evêque d'Orléans à Monseigneur 
Deschamps, Archêvêque de Malines (Paris, 1870), 20.
elusions presented in this pamphlet. "Infallibility in the Church, is infallibility of the Church, that is to say, the pope with his bishops, in the sense that the episcopate is a true and necessary part, at least by its formal or tacit consent, antecedent or subsequent, to the definition of dogma." To say that the pope alone was the source of the Church's infallibility, was to exclude the episcopate from the word "Church," which was, in turn, to assume a position not supportable by logic or by Church history.

In spite of his protestations to the contrary, therefore, Dupanloup seems to have opposed the theology of infallibility as well as the timeliness of its definition. As Lord Acton pointed out, he attacked "the opportuneness with such a powerful array of testimonies...that everyone saw clearly that doctrine itself was involved, though he never entered in so many words on the theological question." Even if Dupanloup did not exalt himself and his authority to the rank of the "third person of the Holy Trinity," as one critic quipped, it is probably true that for Dupanloup to state "that the dogmatic definition of infallibility is inopportune for theological reasons is to say that it will always be." To

79 Dupanloup, Réponse de Mgr. l'Évêque d'Orléans a Monseigneur Dechamps, 18.
80 Ibid., 19.
81 Quirinus, Letters from Rome on the Council (London, 1870), 254.
82 Fèvre, Catholicisme libéral, 170
take such a point of view was to deny the theological basis of the
dogma. "Dupanloup says that he does not discuss opportuneness,
yet two-thirds of his arguments are directed against infallibility
itself." Inopportune, although a powerful argument within it-
selves, does not portray the full scope of Dupanloup's objections to
infallibility.

Illogical and incomplete though his position might have been,
Dupanloup chose to base his opposition to infallibility on argu-
ments concerning the expediency of the definition. Probably he
assumed that it would be the most effective obstruction he could
place in the path of the steam-rolling Ultramontanism. The theory
of "inopportuneness seemed to provide a common ground for the de-
cided opponents of the dogma and for...the vacillating or moderate
adherents of the doctrine itself....It is a position easily mastered
by...the majority. A minority may be invincible on the ground of
dogma, but not of expediency." His argument, therefore, contained
both the seeds of strength and weakness, and placed him defenseless
against the accusation that he would sacrifice eternal truth to
"opportunity."

Arguments in favor of the inopportunity of a definition were

84 E. Cecconi, Histoire du concile du Vatican, 4 vols. (Paris, 1887),
IV, 544.

85 cf. H.L. Chapon, Mgr. Dupanloup devant le Saint-Siège et l'Épiscopat
(Orléans, 1880), 271-296.

86 Quirinus, Letters from Rome on the Council (London, 1870), 255.
strong ones. Dupanloup wrote to the German bishops, meeting at Fulda where they drew up a declaration against infallibility because of its inopportunity, that he adhered to this declaration, stating that "The Church is not a party,...it renders justice to the present times, and it wants to live in peace with men." The definition of infallibility, he said, would tend to alienate the nineteenth century from the Church, because the Church's enemies "represent our faith each day as a suffocating yoke which leaves its members immobile and without freedom of thought." It was not a correct portrayal of the Church, because Catholics "have freedom of thought." Precisely because the "Church is ecumenical, that is to say, composed of the representatives of all the Churches in the world, of bishops living under every kind of political constitution and social regime, the predominance of a particular school of thought within the Church is necessarily impossible."

The definition would tend, therefore, to obscure the true nature of the Church and to lend weight to its enemies' arguments. Moreover, to make infallibility a dogma would end any possibility of the reconciliation of certain Protestant groups to the Roman Church. Also, technical theological problems would ensue. Dupanloup predicted

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88 Dupanloup, Nouvelles oeuvres choisies, IV, 499.

89 Ibid., IV, 500.
grave difficulties in distinguishing papal proclamations and statements which were infallible from those which were not. Is the Pope infallible when he addresses the whole Church but acts under intimidation? And if fear disqualifies infallible deliverances, does not also perverseness, imprudence, and passion? Or will the partisans of infallibility say that God allows the former, but miraculously prevents the latter. And will it be easy to determine what constitutes constraint? From a historical point of view, the new dogma would be embarrassing, for it followed that if the Pope was infallible in 1870, he must have been equally infallible from the beginning. Infallibility must be retroactive.90

Probably the real basis for the argument of the inopportunity of the definition of papal infallibility, was, as Emile Faguet stated, the Syllabus of 1864 and social and political attitudes given official papal sanction by it.91 Liberal Catholics presented an almost unanimous front at the Vatican Council. They feared that the advocates of the new dogma wanted to show that the pope had not erred, nor could he have, in the formulation of the Syllabus; to confirm infallibility at that particular time would seem a confirmation of the Syllabus by the entire Church. As de Meaux said of Montalembert, it was not primarily the doctrine of papal infallibility which was repugnant to him, but he "feared the


91 Faguet, *Dupanloup*, 94.
omnipotence which might be transferred to the pope in political mat-
ters as a result of his doctrinal infallibility. The Church, in his
opinion, should be a limited monarchy, not an absolute one." The
tendency on the part of conservative, intransigent Catholics to
identify themselves as the party in support of infallibility and
to infer that Catholic Liberalism was the source of an anti-
infallibilist sentiment lends credence to Faguet's supposition. As
Acton pointed out, the Catholics who welcomed the Syllabus con-
sidered the infallible pope to be their compendious security
against hostile States and Churches, against human liberty and
authority, against disintegrating tolerance and rationalising
science, against error and sin. It became the common refuge of
those who shunned what was called the liberal influence of Catholic-
ism."93

Infallibility, officially defined, would threaten the intel-
lectual independence of Catholics in temporal matters, it would
tend to place the Church squarely in opposition to the ideas ac-
cepted by the nineteenth century, and as a consequence the Church
would further alienate itself from the people, thus decreasing its
effectiveness in fulfilling its divine mission. The definition of
infallibility was, therefore, untimely. Catholic Liberalism, which
promised to harmonize the Church with the times, would be defeated

92 Viscomte de Meaux, Montalembert (Paris, 1897), 302.
93 John E.E.D. Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London,
1907), 495-96.
by the Church it was attempting to serve. That the new dogma was the death of Catholic Liberalism was commonly assumed by intransigent Catholics at the time. 94 "The liberal opposition reminds us," Gueranger wrote in 1870, "of some gallant ship... dragged by luck into the vortex of an absorbing storm. Round and round the doomed vessel careens, approaching nearer its destruction at every circuit. And now the fatal moment is at hand; she will sink with one cry and with scarcely a ripple."95 The opponents of infallibility, he continued, "were men who, while glorying in the name of Catholic, showed themselves to be saturated with corrupt principles, availing themselves of calumny and sophisms to lower the authority of the supreme head of the Church, of whose prerogatives they were afraid. They do not believe, as other Catholics do, that the Council is governed by the Holy Spirit. They were full of audacity, folly, hatred, and violence."96 As if to summarize, Peletier wrote that Liberal Catholics realized that if papal infallibility were proclaimed, all chance of the Church bending to the maxims of 1789 would disappear. Furthermore, by the definition, all the judgments against those maxims previously rendered would be irrefragable.97

94 Note: The assumption is best noted in Louis Veuillot's Rome pendant le concile, Paris, 1870.


96 Ibid., 21.

97 Victor Peletier, Mgr. Dupanloup, épisode de l'histoire contemporaine, 1845-1875 (Paris, 1876), 89.
Least equivocal of all those associated with the Liberal Catholics in 1870 was the Père Gratry, an Academician, and formerly Oratorian. Along with Mgr. Maret, associate of Ozanam and Lacordaire on Ére Nouvelle in 1848 and now Bishop of Sura, Gratry did not hesitate to base his arguments against infallibility on theological grounds. In four letters addressed to Mgr. Deschamps, Archbishop of Malines, all published in 1870, he set forth his position. Cardinal Manning had exposed himself to danger of excommunication, Gratry declared in his first letter, because the English prelate had defended a heretic, Pope Honorius who had been three times condemned for heresy by Church councils.\(^98\)

Labelling the exponents of infallibility a "school of error," he stated in his second letter that "this school is the disgrace of our cause and the scourge of our religion."\(^99\) Furthermore, Gratry charged the papacy since the sixteenth century with systematically suppressing facts which were antagonistic to the Pope's absolute and separate sovereignty. "This fact alone would prevent us from proclaiming before God and man the dogma of infallibility, since it rests upon theories supported by such methods.\(^100\)

\(^{98}\) Gratry, Mgr. l'Évêque d'Orléans et Mgr. l'archevêque de Malines: première lettre à Mgr. Deschamps (Paris, 1870), 34.

\(^{99}\) Gratry, Mgr. l'Évêque d'Orléans et Mgr. l'archevêque de Malines, deuxième lettre à Mgr. Deschamps (Paris, 1870), 34.

A stranger to the traditions of Gallicanism, Gratry was motivated only by desire to oppose the attempt to exalt papal authority to the level of omnipotence. He had never seriously questioned the pope's position as supreme head of the Church. And Gratry, too, was convinced that an infallible pope would ignore all frontiers between spiritual and temporal matters, that he would invade the domains of history, science, and politics. Encouraged by Dupanloup and others, he entered the first ranks of the "anti-infallibilists." 101

The Correspondant, edited by Broglie and Cochin, published its views on the Vatican Council on October 10, 1869, and then maintained a most cautious silence. They recognized the Pope as the first pastor of the Church, but they criticized the "idolatrous superstition" that some Catholics attached to their devotion to the Holy See. With the convocation of the Council, they said, the papacy would cease to be "exclusively Italian"; it would become not only European, but universal. Consequently, the Church must adopt a more latitudinarian attitude toward social and political philosophy and not sanction any particular political creed. The bishops, they hoped would recognize that the greatest asset of the Church was liberty, and this could be guaranteed only by respecting and promoting the common liberty of all citizens. "A re-

gime of freedom is the providential law of our times," and the Church must always be worthy of it. She must never be guilty of duplicity in accepting freedom in the name of common liberty. Therefore, the work of the Council was to reshape the Church's relations vis-à-vis modern society. Certainly the Council would not define infallibility as a dogma, for it would make no decision without unanimous consent of all bishops freely given, and how could it be believed that an assemblage of the universal episcopacy of the Church would take such a step? Infallibility, once proclaimed, would be applied to the work of previous popes, even to acts which were in violent contradiction to modern public law. Was it possible that Pius IX would be obliged to treat Napoleon III as Boniface treated Philip the Fair, and to talk to Emperor Francis-Joseph in the same tone as Innocent III spoke to Frederick of Hohenstaufen? No, the Council would not be a comedy. It would wisely resolve the questions, half-religious and half-political, upon which were based the conflicts between the Church and society. Collected in Council around the Pope, the bishops would evade all imprudence and declare that the most valuable asset which the Church has is liberty based upon the common liberty of all.\textsuperscript{102}

Such optimism seemed unbelievable to the Count de Montalembert. Two years before, in 1867, he too had welcomed the idea of a Council,  

\textsuperscript{102}Albert de Broglie, "Le concile," \textit{Correspondant}, XLIV (1869), 5-46.
which "would refute the fanatical and courtier-like exaggerations so prodigiously emanating from the contemporary Ultramontanes." 103

As it became more obvious that the Council would be asked to define infallibility, Montalembert became more anxious, for he foresaw that an Ultramontane victory would accomplish the ruination of the Liberal Catholic position. In a letter to Dupanloup in October, 1869, he urged the bishop not to allow the definition of the dogma, for it would mean, he feared, the official acceptance by the Church of the Syllabus and it would threaten the relations of modern society and the Church. 104

With so much to lose by the definition, he was perplexed that his friends, with the exception of Dupanloup and Gratry, were silent. Sick though he was, Montalembert undertook to compensate for that silence by renewed activity of his own. The result was the revising of the pamphlet, "L'Espagne et la liberté," which he had written in 1868; it contained his most vigorous protests against the policies of the papacy, protests so forcefully put that the Correspondant refused to publish them. "L'Espagne et la liberté," which did not appear until 1876 when it was published in the Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, contained the warning

103 Charles de Montalembert, Correspondance de Montalembert et de Léon Cornudet (Paris, 1905), 354.

104 Barbier, Histoire de catholicisme libéral, I, 43; Acton, History of Freedom, 524.
that the history of Spain was proof that both the Church and the State suffocate without mutual independence and liberty. It was not his final stroke in behalf of Liberal Catholicism, however. On March 7, 1870, the Gazette de France printed a letter from Montalembert in which he decried the extremes of contemporary Ultramontanism. In his letter he stated that in all his speeches and writings not a single word could be found "in conformity with the doctrines or pretensions of the Ultramontanes of the present day." There was good reason for that, he continued, since no one had thought of advocating such ideas or even suggesting them between the time he entered public life in 1830 and the advent of the Second Empire. "Never have I said, thought, or written, anything favorable to the personal and separate infallibility of the pope." Such were his convictions, clearly stated. Since his death, which followed the publication of the letter by only a few days, numerous Catholics apologists have sought to show that Montalembert did not oppose infallibility on theological grounds.\textsuperscript{107} Since he

\textsuperscript{105}Note: His purpose was to support Gratry, upon whom was falling the brunt of the Ultramontane attack; cf. Émile Ollivier, L'Église et l'État au concile du Vatican, 2 vols. (Paris, 1877). Ollivier quotes Montalembert as saying, "Since the strong do not support their own champions, the sick must needs rise from their beds and speak," \textit{Ibid.}, II, 63.

\textsuperscript{106}Gazette de France, March 7, 1870.

\textsuperscript{107}cf. for example, Cardinal D.J. Mercier, "Le Centenaire de Montalembert," \textit{La Revue générale}, March, 1912.
always asserted that he was not in a position to question Church policy from a theological point of view, because he was not a theologian, it would appear that there is some support for such apologetic arguments. To say, however, that he supported infallibility as it was defined in 1870 is a different matter. On the contrary, it was evident that he was actively opposed to it. Had he lived long enough to require it, he no doubt would have submitted to the new dogma, or as he put it, "I should, in the event of the definition of infallibility, impose silence on my reasonings. If my difficulties remained, assuredly the good God would not order me to understand, but simply to submit, as I do to other dogmas." He was first a Catholic and only secondarily a Liberal. But as long as there was freedom of discussion on the matter, he opposed the definition of infallibility with all his strength.

Therefore, in opposing papal infallibility at the Vatican Council, the Liberal Catholics took the only attitude which logical consistency would allow. They furnished much of the leadership for the opposition. On July 13, 1870, Dupanloup abstained from voting for the dogma; four days later he signed the protest drawn up by the dissenting bishops. He left Rome the same day in order to avoid being present at the official proclamation of the dogma on July 18. But before his departure, he sent the Pope a final letter on the matter, pleading with Pius IX to decline to confirm the definition.

Dupanloup assured the Pope that his refusal to accept the tribute paid by the Council to the prerogatives of the Holy See would win for the Papacy universal reverence and admiration and would release men unexpectedly at the last moment from all the incalculable misfortunes which the definition would cause. All to no avail. Infallibility became dogma and with it came the decline and virtual death of the Liberal Catholic movement.

Essential to the question of Ultramontanism was the inveterate issue of papal temporal power in Rome. The sporadic challenge of Italian nationalism to the right of Pope Pius IX to govern a portion of Italy politically, evoked a spirit of unity among French Catholics which they had not know since the ancien régime. Gallicans and Ultramontanes, intransigents and Liberal Catholics all sprang to the Pope's defense. At the same time an intellectual crisis was provoked among Liberal Catholics. For if they believed in the independence of Church and state, if they accepted the principle of national self-determination, and if their adherence to the tenets of Liberalism transcended national boundaries, how could they in good faith support the papal position? In the early period of Pius IX's reign, from 1846 to 1848, the problem was not so difficult for Liberal Catholics since the Pope not only accepted many Liberal ideas but applied them to his administration of Papal State affairs. With the reaction following the Roman revolution of 1848-1849, however, Pius IX took a stand squarely opposed to Liberalism and Italian nationalism. Liberal Catholics did not cease to support his claims to temporal sovereignty,
even if they did so less enthusiastically and more hesitatingly than before. They thus adopted an apparently dualistic appraisal of Liberal values and consequently jeopardized the logic of their entire system of thought.

In the spring of 1849 and again in 1859 French forces intervened in Italian affairs, and both interventions occasioned a vociferous debate in France between Catholics and anticlericals. In 1849 an insecure and sedulous Napoleon determined upon a policy to placate, and to ingratiate himself with, French Catholics as well as to protect French interests by restoring papal power in Rome. A decade later a more confident Napoleon III shook loose his clerical ties and engaged France in a war on the side of Sardinia against Austria, the objective being, in the eyes of French Catholics at least, the unification of Italy at the ultimate expense of the Holy See. The first intervention was applauded by French Catholics and the second was deplored, but on both occasions the issue was the same. The question was that of papal temporal power, the preservation of which seemed so menaced by Italian unification movements, whether led by Mazzini in a direct attack on Rome or by Cavour with his more artful diplomatic approach.

