THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT:
A CASE STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP
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By:
RUDOLPH SWAYNE COMSTOCK, JR. B. A., B. S. in Ed., M. A.

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Approved by:

[Signature]
Department of Political Science
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CHAPTER I

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT:

AN INTRODUCTION

The End of a Dream.

The date was May 14, 1954. The scene was the White House office of the President of the United States. Slowly and deliberately President Dwight D. Eisenhower affixed his signature to a piece of congressional legislation which lay before him on his desk. In a tensely emotional atmosphere the President signed his name with the aid of nine pens, subsequently distributed to the important persons surrounding his desk. Among those present were Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his colleague on that committee, Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan. Behind the President stood the Canadian Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney. To his left Representative George A. Dondero of Michigan, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works, beamed with happiness.¹

From the multitude of reporters, cameramen, and correspondents who stood by expectantly, it was obvious

that the President was signing no ordinary or routine piece of legislation. Such, indeed, was the case. The Chief Executive and his audience were watching the successful conclusion of a long dream, the culmination of efforts of countless men and women stretching over a period of many years. The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project was at long last to become a reality.

With the popping of flashbulbs and the steady whirring sound of the newsreel cameras, Mr. Eisenhower made a brief statement.

This marks, of course, the legislative culmination of an effort that has taken thirty years to reach this point. Now work can begin on the great project itself. This work can begin in a spirit of good will and friendly cooperation so that the benefits of this great project can come to all of our people on both sides of that great river. 2

The small, but select, audience applauded vigorously as Senator Homer Ferguson stated:

Coming from Michigan, one of the border States, this has been a dream for many years. Mr. President, when we look at this map we can see that soon transportation can come into the heartland of America. It means a better United States and a better world, I am sure. This occasion is really one that we can all be happy about--that this Administration could bring this about. 3

3Ibid.
With obvious pride born of achievement, Representative Dondero added:

Mr. President, the people of the United States through their Congress, have determined that they will participate with their good neighbor to the North, Canada, in the construction of the St. Lawrence waterway. It has been the dream of many decades. It is one of the greatest waterways in the world and will be one of the great arteries of commerce in the world... I am proud to be a member of the 83d Congress to have had some part in bringing this very happy day about. 4

While the President, Ferguson, and Dondero spoke with sincere conviction, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin made the remarks by far the most eloquent and the most quoted in the nation's press and radio. Wiley, one of the really long-time advocates of the St. Lawrence seaway, spoke with the warmth of feeling which only the final victory, after a hard struggle, can bring to the human voice.

Mr. President, I want to congratulate you. History will now record that at long last the dream--yes, the hope, of countless millions is being justified. Back of us stands the Ambassador of Canada. It is a symbol that we are united in the greatest effort the two nations ever undertook, in building a waterway here that will mean happiness, health, and prosperity for countless millions to come. Across the river we have held hands. Now we cannot part. We are one in a great adventure--to build for the future of America. 5

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
On this note the long and hard fought battle for the St. Lawrence seaway and power project reached its end. In so brief a ceremony there appeared to be much less excitement than the legislation warranted. Quite suddenly, the distinguished guests disbanded to continue their more routine functions.

Truly the long dream of a waterway for ocean-going ships, sailing from the Atlantic Ocean to as far west as the city of Duluth, had ended. Church bells and sirens rang out joyfully in many Great Lakes cities and villages to herald the victory. In addition to the seaway, the legislation provided for hydro-electric installations in the international section of the St. Lawrence which were expected to yield 2,200,000 horespower to be divided equally between the two participating nations. The great benefits anticipated for both the United States and Canada from vastly increased ocean commerce and from new electrical energy were expected to be in full operation by the end of the year 1960.6

President Dwight David Eisenhower had fallen heir to the final completion of a project which had

merited the relentless and united support of no less than five other Chief Executives who had preceded him in office. With the successful conclusion of the long-sought goal of the seaway, no doubt the spirits of Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Franklin D. Roosevelt would have been pleased. Two other former Presidents, still living, Herbert C. Hoover and Harry S. Truman, joined their voices, in rare harmony, to congratulate Eisenhower on the signing of this momentous bill. Although Eisenhower signed the St. Lawrence legislation, his five immediate predecessors had all contributed their best efforts in its behalf.

Although bitterly and fiercely opposed by numerous geographical and functional interests in the United States, and vastly complicated because of the added problems of an international nature, the St. Lawrence program had been concluded. Over thirty years of legislative and diplomatic problems facing American Presidents had been resolved. This fascinating story of the seaway and power project has had no equal of its kind in the history of the United States. The hopes, the plans, the dreams, and the efforts of six American Presidents ended on that historic afternoon of May 13, 1954. Years of presidential frustrations
and rebukes faded in the glow of victory. To Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower belonged much of the credit for the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

While it is plainly manifest to every American school boy that these six great national leaders differed, often violently, on countless issues and policies, they were as one in devotion to the St. Lawrence project. All worked for its final consummation, each in his own time, each in his own way, but each with ardor and enthusiasm. To them and to their leadership this thesis is devoted.

The St. Lawrence: A Great Natural Waterway

Viewing the St. Lawrence system geographically, it was little wonder that even the early pioneers realized its potentialities as a means of water communication for ocean ships from the Atlantic to the heart of the continent. Nature had created a great waterway extending a distance of 2,260 miles from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean with surprisingly few impediments to ocean navigation. Even a casual glance at the map of North America reveals the great
proportions of this natural water route. The length and breadth of this water basin make it one of the most outstanding on the face of the earth.\(^7\) The St. Lawrence route presented very early in its history a great challenge to the engineering ability of mankind. Taking the whole water route from its source to its mouth, it is quite obvious that comparatively little in the way of man-made constructions would be necessary to make it a complete highway for the ships of the world.\(^8\)

Situated deep in the east central section of the North American Continent, the five Great Lakes form the largest body of fresh water in the world. The combined area of these lakes is 91,600 square miles while the land area in their drainage basin is 185,000 square miles.\(^9\) The uppermost, and by far the largest


\(^8\)Excellent pictorial consideration of the St. Lawrence basin in Vernon Quinn, *Picture Map Geography of Canada and Alaska* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1944), Chap. II.

of the Great Lakes, is Superior which is 420 miles long and 80 miles wide with an average depth of 475 feet. At its eastern end Superior discharges in rapids at Sault Ste. Marie and drops 22 feet down to the levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron. This is the only noticeable drop in the lakes until the Falls at Niagara is reached.

Lake Michigan covers an area of 25,900 square miles with an average depth of 325 feet. Its average width is 58 miles and its length, 345 miles. Lake Huron embraces an area of 23,780 square miles with an average breadth of 70 miles. Lake Huron is connected with Lake Erie by means of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and Lake St. Clair. Erie is a rather shallow lake with an average width of 38 miles. The Niagara River leaves Lake Erie and precipitates itself in one gigantic leap at Niagara Falls at the estimated rate of seven thousand tons of water per second.

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Lake Ontario, the smallest of the Great Lakes, emerges from the rather swift flowing Niagara River. Its area is 7,330 square miles. Ontario is 190 miles long with an average depth of 1412 feet. Its average width is 40 miles. At the eastern end of Lake Ontario the St. Lawrence River itself starts in narrowing channels through the Thousand Islands and assumes its stately course to the ocean.

The St. Lawrence River is a clear and bright body of water flowing from one to three miles in width in its course to the city of Quebec. Near Prescott, 119 miles above Montreal, the rapids commence. The Galops, Rapide Plat, and Long Sault are the first group; after which follows Lake St. Francis, a lake 38 miles long. Then follow in quick succession the Coteau, Cedars, and Cascades Rapids to Lake St. Louis, dropping the river down 45 feet to the city of Montreal. At Montreal the St. Lawrence passes through the turbulent Lachine Rapids and then follows a slow-moving course to the ocean which is entirely free of natural obstacles to navigation. At the city of Quebec the St. Lawrence becomes a tidal river. As the St. Lawrence joins the
ocean below Quebec, it presents a yawning mouth 25 miles wide at the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

The very fact that comparatively little would have to be done by man to permit ocean-going vessels drawing not more than 27 feet of water to navigate its entire course freely spurred the imagination of many a citizen of both nations. To fully connect the Great Lakes only three engineering feats were needed: (1) A lock and canal at Sault Ste. Marie between Lakes Superior and Huron, (2) Minor dredging of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and Lake St. Clair between Lakes Huron and Erie, and (3) A canal and lock to bypass Niagara Falls between Lakes Erie and Ontario. To make the St. Lawrence River from Lake Ontario to Montreal navigable for ocean vessels locks and canals would have to be constructed to bypass the three rapids along with minor dredging of channels. From Montreal to the Atlantic Ocean no improvements at all would have to be constructed to permit passage of ocean vessels. Not one of these improvements would present as much trouble to engineers as did the construction of either the Suez or Panama Canals.
The St. Lawrence: Discovery and Exploration

It is little wonder that man saw great opportunity for improving upon nature's water system on the St. Lawrence. The overwhelming length of the St. Lawrence system was freely navigable even to larger vessels. Man early saw the possibilities of erasing nature's errors by construction of canals and locks to bypass the comparatively few miles of the water system which blocked its course. Even the primitive American Indians were accustomed to utilizing the St. Lawrence system as their primary means of long distance transportation within the region.

The arrival of the white man in the St. Lawrence region dates back almost to the time of Christopher Columbus. An Italian sailor, John Cabot, officially made two voyages under the banner of Henry VIII, one as early as 1497. This intrepid adventurer sailed along the full extent of the coast from Labrador down the coast of what is today the United States. Another Italian sailor, Verrazano, sailing for Francis I of France, traveled along the coast of North Carolina, New York, New Hampshire, Maine, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland in 1524. Neither of these early explorers, however, had any real concept of the St. Lawrence though both sailed near it.
The real credit for the first exploration of the St. Lawrence must go to a Frenchman, Jacques Cartier, who made three journeys to the St. Lawrence between 1524 and 1541. It was he who gave this mighty river the name it bears today. As Cartier's small vessels made their way up the St. Lawrence, repeated conversations with the Indians revealed that their concept of the proportions of the St. Lawrence was that of a river "where a man might travel on the face of the waters for many moons in the same direction." Other Indians spoke of it as "the river that has no end." Cartier had hoped that the St. Lawrence might lead him to China. Evidence of his desire to reach the Orient was vividly illustrated when he encountered the first rapids near present-day Montreal which he proceeded to name Lachine.

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Cartier had led the way, and other French explorers shortly added to European knowledge of the great St. Lawrence system. Samuel de Champlain founded the present city of Quebec in 1608 and also discovered Lake Ontario. Further opening of the St. Lawrence occurred after the year 1669 when LaSalle explored the remainder of the Great Lakes and made his monumental trip down the Mississippi River. A series of lesser French pioneers contributed further knowledge of the great St. Lawrence basin. The French rather superficially controlled the vast heart of the continent of North America until their defeat at the hands of the British in the Seven Years War.

After the Treaty of Paris in 1763 the English proceeded to occupy the vast former French territory. The British remained the overseers of the entire St. Lawrence region until the Treaty of 1783 by which the infant United States of America emerged as a nation.


18 Leo F. Jack, LaSalle (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1931). An excellent complete account of the explorations of LaSalle.
Whether under English or French domination the St. Lawrence system proved to be by far the most important media of communication within this enormous basin.

The St. Lawrence: An International River

Were it not for the fact that the St. Lawrence system became an international water route, many of the subsequent problems would have been eliminated. The long range effect of the arrival of the American nation on the world scene was that the full development of the St. Lawrence system was largely precluded from the realm of the national and forced into the realm of the international. The role of the St. Lawrence as an international highway had been well established prior to the twentieth century.

The Treaty of 1783,\(^{19}\) made it abundantly clear at the outset that the total St. Lawrence water system would henceforth be a question of international significance. The second article of this treaty stated

that the northern boundary of the United States would run along the 45th parallel at the St. Lawrence and down the middle of that part of the river until it reached Lake Ontario. From there the line was continued through the middle of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior and their water communications to the most westerly point, the Lake of the Woods. From such a geographic distribution of territory, the St. Lawrence system was clearly made an international highway.

Subsequent treaties and agreements further developed the principle of the St. Lawrence as an international highway. The Jay Treaty of 1794 expanded the principle of the St. Lawrence as an international highway. British subjects and American citizens were granted the right to navigate freely the waters of the St. Lawrence for purposes of commerce. The Treaty of Ghent in 1814 provided through Article VI for a review of several boundary disputes between

\[^{20}\text{U.S. Statutes 116-129; Malloy, op. cit., pp. 590-606; and MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 244-258.}\]

\[^{21}\text{U.S. Statutes 218-223; Malloy, op. cit., pp. 612-619; and MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 289-293.}\]
Britain and the United States over the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River. The famous Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817\textsuperscript{22} aided a very combustible situation on the Canadian-American border through reduction of naval armaments. While the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842\textsuperscript{23} dealt primarily with the dispensation of the Maine Boundary Dispute, Article VII of that Treaty again affirmed freedom of navigation and commerce on the northern water boundary.

The ill-fated Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty of 1854\textsuperscript{24} was an important event in the international development of the St. Lawrence. Article IV specifically provided that American citizens should have not only the right to navigate that part of the St. Lawrence system which formed the common boundary, but also the St. Lawrence system which lay above the international boundary and the 45th parallel.

Although most of the fame attending the Treaty of

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\textsuperscript{22}James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), p. 605.  \\
\textsuperscript{23}8 U.S. Statutes 572-577. Malloy, op. cit., pp. 650-656.  \\
\textsuperscript{24}10 U.S. Statutes 1089-1091. Malloy, op. cit., pp. 668-672.
\end{flushright}
Washington in 1871 was its provision for the later settlement of the Alabama claims arising out of the Civil War, the Treaty was most significant in further internationalizing the St. Lawrence. As the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 had been terminated on due notice by the United States in 1866, a new agreement on the St. Lawrence was reached. Article XXVI provided that navigation on the St. Lawrence River, ascending and descending from the 45th parallel where it ceased to form the common boundary, should forever remain "free and open for the purposes of commerce." Article XXVII specifically extended the principle of free navigation to the various canals already constructed on the St. Lawrence waterway. Article XXVIII granted British subjects the right to navigate Lake Michigan on a basis of equality with American citizens.

With the dawn of the twentieth century the Americans and Canadians had managed to cooperate to the extent of making the entire St. Lawrence route an open waterway to the people of both nations. The principle of the St. Lawrence as an international highway had been well established prior to the long campaign for the

Although Canadian-American relations were not always harmonious, the concept of cooperation for mutual advantage on the St. Lawrence had taken root in a clearly defined manner. In later years the added burdens imposed by the necessity of international accord for a seaway vastly complicated the whole problem.

Early Canadian Interest in a St. Lawrence Seaway

The St. Lawrence seaway was not an idea born of the twentieth century. Many links in the water route had already been constructed to facilitate transportation within this great basin. Indeed, one very small ocean vessel had managed to sail from Chicago directly to England as early as 1847. Therefore, the concept of ocean vessels docking daily at Great Lakes ports was


27 The first direct shipment from the Great Lakes to Europe was made by the small American schooner *New Brunswick* which cleared Chicago for Liverpool in 1847. In 1857 the first return trip was made by the British brigantine *Madera* from Liverpool to Chicago after an 80 day voyage. See Ireland, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
well over a century old. A summary survey of this natural water route quickly revealed that the course of the waterway is relatively clear of natural obstacles when compared with the great length which it encompasses. The necessity for construction of locks and canals was found in few places.

It was quite natural, therefore, that even the pioneers considered means of uniting the various sections of the waterway to make travel and commerce easier and less costly. The very first canal on the St. Lawrence River was constructed in 1630 on the orders of Cardinal Richelieu of France. Most humble by today's standards, this canal was built at a depth of 1½ feet to bypass the rapids of Lachine near Montreal. In 1700 another Frenchman, Dollier de Casson, constructed a 1½ foot canal slightly downstream from Richelieu's canal.

After 1763 the English continued the efforts started by the French to prepare the waterway for enlarged commerce. The first lock canals in Canada


were constructed by the Royal Engineers around the upper and lower of the three rapids between Lake St. Francis and Lake St. Louis in 1783. These locks were 120 feet long and 9 feet wide, with a depth of 6 feet of water over the sills. As the potentialities of the St. Lawrence waterway became increasingly evident, funds were voted by the Assembly of Lower Canada in 1815 for the building of the Lachine Canal. Work was completed in 1825 with seven locks 108 feet long and 20 feet wide with a depth of 4.5 feet. A Joint Commission from Upper and Lower Canada investigated the possibility of further canalization of the St. Lawrence in 1818.

Evidence of the far-sighted program of early Canadians to make the Great Lakes accessible to the ocean was found in a pamphlet written by "A. Projector" in the year 1832. "A. Projector" urged the construction of a St. Lawrence seaway more than twelve decades ago.

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The time is short, but it is sufficient. All that is required is zeal and unanimity to ensure success; and by rendering the frontier of Upper Canada a sea board we will reap within a very limited period, all the advantages and prosperity which it must command. 32

In the year 1824 William Hamilton Merritt organized the Welland Canal Company. 33 The purpose of this organization was the construction of a canal and locks to bypass the treacherous Niagara Falls and Rapids between Lakes Erie and Ontario. The first Welland Canal was subsequently opened in 1829 having forty wooden locks 110 feet long, 22 feet wide, and a depth of 8 feet. As inadequacies of the first Welland Canal developed, enlargements were made in 1840, 1871, and 1887.

32A. Projector, A Concise View of the Inland Navigation of the Canadian Provinces: The Improvements Already Affected and the Inferences to be Drawn from These, Toward Their Full Practicable Accomplishment and Practical Value (Toronto, 1832).

In the Soulages region of the St. Lawrence River (between Lakes St. Louis and St. Francis), canals and locks were constructed in 1817, 1842, and 1899. The Soulages Canal had five locks and provided a maximum navigation depth of 11 feet. In the international section of the St. Lawrence River (between Prescott, Ontario, and Lake St. Francis) many canals were constructed by Canada to overcome a drop of 92 feet. Between 1834 and 1900 canals and locks were constructed at Cornwall, Farran's Point, and the Gallops making possible a navigation depth of 11 feet in this region of the river.

Many of the canals in Canada before 1900 were originally started by private individuals and private companies, but, after 1866, the Canadian Government assumed control of all St. Lawrence canals making them a part of the national transportation program. The result of the construction of Canadian St. Lawrence canals in the nineteenth century was that the entire waterway from the Great Lakes to the ocean was made navigable for

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34 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Document No. 114, 1922, op. cit.; pp. 3-4.
35 Canada, Department of Transport, The St. Lawrence Deep Waterway, op. cit.; pp. 2-3.
vessels drawing not more than 1½ feet of water. This already established waterway was most useful for the smaller Great Lakes vessels, but was inadequate for the larger ocean-going ships.

To the Government and the people of Canada belonged most of the credit for the development of the St. Lawrence water system prior to the year 1900. Canadian interest in improving navigation on the St. Lawrence system was far greater than that of the United States for three primary reasons. (1) From the engineering viewpoint, there was no doubt that the better canal sites lay on the Canadian side of the border, or above the 45th parallel in the all-Canadian section of the river. (2) From the economic viewpoint, Canada depended much more heavily on the St. Lawrence system for transportation of commodities from the interior to the sea than did the United States which was blessed by nature with many other fine ports on its Atlantic and Gulf coasts. (3) From the national viewpoint, the Canadian Government had no desire to see the products of its great interior drained off through the more convenient American ports of Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The Canadian Government, therefore, deliberately encouraged development of the St. Lawrence in order to increase and expand the Canadian ports of Montreal and Quebec which lay on the lower St. Lawrence.

Early American Interest in the St. Lawrence seaway

While it was quite true that the United States had not taken an active part in the canalization of the St. Lawrence in the nineteenth century, this fact was not based on any American prejudice against canals. Indeed, the United States had shown an intense interest in water transportation through canals constructed during the first half of the nineteenth century. The important point, however, in American canal construction was that many of them were designed to compete with Canadian St. Lawrence improvements.

The famous Erie Canal, connecting Lake Erie with the Hudson River, was America's answer to the Canadian Welland Canal constructed at the same time. It was hoped that this American canal would siphon off the inland water commerce of the Great Lakes through the port of New York rather than through Montreal and Quebec in Canada.
Many other American canals constructed in the first half of the nineteenth century were deliberately designed to compete with the St. Lawrence route to the ocean. The United States had constructed numerous canals in the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois connecting the Great Lakes watershed with the Atlantic seaboard and the Mississippi River. The United States, unlike its northern neighbor, had the advantage of possessing numerous alternatives to the St. Lawrence route. For very plain reasons of an economic nature, America had little interest in the expansion of the St. Lawrence as a great seaway.

Most American concern with the St. Lawrence was of a negative or competitive nature before 1900. In 1836 the American Congress ordered the first federal survey of the possibilities of competing directly with Canada and its recently opened Welland Canal. As was later the case, the Congress ordered an investigation of potential canal sites connecting Lake Erie and Lake Ontario to be built entirely on American soil.\(^{36}\) One year later the House Committee on Rivers and Canals

submitted a report reviewing the military and commercial advantages to the United States to be gained from the building of an "American Welland Canal." As international tensions eased gradually, nothing resulted from these investigations.

During the nineteenth century the United States made only two definite efforts to improve the navigation of the St. Lawrence system. As late as 1846 full loads of commerce were transported around the Sault Ste. Marie Rapids only by one old gray horse and a single cart. The State of Michigan constructed the first lock at Sault Ste. Marie and the federal Government assumed the burden in 1853 constructing its first "Soo Canal." The United States also did minor dredging of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers and Lake St. Clair connecting Lakes Huron and Erie to a depth of 18 feet by the year 1892. As almost all American commerce of the period was confined to inter-lake navigation, these improvements were undertaken to


benefit American commercial and agricultural interests. Other American interest in the St. Lawrence was largely confined to measures contemplating more effective competition. As Canadian and American relations again reached another low during and after the American Civil War, Congress considered the possibility of constructing an American canal between Lakes Erie and Ontario for the primary purpose of passing gun boats.39 In 1868 a more comprehensive consideration of six potential canal sites all designed to outflank the Welland Canal was undertaken.40

Ever reluctant to cooperate with Canada in St. Lawrence improvements, the American Chief of Engineers proposed an alternate route for a federal canal paralleling the old Erie Canal which had suffered a financial crisis in 1875.41 Another report of the Chief of Engineers revised the cost estimates upward for the same canal in 1889.42 By this time, however,
the American canals had dwindled greatly in number and in importance. The rapid rise of the railroads as carriers of bulk commodities had made most American canals obsolete.

Throughout the nineteenth century American interest in the St. Lawrence waterway was either apathetic, or more commonly, competitive. The United States did undertake valuable improvements in the St. Lawrence system where it proved desirable, i.e., at Sault Ste. Marie and the linking of Lakes Huron and Erie. Other American interest in the St. Lawrence was largely motivated by economic and national considerations.

This constant commercial rivalry between the two nations has always been a strong consideration throughout the history of the project. American Atlantic ports feared further improvements on the St. Lawrence because of its tendency to funnel the vast commerce of the Great Lakes basin through the Canadian ports of Montreal and Quebec and thence to the markets of the world. American Gulf ports and Mississippi River States have feared the seaway for largely the same reason. So deep seated a conflict of commercial and national self interests was not to be easily resolved.
Early International Efforts to Obtain

The St. Lawrence Seaway (1895-1921)

Improvements made in the St. Lawrence waterway prior to the year 1895 were entirely national in character. Prior to that year there had been no general demand for an international seaway in either nation. As the nineteenth century was drawing to its close, thoughtful persons in all walks of life began to turn their attention slowly but surely to the potential advantages which a seaway could offer to the economies of the landlocked Midwest. As might well be expected, the greatest interest in such a seaway was generated in the American States bordering on the Great Lakes. Across the border in Canada, many citizens of the large Province of Ontario likewise began to be gradually interested in the cheap and speedy water transportation which the St. Lawrence afforded. One of the foremost reasons for this slow awakening of interest in the seaway was the very substantial rise in the economy of the Great Lakes region.

Growing at a very rapid rate, these economies were more and more demanding a cheaper and more convenient outlet for their products and a more direct
access to the competition of the world markets. The decline of American canals and high freight rates of the railroads caused a great deal of interest in the seaway as a logical alternative. In the period from 1895 to 1921 the first crystallization of public opinion in both Canada and the United States occurred with regard to the values of the seaway. This formative stage of efforts to obtain a seaway to the heart of the continent was to engender both loyal support and bitter opposition. In the quarter of a century immediately preceding the Administration of Warren G. Harding, the stage was to be well set for later domestic and international conflicts over the merits of the St. Lawrence seaway.

The International Deep Waterways Association.—The very first international organization to work exclusively for the seaway was the International Deep Waterways Association. This pioneering group consisting of both Canadians and Americans held a series of meetings in Cleveland, Ohio, in October of 1894. Their topic for discussion was the "practicability of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project."[43] This private

international group of businessmen, professional men, sea captains, ship owners, and farmers resolved to take their case to the Governments and peoples of both nations with the one purpose of bringing ocean navigation to the great Midwest. This small, but determined, body was the first private international group to work for the seaway.  

The Deep Waterways Commission.— The vitality and the perseverance of the International Deep Waterways Association had its speedy reward. On February 15, 1895, Senate Resolution 130, introduced at the request of the Association, was reported favorably. This resolution was passed as a part of the Sundry Appropriation Bill on March 2, 1895. The resolution requested President Grover Cleveland to appoint three American representatives "to meet with any similar committee

\footnote{E. V. Smiley, "From the Great Lakes to the Sea," \textit{Review of Reviews}, 12 (September, 1895), p. 306.}


which may be appointed by the Government of Great Britain or of the Dominion of Canada for the purpose of investigating all possible canal routes between the Great Lakes and the ocean. The international committee was expected to recommend one particular route and to devise and suggest the means of implementing its construction.

President Cleveland was notified of British approval of the congressional plan, and the Deep Waterways Commission was formed. The Deep Waterways Commission was the first public international commission to undertake an investigation of the seaway. The Commission, composed of three Americans and three Canadians, met for the first time early in 1896 in the city of Detroit. A thorough investigation of a year's length ensued during which time the Deep Waterways Commission traveled the length and breadth of the St. Lawrence basin hearing testimony and investigating possible canal routes. On January 8, 1897, President

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Cleveland received the report of the Commission and sent it immediately to the Congress with a highly favorable special message.

The report of the Deep Waterways Commission recommended the St. Lawrence route as the least expensive and the most practical means of achieving access from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic for ocean-going vessels. The Commission was also of the opinion that further investigations should be undertaken before any direct action to construct it was taken by the two Governments.

The "All-American" canal.-- Many members of the Congress viewed this pioneering international report with distaste. Their conviction was strong that American funds should not be spent on foreign soil, and, above all, should not be used to enrich the merchants of Canada at American expense. To these numerous critics the answer was the construction of an "all-American" canal, a phrase already widely used since

the start of the nineteenth century.

Consequently, the Congress turned its attention to the possibility of building adequate canals to funnel the commerce of the Great Lakes through American ports. At the request of Congress the Chief of Engineers presented an 1896 report on the costs of deepening the old Erie Canal to bring it up to standard. The report showed the cost to be so high as to warrant little congressional enthusiasm. 49

The Congress followed up the report of the Deep Waterways Commission by asking for an engineering study of the possibilities of constructing a canal entirely within the borders of the United States. Major T. W. Symons set about an intensive investigation of potential all-American canal routes from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic. The Symons report of 1897 50 clearly revealed that the cost of an all-American canal through New York would be very substantially greater.


than that of the St. Lawrence. No action was taken on the Symons report as Congress did not desire to pay for the added luxury of an all-American canal.

The Congress then directed the Department of War to create a Board of Engineers on Deep Waterways whose primary function would be to investigate and survey potential water routes located within American territory from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic. Liberally supported by congressional appropriations totaling $483,000, the Board of Engineers conducted an exhaustive three year study of potential canal sites to be located entirely within the United States.\(^5\) Again, the report of the Board of Engineers showed the cost of an all-American canal to be materially greater than that of the St. Lawrence seaway.\(^5\)

**The International Waterways Commission.** As it


was becoming increasingly apparent that questions concerning the uses of the boundary waters of the United States and Canada were in need of centralized control, the American Congress decided to take further action. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902 requested that the President invite the Canadian Government to join in the formulation of an International Waterways Commission.

The International Waterways Commission was a permanent board of six members, three each from Canada and the United States. The duties of the Commission revolved around the investigating and reporting of problems concerning boundary waters submitted to it by either nation. It was not permitted to make arbitral awards, but could recommend to the two Governments solutions to the water boundary questions so submitted. From 1905 to 1911 the International Waterways Commission, meeting alternately in Toronto and Buffalo, did a generally fine job of resolving certain disputes which had arisen; the most notable of which was the Lake Erie boundary dispute. Although the International Waterways

53 U.S. Statutes 373 (1902).

Commission did not concern itself directly with the St. Lawrence seaway, it did lay the groundwork for its more important successor, the International Joint Commission, which was to take a prominent part in later seaway investigations.\footnote{Canada, Parliament, Proceedings of the International Waterways Commission, Sessional Paper No. 19a (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1913). A Complete official record of the proceedings of the Waterways Commission.}

The International Joint Commission. - Since it was generally believed in both nations that the International Waterways Commission had performed its assigned functions well, still more improvement was sought. American Secretary of State Elihu Root and British Ambassador James Bryce negotiated the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909\footnote{36 U.S. Statutes 2448 (1909).} which created the International Joint Commission.

The International Joint Commission consisted of six members, three each from Canada and the United States, and was created for two primary reasons. (1) The Commission was to settle questions that had already arisen along the common frontier, and (2) the Commission was to make provision for the settlement of any
disputes which might, in the future, arise. The first meeting of the International Joint Commission was held in Washington in January, 1912.

Under the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the navigation of all boundary waters was to be forever free and open for the purposes of commerce to both nations on terms of equality. A citizen of either nation was permitted to sue for damages in the courts of the other for material damages sustained as a result of improper boundary water use. The Commission was given the power to decide what obstructions or diversions of water on either side of the boundary would be allowed. An order of preference for the uses of boundary waters was outlined in the following order: (1) Domestic, (2) Navigation, and (3) Power and Irrigation.

Any questions arising between the two nations over boundary waters were to be referred to the International Joint Commission whenever the Governments of Canada or the United States should so request. The Commission was authorized in each case so referred to

examine and report upon the facts and circumstances of the particular question, together with such conclusions and recommendations or exceptions which were requested in the reference. The recommendations of the Commission were not to be regarded as arbitral awards. Furthermore, the Commission was empowered to hear any question of difference between the two nations, even that which did not concern boundary waters, by mutual consent.

The International Joint Commission quite successfully performed its functions through the years. A careful consideration of the functions of the Commission revealed that it has been generally popular in both Canada and the United States. The work of the International Joint Commission continues to the present day as a permanent mediation board to which both nations have continually submitted both major and minor problems. As the years passed, the Joint Commission was to enter prominently into the whole controversy of the St. Lawrence project.

Canals and electricity.—Canada continued to expand its already established series of canals to unite the St. Lawrence into one long navigable channel. In
1905 the Dominion Government abandoned the system of tolls which it had been collecting for the use of the St. Lawrence canals. In 1909 Canadians gave serious consideration to the construction of a new canal which would have connected Georgian Bay (Lake Huron) directly with the St. Lawrence River. This so-called Georgian Bay Canal would have bypassed the lower Lakes, but its cost was so exorbitant that nothing further was done. In 1906 the American Government began to deepen existing channels between Lakes Huron and Erie and also started work on a new, and larger, canal at Sault Ste. Marie. The American Congress undertook an examination of deepening the Hudson River to Troy, New York, for the purpose of increasing the use of the old Erie Canal.

At this time, too, the first use of electricity


60 Ibid., p. 13.
on a large scale injected another problem into the St. Lawrence program. Many persons were well aware of the value of the river as the means of producing hydro-electrical energy. In later years the question of electricity from the St. Lawrence was, at times, to overshadow the very problem of the seaway, itself. As early as 1892 the State of New York had given the Niagara Falls Power Company the right to take and use the waters of the Niagara River for the purpose of producing up to 200,000 horsepower of electricity. 61

In the year 1901, another hydro-electric plant was installed at Massena, New York, with a capacity of a mere 7,500 horsepower. On the Canadian side of the international section the Province of Ontario established the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission, a public corporation which controlled all power production in the Province.

With the dawn of the age of electricity, vast new problems entered into the St. Lawrence development. Since the St. Lawrence had been made clearly an international river, the production of electricity from

the waters of that river became also an international problem. All hydro-electric installations had to be regulated through international agreement. The American Congress passed the Burton Act in 1906 which denied the State of New York the power to authorize private power developments on the St. Lawrence without the expressed consent of the Secretary of War.

A very important scramble for permission to construct power plants and dams along the northern boundary ensued. Many private American corporations vied with each other for the lucrative business of producing cheap hydro-electric power. So unscrupulous were the methods of these early American power companies that the Congress investigated to determine the extent of bribery and corruption in New York State in 1911. As the years advanced, the whole question

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62 U.S. Statutes 2626 (1906).

of power developments on the river was to become inextricably bound with the question of the seaway.

**World War I and the St. Lawrence.**—As the commerce of the St. Lawrence region continued to grow and the new element of hydro-electric power emerged, increased interest in the project was manifested in the States bordering the Great Lakes. This very important area of the nation began to press more and more for international action. In 1913, Senator Charles Townsend of Michigan proposed a resolution requesting the President to enter into negotiations with Great Britain with the view to securing an international agreement for the concurrent and cooperative improvement of the St. Lawrence River.  

The Townsend resolution passed the Senate and was sent to President Woodrow Wilson for action. President Wilson had earned the reputation as a far-sighted Chief Executive, but he never did make the St. Lawrence question a basic part of his ambitious program. Mr. Wilson's Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane, however, was an out-and-out advocate of the seaway.

[^61: Congressional Record, Pt. 4, p. 3136. Text of Townsend resolution.]
He often spoke of the project as the "creation of an American Mediterranean Sea." 65

At Lane's insistence, the Wilson Administration dispatched a very detached note to the British Government on February 24, 1914. 66 Wilson merely inquired whether or not the Canadian Government was disposed to consider further improvements on the St. Lawrence system as an international endeavor. No reply at all was ever received by the State Department from either Great Britain or Canada.

The advent of World War I preoccupied the leaders of Canada and the United States, and the St. Lawrence question was pushed far into the background. In the Dominion Arthur V. White headed a committee which did a thorough survey of future possibilities of utilizing the waters of the St. Lawrence for the increased production of electricity to meet war time requirements. 67 Further indication of the usefulness

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67 Canada, Commission on Conservation, Committee on Waters and Waterpowers, Long Sault Rapids: St. Lawrence River: An Inquiry into the Construction and other Aspects of the Project, Arthur V. White, Dr. (Ottawa: Mortimer Co., Ltd., 1918).
of the St. Lawrence for electrical power occurred in 1917 when the St. Lawrence River Power Company, an American corporation, applied for, and received the permission of the American Secretary of War to construct a new power dam in the South Sault Channel of the international section of the St. Lawrence River. Over the strongest protests of the Dominion Government, the International Joint Commission approved the permit, regardless of the fact that the Joint Commission was composed half of Canadian members. 68

The all-American canal versus the seaway.—As World War I neared its successful conclusion, the St. Lawrence problem again came to the attention of the American Congress. A Senate resolution of September 21, 1918, requested that the Secretary of Commerce present a report on the commercial advantages of ship canals connecting Lakes Erie and Ontario with the Hudson River. The report was decidedly unfavorable to further development of American canals as the chief outlet from the Great Lakes to the ocean. 69 At the same


time, another report of the Board of Engineers concluded that no further expenditures by the United States on all-American canals to connect the Great Lakes with the port of New York were justified at that time.\footnote{U.S. Congress, House, St. Lawrence Ship Channels, House Document No. 755, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918).}

Colonel J. G. Warren of the Army Corps of Engineers also presented a report which stated the opinion that an all-American canal from the Great Lakes to New York could not be justified.\footnote{U.S. Congress, House, The St. Lawrence-Lake Ontario Channel to the Canadian Border, House Document No. 1591, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918).}

These reports by qualified personnel greatly undermined the abortive congressional move to replace the seaway with a canal built entirely in the United States.

