INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI
ABSTRACT

Past research has not investigated the influence of procedural justice – the extent to which fair procedures when decisions are made – on responses to accountability demands, or other types of social influence attempts. This dissertation presents three experiments that explore how procedural justice influences perceptions of legitimacy and how coping responses are activated in response. Additionally, the current research investigates a number of novel coping responses to accountability demands, including: voicing opposition to the demand; exit/refusal to acquiesce to the demand; exploiting loopholes to avoid fulfilling the demand; and grudging acquiescence to the demand.

Across the three studies, multiple independent variables were used to vary (either directly or indirectly) procedural justice variables. Participants in Experiment One were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in the following design: 2 (Social Influence Attempt: Obedience Demand, Compliance Request) x 2 (Relational Frame: Equality Matching (EM), Authority Ranking (AR)) x 2 (Normative Consistency: Demand is Consistent with Relational Norms, Demand is in Violation of Relational Norms). In this study, participants were asked to retrospect about a prior experience in which they were given a certain type of social influence attempt, and to evaluate a number of possible coping responses.

Participants in Experiment Two were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in the following mixed design: 2 (Ability to Voice Complaint: Present, Absent) x 2
(Power of Authority: High, Low) x 2 (Procedural Justice: High, Low). In this study, participants were presented with an accountability vignette set in a business context. After reading about the situation facing the vignette's protagonist, participants evaluated possible coping responses to the demand.

Participants involved in Experiment Three were completed one of two tasks after being randomly assigned to a condition in the following design: 2 (Accountability: Present, Absent) x 2 (Procedural Justice: Just, Unjust) x 2 (Tasks: Attractive, Unattractive). This study differed from the first two studies in that respondents were asked to be active participants in an accountability situation.

Procedurally just accountability demands were viewed as more legitimate (as measured by an increased feeling that one was obligated to acquiesce), which in turn made voluntary acquiescence more likely. The manner by which people decided to resist the demand depended upon the situational context of the demand, such as the relationship between the giver and receiver of the demand or the presence of other coping responses (i.e., the ability to voice complaint). Those who scored higher on measures of Machiavellianism were more likely to endorse a wide range of subversive responses to the accountability demand.

Further directions for research involving procedural justice and accountability – as well as the notion of legitimacy and the obligation to acquiesce to authority – are discussed. Such research will continue to expand our understanding of the manner by which individuals respond to accountability demands.
For their consistent patience, love, and support, this dissertation is dedicated to my family... Denise, Orie III, Erin, and Lisa.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am proud to say that Philip Tetlock has trained me as a social psychologist. I must thank him for the guidance and insights he's provided over the past four years, and for how he helped me develop an idea I had into a quality research project. I remain profoundly impressed by him. Also, I wish to thank the other faculty who served on this dissertation committee, donating their precious time and cognitive energy to make this document as best as it could be.

Many people in the psychology graduate program must be thanked: Kris Preacher for his statistical advice; members of the Tetlock-Mellers lab group (especially A. Peter McGraw and Mark Polifroni) for commenting on my design and conceptual approaches; and George Y. Bizer for suggesting a more efficient way to conduct Experiment Three (what a life-saver!). I am also grateful for the remarkable job my undergraduate research confederates (Chris Kobusch, Jenn Minturn, Lindsey Cudlike, Stephanie Rezabek, and Mandy Seymour) did for me in Experiment Three.

Many important people offered their unconditional support and encouragement to me, even when I was too focused on my Ph.D to say thanks. So, now let me say “thanks!” to Dave Tom, Ed Oetinger, Drew Ambler, my family, Karen Snyder, and everyone else. It was great knowing that I could rely upon you all.

Finally, I'd like to thank Lisa Michelle Evans. From her, I've learned to appreciate the benefits that come from accepting others' support and encouragement during difficult times. Completing this dissertation would have been even more challenging in so many ways, were it not for her in my life.
VITA

April 1, 1975 ........................................................... Born – Philadelphia, PA

1997 ....................................................................... B.S. Psychology, Ursinus College

1997-present ........................................................... Departmental Fellow,
Department of Psychology
The Ohio State University

1998-1999 ............................................................... NIMH Training Grant Recipient

1999 ....................................................................... M.A. Psychology,
The Ohio State University

1999-2000 ............................................................... Graduate Research Associate,
Department of Psychology
The Ohio State University

2000-2001 ............................................................... Graduate Teaching Associate,
Department of Psychology
The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Psychology

Minor Field: Social Psychology

Quantitative Psychology

Political Psychology
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapters:**

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
   - Acquiescence to Authority: Instrumental and Normative Perspectives .......... 3
     - Instrumental Perspectives ............................................................................. 3
     - Normative Perspectives ............................................................................... 6
   - Procedural Justice – Increasing Obligatory Concern .................................. 7
     - When Does Procedural Justice Matter? ......................................................... 8
   - Legitimacy and Obligatory Concern .................................................................. 10
   - Accountability Theory .................................................................................... 12
   - Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Coping Responses to Accountability:
     - Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses ....................................................... 13
     - Acquiescent/Constructive Responses ........................................................... 16
     - Resistant/Constructive Responses ................................................................. 17
     - Resistant/Destructive Responses ..................................................................... 17

viii
Potential Mediators: Obligatory and Anticipatory Concern ................................. 115
Factor Analysis ..................................................................................................... 115
Potential Mediator: Emotion Variables .................................................................. 117
Factor Analysis ..................................................................................................... 117
Effects of Manipulated Variables on Potential Mediators ................................. 117
Obligatory Concern (PJ) ................................................................................... 117
Anticipatory Concern ......................................................................................... 118
Obligatory Concern (DJ) ................................................................................... 119
Emotion Variables .............................................................................................. 119
Interpersonal Covariate ...................................................................................... 120
Behavioral Measures .......................................................................................... 121
Word-count Accuracy (Words Counted) ............................................................. 121
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 123
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 123
Word-count Accuracy (Use of Scrap Paper) ....................................................... 123
Time to Complete Task ...................................................................................... 126
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 126
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 126
Attitudinal Measures .......................................................................................... 127
Coping Response Patterns .................................................................................. 127
Obedience (Willing) ............................................................................................ 128
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 128
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 129
Voicing Complaint .............................................................................................. 129
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 129
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 129
Procrastination ..................................................................................................... 129
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 130
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 130
Loophole-Exploitation ....................................................................................... 130
  Machiavellianism Effects ................................................................................. 131
  Mediation Analyses ......................................................................................... 132
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Correlated Factor Scores</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effects of Normative Consistency, Social Relationship, and Influence Tactic on Anticipatory Concern</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Negative Affect</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Correlated Evaluations of Coping Responses</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Willing Obedience</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Willing Obedience</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Effects of Normative Consistency, Social Relationship, and Machiavellianism on Complaint-Voicing</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship Buck-passing</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Buck-passing</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10 Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Procrastination</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11 Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Obfuscation</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12 Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Refusal-to-Obey</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.13 Effects of Normative Consistency and Influence Tactic on Refusal-to-Obey</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.14 Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Sabotage</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4Effects of Procedural Justice and Task Attractiveness on Liking of Confederate
(Interpersonal Covariate) .....................................................................................120

4.5Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability
on Accuracy (Words Counted) ............................................................................122

4.6Effects of Machiavellianism, Procedural Justice, and Accountability
on Accuracy (Words Counted) ............................................................................124

4.7Correlated Coping Responses........................................................................127

4.8Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability
on Willing Obedience .......................................................................................128

4.9Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Machiavellianism
on Loophole-Exploitation ..................................................................................131

4.10Effects of Machiavellianism and Accountability on Refusal-to-Obey .................133

4.11Effects of Machiavellianism and Accountability on Sabotage .........................134

4.12Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability
on Grudging Obedience .......................................................................................135
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social entities (family units, political figures, businesses) attempt to exert their influence over others every day, whether it be via television / radio commercials, print advertisements, or direct orders to another. One type of social influence that is of primary interest to this author is that relating to accountability. Accountability has been defined as the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called upon to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others (Tetlock, 1992; see Lemer & Tetlock, 1999).

In a political climate that wants improvement in government, the environment, and public schools, there is a growing clamor for increased efforts to hold people and institutions accountable (see Mitchell, 1993). Although people’s intuitive theories suggest that accountability pressures are a panacea to societal, economic, and personal problems, it is implausible to believe that a simple reliance on accountability can solve these varied social problems. Indeed, a robust literature has documented many conditions that lead accountability demands to have effects that are unexpected at best and sub-optimal at worst (see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999 for review). This being the case, whatever can be done to structure social influence attempts so as to minimize negative effects and to maximize voluntary acquiescence would be beneficial.¹ This dissertation research focuses on a number of factors that facilitate voluntary acquiescence to social influence attempts in general and accountability demands in particular.
For society to function most effectively, it is clear that people need to go through their daily lives obeying laws and orders without feeling coerced to doing so. Voluntary acquiescence — going along with an authority because to do so is "the right thing to do" — is valued over coercive acquiescence due to the prohibitive costs and negative psychological effects associated with the latter (Tetlock, 1998; Tyler, 1990a). Such voluntary acquiescence would be especially beneficial for those who must dispense accountability demands — what can authorities do to oversee its charges in a minimally oppressive and maximally informative manner? Certain researchers (see Tyler, 1997) argue that authorities need to be perceived as legitimate. To promote these perceptions of legitimacy, which in turn can lead to greater acquiescence to the authority and its demands, authorities have been advised to incorporate fair and judicious processes when making decisions.

Research relating to procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1990a) and accountability theory (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1998) suggests a number of conditions that may lead to a perception of a procedurally just accountability demand. These preconditions are met when an accountability demand: is issued in a procedurally fair manner (i.e., unbiased, established processes are consistently applied); sets a reasonably high and attainable standard; and stands to benefit more than just an organizational or political elite. If most of these conditions are met, voluntary acquiescence with the demand is likely. This in turn should lead constituencies to expend greater cognitive and motivational effort to fulfill the specifics of the demand given by the authority. Therefore, those who rely upon procedurally fair accountability demands may be more likely to see higher quality efforts by those who report to them.

Drawing from both procedural justice literature and accountability theory, the following pages review: instrumental and normative perspectives regarding how people
choose to obey laws; the importance of procedural justice theory in providing constituents with normative reasons to obey; and research on how people cope with accountability demands. This review ends with a merging of accountability and procedural justice theories, arguing that to fully understand why people acquiesce to authority, researchers must take into consideration both the extent to which people feel a duty or obligation to acquiesce as well as the extent to which people consider the possible consequences (i.e., reward, gain) to acquiescing.

Acquiescence to Authority: Instrumental and Normative Perspectives

Past research indicates that people obey a demand for two general reasons – instrumental (concern over reward and punishment) and normative (concern over the manner by which one is treated). Although this dissertation focuses more on manipulations of the normative perspective (i.e., procedural justice), differences between both perspectives are presented below.

Instrumental Perspectives. The instrumental perspective to obedience suggests that people base their behavior in response to tangible, immediate incentives and penalties associated with following the law (Tyler, 1990a). In other words, people are motivated to obey laws because of self-interest. This perspective has its roots in behavioral psychology and operant conditioning (Skinner, 1938); from this perspective, obedience is a form of behavior that occurs in response to external factors (Tyler, 1990a).

This perspective on social control is widely accepted and may be found in many social contexts. Our lay knowledge informs us of the wisdom in using a “carrot and stick approach” to encourage a recalcitrant ass; our academic theories often model human behavior with the assumption that humans are fundamentally ego motivated (e.g., Martin, 2000; Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, 1987). It should be of little surprise that aca-
demic research on social influence has offered a number of “resource based models” of behavior and cognition. All of them rely on the assumption that human behavior is motivated and guided by rewards and punishments in the external environment (Tyler, 1990a). Some of the more influential models are presented and reviewed briefly below.

1. Social Control theories (Krislov et al, 1972; Wood 1974). A person will be more pleased with a decision’s outcome to the extent that one may control the process (thereby influencing the outcome in one’s favor).

2. Social Exchange theories (Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, and Mainous, 1988; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Fiske, Lin, & Nueberg, 1999). People’s social decisions are dominated by self-interest calculations. People evaluate a relationship by calculating its expected costs and benefits (e.g., a decision to stay in a relationship is more likely when costs are few and benefits are many).

3. Public Choice theories (Mueller, 1979; Laver, 1981). Offered by political science theorists and highly similar to social exchange theories, these theories hold that evaluations of legal and political authorities, their policies, and the decisions to acquiesce to these policies are governed by utility-maximizing, self-interest calculations (Tyler & Lind, 1992). For example, people may decide to obey a law or vote in an election after considering the positive benefits of obeying or voting against the costs of not doing so.

Resource-based models suggest that the evaluation of an authority (e.g., “how good and/or fair is this authority?”) depends on the extent to which an outcome leads to a positive, beneficial outcome. If an outcome is associated with positive effects, then the evaluation of the authority will also be positive, and vice versa. Behaviorally, motivation to comply with an authority is a function of an authority’s power. Also referred to as asymmetric resource dependency, we tend to seek the approval of people who control resources we value (Tetlock, 1998). Clearly, self-interest often rules our mental calculus.
When considering how to modify the legal and social behavior of its constituents, policymakers often adopt this instrumental, *home economicus* perspective (Becker, 1996). Indeed, March and Olsen (1989) argue that this perspective—also known as “anticipatory concern”—forms the basis for the majority of our accumulated knowledge about the behavior of political actors and institutions. This focus on the instrumental consequences of our actions has merit: it behooves one to attend to rewards and punishments, so as to maximize positive outcomes and to minimize negative outcomes. Attending to authoritative prescriptions and proscriptions is an adaptive, strategic approach for the average citizen: after all, “following the rules has rewards and breaking them has costs” (Tyler, 1991). However, sole reliance on resource-based models (i.e., behavioral control via rewards & punishments) is neither always feasible nor desirable.

Economically, state resources may be scarce or unavailable to enforce every law for every person at every hour of the day. Such an oppressive approach to ensure citizen obedience would rapidly exhaust the resources of the social and institutional structure (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tyler, 1990a).

Psychologically, there are potential costs to an over-reliance on reward and punishment when attempting to model human behavior. These costs include:

1. The undermining effects of extrinsic motivation on cognitive & motivational efforts (see Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 1999; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Enzle & Anderson, 1993)
2. An increased desire to avoid the situation (decision avoidance: Janis & Mann, 1977)
3. An increased desire to circumvent illegitimate criteria control systems (exploiting loopholes)
4. Increased likelihood of reactance from “shotgun style” persuasion attempts (Brehm, 1966; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Braxton-Brown, 1990)
Some important boundary conditions limit the explanatory power of the instrumental perspective. For example, consider the “free rider” problem (Barry & Hardin, 1982). Why don’t more people refuse to pay taxes even though the probability of being caught is low? If instrumental concern are the primary entry in the mental calculus when deciding whether or not to comply with an authority’s demand (i.e., report taxable income), then the rate of non-reporting should be much higher than it actually is: more people should take a “free ride” on the backs of others because the probability of being caught and punished for tax-cheating is low (Tyler 1990a).^3

Sole reliance on the instrumental perspective to understanding obedience cannot explain the free rider problem. Indeed, this perspective would lead to the labeling of this phenomenon as irrational (Tyler, 1986). A substantial array of research (see Tyler, 1997 or Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996, for reviews) suggests that an instrumental perspective cannot fully account for why people choose to obey the law or how people are satisfied with an authority’s order. It is clear that authorities and psychologists must consider more than this instrumental perspective. A revised approach to understanding rule-following social behavior is reflected by the inclusion of normative perspectives to acquiescence.

**Normative Perspectives.** A normative perspective on acquiescence refers to whether people decide they should or ought to obey an authority’s commands as a function of relevant and salient social information. If authorities can foster the perception that their demands are legitimate, this perception should in turn lead to a felt obligation to acquiesce voluntarily to the authority’s wishes. Normative concern may be defined as the extent to which people consider an authority to be just and moral (Tyler, 1990a). As Hoffman (1977) put it, “most people do not go through life viewing society’s moral norms as external, coercively imposed pressure to which they must submit” (85). When deciding whether or not to obey, more occurs psychologically than a simple calculation...
of costs to benefits. In March and Olsen's (1989) taxonomy, authorities should make certain that its constituents experience "obligatory concern" – the feeling that one should acquiesce because an authority's demand is fair, appropriate, and legitimate. Research relating to procedural justice can help guide an authority's attempt to increase the amount of obligatory concern that its constituents experience.

Procedural Justice – Increasing Obligatory Concern

Knowing that people who perceive an authority to be legitimate are more likely to acquiesce and to do so voluntarily, legal and political authorities attempt to maintain public support by maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Tyler, 1990b). One way to maintain this perception is to demonstrate that fair and just procedures have been followed when making decisions. Leventhal (1980) and Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) suggested criteria to determine whether an organization (or more generally, an authority) has used fair procedures. Fair procedures may include one or more of the following:

- consistency (e.g., promoting all people using the same criterion all the time);
- bias suppression (e.g., avoiding self-interest);
- accuracy (e.g., relying upon accurate information during demand-making process);
- correctability (e.g., the presence of appeal mechanisms);
- representativeness (e.g., allowing for input from those receiving demands);
- and ethicality (e.g., the process used conforms to prevailing moral norms).

Justice models of social influence assume that individuals are concerned with whether they receive fair outcomes arrived at through a fair procedure, and not just the favorability of the outcomes received (Tyler, 1990a). Tyler and Lind (1992) conceptualize a procedurally fair authority as one that:
• is perceived as neutral (e.g., an absence of detected prejudice and bias; honesty);
• treats others in a pleasant manner (e.g., politeness, respect for rights; also called ‘standing’);
• is worthy of trust (e.g., demonstrates a concern for the needs and consideration of views of the constituent).

These characteristics are thought to combine into a perception that one has a good relationship with an authority, and one has been treated in a fair way. This is then thought to yield a perception of legitimacy, which in turn is thought to mediate the decision to comply voluntarily with the demand (see Tyler & Lind, 1992)." * 

Upon close inspection, all of these variables may not make sense as antecedents to a judgment of procedural justice. The first characteristic listed above – neutrality – relates conceptually to the idea of procedural justice (i.e., the setting and following of a fair process). The second characteristic seems to relate more to a different justice construct – interactional justice. Interactional justice refers to the perceived quality of the interpersonal treatment between the authority and the person receiving the social influence attempt, including the extent to which someone was treated with respect and dignity and the extent to which the authority took the time to listen and empathize with the person’s concern (Mikula, Petrik, & Tanzer, 1990; Bies, 1987). The third characteristic (trust) may be more of an outcome or mediating variable, resulting from how one has been treated, rather than an antecedent variable to procedural justice.

When Does Procedural Justice Matter? It seems that people who are dealt with in a manner considered to be “fair” are more likely to feel that they ought to obey an authority, even if the outcome from the decision is not optimal. In their meta-analysis of how people react to decisions, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) observed empirical support for this claim, finding that people were more responsive to indicators of a fair process
(i.e., procedural justice) when a decision or outcome was poor / would not benefit the person. If the process used to make the decision was judged to be a fair one, then satisfaction with the authority's decision increased. However, if both the process and outcome were perceived to be unfair, then satisfaction with the authority's decision decreased greatly. Dissatisfaction may increase to the extreme point where people cope by engaging in destructive behaviors, such as theft and sabotage (Folger, 1993; Cropanzano & Folger, 1989), in an attempt to right an injustice.

Why Does Procedural Justice Matter? In a perfect world, an authority would preserve social order by offering equal treatment to all members of all groups. From this perspective, procedures perceived to be fair are valued by a diverse society that seeks harmony and positive relations among its members (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Relatedly, Tyler & Lind (1992) have argued that the manner in which one is treated by an authority is indicative of one's standing in a group and one's relationship with the authority. Therefore, if one is treated fairly and held in good standing by the group's authority, the person perceives the authority to be legitimate.

There is an alternative theoretical explanation for why procedural justice matters to decision-makers. Oftentimes, it is difficult to know *a priori* whether a decision or an order is an objectively "correct" or "good" one. As such, procedural justice variables may act as a heuristic that allows people to judge the worth of a particular decision (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & De Vera Park, 1993). Thibaut and Walker (1978) suggested that when objective indicators of a "good" decision are lacking, the use of fair procedures could help one infer the quality of an authority's demand. The presence of interactional justice may also act as a cue to suggest the likelihood of a good outcome.

Another related perspective is that relating to *fairness heuristic theory*. Because ceding authority to another person or organization raises the possibility of exploitation
(and perhaps exclusion from a favored group), people frequently feel uneasy about their relationship with authorities (van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). To help reduce this tension, people look to the procedures an authority uses, so as to determine whether the authority may be trusted.\(^5\)

Do various types of justice (procedural, distributive, interactional) interact? If so, what does this tell us how people rely upon justice information? In a comprehensive examination of the interactions between the various types of justice, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) found a significant interaction among procedural, distributive, and interactional justice. When distributive and interactional justice were at low levels but a high level of procedural justice was present, retaliatory behaviors against an organization were less likely. It seems that an authority that relies upon fair, established processes can minimize possible retaliatory effects resulting from perceptions of a poor outcome and poor interpersonal treatment.\(^6\)

Thus far, this review has argued for the importance of procedural justice in leading to voluntary acquiescence. Because prior research has hypothesized that legitimacy mediates the relationship between procedural justice and acquiescence, one must be clear as to what the legitimacy construct refers.

**Legitimacy and Obligatory Concern**

The study of legitimacy has a long history. French and Raven (1959) defined legitimacy as the belief that authorities are entitled to be obeyed. Easton (1958) and Friedman (1975) defined legitimacy as the belief that there are adequate reasons to obey voluntarily the commands of authorities. It seems clear that legitimacy influences the degree to which authorities are effective (Tyler, 1997) – the more legitimate an authority is perceived to be, the more likely its demands are to be followed. This is in line with
earlier work by Friedman (1975), who noted that citizens comply with laws because they view the legal authority as having a legitimate right to dictate behavior. A judgment that an authority is legitimate often leads to the voluntary acceptance of an authority's dictates.

Because people accept those leaders who are perceived to be legitimate, these authorities have open-ended, discretionary power to set policy (albeit within appropriate limits; Tyler, 1997). As long as these limits are not exceeded, an authority can accomplish its objectives and govern effectively – with the perception of legitimacy cloaked around them, it is not necessary to defend every order and edict. “Because legitimacy has a procedural basis, legal authorities can deliver unfavorable outcomes to citizens without harming their legitimacy if those outcomes are delivered through procedures people view as fair” (Tyler, 1990b). By relying on fair procedures and, if past circumstances allow, a complementary “reservoir of legitimacy,” authorities can make policy that is unpalatable in the short-term but adaptive and strategic in the long-term.

As reviewed earlier, March and Olsen (1989) make the argument that for too long, analyses of how people behave has focused too much on the “logic of consequentiability.” Also known as anticipatory concern, this perspective suggests that people engage in willful choice that is intended to bring about outcomes that fulfill subjective preferences and desired consequences (March & Olsen, 1989). Conceptually, this is similar to an instrumental perspective, in that behavior and perceptions are influenced by anticipated rewards. As reviewed above, this perspective serves as the default explanation for why people acquiesce to the dictates of an authority.

March and Olsen (1989) also for the importance of a “logic of appropriateness,” or obligatory concern. This perspective suggests that if people determine that a demand is legitimate, or that an authority is legitimate, they attempt to determine the appropriate course of action given a situation and do it.
Both anticipatory and obligatory concern, of course, may operate to influence the activation of coping responses to an authority's demand. As such, both perspectives must be taken into account when attempting to understand how people respond to demands from an authority. Specifically, how can political, civic, and business authorities construct accountability systems (and the demands that emanate from said systems) so as to increase voluntary acquiescence to a demand for accountability?

Accountability Theory

Judging by the volume of accountability research reaching into the domains of business (Kerr, 1975; Cronshaw & Alexander, 1985), education (Rotberg, 1995; Fairchild & Zins, 1992), civil and criminal justice (Hamilton, 1995; Stenning, 1995), and politics (March & Olsen, 1995; Sato, 1989), social pressure to justify one's actions or opinions is strong. Accountability demands are not specific to those in higher levels of society, such as executives in a business organization or political representatives; demands for accountability may be seen in the mundane areas of one's daily life. Whether it is concern about the quality of a child's education or the prompt pick-up of the week's garbage, people are motivated to ensure that their expectations and demands are fulfilled. When these expectations are not met, the perceived need for accountability often increases.

In many cases, accountability demands seem to evoke instrumental responses, in which one attempts to avoid punishers while gravitating towards reinforcers; someone who fails to provide sufficient justification for an action or belief may be the recipient of negative evaluations and/or sanctions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). An intuitive perspective on the use of accountability as a social control technique may suggest that being held accountable may be unpleasant (i.e., people are usually held accountable when something negative happens) and therefore, resisted to the extent possible. For this and other reasons
(e.g., psychological reactance), it is important to know conditions by which one can make acquiescence to accountability demands more likely.

Currently, the Social Contingency Model (SCM: Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992) accounts for a broad and complex set of findings in the accountability literature, some of which are unintended and possibly dysfunctional. Drawing on the metaphor of the intuitive politician, the SCM posits that accountability demands are universal and that people are seekers of approval. As put forth by the SCM and other theoretical frameworks, people are motivated to protect and enhance their social image or identity (Tetlock, 1992; Hogan, 1982; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985; Jones & Pittman, 1982). Prior research has documented a number of responses — strategic attitude shifting, pre-emptive self-criticism, cognitive simplification (bolstering), and decision avoidance — that may be used to cope with an accountability demand. Many of these responses involve the use of the acceptability heuristic, in which the lowest-effort, most salient, and most socially acceptable response to an accountability demand is chosen (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989; Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000). With this in mind, how are people likely to react when faced by accountability demands that are either procedurally just or unjust?

_Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Coping Responses to Accountability: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses_

Prior attempts to investigate legitimacy and how it determines responses to accountability demands (e.g., Cvetovich, 1978; Gordon & Stuecher, 1992) have been problematic: in these studies, it was unclear whether legitimacy was responsible for the observed effects. For example, Cvetovich (1978) found that those participants accountable to a "legitimate" audience (i.e., a friend) were more accurate in their recall of their
betting decisions in the study then when they were accountable to an illegitimate audience (a stranger). What drives this legitimacy effect: a perception that the authority’s demand was right or appropriate, or because most people care more about what their friends think than what a stranger thinks?

The failures of the early attempts to understand the legitimacy construct are not that surprising, given the complexity of this area. In their recent review of accountability theory, Lerner and Tetlock (1999) noted that, “Legitimacy is... a notoriously multidimensional concept and isolating its effects from overlapping constructs – power, expertise, trustworthiness, likeableness – has proven to be a daunting task.” Current theorizing on accountability argues that demands are perceived as illegitimate:

- when due process is not followed in setting an accountability demand;
- when authorities do not allow for feedback to occur about the demand;
- when a demand only stands to benefit an elite group;
- or when decision makers can not fulfill the accountability demand except by unethical or Herculean conduct.

A number of these factors bear a conceptual resemblance to Leventhal’s taxonomy of the preconditions to a just process. When an accountability demand does not satisfy these conditions of procedural justice, obligatory concern should be low and decision makers should attempt to resist illegitimate demands to the extent possible (Tetlock, 1998).