Liberal Catholics and their newly-found political allies—Thiers, Barrot, and Tocqueville—were in a position of influence during the period of the Napoleonic presidency, and it was they who did most to effect the dispatching of a French expeditionary force to Rome and thus to embark the Second Empire on a pro-Catholic policy. For the secular Liberals it was a matter of checking radicalism wherever it
occurred, whether in Paris or in Rome. For the Liberal Catholics the question was clearly one of continuing papal temporal sovereignty.\footnote{Falloux, as Minister of Public Instruction and of Cults, was in a position to exert pressure on Napoleon III, since the latter had need of Catholic and royalist support. Therefore, Falloux and Tocqueville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the channels through which Catholics influenced policy. Montalembert, too, had the ear of Napoleon because of the Count's support in the presidential election. For discussions of Liberal Catholics' negotiations with Napoleon, cf. Count A. de Falloux, Mémoires d'un royaliste, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886); Alexis de Tocqueville, Récollections (New York, 1896); E. Lecanuet, Montalembert d'après son journal et sa correspondance (Paris, 1895-1902); Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du second empire, 7 vols. (Paris, 1894-1905); Georges Weill, Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France (Paris, 1909).

2 Charles de Montalembert, Oeuvres de M. le comte de Montalembert, 6 vols. (Paris, 1860-61), III, 110; cf. his address before the Assembly on October 19, 1849, Ibid., 250-294.} In both cases Liberal principles, including the right of self-determination, were sacrificed.

Montalembert best summarized the arguments of Liberal Catholics, indeed, of all Catholics, in favor of preserving papal temporal authority. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly on November 30, 1848, he declared that only the maintenance of the integrity of the Papal States could insure papal independence, and should the Pope cease to be independent, that is, if he became the subject of a foreign power, the faith of Catholics everywhere would be placed in jeopardy. "Certainly, temporal power is not dogma nor is it identified with Catholic truth. But it is identified with the security, the liberty, and the grandeur of the Church, and what Catholic could fail to understand that papal sovereignty in Rome is a condition which is necessary for the existence of the Church here on earth?"\footnote{Falloux, as Minister of Public Instruction and of Cults, was in a position to exert pressure on Napoleon III, since the latter had need of Catholic and royalist support. Therefore, Falloux and Tocqueville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the channels through which Catholics influenced policy. Montalembert, too, had the ear of Napoleon because of the Count's support in the presidential election. For discussions of Liberal Catholics' negotiations with Napoleon, cf. Count A. de Falloux, Mémoires d'un royaliste, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886); Alexis de Tocqueville, Récollections (New York, 1896); E. Lecanuet, Montalembert d'après son journal et sa correspondance (Paris, 1895-1902); Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du second empire, 7 vols. (Paris, 1894-1905); Georges Weill, Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France (Paris, 1909).} With republicans, or for
that matter, Austrians, in control of Rome, the Vatican would cease to be its own spokesman. Tocqueville as Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed. "Although the Church's kingdom is not of this world," he said, "it does not exert a less constant and immediate influence over the events of this world. It is, then, of the utmost importance that the head of the Church should not have to submit to the preponderance of any power...No one has thought of any other means of retaining the independence of the Pope except that of leaving him a temporal sovereignty." Moreover, if Nassau Senior's estimates are accepted, most Frenchmen and practically all Liberals concurred.

Since the first nationalistic outburst against the system established by the Congress of Vienna, Catholics of a Liberal bent had supported the principle of self-determination. They had spoken enthusiastically and prophetically about the rights of the Greeks, the Irish, the Poles, and the Belgians, each of whom was attempting to throw off the yoke of foreign domination. All of these cases, admittedly, involved the freedom of Catholicism, either Eastern or Roman, from the interference of a foreign power, but it would be unjustifiable to state that the Montalembert group's adherence to the principle of nationalism was solely motivated by that factor. Nor did they accept the principle of self-determination as an absolute right. Extenuating circumstances, such as a case in which two equally just principles were in contradiction, might alter the situation, as it did in Italy.

3 Speech of August 6, 1849, as quoted in Falloux, Mémoires, I, 518-19.
4 Nassau Senior, Conversations with Distinguished Persons during the Second Empire, from 1860 to 1865. (London, 1880), 300-301.
Not being convinced of the efficacy of a strong central government in any case, the Liberal Catholics did not associate the concept of a centralized nation state with the idea of nationalism as the Italian nationalists tended to do. National self-determination was most normally interpreted by Liberal Catholics in terms of emancipation of one nationality from the domination of another. It is in that sense that Liberal Catholic attitudes toward Italian unification can best be understood.

There was scarcely any difference of opinion among the successors of Lamennais concerning national movements. Nations were divinely created institutions, they declared. Jesus Christ "declared that all men are brothers" and that they find their natural rapport within the nation. "Who can teach patriotism better than the clergy? For according to us, God made the 'patrie,' and love of 'patrie' is a Christian virtue." The Liberal Catholics constantly decried the notion that they were aliens to the patriotic concept of the nation because they adhered to a Church which was international in character.

In 1830 they Liberal Catholics had sympathized with the Poles and the Belgians, and they never ceased to champion the cause of the Irish. The English rule over Ireland was despotism, pure and simple, asserted

Lacordaire. All Liberal Catholics concurred. Poland in particular
won their sympathy. "Brave, unhappy Poland, so deeply calumniated,
so bitterly oppressed, so dear to all free men and Catholics!"
Poland "has struggled so long for liberty and has kept unstained her
ancient faith; may she once more regain her place among the nations,"
wrote Montalembert in L'Avenir in 1831. In 1863 Montalembert went
so far as to demand French intervention in behalf of the Polish rebels.
"We live under a reign which has sacrificed the lives of one hundred
thousand Frenchmen who died to cement with their young and generous
blood the rotten foundations of the Ottoman Empire, and not an effort
is to be made to snatch from despair and slavery a Christian nation,
ever youthful in heroism, of antique virtue, of irrepressible and
blind confidence in us!" If the "moral intervention of France" was
not sufficient to coerce the Russian tsar to grant the Poles inde­
pendence, then France should take military action. It would be a war
with objectives which were "essentially disinterested and truly
legitimate," a war "destined to strike the guilty without touching
the innocent, the unconcerned,...and above all, without disturbing
Germany, but guaranteeing to her, on the contrary, the integrity of
her federal territory. And what a war! Never could there be one
more universally accepted and hailed!"

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8Articles de L'Avenir, 4 vols. (Louvain, 1832), I, 403.
10Ibid., 27. cf. Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, V, 281.
Indicative of the rather dualistic position Montalembert was to take in regard to Italian unification was his stand in favor of the Sonderbund, a union of Swiss Catholic cantons created in 1847 and opposed by a league of Protestant Swiss cantons. A short civil war was precipitated between the two groups in November, 1847. Montalembert took the side of the Sonderbund, which was supported by Catholics, conservatives, and Metternich, and which was in favor of decentralized government in Switzerland. The Protestant cantons had the support of the anti-Jesuit radicals who wanted the separation of Church and state and the development of Switzerland into a truly unified nation state. Montalembert explained his extraordinary alliance with Metternich against the principle of nationalism by saying that in Switzerland it had not been a question of nationality, of cantonal sovereignty, or of Jesuits. Rather, the issue had been whether Liberalism or radicalism would triumph. The victory of radicalism, he said, was likely to mean the loss of minority rights, the destruction of the social order, and the introduction of a reign of intolerance. His support of the Sonderbund was further indication that Montalembert interpreted national sovereignty to mean not a unified or centrally governed nation state, but rather the absence of domination by a foreign power. That the Sonderbund advocated an extremely loose federal structure was not, in Montalembert's opinion, a violation of the principle of nationalism.

But what of Italian nationalism and Liberal institutions? These

principles Montalembert attempted not to contest. It was not a
question of Italian unity, Montalembert insisted, but of Italian
freedom. "It is the imprescriptible right of every nation to be
free from foreign domination. I hold, however, that it is not a
legitimate right that Italy be governed by a single master. Italians
deserve to be freed from the yoke of Austrian rule and to be allowed
to govern themselves. Also, it is normal that each state should
have the liberal institutions that suit it." He agreed with the
moderates in Italy who thought in terms of a confederation of Italian
states, perhaps presided over by the Pope. "I see only one remedy.
Italians should embrace without reserve the political liberty and all
the reforms that Pius IX has brought to his people and to Italy."12

In effect he was saying that the plans for an Italian kingdom under
the Sardinian monarchy or for a Massinian Italian republic were not
to be trusted. Pius IX was the hope of Italy.

Montalembert had not foreseen the return to Rome, after the fall
of the Roman Republic in 1849, of a Pius IX who was no longer sympa­
thetic to Liberal institutions, who having been burned once would not
go near the Liberal fire again. Those same Romans who had shouted
in January of 1848, *Viva Pio Nono*, were a few months later to despise
the Pontiff for having deserted the Italian cause. It was clear to
them and to all patriots, whether radical or moderate, that the Pope
was not the hope of Italy. On the contrary, he stood directly in the
path of Italian progress. Montalembert's imprecations upon the Roman

12 *Lecanuet, Montalembert*, II, 355-56.
populace that they were "unworthy and incapable to possess the pure, generous, and regular liberty that the pope offered them" could hardly hide the intellectual dilemma with which Liberal Catholics were now faced. As long as the Vatican supported Liberal tenets, Catholics of the Montalembert group in France could with intellectual honesty champion papal sovereignty in Rome and a confederation of Italian states. After 1849 when the Pope pledged himself to reaction, the Montalembert group was forced to accept a less logical defense of temporal sovereignty. The happy era of the Liberal papacy had expired, and the familiar lack of harmony between Liberal Catholicism and an intransigent pope was reborn.

French troops were in Rome preserving papal power and French Catholics were content. They did not seem to ask the obvious question, perhaps purely academic to them: With French troops occupying Rome, what guarantee did the Holy See have of maintaining its freedom from French domination? Although Manin, the Venetian republican, probably exaggerated when he said that the Pontiff would be freer in almost any situation than in his dependence upon French troops, and that "he is the puppet of the French," he did touch upon an issue ignored by Montalembert. Certainly as a Frenchman and as a Liberal Catholic, Montalembert deplored the Austrian preponderance in Italy. As Falloux declared, "Intervention for intervention, that of France would

13 Montalembert to Count X. de Merode, as quoted in Lecanuet, Montalembert. II, 355-56.

14 Baæau Senior, Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, and Other Distinguished Persons during the Second Empire (London, 1876), II, 125.
certainly be more merciful and, in the best meaning of the term, more liberal than that of Austria. "15 Such was their opinion. They agreed with Thiers when he said that "To know that the Austrian flag was flying on the Castle of St. Angelo is an humiliation under which no Frenchman could bear to exist. It was clear, therefore, that we must occupy Rome ourselves. "16 In any case it seemed obvious to Liberal Catholics that French intervention, as a principle, was not on the same level with Austrian occupation or republican domination of the Eternal City. French Catholics apparently assumed that French troops would liberate the pope whereas Austrian or republican forces would dominate him.

When in 1859 France joined Sardinia against Austria and thus helped provoke a series of revolutions in the Papal States, the argument over temporal sovereignty was renewed with full force. Now the Catholic attack was directed against Imperial policy, and the Montalembert group felt compelled to defend an illiberal papal government against the encroachments of Sardinian Liberalism. This defense, Montalembert attempted in rather negative fashion. "I will not assert, then, that the institutions of the Roman States are superior to all modern institutions, or that the general well-being of the people under papal rule surpasses or even equals that of any people of the world... But are affairs managed worse at Rome than in many other places?" It was not enough, he continued, "to admit to a people the

15 Fau1oux, Mémoires, 1, 445.
16 Senior, Conversations with M. Thiers, II, 43.
right to express their will; their will should be just, and the
expression of it should be legalized by necessity and social utility.
Otherwise we would lapse back into the barbarous maxim of Rousseau:
'It is not necessary for a people to be in the right.' Since
when, he asked, "has the mere fact of not being governed according
to our fancy or having certain preferences or discontents been
sufficient to establish the right of insurrection and to throw our
country and Europe into confusion!...To recognize a social right like
that and to allow its free exercise would be the enthronement of dis­
order." To grant the right of revolution against any and every system
would condemn Europe to conditions of South America, "where a new
government springs up every two weeks, and any general, who can com­
mand the obedience of fifteen-hundred men and invent or revive a
program of opposition, can subvert the government of his country. Such
are the egotistical follies, the capricious tumults, and the criminal
and homicidal blunders that God visits with the most bitter and just
disappointments and which He chastises by a punishment the most severe
and humiliating to a culturally advanced nation—the despotism of the
barracks." Not only did he deny the right of rebellion and question
the legitimacy of the principle of popular sovereignty, Montalembert
reminded Frenchmen that revolutions produce military dictatorships.
Could the Romagnese who were rebelling against the Holy See in 1860
anticipate a better future than the French had known since 1848?

17 Charles de Montalembert, Pius IX and France in 1849 and 1859 (Lon­
don, 1860), 34-35.
18 Ibid., 40.
For foreign statesmen to criticize publicly the government of the Papal States was, in Montalembert's opinion, to contravene the accepted principle that the officials of one nation may not interfere in the domestic affairs of another people. It was unreasonable and unfair to single out for hostile criticism the government of the Papal States, while maintaining cautious silence on the defects of every other nation, he contended. To those who insisted that European governments sanction the revolt in Romagna, he asked: "Why do you concede to this province a right which is denied, or obstinately opposed, in all other states in Europe?"

Often in the past twenty years, he said, the right of the people to revolt against constituted authority had been denied, as in the case of Poland, "the greatest and most illustrious of all persecuted and suppressed nationalities, and formerly an object of the deepest sympathy for Liberals in every country...How has eternal justice, so outraged by the destruction of that nation, been appeased? ...You are silent on the subject." In the case of the Ionian Islands where men wanted to be free of British rule, or in Ireland which wanted independence, or Poland, "a thousand obstacles oppose the accomplishment of our mission. Our present alliances and sympathies hold us back. But in Romagna, which is held by an old priest, who has neither soldiers nor money, we can do everything."

Always willing to discover a diabolical plot against the Church, Montalembert stated that the real aim of the radicals and of the radicals and of the Napoleonic government was "the total destruction

19 Montalembert, Pius IX and France, 46.
20 Ibid., 49.
21 Ibid., 50.
of the sovereignty of the pope, first because he is pope, and then because he is an insurmountable obstacle to Italian unity under one master." 22 For those who hate Catholicism, "who look upon the Church as the enemy of mankind...nothing is more simple, or more logical, than to attack the keystone of the external and temporal organization of the Church." 23 The crime of Pius IX was then that he was a priest, Montalembert declared. He pleaded with the Italians to abandon their crusade against the Church. "If Italy really understood her mission and her glory, if in place of following a policy of disloyalty and political corruption she had remained faithful to the suggestions of men like Balbo—those first and real initiators of her modern patriotism—her first care would have been to leave inviolate and beyond discussion the twofold majesty of the Holy See." 25 Having deserted the Church, even plotted against it, Italian nationalism and liberty was lost.

Montalembert, therefore, never ceased to support the temporal power of the papacy. He tried to reconcile his own Liberalism and acceptance of the principle of self-determination with the Italian cause by proposing an Italy confederated under a regenerated papacy.

22 Montalembert, Pius IX and France, 44. 23 Ibid., 53.

24 To which one anonymous Frenchman replied: "Yes, M. le comte, he is a priest and this alone is enough to justify ending his position as a temporal prince. Are you not cognizant of how extraordinary it is that a priest is the head of a temporal government in the nineteenth century in Europe?" La France et le pape, Réponse à M. le comte de Montalembert (Paris, 1860), 15.

25 Montalembert, Pius IX and France, 45.
When the Pope turned from reform to reaction as a policy basis, Montalembert continued to defend the papal position by negative arguments. In actuality he rejected the whole program of Italian unification because inherent within it were dangers to papal temporal power, and in the final analysis his attitude was conditioned not by his Liberalism but by his religious faith. There was little chance of the Holy See retaining its independence in a unified Italy, Montalembert said. In a letter to Cavour he stated, "You talk of a free Church in a free state, and I see nothing but a Church spoliated by a despoiling state." Earlier he had written to the Sardinian prime minister summarizing his own position. "You believe in a large centralized state; I am for the small independent states. You despise the local traditions in Italy; I like them above all. You want a unified Italy; I desire a confederated Italy. You violate treaties and the rights of men; I respect them because treaties between states are the same as contracts and probity between men. You would destroy the temporal power of the Sovereign Pontiff; I defend it with all the energy of my reason and my sympathy."27

Having said that, Montalembert went further to reveal the inconsistency in his analysis of the Italian problem by stating that at Venice, Cavour supported a just cause. "Venice was odiously betrayed by us in 1797, sadly treated by you [Cavour and Sardinia] in 1849, and

26Charles de Montalembert, Deuxième lettre à M. le comte de Cavour (Paris, 1865), 3.

unjustly abandoned by you and by us in 1859. Her deliverance is just.\textsuperscript{28} Evidently, rebellion was legitimate in one area—where the Austrians were in preponderance—and not in another. Radicalism aroused sympathy when it occurred on the Adriatic but not when it emerged on the Tiber. Montalembert desired to see Italy liberated from domination by foreigners—namely Austrians—but he considered the French occupation of Rome to be a magnanimous gesture in behalf of righteousness.

