ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study owes much to the splendid aid and cooperation of numerous organizations and individuals.

I wish to express my gratitude to the National Security Resources Board and to The Ohio State University Research Foundation for having made available funds that financed this investigation. While dozens of individuals and private and governmental organizations gave generously of their time and facilities, several deserve special thanks.

The Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation and the Columbus, Ohio, office of the Ohio State Employment Service made their records and facilities generously available; Without their cooperation this study would have been impossible. Professor Alma Herbst originally suggested this study and her encouragement and counsel were of great help.

Professors Edison L. Bowers and Alvin E. Coons read the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. Mr. Ralph E. Gabele, wartime director of the Columbus War Manpower Commission Area, and James F. Craine, former manager of the Columbus public employment service office, generously gave of their time and provided much of the detailed information without which the study could not have been done.

Finally, I am indebted to Dr. Herbert S. Farnes, Director of Manpower Research at The Ohio State University, whose valuable constant aid, advice, and direction cannot be overemphasized, and to my wife, Joan, whose encouragement and practical contributions were immeasurable.

Theodore Levitt

December, 1951
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Part of the war effort in the United States during World War II included a formal program of organizing manpower for war production. A special War Manpower Commission was established to help mobilize manpower, stabilize employment, and generally maximize the utilization of the available and potential supply of labor. The mobilization and stabilization program operated through a decentralized administrative organization which permitted considerable local autonomy in the determination of the types of manpower measures that were to be adopted in each labor market area and the way in which they were to be administered and enforced. Nevertheless, there was considerable similarity among most area programs, largely because national policies, directives, procedures, and recommendations were almost universally adopted wherever formal manpower stabilization plans were instituted.

It is a fairly common experience in public administration that national, or even local, plans for the achievement of given ends do not always function in quite the manner that their originators planned. Indeed, it is not unusual that considerations of expediency result in numerous modifications of the plans and procedures originally developed. The present study examines the manpower programs that emerged and functioned in one local labor market area during World War II. Its purpose is to evaluate that area's manpower experience, particularly in
terms of the community, customary, and institutional factors that affected the manpower program. It is concerned with underlying influences which shaped the nature and the operation of the program.

It is obviously useless for national or local administrators to develop apparently excellent programs for wartime manpower management if local conditions, pressures, prejudices, facilities, and attitudes are such as to prevent the programs from being fully adopted or properly carried out. An examination of the nature of some of these factors provides insights into the dynamics of manpower mobilization, stabilization, and utilization which an analysis of the formal program alone cannot provide. Because of the similarity of most of the local area manpower programs throughout the nation during World War II, and since it is not wholly unrealistic to assume that the problems encountered in one industrial area were substantially the same as those in other industrial areas, the findings and generalizations emerging from the study of one area should be useful in evaluating the local operation of the entire national program.

Selected for study is Franklin County, Ohio. Located in central Ohio, the area is roughly that of the Columbus labor market area, which during most of the war was classified as a "serious shortage" manpower area. During this period it had a peak labor force of approximately 200,000 persons.

Detailed recorded information helpful in making this study was conspicuously scarce. However, the recorded minutes of the meetings of the various manpower agencies were available and were studied in detail, as
were the minutes of certain community organizations helping in the man-
power effort. The records of the area's War Manpower Commission, al-
though not officially preserved, were pieced together after an intensive
search through the obsolete and forgotten materials of local and federal
government agencies, and the scrapbooks and personal files of people
associated with the Commission. The local daily newspapers were read
in detail for the entire war period, as were union newspapers, manage-
ment and Chamber of Commerce literature, and the official reports and
publications of federal and local government agencies in the Columbus
area. To the extent that statistical materials are used, they are often
incomplete in the sense that they do not cover the entire war period and
frequently represent the end product of a good deal of piecing-together
of fragmentary data. Moreover, it has been necessary to rely heavily
on the memories of many people who were either formally or informally
associated with the wartime manpower program. Thus more than 50 inti-
mate interviews were held with selected government, business, and union
officials, and with local community leaders as a means of uncovering
many of the subtle details and experiences of the wartime program.

The study is in three major parts. Part I includes three chapters
that provide background for understanding the economic topography of
the area under discussion and the manpower controls that were instituted
in the area. One of the chapters, moreover, provides an overview of
the nature of the wartime problem as it was encountered in the Franklin
County area, and describes very briefly some of the ways in which man-
power officials dealt with it. Part II discusses the actual operation of the manpower program. It contains five chapters, one of which is devoted to conclusions and evaluations. Chapter 5 discusses four major problems encountered under manpower mobilization and stabilization and describes attempts to solve them. Chapters 6 and 7 deal specifically with the manpower utilization effort. Chapter 8 discusses certain major institutional factors affecting the manpower program. Although the impact of institutional factors on the program is a theme that runs throughout the entire study, this chapter selects a few of these factors for special emphasis. Chapter 9 makes concluding generalizations and evaluations about the Columbus area manpower experience in particular and about the national manpower program in general. However, there is no attempt to save all conclusions for this chapter. Most of the preceding chapters, in addition to being descriptive and analytical, are also critical, evaluative, and suggestive. This is particularly so of Chapters 5 through 8. The concluding chapter simply highlights some of the major findings and draws conclusions and makes suggestions based on these findings. For a specific discussion of the many institutional constraints and operational problems encountered during the war, Chapters 5 through 8 should be read with some care. For a broad, panoramic, uncritical overview of the experience, a reading of Chapter 3 may be adequate.
PART I

WARTIME MANPOWER PROBLEMS: BACKGROUND AND PREVIEW
CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON FRANKLIN COUNTY

Franklin County, located in the Scioto River Valley in central Ohio, had a 1940 population of 388,712 spread over a land area of 538 square miles. The City of Columbus, capital city of Ohio and the seat of the county government, with a 1940 population of 306,087, is the largest urban center in the county and accounted for about 79 percent of the county's total population in 1940. Four small communities contiguous to Columbus, with a total 1940 population of 24,181, increased the county's urban population to 85 percent of the total.¹

In addition to being a government center, the Columbus area has for many decades been the largest trade and shopping center in central Ohio. In 1940 more than 21 percent of the county's employed population was in wholesale and retail trade. More than 23 percent was in manufacturing, and less than 3 percent was in agriculture. Among the 521 separate manufacturing establishments in the Columbus Metropolitan District² in 1939, primary metal and metal fabricating firms employed the largest single proportion of workers, together accounting for about 33 percent of the employed persons engaged in manufacturing. Food and kindred industries and leather and leather products industries together accounted for another 27 percent.³

². The Columbus Metropolitan District as defined by the Bureau of Census in 1940 included 94 percent of the population of the county.
³. 16th Census of the U.S., op. cit., Tables E-42 and E-51, pp. 189 and 236.
The value of manufacturing products produced in the county was $181,602,000 in 1939. Nearly $91,000,000 of this was added by local manufacturing activity. Average annual wages per wage earner in manufacturing were about $1,171, as compared with an average of about $1,350 for wage earners in manufacturing throughout the state. The more than 5,400 wholesale and retail establishments in the county sold about $338,000,000 in goods during 1939, and the county's 3,513 farms produced goods valued at $4,663,000, or an average product value per farm of $1,327.4

A. Wartime Changes.

The Columbus area experienced numerous and dramatic economic changes during the war. Some of these changes are graphically reflected in the population and labor force statistics in Table 2.8. Thus it will be noted that in March, 1940, close to 20,000 persons, or 13 percent of the labor force in the metropolitan district, were unemployed. Seven years later, in April, 1947, 19 months after the war ended, the number of persons 14 years old and over had increased by 45,000, the labor force had grown by 35,000, the labor force participation rate had risen from 51 to 55 percent, and unemployment had declined to 2 percent of the labor force.

Public relief cases meanwhile fell from over 7,000 in January, 1940, to less than 800 by the end of 1945.5 The average number of weeks

5. Reported by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce in its area business summaries, current reports.
### Table 2.1

Number of New Unemployment Benefit Claims Filed, and Average Weekly Number of Benefit Recipients, Columbus, Ohio, Annually 1940-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of new claims filed</th>
<th>Average weekly number of benefit recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>17277</td>
<td>3278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>12421</td>
<td>1631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>15099</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1831</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>12653</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Division of Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, RS Forms 214-A and 236-D.
of unemployment compensated under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law in Columbus in 1940 amounted to nearly 3,300, while new claims filed during the year totaled 17,277. (Table 2.1) The number of claims remained high in 1941 and 1942, although the average number of weeks of unemployment compensated was halved, indicating that joblessness was by then much less severe.

Indeed, much of this joblessness apparently resulted from temporary layoffs of persons employed in plants that were converting to war production. By 1943 the number of unemployment compensation claimants and benefit recipients had declined tremendously. By then the prevailing area labor force problem was one of finding workers to fill the available supply of jobs rather than of finding jobs for a surplus of workers. This change was accompanied by a considerable reduction in the hiring standards of local employers, with a consequent increase in the number of women in jobs from which they were previously excluded. This increased employment of women during the war resulted in a permanently greater proportion of women in the labor force. Thus, out of a total work force increase of 35,000 during the seven-year period from 1940 to 1947, over 40 percent of the increase was accounted for by women. The number of women in the labor force increased 25 percent, as compared with a male increase of only 16 percent.

\[ \text{c. General Business.} \] That the Columbus area underwent a considerable economic transformation during the war is hardly debatable. The secretary of a local manufacturers association said with obvious pride
Selected Economic Indicators; Columbus, Ohio, Area, Semi-annually, 1940-1945

in the summer of 1951 that in 1941 "Columbus was still considered a cross-roads political town". This characterization, he implied, is no longer justified in view of the revolutionary wartime changes. Thus a $15,000,000 aircraft plant was built just outside the city in 1941, which at its peak operation alone employed 26,000 persons, only 5,000 less than were engaged in all manufacturing industry in pre-war Columbus. And at the conclusion of the war a new automobile parts plant employing 8,000 persons came to the city. Between 1940 and 1947 the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing employment increased from 24 to 28 percent and the proportion in the service industries declined from 28 to 24 percent.

Chart 2.1 shows the impact of the war on the community, with all the indicators of economic activity showing sharp rises beginning in 1941. The equally sharp declines at the end of the war in 1945 show that the high wartime level was apparently not of a permanent nature. After reconversion, Columbus' economic activity revived during the post-war years, reaching neither the wartime heights nor falling to the late-depression trough. By 1948 it settled down to approximately the 1941 level, which was about 40 percent above the 1935-1939 average.

The greatest wartime gains were made in manufacturing payrolls and employment, as is evident from Chart 2.1. The index of total employment rose from 113 in March, 1940, when total county employment was 140,000, to 178 in March 1944. The index of manufacturing employment, on the other hand, increased from 103 in March, 1940, representing 33,000 workers, to 212 in 1944.
While the above indicators are revealing in themselves, a more intimate appreciation of the economic and social transformation occasioned by the war requires that they be translated into the flesh and blood of the day-to-day evolution of events. Thus, on January 4, 1940, four months after the war broke out in Europe and two years before the United States' entry into it, President Roosevelt confronted the new Congress with a budgetary request that called for a national defense appropriation of $2,248,126,509, the highest in two decades. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe the previous fall had been followed by a sharp upturn in Columbus business activity, this coming on the heels of a minor slump earlier in the year. The Chamber of Commerce's composite business index for Columbus jumped 12 percent from August to September in 1939 and 24 percent from August to December. This flurry of activity subsided during the months after the President's budget message, but returned again in the summer of 1940.

After the establishment of the National Advisory Council on National Defense, which was to help in the direction and operation of the defense program, the Columbus Chamber began an organized effort to familiarize local firms with methods of getting defense contracts. Shortly thereafter it inaugurated a formal program to promote the city as a sub-contracting center. In September, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation approved a loan application for the construction of a huge plant at the eastern outskirts of the city to produce Navy fighter planes.
planes, a plant whose presence and operation was to change the entire economic topography of the area. Indeed, four years later the city's Chamber of Commerce evaluated its impact on the community with glowing metaphor: "The coming to Columbus of the......Corporation was in our opinion, the turning point in the industrial development of Columbus. It was, in a sense, the long pants added to the boy that made him a man."7 Immediately the federal government called for the extension of an east side thoroughfare to the proposed site of the plant. Five months later plans for the extension were completed, the project to cost $294,000, with the federal government, through the WPA program, paying all but $8,000.

By November the airplane company began installing machinery in the buildings of the State Fairgrounds, which was used as a temporary site. It also began immediately to hire persons interested in working there and in being trained for work in the new plant. Two months later construction on the 25-acre, 15-building plant was started, with concrete being poured into retaining walls on a 24-hour basis. The actual erection of the plant was itself a great boon to the area, with as many as 16,000 construction and related workers being employed in the undertaking at one time.

By February, 1941, over 170 persons were enrolled in the company's aircraft training school, 50 having already graduated. At the same time the school was moved to a downtown building, the Fairgrounds space being needed for actual production. In another month, opportunity

7. Pickups, monthly publication of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, November 22, 1944, p. 3.
Table 2.2

New and Expanded Business Activity in the Columbus, Ohio, Area, Annually, 1938-1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New businesses and business expansions</th>
<th>Private new capital invested ($000)</th>
<th>Additional persons employed(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>5244</td>
<td>2751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>14906</td>
<td>4446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>12520(b)</td>
<td>3173(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>24503(h)</td>
<td>5678(c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Does not include persons doing construction and redecorating work.
b) Does not include new airplane plant operations.
c) Does not include a number of new housing projects totaling $8,500,000.

Source: Compiled from reports of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce,
knocking audibly at the door, a similar, but tuition-charging school to train persons for aircraft work was established by other interests in the community. Ten months later the opening of a tuition-charging welding school reflected the rising demand for such occupational skills. Plant training programs, few and inadequate as they were, and tuition schools designed to train people for skills needed in war jobs, began to become more numerous, reflecting an incipient shortage of certain kinds of skilled and semi-skilled manpower in the area.

The expanding importance of defense industry in the Columbus economy was underlined early in the preparedness program in other ways. For example, in October, 1941, the Army Air Forces rented the entire floor of a downtown building to house a branch office of the Materiel Division to function as a regional inspection, priorities, and plant facilities office. Under the stimulus of war demands, private new capital investments in Columbus tripled in 1939 over 1938, reaching nearly $15,000,000. (Table 2.2) In 1940, they amounted to $12,000,000. Including the outlays on the airplane plant, private investments reached almost $25,000,000 in 1941, not counting a total investment of $8,500,000 in various housing projects undertaken in the city during the year. Indeed, the index of the value of residential building permits in 1940 (1935-1939 = 100 percent) was 247 and in 1941 it reached 273, as compared to 188 in 1939 and 104 in 1938. The non-residential index reached 340 in 1941, compared to 130 in 1940, 196 in 1939, and 75 in 1938.8

8. Arnold, Sam, and Yocum, James C., Ohio Business Data, 1926-1948, Bureau of Business Research, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1949, Research Monograph No. 42, p. 85.
Table 2.3: Prime War Supply and Facility Contracts Awarded in Franklin County, Ohio, Selected Periods, 1940-1945 (In Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period and type of contract</th>
<th>Total each period</th>
<th>Cumulative total to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1 through Dec 31, 1940</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>10,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 2,453</td>
<td>2,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 7,593</td>
<td>7,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1 through Dec 31, 1941</td>
<td>89,577</td>
<td>99,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 75,302</td>
<td>88,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 14,275</td>
<td>21,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1 through Dec 31, 1942</td>
<td>123,090</td>
<td>212,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 79,565</td>
<td>157,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 43,525</td>
<td>54,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1 through Sep 30, 1943</td>
<td>400,548</td>
<td>613,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 385,436</td>
<td>543,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 15,112</td>
<td>69,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1, 1943, through Dec 31, 1944</td>
<td>322,314</td>
<td>935,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 316,628</td>
<td>890,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 5,686</td>
<td>75,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1 through June 31, 1945</td>
<td>97,351</td>
<td>1032,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 66,550</td>
<td>926,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 30,791</td>
<td>106,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, June 1, 1940-June 31, 1945</td>
<td>1032,886</td>
<td>1032,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply contracts 926,544</td>
<td>926,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft 705,776</td>
<td>705,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ships 535</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordnance 60,952</td>
<td>60,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication equipment 3,603</td>
<td>3,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 155,678</td>
<td>155,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facility contracts 106,342</td>
<td>106,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 45,958</td>
<td>45,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-industrial 60,384</td>
<td>60,384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Prime contracts exclude sub-contracts. Facility contracts cover land purchases, architectural and engineering fees, construction work and materials, machinery, its installation, etc.  
  b) Through Aug 31, only.  c) Through Nov 30, only.  d) Through May 31, only.

During the first nine months of 1941 the Chamber of Commerce's composite business index showed an increase of more than 19 percent over the same period in 1940, and of 29 percent over 1939.

To the rising volume of private new capital investments in the county were added federally financed investments in industrial enterprises. During the entire emergency period these totaled nearly $46 million, the sum being augmented by another $60 million of government investments in non-industrial projects. (Table 2.3) As in the case of private investments, the impact of the defense program was not confined to the war years themselves. Thus more than $21 million of the government facility contracts let in the county were let during the 18-month period prior to America's entry into the war. During the first year of the war another $33 million were let. Of the nearly $46 million invested locally by the federal government in industrial facilities, 83 percent was for the construction of new plants, 11 percent for the expansion of old ones, and 6 percent for conversions.\(^9\)

In addition to the more than $106 million in government facility contracts, more than $926 million in supply contracts were awarded locally between June 1, 1940, and June 30, 1945. The volume of such contracts coming to the area started modestly, with little more than $2.4 million being awarded during the last six months of 1940. The volume increased during the following years and reached the spectacular sum of $385 million during the first nine months of 1943.

Although Franklin County is industrially well diversified, its  
\(^9\) *Columbus Dispatch*, July 22, 1945.
Table 2-4

Value of Shipments of Fabricated Metal Products from Plants in Franklin County, Ohio, 1939 - 1945 (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Product</th>
<th>Number of establishments</th>
<th>Value of shipments ($000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fabricated metal products, except ordnance, machinery, and transp. equipment (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>13 (c)</td>
<td>9,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, except electrical (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other fabricated metals (d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>10 (e)</td>
<td>9,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,111,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,112,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,734,03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,412,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2,167,52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4,233,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26,779,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Based on records from 39 fabricated metal products plants representing 23 percent of the total value of products of manufacturing industries in the county in 1939.
(b) E.g., heating and cooling apparatus, not electrical.
(c) E.g., construction, mining, and metal working machinery.
(d) E.g., motor vehicles, motor vehicle equipment, primary metals, aircraft, railroad and street cars, mechanical measuring and controlling devices, ophthalmic goods, etc.
(e) One establishment in this group was not operating in 1939.
(f) Two establishments in this group were not operating in 1939.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Industry Division. Plant records were compiled from statistics collected in the 1939 Census of Manufacturers and from wartime reports on Forms ED-275, ED-25A, CSE-7, WP-732, and CPA-732.
two largest industries, each represented by a single firm, were responsible for most of the additional industrial activity brought to the community during the war. Indeed, the local aircraft industry alone accounted for 70 percent of the government supply and facility contracts let in the area. The fabricated metals industry (including machinery) accounted for the other large proportion of government contracts awarded in the area. Its value of output increased from $31 million in 1939 to $111 million in 1944. (Table 2.4)

Among the other industries in the area which expanded significantly as a result of war activity were the foundries and the railroads. The former consisted of several plants, each with over 1,000 employees. The five large railroads which converge in Columbus had a combined employment at their wartime peak of more than 10,000 workers.

b. Military and Government. An examination of how the Columbus area was affected during the war is far from complete unless changes in its military and governmental activities are considered. Besides being a county seat and the state capital, Columbus is also a regional administrative center for numerous federal government agencies. Moreover, its position as a military center must also be mentioned. At the beginning of the war Columbus was headquarters of the Fifth Service Command of the United States Army, site of an active army base and headquarters of the 37th (National Guard) Division, and site of a large and active Army Service Forces general supply depot.

The influx of war and government civilian agencies into the community came early. Not only did employment in many war agencies increase, but a large new non-war agency came to the area as Washington decentralized some of its permanent agencies in 1942. This was a branch of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration which moved here in masse in April, 1942, with 200 employees and their families. During the same month the Navy took over most of the local airport, where by 1944 it had a military complement of nearly 500, and employed several hundred civilian workers. In March, 1942, the annual State Fair was cancelled as the Fairgrounds were to be used as an Air Forces parts and equipment depot. By 1944 this depot employed about a thousand civilian workers. The Army Service Forces depot, which in 1940 employed only about a thousand civilians, had between 8,000 and 9,000 civilian workers in 1944, a growth which aggravated the serious transportation and housing problems in the city's east side.

Early in 1942 the government acquired 1,600 acres of farm land in southeastern Franklin County which it converted into an air base that was to employ nearly a thousand civilians and several thousand Air Force personnel. By the Summer of 1943 nearly 3,000 soldiers were stationed and studying at The Ohio State University, this being the largest ASTP unit in the United States. Another 300 Army STAB trainees were there at the same time, a drop of 1,000 from a previous high. Capital University, on the other side of the city, meanwhile had 250 Air Force trainees. Other new armed forces facilities were established at the same time, including an Adjutant General Department depot employing 150 civilians,
Table 2.5
Number of Civilian Government Employees and Total Weekly Payrolls of Government Agencies, by Unit of Government, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Representative Week, 1939 and 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of government</th>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Total payroll</th>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Total payroll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Columbus and Metropolitan District</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>$6,823,718</td>
<td>3,789</td>
<td>4,300,000(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,405,156</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>1,700,000(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>8,500(a)</td>
<td>12,360,000(a)</td>
<td>9,461</td>
<td>15,000,000(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>3,627,360</td>
<td>15,337</td>
<td>37,000,000(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,287</td>
<td>24,216,234</td>
<td>29,872</td>
<td>58,000,000(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Approximate.
Source: "Public Affairs" Report Sheet, Research Department, Columbus, Ohio, Chamber of Commerce, 1945.
an Ordnance Department repair shop with 300 civilians, and War Depart-
ment and Signal Corps repair shops, together having about 50 civilian
employees. Meanwhile civilian employment at the military establishments
at Fort Hayes, which became the state's induction center for draftees,
increased from a 1940 total of less than 300 to over a thousand in 1944.11

With these changes public employment in the area doubled between
1939 and 1944, federal jobs accounting for almost the entire increase.
Table 2.5 shows the results of establishment censuses of government em-
ployment in the area made by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce in 1939
and 1944. It will be noted that employment remained fairly stable in
municipal and state government agencies. Employment in the county govern-
ment, however, increased by 400 over its 1939 total of 870. Federal
government civilian employment, on the other hand, rose from nearly
3,000 to over 15,000, annual wages paid to this group increasing from
$3.6 million to $37 million.

It can thus be seen that the war's impact on the Columbus area must
be appraised not only from the point of view of changes in the volume
and nature of the activities of private business and industry but also
from the point of view of the further development of the city as a mili-
tary and government service and administrative center.

Needless to say, all these changes created numerous pressures to

11. The foregoing information was collected from the civilian personnel
departments of the Army installations still in operation, from minutes
of the meetings of the Columbus Area Manpower Priorities Committee (WMC),
and the Columbus Dispatch, current issues.
change the pre-war pattern of community life. Unemployment and economic depression were replaced by a labor shortage and an economic boom. Soup kitchens gave way to manpower recruitment stations, and interest in converting housing slums into city parks was changed into efforts to increase utilization of existing housing facilities and to construct new ones. Employers joined, rather than fought, union efforts to increase wages. High school boys now dropped out of school not because economic conditions required them to work in order to supplement inadequate family incomes, but because economic conditions provided an excellent opportunity for them to earn extra money, at comparatively high wages, which they could keep for themselves. Whereas hiring practices of employers had been highly selective, for some employers they became so loose and flexible that the only criterion of a man's employability was a "warm body". Whereas previously juvenile delinquency had been a problem because neither parents nor children had money, now it became a problem because they had more than ever before. While the woman's place was formerly characterized as being at hearth and home, it was now glamorized as being in factory and field and symbolized by "Rosie the riveter". Changing conditions were revealed by changes in the public's reading tastes. While before the war the public library had reported an increase in fiction and "escape" reading, it now reported an increased call for books on technical subjects like welding, blueprint reading, mechanics, machine operation, and factory management. 12

12. Columbus Dispatch, September 6, 1942.
Table 2.6

Civilian Population of the City of Columbus, the Columbus Metropolitan District, and Franklin County, Ohio, 1940-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>April 1940</th>
<th>May 1942</th>
<th>March 1943</th>
<th>Jan. 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>320,187</td>
<td>323,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus Metropolitan District</td>
<td>365,796</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>390,861</td>
<td>395,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin County</td>
<td>388,712</td>
<td>407,101</td>
<td>417,498</td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: April, 1940 data are from the 16th Decennial Census.
Data for 1942, 1943, and 1944 are estimates based on the number of ration books issued in the area by the Office of Price Administration.
the Columbus area was the rapid increase in population, with all its consequences of housing shortage, transportation shortage, restaurant shortage, hospital shortage, increased crime rate, increased demand on existing recreational, amusement and shopping facilities, and even gas and water shortages.

Between 1930 and 1940 the population of Franklin County increased from 361,000 to 389,000. This increase of 28,000 persons represented a growth of 7.7 percent. In the four-year period between 1940 and 1944, despite Selective Service withdrawals, 31,000 persons were added to the population of the county, an increase of about 8 percent. (Table 2.6)

By 1947 the Bureau of the Census reported that the population of the Columbus Metropolitan District had increased 18 percent over the 1940 population of 366,000. This was an increase of about 67,000 in seven years.

While Columbus was never a big manufacturing center, the abnormally large population changes that came during the war years were the result of people having been lured to the area by the prospect of finding war work. As has already been indicated, to a considerable extent they found employment in government agencies and military installations. But the overwhelming majority entered manufacturing employments, particularly those of aircraft, and of iron and steel and their products. Thus manufacturing employment in Franklin County increased from about 33,000 in

Table 2.7
Number of Employees and Index of Employment by Major Industrial Groups, Franklin County, Ohio, April 1940 and Quarterly, 1943-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Wholesale &amp; retail trade</th>
<th>Finance, insurance and real estate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940(a)</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>7626</td>
<td>32784</td>
<td>30041</td>
<td>6511</td>
<td>77361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>5575</td>
<td>66543</td>
<td>29591</td>
<td>6600</td>
<td>108958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>5741</td>
<td>69776</td>
<td>30791</td>
<td>6715</td>
<td>112896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>5628</td>
<td>69341</td>
<td>30694</td>
<td>6509</td>
<td>113136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>4271</td>
<td>70989</td>
<td>31951</td>
<td>6328</td>
<td>114115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>3578</td>
<td>70989</td>
<td>30820</td>
<td>6179</td>
<td>111246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>4329</td>
<td>67589</td>
<td>31091</td>
<td>6415</td>
<td>109343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>4127</td>
<td>67589</td>
<td>30731</td>
<td>6528</td>
<td>107269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>4120</td>
<td>65513</td>
<td>31965</td>
<td>6590</td>
<td>108522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>3208</td>
<td>64566</td>
<td>29382</td>
<td>6521</td>
<td>105134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>3984</td>
<td>62822</td>
<td>30868</td>
<td>6675</td>
<td>104989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>4077</td>
<td>65173</td>
<td>31724</td>
<td>6923</td>
<td>81223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>5451</td>
<td>45567</td>
<td>31780</td>
<td>7281</td>
<td>93695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td>74-6</td>
<td>203.0</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>140.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>137.5</td>
<td>75-5</td>
<td>191.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>145.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>147.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>129.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>214.1</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>143.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>206.0</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>142.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>206.5</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>141.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>123.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>140.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>135.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>191.6</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>135.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>115.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>147.0</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>139.0</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index, 1940 = 100 percent

(a) Refers to employment during the week of March 24-30, 1940.

Source: 1940 data from 16th Census of the U.S., Population, Second Series-Characteristics of the Population, Table 23, p. 61. 1943-1945 data compiled from Ohio Bureau of Employment Compensation "Number of Covered Workers Reported Employed in the Last Pay Period of All Types Ending within Each Month, by Industrial Group in Franklin County, Ohio." Tables 20, 22, 25. The table titles in the last two years were slightly different.
March, 1940, to 67,000 in February, 1943, and to a wartime peak of 71,000 in November, 1943. (Table 2.7) Over 80 percent of the increase in this category was attributable to the new aircraft plant that was completed just as the United States entered the war.14

Two of the most significant facts about this employment increase are the extent to which the sex and race compositions of the labor force changed. In February, 1940, women constituted about 25 percent of employed persons in manufacturing industries, one-fourth of them being employed as office workers and the remainder as plant wage earners. By February, 1944, however, women accounted for about 30 percent of manufacturing employment, with 37 percent in office-type employment and the rest in factory work. But while the proportion of women in manufacturing who were engaged in factory-type work decreased during the period, the actual number of female wage earners increased substantially.15

Before World War II the proportion of Negroes to the total metropolitan area population was about 10.5 percent, but the ratio of employed Negroes to the entire employed labor force was somewhat below 6 percent. The wartime population increase among whites was more rapid than among Negroes, so that the proportion of Negroes to the total population fell to 9.6 percent in 1947.16 But by the end of 1944 the proportion of Negroes to total employment in a sample of firms representing about 30 percent of all employment in the area was 15.4 percent,17 an increase that...

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14. Computed from unpublished work sheets on Franklin County employment at the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations, Columbus, Ohio.
15. Idem
reflects a liberalization of hiring standards on the part of local employers in the face of a tighter labor supply.

Additional changes that came with an increasingly tighter supply of manpower were the relaxation of other hiring standards and the resultant rise in employment of such fringe workers as the physically handicapped, older and younger people, and unskilled and relatively poorly disciplined workers. At the same time there was a considerable geographical expansion of the Columbus labor market area. Thus late in 1943 the local USES labor market analyst revised the conceptual boundaries of the area to include the entirety of the five contiguous counties only portions of which had previously been included in Columbus USES office labor supply computations. A study of personnel records in a sample of Columbus manufacturing establishments has since revealed that the proportion of newly hired persons who lived outside of Franklin County at the time they were hired increased from 3.5 percent in 1940 to 9.2 percent in 1943.18

The lasting effects of wartime changes on the structure of the community's labor force are indicated by a comparison of 1940 and 1947 Census data. Between March, 1940, and April, 1947, there was an increase of approximately 38 percent, or 50,000, in the number of employed residents of the Columbus Metropolitan District, total employment of civilians 14 years old or over being about 183,000, as compared with 133,000

18. Farnes, Herbert S., A Study in the Dynamics of Local Labor Force Expansion, mimeographed, The Ohio State University, 1951, Chapter 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>March, 1940 (Total population)</th>
<th>April, 1947 (Civilian population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>365,796</td>
<td>178,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population, 14 years old and over</td>
<td>296,451</td>
<td>143,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the labor force</td>
<td>152,500</td>
<td>108,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in the labor force</td>
<td>143,951</td>
<td>35,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the labor force</td>
<td>152,500</td>
<td>108,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (except in public emergency work)</td>
<td>132,742</td>
<td>93,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td>130,155</td>
<td>91,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a job but not at work</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>1,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19,758</td>
<td>15,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In public emergency work</td>
<td>7,251</td>
<td>5,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking work</td>
<td>12,497</td>
<td>9,330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population, 14 years old and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the labor force</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in the labor force</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the labor force</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (except in public emergency work)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a job but not at work</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In public emergency work</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking work</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 2-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major occupation group</th>
<th>March, 1940 (Total pop.)</th>
<th>April, 1947 (Civilian pop.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; semiprofessional</td>
<td>13,055</td>
<td>8,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors, managers, &amp; officials</td>
<td>14,788</td>
<td>13,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales, &amp; kindred</td>
<td>34,089</td>
<td>18,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, foremen, &amp; kindred</td>
<td>18,975</td>
<td>14,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives &amp; kindred</td>
<td>23,895</td>
<td>18,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>5,741</td>
<td>5,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service, except domestic</td>
<td>13,099</td>
<td>13,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>6,908</td>
<td>6,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation not reported</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employment</td>
<td>132,742</td>
<td>93,108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentage distribution, vertical = 100 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major occupation group</th>
<th>% Professional &amp; semiprofessional</th>
<th>% Proprietors, managers, &amp; officials</th>
<th>% Clerical, sales, &amp; kindred</th>
<th>% Craftsmen, foremen, &amp; kindred</th>
<th>% Operatives &amp; kindred</th>
<th>% Domestic service</th>
<th>% Service, except domestic</th>
<th>% Laborers</th>
<th>% Occupation not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentage distribution, horizontal=100 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major occupation group</th>
<th>Professional &amp; semiprofessional</th>
<th>Proprietors, managers, &amp; officials</th>
<th>Clerical, sales, &amp; kindred</th>
<th>Craftsmen, foremen, &amp; kindred</th>
<th>Operatives &amp; kindred</th>
<th>Domestic service</th>
<th>Service, except domestic</th>
<th>Laborers</th>
<th>Occupation not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in 1940.\(^{19}\) (Table 2.8) Unemployment fell 75 percent, from about 20,000 at the beginning of the period to about 5,000 in 1947. But the ratio of unemployment to the much expanded labor force fell by a greater proportion, the figures being 13 percent in 1940 and only 2 percent in 1947. The actual size of the labor force had expanded by about 35,000 at the end of the seven-year period, with the labor force participation rate, as noted before, jumping from 51 percent in 1940 to 55 percent in 1947. The participation rate of women increased proportionately more than that of men, although both increased by four percentage points, women from 29 to 33 and men from 75 to 79. The net result of the proportionately greater increase in female participation rates is reflected in the fact that in 1940 women constituted 29 percent of the labor force while in 1947 they constituted 31 percent.

These changes were accompanied by significant shifts in the occupational composition of employed persons. (Table 2.9) The rise in employment between 1940 and 1943 was proportionately greatest among skilled workers. This group grew from 14 percent of the employed labor force in 1940 to 18 percent in 1947. The only other major occupation group that increased relative to total employment was the clerical, sales, and kindred category, which rose from 26 to 28 percent between 1940 and 1947. Service employment, on the other hand, declined relative to the total during this period. This decrease was particularly pronounced among domestic service workers, the absolute as well as the relative number de-

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\(^{19}\) The 1940 data, unlike those of 1947, include military as well as civilian residents. While the military population was small in 1940, it was nevertheless classified as being employed, the net effect being slightly to understated the percentage of unemployment in 1940, and to overstate, as in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, employment in service industries and service occupations in 1940.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major industry group</th>
<th>March, 1940 (Total population)</th>
<th>April, 1947 (Civilian population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7123</td>
<td>9114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>31481</td>
<td>51332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, communication, and other public utilities</td>
<td>13947</td>
<td>19393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>29112</td>
<td>37720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service industries</td>
<td>37106</td>
<td>44649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other industries</td>
<td>11511</td>
<td>19106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry not reported</td>
<td>2462</td>
<td>1391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>132712</strong></td>
<td><strong>182737</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major industry group</th>
<th>Percentage distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, communication, and other public utilities</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service industries</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other industries</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry not reported</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Somewhat more revealing, from the point of view of the war's impact, are changes in the sex composition of each occupation group. While the absolute number of men increased in each group, the proportion of men in all but two of the categories declined. The two exceptions were professional and semi-professional and domestic service occupations. The greatest increases in the proportion of women occurred in clerical, sales, and kindred occupations, in operative and kindred occupations, and among laborers.

The tremendous growth in manufacturing employment in the area during the war has already been noted. The 1947 industrial composition of the labor force that lived in the Columbus Metropolitan District shows the extent to which this appears to have been a lasting change. (Table 2.10) Manufacturing employment declined from the wartime peak of 71,000 to about 51,000 in 1947, which was still 20,000 above the 1940 figure. At the same time, employment in wholesale and retail trade increased by over 8,000, from 29,000 in 1940 to 37,700 in 1947. Yet the proportion of persons in manufacturing rose from 24 to 28 percent while that in trade declined from 22 to 21 percent. The largest relative decline occurred in service industries, where employment declined from 28 to 24 percent.
CHAPTER 3

MANPOWER PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS: A BRIEF SUMMAR Y

A. The Changing Manpower Picture.

About 20,000 of the 160,000 persons in the Franklin County labor force in March, 1940, were unemployed or on public emergency work. Although the employment situation improved during the remainder of the year, jobs were nevertheless not abundant. But as European war supply orders increased, and as the American preparedness program stimulated local industrial activity, the probable inadequacy of the community's labor supply began to be talked about.

In November, 1940, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce arranged a conference with representatives of the airplane manufacturing company that was making preparations for the construction of a plant in the area. The purpose was to discuss certain personnel problems of the firm. The conference had a broad community foundation, as representatives of the local public schools, the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, and the local Metal Trades Association were also present.

Two months later, with over $10 million in government supply and facility contracts having been awarded in Franklin County in the last half of 1940, the Chamber of Commerce reported that the chief concern of 300 industrial executives in the area was whether sufficient manpower would be available to handle expected increases in defense orders. Only a few said that lack of equipment and inability to obtain needed materials would prevent their increasing production, and less than 2 percent reported a shortage of capital as a serious obstacle to increased production.
In March, 1941, the Chamber emphasized the importance of manpower in the coming emergency and suggested that its members develop manpower conservation programs through safety training in defense industries. By the end of the year safety training courses for defense industries were being planned, to begin at The Ohio State University in January, 1942.

Meanwhile defense and war orders came into the area in increasing volume, with contracts amounting to nearly $100 million being let in 1941 alone. At the same time an undisclosed but apparently large number of subcontracts were let. Manpower considerations increased in urgency. In October, 1941, more than 300 managers, field supervisors, and local office managers of the Ohio State Employment Service attended the opening session of a two-day conference in Columbus for the purpose of assuring industry of the necessary supply of skilled workers for defense production. Representatives of the federal government and private industry attended and spoke at the meeting. A rapid survey by the local state employment service office immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack revealed that local industries considered essential to defense production and employing 50 or more persons would need nearly 4,000 skilled and semi-skilled workers within four months. The greatest demand was for machinists, machine operators, aircraft riveters, and sheet metal workers.

By January, 1942, 124 out of the county's more than 500 manufacturing concerns were totally or partially engaged in war work. The impact of these production changes was felt in other ways. For example, in December, 1941, lay-offs in plants converting to war production resulted in the greatest number of unemployment claims to be filed in the local employment service office in a year. Foreseeing the impending
necessity for greater mutuality and cooperation in manpower matters, The Ohio State University called local industry, labor, and government officials together for a joint problems conference. Here it was revealed that the federal government, as never before, intended to eliminate all obstacles to uninterrupted production; that the federal government would insist that labor, management, and government itself cooperate to the fullest in the war effort; that labor, while anxious to cooperate fully in the war effort, would seek to protect its gains except insofar as management made sacrifices, and that the war crisis was bringing labor and management closer together, both as to their immediate aims and their ideologies.

1. Columbus Dispatch, March 2, 1942.
2. Chamber of Commerce Survey in Ibid., March 27, 1942.

At the end of March, 1942, 32,000 persons in the Columbus area, as many as were engaged in manufacturing in the entire county two years earlier, were either directly or indirectly working on war orders, with an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 additional workers needed in the next fifteen months. Many persons were losing jobs that were not war-connected, but they were being rapidly absorbed into war industries. Hiring of women showed perceptible increases, and a number of community pressures began to develop. The most urgent ones arose in connection with inadequate transportation, housing, recreational, and service facilities.

By early 1942, war workers were beginning to attain new social status, the community going through the motions of making efforts for them that were formerly reserved only for visiting dignitaries. The Retail Merchants Association, "to accommodate war workers of the commun-
ity", introduced Monday evening shopping hours in downtown stores. The city's mayor extended the hours which local amusement places could remain open so as "to provide facilities for war workers who now can't make them at present hours", and the Council of Social Agencies made plans to help care for children of working mothers. The Chamber of Commerce provided space for the establishment of a Homes Registration Office which acted as a clearing house for available rental facilities for war workers; the Columbus Real Estate Board investigated available housing and assured the community that local facilities were ample, announcing its findings as constituting a "conclusive answer to any contention that a defense housing project will be needed in Columbus", and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, in a housing study of its own, came to quite opposite conclusions.

The city safety director, taking cognizance of transportation shortages and the inexorable logic of the "law of supply and demand", told taxi companies they would be prosecuted for charging in excess of legally allowed rates. The local Office of Civilian Defense, contemplating the community calamities that would result when the city's public recreation centers for children were closed for lack of funds in 1942, offered to help reopen and operate them. The warden of the state penitentiary, enlisting his facilities in the war effort, established a special 14-week prison training course in machine operation for 30 prisoners up for parole. And a local judge, fired with patriotic indignation, fined a wayward ruffian $10 and costs for being boisterous in a workingmen's district, voicing the solemn admonition that "Defense workers need their rest and I intend to deal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>15826</td>
<td>9401</td>
<td>6421</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 12</td>
<td>13604</td>
<td>8665</td>
<td>4939</td>
<td>2898</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 14</td>
<td>10531</td>
<td>5811</td>
<td>4720</td>
<td>2819</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 16</td>
<td>10237</td>
<td>5013</td>
<td>5219</td>
<td>2791</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13</td>
<td>9604</td>
<td>4817</td>
<td>4787</td>
<td>2310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15</td>
<td>7281</td>
<td>3701</td>
<td>3580</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>8117</td>
<td>4134</td>
<td>3983</td>
<td>1167</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 13</td>
<td>2279</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 18</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 16</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, United States Employment Service in Ohio, R.S. Tables 268.2, 268.3, 268.4, and 268.5.
Table 3.2

Number of Persons Placed by Public Employment Service, by Selected Characteristics, Columbus, Ohio, Annually, 1940-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
<th>Veterans</th>
<th>Physically handicapped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15878</td>
<td>7749</td>
<td>8129</td>
<td>4005</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>29044</td>
<td>15282</td>
<td>13762</td>
<td>9690</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>44957</td>
<td>25277</td>
<td>19680</td>
<td>13376</td>
<td>1207</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>55366</td>
<td>32776</td>
<td>22610</td>
<td>14273</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>58631</td>
<td>37604</td>
<td>21027</td>
<td>16681</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>1076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>56997</td>
<td>38858</td>
<td>18139</td>
<td>18899</td>
<td>5557</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage distribution (Total placements = 100 per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
<th>Veterans</th>
<th>Physically handicapped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Not reported during this year.

Source: Compiled and computed from Division of Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, Tables RS 251.
harsly with anyone brought in here in the future on charges of dis-
turbing the peace."3

Changes in community manpower needs, occasioned by the growth of new industries and the conversion of others, were particularly noticeable in the activities of the local office of the public employment service. For example, as was shown in the previous chapter, the number of claims for unemployment benefits dropped from more than 17,000 in 1940 to 1,800 in 1944, and the average number of weeks of unemployment compensated during 1941 and 1942 was half that of 1940. The number of registrants in the active file of the employment service also declined steadily as the war progressed, from more than 15,000 in the Summer of 1942 to approximately 200 two years later. (Table 3.1)

The changing composition of the labor force is to some degree reflected in the increased proportions of woman and non-whites among these registrants. Data on placements suggest increased utilization of women, non-whites, physically handicapped, and unskilled workers during the war.4 Placements of women rose from 8,000 in 1940 to 21,000 in 1944. Placements of non-white persons increased from about 5,000 in 1940 to nearly 17,000 in 1944. Placements of the physically handicapped numbered 1,000 in 1944, compared with only a third of this

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3. Respectively from Pickups, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, March 26, 1942; Columbus Dispatch, May 21, 1942, and June 4, 1942; Pickups, May 22, 1941, and April 3, 1941; interview with CIO official; and Columbus Dispatch, December 8, 1942, December 9, 1942; June 14, 1942, and August 26, 1942.
4. Additional, and more complete evidence on this point is presented in later chapters.
Table 3.3
Total placements by Occupational Group, as reported by the Public Employment Service, Columbus, Ohio, Annually, 1940-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total placements</th>
<th>Professional &amp; kindred</th>
<th>Salespersons</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Skilled</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15,878</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>9.369</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>29,044</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>14,631</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>5,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>44,957</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>15,890</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>13,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>55,386</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>8,039</td>
<td>26,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>58,631</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>4,229</td>
<td>9,965</td>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>5,955</td>
<td>35,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>56,977</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>10,056</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>6,181</td>
<td>33,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Division of Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, BS Tables 252.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total placements</th>
<th>Agriculture, forestry, &amp; fishing</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Utilities (a)</th>
<th>Wholesale &amp; retail trade</th>
<th>Finance, insurance &amp; real estate</th>
<th>Service except domestic</th>
<th>Domestic Govt.</th>
<th>Domestic Govt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>15878</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>7108 (c)</td>
<td>2325</td>
<td>9558</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>29044</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>5576</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>2604</td>
<td>10783</td>
<td>4208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>44957</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1785</td>
<td>15406</td>
<td>1451</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>7399</td>
<td>6184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>55386</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2418</td>
<td>29075</td>
<td>2658</td>
<td>4547</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>7267</td>
<td>3830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>58631</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>34106</td>
<td>3996</td>
<td>5807</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>2821</td>
<td>7442</td>
<td>3588</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>58997</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>29406</td>
<td>3884</td>
<td>7328</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>2821</td>
<td>7442</td>
<td>3588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Includes transportation, communication, and public utilities.
(b) Data not available.
(c) Total for all service placements.

Source: Compiled from Division of Research and Statistics, Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, BS Tables 254-A.
number two years earlier. (Table 3,2) Whereas only 17 percent of all placements in 1940 were into unskilled jobs, 60 percent of the 1944 placements were for unskilled work. (Table 3,3) The industrial distribution of placements indicates that manufacturing industries were responsible for most of the area's increased civilian employment, with government and railroad transportation being second and third in importance, respectively. These three categories were responsible for virtually the total increase in the number of placements between 1940 and 1945. The increased significance of manufacturing is revealed by the fact that it accounted for only about 10 percent of all placements in 1940, as compared with more than half in 1945. (Table 3,4)

B. The Evolution of Manpower Problems and Programs.

On April 18, 1942, Presidential Executive Order 9139 created the War Manpower Commission (WMC), an agency which was to control and coordinate the use of the nation's civilian manpower resources. A year later, in April, 1943, the Commission's Regional Office V, in line with a new national policy, adopted a plan bringing all communities in Michigan, Ohio, and Kentucky under a manpower control program. The plan set certain limits on the rights of persons in essential industry to transfer jobs and on the rights of employers to hire whomever they chose. In June, an Area Management-Labor Committee was organized in Columbus by representatives of the WMC, its task being primarily to encourage community acceptance of forthcoming manpower measures. In July, the Columbus Employment Stabilization Plan, previously approved by the Committee, went into effect locally, with provisions
paralleling those of the regional plan. By October all hiring of persons in critical occupations was required to be done through the local employment service office, and the next month an order requiring employers of eight or more workers to operate on a minimum 48-hour week was issued.

In March, 1944, a local Manpower Priorities Committee was established to help the employment service in its job referral program by determining the number and urgency of priority jobs that needed to be filled by various employers, and in April a Production Urgency Committee was organized to advise the Manpower Priorities Committee and the War Production Board as to the relative urgency of production in the various plants. By July, virtually complete USES priority referral of male job seekers went into effect, and firms employing 50 or more workers were limited in the number of men they could add to their payrolls. Within a few months all firms were so restricted. In the meanwhile, more or less minor modifications and additions were made to the local program; special civic, union, management, and government manpower drives were promoted, and the employment service office extended and intensified its recruitment and placement activities.

The manpower program was necessitated by conditions of growing manpower stringency that were felt with increasing intensity beginning in 1941 and during the remainder of the war period. Slowly the public employment service office began to function more as a job clearance and placement agency than as an unemployment claims taking agency. Three days before Pearl Harbor, the huge aircraft plant on the east side of
the city was dedicated. Shortly before that the new air base in the southern tip of the county was built, and huge additions were made to the 800-acre armed forces depot adjacent to the aircraft plant. The plant had 6,000 workers in March, when production was getting actively under way. On Christmas and on the following New Year's Day, many plants continued operations.

On January 2, 1942, in his first war message to Congress, President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined the need for a greatly expanded arms program and called upon every able-bodied person to give positive support to the war program. Three months later he told a press conference that while general labor shortages were likely to develop within eight months, he did not contemplate lifting the 40-hour week restriction as a means of alleviating such shortages.

In Columbus, meanwhile, the labor market tightened, with women beginning to take jobs previously reserved for men. Many employers began to show a reluctant willingness to accept some members of the minority groups they had either customarily refused to hire or had hired only for service or custodial jobs. But the pressures of a tightening labor supply were to some extent alleviated by the numerous lay-offs that accompanied conversion of plants to war production. At the same time, immigration and incommuting of workers to the Columbus area became more prevalent.

A high turnover rate, apparently occasioned by job shopping, and the encouragement of such practices by the appearance of enticing want ads in local newspapers, was one of the earliest and most persistent consequences of prosperity. In July, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce
reported that numerous cases of employees leaving their positions to
take other employment without giving sufficient notice to permit their
replacement without disruption of production had been called to its
attention. Employment service representatives received similar com-
plaints, although there is evidence that some of the complaints were
from employers who were trying to hoard manpower. By the same token,
some of the sudden departures of workers appear to have been caused
by labor pirating. As a possible deterrent to disruptive turnover,
the Chamber suggested that "It would be in line with proper business
ethics if firms accepting new employees who have been working else-
where make it possible for the employees to first give their present
employer adequate notice of their intention to resign."5 The sug-
gestion was apparently not widely adopted, as each firm, conscious of
its own needs, advertised and recruited vigorously. This condition
was not aided by the announcement on September 15, 1942, of a Presi-
dential Executive Order freezing wages at their most recent high.
The freeze was to apply to all except sub-standard wages and wage
rates that constituted gross inequities, although some relief became
available under the 15 percent increase allowed by the Little Steel
Formula. The result was a further increase in turnover, again oc-
casioned by shopping for higher paying jobs.

Small, less essential businesses were the first and most severely
effected. The larger non-war businesses generally either went into
war work or muddled through, but the small ones, with their very limit-
ed, almost neighborhood access to the labor market, suffered seriously.

Restaurant owners were the first, or perhaps simply the most vocal, complainants. There was a substantial increase in restaurant business, but traditionally low wages, the availability of factory jobs for women, and the development of a favorable community attitude toward women working in factories combined to cause an early manpower shortage in the restaurant industry. Other service industries and small retailers were heard from before the year's end. Laundries and dry cleaning establishments, feeling the effects of a rapidly expanding population of working wives with less time to do their own washing and ironing, of the better financial capacity of many to have others do their laundry, and of the lure of higher factory wages, were early complainants. Automobile garage owners were another group whose protests to the local War Manpower Commission were heard early and loudly. Hotels also had an acute manpower problem, with women bartenders beginning to appear to destroy the nostalgic stereotype of a sympathetic male bartender. Towards the end of the year taxis were also manned by women.

Meanwhile, in December, 1942, garbage collection became delinquent in various sections of the city because of insufficient labor to man collection trucks. The problem was laid to low pay, the city paying 57 cents per hour to its truck laborers while the local employment service office had a standing order to pay 72 cents an hour to unskilled labor at the armed forces depot. The day following the announcement of the delinquency, over 200 unskilled workers were placed at the depot alone. As City Council took 20 days to look over its budget, the garbage piled up. Meanwhile the cold weather fortunately
prevented a health hazard from developing and the City Health Department judiciously refrained from enforcing the prohibition against burning garbage. At the end of the month it passed a new garbage, refuse, and tax law and increased the starting rate for laborers to 60 cents per hour. The result was not encouraging, but, with the help of workhouse inmates, the city muddled through.⁶

The local employment service office was, in the meantime, making reports to Washington on the current and anticipated labor market situation. On the basis of these and similar reports made by other public employment service offices, WMC classified labor market areas into three categories. Class A areas were those with labor supplies adequate in terms of present and foreseeable requirements. Class B areas were those in which current labor supplies were adequate but in which shortages were expected on the basis of known requirements. Class C areas were those with current manpower shortages. Columbus was classified as a Class B area, as were all other large Ohio cities except Toledo and Youngstown.

These classifications were to be used by the War Production Board as guides for channeling new contracts. Columbus was to get more. But by the end of the year Columbus was included among 64 cities that War Manpower Commissioner Paul V. McNutt recommended be by-passed for new war contracts because in those the current labor shortage was deemed to be acute or would be acute when presently contracted-for production was undertaken. At the same time he reminded holders of contracts in those areas that there was going to be a further con-

⁶ Columbus Dispatch, December 8, 9, and 28, 1942.
traction of the nation's manpower supply and that they should use all
types of labor, including women, older workers, and Negroes. With
the announcement came an implication that the area's production
activity would be set at a ceiling corresponding to the level existing
six months hence. Thirteen other Ohio cities with populations
of over 50,000 were also classified as current shortage areas, although
not all were designated as having "acute" shortages.

The next month, however, at the beginning of Columbus' most im-
portant year from the point of view of the inauguration of new man-
power controls, the system of classifying labor markets was changed,
and Columbus was placed in a category that made it eligible for re-
newal of old war contracts. Nearly all labor market areas with a
central city of 50,000 or more were classified in one of four labor
supply categories. Columbus was placed in Group II, which included
areas of labor stringency which had labor shortages or anticipated
them within six months. War supply contracts held in these areas might
be renewed, but no new contracts were to be let if alternative facili-
ties for the production of the proposed products existed elsewhere.
Columbus remained in this category for the remainder of the war.

Group I areas were those with current acute labor shortages and
were not to have existing supply contracts renewed or have new con-
tracts awarded if alternative facilities existed elsewhere. These
provisions proved unusually helpful in obtaining compliance by employers
with local WMC programs, since employers feared that lack of coopera-
tion might have eventuated in reclassification of a Group II area into

7. Ibid., October 21, 1942.
a Group J area, and the consequent curtailment of present contracts.

At the close of 1942, the manpower situation was bad and getting worse all over the nation. A sign of the times was the dissolution of the Works Projects Administration by Presidential Executive Order. A Columbus newspaper columnist surveyed the local scene: "Waitresses are at a premium and service is poor, war workers go to work here in converted hearse cars from as far away as 40 miles, girls and women are seen in places you never dreamed of before and out in the early hours of the morning, on Saturday night High Street is filled with soldiers and sailors, and there are 'defense' picture shows that end at five o'clock in the morning."8

On December 8, 1942, the Columbus War Manpower Area was established and a director appointed. Problems that he said would occupy his immediate attention were: transfer of workers from non-essential to needed occupations; labor pirating; job-shopping; excessive labor turnover and absenteeism in war plants; full utilization of work forces; maximum utilization of the local labor potential, including training and recruiting of women, older workers, and the physically handicapped; expansion of training programs, and the prevention of uncontrolled migration of workers into the city. He felt that the problem in the area was not sufficiently acute at that time to warrant the "invasion" of department stores and other service establishments to obtain women for essential war work, but promised that the day would come, as would a day for much more intensive utilization of women in all kinds of em-

8. Ibid., December 7, 1942.
At the same time, the first area manpower stabilization plans were introduced in Ohio, one in Warren and one in Youngstown. At the beginning of 1943, they were the only two cities in the state with such plans. By the fall, all Ohio industrial areas were operating on some kind of amended stabilization plan, and six Group II areas in the state had inaugurated controlled referral programs which required virtually all job seekers to pass through the employment service office, a program that was not found necessary for implementation in Columbus until the following summer.

Despite the more acute manpower situation in other Ohio areas, Columbus personnel managers reporting to employment service representatives were unanimous in their insistence that the local situation was desperate. Some reported inability to meet production quotas and delivery dates because of an insufficiency of manpower; others reported that the available workers were unreliable, both as to the quality of their work and as to their daily attendance. Some, whose firm's pre-war success rested upon the cornerstone of low wages, complained of inability to attract and retain workers because of these low wages, and now sought to enlist WMC's help in getting the War Labor Board to grant an upward revision of basic wage rates. Still other firms complained of inability to hold workers because many allegedly quit to "go off on binges" after having earned enough money. Small employers said that the large ones were getting all the good manpower; the old established firms said that the new glamour companies were at an advantage with their higher starting wage rates, and the non-war industries said they

9. Ibid., December 8, 1942.
were losing men to war industries, and this with the help of official
WMC policy.

But there is evidence that much of the turnover experienced in
these early months was desirable turnover, and for that reason was
encouraged by the manpower authorities. From the beginning of the
defense effort there were national as well as local efforts made to
get people out of less essential into more essential occupations and
industries. But that there was excessive job shopping, was also
evident. Still, this "excessive" job shopping was really in line with
the traditional teaching that one should sell his services to the
highest bidder. This teaching was not easily unlearned, and conse­
sequently the plea that workers stay in essential jobs or quickly move
into them was to a large extent unheeded. Employers were also asked
to drop operating norms that were deeply ingrained in the business
culture of our society. It was now unethical to lure workers away
from competitors by offering higher wages, better working conditions,
more authority, and a brighter and more secure future. Moreover, many
found it difficult to respond favorably to government requests that
they hire without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin of
the applicant, this appearing to them to be in the nature of the kind
of regimentation and intimidation traditionally repugnant to a free
enterprise system and against which the entire war effort was directed.