Another reason why the study of legitimate accountability demands has been daunting is due to the lack of clarity regarding the procedural justice construct, which in turn is thought to lead to perceptions of legitimacy. A number of researchers have confounded matters of procedural justice (i.e., the manner by which people are told to do something) and interactional justice (i.e., the extent to which an authority treats a decision-maker in a respectful manner). While some researchers have defined procedural
justice in a broad manner, the present research conceptualizes and manipulates it in a
more restricted sense. A procedurally just social influence attempt (i.e., an obedience
demand, a compliance request, or accountability demand) would be one that:

• is neutral and unbiased;
• reflects consistent, established processes;
• is a reasonable one to make.

Another reason for the confusion surrounding the “legitimacy accountability
effect” may be due to a confounding of the demands’ aspects with participants’ past
dealings with an authority figure. In his theoretical work on conformity and idiosyncrasy
credit, Hollander (1958) argued that a leader might deviate from the expectancies of a
constituency/group when the leader’s prior activities have generated an appropriately
high level of credit with the group members. In a sense, authority figures may be thought
to have a credit line at their own “legitimacy bank,” from which they may draw when
they want to enforce certain policies. Keeping with this metaphor, how is the first deposit
made into the legitimacy bank? What are the key normative and instrumental variables
that contribute to perceiving the demand as legitimate, before a reciprocal feedback
process begins? Whereas most the prior research on procedural justice and legitimacy
have been correlational, the use of an experimental research paradigm – a minimal
legitimacy paradigm of sorts – that manipulates antecedents to obligatory and/or instru-
mental concern is of value.

More to the point, no published research has experimentally measured the effect
of procedural justice on reactions to an accountability demand. This dissertation argues
that the procedural justice of an accountability demand plays an unexamined yet impor-
tant role in determining the selection of a response to the demand (e.g., to acquiesce,
fight, or flee).
As such, this begs the question: to the extent that manipulations of procedural justice evoke obligatory concern – and authority manipulations evoke instrumental concern – what coping responses are activated? The following pages decompose the wide array of coping responses to be studied into four sets: acquiescent/constructive; resistant/constructive; resistant/destructive; and acquiescent/destructive. The term “destructive” refers to the extent to which an actor’s behavior is harmful to the accountability system or authority figure (and vice versa for the term “constructive”).

Acquiescent/Constructive Responses. Accountability theory (Tetlock, 1998) suggests a number of optimal preconditions that influence the selection of obedience coping responses to an accountability demand; this dissertation argues that these preconditions bear a conceptual resemblance to procedural justice. Although these antecedents have not received much investigation, because of their prima facie validity they will contribute to the operationalization of procedural just accountability demands in the proposed research.

Positive Evaluation. Attitudes toward obeying legitimate demands – and those issuing the demand – should be moderately positive. At an absolute level, this attitude may not be very positive (especially when the demand requires effort); nonetheless, attitudes toward obeying legitimate demands will be more positive than attitudes toward obeying illegitimate demands.

Increased Effort. Because there is little justification to disobey an appropriate demand, one does not have the logical and rhetorical “cover” to avoid the demand; the decision-maker will be more likely to invest the cognitive and motivational effort necessary to fulfill the demand.

Willing Acquiescence. The presence of procedural justice variables is hypothesized to lead to the perception that the accountability demand is appropriate and right.
As such, willing acquiescence to the demand should be observed – there is no good reason (aside from a personological one, for those people who are dispositionally inclined to disobey authorities) to disobey.

**Resistant/Constructive Responses.** Generally, some form of reactance (Brehm, 1966) or resistance to an authority’s demands should be noted (e.g., when an authority or demand does not use fair procedures or when the demand is not consistent with the shared social relationship between two people). One constructive way to deal with an illegitimate demand is to voice complaint.

**Voicing Complaint.** Hirschman (1970) outlined a number of responses a decision maker may make in response to a dissatisfying situation. When things are not going well, people often choose to do one of two things – to leave the situation to find “greener pastures” elsewhere (an “exit” response, to be reviewed later), or to voice their complaints in the hope that their concern will be heard and rectified. Withey and Cooper (1989) and Rusbult et al. (1988) expanded upon this research, finding that organizational workers and people in romantic relationships (respectively) often preferred a constructive way to handle the unsatisfying situation - to voice complaints. In these studies, when people reported dissatisfaction with their current situation and the costs of voicing a complaint were low, people were likely to voice.

**Resistant/Destructive Responses.** When people are treated in an unfair or unjust manner, it is often more likely to observe more destructive ways to resist an authority’s wishes:

“When managers lack the legitimacy they need to secure the cooperation of workers, inefficiencies such as slowdowns and sabotage occur. Similar problems of authority are encountered by teachers, political leaders, army sergeants, and others who need legitimacy to function” (Tyler, 1990a).
As mentioned earlier, when an accountability demand does not satisfy these conditions of procedural justice, obligatory concern should be low and decision makers should attempt to resist illegitimate demands to the extent possible (Tetlock, 1998). When a person is asymmetrically resource dependent (i.e., one is less powerful than whomever is giving a demand), attempts to restore justice via retaliation move sequentially from indirect actions (e.g., passive-aggressive behaviors that resist the demand; psychological withdrawal from the situation) to more direct actions, such as theft or sabotage (see Homans, 1961).

**Decision Avoidance Tactics (DATs).** DATs may be measured via actual behaviors as well as self-reported intentions. As put forth by Tetlock (1998), DATs may include: buck-passing (when one transfers responsibility to other decision makers); procrastination (when one delays making a decision or engages in an intentional work slow-down); and obfuscation (when one conceals an attitude or position with opaque language).

Tetlock and Boettger (1994) found that respondents held accountable to an audience and who faced an unpleasant trade-off decision expressed a greater desire to engage in decision avoidance tactics. Similarly, Green et al. (2000) observed participants express a strong desire to engage in procrastination – to delay an accountability interview – when they were told that they would have to explain their views on free trade to two opposing audiences, both of whom could make strong arguments for own point-of-view.

**Exit/Refuse-to-Acquiesce.** A more extreme form of decision avoidance is that relating to exit, in which a person leaves the situation and the attendant need to respond (Hirschman, 1970; Withey & Cooper, 1989; Rusbult et al., 1988). One may choose to exit from an illegitimate accountability demand by refusing to work on it or to leave the accountability system from which the illegitimate demand came. This coping response should be negatively related to the strength of the anticipatory concern that one reports (i.e., more refusal when one has little fear that an authority will sanction disobedience).
Loophole-Exploitation. In a sense, DATs represent a somewhat passive means by which one may resist unsatisfying, illegitimate demands. Like the judo master who does not expend much effort to defeat an opponent, decision avoidance tactics require minimal effort to resist the demand. However, some people desire — and some situations merit — a more active means to resist the illegitimate accountability demand.

Loophole-exploitation refers to "cheating" behaviors that allow decision makers to appear as if they are complying with a demand when in actuality they are not. If an authority gives an illegitimate demand but the decision maker cannot voice a complaint, exit the situation, nor engage in a DAT, the decision maker must portray at least some appearance of obedience with the demand. A person who exploits loopholes will choose to cut corners and exploit existing loopholes — conserving valuable mental and physical effort by avoiding full acquiescence to the demand — to the extent possible.

Sabotage and Theft. If the process used to make a decision/give a demand is perceived to be extremely unjust, reactions to the unjust demand may take the form of retaliatory or retributive behaviors (Folger, 1993; Folger & Baron, 1996; Bies & Tripp, 1995; Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992; Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). Bollinger and Clark (1983) found that employees who felt exploited by a company were more likely to engage in theft in an attempt to correct the perceived injustice. Skarlicki & Folger (1997) explicitly studied the opposite of Organ's (1988) organizational citizenship behavior, or the "extra" little actions workers do to improve the organizational environment and their own productivity. In their study of organizational retaliation behaviors (ORBs), Skarlicki & Folger (1997) found that reports of: purposeful sabotage (of equipment or work process); taking work supplies home without permission; calling in sick when not really ill; disobeying a supervisor's instructions; and taking an extended coffee break (among many other behaviors) were more likely when procedural, interactional, and distributive justice were at low levels.
Stepping slightly away from a justice perspective, retaliatory behaviors may also be interpreted as reactions to a feeling that one has been treated in an inequitable manner (Adams, 1965). For example, employee theft (Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg & Scott, 1996), employee vandalism (DeMore, Fisher, & Baron, 1988), and participants’ stealing behavior (Greenberg, 1993) may be in response to a perception that was has been treated unfairly (i.e., underpayment). Retaliatory behaviors may also serve a social identity function, in that acts of resistance can be seen as an outgrowth of an optimal-distinctiveness-ness-like struggle to keep one's private identity distinct from an organizational identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1996), much like how teenagers often resist the demands of their parents so that they may be their own person. It is doubtful that these responses are “stand-alone” responses to an unjust, illegitimate accountability demand – rather, they may be more likely observed when one acquiesces grudgingly.

**Acquiescent/Destructive Responses.** Potentially the most harmful response to an authority is that of grudging acquiescence. When all other responses have been exhausted and exit is not possible, then one has - to quote the experimenter in Milgram's (1965) paradigm - “no choice but to comply.” The negative psychological effects associated with a reliance on this mode of social control have been reviewed above, as has the economic impact of the around-the-clock enforcement necessary to ensure continued obedience. Grudging acquiescence is marked by negative affect – in these circumstances, people feel emotionally upset and feel negatively towards acquiescing to the demand. As a result, the degree of cognitive and motivational effort invested to fulfill the demand is likely to decrease: people who acquiesce grudgingly will not give a task “their all,” but rather only do the minimum that is required by the authority.

**Personality Effects.** A number of individual difference variables will be measured during the course of this study:
• Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1982)

• Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996)

• Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1980);

• Self-Monitoring (Snyder & Gangsted, 1986).

Please see Appendices A-D for a copy of each survey. These variables were included for exploratory purposes only, with the exception of one: Machiavellianism (or, Mach). Because of its predictive relevance to a number of coping responses, hypotheses relating to it are reviewed below.

Those who score highly on measures of Machiavellianism (Mach IV: Christie & Geis, 1970) have a non-trusting, cynical view toward others. This construct is multidimensional, with its three dimensions tapping: “abstract morality”; a cynical view toward human nature; and the endorsement of deceitful tactics. Overall, those who score highly on this construct are likely to possess a flexible, opportunistic, and cynical view toward other people and institutions as well as endorse the use of a variety of underhanded, deceitful, and exploitative tactics that allow them to reap personal benefits (see Fehr, Samson, & Paulhus, 1992; Christie, 1970), although not always successfully (Wilson, Near, and Miller, 1996).

Those with high Mach scores should be more likely to engage in DATs, to exploit loopholes, and engage in retaliatory behaviors for personal benefit regardless of the demands’ procedural justice. These people need not look for reasons to resist – they are automatically inclined to consider a host of socially undesirable responses, to the extent that they benefit themselves. Conversely, those who score low on this measure should behave in a more complex manner. For low Mach scorers, the presence of procedural justice information should play an important role in activating constructive response to the demand. If a demand is not procedurally just, they should evaluate the resistant/destructive responses more positively.
The following general hypotheses were of primary interest, guiding the construction and analyses of the three experiments reported in this dissertation. Although different methodologies and different independent variables were used across the three experiments, each one explored a broad research question: what were the effects of procedural justice, both on obligatory concern and anticipatory concern, and on subsequent coping response activation? (Note: experiment-specific hypotheses are listed at the beginning of each experiment chapter.)

Procedurally just accountability demands should be viewed as legitimate, as measured by increased obligatory concern. This in turn should increase the likelihood of voluntary acquiescence to the demand. On the other hand, procedurally unjust demands should be viewed as illegitimate, as measured by decreased obligatory concern. This in turn should increase the likelihood of resistance to the demand.

The manner by which certain coping responses are likely to be activated should depend upon the situational context of the demand, such as the relationship between the demand-giver and demand-receiver, or the presence of other coping responses. For example, when one receives an obedience demand from a friend with whom one shares a relationship marked by reciprocity (see Chapter Two) or when a complaint-voicing option (i.e., an “Open Door”) is absent (see Chapter Three), the evaluation of resistant/destructive coping responses such as DATs and even theft should be more positive.

Extrapolating from Homans (1961), one may expect a person faced by an illegitimate accountability demand to think something akin to “How powerful is the authority? What could happen to me if I were to disobey this order / shirk this responsibility?” The actual manner of resistance, however, is unclear a priori. Will people seek to utilize as many coping responses as possible (coping overkill) or do they strategically choose certain options as a function of the situational pressures facing them? Prior research
(Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) suggests that people faced by a threat to important values cope with this threat with as many tactics as is possible – a coping “overkill” of sorts. Alternatively, coping response selection may be sequential, depending upon which resistance response is easiest to accomplish and which response most clearly allows the person to cope with the demand (see Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997; Tesser & Cornell, 1991).
CHAPTER 2

EXPERIMENT ONE

Overview

Experiment One investigates how the social context (e.g., the type of relationship between two people; the form of the social influence attempt) affects: reported levels of obligatory and anticipatory concern; and the evaluation of coping responses to the social influence attempt. Participants were asked to retrospect about a time in which they received an obedience demand or a compliance request from either an Equality Matching (reciprocity / friendship-based) relationship or an Authority Ranking (power and status hierarchy-based) relationship, and whether this influence attempt was consistent with or in violation of the norms for that type of social relationship. After writing about this experience, they then completed measures assessing obligatory and anticipatory concern, and evaluated a number of coping responses that may have been used in response to the influence attempt.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were of primary interest in Experiment One. Adhering to the Fiskean social relationship taxonomy (1992), an Authority Ranking (AR) relationship is one that is marked by clear power and/or status differences between two people. An Equality Matching (EM) relationship is one that is marked by a reciprocal, give-and-
take approach to interacting, such as that often seen between friends. This being the case, reported anticipatory concern should be more readily observed in an AR relationship than in an EM one, because friends (usually) do not have the same type of instrumental power (money, advancement, career status) that bosses do.

The extent to which a social influence attempt is normatively consistent should have effects upon the evaluation of various coping responses. Ceteris paribus, a social influence attempt that is consistent with the norms of the shared social relationship should be met with more acquiescence and less resistance than should a social influence attempt that violates the norms of the social relationship.

The social relationship between a demand-giver and demand-receiver may interact with the type of influence tactic in the following manner. Because Authority Ranking (AR) relationships center upon power hierarchies, obedience demands received in this context should be more likely to be perceived as appropriate. As such, obedience demands received in an AR context should be more likely to be accepted by the recipient, with minimal reports of negative affect and reactance/avoidance responses. Because Equality Matching (EM) relationships center upon reciprocal relationships ("you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours"), compliance demands (from those who have previously done something for the subject) received in this context should be more likely to be perceived as appropriate. As such, compliance demands received in an EM context should be more likely to be accepted by the recipient, with minimal reports of negative affect and reactance/avoidance responses.

When an obedience demand is received in an EM context, the demand should be more likely to be considered as inappropriate, and therefore likely to be met with scorn, avoidance, and reactance (negative coping responses), as if the recipient says "How dare he order me around? All he had to do was ask..." However, these negative coping re-
sponses may not be evidenced in the case of a compliance demand received in an AR context. This may be a positive violation of the shared social relationship – the authority does not have to be “nice,” because s/he has the inherent power (imbued by the social hierarchy) to order whatever s/he wants. It should be less unsettling for a powerful authority to ask you politely to do something; indeed, acceptance of this demand may match or even exceed the levels observed for the two “matches” outlined above.

Machiavellianism should be a strong predictor of how people will evaluate the various coping responses – by definition, those with high Mach scores should be more willing to endorse the use of deceitful tactics that bring about self-benefit. Additionally, Machiavellianism should interact with normative consistency. High Mach scorers on this scale should not be motivated by whether a social influence attempt is consistent with the norms of a relationship, because these people are more open and flexible to the use of such responses. When they see an opportunity for self-benefit, they will consider taking it regardless of however fairly they have been treated. On the other hand, those who score low on this scale should be more hesitant to endorse the use of the resistant tactics. When considering how to react to the social influence attempt, they should look for some rationale to guide the manner by which they respond – when faced by an influence attempt that is consistent with relationship norms, they should acquiesce to it willingly. When they are faced by normatively inconsistent demands, they should be more likely to endorse the use of resistance tactics (DATs, loophole-exploitation, etc.).

Method

Participants

Two hundred sixty-five introductory psychology students participated in the 2 (Social Influence Attempt: Obedience Demand, Compliance Request) x 2 (Relational
Frame: Equality Matching, Authority Ranking) x 2 (Normative Consistency: Demand is Consistent with Relational Norms, Demand is in Violation of Relational Norms) in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research experience course requirement. Of these 265 participants, 19 were dropped from analysis because they did not write about a specific social influence attempt.

Procedure

Students participated in classrooms in groups of 20-30. After all participants were checked into the study, participants were told that the study would take most of the half-hour session, and that they should take the time to read all materials completely and thoroughly. Upon delivering these instructions, the experimenter passed out the different versions of the experimental materials and accompanying survey, randomly assigning participants to one of the eight conditions. When all participants were finished with the study, the experimenter delivered an oral debriefing about the study, answered any questions that the participants had, and thanked them for participating in the study.

Materials and Independent Variables

The participants were asked to read a brief description of one of two Relational Frameworks. Those assigned to think about an AR relationship read the following: Think of relationships that are marked by clear differences in rankings between you and another person. Differences in rank could be due to prestige, power, experience, or authority. Now, think of a person(s) with whom you are involved in a relationship like this. These relationships could be between an employer and an employee, a coach and an athlete, a teacher and a student, etc.

Those assigned to think about an EM relationship read the following description: Think of relationships that are based on an even balance and equivalent give and take, such as in friendships. Each person in the relationship is entitled to the same amount as every other person. Now, think of a person(s) with whom you are involved in a relationship like this. These relationships could be casual friendships or relationships with co-workers or classmates.
After reading one of these descriptions, participants were asked to retrospect about a specific experience from their own life in which someone with whom they shared this type of relationship either asked (i.e., gave a compliance request) or ordered (i.e., gave an obedience demand) them to do something. Lastly, participants were told to think about an instance in which the demand was either consistent with or in violation of the social norms of that relational frame. To help participants understand these latter instructions, they read one of the example paragraphs listed below.

- An example of a demand that is consistent with AR relational norms would be one in which an authority figure who is higher in status asks/tells you to do something that makes sense, given your relationship (e.g., “An instructor of a college class asks/tells one of the students in the class to deliver the end-of-the-quarter teaching evaluations to a college office”).

- An example of a demand that is in violation of AR relational norms would be one in which an authority figure who is higher in status asks/tells you to do something that does not make sense, given your relationship (e.g., “An instructor of a college class says he has a headache and asks/tells one of the students in the class to go to the bookstore to buy aspirin for him”).

- An interaction that is consistent with EM relational norms would be one in which both people in the relationship give and take in fair amounts (e.g., “Pete and Mark give and take fairly. Mark owes Pete a favor. Now, Pete asks/tells Mark to do something to “cash in” the favor”).

- An example of a demand that is in violation of EM relational norms would be one in which a person asks/tells you to do something in return for something that you have done for them; however, the other person only rarely does things for you (e.g., “Pete takes much more than he gives to Mark. Mark does not owe Pete any type of favor. Now, Pete asks/tells Mark to do something”).

**Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks**

Participants were asked to write in detail about their experience, how it reflected the manipulated relationship frame, and how they responded to the social influence attempt. These writings served as a manipulation check. Participants were then asked to complete a number of Likert-type items corresponding to the dependent variables described below.
To gauge their affective reaction to their experience, participants completed Watson and Clark (1984)'s Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) and a feeling thermometer (responses to the latter ranged from 1=very bad to 4=neutral to 7=very good).

The first set of obligatory concern items corresponded to the participants' perceptions of the situation portrayed in the vignette. Using fully labeled 7-point bipolar scales, these items included the following: “To what extent did the other person follow a 'standard operating procedure' when telling you to do this?” (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so to 7=very much so); “Did the other person follow a fair process when giving you this order?” (responses ranged from 1=very fair to 4=a little of both to 7=very unfair); “Was it right for the other person to tell you to do this?” (responses ranged from 1=very wrong to 4=a little of both to 7=very right); “Was the order itself a fair one to make?” (responses ranged from 1=very fair to 4=a little of both to 7=very unfair); and “Was the other person’s order an appropriate one to make?” (responses ranged from 1=very inappropriate to 4=a little of both to 7=very appropriate).

In addition to the set of questions described above, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a number of metacognitive items tapping the logic of appropriateness (i.e., feelings that one is obligated to follow an authority’s wishes) and the logic of consequentiality (i.e., whether one should follow a demand/request out of concern for maximizing personal benefit). Responses to these statements were measured via fully labeled 7-point bipolar scales (responses ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 4 =neutral to 7=strongly agree). Logic of appropriateness items included: “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you thought about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make;” “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you thought about how you felt morally obliged to obey the other person’s order (i.e., the
other person's order was an appropriate one, and so you should follow it);” and “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you thought about the “correct” thing you should do.” Logic of consequentiality items included: “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you thought about the costs or benefits that could occur;” “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you mostly cared about whether you would be rewarded or punished by the other person;” and “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you mostly cared about what you could get out of this situation (e.g., more money, status).”

Participants were then asked to think about how they could have dealt with this situation. They were asked to indicate the extent to which various coping responses would have been a good choice for them given their situation, using fully labeled 7-point scales (responses ranged from 1 = very bad choice for you to 4 = neutral to 7 = very good choice for you). Each coping response featured a definition, making it clear to the participant what the coping response entailed. These coping responses are described below:

- Obey the other person's order with no problems: You obey the other person's order, and do so with no problems. You complete this project with no major complaints.
- Confuse the issue: If you obey the other person's order, you give the other person updates that are so confusing, it's unclear how or what you are doing.
- Pass the buck: You pass this demand on to someone else (“passing the buck”), so that THEY become responsible for doing it.
- Take advantage of loopholes: If you obey the other person’s order, you look for and take any loopholes you can find. That is, if you can cut corners and save yourself time and energy, you do it – even if it would harm the project.
- Procrastinate: If you obey the other person's order, you take a very long time to complete this project, rather than rush to finish it quickly.
- Refuse to obey the other person’s order: You just tell the other person “no,” that you refuse to do this project.
• Obey the other person's order grudgingly: If you obey the other person's order, you do so grudgingly (e.g., unwillingly). In this scenario, you obey because you feel that you have no other choice but to obey.
• Theft: If you obey the other person's order, you do other things (e.g., take office supplies, steal from the other person) that personally benefit you.
• Sabotage: If you obey the other person's order, you do other things (e.g., sabotage) that would purposefully damage what you are doing.
• Voice a complaint: You voice a complaint to some other powerful authority figure about having to do this project.

Next, participants were asked to indicate how much effort they put into doing what they were told if they obeyed the order (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 5=all possible effort). Participants were next asked about how willing they were to acquiesce to the social influence attempt (responses ranged from 1=very unwilling to 4=neutral to 7=very willing, fully labeled). Lastly, participants were asked to indicate how friendly (responses ranging from 1=very unfriendly to 4=neutral to 7=very friendly, fully labeled) and trustworthy (responses ranging from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so to 7=very much so) they perceived the demand giver to be at the time of the interaction.

Lastly, a number of individual difference variables (Need for Cognition, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, and Self-Monitoring) and demographic variables (age and sex) were measured. Upon completing this questionnaire, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Before the results are reviewed, it is necessary to make two brief statements about the data analyses and result presentation throughout the dissertation. First, statistically significant differences between and among marginal means were analyzed via the com-
putation of 95% confidence intervals around each marginal mean. In addition to providing information about the precision of the sample value (as a point estimate for the value's population parameter), confidence intervals also allow for tests of the null hypothesis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). That is, if the 95% interval does not include zero, the null hypothesis can be rejected. More to the point, all values outside the interval can be rejected (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Therefore, if the 95% confidence interval of one marginal mean does not include another marginal mean, the two means may be considered to be significantly different from one another.

Second, all data patterns reported in this dissertation are statistically significant at the p<.05 level, unless otherwise noted. Therefore, rather than report p values for significant results (as is often the case in social psychological research), standard indicators of effect size (η²) are reported. This allows for the communication of more information – most importantly, the strength of the effect – than p values alone can provide.

Manipulation Checks

Manipulation Check Coding. Two research assistants, blind to the study's hypotheses, coded the majority (N=196) of participants' written descriptions of the social influence attempt. Coders were provided with the same description of the Equality Matching (EM) and Authority Ranking (AR) relationship given to the participants, and were asked to judge the similarity of the written relationship to the two provided descriptions (responses ranged from 1=Not at all like relationship to 3=Moderately like relationship to 5=Very much like relationship).

For the social relationship that was deemed to be most similar to one of the two provided descriptions, the judges indicated the extent to which the social influence attempt was consistent with the social norms of that relationship (responses ranged from
Lastly, judges recorded whether the participant used the word “ask,” “tell,” or something else to describe how the social influence attempt was received. After completing their ratings, inter-judge correlations were computed for a random sample of codes. The resulting correlations ranged from .80 to .94, indicating that the coders used a reliable method when making their judgments.

**Social Relationship.** When participants were asked to write about an AR relationship, the judges were more likely to rate the written passage as being similar to an AR relationship rather than an EM one, $F(1,175)=700.38$, $\eta^2=.80$ ($M=4.63$ and 1.17, respectively). When participants were asked to write about an EM relationship, the judges were more likely to rate the written passage as being similar to an EM relationship than an AR one, $F(1,175)=491.60$, $\eta^2=.74$ ($M=3.9$ and 1.2, respectively).

**Normative Consistency.** Judge ratings indicate the normative consistency manipulation was successful. Those who were asked to think of a social influence attempt that was consistent with relationship norms produced written descriptions that were judged to be more consistent with the norms of the relationship as compared to those participants who were instructed to think of a social influence attempt that was in violation of relationship norms, $F(1,175)=89.70$, $\eta^2=.34$ ($M=5.81$ and 3.43, respectively).

**Influence Tactic.** Judges noted the type of social influence attempt described by the participants, relying upon the use of “tell” or “ask” (or some derivative) in the written protocol. A chi-square analysis, cross-tabulating the “ask,” “tell,” or “unsure” judge ratings by the influence tactic manipulation, was performed. A significant Pearson chi-square statistic was observed, $\chi^2 (2)=53.64$. Of those people assigned to the compliance condition, 75% ($N=69$) wrote that a person “asked” them to do something and 10%
(N=9) wrote that the person "told" them to do something. Of those people assigned to the obedience condition, 26% (N=22) wrote that a person "asked" them to do something and 60% (N=51) wrote that a person "told" them to do something.

**Potential Mediators: Obligatory and Anticipatory Concern**

*Factor analysis.* A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine how a number of variables grouped into various composites. These items tapped *(a priori)*: perceptions of demand legitimacy, perceptions of procedural justice, obligatory concern, and anticipatory concern. In all, intercorrelations among 11 variables were entered into the analysis. A four-factor solution fit the intercorrelations well, RMSEA=.055, $\chi^2=29.19$. See Table 2.1 for the correlated factor scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Obligatory Concern (1st set)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Unspecified Factor</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Anticipatory Concern</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Obligatory Concern (2nd set)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cell means were significantly correlated at $p<.05$.

**Table 2.1: Correlated Factor Scores**

The first factor consisted of three items: "Was it right for the other person to tell you to do this?"; "To what extent did the other person follow a 'standard operating procedure' when telling you to do this?"; and "Was the other person's order an appropriate one to make?" The fourth factor consisted of two items: "Was the order a fair one to make?"; and "Did the other person follow a fair process when giving you this order?" These two factors were correlated strongly enough ($r= -.64$) to warrant collapsing them
into a single composite. These five items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach's alpha = .86) and was labeled obligatory concern. This composite represents the extent to which participants considered matters of legitimacy when thinking about the social influence attempt.

