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POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
SPAIN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Mariano Torcal, PhD.

*****

The Ohio State University
September 2002

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ABSTRACT

This is a dissertation about the three dimensions of political support in new democracies: Political affection, support for democracy and political satisfaction. It will examine the degree of relationship among these dimensions, their origins and how they are changed, and the consequences of each. Three major arguments are presented.

First, I argue that these dimensions of political support are autonomous, with the degree to which they are related varying depending on the country studied. Indeed, the concept of political support should be used with much greater care in studies of new democracies, and those which fail to consider its independent dimensions yield problematic results.

Second, I contend that the origin, nature, and evolution of these attitudes of political support depend mostly on national politics. Here politics is taken to include not only recent political events, the nature of party competition or the current institutional setting, but also the historical past of these new democracies. Thus, it is the combination of a country's recent and more distant political past that explains the differences observed in attitudes of political support. Even more, the weight of the problematic past characteristic of many new democracies also conditions the way current political events influence the evolution of attitudes of political support in these countries.
Third, I argue that each dimension of political support has different consequences in terms of citizen behavior. Out of the three, only political disaffection is primarily responsible for the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state in representative democracies. Indeed, the larger number of politically disaffected citizens is responsible for the current quality of many new democracies.

Using extensive survey data from Southern Europe, Western Europe and Latin America, with an emphasis on Spain, this dissertation identifies the problem of political disaffection in new democracies, quantitatively compares attitudes of disaffection in old and new democracies, analyzes the distinct causes of these attitudes and discusses the effects of political disaffection on citizens’ political behavior. Important theoretical consequences of the current research on political culture and democratization are also discussed.
Dedicated to Shannon, Alvaro, Elia and my parents, Ernesto and Pilar.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work is the fruit of an intellectual maturation that began years ago with another doctoral thesis, *Actitudes Políticas de los Españoles: Pautas de Continuidad y Cambio*, defended at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid in 1995. At that time, my argument was limited to the study of the different dimensions of political culture in Spain and their impact on political participation. For all my work then, I am indebted to the professors who were my mentors and became my friends. The first is José Ramón Montero, my professor, the chair of my dissertation committee, and my collaborator on so many projects. Other friends and professors were Felipe Agüero as well as the members of my dissertation committee at Ohio State University: Richard P. Gunther, Bradley Richardson and Paul A. Beck. Their comments on my initial dissertation were decisive.

However, this manuscript is a total different product that the one I presented in Spain in 1995. This substantive and enormous change can be attributed to the intellectual maturation I have undergone over the past years, for which several people are responsible. The first is, once again, José Ramón Montero. To him I am indebted for his efforts to help organize conceptually some of my basic ideas—it was he who suggested the concept of *democratic disaffection* that is so central to this current work. The intellectual climate produced between us as a result of my Spanish dissertation resulted in the working paper, "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent, and Disaffection," published by the Institute for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences of the Fundación Juan March and the *Studies in Comparative International Development* (vol. 23, Number 3, 1997, pp. 124-60), coauthored with José Ramón Montero and Richard P. Gunther. Juan J. Linz made interesting comments and suggestions on a very first manuscript and in later conversations. I have also
enjoyed invaluable conversations on the topic with Paloma Aguilar on different occasions.

As it was maturing, I presented parts of the current work in various forums and was always rewarded with provocative comments. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Pühle offered me the opportunity to present parts of this study at the conference organized in Crete by the Social Science Research Council in 1995 and in Mallorca in June of 1996, where I received interesting comments from the organizers, Diamandouros and Pühle, as well as from Donatela Della Porta, Leonardo Morlino and Sidney Tarrow, among others. At the XXI LASA Congress in April of 1997 I was fortunate to receive comments from Frances Hagopian and Patricia Craig. Finally, I had the pleasure to present parts of my conclusions at the Kellogg Institute, where I received valuable comments from Michael Coppedge, Robert Fishman, Marcelo Leiras, Scott Mainwaring and Guillermo O’Donnell. Many thanks to all of them.

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I would also like to express my gratitude to those who gave me access to the data which are the basis of this research. Julián Santamaría and José Ramón Montero provided me with data from the Four Nation Study; Ronald Inglehart gave me data from the World Values Study; the archive service of the University of Essex provided the European Survey of 1981; Miguel Basáñez, the Latinobarometer; and Juan Díez Nicolás, the CIRES data. My dissertation was awarded best quantitative dissertation project in the social sciences by the
Center for Sociological Research (CIS) in 1994, providing me with an invaluable quantity of
good survey data on Spanish attitudes without which I could not have completed this
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Catherine McBeth, Justin Byrne, and my wife, Shannon Sullivan edited and translated parts
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stays in Denver.

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daughter, Elia; and also my parents Ernesto and María Pilar. Without them this would not
have been possible.
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Books


Chapters in books


ix

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Articles in professional journals

A. Published in English


B. Published in Spanish


C. Published in French


Other Publications

A. Published in English


B. Published in Spanish


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This is a study about the three dimensions of political support in new democracies: political affection, support for democracy and political satisfaction. It will examine the degree of relationship among these dimensions, their origins and how they are changed, and the consequences of each. Three major arguments are presented in the following chapters. First, I argue that these dimensions of political support are autonomous, with the degree to which they are related varying depending on the country studied. Indeed, the concept of political support should be used with much greater care in studies of new democracies, and those which fail to consider its independent dimensions yield problematic results. Second, I contend that the origin, nature, and evolution of these attitudes of political support depend mostly on national politics. Here politics is taken to include not only recent political events, the nature of party competition or the current institutional setting, but also the historical past of these new democracies. Political satisfaction (and its opposite, political discontent) might be the result of satisfaction with incumbent authorities and their policies, but in order to explain the presence and different levels of political affection (and political disaffection) with institutions and political representatives, political engagement and support for democracy, the influence of the political past must also be taken into account. Thus, it is the combination of a country's recent and more distant political past that explains the differences observed in attitudes of political support. Even more, the weight of the problematic past characteristic of many new democracies alsoconditions the way current political events influence the
evolution of attitudes of political support in these countries. Therefore, politics not only explains differences in levels of political affection, but also its nature and how it formed and is currently evolving in many new democracies. Third, I argue that each dimension of political support has different consequences in terms of citizen behavior. Lack of support for democracy favors support for anti-system parties and political actions against the system. Political discontent, which results mostly from dissatisfaction with incumbent authorities and their performance, might alter or reinforce party preferences. However, political disaffection is primarily responsible for the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state in representative democracies. Indeed, the larger number of politically disaffected citizens is responsible for the current quality of many new democracies.

Why a monographic study on the dimensions of political support in new democracies? Most recent comparative studies of this type have focused on old traditional democracies. Very few comparative studies have also included the new ones. This absence is relevant for four reasons. First, because differences among the dimensions of political support are clearer in new democracies, helping to clarify the relationship and congruency between the dimensions. Second, this type of study of the relationships among and consequences of the dimensions of political support in new democracies is essential to the discussion of democratic consolidation, helping to clarify the kind of political support that is required in order to consider a new democratic regime as consolidated. Third, because it allows us to see the differences in the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state in both old and new democracies, shedding light by the contrast on the distinct nature and consequences of the “confidence gap” in new and established democracies. Finally, it allows us to understand better the origin and evolution of the dimensions of political support. In new democracies,


citizens have to create or recreate these dimensions of political support after a long period of non-democratic rule, and in many cases generations of them have no preceding democratic experience upon which to evaluate institutions, politicians and their performance.

I believe that the differentiation between support for democracy, political affection and political satisfaction is clearer and even more essential in new democracies. Many studies of old democracies have already pointed out that the existence of critical citizens should not be considered a sign of a 'democratic legitimacy crisis.' Instead, most scholars now agree that the range of attitudinal symptoms observed in citizens of representative democracies simply reflects a widespread sense of disaffection or lack of confidence in certain mechanisms of political representation, without affecting citizens' support for democracy. This differentiation, however, is even clearer in many new democracies which enjoy in most cases a stable and vast majoritarian support of the citizens even while these same citizens seems to


4 Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, "Political Action. A Theoretical Perspective," in Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979, pp. 37-41; Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France. Chatham: Chatham House, 1988, pp. 72-73, and pp. 238-244; Richard Toft, "Beyond electoral participation," in Klingemann and Fuchs, eds., Citizens and the State, p. 53. In this sense, as Sartori maintains, the literal interpretation of democracy has a prescriptive intention, i.e., the intention to continue ad infinitum, and ad indefinitum; see Guisippe Sartori, Teorias de la Democracia. Madrid, Alianza, 1987, p. 60. The same argument can be observed in the literature on postmodernism and new social movements. The list of references on this topic is extensive, but a brief introduction and discussion can be found in Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government, chapters 2 and 7; and Pippa Norris, "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens," in Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 3-7.

5 The countries that display a majoritarian democratic support are: Southern European countries, Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Perú and Paraguay), former communist countries in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Belarus and Ukraine), Taiwan and South Korea. For a comparative study of these countries, see Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 42-46. For data and a discussion on Southern Europe, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 142 and 222; Leonardo Morlino and José Ramón Montero, "Legitimación y Democracia en el Sur de Europa," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 64, 1993, pp. 7-40; José Ramón Montero and Mariano Torcal, "Voters and Citizens in a New Democracy: Some Trend

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be highly disaffected with the system; that is, they are very critical of the institutions and
decision-making mechanism of representation, the participation opportunities they provide, their
responsiveness and their performance. It seems clear that the existence of separate
dimensions of political support is not only empirically more conspicuous in new
democracies, but also constitutes the only way to understand the presence in most
consolidated third-wave democracies of the "attitudinal paradox" resulting from the
cosmopolitanism of highly critical but democratic citizens enduring economic and social hardship
for long periods of time.

Many of the consequences of the lack of political support in citizens' behavior have
already been the center of numerous comparative studies. However, despite the existence of

---

Democracy and Its Alternatives,” pp. 29-58; Richard Rose, “Where Are the Postcommunist Countries Going?”
Pilar Del Castillo and Ismael Crespo, eds., Cultura Política, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 1997, pp. 89-114;
William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe,” in Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 78-99. For Latin America, see Marta Lagos, “Latin
American’s Smiling Mask,” Journal of Democracy, 8, 1997, p. 133; Frederick C. Turner and John D. Martz,
“Institutional Confidence and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America,” Studies in Comparative
International Development, 47, 1998, p. 81. And, for South-East Asia, Doh C. Shin and Huoyan Shyu,

6 The number of references on the topic are abundant. At minimum, the following should be cited: Laszlo
Bruszt and Janos Simon, Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe
During the Transition to Democracy. Budapest, Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, 1992; Jose M. Maravall, Regimes, Politics and Markets: Democratization and Economic Change in
Southern and Eastern Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997; Richard Rose, “Postcommunism and the
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; José Ramón Montero, Richard P. Gunther and Mariano Torcal,
“Actitudes Hacia la Democracia en España: Legitimidad, Descontento y Desafección,” Revista Española de
Diamond, “Political Culture and Democratic Consolidation,” Working paper 118, Madrid, Centro de Estudios
Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales Juan March, 1998; Turner and Martz, “Institutional Confidence and
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America,” pp. 65-84; Diamond, “Political Culture,” pp. 161-217;
Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis,” pp. 31-56; Russell J. Dalton,

7 See Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, et al., Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies,
Free Press, 1983; Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Introduction:
the decline of Confidence in Government,” in Nye, Why People Don’t Trust Government, pp. 1-18; Russell J.
Dalton, “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” 57-77 in Norris, Critical Citizens.; Robert D.
Putnam, Susan J. Pharr and Russell J. Dalton, “Introduction: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?” in
Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies, pp. 3-20.

Some scholars has disputed the existence of this declining pattern, looking more like trendless
fluctuations, see Kenneth, Newton, “Trust in People and Confidence in Institutions: Trends and Patterns in the

---
some initial negative interpretations of political disaffection, a number of recent studies have
highlighted the more positive consequences that the lack of institutional confidence or
increasing disaffection observed in Western democracies may have for the transformation and
evolution of their democratic institutions and the relationship between citizens and their
representatives. It seems that the relationship between citizens and the state is at the root of
changes that are currently taking place in today's democracies. The changing nature of this
relationship merits increasing attention from researchers since it has been naturally open to
change in pursuit of the 'democratic ideal' from its outset. Even the oldest democracies, as
Linz argues, may be showing certain tendencies in their relationship with citizens that should
be interpreted not as symptoms of weakness or decline, but as factors of their relative
'newness' or innovation. Thus, all these increasingly critical citizens have constituted a
major challenge for the established democracies, and have caused increasing debate about
their nature and development, thus rekindling old debates about democratic theory. Many
'third wave democracies' also have very defined symptoms of political disaffection, but are
they also symptoms that preclude democratic innovation? How is political disaffection
affecting the nature and quality of the new democracies? How is this attitudinal phenomenon

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Di Palma claims "people tend to participate in politics if they are not disaffected from the political system," i.e., "I expect participation to be sustained by the belief that the political system, or at least some of its strategic institutions are open and accessible to the individual. Also, participation does not flourish unless people feel that the polity is not a remote entity, but rather something that is present and important in their daily lives, and unless they are closely identified with and committed to it;" see Giuseppe Di Palma, Apathy and Participation. Mass Politics in Western Societies, New York, The Free Press, 1970, p. 30.


Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government., pp. 16-39.

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affecting the mechanisms of political representation?

According to some literature on the topic, the majoritarian support of citizens is a condition for a new democratic regime to be consolidated. For instance, Linz and Stepan maintain that a new democratic regime is consolidated when it becomes the only "game in town," which implies that it enjoys, among other things, the majoritarian support of its citizens. But what does this condition of "support" mean? Does it include all the dimensions of political support, such as confidence in democratic institutions, or trust in democratic representatives? Considering all three dimensions of political support in the discussion of democratic consolidation not only involves a set of normative presuppositions, but would also leave us, in O'Donnell's words, on the brink of a teleological debate about democratization, opening, in the process, an endless debate which might include many long established democracies. The distinction of and differentiation of support for democracy from the other two dimensions of political support might help to shift from this kind of fruitless debate on democratic consolidation to the study of the quality of the new democracies once they are consolidated. The analysis of each dimension of political support beyond the pure support for democracy might instead reveal the nature of the new 'poliarchies,' and their future development.

Most of the studies trying to explain the origin of the increasing confidence gap or lack of political affection have also focused on old democracies. While macro-sociological theories related with general attitudinal changes produced by increased levels of education and cognitive mobilization initially dominated, current explanations for the phenomenon of

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13 See Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Consolidation*, pp. 5-6. Nonetheless, the concept of "consolidation" is one of the most disputed in recent literature and has even been questioned by some scholars; see, for instance, Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions About Consolidation?," *Journal of Democracy*, 7, 1996: pp. 34-51; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy*, 7, 1996, pp. 39-55.


political disaffection tend to be political and economic. These are related with current institutional and constitutional settings, the lack of correspondence between citizens expectations—sometimes raised by irresponsible electoral promises—and performance, and the constant presence and increasing publicity of political scandals and episodes of corruption. Aggregate levels of economic performance, unemployment, inflation and the individual-level evaluations of the economy are also offered as possible explanations. Thus, generally speaking, most studies now steer clear of macro-sociological explanations, searching instead for cross-national political and economic explanations.

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These political and economic variables may explain differences in political affection among long established democracies and may even constitute the main reason behind political disaffection. In most old democracies, citizens have lived under democratic rule for decades and have some experience on which to base their evaluation of the functioning and performance of the current institutions, so political disaffection is based more on the knowledge and negative evaluation of current socially excluding institutions, their representatives, their declining performance and the long accumulation of frustrated expectations. However, citizens in new democracies with no recent experience of a stable democracy do not have a valid point of reference from which to assess the performance, functioning and achievements of current political institutions. As a result, it seems less plausible that citizens' evaluations, opinions and attitudes with respect to the present democratic institutions, politicians and their overall performance depend primarily on direct experience with the existing institutions and their functioning. It is possible that these attitudes in new democracies instead reflect previous accumulated non-democratic or pseudo-democratic experiences from the past that condition today's evaluations. If politics matters, politics of the past might also matters as well, conditioning the interpretation of current events. As a recent study asserts, "differences in the historical origin of political confidence...offer plausible explanations for some broad, cross-national patterns in political confidence."22

1.1 The Theory of Political Support and its Limitations

Much of the literature on mass attitudes towards democracy treats political affection, support for democracy, and political satisfaction as part of a single broad cluster of perceptions, evaluations and beliefs that form part of the same attitudinal dimension called political support. In my view, this approach overlooks the crucial distinction between the three attitudes. I content that the tendency to see these attitudes of political support as forming part of a single continuum stems from the frequent use and sometimes misuse of

34, 1, 2001, pp. 30-62.

Easton’s extremely important concepts of diffuse and specific support.\textsuperscript{23}

In Easton’s systems theory, political systems have inputs and outputs, with inputs taking the form of demands and support. There are, according to him, two types of political support: Specific and diffuse. While the two are not unrelated, they do enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy from each other. To be more precise, satisfaction with outputs, and the extent to which policy decisions and officials’ activities are seen as responding to citizens’ demands and needs, affect the level of political support obtained by political authorities (specific support), but there may be a reservoir of favorable attitudes and goodwill that allows members of the community to accept and tolerate outputs without questioning the system as such (diffuse support). Diffuse support refers to generalized and durable attachments to the political system, and represents a reserve of goodwill that may not easily be eroded by outputs or performance. This distinction is an important contribution and a significant departure from previous knowledge, but Easton’s concept of political support is not easily interpreted and operationalized, leading some scholars to reach problematic conclusions that might jeopardize the distinction between citizens who support democracy out of a belief that it is a morally superior form of government—or at least the best system for the country—and those who support democracy simply because they think it allows them to live better. It has also led many scholars to assume that support for democracy requires complete support for institutions, its functioning, and even its politicians and their performance. This maximalist interpretation of diffuse support has led to a negative evaluation about the current degree of consolidation of many new democracies.

\textsuperscript{23} For a classical definition of Diffuse and Specific support see David Easton, \textit{A Systems Analysis of Political Life}, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1965, chapter 7, especially pp. 267-8 and 273. See also Easton, David. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” \textit{British Journal of Political Science}, 5, 1975, pp. 447-453. As nicely described by Mishler and Rose: “Specific support... is the temporary and relatively ephemeral acceptance or approval that individuals extend to a political object as a result of its satisfaction of their specific demands.... Diffuse support, in contrast, is conceived as a deeper, more enduring, and more generalized political loyalty resulting from early life political socialization. As such it is conceived as immune to short-term inducements, rewards or performance evaluations.” William, Mishler and Richard Rose, “Learning Democracy: The Dynamics of Popular support for Post-Communist Regimes.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1999, p. 3.
Diffuse Support and Congruence Theory

The first problem comes with the concept of diffuse political support. It is important to note that diffuse support, according to Easton, refers to the broader issue of what a political object means or represents for the members of the polity. As such it has two meanings: Trust and legitimacy. In accordance with Gamson’s definition, Easton understands trust as people’s feeling that the political system will provide preferred outcomes even if the authorities are exposed to relatively little scrutiny. Thus, trust means the existence of some kind of confidence that the political system will produce beneficial results. On the other hand, legitimacy, according to Easton, refers to citizens’ convictions that the political objects conform to their own moral and ethical standards of what is right and proper in politics. I argue that three aspects of these definitions of diffuse support are clearly problematic. Firstly, they assume that political trust is conditioned by system performance; secondly, they take political trust as a barometer of diffuse support for the whole system, assuming that trust and legitimacy are different elements of the same dimension or continuum; thirdly, the definition of legitimacy put forward in these formulations contains an evaluation of all the political objects that make up the system (including authorities and institutions), but lacks a comparative component with respect to different political regimes.

Easton’s contention that all political objects, including political authorities, might enjoy both specific and diffuse support raises additional problems. This possibility that all political objects may have diffuse support, combined with Easton’s definition of diffuse support discussed above, have led a significant number of scholars to conclude that diffuse support for all political objects of the regime is part of, and sometimes a requirement for, broader diffuse support for the whole political regime. This reading of Easton’s work is

24 Gamson defines trust as “the probability, \( P_n \), that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left unattended.” William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1968, p.54.


26 According to Easton, “members [citizens of the system] are capable of directing diffuse support toward the objects of the system. This forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.” Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 273.
obviously questionable and perhaps unintended, but it has helped reinforce the “congruency argument’s” preclusion by the more deterministic cultural tradition, where underlying ideological and cultural values define individual preferences for a specific set of institutions, fostering or conditioning support for the democratic regime.28

Specific Support and the Political Support Continuum

According to Easton, all political objects may also enjoy specific support. This idea has led many scholars to the erroneous understanding that, although relatively autonomous, specific and diffuse support for a political regime are the poles of a single continuum, that diffuse and specific support for other political objects are located in the middle of the same continuum, and that support for these political objects is sometimes, as I mentioned earlier, even a prerequisite to diffuse support for the political regime as a whole. According to Norris, levels of support “can be seen as ranging in a continuum from the most diffuse support for the nation-state down through successive levels to the most concrete support for particular politicians.”29 This interpretation of political support as a single continuum fosters its conception as hierarchical and congruent.

According to Easton, the concept of specific support “arises from the perceptions of the behavior of the authorities in the aggregate, from the patterns of outputs as they emerge over time,”30 does not require the knowledge of the authorities and their policies, and is not based on concrete outputs.31 Based on this abstract idea, scholars have contended that measures of satisfaction with democratic performance are adequate and sufficient indicators of specific system support, and, forgetting Easton’s initial distinction between “specific” and

27 In some cases, this oversimplification of Easton’s work is perhaps unfair but attributed to the fact that his original conceptionalization was so vague as to lead invariably to research that is “ambiguous, confusing and noncumulative.” Max Kaase “Political Alienation and Protest,” in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy. Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1988, p. 117.
30 Easton, A System Analysis, p. 399.
31 Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” p. 441-442.
"diffuse" support, have even made this measurement interchangeable with measures of legitimacy. Some authors have even questioned citizens' capacity to distinguish between Easton's diffuse and specific support. The use of this measurement, by definition empirically related with economic and social evaluations, has led many of these studies to conclude a close (if not deterministic) relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with the performance of political institutions or the economy, and support for the democratic regime per se. This question of whether citizens' attitudes towards their governments and political regimes can be meaningfully separated into such categories as specific and diffuse support, on the one hand, or are largely undifferentiated, on the other, could be regarded as well within the realm of sterile academic debate were it not for the fact that it has led scholars to assert, contrary to Easton's original intentions, that regime support, stability and even survival are highly contingent on popular satisfaction with concrete outputs of governments and, more broadly, democratic institutions, shifting the source of support "away from 'ideal normative agreement' towards 'absolute instrumental acceptance.'"

\textit{Diffuse and Specific Support in New Democracies}

The problematic interpretation and application of the concept of diffuse and specific support is exacerbated for new democracies. Findings on the relationship between the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy and the degree of satisfaction with the current condition of the economy, coupled with the fact that many new democratic regimes

\begin{itemize}


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(particularly among countries of the former Soviet bloc) are or have been confronting extremely severe economic crises, have led many scholars to assert that the prospects for democratic stability and the very survival of these regimes may hinge on their capacity to solve intractable economic problems. For example, Adam Przeworski wrote shortly after the collapse of Soviet Communism, "As everyone agrees, the eventual survival of the new democracies will depend to a large extent on their economic performance. And since many among them emerged in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis, economic factors work against their survival."  

However, citizens in new democracies are able to distinguish between different regimes, regardless of their evaluation of institutions and their performance. This is true even for the new Central and Eastern Europe democracies, where support for the regime—contrary to initial expectations—is not based on economic indicators or citizens' performance evaluations, but is mostly driven by national politics. Citizens in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries make a clear distinction between the evaluation of authorities responsible for the economic crisis and the democratic institutions. While a sociotropic assessment of current democratic supporters may have shown a temporary influence of socio-economic factors on support for democracy in some of these countries, this relationship is disappearing. Citizens of these countries attribute poor economic performance to authorities, not to the new democratic institutions.

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Including other dimensions of political support such as confidence in institutions, in
democratic representatives and the positive perception of the responsiveness of the system in
the interpretation and operationalization of diffuse support will help divert the debate on the
nature of the new democracies away from less meaningful teleological arguments on
democratic consolidation. Fortunately, the literature on political support in Western Europe
increasingly distinguishes confidence in institutions and support for democracy from state
performance and the structure of opposition.41 And, since the publication of Citrin's
research,42 studies have increasingly tended to demonstrate and accept the fact that diffuse
support for the regime and confidence in its institutions and its performance are not directly
related.43 Thus, the distinction of the dimensions of political support is becoming somewhat
more conspicuous in the recent literature on the topic.44 And even if some are still defending
the idea that these dimensions of political support form part of a single continuum ranging
from specific to diffuse support,45 it is increasingly accepted that political support in
representative democracies is composed of at least three somewhat independent dimensions:
Support for democracy, political affection (political disaffection) and political satisfaction (or
discontent). This new approach to the study of political support is essential in the study of
democratization, since it helps focus on the consequences of these dimensions of political
support on the more relevant topic of the nature of citizen-government relationships, which is

Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997; and William Mishler and Christian Haerfer, Democracy and its
Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies, Oxford, Polity, 1998; Mishler and Rose “Five Years
After the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe,” pp. 94-97.

41 Frederick D. Weil, “The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies.”
42 Jack Citrin, “Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.” American Political Science Review,
88, 1974: 973-988; Barbara G. Farah, Samuel H. Barnes and Felix Heunks, “Political Dissatisfaction,” in
Barnes, Kaase, et al., Political Action, p. 432; Jack Citrin and Donald P. Green, “Presidential Leadership and the

43 See, for instance, Barbara G. Farah, Samuel H. Barnes and Felix Heunks, “Political Dissatisfaction,” in
Barnes, Kaase, et al., Political Action, pp. 409-447; Abramson, Political Attitudes in America; Lipset and
Schneider, The Confidence Gap; Weil, “The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies,”

44 This is one of the central arguments of the important volumes edited by Klingemann and Fuchs, Citizens and
the State; Nye, Zelikow and King, Why People Don’t Trust Government; Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected
Democracies.

among the factors that has changed most since the beginning of what Dahl called the 'second transformation,' that is, since democracy in the city-states evolved into the democratic nation-states in pursuit of the democratic ideal. The analysis propose here will therefore reveal the nature of the new 'poliarchies' in terms of their citizen-government relations, and will enable us to predict the future development of new and old democracies.

1.2 Political Disaffection, Support for Democracy and Political Discontent

**Political Disaffection**

Following Di Palma, I would define political disaffection as *the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime.* Political disaffection contains two aspects or sub-dimensions that are in part independent. The first of these sub-dimensions is comprised of a cluster of attitudes relating to the respondent's lack of engagement with the political process and general distrust in politics. I have called this *political disengagement.* The other sub-dimension consists of beliefs about the lack of responsiveness of the political authorities (representatives) and institutions, and their lack of confidence in the institutions of political representation and their representatives. I have called this *institutional disaffection.*

It should be noted that this definition of political disaffection differs somewhat from other closely related concepts, such as political alienation, crisis of trust, political cynicism and political dissent, which are frequently used, often interchangeably, in studies of political culture. Moreover, some of these concepts are sometimes measured similarly, resulting in a rather unclear and sometimes confusing conceptual and methodological picture. I maintain here that many of these alternative concepts suggest a state of crisis in the political regime.

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that disaffection does not. Unlike the concept of political alienation, for example, political disaffection does not imply a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Political disaffection is independent from support for the democratic regime and has different behavioral consequences. Indeed, many democracies, particularly third-wave democracies, show high levels of both democratic legitimacy and political disaffection.

**Support for Democracy**

Support for democracy, or democratic legitimacy, pertains to citizens’ beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. Democratic legitimacy should be regarded as an ideal type, since no system is fully legitimate in the eyes of each and every citizen, and the intensity of positive support for these institutions varies from one person to another. Accordingly, support for democracy may be considered to be “the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others that might be established.” This definition is also relative insofar as it refers to the belief that a democratic political system is the “least bad” of all forms of government. As Lipset asserts, democratic legitimacy is “the system’s ability to generate and maintain the belief that the regime’s political institutions are the most appropriate for society.” This definition implies that support for the regime should be based on a comparison with other types of regime. As Rose and Mishler maintain, “a democratic regime does not necessarily make the ‘right’ decisions…nor is there a guarantee that the government will be effective (...)”, democracy’s claim to superiority is that it is an open system making it possible to learn from mistakes and to correct them through the sanction of voting governments out of office as well as into

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49 As Linz has written, “ultimately, democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular juncture, no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals.” Juan J. Linz, “Legitimidad y Eficacia en la Evolución de los Regímenes Políticos,” in Problemas del subdesarrollo, Granada, Caja General de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Granada, 1978, p. 18.

office.\footnote{Rose and Mishler, "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis," pp. 52-53.} This definition of democratic support is “based upon the comparison of different regimes within the experience of those undertaking the evaluation,”\footnote{Ibid, p. 53.} however this experience is not universal, but different across countries and strongly conditioned by a set of political factors during and after the transition.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 44-53.}

It should be evident by now that this definition and operationalization of support for democracy differs considerably from Easton’s definition of diffuse support, and the intellectual tradition I criticized above.\footnote{The concept of diffuse support lacks the regime comparison component. Moreover, its definition and operationalization has been related too frequently with concepts such as political trust, political efficacy and political alienation, mixing them theoretically, conceptually and empirically to try to measure democratic legitimacy. The positive aspect of this literature is that the authors clearly distinguish between diffuse support and specific support to the political regime, incumbent authorities and their policies. Easton, \textit{A System Analysis}, pp. 140-153. For two brief discussions of the concept, see also, Easton, “A Re-assessment of The Concept of Political Support,” pp. 444-457; and David Easton, “Theoretical Approaches to Political Support,” \textit{Canadian Journal of political Science}, 9, 1976, pp. 431-448.} Diffuse support may well be closer to Weber’s concept of legitimacy.\footnote{David Beetham, \textit{The Legitimation of Power}, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press International, 1991, pp. 15-25.} That is why this tradition has always insisted that indicators of legitimacy should include confidence in a series of institutions, or the sentiment of political self-competence. However, I contend here that both dimensions of political disaffection—political disengagement and institutional disaffection—may have far-reaching consequences on the nature of representative democracies, but \textit{without provoking a general questioning of the legitimacy of representative democracy or a threat to its persistence}.\footnote{Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, “Political Action. A Theoretical Perspective,” in Barnes, Kaase et al., \textit{Political Action}, p. 31.} Citizens may have a negative opinion of the principal institutions of a democratic system, but nonetheless consider that the existing democratic regime is the best possible one and, thus, incontestable, and reject the possibility of showing any support for another type of political regime.\footnote{On the other hand, the recent study edited by Norris—which demonstrates the lack of relationship between democratic legitimacy and confidence in institutions—argues that support for the regime, confidence in institutions, evaluation of government performance and confidence in politicians form part of the same attitudinal continuum; Norris, \textit{Critical Citizens}, pp. 9-13. In the present study, I argue that they do not form part of the same continuum; they are distinct and independent attitudinal dimensions.}

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Political Discontent

Finally, political discontent can be regarded as the expression of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance of the government or political system is falling short of the citizens' wishes or expectations.\textsuperscript{58} More generally, discontent is a reflection of frustration derived from comparing what one has with what one hopes or expects to have.\textsuperscript{59} In political terms, it results from beliefs that the government is unable to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important.\textsuperscript{60} Political disaffection might share with the discontent dimension its negative perceptions and assessments of some elements of the political system, but it is different in one important respect: Political discontent can be regarded as the result of a negative assessments of the way democracy is currently functioning, while political disaffection is a reflection of a distrustful and suspicious vision of political life, political institutions and politicians, if not public life in general. In contrast with discontent (which can be expected to ebb and flow in accord with changing assessments of the current performance of incumbents or democratic institutions), attitudes of disaffection may be more stable, although not unchangeable. In addition, they can also be expected to differ insofar as discontent is charged with a partisan component: Supporters of opposition parties should, by virtue of their political preferences, be more critical of the performance of the government and unhappy with its policy outputs than those who identify with the incumbent party.\textsuperscript{61}

Political discontent might also reinforce or change existing political preferences. In contrast, many of the other concepts mentioned above, such as political alienation, political trust and so on, imply a crisis of the system due to citizens' discontent with government performance. I claim here, however, that political disaffection can be seen regardless of a government's popularity or policies. Disaffection has little to do with short-term fluctuations in

\textsuperscript{57} Gunther and Montero, "The Multidimensionality of Attitudinal Support for New Democracies."

\textsuperscript{58} Di Palma, Apathy and Participation, p. 30


\textsuperscript{61} Gunther and Montero, "The Multidimensionality of Attitudinal Support for New Democracies," p. 3.
assessments of the government’s actions, its decisions or its current popularity.62

1.3 The Argument

The focus of this study is political support in new democracies. New democracies are those that underwent the third-wave democratization process that began in Portugal in 1974, and followed in Greece and Spain, and in many Latin American, Central and Eastern European and Asian countries. However, the present study examines only the Latin American and Southern European cases.

I present three interconnected arguments in the following pages. First, I argue that political support in new democracies consists of at least three different dimensions, each of which has three distinct causes and effects. These three dimensions are: Support for the democratic regime, political affection (political disaffection), and political satisfaction (political discontent). This argument has already been addressed.

My second argument is that among these three dimensions of democratic support, only the lack of political affection, political disaffection, is essential to understanding the quality of third-wave representative democracy. Neither support for democracy nor political satisfaction affect the quality of democracy. Previous comparative studies have shown that political disaffection in old democracies seems to foster democratic innovation.63 This is not the case in the new democracies that are the focus of this study. Rather, political disaffection in the third-wave democracies widens the gap between citizens and their representatives, and leads to political inaction, stagnation, greater political inequality and ineffective participation of the citizens in the decision-making process. While traditional democracies might be aiming toward a more inclusive and more participatory republican democratic polity, it seems clear that third-wave democracies are following in many cases the path toward a more elitist

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and less participatory democracy. This difference in the nature of democracy is due in part to the distinct influence political disaffection has on new democracies.

Why does political disaffection produce different consequences in new democracies? My third and final argument here is that this is so because political disaffection is found at different levels, and has a different origin and nature in new democracies. Third-wave democracies present a longer history of exclusionary institutional settings and practices. As Colomer has pointed out in a recent study, exclusionary or majoritarian democratic institutional settings tend to produce greater regime instability than inclusionary pluralistic institutional settings.64 This is also why, according to his same argument, third wave democracies are characterized by recurrent episodes of non-democratic experiences and a long history of exclusionary institutional settings and exclusive, semi-democratic practices. Authoritarian and other non-democratic regimes are also another type of political exclusion common in the histories of many new democracies. Here, I argue that these exclusionary institutional settings and political episodes of the past explain, in part, current levels of political disaffection at both the aggregate and individual levels. This is to say that differences in the levels of political disaffection are related to the politics of the democratic past of these societies, beyond recent authoritarian democratic experiences and the type of transition.

These exclusionary political episodes go hand-in-hand with demobilization strategies that affect political disaffection and citizens' political engagement.65 It is true that some non-democratic regimes are characterized by high levels of political mobilization66 that have left their long-lasting mark on levels of political engagement and the sense of personal political

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66 According to Bartolini (2000, 12) political mobilization was the process by which former subject individuals were recruited as active participants in forms of nationwide organizational and electoral activities for the purpose of influencing political decision making.” For a classical definition of political mobilization see
power (higher in some of these countries). Nonetheless, periods of political mobilization under non-democratic or pseudo-democratic rule have been isolated, manipulative and have generally ended in frustrating political episodes.67

However, it could be argued that not all third wave democracies have similarly high levels of political disaffection, nor do all first and second wave democracies exhibit low levels of political disaffection. I have distinguished between old and new democracies for the purpose of explaining aggregate levels of political disaffection because even the exceptions do actually reinforce the hypothesis of the attitudinal legacy of the political past. For example, countries such as Uruguay and Chile display much lower levels of political disaffection in spite of their recent authoritarian past. At the same time, there are democracies that, although not part of the recent “third democratization wave,” have high political disaffection. These exceptions, however, confirm the hypothesis about the impact of the political past of democratic inclusion/exclusion on the attitudes of political disaffection.

Chile and Uruguay experienced recent transitions to democracy along with other third-wave democracies, but enjoyed long histories of democratic successes and political inclusion before the democratic breakdown. At the same time, first and second wave democracies such as Venezuela and Italy present high levels of political disaffection. In these countries, however, and despite the stability of democracy during the last fifty years, political practices of democratic exclusion have been present for long periods. Indeed, with respect to my primary hypothesis, the exceptions mentioned above, far from representing a challenge to my hypothesis about the importance of democratic history, serve as examples of the weight of the political past in explaining differences in levels of political disaffection.

This is not purely an institutional argument as is the recent one defended by Norris.68 Here I argue that these differences in levels of political disaffection are related to the historical record of exclusionary institutional settings and practices of preceding tumultuous political periods under democratic, pseudo-democratic, or non-democratic rule—the most radical form of political exclusion. To be more precise, higher levels of political disaffection

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respond to different histories of citizens' democratic inclusion in their politics. In general, countries with lower political disaffection correspond with either the "Nordic model" (characterized by the implementation of sudden massive enfranchisement combined with pluralistic institutional settings) or the "Anglo-model" (characterized by step-by-step enfranchisement with majoritarian settings). According to a recent study, countries following these models of democratic inclusion display higher levels of democratic stability and democratic consensus and have less political confrontation. Countries with higher levels of political disaffection correspond with the "Latin model" of democratization. These countries include most of the third wave democracies as well as France, Italy and Venezuela. The model is characterized by the allocation of voting rights by the sudden introduction of universal men's suffrage under restrictive electoral and institutional rules that produce manufactured majorities. Unexpected and hazardous voting results combine with a threatening new mobilization of the electorate to provoke fears of instability among the incumbent voters and rulers, moving them, in the case of the third-wave democracies, to search for or support authoritarian reactions in order to re-establish the old political order.

The distinction between old and new democracies makes even more sense when searching for the major factors explaining political disaffection at the individual level. In old democracies, citizens, regardless of the success of their democratic history, have experience of democratic rule and have some experience on which to base their evaluation of the functioning and performance of the current institutions. Political disaffection is based more on the knowledge and evaluation of current institutions, their representatives, their performance and the long accumulation of frustrated expectations. In this respect, the causes of political disaffection in all "non third-wave democracies" are the same—the result of accumulated democratic experience. The difference is that in those with high disaffection, the democratic history is full of episodes of failure, manipulation, instability, and the use and abuse of exclusive institutional settings and accumulated poor performance, whereas in countries with high affection, the democratic history tends to be more successful.

The factors explaining disaffection at the individual level in new democracies are somewhat different. The exclusionary institutional settings and practices of the recent non-

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69 Colomer, Political Institutions, pp. 45-53 and 59-65.
70 Ibid, pp. 53-59.
democratic regime produce long-lasting attitudinal effects transmitted by political socialization. Citizens of most new democracies are continually influenced by negative past references when evaluating new and unknown democratic institutions, regardless of the positive performance of some of them. Political disaffection in new democracies has a distinct origin and nature, and is more closely related to the socializing experiences of previous episodes of non-democratic or pseudo-democratic rule. In older democracies, these negative references to democratic rule, its institutions and representatives, and the episodes of demobilization and manipulation are not so salient and their socializing impact is much smaller. This enables citizens in older democracies to evaluate the present with a future perspective, using the democratic ideal as the dominant reference point. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between new and old democracies when studying the nature of political disaffection at the individual level despite similarities observed in levels of disaffection among some of countries.

Fortunately, this is not cultural determinism for third wave democracies. Some third wave democracies display lower levels of political disaffection. Moreover, with time under normal democratic rule, citizens begin to increasingly evaluate institutional performance. While the functioning of the democratic system and its achievements had negligible quantitative impact on citizens' disaffection at the outset of their democratic regimes, with time performance evaluation does matter more. In contrast to what Converse argued, experience of democracy has not resulted in an increase in democratic attitudes. However, my research has shown that the presence of such attitudes among citizens has become much more dependent on their perception of the achievements and functioning of the system. This suggests that new inclusive institutional changes, new mechanisms of citizen participation and other strategies are capable of changing this syndrome of disaffection through political mobilization, promotion of the images of the institutions of political representation, and achievement of certain goals valued by citizens. While this is certainly a highly significant qualitative change, it is still only relative. The low correspondence between the level of growth and prosperity seen in many successful new democracies such as Spain, Portugal and Greece and citizens' evaluation of the political institutions and their political representatives is revealing evidence.

1.4 Politics and the Shaping of Attitudes: Cultural Versus Rational Models

There are two dominant approaches to the study of attitudinal change and formation: The "culturalist" model put forth by Lerner, and to a lesser degree by Almond and Verba, and the "rational culturalist" model. Very briefly, the culturalists contend that attitudes change slowly because they are cultural traits that depend on long-term processes of socialization. Rational-culturalists, on the other hand, believe that culture can change quickly as a result of political or economic events or institutional settings, and through rational adaptation and adult learning.

The preceding argument about the formation of political disaffection might sound like the classic "culturalist" one. I do not contend here, however, the classical cultural model of the formation of attitudes. I do believe that political attitudes can be mostly the product of current or very recent political events or current institutional settings as "rational culturalists" defend. While the source of political disaffection is in the past, the other dimensions of political support, support for democracy and political satisfaction, are mostly the product of current and recent national politics. The level of support for democracy in new democracies is the product of what I call the 'transition effect'—the politics that took place during the democratic transition and consolidation. This conclusion is very similar to the one


73 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. See also Inglehart, Culture Shift, pp. 67-71.


75 There are, however, significant disagreements on this interpretation of Almond and Verba's causality model. Lijphart, for instance, maintains that the use of the terms "independent and dependent variable" does not imply unidirectionality between political culture and political structure. See Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited, Newbury Park, Sage, 1989, pp. 47 and ff. See also Gabriel A. Almond, "The Study of Political Culture," in A Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science, Newbury Park, Sage, 1990, pp. 138-156.

defended by rational-culturalists, who contend that support for democratic norms relates to
the development of party systems, the separation of constitutional matters from day-to-day
political competition, and the success of left-wing parties. Nevertheless, even the explanation of formation of political disaffection I have
proposed does not defend the “culturalist” model. I dispute that political disaffection is a
product of economic and social modernization or of any other culturally determined
characteristic. I also don’t think that political disaffection is the product of an individual’s
personality, nor the major product of any basic cultural attitudinal baseline such as
interpersonal or social trust. I only defend that specific political episodes and political
agents may have long lasting attitudinal effects that can be transmitted by socialization or
reproduced by similar political conditions (or the combination of the two). This is what
Laitin has called the “second face of culture;” that is, the role of political and social elites,
who transform and manipulate certain cultural elements and symbols with political purposes,
and generate “cultural transformations in the process.”

Talking about socialization does not mean that attitudes towards political objects are

Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review, 53, 1959: 69-105; Lipset, The Political Man; and Seymour M.
Lipset, The First New Nation, New York, Basic Books, 1963. For more recent works on this research tradition,
see, Alex Inkeles and Larry J. Diamond, “Personal Development and National Development: A Cross-National
Perspective,” in Alexander Szalai and Frank M. Andrews, eds., The Quality of Life: Comparative Studies,
79 For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see also, David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, “A Cause in
80 For instance, some authors have related political inefficacy to the psychological need present in some
personalities to sense that they control the environment. See, for instance, Stanley A. Renshon, Psychological
pp. 2-3, 8-10, and 235-238. One of the most frequently cited works which takes this approach is Abraham
169-187; Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, “Confidence in Institutions: Faith, Culture, Performance?,” in
Pharr and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies, pp. 52-73; Mishler and Rose, “What are the origins of Political
Trust?,” pp. 30-62.
82 For similar argument see Diamandouros, “Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian
Greece,” pp. 1-9; Stokes, Cultures in Conflict.
83 See, David Latin, Hegemony and Culture. Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba, Chicago,
exogenous or generated outside political life, but quite the contrary: The origin of such attitudes must be sought within the realm of politics. Furthermore, this does not mean that these ideas are unchangeable during one's lifetime, as any rational culturalist would defend. The fact that they are the product of subjective appraisal and perceptions does not mean that they are not also the result of a 'rational' process of evaluating the political environment and the public institutions, objects or discourses which 'formed' them. I emphasize the past tense here to stress that these attitudes are the product of the environment in which they were generated --the political context during the period of citizens' socialization. In this respect, as we shall see, some aspects of the attitudes causing political disaffection among Spaniards are merely the result of a rational evaluation of the political environment in which they originated (which, for many generations, was the longest period of political exclusion, repression and anti-democratic politics --Franquism). If these Spaniards had experienced a different previous political environment, then their current attitudes could also be expected to be different. Such a model of political culture is therefore clearly endogenous (being the result of a past political system), which distances me from the notion of 'cultural determinism' that is so often the basic assumption in many studies of political culture.

Assigning preadult socialization a predominant role in shaping attitudes and preferences does not therefore exclude politics from the causal model. As we shall see in greater detail in chapters five, six and seven, political factors in general play a key role in the process of socialization during adolescence. In fact, political institutions are among the main instruments of socialization, and it is in these institutions of the past that we should seek the origin of many of the political beliefs held by a particular generation. The political discourse of the elites and the effects of political propaganda are equally influential. Thus, political actors and institutions do not only help to define strategies among the different actors in today's political arena, but they also play an important role in shaping their preferences for

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84 See for instance, Mishler and Rose, "What are the Origins of Political Trust?," pp. 34-35.
85 Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," American Political Science Review, 81, 1987, p.5. However, despite this assessment, this author ends up defending what Laitin has called the "first face of culture," i.e., the approach which contends political preferences are formed outside the political system. See, David Laitin, "Political Culture and Political Preferences," American Political Science Review, 82, 1988, pp. 590-591.
86 Besides Wildavsky, the most serious attempt to combine the two approaches can be found in Mishler and Rose, "What are the origins of Political Trust?," pp. 30-62.
the present and the future. This reasoning conforms with so-called “historical institutionalism,” which defends that the institutions of the past give form to the attitudes and preferences of the present.87

Furthermore, this does not mean that the attitudes that shape a political generation cannot be altered by present political events. Preadult experiences and those of early adulthood condition citizens’ reactions to and interpretations of later political events, but they also continually interact with these events,88 particularly when they are new, such as the installation of a democratic regime after a long period of authoritarianism or non-democratic rule. We could say that each generation lives and interprets its “own current events” in a “rational” manner, based on its own previous political experience. Therefore, the idea that preadult socialization plays also a key role in shaping basic political opinions reinforces the importance of politics as a whole in this process of attitude formation, and implies a more dynamic model of political culture. As shown in the more dynamic models of party identification from the late 1970s and early 80s, preadult political socialization can be a key factor in understanding attitudinal change.89

So, defending the role of socialization in forming attitudes does not mean that all political attitudes can only change as a result of socialization, nor that a country’s political culture can only be transformed by the slow process of generational replacement. An individual’s political attitudes at any moment can be conceived as a weighted average of the individual’s lifetime experiences which include early cultural lessons by socialization and challenging or confirmatory life-time experiences.90 We are dealing with fundamental

87 The difference between “rational institutionalism” and “historical institutionalism” is that the former considers institutions essential only as shapers of political strategies, while the latter argues that institutions are responsible for the formation of attitudes and strategies. See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 7-10.
90 Mishler and Rose, “What are the Origins of Political Trust?”, pp. 37-39; William Mishler and Detlef Pollack,
political opinions that merely help inform citizens in the 'rational' process of (re)constructing their attitudes amidst changing political contexts. In other words, political disaffection is a collection of fundamental opinions which inform and condition the 'rational' process of interpreting the current political situation in a continuous process of interaction. As Diamandouros observed, the actions, strategies and tactics of different social actors and groups also play a key role in this reinterpretation of the present and its new cultural recreation, giving rise to multiple processes of questioning and renegotiating everyday life.91 As I will show later, with the passing of time under “normal democratic rule,” political disaffection does depend relatively more on institutional performance, political inclusion and mobilization. Again, the model becomes non-recursive; in other words, politics is once more ‘taken back in’ the model of political culture defended here.

Therefore, not everything in a country’s political culture is changeable, nor can it be recreated from scratch. But neither is everything the product of history. Instead, political culture is shaped by a combination of both factors; likewise, both have separate effects on different dimensions of political culture. The fact that many citizens in new democracies evaluate democratic institutions negatively cannot only be due to the cultural legacy of a more or less recent political past. This, among other reasons, is because many of them had very little direct experience of these institutions before the advent of democracy. It is the way these institutions work now and, above all, the collective interpretation promoted by the political actors which lead to different evaluations in the present.92 Nonetheless, fundamental political opinions formed in the past are also essential factors in that they inform citizens' interpretations of current political events and political discourses. In this respect, Diamond concludes that habituation can re-shape political values and norms to adjust to democratic institutions, but underlying cultural attitudes can accelerate or hinder this process.93 It is

92 The reader should not take this to mean that my argument supports the existence of a process of adult re-socialization, although I have defended this position in an earlier work (Montero and Torcal, “La Cultura Política de los Españoles,” pp. 64 ss). In fact, I think we should be talking about a process of “adult cultural recreation.”
93 Diamond, “Political Culture and Democratic Consolidation,” pp. 41-42.
important to bear in mind that these underlying cultural attitudes are also the product of each community's political history.