At the same time efforts to bring low cost government housing to
the community as a way of solving the growing shortage of rental dwell-

10. Current ES-270 reports on file in Columbus office, Ohio State Em-
ployment Service.
ings were being opposed by the natural peace-time, free enterprise instincts of local real estate interests, and attempts to extend existing public transportation facilities to the new airplane plant and expand similar facilities to the growing armed forces depot were resisted on the equally legitimate ground that the return from such an operation would be insufficient to justify its being undertaken. The overall result was increasingly more job-shifting and turnover, labor pirating, labor hoarding, lack of full utilization of the available manpower supply, increased absenteeism, and a high incidence of out-migration of recent immigrants.

In February, 1943, local manpower officials estimated that Columbus war plants would have to fill over 30,000 more jobs during 1943 by employing women, high school students, and "other groups not now profitably employed". The area WMC director felt that while the labor situation in the coming year would be tight, the area's resident manpower supply would be adequate and that immigration would be unnecessary. However, his public statements were not without some forebodings for the employers who were already bearing the brunt of the increased demand for war workers. He said that "It is unfortunate, but I am afraid many of the places not engaged in war production will be hit hard." And the chief of the Reports and Analysis Division of the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, giving more tangible substance to this remark, estimated that another 7,000 persons would be required to shift from less essential to essential industries in the coming year.

11. Columbus Dispatch, February 14, 1943.
The vast majority of the new job openings expected within the year were to be at the aircraft plant, the armed forces depot, and the roller bearing plant located in Columbus. The employment service was doing everything it could to channel as many persons to them as possible. With the quality of the available labor declining, the employment service was aided by the fact that many of the larger establishments now requested unskilled workers, some to take unskilled jobs, some to undergo one or two-day in-plant training, and others to attend the aircraft training school prior to being put on production lines. Moreover, as early as the summer of 1942 the head of the federalized employment service had issued a directive providing for the establishment of priorities in service to essential employers. While the order was met with opposition in Ohio, the Columbus employment service office followed its provisions by attempting to place all applicants in war-connected jobs. If found incapable of being so placed they were generally referred to non-war-connected firms which had vacancies created by shifts of men to essential industry.

By the summer of 1943 the manpower picture was getting increasingly critical, and several new and divergent problems arose. On the one hand the area's supply of male labor that might be transferred into essential activity was approaching depletion, and the available male labor pool appeared actually to be contracting as Selective Service withdrawals continued at a high rate. On the other hand, area and migrant farmers who had taken industrial jobs during the winter months created a manpower gap as they returned to agricultural work. Many of these had been in hard and enervating foundry occupations, with the re-
sult that increased placements in these industries were required. But of the relatively few male applicants coming to the employment service office, only a handful met the necessary physical requirements and even some of these were reluctant to accept foundry employment. In addition, turnover at these establishments often exceeded 10 percent during the hot summer months, thus causing a considerable production curtailment, a situation which, it was later revealed, had nation-wide repercussions.

By the end of the year conditions had not improved. The area director told the press: "We need at least 225 foundry workers, and we need them badly." And as early as April, chemical fertilizer plants in the area, of which there were four, reported acute labor shortages, primarily of unskilled manual laborers needed to sack, shovel, and load fertilizer. As a result of these bottlenecks in various fertilizer plants, central Ohio farmers engaged in vital food production were in some instances required to postpone spring sowing. In the fall, the same companies again reported desperate shortages of husky men needed to prepare the shipment of fertilizer in time for October wheat planting. The situation was especially serious then because wheat is the most universally fertilized crop.

Meanwhile, shortages of male laborers were again plaguing the Columbus City Service Department, which was reported to be operating with 200 fewer men than it had the previous summer. Great difficulty

13. Ibid., December 14, 1943.
15. Ibid., September 9, 1943.
was experienced in maintaining the normal summer garbage collection schedule, and regular refuse collection was suspended altogether. It was collected only if a group of persons in a neighborhood asked for a city truck and shoveled the rubbish onto the truck themselves.\textsuperscript{16}

Bleak as the current picture was, manpower officials, on the basis of employer reports, estimated the need of another 18,000 workers in the twelve-month period ending in June, 1943, 8,200 of these to be men. Transfers, incommuting, and immigration were expected to add just over 7,000 men, the source of the rest being uncertain.\textsuperscript{17}

The result was that the area WMC director, with the approval of the newly organized War Manpower Management-Labor Committee, and in accordance with the spirit of the newly established Columbus Area Manpower Stabilization Plan, instructed the local USES not to refer able-bodied men to job openings unless the employer had established the fact that male labor was required. This was accompanied by intensified programs to urge women to enter the labor market or to change to essential jobs, and to urge employers to hire women wherever possible. The local USES began talking about expanding its counselling services to employers to include plant surveys to determine the maximum number of women that could be used, and the making of recommendations on reorganizing job operations so that women might be employed.\textsuperscript{18}

By July, despite the great increase in the number of male workers, the proportion of women in the labor force had risen above its 1940 level.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., July 7, 1943.

\textsuperscript{17} Columbus Labor Market Report, USES, July, 1943.

\textsuperscript{18} USES report in Columbus Dispatch, July 7, 1943.
At the same time, serious shortages of skilled workers were reported, the area's labor market analyst reporting that employers were to some extent responsible for failing to forestall this emergency by full utilization of training facilities in the area. Thus, between May and September, 1943, the number of critical shortages in a group of reporting establishments accounting for about 66 percent of area essential employment, tripled. 20

To add to the difficulty, a rumor to the effect that war industry in Columbus was slackening was being widely circulated, resulting in a reduced willingness of job seekers to accept referral to such industries and in increased difficulty in recruiting non-working women into the labor force. Manpower officials, although forced to admit that several hundred workers had been furloughed during May and June "because of slowdowns in production of certain plentiful war products", nevertheless emphasized that Columbus and central Ohio were still in danger of a serious manpower shortage before the end of the summer. Moreover, they observed that when layoffs occur at various war plants "strings are attached to each man so that when production resumes he will be recalled to the essential post he previously held." 21 It was further pointed out that despite these layoffs there were numerous firms that would take all the men they could get. By the beginning of 1944 rumors took the form of predictions that the war was about to end, the consequences being much like those of the previous summer, except that they appeared to be accompanied by increased turnover and an apparent in-

crease in outmigration.

In September, 1943, Columbus unemployment had dropped to the lowest point in the history of the state unemployment compensation program. On July 18 there were 2,234 names in the employments service's active file of available workers. The majority of these were currently employed but sought better jobs. Also included were those unemployed because of physical or mental handicaps. Nearly 1,600 of the listed persons were women, 632 of those being day workers whose names were required to be carried from day to day but who for all practical purposes were not unemployed. Of those on the active list, 230 sought clerical or sales work, 690 service work, 263 professional or managerial work, and 85 agricultural work. Only 158 were skilled workers, nearly all of whom were currently employed. Thirty-six of these were women. The unskilled numbered 227, 157 of whom were women. 22

In October, a new policy requiring all hiring of persons in critical occupations to be done through USES was inaugurated throughout Region V. The measure was designed to hold down migration, check wasteful turnover resulting from disruptive recruitment practices, and to enable companies with the most legitimate claim to skilled workers to get them. In December, the Columbus administrative area inaugurated a compulsory 48-hour work week for all employers of eight or more persons, a program that had been instituted through authority of a Presidential Executive Order by the WMC in 32 other critical areas nine months earlier. Several months later the area director expressed the belief that this measure prevented the area's reclassification into

22 USES report in Ibid., September 9, 1943.
Throughout the war, turnover and absenteeism proved to be the greatest and most persistent problems, the elimination of which might have obviated the need for many controls. Between September 1 and December 1, 1943, for example, over 14,000 persons in the area changed jobs, but only 150 persons were added to the working labor force. This, the area director pointed out, was too much turnover. He was unwilling to grant that more than a very little of it was justifiable. In the case of absenteeism, pre-war norms of between 1.5 and 3 percent rose to between 6 and 10 percent during the war. In some industries the rates were persistently higher, and during the holiday seasons and on weekends often rose to 15 percent. Campaigns to reduce both turnover and absenteeism were undertaken at various times, but none with any apparently lasting effects. Such campaigns were directed at both employers and employees, the former to improve working conditions and personnel practices, and the latter to refrain from unnecessary job changes or absences.

Throughout 1944 the Columbus area manpower situation alternated between crisis and breathing spell. In January, there were about 90,000 persons employed in essential war activity in the Columbus area, with the peak expected to be reached in the fall of 1944. Current manpower shortages in January numbered about 1,200, major shortages being divided industrially as follows: 250 in bearings, 150 in meat packing, 300 in government warehouses, 250 in foundries, 150 in fertilizer, and

23. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, April 14, 1944.
24. Columbus Dispatch, December 13, 1943.
"several hundred" in aircraft. In March the revision in production plans of a few local firms gave rise to unfounded rumors of production cutbacks, seriously affecting recruitment efforts of USES. The tightness of the situation was somewhat relieved in April when Selective Service announced the total suspension of drafting men over 26 years of age who proved themselves to be in essential industry. The next month the burden of proof that men over 26 were not engaged in essential work shifted to the Selective Service Boards themselves. The area director hailed these policies as temporary breathing spells until more high school students became available in June.

Meanwhile it was announced that Columbus had lost an estimated 1,000 workers during the previous few months, and that about 3,000 additional workers were needed as of June. Aside from one major war plant where the loss of workers was due to a planned reduction, most of the losses were due to Selective Service withdrawals, outmigration, and female withdrawals from the labor market. The area director told the Management-Labor Committee that "The labor picture in Columbus is the most serious it has ever been. Applications for priority ratings now on file indicate that urgent manpower needs are spreading from war plants to essential civilian activities such as food processing and allied industries." The greatest immediate need, he said, was in government warehouses and foundries.

The imminent vacation release of 2,000 high school students and teachers was expected to be of some help. However, a special USES

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25. Ibid., January 6, 1944.
26. Ibid., May 22, 1944, and Minutes, Columbus Area Management Labor Committee meeting, May 23, 1944.
"buttonhole" recruitment drive was undertaken June 5. This involved stopping men seen on downtown and neighborhood streets and inquiring about their employment and occupational skills. The state WMC director expressed belief that unless the current trend was immediately checked Columbus was in danger of being reclassified into Group I. He told a Columbus group that the situation "isn't growing more critical as much as it is growing more dangerous. Earlier in the war we anticipated shortages and made provisions for them. Now the general public isn't so ready to accept a critical manpower situation. Public psychology has changed as people feel we are nearing the end of the road. This is our biggest problem—to convince people that the war is not yet won and to keep them on the job until military demands decrease. Then employment may drop." 27

During the first three weeks of July, when the newly inaugurated controlled referral program required virtually all job seekers to go through the USES office, referrals averaged between 400 and 500 daily. Still shortages remained high, especially in foundries, fertilizer plants, and government warehouses. Foundries needed 750 workers immediately. One large laundry, because of manpower shortages, announced cancellation of service to about 25 large commercial accounts. Columbus railroads reported a shortage of about 1,400 workers, most of these being track laborers. 28 As the result, it was decided at a joint meeting of the Management-Labor Committee and the Manpower Priorities Committee that less essential should be asked to take a second 3 percent cut in the number of their

27. Reported in Columbus Dispatch, May 22, 1944.
male employees so as to expose the men so freed to employment service channeling into firms on the "must" list. To focus USES emphasis on the most urgent producers, the Priorities Committee slashed the number of firms on the priority list from 29 to 25, denying requests of 11 firms for priority assistance in obtaining 600 additional male workers.29

By the end of July "end of war" rumors were again disturbingly present. In August, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain aggravated this situation by publicly stating that the war's end was near. The result was that during August, September, and October area employers lost about 4,000 workers. Some of these reductions were due to better utilization, contract terminations and slight cutbacks, and other factors not associated with diminishing labor supply. But a large part of the losses were believed to have been caused by newspaper publicity predicting the imminent end of the war.30

Firms planning reconversion programs were making newspaper announcements of these plans daily, and the general effect of their action was felt in the increased volume of appeals at the employment service by presently employed persons seeking permission to get out of war jobs and into jobs with apparently greater security. The USES estimated in August that Columbus war industry losses to peacetime pursuits were at the rate of about six per day, which was considerably lower than the experience in most Ohio cities. This was attributed to published plans of more than 90 percent of Columbus firms immediately to reconvert to peacetime manufacturing at the war's end. USES's greatest concern in

29. Columbus Dispatch, August 24, 1944.
30. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, December 20, 1944.
31. USES official in Columbus Dispatch, August 23, 1944.
this regard was the white-collar, technically skilled war worker in the
$5,000 a year income group. In September, about 25 percent of this
group applying for releases from current jobs sought employment in
peacetime jobs. Only 10 percent of the appealing wage workers had
the same motive. 32

Although employment was declining in the fall of 1944, current
shortages in December had not increased, a fact which indicated a de-
clining demand for labor in general. An Army procurement officer
told the Area Production Urgency Committee in December that he did not
believe that the principal current bottlenecks were due to insufficient
manpower. The WMC's area director estimated that about 80 percent of
the production bottlenecks could be attributed to such factors as
engineering changes, material shortages, and company personnel problems,
rather than to shortages of qualified workers. Still, there were
some manpower shortages, and these were being aggravated by several new
developments. Up to July, 1944, Columbus was being benefited by an in-
migration rate that was four times the outmigration rate. However,
the tide turned, and by November the area director reported that the
number of outmigrants now "considerably exceeds" the number of workers
coming into Columbus. 35 At the same time critical priority jobs were
being filled at the rate of 30 per day, not even sufficient to meet the
rate of turnover in these jobs.

32. USES report in Ibid., September 27, 1944.
33. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, Decem-
ber 20, 1944.
34. Idem, and Columbus Market Report, USES, December, 1944.
35. Columbus Dispatch, November 3, 1944.
36. Idem.
There was also evidence that some of the firms at which there had been production cutbacks or labor-saving improvements were hoarding the labor surplus that was thus created, a surplus that was urgently needed by other employers. Added to these difficulties was an apparently increasing rate of female withdrawals and apparently strange evaporation of some of the male manpower. Reports submitted to the local WMC from employers of eight or more persons showed that the decline of male employment in the second half of 1944 was not limited to essential industry. The USES's labor market analyst ended her November report with this inconclusive observation: "Just where these male workers have gone is somewhat debatable, since it seems that neither essential nor civilian industry is reporting employment gains." 38

In January, 1945, the rise in the separation rate was temporarily interrupted, and priority orders were filled at the most rapid rate since priority referral started six months before. This was attributed to new talk of a "work or fight" order and to a "work or else" threat made by Selective Service officials in Washington. Between January 1 and 12, 587 out of 887 critical jobs listed with USES were filled and the prospect of soon filling the rest was excellent. 39 Persons coming to the employment service in search of new or different jobs were also found to be more pliant. More than 270 men who came to the employment office between January 1 and 9 were persuaded by

37. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, December 20, 1944.
employment service representatives to return to their previous employment. This compares with only 85 such cases in all of December. Meanwhile general shortages continued, those being considerably alleviated, however, by 435 German prisoners of war working at the armed forces depot. In April, the problem of getting personnel for seasonal work in the half dozen vegetable canneries in the central Ohio area again raised urgent manpower problems. Even when a plant employing more than 1,200 workers was destroyed by fire the next month, the manpower problem was not greatly alleviated.

Despite additional production cutbacks, despite the increasing number of returning veterans, and despite the return to Columbus of workers who had migrated to other areas for jobs in 1940 and 1941, manpower continued to be scarce. On May 24, the Manpower Priorities Committee granted 1,517 out of 2,500 priority requests. This was the largest number of priority requests in the history of the local priorities program. In addition it granted increases in male ceilings in the case of 100 requests, this also being the largest number up to that time.

The next month, with the European phase of the war ended, and with Detroit and other cities in Region V experiencing acute unemployment, Columbus entered a period of one of its severest shortages. The railroads, now engaged in transferring troops and materials to the West Coast, were in need of over 1,000 yard laborers; foundries

40. Idem.
41. Minutes, Columbus Area Manpower Priorities Committee meeting, May 24, 1945.
had continuous, and especially seasonal, shortages; supply depots worked around the clock and needed several hundred men and women, and the aircraft plant indicated a need for another 1,500 workers by September as it undertook to do work at the local plant it had previously sub-contracted to other areas. The Management-Labor Committee, advised of an impending reclassification of Columbus into Group I, urged local employers to re-examine their manpower requisitions for possible downward revisions to forestall such an eventuality. In July the aircraft plant indicated an even greater forthcoming manpower need as its production activities were to be expanded in anticipation of heavy naval air action in the forthcoming Pacific campaign. Government officials felt that additional manpower was not available locally and that about 2,000 persons would have to be recruited from outside the area. Aircraft, procurement, and manpower officials agreed that this would require the erection of federal prefabricated houses to accommodate the increased population, a controversial issue on which, for all practical purposes, the Columbus Area War Manpower Commission did its swan song.

This chapter has presented—briefly and in broad perspective—a history of the manpower problems and the stabilization programs in the Columbus area during the war. Its purpose has been to provide a framework for what is to follow. In later chapters, and particularly in Chapters 5-8, the materials which have been summarized here will be analyzed in considerably greater detail.
CHAPTER 4

MANPOWER CONTROLS: POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATION*

Manpower allocation in the Columbus area, and, with notable exceptions, throughout the nation, was fairly automatic in 1940, 1941, and early 1942. The latter year marked the beginning of serious manpower problems in many geographical areas. In June of that year the nation's first so-called Area Manpower Stabilization Plan went into effect on an experimental basis in Baltimore, Maryland. Two years later, along with many other communities all over the nation, the Columbus area got one too.

The comparatively late coming of rigid manpower controls to the Columbus area is indicative of the fact that, compared with certain other communities, it never really had an exceptionally formidable manpower problem. Indeed, when controls did come to Columbus they were introduced as part of a regional and national plan, rather than solely at the instigation of local War Manpower Commission officials, as was the case in the more critical shortage areas. The fact that controls came to Columbus "from above" at the same time they came to almost all other industrial areas suggests the the seriousness of the manpower problem in the Columbus area was about average. This is supported by the fact that during virtually the entire war period, Columbus was designated as a "labor stringency" area, the designation which the largest single proportion of the other 272 industrial areas also had. Thus over a hundred of the areas were designated as Group II, or labor stringency areas, as compared with less than 40 in Group I, or current acute short-

* The manpower stabilization plans adopted in the Columbus Area are reproduced in Appendix A, below.
age areas. The remainder of the areas were deemed to have currently adequate or surplus supplies of manpower.¹

A. The Evolution of Manpower Controls: A Calendar of Events.

By way of summarizing and describing the national and local manpower controls that came to bear upon the Columbus situation, and by way of providing a rough outline for their further analysis, an annotated manpower controls calendar is presented below.

MANPOWER CONTROLS CALENDAR

With Special Reference to National and Columbus Area Controls

1940

May 28 - Council of National Defense was established and expanded in June to consist of agencies whose jobs were to help facilitate the translation of Congressional appropriations for defense into actual war production. One of the member agencies was the Labor Division, whose job was to insure adequate labor supplies for defense production through its Coordinating Committee on Labor Supply.

1941

Jan. 7 - Office of Production Management was established, the work of the Labor Division of the Council of National Defense being transferred to it on March 17, 1941. The Labor Division's defense responsibilities were extended to provide for labor recruitment in cooperation with and through the use of existing facilities of agencies concerned with manpower problems. The Bureau of Employment Security of the Federal Security Agency, with its affiliated State Services was later to function in this direction, chiefly through twelve regional labor supply committees.

Jan. 1 - All state and territorial employment service offices were officially integrated into and brought under the jurisdiction of the United States Employment Service of the Federal Security Agency. Purpose: National centralization of employment service activities.

Jan. 12 - National War Labor Board was established, succeeding the National Defense Mediation Board. Function: To handle labor disputes, and, later, to administer wage stabilization.

Jan. 13 - War Production Board was established, succeeding the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board and the Office of Production Management. Function: To direct and coordinate war production. Transferred to it was OPM's Labor Division and Labor Supply and Training Program. The function of these was adequately to staff plants engaged in war production, using existing federal, state, and local agencies, with their individual approval, as operating arms to get the job done. In pursuit of this objective USES's twelve regional labor supply committees were also shifted to WPE.

Apr. 18 - War Manpower Commission was established under the Office of Emergency Management (created May 25, 1940) "for the purpose of insuring the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower". It centralized all previous labor supply and training functions under its jurisdiction.

Sept. 15 - Wages were frozen by National War Labor Board, except in cases of gross inequities and sub-standard rates.

Sept. 17 - United States Employment Service was officially brought under jurisdiction of WMC. Purpose: Further to centralize manpower controls and to extend USES activities beyond its customary voluntary service functions. WMC became an operating as well as a coordinating agency. Twelve WMC Regions established nationally.

Oct. 3 - Office of Economic Stabilization was established. Purpose: Devise policies and regulations to stabilize the economy by keeping down inflationary tendencies in rents, prices, and wages.

Dec. 5 - War Manpower Commission given complete control over the mobilization and allocation of the nation's manpower. It was to coordinate the establishment and allocation of manpower needs for both the armed forces and war production. Voluntary enlistments of males between 18 and 38 years of age into the armed forces were halted. WMC was empowered
to direct that all workers be hired through USES if necessary, and to require workers to transfer from less essential to more essential jobs.

WMC was directed to establish a system of manpower priorities to guide allocation between military, industrial, and agricultural needs, and to designate occupations according to their essentiality. All existing government recruiting agencies were either centralized under or encouraged to cooperate with WMC.

Dec. 8 - Columbus War Manpower Area was established, with a director appointed to integrate the work of various governmental agencies with the manpower branches of procurement agencies, to consult with Selective Service, to make determinations as to the state of the local labor market, and to give his attention to various local manpower and manpower-connected problems.

Dec. 10 - Manning Tables were introduced in Ohio war plants to help them tally their own standings in the interplay of Selective Service inductions, occupational deferments, and trained replacements.

1943

Apr. 8 - Presidential "Hold the Line" order was issued as Executive Order No. 9328. It forced WMC to tighten controls.

Apr. 18 - Issuance of WMC Regulation No. 4 prohibiting the transfer of workers to other jobs "except when the transfer is clearly in the interest of the war effort", or if continuation in the present job would be an undue personal hardship. In and out migrants had to clear through USES.

Apr. 19 - Manpower Stabilization Program for WMC Region V was established, containing the provisions of WMC Regulation No. 4. Columbus was subject to the program's provisions, USES becoming the operating agency for their administration. Persons employed in essential establishments could leave their jobs only under certain specified conditions. Separated workers were required to obtain statements of availibility.

May 22 - Issuance of WMC Regulation No. 5 providing for rights of appeal from WMC-USES actions by aggrieved employers and workers. The measure was to carry out the requirements of the Presidential Executive Order of Dec. 2, 1942, giving WMC broad powers over civilian manpower.

June 29 - Columbus Area War Manpower Management-Labor Committee, appointed on June 26, adopted the first Columbus Area Man-
Manpower Stabilization Program, which gave a local character to the Region V Plan as it applied in Columbus. The Committee, composed of five representatives from local management and five from local labor, and chaired by the local WMC area director, was to advise the area director, suggest and vote on local manpower measures, and give local consent to them.

Sept. 5 - Manpower Utilization division established in Columbus Area WMC. Since creation of this division on a national level in February, 1943, a field representative of the Regional Office had been handling utilization activities in the Columbus Area.

July 6 - Columbus Area Manpower Stabilization Program, approved by the Regional WMC Office, became effective.

Oct. 15 - Effective date of WMC Regulation No. 7 prescribing certain minimum standards for incorporation into all stabilization plans throughout the nation. Major provision not previously in effect in Columbus: Requirement that all hiring of persons in 'critical' occupations be done through or with consent of USRS. A national list of 149 critical occupations was published, to which certain local shortage occupations could be added.

Oct. 18 - First 'Locally Needed' designation given to a non-war firm in the Columbus Area. Such firms were in non-war activities that were necessary for maintenance of local health and welfare or were of important indirect help to essential firms. Persons employed in such establishments were subject to stabilization controls.

Dec. 1 - Compulsory 48-hour week for all firms in the Columbus Area employing eight or more persons begun. Program was to become enforceable January 1, 1944.

Dec. 23 - Selective Service System transferred out of WMC and became an independent agency again.

1944

Jan. 11 - Columbus plan was amended so that persons in essential activity without previous industrial experience would be given statements of availability within 15 days of being hired if they could show undue hardship. This was part of national policy to reduce turnover of these workers.

Jan. 14 - Columbus WMC Area was expanded to include eight additional Ohio counties, although the Columbus Stabilization Plan
applied only to five of the six counties contiguous to Franklin County.

Mar. 16 - First meeting of the newly established Columbus Area Manpower Priorities Committee. Purpose: To provide priority ratings by occupations and number of persons in each occupation or by plant departments of essential establishments to assure equitable distribution of the available manpower.

Apr. 23 - Modified Area Production Urgency Committee was established for the Columbus and central Ohio area. Purpose: To determine the urgency rating of each plant in the area, certifying the ratings to the Manpower Priorities Committee for consideration in its priorities actions and to WEP for consideration in making contract allocations.

July 1 - Under provisions of the National WMC's Expanded Manpower Program effective this day, the Columbus Area WMC established Male Employment Ceilings for all employers of 50 or more persons and inaugurated a Controlled Referral Program under which employers of eight or more might hire only those male applicants who had been referred to them by USES. Area priority firms and several special recruitment and placement agencies, such as the U. S. Civil Service Commission, the Railroad Retirement Board, college placement offices, and private employment agencies, were exempted from the latter requirement, however. Employment ceilings were worked out by the local USES-WMC and subject to Manpower Priorities Committee approval.

Aug. 4 - Enforcement provisions of WMC-USES programs and policies were strengthened by an Office of War Mobilization directive. While previously non-cooperative employers were only denied USES referrals, WEP was now directed to withhold materials, equipment, gas and electric power, and transportation facilities to refractory employers.

Aug. 14 - Columbus Area male employment ceiling program was extended to include employers of between eight and 50 workers.

Sept. 26 - Requirement of inter-area clearances for outmigrants was abandoned by the Columbus Area WMC. Public announcement was withheld.

Oct. 3 - Requirement of inter-area clearances for all migrants abandoned by Columbus Area WMC.

Oct. 3 - National WMC abandoned 60-day limit on freedom of veterans from control provisions of National Minimum Standards. Previous controls required that no person in essential or locally needed activities could be employed by another area.
employer for 60 days after he left his job without obtaining an official release.

Dec. 15 - National manpower priorities ratings became effective. Accordingly, five priority categories were established to be applied nationally to appropriate firms and industries, thus shifting much of the emphasis from attempting to meet local manpower needs to attempting to meet the needs of high priority firms, regardless of their geographic location.

1945

Jan. 22 - In line with provisions of a national WMC policy announced January 19, Columbus USES now referred applicants only to 'suitable' employment in high priority jobs, rather than giving them an option among jobs in all essential industries. Gate hiring privileges were to be reviewed so as to limit them to firms on high national 'must' lists, to firms crucially needed locally, and to firms in essential production with geographical locations remote from central labor markets or means of transportation. Consent arrangements with other hiring agencies were tightened. National Priority Categories were increased to eight.

Feb. 8 - In line with tightened National WMC manpower controls, the requirement to hire male applicants exclusively through USES was extended to firms with less than eight employees.

Feb. 26 - War Manpower Commission was directed to enforce a nationwide midnight curfew on night clubs and amusement places effective this day by denying male referrals to such establishments.

May 9 - Curfew restrictions lifted nationally.

May 11 - National WMC director announced that the continuation of all or part of manpower controls was to be left to the discretion of WMC area officials after consultation with area Management-Labor Committees. Columbus Area controls were continued without change.

July 1 - National WMC Management-Labor Committee affirmed the policy of permitting local directors and Management-Labor Committees greater authority to lift manpower controls. Columbus Area controls were continued without change.

Aug. 15 - With end of hostilities, all hiring restrictions were lifted in Region V, including the Columbus Area.

The following is a brief discussion of the administrative features of the stabilization program in the Columbus Area. A detailed analysis
of its operation is presented in Chapters 5 - 8.

B. Administrative Features of the Stabilization Program.

Five major administrative or policy-making groups were responsible for most of the work in connection with operating the local stabilization program. The local War Manpower Commission was the coordinating agency and was ultimately responsible for getting the manpower job done. Its job was to study local hiring practices, the availability of community facilities to handle the increased supply of labor, and to make determinations as to the stringency of the labor supply and the urgency of labor demand. Its director was responsible for initiating new manpower measures locally, and, with the cooperation of the other manpower organizations, was to take meliorative action in connection with such problems as labor pirating, job shopping, and excessive labor turnover and absenteeism in war plants. Also, he was to develop programs for promoting the transfer of workers from less essential to essential occupations and employments, full utilization of available manpower, recruitment and training of workers, migration of workers into or out of the area, the placement of job seekers in the most essential employments, the allocation of available labor to local employers in proportion to the urgency of their needs, and community conditions that would increase the volume or stability of the labor supply.

WMC's operating arm was the local office of the United States Employment Service, through which controlled job seekers were required to pass and from which affected applicants were required to obtain referral cards before becoming eligible for employment in local establishments.
The local office took manpower requisitions from employers, referred and placed workers, ruled on the legitimacy of releases (statements of availability) granted to persons leaving essential industries, issued statements of availability, conducted anti-turnover and anti-absenteeism campaigns, made job analyses and utilization studies in essential plants in order to help increase the utilization of available manpower, recruited workers and cleared migrants coming to or leaving the area, conducted compliance audits, advised and cooperated with WMC and the other agencies in the making and administration of policies, and collected and published regular statistical and analytical reports on current and anticipated manpower conditions.

Working directly with the WMC area director was the Area Management-Labor Committee, composed of 10 local management and labor representatives, and existing primarily to give local consent to the measures that were finally adopted. It also performed the important and time-consuming task of acting as a final local appeals board to which aggrieved employers and workers could take their complaints about stabilization controls.

The other two policy-making and administrative groups were the Area Manpower Priorities Committee and the Modified Area Production Urgency Committee. Both were composed of local procurement officers of the various armed services and the War Production Board, and of representatives from such government organizations as WMC, Office of Defense Transportation, and Smaller War Plants Corporation. The Priorities Committee gave priority ratings to the manpower needs of the various local firms, and, with the cooperation of USES, set manpower ceilings.
The Production Urgency Committee gave urgency ratings to firms based upon the products they produced. These were taken into consideration in the establishment of manpower priorities. The Priorities Committee was instructed to give no preferential benefits to firms that were in non-compliance with stabilization provisions, particularly those which persisted in discriminatory hiring and malutilization of manpower, hired ineligible workers, failed to undertake training and upgrading programs, or failed fully to cooperate with USES. In a further effort to obtain compliance, USES was empowered to withhold its services to non-cooperating employers and freely to grant statements of availability to employees of these employers. These powers were the extent of the measures of compulsion available to the manpower authorities in their dealings with employers.

Powers of compulsion over workers consisted chiefly in USES' right to refuse to refer applicants who were required to be hired through or with consent of USES to jobs other than those for which they were deemed most suitable, or the power to withhold USES referral for 60 days if a worker had left his previous essential employment unjustifiably and without a clearance statement.

The Management-Labor Committee played a most important role in the local manpower program, largely by modifying and giving a local flavor to manpower measures that WMC had proposed, and also by establishing local standards and exceptions to the way in which they were to be administered. An examination of the minutes of the Committee's meetings is very revealing on these points. For example, in giving the local
WAC-USES power to require workers to transfer from one plant to another in the interest of the war effort, the Committee did so only reluctantly and only after a considerable lapse of time and the expression of much dissatisfaction with the proposal. Both management and labor representatives were dissatisfied with it, with the result that the area director never employed the power.

On questions dealing with alleged provoked discharges and provoked quits, similar reluctance to establish administrative machinery to handle the cases was indicated by the Committee, with the final result that each case was settled by personal negotiation between workers and employers. The Committee generally suggested negotiation in specific cases and a Committee member often acted as mediator. Cases involving unions, or tending to touch upon matters covered by union-management agreements, were avoided by the Committee. Indeed, local stabilization plans included provisions to the effect that nothing in the plans was to change, modify, or restrict any union contract, civil service regulation, labor-management agreement, law, or ordinance. The Committee also avoided other controversial questions, dealing specifically with racial discrimination and the extent of efforts made by various employers to solve their own manpower problems.

In the hands of the skillful and trusted area director the Columbus Area was fortunate in having, the Management-Labor Committee did not simply function as an agency through which certain proposed programs were cleared, but actually functioned as a community rallying force. It carried out all its formal functions of fitting local programs into the outlines of national and regional plans, and it undertook such diverse
tasks as programming anti-turnover and anti-absenteeism drives, obtaining community cooperation to facilitate the affairs of war workers, evaluating the operation of local plans, facilitating compliance on all levels, and promoting a community feeling of participation and consultation. Because of the enlightened and diplomatic leadership of the area director, the Committee became a highly motivated, enthusiastic, and devoted group. Since USES-WMC had no real enforcement powers, these qualities made the Committee a vital force in getting the kind of community support that was so necessary for the program's successful operation on a voluntary basis.

The job of the local Management-Labor Committee was, in effect, to help accomplish by voluntary community support what the nation appeared reluctant to do by force of legal compulsion. The degree of support forthcoming from Committee members, and the intensity of their efforts to mobilize community support, determined the effectiveness of the local program. But full Committee support was not always forthcoming. Sometimes it adopted a proposed program only because the National Committee had done so and the local committee felt obliged to make the best of it. Other times it made amendments, modifications, and allowed exceptions which sapped the strength of proposed programs, simply because some or all of its members felt that local conditions did not warrant the proposed measures, felt that they should be more flexible, or felt that their own private managerial or leadership domains would be unduly infringed upon by the proposed measures.

Thus the programs were in some respects diluted by the expression
of the institutional and personal biases of the Committee members. In many cases Committee members were perfectly aware that they were diluting controls and that the broader community interest suggested that more desirable courses be followed. But they also felt their actions to have been dictated by the tastes, ambitions, needs, and prejudices of their constituents. The Committee declined to enforce many of the provisions of stabilization because it feared that widespread lack of cooperation would follow. For the same reason it refused to remind recalcitrant employers and workers of possible restrictive steps that could be taken against them. In certain specific cases of lack of cooperation or outright violation, union or management Committee members personally contacted workers or employers respectively to iron out difficulties and in that way they avoided having to take firm policy stands.

The area director, on the other hand, was in no position to take a firm, positive stand with the Committee by demanding that the proposed programs be passed in their original form and administered to the letter, since without the Committee's support local employers and workers might have withdrawn their cooperation. Thus the need to maintain harmony within the group and to obtain its cooperation undoubtedly prevented the establishment of stronger controls and their more forthright administration. The middle course the area director was required to steer was frequently not the course best calculated to achieve all the goals of the stabilization effort. This was perhaps the greatest weakness of the program's local operation. Its dependence on consent required the watering down of controls to the point at which consent was forthcoming.
and that point was not necessarily one that would allow the projected job to be done rapidly and well.

Still, the Committee exhibited a good deal of statesmanship and understanding in dealing with the problems before it. But the extent to which such statesmanship was displayed was clearly a function of the extent to which its members were free from the pressures exerted by the functions their businesses or unions performed. It is patently clear from this experience that public committees can play a most important role in obtaining community support for what might otherwise be unpopular government programs, but it is also clear that the very act of establishing and relying on such committees invites dilution of the proposed programs, for the committees will not permit themselves to be reduced to rubber stamps. They will express the institutional and personal tastes and needs of their members in ways destructive of some of the aims of the officials who organized them.

Finally, there was another way in which the manpower program became diluted. This was the continuation of the peacetime routine of the Railroad Retirement Board and the U. S. Civil Service Commission acting as exclusive employment agencies in their respective industries. Thus national WMC policies required that railroad and civil service workers who sought to leave their jobs but were denied statements of availability from their employers were to appeal their cases to the Retirement Board and the Commission, respectively. Controlled referral and migration clearance activities were also to be handled through these agencies in cases involving workers seeking to take or leave jobs in
railroad or federal government employments. Hence there was a division of local referral and stabilization authority between USES and other agencies, a situation which unfortunately caused some confusion in the minds of workers who received conflicting directions about where to go under a program supposedly requiring all male and critical workers to pass through the public employment service. To some extent the confusion was mitigated by a local operating agreement among the three agencies, but the dilution of central authority was not avoided.
PART II

THE MANPOWER PROGRAM IN OPERATION
In this part of the study the various features of the Columbus Area stabilization and control program are critically examined from the point of their operation and effectiveness. It is the purpose of the analysis not only to discern how well the program operated, but also why it functioned as it did. Why, for example, although there was a nominal job freeze, was job turnover in essential plants higher than before the war when there was no such freeze? Why, although there had been an active and ostensibly fairly successful campaign to transfer men from less essential into essential employment, did 800 men suddenly appear for essential jobs the day following a Selective Service announcement that those in less essential work were to be reclassified for induction? Why, although there were ample facilities and constant encouragement to train workers for war work as early as 1940, was the amount of such training insufficient to meet local needs? Why, although they experienced apparently serious manpower shortages, were some employers successful in refusing to accept USNS referrals of Negroes? Why, with 30,000 persons daily traveling to war jobs in a new east side industrial area, was more regular public transportation not provided? Why, although local manpower committees had the power to pursue sterner policies, did they fail to pursue them when manpower problems were most critical?

These are the kinds of questions the answers to which are crucial in evaluating the manpower program with which the nation sought to get the production job done during World War II. It is not enough simply to know that certain measures did not work well; it is not enough to have passively anticipated that some of these measures would not work as well
in practice as in theory simply because "a certain amount of cheating is human nature"; and it is not enough to repeat that under the stimulus of a national emergency the appeal to patriotism will insure the successful operation of a voluntary program, and then indignantly to label persons who do not respond to the appeal as "unpatriotic". That is needed is a thorough crystallization of the human and the institutional causes and consequences of manpower stabilization's successes and failures.

This is the aim of the chapters in this part of the study.

The following four chapters analyze in detail the manpower problems during the war period and evaluate the programs that were attempted as solutions. Although all of the problems and programs were interacting, and therefore difficult to classify into distinct categories, they are nevertheless arranged here under four separate chapter headings. The first of these deals with certain problems of mobilization and stabilization, that is, with efforts to induce into the labor force the required number of persons and to keep them in essential jobs. Included under this heading are the problems of turnover, recruitment and placement, absenteeism, migration and commuting. The second and third deal with utilization problems, that is, efforts to make the most effective use of the manpower that was available for employment. The last chapter in the part examines some of the major institutional factors affecting the manpower program. Although the impact of institutional factors is a theme running through the entire study, this chapter is devoted to an examination of those whose effects were most pronounced.
CHAPTER 5
MANPOWER MOBILIZATION AND STABILIZATION: PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

A. Turnover.

a. The Problem. Turnover, or more accurately, the rate of turnover, may be defined as the ratio of separations or accessions to the average number of persons on a given payroll during a specified period. Separations and accessions are the major turnover variables, and each gives rise to a distinct turnover rate. A separation is a termination of employment of any of the three following kinds: quits, layoffs, and discharges. While a quit is generally initiated by the worker because of his desire to leave a given employment, it sometimes results from his physical incapacity, or, during the war, to his having been inducted into the service. Discharges and layoffs, on the other hand, are terminations at the will of the employer, the former with prejudice to the worker, the latter without. An accession is the hiring of a new employee or the rehiring of an old one. In its turnover statistics USES divided the number of separations and accessions by the average number of workers on the payroll and multiplied the figure by 100 to get the rate per 100 employees for the month. In compiling area turnover rates the actual figures for the several establishments were added and the general rates computed from the grand total. Thus each establishment had an influence or "weight" in proportion to its size.

The average monthly separation rate is a particularly significant figure from the point of view of analyzing the manpower situation in a
given area. It not only helps to measure the relative effectiveness of the existing stabilization program, but it reflects the extent of manpower "leaks" caused by excessive job shifting. The relation that separation turnover bears to the solution of a local manpower problem is to some extent revealed by comparing the volume of such turnover with the number of new workers requested in employer manpower requisitions. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a reduced volume of separations would be accompanied by a reduction in manpower requisitions, and that in the absence of a planned expansion in employment, with current needs otherwise met, zero separations would result in zero requisitions. Similarly, increased separations, in the absence of a planned reduction in employment, would be accompanied by increased manpower requisitions. The difference between the number of separations during a given period and the number of workers requested during the same period by any employer would therefore indicate the manpower needs that would have prevailed had there been no separations.

The original and continuing aim of manpower stabilization was to prevent disruptive turnover as a means of maintaining, and where necessary of expanding, the level of war production. Through the statement-of-availability program it was sought to stabilize existing employment by permitting persons to change jobs only if such changes were in the interest of the war effort or if they tended to alleviate undue personal hardships. An analysis of available data provides considerable insight into the effectiveness with which this aim was realized and indicates the extent to which the manpower shortage might have been alleviated had
Table 5.1

Number of Separations and Accessions, and Monthly Separation Rates in Selected Essential War Industries in the Columbus, Ohio Area, Selected Months, November, 1943-August, 1945(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of reporting firms</th>
<th>Number employed</th>
<th>Separations Total(a)</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
<th>Turnover rates</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quits</td>
<td></td>
<td>Separations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-April</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>6.5 (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>7.8 (b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>8.1 (b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>71868</td>
<td>4743</td>
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<tr>
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<td>69</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72748</td>
<td>5311</td>
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<td>4798</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58687</td>
<td>5239</td>
<td>4297</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57225</td>
<td>4490</td>
<td>3491</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56225</td>
<td>3880</td>
<td>2755</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55825</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>2512</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55449</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>2606</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55746</td>
<td>3233</td>
<td>2341</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55207</td>
<td>3809</td>
<td>3036</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51533</td>
<td>3813</td>
<td>2788</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28152</td>
<td>21996</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data compiled by WMC from individual employer reports SS-270. Data for June, 1944, the data represent about 60 percent of essential employment in the area.

b) Data not available.

c) Includes layoffs and discharges, as well as quits.

Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, War Manpower Commission for Ohio, ES Tables 270a, 270c, and 270e.
the stabilization program worked better.

b. Turnover and Manpower Shortage Statistics. Turnover data for the Columbus labor market area were compiled by the local US3S office from current ES-270 employer reports. The local office issued monthly labor market summaries which consolidated and analyzed the information obtained from ES-270 reports. The number of firms included in these summaries prior to mid-1944 varied, so that the statistics for that period are not always strictly comparable.

In June, 1944, however, a standard sample that remained in use for the rest of the war was devised. It included reporting firms whose total employment constituted a little over 60 percent of all essential employment in the area. At that time over 95,000 workers were estimated to have been in essential employment in the Columbus Stabilization Area. This total consisted of about 70,000 in manufacturing, 12,000 in essential government employments, 8,000 in railroading, and over 5,000 in miscellaneous employments.¹

Table 5.1 summarizes the turnover experience of this sample of essential firms as reported to USES. The most striking facts that an examination of the figures immediately reveal are the apparently high separation rates and high proportions of separations to accessions.

¹ According to the official WMC classification another 15,000 should actually have been added to the total in essential industry since all government employees were considered as being in essential work. But for analytical and reporting purposes the local WMC included only the government workers employed by the armed services and by certain local federal war agencies in its essential designations.
Thus, in the last two months of 1943 the average separation rate was nearly 7 percent, with December separations exceeding December accessions. In the first 10 months of 1944 the monthly separation rate did not fall below 7.3 percent and reached a high of 10.6 percent in August. In nine months of 1944 separations actually exceeded accessions, and in four of these months separations were more than accessions by over 1,000 workers. In one month, August, separations were 1,800 more than accessions. Assuming that the separation and accession rates in Table 5.1 were representative of all Columbus Area essential employers, an average of over 7,500 workers in essential activity changed jobs every month in 1944, despite stabilization controls. But Columbus was not unique in respect to having high turnover rates in the face of controls designed to limit them. Indeed, the area's experience was typical. According to the U. S. Department of Labor, average monthly national separation and accession rates in a representative sample of firms and industries were as follows: 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Separations</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>8.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>6.90 (first seven mos.)</td>
<td>5.47 (first seven mos.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While comparative Columbus Area figures are not available for the entire period, an examination of the limited information in the files of the Columbus employment service office shows the local experience closely

2. The great preponderance of accessions represented job changes rather than new additions to the labor supply. Manpower officials and subsequent analysis verify this.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of reporting firms</th>
<th>Current employment</th>
<th>Number of additional workers required</th>
<th>Additional workers as percent of current employment</th>
<th>Male workers as percent of total required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1944</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59328</td>
<td>1526 (b)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1, 1944</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60707</td>
<td>1949 (b)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1, 1944</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58867</td>
<td>1398 (b)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1, 1944</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57225</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1, 1944</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56225</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1, 1944</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55525</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15, 1945</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55119</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 15, 1945</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55716</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 15, 1945</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55207</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 15, 1945</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51,691</td>
<td>1669</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 1945</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51,453</td>
<td>2162 (b)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1, 1945</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51,533</td>
<td>1882 (b)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 15, 1945</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51,126</td>
<td>2517 (b)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1945</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>509,49</td>
<td>3133 (b)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data compiled by the WMC from individual employer reports, ES-270. Data represents about 60 percent of essential employment in the area.

b) Data not available.

to have paralleled the national experience.

Columbus USTS officials estimate the 1939 separation rate in local manufacturing industries to have been about 3 percent monthly. If this rate had prevailed during the war years the manpower shortage would undoubtedly have been less severe. The separations shown in Table 5.1 would have been reduced to 3 percent of total current employment, or to a figure ranging between one-third and one-half of actual separations. In other words, monthly separations in the 33 sampled firms in 1944 would have ranged between approximately 1,300 and 2,900 instead of between 3,800 and 5,800. How far such a reduction would have gone toward solving existing manpower shortages is shown in Table 5.2. This table tabulates the current additional manpower requirements of the firms whose turnover experiences have just been reviewed. It will be seen that in the last six months of 1944 the greatest current manpower shortage occurred in August, when nearly 2,000 additional workers were needed by the reporting firms. During that month the turnover rate of these establishments was over 10 percent. This amounted to nearly 6,500 separations. If during that month the separation rate had been 3 percent, only 2,100 workers would have been separated and as a consequence no aggregate labor shortage would have existed. Indeed, there would have been a surplus of over 2,000. And in each of the remaining five months aggregate current shortages would have disappeared with a one-third to one-half reduction in turnover. The situation was the same for practically every wartime month in 1945 as well.

An undoubted consequence of a high separation rate is that employers
tend to increase their manpower requisitions in anticipation of expected manpower shortages arising from this source. Furthermore, under conditions of persistent shortages a wartime tendency developed for employers to attempt to insulate themselves against problems arising out of such shortages by their hiring as many skilled and semi-skilled, and frequently unskilled, workers as were to be had, whether immediate jobs were available for them or not, so that when jobs became vacated they could be filled without loss of time. This practice aggravated area production problems much more than it helped solve them, because the resultant "hoarded" manpower was unavailable where it was really needed. It is difficult to pin-point the actual existence of these practices; rather, they generally had to be inferred and deduced from intimate familiarity with the firms responsible for them. Employers usually denied engaging in such practices, and when the practices were actually discovered employers commonly responded that it is an accepted conservative and ethical business practice to maintain a reserve of such facilities, materials, and manpower as are likely to be in sudden short supply.

Employment service and WMC officials referred to manpower requisitions that appeared to include offsets for expected turnover losses as "padded" or "exaggerated". To a considerable extent the existence of such padding and exaggeration is supported by available data. Although no studies of the practice were made at the time, available information has been arranged in Table 5.3 to reflect the extent to which it may have occurred. Here the anticipated employment of sample firms
Table 5-3
Anticipated(a) and Actual Additional Manpower Requirements of Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Monthly, September, 1944-June, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of establishments</th>
<th>Actual employment</th>
<th>Additional Manpower Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anticipated (2 months previously)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58,867</td>
<td>63,560(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57,285</td>
<td>65,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56,255</td>
<td>60,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55,876</td>
<td>60,440(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55,526</td>
<td>59,636(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55,746</td>
<td>59,025(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55,207</td>
<td>58,438(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54,289</td>
<td>59,357(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53,235</td>
<td>59,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51,433</td>
<td>58,300(e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) There are two columns of figures showing anticipated employment. One of these represents predictions made by employers two months previously to the month in question. The other represents predictions made four months in advance.
b) Includes only 31 establishments.
c) Includes 33 establishments.
d) Includes only 32 establishments.
e) Includes 35 establishments.
f) Data not available.

is compared with their actual employment during the months the anticipa-
tions, or more accurately the predictions, came due. Assuming the
predictions to have been accurate estimates of planned manpower needs,
the differences between the actual employment level in any of the months
for which predictions were made and the predicted level for these months
would show the extent of additional manpower requirements (or surpluses)
during these months. However, a comparison of the difference between
predicted and actual employment on the one hand, and current additional
manpower requirements on the other, shows a remarkably consistent dis-
parity in all the months covered by the data. Thus the table reveals
employers to have consistently over-stated their anticipated needs;
current needs were always far below previous estimates of what those
needs would be. Moreover, the accuracy of predictions was no better
for those made two months before the current date than those made four
months before that date.

In none of the last four months of 1944 did additional manpower
requirements exceed 1,400 workers, yet the anticipated requirements esti-
mated two months earlier never fell below about 4,400 workers. The
largest disparity occurred during October. Predictions made for that
month in August estimated that employment would have to increase from
60,700 to about 65,300. But October employment proved to be only 57,200,
actually 3,500 less than what it was in August and 8,000 less than what
was predicted. Yet reports by the same employers during October showed
a current shortage of only 1,000 workers, indicating that there was a
net "permissible" work force reduction in these plants during the two-
Table 2-4
Two-month, Four-month, and Six-month Employment Forecasts Compared with Actual Employment Attained, Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Kentucky, July, 1944-February, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting month</th>
<th>Number of establishments</th>
<th>Two-month period</th>
<th>Four-month period</th>
<th>Six-month period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forecast</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Percent forecast to actual</td>
<td>Forecast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63,550</td>
<td>58,867(a)</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65,277</td>
<td>57,225</td>
<td>114.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60,615</td>
<td>56,225</td>
<td>107.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60,444</td>
<td>55,178</td>
<td>108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59,516</td>
<td>55,546</td>
<td>107.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>59,065</td>
<td>55,746(a)</td>
<td>105.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58,538</td>
<td>55,207(a)</td>
<td>106.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59,357</td>
<td>54,267</td>
<td>109.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59,072</td>
<td>53,235</td>
<td>111.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58,200</td>
<td>54,433(b)</td>
<td>114.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Includes 33 establishments.
b) Includes 32 establishments.
c) Data not available.

Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, War Manpower Commission for Ohio, RS Tables 270-A.
month period of 2,500, instead of an anticipated increase of 4,600. It is difficult to account for such immense disparities in planned and actual employment. Since lay-offs in essential plants during the period were less than 200, the only reasonable conclusion is that earlier estimates were either padded or mistaken.

The two-month predictions were from two and one-half to eight times in excess of actual current needs at the time the predictions came due. In only one month were the six-month predictions as little as 50 percent greater than actual needs; in one case they were 10 times in excess of actual needs. Estimated anticipated employment was generally between 5 and 15 percent higher than actual employment in the due month, as Table 5.4 reveals. The average error on the side of exaggeration was over 10 percent. Significantly all errors were in the direction of exaggeration rather than minimization of expected employment, a fact that would support the conclusion that there was a tendency toward conscious exaggeration of needs. It might be added that contract uncertainties to some extent explain the source of errors, but these uncertainties were far from being so general as to account for such consistent errors, and particularly errors on the side of exaggeration.

That turnover (and absenteeism) played an important role in such estimating is revealed in the way in which the ES-270 form on which employers reported their expected employment was constructed. The form asked what employment was expected to be two, four, and six months hence. It did not inquire about expected manpower losses through normal turnover. Thus, employers, knowing they would have separation losses, but
having no place to indicate this on their reports, simply expanded their estimates of future employment so as to provide a basis for a volume of manpower requisitions that would offset expected losses and thereby enable the maintenance of the existing size of their work force.

It is to be noted that the statistics here analyzed are for the period subsequent to the inauguration of the Expanded Manpower Program. Since manpower then was more rigidly controlled than under previous conditions, one might argue that, predictions made under less stringent controls prior to this period were therefore even more exaggerated. On the other hand, however, it might be argued with equal logic that employers were impelled to even greater exaggerations by the more severe manpower controls; for although ES-270 predictions had nothing formally to do with the granting of manpower priorities or of increases in male employment ceilings, there is some evidence that employers padded their requisitions as a bargaining device for higher ceilings and more priorities.

That there were persistent and sometimes wild exaggerations of manpower needs was clear to local manpower officials. But the extent of such exaggerations seems not to have been analyzed by them. It was perfectly obvious to them, however, that exaggerations were integrally linked with high separation rates. This is revealed time after time in the comments of USES employer contact men and in minutes of the Management-Labor Committee meetings. But despite their astuteness in recognizing exaggerations, it would appear that manpower officials were somewhat in error in dismissing apparently exaggerated or padded man-
power requisitions as not being significant. As a matter of fact, it is not altogether certain that "padding" is actually "padding" in the conventional meaning of the word. Quite obviously such padding as occurred was in response to real or fancied needs. Whether real or fancied, the result was quite the same. Employers responded to what they felt to be their needs. If such needs became exaggerated because of the uncertainty caused by disruptive turnover and absenteeism, then from the point of view of the individual employer the nature of what he perceived to be his needs was far from being an exaggeration. It was simply good manpower management, and to the extent that WMC officials were dubious about the legitimacy of these practices their only logical recourse was the removal of the causes of uncertainty. In this they were not particularly successful, for as has been pointed out, had the stabilization program been able to reduce the turnover rate in the essential industries by only three or four more percentage points, general shortages might have been eliminated.

It can be argued, for example, that if the 7,500 persons who were being separated from essential establishments every month were idle at least one day while changing jobs, then an average of about 300 workers were idle every working day. If they were idle two work days the figure would have been 600, and three idle work days would have made it 900.

The employment of this group would have accomplished considerably by way of alleviating current shortages.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Employment service officials estimate that each worker probably lost several days while changing jobs, and that some took one or two-week vacations between jobs. The figure 300 is obtained by dividing total monthly turnover for all essential firms (Continued on next page)
c. Characteristics of the "Unstable" Workers. Employers' complaints about the causes of high turnover rates blended into a consistent and persistent refrain. According to their lamentations a small group of marginal workers, irresponsible to their duties and obligations under organized industrial production, were the perpetuating cause of the abnormally high turnover. ES-270 reports were full of employer remarks to the effect that "20 percent of my workers cause the major portion of turnover and absenteeism", or that "a small group of the same kind of people is responsible for all our troubles". There were also frequent reports attributing most of the turnover to comparatively recently hired workers who either quickly became dissatisfied with their work, had no real intention of working longer than the time necessary to acquire enough money to permit them to go without work for a week, or who were allegedly constitutionally incapable of remaining on the same job for a sustained period of time. Among employers who hired women in comparatively large numbers, it was often complained that the high turnover for which women were responsible was traceable to home problems, sickness, "inability to stand the steady grind of piece work production", and disappointment that the new job didn't turn out as they expected. The latter reason was frequently given in regard to women who had never been employed before, or who had never had industrial employment.

Some light is shed on the characteristics of the "unstable" em-

4. (Continued from preceding page) by the 25 working days in the month. Total monthly turnover for all essential firms (over 7,500) is obtained by expanding the figure of 5,000 for 60 percent of essential workers to equal the figure for 100 percent of essential workers.
ployees by a study of the personnel records of employees hired by Franklin County manufacturing establishments in 1940, 1943, 1947, and 1950.5

This study shows that the proportion of newly hired workers who served less than six months in 1943 was no greater than the corresponding proportions in the pre-war and the post-war years. Moreover, in none of the years covered by the survey was there a substantial difference between the proportion of women and the proportion of men who did not complete six months of service. A relationship was found to exist, however, between a worker's employment stability and his broad occupational classification. Skilled workers, for example, were found to have longer periods of service than semi-skilled; and semi-skilled workers had longer periods of service than the unskilled. Workers who were entering the labor force for the first time showed only a slightly greater tendency than those with previous work experience to leave their jobs after only a short period of service. There appeared to be a direct relationship between the age and length of service of the newly hired employees. Thus, while slightly more than half of the employees 18 to 24 years old served less than six months, less than four out of 10 of the workers 55 years of age or older had periods of service that short. The proportion of workers between the ages of 25 and 54 in this short-service category was about mid-way between these two extremes.

Youngsters 16 and 17 years of age appeared to be the most unstable group,

5. The study sampled 20 percent of the employment cards of persons hired in large Franklin County manufacturing establishments which employed about half of the workers in county manufacturing employment in 1943. See Barnes, Herbert S., A Study in the Dynamics of Local Labor Force Expansion, mimeographed, The Ohio State University, 1951, Chapter 6.
almost two-thirds of them having served less than six months. The short service of the latter group probably reflected the fact that large numbers of high school youths worked during vacations.