The third factor consisted of three items measuring the extent to which the participants felt they could be rewarded or punished: “You thought about the costs or benefits that could occur;” “You mostly cared about whether you would be rewarded or punished by the other person;” and “You mostly cared about what you could get out of the situation (e.g., more money, status).” These three items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach's alpha = .57), and was labeled anticipatory concern. This composite represents the extent to which participants considered the possibility of reward or sanction.

Two of the items on the second factor (“You thought about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make” and “You thought about how you felt morally obliged to obey the other person’s order”) also loaded on other factors, calling into question the discriminant validity of these items. Only one item loaded strongly on the second factor (“You thought about the ‘correct’ thing you should do”), making this a unique factor with construct validity issues (i.e., the “correct” response may emanate from either obligatory or anticipatory concern). Because the psychometric properties of the items constituting this factor were judged by the author to be weak, they were not included in the mediational analyses reported below.

**Potential Mediator: Negative Affect**

*Factor analysis.* A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine which of the 20 items in the PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule: Watson & Clark, 1984) grouped into the “negative affect” factor. A
five-factor solution fit the intercorrelations reasonably well, RMSEA=.06, $\chi^2=193.12$. The first factor observed consisted of items such as "excited" and "enthusiastic," the second factor consisted of items related to negative affect (i.e., "hostile," "upset," "irritable"). These latter items were combined to form a negative affect composite, Cronbach’s alpha = .88.

**Effects of Manipulated Variables on Potential Mediators**

*Interpersonal Covariates.* Prior studies investigating legitimate accountability demands have failed to control for variables that may covary with judgments of legitimacy (e.g., perceptions of friendship and trust). It is important to know how the manipulated variables affected these possibly confounding variables.

A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) on perceptions of friendship between the participant and the originator of the social influence attempt revealed a significant main effect for normative consistency, $F(1,232)=13.51$, $\eta^2=.06$: ratings of perceived friendship were higher when the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms then when it was in violation of them ($M=5.78$ and $5.05$, respectively).

A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) on perceptions of trust between the participant and the originator of the social influence attempt revealed a significant main effect for social relationship, $F(1,227)=3.86$, $\eta^2=.02$, and for normative consistency, $F(1,227)=17.22$, $\eta^2=.07$. Perceived trust was higher when participants wrote about a social influence attempt received in an EM relationship as compared to an AR one ($M=5.50$ and $5.06$, respectively), or when the social influence was consistent with relationship norms as compared to when it was in violation of relationship norms ($M=5.71$ and $4.80$, respectively).
Obligatory (Legitimacy) Concern. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on obligatory concern yielded significant effects for both interpersonal covariates. Friendliness was significant, $F(1,225)=26.91, \eta^2=.11$, such that increased perceptions of friendliness was associated with the increased feeling that the demand was legitimate and appropriate, and therefore obligated obedience. Perceived trust was also significant, $F(1,225)=16.97, \eta^2=.07$, such that increased perceptions of trust was associated with increased ratings of obligatory concern.

In addition to these covariate effects, the expected effect for normative consistency was observed, $F(1,225)=81.83, \eta^2=.27$. Participants who wrote about a social influence attempt that was consistent with relationship norms reported greater obligatory concern than did those who wrote about a social influence attempt that was inconsistent with relationship norms (M= 5.31 and 3.94, respectively).

Anticipatory (Instrumental) Concern. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on anticipatory concern yielded a significant effect for only the interpersonal covariate of trust, $F(1,225)=3.93, \eta^2=.02$. Decreasing perceptions of trust were associated with increasing thoughts about the possible costs and benefits (i.e., the consequences) of the decision to obey.

In addition to these covariate effects, a significant main effect was observed for social relationship, $F(1,225)=23.36, \eta^2=.09$. As expected, participants who received a social influence attempt in an AR context reported more anticipatory concern than did those who received an influence attempt in an EM context (M= 4.34 and 3.56, respectively). In other words, participants who received a social influence attempt in an AR context gave more thought to the possible rewards and/or sanctions that may be of consequence.
The three-way interaction among the manipulated variables was observed to be significant, $F(1,225)=7.76$, $\eta^2=.03$. As Table 2.2 shows, anticipatory concern was at its highest reported level ($M=4.79$) when participants received a compliance request that was consistent with AR relationship norms. Anticipatory concern was at its lowest ($M=3.16$) when participants received an obedience demand that violated EM relationship norms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Tactic</th>
<th>Compliance</th>
<th>Obedience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Relationship</td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Consistency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>4.15$^{b}$</td>
<td>3.49$^{a}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>4.79$^{c}$</td>
<td>3.52$^{a}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

abc Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

Table 2.2: Effects of Normative Consistency, Social Relationship, and Influence Tactic on Anticipatory Concern

*Negative Affect.* A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on negative affect yielded significant effects for both interpersonal covariates: friendliness, $F(1,221)=62.98$, $\eta^2=.22$; and trust, $F(1,221)=12.10$, $\eta^2=.05$. Decreasing perceptions of friendship were associated with increasing negative affect; a similar pattern was observed for the trust covariate.

A main effect for normative consistency was noted, $F(1,221)=5.52$, $\eta^2=.02$. As expected, participants reported greater negative affect when faced by a social influence attempt that violated relationship norms than an attempt that was consistent with relationship norms ($M=2.41$ and $2.10$, respectively).
This main effect was qualified by an interaction between normative consistency and social relationship, $F(1,221)=10.43$, $\eta^2=.05$. As noted in Table 2.3, participants who received a social influence attempt that violated EM relationship norms reported maximal negative affect ($M=2.75$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>$2.08^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>$2.18^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2.75^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2.02^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $^a$ Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at $p<.05$. $^b$ Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

Table 2.3: Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Negative Affect.

**Coping Response Patterns**

To form a general picture as to how the different coping responses related with one another, a correlational analysis of all 10 possible coping responses was performed (see Table 2.4). The partition between “constructive” and “destructive” reactions was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Obey (Willingly)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Voice Complaint</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Buck-passing</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Procrastination</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Obfuscation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Loophole-exploitation</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Refusal to Obey, Exit</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sabotage</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Obey (Grudgingly)</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cell means were significantly correlated at $p<.05$. 

Table 2.4: Correlated Evaluations of Coping Responses

39
important, as most of the destructive coping responses correlated moderately (and signifi-
cantly) with one another while the constructive coping responses correlated moderately
with one another.

Obedience (Willing)

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables,
Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the
willing obedience response. Both interpersonal covariates were observed to be signifi-
cant: friendliness, $F(1,221)=10.16, \eta^2=.04$; and trust, $F(1,221)=10.03, \eta^2=.04$. Increased
ratings of friendliness and trust were associated with more positive evaluations of the
willing obedience coping response.

Significant main effects were observed for the manipulation of social relation-
ship, $F(1,221)=9.78, \eta^2=.04$, and for normative consistency, $F(1,221)=14.76, \eta^2=.06$.
Willing obedience was evaluated more positively when the social influence attempt was
received in an AR relationship than in an EM one ($M=5.34$ and $4.65$, respectively) or
when the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms than when it
was inconsistent ($M=5.43$ and $4.56$, respectively).

Interpretation of these main effects was qualified by the predicted interaction
between social relationship and normative consistency, $F(1,221)=3.53, p=.06, \eta^2=.02$. As
shown in Table 2.5, participants evaluated the willing obedience response most positively
when the demand was consistent with AR norms ($M=5.57$) and most negatively when the
demand violated EM norms ($M=4.01$).
Table 2.5: Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Willing Obedience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>5.11&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>5.57&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the interaction between Mach and normative consistency approached statistical significance, F(1,221)=2.24, p=.14, η<sup>2</sup>=.0115. As shown in Table 2.6, evaluations of the willing obedience coping response were equally high when the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms; however, when the social influence attempt violated relationship norms, those with high Mach scores evaluated willing obedience more negatively than did those with low Mach scores (M=4.29 and 4.82, respectively).

Table 2.6: Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Willing Obedience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>4.82&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>5.37&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Mediation Analyses. Baron and Kenny's (1986) regression technique was used to assess the hypothesized mediating relationships. When regression analyses yielded statistically significant results, the following information was presented: the
unstandardized regression coefficient (b) and its standard error (SE); the standardized regression coefficient / beta weight (β); and the partial correlation of the regression coefficient (pr). The partial correlation coefficient removes the variability of other variables from the independent variable (IV) and dependent variable (DV) in the regression equation, providing the experimenter and reader with a sense of the “importance” this variable has in predicting the dependent variable (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

For mediation to occur, the IV must predict the mediator, the mediator must predict the DV, and the IV’s prediction of the DV must weaken when the mediator is included. Complete assessment of whether an effect is mediated relies upon the use of the Sobel test (1982; see also Baron & Kenny, 1986), which indicates whether the mediator produces a significant reduction in the relation between an IV and a DV. The Sobel calculation uses the relevant unstandardized coefficients and standard errors to compute a z-score: a significant p value for the Sobel calculation indicates that the effect is mediated; a non-significant p value indicates partial mediation (assuming that the IV predicts the mediator and the mediator predicts the DV). Calculation of the Sobel test statistic was greatly aided by an Microsoft Excel™ program authored by Leonardelli and Preacher (2001).

For each coping response analyzed, two possible mediating relationships were examined. The first (referred to as the “concern” mediation) included the obligatory concern and anticipatory concern composite variables, while the second (referred to as the “negative affect” mediation) included the negative affect composite.16

Prior analyses indicated that normative consistency predicted obligatory concern, \( b_{\text{normative consistency}} = 1.39 \) (SE=.15), \( β = .45, \text{pr} = .53 \). Obligatory concern was found to predict willing obedience, \( b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = .69 \) (SE=.08), \( β = .56, \text{pr} = .51 \) (anticipatory concern did not predict willing obedience). As participants thought more about how they
felt obligated to obey, evaluations of the willing obedience coping response became more positive. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the normative consistency effect was observed to fall from significance, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.16$ (SE=.24), $\hat{\beta} = -.04$, $r = .49$, $p = .05$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed. This calculation used the output from two prior regression analyses: one investigating the direct effect of the IV to the DV; and the other investigating the effect of the IV (mediated) to the DV. The Sobel test indicated that the drop was significant, $z = 6.08$, $p<.05$. Obligatory concern can be said to mediate the effects of normative consistency on willing obedience.

Prior analyses indicated that normative consistency predicted negative affect, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.33$ (SE=.14), $\hat{\beta} = -.13$, $r = -.16$. Negative affect was found to predict willing obedience, $b_{\text{negative affect}} = -.49$ (SE=.11), $\hat{\beta} = -.33$, $r = -.29$. As negative affect increased, evaluations of the willing obedience coping response became more negative. When the negative affect variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the normative consistency effect remained significant, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = .67$ (SE=.23), $\hat{\beta} = .18$, $r = .19$. Although the regressions do not offer strong evidence to suggest mediation, the Sobel calculation was significant, $z = 1.98$, $p<.05$. Negative affect may partially mediate the effects of normative consistency on willing obedience. More evidence to this relationship may be found by analyzing the interaction between normative consistency and social relationship.

Prior analyses indicated that this interaction predicted negative affect, $b_{\text{interaction}} = -.32$ (SE=.16), $\hat{\beta} = -.11$, $r = -.13$. When the negative affect variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the interaction effect fell from significance, $b_{\text{interaction}} = .07$ (SE=.27), $\hat{\beta} = .02$, $r = .79$, $p = .02$. To assess whether
this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, \( z = 2.04, p < .05 \). Negative affect mediates the effects of normative consistency and social relationship on willing obedience.

**Voicing Complaint**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the complaint-voicing response. The friendship covariate was significant, \( F(1,221)=19.07, \eta^2=.08 \), and the trust covariate approached statistical significance, \( F(1,221)=3.10, p=.08, \eta^2=.01 \). Increased ratings of friendliness and trust were associated with more negative evaluations of the complaint-voicing coping response.

The effect of the normative consistency manipulation on evaluations of this response was a marginally significant one, \( F(1,221)=2.25, p=.14, \eta^2=.01 \): participants who recalled an influence attempt that violated relationship norms evaluated the voicing complaint response more positively than those whose social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms (\( M=3.25 \) and 2.93, respectively).

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant interaction among social relationship, normative consistency, and Mach was observed, \( F(1,221)=3.74, \eta^2=.02 \). As may be noted in Table 2.7, much of the variance in this interaction may be explained by the behavior of the low Mach scorers who received a social influence attempt in the AR relationship: these participants rated the complaint-voicing response more positively when the social influence attempt violated relationship norms than when it was consistent with relationship norms (\( M=3.61 \) and 2.65, respectively).
Machiavellianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>3.61(^{c})</td>
<td>2.92(^{ab})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>2.65(^{a})</td>
<td>2.94(^{ab})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.04(^{ab})</td>
<td>3.42(^{bc})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.17(^{bc})</td>
<td>2.95(^{ab})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{abc}\) Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at \(p<.05\).

Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

Table 2.7: Effects of Normative Consistency, Social Relationship, and Machiavellianism on Complaint-Voicing

**Mediation Analyses.** Prior analyses indicated that normative consistency predicted obligatory concern, \(b_{\text{normative consistency}} = 1.39\) (SE=.15), \(\beta = .45\), pr = .53. Obligatory concern was found to predict complaint voicing, \(b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = -.21\) (SE=.08), \(\beta = -.19\), pr = -.17 (anticipatory concern also predicted complaint voicing). As participants thought about how they should obey the order (i.e., increased obligatory concern), evaluations of the complaint-voicing response became more negative. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the normative consistency effect was observed to fall from significance, \(b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.02\) (SE=.24), \(\beta = -.01\), pr = .93, pr = -.01. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, \(z = 1.94\), \(p = .05\). Obligatory concern mediates the effect of normative consistency on voicing complaint.

Prior analyses indicated that normative consistency predicted negative affect, \(b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.33\) (SE=.14), \(\beta = -.13\), pr = -.16. Negative affect was found to predict complaint voicing, \(b_{\text{negative affect}} = .26\) (SE=.10), \(\beta = .19\), pr = .17. As negative affect in-
creased, evaluations of the complaint voicing response became more positive. When the negative affect variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the normative consistency effect decreased in size, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.19$ (SE=.21), $\beta =-.06$, $p=.38$, $p_{r}=.06$. To test whether this decrease in effect size was significant, a Sobel calculation was made. The Sobel statistic was marginally significant, $z = 1.65$, $p=.10$. Negative affect partially mediates the effects of normative consistency on complaint voicing.

*Buck-passing*

A $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the buck-passing response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.

The expected interaction between normative consistency and social relationship was observed to be significant, $F(1,229)=4.87$, $\eta^{2}=.02$. As one may tell from Table 2.8, buck-passing was likely to be evaluated positively whenever a social influence attempt violated the norms of an AR relationship or when a social influence attempt was consistent with the norms of a EM relationship (M=2.66 and 2.62, respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
<th>AR</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>AR</td>
<td>2.66$^b$</td>
<td>2.26$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>2.18$^a$</td>
<td>2.62$^b$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{ab}$ Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

Table 2.8: Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Buck-passing
Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the main effect for Mach approached statistical significance, F(1,229)=3.41, p=.07, η²=.02. Buck-passing was rated more positively among those with high Mach scores than those with low Mach scores (M=2.61 and 2.26, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by the interaction with normative consistency, F(1,229)=4.53, η²=.02. When the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms, one’s Mach score affected the evaluation of the buck-passing response – those with higher Mach scores evaluated this response more positively than those with lower Mach scores (M=2.78 and 2.02, respectively – see Table 2.9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>2.49&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>2.02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 2.9: Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Buck-passing

Mediation Analyses. Because no observed effects (involving the manipulated variables) were observed to predict either of the concern variables, the concern mediation analysis was not completed.

Prior analyses indicated that the interaction between social relationship and normative consistency predicted negative affect, b<sub>interaction</sub> = -.32 (SE=.16), β = -.11, pr = -.13. Negative affect predicted buck-passing in marginally significant manner, b<sub>negative affect</sub> = -.17 (SE=.10), β = -.15, p=.08, pr = -.12. Contrary to expectations, as negative affect increased, evaluations of the buck-passing coping response became more negative. When the negative affect variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after
normative consistency), the interaction effect fell from significance, $b_{interaction} = .22$
(SE=.24), $\beta = .06$, $p=.93$, $r = .06$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of
the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed. This decrease was not significant, $z= 1.07$, $p=.28$. At best, negative affect partially mediates the effects of normative consist-
tency and social relationship on buck-passing.

**Procrastination**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables,
Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the
procrastination response. The friendship covariate was observed to be significant,
$F(1,221)=4.10$, $r^2=.02$. Increased ratings of friendliness were associated with more
negative evaluations of the procrastination coping response.

The interaction between influence tactic and social relationship approached
statistical significance, $F(1,221)=2.39$, $p=.12$, $r^2=.01$. The means trended as follows:
participants rated the procrastination response more positively when: participants re-
ceived an obedience demand in an AR relationship; or a compliance request in an EM
relationship.

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see
above), the predicted Mach main effect was observed, $F(1,221)=7.70$, $r^2=.03$. Those with
higher Mach scores were more likely than those with lower Mach scores to rate the
procrastination response positively ($M=3.01$ and $2.48$ respectively).

Additionally, the predicted interaction between Mach and normative consistency
approached statistical significance, $F(1,221)=3.01$, $p=.08$, $r^2=.01$. As shown in Table
2.10, those with lower Mach scores were hesitant to endorse procrastination as a “good”
coping response, even if the social influence attempt was in violation of relationship
norms. Unexpectedly, high Mach scorers felt more positively about the procrastination response when the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms (M=3.26).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>2.56&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>2.39&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 2.10: Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Procrastination

_Mediation Analyses._ As indicated by prior analyses, none of the IV effects listed above were observed to predict the mediating variables. Therefore, further mediational analyses on this variable were halted.

_Obfuscation_

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the obfuscation response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.

None of the manipulated variables were observed to have significant effects upon the evaluation of this coping response.

_Machiavellianism Effects._ When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was noted, F(1,228)=6.36, η²=.03: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to evaluate this coping response positively than those with lower Mach scores (M=2.94 and 2.53, respectively).
Interpretation of the Mach main effect may be qualified by its interaction with normative consistency, $F(1,228)=2.41, p=.12, \eta^2=.01$. As one may see in Table 2.11, only those with low Mach scores and who were provided with a social influence attempt that was consistent with relationship norms rated the obfuscation response low ($M=2.26$), compared to the other three cells.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>2.80$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>2.26$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{ab}\) Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 2.11: Effects of Normative Consistency and Machiavellianism on Obfuscation

**Mediation Analyses.** Because no IV effects were observed to predict the obfuscation coping response, further mediational analyses involving this DV were halted.

**Loophole-Exploitation**

A $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the loophole-exploitation response. The friendliness covariate was observed to be significant, $F(1,221)=7.79, \eta^2=.03$. As one may expect, increased ratings of friendliness were associated with more negative evaluations of the loophole-exploitation coping response.

A significant main effect was observed for influence tactic, $F(1,221)=7.14, \eta^2=.03$. Loophole-exploitation was evaluated more positively when the social influence attempt took the form of an obedience demand than when it took the form of a compliance request ($M=3.12$ and $2.60$, respectively).
Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the expected main effect for Mach was observed to be significant, \( F(1,221)=12.04, \eta^2=.05 \). Those with higher Mach scores evaluated the loophole-exploitation coping response more positively than did low Mach scorers (M=3.19 and 2.53, respectively).

Mediation Analyses. Because no IV effects were observed to predict the mediating variables, further mediational analyses involving this DV were halted.

Refusal-to-Obey

A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the refuse-to-obey response. The friendship covariate was observed to be significant, \( F(1,221)=11.76, \eta^2=.05 \). Increased ratings of friendliness were associated with more negative evaluations of the refuse-to-obey coping response.

The main effect for social relationship was significant, \( F(1,221)=14.68, \eta^2=.06 \), as was the main effect for normative consistency, \( F(1,225)=25.51, \eta^2=.10 \). Refusing to obey was rated more positively when: the social influence attempt was received in an EM relationship than in an AR relationship (M=3.24 and 2.39, respectively); and when the social influence attempt was in violation of relationship norms than when it was consistent with relationship norms (M=3.40 and 2.23, respectively).

Interpretation of these main effects was qualified by the predicted interaction between normative consistency and social relationship, an interaction that approached statistical significance, \( F(1,221)=2.55, p=.11, \eta^2=.01 \). As shown in Table 2.12, participants were most likely to evaluate the refuse-to-obey coping response positively when the social influence attempt violated EM relationship norms (M=4.00).
Table 2.12: Effects of Normative Consistency and Social Relationship on Refusal-to-Obey

The interaction between normative consistency and influence tactic was marginally significant, $F(1,221)=3.01, p=.08, \eta^2=.01$. Participants were most likely to endorse the refuse-to-obey response when an obedience demand violated relationship norms ($M=3.75$); when the social influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms, the form of the influence attempt mattered little in terms of predicting refusal-to-obey (see Table 2.13).

Table 2.13: Effects of Normative Consistency and Influence Tactic on Refusal-to-Obey

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), no significant effects involving the Mach variable were observed.

Mediation Analyses. Prior analyses indicated that normative consistency predicted obligatory concern, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = 1.39 (SE=.15), \beta = .45, pr = .53$. Obligatory concern was found to predict refusal-to-obey, $b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = -.54 (SE=.09), \beta = -.44, pr = -.38$.
(anticipatory concern did not predict willing obedience). As participants thought more about how they felt obligated to obey, evaluations of the refusal-to-obey coping response became more negative. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the normative consistency effect was weakened, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = -.50$ (SE=.26), $\beta = -.13$, $p=.06$, $pr = -.12$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was observed to be significant, $z=4.10$, $p<.05$. Obligatory concern mediated the effect of normative consistency on refusal-to-obey.

Prior analyses indicated that the interaction between social relationship and normative consistency predicted negative affect, $b_{\text{interaction}} = -.32$ (SE=.16), $\beta = -.11$, $pr = -.13$. Negative affect predicted refusal-to-obey, $b_{\text{negative affect}} = .33$ (SE=.12), $\beta = .22$, $pr = .18$. When the negative affect variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the interaction effect fell from significance, $b_{\text{interaction}} = -.27$ (SE=.29), $\beta = -.06$, $p=.35$, $pr = -.06$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed. The decrease was not significant, $z=1.5$, $p=.13$. Negative affect partially mediates the interactive effects of normative consistency and social relationship on refusal-to-obey.

Sabotage

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the sabotage response. The trust covariate was observed to be significant, $F(1,221)=6.39$, $\eta^2=.03$. Increased ratings of trust were associated with more negative evaluations of the sabotage coping response.
The social relationship variable had a marginally significant effect on the evaluations of this coping response, $F(1,221)=3.55$, $p=.06$, $\eta^2=.02$. Those who received a social influence attempt in an EM relationship were more likely to rate the sabotage response positively as compared to those who received an influence attempt in an AR relationship ($M=1.86$ and $1.60$, respectively).

The interaction between normative consistency and influence tactic was also marginally significant, $F(1,221)=2.91$, $p=.09$, $\eta^2=.01$. Those participants who received an obedience demand that violated relationship norms were maximally positive toward this coping response ($M=2.05$).

*Machiavellianism Effects.* When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the predicted main effect for Mach was observed, $F(1,221)=16.13$, $p<.001$: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to evaluate this coping response positively than those with lower Mach scores ($M=2.01$ and $1.46$, respectively).

This main effect was qualified by its interaction with influence tactic, $F(1,221)=2.76$, $p=.10$, $\eta^2=.01$: as can be seen in Table 2.14, low Machs were hesitant to evaluate the sabotage response positively (average $M=1.46$). High Machs – especially those faced by an obedience demand – were more likely to consider the sabotage response as a possibility ($M=2.22$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Tactic</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>1.48$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>1.43$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^abc$ Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 2.14: Effects of Influence Tactic and Machiavellianism on Sabotage
The three-way interaction among social relationship, influence tactic, and Mach approached statistical significance, F(1,221)=2.42, p=.12, \( \eta^2=.01 \). High Machs who received an obedience demand in an EM context reported the most positive evaluation of the sabotage response (M=2.49), while low Machs who received a compliance request in an AR context reported the least positive evaluation of the sabotage response (M=1.28).

**Mediation Analyses.** Based on prior analyses, only the social relationship variable was found to predict a mediating variable (anticipatory concern), \( b_{\text{social relationship}} = -.76 \) (SE=.16), \( \beta = -.29, pr = .29 \). However, anticipatory concern was not observed to predict evaluations of the sabotage response. Therefore, further mediational analyses involving this DV were halted.

**Theft**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the theft response. The trust covariate was observed to be marginally significant, F(1,221)=2.73, p=.10, \( \eta^2=.01 \). Increased ratings of trust were associated with more negative evaluations of the theft coping response.

The interaction between social relationship and normative consistency was marginally significant, F(1,221)=5.23, p=.06, \( \eta^2=.02 \). The theft response was evaluated most positively when participants received a social influence attempt that violated AR norms or was consistent with EM norms (M=1.81 and 1.79, respectively). Interpretation of this interaction was qualified by the significant three-way interaction among the manipulated variables, F(1,221)=4.48, \( \eta^2=.02 \). As one can see in Table 2.15, when the social influence attempt took the form of a compliance request, neither the normative consistency nor social relationship variables affected the evaluation of the theft response.
However, when the social influence attempt took the form of an obedience demand, the most endorsement of the theft response was seen when the demand violated AR relationship norms (M=2.24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative Consistency</th>
<th>Social Relationship</th>
<th>Obedience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violating</td>
<td>AR 1.38&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>EM 1.49&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>AR 1.66&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>EM 1.70&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts are significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Note: AR=Authority Ranking; EM=Equality Matching

Table 2.15: Effects of Normative Consistency, Social Relationship, and Influence Tactic on Theft

*Machiavellianism Effects.* When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was noted, F(1,221)=16.14, η²=.07: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to evaluate this coping response positively than those with lower Mach scores (M=1.97 and 1.33, respectively).

*Mediation Analyses.* Prior analyses revealed that the three-way interaction among the manipulated variables predicted anticipatory concern — however, anticipatory concern was not observed to predict evaluations of the theft response. Similarly, although prior analyses revealed that the interaction between social relationship and normative consistency predicted negative affect, negative affect was not found to predict evaluations of the theft response. Therefore, further mediational analyses involving this coping response were halted.
Obedience (Grudging)

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the grudging obedience response. The friendliness covariate was observed to be significant, F(1,221)=9.45, $\eta^2=.04$. Increased ratings of friendliness were associated with more negative evaluations of the grudging obedience coping response.

The influence tactic main effect was observed to be significant, F(1,221)=5.89, $\eta^2=.03$. Participants evaluated this coping response more positively when the social influence attempt took the form of an obedience demand rather than a compliance request (M=3.86 and 3.35, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was noted, F(1,221)=5.75, $\eta^2=.03$: those with higher Mach scores rated this coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores (M=3.86 and 3.35, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by its interaction with influence tactic, F(1,221)=12.65, $\eta^2=.05$. As is shown in Table 2.16, evaluations of the grudging obedience response were similar when the demand took the form of an obedience demand (average M=3.86). However, when it took the form of a compliance request, those with high Mach scores were more likely to report that they would obey grudgingly than did those with low Mach scores (M=3.98 and 2.72, respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Tactic</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>2.72&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>3.99&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>ab</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 2.16: Effects of Influence Tactic and Social Relationship on Grudging Obedience
Mediation Analyses. Because no IV effects were observed to predict the mediating variables, further mediational analyses involving this DV were halted.

