SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION:
A DEMONSTRATION IN THEORY CONSTRUCTION

DISSER TATION

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Table 1 - Selected Studies Arranged for Cross-Comparison ........................................... 196
The ideas presented in this dissertation were slowly pulled together over a period of almost three years and have had the benefit of suggestions and criticisms from many different sources. I would especially like to thank the following members of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Ohio State University, for their unfailing intellectual stimulation and encouragement throughout my graduate career: Drs. Kurt H. Wolff, Melvin Seeman, John W. Bennett, and Raymond F. Sletto. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank Drs. Carroll L. Shartle, Donald T. Campbell, and Robert K. Merton for the invaluable training opportunities which they made available.

The design of the dissertation has had many crucial changes made in it as the result of the opportunity to participate in the Inter-university Seminar on Stratification held in Columbus, Ohio in June and July, 1951. I am indebted and grateful to the members of this group and to the Social Science Research Council who made the seminar possible.
Chapter 1. Introduction

The subject of this dissertation is social differentiation: its nature, manifestations, regularities, causes, effects and functions. The approach to the subject is one of codification of research and theory in this area, the construction of theory, and resultant suggestions for future theoretical contributions and empirical research. The purpose of this introduction is an attempt to justify both the choice of subject matter and the approach utilized; as well as to outline the content and organization of the whole paper.

A brief look through the subject matter index of any sociology text, or in fact, perhaps through any professional book written by a sociologist, should convince the reader that social differentiation is one of the central concerns of sociological inquiry and research. Such frequently used terms as status, rank, situs, stratum, class, caste, prestige-hierarchy, subordination, superordination, social position, structure, vertical and horizontal mobility, social change, stratification, organisation, role, and so on, all bear very close relationships to matters of social differentiation; it is difficult to think of large areas of sociological theory or research in the absence of these concepts.

But perhaps this is just one of the peculiarities of sociologists, and justification of the relevance and importance of the subject matter chosen cannot be based on mere concern and attention
by professional sociologists. Perhaps we should ask more basic questions such as: (a) whether people do regard one another differentially; (b) whether there is any regularity in this behavior (in its causes, conditions, forms, concomitances, results); (c) whether social differentiation makes any significant difference in the ultimate behavior and attitudes of the people involved, etc. In other words, is it worth knowing?

If the phenomena of social stratification exist, exhibit regularity, and make a significant difference in human behavior, it is the proper subject for study by social science. It does not seem necessary to belabor the first point: it seems obvious from personal experience, and from casual observation of others, that human beings in sociation are constantly differentiating or distinguishing between one another, either identifying or evaluating, and often comparing invidiously. In fact, it is necessary for everyone to distinguish among other individuals, so that one may know how to behave in relation to them. In a mass society particularly, it becomes essential to place the stranger in a familiar niche, until further acquaintance can refine the relationship. So it comes about that individuals in a society take on regularized ways of perceiving, evaluating, and categorizing others, and it is the purpose of this study to investigate the ways in which this differentiating behavior is carried out.

The second question, that referring to the establishment of regularity, is more difficult to answer and demonstrate. In a
preliminary way we can say there are many evidences of regularity, or at least seeming regularity (which on closer inspection and analysis may prove otherwise). Obvious examples are: Southern whites' attitudes toward Negroes vs. other whites; attitudes of the social elite in a small community toward members of other social levels; attitudes of professionals toward other professionals as over against neophytes or amateurs; attitudes of members of certain organizations toward fellow-members vs. members of certain other organizations; and so on. The problem of transforming these informally-observed and casually-felt regularities into a series of interlocking and empirically-derived generalizations is indeed difficult and challenging. The question of the regularity is of course central, since ultimate prediction and coherent understanding must rest upon it.

The third question, involving the importance of the differentiating process, is perhaps most basic. It faces the perennial and invaluable "so what?". What difference does it make if there are regularities in the way people look at one another; does this affect their behavior in other significant areas; or is it an isolated and academic concern only? Since one of the main purposes of this whole study is to demonstrate that the operations of social differentiation, and the systematic analysis of these operations, are basic to the understanding and prediction of important areas of human behavior in society, at this point, only a preliminary note can be made.
The relevance of the process of social differentiation for the understanding and prediction of human behavior can be pointed out in two ways: first by referring to the process itself, and secondly by referring to the results and correlates of the process. The analysis of the process itself is an essential task for the social scientist, who in such an analysis tackles the basic question of how individuals and collectivities order their social universe. From the point of view of the person doing the differentiating, whether he be an actor involved in an ongoing social situation or a scientist attempting to describe and analyze social behavior from the outside, it is necessary to investigate the ways in which this process is carried on in a variety of circumstances by a variety of individuals and for various reasons. The problem seen in this way becomes primarily one of the analysis of some aspects of social perception, both cognitive and cathetic, i.e., or more specifically, involving evaluative aspects, when the objects of the perception are social objects, i.e., other actors, either individuals or collectivities.

In answer to the question of whether and how this kind of social perception affects behavior it is necessary to consider the results or correlates of the process, including the behavior and other characteristics of the persons doing the differentiating as well as the persons who are differentiated. Since this dissertation includes an entire section on the classification of correlates of the persons who are differentiated, which can also be applied to the differentia-
it seems unnecessary to present an exhaustive list at this point. By way of illustration, briefly, the individual who differentiates consistently in an extremely rigid fashion, making fine, clear and unchanging distinctions without ambiguity or hesitation, is apt to have certain personality and behavioral characteristics as correlates, either as cause or effect, which have been characterized as "authoritarian." On the other hand, there can be effects upon the individual who is differentiated, e.g., consistently given a low rank by relevant others on the basis of some characteristic which he possesses and cannot change, he is apt to develop certain behavioral patterns in an attempt to adjust, or reject, this unsatisfactory position.

Turning to a justification of the specific approach attempted here, a brief look at the present stage of development of sociology all too often reveals a sort of chicken-and-egg relationship between theory and research: theory is not sufficiently advanced to guide or interpret empirical research; and not enough empirical research has been done to provide sufficient grounding or demonstration for the further construction or integration of theory. The individual social scientist, particularly the graduate student working by himself, may be forced to do a small and isolated piece of empirical research, with little or no theoretical relevance (unless it be to illustrate or check up on an isolated hypothesis); or he

can, but less and less often does, try to construct a theory, or part of a theory, without empirical evidence to support it. There is a third alternative, which in its worst aspects presents a more discouraging picture than either of the preceding two: a review of the literature in the field, which may take the form of collation and abstract, with a few sparse critical comments (such as, "Lots of work needs to be done here.").

The choice of codification as an approach is made in view of these limitations. The advantages and functions of such an approach have been suggested and outlined in some detail by Merton:³

Codification involves orderly, disciplined reflection...it entails the discovery of what has in fact been the strategic experience of scientific investigators, rather than the invention of new strategies of research. But the discovery of the one may facilitate the invention of the other. As here construed, codification is the orderly and compact arrangement of systematised fruitful experience with procedures of enquiry and with the substantive findings which result from the use of these procedures...⁴ Whereas formal derivation focuses our attention upon the implications of a theory, codification seeks to systematise available empirical generalisations in apparently different spheres of behavior. Rather than permitting such 'separate' empirical findings to lie fallow or to be referred to distinctive areas of behavior, the deliberate attempt to institute relevant provisional hypotheses promises to extend existing theory, subject to further empirical enquiry...A codified formulation...gives rise to theoretic problems which would be readily overlooked if the several empirical findings were not re-examined within a single context. It is submitted that codification, as a

³R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure.
procedure complementing the formal derivation of hypotheses to be tested, will facilitate the co-development of viable sociological theory and pertinent empirical research.5

As indicated above, then, there are three chief tasks set before the "codifier." First, he must survey and integrate existing, often disparate and partial, theoretical attempts in his chosen area. Secondly, he must survey and integrate existing empirical findings and methodology, in whatever areas he may find them, as long as they throw light upon existing theory, support it, or add to it. Thirdly, and perhaps the most difficult, he must integrate the codified body of theory with the codified body of research results, showing the gaps and lack of continuity in them both, and making suggestions for systematic future work at both levels, so that each may contribute to the other in a cumulative, orderly fashion.

Before proceeding, it must be determined whether codification in the area of social differentiation is necessary. Does a coherent theory exist, and if not, are there enough fragments in the literature to warrant the approach of codification rather than wholesale construction and invention? Again, pending the presentation of the material in the body of this study, we must provisionally state that there is no coherent theory of social differentiation; that is, no theory sufficient to guide further integrated research, but that a profitable attempt can be made to construct one based upon some of the disparate concepts and hypotheses already proposed by social theorists.

5R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 96.
As to the codification of empirical methods and results, the need is more obvious. Social research in the area of social differentiation at the present stage, for various reasons, has developed in widely divergent, and seemingly unrelated, practical spheres of activity, ranging all the way from experimental small-group studies of patterns of communication and their relation to status, to class analyses of entire communities, and statistical studies of occupational mobility.

It would seem highly desirable and profitable to pull together this mass of fragmentary data into some sort of theoretical or at least taxonomic order. This "integrative" approach, however, is not met with the unqualified approval of all social scientists. Speaking in metaphors of gold-mining, the argument still rages as to whether it is more profitable to sift through old findings, or to prospect for a new vein. These opposing theoretical mining engineers both appear to have strong arguments on their sides. On the one hand, those of the "sifting" persuasion point out the tremendous waste involved in letting disparate findings lie unused and unconnected. They argue that the only way to avoid this pattern in the future (the pattern of atomized research and theory) is to consolidate and build upon what is already known. On the other hand, those who believe in the futility of the re-examination of old data (the question of whether The American Soldier should be allowed to lie fallow is a good case in point6) advocate the almost exclusive

emphasis on new research. They point out, with some reason, that the research already done, by its very nature, is never adequate to answer the specific theoretical questions asked of it. As with any secondary sources, the data are limited and distorted toward the particular problem or interest of the original investigator, and gaps seem to appear almost fatally at the exact points where empirical evidence is needed to throw light on a crucial hypothesis.

Granting these difficulties, or rather because of them, the position taken here is that until we know the location, nature, causes, and results of these lacunae, both in theory and research, it will be virtually impossible to proceed further with coherent and theoretically relevant research programs. The alternative seems to be an endless repetition of non-cumulative, non-continuous efforts. To use a structural analogy, it would seem advantageous to discover what the framework looks like, however shaky and malformed, and to design elements to fill out the structure, and if need be, to alter it; rather than continually to start new frameworks with different architectures, requiring new, untested materials; or rather than carefully and accurately build segments without any idea as to the structures in which they will eventually be placed.

Another major problem involves the methodology of codification. There is a range of possibilities: one could list definitions, mutually conflicting or supporting hypotheses, pertinent findings; and this might be followed by an arbitrary solution, by a summary of results, or by a statement regarding the confusion followed by
the clarion call for clarity. Or one could start by pointing up conflicting results, and could look for causes in the methodology. Or one could compare methodologies and search for differences in results.

There appears, however, to exist a superior, at least a heuristically promising method for codification: the paradigm.

As explicitly formulated and illustrated by Merton⁷, the nature of the paradigm is as follows (material in brackets is added by the present writer):

Paradigms for sociological analysis are intended to help the sociologist work at his trade. I suggest that paradigms for qualitative analysis in sociology have at least five closely related functions... First, paradigms have a notational function. They provide a compact parsimonious arrangement of the central concepts [or methods, hypotheses, results] and their interrelations as these are utilised for description and analysis. Having one's concepts set out in sufficiently brief compass to permit their simultaneous inspection is an important aid to self-correction of one's successive interpretations, a result difficult to achieve when one's concepts are scattered and hidden in page after page of discursive exposition [to say nothing of scattered and hidden research results in disparate substantive areas].

Second, the explicit statement of analytic paradigms lessens the likelihood of inadvertently importing hidden assumptions and concepts, since each new assumption and each new concept [and research finding] must either be logically derivable from the previous terms of the paradigm or explicitly incorporated in it. The paradigm thus supplies a pragmatic and logical guide for the avoidance of ad hoc (i.e., logically irresponsible) hypotheses. [And at the same time, it tends to prevent the careless omission of assumptions, concepts, findings, that, at first glance, do not appear to have relevance to the other items noted within the frame.]

Third, paradigms advance the cumulation of theoretical interpretation. In this connection, we can regard the paradigm as the foundation upon which we can justifiably repose great confidence will in due course support an interpretative structure of skyscraper

dimensions, with each successive story testifying to the substantial and well-laid quality of the original foundations, whereas a defective paradigm will support only a rambling one-story structure, in which each new set of observations requires a new foundation (for a new wing of the total structure) to be laid, since the original cannot bear the weight of additional stories.

Fourth, paradigms, by their very arrangements, suggest the systematic cross tabulation of presumably significant concepts and may thus sensitise the analyst to types of empirical and theoretic problems which might otherwise be overlooked. They promote analysis rather than concrete description....

Fifth, paradigms make for the codification of methods of qualitative analysis in a manner approximating the logical, if not the empirical, rigor of quantitative analysis... they are open to inspection by all who care to read... the procedures of even the most perceptive of sociologists must be standardisable and the results of their insights testable by others.

To elaborate on the first function, that of notation: the plotting of the available concepts, findings, methods or hypotheses in one place (preferably on a large chart, rather than even on a few successive pages) allows the analyst visually to relate the variables by inspection, and to make various profitable comparisons and cross-checks that might otherwise be omitted. Here, too, after several studies have been superimposed on the frame, the lacunae — recurring omissions and weaknesses in hypotheses — immediately become visible and striking.

In reference to the second point (and also in view of Merton's cautions as to the dangers of oversimplification in the use of a paradigm, and the exclusion of data with a "bad fit"), it should be emphasised that the extended effort to include all, even seemingly relevant data into the frame (in fact, all the available
data under the generic heading of the area), gives assurance that each piece of evidence or each idea will be available for others to codify or re-appraise, even if the original analyst cannot perceive any meaningful structural connection at the time.

This has pertinence for Merton's third point: in his initial construction of the paradigm, the analyst is constrained continually to re-shape and reformulate his framework to allow for the systematic inclusion of new concepts and data. The branching-out and the formation of an unsatisfactory rambling structure is quickly apparent, and gives the analyst an important critical instrument as he maps out the work of a single theorist, or tries to combine the ideas or findings of several men.

An important point to be made is that the paradigm itself may "serendipitously" result in a coherent theory relating systematically the various hypotheses and concepts. If this is to occur, it is of course necessary for the analyst or codifier to fill in the gaps, to resolve the conflicts, and to provide the missing hypotheses, as well as to make concrete proposals for the empirical testing of the new material. To be sure, the paradigm will not automatically result in such a desirable end, but even as a classificatory device will materially aid the sociologist in his search for systematic, utilisable theory.

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8 Ibid., p. 12
This dissertation represents first of all an attempt to codify some of the relevant theory, methodology and empirical findings in the area of social differentiation. This codification must be severely limited and will have to consist of a crude sampling of the literature rather than any systematic and exhaustive coverage, due to limitations of space and time.

The chief result and contribution of the dissertation however will be found in what may be called the methodology of theory construction. As the chapter outline will try to indicate, the rationale of the arrangement of the whole centers around the effort to show, step by step, how the paradigm itself came into being, and what can be done with the finished product with respect to hypothesis formation and research proposals. It is true that the paradigm may be used primarily in a taxonomic function, to classify and critically analyze theoretical contributions and research results. It appears to the present writer that this is a minor function, since the placement of concepts and findings into a systematic scheme is of greatest value in the production of the paradigm and in its subsequent modification. To restate: it would seem that the most important purpose of codification and the construction of a paradigm is not the provision of a schema for classifying other works. Rather, the paradigm, resulting from preliminary attempts at classification, should be used as an instrument for the evolving of significant, related hypotheses, problems, concepts, and concrete research proposals. Codification then is a means to
the end of a paradigm, which becomes a means not primarily for the end of further codification, but a means for the end of theory construction which leads to research. It must of course be said that the paradigm is never complete, and the addition of new and disparate theoretical formulations or research methodologies and findings will materially shift the framework and focus of the scheme, perhaps completely reorganize it; and that these shifts and additions will add new hypotheses, new problem areas, new research proposals.

A brief outline of the organization of this dissertation and its rationale follows:

Chapter 2. Conceptual Analysis. This section consists of a discussion of conceptual and terminological problems in the area of social differentiation, together with the presentation of new or simplified concepts and terms deemed useful for the construction of theory and proposals for research. An attempt will be made to resolve the contradictions, fill in necessary concepts and terms, eliminate overlap, and make a final, coherent statement of terms and their proposed use in theory and research. The primary function of this section is to demonstrate and spell out the problems, contradictions, confusions, solutions, which were encountered and arrived at in the task of constructing the glossary of terms to be presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 3. Glossary. This section consists of definitions of terms used in the body of the dissertation and considered useful for the
study of social differentiation. The purpose of the glossary is to classify, clarify and standardise key concepts and terms in this area, with the sanguine hope that they may be adopted as standard, or at least may aid in desired standardisation in the field.

Chapter 4. Codification of Theory and Research — Selected Studies. This section, in keeping with the general plan of a chronological presentation of theory construction, consists of a series of theoretical studies and researches from the literature, analyzed and arranged for comparison of concepts, terms, hypotheses, methods and findings. Commentary and discussion will attempt to show the process by which the final paradigm was derived and developed. Critiques of the various studies will be included in demonstrating this particular function of the paradigm.

Chapter 5. Paradigm for the Study of Social Differentiation. This section consists of the presentation, in the form of a chart, of the summary paradigm for the study of social differentiation. The basic parts, captions, sub-headings, arrangement, and interconnections among parts will be explained. The selected studies analysed in Chapter 4 are presented in condensed tabular form, according to the headings of the paradigm, for point-by-point comparison. Finally, there is a representative list of hypotheses and research suggestions derived from the relation of the component parts of the paradigm and the comparative analyses of the selected studies.
Chapter 2 - Conceptual Analysis

A brief procedural and biographical note is in order as a preface to the conceptual analysis which follows. The primary interest of the author at the outset was an experimentally-designed study of status perception in small groups. After a number of false starts and abortive attempts at a design and at the isolation of operational variables, it was discovered that the real difficulty lay in the vagueness of the central concepts being utilised, (e.g. "status," "role," "group structure," etc.). This led to a search of the literature for clarification of basic terms and ideas which in turn led to an ever-increasing tangle of verbiage. It was the effort to pick a way through this jungle that eventually suggested the construction of a glossary as an arbitrary set of stable signs and meanings. The chapter that follows is an attempt to reconstruct the problems encountered and the solutions arrived at in the establishment of a comprehensive set of useful, precise terms and concepts necessary for the study of social differentiation.

The first difficulty encountered was the necessity for bridging several distinct areas of theory and research which seemed logically to fall into one over-all, interrelated matrix. Each of these areas had both separate and common sets of terms and meanings, the relationship of which was not always too clear. The areas referred to are: the psychology of status, the study of class consciousness and political awareness, the descriptive study
of the existence and nature of substantive social classes in the community or nation, the study of various stratification systems together with their correlates. These areas range from the extreme of individual psychologism to the extreme of group sociologism (in which individuals serve only as unspecified units in a category). Relevant studies range from inquiries into the psychological processes involved in status perception and awareness as in Hyman,9 Kelley,10 Bavelas;11 to studies of class perception and awareness as in Centers;12 to studies trying to discover the existence of objective classes as in Warner13 or Wheeler;14 to studies which take the system of stratification for granted and are chiefly interested in the results or correlates of such a system, as in Marx, Pareto, etc.

It appeared to the author that all these studies and concerns had elements in common: both a psychological process and a resultant structure. The common psychological process seemed to involve an individual who is categorizing other individuals or places them

9 H. H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status!"
10H. H. Kelley, "Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies."
11Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups."
14Wayne Wheeler, Social Stratification in a Plains Community.
in categories or groupings. Upon further reflection, this process of categorizing seemed to require two simpler forms of behavior: the perception of difference and that of similarity. Carrying this process even farther back, it seemed that in order to assign difference or similarity to two or more objects it is necessary to select, or be taught to select, certain characteristics of the objects as the basis for comparison, and to neglect other characteristics. Any two objects can be viewed as different or alike. At this point another psychological process entered into the picture: that of evaluation. Once difference is perceived, the characteristics or natures of the separate and different objects can be (or perhaps always are) evaluated. That is to say, the objects may be differentially preferred in terms of some need or goal. It might be suggested that any act of differentiation necessarily implies differential evaluation, but it can also be argued that it is at least heuristically possible to think in terms of equal evaluation.

To recapitulate in the seeming chronological order of the psychological process: first the perception of identity of an object, or the separate identity of two or more objects, next the selection, conscious or unconscious, experientially learned or dogmatically taught, of certain characteristics of the two objects and the subsequent assignment of difference or similarity; next (in the case of the assignment of difference) the equal or differential evaluation of the two objects on the basis of their different characteristics; next (in the case of differential evaluation) the arrangement of the objects in order of preference.
So far, we have been talking about the perception of single units and their evaluation. (Within the definition of "unit" falls a number of objects perceived originally as a single whole, e.g., an egg or a plural, that is, a number of individuals originally perceived as one unit.) A further step may be taken and a number of separately identified units may be arranged in categories, that is, arranged or grouped in such a way that the units within the grouping are more similar to one another than they are to units outside the grouping. With the sorting-out and creation of two or more differential categories, again there may be equal or differential evaluation of the categories and, in the case of differential evaluation, there may be the arrangement of the categories in order of preference. Perhaps it is necessary to add that this process may stop at any point in the chronological order just described. It should also be noted that the above frame is relative, e.g., that an egg or a group of people may be viewed as a unit, a category, or a system of categories.

To return to the common elements which the author saw in the various studies of status, stratification, and class; it seemed that the above psychological processes were involved in all of the studies in this area, and that it might be helpful to analyze and compare them in respect to these processes. As noted above, the other elements that the studies had in common were the products of the process, namely the units, the arrangement of units, the categories, and the arrangements of categories, as well as
a concern with changes taking place in any of these elements. So it appeared that each and every study of status, stratification and class, whether theoretical or empirical, consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, had in common some of the following elements:

I. The individual or plurality of individuals who perceive other individuals, singly or in plurality, as identified units ("The Ascriber").

II. The characteristics of the perceiving individual ("Characteristics of the Ascriber").

III. The individual or plurality of individuals ("The Ascribee").

IV. The characteristics of the perceived individuals which are selected and utilized for the assignment of difference or similarity, or which are used as a basis for evaluation ("The Criteria").

V. The act or process of assigning difference or similarity to identified units, the evaluating of units, the placing of units in order of evaluation, the placing of units into categories, the assigning of difference or similarity to categories, the evaluating of categories, the placing of categories in order of evaluation ("Processes of Social Differentiation").

VI. The resultant position of units in an order of differentiation or evaluation, or in a category, the categories themselves, the position of categories in an order of differ-
entiation or evaluation ("Structural Components").

VII. The discovered characteristics of the units or categories after they have been placed ("Correlates of Positions and Structures").

VIII. Changes in any of the elements listed above ("Mobility and Structural Change").

IX. Classification schemes of total structures based upon the elements listed above ("Types of Structure").

In other words, the elements of analysis of studies of social differentiation (a general term including studies of class, status, and stratification) include the individuals engaged in the process of differentiation, the process itself, and the resultant perceived units, categories and arrangements or systems of units and categories. It may be argued, and this argument will be more fully treated later on, that there is a bias in the above analytical scheme in the direction of psychological process. In preliminary rebuttal it may serve here merely to note that the scheme includes both the process and the structural results, and that any given study may emphasize one or the other, or both. It may be further argued that any analytical scheme which attempts to encompass the whole range of studies in social differentiation must include both process and structure. The argument as to whether the analytical scheme should attempt such a broad coverage in the
first place, and whether it loses in clarity and precision what it gains in scope, can only be answered by an evaluation of the use-
fullness of the final product.

It follows the same line of argument that any given study probably will not include all the elements listed above. It is precisely for this reason that the list of elements as an initial framework is useful for the systematic comparison of studies, including their concepts, terms, methodologies, and results. It immediately shows up the lack of common elements dealt with, which often is the key to critical analysis and new hypotheses. The test of this expectation will be the comparison of disparate studies in Chapter 4.

The next step in the methodology of theory construction was the further refinement of the elements of analysis listed above and the fitting of concepts and terms into this framework. This was a two-way process, weaving back and forth from the framework of elements to the concepts and terms found in the literature. In some cases, new concepts and terms to describe them came out of a logical breakdown of the elements in the framework. In other cases, the concepts and terms were taken from the literature and were fitted into the framework, perhaps enlarging it and changing the categories therein. In fact, the list of elements above is a result of this weaving process, and it is quite difficult, and perhaps unnecessary, to show here the exact chronological process of development of the scheme for analysis and the concepts and terms
finally arrived at and listed in the glossary to follow. The remain-
ing section of this chapter will, with some variation, follow the
general order of the list of elements. Each main head will be
underlined and preceded by a roman numeral corresponding to
that in the above list of elements. Each subhead will be under-
lined and preceded by an arabic number in parentheses. This
whole numbering; scheme will correspond with that used in the
glossary. The bulk of this chapter will consist of enlarging
upon each set of elements, breaking them down into specific con-
cepts, terms and useful variables for hypothesis formation, and
at the same time working out, as far as possible, and where rele-
vant, a resolution of the contradictions and overlaps in the con-
cepts and terminology found in the literature.

I. The Ascriber. To consider the individual who does the per-
ceiving is only an heuristic, analytic device, a standing of the
process for a particular snapshot. In actuality any perceiver is
also perceived by others, in many cases by the same individuals
whom he perceives in the first place; and vice versa, the perceived
is also the perceiver. So, for analytic purposes, we must take a
particular view of a given situation for the time being, and see
just one of its aspects.

This extracted individual who, for purposes of analysis, is
doing the perceiving at the given time, is here called the ascriber.
The reason for using the term ascriber instead of "perceiver,"
"looker," "evaluator," "categorizer," etc. is that it seems to carry the essential meaning of the process with which we are concerned, that of placement of individuals into an order. The term also provides for the opposite term, the individual who is placed: the ascribee.¹⁵

When the range of studies of social differentiation is inspected, it becomes evident very quickly that there are many types of ascribers, engaged in many different kinds of activities, and in many different kinds of relationships with the ascribees. For illustration, in small-group studies of the operation of status factors, there are two kinds of ascribers: the scientist-observer who, for example, may take sociometric choice data and use this to place the individuals in the group relative to one another; or he may observe their behavior (who goes to whom for advice, aid, etc.) and infer their positional arrangement; or he may take their statements of where they place others (e.g. ranking of other members) as his evidence. On the other hand, there are the members of the group itself who are making placements of others, explicitly or implicitly. Moving on to community studies of class, there are other kinds of ascribers: the scientist who uses judges to tell him what the placement of individuals and groups should be,

¹⁵This might be viewed as an unhappy word, in general, and a ready target for the slings and arrows of the literary critic, but it seems better than "perceives," "looks," "evaluates," "categorises," in any case. The reason for not using the simpler form of ascribed is that it was tried out, and found to be often confused with the past tense of the verb form.
and then by various methods arrives at his statement of placement; the judges themselves who place other individuals, either as they themselves would place them, or as they think other members of the community would place them. The scientist may ignore the judgments of community members altogether and make his placements on the basis of various objective measures, such as income, education, house type, and the like; the scientist may combine the two methods, or infer one from the other, by correlation and correspondence; he may again utilize sociometric methods, either statements of who goes with whom, or actual observations of visiting patterns, clique membership, and the like, and make his placements on this basis. Considering the more broad-scale political and economic analyses of class structure, class conflict, and social change, there are still different ascriber roles and relationships. In these studies, from one point of view, the scientist may not be concerned at all, in the strict sense, with the placement of individuals in any particular order or in any particular categories, nor need he be concerned with, or use as data, the ascriptions made by the members of the society. He may simply assume that there is a social structure existing, based upon economic differences, life chances, functions in the production scheme or what not, and make his analyses and explanatory and predictive statements, quite disregarding the fact and process of individuals in the society ranking or placing one another. In this last case, it may in fact be argued that the scientist is not properly
concerned with placing individuals at all, but is merely dealing
with categories or relationships between categories (e.g., occupa-
tions, social classes). In other words, he is an observer or
describer, rather than an ascriber, and consequently in this type
of study there are no ascribes at all.

