THE PROGRESSIVES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1898-1917:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE LEADERS
OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT TOWARD EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Volume I

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INTRODUCTION

THE PROGRESSIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY

It is difficult to understand and interpret the foreign policy attitudes of the leading progressives in America from 1898 to 1917 without some prior understanding of the underlying currents of the progressive movement as a whole. For in no small measure the foreign policy idealism of the progressives was related to a larger context of values, beliefs and judgments that centered most forcefully on the imperatives of domestic reform. At the same time, however, the idealistic vision of America's destiny in international politics, seen in 1898 with a sudden new clarity, contributed to a growing awareness among progressives that the nation's political and economic institutions were simply not functioning democratically. To be sure, foreign policy considerations were generally subordinate to a consuming interest in the problems of domestic political and social regeneration throughout most of the period 1898-1917. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the attitudes of the progressives toward external and domestic affairs were but two manifestations of a common spirit which insisted on reform and uplift both at home and abroad, a spirit which demanded justice and democracy for Americans and for all men.

When we speak of "progressive foreign policy" in this study we are referring to a complex of idealistic attitudes long woven into the very fabric of American history. Regarded in early nineteenth century terms as America's "Mission" or "Manifest Destiny," these ideals, in their post-1898 expression, were the monopoly of no political or ideological group. The fact that they received a new em-
emphasis and orientation at the hands of prominent progressives during and after the war with Spain was undoubtedly due to the rather sudden emergence of the United States upon the stage of world politics, and, as a result of this, the felt need on the part of many Americans to impart to the new condition of American power a contextual and ideological framework that incorporated the traditional idealism of American foreign policy. Thus the primary role of the progressives in the foreign policy area from 1898 to 1917 was their attempt to translate the idealism of America's nineteenth century concept of "mission" into the language of the twentieth century, broaden its applicability to include the world at large, and link it to the expansion of American trade and commerce abroad. In conjunction with this, the progressives made every effort to interrelate humanitarianism abroad with reform at home.

The phrase progressive foreign policy, as this study uses the term, incorporates three basic ideas held by most of the outstanding leaders of the progressive movement. First was the conviction that America had to be militarily strong and politically and administratively efficient if she was to play a role of any importance in the competitive state system into which the Spanish war had thrust her. Second, America's ability to compete economically with other nations was related to the health and strength of her domestic economic system and the vigor of her foreign trade. It was felt that the reform, purification and expansion of the capitalist system were acts of national regeneration demanded as much by the moralistic dictates of economic democracy, justice and humanitarianism as by the specific pressures of
competitive international economics or the threat of radicalism at home. Third, the progressives believed that American ideals and practices were exportable commodities, that the American democratic dream was the property of all men. The more pure the dream at home, the greater the market for it abroad. Included among these products for export were such traditional American concepts as international peace, political and economic democracy, and the dignity of the individual. More specifically, these included the protection of the rights of private property, freedom of the seas and respect for international treaties. Convinced that international adherence to these ideals would contribute to that social, economic and political stability of man without which there could be little human progress in history, progressives joined with other Americans in the conviction that these were concepts worth fighting for and insisting upon in dealings with other nations; in fine, worthy of extension to all mankind.

Naturally, not all of the progressives either accepted or acted upon all of these axioms all of the time. But it can be demonstrated that most progressives endorsed most of these beliefs most of the time. To be sure, there was often disagreement about the means to the ends, but, in general, the idealistic and regenerative goals of American foreign policy were pursued commonly by all progressives. The burden of this study, then, is a descriptive analysis of that pursuit. Emphasis will center on the foreign policy attitudes, on specific issues, of men and women prominently identified with the progressive movement. Since progressive journals such as The Nation, The New Republic, La Follette's Weekly and the several muckraking maga-
zines concerned themselves primarily with domestic issues throughout the period under consideration, and have already many times been analyzed by the historians of American progressivism, they have been used here sparingly. Actually, the foreign policy attitudes of prolific progressive writers like Oswald Garrison Villard, Robert M. La Follette, Walter Lippmann, Herbert Croly, Lincoln Steffens, William Allen White, Walter Weyl, William Jennings Bryan and Lyman Abbott are better revealed in their private letters and in their polemical books, speeches and signed articles than in the editorial columns of the magazines and newspapers with which they were associated.

When we use the term progressive movement or progressive, we are not speaking of the rank and file Americans who voted for La Follette, Bryan, Roosevelt or Wilson. We are not dealing with the common man. Instead, we are referring to very uncommon men, to an intellectual elite leadership group of Americans who summed up in their political, literary or forensic careers the aspirations and ideals of the reform mentality. In this group it would be difficult to find two men who agreed in every particular on all major foreign policy questions that arose between 1898 and 1917. It would be more difficult to find a single progressive who accepted all of the specific domestic reform recommendations put forth during the period. Truly, the progressives were exceptionally diverse and extremely individualistic, and their varied ideas on how best to achieve and extend the American dream was a reflection of the fact that in their ranks were all sorts and conditions of men. The sophisticated and the naive, the selfless and the opportunistic, the idealistic and the cynical, all found places under
the progressive banner. But diverse as they were individually, their attitudes toward foreign policy questions demonstrate enough general patterns to warrant group analysis.

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Progressivism was ideologically related to the Greenbackism, Grangerism and Populism that swept the western plains in the 1880's and 1890's. As a reform movement it was certainly more urban, sophisticated and intellectually oriented than its agrarian predecessors. Nonetheless, it too was essentially a revolt of the middle class against the economic plutocracy and political corruption that characterized the rapid industrialization and urbanization of America during the three decades after the Civil War. If it was less wild-eyed, panacea-ridden and emotional than populism, this was because it functioned during a period of greater national prosperity than the 1890's had experienced.

The populism from which progressivism derived represented what might be termed the revolt of middle western agrarian interests against the rise of business monopolies, the arrogance of the railroads and the corrupt management of the public domain. Despite the fact that the populists liked to picture the middle western farmer as a simple, exploited yeoman on whose bowed shoulders the health of the entire economic system rested, there is suggestive evidence that the depressed farmers of the 1880's and 1890's were essentially small

1Robert M. La Follette, Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political Experiences (Madison, Wis., 1911), 18.
business men agitating for a greater share of the capitalist pudding. Populism was largely middle class in its leadership, its goals and its sectional representation in Congress. It was not a radical movement. The populists simply demanded a return to a more individualistic, egalitarian America, an America not controlled by the industrial combines, business monopolies and finance capitalism that exercised such tremendous political power. Seeking primarily to redress the imbalance between business and agriculture as it existed in the 1890's, populism was not hostile to business virtues or business values as such. As populist leader James B. Weaver expressed it in 1892, "Every force of our industrial life is hurrying on the age of combination. It is useless to try and stop the current. What we must do is in some way make it work for the good of all."

Populism, then, was a nostalgic crusade back to an America that no longer existed. It was a movement of rugged individualists who sought to tear the control of government from the grip of corrupt politicians and monopolistic financiers and bend it again to the service of the whole people. Indeed, even its dedication to economic panaceas like "free silver" was essentially an expression of hostility against the creditor classes on the part of agrarian debtors who


3Quoted in Ibid., 165; see also Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston, 1937), 11-12; Ekiroh, The Decline of American Liberalism, 160.

longed to be creditors.

Progressivism, conversely, might be regarded as a merger of the middle western populist tradition with the revolt of eastern, urban, municipal reformers against the growing crassness and corruption of monopoly capitalism run wild. Thus the progressive movement can be defined as a turn-of-the-century alliance of middle western-agrarian and eastern-urban bourgeois reform elements against the entrenched privilege and virtual plutocracy created in America by the rapid and largely unregulated growth of the industrial system after the Civil War. It might further be viewed as a political and ideological alternative both to reaction and radicalism. Created by small capitalists and businessmen who sought to change the undemocratic economic and political conditions which Big Business had created and controlled and on which revolutionary agitation was nourished, progressivism was a form of evolutionary reform, neither radical nor reactionary.

Just as populism absorbed, crystallized and gave voice to much of the economic discontent of the middle west that had manifested itself in the Greenback, Granger, Social Gospel and Single Tax movements, so it was in its own turn gathered into progressivism. First carried by William Jennings Bryan into the Democratic party in 1896, it was borrowed, revised and adapted by Theodore Roosevelt in 1902-1907 for use by moderate urban reform elements in the eastern wing of

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the Republican party. During the Roosevelt period the populist influence was also manifested in the emergence, growth and reform orientation of middle western Republican insurgency. Thus populism exercised a vital and continuing influence on the progressive movement in both major parties throughout the 1898-1917 period. As William Allen White expressed it, the progressives of the first decade of the new century "caught the Populists in swimming and stole all their clothing except the frayed underdrawers of free silver."

It must be made clear, however, that while populism and progressivism were in many ways similar, there were many differences. Both distrusted Big Business; both emphasized a form of rugged individualism; both embraced the private property concept as the bedrock of the American system. But their dissimilarities were also pronounced. In general, populism was rural and agrarian, while progressivism was urban and small-business oriented. The populists were primarily concerned with tariffs, rail rates, the elasticity of currency supply, interest rates and commission merchant fees - in sum, the problems of the agrarian entrepreneur producing for an urban domestic and world market over which he had no control. The progressive, on the other hand, was more concerned about labor and social welfare, municipal reform, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, prostitution, pure food and drug acts - in fine, the problems of the urban

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dwellers and consumer.

The progressive was much more convinced than was the populist that the federal government was the best agency through which reform might be achieved. It might be said that the progressive searched for Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means, convinced that political democracy was the sine qua non of economic democracy. The populist, on the other hand, tended to fear the growing power of the federal government and think in terms of economic democracy as the prior condition to political democracy. Thus while the populist would destroy combines and monopolies in his march back to an economically more democratic America, the progressive was more likely to accept trusts and industrial concentration as the price of a capitalist economy and seek to regulate and control them for the public good.

It seems clear that the attitudes of the progressives toward problems both domestic and foreign were conditioned significantly by the class composition and economic interests of the movement. The fact that the leadership of the progressive movement was essentially drawn from the comfortable middle class in American society cannot be overemphasized in this regard. The leading progressives were editors, lawyers, writers, educators, small businessmen, clergymen, well-to-do farmers, doctors and social workers, generally men and women with an economic and emotional stake in the perpetuation of

8Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 132-133.
American capitalism and private property concepts. The progressive leadership was not comprised of dirt farmers, industrial workers, union officials, white collar workers, big businessmen, or the managerial class of American industry. Indeed, the progressives regarded themselves as a bulwark between the extremes of capitalist plutocracy on the one hand and proletarian mobocracy on the other. As Duane Mowry expressed it in 1902, "it is to...the so-called middle class of our citizens that the reformer must chiefly look for aid and support in making operative better governmental conditions. The wealthier classes, the multi-millionaires, will not do it; the low, and ignorant and vicious cannot and should not do it."

While the progressive leadership occasionally attracted an eccentric personality like New Jersey's Alden Freeman (who mischievously smuggle anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman into a

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luncheon of the sedate Society of Mayflower Descendants), the group, on the whole, was substantial, stable, comfortable middle class. It was primarily to these people that Roosevelt spoke when he said in 1912:

We are a business people....The great mass of business is of course done by men whose business is either small or of moderate size. The middle-sized businessmen form an element of strength which is of literally incalculable value to the Nation. Taken as a class, they are among our best citizens. They have not been seekers after enormous fortunes; they have...[dealt] fairly with their customers, competitors and employees. They are satisfied with a legitimate profit....The average businessman is, as a rule, a leading citizen of his community, foremost in everything that tells for its betterment....

The progressives were indeed a solid group of citizens.

Given the class composition of its leadership, one student of progressivism has defined the movement as a bourgeois revolt for social status against the newly rich, corruptly rich, masters of the great corporations and industrial combines, men who could and did buy legislatures, franchises and political bosses like so many sacks of wheat.

The progressives were not radicals. Like that of populism, the middle-class progressive leadership simply aimed at a better distribution of the fruits of capitalism and sought to restore some measure of


15Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 131;134-135;137;139-141;218.
economic individualism and political democracy to a society gone sour under the impact of rapid industrialization and urbanization. James W. Folk, a progressive Democrat from Missouri, perhaps best expressed this feeling when he told a Democratic party banquet in St. Paul in 1911 that

Progressive democracy is constructive, not destructive. It would not array class against class, but would preserve the rights of all by causing each to respect the rights of the other. It does not attack wealth honestly acquired, but the privileges that produce tainted riches on one hand, and undeserved poverty on the other. It favors the protection of property rights, but recognizes the fact that property rights should not be inconsistent with human rights. It seeks as a remedy for existing evils more government by the people instead of less government by the people. It appeals to conscience instead of avarice, and to the common good instead of private greed.  

The progressive approach to reform was essentially pragmatic and non-theoretical. As William G. McAdoo expressed it: "I do admire political philosophy when it runs into a head-on collision with necessities. Civilization has been made, and is kept in being today, by men and women who are moved by a sense of immediacy, and who turn their hands to the constructive needs of the hour, regardless

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16 Ibid., 5; Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 252-253.
of what either political philosophers or historians may say." With pragmatism a dominant theme, it is clear that the progressive reformers had no comprehensive, theoretical blueprint for America. They were quite content to tinker with the existing machinery of society in the hope that the engine could somehow be made to run better. William Allen White pointed to the essential superficiality of progressivism in action when he recalled:

The underdog bothered us all. We were environmentalists. We believed faithfully that if we could only change the environment of the underdog, give him a decent kernel, wholesome food, regular baths, properly directed exercise, cure his mange and abolish his fleas, and put him in the blue ribbon class, all would be well. We reformers who unconsciously were sucking at the pabulum of the old Greenbackers and Grangers and Populists were intent upon making wholesome dog biscuits for the underdog. We did not know that we were merely treating the symptoms. We and all the world in those days were deeply stirred. Our sympathies were responding excitedly to a sense of injustice that had become a part of the new, glittering, gaudy machine age.18

Indeed, much of the domestic reform philosophy of both Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Wilson's New Freedom was summed up by George Creel

18William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years (New York, 1931), 306. Said Roosevelt: "No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to the way in which such work (reform) must be done; but most certainly every man, whatever his position, should strive to do it in some way and to some degree." Theodore Roosevelt, "Reform Through Social Work," McClure's, XVI (March, 1901), 454; see also Albert J. Beveridge, The Meaning of the Times (Indianapolis, 1908), 172-173, for an application of pragmatism to foreign policy problems.

19White, Autobiography, 389-390. For additional evidence on the superficiality of progressivism, see Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 205; Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (New York, 1914), 7-8; Allan Nevins, ed., The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock (New York, 1956), 1, 84. Said Whitlock: "I want to do my part to help free the cities from privilege and partisanship, and if I can see the initiative and referendum adopted, three-cent fare in Toledo, and a bill providing for non-partisan election in cities, I can quit and go back and write my books." Whitlock to Tom L. Johnson, Nov. 19, 1907, Ibid.
when he wrote that "nowhere was there any doubt as to the means of salvation." It was simply a question of kicking "the rascals out, municipal ownership, laws for the protection of labor; and the return of power to the people through the initiative, the referendum, the recall and the direct primary."

Certainly, the economic doctrines of the progressives were less than radical. Nor was there any revolutionary implication in a movement designed to make little business bigger and big business honest. Men like Herbert Croly and John Dewey, for instance, were quite willing to accept bigness in business as an inevitable stage in capitalist development. Indeed, progressives shied away from any economic theory that suggested anything more radical than a minimum amount of federal regulation of business in the interests of the whole people. Roosevelt liked to remark that his economic radicalism was of the "sane" variety, and his friend, Lyman Abbott, argued that even Jesus Christ did not condemn the amassing of wealth, only its improper social use - an observation which caused Socialist Upton Sinclair to identify the concept as a "most amazing piece of theological knavery."

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20 George Creel, Rebel at Large (New York, 1947), 50.
21 Louis Filler, Randolph Bourne (Washington, 1943), 37;62. Woodrow Wilson in his Inaugural Address in 1913 referred, almost pessimistically, to the "great industrial and social processes which men cannot alter, control, or singly cope with." Quoted in William English Walling, Progressivism - And After (New York, 1914), 150; see also Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, 276-277.
The Socialist interpretation of progressivism did not parallel the views of reform-minded Americans who believed that progressivism was in the nature of a "third force" between the extremes of irresponsible capitalism and proletarian radicalism. William English Walling, one of the most perceptive socialist critics of progressivism, interpreted the movement mainly as a revolt of the small capitalists against the large capitalists. More than a bourgeois upheaval for status, progressivism for Walling was an evolutionary revolution which would pave the way for ultimate socialism because the small capitalists had to ally themselves with the proletarians in order to displace the large capitalists. While he regarded progressivism as a collection of somewhat superficial reforms handed down to the masses by a government dominated by small capitalists, he was nonetheless enthusiastic about these reforms, and he urged socialists to support the efforts of the progressives. Yet he never regarded progressivism (which he defined as State Capitalism) as more than a milestone on the road to socialism and the achievement of real economic democracy through the abolition of private property.

The progressives, however, saw their reform movement as both an alternative and an antidote to socialism. Just as the progressive solution to plutocracy and its characteristic political corruption was "more democracy," so was their solution to socialism to be found in the achievement of a more workable capitalism.

23Walling, Progressivism - And After, vii-x; xvi-xvii; xxvi-xxvii; xxix-xxxi; 7-8; 184; 189; 195; 315; 317-318; 321-322; see also Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, 4; 309-310.
Throughout the period 1901-1917 the progressives emphasized that theirs was a movement which wholly transcended class. With monotonous repetitiousness they argued that America was traditionally classless and that the approach to reform in the United States had never followed class lines. Indeed, they pointed with horror to the growth of classes and class consciousness and warned of impending revolution unless progressive reforms were quickly achieved. E. A. Ross had this in mind when he wrote that "Unless democracy mends the distribution of wealth, the mal-distribution of wealth will end democracy." S. J. Duncan-Clarke expressed it another way when he predicted that "if the philosophy and programme of the Progressive movement are rejected I can see no escape from an ultimate drawing of the issue directly between the workers and the owners, between labor and capital."

Progressive apprehensiveness about socialism and class struggle was undoubtedly exaggerated. True, socialism experienced its greatest growth in the United States between 1900 and 1912, but its appeal was largely confined to urban areas where large numbers


of Americans of Jewish, Russian and German extraction resided. While some contemporary observers viewed American socialism as simply another means to the reform end, emphasizing its bourgeois leadership and its willingness to soften its revolutionary class appeal under the impact of American conditions, the fact remains that socialism had virtually no appeal for the populist or progressive leadership element. On the contrary, they rejected it as turgid and dogmatic, wholly in conflict with the private property basis of American democracy which the bourgeois reform element sought so vigorously to preserve.

The progressives' concept of the role of the state in the reform process is also important to any analysis of the progressive movement. Many progressives insisted that lasting reforms could only be achieved by a proliferation of the powers of the state and federal government. In general, the middle western progressives, steeped as they were in the agrarian populist tradition, thought in more narrow terms of urban and state governments as ultimate reform agencies, whereas eastern progressives tended to rely more on the role of the federal government. Both were agreed, however, that only through

29Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, 276-277.
public agencies as powerful as either the national or state govern-
ments could the people hope to achieve control of the corrupt forces
that threatened to convert America into a private club for Big Busi-
ness and Bossism. Indeed, the faith remained strong among progres-
sives that through the instrumentalities of government, at whatever
level it operated, the millennium could be legislated into existence.

But the fact that some problems transcended solution at the
state level, as well as the fact that state legislatures were more
easily corrupted than the national legislature, produced growing sup-
port for the opinion Roosevelt expressed in 1906: "I am not," he
said, "a believer that very much can be done in matters that concern
the entire Nation by the individual action of the States....while I
am a Jeffersonian in my genuine faith in democracy and popular gov-
ernment, I am a Hamiltonian in my governmental views, especially
with reference to the need for the exercise of broad powers by the
30 National Government." Some progressives, like Herbert Croly and
Henry L. Stimson, were even willing to deny the whole constitutional
concept of checks and balances, particularly the separation of legis-
lative and executive powers, and adopt instead an efficient, highly
centralized, paternalistic, Bismarckian state the expert leadership
of which would determine and hand down social and economic reforms

30. Roosevelt to William Plumer Potter, April 23, 1906, Roosevelt Let-
ters, V, 216-217. For similar views see De Witt, The Progres-
sive Movement, 15-16;23-25;4-5; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and
the Progressive Movement, 10-11.
in the interest of all the people. As one progressive put it in 1916: "We have gained a great deal through the adoption of German economic and social principles and methods, and we would gain more by adopting others. The nation would be immensely benefited by pattern after the marvelous economic, industrial, and military organization of the German Empire."

While it may be argued that many progressives were willing to embrace a paternalistic Bismarkian state and risk possible limitations on individual freedom in the interest of the immediate alleviation of social injustice, hindsight demonstrates the proposition that the main liberties which the progressives sought to deny the individual were the rights to exploit, monopolize and corrupt. True, many progressives were impressed with and influenced by the smooth efficiency of German political institutions, but it seems clear that the primary task the progressives set for themselves was to gain control of the instrumentalities of government and replace undemocratic forces with those responsive to the will of the people. Thus there was nothing implicitly authoritarian or dangerously Germanic in Lyman Abbott's belief that "the remedy for the ills of dep-

31Ekirch, The Decline of American Liberalism, 188; Stimson, On Active Service, 59;61-62. Hiram Johnson argued that the traditional theory of government by checks and balances was really a denial of popular government. Mowry, The California Progressives, 149. Or as Frank Munsey put it, "It is the work of the state to think for the people and plan for the people - to teach them how to do, what to do, and to sustain them in the doing." Quoted in Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 212.
33Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 6-7; Ekirch, The Decline of American Liberalism, 188-192.
mocracy is more democracy," or the view of Duncan-Clarke that "the heart of man never beats more truly in accord with the heart of God than when he turns his hand in sympathy and help to his weaker brother." Progressivism may have been a form of democratic paternalism, but the emphasis was always on the democratic. Indeed, initiative, referendum and recall remained the three wise men of progressive theology throughout the 1898-1917 period.

Closely related to the concept of democratic paternalism was the progressives' belief in strong executive leadership, and the idea of forceful executive direction, whether at the municipal, state or national level, was an integral element in progressive political philosophy. It incorporated an almost abiding faith in the efficacy of a leadership elite comprised of legislative and administrative experts. Something of this was revealed in Toledo in 1904. Reform mayor "Golden Rule" Jones had died, and Brand Whitlock remarked to Tom Johnson, Cleveland reform mayor, that with Jones gone the people of Toledo were helpless in the face of the monopolists. "They're sheep without a shepherd!" said Whitlock. No, replied Johnson, "you're the shepherd." Roosevelt perhaps expressed it more comprehensively in 1912 when he said:

We, the people, rule ourselves, and what we really want from our representatives is that they shall manage the Government for us along the lines we lay down, and shall do this with efficiency and in good faith...we are content to let experts do the expert business to which we

34Abbott, Reminiscences, 446; Duncan-Clarke, The Progressive Movement, 289.
assign them without fussy interference from us. But the expert must understand that he is carrying out our general purpose and not substituting his own for it. The leader must understand that he leads us, that he guides us, by convincing us so that we will follow him or follow his direction.36

III

These progressive attitudes toward capitalism, radicalism, nationalism, paternalism and executive leadership all played an important role in the determination of progressive outlooks on foreign policy. These viewpoints were in turn conditioned by both the class composition and economic interests of the movement, a fact which in part explains why progressive foreign policy ideology had such a strong economic and commercial flavor. As a business-oriented group, the progressive leadership was vitally interested in the economic foreign policy of the United States. Indeed, it will be argued in the following chapters that they generally supported policies designed to extend American commerce and investment capital abroad. Specific analyses of the relationship of leading progressives to turn-of-the-century American imperialism, Dollar Diplomacy, the tariff controversy, Canadian reciprocity, merchant marine and naval expansion, and, after 1914, America’s asserted right to trade with belligerents in wartime, will demonstrate this point.

Foreign commerce, then, was a paramount consideration, and throughout the period 1898-1917 progressives in both political

parties worried about the advent of what Woodrow Wilson designated as "sharp struggles for foreign trade." Even the socialists pointed with both horror and hope to the approach of an Unconsumed Surplus (convinced that the imbalance between production and consumption would eventually wreck American capitalism), while Single Taxers and other economic reformers urged Henry George's idealistic view that lower tariffs and free trade would not only increase American exports but would serve as the "extinguisher of war, the eradicator of prejudice, the diffuser of knowledge."

37 Harley Hotter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore, 1937), 144.

38 Caro Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1847-1908: A Biography (New York, 1912), II, 167; Charles Edward Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, Some Recollections of a Side-Line Reformer (New York, 1933), 215; Henry George, Protection or Free Trade in The Complete Works of Henry George (New York, 1904), IV, 52. Henry George seems to have had an influence on the domestic and foreign policy attitudes of many leading progressives. His views on free trade and commercial expansion, his hostility toward socialism, his conviction that monopoly capitalism was at the root of mankind's woes, his belief (although he was a professed pacifist) that force might legitimately be used to secure social justice, his abiding hatred of militarism and autocracy, and his faith in the coming "federation of the world" might be cited in this connection. See Ibid., 322; 502-305; 325-326; 306-307; 327-329; 40; Henry George, Jr., The Life of Henry George in The Complete Works of Henry George, X, 344-345; Eklirch, The Decline of American Liberalism, 160. For the general impact of Georgism on populism and progressivism see Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, 96-97; Noble, New Jersey Progressivism Before Wilson, 14-16; 92-93; 107-108; Thomas L. Johnson, My Story (New York, 1911), 63; 68-69; 110; Henry George, Jr., The Life of Henry George, 571-574. For the influence of Georgism on individual progressives who later urged commercial expansion, the use of war to secure social justice and the various league of nations proposals, see Edward A. Ross, Seventy Years of It: An Autobiography (New York, 1936), 15; 24; Baker, American Chronicles, 87-88; Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 7; 94-95; Cresh, Rebel at Large, 47-48; Kent, William Kent, 292; Irving Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense (Garden City, N.Y., 1941), 27; Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 24, 51; 55.
The felt relationship between a dynamic capitalism and foreign trade convinced many progressives, particularly those in the Republican party, that large concentrations of capital were a national necessity. Charles R. Van Hise, for example, pointed out that while domestic trusts and combines should be controlled and regulated by the federal government they should not be destroyed. "The United States," he said, "cannot successfully compete in the world market without large industrial units." While progressive Democrats were more inclined to break up the trusts and rely on lower tariffs and reciprocity treaties to stimulate exports, the fact remains that the willingness of many progressives to accept trusts (however well regulated) as the sine qua non of international economic competition again suggests that progressivism was essentially a protest, not against capitalism itself, but against the malfunctioning of the capitalist system in the interests of a corrupt, powerful few.

The menace of domestic radicalism also persuaded many progressives to support economic foreign policies designed to increase commerce, export capital and penetrate foreign markets. All of these measures, it was hoped, would forestall the approaching Unconsumed Surplus and contribute to the prevention of the overproduction and resulting economic stagnation on which radicalism nourished. Democrat Henry Watterson, the Kentucky publisher so instrumental in the

39 Charles R. Van Hise, Concentration and Control (New York, 1912), 224; see also Brown, Lyman Abbott, 179.
40 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 210; 213; 239; DeWitt, The Progressive Movement, 46-47; Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, 310-311.
Wilson boom for the Presidency, interpreted the advent of imperialism in 1898 with this very thought in mind:

From a nation of shopkeepers we become a nation of warriors. We escape the menace and peril of socialism and agrarianism, as England escaped them, by a policy of colonization and conquest. From a provincial huddle of petty sovereignties held together by a rope of sand we rise to the dignity and prowess of an imperial republic incomparably greater than Rome. It is true that we exchange domestic dangers for foreign dangers; but in every direction we multiply the opportunities of the people. We risk caesarism, certainly; but even caesarism is preferable to anarchism. We risk wars; but a man has but one time to die.41

Indeed, so strong was the commercial expansion theme in progressivism that those middle western progressives who opposed Wilson's insistence on freedom of the seas separated themselves from the great majority of progressives on the issue. In their arguments for arms embargo and commercial isolation from Europe, they adopted viewpoints which paralleled socialist and German-American interpretations of the war and America's relationship to it. While there was a soft spot in the middle western progressive heart for German social and administrative efficiency, particularly in Wisconsin, most progressives in the United States regarded the Reich

41Quoted in Richard B. Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in Daniel Aaron, ed., America in Crisis (New York, 1982), 196. "When you come to diagnose the country's internal ills," wrote a Texas Congressman to Sect. of State Richard Olney at the time of the 1895 Venezuela crisis, "the possibilities of 'blood and iron' loom up immediately....just think how angry the anarchist, socialist and populist boil appears on our political surface....one cannon shot across the bow of a British boat...will knock more pus out of it than would suffice to inoculate and corrupt our people for the next two centuries." Ibid., 178; see also Eikrich, The Decline of American Liberalism, 189-193; Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 89-91.
as the "war criminal" in the European conflict. Thus middle western progressive advocacy of commercial isolationism from Europe and opposition to Wilson's pro-British form of neutrality was seen by other progressives, particularly those in the east, as an endorsement of German autocracy and aggression. Partly as a result of this there was, after 1914, a steady decline in the status and influence of those we shall call the "La Follette progressives."

Still another factor which influenced progressive foreign policy attitudes throughout the 1898-1917 period was the belief in racial superiority held by many progressives. The progressive movement was strictly a "lily-white" affair, and at no time did the progressive concept of domestic reform embrace any great effort to improve the lot of the American Negro. On the contrary, one progressive could boast in 1913 that the Roosevelt Progressive party bore "no stain upon its record caused by attempting to force the political recognition of an inferior race upon an unwilling and superior people." Ironically, the American progressive tended to be much more concerned with improving the condition of his "little brown brother" in the Philippines and in Latin America than he was with facing up to the Negro problem on his own doorstep.

42Ross, Changing America, 4-6; White, Autobiography, 326; Roosevelt to Hamlin Garland, July 19, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 521; Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 7; DeWitt, The Progressive Movement, 44; Walling, Progressivism - And After, 377; 387-389.
While the importance of the racial element in progressivism should not be overemphasized, it is probable that the diplomatic approach of the United States with Great Britain during and after 1898 was encouraged in part by a widespread faith in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and destiny, a faith fully shared by American progressives. Even in populism there was an element of paternalistic superiority toward all non-Anglo-Saxon peoples. Among the progressives this took the form of "missionary" diplomacy in backward areas and hostility to uncontrolled immigration. In this connection it will be pointed out that fear of oriental immigration influenced many progressives in their support of the navalism of the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, while the idealistic, uplift diplomacy of Wilson and Bryan in Caribbean America bore the imprint of the felt need of progressives to extend Anglo-American political institutions to the less fortunate Latin races.

In this sense it seems clear that the political paternalism manifested so strongly in domestic progressivism carried over into progressive foreign policy attitudes as a feeling of American superiority, American "mission" and American obligation to carry democ-

44Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 61; 78; 80-85. In her book, The Problem of Civilization Solved, published in 1895, populist propagandist Mary E. Lease of Kansas filled her pages with assumptions of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and paternalistic benevolence toward inferior races. This led her to advocate American annexation of Canada, Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo and Hawaii as steps toward creating a United States-dominated federation of American republics. Not only would this Federation provide superior leadership and guidance for the backward Latin races, but it would serve as a counter-weight to the expansion of the Russian and British empires. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 83-85.
cracy to the world's backward, "inferior" and downtrodden peoples. Conversely, it might be argued that something of the paternalistic quality of 1898-1900 imperialism took root in the "shepherd-sheep" relationship so pronounced in progressive political theory. In any event, an element of American paternalism and egocentricism is clearly to be seen in the Caribbean diplomacy of Roosevelt, Bryan and Wilson.

The emphasis on executive leadership in progressive political theory influenced the foreign policy attitudes of the movement in several ways. In the first place, Roosevelt's belief in the importance of strong executive direction in government was not unrelated to his use of the executive agreement as a legitimate technique of American diplomacy. The Taft-Katsura, Root-Takahira and Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan, as well as his muscular policy in Santo Domingo, all characterized the Rough Rider's employment of the executive power to achieve limited foreign policy goals without recourse to the treaty-making function of the Senate. Likewise, Wilson's ready use of personal diplomatic agents, particularly John Lind and Colonel House, and his willingness, as Commander-in-Chief, to dispatch United States marines to police the Caribbean, attest further to the importance of the cult of leadership in American diplomacy during the progressive period.

But more importantly, the views of the dominant political leaders of the movement like Bryan, Roosevelt, Wilson and La Follette served as focal points for progressive foreign policy attitudes. Their opinions became those of large blocks of rank and file progres-
sives, and their announced positions on foreign policy questions were often ex cathedra pronouncements for their followers. Much of this loyalty might be explained in terms of partisan political necessities and the pressures of political factionalism within the major parties. Certainly, any study of progressive foreign policy ideology that does not relate the attitudes of the progressive to practical political considerations would be incomplete, because differences among progressives in their foreign policy views frequently turned on the opinions of the commanding political personalities in the movement. In this sense, the emphasis on leadership in progressive political theory tended to be a divisive rather than cohesive force among progressives in so far as foreign policy was concerned. Basically, it contributed to the projection of complex diplomatic questions into the give and take and oversimplifications of partisan politics since the leaders of the progressive movement consistently made foreign policy problems the subject of political appeals.

Specifically, the leadership emphasis in progressivism helped to crystallize the foreign policy attitudes of the progressives around three main politico-ideological axes. From 1900 to 1912 it is correct to speak of "progressive Democrats" and "progres-

45 The practical political element in progressivism was always in the foreground. While ideals were important, so were votes, a fact compounded by the basic political approach of the progressives to reform. See especially Croly, Progressive Democracy, 1-2; Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 140; Baker, American Chronicle, 253; Flint, The Progressive Movement in Vermont, 54-56;105; Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 249-250.

46 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 271-274.
sive Republicans" since each party had, or was developing, a distinct progressive element within it. But under the schismatic impact of the election of 1912 and the commencement of war in Europe in 1914, it becomes more proper to speak of "La Follette progressives," "Roosevelt Progressives" and "Wilson progressives." A fourth group, those progressives in the G.O.P. who refused to follow Roosevelt into the splinter party, divided their allegiance between La Follette, Roosevelt and Wilson after 1912 and had no separate ideological identity on foreign policy questions. They will be called "progressive Republicans."

The smallest and least influential of these three factions was the La Follette wing of progressivism. It reflected the greatest degree of middle western isolationist, populist, socialist and German-American influence. On foreign policy its orientation was pacifistic, isolationist and Anglophobe, characteristics that were manifest most strongly after 1914 in its attitudes toward the European war, peace, military preparedness and wartime commerce. This group will also be designated as the "peace progressives," since pacifism played an important role in its thinking.

The Roosevelt Progressives were composed mainly of eastern reform-minded Republicans. There were, however, some middle western and western liberal Republicans in the group. All were intensely loyal to the Colonel, following him into the schismatic Progressive party in 1912 and returning with him to the G.O.P. in 1916.

The Wilson progressives, on the other hand, were almost all Democrats. They came mainly from the middle west, upper south and
and northeast. Some of them, particularly those middle western agrarians who had followed Bryan in 1896 and 1900, worked closely with the La Follette peace progressive faction after 1914, creating what will be called "Bryan-La Follette progressivism," but the overwhelming majority of progressive Democrats followed Wilson's lead on foreign policy questions from 1913 to 1917.

Both the Wilson and Roosevelt groups represented the eastern and urban sector of the progressive movement to a greater extent than the agrarian middle west. Both were Anglophile, both regarded Germany as a "war criminal," both believed that world peace could only be attained and maintained by force, both favored freedom of the seas and differential neutrality, both supported military preparedness and commercial expansion. They differed mainly on the degree of military preparedness, and, most importantly, on the principle of collective security. On the latter point, the Roosevelt Progressives took a strong nationalistic, non-participationist line, while the Wilson progressives favored an internationalist viewpoint. Despite these differences, however, differences magnified by the electoral pressures of 1914 and 1916, the Roosevelt and Wilson factions were closer to each other in attitude than either was to the La Follette group. Thus this study will suggest that the foreign policy attitudes of the Roosevelt and Wilson progressives dominated and characterized the views of the progressive movement - so much so that by early 1917 the La Follette-Bryan persuasion was little more than a dissident cry on the periphery of the main body of progressive thought.
In sum, the central theme in progressive foreign policy ideology was "expansion." Not territorial expansion so much as the extension of American political institutions into backward areas; the superimposition of American democratic ideals and values on backward peoples and "inferior" races; the extension of American morality and Good Samaritanism into international politics; the projection abroad of America's faith in the achievement and enforceability of lasting international peace; and the expansion of American trade and commerce into world markets. Humanistic, idealistic, moralistic, capitalistic and paternalistic, these attitudes ultimately required the use of varying degrees of force and pressure to gain for them a measure of acceptance abroad. As a result, from 1898 to 1917, they contributed to American participation in two wars and several armed interventions. But in spite of this, most of the progressive leadership, and most Americans, embraced these attitudes more readily than they did the pacifism and isolationism of the La Follette-Bryan outlook on world affairs.

IV

In the interest of historical perspective, it is important

to consider expansionist progressive foreign policy attitudes as but one facet of the progressive movement as a whole. While this study emphasizes foreign policy, a degree of historical balance might be assured if the progressive movement is regarded as a phenomenon of four interrelated, overlapping phases. Progressive foreign policy concepts comprise only one of these four phases.

The first phase of progressivism began shortly before the turn of the century and was confined primarily to municipal reform. In cities as widespread as Chicago, San Francisco, Cleveland, Toledo and New York dedicated reformers like Tom Johnson, "Golden Rule" Jones, Brand Whitlock, Jane Addams, Charles R. Crane, Fremont Older, Josiah Strong and others began the fight for commission government, better prisons, the abolition of prostitution, honest police forces, lower transit fares, and the municipal control of transportation, power and water. Their goals were simple and straightforward: to displace the urban political boss and break the back of the municipal political corruption by which a favored few exercised monopolistic strangleholds on the economic life of the city. In sum, the municipal reformers sought to achieve economic democracy through political democracy; to control at the urban level the unbridled laissez-faire that exploited the people in the name of free enterprise. The appearance in 1898 of such organizations as the League

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But the municipal reformers, however successful, were at best treating the symptoms of a disease that not infrequently had its root and origin at the state capital. The reform movement at the state level reflected a growing recognition of this fact, and undertook to attack the problem at the higher source. Thus state reform represents the second phase of the progressive movement. It drew much of its scope and orientation from the urban reformers, and it operated concurrently with and parallel to municipal uplift. As early as 1897-1900 Governor Hazen Pingree of Michigan, a former reform mayor of Detroit, had urged the direct election of United States Senators, direct primaries, the regulation of lobbying, the eight-hour working day and the state regulation of railroad rates and trusts. His attacks on venial public utility companies and railroad-corrupted state legislatures both dramatized and anticipated the progressive attack at the state level.

By 1901 reform governors Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, Samuel R. Van Sant of Minnesota, Albert B. Cummins of Iowa and Herbert Hadley of Missouri had all been elected to office. And by 1902-1905 the "Oregon System," La Follette's "Wisconsin Idea," Cummins' "Iowa Idea" and the so-called "New Idea" of George Record and

Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 30; Straus, Under Four Administrations, 121-122.
others in New Jersey characterized the State House expression of economic democracy via political democracy. From 1901 to 1913 state laws dealing with initiative, referendum, recall, workmen's compensation, minimum wages, commission government for cities, lobbying, maximum hours, corrupt business and political practices, child labor, and public health and safety were placed on the books from Maine, Vermont and Ohio to Wisconsin, Iowa, Oregon and California. Gradually, state government was seen to have a direct responsibility for the general welfare of its people.

Much of the public interest in the success of the reform movement at the municipal and state level can be attributed to the vigor of the muckrakers. Muckraking was a middle-class enterprise, a movement of bourgeois reformers and writers who hoped that journalistic exposure of rottenness and corruption in American life would result in public demand for reform. Believing that American institutions were basically sound, the muckrakers had no blueprint for a new America, no constructive or radical program to offer.

Their approach was negative, but their books, pamphlets and articles threw a searching light on everything corrupt from the "Senatorial Brotherhood of Barkers' Footmen" to the machinations of the trusts and the urban transit rings. The immense popularity of the work


52 Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 156-157; Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 142-143; Baker, American Chronicle, 195-196.
"good form to be a liberal," and in this sense the muckrake move-
ment contributed significantly to establishing the middle class scope
and leadership of progressivism. Not only did the literature of ex-
posure alert America to the need for reform and stimulate reform at
the state level, it also produced demands for reform at the federal
level.

Important to the student of progressive foreign policy at-
titudes is the parenthetical fact that the muckrakers did not criti-
cize American diplomacy or the main instrumentalities of foreign pol-
icy. Save for David Graham Phillips' influential Treason of the Sen-
ate, the muckrakers did not attack the federal government or the
Chief Executive. The State Department and the Navy emerged virtual-
ly unscathed. Even the so-called "Powder Trust" received only pe-
ripheral attention during the muckrake period. Actually, most of
the Republican critics of the status quo in America (Lyman Abbott,
William Allen White, S. S. McClure) were ardent supporters of Roo-
sevelt's Square Deal as well as his Big Stick. Likewise, reformers
with Democratic leanings, men like Ray Stannard Baker, Will Irwin
and Louis D. Brandeis, subsequently supported the "missionary" di-
plomacy of Woodrow Wilson. In sum, men who contributed to the lit-
erature of protest preferred the Roosevelt-Wilson foreign policy

53 Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 250.
54 Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era (New York,
1932), 223-224, 233.
orientation to that of Bryan and La Follette.

The muckrake movement was not planned. On the contrary, it
began rather accidentally with the January, 1903, issue of McClure's
Magazine in which Ray Stannard Baker, Lincoln Steffens and Ida M.
Tarbell published articles critical of Big Business handling of the
Pennsylvania coal strike, municipal corruption in Minneapolis, and
the social insensitivity of the Standard Oil Company. The commer-
cial success of McClure's, combined with the public interest generated
by the expose approach, encouraged other journals to take up the cru-
sade, notably Collier's, American, Everybody's, Outlook and Cosmopol-
itan. The movement reached a peak in 1906-1908, waned during the op-
timistic insurgent ferment of the Taft Administration, peaked again
in 1911, and declined steadily after 1912. Despite La Follette's
assertion that "there must always be muckrakers as long as there are
muckmakers," the decline of muckraking after 1912 paralleled the
decline of the approach to reform at the state level.

Thus by 1912-1913 both muckraking and the state phase of
progressivism had largely run their course. In the first place, re-
forms placed on the books in the various states had progressively
minimized the social and political usefulness of muckraking; such
laws had also in large measure fulfilled the limited scope of reform
at the state level. Secondly, almost every conceivable corruption

55 Baker, American Chronicle, 167-169; S. S. McClure, My Autobiogra-
phy (New York, 1914), 246.
56 Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 175-178;194-195; Chamberlain,
Farewell to Reform, 127-128;140-141.
57 La Follette, Autobiography, 254.
had been exposed to the point of monotony. Finally, and most importantly, state-level progressivism had by 1912-1913 generally lost its forward motion because of its piecemeal approach to what was increasingly viewed as a national problem. In sum, by 1913 the frontier of the progressive movement had clearly shifted to the national level.

But progressivism's third phase, federal reform, actually began as early as 1906 when it became apparent to many that social reform was properly the business of the federal government. The corruptability of many state legislatures combined with popular disillusionment over the effectiveness and practical workability of state reforms already written into law, conspired to stimulate demands for federal reform. Thus, beginning with the second Roosevelt Administration and continuing through 1914, a quantity of reform legislation ranging from the Hepburn Act to the Clayton Anti-Trust Act sought to reform and democratize America and achieve more of the good life for more Americans through the instrumentalities of the federal government. Coincident with municipal and state reform, drawing support and direction from both, the urge to reform at the national level provided not only a safe and sane alternative to a more radical expression of popular discontent, but for the progressive leadership it proved to be exceedingly good politics. Whether identified as Roosevelt's Square Deal or New Nationalism, or Wilson's New Freedom, there were votes to be had in reform. As La Follette frankly ex-

pressed it on one occasion, "Give us this law [direct primary] and we can hold this state forever." Or as Wilson viewed it: "If somebody could draw together the liberal elements of both parties in this country he could build up a party which could not be beaten in a generation, for the very reason that we would all join it."

Conversions of individuals to progressivism were often gradual and reluctant, as the testimony of men like Beveridge, White, Norris, Straus and Ray Stannard Baker attest. But between 1906 and 1909 the progressive trickle became a flood. To the Senate from the middle and far west came Dixon, Borah, Brown, Bourne, Cummins, Crawford and Bristow, joining forces there with La Follette, Nelson, Doolittle, Clapp and Beveridge. To the House came Poindexter, Gronna, Murdock, Madison, Lindbergh, Norris and Kendall, adding their voices and votes to the corporal's guard of progressives already on the Washington scene - men like Crumpacker, Kinkaid, Lovering, Mondell, Parsons, Fowler and Hayes. The founding of the Federation of Democratic Precinct Clubs in 1909 and the National Progressive Republican League in 1909 demonstrated the bipartisan quality of the move-

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60 Quoted in Baker, American Chronicle, 253.
Fertilized by the Payne-Aldrich tariff fight and the Bellinger-Pinchot controversy, the progressive movement in the Republican party matured rapidly in the period 1909-1911. But the suicidal La Follette-Roosevelt struggle for the Republican nomination in 1911-1912, coupled with the emergence of the Progressive party and the resultant victory of Wilson over a divided G.O.P. in 1912, marked a shift in the political and sectional control of the progressive movement from the G.O.P. to the Democracy, from the middle west to the east, facts which had an important bearing on subsequent progressive foreign policy attitudes and activities.

The quantity and quality of Wilsonian reform legislation in 1913-1914 achieved many of the outstanding demands of the progressives for federal intervention in the social, political and economic life of the people, and Wilson's domestic reform record was clearly instrumental in the 1916 success of the Democracy over a re-united Republican party. Yet save for a brief legislative reform spurt in 1916 (not unrelated to the electoral pressures of that year), the positive achievements of the Wilson Administration, coun-

63. The Democratic Precinct Clubs was formed for the express purpose of enabling "the progressive Democrats of the country to control the party organization...and thereby place in office...a progressive Presidential nominee," whereas the National Progressive Republican League called somewhat more specifically for direct election of senators, direct primaries, direct election of convention delegates, abolition of the elective college, initiative, referendum, recall and corrupt political practices acts. See The Federation of Democratic Precinct Clubs of the U.S.A. (n.p., n.d.), 1-16; and Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, 281-282; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 172-173.
pled with growing popular indifference toward the emotionalism of reform agitation and an increasing interest on the part of progressives in United States foreign policy, minimized demands for further federal reform measures after 1914. Thus was the third phase of progressivism virtually completed by late 1914.

The onset of the European war increasingly turned the attention of progressives away from matters predominantly domestic in scope. Contributing to this shift in emphasis was Roosevelt's attempt to hold the disintegrating Progressive party together after its debacle in the Congressional elections of 1914. The Bull Moose search for new issues in the field of foreign policy to replace the domestic issues preempted by the Wilson progressives took the form of vigorous attacks on Wilson's diplomacy in Panama, Mexico and toward the European belligerents. Charging an alleged lack of muscular righteousness in Wilson's foreign policy that compromised American idealism and uplift abroad, Roosevelt made every effort to impart to the Progressive party a new ideological orientation, internal solidarity...

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64 Baker, Wilson, V, 77; Belle Case and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette (New York, 1953), I, 502-503; Ross, Seventy Years of It, 97.
and political appeal so that the inevitable reentry of the Bull Moose into the G.O.P. might be negotiated on a basis of relative equality between the progressive and standpat elements.

Just as the reform movement on the municipal level was absorbed into the movement at the state level, which in turn merged with the progressive crusade at the federal level, so, after 1914, was the national expression of progressivism increasingly internationalized. In fine, the fourth phase of American progressivism was an attempt to extend the American reform ideology into the world at large. Making Toledo or New Jersey or the United States safe for democracy had its logical expression in making Cuba, Mexico, Haiti and ultimately the whole world safe for democracy. But just as the municipal, state and federal reform phases overlapped in chronology and scope, so did the idea of international reform operate concurrently with local, state and national progressivism from the turn of the century until 1917. Whether they concerned themselves with Cuba Libre, the Philippines, Panama, Navalism, Commercial Expansion, Caribbean Imperialism, Military Preparedness or Intervention in the World War, progressives explained, rationalized and urged foreign policies consistent with the commercialism, humanitarianism and paternalistic idealism of the domestic reform mentality.

Only in late 1914, however, did the foreign policy phase of progressivism come predominantly to the fore. Federal reform, given its limited, tinker-with-the-machinery approach had achieved
about all it could reasonably be expected to achieve. Further, political realism among progressive Democrats dictated a shift in emphasis from domestic affairs to foreign affairs as the intensity of Theodore Roosevelt’s attack on Wilson’s diplomacy increased. Most important, however, the behavior of Germany in Belgium and on the high seas, and the bloody career of Mexico’s Victoriano Huerta, completely overshadowed, in the militancy and audacity of their immorality, the comparatively minor corruptions progressives had long struggled against at the municipal, state and national levels.

It will not be overstating the case, then, when we suggest in this study that Wilson’s economic foreign policy toward Germany, his missionary diplomacy in Mexico and the Caribbean and his concern with military preparedness and the achievement of a lasting peace—and even Bull Moose criticism of his diplomatic methods as timid and halting—consistently revealed the operation of the reform mentality in contact with international problems. Thus, in the final analysis, the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson as well as Bull Moose attacks on it, were basically dichotomous but complementary facets of the fourth phase of the progressive movement.

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67 How, Confessions of a Reformer, 249-250; Martin W. Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson (Minneapolis, 1926), 294; Baker, American Chronicle, 296; Norman Hapgood, The Advancing Hour (New York, 1920), 240. Wilson failed rather badly in the areas of woman suffrage and race relations, and there were some progressives, like Herbert Croly, who felt that the reform legislation achieved was not comprehensive enough. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 54-80.

68 Henry L. Stimson dates this shift in emphasis in May, 1915, with the sinking of the Lusitania. Stimson, On Active Service, 78.
By mid-1915 the foreign policy phase of progressivism was clearly ascendant. When the German army slugged its way across the Belgium frontier in August, 1914, the evolutionary metamorphosis of national progressivism toward international progressivism was sharply stimulated. Indeed, in the words of one progressive who looked across the sea in the fall of 1914, a whole new garden was opening to ideological pollination by American reformers:

A great body of Americans have not yet definitely aligned themselves with either element [in the war]. Perhaps some will never awaken to the struggle. Many people are dissatisfied with things as they are but there is no general agreement as to whither we should go. The country is a leviathan, a blind giant, wandering about almost aimlessly. The old material ambition to grow big and strong still survives, when its need has long been served....we are in a transition period and have not yet agreed on a new national purpose....There are those who hope and believe that ultimately American sentiment will crystallize into a desire to work for the betterment of all men by securing for all men, as near as may be, equal opportunity without favor to some or handicap to others. Perhaps the experiment is worth trying, for it would be forwarding the work begun by the Fathers.69

For better or for worse, the "betterment of all men" perhaps best characterizes a primary aim and ambition of progressives in the foreign policy field. It was, after all, a "work begun by the Fathers." Thus with one eye on the heroic era of American history and the other on the coming dawn of a new world order based on American ideals, the progressive leadership in 1917 marched to a war which would finally end all war, make the world safe for democracy, and uphold the rights and dignity of man on the high seas and throughout the world.

69Paul L. Haworth, America in Ferment (Indianapolis, 1915), 10-11.
CHAPTER I

THE IMPERIAL YEARS

The war with Spain in 1898 was truly a people's war. Perhaps no other war in American history was as popular or commanded as much genuine enthusiasm as the crusade to free the Cubans from Spanish colonial despotism. Whatever the later and broader consequences of the conflict, the stated aims of the United States government in Cuba were selfless and idealistic, and the American people were wholeheartedly dedicated to the liberation and uplifting of the embattled islanders. The popularity of the war was confined to no political or ideological group in the United States. It had no particular sectional or class orientation. On the contrary, it was a war with almost universal emotional appeal.

The evidence is strong, however, that the enthusiasm for battle was particularly intense among those Americans who were destined to play leading roles in the great reform movement that dominated the American domestic scene from 1901 to 1917. The view presented here is that leading American progressives, in the years immediately preceding their identification with the progressive movement, vigorously supported the crusade for Cuba Libre. Further, many embryonic progressives, primarily those in the Republican party, also embraced the larger imperialist program that looked toward Hawaiian and Philippine annexation, commercial expansion into Asian markets, and the extension of American democratic institutions into the backward areas of the world.

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To be sure, partisanship and party regularity played a dominant role in the polarization of attitude on the questions of expansion and imperialism in 1898-1900, and the positions taken on these issues by the future leaders of progressivism were as often related to the realities of the ballot box as they were to abstract, ideological principles. Nonetheless, political motives aside, the war with Spain and the territorial expansion that followed in its wake demanded and received explanations and rationalizations that helped produce a preliminary outline of those foreign policy attitudes subsequently associated with progressive leadership.

II

The revolt of the Cubans against Spain in 1895 commanded widespread attention in the United States. The revolutionary cry "Cuba Libre!" struck a responsive note among Americans. Identifying the revolt as a struggle for political independence against a despotic colonial regime, the Cuba Libre slogan appealed to the most basic emotional and idealistic traditions of American history. Americans saw in the uprising a reflection of their own revolutionary heritage and an image of their own historical past.

Thus American sympathy went out to the Cubans in increasing measure as General Valeriano Weyler slowly crushed the rebellion. By the simple but brutal expedient of herding much of the Cuban rural population into concentration camps, "Butcher" Weyler successfully broke the bond between the rebels and the agrarian countryside that sustained the revolution. While this iron policy was a tactical tri-
umph, the thousands of Cuban men, women and children who died in the disease-ridden camps further stimulated American sympathy and indignation and soon encouraged shrill demands for United States intervention.

Unfortunately for the Cubans, however, the growing expression of moral outrage in the United States was blunted during the summer and fall of 1896 by the competing drama of one of America's most significant and exciting presidential campaigns. While Congress recognized a state of Cuban belligerency in April, 1896, and both parties declared in favor of Cuba Libre in their platforms, the election focused on the overriding domestic issues of debtors, creditors and free silver. Only with the returns in and Republican William McKinley elected over Nebraska's Democrat-Populist, William Jennings Bryan, did public attention again center on Cuba. Much to the dismay of Americans who saw the Cuban revolt as a significant blow for human freedom, Weyler had virtually crushed the uprising. When, in October, 1897, a liberal Spanish ministry came to power in Madrid, recalled Weyler, and granted the islanders a degree of political autonomy, the Cuban problem seemed settled.

The insurrectos, however, refused to be purchased with the half-loaf of political autonomy. Damning autonomy and demanding outright independence, they launched new riots and demonstrations in Havana in January, 1898. This renewal of rebellion and upheaval ultimately occasioned the dispatch of the battleship Maine to Havanna on January 24 for the ostensible purpose of protecting the life and property of American nationals. During the night of February 15, for rea-
sons still obscure, the Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor with a loss of over 250 officers and men. While there was no evidence that the tragedy was the work of Spaniards, the indignation that swept the United States knew no bounds. The sensational press and the public at large concluded instantly that the Spanish had perpetrated the deed. Agitation for war was insistent and widespread.

This ferment was especially strong among those Americans destined to be closely identified with the progressive movement. They saw in the possibility of aiding the exploited Cubans an opportunity to secure vicariously some of the reforms they had failed to achieve at home. Certainly, the Congressional vote on the recognition of Cuban belligerency in April, 1896, demonstrated that the enthusiasm for Cuba Libre centered significantly in the Bryan-Free Silver-Populist sections of the country, and there is some evidence to support the view that agitation for military intervention in Cuba was, on the part of political liberals at least, an extension outward of sympathies initially generated by the domestic social protest movement of the 1890's.

From the standpoint of American populists and agrarian reformers, the revolt of the Cuban plantation workers symbolized the struggle of rural mankind the world over for a larger measure of po-

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litical freedom and economic democracy. The fact that conservative business interests in the United States opposed a vigorous policy against Spain on behalf of the Cubans was regarded by the agrarians as the usual cynical Wall Street indifference to the fate of exploit-ed rural interests. Thus when William Jennings Bryan waved a Cuban flag at a Jefferson Day banquet of the Democratic party in 1898 and demanded American intervention for Cuban independence, he was expres-sing the hope that the democratic-agrarian ideals of American popu-lism, defeated at the polls in 1896, might be extended to the Cuban farmer. Of course, Bryan was not oblivious to the fact that a self-less and idealistic advocacy of Cuban independence was also good pol-itics.

Republicans were aware that Free Cuba mixed with Free Sil-ver could produce a potent political cocktail for the Democrats in 1900. Republican Augustus P. Gardner, who was to become a leading progressive of the Roosevelt Era, was convinced that if McKinley succumbed to the anti-war pressures of the business groups and found a peaceful solution to the Maine crisis, it would represent a politi-cal disaster for the party. Likewise, Elihu Root was fearful that "fruitless attempts to hold back or retard the enormous momentum of

the people bent upon war would result in the destruction of the
President's power and influence in the destruction of the Pres-
ident's party, in the elevation of the Silver Democracy to pow-
er...."

Given the popular demand to revenge the Maine sinking and
the apparent political disadvantages in a policy of moderation toward
Spain, future progressives in both parties urged the McKinley Admin-
istration into a war to rescue the Cubans from Spanish terrorism.
"If Spain wants war, then let us have war," shouted Democrat John
Lind of Minnesota. "That, I say, is the general feeling." Spain,
of course, did not want to fight the United States, but that fact was
drowned out in a deluge of pro-war oratory. Republican Knute Nelson,
the Viking Senator from Minnesota, a man long active in the battle
against social injustice, argued that to ignore the Cuban struggle
for liberty would be "cold, icy heartlessness, unworthy of a great
nation and a great people." In New York, Lyman Abbott, destined
later to hold a top command in the Roosevelt army of social righteous-
ness, told his Plymouth Church congregation that "when Christ puts the
sword into our hands, we are not to refuse it."

5Root to Cornelius Bliss, Apr. 2, 1898, in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu
Root (New York, 1938), I, 197. Root, like many other conservatives,
opposed war with Spain and worked to avoid it. He admitted, how-
ever, that the American people had a "moral right" to make war,
and that "the Cuban cause is just." Ibid.
7Martin W. Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson, 286.
8Lyman Abbott, Reminiscences, 437-438. Abbott later recalled that he
did not think "that the history of the world records a nobler war." Ibid.; Ira V. Brown, Lyman Abbott, 166. For similar views see
Jonathan P. Dolliver, Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 2612
(Mar. 8, 1898).
But perhaps the most insistent voice pushing McKinley toward war was that of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. To Roosevelt, a war with Spain was more than a holy crusade for Cuba Libre alone. It would be the first step, he felt, in the inexorable march of American empire into the Caribbean, into the Pacific and towards the markets of Asia. Not only had Roosevelt been instrumental in securing the command of the Pacific fleet for his friend and confidant, Admiral George Dewey, he was also responsible for moving that fleet from Pearl Harbor to Hong Kong in order that it might easily strike at the Philippines if the war he so earnestly desired finally materialized. The Roosevelt of 1898 was an expansionist pure and simple, the leader and spokesman of a small group of Republican imperialists who dreamed boldly of war, empire and commercial expansion.

As one historian has pointed out, the leadership element of the Republican imperialist group derived from an upper middle-class elite that had long fought a losing battle for moderate reform in domestic politics, their aggressiveness in affairs foreign representing psychological and ideological compensation for their frustration in affairs domestic. These Republican reform-minded intellectuals, moralists and Mugwumps, many of whom became leading progressives, believed that the recapture of the martial spirit of an earlier America would serve as an antidote to the growing vulgarity, crassness and corruption of a monopolistic capitalist culture. Most of these men

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," loc. cit., 198.}\]
were New Englanders and not all of them subsequently became progressives, but to those who did, future progressive leaders like William Roscoe Thayer, Lyman Abbott and Augustus P. Gardner, imperialism and expansion were but parts of a purification ritual related to the recovery of the moral fiber of the American people. In urging a war for Cuba Libre, Roosevelt best expressed the sentiments of this group when he argued that "this fight will be of great advantage to the nation, both from the moral uplift it will give us, and because it will mean that we shall acquire both St. Thomas and Hawaii."

With populists and progressives in all sections of the country demanding war, the sensational press screaming for war, the people urging a revenge of the Maine and punishment of the war crimes of General Weyler, the G.O.P. could not effectively oppose the sentiment. Political considerations undoubtedly mastered sober judgment, and on April 11, 1898, the President went before Congress to demand war. His message effectively obscured the fact that Spain had capitulated diplomatically to American insistence on a cease-fire on the island and an end to the concentration camps. Indeed, the Spanish attempt to thwart American intervention in Cuba by a policy of appeasement was buried in the President's rhetoric about the "large dictates of humanity" and American "aspirations as a Christian,

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10 Roosevelt to William Sheffield Cowles, Mar. 29, 1898, Roosevelt Letters, II, 803; to William Pierce Frye, Mar. 31, 1898, Ibid., 806; to James Bryce, Mar. 31, 1898, Ibid., 807; to Elihu Root, Apr. 5, 1898, Ibid., 813.
peace-loving people."

It would be difficult to dignify the Congressional proceedings that followed McKinley's war message as "debates." The remarks of Republican Representative William P. Hepburn of Iowa probably summed up Congressional attitudes most adequately. Speaking with more passion than he mustered for his railroad rate regulation bill nine years later, Hepburn vigorously demanded the use of American armed force in Cuba:

...the conduct of Spain on that island during fifty years of misrule, fifty years of outrage, fifty years of tyranny, has brought about a condition that is now intolerable and insupportable and must cease...we are going there to fight Spain. We are going there...to establish a stable and a permanent government....All the traditions of our nation, all the insistings of our statesmen have been upon the line that upon this continent there should be republican form of government alone....That is the settled policy of this nation, to secure...that form of government - republican government.12

The final result was never in legislative doubt, and on April 19, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution of war with the express and idealistic statement (in the famous Teller Amendment) that the United States had no permanent territorial ambitions in the islands. Cuba would be returned to the Cubans and republican government would be established there.

It would be unfair, in hindsight, to condemn Congress for rushing pellmell into an avoidable war with Spain. A popular enthu-

11The diplomatic exchanges and the war message are found in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy (New York, 1947), 377-381; see also Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years: Memoirs of a Liberal Editor (New York, 1939), 136-137.
12Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 3766 (Apr. 12, 1898).
iasm that ran high enough to persuade suffragist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton to abandon her pacifism and declare that "though I hate war per se, I am glad that it has come in this instance," was one a democratic body could not have thwarted. Even the usually staid populist theoretician, Henry Demarest Lloyd, was carried away by the war fever to the extent of crying out in alarm that "there are Spaniards in our rear as well as in our front. Go for them!" Indeed, in the Republican middle west war fervor was regarded as a measure of one's party loyalty, and newspapers in that region continually set forth the theme that America's destiny to extend its political system abroad was being obstructed by the continued presence of the Spanish monarchy in the western hemisphere.