Dupanloup did not disagree with Montalembert to any great extent. In his paper, \textit{Ami de la religion}, he agitated constantly in 1848 and 1849 for French intervention in behalf of the Pope, even going so far as to introduce a "catechism" on the subject. "The security of the Church," it said, "requires that the Holy See be free and independent and this independence must be sovereign."\textsuperscript{29} Having warned Frenchmen continuously against such irreligion as was manifested in the destruction of papal sovereignty in Rome, the Bishop was able to remind his countrymen that the misfortunes which had accrued to them by 1871 resulted from the lapse in morality which had countenanced spoliations, violations of justice, destruction of the weak and the triumph of force.\textsuperscript{30} Even in the National Assembly elected in 1871, to which Dupanloup was a delegate, he continued to

\textsuperscript{28} Montalembert, \textit{Lettre à M. le comte de Cavour}, 5.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ami de la religion}, December 16, 1848. cf. Dupanloup's articles in \textit{Ami de la religion}, December 14 and 19, 1848.

\textsuperscript{30} Dupanloup, \textit{Nouvelles oeuvres choisies}, II, 427.
speak of the necessity of the independence of the Holy See. He spoke with more moderation, however, than some of his clerical colleagues who ignored the fact that the re-establishment of temporal power would necessitate a major war.

The 1848 revolutions were welcomed with only scant reserve by Ozanam. Writing early in that momentous year, before events had transformed his enthusiasm into disillusion, he declared that "not since the fall of the Roman Empire has the world seen a revolution resembling this...I believe in the emancipation of the down-trodden nationalities, and I admire more than ever the mission of Pius IX, a mission so opportune for Italy and for the rest of the world." He recognized the times to be full of dangers. "I expect to see much hardship, disorder, and pillage. I believe even that we may be crushed, but if so, it will be under the Juggernaut of Christianity." The Bishop of Rome himself would reconcile the modern world with the Church, Ozanam declared. Ozanam would have agreed with his anonymous compatriot who stated that Pius IX had cleansed "the old stains of papal power in the regenerative waters of liberty." Ozanam joined his co-editors of the Catholic republican Ére nouvelle in sending an address to the Holy Father which declared their desire

32 Ami de la religion, Feburary 29, 1848.
34 L'Alpha de la république (Paris, 1848), 3.
to follow in the footsteps of their father and head pastor.35

In 1848 it seemed that there was no conflict of interest between the papacy and Italian Liberalism. French Catholics should follow the lead of Pius IX, who like his great predecessors in the sixth and ninth centuries, had "passed over to the barbarians," that is, Pius IX had appealed to "the mass of the people to whom we are unknown." By "barbarians" he did not mean "the radicals, whose who want to reach the ultimate goal at once," Ozanam was forced to add.36 But when the brief marriage of the papacy and Italian Liberalism proved incompatible, Ozanam joined with the other editors of *Ére nouvelle* in taking a stand against the "barbarians," saying that Pius IX "is a thousand times more venerable in the eyes of the Christian world now than when a grateful people surrounded him with praises and cries of triumph which were soon forgotten."37 Certainly they agreed with their one-time critic, *Ami de la religion*, when it said that "in striking at the head of the Church...they have pierced with the same blow the deepest and most tender spot in our heart."38 Solace could be gained only from the policy of France, the eldest daughter of the Church, to which God had given a share of the glorious work of the restoration of the Pope.39 *Ére nouvelle* promised that France, now a democratic republic, "would do for Pius IX what the monarchs have previously done for the

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36 *Lettres de F. Ozanam*, II, 190. 37 *Ére nouvelle*, November 26, 1848.
38 *Ami de la religion*, November 26, 1848. 39 Ibid.
The republic, they hoped, would preserve papal power. Catholics were overjoyed, therefore, with Napoleon's policy in 1849. A decade later they heartily denounced his alliance with Sardinia as a threat against papal power. The Austrian war of 1859 and the recurrence of Italian revolutionary activity re-posed the problems of 1848. And had not those events served as an adequate stimulus for Catholics to restate their position, the appearance of the inflammatory pamphlet, *Le pape et le congrès*, written by the journalist La Gueronomière, would have been a sufficient supplement. Summarizing the Liberal judgment against temporal sovereignty, La Gueronnière, "a sincere Catholic," hinted that papal sovereignty was anachronistic. Rome should be kept for the pope, but the other Papal States, especially Romagna, should not be protected by French troops—a point of view sustained by official French policy. In the opinion of Catholics, Napoleon's refusal to maintain the Pope's position in Romagna was tantamount to denying the principle of temporal sovereignty, and the reduction of papal territory seemed to justify their original condemnation of the Austrian war, which, they said, had provoked the revolt in Romagna. The question was, as Falloux had put it in February of 1859, "What do we want to accomplish? How are we to act vis-à-vis Italy? Shall we respect the

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40. *La nouvelle*, November 28, 1848.

heritage of Saint Louis or shall we be the sons of the Directory?" 42

In the negotiations following the war with Austria it seemed obvious that the latter path had been taken, and the resulting conflict only served to confirm the presentiments of Liberal Catholics and their mistrust of imperial policy.

Dupanloup, who had already spoken of the matter in a pastoral letter on September 30, 1859, was not slow to answer the author of *Le papa et le congrès*. Five days after its appearance, the bishop published his first attack. He appealed to the common right and to public law. "If Romagna is annexed to Sardinia," he said, "the whole principle of the pontifical state will perish, and with it European public law and the foundations of the social order." 43 On January 20, 1860, he struck out again in a pamphlet, *Deuxième lettre à un catholique*, in which he stated that by failing to support the papacy, France was forgetting its historical mission. The February 25, 1860, issue of *Correspondant* devoted much attention to the question; the issue won for the journal an official warning for violation of imperial press laws. Augustin Cochin, writing for the *Correspondant*, stated that Liberal Catholics ardently desired the expulsion of Austria from Italy, the reform of all the governments on the peninsula, and a "federal union which would be strong enough and supple enough

42 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 207.

43 *Ami de la religion*, December 27, 1859.
to assure to this noble branch of the Latin race the advantages of
diversity as well as of unity."  

Protesting that he believed in
the "right of peoples," he insisted that that right was conditioned
by three qualifications: the principle upon which a people acted
must be obviously just; it must be exercised in an incontestably
free fashion; and its application must not damage the rights of
others. The cause of Italian unification did not meet these quali-
fications. It was not, then, a just and liberal cause, and it could
be supported only at the risk of denying other principles—such as
the principle of papal sovereignty. Liberal Catholics everywhere in
France agreed.

Although Cochin counted himself in the number of Catholics for
whom the "ingratitude of 1848" had not discouraged "the grand hopes
of 1847," only Lacordaire seemed to sense the integral connection
between Liberalism in France and the cause of Italian nationalism.
That cause he misinterpreted to mean freedom, not unification. Be-
because both his devotion to Pius IX and to Liberal principles were
sincere, he was placed in a most difficult situation by the Italian
developments. To the consternation of his Catholic friends Lacordaire
refused to declare himself against the Napoleonic policy in 1859.
Thus, his position was untenable because of the fundamental opposition
between the preservation of papal temporal power and the support of
the Italian nationalists. But his faith was great. He believed to

44 Augustin Cochin, La question italienne et l'opinion catholique en
45 Ibid., 21
46 Ibid., 10-11.
the end that a compromise would be reached which would provide for independence of the papacy and for the realization of an Italian nation. To his own satisfaction, if to no one else's, he solved or ignored the conflicts inherent in his attitude. Typical of Lacordaire's approach was his statement in 1859 that he had been guided by a "two-fold love, love for the papacy and love for Italy. I have never had any trouble in reconciling the two....These two causes were, in my opinion, only separated through misunderstandings and accidents, and I relied on Providence for the triumph of them both." Or, as he wrote to Foisset: "I consider that there are two just causes in Italy, that of Italy and that of the papacy. I do not separate them. I pray for them both...God will conciliate the differences between them."

Certainly Lacordaire's entire position in regard to Italy was premised upon the necessity of preserving the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See. In 1850, in answer to accusations that he had embraced completely unorthodox views, he signed a statement of faith in which he declared that "God willed that His Church, the common mother of all the kingdoms which were to follow, should not be dependent upon any temporal power." He acknowledged the temporal power of the papacy as a "special disposition of the Providence of

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Certainly, Lacordaire believed in the "moral necessity of the temporal power of the Holy See...It is a right for which I would willingly give my last drop of blood." 50

The maintenance of the pope's temporal power, however, was not "at all incompatible with Italian nationalism and Italian liberty, if it is considered in its essence and its history," wrote Lacordaire. 51

Pius IX had shown in 1847 that he was not opposed to liberty, for then the papacy emerged from the "backwardness of absolute power. It rallied around it the princes and people of Italy who were opposed to the oppressors of that beautiful country and its liberties." 52

Pius IX had labored for reform, and if ingratitude and perversity had extinguished his program, it was none the less true that he had attempted reforms. 53 The people of Rome had ruined the Pope's program by their radicalism. Pius IX, however, while keeping his temporal sovereignty, "will probably be obliged to modify his government, as will all Italian princes." 54 Admittedly, the Pope was meeting with difficulty in his States, but that resulted from a general situation

49Raymund Devas, Ex Umbria (Rugeley, England, 1920), 51.
50Lettres inédites du P. Lacordaire (Paris, 1881), 206.
51Henri Lacordaire, De la liberté de l'Italie et de l'Église (Paris, 1860), 27.
52Lettres du R.P. Lacordaire à Mme. la comtesse Budoxie de la Tour du Pin (Paris, 1864), 166.
53Lacordaire, De la liberté de l'Italie et de l'Église, 29.
and not from an incompatibility between papal government and the liberty of the Roman people.  

History and logic, he declared, proved that the head of Christianity need not rule by means of absolute power. "We are persuaded that it was Jesus Christ who introduced civil equality into the world, and with it political liberty, which means a certain participation of men in their own government." In Lacordaire's opinion, therefore, the papacy had to make "serious changes in the government of the Roman states." An such transformation would come only after still more important changes had occurred in the moral direction of papal affairs, a direction which had been recently furnished by the Univers and the Jesuit Civilita Cattolica.

While defending papal sovereignty against the charges that it must necessarily deny Liberal principles, Lacordaire unequivocally supported the attempts of Italians to free themselves from foreign domination. There is no greater misfortune, he wrote, than for one nation to be governed by another. Italy had the right to claim independence from Austria. "Austria is only an unjust and oppressive weight upon Italy," he wrote to the Abbé Ferreyve. "It is an equally heavy weight upon the Church." The two causes were inevitably linked.

Assured by Napoleon III's pledge that he would respect the liberty of

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55 Bernard Chocarne, ed., Lettres du R.P. Lacordaire à Mme. la baronne de Frailly (Paris, 1885), 167-68.
56 Lacordaire, De la liberté de l'Italie, 6.
57 Lettres inédites du P. Lacordaire, 223.
58 Ibid., 16.
the Church, Lacordaire supported the campaign of 1859 against Austria with so much enthusiasm that he now regarded the Emperor, who had seemed so odious in 1852, with favor. "Neither the Bourbons, Louis-Philippe, nor the Republic had the courage to serve efficaciously the cause of Italy," he wrote to the Legitimist Falloux. "Louis Napoleon is a man more able, more hardy, than his predecessors—a man who believes in Italy's interests and in the interests of France enough to break with the legacy of the past." He did not endorse the Empire completely. "I would not have chosen Napoleon," he said. "I ignore his aims and his philosophy...But would you have me repulse him and wait for another man—a Bourbon or an Orleans?" Convinced that Austria was not only the destroyer of Italian freedom, but of the Church's liberty as well, Lacordaire was forced to recognize that the Holy See was allied with Austria. "But under the given circumstances, is the papacy free to make a choice? Between anti-Christian demagoguery and Austria, the Church has not seen a middle position, and the Hapsburgs have occupied themselves with destroying that middle ground." The funeste influence of Austria held the Church as well as the Italian people in bondage. The bonds had to be removed.

As for the unification of Italy into a centralized state, Lacordaire could not accept nor did he understand such a demand. True, the temporal power of the pope prevented the consolidation of Italy

60 "Lettres du P. Lacordaire au comte de Falloux," Correspondant, CCVII (1911), 625-647 and 848-873, 857.

61 Ibid., 856.
into a unitary kingdom, "from changing its capitals into simple chefs-lieux of departments," but Lacordaire disputed whether this was any great misfortune. His ideal, the United States, he rather erroneously pointed out, was not a centralized state, but a confederation. Was it, he asked, any less of a nation? Italy may well aspire to a unitary monarchy, but it cannot do so in the name of nationality or in the name of liberty. The pope was almost invariably an Italian; for several centuries this had been the case. His cardinals and his advisors were also chiefly Italian. How could they, then, be an obstacle to the freedom of the Italian nation? On the contrary, the pope's right to rule in Rome rested on an heritage of a thousand years. It was an integral part of Italy's constitutional framework. To deny this right would be a negation of freedom. A confederation of Italian states, then, was Lacordaire's program, failing as he did to accept unification under one monarchy as the legitimate or even the actual aspiration of Italian Liberals.

The realism of his fellow Liberal Catholics disturbed Lacordaire. He accused Montalembert of having sacrificed the future to the difficulties of the present. So far was he removed from the Montalembert group on the Italian issue—so intense was his support of what he thought was the Italian cause—that he almost broke irrevocably away from his former associates. Writing of Montalembert in 1849, he said

62 Lacordaire, De la liberte de l'Italie, 19.
63 Ibid., 24.
64 Ibid., 22.
"his attitude, as always, has lacked justice, balance, and depth. He and his friends have placed the Church in a sorry position for the past eighteen months, and I am more glad than ever that I have separated from them." When the Italian cause was again an issue in 1859, Lacordaire broke away once more from Montalembert. Harmony was restored only with the publication in 1860 of Lacordaire's pamphlet, De la liberté de l'Italie et de l'Église, in which he defended temporal sovereignty. In the final analysis Lacordaire differed little from his Liberal Catholic friends in regard to the Italian question, since he too found it impossible to forsake the principle of papal temporal sovereignty. As a consequence he found no real theoretical unity in his support of Italian nationalism and Italian Liberalism. Only in his boundless faith was there harmonious accord. He simply ignored the contradictions of his position.

A younger generation of Liberal Catholics, best represented by Arnaud de l'Ariège, was willing to accept or even welcome the loss of the pope's temporal sovereignty, but such ideas were too advanced for the older Montalembert group. The latter's protestations against the attacks on papal temporal sovereignty did not cease as long as the last of its members lived to appear on the rostrum of public opinion to voice a denunciation of the irreligious, unprincipled, and radical force which led and abetted the Italian

65*Letter of November 3, 1849, in Lettres de Lacordaire à Mme. de Freilly, 188.

unification movement. To the end their attitude toward Italian affairs was premised on the idea that the papacy, to be independent, had to possess temporal sovereignty. Support of the pope's sovereignty in the Papal States was not a dogma of faith; it was a right and a necessity, they thought. Temporal sovereignty was essential if the pope was not to become a puppet of a political power or a salaried functionary like the bishops of France.67

That they were in conflict with the principles of Liberalism the Liberal Catholics would not admit. They construed the desire for national self-determination to be legitimate only in so far as it meant the emancipation of a nationality from foreign oppression. Unification of Italy into a centralized state meant only one thing to Liberal Catholics—-an ultimate attack on papal temporal sovereignty, which they as Catholics would oppose.
Chapter VI

POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF LIBERAL CATHOLICS

Liberal Catholics did not produce a systematic body of thought, one logically constructed and metaphysically premised, which might be called a political philosophy. Their central problem was always that of the expediency of reconciling religion with the heritage of the French Revolution, and their orientation was normally political, not philosophical. They sought to clarify the Church's position regarding 1830 or 1848; they seldom attempted to formulate for themselves, or for the Church as a whole, a group of attitudes to which they would subscribe as positive truths. Perhaps this failure resulted from the condemnation of Lamennais who tended to speak of certain liberties in terms of absolute and universal truths, but whatever the reason, the result was the same. A Liberal Catholic philosophy was lacking. Lord Acton's appraisal of Lamennais was even more true when applied to the second Liberal Catholic group. Lamennais "began by thinking that it was expedient for the Church to obtain the safeguards of freedom," Acton wrote, "and that she should renounce the losing cause of the old regime. But this was no more philosophy than the similar argument which had previously won her to the side of..."
despotism when it was the stronger cause....As de Maistre had seen the victory of Catholic principles in the Restoration, so Lamennais saw it in the revolution of 1830. This was obviously too narrow and temporary a basis for a philosophy."