Finally, there is the case of the individual who places him-
self: who sees himself as an entity, different from others,
evaluates himself, places himself in various categories, evaluates
them, and so on. He, too, must be accounted for in any system
of classification of ascribes.

Here then is an illustration of the theoretical weaving pro-
cess mentioned above: the idea of an ascriber, the concept itself,
came from the framework of elements arrived at through the close
analysis of the psychological process of differentiation. The
various kinds and types of ascriber, as well as other pertinent
distinctions and concepts came from an inspection of the litera-
ture in the area of class, stratification and status.

The next step necessary was the attempt to systematize the
above-noted differences, to resolve the contradictions implicit
in them, and to apply terms to the derived concepts. Here the
first problem is to decide whether all types of ascribes should
fit under the same concept and term. The decision was in the
affirmative, for the reasons outlined below.

Let us give these various ascribes names. (1) The Actor-
Ascriber: an ascriber who is placing others as a normal part of
his social behavior; who in his daily life must identify and place others in order to know how to behave toward them, and to predict how the others will behave. This type of ascriber is a part of, and a participant in, the same system of social relations as the ascribes he places; he is simultaneously being placed by these ascribers, and this series of ascriptions is an integral part of their on-going social interaction. Furthermore, this type of ascriber is personally involved in his ascriptions since his perceptions of himself and his relationships with others are all a part of the process.

(2) The Self-Ascriber: An ascriber who, as a normal part of social behavior, is placing himself in the same manner in which he places other ascribes. This placement of himself may or may not agree with the placement given him by other ascribers, and as will be shown later, such similarity or discrepancy can be used for developing a whole range of testable hypotheses.

(3) The Informant-Ascriber: an ascriber who is, like the actor-ascriber, a part of, and a participant in, the same system of social relations as the ascribes he places, but who is temporarily in the particular role of describing this system for another or others, and who is consciously attempting to make this description on the basis of others' ascriptions, rather than his own. In other words, he is placing ascribes not on the basis of his own perceptions and evaluations of the ascribes, but on the basis of his estimate or judgment of how they place one another. He is
answering the question: "How do the members of this community or group (of which you are also a member) place a given individual or group or category?" There are several questions arising out of this distinction between the actor-ascriber and informant-ascriber which will be merely indicated at this point. Can this distinction really be made operationally? Is the informant-ascriber not always acting in part as an actor-ascriber, introducing his own perceptions of the ascribers and his own biases? To put it in another way: is the informant-ascriber not always implicitly acting as an actor-ascriber in that he is using as his basis for judgment some unstated reference group with which he feels identified? Furthermore, does it make any difference in the ascriptions made whether the ascriber is acting as an actor-ascriber who says how he personally places others in the community or group, or whether he is acting as an informant-ascriber who says how he estimates the community or group (or an unstated reference group or individual within the community or group) would place a given ascribee? The importance of this distinction will become clearer when, later in this dissertation, the problem of multiple vs. single systems of stratification is discussed.

(4) The Reporter-Ascriber: an ascriber who is not a part of, or a participant in, the same system of social relations as the ascribee he places, or who at any rate consciously attempts temporarily to assume the role of a detached observer and recorder of facts: the scientist studying and describing the ascription system. This type of scientist-ascriber, as distinguished from
the types of scientist-ascriber which follow, makes his ascriptions (places individuals, groups or categories) on the basis of reports of actor-ascrivers, self-ascrivers or informant ascrivers. The reporter-ascriber uses these reports as his data. The inclusion of the social scientist as an ascriver permits a direct comparison between him as an ascriver and the member of the community or group as an ascriver. They are both involved in the same psychological process of differentiating, identifying, comparing, evaluating, categorizing, ranking the same ascribees. It therefore seems useful to regard them as engaging in the same process, so that a point-for-point comparison can be made of its various aspects.

(5) The Observer-Ascriber: A second type of scientist-ascriber who in this case makes his ascriptions on the basis of direct or indirect observations of the behavior of the ascribees. As distinguished from the reporter-ascriber whose data consist of reports by others, the observer-ascriber must infer placements made by the actors from his own observations of their behavior. As indicated in the examples stated previously, these observations and inferences based upon them take several forms, e.g., statements of intended behavior (typical sociometric choices of roommate, workmate, etc.) or observations of actual behavior (information-asking, visiting, party-going, etc.). The argument for including the social scientist using this type of data as a type of ascriber is perhaps less clear than that regarding the reporter-ascriber. But here again, the scientist is behaving as an ascriber in that he is placing individuals or groups, albeit he
is using their behavior as a clue, and inferring how they would make ascriptions, rather than using their direct statements of how they place one another.

(6) The Objective-Ascriber: a third type of scientist-ascriber, who makes ascriptions based upon his own perception of the ascribees, who makes his own evaluations, his own categories, quite apart from a knowledge of or interest in how the actors make their ascriptions and place each other. It might be argued that this type of scientist-ascriber should be properly designated as a "subjective-ascriber," since the scientist is using his own criteria and making his own placements. There are three reasons why the term "objective-ascriber" is preferable:

a) If the term "subjective-ascriber" were used, it might be confused with the actor- or informant-ascriber. b) The term "objective-ascriber" referring to the scientist who makes placements without regard to the actors' placements is in keeping with the terms "objective class" or "objective strata" as used in the literature. c) The term "objective-ascriber" is also in keeping with some scientists' claim that, in this type of ascription or description, they are merely describing reality and themselves remain outside the system, in short, are "objective." The latter reason leads, somewhat paradoxically, to another argument indicated above: Is this type of study of stratification, class, or differentiation properly a process of ascription at all? The argument against such a characterisation runs as follows: first,
the scientist is not placing individuals in a system or structure or position but is ordering or describing positions themselves, apart from the individuals who occupy these positions; secondly, he may not be engaging in the same psychological process as the actor-ascriber (differentiating, evaluating, categorizing, etc.) but may be merely describing the structure as it exists, or has developed historically, together with its results, causes or correlates.

In answer to this argument, let it first be repeated that the characterization of the scientist as an ascriber is heuristic rather than absolute, and that viewing the scientist within the same frame of reference as the actor-ascriber allows for many critical comparative analyses which would not otherwise be evident. For example, it focuses attention upon problems commonly attacked by the sociology of knowledge: the position of the scientist within the social structure; its effect on his social perceptions and evaluations, etc. Further, as pointed out above, it allows conceptually for direct comparison of the criteria and categories used by the objective-ascriber and those used by the actor-ascriber.

In answer to the argument that the scientist does not place individuals and therefore cannot be classed as an ascriber, it may be said that even though the analyst may not be primarily concerned with the individuals that are in his categories but rather concerned with the categories themselves, in actuality the categories are composed of individuals. The scientist who is concerned with positions, even though he may claim he is not
interested in the individuals who occupy them, or may claim that individuals do not need to occupy them, or that the positions exist regardless of who occupies them (e.g., in the case of an established office), is in effect ascribing, is using the same process as the actor-ascriber, although with a different emphasis. Even the scientist who is differentiating and describing positions on the basis of expected patterns of behavior, again not with any regard for the individuals who occupy these positions, is reporting or observing the behavior of other ascribers who themselves are placing individuals.

As to the second argument that some scientists are merely objectively describing reality rather than acting as ascribers (e.g., splitting up a population on the basis of income differentials or life chances), it seems useful to consider them as engaging in the same psychological process of differentiation as the actor-ascriber: differentiating, using criteria, evaluating, categorizing, ranking, and so on. The ascribées in this case may be large, unknown masses or statistical units, but the process is logically the same, and one of the advantages of this conceptualization is that it draws attention to the scientist as an ascriber who himself has a position in a social system.

Having completed the analysis of types of ascribers based upon the relationship of the ascribers to the ascribées (the two broad headings of the actor-, self-, or the informant-ascriber who are within the same system of social relationships as the ascribées on the one hand, and the scientist-ascriber who
attempts to place himself outside the system for the purpose of his analysis on the other) and upon the kinds of data used in ascription (the various sub-types of scientist-ascriber: the reporter-ascriber, and the objective-ascriber), the next step was to focus attention on other meaningful distinctions and concepts regarding ascribers.

Upon reflection as to the nature of ascriptions made, criteria used, structure perceived by various actor- and informant-ascribers, it seemed that one set of useful predictive hypotheses would center around the degree of intimacy, frequency, and knowledge involved in the relationship between ascriber and ascribes. It appeared reasonable to expect, e.g., that the ascriber in very close, continued contact with the ascribes (e.g., husband and wife) would make placements and categorize with quite different criteria than he would use in placing an ascribes who was relatively unknown to him, with whom he had only infrequent, secondary contacts. 16

Out of this concern for the relationship variables in ascription came another set of distinctions of kinds of ascribers:

16 It should be added, in order to indicate areas which were not investigated, due to time and space limitations, that another set of important hypotheses might center around the situational variables involved in the act or process of ascription; e.g., the investigation of whether ascription takes on different forms in crisis or pressure situations.
(7) The Primary Ascríber: an ascríber who is in continued, intimate contact with the ascribee.

(8) The Secondary Ascríber: an ascríber who is in regular, but non-intimate contact with the ascribee.

(9) The Reputational Ascríber: an ascríber who has no, or very slight or occasional, contact with the ascribee.

It is realized that these distinctions are not operationally or methodologically defined, and that it might be difficult in a research situation to distinguish between a secondary and a reputational ascríber, or for that matter to get a reliable measure of difference between an intimate and a non-intimate contact. But it does seem useful as a first step to make the rough distinctions pending the development of dependable and refined measures of them.

So far the analysis of ascribers has been largely in terms of a single ascríber engaging in a single act of ascription, often with only one ascribee. The complex reality of multiple networks of simultaneous, often reciprocal, ascriptions taking place continuously in any social grouping has been broken down for analysis into single units. There is a need also for concepts dealing with multiple ascriptions with patterned, repetitive acts of ascription. These patterns of behavior can again be analyzed in terms of the ascríber, the ascribee, the criteria, and so on. Regarding the ascribers, there are numbers of ascribers who agree on the ascription of certain individuals or categories, who agree on the criteria they use to differentiate, who agree on the evaluations they make and the resultant ranking they assign to ascribées. This
plurality of ascribers can be designated and defined as follows:

(10) Ascriber Bloc: a plurality of ascribers who agree on the ascriptions of certain individuals, or who agree in their use of certain criteria for given acts of differentiation.

It is possible for these pluralities of ascribers to take many forms: primary groups, secondary groups, aggregates, nominal groups, and so on. It is also possible to have, as indicated above, a number of types of ascriber blocs based upon the subject of agreement: the location of a given ascribee, the criteria used, the evaluations made and so on. There is thus possible the creation of a whole body of hypotheses involving the concept of ascriber bloc, e.g., those referring to the extent of agreement, the areas of agreement, the relationship between the type of bloc and the criteria used.

It is also necessary to consider the fact that a given ascribee may have, and may be aware of, a number of ascribers who are placing him simultaneously, either agreeing or disagreeing in their ascriptions. Further, in the case of disagreement among the ascribers, the ascribee may select certain ascribers and use them to establish his position, perhaps as the basis for his self-ascriction, neglecting other ascribers. It is also possible that the ascribee may be unaware of some ascribers who are placing him, or unaware of the placements they make. (One very common source of anxiety seems to be the doubt or indecision as to where others place us.)
more important than others in a power sense, and can affect the life chances of the ascribee, even without his knowledge, more than other ascribers. In this instance, a given ascriber may be significant from an observer's view, rather than from the ascribee's view. In any case, there seems to be a need for the concept of "relevant ascriber."

(11) Relevant Ascriber: the ascriber, or ascribers, who among a plurality of ascribers is chosen or perceived by a given ascribee to be more significant or important than other ascribees, or who is seen by an observer to be more significant.

It may prove useful upon further consideration, and upon the formulation of certain hypotheses, to distinguish between the subjective relevant ascriber, as seen by the ascribee, and the objective relevant ascriber, as seen by the observer. For example, a series of hypotheses about discrepancies between these two types of relevant ascribers may necessitate such a distinction. These concepts are related quite closely to the concepts and hypotheses brought forth in Merton's reference group theory.17

II. Characteristics of the Ascriber. The characteristics of the ascriber are legion of course, and can be categorized in any number of ways. The classification which follows is rough and preliminary and merely serves to point out some of the areas of hypotheses which seem fruitful. The central concern here is the relationship between the characteristics of the ascriber and the kinds

of ascriptions he makes, the criteria he uses, the structures he creates or perceives. Perhaps the relationships most useful for hypotheses are those which involve three characteristics.

(1) The position of the ascriber(s) in the social structure and the kinds of ascriptions they make. As indicated above, this area of hypotheses, as well as those mentioned below in the other categories of characteristics of ascribers, centers around two sets of problems and two sets of research efforts, depending upon the type of ascriber involved. If the focus of attention is on the actor-, self-, or informant-ascriber, the problems and research will consist of trying to find out how the position, or the relationship to the ascribee, or the personal characteristics of the ascriber in the group or community varies with his perception of the structure of that group or community, the placement he makes of others in it, the criteria he uses and so on. For example, Davis and Gardners' findings indicate that perception of structure varies with the ascriber's own position: those with high positions see distinctions in groupings close to them and tend to lump together those groupings on the lower side; those ascribers with low positions also make distinctions between groupings close to them and blur together those in the higher positions. (The authors' assumption of a single objective system is explicit and the possibility of a multiple system based upon

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actor-ascripters is ignored, but a fuller discussion of this problem will have to wait until the topic of types of structure is considered.

On the other hand, if the focus of attention is upon the scientist-ascripter, particularly the objective-ascripter, the concern becomes one which usually falls under the heading of "sociology of knowledge": the inference of a meaningful connection between the social position of the scientist and the nature of his intellectual product, e.g., the kind of structure he perceives, the criteria he uses, the political outlook he wishes to strengthen, and so on. This kind of interest may also apply to the reporter- or observer-ascripter. 19

(2) The relation of the ascriber to the ascribte. One aspect of this relationship has already been treated above, in the presentation of the concepts of primary, secondary and reputational ascriber. The relationship in that case was limited to analysis in terms of frequency and depth of social contact. It may also be broadened to include other aspects of the relationship between ascriber and ascribte: e.g. similarity or dissimilarity of attitude or opinion, affectional relationships (positive or negative), degree of mutual knowledge, the impact of the ascribte on the ascriber, to name a few. Hypotheses dealing with these variables would again center on the nature of the relationships between...
the ascriber and ascribee and their effect upon, or concomitance with, the kinds of ascriptions made.

(3) Personal characteristics of the ascriber include a number of sub-categories: (a) the psychological characteristics (including personality traits and types), (b) the ideological characteristics (including attitudes, opinions, values, identifications), (c) the physical characteristics (including age, sex, health, etc.), (d) the social characteristics (including marital status, occupation, education, nationality, membership in various kinds of groups or organizations, income, etc.), (e) the behavioral characteristics (including actual behavior patterns of ascribers in various areas: politics, sex, religion, economics, etc.).

It is obvious that this category of characteristics of the ascribers covers a great deal of ground, a multitude of possible hypotheses. It should be reiterated perhaps that all these hypotheses have one central focus: the relationship between the characteristics of the ascriber and the act(s) of ascription, including the created or perceived structure. There is another important set of hypotheses dealing with a different and opposite relationship between the characteristics of the ascribers and the process of differentiation: a relationship in which the characteristics

20 These "social" characteristics could also be subsumed under positional characteristics depending upon the point of view taken: i.e., education could be viewed as a criterion establishing position, or merely as a personal characteristic.
are seen as dependent rather than independent variables. It should
be pointed out that the process of differentiation affects the
ascriber as well as the ascribee, and such problems as the result
of persistent kinds of differentiation upon the ascriber would fall
under this head, and would include the variety of characteristics
listed above.

III. The Ascribee. The next element of analysis to be considered
is the individual, or individuals, who are perceived and placed by
the ascriber. As noted in the section dealing with the ascriber,
to single out (for the purpose of analysis) the individual who is
perceived and to distinguish him from the perceiver is merely a
heuristic device, since in reality he may well be a perceiver
and the perceived at the same time. The chief difficulty with the
concept of ascribes is that in many studies of differentiation
the ascription is not concerned with individuals per se, but with
categories of individuals, or perhaps of behavior patterns. For
example, in studies of occupational stratification, the scientist-
ascriber may be using his own criteria for ranking (e.g., education
required) or actor- or informant-ascribers' statements of how they
rank or rate occupations, but in either case the placement is of
occupations rather than individuals. Davis\textsuperscript{21} specifically states
that stratification is a system of positions, not of occupants.

\textsuperscript{21}Kingsley Davis, \textit{Human Society}, p. 93ff.
The argument is made that a position (e.g., an office in an organization) need not be filled at any given time by an individual; that occupants may come and go while the position persists. In broad-scale descriptions of a society or culture, the scientist-ascriber may again not place any individuals in categories or structures, but may merely describe the structure, and the structural components (classes, organized associations of power, status groups) as they exist, according to his perception. Again, a familiar type of stratification study is the arbitrary selection and breaking up of a continuum according to logical or statistical clusters, and the subsequent relating of these groupings to certain correlates (e.g., the establishment of an income range, the setting up of class intervals, and the correlation of these data to education levels). In all of the above cases, the ascribers are not explicitly dealt with as individuals. The position taken here, however, is that the ascribers in such cases are categorizing and that their categories are in fact composed of individuals. Following this argument one step further, it may be claimed that if the categories are not composed of individuals, then the study is not one of social differentiation, but of some other kind. Thus, according to this view, an occupation may be seen as a category of individuals; a position (e.g., the office of president of a corporation) may be seen as a category of individuals (the individuals who have held, or perhaps will hold, such a position, or are holding similar positions); status groups or social classes
may be seen as categories of individuals. All of the above is not meant to imply that the degree of specificity and identification of ascribees as individuals is not important. On the contrary, it is a central feature in many of the analyses and critiques to follow, and it is precisely the assumption of the concept of ascribee that make such analyses possible. For example, it is of central importance to ascertain whether the ascribees are merely nameless and unknowing members of an imposed category, or whether they are real groups conscious of their membership and aware of the existence and identity of other members. The tracing of the shift from one type of membership to another or — to state it perhaps more clearly — the tracing of the gradual awareness of being categorized and the establishment of membership feelings, is a crucial concern in many studies of social differentiation.

Perhaps it may be asked at this point why there is not a section here dealing with the characteristics of the ascribee corresponding to that dealing with the ascriber's traits above. As will be more fully developed in the section to follow and in the section on correlates, the characteristics of the ascribee are treated under the head of "criteria" if they are used in making placements of the ascribee, and under the head of "correlates" if they are arrived at after the placement is made, or if they are not used in the placement.
IV. The Criteria. So far there has been a discussion of the individuals involved in the process of social differentiation: those who do the differentiating, their characteristics, and those who are differentiated. The next element of analysis was to do with the process of differentiation itself. As indicated above, this process necessitates the selection of certain characteristics or attributes of the objects to be differentiated, and the neglecting of others. Any two objects can be viewed as different or similar depending upon which characteristics are selected for the comparison. This whole process of selection of characteristics is a fascinating problem in itself. For example, why do some people see differences where others see similarity? Are some individuals "difference-prone" and others "similarity-prone"? What factors enter into the determination of seeing difference vs. similarity, under what conditions? In any case, the whole problem of social perception is too complicated\(^\text{22}\) to be gone into at length here; it must suffice merely to point out its existence and relevance for the social differentiation process. It is within the scope of this analysis, however, to discuss the characteristics that are selected, even if it is impossible to dwell upon the reasons, the psychological and social processes that enter into the selection itself. In another section of this dissertation some

\(^{22}\text{Cf. J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman, "Value and Need As Organizing Factors in Perception" and their bibliography as an indication of the scope of this problem.}\)
preliminary hypotheses are outlined which deal with the relations between kinds of characteristics which are selected for differentiation and the degree of social distance between the ascriber and ascribee.

The characteristics or attributes of the ascribee which are selected and used in the act of differentiation are here called criteria. It must be made clear that these characteristics are those selected by the ascriber, as seen by him, and are not necessarily "real" attributes as seen by others. Thus the criteria are always a product of the relationship between the ascriber and ascribee, involving the perception of the ascriber and the actual characteristics (as based upon consensus of qualified judgments) of the ascribee. For example, the ascriber may project certain characteristics, e.g., threatening behavior, beauty, etc. onto the ascribee, and make his differentiations, evaluations and categorisations on this basis; and this perception may very well be at odds with the characteristics of the ascribee as seen by others.

The concept of criteria is of central importance in the study of social differentiation. As will be demonstrated more fully later on in this dissertation, the use of criterion as a concept, distinct from the concept of correlate, becomes a basic tool in the analysis of theoretical and empirical work done in the area of social differentiation. Suffice it to say at this point that the confusion, or the unknowing exchange of these two concepts
is at the bottom of a great deal of the difficulty and contradiction in the studies found in the literature. The criteria are the characteristics used to make the differentiation and to place the ascribee, while correlates are the characteristics of the ascribees discovered after the placement is made; at any rate, they are not used in making the placement. It follows that any given characteristic of the ascribee can be either a criterion or a correlate (at least as used by certain kinds of ascribers). The analytic necessity is to distinguish whether the characteristic is being used as a criterion or a correlate, at a given stage of the theoretic or research process. For example, it is possible to rank ascribees, or to categorize them, using income as a criterion. Once these income groupings have been established, then they may be investigated to discover what their educational level is: the correlate. The reverse procedure would be to use education as a criterion for ranking or grouping, and then establish the correlate of income.

Another point to be emphasized is the problem of the range of content to be included under this head. Many writers insist upon the limitation of characteristics which can be used for social differentiation, or provide for special concepts to cover certain kinds of criteria. Benoit-Smullyan\(^2^3\), for example, distinguishes between the "sources" of prestige and the "criteria" of

\(^2^3\)Emile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types, and Status Interrelations," Pp. 156ff.
prestige (prestige itself being one of the status hierarchies, along with economic and political status). According to Benoit-Smulyan's conceptual scheme, there is a status hierarchy based upon prestige. Prestige itself is based upon such "criteria" as attitudes of admiration and deference or imitative behavior. The characteristics of the individuals which evidently arouse such attitudes or behavior on the part of the ascriber (e.g., age, beauty, luck, skill, etc.) are the "sources" of prestige, according to his terminology. This rather complex set of concepts becomes simplified if they can all be regarded as criteria of varying content. An ascriber can select any of the following as the characteristics he will use in differentiation or placement. Generalized, undifferentiated prestige that is enjoyed by the ascribee and that is evidenced in his reputation as being a "prestigious" individual, may be used as a criterion without further knowledge as to the reasons for this reputation. (It would seem that this would be a fairly rare kind of criterion, since in most cases the reasons for the prestige would be known and specified in some degree. However, it is possible; e.g., the ascriber may merely hear that the ascribee is a "big-shot" or a "wheel," and base his ascription on this criterion alone.) Attitudes of admiration or deference toward the ascribee by others (Benoit-Smulyan's "criteria") might be the criteria used by the ascriber for placement, again without knowledge of the reasons for these attitudes. Thirdly,
the ascriber may use the criteria of age, beauty, luck, or skill for his ascription (Benoit-Smullyan's "sources").

Davis also makes a distinction (between the kinds of evaluation of position) which is actually based upon difference in criteria used. He points out that a position may be evaluated apart from the individual occupying it, and this evaluation he calls prestige. He further states that the individual incumbents of the position do not fulfill their functions or duties equally well, that their relevant behavior is evaluated, and this kind of evaluation he calls esteem. According to the position taken here, Davis' distinction becomes one of difference in criteria used, and also a shift in the ascribers involved. In the case of the prestige of a position (e.g., the occupation of charwoman), the criteria for placement are unspecified, presumably they might be income, physical hardship or dirtiness of the work and the like, and the ascribers seem to include everyone in the society who rank the occupation, perhaps including the occupants themselves as self-ascrbers. In the case of esteem (the position of a given charwoman within a group of other charwomen) the criterion shifts, according to Davis, to a consideration of how well the functions or duties of the position are carried out, and the ascribers shift to the close associates of the ascribes, who have knowledge of such behavior and evaluate it, presumably co-workers or immediate super-

24 Kingsley Davis, op. cit., pp. 93, 94.
This is not to say that the distinction made by Davis is without analytic value, but merely to point out that such a distinction made outside the conceptual framework of criteria and ascriber is a limiting one. But within this framework, it is possible to see that esteem and prestige as defined by Davis are but special cases from an array of possible combinations of types of ascriber and kinds of criteria used by them. For instance, it is possible to begin to see a relationship between the degree of social distance, or amount of knowledge, existing between the ascriber and ascribee and the kinds of criteria used by the ascriber.

None of the above should be construed as an objection to the idea of labeling kinds of position by the kinds of criteria used in the placement of ascribees. It is the purpose here merely to show that such labeling is done in many cases unsystematically and often limits the perspective of the variety of types of position by inadvertently limiting the range of the types of criteria envisaged.

As indicated above, the range of content of criteria is coterminous with the range of content of correlates. Since these correlates will be discussed later, it may suffice here only to

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25 The difference between esteem and prestige does not necessarily involve a change in ascribers, or even in criteria. It is essentially a distinction between the placement of a category and the placement of an individual within a category.
outline some of the possibilities. Criteria may include: attitudes, tastes, opinions, values, goals, identifications of the ascribees; personality traits, intelligence, motivations, psychological deviance, modes of thought attributed to the ascribees; age, sex, health, appearance, physical abnormalities; marital status, occupation, religion, group membership, race, nationality, source and amount of income, education, place and length of residence, family lineage, amount and kind of influence; manners, religious behavior, association with others, deviant behavior in several areas, degree of fulfillment of expected function; other positions. As can be seen, this list is both incomplete and overlapping; it also consists of several levels of criteria. The purpose at this point is merely to illustrate the wide range of possible criteria which can be and are used by ascribers in the process of differentiation and ascription.

To recapitulate briefly, the concept of criterion has been defined; it has been pointed out that the ascriber may project certain characteristics onto the ascribee; the distinction between criterion and correlate has been made and its analytic value noted; the problem of the range of content of criteria has been discussed and an illustration of this range has been presented. It is now necessary to begin classifying the various kinds or types of criteria according to various principles other than content.
There are two ways in which criteria were described: as ascribee's characteristics selected for the assignment of difference or similarity, and as ascribee's characteristics selected for evaluation. This distinction between differentiation and evaluation is central to the whole analysis of social differentiation presented here, and runs through each major analytic element. It follows then that criteria may be usefully classified as differentiating or evaluative criteria. The justification for the value of such a classification of criteria is presented immediately below; the major discussion of differentiation vs. evaluation as processes appears in section V below.