1.5 Presentation of the Argument and Data Source

The present study consists of nine chapters. In the second chapter, I discuss the measurements of the three dimensions of political support and perform a dimensional analysis to show their autonomy and distinct dimensionality. Chapter three is a comparison of these political attitudes for a range of citizens in new and old democracies, and shows that democratic disaffection is more prevalent in most of the new democracies, although not exclusive to them alone, whereas the comparative levels of support for democracy and political discontent do not present any identifiable pattern. I prove that political disaffection is related at the aggregate level with some indicators of the political history of these societies. Chapter four presents evidence of the different nature of political disaffection in new democracies. Chapter five is a longitudinal analysis of these dimensions of political support in Spain, demonstrating how differently they evolve over time and how distinct are their patterns of generational change. Chapter six discusses a model of political disaffection in new democracies. I depart from the Spanish case and test it in other new democracies, showing the importance of political socialization and how citizens' performance evaluations are becoming more important as time passes under normal democratic politics. In chapter seven I discuss and test a model of support for democracy, which proves the existence of the 'transition effect' in cases where majoritarian democratic support is observed. I also show that in these last cases, democratic support constitutes the "safety area" that provides higher probabilities of regime stability in the face of day-to-day political competition, political crisis and even poor performance. However, the consequences of the 'transition effect' decrease as time passes under normal democratic rule. In the eight chapter, I discuss the impact of the dimensions of support for democracy on participation and political information. Democratic support and political discontent do not seem to affect levels of participation. However, political disaffection is key in understanding this basic aspect that defines the nature of the relationship between citizens and government. Political disaffection in new democracies produces a lower propensity to take part in all type of participation, so it is not a source of
'innovation and egalitarian voicing' as some claim. On the contrary, political disaffection reinforces inequality and political elitism. Finally, there is a conclusive chapter on the nature of new democracies and the debate on political culture and democratization.

The empirical material for this study is based on survey data. The comparative data are from the 1980-81 European Value Survey\textsuperscript{94} and 1990-92 and 1995-97 World Value Surveys, several Eurobarometers, the 1995 and 1996 Latinobarometer,\textsuperscript{95} data from the Four Nations Study,\textsuperscript{96} various national surveys from the Comparative National Election Project,\textsuperscript{97} and data on the International Social Science Program (ISSP). Spanish data mostly come from the databank of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).\textsuperscript{98} I have also used data from the post-electoral survey carried out by DATA in 1993\textsuperscript{99} and the Centro de Estudios sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES). Other national surveys data will be cited when used.

\textsuperscript{94} The Spanish survey was directed by Francisco Orizo and administrated by DATA in 1980.

\textsuperscript{95} Marta Lagos is directing the Latinobarometer, and Miguel Basañez gave me the data and permission to use them.

\textsuperscript{96} This study contains 2,498 interviews in Spain, 2,074 in Greece, 2,074 in Italy and 2,000 in Portugal. Richard P. Gunther, helped me understand the necessity of weighting the Spanish and Greek samples. The Spanish sample was too "urban" (since 52 percent of respondents declared that they live in urban areas while according to the census only 42 percent of Spaniards live in urban areas). The Greek sample was too "educated" to represent the population. Thus, the coefficients I used to weight the samples were the following in Spain: towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants, 1.155; between 2,000 and 10,000, 1.241; between 10,000 and 50,000, 1.00; between 50,000 and 100,000, 2.021, and with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 0.823. The coefficients for the Greek sample were: illiterates, 2.5305; incomplete primary school, 1.1605; primary school, 1.1061; incomplete secondary education, 0.9244, secondary education, 0.6165; incomplete university education, 0.9956; university education or more, 0.6382. Mario Bacalhau has weighted the Portuguese survey.

\textsuperscript{97} I am grateful to the other members of the Comparative National Election Project for the data, and to Richard P. Gunther for distributing them.

\textsuperscript{98} The analysis of these data has been possible because of a fellowship provided by the CIS, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, in 1994.

\textsuperscript{99} This survey has been financed by project number SEC95-1007 of the Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología (CICYT), directed by José Ramón Montero and Richard P.Gunther, and is part of the Comparative National Election Project.
CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL DISAFFECTION, LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT:
THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF POLITICAL SUPPORT

A dominant school in the study of political attitudes argues that support for a given democracy by its citizens depends on the development of widespread mass-level approval of its performance and its core institutions--key components of a democratic regime's legitimacy. This school assumes that attitudes toward the political system constitute one single attitudinal domain, including such seemingly distinct orientations as belief in the legitimacy of democracy and satisfaction with the current performance of governmental institutions. I will demonstrate empirically in the following pages that this is not the case in a significant number of “third-wave” democracies. Rather, political support in these new democracies contains three different dimensions: Support for democracy, political discontent and political disaffection.

This chapter includes a brief discussion of some of the items used to measure attitudes of political support, followed by a dimensional analysis of this set of items in a group of new democracies in which I prove the distinct nature of support for democracy, political disaffection and political discontent. In subsequent chapters I will demonstrate how these attitudes evolve and change in a different manner and have different behavioral consequences, reinforcing this conclusion.
2.1 Measuring the Dimensions of Political Support

In this section I discuss briefly the proposed measures of the three dimensions of political support: Political Discontent, Support for Democracy and Political Disaffection.

1. **Political Discontent:** It can be regarded as expressions of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance of the government or political system is falling short of the citizens' wishes or expectations. More generally, discontent is a reflection of frustration derived from comparing what one has with what one hopes or expects to have. In political terms, it results from beliefs that the government is unable to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important. Thus, in order to measure this dimension of political support, I propose to include in the dimensional analysis variables related with the day-to-day evaluations of the general economic situation, personal economic situation and evaluations of incumbent leaders, parties and their policies. These indicators might vary depending on the survey used but in most cases are:

   A. Evaluation of the present overall economic situation.
   B. Evaluation of the personal economic situation.
   C. Evaluation of the government or incumbent authorities.
   D. Evaluation of the incumbent and opposition leaders.

2. **Support for Democracy:** The second set of indicators is intended to tap the abstract concept of support of the regime. This concept includes general support for democracy as well as specific support for a democratic regime. Democratic legitimacy is "the system's ability to generate and maintain the belief that the regime's political institutions are the most appropriate for society." This definition implies that support for the regime should be based

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1 Di Palma, *Apathy and Participation*, p. 30
2 Gamson, *Power and Discontent*
4 Lipset, *The Political Man*, p. 64.
on a comparison with other types of regime, and I intend to use indicators designed to tap this comparison. Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that, as I discussed before, according to Easton, support for the regime can also be based on specific support, that is the support based on the evaluation of the performance of the system. Based on this idea, some scholars claim that that "satisfaction with the functioning of democracy." is an adequate and sufficient indicator of system support "at a relatively low level of generalization." They also argue that these indicators are equivalent to measures of legitimacy, or that democratic support can simply be defined as satisfaction with democracy, or else they equate legitimacy with a broad notion of trust on a continuum running from the private to the public sphere. However, satisfaction with the functioning has been the center of dispute by some scholars who have argued that satisfaction with democracy is not a measure of support and it is more relate with the evaluation of the performing of incumbent authorities. I have just included this item to measure support for democracy in order the test the former hypotheses. Thus, the three indicators used to measure support for democracy are:

A. Evaluations of the preceding political regimes.

B. Evaluations of the present democratic regime in relative terms with other regimes.

C. Satisfaction with the functioning.

The first two indicators are intended to measure if support for the regime is based on a comparison with other types of regimes. The question used is: "Which of the following sentences do you agree most with? (1) Democracy is the most preferable system of all of

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them; (2) In some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship is preferable to a democratic system; (3) All the regimes are the same for people like me.” Other legitimacy indicators designed to tap this regime comparison can be used, obtaining similar results. Finally, for the third indicator, I have included the classic question on satisfaction with the functioning of the current democratic regime to measure specific democratic support (“How satisfied are you with the functioning of the current democratic regime?”).

3. Political Disaffection: As discussed earlier, political disaffection contains two distinct dimensions: Institutional Disaffection and Political Disengagement.

A. Institutional Disaffection (Representative Disaffection): This dimension of political disaffection includes two major concepts:

1) Institutional confidence measured by confidence in parliaments and other democratic representative institutions such as political parties. Evaluations of political parties is an important aspect of this institutional confidence.

2) Assorted evaluations of the responsiveness of democratic institutions (external political efficacy). Some of the indicators of external political efficacy include assessments of politicians and political representatives.

B. Political Disengagement: I propose to measure this dimension with:

1) Subjective political interest.

2) Political salience or importance of politics in life.

3) Assorted evaluations of respondent’s personal capacity to understand and to have something to say about politics (internal political efficacy).

These concepts and items require some discussion.

External and Internal Political Efficacy: In earlier studies, the term political efficacy was

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used with a different emphasis and meaning, but the most widely accepted definition is that developed by researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. They define the concept as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process; i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties. It is the belief that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change.” Subsequent analyses have demonstrated the double dimensionality of the concept and its measures. External efficacy refers to beliefs about the political system, its institutions and its representatives and is therefore included to measure institutional disaffection. Internal efficacy, on the other hand, refers to citizens’ own perceptions of themselves as ‘political subjects,’ and their competence to understand and, ultimately, to be involved in politics. I have used the classic external political efficacy items to measure institutional disaffection and the internal political efficacy ones to tap the political disengagement dimension.

The concept of political efficacy was initially measured using five indicators, which were later reduced to four, two for internal and two for external political efficacy. Despite the intense debate about the validity of these four items, and after experiments with various

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1 Among them is the concept of “political self-confidence,” found in Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marwick, *Competitive Pressures and Democratic Consent*, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1956; and, more importantly, the concept of “subjective political competence,” in Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 137 and 140-141.


4 For the original five items used to measure political efficacy, see Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides*, pp. 187-188. Since 1952, the item “the way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country” was suppressed, leaving the other traditional four items.

others,\textsuperscript{16} internal efficacy is generally measured by asking respondents to agree or disagree with the statements: “Politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on,” and “voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.” External efficacy is measured using the statements: “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does,” and “I don’t think public officials care what people like me think.” These four indicators have proven very successful in measuring both dimensions in many countries\textsuperscript{17} and I propose their use here as well: external efficacy items together with institutional confidence as measures of Institutional Disaffection, and internal political efficacy items together with political interest and political salience as measures of Political Disengagement. In instances, when the same indicators are not included in a national survey, proxies of these items are analysed.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] Since 1968, the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan has added two new survey items to measure political efficacy. After testing the validity and reliability of a set of items, Warren E. Miller (“Misreading the Public Pulse,” \textit{Public Opinion}, 2, 1979, pp. 9-15) concluded that the best way to measure external efficacy is by asking respondents if they “agreed” or “disagreed” with the following statements: “I don’t think that public officials care much what people like me think,” “generally speaking, those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly,” “Parties are only interested in people’s votes but not in their opinions” (last two included since 1968); and internal efficacy with the following statements: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on,” “voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how government runs things,” and “people like me don’t have any say about what government does.” In 1982 and 1984, some of the questions were eliminated and replaced by new ones with more validity and reliability (see, Alan C. Acock and Harold D. Clarke, “Alternative Measures of Political Efficacy: Models and means,” \textit{Quality and Quantity}, 24, 1990, pp. 87-105. Again, in 1988 new changes were made and new questions to tap internal political efficacy were introduced: “I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics,” “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of important political issues facing our country,” “I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people,” and “I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.” The response options were “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “neither agree, nor disagree,” “disagree somewhat,” and “disagree strongly.” These indicators have shown high validity and reliability; see, Richard G. Niemi, Stephen C. Craig and Franco Mattei, “Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in The 1988 National Election Study,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, 85, 1991, pp. 1407-1413. In 1987, a pilot study for The National Election Studies was done to test and compare different political efficacy and political trust items. For the results, see Stephen C. Craig, Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver, “Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items,” \textit{Political Behavior}, 12, 1990, pp. 289-314.

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Institutional confidence and political trust

Along with external political efficacy, institutional confidence is the other indicator of institutional disaffection. It refers to citizens’ approval of, and confidence in, the main political and social institutions of representative democracy. Institutional confidence is sometimes termed political trust. However, despite the similarities between them, I argue that a distinction should be drawn between the concept and measurement of institutional confidence and that of general political trust.

Theorists of representative democracies have long debated citizens’ confidence in their representative institutions and in the people who run them,18 but the concept of political trust was first incorporated into political science by Stokes,19 who published the results of five survey items designed to create a scale for measuring citizens’ evaluations of the United States’ federal government.20 Although Stokes did not initially use the term ‘political trust,’21


20 The classical questions used for the SCR/CPS Trust in Government Index are:

1. “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”

2. “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?”

3. “Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?”

4. “Do you feel that almost all the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don’t seem to know what they are doing?”

5. “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many, or do you think hardly of them are crooked at all?”


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since then these indicators have generally been used to measure political trust or its opposite, political cynicism.\(^2\) However, research has already shown that this scale contains substantial errors.\(^3\) The somewhat vague origin of the concept, and the fact that it is formed by indicators originally designed for other purposes, explains the existence of so many different definitions of political trust and the controversy surrounding its measurement (as exemplified by the famous Citrin-Miller debate).\(^4\) The most widely used definition was coined by Miller, who defined political trust (the opposite of political cynicism) as "the belief that the government is functioning and producing outputs in accordance with individual expectations [of the political system]."\(^5\) This definition includes three notions that I challenge. Firstly, it implies that political trust is essentially the result of decisions and policies implemented by the government ignoring variations in trust in other political institutions.\(^6\) Secondly, it uses


\(^3\) A substantial portion of this error stems from the ambiguity as to whether respondents are being asked to express their attitudes toward governmental institutions generally, the policy performance of incumbent authorities, or something else. See Craig, Niemi and Silver, "Political Efficacy and Trust: A report on the NES Pilot Study Items," p. 291.

\(^4\) Citrin claimed that these indicators only measure government's popularity, whereas Miller contended that they tap identification toward institutions of the regime. See, Miller, "Political Issues and Trust," pp. 951-972; Arthur H. Miller, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism," *American Political Science Review*, 68, 1974, pp. 989-1001; and Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," pp. 973-988; and Citrin and Green, "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government," pp. 431-453. Numerous scholars have joined the controversy and have attempted to assess in various ways the meaning of the Trust index. Easton himself considers that the trust measure "may be picking up evaluations of the general performance of various incumbents, who are vaguely called to mind by the collective terms 'politicians' or 'the government' used in the questions'." Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," p. 450.

\(^5\) Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," p. 952. Another frequently used definition of political trust can be seen in Gamson, *Power and Discontent*, p. 54, where it is defined as "the probability, \(P_b\), that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left unattended."

\(^6\) Moreover, as Hill has demonstrated, the distinction between the two concepts emerges more clearly when question wordings include a more explicit reference to concrete political objects. See, David B. Hill, "Attitude Generalization and the Measurement of Trust in American Leadership," *Political Behavior*, 3, 1981, pp. 257-270.
political trust as a barometer of 'diffuse support' for the system. Finally, but no less arguably, by cuing respondents to focus on the people running the government, these measurements encourage respondents to confuse trust in representative institutions with discontent with political incumbents. For these reasons, I argue that the classic concept and indicators of political trust should be abandoned in favor of the use of the indicators of institutional trust (institutional confidence) in the representative institutions which consists of a ten-point scale measuring confidence in and/or approval of a set of representative institutions. I will create an institutional confidence index with the confidence in these institutions.

Political interest

To measure and conceptualize political disengagement, besides internal political efficacy, I have used subjective political interest and political salience. Interest or psychological involvement in politics simply means "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity." This minimalist definition of interest in politics does not include possible motivational or behavioral consequences, since "interest and psychological involvement may exist without producing any particular outward manifestations." Nonetheless, and although it is possible that many citizens are interested in politics as mere spectators without actually taking part, interest in politics is an important factor to consider in studying political disaffection for two reasons. First, political interest is interrelated with unawareness and incompetence. Some elementary awareness of the political world is a

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28 However, it is important first to ascertain whether these follow a common pattern in order to create an institutional confidence index. The results of factor analysis of the WVS data on evaluations of all the institutions reveal two dimensions. The first dimension apparently reflects approval of those institutions that are characteristic to representative democratic regimes, known as 'institutions of civil society', while the second involves approval of institutions belonging to the 'established order.' Naturally, here I am more interested in the first group. For similar conclusions see Herbert Döring, "Higher Education and Confidence in Institutions: A Secondary Analysis of the 'European Values Survey' 1981-83," West European Politics, 15, p. 136.

29 Campbell, Gurin and Miller, The Voter Decides, p. 33.

prerequisite to interest in politics—people cannot be curious about things they do not perceive. The same logic can be applied to political skills and knowledge. But at the same time, political interest is equivalent to paying attention, which is "a prerequisite for learning anything that might give the citizens the opportunity to participate in democratic decision making." Political interest, therefore, constitutes the best indicator of political awareness, political competence, political information and knowledge. Second, the consistence and persistency of political opinions in time and over time depends on two factors related with political interest: The overall level of political interest and the persistence of political interest over time.

**Political Saliency**

A second conception of political engagement can be stated in terms of political saliency. Even if politics arouses curiosity and concern among citizens, it is not obvious that politics is considered important. People might be much more inclined or in need to use their scarce resources for more important, more relevant, more pleasant, less threatening, or less demanding areas of life, than observing political decision-making processes. Politics just might be interesting but irrelevant for many people, especially if compared with other aspect of life. Political saliency is obviously different from subjective political interest and not necessarily related with it, but is clearly part of political disengagement, the other dimension of political disaffection. The assessment of political saliency reflects this idea of the relative relevance of politics and is based on a survey question on the importance of several topics for the lives of individual citizens.

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31 "Some elementary knowledge of the political system and some skills to handle political information are prerequisites for the development of interest in politics." *Ibid.*, p. 279.


35 For an interesting typology created by the combination of subjective political interest and political saliency see *Ibid.*, p. 131.

36 For each of six different topics (work, family, friends and acquaintances, leisure, politics, and religion) the respondents are invited to indicate 'how important it is in your life' on a 4-point scale ranging from 'very important (1)' to 'not at all important (4). For detail discussion of how political salience is operationalised see...
2.2 The Latent Structure of Political Support

The aim of any dimensional analysis, including factor analysis, is to summarize the interrelationships and the latent structure among variables in a concise but accurate manner as an aid in conceptualization and measurement. I intend in the following pages to use a dimensional analysis to test a specific underlying structure in the variables measuring political support.

I claim here that political discontent, democratic legitimacy and political disaffection are distinct and autonomous, although the degree of the relationship between these dimensions of political support might vary from country to country depending on the political history of these societies. This means, firstly, that political discontent variables should cluster together and autonomously from support for democracy, and behave in radically different ways. Also little relationship would be expected between political discontent and the indicators of institutional disaffection and political disengagement. Thus, if my hypothesis is correct, the items of political discontent should form a cluster by their own, separate from other items measuring support for democracy and political disaffection, and should fluctuate over time in accordance with the government's performance, the condition of the society and economy, or the performance of key political institutions. And since political discontent is focused on partisan political figures, the governments they lead and their performance, it would not be surprising to find that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the same party as that of the incumbent government would be more positive in their assessments of the political and economic situation than those who voted for the opposition.

Secondly, support for democracy should also be somewhat autonomous from both dimensions of political disaffection and political discontent. The former should be related, as I discuss extensively later on, with the evaluation of the previous regime and the conviction, based on that evaluation, that democracy is the best system possible. This support for democracy should be stable and, thus, by definition, independent from incumbent and its

Ibid., pp 139-140.

37 For a similar argument, see Miller and Listhaug, "Political Performance and Institutional Trust," p. 205.
performing evaluations, and the general economic and political situation. Support for
democracy should also be somewhat independent from confidence in the current institutions
of representation, the evaluation of its current functioning, and the trust in their
representatives. Citizens in a given country might support democracy as the best system
possible but dislike its current functioning, or the present institutions of representation and
their representatives. People might also support democracy but display a lack of interest in
politics. A different question, which I will address later on, is what consequences
disaffection may have on the mechanism of representation in contemporary democracies.

Finally, two independent dimensions of political disaffection (institutional
disaffection and political disengagement) should be both independent from each other, and
autonomous from the evaluation of incumbent authorities, their performance and the
evaluation of the current situation. Different rational mechanisms could produce a
citizenship evaluating negatively the institutions of representation and representatives despite
the existence of an unprecedented level of economic and social prosperity. As we will see
later on, many new democracies displays this paradoxical combination. Figure 2.1
represents graphically the expected latent structure of political support and the relationship
among its indicators.
FIGURE 2.1. Latent structure of political support in new democracies
I do not argue here that this latent structure and its relationships should be uniform for all democracies and, therefore, independent from specific internal political factors. This proposition will be inconsistent with the theoretical model of cultural rationalism discussed in the introduction and proposed to explain the formation of the attitudes of political support. The underlying structure should present peculiarities in each country based precisely on the political factors of these societies, which I claim is so relevant to understanding the formation of these attitudes. Here, I only argue that these concepts of political support are different and display an important level of autonomy among them, although they might be more interrelated in some countries depending on a set of political factors. For instance, and as I discussed in the introduction and as many authors have argued, it is very plausible that support for democracy in some new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe might be more related with political discontent produced by economic experiences, which perceptions, at the same time, may be also conditioned by party competition and political parties. As I will discuss extensively later on, this might also be the case of Chile and Brazil, due to the peculiarities of their recent democratic transitions and the way support for democracy was developed in these Latin American countries (see chapter 7).

2.3 Dimensional Analysis of Political Support in New Democracies

In this section, I will perform a dimensional analysis with the indicators of political support discussed above for a set of new democracies. The data used for the analysis are collected from different surveys: The third wave of the World Value Study (WVS), the Four Nation Study of 1985, the 1995 Latinobarometer data, the CNEP survey for Greece and Spain, and one Spanish national data for the year 2000. There is a lack of continuity

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39 As some of these scholars have also pointed out, the relationship is not so axiomatic and it is conditioned by the richness of cognitions regarding politics and partisanship, which both depends on the actions by political parties. Arthur Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reinsiger, “Understanding Democracy: A Comparison of Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine,” Studies in Public Policy, 247, Glasgow, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1995, p. 28.

40 These data come from the Spanish and Greek survey of the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP). The Spanish survey is also the aforementioned 1993 DATA survey, the Greek one was administrated in 1996.
among the items included in each of these studies, but there is in all of them some indicator to measure one of each of the concepts under discussion.

I have chosen the principal axis analysis with varimax rotation procedure for the dimensional analysis.\textsuperscript{42} Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of the analysis for a set of new democracies.\textsuperscript{43} In general, the results support clearly the existence of three distinct and separate dimensions of political support:\textsuperscript{44} Support for democracy, political discontent and political disaffection. The two factors of political disaffection, institutional disaffection and political engagement disaffection, also emerge but only when the survey includes the right indicators for political disaffection. This is the case for the analysis displayed in tables 2.1 and 2.3. Some surveys only include few of the relevant items and the double dimensionality of political disaffection does not show up. The two dimensions of political disaffection do not show up in table 2.2.

and directed by Diamandouros. Portugal is not included in this comparative project, so I have used the data from the Four Nation Study.

\textsuperscript{41} Postelectoral panel study year 2000, CIS study # 2382 and 2384.

\textsuperscript{42} I have chosen to perform a factor analysis procedure instead of principal component analysis. Although both are exploratory and not confirmatory, principal component presents a distinctive technical feature: the communality is always equal to 1. This apparently minor detail has very important theoretical consequences:

1. The results with principal components do not represent the covariance structure in terms of a hypothetical causal model imposed by some theory. Rather, principal component analysis summarizes data by means of a linear combination of the observed data. To be more precise, even when there is no correlation among the variables, the principal component procedure extract as many factors as variables, and any component will be as good or as bad as the other since each will account for only a unit variance. In the same situation, any factor procedure will not produce any other factor because of the lack of any communality.

2. Communality equals 1 means assuming that the data do not contain any measurement error. All the variance must be explained. The other procedures consider the existence of error measurement, which is the difference between 1 minus the observed communality. This is why the variables in figure 2.1 are the result of both the factors and the "u" error.


\textsuperscript{43} Correlations between indicators do display clearly the same pattern. I have not included the correlation matrices for the sake of simplicity (one correlation matrix for each analysis and country) but they can be obtained by request to the author at: Mariano.Torcal@cpis.upf.es.

\textsuperscript{44} To test the possibility of the existence of multidimensionality I have done more than choosing the factors with eigenvalue greater than 1. I have also performed a factor analysis by the Maximum Likelihood procedure not only obtaining very similar factor loadings, but also calculating a chi-squared test that demonstrates that the K+1 common factor model is appropriate for the observed data.
Table 2.1 presents the results of the factor analysis for the WVS data. The first two columns do display the factor loadings for a group of new and old democracies of the third wave weighted by the number of cases. In old democracies, only three dimensions do show up: institutional disaffection, political disengagement and finally political discontent. Support for democracy does not emerge as the fourth factor, but the variables included to measure it do not have loading in the other three. In new democracies, the four dimensions emerge very clearly. The only distinctive result for old democracies is that satisfaction with incumbent authorities forms also part of the institutional disaffection dimension. This fact proves two things: The latent structure of political support is not exactly the same for all countries and might differ in long-established democracies; and, in some established democracies, institutional confidence might be somewhat related with some aspects of the performance of the system or citizens' expectations of its performance, as some scholars have pointed out.

Country results in new democracies also confirm the latent structure of political support seen in table 2.1. The four dimensions are clearly present in Argentina and Chile, and three are present in Peru and Spain, with the absence of any loading for support for democracy in the former, and political discontent in the latter (in Peru satisfaction with incumbent authorities is related with trust in the parliament and political parties). Furthermore, the Pearson r correlations of the dimensions with the support for the incumbent party demonstrate how political discontent is the only dimension related with voting preferences (last row of the table). The major anomaly is Uruguay, with only two factors, one for political disaffection (both dimensions) and the other with loadings for political discontent and institutional disaffection. However, this Uruguayan anomaly partially disappears with the use of different and more valid items included in the 1995

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45 Similar conclusions with the same data can be found in the recent comparative study edited by Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 37-38.

Latinobarometer data (see table 2.3).

Two additional comments on the results with the WVS data for Chile and Brazil are important to mention. In these countries, the underlying structure of political support consistently displays the separate dimensions of political support but with one important peculiarity: Satisfaction with and vote for the incumbent party/authorities is more related with support for democracy. This is also supported by the results of the Latinobarometer data (see table 2.3, especially for Chile). I will discussed this aspect in more detail in following chapters, but this clearly confirms that in these countries, characterized by comparative low support for democracy, the ideological division produced by the non-democratic experience still has long-lasting effects with consequences in citizens’ party preferences.

Table 2.2 presents the different analyses performed using national surveys from the new Southern European democracies: Spain, Portugal and Greece. The items included in these different national surveys vary a lot and in general tend to include few items measuring political disaffection in favor of those measuring support for democracy. However, the results of the factor analyses clearly display the existence of the three major dimensions: Support for democracy, political discontent and political disaffection. The results of these analyses show that evaluations of the individual and national economic situation, the political situation, government performance and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy are all closely linked in Spain and Greece, but they are apparently unrelated to indicators of political disaffection or support for democracy. I have no data on some of these indicators for Portugal, but evaluations of system performance seem to differ from the other two dimensions. Support for the democratic regime, measured with several different indicators, and evaluations of Portugal's previous regime appear to be unrelated to the other dimensions. Finally, the same applies to political disaffection, although this was measured using only indicators of internal and external efficacy.

As can be seen in table 2.3, the loadings of the factor analysis carried out with the indicators included in the Latinobarometer reproduce these same three dimensions of political

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48 The indicators included in the CNEP survey for disaffection (Internal and external political efficacy) and legitimacy were statements with which the respondent "agreed" or "disagreed," but with an additional third
support almost exactly, with only very few exceptions in some cases with the indicator of internal efficacy. Only one item has been included in the survey for support for democracy and it sometimes emerges as an independent factor and sometime does not, but it never shows any loading in any of the disaffection or the discontent dimensions, with the aforementioned exception of Chile.

2.4 Conclusion

These findings reveal quite clearly that support for democracy, discontent and political disaffection are all distinct dimensions of political support, although the degree of relationship among them might vary in some cases. We shall see their differences in greater detail in the following chapters, which are focused on the different origins and consequences of these attitudes, and their links with the nature of representation in contemporary democracies. So far, the findings allow us to draw some important, though still cautious, conclusions. Firstly, political disaffection is a bidimensional phenomenon consisting of institutional disaffection and political disengagement. Also, political disaffection is unrelated to both support for democracy and political discontent. Contrary to classical assumptions of political culture and in line with findings of more recent comparative studies, this proves that different dimensions of a country's political support can be highly autonomous and the relationship between them is less axiomatic.

One additional methodological conclusion can also be derived from the analysis of all these cases. Some of the confusing and contradictory findings in this field of research are the product of improper inferences drawn from the use of inappropriate indicators based upon an unwarranted assumption that the many commonly used empirical indicators are interchangeable, if not conceptually equivalent. In this respect, some scholars have used satisfaction with the functioning of democracy to measure specific support for the democratic regime, and have even explicitly asserted that this is an adequate and sufficient indicators of option: "it depends."

49 Montero, Gunther and Torcal, "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent and Disaffection," pp. 124-160; Kinglemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s," p. 37. For the same theoretical argument see also Norris, Critical Citizens, pp. 9-13. The major discrepancy with this study is that I do not consider these dimensions to be part of the same diffuse-specific attitudinal-continuum, since they are different, displaying a
system support and/or interchangeable with, measures of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{50} Others, however, have equated “dissatisfaction with the functioning” with political alienation.\textsuperscript{51} The results of the above analyses confirm that satisfaction with the functioning is more related with political discontent, that is, with expressions of displeasure resulting from the belief that the political or economic performance of the government is falling short of the citizens' wishes or expectations and that the government is unable to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important.\textsuperscript{52} It is, therefore, related with party preferences and, in many instances, it is merely an expression of these party preferences.

On the same methodological note, it is remarkable how many of the items used here have been easily exchanged to measure discontent, alienation, support for democracy and disaffection. I hope that the present analysis and the theoretical discussion of the concepts and indicators have clarified the picture which to date has been quite blurry.


\textsuperscript{51} Lockerbie, “Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe,” pp. 281-293.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Old democracies</th>
<th>New democracies</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
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<td>.47</td>
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<td>.77</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.74</td>
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<td>.49</td>
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<td>.57</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.80</td>
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<td>% of explained variance</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Pearson r with vote for the incumbent party</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>08**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Only loadings close to or greater than 0.30 are shown.
Numbers in brackets correspond with the name of the variable in the WVS data file.
(*) Significant at p<.01
(**) Significant at p<.05
Source: WVS.

TABLE 2.1 Dimensions of political support in long established and new democracies in 1997 (factor loadings)
**Political Discontent**

<table>
<thead>
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<td>n.i.</td>
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<td>.75</td>
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<td>.33</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<td>National political situation</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<td>.77</td>
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<td>Satisfaction with the way democracy</td>
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<td>.37</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the incumbent leader</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the government</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.51</td>
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**Political disaffection**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“People like me don’t have much say…”</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Those in power only care about their own interest…”</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Politicians don’t care…”</td>
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<td>.51</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Politics is too complicated…”</td>
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<td>.56</td>
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<td>.65</td>
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<td>Interest in politics</td>
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<td>.52</td>
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**Support for democracy**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Democracy is the best system”</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Democracy enables problem-solving…”</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy is preferable to any other form of government</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.46</td>
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<td>.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of authoritarian regime</td>
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<td>.51</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % of explained variance | 24   | 10  | 6   | 20  | 10  | 4   | 16  | 9  | 6   | 25  | 9  | 5   | 20  | 10 | 4   | 24  | 9  | 4   |
| Pearson r with vote for the incumbent party                              | .10  | .54*| .21*| .50*| .06*| .26 | -.07| .46*| .15*| .01 | .24*| .38*| .60*| .16**| -.14**| .53*| .09 | .53 |

(1) In Portugal and Greece 1985 the question was if “our democracy works well, has many defects but it works or is getting worse and soon it will not work at all.”

(2) In Portugal the evaluation of two leaders were included in the analysis (Soares and Eanes). I did it in order to obtain a clear discontent dimension.

(3) In Spain 2000 the question was “Voting is the only way people like me can influence what the government does…”

(*) Significant at p<.01

(**) Significant at p<.05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<th>Paraguay</th>
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<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td><strong>F1</strong></td>
<td><strong>F2</strong></td>
<td><strong>F3</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
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<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with functioning of democracy</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External political efficacy</td>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Congress</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Parties</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Unions</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Judiciary</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the democratic regime</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of explained variance</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson r with vote for incumbent party</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.51*</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only loadings greater or equal to 0.3 are shown.

(*) \( p<0.01 \).

(**) \( p<0.05 \).


**TABLE 2.3: Legitimacy, political disaffection and political discontent in Latin America, 1995 (factor loadings)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td><strong>F1</strong></td>
<td><strong>F2</strong></td>
<td><strong>F3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with functioning of democracy</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External political efficacy</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Congress</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Parties</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Unions</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Judiciary</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of explained variance</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson r with vote for incumbent party</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only loadings greater or equal to 0.3 are shown.

(*) P<0.01.

(**) p<0.05.


**TABLE 2.3: Legitimacy, political disaffection and political discontent in Latin America, 1995, (factor loadings), cont.**
CHAPTER 3

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEVELS OF POLITICAL DISAFFECTION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

In this chapter I will discuss support for democracy and the two dimensions of political disaffection in a series of Western and Latin American democracies. I will provide evidence for the high level of democratic disaffection in new democracies, which is combined in most cases with strong support for democracy. However, democratic disaffection is not found exclusively in recently established democracies. There are also cases of long-established democracies experiencing notable processes of disaffection, and a few recently re-established democracies have comparatively high levels of democratic affection even though many of them enjoy the majority support of their citizens. Thus, the analysis of these aggregate data will confirm that political disaffection is not necessarily related either to the experience of recent authoritarian regimes, the type of transition to democracy, the current constitutional setting or to the levels of support for democracy among citizens. There is nothing intrinsic to the third wave democracies that causes political disaffection to be higher in them.

So why, then, is political disaffection higher in new democracies? I will try to demonstrate here that aggregate levels of both dimensions of political disaffection are somewhat explained by the exclusionary institutional settings and practices of preceding tumultuous political periods under democratic, pseudo-democratic, or non-democratic rule—the most radical form of political exclusion. Democratic regime instability and exclusionary political institutions, practices and discourses against institutions of representation over decades have systematically damaged citizens’ perceptions and evaluations of representative
institutions, resulting in levels of the institutional dimension of political disaffection that vary according to the past experiences of different countries. Such exclusionary institutions and practices are more common among new democracies, but they are not exclusive to them. In fact, despite a recent authoritarian past, in some new democracies (for instance, Chile and Uruguay) I find the opposite is true; that is, I find high levels of 'political affection.' Political disengagement, on the other hand, is also related to exclusionary practices of the past, but in this case with political demobilizing efforts linked to it. It is true that some non-democratic regimes are characterized by high levels of political mobilization that have left their mark on the levels of political engagement and sense of personal political power (higher in some of these countries). However, periods of political mobilization under non-democratic or pseudo-democratic rule have been isolated, manipulative and have generally ended in frustrating political episodes. At the same time, these same political episodes do not seem to have left any imprint on the levels of support for democracy. This is why so many third wave democracies tend to display an unusual combination of political disaffection and majority support for the democratic regime. This combination might be also present among some old democracies depending on the political past of democratic exclusion.

3.1 Comparative Levels of Attitudinal Support

Political disaffection is significantly higher in new democracies. For instance, we can see that citizens in the new democracies generally feel rather less political effective than citizens in other Western democracies, despite a marked decrease in the feeling of political ineffectiveness among the latter.¹ This can be observed in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 which present the results for a series of different indicators of internal and external efficacy.² Table 3.1 contains data from an index of two external efficacy items for several European countries. According to these data, in 1986, citizens in Spain and Greece, along with those in Belgium, Ireland and Britain, are the Europeans who declare that their political system is the most

¹ Dalton, "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies," Table 3.2; Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, "Introduction: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?" pp. 13-20.

² The wording of these indicators for political efficacy does not correspond exactly to the traditional wording. For details see Chapter 2.
unresponsive. According to these Eurobarometer data, the only apparent exception is Portugal. However, these figures for Portugal are not borne out by the results of other surveys. In Table 3.2, which shows data from the 1985 Four Nations Study using more commonly used indicators, we can see that political efficacy among the Portuguese is as low as among Spaniards and even lower than in Greece. In fact, 88 percent of Portuguese citizens think that "public officials don't care what people like me think." These data are more in line with the high levels of cynicism and lack of political efficacy which, according to some authors, have characterized Portuguese citizens since the beginning of their political transition.3 The findings for Greece, on the other hand, are more positive for some of these indicators in the 1985 survey. Only 53 percent agree with the statement "I don't think public officials care what people like me think." Although these results reflect the findings of other scholars at the beginning of Greece's political transition and first period of democratic rule,4 the situation has changed substantially since then. Already in 1989, 68 percent of Greeks agreed with the statements "politicians do not care about what people like me might think," and 77 percent maintained that "politicians only defend their own interests". The percentage of people agreeing with both statements in 1993 increased to 72 and 82 percent respectively, and in 1996 only 29 percent disagreed with the first statement.5 Despite initial differences with respect to other Southern European countries, citizens in Greece have already joined the Spanish and Portuguese in their negative opinions about the responsiveness of their democratic systems.6 Moreover, citizens' negative assessment of the responsiveness of their democratic systems is not an exclusively Southern European phenomenon. Similar views


5 These data come from different Greek surveys: for 1989 EKKE post-electoral study; for 1993 the 1993 OPINION postelectoral study; and for 1996 the CNEP. This last survey includes a third neutral response category, "it depends," selected by 14 percent of the respondents. I want to thank Akfetzis, Nikolapoulos and Diamandouros for sharing these data, which was were passed on to me by Irene Martin.

6 Similar conclusions can be also observed for Greece in Maria Mendrinou and Ilias Nicolacopoulos, "Interests, Parties and Discontent in the Public Mind: Sympathy Scores for Greek Parties and Interest Groups." Paper presented for the ECPR Congress, Berna, 1997, pp. 22-29.
also exist in most of Southern American democracies. External political efficacy is also quite low among citizens in Latin American countries. As Table 3.3 shows, a mere 16 to 29 percent of Latin Americans in this study respond affirmatively to the statement “Congressmen and Senators care about people like me.” Only citizens in Uruguay and Chile feel rather more effective (38 and 24 percent respectively). Also an important percentage of people in these countries consider that “politicians never care about the some problems that interested me.” The percentage reaches almost 50 percent in Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, it is also very high in Peru (39 percent) but it reduces substantially in Uruguay and Chile.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of those who agree with at least one indicator**</td>
<td>Percentage of those who agree with at least one indicator**</td>
<td>&quot;I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues...&quot;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.Germany</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The countries are listed according to political inefficacy in 1986, except Norway, Sweden and USA.
(**) The questions used were: "Most people with power try to take advantage of people like myself" and "The people running the country don't care what happens to people like me."
(*** ) Percentage of those who agree somewhat or a lot.
Source: Eurobarometers 26 and 30 and ISSP 96, Role of Government III.

**TABLE 3.1 Political efficacy in Western Europe, 1986-1999.**

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I do not think that public officials care what people like me think.
Politics is so complicated that people like me often can't understand what's going on.
No matter who is in government, they are only concerned with their own interests.

Source: Four Nations Study, Data Bank, CIS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not think that public officials care what people like me think</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics is so complicated that people like me often can't understand what's going on</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No matter who is in government, they are only concerned with their own interests</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.2 Political efficacy in Southern Europe, 1985 (Percentage of those who claim to agree completely or partially with each statement)
As we saw in the dimensional analysis presented in Chapter 2, external political
efficacy clusters together with confidence in representative institutions. Is there a
correspondence in the levels of these two sets of attitudes? Comparisons between new and
old democracies point in the same direction: there is differentiation, but there is no uniform
pattern.7 Despite a marked decline in institutional trust in the United States8 and Western
Europe9 over recent decades, the institutional confidence gap is also clearly higher among
new democracies. Comparative data from the 1990 World Value Survey (see Table 3.4) show
that citizens in Spain, Portugal and Italy have the lowest levels of institutional trust in
Western Europe, particularly with respect to parliament, public administration and the legal
system.10 In general, citizens in the new Southern European democracies hold particularly

7 For similar conclusion comparing the Spanish case, see José María Maravall. La Política de la Transición, 2nd
ed. Madrid: Taurus, 1984, pp. 125-126. Despite a clear decrease in the United States and Great Britain,
Maravall found significantly lower figures in Spain. The comparison includes references to the output of the
system, i.e., approval and legitimacy given by citizens to the decisions made by incumbent authorities (30-33
percent), bureaucratic authorities (81 percent) and courts (47 percent). For similar conclusion see Richard
from Laurence Parisot, “Attitudes About the Media: A Five-Country Comparison,” Public Opinion, 10, 1988,
Table 1. See, also Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 306; and Alan I. Abramowitz, “The United States: The
Political Culture Under Stress,” in Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited pp. 189-190. For Great
Britain, see Ian Budge, La Estabilidad de la Democracia, Buenos Aires, Paidos, 1971, p. 171; Robert D. Jessop,
Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture, London, Allen & Unwin, 1974, p. 99; Dennis
Kavanagh. “Political Culture in The Great Britain.” In Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds. The Civic

8 It has also been argued that this decline in confidence taps confidence in authorities more than in institutions
per se. See, Lipset and Schneider, The Confidence Gap, pp. 27-28 and pp. 88-89; Peter H. Merkl. “Comparing
Legitimacy and Values Among Advanced Democratic Countries.” In Mattei Dogan, ed. Comparing Pluralist
Legitimacy and Trust,” in H.E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, eds., Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative

9 Some studies carried out during the 1980s and 1990s dispute the alleged decline in confidence in institutions.
Some authors argue, for instance, that this has only affected government institutions, whereas confidence in
national parliaments, for instance, has remained stable or even increased. See, Ola Lishaug and Matti Wiberg,
298-322. However, in more recent studies, scholars have demonstrated the presence of a clear decline in
Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?” in Pharr
and Putnam, Disaffected Democracies, pp. 54-58.

10 It is important to note that Spaniards only seem to trust the mass media (third position in the ranking of
countries trusting the media) and trade unions (fourth position). However, this data on trust in trade unions may
not be very reliable and deserves further consideration, as this level of trust is not confirmed by other Spanish
surveys (CIS and CIERES), in which trade unions systematically appear as the institutions which enjoy the lowest
levels of institutional trust among Spaniards. Moreover, membership of and participation in trade unions in
Spain is much lower than in the rest of Western Europe, and is in decline.
negative evaluations of the basic institutions such as parliament, the public administration and the legal system. They have more positive views of big business, the Church and the Armed Forces, although their assessments of these institutions are also below the European average. These findings reveal a general syndrome of lack of political institutional confidence among citizens in the new Southern European democracies. Data on institutional confidence from Greece are not available in this comparative survey, but, as other scholars have shown, despite more positive evaluations following the transition, Greece also appears to be undergoing a shift towards institutional mistrust, at least as far as the political institutions are concerned.

Very similar findings can be observed for institutional trust in some new Latin American democracies. Table 3.5, which gives the percentage of citizens who are very or quite trusting in a series of institutions, shows that only the Church and the Armed Forces receive majority approval, that is, with results of over 50 percent. The only exceptions are Argentina and Paraguay, where citizens have less confidence in the Armed Forces, even though support for the military is still higher than that for all other institutions in Argentina and the majority of other institutions in Paraguay. This is significant when we bear in mind that the Armed Forces in these countries have often been discredited by recent authoritarian experiences. Overall, with the exception of Chile and Uruguay, confidence in political parties, trade unions, courts, national Congress and the public administration is relatively low in almost all Latin American countries.

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13 For similar conclusions, see Turner and Martz, "Institutional Confidence and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America," pp. 66-70.
Countries* | % "public officials care about what people like me think" (external efficacy) | % "politics is not so complicated and can be understood" (internal efficacy) | % who considered that "politicians do not care about the problems that interested you" (external efficacy)  
---|---|---|---  
Brazil | 16 | 34 | 48  
Venezuela | 16 | 45 | 49  
Argentina | 19 | 61 | 42  
Chile | 24 | 46 | 30  
Paraguay | 28 | 38 | 33  
Peru | 29 | 53 | 39  
Uruguay | 38 | 60 | 30  

(*) The countries are listed in ascending order of external efficacy.  
Source: Two first columns Latinobarometer 1995 and, and the last one Latinobarometer 1996.

**TABLE 3.3** Internal and external efficacy in seven Latin American countries, 1995 and 1996.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Education system</th>
<th>Legal system</th>
<th>Press</th>
<th>Unions</th>
<th>Parliament Administration</th>
<th>Big Business</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The countries are listed alphabetically.

**TABLE 3.4 Confidence in institutions in 14 democracies, 1990 (percentage of respondents stating that they have a great or some confidence)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
<td>95 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>65 63</td>
<td>74 69</td>
<td>81 78</td>
<td>89 85</td>
<td>78 80</td>
<td>56 57</td>
<td>77 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>39 33</td>
<td>61 63</td>
<td>56 51</td>
<td>34 48</td>
<td>64 52</td>
<td>45 39</td>
<td>56 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>20 11</td>
<td>38 32</td>
<td>46 44</td>
<td>40 49</td>
<td>33 28</td>
<td>41 35</td>
<td>19 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>35 24</td>
<td>41 42</td>
<td>37 38</td>
<td>37 45</td>
<td>27 27</td>
<td>58 56</td>
<td>29 28</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37 40</td>
<td>71 50</td>
<td>47 37</td>
<td>27 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarometer 1995 and 1996.

**TABLE 3.5 Institutional trust in some Latin American countries, 1995 and 1996 (percentage of respondents stating that they have great or some confidence)**

64
These two countries contrast with Venezuela, where institutional trust is very low despite the fact that Venezuela has been a democracy since 1958. Therefore, although new democracies tend to have very low levels of institutional trust, there are some significant exceptions such as Chile and Uruguay, and even Greece. Moreover, as exemplified by the cases of Venezuela and Italy, this lack of confidence is not exclusive to recently established regimes. It seems that a lack of institutional trust does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with previous dramatic political experiences under authoritarian regimes. In fact, in a recent comparative study, scholars have argued that although institutional trust is lower in new democracies, it is not possible to identify a general trend or a particular group of new democracies suffering from special problems in this respect.\(^\text{14}\) This suggests that the different trends observed in each country may be due to internal political factors that go beyond their recent authoritarian experiences.\(^\text{15}\)

This lack of institutional confidence is especially important for evaluations of political parties as institutions of political representation. Unfortunately, there is little comparative data on confidence in political parties. The best available data come from the 1997 wave of the World Value Survey, but few Western European countries were included in the final wave of the survey. Despite this shortcoming, the analysis of these data is very enlightening. Of all the countries for which data is available, Venezuela is the one with the highest level of distrust in political parties: some 60 percent of Venezuelans say they have absolutely no trust in political parties. Close behind Venezuela come Argentina, with 49 percent of ‘non-trusters,’ Brazil with 47 percent, Peru with 44, percent Chile with 37 percent, Spain with 29 percent, Uruguay with 26 percent, and at a considerable distance Germany with 17 percent, the United States with 16 percent, Sweden with 11 percent and Norway with 7 percent. These data reveal the scale of the disparities among the citizens of these countries in terms of their level of trust in political parties. Although more comparative data are needed, recent studies in Southern Europe and Latin America have shown that anti-party sentiments are widespread throughout both regions, with the notable exceptions of Uruguay and Chile and,


\(^{15}\) Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s,” p. 52.

These findings on institutional confidence can be seen more clearly when we compare average indexes of institutional evaluation. These indexes are designed to show the two dimensions captured by some scholars when measuring European citizens’ evaluations of a series of institutions, distinguishing between specifically political institutions, and other institutions in society.\footnote{According to Listhaug and Wiberg, the distinction between political and private institutions can be observed, in trends in confidence seen in a set of European countries studied; see, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions,” in Klingemann and Fuchs, \textit{Citizens and the State}, p. 320. Rose divides these institutions into those belonging to the government and other non-governmental institutions. See, Richard Rose, \textit{Understanding Big Government}, London, Sage, 1984. Döring has distinguished between institutions of “civil society” and institutions of “established order.” See, Döring, “Higher Education and Confidence in Institutions,” pp. 133-137. Despite the different labels used, the relevant institutions are generally distributed in a very similar way between the two categories.} Both indexes have therefore been designed with these two dimensions in mind. The first index only includes evaluations of those institutions that belong to the political system \textit{per se} (parliament, public administration and the legal system).\footnote{Political parties were only included in the 1997 WVS wave, which covers only a few Western European countries.} The second includes these three institutions as well as three other important social institutions (trade unions, the Church and big business). Although the inclusion of some of these institutions in the index is debatable, they have been used in comparative studies to show the declining levels of institutional trust in many Western democracies.\footnote{The classic study of this topic is Lipset and Schneider, \textit{The Confidence Gap}. These scholars demonstrate the decline in confidence in institutions by analyzing trust in major industries (pp. 33-40), the educational system, big corporations, and the financial system (pp. 57 and 68, these data come from the \textit{Gallup} and \textit{Harris} and \textit{NORC} surveys).} Table 3.6, which provides data for these indexes (the scale ranges from 4, a lot of trust to 1, none; hence 2.50 is a neutral position), in that it is neither negative nor positive), confirms that the citizens of Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, Peru, Portugal, Spain, and Venezuela have the lowest levels of institutional trust; that is, their evaluations are negative.\footnote{This lack of institutional trust can also be concluded from the classic indicators of political trust. The 1994 CIRES survey, which includes these indicators, found that 77 percent of Spaniards stated that rarely or never can “you can trust the government to do what is right.” The percentage in the United States was only 45 percent in 1972 and 68 percent in 1978. Moreover, 70 percent of Spaniards believed that “the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.” The percentage of Americans agreeing with this}
confirms the sense of estrangement existing between citizens and government in these countries. Therefore, lower confidence in the political institutions is more prevalent among new than old democracies. However, low levels of confidence in the political institutions is neither an exclusive nor a defining characteristic of new democracies: the Chilean and Uruguayan cases represent new democracies with high confidence, while Italy and Venezuela are more traditional democracies with very low levels of confidence.

statement was only 53 percent in 1972 and 67 percent in 1978. For the United States data, see Miller et al., *American National Election*, p. 257.