Bearing out the predictions government experts had made, the New York Barge Canal was opened in 1918, and was, subsequently, to become a heavy financial burden on the State of New York.\footnote{The New York State Barge Canal. Special Report to Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York (Albany: Frederick Stuart Greene, 1926). A detailed account of the construction, operation, and revenues of the Barge Canal.} It was no mere
coincidence that, in the same year, the Canadian Government completed its deepening program of the Welland Canal. As in the past, the Barge Canal was designed to compete directly with the Welland Canal for the outgoing commerce of the Great Lakes basin.

As experience gradually confirmed the opinions of prominent authorities that an all-American canal would be economically unwarranted, more and more interested Americans turned their attentions to the St. Lawrence waterway as the only reasonable alternative for bringing ocean commerce to the Midwest. To lend strength and coordination to the movement for the seaway, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association was formed in Washington, D.C. on February 4, 1919. The sole purpose of the Tidewater Association was to bring about the construction of the seaway through public media of communication and direct lobbying in Washington and the various State capitals.73

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association was very different in organization from regular private

interest groups. The Association was composed of member States in the American union. The greater proportion of the funds used by the Association came from legislative grants made by member States. The seven charter member States were all from the landlocked Midwest. These members were: Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, and Iowa. From the geographical location of these States it was obvious from which section of the nation interest in the seaway was strongest. Through the long years of the struggle to gain the goal of the seaway, the Tidewater Association led the way with a well mapped campaign.\textsuperscript{74}

Almost simultaneously Canadians founded an organization which, in many respects, was the counterpart of the Tidewater Association. In 1919 the Canadian Deep Waterways and Power Association was formed.\textsuperscript{75} Headed by W. R. German of Welland and Mayor T. L. Church of Toronto, and drawing the bulk of its

\textsuperscript{74}Through the years the Tidewater Association greatly increased its membership. By 1923, the Association claimed 18 member States. By 1932, 23 States had joined representing a population of 45 million and an area of more than half of the United States.

\textsuperscript{75}Stephens, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 163.
support from private individuals in the Province of Ontario, the Canadian Deep Waterways and Power Association worked diligently to bring the seaway to Ontario's Great Lakes ports. Although this organization gradually declined in influence and in activity, it did mark the way for other organizations to come.

A third private international organization was formed very shortly. Meeting at Windsor, Ontario, on November 18, 1919, representatives of twenty-three cities and towns on both sides of the Great Lakes boundary, inaugurated the St. Lawrence Conference. The St. Lawrence Conference immediately adopted a program calling for concerted international action by both Canada and the United States to construct the seaway and power project. Annual conferences of this private international organization have been held ever since meeting alternately in Canada and the United States. 76

While advocates of the seaway were uniting to give added force to their campaign, opponents were also solidifying their opposition. The coming struggle for construction of the St. Lawrence project began to take on definite outlines of an economic and geographical

76 Ibid., p. 161.
nature. With the overwhelming majority of American support for the project centered in the great Middle West, the eastern and southern States began slowly to join hands in beating back plans for this vast engineering work. The great harbor interests of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore had no desire to see the St. Lawrence seaway come into being. These powerful ports and their allied economic interests did not wish to see the large commerce of the Midwest drained off to world markets through the St. Lawrence River. They feared that their well established interests would be perilously curtailed and that the Great Lakes cities of Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Duluth would thrive at their expense. The southern and Mississippi River States also viewed with alarm direct ocean access to the central Midwest which would cut greatly into the use of the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans.

In Canada, too, opposition began to crystalize. The two largest primary ports of the Dominion were Montreal and Quebec, both located on the lower St. Lawrence in the Province of Quebec. Since both ports
were easily accessible to the ocean, they enjoyed a profitable warehousing and trans-shipment commerce from commodities brought down the St. Lawrence from the Great Lakes on smaller vessels. Once these commodities of the Midwest reached Montreal and Quebec, they had to be transferred to ocean vessels for overseas shipment. The St. Lawrence seaway would have the effect of bypassing Montreal and Quebec and making it easy for ocean-going vessels to load their cargoes directly in Great Lakes ports. For many of the same reasons, therefore, as those prompting American Atlantic and Gulf port, the Province of Quebec began to emerge as a formidable opposition force within the Dominion.

On the other hand, geographically Canada's large Province of Ontario occupied much the same position with respect to world markets as the American Midwest. Locked in by its location in the Canadian Midwest, the Province of Ontario sought an outlet to the ocean. Throughout the struggle for the seaway, it was in this Province that most favorable action was encouraged.

Not only was there a rising tide of disagreement within both Canada and the United States over the merits of the seaway, but the very nature of the St. Lawrence
as an international river vastly complicated what otherwise would have been merely a domestic problem. Repeated efforts of the American Congress to construct an all-American waterway from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic clearly showed a lack of genuine desire to construct the project as an international endeavor. Likewise, in Canada there was a general mistrust of developing the St. Lawrence in cooperation with the United States. Added to purely domestic differences of opinion, the international situation was to make the seaway very difficult of attainment.

The investigation of the International Joint Commission.—Into this growing controversy over the seaway, Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin managed to force to the floor of the Senate an amendment to the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 2, 1919. The Lenroot amendment, solidly backed by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association, requested that the International Joint Commission investigate and recommend an international program for the improvement of the St. Lawrence waterway to permit the passage of ocean-going vessels. Over the bitter opposition of eastern and

7740 U.S. Statutes 1288 (1919).
southern States, led ably by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the Lenroot amendment was passed.

Following this congressional directive, Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk dispatched two notes, dated March 31st and April 10th, 1919, to British Ambassador Reading. The American Government asked whether or not Canada would be willing to permit the proposed investigation. After some delay a favorable reply was received on July 25, 1919.

Consequently, M.J. Stewart, Canadian engineer, and Colonel Charles Keller, United States Army Corps of Engineers, were appointed by their respective Governments to formulate the terms and conditions which were to be embodied in the reference to the International Joint Commission. Keller and Stewart held three conferences, one each in Ottawa, Montreal, and Washington. On November 11, 1919, the two engineers completed their memorandum.


79 Ibid., pp. 409-410.

The Keller-Stewart Memorandum framed nine specific questions which formed the basis of the investigation of the Joint Commission. The most important recommendation was that a Joint Board of Engineers be appointed to examine the technical and engineering phase of the subject while the International Joint Commission would be charged with the duty of making general investigations and obtaining the information necessary to enable it to select the most desirable final plan.

On January 21, 1920, the Governments of Canada and the United States jointly submitted the Keller-Stewart Memorandum to the International Joint Commission. In accordance with the Memorandum, the American Government appointed Colonel William P. Wooten, United States Army Corps of Engineers, who was then in charge of the Lakes Survey Office at Detroit, as its representative on the newly formed Joint Board of Engineers. The Canadian Government then appointed W. A. Bowden, Chief Engineer of the Department of Railways and Canals, to complete the Joint Board.

81 Ibid., p. 414.
82 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1920, op. cit., p. 413.
83 Ibid., p. 414.
Colonel Wooten and Mr. Bowden, assisted by their respective staffs, launched into a very exhaustive examination of the engineering facets of the seaway and power project.

Simultaneously, the International Joint Commission set out on one of the most comprehensive investigations of all times. In 1920 and 1921 the Joint Commission traveled from Boston to Boise City, from Montreal to Calgary, gathering evidence and patiently listening to all who wished to speak on the subject. The International Joint Commission heard from 118 private and public organizations in fourteen States and five Canadian Provinces. More that 350 witnesses appeared and their testimony, as officially recorded, comprised over 8,000 typewritten pages.

The report of the International Joint Commission dated January 16, 1922, was, on the whole, most favorable to the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. The Joint Commission made the following recommendations to the two Governments. (1) The Governments of Canada and the United States should enter

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84 Waldron, op. cit., p. 625.

into a formal treaty to provide for the proposed project. (2) The New Welland Canal should be made an integral part of the total seaway and should be completed by the Dominion. (3) The projected engineering constructions between Lake Ontario and Montreal should be made according to the recommendations of the Joint Board of Engineers, but further engineering investigations by a new and enlarged Joint Board of Engineers should be first completed.

(4) Adequate provision should be made for damage through flooding resulting from necessary constructions. (5) Compensation should be paid by each nation to its own citizens for lands condemned for construction purposes. (6) All constructions in the international section of the St. Lawrence should be erected and operated under the supervision of an International Board. (7) All other constructions which lie entirely within the territory of one nation or the other should be installed by that nation alone, but under the general supervision of the International Board. (8) All installations for electrical power production should be erected and operated by, and at the expense of, the country in which they are located.
(9) The cost of all navigation works should be apportioned between the two nations on the basis of the benefits which each would receive from the seaway. Every five years the benefits would be determined and costs apportioned in accordance therewith.

The International Joint Commission noted that much opposition to the project existed in both nations, but was of the opinion that the project would ultimately work to the advantage of all sections of both nations. The Commission was convinced that the traffic on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River would be sufficient to pay for the constructions within a "reasonable period of time." The Commission did regret, however, that some aspects of the engineering phase of the project would have to await final solution by an investigation of a new and enlarged Joint Board of Engineers.

The Stage Is Set

With the report of the International Joint Commission completed, the stage was set for a long-term conflict between advocates and opponents of the St. Lawrence project. The future battle lines were beginning to take on a definite character. The whole problem of
the St. Lawrence development had moved out of the realm of mere fantasy and into the realm of possibility.

The nineteenth century had opened to the minds of men the potential usefulness of the seaway to agriculture, commerce, business, and consumer interests in the large landlocked heart of the North American Continent. A long series of gradual constructions of links in the total waterway was extended by the Dominion of Canada in a continuing process toward the ultimate goal of easier navigation on the St. Lawrence. American interest in the St. Lawrence was mainly one of competition. The United States did make improvements in the Great Lakes channels where definite profit to American industry and business could be anticipated. American isolationism and a keen desire to protect American markets from foreign competition stirred repeated interest in an all-American seaway, but worked against any general inclination to work with Canada for a St. Lawrence development program.

With the coming of the present century, a continuing awakening in the American and Canadian Midwest brought about the first pioneering efforts for an international agreement. The obvious benefits of the
seaway to the Midwest engendered powerful opposition from the Atlantic and Gulf coast States in the United States and from the Province of Quebec in Canada. A gradual trend toward increased cooperation between the two nations with respect to their common boundary waters loomed to the front beginning at the turn of the century. Several international bodies were formed by international agreement to investigate and report solutions for various problems which had arisen over the course of years. Repeated international investigations culminating in the 1922 report of the International Joint Commission showed the St. Lawrence route to be by far the most preferable for linking the Great Lakes to the ocean.

The widely discussed question of the seaway received even greater attention as the need for electrical energy became pronounced in the early twentieth century. The idle power of the St. Lawrence could easily be harnessed to produce millions of horsepower of electrical energy. In coming years the question of hydro-electric power developments was to rival, and at times, to surpass that of the seaway itself.
The whole nature of the St. Lawrence controversy had already been well defined by the time Warren G. Harding assumed the presidency of the United States. Reduced to its simplest elements, the successful conclusion of the St. Lawrence project depended upon an affirmative answer to three vital questions. (1) Would the fast approaching conflict of geographical and functional interests within the United States be resolved? (2) Would a similar conflict of geographical and function interests within the Dominion of Canada result in a pro-seaway victory? (3) If these two problems could be satisfactorily solved, could Canada and the United States compromise differences in fundamental national policy to a point where international agreement could be secured?

More than thirty years of continual discussion, negotiation, and investigation was to supply the final, and affirmative, answer. Starting with Warren G. Harding, the St. Lawrence seaway and power project was to become a mutual goal of six consecutive American Presidents.
CHAPTER II
HARDING, COOLIDGE, AND THE
ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT

President Warren G. Harding Leads the Way

Although the short Administration of President Warren G. Harding has been regarded by many historians as a failure, he was to have the distinction of being the first Chief Executive to make the St. Lawrence project a fundamental part of his policy. When the American voters decided that they desired a "return to normalcy" after World War I, a great business and industrial boom engulfed most of the national economy. Faced with the happy prospect of continued economic prosperity, President Harding predicated much of his support for the seaway on the great advantages which it offered the people of this nation.

Ohio's handsome Senator Warren G. Harding had been the dark horse nominee of the Republican convention of 1920. A resident of Marion, Ohio, Harding had been favorably impressed by the St. Lawrence issue prior to his inauguration. As a former newspaper publisher, he had already become interested in the additional post-war
prosperity which the seaway showed promise of bringing to Ohio and the great Midwest. His timely endorsement of the seaway from the White House brought to full glow the smoldering fires of controversy over the project.

The first presidential endorsement.— It was shortly after President Harding took the helm of national policy that the great publicity attending the investigation and report of the International Joint Commission burst into headlines. Carefully reading the International Joint Commission's report, the President gave his unqualified endorsement to its findings. On January 16, 1922, Harding sent the formal report of the Joint Commission to the American Congress,\(^1\) where it was subsequently referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for its consideration and review.

But, of far greater interest to advocates of the St. Lawrence program, President Harding sent a special message to the Congress in which he took an unqualified stand in behalf of the seaway. The President

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\(^1\text{Report of the International Joint Commission also summarized in detail in Canada, Parliament, Correspondence between the United States Government and the Government of Canada concerning the St. Lawrence River Development Scheme, Sessional Paper No. 89a (Ottawa: F. A. Adland, 1922).}
pointed out in detail what future benefits in terms of economic growth of the nation the seaway would bring.

I have spoken of the advantages which Europe enjoys because of its access to the sea, the cheapest and surest transportation facility. In our own country is presented one of the world’s most attractive opportunities for extension of the seaway many hundred miles inland. The heart of the continent with its vast resources in both agriculture and industry, would be brought in communication with all the ocean routes by the execution of the St. Lawrence Waterway Project. To enable ocean-going vessels to have access to all the ports of the Great Lakes would have a most stimulating effect upon the industrial life of the continent’s interior.

The President demonstrated that he was not oblivious to the difficulties surrounding the fate of the seaway. He took cognizance of the fact that powerful sections of the United States did not favor a seaway treaty and that certain problems of an international nature would have to be resolved.

The feasibility of the project is unquestioned and its cost, compared with some other great engineering works would be small. Disorganized and prostrate, the nations of central Europe are even now setting their hands to the development of a great continental waterway which, connecting the Rhine and Danube, will bring water transportation from the Black Sea to the North Sea, from the Mediterranean to the

Baltic. If nationalistic prejudices and economic difficulties can be overcome by Europe, they certainly should not be formidable obstacles to an achievement less expensive and giving promise of greater advantages to the people of North America. 3

Seaway advocates throughout the nation rejoiced at having the formal endorsement of the White House for their program.

Following up his special message, President Harding did not delay in renewing his stand in favor of the seaway. Taking the opportunity presented by his address on the State of the American Merchant Marine on February 28, 1922, Harding told the Congress:

We have had a new manifestation of this broadened vision in the enthusiasm of the great Middle West for the proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, by which it is intended to connect the Great Lakes ports with the marts of the world. There is far-seeing wisdom in the proposal, and this great and commendable enterprise, deserving your favorable consideration is inseparable from a great merchant marine. 4

The immediate effect of the unequivocal Harding stand for the seaway was the consolidation of forces advocating and opposing the seaway. For the first

3Ibid.

time in history an American Chief Executive had taken a positive stand on the issue. Both sides, in and out of the halls of Congress, began to martial support for their views.

The congressional reaction.— Support for the President's stand poured in from the great Middle West. With the full backing of midwestern business, commercial, agricultural, and labor organizations, pro-seaway congressmen began to push for an early approval of the seaway. Congressman W. E. Chalmers of Ohio introduced a resolution on January 23, 1922, providing for "The establishment of an international board to have jurisdiction of the construction, operation, and control of the improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway." On February 1, 1922, Congressman Mapes of Michigan introduced a bill to provide for "a deep waterway for ocean-going vessels from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Ocean by way of the St. Lawrence and Welland Canal." The Senate

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Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, packed with midwesterners, favorably reported a resolution recommending that the United States negotiate a treaty to bring about the construction of the deep waterway.\textsuperscript{7}

As was later to be the case with five succeeding American Presidents, Harding could not hope to make the St. Lawrence issue a matter of party policy. The St. Lawrence problem was very much a non partisan issue. Supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, opposed by Republicans and Democrats alike, geographical and functional interests took precedence over any party or administration loyalties. The most liberal congressman and his most conservative colleague, while customarily disagreeing on many issues, were often found in the same corner when the St. Lawrence question was under consideration.

As proponents of the seaway flocked to support the Administration stand, opponents, too, began to coordinate their efforts in insure its defeat. Much bitter opposition continued to come from the Atlantic States. New York, in particular, feared that the ports

\textsuperscript{7}S. Res. 215, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 1922.
of Canada and the Great Lakes would become the recipients of much of the international trade now being channeled through the Port of New York. Joined in common alliance with the ports of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, New York City interests led the powerful opposition of the East to the President's stand. They still retained the old idea that, if any money at all were to be spent on Great Lakes-to-ocean canals, that money should be spent on an all-American canal.

Much of the lower Mississippi Valley and the Gulf coast States were decisively opposed to the seaway for similar reasons. Business, commercial and agricultural groups in this area feared that the St. Lawrence seaway would send commerce to the east coast through Canada rather than down the Mississippi and through the port of New Orleans. The far western

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8 Representative of the opinion of New York and other east coast port interests were the following articles: S. Wallace Dempsey, U.S. Congressman, N.Y., "All American Route Connecting the Great Lakes and the Atlantic," Port of New York, 5 (April, 1926), pp. 3-10; Alfred E. Smith, Governor, N.Y., "Proposal for All American Ship Canal Connecting the Great Lakes with the Atlantic Ocean," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 122 (March 20, 1926), pp. 1599-1561; and Alfred E. Smith, "All American Ship Canal," Port and Terminal, 6 (May, 1926), pp. 5-6.
American States were generally apathetic to the project in as much as they believed that they would not gain or lose anything by its construction.

Even at this early period various powerful functional groups began to raise formidable opposition to the Harding program. Foremost of these interests was the Association of American Railroads. A perennial foe of the seaway, the nation's railroads were fiercely and unalterably opposed to the project on the grounds that vastly increased water transportation of midwestern bulk commodities would drastically cut their freight hauling revenues. 9 American utilities and their allies, particularly the private power companies, were for the development of the electrical energy of the St. Lawrence, but only if such development could be privately controlled. American owners of Great Lakes vessels were staunchly united in opposition to the seaway because the coming of ocean vessels to the Great Lakes could conceivably drive them out of

9 No private interest group has waged a more thorough and costly battle against the seaway than the American Railroads. Typical of their opposition to the seaway are these pamphlets: The Entering Wedge (Washington: Association of American Railroads, 1951); and Billion Dollar Blunder on Borrowed Money (Washington: Association of American Railroads, 1951).
business. In later years many other interest groups were to work together in powerful lobbying against the project.

In one form or another, opponents of the project generally raised six primary objections to its construction. The first two objections were reflective of prevailing American isolationism and national self interest. (1) Any canal construction should not be built in foreign territory with American money. (2) The St. Lawrence seaway could not be controlled by the United States in case of war or national emergency. The next two reasons were frank appeals to protect American business from harm. (3) Great national business interests would be severely hurt by this unfair Government intervention. (4) Vast existing American port facilities on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts would be greatly curtailed. The last two reasons were general in nature and designed to appeal to all Americans. (5) The seaway would be far too expensive for what few benefits it might conceivably bring to the nation. (6) The seaway would mean increased taxation for every American.

The President proposes a treaty. — Underestimating
the increasing power and determination of the foes of the project, President Harding directed his capable Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, to open treaty negotiations with the Dominion Government. On May 17, 1922, Secretary Hughes dispatched a carefully worded note to Canada. He notified the Dominion that President Harding favored the immediate negotiation of a treaty to be framed on the basis of the report of the International Joint Commission, or "such modifications as might be agreed upon." Hughes stated that President Harding was most eager to announce to the public that he had started treaty negotiations. Furthermore, Harding suggested that either the two Governments immediately conclude a treaty on the basis of the report of the International Joint Commission or else conclude a treaty with modifications to be left to future agreement after the treaty had been signed.


The tone of the message could leave no doubt that the United States was eager for a treaty at the earliest possible moment.

While President Harding was awaiting the reply of the Canadian Government, Prime Minister W. L. MacKenzie King selected June of 1922 as the time for a visit to Washington. The purpose of the visit was ostensibly to confer over Canadian-American cooperation for post-war economic development. At a series of conferences with President Harding and Secretary Hughes, Prime Minister King offered no encouragement for an immediate St. Lawrence treaty. The nation's press erroneously reported that the two national leaders planned shortly to open negotiations for a St. Lawrence treaty.

Such reports proved to be far too optimistic as very quickly the Dominion Government announced its unwillingness "at the present time" to conclude a treaty looking to the development of the St. Lawrence River.


13 Ibid., p. 551.

This rather curt refusal of the Canadians to join in a mutual St. Lawrence improvement program was a severe blow to the aspirations of President Harding and thousands of seaway supporters. In the light of analysis, however, the Canadian rejection of American treaty overtures was not unexpected.

Canadian interest in the seaway not strong.—In many respects similar to the American internal dissension over the seaway, Canada, too, was beset by a fierce disagreement as to the desirability of the project. Prime Minister King, an astute politician, could find no unanimity of opinion in his own nation as to the worth of the program. The most populous Province, Ontario, was located deep in the heart of the landlocked continent. For many of the same reasons as the American Midwest, Ontario stood to gain from the construction of the seaway. The economic interests of this Province were generally favorable to bringing ocean ships to their harbors and ports. The obvious advantage to Ontario from the seaway was recognized from the first by Conservative Party leaders who controlled the provincial parliament. In fact, in 1922, the Ontario parliament passed a resolution calling for
construction of the St. Lawrence seaway without one dissenting vote. 15

Although a preponderance of informed opinion in Ontario favored the construction of the seaway, such was not the case in the other important Province of Quebec. Again, for many of the same reasons advocated by American Atlantic and Gulf coast States, the Province of Quebec was opposed to the seaway. The two most important ports of Canada, Montreal and Quebec, feared the ocean shipway because their large warehousing and transhipment business would be curtailed when ocean vessels could go directly to Great Lakes ports. The Parliament of Quebec did not hesitate to express its distaste for the whole project. 16

As the Province of Quebec was the strongest supporter of the dominant Liberal Party, of which Mr. King was


national leader, the Prime Minister could not proceed without alienating a powerful section of his own party. Furthermore, unlike the United States, the Dominion Government was in the process of a great national railroad expansion directly financed from Ottawa. To complete the seaway would only undermine the worth of the Government owned railway system which was even then having a shaky start.

Even the question of the desirability of electrical power from the St. Lawrence was an issue for bitter debate in Canada. The Province of Ontario was in need of additional electrical energy to feed its growing business and consumer economy. Ontario had previously embarked upon a program of public development of power through its provincial corporation, the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission. Not infrequently, the Hydro Commission was compelled to purchase additional power from private electric companies in Quebec where power was plentiful. Ontario, therefore, was not only desirous of procuring the seaway but could also use additional electrical power from the St. Lawrence. The Province of Quebec, conversely, feared not only economic loss from the
seaway, but had nothing to gain from the power phase of the project.

As was also the case in the United States, Canada's vast western provinces were largely apathetic to the St. Lawrence program. Since Mr. King depended to a great extent on the power of the Liberal Party in the Province of Quebec for his tenure in office, he was compelled to move slowly, if at all, for a St. Lawrence treaty. Coupled with internal disagreement over the project was perennial Canadian distrust and fear of the United States. Indeed, the feeling in Canada was widespread that the United States would reap many more advantages from the seaway than would the Dominion. Viewed in the light of national politics, as well as from the international standpoint, Canada's rejection of the Harding overtures was not at all surprising.

The conclusion.—With the sudden and untimely death of President Harding, his role in the seaway issue came to an abrupt end. In many respects his short Administration was to go down in history as one of the worst ever suffered by the American people. He did, however, show the courage and the foresight to urge the construction of the St. Lawrence project.
In his brief tenure in office he had achieved two important "firsts" for the St. Lawrence program.
(1) He was the first President to place his St. Lawrence policy squarely before the Congress and the American people. (2) He was also the first Chief Executive to propose the negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty to the Dominion of Canada.

Harding's treaty proposals were to prove to be far too premature. He could not definitely count on a majority of Congress to support him. The international situation was definitely not conducive to favorable consideration of any proposed treaty. President Harding's stand on the St. Lawrence project did serve, however, to consolidate and solidify both support and opposition for the program, and, in this respect, Harding insured the fact that the St. Lawrence would continue to be widely discussed and debated by the people of both nations.

Calvin Coolidge and the St. Lawrence Project

Although scarcely a forceful or dynamic President, Calvin Coolidge early pledged his Administration to continue Harding's program with regard to the St.
Lawrence River. As a native son of Massachusetts, Mr. Coolidge might well have ignored the question of the seaway as a detriment to the economy of the Atlantic coastal States. Some doubt was at first entertained by advocates of the seaway when Mr. Coolidge assumed the office of President. Coolidge quickly dispelled such doubts by stating in his first Annual Message to the Congress on December 6, 1923, that "the development of the great power and navigation project on the St. Lawrence River should have the immediate consideration of Congress." The new President was most favorably impressed with the potential benefits to American business, agriculture, and labor which the seaway and power project promised to achieve.

Having full knowledge of his predecessor's rebuff by the Canadian Government over St. Lawrence treaty overtures, Calvin Coolidge quietly contemplated his own course of future action. American opinion on the value of the project was badly splintered. Canadian politics dictated a policy of extreme caution in as

much as the Dominion was clearly unsympathetic to any hasty treaty negotiations. The reluctance of the Canadian Government to consider a treaty at that time was vividly expressed in a statement to the press made by Canadian Minister of Public Works, Mr. J.H. King.

I do not think the Government of Canada or the people of Canada are in a position to consider the project of the St. Lawrence Waterway, and they will not be in a position until it has been thoroughly investigated by a board of engineers representing Canadian interests. Every indication seemed to point out the fact that the Dominion was in no frame of mind to welcome any new American treaty overtures.

Coolidge proposes a treaty.— Seemingly undaunted now by this Canadian attitude, President Coolidge made a direct overture to the Dominion to enter into the immediate negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty. On November 17, 1923, the President informed Ottawa that the United States was desirous of completing the treaty at once. On January 30, 1924, Prime Minister King


rather bluntly informed the President that the Dominion did not wish to enter any treaty negotiations until the entire project could be further investigated, and, more particularly, investigated from the point of view of Canadian national interests.

The Dominion proposed that the Joint Board of Engineers be enlarged, according to the recommendation of the International Joint Commission, to investigate more thoroughly the technical side of the problem. Furthermore, Canada decided to establish its own National Advisory Committee which would proceed to an investigation of the project from the standpoint of Canadian national self interest. After the conclusion of these two additional investigations, then, and only then, would the Dominion consider the possibility of negotiating a treaty for the St. Lawrence.

The full implication of the Canadian reply was not lost upon the Coolidge Administration. The Canadian Government was plainly not disposed to undertake an early consideration of a St. Lawrence treaty. As further pressure upon the Dominion seemed useless, the

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20 Ibid., pp. 342-343.

21 Ibid., p. 343.
Administration could do little but go along with Canadian proposals for further investigation.

On February 27, 1924, Secretary of State Hughes conveyed the President's reaction to the Canadian Government. President Coolidge agreed with Mr. King that the joint Board of Engineers should be enlarged from two to six members, three from each nation, for the purpose of making further engineering investigations. Since Canada had indicated her plan to establish a National Advisory Committee to investigate the Canadian side of the problem, Coolidge informed King that he would establish a similar American body to investigate the seaway question from the viewpoint of the United States.

In a last-ditch attempt to keep the door to a treaty open, the President stated that the United States favored the immediate negotiation of a projet of a treaty with the final terms to be decided after the outcome of these new investigations. In order to expedite a treaty, the United States proposed that both national advisory committees, as well as both sections

22Ibid., pp. 343-345. Text of note from Secretary Hughes to Prime Minister King dated February 7, 1924.
of the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers, should meet in joint conferences from time to time.

The Canadian reply, although couched in the language of diplomacy, all but slammed the door on a St. Lawrence treaty for the time being. Canada definitely rejected the American proposal that the two national advisory committees meet in joint session claiming that such joint conferences would defeat the whole purpose of their creation, i.e. the investigation of national interests. The attitude of the Dominion Government clearly precluded any hopes for an immediate St. Lawrence treaty. President Coolidge took this rebuke in stride and patiently awaited the outcome of the projected investigations.

A period of further investigation. As a direct result of this Canadian-American exchange of views, the United States St. Lawrence Commission was created by President Coolidge on March 14, 1924. By presidential directive, the Commission was ordered to investigate the St. Lawrence issue from the viewpoint of vital American interests and to report its recommendations to the

\[23^{ibid.}, pp. 346-347.\] Text of Canadian note dated March 12, 1924.
The membership of this United States St. Lawrence Commission was composed of six men of unusually high calibre and of widely varying views as to the worth of the project. The President selected Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover as chairman of the Commission. Mr. Hoover, who was later to play even more important parts in the development of the seaway, had been an advocate of the project from as early as the year 1920. His vast engineering experience and keen business acumen made Mr. Hoover an ideal choice to head so important a commission.

The five other members of the Commission were carefully selected by the President to represent prevalent opposing views. Besides Mr. Hoover, the other members were: William C. Breed, attorney, New York City, former President of the New York Merchant's Association;


James E. Davidson, Bay City, Michigan, Vice President of the American Ship Building Company; James P. Goodrich, Winchester, Indiana, former Governor of Indiana; James R. Howard, Chicago, former president of the American Farm Bureau Federation; and James D. Noonan, St. Louis, American Federation of Labor.

In the White House, President Coolidge read a prepared statement to the newly appointed commissioners and to the representatives of the press explaining his reasons for appointing the St. Lawrence Commission.

It is my desire that the Commission should thoroughly consider the whole project in its economic and national aspects, should solicit the views of the various sections of the country, should be able to express an opinion as to whether or not the project should be undertaken at the present time. If this judgment should be in the affirmative, then I wish the Commission to consider the formulation of such projects as might be submitted for international agreement on construction, finance, and administration—all of which of course must be of a preliminary nature as a basis for formal negotiations with the Canadian Government, and obviously subject to the views of Congress. 26

With an economy of language Mr. Coolidge briefly pointed out the importance of the project to the United States and then said to Secretary Hoover:

26Coolidge remarks quoted in "Public Improvements," Congressional Digest, 3 (June, 1924), p. 291.
The project of opening the Great Lakes to ocean ships, and development of the great power resources of the St. Lawrence River, on behalf of both the Canadian and American people, has been a hope long cherished by many millions of our people and it is in the desire that this matter, if it is sound and practicable, should be brought one step nearer to consummation that I am asking you and your fellow commissioners to serve in this matter. 27

With the conclusion of these simple ceremonies, the United States St. Lawrence Commission started a three year study on American interests and the St. Lawrence project.

Quickly thereafter President Coolidge made his appointment of the three American members of the newly enlarged Joint Board of Engineers. The Chief Executive on April 2, 1924, announced the appointment of Major General Edgar Jadwin, chief of United States Army Engineers; Colonel William Kelly, Corps of Engineers; and Lieutenant George B. Pillsbury, Corps of Engineers, these men comprising the Board. Meeting with three Canadian engineers, the enlarged Joint Board launched an investigation into the technical phase of the project. 28

27 Ibid.
On May 7, 1924, the Dominion Government revealed the appointment of three Canadian engineers to constitute its section of the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers.29 The Canadian appointees were Duncan W. McLachlan, engineer with the Department of Railways and Canals; Olivier O. Lefebvre, Chief Engineer, Quebec Streams Commission; and Brigadier General Charles Hamilton Mitchell, civil engineer, Toronto.

On the same day the Canadian Government also announced the appointment of its National Advisory Committee.30 The Committee consisted of Thomas Ahearn, Ottawa; Walter E. Foster, St. John; Beaudry Leman, Montreal; Edward D. Martin, Winnipeg; Wilfred L. McDougald, Montreal; Sir Clifford Sifton, Toronto; Major General John W. Stewart, Vancouver; and Adelard Turgeon, Quebec. At the appointment of the Committee, Prime Minister King explained its function.

It would be in the public interest to constitute a National Advisory Committee to consider generally whether or not the project would, if completed, be beneficial to Canada, whether the benefits which might accrue and the pecuniary returns, direct or indirect, which may be anticipated from it are such as to counterbalance its.


30 Ibid., Order-in-Council dated May 7, 1924.
disadvantages, if any, and whether to enter into discussions with the United States of America looking towards the negotiation of a treaty for the carrying out of the necessary works, and what should the character of the stipulations which any such treaty should contain. 31

On April 28, 1924, Secretary Hughes reported officially to the Dominion Government the American appointment of the St. Lawrence Commission and the American section of the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers. 32 Through an exchange of notes dated February 4, 1925, four technical officers, two from each nation, were appointed to frame the questions for the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers to consider in their investigation. 33 Through another exchange of notes dated March 17, 1925, the completed terms of reference were officially sent to the Board. 34

American interest in the St. Lawrence project.

While international and national investigations were

31 Ibid., p. xii.


33 Ibid., p. 490.

34 Ibid., pp. 490-491.
proceeding with intentional slowness, American internal politics continued to play a part in the future of the St. Lawrence program. Regardless of the variation of viewpoints on the merits of the seaway within both the Republican and Democratic parties, the national conventions of 1924 both adopted planks favoring the construction of the seaway and power project.35

Demonstrating once again that the St. Lawrence project was not a partisan issue, both parties stated their willingness to support it. Action, however, was a different thing entirely. Bitter feelings among geographical and functional interests could not be hidden by empty words of support. So intense was the growing conflict between the Midwest and the east coast that veteran seaway advocate Senator Charles E. Townsend of Michigan was moved to say:

"Yet, New York, actuated by selfishness and permeated with craft, seeks to maintain its unholy monopoly and bring tribute from every merchant, manufacturer, and farmer, every man, woman, and child in the United States."

After his successful bid for election, President

36Ibid., p. 301.
Coolidge again announced in his Annual Message of December 3, 1924, that "Every effort is being made to promote an agreement with Canada to build the St. Lawrence Waterway."\(^{37}\) The seaway itself was debated most intensely throughout the United States but with little promise of positive results.

In the halls of Congress there was increasing evidence that the old idea of an all-American seaway was not dead. The Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1925, contained money for an engineering investigation of possible water routes through an all-American canal in New York State.\(^{38}\) At the same time, the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act for 1925\(^{39}\) approved by the President March 4, 1925, carried an appropriation of $275,000 for the American section of the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers.


\(^{39}\)H.R. 12392.
Continuing its pro-seaway activity, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association resumed its campaign for the project. The Tidewater Association commissioned Alfred H. Ritter, one of the nation's leading authorities on the economics of water transportation, to conduct an independent investigation of the seaway. His impartial research showed the St. Lawrence project to be economically justifiable and most advantageous to the future economies of Canada and the United States.\(^4^0\)

Very shortly after, and more official, reports were to occupy the attention of advocates and opponents of the project. On November 16, 1926, the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers announced the results of its investigations into the technical phase of the St. Lawrence project.\(^4^1\) The Board was in agreement that, from the engineering viewpoint, the seaway and power project was quite feasible and definitely desirable. The estimated cost of a twenty-five foot navigation


project and full power development of the river was $625,000,000 to $650,000,000. This International Board of Engineers agreed on most of the details of the project. There was, however, a disagreement as to whether the project should consist of a single stage power development with one dam at Barnhart Island, or a two stage development with dams at Morrisburg and Cornwall. American members of the Board preferred the former and Canadians, the latter.