14 Caro Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, II, 130. Lloyd was not alone among the old line reformers in his general concept. Even the mild-mannered single tax reformer, Henry George, as much as he hated war, justified it when it was waged for natural rights and liberty. Henry George, Jr., The Life of Henry George, 577.
15 Ray Allen Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," Political Science Quarterly, LX (Mar., 1945), 46-48. Of the 24 middle west Senators, 20 consistently voted for intervention. In the House the war resolution was adopted 173 to 121 with only 25 middle westerners opposing war. George W. Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI (Mar., 1940), 524-525; 529. Republican editors played up the Cuban issue in early 1898 in an attempt to profit politically from Cleveland's policy of neutrality. Democratic leaders in the area were able to divert this thrust and fight the 1896 campaign on the issues of domestic reform and free silver.
Much to the disgust of organized labor, the main opposition to war and Cuba Libre came from the business community in the industrial northeast. Perhaps it was the character of this opposition that impelled Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor to work closely with exiled Cuban revolutionary leaders in New York in his desire to spread "the gospel of unionism in Cuba." In any event, Gompers, and, indeed, the bulk of organized labor, was eager for the American intervention that would destroy Spanish autocracy and create a free society in which labor unions might flourish and grow. At the same time, it seems clear that the opposition of Big Business to Cuba Libre persuaded the first of the great muckrakers, John Clark Ridpath, to charge that the Senators who opposed war were the reactionary agents of Wall Street conservatism.

There was little doubt about the essential justice of the war in the collective mind of those destined to lead the progressive movement. None of the uncertainties that would plague and divide progressives in 1915-1917 were present in 1898. The issues with Spain remained clear and simple. As Robert M. La Follette later defined them, "the flag of freedom was carried to a helpless people, an oppressed and suffering nation, under a despotism more cruel than hu-

17Samuel Gompers, Seven Y ears of Life and Labor (New York, 1925), II, 64-65.
man slavery." David Starr Jordan, pacifist, educator and leading political liberal, was one of the few progressives in 1898 who had serious doubts about the justice of the war and where it might lead the United States, but he choked them down and hoped for the best:

It is too late for us now to ask how we got into the war....All doubts we must keep to ourselves. We are in the midst of battle, and must fight to the end. The "rough riders" are in the saddle....The swifter, fiercer, more glorious our attacks, the sooner and more lasting our peace....If America is to be the knight-errant of the nations she must be pure of heart and swift of foot, every inch a knight.21

Jordan's metaphor was well chosen. America's knight-errants were indeed in the saddle, riding forth to carry the American political system into the last crumbling outposts of the Spanish empire.

The future leaders of American progressivism crowded eagerly forward to take part in the crusade. There were bound to be personal disappointments, however, in a war so small. Colonel William Jennings Bryan of the Third Nebraska Volunteer Regiment sat the conflict out in Florida swatting flies and sand fleas, cursing the apparent political discrimination that prevented the titular head of the opposition party from achieving martial glory in Cuba. The war experiences of men like John Lind, Henry L. Stimson and George Creel

20Ellen Torelle, Comp., The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette (Madison, Wis., 1920), 276; see also Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 78-83; Brown, Lyman Abbott, 165.

21David Starr Jordan, Imperial Democracy (New York, 1899), 5.
were equally tame. Still, it was better to swat sand fleas than remain a civilian. George W. Norris, soon to be a leading progressive in Congress, was certain that it was a war for humanity, but his hopes for active service were dashed when his mother pleaded, "William, if you join the army you will kill your old mother."

Family responsibilities also prevented Jacob Riis, Roosevelt's colleague in the war on New York crime and slums, and George McAdoo, later Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury, from joining the army, although Riis had a severe case of "war fever," and McAdoo was "eager" for service in Cuba.

The war itself approached comic opera in the grand tradition. Theodore Roosevelt, who resigned his post in the Navy Department to lead the famous "Rough Riders" in Cuba, admitted in one of his more introspective moments that "we're all fake heroes." But he did manage to get into a "bully" fight near Santiago and lead a

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24Louise Ware, Jacob A. Riis, Police Reporter, Reformer, Useful Citizen (New York, 1938), 172; William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 425-428.
charge that was "great fun." His friend, Augustus P. Gardner, who managed to discharge but one bullet at the so-called Battle of Coamo (six Spaniards were killed), soon became convinced that the whole thing was a "farce." Lopsided naval victories at Manila Bay and Santiago against the decrepit fleets of Spain also demonstrated that the war was no contest.

Perhaps it was a growing sense of shame that persuaded some of the future leaders of the progressive movement to view the proceedings with disgust. Hutchins Hapgood, later a leading progressive journalist, recalled that "what was patriotic in me was displeased, and what was esthetic in me was shocked." A few pacifists like David Starr Jordan and Oswald Garrison Villard were repelled by the one-sidedness of the slaughter; others were concerned lest the jingo spirit aroused by the conflict spill over into imperialism.

III

It was the issue of imperialism that produced the first clear split in the ranks of the progressives during the war period. While it is clear that they embraced the idealistic means and ends of Cuba Libre with an almost monolithic unity, it is also certain

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that the solidity of their support began to crumble as the crusade to free the oppressed Cubans developed into a campaign to destroy and annex the Spanish empire. Surprisingly, however, the argument that foreign war and expansion were enemies of domestic reform, a view vigorously urged by peace progressives in the 1915-1917 period, was not brought forward to any great extent in 1898. The Christian Socialist paper New Time argued that "war will retard the reform movement," and urged the government to "let Cuba alone and free the American wage slaves." And populist leader Tom Watson later charged that "the blare of the bugle drowned the voice of the reformer." But these were isolated and retrospective observations. Actually, most American socialists supported military intervention in Cuba, confident that the war would wreck American capitalism and hasten the triumph of the proletariat.

It is difficult to determine precisely when the metamorphosis occurred - when the selfless humanitarianism of March, 1898, became the acquisitive imperialism of August. Certainly most Americans and most progressives had urged McKinley to battle with little or no thought of territorial aggrandizement. The Teller Amendment reflected the national mind on this point. But numerous factors conspired to bring imperialistic considerations gradually to the fore as the war progressed. Among these were the imperatives of military


strategy, the pressures of partisan politics, the heady wine of smashing victories, the thought of economic reward and the dawning realization that the conflict had propelled the United States onto the stage of international power politics. Inexorably, then, the ideas and ambitions of Theodore Roosevelt became those of William McKinley, the Republican party and, finally, of a majority of the American people.

Perhaps the first clear indication that Cuba Libre was regarded by some Americans as but a step toward a larger program came in the famous "Middlesex Speech" of Indiana's Albert J. Beveridge. Delivered in Boston on April 27, 1898, two days after war was officially declared, the speech was important not only because its author was destined to become an outstanding progressive Senator, but because it also summed up much of the imperialist program at the very outset of hostilities. As Beveridge saw it:

American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; we must get an ever increasing portion of foreign trade. We shall establish trading-posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. We shall cover the oceans with our merchant marine. We shall build a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies, flying our flag and trading with us will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce. And American law, American order, American civilization and the American flag will plant themselves on shores, hitherto bloody and benighted, but, by those agencies of God, henceforth to be made beautiful and bright. If this means the Stars and Stripes over an Isthmian canal, over Hawaii, Cuba and the southern seas, if it means American empire in the name of the Great Republic and its free institutions, then let us meet that meaning with a mighty joy and make that meaning good, no matter what barbarism and all our foes may say.
or do...The Philippines are logically our first target.

Indeed, the crash of Dewey's guns at far-off Manila on May 1, 1898, demonstrated graphically and positively the fact that Cuba Libre had a geographical scope that stretched well into the Pacific. The voice of Beveridge was the voice of the future.

The Congressional debates on the annexation of Hawaii in mid-summer marked a major turning point in American attitudes toward the war. The islands had long been a target for commercial expansionists who saw the Pacific as a potential American lake and Hawaii as a stepping stone to the markets of Asia. Fearing that the annexation of non-contiguous territory could not be reconciled with the traditions of the Founding Fathers, Democratic President Grover Cleveland had blocked a Republican move to incorporate the islands in 1893.

But in July, 1898, with the war in full swing and a Republican administration again in power, joint resolutions of annexation were introduced in both Houses of Congress. No new rationalizations were offered to justify Hawaiian annexation in 1898 that had not been put forward earlier in the decade. Commercial expansion, the requirements of the Navy, the protection of the west coast and national destiny were again called upon to explain the need. Perhaps the only new argument brought into the discussion by the annexationists was that the exigencies of war dictated the action as an immediate stra-

31 Albert J. Beveridge, The Meaning of the Times, 43-46; see also Oscar King Davis, Our Conquests in the Pacific (New York, 1899), 71.

tegic necessity.

Republicans who would later figure importantly in the progressive movement joined with their party colleagues to urge annexation. Iowa's Jonathan P. Dolliver pointed out in the House that Britain or Germany would seize the islands unless the United States took them, thus depriving America of the military advantages of Hawaii in the war with Spain. Citing the authority of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, Dolliver urged the view that "since these islands must harbor the coal supply of the mid-Pacific, they literally command the ocean, so that if our country controls them we have in them an absolute protection for our coast." Representative Hepburn extended Dolliver's arguments with the more general observation that all great empires in history had been the bearers of civilization, and that

the statesmanship of the earth today is in favor of this system of colonization, of territorial expansion, of breadth and greatness and grandeur, of extension and empire. All the statesmanship of the world, save that of the Democratic party here in the United States, says "aye" to the proposition; they alone are halting in the process....we hope, every patriot hopes, that Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands will be ours by conquest.34

Despite the opposition of Democrats who were convinced that annexation would ultimately involve the United States in foreign en-

33 Cong. Recd., 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 6003 (June 15, 1898).
34 Ibid., 6018; John Ely Briggs, William Peters Hepburn (Iowa City, Iowa, 1919), 197; Davis, Our Conquests in the Pacific, 71. Sam Gompers took the position that "the government may annex any old thing, and I shall be content as long as the laws relating to labor are observed." Actually, those who opposed Hawaiian annexation were badly divided and their efforts were poorly coordinated. The labor movement was split on the issue. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 127; Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 86;93-94;105;109;112-115;133.
tanglements and that colonialism would compromise the integrity of republican government, the joint resolution easily passed and was signed by the President on July 7, 1898. So was a precedent established for a subsequent demand for the annexation of the Philippines.

In addition to the precedent involved, the Hawaiian debate in July also introduced the first element of partisan politics into the war for Cuba Libre. True, the opposition of the Democrats to Hawaiian annexation had not been very effective. Indeed, in rejecting the whole concept of territorial expansion they were forced to deny that Hawaii might have some military usefulness in a war in the Pacific against Spain. However correct they might have been, this did not at the time seem either logical or patriotic to most Americans. The advent of peace in August, however, removed the political stigma of resisting measures urged by the Administration as vital to the successful prosecution of the war. Further, the fact that Spain ceded Puerto Rico and Guam outright to the United States in the initial negotiations and recognized the American occupation of Manila pending final disposition of the Philippines at a subsequent peace conference, dramatically broadened the territorial implications of the imperialism issue and sharpened the political issues involved.

The decision of President McKinley in October to incorporate the annexation of the Philippines into the final draft treaty of peace with Spain projected the expansion question even more firmly into the area of party politics. The debate over the treaty, centering as it did on the wisdom of Philippine annexation, was domi-
nated throughout by rancorous partisanship. The crusade for Cuba 
Libre had become a crusade for American empire, and the bipartisan 
unanimity of April, when Cuban freedom was the main concern, was ir­
reparably destroyed. Imperialism and anti-imperialism swiftly hard­
ened into party attitudes, and among those men who would play leading 
roles in the domestic reform movement of 1901-1917 the sheer politics 
of territorial expansion had a great deal to do with the formulation 
of their attitudes. Indeed, party lines were probably much more de­
terministic in conditioning the attitudes of progressives on imperial­
ism than any inherent dichotomy between a liberal and conservative 
position on the question. Progressives and conservatives were found 
on both sides of the issue.

Republican party leaders who supported the treaty and its 
Philippine annexation clause, advanced four general arguments for 
their position. Briefly, these involved the ideas of Anglo-Ameri­
can racial superiority and destiny; the economic benefits of a co­
lonial system; the historical inevitability of naval and territor­
ial expansion for a vigorous people; and the civilizing mission of 
the United States in backward areas. Combined, these comprised the 
basic case for imperialism, a case embraced in broad outline by em­
bryonic progressives in the party.

The future Republican leaders of the domestic reform move­
ment fully accepted the idea that the white race had a particular 
destiny in world history. Stated specifically, the feeling was 
strong that America and England were destined to lead the inferior 
and backward colored races toward new heights of peace, prosperity,
and civilization. The influence of this concept was destined to be of considerable historical importance in that it posited the necessity of the Anglo-American diplomatic rapprochement that would become a central factor in later twentieth century international politics. Indeed, the growing bond between England and America that rapidly developed during and immediately after the Spanish war was partly cemented, on the American side at least, by a pseudo-scientific belief in Anglo-American racial destiny. In his Middlesex Speech, for example, Beveridge had spoken eulogistically of an "English-speaking peoples' league of God for the permanent peace of this war torn world," and Roosevelt informed correspondents in England in November, 1898, that Britain's benevolent attitude toward the United States during the war marked a major turning point in Anglo-American relations. But William Allen White most forcefully suggested the racial implications of the new-found Anglo-American friendship when he wrote:

> It is the Anglo-Saxon's manifest destiny to go forth as a world conqueror. He will take possession of all of the islands of the sea. He will exterminate the peoples he cannot subjugate. This is what fate holds for the chosen people. It is so written. Those who would protest will

find their objections overruled. It is to be. 36

Even David Starr Jordan, a leading anti-imperialist, drew attention to the menace of Russia and pointed out that the "need of the common race is greater than the need of nations. The Anglo-Saxon race must be at peace within itself. Nothing is so important to civilization as this." And Beveridge returned again and again to the theme that "our race is distinctly the exploring, the colonizing, the administrating force of the world....wherever our race has gone it has governed; and wherever it has governed law, order, justice and the rights of man have been established and defended." 37

Republican progressives also emphasized the economic benefits of colonization even though this argument was most persistently advanced by Big Business elements in the G.O.P. But consistent with the progressive view that American capitalism should be purified and reformed rather than replaced or overthrown, progressives at the turn of the century looked to increased foreign sales as an alternative to a static economy with its implicit danger of radicalism. New Jersey

36 William Allen White, Editorial, Emporia (Kan.) Gazette, Mar. 20, 1899, in Helen Ogden Mahin, ed., The Editor and His People (New York, 1924), 305; William Allen White, Autobiography, 320; see also Brown, Lyman Abbott, 163; and Edward A. Ross, Seventy Years of It, 59.

Republican Representative Charles N. Fowler, later a staunch progressive follower of Theodore Roosevelt, expressed this idea most succinctly when he pointed out that to keep America's laborers employed and her industrial machine in motion "we must capture the markets of the world." Articles by Ray Stannard Baker and speeches by Oscar S. Straus further developed and popularized this viewpoint. Although George W. Perkins, later the controversial financier of Roosevelt's Progressive party, revealed something of the naïveté of the concept when he dispatched Beveridge to the Far East in 1898 to explore the possibilities of selling insurance to the Chinese and Filipinos, the belief was widespread in progressive imperialist circles that "commercial extension is the absolutely necessary result of the overwhelming productive energy and capacity of the American people."

Joining with Big Business conservatives who saw the Philippines as a stepping stone to the markets of Asia, and whose initial opposition to Cuba Libre had veered quickly toward endorsement of the imperialistic and colonial implications of the Spanish War, future Republican progressives argued for the annexation of the islands as a national economic necessity. Wisconsin's Representative Henry A. Cooper, for instance, soon to be Senator Robert M. La Follette's ideological counterpart in the House, linked American ownership of the Philippines to the "coming world struggle to conquer the mar-

38 Cong. Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 527 (June 2, 1900).
40 Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 98; Beveridge to Henry D. Estabrook, May 20, 1898, Ibid., 71.
kets of the East." Even a progressive Democrat like Georgia's William H. Howard had difficulty accepting the Democracy's anti-imperialist line when he contemplated America's "natural advantages over all our rivals that should enable us to drive them out of China with our cotton, raw and manufactured."

Also popular among embryonic progressives in the Republican party was the view that possession of a great navy measured the vigor of a dynamic people. Not only would such a navy protect the growing foreign trade of the United States, but the demands of national honor and the necessity of physical expansion could be sustained by its guns. Indeed, some progressives linked the Navy to the Social Darwinist concept that territorial expansion was historically inevitable. Representative Edgar D. Crumpacker of Indiana, for example, argued in the House that the United States should arm and fortify every island acquired in the Pacific and further build up the navy or "our oriental possessions will not yield the rich results" anticipated. Representative Dolliver demanded that the United States hold the Philippines and construct naval bases there in order to defend "the increasing commerce of the American people in the Pacific Ocean, and from that headquarters spread the influence of American

\[41\text{Cong. Record, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., 461-462 (June 19, 1902); see also Rep. Jonathan P. Dolliver, Ibid., 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 1033 (Jan. 25, 1899); and Rep. Edgar D. Crumpacker, Ibid., 1039.}
\[42\text{Ibid., 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 2900 (Mar. 14, 1900).}
\[43\text{Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson, 244; Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York, 1936), 53.}
\[44\text{Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 1037 (Jan. 25, 1899).}
enterprise in all the market places of the East." Even some Amer-
ican labor journals and labor leaders accepted this theme, although
not with the dogmatism of Beveridge who proclaimed flatly that "the
power that rules the Pacific...is the power that rules the world.
And with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the Amer-
ican Republic."

Perhaps more idealistic was the progressive view that the
United States had a God-given destiny to reform and uplift the back-
ward peoples of the world. While this was basically an extension and
recasting of the "manifest destiny" of the 1840's, it was nonetheless
effectively used in the debate on the treaty with Spain. Clearly, in-
cipient progressives saw the annexation of the islands as a demonstra-
tion of duty, destiny and American benevolence. In this sense, im-
perialism was but a materialization and geographical extension of the
humanitarian ideals of Cuba Libre. Frederic C. Howe defined the moral
basis of this attitude when he recalled his own conversion to the
foreign policy idealism of the imperial years: "This particular
brand of evangelistic morality became bone of my bone, flesh of my
flesh. It was a morality of duty....It was the code of a small town,
of the Sunday School, of my church."

Applied specifically to the question of territorial expan-
sion, the "morality of duty" in its most extreme form visualized a

46 Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 146-147.
47 Cong. Recrd., 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 704 (Jan. 9, 1900).
48 Frederic C. Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, 17.
world made over in the American image. Senator Knute Nelson, for example, spoke of America's obligation to civilize the Filipinos and "breathe into their nostrils the principles of law, order and good government," while Dolliver was certain that the United States was but an instrument in God's hands to "enlarge the boundaries of civilization, to extend the frontiers of freedom in far-off lands, and to garrison new outposts of social progress in the ends of the earth."

This concept of reform militant was extremely popular among budding progressives, particularly those in the Republican party, and it was carried over into the progressive movement where it became, in less intense form, an integral part of progressive foreign policy ideology. In sum, the early nineteenth century vision of American destiny was recast in twentieth century terminology, conceived anew as the imperialism of duty and democracy, and applied to non-contiguous territory. As Henry Demarest Lloyd explained it in 1896, the United States could best cleanse its capitalistic and materialistic soul by defending every existing republic and rising to the assistance of every people seeking republican institutions. "If anything
could save America from her apparently impending Midas-like doom it would be such a mission."

But while Lloyd believed that the United States had a "mission to defend and extend liberty," he vigorously opposed the imperialism of 1898-1900 as crass, selfish and materialistic. Indeed, the distinction he drew between the idealism of Cuba Libre and the stark materialism of territorial annexation pointed up the fact that there were many embryonic progressives and other reform-minded Americans who wholly opposed imperial expansion. Although they were willing to accept the idea of Cuba Libre as a corollary to national spiritual growth, they felt that the subsequent march of American empire, however rationalized in idealistic and humanitarian terms, was a cruel denial of American traditions and a sharp departure from the advice and guidance of the Founding Fathers. Unquestionably, American history was on the side of the anti-imperialists. The spirit of the imperial years, however, was not. And the very fact that anti-imperialist sentiment centered significantly in the agrarian sector of the Democratic party, helped wrap the protest against imperialism in a political and sectional cloak that obscured both the ideological and historical merits of the argument.

Anti-imperialism as a concept was based on the conviction that while America might well carry liberty and democracy abroad to the world's downtrodden, she had in such a mission no directive to

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50 Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, II, 128.
51 Ibid., 129-130;134.
stay on permanently as a colonial power. The occupation of overseas
territory and the subordination of a foreign population to the will
of the American government, however benevolent, had neither prece-
dent in American experience, nor, it was argued, constitutional jus-
tification. In this sense, the anti-imperialist attitude was as ide-
alistic as the imperialist attitude. America, it was maintained,
should perform a political duty to backward peoples and forthwith re-
tire from the scene. Or at the very least, the United States should
extend the rights and privileges of the Constitution to subject peo-
bles, making them equal partners in the American political system.
A republic, said the anti-imperialists, could not arbitrarily sub-
ordinate a colonial population.

In spite of its logic and its idealistic appeal, anti-im-
perialism as a countervailing force in American history at the turn
of the century was weakened by two major factors. First, the atti-
tude was identified with the Democratic party at a time when the
Democracy was clearly the minority party. Indeed, the element of
political expediency associated with the Democratic opposition to
imperialism seemed to prostitute an abstract, idealistic point of
view into little more than a vote-getting device. Secondly, the
Anti-Imperialist League, the organization which best expressed hos-
tility to the concept of imperialism, was a weak vehicle for the
popularization of anti-imperialist ideas. Led by a group of New Eng-
land conservatives and traditionalists, with just the barest scatter-
ing of progressives, the League was accused of looking backward to
the traditionalism of the nineteenth century rather than forward into
the ferment of the twentieth.

The politics of anti-imperialism, projected firmly into the debate on the treaty with Spain by William Jennings Bryan, was perhaps the most significant of these factors. It was Bryan's strategy to support the treaty in the Senate so that the Democrats might preserve the imperialism issue for the 1900 campaign. The party certainly needed a dramatic new point of attack, since the free silver issue of 1896 had virtually evaporated in the golden mist of a war-stimulated prosperity. But Bryan's trip to Washington in February, 1899, to persuade Democratic senators to vote for the treaty and the annexation of the Philippines contributed support to the Republican charge that anti-imperialism was little more than a Democratic political maneuver. Just how many Senate votes the Commoner changed by this tactic is debatable, but it appears likely that he swayed two Democratic votes that might have prevented the treaty from receiving the required two-thirds majority.

Bryan was undoubtedly sincere in his conviction that if the Democratic party came to power in 1900 the Filipinos would be granted independence. But the injection of the political issue into the treaty debates not only strengthened the Republican charge that anti-imperialism was politically motivated, but it gave rise also to the more serious allegation that the anti-imperialist agitation was

encouraging the growing hostility of Filipino nationalists toward the American Army of Occupation in the islands. The suggestion that the anti-imperialists were rendering aid and comfort to a potential, if not actual, enemy was explicit in much of this Republican criticism.

Bryan's critics included the progressive Republicans. They denied the Commoner's contention that advocacy of Philippine independence represented a liberal point of view. On the contrary, they argued that there was a close ideological relationship between imperialist uplift abroad and reform at home. Indeed, many Americans of liberal persuasion agreed with Iowa's Dolliver that the American Republic had reached a period in its development "where it can afford to do a little something for the human race." Certainly, an analysis of the treaty vote in the Senate shows no particular connection between anti-imperialism and incipient progressivism, and it is clear that progressives adhered to both positions in the belief that theirs

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was the liberal attitude.

The nature and structure of the Anti-Imperialist League also tended to support the charge of the Republican progressives that anti-imperialism was somehow related to the forces of conservatism and stagnation in American life. Organized in November, 1898, to provide a more effective focal point for the disorganized sentiment that had failed to prevent Hawaiian annexation five months earlier, the League was financed by two millionaire pacifists, Andrew Carnegie and George Peabody. Its leadership was composed primarily of older men of conservative political and economic views. Its appeal was largely sectional, and its effectiveness was confined mainly to the northeastern United States.

Nonetheless, the League and the arguments it set forth successfully attracted the support of such progressive Democrats as David Starr Jordan, Brand Whitlock, Oswald Garrison Villard and Clarence Darrow. These men were isolationists and pacifists, and they equated

56 The treaty vote was as follows: 64 Senators voted - 57 Yea (39 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 8 Populists and Silver Independents), 27 Nay (22 Democrats, 3 Populists, 2 Republicans). Note that the 11 Populists and Silver Independents voted 8 to 3 for the treaty. See Oberholtzer, A History of the United States, V, 593; and William G. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIII (Dec., 1946), 376-379.

57 Statement based on an analysis of the political backgrounds of the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League as presented in Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (Sept., 1935), 217-219. Harrington points out that the greatest fervor for anti-imperialism came from conservative Independents and Gold Democrats and that the most perfunctory supporters were the Silver or Bryan Democrats who merely followed the party line on the issue. The present writer's analysis confirms Harrington's viewpoint.
pacifism and anti-imperialism with liberalism in spite of the fact that the Anti-Imperialist League was largely controlled and dominated by Republican conservatives. Without question, pacifism and isolationism were regarded by many budding progressive Democrats in 1898-1900 as an integral part of any liberal political philosophy. It must be pointed out, however, that this ideological connection was both tenuous and transitory. Actually, the pacifism of these progressive Democrats wore quite thin after 1914. Indeed, many of them centered their anti-imperialist antipathies on Germany and, under Wilson's leadership, embraced the Allied cause and American intervention in the war as the truly liberal attitude toward European affairs.

In spite of the encouragement given the anti-imperialists by the formal commencement of the Philippine Insurrection on February 4, 1899, just two days before the treaty with Spain was finally

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58 Statements in this paragraph are based on an analysis of the attitudes in 1898-1900 and 1915-1917 of Jane Addams, Moorfield Storey, David Starr Jordan, Felix Adler, John Jay Chapman, Oswald Garrison Villard, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Clarence Darrow, William Roscoe Thayer and Brand Whitlock. The chief financiers of the anti-imperialist movement were committed pacifists. These pacifists had virtually nothing in common politically, and their pacifism sprang from diverse intellectual processes and experiences. See M. A. DeWolfe Howe, John Jay Chapman and His Letters (Boston, 1937), 136-137; M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Moorfield Storey, 1845-1929: Portrait of an Independent (New York, 1932), 183;191-196;235-236; David Starr Jordan, The Days of a Man (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1922), I, 618-619; and Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 141-142; Villard, Fighting Years, 100; Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, II, 133-134; Clarence S. Darrow, Resist Not Evil (Chicago, 1905), 21-22; Thayer to the Countess Cesaresco, Jan. 19, 1900; Dec. 26, 1901; Mar. 16, 1902, in Charles Downer Hazen, ed., The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer (New York, 1926), 112;114; 116-117; Brand Whitlock, Forty Years of It, 159; and Allan Nevins, ed., The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, I, xiv-xviii.
passed by the Senate, their plea for anti-imperialism remained essentially an appeal to the political advice of the Founding Fathers.

The chief exception to this 1776 orientation was the suggestion that an American protectorate be established over an independent Philippine state. David Starr Jordan best expressed this alternative to outright annexation when he wrote:

...the only righteous thing to do would be to recognize the independence of the Philippines under American protection and lend them our army and navy and our wisest counselors, not our politicians, but our jurists, our teachers, with foresters, electricians, manufacturers, mining experts...we should not get our money back but we should save our honor. The only sensible thing to do would be to pull out some dark night and escape from the great problem of the Orient as suddenly and as dramatically as we got into it.\(^{59}\)

Although Republican critics of the protectorate plan were quick to point out that it encompassed most of the military disadvantages and few of the supposed economic advantages of annexation, the Jordan proposal did have the merit of recognizing the fact that to have cast an unprotected, independent Philippine state into the shark tank of Far Eastern power politics in 1899 would surely have been a sentence of national death.

Economic and strategic considerations aside, the appeal of the Philippine protectorate idea was also lessened by the fact that few anti-imperialist progressives seemed to have much confidence in America's ability to plant democracy in the islands. True, American tradition supported the main anti-imperialist argument that a demo-

cratic government could not logically rule colonial peoples without 60
their consent, but no embryonic progressive seriously advanced the
notion that a plebiscite be held in the islands on the question of
independence. On the contrary, while there was much emotional concern
for the oppressed Filipino struggling for freedom against a wall of
American bayonets, some anti-imperialists were frank to admit that the
inferior natives were unsuited for democracy and that democracy would
not work in a tropical climate anyway. Perhaps it was this convic-
tion that explains why so few incipient progressives in either party
supported the key anti-imperialist contention that the political
guarantees of the Constitution should automatically follow the
flag.

The anti-imperialist argument that attention to foreign
affairs would produce oppressive militarism at home and detract the
attention of reformers from domestic corruption and injustice, was
one which became fairly popular in some progressive circles in 1915-
1917. It scarcely got off the ground, however, in 1898-1900. The
view of the Cigar Makers Journal in March, 1900, that "expansion
leads to imperialism which tends to militarism which leads to despotism, and all four lead to oppression and misery for the toiling masses," represented a real fear on the part of an organized labor long familiar with the use of federal troops to break strikes. But this concern was compromised by the fact that a number of labor unions actively supported imperialism. Indeed, as one student of American labor has pointed out, the labor unions either supported or rejected imperialism in terms of the economic benefits that might accrue to the industry of which the individual union was a part. Labor presented no solid ideological front on the issue. Further, the argument that a standing army of 150,000 men, drawn primarily from the laboring class, could or would want to oppress 100,000,000 people was difficult to sustain.

In this context, the view of David Starr Jordan that "we cannot try civic experiments with a foe at our gates," coupled with his belief that "a foe is always at the gates of a nation with a vigorous foreign policy," was not destined to come true. Agitated as he was by the rotten meat scandals of the Spanish war period, Jordan concluded that domestic corruption was inherent in a muscular for-

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63 Quoted in Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 268. William A. Ganoe in his The History of the United States Army (New York, 1924), 501-505, gives a statistical survey of strikes put down by the Army in ten selected states between 1886 and 1895. The number was 186. See also Darrow, Resist Not Evil, 21-22;33;35-37; Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 268-269.

64 Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 122-123;155-159;215-218.

65 ibid., passim.

eign policy. "While people cry out for imperialism, expansionism... for free Cuba," he cried, "the political rings devote themselves to the picking of pockets." Actually, the progressive period in American history was to demonstrate quite the reverse. The virile nationalism and idealism that the progressives continued to manifest in their foreign policy attitudes represented a logical counterpart to their growing interest in the federal sponsorship of reform at home. Thus their dedication to the idea of the federal regulation of immoral political and economic behavior on the domestic scene was reflected in their willingness to use the machinery of the state to oppose immoral political and economic behavior abroad. In sum, the feeling was strong that righteousness at home and righteousness abroad were but two sides of the same coin.

IV

The cases for and against imperialism had been fully blocked out when Bryan was again nominated for the Presidency on the Democratic ticket in July, 1900. No new arguments on the subject were presented during the course of the campaign. Nor were the anti-imperialists stronger at election time than they had been when they failed to defeat the Spanish treaty in early 1899. If anything, they were weaker. The unhappy fact was that their basic political and ideological heterogeneity came forcefully to the surface as the emotional

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67 Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 35;251-253; see also Lloyd, Henry Dem- arest Lloyd, II, 133-134.
urgency of anti-imperialism gradually faded. The alliance against imperialism of the Gold Democrats, Bryan Democrats, New England Mug-wumps and conservative Republicans was at best an unnatural one and it began to crumble as the campaign got under way. At the same time, the Democratic party appeared weaker than it had been in 1896. Not only had prosperity reduced the relevancy of the free silver idea, but, on the imperialism question, there were probably more expansionists among the Democrats than anti-expansionists among the Republi

Nonetheless Bryan was nominated at Kansas City in July on a platform of free silver and anti-imperialism. The conservative Gold Democrats in the east promptly split away from the party. They denounced the economic heresy of free silver, charged Bryan with political opportunism on the Spanish treaty question, and demanded rigid anti-imperialism as the primary issue. Confusion was compounded when other Democrats urged a more positive program of domestic reform

69 James E. Eckels, The Ex-Comptroller of the Currency Under President Cleveland's Administration Tells Why He Did Not and Will Not Support Bryan (n.p., n.p., 1900), 5; see also Murray F. Tulley, et al., What Should Be the Cardinal Planks in the Democratic Platform for 1900? (n.p., The National Jeffersonian Democratic League, 1900), 5-8: "Democracy is the very antipode of imperialism. Give the Democratic party power and it will crush that monster before it is too late." Liberals like Edward A. Ross, Louis F. Post and Tom Johnson were distressed with Bryan's mérite on economic questions, but reluctantly followed him in 1900. Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 228;237. Woodrow Wilson heard Bryan speak in 1900. His reaction was that "...the man has no brains." Baker, Wilson, III, 203.
and a minimization of the anti-imperialism question.

Despite these divisions in his party, Bryan doggedly stumped the country pleading for free silver and the downtrodden Filipino. He charged that "imperialism finds no warrant in the Bible," and he assured his audiences that "the command, 'Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature,' has no gatling gun attachment." While this appealed to many progressive pacifists and isolationists, it signally failed to arouse the people. As one southern farmer put it to Champ Clark, campaigning for the Filipino in Alabama:

"Champ, what the hell do we care about the downtrodden Filipino as long as beef cattle are ten cents a pound on the hoof?" In fine, the Democracy could not counter the full dinner pail with the free silver argument, and anti-imperialism could not be blown up into a burning issue.

70 W. D. P. Bliss, A Plea For the Union of the Reform Forces Within the Democratic Party (n.p., n.p., 1900), 1-16; see also, To the Soldiers of Our Civil War (n.p., The Lincoln Republican League, 1900), 1-16; National Democratic Committee, An Address to the National Democracy, the Gold Democrats of the United States (n.p., n.p., 1900), n.pp.; National Association of Democratic Clubs (n.p., n.p., 1900), front cover; Helmes, John A. Johnson, 103.

71 Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, 501. This theme was carried out in party pamphlets.

72 Howe, Moorfield Storey, 205; Clarence S. Darrow, The Story of My Life (New York, 1932), 94; Thomas L. Johnson, My Story, 108-109; see also Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 172-175.

73 James E. Watson, As I Knew Them (Indianapolis, 1936), 174; see also Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 360-361; Benjamin F. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement, 35. Detectives sent by the Democrats to Cuba to find scandals with which to embarrass the Republicans and liven up the campaign produced nothing politically useful. See Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 289.

74 Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV (June, 1937), 45-47.
The Republicans nominated William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. They defended the foreign policy record of the party and took full credit for the prevailing economic prosperity. Future progressives in the G.O.P., men as diverse in many ways as Beveridge, La Follette and William Dudley Foulke all campaigned vigorously for imperialism and prosperity.

When Bryan was defeated by a margin larger than the humiliation of 1896 Democrats were frank to admit that "imperialism as the paramount issue discouraged a great many of our active workers," and that "we were handicapped by the prosperity enjoyed by the country." The fact that working men had abandoned the free silver and anti-imperialism of the Democracy for the imperialism and full dinner pail of the G.O.P. was somewhat more difficult to explain, but Lincoln Steffens perhaps did it best when he observed, somewhat cynically, that "Everybody is making money. I am making money....I am joining the Republican organization of my district....The Republicans are worse than the Democrats - but they are not fools; they are intelligent rascals, so I prefer them."

While the outcome of the election was not necessarily a

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77 Ella Winters and Granville Hicks, eds., The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (New York, 1938), I, 136-137; see also Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 133; Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 360-362.
mandate for more imperialism, it might be interpreted as an endorsement of what the Republican party had done in the foreign policy field up to November, 1900. Certainly, the debate over imperialism had produced a new view of America as a world power. Speaking in New York six weeks after the election, Woodrow Wilson frankly recognized the emergence of the United States onto the international political stage, pronounced it good, and pointed out that Americans could not hope to achieve their own ideals at home "if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty...or order." Americans have, continued the future President, a "mission" to extend the frontiers of democracy to less fortunate peoples, to "teach them order and self-control..., the drill and habit of law and obedience," which would help elevate them to "at least equal members of the family of nations." In this vein, even anti-imperialist leader David Starr Jordan lauded what he defined as peaceful imperialism and spoke glowingly of the "peaceful conquest of Mexico" where the penetration of American dollars had already produced "stability" and would soon produce a 79 "republic."

It was something of this sentiment that embryonic Repub-
lican progressives of the 1898-1900 period carried over into the progressive movement of 1901-1917. The convulsions of the Spanish war period had challenged the dogma of American isolation, revived the "manifest destiny" spirit of the 1840's, and turned the attention of the country toward duty, uplift and righteousness, not only abroad but at home as well. In fine, progressive Republican leaders had many of their foreign policy attitudes pretty well outlined when they turned to the imperatives of domestic reform.

As for the progressive leadership element in the Democratic party, there was much less certainty of viewpoint and direction. Some were convinced that political advantage might still be wrung from the imperialism question, that Philippine independence might yet become a burning issue. Some still clung to their pacifism, anti-imperialism and isolationism, carrying it like a banner into the progressive wing of the party. Others were inclined to accept the territorial expansion of 1898-1900 as a fait accompli and emphasize domestic reform. The uncertainty of the Democracy increased on these points during the Roosevelt Era, and, as we shall see, the problem was temporarily resolved by the simple expedient of neither supporting nor attacking the muscular foreign policy of the Rough Rider.
CHAPTER II

THE ROOSEVELT ERA: LATIN AMERICA

The assassin's bullet that propelled Vice President Theodore Roosevelt into the White House in September, 1901, was a shot heard around the world. For it marked the beginning of the Roosevelt Era in American history. In matters foreign and domestic, T.R. dominated the first decade of the century as though it were his personal property. During his term of office the progressive reform movement at the federal level was firmly launched, and the boisterous foreign policy of the imperial years was gradually modified.

Roosevelt did not originate progressivism. Indeed, his critics regarded him as little more than a wily political opportunist astride the back of the movement. On the other hand, his supporters and friends saw him as the very soul of the crusade to regulate monopolistic Big Business and reform the economic and social life of the nation. Few would disagree that Roosevelt was dynamic, assertive and opinionated, often wholly unpredictable. But if he was merely a conservative masquerading as a liberal, a man dragged reluctantly into advocacy of progressive principles, then he certainly retained the ability to frighten those whose conservatism was never in doubt.

By his own lights Roosevelt was neither a radical nor a conservative. He was a progressive who saw himself steering America between "the Scylla of mob rule and the Charybdis of subjection to a

2James E. Watson, As I Knew Them, 63-64.
plutocracy," a political leader "trying to keep the left center together." As he explained it to one of his many correspondents, his job as leader of the Republican party was "to take hold of the conservative party and turn it into what it had been under Lincoln, that is, a party of progressive conservatism, or conservative radicalism" because "wise radicalism and wise conservatism go hand in hand."

Basically, Roosevelt was a vigorous leader dedicated to achieving by democratic political methods a better life for the majority of the people in so far as this could be realized within the framework of a capitalist legal code and within the practical boundaries of American party politics. Consequently the radicals viewed him as an apologist for the status quo while the reactionaries saw him as a dangerous radical. He was neither.

Men who loved T.R. and worked closely with him in the reform movement understood this, and they were willing to accept him on his own terms. Walter Lippmann perhaps best summed up the contradictions in the man when he wrote in 1912:

If he is wholly evil, as many say he is, then the American democracy is preponderantly evil. For in the first years of the Twentieth Century, Roosevelt spoke for this nation, as few presidents have spoken in our history.... Sensitive to the original forces of public opinion, no man has had the same power of rounding up the laggards. Government under him was a throbbing human purpose.... Many people say he has tried to be all things to all men - that

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3Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, Dec. 26, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 875; see also Roosevelt to Ray Stannard Baker, June 3, 1908, Ibid., 1048-1049.
4Roosevelt to Sydney Brooks, Nov. 20, 1908, Ibid., 1369; see also Roosevelt to Sen. Thomas Collier Platt, May 8, 1899, Ibid., II, 1005.
his speeches are an attempt to corral all sorts of votes. That is a left-handed way of stating the truth. A more generous interpretation would be to say that he had tried to be inclusive, to attach a hundred sectional agitations to a national program. Crude: of course he was crude; he had a hemisphere for his canvas. Inconsistent, yes, he tried to be the leader of factions at war with one another. A late convert: he is a statesman and not an agitator—his business was to meet demands when they had grown to national proportions. No end of possibilities have slipped through the large meshes of his net. He has said some silly things. He has not been subtle, and he has been far from perfect. But his success should be judged by the size of his task, by the fierceness of the opposition, by the intellectual qualities of the nation he represented.5

Roosevelt's attitudes toward foreign policy questions remain somewhat more difficult to generalize. During the imperial years, 1898-1900, Roosevelt had bluntly urged his countrymen toward war and imperialism. He vigorously supported territorial annexations, and he expounded the martial virtues with a religious fervor. He was an expansionist, militarist, racist and idealist, a man dedicated to the proposition that America had a moral obligation and historical destiny to uplift and improve the backward peoples of Spain's colonial empire.6

If these were the views of Roosevelt the Rough Rider, Roosevelt the President was a far more responsible, cautious person. While his earlier dedication to imperialism, militarism and uplift was clearly reflected in his Big Stick diplomacy in the Caribbean and in his advocacy of Big Navy, the Roosevelt in office was relatively temperate in his foreign policy views. This shift in attitude was perhaps best demonstrated in his Far Eastern diplomacy. As the nation's

5Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 98-99; see also Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy, 11.
leading politician Roosevelt had to concern himself with the permis-
siveness of public opinion. Writing in November, 1908, he pointed
out that even a foreign policy grounded firmly in selfless idealism
and morality required an alert and educated public opinion to give
it forcefulness:

Now, in Haiti, what we need is something that will show
our people that this Government, in the name of humanity,
morality, and civilization, ought to exercise some kind
of supervision over the island....In Cuba, Santo Domingo
and Panama we have interfered in various different ways,
and in each case for the immeasurable betterment of the
people. I would have interfered in some similar fashion
in Venezuela, in at least one Central American State, and
in Haiti already, simply in the interest of civilization,
if I could have waked up our people so that they would
back a reasonable and intelligent foreign policy which
should put a stop to crying disorders at our very doors.
Such a policy would be a little in our own interest, but
more in the interest of the peoples in whose affairs we
interfered...our prime necessity is that public opinion
should be properly educated.7

Roosevelt's complaint that the American people were asleep
as far as foreign policy was concerned points to another factor vital
to any analysis of progressive foreign policy attitudes during the
period 1901-1909. In general, public interest in foreign policy
problems declined steadily between 1901 and 1914. Attacks on the
"malefactors of great wealth," the growing agitation for domestic re-
form, the muckrake movement and the sharp clashes over progressive
legislation at the state and national levels, commanded the center of
the stage, and progressives, like the public at large, concerned them-
selves primarily with domestic affairs. Thus the rape of Panama, the

7Roosevelt to William Bayard Hale, Nov. 3, 1908, Roosevelt Letters,
VI, 1408.
flourishing of the Big Stick in the Caribbean, and the dramatic announcement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine produced relatively little comment among progressives, and Roosevelt's intervention at Algeiras occasioned practically none. Thus throughout the period 1901-1909 the political possibilities inherent in party differences of opinion on foreign policy questions were slim.

This is not to suggest, however, that there was no progressive concern with foreign policy during the Roosevelt years. There was, and in this chapter and the next it will be suggested that where progressive opinion was expressed relative to external affairs, the attitudes, while modified, generally followed the political and attitudinal divisions first outlined in 1898-1900. Indeed, on several occasions, some progressive Republicans urged stronger foreign policy stands than the President was willing to endorse, but, in general, most G.O.P. progressives simply followed where the President led, even into the dark and devious alleys of Panama. Progressive Democrats, if they objected to Roosevelt's diplomacy, did so in virtual silence. Throughout the period, however, those progressives in both parties who concerned themselves with foreign policy continued to emphasize the ideological connection between uplift at home and idealistic goals abroad, particularly with reference to American policy in the Caribbean and toward the Filipinos.

In the area of economic foreign policy there was much more activity and concern. Both Democratic and Republican progressives immersed themselves in the problems of foreign trade, lower tariffs, reciprocal trade agreements and merchant marine expansion. These
interests were undoubtedly related to the belief that the encourage-
ment and stimulation of foreign exports was one means of ensuring the
health of the American capitalist system. The progressive attitudes
toward economic foreign policy between 1901 and 1914 will, however,
be the subject of separate chapters.

II

At the beginning of the Roosevelt Era American policy in Cu-
ba was based on the self-denying Teller Amendment of 1898 which had
categorically renounced United States territorial ambitions in the
island. With the war won and Cuba Libre secured, considerable senti-
ment developed throughout the country in favor of the annexation of
Cuba. Much of this was based on the feeling that the Cubans were
wholly unsuited for self-government. Even David Starr Jordan had ex-
pressed the opinion as early as October, 1898, that were the United
States to extend democracy to the island the Cubans would soon "re-
lapse into an anarchy as repulsive...as the tyranny of Spain," an
anarchy that could only be solved by the "apparition of the man on
horseback."

It was something of this fear, combined with the lingering
paternalism of the imperial years, that persuaded Congress to pass
the Platt Amendment in March, 1901. Although eschewing the concept
of annexation, the Platt Amendment actually reduced Cuba to a pro-
tectorate of the United States. It permitted American intervention
in Cuba to preserve internal order and it provided the United States

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with sites for naval and coaling stations. Only with these goals achieved did Roosevelt withdraw American troops from the island.

There is no evidence that the progressives seriously opposed the conversion of Cuba into an American protectorate. Indeed, several Republican progressives wanted outright annexation. In this desire, however, they did not have the support of the President. Writing in the summer of 1901, Roosevelt remarked that "we do not want to expand over another people capable of self-government unless that people desires to go in with us....I hope it will not become our duty to take a foot of soil south of us."

In spite of the opposition of the White House, there were a few progressives in the G.O.P. who thought they saw ways of making the Cubans "desire to go in with us." Massachusetts Representative William C. Lovering, convinced that annexation was the "ultimate solution," argued that by lowering the tariff on Cuban sugar and thus "ministering to her self-interest and material prosperity," Cuba would be encouraged to seek voluntary union with the United States. Representative Crumpacker emphasized the strategic importance of Cuba to America's Caribbean position. He believed that a reciprocity treaty with Cuba would encourage demands there for annexation, prevent foreign powers from securing a commercial or political foothold on the

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10Cong. Rec. 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 114 (Jan. 17, 1902). Lovering was convinced that whatever the outcome, "the Republican party in the end always does the right thing"; see also Rep. Frank W. Mondell, ibid., 3913-3914 (Apr. 9, 1902).
island, and generally help to "Americanize" the Cubans and ensure among them the continued primacy of American influence. Senator Albert J. Beveridge, emphasizing both strategic and commercial considerations, consistently called for Cuban annexation. Indeed, he tried to impress on Roosevelt his belief that the American public demanded annexation: "The statement that should it become necessary to raise our flag again in Cuba it will be raised to stay, brings a response very much like the wild enthusiasm that preceded the Spanish War," he informed the President in October, 1906. Other progressive Republicans urged the broader and more peaceful view that low tariffs and favorable reciprocity treaties with Cuba and Puerto Rico would lure all Latin America closer to the United States in the commercial sphere.

These arguments were never strong enough or widespread enough to persuade Roosevelt to abandon his initial opposition to annexation. In spite of the importunities of Beveridge, the President chose to operate strictly within the paternalistic framework

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12Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 240.

of the Platt Amendment. Consequently, agitation for annexation largely terminated after 1906. In that year American troops sent in by the President to prevent political chaos in Cuba (Bryan called it "reckless militarism") were quickly withdrawn after the confusion had been straightened out, a solution which received general support throughout the nation.

Nor was a great deal of controversy generated in progressive and party circles when Roosevelt "took" Panama in 1903. Although in this instance the Administration's iron fist in the Caribbean was apparent to all, the use of the Big Stick was popular and progressive Republicans joined their party colleagues in loyally supporting the President. Moreover, progressive Democrats and the Democratic party as a whole did little more than mutter something about the "immorality" of it all. Roosevelt's actions in Panama were too well received by the American people to warrant an open political attack on the Government's isthmian policy.

An American controlled canal at the isthmus had long been a national dream, and in 1899 the State Department sought to exploit growing Anglo-American friendship by opening negotiations looking toward abrogation of the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, a pact that specifically prevented sole American operation and control of a canal in the area. The negotiations proceeded too slowly to suit an impatient Congress, and in January, 1900, a bill was introduced to

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construct a canal in Nicaragua in open defiance of the treaty. Riding
the crest of the imperialist wave that had engulfed Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Hawaii and the Philippines and was already washing at the door of
the China market, Congress, including its progressive Republican mem-
bers, agreed with Representative Hepburn when he brushed aside Clay-
ton-Bulwer with the cavalier remark that America's desire for a canal
"becomes a question of morals rather than law....the people of this
generation will not longer be bound by the barrier that was interposed
by another generation half a century ago."

Progressives added their voices to the clamor for a canal
that grew steadily in America from 1899 to 1901. Given the fact that
the great trans-continental railroads bitterly opposed an isthmian
waterway, those progressives who were fighting to break the rate-fix-
ing agreements of the railroads thus combined their imperialistic
urges and their reform urges in the same outcry. Large segments
of American labor also favored a canal at the isthmus, viewing it both
as a work-making project and as a potential contribution to America's
commercial prosperity. Indeed, few Americans, progressive or not,
were inclined to disagree with Representative Lovering (a cotton
manufacturer by profession) when he pointed out that a canal would
"furnish the best and cheapest method of transportation to the Far

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15 Cong. Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 393-394 (May 1, 1900);
16 Rep. William C. Lovering, Cong. Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 4916-
4917 (May 1, 1900); Rep. Charles N. Fowler, Ibid., 56 Cong.,
2 Sess., 1039 (Jan. 15, 1901); George E. Mowry, The California
Progressives, 10.
17 Appel, Labor and Imperialism, 210-215.
East, where there are 800,000,000 people waiting to be better fed and
clothed." Nor was there disagreement when Hepburn announced that an
isthmian canal would "see that position of empire secured to us com-
mercially, politically, among the world powers."

The upshot of this Congressional pressure was the British
decision to renegotiate the abortive Hay-Pauncefoote treaty of 1900.
This treaty had failed to pass the Senate largely because it had not
permitted the United States to fortify any canal that might be built,
an omission that caused Irish-American and German-American groups to
charge that Hay had been duped by the British Foreign Office. But
Hay persisted, and Britain's position on fortification softened.
Dedicated to diplomatic rapprochement with the United States, hard
pressed in the Boer war, and striving to terminate her policy of
"splendid isolation," Britain finally agreed in November, 1901, to
abrogate the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer treaty and extend to America the
legal right to build, fortify and otherwise control an isthmian ca-
nal. Progressives and others hailed the new Hay-Pauncefoote treaty
with joy, and little attention was paid to the article in the agree-
ment that was to cause such difficulty ten year later - namely, a
clause that prohibited toll rate discrimination against non-American

18 Cong. Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 4916;4945 (May 1, 1900); see also
Charles N. Fowler, Ibid., 56 Cong., 2 Sess., 1039 (Jan. 15,
1901); Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, Mar. 8, 1901, Roose-
velt Letters, III, 9; Briggs, William Peters Hepburn, 213;218.
Hepburn also hoped that a calculated use of toll discrimination
in the canal, once built, could be made to stimulate and subsi-
dize the building of a new American merchant marine. Cong.
Record, 1 Sess., Appendix, 12-13 (Jan. 7, 1902).
ships. Representative Hepburn lightly dismissed this restrictive provision with the off-hand comment that the United States would "brush it out of the way pretty soon."

Up until the time the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed almost all Americans assumed that the canal would be built in Nicaragua. By the close of 1901, however, it was clear that the Roosevelt Administration had shifted its interest to a possible site at Panama. Building rights to the Panama location were held from the Colombian Government by the New Panama Canal Company, a French corporation whose agent in the United States, the mysterious Philippe Bunau-Varilla, made it known that for $109,000,000 these rights would be transferred to the United States. Since the Company's leasehold was due to expire in October, 1904, Bunau-Varilla worked assiduously in Washington to sway legislators away from Nicaragua and toward Panama. Not only was the asking price for the lease reduced to $40,000,000, but Bunau-Varilla had the sagacity to employ as his chief lobbyist one William Nelson Cromwell, a Wall Street lawyer well connected in top Republican circles. Cromwell's personal contribution of $60,000 to the G.O.P. campaign chest in 1900 was not unrelated to the fact that the Republican platform had refrained from specifying Nicaragua as the locus of a future canal. Working through Mark Hanna, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla were able, by January, 1902, to convert the Senate to the

\[19\text{Ibid., Appendix, 13 (Jan. 7, 1902).}\]
Panama route. But negotiations with Bogotá for a specific zone bogged down when the Colombian Senate refused to ratify a treaty Hay had signed with Tomás Herrán, Colombian chargé in Washington. From the Colombian point of view, if the United States was willing to pay the Bunau-Varilla company some $40,000,000 for its lease, then certainly a zone six miles wide across the isthmus was worth more than the $10,000,000 stipulated in the Hay-Herrán treaty. By the simple expedient of delaying any deal until October, 1904, the company's lease would expire, and Colombia could sell both the lease and the zone to the United States for considerably more than $10,000,000. There the matter stood until August, 1903, while Roosevelt's blood pressure steadily mounted.

Since Roosevelt was convinced that an isthmian canal was destined to be the "great bit of work" of his Administration, he was furious when the Colombian Senate refused to ratify the Hay-Herrán treaty. He was certain that "the Bogota lot of jack rabbits" should not be allowed to bar the march of civilization in Latin America. Characterizing the recalcitrant Senators as the "foolish and homicidal corruptionists" of a "little wild cat Republic," Roosevelt admitted privately that he would welcome a Panamanian revolution against

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21Roosevelt to John Hay, July 1, 1902, and Aug. 19, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 284;567.
the Colombian Government. Yet he shrank from fomenting such a revolution personally, admitting only that as a friend of liberty he upheld Panama's "right of resistance to grinding oppression."

There was really no need for Roosevelt to promote a revolution in Panama. That job was already being competently handled by Bunau-Varilla and William Nelson Cromwell. All the Roosevelt Administration had to do was prevent the Colombian Government from landing troops on the isthmus if and when the revolution was launched. This it did. Knowledge of the Bunau-Varilla-Cromwell conspiracy and the exact timetable of revolutionary events facilitated and coordinated American intervention in this form.

On November 1, 1903, American warships were dispatched to isthmian waters. On November 3, the day after the U.S.S. Nashville reached Colón, the revolution broke out, and within twenty-four hours the United States had recognized the new Republic of Panama. On November 18 the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty was signed (Bunau-Varilla had conveniently become Panama's first Foreign Minister), which gave the United States a canal zone ten miles wide for $10,000,000 and reduced the new state of Panama to a virtual protectorate of the

22Roosevelt to John Hay, Sept. 15, 1903, Ibid., 599; to Marcus A. Hanna, Oct. 5, 1903, Ibid., 625; to Kermit Roosevelt, Nov. 4, 1903, Ibid., 644; to Albert Shaw, Oct. 7;10, 1903, Ibid., 626; 628. To Shaw he wrote: "Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent State....but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it." Ibid., 628. Roosevelt to Jacob G. Schurman, Sept. 10, 1903, Ibid., 595; see also Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 315-316.

United States. The job was done swiftly and neatly. The New Panama Canal Company got its $40,000,000 and the United States got the Panama right-of-way. On February 23, 1904, the Senate approved the treaty by an overwhelming 66 to 14 margin.

Throughout these stirring and embarrassingly rapid events, Republican progressives enthusiastically followed the President. Roosevelt justified his own behavior in the crisis with the observation, undoubtedly correct, that "the people of the Isthmus are a unit for the Canal, and in favor of separation from the Colombians." This reasoning was accepted by most Americans and by most progressives. George W. Norris, for example, supported T.R.'s canal diplomacy "step by step," and in the House of Representatives Crumpacker and Doolittle took leading roles in rationalizing American intervention. Doolittle professed horror at the suggestion of some Democrats that the United States had acted improperly at Panama:

I have never even taken an interest in those suspicions which have been scattered broadcast over the world. The very nature of the subject makes it morally incredible that the people of the United States should desire to do

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24Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, Nov. 6, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 649; see also Roosevelt's letters to Kermit Roosevelt, Nov. 4, 1903, Ibid., 644; to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, Nov. 9, 1903, Ibid., 651; to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Nov. 15, 1903, Ibid., 652. A more detailed account of the events of early November can be found in Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 315-338.

anything either by indirection or by subterranean methods of any kind...I have got to the point where I propose to stop apologizing for the Government of my own country.26

Essentially, the Dolliver-Crumpacker defense of Roosevelt boiled down to assertions that the Colombian Government was cruel and despotic, that revolutions in Latin America were chronic, and that a canal at Panama would mark an advance of commerce and civilization. Democratic criticism was dismissed as "the empty vaporings of a desperate minority in stress of weather." To the ringing applause of the House galleries, Dolliver reached a high point of idealistic emotionalism when he exclaimed that for Roosevelt "history will reserve...its choicest benediction - well done, thou good and faithful servant of civilization."

But the most frequent argument used by progressives to rationalize American behavior on the isthmus was a legal one that harked back to an 1846 United States treaty with New Granada. It was maintained that Article XXXV of the treaty demanded American

27 Ibid., 1032;1024-1032 (Jan. 22, 1904); Rep. Edgar D. Crumpacker, Ibid., 257-260 (Dec. 15, 1903). Crumpacker pointed out that "by the substitution of Panama for Colombia we will be relieved of many embarrassments and complications that we would otherwise carry" and he urged the Democrats as a party to support, once in a while, "some worthy movement from its beginning." Ibid., 259 (Dec. 15, 1903). For similar views see Roosevelt's letter to David Decamp Thompson, Dec. 22, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 675. Charge and counter-charge dragged on for several years. In his last important speech in the House prior to his death in office, Rep. William C. Lovering defended William Nelson Cromwell as "a warm personal friend" and argued that Cromwell's role in the Panama incident was entirely above reproach. Cong. Rec. 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 2270;2281-2282 (Feb. 12, 1909).
intervention on the isthmus when the treaty right of transit was threatened. New Granada had later become the United States of Colombia and finally, in 1863, the Republic of Colombia. The legal question was whether Article XXXV was still valid despite the several changes of sovereignty. Into this breach stepped Oscar Straus, one of Roosevelt's most loyal and lasting progressive supporters.

At an informal White House luncheon on November 4, 1903, attended by such progressives as H. H. Kohlsatt, the Chicago editor, and Lawrence F. Abbott, editor of The Outlook magazine, Straus argued that the change of sovereignty in no way affected America's rights or obligations under the treaty. In the course of his remarks he spoke of the "covenant running with the land." Roosevelt was instantly captivated by the phrase, and it was later used officially by the Administration to explain American actions. "That's fine!" he cried, "Just the idea!" John Bassett Moore, State Department legal advisor, also thought the Straus phrase apt. "Perhaps, however, it is only a question of words," he wrote Straus a few days later; "that is to say, it is, indifferently, a question of the 'covenant running with the land' or a question of the 'covenant running (away!) with the land!'"

III

A question which immediately concerned the Democracy was whether political advantage might be secured from Roosevelt's use of

28 Straus, Under Four Administrations, 174-176. Roosevelt also wrote Straus a few days after the luncheon: "Your 'covenant running with the land' idea worked admirably. I congratulate you on it."
the Big Stick in the Caribbean and whether specific criticism of Roosevelt's policy in Panama would benefit the party in 1904. Roosevelt faced no such political decision. He simply damned his Panama critics as a "small body of shrill eunuchs who consistently oppose the action of this government whenever that action is to its own interest, even though at the same time it may be immensely to the interest of the world, and in accord with the fundamental laws of righteousness," and moved on to other business.

The Democratic problem was complicated by the fact that the Panama intervention was extremely popular with the American people. Anti-imperialist Moorfield Storey, for example, was horrified at the immorality of Roosevelt's action in Panama, characterizing it as the "most mortifying chapter in the history of the country." But he was vague on just how it might be exploited in the 1904 campaign. The best he could hope for was a "change in public opinion" that would somehow bring about Roosevelt's downfall. Perhaps Representative John Sharp Williams of Mississippi best outlined the practical politics of the Panama question. Writing in Everybody's Magazine in February, 1904, Williams argued that the Democratic party could not condone the infinitely reckless disregard of international law, rights of nations, and customs of civilization illustrated in our recent connection with the birth of the

29 Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Nov. 15, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 652; to Otto Chresham, Nov. 30, 1903, Ibid., 663.
mushroom Republic of Panama - a birth evidently foreseen, provided for, and aided. We are not responsible for what the Republican Administration has already done; we do not endorse it; we do not condone it....A child with a lighted torch in a powder magazine is a dangerous thing. The Presidential cannon is a dangerous weapon to play with, especially when the man, amusing himself by firing it off, sits astride the cannon, with his face to the breech and his back to the muzzle, and sees nothing that is or might be in front of the gun....Amongst honest men, who believe in certain recognized, fundamental principles of international dealings, the so-called Republic of Panama is an abortion - misbegotten, hagborn - a misshapen Caliban among the "independent nations" of the earth....As to the sin and unscrupulousness of it, that is the affair of the Republican Administration; it is not ours....The Democracy, however, is for a canal and is willing to take a canal even at Panama...because it will do the American navy, American commerce, and American industry a vast deal of good even there. The party is not going to permit itself to be thrown by its enemies into an anti-canal attitude.31

In sum, Williams and his party embraced the fruits of imperialism while rejecting the odious method of stripping the tree.

Clearly, the Democracy's characterization of Panama as a "hag-born, ditch-delivered Republic" in no way constituted a determined anti-imperialist stand on the issue. If anti-imperialist sentiment was not dead, then certainly it was rapidly receding from the high water mark of 1899-1900.

Perhaps for this reason foreign policy was really only a peripheral consideration in the 1904 campaign. Whatever the issues


were, it seems clear that the Democracy's timid criticisms of Roosevelt's Caribbean policy failed to stir the voters. Either Americans did not care about diplomacy, or they accepted the Big Stick as a legitimate manifestation of the nation's new role as a world power. Indeed, during the Congressional elections of 1902 a determined effort had already been made within the Democratic party to abandon criticism of Republican foreign policy in favor of a more positive approach to the imperatives of domestic reform.

In a St. Louis Convention that had "about as much excitement and enthusiasm as an undertaking parlor," the Democrats nominated conservative New York Judge Alton B. Parker, and gave him as a running mate a "doddering millionaire reactionary," West Virginia's Henry G. Davis. Liberals, pacifists and anti-imperialists in the party were not happy with a candidate whose Wall Street connections were public knowledge and whose stand on imperialism was vague. Bryan, for example, voted for Parker only because the Democratic platform declared for Philippine independence, against imperialism and called for a reduction of the standing army.

Clearly, Parker's campaign speeches demonstrated that he embraced the anti-imperialist spirit of 1899-1900 and the foreign poli-

34 George Creel, Rebel at Large, 56.
35 Winifred G. Helmes, John A. Johnson, 136; Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, 177.
36 Paxton Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 252.
oy planks of the 1904 platform with little fervor. He agreed with Roosevelt that the United States must secure additional foreign markets if the output of her expanding industrial plant was to be absorbed. He was not sure that independence for the Filipinos would be desirable until some vague future date, and he could only mildly suggest that Roosevelt's methods in Panama were "a source of regret to many." While other Democrats characterized Roosevelt's Panama policy as one of "plunder," and "Jingo warfare," they too shrank from any suggestion that what the President had done should be undone.

In general, Democratic campaigners avoided Panama and other foreign policy questions.

Instead, Bryan launched a slashing attack on what he called "militarism" in America. Recently returned from a trip to Russia where he had absorbed the pacifism of the learned Tolstoy, the Nebraska Colonel who had drawn his sword for the uplift of the oppressed Cubans now spread the alarm that militarism was stalking America.