For similar conclusions, see Listhaug and Wiberg, "Confidence in Political and Private Institutions," p. 302.
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<tr>
<th>Countries*</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.56</td>
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</tr>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.55</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* The countries are listed in order of their 1990 evaluation of political institutions.
(**) The data for Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay come from the 1995-97 wave.

TABLE 3.6 Confidence in the political institutions of Western democracies, 1981 and 1990 (Index of average confidence in the institutions of the political system and in other social institutions).
Is this distribution of institutional-responsiveness disaffection in different countries also found in the case of the other dimension of political disaffection (political disengagement)? Again, the differences between older democracies and new democracies are persistent, although not consistent in all cases. Differences can also be observed among new democracies, although these are more significant. Going back to Tables 3.1 to 3.3 we can also observe data on internal political efficacy. Of the nine Western democracies included in this ISSP study, Spanish citizens display the lowest percentage stating that they do not understand important political issues European citizens (39 percent).22 Other comparative data in table 3.2 show that the sense of internal political efficacy is also very low in the other new democracies in Southern Europe, although it is a little higher in Greece (where 68 percent of respondents thinks that “politics is too complicated for people like me”). Furthermore, contrary to what we have seen in the case of the other dimension of political disaffection, this situation has remained stable over time (only 55, 61 and 55 percent of respondents agree with this statement in 1989, 1993 and 1996 respectively). The lack of consistency on this dimension among new democracies is even more remarkable in the light of the Latin American data on internal political efficacy. In Table 3.3, it can be seen that in Argentina and Uruguay 61 and 60 percent of respondents respectively declare that “politics is not complicated and can be understood.” The figure for the other countries is around 50 percent, except in Brazil and Paraguay. Hence, in some Latin American countries, we find a picture combining high level of citizen confidence in their political abilities (internal political efficacy) and low levels of confidence in the responsiveness of the system.

The lack of confidence in themselves among citizens of most new democracies is accompanied, as we saw from the dimensional analysis presented in the preceding chapter, by a lack of political saliency and interest in political life and public affairs. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the levels of political interest found in this same group of democracies. We find a similar pattern. While the citizens of new democracies generally tend to display lower levels of interest in politics, this pattern is not uniform. Spain and Portugal, together with Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, show the lowest levels of engagement in politics and public affairs, but countries such as Uruguay, Peru and Brazil and even Colombia display higher levels of

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22 These data come from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the Role of Government III survey
political interest. According to data from the World Value Surveys of 1981-83, 1990-91 and 1995-97 (see Table 3.7), Spaniards and Italians have the lowest levels of interest in politics of all the European countries analyzed except for Ireland and, once more, Belgium. Furthermore, as the data in this table show, Spaniards' interest has decreased since 1981, making them the most politically disinterested citizens of all the Western democracies. Portugal, only included in the 1990 study, is also among the group of countries whose citizens are the most politically disinterested in Europe. Furthermore, the lack of interest in politics among the citizens of these countries is also confirmed by data from the 1983-1990 Eurobarometers. On average, over this period just 34 percent of Spaniards declared that they were very or quite interested in politics. Lower figures are only found in Portugal and Italy (12 and 28 percent respectively). Moreover, between 1983 and 1990, interest in politics rose more in most other European countries than in Spain, where it decreased until 1988 and remained virtually unchanged thereafter. Latin American levels of political interest, however, are not so consistently low. Some of the new democracies in Latin America display lower levels of interest in politics than most European countries but the gap is smaller (see Uruguay and to a lesser extent Peru and Brazil). They even display higher levels of political interest than some traditional Western European democracies. This conclusion is confirmed by Latinobarometer data (see Table 3.8). Higher levels of political interest can be also observed among the Greeks, who display a relatively high level of interest

1996-99, variable v50.

23 For similar conclusions, see Peter Ester, Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor, eds., The Individualizing Society. Value Change in Europe and North America, Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1983, p. 79. These scholars also maintain that falling interest in politics among the Spanish runs contrary to increasing interest observed in the rest of Europe, with the exception of France.


25 The averages in the other EC countries are: Belgium, 34 percent; Denmark, 67; Germany, 57; Greece, 52; France, 44; Ireland, 42; Luxemburg, 47; Holland and Great Britain, 55.

26 In Spain, interest in politics has increased 4 percent since 1988, a smaller increase than that seen in the other EU countries with the exception of France and Holland where it decreased, and Luxemburg and the United Kingdom, with 1 and 4 percent increase respectively. However, it is important to note that these countries display a much higher level of interest in politics than Spain. Moreover, in a recent comparative study, scholars have argued that, with very few exceptions, stability is the dominant tendency in the evolution of political interest in all Western European countries over the last two or three decades. See, Oscar W. Gabriel and Jan W. van Deth, "Political Interest," in Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough, eds., The Impact of Values, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 410.
in politics (52 percent) than Spain, Portugal and some other new democracies, remaining stable overtime according to the data from 1989 and 1993 (53 and 52 percent respectively). Only in 1996 was some decrease observed, as the proportion of Greeks very or somewhat interested in politics dropped to 41 percent; even then, however, Greece still remained well ahead of Portugal and Spain in this respect.

Similar comparative levels of political engagement also emerge when analyzing political saliency, and comparing this with importance they attach to religion. Table 3.7 also gives the percentage of citizens who regard politics and religion as very or quite important in their lives. The findings show that Spanish and Portuguese citizens give the least importance to politics in Europe, in stark contrast to their attitude to religion. Despite the intense secularization processes in both Spain and Portugal,\textsuperscript{27} in both countries citizens attach twice as much importance to religion than politics in their lives. However, this does not mean that citizens in Spain and Portugal give particular importance to religion, but rather that the numbers considering politics to be important are so low.\textsuperscript{28} In Europe, only Belgium, Iceland, Ireland and Italy follow the same pattern. The latter are also politically disaffected societies in which religion is still relatively important (especially in the cases of Ireland and Italy). On the other hand, the importance of religion is consistently higher in Latin America. Only Uruguay is close to the European pattern. This is because, despite the varying levels of political affection in these countries, religion is considered important everywhere. However, the importance given to politics matches and in some cases even outstrips European levels (see Brazil, Peru and to a lesser extent Argentina).


\textsuperscript{28} For similar conclusions, see Maravall, La Política de la Transición, pp. 117-120; Montero and Torcal, “Voters and Citizens in a New Democracy,” pp. 131-134; Bacalhau and Bruneau, Atitudes, Opiniones e Comportamientos Políticos dos Portugueses, pp. 85-90; Mª Luz Morán and Jorge Benedicto, La Cultura Política de los Españoles. Un Ensayo de Reinterpretación. Madrid, CIS, 1995, pp. 55-58.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries (**)</th>
<th>Interest in politics</th>
<th>Importance of politics in life</th>
<th>Importance of religion in life</th>
<th>Difference politics minus religion</th>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The data in the first three columns represent the percentages of respondents stating that they are very or somewhat interested in politics (excluding the DK/DA). The last two columns represent the percentage of those who state that politics and religion are very or quite important in their lives (excluding the DK/DA).

(**) The countries are listed in order of their 1981-97 averages.

(****) The data for the Latin American countries is from 1997.


**TABLE 3.7 Political engagement in Western and Latin American Democracies, 1981-97 (*)**

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### TABLE 3.8 Political engagement in seven Latin American countries, 1995 and 1996 (horizontal percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries and years</th>
<th>% A lot or some</th>
<th>% Little</th>
<th>% None</th>
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</tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil 1996</td>
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<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay 1996</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1995</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru 1996</td>
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<td>Argentina 1995</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1995</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1996</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Countries are ranked in ascending order of political interest.

Source: Latinobarometer 1995 and 1996.
Summing up the comparative evidence on political disaffection, it can be seen that while this is higher among the new democracies, it is not a defining or exclusive feature of these new democratic regimes. Equally, the levels of political disaffection found among new democracies vary depending on the dimension considered. The differences between cases are even greater with respect to the political disengagement, the other dimension of political disaffection, and do not seem to follow any identifiable pattern. It is, therefore, impossible to identify any particular type of democracies in terms of levels of political disaffection, although this phenomenon does tend to occur to a greater extent in new democracies. It is also difficult to find a pattern related to the type of transition to democracy that these countries experienced. For instance, Chile, Brazil and Spain took similar paths to democracy, but they show important disparities in the level of political disaffection. A classification of democracies according to current institutional settings (pluralistic vs. majoritarian model) does not seem to correspond with the differing levels of political disaffection; political disaffection is high in countries like Spain and Greece with parliamentary-pluralistic models as well as in countries with presidential or semi-presidential models such as Argentina, Portugal, and Venezuela; whereas political disaffection is lower in countries with semi-presidential systems such as Uruguay and Chile and traditional pluralistic systems like Norway, Netherlands and Sweden. Why, therefore, is this attitudinal phenomenon higher in new democracies? What factors account for the differences among the new democracies?

Before attempting to account for these different levels of political disaffection, however, it is first necessary to examine comparative levels of support for democracy and compare these with our findings regarding the dimensions of political disaffection. Do we find a similar same pattern to that seen in the case of democratic support? Are these levels of political disaffection related to aggregate levels of support for democracy? Despite the varying levels of democratic support in these countries, these differences follow a totally different pattern. On the whole, the levels of support for the existing democratic regime in most new democracies is similar to, if not greater than, that of historically longer-established democracies. This can be seen from Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. The data in Table 3.10, which shows legitimacy levels during the period 1985-1995 in Spain and 1985-1992 in Greece and Portugal, demonstrate that generally around 75-85 percent of the citizens of these countries supported the new regime (with the exception of Spain and Portugal in 1985, due to the high
percentage of 'no answers' in these surveys).\textsuperscript{29} And, even more importantly, the authoritarian option attracted very little support among the citizens of these new democracies.\textsuperscript{30} However, not all new democracies display similar levels of support for democracy. This can be seen quite clearly from Table 3.11, which shows the degree of legitimacy granted to their new democratic regimes by citizens in various Latin American countries. On the one hand, countries such as Uruguay and Argentina show high levels of support for their respective regimes, whereas many others, such as Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, have much lower levels of support for democracy.\textsuperscript{31} Similar examples can also be found in other new democracies such as Russia and the former Soviet republics of Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as in Taiwan and South Korea.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{29} See Montero and Morlino, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," p. 238. For similar conclusions for the Portuguese case, see Bruneau, "Popular Support for Democracy in Postrevolucionary Portugal: Results from a Survey," pp. 35-39.


\textsuperscript{31} Diamond, "Political Culture," p. 179. For more data confirming these levels of democratic support in Brazil and Chile, see Linz and Stepan, \textit{Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation}, p. 173, and p. 214.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries*</th>
<th>Democracy is preferable</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Don't care</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC Average</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Countries are listed in descending order of unconditional support for democracy. 
Source: Eurobarometer 37, 1992.

Table 3.9 Support for democracy in EC countries, 1992 (horizontal percentages)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries* and years</th>
<th>Democracy is preferable</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Don't care</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1985</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1988</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1992</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1995</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1985</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1988</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1992</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1996</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 1985</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 1988</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal 1992</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The countries are listed alphabetically and by date.
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Comparative Study of Southern Europe 1985, Eurobarometers 30 and 37. Data for Greece 1996 were provided by P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and drawn from the CNEP. See also Montero, Gunther and Torcal, "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent, and disaffection," p. 8.

Table 3.10 Support for democracy in the new democracies of Southern Europe (horizontal percentages)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries* and years</th>
<th>Democracy is preferable</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
<th>It's all the same</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1988</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1995</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1996</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1988</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1995</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1996</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela 1995</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela 1996</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay 1995</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay 1996</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1995</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1996</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1988</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1995</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1996</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1988</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1995</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1996</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The countries are ordered according to their respective levels of unconditional support for democracy. Source: For 1988 see José Alvaro Moisés, *Os Brasileiros e a Democracy. Bases Sócio-políticas de Legitimacy Democrática*, San Pablo, Ática, 1995; for 1995 and 1996 Latinobarometer.

Table 3.11 Support for democracy in some Latin American countries, 1988-1996 (horizontal percentages)
It can be seen therefore, that there are differing degrees of support for democracy in new democracies, but these do not correspond to the observed levels of both dimensions of political disaffection. These data reveal citizens' distinct preferences when asked to choose between different political regimes, particularly when they are able to compare them from personal experience or recent memory. However, in most new democracies in Southern Europe and even in Latin America, the levels of support are high and consistent overtime. Levels of support for democracy in Argentina and Uruguay are similar to those in Western Europe, but contrast sharply with those in other South American countries. Furthermore, support for democracy among the latter is generally higher than the levels of institutional confidence, internal and external political efficacy or political engagement and, more importantly, the varying levels of these attitudes in these countries do not correspond with those observed for democratic legitimacy.

3.2 Support for Democracy and Political Disaffection: an Identifiable Pattern?

In order to try to identify a specific pattern in the different levels of political disaffection and support for democracy, I have defined different types of citizens after grouping the countries in function of these two attitudinal dimensions. Figure A in Table 3.12 presents four ideal types of democracy based on the levels of support for democracy and institutional disaffection: institutionally supported democracy (high institutional confidence and sense of responsiveness from institutions and representatives combined with majority support for democracy), critically supported democracy (low institutional confidence and external political efficacy together with majority support for democracy), institutionally non-supported democracy (high institutional confidence and sense of responsiveness from institutions and representatives along with lack of majority support for democracy) and critically non-supported democracy (low institutional affection and lack of democratic

---


34 This can also be seen in the case of other indicators used in comparative studies to measure abstract support for democracy; see Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1900s,” Table 2.6.
support). If institutional disaffection and support for democracy were related or were indicators of the same dimension of democratic legitimacy, as many interpreters of the Easton model defend, most of the cases under consideration should be located in cells 1 and 4.

However, Figure A in Table 3.13, which assigns countries to one of these four cells according to their levels of institutional affection and support for democracy, shows that many new democracies are located in cell 2 (critically supported democracies) and even one case is located in cell 3 (institutionally non-supported democracies). No relationship between both attitudes can be seen at the aggregate level, confirming the findings of the dimensional analysis developed in the preceding chapter. A significant group of new democracies are located in cell 2, critically supported democracies. Among the new democracies, only Uruguay displays both high support and high institutional affection (Greece is moving rapidly toward the institutionally disaffected group). Not surprisingly, Uruguay has one of the longest, most deeply rooted democratic traditions in Latin America, as a result of the convergence of the main party elites (Blancos and Colorados). Even the military regime established in 1973 was never a long-term project and, despite repression, the regime never attempted to abolish the political parties. Chile presents the other side of the story, high institutional affection but low support for democracy. Despite the dramatic collapse of democracy in 1973 and its unconsolidated democratic present, Chile is nonetheless one of the Latin American countries with one of the longest, most stable and successful democratic past. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Chile shows one of the highest levels of confidence in political parties, and the highest with respect to Congress and trade unions, even though this is combined with comparatively low levels of support for democracy. The critically supported democracies also include long-established cases, such as Belgium, France, Italy and Venezuela (which is rapidly moving to the unsupported side).

Figure B in Table 3.12 represents four ideal types of democracy based on the levels of

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36 In fact, the military were also split by their support for the two major “political families.” See, Charles Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 54-5 and 71-3; and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 152.
support for democracy and the political disengagement: *Mobilized democracy* (high political engagement along with majority democratic support), *Non-mobilized democracy* (low political engagement and non-majority support), *Mobilized unsupported democracy* (high political engagement together with majority support for democracy), *Unsupported non-mobilized democracy* (neither political engagement nor majority support). If, as Almond and Verba argued, the presence of a participatory subculture is a prerequisite for the existence of a civic culture, most of the cases should be located in cells 1 and 3 displaying the relationship between both dimensions, political support and some level of engagement in politics.

However, Figure B in Table 3.13, which classifies the countries according to this typology, shows that many new democracies are located in cell 2 (non-mobilized supported democracies) and that some are even in cell 3 (mobilized non-supported democracies). Some cases such as Austria, Argentina and Uruguay fall halfway between low and high political engagement. A new pattern emerges after classifying the countries in accordance with the observed aggregate levels of both attitudes. Some new democracies are located in cell 2, non-mobilized supported democracies, although other new democracies such as Brazil and Peru are classified as mobilized non-supported democracies, and others, such as Uruguay, as mobilized supported democracies. Argentina or France are in the group of mobilized supported democracies despite having, as we have seen, no significant history of institutional disaffection. In general, and regardless of the level of democratic support, the countries with high political engagement are those either with a steady political mobilizing strategy under stable democratic rule or countries exposed to significant periods of populist political mobilization. For instance, Stokes has shown in the case of Peru that the Velasco government's efforts to politically mobilize excluded and demobilized sectors of society had a long-term attitudinal impact on the citizens concerned, helping to account for the political contestation seen even against the military regime that had fostered the mobilization.17 France is characterized by a historical record of mobilized political contestation, support for democracy and critical attitudes toward institutions and the political authorities.18

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17 Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict. Social Movements and the State in Peru.*

18 This combination of distrust in institutions and politicians (despite the increase of trust during the 1980s among leftists) with high levels of political mobilization and contestation is a characteristic of the French political culture. For a brief discussion see, Henry W. Ehrmann and Martin A. Schain, *Politics in France,* New York, Harper Collins, pp. 71-74 and 101-104.

81
other hand, the low political engagement countries tend to be either new democracies with previous demobilizing non-democratic regimes (Spain, Portugal, Chile and even Argentina) or long-established but historically demobilizing troubled democracies such as Colombia, Italy and Venezuela.

Therefore, while political disaffection is higher among new democracies, it is not a defining feature of such regimes. Political disaffection can also be found in second-wave democracies such as Venezuela and Italy, and even in other Western European democracies such as France and Belgium. On the other hand, Chile, Uruguay and Greece are characterized by much higher levels of institutional affection (although in Greece this has been decreasing rapidly since the end of the 1980s). Other differences should also be noted among new democracies. The level of internal efficacy and political saliency among citizens is not uniform in the third-wave democracies. Some Latin American countries display higher levels of internal efficacy, interest in politics and attentiveness to politics in general.
### A) Typology of democratic support and the institutional dimension of political disaffection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low institutional disaffection</th>
<th>High institutional disaffection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Institutionally supported democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Critically supported democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Institutionalized non-supported democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Critical non-supported democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B) Typology of democratic support and the engagement in politics dimension of political disaffection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low engagement in politics</th>
<th>High engagement in politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mobilized democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Non-mobilized democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mobilized unsupported democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Unsupported non-mobilized democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3.1:** Types of democracies according to levels of support for democracy and both dimensions of political disaffection
FIGURE 3.2: Classification of countries according to the levels of political disengagement and support for democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With majority support for democracy</th>
<th>Low institutional disaffection</th>
<th>High institutional disaffection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 All the UE countries (except Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Uruguay</td>
<td>2 Argentina, Belgium, France, Greece (since end of 80s), Italy, Portugal and Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Chile</td>
<td>4 Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay, Peru and Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without majority support for democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With majority support for democracy</th>
<th>High political engagement</th>
<th>Low political engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Denmark, Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, USA, W.Germany, France.</td>
<td>2 Austria, Argentina, Uruguay.</td>
<td>Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Italy Portugal, Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Brazil, Peru</td>
<td>4 Chile, Colombia, Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Political disaffection tends to occur to a greater extent in new democracies because of their common problematic democratic past. However, this is not a problem exclusive to third-wave democracies. Furthermore, the differences in the level of political disaffection among new democracies do not correspond with the type of transition to democracy that took place in these countries or with their current institutional setting. For instance, Chile, Brazil and Spain took similar paths to democracy, but they show important disparities in the level of political disaffection. Why, then, is this phenomenon more pronounced in new democracies? Why are there also differences among new democracies? I argue that these differences in the levels of political disaffection are related to the politics of the democratic past of these societies, beyond recent authoritarian democratic experiences and the type of transition. In fact, there are two groups of democracies in terms of political disaffection. First, there are older democratic countries with a long and successful democratic past that display high levels of political affection. This group is characterized with the presence of inclusive institutional settings and practices that have favored not only major democratic stability, but also higher levels of “political affection.” This group of democracies also corresponds with the “Nordic model” (characterized by the implementation of sudden massive enfranchisement combined with pluralistic institutional settings) or the “Anglo model” (characterized by step-by-step enfranchisement with majoritarian settings) of democratic inclusion. According to a recent study, countries reflecting these models display higher levels of democratic stability, less political confrontation and greater democratic consensus. Second, there is another set of countries with histories of continuous political crises produced by exclusionary institutional settings and exclusive, semi- or non-democratic practices. These countries share a non-democratic past and suffer higher levels of political disaffection today. This group includes most third-wave democracies, as well as some old democracies such as France, Italy and Venezuela, and corresponds with the “Latin model” of democratization. The model is characterized by the allocation of voting rights through the sudden introduction of universal men’s suffrage under restrictive electoral and institutional rules that produced manufacture majorities. In some of these countries, hazardous voting results and threatening new electoral mobilization provoked fears of instability among the incumbent voters and rulers, moving

39 Colomer, Political Institutions, pp. 212-213.
them to search for or support authoritarian reactions in order to re-establish the old political order.  

Finally, citizens in different countries seem to show different levels of abstract support for democracy independently of their respective country's exclusionary democratic history. Most new democracies show levels of support for democracy similar to those found in long-established democracies. There are a few exceptions, such as Brazil, Peru and Chile, but as I will argue below, these are best explained by the presence of the "transition and consolidation effect."

3.3 Democratic Disaffection and the Politics of the Past

The comparative analysis of the levels of disaffection in the previous section seems to point to the importance of the democratic past in explaining the differences observed among countries. As McAllister's states, "confidence [in institutions] is formed cumulatively within the mass electorates" for, as the same author notes, "institutional confidence is strongly related to the period of time that democratic institutions have been in existence [and] is predicated on the frequency of free, competitive, national elections." However, I argue in this study that the consolidation of pro-democratic attitudes is not, as Converse too would have it, just a matter of time under democratic rule, or merely a question of citizens' experiencing repeated calls to elections. Nor is this a purely institutional argument about the important influence of certain constitutional settings on satisfaction with democracy or confidence in institutions. Rather, the nature and evolution of these attitudes depend to a large extent on how the democracy in question has performed over its lifetime and the degree of mobilization generated under it. So, for example, a democracy with a well-established record of adopting exclusive rather than inclusive institutions and deliberating processes, together with the presence of exclusionary practices such as political manipulation, electoral fraud or non-accountable political corruption will inevitably suffer the consequences in terms

41 Ibid, pp. 53-59.
of visible signs of disaffection. Hence, second-wave democracies such as Venezuela and Italy show much higher levels of disaffection than Uruguay and Chile, regardless of the fact that the latter belong to the so-called new or third-wave democracies. This fact, however, is not a challenge to my central hypothesis. What matters is the time spent living in a representative democracy which is not dominated by exclusionary institutions or practices which systematically challenge or call into question the basic institutions of political representation and produce systematic political demobilization.

As I will attempt to show here, the nature of the democratic past directly influences the political disaffection found in the various countries. This influence is explored in this section, which presents a macro-analysis of data on disaffection and a series of political, economic and social indicators. The starting point for this analysis is the hypothesis that the length of a country's history of "quality" democracy will explain the levels of political disaffection in the present. In order to test this hypothesis, I have compiled a number of aggregate indices for various countries. These indices incorporate a series of social, economic and political indicators that, according to the literature, could influence the levels of these attitudes found in a given society. I go on to examine the relation between these indices and three attitudinal aggregate indicators, one for the support for democracy and three for political disaffection: The proportion of citizens who generally feel that the authorities and the system as a whole are not responsive to their demands, the percentage of citizens who declare that politics is very or somewhat important in their lives, and the index of confidence in the institutions of political representation which has been discussed above and which includes confidence in parliament, the public administration, and the legal system. The countries included in the analysis vary slightly depending on the data available,

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44 These data comes from Tables 3.9 and 3.11. For the Latin American countries I have used the 1996 data.
45 These data are actually a collection of data from various tables seen earlier in the text. For the Western democracies, I used the index of external political efficacy, created from two indicators from the 1988 Eurobarometer and presented in Table 3.1. For Southern Europe, I used the indicator of external efficacy from the Four Nations Study, as presented in Table 3.2. For Latin American countries, I used this same indicator from the Latinobarometer, presented in Table 3.3.
46 The data is given in Table 3.7.
47 These data represent confidence in the three institutions. They were drawn from the 1990 World Values Study and can be found in Table 3.6. Unfortunately, confidence in political parties was not included in the World Values Study until 1997, and many of the other cases of interest to this research were not included in this latest round. Norris has developed a similar index of institutional confidence which also includes confidence in...
but the analysis still centers on the advanced capitalist societies of Western Europe and the United States, the Southern European countries, and the Latin American Southern Cone democracies.48

Four sets of variables with aggregate data were created to test the three major hypotheses: the influence of past democratic history, the influence of current contextual political and institutional features, the influence of major economic and social achievements, and level of modernization. The variables were the following:

A) Three variables to measure past democratic history.

1. Years of liberal and representative democracy from 1930 to 1997. I count only those years in which the country had a functioning democracy according to procedural criteria.49
2. The number of changes of political regime, either to or from a non-democratic (authoritarian or totalitarian), semi-democracy or democracy from 1930 to 1997.50
3. Duration in years of the longest period of uninterrupted democracy between 1930

48 The countries included in the present analysis using the index of institutions and importance of politics in life are: Germany, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, the United States, Spain, France, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Peru, Portugal, England, Sweden, Uruguay and Venezuela. For the analysis using the indicator of internal political efficacy, Greece and Paraguay could also be included, though Austria, the United States, Norway and Sweden were excluded because data was not available.

49 I have used Mainwaring's classification of political regimes (see Scott Mainwaring, “Democratic Survivability in Latin America” in Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler, eds. Democracy and Its Limits. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1999, pp. 14-20. This author classifies governments as democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian (or totalitarian). I have only counted the democratic ones. To be classified as democratic, a government must meet four criteria: (1) the president and legislature in presidentialist systems, or the legislature in parliamentary systems, are chosen in open and fair competitive elections; (2) these elected authorities have real governing power; (3) civil liberties are respected; and (4) the franchise includes a sizable majority of the adult population. I have taken the data for the Latin American cases from Table 1 in Chapter 1. I myself have computed the rest of the data for the other European and North American cases from other sources.

50 Computed from Mainwaring, “Democratic Survivability in Latin America,” Table 1 and other sources.
and 1997.  

B) Five variables to measure some basic contextual political characteristics:


2. Achievements on civil and political liberties, measured by the variations in the “Political Liberties Index” and in “Civil Liberties Index” from the year before the introduction of the last democracy until 1997 or, in the case of democracies established before 1976, between 1976 and 1997.

3. The party systems, measured by the average number of effective parties existing in each country from the beginning of democracy until 1990 or, in the case of democracies founded before 1976, between 1976 and 1997.

4. The degree of social mobilization, measured by the average number of general strikes that took place from the foundation of democracy until 1990 or, if the democracy dates from before 1976, from then until 1990.


---

51 These data for Latin America was collected from Mainwaring, “Democratic Survivability in Latin America,” Table 2.


53 The Latin American data comes from “Latin American Democracies Data set,” collected by Scott Mainwaring, Anibal Pérez-Liñán and Daniel Brinks. The data for the other countries comes from the ACLP Dataset. For a formula for the Effective Number of Parties, see Markku Laakso and Rein Taagapera, “‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, 12, 1979, pp. 3-27.

54 This includes any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority. These data come from Arthur S. Banks and Thomas C. Muller, Political Handbook of the World: 1994-95. Government and Intergovernmental Organizations as of August 1, 1994, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1995.

55 This index goes from “1”, indicating considerable corruption, to “10”, indicating no corruption. The data used here were taken from the web site: www.gwdg.de/~uwvw , and are published by Transparency International Publishers.
C) Three more variables to measure the level of economic and social standard improvements

1. Social achievements and progress, measured by the variation in the country's "Human Development Index" (HDI) from the last time that democracy was reestablished until 1997 or, if a democracy was established before 1980, from 1980 to 1997.  

2. Economic achievements, measured by the Average Gross Democratic Product (GDP) from 1975 to 1997; 


D) Modernization variables:

1. The level of GDP for 1997;
2. Cubic power of the GDP for 1997 in order to test the income threshold theory for modernization which maintains that there is an N-curve relationship between modernization and democratization.
3. The Human Development Index (HDI) for 1997.

The results of a bivariate analysis of the relation between these indicators and the

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57 These data come primarily from the OECD, Historical Statistics, Paris, OECD, various years; and OECD, National Accounts Vol. 1, Paris, OECD, various years.
58 These data come primarily from the OECD, Historical Statistics, Paris, OECD, various years; and OECD, National Accounts Vol. 1, Paris, OECD, various years.
59 O'Donnell challenge the classical modernization theories with respect to the relationship between modernization and democracy, arguing that rapid modernization created bottlenecks of development in most industrialized Latin American countries which triggered the emergence of military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s; see Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973. For similar argument see also Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
aggregate levels of confidence in the political institutions and of external political efficacy are quite consistent and revealing. As can be seen from the significant bivariate correlations given in Table 3.14, the variables most closely related to the levels of institutional trust (first column) are essentially related to the democratic past and the modernization variables. These results would certainly appear to confirm the importance of the relation between institutional confidence and the democratic history of the societies under consideration, thereby challenging the significance, defended by other scholars, of current economic performance, current institutional setting and contextual political features. Only the modernization variables seem to be of similar importance to democratic history. The economic and social performance variables display a secondary or null importance. The only significant finding is the relationship with rise in per capita incomes, which clearly contrasts with the absence of a significant relation with the other main social and economic performance variables. On the other hand, the increase in civil and political liberties does not seem, at first glance, to influence the degree of institutional confidence.

It is interesting to note the weak relationship found between institutional confidence and some political contextual factors such as the current constitutional setting. Only the corruption index (which may reflect a cultural perception rather than a political reality) and the number of general strikes after the installation of democracy are significant; although the correlation is weaker than the variables mentioned above, this variable does show a significant negative relation. In principle, this points towards the existence of a relation between the lack of confidence in the institutions of representation and the use of less conventional mechanisms of political participation and expression. However, as I will show

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below, I find no such relation in the case of external political efficacy (measured by the percentage of politically ineffective people, see Table 3.14, second column).

The relation between these same indicators and external political efficacy is essentially very similar, despite the existence of a few slight differences (the change in the correlation sign is due to the fact that I am comparing the percentage of citizens who feel politically ineffective, see Table 3.14, second column). These very minor differences involve, first, the type of democratic institutions (there is less political inefficacy under presidentialism) which coefficient seems to be statistically significant; second, the disappearance of the relation with the number of general strikes; third, the disappearance of the relationship with the increase in GDP from 1975 to 1997. Once again, however, the same variables (for democratic history, modernization, and increase in per capita income) have the strongest relationship with external political efficacy.

On the other hand the relationship between these same variables and the importance of politics in citizens’ lives, is rather different, but also very revealing. There are not such strong “r coefficients,” but the significant ones tend to confirm to some extent the relationship between the dimension of political disaffection and political mobilization. The levels of importance of politics in citizens’ lives are related to two of the democratic history variables, especially the one measuring the duration of the longest period of democracy: the effect of political mobilization during longer periods (under non-interrupted democratic rule) tend to be a good predictor of the levels of attention of citizens to political life. Furthermore, another good predictor of the different levels of this attitude among countries is the cubic transformation of income. As Deutsch argued in his classic work, social and political mobilization are a function of modernity and, regardless of the effect on democratization or democratic stability, the intensity of mobilization in Southern America has had an N-curvilinear shape corresponding with the cubic transformation of income per capita: strong during the fifties and sixties and weak or non-existent during the eighties under repressive

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military rule. We can, therefore, tentatively speculate that, at the aggregate level, modernization together with the political mobilization linked to it, have an impact on the levels of relevance of, and interest in politics among citizens of different countries. The impact of the institutional variables and economic performance variables is either weaker or non-existent.

These findings on political disaffection at the aggregate level contrast with the lack of relationship with support for democracy (see Table 3.14, last column). Only the modernization variables, increase in per capita income from the introduction of democracy to 1997, and the corruption index are of any statistical significance. These data confirm two important points. First, they point to the distinct nature of disaffection and democratic legitimacy, confirming once again the lack of relationship existing between these two dimensions of political support. Second, these data also show the lack of explanatory power of all preceding hypotheses to explain democratic support. As we will see below, support for democracy in most new democracies is the result of what I call the ‘transition effect;’ i.e., the attitudinal change resulting from the politics of the democratic transition and consolidation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust in institutions</th>
<th>% politically ineffective</th>
<th>% who declare the importance of politics in life</th>
<th>% of support for democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political history variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of democracy since 1930</td>
<td>0.80*</td>
<td>-0.64*</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes of political regime since 1930</td>
<td>-0.84*</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of the longest period under democracy since 1930</td>
<td>0.77*</td>
<td>-0.62*</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modernization variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita 1997</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>-0.81*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic power of income per capita 1997</td>
<td>0.70*</td>
<td>-0.81*</td>
<td>0.58*</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index 1997</td>
<td>0.74*</td>
<td>-0.59*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political context variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions Average number of general strikes from introduction of democracy until 1990</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties from instauration of democracy to 1995</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Index 1980-1992</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>-0.70*</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation in Human Development Index from institution of democracy to 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation in Political Liberties Index from institution of democracy to 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.46**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation in Civil Liberties Index from introduction of democracy to 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth 1975-1997</td>
<td>0.58*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in per capita income from introduction of democracy to 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N) 78*</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>-0.81*</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.56*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Significant at p<0.01.
(**) Significant at p<0.05.
(*** ) Significant at p<0.1.
Source: Compiled by the author.

**TABLE 3.14** Bivariate relationship between some dimensions of political disaffection and support for democracy with various aggregate economic, social and political indicators (only statistically significant Pearson’s r correlations).
All these conclusions about the distinct levels of political disaffection among Western and Latin American democracies are, however, rather contingent, as they are based on simple bivariate relations. In a bid to provide further confirmation for these conclusions, therefore, I developed three regression models: one in which the dependent variable is the percentage of citizens who generally feel that the authorities and the political system are not receptive to their demands; one with the percentage of importance of politics in life as the dependent variable; and another in which the dependent variable is the index of institutional trust. I have not included, however, all the variables shown in Table 3.14 due to the existence of strong multicollinearity between some of them.\(^6^4\) In general, I have only included one variable for each of the four groups of the major hypotheses discussed above (the one showing the strongest correlation in Table 3.14). In some cases, I have maintained two variables when they do not seem to create major problems for the estimation.\(^6^5\)

The models to be estimated are:

1. Institutional confidence = \(f\) (political history variables, modernization, institutions in place, performance of the system).
2. External political efficacy = \(f\) (political history variables, modernization, institutions in place, performance of the system).
3. Salience of politics = \(f\) (political history variables, modernization, institutions in place, performance of the system).\(^6^6\)

As can be seen in Table 3.15, the results of the estimation of these models provide definitive confirmation of the crucial role that the political past plays in shaping these

\(^6^4\) Some variables presented coefficients with a tolerance of less than 0.1 and a very high Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).

\(^6^5\) Different test have been carried out to ensure that these relations do not produce biased estimators or type II error in the test of significance.

\(^6^6\) To test the modernization hypothesis in models 1 and 2, I have included income 1997 and the cubic power of income 1997, since both are testing different theories, however, income 1997 was not included for model 3 since there was no correlation (see Table 3.15). Finally, in models 1 and 2 I have included a new variable that combines the average increase in civil and political liberties (the indices of political and civil liberties), since the original two variables were found to be very closely related \((r=0.8)\). This variable was not included in model 3 due to the lack of relationship detected in the correlations.
attitudes. The significant variables in order of importance in the model for confidence in the political institutions are years of democracy since 1930, number of general strikes and increase in political and civil liberties since democracy was reestablished. The latter is the only variable related to performance that displays any relation with institutional confidence, confirming the findings of Norris' recent comparative study. Nevertheless, I do not think that this is an indicator, as the author suggests, of current institutional political features, but rather an indicator of past democratic history (in fact the correlation between the latter and the increase in political liberties is 0.44). Finally, I could not find any relation with the level of corruption at the aggregate level.

These findings, as well as the crucial importance of the individual country's democratic past, are confirmed once again by model 2 estimating the relation with the degree of external political inefficacy (also in Table 3.15). While the relation with the number of general strikes disappears, the relation with the number of years of democratic rule since 1930 is once again strong. The variables related to income differences, i.e. income levels 1997, income levels 1997 to the cubic power, and income improvement since democracy was established are strong predictors, but they also contain high levels of multicolinearity. The variable measuring income levels in 1997 was not included for this reason. However, the tolerance levels (multicolinearity) produced by the other two income variables remain very high, generating very questionable statistical inference tests for the coefficients. It is clear, however, that the variables containing some income per capita information have an important predicting capacity for the level of external political efficacy, although, I think this is more strongly related to performance than to modernization. For instance, the different levels of modernization of Southern European societies do not correspond with the low levels of political efficacy observed in these countries and the differences among them (Greece with the highest levels of political efficacy). This is also the case of Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

The only significant predictor of the different levels of attentiveness to politics in model 3 is the N-curve modernization variable. Political history variables do lose their predictive capacity as soon as this variable is included in the model (data not shown). Political mobilization does occur more under democratic rule than under authoritarian

67 For an analysis demonstrating the importance of these two variables, see Norris, "Institutional Explanations for Political Support," pp. 232-234.
regimes, however, pseudo-democratic systems in Latin America during the fifties and sixties did implement populist-mobilizing strategies to legitimate their political regimes among demobilized populations, thereby changing their basic attitudes. This is why, as suggested the previous section, engagement and attentiveness to politics are higher in those countries. A similar hypothesis, that is, one which emphasizes the effect of political mobilization on political engagement, has also been put forward to account for the higher levels of interest in politics in Eastern Europe.

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68 As noted above, a perfect demonstration of this argument can be found in Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict. Social Movements and the State in Peru.*

69 For this argument and useful data on political interest, see Irene Martín, “Political Interest in Eastern and Western Europe,” unpublished manuscript, 2000.
The lack of a bivariate relationship according to the previous correlation table and problems of multicollinearity are the two reasons for deleting variables from the model.

TABLE 3.15 Regression model with aggregate data on some indicators of political disaffection (Ordinary Least Square [OLS])
3.4 Conclusions

In this chapter I have examined the different levels of both dimensions of political disaffection in a number of democracies. I have shown that political disaffection is higher in new democracies due to their political pasts, but is not a phenomenon exclusive to them. That some new democracies have lower levels of disaffection than some old democracies does not challenge the central hypothesis, because I contend that higher levels of political disaffection in any democracy depend on the presence of a historical past characterized by exclusionary and/or non-democratic institutions, practices, and discourses against representative institutions, the abusive use of these, and demobilizing strategies. I have demonstrated this hypothesis with a multivariate analysis of aggregate data on political disaffection and other political, economic and social indicators. On the other hand, the effect of the past was absent when I studied levels of support for democracy. In fact, no relationship can be observed within this attitude and the aggregate data on economic, social and political variables. This last fact demonstrates two things. First, it shows once more the distinct nature of political disaffection and support for democracy. Second, and more important, none of the major economic, sociological or cross-national political explanations seems able to explain the varying levels of support for democracy among countries. It seems we should look to internal, national politics to explain many citizens' support of the democratic regime.
CHAPTER 4

THE DISTINCT NATURE OF POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

As we have seen in the analysis of the aggregate data presented in chapter three, the best predictor of the varying levels of political disaffection found in the countries under consideration is their democratic history or, to be more precise, their record of exclusionary and/or anti-democratic institutions, practices and demobilizing political episodes. In this chapter, I will argue that the effect of this political past not only explains differences in political disaffection at the aggregate level, but also explains political disaffection at the individual level. The main aim of this chapter is to show the distinct 'nature' of disaffection at the individual level in new democracies, which are countries with long histories of democratic instability and protracted experiences of serious democratic disruption provoked by the aforementioned exclusionary institutions and practices in a context of social complexity. In short, I will show that the factors explaining political disaffection at the individual level are different in new democracies.

The basic argument about the different nature of political disaffection in new democracies is that the citizens of these countries do not have a valid point of reference from which to assess the performance and representative nature of the current political institutions or the achievements of the system. As a result, their opinions and attitudes with respect to the democratic institutions, politicians and performance of the system will be much less dependent on direct experience of the existing institutions and their functioning, and will tend to reflect accumulated non-democratic or pseudo-democratic experiences in the past.

As we saw in chapter three, high disaffection is not a problem exclusive to new democracies. Some new democracies display low disaffection due to a more distant
successful democratic past, despite recent and sometimes traumatic non-democratic experiences. At the same time, there are democracies that, although not part of the recent "third democratization wave," have high political disaffection due to their history of troubled democratic regimes. These exceptions reinforce the conclusion about the importance of the political past in shaping these attitudes.

However, the distinction between third wave and old democracies to study the origin of political disaffection makes even more sense. The problem of disaffection is different in these old and stable democracies. Citizens have experienced democratic rule and have some experience on which to base their evaluation of the functioning and performance of the current institutions, so political disaffection derives from the negative evaluation of current socially-excluding institutions, their representatives, their declining performance and the long accumulation of frustrated expectations. In this respect, the causes of political disaffection in all non third-wave democracies are the same—the result of accumulated democratic experience. The difference is that in those with high disaffection, the democratic history is full of episodes of failure, manipulation, instability, the use and abuse of exclusive institutional settings and accumulated poor performance, whereas in countries with high affection, the democratic history tends to be full of successes.

In contrast, differences in political disaffection in third wave democracies and traditional democracies—regardless of the levels observed—are not merely a question of degree, but also of the cause; i.e., political disaffection in new democracies has a distinct origin and nature, and is more closely related to the socializing experiences of previous episodes of non-democratic or pseudo-democratic rule. In this respect, despite the similar presence of a certain degree of political disaffection in new and some old democracies, it does make sense to separate them when studying their nature at the individual level.

If this hypothesis is correct, the analysis of the variables that influence disaffection in the new and traditional democracies should produce very different results in each case. Equally, we would also expect the basic characteristics of the disaffected citizens to be quite distinct.

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4.1 Comparative Analysis of the Basic Features of the Disaffected

If the nature of political disaffection varies according to the legacy of the past, disaffected citizens in different countries should have different educational, generational and informational profiles. Table 4.1 presents a brief abstract of possible relationships between a set of basic variables, classified in accordance with the different theories put forward to explain the growth or decline of the ‘civic’ attitudes. As I discussed in the introduction, three main types of hypotheses have been put forward to explain the evolution of disaffection and its varying presence in Western democracies. Political and economic performance explanations (emphasizing institutional factors, government performance, system overload and the “spirit of the times”) reject the possibility that there is any real relationship between these attitudes of disaffection and age. All citizens are exposed to government actions and institutions, so political disaffection should be randomly distributed across generations, cultural and social types, resulting in a general decrease in ‘civic’ attitudes in the long term or general oscillations in the short term responding to factors such as the institutional setting or government performance. Two other hypotheses discussed in the introduction, the so-called “theories of challenge” and the variant of “cultural change”, point to the emergence of a “new citizen” critical of current institutional arrangements, a type of citizen who would be much more common among the younger, better educated generations, resulting in an increase in political contestation through non-conventional means. If these hypotheses are correct, one would expect a positive relationship between these attitudes and age: the older the person, the greater the level of institutional confidence and political engagement.

All the preceding hypotheses concur in their vision of the relationship between disaffection and education and information. They all maintain that these attitudes of disaffection have a positive relation with education and information (both are higher among the disaffected). Citizens who are better educated and, in general, have more individual resources have the time and knowledge to scrutinize the functioning and performance of the institutions and are more exposed to efforts at political mobilization.

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1 For similar argument see Newton and Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions,” p. 61.

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Finally, the theory of modernization posits an alternative possible relationship between age and levels of disaffection. According to this hypothesis, the relationship between age and attitudes should be a strong and negative one in societies that have undergone major social and economic transformations, reflecting the patterns of modernity among younger citizens (the younger are less disaffected as a consequence of rapid modernization).

However, if my hypothesis on the legacy of the undemocratic past is correct, political disaffection in new democracies should be more dependent on the socialization variables and simple generational transmission of past non-democratic political experiences and, for the long-lasting democracies, more on the evaluation and information of the current institutional and representatives performance and the existing structure of opportunities. Furthermore, the citizens with the greatest capacity to cast off the burden of the past in new democracies should be drawn from the youngest citizens, who have been socialized during a period of transition and/or the recent democratic regime; or more generally, those citizens from any generation exposed to normal and successful democratic times who are better educated and have greater exposure to information and, thus, are more knowledgeable and aware of the participatory benefits of the new institutional setting. Therefore, if this is correct, there should be a negative relationship between institutional political disaffection in new democracies and age (very weak because of generational transmission), education and information. This profile among the disaffected should be different in long-established democracies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Institutional Disaffection</th>
<th>Political Disengagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Government</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System overload</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit of times</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of challenge</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural change</td>
<td>Weak negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>Strong negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political past</td>
<td>Weak negative in new</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-democracies, non-existent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in old democratic regimes.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Depends on past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mobilization, although it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>will be positive in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stable long-established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>democracies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.1**: Expected relationship between the two dimensions of political disaffection and age, education and information
On the other hand, if my hypothesis regarding the legacy of the past is correct, the relationship between age and the political disengagement should be rather more random, and more dependent on the presence of different mobilizing efforts in the past regardless of the success of the preceding democratic periods. Some non-democratic or pseudo-democratic regimes have made major efforts to mobilize citizens, although systematic long lasting political mobilization has been always higher under successful democratic competition. In this respect, countries with some specific periods of political mobilization during the 1940s or 1950s under non-democratic rule present, as we saw in the preceding chapter, higher levels of political engagement. In these countries we should also observe a different relationship between this attitude and age, reflecting the impact of those mobilizing efforts on the political engagement of the citizens directly exposed to them. The relationship with education, on the other hand, should also be random, dependent as it is on the sectors of society affected and targeted by these mobilizing efforts of the past, although they might tend to be higher among the more educated citizens who are more exposed to general and untargeted mobilization efforts.

Tables 4.2 to 4.5 show the correlation between indicators of institutional political disaffection with age and education. Table 4.2 shows the correlation that exists between two indicators of external political efficacy and age in twelve European countries. The results are quite enlightening. In most of Europe’s more traditional democracies, there is no significant link between perceptions of the receptiveness of institutions or representatives and age; if there is a link, it is very slight and positive (Britain, Germany and France for 1986 and Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg for 1988) – the older the citizen, the greater his/her sense of efficacy. Moreover, even when the correlation is not statistically significant, in all but a very few cases for particular years or indicators, the sign is positive. The only

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2 Eurobarometers 24 and 30 of 1986 and 1988, respectively, include five indicators of political efficacy to which those interviewed were asked to say whether or not they agreed with the statement, although only three of these are similar to the classic indicators of political efficacy discussed in Chapter Three. These indicators are: “The majority of the people in power try to take advantage of people like you” (v62); “Those who govern the country hardly worry about people like you” (v63); and “You feel you don’t count for anything in the decisions that affect you” (v64). A value of “0” was given if the respondents agreed with the statement and “1” if they disagreed. Efficacy 1 was created by adding the values of variables v62 and v63, and efficacy 2 by adding the values of v62, v63 and v64.

3 Age is variable v209 in Eurobarometer 24 and v690 in Eurobarometer 30. In 1986, these variables include four missing values and 618 under the age of 18. In 1988, they include 18 missing values and 588 under the age of 18. All these have been considered missing values.

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consistent exceptions are Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, in which the relationship is, as we expected, negative. This is also the case when we observe the relationship between age and the confidence in institutions index with the WVS data. The relationship in this case is either positive (such as Germany with 0.21, Ireland with 0.17 or Austria with 0.11), weak positive (such as Iceland with 0.8, or Great Britain and USA with 0.07) or non-existent (France, The Netherlands, Denmark or Belgium). The only countries with a significant negative relationship in Western Europe are Spain (-0.18) and Portugal (-0.09). It seems, therefore, that the relationship between disaffection and age in the more traditional democracies could reflect either the model of "economic explanations" or "political explanations" (i.e., there is no correlation)4 or, in some cases, that of "cultural change" (i.e., there is a correlation, but the sign is positive), although the lack of consistency among cases might point to explanations emphasizing internal political variables, or at least the influence of these in modifying more general trends.