Summary of Research Results from Experiment One

Because of the many dependent measures included in each of the three Experiments, many pages were necessary to communicate the findings. To aid in this communication, each Experiment Chapter features a brief summary of the main and interacting effects.

When the influence attempt took place in an AR social relationship, willing obedience was evaluated positively; when it took place in an EM relationship, refusing-to-obey and sabotaging were evaluated positively. When the influence attempt was consistent with relationship norms, willing obedience was evaluated positively; however, when it violated relationship norms, voicing complaint and refusing-to-obey were evaluated positively.

These two main effects (social relationship and normative consistency) interacted with one another. When an influence attempt was consistent with AR relationship norms, willing obedience was rated positively; however, when it violated AR relationship norms, buck-passing, refusing-to-obey, and theft were evaluated positively. When the influence attempt violated EM relationship norms, willing obedience was evaluated negatively. Note also that influence attempts consistent with EM relationship norms led to more positive evaluations of the buck-passing and theft responses.

The form of the influence tactic also had effects on the evaluation of coping responses: when it took the form of an obedience demand, loophole-exploitation and grudging obedience were rated positively. Influence tactic interacted with the type of social relationship, such that an obedience demand given in an AR context (or, a compli-
ance request given in an EM context) led to positive evaluations of the procrastination response. Influence tactics also interacted with normative consistency: when an obedience demand violated relationship norms, refusing-to-obey and sabotage became likely. One three-way interaction was observed to involve all three manipulated variables — when participants received an obedience demand that violated AR relationship norms, participants rated the theft response favorably.

Machiavellianism was a robust variable with its ability to predict a wide range of coping response activation. High Machs were likely to endorse a wide range of destructive/resistant coping responses (i.e., buck-passing, procrastination, obfuscation, loophole-exploitation, sabotage, and theft) as well as grudging obedience. The form of the influence attempt also played a role during coping response evaluation: sabotage was evaluated positively when high Machs faced an obedience demand; grudging obedience was evaluated positively when high Machs faced a compliance request. Low Machs, on the other hand, preferred less direct modes of resistance. Complaint-voicing was evaluated more positively when low Machs received an influence attempt that violated AR relationship norms.

As predicted, normative consistency interacted with Mach: high Machs who received an influence attempt that violated relationship norms evaluated the willing obedience response negatively. Sabotage received its highest evaluations when high Machs received an obedience demand in an EM context, and received its lowest evaluations when low Machs received a compliance request in an AR context. Note that when high Machs received an influence attempt that was consistent with relationship norms, evaluations of the buck-passing and procrastination responses became more positive.

Almost all of the mediating effects observed in Experiment One were in reference to the normative consistency manipulation. Conceptually, this variable bears the most
resemblance to procedural justice. Obligatory concern was observed to mediate the effects of normative consistency on willing obedience, complaint voicing, and refusal to obey. Negative affect partially mediated the effect of normative consistency on complaint voicing; also, negative affect partially mediated the interaction effect of normative consistency and social relationship on buck-passing and refusal to obey. Anticipatory concern was not observed to mediate any effects in Experiment One.

Discussion of Experiment One

Experiment One focused on how different variables affected reported obligatory and anticipatory concern. When social influence attempts were perceived to be legitimate (i.e., consistent with the shared social relationship), constructive coping responses to the influence attempt (i.e., willing obedience or complaint-voicing) were evaluated positively. When demands did not seem to be legitimate (i.e., violating relationship norms), participants indicated that they resisted the influence attempt through a variety of means.

Those who scored highly on measures of Mach were especially likely to report resisting attempts to influence them, rating various destructive coping responses positively. This is consistent with the conceptualization of the Machiavellian person as a hyper-strategic manipulator of people and situations in the attempt to ensure personal gain.

Questions may be raised about this construct, however. Do high Machs truly endorse the utilization of these coping responses more so than low Machs, or do high Machs feel less social desirability concern when evaluating these coping responses? The most convincing argument for the predictive utility of the Mach construct is a bevy of research findings that document behavioral effects that are predicted by the Mach scale (see Wilson et al., 1996 or Fehr et al., 1992). These reviews suggest strongly that those
with high Mach scores are in fact different (attitudinally and behaviorally) from those with low scores, and that the difference between those who score high or low is not driven by a disregard for socially appropriate responding on the part of high Machs.

Another empirical answer to this construct issue may be found within the present data set. One of the other measured individual-difference variables was the self-monitoring construct (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Self-monitoring (SM) refers to a person's tendency to regulate one's behavior in response to the self-presentation concern of the situation. Presumably, because of the shared focus on adapting behaviors to the immediate situation, scores on the SM scale should be moderately correlated with Mach scores—and they were, $r(209)=.32, p<.05$. However, does this mean that the social desirability concern drove the Mach effects reported above? Multiple one-way ANOVAs failed to detect significant main effects of SM on the resistant dependent variables. Additionally, the analyses reported in the Mach sections above were repeated, with the addition of SM as a covariate: inclusion of the SM variable failed to yield significant covariate effects, and as such did not weaken any of the observed main or interactive effects. Given the totality of this evidence, it seems unlikely that one's dispositional tendency to regulate one's social behavior (to reflect socially desirable responses) was responsible for the high Machs' endorsement of these coping responses.

Experiment One is compelling in a number of ways. It asked participants to recall an instance from their own personal experience, an experience that was anchored to "the real world" and therefore should involve them more in the study. This link to the real world may lends the study an increased capacity to generalize its findings for more applied purposes. Additionally, the current study allowed for the empirical disentanglement of two different types of social influence attempts (i.e., compliance requests and obedience demands). Lastly and most importantly, the current study explored a variety of
situational factors (i.e., the type of shared social relationship, the type of social influence attempt) that may affect the levels of reported obligatory and anticipatory concern.

Experiment One is not free from criticism, however. The main critique of the study may be that there is potential for error in the participants’ coping response evaluations. It is possible that the evaluations of the various coping responses may be predicted not only by the manipulated variables but also from a bias towards maintaining a preferred social identity. In short, participants may have responded in a manner consistent with how they wished they behaved rather than how they actually behaved.

Observers may also note that Experiment One did not directly manipulate the two variables that are the primary focus of this dissertation. While Experiment One investigated a number of variables that influenced judgments of legitimacy (and subsequent selection of ways to cope with the demand), aspects of procedural justice were not directly manipulated. Further, accountability was not manipulated. To address these observations, Chapter Three presents an experiment that directly manipulated whether an accountability demand was provided in either a procedurally just or unjust manner.

Chapter 1 Endnotes

1 The use of the term “beneficial” refers to the point of view of the influence practitioner who wants to increase the likelihood of acquiescence, which is the primary purpose of a social influence attempt. It does not refer to the actual (contextual) outcome of the social influence attempt: what may be beneficial for one person may not be beneficial for another.

2 Those who are especially attuned to maximizing short-term gains—such as those who score highly on measures of Machiavellianism—may only attend to these proscriptions when it is economically and politically expedient to do so (see Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996).

3 This pattern also violates the theoretical expectations set forth by the work on diffusion of responsibility (Latane & Darley, 1970) and social loafing (Latane et al., 1979).

4 There is another pathway through which one may become normatively committed to obey—personal morality, or an internalized obligation to follow one’s personal sense of what is morally right or wrong (Tyler, 1990a). Commitment via personal morality is dependent on the content of the law—if the law matches a person’s value system, then perceptions of its legitimacy (and therefore, the potential for complying with this law) is more likely.
Because procedures may be more reflective of underlying values (Tyler & Lind, 1992), an unfair procedure may be more disturbing to decision makers than an unfair outcome distribution.

Skarlicki and Folger (1997) also found that when distributive and procedural justice were at low levels but there was a high level of interactional justice, retaliatory behaviors against an organization were less likely. That is, an authority that treats those under its command with respect and personal goodwill may be able to offset the effects of giving an unfair outcome through an unfair procedure.

There may also be a connection between the logic of consequentiality and distributive justice, such that those people who are schematically focused on maximizing outcome utility are especially focused on how fair those outcomes are, as opposed to the procedures that give rise to various outcomes.

This does not preclude the operation of other motivations for behavior and cognition.

Gamson et al. (1982) noted that people may feel more comfortable breaking social rules after reframing their thinking to stress the "illegitimacy" or injustice of a rule or request.

Other researchers (see Christie & Geis, 1970) have found that a two-factor solution represents the structure of this individual difference variable best, with the two factors referring to the endorsement of deceitful tactics and a cynical worldview. In Experiments One, Two, and Three, however, factor analyses (maximum likelihood with direct-oblimin rotation, allowing for correlated factors) of the Mach IV scale failed to reveal this factor structure. In Experiments One and Two, the first factor was labeled "moral correctness," featuring items such as "It is possible to be good in all respects." The second factor was labeled "Mach composite," as it combined aspects of both the endorsement of deceitful tactics and a cynical worldview. In Experiment Three, a similar factor structure was found, with the primary difference being that the "Mach composite" factor was now the first factor, and the "moral correctness" factor was second. This provides empirical justification for the use of the Mach IV scale (at least in these experiments) as a composite variable.

Participants were not provided with the actual label of the manipulated relational frame.

The wording (e.g., ask or tell) was a function of the condition to which participants were assigned.

In this Experiment, and the ones to follow, "fairness" survey items were recoded for analysis, such that increasing scores indicated increasing perceptions of fairness.

Thought protocols were coded as "unsure" for this variable when the participant failed to write "tell," "ask," or some derivative.

For ease-of-presentation, all reported analyses involving the Machiavellianism variable relied upon the use of median splits. Regression analyses treating Mach as a continuous variable yield similar patterns of effects.

The interpersonal variables of perceived friendship and trust were also included. This data analytic process was repeated for each of the coping response evaluations reported herein.
CHAPTER 3

EXPERIMENT TWO

Overview

Experiment Two investigated the hypothesis that procedural justice manipulations play a large role in evoking obligatory (legitimacy) concerns and that manipulations of an authority’s power should lead to a corresponding increase in anticipatory concerns. These manipulations should also have effects on the evaluation of coping responses to the accountability demand. In this experiment, participants were asked to read a vignette that described an accountability demand given in a business context. After reading this vignette, participants indicated how they thought the vignette’s protagonist should respond by evaluating a number of different coping responses, from willing acquiescence to grudging acquiescence.

Hypotheses

Two procedural justice manipulations – a direct one (varying the extent to which a fair process is used to institute a demand) and an indirect one (varying the extent to which a voice option is present), should be positively related to reported obligatory concern. A demand that is procedurally just – reflecting unbiased, consistently enforced, and adhered-to procedures – should be considered to be legitimate. The presence of a
voice option tends to be reflective of an organizational commitment to procedural justice, acting as a proactive “safety-valve.” Demands given in a context with either or both of these variables present should be more likely to be perceived as legitimate.

The primary effect for the power of the authority should be related to anticipatory concerns – the more powerful the authority, the more concerned the protagonist should be judged to consider the possibility of rewards and punishments. It is possible that a powerful authority figure who acts in a procedurally just manner may evoke obligatory concerns among its constituents (e.g., a “just authority” akin to the tales of Camelot or Solomon). As such, one may expect to observe an interaction between these variables, leading to a more positive evaluation of the willing obedience coping response.

The presence of a voice option represents a chance for an illegitimate demand to be resisted in an acceptable, constructive manner. If it is available, it should be one of the principal responses selected when one is faced by an illegitimate accountability demand (Tetlock, 1998). When a voice option is not available, the power of the authority will dictate the selection of coping responses. If an authority has little power to enforce its illegitimate demand, respondents should be more likely to resist the demand outright. This response is an active mode of resistance to an illegitimate accountability demand - a “fight” response to an aversive situation. If an authority has much power to enforce its illegitimate demand, respondents should resist the demand passively through the use of decision avoidance tactics (DATs) or actively through the use of loophole-exploitation. Because of the large power differential between the authority and the decision maker, overt resistance to the demand would be ill advised. In a sense, these responses may be considered to be type of “flight” reactions to an aversive situation.

Additionally, one may hypothesize an interaction between procedural justice and voice option: when a demand is given in a procedurally just manner and a voice option is
present, maximal obligatory (legitimacy) concerns should be evident; commensurately with this, greater endorsements of the willing obedience response should be observed. Conversely, obligatory concerns should be at its lowest when a demand is given in a procedurally unjust manner and when a voice option is not present – in this case, participants should not feel that the protagonist would be motivated to acquiesce because the demand is not legitimate. Drawing from prior work involving business managers (see Tetlock, 1998), evaluations of buck-passing and loophole-exploitation coping responses should be more positive when a voice option is absent, when a demand is procedurally unjust, or (especially) when a voice option is absent and a demand is procedurally unjust.

A procedurally just demand is expected to compensate for the lack of voice option, but not vice versa. When a demand is procedurally unfair, the ability to voice complaint may be viewed as an impotent gesture in the context of a corporate climate that allows managers to make unfair demands. On the other hand, when the demand is procedurally just, the voice option becomes less important (i.e., there’s not much to complain about when one has been treated fairly).

Machiavellianism should be a strong predictor of how people will evaluate the various coping responses – by definition, those who with high Mach scores should be more willing to endorse the use of socially inappropriate tactics that bring about self-benefit. Additionally, Machiavellianism should interact with procedural justice and voice option. High scorers on this scale should not be motivated by procedural justice, because these people are more open and flexible to the use of such responses – when they see an opportunity for self-benefit, they will take it regardless of however fairly they have been dealt with. On the other hand, those who score low on this scale should be more hesitant to endorse the use of the resistant tactics. When considering how to react to the accountability demand, they should look for some rationale to guide the manner by which they
respond — when faced by procedurally just demands, they should acquiesce to them willingly. When they are faced by procedurally unjust demands, they should be more likely to endorse the use of resistance tactics (DATs, loophole-exploitation, etc.).

The repeated measures component of Experiment Two was included for exploratory purposes only, and therefore no a priori hypotheses were made. Only those results pertaining to the between-subjects manipulations are reported below.

Method

Participants

Two hundred ten introductory psychology students participated in the 2 (Ability to Voice Complaint: Present or Absent) X 2 (Power of Authority: High or Low) X 2 (Procedural Justice: High or Low, repeated within subjects) X 2 (High Procedural Justice Provided First or Second) mixed design in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research experience course requirement.

Procedure

Students participated in classrooms in groups of 20-30. After all participants were checked into the study, participants were told that the study would take most of the hour long session, and that they should take the time to read all materials completely and thoroughly. Upon delivering these instructions, the experimenter passed out the different versions of the experimental materials and accompanying survey, randomly assigning participants to one of the eight conditions. When all participants were finished with the study, the experimenter delivered an oral debriefing about the study, answered any questions that the participants had, and thanked them for participating in the study.
Materials and Independent Variables

The participants were asked to read a vignette detailing a day in the life of Ed, (the protagonist of the story), an office worker who had been told to take the lead on an annual company project. Ed was told that he would have to report and be accountable to an authority figure, Brett, in the company. Participants read that Brett either had much power (e.g., the Department's Executive Director) or little power (e.g., a middle-management worker with little authority to do anything important) to set strategic course and hire/fire people within the company. Furthermore, the participants were told of the standard process by which this company project was usually completed: the authority figure either followed this process in a fair manner (e.g., it was Ed's turn to do this project) or in an unfair manner (e.g., it was Brett's turn to do this project, leading to the impression that the authority figure was biased, trying to "pass-the-buck" of this unpleasant job onto someone else). Participants were given additional information about the company; in particular, participants read about whether or not the company had an Open Door policy by which employees could voice suggestions or concerns without fear of negative consequences. (See Appendix E for vignette.)

Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks.

To gauge their affective reaction to reading this passage, participants completed Watson and Clark (1984)'s PANAS and a feeling thermometer (responses to the latter ranged from 1=very bad to 4=neutral to 7=very good).

Three manipulation checks were then completed. The first measured the power manipulation, "Overall, does Brett have the power to make important decisions in the HR department?" (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so to 7=very much so). The second measured the effectiveness of the voice manipulation, "To what extent
can Ed voice complaints and concerns to authorities in the company with little fear of negative consequences?", (responses ranged from 1=very unable to voice concerns to 4=neutral to 7=very able to voice concerns, fully labeled). The third measured the effectiveness of the procedural justice manipulation, "Did Brett follow proper procedure when telling Ed what to do?", (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so to 7=very much so).

The first set of obligatory concern items corresponded to the participants' perceptions of the situation portrayed in the vignette. Using fully labeled 7-point bipolar scales, these items included the following: "Did Brett follow a fair process when giving orders?" (responses ranged from 1=very fair to 4=a little of both to 7=very unfair); "Was the order itself a reasonable one to make?" (responses ranged from 1=very fair to 4=a little of both to 7=very unfair); "Is Brett's order a fair one to make?" (responses ranged from 1=very unfair to 4=a little of both to 7=very fair); "Is it right for Brett to tell Ed to do this?" (responses ranged from 1=very wrong to 4=a little of both to 7=very right); and "Is Brett's order an appropriate one to make?" (responses ranged from 1=very inappropriate to 4=a little of both to 7=very appropriate).

In addition to the set of questions described above, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a number of metacognitive items that referred to what Ed may have been thinking during this situation. Measures tapping the logic of appropriateness (i.e., feelings that one is obligated to follow an authority's wishes) and the logic of consequentiality (i.e., whether one should follow a demand/request out of concerns for maximizing personal benefit) were measured via fully labeled 7-point bipolar scales, ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree. Logic of appropriateness items included: "When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed is very likely to think about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make.

When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed is very likely to think about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make. 
thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed will most likely think about how he feels morally obliged to obey the other person’s order (i.e., Brett’s order was an appropriate one, and so Ed should follow it); “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed will think mostly about the “correct” thing he should do.” Logic of consequentiality items included: “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed is most likely to think about the costs or benefits that could occur;” “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed will mostly care about whether he’ll be rewarded or punished by Brett;” “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, Ed will mostly care about what he can get out of this situation (e.g., more money, status).”

Next, participants wrote about the situation facing the Ed, and what they thought he should do about it. In addition to serving as a manipulation check of sorts, this procedure could allow for the measurement of other exploratory dependent variables, such as: the complexity of the participants’ thoughts in reference to the scenario; and participants’ “top-of-the-mind” preferred behavioral response to the situation.

Participants were then asked to think about how Ed could deal with this situation. They were asked to indicate the extent to which various coping responses would be a good choice for Ed given his situation, using fully labeled 7-point scales that ranged from 1 =very bad choice for Ed to 4 =neutral to 7 = very good choice for Ed. Each coping response featured a definition, making it clear to the participant what the coping response would entail. These coping responses are described below:

- Obey Brett’s order with no problems: Ed will obey the other person’s order, and do so with no problems. He will complete this project with no major complaints.
- Confuse the issue: If Ed obeys Brett’s order, Ed will give Brett updates that are so confusing, it’s unclear how much progress has been made.
- Pass the buck: Ed will pass this project on to someone else (”passing the buck”), so that THEY become responsible for doing it.
• Take advantage of loopholes: If Ed obeys Brett's order, Ed will look for and take any loopholes he can find. That is, if Ed can cut corners and save himself time and energy, he will do it— even if it would harm the project.
• Procrastinate: If Ed obeys Brett's order, Ed will take a very long time to complete this project, rather than rush to finish it quickly.
• Refuse to obey the other person's order: Ed will just tell Brett "no," that he refuses to do this project.
• Obey the other person's order grudgingly: If Ed obeys Brett's order, he will do so grudgingly (e.g., unwillingly). In this scenario, Ed will complete the project because he feels that he has no other choice but to obey Brett.
• Theft: If Ed obeys Brett's order, Ed will do other things (e.g., take office supplies, report more hours on his timesheet than he actually worked, take extra long lunch breaks) that personally benefit him.
• Sabotage: If Ed obeys Brett's order, Ed will do other things (e.g., sabotage) that would purposefully hurt the project and/or the company.
• Voice a complaint: Ed will voice a complaint about having to do this project, either to his boss or to a higher authority.

Next, participants were asked to indicate how much effort Ed would probably put into doing what he was told (if he were to choose to do it), with responses ranging from 1=not at all to 3=a moderate amount of effort to 5=all possible effort. Participants were next asked about Ed's willingness to follow Brett's order (responses ranged from 1=very unwilling to 4=neutral to 7=very willing, fully labeled). Lastly, participants were asked to indicate how friendly (responses ranged from 1=very unfriendly to 4=neutral to 7=very friendly, fully labeled) and trustworthy (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so 7=very much so) they perceived Brett to be.

This experiment was a repeated measures design, in that participants completed the procedure described above a second time, reading a similar vignette except that this time the opposite procedural justice manipulation was inserted. The same dependent measures were assessed, excluding the written passage. At the end of this second round
of questioning, participants were asked to complete the following question: After reading Stories #1 and #2, how much do you think you changed your opinion about the fairness and appropriateness of Brett’s demand to Ed (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 3=moderately to 5=very much)? Also, they were asked to write (briefly) about how their reading of Story #1 affected how they reacted to Story #2. Because this repeated measures manipulation was exploratory, data from this manipulation are not included in the results or discussion below.

Lastly, a number of individual difference variables (Need for Cognition, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, and Self-Monitoring) and demographic variables (age and sex) were measured. Upon completing this questionnaire, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Power-of-Authority. Analysis of the manipulation checks revealed that the power manipulation was effective. Ratings of Brett’s power was higher in the high power condition than in the low power condition, F(1,202)=214.74, η^2=.52 (M=5.6 and 2.7, respectively).

Interpretation of this power main effect was qualified by the anticipated interaction between power and procedural justice, F(1,202)=5.31, η^2=.03. When participants read that Brett had a lot of power, the issuance of a procedurally just demand made him seem even more powerful than when he gave a procedurally unjust demand (M=5.8 and 5.4, respectively).

Ability to Voice Complaint. Analysis revealed that this variable was also successfully manipulated: ratings of Ed’s ability to voice complaints was higher when a voice
option was present than when it was absent, $F(1,202)=534.52$, $\eta^2=.73$ ($M=6.2$ and $2.5$, respectively).

*Procedural Justice.* Ratings of whether or not Brett followed proper procedure (i.e., procedural fairness) revealed a main effect for the procedural justice manipulation, with those who read that the demand followed proper procedure rating it as more proper as compared to those who read that the demand did not follow proper procedure, $F(1,202)=128.57$, $\eta^2=.39$ ($M=4.5$ and $2.5$, respectively). However, there were also main effects for power ($F(1,202)=33.35$, $\eta^2=.14$) and presence of voice option ($F(1,202)=9.09$, $\eta^2=.04$), such that those who believed Brett to be powerful or a voice option to be present were more likely to report that Brett followed a fair procedure.

Interpretation of these main effects were qualified by the expected interaction between the presence of a voice option and procedural justice, $F(1,202)=6.3$, $\eta^2=.03$: a just demand given when a voice option was present was rated as much more proper than when a voice option was absent ($M=5.0$, $4.0$, respectively); when the demand was unjust, the presence or absence of a voice option mattered little – participants rated the demand as less proper (average $M=2.5$).

*Potential Mediators: Obligatory and Anticipatory Concerns*

*Factor analysis.* A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine how a number of dependent variables grouped into various composites. These items tapped (*a priori*): perceptions of demand legitimacy, perceptions of procedural justice, obligatory concerns, and anticipatory concerns. In all, intercorrelations among 11 variables measuring these perceptions were entered into the analysis. A three-factor solution fit the intercorrelations well, RMSEA=.037, $\chi^2=32.16$. See Table 3.1 for the correlated factor scores.
Table 3.1: Correlated Factor Scores

The first and most interpretable factor consisted of five items: “Is Brett’s order a fair one to make?” “Is it right for Brett to tell Ed to do this project?” “Is Brett’s order an appropriate one to make?” “Did Brett follow a fair process when giving Ed this order?” and “Was the order itself a reasonable one to make?” These five items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach’s alpha=.96); this factor was labeled obligatory concerns. This composite represents the extent to which participants considered matters of legitimacy and justice.

The third factor consisted of three items including: “Ed is most likely to think about the costs or benefits that could occur;” “Ed will mostly care about whether he’ll be rewarded or punished by Brett;” and “Ed will mostly care about what he can get out of this situation (e.g., more money, status).” These three items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach’s alpha=.51), and was labeled “anticipatory concerns.” This composite represents the extent to which participants considered the possibility of reward or sanction.

The second factor was a unique one, consisting primarily of an item measuring the extent to which the participants felt that Ed should feel morally obligated to obey Brett’s order.
Potential Mediator: Negative Affect

Factor analysis. A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine which of the 20 items in the PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule: Watson & Clark, 1984) grouped into the "negative affect" factor. A five-factor solution fit the intercorrelations reasonably well, RMSEA=.06, $\chi^2=163.73$. The fifth factor consisted of items related to negative affect (i.e., "hostile," "upset," "irritable"); these latter items were combined to form a negative affect composite, Cronbach’s alpha = .65.

Effects of Manipulated Variables on Potential Mediators

Interpersonal Covariates. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) on perceptions of friendship between Brett and Ed yielded main effects for each of the manipulated variables: power of authority, $F(1,201)=3.44, \eta^2=.02$; procedural justice, $F(1,201)=87.82, \eta^2=.30$; and voice option, $F(1,201)=5.68, \eta^2=.03$. Participants reported greater perceptions of friendship when Brett was powerful (compared to when he was weak); when his demand was procedurally just (compared to when it was procedurally unjust); and when a voice option was present (compared to when it was absent).

A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) on the extent to which participants felt that Ed trusted Brett was performed. Similar to the interpersonal covariate of friendship reported above, significant main effects were observed for each of the manipulated variables: power of authority, $F(1,201)=4.46, \eta^2=.02$; procedural justice, $F(1,201)=111.39, \eta^2=.36$; and voice option, $F(1,201)=9.46, \eta^2=.05$. Participants reported greater perceptions of trust when Brett was powerful (compared to when he was weak); when his demand was procedurally just (compared to when it was procedurally unjust); and when a voice option was present (compared to when it was absent).
Overall, these analyses indicate that these interpersonal variables (i.e., friendship, trust) may play some type of covarying role; as such, they were included as covariate variables in each of the analyses reported below.

Obligatory (Legitimacy) Concerns. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on obligatory concerns yielded multiple main and interaction effects. The trust covariate approached significance, $F(1,198)=3.74, p=.06, \eta^2=.02$: higher ratings of trust were associated with higher ratings of obligatory concerns (i.e., more belief that the demand was legitimate and appropriate).

Turning to main effects, all were observed to be significant: power of authority, $F(1,198)=24.14, \eta^2=.11$; procedural justice, $F(1,198)=166.24, \eta^2=.46$; and voice option, $F(1,198)=17.76, \eta^2=.08$. As expected, increased obligatory concerns was observed when Brett’s demand was procedurally just (as compared to when it was unjust) and when a voice option was present (as compared to when it was absent). Additionally, increased obligatory concerns were observed when Brett was powerful (as compared to when he was weak).