While advocates of the seaway were heartened by this engineering report, opponents were not at all happy over the latest of the Army Engineer's reports on their examination of a possible canal from the Great Lakes to the Hudson River through the State of New York. The Army Engineers rated the project far too costly for its anticipated returns. The House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, dominated by anti-seaway members, in anger ordered the Army Engineers to review and re-examine their report. On December 6, 1926, the engineers submitted a second report on the same subject with the same findings. Heaping insult upon

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the Committee, the engineers even went outside the scope of their report to announce their preference for the St. Lawrence seaway instead of an all-American canal. The repeated findings of engineers had clearly shown that the all-American canal was not a practical substitute for the St. Lawrence waterway.

Other Army engineering reports were presented to the Congress. A survey of Great Lakes ship channels showed that all of the Great Lakes were then connected by channels of a minimum depth of twenty feet, and relatively little further work would be needed to bring them up to the proposed twenty-five foot depth of the St. Lawrence seaway. Another engineering report surveyed the traffic on the Great Lakes for the purpose of demonstrating potential usefulness of the proposed waterway.

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On December 27, 1926, the much heralded report of the United States St. Lawrence Commission was presented to President Coolidge by Secretary Hoover. The report of this committee was important in that it represented primarily the American national interest in the project. The St. Lawrence Commission presented a bulky report which made four vital recommendations. (1) The construction of the seaway from the Great Lakes to the sea was considered to be imperative both for present economic conditions and for the future development of the Middle West. (2) The shipway should be constructed on the St. Lawrence route, provided suitable arrangements could be made for joint construction with the Dominion of Canada. (3) The development of power resources of the St. Lawrence should be undertaken by appropriate agencies in Canada and the United States. (4) The negotiations for a treaty should start immediately. In such negotiations for a treaty the Commission recommended that the State of New York and its relation to the power development be given consideration.

The optimism of the St. Lawrence Commission for the project, so explicitly stated, bolstered support in congressional circles, as well as within the Administration. President Coolidge took the opportunity in his Annual Message of December 6, 1926, to re-assert his policy with regard to the seaway. The Chief Executive stated:

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the importance of such a waterway not only to our mid-continental basin but to the commerce and development and to the whole nation. Our river and harbor improvement should be continued in accordance with the present policy. 47.

Although President Coolidge was famed for his high regard of "economy in government," He believed that expenditure on this project was justified.

Expenditure of this character is compatible with economy; it is in the nature of a capital investment. Work should proceed on the basis of trunk lines; if this work is to be a success. If the country will be content to be moderate and patient and permit improvements to be made where they will do the greatest general good, rather than insisting on expenditure at this time on secondary projects, our national waterways can be made a success. 48

Taking full cognizance of various sectional interests

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48 The Coolidge comments quoted in "The St. Lawrence Seaway Project," Congressional Digest, 6 (January, 1927), p. 3.
and their persistent disputes over the value of the seaway, the President urged unity for the general good.

If proposed legislation results in a gross manifestation of local jealousies and selfishness, this program cannot be carried out. Ultimately we can take care of extensions, but our first effort should be confined to the main arteries. 49

Adding his full endorsement of the seaway and power project, Secretary Hoover joined with the President in the controversy.

We have been blessed by Providence with resources in water power greater than any nation in the world. Through the advance of engineering science their possibilities have become a reality, not a dream. These resources are so situated that their use will bring rich reward in wealth and happiness to all of our people. The foundations of agriculture and industry can be strengthened and our population better distributed. We have recovered from the devastating losses of the War; a period of economic strength which enables us to undertake them without national burden. We shall be negligent of our duty if we fail in their development. 50

The words of President Coolidge and Secretary Hoover made little impression on most of the seaway opponents in and out of the halls of Congress. Pressure groups opposing the project intensified their campaign both on

49Ibid.

the general public and, more particularly, upon the Congress. On January 20, 1926, the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors held hearings on the general development of inland waterways including the St. Lawrence and several all-American routes to connect the Great Lakes with the Atlantic. During the first session of the 69th Congress, there were four bills and two resolutions introduced with regard to the construction of the project. The strength of the opposition, becoming more determined with each succeeding year, managed to bottle up these bills in committee.

When President Coolidge officially submitted the report of the United States St. Lawrence Commission to the Congress on January 3, 1927, pro-seaway Congressmen were ready with a program of action. Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota presented a resolution requesting the President to enter into negotiations with Great Britain (Canada) for joint construction of a shipway from the Great Lakes to the

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ocean through the St. Lawrence River. Again, the powerful opposition stifled any possible action.

Although action on the congressional front was temporarily stalled, such was not the case within the official White House family. The United States Department of Commerce reported the results of its study of economic potentialities of the seaway on January 29, 1927. This report was greeted with enthusiasm by seaway advocates because it showed that construction could be justified on the basis of present traffic and future economic improvement.

The disagreement between the Canadian and American sections of the Joint Board of Engineers was resolved in a report of the Board dated July 13, 1927. The American section bowed to the wishes of the Canadian section for a two dam power site at Chrysler Island.


54 Canada, Parliament, St. Lawrence Waterway, 1928, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
With this only major disagreement erased, the Joint Board of Engineers was nearly prepared to begin the actual work of construction.

**Coolidge again asks a treaty.** As the report of the United States St. Lawrence Commission had fully endorsed the seaway project from the American viewpoint, President Coolidge decided to press Canada once again for the immediate negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty. In a very lengthy note dated April 13, 1927, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg resumed negotiations with the Canadian Government at the point where his predecessor Charles Evans Hughes had stopped in 1925.

Kellogg reviewed the entire history of international negotiations for the seaway, and then informed the Dominion Government that the United States was now ready to start formal negotiations for a St. Lawrence treaty. He inquired directly whether or not the Government of Canada was favorably disposed to this view. The whole question of a treaty had been opened by President Coolidge in the same fashion he had employed four years before.

The Canadian reply dated July 12, 1927, held

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out little hope for any immediate undertaking of formal treaty negotiations. As the Dominion Government was also beset with a wide difference of opinion as to the worth of the project, Prime Minister King was moving with the utmost caution. Canada stated that it had not, as yet, received the report of its own National Advisory Committee. Until that report was received and studied, the Dominion would not be in a position to determine its policy on the American proposed St. Lawrence treaty.

Canada views the St. Lawrence problem.—A persistent disagreement between the Province of Quebec, which opposed the project, and the Province of Ontario, which supported it, caused Prime Minister King to avoid publicity of his Liberal Government's policy. Mr. King had no such security of tenure in office as an American President. His entire Government could possibly stand or fall upon one important issue. The powerful Liberal Party of Quebec gave to Mr. King its solid backing. To alienate Quebec's Liberal leaders on the St. Lawrence situation could possibly cause his downfall. Mr. King was an astute politician and realized the political dynamite the question could become if he made the wrong move. On the other hand,
he was also a far-sighted national leader who fully realized the inevitability of the seaway. Therefore, he severely discouraged parliamentary debate on the whole subject.

Unlike the situation in the United States, the Canadian Conservative Party had managed to make the St. Lawrence a partisan question. In 1927 a resolution was adopted not only favoring the construction of the seaway but demanding that it be made an all-Canadian project.\(^5^6\) The political motivation of this resolution was quite apparent. The Conservatives hoped to topple Mr. King from his political tight rope and force him to take a positive stand one way or the other. There was little doubt that the Conservative Party, so strong in Ontario, did generally favor the project, but its fiery and determined stand for an all-Canadian seaway was motivated by political expediency. Whichever way the Prime Minister moved, his Government would suffer. If he endorsed the project, he could count on the loss of support of many Liberals in Quebec as well as lay himself open to Conservative charges of being "a tool of Washington," a very bad situation for a Canadian

Prime Minister. If he disavowed the project completely, he would alienate Liberals in Ontario and the Canadian Midwest, as well as jeopardize American relations. Therefore, for the time being, Mr. King just would not commit himself. This lack of policy from the Dominion Government was vividly reflected in Canadian stalling tactics throughout most of the preceding international discussions.

An American President, guaranteed four years in office by the Constitution, could afford the luxury of independent programs, but a Canadian Prime Minister without such a guarantee to tenure, could not. Furthermore, a difference in views in the two nations as to party responsibility was most evident. The United States did not have a strong spirit of party unity and responsibility. Although not so strong as in Great Britain, the Canadian concept of party responsibility made it practically unthinkable that a Prime Minister would advocate any program for which he could not get at least majority support from his own party. Such fundamental differences in national government and politics played an important part in St. Lawrence negotiations throughout its history.
Continued American prodding of the Canadian Government served only to embarrass Prime Minister King. Internal conditions as well as a general Canadian reluctance to go along with American plans dictated the expedient policy of "wait and See." When such a person as American Minister to Canada William Phillips toured through the Dominion campaigning energetically for the seaway, his remarks caused Mr. King to shudder. What seemed to be the failure of the American Administration to understand Mr. King's position was a source of constant irritation to the Liberal Government. Mr. King was frequently assailed as an errand boy for Washington by Conservative leaders.

Perhaps without a full realization of Mr. King's precarious position, President Coolidge did not wait to re-assert his stand in favor of the joint construction of the seaway. On December 6, 1927, he informed the Congress that he was pressing the Canadian Government for a St. Lawrence treaty to bring the seaway and power project to completion. 57 Mr. King continued to have

"no comment" for reporters on the President's latest remarks.

On January 11, 1928, Prime Minister King received the report of the National Advisory Committee which, for three years, had been investigating the seaway from the Canadian point of view. The National Advisory Committee had prepared ten recommendations resulting from its exhaustive investigation of Canadian interests and the seaway.

(1) The Committee concurred in the findings of the enlarged Joint Board of Engineers that the construction of the project was feasible, but preferred a minimum depth of twenty-seven feet in place of the twenty-five foot channel proposed by the Board. (2) From an economic viewpoint the Committee considered that present traffic alone would be sufficient to justify its construction. (3) The Committee did not believe that the Dominion could possibly afford to pay the entire cost of an all-Canadian seaway or even half the cost of the St. Lawrence seaway. (4) Proposed improvements in the national section of the St.

Lawrence should be made by the Dominion alone. (5) The Joint Board of Engineers should conduct further investigations so that all remaining differences, however minor, would be completely resolved.

(6) In view of the far greater expenditures made by Canada in the past on links in the seaway, the United States should assume the total cost of all navigation constructions in the international section as well as the entire cost for deepening all Great Lakes connecting channels. (7) The Committee was of the opinion that all construction works for the international section of the St. Lawrence River, both for power and navigation, should be under the control and supervision of an international commission. (8) In view of the particular positions of the Province of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, they should be consulted about the construction of the proposed works.

(9) The proposed power plants in the international section of the river would realize 2,200,000 horsepower, half for each nation. As the Province of Ontario needed power, but could not fully utilize so much additional power at one time, a delay might be necessary. The
Committee made it clear that they were opposed to any export of surplus power from the project to the United States. (10) As to the question of whether or not the project should be made the subject of a treaty or merely an agreement under existing treaties, they made no recommendation leaving that to the Government itself.

In contrast with the report of the United States St. Lawrence Commission, the report of the National Advisory Committee of Canada was replete with disagreements over the recommendations of the International Joint Commission and the Board of Engineers. In effect, the Hoover group had "rubber stamped" the work of the Joint Commission, while the Canadians took exception to many points.

Diplomatic manoeuvring.-- The Canadian Government framed an official reply to American treaty overtures. The Dominion answer was presented to Secretary Kellogg by Canadian Minister Vincent Massey on January 31, 1928. Canada followed faithfully the recommendations

of its National Advisory Committee interposing numerous objections to the original report of the International Joint Commission and the Board of Engineers.

Following the Canadian reply, President Coolidge and Secretaries Kellogg and Hoover conferred at the White House to frame the American answer to Canadian objections to the original Joint Commission report. Developing from these conferences was a general feeling that the United States would yield to Canadian views, but President Coolidge made it plain that the proposed costs would have to be fairly divided. On this point the Chief Executive was most adamant.

A note dated March 12, 1928, by Secretary Kellogg gave the American reply to the Dominion. Kellogg revealed that, while the United States was not in complete accord with representations made by the Dominion Government, it was still inclined to regard as an acceptable basis of negotiation a proposal along the general lines suggested.

60 Ibid., pp. 71-75; Ibid., pp. 12-15.
The United States agreed that Canada should be permitted to construct works lying within its boundaries in the national section of the river. The United States was agreeable to constructing all navigation works in the international section of the St. Lawrence. The United States would accept the Canadian view that all constructions provide for a uniform depth of twenty-seven feet instead of the twenty-five foot depth proposed by the Joint Commission. The United States endorsed the Canadian view that the disposition of all power from the St. Lawrence was purely a question of domestic policy. Furthermore, the American Government agreed that all constructions in the international section be built under the supervision of an international commission. The United States agreed to safeguard the interests of Ontario and Quebec in the project, and to refer to the Joint Engineering Board differences of opinion on technicalities of construction yet unresolved.

Although the United States had agreed with Canada on most of its proposals, the American Government made a major issue out of the proposed costs which each nation would bear in completing the seaway. The United
States objected strongly to the proposed allocation of costs. Canada desired to be given credit for all of its past expenditures on canals and locks along the seaway. The Welland Canal and other canals on the St. Lawrence River had cost the Dominion $200,000,000. The United States had expended only $13,000,000 to date in providing links in the seaway, largely in Great Lakes connecting channels. Therefore, Canada was willing to divide the total costs of the seaway and powerhouses equally between the two nations but insisted upon deducting previous expenditures. This stipulation, in effect, meant that Canada would pay approximately $190,000,000 as its share of the final costs while the United States would have to pay about $350,000,000.

To this the American Government voiced its objections stating that it did not consider it proper to include the costs of past works which would have to be largely replaced in the final constructions. The United States would be agreeable, however, to accept all Canadian constructions made in the past which formed a direct link in the over-all project, mainly the Welland Canal. The United States also pointed out that the power phase of the project would be self-
liquidating so that, in the long run, neither Government would have to pay the costs.

Secretary Kellogg went to great lengths in denying the Canadian inference that the United States would benefit much more than Canada from the construction of the seaway and power project. Kellogg stated that while the United States had many outlets by rail and water from the Midwest to the eastern and southern ports of the nation, Canada had only one water navigation system capable of carrying bulk commodities to the markets of the world. Secretary Kellogg was of the opinion that the controversy over cost allocation would be worked out without undue difficulty. He then proposed that both nations proceed to the appointment of commissioners to prepare a St. Lawrence treaty.

On April 5, 1928, Minister Massey delivered another Canadian note to Secretary Kellogg. Indicative of the Dominion's desire to move with the utmost caution, this note emphasized the necessity of further conversations between the two nations over engineering, financial, and procedural problems still unresolved. In addition, the Dominion announced its intention to

61 Ibid., pp. 75-77; Ibid., pp. 15-16.
refer to the Supreme Court of Canada the question concerning relative federal and provincial rights with regard to the waterway and the power development. The Canadian Government also wished to confer with the two provincial Governments in order to reconcile any differences in regard to the seaway which were outstanding. Until all difficulties were resolved, the Government did not believe that it could go ahead with the appointment of commissioners to formulate a St. Lawrence treaty.

President Coolidge was clearly irked by Canadian plans for another delay. In a lengthy note to the Dominion the President stated that the United States was most sympathetic with the Canadian desire to compromise internal problems and to clarify any remaining disagreements with the American Government. The United States, however, could see no reason why the negotiation of a treaty should await the solving of every petty detail. Coolidge maintained that remaining difficulties were largely superficial and could be solved easily while treaty negotiations were in progress. With great determination, Coolidge pointed out that the St. Lawrence project was already one of the

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Ibid., pp. 77-78; Ibid., pp. 1617.
most investigated international programs in the history of the world. Even clouded in the language of diplomacy, his note amounted to a virtual demand that Canada should cease stalling and get down to the serious business of negotiating a treaty.

The end of the Coolidge era.- If the Coolidge Administration had thought that increased pressure on the Dominion Government would hasten the conclusion of a St. Lawrence treaty, it was mistaken. No amount of pressure from the White House could make Prime Minister King rush into the negotiation of a treaty. American prodding did have the effect of causing Mr. King to make one of his rare public statements on his policy toward the St. Lawrence.

If the project, as I believe it to be, is one that will come in the course of time, and which has very much, even now, to commend it, if certain economic considerations can be satisfactorily met, then it will be made all the more certain of accomplishment by being advanced cautiously step by step, but always in the right direction. 63

It was obvious that Mr. King had no desire to enter into the immediate negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty. In 1911 the Liberal Government of Canada had

appealed to the electorate on a proposal which contemplated closer commercial relations with the United States. It had been decisively beaten. Most observers in Canada were of the opinion that, without a more general demand throughout the country for such action than existed, the Liberal Government of Mr. King would hardly invite a similar fate by staking its political life on a St. Lawrence program.

In future years Mr. King's "go slow" policy proved to be the more realistic. President Coolidge's insistence on a St. Lawrence treaty was decidedly premature. Official Canadian opinion refused to discuss the proposed development of the St. Lawrence waterway. The Government severely discouraged all consideration of the project both in the Parliament and in official circles. The variations of opinion in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec continued to exert a neutral policy from the federal Government.

It was made very clear that Canada would do nothing at the time to advance the cause of the seaway. The United States was left in the position of vainly seeking a Canadian commitment which seemed unlikely to materialize. A special committee of the Canadian
Senate conducted an investigation to determine the extent of the sentiment in the Dominion for and against the seaway. This survey of public opinion revealed very plainly that there was a great deal of opposition to the project. The only witnesses appearing for the seaway came from Canadian Great Lakes cities. Much of the opposition testimony was willingly supplied by the business and commercial interests of Montreal and Quebec who still feared the harmful effects of an ocean waterway to the Great Lakes. The investigation pointed out that most of the Canadian nation outside of Ontario was either apathetic or genuinely opposed to a St. Lawrence treaty.

There could be no doubt that President Coolidge, like his predecessor Harding, believed that the construction of the St. Lawrence waterway would be of great benefit to American business, labor, and agriculture. Although Mr. Coolidge vowed his faith in the project, he did not resort to public histrionics to obtain his goal. He pursued his goal with quiet

64 Canada, Parliament, Proceedings of the Special Committee Appointed to Inquire Into the Development of the St. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 54.

and patient determination. He had originally proposed a St. Lawrence treaty shortly after the death of President Harding. After another long series of national and international investigations, Coolidge again pressed the Canadian Government for a treaty.

His determined stand met with an unwavering opposition from the Canadian Government. While his policy was widely applauded by Midwesterners, the rising tide of opposition from eastern and southern States became stronger and stronger. Coolidge's positive support of the St. Lawrence program did serve, however, to unite support for the program. In this way the issue was kept alive and under active consideration in both Canada and the United States. As history has since shown, Mr. Coolidge did not fully realize the power and intensity of the opposition to the seaway, but he did forge still another link in the chain which was eventually to harness the vast resources of the St. Lawrence River for navigation and power.
CHAPTER III
HERBERT C. HOOVER AND THE ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT

The Election of 1928

With the approach of the summer of 1928 thoughts of millions of Americans turned to the forthcoming presidential election. When Calvin Coolidge announced that he did "not choose to run," the Republican Party proceeded to nominate Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover. The Democratic Party, after a serious intra-party squabble, nominated Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York as its standard bearer.

For once there seemed to be some choice for the voters who either favored or opposed the St. Lawrence program. If elected, there could be little doubt that Herbert Hoover would continue to pursue the policy of the preceding Harding and Coolidge Administrations and give his full endorsement to a St. Lawrence treaty. Hoover's avowed support for the project dated from 1920, and he had performed the worthy job of being chairman of the United States St. Lawrence Commission. Hoover's long record of public and private support for
the project would insure another four years of administration efforts in behalf of the St. Lawrence program. ¹

Almost directly on the opposite side of the fence stood Governor Smith. As Governor of New York, he favored the power development phase of the project but had, on numerous occasions, asserted his dislike for the seaway. The Governor preferred the construction of an all-American canal which would work to the advantage of the important Port of New York. There was a marked belief on the part of professional politicians that Smith's election would put an end to negotiations for a seaway treaty. ²

As had been anticipated, Al Smith scrupulously avoided the subject of the St. Lawrence seaway during the course of his campaign. Mr. Hoover made his position on the same subject most clear, and, even before his nomination, informed the press that he would support the project whole heartedly. In the year 1927 Mr. Hoover stated:

I do not think you can find a year of history since that time when the inhabitants of North America have not been digging deeper

²Ibid., p. 156.
canals around one of the great obstacles to this highway to the sea. The scars on this succession of larger and larger canals work on the landscape the grand epochs of our commercial history.

When the actual campaign started in the summer of 1928, Mr. Hoover wasted no time in endorsing completely both the seaway and power projects as a fundamental part of his policy on internal improvements. In his second speech of the campaign, delivered in his home town of West Branch, Iowa, on August 21, 1928, Hoover expressed the view that the construction of the seaway would greatly benefit the depressed economic condition of midwestern farmers as well as the nation in general.

And this development concerns not alone agriculture, but every industry and business in the Midwest. The manufacturer and merchant in this section is suffering from a curtailment of his distribution field; and his business province has shrunk. This development should create a larger diversity of employment and a greater local market for agricultural products. Nor does this development mean the crippling of our railroads. The annual increase in railway traffic will give to them a far more than complete offset to these diversions. Moreover, everything that increases the prosperity of the country also helps the railways.

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Mr. Hoover put himself forthrightly on record by pledging his full support for the project if elected.

The policy of rapid communication of this great project will be continued if the Republican Administration be continued...

It is a vital part of the rehabilitation of the middle west agriculture and business. 5

Emphasizing heavily the value of the seaway to American business and agriculture, Mr. Hoover continued to champion the project throughout the course of his campaign.

The result of the election of 1928 was a very sweeping victory for the "great Engineer." As the new President took the oath of office on March 4, 1929, friends of the St. Lawrence project could rest assured that their cause would be pursued vigorously by the new Chief Executive who had already gained valuable experience and knowledge in the field. The Administration was ably assisted by the new Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, and by the American Minister to Canada, William Phillips.

In the Congress debate raged in the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors over the proposed deepening of the Great Lakes connecting channels to

5Ibid., p. 58.
bring them up to par with the proposed seaway.\(^6\) The sharp emotional outbursts from many witnesses and Congressmen clearly showed that the Hoover stand was not popular in many parts of the nation. Evidence of the increasing controversy over the disposition of power from the St. Lawrence was vividly reflected in the stormy debate in the Senate over the proposed Niagara Falls Treaty of January 2, 1929.\(^7\)

The primary purpose of the Treaty was to preserve the scenic beauty of the Falls which had deteriorated due to large rock slides. Incidental to the Treaty, however, was a provision which gave to the Massena Power Company the right to increased diversions from the Falls for power production. As the Massena Power Company was controlled by the Aluminum Company of America, many Senators considered the treaty a give away.


\(^7\)U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Preservation and Improvement of the Scenic Beauty of the Niagara Falls and Rapids, Senate Document No. 128, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932). The Treaty was rejected by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1931 and withdrawn from the Senate by President Roosevelt in 1935.
of public natural resources. For this reason the Treaty was not approved. The very issue of public against private power development of the St. Lawrence was fast becoming very noticeable, and it greatly complicated the whole St. Lawrence problem. Mr. Hoover quickly found himself engulfed by this new controversy.

Hoover Continues the Coolidge Policy

On February 8, 1929, outgoing Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg stated at a press conference that the United States was continuing to urge upon the Dominion Government immediate negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty. Mr. Kellogg noted that the Canadian Government had declined to consider a treaty until certain disagreements between the Dominion and the provincial Governments of Ontario and Quebec over rights in the seaway and power project could be clarified. The Canadian Government informed the United States that a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada over jurisdictional rights in the project had failed to clarify the situation. Mr. King later informed the


United States that he would undertake a direct conference between himself and Premier Ferguson of Ontario and Premier Taschereau of Quebec. It was hoped that this forthcoming conference could resolve the difficulties. 10

As Mr. Hoover entered the White House he showed a great deal of skepticism about Mr. King's continual excuses for deferring action on a St. Lawrence treaty. In Ottawa, American Minister to Canada William Phillips, a hold-over from the Coolidge Administration, continued to pursue his goal of a St. Lawrence treaty with zeal and perseverance. Roaming at will throughout the Dominion, he had repeatedly urged upon his Canadian audiences a treaty for the seaway. Phillips viewed the seaway as his primary mission during his tenure in Ottawa. His relentless pursuit of this goal was fast becoming a source of embarrassment, if not irritation, to the King Government.

When Henry L. Stimson took over the Department of State in March of 1929, Minister Phillips was quick to ask for a statement of policy from the new Administration and received the expected reply in a very short time. 11

10 Ibid., pp. 523-524.
11 Ibid., p. 524.
After a series of discussions between the President and Secretary Stimson, the latter made it entirely clear to Minister Phillips that the Hoover policy would be identical to that of President Coolidge. President Hoover emphasized that he desired Minister Phillips to continue urging upon the Canadian Government the immediate appointment of commissioners to frame a treaty for the St. Lawrence waterway. There could be no doubt that President Hoover expected to push a St. Lawrence treaty through all means at his disposal.

The Moulton Report

Debate on the St. Lawrence in the halls of Congress was temporarily held to a minimum while both advocates and opponents of the project waited to see how much the Hoover Administration could accomplish with the Canadian Government. Outside the Congress the opposition continued to gain strength and unity. When the Brookings Institution of Washington D.C. published a report of Harold S. Moulton, opponents of the project were decidedly elated. In fact, the

12 Ibid., p. 524.

the Moulton report was the first good news they had had in years. Moulton and his staff presented a complete case against the seaway as well as the power project. On economic grounds the seaway and power project were considered to be unjustifiable. Rather oddly, the Moulton report was the only major impartial study of the project, in its long history, which failed to make out a clear case for its construction.

The Moulton report aroused a wide controversy between the opposing factions. Opponents of the seaway circulated complete texts of the report throughout the United States and managed to gain wide publicity for it. Friends of the seaway pointed out that the Moulton report was strangely at odds with all other national, international, and private investigations of the subject. They bitterly demanded that the Brookings Institution, a very scholarly and respected organization, reveal the source of the funds for this study.15

Repercussions of the Moulton report extended


quickly to the White House. Debate flared as to whether or not Mr. Hoover would change his mind about the project. **New Republic** firmly opposed the seaway at that time and happily editorialized:

In his acceptance speech Hoover said of the St. Lawrence, "There is no more vital method of farm relief." Will he ignore the Moulton report? If this study cannot be upset by an equally careful and disinterested one, Mr. Hoover will have to make a difficult decision. He may feel that his commitments and his reputation as an economist may endure him to try to see it through. But we believe that his reputation would gain more in the long run by an admission that he has been wrong. 16

In spite of the unfavorable publicity given to the seaway by the Moulton report, those who knew President Hoover best were certain that his stand could not be altered. Mr. Hoover never did make a public comment on the Moulton report. Certainly he was aware of the increasing opposition of many sections of the nation, as well as functional interest opposition, but he refused to budge from his commitment. His tacit answer to foes of the project was: to step up attempts to complete a St. Lawrence treaty.

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Canadian Reluctance to Consider a Treaty

As the Autumn of 1929 approached, Minister Phillips continued his one-man campaign in behalf of the seaway. On September 12, 1929, Phillips dispatched two telegrams for the attention of the Administration. The first informed the United States that the long awaited conference between the Prime Minister and the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec over the St. Lawrence would probably be postponed until November. The second telegram informed the President of the desire of the Canadian Government to undertake channel improvements from Lake Ontario to the city of Prescott on both sides of the international boundary.

Minister Phillips stated that it would be dangerous, in his opinion, to the future of the proposed seaway to let Canada proceed with channel developments from Lake Erie and Lake Ontario to Prescott, Ontario. He pointed out that the opening of the new (and fourth) Welland Canal plus proposed channel deepening of the St. Lawrence River would greatly aid Canadian commerce within the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin. The result

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18 Ibid.
might well be a slackened interest in development of the total ocean seaway. As the Port of Prescott had very fine railway connections with Montreal, and thus to the markets of the world, American ports, such as Buffalo and Ogdensburg, with inadequate rail connections then existing, would suffer commercial losses. 19

Phillips then proposed that the Canadian desire for channel improvements within the seaway system might be "horsetraded" for the American desire to proceed with the appointment of commissioners to formulate an over-all treaty. Phillips advised that it would be quite possible for the United States to go as far as to say that since the purpose of the proposed commission was to settle details and costs of improvements in the international section, America would prefer to have the advice and judgment of the commission before undertaking any further piecemeal improvements. The advantages of the New Welland Canal and an improved navigation system in the upper St. Lawrence were considerable to the Dominion, but only

harm might befall the cities of Buffalo and Ogdensburg. Phillips stated that he considered it unwise to allow Canada to move ahead with further channel improvements unless the United States could obtain a guarantee that Canada would not hold up indefinitely the work of improving the entire seaway.

President Hoover gave Phillip's recommendations very serious consideration and then framed new instructions for the American Minister. Mr. Hoover felt confident that the coming conference of Canadian premiers would aid in speeding the construction for the seaway. The President stated that Phillips should continue urging the appointed representatives of the Dominion Government to enter into treaty negotiations. He agreed with Phillips that further improvements in the channels of the St. Lawrence without concluding a treaty for the whole seaway would work hardship on American ports on Lakes Erie and Ontario. Therefore,


the President instructed Phillips to inform Canada that if it would allow the immediate appointment of commissioners to formulate the terms of a treaty, the United States would start, at once, to undertake all channel improvements in the upper St. Lawrence desired by the Dominion. Otherwise, the United States could not consider further channel improvements in the near future.

Carrying out his new instructions, Minister Phillips had an informal discussion with the Canadian Minister of Public Works. This prominent official was definitely of the opinion that, if the United States would not cooperate financially in improving upper St. Lawrence channels, certainly America would permit Canada to do it alone, and without reimbursement. 22

On November 25, 1929, Phillips presented the American proposal squarely to Prime Minister King. The Prime Minister stated that he was not in agreement with the American desire to appoint commissioners to formulate a St. Lawrence treaty. It was his view that any future consideration of a treaty should be in the hands of the International Joint Commission and the Board

of Engineers. Mr. King intimated that he would have nothing further to say on the subject until after his conference with the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec, and after the Joint Board of Engineers had completed plans which would be acceptable to the Canadian Government.23

Once again, Mr. King had made it very plain that his Government would not be inclined to move ahead with plans for a St. Lawrence seaway. And, once again, instead of action, Mr. King had proposed further investigation. Following his comments to Minister Phillips, Prime Minister King reconvened the three member Canadian section of the Joint Board of Engineers. This time the number of engineers was augmented by two representatives of the Province of Ontario. Ontario was given representation because it was the Province which would benefit from the proposed power developments to be constructed in conjunction with the seaway. This five-member Board of Engineers toured the sites of the proposed constructions and held conferences in Ottawa, Toronto, and Quebec in November and December, 1929.

On December 30, 1929, the augmented Board issued

a report of its investigation. The report differed only slightly from the proposed plans of the Joint Board of Engineers. The interests of the Province of Ontario in the construction of power dams were thoroughly harmonized, and the two-stage power construction was again endorsed. In effect, there was now very little disagreement between the American and the Canadian sections of the Joint Board of Engineers as to the technicalities of the proposed constructions. Unfortunately for the project, however, partisan national and international disagreements were not to be resolved so easily.

The attention of the Hoover Administration was turned to Ottawa during the second and third weeks of January, 1930. The long awaited conference of Canadian Premiers was taking place. Present at these meetings were Prime Minister King, Premier Ferguson of Ontario, and Premier Taschereau of Quebec. The hope of the conference was that the questions relating to the rights of the federal Government and the provinces over ownership and control of navigation and power

facilities along the St. Lawrence River could be solved amicably. Although there was never an official communique concerning all that had transpired at this conference, there seemed to be little doubt that the meeting had resulted in an impasse.

Prime Minister King had patiently tried twice to harmonize disagreements within his national family over vested rights in the proposed seaway and power project. The first attempt at solution through a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada had proved inconclusive. The second attempt at adjustment had occurred at the January conferences. This, too, had failed.

The results of the conference were particularly disappointing to President Hoover. It seemed quite obvious that squabbling over "vested legal rights" was merely a cover up for bitter animosities over the value of the seaway within the Dominion.

For political reasons no official announcement has been made of what developed. Officially or not, all Canada knows what happened. They killed the project so far as the Parliament of 1930 is concerned. It is clear there will have to be a considerable reversal of sentiments in Canada before the waterway can ever be forwarded. 25

An analysis of factors surrounding the conference

25"Canadian Premiers Block Road to the Sea," Business Week (February 8, 1930), p. 32.
clearly precluded any speedy approval of the project. Mr. King, himself, still found his Liberal Party torn by sentiment from Quebec to shelve the seaway program. The Conservative Party, with great power in the Province of Ontario, was all for the seaway and power project but demanded that it be made an all-Canadian project without interference from the United States. Even if Mr. King could resolve the differences of opinion in his provincial family, the question of Canadian cooperation with the United States was uncertain. Since Government-owned railroads were moving into the road and increasingly high American tariffs were fast choking off Canadian exports to the United States, the Dominion was in a bad position to appear openly friendly to American overtures. 26 Mr. King, while privately desirous of constructing the seaway, did not believe that the time was right for a treaty. 27 Premier Taschereau of Quebec was most adamant


in his opposition to the project fearing that the ports of Montreal and Quebec would be severely injured by the St. Lawrence constructions. There was generally little support for the seaway or for the power project in his Province. Quebec businessmen considered it economic ruin.  

As for Mr. Ferguson, there was little secret about his views on the St. Lawrence project. He went to the conference at Ottawa frankly confessing the opinion that, "If Canada was going in for the deep waterway scheme, it should be an all-Canadian undertaking, with no sharing of jurisdiction with the United States." His desire for an all-Canadian waterway was in line with the views of his own Conservative Party, which, two years before, had proposed an all-Canadian seaway at its national convention. Representative of the majority of business, agriculture, and labor interests in Ontario, Premier Ferguson believed that both the seaway

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and power project were desirable. For mainly political reasons, Mr. Ferguson attempted to embarrass the King Government with his avowed "anti-American" sentiments.

With the failure of the conference, Mr. King's position was very weak. He and his Government would shortly have to face a national election in which the increasing Canadian depression was to dominate the forum of issues. The time was not advantageous to announce greater cooperation with the United States in such an undertaking.

The Chicago Diversions

As though disagreements on the value of the seaway were not prevalent enough, another issue joined the long list of Canadian-American difficulties. Since the year 1899 the Sanitary District of the city of Chicago had been diverting water from Lake Michigan for a sanitary canal which joined the Illinois River linking it to the Mississippi. Diversions had increased to the point where the city of Chicago was diverting water from Lake Michigan at the rate of 8,500 cubic feet per second by the year 1930. As the levels of the Great Lakes were very low
at that time, Canada persistently complained to the American Government and to the International Joint Commission that the Chicago diversions were causing the level of water in canals, locks, and channels in the entire St. Lawrence water system to become dangerously low. The lowering of channel levels was a great danger to commercial shipping. Other American Great Lakes States also resented the Chicago diversions because they endangered the water levels in their port cities. On January 14, 1929, suit was brought against the Chicago Sanitary District and the State of Illinois by Wisconsin and other interested States in the United States Supreme Court.30 Charles Evans Hughes was appointed by the Court as special master to dispose of the issue.