Nevertheless, the important point here for my argument is not just the results for older democracies, already discussed at length by other scholars, 5 but the comparison of these results with those for new democracies. In new democracies, the relationship between age and institutional disaffection is different. As we have seen above, Portugal and Spain display a significant low, negative correlation with external political efficacy and institutional confidence. In Greece, Southern Europe's other new democracy, the relationship with external efficacy is negative, although it is not statistically significant (no data is available on institutional confidence in Greece). Nonetheless, it is significant when we use another more complex indicator of external political efficacy.6 The only non-new democracy with a similar relationship between external political efficacy and age is Italy (the correlation with

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4 For similar conclusion see, Newton and Norris, "Confidence in Public Institutions," p. 65. For identical results with respect to external political efficacy, see Joan R. Kahn and William M. Mason, "Political Alienation, Cohort Size, and the Easterlin Hypothesis," American Sociological Review, 52, 2, 1987, p.161-168. At any rate, the lack of correlation may also indicate the existence of a curvilinear relationship, reflecting the possible presence of a curvilinear life cycle effect. I have already checked for the possibility of obtaining non-significant effects.

5 See also, Dogan, "Erosion of Confidence in Advanced Societies," p. 29; Sheena Ashford and Noel Timms, What Europe Thinks. A Study of Western European Values, Brooksfield, Dartmouth, 1992; Norris, Critical Citizens; Newton and Norris, "Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?" pp. 52-73.

6 Variable v66, which says, "My opinion doesn't count for anything..." was used together with the three previous variables to create an indicator of external political efficacy. When this scale is formed from four indicators rather than three, the results are very similar with the exception of Greece (r=-0.082, significant at p<0.01).
institutional confidence in this case is positive and non-significant at only 0.04), a fifty-year-old democracy with a long history of highly problematic functioning as well as a protracted non-democratic interlude. As Morlino and Tarchi have noted, the causes of political disaffection among Italians must be sought precisely in Italy’s political past.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1986 External Political Efficacy Index 1</th>
<th>1986 External Political Efficacy Index 2</th>
<th>1988 External Political Efficacy Index 1</th>
<th>1988 External Political Efficacy Index 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Statistically significant at $p<0.01$

(**) Statistically significant at $p<0.05$

Source: For political efficacy 1 and 2, Eurobarometer 26, 1986; for other indicators, World Value Survey 1990-1 and 1995-7.

**TABLE 4.2: Relationship between external political efficacy and age in Western Democracies 1986, 1988. (Pearson's $r$ correlations)**
Admittedly, the model of institutional disaffection that emerges from these data for the new Southern European democracies could again be interpreted as confirmation of the traditional culturalist model or the traditional social-psychological explanation; that is, these results could be used to suggest that the basic attitudes of mistrust in institutions and politicians are the product of "cultural accumulation", and that people retain these attitudes regardless of political and economic changes, as argued by some of the more classical "cultural deterministic" theorists. However, our analysis of the relationship between age and institutional disaffection in Latin America proves that this is not the case.

Although the military regimes established in Chile and Uruguay were of a very different type and duration, both countries are similar in one important respect. First, as I discussed in the preceding chapter, they both had successful, long-lasting democratic regimes before their collapse. Second, they therefore have generations of citizens who experienced long periods of successful institutional functioning, despite the dramatic collapse of their democracies. Consequently, we could expect these citizens to have much more confidence in their institutions than the younger generations. In contrast, countries with convulsive political pasts marked by continual periods of authoritarianism and a long history of populist experiments (such as Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru) could be expected to show similar relationship to the one found in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, albeit with one difference: due to these earlier attempts at mobilization, these countries can be expected to show higher levels of political engagement.

However, it is not, as Converse would have it, merely a question of the length of time spent living under a stable democratic regime. For instance, Venezuela has had a stable democracy since 1958, but it has been marked by several negative features that may have left their mark on Venezuelans' political attitudes. First, it is a democratic regime based on an

---


9 These two democracies were presidential systems but socially more homogeneous diminishing the consequences of the exclusive nature of their respective institutional settings such regime breakdown. For a detail discussion of this argument see Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 212-215.


11 Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," pp. 139-142.
initial pact that was confined to the main moderate parties. This initially guaranteed the stability of the regime, but has become a drawback over time, as these parties have gradually become less politically representative. Second, Venezuela suffers from a lack of political alternatives to the two dominant parties in a presidential system. And third, there is the presence of seemingly endless corruption scandals. For all these reasons, we have already observed in the previous chapter that citizens in Venezuela have as poor an opinion of their democratic institutions as the Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese and to a lesser extent the Greeks, but with one important difference: we would expect this evaluation not to correlate with age and to have a different relationship with education.

Table 4.3 shows the correlation between age and confidence in some public institutions (trade unions, public administration, federal congress, political parties and business associations) and between age and respondents' perception of the responsiveness of political representatives. The data in this table show that, in general, in democracies with a convulsive political past older citizens have less confidence in the basic democratic institutions and their representatives than their younger compatriots. The results for Chile and Uruguay are the opposite, with the older generations showing higher levels of institutional trust and external political efficacy (in the case of the latter attitude, there is no relationship with age in the case of Chile). On the other hand, the correlation is negative and

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12 The definitive pact in Venezuela was made principally between the Committee for the Political Organization of Independent Elections (Comité para la Organización Política de Elecciones Independientes—COPEI), a Christian-democratic party, and the moderate factions of both Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD) and the Republican Democratic Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—URD). The pact left out both the more radical factions of the left, on the one hand, and the more radical conservative members of the army, on the other. Only after the revolts of 1960 were some of these excluded factions incorporated into the system. See, John A. Peeler, "Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 96-98.


14 Ibid, pp.33-34.

15 Variable S2 of the 1995 Latinobarometer questionnaire.

16 Variables p27c, p27g, p27i, p27j y p27k of the 1995 Latinobarometer. These variables were initially coded from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating much confidence, and 4 none. However, the order was altered so that the maximum value was 4, indicating much confidence, and 1 none.

17 Variable p26 of the 1995 Latinobarometer.
often significant in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, rather lower in Paraguay, and almost non-existent in Venezuela. These findings are also confirmed when we see that Chile and Uruguay display significant positive correlations between the institutional confidence index and age (data not shown). Uruguay has the strongest correlation of all the democracies under study (0.23) and Chile (0.11) the fourth largest after Germany, Ireland and Austria. The older generations that experienced a period of democratic success before the 1970s display higher confidence in institutions, whereas the youngest ones show the attitudinal consequence of the periods of non-democratic rule during the latter half of the 1970s and 1980s. This pattern is not found in other Latin American countries because of the absence of previous successful democratic periods and is only present in a few Western democracies since all generations have been exposed equally to established democratic rule. There are hardly any exceptions to this general pattern, confirming that institutional trust and trust in political representatives are related to the political past of these societies.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) For a similar conclusion, see, Turner and Martz, “Institutional Confidence and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America,” pp. 75-76.
### Countries External Political Efficacy\(a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>External Political Efficacy(a)</th>
<th>Trade Unions</th>
<th>Public Administration</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Business Associations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-0.06**</td>
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<td>.007</td>
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<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>0.09**</td>
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<td>.12*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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</table>

\(*)\) Statistically significant at \(p<0.01\).
\(***)\) Statistically significant at \(p<0.05\).
\(****\) Statistically significant at \(p<0.10\).

(a) The wording is the following “deputies and senators do care about people like me”, question p26.


**TABLE 4.3: Age and institutional disaffection in various Latin American countries, 1995 (Pearson’s \(r\) correlations).**
The distinct character of institutional disaffection in the new democracies can be seen even more clearly from the relationship between such disaffection and education. Most classic studies of political culture and attitudes have noted the positive relationship that exists between higher educational levels and 'civic' attitudes. But this relationship has changed in the older democracies. More recent studies have shown that the best educated citizens in fact have the confidence in the democratic institutions. Although this tendency does not follow exactly the same pattern in all Western democracies, in general this lack of institutional confidence among more highly educated citizens has even been interpreted as a "rational act of skepticism" towards these institutions; that is, lower levels of institutional trust are more common among more educated and politically informed citizens who demand better and more democratic functioning and performance from their representative institutions.

Is institutional disaffection also an act of rational skepticism on the part of citizens of new democracies? The relationship with education confirms that it is not. Table 4.4 shows the correlation between education and various indicators of external political efficacy in several European and Latin American countries. The data in this table demonstrate the distinct character of institutional political disaffection in new and old democracies. In traditional democracies, education has a relatively high negative correlation with external political efficacy; in other words, the more educated a citizen is, the more politically ineffective s/he tends to feel. On the other hand, in Greece, Spain and Portugal the correlation is close to zero. These data are very revealing, even more so if we consider the relationship between education and external political efficacy measured through a more traditional indicator. The last column in this table contains the correlation between the classic indicator "those in power do not care about people like me" and education for various new

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20 As shown by a more detailed study of this topic, the impact of education on confidence in the democratic institutions is positive in Spain, Italy, France and Germany (the higher the educational level, the greater the trust), whereas trust decreases among more educated citizens in seven other countries (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Holland, Norway and Sweden). Moreover, these same seven countries are those which evaluate most negatively institutions of order and status, such as the Church, the Police, the Armed Forces and corporations. In contrast, more positive evaluations of these institutions are found in Spain and Italy. See, Döring, "Higher Education and Confidence in Institutions: A Secondary Analysis of the 'European Values Survey,'" p.129 and p. 137.


22 Variables p37 and v44 of the Latinobarometer and the Four Nations Study (*Estudio Cuatro Naciones*), respectively.
democracies. It is high and positive in all these countries; in other words, the higher the level of education, the greater the citizens’ perception of the responsiveness of the institutions and their representatives. Again, the only exception is Venezuela, where this correlation does not exist. The extent to which citizens in most new democracies feel that the system is responsive does not, therefore, seem to be the result of “informed action”; rather, it is apparently caused by an “uninformed sentiment”, albeit created by these societies’ political history. This is confirmed in Table 4.5, which shows the relationship between level of political information and external political efficacy: the more informed citizens are, the more responsive they perceive their system and representatives to be. Venezuela also has a positive relationship between information and efficacy, but again stands out for having the weakest relationship.

Furthermore, confidence in institutions is negatively related with education in new democracies. The institutional confidence index created from the WVS data confirms the existence of a negative relationship with education in all new democracies but especially in Spain (-0.12) and Portugal (-0.10). In the other new democracies the relationship is negative, although statistically insignificant (data not shown). In the remaining Western democracies, including Venezuela, it is positive (although in many cases insignificant), with the exception of Italy, Ireland and USA where it is negative but not significant.

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23 Variable s20 and v162 of the same surveys.
24 Measured by an index of citizens’ exposure to mass media political information.
25 Measured by respondent’s age when s/he left school (Variable v218).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>External Political Inefficacy Index 1(a)</th>
<th>External Political Inefficacy Index 2(a)</th>
<th>External political inefficacy(b)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---</td>
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(* ) Significant at p<0.01.  
(**) Significant at p<0.05.  
(*** ) Significant at p<0.1.  
(a) This index of political efficacy goes from more efficacious to less efficacious.  
(b) In here the order of the variables go from more efficacious to less efficacious. For Southern Europe this is the classic "those in power do not care..." indicator; and for Latin American countries the indicator is "deputies and senator do not care about people like me."  

TABLE 4.4 External political inefficacy and education in Western Europe and Latin America (Pearson's r correlations)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>External Political efficacy</th>
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</thead>
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(*) Statistically significant at p<0.01.


**TABLE 4.5 External political efficacy and political information in Southern Europe and Latin America (Pearson’s r correlations)**
Do politically involved citizens display a different educational and generational profile in new democracies? Table 4.6 shows the correlations between some indicators of this dimension of political disaffection (interest in politics, saliency of politics and how capable citizens feel of understanding politics) and age. These data are conclusive. The countries with the longest and most consistent periods of political demobilization are also those that display a consistent negative relationship between all of these indicators and age (Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser degree Chile and Uruguay). Only the younger generations have been able to break this attitudinal pattern with the arrival of democracy. In long established democracies, there is either a positive relation or a non-existent one, with the sole exception of Italy for some attitudes. With the exception, in this case of Peru for some attitudes, countries with previous experiences of both non-democratic rule and mobilization display either a positive or a non-existent (statistically insignificant) correlation. This pattern is quite clear from the first and second column, referring to internal efficacy and interest in politics. As we can see, the relationship between age and the importance conceded to politics in life is positive in all traditional democracies, although in some of them it is not statistically significant. The exceptions to this positive relation with age are Belgium, Italy, and Venezuela, which have obvious problems concerning the rapid erosion of civic attitudes. On the other hand, in new democracies (excluding Greece due to the lack of data) the older generations are slightly less detached from politics than the younger ones. Finally, at first sight there seems to be no pattern in the relationship between these same attitudes and education (data not shown), showing that past political mobilization does have different effects on different sector of society depending on the group targeted for mobilization.

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26 These results for the United States confirm the conclusions reached by Jennings and Niemi who argue that the decrease in disaffection is most pronounced among the younger generations; see M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi. Generations and Politics. A Panel Study of Young Adults and their Parents. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 173-174. See also, Roberta S. Sigel and Marilyn Hoskin, The Political Involvement of Adolescents, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1981.

27 Inglehart, Culture Shift, p. 27.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Internal Political Efficacy by age***</th>
<th>Interest in politics by age</th>
<th>Importance of politics in life and age</th>
<th>Importance of religion in life and age</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Statistically significant at p<0.01.
(**) Statistically significant at p<0.05.
(*** For Greece, Portugal and Spain and Latin America the item used was the traditional "politics is too complicated for people like me"; while for Western Europe I have used the item included in ISSP96, "I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues."

TABLE 4.6 Internal political efficacy by age and education in Western Europe and Latin America (Pearson's r correlations)
The results become even more significant if we compare them to the relationship between age and the importance respondents concede to religion in their lives. As shown in the last column of Table 4.6, the correlation between the two is high, positive and significant in all the Western democracies (although less so in the United States), with the exception of Venezuela and Brazil which are still the two most religious countries in the Southern American cone. In contrast to the situation with respect to disaffection in the other European countries and the United States, these data show that the secularization of society follows a single common and consistent pattern related to the overall process of modernization.

4.2 Individual Underpinnings of Political Disaffection

I will now present further evidence for the distinct character of disaffection in the new and old democracies. This is drawn from a comparative multivariate analysis of survey data. The third wave (1995-97) of the WVS included a series of particularly interesting variables for this discussion. Using only the last wave of this comparative cross-national survey has two advantages: I can use more variables included in the questionnaire to test different hypotheses and I can include the confidence in political parties in the institutional confidence index (only included in the WVS third wave). On the other hand, it has one disadvantage: unfortunately the survey did not cover all the countries under analysis here. I will, therefore, present the results obtained from survey data for 12 countries, comprising six first- and second-wave democracies and six of the so-called new democracies (16,367 cases).28

In order to verify the distinct character of disaffection I have developed a general model for three different attitudes: the institutional confidence index, importance of politics in life (political salience) and interest in politics. The independent variables chosen from the survey are the following:

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28 The countries included in the analysis are: Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden and Venezuela. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain and Uruguay are included as representative cases of new democracies.
A. Political and performance variables:
   1. Ideological scale,\textsuperscript{29} according to some recent work this is an essential variable in observing the effect of politics on individuals' institutional confidence.\textsuperscript{30}
   2. Satisfaction with the way people now in national office are running the country.\textsuperscript{31}
   3. Perception of the level of corruption existing in the system.\textsuperscript{32}
   4. Evaluation of the extent of poverty in the country compared with the situation ten years earlier.\textsuperscript{33}
   5. Household's financial situation, used to test the effect of individual prosperity on political disaffection.\textsuperscript{34}

B. Cultural variables:
   1. Postmaterialist index,\textsuperscript{35} since some recent literature has identified a relationship between this variable and internal political efficacy.\textsuperscript{36}
   2. Social Trust,\textsuperscript{37} in order to test whether there is a relationship between the type of people who express trust in others and confidence in strong and effective institutions.

C. Attitudinal transmission variables:
   6. Gender.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{29} Question V123 of the VWS questionnaire.
\textsuperscript{30} Newton and Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions,” p.65.
\textsuperscript{31} Question V165 of the VWS questionnaire: “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?”
\textsuperscript{32} Question V213 of the VWS questionnaire: “How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?” “1” almost no public officials are engaged in it; “2” a few public officials are engaged in it; “3” most public officials are engaged in it; “4” almost all public officials are engaged in it.
\textsuperscript{33} Question V171 of the VWS questionnaire: “Would you say that today a larger share about the same share, or a smaller share of the people in this country are living in poverty than were ten years ago?”
\textsuperscript{34} Question V64 of the VWS questionnaire: “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If “1” means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and “10” means you are completely satisfied.”
\textsuperscript{35} Variable V100mpm of the VWS questionnaire containing the materialist-postmaterialist scale.
\textsuperscript{36} Oscar W. Gabriel, “Political Efficacy and Trust,” in Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarborough, \textit{The Impact of Values}, pp. 357-389.
\textsuperscript{37} Variable V27 of the VWS questionnaire: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? “1”, Most people can be trusted; “2”, Can’t be too careful.”
\textsuperscript{38} Question V214 of the VWS questionnaire.
7. Age.

8. Education.

D. I have also added a dummy variable in order to see whether the effect of being an established (0) or new (1) democracy has any effect on the levels of political disaffection.

Accordingly, the general individual level model for political disaffection I propose to test is the following:

Model 1: \( y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A + \beta_2 B + \beta_3 C + \beta_4 D + e \)

To test my hypothesis about the specific nature of political disaffection in new democracies I will add two additional sets of variables in two steps:

E. Aggregate political variables:

9. Number of years of democracy since 1900.
10. Average number of general strikes since the introduction of democracy.

F. Interactions of some of the A, B and C variables with the D dummy old/new democracy variable to test if the individual level variables do have a different impact in new democracies:

Therefore, the models 2 and 3 to be tested are as follows:

Model 2: \( y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A + \beta_2 B + \beta_3 C + \beta_4 D + \beta_5 E + e \)

Model 3: \( y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A + \beta_2 B + \beta_3 C + \beta_4 D + \beta_5 E + \beta_6 F + e \)

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39 Question V216 of the VWS questionnaire
40 Question V217 of the VWS questionnaire.
If my hypothesis about the distinct character political disaffection in new democracies is correct we should expect the following:

1. Coefficients of the interaction variables "E" should be other than zero ($\beta_6 \neq 0$), that is, statistically significant and negative for the satisfaction with the performing variables (since this should be less important in new democracies), positive with the social trust variables (since this variable partly represents the personal socializing experiences in new democracies), and, as I discussed in the preceding section, negative with age and education.

2. Coefficients of aggregate political variables "F" should be other than zero ($\beta_7 \neq 0$), that is, statistically significant. The strength and direction could change depending on the dependent variable: positive for the years of democracy since 1990 and institutional confidence, and positive and stronger for the relationship between the average number of general strikes and interest in politics and relevance of politics in life.

Table 4.7 shows the results of the estimation of three models for each of these three dependent variables. I have only shown the statistically significant beta coefficients with p values of over 0.05, highlighting the largest beta coefficients in bold.\[41\] The parameters estimated in these models confirm the hypothesis regarding the specific nature of political disaffection in new democracies. In model 3 for institutional confidence, the interaction model for satisfaction with authorities is important, significant and negative ($\beta = -0.22$), showing that in new democracies confidence in institutions depends much less on the performance of the system, and more on social trust (significant and positive) and the perception of corruption. On the other hand, there is no consistent relationship in all democracies between education and institutional confidence, which also shows a reduced positive coefficient with age. In contrast, the effect of age and education is more negative and

\[41\] The variable was created with individual score loadings resulting from the following factor analysis: Legal system, 0.58; administration, 0.70, and national parliament, 0.77. Unlike Norris, I did not include confidence in political parties in order to maintain consistency with the index analyzed in previous sections.
significant in new democracies, showing that in these democracies institutional disaffection is greater among the youngest and less educated citizens.

The interaction variables for political interest and relevance of politics are not significant except for age (higher among the younger) and education (higher among the better educated). Even though in some non-democratic countries political mobilization has often been focused on marginal sectors of society, it has a clearer effect on the more educated and younger citizens than on those who were directly exposed to the attempts at mobilization or to greater political information during these periods in the past (Argentina, Peru, Brazil and so on). In contrast, long-lasting political mobilization resulting from enfranchisement and political organization of all sectors of society has a more widespread effect on overall cultural levels with a slightly greater impact among older citizens. The particular relationship between age and education and these two attitudes in new democracies confirms the impact of past political history. However, much of the variance in these attitudes remains to be explained, as shown by the poor goodness of fit. Besides, the beta value of the old/new dummy variable in the models is very important, revealing that there are some additional factors to be included in the analysis in order to explain the lower level of political engagement in these countries.

Additionally, the results reveal a number of very interesting findings, but perhaps most importantly:
A. With regard to institutional political disaffection:
   1. The dummy variable for new/old democracies has a small but positive impact on institutional confidence, showing, as we saw in Chapter 3, that some new democracies have greater levels of political affection (Chile and Uruguay) than their older counterparts (such as Venezuela, Italy or even France). The classification of countries according to the levels of political disaffection does not correspond with recent non-democratic and democratization experiences. However, when I have added to the model (model 2) the aggregate variable measuring the number of years of democracy since 1930, the latter also emerges as a powerful predictor at the individual level. Institutional political disaffection is a problem related to the political history of these countries that goes beyond the third-wave phenomenon.
2. The degree of satisfaction with the incumbent authorities is a powerful predictor of institutional confidence in the traditional democracies, confirming the importance of system performance in predicting this attitude, although, as we saw, this is much less significant in new democracies. The perception of corruption is the other performance variable with the greatest effect. This result confirms the findings of recent studies which have argued that unfulfilled expectations are important determinants of confidence in institutions, such expectations including the idea that the government should “follow procedures that are unbiased,” and “produce outcomes that neither advantage nor disadvantage particular groups unfairly. Additionally, citizens expect political leaders to operate in an honest (...) manner.” However, these expectations could be higher in different countries due to lack of previous democratic experiences to compare with, explaining why the perception of corruption is much greater in the newer democracies than in the more-established ones: while 55 per cent of citizens in new democracies state that all or nearly all the authorities are involved in corruption, this figure drops to 44 per cent in the more traditional democracies (and to just 38 per cent when Venezuela is excluded). This also explains why this variable shows higher predictive capacity among new democracies.

3. However, institutional political disaffection is not a pure reflection of democratic system performance. Surprisingly, neither respondents’ evaluations of the changing levels of poverty nor their personal economic situation have an impact. Institutional confidence depends to some extent on other cultural variables that reflect personal socializing experiences. In fact, and contrary to some recent findings, social trust has a greater impact on the institutional confidence than some performing variables. This is especially true for new democracies (see interactions in model 3). The cultural change of postmaterialism does not have an impact.

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4. Contrary to recent findings, ideology does not have any effect on institutional confidence.44

B. Political interest and salience of politics:

1. The results of the estimation of both models are mirror images, showing that both belong to the same dimension of political disaffection (political disengagement) as we saw in Chapter 2, and respond to the same processes and factors in their origin and evolution.

2. The dummy new-old democracy variable is much stronger and consistent with this type of disaffection (lower among new democracies), but the political aggregate variables are also good predictors, especially the average number of general strikes from the introduction of democracy to 1990. Even the mobilization produced since the (re)establishment of democracy has a significant effect on the level of political engagement.

3. The cultural-socializing variables are the strongest attitudinal predictors, confirming the importance of these dimensions on political engagement,45 whereas the performing variables have a very residual effect.

4. Ideology has very little effect on political interest and none on salience of politics in life.

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44 Newton and Norris, "Confidence in Public Institutions," p. 65.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables*</th>
<th>Institutional Confidence</th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>Salience of Politics</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (V213)</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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<td>Satisfaction with authorities (V165)</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>Poverty compared to ten years earlier (V171)</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
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<td>Social Trust (V27)</td>
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<td>10,043</td>
<td>10,043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Numbers in brackets refer to questions in the World Values Survey.
Note: I have only shown the statistically significant beta coefficients with a p value < 0.05.

TABLE 4.7 Estimation of models explaining institutional trust and political engagement at the individual level in new and established democracies (Ordinary Least Square [OLS])

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4.3 Conclusion

It would seem, therefore, that in all democracies the individual country’s particular
democratic or anti-democratic political past plays a role in determining the degree of
confidence citizens have in their political institutions. For this very reason, the citizens of
older democracies evaluate their institutions according to the results of the system and the
mechanisms they offer for participation and inclusion. As a result, disaffection is greater
among the better educated and more informed citizens, as these are the citizens who have the
greatest information available to evaluate the results of the system and to seek alternative
mechanisms of political contestation. In this respect, these findings have already been
suggested in previous comparative analyses.46 However, things are different in new
democracies. The past plays a very different role in new democracies when it comes to
shaping citizen’s attitudes towards their institutions. In these regimes, the past constitutes a
cultural legacy that negatively influences citizens’ perceptions and evaluations of democratic
institutions, regardless of their performance or achievements. The better educated and
informed citizens are more likely to escape this syndrome of political disaffection, as they are
the citizens who are most aware of the normal functioning and results achieved by the
institutions of political representation: Greater liberty, greater political and social inclusion
and, in many countries, albeit with notable exceptions, greater economic and social progress.
Disaffection and its cultural legacy in new democracy are concentrated, therefore, among
those citizens whose evaluations are shaped by mechanisms of primary socialization and a
lack of information. The same conclusion could be reached with respect to political
disengagement. Both conclusions will be address in more detail in the country analyses of
chapter six.

All this proves that the causes of political disaffection are different in new democracies.
This difference must be sought in the political past of these societies, for it is their respective
political pasts, and the impact of these on political attitudes, which distinguish disaffection in
new democracies. There is nothing cultural in new democracies that ‘sentences citizens in
these countries to be politically disaffected.’ Indeed, some of the countries analyzed fit
neither of the two basic groups of democracies: old and new. There are cases that have a


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similar problem of disaffection to that observed in new democracies, despite having had stable democracies for several decades (Italy and Venezuela). And there are new democracies with much lower symptoms of political disaffection (Chile, despite the fact that there is no majoritarian support for the recently re-established democratic regime, Uruguay and, to a lesser extent Greece). The key to this can be found in the political past (including the democratic transition). Nevertheless, this does not mean that these societies are condemned to repeat their pasts. There is nothing to stop them from improving their institutions of political representation so that citizens can slowly and gradually replace their feelings of political disaffection with more ‘civic’ attitudes.
CHAPTER 5

GENERATIONS AND THE DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT IN SPAIN

In this chapter I analyze some of the key factors for understanding the origin of political disaffection in new democracies. My main argument is based on the Spanish case, but this will enable me to establish certain basic patterns in order to analyze the problem of disaffection in new democracies from a comparative perspective. In previous chapters we have demonstrated that, despite the fact that political disaffection is high in many democracies, its origins and causes are different in democracies with a problematic democratic past, but how can we track the effect of the non-democratic past on political disaffection?

In this chapter I analyze a long longitudinal series of data collected in Spain in the last twenty-two years. This chapter begins with a detailed analysis of the evolution overtime of some basic indicators of support for democracy, political disaffection and political discontent. I compare this evolution with a set of political and economic events and other aggregate data. The analysis of how political attitudes have evolved in the Spanish context since the late 1970s and early 1980s will help accomplish two goals. Firstly, it will show the existing relationship between these attitudes and the political and economic events since democracy was reestablished in 1977, proving that political disaffection have remained generally stable and largely unaffected by the uninterrupted, generally efficient functioning of the institutions, and by the positive and/or negative fluctuations of successive democratically elected governments.1 Secondly, it will illustrate once more the distinct nature of political disaffection, political discontent and support for democracy.

In the second part, I continue with an analysis of these same indicators through Spain’s different political generations. The analysis of the Spanish case reveals that disaffection in new democracies might not conform to any of the main theories on this topic for long established democracies. The phenomenon of disaffection in Spain’s democracy cannot be explained by culturalist theories, theories of modernization or any other kind of standard explanation. Neither can the main generalist theories outlined for the phenomenon on old democracies satisfactorily justify the increasing political cynicism and institutional confidence observed in the new ones. Moreover, it seems that specific political aspects such as the achievements and successes of the new democratic regime cannot explain this phenomenon either. In fact, here I show that political disaffection in Spain is the product of the attitudinal and cultural legacy resulting from the political past: the younger the generation, the greater the presence of civic attitudes.

However, not all the attitudes present the same pattern. The two dimensions of political disaffection do present two distinct ones. The institutional dimension presents a pattern of intergenerational continuity, whereas political disengagement does show a generational rupture. Same political periods did have different effects on these dimensions of political disaffection. On the other hand, support for democracy does depend on the past, but it is mostly resulting from an attitudinal transformation that occurred during the transition and consolidation of democracy (the transition effect).

5.1 Twenty five Years of Democratic Support, Political Disaffection and Discontent in Spain

The Spanish economy has varied considerably during this period, showing very distinctive phases. In striking contrast with the high rates of economic growth and growing individual prosperity during the last decade and a half of Franco’s authoritarian regime, the transition to and consolidation of democracy took place amidst successive economic crises provoked by the ‘oil crises’ of the 1970s. As was the case in the rest of the industrialized world, Spain’s recession peaked in 1981-1982, when unemployment reached 20% of the labor force.\(^2\) After a period of economic transition, the Spanish economy, in contrast,

expanded rapidly during the mid- to late 1980s. While the base level of unemployment remained the highest in Western Europe, overall levels of affluence rose considerably. A third period came with the sudden, acute recession that began in the early 1990s, when unemployment rose to over 23%. The climate of economic crisis was most acute in 1993, but it started to improve substantially giving way to the present new period of prosperity and growth. Figure 5.1, which represents graphically the annual evolution of the economic conditions measured by GNP growth and unemployment and inflation rates, shows this changing evolution clearly.3

The political situation also fluctuated considerably during this period. The Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) government headed by Adolfo Suárez was given much of the credit for the remarkable success of the transition to democracy. This enabled the prime minister to capitalize on the wave of satisfaction after the ratification of the new constitution in December 1978 by calling early elections in March 1979. Yet shortly afterwards, popular support for the UCD government collapsed; the weak and divided minority UCD governments were considered to be incapable of resolving the challenges posed by the economic crisis, increasing terrorist violence, and an inconsistent regional policy.4 It was widely feared at the time that the inefficacy of the UCD government was seriously undermining the original legitimacy accorded to the democratic system. This diagnosis was summed up in the term desencanto (disenchantment), which referred to the disillusionment that came in the wake of the high expectations generated earlier in the transition from authoritarianism. It was generally thought that this desencanto was threatening the consolidation of the new regime. These fears were dispelled, however, after the 1982 general elections, which brought the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) to power with a majoritarian mandate and facilitated the economic recovery. By the late 1980s, Spain had the second highest rate of economic growth in Europe, inflation had fallen significantly, and the highly stable socialist government had achieved notable successes in both foreign and

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3 A more detailed analysis of these macro-economic magnitudes by quarterly rates of change has in fact revealed the presence of five phases. For a detailed explanation of these five phases, see José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, “Political Reactions to the Economy: The Spanish Experience,” Working paper 127, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales Juan March, 1998, pp. 8-15.

domestic affairs. Political problems started up again in the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s. Political opposition to the government increased, trade unions called for general strikes, a succession of political scandals involving party funding began, cases of corruption involving some senior figures in the Socialist administration increased, and crimes committed in the fight against ETA terrorism were revealed. All this coincided with a rapid and severe economic crisis. Economic recovery in the mid-1990s and the electoral victory of the conservative Partido Popular in 1996 marked the departure of the preceding political situation. Since this year until 2000 the political situation was stable with a significant lack of important political scandals in comparison with the preceding legislature and a stable cabinet formed by the PP with the support of the Catalonian nationalist party coalition (Convergencia i Unió, CiU) and the Canarian regionalist party coalition (Coalición Canaria, CC) in the parliament. The economic growth during this same period was outstanding (way above the EU average) with unseen levels of unemployment reduction. In 2000, the Popular Party obtained the absolute majority in the Spanish parliament for first time since democracy was reestablished.

Spaniards' evaluation of the political and economic situation responds to these events and phases. As can be seen in figure 5.2, the level of satisfaction with the economic situation co-varies with the assessment of political conditions, and both closely parallel the changing circumstances outlined above. As would be expected, dissatisfaction with the economic situation was most acute precisely at the peak of the two recessions, and improved at the end of the recession with the return to prosperity reaching very high levels at the end of the 90s. The political situation followed exactly the same pattern. This could be the result of improvements in the economic situation, or of pure coincidence in time with the improvement of the political situation. What is important here is the correspondence between the different phases and periods of the political and economic situation and their evaluation by the public. In fact, a recent time series analysis of the relation between the state of the

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6 The questions were the following: “Generally speaking, would you consider that the current political (economic) situation is very good, quiet good, nor good or bad, quiet bad or very bad?” Positive evaluations in the figure include “very good” and “quiet good.”
economy and aggregate assessments by the public has shown that people are able to accurately assess the state of the economy.\(^7\)

How has support for democracy, political disaffection and political discontent evolved during this same time-span? Do these attitudes evolve in the same way as these political and economics events and citizen’s evaluation of the political and economic situation? The answer provided by scholars working in Spanish politics is not clear-cut. Some scholars believe that attitudes of disaffection in Spain reflect a progressive process of *desencanto* (disenchantment) or “disaffection,”\(^8\) as a result of the way the system functions and the influence of various political events.\(^9\) This conclusion supports those theorists who defend that disaffection is fundamentally the product of citizens’ recent negative experiences with government performance or economic results.\(^10\) On the other hand, other scholars believe that a quite different phenomenon is occurring in Spain; that is, attitudes of disaffection have tended to decrease, reflecting a process of learning and identification with the democratic system.\(^11\) This second opinion implies that, as other scholars have remarked, Spain is currently undergoing a process of habituation and socialization of certain pro-democratic attitudes that is generated simply by institutional functioning.\(^12\)

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Figure 5.1: Economic conditions in Spain, 1978-2000 (annual data)
Figure 5.2: Evaluations of the political and economic situation in Spain, 1976-2000.

I do contend something different here. Contrary to the aforementioned studies, it seems clear that political discontent, that is, dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, is the only attitude that presents serious oscillations responding to the different political and economic crisis of the system, whereas support for democracy and political disaffection seem more stable and do appear to not being influence by the economic and political situation and citizen’s evaluation fluctuations overtime. Figure 5.3 shows that the indicator of political discontent evolves and fluctuates in line with assessments of the economic and political situation.11 This evolution confirms my conclusion in chapter 2 about how this attitude mostly taps satisfaction with the economic and political situation and the incumbent authorities and how these are finally related to party support (political discontent). Spaniards apparently do not find it easy to distinguish between their evaluations of the incumbent government, economic conditions, the efficacy of democracy as a problem-solver and their satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning.

However, Spanish citizens appear to have no difficulty in differentiating these views from their support for democracy. Except for a very minor increase at the very beginning of the 1980s, which I will discuss later, support for democracy has remained stable and practically unchanged despite fluctuating opinions of the economic and political situation, and despite variations in the economic and political situation and citizens’ evaluations of them. Between 1980 and 2000, 76-88 percent of Spaniards regard democracy as the most desirable political regime. Furthermore, as other scholars have shown, this support for the democratic regime is hardly at all conditioned by partisan and ideological options. For instance, only a small percentage of conservatives declare their preference for authoritarian options.14 Alternative legitimacy in favor of authoritarianism and loyalty to Franco has never constituted a threat to democracy in Spain, even during the acute political crises and

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11 The data in figure 5.1 are collected using the satisfaction functioning questions included in the CIS and Eurobarometer surveys (“In general, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied at all with the way democracy is working in Spain?,” but between 1978 and 1983 it was used the question “democracy permits the solutions of Spaniards’ problems.”

14 Maravall, La Política de la Transición, p. 121; Montero and Torcal, “La Cultura Política de los Españoles,” p. 53.
corruption scandals of 1994 and 1995.\textsuperscript{15}

Stability above all is also what characterizes attitudes of disaffection among Spaniards. Not only does this mean rejecting both the aforementioned theories for the Spanish case, but it also shows that, unlike the oscillations of political discontent, political disaffection appears to follow a much more stable pattern independent of political and economic events. Again, this confirms the very different nature of these two dimensions of political culture. Figure 5.3 illustrates the stability of one of the attitudes of political disaffection (trust in politicians) in a context of political and economic change, and citizens’ evaluations of these changing circumstances. In general, it is difficult to observe the evolution of political disaffection in Spain, as few indicators are repeated systematically over the years. However, the data do display a pattern of remarkable stability overtime. Between 60 and 72 percent of Spaniards agree with the majority of indicators used to measure internal and external political efficacy in all the years analyzed; in other words, the majority of respondents feel consistently ineffective.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, this sentiment was already evident in 1978, when most Spaniards still felt hopeful at the start of the new democracy: 71 percent of Spaniards already agreed at the early time with the statement “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think,” 68 percent with “voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about what the government does,” and 60 percent with “politics is so complicated that people like me can’t understand what’s going on.”\textsuperscript{17} These data confirm that both dimensions of political efficacy (internal and external) were already present at the start of democracy in Spain, and have not changed dramatically over the last twenty years. Political efficacy is therefore a stable attitude with a strong cultural component that resists the passage of time and important events.

The same can be said about other indicators of political disaffection such as interest in politics, another indicator of political engagement. Interest in politics has been consistently

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Montero and Morlino, “Legitimacy and Democracy,” pp. 236-237.
\item \textsuperscript{16} These figures are slightly lower in some years for two reasons. In 1982 and 1993, respondents could opt for an intermediate category (“it depends”) - chosen by 5-10 percent - which reduces the distribution of responses in agreement with the statements of inefficacy. In 1980 and 1989, a high proportion of respondents did not answer. Nevertheless, the proportion of those who feel ineffective is relatively similar throughout the period. For all these data and details overtime see Mariano Torcal, \textit{Actitudes Politicas y Participación Política en España: Pautas de Cambio y Continuidad}, Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1995.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Study 1,157, CIS Data Bank.
\end{itemize}
low among Spaniards. Before Franco’s death and at the very beginning of the transition (1971-76) a big majority of Spanish citizens declared that they have little or none interest in politics (between 74 to 81 percent). This attitude improved a little during 1977 and 1978, the years of the first foundational election (1977) and the approval of the Constitution (1978), with a 59 and 60 percent declaring having little or none interest respectively, but it went back at the low levels it had before after this short-period (71 percent) and remaining stable since then.18 In the year 2000, the same 71 percent of Spaniards declared that they have very little or none interest in politics.19 The transition process mitigated Spaniards’ scant interest in politics before the advent of democracy, but the 1978 levels are similar to the ones before the transition and have hardly changed over two decades of democracy.

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19 Study 2,387, CIS Data Bank.
Figure 5.3 Political discontent, political disaffection and support for democracy in Spain, 1978-2000

Source: ‘Satisfaction with functioning’, Temporal series of the Eurobarometer 1974-1994, Eurobarometers 43, 48 y 49, CIS (study 2218 and 2107), and DATA (the formulation was somewhat different ‘Democracy enables problem solution’); legitimacy CIS, and external efficacy (I don’t think that public officials care much what people like me think), CIS and CIRES.
On the other hand, institutional trust has also remained low since the advent of democracy in Spain. Most citizens recognize the importance of these institutions for the functioning of democracy, but then proceed to evaluate them negatively and, significantly, more negatively than other institutions that are not specifically related to the democratic regime. For instance, around 80 percent of citizens think Parliament is very or quite important for the functioning of democracy. Political parties and trade unions are considered less important, but still receive majoritarian support. Moreover, according to a 1986 survey, 31 percent consider that Parliament is the most important institution in a democracy, yet only 2 percent think that it is the most powerful of all the institutions listed. Respondents considered the Government the second most important institution (30 percent), followed at some distance by the Comunidades Autónomas (Spain's regional governments), the political parties and the Armed Forces, with 9.7 and 7 percent respectively. However, although citizens recognize the importance of Parliament, only around a third claim to be very or quite interested in its activities. Respondents are most interested in the activities of Government and the Local Councils (although decreasing rapidly), and less interested in political parties and trade unions. Around a third of all citizens surveyed between 1984 and 1989 believed that Parliament pays too much attention to unimportant problems. In 1987, only 27 and 28 percent respectively thought that Congress and the Senate functioned well or very well. Finally, 33 and 32 percent believed that those elected to Congress and the Senate represented solely the interests of their electors. All these opinions reflect a limited appreciation of the democratic institutions of representation in general and Parliament in particular.

Confidence in representative institutions is low and has remained this way with the passage of time in Spain. Data on institutional confidence between 1991 and 2000 reveal that all the major representative institutions either failed to reach the benchmark of 5 or only

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20 Study 1,695, CIS Data Bank.
21 Study 1,430, CIS Data Bank.
22 Study 1,461, CIS Data Bank.
23 See studies 1,430, 1,740 and 1,788, CIS Data Bank.
25 Banco de Datos del CIS, estudio 1.715.

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slightly surpassed it.\textsuperscript{26} Between 1991 and 1995, those scoring systematically under 5 included the political parties (the most negatively evaluated every year), business organizations, the Senate, National Congress (except in 1993), and the trade unions (except in 1991). I should also note that the period 1991-1995 saw a decline in confidence of all the major representative democratic institutions: Congress, the Senate, political parties, trade unions and the Constitutional Tribunal. Only the confidence in the Ombudsman has remained systematically above the landmark of 5 (between 5.3 and 5.9). This trend contrasts with the rising confidence over recent years of other institutions such as the Crown, the Church, the Armed Forces and business organizations. This confirms that Spaniards’ confidence in institutions is not all equally negative: citizens are able to differentiate those that form part of the democratic representation from the rest, and tend to trust the latter more. Confidence in Spain’s democratic institutions is low, and has remained so virtually since the first years of democracy only recently (1996-2000) the confidence in the Congress has improved slightly (between 5.5 and 5.9). Thus, Spaniards are ambivalent when expressing their evaluations in the institutions. Although a high percentage of citizens recognize the importance of these institutions for the functioning of democracy, they often show a notable lack of confidence and express negative evaluations of their performance and their role in the everyday political process.

I have, therefore, shown that levels of attitudinal support for democracy and political disaffection have both remained virtually constant, and were unaffected by the economic crises of the early 1980s and 90s, the widespread discontent with the UCD government before its 1982 electoral collapse, the scandals which beset the Socialist government in the years leading up to its electoral defeat in 1996, or the political stability and great economic growth that took place during the last legislature under the Conservative governments of Aznar.

These findings highlight three basic points. Firstly, that attitudes relating to satisfaction/system functioning are strongly related with the evaluation of the economic and political situation, goods indicators of incumbent government’s performance and ‘partisanship.’\textsuperscript{27} Secondly, that the basic support for democracy is relatively autonomous, in

\textsuperscript{26} 1991-6 CIRES surveys in Spanish Political Culture and studies 2,124, 2,309 and 2,387, CIS Data Bank.

both theoretical and empirical terms, from political discontent, that is, from perceptions of system inefficacy and dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Finally, political disaffection (in this case, external political inefficacy) has also shown great stability despite changing political and economic situations, showing its independence with respect to these situations, their evaluation and the changing political discontent. ②

5.2 Generations and Politics in Spain

In order to examine the possible reasons for the emergence and evolution of different dimensions of political support, we must study their patterns of change and continuity generation by generation. In other words, we must ascertain whether certain political generations reflect characteristically different levels of these political attitudes, and look at how these differences reflect particular patterns. But before getting in the analysis I want to have a previous brief discussion about cohort analysis and the way I have grouped the political generations in Spain.

5.2.1 Cohort Analysis

In order to detect the existence of different political generations with respect to the attitudes of disaffection analyzed here, I will carry out a cohort analysis using transversal

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survey data collated over a number of years. This kind of analysis can detect three different effects that explain attitudinal continuity or change: the cohort, period or age effect.

These different effects can be detected using two procedures: first, by specifying a model, and second, by simple visual analysis of figures. This last one is easier to interpret and follow, but it does not always capture the presence of cohort effects since they normally appear mixed up with cross-generational fluctuations in opinion resulting from a specific political event (period effect). On other occasions, life cycle can be confused with the presence of a cohort effect, as some attitudes, despite their varying proportions in the different generations, tend to converge across all the generations as they grow older. On the other hand, modeling is a more complete and reliable procedure but involves some technical difficulties and is not so easy to resolve. Therefore, as well as presenting the figures, I have included some very simple regression models in order to detect these effects.

Two important groups of longitudinal research designs are used predominantly in the study of political attitudes. The first group uses panel designs, which provide information at the level of the individual. The second group uses repeated cross-sectional studies which provide information about the aggregate change of the sample or sub-sample (cohort). Purist authors consider the first group, panel studies, as the only designs that can be considered authentically longitudinal. However, as both types of research designs collect information “at” and “for” certain intervals of time (prospective and retrospective information), both designs should be equally considered as longitudinal. Panel studies do provide unquestionable advantages in the study of change and stability of values and attitudes, but present enormous problems of cost and design. For a detailed discussion of these problems, see, Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research, Palo Alto, Houghton Mifflin, 1963; Norval D. Glenn, Cohort Analysis, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1977; and Scott Menard, Longitudinal Research, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1991. Moreover, the results obtained using both types of designs do not differ substantially, as demonstrated by Jennings and Niemi in their now classic study; see, Jennings and Niemi, Generations and Politics. A Panel Study of Young Adults and their Parents, pp. 227-229.

Any one of these three effects is a linear combination of the other two. In other words, to describe it technically, Age = Period - Cohort. This is what is technically called the APC specification problem, manifested primarily when working with aggregate data. For a creative discussion of this problem, see Karen O. Mason, William M. Mason, Winsborough and Kenneth Poole, “Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data,” American Sociological Review, 38, 1973, pp. 242-258. For a current version of this debate and a discussion of how to specify APC models, see Stephen E. Fienberg and William M. Mason, “Specification and Implementation of Age, Period and Cohort Effects,” in William M. Mason and Stephen E. Fienberg, eds., Cohort Analysis in Social Research. Beyond the Identification Problem, New York, Springer-Verlag, 1985, pp. 45-88.

Although the models presented here are not pure APC models (periods under study are not regular, so there is not a total linear combination), these models presented an extremely high multicolinearity (the tolerance levels were close to zero and the VIF very high). To solve this problem, one of the variables was left out. The following steps were taken to implement this decision. First, a model was estimated including cohort and age. For all models, age was not significant. In other words, no important effect of age was detected. Once age was eliminated from the models, two alternative models were tested, one including the cohort as an ordinal variable, and the other with the cohorts as dummy variables, leaving the older cohort as a reference variable. Period effects were included from the beginning as dummy variables (0-1). In each case the indicators proved robust and the multicolinearity was reduced dramatically in spite of an elevated R-squared in the majority of the
In addition to the presence of the three aforementioned effects and their hybrids, there are other important factors that should be sought in a cohort analysis. When a generational effect is detected, we must try to ascertain what the intergenerational differences are. If the intergenerational differences are constant but quantitatively small, we can conclude that these are political attitudes with considerable intergenerational continuity, and we can therefore not expect cultural change to occur as a result of intergenerational replacement (the natural replacement of older generations by younger generations). On the other hand, if the differences between generations are both constant and quantitatively greater, we can conclude that there are significant intergenerational differences and, as a result, natural intergenerational replacement will be the driving force behind attitudinal and cultural change.  

But we must not confuse intergenerational continuity with the intergenerational transmission of values and attitudes (the transmission of attitudes from parents to children). Let me clarify that detecting intergenerational continuity does not necessarily mean that attitudes have been transmitted from parents to children. Intergenerational continuity can also mean that there are other actors in the socialization process who transmit these attitudes between generations, or simply that the political context that generates these attitudes has hardly changed over several generations. Therefore, for the time being, intergenerational continuity should not be regarded here as synonymous for intergenerational transmission.

5.2.2. Political Generations in Spain

In studies of attitudinal change, the cohort limits are normally fixed by date of birth in order to reflect different historical events. As we know, cohort analysis has often been used models.


33 In fact, detecting this transmission in the presence of instability in the aggregated data has proven to be a continuous problem, due to the existence of other factors and depending on the type of attitude. See, M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, “The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child,” *The American Political Science Review*, 62, 1968, p. 183; Jennings and Niemi, “Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations,” p. 1317.

in studies of attitudinal change and continuity, but discrepancies over fixing the cohort limits has been a continual bone of contention. Not only is this due to differences in defining the cohort limits in accordance with the political events that may have influenced the various generations, but also to disparities in setting the basic age of socialization. In this study I have focused mainly on the stage of ‘political maturity’ (17-25 year-olds) because this period is characterized by being more open to the impact of socialization through non-primary political agents, with the role of the family and school relegated to second place. In the present study I have set the cohort limits on the basis of two criteria: the socialization period between the age of 17 and 26; and the main economic, social and political events of Spain’s recent history. This has resulted in the creation of six different cohorts.