(1) **Differentiating Criteria** may be defined as those criteria used in the assigning of difference or similarity to ascribees. They are used merely to distinguish between two or more ascribees, without any evaluation being made. The characteristics used in this differentiation cover a wide range of content as indicated above, and may or may not be the same characteristics used for evaluation. Thus when two ascribees are differentiated on the basis of height, no evaluation need follow; or the evaluation may be made on the basis of height, e.g., in terms of function as a basketball center; or the evaluation may be made on the basis of some other criterion, e.g., the assumption of grace or strength. Perhaps a better example of the last case, of the shifting or criteria from differentiating to evaluating, would be the differentiation of a plumber from a carpenter, using,
e.g., the criterion of kind of work done, and the evaluation made on a different criterion, e.g., income. All of the above might seem to indicate that differentiating and evaluating follow a necessary chronological order. Actually the two processes may occur simultaneously. It is also possible that a set of values might lead to differentiation.

(2) **Evaluative criteria** are those characteristics selected and used for evaluating the ascribees relative to one another or to some standard. It would seem that any criteria, with respect to content, could be used as either differentiating or evaluative criteria. In other words, it seems safe to say that any difference may be evaluated, and that every comparative evaluation is based upon a differentiation.

The whole problem of the chronology of differentiation and evaluation brings up another important distinction in the use of criteria and a further principle for the typology of criteria, namely, the difference between "rough" and "fine" placements, or the problem of successive approximation. It seems useful to think of the social differentiation process taking place chronologically in many instances in a series of increasingly specific placements. For example, in a first meeting of two individuals there may be an initial rough placement in terms of the criteria of physical appearance, name, dress, speech, or the like. Upon further acquaintance, the ascriber may make a finer placement of the ascribee within a category, e.g., from the rough category of
doctor and its rank, to a subsequent ranking of the individual among doctors (cf. Davis, terms "prestige" and "esteem," mentioned above). On the other hand, the ascriber may shift his ranking higher or lower within the same category, e.g., become more or less impressed with the intelligence of the ascribee. Thus the ascriber may shift criteria from the initial placement, which may or may not be a ranking involving evaluation, but may merely be a differentiation, through the subsequent phases of placement, to the final placement, which again may not be stable. If there is any regularity in this shift, and it seems very probable that there is, it should be useful to try to classify the criteria according to whether they are used for initial or subsequent placement, and to discover which criteria, if any, are consistently used in each function. The same distinction would apply in a community setting: the newly-arrived ascriber first makes rough approximate placements and then successively refines them, many times changing criteria.

In any case, it seems worthwhile in order to point to such hypotheses and their testing, to make the analytic distinction between (3) initial criteria and (4) subsequent criteria.

As indicated above, both initial and subsequent criteria can be differentiating or evaluative.

The consideration of the chronology of differentiation and the kinds of criteria used in the different phases of the process led the writer to another problem: the use of criteria as indicators of other criteria. For example, the occupation of doctor
may be given a high rank because to the ascriber this occupation
may indicate that the ascriber has high income, skill, sacrifice
components, or the like. The criterion of occupation then is an
indicator of or a clue to the possession of the criterion of
skill, etc. It may be possible then to classify criteria accordin­
g to the degree to which they represent basic values, or basic
principles of differentiation, as opposed to the degree to which
they stand for, are indicators of, the possession of these basic
characteristics. Three levels have been arbitrarily selected
for analytic purposes, although there could be, possibly, an
infinite number. For the purposes at hand, these levels seem to
apply to evaluative criteria more clearly than to differentiating
criteria. For example, it is easier to list basic values than it
is to get at basic principles of differentiation. However, logi­
cally, the distinction of levels applies to both differentiation
and evaluation: occupation may stand as an indicator of skill
or wealth which is evaluated, or as an indicator of function or
nature of the work which is not evaluated.

The three levels then are called first-level criteria, second­
level criteria, and third-level criteria. (5) First-level cri­
teria refer directly to basic values or basic principles of differ­
entiation. For example, such characteristics as honesty, friend­
liness, courage, efficiency, beauty, humor, industry, etc., and
their opposites, seem to be first-level evaluative criteria.
First-level criteria would also include characteristics which
cannot be specified: situations in which ascribees are ranked without apparent reasons. For example, preferences based upon fiat, where the ascriber places the ascribee where he is told to, without any other reason; hunches, intuition, vague impulses to like or dislike, to prefer or reject would fall under this head. It is difficult to point to any specific characteristics which stand as first-level differential criteria. For example, height or sex may be the basic differentiator, or either may be an indicator of some other basic differentiator, e.g. strength or other physical characteristics. (6) Second-level criteria refer to characteristics used as indicators of first-level criteria. For example, group membership may often be a second-level evaluative criterion, as may occupation, race, nationality, or family lineage. In these cases the occupation, race, family, or group is itself evaluated on the basis of some first-level criteria. The ascriber may assign inferior rank to any and all members of the Ku Klux Klan, or to any and all Negroes because he perceives such membership as an indication of the possession of some first-level criterion, e.g. brutality or stupidity. The second-level criterion stands as an indicator of the possession of the first-level criterion. (7) Third-level criteria refer to characteristics used as indicators of second-level criteria. For example, accent, dress, facial characteristics, attitudes or opinions may serve as indicators of the possession of second-level criteria. To take a current and prevalent instance, certain statements of political
or economic opinion are taken as indicators of group membership in the Communist party. This group membership is taken as an indicator of the possession of certain first-level criteria: treachery, disloyalty, enmity, and so on.

It must of course be emphasised that such a classification is entirely relative with respect to the specific content of the criteria at various levels. In one instance of ascription for a given ascriber, accent may be a first-level criterion (as viewed aesthetically, for example); in another instance it may be second-level (and indicate friendliness); in another situation or with another ascriber it may be third-level (indicating a nationality which in turn indicates untrustworthiness). At the same time, it may be possible to arrive at certain sets of criteria that are typically used, by certain ascribers, in certain situations, in certain structures, at a given level. At least this distinction points the way to a set of hypotheses and research operations which will systematically add to the theory and empirical knowledge in the area of social differentiation.

The consideration of the various levels of criteria and the attempt to classify specific criteria according to this schema drew attention to still another factor involved: the method of ascertaining the possession of criteria. In the use of second- or third-level criteria, for example, the ascriber may use indicators as a result of his own experience and observation, or he may base them upon the opinions or advice of others. Nationality
used as an indicator of a personality trait may be based upon actual observation and experience, or it may be based upon hearsay, reputation and the like. Again, regardless of level, any criterion may be actually observed in the ascribee or taken as evidence from someone else. Thus for analytic purposes there can be distinguished (8) observed criteria ascertained by direct observation of the ascribee, and (9) reputed criteria based upon a knowledge of characteristics gained from others' observations. It seems useful to make this distinction and typology of criteria since it seems to be closely and meaningfully related to the other principles of classification mentioned above and to lead to new areas of hypotheses relating them to one another. For example, it might be hypothesised that evaluative criteria are more apt to be reputed than are differentiating criteria; that initial criteria are more apt to be reputed than are subsequent criteria; first-level criteria are more apt to be observed than are second- and third-level criteria.

Many writers have made a distinction between ascribed and achieved status or position. Ascribed positions are those over which the incumbent has no control; he may be born into them or inherit them and has no ability to change them by his own efforts. Achieved positions on the other hand are those which can be attained by dint of the individual's effort. A rigid caste system is built upon ascribed positions, for example, while an open-class system is made up largely of achieved
positions. Upon closer inspection, this distinction actually seemed to refer to the nature of criteria, and the connection between the kind of criteria and the kind of structure seemed to be variable. Take, for example, the criterion of age, or its accompaniments in strength, agility, beauty, and so on. The ascriber has no control over these characteristics, and yet they change, as his position may change. So it would be quite possible to have criteria over which there is no control, and yet have a great deal of mobility. On the other hand, with a criterion such as attitude or opinion, which can be led and achieved, it may be that the positions based upon these criteria are quite rigid and unchanging as is the whole social structure. Again, this is not to criticise the concept of naming positions or structures according to the criteria on which they are based but merely to point out once more that such labelling is not to be limiting and misleading if the range of criteria is not recognised, and if there is not a clear conceptual distinction made and kept between the idea of criterion and the idea of position. As a result of this kind of analysis a four-fold classification of criteria was constructed based upon the principle of control by the ascriber and the possibility of change in the criteria.

(10) **Congenital criteria** are those which are unchanging and over which the ascriber has no control. For example, race, sex, family lineage and certain physical abnormalities would fall under this head. (11) **Emergent criteria** are those which change,
but over which the ascribee has no control. Age and concomitant physiological changes are perhaps the best examples of emergent criteria. (12) Sustained criteria are those which are unchanging, but over which the ascribee has no control. Examples of this type of criteria are more difficult to present, since the matter of the nature of, or the ability to "control" becomes an issue. Group-membership or attitudes and beliefs may be examples of sustained criteria in certain instances, under certain conditions. (13) Achieved criteria are those which change and over which the ascribee has control. In modern U. S. society, occupation, income, dwelling area might be good examples of achieved criteria, at least for some ascribees.

In the discussion of the four types of criteria based upon degree of change possible and amount of control exercised by the ascribee there is another factor involved: the relation of one criterion to another. This brings up the whole problem of combinations of criteria. It is suggested in much of the discussion above, and in the examples given, that criteria may be used in combination, and that the presence of certain criteria, under certain conditions and in certain societies or with certain ascribees, may empirically limit or prohibit the possession of other criteria. Thus age may limit beauty, race or nationality may limit occupation, occupation may limit income, and so on.

This relationship between criteria may or may not be perceived by certain ascribers or ascribees. There is the possibility that
of classifying criteria as (14) controlling criteria or as (15) controlled criteria. It may look at first glance as if the congenital or emergent criteria were always the controlling ones, and the achieved criteria always controlled. Thus occupation is controlled by race and income is determined by age. Upon further consideration, however, it can be seen that it is theoretically and actually possible for the opposite kinds of connections to exist. That is, it may be that in some instances an achieved criterion may control or limit the existence of a congenital or an emergent criterion. For example, certain occupations may speed up or retard the aging process, as far as the perception and use of this criterion by the ascriber is involved. The phenomenon of "passing" in certain occupations or dwelling areas may be another example of this inverse relationship between the two classifications of criteria.

Empirically, the combination of criteria/prevalent, if not universal. It is probably quite rare for an ascriber to use a single criterion in the placement of an ascribee. This consideration suggests several concepts that appear to be useful in the analysis of social differentiation. First, there must be a term to denote the concept of multiple criteria used by the same ascriber, or set of ascribers, in given acts of differentiation involving a given ascribee, or set of ascribees; in other words, criteria typically used in combination by the ascriber. This term is (16) criterion cluster, which must be distinguished from the concepts of initial and subsequent cri-
teria outlined above. The problem is whether to include in a given cluster all of the criteria used throughout a time period, and in a series of placements, including both initial and subsequent criteria, until a given ascribee is finally placed by the ascriber, or whether the concept applies to a number of criteria used simultaneously, for a given placement of the ascribee. The latter meaning and definition is intended here. Thus, there may be clusters involved in the initial placements, as well as in subsequent placements. To put it another way, initial criteria may be used singly or in clusters, as may subsequent criteria, or for that matter, any of the other types of criteria: e.g., differentiating, first-level, observed, congenital, controlling. The variable relation of the concept of cluster to the concepts of first-level, second-level, and third-level criteria must further be commented on. It may be, for example, that a cluster of second-level criteria are used as indicators of a single first-level criterion. Thus, church-going, abstention from liquor, abstention from profanity, and certain other group-memberships, may compose a second-level cluster used as indicators of a single first-level criterion, such as honesty. On the other hand a single second-level criterion may be used as the indicator of a first-level cluster. Church-going may be the single indicator of a first-level cluster such as "morality," which may include honesty, self-discipline, chastity, piety, etc.
The next point to be considered is the fact that even though the criteria may be used in combination rather than singly, not all the criteria in the cluster will be given equal weight or consideration by the ascriber. Some of the criteria, or a single criterion, in the cluster may be considered to be the most important. This criterion, or criteria as the case may be, is called here the (17) key criterion: the criterion in a cluster which is most heavily weighed in the assignment of an ascribee. Related to the concepts of criterion cluster and key criteria is the concept of (18) criterion halo effect. In many cases the ascriber may assume that a commonly-used cluster exists with all its component criteria, even though only one or two criteria in the cluster are actually observed or known about reputationally. For example, to continue the illustration used above, the presence of church-going and certain other group memberships as characteristics of the ascribee may lead the ascriber to assume that the characteristics of abstinence from liquor and profanity are also possessed by the ascribee as part of the accustomed and expected cluster. The operation of the halo effect may often take place upon the perception of only the key criterion in the cluster, with the other criteria in the cluster assumed to exist.

26 The difference between the concept of "halo effect" and that of first-level and second-level criteria is discussed immediately below.
Here again, a distinction must be made between the concept of halo effect and the concepts of first-, second-, and third-level criteria. It may seem a fine, if not impossible, distinction to make operationally. What is the difference between accent used as an indicator of nationality (third-level criterion standing as an indicator of second-level criterion) and church-going used in the assumption of abstinence from profanity (the operation of the halo-effect, and the assumption of the presence of other criteria in the cluster from the presence of one)? The distinction lies in the difference between the meanings of "indicator" and "assumption of presence." In the first case, there is implied a necessary causal nexus; in the second, mere expected concomitance, or a meaning of "usually found with." Thus, as seen by the ascriber, there is a necessary cause and effect relationship between first- and second-level criteria, between second- and third-level criteria: e.g., membership in the Communist Party is prima facie evidence of disloyalty, treachery, etc.; there is a necessary causal connection between the two criteria at the two levels. Whereas the assumption of abstinence from profanity on the basis of church-going is merely the expectancy of a concomitance. It should be emphasised that these illustrations are taken from the point of view of a hypothetical ascriber. It might well be that a given ascriber in actual operation would reverse the two examples given above and use Communist activity as part of a cluster, or church-going as a second-level indicator
of the first-level sin of profanity. It remains for empirical research to determine which criteria are typically used in which function under given situations, or by given ascribers.

Having moved from a discussion of single criteria to a discussion of criteria used in combination, it is now necessary to move further in the direction of generalization, away from the psychological and toward the social aspects of the use of criteria, to discuss the regularity and consistency with which criteria are used in the ongoing process of social differentiation. In other words, the discussion and analytic distinctions between types of criteria began with a single ascriber using a single criterion, moved to a consideration of ascribers using multiple criteria, and now will be concerned with discussion and analysis of the criteria typically used by a number of ascribers within a social framework. The word "typically" in the previous sentence is the key to the next step of analysis. It can be readily seen that ascribers do not use criteria at random or entirely idiosyncratically. There is agreement upon criteria; patterns of criteria are set up with varying degrees of formality and attached sanctions, for use in certain social situations. Certain criteria are seen as relevant or irrelevant by ascribers and ascribees, for given situations in given relationships or structures. In short, there is in any society or group a set of norms governing and specifying the use of criteria, to varying degrees. This observation led to a final principle of classification of
criteria based upon the degree of standardization and formalization of criteria within a society or group.

(19) **Official criteria** are formally standardized in a group or society; their use is specified and regulated by formal rules or laws, and enforced by formal sanctions. Following a cue provided by Kingsley Davis in his distinction between "office" and "status" and elaborating upon his conceptualization, it may be pointed out that an official criterion can be either very narrowly known within the confines of a formal organizational structure, or can be very widely known throughout the society. The same is true of conventional criteria, as described below, which can be known either narrowly or widely. Thus certain official criteria as specified and formally regulated by a corporation, let us say, e.g., length of service, production levels, and the like, may be known only by the personnel of the corporation, and perhaps their families, whereas official criteria as specified by various government agencies, e.g., electoral votes, family lineage, etc., may be generally recognized throughout the society.

(2) **Conventional criteria** are also standardized in a group or society, but their use is regulated by informal norms and sanctions. Here again the conventional criteria may be specific to a given group or recognized throughout a society. For example, in many occupational groups there are sets of conventional criteria used for evaluation or differentiating which are peculiar to the group, e.g., specific skills such as calf-roping, rivet-
throwing, or a good left hook. Other conventional criteria are more widely known and subject to society-wide norms, e.g., certain forms of dress, manners, or speech.

(21) Unstandardised criteria, unlike official or conventional criteria, are not standardized within either group or society and their use in ascription is not subject to norms or sanctions, except in that their use may bring on negative sanction as applied to a deviation from norms. For example, in matters of aesthetic appraisal, it is often a case of every man to his own criterion. Unstandardized criteria, in short, are those characteristics selected and used by ascribers idiosyncratically, without regard to, nor subject to, norms imposed by the group or society. Thus a given ascriber may rank or place ascribents on the basis of "not liking their looks," which may be a matter of purely private and unshared opinion.

The discussion of the use of degree of standardization and formalisation as principles for the classification of criteria concludes this section. It may seem, perhaps, that some of the twenty-odd classes of criteria are unnecessary. The only justification for such elaboration once more seems to lie in its usefulness for critical analysis, hypothesis formation, and research suggestions. The demonstration of this usefulness must again wait until the chapters involving critiques and analysis of studies in social differentiation and those dealing with suggested areas of hypotheses and research proposals are presented.
There may also be a question at this point as to why these classifications were made of criteria, rather than of positions themselves. In the critical discussions of Benoit-Smullyan's and Davis' concepts, for example, there was a shift from the classification of positions (status, situs, locus; achieved, ascribed positions; positions of esteem or prestige) to the classification of criteria. In each case the point was made that a classification of positions could be made according to the criteria used in establishing them, and there was a plea for a more systematized method of labeling the positions in this way. The issue taken then was not with the labeling process itself, but with the way in which it was carried out. Throughout the present analytic scheme however, there is a consistent effort to deal with classification of positions apart from the classification of criteria. This separation is based upon the use of a different classificatory scheme for positions, largely dependent upon structural principles, and the fact that these two classificatory schemes can vary independently. It is difficult to discuss this point more lucidly at this stage without becoming involved in a thorough explanation and illustration of the classification principles used for positions. Since this matter is fully presented later, further discussion will be delayed until we come to the section on structural components. Suffice it to say at this juncture that although most of the terms and distinctions in types of criteria could be applied to positions based upon
these criteria, it seems more useful to keep the classification schemes of criteria separate from those of positions until such time as their relationship can be more fully analyzed.

V. The Process of Social Differentiation. The next subject for discussion is the act or process of differentiation itself. It must be stated at the outset that some of the terminology used thus far in this dissertation will at this point have to undergo revision and refinement. For purposes of approximate understanding and first acquaintance, the earlier terms may stand, as they apply to the process of differentiation, and its varieties. However, upon closer analysis, it is possible to see several discrepancies and difficulties with the foregoing conceptualization of the differentiation process itself. The first of these discrepancies is the fact that the term "differentiation" has been used in two ways: first, as a general term, usually with the adjective "social" attached, to refer to all the sub-processes, including under the general head such processes as the assigning of separate identity, or difference or similarity to units or categories, the evaluating and placing in order of evaluation of both units and categories, and the categorizing of units; and secondly, as a more specific term, to refer to one of the sub-processes, namely the assigning of difference to units or categories without evaluating, as opposed to the sub-process of evaluating itself. The first use of the term, as a general head including all the sub-
processes, will stand. The second use and meaning of the term, however, must be further refined and replaced by more appropriate terms.

A similar discrepancy may be found in the use of the term "evaluating." It too has been used to refer both to a general process and to more specific sub-processes. In this case the sub-processes refer to a distinction between the kinds of things evaluated, either units or categories, and to the difference between the process of evaluating and the process of arranging in order of evaluation. Here again the term must be further analysed, and new terms must be substituted where necessary.

As pointed out earlier, the conceptualisation of differentiation is central to the analytic scheme attempted here. The individuals involved in this process, as well as their characteristics, have been discussed. It has been shown that their characteristics are selected by the ascriber in order for him to differentiate, and it has been intimated that the process of differentiation results in the placement of ascribees in certain orders, arrangements and categories which make up a social structure. Thus ascribers and ascribees are of interest in that they are engaged in the process of differentiation; the selection and use of criteria are a part of the process; and the social structure is a result of the process. The process itself then is central to all the other elements of analysis.
As just indicated, the term (l) **differentiation** serves as a general head covering a number of processes: the perception of the separate identity of two or more individuals, or two or more pluralities of individuals which are initially perceived as units; the perception and the assignment of difference or similarity to these separately identified units; the equal or differential evaluation of these units; the arrangement of the units in the order of evaluation; the assignment of units to categories; the perception of the categories as different or similar; the equal or differential evaluation of the categories; and finally the arrangement of categories in the order of evaluation. The process of differentiation could thus be defined as the perception of identity, difference, or similarity between single individuals as units, or of pluralities of individuals initially perceived as units, or of categories of individuals, including the processes of categorization of units, and of the evaluation and the arrangement in order of evaluation, of units or categories.

It is obvious from such a definition that further breakdown, analysis and definition of included terms is necessary before the general term can be fully understood. Perhaps if the above definition of differentiation, in all its complexity, or precisely because of its complexity, can serve as an indication of the many different processes involved under a rubric which is all too often left unanalysed and dealt with as an unanalysed variable, it will have served its main purpose. In other words,
if the title and topic of this dissertation is "social differentiation," and the chief aim of this work is to analyze this process, then it would seem reasonable that one of the chief burdens of the definition of this central concept would be to show its complexity and at once the need for its systematic analysis.

It might be well at this point to say a word about the adjective "social" which appears in the title but does not appear in the definition above. It would be possible, and perhaps desirable, to append the word "social" to each of the processes described below, as well as to the general term of differentiation defined above. It seemed economical, however, to use the term only in reference to the basic process, although, strictly speaking, the processes without the qualifying adjective "social" could apply to the differentiation of objects, or ideas, as well as to individuals or categories of individuals. This uncertainty is partially reduced by the specification of individuals as the differentiated objects in each of the definitions of the various processes. As pointed out in an early section of this dissertation, the distinction between social differentiation as applying to human individuals or categories of individuals, and other types of differentiation involving other objects or classes, is a crucial one in that it demarcates and limits the area of study under consideration. Thus, for example, those who might argue that the studies of formal power structures or economic aggregates do not involve ascribers, criteria, ascribend, or the other elements...
of analysis presented here, have the burden of showing they are studying social or some other kind of differentiation, depending upon the nature of the items differentiated.

Turning now to the specific processes included under the general term of differentiation, the order of definitions will follow the principles of logical or psychological chronology and of order from simple to complex. For example, it is impossible to state difference or similarity until separate identity has been established; impossible to make comparative evaluations until difference has been established; impossible to categorize until difference and similarity have been established, and so on.

(2) **Specification** is the process of perceiving or apperceiving the separate identity of an individual, or a plurality of individuals initially perceived as a single unit. This process seems necessarily prior, logically and psychologically, to further description and the establishment of difference or similarity between units. It may be argued that the process of specification is indistinguishable from the process of categorization as described below, in that any specification of an object or an individual is in fact the placement of that object in a recognizable conceptual or perceptual category. The distinction that is attempted here is precisely the difference between perceiving the separate identity of the unit, as a unique object, prior to and distinct from the classification process wherein the recognized unit is classed with units similar to it, and differentiated
from less similar units. Thus in a social situation if the ascriber identifies the ascribee as Mr. Brown (e.g., is so introduced) or simply as a man in a brown suit, he does not necessarily have to categorise the ascribee as being one of a class of Mr. Browns, or of men in brown suits. Similarly, if the ascriber recognises that a cluster of people seems to be forming in a crowded hall, he may identify this cluster as a group separately from and prior to the process of further classification of the group as trouble-makers, dissenters, supporters, or the like. In the process of specification, the ascriber perceives either a unique characteristic of the ascribee, such as a proper name, which differentiates this particular ascribee from all others, or he perceives simultaneously a number of characteristics in unique combination which precludes the categorization of the ascribee based upon a single characteristic, or a special combination of characteristics which signify a class.

(3) Articulation is a process similar to that of specification in that it deals with the differentiation of units, but it goes one step further because in addition to the perception of the separate identity of units there is added the feature of comparison of units and the perception and assignment of difference or similarity between them. In the case of specification a single unit is picked out and regarded as a separate and distinct entity. In the case of articulation, the observed and recognized unit is compared with other units in order to establish further character-
istics of the unit as they relate to the characteristics of other units. The most important features of the process of articulation in regard to the use of the concept in the over-all analysis of social differentiation are that it refers to differentiation without evaluation, and that the object of differentiation is a unit, rather than a category. Thus this term is distinguished from the processes of rating or ranking, which involve evaluation of units, and from the process of segmentation, which involves the differentiation, without evaluation, of categories. Thus the ascriber may perceive Mr. Brown as different from or similar to Mr. Smith on the basis of certain selected characteristics, without evaluating either one of them, singly or comparatively.

(4) Rating is a process of differentiation which involves the evaluation of a single unit or category. Once the unit or category has been specified and its characteristics established in this process, these characteristics may be evaluated. In the process of rating no direct comparison with other present units or categories is involved. The evaluation is made in terms of some external scale of goodness or badness, desirability or undesirability. Thus for example a member of a group may be rated on his ability to get along with others, his leadership, or whatnot, not necessarily in comparison with other members of the group, but with some stated or unstated external reference point. This process is in contradistinction to the process of ranking which involves the specific internal comparative evaluation
of several units or categories with each other, and their arrangement in order of evaluation.

(5) **Ranking** is a process of differentiation which involves, as previously indicated, the comparative evaluation of units with each other, and their arrangement in regular order from the unit assigned the highest value to that assigned the lowest value. After the process of articulation and the establishment of difference or similarity between units, these differences or similarities may be comparatively evaluated and the units arranged in order of evaluation. It may be well to point out here that the results of rating often are translated into ranking by the comparison of rating scores and the arrangement of units in rank order on this basis. Although this translation procedure may be defensible, it would seem that any assumption that the two processes can be readily substituted for one another should not be made without the empirical demonstration of their similar results.

(6) **Categorisation** is a form of differentiation involving the grouping of units wherein the perceived similarity of the units within the grouping is greater than the perceived similarity of these units to any units outside the grouping. Thus categorization is a matter of perception and assignment of similarity, together with a perception and assignment of difference, in order to set the limits and designate the composition of the grouping. Once the category has been established, the units which compose it may be undifferentiated, articulated, rated, or ranked.
It may help clarify the distinctions between the processes so far discussed and illustrated if a brief condensed review is presented at this point. Specification is the isolation and recognition of a single unit. Articulation is the comparison of several units and the perception of difference or similarity without evaluation. Rating is the evaluation of a single unit against some external scale. Ranking is the comparative evaluation of several units and their arrangement in order of evaluation. Categorization is the grouping of units into classes of similarity on the basis of some selected characteristic(s). It may appear that there is some overlap in the conceptualization of the several processes just outlined in that articulation and ranking both involve a plurality of units and that this plurality itself may be regarded as a category so that the processes of articulation and ranking are in reality processes of categorization. Again the distinction must depend on the point of view and the process engaged in by the ascriber. As in the case of the distinction between specification and categorization, which also applies to the process of rating a single unit, it can be claimed that articulation and ranking do not necessarily involve categorization. The plurality of units involved in articulation or ranking may be regarded by the ascriber as a class, different from other classes of units, or they may not. Thus an ascriber who is comparing two acquaintances using the criterion of height without evaluation may form a category of these two ascribees, but is more likely not to. Or in the case of
ranking, several ascribes according to good looks or skill, which are evaluated, the ascriber may form a category of the ranked individuals, but not necessarily so. It is probably an empirical question whether articulation and ranking always or rarely or never involve categorizing, but it does seem useful and possible to make the conceptual distinction. The empirical question to be asked in order to discover whether categorization is taking or has taken place is: does the ascriber group the individuals he perceives as separate from other groupings on the basis of some criterion?