Interpretation of the main effects describe above was qualified by multiple two-way interactions. As expected, the interaction between procedural justice and voice option was observed to be significant, $F(1,198)=5.96, \eta^2=.03$. As indicated in Table 3.2, a demand issued in a procedurally fair manner while an option to voice complaint was present resulted in maximal obligatory concerns ($M=5.39$). When the demand was procedurally unjust, the presence of a voice option mattered little.
Procedural Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.57^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.82^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^abc Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 3.2: Effects of Voice Option and Procedural Justice on Obligatory Concern

Additionally, the two-way interaction between power and procedural justice was observed to be significant, F(1,198)=6.27, η^2=.03. As shown in Table 3.3, maximal obligatory concerns were reported when the authority was powerful and used a just process when making demands (M=5.44). When the demand was a procedurally unjust, the power of the authority mattered little.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power of Authority</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.53^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.86^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^ab Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 3.3: Effects of Power-of-Authority and Procedural Justice on Obligatory Concern

The interaction between power and voice option approached statistical significance, F(1,198)=3.72, p=.06, η^2=.02. As expected, the means corresponding to this interaction trended in the direction seen for the interaction between power and procedural justice – reported obligatory concerns was at higher levels when a voice option was present and an authority was powerful.
Anticipatory (Instrumental) Concerns. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on anticipatory concerns yielded only the expected main effect for power, F(1,198)=24.08, η²=.11. Those who knew Brett to be powerful reported more anticipatory concerns compared to those who knew Brett to have little power (M=4.95 and 4.2, respectively). In other words, those who read about a more powerful authority figure believed that Ed should consider the possible rewards and/or sanctions that may be of consequence.

Moral Obligation to Obey. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on moral obligation to obey yielded only a main effect for procedural justice that approached statistical significance, F(1,198)=3.52, p=.06, η²=.02. Those who read that the demand was procedurally just were more likely to report that Ed had a moral obligation to obey compared to those who read that the demand was procedurally unjust (M=4.69 and 3.81, respectively).

Negative Affect. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables and including the two interpersonal covariates) on negative affect yielded the expected main effect for procedural justice, F(1,197)=5.29, η²=.03. Reported negative affect was higher when the demand was procedurally unjust than when it was procedurally just (M=1.77 and 1.43, respectively). The voice option manipulation showed a similar effect, F(1,197)= 2.99, p=.09, η²=.02. Reported negative affect was higher when a voice option was absent than when it was present (M=1.70 and 1.52, respectively).

Coping Response Patterns

To form a general picture as to how the different coping responses related with one another, a correlational analysis of all 10 possible coping responses was performed. Judging by the correlational patterns presented in Table 3.4, it seems as if the construc-
tive / destructive difference among the coping responses continues to be an important one: constructive responses were moderately correlated with one another; destructive responses were moderately correlated with one another; and there was little correlation between these two sets of responses. Participants thought that Ed should deal with the demand in either a constructive manner (obey it, voice complaint) or in a destructive manner (DATs, theft).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obey (Willingly)</th>
<th>Voice Complaint</th>
<th>Buck-passing</th>
<th>Procrastination</th>
<th>Obfuscation</th>
<th>Loophole-exploitation</th>
<th>Refusal to Obey, Exit</th>
<th>Sabotage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Obey (Grudgingly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cell means were significantly correlated at p<.05.

Table 3.4: Correlated Evaluations of Coping Responses

The following pages present analyses exploring the effects of the manipulated variables on the evaluation of the various coping responses.

Obedience (Willing)

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the willing obedience response. The friendly covariate approached statistical significance, F(1,189)=2.91, p=.09, \( \eta^2 = .02 \); the trust covariate was significant, F(1,189)=4.00, \( \eta^2 = .02 \). As participants rated Brett to be more friendly and trustworthy, willing obedience was rated more positively.

79
The power-of-authority manipulation was observed to be significant, \( F(1,189)=4.56, \eta^2=.02 \), as was the procedural justice manipulation, \( F(1,189)=33.05, \eta^2=.15 \). Willing obedience was evaluated more positively when the authority was strong compared to when it was weak (M=4.58 and 4.13, respectively) or when the demand was procedurally just compared to when it as unjust (M=5.12 and 3.60). The voice option effect on willing obedience approached statistical significance, \( F(1,189)=2.38, \eta^2=.12 \), \( \eta^2=.01 \): willing obedience was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent compared to when it was present (M=4.52 and 4.17, respectively).

Interpretation of these main effects was qualified by the expected two-way interaction between voice option and procedural justice, \( F(1,189)=8.62, \eta^2=.04 \). As predicted, the presence or absence of a voice option mattered little when the demand was procedurally just. However, the presence of a voice option played an influential role in determining evaluations of this coping response among those participants who read about a procedurally unjust demand. As shown in Table 3.5, when a voice option was present and a demand was procedurally unjust, willing obedience was evaluated most poorly (M=3.1). In this situation, the voice option provided a way of out from an unjust accountability demand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>4.06^b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>3.13^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^abc Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 3.5: Effects of Voice Option and Procedural Justice on Willing Obedience
Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a marginally main effect for Mach was observed, $F(1,189)=2.82, p=.10, \eta^2=.02$: those with lower Mach scores were more likely to evaluate the willing obedience response positively as compared to those with higher Mach scores ($M=4.53$ and 4.18, respectively). Additionally, the interaction between power-of-authority and Mach exhibited a weak trend in an expected direction, $F(1,189)=2.12, p=.15, \eta^2=.01$: high Machs who knew that the authority figure was weak were evaluated the willing obedience response least positively ($M=3.81$) compared to the other three cells in this interaction (average $M=4.54$).

Mediation Analyses. Procedures for testing mediation remained consistent with those used in Chapter Two. As noted earlier, procedural justice was found to predict obligatory concern, $b_{\text{procedural justice}} = 2.02$ (SE=.19), $\beta = .58$, $pr = .60$. Obligatory concern was found to predict willing obedience, $b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = .59$ (SE=.07), $\beta = .54$, $pr = .50$. As participants thought more about how they felt obligated to obey, evaluations of the willing obedience coping response became more positive. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after procedural justice), the procedural justice effect was observed to fall from significance, $b_{\text{normative consistency}} = .36$ (SE=.31), $\beta = .09$, $p=.24$, $pr = .08$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, $z = 5.13$, $p<.05$. Obligatory concern mediates the effects of procedural justice on willing obedience.

As noted earlier, power-of-authority was found to predict obligatory concern, $b_{\text{power-of-authority}} = .43$ (SE=.19), $\beta = .12$, $pr = .16$. Obligatory concern predicted willing obedience, $b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = .59$ (SE=.07), $\beta = .54$, $pr = .50$. (Note that although power-of-authority also predicted anticipatory concern, anticipatory concern was not found to
predict willing obedience.) As participants thought more about how they felt obligated to obey, evaluations of the willing obedience coping response became more positive. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after power-of-authority), the power-of-authority effect was observed to fall from significance, $b_{\text{power-of-authority}} = .01$ (SE=.20), $\beta = .01$, $p=.93$, $r_p = .01$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, $z = 2.17$, $p<.05$. Obligatory concern mediates the effects of power-of-authority on willing obedience.

As noted earlier, the interaction between procedural justice and voice option was found to predict obligatory concern, $b_{\text{justice\text{*}voice interaction}} = .66$ (SE=.29), $\beta = .16$, $p_r = .16$ (note: the interaction term was entered into a multiple hierarchical regression after entering the procedural justice and voice option main effects). Obligatory concern predicted willing obedience, $b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = .59$ (SE=.07), $\beta = .54$, $p_r = .50$. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after the two main effects and the interaction term), the interaction term effect was strengthened, $b_{\text{justice\text{*}voice interaction}} = .83$ (SE=.37), $\beta = .19$, $p_r = .16$. A Sobel test yielded a significant effect, $z = 2.12$, $p<.05$: obligatory concern may partially mediate the interactive effect of procedural justice and voice option on willing obedience.

Negative affect was not observed to predict willing obedience, and therefore further mediational analyses involving this variable were curtailed.

**Voicing Complaint**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the
complaint-voicing response. The trust covariate was observed to be significant, 
\(F(1, 190) = 7.54, \eta^2 = .04\): decreased ratings of trust were associated with more positive evaluations of the complaint-voicing coping response.

A main effect for procedural justice was observed, \(F(1, 190) = 33.84, \eta^2 = .15\): voicing complaint was evaluated more positively when the demand was procedurally unjust compared to when it was just (\(M = 5.19\) and \(3.58\), respectively). The main effect for power-of-authority approached statistical significance, \(F(1, 190) = 2.10, p = .15, \eta^2 = .01\): voicing complaint was evaluated more positively when the authority was weak compared to when he was powerful (\(M = 4.54\) and \(4.22\), respectively).

The interaction between procedural justice and voice option exhibited a weak trend in the expected direction, \(F(1, 190) = 1.78, \eta = .18, \eta^2 = .01\). Voicing complaint was evaluated most positively when the protagonist received an unjust demand and when a voice option was present (\(M = 5.47\)); when the demand was procedurally just, the complaint voicing response was evaluated significantly less positively (average \(M = 3.88\)).

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant interaction between Mach and power-of-authority was observed, \(F(1, 190) = 5.06, \eta^2 = .03\): when the authority was powerful, those with higher Mach scores evaluated the complaint-voicing response significantly less positively (\(M = 3.85\)) as compared to the other three cells (average \(M = 4.56\)).

**Mediation Analyses.** Prior analyses indicated that procedural justice predicted obligatory concern, \(b_{\text{procedural justice}} = 2.02 (SE = .19), \beta = .58, pr = .60\), and that obligatory concern predicted complaint-voicing, \(b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = -.48 (SE = .08), \beta = -.45, pr = -.39\). As obligatory concern increased, evaluations of this coping response became more negative. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after normative consistency), the procedural justice effect was weakened but
remained significant, $b_{\text{procedural justice}} = -0.82$ (SE=0.33), $\beta = -0.22$, $p = -0.17$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, $z = 3.14$, $p<0.05$. Obligatory concern partially mediates the effect of procedural justice on complaint voicing.

Prior analyses indicated that power-of-authority predicted obligatory concern, and that obligatory concern predicted complaint voicing. (Note that although power-of-authority also predicted anticipatory concern, anticipatory concern was not found to predict complaint voicing.) When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after power-of-authority), the power-of-authority effect fell from significance, $b_{\text{power-of-authority}} = -0.02$ (SE=0.21), $\beta = -0.00$, $p = -0.01$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, $z = 2.09$, $p<0.05$. Obligatory concern mediates the effect of power-of-authority on complaint voicing.

Because the interaction between procedural justice and voice option was so weak, no mediational analyses were computed for this effect. Negative affect was not observed to predict willing obedience, and therefore further mediational analyses involving this variable were curtailed.

**Buck-passing**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the buck-passing response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.

A significant main effect for procedural justice was observed, $F(1,193)=6.52$, $\eta^2=0.03$: however, the pattern of means was not as expected. Buck-passing was evaluated
more positively when the demand was issued in a procedurally just manner as compared to procedurally unjust manner (M=2.48 and 2.04, respectively). Additionally, the voice option effect was significant, F(1,193)=4.12, $\eta^2=.02$: evaluations of the buck-passing response were more positive when a voice option was absent than when one was present (M=2.43 and 2.09, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by the predicted and marginally significant three-way interaction among the manipulated variables, F(1,193)=3.36, $p=.07$, $\eta^2=.02$. As noted in Table 3.6, buck-passing was rated most positively among those who read that Ed received a procedurally just demand from a weak authority and that a voice option was absent (M=3.01); buck-passing was not rated as an appropriate response among those who read that Ed received a procedurally unjust demand from a powerful authority and that a voice option was present (M=1.75).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power of Authority</th>
<th>Low Power</th>
<th>High Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice Option</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>2.14$^{ab}$</td>
<td>3.01$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>2.07$^{ab}$</td>
<td>2.15$^{ab}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{a,b}$ Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 3.6: Effects of Voice Option, Procedural Justice, and Power-of-Authority on Buck-passing

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the predicted Mach main effect was observed to be marginally significant,
F(1,193)=3.52, p=.06, η²=.02: those with higher Mach scores evaluated the buck-passing coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores (M=2.42 and 2.10, respectively).

Furthermore, the interaction between procedural justice and Machiavellianism was significant, F(1,193)=3.70, p=.06, η²=.02. As one may observe in Table 3.7, those who had low Mach scores and who read about a procedurally unjust demand were the least likely to evaluate this coping response positively (M=1.72).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.72&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.37&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>ab</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 3.7: Effects of Procedural Justice and Machiavellianism on Buck-passing

Mediation Analyses. Neither the “concern” mediational analysis nor the “negative affect” one revealed that the mediators predicted the buck-passing coping responses. Therefore, further mediational analyses involving these variables were stopped.

Procrastination

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the procrastination response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.
A main effect for voice option was observed, $F(1,193)=6.91$, $\eta^2=.04$. The procrastination coping response was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent than when it was present ($M=2.88$ and $2.40$, respectively).

*Machiavellianism Effects.* When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the main effect for Mach was marginally significant, $F(1,193)=2.85$, $p=.09$, $\eta^2=.02$. As expected, those with higher Mach scores evaluated the procrastination coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores ($M=2.79$ and $2.48$, respectively).

A three-way interaction was observed among power-of-authority, voice option, and Mach was observed, $F(1,193)=4.63$, $p=.02$. High Machs who read about a weak authority and knew that a voice option was absent rated the procrastination response most positively ($M=3.45$), while low Machs who read about a powerful authority and knew that a voice option was present rated it least positively ($M=2.09$).

Interpretation of the three-way interaction described above, however, was qualified by an interaction among all four variables, $F(1,193)=3.57$, $p=.06$, $\eta^2=.02$. To interpret this pattern, two three-way interaction analyses were computed as a function of whether participants read that the demand was procedurally just or unjust. The three-way interaction among power-of-authority, voice option, and Mach was only significant for those participants who read about a procedurally just demand, $F(1,91)=8.34$, $p=.02$. As one may tell in Table 3.8, high Machs seemed to pay special attention to the various manipulated situational variables. Although they knew that demand was procedurally just, they also knew that a voice option was not available and that the authority was weak — evaluations of the procrastination response were most positive for this group of participants ($M=3.69$). However, the presence of a voice option mitigated the endorsement of the procrastination response, even though the authority was weak ($M=2.09$).
Table 3.8: Effects of Voice Option, Power-of-Authority, and Machiavellianism on Procrastination

Mediation Analyses. Neither the “concern” mediational analysis nor the “negative affect” one revealed that the mediators predicted the buck-passing coping responses. Therefore, further mediational analyses involving these variables were stopped.

Obfuscation

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the obfuscation response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.

A main effect for voice option was observed, F(1,193)=6.90, \( \eta^2 = .04 \). As expected, obfuscating was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent than when it was present (M=2.89 and 2.36, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was observed, F(1,193)=8.80, \( \eta^2 = .04 \). As expected, those with higher Mach scores evaluated the obfuscation coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores (M=2.91 and 2.32, respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Power of Authority</th>
<th>Power of Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>2.33&lt;sup&gt;abc&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.80&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>2.71&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.19&lt;sup&gt;ac&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at \( p<.05 \).
Additionally, a three-way interaction among procedural justice, voice option, and Mach exhibited a weak but interpretable trend, $F(1,193)=1.91$, $p=.17$, $\eta^2=.01$. As may be seen in Table 3.9, maximally positive evaluations of the obfuscation response were observed for those high Machs who knew that the demand was procedurally unjust and that a voice option was absent ($M=3.43$). On the other hand, low Machs’ evaluations were affected by the simple presence (or absence) of a voice option – they evaluated obfuscation more positively when a voice option was absent, and less positively when a voice option was present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voice Option</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>2.72$^b$</td>
<td>2.62$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>2.09$^a$</td>
<td>1.86$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a^b^c$ Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 3.9: Effects of Voice Option, Procedural Justice, and Machiavellianism on Obfuscation

Mediation Analyses. Although anticipatory concern was found to predict the obfuscation coping response, none of the independent variables were found to predict the proposed mediator. Therefore, further explorations of this coping response were curtailed. The “negative affect” mediational analysis also failed to reveal significant patterns among the variables.
Loophole-Exploitation

A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the loophole-exploitation response. The interpersonal covariates were not observed to be significant, and so a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was re-run without their inclusion.

The main effect for voice option was observed to be significant, $F(1,193)=8.10$, $\eta^2=.04$: exploiting loopholes was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent than when it was present ($M=2.75$ and 2.27, respectively).

The interpretation of this main effect was qualified by a number of interactions. First, the predicted interaction between voice option and procedural justice was observed to be significant, $F(1,193)=3.75$, $\eta^2=.02$. As shown in Table 3.10, the convergence of both an unjust process and the absence of a constructive way to deal with it (i.e., the absence of a voice option) resulted in the most positive evaluation of the loophole-exploitation response ($M=2.93$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Unjust</th>
<th>Just</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>2.93$^c$</td>
<td>2.57$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>2.12$^a$</td>
<td>2.41$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 3.10: Effects of Voice Option and Procedural Justice on Loophole-Exploitation

The interaction between procedural justice and power-of-authority was marginally significant, $F(1,193)=2.74$, $p=.10$, $\eta^2=.01$. When the authority was powerful, procedural justice had little effect on evaluations of the loophole-exploitation response (aver-
age $M=2.51$). When the authority was weak, procedurally unjust demands led to more positive evaluations of the loophole-exploitation response as compared to procedurally just demands ($M=2.67$ and $2.35$, respectively).

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the predicted Mach effect was observed, $F(1,193)=5.76$, $\eta^2=.03$: those with higher Mach scores evaluated the loophole-exploitation coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores ($M=2.71$ and $2.30$, respectively).

In addition to this main effect, the expected interaction between voice option and Mach was marginally significant, $F(1,193)=2.62$, $p=.11$, $\eta^2=.01$. As shown in Table 3.11, when a voice option was present, one's Mach score didn't affect the evaluation of the loophole-exploitation coping response. However, when a voice option was absent, high Mach scorers felt more positively about exploiting loopholes ($M=3.09$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.41a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>2.20a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{ab}$ Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

**Table 3.11: Effects of Voice Option and Machiavellianism on Loophole-Exploitation**

**Mediation Analyses.** Although the anticipatory concern mediator was observed to predict the loophole-exploitation response, none of the significant effects listed above were found to predict anticipatory concern. Therefore, further analyses involving these variables were curtailed.
Although negative affect was observed to predict loophole-exploitation, the voice option variable did not significantly predict the mediator. Therefore, further analyses involving these variables were curtailed.

Refusal-to-Obey

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the refuse-to-obey response. The trust covariate was significant, F(1,189)=4.90, \( \eta^2=.03 \): decreased ratings of trust were associated with more positive evaluations of the refusing-to-obey coping response.

A main effect for procedural justice was observed, F(1,189)=12.29, \( \eta^2=.06 \). Refusing-to-obey was evaluated more positively when the demand was procedurally unjust then when it was just (M=3.21 and 2.28, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between power-of-authority and procedural justice, F(1,189)=2.78, p=.10, \( \eta^2=.01 \). As expected, refusing-to-obey was evaluated most negatively when a powerful authority issued a procedurally just demand (M=2.02); when the demand was unjust, the authority’s power had little effect on the positive response evaluation (average M=3.21 - see Table 3.12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power of Authority</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>3.13(^c)</td>
<td>2.55(^{ab})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.29(^c)</td>
<td>2.02(^a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{abc}\) Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at \( p<.05 \).

Table 3.12: Effects of Power-of-Authority and Procedural Justice on Refusal-to-Obey

92
Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), no significant effects involving the Machiavellianism variable were observed.

Mediation Analyses. Prior analyses indicated that procedural justice predicted obligatory concern. Obligatory concern was found to predict refusal-to-obey, $b_{\text{obligatory concern}} = -.34$ (SE=.07), $\beta = -.37$, $pr = -.31$ (anticipatory concern did not predict refusal-to-obey). As people thought more about how Ed was obligated to obey the demand, evaluations of the refuse-to-obey coping response became more negative. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after procedural justice), the procedural justice effect was observed to fall from significance, $b_{\text{procedural justice}} = -.27$ (SE=.09), $\beta = -.08$, $p=.40$, $pr = -.06$. To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, $z = 3.07$, $p<.05$. Obligatory concern mediates the effect of procedural justice on refusal-to-obey.

Prior analyses also revealed that the interaction between procedural justice and power-of-authority predicted obligatory concern, $b_{\text{procedural justice power interaction}} = .67$ (SE=.28), $\beta = .16$, $pr = .16$ (note: the interaction term was entered into a multiple hierarchical regression after entering the procedural justice and power-of-authority main effects). As noted above, obligatory concern predicted refusal-to-obey. When the obligatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after the two main effects and the interaction term), the interaction term effect was weakened, $b_{\text{procedural justice power interaction}} = -.57$ (SE=.40), $\beta = -.30$, $p=.16$, $pr = -.19$. A Sobel test yielded a marginally significant effect, $z = 1.73$, $p=.08$: obligatory concern may partially mediate the interactive effect of procedural justice and power-of-authority on refusal-to-obey.

Negative affect failed to significantly predict refusal-to-obey; further mediational analyses involving these variables were stopped.
Sabotage

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the sabotage response. The trust covariate was marginally significant, $F(1,189)=3.17, p=.08, \eta^2=.02$: decreased ratings of trust were associated with more positive evaluations of the sabotage coping response.

The main effect for voice option was marginally significant, $F(1,189)=2.80, p=.10, \eta^2=.02$. Sabotaging the organization or the project was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent than when it was present ($M=1.78$ and $1.52$, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was noted, $F(1,189)=5.13, \eta^2=.03$: those with higher Mach scores evaluated the sabotage coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores ($M=1.82$ and $1.48$, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by an interaction between Mach and procedural justice, $F(1,189)=3.44, p=.07, \eta^2=.02$: when the demand was procedurally just, Machiavellianism did not affect the evaluation of the sabotage response (average $M=1.64$). However, when the demand was unjust, high Mach scorers were more likely than low Mach scorers to evaluate the sabotage coping response positively ($M=1.97$ and $1.35$, respectively).

Additionally, the expected interaction among the procedural justice, voice option, and Mach variables was significant, $F(1,189)=3.66, p=.06, \eta^2=.02$. See Table 3.13 for the means associated with the three-way interaction. Maximal positive evaluation of sabotage response was reported by those with high Mach score who read of a procedurally unjust demand and who read that a voice option was not available ($M=2.32$).
Machiavellianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Option</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1.43\textsuperscript{ab}</td>
<td>1.80\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>1.27\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>1.42\textsuperscript{ab}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{abc} Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 3.13: Effects of Voice Option, Procedural Justice, and Machiavellianism on Sabotage

Mediation Analyses. The “concern” mediational analysis failed to reveal significant predictors of the sabotage response. Although the negative affect composite predicted this coping response, none of the observed independent variable effects were observed to predict negative affect. Therefore, mediational analyses involving these variables ended.

Theft

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the theft response. The trust covariate was observed to be significant, F(1,190)=3.92, \( \eta^2=.02 \): increased ratings of trust were associated with more negative evaluations of the theft coping response.

Power-of-authority was observed to have a marginally significant main effect on evaluations of this response, F(190)=2.83, \( p=.09 \), \( \eta^2=.02 \). Stealing from the organization was evaluated more positively when the authority was powerful than when the authority was weak (M=2.06 and 1.75, respectively).
The procedural justice effect approached statistical significance, \( F(1,190)=2.95, p=.09, \eta^2=.02 \). Those who read about a procedurally just demand rated the theft response more positively than those who read about a procedurally unjust demand (2.11 and 1.70, respectively). This unexpected pattern of means is similar to that relating to the evaluations of the buck-passing response, reviewed earlier.

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant main effect for Mach was observed, \( F(1,190)=5.96, \eta^2=.03 \). Those with higher Mach scores evaluated the theft coping response more positively than did those with lower Mach scores (\( M=2.13 \) and 1.68, respectively).

**Mediation Analyses.** Prior analyses indicated that power-of-authority predicted anticipatory concern, \( b_{\text{power-of-authority}} = .74 \text{ (SE=.15), } \beta = .32, r^2 = .53 \). Anticipatory concern was found to predict theft, \( b_{\text{anticipatory concern}} = .23 \text{ (SE=.08), } \beta = .20, r^2 = .20 \) (obligatory concern did not predict theft). Evaluations of the theft coping response became more positive as participants thought more about the possible costs and benefits to Ed's decision. When the anticipatory concern variable was entered into the hierarchical multiple regression (after power-of-authority), the power-of-authority effect was observed to fall from significance, \( b_{\text{power-of-authority}} = .16 \text{ (SE=.19), } \beta = .06, r^2 = .06 \). To assess whether this drop (in the predictive effect of the IV) was significant, a Sobel test was computed: the drop was significant, \( z = 2.28, p<.05 \). Anticipatory concern mediates the effect of power-of-authority on theft.

Negative affect did not predict this coping response, and therefore mediational analyses involving this variable were curtailed.

**Obedience (Grudging)**

A \( 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \) ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariates) was performed on evaluations of the
grudging obedience response. The friendship covariate was marginally significant, 
F(1,189)=2.96, p=.09, η²=.02: decreased perceptions that Brett was friendly were associated
with more positive evaluations of the grudging obedience coping response.

A main effect for voice option was observed, F(1,189)=7.91, η²=.04: grudging
obedience was evaluated more positively when a voice option was absent than when it
was present (M=3.57 and 2.97, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see
above), no effects involving the Mach variable were observed to be significant.

Mediation Analyses. The voice option variable was a marginally significant
predictor of obligatory concern, bvoice option = .36 (SE=.19), β = .10, p=.06, pr = .13; obliga-
tory concern was a marginally significant predictor of grudging obedience, b obligatory concern
= .13 (SE=.08), β = .15, p=.09, pr = .12 (anticipatory concern did not predict willing
obedience). As participants thought about how Ed should be obligated to obey the de-
mand, evaluations of the grudging obedience coping response became more positive.
Rather than weakening the effects noted above, however, the inclusion of this covariate
strengthened the voice option effect described above, bvoice option = -.75 (SE=.20), β = -.25,
pr = -.25.

Negative affect was not observed to predict grudging obedience, and so further
mediational analyses involving these variables were curtailed.

Summary of Research Results from Experiment Two

When the accountability demand was procedurally just, participants rated the
willing obedience response positively; unjust accountability demands, on the other hand,
were met with complaint-voicing and refusals-to-obey. One should note the presence of

97
two unexpected findings involving the justice manipulation: participants faced with a procedurally just demand were also more likely to rate the buck-passing and theft responses positively.

The voice-option manipulation was robust in its prediction of many coping responses to the accountability demand. When a voice option was conspicuously absent, participants rated all of the following responses more positively: willing obedience, buck-passing, procrastination, obfuscation, loophole-exploitation, sabotage, and grudging obedience.

As expected, procedural justice and voice option interacted. When the demand was procedurally unjust and a voice option present, willing obedience was rated less positively and complaint-voicing was rated more positively. When the demand was unjust and a voice option absent, loophole-exploitation was rated positively.

When an authority was strong, evaluations of the willing obedience response and the theft response were more positive. As expected, power-of-authority was observed to interact with procedural justice: when the authority was strong and the demand just, the refuse-to-obey and grudging obedience responses were evaluated less positively. When the authority was weak and the demand unjust, loophole-exploitation was evaluated more positively.

The three manipulated variables were observed to interact with one another when predicting the evaluation of certain coping responses. When the authority was weak, the demand just, and no voice option present, buck-passing was rated positively. When the authority was strong, the demand unjust, and a voice option was present, buck-passing was rated less positively; in this case, loophole-exploitation and grudging obedience were rated positively.
The Machiavellianism construct was a reliable predictor of many coping responses to the accountability demand: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to evaluate the buck-passing, procrastination, obfuscation, loophole-exploitation, sabotage, and theft responses positively. Additionally, those with higher Mach scores demonstrated sensitivity to matters of injustice: when the demand was unjust, or when the safety valve of a voice option was unavailable, they evaluated a number of responses (i.e., loophole-exploitation, sabotage) more positively. Generally, those with lower Mach scores were more likely to evaluate the willing obedience response positively. When faced by unjust demands, low Machs rated the obfuscation response positively and the buck-passing and sabotage responses negatively.