The foregoing evidence suggests that much of the wartime turnover was caused by a comparatively small group of unstable workers who remained on their jobs for extremely short periods of time—a few days or weeks. This follows from the fact that although turnover rates during the war were abnormally high, the proportion of newly hired workers serving less than six months was no higher than in, say, 1947. The only reasonable conclusion is that during the war persons who remained on their jobs for less than six months apparently worked for fewer days or weeks than the same category of persons hired in 1947; that while the relative number of persons who remained in their jobs less than six months was approximately the same in 1943 and 1947, in the former year they stayed for a considerably shorter period of time than in the latter.

The evidence also suggests that insofar as turnover losses caused production slowdowns, of which there appeared to be few, the major contributing factor was loss of unskilled laborers rather than skilled workers. This is further supported by persistent reports in USES's Monthly Columbus Labor Market Report that "Laborors and trainees are probably the most urgent in demand in Columbus". In view of these facts it is not unreasonable to conclude that existing manpower shortages could for the most part have been resolved at any time during the war by simply reducing the separation rate.

To deplore the high turnover rates of the war period, however, is
not to say that all job shifting was undesirable. Indeed, one of the purposes of the manpower program was to encourage shifts from less essential into essential employments and from jobs in which skills were not fully utilized into jobs in which they were more fully utilized. Although it is impossible to say precisely what proportion of the wartime job shifting was desirable in the above sense, the study of newly hired employees mentioned above sheds some light on the matter. For example, in 1943 17.5 of the hires made by the sample firms, almost all of which were classified as essential, were workers who had previously been in war manufacturing. Another 17 percent had been in non-war manufacturing. About 17 percent of the new hires were previously in trade, 10 percent were in service, and 8 percent in government. However, many of the non-war manufacturing establishments included firms that were classified as being essential, and therefore the 17.5 percent of hires that came from war manufacturing probably considerably understates the extent to which new hires came from essential war employments. In addition, all agricultural workers were classified as being in essential wartime work, as were all government workers, of which there were 12,000 in Franklin County who were directly engaged in work for the armed forces. Construction, from which 3.5 percent of the new hires were taken, was also essential work during 1943, and some service and trade establishments were so classified. Thus, of the approximately 33,000 persons hired by the sample manufacturing firms in 1943, a minimum of 31 percent are definitely known to have come from essential employments, and it is likely that as many as 45 percent did. Besides
this, another 11 percent had never been in jobs before. Thus, it would appear that at the most, 66 percent of the hires, or, at the least, 42 percent, represented desirable job shifts.

d. Turnover and Stabilization Practices. Ultimately the success of stabilization depended upon the extent of employer cooperation and the effectiveness of the program's administration by USES. It was obviously to the interest of every employer to comply with the program to the extent that such compliance helped him to hold his workers. There is every indication that employer efforts to hold workers were prodigious, and that as an important means of holding them they invoked the authority of the stabilization program. Despite these efforts, however, the wartime separation rate was high. But indications are that the rate was higher before stabilization than after. Adequate statistics about the rates immediately preceding the inauguration of manpower controls are not available, and to the extent that they are (Table 5.1) they suggest that such rates were no different than post-stabilization rates. However, non-statistical reports by local manpower officials and employers estimate that stabilization reduced turnover by at least 30 percent in two-thirds of the local manufacturing establishments.

Despite employer efforts to hold workers, they found it difficult or inexpedient to do so in most cases. As has been suggested before, there was a general feeling that dissatisfied employees were useless to the firm, and should therefore be granted releases. Employers with
the most severe turnover and absenteeism problems were the most out-
spoken in attributing them to factors outside of their own control.
This is especially interesting in view of the fact that internal factors
appear more frequently to have been the reasons for high turnover in
these cases than in cases of employers who were less voluble in this
respect. The two most frequent, and generally concomitant reasons for
high turnover given by employers were that the marginal workers the
companies were forced to hire were irresponsible, undependable, and
not interested in steady work, and that their wages were below those in
other establishments. Charges of irresponsibility were often accom-
panied by comments that the parties involved worked only until they
got "enough to go off on drunken binges". At the same time these com-
panies sought to increase the wages they might pay, presumably to en-
able their employees to accumulate "enough to go off on drunken binges"
sooner.

Turnover figures in Table 5.1 are the combined rates for a large
number of firms. But the experience of each individual firm was dif-
f erent. Certain firms had consistently very high rates, and these were
firms in which working conditions and personnel practices and policies
were apparently to a considerable extent responsible for such rates.
Because it is much easier for workers to get jobs during periods of
increased industrial activity, the quit rate generally mounts quite
rapidly during these periods. While this is undoubtedly true for in-
dustry as a whole, it has been shown that it does not hold for indi-
vidual establishments where the skillful handling of personnel tends
to lower the turnover rates within the firm regardless of labor conditions for the industry. This finding is supported by the wartime experience in the Columbus Area. Thus in October, 1944, when the overall separation rate in essential employments was 7.6 percent, one-fourth of the reporting firms had separation rates of 4 percent or less, and one-third had separations of 8 percent or more. Several firms had separation rates of over 10 percent, and one company had a rate of 12.5 percent. That personnel policies and practices had much to do with the reported turnover rates of every firm was repeatedly noted by US3S employer contact representatives. Their comments frequently alluded to the primitive personnel practices of employers and noted US3S attempts to improve these practices.

The backwardness of some companies’ personnel practices extended not only to their not having personnel departments, but actually to their insistence that such departments are useless. In these companies foremen did all hiring and firing, and it was only after the establishment of controlled referral that some of them began to formalize their hiring programs.

As an anti-turnover measure US3S-WMC encouraged the creation of exit interviewing programs in every establishment. These were to provide for intimate interviews with every person seeking to quit work, so that the firms might discover the causes for turnover and try to persuade dissident workers to remain on their jobs. After some effort all

local essential firms established such programs. These succeeded in preventing the contemplated quitting of about 10 percent of the persons interviewed. Some firms also reported that through these interviews they discovered the existence of grievances they had not been aware of, and that very often persons who were inclined to quit because of slight, momentary irritations stayed on after the interview. Exit interviews were most successful in the cases of persons who had decided to quit on the spur of the moment because of an isolated irritation just a few hours, and often minutes, before.

USES checks on turnover (and absentee) rates also suffered from the archaic personnel practices of some of the firms. In the early stages of manpower stabilization most firms kept no turnover records whatsoever. USES sought to introduce uniform record-keeping so that both company and manpower officials might have something definite to go on in judging the local experience. Attempts to institute uniform record-keeping encountered some resistance from firms that claimed their independence was infringed by such requests. Obstinate employers generally became convinced of the need for better and uniform reporting after gross discrepancies and inconsistencies in their reports were repeatedly pointed out to them. Still, however, personnel practices that in the judgments of USES employer contact representatives were extremely crude, persisted in many establishments throughout the entire war. Typical of such practices were misrepresentation of jobs during applicant interviews, completely unscientific procedures in placing new hires in jobs, inflexibility in allowing in-plant shifts of workers who had legitimate
reasons for wanting to change, lack of provisions for permitting the
expression and settlement of grievances, arbitrary power of foremen over
workers, and arbitrary determination of shift changes and overtime days
and hours.

Some firms, on the other hand, assiduously inaugurated new and im-
proved personnel procedures in attempts to reduce turnover and absentee-
ism. The largest employer in the area, for example, had 34 counselors
in the plant to advise employees who had problems or grievances they
did not wish to take to the shop union. The company sought to do every-
thing within its power to eliminate employees' problems, whether they
were job-connected or not. Problems, its representative told the Manage-
ment-Labor Committee, regardless of their nature, cause production slow-
downs, accidents, absenteeism, and turnover. But despite elaborate
services, which included giving legal aid and arranging for automobile
repairs, during the 14-week period ending just before Christmas, 1943,
the company gained a net of only 420 workers out of a total of 5,203
hires. That is, separations totaled 4,783 during this period, with the
result that the company claimed a current shortage of 1,000 workers.8

Not all changes in personnel policies and practices alleviated the
turnover problem. For example, more careful selection and investiga-
tion of applicants were advised by USBS and followed by many firms, but
ES-270 reports indicate little reduction in turnover as the result. How-
ever, since such suggestions were generally made to plants that had the
most severe cases of turnover, failure of the programs to show improved

8. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, December
28, 1943.
results would suggest that the causes of turnover were other than poor applicant selection in the first place.

The War Production Board also sought to prevent high turnover, absenteeism, and slowdowns by encouraging better in-plant job relations. Thus it sought to establish plant labor-management committees in which the two sides ironed out problems of mutual concern. USES was not an official sponsor of these committees, although contact men encouraged their establishment. WPB's Area Labor Representative, who was in close contact with essential local firms, was charged with persuading employers to adopt the suggested program. There was both enthusiasm and reluctance among employers during the early stages of the program in 1943. Some felt that it would be helpful, and consulted with workers and unions to establish committees. Others, particularly where employees were not represented by unions, were dubious about the ultimate purpose to which the committees would be put. By the end of the war in 1945, only a few committees were still in operation, the others having either been discontinued or having never really gotten started. The most typical reason employers gave for the failure of this program was that committee meetings "degenerated into union grumbling sessions". Union officials say that unions, or workers who sought to unionize unorganized plants, were justified in "grumbling" during the meetings because their purpose was to air and resolve complaints. But company executives, busy under the strain of difficult and pressing wartime management problems, became impatient with the limited accomplishments of the committees and abandoned them or permitted them to become totally
Working conditions other than personnel policies appeared to be the greatest in-plant cause of high turnover. Foundries, where work is hard and hot, reported that "practically all quits are new workers who do not stay long enough to become accustomed to foundry work". Chemical fertilizer plants, which required considerable heavy manual labor and where the work was generally disagreeable, reported that most of their quits were among newer employees who claimed physical inability to perform the required tasks. And other chemical plants, where the odor was strong and working conditions generally unclean, also reported high turnover among new workers. The wage rates in these employments were generally lower than in other employments in the area. But since applicants accepted jobs in these establishments in full knowledge of the wages they would receive but probably uninformed about the working conditions, it would appear that the latter were largely responsible for high turnover.

Still, some firms persisted in attributing high turnover to low wages. In a few cases where easy comparisons between the nature of the jobs, working conditions, and wages in different plants could be made, indications are that wages were an important contributing factor in the rate of turnover. Thus a large bakery, whose wage for women was sub-standard and whose entry wage for men was just over the sub-standard level, complained that with WLB's recent rejection of a wage increase appeal nothing could be done to decrease turnover. In support of this contention it cited the case of a local food processing plant that
showed a 5 percent decrease in separations after wages were increased, although its working conditions were less favorable than the bakery's. For how long a period the turnover rate remained reduced was not revealed, however. But the evidence is confusing, for bakeries with no substantial differences in wage rates did not complain similarly about excessive turnover rates. Still, however, it is significant that separations suddenly declined by considerable amounts in plants inaugurating new wage incentive programs, an experience that would suggest a causal relationship between the weekly wages paid by a company and its capacity to hold workers.

Employer opinions about reasons for separations were not always verified by USES studies of workers who had left their jobs without obtaining statements of availability. One of these studies revealed that out of 543 responses to USES inquiries, 229 individuals, or over 42 percent, left their jobs because of health reasons. Child care reasons for leaving jobs were given in 75 cases, and 33 left to go or return to school. Another 63 persons, representing nearly 12 percent of the total, were waiting 60 days to resume employment rather than comply with stabilization provisions.9

In view of all these experiences, it would appear that poor personnel practices and unfavorable working conditions were most generally associated with high separation rates, and that while low wages were an important factor in causing separations, this factor was somewhat offset by improved personnel relations and favorable working conditions.

9. Ibid., April 11, 1944.
Since, however, at least in factory employment, poor personnel practices, unfavorable working conditions and low wages tended to exist at the same plants and in the same industries, it is difficult to distinguish with complete certainty the exact influence of each on the separation rate. What is certain, however, is that firms with improved practices and conditions complained much less frequently that most separations were being caused by irresponsible and unstable workers. Whether this means that such workers tended not to be hired by firms whose personnel practices, working conditions, and wages were more favorable, and thus constituted the only source of labor for the remaining firms, is not certain. To some extent this appears to have been the case, however. It is probably true that establishments with the worst working conditions had to settle for the least desirable type of available labor. Thus several fertilizer plants actually sent hiring agents to the "skid row" section of the city to recruit labor from the bars and flop houses when none was forthcoming from US33.

US33 approached the turnover problem in three ways. It sought to improve or eliminate plant practices and conditions that produced high turnover rates; it sought to improve and insure both employer and employee compliance with the stabilization program, and it sought to reduce the waste of turnover by placing applicants who had left other jobs in employments that utilized them to the maximum of their skills and local needs.

One way in which US33 sought to reduce turnover was to determine if
Number of Determinations of Eligibility for Statements of Availability or Referral Made by the Public Employment Service, by Disposition and Type, Columbus, Ohio, Monthly, May, 1943-July, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of determinations</th>
<th>Number found eligible (Total)</th>
<th>Number found eligible (From essential activity)</th>
<th>Number found eligible (From less essential activity)</th>
<th>Number found ineligible (Total)</th>
<th>Number found ineligible (From essential activity)</th>
<th>Number found ineligible (From less essential activity)</th>
<th>Percent of total determinations (From essential activity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>8401</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>5096</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>11032</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>5385</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>9142</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>3990</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>9701</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>2985</td>
<td>2,199</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>9478</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>3,206</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,854</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>8838</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>8358</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>4,705</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,765</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>5737</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>5061</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>1,306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>6781</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6983</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6333</td>
<td>3,021</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>5663</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>4,424</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>9634</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>9612</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>3,116</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>5002</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>3,515</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>5503</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>3,435</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>5549</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>4,527</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>4595</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>7800</td>
<td>2,416</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>3,755</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>7563</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>3,577</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6625</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5893</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6747</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>5525</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>5,007</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>6531</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Includes applicants who had or sought statements of availability or inter-area clearances and had jobs within the preceding 60 days in essential or locally needed firms.
b) Includes applicants from less essential firms (except from May through Oct., 1943), and persons who had or sought statements of availability, inter-area clearances, or migration referrals.
c) Includes investigations of workers' statements concerning their previous employment, residence, etc.
d) Reports on investigations not made during these months.
e) Investigations not broken down into "essential" and "other" employments. Total equal 153.
f) Investigations don't indicate essentiality status. Total equal 1021.
g) Investigations don't indicate essentiality status. Total equal 153.
h) Investigations total 1699.
i) Investigations total 1699.
j) Adequate breakdowns not available. 1531 statements were issued after investigations; 1083 of these involved persons from essential activity.
k) Data included under "Other" in "Number found eligible."

persons coming into the offices with statements of availability from essential employers had received them legitimately. USES interviewers examined statements of availability, referral cards issued in lieu of statements, statements of inter-area clearance, and immigrant referral cards. Applicants were interviewed and previous employers were contacted in order to check the accuracy of the reasons for separation shown on these statements. In this way some control was exercised over possible violation of stabilization provisions. USES also made determinations of requests for statements by applicants who had been denied them by their employers.

USES activity along these lines is to some extent reflected in the number of investigations made of job-release and referral requests, and in the proportion of determinations found ineligible. These data are summarized on a monthly basis in Table 5.5. It will be noted that the proportion of cases from essential activity that USES investigated was never below 50 percent in the months for which data were available and was sometimes as high as 85 percent. The proportion of eligibles to total determinations varied considerably from time to time. Thus, after stabilization machinery got under way and the enforcement program began operating with some degree of effectiveness, the proportion of eligibles reached a high of 20 percent in August, 1943. The proportion remained at approximately this level until May, 1944, when it declined to 8 percent. Although the reason for the abrupt decline in May and June is obscure, the lower proportion that prevailed during the remainder of the year was undoubtedly due to the fact that the burden of ad-
ministering the expanded manpower program which began in July seriously curtailed the investigating activities of USES.

On December 27, 1944, Selective Service ordered a reduction in deferred job holders and in deferred jobs. It ordered investigations of persons with job deferments to see if they still held deferable jobs and the reclassification of others. With this USES undertook more intensive investigation of persons holding and requesting job releases. As a result, the ineligible rate went from 2.3 percent in December, 1944, to 12.1 percent the next month, and continued, with the exception of one month, to remain above 10 percent for the remainder of the stabilization program.

**Conclusions.** Although the actual turnover rate early in 1943 is not properly reflected in available statistical materials, largely because of the lack of proper or uniform record-keeping by reporting employers, an estimate of the change in the turnover rate occasioned by the introduction of stabilization can be made. Thus, on the basis of the area director's estimates made late in 1943, it would appear that the average reduction amounted to about 35 percent. To some extent separations were encouraged by USES-WMC when such separations resulted in workers moving to jobs in which they were of greater use to the war effort. Thus, out of the 1,600 certificates of availability granted to persons in essential work in July, 1943, 275 were granted because the individuals were not fully employed, either at their highest skills or

10. Ibid., December 14, 1943.
in terms of the number of hours they were kept busy on their jobs. And, in connection with the exit interviewing program, USES promoted the posting of placards in each plant which indicated the types of products produced there which were essential and those which were not essential to the war effort. In this way workers were encouraged to seek transfers to work on the essential products or to firms where they could be assured of essential work.

Certain types of separations were of a seasonal nature. August and September separations were high because students and teachers hired during the vacation months returned to school. Spring separations tended to increase in plants at the outskirts of the city where neighboring farmers, now anxious to return to their farms, had been given temporary employment. And during the summer months foundry separations increased as the hot weather made such work more difficult. On the other hand, December separation figures generally declined as workers remained on their jobs so as to qualify for the expected Christmas bonus. The increase in January separations then made up for the December decrease. Separations appeared to increase when end-of-war optimism reached high points and when large contingents of ASTP students moved out of the city and their employed wives moved with them.

Indications are that poor job relations, unpleasant working conditions, and enervating work were major causes of workers quitting their jobs. There is some evidence to support the conclusion that these problems often remained unsolved throughout the war primarily because

Manpower shortages did not become sufficiently severe to compel remedial action. Thus, as long as there was a reasonable supply of available labor to fill the separation gap, some firms saw no reason for changing existing personnel practices and working conditions. Moreover, high turnover did not impose an economic burden on employers because the effect of cost-plus government contracts was to reward companies that had higher costs with greater absolute profits.

Low wages were an important factor contributing to high separation rates, and in some cases were apparently a major factor, not only in causing turnover but in interfering with recruitment, referral, and placement efforts. Available data suggest that a large amount of the turnover was caused by a relatively small proportion of the labor force. These were the marginal workers who worked for short, inconstant periods, had little industrial discipline, and were generally unskilled. The turnover rate among women was about the same as among men, but the causes for their separations were generally different.

The employment service sought to reduce wasteful separations by giving aid and advice to both employers and employees, and by maintaining a constant check into compliance practices. It also expanded its services by stationing interviewers at plants that had large layoffs so as to register and to refer workers to available jobs with a minimum loss of time and effort.

USES efforts to direct workers into essential employment were not always successful. There were two main reasons for this. On the one hand it had no power to compel applicants to accept referral to jobs in
# Table 5.6

Total Number of Persons Separating from Essential Activity, and Number of Persons Separating from Essential Activity Who Cleared Through USES, Columbus, Ohio, Area, November, 1943-June, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total separations(a)</th>
<th>Number of persons clearing through USES(b)</th>
<th>Estimated number not clearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3689</td>
<td>3653</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4743</td>
<td>2862</td>
<td>1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5381</td>
<td>3882</td>
<td>1499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>5311</td>
<td>3395</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>5296</td>
<td>3540</td>
<td>1756</td>
</tr>
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a) These separations occurred in firms employing about 60 percent of all persons in essential activity in the Columbus Area.
b) Includes persons from essential activity for whom USES made job release determinations and/or from whom USES received referral requests.
c) Data not available.
Source: Tables 5.1 and 5.6.
which it sought to place them, and on the other, a comparatively large number of persons separating from essential employments were not required to pass through USES in order to obtain other essential jobs. Table 5.6 shows the approximate number of separated employees who did not apparently pass through USES. The total was alarmingly high, especially in view of the fact that good manpower allocation depended to a considerable extent upon the available manpower being exposed to USES referral interviewers. The table, which compares separations from firms that had 60 percent of the area's essential workers with the approximate number of persons from essential industry passing through USES monthly, suggests that except for five months between November, 1943, and March, 1945, USES regularly failed to see about 2,000 of the essential persons that were separated each month. In two of the months the total was above 4,000, and in three it was above 2,500. A complete census of separations from all essential firms would undoubtedly have increased the estimated total number of separations not going through USES.

Of course, under stabilization provisions, not all job seekers were required to pass through USES. Beginning October 15, 1943, only persons with critical shortage occupations were required to pass through USES, unless they were hired by firms granted freedom to hire without regard to this restriction. And not until July 1, 1944, was a really large segment of the labor force required to clear through USES. The July program called for all men to be hired through USES, or with consent of USES. The area's largest employer, accounting for about 25 percent of essential employment in the area, was given such consent.
The extent to which consent arrangements limited USES access to essential workers is indicated by the considerable increase in the proportion of persons passing through USES in January and February, 1945, when most of these consent arrangements were eliminated. Moreover, until February, 1945, employers of less than eight workers were also permitted to hire men without USES referral, and after October 3, 1944, outmigrants were freed from the requirement to clear with USES before leaving the area. Thus, it is obvious that USES was considerably restricted in its capacity to reduce the wastefulness of separations by channeling persons who had left essential jobs into other equally or more essential jobs.


War time manpower measures were as much concerned with mobilization as with stabilization. Stabilization dealt primarily with the turnover problem, and mobilization had to do mostly with attempts to recruit and place civilian manpower where it was most needed. Anti-turnover programs and recruitment drives were in a sense reciprocals of one another. Anti-turnover efforts sought to reduce manpower needs by preventing wasteful job changes, and recruitment efforts sought to provide manpower to fill these needs. If manpower needs could have been eliminated through the successful reduction of wasteful turnover, the need for recruitment programs would have been obviated. The present section discusses the recruitment, referral, and placement features of the mobilization aspect of the manpower program. The section is in four parts. One deals with the wartime recruitment activities in the Columbus Area,
another with the wartime manpower referral and placement activities,
the third with the role of wages in the manpower program, and the fourth
evaluates these aspects of the mobilization program.

a. Recruitment. Both employers and the public employment service
actively recruited manpower during the war. Both recruited not only
from among local persons who were not in the labor force and from areas
outside of Franklin County, but also from among persons already employed.
As has been shown, for the employment service the latter practice took
the form of encouraging workers to transfer from less essential employ­
ments to essential employments, and from jobs in essential firms in
which their skills were not fully utilized to essential firms in which
they were. For employers it took the form of supporting and encourag­
ing these manpower programs, as well as the form of actively trying to
bid workers away from each other. Where competitive bidding for workers
developed into the systematic luring of individuals away from employ­
ment in one firm and into another, it was known as "pirating".

There is little evidence of sustained manpower pirating in the
Columbus Area. There appears to have been some in 1941, 1942, and early
1943, but only of a very innocent kind. And during the entire stabili­
ization period only one case of outright piracy was reported. This in­
volved a company from a nearby city that actively helped several local
foundry workers to obtain statements of availability so they could take
jobs with that company. To the extent that such practices occurred
before stabilization began, little is known about them, since they gener-
ally went unreported. Columbus Labor Market Reports and Chamber of Commerce bulletins however report the prevalence of some pirating in the early war years. But in practice this does not appear to have been what is generally connoted by the word. It actually involved only rather prominent newspaper advertisements, and later radio solicitation, for certain skilled workers at wages somewhat above those currently prevailing in the community.

Local employers engaged in active solicitation of workers within the local labor market area throughout the war period. Under the provisions of the stabilization programs employers were permitted to advertise for workers, provided that large ads contained a statement that "Only persons qualifying under provisions of the Columbus Stabilization Program need apply." At the same time an arrangement was made with local newspapers whereby this statement appeared at the head of the columns containing smaller ads.

In October, 1941, a small ad appeared in the local papers for draftsmen at the new aircraft plant. No other ads appeared for either men or women for industrial work. By January, 1942, ads for men for non-sales work increased in number so that they occupied one-fourth rather than the previous one-seventh of a normal newspaper column. The next month the aircraft company ran a huge ad for all kinds of machine operators. By June only one or two small ads for women factory workers appeared. But by September ads for men filled two full columns, and female help wanted ads about a half column. In April, 1943, shortly before stabilization began, ads for men filled almost an entire page.
In accordance with a USES request, a few of the ads contained the statement "Those now employed on war production at highest skill, please do not apply." Ads for women also increased considerably, both in number and in size, and large picture ads for both men and women began to appear in parts of the newspapers other than the classified advertising sections. All such ads appealed to the readers' patriotic sentiments, and those specifically aimed at women sought to show the similarity between kitchen work and factory work. Thus one ad, saying that "It's a short step from Housework to Helldivers", was accompanied by a suggestive illustration showing a woman running a Mixmaster and another a drill press.

As manpower shortages became more severe employers became more sensitive about the content and size of each other's advertisements. After the appearance of a particularly large ad, which some employers alleged was undermining manpower stabilization, management members of the Management-Labor Committee insisted upon the establishment of advertising standards to govern local recruitment efforts. Such standards were developed and publicized, and with the cooperation of the local newspapers, enforced. However, from time to time there appeared large manpower ads by out-of-the-area employers who had gotten national or regional WMC clearance to run them locally. These employers directed applicants to apply at the local USES office where their representatives conducted pooled interviews of those applicants screened and cleared by USES. The ads stipulated that only persons qualifying under present WMC regulations should apply. Management members of the Management-Labor
Committee, especially those representing industries from which respondents to the ads might be drawn, were outspoken in their objection to such recruitment.

Committee members agreed that certain firms in industries that had plants locally might have higher manpower priorities which, in the interest of the war effort, should be filled without delay. But they objected to the methods used to attract workers to these jobs. They felt that despite USES screening, the use of large display advertisements such as those used by out-of-the-area recruiters had a disquieting effect on otherwise satisfied workers securely employed and complying with stabilization regulations. The area director convinced committee members that it would be unwise to send a suggested resolution to regional and national headquarters objecting to outside employers recruiting locally. It was felt that the community should not seem to be drawing a protective wall around itself when more urgent national priorities needed to be filled elsewhere. However, after four such recruitments were conducted here, one of which involved four employers from different parts of the country and came while the local USES was engaging in a community recruitment program of its own, the committee forwarded a resolution to regional and national headquarters expressing its "unequivocal opposition" to the methods used for recruitment of applicants by outside employers. It also asked that the area director be invested with the authority to approve or disapprove all requests for recruitment by employers outside the area, subject to the approval of
the local Management-Labor Committee. Although this power was granted, there was no subsequent occasion for its use.

The success of recruitment efforts by outside employers varied. Over 400 persons responded to a campaign in February, 1944, when current local shortages were well over 1,000. After preliminary USES screening, 137 were referred to the recruitment interviewer, 42 of whom were hired. All but one of these were skilled workers, and only one of the skilled workers had been engaged in essential activity locally. The latter was immediately released by his employer because he was not working at his highest skill. Another nine workers, each with experience in aircraft work, were hired as a result of a July campaign. An August campaign proved fruitless, but a November campaign, involving four outside companies, netted 154 hires. At that time local shortages were over 1,000, with two foundries being respectively 20 and 10 percent behind schedule. The occupations of persons hired included laborers, mechanic learners, truckers, bus drivers, women chauffeurs, and cafeteria workers. Openings for workers with technical skills such as tool designers, aeronautical engineers, draftsmen, and lofts remained unfilled, reflecting the dearth of available skilled workmen in this area.

Newspaper ads were highly important in indicating to job seekers and to currently employed persons where and what kinds of jobs were

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12. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, November 14, 1944.
13. Ibid., February 15, 1944.
available locally. The extent to which the ads stimulated labor unrest and turnover is not known, although it would appear that some of the USES applicants seeking referral to specific establishments were advised about the availability of jobs there through the newspapers. After controlled and priority referral began, many applicants went directly to the advertising employers, who in turn told them they would be hired if referred by USES. USES sought to discourage employers from making commitments of this kind. However, it was revealed that applicants, rather than going to the employment offices, often went directly to shop foremen who enthusiastically promised them work. Employment officers generally followed USES suggestions to refrain from making any kind of commitment, however qualified the applicant, until he had complied with all WMC regulations.

But recruitment efforts of local employers were not confined to newspaper advertising. Most employers urged their current employees to advise friends and relatives about the availability of jobs in their plants. While no quantitative data are available to test the effectiveness of this method, employer ES-270 reports indicate this to have been an effective method. A number of reliable studies by competent economists have shown that even in normal times, most workers learn of the availability of jobs through friends and chance acquaintances. It therefore seems reasonable that when these friends and acquaintances are

instructed actively to help in the recruitment of workers, the number
of individuals who learn about job openings in this way increases con-
siderably. Moreover, it was generally as easy to learn about available
jobs from job seekers in the teeming USES office as it was to learn
about them from office interviewers.

Few local employers used any other formal recruiting techniques,
principally because of USES restrictions. One company, located about
16 miles from the center of Columbus, recruited area farmers for work
during the winters by the use of letters, door-to-door and radio
solicitation, posters, and newspaper advertising. These efforts were
not as successful as it was hoped, generally because it was long stand-
ing common knowledge in the area that the company was hiring, and there-
fore persons inclined to work in such factory jobs had already taken
them. Only three Columbus employers went out of the local labor market
to recruit workers. One of these was a railroad company, which found
common laborers in Kentucky and West Virginia. Another was the air-
craft company, which in the Fall of 1944 went to Akron and Cleveland
seeking skilled workers, but without success. The third company, en-
caged in building landing craft sections, had a shortage of about 50
skilled and semiskilled workers for a several month period in the Fall
of 1943. Despite extensive advertising and out-of-the-area recruitment
it failed to attract workers having the necessary skills, attributing
its failure in the use of both mediums to low entry wage rates. Con-
struction workers were also recruited from other areas, but this was
no departure from peacetime practices.
Several companies that were not easily accessible by public transportation or were located a considerable distance from the center of the city, established downtown employment offices, but by the Summer of 1944 they were all closed for lack of results. On two occasions representatives of employers who had no such offices, but who saw an advantage in coming to the prospective employee rather than requiring the latter to come to him, were found to be circulating among the applicants in the USES office trying to recruit them for work in their establishments. In one of these cases a plant foreman whose department was behind schedule because of manpower shortages was the recruiter, although the personnel manager had no knowledge of his activities.

Only one local employer engaged in systematic manpower recruitment. This was the armed services depot, which at its peak employed about 10,000 persons. For a six-week period in the Fall of 1943 it operated a recruitment drive from a large quonset hut on the lawn of the State Capitol in the heart of the downtown section. The hut contained exhibits of the types of goods that were being moved through the depot and of the kinds of jobs that needed to be filled. A loudspeaker blared music, patriotic appeals, and invitations all day, and soldiers walked about discussing the importance of the work with anyone who would listen. A USES representative stationed at the hut screened applicants before they could be interviewed by depot personnel. The drive resulted in the hiring of over 500 persons. It was later augmented, in cooperation with USES, by a small caravan of army vehicles and civilian and military personnel that traveled to workingmen's dis-
tricts in Columbus and to communities within a 40-mile radius. The
caravan stopped at busy intersections, and while prospective employees
were being interviewed, others waiting for their turn to be inter-
viewed were taken on jeep rides. This technique was successful in
preventing persons who had expressed an interest in a job from wandering
off before they could be interviewed. On the other hand, however, it
also resulted in the recruitment of individuals whose interest in the
depot was confined to wanting a jeep ride. Hiring arrangements for
persons found acceptable were completed on the spot. Then they were
immediately driven to the depot for physical examinations.

Judged by peacetime standards, the drive, which continued six days
weekly for five weeks, was not successful, particularly insofar as the
outlying areas were concerned. Similarly unsuccessful results followed
the mailing of 1,100 letters inviting rural route box holders to in-
quire about available jobs at the depot. The effort netted only five
responses. However, USES representatives commented upon the diffi-
culty of measuring success by any standard other than that a job which
had previously gone undone was now being done. Moreover, drives of
this kind were also undoubtedly effective in such collateral ways as
emphasizing to the community the urgency of war production and the need
to stay on the job, and in stimulating people to seek jobs in estab-
ishments other than those doing the recruiting.

The most sustained, best planned, and most successful local re-
cruiting was done under WMC auspices by USES. As early as 1941 the
local employment office made an occupational census of persons in non-war industries with skills useful in war production. On December 7, 1942, the first anniversary of the United States' entry into the war, USES made a direct appeal to 2,500 Columbus residents to help solve the existing war production manpower shortage in the area. Letters were sent to men whose Selective Service occupational questionnaires indicated their present jobs were not essential to the war effort, that their present business or occupations were jeopardized or curtailed by rationing or priorities, or that they had skills which could be utilized in war industry or essential civilian work. The result was encouraging, for while USES placements generally showed a seasonal decline in December, they increased considerably during that month. (See Table 5.7, below.) But this was the first and last time USES used these questionnaires, because they soon became obsolete.

WAC-USES manpower recruiting efforts took several forms. The most obvious was the nationwide promotional campaign to enlist people into war production. This exploited all means of communication. At the same time the Columbus office had its own promotions. These consisted of a weekly radio program during which the nature and number of war jobs were discussed, another radio program honoring the week's "Typical War Worker" by presenting a merit award provided by a local jewelry store, spot radio announcements, short trailers between features at local movies, and posters.

USES also operated a number of special campaigns designed to fill needed manpower gaps at particular times. The success of these are more
easily measured. In January, 1944, 4,200 letters were sent to rural box holders in the county bordering Franklin County to the north in an effort to recruit farmers for work in meat packing and fertilizer plants where current shortages were between 250 and 300. Franklin County farmers were not solicited because it was felt that farmers near Columbus industry who had been able had already taken local jobs. The result was gratifying, although not all jobs were filled. There appeared to be some reluctance to take jobs in these employments because of poor pay and unpleasant working conditions. Moreover, most of the workers recruited returned to their farms during the spring planting period.

In June, 1944, the first Buttonhole Recruitment Campaign was launched in Columbus. The drive was conducted by specially trained staff members from various USSS offices in the state, supplemented by personnel from the local USSS office and recruiters supplied by employers in the area. About $300 was spent on the various advertising media employed to publicize the campaign. These funds were supplied by firms on the manpower priority list who were expected to benefit most from the recruitment. Government establishments furnished three jeeps and a command car for transportation. Recruiters, wearing long, white, conspicuous coats walked busy streets and approached persons to inquire about their employment status and to urge those not in essential work to report to the USSS office where they might be referred to such work. An estimated 1,100 persons came to USSS because of buttonhole contacts, with about half the persons coming the same day they were contacted. Nearly all persons recruited through the campaign were
referred to essential jobs, many to priority jobs. The skill of recruiters in singling out persons who seemed most available for work is reflected in an employment service estimate that about 50 percent of those contacted were found to be unemployed, 25 percent had small incomes and therefore did not work, and the other 25 percent were working in less essential industry. The success of the program indicates that despite previous intensive efforts to employ all available manpower, the local supply was far from exhausted.

In November a second Buttonhole Campaign, emphasizing the recruitment of male workers, was held. The result was a marked success. During the 10-day period of the drive USES traffic increased 30 percent over the same period the previous month, in spite of the fact that on one of these days, Thanksgiving, only 47 applicants appeared. For the month of November, 87 percent of the 772 priority openings in essential industries were filled, in the proportions of 94.7 percent of all male openings and 69.6 percent of all women openings. This compared with 71 percent of the 830 October priority openings filled, in the proportions of 76.4 of all male openings and 52.9 percent of all women openings. Twenty Columbus priority employers helped finance the campaign. Over 3,500 posters were distributed for display in local retail and service establishments, and thousands of hand bills were circulated. Newspaper publicity approximated 4,000 lines in 12 press releases, and

16. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, June 6, 1944, and USES report in Columbus Dispatch, June 11, 1944.
17. Columbus Labor Market Report, USES, November, 1944. The November figures do not include government agencies, railroads, or priority grants made on or after November 22.
efforts included three 15-minute broadcasts and 12 three-minute spot 
appeals by famous movie and radio personalities. City-wide parking 
privileges were extended to campaign workers and to jeeps that provided 
messenger service between recruiters and USES. At the same time re­
ception at USES was altered to facilitate the handling of applicants 
referred to the office by recruiters. In the USES office two wounded 
veterans from a nearby Army hospital spoke to applicants about the need 
to increase the production of war goods. A movie shadow box in the 
office showed battle films emphasizing the sacrifices made by soldiers 
and the destruction of material, and local employers exhibited their 
products in the office.

Two developments impeded the smooth operation of the campaign.
One, as was noted above, was that several non-local firms were simul­
taneously recruiting workers locally. The other was that a local news­
paper reporter misunderstood a USES report about expected production 
cutbacks and manpower layoffs at the war’s end, with the result that 
his prominently displayed article caused considerable contradictory 
publicity. On the one hand WMC was vigorously recruiting workers, and 
on the other it appeared to be saying that they would soon lose their 
jobs. As the result the Management-Labor Committee made one of its 
rare and vigorous denunciations of a local practice. The result was 
the passage of a resolution asking the local press to clear all news 
or articles about expected cutbacks and layoffs with the area director, 
so that publication of the true facts and their proper interpretation
USES made four other formal recruitment efforts, none of which involved the effort or expense of the Buttonhole Campaigns. One was a program to enlist women in war work, another sought to recruit people for foundry work, the third dealt with negotiated transfers of workers from one plant to another, and the fourth dealt with recruitment of farm workers. The manpower program was a comparatively minor effort since the local problem was more one of persuading employers to hire women than of persuading women to make themselves available. The foundry manpower program was experimental in nature and its results were never established. It involved personal letters written by USES to employees of local foundries asking them to contact friends who might be available for employment. They were asked to bring these friends to USES for referral. The plea was made at the end of April, 1945, but with the changing conditions resulting from the ending of the European war early in May it was not possible to establish the effectiveness of such an approach under more trying war conditions. Under existing conditions, however, nothing was accomplished by the effort.

The negotiated transfer program actually never got started. Its history began with attempts to give USES power to require the transfer into other employments of workers who were employed at less than their highest skills or who were more urgently needed in other employments. This was provided for in the first Columbus Employment Stabilization Plan, with the further provision that workers so transferred were to

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18. Minutes, Columbus Area Management–Labor Committee meeting, November 21, 1944.
retain seniority in their original jobs. USES did not use this power, although the Management-Labor Committee wrangled for months over the administration of its provisions. The second stabilization plan, coming in October, 1943, added a section which sought to provide for the orderly furloughing and recall of workers temporarily leaving their present employers, especially those leaving to take more urgent work for periods of short duration. The aim of the effort was twofold: to prevent manpower hoarding by assuring the employer that a furloughed worker could be easily recalled without going through the statement-of-availability procedure, and to facilitate the transfer of urgently needed workers to other employers who needed them, generally for short periods. This provision also gave rise to considerable committee wrangling, particularly in respect to methods of protecting the new employer against sudden loss of a recalled worker and protecting the worker against being deprived of a temporary job because his statement mentioned his furloughed status. It was finally agreed that the statement should not contain any reference to the worker's furloughed status, and that employers in the area should be notified that at certain seasonal intervals workers were being furloughed and were subject to recall.

By the Summer of 1944 USES had not chosen to employ its power to compel transfers, and apparently had no intention of using it. Therefore, the regional director recommended that negotiated transfers be effected by the local WMC offices as a means of filling "must" jobs. According to this recommendation, workers might be transferred from
one plant to another to fill urgent needs, but such transfers had to be agreeable to the unions involved, the managements of both plants, and the individual workers. The Columbus Area director expressed the opinion that the area's production problems might be solved without delay if such a program were instituted.\footnote{Ibid., August 15, 1944.}

A sub-committee was appointed to study the recommendation, and soon many objections to the proposal were raised. It was pointed out that the program would conflict with US3S efforts to effect up-grading of currently employed workers, since new workers would be brought into shops to fill higher rated jobs for which old employees with experience would not be considered. Moreover, the questions arose as to who would be the transferred worker's bargaining agent, what would happen if the transferred worker decided not to remain on the job, and how would compensation be handled if the wage rates for the two jobs were different.

Indeed, the whole question of compensation, which was the knottiest, resulted in some anomalous proposed solutions. In October the War Manpower Commission and the War Labor Board reached an agreement whereby the transferred worker was to be retained on the payroll of the transferring establishment at his regular wage. The agreement noted that this was a possible means of meeting manpower shortages in low wage plants. But obviously this arrangement implied that the manpower problems of the borrowing firm stemmed from low wages and could probably be solved by a wage increase, a view that WLB consistently rejected.
borrowing employer. Both management and labor representatives found difficulty in accepting the method as a possible solution at that time, and the chairman diplomatically concluded that current conditions did not appear to warrant serious consideration of the program. USES nonetheless arranged for a few transfers of the kind suggested from time to time, but these were generally for a few days at a time and were accomplished on a highly informal level.

The present study does not make a detailed analysis of the manpower situation in Franklin County agricultural employments because the farm labor problem is largely separate from the industrial labor problem. Moreover, it is a problem the significance of which is far from being only area or regional-wide. However, the Columbus USES engaged in a number of recruitment efforts to supply workers to fill seasonal farm needs, and these need be looked into. Thus from July through October in 1943, 1944, and 1945 USES engaged in extensive recruiting of fruit and vegetable harvesters and cannery workers. Appeals were made to club women, businessmen, youths, part-time workers, and factory workers. Throughout each summer nearly 400 persons from Columbus, ranging from factory workers to a contingent of lawyers, worked in county orchards and fields, all because of the organizing efforts of USES. But cannery workers were less easily recruited since the work was tedious, full-time, indoors, and had less romantic appeal. To recruit such workers USES conducted campaigns in the towns near the county's five canneries. The campaigns, which generally came in late August and September, involved sound trucks circulating through the cities urging the residents to
apply at a central location, airplanes dropping leaflets, and appeals through various private and governmental farm organizations. One such campaign resulted in three shifts being employed in a cannery where only one shift had worked two days before. The 1944 campaign also included a Cannery Essay Contest in which students from seven high schools in four counties participated. Students wrote essays on the importance of the canned food industry, and winners received war bonds. With the help of Jamaican laborers that were brought into the area in 1944, previously expected crop losses were entirely avoided.

Other USES-WMC recruitment efforts assumed the normal routine of regular press releases about current shortages and expected needs. USES of course provided office facilities to the out-of-the-area recruiters alluded to above, and also provided office facilities for local employers to enable them to conduct pooled interviews. The Columbus office did not recruit workers outside its own labor market area, although local needs were made known to other USES offices through regular WMC publications, indicating the nature of the local industries, the number of jobs expected to develop, the occupations in which openings were immediately available, entry wages and scheduled hours of work, the names of major firms in the area, and the adequacy of housing and living conditions in the area.

With one exception, the Columbus office did not actively recruit local individuals for work in other areas. The exception occurred late in 1944 under provisions of national manpower priorities. The Columbus Area received a requisition to supply 10 skilled machinists and tool-
makers for the top priority, highly secret Manhattan District Project. Within two days a total of 22 were recruited and hired. Considering the scarcity of these skilled workmen and the eagerness of area employers to hold those that it already had, this was a remarkable achievement, one that reflects favorably not only upon the recruitment work of USES but upon the excellent relations that existed between USES-WMC and area employers. The method by which these scarce specialists were recruited was remarkably simple. The USES managers in Columbus and the several other offices in the area simply telephoned employers of such workers telling them that an urgent problem intimately affecting the progress of the war had arisen and that it required the immediate services of these highly skilled workers. Employers were told that the nature of the project was secret and that persons hired would have to move a considerable distance to the job. They were asked if they could spare their best man for the duration of the emergency. Most employers responded willingly, as the result shows. Eight workers were recruited from Columbus proper and the rest from other towns and cities in the expanded administrative area. Significantly, many areas throughout the nation that had also been asked to supply such specialized workers did not fill their quotas. Success in filling them, if the Columbus experience is representative, was in a great measure dependent upon the good employer relations maintained by USES and WMC. It would therefore appear that the somewhat lax administration of controls in the Columbus Area 

20. See subsection "b" of this section, below.
administered more strictly, had the expected effect of maintaining employer good will and cooperation, which, in time of need, paid off handsomely.

b. Referral and Placement Activities. Recruiting was only the beginning of USES efforts to fill local jobs. The more difficult task was, once available individuals appeared at the USES office, to match them with unfilled jobs, persuade them to accept referral to these jobs, and hope that placement would result.

Encouraging available individuals to seek jobs through USES rather than to use their own devices was in itself not an easy task. To some extent controls over the hiring of persons with critical skills, and later over male hires, accomplished the aim of exposing workers to jobs on file at USES. But the extensive gate-hiring privileges which prevailed until January, 1945, to some extent undermined the effectiveness of these controls. They were further undermined by the fact that most women job changers were not required to pass through USES, a fact that is particularly significant in view of the considerable increase of women workers during the war.

Not only did USES seek to encourage the channeling of job seekers through its offices by regular publicity campaigns, but it also attempted to accomplish this by going directly to plants where layoffs were occurring and registering and referring the affected workers on the spot. In addition, it sent contact teams to the area's high schools prior to summer vacations each year to inform students about available summer and
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<td>3660</td>
<td>4260</td>
<td>5503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4146</td>
<td>3402</td>
<td>4576</td>
<td>5785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3694</td>
<td>4450</td>
<td>6029</td>
<td>6601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3256</td>
<td>5379</td>
<td>6035</td>
<td>5662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3642</td>
<td>5314</td>
<td>7662</td>
<td>5442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5103</td>
<td>6143</td>
<td>4892</td>
<td>3706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>4235</td>
<td>5141</td>
<td>5071</td>
<td>3605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>4024</td>
<td>4860</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>2785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4711</td>
<td>4453</td>
<td>3907</td>
<td>2484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44957</td>
<td>55386</td>
<td>58631</td>
<td>56997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reports and Analysis, United States Employment Service in Ohio, RS Forms 201.D.
part-time jobs and to register those who intended to enter the job market. The same was done at the local universities near the end of each academic quarter. The effect of these measures, as well as of the Expanded Manpower Program, is indicated by the fact that while only 40 percent of the area's job seekers went through USES in 1943, this proportion had risen to 60 or 70 percent by late 1944.

USES placement activities increased steadily throughout the war, as Table 5.7 shows. As was shown in Chapter 3, most of these placements occurred in manufacturing. Peak placements occurred in July, 1944, the effective month of the requirement that nearly all male hires be made through or with consent of USES. USES reported that male traffic rose to the highest in over a year during the week after the new program began, and total July traffic increased 47 percent above the previous month. In the program's first two weeks, male referrals increased 55 percent and male priority referrals 53 percent over the same period the previous month. And during the entire month the local foundry industry showed a male employment gain of 25 workers, a gratifying experience at a time of the year when workers were reluctant to accept foundry jobs and when foundry employment generally took a severe seasonal dip.21

Certain other favorable consequences followed the introduction of the priorities program. The most outstanding of these was that smaller firms, which had feared that the program would work against their in-

21. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, July 25, 1944.
Table 5.8
Number of Male Priority Openings, Referrals, and Placements in
Essential Firms, Columbus, Ohio, Area,
November, 1944-July, 1945(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and month</th>
<th>Openings</th>
<th>Referrals</th>
<th>Placements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1571</td>
<td>2336</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>2113</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>2333</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1216</td>
<td>2287</td>
<td>1033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>1546</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data for earlier months, though available in fragmentary form, are unreliable and hence not recorded here.
b) Data not available.
Source: Compiled from the minutes of the bimonthly meetings of the Columbus Area Manpower Priorities Committee.
terests, began to benefit by more referrals being made to them. Smaller firms generally did not have good access to the labor market since the larger employers, because they were well known, attracted workers more easily. But small employers with priorities as high as large employers noticeably improved their labor market positions after local priorities were instituted. Of course USSE had been pursuing an informal priority procedure in making referrals since 1942, but the priorities established by the Manpower Priorities Committee were more dependable and therefore permitted more rigid adherence to priorities without fear of misdirecting manpower or discriminating against and of the employers. The smaller essential firms also benefited because USSE began basing referrals on the urgency rating given to each firm by the Production Urgency Committee.

When the priority referral program started in July, 1944, USSE had about 3,000 listed male openings in essential activities, an average that continued for every month for the duration of the war. Male priority openings generally totaled something less than half this number. As is revealed by Table 5.8, USSE made many more referrals than there were openings, due to the fact that only about 40 percent of priority referrals resulted in placement. This compares with from 60 to 70 percent of referrals to other essential jobs resulting in placement, and 90 to 100 percent of referrals to less essential employments ending in placement. These rates seem to make sense in view of the

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22. This figure is not the same as "additional manpower requirements", which indicated the number of jobs that employers felt should be filled immediately.

23. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, February 27, 1945.
nature of the jobs that needed to be filled in each category. Thus a comparatively larger proportion of priority jobs were of a semi-skilled and skilled nature. There were comparatively few qualified applicants for these, so USES frequently referred persons who were known not to fill all the skill requirements of the jobs in the hope that employers would find them easily trainable and thus hire them. USES also sent persons with related skills rather than persons with the exact skill called for, if none of the latter were available. For that reason the proportion of referrals eventuating in placements was quite low. On the other hand, the high placement rate in less essential industry reflects the eagerness of less essential employers to hire practically anyone who was made available to them, since their access to the labor market was extremely limited. Throughout 1944 the proportion of priority openings filled by USES generally averaged between 60 and 70 percent. About the same average prevailed in 1945, as Table 5.8 shows, with the exception of January, February, and July, when the proportions were 93, 85, and 41 percent respectively.

The low July rate is probably explained by the increased withdrawals from the labor market that occurred at that time. But the high January and February proportions have more interesting and important bases. On January 22 maximum referral standards were instituted locally under which USES refused referral to applicants who did not accept referral to jobs for which they were qualified in establishments in the first six urgency categories. Under previous standards USES sought to

place applicants in plants having high urgency ratings, but generally relented in cases of reluctant applicants. But an even more fundamental reason seems to have been behind the larger proportion of placements in January and February, a reason which also explains why proportions for the rest of the year did not remain equally high. As has been pointed out before, early in January, 1945, a new Selective Service policy was announced calling for the induction of all occupationally deferred men who quit their jobs without draft board approval, and for a general tightening of occupational deferment standards, with the aim of inducting deferred men not in essential work. The announcements were made over the weekend, and on the following Monday the USFS office was overwhelmed with male applicants seeking essential employment. The large number of male applicants continued for the rest of the month and during part of February, when the draft scare wore off and the relocation of most applicants had taken place. To some extent the continued high February rate may also have been occasioned by the fact that early in the month the local stabilization plan was amended to include all firms regardless of their size under the provision that men must be hired through or with consent of USES. Thus male workers seeking jobs in the effected establishments (which totaled about 2,000 in number and employed between 12,000 and 15,000 persons\(^25\)) became exposed to USES referral also.

Tabulations of the identity of the persons placed in local jobs by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of workers placed by USES, by source from which drawn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From local area employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From essential activity</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>2,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From less essential activity</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From seasonal industries</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From local area not employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New entrants</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning veterans</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuters</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>3,956</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>4,224</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of workers placed by USES, by type of placement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In essential activity</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>3,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In less essential and seasonal</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>1,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>3,956</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>4,224</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of workers hired at the gate by selected essential establishments</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total accessions in selected essential establishments</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td>4,261</td>
<td>4,277</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>4,333</td>
<td>3,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of separations from essential establishments</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>4,399</td>
<td>4,323</td>
<td>4,441</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>3,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of layoffs</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net increase(+) or decrease(-) in employment in selected essential establishments</td>
<td>-558</td>
<td>-618</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>-429</td>
<td>-265</td>
<td>-218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) The number of firms and the percent of essential employment they represent is unknown. Monthly placements equal between 70 and 90 percent of all USES placements per month.
b) Sum of gate hiring and USES placements in essential firms.
c) Represents difference between accensions and separations in essential establishments.

Source: Current reports, "Monthly Labor Market Summary, Columbus, Ohio," USES.
USES are fragmentary. But the information that is available tends to support the conclusion reached earlier about the proportion of newly hired persons in essential employments that came from less essential industries. Table 5.9, summarizing the source of USES male placements in selected essential firms in the Columbus Area during the Fall of 1945 and the Winter of 1946, indicates that between 35 and 45 percent of the men so placed had immediately previous jobs in less essential industries. It also shows that between 35 and 45 percent were last located in essential industries, between 5 and 10 percent were new immigrants, another 5 to 10 percent were probably re-entrants into the labor market or previously unemployed persons, and between 2 and 4 percent were returning veterans and new entrants. The over-all proportion of new entrants was probably somewhat higher than these figures indicate since, as has been shown, women entered the labor market in a greater proportion than men during the war years. Moreover, the 1943 proportion of new entrants was probably higher than the late 1944 and early 1945 proportions. It is further to be noted that these placements constitute only between 75 and 95 percent of total male accessions in the sampled firms, a fact that may distort the proportions relative to all accessions. However, there appears to be no a priori reason why the sample proportions in Table 5.9 should not be representative.

One of the most significant revelations of Table 5.9 is that USES male placements in less essential establishments averaged between 10 and 15 percent of all USES placements in the indicated months. (Compare Table 5.9 with Table 5.7) This despite the fact that under the
prevailing stabilization plan less essential establishments were nominally to be deprived of new manpower, and particularly of masculine manpower. And, since the months for which data are available were during the period when nearly all male hiring in the area was done through or with consent of USES according to rather specific priority conditions, it is reasonable to expect that the proportion of placements in less essential establishments was even higher before these provisions were put into the stabilization plan.

There were few aids and many impediments to more successful and effective USES referrals and placements. About the only aid was the appeal that could be made to the patriotic sentiments of applicants. And the success of this device depended so much upon the skill of the interviewer that it far from proved to be of much general usefulness. Another potential aid was that employers were in a position of greater need and thus might be expected to accept referrals more eagerly. This was true, but most of the difficulty lay in obtaining the applicants' acceptance of referral to the intended establishment. The threat of military induction could be, but was not generally, used in the case of draft-age men. And outright refusal to refer applicants to jobs other than for which they seemed best qualified was seldom resorted to.

All three local stabilization plans provided that only suitable employment be offered an applicant, that he could not be required to accept a job that paid less than his previous one, and that he was to be given a choice among suitable jobs. Moreover, it was the local
practice to avoid pressing a worker if he refused to accept the job for which he was best qualified. In addition, prescribed interview tactics were not often used with the required skill by local office personnel. Moreover, many USES interviewers never got over their depression training. The public employment services were established during the 1930's depression. Their task was to find jobs and to get the best men for available jobs. They took unemployment compensation claims, developed an essentially sympathetic attitude toward applicants and employers, and tried to fit applicants to the highly individualized specifications of employers. But war conditions required their finding workers, not jobs; getting tough with applicants, not sympathizing with them, and ignoring or systematically condemning discriminatory hiring specifications, not yielding to them. Thus referral and placement activities were not as aggressive as war conditions required.

Moreover, certain features of the available jobs hindered USES efforts to refer and place workers. For example, it was always difficult to find applicants who would accept referral to fertilizer plants and foundries. Their reputations for poor working conditions, hard work, and comparatively low wages resulted in their not receiving many referrals, even though they required only common laborers. And obtaining an applicant's consent to accept referral did not insure his placement. Indeed, the placement-referral ratio at fertilizer plants was only about 30 percent, as compared to a ratio twice that high in other essential firms.26

26. Ibid., February 27, 1945.
The obstacles to better referral and placement achievements were numerous and peculiar. Unpleasant work or working conditions appeared to be a major factor, USES and employers frequently reporting that these factors hindered recruitment and referral. There is evidence, however, that some firms' unfavorable reputations with regard to these factors were often illusory, that over a large number of years they had acquired reputations which were no longer justified but which persisted and proved to be highly adverse.

Other factors being equal, lower starting wage rates were a very general reason why it was difficult to attract workers to some jobs. Low starting rates were sometimes offset by numerous fringe benefits and incentive pay arrangements, but USES interviewers found that these were not good selling points. The base rate seemed most important. Peculiarly, a few firms with relatively low starting rates attracted applicants very easily. These were new firms only recently moved into the area. It is difficult to determine with absolute certainty why more applicants sought referral there, but several reasons suggest themselves. One was probably the excitement and glamour of their being new. The plants were comparatively large and modern, and their newness and growth were highly publicised in the local press. There was also probably the feeling that these companies offered a better chance for promotion than older companies. Moreover, they had all the most recent conveniences, and, above all, they were comparatively clean. The latter factor was probably a major reason why women were so easily attracted to the newest and largest local plant. It is entirely reason-
able that the number of women who took jobs in the Columbus Area during the war might have been considerably fewer had the new aircraft plant not located in the community.

As has been pointed out, increasing optimism about the early ending of the war made referrals more difficult, as did layoffs and labor-management difficulties. There was also some reaction against accepting priority jobs, expressed in the attitude of applicants that "something's wrong with that job or it wouldn't be on priority—it would be filled." And it was reported that workers hesitated to accept referral to plants reported to be overloaded with manpower, as one firm was alleged to have been several times. USES interviewers also occasionally reported that referral was refused because of a requirement or strong pressure to pay union initiation fees and dues at some plants. On the other hand, of course, young men obviously anxious to escape military service generally sought referral to plants with highest urgency ratings.