This is probably the proper time to point up the distinction between a category and a plurel, since both concepts seem to be involved in the process of categorization. In the description of the process of differentiation, and implied in the description of other processes, the concept of unit was said to apply to an individual or to a "plurality of individuals initially perceived as a single unit." Such a plurality is here termed a plurel. The difference between a plurel and a category is that the plurel is initially perceived as a unit, and not as a grouping of units, as in the case of a category. The presence or absence of the process of grouping, or arranging by discerned difference and similarity, is the essential distinction between the two concepts. Again empirical evidence would have to be brought to bear in order to demonstrate the relevance of this distinction.

The following descriptions of additional processes follows the order and logic of the typology of articulation and ranking, as
above, except that in the present case, the reference is to the arrangement and differentiation of categories rather than units. The process of rating, as already indicated, applies to either units or categories. Perhaps a word is in order here as to the reasons for these distinctions. Why not let the terms articulation and ranking stand for the differentiation of units and categories? Why complicate matters by adding the two concepts of segmentation and stratification? It is necessary, in order to defend the usefulness of these distinctions, to anticipate part of the section on structural components. As indicated previously, the ongoing processes of differentiation result in the formation of certain orders, arrangements and groupings which make up the social structure. The point to be made here is that the components of the structure are directly dependent upon the ongoing process of differentiation which gives rise to them. Thus, in order to have a rank order position, there must first be a process of ranking. In order to have a stratum or class, there must first be processes of categorization and stratification. This may seem to belabor an obvious point, but most studies of stratification and social structure place emphasis upon the positions or criteria, rather than on the processes which make the positions. If it is worthwhile to make a distinction between an individual's rank in a category and the prestige level of the category itself (cf. Davis' esteem vs. prestige), then it is essential to distinguish between the two processes which produce the two types of position.
(7) **Segmentation** is a form of differentiation involving the comparison and the perception of difference or similarity between categories, without evaluation of the categories. It may be necessary to repeat the point made in the discussion of categorization, namely, that the non-evaluative comparison of categories does not necessarily mean that the units which compose the category may not themselves be evaluated (rated or ranked). Thus two categories of individuals on a construction job, e.g., the masons and the carpenters, may be differentiated in regard to function, and not evaluated at all relative to one another, or even rated separately as occupations against some external scale, and still the individuals within these two categories may be rated separately according to some criteria, or ranked relative to one another according to skill or experience. On the other hand, they may be merely articulated, according to their social security numbers, without evaluation.

It would seem that the process of segmentation is one very largely overlooked or slighted in studies of social differentiation. The woods of the literature are full of stratification studies and theories, but studies of segmentation, called by any name, are very rare indeed. Differential evaluation of categories, and their arrangement in order of evaluation seems to be almost assumed to be inevitable by some. Those social scientists and thinkers, for example, who perceive and insist upon a single class system, a single rank-ordering of categories, seem to deny the
possibility of segmentation, or think it of such slight importance that it is not worthy of serious concern. Studies of mobility until very recently, with the notable exception of Sorokin, could be almost assumed to refer to vertical mobility, or mobility through a series of categories arranged in a rank-order of evaluation. It is a serious question why there has been so much emphasis on stratification rather than segmentation, upon status rather than equality, in the literature of social science and in the American culture.

(8) Stratification is a process of differentiation which involves the comparative evaluation of categories with each other and their arrangement in order of evaluation. Once categorization has taken place, the categories may be comparatively evaluated. Aside from remaining undifferentiated, the units within these categories may be articulated, rated or ranked. It should be pointed out that these main types of processes (i.e., processes dealing with categories vs. processes dealing with units) do not necessarily follow this chronological order (stratification — articulation — ranking, etc.). The reverse order may also occur, and the units may be differentiated and evaluated prior to being categorized and the categories being further differentiated and evaluated. It may also be that the ascribers do their own original categorization or stratification, or may learn the categories and evaluation systems of others and thus place ascribes in ready-made categories. The latter method of differentiation
is more common. The constant processes of differentiation carried on by members of a society soon become standardized, accepted, and passed on to others as part of the system of norms. This is not to deny or underestimate any changes that take place, but merely to point out that differentiation processes are repeated, patterned and learned. The whole problem of patterning in the differentiation processes suggests another important area of hypotheses dealing with such matters as the variety and characteristics of patterns: e.g., patterns of agreement between ascribers upon the differentiation and placement of a given ascribee; patterns of differentiation made by a given ascriber over a range of different ascribees, times, situations, consistency and conflict in the patterns, change in the patterns, degree of formality of the patterns, diffusion and spread of a given pattern, and so on.

VI. Structural Components (Positions). The present section deals with the orders, arrangements and categories of ascribees which make up social structure. Structure, as conceived here, is used in a much narrower and more precise sense than is commonly employed in the sociological literature. It does not refer to any and all patterned social relationships. It does not refer to any and all systems of interaction or evaluation. It is specifically limited to the denotation of the groupings and arrangements of ascribees as a result of the ongoing, patterned differentiation processes described above. Thus, for example, a category of ascribees such as an occupation, or a position in a rank order of ascribees, such
as the office of president of a group, are both structural components, whereas a system or pattern of interactions or interrelationships, such as visiting, cooperation, conflict, primary groups, organizations, are not structural components, as the term is used here, unless they are interpreted as groupings or arrangements resulting from the processes of differentiation. In other words, if a group or organization is viewed as a system of interactions, with the characteristics of awareness of the existence and membership of the group, a commonly accepted set of goals and norms formalized to varying degrees, division of labor and function, and the like, it is not being viewed structurally, but rather as a system of action. If however the group, organization or society is viewed as an arrangement of categories or units on the basis and as a result of ongoing, differentiating processes carried on by ascribers of any type, then the group, organization, or society is being seen as a structure, or structurally.

In accordance with the foregoing, discussion, a (1) structure may be described as any persistent or patterned arrangement of units or categories resulting from processes of differentiation carried on by ascribers. It will be noted that this description of structure is dependent upon the meaning of two qualifying concepts, "persistent or patterned" and "arrangement," which must be further discussed. In much of the foregoing, the word "ongoing;"

28 Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils, op. cit., pp. 5ff.
has been used in conjunction with the discussion of the processes of differentiation, but its precise meaning and importance has not yet been worked out. The dynamic nature of the processes of differentiation, the importance of the specific meaning of the term "process," is central to the whole scheme of analysis presented here. It is perhaps easy to arrive at the mistaken impression that the processes of differentiation are only separate, private psychological acts of individual ascribers behaving in a social vacuum. But the essential meaning and analytic value of the whole attempt of the scheme presented here is lost if such an atomistic view is taken. In reality, the ascribers, the criteria they use, the ascribees, the processes of differentiation, are all part of an ongoing, highly complex, series of social behaviors and interrelations. The processes of differentiation constantly operate in making the structure which is in itself dynamic and changing so that any arrangement (a category, a rank-order of units, a particular stratification of categories, or the relative position of a unit in a category) is equally in flux. The dynamic nature of the arrangements does not mean however that there is no continuity or repetition in their appearance or form. Thus, despite change, there is persistence or patterning of the processes and of the resultant structure. Without such persistence or patterning there can be neither structure nor positions in the structure.
It may appear that the word "arrangement" is ambiguous in that it refers both to units and categories. This presents us with the problem of distinguishing between total structure and structural components. If the structure is made up of the arrangement of categories, then the units which compose the categories and the categories themselves become structural components. If on the other hand, the total structure is a category, or a rank order of units not comprising a category, as viewed by the ascriber, then the units are structural components and the category is a structure. The concept of structure is seen to be a relative one, depending upon the frame of analysis used in each particular case. For example, a group may have structure, as well as a society. If the universe of analysis is an organization, the organization as a whole may compose the structure, which is made up of structural components. On the other hand, if the organization is analyzed as a part of a larger social structure, the organization itself becomes a structural component. Structure then designates the largest, most inclusive element of analysis, the largest arrangement, in a given analytic effort, and is composed of sub-arrangements and groupings which are designated as structural components.

It is convenient to have a general term to cover all of these various kinds of structural components. The term that has been chosen is (2) position, which refers to any of the structural components listed below: the location of a unit in a rank order of units, the location of a unit in a set of articulated units,
the location of a unit in a category, the location of a category in a segmentalized set of categories or the location of a category in a stratified set or rank order of categories. The use of the term "location" must be expanded upon, and the relationship between differentiation and placement or location must be explained. As the ascriber engages in any of the differentiation processes, or as a number of ascribers differentiate over a period of time, the ascribees become set and fixed, to varying degrees, in the categories and arrangements which are perceived and produced by the ascribers. What is really involved in the switch from an emphasis on differentiation to an emphasis on location, is a switch from the ascriber's action to the ascribee who is acted upon. The ascriber differentiates and the ascribee is differentiated. Location then designates the place in which the ascribee falls as a result of the differentiation process engaged in by the ascriber. Position is the name of a bin. This description however, implies, as in the discussion on structure, that the bin must have been used often enough and regularly enough by a number of ascribers for it to have acquired a label, a persistence or a pattern. This degree of standardization, persistence or patterning of positions may vary widely, but it is the view taken here that neither structure nor position can be based upon a single, idiosyncratic differentiation by a single ascriber. They must in some degree be a result of the repeated ongoing differentiation processes, over a period of time engaged in by one or more
ascripters. It should be added perhaps that pattern or persistence of the position or structure may or may not be perceived by different ascribers. The scientist-ascriber may see a pattern in placements that the actor-ascriber does not see even though he is involved in the process.

Once the concepts of structure and position have been delineated, it is necessary to make a further breakdown of types of positions in relation to the types of processes of differentiation which give rise to them. (The breakdown and analysis of types of structures is discussed in Section IX below.)

(3) Identity is a type of position which comes about as a result of the process of specification. It will be recalled that this particular process of differentiation involves merely the isolation and recognition of a unit without comparison (perception of relative difference or similarity) between the given unit and any other units. So it follows that the identity of a unit is a unique position, which is not based upon a comparison with other units, and which is not evaluated. Thus the identity of a given ascribee, or plural, as seen by the ascriber, may be based upon his or its name, or some unique combination of characteristics which the ascriber neither evaluates nor categorizes. Often the identity of an ascribee may be the first, and vaguest, placement made by the ascriber in the series of successive placements leading to a final, precise position. For example, an
A scribe may merely know the name of the ascribee at first, then begin to differentiate the ascribee from other ascribees on the basis of personal appearance, dress, and the like; then may evaluate these differences comparatively, and finally make a rather precise placement, perhaps involving categorization, ranking of categories, and location within one of these categories, as a final statement of position. Anyone who has closely observed the sizing up of an unknown guest by the old-timers at a party, has probably seen these various operations take place step by step with great clarity within a short length of time.

(4) Situs is a type of position which is created as a result of the process of articulation. In this process the ascribee is compared with other ascribees and differences or similarities between them are noted without evaluation taking place. It follows that the situs of an individual is his particular position as compared with the position of others, without evaluation of these positions. Thus the members of a production line may be distinguished from one another in terms of operations performed (the differentiating criterion) by each without any evaluation taking place. In this instance, for example, their situses might be stocker, cable binder, splicer, solderer, inspector, sorter, and packer. It may be objected that these situses are, or are apt to be, differentially evaluated in the real work situation by the worker-ascriptors themselves. This is of course
precisely the distinction to be made between situs and rank. If
evaluation does not take place in the comparison between units
the positions involved are situses. If, on the other hand, evalua-
tion does take place in the comparison of units, the positions
are ranks.

As indicated above, in the discussion of processes, there
has been insufficient attention paid in the literature to situs
positions, with an over-emphasis on rank positions, or as they
are often called, status positions. This disparity in emphasis
has grown to the extent that some analysts consider evaluation as
a necessary and inevitable feature of any comparison. All com-
parisons are seen as "invidious." This argument will have to be
resolved empirically, but the inevitability of evaluation should
not be assumed a priori.

It must be re-emphasized that all of the above refers to the
differentiation and location of units rather than categories.
Situs may be positions within categories, or they may comprise
a set or cluster which is not a category. Thus the production
line mentioned in the example above may or may not be viewed as
a category by the ascriber. If the situs is within a category,
the category itself may be arranged in various ways in relation
to other categories, by segmentalization or stratification. In
other words, and anticipating additional terms, an ascriber can
have situs within a segment or within a stratum, or within both
simultaneously. It may be further argued that in the example above the units involved, such as stocker, packer, etc., are in reality categories, and that therefore the positions should be properly called segments (categories differentiated without evaluation) rather than situses (units differentiated without evaluation). Here again the distinction is relative and empirical. If the individuals involved, the ascribes, are seen as a category, e.g., all the stockers in the plant as an occupational grouping, then they do compose a category, and if differentiated without evaluation, form a segment. If on the other hand, they are seen as single individuals within a given work group, carrying certain specialized functions, then they are seen as units, and their positions are situses. Perhaps a clearer example of a situs, referring specifically and unequivocally to an individual as a unit, would be the various member-roles in a small group, such as recorder, summarizer, etc., if these roles are not evaluated.

(5) Rating is a type of position which comes about as a result of the differentiation process of rating which involves non-comparative evaluation of units or categories. That is to say, more specifically, the evaluation of the units or categories does not involve comparison and ranking of the units or categories relative to one another, but rather is a single evaluation based upon some external scale of values. Thus, if the ascriber were to evaluate a given ascribee, not in relation to other ascribees,
but as a single unit based upon some set of values, he would be assigning the ascriber a rating. For example, a man may evaluate his wife, and hold her in high or low esteem, not in comparison with other wives, or with any ranking involved, but simply evaluating her as a single, unique unit. Or an actor-assigner may be asked to rate certain occupations or individuals as to their excellence, without making any explicit comparison with other occupations or individuals. This distinction between rating and rank may seem to be unnecessarily fine, but it appears, as in the case of situs vs. rank, that there is no reason to assume that differentiation always involves evaluation, or when it does, that it involves comparative, invidious evaluation. Shifting to the area of mobility as a further example and justification of this distinction between rating and rank, it may well be that an individual or group wishes to achieve a higher standard of living, not necessarily to get ahead of someone else in competition or to improve their rank, but merely to improve their rating, to satisfy their values apart from a desire to shift their position relative to others. Here again it would seem that an assumption of a universal psychology of competition leads to an erroneous and biased view of the process of differentiation. It may well be that it will be empirically discovered that rank is a much more common position in American society than is situs or rating, but it seems necessary to make these distinctions in order to discover their relative prevalence.
and meaning. It seems obvious at first glance that three groups structured by situs, rating, and rank respectively would be significantly different in many of their characteristics and operations, so that the present analytic distinctions seem justified, at least in a preliminary fashion.

(6) Rank is a type of position resulting from the process of ranking. In this process, the units are differentiated, comparatively evaluated and arranged in order of evaluation. Once articulation has taken place and units are assigned to situses, the differences between units may be evaluated and the units assigned to various ranks on the basis of this differential and comparative evaluation. As previously stated in the section on processes, articulation and ranking may take place simultaneously. The more frequently used term for this type of position is the term "status," meaning among other things, a position in a rank hierarchy. In view of many meanings of "status," however, it seemed desirable to employ a term less commonly in use to refer to a specific type of position rather than try to narrow the term "status" to a specific meaning. As is the case with situses, ranks may or may not be within a category. If a rank is in a category, this category may be either a stratum or a segment in its arrangement in relation to the other categories.

Since this is the last of the positions which are composed of units rather than categories, and the discussion will now move on to a consideration of the arrangement and nature of categories,
this appears to be the appropriate place to point out that two of the positions involving units, i.e., situs and rank, may include a plurality of units as well as single units, without becoming categories. (Identity includes only one individual or plural by definition; rating refers to either units or categories.) In other words, several individuals, or plurels, may occupy a given situs or rank position simultaneously without being regarded by the ascriber as forming a category. This is possible either through the separate differentiation by several ascribers who agree in their placements, or, in the case of a single ascriber, through his separate differentiations over a period of time. Thus, as in the example cited above regarding the positions in the production line, there may be several individuals occupying the situs of packer or sorter, or this rank, if the positions are comparatively evaluated, without the formation of categories, if such positions are arrived at independently by several sets of ascribers, or if a given ascriber places different ascribees in this position over a period of time. Empirically, however, this possibility is rather unlikely, since ascribees in the same positions are not to be categorized and to form a stratum or segment because they are likely to make up a category which may be perceived as such by the ascribers involved. Thus in a formal organizational structure, a given rank (e.g., lieutenant in the Army) is a position occupied by many individuals, and is likely to be perceived as a category; but not necessarily so, as in the case of a particular company
with one individual occupying the rank who may not be regarded by members of the group as belonging to a category of lieutenants.

If the plurality of individuals occupying a given rank or situs is viewed as a category, then the rank or situs becomes a stratum or a segment.

(7) A category is a type of position which results from the process of categorization. Units, either individuals or plurals, are grouped into classes of similarity and perceived as a class to be different from other units or classes of units. As indicated at several points above, the units making up a category may be undifferentiated, articulated, or ranked, or differentiated in more than one way simultaneously. It has been further pointed out that the composition and arrangement of units within the category is independent of the arrangement of the categories themselves. It thus seems useful to classify categories in two ways, first on the basis of the internal structure of the category, and secondly on the basis of the arrangement of categories relative to one another. Following the possibilities and using the criteria of arrangements of units, it is possible to list and distinguish three main types of categories: (8) undifferentiated categories, (9) articulated categories, and (10) ranked categories. The logical possibility of categories composed of specified units, or rated units is denied by the fact that if these processes were carried on within a category, they would automatically become
articulation and ranking, respectively.

It is unnecessary further to discuss "articulated categories" and "ranked categories," since these already have been covered. "Undifferentiated category," however, needs further comment and illustration. It may seem, for example, that the distinction between an undifferentiated category, on the one hand, and a plural on the other, is operationally impossible to establish. As stated above, however, the plural is a unit, initially seen as such, and not perceived as made up of component units or parts, whereas any category, including the undifferentiated category, is seen as a collection of units which are similar enough to be grouped together, while their separate identity as units is not lost. Yet although an ascriber may be aware that a perceived category is made up of units, and may even see the category as a collection of units, he may nevertheless not differentiate between these units. Thus he may see the occupation of taxi-drivers as a category made up of individuals as units, but in a given instance or act of differentiation, he may not further distinguish between the units making up the category. In such a case, he would be perceiving an undifferentiated category.

Moving to the classification of categories based upon their arrangement relative to one another, there are two main types: (1) segments and (2) strata. As the terminology implies, segments are categories arranged according to differentiation without
evaluation, as a result of the process of segmentation, while strata are categories arranged according to comparative evaluation, as a result of the process of stratification. It is perhaps unnecessary to reiterate that segments can be undifferentiated, articulated or ranked, as can strata. Or to put it another way, an individual or plural can have situs within a stratum or segment, or can have rank within a stratum or segment. Thus, for example, a doctor may be seen by a given ascriber as occupying the situs of heart specialist in a community (a specialty of this particular doctor seen as different from, but not comparatively evaluated with other doctors' specialties) within the stratum of doctors (an occupational category with higher prestige than other occupations). On the other hand, he may be seen by another ascriber as occupying a given rank (e.g. "the best heart specialist in the country") within the segment of heart specialists (a particular category of doctors seen as different from, but not comparatively evaluated with other categories). The above example suggests the possibility of categories within categories, e.g. the segment of heart specialists within the stratum of doctors, but it was not deemed practical or necessary to create special terms for such arrangements.

The problem of simultaneously-held multiple positions is a complicated one, and the question of where to stop classification for analysis is indeed difficult. But it would seem that the present scheme which allows for placement within a category, and placement of a category in relation to other categories, either
Vertically or horizontally is sufficient and that any further classification and terminology would be detrimental in its complexity rather than analytically helpful.

The problem of "summary position" as raised in the literature seems a moot one in view of the complexity involved. A given individual or category of individuals holds as many positions simultaneously as there are ascribers, including himself, who are simultaneously placing him. The discussion above illustrates the complexity of placement of an ascribee by even a single ascriber and suggests the greater complications involved when multiple ascribers are concurrently differentiating and placing the ascribee. It seems futile then to speak of a final or summary position of an ascribee. The view of the social structure taken in this dissertation is one which denies or at least seriously questions the existence of a single, "real" arrangement of individuals and groups, and instead emphasizes the orderly complexity of empirically-existent multiple structures based upon the varying differentiations made by a multitude of ascribers. This latter position does not deny order, nor the possibility of scientifically describing it, but it does place the burden of empirical proof upon the scientist who, acting as a single ascriber, insists upon his ordering as the ordering of the social system under consideration, regardless of the kind of data from ascribers' reports or behavior he may use.
As discussed above in the section dealing with the types of criteria, there are two schemes of classifying positions: one on the basis of the kinds of criteria used, and another, the one just completed, based upon the arrangements of units and categories relative to one another. It was pointed out that these two schemes can vary independently. It is now possible to indicate more specifically the range of position types based upon the combination of the two classificatory schemes. It does not seem necessary to enumerate in any complete or exhaustive fashion the possible combinations; it is sufficient merely to list several of the types as illustrations of their range. Thus a segment or a stratum may be an initial or subsequent position, and may precede or follow the placement of the ascribee in a situs or rank. For example, an ascriber may perceive an ascribee as a member of a given profession and initially assign him to a high stratum, e.g., a professor, and subsequently the ascriber may assign the ascribee to a given rank within this category as a poor professor, an inept professor, or the like.

A given rank or stratum may be a first-level, second-level, or third-level position. For example, membership in a given political group, viewed as a comparatively-evaluated category, or stratum, may serve as an indicator of a low rank in a work group. A rank or situs may be observed or reputed. A stratum or segment may be sustained, achieved, or congenital; official, conventional, or unstandardized. Positions may fall into clusters with key
positions, and position halo effect, and so on through the list of types of positions as classified by the type of criteria used in their establishment, as they relate to types of position based upon the arrangement of units and categories. This brief and partial listing of illustrations is not meant to imply that there are no hypothesized relationships between the two types of positions. Quite to the contrary, the double scheme of analysis itself leads to the formation of many fruitful hypotheses.

This concludes the discussion of types of position. The next topic for consideration is the characteristics of these positions. There may be a question at this point as to why there has been no discussion of the nature of the categories or positions, e.g., whether they form real or nominal groupings; whether there is awareness of membership or common goals, and the like. It may also be noted that there has been no mention or definition of social class or caste as types of positions or categories. As has been indicated above in the preliminary discussion of correlates, any of the characteristics of individuals or categories which are established or analyzed after placement has occurred, rather than being used in the establishment of the position (in which case the characteristics are termed criteria), are considered as correlates of the positions. Therefore, discussions of the group characteristics of categories, as well as questions of class, caste and similar terms which depend upon correlates of awareness, similar goal-orientation, and the like, according
to the definition presented here, must be deferred until the next section on correlates.

VII. Correlates of Positions and Structures. It may perhaps seem a thankless as well as useless task to try to classify (1) correlates of positions and structures: those characteristics of ascribees, either as units or as categories, which are not used in placing the ascribees as criteria, but are discovered to be accompaniments of the positions once they are established. There are indeed an enormous number of possibilities ranging all the way from physical characteristics of individuals to characteristics of groups or organizations. It may be said that some classificatory scheme, however rough, is necessary to achieve some order and as insurance against overlooking important variables — precisely because of the complexity and number of factors involved. Simply listing would serve such a function; and if it is possible to order the characteristics in some way, it would seem all the more advisable to attempt it. This classification scheme, as indicated in the discussion of criteria above, will also serve as a way of classifying criteria by content, beyond the schemes already presented.

The question may be raised as to the nature of the relationship between the correlate and the process of differentiation or the criterion: is the characteristic a result of the process of the possession of the criterion, a cause, or merely a concomitant?
For example, if the ascriber ranks a given set of ascribees on the criterion of education, and it is discovered upon investigation that there is a correlate of income, the nature of the relationship between these two characteristics may be analyzed and discovered as a further step in research. This investigation may lead to the establishment of the existence of first- and second-level criteria arrangements and to further understanding of the dynamics of the process of differentiation in the given situation; or it may merely lead to the empirical relationships found between correlates and criteria.

There are two classification schemes used here for distinguishing between types of correlates, one based upon the type of position involved, and the other based upon the type of content of the correlate itself.

(2) **Locational correlates** are those correlates made up of characteristics of ascribees who are in a given identity, rating, situs, or rank; in other words, characteristics of individuals or plurals who are viewed as units, and so arranged by the ascriber.

(3) **Category correlates**, on the other hand, are correlates made up of the characteristics of ascribees who are in a given stratum or segment, or in both simultaneously; in other words, characteristics of categories of ascribees, and so arranged by the ascriber.

(4) **Structural correlates**, finally, are correlates which are characteristics of arrangements of categories, as seen by the ascriber. This classification of correlates seems to fit in with that
constructed upon the basis of content: locational correlates are
to be characteristics of individuals; category correlates
should include characteristics of individuals and groups; while
structural correlates may include both individual and group char-
acteristics as well as inter-group phenomena. Again the nature of
the relationship between the two sets of classifications will pro-
vide a useful additional set of hypotheses.

(5) Individual correlates, the characteristics of individuals,
may be subdivided into several categories: (5a) Psychological
correlates, including, for example, the following: personality
traits and types, motivational patterns, perception patterns and
characteristics, learning behavior, reaction patterns and adjust-
ment modes, aptitudes and skills, deviance. (5b) Ideological
correlates, including, for example, the following: attitudes,
opinions, beliefs, values, tastes, orientation, membership aware-
ness, goals, modes of conceptualization. (5c) Physical correlates,
such as age, sex, health, physical appearance, physical abnormalities. (5d) Social correlates, such as marital status or patterns,
occupation, office-holding, place and length of residence, income,
race, nationality, education, sibling position, membership, lineage,
religion, influence. (5e) Action correlates, such as political
behavior, religious behavior, family behavior, criminal behavior,
sexual behavior, recreational activity, economic behavior, eti-
quette and manners, speech patterns, visiting patterns, community
participation.
It may appear that the analysis of structural components and of correlates up to this point has omitted an extremely important concept found consistently in the literature dealing with stratification, social positions, or structure: the concept of (6) role. Most writers agree (in contrast to Kingsley Davis\(^{29}\)) that role is a set of expectations of behavior which is attached to any position. Some writers, e.g., Parsons\(^{30}\) go so far as to claim that role is the criterion for any position, that positions are made up of and defined by roles entirely. Thus the position of carpenter is defined in terms of what a carpenter is expected or supposed to do. In view of the large number and variety of criteria listed and discussed above, it would seem that the limitation of criteria to role, or expected behavior, is too restricting and not efficient. Certainly certain positions of a Negro in the South, or wherever else racial discrimination is thoroughly practiced, is not dependent upon what he does, and whether his behavior comes up to expectations, but simply upon his skin color (although this placement may in turn determine what he is supposed to do). Similarly, in view of the large variety of possible correlates of positions, it seems unnecessary and inadequate to limit these to the consideration of expected behavior. As the whole range of correlates becomes

\(^{29}\)Kingsley Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

established and known, any one or all of them may become expected. If the ascriber is placed by lineage, for example, the ascriber may expect a wide variety of correlates: all the way from personality traits and values to group membership and physical appearance. Among these expectations may be expected behavior, or role. This is not meant to deny in any way the analytic importance or relevance of the concept of role, but merely to point out that there is no reason to limit the idea of expected correlates to behavior alone. It is perhaps well to repeat here that roles, or any other expectations, or the degree to which the ascriber lives up to the expectations, can be seen and used by the ascriber as either criteria or correlates.