Five of the six cohorts will be used for the analysis. The youngest generation (the democracy generation) has not been included for two reasons. First, because of its similarity

35 There is ample disagreement about the years of socialization most relevant to the formation of attitudes. Moreover, the answer to this question depends, in many cases, on the attitude being studied. For an investigation of this issue, see Jon A. Krosnick and Duane F. Alwin, “Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1989, pp. 416-425.


37 The oldest cohort (6th, the generation of the monarchy) is made up of those born in 1914 and earlier, who in 1977 (the year of the first democratic elections) were 63 years old or older. Members of this generation reached 17 years of age before 1931, which signifies that they became young adults during the reign of Alfonso XIII, experienced the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, his fall from power and the arrival of the Second Republic. The next cohort (5th, the civil war generation) is composed of those born between 1915 and 1923, who reached 17 years of age between 1932 and 1940. This generation experienced their period of political maturation during the Second Republic, the Civil War and the beginning of the post-war period. The following cohort (4th, the post-war or autarchy generation) includes those born between 1924 and 1943, who reached 17 years of age between 1941 and 1960. Members of this generation therefore entered into their stage of adult political socialization during the difficult post-war period, enduring a period of severe economic depression and harsh political repression. The third generation (3rd, generation of the liberalization) includes those born between 1944 and 1957, who reached 17 years of age during 1961 and 1974. In other words, these people matured politically while the Franquist regime was in the liberalization process and in the midst of the economic development of the 1970s. The second cohort (2nd, transition generation) is made up of those born between 1958 and 1965, who reached 17 years of age between 1975 and 1982, maturing politically during the process of political change and consolidation of the new regime which culminated with the arrival of the socialists to power. Finally, the first cohort (1st, the democracy generation) includes those born in 1966 and after, who reached the age of 17 in 1983 and who were socialized within a democracy and with the socialists in power.
with the previous generation (the transition generation), which made it more difficult to visualize; second, and more importantly, because this generation is still in the process of being formed, with new members being incorporated during the period analyzed.\textsuperscript{38} There are no attitudinal data available for this generation in the early studies because its members had not yet come of age, which has prevented their inclusion in the equation models. Nevertheless, this first generation is very similar to the second in virtually all respects.

5.2.3. Intergenerational Change with Indicators of Modernization

In order to provide an illustrative example and prove the validity of cohort analysis, I analyze the indicators of education and religiosity collated in the various surveys used for the Spanish case. Spain’s economic and social modernization over recent decades has helped to increase citizens’ educational level.\textsuperscript{39} But this probably has not affected to all Spaniards equally. Therefore, Spaniards’ educational level should fit the typical model of pure cohort effect with intergenerational change. A person’s educational level is mainly acquired during the first twenty years of life, and remains constant with the passage of time. For this reason, differences in educational levels should show a very stable cohort effect, with notable generational differences.\textsuperscript{40} The same cohort effect should also be present with the cohort analysis of Spaniards’ religiosity. The modernization of Spanish society has gone hand in

\textsuperscript{38} This is what is technically called Hidden Attrition; see, Fienberg and Mason, “Specification and Implementation of Age, Period and Cohort Models,” p.64.

\textsuperscript{39} As some studies have demonstrated, there is a very significant correlation between education and economic development in Spain. This relationship becomes more clear when other variables are included in the model, and as the rate of literacy increases. See Clara Eugenia Núñez, La Fuente de la Riqueza. Educación y Desarrollo Económico en la España Contemporánea, Madrid, Alianza, 1992, pp. 166 ff., 172, and 175-178. This work has been criticized considerably with respect to the validity of the data used. It is my understanding that these criticisms do not detract from the empirical proof of the relationship between economic development and literacy. See, Pere Solà i Gussiyyer, “Recensión a Clara Eugenia Núñez, La Fuente de la Riqueza. Educación y Desarrollo Económico en la España Contemporánea,” in Revista de Historia Industrial, 5, 1994, pp. 182-185. For a comparative analysis of the relationship between literacy and economic development, see Lars G. Sandberg, “Ignorancia, Pobreza y Atraso Económico en las Primeras Etapas de la Industrialización Europea: Variaciones Sobre el Gran Tema de Alexander Gerschenkron,” in Clara Eugenia Núñez y Gabriel Tortella, eds., La Maldición Divina. Ignorancia y Atraso Económico en Perspectiva Histórica, Madrid, Alianza, 1993, pp. 61-90.

\textsuperscript{40} As Ryder contends in his classic work, the proportion of citizens completing different levels of education is a tendency of modern societies that differentiates the characteristics and behavior of their cohorts. See Ryder, “The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change,” p. 14.
hand with a considerable process of secularization,\textsuperscript{41} which should be reflected by the changes resulting from intergenerational replacement. Figure 5.4 and 5.5 show the level of education and religiosity\textsuperscript{42} by generations. This same figures show that the younger generations go to church less and have more education than the older generations, although these processes appears to tail off in the last two generations, reflecting a less marked level of secularization and the already high levels of education among the last generations. Therefore, both models reveal an almost pure cohort effect with intergenerational change, although, this change occurs mainly in the third (C$_3$, liberalization) and second (C$_2$, transition) generations, that is, when the process of economic and social modernization in Spain took place (see coefficients in the equations).

The cohort analysis of education and religiosity has clarified two points. First, it has proved the validity of this type of analysis, and shown that the data fits the models of cohort effect with intergenerational differences. There are some period effects but the oscillations are so small that it is closer to the model of pure cohort effect (note also the insignificance of the coefficients of period effects in the equations [5.1 and 5.2]). Second, this analysis has proved the effect on education and religiosity of Spain's process of modernization that began in the early 1960s.


\textsuperscript{42} Measured by the frequency with which respondents go to church.
Figure 5.4 Cohorts and education in Spain 1978-2000.

\[ \hat{Y} = 7.7 + 32.8 \times C_2 + 18.2 \times C_3 + 3.9 \times C_4 + 0.5 \times C_5 - 0.6 \times P_1 - 1.6 \times P_2 + 1.8 \times P_3 - 2.4 \times P_4 - 2.8 \times P_5 - 3.6 \times P_6 \]

\[ - 0.2 \times P_7 - 3.2 \times P_8 + 1.4 \times P_9 \]

\[ R^2: 0.97 \]

**Variables in the models:**

**Reference variables:** Cohort 6 (monarchy) and Period 10 (2000).

**Equations [5.1]: Model of period and cohort effects on education**
Figure 5.5: Cohorts and religiosity in Spain, 1978-2000.

\[ \hat{Y} = 14.36 + 27.5\text{C}_2 + 18.0\text{C}_3 + 3.8\text{C}_4 + 0.8\text{C}_5 + 2.4\text{P}_2 + 8.2\text{P}_3 + 0.6\text{P}_4 + 1\text{P}_5 + 8.6\text{P}_6 \]

\[ \text{P} = (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.526) (0.03) (0.874) (0.91) (0.03) \]

\[ R^2: 0.914 \]

Variables in the models: \( \text{C}_2 = \text{Cohort 2 (transition)} \), \( \text{C}_3 = \text{Cohort 3 (liberalization)} \), \( \text{C}_4 = \text{Cohort 4 (autarchy)} \), \( \text{C}_5 = \text{Cohort 5 (civil war)} \), \( \text{P}_2 = \text{Period 2 (1978)} \), \( \text{P}_3 = \text{Period 3 (1983)} \), \( \text{P}_4 = \text{Period 4 (1985)} \), \( \text{P}_5 = \text{Period 5 (1991)} \), \( \text{P}_6 = \text{Period 6 (1995)} \).

Reference variables: Cohort 6 (monarchy) and Period 1 (1978).

Equations [5.2]: Model of period and cohort effects on religiosity.
5.3 Cohort Analysis and the Dimensions of Political Support in Spain

5.3.1 Cohort Analysis and Political Disaffection

Attitudes of disaffection in Spain show a clear cohort effect: the younger a generation is, the lower the level of political disaffection. The relationship between age and the dimensions of political disaffection detected in previous comparative chapters does represent a generational effect. Yet none of them come close to the patterns we saw with the models of modernization in the previous section. We can observe two distinct patterns. One is present in the institutional dimension of political disaffection, characterized by generational continuity. The other dimension of disaffection, the political disengagement one, displays a pattern of greater generational rupture.

Both patterns are clear for any of the attitudes I have been using to measure both dimensions, although I have only chosen two examples of each to display. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 display the cohort analyses of both of these indicators: trust in politicians (external political efficacy) ("I don’t think politicians care much about what people like me think"), and political engagement (internal political efficacy) ("politics is so complicated that people like me can’t understand what’s happening"). Figure 5.6 and especially the regression coefficients in equation [5.3] show that there is a dominant cohort effect (although with a small period effect for 1988) but with small differences among generations. This is a pure cohort effect model but with intergenerational continuity\(^43\), representing a total different pattern with the one observed with the items of modernization (education and religiosity). However, this pattern of intergenerational continuity is not present with the personal evaluation of the capacity to understand politics (see Figure 5.7 and equation [5.4]). The intergenerational differences for this indicator of the other dimension of political disaffection are considerably greater than those for trust in politicians (as shown by the value of the

\(^{43}\) These data confirm a point that has already been noted in the comparative literature: political efficacy is highly persistent through the generations, despite the fact that appears not to be transmitted from parents to children; see, Kent M. Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, eds. The Political Character of Adolescence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 128; and Generations and Politics, pp. 203-205; Jennings et al., "Generations and Families. General Orientations," pp. 482.; Russell J. Dalton, "Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer," American Political Science Review, 74, 1980, 412-431; Abramson, Political Attitudes in America, pp. 146-147.
coefficient of the dummy cohort variables \((C_2, C_3, C_4, C_5)\) in equation \([5.4]\)). Internal political efficacy reveals a pure cohort effect with intergenerational change, despite a relatively important period effect in 1988 (see \(P_1\) coefficient). This exact same pattern is also observed with political interest (not shown here), another indicator of political engagement.  

I should highlight three important aspects with the preceding analysis. The first is the very minimal presence of the alleged ‘disenchantment’ felt by Spaniards as a result of the transition and the functioning of the institutions, which as we can see is theoretically link to the performance hypothesis to explain disaffection. Pérez Díaz, among others, has attributed Spaniards’ attitudes of disaffection, which he calls “lack of institutionalization” (citizens’ internalization of the principles and values of the rules of democracy) to the scant permeability and democratic representation of political parties and trade unions, which has generated this disenchantment with the institutions of political representation. If the disenchantment hypothesis were true, we could expect it to affect mainly the generation that were the protagonists of the transition and consolidation of democracy, yet this is precisely the generation with the highest level of political affection (along with the first generation, the generation of democracy, for whom results are not shown here). Moreover, if the disenchantment hypothesis is correct, trust in politicians, as an indicator of institutional disaffection, should reflect this disenchantment far more, as it is subject to greater oscillations depending on citizens’ evaluations of the way the institutions of political representation and participation function. We would therefore expect, for example, a uniform decrease in trust in politicians across all generations during the years or the worse institutional malaise (1993-1996), or at least notable oscillations reflecting the various political climates discussed previously. But this is not the case; contrary to what can be observed in other countries, trust

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44 See Torcal, *Actitudes Políticas y Participación Política en España*.


47 As data from the National Opinion Research Center demonstrate, internal political efficacy not only has not declined in the United States, but actually increased between 1952 and 1980. In contrast, external political efficacy has declined for all Americans as a result of their evaluation of their democratic institutions. On this topic, see Abramson, *Political Attitudes in America*, pp. 172-177.

48 In reality, it is possible that this is an artificial consequence of the elimination of all the no-answers in the computation of the percentages. The 1988 survey is characterized by an unusual number of no-answers.
in politicians remains as or more stable in time than the personal sense of political powerlessness (internal efficacy) (in fact, the only notable oscillation of these two attitudes occurs in 1988, which does not coincide with any particular political or economic event of recent years). These data prove that Spaniards' feelings of political disaffection cannot be attributed to a progressive disenchantment with the unresponsiveness and poor performance of mechanisms of political representation since the beginning of democracy. Indeed, the data for the last period of Franquism show that attitudes of external and internal political inefficacy were already widespread among citizens in Spain. 49 For all these reasons, it is impossible to defend the theory of disenchantment.

Figure 5.6: Cohorts and external political efficacy in Spain, 1980-2000.

\[ \hat{Y} = 17.63 + 8.5C_2 + 8.8C_3 + 2.5C_4 + 0C_5 + 1P_2 - 4.6P_3 + 1.8P_4 - 1P_5 - 2.2P_6 \]

\[ P = (.000) (.000) (.180) (1.00) (.618) (.030) (.372) (.618) (.218) \]

\[ R^2: 0.756 \]

**Variables in the models:** $C_2$=Cohort 2 (transition), $C_3$=Cohort 3 (liberalization), $C_4$=Cohort 4 (autarchy), $C_5$=Cohort 5 (civil war), $P_2$=Period 2 (1985), $P_3$=Period 3 (1988), $P_4$=Period 4 (1993), $P_5$=Period 5 (1995), $P_6$=Period 6 (1996).

**Reference variables:** Cohort 6 (monarchy) and Period 1 (1980).

**Equations [5.3]:** Model of period and cohort effects on external political efficacy

Source: For 1996 and 1995, CIRES; for other years, CIS, studies 1237, 1461, 1788, 2154 and 2384.
Figure 5.7: Cohorts and internal political efficacy in Spain, 1980-2000.

\[ \hat{Y} = 11.93 + 26.83 \cdot C_2 + 20.66 \cdot C_3 + 11 \cdot C_4 + 5.8 \cdot C_5 + 0.00 \cdot P_2 + 11.2 \cdot P_3 + 3.2 \cdot P_4 + 1.6 \cdot P_5 - 0.6 \cdot P_6 \]

\( P = (0.00) (0.00) (0.007) (1) (0.00) (0.149) (0.462) (0.781) \) \( R^2: 0.968 \)

**Variables in the models:** 
- \( C_2 = \) Cohort 2 (transition), \( C_3 = \) Cohort 3 (liberalization), \( C_4 = \) Cohort 4 (autarchy), \( C_5 = \) Cohort 5 (civil war), \( P_2 = \) Period 2 (1985), \( P_3 = \) Period 3 (1988), \( P_4 = \) Period 4 (1993), \( P_5 = \) Period 5 (1995), \( P_6 = \) Period 6 (1996).

**Reference variables:** Cohort 6 (monarchy) and Period 1 (1980).

**Equations [5.4]:** Model of period and cohort effects on internal political efficacy.

Source: For 1995 and 1996, CIRES; for other years, CIS, studies 1237, 1461, 1788, 2154 and 2384.
The second important aspect I want to point out about the preceding analysis is that all the coefficients of all the cohort variables \((C_2, C_3, C_4, C_5)\) for the internal efficacy item are significant, despite their differences in magnitude. Note, for instance, that the coefficient of the autarchy generation \((C_4)\) has a relatively high magnitude (11.0), even higher than any other coefficient for institutional disaffection (trust in politicians). Even the coefficient of the civil war generation (the fifth generation, \(C_5\)) has quite a high magnitude (5.8) and is statistically significant. This contrasts sharply with the pattern of continuity that we observed with the other dimension of political disaffection, showing the different effect of past political events in both dimensions. However, the extent to which Spaniards feel efficient enough to be able to understand politics or declare interest in politics varies across all the generations at different rates, which do not reflect the patterns of modernization either (see education and religiosity). Each generation makes some significant contribution to increase the general level of political engagement (in this case, internal political efficacy), but there is neither correspondence with the social, economic and cultural changes in Spain. I must seek to a more political explanation for the generational evolution of political engagement (internal political efficacy) which I think should be related, according with our hypothesis, with different periods of political mobilization in Spanish political past. I will discuss this argument more in detail in the following chapter.

5.3.2 Political Generations and Support for Democracy

If support for democracy is a separate dimension of Spaniards’ political culture I could expect these attitudes to differ when we observe the patterns of intergenerational change. The analysis of support for democracy by cohorts shows that this is indeed the case. At first glance, Figure 5.8, which shows preferences for the democratic regime in each generation, again reveals a clear pure cohort effect like that observed with attitudes of disaffection. This is confirmed in equation [5.5], which shows the clear cohort effect of legitimacy, with just three period effects, one at the beginning of the series in 1980 \((P_1)\), and two at the end, 1998 \((P_9)\) and 2000 \((P_{10})\). As these findings show, the younger a cohort is the more it supports the democratic regime. However, there is one important difference with
respect to disaffection: all generations profess majority support for the democratic regime, including those that are least in favor (over 60 percent). This means that intergenerational differences in the level of democratic support has had proportionally less impact on Spaniards’ current levels than those of political disaffection. As I will show, this is due to what we will call the transition effect.

Admittedly, we can observe a gradual yet considerable change between the generations in terms of support for the new regime. As the coefficients of equation [5.5] show, there is a considerable increase between each generation and the reference generation (the oldest, or monarchy generation), although the most significant changes involve the fourth generation, the autarchy generation (C₄) (coefficient 10), followed by the liberalization generation (C₃), with an average increase of 7.1 points over the previous generation and 18.1 over the oldest one (coefficient 17.1), and then stabilizing with the transition generation, with an average increase of 2.1 points over the previous generation and 19.2 over the oldest one (C₂)(coefficient 19.2). Given that the average difference between the youngest and oldest generations is 19.2 percent (65.2 percent for the monarchy generation, and 84.4 percent for the democracy generation), we can see that the contribution of the third and fourth generations to the increase in democratic legitimacy is only 36 percent of the total average difference (7.1, difference between third and fourth cohorts, is the 36 percent of 19.2, difference between the oldest and youngest).

50 Another way of interpreting these coefficients is to calculate average unconditional support for democracy over all the years studied: 75 percent for the fourth generation and 82 percent for the third, meaning that the average difference between the two generations is 8 percent.

51 This figure is obtained from the constant in equation [7.2], since monarchy is the reference variable.

52 This figure is also obtained from equation [5.5], constant + coefficient 19.2 of C₂, transition cohort.
Figure 5.8 Cohorts and support for democracy in Spain, 1980-2000

\[ \hat{Y} = 65.2 + 19.2 \cdot C_2 + 17.1 \cdot C_3 + 10 \cdot C_4 + 4.5 \cdot C_5 - 11.6 \cdot P_1 - 0.8 \cdot P_2 + 3.2 \cdot P_3 - 0.2 \cdot P_4 + 1.8 \cdot P_5 \\
+ 0.8 \cdot P_6 - 0.6 \cdot P_7 + 9.4 \cdot P_8 - 11.2 \cdot P_9 \\
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.647) (0.079) (0.919) (0.306) \\
(0.647) (0.731) (0.000) (0.000) \]

\[ R^2: 0.94 \]


Reference variables: Cohort 6 (monarchy) and Period 8 (1996).

Equations [5.5]: Model of period and cohort effects on support for Democracy.

Source: CIS, studies 1237, 1461, 1695, 1788, 1984, 2107, 2154, 2218, 2309 and 2384.
There are three possible explanations for the generational differences in support for the new regime. The first, which we discussed previously, concerns Pérez Díaz's argument about the importance of the resurgence of civil society following the economic and social transformations of the 1960s. The second, a little more political, is that the differences in support for the regime among these two generations simply reveal the changes that took place in the legitimizing discourse of the Franquist regime: during the first phase, the civil war and the regime that followed were presented as an essential "crusade of saviors" against the nation's enemies, whereas the second phase saw this discourse take a back seat, with priority now given to exalting the peace and prosperity induced by the regime.53 Finally, the third theory is that the evolution of legitimacy through the different generations also reflects all the political events that have influenced each generation, in addition to the changes in the regime's legitimizing discourse and the developments of the 1960s.

As I have said, the difference between the first and last generation is around 19 percent, whereas the difference between the third generation (liberalization) and the fourth (autarchy) is only 7.1 percent (coefficients 17.1 and 10). On the other hand, the autarchy generation's contribution to the change is 10 percent with respect to the reference generation (see coefficient), and 5.5 percent with respect to the preceding generation (civil war). If the first two aforementioned theories were correct (i.e., the change in the legitimizing discourse regarding the Civil War and Franquism, and the reemergence of civil society), then the third generation (liberalization) would be the main source of increased support for the regime. But this is not the case, as I also have shown with respect to political disaffection. In fact this generation's contribution constitutes less than half the intergenerational differences observed for regime support. The greatest proportion of attitudinal change is in fact due to the influence of all the other political generations (just over 12 percent). This means that support for the democratic regime is conditioned to a certain extent by the diverse preadult political experiences of all six generations, not only the fourth generation. The older generations' direct experience of the Second Republic and the Civil War, and experience of the recent transition, also contributes to this change, since the different levels of support for the regime with respect to the previous or successive generations are also significant. On the whole, they

have all contributed in some way to creating political generations that now express greater support for the democratic regime than their predecessors. This can be also seen in the evaluations of the authoritarian regime. Evaluations of Franco and of the authoritarian experience may have a much more polarizing effect among Spaniards, but these evaluations are linked with support for the current democratic regime. Intergenerational difference in evaluations of the authoritarian regime and Franco occurs both between the fourth generation (autarchy and post-war) and the third (liberalization), and between the third and the second (transition). This pattern among generations, however, is not present when Spaniards are asked about the confidence in the current Constitution. Older generations are the ones displaying greater confidence combined with less knowledge of the Spanish Supreme Law. The distribution of these attitudes among generations do display that support for democracy seems to be related with some socialization process instead an informed evaluation of the current constitutional setting.

But this does not mean that support for democracy is a pure effect of socialization taking place in the past. On the contrary, support for democracy although conditioned by socialization, is mostly the product of an instrumental decision taking by the great majority of Spaniards. First, I argue here that support for democracy took mostly place during the


55 This is demonstrated in the relationship between the two opinions (see Chapter 3), as well as in their distribution within the distinct generations. With respect to this issue, see also, José Ramón Montero, "Revisiting Democratic Success: Legitimacy and the Meanings of Democracy in Spain," in Richard P. Gunther, *Politics, Society and Democracy. The Case of Spain*, Boulder, Westview, 1993, pp. 149-152; Morlino and Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," pp. 136-137.

56 64 percent of the second generation does have a very negative or negative evaluation of Franco and Franquism; whereas these percentages are reduced to 52 percent for Franco and 49 for the regime in the third generation and 45 and 42 for the fourth one. The differences of the evaluation between the other generations vary only between 1 and 3 percent. The wordings of the questions were for this 1991 CIRES study of political culture are: "After these five years, what is your opinion of the Franco regime? (very positive, positive, neither positive nor negative, negative, or very negative);" and "In your opinion, how would you evaluate the job done by Franco as a head of state? (very positive, positive, neither positive nor negative, negative, or very negative)."

57 80 percent of citizens who belong to the oldest generation defend that they are very or somewhat satisfied with the current Constitution but, at the same time, 56 percent declare that they do know almost nothing about it. The percentage of satisfied decreases to 77 in the fifth generation, 74 in the fourth, 67 in the third, 68 in the second and 64 in the first, but at the same time the percentage declaring knowing almost nothing about the Constitution decreases to 48, 36, 22, 16 and 17 percent in the first, fourth, third, second and first generation respectively. Therefore, the older is a generation, the greater the satisfaction with the Constitution, the less the knowledge they have about it and the less the support for democracy. Data coming from the Study 2,309, Data CIS Bank.
transition. Older generations also profess majority support for the democratic regime (around 65 percent on average). Note also that the constant in the equations is very high: support for democracy reaches 65.24 percent, which cannot be explained by the variables in equation [5.5] (cohorts and period). Disaffection attitudes studied so far display a much smaller constant. This constitutes a considerable difference between support for democracy and disaffection, and means that intergenerational change has little impact on majority support for the democratic regime. This confirms that the current levels of support for democracy took place in some moment in time during the transition to democracy and, I argue, it was due to an instrumental change produced during that short period. By the end of the previous regime, Spaniards did not profess great support for it, but neither were they committed democrats. It was more a case of a “great, silent majority” whose priority values were peace, justice and order, with democracy much lower down the list. As Aguilar suggests, this was the greatest socializing achievement of the Franquist propaganda. The legitimizing discourse of the second phase of Franquism affected all Spaniards, although depending on the political generation to which they belonged. However, this legitimizing discourse did not build the democratic legitimacy, it was only the based upon which it was constructed during the transition. The construction of current democratic support was triggered precisely by the instrumental use of this legitimizing symbols by the main political protagonists of the ‘consensual transition’ together with the fact that the transition itself was smooth and peaceful; that is, the legitimacy of the current democratic system was built on the socializing base of Franquism and the symbols it generated, not before the transition but during it. As we can see in a survey in which Spaniards were asked how political decisions should be made, the percentage preferring “decisions to be made by those elected by the people” rose from 53 percent in 1966, to 56 percent in January 1976, and 78 percent just a few months later in May that year. Yet between 1976 and 1982, this percentage only rose to

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59 Aguilar, Memoria y Olvido de la Guerra Civil Española, p. 349; López Pintor, La Opinión Pública Española: Del Franquismo a la Democracia, pp. 85-86.

60 As Maravall contends, “(Current) democratic legitimacy seems to have become fundamentally settled prior to political change, implying an historical transformation in the political culture of the country.” José María Maravall. Los Resultados de la Democracia. Madrid: Alianza, 1995, p. 275.
79 percent. In fact, as early as in 1978, 77 percent of Spaniards already identified themselves as unconditional democrats. This change in attitudes in just five months shows why intergenerational change is responsible for only a small proportion of the high levels of democratic legitimacy.

The instrumental-rational construction of the majoritarian support for democracy in Spain can also be observed in its evolution over time. Despite its dominant stability during twenty years, I should also point out that support for democracy reveals two points of general increase: one between 1980 and 1985 and one after 1996 (this can be seen clearer in the magnitude and significance of the regression coefficient of period effects 1 (P₁), 9 (P₉) and 10 (P₁₀) – 1980, 1998 and 2000 respectively – in equation [5.5]). The first increase appears to reflect the final stage of the construction of democratic legitimacy during the consolidation of the new regime and it might have been triggered as well by the arrival of the Socialist Party (PSOE) to power. This little attitudinal change that occurs during this period with respect to democratic legitimacy even affects those generations of Spaniards who are rather less inclined to accept the new regime as a result of their preadult political experiences and it constitutes part of the already mention “transition effect.” The second increase (1998 and 2000) is also substantially important and it also has affected to all the generations, but mostly to citizens on the right side of the ideological scale. This might be due to the arrival of the Partido Popular, the conservative party, to power for the first time since democracy was reestablished. The majoritarian support for democracy in Spain, thus, although conditioned by the political past, it is mostly a rational-instrumental recreation.

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61 These data have been taken from López Pintor, La Opinión Pública Española: Del Franquismo a la Democracia, p. 153.

62 According to Linz and others, 77 percent of Spaniards declared that, “Democracy was the best political system for a country like ours,” and only 15 percent disagreed with this statement. See, Juan J. Linz, Manuel Gómez-Reino, Dario Vila and Francisco A. Orizo, Informe Sociológico sobre el Cambio Político en España, 1975-1981 (IV Informe FOESSA, Vol. I), Madrid, Euromérica, 1981, pp. 627-629. For a collection of these data, see Linz and Stepan, “Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction,” p. 44.

63 The reference point in this regression is 1996. This is why 1980 has a significant and negative coefficient, and 1998 and 2000 a positive and significant one.

64 In 1995 the proportion of people supporting democracy unconditionally in the right (9, 10) and center-right positions (7, 8) was 49 and 65 percent respectively, however these percentages have increased in the year 2000 to 88 and 84 percent. The difference of support for democracy between the extreme left and right was 39 percent in 1995, whereas this number has been reduced to only 10 percent in the year 2000. The difference in the center-right position has been reduced from 25 percent to only 6 percent. Data collected from studies 2,154 and 2,384 of the CIS Data Bank.
5.3.3 Generations and Political Discontent in Spain

If political discontent is a different dimension of political support, it should present a different pattern in the cohort analysis. This is in fact the case. Political discontent reveals very marked period effects with no cohort effects at all. In figure 5.9, which includes the percentage of citizens in each cohort who declare they are very or somewhat satisfied “with the functioning of democracy,” there is an apparent absence of cohort effect and predominance of period effects; that is, the lines of the graph oscillate from one year to the next with no identifiable common pattern between the different cohorts. These variations coincide with the three specific phases of this period. The first phase is characterized by the increased popularity of the PSOE government and the economic boom of the late 1980s (see the positive coefficients of 1988 [P3], 1989 [P4] and 1991 [P5] in equation [5.6] --6, 5.6 and 15.6 respectively). The second phase covers the economic crisis in late 1992, the numerous cases of corruption, political scandals, and a general decline in the political and economic situation from 1993 onwards. This led to a period of political instability and discontent that brought about the PSOE’s defeat, and which had a considerable impact on citizens’ satisfaction with democratic functioning (see the huge decrease of the coefficient for 1994 [P6]: -10.6). Finally, the third phase is that of greater stability, beginning with the increase of the economic situation and the prospect of government change at the end of 1995 ([P7], with coefficient 5) and the conservative party’s victory in March 1996 and further economic growth and political stability ([P8], [P9], [P10] with coefficient 0.6, 12.6 and 17.8 respectively). These data in the equation is a clear transferring of the political and economic situation evaluations and pure description of the political and economic events of the 1980s and 1990s, confirming that, contrary to support for democracy and political disaffection, satisfaction with democratic functioning depends on the economic and political situation and the popularity of a particular government, as other scholars have noted. The exact same pattern can be also observed with other indicators of political discontent.

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65 It should be pointed out that the reference is dated 1986, corresponding to a period when political evaluations tended to be high and citizens felt a high degree of satisfaction with the functioning of the government.

66 Some studies demonstrate this relationship, but using, “the degree of satisfaction with the performance…” as
Figure 5.9 Cohorts and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Spain, 1986-2000

\[ \hat{Y} = 54.5 + 1.7* C_3 + 0.5* C_4 + 6.1* C_5 + 11.2* C_6 - 6.2* P_2 + 6* P_3 + 5.6* P_4 + 15.6* P_5 - 10* P_6 + 5* P_7 + 0.6* P_8 \\
+ 12.6* P_9 + 17.8* P_{10} \]

\[(.294) (.756) (.001) (.000) (.009) (.012) (.018) (.000) (.000) (.033) (.792)]

\[R^2: 0.91\]

Variables in the model: \(C_3=\text{Cohort 3 (liberalization)}, C_4=\text{Cohort 4 (autarchy)}, C_5=\text{Cohort 5 (civil war)}, C_6=\text{Cohort 6 (monarchy)}, P_2=\text{Period 2 (1987)}, P_3=\text{Period 3 (1988)}, P_4=\text{Period 4 (1989)}, P_5=\text{Period 5 (1991)}, P_6=\text{Period 6 (1994)}, P_7=\text{Period 7 (1995)}, P_8=\text{Period 8 (1996)}, P_9=\text{Period 9 (1998)}, P_{10}=\text{Period 10 (2000)}\).

Reference variables: Cohort 2 (transition) and Period 1 (1986).

Equation 15.61: Model of period and cohort effects on satisfaction with the functioning of democracy an indicator of regime support. See, Finkel, Muller and Seligson, “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica,” pp. 329-351; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, “The Political Economy of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies,” pp. 998-1021. This same relationship is demonstrated by Lockerbie, using the degree of satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of political alienation. See, Lockerbie, “Economic Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation in Western Europe,” pp. 281-293.

The percentage of Spaniards who declare that democracy “works well” or “works well with some defects” (another indicator to measure levels of satisfaction with democratic functioning), again reveals that there is no cohort effect, although the period effects, despite their magnitude, are not statistically significant either. Despite their non-significance, the coefficients of the periods are important and confirm the downward trend shown also in the graph, between 1991 and 1995, during the period of general political decline and the PSOE’s electoral defeat (data not shown, available if requested to the author).
Cohorts effects can also be appreciated in equation [5.6], but only in the fifth and sixth generations (civil war \(C_5\) and monarchy \(C_6\) respectively), and contrary to what we have observed with support for democracy and disaffection, these two generations stand out for their greater satisfaction with democratic functioning (see the positive sign of the cohort coefficients in equation [5.9]). This may be due to the fact that the two older generations experienced previous democratic periods that were socially, economically and politically far more violent, unstable and chaotic. Again, preadult political experiences condition the interpretation of current events. Nonetheless, these two generations’ more positive evaluations of democratic functioning do not alter their lower levels of support for the regime or their greater political disaffection.

5.4 Four Patterns of Attitudinal Change in Spain: A General Review of the Cohort Analysis

Once we have observed the dominant cohort effect in political disaffection and support for democracy, I want to compare each generation’s contribution to change for each attitude. This way I try to track the impact of the political past in each attitude and disentangle the differences among them. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show a summary of all the cohort effects for all these two attitudes. Table 5.1 displays the regression coefficients of the preceding cohort analysis (see equations [5.1] to [5.6]). Table 5.2 contains the average probability of having the attitude under study compared with the oldest generation. These last figures are the odds ratios of the logistic regression estimate with individual survey data. These different procedures reveal each cohort’s contribution to the increase of each attitude, using the oldest cohort as a reference.

\[68\text{In order to do this, I have undertaken a succession of logistical regressions using the presence/absence of these attitudes in each respondent as the dependent variables, and five dummy variables representing each generation as the independent variables, leaving the oldest generation for reference. This model provides odds ratios representing the average probability that individuals would or would not present the attitude depending on the generation to which they belong. If the democracy generation has an odds ratio of 3.22 in a model whose dependent variable is legitimacy, this means that the average probability of unconditional support for democracy among respondents is 3.22 times higher if they belong to that generation rather than the oldest generation. If the result is 1, they have the same probability, and if it is less than 1, the probability is lower. I have repeated this analysis for all attitudes of disaffection and legitimacy across the years, and calculated the average odds ratio for the whole period analyzed.}\]
The results coming from these different procedures of estimating the generational effects are very similar. First, all the coefficients are positive (table 5.1) and the odds ratios superior to one (table 5.2), this is because the reference category, the oldest generation, is always less affected with the democratic system and are more reluctant to support the current democratic regime; that is, the younger the generation, the greater the probability of having the attitude. Second, and more important at this point, the attitudes can be divided into two clearly distinct groups. Table 5.1 shows that those with intergenerational continuity (institutional disaffection), whose coefficients never exceed 10 points (last two columns); and those with intergenerational change (political engagement and support for democracy), whose coefficients exceed 10 points in all generations except the civil war generation, which is the closest in age to the oldest generation. In table 5.2 we can observe that the probability of sensing that politics is easy to understand and supporting democracy are three times higher if the respondent belongs to one of the younger generations (democracy and transition). But the probability of trusting the politicians is little more than one. There are therefore two different types of attitudes. On the one hand, there are those with greater intergenerational change, such as legitimacy, internal efficacy. This means that the different political experiences of these generations might be reflected in the attitudinal change between them. On the other hand, there are attitudes with greater intergenerational continuity, such as external efficacy and those measuring institutional disaffection.

Finally, the comparison of the constant of the preceding cohort regression models provides a totally different information. The values of these constants (the value of the dependent variable when there is no cohort or period effect) are very low for all the attitudes except legitimacy. The constant in the equation for legitimacy is 64.9, meaning that 64.9 percent of the support for democracy cannot be explained by cohort or period effects. The constants for the rest of the attitudes oscillate between 11.9 and 17.6. As I have said, this means that support for democracy is majoritarian even among the older generations. As I said before, this is not the case with other attitudes under study.
### TABLE 5.1 Relative influence of each cohort on attitudinal change in Spain, 1980-1999. Aggregate data (OLS regression coefficients from the equations of cohort effect)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohort</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Support for democracy</th>
<th>Internal efficacy</th>
<th>External efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(transition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(liberalization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(autarchy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(civil war)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 6</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(monarchy)</td>
<td>category</td>
<td>category</td>
<td>category</td>
<td>category</td>
<td>category</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see equations [5.1] to [5.6].
In order to compare the influence of intergenerational change on current attitudinal levels, I have also calculated the average percentage difference for each attitude between the second and last generation, and what proportion it represents of the total current level of this attitude in the population as a whole. Table 5.3 therefore has three columns: the first gives the average percentage difference for a particular attitude between these two generations; the second shows the average presence of these attitudes in the whole population over all the years; and the third shows the figure in the first column (difference in the averages between the second and last generation) as a percentage of the second (average attitudinal level for the whole population). For example, the difference between the second

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This first generation, as I have discussed previously, is a very unstable generation because it is still developing and, therefore, it has a problem of hidden attrition. This is why it has not been included in the analysis.

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TABLE 5.2 Relative influence of each cohort on attitudinal change in Spain, 1980-1995. Individual data (average probability of having this attitude compared with the oldest generation)
and last generation in the average for support for democracy is approximately 20 (first
column, last row of table 5.3), that is, 84.2 percent minus 64.6 percent, which are the
respective averages of these two generations for support for democracy over all the years
analyzed. The aggregate average support for democracy for the whole population during all
the years is 78 percent (second column). The third column, 26 percent, shows the percentage
of the figure in the first column (difference of the averages between the second and last
generations) as a proportion of the second (average support among the population as a
whole).

The findings in table 5.3 are particularly interesting when we observe the figures in
column 3. Of the attitudes with greater intergenerational change, only support for democracy
represents a minimal percentage of the overall total for this attitude (third column of table
5.3). Intergenerational change accounts for just 26 percent of current levels of legitimacy. But
with internal political efficacy and anti-party sentiment, despite their low levels among
Spaniards, intergenerational change accounts for 62 percent and 75 percent respectively of
current levels. Intergenerational change accounts for 40 percent of the current level of
interpersonal trust, although the generational differences only amount to 10 percent. For all
these attitudes intergenerational change represents an important percentage of the total levels
of this attitude. In this respect they are distinct from support for democracy. The only
exception to this pattern is external political efficacy with 16 percent and this is due to the
consistently high intergenerational continuity of this attitude (the difference among
generations is just 9 percent) and not the high levels already present in the oldest generation
as occurs with support for democracy.

However, these findings for support for democracy do not occur with other attitudes
of disaffection - not even in the case of those whose intergenerational differences are much
smaller, such as external political efficacy. Legitimacy is the only attitude that reveals both
considerable intergenerational change and a high contribution among the oldest generation.
This confirms what we discussed previously; that, despite the contribution of all generations,
the source of these high levels of legitimacy must - as Aguilar would say - be sought in the
transition, although admittedly the instruments used by the political leaders to bring about
this great transformation were unintentionally generated by the political discourse of
Franquism. Again, this confirms the powerful influence that the cultural entrepreneurs can
have over political culture and attitudes when they put cultural symbols to political use, especially within a context of regime change. The case of legitimacy in Spain exemplifies the theories of cultural rationalism discussed in the introduction.

Finally, I would like to point out again that none of the political attitudes present the same pattern of intergenerational change as the one observed with the modernization indicators. Internal political efficacy might come close to the percentage of intergenerational change on the aggregate levels observed for religiosity or education (see column 3, table 5.3) but, as I have already demonstrated for the modernization items, there is one generation that accumulates most of this change: the fourth (liberalization).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average percentage difference between second and last generation (D)</th>
<th>Average total percentage (P)</th>
<th>Percentage of difference over total average percentage (D/P*100=DP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5.3 Cohorts and attitudinal change in Spain**

70 Laitin, “Political Culture and Political Preferences,” p. 591; Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture*, pp. 15-16 and 178-180. On the extremely important role played by political elites in cultural mobilization and transformation, see also Stokes, *Social Movements and the State in Peru*, chapters 1 and 7.
To sum up, I will now look at the patterns of attitudinal change for the three dimensions of political culture in Spain. Table 5.4 shows a typology of these three dimensions, differentiating them by their characteristics of intergenerational change or continuity. The first type, showing political discontent, differs from the other two, as we have already seen, in its lack of cohort effect and its unstable evolution over time, in line with changes in the economic and political situation. The other attitudes do show cohort effects, but there are marked differences between them. Attitudes of political disaffection can be divided into two groups: the type 2 attitudes (institutional disaffection) are characterized by considerable intergenerational continuity, whereas the type 3 attitudes (political disengagement) show greater intergenerational change, due to the impact of past events on these attitudes. Finally, legitimacy is similar to type 3 attitudes because of its intergenerational change, but differs in that this intergenerational change accounts for only a quarter of current levels. As I have said, attitudes of legitimacy were generated during the transition, which explains why even the older generations express majoritarian support. Type 4 attitudes are therefore characterized by the influence of the transition effect, despite being unintentionally rooted in the previous regime. Observing these four types of attitudes in accordance with their different patterns of change and continuity, and their reaction to the change of regime, is the only way to understand the combination of high levels of both legitimacy and political disaffection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>General level in society (percentage)</th>
<th>Cohort Effect</th>
<th>Intergenerational change</th>
<th>Change produced during the transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Political Affection</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement disaffection</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the democratic regime</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Discontent</td>
<td>Oscillates</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Oscillated with the political and economic situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5.4 Typology of political attitudes according to patterns of change and continuity in Spain.**
5.5 Conclusions

In the first part of this monographic chapter on Spain, I have confirmed again that political and economic difficulties (particularly in new democracies) do not seem to have an immediate negative impact on regime support. In contrast to deterministic conceptions of the relationship between support for democracy and system efficacy or performance evaluation, I contend that this relationship is rather more complex. I agree with some scholars in rejecting the claim that indicators of support for democracy are always tightly linked and causally related to satisfaction with the state of the economy. One factor that weakens the link between economic performance and support for democracy is that the latter may be seriously affected by other aspects of government performance, such as respect for fundamental liberties and the legal system. The passage of time also favors the institutionalization of democratic legitimacy, since it helps to insulate support for the regime against short-term economic problems, and even economic crises, as well as political scandals. Furthermore, the public may realize that governments have only a limited capacity in terms of what they are able to deliver, and citizens tend to treat their promises with skepticism, and so be prepared for their failures. Citizens’ pragmatic awareness that some societal problems may simply be intractable, or beyond the capacity of any political leader to resolve, may also limit the extent to which dissatisfaction with system performance undermines fundamental attitudinal support for democracy. As events in some Eastern European countries show, this pragmatism may even lead to a sort of political patience, with citizens predicting that certain problems could take several years to solve. Finally, the basic characteristic of democracy as government pro tempore may play a decisive role in facilitating escape from problematic situations: new elections, and the potential arrival of a

71 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 229; Maravall, Los Resultados de la Democracia, p. 276; and Diamond, “Political Culture and Democratic Consolidation,” pp. 42 ff. For a different position on this issue see Przeworski, Democracy and the Market


73 Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government, p. 75.


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new party in power, may have positive consequences for evaluations of democracy. Even in the recently established Eastern European democracies with little history of democracy, citizens can hold those in power responsible for the economic situation in the interests of their support for the democratic institutions and regime.\textsuperscript{75} And even in Latin America, which has suffered decades of recurrent economic crises, studies show the scant relationship between democratic legitimacy and satisfaction with the way democracy works; the latter is generally much lower, except in Uruguay.\textsuperscript{76}

Similarly, the previous analysis also demonstrates the lack of relationship between political disaffection and the economic and political climate. As has been argued in a recent analysis on confidence in institutions, this attitude is hardly related to economic indicators and their assessment by the public. Contrary to what has been claimed in a classic on the topic,\textsuperscript{77} the impact of the economy on institutional confidence is negligible when compared to the effect of factors such as political culture and historical circumstances, especially in new democracies.\textsuperscript{78} Political disaffection also seems to be unaffected by the political situation and government performance.\textsuperscript{79}

In the second part of the chapter, I have shown that political disaffection presents a very consistent cohort effect revealing that the older a generation is, the greater its political disaffection. Spain’s political past is the main cause of disaffection in the present. The patterns of intergenerational change and continuity for disaffection attitudes do not coincide with those of religiosity and education. Therefore, the process of modernization during the 1960s and 70s seems not to have brought about any significant change in the continuity of disaffection attitudes among Spaniards. Finally, with the longitudinal analysis, I have shown

\textsuperscript{75} Duch, “Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes,” pp. 121-158.

\textsuperscript{76} Diamond, “Political Culture,” pp. 182-183.

\textsuperscript{77} Lipset and Schneider, \textit{The Confidence Gap}, pp. 62-65; Miller and Listhaug, “Political Performance and Institutional Trust,” p. 207. To explain differences between their research findings and those in the Lipset and Schneider classic, Miller and Listhaug point out that Lipset and Schneider examined only the United States, their confidence measures focused on confidence in the leaders of various institutions rather than the institutions per se, and that people in many cultures may not blame the government for short-term economic changes.


\textsuperscript{79} As Miller and Listhaug argue, objective measures of government performance do not have an impact on institutional confidence (despite the observed relationship with public deficit). The influence clearly comes from the perceived fairness of its performance as well as individual concerns about the fairness. See, Miller and Listhaug, “Political Performance and Institutional Trust,” pp. 212-216.
that neither the transition nor democracy and its institutional functioning appears to have significantly altered those preadult political experiences that cause attitudes of political disaffection, which were already widespread before the advent of democracy. The Spanish case, thus, shows clearly the weight of the past on the configuration of political disaffection. But, what are the main political events responsible of the pattern of attitudinal change and continuity already mapped? I will try to answer this question in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 6

EXPLAINING POLITICAL DISAFFECTION: TRACING THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL DEMOBILIZATION, POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSES

In this chapter, I develop and test a comparative model to explain political disaffection in new democracies. As the author of a recent comparative study of the subject has noted, "institutional confidence is formed cumulatively within the mass electorate." The comparative analysis in chapter four and preceding analysis of the various generations in Spain show that this also seems to be true for the attitudes of political disaffection, including institutional confidence. Here, I will further develop two important arguments, which I extend to other new democracies. First, both dimensions of political disaffection—institutional disaffection and political disengagement—are mostly the results of generational transmission or the effect of past political events. Neither of these dimensions, however, reflects a dominant cultural accumulation and determinism. It would be more appropriate to say that both reflect the accumulated political effect of exclusionary democratic practices, discourses or demobilization strategies that have been transmitted and reinforced through the socialization of attitudes. Second, the evaluation of current institutional settings and political and economic performance also has some influence on political disaffection, but it is secondary. However, the influence of these evaluations tends to increase with the passage of time under normal democratic rule. With time under democratic rule, patterns of current political mobilization also become more important, especially when the mobilization is promoted by political parties.

To demonstrate these statements, I propose a model for political disaffection in new democracies. I test the model with a detailed analysis of the Spanish case and continue with

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the analysis of political disaffection in other new democracies. I will show that this model better explains political disaffection in new democracies when individual level variables are introduced in order to track the influence of political history.

6.1 The Theoretical Model for Political Disaffection in New Democracies

As discussed in the first chapter, there are two major competing hypotheses to explain political cynicism, lack of institutional confidence and other attitudes of disaffection at the individual level: Macro-sociological theories related with general cultural explanations, and cross-national and national political and economic explanations. These explanations correspond respectively with the "culturalist" and "the rational-culturalist" models of political culture.

I have shown in preceding chapters that neither the cultural explanation nor the rational-culturalist model does a good job predicting political disaffection in new democracies. I argued that while cross-national and national political explanations may explain differences in political affection in long established democracies and may even constitute the main reason behind political disaffection in these countries, this is not the case in new democracies. As I have shown, the countries' political past is not only the major factor explaining cross-national differences (chapter three), but also an important factor influencing the nature of political disaffection in new democracies. Indeed, political disaffection in new democracies depends more on variables that reflect the influence of the political past (chapter four). Citizens in new democracies with no recent experience of a stable democracy do not have a valid point of reference from which to assess the performance and functioning and achievements of the current political institutions. Their evaluations, opinions and attitudes with respect to present democratic institutions, politicians and overall performance depend less on direct experience with existing institutions and their functioning and more on accumulated non-democratic or pseudo-democratic experiences from the past. But, how can I measure the effect of the political past and its impact on present attitudes at the individual level?
6.1.1 Tracking the Influence of the Political Past

The effect of the political past can be detected by the combination of attitudinal reproduction and transmission and the impact of specific political conditions during socialization (or the combination of the two).\(^2\)

Distinctive Socializing Experiences and Attitudinal Transmission

The literature on socialization has generally identified three basic agents of primary socialization transmission: Family, school and peer group. Regardless of the ongoing debate around the relative importance of each of these agents and of their impact during the various phases of socialization,\(^3\) it does appear that all three play a major role at one point or another in the socialization process.