Hughes, already an authority on St. Lawrence problems, decided that Chicago must begin a gradual reduction in its diversion of water so that by the year 1936 the city could divert no more than 1,500 cubic feet per second. In the meantime, the city was ordered to start the construction of adequate sewage

disposal plants. While this decision was very satisfactory to Canada and to the other American Great Lakes States, Illinois was angered to the point where she withdrew from the Tidewater Association and opposed the entire seaway program for many years to come. Resentful of this decision, Illinois was to become the first and only midwestern Great Lakes State to oppose the entire construction.

The New York State Barge Canal

As was the case in Canada, difficulties within the American family of States were becoming serious problems. Illinois may have been angered over the curtailment of its water diversions, but the State of New York was to present even greater troubles for the Hoover Administration. The New York State Barge Canal, opened with such high hopes in 1918, had proved to be a colossal "white elephant" to the State by 1930. Not only had the canal failed to pay for itself, but it had been operating in the red during the prosperous days of

the 1920's. With the rapidly worsening American depression after 1929, the canal finances became precariously low and caused a very heavy drain on the resources of the State. The losses sustained by this "all-American" canal illustrated quite well numerous engineering reports that the St. Lawrence seaway was the more practical route from the Great Lakes to the ocean.

After a meeting with the New York Water Power Commission, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on April 8, 1930, that he approved the selling of the Barge Canal to the federal Government. 32 Fearful that federal acquisition of the Barge Canal would further stall plans for the international seaway, St. Lawrence advocates were quick to denounce any proposed sale. One of the life-long friends of the seaway, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, met with President Hoover on April 13th and warned him that New York was trying to foist the canal on the federal Government to prevent the St. Lawrence improvements. 33 Fully aware of a possible

delay in the seaway, Hoover quickly rejected the New York offer.

Canada Has A Change In Governments:

In Canada, meanwhile, more heat was being generated by the national elections of July, 1930. In a campaign dominated by depression politics, Prime Minister King and his Liberal Government went down to defeat at the hands of the Conservatives under the adroit leadership of R. B. Bennett. The depression was fast becoming acute in Canada, just as it was in the United States. The Bennett program called for a drastic series of internal economic reforms not too dissimilar from Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal two years later in the United States. Bennett had promised a return to prosperity, and Canadian voters were inclined to give him the chance to perform.

Precisely what change, if any, the Conservative Government would make in its regard to the St. Lawrence question was a topic of pointed discussion in the United States. American observers agreed that the Bennett Government could scarcely have a worse record than the preceding King Government for protracted.
delays in treaty negotiations. If any thing, the Bennett Government seemed to be more inclined to favor the St. Lawrence development program.

It appeared to veteran observers of Canadian politics that Prime Minister Bennett and his Conservative Government would be much more favorably disposed to the seaway for several reasons. The Conservative Party had already gone on record as pledging itself to the construction of the seaway, but as an all-Canadian undertaking. As it was considered unlikely that the Conservatives seriously planned to construct a seaway without American financial aid, its only hope to redeem its pledge was to cooperate with the United States Government. The idea of an all-Canadian seaway was viewed primarily as an attempt to split the opposition Liberal Party.

Furthermore, Mr. Bennett had pledged that his first constructive program would be to restore prosperity to Canadian agriculture, business, and labor. The depression actually seemed to boost chances for the construction of the seaway in view of the fact that repeated national and international studies had shown that the seaway could increase commerce in the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence basin. A Canadian investment in the seaway of only about $40,000,000 held some promise of relieving the business and agricultural depression. It seemed as though it would at least be worth a try.

Then, too, the Conservative Party in Canada was in a better position to deal with the United States in the eyes of most Canadians than King's Liberal Party had been. The Conservatives and their leaders had the reputation of being the Canadian party which stood for "provincial rights" and "a policy of toughness toward the United States." The Canadian electorate might well place more confidence in the hope that the Conservatives could drive a "hard bargain" with the United States and more thoroughly safeguard Canadian interests in dealing with America.

With respect to internal politics, Bennett was also in a better position than Mr. King had been. Unlike the Liberal Party, the Conservatives did not have to rely for a large bulk of their support on the Province of Quebec where anti-seaway sentiment was the strongest. The greater support of the Conservative Party was centered in the Province of Ontario where seaway feelings were most favorable. Bennett was in a political
position where he could more easily reach agreement with Premier Ferguson of Ontario, a member of his own party. Prime Minister King and Premier Ferguson had been avowed political foes for many years while Mr. Bennett had had a record of general friendship with the fiery Ontario leader.

Another development in Canada at that time made prospects for the St. Lawrence project appear even brighter. The New Welland Canal, connecting Lakes Erie and Ontario, was nearly completed. It had locks thirty feet deep, eighty feet wide, and eight hundred feet long. The time of its opening, however, was far from propitious. As the international depression worsened, this very expensive canal faced the bleak prospect of declining use. Many Canadians, who formerly had had little interest in the seaway, now believed that the vast waterway should be completed if only to give the New Welland Canal a better chance indirectly to warrant its great cost.

Although Prime Minister Bennett had not yet committed his Government to any further programs of St.

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Lawrence improvement, President Hoover and his administration were generally encouraged by the change in Canadian politics. After a series of conferences with Secretary of State Stimson, Hoover decided that he would not wait to press treaty proposals upon the new Canadian Prime Minister. Therefore, Stimson forthwith sent further instructions to American Minister Hanford MacNider, who had recently replaced William Phillips.

The new instructions definitely reflected the Hoover optimism that the change in Governments would work directly to bring about the speedy consummation of a treaty. MacNider was instructed to ask immediately whether or not Mr. Bennett would consider the negotiation of a St. Lawrence treaty. MacNider confronted the new Prime Minister with the American proposal on September 2, 1930. The Bennett reply was evasive but far from pessimistic. The Prime Minister stated that he would shortly attend the Imperial


Conference in London, but that, upon his return, he would give immediate consideration to the American overture. The tone of the Prime Minister's comments caused President Hoover to tell the American press that he was "hopeful" from reports received that a St. Lawrence treaty would soon be concluded.

While Prime Minister Bennett was at the very important London Conference of 1930, President Hoover was busily engaged in making plans for a forthcoming visit from the Canadian leader in Washington. Bennett had requested that such a conference be held in Washington for the purpose of furthering Canadian-American cooperation in matters relating to efforts to combat the effects of depressed economic conditions in both nations. The very high American tariffs were a constant source of friction between the two nations. While the main topic on the agenda was the hope of closer trade relations, the question of the St. Lawrence seaway would certainly enter in.

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It was clear that Mr. Bennett recognized that alleviation of the acute agricultural crisis was of primary importance. As he himself had recommended cheaper transportation for farm produce as one of the surest means of achieving agricultural prosperity, the St. Lawrence seaway took on new importance to the Dominion Government. President Hoover, well informed of Bennett's interest in a seaway, proceeded to make this Washington conference an "entering wedge" in his seaway program. Although the conference between the President and the Prime Minister was not attended with great publicity, it was understood by the press that the Prime Minister had, indeed, given Hoover his assurances that Canada would early cooperate with the United States to conclude a treaty for the construction of this great engineering project. 40

After the Washington conference, optimism for the seaway was general throughout Canada and the United States. Mr. Hoover, after ten years of active work for the St. Lawrence program, was moved to tell reporters that he considered the treaty "just a matter of time." 41

At the same time, Prime Minister Bennett told Canadians

40 Ibid., February 6, 1931, p. 1.
41 Ibid.
that his Government was ready to undertake the consideration of a St. Lawrence treaty with the United States.

Continuing the rapid pace of events, the two Governments ordered the Joint Board of Engineers to reconvene on January 23, 1931. The International Joint Commission also began to examine the over-all question of the seaway project. The Joint Board of Engineers was instructed to reconsider its former report in the light of the meeting of the Canadian section of the Board with the two engineers from the Province of Ontario. At a series of meetings of the entire Joint Board, plans were concluded calling for the construction of the two stage power project previously endorsed by the Canadian section. All other details of construction had been generally compromised long before. By December of 1931, the entire Joint Board of Engineers had reached complete accord on the technicalities of the proposed constructions.\(^{42}\)

Electricity and the State of New York
With international indications pointing hopefully

\(^{42}\)Ibid., December 19, 1931, p. 39.
to the conclusion of a St. Lawrence treaty, the State of New York began to play an increasingly large part in future treaty developments. New York was in the rather unusual position of desiring the power phase of the project to be constructed on its international frontier, and, at the same time, of opposing the seaway portion of the program. Even the New York approval of the power project was becoming the subject of acrimonious debate. This debate was primarily concerned with the very important issue of public versus private power development of the St. Lawrence River.

Since the year 1911 when he had first entered the State Legislature, Governor Roosevelt had been a firm and devoted champion of the development of public power. Because of his great interest in furthering public power developments in the State of New York, he incurred the formidable opposition of private utility interests. When elected Governor of New York, he pushed his public power program with the greatest vigor and determination. The vast electrical potentialities of the St. Lawrence were viewed as a further step in the advancement of his public power policy.

The often unscrupulous methods employed by private
utility interests to gain power leases from the State furnished Governor Roosevelt with a good case for the public development of power from the St. Lawrence River. In 1926 the Frontier Corporation, a private power company owned jointly by General Electric, Alcoa, and Du Pont, applied for and received a lease for the construction of power plants on the international section of the river. As the lease had been obtained through the judicious dispensation of bribes and the intimidations of certain State officials, a surge of public indignation compelled the Frontier Corporation to return its lease to the State. Governor Roosevelt used every available opportunity presented by this case to demand the public development of power from the St. Lawrence. He envisioned the new hydro-electric plants to be installed on the St. Lawrence as a major step in his public power program.

Subsequently, Governor Roosevelt urged the State Legislature in his inaugural address of January 11, 1931, to consider the State's part in the international development of the St. Lawrence so that such power could be used in the best interests of the people. In

compliance the legislature created the New York State St. Lawrence Power Development Commission\(^4\) to report and recommend the means by which the State could develop the new power resources of the river.

The Power Commission presented its report on January 25, 1931. The Commission expressed the opinion that the proposed power works in the international section of the St. Lawrence should be made the domain of a State created public corporation which would provide for the public, as opposed to private, development of the water power potentialities of the river.

After much stormy debate and discussion between advocates of public and private power, the dynamic Governor succeeded in obtaining the desired legislation. On April 27, 1931, the New York Power Authority was created.\(^5\) The New York Power Authority was subsequently to play a very important role in the power phase of the St. Lawrence project. If a St. Lawrence treaty were concluded, New York was ready with an agency whose sole function was the control of the American share of the

\(^{4}\)"St. Lawrence Power;" Outlook, 157 (January 28, 1931), pp. 128-129.

2,200,000 horsepower to be derived from the river.

The New York Power Authority was a body politic and corporate, a political subdivision of the State, which could sue and be sued, possess a seal, and have the rating of a corporate municipal instrumentality of the State. The Authority was to consist of five members appointed by the Governor for a term of five years. The trustees were to select from their own membership a chairman and a vice chairman and appoint such other personnel as required from time to time. The trustees were instructed to forward the St. Lawrence power program in cooperation with all other interested national and international agencies. The Authority was given the power to develop, construct, maintain, and distribute any electrical energy which would be derived from the St. Lawrence River. The State Legislature also conferred upon the Power Authority

46Section 1001. Power Authority.
47Section 1002. Trustees.
48Section 1004. Officers and Employees.
49Section 1005. Powers and Duties.
50Ibid.
the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents,\textsuperscript{51} to acquire title in its name to real property,\textsuperscript{52} to negotiate contracts,\textsuperscript{53} and to issue bonds for the purpose of financing the St. Lawrence power program.\textsuperscript{54}

The Power Authority was directed to deposit all monetary receipts in a special account to be maintained by the State Comptroller,\textsuperscript{55} and the State guaranteed the financial obligations of the Authority.\textsuperscript{56} All physical property acquired by the Authority and the activities of its operation and maintenance were to be free from State taxation.\textsuperscript{57} All appropriations made to the Authority by the State were to be regarded as advances and were to be repaid without interest.\textsuperscript{58}

Over the most vocal opposition of private

\textsuperscript{51} Section 1006. Power to Compel Attendance of Witnesses.
\textsuperscript{52} Section 1007. Acquisition of Property.
\textsuperscript{53} Section 1009. Contracts Negotiated By Authority.
\textsuperscript{54} Section 1010. Bonds of the Authority.
\textsuperscript{55} Section 1010a. Deposit and Investment of Money of the Authority.
\textsuperscript{56} Section 1011. Agreement of the State.
\textsuperscript{57} Section 1012. Exemption of State Taxation.
\textsuperscript{58} Section 1013. Repayment of State Appropriations.
utility interests and their allies, Governor Roosevelt appointed the five trustees of the Authority on May 7, 1931. On May 12th, the Authority announced that Frank P. Walsh had been selected as the first chairman. On May 20th, the Power Authority officially took over the records of the old St. Lawrence Commission. And, on June 4th, G. O. Smith, chairman of the Federal Power Commission promised the cooperation of his agency with the Power Authority on matters concerning proposed power developments in the international section of the St. Lawrence.

Governor Roosevelt's forceful position on public power had compelled private electrical companies to join in opposition to the whole seaway program. The State Legislature had clearly excluded them from any part in the proposed power developments. The private utility interests united with the railroads and shipping interests to become the "Big Three" of functional interest opposition. The influence of

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60 _Ibid._, May 12, 1931, p. 2.
62 _Ibid._, June 5, 1931, p. 4.
private utility interests was very great and the very issue of public versus private power probably cost the St. Lawrence program many supporters throughout the nation. Evidence of the desire of private interests to build and operate the new St. Lawrence generating plants was seen clearly in 1925 when private utility companies actually offered to build, operate and maintain all electrical works on the St. Lawrence without cost of any kind to the two Governments.

Electricity and the Dominion

As was now the case in the State of New York, the Province of Ontario anticipated that its share of new power from the international section of the St. Lawrence would be constructed, operated, and distributed through its own public corporation. The Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission had long been the supplier of power for all conummers in the Province. In the Province of Quebec power had been developed through private corporations, much of the financial backing for which had come from American power companies. Ontario needed new power sources, and had to negotiate contracts.
with various Quebec companies for additional electrical energy, at high rate charges.

Thus, the whole question of public versus private power developments in Canada began to become a serious problem. Although all power distribution in Ontario had been under the control of the Hydro Electric Commission, private electrical interests in Quebec would have liked to exercise some interest in the new power works in the international section. Failing that, they were opposed to letting Ontario obtain additional power which would cut off their sales to that Province. Unfortunately for the private power companies, there was never any serious consideration of private development of power form the St. Lawrence. Such power constructions were definitely a duty of the Hydro Electric Power Commission. 63

Any serious possibility of private power constructions in the international section of the St. Lawrence River was almost completely forestalled by one of the most sensational scandals ever to occur in the Canadian Government. This very scandal, involving private electrical companies in Quebec, caused general

Canadian approval of public development of power from the new St. Lawrence sources.

The Liberal Government of Premier Taschereau of Quebec and the Liberal Government of Prime Minister King had permitted private construction of a multi-million dollar power plant at Beauharnois in 1927-1928. In the summer of 1931 the Canadian public was informed that the Beauharnois Company had received permission to construct their power works through the means of corruption and bribery of important Government officials. It was revealed that Senator W. L. MacDougald received two million dollars for his support of the application of the Beauharnois Company. Senator Donat Raymond was also rewarded with one million dollars for his efforts. In addition, it came to light that R.O. Sweezey, head of the Beauharnois Company, donated $800,000 to the Liberal Party campaign fund for the election of 1930. Sweezey had offered the sum of $200,000 to the Conservative Party for the same election but it had been firmly rejected.64

As all the persons involved were important in the

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Liberal Party and were from Quebec, the Canadian public became most indignant over the lack of scruples of the private power interests of Quebec. On the other hand, the spotless reputation of the Ontario Hydro Commission made a clear case, in the minds of most Canadians, for the principle of public power. Prime Minister Bennett stepped into the case seizing the Beauharnois Company's property and transferring it to federal control. This was indeed a daring move for a Canadian Prime Minister.

Of interest to seaway supporters in both Canada and the United States, Mr. Bennett gave as one of his reasons for the seizure the fact that the Beauharnois works "formed a link in the St. Lawrence system and should be under the supervision of the Federal Government." The controversy over public or private power developments formed a serious issue in Canada just as it had in the United States.

The Start of Treaty Negotiations:

In the United States domestic developments in 1931 were setting the stage for making the St. Lawrence project a major issue in the forthcoming presidential

elections. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York had set his goal on the White House. The increasing domestic discontent with the efforts of the Hoover Administration to combat effects of the severe international depression made Democratic politicians hopeful of victory in the election of 1932. Governor Roosevelt took every opportunity to inject himself into the question of the power phase of the projected St. Lawrence treaty. He gave every indication that he expected to use his stand on public power as a vote getting technique against Hoover who was personally favorable to private development of power in the St. Lawrence.

In June of 1931 Governor Roosevelt wrote a letter to President Hoover requesting that a representative of the State of New York be present at any St. Lawrence treaty negotiations in view of the vital interest of the State in new power developments.66 President Hoover, who was well aware of the Governor's presidential ambitions and his already famous "headline

66Ruth Finney, "The St. Lawrence Treaty," Nation, 135 (August 10, 1932), p. 120.
grabbing" techniques, acknowledged receipt of the letter in the most routine fashion.67

Mr. Hoover was much more interested in the business of actual treaty negotiations and only after a treaty had been signed, would he be inclined to consult the State of New York. The arrival of W. D. Herridge, the new Canadian Minister, in Washington on July 8, 1931, set off rumors that a treaty was in the making.68 Minister Herridge conferred with Mr. Hoover at the White House several times in his first week in Washington, but the State Department denied that treaty talks were in progress.69

In an abrupt about-face, however, the State Department admitted three days later that Herridge had been discussing the "general outlines" of a treaty with President Hoover and Secretary Stimson.70 The State Department added, later, that official talks would be suspended during the remainder of the summer.71

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On September 4, 1931, Hoover told a press conference that his Administration was ready to proceed with negotiations with Canada on a St. Lawrence treaty. In Albany, Governor Roosevelt charged that the President was deliberately ignoring the State of New York. On September 12th, Hoover received a personal letter from Prime Minister Bennett stating that his Government was ready to enter full negotiations for a St. Lawrence treaty, but suggested that such negotiations be conducted directly through regular diplomatic channels rather than through the appointment of commissioners as Hoover had proposed.

On October 7th, the State Department revealed the contents of the Bennett note and stated that President Hoover had agreed to direct negotiations. Immediately Chairman Frank P. Walsh of the New York Power Authority charged in a letter to President Hoover that the Administration was ignoring New York's vital

72Ibid., September 4, 1931, p. 20.


interest in the power phase of the project by its repeated refusal to discuss the State's part in the program.\textsuperscript{75} The continued political pressure from Albany was well calculated by Governor Roosevelt to make Hoover appear to be an enemy of the State and, even worse, the champion of vested power trusts.

Prime Minister Bennett also had his problems within his federal family. Premier Taschereau, unlike Governor Roosevelt, was unalterably opposed to the project and told the press that "the project is premature in view of the world wide situation and the disruption of money markets."\textsuperscript{76} Taschereau complained that Bennett, too, was slighting the Province of Quebec by his failure to consult with him on plans for the St. Lawrence treaty.\textsuperscript{77} Not to be outdone by New York, the Quebec Parliament passed a resolution condemning the project and forwarded it to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{78} Mr. Bennett had no comment to offer.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{New York Times}, October 5, 1931, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.}, November 5, 1931, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}, November 6, 1931, p. 4.
As treaty negotiations proceeded in Washington, Chairman Walsh of the Power Authority made public the contents of a letter written to President Hoover on November 12, 1931, in which he dramatically threatened to sue the Federal Government if New York's rights in the new project continued to be "wantonlly disregarded." Secretary of State Stimson replied to Walsh by stating that the Federal Government had the predominant and superior legal rights over the electric power development, but that President Hoover would give consideration to the State of New York after a treaty had been concluded. Later Secretary Stimson and Chairman Walsh conferred in Washington but with very inconclusive results.

On November 15th, the State Department announced that President Hoover, Secretary Stimson, and Minister Herridge had discussed general outlines of a St. Lawrence treaty and had agreed to reconvene the Joint

79 Ibid., November 12, 1931, p. 2.
80 Ibid.
81 President Hoover steadfastly refused to confer with officials of the State of New York but did finally permit Secretary of State Stimson to confer with Chairman Walsh of the New York Power Authority. These conversations were characterized as "informal."
Board of Engineers once again. The Joint Board had already committed itself to a two-stage power control project at Crysler Inland, and other differences were so petty that agreement was speedily reached. The complete approved engineering plans for the seaway and power project were announced on April 9, 1932. The New York Power Authority also began direct consultations with its Canadian counterpart, the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission, to make preliminary plans for their joint control of the new power works.

The Election Campaign of 1932 and the St. Lawrence Seaway Project

Further treaty negotiations continued quietly in Washington, but the fact approaching national conventions of both parties further injected the issue of the St. Lawrence treaty into personal politics.


83 U.S. Department of State, Joint Board of Engineers on the St. Lawrence Waterway Project, Department of State Publication No. 401 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932); Canada, Parliament, Report of the Joint Board of Engineers (Reconvened) on the International Section of the St. Lawrence River with Appendix and Plates dated April 9, 1932 (Ottawa: F. A. Acland, 1932).

84 New York Times, December 24, 1931, p. 11.
Governor Roosevelt was working very hard to win the Democratic nomination and continued to use the St. Lawrence power issue as an instrumentality of his campaign. President Hoover, fully aware of the political implications of Roosevelt's championship of public power, continued to ignore the whole affair.

The Republican National Convention of 1932, perhaps rather unhappily, renominated President Hoover. There could not be the slightest doubt about Hoover's position on the St. Lawrence project. He had spent twelve years as a private citizen, as Secretary of Commerce, and as President of the United States, working steadily and carefully to bring about its construction. If he were re-elected, the public was certain that the project would be pushed with continued vigor. At Mr. Hoover's insistence, and over the strenuous, but offstage, opposition of many of the members of the party, the Republican platform took a firm stand on the St. Lawrence issue.

The Republican Party stands committed to the development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway. Under the direction of President Hoover, negotiations of a treaty with Canada for this development are now
At a favorable point. Recognizing the inestimable benefits which will accrue to the Nation from placing the ports of the Great Lakes on an ocean base, the Party reaffirms allegiance to this great project and pledges its best efforts to secure its early completion. 85

Although this plank certainly did not have the unanimous endorsement of party leaders and members, it did place the Republican Party on record to conclude the project.

The St. Lawrence question was too widely favored and opposed by many members of both major parties to become a partisan issue. The Democratic National Convention adopted a plank calling for:

Expansion of the federal program of necessary and useful construction affected with a public interest, such as flood control and waterways, including the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Deep Waterway. 86

The final phrase of this plank was deleted when read to the convention. Officials of the party said that specific mention of the St. Lawrence issue and the party's stand on it were omitted only "by inadvertence."

The Democratic Party nominated Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York as its standard bearer.

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86 Sucher, op. cit., p. 465.
After receiving the Democratic nomination, Governor Roosevelt announced, for the first time, that he not only favored the power phase of the project, but the seaway as well. The campaign of 1932 was dominated by Roosevelt charges of the failure of the Hoover Administration to take any effective measures to combat the severe national depression. On the St. Lawrence question, however, both candidates were in substantial agreement as to its values. Each man seemed almost to try to convince the electorate that he "was more for it" than his opponent. In his very first action of the campaign, Governor Roosevelt dispatched a telegram to the White House on July 9, 1932. With strong political undertones, the Governor asked that Hoover recognize and take action on the vital interests of New York in the power phase of the project.

I am sure that you agree with me that prompt and speedy settlement of this only question remaining unsettled is a matter of vital necessity. It is a vital necessity for the simple fact that this great project involves two objectives of equal importance and cannot in public justice be accomplished one without the other.

I am deeply interested in the immediate construction of the deep waterway as well as in the development of abundant cheap public power.

The State of New York not only owns this potential power, but seeks, through a State agency to make it available to millions of people at reasonable cost.
In international matters affecting the joint rights and interests of the United States Government and one or more of its sovereign States, an understanding should be reached between the Federal and State Governments as a condition precedent to the conclusion of negotiations with a foreign nation. 87

It was clear the Governor intended to harvest more votes by directly inferring that the Hoover Administration was opposed to the development of low-cost public power. The Governor practically demanded that Hoover meet with him in order to reach an accord with New York.

May I respectfully point out that such action would hasten greatly the initiation of this vast project—one which means cheap transportation by deep waterway for the agricultural and other products of the West; cheap electricity from the State-owned and controlled resource to be developed for the primary interest of homes, farms, and, of immediate importance, employment for thousands of workers.

I hold myself subject to your call and am ready to go to Washington on forty-eight hours notice at your convenience. 88

Taking time off from St. Lawrence treaty negotiations, President Hoover was moved to give a curt, if not

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88 Rosenman, op. cit., pp. 204-205.
sarcasm, reply to the Governor. Roosevelt was garnering many prospective votes from his advocacy of public power, and the President seemed compelled, at last, to make reply. In a return telegram dated July 10th, Hoover emphasized his long support for the St. Lawrence project.

Having ardently advocated for over ten years the great work of completing this shipway from Duluth and Chicago to the sea, I am glad to know that it will meet with your support. 89

On the subject of the proposed meeting of the two candidates to reach a Federal-State accord, Hoover flatly rejected any such conference.

I am glad to assure you that the negotiations between the United States and the Dominion of Canada in respect to the Great Lakes waterway are making progress and that it will not be necessary for you to interrupt your cruise by a visit to Washington. 90

President Hoover told the Governor that, only after a treaty had been concluded would New York and the federal Government come to an agreement on the State's interests in the newwater power developments.

One vital question which Hoover had not bothered

89 Ibid., p. 206.

to answer was the issue of public *versus* private
development of hydro-electric power. Roosevelt had
come out most vocally for public development of St.
Lawrence power. Hoover, personally friendly to private
power development, did not even comment on the issue
as the action of New York in creating its powerful
Power Authority had already slammed the door on
private power interests.

The American press debated widely the St.
Lawrence issue and its relationship to the campaign
of 1932.

Opponents of the St. Lawrence seaway
and power project seek, we read, to create
an issue by which Governor Franklin D.
Roosevelt will appear in the role of
champion in the fight for lower utility
rates, with President Hoover pictured as
the defender of the power trusts.91

Others did not like the attitude of the New York
Governor.

Roosevelt, firing the opening gun in
his state-ownership campaign three years ago
saw no use in consulting Washington or
Canada in advance. "Inquiries will get us
nowhere," he told the legislature in his
1929 inaugural; only late last fall, through
vehement demands of the Power Authority for
a conference with the President to harmonize

91 "Opening Guns in the St. Lawrence Seaway Fight,"
*Literary Digest*, 111 (July 30, 1932), p. 4.
federal and state designs for the St. Lawrence, were New Yorkers made aware of Washington complications in the path of the state project. 92

Many political observers shared the Roosevelt view.

A telegram from Governor Roosevelt to President Hoover asking a conference before the matter was concluded met with a curt and sarcastic refusal. Four days later Hoover announced that an agreement with Canada had been reached. Roosevelt should be angry. 93

The Dominion-Ontario Accord

While debate in the United States over the question of New York's interest in St. Lawrence power continued to rage, the Dominion Government of Prime Minister Bennett rather easily reached an Accord with the Province of Ontario. Firey Conservative Ontario Premier Ferguson had found himself much more favorably disposed to cooperate with the Dominion Government of his fellow Conservative, R. B. Bennett. On July 11, 1932, the Dominion Government announced "complete agreement" with Ontario over its part in the new power developments in the international section of the


St. Lawrence.

The Dominion-Ontario Accord provided that the Province of Ontario, through its Hydro Electric Commission would construct, operate, maintain, and distribute the Canadian share of power from the St. Lawrence. The Dominion Government agreed to lend Ontario $67,202,500 to pay the costs of construction. Ontario was to repay this loan over a ten year period with no interest charges. Although Ontario Premier Ferguson was not completely satisfied with the financial arrangements, he acquiesced in the Accord with an almost surprising minimum of objection. The result of this Accord was that, unlike the New York situation, Canada was fully prepared to proceed with the power phase at once.

The St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty

Largely overshadowed by the politics of the election year of 1932, treaty negotiations continued very slowly and quietly in the Spring and Summer of that year. Canadian Minister Herridge continued his:

regular visits to the White House and the State Department, but the latter commented only that a St. Lawrence treaty was being "discussed." On May 4, 1932, the New York Times reported that private congressional sources anticipated the completion of the treaty very shortly. On May 6th, the State Department revealed that agreement between Canada and the United States had been reached "in principle" but had not as yet been reduced to a written text. It was apparent at this time that both sides were agreed to the desirability of a treaty, but that the question of the allocation of costs for the seaway was the major source of dispute.

An increasing flood of rumors during the month of June pointed to the conclusion that a treaty could be expected momentarily. With the coming of July, the State Department issued no statements with regard to the treaty. Amid the increasing excitement, President

95 *New York Times*, March 27, 1932, p. 15.
Hoover took reporters somewhat by surprise as he announced on July 14th that a St. Lawrence Treaty had been concluded. Simultaneously in Washington and Ottawa, on the morning of July 18, 1932, President Hoover and Prime Minister Bennett informed their respective nations of the signing of the Treaty.

The fulfillment of ten years of American presidential efforts to conclude a treaty with Canada on the St. Lawrence issue had been reached. Presidents Harding and Coolidge had opened the way, and President Hoover had brought the treaty to reality. Mr. Hoover calmly and deliberately read a prepared statement to an overflowing crowd of reporters gathered at the White House. The President termed the St. Lawrence seaway the "greatest internal improvement yet undertaken on the North American Continent." With deep sincerity, but without visible emotion, Hoover discussed the projected values of the seaway.

98 Ibid., July 14, 1932, p. 1.
The treaty represents to me the redemption of a promise which I made to the people of the Midwest. It provides for the construction of a twenty-seven foot waterway from the sea to all Canadian and American ports on the Great Lakes. Such a depth will admit practically 90 per cent of the ocean shipping of the world to our lake cities in the States of New York, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Its influence in cheapening transportation of over-sea goods will stretch widely into the interior from these points. Its completion will have a profoundly favorable effect upon the development of agriculture and industry throughout the Midwest. The large by-product of power will benefit the Northeast. The large benefits are mutual with the great Dominion of Canada to the North. 101

Taking cognizance of the coming fight in the Senate of the United States over ratification, Mr. Hoover attempted to assuage the feelings of American railroads and port interests.

The waterway will probably require ten years for completion during which time normal growth of traffic in the nation will far more than compensate for any diversions from American railways and other American port facilities. The economic gains from improved transportation have always benefited the whole people. 102

The terms of the St. Lawrence Deep Waterway

Treaty of July 18, 1932,\(^{103}\) were the result of many years of planning, investigating, and negotiating. The ultimate result of the Treaty terms would provide an entire waterway from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean with a minimum navigable channel of twenty-seven feet. In addition, both nations would divide equally the 2,200,000 horsepower of electrical energy to be produced in the international section of the river. As the treaty terms were revealed, it was apparent that the United States had conceded to Canada the point of receiving financial credit for existing works which would be an integral part of the seaway. The total cost of the project was estimated at $543,429,000. As both nations were granted credit for past expenditures, this principle made the additional cost to the United States $257,992,000, and to Canada, a mere $38,071,500. Prime Minister Bennett had obviously

exact a high price in return for his support of the treaty.

Specifically the Treaty required Canada to construct all navigation works on the lower St. Lawrence which would lie within its own territory. The United States agreed to construct all works located within its territory in the Thousand Islands section of the upper St. Lawrence. A temporary St. Lawrence International Rapids Commission was to be organized consisting of ten members five from each nation. The duty of this Commission was to supervise and coordinate all constructions for navigation and power in the international section of the river. The aggregate 2,200,000 horsepower of electricity to be developed in conjunction with the navigation works in the international section was to be divided equally between the two nations.

The two nations clearly affirmed their respective sovereignties providing that construction works under

104 Article I.
105 Article II.
106 Article III.
107 Article IV.
the Treaty should not confer any additional rights upon either party. Both parties were granted the right to construct alternate canals within their own territories at any time. Rights regarding freedom of navigation on the St. Lawrence by the Treaty of Washington (1871) and the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) were to be continued in force regardless of termination provisions. The Supreme Court's ruling on reduction of water diversions by the city of Chicago was made an integral portion of the Treaty. Both nations were released from responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or property that might be caused in the territory of the other by works constructed under the terms of the Treaty. The Treaty was to be ratified in the regular constitutional procedure in each nation.

Reaction to the St. Lawrence Treaty

The announcement of the signing of the St. Lawrence Treaty

108 Article V.
109 Article VI.
110 Article VII.
111 Article VIII.
112 Article IX.
113 Article X.
Treaty touched off a series of debates reopening again the whole question of the project's worth. Long-time seaway campaigners were jubilant over the conclusion of the Treaty. Opponents redoubled past efforts to point out its defects. Now that the Treaty was a reality, it was obviously a "showdown" for both sides. Public media of communication in both Canada and the United States were flooded with debates on the issue.

Editorial comment, as might be expected, was very mixed and obviously influenced by geographical and functional viewpoints. In the heart of the seaway country, the St. Paul Dispatch applauded the Treaty and lashed out against selfish interests which attempted to block its approval.

The selfish desire of New York City and Albany on this side of the boundary, of Montreal on the other, to keep the interior of the continent landlocked has been overcome sufficiently to bring the two Governments to the point of agreement that the seaway be built. 114

The Duluth News-Tribune praised President Hoover's

114 "Opening Guns in the St. Lawrence Fight," Literary Digest, 114 (July 30, 1932), p. 5.
successful negotiation of the Treaty and thoroughly criticized New York's delaying tactics.

Power disputes should not be permitted to delay the project any longer. Actual digging should begin next Spring. 115

The Washington Post hailed the St. Lawrence Treaty as:

...one of the greatest engineering projects of modern times assuring the Middle West of both the United States and Canada a new outlet for its produce. 116

The pro-seaway territory in Canada came out in full support of the St. Lawrence Treaty. As was expected, the powerful Toronto Globe editorialized "On With the Seaway," while the Winnipeg Free Press ran a series of articles entitled "The Seaway At Last." Other Ontario and midwest Canadian papers added their voices in agreement that the Treaty should be speedily ratified.

Opponents of the project on both sides of the border lost no times in rallying support for the defeat of the Treaty. New York City newspapers were foremost in the United States in registering their distaste for

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
the Treaty which they believed detrimental to
Atlantic port interests. Typical of New York reaction
was that of the New York Sun which stated flatly:

Governor Roosevelt once soothed the
electorate of New York by visions of
electric waffle-irons in every farm house.
The President now charms the corn belt with
visions of splendid argosies landing
every day at the foot of every Water Street.
Ratification of the treaty depends on the
gullability of the public. 117

Slightly more restrained, but equally opposed to the
Treaty, the New York Evening Post featured an editorial
entitled, "Can We Afford the Seaway?" The conclusion
was, of course, definitely not.

Representative of the views held by other
Atlantic ports: the Baltimore Sun warned its readers
that they should carefully consider the great costs
of the project.

In the discussion of the waterway
project, which is now being dressed up to
play an important part in the coming
presidential campaign, the public would
do well to keep that question in mind.
Otherwise, it may well find that it has
another white elephant in its already
overcrowded stable. 118

In Canada the influential Montreal Gazette

117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
devoted many columns of editorial space to attacking the Treaty as a detriment to the interests of that city. The Gazette asserted that the seaway Treaty was merely a cover up for gaining new power facilities for the Province of Ontario at the expense of private power companies in Quebec.