Inhibited by the Church's disapproval of the tenets of nineteenth-century Liberalism, the Liberal Catholics were forced to hedge on certain basic issues, to devise a dual set of values represented by the thesis and the hypothesis of Dupanloup, and to leave their contemporaries as well as subsequent readers unsure whether on any given occasion it was the thesis or the hypothesis—the absolute or the allowable—to which the Liberal Catholic made reference when he talked about this liberty or that freedom. Not having formulated a philosophical system, it was not surprising that among the leading Liberal Catholics there was frequent ideological conflict, or that they seemed constantly to change their attitudes and approach. Change within itself may perhaps be meritorious, at least not condemnable, but the modulations—and in the case of Montalembert, the permutations—of Liberal Catholics between 1843 and 1870 are more suggestive of a lack of philosophical premises than of intellectual flexibility. Their political inclinations might best be found in their assumption that the Church, being catholic, could adjust itself to any political system, and that no particu-

lar system should be identified with Catholic truth. By implication, therefore, they themselves were not concerned with patterns of thought to which Catholics should universally subscribe. Rather, they sought to provide a *modus vivendi* for the Church in post-revolutionary France.

To say, however, that Liberal Catholics spoke favorably of representative government, freedom of speech, or political liberty without any firm attachment to those ideas would be unjust. Admitting that their prime objective was service to the Church, which could best be implemented by reconciling it to modern society, they nevertheless accepted Liberal political principles at face value, as a positive good, if not as positive truths. If Montalembert forsook his Liberalism in 1851, his attitudes were not different from certain "secular" Liberals who became temporarily frightened by the ramifications of Liberalism. Liberal Catholics, therefore, accepted Liberal institutions sincerely. But their Liberalism remained more a political platform than a philosophy.

At least one unifying consideration was evident in every Liberal Catholic's approach to political questions. If man was endowed by modern society with a certain degree of autonomy, if he was given the freedom to speak, write, and vote, he must possess the self-restraint to use those liberties wisely and judiciously. And if men collectively were to enjoy representative government and perhaps democracy, either respect for morality, authority, tradition, and the rights of others must be present,
or men's liberty would be transformed into the tyranny of the many over the few. Liberty, then, must be contained and restrained by rules and limits. The most suitable source for a moderating influence was the Roman Catholic Church, which inculcated the ideas of deference to authority and order. Because nineteenth-century Liberalism tended to reject Catholicism, most Liberal Catholics feared excessive distribution of political rights, that is to say, they feared democracy, because they felt that the mass of the people tended to show little respect for authority and order in 1793 or in 1848. And essentially, Liberal Catholics respected power, for power allowed the flow of historical forces to evolve undisturbed. Power and authority within themselves might be evil, but carefully compounded with liberty, they would insure the continuation of the tenuous balance between the despotism of an autocratic monarchy and the tyranny of the multitude.

"Two great forces, authority and liberty, balance and fortify each other and make government in human societies possible...Both are rights, and both are necessary....The misuse of authority means tyranny; the abuse of liberty is licence." Both are divine forces which are meant to restrain and consequently to contribute to one another.2 Authority, Lacordaire said, "is an integral part of liberty; between the two there is a necessary correlation."3 By authority they meant the divine superiority

of God—the architect of human society, and fundamental laws—"impartial and sacred laws"—based upon Christian morality. 4 To attempt to establish liberty by destroying authority is to produce despotism, Lacordaire declared. The eighteenth century had sought to achieve freedom, liberty, and rights on the ruins of constituted authority and the result had been first despotism of the masses and then Napoleonic autocracy. 5 With rights come duties. "God has not said to us: Here are your liberties. He has said: Here are your obligations." 6 If liberty is necessary for the individual, that he may not be oppressed by unjust external pressure, obedience to duty is its corollary. Respect for duty enables men to live together in society. If equality is essential in order to retain for the individual his God-given status, hierarchy is equally necessary to prevent the atomization of society and the consequent impotence of the individual. And if fraternity is a valuable concept, "veneration is also necessary for the individual that he may acknowledge and uphold the authority of the age and the magistracy of virtue, as well as the power of the laws and governmental institutions which administer that authority and magistracy." 7 Write then, "if you desire to found

5 Henri Lacordaire, Considérations sur le système philosophique de M. de la Mennais (Paris, 1834), 10.
6 Henri Lacordaire, Conférences de Notre-Dame, II, 296.
durable institutions, above the word 'liberty' the word 'obe-
dience,' above 'equality' write 'hierarchy,' and above 'fraternity,' 'veneration.' Above the august symbol of rights, write the divine symbol of duties. 

Those two necessary principles in the human social order—fundamental law and liberty, duties and rights—had always been defended by the Church against both absolute power and anarchical tyranny, Lacordaire wrote. It was, therefore, to the Roman Catholic Church that modern society must look for the defense and stability of liberty. 

"Without God and Christian morality, all liberty and all moral responsibility would be lost." Religion was the only possible base of society; it was the "aroma" which prevented liberty from corrupting itself. The Church as "the educator of civilization" would inculcate that "grand law of respect which is the foundation of society." Liberty could only exist where law was respected, and law "is a guarantee only when it is endowed with immutability; in virtue of that re-

Lacordaire, Conferences de Notre-Dame, III, 203.

Lacordaire, Lettres du R.P. Lacordaire à Mme. la comtesse Eudoxie de la Tour du Pin (Paris, 1864), 93.


Montalembert in Univers, February 25, 1848.

Félix Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse (Paris, 1845), 259.

H. P. Lecanuet, Montalembert d'après son journal et sa corres-
semblance to God, it offers an invincible resistance to the weaknesses of the community as well as to its powerful conspiracies. 13 Therefore, clearly identified with the universality of law was the universality of divine authority, of which fundamental law was but a manifestation. 14 By teaching respect for God and God's laws, the Church was the single effective guarantee of liberty against those, who because of lack of respect for essential moral principles and for the rights of others, would subvert that liberty into tyranny. Thus viewed, Christianity, Ozanam said, "will be the soul of liberty." 15

Irreligion, therefore, was the cause of the tangential development in modern French Liberal movements. In the opinion of Catholic Liberals, the French, having been made irreligious by insidious propaganda and by bourgeois anticlericalism, were rendered almost incompetent, because of their lack of respect for authority, to enjoy modern liberty. And as long as "this spirit lasts, liberalism will be conquered by an oppressive democracy or by an absolute autocracy. Only by the union of liberty and Christianity can a regime of liberalism be realized." 16 Dupanloup put it more simply when he said that "That which is today war against God will tomorrow be war

14 Ibid., 286.
15 Mgr. Louis Baunard, Frédéric Ozanam après sa correspondance (Paris, 1912), 289.
16 Lacordaire, Lettres inédites. (Paris, 1881), 137.
against society." In his pamphlet, *Athéïsm et le péril sociale*, Dupanloup warned French intellectuals of the "secret solidarity between despotism and materialism." Free thought "leads to free morals, and free morals lead to disrespect and revolutionary activity." Miserable French society! Dupanloup lamented. "It first corrupts its people, and then shoots them down with grape-shot, until it is shot down in turn. When will it escape this fatal circle? When it has found Jesus Christ once more, not before." Lacordaire explained the apparent instability of nineteenth-century France by saying, "One may have wit, knowledge, genius even, and still have no character. Such is the France of today."

Liberal Catholics founded their political attitudes, therefore, upon essentially conservative premises. They were, like Benjamin Constant and the Doctrinaires, primarily concerned with maintaining authority as a means of protecting liberty. Being religiously oriented, they tended more than their philosophical

17 Dupanloup, *Nouvelles œuvres choisies*, II, 324.

18 Ibid., II, 372.

19 Ibid., II, 382.


mentors, Montesquieu and Burke, to stress the divine nature of authority, but their aims were the same—to prevent the autocracy of one or the tyranny of many by providing guarantees for the stability of liberty and governmental processes. They displayed a fear of a strong state of mass revolutions both of which tended to place liberty in jeopardy. They looked to tradition, to respect for divine authority, to Christian morality, and to constitutional devices for guarantees of individual liberty.

Against such a background their political activity and their political attitudes can best be understood. The many political upheavals in the period from 1843 to 1870 provided ample occasion for Liberal Catholics to reflect and take action upon their positions. The advent of a republic and democracy in 1848 presented the first challenge to Catholics, and the radical threats of May and June forced them, it seemed, to re-evaluate their political principles. The coup d'état of 1851 and the subsequent Empire put their Liberalism to a real test. They did not always meet the challenges with honor, their fear of radicalism sometimes being stronger than their original political faith, but in the final analysis they were true to the precepts of Liberalism as they understood them. They were consistent in their attempts to safeguard individual liberty by whatever means possible.

Democracy and Political Equality

On the question of democracy and political equality, the
Liberal Catholics were divided, and this division was nowhere better illustrated than by their respective attitudes in 1848. The proclamation of a democratic republic called upon all to take a stand for or against it. The events of June 1848, and the presidential election in December 1848, tested the sincerity of that stand. Montalembert and Dupanloup were of the group of Liberal Catholics which most hesitatingly, and only temporarily, condemned the idea of democracy, for in reality they were fundamentally opposed to the concept. Ozanam and Lacordaire joined with the Abbé Maret in forming Ére nouvelle, which had as its political philosophy a faith in democracy and as its objectives the harmonization of the republic and the Church. Of the latter group, only Lacordaire's position was equivocal, for although he might sincerely believe in political equality, he did not exclude the possibility of a monarchy superimposed upon popular sovereignty.

In the discussion which follows, therefore, democracy will not be considered as synonymous with republicanism, as it probably was in 1848. Rather, democracy will be taken to mean the right of active participation in political affairs by all levels of the society in proportion to their numbers.

Ozanam belonged to the party of "confidence," in regard

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to the democratic attempt of 1848. "I have believed and I still believe in the possibility of a Christian democracy. I cannot accept any other ideal in matters of politics." He was forced by his knowledge of history, he said, "to the conclusion that democracy is the natural final stage of the development of political progress and that God leads the world in that direction." A government elected by the votes of all the people must necessarily understand better the needs of the people as well as the duties of the state. "Let us side with it and put our trust in it. Are not the men of the Church and the men of the people to be found side by side at the foot of the tree of liberty?"

But democracy would work in France only if it was tempered by Christianity, which would teach to men the need to respect their duties and responsibilities, as well as the rights of others. Ozanam, then, might have deplored the revolution and the violence with which democracy was established; he might even have objected to the eighteenth-century sources of French democratic movement, but he "knew how to extract the good from the undesirable, the living forces from those who were justly dead." Upon these foundations he constructed a political

23Ozanam to Foisset, Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam, 2 vols. (Paris, 1873), II, 251.

24As quoted in Baunard, Frédéric Ozanam, 281.

25Letter of April 12, 1848, Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam, II, 233.
philosophy which had as its core political and civil equality and religious liberty. Ozanam phrased his appeal with historical overtones. "Pass over to the barbarians," as the popes had done in earlier times. By that he meant that French Catholics should follow the leadership of those earlier popes, "and occupy ourselves with the people, who have too many needs and not enough rights, and who demand with justification the most complete participation in public affairs." Even after the June days, he did not lose faith. The people of Paris had been driven to political extremes by abject poverty, he told the middle class. Raise their standards of living, and their political orientation would be more moderate.

Lacordaire's faith in democracy was less certain. He accepted the democratic nature of the 1848 republic as an emancipation which saved France "from bourgeois corruption," he wrote in December of 1848. Later, however, in May of 1849, he admitted that he had felt that it was wrong to "make of democracy an absolute thesis." He confessed that he could not see

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27 Letter to Poisset, February 22, 1848, Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam, II, 224.


29 Lacordaire to Saint-Beaussant, December 5, 1848, Lettres inédites du R.P.H.-D. Lacordaire (Paris, 1874), 185.

30 Lacordaire to Saint-Beaussant, May 1, 1849, Ibid., 187.
clearly "that there is necessarily more liberty, equality, or fraternity in a democracy, taken to mean the government by the people, than under a monarchy." To be sure, Lacordaire lent his name to the editorial staff of *La nouvelle*, and to its "Prospectus" which proclaimed the paper's support of democracy. And for a few optimistic weeks in the spring of 1848 he was no doubt sincerely democratic.

Even though he had declared in 1842 that he "had never written a line or said a word which would allow anyone to say that I am a democrat," Lacordaire had expressed sentiments which closely associated him with democratic thought. In his eulogy of O'Connell, he talked of the equality of men, of the oneness of humanity, saying they were God-given ideas. "Whoever hinders one man in the reclamation of his rights, and whoever consents to the servitude of a single person, whether black or white, is not worthy to participate in the combat for the cause of the human race." Again, in his *Discours sur la loi de l'Histoire*, he spoke of the natural state of man being one of equality. "In the only human constitution of which God has traced the plan, aristocracy was unknown." In primitive

Christian tribes there was civil equality. But civil equality should not be taken to mean absolute equality, he warned; the latter was a chimera which was disavowed by the diversity of aptitudes and merits.  

Therefore, Lacordaire's background served as a fertile field in which democratic thought could temporarily grow. The invasion of the mob into the Assembly Hall of May 15, 1848, and the subsequent June Days so disillusioned him that he gradually ceased his collaboration on Ére nouvelle. Finally his political timidity caused him to resign from the editorial staff. As he wrote to Foisset in September of 1848, "Since May 15...my reserve in regard to democracy and the Republic has increased. As a consequence I have resigned from the staff of Ére nouvelle, for the same reasons that I gave up my seat in the National Assembly."  

Later, in his acceptance speech at the French Academy in 1861, he contrasted American and European democrats by saying that the European democrat tended to lack respect for liberty, that for him the "supreme law to which all else must be sacrificed was equality. Equality in servitude is for him preferable to a liberty maintained by hierarchy of rank." The European democrat idolized the State, and he "takes man and offers him in holocaust to the allpowerful public...He oppresses all men in order to create for them, in


the name of 'patrie,' a narrow prison....European democracy prepares for us, unless it is finally instructed and regulated, the dreadful alternative of a demogogy without bottom or a despotism without limits."36

Montalembert and Dupanloup did not suffer from such vacillation, for they had only the coldest suspicion of popular sovereignty, even if they did hesitatingly give their support to the Second Republic. Equality, Montalembert asserted, was contrary to reason and to human nature.37 Under a regime of equality, that is to say, of democracy, the individual value of men is crushed under the heavy and implacable level of masses of electors careless in their choice and incompetent in their judgement.38 There are two kinds of democracy, he said. One type recognizes the laws of honor and equity, has confidence in the power of truth and justice. By it all are insured the right to equality before the law, equality of taxation, and the access to all employments, emoluments, and honors. Under it intelligence and virtue are the principle conditions of the exercise of power. Then there is a second type of democracy, he said, which is jealous, rancorous, furious, and whose "genius consists in contesting and destroying

37 Abbé G. Peries, ed., "Lettres inédites de Ch. de Montalembert, Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, XXVIII (1902), 413-38, 415.
38 Charles de Montalembert, De l'avenir de l'Angleterre (Paris, 1856), 272.
all the superiorities which arise out of the nature of things such as the historic existence of mankind constitutes and proclaims them. It is the enemy of all that is lasting, of all that is solid, of all that resists, and of all that increases and improves. It denies the gradual progress of liberty."

This second type of democracy was the only one which the modern Continental democrats had known how to establish, Montalembert declared. "It is not a liberal, but an exclusive and intolerant democracy, which must inevitably lead to that exclusive power which constitutes despotism." As France had known it, democracy always turned toward force in disillusion; it coalesced with an absolute monarch to destroy liberty and all real independence. The experience of the first two democratic republics in France had taught, Montalembert argued, that democracy, while it existed, denied the freedom and liberty of the individual, and being destined to failure, contributed to the rise of caesarism which had equally little respect for individual rights. Therefore, democracy with its intolerance, its insistence upon conformity, was the antithesis of liberty. Equality and liberty were completely incompatible.

Wherever democracy "gains the ascendency, it may be predicted

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40 Ibid., 34.
with certainty that liberty has been defeated.... for democracy requires that all throw themselves down in servile respect before the phantom of reason. Gradually, not only all traditions, all ancient and hereditary rights, but likewise all independence, dignity, and resistance disappears. Every nation that imagined itself sovereign in the name of democracy, Montalembert continued, "pays with its liberty the ransom for its pretended sovereignty. The price may be high but it is inevitable. To deny this truth would be to ignore European developments since 1789. It would be to deny a fact which has acquired the certainty of a geometrical theorem." In short, Montalembert did not believe in "universal reason, in the infallibility of the people, in all those high-sounding words by which we have been dazzled, debased, reduced to the abject equality of democracy, in those vast levellings of the universe under the passion or the panic of the moment."

Montalembert objected to those who attempted to make Christianity and democracy synonymous. "Posterity shall know that there was at least one old soldier of Catholicism and liberty who.... in 1848 combated with all his force the pretended identity of Christianity and democracy, and who in 1852 protested against the sacrifice of liberty to force under the cloak of religion." He

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43 Charles de Montalembert, *Les intérêts catholiques au xixe siècle* (Paris, 1852), 79; cf. His speech before the French Academy upon his election to membership, in which he expounded the same opinion. Montalembert, *Œuvres*, III, 571-642.