37 Merle E. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 134; Letter of Acceptance of Alton B. Parker, Sept. 26, 1904 (n.p., n.p., n.d.), 3; 6; 3; 10; 13; see also Two Great Independents Support Judge Parker For the Presidency (n.p., n.p., 1904), 10; 18. The two independents were the New York World and the New York Herald newspapers; see also What Democracy Stands For. Extracts From the Speech of Hon. John Sharp Williams, 4-5; Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 134-136.


39 Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 244-245.
Specifically, he charged that the Republicans were placing soldiers in forts near the large cities in order to coerce labor and intimidate the urban population. It was not much of an issue (Beveridge sarcastically pointed out that there was only two-thirds of a soldier for every thousand citizens), and it stirred little popular interest; but the party stressed the point to the extent of printing and distributing thousands of leaflets quoting a vague disapproval of armaments by Parker and, by way of contrast, an 1899 statement by Roosevelt to the effect that "if we ever grow to regard peace as a permanent condition, and feel that we can afford to let the keen, fearless, virile qualities of heart and mind and body sink into disuse, we will prepare the way for inevitable and shameful disaster in the future."

-Watson, As I Knew Them, 172-173; Roosevelt to Elihu Root, Mar. 7, 1902, Roosevelt Letters, III, 240-241. The militarism argument also took the form that the military establishment occasioned by the emergence of the United States as a world power was simply too expensive to maintain. Hence, America should retire from the world power business and return to the status quo of the 1880's. The money saved could thus be spent on internal improvements. See William E. Smythe, Which is the Party of Irrigation? A Plain Statement of How the Democratic Party Redeemed Its Pledges to the West and How the Republican Party Fought Irrigation to the Last (n.p., n.p., 1904), 14-15; see also Extracts From the Speeches of Hon. Charles A. Culberson and Hon. E. W. Carmack in the Senate and of Hon. Leonidas Livingston and Hon. G. M. Hitchcock, Democrats, and Hon. Theodore Burton, Republican, in the House of Representatives on the Explanation of the Estimated Deficit in the Treasury For the Fiscal Year Ending July 1, 1905 (n.p., n.p., 1905), 1-16.

-Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 213.

-Judge Alton B. Parker on Militarism and Internationalism. From His Speech of Acceptance, Aug. 10, 1904 (n.p., n.p., n.d.), n.p. Actually Parker was so vague on the issue, deploiring armaments but insisting on enough arms to protect American citizens abroad, that Taft said of him: "No one knows what he thinks about anything...he is not in favor of anything and he is not opposed to anything." Henry F. Pringle, Taft, I, 262; see also Two Great Independents Support Judge Parker For the Presidency, 5.
Like their counterparts in the Democratic party Republican progressives did not emphasize foreign policy questions in the 1904 campaign to any great extent. They simply endorsed what Roosevelt had done. In Idaho, William E. Borah stumped the state for Roosevelt with an uncompromising defense of imperialist accomplishments, embracing every facet of it from Cuba Libre to Panama. Charles J. Bonaparte campaigned on the thought that Roosevelt’s adventure in Panama had really brought freedom to the people there, prevented a bloody and destructive civil war and benefited all civilization. To the Democratic promise of a vague sort of isolationism, Republicans responded with eulogies to the "good and faithful servant of civilization."

There is no evidence to indicate that middle western progressive Republicans differed with their party colleagues in any important respect in their attitudes toward Roosevelt’s foreign policy in 1904.

The election resulted in a landslide for Roosevelt and the G.O.P. Parker, in the words of humorist Irvin Cobb, was "defeated by

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43 Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 61-62; see also Pringle, Taft, I, 262-263; Philip O. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 370; Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 212-213. Rep. Henry A. Cooper even claimed that the Philippine war was necessary for American honor: "We were attacked by a bold, adventurous, and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left us except ignominious retreat." Cong. Record, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 2157 (Feb. 20, 1904).

44 Poulke, A Hoosier Autobiography, 126; see also Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 213, in which Beveridge is reported as stating that the party of imperialism had no apologies to make because it was doing the will of God in redeeming downtrodden peoples.

45 Two Great Independents Support Judge Parker For the Presidency, 10; see also Letter of Acceptance of Alton B. Parker, 13. Parker promised, if elected, to "repudiate the role of the American continental policeman" and allow "each American state...to preserve order and otherwise regulate its own internal affairs in its own way." See also Shepard, The Issues of 1904, 28.
acclamation." If the rape of Panama and the Cuban protectorate had not been specifically endorsed, certainly they had not been repudiated. Indeed, post-election analyses showed that many old line Bryanites had abandoned the conservative judge to vote for the more liberal Roosevelt. While this migration was not directly affected by foreign policy questions, it is probable that Roosevelt's personal identification with the emerging progressive protest overshadowed qualms many progressive Democrats might have had about the Big Stick. Indeed, the rather casual progressive reaction to the 1904 announcement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine clearly suggests this.

IV

If American policy in Cuba and Panama undertook to outline a United States sphere of influence in the Caribbean, Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine marked the maturation of the process.

The precise effect of the campaign on the promulgation of Corollary cannot be determined. Certainly, Democratic campaign criti-

46 Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 429.
47 Howe, Moorfield Storey, 235-236; Willis F. Johnson, George Harvey: A Passionate Patriot (New York, 1929), 106;112. Bryan had announced during the campaign that "As soon as the election is over I shall...undertake to organize for the campaign of 1908....the contest for economic reform will begin again as soon as the polls close...." Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 253. Woodrow Wilson, described during this period by his brother-in-law as "near being a progressive Republican," voted without enthusiasm for Parker, but he wanted to purge the Democratic party of its radical economic element, presumably to approach the more balanced and measured reformism emerging under G.O.P. auspices. Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson, II, 161; and Ibid., III, 202.
cism of Roosevelt as a self-constituted "Supervisor and Sponsor of all
the turbulent, chronically revolutionary, bankrupt sham republics of
the Western Hemisphere" whose policies had effected a "grotesque, pre-
posterous and dangerous perversion of the Monroe Doctrine," failed
to arouse the voters. The use of the Big Stick in the Caribbean
seemed almost beyond political controversy. Perhaps for that reason
Roosevelt chose his December 6, 1904, Annual Message to Congress as
the time and place to announce the Corollary.

Stimulated by memory of a cooperative European debt collect-
ing naval expedition against Venezuela in 1902 and a threatened expedi-
tion for similar purposes against a bankrupt and chronically turbu-
 lent Dominican Republic in 1904, Roosevelt explained his Corollary
in the rich language of American idealism. Essentially, it was the
paternalistic doctrine of the Big Brother with a dash of Good Samar-
itanism stirred in:

It is not true [said the President] that the United States
feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards
the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as
are for their welfare. All that this country desires is
to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and
prosperous....Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized
society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the West-
ern Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however re-
luctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or im-
potence, to the exercise of an international police power.
If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show

48Two Great Independents Support Judge Parker For the Presidency,
3-8.
the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt Amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island...all question of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end.49

In general, Republican progressives endorsed this radical interpretation of Monroe's original concept as a logical extension of their interest in moral uplift abroad, and they applauded Roosevelt's seizure of Dominican customs houses. Oscar Straus, for instance, lauded Roosevelt as a great peacemaker and saw no reason why a European nation should be permitted "to go to war to collect a debt at the mouth of a cannon," while Lyman Abbott argued that unless the United States was prepared herself to intervene in Latin America to redress grievances and punish wrong-doing, she could not morally deny that privilege to others. But it was Herbert Croly, writing in 1905, who best expressed progressive thinking on the matter:

The domestic condition of some of the Latin American states presents a serious obstacle to the creation of a stable American international system. Such a system presupposes a condition of domestic peace...there remain a number of minor countries wherein the right of revolution is cherished as the essential principle of their democracy...no American international system will ever be established without the forcible pacification of one or more such centers of disorder....In short, any international American political system might have to undertake a task in states like Venezuela, similar to that which the United States is now performing in Cuba....The United States has already made an effective beginning in this great work, both by the pacification of Cuba and by the attempt to introduce a little order into the affairs of the turbulent Central American republics. The construction of the Panama Canal has given this coun-

49Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 539.
50Oscar S. Straus, The American Spirit, 234-235;237; Brown, Lyman Abbott, 184-185; see also Roosevelt to Elihu Root, Mar. 29, 1908, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 984.
try an exceptional interest in the prevalence of order
and good government in the territory between Panama and
Mexico.51

Party regularity may partially explain why Republican pro-
gressives embraced the moral, strategic and benevolently paternal-
istic implications of the Roosevelt Corollary. Political realism
may explain why progressive Democrats suffered in silence. But it
cannot be denied that Herbert Croly at least spoke for the Republi-
can progressives when he linked a vigorous foreign policy to the
need for an efficient, reform-minded federal government, highly cen-
tralized in its direction and administration, free from internal cor-
rupition and the selfish pressures of special interest groups:

The irresponsible attitude of Americans in respect to
their national domestic problems [said Croly] may in part
be traced to freedom from equally grave international
responsibilities. In truth, the work of internal recon-
struction and amelioration, so far from being opposed to
that of the vigorous assertion of a valid foreign policy,
is really correlative and supplementary thereto; and it
is entirely possible that hereafter the United States
will be forced into the adoption of a really national
domestic policy because of the dangers and duties incurred
through her relations with foreign countries. The in-
creasingly strenuous nature of international competition
and the constantly higher standards of international eco-

domic, technical and political efficiency prescribe a con-
stantly improving domestic political and economic organ-
ization....Its standing as a nation is determined pre-
cisely by its ability to conquer and to hold a dignified
and important place in the society of nations.52

To be sure, the establishment of protectorates and spheres

52Ibid., 310-311. Indeed, the "Big Stick" was so popular a symbol of
the nation's new might that Roosevelt obligingly sent a wooden
club to a Massachusetts benefit for orphans to be used as a prize
in a fund-raising contest. Roosevelt to John B. Tivnan, Mar. 1,
1909, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 1540.
of influence in the interests of national security was not the same thing as territorial annexation, and if America could in a single stroke increase her physical security, find outlets for investment capital, rescue Caribbean peoples from rapine, slaughter and bad government, and at the same time focus attention on the need for domestic reform, few progressives were inclined to carp.

Further, the employment of the Big Stick, while questionable from a standpoint of international political morality, produced better internal conditions in the areas where it was applied. Democrats could and did protest the Roosevelt means, but they did not criticize the ends the Rough Rider sought. They could not deny that some degree of uplift was achieved. Filipinos were undoubtedly better off as American colonists than as Spanish colonists. Panamanians were undeniably better off as citizens of an American protectorate traversed by a wealth-producing canal than as Colombian provincials.

Cubans and Dominicans may have surrendered portions of their national sovereignty, but they received in return a measure of peace, prosperity and political stability. Even William Jennings Bryan, after watching the operation of American policy in Latin America for a decade, could remark to a Peruvian audience in 1910 that "the people of the United States are doing more in an unselfish way for the benefit

of the human race" than any of the world's great powers. Indeed, as Wilson's Secretary of State, Bryan became an enthusiastic proponent of uplift by force in Latin America, and in supporting the missionary diplomacy of his President in the Caribbean, he helped produce more armed interventions than had occurred under Roosevelt.

But this anticipates the story. Additional light must first be thrown on progressive foreign policy attitudes toward East Asia and on the role of the Navy in American diplomacy.

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54 Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 289.
CHAPTER III
THE ROOSEVELT ERA: THE FAR EAST AND THE FLEET

Progressive attitudes toward Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy and his naval building program were in large measure conditioned by the conviction, first set forth during the imperial years, that the annexation of the Philippines would give to the United States a broad gateway to the markets of Asia. As Oscar Straus expressed it, America had reached a new commercial stage in her history, "an offensive as distinguished from a defensive policy...whose aim it is to reach out for our share of the world's commerce." Beveridge, a vigorous foe of free silver, was convinced that the American people were "tired of talking about money, they want to make it," and like other embryonic progressive Republicans he believed that the best place to make it quickly was in the China market. At the same time, the feeling among progressives was strong that once the Philippines were annexed, a great navy would be required to protect the islands as well as America's growing commerce in the Pacific.

Given the economics of Philippine annexation, it was not surprising to find Republican progressives joining with their party

1Oscar S. Straus, The American Spirit, 126.
colleagues in 1899-1900 to support America's Open Door policy in China. Stated in its most idealistic terms, the policy urged the desirability of equal commercial opportunities in China for all the great imperialist trading powers as a deterrent to territorial partition and as a means of preserving the administrative and territorial integrity of China. Clearly, the economic arguments for Philippine annexation would be rendered meaningless if China were partitioned by the European powers or if rigid economic spheres of influence were established there by America's commercial rivals. American penetration of the China market would be impossible under such conditions.

Thus the fundamental question was how to enforce a policy which on the face of it was little more than a polite appeal by Secretary of State John Hay to the powers to respect China's economic, administrative and territorial integrity. Russia in particular was one power that clearly lacked such respect. "What will it avail us to demand open ports in the Orient," asked Indiana's Crumpacker, "unless we have the means to enforce our demands? What good will it do to call a halt upon Russia in the execution of her selfish designs upon the Celestial Empire unless we accompany it with a show of force

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4Straus, The American Spirit, 126; Roosevelt to Herman Speck von Sternberg, Oct. 11, 1901, Roosevelt Letters, III, 172-173; Rep. Charles N. Fowler, Cong. Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 532 (June 2, 1900). Representative Lovering linked the Open Door to the Panama problem. He believed that a canal at Panama would be a "most important step in our retention and defense of our new Eastern possessions," and argued that "if we are going to contend for an open door in the Orient, we certainly ought to have an open gate leading to that open door." Ibid., 57 Cong., 1 Sess., 7161 (June 21, 1902).
that will put her in fear?" The plain answer to this question was that the McKinley Administration initially contemplated placing only moral force behind America's new policy. By 1902, however, Republican progressives could argue that only American possession of the Philippines had permitted the United States to speed troops to north China in time to protect American interests in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion. Indeed, the internal instability of China, coupled with the menacing attitude of Russia (and later Japan) toward the whole principle of the Open Door, persuaded many progressives to abandon the concept of moral power and agitate for a larger navy and for the spirited maintenance of the American presence in the Philippines.

The Philippines, as we have seen, were considered vital to America's economic ambitions in East Asia. For this reason the Philippine Insurrection in 1899 was viewed with considerable alarm by Republican expansionists, for it threatened to crystallize enough sentiment in the United States to force American withdrawal from the island gateway to Asia's riches. Fortunately for the expansionists, however, the anti-imperialist attack of 1899-1900 failed, and after the Republican victory in 1900 the United States Army moved with increasing forcefulness against the insurrectionists while progressives

5Ibid., 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 1037 (Jan. 25, 1899). Progressives who traveled in the Far East during these years pointed to Russia's menace to the Open Door policy. See Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York, 1947), 220-221; Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 155-156; Frederick Palmer, With My Own Eyes: A Personal Story of Battle Years (Indianapolis, 1932), 214.

at home rejoiced that the material, moral and political uplift of
the natives was proceeding on schedule. Thus there was no little
embarrassment in Republican progressive circles when the Army atro-
city scandals came to light in the spring of 1902 and threatened once
again to jeopardize the imperialist position with the American voter.

Basically, the scandal centered on the charge that American
Army officers had forced large quantities of water down the throats
of captured insurgents in an effort to extract military information
from them. In addition to the "water cure," it was also charged that
the Army had adopted the methods of "Butcher" Weyler in utilizing con-
centration camps for the detention of Filipinos suspected of giving
aid and comfort to the insurgents. In addition, strong rumors of
American brutality in the islands appeared verified when an order
from General Jacob H. Smith to his soldiers to "kill and burn and
make a howling wilderness of Samar" was intercepted by the press and
reproduced widely in the United States. By May, 1902, charges and
counter-charges filled the political air.

Republican progressives wholly supported the Administration
and its record in the Philippines. Senator Beveridge, for example,
devoted some twenty-five pages of the Congressional Record to an
evaluation of the alleged atrocities. The Indiana orator denied the
allegations of Army brutality and torture outright. He pictured Army

7Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Ibid., Appendix, 462 (June 19, 1902); Sen.
Knute Nelson, Ibid., 1974-1980 (Feb. 20, 1902); Pinchot, Breaking
New Ground, 230-231; Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and
Labor, II, 327-328.
personnel as kind and helpful in their dealings with the untrustworthy and wretched natives. He argued that the concentration camps were comfortable and humane and a military necessity. And he once again sang the hymn to imperialism, stressing the commercial, strategic and moral value of the islands to the American people. Other incipient progressives in the party denounced insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo as "a colossal egotist, a consummate demagogue, a constitutional agitator," defended the "law of reprisal" against Filipino atrocities, charged that the whole issue had been concocted by "men saturated with political prejudices," and urged that American regeneration of the miserable natives proceed as planned. Perhaps the most disarming defense of the American fighting man in the Philippines came from Senator Nelson. How could there be criticism, he asked, of soldiers so docile and un-warlike that they sat around their campfires singing "Do They Miss Me at Home?" "The Girl I Left Behind Me," and "Just Before the Battle, Mother"? From Manila, Gifford Pinchot, later a leading progressive and conservationist in the G.O.P., assured Roosevelt that his on-the-scene contact with the much maligned soldiers had convinced him that "the officers are manly, upright, clear-eyed, honest gentlemen, and the men of so high a grade that it makes me proud to be an American everytime I see them."

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8 Cong. Rec. 57 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 267-292 (June 3, 1902).
10 Ibid., 1979 (Feb. 20, 1902).
11 Pinchot, Breaking New Ground, 228.
Roosevelt was somewhat more realistic about the whole thing. In July he forced the controversial General Smith into retirement. Having examined the evidence in the case he admitted privately that "not a few of the officers...and not a few of the enlisted men" had, after much provocation by the treacherous natives, used the "old Filipino method of mild torture, the water cure," but that "nobody was seriously damaged, whereas the Filipinos had inflicted incredible tortures upon our own people."

With the discharge of General Smith and the vigorous defense of American policy in the Philippines by the Republicans, the controversy gradually died down. An attempt by the Democrats to inject the question into the November Congressional elections produced no visible political result. By 1906 Representative George W. Norris could boast that at a cost of thousands of American lives, the United States had brought freedom, justice, education, sanitation and commercial betterment to the Filipinos. Except for the quadrennial demand of the Democracy that the Filipinos be given their independence, the issue virtually passed from politics after 1902.

Yet by 1907 Theodore Roosevelt, who had vigorously fought for annexation in 1899, was characterizing the islands as "our heel

13Proceedings of the Young Men's Democratic League...October 31, 1902...Atlanta, Georgia, passim; Cong. Rec, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., 3353 (Mar. 27, 1902); Beveridge, The Meaning of the Times, 200-215; George E. Mowry, The California Progressives, 130; Roosevelt Letters, III, 373, f.n.
of Achilles" and urging that the United States either get rid of them or build a fleet large enough to defend them. In a revealing letter to Taft he stated his fears clearly:

I think we shall have to be prepared for giving the islands independence of a more or less complete type much sooner than I think advisable from their own standpoint, or than I would think advisable if this country were prepared to look ahead fifty years and to build the navy and erect the fortifications which in my judgment it should. The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous.... Personally I should be glad to see the islands made independent, with perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order....I would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress.15

This rather significant shift of attitude on the part of the President was conditioned by several factors. First, the American presence in the Philippines had not produced a springboard to the markets of Asia. In spite of the vigor and tenacity of annexationist arguments and the investment of several thousand American lives in the bushwacking war against Aquinaldo, control of the Philippines had not contributed significantly to the realization of the commercial dream that saw an American cotton shirt on the back of every Chinese. Nor had the corollary to annexation, the Open Door policy, produced any significant increase in Sino-American trade. Further, the rapid rise of Japan to great power status, coupled with a worsening of American-Japanese relations after 1905 (primarily over immigration questions), raised the very real question of whether the islands could

15Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, Aug. 21, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, V, 761-762; see also Sen. Albert J. Beveridge, Cong. Record, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 5016 (Apr. 21, 1908).
be adequately defended in event of war. It was this gnawing thought; as we shall see, that produced considerable support in progressive circles for an expanded naval building program.

The menace of Japan to America's interests in China emerged rather suddenly after 1905. Prior to that year Russia appeared to represent the greatest threat to the American principle of commercial equality in East Asia. Particularly in Manchuria did America's commercial ambitions seem endangered by the imperialist program of the Tsarist Government, a threat Roosevelt watched with evident frustration:

We disclaim any intent to interfere with the political future of Manchuria [he declared in 1903]. All we ask is that our great and growing trade shall not be interrupted and that Russia shall keep its solemn promises... and not prevent the Chinese from giving us the rights for which we have fought in connection with the open-door policy.... The mendacity of the Russians is something appalling. The bad feature of the situation from our standpoint is that as yet it seems that we cannot fight to keep Manchuria open. I hate being in the position of seeming to bluster without backing it up.16

The fact that American opinion would not support a war against a great power in eastern Asia for commercial goals clearly dictated a diplomacy of caution. Unlike the situation in the Caribbean, Roosevelt knew that the Russians were no threat to America's physical security and that public opinion in the United States would not sustain a vigorous policy against them. For this reason he sought closer relations with Japan, visualizing the Japanese as an anti-Rus-

16Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, June 22, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, III, 497; to Lyman Abbott, June 22, 1903, Ibid., 500-501; to John Hay, May 22, 1903, Ibid., 478.
sian counterweight in Manchuria, and, as such, an unofficial handmaid-
en of America's Open Door policy. Thus he secretly welcomed Japan's
attack on Russia in February, 1904, hoping that the Russo-Japanese War
would end in a stalemate with both participants so uniformly weak that
the Open Door in Manchuria and north China would be inviolate for
years. It was this policy of "balanced antagonisms" that persuaded
Roosevelt to undertake the role of peacemaker at Portsmouth in 1905
when it appeared that Russia might be able to salvage a decisive vic-
tory from her initial defeats.

More important, however, the impressive power shown by the
Japanese navy during the early stages of the war raised in Roosevelt's
mind the specter of a future Japanese attack on the Philippines. Con-
sequently, he was eager to negotiate the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement
of 1905 which recognized Japan's suzerainty over Korea (an accom-
plished fact) in return for a Japanese disavowal of any aggressive
intentions toward the Philippines.

Roosevelt's attempt to enlist Japan in an anti-Russian
front failed for two major reasons. First, considerable bad feeling
was generated at the Portsmouth negotiations when the Japanese blamed
Roosevelt for their failure to incorporate a heavy indemnity provi-
sion into the settlement with Russia. But more significantly, the
immigration question that came to a head in 1907 produced a bitter-

\[17\] The interpretation put forward in this and the preceding paragraph
are based primarily on Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian
Rivalry in the Far East (Philadelphia, 1946), 100-130; and A.
Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States
(New York, 1938), 87-132.
ness between the two nations that approached the proportion of a war scare. This in turn stimulated American concern for the safety of the Philippines and encouraged demands for naval expansion.

The attitude of progressives toward the American-Japanese war scare of 1907 can be stated succinctly. They favored Asiatic exclusion and they saw the Navy as the strong right arm of American diplomacy in the Pacific.

The problem of oriental immigration was not a new one in the years 1906-1908. Indeed, fear of oriental migration to America extended well back into the 1870's. In those years, vigorous opposition to Chinese immigration had cut across all social, economic and political divisions in America and had produced a series of Chinese exclusion acts in the 1880's and 1890's. The diplomatic implications of Chinese exclusion were nil. China was not a great power. But the growth of Japanese immigration to California in the late 1890's was another matter. Japan was emerging as a major power, and the Japanese Government clearly resented the concept of racial inferiority implicit in the renewed agitation against the "Yellow Peril."

Almost without exception American progressives were caught up in the psychology of "Yellow Peril." While they were not unique in this regard, it seems clear that their anti-oriental prejudices were related to the strong sense of Anglo-Saxon racial destiny and superiority they had manifested during the imperial years. On the domestic scene, something of this attitude was revealed in their indifference to Jim Crow laws, poll taxes and other practices that effectively reduced the American Negro to a status of a second-class
citizenship. In any event, as late as 1904 muckrakers like Charles F. Holder were still charging that the Chinese already in America could not be assimilated, and by 1906 progressive Republicans on the west coast were in the vanguard of a shrill attempt to alert the nation to the menace of the new "Yellow Peril" from Japan.

The intellectual mentor of the progressives on the race question was the University of Wisconsin's Edward A. Ross. Urging a higher birth rate for Anglo-Saxons, Professor Ross warned in 1908 that only more intensive breeding would preserve the ability of the western nations to restrain control of the vast African, Australian, and South American areas they have staked out as preserves to be peopled at their leisure with the diminishing overflow of their population. If under-breeding should leave them without the military strength that alone can defend their far-flung frontiers in the Southern Hemisphere, those huge under-developed regions will assuredly be filled with the children of the brown and the yellow races, and the whites will contribute less than they ought to the blood of the ultimate race that is to possess the globe.19

Against a background of what was fearfully visualized as the impending domination of the world by inferior races, progressives in both parties demanded that existing laws relating to Chinese exclu-


sion be made applicable to Japanese. They appealed to the spirit of progressivism with the argument that they sought only to protect the living standards of the American worker. They charged that only the most corrupt elements of Big Business (already under attack by progressives on numerous other fronts) favored the continued immigration of cheap Japanese labor, an accusation similar to one used by liberal and labor elements during the anti-Chinese agitation three decades earlier.

The main locus of the anti-Japanese feeling naturally centered in California. In October, 1906, this sentiment was intensified and quasi-legalized when the city of San Francisco passed an act aimed at segregating Japanese children in the city's schools. This humiliation was followed by anti-Japanese riots in the city. These events contributed to a rapid and alarming deterioration in American-Japanese relations and caused Roosevelt to move vigorously in an attempt to secure repeal of the offensive ordinance. At the same time the President made every effort to assuage the sensibilities of the Tokyo government. He pointed out to them the constitu-

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20 Ira V. Brown, Lyman Abbott, 186; Edward A. Ross, Seventy Years of It, 244; Roosevelt to William Kent, Feb. 4, 1909, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 1503; Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 161-162; Steffens to Joseph Steffens, Aug. 27, 1907, The Letters of Lincoln Steffens, I, 187; Mowry, The California Progressives, 164.

tional difficulties of enforcing federal attitudes on state and local
governments in the United States, and he urged Japan to make a con-
tribution to peace by ceasing the issuance of passports to Japanese
laborers bound for the United States.

Roosevelt did not want a war with Japan. He did, however,
urge extensive preparations for war, and he used the possibility of
hostilities to popularize the concept of Big Navy and at the same
time discredit peace elements in the United States who (rather con-
tradictorily, it seemed to the President) favored Japanese exclusion
but opposed an adequate naval building program. Since one of Roo-
sevelt's great achievements in office was a naval building program
that doubled the size of the fleet and put it on a basis of battle-
readiness, it is not surprising to discover that the progressive fol-
lowers of the President were decidedly Navy-conscious. Indeed, many
progressives viewed the Navy as the best means of ensuring peace and
supporting American diplomacy, and they agreed with Roosevelt that
unless the United States maintained a decent naval establishment in
the Pacific the Philippines would indeed remain the "Achilles heel"
of the nation.

Thus to the relationship of navalism and progressivism we
must now briefly turn.

22 The standard history of these events is Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis (Stanford, Calif.,
1934), drawn on here throughout by the present writer; see also
23 Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, July 1, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, V,
699; to Andrew Carnegie, Jan. 22, 1909, Ibid., VI, 1479; Straus,
During the period of the Roosevelt Administration, the battlefleet of the United States Navy was a source of continuing pride to progressives. Not only did it manifest something of the growing national virility of America as a world power, but it upheld (as the war with Spain had clearly demonstrated) the long arm of American justice abroad. It was believed that a nation dedicated to an idealistic foreign policy should maintain some appearance of force behind its idealism. Thus to the progressive mind the fleet could serve much the same function as the six-shooters of a federal marshal in a wild frontier town. It could police the peace, ensure justice and national security, extend and protect the rights and interests of American citizens abroad, and generally uphold good against evil in a world of sin. As Oscar Straus approvingly quoted the American humorist, Silas Larrabee, "if we're goin' to keep on in the world-power business, hadn't we butter put on some world-power clothes, and take on world-power ways?" To American progressives the answer to this question was enthusiastically affirmative.

Liberals and progressives in both parties, from inland as well as coast states, supported the naval building program of Roosevelt. Actually, opposition to navalism more frequently came from political conservatives than from liberals. Oklahoma's Democratic

25 Curti, Peace or War, 220; see also Rep. Joseph M. Dixon, Cong. Record, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 4249 (Apr. 4, 1904); James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York, 1946), 64.
Senator Robert L. Owen expressed the progressives' view of the Navy well when he maintained that "a great navy is obviously of supreme importance to the United States in order to maintain its relative dignity, its relative rank of naval power with the other great nations of the world. It is a question of relative strength, and the history of the world records that no nation is respected in the same degree when it has not the power to enforce at the cannon's mouth, if necessary, its just and righteous demands." And progressive Republican Representative George A. Pearre of Maryland was casting a glance back at the Spanish War as well as keeping a weather eye open for international storms ahead when he demanded an effective and efficient Navy for use "in future wars of righteousness and for the elevation of the rights of mankind."

As we shall see in a later chapter, there were some peace progressives (men like William Jennings Bryan, Oswald Garrison Villard and David Starr Jordan) who believed, as the first decade of the new century drew to a close, that wars were really a thing of the barbarous past, and that the increasing enlightenment of men and nations precluded a reversion to organized slaughter. But most progressives continued to feel that the United States was living in a world in which war was an inevitable occurrence. Given the nature of this

\[\text{footnotes:}
\begin{align*}
26\text{Cong. Record, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 5277 (Apr. 27, 1908).} \\
27\text{Ibid., 57 Cong., 1 Sess., 5609 (May 17, 1902); see also Sen. Albert J. Beveridge, Ibid., 61 Cong., 2 Sess., 6602-6603 (May 20, 1910).} \\
\text{"Large armies," said Minnesota's Charles R. Davis, "at least of civilized nations...have a tendency to keep peace throughout the civilized world." Ibid., 59 Cong., 1 Sess., 2780 (Feb. 21, 1906).}
\end{align*}\]
world, America obviously had a continuing obligation to maintain a respectable military posture. It was also necessary, some argued, to recognize the fact that the American people were as quick tempered and belligerent as the peoples of other nations. Indeed, since Americans might at any moment insist on war, as they had in 1898, the nation should at all times be prepared to fight. As Iowa's Representative Hepburn stated it,

Those who favor an adequate navy do so because they recognize the fact that the American people are a warlike people. Every generation of Americans has had its war, as probably every generation will. There is a passion for military glory in the breast of all Americans....every man knows that if an insult comes to our Government from any foreign government, there will be reparation or war. Why talk about peace when we recognize that fact? The war spirit that is in the hearts, ah, in the blood of young America would force any administration into hostility.  

Arguing from another viewpoint, California's progressive Republican Representative William Kent, no admirer of imperialism, war, or the muscular foreign policy of his party, pointed out that as long as mankind lacked the "ordinary good manners that are necessary to secure peace," and that as long as the United States indulged in "coconut trees, mangoes, bubonic plague and dependencies," and insisted on "possessing such luxuries as Philippines, doctrines, and bad manners," he too would have to vote for more battleships.  

28 Ibid., 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 1307 (Jan. 22, 1909). This view was essentially similar to that of the professional military; see Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Our American Shipping. Address Before The Old Settlers Club, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Feb. 22, 1908 (Milwaukee, The Old Settlers Club, 1908), 7-8.  
The most persistent argument heard from progressive advocates of a great navy was that it was the surest guarantor of peace in a war-filled world. The theme was an old one in naval and legislative circles, and it continued to posit the thesis that a nation armed was a nation unlikely to be attacked by an aggressor. Progressive Republicans like James R. Garfield and Gifford Pinchot fully agreed with the President that "it is just as complete a dereliction of duty to fail to build up the navy and army, to fail to hold ourselves ready to resist aggression from without, as it is a dereliction of duty to fail to reform abuses that exist within our own borders." Similarly, Oscar Straus, a leading figure in both the peace movement and the progressive movement, felt that "a great country such as ours, with a tremendous seacoast and with great international interests, can best serve the cause of peace...by a navy adequate in strength and efficiency to give it the proper weight in the promotion of peace in the council of nations." While Senator Beveridge approached the ridiculous with his assertion that the Spanish war would never have occurred had the United States had "only two more


31 Roosevelt to James R. Garfield, Feb. 16, 1909, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 1825; see also Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, Sept. 11, 1905, Ibid., V, 19.

battleships," the idea of arming for peace was dogma for many progressives.

The Navy was believed to have several more specific duties. It should be ready to defend the coasts against enemy attack, to assist in the extension of American commerce abroad by protecting the merchant marine that some day would be built, and to help hold ajar the diplomatic door to the commerce of China. After all, said Representative Hepburn in 1905, "that's what the navy is for." The Navy was also expected to protect America's commercial and imperialist position in Latin America and maintain the integrity of the Roosevelt


34 Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 293; Rep. William P. Hepburn, Cong. Record, 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 1307 (Jan. 22, 1909); Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Ibid., 61 Cong., 1 Sess., 2925 (June 7, 1909); Sen. Miles Poindexter, Ibid., 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 8649 (July 5, 1912). Poindexter looked toward Europe and Asia and remarked: "the struggle for existence becomes more acute in the great nations bordering upon those oceans. We are compelled to be prepared to defend ourselves."

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Given the unusually high esteem in which the progressives held the Navy, it was perhaps no accident that the naval establishment was virtually untouched by the muckraking movement. This did not mean that there were no critics of the Navy. There were, and some of them were progressives. What it does suggest, however, is the fact that progressive criticism of the Navy was designed primarily to expose its weakness and lack of readiness for war rather than unearth corruption for the sake of corruption. What little criticism there was was constructive. The progressives simply wanted to make certain that when called upon the fleet could serve effectively as what Representative Kent called the "brass knuckles" of civilization.

In this context it must be recalled that the first real grouping of Senate Republican progressives in the struggle against the standpatters came when men like La Follette, Borah, Cummins and


Dixon, all middle western or western progressives, rallied together to strip the 1909 naval appropriations bill of some of its pork and ensure that the money to be spent would actually be expended on the fighting effectiveness of the fleet. As La Follette put it: "Every principle of naval warfare requires that this government should have one of its most important stations at Guantanamo, Cuba. But we have no Senator from Guantanamo, and so we have no harbor there."

Middle western progressive support of the Navy was also demonstrated in 1908 when Senators Owen, Borah, Burkett, Bourne, Beveridge and Doolittle all voted in favor of Roosevelt's radical and controversial four-battleship demand.

The progressives also saw in advocacy of legitimate naval appropriations an opportunity to advance significant progressive concepts. Specifically, they lauded the labor efficiency of the eight-hour day that prevailed in government-owned navy yards, and they worked to extend the principle to private shipyards holding naval building contracts.

On the other hand, the few progressive critics of the Navy justified their opposition to naval appropriations with the hopeful
argument that since there were likely to be no more wars in which Americans would be involved, the battlefleet was an expensive luxury. Republican Representative Asle J. Gronna of North Dakota, for example, pointed out that 2,000 rural delivery routes could be operated for 15 years for the cost of one battleship, while Democratic Representative John Lind of Minnesota professed shock to learn that the $100,000,000 naval appropriation for 1905 equaled the entire value of the wheat crop in Minnesota and North Dakota for the same year. Other progressive critics of naval building charged that the construction of battleships was simply a plot to provide luxurious quarters for naval officers, and that naval recruiting offices were too frequently located over saloons.

While we have seen that there was relatively little muckraking of the Navy by the progressives, the DuPont-dominated "powder trust" attracted their attention to a somewhat larger degree. The trust sold powder to the Navy Department at a fixed, non-competitive rate, a condition which encouraged some progressives to insist that either the federal government enter the powder business or institute

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42 Ibid., 4430 (Apr. 8, 1910); Ibid., 58 Cong., 3 Sess., 2942 (Feb. 20, 1905). Lind represents an interesting study in contradictions: An anti-imperialist in the Far East, an imperialist in the Western Hemisphere, he wanted a "good efficient navy" but never voted for one. Compare Ibid., 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 4458 (Apr. 7, 1904); and Ibid., 1004-1005 (Jan. 21, 1904). One Senator, Maine's reactionary Republican Eugene Hale suggested that money might be saved, not by building fewer battleships, but by reducing them slightly in size! Howe, George von L. Meyer, 439.

an anti-trust suit against DuPont. It was charged that the Navy was being gouged on the price of powder and that from the point of view of national security it was both dangerous and immoral to rely on powder producers who were also selling the commodity to America's potential enemies.

From time to time during the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, resolutions were introduced in Congress to establish a government monopoly on the manufacture of explosives. But legislative attempts to prevent the Navy from buying powder from any "trust or combination in restraint of trade," and even an anti-trust suit against DuPont instituted by Taft, came to naught. Nor did the government go into the powder business despite one progressive Republican's assurance that "give me a great big high fence, tin roof and a few tanks, and a few chemicals, and men to handle them, and I can start a powder plant....It is almost as simple as making country soap, if only you know how."

Perhaps the most interesting sideline on the powder trust question was the fact that none of the progressives during the first decade of the century saw the trust as a greedy fomenter of wars for profit. The image of the warmongering munitions maker, so vivid in

middle-western peace progressive circles after 1914, was simply not present. Criticism of the powder trust centered almost exclusively on concern for economy in peacetime and national security in wartime, and evil motives were not ascribed to the DuPont monopolists.

Such, briefly, was the status of the Navy in the progressive mind when Roosevelt in 1908 asked Congress to step up the battleship building program from two to four dreadnoughts per year, a plea clearly related to the growing crisis in American-Japanese relations.

By and large, Republican progressives in Congress supported Roosevelt's request for four dreadnoughts. On the other hand, progressive Democrats took very little part in the debates; but they loyally voted with their party to whittle down the President's demands, and, in combination with Republican conservatives, they were instrumental in ultimately defeating the four-battleship proposal. In general, then, the greatest support for Roosevelt's crash building program came from progressives in his own party.

Arguing vigorously for the four battleships, Senator Beveridge assured the chamber that "a big navy ensures peace," and he pleaded with his colleagues not to "haggle about the few million dollars that we must spend." Representative Everis A. Hayes of California revealed the thinking of west coast progressives when he called

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45 Cong. Rec., 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 5169; 5174 (Apr. 24, 1908); Ibid., 5291 (Apr. 27, 1908); see also Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 189; Cox, Journey Through My Years, 97-98; Howe, George von L. Meyer, 362-363; Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis, 82-83; Roosevelt to John C. O'Loughlin, Nov. 13, 1908, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 1342.
attention to the recent arrival there of 5,000 Japanese immigrants, pointed to California's "defenseless condition" and argued that "a few million dollars for the erection of battleships is a very small price to pay for peace...upon the Pacific Ocean." So insistent were some of the Congressional demands for a larger fleet that progressive Democrat Senator Owen felt obliged to assure sensitive London quarters that the United States did not aim at naval parity with Britain; indeed, America would be content to have only the second largest navy in the world.

It seems clear that progressive agitation for an expanded naval building program was in part related to their concern over the rising naval power of Japan and the increasing vulnerability of the Philippines. Representative Crumpacker, for example, identified the islands as "our element of weakness...in a conflict with a foreign power," and Herbert Croly pointed out that while they could not "be defended from Japan except by the maintenance of a fleet in Pacific waters at least as large as the Japanese fleet," they should be retained nonetheless for "the political advantage of keeping the American people alive to their interests...in the Far East." Indeed, suggestions that the United States surrender or neutralize the Philippines in the interests of peace with Japan brought dire predictions.

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46 Cong. Rec. 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 4800 (Apr. 15, 1908).
48 Ibid., 59 Cong., 2 Sess., 909 (Jan. 10, 1907); Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, 309; Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis, 229;231;236; see also Rep. Everis A. Hayes, Cong. Rec. 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 4800 (Apr. 15, 1908); Sen. Albert J. Beveridge, Ibid., 5016 (Apr. 21, 1908).
of the collapse of America's moral and strategic position in the Pacific, and as late as 1913-1914 progressive Representative James Wesley Bryan of Bremerton, Washington, still spoke feelingly of the need to maintain "caucasian authority in the Pacific."

There is no sense [he said] in talking about moving our boundary in a little bit and thinking that will give us safety. If we give away the Philippines...then next we will be asked to give away the Hawaiian Islands, and then the Aleutian Islands and Alaska and foreign nations will own them all, and we will get into our shell and be safe. Any such policy as that is ridiculous. What will become of the statesmanship and the accomplishments of our fathers? I say we ought to put our battleships into the Pacific...and go forward with a firm hand for the commercial advancement of the country....The United States is going to keep the Philippine Islands until all of us are dead; there is no question about that....No one is going to consent to the ridiculous proposition of quitting the Pacific Ocean.49

The Bryan approach, however, was sometimes overdone, and with men like Wisconsin's Henry A. Cooper drawing mental pictures of Japanese warships shelling west coast cities, some peace progressives cynically called attention to the apparent fact that "Every time the naval bill is up we hear of the war with Japan."50

Nonetheless, Roosevelt received vigorous support on the four-battleship bill of 1908 from such Congressional progressives as Owen, Borah, Burkett, Bourne, Beveridge, Crumpacker, Dolliver and Hayes, and even though the conservatives and economizers won out, the fight for

49 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 16616-16617 Oct. 14, 1914); see also Ibid., 16092 (Oct. 2, 1914); Ibid., 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 1983-1984 (June 10, 1913).
50 Ibid., 61 Cong., 1 Sess., 2925 (June 7, 1909).
the battleships united the Republican progressives in Congress and impressed them with a sense of their power. "It was a glorious victory after all," wrote Beveridge. "It is the last victory of the old gang. By next year we will be strong enough to do things."

Roosevelt had already decided not to wait until "next year" on the question of resolving the crisis with Japan. For this reason he linked his demand for four battleships with a decision to send the existing battlefleet around the world, to "show the flag" in the western Pacific. Undoubtedly, this was the tour de force of the entire crisis.

Progressives of both parties joined with Americans at large in their enthusiasm for the voyage. Californians greeted it with "shouts of patriotic acclaim" because it gave them a "sense of security." Even the bitterly anti-imperialistic and militantly pacifistic New York Nation exulted in the thought that the fleet was "more active for peace than for war in leaving a trail of international good will along both coasts of Latin America." Beveridge re-

52 Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 282. The New York Telegram took a straw vote among editors and publishers on the four-battleship proposal. Of 162 editors who filled out and returned their "battleship proposals," 126 favored building four dreadnoughts. Among these were many editors supporting Bryan in the 1908 campaign. See Cong. Record, 60 Cong, 1 Sess., 5161 (Apr. 24, 1908).

53 Rep. Everis A. Hayes, Ibid., 4800 (Apr. 15, 1908). Throughout the naval debates of 1908 Roosevelt had the firm support of California progressive Democrat Franklin K. Lane, destined to be Secretary of the Interior in Woodrow Wilson's Cabinet. See Ann Winternute Lane and Louise Herrick Wall, eds., The Letters of Franklin K. Lane (New York, 1922), 68-69; see also Brown, Lyman Abbott, 186.

54 Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis, 272; see also Straus, Under Four Administrations, 336;337-338.
marked that in showing South Americans the "power that is behind our justice," America's policy of "peace by force" would "result ultimately in a continental solidarity, an American sisterhood of nations ....in the greatest possible benefit for our mutual commerce and for the peace of the world." Indeed, the fleet voyage seemed so popular in progressive circles that Roosevelt identified as reactionaries all who opposed it. "At the moment," he wrote Taft, "the attack of the high financiers on me takes the shape of objection to the fleet going to the Pacific. But I am commander in chief!"

Roosevelt's decision to show the flag in Japan actually had little to do with mitigating American-Japanese tension. To be sure, the fleet was received with great popular acclaim in Tokyo, but the real basis for peace had been achieved at least nine months before the President's November, 1907, decision to dispatch the vessels. In February, 1907, San Francisco rescinded the obnoxious segregation order, and the Japanese Government, in the famous "Gentleman's Agreement," agreed to issue no more passports to Japanese laborers bound for Hawaii or the continental United States. By July, Roosevelt himself seems to have regarded the crisis solved and was

55 Cong. Rec., 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 5016 (Apr. 21, 1908). Beveridge was right. In March, 1909, a contemplated attack by Nicaragua on San Salvador was thwarted by the dispatch of naval units to Central American waters. "Our navy is much respected in South America since the voyage of the fleet," remarked George von L. Meyer. Howe, George von L. Meyer, 427-428;429.

56 Roosevelt to William H. Taft, Sept. 5, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, V, 784.
content to view the fleet voyage simply as a good-will tour and a training exercise.

As the events of 1907-1908 receded into history, however, Roosevelt began to interpret his fleet decision as having cowed the Japanese into sweet reasonableness, as having preserved peace by a show of force, an act, he calculated, "worth five hundred peace palaces and arbitration treaties." By 1911, he was arguing that "our navy...has just one overmastering reason for its existence, (as Professor Ross of the University of Wisconsin and I agreed when talking over the subject the other day) and that reason is the absolute necessity of saving our working people from the effects of Asiatic immigration to this continent."

Whatever the President's later explanation of his course of action against Japan, the fact seems clear that his diplomacy in eastern Asia was marked by considerable caution throughout his entire Administration. Unlike the Caribbean, where America's imperialism flowed into a virtual power vacuum, the United States faced powerful opposition to its interests in China. The American people did not want a war with either Russia or Japan, and if the defeat of the four-battleship bill in 1908 was any indication, they were unwilling to make modest provision even to defend the Philippines. Perhaps for these reasons Roosevelt again resorted to the executive agree-

57Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, July 10, 1907, Ibid., 709; Palmer, With My Own Eyes, 270-271.
58Roosevelt to Hiram Price Collier, June 20, 1911, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 292.
ment to throw additional paper fortifications around the islands, and to secure from Japan further statements of support for the Open Door. In November, 1908, the famous Root-Takahira Agreement was initiated. Japan once again disavowed any aggressive intentions toward the Philippines and reaffirmed her dedication to the Open Door principle. In return, Roosevelt acquiesced in what was virtually a free hand for Japan in Manchuria. The retreat from Asia had begun. Save for the attempted holding action of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy in China, the long road to Pearl Harbor stretched ahead.

III

Once again, as a presidential campaign approached, the Democrats were perplexed on how to challenge the man who so successfully combined reform at home with Big Stick diplomacy abroad. Since 1904 the Roosevelt Administration could claim credit for instituting 44 anti-trust suits. It had also pushed through the Hepburn Act, the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act, and it had undertaken a vigorous and popular campaign for the conservation of natural resources. Even the political timing of the dispatch of the battlefleet had been masterful, and as the American people went to the polls in 1908 the fleet was making a triumphant procession between the ports of the world. It returned to New York in February, 1909, just in time to usher the Roosevelt Administration out of office in a salvo of martial glory.

Roosevelt was strongly urged by some of the party progressives to make the race again himself, but he had announced after his
victory in 1904 that he would not seek a third "elective" term and he publicly repeated this statement in December, 1907. There was some passing interest generated in the possible candidacy of Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New York, who had recommended himself to some progressives by his vigorous clean-up of corrupt practices in New York life insurance companies, but Roosevelt had no confidence in Hughes on foreign policy questions - "the anti-imperialists of every grade are with him with a whoop," he declared suspiciously.

The clear fact was that Roosevelt had already hand-picked his successor, his Secretary of War, the fat and amiable William Howard Taft. "There's more red blood in Taft's little finger than in Hughes' whole body," T.R. told one acquaintance, and he was quite prepared to impose his selection on the Republican party. Given Roosevelt's own withdrawal, however, Taft was actually the first choice of the party progressives, and his nomination was, according to Victor Rosewater, "an achievement of the liberal, or progressive, wing of the Republican party over strenuous resistance of the stalwarts."

The Republican convention was a cut and dried affair. Taft
was speedily nominated. The platform endorsed Roosevelt's foreign policy and called for lower tariffs, enforcement of anti-trust legislation and a furthering of Roosevelt's conservation policies. For Vice President, the convention nominated James S. ("Sunny Jim") Sherman of New York, a conservative political hack friendly to the reactionary wing of the party, although Taft's personal choice for a running mate was Senator Dolliver or "some western senator who has shown himself conservative and at the same time represents the progressive movement." It was not a strong ticket, but the vigorous campaign the popular Roosevelt made for Taft spelled the difference.

The Democrats again nominated William Jennings Bryan and gave him a platform emphasizing the party's lower tariff and anti-trust attitudes. Bryan, who had previously embraced free silver, anti-imperialism, anti-militarism and the government ownership of railroads as campaign issues, and who had at various times since 1896 come out publicly and positively for virtually every suggested progressive reform proposal, inexplicably abandoned all of these potential issues in 1908 and campaigned in favor of God and the government guarantee of bank deposits.

Since Bryan and the Democratic party had little to offer the voters that the Republicans were not already offering, the campaign was a dull and listless affair marked only by the Commoner's

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64 Henry F. Pringle, Taft, 354.
covert attempt to exploit the fact that Taft was a Unitarian and, hence, presumably not a believer in the divinity of Christ. Indeed, the intellectual core of Bryan's third run for the presidency was his oft-delivered "Prince of Peace" speech which had as its central message the idea that "until you can explain a watermelon, do not be too sure that you can set the limits to the power of the Almighty...."

It was not a very elevating or educational performance, and many progressive Democrats either voted the straight ticket out of sheer party loyalty or went over reluctantly to Taft.

Foreign policy questions played little part in the 1908 election. As in 1904, the Democrats generally avoided the issue. Indeed, a revealing statement by Grover Cleveland, written just before the ex-President's death in June, 1908, was circulated by the party in pamphlet form under the title "Cleveland's Last Message." In it Cleveland argued that:

Whatever may be said as to the events of the past ten years which are alleged to have made us a world power, there remains small opportunity for controversy over the essential features of our conduct....Dwelling on the unwise of prematurely acquiring colonies is fatuous, the National duty is neither to help those colonies for their exploitation nor to cast them off to avoid the burden of their responsibilities. The questions involved are no more matters to be harrowed through the mill of politics than is the policy of the Panama Canal something to be stamped either as Repub-

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lican or Democrat.\footnote{\textit{Cleveland’s Last Message} (New York, The New York Times Company, 1908), 8-9.}

While the platform of the Democrats declared once again for the independence of the Philippines, the "Last Message" from Cleveland set the general tone of the Democracy on foreign policy questions during the campaign. An attempt to reopen the Panama issue (sensational charges were leveled in October by the \textit{New York World} that Taft had financially profited from the $40,000,000 transaction and that Roosevelt had manufactured the 1903 revolution) resulted in an action filed by Roosevelt for criminal libel, but produced no visible effect on the campaign.\footnote{The \textit{Roosevelt Panama Libel Case Against the New York World. The United States vs. The Press Publishing Company. A Brief History of the Attempt of President Roosevelt by Executive Usurpation to Destroy the Freedom of the Press in the United States} (New York, 1908), 1-26; Bowers, \textit{Beveridge and the Progressive Era}, 296-297.}

Republicans, on the other hand, stuck with Roosevelt's record. They rejoiced in the spreading of "Christian civilization" in the Philippines, lauded the Big Stick in Latin America, cheered Roosevelt's mediation at Portsmouth as having saved the lives of "hundreds of thousands of men," pointed out proudly that because of Roosevelt's efforts the United States was "received and recognized as a world power in the Council of Nations," and called for a larger navy to protect
America's expanding foreign trade.

Taft won by over a million votes. The Republican progressives supported him, firm in the belief that he would continue the domestic and foreign policies of the Rough Rider. Actually, little was really known about Taft's personal views on public questions in 1908, so long had he been in the shadow of Roosevelt. But Democrat Franklin K. Lane expressed the tolerant view of most progressives when he wrote that "everybody is giving him the benefit of the doubt." Democrat Louis D. Brandeis, however, voiced the premonition that under Taft "the Republican party will be less manageable than under Roosevelt." Brandeis was more psychic than he suspected, for not many months were to pass before the Republican party was split to its very core.

Coincident with the return of the fleet to New York, the Roosevelt Administration went out of power to the cheers of the progressives and the booming of naval cannon. Looking back at the do-

70 The People Rule. Mr. Taft's Reply to Mr. Bryan at Hot Springs, Va., August 21, 1908 (n.p., n.p., 1908), 12; Address of Mr. Meyer, Postmaster-General, At the Republican State Convention, Boston, Mass., April 10, 1908 (n.p., n.p., n.d.), 7-10; Bowers, Beveridge, and the Progressive Era, 293. One progressive Republican, New Jersey's Charles N. Fowler, called for reforms in the national banking structure along lines later adopted in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, pointing out that "the one thing above all others that this nation needs, if you would be prepared for the issues and events of a great war, is a financial system that will not break down when the first shock comes...." Cong. Record, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., 1146 (Jan. 27, 1908).

71 Lane to Charles K. McClatchy, Mar. 20, 1909, The Letters of Frank- lin K. Lane, 70.

mestic accomplishments of the "Square Deal," La Follette praised Roosevelt's achievements as a progressive and reformer in the most lavish terms, and Oscar Straus eulogized the outgoing President with the observation that only his vigorous assault on the citadels of privilege and corruption had prevented the reactionaries from making a strong and successful "revolutionary movement at the other end of the social system." But Roosevelt's own evaluation of his seven years in office best summed up the attitudes of Republican progressives toward his foreign and domestic accomplishments:

While President I have been President, emphatically; I have used every ounce of power there was in the office and I have not cared a rap for the criticisms of those who spoke of my "usurpation of power"; for I knew that the talk was all nonsense and that there was no usurpation. I believe that the efficiency of this Government depends upon its possessing a strong central executive, and wherever I could establish a precedent for strength in the executive, as I did for instance as regards external affairs in the case of sending the fleet around the world, taking Panama, settling affairs of Santo Domingo and Cuba; or as I did in internal affairs in settling the anthracite coal strike, in keeping order in Nevada this year when the Federation of Miners threatened anarchy, or as I have done in bringing the big corporations to book - why, in all these cases I have felt not merely that my action was right in itself, but that in showing the strength of, or in giving strength to the executive, I was establishing a precedent of value. I believe in a strong executive; I believe in power; but I believe that responsibility should go with power, and that it is not well that the strong executive

should be a perpetual executive.74

With this theoretical legacy firmly planted in the bosom of the progressive wing of the G.O.P., and with a President of his own creation secure in the seat of executive power, the Rough Rider disappeared into the African brush to massacre lions. But not without a parting bit of advice to Taft: "Dear Will: One closing legacy. Under no circumstances divide the battleship fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans prior to the finishing of the Panama Canal. Malevolent enemies of the navy...will try to lead public opinion in a matter like this without regard to the dreadful harm they may do the country....I should obey no direction of Congress and pay heed to no popular sentiment, no matter how strong, if it went wrong in such a vital matter as this."75

With that, Roosevelt was gone. But it was only to be a sabbatical leave.

74 Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, June 19, 1908, Roosevelt Letters, VI, 1087.
75 Roosevelt to William H. Taft, Mar. 3, 1909, Ibid., 1543. The same advice was later given Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 10, 1913, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 729; see also Sen. Albert J. Beveridge, Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 1 Sess., 6600 (May 20, 1910).
CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY OF TAFT

Progressive Republicans who voted for Taft in 1908 were certain that he would carry out the domestic policies of Roosevelt, and it is true that in four years the Taft Administration produced more progressive legislation and instituted more anti-trust suits than had Roosevelt in seven. But the unwillingness of Taft to use the executive power as a battering ram against the citadels of privilege and the "malefactors of great wealth" soon cast him into outer darkness so far as most progressives were concerned. Thus, despite his record in office, most progressives firmly believed that Taft was a conservative. His lack of dynamic executive leadership and his apparent identification with the conservatives and reactionaries on such controversial issues as Payne-Aldrich, Cannonism and Ballinger-Pinchot overshadowed his accomplishments and raised grave suspicions in the minds of most progressives.

Probably it was Taft's bad fortune to miss the whole point of progressivism at the national level. Indeed, when Augustus P. Gardner identified middle western Republican insurgency as a form

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of revolution, Taft snapped back with the remark, "Then, gentlemen, how can you expect me, the head of an orderly state, to join a revolu-
3 tion?" That he failed to grasp the basic capitalistic and evolutionary quality of progressivism was revealed when he confided to his military aide, Archie Butt, that "we must depend on some of the South to help us out to hold the country from absolute socialism."

There was certainly nothing revolutionary or socialistic about Republican insurgency. Like progressivism as a whole, it was essentially a movement of middle class Republicans (most of them middle westerners) who were thoroughly steeped in the capitalist tradition. While they demanded political control of the G.O.P., there was nothing revolutionary in their belief that the machinery of the party should be directed toward moderate political and economic reform. Far from seeking to socialize the economy of the United States, the insurgents wanted to produce a more equitable and democratic capitalism, and a more responsive political democracy, and they expected Taft, as Roosevelt's hand-picked successor, to commit the considerable power of the executive branch to a vigorous pursuit of these aims. Taft hesitated. Indeed, the longer he was in office the more he came to distrust the concept of the strong-executive-as-reformer which was central in progressive political theory. On this vital point he always differed sharply with Roosevelt and the progressives. "Theo-

3 Archibald W. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 10; 58; see also Henry F. Pringle, Taft, I, 430-431, 410-411; Belle Case and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 300.
4 Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 479.
dore's idea of government," he told reformer-philanthropist Julius Rosenwald in 1910, "is that of the oriental Cadi about whom we used to read in the Arabian Nights. He would like to have every decision of government made without the hampering restraints of Constitution or statute, but according to the manifest equities of the matter as they should be made to appear at the time."

Whatever Taft's liberal impulses might have been, they never emerged clearly from the vortex of progressive criticism that continually swirled about him. The impatient insurgents demanded both speed and positiveness from a man who was inherently cautious and deliberate. Failing to convert the President or capture the party machinery, the Republican progressives bitterly walked out of the organization, and the course of American history was significantly altered. Roosevelt came out of retirement to organize and lead the dissidents into the Progressive party in the 1912 campaign, and the very existence of that splinter party led directly to the victory of Wilson over a divided G.O.P.

Taft's "failings" as a progressive, however, were confined to the area of domestic policy and politics. In the area of foreign policy he was much closer to Roosevelt and the progressive tradition. Hesitant to use the power of his office in matters of domestic reform, Taft was quite willing to employ that power in the foreign policy sphere. Perhaps he felt the Constitution provided a less controver-

5M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald: The Life of a Practical Humanitarian (New York, 1939), 146-147.
sial delegation of executive authority in the area of external affairs. In any event, he intervened forcefully and positively in eastern Asia, and he continued the paternalistic policies of Roosevelt in the Caribbean. Not only did he attempt to bring reform and uplift to Central Americans by the extension of American financial protectorates to chaos-ridden Nicaragua and Honduras, he also continued Roosevelt's two-battleship a year naval building program, and he agreed in all essentials with the emphasis Roosevelt and the progressive Republican imperialists had placed on commercial and economic expansion abroad.

Insofar as interest in commercial expansion was characteristic of progressive foreign policy ideology, Taft was a progressive. The main concern of his policy was the extension of American commerce and capital into foreign markets. This is not to suggest that only progressives favored commercial expansion, or that the search for foreign markets was a monopoly of the progressive movement. Conservative commercial and business interests also favored such goals. It is clear, however, that the progressives consistently supported economic foreign policies (and related domestic measures) designed to effect commercial expansion. Their bourgeois perspectives demanded a healthy capitalist system serving not the plutocratic few but the democratic many, and their fear of economic stagnation, with its inherent threat of a radical reaction, encouraged them to support economic foreign policies that might modify the menace of overproduction and underconsumption.

Given the fact that questions of economic foreign policy largely dominated American diplomacy during the period 1909-1913,
progressive attitudes toward Taft's foreign policy must emphasize general progressive support of his attempt to increase American investments and trade abroad. While it must be kept in mind that interest in foreign policy questions ran a poor second to the dramatic developments on the domestic scene, it will be suggested here that the amount of support Taft received from progressives in both parties on his foreign policy far exceeded the support he received from them on domestic issues. Indeed, as the progressive movement shattered into its political and factional components on domestic questions, a measure of ideological unity was retained in the continued progressive dedication to the idea of and need for commercial expansion. To be sure, it was not strong enough or binding enough to stay the process of factional disintegration, but in the political crisis of 1909-1912 it was one of the few centripetal elements in an otherwise centrifugal situation.

This does not mean that there was a monolithic unity among progressives on all features of Taft's economic foreign policy. Actually, progressives in both parties differed among themselves on acceptable means to the Taft ends. There was also some outright progressive opposition to Taft, and party politics certainly entered into the calculations of leading progressive politicians on several of the issues involved. But Taft couched the aims of his economic foreign policy in the selfless, idealistic terms of uplift diplomacy, and in doing so he allied his goals and ambitions with the Roosevelt tradition. This was perhaps his single source of strength among Republican progressives, and, as we shall see, it was primarily on his
economic foreign policy accomplishments that he appealed to them in the election of 1912.

In the broader framework of American diplomatic history, the emphasis of the Taft Administration on the need for foreign markets formed a link in a chain of attitudes and hopes that stretched unbroken from the dreams of the China market during the imperial years to Woodrow Wilson's policy of differential neutrality and freedom of the seas after 1914. While there was nothing implicitly dangerous or controversial in the progressives' advocacy of commercial expansion during the Taft era, it seems clear that the continuation and strengthening of the concept in the 1914-1917 period had considerable influence on America's decision to enter the war against Germany. Thus any attempt to understand the strong support later given Wilson's economic foreign policy by progressives must be based on a prior understanding of progressive support of Taft in the same area of diplomacy.

II

The progressives clearly accepted the idea of the need for federal intervention in the field of foreign commerce. As S. J. Duncan-Clarke expressed it in 1913,

the progressive movement recognizes that the commercial situation throughout the world has reached a development demanding special attention from the Federal Government. We have come to an era of keen international competition. As we have outgrown the competitive epoch in domestic industries we have found ourselves facing a world-wide fight for foreign markets. The need for extending our operations in order to discover an outlet for our increasing productivity has forced us to look upon other lands with greater interest as possible customers for the commodities we man-

ufacture or the crops we raise. Any attempt arbitrarily to hinder the legitimate consolidation of strength at home means an inevitable weakening of our efficiency to meet competition abroad. This is by no means the least argument opposed to those who are set upon restoring domestic competition....The reconstruction of our consular service with efficiency as the end in view is one of the first steps demanded by the situation. Congress should further provide, by appropriation, for such bureaus as will contribute to the fostering of our foreign commerce. Our State Department must make it a matter of concern to see that the business interests of the Nation have equal facilities in the necessary details of easily transacting business with other countries.6

Partly to meet these conditions Roosevelt had established the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903. Under Secretary Oscar Straus, the Department worked diligently to coordinate the efforts of American businessmen in their search for foreign markets. There must exist, said Straus in 1908, "a close relationship between the Government and the commercial bodies of the country, for the advancement and development of its great business interests. We require a body such as Great Britain has, such as Germany has, which when it speaks, voices the true commercial interest of the country, unhampered by selfish interests or sectional claims, or political limitations."7

The Republican progressives thus accepted the idea that a concentration of business effort under government direction was vital to the conquest of foreign markets. For this reason they were not interested in breaking up the so-called "good" trusts solely in the

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interests of domestic economic competition, an approach which progressive Democrats favored. On the contrary, they agreed with Roosevelt that the primary job of the federal government was to make small business big and big business honest, and they wanted to use existing anti-trust legislation to ensure only this end - an end closely related to the nation's need for large economic combines as agents in the international struggle for trade. The American businessman, so long as he was moral, upright and honest, was regarded as the primary ally the nation had in this struggle. As Senator Beveridge phrased it in 1906:

All hail to the American business man! It is the American business man who keeps the commercial blood of the American people moving....His is the imagination that has conceived the commercial conquest of the globe for the American people, and his the daring that has set these plans in operation. The fruitful genius, the exhaustless initiative, the indomitable will of the American business man constitute the mightiest force for material greatness in the Nation and the world - let it also constitute the mightiest force for righteousness in the Nation and the world. And the American business man is willing and anxious that this should be the supreme purpose of his life. He is willing and anxious for the world to realize that his intelligence is guided by his conscience. And all mankind will realize this when the American business man understands that he has become the first of modern public men - that when he becomes the trustee of a people's welfare he becomes the high priest of the religion of humanity, an agent of God himself.\(^8\)

As the progressives looked about the world of their day the opportunities for commercial expansion seemed almost limitless. "The star of empire is westward," declared Minnesota's Democratic Governor

John A. Johnson with a profit-glazed glance at the Orient. Representative Hepburn looked forward to the day when America would cease to be a borrowing, economically dependent nation and would become one that "stood at the apex, capable of loaning to the world, capable of manufacturing for the world, capable of meeting the commerce of the world, capable of feeding and of clothing the nations." And Nebraska's Representative Elmer J. Burkett was sure that it "must thrill the heart of every American citizen, to feel that we are sending our products into every market on the face of the earth....the Republican party has gone...into the larger field of conquering foreign markets. It has gone out to capture the markets of the world and make them respond for the welfare and happiness of the American people, the progress and development of the American nation." Indeed, Oscar Straus assured the nation, "no agency is working more steadily toward the ideals of international peace than the agencies of commerce."