I do not have access to variables measuring the process of political socialization produced by these agents, but I can estimate the effect of distinct socialization experiences on the reproduction and transmission of political attitudes by estimating the impact of three variables: Education, gender, and the extent of political debate within the family during childhood. It should be emphasized that these three variables do not represent individual attributes that condition citizens' attitudes and behavior, nor are they variables that measure

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\(^2\) Socialization refers to the process by which political attitudes are formed in the pre-adult period and during later stages of life. This definition discounts two fundamental issues found in much of the pioneer studies on socialization. First, contrary to what Easton and Dennis defend, socialization is not a process whose destiny is the inculcation of political attitudes that guarantee loyalty to the system and promote its stability. See, David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children and the Political System*, New York, McGraw, 1969, pp. 5-6. Second, socialization is not a process that culminates when a certain level of maturity is reached. For a debate on this last aspect, see Roberta S. Sigel, *Political Learning in Adulthood. A Source of Theory and Research*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1989, parts I and IV.

political socialization. Rather, they measure indirectly the distinctive socializing experiences that different spaces available for the participation of given social groups have had on the formation of political attitudes. The relation between these variables, on the one hand, and attitudes of disaffection, on the other, is not a consequence of individual attributes, as they are simply rough indicators (proxy variables) of different socializing experiences, their attitudinal reproduction, and the effects of their transmission. It is almost impossible to gauge the effect different socialization has on individual attitudes through cross-sectional survey data except by using proxy variables of the type employed here, which do appear to capture, at least partially, the diversity of socializing experiences and attitudinal transmission.4

Numerous studies have established, for example, that there is a relation between education and many of the attitudes of disaffection.5 However, it was Converse who demonstrated that education is an indicator of a certain social hierarchy, that is, an indicator of the status and the structure of opportunities. Accordingly, education shows a constant relation with political attitudes despite the overall increase in the educational levels.6 There is, therefore, no axiomatic relation between a given attitude and a given level of education. Rather, the relation with education in fact reflects the effect of the structures of opportunity that each citizen is exposed to in key moments of mobilization and participation, and which has a clear socializing effect. As we have seen above, there can be no doubt that the overall level of education in Spain has increased significantly over the last few decades. Nonetheless, education continues to function as an indicator of a certain social hierarchy, or to be more precise, of the existence of certain well-defined social groups and, indirectly, of

4 For example, for Komberg and Clarke, the use of socio-demographics as variables a proxy to measure socialization is justified on the basis of the presumption that these characteristics capture “some distant and subtle effects that the family, peer group and social class have in the process of socialization.” See, Allan Komberg and Harold A. Clarke, Citizens and Community. Political Support in a Representative Democracy, p. 22. See also, Edward N. Muller, “Correlates and Consequences of the Beliefs in the Legitimacy of the Regime Structures,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 14, 1970, pp. 392-412.

5 The relationship between these attitudes and education has been confirmed since the earliest studies on the topic. See, Campbell et al. The Voter Decides, p. 191; Campbell et al., The American Voter, New York: Wiley 1960, p. 479; Stokes, “Popular evaluations of government,” p. 66.

6 Converse distinguished two possible hypotheses to explain the relationship between education and political efficacy. According to the “hypothesis of the educational model,” political efficacy is the simple result of education, and, as such, increases commensurately with the general level of education of the society. The “hypothesis of social hierarchy,” on the other hand, contends that education merely reflects differences in social status that persist in spite of increasing education at all levels of society. In this case, political efficacy remains stable even in the face of an increase in the general level of education. See, Converse, “Change in the American Electorate,” pp. 323-330.
the distinctive political socializing experiences of these groups. As I have shown in chapter five, the existence of a relation between education and these attitudes of social disaffection in Spain, despite the undeniable increase in overall educational levels, could reflect the way these attitudes are affected by the social hierarchy, the structure of opportunities that this generates, and the resulting socializing effect. In fact, as we have also seen, the overall improvement in the education levels of each generation does not coincide with the evolution of these attitudes by generation. Education has an impact on these attitudes even in highly educated countries where its impact may reflect other significant factors, such as individual cognitive capacity to cope with politics. However, any explanation for the possible influence of education on these attitudes mostly represents the continuities in the structure of opportunities, distinctive socializing experiences and subsequent attitudinal transmission in certain social groups. The Spanish case constitutes a clear example. The influence of education has persisted despite profound social transformations and a general increase in education in all sectors of society, including those at the lower end, over the last few decades.

Much the same seems to be the case with respect to gender. Since the very first studies, it has generally been recognized that men tend to participate in politics more, and to feel more politically effective, than women do. Comparative studies suggests that the explanation for this gender gap should be sought in the greater participation of males in the political process, which itself is the result of gender differences in socializing experiences, the structure of opportunities for participation, and finally, the social organization derived from the sexual division of labor and the distinct resources this generates. However, both

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7 Similar conclusion can be found in Abramson's study of political efficacy and trust among white and African-American citizens. See, Abramson, Political Attitudes in America, pp. 152-163 and 213-223.


9 As Norris has argued, the fact that women develop their political activity with distinct forms of participation (community associations, volunteer organizations and protest groups) reflects the availability of spaces for the participation of particular social collectives rather than the presence of particular attributes that are the consequence of gender. See, Pippa Norris, "Gender Differences in Political Participation in Britain: Traditional, Radical and
the structure of opportunities for female participation and the sexual division of labor have changed significantly in advanced societies over the last few decades, and Spain is no exception in this respect. Nonetheless, despite the impact these changes have had in terms of greater female participation, the continued existence of many of these relations reveals the persisting importance of certain gender differences in socialization. Therefore, the impact of gender on the individual levels of political disaffection may indirectly reflect the presence of different socializing experiences and perhaps point to another mechanism of attitudinal transmission and reproduction.

The frequency with which politics was discussed in the respondent’s home during childhood has been taken as another indicator of attitudinal transmission that indirectly reflects the different socializing impact of family environments. As Beck and Jennings argued in a recent study, the attitudes of young people from highly “politicized” families are more similar to those of their parents than those of their counterparts from “non-politicized” families.

Therefore the attitudinal transmission variables to be included in the model to detect the influence of the political past are:

a) Education (education)

Revisionist Models,” Government and Opposition, 26, 1991, p. 56 and p.71. As Astelarra affirms, in studies where the comparison is made between housewives and a selection of men presenting the same traits of political marginality, the differences not only disappear, the housewives actually show higher levels of participation. Thus, once again, the crucial factor appears to be the capacity of organizations to respond to problems of sectors of the population and to motivate them to participate in the organizations and in politics. See, Astelarra, “Las Mujeres y la Política,” p. 15. For a similar posture with respect to the role of organizational resources in the participation of women, see Kay Lehman Schlozman, Nancy Burns and Sydney Verba, “Gender and Pathways to Participation: The Role of Resources,” Journal of Politics, 56, 4, 1994, pp. 963-990.


b) Gender (gender)
c) Frequency with which politics was discussed in the respondent's home during childhood (frequency)

The Impact of the Political Past on Political Generations

As discussed earlier, the influence of the past may also be due to the identifiable political generations formed as a result of the direct influence of specific political episodes during the period of socialization. I call this the 'generational effect.' A political generation can therefore be defined as "a group of human beings who have been exposed to the same historical experiences during their formative years." But although the existence of different generations is part of life, they are only really significant when the individuals of the same generation share unique social and political experiences that influence their attitudes and behavior, thereby distinguishing them from others. This means that we can only refer to a political generation when these attitudes are present as a result of very distinctive political and social circumstances that occurred during their formative years. These generations also tend to be more clear-cut in societies that have undergone far-reaching political, economic and social change.

In order to detect this generational effect on political disaffection and the political episodes responsible its formation, I have considered two variables. First, I include the presence of pure cohort effects. These effects, after other variables such as education, gender and other political attitudes are controlled for, might reflect the long-lasting impact of specific political episodes on the generations exposed to them during "political maturation."

Second, I consider the interaction of those cohorts with ideology. I argue that past episodes of political exclusion are the main reason behind political disaffection, especially political disengagement. These episodes have concentrated on political actors of the Left, but...

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13 Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Silence: Essays in Generational Themes, Westport, Greenwood, 1979, p.8. The fact that there are different generations reflects "the biological rhythms of human existence (...)." But also, as Mannheim adds, "individuals who belong to the same generation and share the same date of birth are characterized by their position at a shared point in the historical process (...)." See Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," p. 290.


15 Abramson, Political Attitudes in America, p. 51.

16 For the discussion of this concept see footnote 36, chapter five.
at the same time, the Left has adopted major political mobilization strategies in order to force their political inclusion. If these political episodes have left an attitudinal mark, people on the Left of the ideological spectrum exposed to those mobilization efforts should tend to have greater predisposition to be involved in politics and give greater attention to politics in their lives. I believe the interaction of cohort by ideology does tap the lasting attitudinal effects of those mobilization efforts on political engagement. I will discuss this argument further below.

**Political Socialization and the Impact of Mobilization**

Finally, mobilization and demobilization strategies adopted by social organizations and their socializing effects are important aspects of the argument defended above: The long-lasting impact of past and present political mobilization on political disaffection. We know, since Almond and Verba's classic,\(^{17}\) that members of associations have higher levels of subjective civic competence. This idea was later supported by Verba and Nie when they defended that the more people are involved in social organizations, the more likely they are to develop skills to be used in political decision making processes and the more they will be stimulated to participate.\(^{18}\) Since then, a vast literature has been produced linking social participation to the development of civic attitudes and political engagement, including recent literature on social capital.\(^{19}\)

This is a very important topic for new democracies since it has been argued that current high levels of political disaffection are due to frustrating individual experiences with the functioning of the institutions of representation and, in particular, to participation within these organizations of political action and representation. However, my argument is the contrary. I think the socialization produced by participation in political parties, and political participation in general, reduces levels of political disengagement and of overall political

\(^{17}\) Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 307-322.


\(^{19}\) The literature on the topic is extensive. Van Deth has produced a short but overall revision and discussion on this topic in Jan W. van Deth, "Introduction," in Jan W. van Deth, Private Groups and Public Life. Social Participation, voluntary Associations and political involvement in representative democracies, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 11-15.
disaffection.\(^{20}\) I do not have individual data on past membership during the citizens' 'political maturation,' but, I do have data on membership in political parties, unions and religious organizations,\(^{21}\) and other voluntary organizations. If the source of political disaffection is found in previous frustrating individual experiences in those organizations, and, especially in political parties, membership in these organizations must increases political disaffection. However, if participation in these organizations decreases political disaffection, I can conclude that the socializing experience of participation in those organizations is beneficial, and that in general the influence of past political episodes of political mobilization through political parties and unions is an important factor reducing political disaffection.

Therefore, the variables included in the model to measure the influence of specific political episodes of mobilization and political exclusion so central to the discussion are:

a) Cohorts (cohorts \(n\))

b) Interaction of cohorts with ideology (cohort \(nx\) ide) to test, as I will illustrate below in more detail for Spain, if past political events and exclusions of specific parts of the ideological spectrum left a mark on these attitudes

c) Membership in political parties (party), unions (unions), church organization (church) or other voluntary association (assoc). The presence of these variables varies from survey to survey, but in general membership in political parties and unions are found in all of them.

6.1.2 The Expanded Model for Political Disaffection

A complete model of political disaffection must also include variables to test the classical cultural and the rationalist explanations. To account for the cultural explanation, I have included the social trust variable, which is considered to be an attitudinal baseline that reflects many cultural legacies (trust).\(^{22}\) The variables I have included in the model to

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\(^{20}\) For the beneficial effects of political participation in civic attitudes see Finkel. "Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis."; Finkel. "The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence From a West German Panel."


measure the impact of current or recent political and economic conditions and to support the cultural-rationalist explanation are the following:

a) Egotropic respondent material situation (personal econ. situation) and sociotropic overall evaluation of the economy (general econ. evaluation)\textsuperscript{23}

b) General regime performance (r. performance or functioning). This variable has been measured by different items depending on the questions available. In general, however, all of the items tap the evaluation of the results of the political regime in general or with respect to very specific issues

c) Current government evaluation (e. government)

d) Respondents' ideology measured by the left-right scale. I have included this variable to test the possibility that current political conditions or institutional settings might have left some citizens from a specific part of the ideological spectrum systematically out of the game or in a recurrent losing position. According to a recent study, this is an important variable to be considered when explaining institutional confidence.\textsuperscript{24}

I have included two variables, the left-right scale (ideology) and the individual deviation from the mean (i.distance).

Therefore the expanded model to be estimated is the following:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{P_j}{1-P_j} \right) = \beta_0 + \alpha_j + \text{government e.} + \beta_1 + \text{ideology} + \beta_2 + \text{i. distance} + \beta_3 + \text{reg. functioning} + \beta_4 + \text{personal econ. situation} + \beta_5 + \text{general econ. eval} + \beta_6 + \text{gender} + \beta_7 + \text{education} + \beta_8 + \text{frequency} + \beta_9 + \text{party or/and union} + \beta_{10} + \text{trust} + \beta_{11} + \text{cohort1} + \beta_{12} + \text{cohort2} + \beta_{13} + \text{......} + \text{cohort n} + \beta_{n} + \text{cohort1xide} + \beta_{14} + \text{cohort2xide} + \beta_{15} + \text{......} + \text{cohort nx ide} + \beta_{nj} + \epsilon
\]  

where;


\textsuperscript{24} Newton and Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions,” p. 65.
\[ \ln \left( \frac{P_j}{1 - P_j} \right) = \text{the probability of feeling politically disaffected for each person (therefore, the dependent variable will take a value of "0" when the respondent does not feel effective, and "1" when s/he does).} \]

6.1.3. The General Model and Hypotheses for Political Disaffection

Based on the preceding discussion, I want to propose a general model to test the relative weight of the three major theories above to explain political disaffection at the individual level. This general model comprises all the variables of the expanded model [6.1] above:

\[ \ln \left( \frac{P_j}{1 - P_j} \right) = \beta_{0j} + \alpha_j + B_p \lambda_p + B_c \kappa_c + B_s \gamma_s + \epsilon_j \]

where;

\[ \ln \left( \frac{P_j}{1 - P_j} \right) = \text{the probability of feeling politically disaffected for each person (therefore, the dependent variable will take a value of "0" when the respondent does not feel effective, and "1" when s/he does).} \]
\[ \beta_{0j} = \text{the constant of the model for a giving person j.} \]
\[ B_p = \text{n-x-1 matrix-vector with the } \beta_{\pi} \text{ parameters for all the variables measuring the impact of the evaluation of current economic and political conditions.} \]
\[ B_c = \text{n-x-1 matrix-vector with the } \beta_{\sigma} \text{ parameters for all the cultural variables.} \]
\[ B_s = \text{n-x-1 matrix-vector with the } \beta_{\eta} \text{ parameters for all the attitudinal transmission and mobilization variables.} \]
\[ \lambda_p = \text{1-x-n vector-matrix with all the } \lambda_{\pi} \text{ economic and political evaluation variables.} \]
\[ \kappa_c = \text{1-x-n vector-matrix with all the } \kappa_{\sigma} \text{ cultural variables.} \]
\[ \gamma_s = \text{1-x-n vector-matrix with all the } \gamma_{\eta} \text{ attitudinal transmission and mobilization variables.} \]

The model is intended to test the relative weight of the political variables versus the other two traditional explanations. If my claim about the centrality of the impact of the political past is correct, we should find that the following is true:
(a) The \( \det|B_p|=0 \); that is, any of the \( \beta_p \) parameters is statistically significant.

and;

(b) The \( \det|B_c|=0 \); that is, any of the \( \beta_q \) parameters is statistically significant.

and;

(c) The \( \det|B|=0 \); that is, some of the \( \beta_q \) parameters is statistically significant.

A less demanding formulation of these hypotheses will be the following:

d) The absolute value of the probabilities of the \( \gamma \) variables is greater than that of the \( \lambda_p \); that is, the influence of the socialization variables is greater than that of the current political and economic conditions.

e) The absolute value of the probabilities of the \( \gamma \) variables is greater than that of the \( \kappa_c \); that is, the influence of the socialization variables is greater than that of the current political and economic conditions.

Hypotheses (a) to (c) are maximalist positions in favor of the dominant role of political socialization and the effect of the political past; whereas (d) and (e) are more relative solutions, although accepting the predominant role of the socialization variables and political past variables in explaining political disaffection.

However, as I said before, living under democratic rule does not guaranty an increase in political affection or of any civic attitude. Time under democratic rule only produces citizens more attentive to performance when they evaluate current institutions and political representatives. If this is true, I have to add an additional hypothesis, especially for institutional disaffection. This hypothesis can be stated as follows:

f) The absolute value of the probabilities of the \( \gamma \) variables at \( t-1 \) is lower than those of \( t \); and at the same time, the probabilities of the \( \lambda_p \) variables at \( t-1 \) is greater than
those of t. That is, the influence of the socialization variables is lower as time passes under democratic rule, whereas the influence of current political and economic conditions tends to increase.

If my hypothesis about the weight of the political past in political disaffection is correct, we should find that hypotheses (a) to (c), or at least hypotheses (d) and (e), are confirmed; that is, the attitudinal transmission variables are the most important in predicting political disaffection during and after the transition and consolidation period in new democracies. This means that attitudinal transmission variables such as education and gender should be very important for both types of disaffection. Ideology should only matter in interaction with cohort, reflecting the effect of the political past (only in cases where there has been some intergenerational rupture and important mobilizing episodes such as in Spain before 1931 and Peru between 1968 and 1975). The sole effect of cohorts must also be present, demonstrating the existence of political generations and, therefore, the effect of politics in cases of some ‘generational effect’ due to important political episodes. Finally, and at the same time, variables measuring the performance or general functioning evaluation of the regime might have some impact, but it must be smaller.

If my hypothesis about the effect of time under democratic rule on political disaffection is correct, hypothesis (f) is confirmed; that is, the effect of democratic performance on institutional disaffection is greater over time as is the effect of political party membership on political engagement.

6.2 Exclusionary Democratic Politics, Demobilization and Political Disaffection in Spain

In this section, I am going to test the model in Spain. The large amount of survey data available to me allows me to illustrate and test the model extensively. Before testing the model, I am going to start with a brief discussion of the historical context in which political disaffection in Spain has developed.
6.2.1 The Historical Background in Spain

Political conditions in Spain over the last one hundred and fifty years have scarcely favored the development of positive attitudes towards democracy and its institutions. This historical background constitutes the political origin of the attitudes of disaffection found in the country. As Maravall has noted, in Spain too “the history of political instability, ideological tensions and prolonged periods of dictatorship which characterized Southern Europe as a whole hindered the construction of a social fabric favorable to democracy.”

The remarkable discontinuities in contemporary Spanish political life can easily be seen from the succession of political regimes that have existed in the twentieth century. The present democracy was preceded in turn by a democratic-oligarchic monarchy (1875-1923), a short military dictatorship (1923-1929), the conflict-prone II Republic (1931-1936), the Civil War (1936-1939), and the Franquist regime (1936/9-1975), which along with that of Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, was the longest lasting of all the dictatorships established in inter-war Europe. According to Colomer, Spain democratic history is an example of the “Latin model” of democratization, characterized by restrictive electoral and institutional rules set by minorities to manufacture majorities, that led to a continuous episodes of irreconcilable political confrontations and a history of threatened incumbent voters and rulers looking after authoritarian solutions in order to re-establish the old political order.

This political instability hindered the development of autonomous social organizations, the emergence and consolidation of nationwide political parties, and of traditions of cooperation between social and political elites. Moreover, this history of discontinuity was exacerbated by the fragility of Spain’s political parties and democratic institutions, as well as by the succession of sharp ruptures in the political elites. It should be emphasized, moreover, that this syndrome of discontinuity has affected the political parties and actors of both left and right. Historically speaking, the Right has defended antidemocratic political discourses and practices (a disloyal opposition). It was the principal forerunner of, and inspiration for, the political structure of the Canovist Restoration, (1875-

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26 Colomer, Political Institutions, pp. 58-60.
1923), an oligarchic and exclusive system of limited electoral participation and later fraudulent universal suffrage, based on an extensive network of political bosses and influence-trading known as "caciquismo." Traditionally the Left and the various labor organizations in Spain have been little different in this respect, however. As Álvarez Junco has noted in a stimulating study, the Spanish Left in this period was essentially characterized by what he calls the predominance of "anti-politicism: hostility towards political power (...) disdain for parliamentary politics, and the relegation of the institutional reform of the State in a democratic direction to a strictly secondary position."27 This anti-politicism was not simply the result of the exclusive character of the regime in this period, as it continued during the II Republic and would only lose force under Franquism. In fact, it was precisely during the dictatorship, that is, in a more exclusive context, that the labor movement adopted a much more explicitly pro-democratic position hindered by the long period under democratic opposition. The anti-politicism that did survive within the Left in this period basically represented vestiges of earlier libertarian, anarchist and revolutionary ideological traditions, although it is possible that Spain's relative economic backwardness also helped account for the weakness of the country's social organizations, the deficient articulation of the demands of many social groups, and the scant influence of those modernizing social leaders opposed to the powerful traditional oligarchy. The monarchical Restoration and Canovist political system led, therefore, to the consolidation of what Linz has identified as one of the distinctive features of interest politics in Spain: the primacy of politics over interests, of partisan cleavages over conflicts of interest, of political alignments over economic interests.28 This situation severely hindered the institutionalization of interest organizations and the consolidation of voluntary associations.

During the 1930s, the short-lived democratic experience of the II Republic saw a massive influx of members into social and political organizations. This organizational upsurge was fruit of intense mobilization, as well as of the extreme polarization of the interests and strategies of these organizations, their tendency to align with the parties in the


numerous conflicts of the period, and the growing polarization in the articulation of their demands. Once again, therefore, the political climate scarcely favored the political institutionalization of the various interest groups, or the consolidation of cooperative mechanisms other than the invariably exclusive political identities. Moreover, this period of Spanish history was also marked by the prevalence of anti-political discourses among the main actors of both right and left.

After the Civil War, the first fifteen years of the authoritarian regime saw the almost complete elimination of most of the surviving traditional organizations, the repression of opposition groups, and the establishment of a strict interventionist framework for those organizations that did manage to survive or establish themselves in these highly unfavorable circumstances. During this first phase of the Franquist dictatorship, only those organizations linked to the Church or the Falange were able to operate with any degree of autonomy. In 1961, there were only 8,329 officially registered voluntary associations in Spain, a figure which itself testifies to the poverty of the country’s associational life.69 During this period, the regime fiercely repressed republican, lay, democratic-liberal, labor, collectivist and regional-nationalist political and social organizations alike. From the 1960s onwards, however, the second phase of the Franquist dictatorship saw a number of significant changes that appear to have contributed to development of a richer associational life among young people. In 1964, the authoritarian regime introduced the Law of Associations, which put an end to the virtual duopoly exercised until then by the Church and the single party, the Falange. This new legal framework enabled the regime to direct a slight expansion in social organization lato sensu, while also facilitating the emergence of a substantial labor movement which, although operating within the institutions of the state and ever more dependent on the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, began to develop a more explicitly political discourse.70 These developments, however, brought no change in Franquist political discourse. Even in the final years of the regime, the official propaganda essentially continued to denounce any form of politics or representative institution.71 In fact, the


71 Aguilar, Memoria y Olvido de la Guerra Civil, Chap. 3.
authoritarian regime never abandoned its strategy of outright rejection of all types of participatory or political engagement other than within the hierarchical structures of the state. As a result, only a minority of Spaniards could be politically mobilized, whether for or against the regime: the vast majority of citizens showed all the signs of political detachment, passivity, and depolitization.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, the leading political actors in the opposition also found it difficult to completely abandon their traditional anti-political baggage, with the result that they too adopted a rather ambiguous, when not openly contradictory, discourse in this respect.\textsuperscript{33}

Ten years later, the success of the democratic transition required the formation of political parties and organizations, at the same time as the new climate of freedom favored the creation of associations of all kinds. Nonetheless, despite this undeniable wave of political mobilization, the transition was basically achieved through negotiations and agreements among the political elites.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, while this period certainly saw major mobilizations, these usually had essentially short-term goals and were suspended as soon as agreement had been reached among the party elites; hence, there was not enough time for participation to become institutionalized. As Álvarez Junco has argued, this defective institutionalization was also explained by three other characteristics of the transition.\textsuperscript{35} First, the political parties were the real protagonists of the process, to the extent that even the labor protests (which accounted for the majority of all mobilizations) were politically instrumentalized by the parties. Second, the most important party was the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), a political vehicle formed by a combination of reformists from within the regime and moderate opposition leaders. Third, one of the characteristics of Spanish political parties in this period was that power was concentrated in the hands of the national leaderships that exercised tight control of their organizations, even when these organizations

\textsuperscript{32} Instituto de Opinión Pública, "Cuestiones de Actualidad Política.\textquotedblleft, pp. 185-227.

\textsuperscript{33} Álvarez Junco, "Movimientos Sociales en España: Del Modelo Tradicional a la Modernidad Postfranquista," p. 430.


were dominated by the ideological members of the parties and the functioning was based on voluntary work. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized once again that, as noted in previous chapters, today's youngest citizens, that is, those who came of age in political terms in this period of Spanish history, are those who show the lowest level of disaffection. This implies that, at most, the transition should only be seen as responsible for failing to break this attitudinal syndrome of disaffection inherited from the past, while, overall it has spawned citizens who display a slightly lower level of political disaffection.

6.2.2 Institutional Disaffection, Political Disengagement and Ideology in Spain

I claim that this historical background might help account for the high levels of institutional disaffection and political disengagement seen in Spain. If this is true, and for the reasons discussed above, the negative influence that the political past has had on attitudes should have affected citizens on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Accordingly, citizens from both these two ideological spaces should not be expected to differ in terms of their confidence in representative institutions or their belief or opinion that politicians and the institutions are not very receptive to their demands. For generations, both ideological spaces have been dominated by an anti-political discourse that has been profoundly hostile to democratic institutions. Correlation data on ideology and institutional disaffection seem to fit these expectations. The uniform impact of the past on these attitudes can be seen from the complete lack of any relation between ideological self-placement and sense of external political efficacy (correlation 0.05), or between the former and the

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3 An example of this could be observed with the Ap between 1977 and 1982. See Elena M. García-Guerra, Factores externos e internos en la Transformación de los partidos políticos: el caso de AP-PP, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Avanzados Juan March, 31, 2002.

37 This lack of correlation could possibly have been due to the presence of a curvilinear relation. Confidence in Parliament or the level of external confidence could have been less at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. To test for this possibility, a logarithmic transformation was performed on ideology and the results were equally insignificant.

38 The datum is taken from CIS survey 1237
evaluation of various institutions of political representation, such as the parliament (0.01), the political parties (0.09), the judiciary (0.08) and the public administration (0.09). The same should not be the case, however, with respect to attitudes of political disengagement. Despite its clear anti-political discourse, and sometimes precisely because of it, the Left has tended to make greater resort to mobilizations than the Right, even if these have often primarily been conceived as a form of resistance to, or even a means of overthrowing, a particular regime or the existing exclusionary democratic rules. Such periods of greater mobilization by the Left than the Right took place most clearly in the run up to the II Republic and above all with the liberalization of the authoritarian regime and the consolidation of the political opposition during the 1960s. It is only to be expected, therefore, that citizens on the left feel at least a little more effective than those on the right.

The analysis of the data show that this is indeed the case, as the correlation between internal political efficacy and ideology is -0.190 and significant at p<0.01. In other words, leftwing Spaniards feel that they have a slightly greater capacity to understand and intervene in politics than their counterparts on the Right.

The impact of the afore described political past on the dimensions of political disaffection should be seen more clearly by examining the correlation between ideology and the sense of internal and external efficacy of the different political generations of Spaniards. Table 6.1, which gives the correlation between these two attitudes of political disaffection and ideology in each of the cohorts, is highly revealing in this respect. The data show that while the absence of a relationship between ideology and external efficacy is relatively consistent across all generations, the relation between internal efficacy and ideology varies in the different political generations. The existence of a negative relation (leftwing citizens feel more efficacious) coincides with the periods in which the Left mobilized to resist or try to change the regime: the years leading up to the II Republic (monarchy) and the period of the emergence of opposition to the regime within Spain itself (liberalization). Even the dominant passive resistance of the Left after the Civil War, or the more minoritarian but extreme and symbolic armed resistance among communist, left their mark on their higher level of political efficacy.

39 The datum is taken from the Spanish sample of the 1990-91 World Values Survey. In the CIS survey 2218, this relation is slightly greater and significant at 0.1.

40 The data are taken from CIS survey 2218.

41 The datum is taken from CIS survey 1237.
engagement among leftist Spanish of this generation (although these two disappear with the multivariable model I estimate below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Internal efficacy</th>
<th>External efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-0.29*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Republic and Civil War</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autarchy</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study 1,237, CIS.

TABLE 6.1 Relation between various indicators of disaffection and ideology by generation in Spain, 1980 (bivariate correlations)

This is not to suggest that more mobilizations did not take place in other periods. The II Republic, in particular, saw a major process of political mobilization, but crucially this involved both the Right and Left and was articulated around very clearly defined and exclusive partisan positions. These data on the relation between ideology and political engagement in the different generations merely confirm that during these periods of Spanish history mobilizations essentially involved the Left rather than the Right. This accounts for the relation between this attitude and ideology in these years which, in turn, testifies to the link between this attitude and political history, and more specifically, a connection with certain strategies and discourses of political mobilization from the past, which many times were pure reactions to the exclusionary democratic practices or the result of incentives from the democratic majoritarian institutional setting. For this very reason, is it hardly surprising that, as noted above, the Spaniards' sense of internal political efficacy and other attitudes measuring political disengagement display patterns of intergenerational change that are not found in the case of institutional disaffection. In other words, those periods in Spanish history that have seen the greatest political mobilizations have hindered the intergenerational transmission of Spaniards' historically weak sense of political engagement. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the generations which shows the largest generational rupture are the ones...
who experienced the periods of major political mobilization after periods of demobilization: the civil war generation, which experienced their period of political maturation mostly during the Second Republic and the Civil War; and the liberalization generation which matured politically while the Franquist regime was in the liberalization process and major political contestation against the regime was organized (go back to table 5.2). However, it should also be noted that these mobilizations have had a limited effect, mainly because they have been marked by discontinuity and anti-politicism, and confined to sporadic and short-lived spurts which were never enough to ensure the institutionalization of political participation or democratic contestation.

6.2.3 The Model for Political Disaffection in Spain

6.2.3.1 Testing the Model During the Consolidation of Democracy

Table 6.2 shows the results of the estimation of this model for both dimensions of political disaffection (lack of external and internal political efficacy) for 1980, confirming hypotheses (d) and (e).\(^{42}\) The first column of the table shows that the variables measuring distinct socializing experiences, the attitudinal transmission variables, are the best predictors of political disengagement, which appears, therefore, to be a product of intergenerational transmission. The explanatory capacity of these three variables (education, gender and frequency of discussion of politics during childhood) is enormous in comparison to that of the other variables included in the model. That is, the data indicate that men, the most educated respondents, and those exposed to political discussions in their childhood, tend to feel more effective or better able to understand and influence politics. This finding can be seen more clearly by focusing on the figure in the final column, which gives the difference

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\(^{42}\) In 1980, the question on personal economic situation, regime performance and government evaluation were slightly different. For personal economic situation the question 44a of CIS study 1237 reads: “We would like to know how you think things are going for you and your family. Specifically, how would you rate, between 0 and 10, your financial situation today?” For the regime overall performance the question reads: “Five years ago, when Franco died, very few people had a clear idea of what was going to happen in this country. In general, without going into details, how do you think things have gone: better, the same, or worse than you expected?” Government evaluation was measured by the extent to which the respondent feels that s/he has benefited or been harmed by the government and its actions. Question 24 of the same study reads: “Do you think the government is good for you, bad for you or neither good nor bad for you?” For the rest of years it was measured by the simple evaluation of the government performance.
between the estimated probability when the independent variable is at its lowest and highest values and all the other variables are kept constant. The first predictive variable is mobilization, that is, membership in unions and/or political parties and it goes in the negative direction, that is, political disaffection is reduced by the effect of past and current membership on political parties and unions. Membership in political parties is not a source of frustration, but a source of greater political involvement.

I find that ideology has no impact in itself, but does have an effect in interaction with some of the cohorts. In other words, this finding confirms a point discussed above, insofar as it shows, once again, the effect of the different periods of mobilization and some limited generational change. In this sense, the effect that ideology can be seen to have on internal efficacy in the case of the oldest generation, that of the "monarchy," is particularly illustrating. As I have discussed before, this was a period of important political mobilization by political parties and social actors of the Left as a reaction, among other things, to decades of political exclusion. Moreover, intergenerational differences are significant (the cohorts coefficients are statistically significant), showing the influence of other political factors not captured by the variables in the model, but manifested by existing political generations. On the other hand, none of the independent variables that measure the evaluation of the functioning of the system show any significant impact, and only respondents' level of personal material satisfaction explains to an important degree current levels of political disengagement. From the variables included to measure current political conditions and government performance, only the latter have some impact on institutional disaffection. Ideological distance from the mean seems to have some impact on political engagement, but it is minor, and it can be argued that this variable also contains the effect of past political events. The only unexpected surprise is the weight of social trust, showing an important effect of some kind of cultural legacy, and refuting hypothesis (c).

Similar results are obtained with the estimation of this model for institutional disaffection (lack of external efficacy) as the dependent variable, confirming the major hypotheses. As can be seen in the second column of Table 6.2, the attitudinal transmission and mobilization variables are, once again, the best predictors of the dependent variable. In other words, those who say that their family discussed politics during their childhood, the

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better educated, and men feel that they can influence the system and that the authorities will take note of their opinion. Participation experiences in political organizations also increase trust in politicians and representative institutions, and not the other way around.

There are, however, some differences with respect to the model estimated with the 1980 data. The first one refers to the lack of any 'generational effect.' It also should be noted that ideology and the ideology-cohort interaction have absolutely no significance. In other words, present political competition and the scant and discontinuous episodes of political mobilization that appear to have an impact on political engagement do not appear to have any appreciable impact on institutional disaffection. Nor are there any cohorts effects, hence the intergenerational continuity shown by this variable.

In fact, besides the variables measuring different socializing experiences and the effect of party and union membership, only government evaluation, measured by the feeling of being damaged by its decisions, and personal economic situation have any explanatory power. Furthermore, in the latter case the sign of the coefficient shows that personal satisfaction increases the lack of trust in politicians and not the other way around as expected. Finally, again, the only presence of some kind of cultural legacy is represented by the effect of social trust, and against hypothesis (c).
Dependent variable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. distance</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime functioning</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General econ. evaluation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation</td>
<td>-0.51*</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime functioning</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General econ. evaluation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudinal

Transmission variables:

| Frequency of political discussion during childhood | -0.35* | 0.70 | -0.31 |
| Gender | -0.65* | 0.52 | -0.17 |
| Education | -0.17* | 0.84 | -0.26 |
| Cohort 2 (transition) Reference | Reference |
| Cohort 3 (liberaliza.) | -0.94** | 0.39 | -0.10 |
| Cohort 4 (autarchy) | -0.77*** | 0.46 | -0.05 |
| Cohort 5 (civil war) | -2.41* | 0.09 | |
| Cohort 6 (monarchy) | -2.41* | 0.09 | |
| Cohort 2 ideology | Reference |
| Cohort 3 ideology | 0.17*** | 1.18 | 0.08 |
| Cohort 4 ideology | 0.17*** | 1.18 | 0.08 |
| Cohort 5 ideology | 0.17*** | 1.18 | 0.08 |
| Cohort 6 ideology (party+union) | 0.53* | 1.70 | 0.31 |
| Mobilization | 0.37* | 0.69 | -0.30 |
| Social trust | -0.28** | 0.76 | -0.09 |
| Constant | 2.33* |

Chi-square of model | 229.3* (d.f. 18) |
-2log likelihood | 1541.5 (1381)
R² Nagelkerke | 0.21 (1350)

Source, CIS, Study 1,237.

(*) Significant at p<0.01
(**) Significant at p<0.10

(1) This column shows the difference between the estimated probability when the independent variable is at its lowest value and the others remain constant at the mean, and the same probability when the value of the independent variable is at its highest value. This is known as the "first difference;" see Gary King, Unifying political methodology. The likelihood theory of statistical inference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 107-108.

TABLE 6.2 Model to explain political disaffection in Spain, 1980 (only significant logistic regression coefficients)
It can be seen, therefore, that the disaffection found among Spaniards in the early 1980s seems to be essentially the result of the impact of the political past transmitted over the generations, although with some important and significant differences. For instance, the perceptions of how much citizens feel listened to by political authorities (external political efficacy) are mostly the byproduct of primary socializing agents. However, to what extent citizens consider themselves capable of understanding and influencing politics (internal political efficacy) varies more across the different generations, reflecting the different waves of political mobilization, some of which are more apparent because they largely or exclusively involved citizens and organizations from just one side of the ideological spectrum. The conclusion about the dominant effect of the political past through reproduction and transmission in no way implies agreement with the notion that Spaniards share some kind of distinctive psychological trait. Nor should be it interpreted as a defense of a causal model in which attitudes have an exogenous character. In fact, the core of my argument focuses on the relation between citizen's perceptions and political events in the past, and in particular citizen's previous direct and indirect experiences of political and social institutions, and the way these condition their interpretation of politics in the present. In no way does this mean, moreover, that attitudes cannot change. Rather, politics can provoke small and incremental changes as is shown by the effect of past mobilization and current political mobilization.

6.2.3.2 Testing the Model After Twenty Years of Democratic Functioning

It might be argued that the previous finding is due to the short length of time Spaniards have experienced the current democratic setting. How has the sustained operation and successful performance of democratic institutions affected these attitudes of disaffection after twenty years of democratic rule? Apparently, and as we saw in preceding chapters, the distribution of these attitudes has scarcely changed over the course of the last twenty years of democracy in Spain. However, this apparent stability in fact masks a significant change. This is a qualitative change that can be seen in the nature of these attitudes, or more precisely, in the variables that affect their stability after a number years of experience of democracy. As seen above, data from the late 1970s and early 1980s confirms that the attitudes of
disaffection found in Spain have been shaped by the mechanisms of attitudinal transmission and reproduction. Over the years, however, as is the case in other, longer established democracies, these same attitudes have also been affected by a number of other variables relating to the perceived functioning and/or achievements of the system. The variables measuring different socializing experiences are still the dominant ones, but these other variables tend to gain greater importance, especially for institutional disaffection. Political disengagement depends more on current mobilization strategies. Another attitudinal consequence of time under democratic rule is that the ‘generational effect,’ included to track the effect of specific political past events, tends to vanish.

The estimation of a very similar model with the 1995 Spanish data⁴⁴ (Table 6.3) —after twenty years under democratic rule— suggests a confirmation of hypotheses (d) and (e); that is, political socialization is still the factor with the greatest influence on political engagement (gender and, above all, education). However, there are substantial differences with respect to 1980. Almost twenty years of democracy has removed virtually all traces of the influence of past episodes of mobilization by the Left which, as we have seen above, previously had a notable impact on the relation between ideology and internal efficacy in at least some generations of Spaniards.

For institutional disaffection displays a different picture. Education is important, but one regime performing and two government evaluation variables are equally important. The former, measured by respondents’ evaluation of the degree of individual freedom and social inequality in Spain compared to ten years earlier, is a significant variable in explaining disaffection. However, although significant, this is of only limited importance, as can be seen from the low probability, as well as from the fact that while 73% of Spaniards consider that there was greater liberty in 1995 than ten years earlier (compared to only 6.2% who believe the opposite), their sense of internal and external efficacy remains quite low. Weaker still is

⁴⁴ Data are taken from CIS study 2154. The major changes of the model are, frequency of political discussion during childhood is not present, neither social trust. I was able to add some variables on performing such as general economic condition, and the increase of freedom and equality in the last 10 years: “Would you say there is more or less individual liberty today in Spain than ten years ago?” To assess social inequality, the question was: “Compared with ten years ago, do you believe social inequalities in Spain have increased or decreased?” For the general regime functioning, I use the question: “Thinking concretely about the functioning of our democracy, with which of the following statements do you most agree: Our democracy functions well. Our democracy has many problems but functions acceptably well. Our democracy functions very poorly?” Evaluation of the government is measured by a question on approval of Felipe Gonzalez’ Government. Social and political mobilization now includes membership in political parties, unions and other voluntary organizations.
the effect of the perception of social inequalities, even if it is true that those respondents who declared that inequalities had decreased over the course of the previous decade tended to feel more effective.

It is very interesting to notice the change after 15 years under democratic rule. Unlike in the newly established democracy in 1980, in 1995 some of the variables measuring the subjective assessment of the achievements of the system and government performance are significant to explain political disaffection: The respondents' evaluation of the overall or personal economic situation, government evaluation (although with different signs) and, albeit slightly less strongly, their evaluation of the functioning of democracy. However, the impact of these variables is greater for institutional affection. At the same time, in 1995, all the generational effects have disappeared even for political engagement.

It seems, according to the results, that hypothesis (f) is confirmed. However, the picture is not so clear-cut. The passage of time might be favoring the incremental weight of performance in explaining both dimensions of political disaffection, but for political engagement, education shows an even greater impact. The average probability of feeling disaffected decreases to a 0.7 from the least educated to the most educated ones. The socialization effects encapsulated on education are becoming stronger showing that the political structure of opportunities might be currently reproducing the high levels of political disengagement in Spain. This is a topic of future research, but it seems that despite the increasing role played by performance, political disengagement, contrary to institutional disaffection, is increasingly the result of socialization under the current political system and its structure of opportunities.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable: lack of internal political efficacy</th>
<th>Dependent variable: lack of external political efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime functioning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (freedom)</td>
<td>-0.12*** 0.88 -0.10</td>
<td>-0.18* 0.83 -0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (equality)</td>
<td>-0.14* 0.87 -0.05</td>
<td>-0.34* 0.71 -0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal econ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
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<td>General econ.</td>
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<td>evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>evaluation</td>
<td>-0.16** 0.85 -0.17</td>
<td>-0.42* 0.65 -0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission variables</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of political discussion during childhood</td>
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<td>n.i</td>
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<td>-0.08* 0.93 -0.20</td>
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<td>Cohort 6 (monarchy)</td>
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<td>Referen.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Referen.</td>
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<td>3.25*</td>
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<td>162.9* (d.f. 19)</td>
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<td>-2log likelihood</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(2547)</td>
<td>(2453)</td>
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</table>

Source: CIS, Study 2,154.

(*) Significant at p<0.01 (**) Significant at p<0.05 (***): Significant at p<0.10
(1) See table 6.2 for an explanation.

**TABLE 6.3 Model to explain political disaffection in Spain, 1995 (logistic regression)**
In short, political disaffection is essentially a product of the political past that is transmitted from generation to generation, even if some attitudes have changed slightly under the impact of certain political events in the past. While the transition to democracy failed to break this circle, it alone is by no means responsible for the existence of a syndrome of political disaffection in Spain. Indeed, the generation of the transition displays the least disaffection of all those considered here. On the other hand, time under democratic rule is having an effect on political disaffection. The functioning of the democratic system and its achievements has an increasing quantitative impact on citizens’ political affection. While this is certainly a highly significant qualitative change, it is still only relative, for as we can see there is very low correspondence between the level of growth and prosperity seen in the last twenty years of democracy in Spain and citizens’ evaluation of the political institutions, their political representatives, or of democracy as a whole. Nonetheless, this change does suggest that it is possible to find mechanisms impact this syndrome of disaffection through political mobilization and participation, the creation of positive images of the mechanism of political representation and achievement of certain goals valued by citizens. Moreover, the potential to do so appears all the greater for institutional disaffection given that these changes can be seen to be affecting citizens independently of their level of education. This is not the case for political disengagement.

6.3 Testing the Model of Political Disaffection in other New Democracies

In this section, I test the same model for two other Southern European and four Latin American new democracies. For Greece and Portugal 1985, I have used the Four Nation Study, and for Greece 1996, the CNEP data. Some variables in the model are not included in these surveys, but enough were available to test the model. For Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, I have used the 1997 WVS. I created only four cohorts to measure the impact of

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45 Although not displayed here, the analysis of the data also demonstrates the lack of interaction with level of education.

46 The five variables not included in the 1985 FNS data are general and personal evaluation of the current economic situation, government or incumbent authorities evaluation, social trust and frequency of political discussion during childhood. The CNEP data for Greece in 1996 included all the relevant variables except social trust.

47 In the models for these four countries the dependent variable are salience of politics for political engagement.
intergenerational change in Greece and Portugal, and three in the Latin American countries.

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 contain the estimation for both dimensions of political disaffection in Greece and Portugal; and Tables 6.6 and 6.7 for the four Latin American countries. For all these countries, the data show a confirmation of hypotheses (d) and (e) --the greater importance of the variables reflecting the influence of the political past through direct socialization or the imprint of different political episodes. In Portugal and Greece for 1985, there is even the confirmation of hypotheses (a) and (b); that is, political disengagement in Greece and Portugal is solely the product of the variables that indirectly measure the effects of distinct socializing experiences and the other variables included to track the heritage of

and confidence in democratic institutions for political affection.

In Greece, age has been grouped in four different generations. The fourth, and oldest, consist of those Greeks socialized prior to 1941. This generation witnessed a very convulsive political epoch, including the appearance of Venezolism under the Monarchy, the Republic (1924-1936), and the dictatorship of Metaxas (1936-1941). The third and next oldest generation began its life under German occupation, until 1944, followed by the Civil War (1944-1949), and the subsequent political instability which lasted until 1952. The second generation was socialized under the experience of the political stability of the democratic regime in place between 1952 and 1967, a regime which, though restricted and exclusionary in nature, brought great cultural and economic change. This generation then experienced the dictatorship of the Coronels (1967-1974). Finally, the first and youngest generation knows the democratic experience initiated by Karamanlis in 1974. In Portugal, four groups were also created. The oldest generation, the fourth, was socialized under the monarchy until the assassination of King Carlos in 1908, the installation of the Republic in 1910 and its fall during a military coup in 1926. The third generation was socialized under the political repression of the Salazar regime and the economic stagnation that was the product of his anti-liberal economic reforms. The second generation experienced the opening of the regime to the outside world, with its entrance into the United Nations in 1955, and the Colonial War that began in 1963. This generation witnessed the economic growth of the 1970s, fueled by the revitalization of the economies of the African colonies and the money brought in by Portuguese immigrants taking advantage of European economic growth and Caetano’s liberalization of the regime following the Colonial War and Salazar’s resignation due to illness. The youngest generation, the first, has known the installation of democracy following the revolution of April 1974. As with the Spanish case, cohorts were grouped taking into account the stage of the “most impressionable years” (17-25), an approach discussed in detail previously.

In all cases studied, three cohorts were created representing those socialized prior to the installation of the final non-democratic regime, those socialized during the authoritarian regime and those socialized since the installation of the democracy. In Uruguay and Chile, the first period is one of normal successful democratic rule, whereas for Brazil and Peru are periods of continuous alternation of military rule and pseudo-democratic regimes. In the case of Brazil, the three cohorts are: The third and oldest, prior to the final authoritarian experience (prior to 1966); the second, final authoritarian regime (1966-1985); and the first, democracy (1985, the year in which Tancredo Neves, the first civilian president, was elected, although Sarney held office due to Neves’ sudden death). In the case of Chile, the three cohorts are: Third and oldest, prior to the final authoritarian experience (prior to 1973); second, final authoritarian regime (1973-1989); and first, democracy (1989-1995). In the case of Uruguay, the three cohorts are: Prior to the final authoritarian experience (prior to 1973); final authoritarian regime (1973-1985); and Democracy (1985-1997). For Peru, the three cohorts are: Third and oldest, prior to the arrival of Velasco to power (prior 1968); second, the military rule under the populist and mobilizing regime of Velasco and five years more under Morales Bermúdez (1968-1980); third, the re-establishment of democracy (1980-1997). Cohorts were grouped taking into account the stage of the “most impressionable years.”
specific political episodes of the past. The major exception to this general confirmation is institutional disaffection in Latin America. This dimension of political disaffection depends more on regime performance and government evaluation. This can be interpreted as a rejection of hypotheses (d) and (e) for this dimension of disaffection, or perhaps is due to the effect of time under democratic rule (confirming hypothesis f). There is no way to know which one is correct with the data available.

There is another major exception to the confirmation of the hypotheses that we have already noticed in Spain: Social trust is significant and reduces political disaffection when data on this variable is available. The influence is not very strong, but shows that political disaffection is fostered by a lack of social trust, reflecting a small but significant negative cultural legacy from the past. This finding confirms the pool analysis findings in chapter four and refutes for new democracies claims made about the lack of relationship between social trust and political disaffection.

Education has enormous explanatory power with respect to disaffection in Portugal and Greece, and is important in the countries of Latin America, again with the exception of institutional disaffection in some Latin America countries. In Greece and Portugal 1985, the effect of gender is also important. Political disaffection in all these countries is much lower among men and the higher educated. These means, as discussed earlier, that there is an important attitudinal transmission of the political legacies of the past, although probably fostered by current political settings.
### TABLE 6.4 Model to explain political disengagement in Portugal 1985 and Greece, 1985 and 1996 (logistic regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greece 1985</th>
<th>Greece 1996</th>
<th>Portugal 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coeffi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Odds ratios</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. distance Regime function. (2)</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situat.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General econ. evalu.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal Transmission variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of political discussion</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
<td>-0.85**</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>-1.18*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>-0.81**</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 4</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co1xideol.</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Co4xideol.</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.73*</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<td>Union</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asocce</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.81*</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Four Nation Study and CNEP.

(*) Significant at p<0.01  (***) Significant at p<0.05  (***) Significant at p<0.10

1. See table 6.2 for an explanation.

2. I use the indicator about how democracy can resolve problems.

Dependent variable: lack of internal political efficacy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Greece 1985</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Greece 1996</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Portugal 1985</th>
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<td>-0.20***</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
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<tr>
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Source: Four Nation Study and CNEP.

(*) Significant at p<0.01; (**) Significant at p<0.05; (****) Significant at p<0.10
1. See table 6.2 for an explanation.
2. I use the indicator about how democracy can resolve problems.

Dependent variable: lack of internal political efficacy.