44 Ibid., 80-81.


46 Ibid., 87.
had heard constantly in his youth, he said, that Christianity and
monarchy were the same thing, and that one cannot be a good Catholic
without being a good royalist. "I have fought for twenty years
not without a measure of success, against that former error which
is now forgotten. I shall fight another twenty years against the
new claim, which confounds Christianity and democracy, another
form of the same blind idolatry of victory, force, and fortune."

In 1849 he denounced social and democratic Catholicism as the
"greatest of all the dangers." Believing this, he never ceased to
attack *Ére nouvelle* until it finally stopped publication on April
9, 1849.

Not accepting the concept of popular sovereignty and despising
its apparent results, Montalembert supported the law of May 31, 1849,
which restricted the franchise. The law was necessary, he said, in
order to wage legal war on socialism and to prevent social upheaval.

He labelled the law the "banner of the party of order." To amend it
in favor of a more democratic suffrage would be to ask, sanction even,
the recurrence of the "red menace."

Therefore, democracy, in the opinion of Montalembert, was not
necessarily Christian, nor was it desirable, for it would eventually
deny liberty to all including the Church. It was a matter of extreme

47 As quoted in Baunard, *Ozanam*, 290; cf. his letter to Ami de la re-
ligion, October 26, 1848, and Montalembert, *Les intérêts
catholiques*, 82-85.

48 Montalembert to P. d'Alzon, March 23, 1849, as quoted in *Actes du Cong-
rès historique du centenaire de la révolution de 1848* (Paris,
1948), 275.

49 Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, III, 4-5.

50 Ibid., 7.
significance to Catholics, he said, because liberty was the only
refuge which the Church had from the unlimited power of the state. Montalembert, in stating his position, had the support of the
Bishop of Orleans, for neither did Dupanloup have much respect for
democracy. In 1848 he revived the almost defunct Ami de la re-
ligion in order to use it as a counter-weapon against Ere nouvelle.
"It is not democracy that I attack," he said later. "Catholic in
time and space, the Church can live with all possible forms of
government....But if democracy is unlimited tyranny of the multi-
tude, if it entails impiety, atheism, war against God and the
Church, if it implies social conflict, the suppression of re-
ligion, and the overthrow of all public order and the principles
upon which society is founded, then the Church must combat it." Viewed in the perspective of his career as a whole, it becomes evi-
dent that to Dupanloup, democracy did signify ant clericalism and
social up-heaval. As such, it was the least desirable form of
government, and to prevent the emergence of a third republic after
1870, he worked furiously to bring about a compromise which would
lead to the reestablishment of the monarchy.

In later years Montalembert seemed to have altered his estimation
of democracy, at times to the point of complete reversal. Neither
had he joined the flock of intransigent Catholics who feigned a

51 Montalembert, Les intérêts catholiques, 81.
52 Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, II, 404.
faith in republican democracy in 1848 nor had he sympathized with the Liberal Catholics who sincerely accepted it. But after 1860 Montalembert apparently became reconciled to the inevitability of the political expression of popular sovereignty. He even ventured to welcome its advent. The Veuillot school of Catholics had praised the February revolution, saying that the Church proclaimed the divine right of the people and "God in the Heavens, liberty on earth—there is our charter in two words." Under the Second Empire, however, they ruled that democracy and republicanism were opposed by Catholic theology. In striking contrast Montalembert gradually mellowed to the democratic ideal.

Although he had grudgingly admitted earlier that "in the last analysis authority resides in the opinion of the majority of citizens," Montalembert had been a consistent opponent of democracy. After 1855, however, he began to change. At the congress of Liberal Catholics at Malines in 1864 he said, "The new society—democracy, to call it by name—exists. Already it is sovereign in half of Europe and tomorrow it will gain the other half...

As a Christian, I am not afraid of it, for the Church will calm

53 Univers, February 27, 1848.

54 Univers, March 14, 1848.


56 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 312.
this democratic storm and give it honor and nobility of purpose."  

The future of modern society, he declared, depended upon the solution of two problems: the infusion of democracy with the spirit of liberty and the reconciliation of Catholicism with democracy."  

England, he said, would provide the example for European states to follow in their task of integrating democracy and a respect for liberty. England would open her doors to democracy, but at the same time, "She will set limits to its advance."  

The progress of democracy there would be made compatible "with stability of laws and institutions, with the maintenance of ancient liberty, and with the respect due to individual dignity."  

England would "remain faithful to the lessons of her own history," and restrain and guide democracy without debasing it; she would regulate it and reconcile it with a liberal monarchy or a conservative republic." Thus would England end the old antagonisms between democracy and liberty.  

Having forgotten the dogmatic statements of his earlier years, Montalembert wrote, "God forbid that we should assert that equality is incompatible with liberty; but up to the present time the art of making them live and last together has not been discovered in any
of the great countries on the European continent." To complete his transformation, he wrote in *L'Espagne et la liberté*, shortly before his death, that "democracy is the natural, simple, and legitimate form of modern liberty." It was, in a sense, a new Montalembert, one who had become the champion rather than the adversary of democracy.

Democracy and republicanism were firmly intertwined in the nineteenth-century French mind. Perhaps one of the more significant legacies of the French Revolution was the post-revolutionary French tendency to assume the juxtaposition of democracy and republicanism as a compounded antithesis of the monarchial form of government. Whereas England might develop a democracy within a monarchy, popular logic in France held such a concept to be a contradiction in terms. To Liberal Catholics, also, the democracy which France had known in 1793 or 1848 connoted tendencies which they could view only with fear and distaste. Popular sovereignty, anti-clericalism, intensive centralization of governmental authority, intolerance to the point of denying individual liberty, and a social outlook which tended to de-emphasize the rights of private property and to voice the need for economic equality as well as equality

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64 Charles de Montalembert, "L'Espagne et la liberté," Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse, LV (1876), 444-481, 468.

before the law—all this they felt was engendered by a democratic regime. Furthermore, they were prone to associate the republican form of government with those features. Especially was that true immediately after 1848. Giddy from their newly gained prerogatives, the masses were apt to be led by republican demagogues into the formation of a republican system which would legalize the deprivation of men's liberties, the Liberal Catholics thought. Therefore, their attitude toward republicanism as a governmental form was preconditioned by their assumption that the republic would be democratic and consequently the outlet for the dangerous ramifications of democracy. Only if republicanism was tempered by a conservatism which respected tradition, Christian morality, and the rights of men—an improbability at best—would they accept it.

Only one of the Liberal Catholics, Frédéric Ozanam, assumed a really positive attitude toward republicanism as a constitutional system. In July of 1834 he wrote, "I have for the old royalism all the respect one owed to a glorious invalid; but I would not lean upon it; because of its feebleness, it does not know how to walk at the pace of the new generations... The Christian republic... is perhaps the highest condition to which humanity can rise." Lacordaire, for his part, did not consider himself a republican. Republicanism was not inherently contrary to the laws of nature or to religion, he

66 Letter of July 21, 1834, Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam, I, 121.
stated, but he did not believe that in his lifetime "nor for long afterward, will republican institutions be possible in France." Montalembert and Dupanloup both hoped that such institutions would not be possible in France, for both were monarchists by conviction.

The Liberal Catholics, however, denied that republicanism or any other form of government was incompatible with Christianity. "Christianity adapts itself to every form of human government," Montalembert stated. The Church is catholic, "that is to say, it embodies all times and all places. It does not enter into questions of republics, monarchies, empires.... All the diverse political forms are left to the free choice of individual Catholics." Or as Ozanam put it, "The Church has never accepted the position of being either imperial, barbarian, feudal, royal, or liberal, because she is more than the sum of all those. She is catholic." Their own personal philosophies were arrived at independently of the Church, although in the final analysis, their attitudes toward the February revolution and its results were largely dependent upon pre-eminent solicitude they felt for the welfare of the Church.

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68 Lacordaire, Testament, 137.


70 Ami de la religion, October 24, 1848.

71 Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 358-59.

72 Baunard, Ozanam, 283-84.
The Revolution of 1848 and Napoleon

From the pulpit of Notre-Dame of Paris, Lacordaire welcomed the revolution in the name of God and of the Church. "We are at one of those hours," he said, "when God discovers himself." Mgr. Affre, Archbishop of Paris, made his way to the Hotel de Ville to grant his benediction to the provisional government, Louis Veuillot proclaimed all France to be republican, and Catholics everywhere busied themselves with blessing "those sickly poplars" which were being planted at "some most inappropriate spot as trees of liberty." On April 15 appeared, affirming the justice of the recent revolutions. "We believe that it was not only permitted, but that it was desired by God." It was a duty of Catholics to rally around the new republic without any regret for the regime which had fallen.

A few, including Montalembert, did not enthusiastically grant their support to the new government. For his part, Montalembert made his adhesion to the republic conditional. In a letter to his constituents, he said, "If this republic, while ameliorating the fate of the workers, guarantees, as does the United States, the

73 Lacordaire, Conferences de Notre-Dame, III, 21-22.
74 Univers, February 27, 1848.
76 Fre nouvelle, April 15, 1848.
77 Fre nouvelle, April 19, 1848.
supreme benefits of liberty to religion, to property, and to the
family, it will have me for one of its most sincere partisans."
If, on the other hand, "it follows the plan charted by the first
French republic, if it proceeds by way of intolerance, suspicion,
and persecution, if it resorts to confiscation and violence, it may
well have me for its victim, but never for its accomplice." But
Montalembert's dubiousness was exceptional among Catholics. Most
of them accepted the republic without undue hesitancy.

Catholics, and especially Liberal Catholics, had, as Tocqueville
indicated, no feeling but enmity towards the July Monarchy. As a
regime maintained in part by the anticlerical bourgeoisie, it had
denied to the Church the rights for which Liberal Catholics cam­
paigned. They turned, then, to the new republic not because of their
faith in republicanism but because they hoped, as Lacordaire said,
"to gain from it for France and the Church, those liberties and in­
stitutions so blindly refused by preceding governments." Without
having any solid faith in the new republic, Lacordaire felt obliged
to give it his sincere adherence, and "to make a great sacrifice for
the sake of God,...to go against my own feeling,...to abandon my own
will to the will of God." Later he wrote to Montalembert that he

78Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 393.
79Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville
(New York, 1896), 56.
80Letter March 16, 1848, Count A. de Falloux, ed., Correspondance
du R. P. Lacordaire et de Madame Swetchine (Paris, 1875), 216.
"accepted the republic which gave us liberty of instruction, freedom of religious bodies, and which was only destroyed by violence, thanks to the impatience and clumsiness of the royalists."\textsuperscript{81} On another occasion he wrote that although he had not desired the republic, he "supported it sincerely. I believed it necessary for a people so divided in opinion as the French."\textsuperscript{82}

Lacordaire joined the staff of \textit{Le \(\text{\`e}re\) nouvelle}, therefore, and worked and wrote to further the adoption by Catholics of the infant republic. He did not so clearly recognize as did his co-editor, Ozanam, that "Behind the political revolution is a social revolution," and that the real questions facing the republic were "the organization of work, or rest, and of salaries."\textsuperscript{83} Nor did he accept Ozanam's and Maret's general views as to the democratic future of European society.\textsuperscript{84} But Lacordaire and a large group of Liberal Catholics subscribed to the cause in which religion, the republic and liberty seemed to be interwoven. And they assented to it sincerely, if not dogmatically.

Their support seemed merited by the results of the April

\textsuperscript{81}Charles de Montalembert, \textit{La \(\text{\`e}re\) Lacordaire} (Paris, 1862), 210.

\textsuperscript{82}Letter of February 11, 1849, Bernard Chocarne, ed., \textit{Lettres du R. P. Lacordaire \`a M\`ee, la Barrone de Prailly} (Paris, 1885), 187.

\textsuperscript{83}Letter of March 6, 1848, as quoted in Georges Goyau, \textit{et.al., Ozanam, Livre du centenaire} (Paris, 1913), 350.

\textsuperscript{84}cf. Leflon, \textit{L'\(\text{\`e}glise\) et la r\'evolution de 1848}, 71-72; Baunard, \textit{Ozanam}, 263-64; Chocarne, \textit{Lacordaire}, II, 208-213.
elections for the majority of the Assembly were men who were moderate in political temperament. But as the revolution progressed to its more radical stages, first with the invasion of the Assembly hall on May 15 and then, with the class warfare of the June days, those whose acceptance of the republic had been conditional or skeptical felt that their original hesitancy had been justified. This republic, they thought, like the other of 1792, had loosed the destructive energies of the lower classes and had ended by challenging private property, the social order, and individual liberty. Liberal Catholics, as well as the secular Liberals of the July Monarchy, took fright and sought refuge from radicalism in the person of Louis Napoleon.

Not all of the Liberal Catholics joined the rush toward the strong executive authority as a means of saving France and French society from the threats emanating from the left. Lacordaire and Ozanam especially, opposed the reaction, and Dupanloup and Falloux were cool toward the election of Louis Napoleon. It was Montalembert who was most guilty. To him it was a matter of choosing between authority and the party of order on the one hand, and chaotic disorder and economic egalitarianism on the other. He made his choice easily, and in return for promises from Napoleon that the Catholic liberties would be recognized, Montalembert set out to deliver the Catholic vote to the future Emperor.

On December 11, 1848, the day after the presidential election in which Napoleon was elected president of the republic by an overwhelming majority, Montalembert wrote in his journal, "I am happier
than I am able to say about the defeat of democratic rationalism by a name. In June of 1848 he had written to Dupanloup that since the advent of the republic, he had regarded France and even Europe as being irrevocably lost. The republic had given vent to the aspirations to transform France into an unlimited despotism, Montalembert stated. By the election of Louis Napoleon, France was at least further removed from that catastrophe.

After December, 1848, Montalembert abandoned himself to his fears of the red peril, and adopted policies which were completely out of keeping with his stated position before and afterward. Pleased by the pro-Catholic policies of Napoleon, Montalembert became one of the Prince-President's most staunch defenders in the National Assembly. "There are a thousand reasons to support him, and none to abandon him," Montalembert wrote in August of 1850.

"I see in him a man who has rendered the greatest services to France, to society and to religion." Napoleon had as his enemies, Montalembert wrote to Dupanloup, "all the representatives of Voltaianism and democracy. For him are those who care for discipline in the

86As quoted in André Trannoy, "Responsabilités de Montalembert en 1848," Revue d'histoire de l'Église de France, XXXV (1949), 177-206, 196.
87Ami de la religion, October 17, 1848.
88As quoted in Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 10.
nation. The clergy must take sides either with its implacable enemies or its natural ally.89 It would be ungrateful, he said, for the clergy to turn its back on Napoleon, who "had done more for religion than anyone else."90 In short, Montalembert temporarily forgot his former devotion to liberal principles, for he as well as other Liberals became convinced that "authority...was the essential element in every society. Liberty du bien was not sufficient to combat and subdue liberty du mal, and the latter must never be recognized in the process of obtaining the former."91 Therefore, the leader of Catholic Liberalism repulsed his former principles. They were made of armor too thin to withstand the destructive onslaught of radicalism. From the presidential election to the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, Montalembert defended the cause of Napoleon and reaction, now become identical. For example, he supported the movement for revision of the constitution which would have enabled Napoleon to seek a second term in office.92 He helped engineer the restriction of the franchise.93 And in November, 1851, he opposed the attempt of the Assembly to give the Assembly's president the means to requisition

90Ibid., 59.
91Ibid., 62-62.
92cf. speech of May 31, 1851 in Montalembert, Œuvres, II, 576-583.
93Ibid., 426-454.
an army, a measure, had it passed, which might have prevented the coup d'etat three weeks later. Certainly, Napoleon did not have a more loyal supporter in the Assembly than Montalembert.

What was his attitude toward Napoleon after the coup d'état? "I believe," he wrote, "that at the present time the President is the instrument of God. The day may come when pride and ingratitude will render him unfaithful to his mission...Then God will allow him to perish miserably....But when that arrives, I will not need to re-proach myself for having given him my support."94 Perhaps he did not approve of the technique employed, and no doubt the brief incarceration of many of the members of the Assembly made his position embarrassing, but Montalembert's support of the coup d'état was none the less unequivocal. He had actually advised in favor of a coup, with the participation of the conservative minority.95 On December 14, 1851, he counseled Catholics to vote "yes" in the plebiscite which was to follow. "To vote against Louis Napoleon would be to acknowledge that the socialist revolution is right, since it is the alternative to the present government. To abstain would be to abdicate the mission entrusted to honest men at the very moment when that mission is most urgent."96 He did not preach absolute confidence

94Montalembert to Dupanloup, December 10, 1851, as quoted in Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 41.

95Trannoy, Extrait de la Revue historique, 73.