The sole question for the gigantic scheme is the development and sale of hydro-electric power. Canada has no immediate need, and for a long time to come will not have any need, for more power than she can herself provide. 119

With ever increasing strength, the American Association of Railroads and other business interests attacked the seaway. The railroads redoubled their already considerable efforts to insure the Treaty's defeat in the American Senate. Alfred P. Thom, General Counsel for the American Railroads, bitterly attacked the seaway for its "planned destruction of American railroads."

...if the Government would pay annually to the railroads the amount it will have to pay for interest charges, maintenance, and operation of the waterway, the roads could afford to handle free all the American grain that would move through

119 Ibid.
American light and power companies established a united front in opposition to the public power development of additional electricity from the St. Lawrence. American ship owners disliked the seaway for fear that American shipping interests would be deluged by cheaper foreign ships snatching away their already emaciated cargoes. Powerful banking interests took up opposition to the project on the assumption that their largest commercial clients would be injured. Coal mine owners and workers denounced the added use of cheaper water power for the production of electricity in place of coal burning steam generators.

Port and business interests in the lower Mississippi Valley renewed their attack on the seaway with greater vigor than ever fearing the loss of trade from the Great Lakes basin down the Mississippi River. 121


The State of Illinois was incensed over the inclusion of the Supreme Court curtailment of Chicago diversions in the Treaty. Western States were generally apathetic to the Treaty believing they would gain little one way or another.

Patriotic associations assailed the merging of Lake Michigan into the international seaway. Advocates of economy in government did not believe that the United States should embark upon such an expenditure in view of the degrading terms of the treaty which were so favorable to Canada. Isolationists resented any joint ownership of an international seaway which the United States could not control alone. Anglophobes were just opposed to any cooperation with the British Empire at all. Many Americans attacked the "hard bargain" which Canada had exacted in return for the Treaty.

The End of the Hoover Administration

Regardless of this formidable array of opposing interests, President Hoover stood squarely with the pro-seaway forces. In the face of ever increasing opposition the President announced that he would submit
the Treaty for the advice and consent of the American Senate. The intervention of the November presidential elections of 1932 ended Mr. Hoover's tenure in the White House. The severe national depression had caused the defeat of the Hoover Administration just as it had been largely responsible for the defeat of Prime Minister King's Liberal Party two years before.

As one of his last presidential acts, Mr. Hoover submitted the St. Lawrence Treaty to the Senate on January 19, 1933. With the Treaty Mr. Hoover enclosed a short note asking favorable action, expressing his belief that the project would greatly benefit all of the nation, and urging that sectional cleavages should not be permitted to destroy the seaway. The fate of the project was then left to a small group of ninety-six Senators.

Although Mr. Hoover had left public life when the Senate acted upon the St. Lawrence Treaty, the Great Engineer had, indeed, accomplished a great deal. For over twelve years he had staked his personal and public reputation as a champion of the construction of the St. Lawrence project. His quiet and undramatic pursuit of his goal was a lasting testimonial to his vision
and courage. To him belonged almost all of the credit for the negotiation of the Treaty of 1932. There was no doubt that there would never have been a treaty if it had not been for the efforts of President Hoover. The very fact that his Treaty was to prove to be twenty years too premature in itself stood as mute tribute to his persistence.

Hoover took up the St. Lawrence where his two predecessors had left off. In an Administration otherwise marred and shaken by the effects of the great depression, the St. Lawrence Treaty stood out as one definite constructive achievement. The President rose above the opposition of many sections of the United States and almost literally pushed the Canadian Government into treaty negotiations. His successful conclusion of the St. Lawrence Treaty was the crowning achievement of his four years in office.
CHAPTER IV
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND
THE ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT

The New President

On March 4, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt stood before the cheering crowds in Washington D.C. and took the oath of office which was to usher in officially the beginning of the New Deal. Most of the immediate efforts of the first Roosevelt Administration were concerned with sweeping new legislation to combat the severe effects of the great depression. With a daring and dramatic policy of domestic internal economic reforms, the new President launched a new era in presidential leadership.

Largely overshadowed by the Roosevelt New Deal policies, the St. Lawrence Treaty continued to be debated in and out of the halls of Congress. Franklin D. Roosevelt had been a confirmed seaway and power project supporter before his election to the presidency. His unalterable stand on the merits of increased public power had played a prominent part in
the campaign of 1932. As Governor of New York he had been instrumental in founding the New York Power Authority and excluding private power interests from any part in the new St. Lawrence developments. At the start of the campaign of 1932 he had vigorously championed the St. Lawrence seaway as well. There was very little doubt among seaway supporters that he would add a new luster and brilliance to the already old question of the St. Lawrence project.

The Defeat of the St. Lawrence Treaty

Even before the Roosevelt accession to the presidency a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by veteran Senator Borah opened hearings on the St. Lawrence Treaty, November 14, 1932.\(^1\) At the start of his subcommittee's investigation of the Treaty, Senator Borah, a pro-seaway man, raised some doubts to reporters that the seaway supporters could raise the necessary two-thirds majority required for ratification.\(^2\) The Congress had adjourned, but the Borah subcommittee continued its investigation from


November 14, 1932, to February 10, 1933. Therefore, by the time that Roosevelt moved into the White House, the committee report had been completed.

The Borah subcommittee heard from an aggregate of sixty-seven witnesses. The debate was acrimonious and tempers were often too short to discuss the Treaty objectively. The committee heard first from witnesses who favored the ratification of the Treaty. The overwhelming bulk of pro-seaway testimony came from representatives of the Midwest who argued that the seaway would place the landlocked Midwest on a basis of economic parity with the eastern, southern, and far-western seacoast States.

Representing the great American Midwest in support of the Treaty were official delegations from the States of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Montana. Various Great Lakes cities vigorously championed the Treaty including Cleveland, Toledo, Monroe, Muskegon, Duluth, and Milwaukee. Functional support interests came from the American Farm Bureau Federation and the State Farm Bureaus of
South Dakota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska. Throughout the hearings the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association, then representing twenty-one States, played the leading role in martiailling support for the Treaty.\(^3\)

A second area of general support for the Treaty was that of upper New York. Witnesses for this section advocated the Treaty primarily on the basis of the advantages which cheap public developed water power from the St. Lawrence would bring to their industries and homes. Representing upper New York were: The Northern New York Federation of Chambers of Commerce, The New York State Development Association, Ogdensburg Chamber of Commerce, the Champlain Valley Council, and the New York Power Authority.

The third area in which the project gained considerable support was that of middle and upper New England. Colonel Charles R. Gov, chairman of the Joint New England Committee on the St. Lawrence Waterway

\(^3\)U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, St. Lawrence Waterway: Hearings on Senate Resolution 278 to authorize the Committee to Make an Investigation and to Hold Hearings Respecting the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty, November 14, 1932, to February 10, 1933, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933).
Project, argued principally for the seaway on the basis that such a construction would furnish intercoastal transportation between industrial New England and the agricultural Middle West, and would bring a market of forty-five million people appreciably closer to New England centers of population. Henry I. Harriman of Boston, one-time president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, testified, in his private capacity, that fears of the port of Boston over increased competition were groundless.¹

In addition to the support of the Middle West, the upper New York area, and the northern New England region, United States Government witnesses appeared to support the Treaty. General Pillsbury and Colonel Markham of the Army Engineers were subjected to the most excruciating examination by anti-seaway Senators on the committee, but they held firm on their cost estimates of the project. A. H. Haag, Director of the Bureau of Research in the United States Shipping Board, stated that ninety per cent of the cargo ships of the world

¹The views of Henry I. Harriman well discussed in his pamphlet, New England and the St. Lawrence Seaway (Boston: The New England St. Lawrence Association, 1929).
would be able to navigate the twenty-seven foot seaway. A. Lane Cricher, chief of the Transportation Division of the Department of Commerce, backed statistically his Department's conclusion that the seaway was economically justifiable. James G. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State, testified as to the reasonableness of the American share of the costs as outlined in the Treaty. Pro-seaway Senators, however, were not happy about the fact that President Hoover, now on his way out, did not muster a more imposing array of top government officials including Cabinet members themselves to lend their personal support to the Treaty.

When advocates of the Treaty had concluded their testimony, anti-seaway forces amassed a powerful and influential opposition. Viewing the opposition geographically, witnesses denouncing the Treaty came mainly from the North Atlantic ports, the Southern Atlantic ports, the Gulf ports, and the Mississippi Valley. Their principal reason for opposing the Treaty was the projected harm which could befall their depression bound port interests.

Representatives of many Atlantic port interests united in powerful opposition to the project. These
representatives included: the Albany Port District Commission, the New York Merchant's Association, the New York State Chamber of Commerce, the Maritime Association of the Port of New York, the Baltimore Association of Commerce, the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, the Maritime Association of Boston, and other public and private organizations allied with the port interests.

Other witnesses from Charleston, South Carolina, Miami, Florida, and lesser southern cities added their voices in general opposition. The very powerful Mississippi Valley Association presented a solid front against the seaway, and proposed that any American money for new navigation improvements should be spent on the Mississippi River system, an all-American enterprise. Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri and Senator Huey Long of Louisiana spearheaded the opposition of the Mississippi Valley and the interests of the port of New Orleans.5

Many business interests continued to take an

5 For Senator Clark's views on a Lakes-to-Gulf waterway see Bennett Champ Clark, _The St. Lawrence Shipway_ (St. Louis: Mississippi Valley Association, 1933), pp. 8-10.
active part in testimony before the subcommittee. Foremost opponent of the seaway was still the Association of American Railroads which spared no effort or expense in bringing its full weight to bear against the Treaty. Numerous private power and light companies, while not objecting too strenuously to the seaway, brought their full pressure against the issue of public power development of the St. Lawrence. The Lakes Carriers Association presented several witnesses who stressed the "ruination" of American Great Lakes shipping interests at the hands of ocean-going foreign vessels freely navigating the Great Lakes. The American Coal Producers Association proved to be unalterably opposed to any water power development which would cut the use of coal in steam generated electrical works then in general use in the Northeast.

American labor unions representing railway workers, coal miners, and merchant seamen firmly united with their employers in opposing the Treaty. In the midst of the great depression with jobs already very difficult to find, prominent labor leaders wanted no part in a project which could conceivably cost their
union members even more employment.

By February 10, 1933, all witnesses had completed their testimony. Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, a member of the subcommittee, raised the question that the Treaty did not mention what was to become of the private American power development of the Niagara Falls Power Company. He feared that the construction of the project might result in increased diversions of water for the Niagara Company, which was largely controlled by Alcoa. An exchange of notes between Canada and the United States dated January 13, 1933, brought mutual agreement and assurance from both Governments that the Treaty was not to be construed as giving more power to the Niagara Company. With this clarification, public power advocates were reasonably satisfied with the Treaty.

On February 7, 1933, a Federal-State Accord with New York designated the Power Authority as the agent of the State to construct, operate, and distribute power from the new St. Lawrence installations. The State

of New York was to be loaned the sum of $89,726,000 by the Federal Government to be repaid over a period of fifty years at no interest. With the signing of this Federal-State Accord, the last opening in the fight of private utilities for a part in the project was closed. Thereafter American light and power companies fought the entire project to the end.

Borah's committee had cleared the remaining details concerned with the implementation of the Treaty. The Canadian Government had come to terms with the Province of Ontario nearly a year before, and now Washington had reached complete agreement with the State of New York over its part in the electrical developments. The subcommittee presented a favorable report to the full Committee on Foreign Relations on February 15, 1933. On February 21st, the Committee on Foreign Relations, by a vote of fifteen to five, recommended to the Senate that it give its advice and

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consent to the St. Lawrence Treaty. Senators Lewis (Illinois) and Wagner (New York) wrote vigorous dissenting reports.

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the heavy burdens of his office, little remained for him to do with regard to the St. Lawrence Treaty. The Treaty had already been reported favorably to the Senate. The Hoover Administration, as it had promised, negotiated the Federal-State Accord of February 7, 1933, giving to the Power Authority the right to St. Lawrence power developments. The fate of the Treaty was to be decided by the Senate, and the Federal-State Accord by passage of a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress. On April 3, 1933, the Federal Power Commission rejected all bids of private electrical companies for rights in the new St. Lawrence power developments wiping the slate clean for the Power Authority to take over after congressional approval of the Treaty and the Accord.


Although the New Deal program of congressional legislation was very extensive and occupied much of the efforts of the new President, Mr. Roosevelt still managed to find the time to work personally for the Treaty and the Accord. His seemingly limitless energy won the hearty approval of his friends and caused dismay among the opposition. Working behind the congressional scenes, Roosevelt set out on a well mapped campaign to soothe the feelings of certain Senators who were opposed to the Treaty.

He was fully aware that Illinois' two Senators (Lewis and Dieterich) were opposed to the project only because they believed that their State had been insulted by the inclusion of the Supreme Court imposed regulations on diversions of water from Lake Michigan by the city of Chicago for sanitary purposes. Roosevelt immediately requested that Secretary of State Cordell Hull inquire of the Canadian Government whether or not it would be disposed to granting an extension of time to Chicago in the construction of sewage disposal plants in view of the decreased tax revenues resulting from the depression.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1933, II, op. cit., pp. 100-101. Text of Canadian-American exchange of notes dated April 5, 1933.} The Canadian reply, received...
the same day, April 5, 1933, agreed to the Roosevelt proposal. The President hoped that this arrangement would console wounded Chicago feelings.

FDR also privately communicated with Senators representing the Atlantic coastal States, the Gulf States, and the lower Mississippi Valley, and hinted at new federal aid for their ports in return for support of the Treaty. Nor did the President overlook the necessity of encouraging pro-seaway Senators. On June 8, 1933, he wrote a letter to Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin stating his unequivocal stand that the Congress should speedily approve the Treaty and the Federal-State Accord.

I do not hesitate to tell you and I do so with complete consistency that I favor the resolution relating to the St. Lawrence power development passed by the House. I also favor the ratification of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway Treaty.

The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, headed by Sam Rayburn of Texas, had reported

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\[11\] Ibid., p. 101.

\[12\] The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

favorably the Federal-State Accord on April 18, 1933. On April 26th, the House of Representatives passed a joint resolution approving the Federal-State Accord. With this speedy action, the House concluded its part in the St. Lawrence legislation. Now all action was centered in the Senate where opponents of the Treaty and Accord were concentrating their strength. The formidable display of that power was soon to be made evident.

Although the House had quickly approved the Federal-State Accord, action in the Senate faced a much more severe test. Senators Pittman (Nevada), LaFollette (Wisconsin), and Borah (Idaho) jointly introduced a resolution identical to the one just passed by the House to give Senate approval to the Federal-State Accord. The resolution met with a filibuster on the part of Senators Huey Long (Louisiana) and Royal S. Copeland (New York). As the Congress was

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15 The vote on H. J. Res. 157 was 224 for and 171 against.

slated to adjourn June 10, 1933, Senator LaFollette made a desperate attempt to gain approval for the Federal-State Accord by offering the resolution as an amendment to the National Recovery Bill on June 9th. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 59 to 20. Many Senators had voted against the amendment only on the grounds that it should not be rammed through the Senate without sufficient discussion.

The Congress adjourned right on schedule, but President Roosevelt took full advantage of the lull in congressional activity to consolidate and increase support for the Treaty. On September 14, 1933, FDR announced the appointment of an Interdepartmental Board on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Project. Roosevelt explained that the Interdepartmental Board would study the project in "all its aspects." On January 10, 1934, the Board, with Frank R. McNinch as chairman, presented a four part report to the President. The four parts of the report were written

17 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, op. cit., p. 34.

respectively by the Department of War, the Department of Commerce, and the entire Interdepartmental Board, with an additional survey of the power phase of the project by the Federal Power Commission in conjunction with the New York Power Authority. This massive report, as was expected, presented an exhaustive study of the project with the conclusion that the Senate should act favorably upon the Treaty now pending.

At a midsummer press conference the President was asked whether or not he continued to give his complete approval to the St. Lawrence Treaty. His answer was definitely affirmative. He told the press that certain Senators, including Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, had asked him to set aside $150,000,000 from public works appropriations for partial payment of the construction costs of the international section of the River. FDR rejected this proposal stating:

....I frankly don't think that was within the intent of the Congress in appropriating the money. They wanted that money to apply to projects which could be immediately started. 19

Continuing his efforts to arouse favorable

19*The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, II, op. cit., p. 314.*
support for the Treaty, Roosevelt bolstered pro-seaway forces meeting at Detroit, Michigan, on October 19, 1933, by sending to the Great Lakes Harbors Association a strong telegram.

It goes: without saying that I in no way have changed my mind favoring deep waterways from the head of the Great Lakes to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. 20

As Mayor John W. Smith of Detroit read the President's telegram to the assembled delegates, a large burst of applause filled the hall.

With the return of Congress in the winter of 1934, President Roosevelt began to exert his influence directly upon the nation's law makers. On the morning of January 10, 1934, the Chief Executive told reporters that he had cancelled all appointments for the day and would devote his time to preparing a "hard hitting" special message to the Senate urging immediate ratification of the St. Lawrence Treaty. 21

True to his word that afternoon Roosevelt sent a

20Ibid., p. 410.

special message for the consideration of the Senate along with the report of his Interdepartmental Board. FDR made it quite clear that he fully endorsed the Treaty of 1932 and that he desired its immediate ratification. After pointing out the advantages which the seaway and power project would bring to the entire nation, he asserted:

I want to make it very clear that this great international highway for shipping is without any question going to be completed in the near future and that this project should be carried out by both nations instead of one.

The President commented on the "powerful interests" which were determined to defeat the Treaty.

I am convinced that the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway will not injure the railroads or throw their employees out of work; that it will not in any way interfere with the proper use of the Mississippi River or the Missouri River for navigation. Let us be wholly frank in saying that it is better economics to send grain or other raw materials from our Northeast to Europe via the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence than it is to send them around three sides of a square—via Texas, ports of the Mississippi, thence through the Gulf of Mexico, and thence from the southern end of the North Atlantic to its northern end. In this,

The President did not miss the opportunity to re-affirm his concept of public power developments throughout the nation.

The other great objective provided in the Treaty is related to the development of electric power. As you know, I have advocated the development of four great power areas in the United States, each to serve as a yardstick and each to be controlled by government or governmental agencies. The Tennessee Valley plants and projects in the Southeast, the Boulder Dam on the Colorado River in the Southwest, the Columbia River projects of the Northwest are already under construction. The St. Lawrence development in the Northeast calls for action. This great river is a source of incomparably cheap power located in proximity to a great industrial and rural market and within transmission distance of millions of domestic consumers.

Roosevelt had clearly linked the St. Lawrence power development with his other three vast public power programs. He also urged that the international development of the St. Lawrence River should be accomplished in friendship and cooperation with America's great northern neighbor.

Whether the forceful Roosevelt message had any

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.
pronounced effect upon the Senators was doubtful. If a British Prime Minister had made such a firm announcement of policy to his Parliament, there would be little doubt that he could count on the support of nearly everyone of the members of his party. The American Senator, however, was generally averse to a concept of severely rigid party responsibility. The St. Lawrence issue was far too old and too inextricably tangled in sectional and functional interests ever to become a party issue. Here was an issue on which the most conservative Republican and the most liberal Democrat could stand united in either support or opposition. In most cases the individual Senator's vote was to be determined by the prevailing sectional and functional interests in his State.

On January 12, 1934, the Senate started debate on the St. Lawrence Treaty. The debate lasted from January 12 to February 10, 1934, and again, from March 8 to 14, 1934. The debate was very acrimonious and often brought out personality clashes between Senators. The often stormy Senate discussions did not bring new issues to light. The old arguments for and against the St. Lawrence project had already been well worn.
The pro-seaway Senators repeatedly emphasized its advantages to the nation. They argued that the seaway would affect immediate relief to the economies of the landlocked Midwest, that it would expand coastwise trade and thereby benefit all American ports; that it would increase the entire national income bringing new business to American railroads; that it would afford cheap power to residents of the Northeast and improve standards of living; and that all official investigations of the project had found it to be justified on an economic basis. Advocates of the Treaty also charged that principal opposition was directed by formidable, self seeking, private utility and banking interests in New York City. They asserted that both major political parties had committed themselves to the Treaty and that, by direct inference, the Senate should also be committed to it. Much time was spent in refuting the general belief that the project would injure the Atlantic ports and the Mississippi Valley.

Spearheading the Administration's drive for treaty ratification were Senators LaFollette (Wisconsin), Vandenberg (Michigan), Pittman (Nevada), and Norris.
(Nebraska). Those four Senators worked tirelessly in an endeavor to win votes for the President's St. Lawrence program. The ultimate prospect of victory was not bright, however.

Working equally hard were Senators from other States who were determined to defeat the Treaty for one reason or another. Senators Lewis and Dieterich of Illinois had been in no way appeased by Roosevelt's attempts to extend the time for construction of sanitary plants in Chicago. Senator Lewis, in particular, denounced the seaway as "that all-British canal," and pictured dramatically the advance of British battleships to the city of Chicago.

Speaking for the Atlantic port interests, Senators Robert Wagner and Royal S. Copeland of New York attacked the seaway on the grounds of its projected injury to the east coast. As a vivid illustration of the fact that the St. Lawrence was not a partisan issue, it was strange to see such a loyal New Deal stalwart as Senator Wagner of New York bitterly opposing the recommendations of the President, while the conservative, but highly respected Republican Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vandenberg, praised the Roosevelt stand.
Leading the opposition of the Mississippi Valley was Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri. He not only continued to oppose the Treaty, but, with monotonous regularity, demanded the construction of a Lakes-to-Gulf waterway in its place. Representing southern Gulf port interests in general, and New Orleans in particular, Senators Long and John Overton of Louisiana fiercely denounced the Treaty. Senator Long, with characteristic abandon, assailed the Treaty as "a betrayal of American ports for the benefit of the British Empire."

While the debate was flaring in the Senate, President Roosevelt made several sincere attempts to rally additional support for the Treaty. On January 12, 1934, FDR told newsmen that he would make all possible efforts to gain Senate ratification for the Treaty. On January 15th, he conferred with pro-seaway Senators LaFollette, Pittman, and Vandenberg to map strategy. By January 19th, the Chief Executive hastily sent a report of the War Department

26 Bennett Champ Clark, Why Every State in the Mississippi Valley Should Oppose the St. Lawrence Treaty (St. Louis: Mississippi Valley Association, 1934).


to the Senate on the military advantages of the project. But, on January 21st, Chairman Key Pittman of the Foreign Relations Committee hinted that he did not believe that the Administration could muster the required two-thirds majority.

President Roosevelt, however, informed reporters on February 1st, that he believed that his drive for Treaty ratification was making "appreciable gains." On February 23d, the Chief Executive told the press that he thought the Treaty would win approval. The President centered his pressure on Senators from the west coast and Rocky Mountain States who were not definitely committed. Regardless of the most determined White House pressure, the Treaty cause looked hopeless as debate was stopped on March 12th.

As the Senate had scheduled its vote on the Treaty for the afternoon of March 14, 1934, reporters expectantly assembled at the White House that morning. FDR seemed resigned to the defeat of the Treaty, a strange position for a President who had never before

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29 Ibid., January 20, 1934, p. 15.
30 Ibid., January 22, 1934, p. 5.
31 Ibid., February 1, 1934, p. 1.
32 Ibid., February 24, 1934, p. 16.
suffered a major legislative reverse. In reply to a question, FDR stated with determination:

...whether the thing goes through this afternoon or not makes little difference, because the St. Lawrence Seaway will ultimately be built at a very, very low cost as things go today. 33

The President warned the reporters that if the United States did not agree to cooperate with Canada, then the Dominion could very easily build an all-Canadian seaway. Using a large map of the St. Lawrence region, the President stated:

Canada isn't very crazy about having water power; they have an awful lot of it. If Canada were to do that on the Canadian side of the river, there would be an all-Canadian seaway. Mind you, the amount necessary to do that canal over would be less than one hundred million dollars so you can see what a small amount it is. There would then be a Canadian seaway from salt water up the St. Lawrence River past the Lachine, Beauharnois, and the international section, and then you would be in the Lakes. That seaway would be 100 per cent under the control of Canada. 34

In the most unqualified terms, the President stated his belief that the seaway would be constructed eventually.

33 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, op. cit., p. 146.
34 Ibid., p. 147.
The thing is going through; perhaps not today, but the St. Lawrence Seaway is going to be built just as sure as God made little apples. The only difference is that I would like to see it done by joint action of two neighboring nations. 35

Reporters eagerly inquired whether or not the President considered sending the Treaty back to the Senate if it were rejected. The Roosevelt answer was short, but directly to the point.

I will go back to the Senate in some form. How soon, I don't know, but it will go back as soon as it can. 36

Several hours later on the floor of the United States Senate, the roll call vote on the St. Lawrence Treaty bore out the previous presidential pessimism. The vote was certainly no great surprise to informed observers. Forty-six votes were recorded in favor of the Treaty while forty-two Senators opposed it. 37

Although the St. Lawrence Treaty had gained majority approval, it fell far short of the necessary two-thirds majority required for Treaty ratification.

An analysis of the vote distribution revealed several interesting features. In the first place, the

35Ibid., p. 147.
36Ibid., p. 148.
3726 Congressional Record, Pt. 4, pp. 4474-4475.
vote on the Treaty could not be classified as a party issue. Of the forty-six votes cast in the affirmative, thirty-one came from Democrats, fourteen from Republicans and one from the Farm-Labor Party. On the negative side stood twenty-two Democrats and twenty Republicans.

In the second place, analyzing the vote from a geographical viewpoint, no surprises were found. From Maine to Florida east of the Appalachian Mountains, there were only four votes (two from South Carolina, and one each from Vermont and New Hampshire) in favor of the Treaty as compared with twenty-four adverse votes from the same region. The State of Florida abstained completely. The second most important source of opposition came from the Mississippi Valley where eight solid votes were cast in the negative. Two adverse votes from neighboring States (McGill of Kansas and Connally of Texas) were influenced by the Mississippi Valley interests. The State of Illinois cast its two votes on the negative side, and the six remaining opposing votes were scattered.

The vote clearly revealed that the Treaty was opposed by all the Atlantic seaboard States except
South Carolina and by all the Gulf States except Alabama. West of New York and Pennsylvania, the Treaty was approved by all of the border States except Illinois, by all three Pacific Coast States, by two States on the Mexican border, and by three States in the interior drained by the Mississippi system.

In the third place, the vote could not reveal the actual strength exerted by many functional interests who were opposed to the Treaty in principle and not because of purely geographic considerations. The railroads, private electrical companies, commercial banks, American ship owners, and allied labor unions did exert a great deal of offstage pressure to defeat the Treaty. It was generally believed that their influence may have brought several wavering Senators into line, but the precise extent of their influence was unmeasureable.

Nothing that could be classified as unusual emerged from the Senate vote. The vote had gone just about the way informed persons had assumed it would. As to the question of what brought about the defeat of
the Treaty, there was no shortage of answers. Representative Pevey of Wisconsin told reporters that the Treaty failed because of the inactivity of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association. Senator LaFollette placed the blame squarely on private Wall Street power and banking interests.

The opposition came chiefly from the power interests under the control of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company. The assertion that I make earlier that this firm was against the Treaty still stands.

Senator Key Pittman of Nevada was not too dismayed over the Senate rejection of the Treaty, and predicted that it would win out eventually.

The treaty is not dead. It took seven years to get the Boulder Dam proposition through and, I believe the fears of some of the Senators in the Mississippi River region are unfounded and that the provisions of the Treaty can be so clarified as to remove their fears; fears of others as to damages can also be removed.

Many American periodicals rejoiced in the fact that the Roosevelt New Deal had suffered its first


39Callahan, op. cit., p. 554.


41Ibid.
One Canadian newsman in Washington said that the St. Lawrence Treaty would be dead for fifty years, but veteran American reporters placed high emphasis on FDR's bulldog determination to see it through.

In Canada reaction to the defeat of the Treaty was either very mild, or more generally, non-existent. Prime Minister Bennett had announced on October 7, 1932, that he would submit the Treaty to the Parliament. The tremendous opposition raised by Premier Taschereau and his Quebec Government caused him to hesitate. Premier Taschereau of Quebec had demanded the Treaty be defeated in the strongest possible terms. The Quebec Parliament backed his stand fully by passing a resolution condemning the project. The Quebec Premier asserted that the Treaty was worthless, that Canada had no need of additional electrical power, and that the seaway would be most detrimental to the already depressed economies of the ports of Montreal and Quebec. Attacking the Treaty as a "national crime" the

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43 New York Times, October 7, 1932, p. 43.
Premier announced his intention of blocking its ratification as long as possible.  

After all, the Treaty of 1932 had been negotiated at the insistence of President Hoover. Canada had gone along rather reluctantly. Bennett withdrew the Treaty in December, 1932. He therefore discouraged all debate in the House of Commons on the Treaty stating that the time for discussion was when the Treaty actually came up for ratification. The Prime Minister decided to wait until the United States took action one way or the other before the issue would be put to the Dominion Parliament. Consequently, with the unfavorable vote of the American Senate in March, 1933, the Treaty of 1932 was never acted upon at all in Canada.

It was apparent that the support for the St. Lawrence project had waned in Canada. The continuing depression greatly cut down the demand for the seaway as exports had dwindled severely. The Canadian

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depression bound economy did not care for the additional expenditure for the seaway. The depression caused lessening of the demand for electrical power in Ontario, and that Province's economy could not utilize so much additional power for some time. The Dominion Government, unlike its American counterpart, was directly in the railway business, and its National Railway was already losing money at the alarming rate of $1,000,000 a week. In addition, the Government had loaned the Canadian Pacific Railway $60,000,000 to keep it from bankruptcy. To build such a large competitive alternate means of transportation would only serve to drive the Government railroad further into the red.

The Bennett Government was well aware by 1934 that it would have to face a national election within one year, and that its chances of a return to power were slight. While opposition to the Treaty greatly increased, the supporters of the project gradually dwindled in numbers and influence. Prime Minister Bennett and his Conservative Government had not been able to cope with the ravages of the depression in the way that they had so hopefully promised the electorate four years before.
As had always been the case in Canadian-American discussions of the St. Lawrence Issue, sentiment in the United States had been far greater for the project than in Canada. As the Conference on Canadian-American Affairs, held in Clayton, New York, in 1935 observed:

...It should be observed that the dates of all American decisions and appointments over a long period of years are prior in time to the corresponding actions of the Canadian Government. It is a fair inference that there has been more anxiety in the United States for the construction of the waterway than in Canada. 46

When the American Senate rejected the Treaty of 1932, no doubt Prime Minister Bennett heaved a sigh of relief. The Treaty itself stood as a symbol of the persistence of Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, and a fine example of what could be accomplished by sheer will power and drive. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's most determined efforts could not bring the American Senate to approve his stand. Therefore, it was obvious that the Canadian Government would take no part in the immediate future to bring about construction of the project.

Concrete evidence of the waning of the desire for the seaway in Canada was shown in 1934, when Mitchell F. Hepburn and his Liberal Party won the Ontario Provincial elections defeating the pro-seaway Premier Ferguson and his Conservatives. Premier Hepburn had loudly denounced the construction of both the seaway and the power projects and stood unalterably opposed to the St. Lawrence Treaty. In one of his first acts as the new Premier, he dissolved the Dominion-Ontario Accord on the construction of power projects in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. The year of 1934 had brought the official and public opposition of both the Ontario and Quebec Governments to the scheme. Canada's two overwhelmingly powerful Provinces stood together in opposition to the Treaty. Under such circumstances the tottering Bennett Government was powerless.

Roosevelt Attempts to Negotiate a New Treaty

In the United States, President Roosevelt worked very hard to find a grounds for negotiation of a new Treaty. So far FDR's role in the St. Lawrence question had been confined to attempting to gain Senate approval
for the Hoover negotiated Treaty of 1932. With the rejection of that Treaty, and with the rising opposition in Canada, the St. Lawrence issue became a very ticklish one for the President. There was no doubt that Roosevelt wanted the St. Lawrence project very badly. His sincere devotion to the development of cheap public power had been well displayed. The most difficult question of all, however, was how to achieve this goal.

One week after the Senate vote on the St. Lawrence Treaty, the President asked the State Department to prepare an opinion for him in regard to what action he should take to re-open the St. Lawrence issue with Canada. John Hickerson, then Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, prepared a memorandum for the Chief Executive.\textsuperscript{47} The State Department was of the opinion that the President should seek to negotiate a new treaty with Canada rather than attempt to amend the existing convention. The State Department believed that there was already too much

animosity over the old Treaty and that a new document could bring the whole seaway question up to date as well as enhance the reputation of the present Administration.

The State Department was of the opinion, however, that the negotiation of a new treaty with Canada would be very difficult at that time in view of Canada's increasing lack of desire for the project. In the words of Mr. Hickerson:

I wish to make it clear in connection with the foregoing that we have no information as to the attitude of the Canadian Government in this matter. Public sentiment for the St. Lawrence Project has never been strong in Canada, and I suspect that there was a considerable feeling of relief in the Dominion at the result of the vote in the Senate last week. Premier Bennett's Government faces the certainty of a general election not later than August, 1935, and their political position is by no means good. On this account it would be difficult for Mr. Bennett to acquiesce in changes in the treaty which might appear to be more advantageous to the United States than the pending Treaty. 48

The advice of the State Department to the President was to move very slowly and cautiously toward a new treaty.

The views of the State Department proved to be very accurate when on June 15, 1934, Prime Minister

48 Ibid., p. 973.
Bennett told reporters in Ottawa that he had no plans whatsoever to reopen the St. Lawrence negotiations with the United States. President Roosevelt, on the other hand, was busily preparing plans to do that very thing. The Chief Executive instructed Under Secretary of State William Phillips to inform Canadian Minister W. D. Herridge that he would like to reopen negotiations on either a new treaty, or, at least, on amendments to the old Treaty, so that he could re-submit it to the Senate in 1935.

Under Secretary Phillips, an old hand in the seaway fight and former Minister to Canada, confronted the Canadian Minister with the Roosevelt proposition at luncheon on June 11, 1934. Herridge replied that he had received no word at all from the Bennett Government concerning the Treaty, but, that speaking for himself, he considered the time "most inopportune" to renew the issue. He reminded Phillips that the Canadian Government was "most relieved" at the defeat of the Treaty in the American Senate. He did not believe that anything had transpired since that time which had changed the views of the Dominion. He also pointed out, 49

that in view of the fact that the Province of Ontario had taken a firm stand against the Treaty and that Quebec opposition remained as strong as ever, it would be exceedingly embarrassing to Mr. Bennett if the United States insisted upon further pressure tactics. 50

The Herridge comments made it quite clear to the President that Bennett wanted nothing further to do with a St. Lawrence treaty. But, anyone who thought that FDR would quietly submit to defeat grossly underestimated the Roosevelt determination. The President then requested that American Minister to Canada, Warren D. Robbins, submit his views on the possibility of reopening the St. Lawrence question. On July 17, 1934, Minister Robbins informed the President of his views in regard to a new treaty. 51

Minister Robbins held out very little hope for the President to win a new treaty from Canada. The Minister stated that the recent election of Liberal Premier Mitchell F. Hepburn in Ontario was a crushing defeat for the seaway. He reported that his

informants had told him that Mr. Hepburn was adamantly opposed to any further seaway negotiations.