It is useful to make another distinction at this point between the two varieties of expectation: probability expectation and desirability expectation. In the first case the expectation is based upon the probability that the correlate will appear, and the typical reaction to non-appearance is surprise. In the second case the expectation is based upon the desirability of the appearance of the correlate, and the typical reaction to non-appearance is disappointment or disapproval. This same distinction of course applies to norms, and the arguments over whether the sexual norms as pointed out by Kinsey and others meant a statement of probability or desirability are an illustration of the distinction. Thus, there is the possibility of both probability roles and desirability roles, as well as this distinction between other expected correlates. It may be argued that
the tendency toward the reduction of ambiguity and the increase of certainty may result in making the great majority of expectations of the desirability type. That is, what is improbable or surprising may well be generally disapproved, but it would seem that this is a matter for empirical demonstration.

(7) Collectivity correlates, the characteristics of pluralities of individuals, either groups or categories, are more difficult to organize and outline than are the individual correlates. One of the problems involved here is the charge of reification. Another is the necessity of distinguishing between (a) summary or average statements of group or category characteristics based upon the characteristics of the individuals composing the collectivity, in which case the collectivity could have an average personality, an average height, morbidity, fertility, average attitudes, goals, etc., in fact any of the characteristics listed above under individual correlates; and (b) statements of group characteristics which, although interpreted from members' responses, could not be re-applied as the characteristics of a given individual. Thus in the first case, it would seem that statements of such collectivity correlates as group personality, group motivation, or group physical characteristics, as based upon averages or distributions of individual members' characteristics, are unwarranted reifications. In the second case, however, statements of group solidarity, size, or homogeneity, for example, are not reducible to characteristics possessed by individual members, and are legitimate
characteristics of collectivities. The integrated analysis of collectivity characteristics of the latter type has been surprisingly limited in sociological literature. Perhaps the best summary list of operationally defined characteristics, is to be found in Hemphill and Westie. These characteristics are specified for groups, although they could apply to any type of collectivity. They are such "dimensions" as: size, homogeneity (according to any selected criteria), autonomy (independence in functioning), control (of the group over its members), flexibility (formality-informality of sanctions), intimacy (degree of interpersonal knowledge), permeability (degree to which group allows new members to enter), polarization (goal agreement), and viscosity (degree of operation as a unit). It does not seem necessary to exhaust the list at this point or to systematically compare it with other such attempts to classify collectivity characteristics, since the present purpose is merely to illustrate and give examples of the kinds of characteristics included under the head of collectivity correlates.

In respect to (8) social class, the position taken here is that the term must be very narrowly and carefully defined in order to avoid confusion. It has been impossible to define it until this point, since the definition involves the concept of

collectivity correlates in addition to the concepts outlined in the section on structural components. Social class, as conceived here, is only one of the great variety of concepts made possible by combining structural elements and correlates. It is a particular case among many possibilities and thus loses its preeminence and centrality as a concept in the present analytic scheme. To illustrate the range of possibilities of combinations of positions and correlates: there may be a type of rank, as classified by the criterion used, with a psychological correlate (e.g., a low sociometric position in a group with the correlate of inadequacy or insecurity feelings); there may be an official stratum with a behavior correlate (e.g., Army lieutenants with the correlate of certain recreational activities); there may be an emergent segment with an ideological correlate (e.g., individuals above 70 years of age with the correlate of certain values and beliefs about health). Social class, seen as a specific kind of combination, falls in this array of possibilities by being defined, in line with Marx's and Weber's conceptualization, as a conventional stratum recognized by ascribers throughout a given society (or largest unit of membership-recognition), based upon the criterion cluster of income, occupation and influence, present or past, with the correlate of membership awareness, goal agreement, and common effort toward those goals. As pointed out above, this definition is narrow, intentionally so, in order to distinguish social class from other combinations of types of position and
types of correlates. It can be seen immediately that according to this definition there appear to be no social classes in America. Neither Centers'\textsuperscript{32} nor Warner's\textsuperscript{33} classes meet the specifications. Centers' classes are based upon the criterion of awareness (which is not demonstrated, in any case, by the questions asked) with correlates of income, occupation, etc.; Warner's classes are based ultimately upon the criteria of associational behavior with correlates of income, occupation, etc., and apply only to communities. This is not the place further to discuss Centers or Warner, and the above remarks are over-simplified for illustrative purposes. The detailed discussion of analysts of class will be presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The purpose and function of introducing the concept of social class at this point is to demonstrate its nature as a special case of combination of position type and correlate type.

(9) \textit{Institutional correlates}, the characteristics which apply to relationships between collectivities, are perhaps most difficult to organize and outline. They include such characteristics as patterns of interaction processes between collectivities (competition, cooperation, and the like), power relationships and functions.

\textsuperscript{32}Richard Centers, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{33}W. L. Warner, \textit{et. al.}, \textit{op. cit.}
and communication — to name a few of the most important characteristics. It perhaps is worthwhile to reiterate the difference between structural correlates and institutional correlates as examples and illustrations of the two modes of classification. Structural correlates are correlates of structure. Once a given structure, or arrangement of units or categories, has been established, the structure may have correlates which range all the way from individual correlates (characteristics of individuals in the structure) to institutional correlates (characteristics of relationships between the collectivities which compose the structure). Institutional correlates are characteristics of relationships between collectivities.

VIII. Mobility and Structural Change. It will be noted at the outset that the title of this section makes a distinction between the concept of mobility and that of structural change. As conceived here, (1) structural change is a change in the arrangement or characteristics of positions, as a result of changes in ascribers, criteria, or ascribees. (2) Mobility on the other hand, is the change of position of a given ascriber, from a (2a) base position (starting position) to a (2b) terminal position (end position) within or between given structures (which may or may not be in a state of change). Although these two forms of change may often be interdependent, it seems necessary to distinguish them. As will be seen below, mobility may result from
various kinds of structural change, and structural change may be the result of certain mobility.

The first classification scheme of types of mobility is based in part upon the kinds of structural changes in criteria used, and changes in ascribers which result in mobility). (3) *Attributive mobility* is a form of mobility, or change in position of a given ascribee, which results from a change in the criteria possessed by the ascribee, while these criteria as used by a given ascriber may remain constant. In other words, the ascriber is using the same criteria for differentiation while the ascribee changes these given characteristics. Thus to use a simple example, the given ascriber may be using amount of skill as a criterion for rank, and the ascribee may increase his skill and change his rank position upward.

(4) *Procedural mobility*, conversely, is a form of mobility which results from a change in the criteria, or arrangement of positions, used by the ascriber, while the ascribee's characteristics remain constant. Thus, for example, the ascriber may shift his criteria for ranking ascribees in a given situation from skill to ability to get along with others, or courage, etc., and although the ascribee may have unchanging characteristics, he may still change his rank position, or be involved in one kind of mobility, in the eyes of the given ascriber.

(5) *Originative mobility* is a form of mobility resulting from a change of ascribers, with the possibility that both the criteria possessed by the ascribee and those used by the given
109.

Ascriber remain unchanged. This is not intended to mean that in
originative mobility the criteria used by one ascriber must be
identical with those used by the other ascriber involved in the
shift, but merely that the criteria used by the first ascriber
need not change in this type of mobility. Thus, for example, a
professor may have a given rank in one university based upon
the criteria of length of service, publications, and degrees. He
may change this rank by moving to another university, say a much
smaller one, where the new ascribers use the same criteria, and
where his characteristics have not changed, but where the ascribers
change, perhaps comparing the professor with different other
ascribees and changing his rank among his colleagues from low to
high.

This example and the discussion of originative mobility bring
up the whole problem of (6) mobility discrepancy, as existing
between several ascribers. To put it another way, it raises the
question of the point of view from which mobility is seen. It
is possible in the example given above that the professors in
the old, large university may see their colleague's change of
position to a smaller institution as a step down; that the
ascriber himself may see it as a step up; that the staff of the
new university may on the other hand not see the move as involving
any change in rank at all. This problem or question of mobility
discrepancy is inherent in any statement concerning any kind of
mobility, and thus requires that any such statement always specify the ascribers involved, including the self as ascriber. In the case of originative mobility, the problem is more complex since, by definition, this type of mobility includes at least two sets of ascribers, although discrepancy may also be involved in either attributive or procedural mobility. Thus the ascribee may think he has attained the possession of certain desired criteria and thus changed position, although other ascribers may not think so, or may disagree among themselves. It probably should be added that originative mobility may often be attempted by the ascribee as a last resort when he is unable to change his characteristics or to get relevant ascribers to change the criteria they use. Change of group membership or geographical migration for instance, may both involve originative mobility.

Another usual method of classifying types of mobility is to distinguish them on the basis of the types of position involved in the change. There are a number of logical possibilities which can be classified by the principles of direction and distance. (7) Vertical mobility (upward or downward) is the movement of an ascribee from rank to rank, from rating to rating, or from stratum to stratum, within the same situs or segment. Upward vertical mobility is the movement from one of these positions to another with higher evaluation; downward mobility the reverse. (8) Horizontal mobility is the movement of an ascribee from an identity to an
identity, a situs to a situs, or a segment to a segment, within the same rank or stratum. (9) **Diagonal mobility** (upward or downward) is the simultaneous movement of an ascribee from rank to rank, or stratum to stratum, and from situs to situs, or segment to segment. In other words, the ascribee is moving along the two axes at once: vertical and horizontal.

The second principle of classification by types of position involved in the change is distance. There are two types. (10) **Intramobility** is the movement of an ascribee within a category, from rank to rank, or situs to situs, whereas (11) intermobility involves the movement of the ascribee from category to category, from stratum to stratum, or segment to segment. It is, of course, possible to combine these three classification schemes in the description of a given case of mobility. Thus there may be attributive vertical intermobility, originative horizontal intramobility, or other combinations. The way in which these types typically combine is another area of hypotheses which may be profitably tested.

It is also possible to classify types of mobility by means of the content of the criteria which are involved in the change, or by some of the types of criteria involved. Thus it is possible to refer to skill mobility, economic mobility, and the like, or to observed mobility, reputed mobility, official mobility, conventional mobility, and so on.
There are several other concepts necessary for the analysis of mobility. (12) Mobility distance may be measured by the number of positions transversed by the ascribee in a given change. (13) Mobility rate, derived from #12, is the number of positions transversed (mobility distance) per unit of time. (14) Mobility volume is the number of ascribees who change position in a given structure during a given period of time. (15) Mobility chance is a measure or estimate of the probability or possibility that a given ascribee will change positions according to various types, distances and rates of mobility. Finally, (16) mobility channel is the typical sequence of positions through which an ascribee is likely to move over a stated period of time.

As noted above, mobility may also be the cause of structural change. As a given undifferentiated category, for example, is filled as a result of movement of ascribees into it, it may be that the competition brought about by this crowding will cause the category to become ranked or further specialized and segmented or split into situses. The various changes in structural arrangements may affect the position held by a given ascribee, and changes in position by given ascribees may affect the composition of the structure itself. Again it must be stressed that all of these statements of mobility or structural change must be ascertained as made from the point of view of a specified ascriber or set of ascribers.
Although the continual listing of unrelated concepts may seem tedious and without significance at this stage, it is necessary to formulate, define, and discuss such analytic elements before the task of analysis of the literature or hypothesis construction can be attempted.

A final section on the classification of types of structures will conclude this chapter on conceptual analysis.

IX. Types of Structure. Types of structure can be classified in many ways by utilizing all of the characteristics of structures listed. In order to gain efficiency and clarity of classification, however, it seemed necessary to limit the typology to several main principles: the relative number of positions involved, the relative number of ascribees in these positions, and the relative rate and volume of attributive mobility. Thus the classification is limited to differences in form rather than in content, and is based upon an unstated range of variation, broken into an unstated number of types and arrangements. In short, the chief aim of this section is to present a possible system or method for classifying structures, rather than to give a completed scheme. This course is necessary because of the large number of combination types which are possible in reality, as will be seen further on.

The first principle of classification is (1) the relative number of positions making up the structure. This scheme breaks down into a further system of classification: the number of strata
vs. the number of segments (the comparative number of vertical and horizontal categories). Splitting each of these characteristics into dichotomies, simple (relatively few categories, which might arbitrarily be set at less than four) and complex (relatively many categories, arbitrarily set at more than three), results in the following possibilities: simple segmentation—simple stratification ("SS" type); simple segmentation—complex stratification ("SC" type); complex segmentation—simple stratification ("CS" type); complex segmentation—complex stratification ("CC" type). If the structure involves no segmentation or stratification, the letter "N" might be used in combination with those standing for "simple" or "complex" — thus: "NS", "NC", "SN", "CN," as types, the first letter designating segmentation, the second stratification, as above.

If these types of structure are further broken down and classified by the relative number of positions, both vertical and horizontal (ranks and situses respectively) within categories, there might be a sub-script system of labelling following the system outlined above. For example: "SC-sn" indicates a structure with simple segmentation (less than four segments) complex stratification (more than three strata), simple articulation (less than four situses within categories) and no ranking (no ranks within categories). "NS-ns" indicates a structure with no segmentation, simple stratification, no articulation and simple ranking. With this scheme it would be possible to begin the systematic classi-
fication of most groups or organizations, and possibly of some communities or societies (although most of them would probably fall into the "CC-cc" type, and thus be indistinguishable from one another) according to the principle of the relative number of positions, both vertical and horizontal. It might be possible to adapt this scheme further to the classification of larger collectivities, such as communities or societies, if the positions involved were limited to certain types as classified by criteria types (e.g., official positions or congenital positions), or if the simple-complex dichotomy were further broken down and operationally defined by number of positions. Again it should be stressed that any description of classification of structures must specify the ascriber or collectivity of ascribers from whose point of view the structure is perceived.

The second principle of classification of structure is based upon (2) the relative number of ascribers occupying given positions within the structure, that is, relative to the number of ascribers in other positions. This scheme applies, particularly, to larger collectivities, since it implies classification by categories made up of a number of ascribers, rather than classification by arrangement of units within categories where each position may contain only a single individual. According to the principle of relative rather than absolute size, the differences in population of given categories could be handled by percentages of the
population of the whole structure, as drawn on a horizontal axis. Diagrams drawn according to this scheme could show both segments and strata, and the relative size of each. The over-all patterns can be further organized and labeled according to the general shapes and arrangements they fall into, e.g., triangular, diamond-shaped, etc. Thus, it is possible to diagram structures according to number of positions and size of positions, simultaneously, combining the two principles of classification of structures. As noted above, the presentation of structure types is meant to be a proposal for a method of typing rather than a completed schematic classification, so that the example given are merely illustrative.

The third principle of classification of structures is based upon (3) the relative rate and volume of attributive mobility in the structure, including vertical, horizontal and diagonal mobility, and both intermobility and intramobility. This of course becomes a very complex system of classification, and would probably be limited to particular aspects and kinds of mobility in any one classification scheme, although it is possible to show schematically several types of mobility volume simultaneously. If, for example, it is desired to diagram the structure of an organization which shows the number and size of official positions, as well as the rate and volume of mobility between these positions, it may be shown by some such device as drawing arrows composed of numbers of lines representing the percentage of the population of the base
position involved, and indicating the direction of the mobility. It would then be possible to type structures according to the rate and volume of certain kinds of mobility. For example, open structures might be defined as structures in which over 25 percent of the population of each base category (either segment or stratum) move to a different category within a given time period; closed structures defined as containing less than 1 per cent movement, and so on. The whole problem of classification of structures is a difficult one, but it is hoped that the above suggestions may lead to further attempts in this area which at least go beyond the traditional and inadequate distinctions of class, caste, and estate.

In concluding the chapter on conceptual analysis, it is useful to recapitulate. It has been pointed out that the formulation of theory, i.e., meaningful, interrelated hypotheses, in the area of social differentiation must precede suggestions for, or the actual carrying on of, empirical research. Furthermore, it has been stated that the formulation and operational definition of key concepts and variables must precede the construction of theory. As a starting point in the chain of operations that will eventually lead to cumulative research in social differentiation, it has thus been necessary to list, define, and discuss the concepts which are to be used. These concepts and their definitions in condensed form are summarized in the glossary which composes the next chapter. Chapter 4, following the glossary, will be composed of a series of
critical analyses of theoretical and research studies in social differentiation, using the conceptual tools discussed. This chapter will serve several functions. It will test the usefulness of the distinctions made in the present chapter; it will present a set of critical appraisals and analyses which may prove of value in their own right; and it will illustrate the need for the construction of new concepts and methods of analysis; and it will show the sources of some of the analytic elements presented in this dissertation. The concluding chapter will outline additional, related hypotheses and research suggestions in the area of social differentiation.
Chapter 3 - Glossary

As previously stated, this glossary is an attempt to present in condensed form the concepts, methods and elements of analysis, and definitions which have been discussed at greater length in Chapter 2. The glossary has two chief functions: to give an easily-encompassed purview of the whole analytic scheme, and to serve as a ready reference of definitions of terms used throughout the body of the dissertation. As the next chronological step in theory-construction, it should help to pull together the disperse ideas and suggestions presented in Chapter 2, and, as a preliminary form of codification, it should begin to show up gaps and overlaps in the organization of material. The arrangement, numbering, and nomenclature of headings and sub-headings follow the system used in Chapter 2.

I. The Ascriber
   (the individual who differentiates)

1. Actor-ascriptor: an ascriber who is differentiating as part of his normal social behavior and is interacting with the ascribees.

2. Self-ascriptor: an ascriber who, as a part of his normal social behavior, is differentiating and placing himself in the same manner that he places other ascribees.

3. Informant-ascriptor: an ascriber who, although in the same system of interaction as the ascribees, is temporarily in the role of estimating and describing the differentiations
of others in this system.

4. **Reportor-ascriber**: a type of scientist-ascriber who is not in the same system of interaction as the ascribees and who attempts to make a detached description of the differentiation process carried on by others, based on the reports of actor-, self-, or informant-ascribers.

5. **Observer-ascriber**: a type of scientist-ascriber who makes his detached description of the differentiation carried on by others, on the basis of direct or indirect observation of the behavior of other ascribers.

6. **Objective-ascriber**: A type of scientist-ascriber who is not in the same system of interaction as the ascribees and who differentiates on the basis of his own judgments, values and perceptions quite apart from the differentiation process carried on by actor-, self-, and informant-ascribers.

7. **Primary-ascriber**: an ascriber who is in continual, intimate interaction with the ascribee.

8. **Secondary-ascriber**: an ascriber who is in regular, non-intimate interaction with the ascribee.

9. **Reputational ascriber**: an ascriber who has no, or only occasional, non-intimate interaction with the ascribee.

10. **Ascriber bloc**: a plurality of ascribers who agree upon the differentiation and placement of given ascribees, or
who agree on the use of certain criteria for given differentiations.

11. **Relevant ascriber**: an ascriber who is perceived or chosen by the ascribes to be more significant or important than other ascribers, or who is seen by an observer to be more significant.

II. **Characteristics of the Ascriber**

1. Position of the ascriber in the structure.
2. Relation of the ascriber to the ascribes.
3. Personal characteristics of the ascriber: psychological, ideological, physical, social, and behavioral.

III. **The Ascribes**:

-(the individual or collectivity who is differentiated)

IV. **The Criteria**:

-(the characteristics of the ascribe which are selected and used by the ascriber in the process of differentiation)

1. **Differentiating criteria**: the criteria used in the processes of differentiation which do not involve evaluation.
2. **Evaluative criteria**: the criteria used in the processes of differentiation which do involve evaluation.
3. **Initial criteria**: the criteria used by the ascriber in the chronologically first, rough placement of a given ascribee in a sequence of placements.
4. **Subsequent criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber which chronologically follow the initial criteria in the sequence of placements of a given ascribee.

5. **First-level criteria:** the criteria which represent the basic values, unaanalysed first affective or cognitive reactions, or basic principles of perception of the ascriber.

6. **Second-level criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber as indicators of, or clues to, the possession by the ascribee of first-level criteria.

7. **Third-level criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber as indicators of, or clues to, the possession by the ascribee of second-level criteria.

8. **Observed criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber which are based upon direct observation of the characteristics of the ascribee.

9. **Deputed criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber which are based upon a knowledge of the characteristics of the ascribee gained from others' observations.

10. **Congenital criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber which are made up of characteristics over which the ascribee has no control, and which do not change.

11. **Emergent criteria:** the criteria used by the ascriber which are made up of characteristics over which the ascribee has no control, but which change.
12. **Sustained criteria**: the criteria used by the ascriber which are made up of characteristics over which the ascribee has control, but which do not change.

13. **Achieved criteria**: the criteria used by the ascriber which are made up of characteristics over which the ascribee has control, and which change.

14. **Controlling criteria**: those criteria which limit, prohibit, or are prerequisites for the possession of other criteria by the ascribee.

15. **Controlled criteria**: those criteria which are limited, prohibited or allowed on condition of the presence of other criteria possessed by the ascribee.

16. **Criteria cluster**: the plurality of criteria typically used by the ascriber in given processes of differentiation involving given ascribees.

17. **Key criterion**: the criterion in a criteria cluster which is assigned the greatest importance or weight by the ascriber.

18. **Criterion halo effect**: the assumption or expectation of presence of other criteria in a criteria cluster upon the perception of a partial number of criteria in the cluster.

19. **Official criteria**: the criteria used by ascribers which are formally standardized in a given group, organization, community or society and are specified and regulated by formal rules and sanctions.
20. **Conventional criteria:** the criteria used by ascribers which are standardized in a given group, organization, community or society and are specified and regulated by informal norms and sanctions.

21. **Unstandardized criteria:** the criteria used by ascribers which are unstandardized and the use of which is not specified or regulated by the group or other collectivity.

V. **Processes of Social Differentiation**

1. **Differentiation:** the process of perceiving identity, difference, or similarity between single individuals as units, or pluralities of individuals initially perceived as units; the perceiving of categories of units; the evaluation, and arranging in order of evaluation of units or categories. Differentiation is a general term including all of the specific types of process listed below. Also called ascription or placement.

2. **Specification:** a form of the differentiation process which involves the perceiving of the unique and separate identity of a unit, either an individual or a collectivity initially perceived as a unit.

3. **Articulation:** a form of the differentiation process which involves the perceiving of the difference or similarity between two or more units, without evaluation taking place. Articulation is primarily a process of comparison.
4. **Rating**: a form of the differentiation process which involves the evaluation of a single unit or category against some external scale, without comparison with other present units or categories.

5. **Ranking**: a form of the differentiation process which involves the comparative evaluation of units with each other and their arrangement in order of evaluation.

6. **Categorisation**: a form of the differentiation process which involves the grouping of units so that the perceived similarity of units within the grouping is greater or more significant than the similarity of any of these units to any units outside the grouping.

7. **Segmentation**: a form of the differentiation process which involves the perceiving of the difference or similarity between two or more categories, without evaluation taking place.

8. **Stratification**: a form of the differentiation process which involves the comparative evaluation of categories with each other and their arrangement in order of evaluation.

VI. **Structural Components**

1. **Structure**: any patterned or persistent arrangement of units or categories which come about as a result of the processes of differentiation carried on by ascribers.

2. **Position**: the location of a unit in a set of articulated
units, or in a rank order of units, the location of a unit in a category, or the location of a category in a set of segmentalized categories, or in a set of stratified categories. Position is a general term including all of the specific types of structural components listed below and indicating a particular part of the structure.

3. **Identity**: a type of position which results from the process of specification; the unique position of a unit which is not based upon differential comparison with other units, and which is not evaluated.

4. **Situs**: a type of position which results from the process of articulation; the position of a unit which is based upon differential comparison with other units without evaluation.

5. **Rating**: a type of position which results from the process of rating; the position of a unit or a category which is based upon evaluation against an external scale without comparison with other units.

6. **Rank**: a type of position which results from the process of ranking; the position of a unit which is based upon comparative evaluation of units with one another and their arrangement in order of evaluation; position of a unit in an order of evaluation.

7. **Category**: a type of position which results from the process of categorization; the position of units which is based upon
the grouping of units into classes of similarity.

8. **Undifferentiated category**: a category in which the component units are not further differentiated from one another.

9. **Articulated category**: a category in which the component units are articulated, or differentiated without evaluation.

10. **Ranked category**: a category in which the component units are ranked, or differentially evaluated and arranged in order of evaluation.

11. **Segment**: a type of position which results from the process of segmentation; the position of a category which is based upon differential comparison with other categories, and which is not evaluated.

12. **Stratum**: a type of position which results from the process of stratification; the position of a category which is based upon the comparative evaluation of categories with one another and their arrangement in order of evaluation; position of a category in an order of evaluation.

**VII. Correlates of Positions and Structures**

1. **Correlate**: any characteristic of an ascribee or collectivity of ascribees in any type of position which characteristic is not used by the ascriber as a criterion in making the placement of that ascribee in that position. Also any characteristic of structure which is not used as a criterion.
2. **Locational correlate**: a correlate of an ascribee in a given identity, rating, situs, or rank.

3. **Category correlate**: a correlate of an ascribee or collectivity of ascribees in a given stratum or segment.

4. **Structural correlate**: a correlate of an ascribee or collectivity of ascribees, in a given structure, or arrangement of categories or units, including relationships between ascribees in given positions.

5. **Individual correlate**: a correlate made up of characteristics of individuals, including: (a) psychological correlates, (b) ideological correlates, (c) physical correlates, (d) social correlates (e) actor correlates.

6. **Role**: action correlates expected by the ascriber.

7. **Collectivity correlate**: a correlate made up of the characteristics of collectivities of individuals.

8. **Social Class**: a conventional stratum recognized by ascribers throughout a given society based upon the criterion cluster of income, occupation and influence with the collectivity correlate of common goal-oriented behavior.

9. **Institutional correlate**: a correlate made up of the characteristics of relationships between collectivities.

**VIII. Mobility and Structural Change**

1. **Structural change**: any change in the arrangement or characteristics of positions in a structure, as perceived by given ascribers.
2. **Mobility**: any change of position (or movement) of a given ascribee within a structure or between structures, as perceived by given ascribers.

2A. **Base position**: the position from which an ascribee moves in mobility.

2B. **Terminal position**: the position to which an ascribee moves in mobility.

3. **Attributive mobility**: a type of mobility which results from a change in the criteria possessed by the ascribee.

4. **Procedural mobility**: a type of mobility which results from a change in the criteria used by the ascriber.

5. **Originative mobility**: a type of mobility which results from a change in ascribers.

6. **Mobility discrepancy**: the difference between mobility perceived by one ascriber vs. another.

7. **Vertical mobility** (upward or downward): a type of mobility which involves the movement of an ascribee from rank to rank, rating to rating, or stratum to stratum. Upward vertical mobility is a change from a position with lower evaluation to one with higher evaluation; downward vertical mobility is the reverse.

8. **Horizontal mobility**: a type of mobility which involves the movement of an ascribee from identity to identity, situs to situs, or segment to segment.
9. **Diagonal mobility** (upward or downward): a type of mobility which involves both vertical and horizontal mobility simultaneously.