96Univers, December 14, 1851.
in the new government, he said. Nor was unlimited devotion to the new regime implied. "But my choice is made. I am for authority against revolt, for conservation against destruction, for society against socialism, for a possible liberty du bien against certain liberty du mal,...and today as always, for Catholicism against the Revolution." 97

Within nine months after making these statements, Montalembert had turned against Napoleon, and in October, 1852, he published Les intérêts catholiques au xixe siècle in which he sought to prove that the Church only loses when it opposes liberty, and that all Catholics should turn their backs on despotism and embrace freely and sincerely Liberal principles. Why this about-face? A suitable answer is not readily apparent. Montalembert's biographer, Lecanuet suggests that he separated from the new regime because Napoleon refused to use his power to free the Church from the Organic Articles and to extend Catholic control over education. Secondly, the Liberal Catholic leader objected to the Constitution promulgated on January 14, 1852, because it promised to make the dictatorship, which might have been admissible as a temporary necessity, a permanent institution. Finally, Lecanuet stated that the confiscation by Napoleon of the patrimony of the Orléans family completed Montalembert's break with the Empire. 98 These reasons seem hardly satisfactory. Montalembert

97 Univers, December 14, 1851.

98 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 51.
had already recognized Napoleonic beneficence in regard to the Church and there is scant proof that he was not satisfied with the results of the Falloux Law. Moreover, the new Emperor was slow to show any indication that he would ever seek to break his alliance with the Church. Concerning the constitution, Montalembert, though naive, was not gullible enough to imagine that Napoleon would use his power for any other purpose than the restoration of the Empire, with all its connotations. The confiscation of the Orléans estate was decried by Montalembert, but it was not significant enough to cause his complete change in attitude.

More important, no doubt, was Montalembert's disappointment when he was not named by Napoleon III to an important post after the coup d'état. The Liberal Catholic leader evidently expected to become a trusted advisor to the Emperor and to be named to an important position in the government. Actually, he was appointed a member of the consultative commission to serve during the interim between the coup d'état and the promulgation of a constitution. On January 23, 1852, he resigned from the commission, which had not been abolished when the constitution was announced; his resignation was allegedly due to the Napoleonic confiscation of private property, particularly that of the Orléans family. Six days earlier, however, he had been offered a seat in the new Senate. Montalembert in his journal went into a rage against the ungratefulness of Napoleon, who had used the count's name as an "affiche" and had led France to believe that "I was his counsellor, when in reality I had never been consulted by
Napoleon, nor did he listen to my views about any matter in particular." He admitted that he wanted to be a counsellor of state, preferably the minister of foreign affairs.99 There is evidence, therefore, to support Thier's statement that Montalembert "thought that by deserting to the enemy he should get a high command."100

On the other hand his desertion of the Napoleonic cause was gradual. In a letter of February 2, 1852, he stated that he still believed that Napoleon was justified in his action of December 2 and that the coup d'état had been a social and political benefit.101 His speech on the occasion of his admission into the French Academy on February 5, 1852, had attached him definitely to the party of reaction for it had shown that he was not yet quite recovered from his fear of radicalism and socialism. Whatever the reason, however, by the summer of 1852, Montalembert had come to regret his renunciation of liberal principles in December of the preceding year. In September he explained his political wanderings during the past three years, by saying that out of love for liberty, he had "combatté those who, under the cover of liberalism, had propagated a democratic and social revolution." If he detested revolution, he

99 Transnoy, Extrait de la Revue historique, 80.
100 Nassau Senior, Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, and other Distinguished Persons During the Second Empire, 2 vols. (London, 1878), I, 370.
101 As quoted in Transnoy, Extrait de la Revue historique, 83.
thought as little of absolutism, he wrote to his friend, the Abbe Texier. He deplored "the servility of all France vis-a-vis the new power, the abandonment of liberty, and the enthusiastic cult of force." 103 A few days earlier he had decried the tendency of Catholics, and especially the Univers, "to bow in miserable subservience to, and become the apologists and admirers of, absolutism....I am resolved to protest against this shameful palinode." 104

Blithely overlooking his own inconstancy, Montalembert broke his public silence by publishing Les intérêts catholiques au xixe siècle, in October of 1852, to chastise those who had forsaken Liberal principles and who now defended Napoleonic policy. Completely inconsonant with the position he had taken the previous December, Montalembert stated in his pamphlet that the progress of Catholicism in the nineteenth century had paralleled the development of a Liberal climate. It was therefore not in the interest of the Church for Catholics to support autocracy, whatever form it might take. The pamphlet bore the imprint of a persistently conservative spirit, defying universal suffrage and radicalism in general. But it served to separate Montalembert decidedly from the camp of Napoleon and from the party of Louis Veuillot of the Univers. With its publication, the leader of the Liberal Catholics embarked upon an eighteen year crusade against the empire and the school of Catholics which supported

103 Letter of September 2, 1852, Montalembert, Correspondance avec Texier, 349-350.
104 Montalembert, Correspondance de Montalembert et Léon Cornudet, (Paris, 1905), 301-02.
it, and in favor of Liberal principles in the L'Avenir tradition.

He, at least, comprehended his volta-face. Answering the charges of Mgr. Pie of Poitiers that he was as guilty of supporting absolutism as those whom he accused, Montalembert said, "I have never invoked authority except as a safeguard for liberty. I have defended liberty against the outrages of democracy, just as I protect it today against absolutism." Montalembert's self-apology and his subsequent attitudes notwithstanding, it was true, as Lacordaire stated, that by his attitudes after 1848, Montalembert had "destroyed with his own hands the edifice which he had built, and he prepared misfortunes for us which he would later regret." In short, he had so thoroughly compromised Liberal Catholicism by his flirtations with Napoleonic absolutism that even his eighteen years of opposition to the regime never really removed the blemish of December, 1851.

Montalembert's right to scold his fellow Catholics for their rather Gallican servility to the Empire was somewhat enhanced by his being brought to trial in 1854 and 1858 on charges of offenses against the person of the Emperor, inciting hatred of the government, and disturbing the public peace. The first charge resulted from the publication in a Belgian paper of a letter he had written to Dupin.

105 Letter of December 17, 1852, as quoted in Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 78.


In this he had made a blistering attack on the Empire, decried the perpetration by Napoleon of absolutism, and lamented the loss of liberal institutions. In 1858, he was tried on basically the same charges, the felony this time being the publication of a pamphlet, praising the English parliamentary system. The first trial, carried on in the Corps législatif, was eventually dropped, but on the second occasion he was found guilty by the Imperial court and sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 francs. He was pardoned by Napoleon. Having done at least partial penance for his sins against liberalism in earlier years, Montalembert now glissened under the approbations of Liberal Catholics everywhere.

"You are among the most honorable men of our time," Lacordaire wrote to him in November of 1858. "You belong to that very small group who are willing to sacrifice something for the sake of convictions and the cause of liberty." 109

To give voice to his protestations, Montalembert, in collaboration with the Duke de Broglie, Augustin Cochin, and others, assumed control of Correspondant in January, 1856. Under their guidance it became the outlet for Liberal Catholic opinions in France, and as such, was opposed vociferously by Univers, edited by Veuillot.

Already rigidly divided between the intransigent majority, which

108 Montalembert, Un débat sur l'Indie au parlement anglais (Brussels, 1858), 17.

despised liberal institutions and which hailed Napoleon as the saviour of France and the Liberal minority, French Catholics were to witness for the next fourteen years a continuous conflict between those two publications. It was largely because of the Correspondant that Liberal Catholicism did not wither away from muteness during the Imperial period.

The Univers went the full course in its acceptance of the Empire, what was, it said, the apex of French civilization, just as the empire had been the highest expression of Roman civilization. It praised absolute monarchy and the reign of Louis XIV as the ideal type of Catholic government and proclaimed that "one of the great merits of the regime of Louis XIV had been the revocation of the Edict of Nantes." Against the Univers and its sympathizers, Montalembert had nothing but scorn. "I am especially exasperated," he wrote, "by the hypocrisy and the universal dastardliness of the clergy which four years ago had an attitude so noble and so justly popular; I am ashamed by the debris of the old noblesse which has abandoned itself to the joys of the antechamber, and by the liberals who made government impossible when France was ruled by honest princes and who now offer little objection to the loss of their voice."  

110 Univers, March 21, 1856. 111 Univers, November 17 and 18, 1852. 112 Univers, October 26, 1853. 113 Letter of January 1, 1856, Peres, ed., Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, XXVIII, 435.
On another occasion he said, "If the men of the Univers are Catholics and if theirs is the only true brand of Catholicism, there is nothing left for me to do but lower my head and envy the fate of the deaf mutes and the blind."  

After September, 1852, therefore, Montalembert opposed the autocracy of the Napoleonic regime just as fervently as he had previously sought refuge in it. There is little reason to believe that his reversal was not sincere, even if the depth of his Liberal roots was rendered more questionable by the fact that his previous activities made an about face necessary. Writing two years before his death, he admitted the mistake he made in originally supporting Napoleon. "I committed a great mistake," he said, "the greatest of my life. It costs me little to admit it, but it cost much to have committed it." After many hesitations, "I shared the illusions of the immense majority of Frenchmen. Mistaken about the extent and nature of the real danger which faced us then, I believed that a coup d'etat was necessary to save society and liberty, both of which I thought were menaced by anarchy." That mistake, incontestable and unsuspicous though it was, he hoped he had expiated. "I accepted the dictatorship only as a temporarily essential remedy...and I soon repudiated that renovation of the old alliance of the altar and the throne which could only be the alliance of the corps de garde and the sacristie."  

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114 Periss, ed., Revue catholique des institutions et du droit, XXVIII, 420.  
115 Montalembert, Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse, LIV, 646.
Their reaction to the coup d'état and the Empire varying from coolness to outright hostility, the other leading Liberal Catholics were not to feel the need of such apologies. Even Dupanloup was cool to the turn of events in December of 1851. He counselled Montalembert that it would be an irreparable mistake to accept a position on the Consultative Commission, and his objections to Napoleon were strong enough to lead him to believe that the "entire country will reject this pretended saviour." Although he shared with Montalembert the fear that the events of 1848 represented not only political disorder, but "social disorganization...and the absence of all respect and the rejection of all authority," Dupanloup was not willing to succumb to autocracy in order to maintain a status quo. In his private journal he gave vent to his opposition to December 2, writing that he regretted "the part which force plays in all human affairs," and the "sudden storms which place a whole nation at the feet of one man." Later he publicly voiced his disapproval of the Napoleonic regime, and it is probably true, as Émile Faguet stated, that what Dupanloup detested most after '93,

116 Lecanuet, Montalembert, III, 34.
118 Ami de la religion, October 17, 1848.
120 Dupanloup, Nouvelles oeuvres choisies, IV, 327.
was certainly the first and second Empires.\footnote{Faguet, \textit{Dupanloup}, 156.}

Ozanam was too removed from the situation in 1851 to be called upon for opinions. In poor health, he left France for an extended stay in Spain and Italy, and he died in 1853. But Lacordaire wasted little breath in decrying the adoration of power with which France was gripped. The praise which Catholics lavished on Napoleon especially irritated Lacordaire. After the election of Napoleon to the presidency, Lacordaire predicted the Empire. \footquote{Absolutism will claim to be the only counterbalance to demagogy. The bourgeoisie will applaud because of their fear, the clergy because of their hopes, and the cannon will be fired from the Invalides to announce to the world the era of order, peace and religion. For myself, I will live and die championing the civilization of the Gospel against the civilization of the sabre and knout.} He pleaded with his audience at Notre Dame in 1851 to say with him, \"I have loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore I die in exile, if I must.\"\footnote{As quoted in Haussonville, \textit{Lacordaire}, 200.} Although he recognized the threat of the \"demagogic party,\" he asked if it was necessary to destroy all in order to save all. Despotism has never preserved anything, he declared.\footnote{Lacordaire, \textit{Conférences de Notre-Dame}, IV, 56.} His opposition to the new power which, he said, was born of a military \textit{coup d'État} and despotically

organized, did not diminish. After giving a final sermon at St. Roch in Paris on February 10, 1853, in which he said, obviously referring to Napoleon, "He who employs evil means to do good, even to save his country, is never anything but a villain," Lacordaire left the capital to assume control of a school at Soreze in the south of France. From there he continued his opposition to the Empire and to the defamation of Liberal institutions by all concerned. Probably with more truth than any other Catholic in France could muster, he wrote that "God alone knows if we shall see better days, if France deserves to regain the institutions she has willfully lost....But a future will dawn upon our graves, and it will find me pure from treason, from defection, from pandering to success, and firm in my hope of a political and religious state of things worth of the Christianity in which I believe. I have always scorned the idea of propping up my faith by despotism." Therefore, the record of the Liberal Catholics as a group in adhering to their principles in face of the Napoleonic Empire was as good, if not better, than that of the bourgeois Liberals of the Thiers-Barrot school. They remained relatively faithful to their creed of representative and liberal institutions. They did not look

127 Lacordaire, Testament, 103.
with complete favor upon republicanism, and like most nineteenth-century Liberals, they might accept democracy as inevitable, but they would not welcome it. They, like the French secular Liberals during the first half of the century, desired a parliamentary system, preferably monarchical, in which liberty of the individual would be securely guaranteed against the power of the state, which in turn should be as decentralized as possible.

Guarantism and anti-étatisme

Against the obtrusive power of a centralized state which tended to trespass upon the liberties of the individual in order to serve the will of all, Liberal Catholics sought to establish intermediary guarantees of the individual's freedom. In the spirit of Montesquieu's guarantism, Burke's organic concept of the state, or Constant's insistence upon interjacent institutions between the individual and the central government, the Montalembert group constructed its positive political attitudes. These attitudes were based on the negative foundation of a fear of the unlimited power of the central government, whether it be an absolute monarchy in the Bourbon tradition or a republic patterned after 1793. Decentralized government authority, a parliamentary system, the interposition of localized loyalties between the citizen and his loyalty to the central state, and the freedom of expression, public and private—these, they suggested, were to be sought as guarantees of liberty against the encroachments of the centralized state.
Dating back to the Lamennais movement, Liberal Catholics had urged the decentralization of governmental functions as a method of better insuring liberty. *L'Avenir* had stated categorically that liberty and centralization were in theory opposed, "since centralization implied the excessive tutelage of the state in moral and material matters, and each liberty was the absence of all governmental action." The state "should not interfere in the affairs of the commune, of the province, or the family, except to protect the interests of all." 128

Liberal Catholics simply echoed that point of view. Their opposition to democracy lay primarily in their anti-statism, an attitude they shared with most nineteenth-century Liberals. Democracy, they thought, as it was instrumented by the interpreters of Rousseau, proclaimed the omnipotent sovereignty of the state and the eradication of all subordinate sovereignties, leaving the individual "feeble and disarmed in the combat against the anonymous and collective being called the state and that voracious idol called centralization." 129 Radicals in France and Italy masqueraded under the name of the principles of '89, Cochin argued, when their real program"


129 Albert de Broglie, "Discours de M. de Broglie à l'Assemblée de Malines," *Correspondant*, XXIV (1863), 56–64, 59.
was democracy and centralization—in other words, absolute equality and absolute authority.\textsuperscript{130} In Montalembert's opinion the central state wanted to achieve the destruction of local autonomies which, if accomplished, would abandon the individual to the caprice of unlimited power.\textsuperscript{131} He voted against the constitution of 1848, he explained, because it did not guarantee the independence of the average citizen against an omnipotent legislature arranged on a unicameral basis.\textsuperscript{132} "This insane centralization," Montalembert said at Malines in 1863, "each day more dangerous, is a social leper... which prepares the death of individual dignity."\textsuperscript{133} And in his Testament Lacordaire lashed out against the administrative centralization which put all liberty in jeopardy. Although none of them offered concrete suggestions as to alternative local institutions, all Liberal Catholics joined Tocqueville and his coterie in decrying centralization as a cancer eating away at the soul of France, and in identifying it as an evil resulting from a democratic structure. Decentralized government was equated with the stability of liberty.

Another guarantee of liberty against the increasing power of

\textsuperscript{130} Augustin Cochin, "Les principes de 1789 et la doctrine catholique," Correspondant, XXII (1863), 401-404, 403.


\textsuperscript{132} Ami de la religion, November 7, 1848.