USES attempts to encourage fuller utilization of available manpower were considerably frustrated by the continuation of discriminatory hiring practices by many employers. Some went through the entire war without hiring Negroes. Others hired them only in unskilled service and custodial positions. Others did not place them in certain departments of their establishments. Many were particularly discriminatory with respect to Negro women. There is evidence that employers dis-

27. Ibid., December 26, 1944.
28. Ibid., April 1, 1944.
criminated against recent immigrants also. There was a general feeling among employers that these workers were unreliable both as to their technical competence and their tenure. The same kind of discrimination was prevalent to a lesser degree in respect to persons commuting from surrounding towns and rural areas. And, as will be demonstrated later, employers' suspicions on this score were to a considerable extent true. Lack of adequate housing was responsible for many immigrants leaving the community after only a short period of local residence. The difficulty of traveling long distances every day often resulted in commuters quitting after a few months. Other immigrants and commuters returned to their regular farm work during the spring and summer months, and for many persons from rural areas the rigorous pace of industrial production required a discipline that conflicted too harshly with their bucolic habits.

a. The Wage Question and the Mobilization and Stabilization of Manpower. The role of wages in the stabilization program requires a separate discussion. Because some employers repeatedly asserted that low wage rates were a major cause of their inability either to attract new workers or to hold those now employed, it is appropriate that it be discussed at this juncture. While it can safely be said that many of the employer judgments on this matter were rationalizations and the result of naive interpretations of the dynamics of manpower behavior, their claims cannot be dismissed entirely. A very brief look at the official relationship between the government's handling of wage stabili-
ization on the one hand and manpower mobilization and stabilization on the other is therefore desirable.

Under the wartime stabilization program, wage rates were nominally frozen at levels prevailing on September 15, 1942. From time to time thereafter the National War Labor Board, which was charged with administering the wage stabilization program, made rulings and policies which permitted certain adjustments in the prevailing wages to be made. None of these adjustments, however, were to be for the purposes of facilitating manpower allocation or manpower stabilization. Indeed, to refrain from doing this was one of the guiding operating principles to which all War Labor Board analysts were expected to adhere rigidly.

To the extent that wage adjustments were permitted, they were to raise prevailing rates above sub-standard levels, allow certain adjustments to offset increases in the cost of living, undo gross inequalities in the wages paid to persons performing the same kind of work in different plants within the same area, and compensate for gross inequities. Merit increases, length-of-service increases, promotion increases, and certain piece-work or incentive increases were also permitted with specific limitations and under specified conditions.

Thus according to WLB policy, the wage question was deemed something not only different from the manpower mobilization and stabilization question, but actually separate from that question. This circumscribed view of the function of wages in a mobilization period was not shared by persons faced with the day-to-day task of operating the manpower program. Indeed, Columbus Area manpower officials were forced
by circumstances, to take into consideration the impact of wages on the
program they were required to administer.

For example, as has been noted, the wage factor was one that USES
placement officers continuously encountered in their referral work.
On a broad policy level, the Management–Labor Committee took active
cognizance of it. Thus it generally provided that before ruling on
permission to grant locally needed status to less essential firms, and
before designating occupations as being in local short supply (See
Chapter 6, Section A, below.), the firms involved must have made suffi-
cient efforts to obtain manpower by other means. These included rais-
ing entrance wage rates above the sub-standard level, if they were
sub-standard, and raising other wages to levels of competitive equality
with area firms that hired similar types of labor. This policy was
an expression of the apparent WMC belief that wages were the final
arbiter over the effective allocation of manpower. Indeed, the Region
V Management–Labor Committee on one occasion passes a resolution advis-
ing the regional director to "make all possible representation...to the
Director of War Mobilization for the adjustment on either an industry
or an area basis of those wage ceiling which are currently so low as
to interfere with an adequate flow of manpower and with the proper oper-
ation of controlled referral plans".29 The resolution further stated
that the most effective allocation of the labor force was hampered by
differing wages and working conditions among essential industry plants,
and that controlled referral programs spotlighted the difficulty these

29. Minutes, Region V Management–Labor Committee meeting, January 9,
1945.
The existence of a relation between successful manpower recruitment, effective manpower allocation, and wages was given official recognition on December 24, 1943, when WMC and WLB agreed to a procedure under which wage decisions by WLB were to be expedited by consulting with WMC on the urgency of proposed wage increase requests. WMC was to certify that there was in fact a manpower shortage in the area of origin of the request, that the shortage in the requesting firm could not be remedied solely by the application of measures available to the employer and to WMC, and that the proposed increase would have a favorable effect on the manpower situation within the plant and not have a debilitating effect on the manpower situation within other plants in the area.30 While this was in the nature of a recognition on the part of WLB that wages were indeed important in the allocation of manpower, WLB nonetheless remained adamant in its standing policy that wages were not to be used to direct or allocate manpower. The duality of this position is unmistakable, and it expressed itself in the failure of the WMC-WLB agreement to have materialized into an effective working arrangement.

Insofar as the local situation was concerned, WMC generally encouraged the employer to seek an increase without the benefit of WMC aid. Only after failure, and sometimes only upon WLB request, did WMC make recommendations. But the WLB in Region V generally ignored unsolicited WMC recommendations, and frequently made its own field investigations. Often WPB's War Labor Representative was called in, or

or voluntarily entered the case, to give his reactions to a firm's needs and difficulties. The result often was considerable overlapping in the labor activities of government agencies, differences of opinion, and lack of effective action.

There were three reasons for WMC's reluctance to aid local firms in their wage requests. One, in the interest of the over-all stabilization program, it was desirable to avoid wage increases. Two, in the absence of easy access to wage increases, firms would be forced to seek solutions to shortages by improving manpower utilization and personnel practices, and three, appearing before WLB in behalf of a private firm might have given rise to an impression that WMC was more interested in supporting the claims of firms under its jurisdiction than in stabilizing the economy.

From the analyses in the previous sections it is possible to make certain generalizations about the role of wages in the manpower program. First, it is certain that wages played an important role in influencing manpower mobilization and allocation, at least within the local stabilization area. Second, however, it seems likely that the influence of wages has been overemphasized by employers and underemphasized by WLB. The evidence indicates that wages exert their most powerful effect in situations where other factors such as working

31. Carroll R. Daugherty, formerly director of wage stabilization in the National War Labor Board, recently repeated that "experience showed that wage rates cannot be used as a means of moving manpower from place to place." He did not, however, document this observation. See his "Wage Stabilization Standards", Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter, 1951, p. 101.
conditions and personnel practices are about equal. Where there are differences in these factors, on the other hand, any of them may be of equal or even greater importance than wages in influencing workers' job choices. Finally, whatever influence wages have, it appears likely that they exert a more powerful influence on some groups than upon others. For example, chronic job-hoppers appear to have made most of their job choices exclusively in response to wage differentials within the area.

Although the evidence is inconclusive, and there has been no effort to make an exhaustive analysis of the wages question in this study, these generalizations suggest that manpower stabilization and recruitment ought not be handled independently of wage control, as they were in World War II. The problems of stabilizing and efficiently utilizing the available labor supply within given stabilization areas cannot be solved unless a better operating relation exists between the wage and the manpower stabilizers. While it is true that the wage stabilization problem and the manpower stabilization problem are in some respects different and may require different kinds of experts to deal with them, it is nonetheless true that wages and wage controls can be effectively utilized in facilitating manpower mobilization, stabilization, and utilization. In view of this, consideration might well be given to the desirability of a single administrative organization which would administer as a unified program wage stabilization and manpower mobilization.

d. Conclusions. The Columbus manpower experience suggests that to
a considerable extent the large increase in the wartime work force resulted simply from the availability of more jobs in the area; that recruitment efforts based only on patriotic appeals were generally unsuccessful; that the exotic promise of adventure in a new experience and the general enthusiasm for war probably encouraged more people to enter the job market than did the emphasis on the sharing of war sacrifices and the preservation of freedom, and that in general the comparatively prosaic mechanism of the price system, coupled with the ease of getting jobs, was a substantially effective recruitment device.

Employer reports indicate that USES referral was helpful, and that priority referral was particularly so. Area firms, although they claimed continuously high current manpower needs, were not bothered by persistent production lags. After the Fall of 1944 no "must" firms were ever behind schedule. To the extent that manpower shortages existed, it would appear that well over three-fourths of current additional requirements could have been met by hiring unskilled persons for either immediate employment or for employment after a few days of on-the-job training. The rather lax administration of controls furthermore suggests that local shortages were far from being severe. The absence of a severe shortage is illustrated in several experiences. For example, hundreds of men suddenly made themselves available for essential jobs whenever Selective Service threatened to crackdown on deferred men. In December, 1944, 40 percent, or 3,800, of the county's draft-age men classified as IV-F, were estimated still to have been in less essential employments. Indeed, in view of the increase of men applying at USES

32. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, Jan. 9, 1945
with each more stringent Selective Service policy announcement, and
with every Washington rumor of "work-or-fight" legislation, it would
appear that the use by USES of the draft weapon as a means of recruit-
ing and placing young men in essential jobs was far from what it might
have been.

It would also appear that manpower recruitment lacked considerable
integration. The specter of area employers contributing money for a
campaign to recruit local manpower for local employment only to have
half a dozen out-of-the-area firms receiving regional and national per-
mission to draw from the responding applicants had a ludicrous Gilbert
& Sullivan flavor. Publicity about local layoffs during recruitment
campaigns also created anomalies. And recruitment campaigns that did
not place sufficient emphasis on "staying on the job" probably caused
problems where solutions were being sought.

The recruitment and referral experiences point up some rather im-
portant facts about labor market dynamics. They indicate, for example,
that the size of the labor force can be changed by a multitude of
peculiar, non-economic factors; that certain apparently homogeneous
manpower groups are heterogeneous in unexpected respects; that the
size of the labor force does not depend on the number of available
workers alone but must be measured in more effective terms which take
into consideration employer hiring standards, prejudices, and tactics,
and that claimed manpower shortages are not necessarily shortages at
all.

C. Absenteeism.
Table 5.10

Estimated Volume and Rate of Absenteeism and Estimated Additional Manpower Requirements of Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Selected Months, 1943-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month and year</th>
<th>Absenteeism rate</th>
<th>Daily number of absentees</th>
<th>Number of additional workers required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943 June</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5600</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5600</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11400</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 May</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7600</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6800</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7800</td>
<td>2100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 January, 1-15</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9700</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 16-31</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5300</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estimates based on data from minutes of Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee, Columbus Labor Market Reports, and Columbus Dispatch.
Absenteeism is failure on the part of a worker to be at work when he is scheduled to be at work. Absenteeism adversely affected production during the war not only because of loss of the absentee's labor, but also because of the disruption of work flow. As was pointed out by the War Manpower Commission, "During peacetime, production schedules are more or less flexible and extra workers are readily available as substitutes. During wartime, however, the speedup of production schedules and the shortage of workers as replacements make any absenteeism a matter of concern." An executive of one of the nation's largest equipment producers estimated that in highly tooled, modern metal manufacturing each percent of absenteeism reduces production about 2.5 percent.

Absenteeism was probably more disruptive than turnover. Available information on absenteeism is fragmentary and none too accurate. But what is available indicates that area manpower shortages might have been eliminated by comparatively small reductions in absenteeism. Thus data in Table 5.10 suggest that current aggregate additional manpower requirements might have been met by reductions in the area's average absenteeism rate of as little as 10 percent at some times and at the most 50 percent at other times. Indeed, the area director estimated in the late Fall of 1943 that a permanent 50 percent reduction in the rate would have resulted in meeting not only the current labor requirements of essential employers but also their anticipated labor needs.

Absence began to receive extensive national publicity early in 1943, and local publicity began to emanate from the Management-Labor Committee and USES in June of that year. In September a subcommittee to study absenteeism in the community and recommend appropriate action was appointed by the Committee. In addition to including Committee members, it included representatives from the local USES and an officer from the local armed services depot who had considerable experience in absenteeism work. The most difficult problem faced by the subcommittee, and one that USES had been giving its attention for many months, was that no accurate reports of the rate of local absenteeism were available. Employer ES-270 reports had an absenteeism section, but some firms kept no absentee records, and those that did used differing methods and standards of computing the rate. Thus the first concern of the subcommittee was to facilitate USES efforts to obtain the establishment of uniform records on absenteeism in essential firms.

USES proposed a simple system according to which the rate was to be the quotient of the number of man-days lost because of absences divided by the sum of the number of man-days worked and man-days lost. But by the following year some firms had not yet taken appropriate action. One of the delinquent companies was known to be generally obstinate in its relations with government agencies, and continued throughout the war to object to many manpower measures. Those measures and procedures it agreed to follow with any degree of thoroughness it

35. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, November 16, 1943.
followed only reluctantly. A few firms felt that nothing would be gained from the proposed procedure; others, especially those that looked upon modern personnel practices as a variety of social work, claimed to be too busy with production problems to be bothered, and still others said that the procedure was too expensive. But most of the delinquent companies simply procrastinated, putting the job off from one day to another, apparently because they felt it would accomplish nothing anyway. Not until April, 1944, when 25 large firms had standardized their reports, was USES able accurately to sample the extent of absenteeism in the area.

In December, 1943, a serious flu epidemic resulted in a considerable increase in absenteeism, as Table 5.10 shows. However, the high rate was also to some extent seasonal, reflecting the effect of holiday shopping and trips to visit friends and relatives. In consideration of the disruptive effect of illness, the Management-Labor Committee addressed a letter asking the State Director of Health to urge local war plants to use preventive measures. Local plants were so urged, but little came of it. At the same time USES and WMC officials suggested a city-wide anti-absenteeism publicity campaign, but the suggestion was tabled when financial support was not forthcoming from agencies representing local employers. Their primary objection was the cost. They said, moreover, that the great variation in absenteeism rates among plants indicated that the problem could be handled best by the individual firm if approached properly. At that time rates in local firms varied
between 4.5 and 11 percent.\textsuperscript{36}

Early the following April, when the weather became more pleasant and a seasonal increase in absenteeism occurred, WMC and USES sponsored an anti-absenteeism campaign. Emphasizing the positive aspects of the problem, it was called the "Presenteeism—Stay on the Job Campaign". A committee of USES and WMC personnel operated the campaign. It ran for three weeks. No funds were available for the project, but through the considerable cooperation of local business, industry, and labor an extensive publicity program resulted. The campaign opened with a mayor's proclamation published in the Sunday newspapers. Through the efforts of the Retail Merchants Association many local merchants used the campaign slogan "Did you work today?" in all their advertising throughout the duration of the campaign. The local association of industries and the two large labor federations jointly sponsored a letter-writing contest on "How Can Columbus Improve Presenteeism on the Job?" A local bakery printed and distributed, at its own expense, over 25,000 pamphlets stressing the importance of staying on the job. A downtown theater showed a short movie on the importance of war production. Nine 15-minute presenteeism radio programs were broadcast by local stations each week, business associations and labor federations sent letters to their members urging cooperation in the drive, and community newspapers, house organs, trade and union papers, and plant bulletin boards carried campaign publicity. In addition, all the daily newspapers carried a daily barometer of attendance in Columbus war plants showing

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., December 21, 1943.
the current presenteeism rate and emphasizing a goal of 95 percent. But
the goal was far from reached. Indeed there was no change from the high
absenteeism rate of nine percent.

Early the following January, with the current average absenteeism
rate at over 11 percent, another campaign was outlined by the Management-
Labor Committee. After consulting with community leaders composed of
representatives from groups ranging from the Chamber of Commerce to the
Council of Social Agencies and the Franklin County Ministerial Associa-
tion, a campaign subcommittee consisting of USES, WMC, and Management-
Labor Committee representatives was formed. As usual, no funds were provided.

The subcommittee conducted an educational program designed to
educate housewives about the need to limit shopping to mid-day hours,
instruct children to respect transportation property since additional
buses were not available and repairs could not easily be made, emphasize
to workers the need to allow themselves sufficient time to get to work
and to be patient in the event of delays, and encourage industrial
management to review the "share-the-ride plans" within its plants and
to assist drivers and riders as much as possible. The cooperation of
selected firms was enlisted by having them make daily presenteeism re-
ports to USES and execute self-analysis check lists designed by the USES
Utilization Section for the express purpose of assisting in reducing
absenteeism and turnover. Employers were also advised to contact the
USES consultant on absenteeism about their absentee problems.
Another feature of the program was a concentrated publicity campaign which enlisted the cooperation of department stores, newspapers, radio stations, unions, taverns, restaurants, police cars equipped with loud speakers, theaters, churches, pool rooms, and the routemen of dairies and bakeries. As the result of this marshalling of community forces absenteeism declined from 9 percent on the day before the campaign began to 6.5 percent the day it ended. This represented an increase of about 2,300 in the number of persons on the job daily.37 In the spring another such drive was held, with comparable results.

Detailed information as to the identity of the absentees was never compiled. However, there is indication, as there was to some extent in connection with turnover, that a good deal of the absenteeism was caused by marginal, industrially undisciplined workers. Absenteeism rates appeared to be higher for women, older workers, recently hired workers, and workers new to industrial work. The higher rate among women is probably explained by their household duties, their greater susceptibility to illness (which also applies to older workers), and to the fact that illness in the family generally results in the wife, rather than the husband, remaining home. One firm reported female absenteeism decreased considerably with the elimination of Saturday work. Newly hired workers, it was alleged by one firm, were absent more frequently because they were disappointed in their jobs and went job shopping. Persons new on industrial jobs became easily fatigued and required some

37. From the final report of the Presenteeism Policy Subcommittee, mimeographed, February 2, 1945.
time to acquire the necessary discipline for continuous, every-day work. Absenteeism rates also increased with lengthened workweeks for all categories of workers. Housing shortages probably had something to do with causing absenteeism, particularly in the case of immigrants who had not yet located adequate housing. Some never located adequate housing, as is indicated by an affidavit certifying to the existence of "hot beds" in which workers slept in alternating shifts geared to their job shifts.

With inadequate housing was also associated the problem of inadequate transportation facilities, where housing was in short supply workers traveled longer journeys to and from their jobs. The resulting increase in fatigue, and the reduction in time available for family, shopping, rest, and recreation probably also contributed to absenteeism. Inclement winter weather that hampered automobile traffic also seems to have caused some absenteeism, and balmy spring and summer days were marked by increased absenteeism, too. Hot summer days did the same in foundry employments. There is also some indication that absenteeism was higher when production changeovers, material shortages, faulty work flow, poor planning, or labor hoarding resulted in some workers being idle and in creating the impression that there was neither a great need to be on the job nor a real labor shortage. Absentee rates were generally higher on days before and after weekends and holidays and days following pay day. In connection with the latter case, an interesting phenomenon was discovered. Several firms successfully reduced Saturday absenteeism by changing pay day from Friday to Saturday, but the result
was an increase in Monday absenteeism, an experience that suggests that some workers were determined to get two consecutive days off after pay day. As might be expected, absences were least frequent on pay days. One firm, whose workweek began on the second shift on Sunday afternoon reported an absentee rate of nearly 30 percent on that shift each week.

Some of these causes for absenteeism were the object of specific remedial efforts by USES-WMC, the Management-Labor Committee, employers, and, to some extent, unions. For example, retail stores, utilities, banks, and such professional persons as physicians, dentists, and lawyers were contacted by a subcommittee of the Management-Labor Committee to obtain the establishment of shopping and service hours more convenient to war workers. However, these efforts produced no results. The Retail Merchants Association pointed out that downtown stores were already open until 9 p.m. on Mondays and observed that an extension of this practice would not prevent absenteeism. Banks were thoroughly opposed to remaining open during evening hours because of the increased risk involved in handling money and because to do so would cause their insurance premiums to be increased.38

Of the many anti-absenteeism "devices" suggested from time to time by USES-WMC, several were used by Columbus Area employers. Among these were attaching AWOL slips to the time cards of absentees, posting the names of chronic absentees in prominent places in the plant, appointing in-plant anti-absenteeism committees, and requiring advance notice of any expected absence.

38. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, December 21, 1943.
Some firms attempted to reduce absenteeism by sending telegrams to unexcused absentees and others sent a visiting nurse to absentees claiming sickness. A few firms imposed disciplinary layoffs for repeated unexcused absences, but this tactic was discouraged by WMC, and besides, proved fruitless. One company reported that it made little progress in reducing absenteeism until it turned the whole job over to the workers themselves. The workers held special hearings on each absentee and had fellow workers call on individuals on the day of their absence. The company personnel director said that the workers used methods that he would not have used himself, but the result was a considerable reduction in absenteeism.

The effort required to reduce turnover in some establishments consisted in little more than removing the cause of illness. For example, drafty warehouses were heated and fires were provided for men on outside jobs. Improved morale through membership in various in-plant committees seems to have helped in some places. Thus one plant had a committee for practically everything, and nearly everybody had a committee post. There was a transportation committee, a sports committee, a Christmas party committee, a cleanliness committee, a scrap drive committee, a correspondence committee, an absenteeism committee, a welcoming committee, and many more.

Another anti-absenteeism tactic that was used, but unfortunately very infrequently, was reporting habitual absentees to their draft boards. In fact, that this was a weapon available to employers seems not to have been publicized adequately. However, late in 1944, local draft boards made a half-hearted announcement that employer requests for
deferments were to be accompanied by the absentee records of the workers in question.

The relatively infrequent union efforts to reduce absenteeism do not seem to have been particularly successful. Indeed, unions often avoided the issue for fear of, as one shop steward put it, "rubbing the boys the wrong way."

It would appear that a considerable increase in absenteeism was probably unavoidable under the kind of war conditions and control measures prevalent at the time. Marginal workers, often with rural backgrounds, were hard to discipline into regular attendance, and the impact of war shortages on housing, transportation, and other community facilities necessarily made themselves felt. Augmenting these factors was the reluctance of many employers to do anything very constructive about absenteeism because of the time and effort involved and lack of promise that is would be successful. The limited successes of the anti-absenteeism drives are probably not significant because several weeks after the campaigns the rates rose again, and continuation of these drives over longer periods would probably not have resulted in permanently lowered rates. As Great Britain discovered, probably the best approach to a remedy is fines and jail sentences, at least with respect to habitual absentees. And since during the war money meant comparatively little to some people, and particularly to habitual absentees, perhaps fines should have been in the form of deprivation of certain ration coupons.

On the basis of the war experience, nothing very certain can be
said about ways of reducing excessive absenteeism. The combined use of all the methods mentioned above is probably the best recommendation that can be made. The only fairly certain conclusion is that the increasing availability of jobs and the prevalence of a manpower stringency tends to be accompanied by increased absenteeism, and that estimates of the available labor supply in a given area are not likely to be very useful unless consideration is given to man-days lost by excessive absenteeism.

D. Migration and Commuting.

Available information on the extent of immigration into the Columbus Area during the war is extremely fragmentary. Information on the extent of the changes in the number and in the commuting patterns of commuters who worked in local establishments is even more fragmentary. However, the information that can be pieced together is fairly revealing.

a. Migration. Anything but a very rough approximation of immigrants is difficult. However, it is known that between 1940 and 1947 the population of the Columbus Metropolitan District increased from 366,000 to 433,000. This 67,000 increase compares with a 28,000 increase during the entire decade of the 1930's. According to the Bureau of Census the area's labor force increased by 36,000 persons during the seven-year period, and the labor force participation rate rose from 51 to 55 percent.

The changes that occurred during the war years were more dramatic.
Table 5.11

Net Immigration of Workers into Columbus, Ohio, Area, as Measured by Statement of Availability, Determinations, Monthly, June, 1943-April, 1944(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and month</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Outmigration</th>
<th>Net immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2194</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2144</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>1229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>1045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) From June, 1943, through October, 1943, the data refer to applications granted. From November, 1943, through April, 1944, the data refer to applications received.

Source: June, 1943, through October, 1943, from USES report in Columbus Dispatch, November 2, 1943. November, 1943, through April, 1944, from Reports and Analysis, War Manpower Commission for Ohio, RS Tables 105,1.
Thus the 1940 labor force was 160,000, of which 20,000 persons were unemployed. But despite military withdrawals of about 40,000 persons, at its wartime peak in 1944 area employment was about 200,000. It would appear therefore that the area's labor force increased by about 80,000 persons between April, 1940, and mid-1944. This increase can logically have occurred in only three ways: more intensive participation of the existing population in the labor force, larger numbers of persons residing outside the area commuting to jobs within the area, and increased migration of persons from other areas into the Columbus Area.

With the advent of manpower stabilization controls in 1943, migrants were required to clear through the USES office. The extent to which this requirement was violated is not known precisely, but until the abolition of the requirement in October, 1944, the Columbus Labor Market Report made repeated references to the belief that USES was not contacting all migrants. This was particularly true in the case of out-migrants. According to USES tabulations (Table 5.11), in the last seven months of 1943 about 13,000 immigrant workers cleared through the local office. But simultaneously about 6,000 workers outmigrated, leaving a net immigration for the period of about 7,000. During the first four months of 1944, 4,700 immigrant workers cleared through the office, while at the same time 3,200 sought to outmigrate. By early Fall of 1944 the number of immigrants had fallen off considerably, with the result that outmigrant workers nearly equaled immigrant workers. At the same time the local office adopted a new policy according to which immigrants were to be referred to no jobs other than those in essential industries. By the late fall outmigrants were estimated to be exceeding
immigrants, a fact that is to some extent reflected in a reduction in the number of persons employed in essential establishments. On the basis of data in Table 5.11 and in Columbus Labor Market Reports, it would appear that immigration reached both a gross and a net peak in 1943. Assuming the migration experience of the last six months of 1943 to be typical of the first six months and of 1942, an estimated 40,000 immigrant workers came to Columbus in the two-year period, or a net of about 28,000 during these two heaviest of migration years. If 1941 were to be included in the calculation, the total net immigration of workers would probably be about 35,000, with another 1,000 added in 1944.

Some of the significant characteristics of the immigrant workers are revealed by the sample study of newly hired factory workers in Franklin County manufacturing firms that has been referred to earlier. The study shows that approximately a third of all the workers hired by the sample of 22 manufacturing firms in the area in 1943 were immigrants, having moved into Franklin County within a year prior to being hired.

Half of these immigrants came from other areas in Ohio, probably largely from southeastern Ohio which is heavily rural and has a high proportion of family subsistence farms. Another fourth were from Kentucky and West Virginia. The remainder came from widely scattered areas. Demographically, the composition of the immigrating workers was not

40. Parnes, Herbert S., op. cit. The following data are from Chapter 5.
substantially different from the composition of the local residents who were added to manufacturing payrolls during the year. To the extent that there were differences, the immigrants were a more select group in terms of the hiring standards traditionally used by personnel men. For example, fewer of them than of the local workers were under 18 years of age and fewer also were 45 years of age or over.

Considering only the jobs they held immediately before being hired locally, the industrial experience of the immigrants did not differ substantially from that of the newly hired local workers. As a matter of fact, a somewhat smaller percentage of the immigrants than of the local workers had no previous work experience, and a somewhat larger percentage of the immigrants had previously worked in manufacturing. However, in view of the fact that only the immediately preceding job of the newly hired workers was investigated by the study, these comparisons are not necessarily inconsistent with other indications that the immigrants had predominantly rural backgrounds. Moreover, there is a basis for believing that the immigrants hired by manufacturing firms were not representative of the entire group who poured into the area during the war. Hiring officers of the manufacturing firms, particularly in view of their biases that have been noted above, were probably highly selective in their hiring of immigrants.

b. Commuting. It has been pointed out that the Columbus USES and a number of Columbus firms recruited workers in counties contiguous to Franklin County. Almost one of every 10 workers hired by Franklin County
manufacturing firms in 1943 lived outside the county. This compares with less than one out of 20 in 1940. Unless, after getting their jobs they moved into the county, these persons commuted to work daily. It is also notable that during the three-year period the proportion of women hires that lived outside the county increased considerably more than that of men. The changes in female proportions were from 1.2 to 7.5 percent, while male changes were from 4.1 to 10.5 percent.\(^1\)

c. Conclusions. Migration controls were extremely difficult to enforce. Once a worker entered the area, it was difficult to send him home simply because he had no inter-area clearance or statement of availability. Many workers pleaded ignorance of WMC regulations, a tactic that was probably as much sincere as it was learned. The job of the USES interviewer who screened migrants was difficult. As in so many other cases, applicants crowded the interviewer, listened, and learned the right answers to be used during their own interviews. USES found that strict enforcement of migration regulations made "liars out of our applicants and drove them away from our office".\(^2\) Despite recruitment efforts of the USES offices in the rural areas of Southeast Ohio, West Virginia, and Kentucky, it would appear that most of the immigrants who came into the Columbus Area were not directed to it by these offices. If they had, most of them would have had area clearances. But most of them did not. And since few local firms actually recruited workers directly from these areas, it is reasonable to assume that most

\(^{41}\) Ibid., Chapter 7.
\(^{42}\) Minutes, Region V Area Directors meeting, January 22, 1944.
of them learned about Columbus job opportunities through word of mouth or through correspondence with friends or relatives. Indeed, that job opportunities were abundant in large cities was common knowledge, and many workers simply went to the large cities that were situated on convenient railroad and bus routes. This, at least, is the view of the chairman of the regional War Labor Board, according to whom a study of migration patterns made by his office verifies this conclusion.

It would appear, therefore, as in the case of local recruitment, that the promise of easy-to-get jobs at comparatively high wages, rather than specialized recruitment efforts aimed at potential workers, was the chief factor behind the immigration that expanded the local labor supply. Indeed, insofar as Columbus Area needs were concerned, it appeared almost unnecessary to engage in recruitment in the areas from which most of the immigrants were drawn. The grapevine that apparently transmits job news from labor-hungry urban areas to the rural hinterland has a record of achievement as good as the huckster. That is not to say, of course, that direct, personal solicitation would not obtain better results and would not have yielded workers from an area that appeared to have furnished all the manpower it possibly could, but simply that the way of the grapevine, unaided by the slick techniques of fluent personnel men, and unencumbered by appeals to patriotic sentiments, appears to have been extraordinarily effective.

The administration of migration controls during the war suffered from a failure to distinguish between the problem of migration from one industrial area to another and the quite different problem of mi-
gration from a rural to an industrial area. Workers from industrial areas should obviously not have been permitted to migrate to new areas without possessing clearances. However, uninformed migrants from relatively backward rural areas should not have been expected to have clearances. Yet stabilization programs required that they have them, with the result that USES was trying to control the movement of two different types of immigrants with machinery appropriate for only one type. The consequence was corruption of the program in its application to migrants whose movements should have been more effectively controlled. As the program operated, USES had to do most of its controlling at the wrong end of a migrant's journey. But that was obviously impossible, for it was seldom feasible to send a worker home after he had made a long and expensive journey, and particularly a journey that appeared to be in the interest of the war effort. If it was too difficult or cumbersome to have different controls for workers from backward rural areas than from urban areas, then USES should have met the problem with a vigorous publicity program in these rural areas designed to inform potential migrants about the stipulations of WMC controls.

USES was also faced with the problem of trying to keep migrants who were currently employed in the area from going home. Poor housing was frequently given as a reason for immigrants wishing to return home. It was particularly difficult to keep in the area those immigrants whose families had remained behind. Refusal to grant clearance for outmigration often resulted in workers leaving the area without clearances, especially workers returning to rural areas where there were no
stabilization controls and where they worked on their own farms. Such disregard for stabilization controls obviously tended to undermine the entire program. In October, 1944, the futility of migration controls was recognized, as outmigrants were given freedom to leave the area if their employers granted them releases, and as the requirement of an inter-area clearance for immigrants was abolished. Immigrants were still required to have statements of availability if they had previously worked for essential employers in control areas, but whether they had worked for essential employers or were from stabilization areas was easily falsified.

The WMC provision which permitted farm workers to return to their farms without statements of availability from their current essential employers was not a good one. Even to the extent that it was possible to insure that such persons returned to farms, these were often marginal farms that were of no benefit to the nation. Yet they were farms, and according to existing regulations workers could freely return to them.
CHAPTER 6
MANPOWER UTILIZATION: PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

The present chapter deals with various problems of manpower utilization in the Columbus Area during the war and with formal USES-WMC operations designed to deal with them. The chapter is in six sections, each concerned with a specific manpower program. The first is concerned with essential and locally needed activities and essential and local shortage occupations. The second discusses the compulsory 48-hour work week. Another deals with the Expanded Manpower Program and its provisions. The fourth deals with the manpower training program, the fifth with the formal USES-WMC utilization program, and the final one with the compliance program.

A. Essential Activities and Occupations.

Soon after the first Columbus Area Stabilization Plan went into effect in July, 1943, the national War Manpower Commission issued its first list of so-called essential activities. This was rapidly followed by a list of so-called critical occupations. At the same time provision was made to permit area stabilization directors to designate, in the interest of community health, welfare, and production, certain local activities as essential, and certain occupations in local short supply as critical. Firms and occupations on these lists were subject to stabilization controls.

The national list of essential activities included 35 major categories. An establishment was not to be regarded as essential unless
at least 75 percent of its regular production was in one or more of these categories. Only those firms actually designated as being essential were to be given preferential treatment in the referral activities of USES, although all persons engaged in essential activity were subject to stabilization controls. This led to some difficulties in view of the fact that while certain departments of a company were producing entirely for war consumption, essential production might remain less than 75 percent of the company's total output. The Columbus USES generally refused to give preferential service to companies in this position, even though they claimed they needed manpower only for the departments engaged in essential work. One establishment, 52 percent of whose output was for the armed services, sought to obtain preferential treatment by being declared locally needed, but the question of whether this could be done was never decided since the local WMC refused to hear the company's plea because of a sub-standard entry wage rate.

The local WMC estimated that at its wartime peak about 70,000 persons were employed in essential manufacturing activities in the Columbus Area. Railroads, the federal government, and such other employers as utilities, public transportation, motor freight and warehousing, and construction accounted for the remainder of the more than 25,000 other persons in essential work. In addition, seven activities, employing about 4,000 persons, were declared locally needed. In all, therefore, nearly 100,000 workers in the area were subject to restrictions on their freedom to leave their jobs. These were employed in over 800 establishments, 33 of which accounted for about 60 percent of
The procedure for declaring firms essential was simple and clear-cut. The War Production Board certified to the local WMC the names of local firms engaged in essential activity and the proportion of their output that was essential. In the matter of designating establishments as locally needed, WMC had more discretionary power. The responsibility of making such designations was the area director's. In the Columbus Area, however, applications for locally needed status were placed before the Management-Labor Committee, which could either recommend that an application be approved, disapproved, or turned over to the area director for his decision. By placing the applications before the Committee the area director avoided possible charges of concentrating power in his own hands and of making arbitrary rulings, (even though WMC procedures did not stipulate that he consult the Committee). Making the Management-Labor Committee a party to the rulings resulted in the continuation of amicable relations with the business and labor community, and resulted in discussions that brought to light many factors which were helpful in making decisions.

All but one of the seven employments that were granted locally needed status were directly concerned with the health and welfare of the population. That which was not, was concerned with the maintenance of transportation facilities. Employers sought locally needed designations for two obvious reasons: to obtain preferential referral treatment from USES, and to stabilize their employment by obtaining the application of restrictions on the right to change jobs to their current...
employees. The first designations were made in October, 1943, when 57
dry cleaning and retail coal distributors were declared locally needed.
In April, 1944, the national WMC ruled that cafeterias maintained by
essential establishments were not to be considered as essential. The
Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee disagreed and promptly declared
such facilities locally needed. Other activities declared locally need­
ed later in 1944 and early in 1945 were laundering, milk distribution,
wholesale baking, wholesale grocery distribution, and auto parts dis­
tribution.

The Management-Labor Committee generally applied five tests to
applications for locally needed status. The first was the importance
of the service to maintaining community health and welfare or main­
taining or facilitating war production. The second was whether the
service in question was lagging, and if so whether such lag was more
than permissible in view of the sacrifices that the war effort required.
Third was whether the applicant had made an exhaustive effort to obtain
necessary manpower, whether his hiring standards were reasonable and
non-discriminatory, and whether removable factors internal to the
operation of the establishment were responsible for inability to hold
workers. Fourth was whether wages were above sub-standard levels and
whether reasonable effort had been made to obtain WLB permission to in­
crease wages. Fifth was whether the establishment was in compliance
with stabilization directives. In practice, however, only four of the
tests were applied with rigor. Questions relating to unreasonable
and discriminatory hiring standards and the existence of company
policies and practices that aggravated employment instability were
never closely pursued. Thus, for example, bakeries were known to be discriminating against Negroes in their hiring, and it was common knowledge that there were no Negro drivers of milk delivery trucks. Yet these employments were declared locally needed without the question of discriminatory hiring even being raised in the hearings before the Management-Labor Committee. The question came up only once during a locally needed appeal and on this occasion it was raised by the area director. The Committee failed to support his queries on the matter, and thereafter they were never ventured again.

The question of the adequacy of entry wages posed the most difficult problem in that it generally resulted in a conflict of interests between WMC, WLB, and the Office of Price Administration (OPA). For example, when several laundries requested locally needed status, their original request was denied because of sub-standard entry wages. Re‐viewing the case before the Management-Labor Committee the area director said that prevailing wages in laundries made recruitment of additional workers virtually impossible. WMC advised the operators to obtain permission to increase wages. However, while WLB generally granted increases designed to bring wages above sub-standard rates, operators maintained, and USES agreed, that wages would have to be increased substantially above the 50 cent hourly minimum since common laborers were in great demand at wages over 60 cents per hour. But any effective wage increase, the operators contended further, could not be paid because, since OPA refused to authorize price increases, the payment of higher wages would result in financial losses. OPA refused to authorize price increases until the operators had proved to
OPA's satisfaction that wage increases without corresponding price increases would force them to operate at a loss. The laundries rode this merry-go-round for over eight months. Finally, after they threatened to suspend vital services, the area director arranged a joint meeting with OPA and WL to iron out the difficulties. In two weeks both OPA and WLB yielded and locally needed status was granted.

Local industries generally improved the possibility of getting their applications for locally needed status approved by applying as a single group. Failure to apply as a group generally resulted in the belief that the non-applying firms in the industry were not experiencing unusual difficulty and therefore there was something wrong with the management of the applicant company. This belief was voiced several times during appeals by single companies. A premium was therefore put on cooperation and consultation among employers in the same industry. Since most of the industries were composed of small employers who were likely to be competitive to the extent of not having a history of cooperation and consultation, the Management-Labor Committee's habit of suspecting single company applicants tended either to reduce competition in industries seeking locally needed designations, or tended to prevent companies with legitimate claims from getting preferential USES and stabilization treatment.

The national WMC's list of critical occupations designated which skills could be hired only through or with consent of USES. The original list included 149 occupations. According to the October 15, 1943, revision of the Columbus Area Manpower Stabilization Plan, employers
were denied the right to hire a new employee for work in a critical occupation, or whose last employment was in a critical occupation, without referral from or with consent of USES. Thus persons leaving critical occupations in one employment were to be channeled through USES so that they could be exposed to openings in establishments with the greatest need. The stabilization plan also gave the area director power to declare occupations not on the national list to be critically short in the local area, and persons with such occupations were to be treated in the same manner as persons in occupations on the national critical list. On November 16, 1943, a list of 13 local shortage occupations was appended to the national list. It included automobile mechanics and repair men who were critically needed by the army service depots and by local garages, several skilled factory occupations, foundry welders, tire builders and molders, and licensed firemen. Several months later a revised list was issued, and from time to time additions and deletions were made.

Employers who were granted locally needed status generally commented that the designation helped them, although to what extent is not revealed by available records. It is known, however, that none of the services that were designated as locally needed were seriously curtailed. The only broad curtailment was made by the laundries, but this was a planned curtailment in certain types of rapid and special services and was negotiated with WMC, OPA, and WLB. USES's consultant on locally needed activities reported that in spite of WMC's refusal to designate them as locally needed, such important activities as
wholesale fruit and vegetable distribution apparently were not seriously curtailed either.

The locally needed activities program was obviously a necessary part of the stabilization program. Coupled with the essential activities program it insured that the right jobs got done first, at least insofar as helping to stabilize employment and provide manpower were facilitating factors.

With respect to administrative, operational aspects of the activities discussed in this section, it is again evident that liaison and coordination between various war-time stabilization agencies was not what it might have been. It is also overwhelmingly evident that the problem of stabilizing prices, wages, and manpower in a war economy is something more than giving full authority to three separate agencies for each to go its independent way in its own stabilization area.

It is abundantly evident that concessions that were made to traditional discriminatory hiring practices inhibited the full utilization of manpower resources. What is perhaps most lamentable in this connection is that, in connection with employers seeking locally needed designations, the discriminatory hiring practices went almost unchallenged. Even though it was clear that ultimately WMC would be forced to capitulate, WMC should nonetheless have asserted itself by showing that anti-discrimination provisions of stabilization programs were something more than decorative facades designed merely to give the impression of belief in certain virtues of democracy.
B. The Compulsory 48-hour Work Week.

On December 1, 1943, a compulsory 48-hour work week for all establishments with eight or more employees was inaugurated in the Columbus Area. The purposes of the program were to make more intensive use of currently employed manpower, reduce the demand for additional workers, and increase the available supply of workers through the release of excess manpower created by the longer work week.

For most essential firms in the area this required no change in existing production or manpower planning since they were already operating at or in excess of 48 hours per week. Firms that could establish the 48-hour week without releasing workers were expected to install it almost immediately. In other firms, provision was made for attaining the lengthened work week gradually. The 48-hour standard was not inflexible, however. Where it was not feasible to gear schedules to 48 hours, joint WMC-employer efforts were made to increase the minimum work week to the greatest number of hours practicable up to 48.

Problems arose in the Columbus Area in respect to increasing the work week of certain classes of employees to 48 hours. After many hours during which the Management-Labor Committee heard exemption appeals, the area director called special meetings with affected local establishments in outlying districts of the Columbus Area were excluded from the requirement because they were relatively few in number, not essential, and not in the heart of the labor market area. The included area was approximately that of Franklin County.
employers and negotiated compromise hours agreements.

It was agreed that employers of 20 or fewer office workers were to be permitted to schedule a minimum 44-hour week for such workers, with no restrictions made on their hiring of replacements. Employers of 21 or more office workers, who were also granted the 44-hour week, were not to increase their employment without permission of the area director. Such employers were also to replace male workers with women workers wherever possible. In the local shoe industry a compromise 45-hour week was established, because production difficulties peculiar to the industry made 48-hour operation impractical. In the garment industry, where experience had indicated that Saturday operations were accompanied by disruptive amounts of absenteeism because of the high proportion of housewives employed in this industry, it was agreed that Saturday operations might be suspended on the condition that 45 hours be worked during the remaining five days. Also exempt were retail stores (except their office workers), banks, building and loan institutions, restaurants, and movies, where compliance with the 48-hour requirements was deemed impractical.

By the beginning of 1944 nearly all local affected establishments had complied, or indicated their intention to comply, with the minimum work week. Difficulties peculiar to certain types of plants took some weeks to iron out, and certain companies seeking exemptions had to be studied by USES utilization consultants to determine the legitimacy of their claims. Early in March WMC's consultant on the 48-hour week made the last of a series of weekly reports on the progress of the
program. He reported that 97 percent of firms employing eight or more persons were in compliance. About 125,000 persons were working 48 or more hours weekly, 15,000 were working 44 or 45 hours weekly, about 6,000 were exempt by reason of being part-time workers or physically handicapped, 4,000 were exempt because of the impracticability of the program in their employments, another 10,000 were exempted government employees, about 5,000 were in agricultural work, and the remaining 30,000 to 35,000 were exempt by reason of being self-employed or working in establishments located in outlying areas or employing less than eight persons. The report estimated that a gain equivalent to 1,475 workers had been achieved through the lengthened work week and that 230 workers had been released to other industries, although in most cases no one was actually laid off because of the increased work week. Workers who left their jobs were simply not replaced, and employers did the same volume of work with fewer employees. Shortly after the minimum work week was established, the area director told newsmen that the Columbus Area would have been classified a Group I region if the new program had not been adopted. Within a few months after the new hours went into effect WSES reported a decline in manpower requisitions, and, except for occasional months, in anticipated additional manpower requirements as well.

WMC encountered several reluctant employers, most of whom sought

2. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, March 14, 1944. The report was not as complete as the data presented here. Some of the totals are my own estimates.
3. Columbus Dispatch, December 29, 1943.
4. WSES report in Columbus Dispatch, March 16, 1944.
to avoid the 48-hour requirement because of the added expense of overtime wages. Indeed, for firms operating on close margins this was a serious problem. At one time the Management-Labor Committee, in a statement that was to publicize the advantages of the new program, sought to include the observation that longer hours would help in manpower recruitment because the take-home pay of the workers would increase. But management members from smaller establishments vigorously objected to publicizing this point because they alleged that smaller establishments found increased wage costs especially burdensome and that, therefore, every effort should be made to de-emphasize wages as recruitment devices. The wage question also revealed other institutional biases among members of the Management-Labor Committee. Thus labor members tended to object to appeals for exemption because, apparently, longer work weeks meant increased take-home pay for workers. However, in those cases where unions joined management in requesting exemptions, labor members of the Committee invariably voted to grant them. This type of institutional bias was expressed particularly strikingly in an appeal of March, 1944, in which union agents and management officials argued that the high proportion of women in the plant in question caused so much Saturday absenteeism that everybody would benefit if the 48-hour requirement were eliminated. Management members of the Committee insisted that an exemption for this firm would indirectly condone absenteeism, and might eventually lead to a breakdown of the 48-hour work week since other firms undoubtedly had similar experiences. The appeal was granted, however, as one management member voted with the labor members of the Committee.
This partisanship on the part of labor members suggests a certain lack of statesmanship, a condition probably resulting from the fact that statesmanship might have cost union officials their offices since they were elected officials whose tenure depended upon satisfying the desires of their constituents. On the other hand, the determined insistence of management members that exemptions of the type noted above should not be granted because, regardless of the merit of arguments in their favor, they would tend to undermine the overall program was a contradiction of business's typical grievance that government regulations tend to be poor regulations because they allegedly fail to provide for sufficient flexibility in their application or fail to give adequate discretionary authority to their administrators.

Another case of institutional friction arose in connection with declaring certain industries exempt because of the impracticality or inexpediency of a 48-hour week. Included in the proposed list were newspapers and radio stations, both of which were classified as essential industries. But the Management-Labor Committee member from the local privately-owned electric company objected, saying that he was unable to see that their claim to exemption was any better than the claim of utilities. Either the utilities were to be exempted, or exemption was to be denied newspapers and radio stations. The latter view prevailed. And, as has just been noted, there were also frictions between the large and the small employers, frictions that arose out of the existence of wage disparities between them and the easier access of large employers to the labor market. Still another friction was
between paid government manpower officials and members of the Committee. This arose in connection with a suggestion by the former that unfavorable publicity be used against non-complying employers. This was objectionable to Committee members since it might have required them to direct embarrassing publicity against persons with whom they were associated in other connections. This, they probably thought, was not good business ethics, even if it was in the interest of the war effort.

USES utilization consultants and WMC’s consultant on the 48 hour week made studies of plants whose managements alleged the 48-hour week to be impractical in their cases. During the first three months of the program 10 surveys were made in Columbus, and in almost every instance the managements agreed that the work week could be lengthened, although they had previously said it was impossible. The consultants also reported that the problem of obtaining compliance was often one of "selling" reluctant employers on the feasibility and necessity of the program. In this respect, informal discussions with employers generally worked best. Sometimes, however, compliance was obtained simply by pointing out that failure to comply might result in loss of workers who could easily obtain statements of availability from USES. One firm lost 12 workers in this manner before it agreed to comply.

On the whole, the enforcement procedure was not what it might have been, especially with respect to less essential employers. Essential employers faced the possibility of being deprived of referrals, but for

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5. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, February 22, 1944.
less essential firms this was not an effective threat. Unfavorable publicity was the only weapon with reasonable promise of effectiveness in obtaining their compliance, but the method was not employed. Use of publicity was confined to complimenting complying establishments.

The program appears to have been successful in reducing manpower needs in the area, and there is some indication that it helped to make employers manpower conscious. USES also reported some improvement in manpower utilization as the result of the program. However, the program had certain internal impediments to its own success. Thus an unfortunate feature was one of its stated purposes, namely, that the 48-hour week was to be established only if it would contribute to the reduction of labor requirements. Appellant employers frequently contended that it should not apply in their cases because no reduction in labor requirements would result. It was not good policy, however, to exempt firms making such claims, since that had a tendency to undermine compliance and confidence in the program throughout the area.

But denying the appeal of an employer who was not apparently directly benefiting from the program, despite the widely publicized claim that the program was not to be applied unless it directly benefited an employer, resulted in loss of confidence in the integrity of both the program and the Management-Labor Committee.

C. The Expanded Manpower Program: Manpower Ceilings, and Manpower Priority Referral and Production Urgency Ratings.

The present section discusses the employment ceiling program and
takes a detailed look at the inner workings of the committees respectively responsible for the determination of manpower priorities and production urgency ratings under the Expanded Manpower Program.

The original proposal for the inauguration of priority referral of male job seekers through USES was met with considerable hostility by both management and labor representatives of the Management-Labor Committee. Labor members feared that workers would be unfairly deprived of the right freely to choose their jobs. Management members feared that they would become entirely dependent upon USES for their male workers, and furthermore that they would be required to hire whatever workers were referred to them. Labor members were somewhat mollified when it was pointed out that applicants would only be asked to take "suitable" jobs. Management members were mollified when it was explained that employers would retain their freedom to accept or reject applicants, and that under certain conditions they would be free to hire applicants not referred by USES. Moreover, women workers were not subject to the controls under any circumstances. The management member representing the local association of industries continued, however, to oppose the program at the time of its adoption on the ground that gate hiring privileges were given to too restricted a group of essential employers. Opposition to priority referral was considerably abated, however, by the area director's assurances of fair treatment for all, and particularly by his explanation of the place of male employment ceilings in the entire program.

6. USES report in *Columbus Dispatch*, March 16, 1944.
a. The Ceiling Program. Male employment ceilings were a necessary concomitant of the male priority referral program. Ceilings placed an upper limit to the number of full-time men that might be in the employ of a given establishment during any given period. Thus, affected employers, regardless of their drawing power, could hire no more than the number of men allotted to them. Moreover, employment ceilings helped the Manpower Priorities Committee to keep the number of priorities it granted within reasonable limits. In addition to setting limits on the amount of manpower that might be used by an employer, the ceiling program also provided information on the total volume of manpower available in the area. The priorities system performed the reciprocal task of rationing the limited supply of labor to the most deserving establishments. The system would obviously have been destroyed if the Manpower Priorities Committee persistently promised to supply more labor than was available. An inflated priority list would not only have been worthless, but actually destructive of its own end, for continuous inability of USES to supply manpower for priority openings would probably have resulted in loss of confidence in all stabilization efforts, wholesale violations of stabilization measures, and the consequent return to an uncontrolled labor market.

A month before male employment ceilings were established, USES sent questionnaires to over a thousand area employers to determine their past, present, and expected future employment. Ceilings were established on the basis of male employment and expected production loads as of June 1, 1944. Originally only employers of 50 or more persons were included in the ceiling program, although employers of from eight to 50
persons were asked to cooperate by voluntarily refraining from increasing the number of men on their payrolls. Later, on August 8, 1944, the latter group of employers was also brought under the formal program. As in the case of priority referral, employers in outlying communities were not subjected to the new controls. Before the imposition of the Expanded Manpower Program the area director held separate conferences with 19 different industry and business groups and their representatives to explain the program. Meetings were also held with newspapers in regard to advertising policies, with the major labor union federations, and with the private employment agencies. The response of all groups was reported to have been excellent. There were few objections to the proposed new controls, although there were many questions which revealed gross misconceptions.

Nearly 80,000 male workers were covered by the ceiling program after employers of eight or more persons were included in it. The original plan of the program was to re-examine ceilings every two months, but in practice they were re-examined somewhat more frequently. Thus firms made monthly reports of their employment status, and those in which male employment had declined, but in which there were no production lags, had their male ceilings reduced to the lower existing levels. In this way, ceiling reductions were sometimes merely a recognition of an accomplished decline in employment, rather than being imposed to effectuate such a decline. By lowering the ceilings to existing employment levels it was also believed that men thus released from firms that could apparently spare them would become available for referral to priority establishments. But things apparently did not work
quite that way, for while firms which could afford losses were incurring them, those that could not were also experiencing them. From 80,000 men covered by ceilings late in August, 1944, the total dropped to 78,500 by the end of September, and 77,000 by the end of the year. At the end of May, 1945, the total was 75,700. This was a loss of over 4,000 in nine months. And, to make matters worse, most of the losses were in industries that could least afford them.

Manpower officials were at a loss to explain where the workers went. Since all firms with eight or more workers were covered, losses by some firms should have been reflected in gains by others, unless the losses were in the form of outmigration, withdrawal from the labor market, Selective Service induction, or transfers to firms with less than eight employees. The last was held to be a highly improbable explanation, although USES admitted that large numbers of applicants sought to return to jobs with post-war security, many of which could be found in the very small firms. Selective Service inductions were estimated to have been less than 1,500 during the period and returned veterans numbered over 500. Thus a reduction of 3,000 male workers in covered establishments remained to be accounted for. Of the two possible remaining explanations, outmigration appears to be the most reasonable.

But these statistics do not suggest that the ceiling-priority referral program was a failure. Indeed, production was maintained at

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7. Columbus Labor Market Report, USES, November, 1944, and December, 1944, and minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, June 5, 1945.
a reasonably high level despite manpower losses. And to the extent that losses occurred, certain features of the ceiling-referral program helped to make the best of the situation. One of these features was two planned reductions in the ceilings of less essential establishments. These came at the very outset of the program when less essential employers, with about 20,000 male employees, were asked to take three percent reductions in their male employment in each of two successive months. The reductions were to be accomplished by non-replacement of male separations. In this respect USES reported that "Cooperation of Columbus' less essential employers with the ceiling program was unusually good." It was not reported, however, that this amiability imposed no additional burden on the cooperators since for the most part they had not been doing well by way of replacing separated male workers anyhow. As was indicated, during the subsequent period both less essential and essential employers lost male workers, and so there is no reliable way of determining if the planned reductions were beneficial to essential firms. Less essential employers had been reporting steady male losses since before the war began. Controlled male referral would obviously have curtailed their male hirings even further, so from that point of view the planned ceiling reduction appears to have been a somewhat useless maneuver. However, from the point of view of emphasizing the community the stringency of shortages in male workers it may have been worth the effort.

Another important feature of the program was that it gave USES consultants a legitimate excuse for investigating the utilization

Ibid., August, 1944.
practices of certain firms that had previously refused to permit utilization surveys. Thus, within a month after the program, 10 employers filed appeals that their ceilings were too low, and USES made surveys at several of these. The Manpower Priorities Committee generally cooperated on these ventures, and indeed occasionally initiated the request for a survey.

b. The Manpower Priorities Committee and the Modified Area Production Urgency Committee. Once every establishment subject to them was assigned a specific ceiling, the Manpower Priorities Committee was faced with the problem of adjusting these ceilings to suit the changing needs of area employers. The necessity for upward revisions generally arose out of errors in the computation of the original ceilings, or out of changes in war demands which called for increased output in the affected establishments. Upward revisions in ceilings were generally accompanied by requests for an equal number of manpower priorities. However, such priorities were only granted to firms which the Production Urgency Committee had placed on the "must" list and which demonstrated to the Committee's satisfaction that current or future output commitments could not be met unless additional manpower was made immediately available. The Committee was provided with an elaborate set of schedules, estimates, and surveys by USES and WMC consultants to guide it in making ceiling and priority determinations. The work of the Manpower Priorities Committee was extremely important to the stabilization program. Although USES's administration of priorities tended to be lax, nevertheless the priorities were invaluable guides to
### Number of Male Priority Openings and Referrals in All Essential Establishments and in Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Monthly, Nov., 1944-July, 1945

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<td>243</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- a) Includes the two largest manufacturing firms in the area.
- b) Includes five government agencies and five railroads. However, only two government agencies and one or two of the railroads actually received priority benefits.

Source: Compiled from the minutes of the bimonthly meetings of the Columbus Area Manpower Priorities Committee.
placement interviewers. Moreover, they gave employers assurance that contractual obligations could be undertaken with some confidence that available manpower would be allocated on the basis of urgency of need.

The Committee distinguished between priority openings that had to be filled by men and those that could be filled by women. In this way it helped assure that men would not be placed on jobs that could be filled by women, regardless of how high the priority ratings of these jobs were. This practice, to the extent that it encouraged the employment of women, who were not covered by ceilings, helped to keep ceilings at a minimum.

Male priorities generally numbered between 1,000 and 1,600 job openings. But those represented chiefly the huge needs of relatively few employers. Indeed, two employers generally accounted for between one-fourth and one-third of all priorities granted. And, as can be seen in Table 6.1, these two, together with government agencies and railroads, accounted for between one-half and three-fourths of all priorities granted. That left only a few hundred priority openings to be spread thinly among the remainder of the essential firms each month.

The process of determining which firms should receive priorities and how many they should receive evoked bitter factional and sometimes personal disputes between Committee members. The same kind of conflicts also raged in respect to advising the area director about adjustments of manpower allotted to civilian or less essential services, and about proposed ceiling changes. The conflicts generally arose out of the uncompromising insistence of procurement representatives from the various
armed services that firms producing equipment for their particular service should be given all the priorities they sought. Being officers of the armed services, which during the war were in a position to exert considerable pressure on high-ranking civilian authorities, they took full advantage of their positions. This frequently involved threats to "call General So-and-So this minute and we'll see if that company isn't going to get those priorities". When overruled, military men were over-inclined to appeal their cases to higher authorities. Compromise did not appear to be part of their strategy for effective committee work.