Specifically, lower tariffs and reciprocal trade agreements were seen as two methods that would contribute to the extension of American commerce abroad. During both the Roosevelt and Taft Admin-

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11 Ibid., 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 1268 (Jan. 27, 1904).
istrations the progressive Republicans favored what they termed a "scientific" tariff administered by a Tariff Commission. The Commission would set tariff schedules with the overall interest of the health of the national economy as the paramount consideration. This, it was argued, would remove the tariff question from partisan politics and the clutches of the special interests. Progressives of both parties were convinced that high tariffs were the "mother of trusts," and one of the distinctive characteristics of progressive ideology was widespread belief in the need for tariff revision downward.

The debate on the controversial Payne-Aldrich tariff bill in 1909 demonstrated something of the connection that progressives made between low tariffs and commercial expansion abroad. High tariffs, thought Wisconsin Representative Irvine L. Lenroot, "do away with all possibility of reciprocal arrangements and concessions.... Instead of proposing mutual concessions in a spirit of friendship for the interests of all, we lift a club." While the progressives fought vigorously for lower tariff schedules during the Payne-Aldrich controversy, there is no evidence in the Congressional debates to indicate that they favored breaking a trust with lower tariffs if such action would endanger America's competitive position in international markets. On the contrary, there is evidence to indicate that on items relating to the nation's military posture and national defense, some progressives actually favored higher duties. Senators Dixon and Bev-

eridge, for instance, argued cogently in 1909 for a higher duty on antimony, a substance important in the manufacture of ammunition. They wanted to encourage the development of domestic sources of antimony and end American dependence on British supplies. But New Jersey's Republican Representative Charles N. Fowler best stated the progressive attitude on the tariff-trade relationship when he said:

I maintain that it is unreasonable to expect that we can go into the markets of other countries and sell our excess of production to a degree that is ruinous to their industries without incurring hostility. . . . we can only secure universal friendship after we have become aggressive competitors in the markets of the world by a system of reciprocal trade treaties. . . . I am [also] in favor of a permanent tariff commission whose high office and important duty shall be to negotiate reciprocal treaties and work out tariff adjustments from time to time, as the business interests of the country demand. . . . (These treaties) will bring strength, steadiness, and stability to the world's commerce and contribute immeasurably to the world's peace and general welfare. . . . (To secure needed markets the United States must develop the merchant marine and extend American) banking connections throughout the world, by which we shall get control of the goods and route them over direct American shipping lines.15

Thus as progressives viewed some of the practical problems involved, they came to accept the development of the American merchant marine as an important corollary to commercial expansion. Also, they were generally agreed that an American owned fleet of cargo carriers was related not only to commerce extension but also to national dignity and naval preparedness, and during both the Roosevelt and Taft

14Ibid., 2157 (May 18, 1909); see also Sen. Coe I. Crawford, Ibid., 1954-1955 (May 12, 1909).
15Ibid., 899; 902 (Apr. 2, 1909); see also Sen. Jonathan P. Dolliver, Ibid., 57 Cong., 2 Sess., 710 (Jan. 13, 1903); Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 144.
Administrations there was considerable agitation from progressives for a respectable maritime industry. Indeed, almost all Americans agreed that it was a national disgrace that foreign vessels were carrying some 90% of America's foreign trade. What would happen to American commerce, asked Representative Augustus P. Gardner prophetically in 1904, in the event of a European war? "Who is going to carry that two thousand millions of dollars worth of goods?...Violate neutrality laws we must, if we wish our export trade to continue....If a war between Germany and Great Britain comes and finds us without a merchant marine, God help our foreign trade!"

The main point of disagreement among progressives was how best to revive the merchant service and at the same time remain true to progressive political and economic principles. One bloc of progressive opinion argued that the only efficient and practical way to ensure the expansion of American commerce was to provide direct government financial subsidies to American owned steamship companies so that they might compete successfully with foreign shippers. The form of subsidy most frequently recommended was payment by the federal government for the service of carrying United States mail abroad. The Ocean Mail Bill of 1907 was typical in this regard. But Representative Crumpacker identified the measure as one with diplomatic as well as commercial goals. Besides strengthening the merchant marine, the bill would be a step toward uniting "this country and the South Amer-

ican republics commercially [so] that American products will be brought to the notice and within the reach of the markets of those countries."

Further, he argued, in binding North and South America more closely together in the commercial sphere it would strengthen the Monroe Doctrine and help spread American political concepts in Latin America:

"The governments in the Western Hemisphere have a common destiny. The tendency is toward republican institutions....The Monroe Doctrine is the law of the political development of the Western Hemisphere....its purpose is...in short, to republicanize all America."

Republican Representative Mondell of Wyoming viewed the 1907 Mail Bill in much the same manner. He pointed out that the feature of the bill which instituted seven mail routes to Latin America and Asia would not only bring South America into the commercial orbit of the United States, but would facilitate America's "peaceful conquest of the Pacific."

When the legislation failed to pass, Roosevelt, who strongly supported the idea of subsidies, remarked that it was a "real blow to our country" because it "tended to dampen some of the enthusiasm for closer

18 Ibid., 59 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 71-72 (Feb. 27, 1907); see also Straus, Under Four Administrations, 237.
19 Cong. Record, 59 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 37-38 (Feb. 27, 1907). Rep. George W. Norris liked the "South American proposition" of a similar piece of legislation brought forward in 1909, but he voted against it because it was otherwise badly drawn. Ibid., 60 Cong., 2 Sess., 3683 (Mar. 2, 1909).
Clearly, the subsidy concept attracted considerable progressive support.

On the other hand, many progressives felt that while merchant marine expansion was vital to commercial expansion, the subsidy approach as such was little better than a camouflaged hand-out to Big Business. The fact that the advocates of subsidy included in their number such special interest groups as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Merchant Marine League of the United States, and even something called the Musical Industry Merchant Marine League, gave them pause. For Republican Representative Kustermann of Wisconsin

20 Roosevelt to Rep. Ernest M. Pollard, Mar. 19, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, V, 626. The question of how to subsidize produced differences among progressives. Straus favored the mail subsidy concept; Franklin K. Lane urged a system of preferential through routes linking shipping to the railroad systems and permitting railroads carrying goods to a port to make through joint rates to the foreign ports of destination; Woodrow Wilson favored direct government loans to shipping companies. See Straus, Under Four Administrations, 237; Lane to Elihu Root, Feb. 14, 1908, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 66; Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 187.

21 The Ocean Mail Bill of 1909, for instance, drew the support of such middle western progressive insurgents as former Governor Samuel Van Sant of Minnesota, who served as Vice President of the Merchant Marine League for Minnesota, Senators Knute Nelson and Moses Clapp of Minnesota and Representatives Charles R. Davis, Charles A. Lindbergh and Andrew Volstead. See Merchant Marine League of the United States, The American Flag, No. 8 (Dec. 1, 1909), 7.

22 The Merchant Marine League of the United States was organized in 1904 by a group of Cleveland business associates of Senator Marcus A. Hanna. It was a lobby and pressure group controlled by the ship-owners. It preached an extreme brand of patriotism, almost chauvinism, to alert Americans to the economic and military dangers of lack of a merchant marine. See pamphlet, Merchant Marine League of the United States, The American Flag (Cleveland, Ohio, 1909), passim. See also George J. Seabury (Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine of the N.A.M.), My Last Plea For An Overseas Merchant Marine (New York, The Author, Dec. 25, 1905), 6;13-14.
sin was not wide of the mark when he branded the "subsidy shouters" of the Merchant Marine League of the United States as "wolves stalking around under cover of patriotic titles." For was the subsidy cause aided when crackpots like Kansas lawyer William P. Hackney identified all of its opponents as "low-browed, hungry visaged, measly cadavers, with foreheads so low that when they cry the tears run down their backs." For these reasons, many progressives agreed with Minnesota's Volstead when he declared that "The shipowners need no charity," and with Iowa's Cummins when he announced that he was "unalterably opposed to the [subsidy] principle itself."

Just as eager as their pro-subsidy colleagues to build up the merchant marine and stimulate commercial expansion, the anti-subsidy progressives argued that the navigation laws of the United States should and could be revised to permit American-owned ships built in foreign yards to receive American registry and fly the American flag.


"Nothing more would be necessary to cover the high seas with ships flying the American flag," said Senator Owen.

Progressives like Senator La Follette and California's Representative Kent joined the maritime labor unions in recommending still another approach to strengthening the American merchant marine. They urged Congress to pass legislation regulating and improving shipboard conditions so that the seagoing profession might be made more attractive to American citizens. This, thought La Follette, was absolutely necessary to national defense. "Every great sea power in the history of the world has drawn the men for its warships from its fisheries and its merchant marine. It has become almost axiomatic that you can measure the sea power of a nation by its commerce and its merchant marine."

Thus another argument for an expanded merchant marine related it to naval preparedness. It was one frequently cited by progressives. Much was made of the fact that when the fleet circumnavigated the world in 1908-1909, some 27 foreign flag colliers had to carry the necessary coal. This blow to national pride so agitated Iowa's

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27 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 5781 (Oct. 23, 1913); see also Kent, William Kent, 249; International Seaman's Union of America, The American Seaman in His Relation to the Merchant and Naval Services, 5; American Labor and the Merchant Marine (n.p., Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders of America, 1904), 10.
Senator Cummins that he urged the suspension of battleship construction until a fleet of auxiliary and supply ships had been built. Cummins' plan was to spend $15,000,000 - the going price for one battleship - for auxiliary craft which, manned by regular Navy personnel, would carry regular maritime cargo in peacetime and naval supplies in wartime. In sum, the Cummins plan would, in one stroke, put the federal government into the shipping business, create a naval auxiliary and achieve merchant marine expansion. The Cummins proposal was not adopted, but the naval auxiliary idea remained popular in progressive circles.

The Taft Administration was unable to put through a merchant marine expansion program. In spite of the fact that most of the progressives favored the general concept, they could not agree on the means to the end, and no specific expansion plan suggested was able to command a majority of their votes. Taft was unwilling, however, to abandon his dream of commercial expansion. Perhaps he agreed with Representative Kustermann's demand to "get the trade first and then there will be no difficulty in finding ships that will eagerly seek

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28 Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 1233-1234 (Jan. 21, 1911). Rep. George W. Norris had proposed much the same thing in 1910 as a way around the ship subsidy idea. He advocated substituting for the two battleship building program a one battleship-six transports program. Ibid., 61 Cong., 2 Sess., 4433-4434 (Apr. 8, 1910).

the business without the profiler of subsidies." In any event, his policy of Dollar Diplomacy was another approach to the problem of extending America's commercial interests abroad.

III

Any analysis of the progressives and Taft's policy of Dollar Diplomacy must emphasize the fact that the progressive viewpoint was as often revealed in what was not said as in what was said. Negative evidence is never entirely satisfactory, but the campaign of silence to which most progressives treated Dollar Diplomacy might reasonably be regarded as tacit acceptance of the policy. It might also be suggested that progressive criticism of the President in almost all of his endeavors did not extend to Dollar Diplomacy because it was a policy dedicated to commercial and capital expansion abroad and one which Taft explained and defined in terms that appealed to the idealistic orientation of progressives on foreign policy matters.

In China, Dollar Diplomacy had two interrelated aims: To revive and maintain the idealistic political principles of the Open Door policy, as well as to assist the extension of American commerce and investment capital. Taft felt that by participating in foreign loans to the Chinese government, the United States might exercise a watchdog function on those imperialist powers - particularly Russia and Japan - whose aggressive financial policies endangered the economic and administrative integrity of China. It was also hoped that

a renewed emphasis on the Open Door principle would encourage and fa-
cilitate American commercial expansion into Manchuria. Dollar Diplo-
macy was, of course, entirely peaceful. There was no suggestion of
military force behind it. In actual operation, it was an alliance
between Washington and Wall Street by which the Taft Administration
sought to achieve certain political and economic goals in east Asia
by forcing American capital into areas where it would not flow of its
own accord.

In the Caribbean, however, Dollar Diplomacy had a somewhat
different emphasis. The commercial expansion element was present, but
Taft's policy in the area was primarily designed to supplement the
Roosevelt Corollary by creating politically and economically stable
regimes in the chaotic states along the approaches to the Panama Ca-

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nal. In sum, the strategic aims of Dollar Diplomacy outweighed its
commercial aims in the Caribbean.

The intellectual father of Dollar Diplomacy in China was Wil-
lard Straight, later prominently identified with the progressive move-
ment as founder and editor of The New Republic magazine. Straight,
who served as American consul in Mukden from 1906 to 1908, and Acting
Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department in 1908-1909,
came to the significant conclusion in 1907 that the best way for the
United States to extend its economic interests in Manchuria and uphold

31 Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 161-
191; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United
States, 133-175.
32 The standard works on Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean are Scott
Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1925);
the Open Door principle there was to force American capital into the area. This, he felt, would also help strengthen the political and economic connection between the Peking Government and its Manchurian province, a connection made tenuous by the aggressiveness of Russian and Japanese concessionaires in Manchuria.

Although Straight retired from the diplomatic service in 1909 to become the personal agent in China for J. P. Morgan, a man scarcely associated with the progressive movement, it seems clear that Straight's concept of strengthening China internally with the aid of American capital was in the progressive foreign policy tradition in the sense that it combined an idealistic concern for the welfare of China with the idea of American capital expansion abroad.

Writing to his fiancée about American participation in the 1911 Currency Reform Loan to China, Straight exulted in having helped bring about the "first real sound financial basis for a country of four hundred millions." The loan, he felt, was "an instrument which gives us a hold that should enable us to force China, even against the selfish, narrow-minded bigotry of...[her] officials, to adopt a scheme which will really make currency reform effective." And to J. P. Morgan, he explained:

Owing to its primary place in the Currency Loan the American Group should be able to secure the leadership of the various financial interests...with this leadership in your hands the American government should be able to make good its repeated declarations and to render to the Chinese government practical and much needed assistance in furthering administrative reform and in preserving China

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33 Herbert Croly, Willard Straight (New York, 1924), 395-399.
from the encroachments of those Powers who menace the integrity of the Empire. 34

Taft absorbed both the idealism and commercialism of Straight's policy conception. His famous wire to Prince Chun, Regent of China, on July 15, 1909, demanding American participation in the Hukuang Railroad Loan, emphasized the idea that the President had "an intense personal interest in making the use of American capital in the development of China an instrument for the promotion of the welfare of China, and an increase in her national prosperity without entanglements or creating embarrassments affecting the growth of her independent political power and the preservation of her territorial integrity." But the purely commercial features of Dollar Diplomacy were also of great importance to the President. "The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse," he declared in 1912:

This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims. It is an effort frankly directed to the increase of American trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Government of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise

34 Ibid., 403.
35 Ibid., 295; see also Pringle, Taft, II, 690. "We do not want any of your territory," Taft told Dr. Wu, the Chinese Minister, "we only want your trade....You can't grow too independent or too strong for us. I only wanted to get a share of that loan in order that we might be able to have our say in the councils of other nations when matters concerning China were being discussed. It was of greater value to your country than it was to us, for the United States to have an interest in the loan." Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 215.
In spite of the fact that Dollar Diplomacy involved cooperation between the Taft Administration and the very "malefactors of great wealth" whom progressives continually criticized, there was little opposition to the policy from the progressives. With the exception of the attack by Senators Borah and La Follette on its Latin American phase, the few progressives who expressed opinions on Dollar Diplomacy at all seemed to favor it. In sum, they seemed agreed with the Committee on Foreign Policy of the Grange when it stated that "The action of the State Department in demanding equal rights for American capital in the $30,000,000 loan to China, will without doubt increase the trade with China and give a decided advantage to this country." Even Woodrow Wilson believed that government force might be used to open foreign markets, and he did not criticize Taft's policy in China until the 1912 campaign was well underway. Indeed, as early as 1907 he had expressed the thought that "since trade ignores

36 Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1912, quoted in Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, 134. In May, 1910, Taft wrote: "While our foreign policy should not be turned a hair's breadth from the straight path of justice, it may be well made to include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investment which shall ensure to the benefit of both countries concerned. There is nothing inconsistent in the promotion of peaceful relations, and the promotion of trade relations, and if the protection which the United States shall assure to her citizens in the assertion of just rights under investment made in foreign countries, shall promote the amount of such trade, it is a result to be commended." Pringle, Taft, II, 678.


national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process."

On the other hand, Alfred Love, a leading figure in the peace movement, actually interpreted the President's policy as a vehicle of peace, and magazines and newspapers friendly to the cause of progressivism on domestic questions ran articles supporting Dollar Diplomacy in China. A writer in Lyman Abbott's Outlook, for example, noted that Taft's statesmanship was "in advance of the Nation" and urged American business to lend "patriotic support" to the program.

Not all progressives, however, accepted Dollar Diplomacy either tacitly or actively. A few opposed the policy, but theirs were isolated voices. Senator Robert M. La Follette's was one of these. But like Wilson the full force of La Follette's criticism of Taft's policy was not manifest until the heat of the 1912 campaign had

39 Ibid., 147-148.
40 Merle E. Curti, Peace or War, 186.
41 Frederick McCormick, "American Defeat in the Pacific," The Outlook, XCVII (Jan. 14, 1911), 67-73, quoted in Charles Vevier, The Progressives and Dollar Diplomacy. Unpublished M.A. Thesis (The University of Wisconsin, 1949), 112-113. Vevier's analysis of Collier's, The Review of Reviews, The Outlook, the Los Angeles Express and the Chicago Tribune, coupled with an examination of the views of Roosevelt, Beveridge, John C. O'Laughlin, Oscar Straus, Herbert Croly and Willard Straight, leads him to the conclusion that while the China policy generated very little specific interest, there was a general progressive support for it in its broad outlines. Ibid., 95-96;118;125. The present writer has found no evidence to dispute this.
produced deep factional divisions within Republican progressivism.

Nonetheless, the Wisconsin progressive announced that he was "opposed to the dollar diplomacy which has reduced our State Department from its high place as a kindly intermediary of defenseless nations, into a trading outpost for Wall Street interests, aiming to exploit those who should be our friends." Even after a futile attempt to incorporate this interpretation of Dollar Diplomacy into the Republican platform for 1912, La Follette continued to characterize Dollar Diplomacy as a capitalist plot to assist "the MORGAN banks to fat loans, secured by government's army and navy...." Few progressives, however, publicly identified themselves with La Follette's attitude.

Taft's Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America was no more controversial among progressives than his policy in China. Perhaps this was because the President continually emphasized the peace features of Dollar Diplomacy in Caribbean America. That he desired peace and stability in the Panama Canal area there can be no doubt. He even yearned for the "right to knock their heads together until they should maintain peace between them." Eventually, force was used. American marines were landed in Nicaragua and a treaty to permit American con-

42 La Follette's Magazine, VI (Mar. 16, 1912), 3-4.
43 Ibid. (June 29, 1912), 8; (Dec. 14, 1912), 3. La Follette did not know in 1912 that the Wall Street bankers had been urged into the consortium against their better judgment by the Administration and that they actually lost money in the process. See Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 191; Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, 174; Croly, Willard Straight, 281-282.
44 Pringle, Taft, II, 694.
control of the Nicaraguan debt was negotiated. During the Taft Administration American bankers also took effective control of the National Bank of Haiti, and a treaty to ensure American direction of the national debt of Honduras was negotiated. In effect, Taft created financial protectorates and receiverships in Caribbean America and called it peace.

This policy was at least tacitly endorsed by most progressives. Writing in 1910, Frederick Palmer probably revealed progressive attitudes toward Caribbean America best when he said:

We can hear the call of 'Destiny,' which involved us in the work of order, education and sanitation across the Pacific, but not the call of neighborly duty and economic self-interest to remedy conditions [in Central America] far worse than the Philippines ever suffered....Central America and the West Indies are in our yard, and the commerce of the West Indies, thanks to flourishing Cuba and Porto Rico paying us back in the coin of trade for our interest in their behalf, equals that of the East Indies....Whatever we do about Central America, we must bear in mind that the best philanthropy and the best humanitarianism will begin and end only with such measures as will mean economic...educational and governmental progress. There can be no prosperity without a drastic, permanent reform of conditions....Through the agency of our ministers we can demand...the end...of the confiscation of property; the reorganization of national credit, with the guaranteed payment of interest on...old loans, and the establishment of personal freedom and the right of trial.45

The progressive-oriented magazines that commented at all on Taft's policy in Caribbean America were convinced that it was in the interest of civilization. When Nicaraguan and San Salvadorian troops clashed in 1909, The Review of Reviews demanded that the State De-

45Frederick Palmer, Central America and Its Problems (New York, 1910), 299-301;303-304.
Department restore order in Central America and aid the warring states
in returning to "that condition of mind and national dignity which
is essential to the preservation of national integrity," while The
Outlook spoke of America's "moral obligation" in creating stability
in the area and hoped that "in the interests of civilization" and for
the benefit of the peoples involved "honest and competent American fi-

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nanciers shall help them."

When the Nicaraguan and Honduran treaties (which provided
for the application of Honduran and Nicaraguan customs receipts to
debt reductions and American supervision of the collection of duties)
came before the Senate in 1911, Roosevelt labored diligently to line
up progressive support for them. In a letter to Senator Coe I. Craw-
ford of South Dakota, the Colonel remarked:

Of course I do not wish the fact that I have written to
you to be quoted, but you can tell any of our progres-
sive friends you choose what I say. Judging from what
I see in the papers, the Honduras treaty should certain-
ly go through. It is in line, apparently, with what we
did in Santo Domingo. We can always prevent our own fi-
nancial people from doing what is wrong in these coun-
tries and indeed my experience as regards the Philip-
pines and Porto Rico was that we were more apt to give
our monied men too little scope than we were to give them
too much scope in our overseas possessions. But in Cen-
tral America what is needed is that a steadying hand should
be put on the little disorderly governments.47

In spite of Roosevelt's efforts, the treaties were not ratified during
the Taft Administration. While the Democrats opposed them on party

46 The Review of Reviews, XL (Dec., 1910), 661-662; The Outlook, XCVII,
(Aug. 19, 1911), 856-857; CII (Sept. 7, 1912), 3, quoted in Vevi-
er, The Progressives and Dollar Diplomacy, 100-103.
47 Roosevelt to Sen. Coe I. Crawford, June 12, 1911, Roosevelt Letters,
VII, 282-283.
lines, only Senators Borah and La Follette among progressives of either party spoke up to condemn them publicly on the floor of the chamber. The Senator from Wisconsin criticized the fact that the Honduran treaty was debated secretly in a Senate executive session. He branded it as a proposal that "this government shall become surety for and guarantee loans aggregating millions of dollars made to the Honduran government by American capitalists," and noted that "evil and corruption thrive best in the dark."

But aside from the opposition of La Follette and Borah, Republican progressives either supported Dollar Diplomacy because it was so patently an extension of Roosevelt's policy of uplift in the area, or they remained silent. In general, then, progressive attitudes toward Dollar Diplomacy were shaped more by party loyalties than by ideological considerations. Not until the heat of the campaign of 1912 did progressives like Wilson and Bryan begin openly to attack Dollar Diplomacy, and with the exception of Borah and La Follette, these critics were invariably Democrats.

When Dollar Diplomacy threatened to impinge on naval affairs, however, Congressional progressives in both parties reacted vigorously. Basically, they opposed any arrangement that compromised the fighting effectiveness of the fleet. This was revealed in

49 Vevier, The Progressives and Dollar Diplomacy, 141-142.
May, 1910, when Taft announced that Bethlehem Steel had obtained an order from the Argentine Republic for two battleships costing $23,000,000, an order which represented the only significant success of the commercial extension feature of Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America. La Follette attempted to block the deal on the Senate floor. Fearful that the fire control system and torpedo tube design entrusted by the Navy to Bethlehem Steel would be built into the vessels, La Follette demanded to know if these American naval secrets would go to Argentina with the ships. In a formal resolution he insisted that the Secretary of State hand over to the Senate all communications with the Navy Department and the Argentine Republic relative to the vessels. While the Argentine question was blurred by such issues as the right of the Senate to subpoena documents from executive agencies, Senate progressives supported La Follette's resolution. The resolution was defeated 44 to 28, but the virtual unanimity of the Senate progressives on the question marked the only instance in which progressives in Congress opposed a feature of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy.

IV

Unlike Dollar Diplomacy, the Canadian reciprocity issue split progressive forces into factional, party and sectional groups and cast an important aspect of Taft's economic foreign policy into the arena of bitter controversy. But given the political context of

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the increasing hostility of the progressive Republicans toward the Administration in 1911-1912, the surprising and significant feature of the reciprocity debate is that Taft commanded as much support as he did from the progressives in his own party. At the same time, however, it is clear that differences between eastern and middle western progressives, so pronounced on foreign policy questions in 1915-1917, first came dramatically to the fore during the reciprocity struggle.

With the approach of the 1910 Congressional elections, Taft instituted talks with the Canadian government on the possibility of a reciprocity treaty. He apparently believed that a speedy and favorable agreement with the Canadians would rehabilitate the sagging political prestige of his Administration, and help heal the progressive-conservative breach in the G.O.P. that had developed over the Payne-Aldrich tariff act. Unfortunately for the President, the Republicans had lost control of the House and suffered sharp reductions in their Senate majority by the time the treaty was finally initialed in January, 1911. Nonetheless, Taft strongly urged its approval by the Congress. He regarded the treaty as a step toward the commercial expansion and lower tariffs that progressives in both parties had consistently urged. In its final form, however, the treaty established free duty on certain American manufactured products in exchange for free duty on certain Canadian raw materials and farm products. Regarded from a sectional point of view, the agricultural items placed

52E. Ethan Ellis, "The Northwest and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI (June, 1939), 55.
on the free list promised to heighten competition in the American staple market for the western farmer while providing the eastern manufacturer with an expanded Canadian market.

Yet Taft hoped that the overall advantages of tariff reduction would outweigh the sectional considerations involved, and he was undoubtedly encouraged when progressive Republican Representative Edmund H. Madison of Kansas, supported by several other middle western progressives, argued that all middle western progressives who had voted against Payne-Aldrich because they favored lower tariffs should logically support the Administration on Canadian reciprocity. But this was not to be.

The reciprocity issue soon became hopelessly ensnared in the jockeying for political power within the Republican party that lasted throughout 1911 and into 1912. Roosevelt, for example, joined Beveridge and Madison in support of the treaty early in 1911. He characterized it as "admirable from every standpoint," and charged that some Republican progressives were playing politics on the reciprocity issue soon became hopelessly ensnared in the jockeying for political power within the Republican party that lasted throughout 1911 and into 1912. Roosevelt, for example, joined Beveridge and Madison in support of the treaty early in 1911. He characterized it as "admirable from every standpoint," and charged that some Republican progressives were playing politics on the reciprocity issue.

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53 The following items were placed on the free list: live animals, poultry, wheat, rye, oats, barley, corn, hay, vegetables, fruits, dairy products, fish, lumber, wood pulp, railroad ties, telephone poles, brass, carbon, cream separators, galvanized iron, steel sheets and plates, coke, iron and steel. Great tariff reductions were made on: farm machinery, wagons, engines, musical instruments, clocks, watches, plate glass, cement, peanuts and coal. George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 159-160; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, 1, 339; Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 106; Ellis, "The Northwest and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911," loc. cit., 55-56.

54 Cong. Record, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 544 (Apr. 21, 1911); see also Rep. Paul Howland, Ibid., 386 (Apr. 18, 1911); Sen. Norris Brown, Ibid., 3028 (July 19, 1911); Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 106; Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 404; Ellis, "The Northwest and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911," loc. cit., 57.
procyn question solely to undermine Taft. But the Colonel completely reversed his position on the issue during the 1912 North Dakota primaries. La Follette, also running hard for the Republican nomination, attacked Taft and reciprocity with arguments that, however sound, were transparently political. And while progressive Democrats supported Taft's reciprocity as a step toward tariff revision downward, they were not reluctant to use the controversy to drive a wedge between the competing factions of the G.O.P.

The middle western Republican progressives who broke with Taft on the reciprocity issue argued variations of one central theme: That the Administration was trying to ruin the American farmer by forcing him to buy in a protected market and sell in a free market; that reciprocity was a Wall Street plot against the agrarian west. The screams of anguish from the west were indeed loud. Representative Volstead called the measure "undisguised, selfish, class legislation in behalf of the cities against the producers of food," and Senator Dixon declared that "the western farmer shall [not] be relegated to a 'Jim Crow' car while the eastern manufacturers continue to ride in Pullmans." As South Dakota Senator Coe I. Crawford put

58 Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 2541 (Feb. 14, 1911); ibid., 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 2387 (June 21, 1911).
it, the American farmer "is not yet an extinct specimen of the human
race," and he does not "indulge in these fine sentiments about ex-
tending American trade."

Progressive opponents of reciprocity maintained that the
American farmer simply could not compete with the Canadian farmer,
and they argued the point so vigorously that Representative Crumpack-
er sarcastically concluded that "our country is the most unfortunate
spot on God's green earth; we can not compete with anybody or any-
thing, anywhere, at anytime." Nonetheless many of them vowed po-
itical revenge on Taft for his attempt to subsidize the eastern man-
ufacturer at the expense of the western farmer. Norris, for example,
promised that the farmer would rise up "in his strength and his might
and smite the men who are attempting to practice upon him this de-
ception."

By all odds, the most savage attack on Canadian reciprocity came from La Follette. As a leading figure in the National Pro-
gressive Republican League's fight for control of the party organiza-
tion, La Follette had much to gain politically from the collapse of
Taftism. Claiming that the President had "abandoned the progressive

59 Ibid., 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 3578 (Feb. 27, 1911).
60 Rep. Solomon F. Prouty, Ibid., 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 467-469 (Apr. 20,
1911); Rep. Charles E. Pickett, Ibid., 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 2553
(Feb. 14, 1911); Rep. Louis B. Hanna, Ibid., Appendix, 169
(Feb. 14, 1911); Rep. Frank W. Mondell, Ibid., 62 Cong., 1 Sess.,
466 (Apr. 20, 1911).
61 Ibid., 347 (Apr. 17, 1911).
62 Ibid., 61 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 158 (Feb. 14, 1911); see also
Sen. Robert M. La Follette, Ibid., 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 3152
(July 21, 1911).
principles committed to his keeping" by Roosevelt, the Wisconsin Senator charged that reciprocity, taken together with Taft's conservation policy, was simply another assault on the 33,000,000 farmers of America who were "fighting for simple justice with their backs to the wall." Pointing to the influence of Big Business on the Administration, La Follette identified reciprocity as a "special-interest tariff measure," a Wall Street plot against the people. He argued that only "trust controlled" articles like steel, beef, agricultural implements, coal, glass and oil should be placed on the free list, and he pointed out that under a reciprocity arrangement, "our bins will be filled with Canadian wheat...our splendid home market for wheat will be utterly destroyed." Finally, he accused Taft of using the treaty to restore the sagging prestige of his Administration, and he charged that the Democrats were supporting the President's position only to ensure a campaign issue for 1912.

It must not be supposed that La Follette's views represented those of all progressives. Progressive Democrats supported reciprocity, and many eastern and middle western Republican progressives stood with the President on the issue. Lower tariffs, they argued, would encourage commercial expansion. Democrats like Arkansas's William A. Oldfield defined the treaty as "an entering wedge for the

\[\text{Ibid.}, 2902-2906; 3145-3154 (July 13, 1911; July 21, 1911); see also Ellis, "The Northwest and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911," loc. cit., 66. La Follette feared that reciprocity would strengthen the trusts by giving them cheaper raw materials; that ultimately it would place the Canadians at the mercy of the American trusts. La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 339.\]
destruction of the protective tariff system in this country," while Republicans like Nebraska's Senator Norris Brown congratulated the Democrats for their support of reciprocity and pointed out that the agreement would convert Payne-Aldrich into a victory for lower tariffs. Not only would a reciprocity treaty extend American commerce into Canada, said some progressives, but it would also reduce living costs at home and help cement American-Canadian peace. "Let us strengthen the bond of unity between these peoples, said Indiana's Crumpacker, "so that we under the Stars and Stripes and they under their own national emblem may be one people in all things that make for the common good, and tend to promote the welfare of mankind."

The dilemma that many anti-reciprocity progressives had to face stemmed from their earlier support of the general principle of reciprocity as a technique of commercial expansion. Consequently, some of them opposed Taft's policy with obvious reluctance, mak-
ing a distinction between what they called "real reciprocity" and Taft's Canadian pact.

Taft managed to push his reciprocity measure through Congress without great difficulty. The House passed the act 268 to 89, with 78 of the opposition votes coming from the Republican side. The Senate vote was 53 to 27. Republican progressives from the east and middle west voted on both sides of the issue in both houses; Democratic progressives almost solidly supported the President. But with final victory in sight for the Administration the Canadian parliament refused to ratify the treaty. There had been too much irresponsible talk in the United States about Canadian annexation and about the destruction of the British imperial preferential tariff system.


Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 166-167; Ellis, "The Northwest and the Reciprocity Agreement of 1911," loc. cit., 64-65;66,66; Pringle, Taft, II, 594-595; Cong. Record, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 559-560 (Apr. 21, 1911). The division among progressives was somewhat closer than some authorities have suggested. See Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 404; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 166-167; Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 106. The present writer's study shows that in Congress the reciprocity issue commanded the support of no fewer than fourteen prominent progressive Republican leaders from middle western and western states, and no less than the same number of progressive Democratic leaders from agrarian mid­dle western, southern and border states. Conversely, some twenty-two progressive Republican leaders of prominence from middle western and western states opposed the reciprocity treaty. Prominent eastern progressives of both parties generally favored the treaty.
While the idea of annexation was not a major feature of the Canadian reciprocity debate, it could not be denied that a few progressives, mainly Democrats, had for some years considered the prospect with interest. As early as 1886 Henry George had written that free trade was an excellent way to extend the "area of freedom"; the United States, he said, "may annex Canada to all intents and purposes whenever we throw down the tariff wall we have built around ourselves..." In 1904 Minnesota's Democratic Representative John Lind had predicted that a reciprocity treaty with Canada would split asunder the British imperial trade union:

Some day [said Lind] Canada and this great country of ours will be under one economic system. God further the day.... I trust the time is not distant when our industrial, economic, and financial unity will be as extensive as the Monroe Doctrine.... It is now within our grasp. These aspirations and hopes...are not visionary. They rest upon the natural law that trade follows lines of longitude rather than of latitude.... I beg of you to forget mere local and temporary considerations in this larger aspiration, and deal with this question as Americans rather than as localized citizens of Michigan or Minnesota.... [Soon there will be on this continent] a way of iron extending from the Arctic Circle on the north to the Antarctic on the south, coextensive with our Monroe Doctrine. (Loud applause on the Democratic side.)

In 1905 John A. Johnson declared that the "American flag ought now to float over all North America.... For commercial expansion north and south we have the Dominion of Canada at our northern doors and South and Central America at the mouth of the Mississippi. The commercial federation of America is our opportunity and duty." In 1909 James

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70 Henry George, Protection or Free Trade, IV, 330.
71 Cong. Rec., 58 Cong., 2 Sess., 1004-1005 (Jan. 21, 1904); see also George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 195.
W. Folk of Missouri predicted that Canada would sooner or later be annexed to the United States, and Herbert Croly suggested that free trade with Canada would show Canadians that "the real interests of Canada in foreign affairs coincide with the interests of the United States rather than with the interests of Great Britain."

Additional references to the annexation concept also appeared in the Congressional debates on the reciprocity treaty in 1911. Senator John D. Works of California identified the American-Canadian boundary as "an imaginary line only," and Representative Kustermann was certain that "there is not a citizen of the United States who would raise his voice against the admission of Canada to the Union, thus bringing about almost the identical conditions to be achieved by this treaty." But it was an indecent remark by the President himself that did the greatest harm. In spite of Premier Laurier's warning to Taft (conveyed personally by Beveridge) that any hint or suggestion of annexation could wreck the pending treaty, the President made a statement at Springfield, Illinois, in February, 1911, that enraged Canadian nationalists. Urging American farmers to sup-

73Louis Geiger, James W. Folk of Missouri, 134; Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, 305.
74Cong. Rec. 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 3055 (July 19, 1911); Ibid., 61 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 153 (Feb. 14, 1911). Rep. Elbert H. Hubbard, Iowa insurgent Republican, felt that reciprocity would stimulate American emigration to Canada: "Is it not an excellent and desirable thing that we should have friends and kin folks dwelling over the border and influencing the policy and commerce of our northern neighbor?" Ibid., 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 417 (Apr. 19, 1911).
75Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 410.
port the reciprocity treaty, Taft said: "Now is the accepted time! Now Canada is in the mood! She is at the parting of the ways! Shall she be an isolated country, as much separated from us as if she were across the ocean, or shall her people and our people profit by the proximity that our geography furnishes and stimulate the trade across the border?" Privately, the President confided to Roosevelt his belief that the treaty "would make Canada only an adjunct of the United States," and a few days after the ill-considered Springfield speech the Democratic Speaker of the House, Champ Clark, bluntly called for the annexation of all British North America. Despite Taft's diligent efforts to retrieve these malapropisms, the damage was done. Canada refused to ratify the treaty, and Laurier's government fell on the issue.

Progressive attitudes on Canadian reciprocity combined with those on marine expansion and Dollar Diplomacy indicate that progressives were generally willing to support an economic foreign policy geared to commercial and capital expansion. Indeed, it might be argued that only in the field of economic foreign policy did Taft meas-

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76 Pringle, Taft, II, 592.
77 Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 156;166-167; Pringle, Taft, II, 592-593; see also James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years, 134. This statement, Cox believed, injured Clark's nomination chances in the 1912 Democratic convention.
78 Pringle, Taft, II, 593.
ure up to the progressive concept of strong executive leadership.

But even in this area he was a failure, despite his relatively strong leadership and considerable progressive support for his programs. None of his projects really panned out. The merchant marine was not expanded, the tariff was not lowered, Dollar Diplomacy produced no significant flow of American capital into China or Latin America and no significant increase in Sino-American trade, and Canadian reciprocity died an unsung death in Ottawa. Certainly there was little left to recommend Taft to progressives as the fateful election of 1912 approached.

V

The campaign of 1912 was not primarily concerned with foreign affairs. While the speeches and literature of the leading candidates made occasional reference to international relations, the statements were mainly for the record, and, according to Walter Lippmann, "did not influence two hundred votes" one way or another. But any analysis of the progressives and their foreign policy attitudes would be incomplete without mention of the stands taken by the candi-

79On this point see Sen. Norris Brown, Cong. Record, 62 Cong., 1 Sess., 3038 (July 19, 1911). On the other hand, Sen. Cummins and Rep. Gronna criticized Taft's use of the executive power in negotiating the Canadian treaty arguing that as a tariff measure it invaded the prerogatives of Congress. Cummins objected to legislation by treaty. Gronna felt that it might set a precedent for some future President "whose penchant will be the extension of territorial dominion instead of the surrendering of the farmer's markets." Ibid., 2572;2677 (June 28, 1911; July 6, 1911). But this represented the extent of criticism of Taft on this point by progressives.

dates and parties on the central foreign policy issues of the day.

Roosevelt returned from Africa in 1910. In his famous Osawatomie, Kansas, speech on August 31 the Rough Rider again reminded a sleepy public that reform at home and an uplift diplomacy abroad were but two sides of the same coin:

It is hardly necessary for me to repeat that I believe in an efficient army and a navy large enough to secure for us abroad that respect which is the surest guarantee of peace. A word of special warning to my fellow citizens who are as progressive as I hope I am. I want them to keep up their interest in our internal affairs; and I want them also continually to remember Uncle Sam's interests abroad. Justice and fair dealing among nations rest upon principles identical with those which control justice and fair dealing among the individuals of which nations are composed, with the vital exception that each nation must do its own part in international police work.81

The idea of "international police work" in the selfless interests of "justice" abroad was not a new one in progressive circles. But the forceful linking of the concept to domestic reform again pointed up Roosevelt's insistence that emphasis on problems at home should not cloud or obscure the nation's continued dedication to righteousness abroad. Indeed, this consideration was never far from Roosevelt's mind. A few days before the Osawatomie speech he wrote an English friend that "I am a genuine radical. I believe in what you would call an 'imperialist democracy.'"

A definition of "imperialist democracy" was spelled out by

Joseph M. Carey, progressive Republican Governor of Wyoming. Speaking at a Roosevelt rally in April, 1912, shortly after Roosevelt had displaced La Follette as the Republican progressives' leading candidate for the G.O.P. nomination, Carey demonstrated that many progressive Republicans in the west still embraced the muscular foreign policy of the former President. In his speech Carey endorsed every facet of imperialist uplift abroad. He also emphasized the idea that since speaking softly, carrying, and occasionally using, a big stick was really the only way to secure peace, Roosevelt was truly a peacemaker.

The rape of Panama in 1903, thought Carey, was a selfless seduction demanded by civilization: "The only time to do things in Central America and South America is when opportunity makes it possible to do them. The world demanded, and our country demanded, the building of the Panama Canal. Roosevelt had the intuition to prepare the way for that canal, and all praise is due him."

The progressives who followed Roosevelt into the Progressive party in 1912 needed no "intuition" to discover what the party stood for in foreign affairs. Much to the distress of David Starr Jordan, Jane Addams and other peace progressives who supported Roosevelt, the Progressive platform called for a larger navy and the continued building of two battleships a year. To the assembled dele-

gates at the Progressive convention Roosevelt also argued that "our aim is to control business, not to strangle it," and he warned that if the Democracy was elected on its anti-trust plank,

practically all industries would stop...if we are to compete with other nations in the markets of the world
...we must utilize those forms of industrial organization that are indispensable to the highest industrial productivity and efficiency....Either we must modify our present obsolete laws regarding concentration and cooperation so as to conform to the world movement, or else fall behind in the race for the world's markets.85

Roosevelt ran openly and frankly on his foreign policy record. Whatever the basis of the interest in his candidacy shown by pacifists like Jane Addams and Oswald Garrison Villard, progressivism still included a diplomacy dedicated to uplift and righteousness abroad as far as Roosevelt was concerned. He strongly urged commercial expansion, and he argued that the Democratic intent to destroy the trusts would hinder this necessary goal. He made no apologies for his actions on foreign policy questions while President. Indeed, in one campaign speech he boasted that "I...took the Isthmus and started the Canal and allowed Congress to debate me instead of the Canal. That was a good working compromise. Uncle Sam got the Canal and Congress got the debate. Instead of debating the Canal, which would have hurt everybody, they debated me, which hurt nobody...."86

Roosevelt publicists lauded the Colonel's construction of a great

battlefleets. "Without doubt," wrote one, "our possession of a vastly superior naval force was one of the most important factors in assuring peace with Japan," because the voyage of the fleet "carried the American flag and the solid evidence of American power to all the seas...."

More revealing, perhaps, was the campaign broadside widely distributed by the Progressive party. Entitled Lest We Forget, it pointed with pride to such earlier Roosevelt accomplishments as the "Canal Zone acquired," Santo Domingo finances "straightened out," the Navy doubled in tonnage and sent around the world, the "settlement" of the Russo-Japanese war, the negotiation of twenty-four treaties of general arbitration, and "keeping the door of China open to American commerce." Thus while external affairs were not important in the campaign, there could be little doubt where the Progressives stood. They favored a vigorous foreign policy, and they fully endorsed the past actions of the Rough Rider in the diplomatic field.

Roosevelt did not attack Taft's Dollar Diplomacy during the campaign. While Progressive spokesmen in New York State did refer to

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88 Progressive National Committee, Lest We Forget. Some of the Notable Achievements of the Roosevelt Administration (New York, 1912), 1-4.
Taft's foreign policy as "one of the most signal failures of the administration," and suggest, rather tentatively, that "there is a general belief at home and abroad that the State Department has been run on a system of dollar diplomacy for the benefit of the trusts," the Bull Moose largely ignored Taft's economic foreign policy as a possible campaign issue.

On the other hand, Taft and his campaigners called attention to the President's dedication to peace and commercial expansion. The restraint exercised by the Administration with regard to provocations on the Mexican border was particularly emphasized, and the annexation of the Philippines characterized as "an attempt to carry out an American ideal...a noble experiment." Republican party publicists vigorously defended Canadian reciprocity and Dollar Diplomacy. One campaign circular lauded Taft for having "induced China to open to American finance on equal terms with the rest of the world," and argued that the "new treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua will make for permanent peace in those countries." Taft also defended Amer-

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90 Roosevelt League of New York State, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, 15.
91 Address of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Delivered at St. Paul, Minnesota, Oct. 23, 1912 (Washington, 1912), 14-15; Said Taft: "It seemed the course of patriotism and wisdom to subject ourselves and our citizens to some degree of inconvenience" rather than attempt to enforce peace "upon these 15,000,000 of people fighting among themselves." President Taft's Speech of Acceptance and Senator Root's Speech of Notification, Aug. 1, 1912 (n.p., n.p., n.d.), 14-15; see also Republican Platform as Adopted by the Republican State Convention of New Hampshire, 1912 (Manchester, N.H., John B. Clarke Co., 1912), 2-3.
92 Three Years of Taft: An Index (n.p., n.p., 1912), 1-4.
icth a loan to China - "In order that our influence might be useful" - and pointed to his interest in peace and in treaties for "universal arbitration." At the same time, however, he endorsed a two-battleship a year naval building program and urged that it be continued "whatever party comes to power"; a navy, he said, "is for fighting, and if its management if not efficiently directed to that end the people of this country have a right to complain."

Undoubtedly, Taft hoped to attract the support of the progressive Republicans and that of the peace progressives, with a mixture of peace, commercial expansion, arbitration and naval building, a compound that had been demonstrably popular with progressives for nearly a decade. But Taft's domestic record was unacceptable to G.O.P. progressives, and, as we shall see when we discuss the Panama Canal tolls question, his record on arbitration, an attractive issue to many peace progressives, had not been spotless. Indeed, many prominent peace progressives (Addams, Villard, Jordan) supported the bellicose Roosevelt, convinced that the advantages of his more radical domestic reform program outweighed the disadvantages of Big Stick diplomacy. Similarly, other peace progressives (Charles R. Crane, Louis D. Brandeis and Robert M. La Follette) supported the reform-minded Wilson, although Wilson was no more of a pacifist than Roose-

93President Taft's Speech of Acceptance...., 14-15.
Of the three major candidates in 1912 Woodrow Wilson was by far the most non-communicative and non-committal on foreign policy questions. Unlike both Taft and Roosevelt, he had no foreign policy record in office to defend or boast about. This did not mean, however, that he had no convictions about American diplomacy. While his record as Governor of New Jersey in 1910-1912 stamped the Democratic nominee as a progressive on domestic questions, he had called attention to the relationship between reform at home and uplift abroad and become a vigorous advocate of commercial expansion as early as 1900-1901. Thus, while Wilson's conversion to domestic progressivism in 1910 was somewhat belated, his progressive view of America's role in international affairs extended back to the turn of the century.

Something of this was expressed in a speech in Denver on May 7, 1911, when the Governor was still campaigning for the Democratic nomination:

There are times in the history of nations [he said] when they must take up the crude instruments of bloodshed in order to vindicate spiritual conceptions. For liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in warfare. I will not cry "peace" so long as there is sin and wrong in the world.95

The Democratic platform once again called for Philippine in-

96Netter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 176-177.
dependence. It was a call hedged with restrictions, however, not the old, flamboyant demand for immediate separation. Indeed, by 1912, the Democracy had come to favor independence only when "stable" government could be established in the islands, and only if the Philippines could be neutralized by international agreement. And even then, "our government should retain such land as may be necessary for coal stations and naval bases." Given the platform stand on the question of Philippine independence, Wilson advanced only the relatively non-controversial notion that "we hold them in trust for the people who live there," a remark, thought Bryan expansively, "gratifying to those who have in four campaigns endorsed the Democratic protest against imperialism." Actually, the Democracy's criticism of Republican imperialism, a point of attack hoary with political age, disappeared in one sentence in the platform: "We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead of strength, and laid our nation open to the charge of abandonment of the fundamental doctrine of self-government."

While the Democratic platform made no derogatory reference to Taft's economic foreign policy, Bryan vigorously attacked Dollar Diplomacy as an "inexcusable degredation of the Department of State."

97Bryan, A Tale of Two Conventions, 225.
99Ibid., 225.
Wilson, however, was more indirect and he waited until election eve before he endorsed a foreign policy based on good will and justice "rather than upon mere commercial exploitation and the selfish interests of a narrow circle of financiers extending their enterprises to the ends of the earth."

But in numerous pre-convention and campaign speeches Wilson returned again and again to the theme that America must conquer the markets of the world. In view of the subsequent impact of the World War on American commerce, and Wilson's emphasis on maritime neutral rights to the point of actual American involvement in the conflict, his campaign statements in 1912 were significant. In his acceptance speech he argued that

We must revive our merchant marine...and fill the seas again with our fleets....without a great merchant marine we cannot take our rightful place in the commerce of the world....Our industries have expanded to such a point that they will burst in their jackets, if they cannot find a free outlet to the markets of the world....Our domestic markets no longer suffice. We need foreign markets.....The tariff was once a bulwark; now it is a dam. For trade is reciprocal; we cannot sell unless we also buy.101

To a group of New Jersey farmers Wilson declared categorically that "if prosperity is not to be checked in this country we must broaden our borders and make conquest of the markets of the world." And to the Economic Club of New York he linked his political concept of

100 Ibid., 104-105; Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 197.
strong executive leadership with his ideas on economic foreign policy:

Society is an organism and every government must develop according to its organic forces and instincts....What we have been witnessing for the past hundred years [in America] is the transformation of a Newtonian Constitution into a Darwinian Constitution. [Applause.] The place where the strongest will is present will be the seat of sovereignty....Since [the Spanish-American War] America has stood up, looked about her, drawn the veil of preoccupation from her eyes and beheld herself a great power among the peoples of the world; and ever since that moment the President has, of necessity, become the guiding force in the affairs of the country. It was inevitable....we cannot shut our eyes to foreign questions - particularly now when we see some prospect of breaking our isolation by lowering the tariff wall between us and other nations; now that we see some possibility of flinging our own flag out upon the seas again [Applause.] and taking possession of our rightful share of the trade of the world....We must have some central point of guidance. This is the adjustment to environment; this is the Darwinization of the government of the United States.103

In sum, progressive economic foreign policy theory, as expressed during the 1912 campaign by both Republicans and Democrats, demanded commercial expansion as the sine qua non of national industrial health. Roosevelt would permit "honest" trusts and combinations to spearhead international economic competition. Taft, although no progressive in the eyes of leaders in the Republican progressive movement, found progressive support for the view that the Government should utilize the banking houses to help thrust American investment capital into backward areas to serve the righteous cause of political pacification and stability. Wilson would lower tariffs. And almost all of

the progressives supported a great navy, an expanded merchant marine, reciprocity treaties, and tariff revision downward. Taken together, these views would subsequently influence America's march to war in 1917.
THE PROGRESSIVES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1898-1917:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE LEADERS
OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT TOWARD EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Volume II

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By

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CHAPTER V

WOODROW WILSON: POLITICS, PANAMA AND PROTECTORATES

The election of 1912 significantly altered the political course of progressivism. Not only was the G.O.P. split into its liberal and conservative components, but the Roosevelt-La Follette feud badly divided the progressive wing of the party. Convinced that Roosevelt had used tactics less than honorable to secure leadership of the Republican progressives on the eve of the convention, La Follette sought to prevent the nomination of the Rough Rider at Chicago. And when Roosevelt failed of nomination and bolted the party to form the schismatic Progressive party, La Follette did not follow. Embittered at being shunted aside by the popular Roosevelt in the race for the nomination, the Wisconsin Senator and many of his followers actually supported Wilson. To encourage this factional split, the Democrats organized the Wilson Progressive Republican League, an organization numbering some 40,000 that helped bring many of the La Follette progressives into the Wilson fold. Not only did Wilson thus benefit from the Taft-Roosevelt division, but from the Roosevelt-La Follette break as well.

2Maxwell, The Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin, 335-346; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 453.
La Follette's defection from the Republican party and his repudiation of Roosevelt's Progressive party severely reduced his personal influence in Republican progressive circles. Rejected by progressive Democrats for his Republicanism and by the Bull Moosers for both his political disloyalty and his alleged radicalism, La Follette had no real political home after 1912. Indeed, Wilson's nomination and election and the resulting decline of Bryanism in the Democratic party, coupled with the strong showing at the polls of the Progressive party, marked a shift of power within progressivism from La Follette, Bryan and the agrarian middle west toward Roosevelt, Wilson and the urban-industrial east.

In addition to the growing sectionalization of the movement, the factionalization of progressivism into separate La Follette, Roosevelt, Wilson and progressive Republican groups also had an important influence on the determination of the foreign policy attitudes of the leadership element of the progressive movement after 1912. The La Follette progressives, centering largely in the north central states, became increasingly pacifist and isolationist. The Roosevelt progressives, mainly eastern but with a good sprinkling of middle westerners, tended toward extreme nationalism and a muscular foreign policy in general. The progressive Republicans, mostly middle westerners who stayed in the Republican party in 1912 rather than walk into outer political darkness with the third party movement, occupied a middle position in their attitudes. Some leaned toward La Follette and isolationism, others toward the re-blooded diplomacy of Roosevelt. Wilsonian diplomacy, emphasizing Big Stick morality in Latin America
and an internationalist outlook on world politics in general, commanded the support of the progressive Democrats and the party as a whole. It also attracted the support of some Roosevelt progressives and progressive Republicans, but lost the backing of a few prominent Democratic peace progressives (notably Bryan after his resignation from the Cabinet in 1915) who worked with La Follette. Nonetheless, progressive Democrats were relatively solid in their support of Wilson's foreign policy, a loyalty perhaps not unrelated to the fact that as a minority party facing a reunited G.O.P. in 1916 the Democracy could ill afford the luxury of dissension on diplomatic questions.

Between 1898 and 1913 these differences on foreign policy had not been nearly so distinct among progressives. All of them had favored Cuba Libre and the righteous war of 1898. Almost all of them had supported, or at least accepted, various schemes for commercial expansion, merchant marine expansion and naval expansion. Both middle western and eastern progressive Republicans had, with few exceptions, joined the main body of the G.O.P. in support of McKinley's imperialism and Roosevelt's Latin American policy. Likewise, the progressive Democrats had raised little objection to Roosevelt's Big Stick, although they had loyally supported the Democracy's opposition to McKinley's imperialism and annexationism during the 1900 campaign. But with the Republican political debacle of 1912 and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 differences in foreign policy attitudes among progressives became increasingly pronounced.

At least one primary fact will emerge from an analysis of this change: contrary to traditional interpretations of progressi-
visim and foreign policy, La Follette's emphasis on peace and commercial isolationism did not characterize the foreign policy attitudes of most progressive leaders after 1914. Indeed, the views of the Wisconsin Senator were those of but a small group of middle western progressives, a group that became increasingly isolated from the mainstream of progressive foreign policy ideology as America marched to war. On the great questions of war and peace and trade policy, La Follette could deliver only the votes of the Wisconsin progressives and those from the surrounding north central states. Thus it will become clear that the foreign policy views of Roosevelt and Wilson were generally those of most prominent progressives from 1914 to 1917.

The nomination and election of Woodrow Wilson significantly influenced the course and direction of progressive foreign policy attitudes within the Democratic party. Indeed, as the locus of Democratic leadership shifted from the agrarian west toward the urban east, the influence of Bryan and the old populist element in the party, if not destroyed, was certainly weakened. Some of the President's intimates even suggested that the Commoner be exiled to St. Petersburg or London as the American ambassador, but this move collapsed when Bryan made it perfectly clear that he was going to stay in Washington "to watch this administration and see what it is going to do." Given Bryan's senior position in the party and his contributions to Wilson's nomination at Baltimore, the President could do no less than offer him the prestige-filled post of Secretary of State.

4Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson, III, 440-442.
This he did with reluctance, accepting Bryan's stipulation that no intoxicating liquors be served at official state functions.

The advent of "Grape Juice Diplomacy," however, produced no revolutionary changes in American foreign policy, in spite of the hope of some peace progressives that under Bryan's leadership "we may expect our diplomacy to accomplish high results in doing away with war and the spirit of war." On the contrary, Bryan vigorously supported the armed interventions occasioned by Wilson's missionary diplomacy in Mexico and Caribbean America. And when the Commoner finally broke with Wilson on the maritime neutral rights question in 1915 and left the Cabinet, his departure was mourned neither by the President nor by most progressives in the Democratic party. With Bryan, of course, went much of the pacifist and isolationist influence he might have exerted on Wilson's European policy during 1916-1917. Nonetheless, Bryan's defection merely underlined the fact that it was Wilson, not Bryan, who dominated the destiny of the Democratic party from 1913 to 1917. And at the risk of armed interventions and war he dedicated the progressive wing of the Democracy to a diplomacy of uplift and righteousness abroad.

Thus any analysis of progressive foreign policy attitudes between 1913 and 1917 must keep in the foreground the fact that the political expression of progressivism was largely controlled by two eastern leaders - Wilson and Roosevelt. Each in his own way was com-


mitted to foreign policy attitudes which emphasized the idealism of America's mission to extend good and resist evil throughout the world. Opposed to this orientation was La Follette, and later Bryan, two middle western progressives who leaned toward pacifism, isolationism and a primary emphasis on greater reform at home and less concern for the downtrodden elsewhere. The merits of the Bryan-La Follette position were considerable, and men of the stature of Borah and Norris frequently supported that position, but, as we shall see, Bryan and La Follette each commanded only a splinter group of progressives within their respective parties. Nor was the combined strength of these minority factions sufficient to counter the attitudes and activities of the numerous progressives who followed both Roosevelt and Wilson.

The real irony of the history of progressive foreign policy attitudes during the Wilson Administration lies not in the La Follette-Bryan opposition to Wilson but in the fact that Roosevelt continually and savagely attacked Wilsonian foreign policy for being cowardly and pusillanimous. Certainly, his vigorous criticism of the President's diplomacy tended to blur the ideological dichotomy in progressive foreign policy that pitted La Follette-Bryan pacifism against Wilson-Roosevelt activism. Roosevelt's motives in this assault were at least partly political, and we shall see that the politics of factional progressivism played an important role in this criticism. Clearly, Roosevelt's attacks on Wilson stemmed from different motives and had different objects than the criticisms of La Follette and Bryan.
In many ways, Wilson's success as a progressive reformer on the domestic scene brought the new Progressive party to a state of crisis. As Roosevelt had written shortly after the election, "If the Democrats do well, then the reason for a Progressive Party will be so small that the ground may be swept from under our feet." Unfortunately for Roosevelt, the Democrats did extremely well. Under Wilson's dynamic executive leadership the Underwood Tariff Act, the Federal Reserve Act, the Smith-Lever Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act soon became laws of the land, and progressives of all shades of political opinion rejoiced. Some predicted that Wilson bid fair to walk off with the whole progressive movement, so popular and timely was the legislation. Others cheered the thought that American socialism was confounded and undone.

Bull Moose Progressives in Congress supported Wilson's re-

7Roosevelt to Emily Tyler Carow, Jan. 4, 1913, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 689.
form program virtually to the point of losing their partisan identity. Indeed, critics of the President among Progressives and progressive Republicans could muster charges no more damaging than the view that the reforms were not comprehensive enough, were pushed through by a dictatorial use of the Democratic party caucus, or represented, at best, an aberration, merely an appearance of progressivism on the part of a party that was essentially conservative. But Wilson was scarcely touched by this criticism. He was, as one progressive expressed it, "not only the chief unifying force in his party, but he has greater political strength than his party. It is beyond question that he has shown decided qualities of leadership. In fact he is the government." In fine, Wilson's reform program was so successful and popular that as late as August, 1914, Oscar King Davis, Secretary of the Progressive National Committee, despaired of finding an issue on which the Bull Moose could successfully attack the President. And in an election year that was catastrophic.

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13Paul L. Haworth, _America in Ferment_, 404.

By mid-1914, then, the Progressive party was in dire trouble. Wilson had preempted much of the domestic reform program the Bull Moose had offered the voters in 1912, and Bull Moose Congressmen had actually assisted in the theft. At the same time, a Congressional by-election in Maine in 1913 demonstrated rather conclusively that the continuation of the third party did not cut into regular Republican strength in sufficient quantity to force the G.O.P. standpatters to bargain with the Progressives. The separate existence of the Progressive party also dimmed hope for any liberal action within the Republican party and weakened whatever role the progressives still in the organization might play. Finally, the continued presence in the Progressive party of men like Wall Street's George W. Perkins, the conservative millionaire financier of Roosevelt's schismatic crusade, discouraged many Bull Moose liberals who felt the party had no future unless the progressivism of its leadership was absolutely beyond question.

Given the manifold problems facing the Progressives, many of the Bull Moose leaders hurried back to the Republican fold. As Harold L. Ickes described the migration, it resembled "rats leaving

15Elizabeth Ring, "The Progressive Movement of 1912 and the Third Party Movement of 1924 in Maine," The Maine Bulletin, XXXV (Jan., 1933), 22-29;34-35; George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 288; see also the exchange between Representatives William H. Hinebaugh and James F. Burke, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 1 Sess., 4815 (Sept. 12, 1913); and White to Theodore Roosevelt, Sept. 24, 1913, Selected Letters of William Allen White, 144-145.

16Powers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 440; Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 296.
a sinking ship." Others began to preach the doctrine of "amalgamation" with the G.O.P. Except for the fact that "one call upon Colonel Roosevelt's birch-bark horn" was still worth "a million votes at the lowest calculation," the Progressive party had no past, no present, and no apparent future.

It was largely the crisis within the Progressive party, coupled with an obvious poverty of issues on which to attack Wilson, that persuaded Roosevelt to crack down on the Administration's foreign policy. At first this was a tentative, exploratory operation. But after the political debacle of 1914 it became a primary concern of the Progressive leadership. In October, 1913, Roosevelt himself reconnoitered the terrain with a reference to the Administration's "discreditable impotence in foreign affairs," and throughout the summer of 1914 Bull Moose Congressmen followed suit, specifically attacking Wilson's position on the Panama Canal tolls question and the Administration's Mexican policy.