Interactions involving Mach provide additional information as to how participants — especially high Machs — choose to respond to accountability demands. When high Machs read that a weak authority had given the demand, they were less positive in their evaluation of the willing obedience response; when the authority was strong, they were less positive toward the complaint-voicing response. When high Machs received a demand that was unjust (and a voice option absent), they were more positive toward the obfuscation response; when the authority was weak (and a voice option absent), they were more positive toward the procrastination response.

Obligatory concern was observed to mediate (either in full or partially) a number of effects relating to willing obedience, complaint-voicing, and refusal-to-obey. Anticipatory concern mediated the effect of power-of-authority on theft. Lastly, negative affect did not any of the reported effects.
Discussion of Experiment Two

Consistent with hypotheses and with prior work involving business managers (see Tetlock, 1998), main and interacting effects between procedural justice and voice option on the evaluations of the buck-passing and loophole-exploitation coping responses were observed. Participants were more likely to endorse the use of these coping responses when a voice option was absent, when a demand was procedurally unjust, or (especially) when a voice option was absent and a demand was procedurally unjust.

Obligatory concerns — the belief that some demand or order is fair and appropriate, and therefore worthy of being obeyed — assisted in the understanding of why people obey (or, disobey) authority's commands. As was observed in Experiment One, when demands were perceived as legitimate, evaluations of willing obedience increased — meanwhile, evaluations of the refuse-to-obey and voicing complaint responses decreased. These results are consistent with the general hypothesis laid out by Tyler and colleagues — legitimacy is an important variable in determining whether people will obey the law.

The presence of a voice option played a consistently important role in determining evaluations of the resistant/destructive responses. When a voice option was present, participants evaluated these destructive responses significantly less positively. This may reflect the notion that participants feel it is wrong to hurt someone who is willing to respect / listen to concerns or suggestions. Consistent with prior theorizing, a voice option seemed to represent an acceptable way to resist the demand in an non-destructive manner.

Anticipatory concerns mediated the evaluations of the theft response. There may be a conceptual similarity between notions of anticipatory concern (whether one considers issues of reward or punishment) and the purpose of theft, which is to acquire more "rewards."
The pattern of intercorrelations among the possible coping responses in Experiment One was similar to that observed in Experiment Two – destructive responses tended to group together, while constructive responses tended to group together. Also, Machiavellianism continued to be an important, reliable predictor of how participants evaluated responses to accountability demands (especially those that were unjust).

The chief strength of the experiment described in this chapter is that it is the first to manipulate aspects of both accountability and procedural justice in a controlled setting. The primary critique of this study is related to this point – because the experiment relied upon the use of hypothetical vignettes to deliver the manipulations, there is the possibility that some participants engaged in demand characteristic responding (Orne, 1962). "Demand characteristics" refer to the clues that a study presents to its participants, clues that may allow accurate guesses about the hypotheses of interest. If participants can guess the study's hypotheses, then they may decide to respond (attitudinally and behaviorally) in ways that either help or hinder the experimenter. Clearly, this type of contamination should be avoided to the extent possible (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998); to this end, each survey contained a code that specified the vignette's manipulations (thereby keeping the survey administrators blind to the participants' conditions). Additionally, the survey materials were embedded within the story in an attempt to conceal what constituted the experimental manipulations (e.g., mention of an "Open Door" policy was accompanied by highly descriptive information about the business park in which the business vignette took place). One should note that response editing has been mostly documented as a response to sensitive questions, such as sexual behaviors and illicit drug use (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000): this Experiment did not feature such invasive questions.
Another critique of this study is that the procedural justice manipulation should be strengthened; its effects should be separated from those of the voice option, allowing for a clearer assessment of each variable’s effects.

Experiment Two was important in that it manipulated procedural justice, allowing for the assessment of its effects on subsequent judgments. In Experiment Three, both procedural justice and accountability were manipulated, allowing for the assessment of the interaction effect on judgments of demand legitimacy and preferred coping response. Additionally, whereas Experiment Two used a more passive methodology (i.e., vignettes), Experiment Three increases psychological realism while maintaining empirical control: to do so, participants in Experiment Three were actually held accountable to complete tasks that were given in either a procedurally just or unjust manner.

Chapter 3 Endnotes

1 The psychometric properties for this composite (Cronbach’s alpha) were similar to those observed in Experiment 1.

2 Two items (“Ed is very likely to think about whether the demand is an appropriate one to make” and “Ed will think mostly about the ‘correct’ thing he should do”) loaded on multiple factors, and therefore probably do not represent well-worded items to be included in a composite.
CHAPTER 4

EXPERIMENT THREE

Overview

Experiment Three required participants to complete either an attractive or unattractive task while being held accountable (or not). The tasks to be completed were distributed among the participants in either a just or unjust manner. This active involvement of the participants, some of whom will expect to justify their actions and thought processes to a small audience, allows for the study of procedural justice and accountability in a manner that approximates how these variables interact in the "real-world." This experiment is the first to manipulate these two variables, doing so in a way that allows for high psychological realism while still maintaining experimental control. In addition to the administration of attitudinal scale response items (such as those used in Experiments One and Two), this study also allows for the measurement of actual behaviors, such as: accuracy in task-completion; time to complete the task (as a measure of effort); exit; loophole-exploitation; and complaint voicing.

Hypotheses

When a demand is perceived to be procedurally just, participants should invest more effort (i.e., take more time to complete the task) and more accurate outcomes.
Additionally, evaluations of the willing obedience coping responses, liking of the task, and liking of the group leader should be more positive. Overall, accountability will not play a strong moderating role when the demand is procedurally just—participants who are given a demand in a fair manner should already be motivated to acquiesce to the task and to do well on it.

The opposite should be observed for procedurally unjust demands, which should be associated with lower effort (i.e., less time to complete the task) and less accurate outcomes. Additionally, evaluations of various destructive coping responses (such as loophole-exploitation and sabotage), should be more positive; evaluations of the willing obedience coping response, the task, and the group leader should be more negative. These patterns should be mediated by obligatory concerns. Overall, accountability should play a moderating role when the demand is procedurally unjust—it should make people consider the possible consequences for their actions when completing the task. Anticipatory concerns (instrumental thinking) may play a mediating role when this interaction occurs.

Procedural justice and accountability should interact with the type of task. When the task to complete is attractive, the manipulation of procedural justice or accountability should have little effect (i.e., intrinsic motivation is high). When the task is an attractive one, the following effects should be observed: task-completion accuracy will be at higher levels; accuracy efforts will be at higher levels; willing obedience will be evaluated more positively; the various resistant and destructive coping responses will be evaluated more negatively. However, when the task is unattractive, manipulations of procedural justice or accountability will be important.

When an attractive or unattractive task is given in a procedurally just manner, the following effects should be observed: task-completion accuracy will be at higher levels;
accuracy efforts will be at higher levels; willing obedience will be evaluated more positively; and the various resistant and destructive coping responses will be evaluated more negatively. When the task is given in a procedurally unjust manner, the following effects should be observed: task-completion accuracy will be at lower levels; accuracy efforts will be at lower levels; willing obedience will be evaluated more negatively; and the various resistant and destructive coping responses will be evaluated more positively.

When the unattractive task is given in a procedurally unjust manner but the participant is held accountable, accuracy in task completion as well as the effort to complete the task should be at relatively high levels. This is because of the increase in extrinsic motivation resulting from the accountability manipulation. However, this obedience will most likely be of the grudging variety; evaluations of the various destructive responses should also become more positive. When the unattractive task is given in a procedurally unjust manner and the participant is not held accountable, the following patterns should be observed: accuracy and effort to complete the task should be at their lowest levels; and evaluations of the refuse-to-obey and other resistant responses should be at their lowest levels.

Method

Participants

One hundred sixty-eight students participated in the 2 (Accountability: Present, Absent) x 2 (Procedural Justice of Demand: Fair Process Used to Distribute Tasks, Unfair Process Used to Distribute Tasks) x 2 (Tasks: Attractive, Unattractive) design in exchange for partial fulfillment of a research experience course requirement. Three participants were dropped from analysis: one did not believe the accountability manipulation; and two suspected the presence of a confederate. Overall, the responses from 165 participants were eligible for analysis.
Procedure

Students participated in classrooms in groups of 3-4. In addition to the participants, a research confederate who pretended to be a Psychology 100 student attended each session. Each group was brought into the laboratory, where they were told that they would have to complete a number of tasks relating to group processes. Participants were given a cover story that the day’s study was investigating the processes underlying small group performance on relatively simple tasks.

To this end, those participants who were held accountable heard the following instructions:

“At the end of the study, we’ll go upstairs to the faculty offices on the first floor. Each of you will meet with a faculty member, myself, and your group leader for about 5-10 minutes to discuss your reactions, performance, thought processes, and feelings during the day’s study. Basically, you’ll have to explain the things you did today and how you went about doing them. This is why we only scheduled a small group for this hour. Note: your performance during this interview will be noted & graded by those judging you.”

This induction of accountability required deception – accountable participants had to believe that someone was waiting to ask questions about the study. Those who were not assigned to be accountable were told:

“Everything you say, do, or think today will remain anonymous and confidential. No one will ever be able to associate the words or actions you say or do today with your name.”

After this manipulation, participants were asked if they understood what they had just been told. Participants were then reminded of their rights as participants in this experiment. Specifically, they were told that:

“I’m sure many of you remember what your Psych 100 teachers have told you about your rights when participating in studies, but let me remind you again.

1) If you are concerned about any aspect of the study today, you have the right to tell me about what is concerning you. Just get my attention, and we’ll talk about this in another room.

2) If you have a strong reaction to or feel uncomfortable doing anything today, you have the right to refuse to do it without any penalty. Just notify the group leader or myself that you refuse, and that will be acceptable.
3) If today’s study as a whole makes you feel uncomfortable, you have the right to leave without any penalty. Again, just notify me or the group leader if you wish to leave the study."

Again, participants were asked whether they understood his/her rights today. In addition to serving as a reminder of their rights as participants, this information was also intended to encourage participants to voice complaints or exit the study if they felt it was necessary to do so – relatively uncommon responses to Introductory Psychology experiments that could be measured and analyzed.

In another effort to increase the likelihood of participants complaining to the experimenter or telling the experimenter that they wish to exit, the procedural justice manipulation (i.e., the process by which students were given one of the tasks) was delivered by a third party, not by the experimenter. Specifically, the group leader (i.e., the confederate) manipulated the procedural just (or, unjust) task assignments. Participants were told that because the experimenter was not a member of this group of Psych 100 students, it would not be totally appropriate for the experimenter to give specific orders to the group (e.g., “Student X should complete Task Y”). Therefore, participants were told that they needed to determine who would lead their group. Participants were asked if anyone would like to campaign for group leader.

Each participant-candidate (as well as the confederate) would make a very brief (10-20 second) speech about his/her philosophy of leadership. The confederate waited until at least one person volunteered to speak; if no one volunteered after 10 seconds, the confederate volunteered to be a candidate. The confederate as naturally as possible from a memorized script designed during pretesting to present her as a strong candidate for the position of group leader:

“My name is ______. Ahhhh, I enjoy being in leadership positions and, ummm, I think I’ve done a good job in the past. Plus, I’m an assistant manager at work.”
The experimenter instructed the participants that they were to vote on a candidate via a secret-ballot process: they were instructed not to talk about how they voted during the course of the group activities. After so instructing the participants, the experimenter then asked the participants to vote for one person to be group leader. After tallying the votes, the experimenter announced that the confederate was the winner, either by election or by default. To minimize the possibility that a competing participant was embarrassed for losing the election, care was taken to announce that the vote was a close one; additionally, the competing participant(s) was/were given sincere thanks and praise for volunteering for the group leader position.

The experimenter then discussed the two tasks that were to be completed by the group members. Two group members would have to count the number of times the word “the” was used in 6 pages excerpted from Cohen and Cohen’s (1983) *Applied Multiple Regression / Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* – a source that is unattractive and boring for most college students. The other two group members would have to count the number of times the word “the” was used in 20 pages excerpted from a recent issue of *People Magazine* – a source that is attractive and enjoyable for most college students. In an attempt to minimize perceptions of distributive injustice, the amount of word counting for each task was designed to require approximately equal amounts of effort; furthermore, participants were told that the task assignments were derived from prior studies which showed that they required equal amounts of effort to complete. After discussing these tasks, the experimenter left the room to allow the group leader to assign the tasks to the group members.

At this point, the confederate group leader assigned one of the two tasks to each participant in either a just or unjust manner. A just process involved the group leader flipping a coin to assign participants randomly to the tasks; the group leader would
express her belief that this was the most fair, unbiased way to do things, eliciting the approval of the participants. When an unjust process was followed, the group leader engaged each participant in a conversation that would lead to assigning the tasks in an obviously biased manner. The script followed for the procedurally unjust condition is presented below:


2. “What’s your name? _____ (nod). What’s your major? Cool, my best friend is majoring in that. Why don’t you work on People’s Magazine!”

3. “What’s your name? _____ (nod: as soon as the person says his or her name, recoil a bit, as if you’re remembering a negative memory but are trying to control it).
   • (If female) I had a good friend named ______ until she broke up my boyfriend and I. Why don’t you work on the statistics book.”
   • (If male) My boyfriend’s name is ______, until he dumped me for some other girl. Why don’t you work on the statistics book.”

4. “What’s your name? _____ (nod). So, where are you from? _______. Really, my grandparents live there! I love visiting them! Why don’t you work on the People’s Magazine.”

After the tasks had been assigned, the group leader notified the experimenter that the participants had received their assignments. The experimenter then administered the pre-counting survey (i.e., Survey #1) to complete before the participants went on to their word count. As soon as the first person finished counting, the group leader escorted this person into an adjoining room, where they were told that they would not be meeting with anyone today (for those in the accountability condition). They then completed the post-counting survey (i.e., Survey #2). All participants were told that this was a confidential survey, and as such they should feel free to answer truthfully and honestly. Participants were reminded of this confidentiality when they read the following instructions at the beginning of Survey #2:

ALL RESPONSES TO SURVEY #2 ARE CONFIDENTIAL!
AT NO POINT WILL ANYONE IN A POSITION OF AUTHORITY READ THEM!
Please respond honestly and truthfully.
This emphasis on confidentiality was intended so as to make the participants feel comfortable answering truthfully, especially when evaluating the destructive coping responses.

Upon completion of the post-counting survey, the experimenter engaged in a funneled debriefing with individual participants, inquiring as to whether they understood the instructions given to them today and the manipulations they experienced. Additionally, participants were asked if they anything seemed strange to them, in an attempt to determine if participants failed to believe the accountability manipulation or if suspected the confederate. Lastly, the experimenter engaged in a thorough debriefing with the participant. See Appendix F for the debriefing materials used at the end of this experiment.

Dependent Measures and Manipulation Checks.

Pre-counting Survey (Survey #1). A copy of Survey #1 is included in Appendix G. To gauge their affective reaction to this experience, participants completed a modified version of Watson and Clark (1984)'s PANAS: rather than complete all 20 items on this scale, only those adjectives deemed most relevant (i.e, negative affect, positive affect) were included.

Perceptions of procedural justice were measured via the following items: “To what extent did the group leader act consistently when assigning the tasks?” (responses ranged from 1=not at all to 4=moderately so to 7=very much so); “Did the group leader follow a fair or unfair process when giving you this order?” (responses ranged from 1=very fair to 4=a little of both to 7=very unfair); “Was the group leader biased or unbiased when giving you your task to complete?” (responses ranged from 1=very unbiased to 4=a little of both to 7=very biased).
It is possible that some of the questions used in prior studies may have tapped distributive justice — how just or fair the outcomes received are perceived to be. To explore this possibility, two fully labeled, 7-point bipolar questions (adapted from Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) assessed perceptions of distributive justice. These items included: “I believe that the task I was given is no more difficult than anyone else’s” (responses ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree); and “Other group members have tasks that will require similar effort to complete as mine does” (responses ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree).

Obligatory (legitimacy) concern items included the following fully labeled, 7-point items: “Is it right for the group leader to tell you to do this task?” (responses ranged from 1=very wrong to 4=a little of both to 7=very right); “Are the group leader’s orders appropriate ones to make?” (responses ranged from 1=very inappropriate to 4=a little of both to 7=very appropriate); “Do you think that the group leader’s demand to you is legitimate?” (responses ranged from 1=very illegitimate to 4=a little of both to 7=very legitimate); “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about how you feel morally obliged to obey the group leader’s order” (responses ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree); and “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make” (responses ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree).

Attitudinal reactions to the assigned task were also measured. Participants completed three measures that evaluated the tasks: “How positive do you feel toward completing this task?” (responses ranged 1=very positive to 4=a little of both to 7=very negative); “How good is the task to which you’ve been assigned to complete?” (responses ranged from 1=very good to 4=a little of both to 7=very bad); “How satisfied are you with the task to which you’ve been assigned to complete?” (responses ranged from 1=very unsatisfied to 4=a little of both to 7=very satisfied).
Measures tapping anticipatory concern (i.e., whether one should follow a demand/request out of concerns for maximizing personal benefit) were measured via two fully labeled 7-point bipolar items, ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 4=neutral to 7=strongly agree: “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about the costs or benefits that could occur”; “When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you mostly care about whether you will be rewarded or punished by the experimenters.”

Additionally, participants indicated their attitudes toward the experimenter, their group leader, and the entire group.

At the end of this brief survey, participants were reminded that at any point, they could feel free to leave the study without penalty. This measure allowed for the measurement of both an interesting dependent variable (i.e., given a reminder of their right to exit, do some participants wish to “flee” from illegitimate accountability demands?) as well as to protect participants from possible stress. That is, if participants felt undue stress about their involvement in the study, they would have a “sanctioned” opportunity to exit the study and still receive full research credit.

Post-counting Survey (Survey #2). A copy of Survey #2 is included in Appendix H. As noted earlier, all participants were told that this survey was confidential, and as such, should be completed honestly and truthfully.

Participants were asked to indicate how much effort they put into completing their task (responses ranged from 1=no effort at all to 4=a moderate amount of effort to 7=all possible effort). They also indicated how much they enjoyed completing the tasks (responses ranged from 1=didn’t enjoy it at all to 4=enjoyed it moderately to 7=very much enjoyed) and how willing they were to complete the task (responses ranged from
1=very unwilling to 4=neutral to 7=very willing). Additionally, participants reported how much they liked their group leader and experimenter, using items similar to those used in Survey #1.

Participants then completed measures assessing how they coped with the study's demand. They were told to indicate the extent to which each response was similar to what they actually did today. Items included:

- **Obey the group leader’s order with no problems:** You obey the group leader’s order, and did so with no problems. You completed this project with no major complaints.
- **Procrastinate:** If you obeyed the group leader’s order, you purposely took your time to complete the task, rather than rush to finish it quickly.
- **Take advantage of loopholes:** If you obeyed the group leader’s order, you looked for and took any loopholes you could find. If you could cut corners and save yourself time and energy, you did it— even if it meant you didn’t do as well on the task.
- **Sabotage:** If you obeyed the group leader’s order, you did other things (e.g., made up numbers) that purposefully hurt the task, the group, or this study.
- **Refuse to obey the group leader’s order:** You just told the group leader “no,” that you refuse to do this task.
- **Voice a complaint:** You voiced a complaint or gave a suggestion to an authority figure (e.g., the experimenter).
- **Obey the group leader’s order grudgingly:** If you obeyed the group leader’s order, you did so grudgingly (e.g., unwillingly). You obeyed because you felt that you had no other choice but to obey.

Lastly, a number of individual difference variables (Need for Cognition, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, and Self-Monitoring) and demographic variables (age and sex) were measured.

Before participants left the study, they received a funneled debriefing. Participants indicated whether they believed they were held accountable during the session, discussed how the group leader decided to apportion the tasks, provided comments about what they thought was strange or unusual during the session, and lastly to guess the study’s hypoth-
eses. Upon answering these questions, the experimenter discussed the study’s hypotheses, told the participants about how deception was used to make them think they were accountable, and told the participants that their group leader was actually a confederate (and as such, everything the group leader did or said to assign participants to certain tasks was not in any way indicative of how she truly felt).

Results

Manipulation Checks

Procedural Justice. A three-way ANOVA involving the manipulated variables indicated that the procedural justice manipulation was effective. Ratings on the survey item referring to whether “the group leader followed a fair process” indicated a main effect for the procedural justice manipulation, F(1,157)=41.66, η²=.21: those who were given the task in a procedurally just manner rated the group leader’s process as more fair than did those who were given a task in an unjust manner (M=6.20 and 4.56, respectively). A main effect for accountability was also detected, F(1,157)=4.79, η²=.03: those who were held accountable rated the group leader’s process as more fair than those who were not held accountable (M=5.66 and 5.10, respectively). Interpretation of these main effects was qualified by the interaction between procedural justice and accountability, F(1,157)=5.30, η²=.03. When a just process was used, ratings of the process’ fairness were similar (average M=6.2). When an unjust process was used, accountability became important: those held accountable perceived the process as more fair than did those who were not held accountable (M=5.13 and 3.99, respectively).

Accountability. The debriefing procedure revealed that only one participant failed to believe the accountability manipulation.
Task Attractiveness. Participants completed three survey items on the pre-word count survey referring to their attitude towards their specific task (i.e., either People Magazine or Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Scale analysis suggested that these items would form a reliable composite, Cronbach's alpha = .81, and so these three items were averaged into a composite measuring their attitude toward the task. However, a three-way ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) on this composite failed to reveal any significant differences – participants rated each task equivalently (average M=4.54 on the 7-point scale). However, when a similar ANOVA was computed using the post-word count survey question (i.e., inquiring about how much they enjoyed the task), the predicted main effect for task attractiveness was observed, F(1,153)=8.03, η²=.05: those who were told to complete the attractive task (People Magazine) enjoyed it more than those who were told to complete the unattractive task (M=3.11 and 2.4, respectively). Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between accountability and task attractiveness, F(1,153)=3.67, p=.06, η²=.02. Those who were told to work on an unattractive task rated their enjoyment similarly, regardless of whether they were held accountable (average M=2.41). Those who worked on an attractive task and who were held accountable enjoyed their word counting more than those who were not held accountable (M=3.41 and 2.81, respectively).

Potential Mediators: Obligatory and Anticipatory Concerns

Factor analysis. A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine how a number of dependent variables grouped into various composites. These items tapped (a priori): perceptions of demand legitimacy, perceptions of procedural justice, perceptions of distributive justice, obligatory concerns, and anticipatory concerns. In all, intercorrelations among 15 variables were entered into the
analysis. A four-factor solution fit the intercorrelations well, RMSEA=.038, $\chi^2=62.46$. See Table 4.1 for the correlations among these composite variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Obligatory Concern (PJ)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Attitude Toward Task</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Anticipatory Concern</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Obligatory Concern (DJ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cell means were significantly correlated at p<.05.

Table 4.1: Correlations Among Factor Composites

The first factor consisted of six items (Q13, Q14, Q15r, Q16, Q18, Q21), and was labeled "Obligatory Concerns, driven by procedural justice considerations" or "Obligatory Concerns (PJ)." These six items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach’s alpha=.77). This composite represents the extent to which participants felt that the process used to distribute the tasks to the group members was fair (e.g., "the group leader followed a fair process").

The second factor consisted of two items (Q24r, Q26), and was labeled "Attitude Toward Task." These two items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach’s alpha=.78). This composite represents the extent to which participants considered their task to be a good one. This composite will not be treated as a mediator but rather as a composite dependant variable.

The third factor consisted of two items (Q27, Q29), and was labeled "Anticipatory Concerns." These two items formed a reliable composite (Cronbach’s alpha=.68). This composite represents the extent to which participants reported instrumental concerns (e.g., "you thought about costs or benefits that could occur") when thinking about how to respond.
The fourth factor consisted of three items (Q17r, Q20r, Q22r), and was labeled "Obligatory Concerns, driven by distributive justice considerations" or "Obligatory Concerns (DJ)." These three items did not form a very reliable composite, Cronbach's alpha=.40. Nevertheless, a composite was formed from these three items, representing the extent to which participants agreed that their outcome from the task distribution process was fair. (e.g., "my task is no more difficult than anyone else's").

Potential Mediators: Emotion Variables

Factor analysis. A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique quartimax rotation was used to determine how 12 items from the PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Watson & Clark, 1984) grouped. A four-factor solution fit the intercorrelations well, RMSEA=.06, $\chi^2$=37.11. The second factor consisted of items related to the participants feeling afraid ("scared," "afraid," "nervous"); these items were combined to form a composite labeled "fear," Cronbach's alpha = .80. The third factor consisted of items related to the participants feeling negative affect ("distressed," "hostile," "upset"); these items were combined to form a composite labeled "negative affect," Cronbach's alpha = .63.

Effects of Manipulated Variables on Potential Mediators

Obligatory Concerns (PJ). A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was performed on reports of obligatory concern (PJ), yielding a significant main effect for procedural justice, $F(1,157)=61.32$, $\eta^2=28$. Those who were given a task in a procedurally just manner reported felt that the process used to distribute tasks was more fair than did those who were given a task in a procedurally unjust manner ($M=6.05$ and 4.84, respectively). Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by its interaction
with accountability, $F(1,157)=6.87, \eta^2=.04$. As indicated in Table 4.2, when a task was given in a procedurally just manner, participants were more likely to report that they were thinking about issues of legitimacy/appropriateness -- the presence or absence of accountability mattered little. When the task was given in an unjust manner and they were held accountable for their outcomes and processes, reported obligatory concerns (PJ) decreased significantly; when participants were not held accountable, perceptions of a fair process decreased to their nadir ($M=4.57$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable</td>
<td>5.12&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Accountable</td>
<td>4.57&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abc</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 4.2: Effects of Procedural Justice and Accountability on Obligatory Concern (Procedural Justice)

**Anticipatory Concerns.** A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was performed on reports of anticipatory concern, yielding a marginal main effect for accountability, $F(1,151)=2.63, p=.11, \eta^2=.02$. Contrary to expectations, those who were held accountable were less likely to report considering the possible rewards and/or sanctions that may be of consequence than were those who were not held accountable ($M=4.15$ and $4.45$, respectively). However, interpretation of this main effect was qualified by its interaction with the procedural justice manipulation, $F(1,151)=4.15, \eta^2=.03$. As indicated in Table 4.3, participants were most likely to consider the possible costs and benefits to various coping responses when they were not held accountable and the task was given in a procedurally unjust manner ($M=4.60$).
Table 4.3: Effects of Procedural Justice and Accountability on Anticipatory Concern

A similar pattern was observed for the marginally significant interaction between accountability and task attractiveness, $F(1,151)=2.51, p=.12, \eta^2=.02$: participants who were not held accountable for their performance on the unattractive task were most likely to consider the potential costs and rewards to various coping strategies ($M=4.64$).

**Obligatory Concerns (DJ).** A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was performed on reports of obligatory concern (DJ), yielding a marginally significant main effect for accountability, $F(1,157)=2.37, p=.13, \eta^2=.02$. Those who were held accountable reported that their outcome (i.e., their task) was fair compared to those who were not held accountable ($M=5.28$ and 5.00, respectively). In other words, people were more concerned about how fair the outcomes were (i.e., which person received which task) when they were held accountable for their performance on the task.