In addition to vying among themselves for more priorities and higher ceilings for the firms they happened to be interested in, armed services procurement officers also stood in solid opposition to representatives of civilian agencies. They generally opposed any action which in their view might directly have detracted from production of military goods. This opposition often took illogical turns. Thus proposals that the area director be advised about giving locally needed status to civilian services concerned with the maintenance of transportation facilities were violently opposed by armed services representatives on the ground that the manpower was needed at the Army depot. It was of no avail to explain that the few men that would be placed in civilian services as the result of the proposed action might save hundreds of man-hours by helping reduce absenteeism and wasteful turnover at the depot.

Specific standards governed the granting of priorities and violation of these standards was cause for revoking them. Besides having to establish the existence of an actual critical need for workers,
essential firms were required to give evidence that they were doing
everything reasonable to solve their own manpower problems. This in-
cluded the adoption of the 48-hour work week, fully utilizing without
discrimination the available labor supply, establishment of in-plant
training and upgrading programs, and action to reduce turnover and
absenteeism. Every applicant firm was required to fill out a form
indicating its activities along these lines. According to stabilization
provisions, firms failing to comply with these standards were to be
denied the benefits of priority referral, and indeed of all USES re-
feral.

Although the Manpower Priorities Committee had at its disposal
effective methods of obtaining compliance, there is no indication that
they used them. For example, since company representatives personally
attended hearings on their requests for priorities, the Committee
might well have raised pertinent questions about certain discriminatory
hiring practices. But such questions were seldom asked, and when asked
were put timidly and hesitantly. Nobody, apparently, was up to "inter-
fering" in the private affairs of individual employers, at least not if
such private affairs touched on delicate matters. In the early stages
of the program the question of discrimination against minority groups
was broached, but the procurement officers, usually vigilant and alert
for ways to increase the manpower available to essential employers,
often fought this as an encroachment on the private affairs of the em-
ployer and as an oblique insinuation respecting his character and
motives. Thereafter, the question of discriminatory hiring and employ-
ment practices was never broached again.
The Committee also failed to pursue adequately the question of better in-plant utilization practices of appellant firms. Armed services procurement officers generally objected most strenuously to proposed utilization studies since they were theoretically in constant touch with the firms and supposedly doing everything necessary to help increase production. Besides, procurement officers felt that utilization factors should not be considered in "must" plants. The overwhelming need was to produce, and if manpower shortages existed the obvious solution—pouring in people to staff unfilled jobs—should be undertaken.

The frictions between large and small employers that were prevalent in the Management-Labor Committee were even more prevalent in the Manpower Priorities Committee. The representative of the Smaller War Plants Corporation found himself in considerable and almost interminable differences with committee members whose major concern was with the larger plants. Small plants tended to feel that the larger ones were getting the lion's share of benefit from the referral program, or if they didn't feel this they were extremely sensitive about the possibility that it might happen, and so acted as if it were happening.

Only three of the 12 members of the Manpower Priorities Committee were familiar with local conditions by reason of having lived in the community for some time. The others came to Columbus because the war brought them there. They knew little of its business life and less about the personalities of the people for whom they were making decisions. The large local firms had easy access to the various government and military representatives; and not only to those handling local
affairs, but also to those operating on a national level out of Washington. Hence they were in a good position to communicate their needs and views to the new officials. The small employers had no such access, at least not to Washington. And to the extent they had it locally, they generally failed to take advantage of it, probably because of unfamiliarity with the devious ways of government liaison. They had, however, a militant spokesman on the Manpower Priorities Committee in the person of the representative of the Smaller War Plants Corporation. He had solicitude for their needs and problems, and he voiced them confidently and vigorously during the meetings. The result was another basis for friction.

The Modified Area Production Urgency Committee performed the important and essential job of determining the production programs which were feasible within the area, determining their relative urgency, and advising the Manpower Priorities Committee of these determinations. On the basis of this information the latter group was then able to act more wisely on ceiling and priority appeals. The Production Urgency Committee had several other important tasks, some of which it performed formally and punctiliously, and others it did informally and matter-of-factly, depending upon the needs of the case. Of these, the most important and time-consuming was that of reviewing proposals for new facilities and procurement contracts proposed for the area. In this connection, the same types of friction prevailed as existed within the Manpower Priorities Committee. Conflicts in interest developed between military personnel and civilians, between those interested in
large and those interested in small firms, between those concerned with military procurement and those interested in production of civilian goods and services. For example, in connection with a proposal for expanding the capacity of a firm making Navy torpedoes, Air Force, Army, Navy and Maritime Commission representatives favored the expansion. The representatives of the Smaller War Plants Corporation and of the War Food Administration actively opposed it, and received the backing of those members who had had unpleasant differences with the armed services representatives on previous occasions. The Smaller War Plants Corporation representative felt that the company in question was already large, and that the proposed expansion would put small establishments at a further disadvantage in the labor market. Besides, the company was one of the so-called glamour companies whose wages were considerably higher than most others, thus making it even more attractive to job seekers. The War Food Administration representative feared that expansion of the plant would result in further uncontrolled migration of farm workers from surrounding areas to city jobs, thus reducing the already short supply of area agricultural labor.

Armed services representatives also opposed every application to produce more civilian goods, to permit buying critical materials for production of civilian goods, or to construct or remodel plants for post-war civilian production.

The power of the Production Urgency Committee was tremendous, for its approval or disapproval of proposed local business or industrial plans and projects was virtually final, even though other interested agencies had given complete clearance to the proposals. Thus the Com-
mittee effectively vetoed housing projects approved by the National
Housing Agency, the use of material grants to less essential manufac-
turers approved by WPB, and the use of previously restricted, on-hand
critical material for current production.

One of the most persistent complaints made by employers, WMC,
unions, and many war agency representatives on both the Priorities
Committee and the Urgency Committee was the apparently excessive
secrecy with which changes in contracts were handled by the armed
services. Only on the rarest occasions were interested parties inform-
ed within a reasonable time about contemplated contract changes or
changes in products that entailed layoffs or short furloughs of con-
siderable numbers of workers. On some occasions warnings of changes
or curtailment of contracts came less than a day before they occurred.
The result often was total confusion for employers, WMC, workers, and
both the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Production Urgency Com-
mittee. Although one of the reasons for the representation of the pro-
curement agencies on these committees was to assure the smooth trans-
mission of production information so that maximum manpower utilization
might be facilitated, procurement officers seldom provided the necessary
advance information that would have helped attain this end. Furthermore,
there is no indication that they ever took heed of complaints on this
score. Secrecy was a principle to which military men apparently were
deotedly committed, regardless of the damage produced.

c. Conclusions. There is no evidence in either the statistical
or the qualitative reports of USES-WMC that the ceiling program made more
male workers available to essential employers. The only enthusiastic remarks made by manpower officials in connection with the program were that compliance was apparently good and that it had the effect of making employers manpower conscious, which encouraged better utilization practices. It would seem that the gradual increased tightening of manpower controls also had the salutary effect of periodically re-emphasizing to the community the importance of the manpower problem, and thus abating to some extent the increasing indifference of the man on the street to the war effort.

With respect to the operations of the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Production Urgency Committee it would appear that while the representation on these committees of divergent interests was desirable, better results would have been forthcoming had the attitudes and behavior of these representatives been more statesmanlike in deciding important issues. The competitive behavior of procurement officers suggests that they often acted more out of regard for their own advancement in military rank than out of concern for advancing the war effort or solving local problems. For them the measure of success appeared to be whether they could get as much or more than their military colleagues, and whether they could stifle non-military production. That there was considerable rivalry for personal advancement in rank was quite obvious to non-military members of the committees, who noted with considerable amusement the operation of the principle of oligopolistic circularity in the promotions of the various military representatives.

The almost pathological negativism of military representatives considerably dissipated the work of both committees. Attempts of the
representative to restore the balance of objectivity by opposing 
and challenging the military representatives were far from successful, 
for they resulted in distorting his own judgment as to the desirability 
of certain practices and proposals. And where the disparate interests 
of other groups took rather discernable and regular forms, the judg­
ment of these groups also suffered.

Another important factor contributing to the difficulties and mis­
understandings in these committees, was the fact that most of the com­
mittee members were comparatively alien to the area. It is probably 
true that too intimate familiarity with the local situation and local 
people might have distorted manpower judgments in favor of local needs 
at the expense of the over-all war effort. But it is unquestionably 
true, as experience demonstrates, that the lack of familiarity with 
local problems, together with the rather pronounced partisanship that 
was too often evident, resulted in committee disputes that were fre­
quently resolved acrimoniously and with little objectivity.

With respect to the membership composition of the committees it 
would also appear that a representative of labor organizations, or at 
least of the U.S. Department of Labor, might well have been included, 
since the backgrounds of most of the members assured an effective re­
presentation of management. Questions dealing with discriminatory hiring 
practices, new plants, housing, and transportation were of direct in­
terest to workers, yet they had no direct voice in decisions made in 
respect to them by these committees. If institutional biases were to 
be reflected in the important decisions of local policy committees, it 
would seem proper that a more representative sample of the major in-
stitutional groups should have been included among their memberships.

D. Manpower Training.

The need to provide training for the thousands of new workers never before in industrial employments who were available for war jobs became evident early in the defense program. At the same time the many people who had lost their skills during the depression or who had never been in a position to acquire industrial skills needed to be trained. In addition, new war industries, such as aircraft for example, required persons with skills that were not generally found in the Columbus Area before the war.

In May, 1940, Congress authorized the War Production Training program, one phase of which was designed to meet the immediate needs of emergency by promoting and financing refresher, preparatory, and supervisory training for war production workers. In conjunction with the program, and at the initiative of The Ohio State University, Columbus industrial representatives met with members of the Engineering College of the University in November, 1940, to plan the establishment of training classes for students with technical backgrounds in order to prepare them for the industrial jobs that were becoming available in greater abundance. The following January, 260 students from local industries were enrolled in the new courses.

In the fall of 1940 the National Defense Council began promoting Training Within Industry (TWI) programs in establishments with defense contracts. A Columbus subcommittee of the Cincinnati Regional Committee was established in November, 1940, to facilitate their adoption locally.
Members of the subcommittee included representatives of industry, the public schools, the university, and business and industrial associations. With the cooperation of various government agencies, including the public employment service and the Apprenticeship Training Service, courses of instruction in various industrial skills were established in the Columbus public schools and made available free of charge to local residents.

When the War Manpower Commission was established in April, 1942, a Bureau of Training was created under its jurisdiction and was directed to determine training needs for war production, plan comprehensive community-wide training programs, render technical assistance to war industries and coordinate the services of training agencies. At the same time the Labor Division of the War Production Board operated a Labor Supply and Training Program that sought to enlist employer cooperation in establishing and operating the suggested programs.

In 1941 the Training Within Industry subcommittee was replaced by a War Production Training Council in which the same groups, plus the public employment service and labor unions were represented. The Council planned the types of instructional courses that should be offered and arranged for the cooperation of local employers in providing competent instructors.

From 1940 through 1944 the facilities of the Columbus public schools were used to teach industrial skills to over 9,000 persons enrolled in government-sponsored training programs. (Table 6.2) About 5,600 were given pre-employment training preparatory to their taking industrial jobs, about 3,200 were given special training to supplement
what they were learning on their current jobs, and 470 out-of-school, teen-age youths were given special training in industrial skills as a means of compensating for the losses they incurred in leaving school early.

The facilities of 10 schools were used and 36 subjects were taught in 273 separate courses during the period. The courses were generally from five to 12 weeks in duration and were conducted during hours most convenient for the students. Thus some courses were held from 4 a.m. until 7 a.m., some from 4 p.m. until midnight, and others from 7 p.m. until 10 p.m. During the summer months when the schools were not occupied by regular high school students some of them offered training courses on 24-hour bases. Courses in which instruction was given included machine shop, electricity, drafting, sheetmetal layout, arc welding, acetylene welding, pattern making, foundry, radio code, related auto mechanics, structural layout, blueprint reading, mathematics, power sewing, and foremanship. The entire program, financed by the federal government, was provided at a cost of $199,131 in instructors' salaries, tools, and equipment.

Pre-employment training had two purposes: to teach skills to persons not engaged in industrial employment, and to improve the skills of persons already in industry. Table 6.2 shows that relatively few persons were trained under this program. Moreover, out of the 5,600 persons who were trained, nearly 3,600 were assigned to the schools because they were in WPA or in NYA relief programs, leaving only about 10.

10. Report in the files of the Industrial Education Department of the Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education.
Table 6.2

Number of Persons Enrolled in Public School War Production Training Classes, by Sex, Race, Source of Students, and Type of Training Program, Columbus, Ohio, Annually, 1940–1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and type of program</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>Source of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-employment courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 (a)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>3432</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5593</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>1306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3193</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-School Youths Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9256</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>1302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Last six months only.
b) Data not given.

Source: Compiled directly from the records of the Industrial Education Department of the Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education.
2,000 who voluntarily took training. Another 1,000 received somewhat more advanced training of a similar nature under the same type of program at two local universities. These trainees were recruited and screened through the public employment service where they were tested to determine their aptitudes and suitability for such training. The 3,200 persons enrolled in the supplementary training program were sent to the schools by their employers.

Trainees recruited by the employment service increased sharply from 161 in 1941 to 1,266 in 1942. In 1943 the number fell off to 432 and in 1944 it was 80. As the result, the program was discontinued at the end of 1944, notwithstanding the fact that enrollment in the supplementary training courses increased steadily from 375 in 1942 to 1,537 in 1944. While enrollment in the pre-employment program was dropping off in 1944 employers continued to report the existence of shortages of trained workers. The 1944 decline was probably part of the general reduction in the total labor supply that occurred during the period, but probably even more the result of employers' willingness to hire completely unskilled persons. Indeed, that was probably the major reason why enrollment in pre-employment courses was as low as it was throughout the entire war, although an improved publicity program might have increased the enrollment considerably.

Only about a half dozen local employers and two craft unions were represented by the persons taking supplementary training in the public schools. About 3,000 persons, representing almost all large employers in the area and dozens of small ones, took specialized technical training in the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training Program.
(ESWMT) that the government financed at The Ohio State University and at Capital University. 11

Workers were also trained in special tuition-charging technical schools established outside the sponsorship of government, and in training programs operated by various establishments exclusively for their own employees. None of the three non-government sponsored technical schools that operated in Columbus during the war kept records of enrollments. However, employment service personnel estimate that between 2,000 and 3,000 persons were trained by them.

Only four essential establishments operated training programs of their own. One association of employers established a special program for employees of its members under the supplemental training arrangement of the public schools. Another association, in cooperation with a labor union, operated an independent program, and one employer arranged to have the supplemental training given in his plant rather than at the public schools.

The aircraft company operated the biggest plant training program. It had a downtown training school for welders, riveters, and assemblers which trained nearly 20,000 persons during the war. In addition, it operated 26 other in-plant programs that trained workers in short two-hour sessions several times weekly in skills ranging from blueprint reading to tool designing. The two largest armed services depots trained workers as automobile mechanics, automobile engine assemblers, packers, processors, and office clerks. These people were trained in

11. Enrollment in the university classes was estimated by the director of the area ESMWT program. Records of the actual enrollment have not been preserved.
short daily sessions during normal working hours. Seventy-four local automobile garage owners, their application for locally needed status having been rejected, arranged for the establishment of government-financed classes to train mechanics and mechanics' helpers. Area trucking companies and the union with which they had contracts established a program to train drivers and rate clerks. The school was financed jointly by the two groups and operated by the union. And finally, one establishment which had difficulty in getting its workers to attend night classes at the public schools arranged for the supplemental training program to be conducted on its own premises. Workers spent half their time in regular employment and the other half in taking the course. Plant foremen were hired as instructors and paid by the State Vocational Education Department, under whose jurisdiction all government-financed programs were operated.

Most companies had on-the-job training for new employees. This was known as "over-the-shoulder training" because it involved little more than trainees working with foremen for a short while and then being put to work under their watchful eyes. Such training was informal, routine, and was not actually in the nature of a program.

The Training Within Industry program was operated in closer affiliation with WMC than any of the others. A representative of the program was attached to the local WMC office and he trained local staffs who in turn trained supervisors within the various plants. The program consisted of four types of training: Job Instruction Training (JIT), Job Relations Training (JRT), Job Methods Training (JMT), and Program Development Training (PDT). JIT trained supervisors and foremen in
the methods of training new workers to do their jobs. JRT trained supervisors and foremen in methods of dealing with people. JMT trained them in methods of improving utilization practices, and PDT trained them in the efficient planning production. The local TWI representative trained small groups of supervisors in each of the programs and these were to train supervisory personnel in their own or other plants. Each program was completed in five two-hour sessions, and like the other training programs, they were provided free of charge.

Considerable resistance was encountered in attempts to obtain employer cooperation in instituting these supervisory training programs. According to the local TWI representative, the program faced two distinct disadvantages: it was free of charge and it was government sponsored. Employers, he believed, were suspicious that what they received free would have to be paid for in the form of a disagreeable duty or penalty later. Government sponsorship, on the other hand, was associated in their minds with requirements of making numerous applications and reports. Another difficulty was the objections of plant managers and superintendents. They generally objected on the grounds that their foremen would be absent from their jobs during the training hours, and production would suffer as consequence. Top managements were generally more easily convinced about the merits and desirability of the program, and it was often only after repeated appeals to them that superintendents and plant managers were overruled.

In the early stages of the program the local representative himself generally contacted employers in efforts to obtain their consent to train their supervisors. But his efforts were usually unsuccessful.
Finally the cooperation of the Foremen's Club of Columbus was obtained and through its influence supervisory training classes were held in many plants. The office of the Club was used to train a nucleus of supervisors who then trained others in other plants. Once the nucleus was established it was easier to obtain the consent of employers not only because of the Club's association with the program but also because the instructors were men from local industries. One large area establishment sent its training director to the regional TWI school to receive the same training the local representatives affiliated with WMC received. He returned to train instructors in his plant and these trained other supervisors in the organization. On several occasions armed services procurement representatives requested the local TWI representative to conduct classes in plants holding contracts from their respective services. When such requests were made over the objection of the plant managements, the results of the programs were generally unsatisfactory. When employers were opposed to the programs, the enthusiasm and interest necessary to make them successful were absent, with the result that the training efforts were largely wasted. In spite of these difficulties, however, about 3,000 supervisors were trained.¹²

¹² Records of the exact number were not preserved. The estimate was made by the TWI representative who operated the local program during the last two years of the war.

On the whole the training facilities operated locally left something to be desired. Understandably, apprenticeship training practically disappeared. Young men were being inducted into the armed ser-
vices and thus the group from which apprentices are generally drawn was depleted. However, it would appear that entirely too few people receive pre-employment training. Undoubtedly the willingness of employers to hire unskilled persons contributed to this, for to most job applicants it appeared that there was little economic advantage in spending time in training when that time might be spent in earning. But free pre-employment training was generally made available during non-working hours. This suggests, therefore, that another reason so few people took advantage of it was that it was not sufficiently publicized and promoted by local manpower officials and employers.

Employers probably did not promote it more diligently because they felt that persons exposed to the training courses did not actually emerge with the skills for which they were theoretically trained. Employers complained that pre-employment training was useless unless it was directed toward qualifying the trainee for a specific job. If that was true, it would appear that employers should have promoted a program which would have shown an applicant the specific job for which he was to be trained and then have sent him off to be trained for it. This employers did not do. The nearest approximation to it was the supplementary training program, with which employers appeared much more satisfied. But a total of only about 6,000 persons were trained under its provisions. Why so few were trained is perhaps partly explained by the comment of one employer who opposed sending his workers to these classes "because then they get ambitious and want promotions".
When the various training programs were first suggested in the early period of the war production effort, many employers resisted them. They were often overconfident that enough trained manpower would be available and often impatient with training programs in general. The local Chamber of Commerce foresaw the need early and called several conferences in 1940 and 1941 to emphasize the need to train men. But there was little enthusiasm for it, and when needs became more urgent many employers persistently held to a mysterious faith that somehow the needed manpower would appear, or were possessed of the notion that there was something peculiarly unbusinesslike about training one's own workers. For example, one company whose total employment was less than 500 suddenly requisitioned over 100 draftsmen from the employment service. A USES representative personally contacted the company president to advise him that since these men were not available a supplementary training program should be instituted to train the required number of persons. The president rejected this solution with the confident declaration that he would get 100 draftsmen if USES couldn't. He would get them as he had always gotten them during 30 years of successful management. Three weeks later he asked that a training program be instituted.

It would appear that some of the shortages of skilled workmen in 1943, 1944, and 1945 might have been avoided by the exercise of more foresight by local employers. At first they refused to admit that shortages would arise, and later they were reluctant to train workers because this had never been done in the past, or for fear that such employees might subsequently quit or become dissatisfied with their
present jobs and wages. Employers were apparently reluctant to promote pre-employment training for fear of losing current employees who might take such courses and then seek employment at higher skills elsewhere. Workers on the other hand did not take advantage of the free training facilities in greater numbers, probably because one could be paid while taking the same courses under the auspices of the large aircraft company. But probably the most important reasons for the programs not having been more effective were that they were not properly publicized and promoted, and employers eagerly hired unskilled applicants. The supplementary training programs proved to be very helpful in all cases in which they were instituted, and it would appear that with better organization and promotion more firms might have been enlisted in them, especially in those classes that were held in the public schools. The successful operation of the PFT programs, after receiving an unwelcome reception, shows what can be done with ingenuity and effective promotion.

More might have been done by way of training local personnel directors and employment managers in better techniques of personnel management. It has been pointed out that poor personnel practices were a chief cause of poor utilization and high turnover and absentee rates. Yet only one personnel training class was held under the ESMVT program, and this was poorly attended.

The Utilization Program.

Probably no feature of the wartime manpower program was launched with so many glowing promises, yet achieved such disappointing results
as the utilization program. A manpower utilization division was attached to the Columbus Area WMC in September, 1943. Issuing an impressive list of objectives and a hasty attribution of nearly all current problems to improper manpower utilization, it defined manpower utilization to mean "the most productive use of the minimum amount of labor necessary for production under working conditions that will maintain worker effectiveness and morale."\(^{13}\)

The utilization program was to concern itself with all factors affecting workers in the performance of their productive efforts, including plant conditions, production procedures, personnel policies, out-of-plant community conditions, and the relation of the individual workers to each of these factors. The greatest concern of the program was that of helping meet serious manpower shortages by effecting greater utilization of employed workers rather than by adding new employees.

Three utilization consultants were assigned to the Columbus Area WMC. They were to aid the local manpower program by developing three phases of utilization: the positive community program, the troubleshooting program, and the normal operating program. The first was to work with existing agencies and organizations to help facilitate community efforts to increase utilization through developing child care facilities, school programs, transportation, housing, etc. Along this line the local utilization section did practically nothing. The second was to make surveys of plants having persistent difficulties, such as

\(^{13}\) What Merits Consideration, Columbus Area WMC, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 28, 1943.
excessive turnover and absenteeism, production slowdowns, labor-management difficulties, bottlenecks, and recruiting difficulties. This also involved making spot surveys to check on the legitimacy of priority requests and to help employers with such specific problems as modifying jobs and processes so that they could be performed by women workers. The third was to promote the introduction of better utilization techniques by making employers manpower conscious, encouraging and facilitating the introduction of various worker and supervisory training and upgrading programs, enlisting the aid of USES personnel in promoting better utilization, consulting with other government and procurement agencies, and soliciting the support of labor unions.

By way of making the utilization program a continuous operation, USES interviewers and contact men were to be trained by the utilization staff in methods of improving referral and placement techniques and in discovering poor utilization practices of employers through plant visits and examination of employer reports. This, however, was not done effectively because both USES personnel and utilization consultants were too busy with what were deemed to be more urgent matters.

UMC emphasized that the purpose of the utilization program was to promote voluntary action and self-solution of problems rather than government-imposed solutions. In keeping with this objective it prepared and sent check lists to essential employers against which they could take inventories of their policies and practices to determine if they were in the best interests of efficient manpower utilization. They were not required to be returned to any government agency, although
employers could, on the basis of the results, consult the utilization staff about ways and means of improving conditions and practices.

In-plant surveys were generally made at the suggestion of USES contact men. Contact men generally operated on the theory that persistent manpower and production difficulties reflected the existence of remediable problems. They approached top management explaining the nature and purpose of an in-plant utilization survey. It was emphasized that a survey was not designed to tell employers how they should run their plants, but merely to get at the root of certain problems. Utilization consultants were to make suggestions, not to issue directives. The surveys made by the consultants, and the reports which they submitted to the managements of the surveyed plants, were directed at discovering the existence and causes of production lags, and possible methods of remedying them. The consultants not only took into consideration the opinions of executives, foremen, and union representatives on these matters, but they also made personal investigations into such subjects as sanitation, lighting, safety measures, hospitalization, morale, training, housing, parking facilities, school child care, shopping facilities, hours of work, and the workers' attitudes toward management.

By February, 1945, 23 detailed plant surveys had been made in the Columbus Area. The results, however, were not encouraging. All of the surveys recommended ways to improve utilization, but most of them were inferior in quality, unduly long, and inordinately concerned with minutiae. This was due both to lack of competent utilization consultants and to the nature of the national standards governing the way in
which the studies were to be made.

Only one of the three consultants in the local office had real competence, having been a plant superintendent prior to entering the service of WMC. He was experienced in all phases of industrial production, was over 50 years of age, spoke the language of plant management, and inspired confidence. The other two consultants, on the other hand, were comparatively young and inexperienced in high-level industrial management. Employers had no real confidence in their ability, and their reports lacked the mature insight that is generally produced by long experience. National standards required the reports to be much too lengthy and detailed, with the result that managers who were already pressed for time often considered them academic and verbose, and lost interest. But there was no real reason for the reports being as detailed as they were, for they were used only by local manpower officials who were already adequately familiar with the plants analyzed. While the reports were sent to state headquarters, they were only used there as a means of checking on the activities of the area consultants. They were also to be used by the Manpower Priorities and the Production Urgency Committees, but again only the results and recommendations were of interest.

Another serious impediment to the better operation of the utilization program was its failure to be properly integrated into the over-all national production and manpower program. Thus, when the national utilization program was first announced early in 1943, it was established as part of WMC. Although this agency was advised to cooperate, wherever necessary, with the War Production Board, it was given no
specific indication as to which utilization practices were the responsibility of WMC and which were WPB's. Finally, in September, the War Manpower Commissioner and the chairman of WPB issued a joint statement stipulating that WPB was to be exclusively concerned with utilization problems arising out of "difficulties of a clearly collective bargaining nature" and "difficulties that are immediately connected with production and which can be corrected on the spot". This, however, was far from adequate, for it succeeded only in trying the patience of employers who found themselves dealing simultaneously with representatives of the Labor Production Office of WPB and with WMC utilization consultants, both of whom appeared to be trying to do the same thing independently.

Moreover, the national utilization program was introduced with no apparent effort having been made to enlist the support of the various national industry associations and labor federations. The business of going into an employer's plant, making a detailed study, and telling him that things aren't just right is one that is likely to arouse some resentment on the employer's part. He is neither accustomed to having outsiders criticize his methods, nor likely to concede that he has somehow erred during the many years of his tenure. Thus it is necessary that employers be properly conditioned to receive consultants who seek to study their plants. This was not done, either on a national level or on a local level. The program was simply announced and activated, without regard to the sensibilities of the people it affected most in-

The same thoughtlessness was displayed in respect to the program's relation to government and military procurement agencies. The military agencies had inspection teams that made informal utilization studies of their own in plants producing goods for them. However, this utilization effort was uncoordinated with that of WMC. The result was that procurement representatives on the local Manpower Priorities and Production Urgency Committees generally opposed the making of WMC utilization studies in establishments under consideration for changes in urgency or priority ratings and ceiling levels. As has been pointed out, this created a difficult problem and materially affected the operations of the committees and the programs with which they were concerned.

Because the WMC utilization consultants investigated all factors that in their opinion affected utilization, their efforts overlapped with the work of other government agencies. Thus recommendations about health and sanitary conditions impinged upon the work of state health inspectors, recommendations about wages came under the jurisdiction of WLB, and suggestions for reducing absenteeism and turnover by improving transportation and housing facilities dealt with matters that were the concern of the Office of Defense Transportation and the National Housing Agency, respectively. Recommended action to meet housing and transportation shortages and to correct in-plant conditions and work processes often required additional materials that could only be gotten through the War Production Board. And other recommendations might require help from the War Food Administration, the Office of Price Administration, the Department of Labor, or the Area Management-Labor Committee. The
prospect of consulting and negotiating with this formidable aggregation of officialdom had a tendency to discourage employers from taking necessary remedial steps. They know, moreover, that it would take weeks, sometimes months, and often forever to obtain the permission, materials, or services necessary to carry through the utilization proposals. As the result, proposals to help the war by means of better manpower and production practices were sometimes rendered useless by the very nature of the organized war effort itself.

To summarize, the utilization program suffered from a lack of competent consultants, insufficient liaison and coordination with other government agencies, improper preparation of the business and labor community to insure their sympathetic acceptance of the program, employer fears that investigations might reveal discriminatory hiring practices that would result in deprivation of USES services, additional employer fears that the surveys would stir up labor unrest, and the lack of a really burdensome manpower shortage in most plants.

Moreover, the utilization staff gave insufficient attention to the training of employer service representatives in the local office. It would also appear that attention should have been given to the possibility of channeling priority requests through the utilization section to insure that information reaching the Manpower Priorities Committee reflected a true picture of in-plant conditions, with particular respect to utilization of presently employed workers. And it would probably have been very helpful if ES-270 reports had been made available to the utilization staff so that actual plant conditions might have been check-
against reported conditions. Such analyses might have become the basis for measures to improve the quality, completeness, and accuracy of these reports.

F. The Compliance Program

It has repeatedly been pointed out that the wartime manpower program depended for its support on the voluntary cooperation and compliance of the people and groups it affected. The legal basis for enforcing its provisions was questionable, and although reference was occasionally made to using fines to penalize violators, no actual use was made of this device locally. Indeed, it was not even used as a threat in any specific case.

The local USES-WMC depended upon voluntary public support to carry through its measures. Newspaper and radio publicity, organized community support, and labor-management backing through the Management-Labor Committee created the broad cooperative framework on which the successful operation of the stabilization program depended. A comprehensive and continuous propaganda job of familiarizing the community with stabilization provisions and the necessity for manpower controls was indispensable to obtaining wide voluntary acceptance of the program.

Employers were in a key position, for without their adherence to hiring restrictions the entire program would have collapsed. With their cooperation the movement of workers was more easily controlled and the rest of the community was more easily enlisted in support of the program.

As has been pointed out, USES-WMC might have applied certain sanctions in the case of non-complying employers. These included re-
fusal to refer workers to them, withdrawal of preferential referral treatment, granting statements of availability to their employees, asking Selective Service boards to withdraw deferments granted to their employees, and reducing their employment ceilings. USES-WMC might also have enlisted the cooperation of other federal agencies by asking them to withdraw priorities for materials and contracts, refuse to issue new contracts, refuse validation of vital transportation services, arrange for withdrawal of fuel and power. It might even have asked the War Department to assume operation of the establishment.

Workers might be forced into cooperation by threats to withdraw deferments of military induction, refusal to grant statements of availability, and refusal to grant referrals to any but such firms as USES deemed the applicants were suited for. At the same time more subtle means such as unfavorable newspaper publicity might be used to obtain the cooperation of recalcitrants, particularly employers.

Although the local USES-WMC occasionally and with reluctance threatened to invoke sanctions against employers, in only one instance did it actually do so. This was a case in which it granted statements of availability to the employees of a firm which was violating the 48-hour week. On the other hand, the enforcement provisions against workers were by their very nature easily imposed, and furthermore were less likely to disrupt production when applied.

In general, USES-WMC relied on consultation and persuasion to obtain the cooperation of violators. However, efforts to detect violations were somewhat limited. Questioned by members of the Manage-
ment-Labor Committee in the summer of 1943 about inaugurating a detection program, the area director said that staff limitations made such a program impossible at that time. Interviewers and contact men were to keep on the alert for violations, and were often quite astute in detecting them. USES also encouraged employers and workers to report violations of other employers and workers, but this resulted in accusations often based only on hearsay.

Late in 1943, USES inaugurated the first of two programs to check on compliance. Letters inquiring about their current status were sent to all persons who had left their jobs in selected establishments without obtaining statements of availability either from the employer or from USES. Of the nearly 2,000 letters sent during a three-month period, less than 60 percent were answered. As the result of further USES action, 130 of the workers returned to their jobs, and 174 were given statements of availability either by employers or by USES. Of the approximately 1,200 persons who responded to the letters, 64 were found to have violated the stabilization program, 35 had gone into the armed forces, 73 had left the area, and 542, or almost half, were not working. Of the group not working, almost half indicated illness as the cause, a fourth gave no reason, and the remainder said they were not working because of child care problems, resumption of education, vacationing, or dislike of industrial employment. This compliance check accomplished a positive result insofar as it caused some workers to return to their jobs. As an indication of the effectiveness of the stabilization program, however, the results were somewhat discouraging.

15 Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, April 11, 1944.
The fact that more than four out of 10 of the workers could not even be located, and that more than a fifth had either left the area without clearance or gave no good reason for not working, indicated that employment in the area had not been completely "stabilized".

In December, 1944, a second compliance audit, directed more specifically at employers, was begun, although initially there was some opposition to the proposal from both employer and union representatives on the Management-Labor Committee. The audit involved unannounced visits by USES representatives to the employment offices of firms to inspect their employment records. Generally a number of personnel cards representing recent hires were selected at random and the company was asked to produce the statements of availability and/or referral cards relinquished by the workers when they were hired. This audit continued for a month, and was conducted periodically for the remainder of the war. During the first month, the employment records of 36 essential and locally needed firms and 86 less essential establishments were inspected. Together they employed 11,412 persons. Out of 2,209 recent accessions, there were 118 invalid hires and 23 hires in excess of ceilings. These were found chiefly in hotels, restaurants, and junk yards, and included principally service workers. Some of the violations were believed to have been deliberate, induced by a desperate need for employees. However, ignorance of the stabilization program, errors and oversights, decentralized hiring, and poor bookkeeping methods accounted for the majority of the infractions. Employers in violation were asked to send affected workers to the USES office.
for proper referral. Of the 137 releases from the less essential establishments, 37 percent were referred to essential jobs and 63 percent were allowed to remain with the less essential firms because, in the opinion of USES, they were physically unable to take other employment. 17

On first contact a few employers refused to show payroll records, but interim telephone calls made second visits successful. Most employers were cooperative and their records showed little trace of violation. This was particularly true in essential firms employing 100 or more workers. It was therefore recommended that check-ups on companies in this category be suspended and more intensive checks be made on smaller, less essential establishments.

USES reported that most of the stabilization infringements grew out of lack of information about the program or out of poor company personnel practices. Thus one company which was found to be in violation did not require written applications of its applicants, so there was no way to check into their past employment records. However, there were probably considerably more violations that were uncovered, largely because USES judiciously refrained from investigating some firms that were known to be in violation. Fertilizer plants, for example, recruited workers from the city's "skid row", and USES was generally pleased when they obtained help, regardless of the source, or of the stabilization violations involved. In the same way, establishments known to be discriminating against Negroes were not punished. And one firm that was in repeated violation in respect to practically all stabilization

measures, was never punished, probably because of its high priority rating. Any attempt to withhold workers or seek to stop contracts would obviously have resulted in immediate and effective complaints by procurement agencies. Moreover, it was not certain that contracts could in fact be halted. The area directors argued this point at great length at a Region V meeting early in 1944, but no clear statement of the possibilities emerged. Local enforcement was, however, helped by a Cincinnati incident during which an essential establishment had its electric power cut off for an entire day because of non-compliance with stabilization measures. Whether this was legal and whether it helped or harmed subsequent Cincinnati stabilization efforts was not investigated, but Columbus Area officials continuously cited the incident as an example of USES-WMC enforcement powers, and to that extent profited by it.

Under the circumstances, and as voluntary programs go, compliance in the Columbus Area was exceptionally good. There were few cases of outright malevolent or conscientious violations by employers. However, administration of the program was also relatively lax, so that there may have been many small or innocent violations that went undetected. Violations on the part of workers appeared to be relatively more numerous. Lack of information about the stipulations of the program was undoubtedly responsible for some of them, but many were undoubtedly due to a desire to do what was not permitted by the program.
CHAPTER 7
MANPOWER UTILIZATION: MINORITY AND FRINGE GROUPS

This chapter continues the discussion of the utilization efforts under the manpower program. The chapter differs from the previous one in that it discusses the utilization effort from the point of view of the problems and methods of increasing the employment of Negroes, women, old and young people, the physically handicapped, etc., rather than from the point of view of specific programs designed to increase the utilization of the available manpower in general.

A. Employment of Negroes.

A Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) was established by Presidential Executive Order as early as June, 1941, to encourage the employment of Negroes in war industries. In July, 1942, FEPC became a unit of WMC, and later was reorganized and transferred to the Office of Emergency Management. Early in 1943 an operating agreement was drawn up between WMC and FEPC which contained procedures which were to govern the relations between these two agencies for the remainder of the war period. According to this agreement USES was to receive complaints of discrimination and to act upon them. If no satisfactory result was obtained within 10 days, the complaints were to be forwarded to FEPC. Upon receipt from USES of Form 510 (Report of Discriminatory Employment Practices), FEPC was to investigate the complaint

1. For a complete discussion of the history of FEPC see Beatty, Donald, Mobilization of Manpower for War Production During World War II, Ph. D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1948, pp. 177-204.
Table 7-1

Number of Persons Employed in Selected Essential Establishments, by Race, and Number of Persons Registered for Work with the Public Employment Service, by Race, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Selected Months, May, 1942-Dec, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. of establishments</th>
<th>Total employment</th>
<th>Negro employment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1942</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<td>41,155</td>
<td>3,385</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>3,176</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>42,740</td>
<td>3,376</td>
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<td>10,531</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41,254</td>
<td>3,185</td>
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<td>2,791</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45,642</td>
<td>3,742</td>
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<td>2,320</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47,358</td>
<td>4,285</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7,291</td>
<td>1,880</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47,251</td>
<td>4,425</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8,117</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
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<td>47,358</td>
<td>5,015</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2,179</td>
<td>832</td>
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<td>5,425</td>
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<td>802</td>
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<td>37.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td>8,897</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<td>8,955</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59,328</td>
<td>8,425</td>
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<td>631</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60,707</td>
<td>8,438</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
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<td>8,300</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
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<td>57,285</td>
<td>8,429</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56,225</td>
<td>8,602</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>55,207</td>
<td>8,653</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>55,449</td>
<td>8,484</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>8,752</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<td>54,691</td>
<td>8,422</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>51,433</td>
<td>7,855</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>51,533</td>
<td>8,115</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50,349</td>
<td>8,173</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<td>4,198</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>Oct</td>
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<td>23,937</td>
<td>4,045</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23,458</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23,458</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data compiled by the U.S. Employment Service, ES-270.
b) Data not available.

Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, United States Employment Service and War Manpower Commission in Ohio, ES Tables 270-2, 270-3, 270-5, 270-6, 268-2, and 268-5.
and attempt appropriate remedial action. Such action might take the form of requesting USES to withhold referrals from refractory employers.

This procedure was far from effective, however. USES personnel were generally reluctant to prepare Forms 510. For years they had been trained to supply manpower in accordance with whatever specifications employers made. Moreover, they were afraid to antagonize employers and thus risk losing their business, a condition that would have threatened the very existence of public employment services. Negro workers, on the other hand, were not well informed about the operation of the non-discrimination program. They generally refrained from applying for jobs in establishments known not to hire Negroes, and often filed complaints that were vague and inconclusive in their evidence of discrimination. Meanwhile FEPC was in no position effectively to reduce or prevent discrimination. It had no direct control over USES policies and practices, and besides confined its work to investigating reports of discrimination rather than seeking to promote the integration of Negroes into plants that obviously discriminated.

The proportion of Negroes in essential activities in the Columbus Area increased considerably during the war, as Table 7.1 shows. The proportion doubled, from 8 percent in July, 1942, to 16 percent in July, 1945, and actually increased while the general level of employment declined late in 1944. Thereafter, it remained practically constant as total employment declined steadily in 1945. But despite this increase in the employment of Negroes in essential industries it is note-
Table 7.2

Selected Population, Labor Force, Employment, and Training Data, by Race, Columbus,
Ohio, Area, Selected Periods, 1940-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>Number of non-white persons</th>
<th>Non-white persons as percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>April, 1940</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>35,904</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force</td>
<td>130,117</td>
<td>15,055</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing employment</td>
<td>26,954</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other employment</td>
<td>85,493</td>
<td>9,492</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>17,670</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment, 35 essential firms (November)</td>
<td>42,740</td>
<td>3,376</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USES active file registration (November)</td>
<td>10,531</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-employment training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average employment in 34-37 essential firms</td>
<td>47,452</td>
<td>4,655</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of USES active file registrants</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-employment training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average employment in 31-69 essential firms (first 6 mos. only)</td>
<td>68,500</td>
<td>8,761</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in 33 mfge firms (May)</td>
<td>55,531</td>
<td>5,245</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of USES active file registrants (first 6 mos. only)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-employment training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary training enrollment (total for the year)</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) 1940 data are from the City of Columbus only, as racial data according to industry groups are not available on a county basis. Data on employment and number of registrants include the Columbus labor market area, and training data include Franklin County residents only.

Source: 1940 data are from the 16th U.S. Census, Population, 3rd Series, The Labor Force, Ohio, Table 1, p.10, and Table 19, pp. 160, 161, 164, and 166. Essential industry data from Table 7.1, USES registration data from Table 3.4, and training data from Table 6.2. Manufacturing data from Columbus Labor Market Report, USES, June, 1944.
worthy that Negroes constituted less than 10 percent of essential manufacturing employment in the area in May, 1944 (Table 7.2), a fact that suggests that an unusually large proportion was employed in non-manufacturing essential establishments. This is supported by data which show that in the Spring of 1944, 40 percent of the Negroes in essential work were employed by the federal government, which had only 16 percent of all essential workers in the area at that time.  

It was to be expected, of course, that the proportion of Negroes in essential work would increase, especially in view of the fact that such a large proportion of the unemployed from 1940 to 1943 were Negroes. During this period over 23 percent of the unemployed were Negroes, although Negroes totaled less than 12 percent of the entire population. (Table 7.2) Even through 1943, over 25 percent of the registrants in the active files of the local USES office were non-whites. (Table 7.1) By 1944, however, this proportion was reduced to the proportion of Negroes in the entire population.

The large increase in the proportion of Negroes in essential employment does not indicate the absence of discrimination, however. The fact, for example, that the proportion of Negroes in manufacturing was about equal to the proportion in the total population, does not mean that opportunities in those industries were unlimited for Negroes. Since other large areas of employment are traditionally closed to Negroes, this group gravitates toward manufacturing employment in great-

2. Computed from Columbus Labor Market Report, USES, June, 1944.
3. Census and USES "Non-white" designations for the Columbus Area may be used interchangeably with "Negro" designations since the latter constitute well over 99 percent of the non-white population.
er proportions than whites. Had there been unlimited opportunities for Negroes in manufacturing, therefore, they would have constituted a larger proportion of manufacturing employment than of the entire population.

Discrimination against Negroes manifested itself in several ways. Some manufacturing firms refused to hire them altogether. Many firms that did hire them placed them in lower-paying service and unskilled jobs. This, of course, does not necessarily indicate wartime discrimination, since pre-war discrimination against Negroes had not enabled them to acquire industrial skills. But the entire situation cannot be explained on the basis of this factor, because in some firms the placement of Negroes in inferior jobs was a matter of policy rather than necessity.

There was also active discrimination in the matter of promotions and upgrading. For example, there were persistent reports of this by US3S, and statistics of enrollment in the supplementary training programs of the Columbus public schools tend to support the complaints. Since students entered supplementary training classes only with the consent of their employers, the fact that the proportions of Negroes in such classes were well under 5 percent during the war suggests that insofar as such training was generally preparatory to upgrading and promotions, Negroes were discriminated against.

Columbus Area efforts to promote the hiring of Negroes and to mitigate discriminatory employment practices went considerably beyond
affic measures. A civic organization long dedicated to preparing Negro youths for competent service in industrial jobs intensified its efforts by obtaining the cooperation of additional civic, welfare, and religious organizations. As early as March, 1942, its annual Vocational Opportunity Campaign was directed toward organizing the community behind the promotion of the employment of Negroes. Shortly after its organization the Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee established a Minority Groups Subcommittee to look into the problem of integrating Negroes into jobs customarily reserved for whites. Following the failure of the first National FEPC, a local Fair Employment Practices Council was established to do on a local level what had failed to be done on a national level. The Council was organized under the joint efforts of the area manpower director and local Negro organizations. Its membership consisted of representatives of civic, welfare, religious, and labor organizations, of an executive from a local manufacturing concern, and of the minority groups representative of the local USES, who, however, did not officially represent USES.

The Council became the focal organization in the Negro employment question. Various interested groups and organizations worked through and consulted with it. The Management-Labor subcommittee was in close touch with it at all times. Through the Council, USES-WMC was able to accomplish what the new WMC-FEPC working agreement could not. Thus complaints of discriminatory practices were referred to the Council, members of which then contacted the accused parties. Union representatives contacted unions, and management, civic, or religious represent-
atives contacted employers. This personal approach was more effective than the previous system of sending to the employer a copy of Form 510 alleging discriminatory practices. Such forms had often been poorly worded and carried a hostile tone. Employers reacted negatively against them, and, besides, USES personnel were disinclined to execute these accusatory forms. There is also some evidence that aggrieved workers were reluctant to take their complaints to USES. They apparently more readily took their problems to a private organization they knew to be dedicated to serve their interests than to a government agency that was suspected of existing only because of a Presidential Executive Order.

The Council met monthly, with a Subcommittee on Complaints meeting biweekly. If any accused party was found by the Subcommittee to have been engaging in discriminatory practices, and if, over a period of time, no attempt was made to correct them, USES was advised of the party's unsympathetic and refractory manner. Only then was a Form 510 executed, and 10 days later the regional FEPC examiner entered the case.

The area director was subject to considerable official criticism by the regional FEPC for operating in this manner. However, he felt that this method was more fruitful than the method of the FEPC-WMO working agreement. The local Council was familiar with local traditions, pressures, and practices and was better able to deal with local employers than the FEPC examiner. Moreover, the examiner tended to be abrupt, whereas Council members were patient, understanding, sympathetic. If contacted employers responded with "We'll see what we can do", this
was taken as a sign of progress. On the whole employers were more responsive to the pleas of the Council than to FEPC. Employers were suspicious of the latter not only because it was a government agency, but also because they were not completely certain of its motives.

The local arrangement for handling minority groups problems was probably superior to the national program, but it was far from being entirely effective. Council members were perhaps somewhat too sympathetic and understanding, with the result that insincere promises to lift certain restrictions passed as being sincere. Since accused groups were not required actually to act to alleviate restrictions, but needed only to indicate a willingness to "look into the matter", not too much was accomplished in a direct way.

That local anti-discrimination measures might have been more vigorous is perhaps reflected in the fact that the chairman of the Management-Labor Committee's Minority Groups Subcommittee was the president of a craft union that itself discriminated and energetically upheld the legitimacy of its practice. While he apparently sincerely believed employers should not discriminate in their manpower practices, he apparently also felt that their policies of non-discrimination should not interfere with union discriminatory practices.

Other unions, also, were not beyond rebuke. Thus in three cases of discriminatory employment practices, unions were found to stand in the way of correcting the conditions, although employers appeared willing to relax their standards. In another case several hundred union workers walked off their jobs when the company placed a Negro in their
department. The union avoided any positive stand by mildly asserting management's right to hire whom it pleased.

The Minority Groups Subcommittee was not an action group, although it engaged in some direct action. Members of the Subcommittee consulted with habitual and antagonistic violators of the stabilization plans' non-discrimination provisions and outlined the nature of the sanctions that might be applied, spoke to employer, civic, and union groups about discrimination problems, and sought to anticipate and mitigate racial tensions. The most tangible form of the latter activity was having local newspapers cease the practice of identifying criminals according to their race.

A locally published Negro newspaper and a Negro action group militantly fought discriminatory employment practices. They often publicized cases of alleged discrimination as actual discrimination, and vigorously pressured USES-WMC to apply sanctions in accordance with stabilization plans and Presidential intentions. Racial tensions reached serious proportions late in 1944 and early in 1945. For several weeks a somewhat repressed "pushing and shoving" war raged between Negroes and whites on buses and in public places.

The area director, after consulting with Negro civic and political leaders, became convinced that USES-WMC must demonstrate its sincerity in carrying out its anti-discrimination duties. Having been advised by these leaders that the most dramatic case of discriminatory employment practices was the refusal of the local public transportation company to employ Negro drivers, the company was consulted about altering
that practice. After two months of consultation and pleading, the company was informed that USES would cease to refer workers to it and that its currently employed workers would be given statements of availability upon request. A protracted and bitter appeals hearing, lasting over a month, followed. Several Negroes, selected by the Negro action group, had been sent to the company by USES in response to a request for drivers. The company refused to hire them on the ground that they did not meet the specifications outlined in a detailed summary of character, literacy, honesty, and appearance requisites. Since national FEPO rules required that discriminatory employment practices must be proved in respect to situations involving specific persons, USES-MC's case was fought on the basis of the rejection of the four applicants. The company effectively showed that none of the four measured up to the requirements stipulated in the summary it presented as evidence. One man had been arrested for disturbing the peace. Another had failed to account for two months in his employment history, thus making him subject to the allegation that he would not be able to fill out an accurate accident record. The other two were denied employment for similar types of flaws in their applications.

The local consultant on minority groups employment presented criminal and drunken driving police records of several white men recently hired as drivers by the company to show that its hiring standards were false fronts that had not been used since the war began. But this was not admitted as evidence since it did not directly involve the four men in question. In the final appeals vote only the two industrial
union representatives voted to uphold the area director. The area
director appealed the case to the regional Committee, which reversed
the local Committee's decision. Then the company appealed to Washington
and a ruling supporting the area director was handed down as the war
ended in August, 1945.

The transportation company was the only area establishment against
which sanctions were sought for failure to abide by the anti-discriminatory provisions of the stabilization plans. The result was inconclusive,
except for the fact that it helped to make the local WMC unpopular among
employers and certain unions.

Discrimination bars were lifted somewhat during the war, although
some employers still boast of never having hired Negroes. Five of the
larger companies, with long records of discrimination against Negro
applicants, made positive efforts to integrate Negroes into their shops,
especially Negro women, but with only moderate success. These efforts
were undertaken in cooperation with the Fair Employment Practices Coun-
cil, which supplied the initial group of handpicked workers. The com-
panies found that it was more difficult to integrate Negroes into the
higher skilled jobs than into the unskilled jobs, chiefly because of
the resistance of white workers. Dangerous community tensions arose,
although one community discrimination bar was apparently permanently
lifed as Negroes for the first time attended downtown theaters in
large numbers. On the whole the basic employment discrimination patterns
continued as before the war, with Negroes finding access to the higher
skilled jobs difficult, and with Negro employment opportunities being abundant only in unskilled and service occupations.

USES-WMC did not aggressively fight discrimination, partly for lack of inclination, partly because manufacturers of essential war goods could not easily be subjected to sanctions, partly because unions did not actively support the program, partly because of the community hostility to Negro integration, and partly because USES feared antagonizing employers and thus losing their good will both in respect to present cooperation and in respect to their future willingness to do business with USES. There was a lack of adequate anti-discrimination publicity and education, and there was probably a lack of statesmanlike behavior on the part of some of the leaders of the Negro population. Discrimination is an obvious evil, especially in a nation which at that time professed to seek to rid the world of the century's most blatant manifestation of organized bigotry and hate. But it is unlikely that the method of inflammatory newspaper oratory was best calculated to overcome the evil.

It would appear that a representative local group dedicated to promoting the integration of Negro workers into all jobs is preferable to the same job being undertaken by an FEP examiner from a regional or national office. On the other hand there is the danger that a local group will accept prevailing discrimination patterns as being somewhat more rigid and insurmountable than they are, with the result that the assigned anti-discrimination job does not get done as well as it might. Obviously discriminatory hiring is an important deterrent to the fuller
utilization of the manpower available in a given community, as it is a
deterrent to the immigration of minority group workers who might other­
wise be inclined to seek employment in the community in which hiring
discriminations occur.

It is quite clear that labor is not a homogeneous entity, but
neither is management. Thus in estimating the supply of available
manpower, it is essential to take into consideration the reactions of
employers and fellow workers to various types of manpower; these re­
actions, to a large extent, determine whether, and how efficiently,
that manpower will be utilized.

3. Employment of Women.

Women constituted a large potential supply of manpower to fill the
needs that arose during the war. As has been suggested before, they
took wartime jobs in large numbers.

It was not until late in 1941 that the absolute number of women
holding jobs in the Columbus Area began to increase. However, the man­
power squeeze was obviously on. Just before Christmas, 1941, the Ohio
Department of Industrial Relations adopted a policy of permitting
selected war production firms to employ women in excess of 45 hours per
week for short periods.¹ Three weeks later, women were applying for
and receiving licenses to drive Columbus taxis, although existing
state laws prohibited their engaging in such work. By the Summer of
1942 local business establishments not engaged in war work, but feeling
the effects of the manpower shortage, began organized efforts to secure

¹. Columbus Dispatch, December 20, 1941.
changes in existing state legislation which was then prohibiting their hiring women for certain kinds of work and in excess of certain numbers of hours. After much prolonged agitation the Ohio legislature passed a series of laws in April and May of 1943 relaxing minimum age and maximum hours standards and permitting the employment of women in jobs in which they had previously been prohibited from working.

Meanwhile, articles began to appear in the local press about what women could do for the war effort. But in the early months of 1942 the emphasis was on being friendly to servicemen, helping to sell war bonds, and wrapping bandages for the Red Cross. Articles bearing Washington datelines and promoting female factory employment appeared in May. This type of employment increased during the summer months, and by August it was sufficiently extensive to be reflected in a fashion advertisement of a local department store. The ad advised that "When the shift changes" a woman should "forget it...be yourself. America also needs that side of your life." And it suggested that the way to "forget it" was to get fashionable clothes at the designated establishment. In October the local railroads began hiring women ticket sellers, and, as a further means of overcoming shortages, reduced their training periods from six to five weeks. At the same time a group of women, all officers of Columbus women's organizations, sponsored an all-day conference on "The Problems of Industry, Labor, and Government", to "discuss important matters with representatives of business and to confer on problems that are crowding more and more into women's sphere as

5. Ibid., August 30, 1942.
6. Ibid., August 26, 1942.
Table 7.3

Female Employment As Percentage of Total Employment in Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Selected Months, May, 1942-July, 1945 (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of reporting firms</th>
<th>Total employment</th>
<th>Female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May (b)</td>
<td>11,195</td>
<td>38,109</td>
<td>4,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5,373</td>
<td>41,915</td>
<td>5,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>40,725</td>
<td>6,394</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>42,740</td>
<td>7,095</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>41,254</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>45,612</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>47,738</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,071</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>47,763</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>51,266</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>71,751</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>72,512</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>70,380</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>59,328</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>60,707</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>58,067</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>57,225</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>56,225</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>55,825</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>55,149</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>55,766</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>55,207</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>54,691</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19,470</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>51,833</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>51,533</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>50,949</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18,375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data compiled by the USES and WMC from individual employer reports, ES-270.
b) Data not available.

Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, United States Employment Service and War Manpower Commission in Ohio, RS Tables 270.2, 270.E, and 270.L.
the war and war work make increasing demands upon men's time and attention. Early in January, 1943, the county's first woman deputy sheriff was appointed. By February, the number of women in manufacturing had doubled over the figure two years earlier and the proportion in essential employment had doubled over the figure only one year earlier. (Table 7.3) A local railroad at this time was employing about 200 rugged women in its yards and maintenance departments.

Shortly after the Columbus War Manpower Area was established in December, 1942, its director declared that industry must make positive efforts to recruit, hire, and train women for war work. Managements were advised immediately to analyze all occupations in their plants, to determine the types of work women could do, and to take steps to prepare their plants for the maximum employment of women. At the same time, USES abandoned the practice of stating expected manpower needs in terms of the aggregate number of persons by beginning to distinguish between male needs and female needs.

The new aircraft plant set the area vogue in the employment of women. Other manufacturing establishments were at first reluctant to hire women, but the reality of male shortages forced them to change hiring specifications. The lowering of specifications to permit employment of women in jobs generally done by men increased noticeably in the Summer of 1943 after stabilization controls were introduced, a development that probably reflects the intensified efforts of employ-

7. Pickups, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, October 15, 1942.
9. Ibid., December 20, 1942.
ment service contact men to promote the hiring of women. However, the area director declared that some employers were still as "fussy as the late Flo Ziegfield" in hiring women and that the door to their hiring was far from "invitingly open." But USES was making progress, for during May it placed women in a large number of traditionally male and heavy-duty occupations. Thus women were placed as auto mechanics, taxi and truck drivers, plant guards, heavy equipment assemblers, welders, packing house workers, laborers in manufacturing plants, and machine operators.