Furthermore, Robbins had conversed with William F. Finlayson, Ontario Minister of Land and Forests, and the latter stated that:

...he thought many of the Government supporters here were rather relieved that we had not ratified the treaty, since they felt support for the waterway from the West and Central West had considerably died down as a result of the depression, whereas the opposition remained as strong as ever. 52

Minister Robbins urged that President Roosevelt move with extreme caution so that there would be no excuse for the Liberal Party to come out in open opposition to a new treaty. 53

President Roosevelt bore in mind the advice of the State Department, but continued to advocate the St. Lawrence as a great international project. In a speech delivered at Bonneville Dam on August 3, 1934, the President referred to the St. Lawrence as "one of the four outstanding national yardsticks for electrical rates in the nation." 54

Roosevelt also sent a

52Ibid., p. 976.
53Ibid., p. 977.
54The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, V, op. cit., p. 121.
telegram on August 18th to the Mayor of Milwaukee on the occasion of that city's tercentenary celebration in which he pointed out that he was still greatly interested in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway "not only as a great international highway for shipping, but also as a fourth yardstick in the power developments projects already started by the federal Government." 55

Frank P. Walsh conferred with the President at the White House on September 5, 1934, and reported on recent electrical studies made by the Power Authority indicating great savings for consumers of power if the St. Lawrence works were constructed. 56 Roosevelt requested that Walsh confer with the State Department about developments in the attempt to reach a new treaty. 57

Walsh and R. G. Sucher, Washington counsel for the Power Authority, conferred with Under Secretary of State Phillips. Phillips gave his assurances that the

55 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
57 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1934, I, op. cit., p. 977. Text of note from FDR to Secretary Hull.
State Department was doing all in its power to bring about the conclusion of a treaty.\textsuperscript{58} Walsh told Phillips that the President would like to see the treaty redrawn or amended, but if the proved impossible, he would feel disposed to sending the treaty back to the Senate in its original form.

President Roosevelt then began to plot a three point campaign to bring the treaty to a successful conclusion. In a memorandum to Secretary Hull the President outlined the policy he would follow to counteract the opposition of special interests which had fought the treaty so successfully. (1) He urged strong pressure from the State Department on the Canadian Government for renewed treaty negotiations. (2) Noting the anti-seaway maneuvers of the power trusts, he requested the Federal Trade Commission to start an investigation of their lobbying activities in Washington. (3) The President also proposed widespread publicity about the St. Lawrence project, particularly in terms of reduced electrical rates.\textsuperscript{59}


Following the policy of "informal talks" with Canada about the treaty, Roosevelt sent Under Secretary Phillips to Ottawa on November 10, 1934. The press rumored that Phillips was conferring with the Dominion Government about treaty revisions, but the State Department released no word concerning his mission. At a presidential press conference on November 19th, eager reporters asked the Chief Executive why Phillips had gone to Ottawa. The President was rather non-committal merely stating that the Under Secretary of State had taken up with the Prime Minister a few minor changes which might be made in the treaty. When reporters inquired whether the Phillips mission meant larger diversions for the city of Chicago, Roosevelt's reply was hardly diplomatic.

The Chicago papers might as well get into their heads for once and all that there will be no change regarding the diversions of water from Lake Michigan. They've got enough water. They've had enough water, and they won't get any more water.

Although President Roosevelt did not want to

60 New York Times, November 11, 1934, p. 3.
62 Ibid., p. 979.
embarrass the Bennett Government by openly advocating treaty revisions, the fact of the matter was that Phillips had told Bennett that the President was keenly desirous of re-submitting the Treaty to the Senate at the next session of the Congress. He also had asked the Prime Minister to authorize Minister Herridge to open formal conversations at Washington for changes in the treaty. The Prime Minister's only reply was that he would have to give the subject "further consideration."

By December 4th, the State Department still had not heard from Minister Herridge. Consequently, that afternoon John Hickerson telephoned Minister Robbins and suggested that he speak to the Prime Minister about this delay. The next day Herridge telephoned the State Department and stated that the situation in Canada was such that formal treaty conversations would be impossible, but that he would be happy to discuss treaty changes on a strictly informal basis.

On December 9, 1934, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dr. O.D. Skelton, made a

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hurried trip to Washington where he discussed with Phillips and Hickerson the St. Lawrence treaty. Skelton expressed the view that the announcement of Premier Hepburn's rejection of the Dominion-Ontario Accord of 1932, and the Treaty itself, placed Mr. Bennett's Government in an "exceedingly difficult position." Hepburn's opposition meant that Bennett could not submit the Treaty to Parliament until a new Dominion-Ontario Accord had been reached since that Province was the only possible customer for the power to be developed from the international section of the St. Lawrence.  

In a futile discussion with Minister Herridge on December 21st, Under Secretary Phillips was informed that the Bennett Government would not submit the Treaty to Parliament at all. The negotiations seemed to have been suspended by Canada. It was made very clear that Canada did not choose to talk any more about the St. Lawrence question. From the Canadian viewpoint, the St. Lawrence Treaty of 1932 was dead.

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65[footnote]

As far as President Roosevelt was concerned, however, the St. Lawrence Treaty was still very much alive. Plotting new strategy, FDR sent a short note to Secretary Hull on December 29, 1934, in which he requested an investigation by the State Department into the old Niagara Falls Treaty of 1929.67

Assistant Secretary John Hickerson made reply to the President's inquiry on January 2, 1935.68 Hickerson informed the President that the Niagara Treaty signed January 2, 1929, had been ratified by the Canadian Parliament in the same year. The American Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had rejected the Treaty by a vote of thirteen to nothing in February, 1931. The rejection was based on the fact that, while the main purpose of the Treaty was the preservation of the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls, the Aluminum Company of America had coincidentally been granted the right to increased water diversions for power production. This arrangement was clearly unsatisfactory to the Senate, but President Hoover had never withdrawn

67 Ibid., p. 981.
68 Ibid., pp. 982-983.
the treaty.

On December 17, 1934, the President requested the War Department to make an investigation into the proposed remedial works at Niagara Falls. Secretary of War Dean promptly reported on December 28, 1934, that the cost of American improvements on the Falls would amount to about $975,000 and that he was:

...disposed to favor a reopening of the question with the Canadian Government in the manner you suggest if American participation in the project is in harmony with the financial policy of the President.

Roosevelt's sudden interest in the preservation of the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls was based not only upon the fact that three serious rock slides had occurred in 1933 and 1934, but also upon his desire to use renewed conversations with the Canadian Government of Prime Minister Bennett over the Falls as an "entering wedge" in formal talks for a new St. Lawrence agreement. Roosevelt, therefore, instructed Secretary Hull to take up conversations with Canada on this new matter.

Hull communicated with Minister Robbins on February 21, 1935, urging him to open conversations.

\[69\text{Ibid.}, \ p. 982.\]
with the Canadian Government on the question of the remedial works at Niagara Falls. As there was no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the old Niagara Treaty because of its power clause, Hull stated that the President was of the opinion that it was "urgently necessary for those works to be undertaken without further delay." No answer from the Dominion Government was immediately forthcoming.

The whole St. Lawrence situation had reached an unsatisfactory point for the President that all conversations with Minister Herridge were broken off in January, 1935. The St. Lawrence Treaty status, indeed, was little short of being completely dead. The Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission had let new contracts to private Quebec power companies to supply its need for additional electricity which could not be obtained from the St. Lawrence as a result of the failure of the St. Lawrence Treaty. In New York, however, the growing need for electrical energy could not be so easily met. The Federal Power Commission reported that


the State of New York would face an actual power famine within the next five years. 73

Another unfortunate development occurred in July of 1935 when Canadian Prime Minister Bennett and his Conservative Party not unsurprisingly went down to defeat at the hands of the Liberals. The defeat of Conservative Premier Ferguson in the Ontario elections of 1934, and the return of Prime Minister King to power in 1935, were viewed by the State Department as an unfortunate situation for advocates of the St. Lawrence Treaty. Prime Minister King's extreme reluctance to consider a St. Lawrence agreement in the 1920's was well known to American Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. With King's return to power, President Roosevelt was well aware that chances for any future St. Lawrence agreement were very slim.

On November 6, 1935, the Canadian Government announced that Prime Minister King would visit Washington for personal conversations with President Roosevelt. 74 Arriving at the White House on November


9th, King began discussions with the President about improving Canadian-American trade relations and the lowering of high American tariffs. The press believed that he might also talk about the St. Lawrence situation. At the conclusion of this conference, reporters eagerly asked the President about King's views on the St. Lawrence question. Roosevelt answered only that the question had been brought up, but his attitude plainly indicated that King had thrown cold water on his desire for any new St. Lawrence agreement.

Anyone who seriously believed that FDR would give up his efforts to conclude a new St. Lawrence agreement was very much mistaken. On January 20, 1936, Roosevelt instructed Secretary Hull to inquire from the Canadian Government what their reaction was to his proposal of executing a new agreement for preserving the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls. The Canadian Government, well aware of the President's intention

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75 Ibid.
76 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt V, op. cit., p. 122.
to use the Falls Agreement as an opening for future
over-all treaty discussions, had not bothered to answer.
Hull immediately instructed the new American Minister
to Canada, Norman Armour, to make inquiries about this
situation.

Minister Armour attempted to see the Prime Minister
but could not get beyond Under Secretary Skelton who
informed him that Canada was just not interested in
the Roosevelt proposal. Secretary of State Hull again
communicated with Armour on February 25th, revealing
publicly for the first time the Roosevelt scheme to
make the Falls a part of new St. Lawrence treaty
overtures. Hull informed Armour that Roosevelt had
instructed him to say that:

...there would be obvious advantages to
both the United States and the Canadian
Governments in negotiating a new treaty to
deal with the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
Basin as a whole, including the problems
relating to Niagara Falls. You are
accordingly directed to discuss this
whole question with the Prime Minister at
the earliest possible moment, in order
that his views may be obtained. 79

Hull explained that if Prime Minister King's views were
favorable, Roosevelt was ready to withdraw both the

78 Ibid., p. 837.
79 Ibid., p. 838.
Niagara Falls Treaty of 1929 and the St. Lawrence Treaty of 1932 from the Senate and start negotiations for a whole new comprehensive St. Lawrence basin agreement.

Minister Armour presented Roosevelt's new treaty overtures to Mr. King immediately. The Prime Minister made it very plain that he was not interested in negotiating any new St. Lawrence basin agreement at that time. As Armour reported:

While Mr. King did not enter into a discussion of the merits of either treaty, he made it very clear that the announcement of the negotiation of a new treaty dealing with these questions at this time would, he felt, be embarrassing to him. He also indicated that he was not at all convinced that the waterway portion of the treaty would be of benefit to Canada at the present, fearing particularly its effect on the Canadian National Railways at any rate, which are already in a difficult position. Mr. King admitted that the power phase of the St. Lawrence Treaty was something to be considered, but did not go so far as to admit that he felt this would be sufficient to change his opinion.

Unhappy, but not discouraged over Mr. King's remarks, President Roosevelt insisted that Minister Armour continue to press his proposal on the Prime Minister.

Minister at every available opportunity. Mr. King became increasingly "unavailable" to the American Minister as the weeks passed. Finally, on March 10th, Minister Armour caught the Prime Minister on his way to a meeting of the Privy Council, but Mr. King had only a short comment to make.

After talking the matter over with the members of the Cabinet, I do not feel that it would be wise to raise the matter at the present time. 81

The Prime Minister could not possibly have made his position any more positive on the Roosevelt plans for a new agreement.

The following day marked the opening of the Seaway and Power Conference in Detroit, Michigan, and the President had hoped to have something definite to say about a new St. Lawrence agreement. Mr. King's extreme aversion to discussing a new treaty had left the President with little but hope to offer to the assembled delegates.

Consequently, Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, read a rather unspectacular address from the President to the

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Conference on March 11, 1936. The President gave his assurances to the disappointed delegates that he would continue his unremitting efforts to complete the seaway and power project. He briefly reviewed his history of support for the Treaty and lashed out at selfish interests which were blocking its path.

Let us be realistic and frankly face the fact that delays have not been due to any failure of negotiations to reach an accord among the four sovereignties involved: The federal Government of the United States, the federal Government of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the State of New York. Delay has come, rather from fears of economic harm to special localities or to special interests, which I have always believed are grossly exaggerated, and especially from opposition based upon the fact that the power available in these boundary waters is publicly owned and will be generated and distributed, under existing laws, by public agencies in both Canada and the United States.

Roosevelt pointed out the economic advantages in terms of cheaper transportation and electricity to be derived from the project. He concluded his message by stating:

For the United States and Canada to demonstrate the full value of such a policy

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83 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
on a frontier that opens a continent would contribute immeasurably to security and progress in the Western Hemisphere.

With the will to cooperate present, I feel we may look forward confidently to the early undertaking of this project on terms acceptable to the great neighboring nation. 84

During the course of the address, it became increasingly obvious to the delegates that the President had nothing new to offer. As the sole purpose of the Seaway and Power Conference was the promotion of the construction of the St. Lawrence program, many delegates believed that the President was not so eager for this project as his numerous statements would lead anyone to believe. The Detroit Free Press, long an ardent supporter of the seaway, editorialized:

Somehow we can't forget that the Administration has had more than three years in which to get ratification of the St. Lawrence Treaty and that the one brief plea Mr. Roosevelt made for action was singularly ineffective in view of the general stranglehold he had on the Senate. 85

Governor Wilbur Brucker of Michigan, one of the leading figures at the Conference, accused the President of "faltering and turn coating." 86

84 Ibid., p. 120.
Nevertheless, the Conference proceeded to pass a resolution commending President Roosevelt for his work in behalf of the project. The Conference also created the National Seaway Council, a permanent body designed to coordinate on a day-to-day basis the total program of the Seaway Conference. The National Seaway Council held its first preliminary organizational meeting at Cornwall, Ontario, on August 14, 1936, to map strategy for arousing governmental and public interest in both nations for the advancement of the St. Lawrence project.

On March 11, 1936, Minister Armour dispatched a note to Secretary Hull in which he stated that he had just completed a conversation with Under Secretary Skelton about a new St. Lawrence agreement. He reported that Skelton's reaction was most unfavorable. Skelton believed that any changes in the old St. Lawrence Treaty to make it more attractive to the

87"St. Lawrence Waterway Again an Issue," Scholastic, 30 (February 6, 1937), p. 27.


American Senate would necessarily have to be made at the expense of Canada. Skelton also pointed out that the St. Lawrence project was not very desirable from the general Canadian viewpoint and that public opinion just would not tolerate further concessions to the United States.

Although it could not be more obvious that the Canadian Government was in no mood to consider a new agreement, the Roosevelt persistence knew no limits. The President promptly dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson to join Minister Armour in Ottawa in a new conference with the reluctant Canadian Prime Minister. On May 15, 1936, Hickerson and Armour met with Mr. King and carried on a very one-sided conversation about a new St. Lawrence agreement. Reporting Mr. King's stand, Minister Armour stated:

While Mr. King admitted that he supposed there would be no objection to discussing the matter informally, he had a very strong feeling that far from gaining ground the sentiment in favor of a St. Lawrence treaty was on the wane, and that most people felt the need for it past, if it ever existed. He stressed the opposition to it in Quebec as well as in Ontario, and in general showed little enthusiasm for the project.

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91 Ibid., p. 845.
With the approach of the American presidential elections of 1936, the newly created National Seaway Council began to apply increased pressure on the Roosevelt Administration to do something about the Treaty, little knowing the vast complications which the President was having with Canada. On September 16, 1936, the representatives of the National Seaway Council, which had just opened permanent offices in Washington and in Cornwall, Ontario, called on the President.\(^92\)

In a telegram of the same day to Fred J. Freestone, chairman of the National Seaway Council, Roosevelt unhesitatingly expressed his support for the program of that organization.

> I subscribe wholeheartedly to this declaration of the Seaway Council and to all other particulars set forth in your letter. It is my very earnest hope that negotiations for the St. Lawrence project may be carried out within the coming year to a successful and final conclusion. \(^93\)

Shortly thereafter, the National Seaway Council solicited the views of Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, Republican presidential nominee of 1936, on the St. Lawrence project. Showing once again that the

\(^92\)New York Times, August 17, 1936, p. 15.

\(^93\)Sixth Annual Report of the Power Authority of the State of New York, op. cit., p. 60.
project was not a party issue, Governor Landon praised it on October 6, 1936.

I have previously expressed a conviction that construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway would promote the agricultural, industrial, and commercial prosperity of the nation as a whole. To make this possible, it is necessary that a treaty with Canada be ratified, in which the interests of the United States are properly protected.

My sentiments in these respects remain unchanged. It is my sincere hope that this great and meritorious project may be brought to an early and successful completion. 94

No sooner had the President won his sweeping landslide victory of 1936 than he set about work to bring a new treaty closer to reality. On November 12, 1936, the Chief Executive conferred with Chairman Walsh of the New York Power Authority at the White House. At this meeting arrangements were made for sending an American delegation to Ottawa on an "informal visit" with the Canadian Prime Minister. 95

On December 4th, the American delegation reached the Canadian capital. The delegation consisted of Walsh, Minister Armour, Assistant Secretary Hickerson, and Executive Secretary of the Power Authority Leland

Representing the Canadian Government were Prime Minister King, Under Secretary Skelton, and the Ministers of Justice, Finance, Transport, Public Works, Labour, and the Postmaster General. This imposing array of Canadian and American officials formed the largest official top level conference on the St. Lawrence project to that date.

The purpose of the conference was a strictly informal evaluation and exploration of the possibilities of reaching a new agreement for the St. Lawrence basin. Although no positive results were forthcoming, the conference did serve to keep the whole St. Lawrence question alive in both nations. The American delegation was plainly disappointed that Canadians pointedly refused to consider any actual treaty changes.

On January 5, 1937, the United States Congress convened, and President Roosevelt still was not in a position to submit either a modified treaty or a completely new one. When asked by reporters about the St. Lawrence issue, the President stated only that there was a great deal of Canadian opposition to any changes in the treaty.97

96 Ibid., December 8, 1936, p. 4.
97 Ibid., January 6, 1937, p. 10.
Following the instructions of the President, Minister Armour continued his campaign to get a new St. Lawrence agreement from the Canadian Government. Armour carried on a lengthy series of conversations with Under Secretary Skelton in the rather futile hope of obtaining a new agreement for the consideration of the 1937 session of Congress. Dr. Skelton avoided that issue stating that Mr. King would hold a conference with prominent officials from Toronto on January 7th. If these officials could harmonize their opposition to the treaty, then there might be some hope for a new agreement. Skelton observed, however, that he did not think the present time would be propitious for any new agreement.

Minister Armour also reported that many Canadian newspapers in the Province of Ontario and in Quebec were carrying on an editorial war against the treaty. the port interests of Montreal and Quebec continued to be stubbornly opposed to any seaway. Furthermore, the Liberal Government of Premier Hepburn in Ontario stood adamantly opposed to any new agreement with the United

The great political power of these two large Provinces made the position of Mr. King very weak.

In the face of these persistently bad reports, Mr. Roosevelt was compelled to tell reporters on January 15, 1937, that there would likely be a "long delay" in the negotiation of any new agreement. The President shortly thereafter heard again from Minister Armour who could not offer any further hope for a new agreement for the 1937 session of the Congress. He informed the President that two prominent officials from Ontario had met with Mr. King on January 7, 1937, to discuss the role of that Province in any forthcoming treaty negotiations.

The two Ontario officials were Thomas B. McQuesten, Minister of Highways and T. Stewart Lyon, head of the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission. In their discussions with Mr. King they appeared to confirm the prevalent American view that Ontario would face a severe power shortage in the next five years, and this potential power shortage could possibly have the


effect of forcing Premier Hepburn to alter his stand of opposition to any new St. Lawrence treaty. If he did not, his only other source of additional power was that of Quebec private electrical companies.

Premier Hepburn, an ardent and very vocal foe of the St. Lawrence project, repeatedly stated that Ontario did not need additional power. He stated often that the project was far too expensive, that Canadian owned railroads which were facing a financial crisis would be further hurt, and that no further concessions should be made to the United States. He was also engaged in a constant battle with the weakened, but potentially powerful, Conservative Party of Ontario which still mildly favored the construction of the project.

Now it seemed that Premier Hepburn was showing much more interest in the electrical power developments of the St. Lawrence. Although he had rejected the Dominion-Ontario Accord of 1932, he was, in reality, eager to obtain new power sources. The fact of the matter was that Ontario had become dependent upon private power companies in Quebec to meet its increasing power needs. Long term contracts had been
issued to those Quebec companies by the Ontario Hydro Electric Commission in 1937. All might have gone well except that the Premier became embroiled in a personal feud not only with the Quebec power companies, but with his own Hydro Commission as well. He announced that electrical rates from the Quebec companies were far too high and proceeded to cancel the contracts. Very shortly thereafter, the whole Province began to feel the pinch of decreased electrical power.

Public indignation over the Premier's rash moves, led ably by the influential Toronto Globe and Mail, forced Hepburn to recant and re-instate the power contracts. The proud Premier's humiliation forced him into the position where he would have to consider the St. Lawrence as a new source of power or else forever be dependent upon the private power companies of Quebec.

Mr. Hepburn was faced with the prospect of a provincial election in October of 1937 and it would have been politically unwise for him to have suddenly reversed his stand against the St. Lawrence project. He therefore requested that Prime Minister King put off
any conversations with the United States over a new agreement until after the election. If this were not done, he would have to come out in opposition to any new negotiations. Prime Minister King agreed to the Premier's request. Hepburn would not commit himself as to his future stand on the Treaty even after the elections were over. 101

President Roosevelt, still pushing for a 1937 St. Lawrence treaty, took the unusual step of inviting Mr. King to come to Washington so that the two leaders could have a personal conversation about the St. Lawrence issue alone. On March 5, 1937, the Prime Minister arrived at the White House. During the course of conversations between the two national leaders, Mr. Roosevelt managed to extract a pledge of cooperation from the Prime Minister that he would undertake further consideration of a new St. Lawrence agreement. Mr. King emphasized the powerful opposition to any new treaty within his federal family and held out little hope that the Canadian situation would permit any new formal negotiations at that time. The Roosevelt hope

for a new agreement to be presented to the 1937 session of Congress was completely killed by the Prime Minister.

There was then little left for the President to do except to continue to urge the American public to support the seaway project. His plans had again been thwarted by the Dominion, but the President was not the type to desert so important an issue. When Congressman W. G. Andrews, who represented the Niagara Falls district of New York, demanded to know what the Administration was doing about preserving Niagara Falls, Roosevelt took the opportunity presented to re-assert his stand on the St. Lawrence question. The Falls had recently suffered another series of rock slides, and no action at all had been taken to remedy this condition by either Government since 1929.

On May 25, 1937, Roosevelt wrote to Congressman Andrews explaining that he wished to make remedial works at Niagara Falls an integral part of a new comprehensive treaty for the entire St. Lawrence development.102 Roosevelt revealed publicly that he

102The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, VI, op. cit., pp. 222-223.
had attempted to negotiate a treaty, but that the
Canadians had refused to cooperate in this mutual
enterprise.

There is nothing of a definite
character which I can say at this time
other than that these exploratory
conversations are continuing in the
hope of reaching a basis of mutual
agreement. 103

Roosevelt strongly re-announced his stand in favor of
the new treaty and gave Andrews his assurances that he
was doing everything possible to conclude the new
agreement.

I think I need hardly assure you
that this whole problem is one in which
I continue to have the keenest interest
and that no stone will be left unturned
in the efforts of the Government to reach
a satisfactory agreement at the earliest
possible moment. 104

President Roosevelt on May 26th, also dispatched
a telegram to Fred J. Freestone, chairman of the
National Seaway Council, on the occasion of its first
anniversary. He reminded the Council that he was doing
all in his power to negotiate a new St. Lawrence treaty.

My interest in and enthusiasm for
this important project has constantly

103 Ibid., p. 222
104 Ibid., p. 223
increased and I propose to do everything within my power to bring about an agreement which will start its construction at the earliest possible date. Please convey to the Council my hearty congratulations on the splendid accomplishments achieved during its first year of activity and my best wishes for its continuous success.

Roosevelt was still awaiting somewhat impatiently the outcome of the Ontario provincial elections of October, 1937. The American press reported that, "Hopes for the St. Lawrence depend on the defeat of Premier Hepburn." The Roosevelt Administration would also have liked to see the defeat of the strongly anti-seaway Ontario Premier. The electorate of Ontario, however, returned Hepburn to power with a comfortable majority in the provincial Parliament.

Previous hopes that Hepburn might change his position as a result of power shortages were dashed when shortly after his re-election, the Ontario Premier initiated a vitriolic attack on the project. Hepburn, this time, charged that any Dominion-American treaty would be designed to "force Ontario's approval of the seaway plan." He directly accused Prime Minister

105 Ibid., pp. 234-235.
106 Ibid., October 6, 1937, p. 52.
King of trying to coerce the Ontario Government into approval of a new treaty. Hepburn also attacked what he termed "secret negotiations" between the United States and Canada without consulting the Province of Ontario. He demanded that Prime Minister King make all American correspondence with the Dominion on a new St. Lawrence treaty public to verify his charges. From Hepburn's renewed forays against the project, it seemed unlikely that Roosevelt could count on any immediate treaty negotiations.

Following the Ontario elections, Roosevelt again attempted to obtain a commitment from Prime Minister King for new treaty negotiations. On October 25, 1937, Secretary Hull instructed Minister Armour to inquire of the Prime Minister what steps he proposed to take for the formulation of a treaty. Hull stated that since the elections in Ontario were over--

...this Government is now entitled to look forward to his active cooperation in pushing the matter to that definite conclusion which promises much material benefit to the people of both countries. 109

On November 1st, Armour reported that he had

presented to the Prime Minister the American wish for a statement of policy. Mr. King reaffirmed his previous views that he was not in a position to proceed with any treaty negotiations due to the general opposition existing in Ontario and Quebec. He was of the opinion that, unless there was a considerable reversal of sentiment in Canada, it would be unwise for him to attempt any new negotiations. King held out small hope that the approaching power shortage in Ontario might cause a change of views in Hepburn's Government.

On November 27th, Prime Minister King received a letter from Premier Hepburn in which he re-stated his opposition to the St. Lawrence project. Hepburn made his position very clear. He did not approve of a new St. Lawrence Treaty in any form. Two days later Hepburn traveled from Toronto to Ottawa to meet with Prime Minister King, and he again repeated his opposition to the whole issue.

Hepburn's public stand that Ontario was not in

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111 Ibid., p. 178.
112 Ibid., p. 179.
need of additional electrical power was belied when he asked King to write to the American Government for permission for the Province of Ontario to construct power plants on the Ogoki River. The Ogoki River flowed into Lake Superior and as the construction of proposed works would divert water in this international system, the approval of the International Joint Commission was required. Hepburn's proposed power constructions caused observers to believe that he was certainly not being honest in denying an Ontario power shortage.

The Canadian Government forwarded a note to the United States on January 26, 1938, requesting American permission for the Ogoki constructions, but Secretary Hull flatly rejected the request on March 17th. In effect, Hull stated that Canada must cooperate with the United States in a comprehensive Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin development, or it would receive nothing.

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114 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
CHAPTER V
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT
(CONTINUED)

The Treaty Draft of 1938

As the Ontario request for additional power constructions on the Ogoki River amounted to a virtual admission that the Province badly needed new sources of power, President Roosevelt considered the time most opportune to urge upon the Dominion a new comprehensive St. Lawrence treaty. Therefore, he instructed Secretary Hull on May 28, 1938, to submit to Canada a treaty draft which had been carefully worked out by the United States to provide for the full development of all of the outstanding problems of the St. Lawrence basin. ¹

Secretary Hull immediately dispatched a copy of the American proposed treaty to the Dominion. ² This new


treaty was designed to accommodate changes in the St. Lawrence situation since the Treaty of 1932. The treaty not only encompassed the old field of the construction of the seaway and power projects, but also provided for the construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls.

Article I provided for the creation of a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission to be composed of not more than ten members with an equal group from each nation. The Commission was to have the over-all authority to supervise the construction of the project. Article II provided that Canada would undertake the construction of all navigation works which were to be located entirely in its national section of the river. Article III stated that the United States would provide the funds for the construction of all necessary navigation works in the international section of the river. Article IV empowered the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission to make appropriate arrangements with the two agencies designated by Canada and the United States to construct and operate the power phase of the program to be located in the
international section.

Article V stated that the two nations agreed that the construction of works under the treaty should not confer upon either of them proprietary, legislative, administrative, or jurisdictional rights in the territory of the other. Article VI permitted either nation to construct alternate canals or locks within its own territory. Article VII stated that freedom of navigation of the St. Lawrence guaranteed by the Treaty of Washington (1871) and the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) should be extended in perpetuity not withstanding termination clauses.

Article VIII again incorporated the Supreme Court's ruling on the Chicago diversions into the Treaty, but provided that the diversions could be increased at any time by a mutual exchange of notes. Article IX was new to the St. Lawrence treaty and incorporated the problem of remedial works for Niagara Falls into its text. Article X stated that the parties would agree to release each other from responsibility for any damage or injury to persons or to property which might be caused by any action
authorized under the terms of the treaty. Article XI merely provided for ratification of the treaty by the regular constitutional procedures in each nation.

In the letter accompanying the treaty draft Secretary Hull pointed out the advantages which President Roosevelt believed this new treaty would bring to both nations. Hull stated that the United States would start immediately the complete construction of all canals and locks in the international section of the river, and that Canada would not have to complete works in its own national section for a period of ten years. The Secretary also noted that the treaty would permit the immediate construction of the power works in which New York was so vitally interested. The Province of Ontario could wait as long as it wanted to install power generators on its side of the power dam and could, therefore, use as much or as little of the new power as its economy dictated.

Hull emphasized that this treaty would also provide for the immediate start of construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls which would preserve the scenic beauty of that great natural wonder.
Furthermore, Hull explained that if Canada would acquiesce in this treaty, the United States would agree to additional water diversions from the Ogoki River for the Province of Ontario if the latter should again request such approval. Hull renewed his assertion that the waterway would bring tremendous economic benefits not only to the landlocked heart of both nations, but to their national economies as well. He stated that by the time the waterway was completed, the additional economic growth would provide greatly increased traffic for the railroads of the two nations.

Hull informed the Canadian Government that President Roosevelt believed that this treaty draft would provide an excellent basis for negotiations between the two nations. Roosevelt was certain that the treaty would serve the best interests of all the people on both sides of the boundary. FDR gave his assurances that the terms of the treaty were such that they would be acceptable to the Province of Ontario and to the Dominion Government. He held out hope that the Canadian Government would give the treaty draft its wholehearted and favorable consideration.
In spite of the President's powers of persuasion, the Canadian Government was completely unmoved by the new treaty draft. Prime Minister King and his Liberal Government did not even bother to answer the Roosevelt proposal for over a year and a half. It was very obvious that the situation in Canada in regard to the St. Lawrence problem had not materially altered. President Roosevelt no doubt was quite exasperated at continued Canadian hesitation but seemingly could do little more about it.

The St. Lawrence Question Marks Time

If President Roosevelt could not obtain a commitment from the Canadian Government for a new St. Lawrence agreement, he could not be stopped from a new campaign in behalf of the treaty on the American domestic scene. When the President revealed the terms of his new treaty draft to the public, he once again renewed the very old debate on the issue. With the typical Roosevelt drive and energy, the President began to step up his home front campaign for the seaway and power project. FDR instructed his Administration assistants to urge the construction of the project at
every available opportunity. 3

In complying with the Roosevelt directive, Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr., delivered a powerful attack on vested interests who opposed the seaway. Speaking before a meeting of the Public Utilities Committee of the New York State Constitutional Convention on June 29, 1938, he demanded that the revised constitution of the State should include adequate provisions reserving ownership and development of water power sites to the people of the State. In a very pointed attack on private power interests in New York, Berle stated:

The federal Government is prepared to do its part through the medium of the proposed Canadian Treaty. The State, by putting the principle of public ownership into its fundamental law, can guarantee that that development shall be for the everlasting benefit of the people of the State of New York, and not for a small group of manipulative interests.

The federal Government is endeavoring to open the way through the proposed Canadian treaty. It is for you to say whether the wealth at your door shall be used to levy tribute on industry and consumers here, or whether it shall be maintained as a permanent asset of the people of New York. 4


President Roosevelt was not content with permitting his top aides to carry on the fight alone. FDR took the opportunity presented by the dedication of the new Thousand Islands Bridge at Clayton, New York, to deliver his most hard-hitting speech to date on the worth of the St. Lawrence project. The Chief Executive, speaking on August 18, 1938, dramatically stood on the new bridge as a symbolic gesture that the two nations could cooperate in joint endeavors when the opportunity was right. The President, in top form, spoke with power and conviction.

When a resource of this kind is placed at our very doors, I think the plain people of both countries agree that it is ordinary common sense to make use of it. Yet, up to now, the liquid wealth, which flowing water is, has run in large part unused to the sea. I really think that this situation suggests that we can agree upon some better arrangement than merely letting this water contribute a microscopic fraction to the level of the North Atlantic Ocean. The bridge which we here dedicate is tangible proof that administration by two neighbors of a job to be done in common offers no difficulty. Obviously the same process applied on a larger scale to the resource of full sea going navigation and of complete power development offered by the St. Lawrence River can build and maintain the necessary facilities to employ its magnificent possibilities. 5

Roosevelt then spoke one of the greatest truths in the entire history of the seaway movement.

At various times both the people of Canada and the people of the United States have dreamed of the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes development. They have translated these ideas into plans which with modern engineering skill can easily be carried out. While there has been no difference between us as to the object itself, history compels me to say that we have not been able to arrange matters so that we have had the same idea at the same time. I offer a suggestion. How would it do for a change, if, instead of each of us having the idea at alternate intervals, we should have the idea simultaneously? And I am very much inclined to believe that we are rapidly approaching that happy and desirable event.

Roosevelt energetically defended his view that the St. Lawrence project would not harm the railroads or the Atlantic and Gulf port interests of the nation. He asserted, instead, that the seaway would bring them new business and new prosperity. Turning his attention to the powerful utility interests which opposed the treaty, President Roosevelt unleashed a withering verbal attack.

If you were to search the records with which my Government is familiar, you
would discover that literally every
development of electric power, save only
the Ontario Hydro, is allied to, if not
controlled by, a single American group
with, of course, the usual surrounding
penumbra of allies, affiliates, subsidiaries,
and satellites. In earlier stages of
development of natural resources on this
continent, this was normal and usual. In
recent decades we have come to realize
the implications to the public -- to the
individual man and government itself--
resulting from the ownership by any group
of the right to dispose of wealth which
was granted to us collectively by nature
itself.
To put it bluntly, a group of American
interests is here gradually putting itself
into a position where, unless caution is
exercised, they may in time be able to
determine the economic and the social fate
of a large area, both in Canada and the
United States.

Great bursts of applause from both Canadians;
and Americans assembled at the new bridge came when
Roosevelt closed his address with the oft-quoted remark.

I look forward to the day when a
Canadian Prime Minister and an American
President can meet to dedicate, not just a
bridge across the water, but the very water
itself, to the lasting and productive use
of their respective peoples.

Reaction to the powerful Roosevelt speech was
instantaneous, and, as could be expected, mixed. Two
days after the Roosevelt declaration, Premier Hepburn,
at a press conference in Toronto, charged that the waterway would mean additional expenditure and taxation, and that public funds would be spent to compete with the floundering Canadian railroads. The sedate Times of London ventured the hope that President Roosevelt's suggestions would be made the basis for early negotiations. Sadly the Times observed that the opposition of the Ontario and Quebec Premiers would perhaps intensify the feud between them and Prime Minister King, which "has already become a piquant feature of Canadian politics." American newspapers criticized Prime Minister King and inferred that he was "not the master in his own house."

The forceful Roosevelt presentation of the case for the St. Lawrence seaway even moved Prime Minister King to make one of his rare public statements on the subject. On August 20, 1938, King announced, in a speech at Woodbridge, Ontario, his intention to consider negotiations with the provincial governments of

7 Times of London, August 21, 1938, p. 3.
Quebec and Ontario as well as with the United States for a new St. Lawrence treaty. 

On August 30th, however, Mr. King backtracked somewhat from his statement. He told reporters that the national Parliament had the right to ratify or reject any treaty that might be concluded. His remarks were interpreted to mean that he was not "all out" for the treaty, but would prefer to let the Parliament make the final decision. Still the Canadian Government made no effort to reply to the new Roosevelt treaty overtures.