TABLE 6.5 Model to explain institutional disaffection in Portugal 1985 and Greece, 1985 and 1996 (logistic regression)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Independent variables</strong></th>
<th><strong>Brazil</strong></th>
<th><strong>Chile</strong></th>
<th><strong>Peru</strong></th>
<th><strong>Uruguay</strong></th>
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<td>0.05***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. functioning (1)</td>
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<td>0.06***</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. functioning (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>General econ. evaluation (5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation (6)</td>
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<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>Attitudinal Transmission variables:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Frequency of discussion</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colxideol.</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rel. Org</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asocc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.84*</td>
<td>1.32*</td>
<td>1.54*</td>
<td>2.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1220)</td>
<td>(1079)</td>
<td>(1002)</td>
<td>(1155)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WVS.

(*) Significant at p<0.01

(**) Significant at p<0.05

(*** ) Significant at p<0.10

(1) I have used a question on corruption V213.
(2) I have used a general question on how the economy performs under democratic rule V160.
(3) I have used a general question on how the public order is maintained under democratic rule V162.
(4) I have also used a general question on personal financial satisfaction V64.
(5) In this case, I have used the question on poverty V171.
(6) Question on incumbent satisfaction, V165.

Dependent variable: Salience of Politics V7.

**TABLE 6.6 Model to explain political disengagement in Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, Portugal 1997 (OLS regression)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05**</td>
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<td>1. distance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. functioning (1)</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. functioning (2)</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg. functioning (3)</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation (4)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation (6)</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal Transmission variables:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of discussion</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.32*</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colxideol.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co2xideol.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co3xideol.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
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<td>Asocc.</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.71*</td>
<td>-1.01*</td>
<td>-1.49*</td>
<td>-1.10*</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1229)</td>
<td>(1072)</td>
<td>(964)</td>
<td>(1172)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WVS.

(1) I have used a question on corruption V213.
(2) I have used a general question on how the economy performs under democratic rule V160.
(3) I have used a general question on how the public order is maintained under democratic rule V162.
(4) I have also used a general question on personal financial satisfaction V64.
(5) In this case, I have used the question on poverty V171.
(6) Question on incumbent satisfaction, V165.

Dependent variable: Institutional Confidence Index.

**TABLE 6.7 Model to explain institutional disaffection in Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, Portugal 1997 (OLS regression)**

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It is also important to point out the significance of some 'generational effects.' Interaction between cohorts and ideology in many countries are important, reflecting the effect of past political mobilization periods on political engagement. This is substantially important for the third cohort in Greece and second generation in Peru, demonstrating that the citizens of these generations that position themselves on the Left feel remarkably more able to understand and play an active role in politics. In Greece, this is the generation of intense political mobilization by Communists during the German occupation, the Civil War (1944-1949), and the subsequent political instability which lasted until 1952. In Peru, the second generation is the one socialized under the Velasco’s populist dictatorship, a period of great mobilization for the Left. Peru also confirms the socialization effects of the mobilization strategies adopted by this populist regime, as demonstrated by Stokes. The greater mobilization efforts by the Left have also left a mark on levels of political engagement in other generations in Greece (second one), Peru (first one), and even in Portugal (second one), but they are not as remarkable.

Finally, many cohorts are also statistically significant, reflecting additional generational effects in terms of political disaffection. For instance, in Chile the authoritarian experience has left a political generation that displays much lower confidence in democratic institutions. This is also the case in Portugal, although the effect is much lower. However, in some countries, and contrary to what is normally maintained, the generations that were socialized under the current democracy tend to have greater, or at least the same, confidence in institutions that those of the past. In Peru and Brazil, the confidence of the youngest generation has increased. Although, in Brazil, this same generation displays in Brazil lower levels of political engagement. In Peru, again the second and first generations are the ones with higher political engagement.

The estimation of the model with the 1996 Greek data partially confirms hypothesis (f), that is, while it is true that the performance variables have greater predicting capacity for political disengagement, like in Spain, a substantial increasing influence of education is also seen. Economy and governance become relevant in 1996. It seems that in Greece the

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51 Stokes, Cultures in Conflict. Social Movements and the State in Peru.

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performance of the system will have increasingly more to say in the levels of institutional disaffection.

Finally, it is important to point out that for all dimensions, countries and years, party membership tends to reduce political disaffection substantially. Again, this fact shows the importance of political parties mobilization. The experience of participating in political parties under current conditions does not produce frustration and distancing from the system: On the contrary, the more citizens take part in these political organizations, the more politically competent they feel and the more they get engaged in politics. As in the past, politics and political parties are the solution and the problem of the current distance between citizens and their representatives and institutions. Political disaffection might be the result of past politics of political exclusion, manipulation and anti-democratic discourses, but it can be changed by politics and the current political parties.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed and developed a model to test the relative weight of the three major hypotheses proposed to explain political disaffection. I have shown that the attitudinal legacy produced by past political episodes of political exclusion, mobilization and demobilization, and discourses against institutions of representation are the dominant factors explaining the high levels of political disaffection at the individual level in new democracies. The other two hypotheses, the cultural and performance ones, are not totally discarded, but they are very weak in explaining political disaffection in these democracies. The national level analysis presented in the previous pages confirms the findings in chapters three and four, including also the unexpected influence of social trust. This is not a dominant factor in explaining political disaffection, but it is, contrary to what is seen in older democracies, a significant one, displaying the effect of some negative cultural legacy of general mistrust.

However, this is not a culturally deterministic argument. One of the major findings is the important role played by political parties in producing less disaffection. Present strategies of political mobilization by these collective actors have the potential to significantly reduce political disaffection, and they are not the source of current frustration. The other important finding against cultural determinism is that the passage of time under democratic rule increases the weight of the evaluation of government performance in
explaining political disaffection, in detriment of the generational effect and the attitudinal transmission variables.
CHAPTER 7

THE TRANSITION EFFECT: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE NEW REGIME

In previous chapters I developed and tested a model to show the influence of the political past on political disaffection through socialization. In the present chapter I study at the individual level the other two dimensions of political support in democratic regimes: Support for democracy and political satisfaction. The multivariate analysis of these two attitudinal dimensions will reveal quite different results from those for political disaffection, again confirming the different nature of these three dimensions. We have seen in chapter five that in Spain attitudes of discontent reveal a complete lack of cohort effect. This is because political satisfaction and, its opposite, political discontent are highly linked at the individual level to day-by-day partisan evaluations and opinions in new democracies. Support for democracy, on the other hand, displays a cohort effect with patterns of intergenerational change similar to those observed in some attitudes of disaffection. However, unlike the findings for disaffection, intergenerational differences and transmission are unable to explain the current levels of support for Spain’s current democratic regime. Even in those generations that are least willing to support the current regime, the majority of citizens still do so. This is due to the fact that the majoritarian support for democracy found in many of these regimes is the result of an attitudinal change that took place during the transition to democracy, a phenomenon which I term the ‘transition effect.’ The ‘transition effect’ depends on the national politics during the transition and consolidation period and the existence of an elite settlement or convergence of some sort towards democracy.1 This ‘transition effect’ is also contingent upon a set of political factors related with the nature, performance, and legitimizing discourse of the previous

non-democratic regime, as well as the type of transition. In this chapter, I attempt to
demonstrate the crucial importance of this ‘transition effect’ in explaining the existence of
majoritarian support for democracy in new democracies. The ‘transition effect’ is also
essential in building the “safe area” that guarantees democratic support does not depend on the
absence of economic and political crises, their social consequences or even the presence of
high political conflict produced by the day-to-day political competition. The existence of this
‘transition effect’ fosters democratic consolidation. A final conclusion to this chapter will be
that politics can also produce dramatic and rapid attitudinal changes in some dimensions of
political support.

7.1 Politics and Support for the Democratic Regime in New Democracies

Very different hypotheses have been put forward to explain how support for democratic
regimes is sustained and, to a lesser extent, generated. On the whole, these hypotheses can be
divided into three categories or types: Socio-cultural explanations, macro or micro-economic
explanations, and political explanations. Advocates of the socio-cultural theories maintain that
as a society modernizes, its citizens tend to give more support to democratic systems and to
moderate their political positions. Another socio-cultural explanation stems from the systemic
tradition cultivated by Easton, who argued that the degree of support for a political regime is
determined by a long and complex process which depends on the success of the agents of
socialization “in producing children who acquire positive sentiments towards it.” It can be
seen, therefore, that the distinguishing characteristic of these explanations is their preference to
long-term processes of economic, social and cultural change.

Second, and again as was also the case with respect to disaffection, there are those
theories which center on the importance of the economic results of democratic regimes.
According to the proponents of these interpretations, the stability of citizens’ support for a
democratic regime depends on their assessment of government performance and the economic

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2 Other classics, in addition to those cited earlier, are J.R., Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966; and Lipset,
Political Man, pp. 78-79.

3 Easton and Dennis. Children and the Political System, p. 5.

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and social achievements. In this case, citizens' expectations of constant economic growth and
general prosperity would increase the potential for declining democratic support.  

Political explanations, in contrast, highlight the importance of much more immediate
processes and are attributed to three types of political factors. The first concerns what I have
termed above "institutional factors." Proponents of "institutional explanations" maintain that a
decline in support for a regime may be due to the character of its party system, governmental
instability, national politics or the nature of the governments resulting from the changing
parliamentary majorities. The second type of political explanation focuses on the role of the
political opposition. Above all, it is concerned with the type of opposition --loyal, semi-loyal
or disloyal-- practiced by the leading political actors, especially during periods of crisis. Finally, the third type of political explanation appeals to the notion of "democratic overload." In this version of events, political discontent would be the result of citizens "overloading" democratic systems with their expectations, a tendency which gives them the sensation that governments are not responding to their needs and expectations. This type of interpretation also leads to a more general theory proclaiming the "legitimacy crisis" of contemporary representative democracies.

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4 Much of this literature has been cited previously, but the classics are: O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State; Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State; and Habermas, Legitimation Crisis; Lipset, The Political Man.
7 Rose and Mishler, "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis," p. 50.
9 The importance of these types of opposition for democratic stability can be seen in Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration, pp. 28-45; Ekkart Zimmerman and Thomas Saafield, "Economic and Political Reactions to the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s in Six European Countries," International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1988, pp. 305-334.
10 Evidence against the existence of a general tendency for democratic legitimacy to deteriorate can be seen in Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson, "Support for the Democratic System," pp. 323-353.
However, none of these different theories serve to analyze the emergence and stability of support for democracy in newly established democracies. This is mainly because nearly all the various types of interpretation are concerned with the question of how to sustain support for long-established democratic regimes. In contrast, except for few exceptions, they have little or nothing to say about how support may be generated for a regime during its installation and consolidation. Moreover, with the exception of the literature on political opposition in inter-war Europe and recent transitions in central and Eastern Europe, the political explanations put forward in the studies of democratic support mentioned above are invariably based on the analysis of cases of representative democracies which have existed for half a century or more; that is, democracies whose citizens only have experience of democratic politics and who cannot imagine it being replaced by any other type of regime. The problem is, of course, that citizens of new democracies do have direct or indirect experience with different political regimes. In contrast to those who have only known democratic institutions, they have accumulated experience of at least one other type of political regime, which serves as a point of reference when it comes to evaluating the recently (re-)established system.

The literature on new democracies either pays little attention to this subject (in some cases considering that democracy can be established and consolidated without democrats) or, when it does so, tends to offer very different, when not actually conflicting, explanations for how majority support is generated for the new regimes. However, recent research has shown that when such support comes to exist among the citizens of a country, the result is a small "safe area" which mostly depends on citizens' negative evaluation of the previous political regimes leaving the support for the new regime relatively immune from the

11 Together with the famous Rustow article this literature constitutes the theoretical foundation on which theories of political transition, and the role played by political elites in such transitions, have been formed. See Rustow, Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics, 2, 1970, pp. 337-363.
For a discussion of this topic, see Felipe Agüero and Mariano Torcal, "Elites, Factores Estructurales y Democratización: Una Discusión de Aportes Recientes en la Literatura," Revista de Estudios Políticos, 80, 1993, pp. 329-350.


13 Among many others, see Di Palma, To Craft Democracies; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. For an argument refuting this idea from the point of view of the rational election paradigm, see Barry H. Weingast. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and The Rule of Law," American Political Science Review, 91, 1997: 245-263.
functioning of the system, its social and economic results, or the support given to different political options.\textsuperscript{14}

This argument might sound somehow tautological and in fact the comparative approval of both regimes is part of the definition of support for democracy discussed in the introduction. It is true that the degree of support for the new regime depends on the rejection of the preceding non-democratic one, but they are not exactly the reverse side of the same coin and the latter does not constitute a precondition for democratic support.\textsuperscript{15} Some people might positively value the experience of the non-democratic regime and consider it as a necessary step towards modernity and progress at that time, while giving total support to the current democratic regime.\textsuperscript{16} However, what is new in my argument here is that the degree of reaction to the preceding regime and acceptance of the new one by the public depends on the politics during the transition and consolidation.\textsuperscript{17} The rejection of the previous regime, and hence, approval of the present system, is not the product of individual experience of the previous and current regimes, but rather reflects an attitudinal change springing from the essentially political experience of the transition to, and consolidation of, the new democracies, a change in which the most important political and social actors and elites play a leading role. The existence of some sort of elite settlement or convergence for the new regime will not only influence the consolidation of the new regime,\textsuperscript{18} but also the ideological sector of citizenship that support the new regime and the reasons behind that support. An elite settlement or foundational pact is not necessary for a 'transition effect' to take place. The effect may be also resulted from the politics of democratic elite convergence. Thus, only exclusionary foundational pacts or the lack of any political convergence might leave some sector of the ideological spectrum reluctant to support a regime that could represent a threat to their interest, leaving the new regime not only without the support of some important sector of society, as has occurred many times in the

\textsuperscript{14} This is the main point of recent work carried out by Rose and Mishler in Eastern Europe. According to these authors, interpretation of the non-democratic past and support for the present democratic system depend fundamentally on what they call the legacy of the communist past. See, Rose and Mishler, "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis," pp. 44-50, and also Duch, "Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes," pp. 121-158. For a similar argument with respect to Southern Europe, see Morlino and Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy," pp. 231-260.


\textsuperscript{16} For a similar argument see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 144-147.

\textsuperscript{17} For a very similar argument see Rose and Mishler, "Testing the Churchill Hypothesis," p. 50.

past, but more importantly, without the “safety net.” In this case, the new regime will be evaluated more on the basis of its performance in comparison with the preceding one, or at least in pure performance terms.

Obviously, the protagonists of the transition do not have a completely free hand when it comes to creating and recreating citizens’ rejection of the preceding regime and support for the new one. Rather, the possibilities for producing the attitudinal change are not only dependant on the existence of a foundational pact or elite convergence, but also to a large extent are highly influenced by a series of political factors, and above all, by the legitimizing discourse of the previous regime, by citizens’ perception of the previous regime’s successes and failures and the reasons for and the nature of its collapse. All these factors condition the possibility of the existence of a foundational democratic pact and of a consensual return to political competition and, also, the extension of the support for the new regime among all the partisan and ideological positions. For example, Brazilians did profess majoritarian support for democratic institutions prior to the military coup in 1964, as confirmed the following year by the overwhelming electoral defeat of Alianza Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), the military government party. However, by 1972-3, following the regime’s relative ‘success’ and much intense propaganda, these same citizens switched their majoritarian support to the military government and its policies.19 This support then subsided again in the last years of the dictatorship.20 This fact is partially responsible for the dominant position of the outgoing military regime, conditioning the type of transition, the lack of a foundational democratic pact,21 and an attitudinal change against the preceding non-democratic regime. Support for democracy in Brazil it is not only comparatively low, but depends to a greater degree on the simple comparison of the regimes performance and the inability of the new democratic system to face the increasing problems of Brazilian society.22 This is an important problem for the new democratic system in this country because, as a 1989 Brazilian survey demonstrates, an

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important majority of citizens in this country think the economic and overall situation were
much better under military rule.23

Therefore, the politics of the transition and consolidation in combination with the
nature, legitimating discourse and success of the preceding non-democratic regime determine
the existence or otherwise of the ‘transition effect,’ which is key in order to have majoritarian
support for democracy among citizens. This said, I do not deny the influence of other
transnational factors such as the dominant democratic legitimacy discourse in the international
arena, or what has been termed the triumph of the “democratic ethos” or “democratic
Zeitgeist.”24 However, the actual building of a majoritarian support for democracy among all
citizens, regardless of their political preferences, depends on national politics, especially
during the periods of major political changes and uncertainty.25

7.2. The Model of Support for Democracy in New Democracies

To confirm the importance of the transition effect to build support for democracy in the
new democratic regimes, I propose testing the model used in chapter six to analyze political
disaffection, but with four small changes. First, the dependent variable is now a dichotomous
variable representing unconditional support for democracy.26 The second change with respect
to the model of disaffection is the inclusion of a variable representing the respondent’s

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23 According to this survey, 52 percent of Brazilians maintain that the economic situation was much better under
military rule and only 13 percent under democratic rule. Similar percentages were observed in topics such as
inflation and, to a lesser degree, corruption and foreign debt. These data come from Ibope, April 1989, N=2750;
see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 174.

24 If indeed it seems this aspect was relatively important for Southern European countries compared with other
cases, see Geoffrey Pridham. “The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in
Comparative Perspective.” In Richard P. Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., The
Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 166-203; and Samuel P. Huntington. The Third Wave. Democratization in
of the entire issue is found in Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization,” in O'Donnell,
Schmitter and Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore, The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 20-23; and, Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation, pp. 113, and 140-141.

25 For the same argument see Frederick D. Weil, “Political Culture, Political Structure, and Democracy: The Case
pp. 104-106.

26 The value “1” represents unconditional support for democracy, and “0” the other options. For details about this
indicator of legitimacy, see footnote 14 of this chapter. In 1980, the following phrase was added to the category:
“Any other form of government is preferable to democracy.”

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evaluation of the previous political regime. The third novelty consists in the incorporation into the model of the two most frequently analyzed indicators of both dimensions of political disaffection, internal and external efficacy, which have been included in order to explore how they relate to support for democracy. Finally, I have dropped the government evaluation variable, not included in many surveys I am working with and highly correlated with other variables in the model such as general economic evaluation. Therefore, the expanded model to test is the following:

$$\ln(P_j/1-P_j) = \beta_{0j} + \alpha_j + e\text{previous regime, } \beta_{1j} + \text{ideology, } \beta_{2j} + \text{i. distance, } \beta_{3j} + \text{reg. functioning, } \beta_{4j} + \text{personal econ. situation, } \beta_{5j} + \text{general econ. eval, } \beta_{6j} + \text{gender, } \beta_{7j} + \text{education, } \beta_{8j} + \text{frequency, } \beta_{9j} + \text{party or/and union, } \beta_{10j} + \text{trust, } \beta_{11j} + \text{internal efficacy, } \beta_{12j} + \text{external efficacy, } \beta_{13j} + \text{cohort1, } \beta_{14j} + \text{cohort2, } \beta_{15j} + \ldots + \text{cohort n, } \beta_{n} + e$$  

[7.1]

Where;

$$\ln(P_j/1-P_j)$$ = the probability of supporting the democratic regime.

If my hypothesis on the ‘transition effect’ and its link with national politics during the regime change is correct, we should expect the following with respect to the model of democratic support above:

1. For all the cases regardless of the “transition effect”:
   a) The best predictor of support for should be respondents’ evaluation of the previous regime or/and any other variable related with the moral superiority of democracy compared with other non-democratic forms of government.
   b) The lack of relation with the variables measuring political disaffection.

2. In case of the existence of ‘transition effect’:
   a) The effect of attitudinal transmitting variables (gender, education, and political discussions and cohort) will be minimal or non-existent.
   b) The ‘generational effect’ (cohort effect) should also minimal or non-existent.
   c) Variables related to the economic and social achievements of the system will have little or non impact, displaying the presence of the ‘safe area’ of
democratic support.

d) Variables measuring the attitudes of party politics and competition (such as party preferences, ideology and evaluation of the incumbent government or its economic performance) should not have any effect.

e) The model will have less overall explanatory power due to the transforming impact of the politics of the transition, which cannot be captured by any of the variables included in the model.

3. In case of the absence of the ‘transition effect’:

a) The effect of attitudinal transmitting variables will be significant and important.

b) The ‘generational effect’ (cohort effect) will be present, especially in cases, like the Spanish one, in which different political events have resulted in the presence of political generations with respect to the support for different types of regimes.

c) Variables related to the economic and social achievements of the system will have greater impact. This will leave without the ‘safe area’ and democratic support pending more on economic achievements and their comparison with those of the preceding non-democratic regime.

d) Variables measuring the attitudes of party politics and competition will have an important effect.

e) The goodness of the fit of the model will be much greater since many of the variables included in it will have much more explanatory power.

Before testing the model, I want to expand my discussion on ideology and democratic support. I think this relationship is essential to capture the impact of the transition effect. As

27 In the present model, I have not included the cohort-ideology interactions. Contrary to what I found for disaffection, the relation between ideology and support for democracy is very unstable due to the “transition effect.” The interaction might represent the consistent fight between two ideological camps during a particular period to maintain and suppress democratic politics, however, if the transition effect and the important attitudinal change linked to it are present, it might be difficult to find any presence of the ideological conflict of the past and in general any kind of ideological conflict in the present. Thus, the inclusion of the interactions makes to model to complex without adding any additional information.
discussed earlier, in many countries, the “rules of the game” in the past included the political exclusion of or collective action against one sector or other of the population and their political representatives. This may have left an attitudinal legacy, traceable through the impact of ideology on support for the democratic regime. If the transition effect has taken place in a new democracy, this relationship should have been reduced or diminished. Let me use again the Spanish case to illustrate this hypothesis. In 1980 in Spain, soon after the end of the transition, the correlation coefficients between ideology and support for democracy for all generations were all still high and negative (see table 7.1), confirming that, in all political generations, leftwing Spaniards tended to identify themselves as more committed democrats than those on the Right did. This tendency accords, once again, with Spain’s political history. While both Left and Right have adopted semi-, if not overtly disloyal stances with respect to democracy,28 the Left has nonetheless always shown a greater commitment to establishing and defending representative democracy than the Right, especially during and after the Franquist regime. The gap between left- and right-wing Spaniards is particularly pronounced in the third political generation, which came of age during the period of liberalization, when the Left completely dominated the opposition to the Franquist regime and the struggle to replace it with a democracy. Hence, as can be seen in table 7.1, the closest correlation between ideology and support for democracy is found precisely in this generation. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the relation between ideology and support for democracy is very strong in all the different generations. This finding shows that while a major attitudinal shift did take place during the transition, the indelible marks of Spain’s political past are still visible in Spaniards’ political attitudes of the time. The transition effect and the attitudinal change were not yet complete.

These marks, however, have faded as a result of the passage of time under democracy, or to be more precise, as a result of the actively pro-democratic discourse that, with the partial exception of the Basque Country, all the significant political actors from across the ideological spectrum have adopted since the return to democracy. But more, importantly, it highlights again the effect of the arrival of the conservative party Partido Popular (PP) to power, teaching most conservatives that anybody could win with the present “rules of the game.” Between the discourse and the arrival of the PP to government, even the most extremist citizen of the Right

28 See the chapter about Spain in Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe.
has become democratic supporters. As I said in chapter five, part of the attitudinal change to support democracy among Spaniards that I have called ‘transition effect’ was instrumental in nature.29 Hence, Table 7.1 also shows that in 1995, after 18 years of democracy, the correlation between ideology and support for democracy is much weaker in the first generation, socialized under democracy, and even more strikingly, it has become significantly weaker in the second, third, and fourth generations. This was the effect of almost two decades of democracy, even at a time when the Right had yet to win a general election or hold power in democratic Spain. In fact, the data for 1996, drawn from a survey conducted just three months after the electoral victory of the conservative PP, show a further substantial weakening of the correlation between legitimacy and ideology. Only the oldest two generations, that is, those of the monarchy and the Civil War, remain immune to the socializing effect of the functioning of democracy (and the moderating discourse of the main political actors). Data collected in the year 2000 confirm this trend, and after four years of conservative rule and just after obtaining the absolute majority in March of 2000 even the most conservatives of the oldest generations have become convinced democrats. It would seem, therefore, that the dramatic political events that shaped these generations’ political socialization have left a lasting mark on their level of democratic support for the new regime, a mark that the present democracy has been unable to remove.

All this suggests three conclusions. First, that despite the enormous attitudinal change regarding support for democracy that took place during the transition, the political past of Spanish society, marked by the struggle between the “two Spains” can also be seen in the greater presence of a ‘democratic ethos’ among leftwing citizens that among those on the right. Second, and as a result of this, in the early years of the new democracy, ideology was an important factor that had a similar influence on the degree of support for democracy professed by citizens from all generations, despite the great attitudinal transformation that took place during the transition. Third, this analysis shows that the functioning of democracy has led to a qualitative, rather than a quantitative change in Spaniard’s support for democracy (which was already high in 1978, and has increased little since then). Almost twenty years of democracy

has eliminated the influence of ideology and diminished the influence of the approval of the preceding regime in determining citizens’ unconditional support for democracy.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1 (democracy)</td>
<td>Not yet formed</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2 (transition)</td>
<td>-0.36*</td>
<td>-0.27*</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3 (liberalization)</td>
<td>-0.43*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 4 (autarchy)</td>
<td>-0.39*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 5 (Civil War)</td>
<td>-0.33*</td>
<td>-0.34*</td>
<td>-0.39*</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 6 (monarchy)</td>
<td>-0.30*</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIS Studies 2,154, 2,218 and 2,384.
* Significant at p<0.01
** Significant at p<0.05

TABLA 7.1 Relation between ideology and support for democracy by cohort in Spain, 1980 and 2000 (the figures give the correlations between ideology and support for democracy)

7.3 The “Transition Effect” in Spain

As I have shown in chapter five, the year 1980 displays the lowest democratic support since democracy was reestablished in Spain. This might be due to the lack of the completion of the “transition effect.” Perhaps the attitudinal change underway was stopped short by political circumstances following the approval of the Spanish constitution. This was a period of substantial political and economic turmoil. Popular support for the UCD government was rapidly collapsing and the weak and divided minority UCD governments were considered to be incapable of resolving the challenges posed by the economic crisis, increasing terrorist violence, and an inconsistent regional policy.  

The major attitudinal change may have occurred by then, but the process of creating majoritarian democratic support was not

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30 A similar conclusion can be seen in McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain, pp. 43-53.
complete. If my diagnosis is correct, the model developed above should be able to detect the lack of the completion of the "transition effect" for that year.

The results of the estimation of the model for Spain with the 1980 survey data are exactly as predicted, displaying the lack of the completion of the "transition effect" (Table 7.2). Rejection of the preceding regime\textsuperscript{32} was one of the best predictors of support for democracy in 1980, however, the respondents' ideology was still the most powerful one (the Left tended to support substantially more democracy). Another sign of the lack of completion of the attitudinal change is the impact of cohorts 3 and 4 (liberalization and autarchy respectively), already discussed above. At the same, nevertheless, there were signs that the major attitudinal change had already taken place. The absence of any relation of democratic support with the variables measuring respondents' personal material situation, their assessment of the functioning of democracy, or government in the middle of this political and economical crisis shows a significant "safe area" for democracy already existed. Similarly, there is no relation with the indicators measuring indirectly the impact of different socialization experiences, with the exception of the very weak relation with gender and frequency of political discussion during childhood. Social capital has no impact on democratic support, so cultural heritage is not responsible for the level of support to democracy. Finally, the value of the constant and the model's scant, albeit significant, explanatory power, point also to the presence of the transition effect in explaining the origin of support for democracy in 1980.

However, in 1995, as can be seen from the estimation of a very similar model with survey data of that year (table 7.3.), the transition effect had been completed some time ago. The evaluation of the previous regime constitutes, along with ideology, the best predictor of the level of support for democracy (with first differences of -0.4 and 0.4, respectively). But, ideology lost predictive capacity in comparison with 1980. This result is probably due to the ideological depolarization with respect to support for the democratic regime that, as discussed extensively before, took place over the course of the 15 years that separated these two surveys.\textsuperscript{33} Otherwise, the results are similar to those in 1980, except in two important respects. First, as was the case with political disaffection, with the passage of time under democracy, the

\textsuperscript{32} For this year I have used the side that the respondent's family sympathized with in the Civil War. Respondents were not asked about their assessment of the political regime in this year, but this variable can be considered a valid, albeit imperfect, proxy, since they are highly related.

\textsuperscript{33} For similar conclusion see McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, \textit{The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain}, p. 51 and table 2.4.
legitimacy of the system becomes more closely related to variables such as personal material
situation and evaluation of the regime's achievements. While these variables still have nothing
like the predictive capacity of ideology or the evaluation of the previous regime, they
nonetheless show a significant relation with support for the regime. It is important to take this
into account when trying to understand the potential reduction of the "safe area" which
unconditional support gives a regime once a democracy has been established and consolidated.
Second, education --one of the socialization variables -- and internal efficacy --a disaffection
variable -- are now found to be significant, a finding which does not accord with the expected
results. Similar analysis with year 2000 survey data confirms the observed trend and, more
importantly, the central hypothesis. I have not reproduced the results of this last analysis due
to the lack of a very relevant variable for the argument (the evaluation of the preceding
regime), but the remaining variables confirm the following: Increasing disappearance of the
ideology effect, the lack of any effect of the variables measuring the impact of different
socializing experiences--except discussion of politics in the family during childhood-- and the
weak but increasing importance of the evaluation of functioning variables (sociotropic
economic evaluation).34

Two other variables are worthy of mention from the 1995 and 2000 results. First, the
lack of internal efficacy unexpectedly seems to be statistically significant for that year, but it
has a secondary impact. Finally, political mobilization favors democratic support, something
that was not seen when the transition effect was still in progress.

In short, support for the democratic regime in Spain expanded during the transition to
democracy as the result of a combination of political factors that emerged during that process
but originated before it began. This attitudinal change cannot bury other aspects of the political
struggle between Right and Left that has long polarized Spain's political history, but is has
reduced their impact considerably. Moreover, the subsequent functioning of the democratic
system and the discourse of the main actors from across the political spectrum have favored
and completed this attitudinal shift. As a result of this phenomenon, which unfolded during the
transition to, and consolidation of democracy, attitudinal transmission has played virtually no

34 The data comes from the Spanish survey, CIS 2382. The statistically significant parameters of the model for
p<.05 are the following: \( \ln (P_i / 1 - P_j) = -0.19 \text{ ideology } + 0.52 \text{ e. economic situ. } + 0.27 \text{ discuss } + 0.40 \text{ internal }
efficacy + e. \) R² Nagelkerke=0.10; Chi-square of improvement 145.64, significant at p<.01 (14 d.f.).
The rest of the variables in the model were not statistically significant. The variable evaluation of previous regime
was not included in this survey.
role in democratic legitimization. The importance of attitudinal transmission has also been undermined, albeit much less significantly, by the intergenerational change that has taken place with respect to this attitude (a change which is much slighter in the case of the older generations which lived through the period before the II Republic, its collapse and the Civil War). We have also seen here that the variables relating to respondents' evaluation of the achievements of the system, as well as of their personal material situation, show virtually no relation with support for democracy. This was particularly true in the early years of the new democracy, when the 'safe area' formed by unconditional support for democracy was larger. Finally, political disaffection, the core theme of this study, shows a scant, if not null relation, with unconditional support for democracy.
Table 7.2: Model to explain support for democracy in Spain, 1980 (only statistically significant logistic regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Odds ratios</th>
<th>First Difference Probabilities (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>E. previous regime (2)</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
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<td>-0.82</td>
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<td>I. distance</td>
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<td>-0.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>General econ. evaluation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization variables:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of political discussion during childhood</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2 (transition)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Cohort 3 (liberalization)</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohort 4 (autarchy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization (party+union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>Disaffection variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chi-square of model</td>
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<td>-2log likelihood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² Nagelkerke</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1026)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIS, Study 1.237.
(1) This column shows the difference between the estimated probability when the independent variable is at its lowest value and the others remain constant at the mean, and the same probability when the value of the independent variable is at its highest value. This is known as the first difference; see King, *Unifying political methodology*, pp. 107-108.
(2) I have used family's side in Civil War as a proxy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds ratios</th>
<th>First difference Probabilities (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1.38</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Regime performance 2 (equality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situation</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>General econ. evaluation</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
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<td>Cohort 2 (transition)</td>
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<td>Cohort 3 (liberalization)</td>
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<td>Cohort 4 (autarchy)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Cohort 5 (Civil War)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohort 6 (monarchy)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization (party+union+asocc)</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>1.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disaffection variables</td>
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<td>(N)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIS, Study 2,154.

(*) Significant at p<0.01
(1) See table 7.2 for an explanation.

TABLE 7.3 Model to explain support for democracy in Spain, 1995 (only statistically significant logistic regression coefficients)
Before moving on to the comparative analysis, it should be stressed again that the finding that the evaluation of the previous regime is one of the best predictors of the level of legitimacy conceded to the present regime, does not imply that rejection of the previous regime is a precondition for either the introduction of a democratic regime, or for the existence of a majority of democratic citizens. In this respect, I share Linz and Stepan critique of the fundamental error in this type of reasoning. First, because as they note, it is both possible and reasonable to imagine the existence of citizens who give their unconditional support to the new democracy even though they do not reject the previous regime. The data analyzed here for Spain, as well as those presented below for other cases, suggest that Linz and Stepan are most certainly right. As we have seen, citizens’ opinion of the previous regimes is neither the only, nor a perfect, predictor of unconditional support for democracy. According to the results of the regression shown in Table 7.3, the probability that respondents will identify themselves as democrats increases by a mere 0.40 per cent among those who state that they reject the previous regime. This is explained by the fact that 51% of those Spaniards who declare that Franquism was good for Spain also profess unconditional support for democracy. At the same time, and much more importantly, the attitudinal change that occurred during the transition, and which gave rise to a majority of unconditional democrats, was accompanied by a reevaluation of the previous regime that took place, while not in parallel, simultaneously with it. In this sense, Linz and Stepan would appear to be right to argue that: "a majority in favor of democracy emerges when the elites and ordinary citizens begin to consider, due to the social problems which they have to face and the world in which they live, the democratic procedures for the regulation of conflicts are better and less dangerous than any other form of government." This ‘instrumental’ calculation, which is made in the process of the construction of democratic legitimacy during the transition, is linked to a reevaluation of the previous regime which is not always negative: hence the two are linked, even if the latter is not determinant.

35 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 144-147.
36 These data also come from CIS questionnaire 2154.
37 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation, p. 144.
7.4 Support for Democracy in Other New Democracies

To what extent can these conclusions about the Spanish case be extrapolated to other new democracies? As I will attempt to show through an analysis of a number of other new democracies, support for the new regime depends on what happens during the transition and is conditioned by other political factors such as the nature, success and achievements of the previous regime. Before going any further, however, it should be emphasized that here I will not attempt to offer a systematic analysis of the various variables which have a decisive impact on the process of generating support for the new regime. Rather, the more modest goal of the pages that follow is twofold. First, to demonstrate the decisive role that politics, and the behavior of the main political actors, play in the formation of majoritarian democratic support during a specific period of time. Second, to show how this process is also conditioned by political factors such as the legacy of the previous political regime, its successes, general performance and the legitimizing discourse of the previous and the new regimes.

Support for Democracy in Portugal and Greece

In table 7.4 I present the results of the estimation of the same model discussed above with data from other new democracies in Southern Europe (Greece and Portugal). The data on these countries come from the Four Nations Study which unfortunately does not include all the required variables. Hence, I cannot estimate the exact same model, but at least the analysis includes the most important variables needed for an initial estimation: respondents’ evaluation of the previous regime, ideology, their evaluation of the functioning of the system, their sense of internal and external efficacy, and attitudinal transmitting variables (except the frequency of political discussion within the family, which I replaced by size of habitat, bad proxy for the level of politization of the family). Moreover, four cohorts have been defined in both countries in order to measure the impact of intergenerational change.38

The results of the estimation of the model corroborate a number of the conclusions reached above. First, in both Portugal and Greece evaluation of the previous regime again emerges as the best predictor of unconditional support for democracy. In this respect, although

38 For the discussion on the formation of these four cohorts in Greece and Portugal see footnote 44, chapter six.
both regimes has enjoyed for a long time a majoritarian democratic support, it is hardly surprising to find that the current democracy enjoys greater support in Greece than in Portugal, since the evaluation of the previous authoritarian regime in Greece is particularly negative, reflecting the fact that the "Junta" was never able to win the approval of a significant proportion of Greek citizens, of the political elites, or of the rest of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{39} The disaffection variables have low and no impact. But the more important finding is that the "transition effect" can be seen clearly in both countries. Once again, the variables representing different socializing experiences appear to be almost irrelevant, with the exception of the slight influence gender has in Portugal. Cohort effects are not significant. All this bears out the conclusions drawn from the Spanish case, confirming that in these two cases, as in Spain, support for democracy developed as the result of a profound attitudinal transformation which took place in both countries during their respective transitions to democracy.

It is also very important to note that no relationship between ideology and democratic support is seen in either of these countries. This was the finding of Morlino and Montero in earlier research,\textsuperscript{40} but once again, it points to the crucial importance of past politics, and of the events of the transition itself, in shaping attitudes of support for the new regime.

In Greece, both the Left and Right have been characterized in the past by their resort to political practices that can at best be described as semi-loyal, when not actually disloyal, to democracy.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, Karamanlis, the conservative leader who in the 1970s and 1980s played such a crucial role in establishing the present democracy, himself had played a key role during the previous pseudo-democratic period in drafting and securing approval of the most restrictive and discriminatory legislation in this area.\textsuperscript{42} From the end of the Greek Civil War


\textsuperscript{40} The work of these authors demonstrates an ideological relationship for these two cases. The important difference in the results is due to the way they have created an indicator for legitimacy that combines the indicator used here with that of evaluation of the system's functioning. As already shown, the latter is in fact an indicator of political discontent, dependent upon the approval of the incumbent government. A strong relationship with ideology would therefore be anticipated and indeed is found by the authors. However, what also seems clear according to their data is that unconditional support lacks any relationship with ideological self-positioning, confirming the conclusions reached in here. See, Morlino and Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," pp. 240-241, and 245-248.

\textsuperscript{41} Dimandouros, "The Politics of Constitution Making in Postauthoritarian Greece," p. 133.

until 1967, the Right in general persistently defended a form of “controlled democracy,” in which the rights of citizenship were denied to those on the left who were considered to be “non-nationally minded.” On the other hand, on the Left, the communists, and above all the pro-soviet KKE, consistently toyed with non-democratic opposition tactics. Even the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which Andreas Papandreou founded in 1968 and would subsequently play such an important role in the consolidation of the present democracy, espoused a maximalist, antidemocratic discourse which at times even outmatched that of the communists.43

However, the first five years of the newly established democracy saw all the main actors from across the political spectrum embark on a process of change and adjustment which left no doubt as to their acceptance of democracy, its rules and institutions, bringing the “cultural end” of the Civil War.44 The alternation in power favors even more the consolidation of support for democracy among the vast majority of Greeks on both sides of the ideological spectrum.

As in the Greek case, in Portugal too the lack of relation between ideology and support for democracy is explained by a combination of the political past and the events that took place during the drawn-out and turbulent Portuguese transition to democracy. The end of the authoritarian regime in Portugal began with a coup by a number of middle-ranking army offices, above all captains belonging to or associated with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). Their opposition to the regime, and the decision to launch the coup itself, were inspired by the course of events in Portugal’s colonial war and the corporative discontent provoked by the regime’s military policy.45 In the absence of any resistance from the previous


44 As Linz and Stepan have argued, this process was undoubtedly helped by Karamanlis’ creation of the conservative New Democracy party (Nea Dimokratia [ND]), the legalization and political participation of the two communist parties, both the pro-soviet KKE and the eurocommunist KKI (interior), but even more by the changes introduced into the ideology and discourse of the PASOK, above all after it won power in 1981. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 134-135.

45 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 138. This same argument is defended by Diamandouros, “Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian Greece,” pp. 9-20 and 34-42.

46 See, Kenneth Maxwell, “Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal,” in
regime, and helped by popular mobilizations in Lisbon and the south, the coup gave birth to revolutionary assembly movements from which the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was catapulted into power through the help of the most radical elements in the military. The Communists then went on to form a series of 'interim governments,' with the result that Portugal seemed set to become a socialist regime and the consolidation of a democratic regime looked highly unlikely. In this context, as Linz and Stepan rightly argue, the MFA's previous commitment and promise to call for elections was the key factor for creating a new democratic regime.

The results of the constituent elections held on April 25th, 1975 gave definitive popular backing to democratization and represented an overwhelming rejection of the system established in the wake of the revolution. Between them, the political parties in favor of establishing a representative democracy won 75 per cent of the votes and 222 of the 263 seats in the assembly. These parties included a variety of center-left parties, the Socialist Party (PS) led by Mário Soares, the center-right Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the conservative Democratic and Social Center (CDS). In other words, with the sole exception of the PCP, the parliamentary parties from right across the ideological spectrum were in favor of the introduction of a representative democracy. Through their proposals, and the support they won from the majority of Portuguese voters, pro-democratic political parties of both ideological sides managed to put a halt to the apparently almost unstoppable non-democratic discourse of the 1974 revolution. Moreover, the Portuguese citizens and their parties achieved this result by resorting to the democratic instrument par excellence, elections. This meant that the enormous attitudinal shift implied by the emergence of majority support for the new democratic system in

---


48 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 119.


50 For a discussion of the origin and evolution of these parties in Portugal, see Bruneau and Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal, chapter 4; Leonardo Morlino, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 345-347.
Portugal involved citizens from across the ideological spectrum with the exception of the communists, who have received very little electoral support since 1975.

In Portugal there was no a democratic settlement, but instead a resolution, not simultaneously but sequentially for fifteen years, of the main issues dividing the polity among the major relevant political actors by the use of democratic means. With the exception of the communists early on, there was an agreement among the most important groups on the desirability of competitive party politics, and representation in the National Assembly through the elections to resolve the major political conflicts. The politics of the transition, despite the absence of a foundational pact, has produced a transition effect and explains the absence of any relation between ideology and democratic legitimacy.

---

51 Lawrence Graham, "Redefining the Portuguese Transition to Democracy," in Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, pp. 296-297.
### TABLE 7.4 Model to explain support for democracy in Greece and Portugal, 1985 (only statistically significant logistic regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E. the previous regime</td>
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<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. distance</td>
<td>0.54*</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime function. (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal econ. situat.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General econ. evalu.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of political</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discussion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 4</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asocce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.60*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of model</td>
<td>125.7*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d.f. 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2log likelihood</td>
<td>549.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² Nagelkerke</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1522)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Four Nations Study

(*) Significant at p<0.01  (***) Significant at p<0.05  (*** ) Significant at p<0.10

1. See Table 7.2 for an explanation.
2. I use the indicator about how democracy can resolve problems.
Support for Democracy in Latin America

I have shown what happens when a ‘transition effect’ takes place, but what happens when it does not? For the purposes of this discussion, I have chosen two Latin America countries where ‘transition effect’ is not found and support for democracy is relatively low (Chile and Brazil), and two where the ‘transition effect’ is present and majoritarian support for democracy is seen (Uruguay and Argentina). The different patterns observed in the relationship between ideology and support for democracy in these two pairs of countries at the Southern Cone of Latin America confirms the importance of the politics of the transition and consolidation in the shaping of citizens’ support for the new regime. These different patterns also reveal the importance of the legacy of the political past, as well as of the skill, or lack thereof, with which the political elites exploit or manage that legacy. In order to demonstrate this point, I have estimated a very similar regression model, this time using survey data from these Latin American countries.52

Let me first discuss the results for Chile and Brazil, two countries without a foundational democratic pact (democratic settlement) or any kind of elite convergence and, not by chance, with low democratic support. As can be seen from Table 7.5, the proxy for the evaluation of the previous regime is one of the variables which best explains the degree of support for the new regime in all these countries except Brazil, where there is no significant relation. In contrast, the relation is particularly strong in Chile, a case in which the average probability of a respondent identifying him/herself as a democrat is 0.37 lower when s/he has a positive opinion of the armed forces. The contrast between Chile and Brazil in this respect is striking. The difference between these two cases can also be seen with respect to the importance of ideology in explaining support for democracy. While in Chile leftwing citizens are remarkably more likely to identify themselves as unconditional democrats, the ideology variable is of no importance in Brazil. There, the evaluations of the overall economic situation, 

52 However, it should be noted that since the survey used did not include a variable measuring the degree of support for the previous regime, the degree of approval of the armed forces has been used as a proxy variable instead, given military nature of the non-democratic regimes in these countries.

In all cases studied, three cohorts were created representing those socialized prior to the installation of the final non-democratic regime, those socialized during the authoritarian regime and those socialized since the installation of the democracy. In the case of Argentina, the three cohorts are: The third, and oldest members of the population, prior to the final authoritarian experience (prior to 1973); the second, final authoritarian regime (1973-1984); and the first, democracy (1984-1995). For the details of formation of the cohorts for the rest of the countries see footnote 45, chapter six.
and, to a lesser extent, of the respondent’s personal economic situation, have significant predictive power. The two cases only coincide in terms of the relative importance of the variables reflecting different socialization experiences, and above all education. It should be remembered that in both cases the level of support for democracy is relatively low, and that there is little evidence of what has been termed here as the transition effect. Why, therefore, do we obtain such different results of the same model? Once again, the answer lies in the political explanation, that is, in the political events that shaped the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy, and in the limitations imposed on these processes as a result of these countries’ political pasts.

In Chile, after fifteen years of military rule, in 1988 the authoritarian regime could count on the strong support of a significant part of the population. This rested on a combination of the regime’s economic successes and of the political events that had taken place in Chile between 1970 and 1973 and which ended in the breakdown of Chilean democracy, one of the oldest and most prestigious democratic regimes in Latin America. Moreover, in 1988 the authoritarian regime was in a strong position, with the armed forces united behind their visible head, General Pinochet, who intended to remain in power by constitutional means for another decade at least.53

In this context of control by the authoritarian regime, the transition was sparked by Pinochet’s defeat in a plebiscite called in 1988 in accordance with the constitution which the regime itself had introduced eight years earlier. The plebiscite and its result paved the way for a return to democracy, the celebration of presidential elections in 1989, the adoption of moderate strategies and a commitment to dialogue by the former irreconcilable political enemies in the Socialist and Christian democratic parties54 which, along with a number of other center-left parties, formed the electoral coalition which has governed Chile ever since. However, the result of the process and the introduction of democracy also implied the consolidation of a major divide in public opinion between pro-democrats and pro-authoritarians, which has crystallized in the party system. This comprises, on the one


hand, the conservative coalition made up of Renovación Nacional (RN) and the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI). On the other, the center-left coalition formed by the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the Partido Socialista (PS), and the center-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD). All this has led to the consolidation of what Constable and Valenzuela have termed the “nation of enemies.” Since the very beginning, and in marked contrast to its counterpart in Brazil, the current democratic regime in Chile has proved highly efficient in economic terms. In fact, there is a positive relation between economic evaluations and support for the new regime (see table 7.5).

This could have been expected to help heal the divisions within this ‘nation of enemies’ and favor the emergence of a clear majority of unconditional democrats. In practice, however, the attitudinal impact of the democratic governments’ economic achievements has been weakened by the fact that most pro-authoritarian citizens attribute this economic efficiency to the conditions imposed by the outgoing regime during the transition, which guaranteed the continuity of the military’s neo-liberal economic policies, rather than to the center-left government’s successful handling of the economy. All this has played a decisive role in the consolidation of a new cleavage or political conflict, the authoritarian/democratic divide, which also has a small, but nonetheless significant, social dimension. Hence, it is hardly surprising that ideology and opinion of the previous regime constitute two basic aspects for predicting Chileans political behavior, as well as for understanding the absence of majority support for the existing democratic regime.


In the case of Brazil, however, the lack of the transition effect is manifested in the relationship of the lack of support for the current democratic regime primarily with socialization variables (as in Chile) and, somewhat more significantly than in Chile, with citizens' evaluation of the comparative efficiency of the two regimes. More specifically, it is linked to a simple comparison of the economic achievements of the two systems, and the democratic regime's notorious inability to deal with the growing problems facing Brazilian society.59

Indeed, as noted above, the majority of Brazilians did support the democratic institutions before the 1964 coup d'etat. However, by 1972-73, and coming in the wake of the regime's relative 'successes' and the intense domestic propaganda campaign launched around them, the military and their political figureheads could boast the support of a majority of Brazilians,60 even if this shrank slightly towards the end of the dictatorship.61 Moreover, as I said above, a study of Brazilian public opinion carried out in 1989 showed a large majority of citizens maintained that both their personal and the overall economic situation had been significantly better under the authoritarian regime.62 This was perhaps hardly surprising, given that the respondents' had seen no fewer than seven stabilization plans run aground between 1985 and 1992, amid a dramatic process of hyperinflation and economic and social collapse under democracy.63

As Linz and Stepan argue, all this was the consequence of the continual state of political crisis, which in turn was largely attributable to the institutional and political settlement imposed by the outgoing military regime during the extremely long drawn out transition process,64 especially important with the sudden disappearance of the elected Tancredo Neves and his replacement by Jose Sarney.65 In any event, and despite the very serious economic, social and political crises that the country has endured under democracy,

62 As indicated in chapter four, these data come from a survey administered by Ibope to 2750 Brazilians in April of 1989; see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 174.
63 For insight into the Brazilian economic situation as compared with other new democracies, see Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, José Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
64 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 167-171.
unlike in Chile there has been no serious support for a return to the past. In the first place, no political party or force, with the exception of the Partido Democrata Social (PDS) (formerly promilitary ARENA), opposed the return to democracy during the long transition process that began in 1974. In fact, if anything has kept Brazilian civil society together in recent years, it was precisely the campaigns for direct presidential elections, which were finally held in February and June 1984, and for impeachment to remove President Collor in 1993.