18Haworth, America in Ferment, 402; see also White to Theodore Roosevelt, Sept. 24, 1913, Selected Letters of William Allen White, 145.
But as the campaign of 1914 developed, many Progressive candidates for office nervously urged Roosevelt to abandon this line. They felt that the President's foreign policy was much too popular with the voters to risk an open assault on it. As Roosevelt later explained:

Nothing irritated me more last summer than the attitude of my own friends and also of the Republicans toward Wilson's foreign policy, especially in Mexico. My own friends and supporters besought me not to touch him, and whatever they said themselves, was really in his favor.... They...fell over themselves to say that they supported him for his noble and humanitarian peace policy. They took this ground over and over again...vying with the Democrats in saying how splendid it was that Wilson had kept us out of war with Mexico and had preserved such absolute neutrality in this European war. I told my own friends that as I was doing what I could for them this fall I should not make an attack which they thought would hurt them but that after the election I should smite the administration with a heavy hand.21

Despite the fact that the Progressive party ran its very best men against the Republicans and Democrats in 1914 – men of the calibre of Albert J. Beveridge, Gifford Pinchot, Victor Murdock, Raymond Robins, James R. Garfield and Bainbridge Colby – it was everywhere defeated. It simply had no dramatic issues, foreign or domestic. The 4,000,000 votes cast for the party in 1912 shrank to

21Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, Dec. 8, 1914, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 862. (Emphasis supplied.)

22In Ohio, for example, the Progressives endorsed the 1912 national platform, called for an expanded merchant marine, free passage for American coastwise ships through the Panama Canal, and criticized Wilson's idea of reimbursing Colombia $25,000,000 in payment for Roosevelt's theft of Panama. Mainly, however, the Ohio Progressives ran as the true anti-liquor party. See The Ohio Progressive Bulletin (Columbus, Ohio, Oct. 24, 1914), 111; and (Ohio) Progressive Party State and Local Candidates and What They Stand For (n.p., n.p., n.d. (1914)), 3-4.
2,000,000. With but one exception, the entire Bull Moose delegation in Congress was wiped out. It was, said Roosevelt correctly, an "utter and hopeless defeat."

But as Roosevelt surveyed the wreckage of the Progressive party in November, 1914, he became convinced that the organization should be held together for bargaining purposes. Indeed, it seems clear from his private letters at the time that he viewed an "amalgamation" with the Republicans as an ultimate political necessity. The Progressive party, he felt, should purge its "lunatic fringe," bring to the fore its "practical politicians" and "give the fullest recognition to the Perkins type" in the organization. In such manner would the possibilities of an eventual reunion with the G.O.P. be increased. At the same time, by "smiting the administration with a heavy hand" on foreign policy questions, Roosevelt hoped to impart to the disintegrating Progressives a new rallying point, a new ideological cohesion and organizational strength that would facilitate the return of the Progressive apostates to the parent G.O.P. without prejudice. It was at best a difficult assignment. Since some Progressive leaders frankly liked the way Wilson conducted the business of government both at home and abroad, new issues would cer-

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23Roosevelt to Ethel Roosevelt Derby, Nov. 4, 1914, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 831-837.
24Roosevelt to Hiram Johnson, Nov. 6, 1914, Ibid., 844-845; to Meyer Lissner, Nov. 16, 1914 and Dec. 11, 1914, Ibid., 848-849; to Edward A. Van Valkenburg, Nov. 23, 1914, Ibid., 863. See also Roosevelt to Hiram Johnson, July 30, 1914, Ibid., VII, 784.
tainly have to be found. William Dudley Foulke recognized this fact when he stated in December, 1914, that "If we confine our attention to the tariff in the present crisis, it seems to me we should be following a wholly wrong scent. The question at this moment is the question of national defense. If we are indifferent to that, in what may become the critical period in our history, the country may very well 26 become indifferent to us."

While it would be unfair to characterize Progressive opposition to Wilson's foreign policy as wholly motivated by political considerations, wholly devoid of principle, it seems reasonable to interpret that opposition partly in terms of a growing sense of realism about the need for political amalgamation with the Republicans. Certainly the combined attacks of Progressives and progressive Republicans on Wilson's Panama and Mexican policies represented a trial remarriage of those progressives who had deserted the G.O.P. and those who had remained, however reluctantly, in the fold.

III

The Panama Canal tolls dispute turned on a clause in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 which stated that "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations ... on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrim-

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26Foulke to George Perkins, Dec. 9, 1914, in Ibid., 198. Foulke launched his campaign to save the Progressive party with a letter to the Indianapolis Star in January, 1915, in which he argued that when the Germans had conquered Europe they would turn west against the United States. Raising the specter of German invasion, he called for extensive military preparedness.
ination against any nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect
of the conditions or charges of traffic....Such conditions and
charges of traffic shall be just and equitable." The implications
of this clause seemed reasonably clear in 1901. A Senate amendment
specifically designed to permit the United States to discriminate on
toll rates in favor of its coastwise shipping was beaten 45 to 27.

But as the waterway at the isthmus approached completion,
it was obvious that carefully considered legislation would have to be
drawn to govern its future use and operation. To meet this need the
Panama Canal Act of 1912 was debated and passed. The central feature
of the act was a provision, strongly recommended by the Taft Adminis-
tration in the interests of merchant marine expansion, that United
States vessels in the coastwise trade be permitted to use the canal
free — or more accurately, to receive a rebate on tolls paid. When
this recommendation was incorporated into the legislation it repre-
sented a clear violation of the treaty with Britain.

Nonetheless, the debates on the Canal Act in Congress found
progressives in support of this particular feature of Taft's economic
foreign policy by a two to one margin. Party lines were not dis-

27 Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 398. (Empha-
sis supplied.)
29 General statistical statements with reference to the tolls question
throughout this section are based on an analysis of the expressed
opinions of forty-eight progressives of the Republican, Democratic
and Progressive parties.
But most of the progressives were agreed that the rebate clause would stimulate the growth of the American merchant marine and produce needed competition to the transcontinental railroad monopoly. Only a few of them suggested that the rebate might be regarded as a crude subsidy to the coastwise shipping monopoly, and fewer still called attention to a possible violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

Actually, Senator Works of California summed up a view widely held in progressive circles in 1912 when he argued that the treaty certainly permitted toll discrimination because any other interpretation of it "would take away from the Government practically all the benefits resulting from ownership or sovereignty." Thus assured about the treaty, there was little disposition on the part of Congressional progressives to submit the toll question with Britain to international arbitration. Democratic Senator Chamberlain of Oregon maintained


32Rep. William Kent, Cong. Record, 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 6914 (May 21, 1912); Sen. Asle J. Gronna, Ibid., 10436 (Aug. 8, 1912). Taft stilled his own doubts about the treaty with the idea that toll rebate was a subsidy. Since foreign nations all subsidized their own merchant marines, the U.S. subsidy would not really be toll discrimination. Henry F. Pringle, Taft, II, 649-651.

that the Hague Court was "packed" against the United States, and even Taft, perhaps America's leading exponent of the doctrine of arbitration, opposed it in this instance for the very realistic reason that we may lose."

The Panama Canal Act was passed by Congress on August 24, 1912, with comfortable majorities and Taft signed it. Both the Progressive and Democratic party platforms of 1912 endorsed the idea of free tolls for coastwise ships. Wilson publicly supported the concept during the campaign, and as late as August 13, 1913, Secretary of State Bryan took the same stand, in spite of the fact that ten months earlier on October 14, 1912, the British Government had lodged a strong protest. This objection charged that the toll rebate provision of the Canal Act was a violation of Article III, Section 1, of the Hay-Paunceforte treaty, and suggested that the matter be submitted to arbitration.

Wilson paid no attention to the British protest during the campaign. Soon after he took office, however, a careful study of the question convinced him that the principle of toll rebate was indeed in conflict with the treaty. When he was informed by his ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, that even British circles friendly to the United States regarded America's stand on the toll question as

"dishonorable," Wilson reversed his earlier stand on the matter and privately assured the Foreign Office that he would work for repeal of the offensive clause in the Canal Act. Waiting until the Federal Reserve Act and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act were well on the road to adoption, Wilson publicly announced in January, 1914, that the toll provision of the Canal Act was a "clear violation of the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty." To a joint session of Congress on March 5 he repeated this observation and pleaded for the repeal of the toll rebate clause: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence, if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." This enigmatic reference was undoubtedly to the Administration's Mexican policy, which, we shall see, was indeed in a state of crisis.

Wilson's reversal on the tolls question from the stand he had taken in 1912 produced the first clear opportunity for Progressives and progressive Republicans to attack the popular President, and they moved with alacrity, joining forces in a vigorous and almost unanimous assault on the Administration. Bull Moose Representative Melville C. Kelly of Pennsylvania set the tone of the attack when he charged that the "Stars and Stripes shall be pulled down from its place over the American Canal at Panama, while in its place is hoisted

a piece of muslin with the British Union Jack on one side and the white of nerveless neutrality on the other." And Progressive Representative William H. Hinebaugh, with one eye on the political future of the Bull Moose, warned that "Nothing has occurred during this administration which emphasizes the need of the Progressive Party and a Roosevelt in the White House than this attempt to reverse a national policy. I promise you now, my Democrat and Republican friends, that if you pass this...[new canal] bill the people will see to it that Roosevelt will go to the White House in 1916."

The argument most frequently utilized by Progressives and progressive Republicans in their joint assault on Wilsonism held that the President was bowing in abject surrender before British pressure. Once again American history witnessed the scream of the Eagle as it twisted the tail of the Lion. Representative Hulings spoke of Wilson's "posture of obeisance to Britain," and Senator Works was convinced that the President had "out-Britished the British." Senator Bristow refought the Battle of Bunker Hill and urged a continued policy of no surrender to the Redcoats, while Representative Chand-
 ler warned Wilson that he must learn to be the President of a nation
"whose people are neither cravens nor cowards and whose martial spir-
it is not dead." After all, said Representative Hinebaugh with an
air of finality, the civilizing mission of the United States on the
isthmus fully justified charging Britain tolls to help defray the
cost of uplift.

Republican progressives and Progressives made much of the
political immorality of Wilson's reversal on the issue, and sug-
gested that he was fronting for the transcontinental railroads.
They urged the view that any interpretation of Hay-Pauncefote which
denied the United States the right to discriminate in favor of Amer-
ican ships would "convict Hay and Roosevelt of a stupendous blunder
and the whole of the American people as accessories after the fact."

But whatever the origins, disadvantages or implications of Hay-Paunce-
fote for the United States, the fact remained that the treaty plainly
denied toll discrimination. Thus after involved and tortuous semantic

43 Ibid., 5742 (Mar. 28, 1914); see also Rep. Moses P. Kinkaid, Ibid.,
5990 (Mar. 31, 1914); Rep. Victor Murdock, Ibid., 5564 (Mar. 26,
1914).
44 Ibid., 5613-5614 (Mar. 27, 1914).
L. Bristow, Ibid., 3600 (Feb. 18, 1914); Rep. James W. Bryan,
Ibid., 6008-6009 (Mar. 31, 1914); Rep. Horace M. Towner, Ibid.,
5726 (Mar. 28, 1914).
46 Rep. Charles A. Lindbergh, Ibid., 5873 (Mar. 30, 1914); Rep. Vic-
tor Murdock, Ibid., 5564 (Mar. 26, 1914); Rep. Everis A. Hayes,
Ibid., 5851 (Mar. 30, 1914); Sen. William E. Borah, Ibid., 9730
(June 3, 1914).
47 Sen. William E. Borah, Ibid., 9027 (May 22, 1914); see also Rep.
Everis A. Hayes, Ibid., 5850 (Mar. 30, 1914); Rep. Jacob A. Fal-
coner, Ibid., 6008 (Mar. 31, 1914).
attempts to prove that the phrase "all nations" in the tolls clause of the treaty really meant "all other nations," many Progressives and progressive Republicans simply came out flatly for unilateral renunciation of the pact. Forget about treaties "with hyphenated names," urged Representative MacDonald, and vote to permit the American people "to control their internal affairs, without the consent of any other nation on earth." Likewise, Senator Poindexter dismissed the treaty as a "worthless leaf of paper," and Representative Chandler was convinced that it was "Better a thousand times [to] lose the respect of the world than lose our self-respect. We can live down a broken treaty."

Progressive Democrats supported their President on the tolls question almost without exception. Their main argument, and it was one which some Progressives and progressive Republicans felt obliged to sustain, emphasized the sanctity of treaties. Hay-Pauncefote may not have been a good arrangement, said progressive Republican Representative Augustus P. Gardner, but "we made the bargain for better or

49Ibid., 5615 (Mar. 27, 1914); see also Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 10334 (June 12, 1914).
50Ibid., 9981 (June 8, 1914); Ibid., 5737-5738 (Mar. 28, 1914).
for worse and we ought to stick to it." The United States, argued Senator Owen, "has a gigantic responsibility as a civilizing agency as the representative leading Christian Republic; and for the nation to disregard the divine law of equity and of the golden rule would be a huge national blunder."

Progressives who supported Wilson on toll repeal argued, as a few of their number had in 1912, that the whole concept of toll exemption was no more than a screen to permit Government subsidy of the coastwise shipping monopoly. The subsidy advocate, charged Kentucky's Senator Ollie James, "grabs the American flag and waves it over his head, and cries 'patriotism, patriotism, patriotism,' when what he really means is 'plunder, plunder, plunder.'" Toll exemption was no more than a hand-out, added progressive Republican William Kent, "masquerading under all sorts of nonsense, miscalled patriotism, nonsense wrapped in flags and punctuated by squalls of the lion in torture and by the squeaks of the eagle in triumph."

To be sure, the Democrats were embarrassed by the stand they had taken on the tolls question in their 1912 platform. For

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54 Ibid., 5934 (Mar. 31, 1914).
this reason Secretary Bryan attempted to demonstrate that the plank favoring toll exemption did not really represent the true views of the delegates to the convention. He announced that the convention delegates had been polled anew by mail. Of the 845 who answered, 55 said Bryan, 682 now favored repeal. Representative A. Mitchell Palmer was more direct: "The continued peace between this Republic and our neighbors...is of more vital concern to our people than the preservation of a plank in the Baltimore platform," he maintained.

Even progressive Republican Representative Gardner applauded Wilson's political "courage" for disregarding the platform in the interest of national honor.

Again, as in 1912, there was virtually no sentiment among pro-repeal progressives for arbitration, although Britain had specifically suggested this as a possible solution. To the progressive Democrats, America's violation of the treaty was clear and arbitration would simply be wasted motion. Such support as there was for arbitration came from a few progressive Republicans who saw arbitration as a lesser evil than outright repeal and hoped that through arbitration something of the extreme nationalist viewpoint might be sal-

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56 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 5630 (Mar. 27, 1914).
Actually, most of the progressive Republicans took a dim view of arbitration, apparently agreeing with Senator Cummins that "there is not a citizen of the United States who has any thought of submitting to arbitration a question of this kind."

Despite the validity of the arguments pro and con on the repeal question, Wilson had the votes. The House passed repeal 247 to 162. In the Senate the margin was a comfortable 50 to 35. In the voting, as in the debates, the progressives divided largely along party lines. Only one progressive Democrat of any prominence, Senator Chamberlain, joined the opposition, and only a corporal's guard from among the Republican and Bull Moose progressives supported Wilson. On foreign policy issues, at least, party lines among Repub-


59. Ibid., 10162-10163 (June 10, 1914); see also Rep. Walter M. Chandler, Ibid., 5738 (Mar. 28, 1914); Sen. Miles Poindexter, Ibid., 10173 (June 10, 1914); Rep. Jacob A. Falconer, Ibid., Appendix, 353 (Mar. 31, 1914). Reflecting his opposition to arbitration or any other avenue toward relinquishment of American rights, Senator Cummins introduced an amendment to the toll repeal bill stating that nothing in the bill should be construed as a surrender of the American right under Hay-Pauncefote to exempt United States vessels from canal tolls. The amendment, which failed 49 to 37, nonetheless commanded the support of such progressives as Senators Borah, Bristow, Chamberlain, Clapp, Crawford, Kenyon, La Follette, Poindexter and Works. Ibid., 10174 (June 10, 1914).

60. The Senate wrote into the toll repeal bill the face-saving thought that repeal implied no waiver of America's theoretical "right" to favor its own vessels. Thus in its final form, progressive Republican Senators Crawford, Gronna, Kenyon and Norris voted with the Administration. Borah, Bristow, Clapp, Chamberlain, La Follette, Poindexter, and Works opposed the President. Ibid., 10247-10248 (June 11, 1914).
lican progressives, badly weakened in 1912, began to form again.

Thus Wilson's plea for support on the toll questions because of "other matters of even greater delicacy" made little impression on the Progressives and progressive Republicans in Congress. Indeed, it simply pin-pointed the President's Mexican policy as another fruitful line of attack on the Administration and further encouraged a growing spirit of unity among Progressives and progressive Republicans in Congress. To Progressive Representative Hinebaugh, for instance, it was a matter of deep regret "that our Government has been so far outgeneraled in its foreign policy by the Governments of Mexico and Great Britain that our President has felt compelled to bow the head and bend the knee to the demands of England in the matter of Panama tolls." Likewise progressive Republican Senator Works could see but one reason for Wilson's insistence on toll repeal: "The President is in trouble....something in the foreign relations of the country is going wrong; and he calls upon Congress to help him out of his difficulty by surrendering the rights of the people of this country in the Panama Canal."

IV

To understand Wilson's Mexican policy, his attitude toward Latin America as a whole must first be appreciated. Primarily, it must be kept in mind that the President had a sincere desire to reform

61 Ibid., 5613-5614 (Mar. 27, 1914); see also Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 5668 (Mar. 26, 1914); Sen. Miles Poindexter, Ibid., 4393 (Mar. 6, 1914); Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Ibid., 5935 (Mar. 31, 1914).
62 Ibid., 6400 (Apr. 8, 1914).
Latin America. He wanted to bring to the masses of people of the backward states in and around the Caribbean a measure of political democracy and free them from the corrupt and chaos-breeding dictatorships that fattened on ignorance, illiteracy and religious fatalism. He hoped to make Latin America over in the political image of the United States, and he sought to produce there a standard of political morality and behavior that would contribute to the achievement of a better economic life for all.

Wilson's statements, both public and private, were filled with these ideals. "I feel bound in conscience, as the official representative of the American people," read one, "to act in these critical circumstances as a friend of the people of Mexico even when proposing to use force against those who profess to be their government but do not govern." On another occasion, the President felt obliged "to retain immovably my position that I will not and cannot recognize a government which originated in individual unconstitutional action."

As for dictators south of the border, Wilson on more than one instance felt that the "scoundrel ought to be put out." To accomplish this and to show the "paths of freedom to all the world," Wilson believed that the Army and Navy were but the "instruments of civilization."

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63Eaker, Wilson, VI, 79. From an undelivered draft message to Congress, June, 1916, when war with Mexico threatened. Ibid., VIII, 291-292.
64Letter to Bryan, July, 1918, on not recognizing the Tinoco government of Costa Rica, Ibid., VII, 550.
65Letter to Robert Lansing, Feb., 1918, on dictator Gomez of Venezuela, Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 303; and Baker, Wilson, VI, 211.
the tools of America's desire and destiny to "serve humanity."

There was widespread support for these ideals in progressive circles. For instance, one Republican progressive wrote in 1916 that the United States "has a direct interest in evils elsewhere, for those evils react upon its own happiness, its own welfare and its own prosperity. Therefore, it is manifestly concerned in the preservation and extension of human liberty, the existence and promotion of human welfare; and it is justified in acting whenever and wherever broad, humanitarian principles are at stake." More significantly, the attitudes of Bryan toward Caribbean America differed little from those of the President. No sooner had he taken office as Secretary of State than his pacifism and anti-imperialism began to melt under the hot sun of political responsibility, and he soon became one with Wilson and Roosevelt in the belief that uplift should be and could be a legitimate aim for American foreign policy in Latin America. Not only was he willing to use the military tools that had already proved so effective there, he actually seemed to relish making the decisions that sent marines and fleet units into action all over the Caribbean.

Bryan's views on Dollar Diplomacy also changed. He and the President had both condemned the concept during the 1912 campaign. Indeed, one of the first acts of the new Administration had been a widely publicized renunciation of Dollar Diplomacy in China because

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the policy undermined "the administrative independence of China itself." But in Nicaragua, Haiti and Mexico a form of Dollar Diplomacy was used by the Democrats, and Bryan, who had long criticized the American banker and his role in economic foreign policy, now welcomed Wall Street as an ally.

In Nicaragua, Wilson and Bryan pursued a vigorous policy of economic imperialism. Bryan argued that the only way to prevent that unhappy land from falling into periodic anarchy was to pump American money into its economy and maintain the United States marines in the country. He felt that a series of government loans would "give our country such an increased influence... that we could prevent revolutions, promote education and advance stable and just government," thus ensuring "the increase of trade that would come from development and from the friendship which would follow the conferring of the benefits named." All this, thought Bryan, would furnish the "modern example of the Good Samaritan."

In Haiti, the Bryan-Wilson policy was much the same. There foreign control of the harbor and potential naval base at Mole St. Nicholas could seriously challenge America's exclusive control of her Panama lifeline. Bryan eyed the harbor avariciously. "I am satisfied," he wrote Wilson in June, 1913, "that it will be of great value

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68 Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 419.
69 Merle E. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 174; 176-177; Baker, Wilson, VIII, 313.
70 Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 175-176; Villard, Fighting Years, 233-234.
71 Baker, Wilson, IV, 433-434.
to us and even if it were not...it is worth while to take it out of the market so that no other nation will attempt to secure a foothold there." Replied Wilson: "I fully concur..." With that point settled, it was decided to persuade Haiti to request American intervention to quiet and stabilize an incredibly chaotic political situation. In October, the marines landed, and by 1915 Haiti had been converted into an American protectorate, an act, explained Wilson, necessary to teach the people democratic self-government and provide the stable environment so conducive to material prosperity. As Walter Lippmann correctly pointed out at the time, "the Democrats may deplore the 'dollar diplomacy' of Mr. Knox and the Taft Administration, but Mr. Wilson has proposed a treaty with Haiti which, whatever its merits, is built on the most approved model of modern economic imperialism."

If by 1916 there were any thoughtful Americans who still doubted the truth of Lippmann's characterization, events in the Dominican Republic must have proved convincing. There, as in Haiti, a chaotic political situation brought the marines, the protectorate dedicated to good roads, schools and sanitation systems, and Wilson's explanation that he was determined to provide for the Dominican people "a government that will provide peace, individual guarantees, and opportunity for development, without which no true prosperity can

72Ibid., VI, 87.
73Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 284; 361;424-425; Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 175-177.
74Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, 18-19.
come." And Wilson was right. Peace and a degree of prosperity soon returned to the Dominican Republic, as indeed it had following American intervention in Nicaragua and Haiti. Whatever the morality of Wilson's policy, American imperialism in the Caribbean actually produced political stability and higher living standards among the peoples involved.

Perhaps this was one reason why only scattered criticism of Wilson's policy in the three protectorates emanated from progressive circles. Progressive Democrats loyally supported Bryan and the President. What little opposition there was came primarily from Republican peace progressives. Thus when Norris, Borah and La Follette attacked Wilson's policy in the Caribbean, as they had earlier attacked Taft's Dollar Diplomacy there, their criticisms did not represent the views of many other progressives. Nonetheless, Senator Norris charged that the Bryan-Chamorro pact with Nicaragua was at best "a treaty with ourselves" since the United States controlled the government there in the interests of Wall Street. Senator Borah launched a private investigation in Nicaragua and concluded from his findings that Bryan's treaty was "with the puppets which we put in power," and was based on "deception, misrepresentation, fraud and

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75 Baker, Wilson, IV, 446; VI, 90-91; Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 280-281; 309-310; 335-336; Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 174-175.
76 Lieb, Democracy's Norris, 171.
corruption." La Follette called attention to the coercion of "weaker nations in the interest of speculative investors in foreign countries," and unsuccessfully urged an amendment to the 1916 Naval Appropriations bill that would prevent United States warships from being used for the collection of private claims against Latin American governments.

At the same time, Jane Addams and her Woman's Peace Party regularly drew attention to the glaring gap between Wilson's idealistic messages to war-torn Europe about human dignity and the self-determination of peoples and the sordid denial of those same ideals in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. On this point the lady peacemakers enlisted a peculiar ally in the person of Theodore Roosevelt who wrote in 1918 that

the United States has deprived and is depriving Haiti and Santo Domingo of self-determination. It has destroyed democracy in these two little festering black republics. It is ruling them by marines, and you can't find, and no one else can find, a published word from the President even relating to what has been done. Is the Peace Conference going to solemnly listen to chatter about impossible promises for self-determination for

77 Cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 11614-11617 (July 6, 1914); Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 342-344. Borah's motion (S.R. 411) to debate the Bryan-Chamorro treaty openly on the Senate floor instead of in executive session was defeated 42 to 19 with 35 Senators not voting. Supporting Borah's demand for open covenants were Bristow, Clapp, Gronna, Kenyon, Nelson, Norris, and Poindexter. James and Works voted with the majority. Crawford, Cummins, La Follette and Owen were not recorded. Cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 12141 (July 15, 1914).
78 Torello, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette, 192; see also Lieb, Democracy's Norris, 174.
79 Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War (New York, 1945), 55-57. Lobbyists of the Woman's Peace Party were told by Administration officials that fear of French or German control of naval bases in Hispaniola had impelled American occupation.
everybody in the future, and not ask for some rule which will make hypocrisies about cases like that of Santo Domingo a little less blatant than at present?80

The Rough Rider's point was well taken. Indeed, Wilson's Latin American policy posed interesting contradictions when compared with the stated ideals of his European policy. In 1917 Senator Cummins wondered how Wilson rationalized his Caribbean policy in view of his condemnation of territorial conquest and his demand for a new world order based on international justice and a League of Nations. "By what right do we hold Cuba in check?" he asked. "By what right do we enter day after day and month after month the Republics of Central America in order to suppress crime, in order to defend and maintain Governments which we ourselves establish within the borders of those countries?"

Wilson's Mexican policy, like his policy in Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, also revealed the President's desire that all Caribbean America be reformed, pacified and uplifted. For this reason most progressives supported the Administration's ideal in Mexico if not the means of attaining it. Specifically, the President's policy in Mexico commanded the allegiance of almost all progressive Democrats, and it attracted considerable support in progressive Republican and Bull Moose ranks. To be sure, leaders in

80Roosevelt to James Bryce, Nov. 19, 1918, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 1401; see also Roosevelt to Ernest E. Smith, Oct. 26, 1917, Ibid., 1248, in which the Colonel charged that Wilson's occupation of Hispaniola had "not 1/1000 part as great as the justification for what I did in Panama."
81Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 2232 (Jan. 30, 1917).
these various groups followed the President for different reasons. To some his policy seemed one of "peace" in an otherwise incendiary situation. To others the righteous and uplifting aims were appealing. Still others thought it manifested vigorous, red-blooded, 100% American attributes. Many followed Wilson for reasons of political loyalty to the party and personal loyalty to the President.

Opposition by progressives to Wilson's Mexican policy was of two distinct types. First, there were those who felt Wilson was too halting and timorous in his defense of national honor and the rights of American citizens in Mexico. On the other hand, there were those who argued that his policy was too vigorous and could only result in an aggressive war of conquest. The former, including such Progressives as Roosevelt, Beveridge and Murdock wanted more blood and thunder than the policy seemed to promise, and they saw distinct political possibilities in the crisis and an opportunity to advance amalgamation by sharp criticism of the Administration. The latter, comprising those who were identified with the La Follette isolationist and peace faction in the progressive movement, feared that the urge to reform Mexico was merely an ideological cloak for nefarious capitalist and imperialist designs. This segment, represented by such leaders as Lindbergh, La Follette, Kent and Villard, was the smallest and least vocal of the contending progressive pressure groups that spoke out during the Mexican crisis.

The primary and specific aim of Wilson's Mexican policy was to eliminate Dictator Victoriano Huerta from control of the Mexican
government. In February, 1913, Huerta had come to power over the dead body of Francisco Madero, the popular and democratic revolutionary leader who had overthrown the infamous tyranny of Porfirio Diaz in 1911. For two generations Diaz had ruled Mexico in the interests of landed aristocracy, Catholic hierarchy and foreign concessionaires, and the successful Madero revolution seemed to mark the beginning of a hopeful new chapter in Mexican history. But Huerta's brutal murder of Madero in 1913 gave every evidence of a return to the pre-1911 status quo, and it persuaded Wilson, when he assumed office in March, 1913, not to extend diplomatic recognition to what he characterized as a "government of butchers."  

The President's reversal of the traditional American practice of recognizing de facto governments, regardless of their moral antecedents, was the first shot in a campaign to depose Huerta, liberate the Mexican masses from dictatorship and peonage and set the Mexican people on the high road to political democracy. Huerta, unfortunately, had a different view of the matter, but as his dictatorship increased in brutality and rigidity, Wilson's determination hardened.

In November, 1913, the President circularized foreign governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the dictator, warning them that it was his "immediate duty to require Huerta's retirement from the Mexican government" and pointing out that the United States would "now proceed to employ such means as may be necessary to se-

When Sir William Tyrell reached Washington to assure the President that Britain would cooperate with Wilson by withdrawing recognition from Huerta, Wilson informed him that it was American policy "to teach the South American republics to elect good men!" But whether British willingness to acquiesce in Wilson's chastisement of Huerta was related to a "deal" or some sort on the Panama Canal tolls question is not known, although, as we have seen, this was widely assumed to be the case by Republican progressives hostile to Wilson on the tolls issue.

The hardening of Wilson's resolve toward Huerta was undoubtedly influenced by a continuous stream of analytical dispatches from John Lind, the President's personal agent in Mexico. The Minnesota progressive Democrat instructed Wilson that the best alternative to outright military conquest of Mexico was to throw the weight of the United States behind an anti-Huerta faction. "To make a dog feel that he really is a cur," he wrote Bryan, "he must be whipped by another dog and preferably by a cur....let this housecleaning be done by home talent. It will be a little rough and we must see to it that the walls are left intact, but I should not worry if some of the veranda and French windows were demolished." Specifically, Lind urged that American troops be landed to assist General Carranza, leader of the anti-Huerta Constitutionalists, in his march on Mexico City,

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83 Ibid., 117.
84 Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, I, 204-205.
and he suggested that to facilitate this aid to Carranza the United
States might seize Tampico, Vera Cruz and other Mexican Gulf ports.
The United States, Lind felt, must be the "pillar of cloud by day
and the pillar of fire by night and compel decent administration [in
Mexico]...From this necessity there is no escape."

Wilson accepted Lind's analysis in large measure, rejecting
only the recommendation calling for the immediate use of American
troops in an active anti-Huerta capacity. He was determined to lib-
erate the Mexicans by "peaceful" means if it could possibly be ac-
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complished. In October, 1913, in his famous Mobile Address, he as-
sured both Latin America and the world at large that the United States
would never again "seek one additional foot of territory by conquest,"
and that the day was not far removed when Latin America would be eman-
cipated from its subordination to foreign concessionaires. "It is
a very perilous thing," said the President, "to determine the foreign
policy of a nation in terms of material interest"; the United States,
he declared, was striving only for the "development of constitutional
88
liberty in the world." Under Huerta, of course, there could be no
development of "constitutional liberty," in Mexico and his continua-

86 Ibid., 246-255.
87 Baker, Wilson, IV, 276.
88 Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 540-541. Progressive
Paul Haworth considered Wilson's denial of territorial ambition
wholly naive. "We can only judge the future by the past, and it
would hardly be reasonable to assume that a process begun when
the pressure for an outlet to super-abundant energy, enterprise
and adventure was infinitely less than to-day should suddenly be
discontinued. As soon expect a boy of thirteen to cease growing
because his trousers have become too tight." Haworth, America
in Ferment, 32-33.
tion in power there made a mockery of Wilson's dream that as the years go on...the world...will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom...that America will come into the full light of the day when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity. 89

There was little disagreement among progressives that Huerta's overthrow was an absolute prerequisite to carrying democracy to the Mexicans. To most progressives, the Mexican dictator was a "Frankenstein devoid of all moral judgment, ruled by appetite and passion, and guided by cunning," an assassin, brigand, murderer, plotter, a man heading the "cruel commercialized military oligarchy now riding the people of Mexico to ruin and chaos." The time had come, said Progressive Representative Willis J. Hulings in March, 1914, for the United States to exercise its "plain Christian duty" in assisting the Mexican people to "turn the guerrillas back to their kennels....and pull the assassin Huerta out of his usurped place and put a strong, clean, red-blooded man in control and give him the necessary support"; if this leads to war, continued the Pennsylvanian, "I would willingly leave my place here and, as a soldier not for conquest but for peace and civilization, bear my share of whatever might fall." Senator Works of California was convinced that unless American life and property could adequately be safeguarded the United

90 Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 267; Sen. Ollie M. James, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 6990 (Apr. 21, 1914); Sen. John D. Works, Ibid., 4404 (Mar. 6, 1914); Sen. Robert L. Owen, Ibid., 8506 (May 13, 1914); George Creel, Rebel at Large, 79.
States would have to "send...soldiers into Mexico" to deal with Huerta in some "decisive way." This would not, however, be for the "aggrandizement of our country, the acquisition of territory, or any other advantage to us, but in the interests of the Mexican people...the restoration of peace and order, and the establishment of a stable government for our sister Republic." And Roosevelt felt that America would have to handle Mexico "somewhat along the lines of what we have done in Santo Domingo and Cuba," a view which Beveridge expanded to mean that "we ourselves must go there and administer her affairs for the next two or three generations."

The armed intervention spirit among progressives was rationalized and intensified by their demand that American citizens in Mexico be protected from the ravages of the revolution. Former Representative William P. Hepburn, for example, insisted that the flag give "protection to every American and his property wherever he chose to go under God's sun." Indeed, the Bull Moose group in Congress was convinced that in failing vigorously to demand the protection of American lives and property, Wilson was simply encouraging the excess-

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92Ibid., 4405 (Mar. 6, 1914). At the same time, Works had little confidence in the political sophistication of the Mexican masses. A free election, such as Wilson had called for, would "probably bring about the election of a bull fighter for President." See also Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 235.

93Roosevelt to Gilbert D. Baine, Mar. 4, 1913, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 711; Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 448; see also Haworth, America in ferment, 35-36.

ses of the revolutionary leaders. "A strong man like Theodore Roose-
velt would have settled the difficulty," said one Progressive Congress-
man.

The increasing clamor in the United States for the protec-
tion of American "rights" and property in Mexico tended to obscure
the underlying social and economic nature of the Mexican revolution
for most progressives. In general, they viewed the revolution in
terms of the American progressive emphasis on political democracy and
a responsible capitalism. Thus "good" or "bad" political leaders,
"stability" or "chaos" as socio-political absolutes, and the degree
of respect or non-respect for the private property of Americans,
were the yardsticks by which revolutionary changes were measured.

Perhaps the most accurate analysis of the true character
of the Mexican revolution came from men on the economic left of the
progressive movement. Lincoln Steffens, for instance, pointed out
that it was "the revolution; not only the Mexican revolution....the
Mexicans want important things; things which we all ought to want:
"economic, not alone political independence and liberty." Progressive Democratic Representative Warren Worth Bailey of Pennsylvania,

95Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 5143 (Mar. 19, 1914). This point
ultimately became central in Roosevelt's attack on Wilson's Mex-
ican policy after the 1914 elections. Roosevelt Letters, VIII,
861.

96Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 294;
see also Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 279-280; Sen. Robert
L. Owen, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 8509 (May 13, 1914);
Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 5141 (Mar. 19, 1914); Rep. Frank
W. Mondell, Ibid., 4049 (Feb. 27, 1914).

97Steffens to Laura Steffens, Dec. 5, 1914, The Letters of Lincoln
Steffens, I, 351.
a legislator with strong Single Tax leanings, characterized it as "at bottom...a peasant uprising - an agrarian attempt to overthrow an order established in rapine, corruption and tyranny. The Constitutionals have a program big with economic and social possibilities," continued Bailey, "a program which contemplates the restoration of the soil of Mexico to the millions who inhabit it." Given this evaluation of the revolution, the left progressives interpreted any advocacy of American intervention in Mexico as part of a capitalist-imperialist plot to preserve American property in the face of the legitimate aspirations of the Mexican masses.

While few progressives seemed to appreciate the deeper social and economic undercurrents of the Mexican revolt, almost all agreed that Huerta was an evil force. Yet, like Wilson, most progressives wanted to depose the dictator by peaceful means. Thus when Wilson in August, 1913, announced that he had embargoed arms shipments to all factions in Mexico and defined his policy as one of "watchful waiting," he received widespread support in progressive circles. But

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the President made it perfectly clear in December, 1913, that "watchful waiting" in no way involved a permanent acceptance of the Huerta dictatorship:

There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority in Mexico; until it is understood on all hands, indeed, that such pretended governments will not be countenanced or dealt with by the Government of the United States. We are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions. 101

An excellent excuse to champion constitutional government in Mexico finally came in April, 1914. Utilizing an affront to a group of American sailors by Huertista forces at Tampico, and fearing that a German vessel was about to land Huerta-consigned arms and ammunition there, Wilson and Bryan boldly decided on direct military intervention. The fact that Huerta refused to absolve himself from the insult to American sailors at Tampico by formally saluting the American flag added an element of "national honor" to the situation. Fleet units were dispatched to Mexican waters and Vera Cruz was occupied by American forces. On April 22, in a pitched battle at Vera Cruz, 19 Americans were killed and 71 wounded. Wilson explained to the country that it was his "passion" for the "submerged eighty-five percent of the [Mexican] people...now struggling toward liberty" that had impelled the intervention. As for the 19 Americans who died, the President explained that it was "a proud thing to die in a war of service" because war was a "dramatic representation of a thousand forms of duty," and that the action at Vera Cruz was simply a specific ex-

101Laughlin, Imperiled America, 77-78.
pression of America's duty "to serve mankind." To Congress he made
it clear that he had no quarrel with the Mexican people, only with
Huerta, the tyrant over them. "We do not desire to control in any de-
gree the affairs of our sister republic... The people of Mexico are
entitled to settle their own domestic affairs in their own way," said
the President.

Although the ostensible provocation for the intervention in-
volved no more than the arrest and temporary detention of a boatload
of American sailors who accidentally landed behind Huertista lines,
and Huerta's subsequent refusal to salute the American flag, many
progressives viewed the incident at Tampico as an outrageous viola-
tion of national honor and a legitimate invitation to commence the
reform of Mexican institutions. Bull Moose Representative James W.
Bryan harked back to the slaughter at the Alamo, emotionally refought
the Mexican-Texas war, and argued that it was America's "duty to pre-
sure order in Mexico" lest "some other nation... act on its own ini-
tiative" and intervene to produce even more pronounced complica-
tions. "Huerta must be deposed," agreed Senator Owen, because the
"welfare of the whole world depends upon the establishment of the
ideals of the Republic of the United States of constitutional liber-

102 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 298.
103 Ibid., 289; Baker, Wilson, IV, 334.
similar fears of Huerta's extra-hemispheric international politi-
cal machinations, particularly with Japan, see Sen. Robert L.
Owen, Ibid., 8512 (May 13, 1914); Rep. James W. Bryan, Ibid.,
6948 (Apr. 20, 1914); Rep. William J. MacDonald, Ibid., 6946
(Apr. 20, 1914).
ty and order and justice between man and man." Only by eliminating Huerta, continued Owen, could the United States assure every country in the Western Hemisphere "that we are moved alone by purposes of unselfish humanity," for as long as Huertaism exists "the whole of America is in peril." Kentucky's Senator James pointed out that Wilson was forced to seize Vera Cruz to prevent German arms from reaching the Mexican dictator. He called for national unity and a vigorous policy against Huerta.

It is no time to quibble now [said James]....There is no time now for hair splitting. Our soldiers are upon Mexican soil. Their blood has been spilt. The flag of our country flies from the parapet of the Vera Cruz fort. It is the duty of every Senator here to uphold the glory of that flag. It is no time to play politics. Politics ends at the Rio Grande and patriotism takes its place....this night, upon Mexican soil, President Wilson walks side by side with Uncle Sam, clad in the blue uniform of the greatest, freest Republic in the world, holding aloft in his hands the flag of this Nation – the flag of no party, of no creed, but the flag of a common country...with every star ablaze and every stripe aglow....

There were some Congressional progressives, however, who were convinced that the intervention at Vera Cruz was not really an act of war. Instead, it was interpreted as an act of peace, the legitimate exercise of the police power of a "great Christian nation" whose patience with Huerta was simply "worn out." Democrat War-

105Ibid., 8509; 9512-8513 (May 13, 1914); see also Rep. Victor Murdock, Ibid., 6936 (Apr. 20, 1914).
ren W. Bailey, a leading peace progressive, saw Wilson as the "great peacemaker at the other end of the avenue," and urged his colleagues to support the President's attempt to establish in Mexico a "new order founded on human liberty and human rights." Other progressives supported Wilson's request to employ armed force against Huerta, but worried about the flimsy nature of the pretext for intervention and the lack of sportsmanship implicit in a contest between unequals. Augustus P. Gardner, for example, wished that "Mexico were a little nearer our size. In that case I should feel more like indulging in heroics, as does my friend from Kansas (Mr. Murdock), the leader of the Progressive Party, but there is no occasion for heroics in dealing with poor little Mexico."

Progressive opposition to Wilson's policy at Vera Cruz stemmed from two groups. On one extreme were those Bull Moose progressives who attacked the President for his timidity in Mexico. Senator Poindexter, for instance, wanted an outright declaration of war against Mexico, and Lyman Abbott urged Wilson to occupy the whole country and "maintain an orderly and just government while, during a period which would last two or three years, we are educating the peo-

108Ibid., Appendix, 523 (May 27, 1914).
109Ibid., 6946 (Apr. 20, 1914). Progressive Representative MacDonald of Michigan denied that the contest would be unequal, pointing to undefined "forces" operating in Mexico that would have to be dealt with. Ibid., 6946 (Apr. 20, 1914). On the other hand, Rep. Mondell thought it ludicrous to send the fleet south "to line up in battle array in front of the two little mealy worm-eaten gunboats that Mexico has off Tampico." Ibid., 6715 (Apr. 15, 1914).
Likewise, Kansas Progressive Victor Murdock called for an end to "watchful waiting" and the adoption of a policy that breathed more fire:

When my country meets a crisis (he said), I have one rule—follow the flag. We have temporized, Heaven knows, long enough with Victoriano Huerta. The time has come to take him in charge. He is a dictator who came into place and power through violence....compel from Huerta respect for our flag and murder and rapine in Mexico against our citizens will cease. I am tired of the policy of watchful waiting.\textsuperscript{111}

On the other extreme were a small group of Republican peace progressives who leaned toward the pacifist isolationism of La Follette. Their criticisms of Wilson were varied. Senator Borah, for example, felt that the President had encroached on Mexican sovereignty at Vera Cruz and feared that "if the flag of the United States ever went up in Mexico it would never come down." While he admitted that were he President he would either demand that Mexico "respect American lives and property" or "see to it that they are protected," Borah nonetheless urged Wilson to retire from Mexico and recognize any type of government the Mexicans decided to adopt. Other progressives jeered at the flag-salute pretext Wilson had used at Tampico. Senator Norris based his opposition to the Administration on the grounds that flag saluting was an "ancient international custom

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110]Ibid., 7004-7005 (Apr. 21, 1914); Ira V. Brown, Lyman Abbott, 212.
\item[112]Ibid., 7121-7123 (Apr. 23, 1914); Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 194.
\end{footnotes}
of barbarism...a silly, foolish form." Why talk of America's dedication to peace, asked Senator Works, "when at the first instant when there is the slightest insult to our flag we are ready to go to war?" Representative Kent was convinced that it was American Big Business urging Wilson to war, while progressive Republican Representative Mondell charged the President with seeking "the opportunity to make widows and orphans and pile up an awful debt in an unjustified wicked war upon a single individual whom the President wants eliminated."

Most progressives, however, supported Wilson in his desire to punish and unseat Huerta by punitive military measures short of general war. True, the Bull Moose progressives generally wanted more vigorous measures, and the La Follette progressives argued that even the limited use of marines and fleet units at Vera Cruz was dangerous, provocative and unjustified. But the bulk of the leadership element of the progressive movement followed the President's middle way and rejoiced when General Carranza, aided by a steady stream of American arms and ammunition, finally overthrew Huerta in July, 1914.

113Cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 7000 (Apr. 21, 1914). Norris said he would follow Wilson into war, but not over a flag salute: "If this is unpatriotic, then I am guilty." See also Rep. Charles A. Lindbergh, Ibid., 6951-6952 (Apr. 20, 1914).
114Ibid., 6974 (Apr. 21, 1914). Works blamed America's difficulties on a weak policy in the past, called Wilson a sincere believer in peace, and recommended that the United States accept an apology from Huerta and be done with it.
115Ibid., 6946; 7339-7340 (Apr. 20, 1914; Apr. 27, 1914); Ibid., 6941 (Apr. 20, 1914).
116On the final Senate vote, only Bristow, Norris, La Follette and Works among the progressives voted against the use of punitive armed force at Vera Cruz. Ibid., 7014 (Apr. 21, 1914).
"It is the new idea of the President that is the progressive power in this progressive age," wrote Lincoln Steffens. "He is doing, doing, doing...he is spreading [the conviction] that good and beautiful ideas and ideals work; that is the biggest achievement of his."

The departure of Huerta was indeed a signal victory for Wilsonian righteousness. When the dictator finally left the country, Secretaries McAdoo and Bryan "embraced and danced about like a pair of boys. Every one was in a lively mood."

So popular was Wilson's "peaceful" victory over Huerta among progressives and the American public at large that the Bull Moose, as we have seen, carefully avoided criticism of the President's Mexican policy during the Congressional elections of 1914. Not until after the stunning defeats in November did the Progressive leadership, searching for new issues, again launch a determined and concerted attack on Wilsonian foreign policy, an attack which continued up to and figured in the election of 1916.

117 Steffens to John Reed, June 6, 1914, The Letters of Lincoln Steffens, I, 342.
119 Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 307. Roosevelt opened his campaign for intervention in Mexico in Dec., 1914, after the elections were over. He charged that Wilson was largely responsible for the civil war because he had aided and supported Carranza. This was essentially the argument used in July by insurgent Republican Frank W. Mondell, Cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 12096-12098 (July 14, 1914). Roosevelt came to agree with Mondell's characterization of Wilson's Mexican policy as one "begun in immove vacillation, pursued in malevolent meddling, continued in truckling partisanship to the insurgent cause and characterized all the while by insincerity, double dealing, and Pecksniffian hypocrisy, finally closed...with a truly characteristic surrender of American rights." Sen. Borah swung around to the same hypothesis in Jan., 1915. Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 1501-1503 (Jan. 13, 1915).
Early that year the "beautiful ideas and ideals" to which Steffens had referred were put to the test once again in Mexico. The background, however, was quite different from that in 1914. War raged in Europe, Newton D. Baker, a self-styled pacifist, headed the War Department, Bryan had departed from the State Department, and, as the presidential elections loomed, Colonel Roosevelt was vigorously attacking Wilson's foreign policy and preparedness program.

In addition to these factors the provocations from Mexico were greater and more dramatic than they had been at Tampico in 1914. In January, 1916, the Mexican bandit chieftain, Pancho Villa, stopped a Mexican train at Santa Isabel in Chihuahua, removed 17 American citizens and promptly shot 16 of them dead on the spot. This was Villa's quaint way of attempting to provoke American intervention in Mexico as a means of discrediting the Carranza regime, against whose government Villa was in open revolt. On March 9, 1916, Villa crossed the border and shot up the town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing 19 more Americans. American opinion was inflamed, demands for a get-tough policy insistent.

With the approach of the elections prominently in the background, progressives divided along party lines in their condemnation or support of the President. Senator Borah, who had criticized the Administration's policy in 1914 at Vera Cruz as aggressive and immoral, now felt that

there are some things which are dearer to me than peace ...

[the United States] must protect its citizens and the honor of its women and prevent them from being ravished and murdered even upon its very doorsteps....the flag
which does not protect its protectors is a dirty rag that contaminates the air in which it floats....My Bible and my religion teach me that there may be times when it is the duty of Christians to fight.120

Progressive Republicans joined with the main body of the G.O.P. to breathe fire at Mexico and hurl brickbats at the alleged vacillation of Wilson's policy there. It looked like a good issue for November.

Faced with the coming campaign and unable to gainsay the brutalities of Villa, progressive Democrats urged strong measures against Mexico. Franklin K. Lane demanded a declaration of war. Ray Stannard Baker believed that "what is needed is a concrete and constructive leadership: if Wilson does not furnish it for higher ends, Roosevelt is on hand to furnish it for lower ends." And Walter Lippmann, with one eye on events in Europe, warned that "a government which hesitates very long at intervention...depreciates the value of its diplomatic power everywhere."

With the exception of Franklin K. Lane, however, none of

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120 Ibid., 1502-1503 (Jan. 13, 1915); Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 194.
the liberal Democrats wanted open war with Mexico, but, as with Huerta at Tampico, they wanted Villa punished and American interests safeguarded. And they wanted to win the election in November. The President himself wanted no war. He feared that it would take "five hundred thousand men at least" to pacify Mexico at a time when the nation might need all its forces to meet the German situation. And as John Lind pointed out, "the Republican politicians, who are now fostering the war spirit, will condemn the war and blatantly curse the administration 'for bringing it on.' Such is always the fairness and good faith of partisan politics." Wilson agreed. "What Machiavellis these men are who are trying to stir up war," he remarked.

But given the politics of the situation and the apparent inability of Carranza to police his side of the border, Wilson could ill afford to remain entirely passive. Thus on March 15, 1916, he ordered General Pershing and 5,000 American soldiers into Mexico to pursue and capture Villa, an act hailed by progressive Democrats. Newton D. Baker said he was so much of a pacifist that he was willing to "fight for peace" in Mexico; William Jennings Bryan supported Wilson's decision to dispatch Pershing; and Lincoln Steffens characterized the soldiers of the Punitive Expedition as "friendly invad-
Wilson had no intention of using American troops in a political capacity in Mexico in 1916. He was not trying to unseat Carranza with the tactics used against Huerta in 1914. He did not want a full-scale intervention, which he defined as the "rearrangement and control of Mexico's domestic affairs by the United States." But as Pershing's force grew steadily in size and penetrated deeper into Mexico in the futile pursuit of Villa, Carranza became alarmed, and he demanded the immediate withdrawal of American troops. A minor brush between Pershing and Carranza forces at Parral on April 22 increased American-Mexican tension, as did a new raid by Villa on Glen Springs, Texas, in May. More American soldiers crossed the frontier to strengthen Pershing's column and broaden the search for Villa. On May 22, Carranza demanded that Wilson withdraw Pershing or risk war, and on June 21 at Carrizal a major clash of American and Mexican forces occurred. Demands for war reached a fever pitch throughout the United States.

At the very height of the crisis, when the clash at Carrizal seemed to presage full-scale war, the peace progressives who looked to La Follette for leadership, did yeoman work to avoid hostilities. Lincoln Steffens went to the White House to assure Wilson that despite Carranza's stiff-necked attitude toward the Pershing Exp-

128 Baker, Wilson, VI, 74-75.
petition, the Mexican leader did not want war. The American Union Against Militarism, headed by Jane Addams, Lillian D. Wald, Moorfield Storey, Amos Pinchot, Oswald Garrison Villard and other peace progressives, bought full page advertisements in leading newspapers which argued convincingly that the Americans, not the Mexicans, had been the aggressors at Carrizal. In the Senate, Robert M. La Follette, whose private conversations with Steffens wholly convinced him that Carranza wanted peace, charged that only "American capital" wanted war.

Thanks in part to this campaign, thousands of telegrams, letters and petitions for peace flooded in upon official Washington, reinforcing Wilson's personal desire that war be avoided.

When it was finally announced on July 19 that a joint Mexican-American Commission would be appointed to mediate the crisis, there was a collective sigh of relief in progressive Democratic circles. Brand Whitlock, who felt that a war in Mexico would be the wrong war, against the wrong nation for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time, wrote from Belgium: "What a light in the universal darkness! What an example to civilization in the midst of anarchy! What a lesson and reproach to Europe...! It seems to me like a portent of the future, when finally the American idea will be more generally understood and accepted, when democracy shall reign."

129Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 320; Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography, 737; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 573-574; Torello, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette, 196-197; Merle E. Curti, Peace or War, 247.
The appointment of the mediation Commission minimized the importance of the Mexican issue during the 1916 campaign and imparted real meaning to the Democratic campaign slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War." Certainly, as we shall see, the President's cautious policy in Mexico in 1916 influenced the La Follette progressives to support his candidacy in November. In any event, American forces finally withdrew from Mexico in January, 1917, and by December of that year Newton D. Baker could look back on the crisis of 1916 and eulogize Pershing's temporary occupation in northern Mexico as having brought "peace and quiet and confidence and industry and opportunity to those people such as they had never had before."

Indeed, the idea that America might somehow force the Mexicans to be peaceable and democratic did not quickly pass from the minds of some progressives. As Franklin K. Lane put it in 1916, "If I were only Dictator I could handle the thing, I think, all right. The hardest part of all is to convince a proud and obstinate people that they really need any help." And as late as 1919 Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia of New York could still remark: "I would go down with beans in one hand and offer help to the Mexican people, but I would be sure to have hand grenades in the other hand, and God help them in case they do not accept our well-intended and sincere friendship." But most progressives would later look back on Wil-

132Lane to Alexander Vogelsang, Sept. 29, 1916, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 226.
133Cong. Rec. 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 2418;2421 (July 10, 1919); see also S. S. McClure, Obstacles to Peace (New York, 1917), 464-466; Creel, Rebel at Large, 79.
son's policy of uplift in Mexico, 1914-1916, an uplift achieved without general war, and agree with Lincoln Steffens that "his record on Mexico is great."

CHAPTER VI

THE WORLD WAR: PROGRESSIVISM, PEACE AND PREPAREDNESS

The beginning of the European war in the late summer of 1914 had a tremendous impact on American progressivism, coinciding as it did with the virtual termination of Wilson's domestic reform program. Many of the reforms suggested by the Progressive and Democratic party platforms in 1912 had been enacted by August, 1914, and the Wilson Administration paused to consolidate its gains before launching another round of progressive legislation in the pre-election spring and summer of 1916. Consequently, the impact of the war caused progressives to concern themselves less and less with the waning imperatives of domestic reform and more with the new problems occasioned by the struggle in Europe. Specifically, these problems included the nature of the war and America's stake in it, the question of American preparedness, and the relative merits of commercial expansion or economic isolation in wartime.

The advent of the war also coincided with the decline of Roosevelt's Progressive party. Deprived largely of domestic issues by the successes of a progressive Democracy, the Bull Moose leadership, particularly Roosevelt, moved more resolutely into the foreign policy area in search of fresh issues. Sharp criticisms of the President on his Panama tolls and Mexican policies were, as we have seen, the opening guns of a sustained Bull Moose attack on the Administration, designed in part to lead the party out of the political wilderness and into the promised land of amalgamation with the G.O.P. The attitude of Wilson toward peace, preparedness and maritime neutral
rights provided additional ammunition for the Bull Moose assault.

We will concern ourselves here with the intellectual and emotional reaction of progressives to the European conflict and with the broad questions of American peace and preparedness in a world at war. The commercial expansion aspect of the problem will be treated in another chapter. It will be shown that progressives split into three main divisions on these issues. On one extreme were the Roosevelt Progressives who leaned toward intervention in the war on the side of the Allies and who agitated for comprehensive military preparation on the theory that a nation armed was a nation secure. They linked military preparedness to progressivism in their demand for increased national strength through social and industrial reform. They continually attacked the Wilson Administration for its alleged pacifism and its advocacy of moderate preparedness. Their general view on peace was that it was a condition in international relations that had to be militarily enforced to be made truly effective and lasting. But when the specifics of the problem were discussed the Bull Moose leaders rejected the league of nations, collective security, approach. A league of nations, they argued, would deny to the United States its obligation and right to enforce peace unilaterally in the western hemisphere, and it would tend to collectivize America's maintenance of righteousness and justice in the area under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Further, while they generally professed their love for peace, some of them were quite willing to admit that peace was not always desirable and that war could be a beneficial handmaiden to reform.
On the other extreme were the Bryan-La Follette progressives who believed in peace through non-involvement in the problems of Europe. They fought the military preparedness agitation vigorously, offering in its stead a program of what they termed "real preparedness"—i.e., comprehensive domestic reforms designed to place the American people morally and spiritually above the danger of foreign aggression. They argued that military preparedness was the first step toward militarism and a basic threat to American liberalism. Specifically, they pointed to the reactionary industrial combines that supported military preparedness and concluded that the whole agitation for arms was probably a capitalist plot against the masses. Their view of world peace was that it could be enforced by moral suasion alone, and even after 1914 some of them advocated unilateral American disarmament as a moral example to a world at war. War, they felt, was a greater evil than any it propped to cure.

Unfortunately for the La Follette progressives, or the "peace progressives," as we shall call them (not all of them were "pacifists" in a strict ideological sense), their view of the war in Europe and the attitude America should take toward it paralleled those of American socialists and the German-American Alliance. Consequently, their arguments, however persuasive, suffered through guilt by association comparisons that reduced their appeal. Of the three factional groups in progressivism theirs was the smallest and their recommendations were perhaps the least convincing to most Americans.

Between the Roosevelt and La Follette extremes the Wilson
progressives took relatively moderate positions. On the peace question they leaned to the view that world peace had to be militarily enforced and they favored a league of nations to handle the task. But on the preparedness issue they at first tended toward the attitude of the peace progressives. Gradually, however, under the President's leadership, the Wilson progressives moved toward moderate military preparedness, an act dictated by the politics of progressivism, the Pershing fiasco in Mexico, and the growing realization that the Administration's insistence on the right to trade with belligerents in wartime had implicit in it the danger of war.

While not intellectually acceptable from the Bryan-La Follette viewpoint, the Wilson program for gradual preparedness commanded the political support of the peace progressives when the issue was first squarely faced in the political arena. Given the Roosevelt emphasis on military preparedness and war as reform devices, the peace progressives, many of whom had Republican backgrounds, rallied to Wilson's candidacy in 1916. This, as we shall see, was a shift of political loyalty that significantly influenced the President's victory over a reunited G.O.P., and marked his final emergence as the dominant figure in American progressivism.

The Republican progressives who had remained in the G.O.P. during the schism of 1912, split asunder on the questions of peace and preparedness. Their attitudes cannot be generalized, either in political, sectional or ideological terms. Some identified themselves with La Follette and the peace progressives, others with Rooseveltian red-bloodedness, still others with Wilsonian gradualism.
In sum, however, most progressives supported military preparedness in some degree. Most progressives believed that peace had to have more than moral suasion behind it. Most progressives, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, supported Wilson's economic foreign policy of differential neutrality with its emphasis on "strict accountability" and its implicit danger of war. In fine, American progressives, not unlike the American people at large, supported a foreign policy dedicated to moralistic, idealistic and commercial expansionist goals, goals which ultimately involved a concept of peace through force and the creation of a military establishment to give it meaning.

II

While the outbreak of the first World War was a shock to most Americans, its commencement did not astonish that handful of progressives who carefully studied continental politics, particularly those who had visited Europe prior to the beginning of actual hostilities. In the fall of 1912 Brand Whitlock had seen "ugly grey battleships at target practice everywhere" and heard on every hand talk of the impending war. 1 Fiorello La Guardia had listened in amazement when Austro-Hungarian officers laughed at the military weakness of England and France and spoke confidently of a Europe 2 controlled by Teutons. And Roosevelt wrote Henry Cabot Lodge as

early as the fall of 1911 that the "war clouds" were gathering and that the "German war plans contemplate, as I happen to know personally, as possible courses of action, flank marches through both Belgium and Switzerland. They are under solemn treaty to respect the territories of both countries," explained the Colonel, "and they have not the slightest thought of paying the least attention to these treaties unless they are threatened with war as a result of their violation."

But when the war began in August, 1914, few Americans seriously concerned themselves with it. Nor did the progressives at first. La Guardia recalled that "as soon as war broke out, I convinced myself that we would become involved but I could not find anyone to agree with me." The Senate unanimously passed Senator J. H. Gallinger's resolution "regretting" the conflict and turned to other business. Likewise, the editor of the Saturday Evening Post declared confidently that he was "going to play this war hard for six months - in case it lasts as long as that - and drop it. By then the American people will grow sick and tired of reading about it." Even in the recently opened offices of The New Republic, the progressive editors interrupted their detailed discussions of the magazine's policy on a variety of domestic questions only long enough to decide that Ameri-

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3Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, Sept. 12, 1911, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 343; see also Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 301; Hutchins Hapgood, A Victorian in the Modern World, 400; Frederick Palmer, With My Own Eyes, 291.

4La Guardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 115; see also Ray Stannard Baker, American Chronicle, 298; Walter E. Weyl, American World Policies, 32-33.


6Will Irwin, The Making of a Reporter, 204.
ca's foreign policy should be devoted to staying out of foreign complications. From Michigan Belle La Follette wrote her husband that on the Chautauqua circuit she had heard "only one point of view regarding war," and noted her conviction that "the Wilson Administration is entrenched if it keeps us out of war."

It was this spirit that pervaded the nation when Wilson issued his widely hailed neutrality proclamation of August 18 urging all Americans to be "impartial in thought as well as in action," a plea which permitted the Democratic party in the fall elections to sigh thankfully: "War in the East! Peace in the West! Thank God for Wilson!" While the red-blooded Roosevelt could complain privately that "on this side of the water at the moment there is no opportunity for the display of heroic qualities," the temper of the country was resolutely peaceful.

Although the detached, rather casual attitude of Americans toward the war in Europe had its predominant sectional locus in the middle west, it must be recalled that the greatest amount of intense pro-Germanism also centered there. Basically, pro-Germanism was a sentiment confined largely to Americans of German extraction which

7Eric Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 233.
8Belle Case and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 502.
insisted on rigid American political and economic neutrality, not out of passion for American non-involvement in Europe as an abstract idea so much as an indirect aid to the war effort of the Fatherland. Thus while the idea of American neutrality was not confined to German-American groups in the middle west, the German-American attitude made Americans increasingly aware of the thought that a neutrality benefiting only Germany was not true neutrality.

The organization which best expressed the German-American attitude toward American neutrality was the National German-American Alliance, headed by Dr. Charles John Hexamer, and claiming, by 1916, a membership of some 3,000,000. The Alliance forcefully identified itself with the cause of the Fatherland in October, 1914, when it protested the substance of the State Department's famous "Neutrality in Trade and Contraband" paper. The paper made it clear that under existing laws of neutrality, an American citizen could legally sell anything he wanted to a belligerent, so long as he understood that the enemy of the purchaser enjoyed the countervailing right to intercept and confiscate contraband of war. The Alliance vigorously protested this ruling, correctly arguing that since British naval power could prevent German ships from reaching American ports, a neutral-

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ity of this sort actually subsidized the British war effort against Germany.

Working through Representatives Richard Bartholdt of Missouri and Henry Vollmer of Iowa, the Alliance sponsored and fought for two House resolutions "to prohibit the export of arms, ammunition and munitions from any territory or seaport of the United States."

In a speech in Philadelphia on November 23, HEXAMER supported this legislation. He denounced the "lick-spittle policy" of the United States toward Britain and suggested that the stars and stripes on the flag be replaced by dollar signs. A nation is hypocritical, said the German-American leader, "that prays for peace on Sunday and supplies the Allies with munitions all the rest of the week." These views were embraced by Representative Vollmer who charged further that the munitions makers were ready to lead the country down the "gory road of militarism," with a policy of "dollar neutrality."