10. **Intramobility**: a type of mobility which involves the movement of an ascribe within a category.

11. **Intermobility**: a type of mobility which involves the movement of an ascribe between categories, from one category to another.

12. **Mobility distance**: the number of positions transversed in a given movement or series of movements of an ascribe.

13. **Mobility rate**: mobility distance per unit of time.

14. **Mobility volume**: the number of ascribes in a given movement, or series of movements during a given period of time.

15. **Mobility change**: the estimate or measure of the probability chance of mobility for given ascribes.

16. **Mobility channel**: the typical sequence of positions through which a given ascribe is likely to move during a given period of time.

**IX. Types of Structure**

1. Classified by the relative number of positions in the structure.

2. Classified by the relative number of ascribes in the positions of a structure.

3. Classified by the relative rate and volume of attributive mobility within the structure.
Chapter 4 - Codification of Theory and Research - Selected Studies

As indicated at the end of Chapter 2, the present chapter is intended to serve several functions: the preliminary codification of some important contributions to theory and research in social differentiation; the concrete illustration and justification of the concepts distinguished and defined in the two preceding chapters; and the critical analysis of some selected central studies in the field. This codification of disparate studies according to a single scheme is a preliminary step to the arrangement of these studies for a point-by-point comparison within the paradigm (Chapter 5). The various studies must be analysed and broken down separately before they can be systematically arrayed for comparison.

The second function, that of critical application of the conceptual tools or elements of analysis which have been spelled out, is perhaps an obvious requirement. On the basis of the general chronology and theme of this dissertation, — the demonstration of successive steps in theory construction — it may be discovered that some of the conceptual distinctions made above are useless, picayune, or operationally impossible, or, on the other hand, that additional distinctions and additions must be made.

The third function, that of criticism of studies in the field, is of value in its own right. However it would appear that
systematic criticism within the framework provided will be of great-
er value than the disparate, isolated attempts typically found in
the literature.

The method and rationale of the selection of studies for
inclusion requires some comment. The tremendous volume and variety
of studies in social differentiation presents a very serious prob-
lem of choice, with the dangers of overlap on one hand and the
possibility of significant omissions on the other. The problem
of overlap is not a simple one. It may be very revealing to ana-
lyse two or more studies which address themselves to approximately
the same data or problem area. In keeping with the specified func-
tions of codification, that of providing for the comparison of
disparate theoretical attempts and empirical findings, the chief
principle of selection was the attempt to provide a crude sampling
across a wide range of types of studies. This range of types was
first broken down into two classes: theoretical studies and re-
search studies. The particular theoretical studies, Weber\(^{32, 33}\) and Parsons\(^{34}\), were chosen because, as will be demonstrated in
the analysis to follow, they complement each other remarkably well.

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\(^{32}\) H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (editors), *From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology*, pp. 1-74, 180-195, passim.

\(^{33}\) A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (editors), *Max Weber: The

\(^{34}\) Talcott Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-51, 166-184.
and secondly because they represent two quite different points of view; one analyst is typically an objective-ascriptor; the other an observer-ascriptor. Thirdly, both writers are known as theorists of the first rank and have exercised very considerable influence upon other theorists in the area of social differentiation.

The particular research studies, Centers\textsuperscript{35} and Wheeler\textsuperscript{36} were chosen because they represent the two chief schools of research in stratification in America at the present time, and because they too show a marked complementarity. They proceed from very different theoretical assumptions, use different methodologies, and, perhaps naturally enough, produce quite different results.

It may be well to explain the omission of Warner from the list of selected studies, despite his importance and influence upon other research in the field. It appeared to the present writer that the Warner school is more aptly represented by the Wheeler study, even though there are some important differences in techniques, than by the studies made by Warner himself and his associates. To do justice to this school, it seemed advisable to select the methodologically clearest research report. This is in no way meant to deny or depreciate the enormous and far-reaching importance of the Warner researches, which have undoubtedly given more impetus and made greater contributions to the empirical study of social

\textsuperscript{35}Richard Centers, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{36}Wayne Wheeler, \textit{op. cit.}
differentiation than have any other study or series of them.

It is of course realized that any limited selection of studies
is open to attack on many different grounds: that it gives undue
emphasis to a given approach or concern; that it omits important
contributions; that it includes inferior examples of certain types
of studies which might be much more adequately represented by
others; that it is unsystematic and leaves out many important classes
of studies; that its range is too restricted, e.g., that it does
not include small group studies. All of these criticisms may be
granted in some respects, but if the criteria for selection, as
well as time and space limitations, are considered, it is hoped
that the present array will not seem too inadequate.

The analyses of the studies, whether in theory or research,
will follow the same general scheme in accordance with the arrange­
ment of the elements of analysis as presented in the first two chap­
ters: I. Ascriber, II. Characteristics of the Ascriber, III. Ascrib­
er, IV. Criteria, V. Processes, VI. Structural Components, VII. Cor­
relates, VIII. Mobility and Change, IX. Types of Structure. As
previously indicated, not all of these "cells" can be filled in the
analysis of any given study, but the very absence of certain ele­
ments may prove to be of crucial significance in the criticisms
which are incorporated in each analysis.

I. Ascriber: Weber's position as an ascriber immediately points
to the possible need for an additional classification of ascribers.
For although Weber most nearly falls under the head of objective-ascriber in that he uses his own criteria for differentiation, he does not meet all specifications because he is aware of, and interested in, the processes of differentiation carried on by the actors in the social system, even though he does not, as far as any overt statements are concerned, base his distinctions upon data involving the differentiation of the actor-ascribers. There thus is at once a need either for adding an additional type of ascriber, or for amending the original definition to read, instead of "quite apart from knowledge or interest in how the actors make their ascriptions and place each other," as "and who does not base his ascriptions upon data supplied by actor-, informant-, or self-ascribers." Perhaps the amendment is more efficient than the addition of the new type.

Weber's awareness of actor-ascribers is shown in several places: he speaks of members of status groups (positively privileged ones in particular) who set up obligations and barriers to admission; he speaks of the need for negatively-privileged status groups to find their prestige or honor in the past or future, or in a belief in some special mission or duty all of which might be viewed as an awareness of self-ascribers; he notes that status

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38. Ibid., p. 189.
groups have certain expectancies about others in relation to their style of life. These comments seem to indicate that Weber is very much aware of the mutual placement of individuals, although it would seem that his focus of interest is largely upon the upper status groups, those with highest prestige, looking down upon those in lower categories. The chief fact remains however that Weber is acting in the main as an objective-ascriber and making his own placements, using his own criteria, rather than using the reports or behavior of actor-ascribers as his data for ascription. This is certainly true of his definitions of class groups which are based entirely upon economically-based life chances, and of political parties which are based upon the criterion of power, both of which are quite independent of how individuals in the society place one another. The distinction between types of ascriber may appear to some as quibbling, based upon the difference between the methodology of formally collecting data from actor-ascribers, and of theory-building from informal personal observation of their statements and behavior. The distinction between reporter- or observer-ascriber and objective-ascriber, however, is much deeper than that between the techniques used in data-collection; it is

39 Ibid. p. 300.


based upon the systematic use of actor-ascriber placements, or the lack of it. Weber's omission of the placements made by ascribers in the lower strata, for example, seems to be a strong indication, in addition to his emphasis upon objective class and party, that in the end he is making the placements, rather than the actors in the society.

II. Characteristics of the Ascriber. With Weber's lack of utilization of the placements made by actor-ascribers, it is to be expected that there will not be much attention paid to their characteristics. He infers that ascribers in the higher status groups are motivated to keep their own prestige inviolate, to keep out outsiders, to maintain the status quo, but this is about the extent of his concern with this variable. There is no indication of an awareness of personal characteristics of the ascriber or of their relations to the ascribees.

As far as the characteristics of Weber himself as an objective-ascriber, there is neither time nor space to comment at length upon Weber's social position, personal characteristics, or relation to the ascribees. Suffice it to say that Weber's detailed knowledge of, and heavy emphasis upon the ascribers in the upper prestige brackets, is probably not entirely unrelated to his own position as a professor in his particular society.

\[^{42}\text{Ibid., p. 192.}\]
III. Ascribee. Weber's ascribees are unstated, but presumably they include all the individuals in a given nation, either Germany or the U. S. As indicated previously, the emphasis of analysis is upon the upper prestige groupings.

IV. Criteria. Weber uses three main criterion clusters in his differentiation scheme: life chances, style of life, and power. The first cluster is defined as the typical probability that the individual or group will possess a given supply of property, goods, or skills, which he will have the power and opportunity to dispose of in a given economic system, in order to gain certain income, services, and living conditions. In short, life chances are synonymous with economic chances, or probability of achieving money and the things that money buys. This criterion is used to differentiate ascribees into positions called classes.

"Style of life," on the other hand, is a criterion cluster used to differentiate ascribees into positions called status groups. This cluster is more complex and is composed of a number of evaluative criteria: education, occupation, birth, power, organizational membership, charisma, attitudes, manners, office, types of consumption of goods, and sometimes income or property.

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43 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
44 Ibid., pp. 186-188.
In other words, style of life is measured, and granted various degrees of honor or prestige, in terms of the ascribees' possession of these various characteristics. This criterion is comparable to the criterion of sub-culture as used by Gordon, Lynes and others.

The third criterion cluster, power, is used to differentiate ascribees into positions called parties. This cluster is merely indicated, and the specific component criteria which make it up are not specified, except for the suggestion that they may include both class criteria (life chances) and status group criteria (style of life). This whole set of criteria and the positions based upon them seem to be a somewhat gratuitous addition on the part of Weber, as measured by the degree of analysis supplied to them, as compared with the other two criterion clusters, although their central importance is quite evident.

Weber in effect distinguishes between controlled and controlling criteria, pointing out that life chances, or economic position, can control the possession by the ascribee of a given style of life, and vice versa, that in some instances style of life may control, limit, or be prerequisite for, the possession of certain economic chances. He also observes that certain achieved criteria may be dropped or converted into congenital criteria, e.g., certain

46M. N. Gordon, "Social Class in American Sociology."
47Russell Lynes, "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow."
status groups differentiated on the basis of education or occupation, may claim a characteristic of blood or inheritance in order to insure the continuance of high position in successive generations. He seems to select education as the key criterion in the cluster. Weber's remarks regarding the use by ascribing of group membership and status symbols as indicators of the degree of prestige of their style of life, can be interpreted as an analysis of first-level and second-level criteria.

Weber also points up an important area of hypotheses in discussing the possibility of conflict between criteria, especially between official and conventional or unstandardized criteria. In his discussion of the control and the bestowing of official criteria by the church and its opposition to "virtuoso" religiosity, Weber makes valuable contribution to the elements of analysis of social differentiation by pointing out, and thus opening the way for studies of, the dynamics of criteria: how and why they change under given conditions.

It is not quite clear to the present writer what Weber gains in grouping his criteria into two main clusters, life chances and style of life. It would seem that such a grouping -- particularly

49 Ibid., p. 309.
50 Ibid., p. 308.
51 Ibid., p. 288.
52 Ibid., p. 288.
since it is so one-sided, with life chances including only economic criteria and style of life including the rest of the range of content — obscures more than it reveals. If Weber's interest in relating and analysing controlled vs. controlling criteria, for example, were not limited in application to economic vs. style of life criteria, and instead were broken down into the specific relations between the various kinds of criteria included under "style of life," it would seem that a more thorough and systematic analysis could be made. For example, education could be related to occupation, birth to power, membership to charisma, and so on. Again, as will be shown in the section on structural components, Weber's isolation of status groups as a chief unit of structural analysis suffers from the great variety and complexity of criteria which make it up. This is an excellent illustration of a point made earlier with regard to Davis and Benoit-Smullyan (in the discussion of criteria content), that structural components based upon type of criteria can conceptually be no better than the analysis of these criteria themselves.

It may also be asked what Weber gains by the application of his concept of "chances" to economic criteria alone. Why is it not equally applicable to other criteria as well? Why not educational chances, occupational chances, membership chances, or style-of-life chances in general? It would appear that little is gained by

53 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
such a construction as long as it is not consistently applied, and that it is difficult to work with in empirical research. It is easier to establish an income, education or occupation of an ascriber than it is to establish the possibility or probability of such a characteristic, either for the scientist-ascriber, or the actor-ascriber, who would be unlikely to use it for this reason.

V. Processes. Weber, as far as his own ascriptions are concerned, relies almost entirely upon the process of stratification: the comparative evaluation of categories and their arrangement in order of evaluation. He does not seem to be aware of the possibilities of segmentation, nor does he attempt to differentiate units. The only place where he appears to appreciate the fact that there may be differentiation without comparative evaluation is in his analysis of status groups according to various criteria of education, ancestry and occupation, where it may be inferred that different but not comparatively evaluated or stratified sub-groupings can be formed within the same status group. The only comment which could be construed as a recognition of the possibility that there may be differentiation within categories is his discussion of the variation of class position (differential income or economic position) that may occur within a given status group having the same style.

54A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, op. cit., p. 428.
of life, e.g., officers or students. The effect of such a limitation in the use of processes is of course reflected in the resultant structure perceived and described by Weber. It is entirely laid out upon a vertical axis, as is the mobility which takes place within it. Again it is interesting to speculate upon the connection between the characteristics of Weber as an ascriber, e.g., his social position in a given kind of structure, and the nature of the structure he perceives.

VI. Structural Components. We have seen that Weber's classification of structural components is based entirely upon the principle of criteria content, rather than upon structural principles. This is a natural outcome of his use of differentiation processes which are limited to those of stratification. His three main kinds of strata are class, based upon the criterion cluster of life chances, status group, based upon the criterion cluster of life style, and party, based upon the criterion cluster of power. Weber is very loose in his distinctions between the various kinds of strata as classified by any one criterion cluster. That is to say, he is quite vague about the number and the distinctions between various classes, between various status groups, between various parties. In his breakdown of property class and acquisition class, he roughly distinguishes three classes, the positively privileged, the negative-

ly privileged, and the middle classes; while in his treatment of social class, he essentially adds a fourth category: the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{56} Status groups, however, are divided into the two categories of positively privileged and negatively privileged,\textsuperscript{57} while parties are not specified as to type or number at all.

The principle of classifying classes into the three sub-types of property class, acquisition class, and social class is inconsistent. For the first two, he uses determinants of life chances; in the former, life chances as determined by differences in property; in the latter life chances as determined by differences in skill or chances on the market. His distinction of social class on the other hand, is based upon the principle of vertical mobility. This seems to be an odd and defective kind of classification scheme, since mobility is certainly possible between the various property or acquisition classes. Here again it would appear that if the classification of structural components is to be based on types of criteria, these criteria must be more fully analysed.

Status groups are not further classified except for a passing reference to caste as a completely closed and endogamous status group.\textsuperscript{58} It seems rather strange that the simplest criterion cluster (life chances) should be subdivided and used as a principle for

\textsuperscript{56}A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 425-427.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 428.

\textsuperscript{58}H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 188-189.
establishing sub-types of classes, whereas the very complex criterion cluster of life style should be left in an unanalysed state, as far as the establishment of sub-types of status groups is concerned. Perhaps the unevenness of conceptual analysis was brought about originally by the use of criteria-content as a principle for the establishment of types of structural components, rather than the use of structural principles. As pointed out previously the use of structural principles is precluded by the limitation of the use of processes of differentiation. Thus Weber's omission of the analysis or perception of segments, situses, and ranks is partially dependent upon the principle he used for classifying positions, and partially dependent upon the limitation of the processes of differentiation which he perceived.

Perhaps Weber's most significant contribution, and one which has been all too often overlooked in the literature on differentiation since his time, is his insistence upon multiple positions held simultaneously by given ascribees. Although all these positions lie along a vertical axis, Weber's perception of multiple coexistent structures is based upon a variety of criteria, rather than an attempt to impose a single set of criteria as determining the social structure. In the opinion of the present writer, this is an extremely important addition to the theory of differentiation, which is not diminished by Weber's oversimplification (the compression of the variety of multiple positions into two main heads and two principal structures).
VII. Correlates. Weber's list of correlates is extensive and suggests an additional principle of classification dependent upon the nature of the relationship between the position or structure and the correlate. Thus it is possible to distinguish causal correlates, resultant correlates, and concomitant correlates. Among the causal correlates, of the category variety, i.e., causes of category formation of various types (a new variable), Weber mentions that legal order maintains and formalizes the relative prestige of various status groups,\(^{59}\) that the distribution of power causes the formation and stratification of both status groups and classes,\(^{60}\) that economic and social stability makes for the creation of status groups, whereas economic change and invention make for the creation of classes and the reduction of the importance of status groups.\(^{61}\)

Among the resultant correlates of categories are found: class interests, class associations, and several varieties of class action (mass action, the similar actions of class members; communal action based upon membership—feeling; societal action based upon rational adjustment of interests as an end,\(^{62}\) all of which may or

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may not occur as a result of class formation. Monopoly and appropriation of certain privileged positions, status symbols, education, and certain consumption goods are seen as results of the formation of status groups. The formation of status groups also results in restriction upon intercourse through connubium and commensality, as well as in the irrational restriction of the development of market economy through regulation of consumption.

Concomitant correlates of strata, those in which the direction of cause and effect is not stated by Weber, include many of those listed inasmuch as he analyzes several of them as being cause and/or effect of the formation of categories.

It will be noted that most of the correlates listed are category or structural correlates. Since Weber does not deal with the placement of units, he is not concerned with locational correlates. This emphasis carries over into the second scheme for classifying correlates, which is based upon the characteristics of the ascribers. It can be seen that Weber is little concerned with individual correlates, and focuses almost exclusively on institutional correlates, e.g., power distribution, economic stability, monopoly, and the like, and somewhat less with collectivity correlates, e.g., class interest, association, and action.

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63 Ibid., p. 188.
64 Ibid., p. 300.
65 Ibid., p. 301.
Here is still another illustration of the way in which the choice or use of certain processes of differentiation by the ascriber determines the kinds of analysis that can be made in other phases of theory or research. The discussion of Weber's correlates does not include cause-and-effect statements regarding some of the characteristics of ascribents upon which he lays great emphasis, such as property differentials and market chances as determining the formation of status groups. It should be recalled that these relationships were already discussed in the section on criteria, in terms of controlled and controlling criteria. This observation again demonstrates the function and application of the distinction between correlates and criteria, between characteristics of the ascribents used by the ascriber in placing them, and those not so utilized.

VIII. Mobility and Change. Weber's discussion of mobility, it was noted, is concerned almost entirely with vertical intermobility, or movement from stratum to stratum. His concept of structure which is laid out on a vertical axis and consists of strata which are undifferentiated categories, controls the type of mobility that can occur. His chief emphasis and contribution, however, is upon structural change and its effects upon mobility. He discusses the way in which status groups close themselves through restrictions on social intercourse, through the formalization of convention into legal privilege and ritual, and the gradual transformation into
castes between which there is no movement. He also deals with the control and restriction upon mobility exercised by those in power positions, as well as with some of the effects of mobility upon the nature of the structure itself. In addition, he shows how the rate and amount of cultural change affect the nature of strata, with stability being favorable to the formation and maintenance of status groups, and with change favorable to the development of classes.

All of these observations lead to the possible establishment of a new element of analysis: the correlates of mobility and change. Although relationships between structural change and mobility were discussed in the analysis of the distinction between structural change and mobility (Chapter 2), there was no specification of correlates of mobility and of structural change. It would appear that this is a useful if not necessary element of analysis which should be added to our list.

Perhaps the chief criticism that can be made of Weber's treatment of mobility is that it is unsystematic in conceptualization and spotty in application. The concept is used loosely as a criterion for a type of class which is called social class and which is composed of individuals who are mobile (direction and type unspecified), e.g., easily trained workers, petty bourgeoisie, experts, white-collar workers, and so on. The difficulty lies in

66 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
67 Ibid., p. 194.
the fact that the concept is not systematically applied to Weber's structural components. There is no treatment, for example, of property-class mobility or acquisition-class mobility, and very little attention is paid to mobility between status groups, although movement into and out of them is discussed without the specification, however, of base or terminal positions.

IX. Types of Structures. Most of the comments upon the nature and types of structure that Weber sees have already been made in the section on structural components. Weber does distinguish between status societies made up primarily of status groups and class societies composed largely of classes, which seems to imply a view of a single structural type within a given society or nation. The nature of an ethnically-based status structure, or caste society, is differentiated from "ethnic coexistencies," or ethnically separated groups which are not in a superior-subordinate relationship. Despite these characterizations of single structures, it would still seem that Weber's main intent and result are the demonstration of simultaneously existing multiple structures within a given society, based upon the sum of multiple criteria used by the ascriber. If he had gone a step further and shown the existence of multiple ascribers, he would have revealed much more of the complexity of the total social system.

69 Max Weber, op. cit., p. 5.
70 H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, op. cit., p. 188.
As the various analytic elements are applied to Weber's overall conceptual scheme, the following critical evaluation emerges: Weber is essentially an objective-ascriber. Although he is aware of the placements made by actor- and self-ascribers, he does not focus upon them or their characteristics. He simultaneously uses three main clusters of criteria and arrives at three unevenly analyzed coexistent structures—class structure based upon economic chances, status structure based upon style of life, and party structure based upon political power. He restricts his processes of differentiation to stratification, or the evaluative arrangement of categories, and thus limits his structures, as well as the types of mobility within them, to vertical arrangements of categories, omitting (except for "ethnic coexistencies") the possibility of differentiation without evaluation and the possibility of differentiation within categories. His discussion of correlates includes cause-and-effect relationships between structural components and other variables, as well as the consideration of cause and effects of mobility and structural change. To make a grossly over-simplified appraisal, it might be said that Weber suggests a number of vitally important conceptual distinctions, but that they are often lopsided and unsystematic in organization and application. The present writer is of the opinion, however, that Weber's contributions far outweigh his defects.

This first analysis of a study in the literature has, it is hoped, in some degree fulfilled the functions which were intended
and laid out at the beginning of the present chapter: the systematic codification of the material included in the articles; the testing of the elements of analysis proposed in Chapter 2, which in this case included suggestions for the addition of several new distinctions, as well as the preliminary suspicion that perhaps some of the distinctions originally made will not be useful; and finally the constructive criticism of the work itself within the analytic framework posed.

Talcott Parsons

I. The Ascriber. Parsons is primarily an observer-ascriber concerned with the way in which actor- and self-ascribers place each other in a society, with their reasons, the function ascription serves for them, and the results of their ascriptions. Although Parsons has not formally collected data upon ascriber's behavior, he still may be classified as an observer-ascriber, since his use of criteria is based upon his estimate of which ones are used by actor- and self-ascribers in the given society, rather than upon his own selection of characteristics for differentiation. The actor-ascribers and self-ascribers in this study are unspecified and undifferentiated, presumably including all of the actors in the society. There is one indication that Parsons may be aware of the distinction between primary and secondary ascribers: the comments upon the fact that in a secondary society ascribers are in contact with only certain parts of the value system and are limited
to the use of certain criteria.\textsuperscript{71} But there is no systematic
analysis of the two kinds of ascribers. There is no indication of
Parsons' awareness of such characteristics of the ascriber as his
position in the social structure, or his personal characteristics,
as important variables in the analysis of social differentiation.

II. Characteristics of the Ascriber. Since Parsons does not speci-
fy or distinguish between types of actor- or self-ascripters, his
comments on their characteristics apply to all ascribers in general.
He notes that actors have moral norms which they apply to them-
selves as well as to others; that they are motivated toward the
goals of hedonic satisfaction, affective response from others,
recognition and respect of others; that they must keep these various
goal achievements in balance since they are all interdependent, and
that they must thus continually engage in comparative moral evalua-
tions of themselves and others, and be aware of the evaluations of
themselves by others.\textsuperscript{72} The characteristics of Parsons himself as
an ascriber seem to be of relatively little importance since he is
not acting in the role of objective-ascripter who uses his own
criteria.

III. Ascribee. The precise nature of the ascribees is unstated and
appears to refer to everyone in the society.

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\textsuperscript{71} Talcott Parsons, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 169-170.
IV. Criteria. Parsons places his chief emphasis upon the analysis of criteria. Many of the distinctions between types of criteria as listed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation were originally suggested by his analysis. He is one of the few theorists in the area of social differentiation who have focused upon this centrally important element of analysis. It seems rather odd that his scheme with its emphasis upon types of criteria should be so weak on structures and structural components. The reasons for this unbalance may perhaps become apparent from the discussion of the relation between criteria and structure later on.

Although Parsons distinguishes between segmentation and stratification (although he does not use these terms), and points out that both processes of differentiation are in operation, he limits his discussion of criteria to evaluative criteria which result in stratification. He points out that these moral evaluations are supposed to be made according to a set of standards or norms, but that the actual patterns of evaluation may be at variance with the ideal set of standards. This seems to be an important addition to the elements of analysis in that it points out the possible discrepancy between ideal and real criteria on the part of ascribers. Various racial characteristics used as criteria may be a good illustration of this point. Parsons further discusses how

\[73 \text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 167.}\]
criteria are learned, how they function in maintaining the ascriber's moral sentiments, toward himself and others, and how certain factors produce changes in the use of criteria (e.g., lack of knowledge).

Here, Parsons' comments suggest another important element of analysis: causal (and resultant) correlates of criteria, which may be added to the list of types of correlates, as were the correlates of mobility and structural change.

Perhaps one of Parsons' chief contributions to the analysis of types of criteria is his suggestion that there are primary and secondary criteria. Primary criteria are attributes of the individual which are valued for their own sake, while secondary criteria are characteristics regarded as accompaniments or effects of primary criteria. It can be readily seen that this distinction is much the same as that between first-level and second-level criteria, and it is indeed the source of the latter. Parsons points the way to a new feature of analysis in his suggestion that secondary criteria often replace the primary criteria for which they once stood as indicators, thus, wealth or office may once have stood for achievement which itself was a basic value, but may now replace this characteristic and become values in their own right.

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74 Ibid., p. 181.
75 Ibid., p. 176.
76 Ibid., p. 178.
Parsons' second major contribution to the analysis of criteria is his suggestion for their classification in terms of content. He distinguishes six main content categories: membership in kinship units, personal qualities, achievement, possession, authority, and power. It may be claimed that he has omitted many important criteria, such as behavioral characteristics or organizational membership, and that he has blurred together categories which should be kept distinct — thus, his classification of "personal qualities" covers a multitude of possibilities. The fact remains, however, that he is one of the few theorists who have tried systematically to classify criteria in this manner. He seems to imply that these criteria may be used simultaneously by a number of ascribers in a society, which may result in multiple stratification systems, but he limits this possibility to societies which are badly integrated.

He also implies the concept of key criteria, pointing out that criteria may vary in emphasis within a cluster and can be classified accordingly. Thus the chief evaluative criteria currently used in the U. S. are achievement within a specialized occupational field as measured by amount of authority in that field and kinship position. Parsons also makes the distinction between ascription and achievement but applies it to criteria rather than to positions, as

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77 Ibid., p. 171
78 Ibid., p. 183
79 Ibid., p. 179.
Parsons' interpretations of role (expected behavior), rights, and obligations are rather unclear. In one instance he seems to view them as criteria, saying that status is based upon them, while at other points he seems to view them as resultant correlates, or accompaniments of given positions. According to the position taken in this dissertation, they can be either criteria or correlates, as can any other characteristics of the ascribee.