\textsuperscript{133} Lecamuet, Montalembert, III, 350.
the state was a parliamentary system organized on a bicameral basis, with a hereditary chamber which was not subject to every despotic whim of the multitude. England was the model that Liberal Catholics wanted France to emulate.\textsuperscript{134} Thanks to her parliamentary institutions, "which only England has shown how to preserve and bring to perfection, she alone has been able to escape autocracy and anarchy, while all nations on the Continent have fallen victims to one or the other, and sometimes to both."\textsuperscript{135} Radicals in France, he declared, had attempted to show that the English parliament was nothing but a noisy, troublesome, and superfluous piece of governmental machinery. "Radicalism," he continued, "which hates all political guarantees, because every guarantee is an obstacle to its progress, has an instinctive desire to abolish the parliament, which, while it opposes an equal barrier against anarchy from clubs and despotism from barracks, is also the bulwark of order and legitimate authority, as well as of individual liberty."\textsuperscript{136} Representative government, he concluded, was no doubt a long, laborious, and difficult "education," but it is the most honorable and fruitful of all.\textsuperscript{137}

This he said in spite of his low opinion of the abilities of the French to govern themselves. "My countrymen make me almost a

\textsuperscript{134} Lettres du R. P. Lacordaire à Mme de la Tour du Pin, 220.
\textsuperscript{135} Montalembert, De l'avenir de l'Angleterre. (Paris, 1856), 270.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 135-36.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 277.
misanthrope," he declared to Nassau Senior. "They are to be governed only through their bad passions or their servile passions. They are like hounds. They enjoy nothing but a hunt, and respect nothing but a whip." The dangers, therefore, in a representative government were apparent, but they were inherent, he said, within any governmental form. Since monarchy could not be trusted to guarantee liberty, nor could one rely on provincial liberties because they were unfortunately a thing of the past, the representative form of government "is the only possible form of political liberty." "

By "parliamentary system" Liberal Catholics assumed a parliament independent from coercion from above. They deplored the "consultative despotism or representative absolutism of which both Napoleons made use." Also, illegitimate coercion from below was not to be tolerated. They came, with hesitancy perhaps, to admit the absolute right of rebellion or revolution. "I have always held," Montalembert stated in 1859, "the doctrine which most countries of modern Europe...have consecrated by their example—the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the necessity of the people's consent to the government which rules them. But this is far from admitting, with

139Montalembert, Les intérêts catholiques, 110.
the revolutionaries, that such a consent, once directly or tacitly given, may be constantly reconsidered or withdrawn, without the most weighty reasons." Nor would he concede "that all governments without exception must be modelled after the same pattern and that, for this purpose, a people have the right to change their government whenever they choose; no revolution is lawful by the mere fact that it is a revolution." Certain revolutions might have been accepted by Liberal Catholics as expedient or efficacious—the revolutions of 1789 and of 1830, for example—but they never granted the theoretical basis of a universal right of revolt. When Dupanloup said, "For myself, I have a horror of revolutions," he accurately represented their opinion.

Furthermore, the parliamentary system best served the Church's needs. Admittedly, "under parliamentary government, the Church has no political power, but such power is not favorable to her interests." In such a system, "she possesses what is a thousand times better than power. She has rights." But neither would the Church actively condone the principle of revolution or the right to revolt, even if at times revolution might inadvertently serve the Church. The revolutionary spirit, Montalembert said, "is the original sin of political life." The Church, however, was not opposed to, nor the

141 Charles de Montalembert, Pie IX et la France en 1849 et 1859 (London, 1859), 32.

142 Faguet, Dupanloup, 160.

143 Montalembert, Les intérêts catholiques, 150.

144 Ibid., 162.
enemy of, representative government or political liberty, Dupanloup stated in his clever interpretation of the Syllabus of Errors.\(^{145}\)

Representative government was a more effective guarantee of liberty if it was based on a bicameral system. One house would check and balance the other and better protect the representative system against pressure from mob action.\(^{146}\) So much the better if the upper chamber was hereditary, or at least self-perpetuating. The services rendered by the hereditary peerage to the dignity of the country from 1830 to 1848, Montalembert argued, was proof of its efficacy. By discarding the principle of heredity, Lacordaire asserted, the Chamber of Peers lost the source of its independence.\(^{147}\) Liberal Catholics' inclination toward a hereditary upper chamber revealed the hesitancy with which they accepted a popularly elected assembly. They were concerned with developing institutions which would secure the parliament against the sovereign people, for as Dupanloup stated, "If there is despotism of sovereigns, is there not also the despotism of assemblies, sometimes even more tyrannical and cruel?"\(^{148}\)

Another guarantee of liberty, Liberal Catholics contended, could be found in the subdivision of society into collective groups and associations. The right of association, that is to say, the right to

\(^{145}\) cf. Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 357.

\(^{146}\) Ami de la religion, November 7, 1848.

\(^{147}\) Lacordaire, Testament, 133.

\(^{148}\) Dupanloup, Nouvelles œuvres choisies, IV, 359.
form intermediate loyalties and protective devices for groups of citizens within the state, had not been universally granted by Liberals, and had been almost unanimously deprecated by republicans and democrats as an interference with the natural culmination of loyalties in a central state. Catholics of all political beliefs normally joined forces in demanding that right, because to gain it would mean freedom to form religious associations and develop religious orders—including the Society of Jesus—without the interference of the state. Liberal Catholics shared in that demand, but to them associations served other purposes as well. They viewed associations of all types as another counterbalance to the overwhelming power of the state.

In *Des associations religieuses*, which was published in 1845, Dupanloup declared that the liberty to form organizations of any kind was but a necessary extension of freedom of speech and thought. If one was free to have convictions, then he must be free also to join with others of the same point of view for the protection and propagation of that conviction. Lacordaire championed not only the right to form religious associations—in a sense he was the expression of that right for he had refounded the Dominican Order in France—but the rights of all associations "with aims which conform to reason and are in the public interest." Without them, he said, "the individual is isolated and all are reduced to equal mediocrity of fortune.

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and influence, ... unable to resist the oppressive and colossal grandeur of a state possessing all power. 150

_L'Avenir_ had called the right to form associations a natural right.151 Liberal Catholics in the mid-century would not go so far, remembering the condemnation by _Miran vos_ of liberties labelled absolute, but they did tend to apply their attitude generally. They did not deny the right of French workers to organize. Indeed, they championed that right. Montalembert asked Louis Napoleon to favor the establishment of Christian workers associations,152 and Albert de Broglie demanded, "as Lacordaire and Tocqueville have done before me, the right of association, the right of workers to organize in groups, the right of Frenchmen to associate freely for the purpose of thinking and praying in common."153 It is not clear whether Lacordaire would have granted freedom to politically or economically radical associations, but his attitude toward workers' organizations is adequately positive. To raise the standards of the workers' conditions, he said, "the first step is to establish associations of workers to protect the individual laborer....Perhaps the association should not be given complete latitude....I believe that such

150 As quoted in Albert de Broglie, _Lacordaire_ (Paris, 1863), 89-90.
151 _L'Avenir_, October 17, 1830.
152 Lecanuet, _Montalembert_, III, 47.
153 Albert de Broglie, "Discours de M. de Broglie à l'Assemblée de Malines," _Correspondant_, XTV (September 23, 1863), 56-58, 59.
organizations would be a great remedy for the sufferings of labor. At the same time, the remedies themselves should not become a new force to threaten others. Furthermore, if "the employers alone are allowed to associate, to form combinations, without allowing to workers the same facilities of combat, injustice results. Even without organizations, the employer is much stronger because of his resources. To counterbalance that strength, workers should be allowed to combine." But the workers should not gain such strength as to give them control of a given industry. That would be equally unjust. Without any rights to organize for strength, however, the laborers would be reduced to "white slaves" in industrial society.

Associations, therefore, would help prevent the isolation and consequent impotence of the individual in face of both the state and powerful groups within the society. Localized loyalties, then, would tend to stabilize government and society. Respect for family would have the same effect. The maintenance of the family as a closely coordinated element within the society would further help the individual to identify himself with his heritage in an age of mass upheavals. The concept of family, too, was a conserving influence, in the opinion of Liberal Catholics.

Liberal Catholics also looked to liberty of speech and press, and the freedom to criticize governments, as additional guarantees.

154 Lacordaire, Correspondance de Lacordaire (Paris, 1876), 544-45.
155 Ibid., 543-44.
Lacordaire spoke for all Liberal Catholics when he said, "There is something divine, eternally free in man—speech." Lacordaire's sentiments were supported in principle by all Liberals after the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789. But freedom of speech and its corollary, freedom of the press, was intermittently questioned and denied by nineteenth-century governments, by the Church, and at times by Liberals themselves. The laws of 1835 prescribed limitations on those rights, the Empire had its censorship, and the Syllabus of Errors corroborated the opinions expressed in Mirari vos and Singulari nos by which the Church had condemned the principles of free speech and press.

Probably on no other issue were the Liberal Catholics as united. Even Dupanloup, more apprehensive than the others in regard to modern liberties, was willing categorically to state his support. Quoting Guizot, who said that the "first duty of liberty is to accept the publicity of a free press," Dupanloup declared that if it was a duty it was also a right, and a right which he cherished. He was willing to recognize the dangers of a free press, but the lack of it under the Second Empire had shown him that "nothing surpasses the dangers of the censorship of the present regime." In denying to some the liberty to speak and write freely, the Empire had established a monopoly for the privileged and had gagged the excluded. Such a

156 As quoted in Montalembert, Lacordaire, 30.

157 Dupanloup, De la pacification religieuse, 85.
situation he could not admire.\(^\text{158}\) And when he was accused of denying freedom of speech when he worked feverishly to keep Littre out of the French Academy, he agreed that the Academy was not a school of theology, but he insisted that it was his right to oppose, wherever he could, the ideas which he abhorred. It was, he said, an exercise of free speech.\(^\text{159}\) Dupanloup even undertook to minimize the effects of the condemnation of freedom of the press by the Syllabus. The Pope, he pointed out, had condemned liberty of the press when the term was applied in an absolute sense. Who, he asked, would advocate a freedom without any restrictions? "Every man of good sense, regardless of his political or religious faith, would agree with us that unlimited freedom would be impractical and undesirable."\(^\text{160}\) Undoubtedly most Catholics agreed with Abbé Jules Morel that the Pope had condemned liberty of the press in a more general sense.\(^\text{161}\) Even the most democratic of governments must impose certain limits, in order to maintain the rights of all. Thin logic perhaps, but then his freedom as a Catholic bishop to accept the concept of a free press rested, after 1864, upon very shallow ground.


\(^{159}\) Dupanloup, "Avertissement a la jeunesse et aux pères de famille sur les attaques dirigées contre la religion par quelques écrivains de nos jours," Nouvelles œuvres choisies, II, 32.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., IV, 329-331.

L'Avenir had unequivocally called for freedom of the press, and Montalembert and Lacordaire, in spite of diplomatic retreats in deference to Mirari vos and Singulari nos, never really ceased to champion it also. Freedom of the press, L'Avenir admitted, would without doubt grant freedom of error and also allow "abuses and scandals in the press." But a system of state censorship would be impossible in a free society, Lacordaire wrote, and Catholics should not imagine that under such a system their writings would be privileged. Exercised by the state, censorship would reduce the Church to servitude. "Catholics must have confidence in the power of the truth," 162 The editors of L'Avenir wanted "freedom of the press as a necessary guarantee of our other rights, particularly our religious rights," 163 and that freedom should have no legal limitation of fiscal restrictions. 164 In a letter written on December 14, 1833, to Montalembert concerning Mirari vos, Lacordaire retreated somewhat, saying that perhaps liberty of the press was nothing but the oppression of "feeble minds by strong minds", and that it might prove injurious to European liberty and literature. Furthermore, the Encyclical had not been concerned with the political press or the right of anyone to speak freely on public affairs. It should be applied only to "writings against morality, faith, and common sense." 165 Later in his life,

162 Articles de l'Avenir, IV, 505-509.
163 Ibid., II, 478.
164 Ibid., I, 97-104.
165 Théophile Foisset, "Le P. Lacordaire. Documents inédits", Correspondant, Li (1872), 985-1007; His position was not different from that of A. de Courson, "Cas de conscience;" Correspondant, December, 1847, 839-65.
however, he was to give adequate proof of his acceptance of the principles of free speech and press.

Against the Catholics who stated that press censorship under the Empire was in harmony with the practices of the Church—first a warning, then suppression—166 and those who declared that liberty of the press was blameworthy, whether as a principle which was momentarily acceptable or as one ideally desirable,167 Montalembert argued incessantly. Only during one period of his life did his faith in a free press falter, and that was in 1849 when the fear of a socialist threat to organized society led him to take a position concerning liberty which was out of keeping with his opinions before and after the period of the Napoleonic presidency.168

Montalembert, too, had written for L'Avenir in favor of liberty of press and speech. In 1835, he spoke in the Chamber of Peers against the "September Laws", which, ironically enough were being sponsored by the Doctrinaire Liberals. On September 8, 1835, he criticized the suppression of the "right of discussion", of the principle of "absolute liberty of speech, which I avow freely."169 Later, after he assumed a hostile attitude toward the Empire, he

166 Abbé Jules Morel writing in Univers, December 22, 1855.


169 Ibid., IV, 312.
commented on the English parliamentary system by saying that "Of all the qualities which constitute the social strength of this privileged race, the rarest and the most essential to the political life of a free nation is the respect for the opinions of others." From that climate "arises the desire of hearing and discussing all the sides of a question, of allowing free speech to all interests, to all parties, and to respect the opinions thus expressed with a tolerance that sometimes seems to degenerate into complicity." Later, he wrote that he would not cease to repeat that "it is this extensive, and indeed, unlimited publicity, that makes up the principal strength of the English society, the essential condition of its vitality, and the sovereign guarantee of its liberty." Montalembert, therefore, as well as the other Liberal Catholics accepted openly, to the extent that they as Catholics could accept, the principle of freedom of speech and press. Even papal encyclicals against the principle were interpreted by them to mean that only liberty of press in the most absolute sense was censured by the Church. Although they felt that constitutions were not necessarily effective guarantees of liberty, Liberal Catholics presupposed the existence of a written charter in which the liberties of the individual

170 Charles de Montalembert, De l'avenir de l'Angleterre (Brussels, 1856), 229.
171 Ibid., 231.
172 Charles de Montalembert, Un débat sur l'Indie au Parlement Anglais (Brussels, 1858), 24.
would be enumerated. They preferred, also, that the constitution provide for a monarchy, since they instinctively tended to believe that within a monarchy, properly limited in power, yet another guarantee of liberty could be found. Liberal Catholics, therefore, preferred a constitutional monarchy to all types of government.

Once again England provided the model, as it had for Constant and the Doctrinaires. The English monarchy, powerful but limited, had served as a check both for the passionate ambition of absolutists and for the clumsy despotism of socialism and democracy. 173 He and his associates had not lamented the passing of the Bourbons in 1830, and their monarchism—Bishop Dupanloup excepted—was never identified with Legitimacy. 174 Rather, they supported constitutional monarchy. They would have given Louis Philippe their sincere adherence had it not been for the anticlericalism of the regime, they contended. Despite that, Montalembert regretted the overthrow of the July Monarchy in 1848. 175

Ozanam was perhaps the only republican in the group. Lacordaire, even though he supported the Republic of 1848, leaned by

173 Montalembert, De l'avenir politique de l'Angleterre, 2.


175 Lecanuet, Montalembert, II, 382; A. Trannoy, Revue historique, CXXXII, 263.
preference toward a monarchy. "Limited monarchy," he wrote, "in spite of its faults, has always seemed to me the most desirable of all forms of government." In 1836 he wrote Lettre sur la Saint-Siege, in which he identified himself absolutely with monarchism. "France will have either a monarchy or chaos, because there exists no other real milieu between submission to an absolute authority and the radical independence of all citizens." Lacordaire rearranged his position in 1848; no longer would he admit the absolute necessity of monarchy. On the contrary, he took pains to show that Catholicism should not be identified with any dynasty or particular governmental form. "I know of no one less naturally disposed toward the republican form of government than I am. I have regarded the republic as a fact and a necessity, and I have adhered to it without pleasure or without remorse." Perhaps his position was best summarized by Montalembert. "Born a democrat, Lacordaire had no difficulty believing, like all the clear-headed men of his age, in the inevitable triumph of democracy. Like the majority of real liberals, he was tolerably indifferent to dynastic questions, and in a certain measure to forms of government. He always, however, leaned towards limited monarchy." 

177 Henri Lacordaire, Lettre sur le Saint-Siege (Paris, 1836), 84.
179 Montalembert, Lacordaire, 194-95.
Although he did not actively participate in the Legitimist or Orléans parties before 1871, Dupanloup was a strong partisan of monarchy. After the collapse of France before the Prussian armies, he worked steadily for the re-establishment of the Bourbons, for the prerequisite fusion of monarchical claims, and for the acceptance by the Count of Chambord of the principles of liberal constitutional government as represented by the tricolor. In 1873 he personally appealed to Chambord to compromise, and he asked the Pope to persuade the pretender to accept the conditions of the National Assembly. As a member of the Assembly he worked furiously to effect a fusion which would allow a monarchical re-establishment. Convinced that only the restoration of the monarchy would end France's problems, he said, "France is lost among nations! Every ten or twenty years a fresh revolution!...The country must go back to her stability and grandeur. Let all princes united together around the one monarchical principle."