**Emotion Variables.** A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was performed on the fear composite. The accountability manipulation resulted in a marginally significant difference for this composite, $F(1,151)=1.94, p=.17, \eta^2=.01$. Participants who were held accountable were more afraid than those who were not held accountable ($M=1.35$ and 1.23, respectively). Additionally, the interaction between accountability and task attractiveness exhibited a weak trend, $F(1,151)=1.83, p=.18, \eta^2=.01$. The means trended as follows: when participants were held accountable for their work on the unattractive task, fear ratings were at their highest ($M=1.43$); when they

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable</td>
<td>3.93$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Accountable</td>
<td>4.60$^c$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{abc}$ Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$. 
were not held accountable for their work on the unattractive task, participants' fear ratings were significantly lower (M=1.19). When participants worked on the attractive task, fear responses did not differ as a function of accountability (average M=1.27).

A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was performed on the "negative affect" composite. The only significant effect observed was that relating to procedural justice, F(1,149) = 5.17, \( \eta^2 = .03 \). Reported negative affect was higher when the demand was procedurally unjust than when it was procedurally just (M=1.49 and 1.29, respectively).

**Interpersonal Covariate.** Because prior research indicated that legitimacy effects might derive from interpersonal variables (i.e., how much one likes the person who gave a demand), analyses were computed to assess the effects of the manipulated variables on the primary interpersonal covariate — how much the participants liked the group leader after completing the word-count task.

A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (involving the manipulated variables) was computed on the evaluation of the group leader (post-word count). A significant main effect for procedural justice was observed, \( F(1,151)=6.40, \eta^2 = .04 \). Those who received their task in a just manner evaluated the group leader more positively than those who received their task in an unjust manner (M=5.00 and 4.42, respectively). Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by its interaction with the task attractiveness, \( F(1,151)=9.35, \eta^2 = .06 \). As may be seen in Table 4.4, participants liked the group leader the least when the participant received the unattractive task given in an unjust manner (M=4.04) — when the participant received the unattractive task given in a just manner, liking of the group leader was at its highest (M=5.32).
Table 4.4: Effects of Procedural Justice and Task Attractiveness on Liking of Confederate (Interpersonal Covariate)

Correlational analyses found that the liking of the group leader was significantly correlated \( (p<.05) \) with three outcome variables: obedience (willing); loophole-exploitation; and obedience (grudging). Furthermore, the probability level of the correlations between liking of the group leader and the following outcome variables (procrastinate; refuse-to-obey; voicing complaint) was \( .10 < p < .15 \). Therefore, the evaluation of the group leader (post-word count) was entered as a covariate for the analyses relating to these variables.

Behavioral Measures

Word-count Accuracy (Number of Words Counted)

Word-counts from eight of the participants were discarded due to subject error (i.e., participants did not follow instructions as to what words they were supposed to count). There were 131 uses of the word “the” in the People Magazine reading (i.e., attractive task), and 205 in the Cohen and Cohen reading (i.e., unattractive task). Overall, participants counted an average of 93.00 words when working on the attractive task (a 71% accuracy rate), and an average of 144.95 words when working on the unattractive task (also a 71% accuracy rate). Accuracy was operationalized as the ratio of the words counted by the participants divided by the true total number of words – the higher the ratio, the more accurate the participants were at their task.
A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was performed on the accuracy measure. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion.

Procedural justice was observed to be significant, F(1,141)=3.90, \( \eta^2=0.03 \): those who were given their task in a just manner were more accurate than those who were given their task in an unjust manner (M=73% and 67%, respectively).

The expected three-way interaction was observed to be significant, F(1,141)=4.18, \( \eta^2=0.03 \). As may be seen in Table 4.5, participants who were given the unattractive task in an unjust manner and who were not held accountable for their performance reported the most inaccurate counts (M=65.3% accuracy) – in this case, participants lacked either intrinsic (i.e., procedural justice effects) or extrinsic (i.e., accountability pressure) motivations to do well on the task.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Not Accountable</th>
<th>Accountable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Attractiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>71.3%(^a)</td>
<td>74.3%(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattractive</td>
<td>65.3%(^a)</td>
<td>73.0%(^b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{ab}\) Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 4.5: Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability on Accuracy (Words Counted)

One should note that the word-count accuracy was similarly low for those participants who were given the attractive task in an unjust manner and were held accountable
(M=65.6% accuracy). This may be due to a "relief" effect of sorts — participants saw how the other participants were given the other tasks in an unfair manner, and so they may have felt relieved that they weren't submitted to that treatment. This interpretation may also explain why the accuracy is so high (M=73.7%) for those who were given the unattractive task in an unjust manner and who were held accountable — they may have felt that they had something to "prove." Relatedly, they may have been preparing for the accountability interview, building "credit" so that they could express dissatisfaction with the procedural injustice they experienced (i.e., higher accuracy could give them the leeway to complain about their treatment). When neither motivating factor was present, accuracy decreased (65.3%).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), two effects involving the Mach responses were observed to be significant. The two-way between task attractiveness and Mach was significant, F(1,141)=7.42, \( \eta^2=.05 \): those with low Mach scores were less accurate when working on the attractive task (accuracy = 65.2%), while those with higher Mach scores were less accurate when working on the unattractive task (accuracy = 66.6%).

Interpretation of this effect was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between accountability, procedural justice, and Mach, F(1,141)=4.03, \( \eta^2=.03 \). As can be seen in Table 4.6, high Machs who were given their task in an unjust manner and who were not held accountable reported the least accurate word counts (M=62.6% accuracy), lower than almost every other cell mean.
Mediation Analyses. Procedures for testing mediation remained consistent with those used in Chapter Two and Three. A hierarchical multiple regression, entering the liking of group leader (post word count) on the first step and the three concern composite variables on the second step, found that obligatory concern (DJ) and anticipatory concern predicted task accuracy. However, as noted above, none of the independent variables were found to be strong predictors of obligatory concern (DJ). Additionally, the independent variables previously observed to predict anticipatory concern (i.e., the interaction between procedural justice and accountability) did not predict this dependent variable. Further mediational analyses involving these variables were ended.

The negative affect composite was not observed to predict accuracy on the word count task. Therefore, further mediation analyses involving these variables were curtailed.

Word-count Accuracy (Use of Scrap Paper)

After the first few session of the study, it became apparent that some participants were choosing to not use the scrap paper offered to them. This observation led to the
recording of an additional dependent variable, one that may be considered to be an unobtrusive measure of the process that participants used to count the words. The experimenter recorded whether participants kept count in their head (which may be a less accurate process) or on a piece of scrap paper (which may be a more accurate process).

Because ANOVAs are not appropriate for the analysis of dichotomous dependent variable, multiple non-parametric analyses (i.e., chi-square tests) were performed. Each manipulated variable was paired with the scrap-use variable and submitted to a chi-square analysis, the results of which are reported below.

The chi-square analysis for the accountability manipulation revealed a significant effect, \( \chi^2 = 4.33 \). Of those 81 people held accountable, 10 (or, 12.3%) did not use scrap paper; of those 84 people not held accountable, 21 (or, 25%) did not use scrap paper.

The chi-square analysis for the procedural justice manipulation also revealed a significant effect, \( \chi^2 = 6.91 \). Of those 83 people who were given their task in a procedurally just manner, 9 (or, 10.8%) did not use scrap paper; of those 82 people who were given their task in a procedurally unjust manner, 22 (or, 26.8%) did not use scrap paper.

The chi-square analysis for the type of task manipulation did not reveal a significant effect.

A more sophisticated chi-square analysis was then computed, involving both the accountability and procedural justice variables. When participants were held accountable, no significant differences in use of scrap paper by procedural justice were noted. However, a significant difference was noted when participants were not held accountable. Of the 42 people who were not held accountable and who were given their task in a procedurally just manner, 6 (or, 14.3%) did not use scrap paper. In contrast, of the 42 people who were not held accountable and who were given their task in a procedurally unjust manner, 15 (or, 35.7%) did not use scrap paper. This finding relates back to the
low levels of accuracy among those who were given the task in an unjust manner (and who were not held accountable – see Table 4.5):  

*Time to Complete Task*

After the participants were provided with their task and the pre-count survey, a stopwatch was started unobtrusively. When the confederate group leader brought the participant into an adjoining room to complete the next part of the study, the elapsed time was recorded.

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was performed on the time to complete the task measure. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion.

A main effect for accountability was observed to be significant, $F(1,139)=7.04$, $\eta^2=.05$: those who were not held accountable took longer than those who were held accountable ($M=19.51$ minutes and $18.03$ minutes, respectively). The main effect for task attractiveness was observed to be significant, $F(1,139)=9.04$, $\eta^2=.06$: those who worked on the attractive task spent more time working than did those who worked on the unattractive task ($M=20.03$ minutes and $17.51$ minutes, respectively).

*Machiavellianism Effects.* When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), no Mach effects were observed to be significant.

*Mediation Analyses.* Because none of the observed independent variable effects were found to predict any of the mediators, the mediation analyses for this variable were not computed.
Attitudinal Measures

Coping Response Patterns

After completing the word-count task, participants were to indicate how similar 7 different coping responses were to their actual behavior during the study. To form a general picture as to how the different coping responses related with one another, a correlational analysis of these coping responses was performed. As can be seen by the correlational patterns presented in Table 4.7, the previously observed differentiation between constructive and destructive coping responses failed to appear. Rather, increased ratings of the willing obedience response were associated with decreased ratings for the other resistant/destructive responses. This correlation matrix may provide further insight into how various coping responses are activated. It seems that reactions to the accountability demands may take the form of an “overkill” pattern, with multiple coping responses being activated. For example, note the moderately strong correlations (average r = .50) between: refusing-to-obey and voicing complaint; refusing-to-obey and sabotage; and loophole-exploitation and sabotage.

Table 4.7: Correlated Coping Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Accuracy Measure</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Use Scrap Paper</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Time to Complete Tasks</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Obedience (Willing)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Voice Complaint</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Procrastinate</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Refuse-to-Obey</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Loophole-exploitation</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sabotage</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Obedience (Grudging)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cell means were significantly correlated at p<.05.
**Obedience (Willing)**

A $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was performed on how similar the willing obedience response was to their own behavior. The interpersonal covariate was observed to be significant, $F(1,141)=11.51$, $\eta^2=.08$. More positive evaluations of the group leader were associated with a higher likelihood of willing obedience.

The three-way interaction among the manipulated variables approached statistical significance, $F(1,141)=2.15$, $p=.15$, $\eta^2=.02$. See Table 4.8 for the means associated with this pattern. When participants were held accountable, there were differences among those participants who worked on the unattractive task: willing obedience was at its lowest when people were held accountable for their performance on an unattractive task that they had received in an unjust manner ($M=5.90$); this mean was significantly lower as compared to when accountable participants were given the unattractive task in a just manner ($M=6.63$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Not Accountable</th>
<th>Accountable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Attractiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.06&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.59&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattractive</td>
<td>6.14&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.08&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>ab</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 4.8: Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability on Willing Obedience

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the Mach main effect was observed to be significant, $F(1,141)=4.86$, $\eta^2=.03$.  

128
Those with lower Mach scores were more likely to report that they obeyed willingly as compared to those with higher Mach scores (M=6.55 and 6.00, respectively).

Mediation Analyses. The only observed effect that can be mediated is that referring to the Mach variable, because this is the only independent variable observed to predict the coping response and a possible mediator – negative affect. However, negative affect was not found to predict the willing obedience response. Further mediational analyses involving these variables were stopped.

Voicing Complaint

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was performed on how similar the complaint-voicing response was to their own behavior. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion. No significant effects involving the manipulated variables were detected.

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a significant Mach main effect was observed to be significant, F(1,149)=15.74, \( \eta^2=.10 \). Those with higher Mach scores were more likely to report voicing complaint as compared to those with lower Mach scores (M=1.77 and 1.15, respectively).

Mediation Analyses. Although Mach was observed to predict negative affect, negative affect did not predict this coping response. No further mediational analyses were computed.

Procrastination

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was performed on the accuracy
measure. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion.

A marginally significant effect for accountability was observed, F(1,147)=3.52, \( p=.06, \eta^2=.02 \). Those who were accountable were more likely to report procrastinating than those who were not held accountable (M=4.32 and 3.58, respectively).

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), a marginally significant interaction between Mach and accountability was observed, F(1,147)=2.99, \( p=.09, \eta^2=.02 \): those with lower Mach scores were more likely to report procrastinating when held accountable (M=4.92).

**Mediation Analyses.** Because none of the observed effects were found to predict the mediators, no mediational analyses were computed.

**Loophole-Exploitation**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was computed on how similar the loophole-exploitation response was to their own behavior. A significant covariate effect was observed, F(1,142)=5.75, \( \eta^2=.04 \). As liking for the group leader decreased, participants were more likely to report engaging in loophole-exploitation.

The procedural justice manipulation exhibited a weak trend toward significance, F(1,142)=1.79, \( p=.18, \eta^2=.01 \). Those who were given their task in an unjust manner were more likely to report engaging in loophole-exploitation than were those who were given their task in a just manner (M=2.52 and 2.15, respectively). The task attractiveness manipulation was observed to be significant, F(1,142)=12.55, \( \eta^2=.08 \): those who worked on the unattractive task were more likely to report loophole-exploitation than those who worked on the attractive task (M=2.81 and 1.86, respectively).
**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the Mach main effect was observed to be significant, $F(1,142)=5.35, \eta^2=.04$: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to report that they exploited loopholes as compared to those with lower Mach scores ($M=2.65$ and $2.02$, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect was qualified by its interaction with procedural justice, $F(1,142)=2.13, p=.15, \eta^2=.02$: those who scored high on the Mach scale and who were given their task in an unjust manner were most likely to report loophole-exploitation ($M=3.03$) compared to the other three cells.

Lastly, the three-way interaction among procedural justice, task attractiveness, and Mach approached statistical significance, $F(1,142)=2.38, p=.13, \eta^2=.02$. As one may see in Table 4.9, those who scored higher on the Mach scale and who were given an unattractive task in an unjust manner were most likely to report loophole-exploitation ($M=3.45$). When participants received the attractive task, the procedural justice manipulation didn’t affect reported loophole-exploitation except among those high Machs who received it in an unjust manner – these people were more likely to report exploiting loopholes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
<th>Low Mach</th>
<th>High Mach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Attractiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unjust</td>
<td>Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>1.66&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.39&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattractive</td>
<td>2.36&lt;sup&gt;b,c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.68&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>abcd</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 4.9: Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Machiavellianism on Loophole-Exploitation
Mediation Analyses. Although Mach predicted negative affect, negative affect was not observed to predict this coping response. Because none of the other observed effects were found to predict the mediators, no mediational analyses were computed.

Refusal-to-Obey

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was computed on how similar the refuse-to-obey response was to their own behavior. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion.

The main effect for accountability was marginally significant, $F(1,148)=3.31$, $p=.07, \eta^2=.02$. Those who were not held accountable were more likely to report that their behavior was similar to the "refuse-to-obey" response than those who were held accountable ($M=1.31$ and $1.04$, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the Mach main effect was observed to be significant, $F(1,148)=5.30$, $\eta^2=.04$: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to report endorsement of the refuse-to-obey response as compared to those with lower Mach scores ($M=1.35$ and $1.00$, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect may be qualified by the marginally significant interaction between Mach and accountability, $F(1,148)=3.31$, $p=.07, \eta^2=.02$. As may be seen in Table 4.10, only those participants with high Mach scores and who were not held accountable reported that their behavior was similar to the refuse-to-obey response.
Table 4.10: Effects of Machiavellianism and Accountability on Refusal-to-Obey

Mediation Analyses. Although Mach predicted negative affect, negative affect was not observed to predict this coping response. Because none of the other observed effects were found to predict the mediators, no mediational analyses were computed.

Sabotage

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was computed on how similar the sabotage response was to their own behavior. The interpersonal covariate was not observed to be significant, and so a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was re-run without its inclusion.

The main effect for accountability exhibited a weak trend in the predicted direction, F(1,149)=1.81, p=.18, η²=.01. Those who were not held accountable were more likely to report that they engaged in some type of sabotage response than those who were held accountable (M=1.33 and 1.11, respectively).

Machiavellianism Effects. When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), the Mach main effect was observed to be significant, F(1,149)=4.49, η²=.03: those with higher Mach scores were more likely to report endorsement of the sabotage response as compared to those with lower Mach scores (M=1.39 and 1.05, respectively).

Interpretation of this main effect may be qualified by the marginally significant interaction between Mach and accountability, F(1,149)=3.01, p=.09, η²=.02. As may be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accountable</th>
<th>Not Accountable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.
seen in Table 4.11, only those participants with high Mach scores and who were not held accountable reported that their behavior was similar to the sabotage response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machiavellianism</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>ab</sup> Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at p<.05.

Table 4.11: Effects of Machiavellianism and Accountability on Sabotage

**Mediation Analyses.** Although Mach predicted negative affect, negative affect was not observed to predict this coping response. Because none of the other observed effects were found to predict the mediators, no meditational analyses were computed.

**Obedience (Grudging)**

A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (involving the manipulated variables, Machiavellianism, and the interpersonal covariate) was computed on how similar the grudging obedience response was to their own behavior. A significant covariate effect was observed, F(1,140)=5.38, η<sup>2</sup>=.04: as liking for the group leader increased, grudging obedience decreased.

The predicted three-way interaction was marginally significant, F(1,140)=3.23, p=.08, η<sup>2</sup>=.02. As may be observed in Table 4.12, participants were least likely to report that they obeyed grudgingly when they were given the attractive task in a just manner and were not held accountable for their performance (M=1.33). These participants were happy to oblige! Participants were also less likely to report grudging obedience when were given the attractive task in an unjust manner and were held accountable (M=1.93).
Note that when participants were given the unattractive task in an unjust manner and were held accountable, reports of grudging obedience were at their highest ($M=2.92$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Not Accountable</th>
<th>Accountable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Attractiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural Justice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive</td>
<td>Unjust: 2.50(^{bc}), Just: 1.33(^{a})</td>
<td>Unjust: 1.93(^{ac}), Just: 2.71(^{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unattractive</td>
<td>Unjust: 2.47(^{bc}), Just: 2.27(^{bc})</td>
<td>Unjust: 2.92(^{b}), Just: 2.46(^{bc})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{abc}\) Cell means with different superscripts were significantly different from each other at $p<.05$.

Table 4.12: Effects of Task Attractiveness, Procedural Justice, and Accountability on Grudging Obedience

**Machiavellianism Effects.** When the omnibus ANOVA was computed (see above), no significant Mach effects were observed.

**Mediation Analyses.** Because none of the other observed effects were found to predict the mediators, no mediational analyses were computed.

**Summary of Research Results from Experiment Three**

The manipulation of procedural justice was found to have the following effects. When tasks were given in a procedurally just manner, word-count accuracy increased, as did the likelihood that participants would use scrap paper as an aid. Additionally, procedural justice was associated with increased obligatory concerns (via procedural justice) and liking for the group leader/confederate. Conversely, increased procedural justice was associated with less negative affect and less reported loophole-exploitation.
When participants were held accountable, participants took longer to complete the word-count task and were more likely to use scrap paper when counting words. Those who were held accountable were also likely to report: increased obligatory concerns (via distributive justice); more fear; more procrastination, less refusal-to-obey; and less sabotage of the study.

Task attractiveness also had two main effects in Experiment Three – those working on the unattractive task spent less time counting words and were more likely to report that they engaged in loophole-exploitation.

In addition to these main effects, a number of interactions involving procedural justice and accountability were observed. More anticipatory concern was reported when participants received their task in an unjust manner and were not held accountable for their performance. Procedural justice and accountability also interacted when predicting whether participants would use scrap paper to aid with their word counting – when participants received their task in an unjust manner and were not held accountable for their performance, reported use of scrap paper was at its lowest. Task attractiveness and accountability also interacted, such that those who were not held accountable for their performance on attractive tasks were the least likely to procrastinate.

The predicted interaction among the manipulated variables was observed for two of the study’s most important dependent variables – word-count accuracy and willing obedience. As expected, word-count accuracy was at its lowest when participants were not held accountable for their performance on an unattractive task received in an unjust manner. Also, willing obedience was at its lowest (and grudging obedience at its highest) when participants were held accountable for their performance on an unattractive task received in an unjust manner.
Machiavellianism continued to be a robust predictor of how participants would respond to the accountability situation facing them. Participants with higher Mach scores reported: less willing obedience; more complaint voicing; more loophole-exploitation; more refusal-to-obey; and more sabotage.

Machiavellianism interacted with accountability to predict responses to three different dependent variables: those with higher Mach scores and who were not held accountable reported refusing-to-obey and sabotaging the study; those with lower Mach scores and who were held accountable reported procrastinating. Machiavellianism also interacted with procedural justice, such that those with higher Mach scores and who were given a task in a procedurally unjust manner were more likely to engage in loophole-exploitation.

The predicted three-way interaction involving Mach, accountability, and procedural justice was observed for the accuracy variable – those with higher Mach scores and who were unaccountable for their performance on a task given in a procedurally unjust manner reported the least accurate word counts. Additionally, the three-way interaction involving Mach, procedural justice, and task attractiveness was observed to be significant when predicting responses on another coping response – those with higher Mach scores and who worked on an unattractive task given in an unjust manner were more likely to report exploiting loopholes.

Few mediated effects were observed in Experiment Three. Obligatory concern (PJ) mediated two interaction effects (among accountability, procedural justice, and task attractiveness; and among accountability, procedural justice, and Mach) on accuracy. Obligatory concern (DJ) mediated the accountability effect on evaluations of the refuse-to-obey response. Fear mediated how participants evaluated the loophole-exploitation response, as predicted by procedural justice, the interaction between procedural justice and Mach, and the interaction among procedural justice, Mach, and task attractiveness.
Discussion of Experiment Three

Experiment Three represents an important step toward bringing experimental accountability research into the real world in two ways. First, it was high in psychological realism, in that some participants were manipulated to feel the accountability pressure and/or to feel the effects of an unjust process. Such manipulations allow for researchers to have greater confidence in the validity (construct and external) of their manipulations.

Furthermore, Experiment Three allowed for the measurement of behavioral, effort-demanding dependent variables (i.e., word counts), not simply checks on attitudinal scales. This multi-method measurement increases researcher confidence that the relevant constructs are in fact being accessed – across different types of dependent variables, one may see the robust effects of procedural justice and accountability on reactions to accountability. Additionally, the use of behavioral measures increases the real-world applicability of the research, making it more accessible to those who have interests in accountability systems and compliance with accountability demands.

While on the topic of behavioral measures, it is possible that one of them – whether participants used scrap paper during the word count – may be a form of loophole-exploitation. That is, their non-use of scrap paper may have represented a way for them to cut corners in regards to how much effort they invested in their word count. Rather than take the time to record a tick mark for each “the,” participants could keep a casual rough count in their short-term memory. Note that both processes would result in an outcome – a count of the words in the reading – but only one would reflect a high effort (relatively speaking) process.

Furthermore, there may be a connection between this behavioral measure to a previously unmentioned social psychological concept: self-handicapping. Self-handicapping refers to the process of establishing an alternate explanation for possible failure, an
explanation that does not reflect a dispositional weakness. Recall that those participants who were not held accountable (and especially those who were not held accountable and who were given the task in an unjust manner) were less likely to use scrap paper. Although it may be the case that these participants cared less about their accuracy on this task (because of its procedural injustice), they may have also sought to preserve their self-esteem in the event that they would not be accurate — rather than think that they are somehow deficient in their ability to count words, they could instead attribute their inaccuracy to their decision to not use the scrap paper. Future studies are necessary to investigate the role of self-handicapping responses to accountability demands (some possibilities on this very topic are discussed in the general discussion).

It should be noted that Machiavellianism had no effect on the elapsed time to complete the word-count task in Experiment Three, although those with higher Mach scores were more likely to report engaging in a host of coping responses that, in theory, should help them finish more quickly. This is consistent with past reviews of the Mach construct — although those with higher Mach scores are more likely to consider using these coping responses, it does not mean that they will actually benefit from their use.

General Discussion

A successful dissertation in social psychology represents a doctoral student’s ability to conduct theoretically grounded, scientifically rigorous research done in a professional manner. To this end, this dissertation presented the first research to measure the manipulated effect of procedural justice variables on coping responses to an accountability demand. So, what do researchers and practitioners know now that they didn’t know before? In other words, how did the accumulated base of knowledge grow with this research?
Theoretical Advancement

Prior research investigating notions of legitimacy were flawed by threats to internal validity – often, researchers would confound legitimacy effects (i.e., feelings that one should obey because it is the “appropriate” thing to do) with other important yet conceptually distinct variables (e.g., how much participants liked an order-giver). The present research controlled for as many of these confounding variables as possible while involving the participants as much as possible – by asking them to recall prior experiences (Experiment One) or by holding people accountable for their performance on a task given in either a procedurally just or unjust manner (Experiment Three).

Overall, when people were given procedurally unjust demands or were held accountable for their performance on a procedurally unjust task, participants were likely to report resisting obedience to the demand, and engaging in a number of resistance (and in some cases, retaliatory behaviors) to the accountability demand. However, when people were given procedurally just demands or were held accountable for their performance on a procedurally just task, these negative effects were minimized, with willing acquiescence to the demand becoming more likely and resistance to the demand becoming less likely.

One should note that procedurally unjust accountability demands (especially those that are biased against someone) affect more than just the person being treated unfairly – they also affect any participants who observe it. In Experiment Three, participants who received an attractive task in an unjust manner did poorly in comparison to those who received an unattractive task in an unjust manner. When one sees that others have been treated unfairly (and in a “bad” way), that vicarious knowledge may be enough to make disillusion them, to de-motivate them, to not make them want to succeed on the task. In short, procedural justice issues have a wider range than just the one person receiving the accountability demand.
When discussing procedural justice, it is important to consider patterns of mediation. Was the activation of coping responses mediated by how participants perceived the demand to be legitimate, or how were they more motivated by thoughts of sanction (or, desire for reward)? Or, could their responses be a function of how afraid they felt? Perceptions of legitimacy (i.e., obligatory concern) were found to mediate constructive responses to the accountability demand (i.e., willing obedience, voicing-complaint). Anticipatory concerns – thoughts about the possible consequences, either positive or negative, of a particular course of action – played a relatively minor role in the experiments (mediating the evaluation and endorsement of responses such as loophole-exploitation and theft), most probably because there were few negative consequences to be had. Consider Experiment Three, the most psychologically “real” experiment conducted in this set of research projects: the participants knew that their participation credit was assured, and so there was little plausible threat of punishment for resistance. Across the three experiments, negative affect was not observed to play a strong mediating role.

While extending the current state of accountability research, the current dissertation also successfully replicated past research. The current research found effects (regarding the endorsement of resistant coping responses such as buck-passing, loophole-exploitation, and procrastination responses) that mirrored Tetlock's (1998) research investigating the responses of business managers to accountability. In the current studies, participants were more likely to endorse the use of these coping responses when a voice option was absent, when a demand was procedurally unjust, or especially when a voice option was absent and a demand was procedurally unjust.

This research advanced accountability theory research by its investigation of an expanded range of coping responses to the demands. In these experiments, attitudinal and behavioral responses to accountability demands that had received scant research attention
previously (e.g., complaint voicing, loophole-exploitation, sabotage, theft, grudging obedience, accuracy, effort) were measured. This extension is exciting from both a theoretical and an applied perspective. Knowing the factors that may help prevent employee theft (also known as “shrinkage” in organizational behavior parlance) and resistance to the demand (e.g., loophole-exploitation) benefits both the development of existing theory (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Greenberg, 1993) as well as for those who seek to apply social psychology to the real social world.