Throughout the first half of 1943 the area was able to meet the manpower demand without engaging in intensified recruiting work. USES sought to encourage women into war work by statements to the press and through its regular job opportunities radio program. It also instituted a second short weekly broadcast honoring a woman war worker in the area. But by the end of the summer, particularly as high school students who had taken temporary jobs, returned to school, USES found it necessary actively and systematically to recruit women. The result was a women's recruitment campaign during the last three weeks of September. It was conducted by means of newspaper publicity, radio appeals, theater publicity, and speakers' appeals to community and civic organizations, church groups, and clubs. Simultaneous national WMC promotion of female employment augmented local efforts. The response was felt to be gratifying, as the number of women contacting USES during the three-week period doubled to 4,000. Approximately

10. Ibid., May 9, 1943.
11. Idem.
3,700 were referred to jobs and over 2,000 were verified as hires.\textsuperscript{12}

As part of the drive, a Women's Recruitment Committee of the local US33 office conducted a survey of the need for women workers in the area. Over a thousand employers were contacted to obtain estimates of the number of women that might be employed. Not only essential industries, but such distressed less essential industries as restaurants, laundries, dry cleaning establishments, and other service industries were contacted. In cooperation with the campaign the Central Ohio Guidance Association established and operated a Community Guidance Center on the main floor of the city's largest department store, where it disseminated job information to women.

Between the end of July, 1943, and the end of November, 1943, the proportion of women in Columbus Area essential industries increased from 29.7 to 34.6 percent. In December US33 contemplated another women's recruitment campaign, but by then the number that were voluntarily making themselves available exceeded the demand.

Over 40,000 Franklin County women were actively employed in 1940. They represented about 28 percent of the employed labor force. The proportion of women in manufacturing was approximately 25 percent. On the basis of returns from questionnaires sent out in connection with the ceiling program in July, 1944, approximately 45 percent of the persons employed in the county were estimated to have been women.\textsuperscript{13} That is, nearly 90,000 women, 50,000 more than in 1940, were in active

\textsuperscript{12} Columbus Labor Market Report, US33, September, 1943.
\textsuperscript{13} Idem.
paid employment. On the basis of Department of Industrial Relations figures over 27,000 of these were engaged in manufacturing, compared with 8,000 in 1940. Of the 1940 number, 6,000 were factory wage earners and the rest were office workers. By the Summer of 1944 the number of female factory wage earners had increased to over 17,000. The proportion of women in essential activities increased from approximately 12 percent in May, 1942, to over 27 percent in May, 1943, and to 36 percent in May, 1944. By the Fall of 1944 it was over 38 percent, and dropped to between 35 and 37 percent for the remaining months of the war. (Table 7,3)

On the basis of the above data it would appear that 54,000 of the county's 90,000 employed women in 1944 were in less essential employment and 36,000 were in essential employment. Of the 36,000, 27,000 were in manufacturing and 9,000 in non-manufacturing. Half of the latter were working in the local armed services depot.14

In July, 1943, USES reported that of the over 5,000 women expected to be hired by local establishments within the next three to four months, over four-fifths would be absorbed by the new aircraft company. This company established the pace and vogue of female hiring in the area. It accounted for 85 percent of aircraft employment in the county, and aircraft employment accounted, in August of 1944, for over 36 percent of all manufacturing employment in the county. A year earlier it had accounted for over 40 percent. Table 7,4 shows the impact of the aircraft industry on area employment. It will be noted that in

14. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, July 11, 1944.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of work and sex</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled and computed from unpublished IBH worksheets at the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Statistics, Columbus, Ohio.
February, 1942, it had only about 12 percent of all manufacturing workers in the county, and only 3.5 percent of female wage earners in county manufacturing establishments. But by August of 1942, nearly 31 percent, or 8,500 of the 27,500 women in manufacturing, were in aircraft, and nearly all of them in the same plant. And of the 17,600 female wage earners in county factories, 7,300 were in aircraft.

But the company's record as a pace-setter was not entirely clean, for in many ways it also impeded the more widespread entry of women into the labor force. Thus it had extremely high selection standards, an entry wage rate for women of 50 cents an hour, and recruitment and hiring practices that often had the effect of discouraging women from seeking work elsewhere after being turned down there. For example, the company engaged in continuous and extensive advertising for women workers. But on many occasions, women applicants were simply advised that "We're not hiring today." Many women were turned down without being given reasonable and sympathetic explanations of the bases for their not qualifying, and others were kept waiting for many long hours before even receiving an application, and were then told to mail them in. News of these practices circulated quickly through the efficient grapevine of job seekers. It discouraged people who had been seeking or might have sought their first industrial job, and threw considerable doubt on the actual existence of a labor shortage, in spite of urgent advertisements and USES pleas for more manpower.

In the early stages of the war USES was obliged to engage in active
recruitment of women for war work. Later its problem changed to that of finding jobs for an abundant supply of women. This suggests that once women became informed about the availability of jobs for them and that once widespread social approval of working mothers and working wives was forthcoming, this group readily made itself available for work.

Many area manufacturing establishments changed the nature of individual jobs and reorganized production processes so as to enable women to perform jobs formerly done by men. Still, however, there is ample indication that much more might have been done along this line, particularly in view of the fact that two plants alone employed nearly 40 percent of all women engaged in manufacturing employments in the area.15 On the other hand, the reluctance of employers to hire women in greater numbers was in some respects understandable. For example, they were more vulnerable to illness than male workers, and were apparently responsible for a great deal of absenteeism if required to work on Saturdays or in excess of 48 hours per week. Women who had never before been in industrial employment, and particularly those accustomed to the undisciplined routine of housework, had some difficulty in adjusting to the more rigorous requirements of factory production and as the result often left their jobs after only a few days of work. And finally, in view of the relative adequacy of the existing labor supply there was no need for employers to attempt further to modify their

15. The roller bearing manufacturing company had 1,700 women out of a total employment of 4,600 in the Summer of 1944. (Columbus Labor Market Report, USSS, August, 1944.) The aircraft plant's proportion of women workers has already been noted.
production processes in order to accommodate women workers.

To the extent that women were hired, they were actively discriminated against in respect to wages and promotions. Throughout the entire war female entry wage rates were an average of five cents below male entry rates in every Columbus industry.16 Men appeared to be somewhat hostile to the idea of women taking jobs in the same departments, and particularly to their competing for upgrading and promotions. Unions generally played a passive role in this respect, neither encouraging nor discouraging the employment of women, and neither fostering nor deploiring such hostility. USES, on the other hand, conducted no campaign to mitigate hostility of this kind. Such a campaign might have been of an educational nature, or it might have consisted of promoting the reservation of certain occupations exclusively for women. The latter was suggested locally, but both management and union representatives on the Management-Labor Committee objected that this would infringe upon the internal affairs of management. The fear was expressed that the result of such action might be that both employers and workers would withdraw their cooperation from the stabilization program.

There is evidence that substantial numbers of the women who poured into manufacturing employments in 1943 did not represent new additions to the labor force. To a considerable extent, women shifted from non-manufacturing into manufacturing employments, and were replaced in the nonmanufacturing industries by other groups of women who were entering

or re-entering the labor market. 17

Indications are also that the women who actively entered the labor force were for the most part restricted to those from working class families. Indeed, almost all recruitment publicity was directed towards them, and women's organizations and clubs, typically composed of women from proprietary, professional, and managerial families, appear to have done virtually nothing by way of promoting the idea of women in war work. Veblen's famous characterization of the leisure class as considering itself exempt from industrial employments has an analogy in the wartime promotional activities of women's clubs. During the entire three-week "womanpower" recruitment campaign, for example, there was not a single indication in the society pages of the city's largest newspaper that such a recruitment campaign was in progress. Women's clubs were primarily concerned with such activities as art, hobbies, citizenship, beautification, drama, literature, music, and child conservation. Club activities most nearly approximating awareness of the existence of war were those promoting the Red Cross, supporting war bond drives, and collecting money to buy magazines for USO clubs. Employment of women in war jobs was featured only once during the entire war in the society pages of the newspaper in question, 18 and this appears to have been at the initiative of the newspaper rather than the women's clubs themselves. As far as can be discerned, the clubs did nothing to promote war work among their members. Although women's organizations held a conference on "The Problems of Industry,

17. Parnes, Herbert S., op. cit., Chapter 3.
18. Columbus Dispatch, July 28, 1943.
Labor, and Government" in October, 1942, at which a number of authorities spoke about expected war problems, no concrete policies or plans emerged. The women's organizations did nothing more than reap each other's compliments about having organized a fine meeting.

Insofar as the role of newspapers in encouraging women into the labor market and in promoting the employment of women was concerned, somewhat better judgment might have helped. News admittedly is news, but when in the midst of a desperate war effort a newspaper prominently publicizes the comment of an obscure U. S. Congressman that "War or no war, woman's place is in the home—a working wife is a menace to the community", it would appear either to be displaying gross stupidity or consciously sabotaging the war effort. Yet this is exactly what was done.19

During the manpower recruitment campaign in 1943 a Womanpower Advisory Board was organized to work in cooperation with the Area WMC. Board members included representatives of labor, management, governmental establishments, minority groups, community organizations, and USES. The Board was to advise WMC about recruitment of women, and about problems arising out of the increased number of women in industry. It had several luncheon meetings and generally discussed the types of programs that should be prepared in the event that more women would be needed and in the event that community problems arising out of the greater employment of women became more difficult. However, nothing of a tangible, operational nature was ever done by the group.

19, ibid., May 16, 1943.
largely because neither the Board nor WMC felt the need for it.

Willingness to employ women does not follow automatically as male workers become scarce. During the war, some employers were more imaginative and pioneering than others in respect to making places for women workers. For example, the new manufacturing establishments with younger managements tended to hire more women sooner than other plants and managements.

The supply of womanpower appears to have been very elastic, responding pretty much to the volume of job opportunities, and particularly to certain job opportunities. New and cleaner firms tended to attract applicants more easily than others. For example, despite the comparatively low entry wage rate in the new aircraft plant, indications are that women applied for jobs there without ever applying at older, less clean, though better paying plants. If they were turned down, or disappointed with their job experiences in this plant, they simply withdrew from the labor market entirely.

The record of women’s participation in the wartime labor market in the Columbus Area has implications with respect to the efficacy of patriotic appeals in inducing women to take jobs. Although it is not known exactly how effective these appeals were, the evidence presented above makes it obvious that if they were effective they had more pronounced effects on women from working class families than upon those from the middle and upper classes. This does not mean that the former group was more patriotic than the latter, but rather that the differ-
ences between the traditions and cultures of these two groups made the manifestation of their patriotism different. In view of the evidence, two hypotheses can be suggested with respect to the importance of the patriotic motive. The first of these is that it was extremely important in eliciting the labor force participation of those groups of women whose customary mode of life and attitudes did not prevent this kind of response. The other hypothesis is that the patriotic appeal was not particularly effective at all, and that the wholesale entrance of working class women into the labor market was simply indicative of what would have happened, war or no war, in the presence of unlimited job opportunities. In view of the failure of the patriotic factor to obtain certain stabilization aims, it is probably reasonable to conclude that the latter hypothesis is more tenable.

C. Employment of Other Fringe Groups.

Persons who, because of particular distinguishing characteristics, do not typically have as easy access to the available supply of jobs as persons without such characteristics, are on the margin, or fringe, of the labor force. As has been shown, persons in minority racial groups, women, and recent immigrants, were unable to find work as easily as most other applicants, and to the extent that they did find work were often discriminated against in respect to the types of jobs available to them and the wages they received. Some other fringe groups are older persons, younger persons, physically handicapped persons, persons with little or no education, and persons available only for
part-time employment. The present section reviews and analyzes the experiences of these groups in the Columbus Area during World War II.

It has been pointed out that as the war progressed and as the traditional sources of manpower yielded increasingly fewer workers, employers relaxed hiring standards and hired persons from among the normally less satisfactory applicants. In addition to women, both older and younger people tended to find jobs more easily during the war than before the war. 20

In the Spring of 1942 the Columbus Usrs office and the local Civil Service Commission inaugurated a policy of sending representatives to area colleges and high schools to encourage graduates and vacationing students to take jobs in local industries. In the meanwhile, most local high school principals individually arranged class schedules so that students might conveniently be dismissed during the last hour of the school day to take jobs. The Management-Labor Committee considered a recommendation seeking the cooperation of the Columbus Superintendent of Schools in permitting high school youths to arrange their school schedules so as to enable them to accept part-time employment. The Committee decided not to make such a recommendation, however, as several labor representatives expressed the view that high wages earned by school-age workers were contributing to serious delinquency problems in certain sections of the city. 21

21. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, September 5, 1944.
Table 7-5

School Enrollment in Grades 7 Through 12 in All Franklin County Schools, and First Work Permits Issued, by Type of Permit and Sex of Recipient, Annually, 1940-45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(a)</th>
<th>Enrollment(b)</th>
<th>Number of permits issued</th>
<th>Type of permit</th>
<th>Permits as percentage of enrollment</th>
<th>Percentage dist. (Total permits=100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Regular(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940(e)</td>
<td>26324</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941(e)</td>
<td>25761</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942(e)</td>
<td>24766</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>23827</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>24039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>23428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Years refer to school years starting in September.
b) The City of Columbus schools and all private and parochial schools enrollment data refer to students in the seventh grade or higher. The Franklin County component of the total school enrollment is made up of students 14 years of age or older.
c) Issued to students 16 and 17 years old who left school for full-time work.
d) Issued to students 14 through 17 years old for after school work or vacation jobs.
e) Does not include National Youth Administration workers.

Source: Data on work permits from rosters of the offices of the boards of education of the City of Columbus and Franklin County, Ohio. Enrollment figures for public schools in the City of Columbus and in Franklin County were taken directly from the respective boards of education. Enrollment data for private and parochial schools were obtained from records of the Ohio Department of Education. The data were collected by Sanford Cohen in The Problem of Estimating Manpower Resources in a Local Labor Market mimeographed, Ohio State University, Columbus, O., 1951.
Still, however, the number of school-age youths taking part-time or regular jobs increased phenomenally during the war years. Under Ohio law, work permits issued by the local superintendent of schools must be on file on the premises where any child under 18 years of age is employed. In May, 1943, certain restrictions on the number of hours and days per week school-age minors were permitted to work were relaxed in an emergency effort to increase the volume of manpower available from this source. The changes were not of a substantial nature, although the hours extensions probably enabled the hiring of certain minors for work on long shifts for which they were previously ineligible. At any rate, the number of work permits granted in Franklin County increased from nearly 1,800 in 1940 to over 10,000 in 1943. The largest increases came in the years 1942-1943 and 1943-1944 (Table 7.5), when the relaxation of hiring restrictions on minors went into effect. The proportion of permits to total county enrollment in the seventh grade and above increased from 6.7 percent in 1940 to 10.4 in 1941, 11.0 in 1942, 42.5 in 1943, dipped to 40.8 in 1944, and dropped to 20 percent in 1945. Throughout these years male students obtained between 57 and 65 percent of the permits, except in 1943 when they got over 77 percent, a change that probably reflects the impact of the relaxed law, according to which all restrictions on the number of hours boys 16 and 17 years of age might work were suspended.

These data suggest that students became an important source of manpower when other, generally more satisfactory labor was in short supply. A detailed examination of the industries in which school-age
Table 7.5

First Work Permits Issued to Students 14 to 17 Years of Age, by Industry Group, Type of Permit, and Sex, Franklin County, Ohio, 1940-45(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry group</th>
<th>1940 (a)</th>
<th>1941 (b)</th>
<th>1942 (c)</th>
<th>1943 (d)</th>
<th>1944 (e)</th>
<th>1945 (f)</th>
<th>Total, 6 year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, &amp; fishing</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1397</td>
<td>12109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>3440</td>
<td>3334</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>13160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, communication, and public utilities</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>3819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal,domestic, recreational, &amp; business services</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>5879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>2697</td>
<td>7685</td>
<td>10147</td>
<td>9206</td>
<td>4717</td>
<td>36028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage distribution, vertical = 100 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry group</th>
<th>1940 (a)</th>
<th>1941 (b)</th>
<th>1942 (c)</th>
<th>1943 (d)</th>
<th>1944 (e)</th>
<th>1945 (f)</th>
<th>Total, 6 year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, &amp; fishing</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, communication, and public utilities</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal,domestic, recreational, &amp; business services</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Years refer to school years starting in September. b) Does not include NIA workers. c) Issued to student 16 and 17 years old who left school for full-time work. d) Issued to students 14 through 17 years old for after school work or vacation jobs.

Source: Fosters, offices of the boards of education of the City of Columbus and Franklin County, Ohio. The data were collected by Sanford Cohen in the Problem of Estimating Manpower Resources in a Local Labor Market, microphotographed, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1951.
minors were employed reveals more graphically how the pattern of man-
power needs was expressed in the employment of this resource. Between
1940 and 1944 there was a decided increase in the proportion of certifi-
cates granted for employment in manufacturing. The proportion going
to retail and wholesale trade remained relatively constant, while the
proportion going to other industries dropped sharply. (Table 7.6) As
might have been expected, the largest single proportion of permits
given to boys during the war, 42 percent, was for manufacturing jobs.
Among girls, on the other hand, 48 percent went into wholesale and
retail trade. About 17 percent of the girls went into manufacturing
and 29 percent of the boys into trade.

Over two-fifths of the permits were for regular full-time jobs,
the remainder being for part-time or vacation jobs. Regular permits
were given only to 16- and 17-year-olds who left school for full-time
employment. Nearly 70 percent of the manufacturing permits were of
this kind, compared with less than half of the permits for wholesale
and retail trade. Thus, while the largest single proportion of per-
mits issued during the period was for jobs in the latter industry,
the largest single proportion of full-time permits was for manufactur-
ing jobs. This suggests that manufacturing concerns were either less
able or less inclined to hire part-time youths than were retail concerns.

USES repeatedly reported a surplus of applicants for part-time
jobs over the demand for part-time workers. Its efforts to promote
the employment of part-time labor in the larger industrial plants were
generally unsuccessful. Several firms actually attempted to operate
Table 7.7

Employment of Part-Time Workers as Percentage of Total Employment in Selected Essential Establishments, Columbus, Ohio, Area, Nov. 1944 to July 1945(a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of reporting firms</th>
<th>Total employment</th>
<th>Part-time workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51246</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71751</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72942</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70380</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59328</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60707</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58867</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57225</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56225</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55025</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55149</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55446</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55207</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51691</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51153</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51533</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50949</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Data compiled by WMC from individual employer reports, ES 270.
Source: Compiled and computed from Reports and Analysis, War Manpower Commission in Ohio, RS Tables 270.E, 270.N, RS 270.L.
four-hour shifts but discovered that such split shifts posed too great a problem in the coordination and flow of production. The armed services depots successfully operated such shifts for a short period, however, although the type of work and the operating problems were considerably different from those in industrial establishments.

An examination of employment in 33 large Columbus Area establishments accounting for 60 percent of essential employment reveals that an average of less than one-half percent of total employment consisted of part-time workers. (Table 7.7) In the second half of 1944 and in early 1945 this amounted to less than 200 persons. This is about 700 short of the number of permits granted to high school students for part-time employment in manufacturing during that period. (Table 7.6) Assuming that the part-time workers in the sample firms were primarily high school students, this suggests that most of the students who held part-time jobs in manufacturing establishments worked in small plants. This supports the observations of several local school officials that smaller manufacturing establishments with more limited access to the labor supply hired the bulk of part-time student manufacturing workers.

While available data are not differentiated as to part-time or full-time, or on-campus or off-campus employment, job placements through the student employment office at The Ohio State University doubled from 11 percent of total enrollment in 1941-1942 to over 22 percent of enrollment the following year, and remained at approximately 20 percent for the duration of the war. Significantly the proportion of women placements to women enrollment reached a high of 33 percent as
compared with a high of 19 percent for men, a fact that probably reflects greater war-time study loads of male students operating on accelerated study plans.\(^{22}\) Although these data do not indicate the types of employment in which students were engaged, many worked in essential jobs. Thus, for example, medical students worked on police and fire department emergency trucks, and, during a nine-month period, about 70 coeds took a chartered bus daily to a nearby armed services depot to work alternating four-hour shifts. The same depot also employed over 500 high school students in the Spring and Summer of 1943; employed older women in early evening shifts for clerical work, and at one time hired part-time women welders.

Records on the extent of war-time employment of physically handicapped persons in the Columbus Area were not kept. However, as early as 1942 USIS urged employers to give them greater consideration in hiring, and from time to time the Chamber of Commerce announced their availability and suggested types of jobs for which persons with particular kinds of handicaps were suited. At the same time the Council of Social Agencies, through its affiliated organizations, sought to promote the hiring of handicapped persons, and representatives from the State Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation visited employers in efforts to obtain placements for the handicapped.

Under Ohio law, the State Industrial Commission, which administers the Workmen’s Compensation law, is required to send all employable and

\(^{22}\) From the files of the Student Financial Aids Office, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
rehabilitable persons under its jurisdiction to the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation. This bureau counsels, trains, equips, and attempts to obtain jobs for them. In addition to those who have become disabled because of industrial accidents and thus are sent to the Bureau by the Industrial Commission, all other disabled persons, with the exception of veterans, and, since 1943, the blind, may use the Bureau's services. During the six-year period from 1940 through 1945 the Bureau was considerably more successful in placing the handicapped than it was in the pre-war years, particularly in placing them in industrial plants. While successful placement of the disabled continued to require a selling job, war-time shortages considerably softened employers' sales resistance. But the actual extent is not definitely known. The Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation has available only the war-time records of places for whom specialized training or help-work appliances were provided. During the period 403 such persons were placed in Columbus Area industry, 43 in personal services, 16 in the professions, 37 in government bureaus, and 23 became self-employed.23

During the same period the number of jobs for physically handicapped persons in the Goodwill Industries doubled to over 200, when a local employer sub-contracted a parts-sorting project to it, 24

Both the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation and USDS encountered more than normal difficulty in placing the physically handicapped because employers misunderstood certain provisions of the Ohio Workmen's

23. From the files of the Ohio Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation, Columbus, Ohio.
24. From the files of the Goodwill Industries, Columbus, Ohio.
Compensation law. Many, for example, erroneously feared that they would assume a double risk by hiring disabled persons: first, they felt that in the event of a second injury they would be held liable for the combined effects of both injuries, and second, they feared that the merit rating system would raise the insurance rates on all employees if handicapped persons were hired. Under Ohio law, however, unlike that of a large number of other states, at that time, employers were held responsible only for the normal cost of an accident, with the added cost of the cumulative effects of a second injury or additional disablement being borne by the Commission's surplus fund. This was a fortunate feature of the law. It enabled Ohio placement counselors to meet employer objections that counselors in many other states were unable to meet.

Suggestions that prisoners of war, or foreign laborers imported for work on nearby farms during the summer months, be employed in local industries were met with considerable hostility on the part of labor members of the Management-Labor Committee. Objections by management members generally took the form of expressing doubt that prisoners could be properly assimilated into the plants. But prisoners were employed at the armed services depot, and only the absence of adequate housing prevented the employment of several hundred available Jamaican laborers.

The experiences described in the chapter again illustrate the
flexibility of the labor supply and the existence of sources of man-
power that are not generally taken into consideration in estimating
these resources. They further show that the supply is to a consider-
able extent a function of demand, and of the nature of employer hiring
policies. Moreover, they demonstrate that the supply of manpower is
not an independent quantum free from problems of technical plant organ-
ization, institutional pressures, and broadly social considerations.
Thus part-time labor, and certain "inferior" grades of labor, though
available, may not be readily usable; prejudices and vested group
interests may impede the use of some types of manpower, and the practi-
cal requirements of law and order may demand that the use of certain
potential types of labor be avoided.

USES sought to improve the utilization of minority and of fringe
groups, particularly in manufacturing. But it was not well organized
to perform most of the jobs incident to this function, particularly
in view of the conditions of wartime haste under which USES was required
to operate. Actually, the job USES was asked to do along these lines
requires much patient work of long duration. However, it would appear
that a much improved job of utilizing these groups might still have
been done. Under more pressing circumstances intensified use of all
available manpower might have taken the form of reserving certain occupa-
tions for young and old people and for women; having certain plant
departments staffed only by young, old, or handicapped people or by
women; having high school home economics and shop classes work on actual
war projects, and even substantially shortening the hours of school.
CHAPTER 8
SOME INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE MANPOWER PROGRAM

One of the chief aims of this study has been to examine the way in which such factors as business, industry, and union pressures, the structure and operation of government agencies, community norms, and personal prejudices affected the manpower program. Their impact has been highlighted throughout the analysis. The present chapter is devoted to a further examination of certain of these institutional factors, particularly union and management policies and practices, community problems and efforts, protective legislation, and Selective Service policies and practices.

A. Union and Management Policies and Practices.

As the foregoing analysis has shown, the policies and practices of unions and of employers were factors in the success or failure of mobilization, stabilization, and utilization measures. Many of these policies and practices have already been noted. The present section summarizes and adds to these, with particular emphasis on the attitudes of representatives of the two groups to various manpower measures.

a. Unions. The wartime national growth in the membership of organized labor was reflected in similar growth in the Columbus Area. During 1942 alone membership in the Columbus Congress of Industrial Organizations increased 300 percent and membership in the Columbus Federation of
Labor doubled.\textsuperscript{1} As the result, unions became a more important community force during the war, and their power to influence people and affect local WMC measures and programs increased proportionately.

The aim of union is to obtain collectively what is difficult to obtain individually. The ultimate strength of union lies in united action and capacity to force a showdown. Between January, 1942, and August, 1945, there were 32 work stoppages in Columbus establishments, 24 in essential employments and eight in less essential employments. Most of these were of short duration, lasting anywhere from one hour to three days. The longest lasted a month, and it involved refusal of tractor-owning farm workers to render their services at the prevailing rates. The next longest lasted three weeks, and involved beer truck drivers. The longest stoppage in essential industry lasted a week. Two of the stoppages, in the steel industry and in the telephone communications industry, were part of national disputes, and four of the stoppages occurred in the same plant at different times.\textsuperscript{2}

After wage controls came effective, few stoppages were over wage questions. Most dealt with on-the-job grievances like working conditions, alleged anti-union discrimination, and insufficient material which reduced workers' capacity to maintain or increase their incentive wages. A number of stoppages were demonstrations against delays in wage adjustment applications pending before WLB. This, of course, was no way

\textsuperscript{1}\textbf{Columbus Dispatch}, December 20, 1942.
\textsuperscript{2} Complete and accurate records of area work stoppages were not kept. I have compiled the above record from local newspaper reports during the war period.
to stimulate WLB action, and union officials knew it. However such stoppages appear to have been unofficial and wildcat. But to some extent both labor and management officials were to blame for them since they both continuously publicized the fact that applications were pending, each doing so as a means of obtaining the support, loyalty, and confidence of the workers.

The War Production Board's labor representative in the Columbus Area was the government agent working most closely with local employers and unions in efforts to promote production through better management-labor relations and practices. Like all field representatives of the Board's Labor Production Division, he was a former labor union official. His job was to assist in the prevention and settlement of work stoppages; keep WPB and WMC currently advised on the thinking of labor in matters related to the production and manpower programs; aid in the establishment and servicing of joint in-plant Labor-Management Production Drive Committees; aid in the execution of programs designed to stimulate production in war plants, and obtain full cooperation of labor groups in the solution of labor production problems.

His most effective work in the Columbus Area was preventing and helping settle work stoppages. He served as a mediator who was on tap at all times, who got to know and be trusted by both labor leaders and management officials. In some ways he was better informed about the management-labor problems in particular plants than the presidents of the locals with bargaining jurisdiction in these plants because management officials confided in him but not in the local presidents. Some-
times he knew about disputes before the business agents of the unions involved. For example, he once called a business agent to ask why a walkout had occurred at a certain plant, only to discover that the latter was unaware of the walkout.

The program in connection with which he spent the most time and was least successful was the establishment of in-plant Labor-Management Production Drive Committees. These committees were to provide for consultation between management and labor respecting ways to increase production. However, there was considerable reluctance on the part of employers to cooperate in establishing them because of fear that they would either become the nuclei for union organizations or outlets for union complaints and grievances. Many of the larger firms finally established the committees only to find their suspicions verified. As the result the managements withdrew their cooperation and the committees soon petered out.

Local union efforts designed to promote more effective manpower stabilization were, for the most part, few and half-hearted. In May, 1942, a Columbus CIO-AFL Unity Committee was organized, symbolizing their determination to direct their efforts toward maximum war production. They cooperated in promoting local rent control, the erection of more low-cost, low-rent houses, and bettering public transportation facilities. With respect to the manpower stabilization plans, they helped publicize anti-turnover and anti-absenteeism drives, strongly supported the establishment of in-plant Labor-Management Production
Drive Committees, and publicized provisions of stabilization controls. They were reluctant, however, to undertake direct action to reduce turnover and absenteeism, primarily because, as has been noted, they feared antagonizing their members by making the same speeches that the managements they were generally criticizing were making.

Their record on efforts to reduce discriminatory hiring and employment practices leaves much to be desired. Craft unions retained their traditional discrimination patterns, and industrial unions approached the problem with considerable reluctance. If it had not been for Negro members of the industrial unions themselves, it is unlikely that such anti-discrimination efforts as were made would have been undertaken. There appeared to be no enthusiastic local sentiment among unions to promote the integration of Negroes into industrial jobs, and where conflicts between workers resulted from attempted integration, unions generally avoided getting embroiled.

Nor did they back the manpower utilization program, apparently because of their traditional function of protecting the members from overwork.

On the whole, the program making certain unions the referral agents within their respective crafts operated surprisingly well, although it was not adequately supervised and certain of its conditions were not properly enforced. Hence, for example, the union business agents who were theoretically required to submit weekly reports of their referral activities never submitted them, and to that extent their operations were not well supervised. Through these referral powers, certain craft
unions representing most of the workers in their trades were in a strong position to enforce their intentions on employers dependent upon them for manpower. On one occasion, for example, although the supply of truck drivers appeared then to be ample, an employer at odds with the union was unable to obtain drivers because the business agent refused to make referrals unless the company capitulated on the disputed point.

From the administrative point of view, the most perplexing features of the stabilization program were the provisions pertaining to provoked discharges, provoked quits, negotiated transfers, and work furloughs. It was always difficult to establish that a discharge or a quit was provoked. In such cases Management-Labor Committee members visited the establishments involved and sought to obtain a settlement without the case having to be ruled upon by the Committee. Such cases were likely to cause unpleasant differences among Committee members.

The most difficult cases were those in which unions, operating under a union shop agreement, or a variant thereof, insisted upon the discharge of an employee to whom the company refused to issue a statement of availability. On several such occasions WMC officials sought to obtain a settlement by negotiating with both union and management. Unions generally refused to relent, even where the contracts did not give them the power to insist upon such discharges. In one case the union maintained that the persons involved were continuous troublemakers, benefited from union struggles, but refused to join the union. The union threatened a work stoppage unless the accused workers were discharged. The company discharged them without statements of availability and re-
fused to grant them despite WMC urgings that they do so. The Committee heard the case and sought, again unsuccessfully, to obtain a settlement. To avoid trouble, the area director finally advised USES to grant statements, even though the Labor-Management Committee had not ruled on the case. Alleged provoked quits generally resulted in similar dispositions.

Union members of the Committee were opposed to any form of negotiated transfer or furlough program which would deprive the worker of an opportunity to maintain or increase his weekly wages. On the other hand, in individual appeals cases of workers seeking to transfer to higher paying jobs, union representatives were more statesmanlike, acting strictly on the merits of the appeals. But another reason for union opposition to negotiated transfers and furloughs was that they tended to conflict with provisions of existing contracts relating to promotions and seniority. Indeed, union members were joined by management in their insistence that no provision of any stabilization plan should supersede a labor-management contract. On one occasion a management representative actually threatened to resign from the Committee if this principle were not obeyed.

Union members also had objections to the use of foreign labor in the area. They successfully prevented the use of prisoners of war in local foundries, although they were unsuccessful in preventing their use in armed forces installations. They also opposed the use in local plants of Jamaican laborers who had worked on area farms the preceding summer. And they sought to protect local job seekers from devious pressures designed to channel them into jobs they did not want. Thus
they objected to a proposal to bring wounded, uniformed veterans into the USES office to talk to applicants about taking certain jobs that needed badly to be filled.

It cannot be said that as individual organizations or as an organized group labor unions did much to promote the success of the manpower stabilization program. However, they were not unusually disruptive of war production, despite work stoppages. To some extent such stoppages were obviously the unorganized expression of worker frustrations in the face of war restrictions and controls on their capacity to change jobs and obtain wage increases. One local union official told WFB's Labor Representative that many workers would have quit their jobs in the plant that had four of the 32 stoppages if it had not been for stabilization controls. Another official said that some of the stoppages were provoked by managements that were "out to get their pound of flesh" while the no-strike pledge was on.

Unions had certain legitimate grievances that to some extent cooled them on stabilization controls. For example, when the area director proposed a "clinical approach" to the solution of production problems in certain plants, union representatives were excluded from the program on the ground that production information could not be divulged to them. Similarly they continuously complained that they were not being adequately informed about proposed production changes, layoffs, and job changes, and that if they were not taken into the confidence of

3. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, January 2, 1945.
management on these matters they could not support management efforts to increase production and remove impediments to production.

Unions perform certain institutional functions that they found hard to relinquish during the war. For example, it was difficult for them to ask their members to sacrifice higher-paying jobs for jobs that were more crucial to the war effort. For that reason they were reluctant to back measures that would impede workers in their quest for higher-paying jobs. For similar reasons they were disinclined to promote utilization studies which might result in their members doing more work for the same pay. Because union officials are elected to office, they cannot easily take statesmanlike positions on questions of this kind. Statesmanship is a luxury, generally available only to leaders who have perfectly reasonable and selfless followings, who are in unchallenged positions of power, who are able to conceal their actions, or who are indifferent as to whether they retain power. On the whole, however, former management members of the Committee agree that union members displayed considerable restraint, good judgment, and fairness in their Committee work.

b. Management. Employers occupied a more strategic place in the stabilization program than unions, and for that reason were in a more direct position to influence its operation. It has been pointed out that on the whole they cooperated excellently with its main features. It has also been noted that in some respects their efforts left something to be desired. These included practices dealing with the hiring
and employment of Negroes, women, and part-time workers, training of
less skilled and unskilled workers, and utilizing better production
and personnel methods.

Considerably more might have been done by way of reducing turnover
and absenteeism. In-plant committees, even if they degenerated into
labor-management struggles, might at least have been retained as a
means of spotlighting the nature of existing grievances. The fact
that the committees appeared to work in several plants suggests that
they might have worked in others if they had been given the opportunity.

One company had 34 plant counselors who counseled employees on any
matter that was raised. In that way they obviated problems that might
have led to production difficulties. Another plant had numerous plant
committees in which workers actively participated, thus giving them
an added stake in daily attendance and in remaining in the employ of
the company.

Some employers, in their eagerness to obtain the services of
applicants, appeared to misrepresent the nature of the proposed jobs,
so that the Management-Labor Committee was faced with a number of re-
quests for statements of availability on grounds that jobs were mis-
represented to them. It appears that recent immigrants were most often
duped into misrepresented jobs.

Employers' exaggerations of the extent of their current manpower
shortages and their future manpower needs were widespread and often
obscured the real nature of local needs. This exaggeration appeared
in advertisements for manpower as well as in reports to USES. In respect
to advertising it had particularly adverse effects, since applicants for advertised jobs which failed to materialize sometimes became disappointed and left the labor market. Thus, as early as 1941, the new aircraft plant ran a series of huge manpower ads in most of the newspapers in the area. Over 8,000 applicants appeared from within a radius of 50 miles within two days after the first ad appeared. They were not even interviewed, but simply handed applications and told to mail them back. Only two or three hundred were hired. This happened several times during the war, and many firms, because of discriminatory or poor personnel practices, inflicted similar disappointments on applicants who had answered ads that appeared daily in the local press. This, coupled with verified stories of mass idleness of workers in some plants, resulted in the feeling that there really was no manpower shortage, with the further consequence that people lost interest in the war production effort, and many who might have made themselves available for work, or who had been available for work, decided not to take jobs after all.

In the Management-Labor Committee, management representatives like the labor representatives, expressed the interests of their group and exhibited institutional biases. Their concern about the alleged impracticality of the negotiated transfer and furlough program was as great as that of union representatives, and they were as much responsible for the difficulty of dealing with the matter of provoked discharges and provoked quits as were union representatives. And again, like union representatives, one of their greatest concerns was with the
referral program. Employer representatives were generally suspicious of, and somewhat hostile to, suggested programs that infringed upon the freedom of employers to hire and fire as they chose, with the result that they insisted on long analyses and discussion of proposed new measures. These extended discussions, though time consuming, were generally profitable in that they prevented ill-considered measures and resulted in better understanding of the plans ultimately adopted. Occasionally, however, there were purely emotional outbursts, such as the time one management representative told the local press that the priority referral program was "nothing but a compulsory labor draft".4

In certain respects the practices of some employers were destructive of harmonious relations between themselves and organized labor. Distortion of issues, and public accusations that wartime union organizational efforts are treasonable, are certainly not calculated to promote amicable relations between management and labor. Thus during a period when a number of local industries were being organized by industrial unions, a full page ad, including an immense picture of General Douglas MacArthur, appeared in a local newspaper with the following message:5

There's no closed shop on any war front... Soldiers are unsympathetic with the quibbling here at home over the question of wages, of hours workers will give to keep the supply lines flowing, of union demands that the "closed shop" be enforced. Their job is much too big for wages, hours and working policy disputes. Their duty is not limited to eight hours daily—there is no time and one-half for overtime. Let us steer clear of making this a war of "unionism of labor"—for the "closed shop"—for wages that even now are so high as to make us blush.

4. Columbus Dispatch, July 9, 1944.
5. Ibid., June 14, 1942.
with shame when we read the news reports of "production" of another force of workers across the sea whose pay is less than two dollars. Let's thank our lucky stars that we have a good job at home with good pay. ——This message is sponsored by a group of true Americans whose first consideration is victory.

As is shown in the following section, the efforts of employers, as a group, to improve such community facilities as housing, transportation, and child care centers, all of which would probably have increased and stabilized the labor force, were somewhat limited and unimaginative.

c. Conclusions. Considering that the stabilization program was such a pronounced departure from customary labor-management and labor market arrangements, the adjustment that labor and management made to the wartime program was a remarkable achievement. There were, of course, some lapses. Chief among these were with respect to the drive against discrimination and the promotion of better manpower utilization. Union failures in these respects were generally due to personal biases of leaders and to their desire to remain on good terms with their members. Management failures arose from personal biases, too, but also because of a lack of confidence in the usefulness of certain proposals and because of a desire to avoid offending business colleagues.

D. Community Problems and Efforts.

The increased demand for war workers and the consequent increase in the area's wartime population generated certain specific community problems and resulted in various group efforts to resolve them. The
two major problems impinging upon the manpower supply and the effectiveness of the stabilization program were the shortages of housing and transportation facilities. The present section is devoted to a discussion to each of these, as well as of other community activities related to the manpower program.

a. Housing. In spite of military withdrawals of nearly 33,000, the Franklin County population increased from 389,000 in April, 1940, to an estimated 424,000 at the beginning of 1945. Total net immigration for the period appears to have been about 55,000.6

In 1940 Columbus experienced its biggest housing boom since 1929. During the year news of the prospective construction of a new aircraft plant in the area reached the city. The Chamber of Commerce and the local real estate board consulted with company officials about housing facilities, and concluded that the existing supply of houses was sufficient to meet the needs of the 2,500 new workers that the aircraft plant expected to bring into the area during the year.7 At a February, 1941, YMCA roundtable conference on the probable effects of the defense program on housing in the area, suggestions were made that a defense housing project might be necessary.8 However, the real estate board insisted that no such project was needed.9 In May, the Columbus Chamber

6. Military withdrawals were estimated by assuming that Franklin County withdrawals were in the same proportion to national withdrawals as the Franklin County population was to the national population. National withdrawals were approximately 11,400,000 in January, 1945.  
7. Pickups, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, April 3, 1941.  
8. Columbus Dispatch, February 6, 1941.  
9. Pickups, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, April 3, 1941.
of Commerce, in cooperation with the real estate board, the building
and loan league, clearing house association members, the retail mer-
chants organization, and the city administration, opened a Homes Regis-
tration Office where vacancies and requests for any kind of housing
might be listed free of charge. The Chamber reiterated that "an abun-
dance of privately owned property, together with the numerous homes
under construction and planned for the near future, will preclude any
necessity for government defense housing projects here". 10

In April, the Office of Production Management and the National
Housing Agency established a priorities program under which housing
constructed by private capital and intended for military personnel or
defense workers was to be given preferential treatment in obtaining
material. In September, the National Housing Agency outlined a six-
months private building program calling for the construction of 1,500
dwelling units in the Columbus Area to rent at less than $50 monthly
and to sell for $6,000 or less. Contractors building under the pro-
visions of the program were to receive priority treatment. In January
1942, the priority quota was raised to 2,000 dwelling units, in February
to 2,500, and by December to 4,885. Later this quota was reduced by
800 units. 11

In November, 1941, the local director of the National Housing
Agency called for more housing for defense workers and called attention
to the possibility of rehabilitating and expanding existing housing
facilities. At the same time the Chamber of Commerce's Homes Regis-

10. Ibid., May 22, 1941.
11. From the files of the Columbus office, Federal Housing Administration.
tion Office announced the availability of experts to advise homeowners on possible conversion of parts of their homes into living space for defense workers. It also gave advice about the availability of funds for this purpose through the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Both services were provided free of charge.

In March, 1942, the Metropolitan Housing Authority announced that henceforth preferential treatment in the leasing and renting of apartments in local federal housing projects would be given to defense workers in the 17 Columbus plants then engaged in war production. About the same time, a Columbus Fair Rent Committee, with labor, business, and public representation, was organized to exert its influence in preventing rent gouging. The main function of this local committee, however, was superseded by the imposition of federal rent controls in the Columbus Area two months later.

In April, the War Production Board issued an order that virtually banned all non-war building. At the same time surveys by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, the Chamber of Commerce, and the real estate board, indicated that with current building, expected new construction, and current habitable vacancies, local housing needs would be met for the coming year. On the other hand, the State Board of Housing and the CIO revealed separate studies claiming that by the end of the year Columbus would have serious housing shortages unless many more low-cost rental units were made available.12

Meanwhile a War Housing Center, which was a unit of the National

Housing Agency, was established locally to act as a clearing house for rental information. To advise and help it, a Citizens' War Housing Committee, with representatives from government, business, labor, civic, church, and charitable organizations, was organized. By late 1942 and early 1943 the rental situation was acute. In the face of high immigration and increased manpower needs, the manager of the Center said that "The only housing facilities available are rooms for single persons, and we haven't any applications for such quarters. Our applications are from married workers and we can't place them. The situation is even more acute for workers with children because it is almost impossible to get quarters for families with children." The manager told the Management-Labor Committee that as of September 28, 1943, there were 132 available dwellings listed at the War Housing Center. Of these 77 had baths which had to be shared, 46 had kitchens which had to be shared, nine were without baths, six without furnaces, 11 were located outside the city limits, 83 specified "no children", and 103 were definitely substandard. At the same time the area director pointed out that the proportion of new immigrants who had families was increasing, and now approximated 40 percent.

In December a subcommittee of the Management-Labor Committee reported that the housing problem was aggravating absenteeism, turnover, crime, and juvenile delinquency. It recommended that families move to smaller quarters or double up with other families occupying larger

13. Ibid., September 9, 1943.
14. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, September 28, 1943.
quarters than they needed; that native war workers be allowed to qualify for war housing that was then being reserved, in most cases, for immigrants, and that immediate steps be taken to provide more housing for Negroes.\(^{15}\) Two months later, in response to the latter recommendation, the National Housing Agency authorized 150 new dwelling units for Negroes and 20 conversions for Negroes. A hundred conversions were also authorized for whites. At a Columbus town meeting radio panel one speaker appraised the situation with respect to Negroes: "The saddest and most heart-breaking fact in the housing problem is the way it affects the Negro, the forgotten tenth man in America and in this city. The denial of decent housing ranks second in America's crimes against the Negro, and Columbus, like most American cities, reflects that crime."\(^{16}\)

Six months later a newspaper article, perhaps somewhat hysterically, announced that the "housing situation is near panic proportions here". It noted that transfer companies, insurance agents, milk delivery men, and others engaged in service jobs were deluged with requests for advance tips on homes about to be vacated. Rewards up to $50 were alleged to have been given for tips leading toward rentals. About 400 eviction notices were passing into the area OPA rent office every month, about 300 involving non-payment of rent. With property at a premium, landlords were taking advantage of those who lagged in rent payments even for a day. OPA advised occupants that this was entirely within the rights of the landlord, and that eviction notices

\(^{15}\) Reported in *Columbus Dispatch*, December 19, 1943.
\(^{16}\) *Ibid.*, February 20, 1944.
must be granted in such cases. At the same time the local WMC advised USES to tighten immigration controls with respect to "job shoppers" who traveled from area to area in search for higher paying jobs.

Early in March 1945, priorities were granted for the construction of 200 family housing units for immigrant war workers, and later in the month application was made for 650 units for returning veterans. However, under current government regulations no building projects could be undertaken unless the local Production Urgency Committee ruled that the use of manpower necessary for the construction of the project would not interfere with military production. At first the Committee disapproved the request for 650 units. But after bitter wrangling 300 units were approved by a 5 to 4 vote. A month later the other 350 were approved.

Meanwhile a local air base was having increasing difficulty placing veterans returning from foreign duty, even though it operated a rental agency of its own. As a result, from May 1 through May 14, 1945, a "Homes for Heroes" drive designed to find homes for such veterans and their families was held in Columbus, but results were extremely discouraging. The next month ground was broken for the 650 approved privately financed homes. Then, in July, the aircraft plant told WMC it needed 2,000 workers for increased production of a plane that was being planned for use in the contemplated invasion of Japan. WMC responded that these could only be provided through immigration.

17. Ibid., August 9, 1944.
18. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, August 29, 1944.
which would require considerably more new housing. USES had already reported that migrants were reluctant to settle in Columbus because of inadequate housing, and that many already here were leaving the city for that reason. The area director noted, furthermore, that "people are now refusing to live in single rooms and in crowded conditions". Over half of the commuters previously in local jobs were alleged to have quit in the last six months because their cars were no longer able to make the trips. And a newspaper quoted the City Health Department as saying that hundreds of Columbus people were living in filth and squalor, about which nothing could be done or had been done during the war years. The health commissioner was quoted as saying that "If we condemned the many houses which should be condemned these people would have no place to go. We have to wink at many things we wouldn't tolerate before the war." He said that between 3,000 and 4,000 Columbus homes should be condemned as not fit for human habitation. "Blighted areas in the city are spreading like dry rot...Rooming houses are overcrowded...Many of them are infested with rats and bedbugs. There is such a demand for houses that we don't condemn now until there is actual danger of them falling in", he said.20

At least 1,000 and probably 1,500 rental units were needed immediately. Manpower was not available to construct regular houses, and besides, this would have taken too long. A conference of WMC, WPB, National Housing Agency, and Chamber of Commerce officials was held to discuss the matter. It ended in deadlock. Finally WMC and WPB de-

19. Ibid., July 18, 1945.
cided on the erection of 1,000 temporary prefabricated and trailer units for immigrants. The Production Urgency Committee approved 700. The local real estate board and a home builders association attacked the proposal and alleged the area director was seeking personal publicity rather than wanting to solve the housing problem by "an honest attempt".\footnote{Columbus Dispatch, July 13, 1945.} U. S. Congressmen got embroiled in the controversy and wanted to investigate the local situation, and then in the first week of August, 1945, at the continued prodding of the area director, both the Production Urgency Committee and the National Housing Agency approved the erection of the entire 1,000 units. County officials, AFL leaders, builders, realtors, and "home owners" were up in arms, claiming fire and health hazards as among their lesser objections. The Chamber of Commerce repeated a previous statement of its position: "We are opposed to public housing, either temporary or permanent, as an emergency measure to provide homes for war workers. Our experience is that we can build all the housing units that are allocated to us if means are provided to get the men and material, and if a government-sponsored project can get men and material to meet an emergency it can just as easily be allocated to private builders." AFL spokesmen were more concerned with the aesthetic component. They said that temporary houses looked like concentration camps and were eyesores. By way of disclaiming any selfish interest they said they would rather see good houses erected by non-union men than temporary houses by union men.\footnote{Ibid., August 9, 1945.} No comments favorable to the proposed project were published in the local
### Table 8.1
Population and Housing Indicators, Franklin County, Ohio, Selected Dates, 1940-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of families</th>
<th>No. of family dwelling units</th>
<th>Families per dwelling unit</th>
<th>Dwelling unit shortage or surplus</th>
<th>Number of Columbus temporary rooming house permits granted during the year</th>
<th>Number of Columbus homes converted into apartments during the year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April, 1940</td>
<td>389,712(1)</td>
<td>105,742(2)</td>
<td>109,737</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>+3,955</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1941</td>
<td>390,768(a)</td>
<td>107,202</td>
<td>112,350</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>+5,142</td>
<td>2,676</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1942</td>
<td>407,101(b)</td>
<td>110,473</td>
<td>115,346</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>+4,373</td>
<td>3,088</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1943</td>
<td>417,493(c)</td>
<td>119,429</td>
<td>118,020</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>-1,409</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1944</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>123,815</td>
<td>118,664</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>-5,151</td>
<td>3,191</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1945</td>
<td>423,710(a)</td>
<td>126,006</td>
<td>118,793</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>-7,247</td>
<td>3,488</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a)** Estimated by the National Housing Agency, Columbus, Ohio.

**b)** May, 1942.

**c)** March, 1943.

Source: Columns (1) through (5), Population and Housing, 1940-1950, War Housing Center, Columbus, Ohio, August, 1945.

1940 data: Columns (1) through (5) from 16th U.S. Census. 1941 through 1944 data, Column (1) estimated on basis of OPA surveys, estimated military withdrawals, estimated normal population growth, and estimated immigration; Column (2) estimated on basis of average size of the normal family applied to estimated population; Column (3), computed by adding dwelling unit permits granted by local municipal and rural governments to the number of dwelling units in 1940, less annual demolitions; Column (4) equals Column (2) divided by Column (3); Column (5) equals Column (2) less Column (3). Column (6) and (7) data are from the files of the Building Dept., Department of Public Safety, Columbus, Ohio.
newspaper's "survey of public reaction" from which the above reactions are taken.

Within two days the war ended dramatically, an eventuality that fortunately avoided a showdown on compliance with stabilization controls in general, for by its unyielding insistence on temporary housing, the Columbus WMC made many enemies among local business and AFL groups. There is some indication that their hostility toward the Commission might have expressed itself in widespread violation of manpower controls.

There are no complete records of housing and housing needs in Franklin County during the war years. However, a reasonably good set of indicators is presented in Table 8.1. It shows, for example, that between April, 1940, and January, 1945, the number of families residing in the area increased by about 20,000, while the number of dwelling units increased by only 9,000. In April, 1940, there were nearly 4,000 vacancies, or 3.51 per 100 units. This situation was roughly consistent with the general conception of a balanced market, a 4 to 7 percent vacancy rate being considered about normal. Within the next eight months about 2,600 dwelling units were added to the existing supply, making the surplus in January, 1941, more than 5,100 units. Another

23. This may somewhat overstate the actual increase of the number of families since the method by which the estimate was made (see source notes in Table 8.1) did not account for the relatively larger than normal number of unattached workers among the immigrants.
3,000 were added during 1941, so that by January, 1942, the surplus was nearly 4,900. During the next year, however, despite an addition of 2,700 units, a shortage of 1,400 units developed as a result of population increases. In 1943 only 600 units were added and in 1944 less than a hundred were added. By January, 1944, the shortage was 5,100, and in January, 1945, it was 7,200. Taking into consideration that between 3,000 and 4,000 inhabited units were officially viewed as not fit for human habitation, the effective shortage exceeded 10,000.

Meanwhile the supply of single rooms appeared to be ample, with the number of rooming houses increasing constantly during the war, so that by 1945 there were twice as many as in 1940. Conversions of homes into apartment units were relatively few.

In the aggregate, priorities for less than 5,000 dwelling units were granted locally during the war years. At the end of 1942, 886 of the 4,066 homes authorized by NHA had not yet been started.\textsuperscript{25} Priorities for another 150 dwelling units were granted in February, 1944; yet between the end of 1942 and the end of 1944 only 739 additional dwelling unit permits had been granted by local government agencies. The greater number of priorities than of building permits during this period reflects an inability on the part of local private builders to undertake the projects because of lack of building materials, priorities notwithstanding. Most local builders obtained their materials from suppliers in other parts of the state or country because they were unavailable here.

\textsuperscript{25} From the files of the Columbus office, Federal Housing Administration.
In appraising the housing situation it is important to take into consideration that it was at no time the intention of housing or manpower officials to issue sufficient priorities to meet the needs of all families. The intention was to limit construction to that consistent with the maintenance of the manpower supply necessary to meet production schedules. There is considerable evidence, however, that local housing deficiencies had undesirable effects of manpower. For example, in January, 1944, the Columbus War Housing Center appraised the effect of housing shortages as follows: 26

Men spent hours and hours of their off-work time tramping the streets trying to find a home in which to live. Thousands of loyal Americans have come here to do a job. About one-third of them become discouraged and either return to their former homes or move to another city. This accounts for a portion of high turnover in war plant employment. The absenteeism that makes necessary the employment of an extra 5 percent more workers is caused in part by men taking time off to hunt for a house or to go back home for a day with their families who can't be moved until adequate accommodations are found.

No temporary, low-cost federal housing was brought into Columbus, during the war. Only one federally-financed housing project was built, and it was a permanent single-homes project of only 250 dwelling units. Manpower officials sought unsuccessfully to bring temporary low-cost federal housing into the area, but opposition to such housing, either permanent or temporary, was spirited and well organized. Said the Chamber of Commerce proudly in February, 1944: 27

The Chamber has had a Housing Committee for more than three years, the group having functioned since before the first influx of workers in the prewar period. This committee has been solely

26. "War Housing in Franklin County", a pamphlet by the Columbus War Housing Center, January, 1944, pp. 4-5.
27. Pickups, Columbus Chamber of Commerce, February 17, 1944.
A People's Housing Council was organized to oppose the Chamber and affiliated groups by urging the erection of federal housing projects. The Council consisted of representatives from liberal civic organizations, CIO and a few AFL unions, and interested private citizens. Its chairman was a well-known renegade real estate broker. It applied pressure locally and in Washington, although one of its officers complained that in three attempts he was unable to obtain even an appointment with the U. S. Congressman from the Columbus district.

As a group, local employers played an ambivalent role, for they complained vigorously that housing shortages were causing turnover, absenteeism, and manpower shortages, but they did not support efforts to increase local housing through temporary government projects. The argument for temporary projects was that they could be erected quickly, with a minimum of cost and labor. However, this argument was not sufficiently powerful to withstand the organized opposition of the real estate interests.

Unions also were ambivalent with respect to the housing question. Thus AFL unions favored government housing, but not temporary prefabricated housing that would endanger craft union power in the building industry, and CIO unions favored any kind of housing.

b. Transportation. The wartime transportation problem in the Columbus Area was almost exclusively one of providing means of transportation for workers employed at the aircraft plant and the armed
services depot just outside the eastern limits of the city. At their peak, these establishments employed over 30,000 persons, or nearly a third of all essential workers in the area.

As early as 1940 representatives from the aircraft company and the armed services sought to obtain a one-mile extension of existing public transportation lines to their respective establishments. At that time the transportation company refused to extend the lines because it was allegedly unprofitable to do so. Later it claimed inability to obtain additional facilities as its reason. By the middle of 1941 the pressure of increased traffic manifested itself in overloaded streetcars, buses, and trolleys, congestion of downtown streets, and morning and late afternoon traffic jams on the main thoroughfare leading to the new east side industrial area. In the meanwhile WPA had built a two-mile four-lane extension of the thoroughfare to facilitate automobile traffic to the aircraft plant. The result, however, was snarling traffic jams at an intersection in which depot and aircraft plant traffic met. The intersection was therefore replaced by a cloverleaf merger, but traffic jams merely increased as more automobile drivers took this route because of the greater "convenience" of the cloverleaf.

In January, 1942, rationing of automobile tires was begun. In a week passenger loads of public transportation facilities increased 15 percent. At that time 97 streetcars, 61 gasoline buses, and 103 trolley coaches were in local operation, with company officials claiming that there was no chance of getting additional equipment. City Council immediately approved a proposed company survey to work out de-

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tails for staggering working hours in downtown offices and industrial
plants. Two weeks later, left turns on 15 downtown intersections were
prohibited as a means of halting traffic congestion during rush hours.
But efforts to institute staggered hours by downtown offices failed,
the only complying organization being the transportation company it-
self. The city's mayor quickly asked a transportation committee he
had formed in January to look into alternative ways of improving local
conditions. An educational campaign was begun to promote the staggered
hours program, and an effort was made to have one of the railroads
operate fast trains on its tracks between the railroad station and the
aircraft plant.

The railroad company claimed a shortage of equipment in refusing
the proposal. However, the working hours of several thousand downtown
state employees were staggered. Meanwhile City Council responded to
one of the committee's major efforts by giving emergency power to the
mayor to enable him to demand rerouting of the public transportation
lines without having long, drawn-out hearings and controversies. Later
several changes were made in existing routes so as to make available
more buses for other routes and to facilitate the handling of rush-
hour traffic.