There is a remarkable relation between Weber's and Parsons' treatment of criteria. They are almost perfectly matched in that Weber leaves out what Parsons analyses and vice versa. Weber hardly considers first-level and second-level criteria, ideal and real criteria, correlates of criteria, and classification by content of criteria. Parsons omits any systematic consideration of controlled and controlling criteria and of official and conventional criteria. Neither of them deals with differentiating criteria, although Parsons recognizes that there are positions differentiated without evaluation.

V. Processes. Although Parsons places primary emphasis upon stratification and ranking as functionally necessary form of the differentiation process, he also points to segmentation, although
he does not use this term. He enters a plea for the further breakdown of this latter process by suggesting that not all non-ranking differentiation should be included under the single head of "horizontal difference" but his only contribution to his breakdown is a preliminary classification by content, e.g. sex, non-ranked occupations, or religious affiliation. Perhaps Gross's distinction between groupings composed of intervals marked off on a continuum and groupings as discreet categories is applicable here.

Parsons uses the processes of articulation and ranking (the differentiation of units rather than categories) to arrive at the structural component of "status" which is specifically designated as the position of an individual, whether in a rank-order or not. Yet he does not systematically relate or distinguish the two sets of processes, nor does he derive separate sets of structural components from them. He does not, for example, seem to see the possibility of differentiation of units within categories, although he does intimate that there are undifferentiated categories (families) within categories (social classes). It would appear that his careful elaboration of types of criteria and his recognition of the

83Ibid., p. 183.
85Talcott Parsons, op. cit., p. 184.
86Ibid., p. 172.
use of the various kinds of differentiation process should have led
him to the systematic analysis and careful presentation of the
structural components. Unfortunately however, this is not the
case, as will be seen directly.

VI. Structural Components. Parsons distinguishes only three
structural components: status, kinship units, and class. It is
not clear whether he views status as a combined position upon
some totality of criteria or not. In one instance he states that
status is the result of the ascribee's placement in each of the
six categories of criteria, 87 which statement is itself ambiguous.
In another place he defines status as an institutionally defined
position, 88 which latter term he has previously defined as a total-
ity of particular statuses. 89 However, he speaks of the status of
family units being based upon the single criterion of the occupa-
tional achievement of the head of the family. 90 An over-all view
of his definitions of "status" suggests the term is intended as
roughly comparable to "position" as used in this dissertation,
i.e., as a general term applying to any structural component.
Nevertheless, Parsons continually uses the term in an offhand way
to refer to rank or stratum only.

87 Ibid., p. 172.
88 Ibid., p. 184.
89 Ibid., p. 43.
90 Ibid., p. 177.
Kinship units are seen as clusters of ascribeds having the same class status, although they may have different age and sex statuses. In fact, he defines social classes as groups of members of effective kinship units which are valued equally in a hierarchy. In other words, classes are made up of kinship units of equal rank. This construction leads him to the conclusion that in systems where the criterion of birth is entirely irrelevant, class will disappear. Family membership thus appears as the chief if not the only prerequisite for the establishment of classes, yet later on, Parsons expressly denies this and points out that the stratification of kinship units into various categories called classes is based primarily upon the criterion of the occupational achievement of the family head. The over-all picture seems to be an unspecified number of classes or stratified categories made up of other categories of family units whose members have equal rank within the category of family. This is an unusually and unexpectedly crude analysis of structural components. It omits segments and situses entirely, and makes only the roughest distinctions between types of strata and ranks. However Parsons does note the possibility of ascribeds holding multiple positions simultaneously and of possible discrepancy between positions.

91 Ibid., p. 173.
92 Ibid., p. 177.
VII. **Correlates.** As mentioned previously, Parsons deals at some length with causal correlates of criteria and mobility. It will be remembered that in his view the lack of integration in a society leads to multiple, separately operating stratification systems based upon different criteria. Inversely, agreement upon evaluation and ranking will result in, and is essential for, an integrated social system. In general, however, Parsons is not concerned with the correlates of positions or structure, probably again because the positions were left in such an unanalyzed state. The one possible exception to this omission of positional correlates is his treatment of role, or expected behavior. As previously indicated, it is difficult to determine whether Parsons sees role as a criterion or a correlate or both.

VIII. **Mobility and Change.** Parsons' treatment of mobility and change is extremely limited, again probably because of the unanalyzed state of the structural components. It is difficult to speak analytically of movement from position to position when the positions are not clearly specified or defined. He does seem to indicate some awareness of the concept of intramobility when he mentions the fact that individuals can move about within broad ranges of standards of living without change of status, although

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93 Ibid., pp. 49, 167.

94 Ibid., p. 181.
this statement is rather unclear and may mean either vertical intramobility or horizontal inter- or intramobility.

In dealing with the dynamics of criteria, Parsons is concerned briefly with structural change. He does make several very cogent comments upon the correlates of mobility, particularly the amount of class mobility that occurs as a result of the use of the criteria of occupational achievement and the divisive effects of such mobility upon family solidarity, and upon the ways in which such strains upon the family are cushioned.95

IX. Types of Structure. The chief characterization that can be made of Parsons' treatment of types of structure is that he recognizes the existence of multiple vertical structures with the possibilities of discrepancy and conflict between them, and that he sees multiple structures as a sign of the lack of social integration. He briefly mentions caste as a type of class structure based upon the use of the criterion of birth.

In summary and review: Parsons is an observer-ascriptor concerned with the way actor- and self-ascripters place one another. He attempts to explain the reasons and functions of differentiation for the ascribers and centers most of his analysis upon the systematic classification of criteria and their correlates. Although recognizing a number of differentiation processes, he severely

95Ibid., p. 182.
limits his analysis of structural components. As a result of this lack of systematic structural elements Parsons' analysis of mobility and types of structure is weak, although there are significant contributions regarding the correlates of mobility.

The critical analyses thus far presented may strike one as unfair inasmuch as Weber and Parsons have been criticized for their failure to fill all cells of the analytic scheme here presented. It is fully recognized that one or two articles cannot cover everything, and that writers may quite legitimately specialize in certain areas of analysis, leaving others untouched or dealt with only briefly. The chief reason and function of pointing out lacunae and unanalyzed variables is not that of destructive criticism, but of pointing the way to further theory construction in areas where it is needed.

Richard Centers

I. Ascriber. There are several types of ascriber in this study. The first is Centers himself, who functions in the early stages of the study as an objective-ascriber. As a scientist, classifying his respondents, he differentiates them according to his own judgments and criteria. His perceptions and arrangements of respondents may be entirely separate from the perceptions of those whom he describes and places. For example, he first classifies respondents by occupation, grouping them in ten categories which, he states, form "a hierarchy in terms of skill, responsibility, and
complexity of the occupational function or role in the total economy of production and exchange of goods and services." Table 6 in his work presents this classification. It is plausible that the respondents, if asked to place themselves in the ten categories of occupation might have made very different selections, might have used criteria other than those employed by Centers and, in fact, might have disagreed entirely with the categorizing scheme and suggested another.

Centers again functions as an objective-ascriber (although it would seem that his general intention is to function as a reporter-ascriber) when he asks respondents to tell in which social class they belong: the class names and the number and arrangement of structural components are of his choosing rather than of the respondents'. It is quite conceivable that the respondents, if permitted unstructured responses, might have used other class names, might not have thought in terms of class at all, might have seen more or fewer classes than those specified by Centers. Perhaps individuals do not think spontaneously in terms of social class, but will do so only when invited by the interviewer in the interviewing situation. It might be discovered that unless someone presents the

96 Richard Centers, op. cit., p. 48.
97 Ibid., p. 49.
98 Ibid., p. 233, question 23a.
terms quite specifically, respondents do not use them and/or do not place themselves in these categories. The directions given to the respondents by Centers structures the response situation so rigidly that inferences as to the respondents' class consciousness and identification with class are hazardous.

Centers' "discovery" of a working class, the subject of many of his later writings, becomes questionable in the light of considerations such as these: suppose that he had added "white collar class" as another class name, or "managerial class," or "upper middle class" -- how would the responses then have distributed themselves? Or the reverse question, restricting the number of categories, might be added: suppose only "upper" and "lower" had been used as class names, would the conclusion then be that objectively only two classes exist, only two types of class consciousness and awareness?

Another question that arises pertains to Centers' conclusion that the selfplacements of the respondents, implying awareness and consciousness of belonging, objectively demonstrate the existence of class. He assumes that the choice of a category reflects real feelings of membership, which in turn imply the existence of psycho-social groupings. However, if the respondents had been given strata names to choose from, such as well-educated vs. poorly educated, wealthy vs. poor, etc., they probably could have placed themselves as easily as before. Could it then be concluded that
these strata also were classes by his definition, since respondents
could choose a category in which they belonged? By placing them-
selves in pre-established categories the respondents would be indi-
cating no more or less identification or feeling of belonging in
these categories than in the class categories offered. The opera-
tional definition of class thus becomes over-comprehensive, namely,
any set of pre-established categories furnished by the interviewer.

Fomers' conclusions that classes exist, because of self-placement
by respondents in offered categories, and his assumption that self-
placement implies "feeling of belonging," appear not to be empiri-
cally demonstrated by his study. The rebuttal might be offered that
the respondents' ability to name other individuals or categories of
individuals who belong to the same grouping demonstrates a feeling
of belonging or membership, but this same ability would apply in
any of the strata classifications mentioned above.

The second ascriber role is filled by the respondents. They
become actor-ascriptors when they answer this question: "Which of
those (occupations) in this list would you say belonged in the

.................. class (whatever class respondent has
chosen as his own)?"99 The respondent is then given a stimulus
card which includes a number of occupational categories.100 Then
he is asked: "What would you say outs a person in the upper social

99 Ibid., p. 232, question 33b.
100 Ibid., p. 235.
class? What would you say puts a person in the lower social class? In responding here the individual becomes an informant-ascriber, since he is temporarily in the role of estimating and describing the way in which other ascribers in this interaction system place one another.

The third type of ascriber role which the respondent assumes is that of self-ascriber. He is asked, "If you were asked to use one of these four names for your social class, which one would you say you belonged in, the middle class, lower class, working class, or upper class?" Here the respondent differentiates and places himself although he is provided with a pre-established set of categories, as discussed above.

II. Characteristics of the Ascriber. The characteristics of the respondents, who are the most important ascribers in this study, were chosen by Centers through explicitly specified sampling techniques. Eleven-hundred white male respondents were selected from a national universe first by representativeness of various geographical locations, by urban and rural residence, by age, and by certain economic or standard-of-living criteria. These characteristics are in effect criteria which Centers, as an objective-

101 Ibid., p. 234, questions 24a, 24b.
102 Ibid., p. 233, question 23a.
ascriber, uses in placing ascribees (respondents) in various categories.

For a fuller analysis, Centers' own characteristics as an ascriber should be considered. His relationships with the ascribees were necessarily highly impersonal, being limited and defined by his methodology which entailed the use of interviewers, a national rather than a community sample, etc.

III. Ascribees. The first set of ascribees seen to consist of everyone in the country, as placed by the respondents, serving in the capacity of actor- or informant-ascribes. The second set is made up of the respondents themselves, when they are placed by Centers in various occupational strata, power strata, and so on.

IV. Criteria. The first criteria encountered are those with which Centers selected and differentiated his sample of respondents, as has been described. Once the respondents were selected however, additional criteria were employed.

In the first stage of the study Centers stratifies occupations in terms of skill, responsibility, and occupational complexity. In other words, he is employing evaluative criteria to construct an occupational stratification system in which he places the respondents.

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\[\text{Ibii}, \ p. \ 49.\]
Next, in arriving at what he calls a single stratification variable or scale, he combines three separate sets of criteria, namely, occupation, power, and economic status. The occupation variable has been attended to. The power or dominance-subordination hierarchy ranges from employer to employee. In between these two extremes are manager, independent, and tenant. It is difficult to establish the single differentiating principle or criterion involved, unless one were to speak of some sort of relation to the means of production. Such problems as these arise: 'ight not an employer also be a manager?, or a tenant (farmer) also be an employer, a manager? And while it is true that each category may be operationally defined, the operational criteria are not specified. The third variable, that of economic status, is constructed on the criterion of wealth.

In a later phase of the study, where Centers determines the class identifications of the respondents, there is a concern with the criteria used by the respondents. Centers asks the respondents to give the criteria which "put people in the upper social class and lower social class." It should be noted, however, that Centers actually imposes his own criteria. The pre-established criteria of family, money, education, and beliefs were previously presented to the respondents in an effort to determine which of

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104 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
then they used to identify other individuals who belonged in their own class. It is not surprising, therefore, that the same criteria are used by the respondents in placing ascribines in specific classes other than their own. It is odd that although Centers asks respondents to list or choose the criteria with which they place others in their own class or in other classes, he never asks the crucial question of what criteria they use to place themselves in a given class.

The problem of "structuring" the responses arises here again when it is realized that criteria are structured by the procedure of asking individuals to "pick one" or "select from the following." The conclusion that individuals use certain criteria for placement of themselves and others in classes, is misleading because respondents were told to do so. Nor did Centers materially diminish his error by supplying an "other" category. What would the results have been if no pre-arranged categories had been given to the respondents?

Beliefs and attitudes, education, and family are found to be important criteria used by the respondents in the placement of ascribines in their own social classes. Occupation was excluded from the list of possible choices. One wonders what the picture

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would have been if other choices had been permitted, e.g., power in the community, political standing, etc. The responses are interpreted by Centers as supporting the interest-group theory of class, since beliefs and attitudes are most frequently cited by the respondents as the criteria they use in placing others in their own class. In light of the method employed, the results are questionable.

As far as the content of criteria used by respondents in placing ascribees in classes other than their own, the most important criterion for membership in the upper social class is wealth or income, and the most important one for membership in the lower class is poverty. We do not know the questions which produced the information that the criterion for middle-class membership is money or income, and for working-class membership, "working for a living." These questions were not asked of the 1945 sample, but in a later study. Since the new question-forms are not cited, it is difficult to discern whether pre-established criteria were presented to the respondents or whether they made choices from among suggested criteria, as in the case of the questions concerning upper and lower social class membership.

The question which Centers poses, "What is the relationship between people's present occupational status and their class
"relationship?" raises a serious analytic problem. It may be difficult to determine from the word "relationship" what are the criteria and what the correlates in a given case. Further confusion arises when it is seen that class identifications may be used by Centers as correlates of occupational strata at one time, while later on in the study these same identifications are employed as criteria for establishing classes with other correlates: political conservatism—radicalism, prejudice toward Negroes and union affiliation. Only a careful examination of each table reveals which variables are being used as criteria and which are used as correlates. In some cases to make the picture even more complex Centers is comparing two structures, as in the questions at the beginning of this paragraph, or uses two sets of criteria, one (the occupations) furnished by himself, the other (class identification) furnished by the respondents.

Controlling and controlled criteria may be present in the study, although they are not distinguished. Income is related to wealth, wealth to education, education to political conservatism, and so forth, but the direction of determination or relation is quite difficult to determine.

It may appear that the above discussion of criteria, and of ascribers for that matter is unwarrantedly complex, and that perhaps

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108 Ibid., p. 85.
this complexity is due to the classificatory scheme proposed in
this dissertation. It may be noticed further that there has been
no discussion of whether Centers at various stages of the study,
or the respondents in their various ascriber roles, use initial
or subsequent criteria, first- or second-level, observed or con-
ventional criteria. The possible complexity here may seem over-
whelming, and its elaboration will not be attempted for this
reason. It may be claimed, however, that the real nature and
cause of the complexity lies in Centers' study itself, rather than
in the scheme of analysis. The methodology which Centers has used,
and the way in which he has analyzed and interpreted his data, are
seen to be much more complicated that they appear at first glance.

V. Processes. The main processes involved in Centers' study are
categorization and stratification. These processes, although
recurring in the respondents' ascriptions are representatively
illustrated by Centers' construction of the initial occupational
classification described above. The process of segmentation is
never systematically used either by the author or by his respond-
ents. Centers' awareness of this process might be said to be
implied by his handling of rural-urban differences and his, albeit
questionable, resolution of these differences through the con-
struction of a uni-dimensional occupational stratification
In the placement of themselves or others, the respondents are limited to the use of pre-categorized and pre-stratified categories, i.e., upper class, middle class, working class, and lower class. Thus the use of the processes of segmentation, articulation, rating and ranking by the respondents is precluded. The resultant incompleteness is obvious.

VI. Structural Components. The major structural components which Centers treats are classes and strata. There are various stages in the development of definitions of each of these terms, involving coverage of common usages and differences in meaning. Centers defines class in the following way:

"Classes are psycho-social groupings, something that is essentially subjective in character; dependent upon class consciousness (i.e., a feeling of group membership); and class lines of cleavage may or may not conform to what seem to social scientists to be logical lines of cleavage in the objectives or stratification sense."\(^{110}\)

The four classes which Centers distinguishes \textit{a priori} (upper, middle, working, lower)\(^{111}\) are discussed from three vantage points:

\(^{109}\)Ibid., pp. 49-51.
\(^{110}\)Ibid., p. 27.
\(^{111}\)Ibid., pp. 211-214.
first, on the basis of each class's occupational composition as described by the respondents who affiliate with it; secondly, in terms of the actual occupational strata based upon the characteristics of the respondents who most frequently identify themselves with a given class; and thirdly, in terms of criteria other than occupation used by the respondents in the placement of individuals in a particular class.

The term "stratum"\textsuperscript{112} refers to objective characteristics of ascribeds according to Centers. These objective characteristics are seen to derive largely from economic origins. On the basis of occupation, power, income, standard of living, education, and other criteria, social and economic groupings and categories of people are distinguished. As pointed out above, this distinction between class and stratum becomes meaningless upon a careful examination of Centers' methodology.

Although he uses the term "status" frequently, Centers never defines it. From a representative use of the term,\textsuperscript{113} it appears to refer to location in a particular stratum. Although Centers recognizes and mentions that such terms as "social rank"\textsuperscript{114} and "social position"\textsuperscript{115} are used in the literature, he himself does not use them.

\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 226.
\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.
As might be expected from the limitations upon the use of the processes of differentiation, there is no concern with segments, rank, situs, or other intra-category positions. The concepts employed indicate a concern with only the vertical axis of differentiation and a treatment of categories as the smallest positional unit.

VII. Correlates. We have seen that during the course of Centers' study, the most important criteria for differentiating categories become correlates. The most outstanding illustration is the phenomenon of class-consciousness -- a criterion for ascertaining class membership -- which is also used as a correlate of socio-economic stratification (economic status, dominance-subordination or power, and occupation). When classes based upon the criterion of class-consciousness are used, Centers states that they too have correlates, such as desires and ends, satisfaction and discontent, religious and political affiliation, etc. In stating that "each class has a distinctive pattern of occupational strata as members," Centers treats strata as correlates of classes. The upper and middle classes have the occupational

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correlates of business and the professions, while the working and lower classes have the occupational correlate of manual labor.\textsuperscript{119}

On the other hand, according to Centers the two most import-
and correlates of strata are class identification and politico-
economic orientation. A central function of the study is to deter-
mine how they are related to status and role. He asks the question:

"Do persons of differing status and role in the economic order (e.g., occupational strata) characteristically distinguish themselves from one another by the possession of differing points of view with respect to important political and economic issues?"

"...In short, are some occupational strata radical and opposed in point of view to other occupational strata who are conserva-
tive?"\textsuperscript{120} Centers shows that conservatism—radicalism in politico-economic orientation is correlated with occupational strata, demon-
strating his hypothesis that such would be the case.\textsuperscript{121} It readily can be seen that if the distinction between class and stratum is dropped, Centers merely rotates a set of criteria and correlates.

VIII. \textbf{Mobility and Structural Change}. Centers does not treat mobility or structural change.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 79–80.
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 57, Table 8.
\end{itemize}
IX. Types of Structure. The principal concern is with class structure based on the criterion of identification. Although other structures used in the study might be discussed as such, Centers is not concerned with the nature of stratification or its components: occupation, power, and economic status. The class structure includes the four social classes mentioned above. The upper class membership consists of about 3 or 4 per cent of the population; the middle class consists of 40 per cent; more than half the population is in the working class; and 1 to 5 per cent of the population identify with lower class. Since mobility is not treated, no further description of structure can be made. Centers in effect sees a single structure based upon identification of self-ascripters into four pre-established categories.

In a summary critique, one can say the following: Although Centers purports to be a reporter-ascripter, and to be engaged in the process of discovering how actor-ascripters place themselves and one another in a society, he in reality is behaving as an objective-ascripter. In the first place, he uses his own criteria, makes and stratifies his own categories when he deals with occupational and other strata, and places ascribees within them. Secondly, he supplies the categories and their rank order for

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122 Ibid., p. 51.
123 Ibid., pp. 211-214.
self-ascribers when he asks them to place themselves in classes. Thirdly, he supplies a set of criteria for the actor- and informant-ascribers, either directly or by precept, and also a set of predetermined categories already ranked, when he asks the respondents to place others in the various classes, whether their own or others'. If in future studies an awareness of various ascriber roles is utilized, such confusion may not occur; and if class perceptions, self-placement, or other differentiation processes engaged in by actor-ascribers are to be the subject of investigation, the results may be pertinent and unambiguous.

Because of the imposed and limited nature of the differentiation processes and categories, the actor-ascribers and Centers himself are restricted to a perception and description of a single vertical structure made up of a small number of undifferentiated categories. That is, units are undifferentiated within categories, and the possibilities of segmentation, articulation, and ranking are precluded. Any studies of mobility within such a structure would be similarly distorted and oversimplified.

Although Centers has made a very remarkable contribution to the empirical investigation of stratification, particularly in his discovery of political and other attitudinal correlates of occupational strata based upon a nation-wide sample, it would appear that his conclusions as to the psychology of class consciousness are unwarranted. Suggestions for a similar study which would avoid such
limitations and distortions can be gained by the comparison of Centers' methodology with that used by Wheeler.

**Wayne Wheeler**

1. **Ascriber.** Wheeler operates almost entirely as a reporter-ascriber. In fact, when one realises that actor-ascribers place one another using their own criteria, their own terminology, their own categories, and even do their own selecting and weighing of items for an "objective" social status score, it might appear that Wheeler is entirely and unequivocally a reporter-ascriber. There are several exceptions to this role however: in one instance he requires the actor-ascribers to rank categories, instead of allowing them freedom to stratify or segmentalise. Secondly, he requires them to categorise without the possibility of ranking or articulating units within categories. And thirdly, he makes his own categories out of the range of social status scores and supplies his own class names (or rather, Warner's) to all classes, however derived. Each of these details will be explained more fully below.

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125 Ibid., p. 35.
126 Ibid., p. 73.
127 Ibid., pp. 36, 73.
There are two other sets of ascribers, or perhaps just one. The first set is clearly in the role of actor-ascriber. They are members of a small community placing other members, with whom they are acquainted, in various self-established categories. The second set of ascribers are in a peculiar role that is difficult to classify, since they comprise a "panel of citizens" who select and differentially weight criteria for the construction of a social status scale to be applied to ascribess in the community, although they themselves actually make no placements. It is assumed, with some hesitation, that they may be classified as informant-ascribers. It is not clear whether these two sets of ascribers are the same people or not.

II. Characteristics of the Ascriber. The actor-ascribers were 25 judges selected on the basis of willingness to cooperate, long residence in the community, and acquaintance with a large number of the ascribess. Fortunately other data were collected on these judges, principally their own "prestige-class position" (see section on structural components below for a definition of his term) as determined by the other judges. There is a discrepancy in the Wheeler report as to the exact prestige-class

128 Ibid., p. 37.
129 Ibid., p. 37.
130 Ibid., p. 34.
distribution of the judges.\textsuperscript{131} Taking the latter figures, their range is as follows: lower-lower, none; upper-lower, six; lower-middle, six; middle-middle, one; upper-middle, six; lower-upper, five; upper-upper, three. Their nationality is also listed.\textsuperscript{132} It is strange that no particular analysis was made of the relation of these characteristics of the ascribers to the kinds of ascriptions they made (the number of classes each perceived and the number of ascribers each placed are listed\textsuperscript{133} but not analyzed or interpreted.). No indications of the social distance between ascriber and ascriber is given, nor are any personal characteristics except nationality.

The characteristics of Wheeler himself as an ascriber seem relatively unimportant since he functions largely in the role of reporter-ascriber, although the fact that he was a life-long member of the community\textsuperscript{134} and personally knew the judges as well as many of the ascribers may have affected his selection of judges in some unknown degree. As previously stated, no indication of the number or characteristics of the informant-ascribers, the "panel of citizens," is given. It seems unfortunate that with the possibility of so much material on the characteristics of the ascribers no

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., cf. p. 30 and p. 36.
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{134}Ibid., p. 31.
systematic checking of hypotheses in this area was attempted.

III. Ascribes. The ascribes were 190 family units selected by Wheeler from a population of 1,035 families in the community.\textsuperscript{135}

The sampling was admittedly not rigorously representative, but rather was largely based upon Wheeler's knowledge of the community. The judges sorted out those families with whom they were familiar, and ranked anywhere from 42 to 148 ascribes each.\textsuperscript{136}

(It is not stated whether Parsons' hypothesis as to the similar class rank of all members of the same family held up or not, although the data must be available. It is not clear, due to the technique used by Wheeler, whether the judges could assign different ranks to members of the same family.\textsuperscript{137})

The ascribes to which the social status scale was applied were 181 of these same 190 families.

Wheeler's study points up the possibility of another analytic element, namely, characteristics of the ascribes which are not used as either correlates or criteria but which merely describe the population of ascribes before they are differentiated. In the previous studies analyzed, the ascribes were all the members of a society, but in most of the community studies of stratification,

\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{136}Ibid., pp. 30, 34.

\textsuperscript{137}Ibid., p. 33.
to say nothing of small-group studies, the universe of ascribes is severely limited. This discrepancy in ascribe populations opens a whole area of problems and hypotheses which center around the possibilities of comparison of structures and the generalization of structures from community to society. Many of the criticisms of Warner's studies focus upon this point. Wheeler himself is aware of it and attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to cope with it by comparing the class structure of the community, Valley View, with the structures found in Yankee City and Plainville. The difficulty in comparison lies in the absence of a suitable frame of reference.

IV. Criteria. There are two distinct sets of criteria used by the two sets of ascribers, the judges (actor-ascribers) and the panel (informant-ascribers). The judges were asked to explain why they placed certain individuals where they did (the nature of this placement will be discussed below) and to describe the characteristics of each of the categories which they had differentiated. These criteria, as used by the actor-ascribers, are as follows (using only the main headings): wealth and its use, education and its use, community leadership, associational membership and activity

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138 e.g., W. R. Goldschmidt, op. cit., pp. 480–487.
140 Ibid., p. 35.
religious affiliation and religious activity, occupation, behavior and personal appearance (including role or expected behavior), race and nationality, kinship affiliation and family reputation, and place of residence.  

At this point it would seem that Wheeler missed an important opportunity to do more with this crucial material than to classify it. He makes no attempt to relate the kinds of criteria used to the characteristics of the ascriber, or to the particular categories to which they are applied. He does not ask his respondents to list them in order of importance or to weight them, either as they apply to particular categories of prestige classes, or as they are used generally for all positions. He thus loses the chance of distinguishing and analyzing first-level and second-level criteria, observed and reputed, congenital, emergent, sustained and achieved, controlled and controlling, official, conventional and unstandardized criteria.

This lack of analysis prevents any systematic comparison of these criteria as selected and weighted by the panel for use in the social status scale. Here is a tremendously important body of data left unanalyzed when it could be applied to a whole set of crucial hypotheses. Instead, Wheeler merely notes that they are used in greater or lesser degree and in varied combination by the ascribers.