Considerable pressure for the Bartholdt-Vollmer arms embargo was generated by the Alliance in areas where large numbers of German-Americans lived and voted. Senator La Follette and six Wisconsin Representatives, for example, announced in favor of the bills. But both measures died in committee in January, 1915, when Secretary of State Bryan announced that it had "never been the policy of this government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition to belligerent

14 Ibid., 355-359.
territory except in the case of neighboring American Republics."

Aside from the political considerations involved, La Follette's vote for the German-American sponsored arms embargo bills reflected something of the ideological soft spot for things German that resided in the bosom of the progressive movement, particularly its middle western expression. Many leading American liberals and intellectuals had been educated in German universities. The German state had led the world in the field of paternalistic social reform legislation; indeed, American reformers often referred to La Follette's Wisconsin as the "Germanic state," in salute to the character and the quantity of the social legislation enacted at Madison. In his book, What Is Back of the War (1915), Albert J. Beveridge demonstrated a genuine, almost naive, admiration for German efficiency and Realpolitik, and S. S. McClure even excused German atrocities in Belgium and informed his American readers that the kindly and efficient invaders had abolished contagious diseases in that country. "Great God!" exclaimed progressive Democrat Brand Whitlock, American ambassador in occupied Belgium, "nowhere in the world can a damn fool get so ready or so wide a hearing as in Ameri-

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15 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 362.
16 Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 234; George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 320.
Admittedly, it was a peculiar group from the ranks of the progressives who leaned toward the German cause or who advocated a neutrality toward Europe that could only benefit Germany. It was difficult to picture George Sylvester Viereck, America's leading German apologist, a man who had "shouted [himself] hoarse for Roosevelt day after day" at the 1912 Republican convention, linking arms with pacifist Jane Addams and old-line imperialist Albert J. Beveridge in a crusade to achieve a pure form of American neutrality.

The fact that the war made strange bedfellows among American progressives was also revealed in socialist reactions to the events in Europe and the tendency of some middle western progressives and peace progressives to accept a Marxist interpretation of those events. This does not mean that middle western progressivism suddenly went socialist. Socialism, as we have seen, was anathema to most progressives. What it does mean is that many peace progressives, and those progressives who viewed the German cause favorably, found in socialist interpretations of the European war an ideological foundation for their advocacy of strict neutrality, arms embargo and anti-preparedness.

Since American socialism had a strong appeal to first and second generation German-Americans in middle western cities like Milwaukee and Cincinnati, it was not surprising to find that the German-Americans and the American socialists were often agreed and allied in

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their support of the German cause against the Allies. Consequently, many Americans came to believe that peace progressivism, socialism and German-Americanism represented but the opposite sides of an ideological triangle dedicated to a type of American neutrality that would aid the German war effort against democratic Britain and France. Progressives who favored strict neutrality and arms embargo for pacifist and isolationist reasons thus found themselves locked in a socialist and German-American embrace which increasingly isolated them from that overwhelming majority of American progressives who came to favor the Allied cause.

So it was that when Representative Charles A. Lindbergh stated flatly his belief that "the Socialist's view of war is, in my judgment, the correct view," and Oregon's progressive Republican Representative Abraham W. Lafferty, a strong supporter of Senator La Follette, announced that the socialist view of peace was the "most powerful argument...that has ever come to my notice," the peace progressives began their oblique march into the open arms of the socialists. Likewise, when Representative Clyde H. Tavenner, Illinois progressive Democrat and leading Congressional peacemaker, cited a Reichstag speech by Carl Liebknecht to prove his contention that preparedness agitation in America was the work of "war-trafficking pri-

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20 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 6951 (Apr. 20, 1914); Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 191-194 (Jan. 22, 1915). Lafferty inserted into the Congressional Record an article by Socialist Allan L. Benson entitled "War and Socialism" which argued that modern war was inspired by capitalists. Were man but to collectivize private property wars would cease and mankind would stand on the threshold of utopia.
vate arms and ammunition firms who are endangering the peace and welfare of 100,000,000 people in order that they might satisfy their greed for profit," his analysis had a sharp Marxist flavor. It seemed to parallel the socialist argument that capitalists and bankers had forced the European war and that the carnage amounted to little more than two imperialistic alliance systems sacrificing proletarian hostages on an altar to Mars in the interests of the material greed and cupidity of the ruling classes.

It must be pointed out, however, that not all American socialists accepted this neat formula. Some failed to transcend the ostrich-like attitude of most Americans. "I do not even want to think about Europe until the war is over and life is running again," said Randolph Bourne. Others, men like Charles Edward Russell, William H. Ghent and Graham Phelps Stokes, hoped for a British victory, convinced that the invasion of Belgium and the German disregard of solemn treaties condemned the Reich as an enemy of international socialism. These heretics were ultimately expelled from the Socialist party for their pro-Allied and pro-interventionist views.

But most American socialists, particularly those of German origin or of Jewish background, hoped that Germany would win the war.

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21Ibid., Appendix, 417-418; 438-439 (Feb. 15, 1915); and Ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 272-276 (Dec. 15, 1915).
23Louis Filler, Randolph Bourne, 52-53.
24Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 295.
and that the Russia of the pogroms and the France of the anti-Dreyfusards would be ground forever into the earth. "You know how I have always hated the Kaiser," declared Austrian-born Milwaukee socialist Victor Berger, "but when I see the world taking arms against him I feel that I must seize a rifle and take my place in the ranks and fight for him," a view that was given material expression by some middle western socialists in a "little bronze medal...cast in happy expectation of the day when the German armies should enter Paris."  

In spite of the fact that advocacy of strict neutrality seemed to suggest pro-Germanism, the peace progressives went resolutely forward with vigorous pleas for an uncompromising neutrality. David Starr Jordan went on the lecture platform to plead that America stay out of the war and work to end it with a negotiated peace which would include some form of international organization. Oswald Garrison Villard insisted that the United States steer clear of any European involvement, and Jane Addams launched her Woman's Peace Party dedicated to American isolation and a negotiated peace to end the war.  

In all of these appeals for non-involvement and a negotiated peace, the peace progressives made no clear distinction between the aggressors and the victims of aggression in the European conflict.

25Ibid., 286-287; 290; 293-294; 296.  
26Ibid., 288-289.  
27David Starr Jordan, The Days of a Man, II, 651.  
28Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, 121; Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 237; Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 1-2; Baker, American Chronicle, 302; Evelyn Wells, Fremont Older, (New York, 1936), 350; Elizabeth T. Kent, William Kent, 279.
On the contrary, they tended to equate the guilt of all parties involved in the struggle. Their argument rested on the simple syllogism that war was bad, the Allies and the Central Powers were at war, therefore, the belligerents on both sides were equally evil. With specific emphasis on the fact that Tsarist Russia was fighting on the Allied side, many peace progressives professed to see no essential differences in the moral or ideological composition of the two warring alliances. Senator Works, for example, cited Jane Addams and various Quaker pamphleteers to demonstrate that there was no monopoly of right, justice or humanity on either side, that Germany and Russia were both despotisms, and that America should have nothing to do with either alliance. These attitudes drove interventionist progressives like George D. Herron, himself a one time pacifist and Christian Socialist, to wonder "How can we reason with...men who repeat that there is no difference between the German occupation of Belgium and the Franco-English occupation of Greece?"

Contrary to the views of the peace progressives, however, most American progressives who reacted to the outbreak of the war in any positive way did make sharp moral distinctions between Germany and the Allies. And these distinctions became the very foundation of the pro-British bias that ultimately pervaded American progressivism. While this bias centered most strongly in northeastern and Atlantic

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29 Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 4671 (Mar. 23, 1916); see also George E. Mowry, _The California Progressives_, 227-228; Hapgood, _A Victorian in the Modern World_, 400; Howe, _Why War?,_ x-xi; 19.
seaboard progressive leadership circles, there were also many middle
western progressives who hated every thing that Germany stood for.
Progressives who were caught in Europe when the German army violated
the Belgium frontier had very sharp anti-German reactions. Indeed,
something resembling a "Law of Geographical Proximity" operated, so
fierce was their emotional response to what appeared to be Evil ramp-
ant. Thorstein Veblen, for example, charged that Germany had started
the war, that it would be a fight to the finish for the English-speak-
ing peoples, and predicted ultimate American involvement. John Jay
Chapman, onetime anti-imperialist, proclaimed an abiding hatred for
Prussia and threw himself wholeheartedly into the Allied cause.
Similar reactions by William Dudley Foulke, vacationing at Bad Nau-
heim, and Augustus P. Gardner, visiting in England, had an important
influence on their early and insistent advocacy of American military
preparedness, and when the German army marched triumphantly into
Brussels, eye-witness Brand Whitlock defined them as "grey hosts"
pouring down from the middle ages into modern civilization. "Did I
ever say that these people have any genius for Government?" the Ohio
reformer wailed. "If I ever did I was a fool. They have literally
none. No imagination, no pity, no realization of what the word humili-
ation means, not the least conception of the feeling of other peo-

31Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York, 1940),
Stung and shocked by the German rape of Belgium, Whitlock, Darrow and other progressives who had long considered themselves pacifists, abandoned the doctrine in 1914. To them it seemed wholly unrealistic in the face of military aggression. Weakness produced only invasion and conquest.

The first feeling that settled over those progressives most shocked by Germany's invasion of Belgium was that America could not hope to remain entirely isolated from the struggle. While the progressives in Congress (excepting Augustus P. Gardner) were initially silent on this crucial point, progressives not in public office, men as diverse in many ways as Clarence Darrow, Thorstein Veblen, John C. O'Laughlin and F. H. La Guardia, were agreed that the days of United States isolation from European affairs (if such days had ever existed) were over, and that Americans should at least face the possibility of ultimate involvement in the war. By mid-1915 Walter Lippmann was pointing out that if the United States was to be "a leader, or even an important factor, in the stabilizing of mankind," it must think realistically in terms of power politics and alliances. Admitting that the idea of alliances "terrifies me and disturbs every prej-

34 The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 11;40-41;64; see also Palmer, With My Own Eyes, 302.
35 The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 92;239; Darrow, The Story of My Life, 210-211; Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 331.
udice of my training," Lippmann declared flatly that if "the strategy
of peace is to use the democratic governments as organs of leadership
in world politics....isolation must be abandoned if we are to do any-
thing effective for internationalism."

The rape of Belgium by German arms, more than any other sin-
gle factor, contributed most to the pro-Allied leaning of the American
progressive leadership, even though there had been considerable mis-
givings about "poor little Belgium" in the progressive mind prior to
the German occupation. From 1903 to 1907 the muckrakers had savagely
attacked Belgium's colonial policy in the Congo, condemning the shoot-
ing, hanging and systematic starvation of the natives by the exploi-
tive government of Leopold II. Thus when the Belgian frontier was
violated in 1914 Roosevelt's first reaction was the detached observa-
tion that "I am not prepared to say that in dire need the statesmen
of a nation are not obliged to disregard any treaty, if keeping it
may mean the most serious jeopardy to the nation." It would be
folly, said the Colonel, "to jump into the gulf ourselves" because
"nothing we could have done would have helped Belgium," and it would
be unwise, he felt, to utter "a single word of official protest unless
we are prepared to make that protest effective."

37Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, 226;228.
38C. C. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 137. See particularly
Robert E. Park, "The Terrible Story of the Congo," Everybody's,
XV (Dec., 1906), 763-772; and Robert E. Park, "A King in Busi-
39Roosevelt to Hugo Munsterberg, Aug. 8, 1914, Roosevelt Letters,
VIII, 826.
40George Creel, Wilson and the Issues, 15-16; David F. Houston, Eight
Years With Wilson's Cabinet (Garden City, N.Y., 1926), II, 242.
But when the Congressional elections ended in the defeat and demoralization of his Progressive party, Roosevelt began carrying out his promise to "smite" the foreign policy of the Wilson Administration "with a heavy hand." Specifically, he abandoned his detached attitude toward Belgium and began charging that Wilson's policy of neutrality toward Europe demonstrated an immoral and callous disregard for the well-being of the Belgians that drew no distinction between the aggressors and the victims of aggression.

This criticism was not entirely political in motivation. By December, 1914, Roosevelt, like millions of other Americans, was shocked and disgusted with what he had learned of Germany's occupation policy in Belgium, a shock and disgust shared by many progressives. Beveridge, for example, reported a meeting with Gifford Pinchot in Paris in early 1915 during which the forester became "so violent as to be incoherent mentally about Belgium and German outrages"; and Clarence Darrow recalled that "when I read of the German army marching through Belgium I had exactly the same reaction that I would experience if a big dog should attack a small one....my sympathies were at once with France, England and Russia." Likewise, William Allen White took one look at the violation of Belgium and instructed readers of the Emporia Gazette that the morality of the contestants provided little more than a "choice between the philosophies of Nie-


\[42\] Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 471; Darrow, The Story of My Life, 211.
tzsche and of Jesus of Nazareth." The ultimate implication of this sentiment was clear. "How fortunate it was, for the sake of our relations with America," said Arthur Balfour, "that we had the outrage on Belgium." Indeed, it was fortunate for Britain that German atrocities at Louvain, Aerschot, Dinant and Taines so stirred the American conscience.

German behavior in Belgium also helped formulate attitudes which placed the European war in an intellectual framework consistent with the moralistic predilections of American progressivism. In spite of the myopic view of German totalitarianism held by a few progressives like La Follette, Lindbergh and Beveridge, most American progressives roundly condemned the autocratic militarism and the political authoritarianism of the German state, and anthropomorphised these evils in the person of William II. In their attack on German

43 William Allen White, Editorial, Emporia Gazette, Oct. 23, 1914, in Helen Ogden Mahin, ed., The Editor and His People, 362; see also Martin W. Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson, 286; O’Laughlin, Imperiled America, 41-42; The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 72; Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 334. Thayer’s reaction was in the same violent vein: "I went about hurling imaginary rejoinders to the sophistries, and arrogant claims and shameless lies of the Germans, until sometimes I thought my brain would snap or my heart stop." The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 239. Letter to Frederick Crowninshield, Oct. 5, 1914.

44 Palmer, With My Own Eyes, 309.

45 John Dewey, Characters and Events (New York, 1929), I, 146; The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 277; Irwin, The Making of a Reporter, 271. Irwin, who worked with Whitlock and Herbert Hoover on Belgium relief, claims to have coined the phrase, "Hang the Kaiser," which figured so prominently in the 1918 British general elections.
autocracy, the progressives were always careful to distinguish the rulers of the Reich from the ruled. Just as a distinction had been made between Victoriano Huerta and the Mexican people and between the Cuban people and their Spanish overlords (distinctions not unlike those that separated the American political boss from a duped but honest citizenry), so was the Kaiser and his military junta regarded as the root cause of German authoritarianism and aggression. Remove the Kaiser, reasoned the progressive mind, and all would be well. Thus many progressives argued that there were really two Germanies. Brand Whitlock defined these as "the civil Germany, with whom one might discuss and arrange matters if it were not under the heel of the other Germany, military Germany, that has gone crazy." It may be, remarked George Herron in 1916, "that it is the German head that has gone wrong - not the heart; and that if the real heart of Germany were authentically and wisely invoked, it would repent and respond even to the extent of disencumbering itself of its Prussian rulers and teachers."

Thus to most American progressives the war was not a sordid struggle for capitalist gains, as the socialists urged America to believe, or a useless slaughter as the peace progressives argued, but a holy crusade for political liberty and the dignity of man led by Great Britain and France against the Potsdam monster. Within a month

46 The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 212; see also on this point O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 238-239; Baker, American Chronicle, 106-107; Villard, Fighting Years, 245-246; Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 334.
47 Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 94.
after the war began, Lyman Abbott wrote in The Outlook that "History will hold the German Emperor responsible for the war in Europe. We regard the conflict as one not merely involving historic racial jealousies, but also as one of autocracy, intelligent, capable, and highly organized, against aspiring but imperfectly organized democracy.... a Power greater than that of all the warring peoples is directing the purpose of the war. That purpose is the end of military autocracy in Europe." As suffragist Harriet Stanton Blatch recalled her attitude toward the belligerents, "I felt that we should have entered the World War even earlier than we did, so convinced was I...that it was a war for democracy, a war which would bring democracy and feminism a century ahead."

Among progressives and reformers who interpreted the war as a struggle between Prussian military autocracy and Anglo-French democracy, the cause of the Allies was truly a holy one. Britain, it seemed, was fighting for the ideals of American progressivism at the international level, and it was vital to progressives that all re-

49 Harriet Stanton Blatch and Alma Lutz, Challenging Years: The Memoirs of Harriet Stanton Blatch (New York, 1940), 284; for similar views on the ideological stakes in the war see O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 204-205; Veblen, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Peace, 117; S. S. McClure, Obstacles to Peace, 348; Baker, American Chronicle, 303.
form-minded Americans identify themselves with the struggle. When, for example, Brand Whitlock confided to Wilson in December, 1915, that he was "heart and soul for the Allies," the President responded:

So am I. No decent man, knowing the situation and Germany, could be anything else. But that is only my own personal opinion and there are many others in this country who do not hold that opinion. In the west and middle west frequently there is no opinion at all. I am not justified in forcing my opinion upon the people of the United States and bringing them into a war which they do not understand.51

Thus the President faced something of the same dilemma in Europe that Roosevelt had earlier complained about in the Caribbean. Wilson was convinced that righteousness lay with the Allied cause, but he considered public recognition of the moral issues involved in the war inadequate and insufficient. More importantly, he wanted to avoid war in Europe, and he was unwilling to commit the nation to the Allied struggle against Germany until the moral issues were clear to the American people or unless America's interests could be safeguarded in no other way. Further, the presence of Tsarist Russia in the camp of the democracies was embarrassing and it helped cloud and ob-


secure the neat ideological dichotomy embraced by most progressives.

Muckrakers and progressives had savagely attacked the re-
actionary terrorism, anti-semitism and secret police of the Tsarist
government during the decade preceding the war. This, of course,
had no effect on the Tsar, and by 1911 the anti-semitic policies of
the Russian government had brought American-Russian relations into a
state of semi-crisis. American Jews were denied entry into Russia
for commercial purposes, although under the 1832 American-Russian
Treaty of Commerce and Amity the right of all American citizens to
travel in Russia for business purposes without regard to race or
creed was clearly stated. Consequently, progressives and other Amer-
icans demanded that the United States strike a blow for human digni-
ty by unilaterally abrogating the 1832 treaty. Republican Represent-
ative Herbert Parsons of New York introduced House Joint Resolution
284 in February, 1911, to renounce the pact outright. Such renunci-
ation, said Parsons, would strike a blow at anti-semitism everywhere
and prove once more that "this great Republic is still ready to lead
in the fight for the rights of man." Assured by Oscar Straus that
only 1.2% of America's foreign trade was with Russia, and that abro-
gation of the treaty would have little effect on the nation's commer-
cial expansion, Congressional progressives like Wisconsin's Cooper,

52Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers, 186; see also Foulke, A Hoosier
Autobiography, 96-97; M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald, 94; Roose-
velt to Jacob Schiff, Dec. 14, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, V, 112-
113; Oscar S. Straus, The American Spirit, 171-176. Straus under-
took in 1905 to destroy the Civil War myth of American-Russian
friendship.

53Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 3141 (Feb. 22, 1911).
Iowa's Kendall and Washington's Poindexter waxed eloquent about the dignity of man and the sanctity of treaties. Since there were no commercial considerations, it was righteousness at rock bottom prices. The Senate abrogated the treaty 72 to 0. Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt both endorsed the action, and Straus was moved to assert that it was further evidence that American diplomacy placed "human rights above property, the man above the dollar."

Thus there was considerable intellectual discomfort when American progressives found the Tsarist state arrayed on the side of the democracies against German aggression and authoritarianism. In general, progressives made little effort to rationalize this embarrassing alignment. Roosevelt and Raymond Robins felt that Russia's appearance on the democratic side was only "accidental," and hoped that the war would liberalize the Tsarist autocracy. But Beveridge, arguing from a pro-German point of view, had little hope that Russia could be liberalized by war. He pointed out that an Allied victory over Germany would only serve to make Russia the "one, great, predominant military power of the world." This point, however un-


[58] Beveridge, What Is Back of the War, 408.
pleasant, was frankly admitted by Herbert Croly, Oscar Straus and other pro-Allied progressives. While it was not a happy prospect, the progressive mind regarded it as the lesser evil when they contemplated the horrors that would stem from a German victory.

To many progressives, the threat to America would be real if Germany should win the war. A German victory, warned George D. Herron, "would drag man back to his primordial pit"; it would produce a situation, said Senator Knute Nelson, in which "there would be no place in the sun for America...we would be the next victim of German aggression." As early as August, 1915, Woodrow Wilson confided the same view to Professor William E. Dodd:

I am as much a devotee of peace as any man; but in case Europe falls under the domination of a single militarist group, peace and democracy in our country are going to be in grave danger. In case that seems obvious, I shall have to urge American intervention. We shall have to try to save democracy. But at the end of the struggle I would try to bring the peoples into a cooperative association which would unite them against any nation that

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59. Roosevelt to Hugo Munsterberg, Nov. 2, 1914, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 826; to Arthur Hamilton Lee, Aug. 8, 1914, Ibid., VII, 812; Thayer to Charles F. Thwing, Aug. 31, 1914, The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 233. Oscar Straus warned Sr. Edward Grey that "from an American point of view it was important that Russia give some evidence of a liberal spirit, otherwise it might be feared that victory for the Allies would redound mainly to the advantage of the autocracy in Russia"; he urged Grey to bring Russia "into line." Oscar Straus, Under Four Administrations, 375-376.

60. Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 117-118; Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson, 288; see also La Guardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 131; Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 293-294; Howe, John Jay Chapman, 287; Thayer to Worthington C. Ford, Sept. 5, 1914, The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 234; 237. "You and I will be pretty old to learn the goose-step or to man coast-defences: but at least we can write as good poems as any that have appeared...to hearten the younger generation."
resorted to war - the savage method of solving problems.

It was fear of this sort that made Harold Ickes feel that "every democratic nation in the world was in danger" and that "we ought to jump in and help Great Britain and France." Likewise, the progressives in the offices of The New Republic began gradually to evolve their view that since America was an integral part of the "Atlantic community," long shielded from European aggression by British sea power, she had an obligation to Britain, Canada, Belgium and France to engage actively in the defense of the Atlantic sphere in the face of German aggression.

While the moral issues in the war seemed clear and the potential danger to American pronounced, progressives who favored the Allied cause were not agreed on precisely what course of action the United States should follow. Unlike the peace progressives who advocated an uncomplicated policy of rigid neutralism and commercial isolation, the pro-Allied progressives found their task relatively complex. With one eye on the elections of 1916, a small group of them, mainly Bull Moose and progressive Republican fire-eaters, openly condemned Wilsonian neutrality and urged American intervention on the

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61 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 432.
63 Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 251-252; see also Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, 306-307, for an early statement of the North Atlantic Triangle or Atlantic community viewpoint.
side of the democracies. Another group, primarily Democrats, comforted themselves with the thought that commercial neutrality as conceived by the Wilson Administration was really aid to Britain short of war and, hence, morally and tactically correct. In any event, almost all pro-Allied progressives were convinced that the state of world politics demanded an immediate program of military preparedness. As Bull Mooseer William Dudley Foulke stated it at a Progressive party dinner in January, 1915: "I expect to vote for that party and that candidate that gives me the strongest assurance that our country shall be defended. If the Republican party is the only one which can supply it, I intend to hold my nose and vote for any unregenerate rascal it may nominate."

III

The conflicting reactions of the progressives to the outbreak of the European war suggests the thought that two very distinct theoretical attitudes toward peace were operating simultaneously with-

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65 This point will be developed in the next chapter.

in progressive leadership circles. While all progressives professed their love of peace, the question that divided them was how best to obtain it and maintain it. Two basic views had emerged from the so-called "peace movement" that developed during the decade prior to the World War. One of these argued that peace was such a priceless commodity men should be willing to fight for it; the other maintained a love of peace so passionate that death was preferable to the use of force in its name. While there were more progressives who embraced the former attitude (they will be called "activists" for the sake of convenience) than the latter, the peace progressives made an appealing case for the non-resistance viewpoint. Certainly, there can be no clear understanding of the various attitudes of the progressives toward preparedness without prior understanding of their divergent peace theories.

Although different arguments were employed to support their views, the peace progressives began with the basic premise that all war was evil all of the time. David Starr Jordan, for instance, embraced a biological view when he argued that the war system destroyed the most virile elements of the race by producing the survival of those unfit to be conscripted. William Allen White, a pacifist between wars, maintained that war was socially reactionary, "the devil's answer to human progress," because, as Representative Warren Worth Bailey put it, it converted "gentle human beings into monsters revel-
ing in blood." War, wrote Frederic C. Howe in 1916, employing still another taot popular in peace progressive circles,

has little or nothing to do with national ambitions; it has nothing to do with the desires of peoples....wars... are born of privilege in politics, privilege in finance, privilege in trade....war and preparations for war are the international expressions of the same struggle that has convulsed San Francisco, Cleveland, Chicago, Denver or Toledo in the conflict of franchise corporations to protect their grants from the city; it is an expression of the same conflict over the resources of Alaska, of the seizure of the public lands of the nation, of the financial exploitation of...railroads....

Nor could reform-minded clergymen like John Haynes Holmes and Washington Gladden find anything in Christian teaching to justify the war system, a discovery that was instrumental in the 1909 formation of a department for peace and arbitration in the Federation of the Churches of Christ in America.

Perhaps nowhere was peace idealism better stated than by Clarence Darrow in his book Resist Not Evil (1903). Emphasizing his intellectual debt to Tolstoy, Darrow argued that the modern state was a repressive machine resting on force and violence, a device designed by the ruling class to maintain existing property arrangements in society. Since armies and navies protected and supported the modern state system they were, by definition, enemies of the people.

Abolish war, said Darrow, and the armies would disappear; conversely, abolish the military and both war and social injustice would vanish.

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68White, Autobiography, 496; Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 446 (May 5, 1914).
69Howe, Why War?, 300-301; 307-308.
70Mørle E. Curti, Peace or War, 210.
The nation [said Darrow] that would to-day disarm its soldiers and turn its people to the paths of peace... would exhibit to the world such an example of moral grandeur and true...worth that no nation, however powerful, would dare to invite the odium and hostility of the world by sending arms and men to conquer a peaceful, productive, non-resistant land.\(^7\)

Darrow could not practice the theory he preached. No sooner was the book published than he rushed west to apply his towering legal skill to the defense of the head-cracking, dynamite-throwing Western Federation of Miners. Indeed, his life-long fight against corruption and reaction never incorporated turning the other cheek, and his abandonment of pacifism in 1914 was symbolic of the fact that many peace progressives could no longer visualize a supine state as a secure state after the German attack on Belgium. As Bryan's experience in Caribbean America was demonstrating, it became increasingly difficult for some progressives to reconcile a doctrine of passive non-resistance with an intellectual and emotional commitment to oppose evil and corruption both at home and abroad.

But in spite of this dilemma, most of the peace progressives supported a variety of ideas, organizations and plans designed to achieve world peace without the employment of force. The common denominator of most of these was the conviction that disarmament and moral force were alone sufficient to achieve and maintain world

\(^7\)^{Clarence S. Darrow, Resist Not Evil, 27; see also Ibid., 1-20;39-42.}
\(^7\)^{Irving Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense, 185.}
\(^7\)^{Howe, John Jay Chapman, 137. For Bryan's dilemma see Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944), 71-72; see also Curti, Peace or War, 200; Merle E. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 113-116;135-137;141-142;181-183.
peace. Thus one of the most interesting plans to which peace progresses rallied was Secretary Bryan's famous "Cooling-Off" scheme.

The central concept of the Bryan "Cooling-Off" treaties, some thirty of which were negotiated and signed in 1913-1914, was the hope that when war threatened between nations, the divisive issues, including all questions of national honor, would be submitted to an international tribunal for study. Under the Bryan plan, the tribunal would have a full year to consider the crisis, during which time the interested parties would not resort to hostilities. At the end of one year (the cooling-off period) the contestants would resume full freedom of action. Submission of the dispute to the tribunal was not compulsory, enforcement of the final decision of the tribunal was not visualized, and the prohibition of military action during the year period was in no way guaranteed. Nonetheless, progressives like George Norris and William Allen White were convinced that had the treaties been projected earlier the war in Europe might have been averted. Other progressives disagreed. Walter Weyl took the view that the cooling-off period would so adversely affect the nation most ready for war that it would have to be "coerced into accepting the arrangement," and Roosevelt observed that without enforcement provisions such treaties "would not be worth the paper on which they are written.

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in any serious crisis." But whatever the weaknesses involved, the peace progressives hailed the Bryan treaties as a great step forward.

Another proposal that attracted considerable support among peace progressives prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 was the idea of American naval disarmament. It was predicated on the firm belief that the world was moving steadily away from war as an international problem-solving device, and that if America would only take the lead in reducing her own navy such unilateral action would encourage disarmament everywhere. Thus Representative Warren Worth Bailey, convinced that "Every pretense that naval expansion means international security is a false one," suggested that in lieu of navies peace might best be attained by a "new birth in the spirit of Him who said: 'A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another.'" According to Representative Frank W. Mondell, naval disarmament would result in no more than the loss of the Philippines and Hawaii, "which...we would be better off without," and this, he felt, would be a small price to pay for "our belief that we have a mission in the world as a Nation" to lead the world to peace and disarmament through our example. Likewise, Senator Works believed that the United States should give up its colonies, reduce its army

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75Weyl, American World Policies, 228-229; Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, Aug. 1, 1914, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 790.
and navy and work for an alliance of civilized, peaceloving nations
who would "ostracize any nation that goes to war." Speaking in Feb-

ruary, 1912, he pointed out that these nations

...should bind themselves to withdraw all trade and other
relations with a nation at war, whatever the cause of the
war may be, at the same time obligating themselves to ten-
der their services to settle the dispute between the con-

flicting nations fairly and fully by peaceful means. At
the same time they should agree and bind themselves not to
increase their own armament and to reduce it to the limit
of the needs of eternal peace and safety.\(^\text{78}\)

In broad outline, the peace progressives' program for Amer-

ica on the eve of the war that could never happen was to emasculate
the American Navy, cooperate with other "civilized" states in enforc-
ing peace "by peaceful means," abandon the Philippines and Hawaii,
and lead the world toward disarmament by moral example. Some of these
beliefs subsequently found their way into Oswald Garrison Villard's
League to Limit Armaments (founded in December, 1914) which was ded-
icated to the proposition that the United States should present, even
to a world already at war, the moral example of unilateral arms re-
duction.\(^\text{79}\) Indeed, as late as December, 1915, George Foster Peabody
could write Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
to the effect that the best way to end the European war would be to
scrap the American Navy. Said Peabody: "I am personally a believer
in the obligation of non-resistance upon the man or woman who follows

\(^{78}\text{Ibid., 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 1837 (Feb. 8, 1912). (Emphasis supplied.)}\)
\(^{79}\text{Villard, Fighting Years, 248-249. Among the outstanding peace pro-
gressives associated with the League at its inception were George
Foster Peabody, Adolph Lewisohn, Hamilton Holt, Lillian Wald,
Carrie Chapman Catt and Newton D. Baker.}\)
Christ's teachings, and also am completely convinced that it is the one way in which ultimate and true victory could be obtained from such war-mad countries as Germany...."

There was, however, much less talk about unilateral naval disarmament as an approach to world peace after the war in Europe began. Instead, peace progressives worked for less controversial and somewhat more realistic proposals. Specifically, they agitated for the government ownership of munitions plants and the revision and tightening of laws relative to neutrality. In addition, most peace progressives vigorously supported the La Follette Peace Resolution.

Introduced on February 8, 1915, the La Follette resolution proposed that the President call a conference of neutral nations to search for a formula to end the European war, limit armaments, and establish an "international tribunal...whose decrees shall be enforced by the enlightened judgment of the world." Further, the resolution looked to the immediate formation of a federation of neutral trading nations which would undertake the "peaceful maintenance and


81Peacemakers of all shades of opinion supported this. See particularly Sen. Robert M. La Follette, Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 9459 (May 29, 1914); Jordan, The Days of a Man, II, 165; Kent, William Kent, 273.

82On this point, embraced by peacemakers of all persuasions and degrees of intensity, see especially Roosevelt to Oscar King Davis, Mar. 12, 1912, Roosevelt Letters, VII, 525; Kent, William Kent, 273; Straus, The American Spirit, 56-57; and Straus, Under Four Administrations, 330-332. In 1907 Straus argued that loans to belligerents by private citizens should be prohibited by law. He did not mention the point after 1914, however.
and preservation of the sovereign rights of neutral commerce." In calling for the formation of a post-war international tribunal La Follette admitted that the creation of an international police force "may be...a necessary step in the evolution of international peace," but he argued that a complete social, cultural and economic boycott of an offending state by all other nations would render military force unnecessary.

The Woman's peace Party immediately threw its support behind the La Follette resolution. Founded by Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt in January, 1915, the party's program for world peace included arms limitation, the nationalization of arms manufacture, opposition to preparedness agitation at home, the democratic control of foreign policy, a "Concert of Nations" to replace the "Balance of Power," the substitution of "Law" for "War," and the maintenance of peace by economic pressure and commercial non-intercourse rather than by armies and navies.

In spite of strong support for the La Follette resolution

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83 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3631-3633 (Feb. 12, 1915); La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 518-519. This plan attracted the support of the Woman's Peace Party and such peace progressives as Oswald Garrison Villard, Mark M. Fagan, Mayor of Jersey City, and Amos Pinchot. Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3634 (Feb. 12, 1915); also Sen. Albert B. Cummins, Ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11313 (July 19, 1916).

84 Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 7-10. Among the devotees of this plan were the Mrs. Henry Villard, Lucia Ames Mead, Glendower Evans and Louis F. Post, all strong supporters of the career of Senator Robert M. La Follette. For La Follette's support of the "democratic control of foreign policy," in sum, an attack on the executive's control over foreign policy, see Ellen Torelle, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette, 204-206; see also Howe, Why War?, 343-344.
by the Woman's Peace Party and peace progressives, it made little impression either in the Senate or among most progressives. Not only did the enforcement clauses seem unrealistic, but there were too few progressives who agreed with Bryan when he stated in 1916: "When we turn from moral suasion to force, we step down and not up. I prefer to have this nation a moral power in the world rather than a policeman."

On the contrary, most progressives believed moral power alone insufficient to maintain peace, and some even took the position that war was a social and biological necessity, a wholly legitimate way to secure reform and human progress in international society. As Bull Moose Representative Willis J. Hulings stated it in 1913:

I am not one of those who regard war as an unmitigated evil. As the struggle of the young pine tree in the thicket upward for the breath of life produces the clear stuff and the tall timber, so in human life struggle, toil and arduous effort are the atmosphere that develops the grand qualities of race. The man who in pursuit of some worthy purpose has not held on until he could taste blood, who has not persisted until every breath became a gasp, has never tasted the real wine of life.... The stairway of human progress is an escalade of battles. War - horrid, wicked, illogical as it is - is not without compensations. The Almighty framed His universe upon a plan of benevolence, and in His gracious goodness ordained that out of our very blunders and foolishness may come blessings, so that even in the jaws of the lion honey may be found....

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86 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 399 (Dec. 6, 1913).
Other prominent progressives who embraced the concept of war as an instrument of reform were Oscar Straus, John C. O'Laughlin, Herbert Croly, George D. Herron and Lyman Abbott. Indeed, Wilson frequently made a distinction between "good" wars for reform and "bad" wars for aggression, and even Senator Borah rejoiced in 1914 that the war in Europe was a "Holy War" for democracy: "The Europe of the future," he said, "will be a freer, a more released, a more democratic Europe. The people will have a greater voice, humanity will never be weighed down again by the...burden of royalty....I thank God I have lived to see the beginning of the end of Old Europe."

Perhaps the most persistent viewpoint about peace found in progressive circles was the argument that its attainment and maintenance ultimately depended on military force. Even before the outbreak of the war in Europe some Congressional progressive advocates of naval building attacked the concept of peace through disarmament and insisted anew that only a Big Navy could guarantee national and international peace and security. If the United States, said Hulings:

should set about to build a Navy such as she easily could, that would be paramount on every sea, and from her great throne of physical and moral power should call a Congress of all nations, or if England, Germany and the United

88 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 443-444;461-462;516-517; Willis F. Johnson, George Harvey, 240-242.
States would unite to establish an international court to police the world, endowed with the physical power to enforce its decrees, and should decree the disarmament of all nations except for internal police, an enormous burden would be lifted from the shoulders of sweating millions... until such a court is established we shall always be in danger of war...

Without question, then, the most significant concept to attract the attention of progressives concerned with the problems of peace in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the European war was the idea of an international organization that would enforce peace with an international police force. As early as 1909 George W. Norris toured the Chautauqua circuit with a speech advocating "a league of nations to prevent war and to ensure permanent peace"; and in his book, The Promise of American Life, published the same year, Herbert Croly wrote that "Peace will prevail in international relations, just as order prevails within a nation, because of the righteous use of superior force." Even the nationalistic Roosevelt, in his Nobel Prize address at Christiania, Norway, in May, 1910, advocated the formation of a "league of peace," complete with some form of an international police force, and Congress by joint resolution in June, 1910, urged the creation of a peace commission to "consider the expediency of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by inter-

89 Cong. Rec. 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 399; 7025 (Dec. 6, 1913; April 21, 1914); see also Sen. Miles Poindexter, Ibid., 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 8648-8649 (July 5, 1912); Sen. George E. Chamberlain, Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 3205-3210 (Feb. 9, 1914).
90 George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 203; Croly, The Promise of American Life, 312.
national agreement, and of constituting the combined navies of the
world an international force for the preservation of universal
peace...." The resolution bore no fruit, and Roosevelt soon re-
nounced the league concept, but considerable respectability was im-
parted to the idea of peace through force. Indeed, professed paci-
fist William Kent advanced the view in 1911 that peace "must be
backed by [the] police power of state, nation or international alli-
ance," and in 1913 he called for an "international police force" to
punish peace breakers. With progressives as diverse as Republican
William Dudley Foulke and Democrat Louis D. Brandeis demanding as in-
ternational police force for the preservation of world peace, progres-
sives were not taken aback when Woodrow Wilson in August, 1914, first
called for a post-war "association of nations, all bound together for
the protection of the integrity of each, so that any one nation
breaking from this bond will bring upon herself war; that is to say,
punishment, automatically."

From the point of view of the activist progressives, the
idea of collective security was their greatest goal, the forceful pro-
jection of the American reform mentality into international politics.
In the words of Roosevelt, men should be "willing to back righteous-

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91 Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace, 26; Pringle, Taft, II, 739-
740; Roosevelt Letters, VII, 75.
92 Cong. Rec., 62 Cong., 2 Sess., 558 (Dec. 20, 1911); Ibid., 63
Cong., 2 Sess., 401 (Dec. 6, 1913).
93 Foulke, A Hoosier Autobiography, 181-182; Alpheus T. Mason, Bran-
deis, 440; Baker, Wilson, V, 74. For similar views see Rep. Wil-
lie J. Hulings, Cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 7025 (Apr. 21,
1914); Sen. William S. Kenyon, Ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11179
(July 17, 1916); Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace, 52-53.
ness by force and make their words good by deeds and... preserve international peace as peace is preserved within each nation...."

A clear expression of this willingness was the League to Enforce Peace. While this organization was dominated by conservatives like Lodge, Root, Hughes and Taft, it attracted the support and enthusiasm of many activist progressives, producing for them visions of a new world order based on American participation in a post-war collective security system. Founded in January, 1915, the League looked toward a post-war league of nations in which the United States would participate, a league in which "The signatory powers shall jointly use their military forces to prevent anyone of their number from going to war, or committing acts of hostility...." Woodrow Wilson endorsed the aims of the League in May, 1916; the Progressive


party incorporated the peace-by-force idea in its 1916 platform; and the American Federation of Labor loaned both its name and energy to the concept. Representative Martin B. Madden of Illinois declared that "We are going to have [peace] if we have to fight for it"; and James W. Folk assured an audience at the University Club in Washington in February, 1916, that "Men here...will live to see the time when the idea of public right will be controlling throughout the world and when universal peace will be maintained by an International police force under the direction of an International parliament."

Even peace progressives (David Starr Jordan, Washington Gladden, Moorfield Storey) joined the League in such numbers that William Dudley Foulke had to assure Roosevelt that pacifists had not captured the organization: "You are mistaken in considering that the bulk of the men controlling the movement are pacifists," he wrote; "Indeed, at the last meeting of the executive committee...it seemed to me none of them were....this has never been [the League's] attitude." Foulke was


correct. The men "controlling the movement" were anything but pacifists, as Bryan's attack on the peace-through-force emphasis of the League clearly demonstrated.

But it was not from Bryan and the pacifists that the League received its most vigorous opposition. It was from Bull Moose nationalists like Roosevelt, Borah and Gardner. Roosevelt's attitude was particularly interesting. At Portsmouth, at Algeciras, and at the Washington Conference which created the Central American Court of International Justice, his activities in behalf of peace had been cheered by progressives. His endorsement of the league idea in the 1910 Christiania speech had also been well received. But the former President was wholly opposed to the program of the League to Enforce Peace. He believed that the United States would compromise its traditional dedication to the maintenance of morality and righteousness in world affairs if it placed its military force at the disposal of an international tribunal. Fearing the loss of America's cherished "freedom of action" in international affairs, particularly in the

western hemisphere, the Roosevelt-Borah-Gardner group raised numerous objections to the aims of the League. They pointed out that America should first increase its armed strength before worrying about enforcing anything. They argued that multilateralization would endanger the Monroe Doctrine, and that European and Asiatic nations would dominate the proposed league of nations. They raised the specter of the league enforcing a decree to permit oriental emigration to the United States, charged that the unrighteous nations would outvote the righteous ones in the councils of the league, and denied that the idea of international government was historically realistic. Said Gardner:

As to this philosophy of international government based on the brotherhood of man, that may come in the sweet by and by, when Californians have learned to intermarry with Chinese and Mississippians have begun to select negroes for their wives....[The idea of the League to Enforce Peace is] to persuade the American people that nations with great military strength, little land, and no money will be willing to enter into an agreement for the purposes of protecting from war the United States, which has no military strength, boundless land, and untold money.¹⁰³

Thus from the viewpoint of the progressive critics of the League to Enforce Peace the United States should, as the first order of business, spend some of its "untold money" on building up America's military strength.

Like the broader question of peace, interest in America's military preparedness was not confined to progressive circles. But vigorous progressive participation in the preparedness controversy was based on the belief of many progressives that the United States was a nation with inadequate force either to defend itself or to underwrite an idealistic diplomacy. On the other hand, there were some progressives, fewer in number, who feared that any increase in the military establishment was but a step on the short road to militarism in America. Both groups presented their views with equal stridence.

As of August, 1914, the military facts of life seemed to support the contentions of the pro-preparedness progressives. Compared with the millions under arms in Europe and Asia, the United States Army numbered but 85,000 men, supplemented only by 120,000 national guardsmen of dubious readiness for combat. Against the swarms of planes that filled European skies the United States could put fewer than 25 military aircraft into the air. To match European industries geared for total war, American arms factories could produce in 24 hours only enough ammunition to keep three artillery pieces in action. The Navy ranked fourth behind Britain, Germany and France, new ship construction barely keeping pace with obsolescence. Only one American submarine was in fit condition to dive.

It was to this state of affairs that Augustus P. Gardner called the nation's attention in October, 1914, when he urged a standing army of 200,000 men, an increase in aircraft appropriations
from $300,000 to $1,000,000, four new battleships and 200 naval air-
planes. "Now do not tell me," he said, "that an army of 200,000 Reg-
ulars is undemocratic and likely to oppress the people. That is all
demagogic rubbish. Two hundred thousand men can not oppress a country
of a hundred million population."

But in the fall of 1914 President Wilson was still unim-
pressed by these military statistics. He dismissed the beginning of
the preparedness agitation as "good mental exercise," and in his an-
nual message to Congress in December he reaffirmed the time-honored
American dogma which argued, in effect, that to be unprepared for war
was a virtue peculiar to and revered by democratic states. "We shall
not alter our attitude," said the President, "because some amongst us
are nervous and excited."

Despite increasing pressure from progressives and other
Americans for military preparedness, the lack of a strong President-
tial commitment to the concept, coupled with bitter peace progressive
opposition to preparedness, produced a naval appropriation bill in
1915 that was wholly inadequate and an army appropriation measure in
1916 so conservative that the time spent wrangling over it seemed
wasted. Only with Wilson's reluctant conversion to "moderate prepared-
ness" and his decision to support a naval building program, did the

\[104\] Rep. Augustus P. Gardner, Cong. Recor d, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 16745-
16746 (Oct. 16, 1914); see also Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 2061-
2063 (Jan. 21, 1915); Ibid., 2105 (Jan. 22, 1915); Ibid., 2687-
2688 (Jan. 29, 1915); Ibid., 4430;4425 (Feb. 23, 1915).

\[105\] Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 177; V il-
lard, Fighting Years, 248.
1916 naval legislation begin to approach the national need. Yet even these halting, exploratory steps toward preparedness were denounced by peace progressives as "militaristic" measures.

The effectiveness of those progressives who fought for extensive preparedness (they were mainly Bull Moose and Republican progressives) was admittedly compromised by the fact that the drive for a respectable military establishment was headed by the most reactionary political and economic groups in America. The Wall Street-financed National Security League, American Defense Society and Navy League were not organizations overflowing with progressives. Nevertheless, men like Roosevelt, Stimson, Straus and Garfield worked closely with them. This cooperation might be regarded in part as a facet of the Bull Moose-Republican "amalgamation" movement that marked the eighteen months following the collapse of the Progressive party in November, 1914. In any event, the progressives who favored preparedness had to work diligently to convey the thought that their advocacy of the principle in no way indicated their domi-

106 The 1915 naval appropriation bill provided for two battleships, six destroyers and 18 submarines. The 1916 naval bill, supported by Wilson, projected a five-year program costing $500,000,000 and providing ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten cruisers, fifty destroyers, one hundred submarines and various auxiliary craft. The Senate reduced the time spread to three years, and it passed in that form. The 1916 army appropriation bill proposed, in addition to an increase in the Regular Army, the scrapping of the National Guard and the creation of a 400,000 man reserve controlled by the federal government. This failed of passage. The compromise that emerged was a provision to increase the Regular Army to 219,000 officers and men, with an increase of a "federalized" National Guard to 457,000 officers and men over a five-year period. See Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker, I, 64; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 179-180;183-190.

107 Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 53-54.
ination by the Wall Street reactionaries. Gardner, for instance, dismissed as "noisome slanders" the charge that he was a tool of the munitions makers, and Cummins pleaded with his colleagues not to abandon preparedness just because reactionary extremists also favored it; even Gronna urged the Senate to "dismiss the thought that there are any sinister influences or any unworthy motives back of this great preparedness scheme." But while Washington Gladden could beseech his pacifist friends to "recognize the fact that a man may urge...[preparedness] for patriotic reasons," few peace progressives would adopt Roosevelt's view that "as long as they [the munitions makers] are supporting a cause that is right, it would certainly not do for you and me to abandon the cause because of such support."

Throughout the 1915-1916 fight for a larger and more efficient military establishment, progressives emphasized the vulnerability of America to attack and linked preparedness with the nation's physical security. California's Kent argued that "we are surrounded by hostile nations. We are surrounded by a world at war - by a world

plotting and planning to involve us...we ask for peace and may be obliged to fight for it." Representative Stephens called preparedness "national life insurance of the very highest type and character," and noted "how little insurance we have against trouble from without," a theme which Gardner and others emphasized over and over. To Wisconsin's Lenroot, American preparedness turned essentially on the European balance of power:

"Now in the past I have been for a small Navy, because up to the beginning of this European war neither the power that had the first nor the power that had the second navy was in such a position that there was any possibility of our expecting trouble from them. It was not even a remote possibility so long as each was watching the other and had to reckon with the other's aggression upon it if there was trouble with us. This European war has changed the situation. We can not now tell what the condition will be with reference to the balance of power in Europe when this war is over. If either side crushes the other and absolutely dominates the situation, then we may need a Navy that is equal to the best in the world. (Applause.)....So long as that possibility exists, I believe it is our duty to make the utmost preparation possible at this time...."

Indeed, said Senator Kenyon to a Davenport, Iowa, preparedness rally, "we have got to realize as a practical people that if a foreign fleet on conquest bent is approaching our shores we cannot go out and read them the Lord's Prayer or the Ten Commandments, or invite

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them to a Chautauqua lecture to solve the difficulty."

In the same breath the pro-preparedness progressives, with one eye on Belgium and the other on the Mexican border, assured the nation that only a respectable military posture could preserve peace and avoid war. "History teaches us," said Oscar Straus, "that national weakness instead of being a protection has been one of the chief promoters of war, because it has been an invitation to aggression." Weakness invites conquest, agreed Borah of Idaho, "and in proportion to the magnificent estate which you hold you must prepared to take care of it."

The pro-preparedness progressives also restated the idea that the nation's diplomacy was only as respected as the military power behind it. Senator Borah stated flatly that diplomacy was effective only where it was backed by sufficient force, and Woodrow Wilson had the same thing in mind when he linked his belated conversion to preparedness in January, 1916, to the promise that "mankind is going to know that when America speaks she means what she says." But the thesis, long popular in progressive circles, was probably stated in its most inclusive form by John C. O'Loughlin in 1916:

Those who shudder at the possibility of the United States becoming involved in war, no matter how serious the affront to our honor and our vital interests, who advocate

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113 Midwest Conference on Preparedness, 17.
115 Lief, Democracy's Norris, 172.
116 Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 263-264; Baker, Wilson, VI, 305-306.
the doctrine of non-resistance, and who regard armaments as provocative of conquest, would make their country voiceless in the councils of the world. Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just, and thrice times thrice is he armed if he hath a pistol at his hand. Had the United States, at the outbreak of the war, possessed an adequate fleet and an army of half a million men, there is no question that the lives of our citizens would not have been jeopardized and our rights would not have been violated. A man who is not blind must see that Japan can do what she wills in China because she realizes the United States, the only great power not at war, is in no position to make good militarily with reference to any protest against her conduct. What is true of Japan is true of other nations; for to them the United States is largely a big, ununified mass, with valuable outlying possessions in the Panama Canal, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines, which it has not sufficient actual strength to defend.117

When the preparedness progressives discussed the specific implementation of the concept, they advocated a combined program of naval, social and industrial preparedness. The upbuilding of the Navy, not the Army, was their main interest. It was the Navy, they felt,

which would best support American diplomacy and maintain peace.

Indeed, men like Kanyon, Borah and Gardner all argued that the larger the Navy the less need there would be for a large standing army, but there was no progressive sentiment for a navy larger than Britain's or a Regular Army exceeding 250,000 men. Only a few progressives argued the need for universal military training, and in this they were ineffectual. In sum, progressive advocacy of preparedness was never oriented toward the Army, and it was with great difficulty that Wilson got legislation in 1916 increasing the author-


119 Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11179 (July 17, 1916); ibid., 6028 (Apr. 13, 1916); ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 2687 (Jan. 29, 1915).


ized peacetime strength of the Regular Army from 105,000 to 219,000.

But under the impact of Wilson's diplomacy of "strict accountability," the Lusitania crisis, and general enthusiasm for commercial expansion, naval building legislation found many friends among the progressives and had less arduous voyages through Congress.

In concert with naval expansion, the preparedness progressives also offered arguments designed to link war preparation with domestic reform. Roosevelt came out for federal control of the munitions industry and the democratization of war through universal military training. U.M.T., he felt, would be a guarantee "forever against the kind of conflict which is known as a rich man's war and a poor man's fight... It would be a war waged by the people for the people."

In addition, the Colonel advocated the reform of industrial practices and working conditions that in any way reduced maximum productive efficiency, legislation to protect the "social and economic rights" of farmers and wageworkers, firm government regulation of corporations involved in war work, the abolition of child labor, the scientific determination of tariff schedules, and the conservation of natural resources. And on the basis of the feeling that men would go willingly to war in defense of their homes, Senator Kenyon advocated a

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federal home purchase plan involving long-term government loans at low interest rates; the Iowan also thought that the Administration's child labor and rural credits bill were "good preparedness measures."

One of the most interesting ideas to emerge from demands for social and industrial preparedness was a plan brought forward by Progressive Representative Willis J. Hulings. In conjunction with an expanded Navy and in lieu of a larger standing army, the Pennsylvanian proposed legislation to create a "public service corps" which would recruit, arm and train young men from 16 to 25 years of age. Hulings visualized a service period of one year with no reenlistment permitted. The primary task of the organization would be to "build roads or other public works," and monthly pay was to be $30. Hulings pointed out that the corps would soak up unemployment and help produce what Wilson meant when he spoke of a "citizenry trained to arms." Further, he argued, the men of the corps could provide much needed national highways at half the current cost. But neither this, nor a similar scheme proposed by Senator Works, ever got out of committee.

123 Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11179; 5705-5708 (July 17, 1916; Apr. 8, 1916). The general theme of the need for social and industrial preparedness in conjunction with military preparedness was given circulation by such other progressives as Creel, Rosenwald, Brandeis and Rep. Stephens. See Creel, Wilson and the Issues, 25; Werner, Julius Rosenwald, 178; Mason, Brandeis, 518-519; Rep. William D. Stephens, Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 8804 (May 27, 1916). "From an economic point of view," said Wilson on one occasion, "there is little difference between the machinery required for commercial efficiency and that required for military purposes..." Palmer, Newton D. Baker, I, 60.


125 Ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 323-326 (Dec. 16, 1915).
Whatever the merit and influence of the arguments for extensive preparedness, the fact that the debate reached a peak during the preliminary maneuverings attendant on the 1916 campaign was in large measure responsible for Wilson's shift of attitude on the question. Roosevelt was determined to make a political issue of preparedness in his effort to strengthen the disintegrating Progressive party and advance amalgamation. Thus the Colonel continually flagellated the preparedness policy of the Administration and the stupidity of those Republicans and Progressives who felt that by "refusing to stand for true preparedness and tagging behind Wilson in his half-measures - really one-twentieth measures - they are doing the political thing."

Progressive Democrats clearly feared the political consequences of anti-preparedness as party policy, and this factor was an important consideration in Wilson's shift to public advocacy of the concept in January, 1916. At the same time, however, the logic of an economic foreign policy based on business as usual, coupled with the Pershing fiasco in Mexico in March, 1916, served to persuade the President and other progressive Democrats that at least

127Lane to Francis R. Wall, Nov. 27, 1915, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 187; Palmer, Newton D. Baker, I, 55-56; Villard, Fighting Years, 311; Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 97-98.
moderate military preparedness was called for — a degree of prepared-
ness somewhere between stark nakedness and full-scale mobilization.

In this sense, the President's conversion to preparedness had the
same logical basis as similar conversions by progressives like Newton
D. Baker, John Dewey, Julius Rosenwald, William Kent, Joseph L. Bris-
tow, Irvine L. Lenroot and William S. Kenyon. Despite the charges
of the peace group, these were not men duped by the munitions makers;
nor were they the lackeys of reactionary Big Business. With an in-
creasing sense of realism, they came to the conclusion that it would
be both foolish and dangerous for the United States to attempt to live
and do business in a world aflame and remain wholly unresponsive to
the possibility of war, however remote.

Wilson's shift to preparedness in early 1916 carried most
progressive Democrats not already there into the preparedness camp.
A few like William Jennings Bryan, Warren Worth Bailey, Claude Kit-
chin and Clyde Tavenner refused to go along, and they joined with La
Follette and the peace progressives in opposition to any form of mil-

Baker, Wilson, VI, 2-3; 8; 12; 25; 26-29; Houston, Eight Years With
Wilson's Cabinet, I, 161-162.

Villard, Fighting Years, 249; Dewey, "Universal Service as Educa-
tion," loc. cit., 309-310; Werner, Julius Rosenwald, 178-179;
Rep. William Kent, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3126 (Feb. 5,
Irvine L. Lenroot, Ibid., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 8895 (May 29, 1916); Sen.
William S. Kenyon, Ibid., 11178-11180 (July 17, 1916). In
April, 1916, Baker told Wilson that the enthusiasm for prepared-
ness "ought not to be allowed to cool and pass away as a fruit-
less agitation, but rather should be captured and capitalized
into a policy tending to strengthen our national life." Walter
Millis, Road to War (Boston, 1935), 295.
itary preparedness. But the bulk of the progressive Democratic leadership followed the President, although the degree of preparedness that each supported sometimes varied widely in individual cases. Thus, it seems clear that the peace progressives, while vocal and sincere, represented at best a relatively small opposition bloc to preparedness within progressive circles.

The main burden of the peace progressive argument was that preparedness meant militarism, and that since militarism was hostile to democracy the supporters of preparedness were, by definition, anti-democratic. The pacifist-dominated Anti-Preparedness Committee stated this thesis most succinctly in one of its many pamphlets:

The country is simply being rushed by a clique of men into an excitement for militarism veiled under the pretense of "Preparation," and the politicians are afraid to oppose the apparent trend. The outlook is the most alarming for the future of civilization in America that has appeared within a generation. If this country is to be turned from its policy of expecting peace into a policy of expecting war, it will be the greatest blow to the development of democracy that could possibly be conceived. 131

Representative Bailey saw preparedness as a plot by the "ruling class in this country" to graft European militarism onto the United States


and destroy democratic institutions. Representative Lindbergh saw the Wall Street "dollar plutocrats" working overtime to deceive the "toilers" into supporting militarism. Representative Lafferty argued that all modern wars were caused by the "money kings" in order to create the debt and taxation which "enslave the peasants." Therefore, he argued, "a great war once in a while is a good thing for the money kings. We must have one in America before long...or our people are liable to get out of bondage." This attitude, not unlike the American socialist line at the time on war and preparedness, was


standard coin for peace progressives.

Among the peace progressives there was also an absolute certainty that the country was in no danger of foreign aggression or attack from any quarter. Indeed, the advocates of preparedness had painted such a grim picture of an America suprime and defenseless that Norris was moved to announce in mock horror that Villa and a half-dozen Mexican bandits could easily capture Washington. "If Villa could read the Congressional Record he would be up here in two weeks." It was impossible, thought Norris, that the "cripples and the widows and the orphans" left over at the end of the European war could somehow "construct a raft, after the fleets are destroyed, and come across the Atlantic Ocean and capture the United States."

With equal fervor the anti-preparedness progressives maintained that preparedness policies led nations inevitably to war, and


that if America were caught up in the international arms race on the
strength of the mistaken belief that a nation really armed for peace,
it would compromise and dull her pretensions of bringing peace to a
world at war. In this vein the Anti-Preparedness Committee urged
Americans to write their Congressmen that "The road to war is paved
with 'preparedness.' Go slow"; and Representative Claude Kitchin
argued that the 1916 naval bill was such that "when order is restored
in Europe it will be a fresh menace to the peace and humanity of the
world. It condemns our pretensions to international arbitration and
a world peace as hypocrisy and mockery."

Given the identification of preparedness with militarism,
the danger to democracy which militarism produced, an abiding faith
in America's physical safety, and the belief that preparedness could
lead only to war, the anti-preparedness progressives reached what to
them seemed a logical conclusion: namely, that the agitation for pre-
paredness in the United States was a plot by Big Business and the mu-
nitions makers to involve the nation in war, a program for which the
workers and farmers of America would ultimately pay both with their
money and their blood. Specifically, the peace progressives identi-
fied the forces behind preparedness as the DuPont Powder Company,
Bethlehem Steel, Midvale Steel, United States Steel and the Navy
League of the United States. These were the organizations, said

138 The Anti-Preparedness Committee, 2; Arnett, Claude Kitchin and
the Wilson War Policies, 107; see also Gladden, A Plea for Paci-
fism, 4;13; Rep. Warren Worth Bailey, Cong. Record, 63 Cong.,
3 Sess., 2737 (Jan. 29, 1915); Sen. Asle J. Gronna, Ibid., 64
Cong., 1 Sess., 11352 (July 21, 1916).
La Follette, who paid for preparedness propaganda "out of the bloody profits made from shipping arms and ammunition abroad." These were the agitators for sharp increases in war expenditures, charged Frederic C. Howe; the evil forces, continued Claude Kitchin, who compelled "the controlling factors of both parties to make perpetual the surrender to them of the Federal Treasury and to place permanently at their mercy the taxpayers of the country." Having thus identified the enemy, the peace progressives urged that the profit be removed from war by having the federal government own and operate all arms and munitions plants, a reform which progressives of nearly all shades of opinion on preparedness were willing to accept.

The peace progressives were also convinced that the European war and the agitation for preparedness at home had diverted public attention from social legislation and the further extension of progressive reform. As Frederic C. Howe lamented in 1916: "Already


the democratic gains of recent years have been submerged. Congress and the public mind are absorbed with other questions. There is no place for a peace program, for abating the abuses of privilege, or for consideration of the proposals of democracy."

To meet this complaint and to offer something positive in lieu of military preparedness, the peace progressives worked for what they called "real preparedness." This was the phrase given their demand for the further extension of domestic reform. In July, 1916, they joined with a group of socialists, single-taxers, suffragists, philanthropists and municipal ownership people to issue a call for a Conference on Real Preparedness which would immediately undertake propaganda for the extension of public health, the de-monopolization of natural resources and the abolition of child labor. Representative Lindbergh saw "real preparedness" as an opportunity to "correct our social system so that the toilers would be the principle beneficiaries of their own toil"; Hiram Johnson of California defined it as an obligation to "protect the individual citizen from rapacious greed"; and Lincoln Steffens considered it simply a ques-

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141 Howe, Why War?, 314-315; see also Lief, Democracy's Norris, 164; White, Autobiography, 496.
tion of "abolishing poverty" at home. But La Follette summed it up best when he said:

We have better uses for our money. Let us prepare the manhood and the womanhood of our country for the struggle of peace; more compensation for the industrial soldiers who fall by the wayside by reason of the hazards of their occupations; more compensation to their widows and children; pensions for the aged and infirm who have failed in the struggle of life to gain a pittance against old age or misfortune; more wages; more education; more money for the common good; more money to fight contagious diseases. This is the preparedness toward which we should turn. We should spend less to prepare to kill and more to prepare to live.\(^\text{144}\)

In retrospect, it is easy to overestimate the strength of anti-preparedness sentiment within the leadership echelon of the progressive movement. Actually, a handful of dedicated people bore the brunt of the agitation. Groups like the Anti-Preparedness Committee, the League to Limit Armaments, the Woman's Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism, each extremely vocal in the fight against preparedness, were all organized and guided by the same small coterie of peace progressives - Hamilton Holt, Jane Addams, Amos Pinchot, Lillian Wald, Oswald Garrison Villard, David Starr Jordan, Mrs. Glendower Evans, John Haynes Holmes, Stephen S. Wise, Florence Kelley and a few others. In Congress, the active anti-preparedness progressive group was bipartisan but small - Kitchin, La Follette,


\(^\text{144}\)\text{Toobservable, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette, 193. Quote from a Senate speech in July, 1916. For similar views on preparedness see Howe, Why War?, 350-355; Filler, Randolph Bourne, 102.}
Buchanan, Norris, Taverner, Bailey, Gronna, Lindbergh and Lafferty. A few prolific anti-preparedness pamphleteers and speakers—men like Gladden, Bryan, Howe, Older and Peabody—rounded out the inner circle. So extensive did anti-preparedness sentiment among progressives seem, however, that one recent student of the movement has concluded that "almost every leader of the American progressive movement was found in the anti-preparedness ranks."

This was not the case. While quantity and quality should not be confused, there were more prominent progressives in the fight for military preparedness. Around Roosevelt, leading advocate of the concept, clustered such pro-preparedness Republican and Bull Moose progressives as Harold Ickes, Henry L. Stimson, John C. O'Loughlin, Augustus P. Gardner, William R. Thayer, Willard Straight, William Dudley Foulke, Victor Murdock, Charles J. Bonaparte, Oscar Straus and James R. Garfield. Around Woodrow Wilson and the Administration's so-called "moderate" preparedness policy gathered such progressive Democrats as Dudley Field Malone, Newton D. Baker, Franklin K.