While on the topic of the “real world,” one may seek to apply some aspects of the current research to a pattern of behavior often portrayed in the popular media – the Byzantine machinations among group members in such “reality” television shows as “Survivor” or “The Mole.” As the reader recalls, in Experiment One participants were asked to think about influence attempts received in either an Equality Matching (EM) relationship or an Authority Ranking (AR) one. Interestingly, those who thought about influence attempts that were consistent with EM relationship norms (i.e., were appropriate given that relationship) produced responses that were somewhat cynical and Machiavellian-like – these people rated the buck-passing, theft, and procrastination responses positively. Similarly, in Experiment Two, participants who read about a procedurally just accountability demand were likely to evaluate the buck-passing and theft responses positively. These patterns bear a resemblance to the behavioral patterns featured in the television programs noted above: these programs feature people in EM relationships who rely heavily on reciprocal, tit-for-tat interactions and exchanges while in a situational context where the other persons’ interests are not of primary concern. Both research findings demonstrate that people who “play by the rules” may be taken advantage of – from a prisoner’s dilemma perspective, others may “defect” when their counterpart is perceived to be too trusting, and therefore vulnerable to exploitation.
This discussion provides a natural segue into a review of an individual difference variable that concerns itself primarily with how people manipulate others for personal gain – Machiavellianism. In these experiments, Machiavellianism proved to be a reliable predictor and important moderator in determining how people would resist accountability demands and to matters of procedural justice. Overall, those with high Mach scores were more open to resisting the demand when they saw fit to do so – in other words, procedurally unjust demands seemed to give high Machs the rationale for “defecting” or taking advantage of the situation for personal benefit. Future research should investigate the process by which high Machs seek to resist social influence attempts: Is it the case that those with higher Mach scores are more likely to want to get “payback” from an authority that has issued an illegitimate demand (i.e., a punitive orientation)? Or, do they wish to set right a social exchange that has gone wrong (a la Greenberg & Scott, 1996)?

While those with high Mach scores were more likely to engage in a host of resistant coping responses, those with low Mach scores were more complex in their evaluation and engagement in various coping responses. In Experiment One, low Machs endorsed complaint-voicing positively while in Experiment Three, low Machs reported that they procrastinated when they were held accountable. Future research should assess how people (especially low Machs) as they evaluate coping responses to accountability demands: Are some responses perceived as “more appropriate” than others? Are some responses more appealing than others?

Applications

As mentioned at the outset of this dissertation, accountability pressures are widespread. Many of these influence attempts would benefit (i.e., be met with more willing obedience, less resistance, more accuracy and effort) when they are given with a focus on procedural justice.
This research has clear connections to organizational research investigating employee retaliation (Greenberg & Scott, 1996; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Building off past research demonstrating that procedural justice can compensate for distributive injustice, some researchers (Greenberg, 2000) apply this finding to the business world. Employers should promote the perceptions (and reality) of procedural justice so that employees become more accepting of negative work outcomes (e.g., temporary pay decreases, loss of vacation days).

When considering past OB research (such as that described above), it would be important to know whether a voice option (i.e., an “Open Door” policy) was clearly present when the employees were surveyed. In the current research, when demands were procedurally unjust and a voice option present, the voice option acted as safety valve to funnel decision-makers to more constructive responses (i.e., voicing complaint) rather than more destructive ones (e.g., exploiting loopholes). So, although the voice option did not act as a proxy or substitute for procedural justice, it did assist in helping people work with the authority, rather than against the authority. In the prior research, the presence or absence of a voice option may be a third variable influencing the patterns of covariation among the different types of justice and the behavioral responses to the employers’ demands.

The focus of this dissertation – that procedural justice is important when people respond to accountability demands – has already been applied (albeit non-scientifically) to the realm of college teaching: during the Winter 2001 and Spring 2001 academic quarters at The Ohio State University, the author cloaked his teaching behavior with the style and substance of procedural justice, and presented many voice options to his Psychology 367.01 students. These variables were not stressed during the Autumn 2000 quarter. Students in the “treatment” groups knew that the instructor was following a clear
and understandable process for teaching the course, and knew that they had many opportunities to voice complaint and to make suggestions to the instructor. Anecdotally, the students in the treatment groups were more likely: to acquiesce to the rules of the class (i.e., papers were not turned in late, unless properly documented); to invest more effort (i.e., ask more questions); to perform better in the class (i.e., earning higher grades); and to rate the instructor highly.

Directions For Future Research

As is the case with many research projects, the present research seemed to raise more questions than answer. Multiple directions for research show themselves, offering to shed even more light onto how people consider matters of procedurally just when responding to accountability demands. A number of possible research directions that build on the current research are reviewed below. Clearly, there is great potential for future research in this area.

As more research is conducted on the activation of coping responses to unjust accountability demands, multiple coping responses (i.e., loophole-exploitation, theft) should be manipulated to be absent or present. When given a procedurally unjust demand, are people more likely to take certain coping responses as opposed to others? Is procrastinating viewed as a more desirable response than, say, loophole-exploitation or theft? Past empirical research has been able to manipulate the “theft” coping response (see Greenberg, 1993), finding that participants were more likely to steal from an experimenter when experiencing an inequitable distribution of rewards for a menial task performed during the study. Would some participants have preferred to not steal, but felt that it was the only viable means of coping? Did anticipatory concerns affect the decision to engage in theft in this study?
A related research topic follows from the above point. In Experiment Two, the voice option was either conspicuously absent or conspicuously present. What happens when the salience of coping response availability is reduced? When considering how to respond to the accountability situation, do participants truly care about the presence or absence of various coping responses, or are their responses confounded with demand-characteristic responding? If demand characteristic responding does play a role, how strong are its effects?

The present research examined responses to procedurally just/unjust accountability demands. How else could the two issues interact? Could it be that breaches of procedural justice lead to increased calls for accountability? For example, when the Columbus School Board president violated a school enrollment process (i.e., she was one of 13 parents who had her children accepted into a top-ranked city public school, and did so without completing the necessary application), community members called for her to be held accountable. When procedural justice is violated, are the accountability demands that result more punitive or are they simply more focused on gathering-information? How do these different functions affect the activation of coping responses to accountability demands?

In Experiment One, those who thought about procedurally just influence attempts received in an EM relationship produced responses that were somewhat cynical and Machiavellian-like. Although the demand was proper and appropriate, people felt positively about resisting the demand in relatively sneaky ways (while also considering stealing from the person outright). EM relationships, which are primarily based on reciprocity such as that seen among friends and acquaintances, may be contrasted with Communal Sharing (CS) relationships, which are primarily based on strong in-group bonds such as those among family members and other strongly identified groups (Fiske,
Ceteris paribus, it seems as if CS relationships are more interpersonally involving than EM ones. As such, accountability demands (or other influence attempts) may be harder to resist than EM demands (or AR ones, for that matter). Future research should investigate how responses are activated in response to a varying of the social context (i.e., CS, AR, EM) that surrounds the demand.

To what extent is self-handicapping a response to accountability? The current data suggest that accountability minimizes self-handicapping effects (i.e., when held accountable, participants were less likely to use scrap paper to aid their accuracy). Does accountability limit self-handicapping to only those explanations that are socially acceptable? When giving an account to an authority, saying that one chose not to use scrap paper would represent a weak situational explanation for counting inaccuracy. Rather, those held accountable may seek more socially acceptable explanations to explain inaccuracy. For example, during the course of the study some participants remarked that the People Magazine was "too involving," and surely distracted them from their word count; other participants remarked that the statistics text was so boring, it interfered with their word count. Future research could systematically code for these types of responses as reflective of attempts to explain the possibility of failure, and correlate those responses to more behavioral manifestations of self-handicapping. Additionally, further research should investigate the relationship between loophole-exploitation and self-handicapping - it may be the case that workers (in a business, in a Psych 100 experiment) exploit loopholes in a way to provide them with a socially acceptable explanation for failure.

A pilot study for Experiment Three, conducted at the end of the Wi01 academic quarter, found that almost 1/3 of the 30 participants engaged in behavioral responses to unjust accountability demands (especially those that left participants working on the unattractive task) - participants left the study, participants voiced complaint to the ex-
perimenter, and so forth. When the primary data were collected for Experiment Three, behavioral responses to unjust accountability demands were negligible. This may be explained by a difference in the quality and type of Psych 100 student who participates in studies at the beginning or end of the academic quarter. The stereotype of “early” research participants is that they are better students who are more likely to show up on time so that they may satisfy their class requirement quickly. Leaving the study would be an issue, especially if they might be concerned (the experimenter’s efforts to the contrary) that they may not receive credit for their exit. These students may be compared to the “late” research participants, who have waited until the end of the quarter to satisfy their class requirement. These students are more likely to have received at least one debit (for a failure to participate when they have committed to a study), and so a good number of them already have “little to lose.” It might be the case that resistant coping responses are more likely to be observed when people experience less psychological involvement.

Conclusion

This dissertation confirms once again the utility of studying social behavior and cognition as a function of both situational variables (procedural justice, accountability) and the person variables (Machiavellianism). Matters of legitimacy may in fact be important for determining, as Tyler says, “Why People Obey The Law.” However, when it comes to how people decide to resist the law, other factors must be taken into account.
Chapter 4 Endnotes

1 It is possible that the imposition of an accountability demand when intrinsic motivation is high (i.e., participant was given an attractive task in a procedurally just manner) could lead to an overjustification effect, leading to decreased ratings of task enjoyment, which in turn may decrease task accuracy.

2 The confederate was elected group leader by default for 27 of the 51 experimental sessions (i.e., no participants volunteered for the group leader position). When the secret-ballot voting process was used during the remaining 24 sessions, the confederates won 15 of the 24 elections, a win rate of 63%. Overall, the confederates were largely successful in their “campaigns” for the group leader position, becoming group leader by vote or by default in 42 of the 51 sessions (82%).

3 These items were reverse coded upon analysis, with higher scores indicating that participants perceived their task to require similar effort as compared to the other participants’ tasks.

4 Survey items measuring attitudinal reactions to the task were reverse-coded for analysis, with higher scores indicating increased positivity toward the task.

5 When a three-factor solution is considered, these items become distributed between the Obligatory Concerns (PJ) and Attitude Toward Task factors.

6 The other two items submitted to factor analysis loaded weakly on multiple factors, and therefore do not represent items that should be included in a composite.

7 The first popular reality television show, and the first to document this type of behavior among people who share EM relationships, was entitled “The Real World.”
LIST OF REFERENCES


Leonardelli, G.J., & Preacher, K.J. (2001). A program for the sobel test [Computer program using a Microsoft Excel97 spreadsheet]. Columbus, OH: Authors.


APPENDIX A

NEED FOR COGNITION INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE SCALE
The following questions ask about you. There are no right or wrong answers here, so please complete these questions as fast as you can. Please go on!

For each of the following statements, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you or of what you believe. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe (not at all like you), please choose the “1 Extremely Uncharacteristic” option; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you or what you believe (very much like you), please choose the “5 Extremely Characteristic” option.

Use the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely Uncharacteristic</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Extremely Characteristic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ___ I prefer complex to simple problems.
2. ___ I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. ___ Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. ___ I would rather do something requiring little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
5. ___ I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance that I will have to think in depth about something.
6. ___ I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.
7. ___ I only think as hard as I have to.
8. ___ I prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones.
9. ___ I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
10. ___ The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. ___ I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. ___ Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me much.
13. ___ I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. ___ The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. ___ I prefer tasks that are intellectual, difficult, and important to ones that do not require much thought.
16. ___ I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
17. ___ It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.
18. ___ I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
APPENDIX B

RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE SCALE
For each of the following statements, please indicate whether or not you agree with each statement. You will probably find that you agree with some statements and disagree with others to varying extents. You may find that sometimes you have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("-4") with one idea in a statement but slightly agree ("+1") with another idea in the same statement. When this happens, please combine your reactions and write down how you feel "on balance" (i.e., a "-3" in this example). Please continue.

Use the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+3</th>
<th>+4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Very Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Moderately Disagree</td>
<td>Slightly Disagree</td>
<td>Slightly Agree</td>
<td>Moderately Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Very Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ___ Our country desperately needs a mighty ruler who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

2. ___ Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the rotten apples who are ruining everything.

3. ___ The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.

4. ___ What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path.

5. ___ The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

6. ___ What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights," is a good stiff dose of law and order.

7. ___ Once our government leaders give us the go ahead, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

8. ___ The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.

9. ___ The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.
APPENDIX C

MACHIAVELLIANISM INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE SCALE
Please answer the following questions, using the following scale.

1  2  3  4  5
Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree

1. ___ The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
2. ___ When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons that may carry more weight.
3. ___ Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
4. ___ It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
5. ___ Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
6. ___ It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
7. ___ Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
8. ___ One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
9. ___ It is wise to flatter important people.
10. ___ It is possible to be good in all respects.
11. ___ Barnum was very wrong when he said there's a sucker born every minute.
12. ___ All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.
13. ___ Most people are basically good and kind.
14. ___ There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
15. ___ Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.
16. ___ Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
17. ___ Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.
18. ___ The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
19. ___ Most people are brave.
APPENDIX D

SELF-MONITORING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE SCALE
Please answer the following questions, using the following scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ___ I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2. ___ At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
3. ___ I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
4. ___ I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
5. ___ I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
6. ___ I would probably make a good actor.
7. ___ In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8. ___ In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
9. ___ I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10. ___ I'm not always the person I appear to be.
11. ___ I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
12. ___ I have considered being an entertainer.
13. ___ I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14. ___ I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
15. ___ At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
16. ___ I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.
17. ___ I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
18. ___ I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
APPENDIX E

EXPERIMENT TWO: SAMPLE VIGNETTE
Please read the following story about Ed, a middle management employee who works in the Human Relations Department at one of the Limited® Companies.

It was a usual Monday, as Monday's go: the day went by as it usually did. Ed typed memos about various projects he was involved in, he sent and received a number of voice and e-mail messages (all business related), and he attended a meeting. After this busy but productive morning, Ed went for a 30 minute lunch.

Upon returning to his cubicle from his lunch break, he checked his voice mail and e-mail for messages. He found one: he had a voice mail from Brett, the Executive Director of Human Relations. This is a top-level, powerful position in the Human Relations Department. As Executive Director of the Human Relations Department, Brett has the responsibility to set strategy and lead projects for the entire department. Moreover, he has the power and ability to make important decisions, such as the hiring and/or firing of workers like Ed.

On the voice mail, Brett asked Ed to stop by his office when he got in from lunch. So, Ed walked to Brett's office; upon arriving, he was offered a seat. When he sat down, Ed was told that he was to begin a new project. Ed would be the lead and only analyst for a major organizational study within the company. During the course of the project, Ed would have to explain to Brett how the project progressed, what outcomes resulted from the project (such as if it failed or was successful), and reasons for why it failed or was successful.
Ed had spent the past few years in the office and he knew that there were certain established procedures for how this project should be conducted. For instance, each year it was someone else's turn to do the project; this year, it was Ed's turn. Therefore, Ed thought that it was fair for Brett to tell him to work on this project. This year, it was Brett's turn. Therefore, Ed thought that it was unfair for Brett to tell him to work on this project. 

[Bolded text refers to procedural justice manipulation; underlined text refers to procedural injustice manipulation]

Here are some additional pieces of information that may help you understand the situation around Ed:

The company has an Open Door Policy. An Open Door policy refers to a process by which employees can voice complaints and concerns to authorities within the company (not necessarily their boss) without worrying about getting into trouble or even worse, fired. With such a policy at the organization, employees are often more comfortable speaking up about issues that are important to them. 

The company does not have an Open Door Policy. An Open Door policy refers to a process by which employees can voice complaints and concerns to authorities within the company (not necessarily their boss) without worrying about getting into trouble or even worse, fired. Without such a policy at the organization, employees are often afraid to speak up about issues that are important to them. 

[Bolded text refers to voice option manipulation (present); underlined text refers to voice option manipulation (absent)]

The company is located in a relatively large industrial park, surrounded by many other office buildings (as well as a small, manmade lake and walking trail).
“Some groups involved in this study here are told that you will meet with some people at the end of the study - that will not happen today. Today, we used deception so that you would think you were “accountable” – or, that you will have to explain or justify something to someone else. You will not have any type of interview today!

The second variable that we were interested in has to do with something called procedural justice – that is, whether or not the way a person makes a decision is fair and unbiased. Now, a fair way to give out the tasks today would be to flip a coin and leave it up to chance; an unfair way to give out the tasks would be to ask you personal questions and then give you the assignment based on your personal characteristics. We are interested in how both of these variables affect how accurate you are, how much effort you put into the word counting task, and what your attitudes are about this project.

To help us manipulate the procedural justice variable, your group leader (____) is actually a research confederate working with me. She is not a Psychology 100 student; rather, she is assisting me with the project. Everything she said or did today followed a script that we have pulled together: so, it’s not that she doesn’t like you or falsely likes someone else, she was just following her script. (Pause for smiles from the participants!).

Note: participants who volunteered for the group leader position are told that they did “very well” in the voting.

Do you have any questions for either the confederate or myself? If you do have any questions or concerns about the study, you’re welcome to e-mail them to me.

The only other thing I have to ask of you is that you don’t tell other students about what we did here today – this way, each participant that comes in here gets a similar experience. Okay? Thanks much!”
APPENDIX G

EXPERIMENT THREE: PRE-COUNTING SURVEY (SURVEY #1)
For the items below, indicate whether or not the adjective is characteristic of how you feel right now. Write your answer on the line provided next to each adjective.

Use the following scale: Right now, I feel...  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Irritable __
2) Tired __
3) Distressed __
4) Nervous __
5) Excited __
6) Afraid __
7) Hostile __
8) Upset __
9) Scared __
10) Enthusiastic __
11) Interested __
12) Strong __

Please circle your answer to the following questions...

13) To what extent did the group leader act consistently when assigning the tasks?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Moderately so</th>
<th>Very much so</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14) Is it right for the group leader to tell you to do this task?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very wrong</th>
<th>Wrong</th>
<th>Somewhat wrong</th>
<th>A little of both</th>
<th>Somewhat right</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Very right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15) Did the group leader follow a fair or unfair process when giving you this order?
   1 Very fair
   2 Fair
   3 Somewhat fair
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat unfair
   6 Unfair
   7 Very unfair

16) Are the group leader's orders appropriate ones to make?
   1 Very inappropriate
   2 Inappropriate
   3 Somewhat inappropriate
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat appropriate
   6 Appropriate
   7 Very appropriate

17) I believe that the task I've been given is no more difficult than anyone else's.
   1 Strongly agree
   2 Agree
   3 Somewhat agree
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat disagree
   6 Disagree
   7 Strongly disagree

18) Was the group leader biased or unbiased when giving you your task to complete?
   1 Very biased
   2 Biased
   3 Somewhat biased
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat unbiased
   6 Unbiased
   7 Very unbiased

19) As of right now, how much do you like your group leader?
   1 Dislike very much
   2 Dislike a little
   3 Somewhat dislike
   4 Neutral
   5 Somewhat like
   6 Like a little
   7 Like very much
20) Other group members have tasks that will require similar effort to complete as mine does.
   1 Strongly agree
   2 Agree
   3 Somewhat agree
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat disagree
   6 Disagree
   7 Strongly disagree

21) Do you think that the group leader’s demand to you is legitimate?
   1 Very illegitimate
   2 Illegitimate
   3 Somewhat illegitimate
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat legitimate
   6 Legitimate
   7 Very legitimate

22) How positive do you feel toward completing this task?
   1 Very positive
   2 Positive
   3 Somewhat positive
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat negative
   6 Negative
   7 Very negative

23) As of right now, how much do you like the experimenter?
   1 Dislike very much
   2 Dislike a little
   3 Somewhat dislike
   4 Neutral
   5 Somewhat like
   6 Like a little
   7 Like very much

24) How good is the task to which you’ve been assigned to complete?
   1 Very good
   2 Good
   3 Somewhat good
   4 A little of both
   5 Somewhat bad
   6 Bad
   7 Very bad
25) Overall, how much do you like your group?
1  Dislike very much
2  Dislike a little
3  Somewhat dislike
4  Neutral
5  Somewhat like
6  Like a little
7  Like very much

26) How satisfied are you with the task to which you’ve been assigned to complete?
1  Very unsatisfied
2  Unsatisfied
3  Somewhat unsatisfied
4  A little of both
5  Somewhat satisfied
6  Satisfied
7  Very satisfied

27) When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about the costs or benefits that could occur.
1  Strongly disagree
2  Disagree
3  Somewhat disagree
4  Neutral
5  Somewhat agree
6  Agree
7  Strongly agree

28) When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about how you feel morally obliged to obey the group leader's order.
1  Strongly disagree
2  Disagree
3  Somewhat disagree
4  Neutral
5  Somewhat agree
6  Agree
7  Strongly agree

29) When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you think about whether the demand was an appropriate one to make;
1  Strongly disagree
2  Disagree
3  Somewhat disagree
4  Neutral
5  Somewhat agree
6  Agree
7  Strongly agree
30) When thinking about how to respond in this situation, you mostly care about whether you will be rewarded or punished by the experimenters.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Neutral
5. Somewhat agree
6. Agree
7. Strongly agree

When you are finished with this survey, please begin your word-counting task. If at any point you wish to not do your task, or if you wish to voice a concern (or compliment!), please notify the group leader and/or the experimenter.
APPENDIX H

EXPERIMENT THREE: POST-COUNTING SURVEY (SURVEY #2)
What did you read?
How many “the” words did you count?

ALL RESPONSES TO SURVEY #2 ARE CONFIDENTIAL! AT NO POINT WILL ANYONE IN A POSITION OF AUTHORITY READ THEM! Please respond honestly and truthfully.

Please circle your answer to the following questions...

31) How much effort did you put into completing your task?
   1  No effort at all
   2
   3
   4  A moderate amount of effort
   5
   6
   7  All possible effort

32) How much did you enjoy completing your task?
   1  Didn’t enjoy at all
   2
   3
   4  Enjoyed it moderately
   5
   6
   7 Very much enjoyed

33) How willing were you to complete your task?
   1  Very unwilling
   2 Unwilling
   3 Somewhat unwilling
   4 Neutral
   5 Somewhat willing
   6 Willing
   7 Very willing

34) As of right now, how much do you like your group leader?
   1  Dislike very much
   2 Dislike a little
   3 Somewhat dislike
   4 Neutral
   5 Somewhat like
   6 Like a little
   7 Like very much
35) As of right now, how much do you like the experimenter?
1  Dislike very much
2  Dislike a little
3  Somewhat dislike
4  Neutral
5  Somewhat like
6  Like a little
7  Like very much

Below is a list of 7 different ways you could have responded when completing the task the group leader gave you. Please circle the extent to which each response is similar to what you actually did today.

36) Obey the group leader's order with no problems:
You obeyed the group leader's order, and did so with no problems. You completed the task with no major complaints.
1  Not at all like what I did
2
3
4  Moderately like what I did
5
6
7  Very much like what I did

37) Procrastinate:
If you obeyed the group leader's order, you purposefully took your time to complete the task, rather than rush to finish it quickly.
1  Not at all like what I did
2
3
4  Moderately like what I did
5
6
7  Very much like what I did

38) Take advantage of loopholes:
If you obeyed the group leader's order, you looked for and took any loopholes you could find. If you could cut corners and save yourself time and energy, you did it - even if it meant that you didn't do as well on the task.
1  Not at all like what I did
2
3
4  Moderately like what I did
5
6
7  Very much like what I did
39) Sabotage:
If you obeyed the group leader's order, you did other things (e.g., made up numbers) that purposefully hurt the task, the group, or this study.
1 Not at all like what I did
2
3
4 Moderately like what I did
5
6
7 Very much like what I did

40) Refuse to obey the group leader's order:
You just told the group leader "no," that you refuse to do this task.
1 Not at all like what I did
2
3
4 Moderately like what I did
5
6
7 Very much like what I did

41) Voice a complaint:
You voiced a complaint or gave a suggestion to an authority figure (e.g., the experimenter).
1 Not at all like what I did
2
3
4 Moderately like what I did
5
6
7 Very much like what I did

42) Obey the group leader's order grudgingly:
If you obeyed the group leader's order, you did so grudgingly (e.g., unwillingly). You obeyed because you felt that you had no other choice but to obey.
1 Not at all like what I did
2
3
4 Moderately like what I did
5
6
7 Very much like what I did

Please turn to the next page.
The following questions ask about you. There are no right or wrong answers here, so please complete these questions as fast as you can. Please go on!

For each of the following statements, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you or of what you believe. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe (not at all like you), please choose the "1 Extremeiy Uncharacteristic" option; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you or what you believe (very much like you), please choose the "5 Extremely Characteristic" option.

Use the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Extremely Uncharacteristic</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
<th>Extremely Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ___ I prefer complex to simple problems.
2. ___ I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. ___ Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. ___ I would rather do something requiring little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
5. ___ I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance that I will have to think in depth about something.
6. ___ I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.
7. ___ I only think as hard as I have to.
8. ___ I prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones.
9. ___ I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
10. ___ The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. ___ I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. ___ Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me much.
13. ___ I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. ___ The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. ___ I prefer tasks that are intellectual, difficult, and important to ones that do not require much thought.
16. ___ I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
17. ___ It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.
18. ___ I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
For each of the following statements, please indicate whether or not you agree with each statement. You will probably find that you agree with some statements and disagree with others to varying extents. You may find that sometimes you have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("-4") with one idea in a statement but slightly agree ("+1") with another idea in the same statement. When this happens, please combine your reactions and write down how you feel "on balance" (i.e., a "-3" in this example). Please continue.

Use the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Moderately Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Very Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. ____ Our country desperately needs a mighty ruler who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.

20. ____ Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the rotten apples who are ruining everything.

21. ____ The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.

22. ____ What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path.

23. ____ The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.

24. ____ What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights," is a good stiff dose of law and order.

25. ____ Once our government leaders give us the go ahead, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

26. ____ The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.

27. ____ The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.
Please answer the following questions, using the following scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. ___ The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
29. ___ When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons that may carry more weight.
30. ___ Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
31. ___ It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
32. ___ Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
33. ___ It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
34. ___ Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
35. ___ One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
36. ___ It is wise to flatter important people.
37. ___ It is possible to be good in all respects.
38. ___ Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute.
39. ___ All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.
40. ___ Most people are basically good and kind.
41. ___ There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
42. ___ Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.
43. ___ Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
44. ___ Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so.
45. ___ The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
46. ___ Most people are brave.
47. ___ On average, which is more important when one decides to do something: the ends (e.g., the outcome that one can see – circle 1 if you think this is more important), the means (e.g., the process one can use to arrive at an outcome – circle 5 if you think this is more important), or something in between?
48. ___ On average, a fair process can make up for an poor outcome.
49. ___ If I’m told to do something, it’s very important for me to know whether fair procedures have been followed when telling me what to do.
50. ____ I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
51. ____ At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
52. ____ I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
53. ____ I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
54. ____ I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
55. ____ I would probably make a good actor.
56. ____ In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
57. ____ In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
58. ____ I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
59. ____ I'm not always the person I appear to be.
60. ____ I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
61. ____ I have considered being an entertainer.
62. ____ I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
63. ____ I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
64. ____ At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
65. ____ I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should.
66. ____ I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
67. ____ I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
68. What is your age (in years)? ______
69. What is your sex? Circle the appropriate category: Male Female

PLEASE LET THE EXPERIMENTER KNOW THAT YOU ARE FINISHED!

187