Although no word in support of the treaty was forthcoming from Ottawa, President Roosevelt was by no means silent in his perpetual campaign for the St. Lawrence project. Near the close of the year 1938, FDR informed the National Seaway Council that he was continuing to support a new St. Lawrence treaty to the fullest possible extent. He lauded the Council by stating that history showed that the grand persistence of such organizations had ultimately enabled the country's

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., September 1, 1938, p. 3.
leaders to overcome selfish opposition to great national undertakings. He particularly stressed the importance of securing great new sources of cheap electrical energy.

The two nations, Canada and the United States, share a great water resource which is today only partially used. Removal of the barriers to its full use for navigation will release millions of horsepower of cheap hydro-electric energy in sections in which the rapidly growing market for power will soon overtake present sources of supply. Failure to take advantage of this cheap power will not only tend to cramp industrial development but will force the substitution of more costly power with resulting burden on consumers of electricity. In an age so dependent upon transportation and power, serious consequences will follow failure to anticipate future requirements. 11

The Advent of World War II and the St. Lawrence Project

Notwithstanding President Roosevelt's considerable efforts to bring about a new St. Lawrence agreement, the Canadian Government had stalled his attempts by its extreme reluctance even to consider the issue. The fast approaching European crisis had turned the attentions of

the Canadian and American leaders to affairs abroad. The Hitler seizures of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the threats against Poland, and his seeming desire to start a general conflagration on the continent all were matters taking immediate precedence over discussions of a St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

When the Second World War started upon Hitler's invasion of Poland in September, 1939, more reasons were added to the already long list of motives for supporting the St. Lawrence project. Quick to urge the St. Lawrence project as a part of the national and continental defense, President Roosevelt injected the new issue of military advantages to the nation which would result from the proposed constructions. While Canada immediately entered the war on the side of Great Britain, the United States began slowly to prepare for defense measures "short of War." Into this new program of defense, the St. Lawrence project once more assumed the dimensions of a major issue.

Seeing the vast possibilities as to the Great Lakes for training centers for the expanded naval program,
FDR requested that the Canadian Government agree to alter the terms of the old Rush-Bagot Agreement to permit the construction and use of more armed vessels on the Great Lakes for national defense. As the Dominion also wished to use the Great Lakes for naval training purposes, its assent was speedily granted. The resulting agreement increased the number of both Canadian and American armed ships used for training purposes on the Great Lakes.  

At almost the same time, the President decided that conditions were now opportune to press Canada once again about a new St. Lawrence agreement. Over eighteen months had elapsed since he had proposed the new treaty draft to Canada, and nothing had resulted therefrom. This time he pointed out that the increasing demands of defense made the new electrical power developments on the St. Lawrence a "vital necessity" for national preservation. In addition, he pointed out

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12 Canada, Parliament, Exchange of Notes Relating to the Application and Interpretation of an Agreement Which was Embodied in the Exchange of Notes by His Majesty's Government and the United States Concerning the Naval Forces to be Maintained on the Great Lakes, 28-29 April, 1817 (Rush Bagot Agreement) (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1941), pp. 3-6.
that the Great Lakes ship yards could construct hundreds of vessels for war if only they could be navigated down the St. Lawrence to the open seas.

As Canada, also, was beginning to feel the need for increased electricity and naval armaments for the prosecution of the war, the Dominion, for the first time, made a direct reply to the Roosevelt treaty proposals. The Canadian answer was not committal, but held out encouraging signs that the Dominion Government would at least discuss the proposed treaty. The Dominion suggested that a meeting be arranged between representatives of the two countries for the purpose of clarifying a number of issues involved. The message, indeed, was most welcome to Roosevelt.

Four days after the receipt of this Canadian request, Secretary Hull made reply. Hull stated that the President was most agreeable to the meeting proposed by the Canadian Government. On January 7, 1940, an American delegation consisting of A. A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; Leland Olds, chairman of the Federal Power Commission; J. D. Hickerson, Assistant

Secretary of State; and engineers representing the New York Power Authority, the Federal Power Commission, and the Army Engineers; left Washington for Ottawa.

Conversations were held with the Canadian delegation on January 8-9, 1940. The Canadian group was headed by Under Secretary Skelton and engineering representatives of the Dominion and provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The purpose of the conference was to explore, in a general manner, the engineering and diplomatic questions involved in the new St. Lawrence treaty proposal. The American State Department announced to the press that the conference was examining a possible new St. Lawrence treaty.

On January 22d, the Canadian delegation paid a return visit to Washington which lasted until the 24th. The Canadian delegation departed from Washington on the morning of January 25, 1940, in a spirit of good will and friendly cooperation.

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At the conclusion of these two conferences a joint statement was issued by the Canadian and American Governments on January 24, 1940.

During the discussions the whole field was covered and definite progress was made. The discussions have now reached the point where it is necessary for the delegates to refer to their respective Governments on various matters of policy requiring their consideration and decision.

The engineering advisors of the two Governments have reached substantial agreement on the feasibility and desirability of a project in the international section of the St. Lawrence River which would involve a main dam in the vicinity of Barnhart Island with a powerhouse in each country, and a control dam upstream.

The negotiations will continue through diplomatic channels. 18

So optimistic was the tone of the report that certain sources falsely reported that the treaty had been completed. 19 The advent of the Second World War in which Canada was already actively participating had given Premier Hepburn of Ontario the pretext which he needed to reverse his frantic stand of opposition to a treaty. Fully aware of the Ontario need for greater electrical power for war purposes, President Roosevelt had successfully woven the St. Lawrence

project into his defense preparedness program. Roosevelt who had consistently supported the project for the past seven years, was plainly trying again to obtain approval. Even the most confirmed opponents of the seaway had to concede that Roosevelt would not give up.

President Roosevelt's prize baby is the St. Lawrence power and seaway project. Because he will never be satisfied until he gets it, Republicans have been heard to remark that it would be good politics to give it to him, or he'll be back for a third term. 20

Power Requirements Boost St. Lawrence Chances

The violent opposition of Premier Hepburn in Ontario to any new plans for a St. Lawrence project seemed to have been almost miraculously reversed. His vitriolic attacks on the St. Lawrence treaty were a prominent feature of Canadian politics throughout the latter half of the 1930's. Now it appeared that his opposition to a new treaty was fast diminishing. The plain fact of the matter was that in spite of Hepburn's repeated assertions to the contrary, the Province was

badly in need of increased electrical energy. The vast rise in Canadian production of war goods for the Allies had forced the Province to acquiesce in the Canadian-American conferences of January, 1940.

It was no longer a secret that Ontario was actively seeking all possible means to gain additional power. Dr. Thomas Hogg, chairman of the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission, was making it increasingly clear that Ontario must step up its power production to face the needs of war. In the annual report of Ontario Hydro for the year 1939 Dr. Hogg stated:

Evidence of the increasing industrial activity throughout the Province was reflected in increasing loads. In fact, for some months prior to the declaration of war, Hydro experienced substantial increases in loads, and not Hydro alone, but other electric supply organizations across Canada. 21

Again, in April, 1940, Dr. Hogg commented:

What we must know, and must know soon, is whether or not the St. Lawrence is to go ahead at once. This is the crux of the whole situation as far as I and my colleagues are concerned. I am satisfied that Canada would make no mistake in joining with the United States in the development of the St. Lawrence River for power and navigation. 22


On January 5, 1941, the chairman of Ontario Hydro spoke to members of the New York Power Authority in a tone of urgency.

Increased demand for power for war industries is inevitably accompanied by an increased tempo in nearly all activities. It is therefore true, that Canada cannot play that full part that is being assigned to her, and that she is willingly accepting, unless there can be made available large additional quantities of power. 23

In view of these official comments by the man responsible for all the power requirements of the Province of Ontario, it was not too surprising that Canada desired to discuss the St. Lawrence agreement with the United States.

In the United States also, the demands of the defense effort worked to the advantage of the St. Lawrence project. Heavy requirements of vastly increased war production to make the United States the "arsenal of democracy" gave the President the opportunity to demand the St. Lawrence project again. 24

With FDR's urging of the construction of the power and


24"St. Lawrence Assured?" Business Week (December 14, 1940), p. 54.
seaway project, private utility interests again sent up a barrage of claims against public power developments. In May, 1940, the Niagara Frontier Planning Board, a creation of the Aluminum Company of America, issued a scathing denunciation of the entire seaway plan. 25 The Niagara Planning Board was liberally subsidized by the Mellon family of Pittsburgh who were ardent enemies of the New Deal. 26 The report urged that, instead of spending the taxpayers' money on public power development of the St. Lawrence, the project should be constructed by private industry without governmental expense.

In direct reply to the Niagara Board's widely publicized report, the New York Power Authority issued a report of its own which statistically pointed out the saving to consumers resulting from public construction and operation of the project. The Power Authority, now headed by James C. Bonebright after the death of Frank P. Walsh in 1939, demanded immediate international action so that New York could have electrical power for

25 The St. Lawrence Project (New York: Niagara Frontier Planning Board, 1940).

the increasing needs of war.27

As it was now obvious that both the Province of Ontario and the State of New York sincerely wanted the construction of the power project, a joint conference between the Power Authority and Ontario Hydro was held in Toronto, June 17, 1940. Chairman Bonebright and Dr. Hogg proceeded to a thorough examination of the plans of their respective organizations for the immediate construction of the project. They announced that power from the St. Lawrence could be utilized within three or four years for the combined national defense and for peace time prosperity.28

Stepping up their campaign for the immediate development of St. Lawrence power, the Power Authority met with Governor Lehman on July 29th and urged that he request the President to negotiate a special agreement with Canada to permit joint construction of electrical installations immediately. On August 31, 1940, Governor Lehman conferred with President Roosevelt at Hyde Park and repeated to him the Power Authority's

28 Ibid., p. 15.
keen desire for a special agreement. For the first time, it was suggested by responsible sources that the President negotiate a special agreement in place of a treaty.

As the President had just been renominated by the Democratic Party for an unprecedented third term, he was quite preoccupied at the time with the forthcoming election. There was not any doubt that the proposal of negotiating an executive agreement meant that the seaway would be furthered. Approval of an executive agreement meant the passage of the legislation by merely a majority of both houses of Congress. The requirement for a two-thirds majority in the Senate for the ratification of a treaty had caused the defeat of the St. Lawrence convention of 1932. Although the idea of replacing the treaty with an executive agreement was not new to FDR, advocacy of this change by such a prominent person as the Governor of New York caused him to consider it seriously.

Mr. Roosevelt's opponent in the election of 1940, Wendell L. Willkie, had announced that he would oppose the St. Lawrence project if elected.²⁹ He had

been directly connected with private power interests in New York City. As FDR was rather easily returned to office for a third term, there was complete assurance that the White House would continue to prosecute the St. Lawrence program with vigor and determination. On March 26, 1940, veteran Canadian Prime Minister King was also returned to power, insuring the continuation in office of these two experienced national leaders.

The Negotiation of the St. Lawrence Agreement of 1941

As the people of the United States were already hard at work in pursuing the defense effort and the people of Canada were actively engaged in the war, the St. Lawrence project continued to be urged favorably by FDR. In addition to the numerous previous arguments of which there were many, the international situation was such that the President could take full advantage to aid his cause by linking the project to the most vital defense interests of the United States. In August of 1940, Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt journeyed to Ogdensburg, New York, where general plans for continental defense were discussed secretly. At
this Ogdensburg conference, President Roosevelt proposed directly to the Prime Minister that both Governments undertake the immediate negotiation of an agreement for the St. Lawrence development. He particularly advocated the agreement on the grounds that 2,200,000 horsepower of electricity could be added to the Canadian-American war potential. Mr. King was of the opinion that, in view of the increased power demands of war, the project might prove useful.

The President was very much encouraged by Mr. King's obvious interest in the St. Lawrence project. He immediately instructed his Administration assistants to urge the program upon the public and the Congress at every available opportunity. On September 6, 1940, Mr. Cruise and Mr. Sucher of the Power Authority conferred with Secretary Hull in Washington. The Power Authority presented the Secretary with plans of the new power constructions in cooperation with Ontario Hydro. That afternoon Secretary Hull arranged for a conference with Assistant Secretary Berle, the State Department's leading authority on the St. Lawrence question. Berle assured the representatives of the Power Authority that the
State Department would do all in its power to bring about the negotiation of a new St. Lawrence agreement.  

Assistant Secretary Berle and Chairman Leland Olds of the Federal Power Commission met with President Roosevelt at the White House on September 12th where preliminary plans were considered for the negotiation of a St. Lawrence agreement. The President emphasized his desire to see the plans completed in view of war born demands for new sources of electrical energy. He also informed Berle and Olds to be ready for a trip to Ottawa in the near future.

On September 13th, FDR told reporters that the power project development of the St. Lawrence had been revived because of the pressing need of defense industries for additional power. The nation's press rumored that a new St. Lawrence treaty could be shortly expected. Even the Acting Premier of Ontario, H.C. Nixon, told newsmen that he, too, expected an agreement shortly. On October 7th, Prime Minister King revealed

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32 Ibid., September 14, 1940, p. 19.
33 Ibid., September 20, 1940, p. 9.
34 Ibid., September 22, 1940, p. 28.
that he would make a statement on the project only after preliminary conversations had been concluded.35

The increasing flood of rumors pouring out of Washington and Ottawa in the Autumn of 1940 were not without justification. Roosevelt considered the time finally right for pressing upon the Canadian Government the negotiation of a new St. Lawrence agreement. He therefore requested that Assistant Secretary Berle take steps to initiate overtures.

On October 14, 1940, Berle sent a note to the Canadian Minister in Washington in which he pointed out strongly the advantages which St. Lawrence power would give to the war effort in both nations.36 Berle stated that President Roosevelt had instructed him to urge that each nation appoint forthwith a Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee consisting of not more than five members.

These two committees would cooperate in preliminary engineering and other investigations for that part of the project which is located in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, in order that the entire project may be undertaken without delay when final decision is reached by the two Governments.

36U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, 3 (October, 1940), p. 430.
Berle also stated that the United States was prepared to advance necessary money up to $1,000,000 to pay for these preliminary engineering and diplomatic investigations.

The Canadian reply was received that same day, and it was entirely favorable to the appointment of the Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee.37 The following day, the State Department announced that the United States and Canada had begun an investigation of proposed development of the international section.38 Prime Minister King in Ottawa and Premier Hepburn in Toronto simultaneously announced their complete approval of the arrangements just concluded.

Without delay, President Roosevelt issued an executive order dated October 16, 1940,39 to put into effect the substance of the recent agreement between Canada and the United States. FDR created the St. Lawrence Advisory Committee which consisted of Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, as chairman; A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of

37 Ibid., p. 6.
State; Brigadier General Thomas H. Robbins, Corps of Army Engineers; and Gerald V. Cruise, New York Power Authority. The chief duty of this St. Lawrence Committee was to investigate and report approved plans for construction of the power and seaway project.

FDR directed the Federal Power Commission and the United States Army Engineers to cooperate with the Advisory Committee in technical and engineering advice. The St. Lawrence Advisory Committee immediately launched still another investigation into plans for the development of this great region.

Continuing his rapid pursuit of a St. Lawrence agreement, FDR sent, the very next day, a special message to the Congress in which he underscored the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project as a vital necessity for the conduct of defense preparedness. 40

It is urgent that this project be undertaken at the present time, not only from the point of view of our own defense but also in terms of those of our neighbor Canada. The Province of Ontario needs to be able to count upon the early availability of this power to meet its growing load. The project may, therefore, be considered as an essential part of the program of continental defense.

defense which is being actively worked out by the two peoples.

FDR informed the Congress that preliminary investigations of potential electrical power developments in the international section of the river were so vital to continental defense that—

I have, therefore, allocated $1,000,000 of the special defense fund to the Federal Power Commission and Corps of Engineers, United States Army, for this preliminary work and have appointed a committee of four to advise me in planning the work and to cooperate with appropriate agencies of the Canadian Government.

Last his message sound too much like presidential dictation to the Congress, Roosevelt reminded the nation's law makers that no commitment to construct had been made.

The preliminary investigations which I have authorized involve no actual construction of commitment to construct. In taking this means of advising Congress of the survey I am having made, I wish to make it clear that Congress will be kept advised of such further steps as may be necessary.

With the Congress completely informed, the St. Lawrence Advisory Committee held its first organizational meeting on October 21st in Washington. On October 23d, the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence Basin Advisory Board was appointed. The Canadian Advisory Board consisted of Guy A. Lindsay, engineer in charge of general engineering, Department of Transport, as chairman; Thomas H. Hogg, chairman of the Ontario Hydro Commission; Olivier Lefebvre, Vice Chairman of the Quebec Streams Commission; and J.E. Read, Legal Adviser of the Department of External Affairs.

The first joint meeting of the two advisory committees was held, appropriately enough, at Massena, New York, near the project site on October 31, 1940. General agreement was reached on the scope and conduct of preliminary engineering work and upon a general plan for a controlled single stage project for the power development of the international section. In a joint communique, the two committees stated:

The general plan for improvement of the International Rapids Section which will be developed in greater detail, is known as the controlled single stage project. It includes a main dam to be located at the head of Barnhart Island, and a small dam near the head of the rapids to establish complete control of the flow of the river at that point.

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3 Ibid., p. 40.
Another conference was held at Massena, November 19th under the auspices of the United States Army Engineers to formulate plans for hydraulic and electrical features of the proposed dam and power houses. On the same day, Dr. Hogg of Ontario Hydro and Mr. Cruise of the Power Authority conferred in Washington to plan for the characteristics of the number and type of generating units to be used at Massena.  

President Roosevelt was very pleased with the rather rapid progress which was being made to further the power phase of the St. Lawrence program, but he did not relax his efforts to arouse support for the plan on the home front. At the meeting of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Defense Conference on December 5-6, 1940, at Detroit, FDR took the opportunity presented to emphasize the value of the program as a vital measure of national and continental defense. Although the increasing presidential duties kept him from attending in person, his address was ably read by Assistant Secretary Berle.  

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44 Ibid., p. 20.  
45 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 3 (December 7, 1940), p. 518; also printed in 86 Congressional Record, Pt. 18, p. A6805.
FDR recalled to the minds of the delegates that in his message to the Conference four years before, he had stated that the seaway was then "an opportunity." Roosevelt said, "It is now a vital necessity." The Chief Executive turned his attention to those who opposed the project.

Selfish interests will tell you that I am cloaking this great project in national defense in order to gain an objective which has always been dear to me. But I tell you that it has always been dear to me because I recognized its vital importance to the people in peace and war.

Let those who oppose the immediate undertaking of this project sit here at the center of the national defense effort in Washington and feel the pressure of the National Defense Commission calling for more and more power for our great aluminum works and for other munitions industries requiring lots of cheap power. I am sure they will know the opposition which defeated the St. Lawrence Treaty in 1934 was a mistaken opposition based on failure to appraise the full needs of their country in the world situation which was even then developing.

In his customary forceful way, the President told delegates that if the project had been approved in 1934 the United States would not only have 1,100,000 horsepower of additional electrical energy, but would be in a position to use the Great Lakes ship yards to
construct war vessels, to be sent to the oceans of the world. FDR made reply to many charges claiming the seaway and power project would not be ready to aid the war effort at all.

Opponents of the project have pointed out that it takes four years to build this seaway. They know, but fail to mention, that it takes at least that long to build a battleship. They also know that this project will cost the United States less than three battleships and that the power project would be entirely self liquidating.

In closing his address FDR pictured the great benefits of the project to the nation and its people.

What the project means to the ordinary man and woman cannot be too highly stressed. It means a more secure nation. It means a continent protected and served by the additional shipping built in inland ship yards. It means more industries, both defense and domestic, thriving on the cheapest power in history. It means more comforts in the homes of many cities and rural areas. It means more work for the ordinary citizen in connecting the center of this continent with this great highway and from our national and international markets.

The President informed the assembly that he would shortly urge congressional action to bring about the conclusion of the project.

I shall propose to the Congress of the United States which will assemble in January, that it take the necessary steps toward completion of this St. Lawrence Seaway and.
Power Project, on which so much of our national safety and welfare depend.

Reaction to the presidential address was, as always, very mixed. Proponents of the project hailed the efforts which the President was making. Opponents quietly began to mobilize their forces for what the Chief Executive was making another "showdown" in the Congress. Many observers believed that the Administration was going to have great difficulty in gaining congressional approval for this program.

As *Time* magazine phrased it:

But the scheme was still only a scheme, in spite of the President's determined words. There was bound to be a hot time in Congress when the seaway came up before it. Public opinion might stop the plan, as it had stopped the Supreme Court reorganization bill, or... it might be abandoned in the face of natural difficulties. The United States after eight years had learned that the most soaring projects of State planning had a way of shaking down to workable human proportions. 46

President Roosevelt, however, was fully determined that any new St. Lawrence agreement with Canada could and would be pushed through the Congress by all possible means. While Canada was dramatizing her power

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46 "FDR and the St. Lawrence Plan," *Time*, 36 (December 16, 1940), p. 20. The Roosevelt address also reviewed in "The St. Lawrence," *Newsweek*, 16 (December 16, 1940), p. 32.
plight by extending daylight savings time into the Autumn, Prime Minister King told the House of Commons that the Canadian Government would negotiate with the United States and that an agreement would probably be shortly reached. 48

FDR had requested that the Department of Commerce undertake a thorough study of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project to back up his coming campaign in Congress to gain approval for a new agreement. On December 20, 1940, the Commerce Department announced the results of its exhaustive investigation finding the St. Lawrence project to be justified on an economic basis and imperative for defense purposes. 49 Roosevelt presented this most comprehensive study for the consideration of Congress and used it as an important part of his St. Lawrence advancement campaign.

Meanwhile FDR concentrated his attention on the continuing activities of the two national St. Lawrence committees which were proceeding very rapidly with

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plans for a new power and seaway development. On December 20, 1940, representatives of the United States Army Engineers, the New York Power Authority, and the Federal Power Commission again conferred on plans for the construction of the power project on the international section of the river. Following this meeting, a joint conference was held on January 2-3, 1941, by the entire Canadian Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Board and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee. Having received all preliminary engineering reports, this Ottawa conference proceeded to formulate its recommendations to the two Governments. The report of these two advisory committees was issued January 3, 1941.\textsuperscript{50}

The report stated that power installations should be constructed in accordance with the so-called 238-242 controlled single stage project agreed to by all engineers. The report also praised the construction of

\textsuperscript{50}Text of the joint report and accompanying engineering report in U.S. Department of State, \textit{Bulletin}, 4 (March 22, 1941), pp. 331-334; and in Canada, Department of External Affairs, \textit{St. Lawrence Deep Waterway International Rapids Section: Reports submitted to the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Canada by the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1941).
the seaway especially for purposes of using it as a route through which Great Lakes constructed war vessels could pass to the ocean. The revised estimate of costs for the development of the international section combined power and navigation project was $266,170,000.

Reaction to the joint report of the two national committees seemed to confirm the view that FDR was pushing for a complete St. Lawrence agreement to be presented shortly to the Congress. On January 11th, Assistant Secretary Berle returned from his job in Ottawa and told reporters that he was confident of congressional approval of the St. Lawrence project. On January 15th, Governor Lehman of New York told the State legislature, "I believe that the development and utilization of the St. Lawrence power is an urgent necessity." On February 26th, Prime Minister King stated on the floor of the House of Commons that the St. Lawrence project would definitely "be beneficial to the interests of the Dominion."

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Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia bravely incurred the wrath of New York City port interests and came out squarely for both the seaway and the power phases of the project.\textsuperscript{54}

In spite of encouraging signs for a new St. Lawrence agreement, Prime Minister King expressed some doubts about the haste with which developments were proceeding in a note dated March 5, 1941.\textsuperscript{55} The Canadian leader, obviously a little uncomfortable over the speed with which Roosevelt was pursuing his goal, intimated that he would like to see a more cautious approach to the whole problem. King suggested that the United States review the St. Lawrence situation again before a treaty or agreement was concluded. He stressed in particular the great drain of the war on the Canadian manpower and industrial situation as his primary reason for requesting a review by the United States.

FDR sent back a personal letter to the Prime Minister on March 10, 1941, in which he all but demanded that Canada get down to the serious business of

\textsuperscript{54}Eleventh Annual Report of the Power Authority of the State of New York, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{55}Canada, Department of External Affairs, \textit{Correspondence and Documents Relating to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Development} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1941), p. 18.
reaching agreement on the St. Lawrence issue.56
FDR stated that he was sympathetic with the strain of
the war effort on the Canadian economy, but proceeded
to link the St. Lawrence project so closely to the
American defense effort that King could not fail to get
the implication that the United States would not
tolerate further delay.

The Government of the United States regards
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence project as
directly related with the accomplishment of
the foremost national objectives of this
Government. It believes that the project
should be proceeded with and the construction
should commence at the earliest possible
moment. It regards the construction of this
project as a matter of vital necessity.

The President clearly stated that it was his
desire that construction of the project start by Spring.
He emphasized in the strongest possible terms the
great contribution which the project would make to the
effective conclusion of the European war. He concluded
his letter to King by stating the American position
in the simplest possible language.

In the light of these facts, it is my
belief that the funds and power required for
the earliest possible completion of the St.
Lawrence project could not be better spent
for our joint defense effort, including aid
to Great Britain. It is my feeling that

56 Ibid., p. 19. Text of Roosevelt letter of March
10, 1941.
failure to take advantage of the possibilities of this project would be short sighted, in no way contributing to an increase in our immediate defense effort, while limiting our defense program in the difficult years which lie ahead.

The bulldog tenacity of the President to bring about his long-sought St. Lawrence program effectively stopped Mr. King from requesting any further delays. The force and vigor of the Roosevelt letter could not be ignored. As Business Week put it:

The President's reply linked the project with the "foremost national objectives" of the American Government, victory for Britain, and Western Hemispheric defense--and that effectively put the quietus on Canadian objections. Even Quebec's traditional resistance collapsed under the Roosevelt determination. 57

With pressure from Washington on the Dominion so very strong, Prime Minister King was compelled to go along with the Roosevelt statement of policy. The very bad position of the Allies in the war enabled FDR at last to force King into negotiating a new agreement. Canada and Great Britain simply could not afford to offend the United States in view of the world crisis.

The Executive Agreement of 1941

One week after his forceful note to the Canadian Prime Minister, FDR dispatched Assistant Secretary Berle and Federal Power Commission Chairman Olds to join American Minister Jay P. Moffat in Ottawa for the purpose of concluding an executive agreement on the St. Lawrence project. At a conference which lasted only two days, the Canadian delegation consisting of Prime Minister King, Minister of Munitions and Supply Clarence D. Howe, and Legal Adviser for the Department of External Affairs John E. Read, reached complete agreement. On March 19, 1941, the St. Lawrence Agreement was signed. There was practically no debate on the terms of the Agreement as the United States relied on the Roosevelt treaty draft of 1938 as the basis of the Agreement.

Briefly the Agreement of 1941 was designed to bring about the complete construction of the seaway and

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power project. Provision was made for the construction of the remaining links in a twenty-seven foot waterway from the Great Lakes to Montreal for a combined power and navigation scheme in the international section yielding a total of 2,200,000 horsepower to be equally divided; for remedial works to preserve and restore the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls; and for increased water diversions in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin by mutual agreement.

Article I provided for the establishment of a ten member Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission, the chief function of which would be to supervise and coordinate construction of the entire project. Article II stated that Canada would construct all works located within its own territory on the river. Article III provided that the United States would construct all works located within its national territory. Article IV provided for the joint construction of all works in the international section including power plants.

Article V provided that neither nation would be granted proprietary, legislative, or administrative rights in the territory of the other. Article VI
permitted either Government to construct within its own territory alternate canals and locks. Article VII provided that navigation on the new waterway would forever remain free and open for purposes of commerce regardless of termination clauses in preceding treaties. Article VIII permitted additional diversions of water from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin by mutual agreement.

Article IX provided for the rehabilitation of the Niagara Falls. Article X relieved each nation from suit for damages brought by citizens of the other nation for injuries resulting from constructions under the terms of the treaty. Article XI provided for ratification of the Agreement in the regular constitutional manner in each nation.

The annex to the Agreement incorporated the recommendations of the report of the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee of January 3, 1941, in regard to the controlled single stage project (238-242) for power installations in the international section.
An analysis of the terms of the new Executive Agreement revealed that it was almost a replica of the Roosevelt proposed treaty draft of 1930. When compared with the old St. Lawrence Treaty of 1932, surprisingly few changes could be detected. Even those few changes were comparatively unimportant.

Under the 1932 Treaty a temporary St. Lawrence Commission was to have direct responsibility for the construction of all works in the international section. Under the 1941 Agreement actual construction of the works in the international section was to be undertaken directly by the two Governments, but subject to the general supervision of a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission.

Under the 1932 Treaty power was to be developed in a two stage project with an upper dam and power house at Crysler Island and a lower dam and power house at Barnhart Island. Under the 1941 Agreement power was to be developed through a single stage project with a dam and power house located near Barnhart Island with a smaller dam constructed near Iroquois Point for river control purposes only.
The 1932 Treaty made no provision for remedial works to be constructed at Niagara Falls, but this feature became an integral part of the 1941 Agreement. The 1932 Treaty incorporated the Supreme Court's water reduction program for the city of Chicago into its text, but, as water diversion reduction had been completed, there was no mention of it in the 1941 Agreement.

On the very same day that the Agreement was signed, Prime Minister King announced the signing of a new Dominion-Ontario Accord for the purpose of allocating the Canadian share of the 2,200,000 horsepower from the project to that Province. The new Accord of March 19, 1941, provided that the Province of Ontario, through its Hydro-Electric Power Commission, would construct, maintain, operate, and distribute all electricity from the new power plants in the international section of the river. The Dominion agreed to lend to Ontario the sum of $64,125,000 to defray the costs of the power installations. Ontario was to repay this loan without interest charges over
a period of ten years.59

The American federal Government also began the immediate negotiation of a new Accord with New York. On April 7, 1941, President Roosevelt met with Governor Lehman, Chairman Bonebright of the Power Authority, and Leland Olds of the Federal Power Commission at the White House. Preliminary consideration of the terms of the new Federal-State Accord were discussed. On May 16th, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Chairman Bonebright expressing his wish for an immediate signing of an accord.60 Consequently, on May 21, 1941, the terms of the Federal-State Accord were announced in Washington and Albany.61

The State of New York, through its Power Authority, was given the right to construct, operate, maintain, and distribute the American share of the power from the international section of the river. The United States agreed to lend New York the sum of $93,375,000 which was to be repaid without interest over a fifty year period.

59 Text of Dominion-Ontario Accord in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Correspondence and Documents Relating to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Development (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1941), pp. 11-13.
60 Eleventh Annual Report of the Power Authority of the State of New York, op. cit., p. 16.
61 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
With the conclusion of the Executive Agreement and the two Accords on power, all was then ready for congressional action. FDR thereafter concentrated his attention on winning approval from the Congress for his hard won agreement.

An Executive Agreement or a Treaty?

As soon as the signing of the Agreement of 1941 was announced, many persons in all walks of life began to question the constitutionality of the Agreement. As a very practical plan, the Agreement was decidedly preferred by President Roosevelt. A Treaty under the terms of the American Constitution must be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the American Senate. This very requirement had been responsible for the defeat of the Treaty of 1932. The Treaty had gained majority Senate support and probably would have also been approved by the House. As an Executive Agreement required only regular majority approval of both Houses of Congress for ratification, this form seemed much more desirable to FDR.

In Canada it made no difference at all in its ratification method whether an international pact was
termed a treaty or an agreement as either one was ratified by a simple majority of both Houses of Parliament. To the American Government, however, the difference between the ratification methods of an agreement and a treaty might well mean the difference between success or failure. As the question of the St. Lawrence was intricately wrapped up in geographical controversy, Senators representing the Atlantic and Gulf coast States alone could easily defeat a treaty. In the form of an Executive Agreement the St. Lawrence project would undoubtedly have a better chance for passage.

Anticipating subsequent debate over the legality of the St. Lawrence Executive Agreement, both Governments went to great lengths to justify it in place of the treaty. On February 24, 1941, Mr. R. B. Hanson, leader of the opposition Conservative Party in the federal Parliament, raised the question of whether an Agreement would be binding upon the United States under international law. 62 Prime Minister King replied that

he would take up the matter with the Ministry of Justice and report to the Parliament.

On February 28th, Deputy Minister of Justice W. Stewart Edwards prepared a memorandum in which he stated his opinion that he preferred a treaty as the better form in which to accomplish the St. Lawrence project. He noted that some authority did exist for negotiating an executive agreement in Article XIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. This Article stated:

In all cases where special agreements between the High Contracting Parties hereto are referred to in the foregoing articles, such agreements are understood and intended to include not only direct agreements between the High Contracting Parties, but also any mutual arrangement between the United States and His Majesty's Government in Canada expressly by concurrent or reciprocal legislation on the part of the Congress and the Parliament of the Dominion.

Mr. Edwards did not believe that this article presented basis enough for the Agreement, but stated that he was of the opinion that an agreement, aside from the Boundary Waters Treaty, would be perfectly binding on the United States under international law.

The question was subsequently referred to Mr. John E. Read, Legal Adviser for the Department of External Affairs. On March 12, 1941, Mr. Read prepared a memorandum for the Parliament in which he concurred with the views of Deputy Minister of Justice Edwards. Read was also of the opinion that Article XIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty was not sufficient to replace the treaty with an agreement. Mr. Read, however, was of the opinion that an agreement itself, aside from Article XIII, would be considered just as binding on both parties under international law as a treaty. From the viewpoint of its binding qualities, Mr. Read believed the agreement would be just as strong as a treaty.

No Government would dare to contravene the pact. There is no way in which the Canadian Government would contravene the pact without causing as much disadvantage to Canadians as to interests in the United States. In the same way Congress could not repeal the legislation authorizing the agreement without causing as much disadvantage to United States interests as to Canadian. Further, Congress could not in this manner gain any advantage whatsoever for United States interests.

In this way Read was of the opinion that the Agreement would be perfectly satisfactory for Canadian interests.

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64 Ibid., pp. 7-11. Text of Read memorandum.
These views were generally accepted by Canadians, but many believed that the treaty form would at least have been simpler, more direct, and devoid of accompanying doubts. With approval from two of Canada's top legal advisers, the Agreement was signed. The main interests of Canadians in the legality of the Executive Agreement were centered around the question of its being binding on the American Government. There was no discussion at all in the Dominion as to whether the Agreement was a constitutional means of attaining the St. Lawrence development under Dominion law.

In the United States, the situation was more complicated. Not only did the United States have to assure Canadians that the Agreement would be binding under international law, but it also had to assure Americans that the Agreement was compatible with the Constitution. There was little doubt that FDR had deliberately negotiated the Executive Agreement to avoid the disastrous defeat of the St. Lawrence program by the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the American Senate. Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser for the State Department, issued a memorandum on March 13,
1941, in which he asserted that the Executive Agreement was thoroughly compatible with the Constitution and would be completely binding under international law. He reviewed at great length a long list of previous executive agreements negotiated by American Presidents dating back to the year 1845, and concluded that they were a well established feature of American Government.

Hackworth also believed that the idea of the executive agreement was completely constitutional. He based his case for the agreement on the commerce clause of the Constitution.

The improvement of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin for navigation and other purposes would seem clearly to fall within the commerce clause of the Constitution, giving Congress the authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Where the undertaking with respect to interstate and foreign commerce involves boundary waters over which this country does not have exclusive jurisdiction, there would seem to be no reason why the Congress should not within its constitutional power enact legislation, contingent upon a like legislative enactment in the other country, signifying its approval of a joint undertaking signed by both Governments. The signing of an agreement by the two Governments would be but a convenient


66U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
way of bringing about in advance of legislative enactments a joint undertaking by the two Governments on a complicated question which could hardly be handled without such advance understanding. The agreement would contain provisions which might otherwise be incorporated in a treaty, but would not take the treaty form or follow treaty processes. It would not constitute a binding international agreement until after Congress and the Canadian Parliament had indicated their approval.