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141 Ibid., pp. 38-54.
to assign ascribes to given positions in a single structure.\footnote{Ibid., p. 38.}

The second set of criteria, then, was selected and weighted by a panel of citizens for use in a social status scale which was then applied to the ascribes. These criteria, markedly different in content from the set used by the judges, are: place of residence, occupation, church membership, church attendance, education, newspaper subscription, number and types of magazines used, vacation (later excluded), organizational membership.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 108-112.} Ranked in order of importance as weighted, occupation and education rank highest, church and organizational membership next, church attendance next, and residence, newspaper and magazine use last. These criteria are combined for a total status score. As Wheeler points out, each criterion taken separately presents a broad range of scores which extends over several class categories for any given classification of ascribes,\footnote{Ibid., pp. 75-77.} although in combination they provide a means of ranking and arbitrarily placing all individuals (see discussion on structural components below). We have seen that these two sets of criteria are never systematically compared, although even upon inspection this comparison is quite revealing and suggestive of several hypotheses involving the concepts first- and second-level criteria. For example, the second set may in some cases be
used by the ascribees as indicators of the first set, or, according to Parsons' hypothesis, may have replaced it (e.g., church membership as an indicator of behavior; magazine subscription as an indicator of education). It should be pointed out that the criteria in the second set were limited by the consideration of the difficulty of obtaining information from the respondents (e.g., income was omitted since it was too difficult to obtain data on it).

V. Processes. Wheeler limited his actor-ascribees to the processes of categorization and stratification. He asked them first to sort the ascribees into groups who belonged together, and then to arrange these groups into a rank order, if they had not already done so. He thus precluded the possibility of their engaging in segmentation, articulation or ranking. In his own differentiation of ascribees according to their social status scores, the nature of the continuous range of scores and the use he made of it again required and limited the processes of differentiation to categorization and stratification.

VI. Structural Components. Because of this restricted nature of the differentiation processes the structural components consist entirely of strata. Wheeler's use of terminology is somewhat loose.

145 Ibid., p. 37.
146 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
In the introduction and the title of the work, he speaks of stratification and strata. However, he entitles Part Two "The Social Classes of Valley View" and in several places uses the terms strata, classes, social classes, status group and group quite interchangeably. He finally settles on the term prestige class to denote the strata as classified by the judges or actor-ascripters, and on the term class to denote the strata as differentiated by the social status scale. Even though he confuses this terminology at times, his intent is clear.

Prestige classes are arrived at by actor-ascripters sorting cards containing names of adult family members into as many or few groups as they wish, each composed of persons who belong together. The judges were not uniformly given the designation for "class" for these groupings. The 25 judges differentiated 3 to 8 classes as follows: 3 judges distinguished 3 classes, 3 said 4, 3 said 5, 1 said 6, 14 said 7, 1 judge said 8 classes. Wheeler picked the majority statement and settled on seven classes. He admittedly

147 Ibid., p. 29.
148 Ibid., pp. 32. 95.
149 Ibid., pp. 59. 93.
150 Ibid., pp. 33–34.
151 Ibid., pp. 34–35.
borrowed the terminology of Warner and named them upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, middle-middle, lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower. The distribution of ascribents in these classes is discussed in the section on types of structure below.

Classes, on the other hand, as determined by scores on the social status scale, are arbitrarily stratified by Wheeler himself. "In order to correlate" social status scores with prestige classes the range of scores is broken, with some juggling, into seven class intervals and similarly designated with the same class names. This is a peculiar method of arriving at classes, to say the least. It is no surprise that the two stratification systems correlate, although Wheeler expresses some anxiety in anticipating that they might not. There seems to be a consistent strain for the "discovery" of single systems running through much of the literature, with some very interesting political implications which have been pointed out by Goldschmidt.

VII. Correlates. Wheeler tells us (and this is an occasion for granting him a sincere accolade for his unusually clear and frank

\[152\] Ibid., p. 36.
\[153\] Ibid., p. 73.
\[154\] Ibid., p. 88.
presentation of methodological steps and assumptions) that he originally intended to collect a body of data on the ascribeds which were to be used as characteristics of the individuals in the various prestige classes, \(^{156}\) that is, as correlates. Most of these correlates were later used however, as data to determine class as measured by the social-status scale. In other words, they were never used as correlates, or distributed by prestige class. This use of the most important correlates left a rather skimpy list of characteristics of ascribeds which were actually used as correlates. Some of them were used as correlates of prestige classes (e.g., rooms, type of garden \(^{157}\) ), and some as correlates of classes (e.g., age and make of car, home ownership, and card playing \(^{158}\) ). It is not clear what rationale Wheeler followed in relating correlates to prestige classes rather than to classes. It seems to be a random operation. It is also not clear why he felt he could not use the characteristics making up the social status scale as correlates of prestige classes. Again it would seem that he missed an important opportunity for the analysis of theoretically relevant data.

VII. Mobility and Change. Wheeler is aware of the distinction between vertical and horizontal mobility and of various kinds of

\(^{156}\) Wayne Wheeler, op. cit., p. 72.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., op. 41, 45.

\(^{158}\) Ibid., op. 78, 80, 83.
structural change, but admits that he could not deal with these matters in his study. 159

14. Types of Structure. Both of Wheeler's structures, the prestige class structure and the class structure, have by design the same number of strata. The distribution of ascribees within each stratum is similar. 160 Perhaps the most striking thing about the whole study is that Wheeler refuses to recognize simultaneous multiple systems even when the actor-ascribees see anywhere from 3 to 8 classes. Following the reasoning of Warner (i.e. the practicality of being able to use objective measures) he is pleased to find a correlation of +.92 between prestige class and class (which correlation is spurious, largely because of the arbitrary division of status scores into classes). This permits him to substitute the status scale for the prestige ranking and use it to determine class placements. 161 The data are available for the analysis of several structures as seen by different ascriber groups using different criteria, but they are all lumped and forced together into one ersatz set of strata.

There is an unusual complementarity between the two empirical

159 Ibid., p. 99.
160 Ibid., cf. p. 59 and p. 74.
161 Ibid., p. 88.
studies, as there was between the two theoretical works of Parsons and Weber. Centers does what Wheeler does not; Wheeler does what Centers does not. Centers makes full use of the analysis of criteria, correlates, and characteristics of the ascriber, but does not allow the actor-ascriber to differentiate in his own way. Wheeler allows the actor-ascriber almost complete freedom, but he does not analyze the data. It seems obvious that a study could be designed which would meet all of the specifications.

This concludes the present chapter dealing with the systematic and critical analysis of selected studies according to the elements of analysis developed in Chapter 2. It can now be estimated whether the functions of the present chapter have been carried out successfully. The preparation of the studies for systematic comparison has been completed; the elements of analysis have been tested; some new elements have been added; systematic criticisms of the various studies have been made. Perhaps a word is in order regarding the possible removal or discard of some of the conceptual distinctions which have not been successfully applied in the analysis of the selected studies. It may be recalled that these distinctions were based upon the informal analysis of a wide and disparate range of theoretical and empirical studies in the area of social differentiation. Since not all of them, nor even a fair representation of them, can be presented here, it does not seem wise to delete any of the distinctions merely because they did
not happen to be applicable to the four particular studies analyzed.
Perhaps their fruitfulness can best be, and can only be, demonstrated
now by their usefulness for hypothesis suggestion as shown in the
next, concluding chapter.
This chapter is intended to serve several functions within fairly brief compass. It is organized into several sections. First, the presentation in chart form of the revised and final elaboration of the paradigm which is composed of the elements of analysis suggested in Chapter 2, together with those new elements suggested by the critical analysis of the selected studies. Second, the condensed conceptual summary of the analyses of the selected studies presented in tabular form for point-by-point comparison. Third, a representative list of hypotheses and research suggestions derived from the relation of the component parts of the paradigm and from the comparative analyses of the selected studies. Fourth, a brief statement of summary and conclusion regarding the dissertation as a whole. The paradigm and the summary table are presented on the next two pages.
1. THE ASCRIBER

5. OBSERVER-ASCRIBER

4. REPORTER-ASCRIBER

3. INFORMANT-ASCRIBER

2. SELF-ASCRIBER

1. ACTOR-ASCRIBER

Note: Numbered arrows are explained in the legend at the right side of the chart.
II.
CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE ASCRIBER

1. POSITION OF THE ASCRIBER
   IN THE STRUCTURE

2. RELATION OF THE ASCRIBER
   TO THE ASCRIBEE

3. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
   OF THE ASCRIBER:
   PSYCHOLOGICAL
  IDEOLOGICAL
   PHYSICAL
   SOCIAL
   BEHAVIORAL

III.
THE ASCRIBER -- 9

CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE
ASCRIBEE
POPULATION
### IV

#### THE CRITERIA

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**III.**

THE ASCHRIEBE — 9

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ASCHRIEBE POPULATION

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CORREL OF CRIT
ARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

V.

PROCESSES OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

1. STRUCTURE

2. POSITION

3. SPECIFICATION

4. ARTICULATION

5. RATING

6. RANKING

7. CATEGORIZATION

8. SEGMENTATION

9. ARTICULATED CATEGORY

10. RANKED CATEGORY

11. SEGMENT

12. STRATUM

13. INDEBTEDNESS

14. RATING
VI.

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

1. ARTICULATED CATEGORY

2. STRATUM

3. RANKED CATEGORY

4. SITUS

5. RANK

6. RATING

7. INDENTITY

VII.

CORRELATES OF POSITIONS AND STRUCTURES

1. CORRELATE

2. LOCATIONAL CORRELATE

3. CATEGORY CORRELATE

4. STRUCTURAL CORRELATE

5. INDIVIDUAL CORRELATE

6. ROLE

7. COLLECTIVITY CORRELATE

8. SOCIAL CLASS

9. INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATE

CORRELATES OF MOBILITY AND CHANGE
VIII.
MOBILITY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

1. STRUCTURAL CHANGE
2. MOBILITY
3. ATTRIBUTIVE MOBILITY
4. PROCEDURAL MOBILITY
5. ORIGINATIVE MOBILITY
6. MOBILITY DISCREPANCY
7. VERTICAL MOBILITY
8. HORIZONTAL MOBILITY
9. DIAGONAL MOBILITY
10. INTRAMOBILITY
11. INTRAMOBILITY
12. MOBILITY DISTANCE
13. MOBILITY RATE
14. MOBILITY VOLUME
15. MOBILITY CHANGE
16. MOBILITY CHANNEL

IX.
TYPES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

1. CLASSIFIED BY THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS OF A STRUCTURE
2. CLASSIFIED BY THE NUMBER OF ASCHлю POSITIONS OF A
3. CLASSIFIED BY THE RATE AND VOLUME WITHIN THE STRUC...
IX.

TYPES OF STRUCTURE

1. CLASSIFIED BY THE RELATIVE NUMBER OF POSITIONS IN THE STRUCTURE

2. CLASSIFIED BY THE RELATIVE NUMBER OF ASCHIBEES IN THE POSITIONS OF A STRUCTURE

3. CLASSIFIED BY THE RELATIVE RATE AND VOLUME OF MOBILITY WITHIN THE STRUCTURE.
1. The observer-ascriber makes placements based upon his observations of the actor-ascribers' behavior as they place one another.
2. The reporter-ascriber makes placements based upon the reports of actor-ascribers, self-ascribers, or informant-ascribers.
3. The self-ascriber may base his placement of himself upon the placements made by certain actor-ascribers.
4. The informant-ascriber is estimating the placements made by actor-ascribers.
5. Each of these five types of ascribers possesses certain characteristics which may affect the kinds of differentiation made, criteria used, etc.
6. The objective-ascriber is not concerned with placements made by actor-, self-, or informant-ascribers. The characteristics of the objective-ascriber may affect the kinds of differentiation he makes, the criteria he uses, etc.
7. The characteristics of the ascriber population before differentiation takes place is a variable which has been added as a result of the analyses of studies of differentiation. These characteristics are different from criteria or correlates.
8. There may be cause-and-effect relationships established between the characteristics of the ascriber and the criteria he uses.
9. Criteria are characteristics of the ascribers selected and used by the ascriber in the various processes of differentiation.
10. The ascriber, using certain criteria, differentiates the ascribers by the various processes listed.
11. There are certain causes and effects of the use of certain criteria other than the characteristics of the ascriber.
12. The processes of differentiation result in the various arrangements of structural components as shown.
13. Segments can be ranked, articulated or undifferentiated.
14. Strata can be ranked, articulated or undifferentiated.
15. Structures or structural components may have causal, resultant or concomitant correlates. These are characteristics not used as criteria.
16. Mobility and structural change may take place within the structure, or between structures.
Correlates of mobility and change are variables which have been added as a result of the analysis of studies of differentiation. They include causes, effects and concomitants of mobility and structural change.

Types of structure may be classified on the basis of kind and amount of mobility, number and arrangement of structural components, etc.
Weber

Weber is objective-ascriber and actor-ascriber at the same time; aware of other actor-ascribers, but he makes placements.

Parsons

Parsons is observer-ascriber; concerned with the way in which actor- and self-ascribers place each other in a society.

Centers

Centers is an objective-ascriber, although attempting to be reporter-ascriber, respondents actor-ascribers, self-ascribers, and informant-ascribers.

Wheeler

Wheeler is mainly reporter-ascriber, but requires actor-ascribers to rank categories. Actor-ascribers are primary-ascribers. Informant-ascribers also used.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF ASCRIBER

Those in higher status groups motivated to keep prestige intact, keep outsiders out, maintain status quo; no indication of awareness of relation between ascribers and ascribes or of personal characteristics.

(Inference: comments apply to all ascribers in a society since unspecified.) Stresses their moral norms, motivations, goals, evaluations in terms of norms.

1100 white males, national sample. Some characteristics selected by sampling procedures, e.g. rural-urban, ages, standard of living, wealth. A large number of characteristics were obtained through the questionnaire, e.g. attitudes, occupation, education, economic status, religion, etc.

III. ASCRIBEE

Unstated. (Inference: all the individuals in a given group, although emphasis upon upper prestige groupings.)

Unstated. (Inference: everyone in the society.)

Respondents when Centers is the ascriber; everyone in the country when respondents are ascribers.

190 family units selected by Wheeler on basis of knowledge from a community population of 1035 families.
III. ASCRIBE

Unstated. (Inference: all the individuals in a given nation, although emphasis upon upper prestige groupings.)

Unstated. (Inference: everyone in the society.)

Respondents when Centers is the ascriber; everyone in the country when respondents are ascribers.

190 family units selected by Wheeler on basis of previous knowledge from a community population of 1035 families.
IV. CRITERIA

Three main criteria clusters: life chances (economic), style of life (sub-culture), power. Distinguishes between controlled and controlling criteria. Distinguishes first-level and second-level criteria. Possible conflict between official and conventional or unstandardized criteria recognized.

Distinguishes between real and ideal criteria; discusses learning of and functioning of criteria. Suggests difference between primary and secondary criteria and that criteria can be classified by content. Implies key criteria. Distinguishes ascribed from achieved criteria. Roles, rights and obligations may be criteria or correlates.

Criteria Centers uses to stratify respondents: occupation, power, religion, education and income; combined criteria consist of power, occupation, and wealth. Criteria the respondents use for stratifying the general population into classes: occupation, family, money, education, beliefs, and others. Uses evaluative criteria mainly.

Two distinct sets used by two sets of ascribers (Actor-ascribers and informant-ascribers.) Two sets never systematically compared.
TABLE 1. SELECTED STUDIES ARRANGED FOR CROSS-COMPARISON

V. PROCESSES

Uses stratification mainly. Little awareness of possibility of segmentation, differentiation of units, or differentiation within categories. Resulting structure and mobility laid on vertical axis alone.

Primary emphasis on stratification and ranking; indicates possibility of segmentation although not developed. Uses articulation and ranking, but does not relate or distinguish them or derive separate structural elements from them.

Uses categorization and stratification; does not deal with segmentation, articulation, rating, or ranking (actually could not do so with the present methodology.)

Uses categorization and stratification; does not deal with segmentation, articulation, or ranking.
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| Uses categorization and stratification; does not deal with segmentation, articulation, rating, or ranking (actually could not do so with the present methodology.) |
| Uses categorization and stratification; does not deal with segmentation, articulation, or ranking. |
VI. STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

Based on criteria content, not structural principles. Three main types of strata: class, status group, party. Classes broken down into three property classes, three acquisition classes, and four social classes (latter includes intelligentsia). Status groups broken down into two categories: high, low. Parties not differentiated. Recognition of multiple positions held simultaneously by ascribers.

Three components: status (roughly comparable with position), kinship units (ascribers having same status in terms of class placement), classes (kinship units of equal rank.) Omits segments and situates. Notes possibility of holding multiple positions, perhaps conflicting. Does not break down number of classes.

Classes (psycho-social groupings, subjective in character) and strata (objective characteristics of the ascribers) are most important. Four classes: upper, middle, working, lower. Ten occupational strata. No concern with segments, rank, situs.

Consist of strata only. Prestige class: strata groupings as classified by actor-ascribers; class: strata differentiated by the social status scale and grouped by Wheeler. Seven classes, seven prestige classes: UU, LU, UM, MM, LM, UL, LL.
VII. CORRELATES

Causal correlates, e.g. power distribution, economic stability, monopoly; resultant correlates, e.g. class interest, association and action; concomitant correlates.

Deals with causal correlates of criteria and mobility. In general not concerned with correlates of positions or structures. However, does treat role, but difficult to know whether as correlate or criteria.

Two most important correlates of strata are class identification and politico-economic orientation. Criteria often become correlates, e.g. class consciousness is a criterion for ascertaining class membership, also a correlate of socio-economic strata.

Most of the correlates, collected as data, were not used as correlates. Those used as correlates were: rooms per person and make of car, home ownership, and card playing.
VII. CORRELATES

Causal correlates, e.g. power distribution, economic stability, monopoly; resultant correlates, e.g. class interest, association and action; concomitant correlates.

Deals with causal correlates of criteria and mobility. In general not concerned with correlates of positions or structures. However, does treat role, but difficult to know whether as correlate or criteria.

Two most important correlates of strata are class identification and politico-economic orientation. Criteria often become correlates, e.g. class consciousness is a criterion for ascertaining class membership, also a correlate of socio-economic strata.

Most of the correlates, collected as data, were not used as correlates. Those used as correlates were: rooms per person, age and make of car, home ownership, and card playing.
VIII. MOBILITY AND CHANGE

Vertical inter-mobility; movement from strata to strata. Chief emphasis upon structural change and its effects upon mobility, as well as effects of mobility upon structure.

Aware of intra-mobility, correlates of mobility. Little analysis of either vertical or horizontal mobility.

Does not treat mobility or structural change in this study.

Aware of differences between horizontal and vertical mobility, but does not deal with them in the study.
IX. TYPES OF STRUCTURE

Distinguishes between status societies, class societies and caste societies. Demonstrates simultaneously existing multiple structures within a society.

Recognizes multiple vertical structures with possibilities of discrepancy and conflict between them.

Class structure of four social classes: Upper (3%) middle (40%), working (50%) and lower (1-5%) of the population. Sees a single structure based on self-placement of self-ascriptors. Does not use strata materials to develop structures.

Two structures: a prestige class structure and a class structure, with same number of strata in each and with classes of approximately the same size: around 10-12%, with exceptions of upper-upper class (6%), middle-middle (14-16%), and upper-lower (35-40%). Is not aware of multiple systems, uses classes as indicators of prestige classes, since high correlation between them.
The following list of representative hypotheses and research suggestions was derived from the paradigm or the tabulated studies just presented. It is of course possible vastly to expand the list, by systematically relating each variable with every other one. To facilitate this is one of the functions a paradigm may serve; it is a sort of visual hypothesis-factory which can be arranged in the manner of a city-to-city mileage chart so that each variable may be related to every other.

Using only the nine main headings of the paradigm (i.e. ascriber, characteristics of the ascriber, ascribee, criteria, processes of differentiation, structural components, correlates, mobility and change, types of structures), there is the possibility of thirty-six areas of hypotheses. Time and space considerations preclude the systematic treatment of all of these areas, much less the specification of detailed hypotheses and research suggestions within each area. It must suffice to list the areas, and to select only a restricted number of specific hypotheses and research suggestions for illustrative presentation at this time. Some of these hypotheses and suggestions for research are derived from the studies just analysed, others are suggested by the relation of variables within the paradigm itself. Thus two functions of hypothesis formation and integration are performed by the present analytic scheme: the creation of new hypotheses through the systematic relation of the specified conceptual variables, and the codification
or specification of suggested hypotheses in the research and theoretical literature within a single frame of reference.

The list of hypothesis areas as derived from the cross-tabulation of the main variables in the paradigm follows: (1) types of ascribers vs. characteristics of ascribers, (2) types of ascribers vs. types of ascribers, (3) characteristics of ascribers vs. types of ascribers, (4) types of criteria vs. types of ascriber, (5) types of criteria vs. characteristics of the ascriber, (6) types of criteria vs. types of ascribers, (7) processes of differentiation vs. types of ascriber, (8) processes of differentiation vs. characteristics of the ascriber, (9) processes of differentiation vs. types of ascribers, (10) processes of differentiation vs. types of criteria, (11) structural components vs. types of ascriber, (12) structural components vs. characteristics of ascribers, (13) structural components vs. types of ascribers, (14) structural components vs. types of criteria, (15) structural components vs. processes of differentiation, (16) correlates vs. types of ascriber, (17) correlates vs. characteristics of ascribers, (18) correlates vs. types of ascribers, (19) correlates vs. types of criteria, (20) correlates vs. structural components, (22) mobility and change vs. types of ascribers, (23) mobility and change vs. characteristics of ascribers, (24) mobility and change vs. types of ascribers, (25) mobility and change vs. types of criteria, (26) mobility and change vs. processes of differentiation, (27) mobility and change vs. structural components, (28) mobility and change vs. correlates, (29) types of structure
It can be seen that the various hypotheses and research findings from the literature discussed in the previous chapter can be placed in the proper hypothesis area above and thus further codified. The selected hypotheses presented below are coded by hypothesis area numbers according to the list just presented.

1. (Hypothesis Area 29) Ascribers within an interaction system (actor-informant-, and self-ascribers) will be more apt to perceive multiple structures, and complexity within those structures, than will ascribers who are outside that interaction system (scientist-ascribers). This same relationship will apply within the two sub-types of ascribers depending upon the degree of interaction with the ascribes: actor-ascribers and self-ascribers will perceive more complexity than informant-ascribers will; observer-ascribers more than reporter-ascribers; observer-ascribers more than reporter-ascribers; observer- and reporter-ascribers more than objective-ascribers.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by comparing the complexity of social structure as seen by Centers and Weber as
objective-ascribers, by Parsons as an observer-ascriber, and by Wheeler as a reporter-ascriber.

Research suggestion: Systematically compare the complexity of structure perceived by a variety of types of ascribers within a given community, or compare the complexity of structure perceived by various types of ascribers in the theoretical and research literature.

2. (Hypothesis Area 12) The actor- or self-ascriber's view of structural components will vary with his segment as well as with his stratum. In general, he will make more differentiations in those positions near him and fewer among those far from him.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by Weber's emphasis upon upper-prestige strata and his use of finer distinctions of positions within these categories. It is also suggested by the findings of Allison Davis. 162

Research suggestion: Compare the perceptions and differentiations made by ascribers in various occupations, as they apply to categories of occupations which differ both horizontally and vertically from those of the ascribers.

3. (Hypothesis Area 5) The amount of criterion halo effect will increase with the amount of social distance between ascriber and ascribee.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by the relation of the pertinent variables (types of criteria vs. characteristics of the ascriber) from the paradigm, and appears to be related to the social psychology of stereotype formation.

Research suggestion: Furnish ascribers with given criteria for differentiating ascribes at varying social distances from them; ask for other criteria which ascribers themselves would use in differentiating; ask ascribers to judge whether ascribes have these characteristics.

4. (Hypothesis Area 5) The use of role performance (degree of fulfillment of expected behavior) as a criterion will decrease as social distance between ascriber and ascribe increases.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by Parsons' comments upon the predominant use of the criterion of role performance by family members in the ranking of one another. It is also suggested by Kingsley Davis' discussion of the criteria used for the establishment of "esteem" positions.

Research suggestion: compare the criteria used by ascribers in differentiating ascribes at varying social distances from the ascriber.

5. (Hypothesis Area 28) Aspiration for vertical or horizontal inter-mobility (movement between categories) will decrease as ascribee reaches higher rank within a stratum.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by the relation of pertinent variables (mobility vs. correlates) from the paradigm.
Research suggestion: compare mobility aspirations of ascribees as they move through different positions in a structure.

6. (Hypothesis Area 32) Official criteria for self-ascription will be used more often in structures where there is little vertical mobility than in structures where the volume of vertical mobility is great.

Source: This hypothesis is suggested by Weber's, Parsons', and Davis' comments upon the nature of criteria used in caste structures.

Research suggestion: applying this hypothesis to organizations rather than to whole societies, compare organizations with varying degrees of vertical mobility and relate to the kind of criteria used by self-ascribers.

It is possible to suggest many more hypotheses and research suggestions within the various areas of hypotheses, but it would seem that the utility of the paradigm as a source of hypotheses and research suggestions is sufficiently established.

In conclusion it may be said that the dissertation has attempted to make contributions and fill needs in several important areas. First, as the title suggests, it has been a demonstration in theory construction. It appears to the present writer that such an overall scheme and theoretical methodology as described here could profitably be applied to other areas of the social sciences. The general rationale and the step-by-step description of the process
were designed and intended to serve this function, and it is hoped that the attempt was carried out in a way which suggests application elsewhere.

Secondly and more specifically, the dissertation has been aimed at the codification and clarification of the area of social differentiation. Although the testing of unique hypotheses is a legitimate scientific activity, it is felt that the construction and testing of related hypotheses will lead more rapidly to the development of an integrated empirically demonstrable theory of social differentiation. It is hoped that the paradigm so organizes areas of variables as to facilitate recognition of the place of unique and related hypotheses in a larger framework of variables. Although random combination of variables may often result in hypotheses which are important to general theory, it is felt that systematic combination will more rapidly lead to this result.

Thirdly, the dissertation fills the need for a broader frame of reference for critical analysis of works in the field. The usual critiques and analyses of research and theory in the area of social differentiation have been primarily concerned with attacks upon or defenses of fairly narrow ranges of concepts and findings. Very often the critic will merely substitute his own convictions about what social structure really is for the author's. Seemingly opposite points of view are often the result of semantic confusion, and one set of definitions may be substituted for another without
materially changing the conceptualization. Criticisms are frequently destructive without offering any substitution of more appropriate ways of solving the problem to which the author has addressed himself.

It is felt that the codification of concepts and the more concise operational definition of terms, as well as the illustration of their application in critical analysis, will facilitate the comparative and separate evaluations of contributions in the area of social differentiation. The glossary is an effort in this direction and it is hoped that standards have been suggested with respect to the use and meanings of terms which will find wide application.
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I, Richard Thacker Morris, was born in Columbus, Ohio, April 28, 1917. I received my secondary school education at the Columbus Academy and University High School, Columbus. My undergraduate training was obtained at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio and at the Ohio State University, from which I received the degree Bachelor of Arts in 1941. While in residence at the Ohio State University I acted in the capacity of teaching assistant in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 1947-48. I held the position of research assistant in the Personnel Research Board, the Ohio State University, 1948-49, and was a Social Science Research Council Fellow, 1949-50. In the fall of 1950, I received an appointment as Instructor in Sociology at the University of Wisconsin and currently hold that position.