However, in Brazil there has not been a serious and general commitment to democracy either. Since the return to democracy, and given the regime's evident incapacity to resolve the country's problems or construct an alternative democratic legitimacy, there has been no increase in the proportion of unconditional democrats in Brazil. In this light, it is hardly surprising that the factors with the greatest capacity to explain support for democracy in this country are evaluations of the economic situation. Nor it is strange to learn that neither respondents' ideology nor their opinion of the armed forces, as a proxy of support for the preceding authoritarian regime, have any impact on the individual democratic support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds ratios (l)</td>
<td>Odds ratios (l)</td>
<td>Odds ratios (l)</td>
<td>Odds ratios (l)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. previous regime (2)</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.60*</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.84*</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.87**</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. regime functioning (3)</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General economic situation</td>
<td>1.23**</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.49*</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic situation</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization variables:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.21*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.15*</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.57*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 1</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 2</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort 3</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.72*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaffection variables</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>External effic.</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.70*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal effic.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the national parliament</td>
<td>1.33***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>R² Nagelkerke (N)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(646)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latinobarometer 1995

(*) Significant at p<0.01

(***): Significant at p<0.001

(1) See table 7.2 for an explanation.

(2) I have used confidence in armed forces as a proxy.

(3) I have used question p14 of the questionnaire in which respondents are asked if they think that economic problems are being resolved.

TABLE 7.5 Model to explain support for democracy in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, 1995 (only statistically significant logistic regression coefficients)
Argentina and Uruguay on the other hand, show high levels of support for democracy and are the two examples of the existence of the transition effect. Uruguayan democracy is the result of the convergence between the most significant partisan elites (in the Blanco and Colorado parties) which enjoy strong roots in society.\textsuperscript{66} Even the military regime established in 1973 always saw itself as a passing necessity and, even though it severely repressed the political parties, it never actually tried to replace them.\textsuperscript{67} At the same time, and despite the fact that the onset of the transition was mainly due to the surprising result of the 1980 plebiscite rather than to the strength of the democratic opposition, none of the traditional political forces opposed the change of regime. This was explained, in part, by the fact that the military had by then lost most of the support they had once enjoyed, as well as the realization that result of the plebiscite made change inevitable. Nonetheless, once the process was underway, all the political forces, including the leftwing coalition, Frente Amplio, made significant contributions to the success of the transition to democracy and the construction of a legitimizing discourse.

However, it is important to emphasize that the authoritarian regime in Uruguay had been relatively short, and that the country’s citizens do not appear to have forgotten the semi- and disloyal behavior of important factions within the two traditional parties, the Blanco and Colorado parties. In power between 1968 and 1973, the Colorados had taken advantage of the situation created by the increasing strength of the Tupamaros urban guerrilla to persistently undermine the democratic institutions and parliament. This merely exacerbated the already semi-loyal behavior of the Left, with the exception of the dominant faction within the Blancos.\textsuperscript{68} In practice, the military coup was in part at least a response to the invitations that the most radical elements within both the main parties had long been making to their ‘sympathizers in the army.’\textsuperscript{69} These events are carved into the memories of Uruguayan citizens, and have been reflected in the electoral support of the two parties since the return to


\textsuperscript{67} Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay, pp. 54-55, and pp. 71-73; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 152.


\textsuperscript{69} Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy, p. 44.
democracy. Hence, it is not surprising to find that in Uruguay the only, albeit very weak, predictors of support for the democracy are respondents' ideology and their opinion of the armed forces, but they are not strong and much weaker than in Chile due to the effect of the transition effect. Moreover, the lack of impact of any attitudinal transmitting variables demonstrates the presence of the transition effect as I will discuss below.

The data on Argentina also show that ideology plays no role in influencing democratic support. Only respondents' opinion of the armed forces and some indicators of disaffection -- a point I will return to below -- has any relations with support for the new democratic regime. However, here the interpretation of these results as the consequence of the transition effect is more questionable. Ideology and support for democracy in the past of these country might not be so linked. It should be noted, first, that the nature of the Peronist phenomenon and its semi-fascist, populist-nationalist rhetoric, means that the left-right scale hardly has any meaning in Argentina. More importantly, the two main political parties in the system existing before the last military coup d'etat in 1976, the Peronist Justicialista Party and the Radicales del Pueblo, constantly adopted semi- and disloyal positions, exemplified by their repeating invitations to the military to intervene as arbitrators in a democracy which O'Donnell has brilliantly termed the "impossible game." It should also be remembered that, unlike in Chile, Argentineans did not feel threatened by a government or party, but rather by the breakdown of governmental authority and control, and the violence of guerrilla terrorists and of the guerilla state. Once this threat disappeared and the army could no longer hide its inability to resolve the country's economic and social problems, in the wake of the disastrous military adventure in the Malvinas (Falklands), the system lurched towards collapse, and from there into the transition. From then on, all the parties, for the different reasons studied in depth by Linz and Stepan, have behaved with complete loyalty to the democratic system, contributing to the introduction and consolidation of the new regime and majoritarian democratic legitimacy. Hence, the lack of relation in Argentina between support for democracy and ideology might be the result of the politics of transition and consolidation but it might also be the reflection of the

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72 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 224.
73 Ibid, pp. 198-200.
politics of the last five decades before the transition took place. The only clear evidence of the transition effect is the lack of the influence of the variables included to measure different socializing experiences.

The presence, or lack thereof, of the transition effect on democratic support in these four countries is somewhat clearer after observing the parameters estimated for the socialization and the cohort variables. With respect to the 'generational effect' (cohort variables), it is important to highlight that, in contrast to the Spanish case, in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay the older generations appear to be more democratic than their younger fellow citizens (to show clearly I have left the second generation, that is, the one socialized under non-democratic rule, as the reference category). Although this effect does not have much impact on the likelihood of respondents declaring themselves unconditional democrats, in Brazil and Uruguay, and above all Chile, it is statistically significant. The political experiences of the older generations in these countries help explain why they are more strongly in favor of the current democracy. In these three cases it makes sense. As noted above, Chile and Uruguay were exemplary democracies until their collapse, when the final phase of military intervention began in Brazil in 1966, a majority of Brazilians preferred a democratic system. This finding confirms the impact of past politics on democratic support when, as in the case of Chile, there is a lack of any general attitudinal change towards increasing democratic support.

Moreover, note also should be taken of an important point regarding different socializing experiences. The effect of the variables measuring intergenerational transmission, education and gender, can be seen precisely in the two cases in which there is no evidence of what I have termed the 'transition effect.' This finding coincides with the fact that the models which have the greatest explanatory power are those for Brazil and Chile, the two countries without a so-called 'transition effect.' Another indication of the absence of a 'transition effect,' and hence of the absence of majority support for democracy among citizens, is that there is a greater probability of a Brazilian or Chilean identifying him or herself as a non-democrat than a Uruguayan or Argentinean.

Finally, the existence of a transition effect fosters the presence of a "safe area" for democratic consolidation. As we can see from the preceding analysis of these cases, when there is no such 'transition effect,' support for democracy after the transition depends much more heavily on economic and social evaluations, overall evaluation of the regime
performance and even on day-to-day politics. Brazil and Chile are a clear example of this pattern.

An additional observation must be made concerning the results in Table 7.5. There is a relation between the indicators of political disaffection, especially confidence in democratic institutions, and support for democracy. This relation is not especially significant in comparison with other indicators, except in the case of Argentina. As has already been clearly demonstrated in the second chapter with this same data, in every case disaffection and support for democracy have been found to be distinct dimensions of the political support of the country concerned. Nonetheless, there is some relation between these two dimensions and this should be taken into account in this analysis, even if it is difficult to know if this relation has developed from the functioning of the institutions, or whether it has existed since the outset of the democratic regime.

These findings can be summed up in several conclusions. Foremost among these is that majoritarian support for a new regime requires the existence of what I have termed a 'transition effect,' that is, an attitudinal transformation which takes place during the transition and which affects both the degree of support for the new regime, and the evaluation of the outgoing regime. The political factors that facilitate this 'transition effect' are:

(1) The existence of an elite settlement or a democratic convergence. This is the most important political factor. This convergence or agreement must include principal political and social forces during the transition, especially if the authoritarian regime was preceded by a difficult political history of confrontations and semi-and/or disloyal behavior, and if, moreover, the authoritarian regime satisfied the political and social interests of certain sectors of the population.

(2) The degree of economic and social transforming success of the previous authoritarian regime, especially if this was the main cornerstone of its legitimizing discourse.

(3) The extent to which the authoritarian regime’s successes benefited particular social and political groups, facilitating their identification with the authoritarian past.

(4) The extent of the authoritarian institutional legacy, which, in turn, depends on the degree of control that the outgoing authorities exercised over the process of regime change, the degree of hierarchalization of the outgoing military power, and whether
it was an institutionalized and civilian authoritarian regime.

(5) The identity of the leading forces in the democratization process.

(6) The capacity of the political authorities to effectively exercise political delegation and representation without getting enmeshed in the institutional obstacles inherited from the previous regime.

These are, of course, merely tentative conclusions which require deeper and more systematic analysis. Nonetheless, they do usefully highlight the importance of the politics of the transition, and the limitations that the political past imposes on this, for the creation of support for democracy during the process leading to the creation of the new regime.

7.5 The Politics of Political Discontent

In this final section I will show that, in contrast to what we have seen with respect to support for democracy, the best predictors of political discontent are respondents' evaluation of the government and support for the party in power, its achievements, and the economic and political situation. This analysis will provide further evidence of the distinct nature of political discontent. Furthermore, a second goal will be achieved, since I am going to use satisfaction with the functioning of democracy as the dependent variable. 74 I will further show how this is an indicator of political discontent instead of support for democracy.

A regression model has been estimated for the five cases under study in which this indicator is available, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain and Uruguay. The variables included in this model are almost identical to those in the models for support for democracy in the previous section with the exception of one which I have dropped because it seems theoretically and empirically irrelevant to this argument: Ideological distance from the mean and regime functioning overall evaluation. At the same time, however, two new variables have been incorporated. These are respondents' evaluation of the overall political situation, and a dichotomous variable which serves to measure voting intention ("1" in the case of a vote for the party in power, and "0" for a vote for an opposition party).

74 The reader is reminded that the question in this indicator was the following: "In general, would you say you are very satisfied, more or less satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the functioning of democracy [in Spain]?") For this question a dummy variable was created with "0" indicating not at all or not very satisfied and "1" indicating very or more or less satisfied.
As can be seen in Table 7.6, the results of the analysis reveal once more the distinct nature of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. In all the cases analyzed here, the best predictor of this attitude is respondents' evaluation of the political situation: The better the political situation, the much greater the likelihood that a citizen will feel satisfied with the functioning of democracy. The evaluation of the overall economic situation (and the respondent's personal economic situation in the case of Brazil) also favors substantially the probability of feeling satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Moreover, it should be remembered that these two variables, the evaluation of the political and economic situation, are closely linked in all the cases considered here (in Brazil and Argentina they show high levels of multicollinearity), increasing the risk of accepting the null hypothesis (there is no relation) for the significance test, when in fact such a relation does exist (a type II error). These data alone constitute sufficiently clear evidence that political discontent is an attitude which depends on citizens' evaluation of the economic and political situation and that, as a result, in contrast to support for democracy or both dimensions of political disaffection, it is subject to significant oscillations and changes of opinion of the type we saw in previous chapters.

Moreover, it should also be noted that the degree of political satisfaction also partly depends on who is in power as we saw in chapter two. This can be seen in the cases of Argentina, Chile and Spain: Respondents are more likely to feel satisfied with democracy if they voted for a party in power. In this respect, it is interesting to note that there is no evidence of specific ideological partisan support, i.e., there is not a systematic relation with parties of the Left or of the Right as we saw in some countries with the others two dimensions of political support. Rather, all we can see is that respondents are more satisfied if the party they voted for is in power (note the positive sign), but this is the case regardless of whether it governs a coalition of center-left parties as in Chile, a center-left party (the PSOE in 1995) in Spain, or a rightwing party in Uruguay and Argentina (Justicialista Party following Menem's victory).

In striking contrast to what we saw with respect to support for democracy, in most cases satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is not related to ideology. When such a relation does exist, as in the case of Uruguay, it operates in the opposite sense to support for democracy. The electoral growth of the leftwing coalition headed by Tabaré Vásquez, and the alliance's systematic exclusion from power despite this growth, may have increased in 1995 the level of discontent among the coalition's supporters, at least temporarily. Finally, as
expected, the socialization and cohort variables have no impact, except in the case of education in Brazil.

One unexpected result is the relation found between political discontent and some of the variables of disaffection. In most cases this relation is weak, and therefore, does not significantly challenge the conclusions drawn until now. However, in some cases the relation with confidence in the national parliament is quite strong. This is an important finding, which could be explained in two ways. On the one hand, it might simply reflect the satisfaction with the party composition of the national parliament and who controls the majority of representatives. On the other, it might be a relation with greater implications for this analysis (the relation between discontent and disaffection). This is an issue which requires further analysis, but it is interesting to see that of all the indicators of confidence in the institutions of political representation covered in this survey (parties, unions, judiciary, public administration, press, and employers' association), confidence in the national parliament is the one which shows the closest correlation with satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (data not shown). This suggests that this relation could indeed be simply a result of the respondent's sympathy for the party or coalition with a majority in Congress.

7.5 Conclusion

I conclude this chapter pointing out again that political discontent is, therefore, mainly related to the support of and satisfaction with incumbent authorities and, thus, is highly volatile over time. On the other hand, support for democracy is more stable and enduring overtime, reflecting the influence of more long-term political factors. However, the study of democratic support also reveals that enduring political attitudes can be the subject of radical and fast changes as well. As we have seen, the new democracies that enjoy widespread support have experiences what I have termed the 'transition effect,' that is, an attitudinal transformation which takes place during the transition and which affects both the degree of support for the new regime, and the evaluation of the outgoing regime. This transformation is mostly the result of the politics of the transition and consolidation of democracy and the existence of some kind of elite settlement and democratic convergence, which is at the same time conditioned by the political heritage of the previous authoritarian regimes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Argentina (1)</th>
<th>Brazil (2)</th>
<th>Chile (1)</th>
<th>Spain (2)</th>
<th>Uruguay (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E. Previous reg. (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.10** 0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General economic situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.71* 0.54</td>
<td>1.35* 0.48</td>
<td>1.35** 0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic situation</td>
<td>1.54** 0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2*** 0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the political situation</td>
<td>1.77* 0.70</td>
<td>1.50* 0.45</td>
<td>1.76* 0.74</td>
<td>1.43* 0.43</td>
<td>1.87* 0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended vote</td>
<td>1.92* 0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socialization variables:

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<th>Education</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Cohort 1</th>
<th>Cohort 2</th>
<th>Cohort 3</th>
<th>Cohort 4</th>
<th>Cohort 5</th>
<th>Cohort 6</th>
<th>Refer.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Refer.</td>
<td>Refer.</td>
<td>Refer.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.49**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaffection variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External efficacy</th>
<th>Internal efficacy</th>
<th>Confidence in national parliament</th>
<th>Constant (coefficient)</th>
<th>Chi-square of model</th>
<th>-2log likelihood (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.20* 0.34</td>
<td>1.83* 0.20</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>-3.08* -4.46* -4.51* -3.30* -4.03*</td>
<td>128* d.f.13</td>
<td>507.6 (461)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.84* 0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2*** 0.39</td>
<td>1.26* 0.40 1.46* 0.34 1.3** 0.45</td>
<td>62.9* d.f.13</td>
<td>333.8 (317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>69.7*</td>
<td>93.7* 90.4* 140.4*</td>
<td>355.4 d.f.13</td>
<td>535.4 (458)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1300.3 d.f.13</td>
<td>1300.3 (1060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>631.6 (563)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Odds ratios.
(2) See Table 7.2 for an explanation.
(3) I have used confidence in the Armed Forces as a proxy.


(*) Significant at p<0.01
(**) Significant at p<0.05
(***) Significant at p<0.10

**TABLE 7.6** Model to explain political discontent in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain and Uruguay, 1995-1996 (only statistically significant logistic regression coefficients)
CHAPTER 8

THE MODEL OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THIRD WAVE DISAFFECTED DEMOCRACIES

In this chapter I demonstrate some effects of political disaffection, political discontent and lack of support for democracy on the nature new democracies. There are two central arguments here. The first is that, of these dimensions of political support, political disaffection is a significant factor conditioning the relationship between political authorities and citizens in representative democracies, much more so than support for democracy or political discontent. This is by itself important because this relationship defines the changing nature of representative democracies themselves. However, this argument becomes even more important when linked with my second argument: The effect of political disaffection in new democracies engenders consequences that are distinct from democracies of the first and second waves. As recent studies in political disaffection have argued,\(^1\) the lack of institutional confidence or increasing disaffection in old democracies is responsible for the decrease in the use of mechanisms of conventional participation and the parallel increase in the use of non-conventional forms of participation, changing their democratic institutions and the relationship between citizens and their representatives. It seems that the relationship between citizens and the state produced by increasing disaffection is at the root of changes that are currently taking place in today’s democracies.\(^2\) Thus, all these increasingly critical citizens have constituted a major challenge to the established democracies, and have caused


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increasing discussion about the nature and future development of these democracies, rekindling old debates about democratic theory. However, I will demonstrate in the present chapter that this is not the case in the third-wave democracies. Political disaffection in new democracies produces a general syndrome of lack of participation affecting all types and forms of political participation. This means that the newly established democracies and the traditional ones are evolving in different directions, aiming toward different representative democracies due to the distinct effect of political disaffection.

To demonstrate these contentions about new democracies, I will analyze the effect of political disaffection on political participation in two of its basic dimensions (conventional and non-conventional) in a number of third-wave democracies. This analysis shows that the lack of conventional and non-conventional participation in these countries is highly related to political disaffection.

8.1 Political Disaffection and Political Participation

Any theory of democracy must consider at least three fundamental questions: What type of political action is acceptable and should be carried out, with what intensity, and by whom? It is therefore not surprising that political participation has been one of the central elements in the discussion among democratic theorists. Political participation is a defining feature of representative democracy and an essential element in any definition of it. Although there are many definitions, the most commonly used one defines political participation as those “voluntary activities by which members of a society select their representatives and, directly or indirectly, influence public policy.”

The preceding is a broad definition that encompasses a multitude of political activities and actions that go far beyond voting. Nonetheless, leaving aside certain normative

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3 Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government., pp. 16-39.
4 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, p. 7.
6 Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, “Political Action. A Theoretical Perspective,” in Barnes, Kaase et al., Political Action., p. 27. As these authors affirm (p.29), this set of actions constitutes the means of interaction between authorities and citizens via institutions. A similar, broad definition can be found Jack H. Nagel, Participation, Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1987, p.1; and in M. Margaret Conway, Political Participation in the United States, 252
presumptions, not all modes of political participation are equal. Contrary to what is claimed by the early classics on this topic, political participation is a multidimensional phenomenon. This means that each type of participation requires, among other things, different degrees of initiative, commitment, information and objectives on the part of the citizens. This multidimensionality has additional implications. First, participation may become specialized in certain areas or dimensions. Second, there may be citizens who concentrate only on determined types of political action. Certainly, we must recognize the existence of different types of citizenship depending on the form of participation preferred. Finally, the presence of distinct dimensions of participation also means there could be a set of factors that influence different dimensions of participation in different ways. Many scholars have shown that people who do not have confidence in institutions, or who feel left out of politics or incapable of understanding them will be reluctant to participate in the democratic process, producing general apathy. But, it is equally possible that political disaffection could mobilize citizens seeking alternative ways of expressing their political opinions and their frustration with the functioning and performance of existing democratic institutions. In Gamson’s view, it is the combined effect of low political trust and high political efficacy that produces “the optimum combination for mobilization.” Thus, according to this literature,

2 Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation. How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?
9 Di Palma claims “people tend to participate in politics if they are not disaffected from the political system,” i.e., “I expect participation to be sustained by the belief that the political system, or at least some of its strategic institutions are open and accessible to the individual. Also, participation does not flourish unless people feel that the polity is not a remote entity, but rather something that is present and important in their daily lives, and unless they are closely identified with and committed to it;” see Di Palma, Apathy and Participation, p. 30. For similar conclusions, see Parry, Moyser and Neil, Political Participation and Democracy in Britain.
10 See Barnes, Kaase, et al., Political Action; Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies; Dalton, “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” pp. 57-77.
11 Gamson, Power and Discontent, p. 48.
an attitudinal blend of perceptions that political institutions are unresponsive provides the strongest motivation for unconventional behavior at the same time that it discourages more traditional forms of political action. Some of these attitudes are, therefore, becoming the driving force that may be transforming the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state in representative democracies.13

Do the different dimensions of political disaffection—institutional disaffection and political disengagement—produce the same mobilizing effect on citizens in new democracies? I argue here that political disaffection in new democracies does have the same effects on both conventional and non-conventional political participation, equally reducing the incentive to participate in either form.14 Political disaffection in new democracies has a very dominant and strong 'demobilizing effect,' reducing participation to a mere act of voting (and delegation) and decreasing the accountability of representatives between elections. To demonstrate this claim I am going to specify two models for political participation in some of the new democracies I have been analyzing where data is available, one for conventional participation and one for non-conventional participation.

8.2. A Model for Explaining Political Participation

According to most recent literature, political participation depends on three basic factors: (1) the ability to participate (if citizens do not participate it is because they cannot due to a lack of sufficient resources such as money, time, etc.); (2) the incentive to participate (if citizens do not participate it is because no one has asked them to, in other words, because no one has attempted to mobilize them); (3) the motivation to participate (if citizens do not participate it is because they do not want to because they do not feel they are an important part of the process or because they lack interest).15 These factors are generally


14 For a similar argument that includes significant empirical support using data for the Spanish case, see Torcal, Actitudes Políticas y Participación Política en España, chapter 4.

15 Verba, et al., Voice and Equality, p.16. These three factors coincide with those discussed by Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America, New York, 254
measured using sociological, attitudinal and political variables. The first models to explain political participation tended to focus on attitudinal and social aspects of individual citizens (survey respondents), but more recently the literature on political participation has focused on a set of political factors external to the individual, such as institutional factors, the mobilizing effect of issues, mobilizing strategies of political actors, and the set of social and political networks.

To test the effect of political disaffection on participation, I have estimated a regression model for conventional and non-conventional participation. The model includes information about individual social and economic resources (the basic socio-demographic variables), indicators of political discontent such as the evaluation of general and one’s economic situation (Economy and Personal econ. Situation), and finally satisfaction with Macmillan, 1993, chapter two. According to these authors, resources and motivation explain who participates, but mobilization on the part of political leaders determines when they participate. Citizens’ resources and motivation are the foundation on which the leaders exert their mobilizing influence.


Parry, Geraint; George Moyser and Neil Day, Political Participation and Democracy in Britain.

Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America.

the functioning of democracy (S.functioning), in general of the regime (E.functioning) and
democratic support (Support for democracy). Two variables were included to measure the
two dimensions of political disaffection: An index with the combination of confidence in
institutions and external political efficacy for institutional disaffection (Institutional des) and
internal political efficacy for political disengagement (Pol. Engagement). I have also
included a variable combining external political inefficacy and internal political efficacy.
This combination will test the hypothesis that perceptions that political institutions are
unresponsive combined with feeling of political capability, might provide, as I discussed
above, the strongest motivation for unconventional behavior at the same time that it
discourages more traditional forms of political action (Gamson’s Hypothesis). I have also
included ideology as a way of controlling the effects of current political competition and
exclusion.

So the model to be estimated for conventional participation is the following:

\[
Y_{\text{conventional participation}} = \beta_0 + \alpha_j + E.\text{economy}, \beta_{1j} + \text{Personal econ. situation}, \beta_{2j} + \text{Ideology}, \beta_{3j} \\
+ S.\text{functioning}, \beta_{4j} + \text{Support for democracy}, \beta_{5j} + E.\text{functioning}, \beta_{6j} + \text{Institutional des.}, \beta_{7j} \\
+ \text{Pol. engagement}, \beta_{8j} + \text{Gamson’s hypothesis}, \beta_{9j} + \text{Education}, \beta_{10j} + \text{Gender}, \beta_{11j} + \text{Age}, \beta_{12j} \\
+ \text{Income}, \beta_{13j} + e
\]

[model 9.1]

In order to test the mobilizing effects of political disaffection in terms of non-
conventional participation and the fostering of institutional innovation, I have added two
additional variables for the model of non-conventional participation:

1. Conventional participation (Conventional).
2. Interaction between not using the conventional mechanisms of participation and
institutional disaffection (conven*institutional des.). This variable is intended to
tap those citizens who, refusing conventional modes of participation, turn to non-

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21 Political interest is another powerful predictor of political participation and part, as I have shown before, of
political disengagement. However, I have decided to keep it out of the model because this attitude has a
behavioral component that would have favored my argument in a very questionable way.

22 In order to create the double condition of these variable (external inefficacy and internal efficacy), I have
create two dummies variables with value "1" for external inefficacy and "1" for internal efficacy and I have
multiplied them, so value "1" is equal to external inefficacy and internal efficacy, and "0" the rest of the other
combinations.
This model of non-conventional participation differs from the model of conventional participation in an additional way: The dependent variable is a dummy variable with "1" if the respondent has used some unconventional form of participation and "0" if she/he has not. So, instead of using OLS as I did with conventional participation, I have use a logistic model for the estimation.

So the model for non-conventional participation is the following:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{P_j}{1 - P_j} \right) = \beta_0 + \alpha_j + E. \text{economy}_j \beta_1 + \text{Personal econ. situation}_j \beta_2 + \text{Ideology}_j \beta_3 + S. \text{functioning}_j \beta_4 + \text{Support for democracy}_j \beta_5 + E. \text{functioning}_j \beta_6 + \text{Institutional des.}_j \beta_7 + \text{Pol. engagement}_j \beta_8 + \text{Gamson’s hypothesis}_j \beta_9 + \text{Education}_j \beta_{10} + \text{Gender}_j \beta_{11} + \text{Age}_j \beta_{12} + \epsilon
\]

\[23\] I have first created a dummy variable for conventional participation with values “1” when \( x \leq \bar{x} - 1S \); and “0” when \( x > \bar{x} - 1S \). Then, I have multiplied this dummy variable by the institutional disaffection index. This variable has value 0 for those who use some conventional mechanisms and the values of the institutional disaffection index for those who do not.

\[24\] To create the dependent variable for non-conventional participation in Latin America, I have done the following. I have first created a dummy variable with each of the following activities: Participating in demonstrations and blocking traffic (variables p65a and p65b of the 1995 Latinobarometer), assigning “1” to those who declared “yes, I have done it,” and “0” to those who said “no” or “I might do it.” I am not interested in the potential for participation as an attitudinal predisposition to participation so I gave a value of “0” to the potential participants. For a defense of this concept, see Alan Marsh and Max Kaase, “Measuring Political Action,” in Barnes, Kaase et al. Political Action, p. 58; for a critique of the use of this concept, see Ian Budge, “Book Review: Political Action,” American Political Science Review, 75, 1981, pp. 221-222. Second, I created an additive scale with these dummy variables. However, these type of variables have complex distribution (Poisson distribution), so I decided to create a dummy variable with those who had participated in at least one of these forms. This dependent variable requires a logistic model.

Unfortunately, for Southern Europe we do not have a comparative survey with declared behavior, so I have used participation approval for non-conventional participation. I have also created an average in a Likert scale of the following activities: participating in demonstrations, participating in strikes, blocking traffic, and writing slogans (V36, V37, V39 and V41 of the Four Nation Study). This is why I have used OLS for the estimation for non-conventional participation in Southern Europe [model 9.2].

\[25\] For Latin America the dependent variable for conventional participation is an average position in a Likert scale created with the following activities: Talking about politics with friends, trying to convince others of my own political opinions, asking something of civil servants, working for a political party (variables p64b to p64e of the 1995 Latinobarometer); and the following for Southern Europe: Working for a party, attending meetings or political rallies, and trying to convince others of my own political opinions (variables V29 to V31 of Four Nation Study). In this case, I could use OLS to estimate this model.
If political disaffection is a source of democratic innovation, an alternative source of political control and a new instrument of the expression of citizens’ preferences, we should find the following:

a) Neither dimension of political affection should be related with conventional participation, therefore, in model 9.1, $\beta_{i,j} = 0$ and $\beta_{8,j} = 0$.

b) The Gamson’s index (external disaffected with internal efficacious) should have a negative relationship with conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.1, $\beta_{9,j} < 0$.

c) Both dimensions of political affection should have a negative relationship with non-conventional participation; that is, the disaffected should be the ones promoting this kind of non-formal participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{1,j} < 0$ and $\beta_{8,j} < 0$.

d) The Gamson’s index should have a positive relationship with non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{9,j} > 0$.

e) Conventional participation should not be related or should be negatively related with non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{14,j} \leq 0$.

f) The interaction of dummy conventional participation and institutional affection should be negatively related with non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{15,j} < 0$.

If the preceding discussion of the different consequences of political disaffection in new democracies is correct and it constitutes instead a reason behind the widening of the gap between citizen and institutions and political authorities, promoting a general lack of participation, less expression of political preferences and less political accountability of
authorities between elections, creating a more elitist less-participating democracy, we should expect the following:

g) Both dimensions of political affection should have a positive relationship with conventional participation, therefore, in model 9.1, $\beta_{1j} > 0$ and $\beta_{2j} > 0$.

h) The Gamson's index (external disaffected with internal efficacious) should have a positive or non-existent relationship with conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.1, $\beta_{3j} \geq 0$.

i) Institutional affection and political engagement should have a positive relationship with non-conventional participation; that is, the affected should be the ones promoting this kind of non-formal participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{7j} > 0$ and $\beta_{8j} > 0$.

j) The Gamson’s index should have a negative or non-existing relationship with non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{9j} \leq 0$.

k) Conventional participation should be positively related to non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{14j} > 0$.

l) The interaction of dummy conventional participation and institutional affection should be positively or not related with non-conventional participation; therefore, in model 9.2, $\beta_{15j} \geq 0$.

Before going into estimating the model, I have to point out that this model obviously fails to include important contextual variables for political participation. However, my main goal is not to develop a complete model to account for political participation in these countries. I only intend to show the influence and the direction of political disaffection with respect to conventional and non-conventional participation, after controlling for a set of significant individual level variables typically included in the literature. Furthermore, the non-inclusion in the model of contextual national level variables in individual-level analyses
by country should not be considered an under-specified model problem. National contextual level variables are constant within each country and only provide information to explain the differences on the levels among countries, which is not my primary concern here.

Moreover, as I have demonstrated earlier, the political attitudes under study here (particularly those that measure political disaffection) contain important information about the political context of the past. As discussed previously, this means that, although political attitudes are reflections of individual features, they contain a cultural legacy of past political events. Most models of political participation try to include in their explanations current contextual political factors, but political attitudes can carry information on past political events. This claim is important because most current models of political participation give politics a residual role when they include only current contextual political features—politics are generally thought to explain only what is left after sociological and individual attitudinal attributes are taken into account. Considering and stating more clearly the effects of the 'politics of the past' on attitudes may help to overcome this 'residual status' of politics in the models to explain political participation.

8.3 The Effects of Political Disaffection on Political Participation

Table 9.1 contains the results of the estimation of the models for conventional in eight new democracies. The results show that political disaffection, together with socio-economic resources, are in general a strong predictor of conventional participation. But the coefficients of political disaffection have a positive sign (the greater the affection the greater the use of conventional mechanisms). This confirms hypothesis (g) instead of (a), and shows that political disaffection reinforces the political inequality produced by the individual

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26 Furthermore, under-specification substantially favors the robustness of my conclusions and parameters given that the most relevant variables in the discussion are significant and robust.

27 For Southern Europe, I have used the Four Nation Study data which do not include the overall and personal economic evaluation, and satisfaction with democratic functioning. For the evaluation of the regime functioning, I have used different questions on how democracy can resolve problems (V80 for the FNS and p22 for the 1995 Latinobarometer). For the Latin American data, I have used a socio-economic status variable instead of income. Finally, for the Index of Institutional Affection in Southern Europe, I have used a combination of external efficacy and an anti-party sentiments index, instead of institutional confidence. The classical institutional confidence variables were not included in this study and antiparty sentiments are highly related with institutional disaffection. For the details of this index and how it is related with political disaffection, see Torcal, Gunther and
resources in this dimension of political disaffection. This holds true for institutional affection as well as for political engagement. Even Gamson’s hypothesis is not confirmed; that is hypothesis (b) is rejected for all the countries with the only exception of Chile, where the combination of external inefficacy and political engagement produce a rejection of conventional forms of participation. In the remaining countries hypothesis (h) is confirmed; that is, this attitudinal combination of politically engaged but discontent citizens does not produce a negative reaction against conventional participation and even in Peru it has a positive effect.

Tables 9.2 and 9.3 present the results of the estimation of the model 9.2 for non-conventional participation in the same group of new democracies. In this case, the major predictors are the economic evaluations (mostly the egotropic one),\(^{28}\) the individual resources variables (especially, education and age) and the political disaffection variables (except in Brazil). However, hypothesis (i) is confirmed instead of (c), that is; political affection has a positive relation with non-conventional participation as well. This leads me to conclude that political disaffection is in part responsible for the lack of both types of political participation in these societies, reinforcing the political inequality produced as a direct result of the significant differences in individual socio-economic resources that exist in these societies. Furthermore, Gamson’s hypothesis is not confirmed for this dimension of political disaffection; that is, the combination of disaffected but politically engaged citizens does not produce an increase in non-conventional participation. Hypothesis (d) is not confirmed for new democracies. Instead, hypothesis (j) is verified; that is, this attitudinal combination does not have any effect on non-conventional participation in the seven new democracies under study. It has a positive effect only in Spain, and in this case, we have to take into account that the dependent variable is not the declared behavior, but the behavior approval.

---

Montero, “Anti-party Sentiments in Southern Europe.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic situation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic situation</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democratic functioning</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Regime functioning</td>
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<td>.09**</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.18*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
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<td>.17**</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
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<td>Gamson’s Hypothesis</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.18*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (coefficient)</td>
<td>.76*</td>
<td>.73*</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>2.27*</td>
<td>.85*</td>
<td>.89*</td>
<td>1.20*</td>
<td>.92*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(606)</td>
<td>(523)</td>
<td>(789)</td>
<td>(465)</td>
<td>(685)</td>
<td>(1003)</td>
<td>(1124)</td>
<td>(655)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<0.01.

(**) Significant at p<0.05.

**TABLE 8.1** Models to explain conventional political participation in eight new democracies (only statistically significant beta coefficients)**

262
### TABLE 8.2 Models to explain non-conventional political participation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, (only statistically significant logistic coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Overall economic situation</td>
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<td>.28**</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.70**</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democratic functioning</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Regime functioning</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Affection</td>
<td>.90**</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.30**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamson’s Hypothesis</td>
<td>.90**</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-.26</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.37**</td>
</tr>
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<td>Socio-economic status</td>
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<td>.03*</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.37**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional Participation</td>
<td>1.22*</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.73*</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1.23*</td>
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<tr>
<td>No participation*</td>
<td>1.22*</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.73*</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional desaffection</td>
<td>1.22*</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.73*</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1.23*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant (coefficient)</td>
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<td>-2.92*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.13*</td>
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<td>Chi-square of model</td>
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<td>85.5</td>
<td>139.6</td>
<td>102.7</td>
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<td>R² Nagelkerke</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(584)</td>
<td>(521)</td>
<td>(751)</td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td>(648)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<0.01.

(**) Significant at p<0.05.

Last column shows the difference between the estimated probability when the independent variable is at its lowest value and the others remain constant at the mean, and the same probability when the value of the independent variable is at its highest value. This is known as the “first difference;” see King, *Unifying political methodology. The likelihood theory of statistical inference*, pp. 107-108.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
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<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic situation</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>-.32*</td>
<td>-.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democratic functioning</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
<td>n.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Regime functioning</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Affection</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamson’s Hypothesis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Participation</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No participation*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional desaffection</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (coefficient)</td>
<td>2.59*</td>
<td>2.52*</td>
<td>2.63*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(1414)</td>
<td>(968)</td>
<td>(1059)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Four Nation Study.

(*) Significant at p<0.05

TABLE 8.3 Models to explain approval of non-conventional political participation in Greece, Spain and Portugal (only significant beta coefficients [OLS])
The results contrast with the effect of political disaffection on political participation observed by the literature in more traditional democracies. According to the dominant literature, political disaffection in old democracies produces a mobilizing effect that leads to non-conventional forms of participation, resulting in greater control, alternatives ways of expressing political preferences, democratic and institutional innovation, political accountability beyond pure democratic delegation and more responsive leadership. In fact, in new democracies, the best predictor for non-conventional participation is participation in conventional forms, but with a positive relationship, confirming hypothesis (e) instead of (k). The use of these forms of participation in new democracies is not a response to the lack of satisfaction with the current conventional forms, but the results of decades of the attitudinal effects of political exclusion reflected in high levels of political disaffection. Even the effect of political disaffection among the citizens that do not use conventional forms of participation is very revealing. The relationship is negative and significant in only three countries: Chile, Portugal and Spain. This means that in only three countries does institutional disaffection among the conventional non-participants increase the probability of using non-conventional forms of participation (hypothesis (e)); and in the last two countries, the dependent variable is not declared behavior, but behavior approval. For the rest, there is no effect (hypothesis (l)).

It is also important to note that the effect of democratic support on political participation in the new democracies under study is almost non-existent (the only exception is Uruguay). Political discontent does not have any relevant effect either. There is only a weak relationship between non-conventional participation and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Chile and Peru. That is, people tend to use less non-conventional forms when they are more satisfied with the democratic functioning, but there is no effect with the conventional forms. This shows, again, that satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is actually more a measure of satisfaction with incumbent authorities and, therefore, as the classic on this topic contended long ago, people tend to participate less using alternative forms when they are satisfied with the current authorities (there are less incentives). It seems, thus, that democratic support and political discontent do not substantially affect political participation, a basic aspect of the nature of the relationship between citizens and the representative authorities. Of the attitudes of political support, only the two dimensions of
political disaffection have any effect on the citizens’ individual decision to participate in new democracies.

To conclude, I can therefore assert the importance political disaffection plays in the low levels of conventional and non-conventional political participation that mark new democracies. Contrary to what seems to happen in more traditional democracies, political disaffection discourages any kind of political participation and, thus, appears to be the force driving change in the nature of the relationship between citizens and incumbent authorities. In fact, political disaffection is broadening the already significant gap between citizens and representatives. While traditional democracies are aiming toward a more inclusive and more participating republican democratic polity, new democracies are following the path toward a more elitist and less participatory democracy. This difference in the nature of democracy is due in part to the distinct influence political disaffection has on new democracies.

8.4 Conclusion

To conclude, I can therefore assert the importance political disaffection plays in the low levels of conventional and non-conventional political participation that mark new democracies. Contrary to what seems to happen in more traditional democracies, political disaffection discourages any kind of political participation and, thus, appears to be the force driving change in the nature of the relationship between citizens and incumbent authorities. In fact, political disaffection is broadening the already significant gap between citizens and representatives. While traditional democracies are aiming toward a more inclusive and more participating republican democratic polity, new democracies are following the path toward a more elitist and less participatory democracy. This difference in the nature of democracy is due in part to the distinct influence political disaffection has on new democracies.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has focused on three interrelated topics: First, the distinction between, and empirical presence of three separate dimensions of political support (political affection, political satisfaction and support for democracy) in new democracies; second, the importance of national politics in defining the origin and distinct levels of these dimensions of political support; third, the effects of these dimensions of political support on the nature of the third-wave democracies.

In the preceding chapters I have demonstrated the distinct nature of the dimensions of political support. The detailed dimensional analysis of chapter two shows clearly that political affection, political satisfaction and support for democracy are distinct dimensions of political support, although the degree of relationship among them might vary in some cases. Subsequent chapters offer further empirical proof of this claim showing how the origin and evolution of these attitudes respond to totally different causes and factors. The longitudinal analysis of these attitudes among Spaniards in chapter five is particularly illustrative. The cohort analysis in this chapter reveals different patterns in the evolution of these attitudes over time, of the generational and period effects observed and of their intergenerational transmission. Furthermore, the analysis of different countries in chapters six and seven are also very conclusive. Chapter six demonstrates that different socializing experiences and the attitudinal transmission that produces are the best predictors of political disaffection showing that the attitudinal legacy produced by past political episodes of political exclusion, mobilization and demobilization, and discourses against institutions of representation are the dominant factors explaining the high levels of political disaffection at the individual level in new democracies. The cultural and performance explanations are not totally discarded, but they are very weak in explaining political disaffection in these democracies. On the other
hand, in chapter seven, we see that support for democracy does not respond to these same factors, especially if there has been a "transition effect" -- that is an attitudinal transformation in favor of democratic support during the transition due to a foundational pact or elite convergence. Democratic support depends on the politics of the transition and consolidation, not on attitudinal transmission factors. Finally, I have also shown that political satisfaction, and its opposite, political discontent, depend on the day-to-day politics of party competition.

Lastly, in chapter eight, I show how each of these dimensions of political support has different behavioral consequences. Political disaffection is the only one of the three dimensions responsible for the type of relationship that exists between the citizens and government, elected representatives and institutions in new democracies, and it is these attitudes that define the nature of the new democracies and the direction in which they are headed.

The general conclusion that the concept of political support in fact includes three distinct dimensions, each with a different nature and consequences, is relevant to the discussion of Easton's theory of diffuse and specific support and vital to the debate about democratization. Contrary to classical assumptions of political culture and dominant interpretations of the diffuse and specific support concepts, and in line with findings of more recent comparative studies, this proves that different dimensions of a country's political support can be highly autonomous and the relationship between them is less axiomatic than believed. In addition, demonstrating the relationships among and consequences of the dimensions of political support in new democracies is essential to the discussion of democratic consolidation, helping to clarify the kind of political support that is required in order to consider a new democratic regime as consolidated. Moreover, the relative autonomy of these different dimensions of political support may help us understand why many new democracies display stable and vast majoritarian support of the citizens even while these same citizens seems to be highly disaffected with the system -- critical of the institutions and mechanism of representation, the participation opportunities they provide, their responsiveness and their performance. Furthermore, clarifying the type of democratic support needed to consider a democratic regime as consolidated opens a new avenue for a more prosperous discussion on the nature of these new democracies once they are consolidated. The analysis of each dimension of political support beyond pure support for
democracy might instead reveal the nature of the new 'poliarchies,' and their future development.

With respect to the second topic, I have demonstrated how national politics play an important role in explaining the level, origin and evolution of these dimensions of political support. But, politics does not include only the current political competition and institutional setting of each country. Politics also includes the political game during the regime change. The politics of the transition and consolidation are essential to understanding the different levels of democratic support across countries observed; and, more importantly, if democratic support constitutes the "safety area" that provides higher probability for regime stability in the face of day-to-day political competition, political crisis and even poor performance. This is to say that when a "transition effect" has happened, economic and political performance variables and party and ideological preferences play a very weak role or even no role in determining levels of democratic support.

An important claim with regard to this second topic is that politics also includes the politics of the past beyond the recent transition. In chapter three, I examined the different levels of both dimensions of political disaffection, institutional disaffection and political disengagement, in a number of democracies. In general, political disaffection is higher among third-wave democracies. There are some exceptions to this pattern, but these outliers reinforce the importance of the past democratic record in shaping political disaffection. In fact, the different aggregate levels of political disaffection suggest that the higher level of political disaffection in many democracies depends on the presence of a historical past characterized by exclusionary and/or non-democratic institutions, practices, and discourses against representative institutions, the abusive use of these, and demobilizing strategies. Most third-wave democracies share this common political past, which generally results in higher levels of political disaffection. A few first and second wave democracies present somewhat similar exclusionary institutional and political practices, but without democratic interruptions for the last forty or fifty years. This is why political disaffection in some of these old democracies is also high, although not as high as in many new democracies.

I demonstrated the hypothesis about the impact of the past democratic record on levels of political disaffection with a multivariate analysis of aggregate data on this attitude and other political, economic and social indicators. The results show that in all democracies the individual country's particular democratic record plays a role in defining the degree of
confidence citizens have in their political institutions. For this reason, the pooled cross-sectional analysis of individual level data in chapter four shows that the citizens of older democracies evaluate their institutions according to the results of the system and the mechanisms they offer for participation and inclusion, and political disaffection is greater among the better educated and more informed citizens, as these are the citizens who have the greatest information available to evaluate the results of the system and to seek alternative mechanisms of political contestation.

However, precisely, because of the impact of the political past, things are different in new democracies. The past plays a very different role in new democracies when it comes to shaping citizens' attitudes towards their institutions. In these regimes, the past constitutes a cultural legacy that negatively influences citizens' perceptions and evaluations of democratic institutions, regardless of their performance or achievements. The better educated and informed citizens are more likely to escape this syndrome of political disaffection, as they are the citizens who are most aware of the normal functioning and results achieved by the institutions of political representation: Greater liberty, greater political and social inclusion and, in many countries, albeit with notable exceptions, greater economic and social progress. Disaffection and its cultural legacy in new democracies are concentrated, therefore, among those citizens whose evaluations are shaped by mechanisms of primary socialization and a lack of information.

This is not a culturally deterministic argument. One of the major findings of this study is the important role played by political parties in reducing disaffection. Present strategies of political mobilization by these collective actors have the potential to significantly reduce political disaffection. In fact, membership in current political parties is not the source of frustration with the political system. Indeed, party participants tend to be substantially less disaffected. The other important finding against cultural determinism is that the passage of time under democratic rule increases the weight of the evaluation of government performance in explaining political disaffection, in detriment to the generational effect and the socialization variables. This is an important practical finding for suggesting mechanisms to improve the levels of political affection in new democracies.

The preceding discussion is also very important to the underlying discussion about models of political culture. As I discussed, there are two prevailing approaches to the study of attitudinal change and formation: The "culturalist" model and the "rational culturalist"
model. Some findings in this dissertation confirm the culturalists model which contends that attitudes change slowly because they are cultural traits that depend on long-term processes of socialization. Others, however, support the notion that culture can change quickly as a result of political or economic events or institutional settings, and through rational adaptation and adult learning, reinforcing the classical rational-culturalist arguments. This dissertation, in fact, tries to conciliate the two approaches. Some dimensions of political support are the product of current or very recent political events or/and current institutional settings as "rational culturalists" defend, while the source of political disaffection is in political socialization. Nevertheless, even the explanation of the formation of political disaffection I have proposed does not defend a pure "culturalist" model. Political disaffection is not a product of economic and social modernization or of any other culturally determined characteristic. It is not a product of an individual's personality, or any basic cultural attitudinal baseline such as interpersonal or social trust. I contend only that specific political episodes and political agents may have long-lasting attitudinal effects that can be transmitted by socialization or reproduced by similar political conditions (or the combination of the two). In fact, a major conclusion of this discussion is the relevance of the role played by political and social elites in transforming and manipulating certain cultural legacies using different institutional and political instruments at their disposal.

Finally, as I said in the introduction, talking about the impact of different socializing experiences and the resulting attitudinal transmission does not mean that attitudes toward political objects are exogenous or generated outside political life, but quite the contrary: The origin of such attitudes must be sought within the realm of politics and in fact they are changeable during one's life-time. Furthermore, the fact that they are the product of subjective appraisal and perceptions does not mean that they are not also the result of a 'rational' process of evaluating the political environment and the public institutions, objects or discourses which 'formed' them.

The final topic covered in the preceding pages is the different consequences of the dimensions of political support in new established democracies. Chapter nine asserts the importance political disaffection plays in the low levels of conventional and non-conventional political participation that mark new democracies. Contrary to what other studies have pointed out about more traditional democracies, in new democracies political disaffection discourages any kind of political participation and, thus, appears to be the
driving force behind the changing nature of the relationship between citizens and incumbent authorities. In fact, political disaffection is broadening the already significant gap between citizens and representatives. While traditional democracies are aiming toward a more inclusive and more participating republican democratic polity, new democracies are following the path toward a more elitist and less participatory democracy. This difference in the nature of democracy is due in part to the distinct influence political disaffection has on new democracies.

This by itself is an important reason to study in detail the problem of political disaffection in new democracies. However, my conclusions about political disaffection and participation do not address the question about the effects of political disaffection on the fundamental mechanism of political control and delegation in contemporary representative democracies: Casting the vote. Voters in new democracies also have to make decisions in choosing a party or candidate, but how well informed are they to make that decisions, and more importantly, how is political disaffection affecting the amount and type of voters’ information in new democracies? This is a topic for future research, but I suggest that political disaffection reduces the amount of political information, the level of political attentiveness to politics and to electoral campaigns, and the overall quantity and frequency of political discussion, exchange of political opinions and political deliberation. We know that “limited information need not prevent people from making reasoned choices,” ¹ but we also know since Downs that the lower the level of information, the greater the space for political manipulation. Political disaffection may be not only be exacerbating the “democratic dilemma,” but may also be partially responsible for the current low levels of political accountability observed in many new democracies.

¹ Lupia and McCubbins, The democratic Dilemma, p. 4.
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