Liberal Catholics, building a political ideology upon the basis of anti-statisme in the tradition of nineteenth-century Liberalism and upon the guarantism of Montesquieu and Burke, distrusted democracy and republicanism as contributors to a centralized state. If

180 LaGrange, Dupanloup, II, 441.
181 Ibid., II, 442-43.
182 cf. LaGrange, Lettres de Mgr. Dupanloup, II, 315-17.
183 LaGrange, Dupanloup, II, 392.
individual liberty was to be maintained, they contended, it must be
well fortified by insurances against the power of the state and the
tyrannical tendencies of democracy. Guarantees were the panacea for
the ills incumbent within a regime of popular sovereignty, which
they supposed to be inevitable. As defenses of individual liberty,
they proposed parliamentary government, decentralization of authority,
localization of loyalties by the establishment of associations,
emphasis upon the family as a stabilizing factor, and limited mon­
archy. Those elements, however, might prove to be feeble. In the
final analysis the best guarantee was the inculcation of respect for
authority and Christian morality. This latter task, only the Church
could perform.
CONCLUSIONS

The Liberal Catholic group between 1843 and 1870 did not produce a body of thought which might be called a philosophy. Perhaps such a failure was a calculated one, for when they stated their opinions in any fashion a barrage of criticism emanated from every source of intransigent Catholicism—to have formed logical and metaphysical premises upon which to base their outlook might have put them in direct contradiction with the views of the Church. To escape condemnation it was essential that they not appear to accept Liberalism as an absolute truth but as a concrete good, always preferable to other political and social systems. Even their deliberate efforts to avoid the mistakes of Lamennais, however, did not spare them, for certainly the Syllabus of Errors was directed more at them than at any other group.

More likely, however, the absence of a philosophical system was due to the general inferiority of French Catholic scholarship and philosophical contribution during the nineteenth-century. Seldom, perhaps, has the Church in France been so lacking in intellectual originality and activity. Liberal Catholics shared this
shortcoming. They dealt in politics and in polemics, not philosophy. At a time when the Church was being challenged from every direction---by Taine, Renan, Littre and the Positivists, the Liberals, the socialists, the democrats---French Catholics picked up the gauntlet, but they chose as weapons vituperous criticism and resounding imprecation, not convincing logic. Intransigent Catholics appealed to the quasi-philosophy of de Maistre and de Bonald. Beyond it they would not give an inch of ground, nor did they attempt to refortify their position by the introduction of new defenses. Liberal Catholics appealed to intuition and even to expediency.

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the Liberal Catholics and their associates were admitted to the French Academy---Dupanloup, Montalembert, Lacordaire, Albert de Broglie, Falloux, Gratry---their scholarship was so weak that they could not muster adequate defenses against the onslaught of criticism which was aimed at them and at the Church. For example, the best effort that Dupanloup seemingly could make in answer to Renan's Life of Jesus was the publication in 1864 of L'Athéisme et le péril social in which he attempted to show that irreligion would heap upon France the worst kind of social and political disasters. If Dupanloup was not at all a theologian,1 neither were the others, and Lacordaire was reputed

to be "the most ignorant man that ever entered the Academy."

Ozanam, perhaps the most learned of them all, was preoccupied with his study of medieval literature, and he died before many of the controversies requiring ripostes had taken shape.

In so far as theological controversies moved from the realm of personalities and political outlooks, the major theological conflict in the mid-century evolved around the traditionalist school, which was opposed by the Liberals. Traditionalist philosophy had regained vigor with Lamennais, who before his transformation in 1830 had appeared as its champion. Intransigent Catholics after 1830 went much further than Lamennais, reducing the capacity of reason to almost nothing. They identified reason absolutely with eighteenth-century Rationalism, and they accused those Catholics who upheld the validity of human reason of being guilty of heresy by association.

Liberals and Gallicans coalesced to oppose the new attack on reason. The Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne, being named by the state without intervention from Rome, was the outlet for Liberal and anti-traditionalist philosophy. There, Gratry and Bautain, who had departed from his earlier sallies against reason, both found shelter.²

Liberal Catholics themselves objected to the intransigent Catholic tendency to discredit reason. Dupanloup considered the attempt to degrade reason not only unworthy of Catholic scholars but it was, he stated, in conflict with Church doctrine. In 1855 Pius IX published four propositions declaring the accord between faith and reason and avowing their common divine origin; therefore, on this issue Dupanloup was in the extraordinary position of being supported by Rome.\(^4\) But Dupanloup and the Church, however, condemned as anti-Christian and unphilosophical the idea that reason is "absolutely omnipotent and sovereign, which is, implicitly, the negation of God Himself, and of His Church."\(^5\) For his part, Lacordaire said there were two forces in the human mind: "Reason, having its sources in the natural order, and religion, which has been transmitted to us from age to age, by tradition and authority. Now the system is false which teaches that the Author of human nature has implanted there two forces which are contradictory rather than harmonious."\(^6\) Albert de Broglie and Montalembert were of the same opinion. They saw no incompatibility between faith and reason, while admitting that reason was an insufficient basis for faith and truth. Christianity, the Duke de Broglie wrote, "is the mediator between God and natural laws on the one hand, and humanity on the other."\(^7\)

\(^5\)Ibid., IV, 334.
But Liberal Catholics could never accept the priority which the eighteenth-century formulatoes of Liberalism gave to reason. Reason to the latter was the basis for a new system; to Liberal Catholics it was a complement to religion. To the eighteenth-century Rationalist, reason was the source of morality, of progress, and of faith. To the Liberal Catholic, reason was a subordinate support for faith. There was, therefore, little similarity in the two approaches to reason.

And talk as they did of natural law, Liberal Catholics were not in harmony with the eighteenth-century interpretation of such laws. Both Broglie and Lacordaire spoke at length on the existence of natural laws, but both concluded that Christianity was necessary to give men hope when oppressed by the realization of their weakness in face of natural laws. Faith, then, was a necessary complement to reason, for only by faith could men "accept what was in contradiction to natural law," and thereby escape abject defeatism. None of the Liberal Catholics could accept the finality and ineluctibility of natural law, and as a result, they were infinitely removed from the eighteenth-century foundations of Liberalism.

Although nineteenth-century Liberals often deviated from its original nature, Liberalism was premised on a humanism which

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8Henri Lacordaire, Conferences de Notre-Dame, II, 281-82; Albert de Broglie, Études morales et littéraires (Paris, 1853), 370-71.

9Ibid., 370.
demonstrated a high evaluation of the nature and capabilities of men and upon a subsequent faith in progress. Liberal Catholics, too, believed in progress, but they proceeded from an entirely different source toward a different ideal. And glorify men as they would, Liberal Catholics could never escape Church doctrine of original sin and its consequences. As a result, they, like their secular counterpart, were in constant search of restraints which would protect order and society from the rampages and ravages of politically liberated men. And they made progress dependent upon the widespread acceptance of religion. "The grand law of progress of liberty and of civilization is the Gospel. It was Jesus Christ who posed the most elevated and the purest ideal toward which mankind is constantly moving."\(^{10}\) God had not created humanity without design, Ozanam said, and that design must necessarily be accomplished. "There will be retrogressions and at times slow advances....God leaves individuals as masters of their own acts, but He keeps His hand on society....While humanity accomplishes its inevitable destiny, man remains free."\(^{11}\) Their utopia, however, was being approached according to a divine plan, while Liberalism depended upon reason not only to supply the means of progress but also to design the utopia.

Liberal Catholics spoke of freedom of the individual, of liberty

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\(^{10}\) Dupanloup, *Nouvelles Oeuvres choisies*, IV, 340.

\(^{11}\) Abbé Camille Rambaud, *Ozanam* (Lyon, 1898), 8.
in the abstract, but never could they accept the eighteenth-century ideal of liberty. "Shall I be suspected," Montalembert asked, "of venerating, under this ancient and sacred name of liberty, the inventions of modern pride, the infallibility of human reason, and the foolish heresy of the indefinite perfectibility of man...? And shall I be reduced to the necessity of defending myself against any complicity with the advocates of unlimited and absolute liberty? I trust not."¹² What he wanted to see established was "a well-regulated, restricted, orderly, temperate, righteous, and moderate liberty... that liberty, which, far from being hostile to authority, cannot subsist without it."¹³ Once more, he continued, "I do not mean here to profess any absolute, universal theory, exclusively applicable to all ages and to all peoples. I maintain solely, that in the present state of the world, liberty is a good—a relative, not an absolute good."¹⁴ Furthermore, "liberty, defined and limited as I have endeavored to make it, is still a weapon for evil, through the original fall of man; but it is also capable of being turned to good, thanks to the remnant of intelligence and virtue which still exists in man redeemed by the blood of God."¹⁵ Far from accepting the autonomy of the individual, Montalembert as well as the other Liberal Catholics were forced by the nature of their religion to place

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¹² Charles de Montalembert, Les intérêts catholiques au xixe siècle (Paris, 1852), 70.

¹³ Ibid., 70.

¹⁴ Ibid., 71.

man in a divine plan, that is to say, to subordinate him and reduce his sovereignty over himself. Also, Free Will in the long run was, in the eyes of Liberals, a narrowly constructed liberty, for even if the individual was free to accept or reject salvation, he, having once made the choice, would have no control over his destiny; consequently, he would be in no sense free.

Liberal Catholics, therefore, were far removed from a rapprochement with the philosophical bases of Liberalism. They did not accept the omnipotence of reason; natural laws were divinely instrumented, and they were subject to the miraculous intervention of God; man, though perhaps noble, was stained by the original sin; moral progress would result from the acceptance by man of the concept of humanity's divine destiny, not from the development of human reason; the ideal toward which mankind moved was the universal application and acceptance of Christian truth, not of reason and rational patterns; and finally, man's freedom was relative, the individual was not autonomous.

Upon what basis, therefore, did the Montalembert group merit the name "liberal?" It has been suggested by some that only in comparison with the intransigent Catholics were they liberal, for certainly "the one body, the Church is divided against itself, and the fictitious veil of absolute unity fails to conceal the fact."16

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Throughout the century there was a continuous feud between Liberal and intransigent Catholics, a feud which betrayed the lack of unity within the Church. In the eyes of the Veuillot school, the Liberal Catholics were not only Liberal, they were heretics. The intransigents declared Liberalism to be opposed to Catholicism since Liberals based social order on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and because they believed in a kind of social rationalism and propagated the idea that the state was the single sovereign and independent power. Liberalism being the great heresy of the nineteenth-century, it followed that those Catholics who wanted to harmonize the Church with Liberalism were of questionable orthodoxy as well. "Liberal Catholicism is neither Catholic nor Liberal. It is sectarian," Veuillot wrote. Worse still, it "is one of the most deliberate heresies the Church has known." Mgr. Segur agreed that "it is false to pretend that one is able to be Catholic in religion and Liberal in politics. A single Liberal Catholic priest does more damage to the Church than five hundred anticlericals." A more pertinent comment, perhaps, was that of the Pere Ramière, who stated that "one is no longer a Catholic when he makes his obedience

to the authority of the Church conditional upon the Church following his ideas."\(^{21}\) If not guilty of heresy, as Veuillot charged, the Liberal Catholics in a sense put themselves outside the pale of orthodoxy by their tendency to attempt to lead the Church rather than to be led by it.

True it was that the Liberal Catholics attempted to lead the Church in the direction of a rapprochement between it and the principles of the French Revolution. To the Montalembert group it was "the great error, the widespread and fatal error of our time to declare that the society emanating from 1789 is incompatible with Christianity."\(^{22}\) To correct that error, to accomplish the union of Catholicism and Liberalism, was the goal of the Liberal Catholics. They wanted to form "a party freely Catholic and frankly Liberal.... Catholics should become Liberals and Liberals should become Catholic."\(^{23}\) In short, they sought to Catholicize Liberalism. They wanted to show that "political liberty, if free from revolutionary license and anarchy, is dear to the Catholic Church and is actually one of its stoutest earthly guarantees. One must convince this modern society that the Gospel is the source of all social progress, of all legitimate efforts to lessen the inequality of men.... Finally,

\[^{21}\]Père Henri Ramière, \textit{Les doctrines romaines sur le libéralisme} (Paris, 1870), xii.
it is necessary to explain that all secular intolerance...which would convert men by means of the sword or the law rather than by the ministry of the Word....is an abominable doctrine, condemned by the Church."24

But the Liberal Catholics sought not a capitulation to, but a compromise with, Liberalism. Between modern society and the Church they looked for that which reconciled the two, not that which separated them. 25 As Gratry said, one half of mankind "cries out that the Revolution is evil, the other half that it is just....It is our duty to disentangle these contradictions, to overthrow evil and glorify justice....We must interpret the Revolution by the light of the Gospel, in wisdom, in peace, in fraternity; this is the problem of our day, the main task of all apostles of truth and prophets of liberty."26

In that spirit, Liberal Catholics set out to show that the principles of 1789, despite the fact that they were based on unacceptable premises, were not contrary to Roman Catholic doctrine. If absolute liberty of the individual was a fallacious concept, at least they could accept political liberty. Equality they proclaimed to be a divine principle, for "Was it not Christianity which has revealed to men their equality before God, and is that so far from

24 Lacordaire, as quoted in August J. O. Gratry, Henri Perreyve (Paris, 1866), 156-57.
25 Vicomte Camille de Mesur, Montalembert (Paris, 1897), 246.
26 Gratry, Henri Perreyve, 162-63.
equality before the law.27 God had established rights which were anterior to laws; the most important of those rights was, Cochin wrote, the equality of men.28 Catholics then not only could, but had the duty to proclaim the equality of men. Freedom of speech and of press were desirable. Liberty of conscience and freedom of worship were acceptable. They declared that the Church could no longer expect, nor should it desire, state protection and privilege; as a formula for Church-state relations, they proposed and propagated the concept of dualism, or the mutual independence of the Church and the state. Economic theories were of little significance to their thought, but they defended the rights of property. In the long run, however, they had little in common with economic Liberals. None of those principles, they said, were incompatible with Catholicism.

Like the Liberals of 1789 or 1830, they distrusted democracy and republicanism, since they associated with those systems an intensification of the prerogatives of the central government. Believing that such centralization was a threat to individual liberty, since it removed the institutional and traditional guarantees of that liberty by eradicating all subordinate authorities, the Liberal Catholics shared with secular Liberals an anti-statisme. They sought to restore the guarantees of individual liberty which the Revolution had

removed. Furthermore, they saw in Christian morality the most effective restraint upon the individual, and consequently proclaimed Christianity to be the natural ally and defender of liberty.

Without accepting the philosophical precepts of Liberalism, therefore, Liberal Catholics incorporated into their outlook, the essential Liberal principles. Their motivation, however, came from different sources than that of secular Liberals. Rather than being led to their conclusions by a faith in reason or by a desire to serve the rising middle class, their principal stimulus was found in their Catholicism. They sought to serve the Church. As long as the Church allied itself with the forces of reaction and counterrevolution, as long as it defied modern society and the principles upon which that society was founded, it would alienate men rather than win them. The Liberal Catholic set out to show to Frenchmen that the Church was not necessarily opposed to modern liberties. To the Church, the Liberal Catholics not only attempted to demonstrate that Catholicism would lose the support of the masses if it continued to oppose Revolutionary principles, but also, the Montalembert group argued that it was in the interest of the Church to reject state protection and pronounce in favor of liberty. For the Church was best served, as 1848 had proved, and it prospered most in a regime of liberty. By sincerely supporting liberty for all, the Church would gain the right to share in that liberty; but only by championing the liberty of all could the Church expect liberty for herself, as the campaign for liberty of education had shown. Once free from all
encumbering alliances with the state or with reactionary political groups, once a climate of liberty was obtained, Catholic truth would surely be victorious.

Even if they achieved to their own satisfaction the rapprochement between Liberalism and Catholicism, that is to say, even if they succeeded in divorcing the principles of 1789 from their anti-Catholic foundations, the Liberal Catholics, in the final analysis, failed. For the Church did not heed their word, and instead of moving in a conciliatory direction, it took an opposite path which led to the Syllabus of Errors and Papal Infallibility. Liberals, as a result, were only hardened in their anticlericalism and in their suspicion of the insincerity of Liberal Catholics.

Liberal Catholics themselves sensed that they had failed. The Syllabus of Errors had been a blow more deadly than Mirari vos or Singulari nos. As if to make one final effort, they rose up to protest against the infallibility of the pope in 1870. But the definition of the new dogma was evidence enough that their Liberal principles had been rejected by the Church and the only voices heard in Rome were those of the intransigent Catholics. The Count de Montalembert, after his pilgrimage away from Liberalism in 1851, became increasingly devoted to the concept of liberty, and his death in the spring of 1870 was symbolic of the eclipse of Catholic Liberalism. His sentiments, as they had evolved by 1868, were representative of what was most sincere in Liberal Catholicism. Liberty "will always be the best remedy for all ills, and the most beautiful recompense
of all virtue. Should I be taken for an old dotard, for a triple fool, or what is worse, for a triple heretic, liberty will be, until my last breath, the cry of my conscience and my heart. The Liberal Catholic helplessness in face of an unbending Church, he expressed, almost by way of conclusion; "To suffer for the Church, nothing would be sweeter; but to suffer for it and then be reduced to impotence by it, to be struck down by it, is more than I can understand....We have been condemned and disavowed....The Syllabus of Errors and the condemnation of modern liberty is an act of war against modern society....The Church for generations to come will suffer for this defiance of the Liberal principles so dear to men."  


30 Ibid., 642.
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