Lane, Louis D. Brandeis and John Dewey. In Congress, numerous Demo-
cratic, Republican and Bull Moose progressives — Henry A. Cooper, Al-
bert B. Cummins, Irvine L. Lenroot, George E. Chamberlain, James W.
Bryan, William Kent and Thomas D. Gallagher — threw their energies be-
hind some form of armed preparedness.

Admittedly, there were differences among these progressives on how much preparedness there should be and what specific form it should take. Senator Cummins expressed the problem best when he said that "Somewhere between the armed camp of William of Germany and the open dovecote of William of Nebraska there must be an honorable abiding place for a great nation which is prepared to lead the world to-

147Inez Haynes Irwin, The Story of the Woman's Party (New York, 1921), 240-241; Palmer, Newton D. Baker, I, 47; The Letters of Franklin
K. Lane, 177-178; Mason, Brandeis, 518-519; Filler, Randolph
Bourne, 101.

148Among progressive Republican Congressmen favoring preparedness were: Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 312
(Apr. 5, 1917); Sen. Joseph L. Bristow, Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess.,
4700 (Feb. 26, 1915); Sen. Albert B. Cummins, Ibid., 64 Cong., 1
Sess., 11311 (July 19, 1916); Rep. William Kent, Ibid., 63 Cong.,
3 Sess., 3125-3126 (Feb. 5, 1915); Sen. William S. Kenyon, Ibid.,
64 Cong., 1 Sess., 11178-11180 (July 17, 1916); Rep. Irvine L.
Lenroot, Ibid., 8895 (May 29, 1916); Rep. William D. Stephens, 
Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 2666-2667 (Jan. 29, 1915); Rep. Cler-
ence B. Miller, Midwest Conference on Preparedness, 54-55. Pro-
gressive party Congressmen supporting preparedness were: Rep.
James W. Bryan, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 7166-7167
(Apr. 23, 1914); Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 63 Cong., 3
Sess., 2695 (Jan. 29, 1915). Some progressive Democrats sup-
porting preparedness were: Sen. George E. Chamberlain, Ibid.,
4266 (Feb. 22, 1915); Rep. Thomas D. Gallagher, Ibid., 64 Cong.,
1 Sess., 6914-6915 (May 30, 1916); Rep. William W. Rucker,
Ibid., 8916 (May 30, 1916); Rep. James T. McDermott, Ibid., Ap-
ward peace, but will not submit to injustice or indignity." 149  The "abiding place" for many progressives was located in what was called "moderate" preparedness, a posture of readiness for war that fully satisfied few of them. Too "militaristic" for the peace group, too "pacifistic" for the activists, it was a compromise which, by April, 1917, had done little to prepare America for active involvement in the European war.

In sum, the election of 1912, the outbreak of the war in Europe, and the subsequent debate in America on peace, war and preparedness, produced three broad attitudes among the leadership element of American progressivism. The largest group were those who supported the peace program of the League to Enforce Peace. Composed of Wilson progressives, and some progressive Republicans and Bull Moose Progressives, this bloc, largely eastern in sectional locus, also favored military preparedness. Opposed to the Wilson coalition were two minority groups, the La Follette peace progressives and the Roosevelt Progressives. The peace progressives, led by the Wisconsin reformer and Bryan (after the Commoner left the State Department in 1915), advocated peace by moral suasion. They worked for American and world disarmament and what they called "real preparedness" in lieu of military preparedness. Their attitude toward the European war was one of strict neutralism, almost isolationism, and in this

149 Ibid., 1244 (Jan. 19, 1916); see also Rep. William W. Rucker, Ibid., 8916 (May 30, 1916); and Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 263. Borah's version of the middle position incorporated support for a great naval building program and opposition to increases in the army. See Lief, Democracy's Norris, 172.
regard their various arguments paralleled socialist and German-American attitudes. On the other hand, the Roosevelt Progressives, supported by some progressive Republicans, fought for extensive military preparedness. Some of them saw war as an instrument of international reform and most of them accepted the idea that world peace could best be maintained by force. They were opposed, however, to American participation in an international collective security system.

In broad terms, then, most American progressives favored military preparedness and the use of force to attain and maintain peace. On the questions of trade, commercial expansion, differential neutrality and freedom of the seas, questions of greater import for America than the theory of war or peace or the debate on preparedness, only the Bryan-La Follette progressives opposed the economic foreign policy which ultimately led America to war. The Wilson and Roosevelt progressives, as we shall see, generally supported the concept of "business as usual" in time of war.
CHAPTER VII
BUSINESS AS USUAL

In spite of the fact that some progressives accepted war as a legitimate approach to social reform, it would be misleading to suggest that the American progressive movement in 1915-1916 yearned to march straight into battle. Actually, few progressives advocated outright intervention in the European conflict, and those who did had little influence. On the contrary, most progressives were satisfied with Wilson's policy of differential neutrality and freedom of the seas. They were convinced that the Administration's economic foreign policy was both morally and tactically correct. It favored the victims of aggression instead of the aggressors; it upheld the democrats, not the autocrats. But most importantly, perhaps, American neutrality imparted a certain solidity and reality to the dreams of commercial expansion present in the progressive mind since the turn of the century.

Save for the La Follette peace group, most progressives supported Wilson's insistence on the right of Americans to trade with European belligerents, i.e., the Allies, and travel on belligerent ships in time of war. To be sure, as an analysis of the Shipping Bill and the McLeomore Resolution will indicate, there were differences of opinion on how best to implement the general principles. Domestic political pressures also influenced the various recommendations that were made. But, in general, American progressives were agreed that the nation's traditional position on maritime neutral rights, extending back as it did to the Treaty Plan of 1776, should be upheld.
Given German hostility to a policy of neutrality that primarily benefited the Allies, this conviction brought most prominent progressives to the view - really a point of no return - that the Reich should be forced to respect American rights on the high seas, by diplomacy if possible, by war if necessary.

This attitude was not a progressive monopoly, indeed it was widely spread throughout the whole body of American public opinion. But the fact remains that an insistence on the traditional doctrine of freedom of the seas could only encourage "incidents" between the United States and Germany, incidents which inflamed progressive opinion against Germany and produced for almost all Americans a picture of the Reich as a ship-devouring sea monster. As sometime pacifist David Starr Jordan later expressed the implications of America's attitude, "when overt acts shock the moral sense there is no obligation on man or nation to be truly neutral." Thus while most progressives wanted peace, they supported an economic foreign policy that increased the probability of "overt acts" that shocked the "moral sense," a policy which finally brought America into the conflict.

American neutrality, then, as Wilson and other progressives clearly recognized, was inherently dangerous in that it involved United States economic support of the Anglo-French war effort. As William Roscoe Thayer expressed it in February, 1915:

...many of us think that it will serve the Allies best

1David Starr Jordan, The Days of a Man, II, 673.
...if we remain neutral. Thanks to this neutrality, England and France have been getting food and munitions from over here, and now at last the Kaiser, driven stark mad as it appears, has declared his war zone and threatened to blow up our ships...with his submarines. If one American life is lost in this way we shall declare war on Germany. This is I think a safe prediction, even amid the daily shifts of diplomacy and occurrences.2

It was also believed in progressive circles that the war presented a golden opportunity for American commerce to achieve some of the overseas expansion eagerly sought since the optimistic days of the Spanish-American war. In his tariff speech to Congress in April, 1913, Wilson had urged once again that the United States build up its foreign trade because "we more than ever need an outlet for our energies." The outbreak of the war in Europe brought a White House observation that the United States would undoubtedly be called upon to supply the world with commodities formerly purchased in Europe. "Only America, among the great powers," said the President, "is free to govern her own life; and all the world is looking to America to serve its economic need." In December, 1915, in a speech before the Columbus, Ohio, Chamber of Commerce, Wilson spoke of America's duty to "supply and serve" the world, a duty which would carry the nation toward a "peaceful conquest" of the world and help promote American leadership and influence in the nation's attempt to bring

3David F. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, I, 55.
4Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 370;381.
about international peace. "Therefore it is imperative," declared the Chief Executive, "that no impediments should be put in the way of commerce with the rest of the world." This stricture applied not only to German submarines but to the British as well. The President wanted no interference that would "prevent our merchants getting a foothold in markets which Great Britain has hitherto controlled and all but dominated."

Save for the La Follette peace group Wilson received firm support from the progressives for his belief that American commerce might utilize the distresses of the European war to expand abroad. John C. O'Laughlin called for a "fluid" foreign policy in order to realize "our moral, our political and our commercial aspirations," and suggested that "it is becoming more and more important to us that the countries with which we trade, particularly those within our sphere of influence, shall maintain peace and order...and... treat us on precisely the same footing as their other customers."

Senator Borah and Walter Weyl cried out that Americans must seize the golden moment provided by the war to extend and expand their commerce and investments abroad, or the United States would lose out in the world wide economic struggle. Middle western Republican progressives like Minnesota's Knute Nelson and Iowa's Horace M. Town-

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5Ibid., 463.
6Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson, VI, 312.
7John C. O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 248; 242.
er were horrified at the specter of the section's agricultural surpluses piling up on the docks with no established markets to absorb them and no merchant ships to transport them to new markets. At the same time, Wisconsin's Henry A. Cooper looked westward to China as an area which might absorb more and more of America's exports, and he urged the Wilson Administration to plan for the "coming world struggle for the trade of China and other nations of the Far East." On the other hand, Washington's Progressive Representative James W. Bryan looked southward. He pointed out that the war gave American commerce the opportunity to capture markets there, and suggested that "with our boats into South American cities should go our bankers."

In these circumstances, there was little disposition among progressives to regard the extension of American credit or loans to Britain as neutral behavior, since there was nothing in international law or precedent that maintained the impropriety of a neutral extending credits or loans to belligerents. To be sure, Bryan argued at the very beginning of the war that money was contraband and that the federal prohibition of loans to belligerents by private citizens would serve to shorten the conflict and strengthen the moral posture of American neutrality. But he soon reversed his position to the extent of accepting the idea of bank "credits," a concept that was technically distinct from that of a "loan" but which had the same ef-

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9Ibid., 13385 (Aug. 6, 1914); Ibid., 13180 (Aug. 3, 1914).
10Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 4230 (Feb. 20, 1915).
fect of helping finance British war purchases in the United States.

Wilson, however, soon came to accept the idea of outright loans to

Britain, loans financed by public subscription to privately issued

bonds. Thus when Senator George E. Chamberlain, progressive Democrat

from Oregon, protested the neutral implications of a $500,000,000

Morgan loan to Britain in September, 1915, Wilson instructed William

G. McAdoo to inform the Senator of the "real significance of this

loan, namely, the maintenance of international exchanges whose break-

down would be absolutely disastrous to the United States." By mid-

1916 the President could exult in America's new status as a creditor

nation, boast of its capacity to "finance the world in some important
degree," and urge American businessmen to view international trade as

a vehicle "to carry liberty and justice and the principles of humani-

ty" to a benighted world.

Against this utopian Presidential vision of world reform

riding upward and outward on the wings of the American dollar, a few

progressives with pacifist and German leanings protested. La Fol-

lette, for instance, charged that the Morgan-arranged loan of 1915

was a violation of neutrality, and Beveridge observed that the loan

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12 Merle E. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 191-193. See the documents

relating to the distinction between a "loan" and a "credit," in-

cluding testimony from Thomas W. Lamont, J. P. Morgan and Robert

Lansing on this distinction, and Bryan's opposition to "loans," in

William A. Williams, ed., The Shaping of American Diplomacy:

Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations, 1750-1955

(Chicago, 1956), 577-581.

13 Baker, Wilson, V, 383.

14 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 542-

543; Baker, Wilson, VI, 494.
gave American business both an economic and emotional stake in Allied victory. The German-American Alliance sharply condemned the "Money Trust" and the "Anglo-American finance combine" and tried, unsuccessfully, to organize "runs" on banks that participated in the loan. Whatever the attitude of Wall Street on American neutrality, there was little criticism of the so-called "Money Trust" from progressives in 1915 and early 1916. Only after December, 1916, did it become relatively fashionable in peace progressive circles to blame America's anti-German diplomacy on the bonds of gold binding London and Washington. Prior to that time few progressives were prepared to embrace an argument which seemed to smack of Kaiserism and socialism. On the contrary, most prominent progressives either acquiesced in the loan and credit concepts without comment or agreed with John C. O'Laughlin's view that "The United States now has the promise of becoming the world's greatest banker....There is not the slightest objection in international law to the making of loans by private individuals to a belligerent" - an opinion which was fully shared by American Big Business.

17 Senator Norris is a case in point. Compare his attitude on economic neutrality in 1915-1916 with that expressed in his April 4, 1917, speech in the Senate opposing the American declaration of war. See George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 196-197.
In addition to their optimism about wartime commercial and financial expansion, one other vital point was repeatedly emphasized by progressives. This was the idea that simply by a process of extending or withholding its commerce, the United States could bring about among the several belligerents a greater respect for America's asserted maritime neutral rights. In sum, commerce was regarded as an important weapon in the achievement of the nation's foreign policy ideals. Walter Lippmann apparently had this in mind when he urged Americans to "invest and trade in the backward countries" in order to provide "our diplomacy a leverage on events." And it was the search for diplomatic leverage that persuaded Progressive Representative John A. Elston to insert in the Congressional Record a letter from the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce to the effect that the United States should consider an embargo on arms and loans to Britain as a means of pressuring the British government into a more healthy respect for America's claimed right to freedom of the seas. Similarly, Franklin K. Lane angrily urged a suspension of all trade with Germany unless the Kaiser also recognized the legitimacy of American neutral rights; and Walter Weyl argued that America's commercial expansion during and immediately after the war would demand a new diplomacy emphasizing an international approach to the problems of the post-war

19Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, 226.
20Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 2485 (Feb. 12, 1916); for a similar suggestion see Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 48-49.
21Lane to Frank I. Cobb, May 6, 1916, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 207.
II

While progressives were largely agreed that commerce and diplomacy were closely related and that the European war had provided America with a rare opportunity to expand abroad commercially, specific proposals on how best to do this were invariably colored by political considerations. The Shipping Bill, debated in Congress early in 1915, was a case in point.

To pursue the dream of commercial expansion in wartime, the United States desperately needed merchant ships. Indeed, the failure of the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations significantly to expand the merchant marine had placed the United States in a difficult position when the war suddenly and sharply reduced the carrying services that could be supplied by European states. Thus on July 31, 1914, with the European crisis rapidly approaching the boiling point, Wilson called Democratic Congressional leaders to the White House. "Our bountiful crops are ready to harvest," he told them bluntly. "Unless they can be carried to the foreign markets, they will waste in the warehouses, if they do not rot in the fields....My object in calling you gentlemen together was to...ask you to provide ships to...carry our commerce to all parts of the world."

When the war commenced a few days later, Wilson intensified and broadened the search for available vessels. Under the Panama Ca-

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22Weyl, American World Policies, 138-140.
nal Act of 1912 restrictive navigation laws had been modified to the extent of permitting foreign-built merchantmen to be registered under the American flag if they were not over five years old. On August 18, 1914, the President signed emergency legislation which removed the age stipulation, an act which encouraged the flight of European shippers toward the protection of the neutral flag of the United States. By December, some eighty merchantmen, many formerly under British flags, were newly registered in the United States. This did not, however, solve the problem of inadequate carrying space for American produce. Therefore, the Administration toyed with the idea of buying up the some 500,000 tons of German and Austrian shipping interned by the war in American ports. The Administration's thinking turned on the belief that the "United States has always maintained the right to buy belligerent merchant vessels and transfer them to the American flag. It is an accepted principle of our historic international duty."

But it was on the Shipping Bill that Wilson centered his main effort to relieve the shortage of American merchantmen. The plan was drawn up in August, 1914, by William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. McAdoo's idea was to create a government-owned corporation that would buy, build, charter and operate cargo vessels. The scheme envisioned a federal Shipping Board of five men appointed by the President that would direct the business of the

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25 William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 309.
26 Ibid., 296.
corporation. For the Board's use Congress, it was hoped, would appropriate $50,000,000. As visualized by McAdoo, the Shipping Board had two primary tasks: create a naval auxiliary of 400,000 to 500,000 gross tons and establish new steamship lines to South America and the Far East. The government would subscribe to not less than 51 percent of the corporate stock, and the Board members would vote the government's holding. To protect the free enterprise concept, the corporation could be sued.

In part, the idea of a government-owned shipping corporation was designed to achieve in one sweeping stroke three goals long sought by progressives. First, there was a desire to strike a blow at the American shipping monopoly and the "orgy of profiteering" in maritime carrying charges occasioned by the wartime removal of British and German competition. Indeed, after the war began American shipping companies could charge virtually any rates they pleased, and a year's net profit of 300 to 500 percent on the money invested in a single vessel was not uncommon. Not surprisingly, the proposal to put the government into the shipping business to protect exporters brought J. P. Morgan down to Washington to protest the whole concept as a "menace" to free enterprise. A second aim, revealed in the provision to establish steamship lines to South America and the Far East, was to expand American commerce into areas long dominated by British commercial interests. "This great trade is open to us," said McAdoo. "If we

27 Ibid., 9-10.
28 Ibid., 304-305; Baker, Wilson, V, 113-114.
take these markets while we have the chance, we can establish unparal-
leled prosperity in this country...." Finally, the Shipping Bill
looked to the creation of an extensive naval auxiliary as part of a
balanced preparedness program. As McAdoo later explained it:

The Administration and the friends of the shipping bill
came to the conclusion that our campaign for ships would
be helped by combining in one objective the creation of
a merchant marine and a fleet of naval auxiliary vessels;
carriers of merchantable cargoes in time of peace, and
carriers of men and munitions in time of war. The speeches
I made were along that line. As a matter of policy I put
the idea of naval auxiliaries first, and the merchant ma­
rine second. Experience had convinced me that people as
a rule are far more interested in fighting, and in prepar­
ations for fighting, than they are in any constructive
commercial or industrial effort.30

The Congressional struggle over the Shipping Bill in Jan­
uary and February, 1915, was fought more along party lines than on
a progressive-conservative basis, although some ideological division
was apparent. Progressive Republican Senators like Norris, Kenyon,
Clapp and La Follette supported the principle of the bill. At the
same time, seven conservative Democratic Senators, eyes riveted on
the specter of government ownership, abandoned Wilson and cast their
lot with the Republican opposition.

In general, then, progressives supported the broad prin­
iple and commercial aims of the Shipping Bill, if not the specific
method of implementation. Michigan Representative William J. Mac­
Donald, for example, announced that as a Progressive he would have

29William G. McAdoo, A Naval Auxiliary Merchant Marine. Speech Be­
fore the Chamber of Commerce of Indianapolis, Ind., Oct. 13, 1915,
30McAdoo, Crowded Years, 312.
31Ibid., 305-307;314-315; Baker, Wilson, V, 133.
to vote for the Shipping Bill because the Democrats almost always
sponsored legislation to which Progressives were in principle com-
mitted. "This Congress has been wonderfully progressive," added
Progressive Representative James W. Bryan, "but there are some more
big things to be done, and I hope the passage of the...bill will be
accomplished." Senator Knute Nelson saw an expanded merchant ma-
rine as a vital key to commercial empire. "I am glad that the war
has come, in one way," argued the Minnesota progressive Republican.
"I am glad this war will...give us a chance to build up American ship-
ping." It would also, thought the Bull Moose contingent in the
House, deal a death blow to the transcontinental railroad monopo-
lists.

Progressive Democrats like Representative George A. Neeley
of Kansas outlined the Administration's Shipping Bill so clearly and
linked it to commercial expansion and American neutrality so skill-
fully that progressive Republicans were indeed hard pressed to find
arguments against the measure. Neeley, for example, painted a pic-

32 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3904 (Feb. 16, 1915).
34 Ibid., 13386 (Aug. 6, 1914); see also Sen. George E. Chamberlain,
   Ibid., 13496 (Aug. 8, 1914); Rep. Horace M. Towner, Ibid., 13180-
   13181 (Aug. 3, 1914); Sen. Coo I. Crawford, Ibid., 63 Cong., 3
   Sess., 907 (Jan. 4, 1915). As early as April, 1914, Senator
   George Norris had urged establishing a government-owned shipping
   company to put American flag vessels into the South American trade.
35 Rep. Melville C. Kelly, Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 14391 (Aug. 28,
   1914); Rep. Willis J. Hulings, Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3913
   (Feb. 16, 1915); Rep. James W. Bryan, Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 Sess.,
   Appendix, 1242 (Oct. 14, 1914); Sen. George E. Chamberlain,
   Ibid., 13512 (Aug. 8, 1914); Sen. Knute Nelson, Ibid., 14175
   (Aug. 24, 1914); Thorstein Veblen, An Inquiry Into the Nature
   of Peace, 24-25.
ture of an America "practically ostracized from the great consuming portion of the world," her grain bins and warehouses overflowing, her industry threatened; the Shipping Bill, he promised, "will mark the beginning of an active campaign for commercial supremacy on the high seas and will in time make us independent of Europe and her broils; will make the Stars and Stripes known in every port on the globe, to the great glory of the American people."

In the final reckoning, however, many Republican and Bull Moose progressives were embarrassed in their support of the Shipping Bill by Wilson's decision to play politics with the issue. Speaking before an Indianapolis audience early in January, 1915, the President declared that a government-sponsored merchant marine was truly a progressive measure because it would reduce freight rates on grain and cotton exports. Wilson appealed to all progressives to support the Democratic party on the question because it was a party two-thirds progressive while the Republican party, he felt, was only one-third progressive.

This exercise in partisan factions stung many progressive Republicans and led directly to a bitter attack on the Administration in the Senate by Iowa's Senator Cummins. Cummins charged that while the intent of the Shipping Bill was progressive in that it coupled commercial expansion with the need for naval auxiliary vessels, it

was in form "reactionary...dangerous and...unconstitutional," suited only to the mentality of an "extremist radical." To circumvent Wilson's alleged radicalism, maintain party unity against the Administration in an election year and achieve the clear commercial benefits of the original McAdoo proposal, the Iowan devised an amendment to the Shipping Bill. It provided $30,000,000 for government construction and purchase of naval auxiliary merchantmen which would be leased to private operators in time of peace and over which a government corporation would have no operative control. Divested of its "socialistic" features, the Shipping Bill, as amended, attracted support from conservatives in both parties. Thanks to the Cummins formula, which in no way disturbed the commercial expansion-naval auxiliary features so attractive to progressives, Senate progressive Republicans joined with party conservatives in supporting the measure as amended. Indeed, when Wilson rigidly insisted on the original McAdoo plan they participated in the Senate filibuster that ultimately did the bill to death.

38 Ibid., 2083; 2088-2090; 2091 (Jan. 22, 1915); see also Sen. Asle J. Gronna on doubtful constitutionality of the measure, Ibid., 4003 (Feb. 18, 1915).
39 Ibid., 2091 (Jan. 22, 1915); Ibid., 3400 (Feb. 8, 1915); Rep. Everis A. Hayes, Ibid., 4132 (Feb. 19, 1915). Many progressive Republicans who opposed the Shipping Bill were perfectly willing to have government ownership of some steamship lines. The cry of "socialism" did not impress them. See, for example, Rep. William D. Stephens, Ibid., 3907 (Feb. 16, 1915). See also Roosevelt to Miles Poindexter, Jan. 30, 1915, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 887. Roosevelt urged Poindexter, Clapp, Norris and Murdock to defeat the bill or at the very least vote for the Cummins substitute. The Colonel's correspondence on the Shipping Bill was an important step in his amalgamation movement. See also Baker, Wilson, V, 132-133; Lane to John C. Burns, Mar. 3, 1915, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 167; Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 251-283.
Aside from Wilson's political blunder and the partisan politics of the question, another factor that produced progressive Republican opposition to the Shipping Bill was the belief that the measure, under certain circumstances, might actually increase Anglo-American tension and thus indirectly benefit the German cause. Specifically, the fear was expressed that Administration policy under the bill might compromise American neutrality by involving America in war, not with Germany, but with the Allies. Thus some opposition to the Shipping Bill turned not so much on fear of war per se as on fear of war with the wrong side in the European struggle for democracy. Led by Roosevelt, Republican progressives hammered away at the point that if the bill were passed, the ship-hungry Administration would undoubtedly empower the Shipping Board to buy up interned German and Austrian tonnage. When these ships put to sea under the American flag, they would be seized by British naval units, an act which would surely produce Anglo-American tension. Representative William Kent favored the idea of the government going into the shipping business to create a naval auxiliary, but he opposed the Shipping Bill and its rumored corollary involving the purchase of German and Austrian merchant ships:

The ships now interned in the neutral waters of the United States [said Kent] would be subject to capture if they went out under their own flags. If they go out under our flag, there would be a close analogy to the case where a hound dog chased a rabbit into a hole and waited at the mouth of the hole, saying to himself with

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watering mouth, "There is my rabbit," and thereafter
the rabbit emerged with the American flag wrapped
around him. There might be trouble for the rabbit,
and the American flag might be torn. It is safer to
leave the belligerent ships entirely alone.41

Wisconsin's Lenroot also felt that the purchase of German ships would
involve the United States in nasty situations with Britain. "If this
bill passed," he said, "many in this country will insist that these
ships engage in the German trade, on the ground that English ships
are constantly carrying cargoes from the United States to England;
and therefore, if we would be strictly neutral...we should devote the
ships to the German trade to equalize our exports. To this England
would strenuously object." But Roosevelt put it most forcefully
when he wrote Senator Poindexter:

...the intention of the Administration is to buy the
German ships. If that is done, and these ships, owned
by the United States Government, go to sea, the Allies
will have a perfect right to refuse to recognize the
transfer of the flag....they are liable to be captured
or in case of resistance to be sunk. This would bring
us very close to war not only with England alone, but
with her Allies....France, Russia and Japan. I think
it is literally a criminal act for this Administration
to go into this without considering the gross breach of
neutrality which it would be to relieve Germany of these
ships and pay her thirty or forty million dollars of pub-

W. Temple admitted the great need for merchant ships to maintain
America's foreign commerce but argued that "If we buy belligerent
vessels we are hunting trouble." Ibid., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 13185
(Aug. 3, 1914). This, too, was Senator Norris' view. Roosevelt
Letters, VIII, 892.
42 Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3889 (Feb. 16, 1915); see also
Rep. Frank W. Mondell, Ibid., 3978 (Feb. 17, 1915); Sen. Joseph
L. Bristow, Ibid., 1933 (Jan. 20, 1915).
lic money. 43

So concerned were pro-Allied extremists that the Shipping Bill might damage Anglo-American relations and aid the German war effort that rumors were circulated in Washington charging that pro-Germans and the German-American Alliance were supporting the measure as a means of fomenting controversy between the United States and the Allies. Senator Lodge even went so far as to suggest that the Shipping Bill was part of a plot between American and German bankers aimed at stirring up Anglo-American animosity. In any event, when a filibuster prevented the bill from coming to a vote in the Senate, the British were pleased. And well they might have been. Not only had America deprived herself of merchant ships for commercial expansion into traditional British markets, but she had removed a possibility of Anglo-American friction in the process.

Wilson was very disappointed. The Shipping Bill was his first major legislative defeat since taking office in 1913. He considered it a progressive measure. While he had received the support of the Democratic progressives in the House and Senate and the Bull Moosers in the House, he had lost the backing of progressive Republi-

43 Roosevelt to Miles Poindexter, Jan. 30, 1915, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 686-687; see also Roosevelt to Dwight E. Heard, Jan. 29, 1915, Ibid., 686; Sen. A sle J. Gronna, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 4003 (Feb. 18, 1915); Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 452.

44 Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 279-284; George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 318-319; McAdoo, Crowded Years, 309; Baker, Wilson, V, 182.
cans in both chambers. It is clear that his appeal to partisanship was in part responsible for this. Nonetheless, he condemned the seven conservative Democratic Senators who had worked with the Republicans to forestall the measure as "members of that ill-omened coalition" who would have to bear responsibility for the "infinite damage to the business of the United States, to farmers, to laborers, to manufacturers, to producers of every class and sort." These men, said Wilson, had helped "fasten the control of the selfish shipping interests on the country."

The President's disappointment was only temporary. The Shipping Bill finally became law in August, 1916, when the Administration concentrated on the naval auxiliary feature and, with the support of all progressives save the La Follette peace group, pushed it through as part of its general naval preparedness program. Thus the primary function of the Shipping Bill debate in early 1916 was to open for extensive discussion the whole question of America's commercial rights as a neutral in a belligerent world.

An analysis of the voting indicates that in the House, progressive Republicans and progressive Democrats followed party lines, with Bull Moose Progressives supporting the bill. The situation was more scrambled in the Senate. In general, progressive Republicans, fearing the anti-Allied implications of the measure, voted against it. Progressive Democrats stood with Wilson. Seven conservative Democrats deserted the party, causing the slim Democratic margin in the Senate to disappear and the bill to fail to come to a vote. See Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 3923 (Feb. 16, 1916); Baker, Wilson, V, 133.

Ibid.; see also McAdoo, Crowded Years, 352.

III

The precedent on which the United States, the Wilson Administration and most progressives based their insistence on the right of Americans to trade with belligerents in time of war was established in the years 1776-1815. Indeed, it was during this period that American maritime neutral rights principles had been hammered out on the stern anvil of war - principles which said in effect that Free Ships make Free Goods and Free Goods make Free Ships except contraband of war which the United States defined as arms and ammunition. These national principles were designed for the relatively polite warfare of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Written into international law, they bore little practical relationship to the realities of the total war of 1914-1918. Given new weapons like the submarine, given the very nature of war involving whole civilian populations, given changes in the character of contraband and the possibility of victory or defeat by starvation, the doctrine of "freedom of the seas" had become something of an anachronism. But to Woodrow Wilson, as to most Americans, these principles represented America's historical position, the sine qua non of international commercial justice, the very bedrock of international law. It was the President's steadfast contention that American ships had the legal right

to travel in European war zones with non-contraband (as America defined the term) cargoes, and on February 10, 1915, he announced that if German U-boats sank American vessels or caused the loss of life of American citizens on the high seas, the United States would hold Germany to "strict accountability" for such depredations.

Progressive support for this position formed quickly. In May, 1915, the New York Reform Club memorialized the President, urging on him a program of freedom of the seas, colonial free trade and the internationalization of the export of capital as the keys to future peace. Nor was there objection from progressive ranks in October of the same year when Wilson argued that part of America's mission in history was to "spread to all mankind" the Anglo-American tradition of "personal liberty," and that implicit in this was America's determination to "maintain certain principles of action which are grounded in law and justice," among these being the idea of freedom of the seas. Indeed, progressives like John C. O'Loughlin, George D. Herron, William Jennings Bryan, William Allen White, George W. Norris, William E. Borah and Walter Weyl all firmly supported the idea that the United States must never surrender her right to free use of the seas in wartime. As Iowa's Senator Cummins put it:

49 O'Loughlin, Imperiled America, 170-171.
50 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 416.
51 Ibid., 444-445.
It is intolerable that war between two nations shall destroy the commerce and interrupt the business of every other nation which may be at peace, and if this war teaches nothing else, it teaches us that the rights of neutral powers in commerce and business must be respected, and not only respected, but they must be advanced....I am not afraid of war.53

It was this attitude, of course, which ultimately triggered the situation from which there was no extrication save war. For only so long as Germany was prepared to accept the American contention on freedom of the seas could the United States hope to remain neutral - a neutrality which Berlin increasingly interpreted as a series of legalisms designed to maintain America as an arsenal for the Allied war effort.

So widespread was progressive support for the principle of freedom of the seas, however, that even the peace progressives, the only group within progressivism hostile to the concept, were loath to attack it frontally. Instead, the peace progressives concentrated their criticisms specifically on the immorality of the arms traffic. But even on this score, relatively few of them stood forward to be counted. Those who did were forced to accept the unpopular and cynical view of Representative Kent that "international law is nothing but convention established from time to time between the nations...most powerful on land or sea as suits their convenience," or admit with Senator Kenyon that while "international law may permit it, moral law condemns it." Thus, in January, 1916, when Kenyon pre-

53 Speech by Senator A. B. Cummins printed in Midwest Conference on Preparedness, 13; see also Sen. William E. Borah, Cong. Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 16645 (Oct. 15, 1914).
54 Kent, William Kent, 272-273; Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1613 (Jan. 27, 1916).
sented to Congress a petition to embargo the export of arms and ammu-
nition circulated by the Organization of American Women for Strict
Neutrality and containing over a million signatures, Kitchin, Clapp,
Works and Kent were the only Congressional progressives who publicly
endorsed it. "Let us not deceive ourselves," said Kenyon in pre-
senting the petition, "or hug to our bosom any delusion as to the
prosperity coming to us from profits arising from helping to slaugh-
ter men, to widow women, and to orphan children. The jingle of the
bloody dollar can not drown the sound of the groans and cries of
misery arising from the battlefields of Europe." Most peace pro-
gressives, it seemed, preferred to fight on safer fields - such as
on the controversial McLemore Resolution to warn American citizens
to stay off belligerent vessels, or on the crucial preparedness is-

55La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 551-552; Rep. William Kent,
Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 337-338 (Feb. 12,
1916); Arnott, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 48.
56Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1612-1613 (Jan. 27, 1916).
57Ibid., 63 Cong., 3 Sess., 202-203 (Dec. 15, 1914). Works intro-
duced S.6862 on Dec. 10, 1914, to achieve total embargo. De-
spite Works' forceful contention that arms exports could only
serve to prolong the war and make Americans "responsible for the
lives that are lost," S.6862 received no support from the floor
and was consigned to the Foreign Relations Committee where it
died quietly.
in its fight for an embargo on munitions, a fact that caused some peace progressives to wonder about the essential neutrality of the proposal. Certainly, as Grand Admiral von Tirpitz made clear in his widely publicized January, 1915, interview with Beveridge, an American embargo would clearly help Germany. "If America would not send any more powder, guns and food to our enemies," said von Tirpitz, "this war would very soon be over." Secondly, Secretary of State Bryan himself did not support an arms embargo. "There is no power in the Executive," the Commoner said in January, 1915, "to prevent the sale of ammunition to the belligerents. The duty of a neutral to restrict trade in munitions of war has never been imposed by international law or by municipal statute."

So obvious did it seem to most Americans and to most progressive leaders that a policy of strict neutrality by embargo would strengthen the German war effort that even old-line pacifists and anti-imperialists like David Starr Jordan were disturbed. "I was not able to convince myself that traffic in munitions should be debarred, as prohibition in that matter would play directly into Germany's hands," he recalled. Andrew Furuseth, a leading figure, with La

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58 Albert J. Beveridge, What Is Back of the War, 68-70. The German-Americans had great difficulty adjusting their arguments to the admissions of the Imperial German Government. As early as Dec. 15, 1914, at the very moment the Vollmer and Bartholdt munitions embargo bills were submitted in the House, Berlin admitted the legality of the arms trade. Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War, 1914-1915," loc. cit., 368.

59 Baker, Wilson, V, 189.

60 Jordan, The Days of a Man, II, 652.
Follette, in the movement to better working conditions in the American merchant marine, urged the seamen in whose cause he labored to stay at their calling during the war. To refuse to sail American cargo ships to Europe would only benefit Germany and constitute a violation of true neutrality, he argued. Roosevelt, as might be expected, was thoroughly disgusted with those who advocated embargo. "It seems incredible," remarked the Colonel, "that they should be willing to play the game of the German aggressors by cutting off supplies from those endeavoring to right the wrongs of Belgium; but they are doing it and doing it with unctuous professions of high morality."

The sinking of the British liner Lusitania on May 7, 1915, with the loss of 128 American citizens brought the whole question of embargo and maritime neutral rights into bold relief, particularly that part of it concerning the right of American citizens to travel on belligerent merchant or passenger vessels in war zones. Admittedly, America's moral case on the Lusitania was not as strong as it might have been - the Germans had specifically warned American citizens not to embark on her, and the ship was carrying 4200 cases of rifle ammunition. But legally, it was generally agreed among international lawyers that neutral civilian passengers on non-combatant belligerent vessels were above danger.

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61 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 338.
63 Oscar Handlin, "A Liner, A U-Boat...And History," American Heritage, VI (June, 1955), 41-43.
In any event, both public opinion and progressive opinion in the United States were instantly inflamed. La Follette urged the President to take a "firm stand," but one short of actual war. Lyman Abbott demanded a complete severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. "In such a crisis," he wrote the editor of the New York Times, "courage is a duty and timidity a crime; dread of war creates peril of war." Henry L. Stimson, Brand Whitlock, Fiorello H. La Guardia, John Jay Chapman, Thorstein Veblen, John C. O'Laughlin, Walter Lippmann and Will Irwin all reacted to the sinking with moral indignation, shock and an intensified hatred of Germany. Roosevelt characterized the Lusitania incident as "piracy on a vaster scale of murder than any old time pirate ever practiced" and concluded that "the time has come to speak out"; specifically, he urged that all commerce with Germany be prohibited and that trade with the Allies be increased. Only William Roscoe Thayer among the progressives detected a silver lining in the cloud. "This monstrous crime," he wrote, "has had the beneficial effect already of causing many German-

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64 La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 542.
Americans to declare that they are loyal. I predict that before the end hyphens will be very unfashionable...." Indeed, the propaganda activities of the German-American Alliance were curtailed for several months, so sharp was America's anti-German reaction to the sinking.

Had Wilson wanted war on the Lusitania issue, recalled Walter Lippmann, "he could have had it." But like most of the other responsible leaders of American progressivism, Woodrow Wilson did not want an open war with Germany in May, 1915, faced as he was with the crisis in Mexico and a military preparedness program barely in the blueprint stage. He did, however, regard the Lusitania disaster as an opportunity to pressure Germany, on possible pain of war, to accept his view that American citizens had the legal right to travel on belligerent merchant ships in war zones. Yet when he announced publicly in a speech at Philadelphia on May 10 that "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right," he was greeted with a cascade of criticism from the Republicans, among them Republican progressives. The phrasing was unfortunate, a far cry from the spirit of "strict accountability," and White House sources hastened to assure the nation that "too proud to fight" in no way reflected the attitude of the govern-

70 Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy, 15.
ment toward the Lusitania outrage. But the political damage was
done.

While progressive Democrats maintained an embarrassed si-

lence and peace progressives cheered "too proud to fight" as a great

act of moral courage, progressive Republicans and Bull Moose Pro-
gressives attacked the President roundly. Roosevelt demanded instant
measures to obtain redress from the German Government; Borah sarcas-
tically implied that cowardice dominated the councils of state in
Washington; and William Dudley Foulke condemned the "too proud to
fight" psychology out of hand. Similarly, progressives like Frank-
lin K. Lane, John Jay Chapman and William Roscoe Thayer denied that
the United States could talk "Princetonian English to a water-front
bully," charged that the President was a "slowpoke and a pro-German
temporizer," and spoke feelingly of America's "diplomatic humiliation
in the face of the world." But while progressive Republicans mixed
their politics with their demands that the President vigorously uphold
American rights and national honor, there were no clarion calls for
war. Indeed, as Ray Stannard Baker recorded in his diary at the

71 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 405;
72 Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, 256-257; Baker, Wilson, V,
343-344.
73 O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 173-174; Johnson, Borah of Idaho,
195; William Dudley Foulke, A Hoosier Autobiography, 166.
74 Lane to George W. Wickersham, July 18, 1915, The Letters of Frank-
lin K. Lane, 176; Chapman to Mrs. Henry C. Green, June 21, 1915,
Howe, John Jay Chapman, 312; Thayer to Henry Cabot Lodge, Sept.
15, 1915, The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 255; for similar
view see Borah's statement in Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 195.
75 White to Woodrow Wilson, Telegram, May 9, 1915, Selected Letters of
William Allen White, 161;15; Stimson, On Active Service, 84.
time: "It is a very ticklish situation: the country wants Mr. Wilson to be firm and yet almost no one wants war. How both these desires can be satisfied it is difficult to see." 76

The President attempted to satisfy his critics and remove himself from the horns of this dilemma by writing sharp notes to Berlin. In these he upheld the "indisputable" rights of Americans to sail the seas, spoke of America's "sacred duty" to uphold such rights and announced, to the applause of many progressives, that

The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privilege of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity... It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.77

This, of course, was no ultimatum. But it was a position of moral righteousness from which the Administration could not easily retreat in the future, and the possibility of its leading to the ultimatum stage was strong unless Germany accepted the principle. Fearing that Wilson's position on the Lusitania affair was a step toward inevitable war, Bryan resigned from the Cabinet in protest.

Prior to taking his leave, the Secretary had urged the President to investigate the legality of preventing American citizens from

taking passage on belligerent ships. He had also suggested that if such a prohibition proved legally indefensible, the President might appeal publicly to Americans to refrain voluntarily from such action. To these importunities, Wilson replied that since there were no laws preventing Americans from traveling abroad, a Presidential appeal would be useless, not only "because the danger is already fully known," but because it would weaken "the effect of our saying to Germany that we mean to support our citizens in the exercise of their right to travel both on our ships and on belligerent." Bryan could not accept this viewpoint. Feeling that he could "do more on the outside to prevent war than...on the inside," he resigned.

I think this will destroy me (he said), but whether it does or not, I must do my duty according to my conscience, and if I am destroyed, it is, after all, merely the sacrifice that one must not hesitate to make to serve his God and his country....I go out into the dark....I have many friends who would die for me.®

Cheered forward by the peace progressives, the ex-Secretary of State immediately launched himself on a vigorous speaking campaign in which he urged Americans to stay off belligerent ships. He also advocated government ownership of munition and armaments plants, denounced loans to belligerents, called for national referendums on all questions of war and peace, and congratulated a Lincoln, Nebraska, audience on their wisdom in living thirty-six hours from the noxious influence of New York. Inevitably, perhaps, he soon found himself lion-

80 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, I, 146.
ized by the German-American Alliance, and although he resisted their pressure to announce in favor of an arms embargo (he never relinquished the feeling that arms embargo would be essentially unneutral in that it would clearly aid Germany), his advocacy of peace and non-involvement paralleled that of the pro-Germans to the point that, in the words of the Washington Herald, "he merely put their views into his own words." Thus the "friends who would die for me" were sprinkled heavily with German-Americans whose interest in neutrality and non-involvement had a somewhat different motive and basis than Bryan's. Perhaps for this reason Oswald Garrison Villard condemned Bryan's act of resignation as "embarrassing" to the government, and Brand Whitlock had the rare experience of being one with Theodore Roosevelt in feeling that "Bryan's action in resigning is that of a mucker - if any one cares for my opinion on the subject."

Wilson won his contest with the German Foreign Office on the Lusitania question, at least for a time. For reasons relating more to the higher strategy of the war than the skill or persuasiveness of Wilson's diplomatic representations, the German Admiralty ordered its U-boat commanders not to torpedo passenger vessels. Germany did not, of course, accept the President's principles. On the contrary, the Reich merely agreed to postpone violating them, a fact

82Villard, Fighting Years, 275; The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 165. Pacifist Villard later confessed his error and announced happily that Bryan "forgave me for my mistake." Villard, Fighting Years, 276; see also Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, June 17, 1915, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 937.
Wilson clearly understood. As O'Loughlin correctly pointed out, "Germany and Austria-Hungary have not abandoned their submarine warfare; they have not agreed to live up to the spirit of the principles of humanity and international law."

It was partly the recognition of this fact that lay behind the Gore-McLemore Resolution. Brought forward in February, 1916, the resolution was a model of simplicity. Since it incorporated no suggestion of a penalty for disobedience, the resolution was little more than an announcement that there was a war in Europe and a request that it would be advisable, in the interests of American non-involvement, if American citizens refrained from taking passage on belligerent vessels. In spite of its innocuousness the resolution soon became the center of bitter controversy. The predominantly middle western Bryan-La Follette peace progressives, and some middle western progressive Republicans were strongly in favor of it. But so were many middle western and southern isolationists in both parties, men without progressive ties. Democrats who sponsored the measure and pushed it most vigorously in Congress in the face of Presidential opposition, were not in the progressive wing of the party. Thus Joseph P. Tumulty explained to Wilson that "Underlying this resolution is a purpose to discredit your leadership, for the forces that are lined up for this fight against you are the anti-preparedness crowd, the Bryan-Kitchin-

83 O'Loughlin, Imperiled America, 176; see also Norman Hapgood, The Advancing Hour, 237.
Clark group, and some of the anti-British Senators...." Indeed, progressive Democrats aided by some eastern progressive Republicans consistently upheld Wilson's insistence that he would not "consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect," because it would "make everything this government has attempted and achieved during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile."

In many ways, the fight for the McLemore Resolution produced a temporary alliance of peace progressives, middle western progressive Republicans and middle western and southern isolationists whose politics were conservative. Beaten on preparedness and commercial expansion, loans and credits to belligerents, and arms embargo, the opposition of the peace progressives was in the nature of a major effort to reverse policies which they felt could lead only to war. And for Democratic opposition to the President, support of the McLemore Resolution represented a conservative challenge to Wilson's progressive leadership within the party. In sum, sectional and political considerations in the McLemore debate probably outweighed any ideological progressive-conservative juxtaposition that might be attached to it.

Admittedly, there were some peace progressive Democrats who had difficulty joining such a polyglot movement against the President. As Warren Worth Bailey phrased it:

84 Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, N.Y., 1921), 204-205.
85 Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 489.
I think I have a right to travel on the high seas, but not if in so doing I endanger the rights of the American people, as would be the case were I to take passage in an armed belligerent merchantman sailing into the zone of danger and falling a victim to an enemy submarine. My act would endanger the safety of the nation....I have thanked God for Woodrow Wilson....I am the last man to do anything to hamper the President in safeguarding the interests of the country. He is my President. He is the leader of my party. I sat in the Baltimore convention and voted for him 46 times. I have supported him earnestly in all his great work since taking office, except in so far as it has related to increased armament, which I think unnecessary and dangerous....This country is for peace. It loves Woodrow Wilson because he has stood for peace....[but] my own people [constituents] seem to be almost a unit in favor of restraining Americans from taking passage on armed belligerent merchant vessels....

Republican peace progressives were involved in no such soul-searching. Men like Cooper, Lindbergh and Works attacked the Administration savagely with a variety of arguments in support of the McLeomore Resolution. Wisconsin's Cooper, ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, condemned Wilson for "recklessly insisting upon the exercise of a doubtful legal right." Lindbergh interpreted all opposition to the resolution as a manifestation of the Wall Street plot to involve the United States in the war. Urging that Americans stay off belligerent merchant ships, the Minnesota Congressman charged that if the resolution passed "none but moral cowards,


thoughtless persons or scheming speculators willing to take the risk for big profits, will travel on these ships. No American worthy of the name will by any unnecessary act, jeopardize the welfare of a hundred million fellow Americans."

Whatever the merits of these arguments, Wilson had enough votes to kill the McLemore Resolution (276 to 142 in the House, 68 to 14 in the Senate) and ensure the continued commitment of the Democracy to a foreign policy emphasizing not only commercial expansion but the rights of man on the high seas.

Throughout these debates Wilson, and those progressives in both parties who supported him, were always careful to make a distinction between German violations of America's maritime neutral rights and violations by England. For the British were also impinging on United States' rights in their policy of stopping and searching American ships bound for neutral ports. Not infrequently were United States vessels hauled into British ports and searched for contraband.

89For the roll call see Ibid., 3465; 3720 (Mar. 3;7, 1916). The bulk of Wilson's opposition was sectionally middle western, crossing progressive-conservative lines. Augustus P. Gardner and Knute Nelson were outstanding Republican progressives supporting Wilson; Representatives Tavenner and Bailey, both Democrats with strong pacifist leanings, deserted the Administration. Claude Kitchin, surprisingly, supported the President. In the Senate, Borah, who had demanded a strong stand on the Lusitania disaster, reversed his position and joined with progressive Republicans Clapp, Cummins, Gronna, La Follette, Norris and Works in opposing the Administration. See also Martin W. Odland, The Life of Knute Nelson, 258-259; O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 181; Ray Allen Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," loc. cit., 55. Congressional sentiment for the McLemore Resolution centered heavily in the middle west.
Even American mail was tampered with. But this behavior, while insulting and frustrating, cost no American lives, only expensive delays in the dispatch of commodities abroad, and this essential difference was stressed over and over by progressives committed to the Anglo-French struggle against German autocracy.

Peace progressives like Claude Kitchin and William Jennings Bryan, however, could see no distinctions. To them, it appeared that the President was holding Germany to one set of standards and Britain to another that was much less rigid. Bryan's conversion to this critical view was somewhat belated. Prior to his resignation from the Cabinet he had forcefully argued that "the American people cannot regard the holding up of merchandise by Great Britain in the same light that they regard the taking of life by the sinking of the Lusitania," an attitude that was adopted and maintained somewhat more consistently by the President and the progressives who supported his economic foreign policy. "I have no doubt whatever," wrote Representative Gardner, "that history will draw a very clear distinction between the savagery with which Germany...has repeatedly violated our rights as human beings, and the recklessness...with which Great Britain has violated our rights as traders."

90Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 47-48; Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 198.
91Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan, 377; see also Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 413; O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 192-195; Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America, 354-355; Lane to John C. Burns, Jan. 22, 1915, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 164.
92Gardner to Mrs. ____, Dec. 9, 1915, Some Letters of Augustus P. Gardner, 94; see also Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 210.
In the final analysis, however, "our rights as human beings," related as they were to "our rights as traders," would soon cost America a war, a war which American progressives would enthusiastically endorse.
CHAPTER VIII

THE ROAD TO WAR

Throughout 1915-1916 the American progressives and the nation at large were primarily concerned with the war-related problems of commercial expansion, maritime neutral rights, peace and preparedness. Save for the insistent demand of the peace progressives for "real preparedness," the imperatives of further domestic reform were largely subordinate to foreign policy questions. Only with the approach of the campaign of 1916 did it become evident that Wilson had not wholly abandoned domestic reform in favor of the rights of man abroad. Thus as the controversies over peace and preparedness approached a climax in 1916, Wilson launched the final phase of progressive reform on the national level.

In rapid order the President threw his prestige and power behind federal bills to provide credits for farmers, workmen's compensation, the prohibition of child labor and the suspension of the anti-trust laws so that manufacturers engaged in the export trade could legally combine together for the purposes of extending American commerce abroad. Not only did these moves toward "real preparedness" serve to attract Democratic and Republican peace progressives to the Democracy and minimize their growing antagonism toward the President on the military preparedness and freedom of the seas issues, but the new reform legislation placed under Democratic auspices much that remained of the reform demands of the 1912 Bull Moose
platform. Consequently, as the conventions approached the Progressive party was forced to emphasize foreign policy questions almost exclusively. Given a lack of domestic political issue, this emphasis took the form of a blood-and-thunder attack on Wilson's diplomacy so intemperate that it helped drive the La Follette-Bryan peace progressives straight into the camp of the Democracy.

On January 11, 1916, the Progressive National Committee laid down the Bull Moose line for the coming campaign with the charge that

the Wilson Administration has repudiated the faith of our forefathers which made the American flag the sufficient protection of an American citizen around the world. It has suffered American men, women and children to be slaughtered in Mexico and on the high seas, American property to be destroyed and American liberty to travel and trade to be subject to the arbitrary and lawless coercion of foreign belligerents....It first among American administrations has shown the supine spirit, whose sure consequence is the contempt of the world.1

These were the themes that Roosevelt spelled out during his middle western speaking tour in April and May. It seems clear that the Colonel had his eyes set on no smaller game than the Republican nomination, and to further this ambition he sought to stir the martial emotions of the people with a heady mixture of Americanism and

1Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 226-229.

The editors of The New Republic pointed out that "the whole record of (Democratic legislation) ignores and defies the Jeffersonian tradition. Its tendency is to use Hamiltonian administrative nationalism in the interest of a democratic social policy which is, of course, precisely what the Progressives proposed to do four years ago. The Progressive party is dead, but its principles are more alive than ever, because they are to a greater extent embodied in the official organization of the nation." The New Republic, VIII (Sept. 2, 1916), 104.

preparedness. At Kansas City he declared that under the Hague Convention of 1907 the United States had both a moral and legal duty to go to the aid of Belgium in 1914, and he condemned the President for refusing to organize American military and industrial strength and "use it for righteousness." When the war in Europe is over, warned Roosevelt, "it is possible that some of the combatants, being fully armed will assail us because we offer ourselves as a rich and helpless prize." At Chicago he argued that Wilson's effort "to placate outside nations by being neutral between right and wrong" was a pacifist policy dictated by commercial considerations, a policy which sought to "make right helpless before might...and turn the Goddess of Liberty into a pacifist female huckster, clutching a bag of dollars which she has not the courage to guard against aggression." And at Detroit Roosevelt lashed out at the German-Americans, a popular target in all of his 1916 speeches, by charging flatly that the "polito-racial hyphen is the breeder of moral treason. One of the most sinister developments of the last twenty-two months has been the fact that a section of the professional German-Americans has joined the pacifists in the effort to keep America helpless, while...lauding German militarism to the skies...."

5Ibid., 15-16.
6Ibid., 46-47. On the anti-hyphenism of Progressives, see John C. O'Loughlin, Imperiled America, 33-34.
The Bull Moose emphasis on a more red-blooded foreign policy in early 1916 had, as we have seen, a definite bearing on Wilson's vigorous reaction to the Santa Isabel massacre and his conversion to moderate preparedness. But it also seems clear that Roosevelt's assault on the Administration in April and May convinced many Republican peace progressives that, compared with the Colonel, Wilson was truly a man of peace. While old-line Bull Moosers like William Roscoe Thayer applauded the Roosevelt attack, hoping that it would "restore the backbone to this country which Wilson and Bryan have reduced to a jellyfish," many peace progressives agreed with Lincoln Steffens that "There's a passion back of Roosevelt, rage, war-hates, crazy patriotism, and it's hard to tell what the mob will do when the mob spirit is high....I expect to see him get the nomination." For the peace progressives, of course, Roosevelt had only contempt. "I cheerfully forfeited the good will of these men of the David Starr Jordan and Jane Addams type of native-American Progressive," he wrote Lodge.

Despite Wilson's hope that the Colonel would gain the Republican nomination, feeling sure that he could "lick Roosevelt on the war issue," the G.O.P. convention in Chicago named Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes as the Republican nominee. Hughes,

a man of modest progressive sentiments, had long been out of touch
with the politics of progressivism. Nor were his foreign policy
views known. Consequently, from the point of view of the Repub-
lican progressives, mainly those who followed La Follette, the high
point of the June convention was not the nomination of Hughes but
the Wisconsin Senator's attempt to get a platform adopted that re-
lected his fear of the foreign policy views of both Roosevelt and
Wilson.

Three months earlier, in March, 1916, La Follette had won
the North Dakota preferential primary on a program calling for gov-
ernment ownership of munitions plants, an arms embargo and "a con-
ference of neutral nations to cooperate for peace among nations and
to consider the establishment of an international tribunal for the
settlement of international disputes." Convinced that there was
strong popular support for such a program La Follette submitted
these proposals to the Republican Platform Committee. In addition,
he demanded an immediate conference of neutral nations to mediate the
European war, a law providing for a popular referendum prior to an
American declaration of war, an end to the "un-American and undemo-
cratic secret diplomacy" of the Administration and a termination of

11Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925 (New York,
1930), III, 51-68; 281-288; Henry L. Stoddard, Presidential Sweep-
stakes (New York, 1948), 156; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Pro-
gressive Era, 231; Benjamin P. DeWitt, The Progressive Movement,
William Allen White, Autobiography, 530.
12Belle Case and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 562.
Wilsonian "Dollar Diplomacy" in Latin America. While it is doubtful that these principles commanded as much popular enthusiasm as La Follette seemed to think, they certainly summed up the attitudes of most of the peace progressives on American foreign policy as the campaign got underway.

On one major point, however, La Follette shifted ground. He advanced significantly toward the theory of peace held by most progressives when he recommended that

To compose the differences of nations and to maintain World peace, we favor the creation of an international Tribunal to which shall be referred for final settlement, all issues between nations, and upon the establishment of such a Tribunal we favor action by our government toward general disarmament of the nations of the World; and that an adequate International Army and Navy be maintained under the command of such Tribunal to enforce its decrees....

As might have been expected, the convention dismissed the La Follette proposals out of hand. Instead, Borah and Lodge collaborated to produce a Republican foreign policy plank designed to mean all things to all men. The platform called vaguely for protection of American rights "by land and sea," demanded something called "straight and honest neutrality," favored "adequate" preparedness, and blamed Wilson for the revolutionary chaos in Mexico. On the domestic scene, the G.O.P. claimed that it too favored rural credits and child labor legislation. These vague platform provisions, which

- Ibid., 413-413. (Emphasis supplied.)
- Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, 172.
clearly repudiated the spirit and substance of Roosevelt's foreign policy speeches in April and May, were designed to woo both the German-American vote and that of middle western isolationists and peace progressives. Thus in an attempt to assuage Republican isolationist sentiment in the middle west on the one hand and lure Roosevelt Progressives back into the G.O.P. on the other, the convention produced a platform that was, in the words of one prominent Republican, "by common consent...a sorry document...both in literary style, in progressiveness and in definiteness."

While the Republican convention deliberated over its platform and nominations, the Progressive convention, also meeting in Chicago, worked long hours to persuade the G.O.P. leaders to nominate Roosevelt as a coalition candidate on which both parties could unite. While these fruitless negotiations proceeded, the Bull Moose brought forward a platform which demanded social, industrial and military preparedness, criticized Wilsonian diplomacy as nerveless, and endorsed the idea of world peace through force, a navy second to Britain's, a Regular Army of 250,000 and peacetime compulsory military training. Only one paragraph was devoted to further domestic social reform, a general statement to the effect that "A nation to survive must stand for the principles of social and industrial justice.

17 Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years (New York, 1939), 256.
We have no right to expect loyalty from an oppressed class. . . . A country must be worth living in to be worth fighting for."

From the point of view of domestic liberalism, the Progressive platform was a distinct step toward amalgamation with the G.O.P. It was, of course, predicated on the hope that both parties could unite on Roosevelt as the joint nominee. Indeed, the Colonel had advised his followers at the Bull Moose convention to stick to Americanism, preparedness and efficiency and avoid a "mass of resolutions, however sound, about social and industrial justice to which no human being at the moment will pay the slightest attention." This they did, and when Senator Lodge surveyed the handiwork of the Progressive Resolutions Committee, he decided that Republicans and Bull Moose "could stand equally well on each other's platforms."

Amalgamation, however, could not be achieved with the Progressive party in the field, and Roosevelt had no intention of leading another schismatic Bull Moose crusade to nowhere in particular. First he suggested that the Progressives nominate the conservative Henry Cabot Lodge as the candidate best suited to encourage a fusion ticket. The Progressives were properly horrified at the suggestion, insisting that only the Rough Rider was qualified to lead the party. Consequently, when the Republicans finally rejected the idea of Roosevelt as a fusion candidate and selected Hughes, the Progressives

20 Roosevelt to Dwight E. Heard, Apr. 17, 1916, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 1083.
21 Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 348.
angrily retaliated by again nominating the Colonel on a third party
ticket. To the considerable shock of some Bull Moose leaders Roose­
velt flatly refused the honor and urged the Progressives to support
Hughes. The convention was stunned. Amid cries of treason and be­
trayal, the Progressive party disintegrated. "I think," said Albert
J. Beveridge, "that history has not one single example of a party...
used so coldbloodedly and wrecked so cynically and selfishly."

While leading Bull Moose Progressives were trying to make
up their separate minds on what to do about the "betrayal" at Chi­
ca­go, the Democrats met in St. Louis, optimistic in the know­ledge that
the Republican-Progressive split was still not healed. Wilson in­
structed party managers en route to the convention to emphasize the
Americanism theme and give frequent evidence of the Democracy's loy­
ality to the flag.

Unfortunately, Wilson's strategy to remind the delegates
of fatherland and flag went unpredictably astray. Former New York
Governor Martin H. Glynn's keynote speech emphasizing preparedness
and 100-percent Americanism produced little response among the dele­
gates until he began citing precedents under Washington, Adams, Jeff­
erson, Van Buren and Pierce in which America had been provoked to
war but had remained at peace. At the end of each example, Glynn

22 Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 490; see al­
ters of Brand Whitlock, I, 198; Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting
Years, 316; Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 1074; Stoddard, As I Knew
Them, 448.
shouted, "But we didn't go to war. We didn't go to war!" Suddenly, the convention became electric with enthusiasm. "Repeat it....Say it again!" the delegates screamed. Panicky party managers hastily scribbled a note to Glynn urging him to point out that America was "willing to fight if necessary," but the Governor ignored it. In the press section Bryan was observed weeping with emotion as Glynn continued to recite the past victories of peace. The crowd obviously wanted more, and with the convention completely out of hand, Kentucky's Senator Ollie James gave it to them:

Four years ago they sneeringly called Woodrow Wilson the schoolteacher; then his class was assembled within the narrow walls of Princeton College. They were the young men of America. Today he is the world teacher, his class is made up of kings, kaisers, czars, princes and potentates. (Applause.) The confines of the schoolroom circle the world. (Applause.) His subject is the protection of American life and American rights under international law (Applause.), the saving of neutral life, the freedom of the seas....without orphaning a single American child, without the shedding of a single drop of blood, he wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded above a battlefield an acknowledgment of American rights and an agreement to American demands.

"Repeat it, repeat it!" shouted the delegates. It was a stampede for peace.

The peace craze exhibited at the convention materialized in the campaign slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War," which was confidently written into the Democratic platform. Apparently originating in 25 Robert Woolley's Publicity Department, the slogan tended to obscure the implications of Wilson's earlier promise of "strict ac-

24 Baker, Wilson, VI, 251-253.
25 Ibid., 257; William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years, 385.
countability." Without question, this disturbed the President. On one occasion he told Secretary of the Navy Daniels, "I can't keep the country out of war. They talk of me as though I were a god. Any little German lieutenant can put us into the war at any time by some calculated outrage." On another occasion he stormed into Woolley's office in a rage, charging his campaign managers with "deliberately giving the impression that my policy is one of unchangeable neutrality, no matter what arises. And yet in speech after speech I have made it plain that the day may come when we may be forced to fight."

Likewise, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Campaign Manager Vance McCormick that at any moment a German submarine attack could drive America into the war. Fine, answered McCormick, in effect; if the United States were forced into war under such conditions the re-election of Wilson would be beyond doubt. In sum, the popular response to "He Kept Us Out of War," was too positive to be watered down by the consciences of Wilson and Lansing. So after a respectful pause, Woolley and the Publicity Department went back to the slo-

26 Baker, Wilson, VI, 258.
27 George Creel, Rebel at Large, 155. Wilson had had this to say on the point: "Suppose...some nation should invade our right. What then?...it may be necessary to use the force of the United States." In another place the President said: "...no nation must doubt that (American) forces are gathered and organized in the interest of just, righteous and humane government." Baker, Wilson, VI, 274. In his acceptance speech Wilson argued that "no nation can any longer remain neutral as against any willful disturbance of the peace of the world." The New Republic thought this Wilson's most important doctrinal statement because the idea was "the basis of organized peace in the world." See The New Republic, VIII (Sept. 16, 1916), 151.
28 Baker, Wilson, VI, 244;264.
gan with full force. Wilson did not protest again.

The reaction of the Bryan-La Follette progressives to the sudden peace emphasis of the Democrats was enthusiastic. Not only were Wilson's Mexican complications being resolved short of general war, but from a practical standpoint the peace progressives had nowhere else to go politically. Certainly the Republicans offered little that was progressive. In any event, they threw themselves into the Wilson campaign with vigor. Bryan, who a scant six months earlier had accused Wilson of "joy-riding with the jingo" because the President advocated moderate preparedness, now stumped the country pleading for his reelection because he "kept us out of war." William Kent deserted the G.O.P. and headed the Woodrow Wilson Independent League. Jane Addams rose from a sick bed to campaign for the President. George Foster Peabody contributed $10,000 to the party coffers and worked long hours for the cause. And in Wisconsin when the Democrats claimed flatly that the reelection of Wilson meant keeping the United States out of war, La Follette obliquely endorsed the claim by refusing to assist Hughes in any way. "Peace at any price!" shouted Mrs.