In July, the transportation committee, which by then included
for the first time a representative of organized labor, recommended
later hours for downtown stores, staggered hours for downtown offices,
and the discontinuing of 77 stops then made by streetcars and buses.
The mayor appointed a local businessman to take charge of meetings with
merchants to arrange the staggered hours. Two months after the mayor's committee's recommendations were made, 74 trolley and bus stops were eliminated and many buses began turning back before reaching the end of the line so as to make more short runs. At the same time a thousand separate downtown offices and industries were asked to "conform with a transportation-rationing program" but only a few agreed to stagger their working hours. The aircraft plant and the armed services depot, in the meanwhile, had already staggered their hours.

Part of the transportation rationing program involved the promotion of share-the-ride arrangements. After the beginning of gasoline rationing on December 1, 1942, OPA gave special gasoline allotments to owners of automobiles participating in share-the-ride arrangements in an effort to help reduce the consumption of gasoline and tires, and to alleviate the traffic jams and transportation problems arising out of an insufficiency of public facilities. As part of this effort a local newspaper organized a Victory Car Club which enabled persons seeking rides, or drivers seeking riders, to register at the newspaper's offices where they could arrange for rides or passengers. The aircraft company and the government depots vigorously promoted the share-the-ride program, for in the absence of adequate public transportation facilities this was their only recourse. The program also received strong support in other quarters, particularly from outlying essential concerns and from USES-WMC. The effectiveness of the program is indicated by the fact that in May, 1945, OPA awarded the aircraft company the first share-the-ride merit citation given in the district and the second in the nation.
The armed services depot and another local plant were respectively the third and fourth national recipients of similar citations.

Meanwhile, however, east side public transportation lines continued to end a mile or more from the establishments in that area, with workers having either to walk or shuttle the rest of the way to their places of employment. As early as December, 1942, City Council approved a request by the transportation company for a franchise to extend one of its bus lines to the gates of the depot, but to everyone's disappointment the proposed extension was never effected. Finally, in June, 1944, the depot began providing shuttle service itself, but the aircraft company had no such equipment. A nearby farmer is alleged to have paid off a long-standing mortgage from revenues accumulated by shuttling bus riders to the plant with his horse-drawn wagon.

Finally, in April, 1943, a positive step was taken in the direction of increasing transportation available to east side workers. After being guaranteed a minimum revenue by the aircraft company, the transportation company began operating special trailer buses to take workers to the aircraft plant, although the regular bus lines continued to end a mile from it. These special buses departed from three neighborhood areas and a downtown corner three times daily, at 7 a.m., 3:30 p.m., and midnight. This materially relieved the local transportation problem. However, buses, streetcars, and trolleys then in use were rapidly showing symptoms of the nearly 30 percent increase in daily traffic.

In July, 1943, 20 buses were out of use because of needed repairs, and repair was slow and difficult because of shortages of spare parts and
mechanics.

The local automotive maintenance industry had similar difficulties. In November, a Columbus automobile trade association claimed a critical need of 115 mechanics. Member garages were reported to be turning down nearly 300 repair jobs daily because of the shortage of mechanics, many of whom had gone into industry or been drafted. A district representative of a large automobile manufacturer said that while most cities showed an increase in service and repair work on passenger cars, Columbus showed a decrease of .3 percent. A private survey of four of this company’s local dealers indicated that between March, 1942, and December, 1943, they lost 87 service men. Only 16 entered military service, 23 went to the aircraft plant, six to the armed services depot, 10 to other factories, and the rest to miscellaneous industries.

With the backing of the local Office of Defense Transportation the association arranged for a series of pre-employment training classes in automotive maintenance, and sought to obtain locally needed status for garages. However, WMC consented only to declare mechanics as being in local shortage occupations, since the depot needed them quite as urgently as garages.

By February, 1944, transportation difficulties were being cited with increasing frequency as causes of absenteeism, turnover, and tardiness. The Area Management-Labor Committee met to consider possible action. Local garage owners repeated their assertion that there were now only three mechanics for every 1,000 cars in the area, as compared

29. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, November 9, 1943.
30. Columbus Dispatch, November 7, 1943.
with 11 in 1941, and that, moreover, cars required much more servicing these days, with the average repair order having increased from $4.60 in 1941 to $11.00 in 1944. Again WMC rejected as a possible solution any effort to effect the release of mechanics now employed in other establishments so that they might return to their former positions as garage mechanics. It also rejected repeated proposals to give garages locally needed status.\(^1\) The Committee explored the possibility of marshaling into use idle buses of local armed services installations, schools, and other establishments, but without success. Meanwhile the transportation company was again asked to intensify its efforts to obtain additional buses. Later OPA revived a previous suggestion to establish automotive repair shops in war plants where employees might have their cars repaired while working. But the association of garage owners rejected this as a possible solution to absenteeism and turnover, claiming that the plants were sufficiently close to the city to enable car owners to drive in for repairs.

Various other efforts were made to reduce tardiness, turnover, and absenteeism due to automobile difficulties. Thus there were regular joint WMC-automotive association statements encouraging the upkeep of cars by periodic inspections and by proper winter care. WMC and the local Office of Defense Transportation also sought to obtain from the armed services the loan of additional transportation equipment which might be used to carry workers to outlying plants that most frequently attributed their manpower problems to transportation shortages or

\(^1\) Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, February 15, 1944.
Because of the extensive share-the-ride program the local transportation situation did not reach critical proportions. But the program was also misused, as there is indication that some companies, eager to obtain added gasoline allotments for their employees, were unduly liberal in certifying to OPA that car owners carried share-the-ride passengers. Late in 1944 OPA tightened its enforcement of the program, although complaints of violations continued.

Possibly the most debilitating effect of inadequate public transportation was the way it interfered with more effective USES referral and placement. Thus it was difficult to get applicants to accept referral to many outlying establishments because, on the one hand, there was no regular bus service to take them there for immediate interviews, and on the other hand, they felt that they would be unable to obtain regular rides once they were employed. Because of inadequate regular bus service to these plants USES was also obliged to grant more consent hiring privileges than were probably in the interest of the best utilization of available manpower. Contrasted with its adverse effects on referral and placement, the extent to which the transportation problem contributed to absenteeism and turnover is debatable. Only the outlying establishments attributed these difficulties to transportation, and these complaints were relatively infrequent.

It would appear that somewhat better cooperation on the part of the local transportation company might have been forthcoming. Nothing in
its behavior suggests that it made a positive effort to facilitate service to the outlying areas. When the special trailer bus service was finally provided, it was obtained through the efforts of the aircraft company itself, and even then a special contract was drawn up to guarantee the transportation company ample revenues. In January, 1945, it threatened to suspend its operation of the trailers unless the contract was improved. The aircraft concern had no choice but to increase the amount of the guaranteed revenues.

It was quite evident to manpower officials that the company was reluctant to extend its regular facilities because it felt there was no economic advantage in doing so. Indeed, it probably expected a considerable long-run disadvantage because of its belief that post-war transportation needs would decline and leave costly surplus facilities on hand. If this was the underlying reason behind inadequate war-time public transportation, it would appear that the demands of war production require that either local transportation companies be subsidized and compensated for any loss associated with providing essential services, or that a special war transportation unit be organized to serve where existing private (or public) concerns do not. Compared with the load factor and rubber and fuel consumption of buses, the share-the-ride program was a gross waste of essential material. While it solved the local problem, it did so at a considerable, and from a wartime standpoint, and intolerable cost.

The efforts of the local ODT appear also to have left something to be desired, probably because all its working committees were composed
of representatives of local garages, automobile dealers, and transportation company officials. There was no community, labor, or other business or industry representation, although there is no a priori reason why persons from such groups should not know as much about local transportation needs as used car salesmen, for example. The mayor's transportation committee also lacked effectiveness. Although it actively helped promote share-the-ride programs, it failed to obtain sufficient cooperation in staggering hours of local establishments, particularly those located in the downtown area. Downtown stores encouraged shoppers to refrain from using buses during rush hours, but they publicized sales with such vigor that early morning shopping traffic increased perceptibly on the occasion of each large sale.

c. Child Care. Early in the mobilization period it became obvious that more women might be made available for war work if their children could be cared for during working hours. Throughout 1941 and 1942 the Columbus Community Chest operated or helped operate five day nurseries, principally to care for children of delinquent or employed parents. At the same time the Works Projects Administration operated two nurseries, principally to enable mothers to take jobs and thus supplement meager family incomes. In the Summer of 1942 the local Community Chest, the Council of Social Agencies, USES, WMC, WPA, the CIO, the State Department of Public Welfare, the Juvenile Court, and the Columbus Board of Education met to consider the possibility of providing additional day care facilities as a means of increasing the local supply of female
Table 8.2

Average Annual Enrollment in Public and Quasi-Public
Child Care Centers, Columbus, Ohio, 1941-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of centers(a)</th>
<th>Enrollment(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Median number during the year.
b) Approximate median enrollment during the year.
Source: From untabulated records in the files of the Columbus Community Chest.
labor. A Joint Committee on Day Care of the Civilian Defense Council and the Council of Social Agencies, later called the War Services Board Day Care Committee, was organized and met with personnel directors from local war plants to discuss the need for day care centers. The response was not particularly encouraging, although USES-WMC continued to press for them.

In December, 1942, WPA's day care funds were cut off, although for a while the staff continued to operate two centers under the sponsorship of the Salvation Army and the Urban League. At the same time the U. S. Congress enacted the Lanham Act which provided funds for the establishment of day care centers for children of working mothers. Two of these were established and operated by the Columbus Board of Education in May, 1943. Throughout the remainder of the war it operated at various times from two to five of these centers.

Table 8.2 shows the median number of all types of public or quasi-public centers, and their median annual enrollment, during the years 1941 through 1945. It will be seen that the number of centers increased from seven in 1941 to 10 in 1945, with enrollment rising from 277 in the former year to 347 in the latter. By 1945 the Community War Chest was financing or helping finance six of the centers, with the other four operating under the Lanham Act. As the war progressed the purpose of the Chest centers changed somewhat from their previous aim of providing care for children to that of giving mothers an opportunity to take jobs. These centers generally gave preference to children from homes whose fathers were away in the armed services and to children of mothers in
The greatest need of additional income. The centers were financed jointly by the Community War Chest, the State Department of Public Welfare, and persons receiving the service. Tuition generally varied according to ability to pay, and seldom exceeded one dollar per day.

The Lanham Act centers were available to children of working mothers, regardless of the type of work in which the mothers were engaged, and were generally limited to children between three and 10 years of age. Tuition was 50¢ per day, including food, and the centers remained open from 6 a.m. until 6 p.m. Unlike the Community Chest centers, they did not segregate Negro and white children into different schools.

Before establishing a center, public school representatives generally interviewed between 60 and 80 families in the neighborhood to determine if they would take advantage of facilities that might be provided. In the five such surveys that were made, about 80 percent of the mothers indicated that they would take jobs if the centers were established. However, less than 25 percent actually took jobs and sent their children.32 As the result, several centers were closed a few weeks after opening for lack of sufficient enrollment. Meanwhile enrollment was solicited through the newspapers, the public schools, and through personal contacts at industrial plants.

Enrollment in the Lanham Act schools was always considerable below capacity and generally averaged around 20 children, compared with averages in excess of 30 and 40 in Community Chest centers. The reason for this difference is probably that the latter had a longer history, and

32. From the files of the Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education.
neighborhood parents had become accustomed to the principle of nursery schools. The former, on the other hand, were introduced in neighborhoods in which parents often had never experienced such facilities and hence were not conditioned to think in terms of them in making occupational plans.

The over-all low enrollment in all centers cannot be attributed to lack of need for such facilities. In May, 1943, for example, the Columbus Foster Home Committee sent a questionnaire to local parents to inquire about the need for day care facilities during the forthcoming summer. Responses indicated a desire to have more than 1,000 children cared for. This was more than three times the actual enrollment in child care centers during that summer.

The number of mothers who withdrew from the labor market in order to care for their children suggests a persistent need during the war for some kind of care for children of working mothers. Yet the facilities that were available were not fully utilized. One of the best explanations for this phenomenon is undoubtedly the inconvenience of sending children to the centers. Mothers had to prepare and take their children to the centers at an extremely early hour in order to get to work in time themselves. Moreover, the centers were not always conveniently situated in terms of the destinations of the mothers, so that mothers might be obliged to make special trips to the centers rather than taking the children there on their way to work. And even if the

33. Minutes, Columbus Foster Home Care Committee meeting, May 17, 1943, in the files of the Columbus Community Chest.
34. See Chapter 6, Section F, supra.
centers were on route to the place of employment, if parents were share-the-ride passengers it would have been extremely inconvenient to carry children in cars that were already full.

Besides these inconveniences, there was another important reason why many of the women who expressed a willingness to take jobs if their children could be cared for did not take advantage of available facilities. This was their tendency the think of "child care" in terms of care by a member of the family rather than by a counselor in a day center. This finding was reported by the Day Care Committee to WMC as a result of a survey of women who had left essential war jobs for child care reasons.

The nature and availability of day care centers was not well publicized through the local communications media. USES mentioned them on its radio programs from time to time, but newspapers did not publicize them widely. It is true that this did not have particularly unfortunate consequences, in spite of the fact that women quit jobs for child care reasons, because the local supply of women workers in any event exceeded demand. But it is clear that if child care facilities are to play an important role in increasing the supply of women workers, they must be made both more popular and more convenient. The first task can be accomplished by means of comprehensive publicity campaigns that emphasize their advantages and their desirability from an educational-psychological viewpoint, and the second by providing for pickup and delivery service, as many private nurseries do.
d. Newspapers. It is unnecessary to reemphasize that manpower controls depended upon community support and on widespread confidence that they were indispensable features of mobilizing for war. The prevalence of such confidence and support depends upon how well the government is able to communicate the nature of and the reasons for the measures it invokes. In the United States the government relies totally, and without recourse, upon the private owners of the mass media effectively and properly to publicize its programs. A free press therefore owes, as the President's Commission on Freedom of the Press has pointed out, an obligation to the community to be responsible and objectively informative, regardless of its political, economic, religious, cultural, or any other differences with the heads of that government.

In respect to manpower controls, the Columbus press cannot be said to have fulfilled that obligation. Examining the city's largest daily newspaper, it becomes readily obvious that its editorial pages, and to a considerable extent its news pages, were devoted to a policy of undermining public confidence in many measures proposed and instituted by the existing government. The effect of this was undoubtedly to weaken the mobilization and stabilization program. A few examples will illustrate the point.

Even before stabilization controls were instituted locally, a cartoon appeared on the paper's editorial page showing "Mr. American Worker" standing at the door of an employer who seemed anxious to hire him. Out of menacing overhanging clouds a hairy hand directed the worker to

35. See "A Free and Responsible Press", in Supplement to Fortune, April, 1947.
go elsewhere with the admonition "You'll work where we tell you!" Another hand, labeled "Bureaucratic government by Decree" tapped the perplexed worker on the shoulder. The cartoon was captioned: "Free America—1943." Again, two days after regional stabilization controls became effective locally, the paper commented pictorially with an opulent, cigar-smoking, obese, unkempt individual labeled "Washington Manpower Bureaucrats" telling the clean-cut American worker who wants to transfer to a job with higher wages: "Is ZAT SO? YOU'LL work where you are told—and you'll STAY PUT." Leaving nothing to the imagination, a torn document reading "The right of every American to work where his services are of value to himself and his employer" is shown in an overflowing wastebasket. Editorially the paper said in part:

A great step forward in the march of humanity toward the goal of full dignity and freedom for the individual was made in 1861 when Russia...freed its serfs from cradle-to-grave attachment to the land on which they were born. A second and equally great stride was taken in the United States...human slavery was abolished...A step which goes almost the whole way of cancelling out these two great advances of the 19th century was taken during the past weekend by Manpower Commissioner McNutt's order refusing any American the right to change his present occupation for one paying higher wages. A coating of war necessity sugars the pill and certain exceptions and procedures are noted which place the color of fairness on the coating, if not the content, of the dose. But in effect it places every man now employed in a war plant or other designated essential industry under the pain of prison sentence if he attempts to exercise his right of selling his personal services to the highest bidder...McNutt's order amounts to one of the boldest steps taken over a long period of years to which many similar steps have been taken to establish a bureaucratic form of dictatorial government over the individual lives of the American people...The average American becomes the brother to his medieval ancestor, the "unfree man"...

In January, 1944, when some Washington people spoke vaguely about

36. Columbus Dispatch. February 12, 1943.
37. Ibid. April 21, 1943.
a possible "labor draft" the same newspaper featured a story of one employer's reaction that this was "Hitlerian" by giving it a six-column headline. And in June, 1944, just before priority referral went into effect, an eight-column streamer appeared saying "New Hiring System, Effective Saturday, Branded 'Slave Labor'". Beneath it was an article quoting an obscure member of the Nebraska State Legislature to this effect. A week later an editorial page cartoon repeated the stereotype of the "Washington Bureaucrat", this time engaged in placing a harness around the neck of "free American labor". The harness was labeled "McNutt's job-control directive". The bureaucrat drawled: "Now then, Mah Friend, you'll work where we TELL YOU, and DO what we tell you." The customary editorial explaining in simple words the deeper meaning of the cartoon also appeared.

Local manpower officials were not subjected to this abuse, probably because it could easily be seen that they did not fit the bureaucratic stereotype. Local manpower drives were willingly supported by the press, and the press cooperated in efforts to prevent destructive manpower advertising. News stories explaining the nature of any new manpower programs were dutifully printed, and some effort was made to report the area director's explanations as to the reasons for the measures. Articles of a national or Washington origin included parts of the War Manpower Commissioner's explanations of the theory behind certain measures, but, as in most other daily newspapers, the stories were to some extent cut in length and therefore probably in fullness of explanation.

38. Ibid., June 30, 1944.
39. Ibid., July 5, 1944.
The newspaper did not help the manpower program either by its extensive featuring of deaths and injuries in war plant accidents, particularly when these involved women. It would appear that if current efforts are to induce into industrial employment women and other groups never before employed in such work, then it might be well for the press to consider restraint in the publication of incidents which illustrate certain hazards of that type of employment. There might at least be a somewhat more euphemistic treatment of these accidents, the publication of which undoubtedly has a tendency to reduce the volume of available manpower for certain jobs.

Just how much the cartoons, editorials, and articles mentioned above undermined confidence in the manpower program is obviously not determinable. However, it is probably true that an individual making a street corner speech and using the kind of language and insinuations that appeared in the local press during the war would have been removed to the city jail on charges of subversion or inciting to commit treason. But the newspaper, hiding behind immunities guaranteed by the "freedom of the press" principle, was free to subvert and incite.

Successful mobilization of the community behind compulsory or voluntary government measures that impinge upon a large proportion of the population in a way that is at the same time uncomfortable to those affected and comparatively easily circumvented or violated, requires that the operating and enforcing agencies be able to communicate their intentions clearly and effectively. Insofar as the Columbus experience was concerned, newspapers did not do an adequate job of com-
communicating the nature, goals, and reasons for the manpower measures. People are not likely to give easily their consent to controls restricting their freedom to come and go. The nature of and reasons for such controls must be fully and properly explained. During periods of war mobilization when such controls are more numerous and more restrictive than ever, it is increasingly more essential that government communicate effectively to the people subject to these controls. It therefore appears reasonable that during such times daily newspapers be required to make available about a page in each issue for government's exclusive use to transmit directives, explain the nature and purposes of its programs, elucidate on the progress and effectiveness of war measures, and so forth. It is crucial that government be able fully to explain the reasons for its actions and the exact nature of its programs. Distortions, omissions, and errors in the daily press are intolerable, particularly when the nature of the programs requires the wholehearted support and consent of the entire population.

e. General Efforts. In addition to those community efforts already mentioned, other groups enthusiastically cooperated in helping overcome local manpower problems. As has been noted, the churches, schools, and the social service agencies were most cooperative, and if the occasion had demanded, would probably have helped more intensively. Certain professional groups, such as the County Bar Association, supplied manpower to help harvest county agricultural crops, and the medical profession cooperated in standardizing statements used in
support of statement-of-availability claims. The County Tuberculosis Society proposed X-raying all local workers, and with the cooperation of some firms did so. And a War Services Board was established to coordinate the activities of all war-time civic, government, and charitable organizations, including the housing committees, the transportation committees, and the child care committee.

C. Protective Legislation.

Because certain state and federal laws or administrative orders set basic standards and limitations on the wages, hours, and types of employment various groups of persons, particularly women and minors, these groups could not be as freely employed as others.

The extent to which federal minimum wage laws, state minimum wage orders, and hours and type-of-work restrictions on women and minors limited the effective supply of the available manpower, and to that extent hindered production, is uncertain. There is some indication that these measures, designed originally to help keep youths in school and to protect them and others from financial exploitation and health hazards, may at various times have interfered with war production. But to the extent that this occurred, it does not appear to have been a serious problem. Moreover, certain of the applicable laws were changed or suspended during the war years, and thus certain barriers to the indiscriminate employment of various types of manpower were removed.

The most restrictive of the protective laws applied to the employment of women and minors. In 1919 and again in 1937 the Ohio Legis-
lature established a long list of restrictions on the types of occupa-
ations and the number of hours minors and women were permitted to
work. It also required the establishment of certain minimum working
conditions in connection with the employment of women, and limited the
number of consecutive work days women and minors might be employed
without a day of rest.\footnote{40}

Late in 1941 the director of the State Department of Industrial
Relations, who is charged with administering these laws, received
numerous requests from defense industries for temporary exemptions from
the provision of the laws limiting the working hours of women in manufac-
turing employments to 45 per week. As the result he granted, from
time to time, special permission to various firms to employ women in
excess of 45 hours until these firms were able to train men to do the
jobs then held by women. But as the tempo of war production increased
and as work weeks began typically to exceed 45 hours in most manufac-
turing concerns, the pressure to relax hours restrictions on women and
minor workers increased to the point that it became more practical to
change the law than its administration. By the Spring of 1942 some
60 corporations throughout the state had been granted 30- to 90-day
exemptions from laws. Moreover, many violations of various provisions
of the laws were reported by the administrator.\footnote{41}

Thus with the backing of industry, labor, and social service
organizations the state legislature began deliberating about a new law
\footnote{40. \textit{Ohio General Code}, Sections 1008, 1027, 12972, 12993, 12994, 12995,
12996, 12997, 13000, 13001, 13002, 13003, 13005, 13006, 13007, and
their subdivisions.}
\footnote{41. \textit{Columbus Dispatch}, April 14, 1942.}
to permit the employment of women and minors for longer hours and in then prohibited occupations. Because of the difficulty of establishing new standards, the existing laws were not changed until May, 1943, however. Meanwhile, local business groups, consisting chiefly of less essential employers in the service industries, agitated for relaxation of existing legislation so as to permit the more extensive employment of women and minors. Then, in November, 1942, the U. S. Secretary of Labor, under authority of the Walsh-Healey public contracts act which permitted her to exempt employers from the 18-year age limit for women employment on federal contracts, dropped the age requirement to 16. She acted on request of the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission, which claimed that the continuation of the 18-year limit would "impair seriously the conduct of government business by retarding essential production and interfering with the successful prosecution of the war". The consequent relaxations did not change the situation in Ohio, however, since the state law was not superseded by the Walsh-Healey change.

Finally, in May, 1943, the governor signed an emergency bill suspending many of the employment restrictions applying to women and minors, and establishing, for a two-year period only, new and vastly less restrictive standards. The major provisions of the new law lifted maximum permissible work hours for women over 17 years of age in manufacturing industries from eight to 10 hours in any one day and

42. An article of the efforts of these groups appeared in the Columbus Dispatch, August 30, 1942.
43. 120 Ohio Laws 1923, pp. 174-179. (May 14, 1943)
from 45 to 50 hours in any one six-day week. Under certain short-run emergency conditions essential employers were permitted to employ women in excess of 50 hours weekly. Women 16 and 17 years old continued to be restricted from working between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., although certain similar restrictions for those above 18 were eliminated. Women were also permitted to take jobs in numerous occupations from which they were previously excluded, including jobs in foundries, shoe shine parlors, bowling alleys, and such occupations as freight elevator operators, section hands, meter readers, delivery truck drivers, plastic moulders, crossing watchmen, baggage and freight handlers, and occupations that required lifting weights up to 35 pounds. Minors between 14 and 16 years of age were restricted to a maximum of nine instead of the previous eight hours per day. The provision limiting their combined school and work hours to 48 per six-day week and their employment to the hours between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. remained unchanged. Girls 16 and 17 years of age were permitted to work and go to school for a maximum of 10 instead of eight hours per day and 50 instead of 48 hours per six-day week. Similar previous restrictions on male minors 16 years of age and over were entirely removed, with the exception that they were to receive at least one day of rest every seventh day. Certain other previous requirements, respecting adequate lunch hours, rest periods, and toilet facilities were retained, as were prohibitions against minors in certain so-called hazardous or otherwise "undesirable" occupations.

Six days after the law went into effect the aircraft company
announced it would hire 16 and 17 year old boys and 18 to 21 year old girls to relieve its manpower shortage. There is some indication, as previously noted, that there was a considerable increase in the employment of minors, particularly those hired on a full-time basis, after the law became effective. However, available figures (Table 7.3) do not show any abnormal increase in female employment in essential activity at that time. Although a considerable increase occurred throughout the year, it appears to have been part of a trend which began in 1942 rather than the result of the law. Still it is doubtful that the increase could have been as great as it actually was had the law not been changed, for employment of women on long shifts would have been impossible under the provisions of the 1937 law. Moreover, the compulsory 48-hour work week that went into effect in the Fall of 1943 would have failed had the change not been made. While the new law was thus of considerable help in increasing the supply of manpower, its failure to have been enacted sooner does not appear to have been particularly harmful. Indeed, the delay may have been helpful in that it may have induced employers who were somewhat short of manpower to relax their standards in respect to the employment of older men and members of minority groups and to increase the internal operating efficiency of their plants.

Child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act were in themselves not restrictive since Ohio limitations were even more restrictive and more specific. Nor do the minimum wage provisions of the act appear to have been harmful, since firms subject to them were
already paying in excess of 40¢ per hour. The evidence does not suggest that the hours provisions of the act, requiring time and one-half for weekly hours over 40, discouraged war plants from operating in excess of 40 hours per week. The cost-plus arrangement whereby holders of government contracts were virtually guaranteed a minimum percentage mark-up over cost probably overcame any reluctance employers might otherwise have had to incurring overtime costs, and indeed may have encouraged them to do so. However, the less-essential firms, without government contracts were not so fortunate in this respect. They were squeezed from both ends, on the one hand being compelled by their limited access to the labor supply to operate in excess of 40 hours per week and thereby to increase their unit costs, and on the other hand being prevented from increasing the prices of their services or products. Since their labor supply was so limited, it is unlikely that they hired more workers in order to obviate the necessity of paying overtime wages to a smaller work force. Indications are that their total employment remained about stable during the war, in spite of a greatly increased volume of business.

State wages and hours laws are also not likely to have reduced the labor supply available to employers affected by them, since all but one of these set basic minimum wages at considerably lower levels than the national standard. Besides, they applied only to four industries, and in three of these affected only women and minors. 44

44, Minimum Fair Wage Standards, Mandatory Order No. 1, July 26, 1934, governing women and minors in laundry occupations and in the laundry trade, had a basic rate of 27½¢ per hour; Mandatory Order No. 2, January 7, 1935, governing women and minors (Continued on following page)
There is some indication, however, that at one point during the war certain provisions of the Old Age Assistance law prevented some types of labor from being made available for certain kinds of work. To remedy this, the administrator of the Ohio assistance program, in accordance with a previously enacted federal law, issued a regulation in the Spring of 1943 which permitted pensioners to take remunerative casual or seasonal agricultural work without thereby being deprived of their monthly allotments. But the Old Age and Survivor's Insurance program continued to disqualify beneficiaries who earned in excess of $15 per month in covered employment.

City and state sanitary and health codes were not modified during the war. Although their enforcement may have been relaxed, this was probably due more to a shortage of inspectors than to any conscious official policy.

The only other legislation which appears to have affected the manpower supply were certain state laws that required various craftsmen, who were in short supply, to have rather lengthy experience before being eligible to work for the railroads. Thus, although they might be adequately trained in six months, the experience requirement was in

44. (Continued from preceding page) in cleaning and dyeing occupations in the cleaning and dyeing trade, had a basic rate of 35¢ per hour; Mandatory Order No. 3, July 1, 1936, governing women and minors at work in establishments engaged in the furnishing of food or lodging or bath, had a basic rate of less than 22¢ per hour for cities of the size of Columbus, and Mandatory Order No. 4, April 4, 1941, governing beauty culture occupations, had a basic rate ranging between 40¢ and 55¢ per hour. These orders were issued at the discretion of the director of the State Department of Industrial Relations under provisions of the Ohio General Code, Section 154-45r.
The Ohio law of 1943 which relaxed the standards pertaining to the employment of women and minors was allowed to expire on April 1, 1945. Ominous warnings from procurement officials, and a tough message by the governor obtained its re-enactment three days later, however; on December 15, 1945, four months after the war ended, it expired once again and the old restrictions were automatically re-imposed.

In the aggregate it does not appear that the state and federal protective legislation that prevailed during the war seriously restricted the utilization of the potential labor supply. In terms of the needs of the time, weighed against the requirements of community health, welfare, and educational standards, relaxation of legal restrictions beyond those that actually occurred do not appear to have been necessary. To the extent that relaxation occurred, it seems clear that it resulted in more people being employed, and certainly being employed longer hours, than might otherwise have been.

The rapid return to peace-time standards at the war's termination shows that temporary relaxations do not necessarily degenerate into permanent ones. When the circumstances are propitious, wide backing can be obtained for relaxations, provided that it is stipulated that the new standards are temporary in nature and will be superseded by their predecessors within a specified period after the emergency passes.

D. Selective Service Policies and Practices.
The matter of allocating the available supply of manpower between the armed services and the factories can be as difficult a task as that of properly dispersing an army over several fronts. Both the military chiefs and the non-military administrators charged with the provision of supplies to the armed forces made eloquent claims to the same manpower pool during World War II. But military claims, being more dramatic in time of war, and being considerably more restricted in respect to the age and physical requirements of the persons needed, received priority. Nevertheless, some concessions had to be made to the requirements of the manufacturing plants that supplied materials and equipment for the armies. To this extent certain policies were devised and certain practices pursued that sought to prevent indiscriminate and harmful military withdrawals of trained workers from war plants, and sought to staff the armed forces in such a way as not to endanger the maintenance of the flow of supplies upon which they depended.

Between 1941, when the World War II draft started, and December 2, 1946, 46,010 persons between 18 and 64 years of age were drafted or enlisted into the armed forces from Franklin County. By December, 1946, 122 had died, 11,125 were still in service, and the rest had been discharged. Actually, all men between the ages of 18 and 65 were registered for Selective induction. But only the 18-to-44 age group was drawn from, and mostly only the 18-to-38 group. However, it was felt from time to time that those not required to go into military service should be inducted into essential non-military service, chiefly

45. From a special tabulation prepared by the Statistical Section, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, September 20, 1950.
war production. Thus, two months after the United States entered the war the national Selective Service director predicted that some form of conscription of labor was inevitable, and that the most eligible candidates were men exempt from military induction. The Social Security administrator, who later became WMC head, said the same thing.46 Throughout 1942 Washington buzzed with talk of conscription for war production. Finally, in his State of the Union message on January 11, 1943, President Roosevelt asked Congress to enact national service legislation which would empower the government to require able-bodied men and women to work where they were most needed. Congress rejected the request, but the Selective Service System, which the previous month was placed under WMC jurisdiction, advised local boards to use their powers to require draft-age men to get into war work.47

Meanwhile, WMC and Selective Service jointly developed machinery designed to mitigate the destructiveness of military withdrawals from war plants. Essential employers were asked to execute two special forms. One of these was the Manning Table, which presented a firm's personnel requirement pattern by listing all the various jobs in the plant, showing the skills and essential physical and other characteristics needed for each job, estimating future personnel needs to cover present turnover and future expansion, indicating the degree to which male employees were vulnerable to Selective Service, and presenting a time-table for their release to the armed services. The other form,

46. Columbus Dispatch, December 22, 1942.
47. Ibid., April 1, 1943.
the Replacement Schedule, was a device for scheduling withdrawals of male workers leaving for the armed forces and gearing replacements to the contemplated rate of withdrawal. The Replacement Schedule, which in essence could be viewed as part of the Manning Table, was to list scheduled military withdrawals according to the ability of the employer to obtain replacements through hiring, transferring or upgrading, and training. The schedules were to be submitted to the State Selective Service office where they were either approved, disapproved, or revised. Upon final approval they were used by local boards as authority to grant deferments for the periods of time indicated.

Columbus Area employers do not appear adequately to have taken advantage of the program. State Selective Service headquarters said that local employers were reluctant to prepare systematically for future manpower losses to military services by executing replacement schedules. Indeed less than 25 employers participated in the program. A high ranking spokesman for the State Selective Headquarters surveyed the failure of the program locally with the observation that "Columbus employers live in the past. They still hope that some blanket group deferment will be effected. They are very reluctant and slow to agree to give up workers. They have a lack of appreciation for the objectives of the program."48

But the reason for the program's failure was as much the fault of WAC-Selective Service as it was of employers, since an alternative, less cumbersome program for obtaining deferments existed. Thus in July,

48. Ibid., April 27, 1943.
1942, WMC issued its first list of essential occupations, which Selective Service boards were asked to take into account in making draft decisions and occupational deferments. The list originally included 138 occupations. Later it was increased to 149, and was augmented by additions of local shortage occupations. Employers could make deferment requests for employees with essential occupations, and local boards were requested to consult the local USES if there was doubt about the essentiality of the occupations for which deferments were requested or about the replaceability of the registrant. Later, early in the Fall of 1943, an attempt was made to assure long-term occupational deferments for workers with critical skills in essential industries as WMC issued instructions "forbidding" local draft boards to order the induction of these workers until at least 30 days after the boards had referred the cases to USES for examination and advice. USES was to make job analyses and utilization studies to determine if the workers' employment fully utilized their claimed skills. If USES affirmed the claims, employers were asked to submit new deferment requests and the boards were then to consider deferment in light of the new evidence.

But these directives did not actually compel local boards to operate in accordance with them. Indeed, local boards were extremely individually inclined, and generally made their own rules and regulations, even in disregard of national policy. On one occasion General Lewis B. Hershey, the national Selective Service director, told a congressional committee that "Of course the local boards need not pay attention to 99 percent of the things we sent out. It is a good thing
they do not have to". Moreover, local boards did not have the technical competence to determine occupational deferments. Their chief aim was to fill their quotas, and to the extent that they were qualified to determine deferment needs of the home front there is little indication that they permitted such requirements to prevent them from responding to the more dramatic need: the need for soldiers.

To some extent USES recommendations helped the boards in making deferment decisions, but the boards did not regularly consult USES. Even when they did, it is not certain that USES recommendations were based entirely upon objective criteria. Thus the local office required that all recommendations be channeled through the office manager, who consulted with his utilization and job analysts. But the local manager himself had four sons in the service, and later confessed that he was emotionally unable to concede that home front jobs could be more important than army jobs. He never recommended a deferment of more than six months duration.

On the other hand, however, draft board referrals of deferment applications to USES served useful functions. More than one investigation showed essentiality claims to have been false. Thus an alleged tool designer was found to be employed as a bookkeeper, and the cousin of a plant manager was found suddenly to have been promoted from a platform laborer to a machinist.

Throughout 1943, the newspapers were spotted with conflicting Selective Service policy announcements emanating from national and state headquarters, from WMC, and from local draft boards. Most of the confusion arose in respect to the drafting of fathers, the drafting of essential and locally needed workers, and the drafting of eligible men not in essential activity. Any effort to make sense out of the confusion was doomed to failure, particularly in view of the fact that the national headquarters allowed innumerable exceptions to its general policies and that local boards pursued whatever policies would help in filling their induction quotas.

In December, 1943, when Selective Service was freed from the jurisdiction of WMC, the national Selective Service director revoked a previous order designed to force draftable men employed in less essential activity into the armed forces. Then, in April, 1944, a new national draft order directed local boards to prove that inductees over 26 years of age were not essential to the war effort before actually inducting them. The burden of proof was thus shifted from inductee to draft board in an effort to clean local files of all men under 26. Men over 30 years of age in essential industry were given an indefinite deferment. But all 25 Columbus boards reported they had practically no 18-to-25 year olds available, and thus would have to fill their quotas with persons above 25.50 Besides, although proof of non-essentiality was to be submitted to state headquarters, even headquarters was anxious to fill its quota, and so the nature of proof degenerated into a con-

50. Columbus Dispatch, April 10, 1944.
sideration of the need for the men in question. In December, state headquarters ordered a reduction in the number of deferred job holders and in the number of deferred jobs, thus revoking the April policy.

In January, 1945, a new national order gave the draft boards final authority in determining job urgencies, and ordered the induction of occupationally and physically deferred men who quit essential jobs without draft board approval. This resulted in a virtual stampede of male workers applying for essential jobs at the Columbus USES. But the order proved to be full of operational defects that engendered both management and labor criticism. Draft boards would not talk to a registrant about the possibility of a change in classification that might result from a contemplated change of jobs until he had obtained from USES an actual referral to the job he wanted to take. But USES would not discuss the referral until he had an exit interview with his present employer. Thus a registrant who wanted to change jobs might not want to change or quit his present job unless he was certain that the board would sanction the transfer and assure him that his draft classification would not change.

As the result, the policy operated to the disadvantage of the workers. Moreover, there is some evidence that even after a worker had obtained a release from his employer and a referral card to another essential employer, some draft boards nonetheless ruled against him and withdrew his deferment status. Thus draft boards undertook to establish that one job was more essential than another, decisions that were the province of the Management–Labor Committee. This fact was
angrily pointed out by several members of the Committee at the time of the inauguration of the policy. Meanwhile, the worker, as was pointed out by a management member of the Committee, was left completely "in the middle" in cases where immediate, pretransfer decisions could not be obtained from his local board.

Another difficulty arose because the regulation did not instruct Selective Service to recognize referrals from the Railroad Retirement Board and the U. S. Civil Service Commission. Thus workers under their jurisdictions were not safeguarded against possible changes of classification. An arrangement was finally devised locally whereby these workers were routed to USES, which duplicated and legitimized their referral cards, an administrative practice that simply highlights the circumspect nature of the arrangement that permitted these two agencies to retain independent referral powers in the first place.

Prior to Selective Service's coming under the authority of WMC, the system had no regional administrative organization, but operated through state directors, appeal boards, and local draft boards. When WMC took over in December, 1942, field offices were established to act as liaison agencies between Selective Service and WMC at the regional level, and to keep each agency currently informed as to its respective plans and activities. The same liaison was to be established on the local level. After the Selective Service System again became an independent agency, the liaison arrangements were to be retained. But

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51. Minutes, Columbus Area Management-Labor Committee meeting, February 6, 1945.
effective liaison was never achieved. Indeed, the over-all planning
in respect to the final use to which human resources were to be put—
military or non-military—was almost a complete farce. The War Man-
power Commissioner tried vainly to obtain real control over the entire
manpower field, but even when Selective Service was under his juris-
diction, he was unable effectively to control its policies, and failed
almost entirely to control its activities. The fact that the military
chiefs opposed the idea of a civilian head in a position to make de-
cisions about the size of the armed forces prevented this head from
effectively making such decisions. And since there was no one person
or agency making such decisions, there could be nothing but a perpetual
tug of war between the different chiefs responsible for policies affect-
ing a single manpower pool.

Moreover, local boards, as has been pointed out, were extremely
individualistic, so that even the national draft director abandoned
efforts to supervise their activities closely. Indeed, local boards
often took action of the most arbitrary and repugnant sort. Thus late
in 1942, during the course of a work stoppage in an essential plant,
one Columbus board suddenly announced a new policy of reclassifying
workers who had been deferred for war work but who were known not to be
doing such work at the time of the announcement. One of its spokesmen
said: "If a man, for some personal reasons, doesn't want to work he
is putting himself ahead of the welfare of the country and the communi-
ity... This is the reason why our board... began reclassifying men who
we had reason to believe were no longer engaged in essential war work."

52. Columbus Dispatch, December 30, 1942.
Although the stoppage lasted less than 48 hours, the board reclassified two persons and withdrew deferment of 19.

Local boards made the initial decision whether a man should go into military service or be deferred for occupational reasons. The WAC lists of critical occupations were useful guides. However, insofar as the Columbus Area was concerned, there was considerable confusion as to the officiality of local additions to this list, with the result that throughout the entire stabilization period it was never certain whether the various boards would recognize these in the same way as they recognized occupations on the national list. And even in respect to the national list there is not much evidence that boards permitted it to stand in their way of filling their quotas. Furthermore, although this guide to types of occupational deferments was available to the boards, it would appear that their general lack of technical competence to make deferment decisions on the basis of occupational considerations should have been offset by the presence of an occupational or placement analyst on each board. To some extent the services of such an analyst were provided by USES, but in view of the lack of greater use of USES facilities and the lack of more conscientious adherence to its recommendations, it would appear that each board, or group of boards, should have had an analyst of its own.

It would also appear that the quota arrangement whereby local boards were required to furnish a specified number of draftees within a given period left something to be desired. The system apparently resulted in the almost complete atomization of national, regional, state,
and even local standards, with each board following those policies and practices that would help it fill its quota, rather than the policies that theoretically prevailed nationally at that time. The effect was public confusion, employer uncertainty, undermining of civilian morale.

And finally, it does not appear that the threat of military induction was used as widely and successfully as it might have been in the form of a lever to press draft-age men into essential work. There appears to be no excuse, for example, for 800 men suddenly becoming available for essential work as late as 1945 simply because of a change in Selective Service policy. And this rush was repeated every time there was talk of a "work-or-fight" order. The apparent reasons for improper use of the draft lever were the lack of coordination between WRC and Selective Service on a national basis and the independent attitudes of local boards.

The armies and the factories drew from the same manpower pool; the drawing power of the armies was reinforced by the power of compulsion, while that of the factories was reinforced, at the most, only by the threat of requiring military service if factory service was refused. But this threat was not effectively employed, even in the placement activities of the local USES office. Political considerations perhaps militated against its use as an expressed national policy, but there was no reason for its not being employed locally. Failure to do so was unfortunate, especially in view of the difficulty of placing men in certain plants and occupations. It would certainly not have been inconsistent with the "voluntary" nature of the stabilization program.
to have employed this threat, certainly no more than it was inconsis-
tent to threaten loss of income to persons who quit essential jobs
without obtaining statements of availability.

Military withdrawals obviously injured the production program,
but in the aggregate, local adjustments were made quickly and with not
a great deal of difficulty. The largest employer in the area lost
over 6,000 employees to the armed forces, yet seemed always reasonably
well staffed, a fact that simply illustrates that Columbus' manpower
problem was far from being at a crisis stage.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATIONS

In the foregoing chapters the nature and operation of the wartime manpower mobilization, stabilization, and utilization program were analyzed. The present chapter is devoted to reviewing the major findings of the study and to making critical observations, evaluations and suggestions about manpower management under conditions of full mobilization for war.

The number of Franklin County persons actively in the labor force in 1940 was 160,000, 20,000 of whom were unemployed or in public emergency. Although military withdrawals during the war amounted to about 40,000, total employment nonetheless increased to 200,000 during the same period, an 80,000 increase in the county's labor force. Net immigration accounted for about 35,000 of this increase. About 50,000 more women took jobs during the war than had them in 1943. A substantial proportion of them may have been immigrants, since a sample study shows that over 40 percent of the immigrants hired by Franklin County manufacturing concerns in 1943 were women. School-age youngsters were also hired in large numbers, either for full-time or part-time or vacation employment. A pronounced increase in the utilization of this group occurred particularly in manufacturing.

Older persons constituted another group which was more generally employed in 1943 than in 1940. Thus only 6.5 percent of 1940 hires in county manufacturing concerns included persons 45 years of age or over,
a figure that increased to 12 percent in 1943. And finally, another
important source of the additional manpower was the increase in the
number of persons commuting long distances to jobs located nearer the
heart of the metropolitan area.

Over $1 billion in prime supply and facility contracts were placed
and completed in Franklin County between 1940 and 1945, with production
almost always remaining on schedule, despite isolated cases of labor
shortages. The wartime manpower program was undoubtedly instrumental
in achieving this remarkable production record. Not only was the
available manpower channelled to the most essential job openings, but
employment was also stabilized by the reduction in turnover. The turn-
over rate declined approximately 30 percent after stabilization controls
went into effect. Efforts to reduce absenteeism, on the other hand,
appear not to have had lasting effects.

The controlled referral and the priority referral programs un-
doubtedly resulted in more efficient allocation and use of available
manpower, although the nature of the referral machinery and indeed the
entire stabilization program, was such as to dissipate many of its
potential advantages. A brief discussion of the stabilization program
in terms of the underlying mitigating factors responsible for this
dissipation is therefore undertaken here. It will serve the dual pur-
pose of focusing attention on what the previous chapters have shown
to have been the program's crucial weakness and of providing background
for the consideration of possible alternative ways of dealing with the
manpower question under conditions of mobilization for war production.

Despite its successes, the referral program was somewhat less than
completely effective because compliance with manpower controls and directives was largely unenforceable. Appeal to the patriotic sentiments of both employers and employees was the most widely relied upon method of obtaining cooperation. The area Management-Labor Committee was the organizing unit through which community consent and backing for manpower measures was enlisted. But the Committee itself had a voluntary basis, so that before it went about enlisting the cooperation of the community, its own cooperation had first to be secured. And this involved making concessions to the institutional and personal biases of its members.

The Columbus Area Committee modified many of the manpower measures suggested by WMC in order to satisfy the individual or institutional needs or whims of some or all of its members. To that extent the resultant program, as well as its administration, was not as effective as it might have been. For example, both management and labor agreed that nothing in the stabilization program should modify or alter the provisions of a labor-management agreement, a stipulation that prevented, among other things, the introduction of proposed negotiated transfers and the wider application of upgrading programs. The area director, in consideration of his need for the confidence and backing of the Committee, often found himself in the position of supporting practices that were personally and administratively repugnant, and indeed of retreating from perviously strongly held views. On one occasion, for example, he indicated to the Committee that the seriousness of the current manpower shortage was such as to make the immediate adoption of negotiated or forced transfers inevitable. Although the existing
stabilization plan had provided for such transfers, the Committee procrastinated for two weeks during which the members raised innumerable questions respecting certain difficulties that might arise if transfers were undertaken. Finally the area director, perceiving that the members were in this way expressing their opposition to the proposal, told them that upon further consideration of the facts, it did not appear that the transfer program was necessary at this time. In this way, he avoided a showdown with his Committee, saved face by not appearing to have given in, retained the Committee's support, but diluted the effectiveness of the manpower program.

The same kind of dilution occurred in respect to other provisions of the stabilization program. The program was continuously compromised, for instance, with respect to the prohibition of discriminatory hiring practices. While the proportion of Negroes in essential employment increased from five percent in 1940 to more than 15 percent in 1944, there was still considerable discrimination, not only in respect to hiring, but also in respect to the kinds of jobs for which they were eligible and in respect to promotions and training for advanced skills. Only once during the entire war did USES seriously threaten to use sanctions against firms violating non-discrimination orders. In practice they were never used.

Administratively, there were a number of barriers to the easy application of sanctions. For example, they could not be applied while appeals on the area director's decision to apply them were pending before either the area, regional, or national Management-Labor Committee. Locally the appeals procedure alone consumed about three months,
Moreover, the national anti-discrimination order provided that discriminatory hiring practices had to be proved with respect to specific cases of alleged discrimination, a requirement that almost completely neutralized efforts to prove discrimination. An employer could generally invent a legitimate reason for turning down any individual applicant. A minor error, inconsistency, or omission in his application might easily be used as evidence of his unreliability, or a slight health impediment or a somewhat unstable work record might disqualify him where other excuses were unavailable. Since discrimination had to be proved with respect to an employer's treatment of individual applicants, evidence showing that an employer did not apply to whites the high hiring standards he applied to Negroes was inadmissible. Yet it was perfectly obvious to employment service personnel that certain employers openly discriminated in the hiring of Negroes. Thus it would appear that in the interest of the better utilization of available manpower, manpower officials should be given the opportunity to prove the existence of discriminatory hiring by simply pointing to the obvious absence of workers of certain available races, for example, in the work force of the employers involved. Appeals should be rapid and clear-cut, with presumptive evidence counting as heavily as the direct evidence which was demanded during World War II.

In the Columbus Area private community groups sought to increase the employment opportunities of Negroes. Although the method was superior to the national FEPC program in the sense that employers were approached and treated more sympathetically than they might otherwise have been, it was also to some extent too lenient, with the result that
it accomplished less than it might have. Still this type of community approach to the problem has considerable merit and would appear to be an indispensable feature of any national manpower program.

The problem of increasing the utilization of available manpower, not only in respect to the employment of Negroes, but also in respect to the more effective allocation of available workers, is also a problem of reorienting employment service personnel in regard to what they perceive to be their function. Because of their pre-war emphasis on exacting service to both job seekers and employers, they were not able fully to accomplish the wartime task of insisting that employers modify their strict hiring standards and of getting applicants to accept referrals to the jobs for which they were reasonably suited and which were in most urgent need of being filled. Before the war their principal task had been to find jobs, and to please both the applicant and the employer in the final fitting of the applicant to the job. Suddenly, they were asked to find applicants rather than jobs, and to do this with speed and with a minimum concern for the whims and tastes of the parties involved. This was not an easy transformation for employment service personnel, and they did not fully succeed in making it.

Employment service personnel were also reluctant to enforce the utilization and non-discriminatory hiring provisions of the stabilization plans because they feared losing the goodwill of the affected employers upon whose manpower orders the continued post-war existence of the public employment services depended. Similarly they were reluctant
rigidly to interpret and enforce referral standards for fear of antagonizing and alienating job applicants who might, as the result, refuse to seek jobs through the public employment services after stabilization controls ended. And finally, USES and WMC officials failed fully to enforce other stabilization provisions for fear of antagonizing the very employers and workers upon whose cooperation the effectiveness of the program depended.

The power of USES and of the Manpower Priorities and the Production Urgency Committees to apply sanctions to recalcitrant employers was never fully or conscientiously used. But the failure to have applied such sanctions does not indicate the absence of practices that warranted them. Indeed, discriminatory employment practices, underutilization of manpower, refusal to permit WMC utilization studies, and inadequate anti-turnover and anti-absenteeism efforts were sufficiently prevalent to have warranted the use of sanctions. Still non-complying essential employers continued to receive the benefits of manpower stabilization simply because their production was essential. Certain employers knew that the urgency of war production required that they continue to receive high priority ratings and specialized referral treatment from USES, despite their being in violation of some of the stabilization standards. Moreover, procurement officers from the armed services for whom the essential products were being made exerted pressure in support of the claims of these firms for priority treatment, regardless of the failure of these establishments to have fully exhausted the possibilities of helping solve their own manpower problems by adhering more fully to
stabilization provisions.

Whether a manpower program relies on compulsion or on voluntarism for its success, it must insurb itself against developing operating contradictions. Two characteristics of any manpower control program which may lead to contradictions are that it needs the wide general consent of the persons directly affected, and that attempts to enforce its provisions may accomplish the opposite of what is intended. Thus, because manpower programs impinge on the daily affairs of every working person in very intimate and direct ways, considerable pressure develops for its widespread violation (or circumvention). The longer the program remains in effect, the more intense this pressure becomes. The community is likely to view violations (or circumventions) with the same moral indifference as is displayed toward exploiting loopholes in the income tax law. Indeed, the successful violator becomes a hero among his friends and a source of confidence that the manpower people can be outwitted. It is therefore desirable that the consent of the community be intensively and constantly cultivated to prevent the development of this kind of attitude. This requires that the government be in the best possible position to communicate effectively to the people. One method of accomplishing this is by giving the government access to space in the daily press in which it can clearly and continuously state its programs, objectives, problems, needs, and accomplishments.

At the same time, a manpower program must protect itself against the inconsistency of causing a curtailment of production as the re-
suit of punishing violators. For example, if it simply prevents a violating worker from taking another job for 60 days, as it did during World War II, it has effectively deprived needy employers of a unit of manpower during that period. By the same token, refusal to give priority referral privileges to a violating employer deprives him of manpower that may be urgently needed to meet the needs of war production. Severe fines or jail sentences may result in similar contradictions.

On the other hand, however, the World War II experience suggests that effective fines, and even jail sentences, should be considered as a means of helping enforce manpower measures. In respect to fines, non-complying employers might be fined on an ad valorem basis, the amount being deducted from net profits after taxes. Such fines might also impinge on the personal incomes of company executives. Unions, union leaders, and workers might be subject to similar fines. In view of the extent to which the effect of even the limited sanctions of the World War II program was vitiated by lengthy appeals procedures, thought should also be given to possible methods of speeding up such procedures. In the case of appeals, fines which are ultimately imposed should be made retroactive to the beginning of the offense.

Exclusive reliance on the use of punitive measures or on sanctions of the World War II variety is not enough, however. It is not sufficient to argue that the uncompromising use of these would ultimately prevent practices requiring their further use. There is no such guarantee. Punitive measures alone do not insure compliance. To the extent that they are necessary, however, they must be more effective than those of World War II. To the extent that they are
relied upon, they must be accompanied by an intensive educational campaign designed to obtain consent.

It is not a contradiction in terms to suggest that effective punitive measures be used in a voluntary program. The mechanics of such a program may be such that compulsion can be used without violating the spirit of voluntarism. For example, a national Management-Labor Committee, representing the two most intimately affected functional groups in society, could determine the nature and provisions of the manpower program and at the same time stipulate punishments to which violators are subject. These determinations might have the effect of law, somewhat like the National Industrial Recovery Administration's industry codes. The constitutional objections which resulted in the invalidation of the industry codes could be overcome by means of a somewhat better delimitation of the power of the Committee than was imposed in the case of NJRA.

It can be argued, of course, that if a program is to have the effect of law, it might as well originate in Congress, and thus avoid constitutional squabbles. This, however, would destroy the voluntary nature of the resultant program. If nearly the same provisions as Congress would be inclined to pass can be obtained by means of voluntary agreement, it would appear preferable to follow the path of voluntarism. The question is, however, whether a national Management-Labor Committee would approve controls as strong and as adequately supported by effective penalties as Congress would.

The World War II experience suggests that the national Manage-
ment-Labor Committee is capable of being a far-sighted and essentially selfless group that thinks in broad national-interest terms. The same can probably not be said of local committees, however. While on the whole the Columbus Area Committee functioned quite well, its members were too deeply involved in the day-to-day affairs of managing their unions or their establishments to display the kind of statesmanship and objectivity that an effective voluntary program requires. The local Committee on a number of occasions opposed the introduction, or refused to require effective administration of, programs emanating from the national Committee, even though the latter was composed of representatives from the same groups as the former. It would appear that the further such representatives were removed from the actual place of final administration of the controls, the less likely were they to be concerned with the petty needs or interests of the groups they served. The less intimately familiar they were with the day-to-day impact of the controls on the operation of specific unions or establishments, the more they appeared to think in terms of broad national strategy. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the manpower controls emanating from any future national Committee will be characterized by the same kind of statesmanlike appreciation of national needs as characterized those of World War II. Thus, a national Committee, functioning on a voluntary basis and issuing directives, orders, and plans that are made by representatives of those who must finally abide by them, can probably, if handled with diplomacy and skill by manpower officials, be safely relied upon to develop a program as good as might be developed by Congress.
Another way of getting the mobilization and stabilization job done is, of course, through a national service program that compels affected persons to take such jobs as the program's administrators stipulate. Under future conditions of full mobilization for war some such program may be inevitable, the British example of World War II serving perhaps as our working model. However, there is much to be said in favor of withholding extreme measures of this nature until all others have failed. The Columbus experience indicates that the periodic imposition of increasingly severe manpower measures has a sobering effect that not only accomplishes the job of better utilizing available manpower but also of re-emphasizing to the community the urgency of manpower and production needs. Increasing the severity of the measures expresses the nature of existing problems in more dramatic terms than do public statements appealing to people's patriotic sentiments.

The flush of patriotic devotion that often accompanies the early months of a war may help to overcome manpower problems during this period, but disinterest is likely to develop and more effective means of circumventing existing controls are likely to be discovered. A periodic strengthening of controls would help prevent loss of interest, and would help frustrate widespread violation of existing controls. The manpower program in a future all-out war might therefore initially take a form similar to the Expanded Manpower Program of World War II and from time to time thereafter be strengthened as the situation demands. National service would be the last resort. Since, however, opposition to government controls is likely to become more forthright as the war progresses, it is probably desirable that legislation
permitting a manpower draft be passed during the early crisis period and thereafter be used merely as a threat to help make less stringent measures successful, until or unless circumstances finally force its implementation.

Local flexibility is, of course, highly desirable in any stabilization plan, and can be achieved even in a national service program, as the British experience illustrates. But there is considerable danger that if the program is as widely voluntary as the United States World War II program was, and if the local Management-Labor Committee is permitted as wide a berth in ruling on the provisions of a local program as it had, local qualifications, exceptions, and reservations will dilute the program to an extent that will render it almost ineffective.