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29 Creel, Rebel at Large, 155-156.
Fremont Older as she toured California for Wilson.

The Democracy embraced every opportunity to encourage the defection of the peace progressives from the G.O.P. and the Bull Moose, and for this effort progressive Democrat George Creel struck exactly the right note when he charged that "the intelligence that conceived the preparedness madness...[was] that mysterious, titanic thing that is variously referred to as high finance, big business, special privilege, or Wall Street."

At the same time that the predominantly Republican peace battalion reported for duty under the Wilson banner, the Democrats launched a determined attempt to capture the support of disillusioned Bull Moose. Emphasizing the conservatism of Hughes, the domestic progressive accomplishments of Wilson and the cynicism of the Colonel's betrayal at Chicago, this appeal was not without reward. Indeed,

30Marle B. Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 236; Elizabeth T. Kent, William Kent, 286; Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 57-58; Louise Ware, George Foster Peabody, 179; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, 581-582; Evelyn Wells, Fremont Older, 291. Early in the campaign La Follette announced that "the nomination of Mr. Justice Hughes will be acceptable to the great body of progressive Republicans in this country....He was not the choice of the reactionary element which formed the platform and otherwise controlled the Convention." The Progressive Party: Its Record. January-July, 1916, 151. While this statement was widely featured in G.O.P. and Progressive campaign propaganda, La Follette's second thoughts on the matter led him quietly to support Wilson, as he had in 1912.

an organization called the "Committee of Progressives Formed to Promote the Reelection of President Wilson" sprang up, and a few days before the election eleven of the nineteen members of the Progressive party Platform Committee announced for Wilson on the basis of their observation that twenty-two of the thirty-three planks in the 1912 Bull Moose platform had become law under the President. Thus throughout the summer and fall, progressive leaders of all shades of opinion announced for Wilson. The appeal of "He Kept Us Out of War," combined with the vagueness of Hughes on foreign policy and the fact that the G.O.P. offered little in the way of a constructive pro-

33President Wilson a True Progressive: His Record is Progressive. His Thought is Progressive. His Aims are Progressive. Is It Not the Duty of All Progressives of the Great 1912 Movement to Support President Wilson as a Progressive? (n.p., Committee of Progressives Formed to Promote the Re-election of President Wilson, 1916), 1-15; Baker, Wilson, VI, 286.

gressive program, guided the migration. "We got a good many of them," recalled Norman Hapgood, "mostly on the proof that Mr. Wilson was more radical than Mr. Hughes."

In addition to the argument for Wilson's liberalism, he was extolled as a man of peace, but a man whose support of naval and merchant marine expansion evidenced his interest both in moderate preparedness and an increase in foreign trade. He was also pictured as a President who had proved his "devotion to democratic ideals" by deposing Huerta, the "drunken, brutal assassin wet with the blood of his benefactor," and upholding American rights on the high seas without resort to war in either case.

While it was clear throughout the campaign that the peace...
progressives were flocking to Wilson, the Republicans made every effort to prevent a stampede of embittered Bull Moose to the President. In most respects this was successful. William Allen White's September, 1916, estimate that only twenty-five percent of the top Bull Moose leadership was supporting Wilson was reasonably accurate. Thus, in spite of significant Bull Moose desertions to the Democracy - Bainbridge Colby, Victor Murdock, Ben Lindsey, Edward Costigan and Ray Stannard Baker among others - a majority of the prominent leaders of the Progressive party followed Roosevelt back into the G.O.P. The alliance was finally sealed with the appointment of six Progressives to the Republican National Committee, a fifteen-man group dominated by standpatters and reactionaries. In this wise was amalgamation finally consummated - with the cannibals swallowing the missionaries.

The problem of returning gracefully to a Republican party obviously dominated by the standpatters was one that many of the Progressive leaders had to face and their rationalizations were of wide variety and scope. William Allen White decided that "The whole trouble with our humanitarian platform...is that it hit war. Kaiser Bill blew it up. You cannot get humanitarian progress on the first page


when humanitarian retrogression is occupying the headlines. You cannot get people interested in minimum wages and laws for hours of service and equitable railroad rates in the face of news from Verdun."

Convinced that the times were out of joint, White announced for Hughes. Likewise, Raymond Robins suffered sharp intellectual torments before he renounced a leaning toward Woodrow Wilson and finally endorsed Hughes. He decided that the Republican party was by far a better vehicle for future progressivism than the Democratic party. He felt that the party of Wilson was dominated by southern reactionaries; that it was "individualistic in its thinking, sectional in its sympathies, and inherits a tradition against common labor as servile"; and that its social organization was "semi-patriarchal." But foreign policy questions concerned Robins most. The Democratic peace crusade clearly disturbed him, as it did many other Progressives who finally gravitated to Hughes:

We need [said Robins] universal service and military training of the youth of America [which will] break down class and sectional prejudice...unify the diverse groups of our national life in a vital Americanism....We need a comprehensive foreign policy that will accept the facts of the world situation and our obligations under the Monroe Doctrine; the open door in China; and the Exclusion Acts; and prepare adequately to maintain our right part in the world movement, advancing the democratic purpose and human interests in the international field as against the domination of privilege, autocracy and militarism. Can these imperative national needs be worked out by a states rights Democratic Party that plans a state-dominated militia with its menace of shiftless incompetence, spoils politics and organized snobbery as a national de-

fense force, at a time of world peril?...Comprehending
our national necessities, how can a Progressive hesitate
long to choose between the party of nationalism and the
party of sectionalism? For myself, I gladly enlist with
the great majority of the Progressives under the leader-
ship of Charles Evans Hughes.40

Like Robins, many of the more militant Progressives feared
the lack of aggressiveness in Wilson's preparedness and foreign poli-
cy programs. The National Hughes Alliance, on whose executive coun-
cil sat such Progressives as Roosevelt, Beveridge, Bonaparte, Herbert
S. Hadley, Robins, Rosenwald, Stimson and Straus, emphasized this
theme continually in its propaganda:

We are not a political party; we have no partisan ends to
serve; we are interested in no political party....Are you

130-131. Various other reasons were given by Progressives who
made the trip to Canossa. Beveridge decided it was Hughes' "trustworthiness and straightforwardness." William Roscoe Thayer
said he would vote the Republican ticket "for the first time in my
life" because he wanted to "recover our national honor and self-
respect." Ickes said that since he had favored Hughes in 1908 he
could, after Roosevelt's removal, "adhere to Hughes with a clear
conscience." Moorfield Storey supported Hughes because Wilson
"stands for injustice to the Negroes" and for "vacillation in
foreign policy." George Harvey and Julius Rosenwald both an-
nounced for Hughes because they felt he was more preparedness-
minded than Wilson. Lyman Abbott shifted easily from Roosevelt
to Hughes because of the "weak" foreign policy of Wilson in Mexi-
co and on the Lusitania sinking. Gardner supported Hughes be-
cause "if Wilson is elected, it will mean nothing more or less
than the triumph of pusillanimity." For similar reasons George
Perkins, Chester H. Rowell, Henry L. Stimson, Herbert S. Hadley
and Oscar S. Straus all supported Hughes. See Bowers, Beveridge
10, 1916, The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 286-287; Ickes,
The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon, 179; Storey to Wilbur L. Cross,
Oct. 9, 1916, in M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Moorfield Storey, 313; Wil-
lie F. Johnson, George Harvey, 242-243; M. R. Werner, Julius Ros-
enwald, 179; Ira V. Brown, Lyman Abbott, 218; Gardner to His
Daughter, Oct. 29, 1916, Some Letters of Augustus P. Gardner,
107; Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, II, 268.
satisfied that our flag flies as proudly as once it did when it meant protection to American citizens? Are you satisfied with a Chief Executive who is 'Too Proud to Fight'? ... You are not – no red-blooded American can be.

... Is your conscience as a citizen to be stilled with the lullaby, "We have kept out of war"? We believe in the election of Charles E. Hughes if for no other reason than that the present administration must not be returned to power ... every American with a backbone in his anatomy feels the need of a resolute hand at the helm.41

The impression indirectly conveyed by all this was that the Progressive-Republican coalition was ready and willing to march to war when the election was won. This made Hughes' campaign strategy extremely difficult. He could say little that the diverse elements in the G.O.P. might agree upon. As David F. Houston described his dilemma, "He had the impossible task of attempting to coordinate the incongruous. He had too many mental and emotional patterns to match, and, like the chameleon which tried at the same instant to match all the colours of a crazy quilt, he blew up."42

To help the Republican explosion George Creel constructed a series of barbed questions which were hurled at Hughes and the Republicans throughout the campaign: Would you have gone to war to help Belgium in 1914? Would you have severed diplomatic relations with Germany after the Lusitania sinking? Do you favor an embargo on munitions to the Allies? Would you have recognized Huerta? Are you in favor of military intervention in Mexico? If you oppose the Shipping


42 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, I, 212–213; II, 268.
Bill does it mean you favor ship subsidies? Will you repeal the Clayton Anti-Trust Act? Do you still oppose the income tax amendment? Do you believe in paying for preparedness out of taxes on incomes, inheritances and munitions? Do you favor equal suffrage? "Of course," recalled Creel, "he did not attempt a reply, for every question was packed with dynamite. Whether he answered affirmatively or negatively, thousands of votes were bound to be lost."

Hughes tried to save votes by saying little that was precise on any major controversial issue. He particularly avoided the neutrality question. Fearful that the peace emphasis of the Democracy would prove seductive to those German-Americans whose hopes for a German victory over Britain rested on American non-intervention, Hughes and the G.O.P. strategists attempted to hold the normally Republican German-American vote by being as vague and non-controversial as possible on the neutrality issue. This approach was admittedly successful in the sense that the German-American Alliance and the German-language press in the United States supported the Hughes' candidacy. "We favor," said the Chicago Abendpost bluntly in its endorsement of

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43Creel, Rebel at Large, 153-154.
Hughes, "a policy that will be advantageous of Germany."

But the strategy of minimizing controversy on issues near and dear to German-Americans was complicated by Roosevelt and other former Bull Moose Progressives whose concept of a vigorous Americanism and the forceful maintenance of the maritime neutral rights policy permitted no truckling to hyphenism. Harold Ickes, for example, who was supported Hughes because Wilson "set his face so solemnly against intervention," was distressed at rumors of a Republican deal with the German-American Alliance that had produced a public endorsement of Hughes by a group of German-American Lutheran clergymen, and he wondered in dismay whether he had inadvertently cast his lot with a "man who would permit the Kaiser to overrun Belgium, France and England and do nothing to stop him." Indeed, it was difficult for the

45George D. Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 55-59. Herron prints extended editorial excerpts from ten German-language papers in the United States. All favored the election of Hughes as a step toward "true" neutrality, an end to munitions exports and a general "wallowing in blood money."


47Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon, 186;187-188. Walter Lippmann was also distressed. He concluded that Hughes was nominated as a "drag-net for all possible anti-Wilson votes" and that the drag-net sought to catch the Republican organization, the Roosevelt Republicans, the homeless progressives, the upper-class pro-Ally vote, the pro-German vote, the suffrage vote and the anti-Carranza Catholic vote. Lippmann, "The Puzzle of Hughes," loc. cit., 210. For the influence of the German-American issue in the campaign see White, Autobiography, 530. For an analysis of the interrelationship of the campaign with the peace, preparedness and German-American issues on the state level see Ernest L. Bogart and John M. Matthews, The Centennial History of Illinois: The Modern Commonwealth, 1893-1918 (Springfield, Ill., 1920), V, 454; Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio (New York, 1934), 474-476. It was the opinion of German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff that "If Hughes is defeated, he has Roosevelt to thank for it." Quoted in Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 244.
G.O.P. to appease the German-American vote on the one hand and at the same time conduct the sort of campaign Fiorello La Guardia made for Congress in New York where he "dismembered the Hapsburg Empire and liberated all the subjugated countries under that dynasty almost every night."

In spite of the cautious approach of Hughes, some of the Progressives smote Wilson's "weak" policy in Mexico and his "Too Proud to Fight" reaction to the Lusitania sinking with such vigor that the Republican-Progressive coalition seemed to take on the character of a "war party." In Wisconsin, for example, Democratic candidates charged flatly that "a vote for Hughes means war; a vote for Wilson, peace." While Hughes did not associate himself with this uncompromising truculence, he did little to bring it under control. Actually, neither Hughes nor Roosevelt could be persuaded that the Democratic emphasis on peace had great political appeal in the west,

50 La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 583; see also McAdoo, Crowded Years, 385; Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota, 331-332. Hughes was soon on the defensive: "A vote for me is not a vote for war. It is a vote for lasting peace. It is a vote for the maintenance of American rights on land and sea, throughout the world." Baker, Wilson, VI, 289; see also Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 243-244.
and at no time did the G.O.P. effectively counter the impression conveyed by some of the Progressives that a vote for Hughes would bring a sharp swing toward belligerence in American foreign policy. George Creel had warned the voters that the "dead children of the Lusitania will be dragged from the ocean bed, and the bodies of Villa's victims loaded upon campaign carts for oratorical purposes." They were.

In contrast with Hughes, Wilson refused to pussyfoot on the neutrality issue or cater to hyphenate pressure. When Irish-American leader Jeremiah A. O'Leary of the American Truth Society tried to force the President to promise that if reelected he would begin to uphold American neutral rights against Britain as vigorously as he had against Germany, Wilson shot back one of the most quoted sentences of the campaign: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."

If one factor can be said to have contributed most positively to the narrow victory Wilson won in 1916, that factor was understandably the peace issue, particularly in those western states where women had the vote. In addition, the Democratic emphasis on peace and

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52 Creel, Wilson and the Issues, 3.
53 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 247; Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 1099.
non-involvement in Europe helped Wilson to cut into Hughes' majorities in many German-American districts, and it certainly brought him thousands of the socialist votes cast for Debs in 1912. By tacking sharply toward the attitude of the Republican peace progressives on war and "real preparedness," Wilson attracted their support as well. Indeed, his peace-oriented campaign built a political bridge between the peace progressives and those progressives in both parties who were proponents of commercial expansion, preparedness and a league to enforce peace. Convinced that Wilson's domestic record was truly progressive and that the preparedness and neutral rights policies of the Administration would be continued, progressives with pro-British sympathies also supported the President. To them the conservative Hughes seemed to be the choice of the German-American and Irish-American hyphenates.

55 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 247-251. A. M. Simons charged that the Socialists "on every question...worked with the German-American Alliance" and that many "followed the pacifists" even though "the pacifist movement had also been manipulated in the pro-German direction." Simons also credited Wilsonian domestic progressivism with having attracted many who had voted for Debs in 1912. A. M. Simons, "The Future of the Socialist Party," The New Republic, IX (Dec. 2, 1916), 120.

56 See footnote 30 above; and La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 585.

In sum, the election of 1916 produced a temporary coalition of Wilson progressives, Bull Moose Progressives and La Follette progressives; and with the victory of the Democracy Wilson emerged as the clearly dominant figure in American progressivism. The importance of this fact cannot be overemphasized, because it was in large measure the progressive fusion of late 1916 that enabled Wilson so easily to lead the bulk of the movement into its final ideological phase - the war to end war, save the world for democracy and uphold the rights and dignity of man on the high seas. As William Dudley Foulke explained it in 1922: "In one respect [Wilson's] election was not so serious a misfortune as it seemed at the time, because the anti-war element was greatest in the Democratic Party and could best be controlled by a Democratic President who had sympathized with it...."

58An interesting analysis of middle western voting habits by Edgar E. Robinson in August, 1916, pointed to this. Analyzing the 1908 and 1912 voting on the county level, Robinson concluded that few progressive Republicans had voted for Wilson in 1912. Yet an analysis of roll-call votes in Congress showed that many progressive Republican legislators supported Wilsonian reform in 1913-1914. The growth of foreign policy issues, however, brought the progressive Republican and Bull Moose leadership closer together and helped heal the wounds of 1909-1912. Also by 1914 so many progressive Republican leaders had made their peace with the G.O.P., that by 1916 progressive Republicanism as such was "dead," there being little difference between progressives and standpatters at the leadership level of the G.O.P. The rank and file of Republican progressives eschewed this merger. They supported Wilson reform instead. Robinson saw the middle west as being progressive Republican rather than Bull Moose, and he predicted that large numbers of the progressive Republican rank and file would probably vote for Wilson in 1916 because of their belief that his diplomatic policies were peace-oriented. Edgar E. Robinson, "The Role of the Middle West," The New Republic, VIII (Aug. 5, 1916), 34-35.

Save for the Bryan-La Follette peace progressives, a group which diminished steadily in size, effectiveness and public toleration in the early months of 1917, the American progressive leadership followed Wilson along the last mile of the road to war. Those who opposed the journey were few - only the "little group of willful men" that Wilson publicly scorned. Certainly, after January, 1917, they did not represent the foreign policy sentiment of the American progressives or the country at large.

II

An analysis of progressivism and foreign policy in the period from December, 1916, to April, 1917, must emphasize the futile opposition of the peace progressives to Wilson as he reluctantly, and with grave misgivings, led America to war. To say that few Americans wanted war belabor the obvious. But most Americans, and, as we shall see, most progressives, insisted upon the maintenance of certain maritime neutral rights which Germany would no longer respect, and, in the last resort, they were willing to fight for those rights.

Wilson was convinced that the election of 1916 had been a great popular demonstration for peace. Indeed, he was almost fearful that the country would remain at peace "no matter how many Americans were lost at sea," that the insistence on neutral rights and the retaliatory implications of "strict accountability" had been compromised at the ballot box. Consequently, he turned to the task of

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60 Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 255.
trying to find a formula that might provide the basis for a negotiated peace. In his famous December 18 note to the powers he appealed for an end to the blood bath. He pointed out that neither adversary had been able to crush the other, and that "the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." He called for a clear statement of the minimum war aims of the contestants as a preliminary step toward peace negotiations, and he suggested that implicit in any settlement would be "the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world," an idea which the Democratic party had incorporated in its 1916 platform.

Peace progressives were tremendously encouraged by the President's note. Bryan warmly congratulated his former Chief, and Jane Addams recalled that "for the time being the pacifists were almost popular." But there were those, on the other hand, who objected to equating the war aims of the Allies with those of Germany, and some, particularly Roosevelt and Borah, who seized the opportunity to condemn the league of nations proposal in the note out of hand.

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61 Walter Millis, Road to War, 364-367.
62 Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 238; Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 45; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 261.
63 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1, 218-219; Millis, Road to War, 368; Baker, Wilson, VI, 415-418. The editors of The New Republic hailed the note as "a declaration of our alliance with the liberals of Europe" and rejoiced that "those who have cried for a leadership expression of American idealism and interest have it now." The New Republic, IX (Dec. 30, 1916), 232.
The response of the powers to the December 18 note convinced the President that neither side wanted a peace that would not provide compensation for the blood and treasure expended in twenty-eight months of conflict. Embittered and discouraged by the reaction of governments, Wilson undertook to prepare a direct appeal to the people of the belligerent countries. This, of course, was the well-known "Peace Without Victory" speech delivered in the Senate on January 22, 1917.

Observing again that the war was stalemated, Wilson called for an end to the slaughter and the immediate formation of a new European "community of power" to replace the old "balance of power" system that had periodically reduced the international state system to chaos. The peace which preceded this regeneration of the state system, thought the President, would have to be a "peace without victory" since "only a peace between equals can last." Wilson also assured the people of war-torn Europe that it was "inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in [the] great enterprise," and in clear and forceful language he spelled out for them the dream of a new world order based on American principles:

To take part in such a service [to mankind] will be the opportunity for which [Americans] have sought to prepare themselves...ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might... show mankind the way to liberty....That service is nothing less than this, to aid their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world....If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.... I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but
that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. . . . I am proposing government by the consent of the governed. . . . Freedom of the seas. . . . and. . . moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence. These are American principles, American policies. And they are also the principles. . . . of mankind and must prevail. 64

Despite the obvious idealism in it, progressive reaction to the speech was mixed. Brand Whitlock felt that Wilson had set forth a "new Americanism" which spoke for "the voiceless peoples everywhere"; Walter Weyl announced that with the speech "American isolation ends, not in confusion, but with purpose defined." To Thorstein Veblen the President's remarks were additional evidence to support the view that the Administration was "renouncing national isolation" and becoming "more aggressively pacific," while Wisconsin's Henry A. Cooper was certain that Wilson had propelled the whole subject of American participation in a league of nations into "the very high-

est realm of statesmanship."

On the other hand, there were those progressives who feared anew that a peace without victory combined with American participation in a league of nations would internationalize America's dedication to righteousness, and contribute to a moral disaster for the democratic nations:

You cannot [said George D. Herron] for the sake of shortening the war, wipe the horrors of Belgium from the German slate; nor the destruction of Servia; nor the Armenian massacres and the submarine assassinations. A peace bought with a price so vile would announce nothing less than the moral suicide of the nations....Besides, such a peace would be, in every essential effect, an overwhelming victory for Germany....as the European situation now stands, Germany has won the war; and the peace that the pacifists propose, apparently granting victory to neither side, would leave her in possession of territories and spoils unequalled... by the greatest of ancient empires.66

Theodore Roosevelt agreed. Indeed, his attack on both the league idea and the peace without victory concept was so intense that The New Republic became frankly "skeptical of his title to be considered the undisputed Chief of the Kingdom of Righteousness." Senator Cummins


67Editorial, "Roosevelt and Righteousness," The New Republic, IX (Jan. 13, 1917), 282. The magazine emphasized Roosevelt's earlier dedication to the league to enforce peace idea and charged him with "cheapening great issues for the gratification of personal animosities." Ibid., 283. See also Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 370.
believed that the speech "overflows with just and beautiful sentiments so eternally right that they instantly command the approval of all lovers of humanity," but he too was convinced that the league proposal "involves the denial to any...nation...the right to redress its own wrongs or to maintain its own honor. It contemplates complete crystallization, eternal fixity."

Extended debate on the relative merits of the President's address was cut short by the German announcement on January 31 of a new submarine policy. As of February 1, 1917, Berlin declared, German submarines would sink all belligerent and neutral vessels found in an extensive zone which included the British Isles, France, Italy and the eastern Mediterranean. The Imperial Government agreed, however, to permit one American passenger ship per week to sail to Britain, provided it was painted prominently with red and white stripes. But this "concession" only heightened the intensity of anti-German antagonism that swept America on the heels of the German announcement.

The official United States response to the German declaration was hammered out in a Cabinet meeting on February 2. That the President wished to take no step that might be interpreted as aggressive, indeed, that he searched desperately for some way to rationalize continued American non-intervention, is clear. The Cabinet, however, urged the view that the only honorable course for America to follow would involve, at the very least, the termination of diplo-

68 Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 2231-2232 (Jan. 30, 1917).
69 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, I, 229-230; Lane to George W. Lane, Feb. 9, 1917, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 234.
matics relations with Germany. Thus on the following day, February 3, the President asked the Senate to approve the severance of diplomatic relations with Berlin, and by an overwhelming vote of 78 to 5 the Senate complied. Roosevelt Progressives were overjoyed at this turn of events. "So at last the lost vertebra has been found in the White House," shouted William Roscoe Thayer. "GLORIA IN EXCELSIS! But it is a solemn moment....we have a poor fleet and small army; but perhaps Providence - which has looked after children, drunkards and Americans - will be good to us a little longer. At any rate, the world at last must recognize that we officially uphold honor."

The lop-sided Senate vote was perhaps an accurate indication of American sentiment on the termination of diplomatic relations with Germany. Certainly it reflected the attitudes of most progressives toward Wilson's action. Thus Representative Lenroot of Wisconsin summed up a large body of progressive thinking when he said that the President did only his duty. (Applause.) To have done less would have forfeited any respect the world still had left for us. (Applause.) By her own admission Germany has made herself an outlaw....any people too cowardly to fight for their liberty upon the sea, if need be, will be too cowardly to fight for their liberty upon the land....we will vote to maintain by force, if need be, our liberties upon the sea; but that does not mean that we will vote a general declaration of war against Germany; it does not mean that we will intervene in the European war; it does not mean that we will send our men to the trenches of Europe; it does not mean that we are to sit in and determine the terms of settlement of European questions. It means only that we are going to settle our difficulty with Germany by compel-

70Thayer to Mrs. Michael Foster, Feb. 4, 1917, The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 290; see also Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations, 367-388.
ling her to respect our rights upon the sea. (Applause.) If war must come it will be a war upon the sea, destroying every German submarine that we can and protecting our own ships until such time as Germany shall cease to be an outlaw...when Germany shall again respect our rights our quarrel with her will be over and we will be ready to make peace with her regardless of European nations or European quarrels. (Applause.) ...those who would drag us into this world war for reasons other than maintaining our own rights, and those who are for peace at any price, together, constitute a very small minority. 71

Lenroot's idea of a limited naval war against Germany, one which would be fought irrespective of European power politics, revealed the fact that while most progressives did not want general war, they did want Germany to respect America's maritime neutral rights. For this they were prepared to fight, and regardless of the political slogans of 1916, so were most Americans. Those who favored "peace at any price" were few indeed. But among them were peace progressive Senators Works, Gronna and La Follette, who, together, cast three of the five votes against the resolution breaking off diplomatic relations. La Follette found "all of the Progressive Republicans and Democrats...sick at heart" over the prospect of terminating relations. Gronna, admitting that severance was "probably the only thing left for [Wilson] to do," stated bluntly that he would vote neither for the President's request nor any subsequent war measure, "regardless of whether it is in accordance with the wishes of the people whom I represent and the wishes of the people of this great Nation." Works advocated keeping American ships out of the designated zones even if

71 Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 3529 (Feb. 17, 1917). (Emphasis supplied.) See also Johnson, George Harvey, 248; Baker, Wilson, VI, 459.
it meant losing "a few thousands of dollars."

If La Follette was correct in his observation that "all" of the progressives in Congress were "sick at heart" over the martial implications of terminating diplomatic relations with Germany, then it is also a fact that they were unwilling to speak or vote their convictions. On the other hand, it seems clear that Gronna's defiance of the public will, however irrational that will might have been, and Works' call for commercial embargo were points of view few progressive political leaders were willing to endorse. Indeed, anti-German opinion in the United States and in Congress increased so markedly after February 1, whipped forward as it was by Germany's submarine policy and by news of the deportation of Belgian workers to Germany for forced labor, that few politicians, progressive or otherwise, were willing to stand against the rising tide.

Public opinion in the United States was further inflamed by the release to the press on March 1 of the fantastic Zimmerman note to Mexico wherein Germany promised the Carranza Government recovery of the "lost territories" of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona in return for a Mexican attack on the United States in event of an American-German war. On the strength of the note, which fortified Wilson's conviction that Berlin was serious about implementing the new submarine...
policy against American merchantmen, the President reluctantly asked Congress for legislation to permit the arming of American cargo vessels.

The idea of arming merchant ships had been strongly urged by Secretaries McAdoo, Houston and Lane in Cabinet meetings throughout February. Their argument was that without some show of government support against the submarine menace, American ships were remaining in port, and that goods consigned to Europe were beginning to pile up in American warehouses. Wilson's view, however, transcended the purely commercial. He seems to have regarded an armed neutrality as a last desperate attempt to maintain peace with honor by forcing German respect for American rights under international law. Because of the President's emphasis on the peace with honor feature of armed neutrality, prominent peace progressives like Oswald Garrison Villard, Paul U. Kellogg, Claude Kitchin, Amos Pinchot and Warren North Bailey supported Wilson on the armed ship issue.

Moreover, most progressives in Congress apparently agreed with Republican Irvine Lenroot and Democrat Ollie James when they pointed out that arming American merchant vessels was not in itself an act of war, and that Wilson's request did not visualize the protection of Americans traveling on belligerent munitions ships. James

vigorously advanced the opinion that a "United States merchant vessel
has a right upon the high seas - just as much right as I have to go
down Pennsylvania Avenue," and he castigated those Senators who were
filibustering against the armed ship bill as men "who would deny to
their colleagues, in a time of great stress and peril like this, the
opportunity to vote for legislation to protect American lives and keep
the commerce of the country from being destroyed on the high seas."

The Senate filibuster of the armed ship bill was carried out
by a small group of middle western Republican progressives (Gronna,
Cummins, Clapp, Norris, Works, Kenyon and La Follette), most of them
peace progressives, who were certain that the measure was an irrevoca-
ble step toward war. They were joined by Senators Stone, Lane, Varda-
man and O'Gorman, Anglophobes and isolationists without progressive
ties. Save as a delaying tactic, their cause was hopeless, for de-
spite the opposition of peace progressives like Lindbergh and Cooper,
the House of Representatives had already passed the bill on March 1 by

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76Ibid., 4893 (Mar. 4, 1917); Sen. Irvine Lenroot, Ibid., 4638
(Mar. 1, 1917). For additional progressive support of the armed
ship bill see Roosevelt to John C. O'Laughlin, Mar. 8, 1917, Roo-
sevelt Letters, VIII, 1161; Alfred Lief, Democracy's Norris, 194-
195; Straus, Under Four Administrations, 388; Ray Stannard Baker,
American Chronicle, 289; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I,
600; O'Laughlin, Imperiled America, 177-179; McClure, Obstacles
to Peace, 134;137.
an overwhelming 403 to 14 vote. Thus in the Senate, the little group of "willful men" (as Wilson called them), faced with a public sentiment that Norris later admitted was "almost unanimous in favor of the bill," undertook to thwart the will of the majority by filibuster until the session ended at midnight, March 4. In so doing they abandoned the view of La Follette, expressed a decade earlier, that "In a representative democracy the common judgment of the majority must find expression in the law of the land. To deny this is to repudiate the principles upon which representative democracy is founded."

Under the leadership of La Follette, who controlled and directed the filibuster, the "willful men" condemned what Senator Works termed the "lawlessness of the majority" and revived the thesis that Wilson, a puppet of the munitions makers, was deliberately seeking to involve the United States in a useless and needless war. Arguing

77Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 4691-4692 (Mar. 1, 1917); see also Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 242-243; Lief, Democracy's Norris, 183. An effort led by Henry A. Cooper in the House to return the bill to committee was defeated 293 to 125. Progressives voting for recommittal were Bailey, Cooper, Esch, Kent, Lenroot, Lindbergh, Tavenner, Davis and Stafford, most of them from the middle and far west. Opposed to recommittal were Gallagher, Gardner, Godwin and Kitchin. In general, progressives in the House voted for recommittal along party lines. The final vote on the bill of 403 to 14 found all the House progressives in favor of the measure save Cooper, Davis, Lindbergh, Stafford and Socialist Meyer London. See Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 4691-4692 (Mar. 1, 1917); and Baker, Wilson, VI, 478. An amendment by Cooper to prohibit the arming of munitions ships was defeated 295 to 124 with the same general division that characterized the recommittal effort. See Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, II, 239-240.

78George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 178.

79Torelle, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette, 356-357.
that the timely release of the Zimmerman note was a part of this plot, they charged that the President sought to "coin blood into dollars" (Senator Gronna's phrase), and that arming merchant ships was no less than a declaration of war. Together, they urged that American ships be kept out of war zones and that the idea of freedom of the seas be abandoned.

Whatever the raw political courage manifested in the stand of the La Follette progressives on the armed ship bill, their position was certainly not popular. Castigated by the press as "traitors," "wretches" and "knaves," the vigor of their opposition to Wilson even produced criticism in progressive circles long friendly to them. Louis D. Brandeis, for example, wrote La Follette that his stand was "wrong," and Ray Stannard Baker recalled that he "could not understand how La Follette and the little group of Insurgents...could, with all
the facts in hand, take the position they did. They apparently had no alternative constructive program; not even their own long-time followers were behind them with such unanimity as to warrant the desperate fight they were making.  

With peace progressives like Kitchin, Bailey, Pinchot and Villard supporting armed neutrality as an alternative to war, the question of for whom the "willful men" spoke was indeed a pertinent one.

The victory of La Follette was Pyrrhic. While the filibuster was a success, less than two days after Congress adjourned the President announced that a further examination of the law convinced him that he had the power to arm merchant ships by executive decree. And so it was done, apparently with the overwhelming support of the American people. American commerce would be defended, and the rights of humanity on the high seas would be upheld.

Despite the vigorous activities of the peace progressives throughout February and March, the nation inched closer to war. The redoubled efforts of the American Peace Society and the American Union Against Militarism, combined with the manufacture of new peace fronts like the Anti-War League, the Emergency Peace League and the Committee for Democratic Control (the latter hastily created by Ran-

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82 La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 633; Baker, American Chronicle, 289. One alternative plan was put forth by Rep. Cooper when he argued that not to arm merchant ships "would compel the submarine to rise and capture it or be treated as a pirate. Just simply prevent them from arming, and then the submarine could rise." Cong. Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 3027 (Feb. 10, 1917). The Wisconsin legislator did not elaborate on how this procedure would safeguard freedom of the seas.

83 Norris, Fighting Liberal, 188-189.
dolph Bourne, Max Eastman and Amos Pinchot), were no more effective in reversing this direction than feathers in the teeth of a hurricane.

True, the people of the United States may not have wanted war; but they wanted the maintenance of American rights on the high seas, and Bryan's repeated demands for keeping Americans off belligerent ships and American ships out of war zones fell on ground emotionally and intellectually unfertile.

In the midst of these events, while Wilson waited nervously for the first overt act against an American ship by a German submarine, news of the Russian revolution reached the United States. Hailed on every hand by progressives, conservatives and the public at large, the revolution seemed to clear the ideological air into which the United States was moving. The Tsar, long viewed as the classic symbol of autocracy and despotism by American progressives, was overthrown, and Americans cheered the news that constitutional government had come to Russia.

Brand Whitlock saw the revolution as a "sublime" and "splendid thing," and Newton D. Baker summed up the hopeful reaction of many Americans when he concluded that the "king business" in Europe was "pretty near over." While liberal journals like The Nation, The New

84 Paxton Hibben, The Peerless Leader, 355; Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 241-242; Louis Filler, Randolph Bourne, 104; Arthur C. Cole, "Illinois and the Great War," in Bogart and Matthews, The Centennial History of Illinois, V, 455. Bryan's advocacy of embargo was a desperation measure and marked a significant shift in his view on the point. Up until this period he had believed that embargo would be neutral in that it could only subsidize the German war effort.

Republic and La Follette's Magazine rejoiced over the decline of Nicholas II, the optimistic Edward A. Ross hurried to Russia to be of "practical use to the Russian reform leaders in advising them."

Americans as diverse in their political opinions as Elihu Root, Julius Rosenwald, Sam Gompers and Thorstein Veblen joined in the enthusiastic reception of the stirring news from Russia. To the eminently conservative Root it was but part of the "irresistible movement of the whole world to substitute democracy for autocracy in human government." Rosenwald viewed it as "new era dawning for the Jews in Russia"; and Gompers saw in it the dim beginnings of an unfettered labor movement in Russian economic life. In sum, progressive voices blended with the whole choir of American opinion to proclaim the glad tidings of democracy in Russia.

The precise influence of the Russian Revolution on America's subsequent entry into the European conflict cannot be measured. Certainly in mid-March, 1917, there was none of the sureness later exhibited by some American observers, progressives among them, that the

86 Paul H. Anderson, The Attitude of the American Leftist Leaders Toward the Russian Revolution, 1917-1923 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1942), 79-81; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 640-641; Edward A. Ross, Seventy Years of It, 150. Like Ross, Lincoln Steffens also departed for Russia, convinced that the revolution was the second phase (Mexico was the first) in the great class upheavals that must inevitably spring from the chaos and confusion of the World War. See Steffens to Laura Steffens, Mar. 22;27, 1917, The Letters of Lincoln Steffens, I, 395-397.

87 Elihu Root to Charles R. Flint, Mar. 24, 1917, in America's Message to the Russian People. Addresses by the Members of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to Russia in the Year 1917 (Boston, 1918), 9; M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald, 184; Anderson, Attitude of the American Leftist Leaders Toward the Russian Revolution, 63; Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America, 372.
revolution removed the final ideological barrier to American intervention on the Allied side. Nonetheless, the chronological accident that placed the Russian revolution in the same week that German submarines commenced the sinking of American merchant vessels reinforced the belief, held by many progressives, that the upheaval in Russia and American intervention on the side of the democracies were somehow causally related. Probably the most that can be inferred from the evidence is that the termination of autocracy in Russia made it ideologically less difficult for progressives to endorse Wilson's call to arms two weeks later.

The sinking of the American vessels City of Memphis, Illinois and Vigilancia by German submarines on March 18 brought relations between the United States and Berlin to the final point of showdown. By March 20 the entire Cabinet favored "going to the mat with Germany." But Wilson hesitated. He was still not convinced that the people were solidly behind him, and he had doubts that the American constitutional system could withstand the strain of a military commitment abroad. In a famous interview with Frank Cobb, editor of the New York World, he revealed his fear that the animal instincts in man released by war might well sweep away free speech and free assembly.


89 Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, I, 243-244.
in America. "Once lead this people into war," he argued, "and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance."

However diligently the President searched for a way out - "If there is any alternative, for God's sake, let's take it," he told Cobb - there seemed to be but two realistic courses for the Administration to follow. It was either the appeasement of Germany on the neutral rights question, or it was war. And there was little sentiment in the United States for a policy of appeasement. Thus Franklin K. Lane summed up the attitude of most Americans and most progressives when he wrote, on April 1, that "we can stand Germany's insolence and murderous policy no longer"; the American people, observed Lane, 91 wanted peace but "they will not suffer further humiliation." Lincoln Steffens also stated the problem accurately when he said: "We have lost control....the Germans decide for us war or peace; not our Congress; not the President; but the Germans."

At 8:30 P.M. on April 2 Wilson went before a joint session of the Congress to read his war message. It was a magnificent speech, one in which the President sought to share with all the American people his faith in those ideas and ideals of foreign policy long maintained and upheld in progressive circles. Against a backdrop of thunderous applause and genuine enthusiasm - only La Follette sat

90Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 642; Baker, Wilson, VI, 506-507.
91Lane to George W. Lane, Apr. 1, 1917, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 242-243. Lane's view is upheld by Notter's later analysis of Congressional and public opinion at the time. Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 636-637.
motionless and unmoved, "chewing gum with a sardonic smile" - Wilson defined warfare against commerce as "warfare against mankind," and he urged his conviction that "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." He concluded:

...right is more precious than peace and we shall fight
for the things which we have always carried nearest our
hearts - for democracy, for the right of those who sub-
mit to authority to have a voice in their own Govern-
ments, for the rights and liberties of small nations,
for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of
free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all na-
tions and make the world itself at last free....the day
has come when America is privileged to spend her blood
and her might for the principles that gave her birth....
God helping her, she can do no other.\textsuperscript{94}

Wilson's message gave the popular demand for war an ideal-
istic direction and goal. Legislatively, there was no doubt that the
Congress would support the President's call to arms and reflect in
that act the emotional attitude of the nation. So it was with the
great majority of the progressives, and most of their leaders marched
to war with the fervor that had characterized \textit{Cuba Libre} nineteen
years earlier.

Only a few opposed war to the bitter end. In Congress,
these were the same peace progressives who had also opposed the sev-
erance of diplomatic relations with Germany and the armed merchant
ship bill. But it seems clear that the bulk of the Congressional op-
oposition to war centered among middle western isolationists who had

\textsuperscript{93}The description is Professor Eric Goldman's in his \textit{Rendezvous With
Destiny}, 238.
\textsuperscript{94}Quoted in Link, \textit{Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era}, 281-282.
had no particular identification with the progressive movement. Of
the fifty members of the House of Representatives who voted against
war, only twenty of them had been identified in any way with the pro-
gressive movement of the preceding decade, and of these twenty at
least nine were Wisconsin legislators who invariably followed the lead
of La Follette on important matters of national policy. In the Sen-
ate, three of the six votes against war came from influential progress-
atives. Indeed, the vigorous last ditch fight against American inter-
vention on the part of Gronna, Norris and La Follette has suggested
the view that anti-war attitudes in 1917 were a characteristic of mid-
dle western progressivism. On the contrary, pro-war and anti-war
sentiment was more a sectional phenomenon than an ideological issue
between progressives and conservatives. Thus while the greatest op-
position to war came from the middle west, a majority of the Congress-
men from that section who opposed American intervention were not pro-
gressives. Undoubtedly, of the twenty-odd middle western progressive

\[95\] Statement based on an analysis of the Congressional political ca-
reers of the fifty who voted "no" on the war resolution. The
twenty were Representatives Britten (Ill.), Browne (Wis.), Cary
(Wis.), Connelly (Kan.), Cooper (Wis.), Davidson (Wis.), Davis
(Minn.), Esch (Wis.), Frear (Wis.), Haugen (Iowa), Hayes (Calif.),
Hull (Iowa), Johnson (S.D.), Kinkaid (Ill.), Kitchin (N.C.),
Knutson (Minn.), La Follette (Wash.), Lundeen (Minn.), Nelson
(Wis.), Stafford (Wis.) and Voigt (Wis.). See Cong. Record, 65
Cong., 1 Sess., 412-413 (Apr. 5, 1917); and William Francis Raney,
Wisconsin: A Story of Progress, 301. The fact that Rep. Lenroot
refused to follow La Follette's lead produced a split in their
personal relations that led to an attempt by La Follette to purge
Lenroot. Ibid., 355-356. The legislature at Madison petitioned
all Wisconsin Representatives in Washington to vote "no" on the
war declaration. See Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Cong. Record, 65
Cong., 2 Sess., 10531 (Sept. 20, 1918).

\[96\] Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 241-242.
Congressmen who voted "no" on the war resolution, there were those who did so because they felt that a liberal position dictated it. But some of them were equally influenced by socialist, isolationist, pro-
German and pacifist leanings. And while these proclivities were to be found in considerable degree and intensity in the middle western expression of progressivism, they certainly did not dominate middle western progressive attitudes, nor, as we have seen, were they characteristic of the thinking of most American progressive leaders.

Thus it was a very small coterie of progressives who spoke against war in the debates that followed the President's call to arms. Some emphasized the idea that American participation in the conflict would degrade the United States and pose serious threats to American constitutional guarantees. Others, Kitchin and La Follette in particular, argued that Britain's violation of America's neutral rights in no wise differed from Germany's, and that there was nothing democratic about entering a war on the side of colonial and imperial

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97 Statement based on an analysis of the pre-1917 foreign policy attitudes of the Congressional progressives who voted against war, combined with evidence on the personal backgrounds of individual opponents of the war resolution, as presented in Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 242; Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 225; La Guardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 143-144; Cole, "Illinois and the Great War," loc. cit., 461; Cyrenus Cole, Iowa Through the Years (Iowa City, 1940), 447; Raney, Wisconsin: A Story of Progress, 301; 347-349, 365; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 667; William G. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," loc. cit., 380-381; Ray A. Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," loc. cit., 56.

98 Rep. Henry A. Cooper, Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 312 (Apr. 5, 1917); Villard, Fighting Years, 324; see also La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 659-660; Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 240.
But the most persistent argument against war employed by the peace progressives maintained the idea that America's entry was part of a capitalist conspiracy against the people. In sum, it encompassed the thought that America was going to war to underwrite the loans and credits extended by Wall Street to the Allied powers, and to preserve the right of the Big Business munitions makers to traffic in death. George Norris best expressed this feeling when he charged on the floor of the Senate that

We are going into war upon the command of gold. We are going to run the risk of sacrificing millions of our countrymen's lives in order that other countrymen may coin their lifeblood into money....we are going to pile up a debt that the toiling masses many generations after us will have to pay....and all because we want to preserve the commercial right of American citizens to deliver munitions of war to belligerent nations....I would like to say to this war god: "You shall not coin into gold the lifeblood of my brethren!"....we are about to put the dollar sign on the American flag.100

Representative Charles A. Lindbergh contributed the observation that a "certain 'inner circle,' without official authority and for selfish

99Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 230-231; La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 661-663; John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, 260-261. Rep. Cooper went further than most who held this view when he claimed that German militarism was responsible for overthrowing in Russia the "most tyrannical, backward, reactionary, oppressive, medieval despotism" of the Tsar, the very government with which the so-called democracies were allied. Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 314 (Apr. 5, 1917). And Rep. Kitchin scored a point with the observation that Wilson's intervention at Vera Cruz to prevent German arms from reaching Huerta was in no wise different from the intervention of German submarines in the Atlantic to prevent American arms from reaching Britain. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 232-233.

100Norris, Fighting Liberal, 196-197; see also Villard, Fighting Years, 277; Weyl, The End of the War, 62-63.
purposes, adroitly maneuvered things to bring about conditions that would make it practically certain that some of the belligerents would violate our international rights and bring us to war with them."

Unfortunately, there was little tangible evidence to support the capitalist conspiracy hypothesis, and the Norris-Lindbergh arguments only served to convey further the impression that the peace progressives and the socialists were somehow ideologically connected on the war issue.

101 Quoted in Tom Parker Junkin, This is My War (Washington, D.C., Privately Published, 1918), 7.

102 The New Republic editors and Charles A. Beard categorically denied the capitalist conspiracy thesis at the time. Socialist Charles Edward Russell recalled that "I was in Washington and observing Congress throughout the period when the war resolution was passed, and the capitalists had nothing to do with it. If they had, I should have known the fact." Professor Harold C. Syrett has also demonstrated this fact most convincingly. See Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 252; Charles Edward Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 292; Harold C. Syrett, "The Business Press and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," loc. cit., passim; see also Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 150-151.

103 The Socialist Party Emergency Convention at St. Louis, April 7-14, 1917, produced a minor division in the ranks of the comrades. By a vote of 21,639 to 2,752 the Convention condemned America's entry into the war. The small group of Socialists who favored intervention no more characterized the attitudes of American socialism on the war issue than the small group of progressives who opposed intervention characterized the attitudes of American progressivism. Socialists overwhelmingly opposed war. Progressives overwhelmingly supported war. The defection of Socialists like Walling, Stokes, Russell, Ghent, Spargo and Sinclair from the party on the war issue cannot be viewed as having greater interpretive significance than the defection of Norris, Lindbergh, La Follette and Gronna from progressive ranks over the same issue. See Balch, Approaches to the Great Settlement, 60; W. J. Ghent, et al., "Democratic Defense: A Practical Program for Socialism," The New Republic, X (Mar. 31, 1917), 262-263; Russell, Bare Hands and Stone Walls, 293; Raney, Wisconsin: A Story of Progress, 382-383.
In addition to this, peace progressive criticism of Wilson offered no alternative to war save the often stated concept of commercial isolation from Europe, a price few Americans and few progressives were willing to pay. Thus when Claude Kitchin pleaded with his colleagues to "forego...our rights" by keeping American ships out of the war zone, and La Follette urged the Senate to embargo both belligerents as a lever to compel their recognition of the rights of neutral commerce, the appeals fell on deaf ears. Likewise, the demand of Gronna and Norris that a popular referendum be conducted on the issue of war or peace represented a clear repudiation of the executive leadership concept so vital in progressive political theory.

It must, of course, be emphasized that had the anti-war progressives combined the wisdom of Solon with the oratorical skill of Demosthenes they could not have thwarted the march to war in April, 1917. Their anti-war arguments admittedly incorporated little that had not been set forth with vigor for nearly two years. But aside from that, and the fact that after 1915 their economic foreign policy attitudes ran increasingly counter to the notions of commercial expansion held by most progressive leaders, they were faced with a strong popular demand for war. Indeed, the last-minute desertion of Senators Kenyon and Cummins from anti-war progressive ranks to the Wil-
son camp indicates something of the pressure for war that built up after Wilson's message, a pressure undoubtedly stimulated by Senator James' charge that those Senators who supported Norris and opposed war were "seeking to place the picture of the Kaiser on the American flag."

At the same time, persuasive arguments were put forward to demonstrate that a true progressive had no choice other than to support a war against the Potsdam monster. Democrat and Republican, Wilsonian and Bull Moose, progressives of every stripe saw American intervention against Germany as the realization of true American idealism. Brand Whitlock read the President's war message "with tears... of joy, to see us at last - much as I hate war - ranged on the side of right!" William Roscoe Thayer rejoiced that Wilson's war message had "completely suffocated Autocracy in the fold of the great banner of Democracy," while William Allen White interpreted America's intervention as a projection of progressive principles into interna-
tional politics. But Senator Kenyon perhaps summed up the progressive reaction to Wilson's war message most succinctly when he told his colleagues that


107Cong. Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 217 (Apr. 4, 1917).
108The Journal of Brand Whitlock, II, 380; see also Baker, American Chronicle, 303.
but solely as in the Spanish War, for humanity and the preservation of its ideals. When peace comes — which God grant may be soon — when the peoples of Europe may be freed from the tyranny of crowns and scepters and come from the darkness of bondage into the light of freedom, as are now the people of Russia, the giant Republic of the west will have no apologies for the part it has played under the providence and guidance of the Almighty.110

Actually, the fact that such an overwhelming number of progressives supported Wilson's call for war was in itself a measure of the national unity that prevailed on the issue. The cautious quality of the President's conversion to preparedness, his lack of bellicosity during the Mexican crisis of 1916, the peace emphasis of the 1916 campaign, his post-election attempts to resolve the European conflict and his reluctance to commit the nation to war even after the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, all served to parry any suggestion that Wilson was hell-bent for battle. Indeed, his middle-of-the-road approach to the great questions of war and peace, combined with his appeals to international law and American tradition, served to prevent both the progressive movement and the nation as a whole from splitting asunder during the crisis of February-March, 1917.

For these reasons, the Chief Executive had the overwhelming support of the people when he finally led the United States into the struggle against Germany. Ray Stannard Baker summed up these considerations when he later recalled that

The more I looked into each of Wilson's decisions and studied his notes, the more I felt that, under the circumstances, he could scarcely have done anything else....I have often thought that if the warlike Theodore Roosevelt had been President at that time he might easily be demanding immediate war on Germany, have split the country wide open. Wilson's patient dealing with crisis after crisis, his reluctant conversion to preparedness and finally to war, truly expressed the awakening and slowly changing convictions of the people. When he finally closed his war message to Congress with the words of Martin Luther, "God helping her, she can do no other," the majority of the Nation was with him, as I was, fervently.\(^\text{111}\)

The fact that most progressive leaders enthusiastically supported the President's call to arms reflected the conviction, long treasured in progressive circles, that America had a destiny to project its moral concepts and political traditions into the world at large. A genuine concern for the perpetuation and extension of democracy, an interest in a new international basis for world peace, a moralistic abhorrence of the behavior and pretensions of Imperial Germany, and the desire to maintain the dignity of the individual on the high seas and elsewhere - these beliefs influenced most progressives to uphold Wilson in his final decision to make Germany over in the American image. Indeed, the progressive sentiment that had crystallized around Wilson's candidacy in 1916 was enlarged and strengthened and given an international scope by the idealistic phrases of the President's war message.

Certainly, most progressives agreed with Wilson that the war into which America was entering was truly a holy war for democ-

racy, a war for peace, a war to end war, a struggle for human liberty. In the words of George Creel, it was America's "idealism put in khaki, that made the Great War a war for democracy." American labor leaders also emphasized this theme, arguing that there could be no free labor movement under autocratic, Kaiser-type governments. Other progressives pointed out that America's march to war was endorsed by Jesus because the ultimate goal of intervention was international reform and spiritual uplift. As Edward A. Filene put it, "when war is for the commonweal, war is worship, war is prayer."

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113 George Creel, The War, the World, and Wilson (New York, 1920), 1-2; see also Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 148-149.


115 Brown, Lyman Abbott, 220-221; Granville Hicks, "The Parsons and the War," American Mercury, X (Feb., 1927), 129-142; Lyman Abbott, The Twentieth Century Crusade (New York, 1918), 33.

116 Edward A. Filene, "The War and Insight," in Win the War For Perma-
With something of the same emphasis on religious mysticism, William Allen White described military combat for a just cause as "the most beautiful experience a man may have," and Franklin K. Lane wrote a young soldier of his acquaintance that

This will be a better world for the poor man when all is over. We must forget our dreams, what our own individual lives would have been, and with dash, and cheer, and courage, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice, set our jaws and go forward. The devil is in the saddle and we must pull him down, or else he will rule the world — and you are to have a tug at his coat. And I envy you ... this world is going upward, not downward ... the devil is to be beaten — the devil ... that is represented by the overbearing, cruel militarism and ruthless inhumanity of Germany. You are a soldier of the Lord, just as truly as Christ was. 117

Also expressed in progressive circles was the view that American participation in the war afforded the United States an opportunity to improve the economic status of industrial workers and the political status of American women. Thus it was pointed out that "never before has democracy for wage-earning men and women made anywhere near the progress that it has made in the nine months of this war.... it will come out of this war with the universal eight-hour day and with as much power to fix its own wages by its own representatives as employers have." 118

More significantly, however, many progressives saw the war

117 White to Chauncey Williams, Mar. 13, 1918, Selected Letters of William Allen White, 188; Lane to John Lyon, Mar. 15, 1918, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 280-281. In the same vein see also Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 142-143; The Letters of William Roscoe Thayer, 352; Baker, Wilson, VIII, 76; Creel, How We Advertised America, 5.
118 Commons, "Why Workingmen Support the War," loc. cit., 226; see also Baker, Frontiers of Freedom, 112-113; 171-172; 210.
as an opportunity to extend American political forms abroad to less
fortunate peoples. Revolutionary Russia, it was suggested, was par-
ticularly ripe for experiment with American political and economic in-
stitutions. Indeed, George D. Herron, Newton D. Baker and Jane Ad-
dams all visualized various parts of the post-war world adopting the
checks and balances federalism of the United States. But Walter
Weyl best summed up the missionary flavor of the progressive urge to
war in 1917 when he wrote:

Thus we leave our policy of isolation for a new policy
of intervention in Europe. We leave behind our old
Americanism to find abroad a new and broader American-
ism; an Internationalism. Our most sanguine optimists
believe that we are to reproduce our Supreme Court in
a Supreme Court of the Nations; that we are to intro-
duce our federal system to Europe, establish disarma-
ment among nations as among our States, empty European
frontiers of troops as our Canadian frontier is empty.
We are to do this for Europe...in obedience to the same
spirit that sends out our missionaries to Asia...we are
going abroad to protect our own American democracy, as
an emigrant may fare forth to new lands to earn the
wherewithal to protect his own home. Such is the vision
of idealists...121

Such was the vision of American progressives as they marched
with Wilson to save the world for democracy, preserve the seas for
commerce and uphold the rights of man everywhere. From their point
of view, American intervention in Europe was but a new phase of the
great struggle for political democracy, social stability and respon-

119Ross, Seventy Years of It, 168-169; America's Message to the Rus-
sian People, 136;139;141.
120Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace, 136-137; Baker, fron-
tiers of Freedom, 221-222; Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of
War, 52.
121Weyl, The End of the War, 71-72.
sible capitalism that had been waged for nearly two decades at the
cellular, state and national level in the United States. The Amer-
ican insistence on democracy, stability, humanity and justice had
already been exported in small quantities to Cuba, the Philippines,
Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Now,
in April, 1917, a vast new market seemed ready for the penetration
of American ideals - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia. Beyond that,
the world. Logically, of course, there were no geographical limits
to the applicability of righteousness and humanitarianism. Indeed,
the concept of an ever expanding American idealism, coupled with the
missionary flavor of the actual expansion, dictated goals that could
only be ultimate and absolute in scope. As an obscure Illinois Con-
gressman expressed it in 1915, Americans were obligated not only to
guard and perpetuate their own liberties, they were required by their
destiny to "extend that liberty to the remotest sections of the
earth." This, in fine, was the progressive dream.

APPENDIX

ROSTER OF THE PROGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP

Abbott, Lyman
Addams, Jane
Anthony, Rep. Daniel R.
(R., Kan.)

Bailey, Rep. Warren W.
(D., Pa.)
Baker, Newton D.
Baker, Ray Stannard
Beard, Charles A.
Bell, Rep. Charles W.
(Prog., Calif.)
Beveridge, Sen. Albert J.
(R., Ind.)
Blatch, Harriot Stanton
Bliss, W. D. P.
Bonaparte, Charles J.
Borah, Sen. William E.
(R., Idaho)
Bourne, Sen. Jonathan
(R., Ore.)
Brandeis, Louis
Bristow, Sen. Joseph L.
(R., Kan.)
Brown, Sen. Norris
(R., Neb.)
Bryan, Rep. James W.
(Prog., Wash.)
Bryan, William Jennings
Buchanan, Rep. Frank
(D., Ill.)
Burkett, Sen. Elmer J.
(R., Neb.)

Carey, Joseph M.
Chamberlain, Sen. George E.
(D., Ore.)
Chandler, Rep. Walter M.
(Prog., N.Y.)

Chapman, John Jay
Clapp, Sen. Moses E.
(R., Minn.)
Colby, Bainbridge
Commons, John R.
Cooper, Rep. Henry A.
(R., Wis.)
Copley, Rep. Ira C.
(Prog. R., Ill.)
Cox, Rep. Henry A.
(D., Ohio)
Crane, Charles R.
Crawford, Sen. Coe I.
(R., S.D.)
Cree, George
Croly, Herbert
Crumpacker, Rep. Edgar D.
(R., Ind.)
Cummins, Sen. Albert B.
(R., Iowa)

Darrow, Clarence
Davis, Rep. Charles R.
(R., Minn.)
Davis, Oscar King
Lewey, John
Dixon, Sen. Joseph M.
(Prog. R., Mont.)
Dolliver, Sen. Jonathan P.
(R., Iowa)

Elston, Rep. John A.
(Prog. R., Calif.)
Ely, Richard T.
Esch, Rep. John J.
(R., Wis.)

Falconer, Rep. Jacob A.
(Prog., Wash.)
File, Edward A.
Folk, James W.
Foulke, William Dudley
Fowler, Rep. Charles N.  
(R., N.J.)

Gallagher, Rep. Thomas D.  
(D., Ill.)
Gardner, Rep. Augustus P.  
(R., Mass.)
Garfield, James R.
Gladden, Washington
Godwin, Rep. Hiram H.  
(D., N.C.)
Gompers, Samuel
Gronna, Sen. Asle J.  
(R., N.D.)

Hapgood, Hutchins
Hapgood, Norman
Haworth, Paul L.
Hayes, Rep. Everis A.  
(R., Calif.)
Hensley, Francis J.
Hepburn, Rep. William B.  
(R., Iowa)
Herron, George D.
Hinebaugh, Rep. William H.  
(Prog., Ill.)
Holmes, John Haynes
Howard, Rep. William M.  
(D., Ga.)
Howe, Frederic C.
Hubbard, Rep. Elbert H.  
(R., Iowa)
Hulings, Rep. Willis J.  
(Prog., Pa.)

Ickes, Harold L.
Irwin, Inez Haynes
Irwin, Will

James, Sen. Ollie M.  
(D., Ky.)
Johnson, Sen. Hiram  
(R., Calif.)

Johnson, Gov. John A.  
(D., Minn.)
Johnson, Thomas L.
Jordan, David Starr

Kelley, Francis
Kelly, Rep. Melville C.  
(Prog. R., Pa.)
Kendall, Rep. Nathan E.  
(R., Iowa)
Kent, Rep. William  
(Prog. R., Calif.)
Kenyon, Sen. William S.  
(R., Iowa)
Kinkaid, Rep. Moses P.  
(R., Neb.)
Kitchin, Rep. Claude  
(D., N.C.)
Kohlsaat, H. H.
Kustermann, Rep. Gustav  
(R., Wis.)

Lafferty, Rep. Abraham W.  
(Prog. R., Ore.)
La Follette, Sen. Robert M.  
(R., Wis.)
La Guardia, Rep. Fiorello H.  
(R., N.Y.)
Lane, Franklin K.
Lenroot, Rep. Irvine L.  
(R., Wis.)
Lewis, Rep. Fred E.  
(Prog. R., Pa.)
Lind, Rep. John  
(D., Minn.)
Lindbergh, Rep. Charles A.  
(R., Minn.)
Lippmann, Walter
Lloyd, Henry Demarest
Lovering, Rep. William C.  
(R., Mass.)

McAdoo, William G.
McClure, S. S.
McCormick, Medill
McDermott, Rep. James T.  
(D., Ill.)
MacDonald, Rep. William J.  
(Prog., Mich.)
Madden, Rep. Martin B.  
(R., Ill.)
Madison, Rep. Edmund H.  
(Prog. R., Kan.)
Miller, Rep. Clarence B.  
(R., Minn.)
Mondell, Rep. Frank W.  
(R., Wyo.)
Morse, Rep. Elmer A.  
(R., Wis.)
Mowry, Duane
Murdock, Rep. Victor  
(Prog. R., Kan.)

Neeley, Rep. George A.  
(D., Kan.)
Nelson, Sen. Knute  
(R., Minn.)
(Prog. R., Calif.)
Norris, Sen. George D.  
(R., Neb.)

O'Laughlin, John C.
Older, Fremont
Oldfield, Rep. William A.  
(D., Ark.)
Owen, Sen. Robert L.  
(D., Okla.)

Palmer, Rep. A. Mitchell  
(D., Pa.)
Palmer, Frederick L.
Parsons, Rep. Herbert  
(R., N.Y.)
Peabody, George
Pearre, Rep. George A.  
(R., Md.)
Perkins, George W.
Pickett, Rep. Charles E.  
(R., Iowa)
Pinchot, Amos
Pinchot, Gifford
Poindexter, Sen. Miles  
(Prog. R., Wash.)

Post, Louis F.
Prouty, Rep. Solomon F.  
(R., Iowa)

Richberg, Donald R.
Riis, Jacob A.
Robins, Raymond
Roosevelt, Theodore
Rosenwald, Julius
Ross, Edward A.
Rucker, Rep. William W.  
(D., Mo.)
Rupley, Rep. Arthur W.  
(Prog. R., Pa.)
Russell, Charles Edward

Sabath, Rep. Adolph J.  
(D., Ill.)
Shaw, Anna
Shepard, Edward M.
Stafford, Rep. William  
(R., Wis.)
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady
Steffens, Lincoln
Stephens, Rep. William D.  
(R., Calif.)
Stimson, Henry L.
Storey, Moorfield
Straight, Willard
Straus, Oscar S.

Tarbell, Ida M.
Tavener, Rep. Clyde H.  
(D., Ill.)
Temple, Rep. Henry W.  
(Prog. R., Pa.)
Thayer, William Roscoe
Thompson, Rep. Charles M.  
(Prog., Ill.)
Towner, Rep. Horace M.  
(R., Iowa)

Van Hise, Charles R.
Weblen, Thorstein
Willard, Oswald Garrison
Vostead, Rep. Andrew J.  
(R., Minn.)
Wald, Lillian
Walling, William E.
Weyl, Walter
White, William Allen
Whitlock, Brand
Wilson, Rep. William B.
(D., Pa.)

Wilson, Woodrow
Wise, Stephen
Woodruff, Rep. Roy O.
(Prog. R., Mich.)
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I, Robert Seager II, was born in Nanking, China, September 12, 1924. I received my secondary education at the Virginia Episcopal School, Lynchburg, Virginia. In 1942-1943 I attended The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina. I entered the United States Merchant Marine in 1943, and the following year I received a diploma from the United States Merchant Marine Academy, King's Point, New York. From 1943 to 1946 I served on various merchant vessels in the capacities of Deck Cadet, Third Mate and Second Mate. Returning to college after the war, I entered Rutgers University and was graduated in 1948 with the degree Bachelor of Arts with honors in history. I received the degree Master of Arts from Columbia University in 1949 and was employed as Instructor in History at Denison University, Granville, Ohio. I began work on the degree Doctor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University in the summer of 1950. Granted a year's leave of absence by Denison in 1951-1952, I was appointed a University Fellow in History at the Ohio State University. From 1952 to 1956 I combined work on the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Ohio State with my teaching duties at Denison. In 1954 I was promoted to the rank of Assistant Professor in History at Denison. My scholarly publications include articles and critical reviews in the fields of naval history, the history of religion and the philosophy of history.