With respect to certain other specific operational features of the manpower program in the Columbus Area, it is quite obvious that utilization efforts were far from adequate. Besides the refusal of some plants fully to utilize women, Negroes, and immigrants, the in-plant management of personnel and production processes was often such as considerably to prevent the full utilization of the actual work force. The elimination and correction of poor utilization practices is a necessary part of any manpower program. In the Columbus Area, WMC's utilization consultants were not adequately qualified to accomplish the tasks they were assigned, and besides, the national directives that were to guide the consultants stipulated practices and procedures that were too cumbersome, too detailed, too time-consuming. Moreover, they
frequently resulted in advice and recommendations that were petty and impractical. Furthermore, the utilization program was never cleared with the various associations of employers who were to be affected by its operation, with the result that employers were not as receptive to suggestions that their utilization practices be studied as they might have been. Indeed, they were often openly hostile, partly out of suspicion that they would be required to follow procedures they disliked, partly for fear that it would endanger their continuance of certain restrictive and discriminatory hiring practices, partly out of institutional reluctance to have outsiders interfere with the internal affairs of their plants, and partly out of customary hostility to government.

Perhaps a better method of conducting the utilization program would have been to follow the Toledo, Ohio, example of having employers conduct their own utilization surveys. To some extent this was attempted in Columbus, but it was not an organized program and employers were not enlisted in the effort in any formal way.

It also appears that malutilization was to some extent aggravated by the cost-plus method of letting production contracts. This method provided an incentive for wasteful use of manpower. Exaggerated employer estimates of their expected manpower needs further appear to have contributed to some malutilization of the available area supply and had the effect of distorting the actual nature of the local situation and to that extent misdirecting or dissipating formal mobilization efforts. However, statistical information on the basis of which area manpower officials made plans was often unreliable and inconsistent for
reasons other than the distorted estimates of employers. For example, many of the estimates of existing manpower supply appear to have been made on the basis of random, unscientific observations. Moreover, the statistical reports made available to local manpower officials were not always comparable from one period to another. Too frequently the components of the samples, and the nature of the samples themselves, changed so often that the basis for long-term comparisons was destroyed. It would appear that one of the best preparatory steps that can be taken to aid future manpower programs is the development of consistent and useful statistical series that can and will be employed uniformly in all stabilization areas throughout the nation.

The utilization program encountered another very persistent difficulty, namely the overlapping activities of several government agencies. For example, USES consultants, armed services procurement officers, and WPB representatives all made independent utilization surveys. Indeed, the repeated presence of procurement officers, WPB, OPA, ODT, and WLR officials, and inspectors from the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations and the State Health Department, all inquiring into certain manpower problems and practices, often tried the patience of employers and supplied a legitimate basis for their not infrequent complaints about the abundance of government alphabetic agencies performing overlapping functions.

The World War II experience also sheds some light on certain processes of local labor force expansion. It is apparent, for example, that it is much less necessary to rely on active recruitment of manpower as a means of increasing the work force of a given area than
has often been supposed. An industrial area that lies within two or three hundred miles of large stretches of comparatively infertile or marginal farm land appears to be extremely well situated from the point of view of obtaining additional manpower. There appears to be no need intensively to recruit workers from these areas in times of an abundance of jobs. They apparently hear of the easy availability of jobs in the industrial centers through their own private communications grapevine, and apparently respond to this availability in proportion to the comparative ease of obtaining jobs.

Local residents also appear to respond to the greater need for workers in proportion to the ease of obtaining jobs. This is particularly the case in respect to women. There is also some evidence that this increase in local labor force participation rates expresses itself in new workers taking many of the lesser-paying jobs in less essential employments to replace persons who have shifted to the more essential, higher-paying jobs to which their access had previously been somewhat limited.

The turnover experience suggests that while much of the wartime turnover was caused by workers being "pushed" out of their jobs because of such undesirable in-plant factors as poor working conditions and bad personnel practices, many appear also to have been "pulled" out by the availability of other jobs at higher wages. Not only wages, but other factors such as the non-pecuniary reputation of an establishment as either a "good" or a "bad" place to work, played an important role in place-of-employment choices. Important in this connection are the cleanliness of an establishment, its newness in the community,
its personnel practices, and its relative accessibility by public transportation. There also seems to be a tendency for persons to prefer to work at plants where their friends are already employed. These factors seem to be particularly important to those persons, primarily women, who have not previously or recently been employed.

But the wage factor cannot be entirely ignored. Wage considerations are important in job choices and cause unrest among persons already employed. It would appear that the problems of manpower recruitment, placement, and stabilization, and the problem of wage control, are merely different aspects of a single problem. This suggests the need for somehow integrating the manpower and the wage programs under periods of mobilization for war. The need for such coordination became inescapably evident during World War II when the lower-paying service establishments found their labor supply dwindling and when some concerns successfully circumvented the intent of wage controls by increasing the take-home pay of their employees by having them work longer hours. It may perhaps be necessary to establish more nearly uniform wages within given areas than was done during World War II, and even to limit maximum hours so as to prevent certain firms from offering more take-home pay by scheduling longer hours. Since it appears that productivity declines considerably when workers are employed in excess of 54 to 56 hours per week, the limitation of maximum hours to about this level would not appear to be harmful to the production effort.

To suggest a relationship between wages and the availability of manpower is not necessarily to support the classical doctrine that an increase in wage rates results in the availability of more workers. This
does not follow from the war-time experience. What does follow is that wages are one among many factors in job choices and that the labor supply increases with the greater abundance of jobs and the greater ease with which jobs may be gotten.

Conventional economic theory will argue, however, that a relaxation of hiring standards and the resultant availability of jobs to persons previously not offered them, is tantamount to a wage increase; that relaxed hiring standards simply reflect employers' willingness to hire persons at present wages whom they previously would only have hired at considerably lower rates, and that for this reason the theory is perfectly legitimate. This is obviously true, but in terms of the practical realities of manpower dynamics it is not relevant to argue that traditional economic theory is justified by the fact that the less desirable workers hired in 1944 at, say, 55¢ per hour would and could have been hired at their "actual" value of 25¢ per hour in 1939; and that by being hired for 55¢ they received a 30¢ hourly raise.

The fact is that they could not and probably would not have been hired at 25¢ in 1939 because of minimum wage laws, union restrictions, local custom, and because it might have been excessively injurious to the local reputations of the firms involved. Indeed, even before the enactment of minimum wage legislation and before the advent of unions employers exhibited no general willingness even to offer jobs at wages considerably below prevailing rates, despite widespread unemployment, because, if for no other reason, the technological structure of modern industry prevents employers from behaving in the manner posited by conventional wage theory. Employers simply cannot, in most cases, re-
place machines with cheap labor, even if that labor can be hired for 1½ per hour.

A problem-solving approach requires that the fetters of theoretical elegance be shed in favor of the practical operational requirements of actual manpower dynamics. To say that a relaxation of hiring standards amounts to a wage increase preserves the internal consistency of price analysis, but it does not take into consideration the institutional, customary, and personality barriers that prevent indirect wage increases of this kind. Indeed, attempts to fit the practical realities of manpower dynamics into the Procrustian bed of price analysis obscures these factors, and is more likely to hinder than to facilitate an understanding of the problem under consideration. Practically, the important fact of the matter is that a lowering of hiring requirements and the resultant greater ease of obtaining jobs is the best way to increase the labor force participation rate and the manpower supply of a given area.

Conventional economic theory describes this phenomenon in terms of an increase in wages, which is the other side of the theoretical coin. But it is also the tautological side; it only partially and crudely explains the nature of the process by which the supply of labor is increased. Taken in hypothetical isolation it is logically impeccable, but applied in practice it requires a chain of devious reasoning the outcome of which is the bare-faced fact that a clear and simple reduction of hiring standards increases the supply of labor available to a community.

As persons never before in industrial employment can more easily obtain jobs in these employments, it becomes necessary to expand avail-
able training facilities and to provide for somewhat more rapid up-
grading. In the Columbus Area training facilities were far from abundant,
to some extent because of lack of employer interest in training their own
workers, and to some extent because of lack of any great need. As divi-
sion of labor increases and as labor-saving machines are more generally
employed, individual functions in industrial jobs become increasingly
more atomized and require increasingly fewer and lesser skills. Still,
the need for some formal training persists in the case of a large pro-
portion of industrial workers. Training facilities must therefore be
supplied, and the industrial community must be indoctrinated to take
advantage of the training facilities that are provided for potential
war workers. Employers, on the other hand, must join the effort and re-
frain from hiring unskilled workers for purposes of training them them-
selves when public facilities are available. One of the reasons for
low enrollment in the Columbus public training schools during World War
II was undoubtedly the willingness of employers to hire the unskilled
at comparatively high wages, and their willingness to pay those newly
hired persons while they were learning.

Still, there are many jobs that can be performed only by physically
strong, unskilled workers. A number of local production bottlenecks
were caused by shortages of such workers. Unfortunately for the home
front, persons best qualified for jobs of this kind were also extremely
vulnerable to military induction. Situations of this kind suggest the
need for a somewhat better management of the manpower pool so that both
the military services and the factories are properly staffed. Moreover,
it appears that there might also be a somewhat better allocation between
the production needs of the military services and the production needs of the factories. Thus, although manpower shortages caused production lags at some plants, the substitution of certain machines for manpower would have permanently eliminated such lags. Fertilizer plants, for example, persistently needed unavailable husky young men to shovel and load the finished product. The simple substitution of conveyors for men would have solved the problem, but conveyors were not being produced, or at least were not available locally. It would appear therefore that the solution to certain manpower problems lies in a more liberal attitude toward permitting "non-military" production.

The problem of stabilizing and mobilizing manpower in any area is in the final analysis a problem of efficient manpower utilization. This reduces itself to the problem of removing the barriers to efficient utilization. The removal of the barriers is probably much more a problem of human relations than of technical industrial planning and manipulation.

It has been seen that there were innumerable institutional and personal impediments to the better utilization of manpower. There were union restrictions and management restrictions arising out of conflicts between industrial and craft unions, between large and small employers, between essential employers and less essential employers, between representatives from different government or military agencies, and between social and civic groups. But in viewing the practices of these groups it is not sufficient simply to note that better cooperation on their part might have solved certain manpower problems, for many of these practices have origins in institutional rights and privileges that most
people are probably unwilling to see suspended. For example, it was noted that both unions and managements obstructed the stabilization program by either open hostility toward, or lack of enthusiastic compliance with, certain features. A good deal of this behavior was dictated by the institutional nature of these organizations. Their practices were an expression of the functions society normally expects them to perform. When they fail to perform them they are often punished by loss of income, loss of status, or by destruction. The complete eradication of these practices, or the attitudes and motives that germinate them, can only be accomplished by the complete eradication of the groups performing the functions anterior to these practices. Therefore, unless one is willing to advocate the complete suppression of these groups, it becomes unrealistic to speak in terms of what is theoretically attainable in the way of manpower utilization. Indeed, even if one were willing to advocate that the groups be suppressed, that, for example, government abolish or assume all of their functions, there is no guarantee that other and perhaps more damaging practices would not prevent optimum utilization of manpower.

The study has shown that the combined efforts of government agencies, business, industry, labor, newspapers, and civic groups can do a great deal by way of promoting the kind of spirit of cooperation, sacrifice, and resolute determination that makes the job of manpower mobilization, utilization, and stabilization easier. It is important, however, that these promotional efforts be incisive. They must avoid deferring to customary patterns of behavior which, for example, resulted in Columbus
in the limitation of female recruitment to women in "working class"
families, and in soft-pedaling anti-discrimination programs.

Of course the war experience indicates that appeal to fair play in
hiring, promotions, training, and in-plant relations is not adequate to
insure cooperation with national objectives. Moreover, appeal to patrio-
tism cannot be relied upon to increase the manpower supply or improve
its utilization. Patriotic appeals were sometimes countered with conten-
tions that patriotism also consisted in vigilant resistance to un-
American controls and regimentation. Patriotic motives generally succ-
cumbed to the prior claims of self-interest. While the need for consent
requires the promotion of a spirit of solidarity, sacrifice, and pur-
pose, all three of which can be supported by appeals to patriotic senti-
ments, it appears that such appeals are not enough, and that certain
jobs can only be accomplished by force of legal compulsion.

This preceding study has been concerned with the operation of a
wartime manpower stabilization and mobilization program. Many observa-
tions dealing with the program have important implications respecting
the nature of manpower and labor force dynamics. A few summary words
should be said in their regard.

First, it may be repeated that the concept "manpower problem" means
different things to different people. When the Chamber of Commerce said
in 1940 and 1941 that there was a labor shortage in Columbus, it merely
reflected local personnel managers' new experience of fewer than the
usual number of men answering job advertisements. Employment service
officials at the same time continued to have difficulty in placing the
thousands of unemployed workers in the city. Indeed, even during the depression, some employers complained about labor shortages.

It is quite clear that a "manpower problem" cannot be defined as simply a situation in which a community or a firm or an industry experience a shortage of undifferentiated manpower. The word "manpower" is easily abused, and the abuse can lead to obfuscation and to difficulty in attempts to carry out crucial wartime plans. Manpower is not raw, not homogeneous, not undifferentiated. Despite industrial atomization and the increasing obsolescence of the artisan and craftsman, the industrial millennium is far from a reality. The industrial process continues to require skilled and semi-skilled operatives, technicians, functionaries, and even unskilled ho-men with nothing more than muscle and perseverance. Moreover, employers also are not homogeneous and undifferentiated, not only in respect to their manpower needs, but also in respect to their attitudes to the supply of labor. Thus they differ in respect to the skills they require of their workers and they differ in respect to their willingness to hire Negritos, immigrants, women, young and old people, persons with foreign-sounding names, union sympathizers, etc.

The net result is that the broad designation of "manpower shortage" may mean very little. It is possible for a community to have an over-abundance of persons actively willing and able to work and for it still to find itself in the throes of a difficult manpower problem. It may desperately need welders, machinists, or molders. These are not easily and quickly trained, and, even if they were, there are so many institutional frictions in the labor market and in the employment of workers
that they might never get trained, or if trained, never hired. Not only are workers heterogeneous, but so are employers, unions, laws, and communities. They all have their pressures, prejudices, restrictions, and biases.

Insofar as labor market estimates are concerned, it is obvious that one must not only take into consideration the above factors so as to obtain an effective rather than a gross estimate of the prevailing supply, but also a number of other important factors. For example, knowledge of the volume of a given supply means comparatively little in terms of the solution of manpower problems or in terms of the capacity of that supply to produce a potential volume of production if the supply is not properly allocated. Moreover, even if it is allocated in terms of the skills and aptitudes of every person in that supply, the occupational flexibility of workers may be such as to enable their being easily trained to do jobs in which their productivity exceeds that of their present jobs. Certainly the World War II experience indicates that the occupational flexibility of the labor force is much greater than has been generally assumed. Finally, when one talks of the available or potential labor supply, whether thinking in strategic wartime terms that include the power to compel persons to take designated jobs, or in terms of a more flexible wartime or even peacetime situation, the ultimate nature of job adjustments being fundamentally a matter of human relations, one must think in terms not only of organizing efforts and recruiting, but also in terms of flattering, cajoling, threatening, coercing, and bribing.
APPENDIX A

COLUMBUS, OHIO, AREA MANPOWER STABILIZATION PLANS
In order to implement the provisions of Executive Order #9328 and regulations issued thereunder, and establish minimum standards for employment stabilization which will promote the orderly job transfer and migration of workers, prevent piracy, reduce turnover and absenteeism, encourage upgrading, and in general insure the most efficient utilization of the Columbus Area manpower for the effective prosecution of the war and the preservation of a minimum civilian economy, the Area Director and the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, acting with the consent and approval of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission, do hereby adopt the following Plan, and bespeak compliance by all employers and workers in the Columbus Area.

I. Definitions

1. The Columbus Area shall consist of Franklin, Delaware, Union, Madison, and Pickaway Counties.

2. An "essential worker" is one whose present or most recent employment was in an activity listed as "essential" or "locally needed".

3. An "essential activity" is any activity included in the "List of Essential Activities" published by the War Manpower Commission, and any activity approved by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission as locally needed.

4. An "immigrant worker" is any non-resident who has resided less than 30 days in the area.

5. A "Statement of Availability" is a written statement which shall contain only the worker's name, Social Security account number, if any, the name and address of the issuing employer or War Manpower Commission office, the date of issuance, and a statement to the effect that the worker may be hired elsewhere in an essential activity. Other pertinent qualifying or limiting information may only be added by the United States Employment Service of the War Manpower Commission.

6. A "Statement of Inter-Area Clearance" is a statement issued by the USES of the WMC to an outmigrant worker, indicating that his services are not needed in the area in the best interests of the war effort and that, upon advice
of the USES of the WMC, he has agreed not to use such clearance in any area where immigration is restricted.

7. A "referral" is the act of the USES of the WMC in sending a worker to a specific job with a specific employer, for consideration of hiring by such employer.

8. "Solicit for the purpose of hiring" is interpreted to mean an offer of employment by an employer to an essential worker who has not yet obtained a Statement of Availability.

II. Restrictions on Hiring

1. No employer, private or governmental, shall hire or solicit for the purpose of hiring any worker whose most recent employment was in an essential activity without a Statement of Availability issued by his employer or the USES of the WMC. Employers shall retain and file such certificates and shall make them available for inspection upon request of the WMC.

2. No worker shall accept employment with an employer if such employer is prohibited from hiring him under the provisions of this Stabilization Plan.

3. Workers whose most recent employment was in an essential activity shall only be hired by employers engaged in essential activities. Employers engaged in other activities not defined as essential shall not hire such workers; provided, however, that the USES of the WMC may refer any such worker to an employer in a less essential activity if such referral would be in the best interest of the war effort and no increase in wage or salary rate is involved.

4. Workers in activities not designated as essential may be hired by employers engaged in essential activities without restrictions, provided that they reside in the area where they are hired.

III. Control of Inter-Area Migration

1. No employer shall hire any immigrant or transient worker except upon referral by the local office of the USES of the WMC in the area in which the employer offers employment. Local offices of the USES of the WMC shall not refer any immigrant worker to employment in an area designated as restricted or controlled for immigration except as provided herein.

2. No migrant worker shall be referred for employment by the USES of the WMC unless he presents a Statement of Inter-Area Clearance issued by the local office of the USES of the WMC in the area in
which he was last employed.

3. Whenever, in the judgment of the Area Manpower Director and the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, it becomes necessary to restrict or close the area to immigration, the Regional Manpower Director shall be notified, and the Regional Office may then certify the area as "controlled for purposes of immigration". Local offices of the USES of the WMC shall be informed of such certifications and shall advise all applicants for Statements of Inter-Area Clearance that such Statements will not be honored in the restricted areas. This provision is not to be construed to prevent or interfere with normal USES clearance procedures.

IV. Transfers Within the Contract Construction Industry

1. In the event that the prosecution of the war demands that workers laid off in the construction industry immediately transfer to other jobs within the construction industry in their regular occupation, and the most recent employer fails to provide a Statement of Availability, and contact with the USES of the WMC to secure a Statement of Availability would impede necessary construction, the Union representative having jurisdiction shall notify the USES of the WMC of the emergency transfer, which notification shall serve in lieu of a Statement of Availability within the industry.

V. Valid Reasons for Job Transfers

1. A Statement of Availability shall be issued to any worker by his last employer or by the USES of the WMC whenever the worker:

   a. Is discharged by his last employer; provided, however, that when a worker willfully provokes his own discharge for the purpose of obtaining a Statement of Availability, he shall be deemed to have voluntarily quit within the meaning of this section. All such cases will be reviewed by the Area War Manpower Committee.

   b. Is laid off for an indefinite period or for a period of seven or more days.

   c. Can establish that his present employment does not utilize his highest skill, or that he is not being employed full-time; provided, however, that when a Statement of Availability is issued by the USES of the WMC on the basis of higher skill, such statement shall only be valid when accompanied by a referral issued by the USES of the WMC and for employment with the employer designated thereon and in the occupation specified on such referral. Proven skills or previous job classifications at a higher skill rather
than wage rates shall determine the worker's right to transfer.

d. Has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change employment.

e. Is employed at sub-standard wages as defined by the War Labor Board; provided, however, that when an employer paying sub-
standard wages now has a wage request pending before the War Labor Board, no Statement of Availability shall be issued until
a decision is made by the War Labor Board, unless the decision is delayed an unreasonable period of time.

2. No Statement of Availability shall be issued solely on the ground
that an individual's wage or salary rate is less than that prevailing in the locality for the same or substantially similar work.

VI. Employer's Rights and Responsibilities

1. It is incumbent upon the employer to investigate requests for
Statements of Availability based on any one of these valid
reasons, and to issue Statements as provided herein. Further,
exit interviews provide an opportunity to reconcile the worker's
reason for separation, and blanket refusal on the part of the
employer to recognize valid reasons for separation of workers
will merely transfer responsibilities to the USES of the WMC
which should be resolved between the employer and the employee.

2. Hiring by departments and agencies of the Federal Government in
the Columbus Area subject to Civil Service rules and regulations
shall be done only with the approval of the U. S. Civil Service
Commission, which shall conduct its recruiting activities and
make referrals pursuant to the provisions of this Plan and in
accordance with policies, procedures, and standards of the War
Manpower Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall clear
job openings with the local USES office before recruiting outside
the local commuting area. However, such clearance shall
not be required for Civil Service job openings which are gov-
erned by Federal law on the apportionment of positions to States.

3. Railroads shall hire immigrant workers with Statements of Inter-
Area Clearance only through the Railroad Retirement Board
Employment Service. All orders for workers shall be cleared
with the USES of the WMC prior to negotiating for immigrant
workers.

VII. Worker's Rights and Responsibilities

1. If a worker desires to quit or be transferred, he shall notify
his employer in writing of that fact, together with his reasons.
If within three days the employer fails or refuses to issue a
Statement of Availability, then the worker shall notify the local
office of the USES of the WMC, and the USES of the WMC shall forthwith consult with the employer and make such further investigation as it deems advisable. Within five days, excluding Sundays, the USES of the WMC shall determine the issue and grant a Statement of Availability if the worker is entitled to it, and shall notify the worker and the employer of the action taken.

2. Until such time as issuance of the Statement of Availability is determined by the USES of the WMC, the worker shall remain on the job. The worker shall be considered an employee of the employer until the Statement of Availability issue has been determined.

VIII. Seniority

1. An essential worker who has been granted a Statement of Availability shall have his seniority and reemployment rights preserved in accordance with the following provisions:

a. When the transfer is made by the USES of the WMC in the best interest of the war effort, or authorized because the worker is employed below his highest skill or for less than full-time, the worker shall maintain and accumulate seniority with his original employer during the period of transfer. Where labor contracts do not exist, employers shall give workers a written statement defining their seniority rights when the worker is requested by the USES of the WMC to transfer to more essential employment. The seniority of workers transferring for other reasons shall be determined by employer-employee negotiation.

b. Statements of Availability in transfer cases outlined in sub-section VIII-l-a shall be issued in triplicate and marked "Transfer" across the face of each Statement and signed by the employer under the word "Transfer"; two copies will be given to the worker (one for himself and one for his new employer), and the third copy will be retained by the original employer.

c. Transferred workers shall apply for reemployment with their original employer within one week after separating from the job to which they originally transferred, if the separation occurs during the war, or within 40 days if the war shall have ended. No transferred worker applying for reemployment with his original employer shall be refused reemployment on account of physical condition if his physical condition is substantially the same as when he was originally transferred.
IX. Appeals

1. Within three days after receipt of notice of action taken by the United States Employment Service of the WMC in the matter of failure or refusal of employer to issue a Statement of Availability, or within five days after it was mailed to his last known address, the worker or the employer may appeal to the Area War Manpower Committee. Further appeals may be taken by any party at interest to the Regional War Manpower Committee, in accordance with established War Manpower Commission policies. Decisions on appeals to the Area War Manpower Committee shall be determined within seven days from the date of such appeal unless extraordinary circumstances require additional time.

2. Any worker or employer, or groups thereof, may be represented at any stage of any proceedings by their union or other bona fide representative.

X. Non-Compliance with Provisions of the Plan

1. Any employer shall, upon request of the USES of the WMC, release from employment any worker hired contrary to the provisions of this Plan or through misrepresentation; and re-transfer of such worker shall be effected in such manner as justice to the worker, the employer, and the best interest of the war effort demand. Appeals from such decisions may be taken in the same manner as in the case of original transfers.

2. Workers failing to remain on the job until such time as their request for a Statement of Availability is considered will be deemed to be in violation of this Plan, and no Statement of Availability or Inter-Area Clearance will be issued, pending determination of the case.

3. Essential employers whose workers are hired by other employers in violation of this Stabilization Plan shall notify the Columbus local office of the USES of the WMC in writing, giving the name of the employer or employers involved, and sufficient additional information as may be required for purposes of identification.

XI. General Provisions

1. The provisions of this Plan shall become effective upon publication of formal acceptance by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission.

2. Nothing contained in this Plan shall change, modify, or restrict any union contract, Civil Service regulation, railroad labor-management agreement, law, or ordinance.
XII. Amendments and Sub-Plans

1. This Plan may be amended or sub-plans adopted by a majority vote of the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, subject to prior approval by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission.

Approved: July 6, 1943

Regional Director,
Region V
War Manpower Commission

s/ Wade Hammond
Wade Hammond, Columbus Area Director
War Manpower Commission

Columbus Area War Manpower Committee
In order to implement the provisions of Executive Order #9328 and regulations issued thereunder, to conform to the provisions of Regulation 7 of the War Manpower Commission, and to promote the orderly job transfer and migration of workers, prevent piracy, reduce turnover and absenteeism, encourage upgrading, and in general, insure the most efficient utilization of the Columbus Area Manpower for the effective prosecution of the war and preservation of a minimum civilian economy, the Area Director and the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, acting with the consent and approval of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission, do hereby adopt the following Plan, and bespeak compliance by all employers and workers in the Columbus Area.

SECTION I - DEFINITIONS (As used in this employment stabilization plan)

A. The Columbus Area shall consist of Franklin, Delaware, Union, Madison, and Pickaway Counties.

B. An "essential worker" is one whose present or most recent employment was in an activity listed as "essential" or "locally needed".

C. "Essential Activity" means an activity included in the WMC list of Essential Activities.

D. An "immigrant worker" is any worker who has not worked or lived in the Columbus Area throughout the preceding 30-day period.

E. A "Statement of Availability" is a written statement issued to the worker by his employer or the USES of the WMC to the effect that the worker may be hired elsewhere in the Columbus Area in an essential activity.

F. A "Statement of Inter-Area Clearance" is a statement issued by the USES of the WMC to an outmigrant worker permitting him to seek work outside of the Columbus Area.

G. A "Referral" is the act of the USES in sending a worker to a specific job with a specific employer, for consideration of hiring by such employer.

H. "Solicit for the purpose of hiring" is interpreted to mean an offer of employment by an employer to an essential worker who has not as yet obtained a Statement of Availability.

I. "Agriculture" means those farm activities carried on by farm owners or tenants on farms in connection with the cultivation of the soil, the harvesting of crops, or the raising, feeding, or management of livestock, bees and poultry, and shall not include any packing, canning, processing, transportation or marketing of articles produced on farms unless performed or carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations.


K. "New Employee" means any individual who has not been in the employment of the hiring employer at any time during the preceding 30-day period. For the purpose of this definition, employment of less than seven days duration and employment which is supplemental to the employee's principal work shall be disregarded. For purposes of recall under seniority provisions, this definition shall not apply.
L. "Critical Occupation" means any occupation designated as a critical occupation by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

M. The terms "Employment" and "Work" as applied to an individual engaged in principal and supplementary employment mean his principal employment.

N. A "Local Shortage Occupation" is an occupation or category of occupations in which shortages in the Columbus Area threaten critically needed war production, The USES, subject to approval by the Area Director, shall designate such local shortage occupations on the basis of the number and age of unfilled orders and other pertinent information.

O. A "Locally Needed Activity" is a trade or service primarily local in character which has been declared locally needed to protect the health, welfare, and safety of the area by the Area Manpower Director.

SECTION II - RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AREA WAR MANPOWER COMMITTEE

The Area War Manpower Committee shall have the following responsibilities and duties:

A. to consider questions of policy, standards, and safeguards in connection with the administration of this plan and other WMC policies and to make recommendations to the Area Manpower Director;

B. to hear and decide appeals arising under this plan or other policies of the WMC in accordance with the WMC Regulation No. 5;

C. to assist the Area Director in securing compliance of their constituents with this plan and other policies of the WMC.

SECTION III - COMPLIANCE BY EMPLOYERS

Employers shall

A. hire or solicit workers in or for work, in the Columbus Area only in accordance with the terms of this plan;

B. hire workers outside the Columbus Area for work in the area through the USES only, with the following exceptions:

1. hiring by departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the Columbus Area subject to Civil Service rules and regulations shall be done only with the approval of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, which shall conduct its recruitment activities and make referrals pursuant to the provisions of this Plan and in accordance with policies, procedures, and standards of WMC.

The Civil Service Commission shall clear job openings with the local USES office before recruiting outside the local commuting area. However, such clearance shall not be required for Civil Service job openings which are governed by Federal law on Apportionment of Position to States;

2. railroads shall hire immigrant workers only through the Railroad Retirement Board Employment Service. All orders for workers shall be cleared with the USES of WMC prior to negotiating for immigrant workers;
C. take all steps necessary to the maximum utilization of manpower resources; and to this end, shall cooperate with WMC in effecting better utilization where necessary, and hire or refrain from hiring any individual solely on the basis of essential qualifications and suitability for performance of the job and without discrimination as to race, color, creed, sex, national origin or (except as required by law or regulations of procurement agencies of the armed forces) citizenship;

D. take all steps necessary to eliminate unnecessary employment turnover including:
1. provision for interviewing workers desiring to leave their employ and making reasonable adjustment, where possible, to retain such workers;
2. granting of Statements of Availability only to those workers who have demonstrated that they are entitled thereto under Section V of this plan;
3. retention of those workers to whom they deny Statements of Availability and who request review by the USES while permitting such workers to absent themselves from work as may be necessary to pursue such requests, and retention or rehiring of workers who have been denied Statements of Availability by USES;
4. it is incumbent upon the employer to investigate requests for Statements of Availability based on any one of the valid reasons and to issue Statements of Availability as provided in Section VII. Further, exit interviews provide an opportunity to reconcile the worker's reason for separation, and blanket refusal on the part of the employer to recognize valid reasons for separation of workers will merely transfer responsibilities to USES which should be resolved between the employer and the employee.

SECTION IV - RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORKERS

A. If an essential worker desires to be transferred, he shall notify his employer of that fact, together with his reasons. If the employer fails or refuses to issue a Statement of Availability promptly, the worker shall notify the local office of USES and USES shall forthwith consult with the employer and make such further investigation as it deems advisable. Within five days, excluding Sunday, the USES shall determine the issue and grant a Statement of Availability if the worker is entitled to it, and shall notify the worker and the employer of the action taken.

B. An essential worker who has been granted a Statement of Availability shall have his seniority and reemployment right preserved in accordance with the following provisions:
1. When the transfer is made by USES in the best interest of the war effort and with the consent of employee and employer, or authorized because the worker is employed below his highest skill or for less than full time, the worker shall maintain and accumulate seniority with his original employer during the period of transfer. Where labor contracts do not exist, the employer shall give workers a written statement defining
their seniority rights when the worker is requested by USES to transfer to more essential employment. The seniority of workers transferring for other reasons shall be determined by employer-employee negotiations;

2, Statements of Availability in transfer cases outlined in subsection IV-B-1 shall be issued in triplicate marked "Transfer" across the face of each Statement and signed by the employer under the word "Transfer"; two copies will be given to the worker, one for himself and one for his new employer, and the third copy will be retained by the original employer;

3, transferred workers shall apply for reemployment with their original employer within one week after separating from the job to which they originally transferred, if the separation occurs during the war, or within 40 days if the war shall have ended.

SECTION V - RESTRICTIONS ON SOLICITATION AND HIRING OF WORKERS

A. No employer in the Columbus Area shall hire without referral or in accordance with arrangements with the USES;

1. a new employee for work in a critical occupation or a worker whose last employment was in a critical occupation;

2. a new employee for work in a local shortage occupation or whose last employment was in a local shortage occupation after notice by the Area Director that such occupation has been so classified;

3. a new employee who has not lived or worked in the area throughout the preceding 30-day period;

4. a new employee whose last regular employment was in agriculture and who is to be hired for nonagricultural work, provided that no such individual shall be referred to nonagricultural work except after consultation with a designated representative of the War Food Administration, and provided further that such individual may be hired for nonagricultural work for a period not to exceed six weeks without referral or presentation of a Statement of Availability.

B. No employer in the Columbus Area shall advertise or otherwise solicit for the purpose of hiring any individual within or outside the Columbus Area if the hiring of such an individual would be subject to restrictions under this plan, except in a manner consistent with such restrictions.

C. Any employer may hire a new employee without restrictions if such new employee has not been employed in an essential or locally needed activity within the 60 days preceding such hiring, and such hiring is not subject to referral by or with the consent of USES under subsection "A" of this section.

D. Any employer in an essential or locally needed activity may hire a new employee who has been employed in an essential or locally needed activity within the preceding 60-day period if such new employee presents a Statement of Availability issued by his last employer or the USES, provided the hiring of such new employee is not subject to referral by or with consent of USES under subsection "A" of this section.
E. No employer engaged in other than essential or locally needed activity shall hire a worker who has been employed in an essential or locally needed activity within the preceding 60-day period except upon referral by or with the consent of USFS.

F. No provisions of the employment stabilization program shall be applicable to:

1. the hiring of a new employee for agricultural employment.
2. the hiring of a new employee for work of less than seven days' duration, or for work which is supplementary to the employee's principal work but such work shall not constitute the individual's "last employment" for the purpose of the program, unless the employee is customarily engaged in work of less than seven days' duration;
3. the hiring of an employee in any territory or possession of the U.S., except Alaska and Hawaii;
4. the hiring by a foreign, state, county, or municipal government, or their political subdivision or their agencies and instrumentalities, or to the hiring of any of their employees, unless such foreign, state, county, or municipal government or political subdivision or agency or instrumentality has indicated its willingness to conform, to the maximum extent practicable under the Constitution and laws applicable to it, with the program;
5. the hiring of a new employee for domestic service, or to the hiring of a new employee whose last regular employment was in domestic service;
6. the hiring of a school teacher for vacation employment or the rehiring of a school teacher for teaching at the termination of the vacation period.

SECTION VI - REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS OF AVAILABILITY.

An individual who is or was last employed in an essential or locally needed activity shall receive a Statement of Availability if:

A. he has been discharged, or his employment has been otherwise terminated by his employer, or
B. he has been laid off for an indefinite period or for a period of seven or more days, or
C. continuance in his employment would involve undue personal hardships, or
D. such employment is or was at a wage or salary or under working conditions below standards established by State or Federal law or regulation, or
E. such employment is or was at a wage or salary below a level established or approved by the National War Labor Board (or other agency authorized to adjust wages or approve adjustments thereof) as warranting adjustment, and the employer has failed to adjust the wage in accordance with such level or to apply to the appropriate agency for such adjustment or approval thereof.

F. No Statement of Availability shall be issued solely on the ground that an individual's wage or salary rate is less than that prevailing in the locality for the same or similar work.
SECTION VII - PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS OF AVAILABILITY

A. Whenever a worker has been discharged or laid off (indefinitely or for seven or more consecutive days) his employer shall immediately issue a Statement of Availability to him. If a worker believes that he is entitled to a Statement of Availability for any of the other reasons set forth in Section VI, he shall request his employer to issue such statement to him. Promptly, but not later than three days after such request is made, the employer shall deliver such statement to the worker or shall notify him in writing that he has denied such request. The notice of denial shall advise the worker that he may apply to USES if he wishes to do so.

B. An application for a Statement of Availability may be filed with the USES by any worker whose employer has failed or refused upon request to issue a statement to him. USES shall promptly investigate and decide the issue involved in such application and shall notify the worker and employer in writing of the decision.

SECTION VIII - REFERRAL IN CASE OF UNDER-UTILIZATION

If an individual is employed at less than full time or at a job which does not utilize his highest recognized skill for which there is a need in the war effort, USES may, upon his request, refer him to other available employment in which it finds that the individual will be more fully utilized in the war effort. However, a worker who wishes to request such referral shall first consult with his employer who may issue a notice of release directed to USES. If the employer refuses to issue such a notice, the worker may apply to USES in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as provided in Section VII.

SECTION IX - CONTENT OF STATEMENTS OF AVAILABILITY

A Statement of Availability issued to an individual pursuant to the program shall contain only the individual's name, address, Social Security Account Number, if any, the name and address of the issuing employer, or WMC officer, or office, the date of issuance, a statement as to whether or not the individual's last employment was in a critical or local shortage occupation, and such other information not prejudicial to the employee in seeking new employment as may be authorized or required by WMC.

SECTION X - CONTROL OF INTER-AREA MIGRATION

A. Any worker whose most recent employment has been in the Columbus Area and any worker who has not been employed throughout the preceding 60-day period, but has resided in the Columbus Area, shall apply to the USES for a Memorandum of Inter-Area Clearance if he wishes to seek employment in an area in which he has not worked or lived throughout the preceding 30-day period. Such inter-area clearance shall be granted to the worker if:

1. he is entitled to, or is not required to obtain a Statement of Availability, and

2. he is not qualified for employment (at his highest skill of value to the war effort) in a local shortage occupation, or his
reasons for wishing to seek employment elsewhere are such as to
take precedence over the local need for his services, and
3. he agrees not to seek work in any area which has been closed
to immigration by action of WMC.

B. An applicant for employment who has not lived or worked in the
Columbus Area throughout the preceding 30-day period shall be re-
ferred to employment in the Columbus Area only if he presents a
Statement of Availability issued by his last employer or by the
local office of USES serving the locality in which he was last em-
ployed, or he presents evidence that he is not required to obtain
such statement, provided, that if such applicant was employed in a
locality covered by a stabilization plan which provides for control
of migration, he shall be referred to employment in the Columbus
Area only if he presents a Memorandum of Inter-Area Clearance or
such similar document as may be provided for in the applicable
agreement.

C. If the Columbus Area is closed to immigration by the Regional
Director of WMC no applicant for employment who has not lived or
worked in the area throughout the preceding 30-day period shall be
referred to employment unless he has been recruited for such employ-
ment, through the regular clearance procedure of USES or is quali-
fied for employment at his highest skill in an occupation for
which clearance orders are outstanding.

SECTION XI - AUTHORIZED ACTIONS TO SECURE COMPLIANCE

A. A Statement of Availability shall be issued by USES to any indi-
vidual in the employ of an employer who the WMC finds after notice and
opportunity to be heard, has not complied with any WMC employment
program, regulation or policy, and for so long as such employer
continues his non-compliance after such finding.

B. In the event any employer is found after notice and opportunity
to be heard, to have failed or refused to abide by Section III of
this plan the Area Director may direct that, in addition to the
action provided by subsection "A" of this section the USES shall
refuse to refer any worker to him or to consent to the hiring of
any worker by him (if such consent is required by the terms of
this plan) for so long as such failure or refusal continues after
such finding.

C. The WMC shall take such action as may be necessary and practicable
to discover the places of employment of workers who have left their
employment in essential or locally needed activities, and have been
hired for and accepted new employment contrary to the provisions of
this agreement. Upon finding that such hiring for and acceptance of
new employment has occurred with respect to any worker, the
hiring employer shall release such worker who shall be directed to
his former employment or referred to other employment in the dis-
cretion of the Area Director.
SECTION XII - APPEALS

A. Any worker or employer may appeal from any act or failure to act by the WMC under this employment stabilization plan in accordance with regulations and procedures of WMC.

B. Within three days after receipt of notice taken by USES in the matter of failure or refusal of employer to issue a Statement of Availability, or within five days after it was mailed to his last known address, the worker or employer may appeal to the Area Committee of WMC. Further appeals may be taken by any party at interest to the Regional committee of WMC in accordance with established WMC policies. Decisions on appeals to the Area Committee shall be determined within seven days from the date of such appeal unless extraordinary circumstances require additional time.

SECTION XIII - REPRESENTATION

Nothing contained in the program shall be construed to restrict any individual from seeking the advice and aid of, or from being represented by, the labor organization of which he is a member or any other representative freely chosen by him at any step in the operation of the program.

SECTION XIV - GENERAL REFERRAL POLICIES

No provision in the program shall limit the authority of USES to make referrals in accordance with approved policies and instructions of WMC. All referrals shall be solely on the basis of essential qualifications and suitability for performance of the job and without discrimination as to race, color, creed, sex, national origin or (except as required by law or regulations of procurement agencies of the Armed Forces) citizenship.

SECTION XV - GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. The provision of this Plan shall become effective upon publication of formal acceptance by the Regional Director of WMC.

B. Nothing contained in this Plan shall change, modify, or restrict any union contract, Civil Service Regulation, railroad labor-management agreement, law, or ordinance.

C. In the event that the prosecution of the war demands that workers laid off in the construction industry immediately transfer to other jobs within the construction industry in their regular occupation, and the most recent employer fails to provide a Statement of Availability, and contact the USES to secure a Statement of Availability would impede necessary construction, the Union representative having jurisdiction shall notify USES of the emergency transfer, which notification shall serve in lieu of a Statement of Availability within the industry.

SECTION XVI - AMENDMENTS AND SUB-PLANS

This Plan may be amended or sub-plans adopted by a majority vote of the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, subject to prior approval by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission.
SECTION XVII - EFFECTIVE DATE

This program shall become effective October 15, 1943.

Approved:
Regional Director Region V, WMC
October 15, 1943

/ Ralph E. Gabele
Ralph E. Gabele
Acting Area Director
Columbus Area WMC
Columbus Area War Manpower Committee.
SECTION I. Statement of Purpose.

In order to implement the provisions of Executive Orders #9139, #9279, and #9328, and in order to amend the former Columbus Employment Stabilization Plan, adopted October 15, 1943, and to conform to the provisions of Regulation No. 7 of the War Manpower Commission, to eliminate so far as possible waste of manpower due to disruptive recruitment and undue migration of workers, and to direct the flow of workers to the jobs in the war effort for which they are most urgently needed, this Employment Stabilization and Manpower Budget Plan for the Columbus, Ohio, Area is hereby established by the Area Director for Columbus, with the approval of the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, and with the consent and approval of the Regional Director of Region V of the War Manpower Commission.

SECTION II. Application of Plan.

This plan shall be applicable throughout the Columbus, Ohio, Area.

SECTION III. Definitions.

As used in this plan:

1. The Fifth Region of the War Manpower Commission is comprised of the States of Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio.

2. The Columbus, Ohio, Area of the War Manpower Commission includes the counties of Franklin, Delaware, Union, Madison, and Pickaway.

3. Agriculture means those farm activities carried on by farm owners or tenants on farms in connection with the cultivation of the soil, the harvesting of crops, or the raising, feeding, or management of livestock, bees, and poultry, and shall not include any packing, canning, processing, transportation, or marketing of articles produced on farms unless performed or carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations.

4. New employee means an individual who has not been in the employment of the hiring employer at any time during the preceding 30-day period. For the purpose of this definition, employment of less than seven days' duration and employment which is supplemental to the employee's principal work shall be disregarded.

5. Critical occupation means any occupation designated as a critical
occupation by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.


7. Locally needed establishment means any establishment designated as such by an Area War Manpower Director in accordance with standards prescribed by the Regional War Manpower Director.

8. Immigrant worker means any worker who has not, during the last 30 days, been employed in or lived in the area in which he is seeking employment.

9. The terms employment and work as applied to an individual engaged in both principal and supplementary employment mean his principal employment.

10. Ceiling program means a system whereby employment levels of all covered employers are limited with respect to total employment or types of workers, and whereby the rate of hiring employees is restricted, to conform to adequacy of labor supply and relative urgency of product or service.

11. Male worker means any male employee 17 years of age or older.

12. A local shortage occupation is an occupation or category of occupations in which shortages in the Columbus, Ohio, area threaten critically needed war production. The USES, subject to approval by the Area Director, shall designate such local shortage occupations on the basis of the number and age of unfilled orders and other pertinent information.

13. Priorities Committee is a group of representatives of procurement services and other manpower claimant agencies who advise the Area Director with respect to priority service and ceiling adjustments.

SECTION IV. Hiring Regulations.

All hiring and solicitation of workers in, or for work in establishments located in the Columbus, Ohio, Area shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this plan.

The decision to hire or refer a worker shall be based on qualifications essential for performance of or suitability for the job, and shall be made without discrimination as to race, color, creed, sex, national origin, or except as required by law, citizenship.

A. Requirement of Statement of Availability.

A new employee who, during the preceding 60-day period, was engaged in an essential or locally needed establishment, may be hired only if such hiring would aid in the effective prosecution of the
war. Such hiring shall be deemed to aid in the effective prosecution of the war only if:

1. Such individual is hired for work in an essential or locally needed establishment or for work to which he has been referred by the United States Employment Service, and
2. Such individual presents a Statement of Availability from his last employer in an essential or locally needed establishment; and/or is referred by the USES of the WMC, or is hired with its consent, as provided herein.

B. Issuance of Statements of Availability by Employers.

An individual whose last employment is or was in an essential or locally needed establishment shall receive a Statement of Availability from his employer if:

1. He has been discharged, or his last employment has been otherwise terminated by his employer, or
2. He has been laid off for an indefinite period, or for a period of seven or more days, or
3. Continuance in his employment would involve undue personal hardship
   a. In the case of an individual who is a first-time employee without previous industrial experience and who finds his job in essential industry unsuitable and has so notified his employer, the USES shall grant a Statement of Availability to such individual on the grounds of undue personal hardship, provided application for such Statement is made within 15 days from date of hire in such essential industrial establishment,
4. Such employment is or was at a wage or salary or under working conditions below standards established by State or Federal law or regulations, or
5. Such employment is or was at a wage or salary below a level established or approved by the National War Labor Board (or other agency authorized to adjust wages or approve adjustment thereof), as warranting adjustment, and the employer has failed to adjust the wage in accordance with such level or to apply to the appropriate agency for such adjustment or approval thereof.

C. Issuance of Statement of Availability by USES.

1. A Statement of Availability shall be issued promptly to an individual when any of the circumstances set forth in Section IV-B is found to exist in his case. If the employer fails or refuses to issue a Statement of Availability to an individual entitled to such statement, the USES of the WMC, upon finding that the individual is entitled thereto, shall issue a Statement of Availability to the individual.
2. A Statement of Availability shall be issued by the USES to any individual in the employ of an employer who the WMC finds, after
notice and opportunity to be heard, has not complied with any WMC employment stabilization plan, regulation, or policy, and for so long as such employer continues his non-compliance after such finding.

D. Workers Who May Be Hired Only Upon Referral by the USES.

Under the circumstances set forth below, a new employee may not be hired solely upon presentation of a Statement of Availability, but may be hired only upon referral by, or with consent of, USES:

1. The new employee is a male 17 years of age or older.
2. The new employee is to be hired for work in a critical occupation, or in a local shortage occupation, or his or her Statement of Availability indicates that his or her last employment was in a critical or local shortage occupation.
3. The new employee has not lived or worked in the Columbus Area throughout the preceding 30-day period.
4. The new employee’s last regular employment was in agriculture and he is to be hired for non-agricultural work, provided that no such individual shall be referred to non-agricultural work except after consultation with a designated representative of the War Food Administration, and provided further that such an individual may be hired for non-agricultural work for a period of not to exceed six weeks without referral or presentation of a Statement of Availability.

E. Hiring with Consent of USES.

1. Subject to such regulations approved by the Area Director of the War Manpower Commission and the Area War Manpower Committee, employers or other hiring or referral agencies may be granted authority by the Area Director of the WMC to hire workers subject to referral by the USES without such referral, but solely on presentation of a Statement of Availability.

The U.S. Civil Service Commission is authorized to be the referral agency of U.S. Government agencies.

The Railroad Retirement Board is authorized to be the referral agency of the railroads.

2. Until September 1, 1944, and thereafter unless otherwise directed by the Area Director, consent is hereby given for all employers of less than eight employees, engaged in an essential activity, to hire workers subject to referral under Section IV-D above, solely upon presentation of a Statement of Availability.

3. Until September 1, 1944, and thereafter unless otherwise directed by the Area Director, consent is hereby given for all employers of less than eight employees engaged in less essential activity to hire employees without referral by USES except that any worker employed in an essential activity within the preceding 60-day period may not be hired except upon referral by USES.

4. Employees hired for professional-grade work in establishments not
directly engaged in war production, provided that the skill requirements of the work are such that extensive on-the-job experience and/or specific educational requirements are inherent to the job, are exempt from priority referral. Illustrative of this skill-grade are the following types of occupations: doctors, lawyers, embalmers, undertakers, scientists, clergymen, teachers, journalists, social and welfare workers, architects, librarians, etc. Interpretation of exclusions other than those specifically mentioned in the foregoing illustrative list shall be left to the administrative discretion of the Area Director.

SECTION V. Referral in Case of Under-utilization.

If an individual is employed at less than full time or at a job which does not utilize his highest recognized skill for which there is a need in the war effort, USES may, upon his request, refer him to other available employment in which it finds that the individual will be more fully utilized in the war effort.

However, a worker who wishes to request such referral shall first consult with his employer who may issue a notice of release directed to the USES. If the employer refuses to issue such a notice, the worker may apply to USES.

SECTION VI. Control of Inter-area Migration.

A. Outmigration.

Any resident of the Columbus, Ohio, Area wishing to seek employment in a labor market area outside the Columbus, Ohio, Area within Region V shall apply to USES nearest his present home or place of employment for a Statement of Inter-Area Clearance. Subject to such additional standards as the Area Director may prescribe, such inter-area clearance shall be granted if:

1. He is entitled to, or is not required to obtain, a Statement of Availability, and
2. His reasons for willing to seek employment elsewhere are such as to take precedence over the local need for his services; and
3. He agrees not to seek work in any area into which migration has been limited by action of a State Director of WMC.

B. Immigration.

Subject to such additional limitations as the Regional Director may prescribe, an immigrant worker may be employed only if:

1. He has been granted a Statement of Inter-Area Clearance or equivalent by the USES in the area of his last residence or employment; provided that if the immigrant worker's last place of residence was
outside Region V, he may be employed if he presents a Statement of Availability or evidence that he is not required to obtain one; or

2. He has been recruited through the clearance system of USES.

C. Limitation of Migration.

Whenever, in the judgment of the State Director for Ohio, the volume of migration into the Columbus, Ohio, Area becomes so great as to threaten the safety and welfare of the community, or the area fails to use all local sources of labor or to supply the labor needs of more critical areas, he may proclaim a limit upon migration into this area. Thereafter, applicants for employment who have not worked or lived in this area throughout the 30 days preceding application shall be referred to employment only in accordance with the standards prescribed by the State Director.

SECTION VII. Content of Statements of Availability.

A Statement of Availability issued to an individual pursuant to this plan shall contain only the individual's name, address, Social Security account number, if any, the name and address of the issuing employer or WMC officer and office, the date of issuance, a statement as to whether or not the individual's last employment was in a critical occupation and such other information not prejudicial to the employee in seeking new employment as may be authorized or required by WMC.

SECTION VIII. Solicitation of Workers.

No employer shall advertise or otherwise solicit for the purpose of hiring any individual if the hiring of such an individual would be subject to restrictions under this employment stabilization plan, except in a manner consistent with such restrictions.

SECTION IX. Manpower Budget Program.

In addition to the above restrictions on hiring, no male worker may be hired for employment in any establishment located in the Columbus, Ohio, Area, unless specific authorization to do so has been granted by the Area Director of the WMC, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Regional Director.

Authorization to hire specified numbers of male workers referred by the USES shall be granted to any employer covered by an approved ceiling (manpower budget) program when:

1. Such employer has been classified by the Area Manpower Priorities Committee as one whose necessary war production commitments or essential service to the civilian economy require either an expansion of his current male labor force (Class A) or the provision of replacements to maintain his present male labor force at his current level
2. Such employer has furnished the USES with a statement concerning his employment situation and his production or operations problems. Authorization to hire a key male worker, without whose services the operation of an establishment necessary to the civilian economy would be impaired, may be granted to an employer without regard to his classification by the Priorities Committee.

SECTION X. General Referral Policy.

A. No provision in this plan shall limit the authority of the USES to make referrals in accordance with approved policies and instructions of the WMC.

B. Subject to standards prescribed by the Regional Director and after approval by the Area Manpower Priorities Committee, the Area Director will designate certain job orders or openings for priority service by USES, in accordance with the provisions established by the Area Manpower Priorities Committee.

Subject to standards prescribed by the Regional Director, the Area Director, after consultation with the area representative of the procurement agency involved, may grant temporary priority service and authorize the USES to designate certain job orders or openings for such priority service. Further action on the priority will be subject to approval of the Area Manpower Priorities Committee at the regular meeting.

C. So far as may be consistent with the requirements of the war effort, and subject to standards prescribed by the Regional Director after consultation with the Regional Labor-Management Committee, individual workers subject to referral by the USES shall enjoy a free choice among suitable job openings in essential activities.

1. In determining the suitability of a particular job opening for a worker local USES offices shall consider the following factors:

   a. the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals
   b. his physical fitness
   c. his job training
   d. his previous experience
   e. the length and recency of his experience and training
   f. the demand for his experience and training in the war effort
   g. his usual earnings
   h. the distance of the prospective employment from his residence (considering transportation facilities), or the availability of suitable housing at or near the place of prospective employment.

2. No individual shall be required to accept referral to a position if:

   a. the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock-
out, or other labor dispute, unless such referral is specifically authorized by the Regional Director as required for the successful prosecution of the war;
b. as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join or to refrain from joining any labor organization;
c. the remuneration, hours, or other conditions of work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.

SECTION XI, Exclusions.

No provision of this plan shall be applicable to:

1. the hiring of a new employee for agricultural employment.
2. the hiring of a new employee for work of less than seven days' duration, or for work which is supplementary to the employee's principal work; but such work shall not constitute the individual's "last employment" for the purposes of the plan, unless the employee is customarily engaged in work of less than seven days' duration.
3. the hiring by a foreign, state, county, or municipal government, or their political subdivision or their agencies and instrumentalities, or to the hiring of any of their employees, unless such foreign, state, county, or municipal government, or political subdivision or agency or instrumentality has indicated its willingness to conform, to the maximum extent practicable under the constitution and laws applicable to it, with the plan.
4. the hiring of a new employee for domestic service, or to the hiring of a new employee whose last regular employment was in domestic service.
5. the hiring of a school teacher for vacation employment or the re-hiring of a school teacher for teaching at the termination of the vacation period.
6. the hiring of a veteran of World War II within the first 60 days following his initial civilian employment subsequent to discharge.

SECTION XII, General Provisions.

A. When a transfer of a worker to a new employer is made by USES of the WMC in the best interest of the war effort and with the consent of employee and employer, or authorized because the worker is employed below his highest skill or for less than full time, the worker shall maintain and accumulate seniority with his original employer during the period of transfer. Where labor contracts don't exist the employer shall give workers a written statement defining their seniority rights when the worker is requested by USES to transfer to more essential employment. The seniority of workers transferring for other reasons shall be determined by employer-employee negotiations.

B. Statements of Availability in transfer cases outlined in Section XII-A shall be issued in triplicate marked "Transfer" across the
face of each Statement and signed by the employer under the word "Transfer"; two copies will be given to the worker, one for himself and one for his new employer, and the third copy will be retained by the original employer.

C. Transferred workers shall apply for reemployment with their original employer within one week after separating from the job to which they originally transferred, if the separation occurs during the war, or within 60 days if the war shall have ended.

D. Nothing contained in this plan shall change, modify, or restrict any union contract, Civil Service regulation, railroad labor-management agreement, law, or ordinance.

A furloughed employee, recalled by his former employer under the provisions of and in accordance with a management-labor contract or agreement regulating working conditions, may return to his former employer without a Statement of Availability or a referral by USES. (Note: In the letter of recall, the recalling employer shall advise the employee to give his present employer prompt notice that he is returning to his former employer.)

SECTION XIII. Appeals.

Any worker or employer may appeal from any act or failure to act by the WM under this employment stabilization plan, in accordance with regulations and procedures of WMC. Such appeal shall be taken in all instances to the Area War Manpower Committee.

SECTION XIV. Representation.

Nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to restrict any individual from seeking the advice and aid of, or from being represented by, the labor organization of which he is a member, or any other representative freely chosen by him, at any step in the operation of the plan.

SECTION XV. Amendments and Sub-Plans.

This plan may be amended or sub-plans adopted by a majority vote of the Columbus Area War Manpower Committee, subject to prior approval by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission.

SECTION XVI. Effective Date.

This Program shall become effective on July 1, 1944, and supersedes all previous plans.

Approved: Ralph E. Gabele
Regional Director, WMC Region V

Ralph E. Gabele
Columbus Area WMC Director
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I, Theodore Levitt, was born in Vollmerz, Germany, March 1, 1925. I received my secondary education in the public schools of Dayton, Ohio. After serving in the army, I entered Antioch College from which I received the degree Bachelor of Arts in 1949. In the Winter of 1950 I was appointed a graduate assistant in the Department of Economics at The Ohio State University. In the following fall I was appointed a teaching assistant, a position I still hold. Since the Summer of 1951 I have also held an Ohio State University Research Foundation research assistantship at the Personnel Research Board of The Ohio State University.