To clarify further the constitutionality of the agreement, the Hackworth memorandum was submitted to the Attorney General of the United States, Robert H. Jackson. In a brief reply dated March 14, 1941, Jackson stated that it was:

...legally unobjectionable so far as this country is concerned for the executives of the United States and Canada to enter into an agreement regarding the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway Project conditioned for its necessary effectiveness upon legislation by the Congress and by the Canadian Parliament. 67

The Attorney General was also of the opinion that the Agreement once executed would be binding upon the American Government under international law.

Although the top legal experts of both Governments could see no objections of a serious nature to the

Executive Agreement, many other authorities doubted the advisability of undermining the American treaty process. Others bitterly attacked the Roosevelt attempt to avoid another treaty test in the American Senate. Edwin Borchard of the Yale University School of Law, a distinguished authority in international law, disputed the constitutionality of the executive agreement in principle. He warned that extensive use of the executive agreement would gradually nullify the treaty ratifying power of the American Senate. He stated, "I venture to say that this was a procedure unknown to our Constitution."68

The result of the replacement of the treaty with an executive agreement was that still another controversy was to rage over the St. Lawrence project. In addition to the very numerous older arguments over the seaway and power project, the question of the constitutionality of the executive agreement was to complicate the situation even further. As the top level legal advisers of both Governments had justified the Agreement of 1941, FDR,

unperturbed by this new controversy, was ready for the coming congressional battle.

The Demise of an Executive Agreement

Neither the Canadian nor the American Government delayed in pressing their respective legislatures for speedy approval of the Agreement of March 19, 1941. The following day Prime Minister King stood before the House of Commons and formally opened debate on the Agreement. He stressed the agreement in terms of its advantages to Canada to meet increasing demands of the war program and urged its speedy approval. 69

On March 21, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt transmitted the Agreement to Congress along with a brief letter requesting its immediate consideration. He announced that he was sending the Agreement "for the information of the Congress," and that he expected in due course to request introduction of legislation designed to make the Agreement effective. 70

On June 5, 1941, the President dispatched a

special message to the Congress requesting immediate approval of the Agreement. He particularly stressed favorable action in view of the great demands of the defense effort for increased power and for more ships which the Agreement would provide. With regard to the power aspects of the project, FDR stated:

Let us remember that it takes tens of thousands of kilowatt hours of electricity to produce the material that goes into a single airplane. Our present aluminum program alone calls for more than ten billion kilowatt hours a year. It is constantly expanding with the need for more planes to outstrip the aggressors.

On the subject of the Great Lakes as ship building centers the President commented:

The Great Lakes today hold many shipyards and dry docks as well as resources of men and materials for ship building. They are bottled up because we have delayed completing the seaway. If we start the seaway now, scores of additional merchant ships may be built in coastal yards freed by transferring a portion of the longer-term naval program to the Great Lakes.

The President warned against arguments that the seaway would be completed only after the need for it had vanished.

I am advised that we can build the St. Lawrence project in four years. Under emergency pressure it may be completed in less time. I should like to agree with the people who say that the country's danger will be over by that time. But the course of world events gives no such assurances, and we have no right to take chances with the national safety.

FDR then made a strong appeal that the Congress hasten the passage of legislation to make the project a reality.

I know of no single project of this nature more important to this country's future in peace and war. Its authorization will demonstrate to the enemies of democracy that, however long the effort, we intend to outstrip them in the race of production. In this modern world, that race determines the rise and fall of nations. I hope that authorization will not be delayed.

The Roosevelt plea for quick action on the Agreement again centered future debate in the halls of Congress.72

Roosevelt had previously made suitable arrangements for legislation authorizing the Executive Agreement. On May 22, 1941, a conference was called in Washington consisting of representatives of the State Department, Army Corps of Engineers, War Department, New York Power

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Authority, and the Federal Power Commission. At this meeting a draft bill was formulated which was subsequently submitted to the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors on June 2, 1941.

The House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, with Chairman J.J. Mansfield presiding, took up active consideration of H.R. 4927 on June 17th. Hearings on H.R. 4927 lasted until August 6th. During the course of committee hearings testimony was compiled totalling 2,284 pages. In July, the entire Committee on Rivers and Harbors toured the construction area for a period of ten days. Roosevelt had suggested this tour so that committee members could view the construction sites first hand.

FDR also made very certain that the most important officials of his Administration would be on hand to lend their complete and personal support to H.R. 4927. Secretary Hull told the committee that he was "glad to be in accord with the proposed legislation." 74 Secretary

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74 Ibid., I, p. 19.
of War Stimson (a veteran on the St. Lawrence problem and Hoover's Secretary of State) believed "we should have the benefit of cheapened transportation and increased power." 75 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox pointed out "what a great boon it would have been to national defense now if when the project was first proposed it had been agreed and put into effect." 76 Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard stated "I urge your committee to take prompt and favorable action on the Bill." 77 Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones reported that "the experts of the Department of Commerce have found that extensive commercial navigation through the St. Lawrence is wholly feasible." 78

In addition to this imposing array of top Cabinet officers, Roosevelt mustered an even greater number of lesser officials from all divisions of the federal Government. These officials included William S. Knudson, Office of Production Management; Brigadier General Thomas W. Robbins Assistant Chief of Army Engineers; A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of

75 Ibid., I, p. 4.
76 Ibid., I, p. 96.
77 Ibid., II, p. 1968.
78 Ibid., I, p. 283.
State; Lindel Odum, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission; Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission; Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration; Rear Admiral George H. Roak, Chief Constructor, United States Navy; N. R. Danielian, Department of Commerce; John N. Carmody, Administrator of the Federal Works Agency; Leo T. Crowley, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Jerry Slattery, Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration. FDR had made it very certain that practically every one of his top aides would be there to support the Agreement before the House Committee. No one could doubt that the President was terribly determined to leave no stone unturned in his efforts to secure congressional authorization.

In addition to these top federal officials, strong support for the Agreement came from personal testimonies of various State Governors and Mayors of large cities. Included in this category were Herbert S. Lehman, Governor of New York; Charles Edson, Governor of New Jersey; Charles Poletti, Lieutenant Governor of New York; Harold E. Stassen, Governor of Minnesota; John
Moses, Governor of North Dakota; Sam C. Ford, Governor of Montana; Julius P. Heil, Governor of Wisconsin; Murray D. Van Wagoner, Governor of Michigan; Fiorello LaGuardia, Mayor of New York City; Edward J. Jeffries, Mayor of Detroit; and James C. Bonebright, Fred J. Freestone, and Gerald V. Cruise of the New York Power Authority.

The Agreement also drew support from many business, farm, and labor organizations including the National Grange, the State Granges of Montana, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Oregon, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Idaho, and New York, the Farmer's Union of America, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Aluminum Workers of America, the International Ladies Garment Workers, the Detroit Federation of Labor, the Greater Detroit Industrial Council, the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor, as well as numerous Chambers of Commerce representing largely Great Lakes cities.

In many respects the arguments heard by the committee were a monotonous repetition of debates in the Senate in 1933 and 1934. The only new arguments
centered around the St. Lawrence project and its relation to the defense program as well as the constitutionality of the Executive Agreement. The opponents of the project were comparatively few, but very powerful with respect to their influence upon the law makers. Frank S. Davis of the Boston Maritime Association pictured that port deserted and vital national products passing through Canadian cities enriching them at the expense of the United States.

Mayor Thomas Holling of Buffalo stated that 15,000 dock workers would be fired if the bill were passed. Other representatives from New Orleans decried the injurious effect of the seaway on that port. The huge Edison Electric Institute bitterly opposed the public power phase of the project and admonished against Government competition with private enterprise. 79

The Association of American Railroads still was fighting the project because of the seaway's supposed diversion of business to water carriers. The National Association of Manufacturers disputed the value of

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spending money on foreign soil and in competition with American business. In addition to business interests, organized labor was heard in opposition to the Agreement. The American Federation of Labor testified that the project would be of little value to American labor and might cause widespread unemployment in the East. The Railway Brotherhoods opposed the Agreement on the basis that it would hurt the railroads and thereby cause unemployment in this business. John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers bitterly attacked the project for fear that coal burning electrical generators would be replaced by hydro-electric power, and also that cheaper foreign coal would be dumped into the Great Lakes region displacing American coal. 81

Other opponents of the project reverted to the very old question of the expense involved. The NAM in particular made much of the cost factor. The total cost of the project was then estimated at $579,000,000. Of this amount Canada would have to pay $277,000,000.


Canada, however, had been given credit for $133,000,000 for construction of past links in the seaway including the Welland Canal. This left the Canadian share to be paid at $144,000,000. On the other hand, the United States had been assigned total costs of $302,000,000 with credit for only $17,000,000 for past constructions (mainly the Sault Ste. Marie Canal). The total additional cost to the United States would therefore be $285,000,000. The NAM thought that Canada had made too hard a bargain. As a matter of fact, though, the Agreement of 1941 gave the United States much more favorable terms than the old 1932 Treaty where Canada was to pay only an additional $38,000,000.82

Opponents of the project also contested FDR's attempt to ram the Agreement through Congress under the guise of its being a vital part of the national defense program. They asserted that the Agreement was merely another Roosevelt scheme to force his public power program on an unwilling public. They made much of the point that the seaway and power project would not be completed in time to lend any large degree of support

82"St. Lawrence," Time, 38 (July 7, 1941), p. 57.
to the war effort.

As the Committee on Rivers and Harbors had heard from all who wished to testify, Chairman Mansfield called for a vote on H.R. 4927 on the afternoon of August 8, 1941. All twenty-five members of the Committee were present, and the vote resulted in endorsement of the bill seventeen to eight. Chairman Mansfield reported H.R. 4927 to the floor of the House on November 20, 1941. H.R. 4927 was incorporated as Section 2 of the National Rivers and Harbors bill (H.R. 5993).

Only seventeen days later the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the American nation directly into the Second World War. On December 18, 1941, FDR told newsmen that he considered immediate congressional authorization of the Agreement "absolutely vital" to the successful conduct of the war. On the same day, Prime Minister King informed FDR that the Canadian Parliament had passed the Executive Agreement of March 19, 1941, and stated his hope that the American Congress would

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shortly do the same. 85

As the Congress reconvened in January, 1942, all thoughts were turned to efforts for the successful prosecution of the war. In the face of growing disinterest in the St. Lawrence project, FDR vainly attempted a last ditch attempt to get congressional authorization for his Agreement. On February 10, 1942, the President sent a personal letter to Chairman Mansfield urging approval of the Agreement as being highly desirable for the economical and speedy production and transportation of war materials. 86 It was soon obvious, however, that the Congress was much more vitally concerned over direct war measures than over a project which had grown stale with age and repetitious discussion. The active participation of the United States in World War II had pushed the St. Lawrence question deep into the background.

On September 26, 1942, Business Week magazine gained a national "scoop" by predicting that President Roosevelt would shelve the St. Lawrence project "for the duration."

85 Ibd.

Shelving of the St. Lawrence power project for the duration not only is a bitter renunciation for President Roosevelt personally, but a crushing blow to the Administration's public power bloc which hoped that the war emergency would add this capstone to their program. 87

As yet there was no official word from FDR on the persistent rumors that the prosecution of the war would cause him to shelve the Agreement of 1941. As the weary war months of the winter and summer of 1942 dragged on, the House of Representatives had not even brought H. R. 4927 to a vote. Finally at his eight hundred and fiftieth news conference on October 9, 1942, President Roosevelt confirmed the rumors.

In a very grave voice FDR informed reporters that he doubted—

...very much whether, under the present circumstances of steel, primarily, and manpower, whether we can go ahead at the present time. But that doesn't change in any way the broader aspects of the need of opening the lakes to the ocean, and of developing the power as soon as we are able to. 88

After nearly ten years in the White House of battling for the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, FDR told


...if we win this war the time is going to come, after forty years of a great deal of spilled ink and a great many words, there is no question that there will be, someday, access from the Great Lakes to the ocean. It is not just a matter for the State of New York or a State bordering the Great Lakes. It's a matter for the whole nation. It's bound to come, because man has the scientific mechanical ability to overcome a handicap of nature. 89

In reply to a reporter's question whether he considered the St. Lawrence Agreement to be dead, FDR's answer was a resounding "No."

There were persistent, but unconfirmed, rumors that in 1942 Roosevelt came close to ending the seaway argument for all times by using his personal war time powers to build the project by executive order. This expedient was blocked only "by insufficient funds in the kitty of the Executive Office," said Freemen Lincoln.90 Forced to ask for money from the Army, Roosevelt met with stubborn and effective opposition from the Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Army Supply Chief Lieutenant General Somervell, who deemed the project insufficiently urgent as a war time measure.

89 Ibid., p. 415.
While the war effort demanded most of the time of the Administration in the years 1941-1945, the seaway issue refused to die. FDR had fought too long and too hard for the seaway and power project ever to give up. On September 28, 1943, Senator George Aiken of Vermont introduced a bill (S. 1385) which was identical in terminology to the ill-fated H.R. 4927. On March 3, 1944, President Roosevelt sent a personal letter to Aiken in which he gave his full support to the efforts of this veteran Vermont Republican.

I am convinced that the time has come for a non-partisan effort to secure congressional authorization for the St. Lawrence development in order that the project may be available for early post-war construction. I am advising interested federal agencies that your bill has my approval.

True to his word, FDR immediately urged top Administration aides once again to exert pressure upon the Congress in behalf of the Aiken bill. On April 10, 1944, Secretary Hull sent a letter to Chairman Josiah W. Bailey of the Senate Committee on Commerce urging

91 S. 1385, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943. Text of Aiken bill also in 89 Congressional Record, Pt. 6, p. 7844.
approval of S. 1385.

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project has been supported by leaders in the United States for many years without regard to political affiliation. It is my earnest hope that Senator Aiken's bill authorizing this great project will be enacted into law. 93

On May 6, 1944, Senator Aiken told reporters that he hoped for speedy Senate approval of his bill and stressed the post war economic advantages of the project.94 On April 15th, Secretary of War Stimson wrote to Senator Bailey urging approval of the Aiken bill,95 and on July 13th, Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones stated his continued support for the project.96 Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan wrote to Secretary Hull on May 23, 1944, giving his full support to S. 1385. He was of the opinion that it made no difference whether the pact was concluded as a treaty or an executive agreement.

To my mind it is a question of little importance which method is pursued. What is of importance is that we should not lose the benefits of this great international waterway system, with all its potentialities. 97

93 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
95 Fourteenth Annual Report of the Power Authority of the State of New York, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
96 Ibid.
97 90 Congressional Record, Pt 7, p. 9292.
The youthful Governor of New York, Thomas E. Dewey, told reporters that he favored the Aiken bill and stated, that if the Federal Government did not act soon, the State of New York should undertake the power development on its own. 98

After FDR's victory over Governor Dewey in the election of 1944, he again turned his attention to the St. Lawrence question. On November 14, 1944, FDR invited Senator Aiken to the White House for conversations on strategy to gain Senate approval for S. 1385. 99 FDR and his top Administration assistants continued to praise the project in terms of post war prosperity and as a non-partisan issue for the good of the entire nation.

Consequently, on November 21st, seaway supporters managed to force a subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee to hold hearings on S. 1385. The subcommittee was headed by veteran seaway opponent John H. Overton of Louisiana who ruled that hearings


99 "That St. Lawrence Seaway," Scholastic, 45 (December 4, 1944), p. 2.
would be closed to the public, and that only the constitutionality of the Executive Agreement would be considered. Senator Overton successfully pidgeoned S. 1385 and no report at all was made by the subcommittee.

Seeing the futility of trying to break Overton's grasp on the bill, Senator Aiken attempted to save S. 1385 by offering it as an amendment to the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Bill on December 11, 1944. FDR sent a special message to the Congress the following day in which, once again, he requested approval of the St. Lawrence legislation.\footnote{New York Times, December 13, 1944, p. 1.} That afternoon a roll call vote on Aiken's amendment showed the hopelessness of his cause. The Senate vote revealed 57 Senators to be against the amendment, 25 for it, and 14 not voting.\footnote{Congressional Record, Pt. 7, p. 9243.} The primary reason for the large negative vote was that many Senators were of the opinion that the bill should have adequate time for full Senate debate. FDR took another congressional rebuff gravely, but still was unwilling to admit defeat for the project which he had so fully supported for nearly twelve years in the
White House. The Senate had rejected authorization of the Agreement of 1941, and the House had never brought the measure to a vote.

A Study in Futility

Although it was not known at the time, this was to be FDR's last effort in his long battle for the St. Lawrence. His sudden death was mourned the world over. In slightly over twelve years in the White House, President Roosevelt earned for himself a permanent place in the history of the world as one of the greatest of national leaders. His long tenure in Washington had proved unusually successful, and his New Deal left a permanent mark on American social and economic life. His tireless and relentless pursuit of the solution of depression problems in the 1930's and his vigorous leadership in World War II had made his name a household word throughout the world.

His generally very successful attempts to gain whatever he wanted from the Congress and the nation made the St. Lawrence question an outstanding study in futility. As Governor of New York he had worked
without rest to advance the cause of his public power program for the St. Lawrence through the creation of the New York Power Authority. As he first entered the White House, he made every possible effort to gain Senate ratification of the Hoover negotiated Treaty of 1932. When that treaty was defeated by a powerful combination of sectional and commercial interests, he did not hesitate to attempt to negotiate a new treaty with the Canadian Government. From 1934 to 1938 FDR had made every possible effort to obtain Canada's consent to a new treaty. During this period his plans were thwarted by the Dominion Government of Prime Minister King which could not find enough backing for the project within the nation.

As the world crisis began to take on alarming proportions in 1938, FDR was ready with a proposed treaty draft to accomplish his St. Lawrence objective. The Canadian Government contined to show only extreme reluctance to consider a new agreement. As the United States entered into a vast defense build up and the Dominion actively joined in World War II, President Roosevelt used the opportunity presented to make the St.
Lawrence question a part of American and continental defense. Through the force and drive of the Roosevelt personality, and because of Ontario's growing power shortage, he was able to bring about the successful conclusion of the Executive Agreement of March 19, 1941. He had negotiated an Agreement rather than a new treaty in the vain hope that it would have a better chance to gain congressional approval.

The United States entrance into World War II and resulting material and manpower shortages compelled FDR to shelve his St. Lawrence project for a short time, but he gave his complete backing to Senator Aiken's mid-war attempt to gain Senate approval of the Agreement. As American sectional and commercial jealousies were still very strong, and as the war was still foremost in the minds of most congressmen, the time proved inopportune to obtain any congressional agreement for his project.

The very fact that even so powerful a President as Franklin D. Roosevelt in twelve years could not accomplish the completion of the St. Lawrence project, is a silent testimonial to the great underlying problems of the issue. As Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and
Hoover before him, FDR was compelled to leave his great goal before it was achieved. Although the President had managed to negotiate an Agreement, he could not manage to overcome the great opposition to the project within his own nation. As the value of the project within Canada was a topic of considerable debate also, his Agreement proved to be premature. After over twenty-three years of American presidential leadership to bring the seaway and power project to a successful end, the mission still had not been accomplished.
THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AND POWER PROJECT:
A CASE STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP

VOLUME II

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State
University

By
RUDOLPH SWAYNE COMSTOCK, JR. B.A., B.S. in Ed., M.A.

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The Ohio State University
1956

Approved by:

[Signature]

Department of Political Science
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CHAPTER VI
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE
ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT

A New Administration Copes With the Problem

With the unexpected death of President Roosevelt, Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the heavy burdens of the office of the Chief Executive. Most professional observers were of the opinion that the new President would continue to support the St. Lawrence program as had his four immediate predecessors in the White House. It was well known that Mr. Truman had voted for the Executive Agreement of 1941 as a Senator from the State of Missouri. Although the tremendous job of bringing the war to a successful conclusion occupied most of the time of his first few months in office, President Truman told reporters on August 30, 1945, that he would set about work at once to gain congressional approval for the seaway and power project.¹

Faithful to his words, Truman embarked upon a coordinated plan of activity to bring about completion

of the St. Lawrence project. He summoned to the White House a top group of congressional leaders, both Republicans and Democrats, in order to plan strategy for the coming congressional campaign. On September 6-7, 1945, meetings were held at the White House which resulted in a whole new approach to the old question of the St. Lawrence project.\(^2\)

These conferences quickly resulted in action. On October 2, 1945, Majority Leader Alben Barkley introduced Senate Joint Resolution 104 for himself and nine other Senators who had attended the White House conferences.\(^3\) At the same time, Adolph J. Sabath, veteran Illinois congressman and chairman of the powerful House Rules Committee, introduced an identical measure, House Joint Resolution 248.\(^4\)

This so-called Barkley resolution presented a whole new approach to the old problem of the seaway. While the resolution was offered to give congressional

\(^2\)Ibid., September 8, 1945, p. 22.

\(^3\)Besides Barkley, the other co-sponsors were Wagner (New York), Aiken (Vermont), LaFollette (Wisconsin), Ferguson (Michigan), Vandenberg (Michigan), Langer (North Dakota), Shipstead (Minnesota), Hill (Alabama), and Taylor (Idaho).

authorization to the Executive Agreement of 1941, it contained a provision which was designed to remove one serious objection to the seaway. The Barkley resolution provided that the proposed St. Lawrence seaway should be made self-liquidating through the imposition of "reasonable" tolls on all vessels navigating its course. At this time the provision meant that the seaway could be presumed to pay for itself eventually. There would be no cost at all to either Government for the entire project.

The Barkley resolution, however, did omit specifically the Federal-State Accord of 1941 with New York on power production from its scope. The President was merely authorized to reach agreement with New York after the Executive Agreement had been approved by Congress. The Federal-State Accord of 1941 had been the source of constant conflict with the huge private utility interests. It was purposely omitted in order to lessen the terrific pressure of private utility interests which were concentrated on it. In this way, it was the hope of President Truman that the Executive

Agreement would stand a better chance of approval. As approval of the Federal-State Accord on power was to become the subject of a separate agreement, at the very least the turbulent power fight would be postponed.

Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York and the Power Authority were alarmed at this omission in the Barkley resolution. They feared that the seaway portion might be approved, but that power development plans might be postponed indefinitely. Dewey sent a very strong telegram to President Truman on September 19, 1945, in which he demanded that the Administration restore the Federal-State Accord of 1941 to authorizing legislation. President Truman replied on September 26th by telegram that the policy of separation would be followed by him as it had been recommended by his congressional advisers.

In as much as it is a legislative matter, I am inclined to follow their ultimate conclusions on the best means of avoiding continued fruitless discussion and for getting some early, definite action towards accomplishing both these objectives. 7.


7 Ibid., p. 489. Text of Truman telegram.
Although Dewey and the Power Authority were not at all happy over the Truman decision, the disposition of power from the St. Lawrence seemed likely to become a bitter fight in times to come.

Immediately after the introduction of the Barkley resolution, President Truman dispatched a special message to the Congress urging quick approval. 8

As a part of our program of international cooperation, expanding foreign trade, and domestic progress in commerce and industry, I recommend the speedy approval by the Congress of the Agreement of March 19, 1941, between the United States and Canada for the development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin.

Truman pointed out that the exigencies of war had delayed the construction of the St. Lawrence project but that it was now vitally needed for post-war economic prosperity and for international cooperation. Truman reviewed the obvious fact that-

For fifty years the United States and Canada under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, under Liberal and Conservative Governments, have envisioned the development

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of the project together, as a joint enterprise. Every engineering investigation during the past fifty years, every economic study in the past twenty-five years has found the project feasible and economically desirable. The case has been proved; the plans are ready.

Truman emphasized the values of the project in terms of post-war developments including utilization of the greatly expanded war born factories; in terms of increased employment in peace times; in terms of furthering international trade relations; and in terms of post-war economic prosperity to be shared with Canada. He made considerable mention of the power phase of the project pointing out the need for cheap electricity within a radius of three hundred miles of the international section of the St. Lawrence. In conclusion, Truman urged that the Congress adopt the Barkley resolution so that work could begin at once on the St. Lawrence project.

Senate Joint Resolution 104 was subsequently referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. After a short discussion by the Committee, its chairman, Senator Josiah Bailey, announced that it would be transferred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. On December 19, 1945, Senator Tom Connally, an implacable foe of the St. Lawrence project and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, appointed a subcommittee to conduct hearings on S. J. Res. 10.

The subcommittee investigation was delayed as the Congress adjourned. With the reconvening of Congress in January, 1946, President Truman again endorsed the St. Lawrence project in his Budget Message of January 14th. At a presidential news conference on January 22d, the President avowed that the Barkley resolution should have the immediate approval of the Congress.

With continued pressure exerted from the White House, the subcommittee started hearings on S. J. Res. 10 on February 18th. Senator Carl Hatch (New Mexico) was appointed subcommittee chairman with Senators Hill (Alabama), White (Maine), Tunnell (Delaware), and LaFollette (Wisconsin), also serving. These hearings

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9 Letter from Chairman Bailey to Chairman Connally printed in 94 Congressional Record, Pt. 2, p. 866.
lasted until March 9, 1946.

The Hatch subcommittee heard once again from the regular return of advocates and opponents of the project. It was shortly made very clear to the subcommittee that the idea of making the seaway self-liquidating and omitting the discussion of the disposition of power from the St. Lawrence had not affected the opposition at all. The same bitter attacks from private utility interests, the railroads, ship owners, coal miners, American Federation of Labor, and commercial bankers continued to pour in. On the other hand, the same faithful group of midwestern interests continued to urge construction of the project.

Of more interest was the campaign going on simultaneously in the Senate itself to sway Senators to the cause of the St. Lawrence project. As a continuous indication of the non-partisan nature of the St. Lawrence controversy, five leading Republican Senators served as leaders of Truman's drive for

authorization: Vandenbhor (Michigan), LaFollette 
(Wisconsin), Shipstead (Minnesota), Ferguson (Michigan), 
and Aiken (Vermont). Senator George Aiken worked 
tirelessly for his goal of the St. Lawrence project as 
his 1943 resolution had gone down to defeat. As 
Carey Longmire observed:

"Put the question to George Aiken, and 
his normally easy voice crackles with anger. 
Powerful rail and utility interests, plus 
some of their bankers and other allies, he 
asserts, have blocked the recommendations 
of half a dozen successive Presidents. If 
the St. Lawrence turbines were there now, 
he vigorously declares, Vermont would be 
saving one half the money it now pays for 
electricity--about three million dollars 
a year."

It was highly unusual to see Senator Aiken and 
fiery white racist from Mississippi Congressman 
John Rankin in the same corner, but the St. Lawrence 
issue was noted for bringing out unusual combinations 
of forces. Rankin commented:

"In Tupula, after we got TVA power, the 
consumption of electricity in the average 
home jumped five times; why we even heat 
our houses with it. And they say the South 
is backward."

The power question continued to be widely 

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13 Carey Longmire, "Showdown on the St. Lawrence," 

14 Ibid., p. 12.
debated in and out of the halls of Congress. The very powerful private utility interests came in for a barrage of attacks. As Miles McMillin observed about the power trust:

Everybody is for it, but we never seem to get it. Maybe everybody isn't for it after all. Maybe the gang in the back room playing with all those blue chips isn't for it. That gang has been hanging around Washington a long time with those blue chips which they collect every time with hard cash as you pay your monthly light bill. They're just using the principle known as the "old college try." It's just the old determination, that's all. The fact is, the St. Lawrence project means sink or swim for the power trust. And the boys have vowed one unto the other that they're going to swim.

There was no dearth of comment against the St. Lawrence project either. Senator James Mead of New York attacked the program as "undesirable, unconstitutional, and un-American." Mathew Wolf, an American Federation of Labor vice president, favored the word "monstrosity" in referring to the project, and stated that American dollars would be used to hire Canadian workers.

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Association of American Railroads preferred the phrase "billion dollar blunder" when describing the St. Lawrence issue. The newly formed National St. Lawrence Project Conference, an organization composed of many opposition interests, launched a major attack on the constitutionality of the Executive Agreement.

All in all, the terrific debate stirred by the Truman efforts to gain authorization for the Executive Agreement changed the minds of very few. If anything, it appeared that the opposition was gaining strength. During the course of hearings of the Hatch subcommittee, Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois proposed an amendment to the Barkley resolution which was designed to make control of water diversions from Lake Michigan a strictly American concern. Raising the old objections of the city of Chicago, Lucas was opposed to Article VIII(C) of the Agreement which made all water diversions from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin a subject of international control.

On March 9, 1946, the subcommittee reported to


the full Committee on Foreign Relations that it approved the passage of the Barkley resolution. On June 5, 1946, by a vote of twelve to seven, the Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Lucas amendment which was added to the resolution. On June 13, 1946, after a bitter intra-committee battle, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved S.J. Res. 104 by a vote of fourteen to eight and reported it favorably to the floor of the Senate.\(^{20}\)

Senator Wallace White of Maine filed a vigorous dissenting report. As the Congress was then ready to adjourn, no positive action was to be taken in the 79th Congress on the Barkley Resolution. At least the Administration had been successful in gaining the favorable report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

President Truman had hoped that his carefully planned strategy with congressional leaders would bring about the approval of the St. Lawrence project, but, once again, the old alignment of anti-seaway interests

had stalled and blocked it. The only encouraging news for the President was the receipt of an official note from the Canadian Government which strongly emphasized Canada's renewed interest in completing the power project and agreeing to the American proposal that tolls be charged on the seaway to make it self-liquidating.21 As the Canadian Government had ratified the Agreement in December of 1941, that nation was now awaiting the outcome of the Truman battle with congressional foes of the project.

The Eightieth Congress and the St. Lawrence Project

The congressional elections of November, 1946, had resulted in the first Republican controlled Congress since the days of Herbert Hoover. While politically this was a severe blow to the Truman Administration, the change in party control worked to the advantage of the St. Lawrence project. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, life long friend of the seaway, replaced Tom Connally of Texas as chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the House, Representative

George A. Dondero of Michigan moved up to the chairmanship of the Committee on Public Works. Two strong seaway supporters now headed the two vital committees concerned with the St. Lawrence project.

On May 9, 1947, with the full backing of President Truman, Senator Arthur Vandenberg introduced another resolution to accomplish the goal of approving the Executive Agreement of 1941. The Vandenberg resolution was an exact duplicate of the Barkley resolution which had been stalled in the preceding 79th Congress. Vandenberg extolled the self-liquidating aspect of the seaway terming it "the first constructive idea about the seaway in twenty years."  

Vandenberg then appointed a subcommittee headed by pro-seaway Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin to proceed with a consideration of his resolution. The other two members of this subcommittee were Senators Alben Barkley of Kentucky and H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey. Senator Wallace White of Maine objected.


to the fact that the three member subcommittee was obviously composed of a majority of pro-seaway Senators. Only Senator Smith represented the opposing view.  

The Wiley subcommittee held hearings on the Vandenberg resolution from May 28 to June 20, 1947. Wiley strictly confined all testimony to a consideration of national defense and the self-liquidating aspect of the seaway. He ruled that the Senate had already more than adequately examined the general pro and con arguments on preceding occasions. Consequently, confined so narrowly, the hearings were unusually dull for the St. Lawrence question. As was anticipated upon the conclusion of hearings on June 20th, Wiley reported that his subcommittee favored the Vandenberg resolution by a vote of two to one. As the Congress was preparing to adjourn, no further action could be taken on the Vandenberg resolution until the following January.

Simultaneously in the House of Representatives, Congressman George A. Dondero of Michigan introduced an

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identical resolution in his Committee on Public Works.\textsuperscript{26}

The Dondero resolution was considered by the full House Committee on Public Works from July 14 to 18, 1947, but no recommendation either for approval or rejection was presented.

Although action on the St. Lawrence in Congress was marking time until January, 1948, President Truman continued to assist congressional proponents of the seaway by all possible means. He had sent to the Congress several studies made by Administration agencies which pointed out favorably the advantages of the St. Lawrence project. The Attorney General exposed the monopoly practices of the Aluminum Company of America which controlled private power works at Niagara Falls.\textsuperscript{27} Truman also dispatched to the Congress a report of the Federal Power Commission showing the great need of New


York for additional public power. The President sent a report of the Commerce Department which again justified completely the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway.

On June 11, 1947, President Truman delivered an address before the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa on post-war relations. During the course of his address he drew much applause by telling the Canadian law makers that he would continue to do everything in his power to obtain the approval of the American Congress for the joint construction of the seaway and power project with the Dominion. Certainly his remarks were welcome to the business and industry of Ontario which continued to face a severe power shortage.

As the Congress reconvened in January, 1948, President Truman waited expectantly for legislative

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approval of the St. Lawrence Agreement. Senator Vandenberg called at once for a full committee vote on the favorable report of the Wiley subcommittee. On January 7, 1948, Senate Joint Resolution 111 was approved by the full Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of nine to four. On the same day, Senator Vandenberg reported his resolution to the floor of the Senate. A dissenting minority report was prepared by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts for himself and for Senators Connally (Texas), George (Georgia), and White (Maine).

With this favorable action by the Committee on Foreign Relations, President Truman again raised his voice in support of the project. Truman's Budget Message of January 12, 1948 stressed the importance of the development of power and navigation to the St. Lawrence. On January 15th, Truman told reporters that he would press for congressional action on the Vandenberg resolution. Truman wrote a letter to the

President of the Senate on January 26th, requesting early action on the 1941 Agreement with Canada respecting the St. Lawrence seaway and power project. On January 23d, the President told reporters that the St. Lawrence seaway was "absolutely essential" to the nation's postwar economic prosperity.

Most important of all, the President again backed up seaway congressmen by dispatching a powerful special message to the congress on the afternoon of January 26, 1948. Truman informed the Congress that he was urging the immediate approval of the Executive Agreement of 1941. He noted that Canada was actively supporting the project and needed electrical power so badly that she would not tolerate delay. Speaking of the self-liquidating aspect of the seaway, the President remarked:

Plains for this great international undertaking are now based upon the principle of making the new deep-draft navigation feature self-liquidating by the levy of reasonable tolls on shipping. The Government

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will also be reimbursed from the new power facilities. The application of the principle of self-liquidation to the navigational features as well as the power phase of the seaway should remove objections concerning the economic soundness of the enterprise.

Truman concluded with a personal plea for speedy congressional enactment of authorizing legislation.

I am convinced that the great majority of Americans realize that the St. Lawrence seaway must be developed if we as a nation are to continue to receive the fullest benefits from our natural resources. I am personally convinced of the need for this project, both from the standpoint of our common economic welfare and of our national security. I therefore strongly recommend that the Congress enact legislation authorizing this great undertaking.

No sooner had the President's words been uttered when Senator George Aiken of Vermont took the floor to open debate on the Vandenberg resolution. The debate was to run intermittently in the Senate from January 26 to February 27, 1948. Senator George Aiken unleashed a scathing attack against monopoly private utility interests. Senator Irving Ives, newly elected Republican of New York, urged passage of the Vandenberg resolution that his State could proceed with construction of new power works on the St. Lawrence. Senator Wagner
joined his colleague from New York in expressing support for the project. Senator Tobey of New Hampshire addressed the Senate in a very long speech emphasizing the value of the power developments to his state.

Senators Vandenberg, Wiley, and Barkley, urged repeatedly that the St. Lawrence project was a vital necessity.

Senator Ferguson of Michigan devoted two hours to explaining the benefits of the seaway to Great Lakes interests.

Senator Carl Hatch of New Mexico advocated the Vandenberg resolution on the grounds that economic growth would benefit the entire nation. Hatch stated:

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project will contribute to the United States' objectives of working toward the expansion of the international trade and the promotion of unity among the nations of the world. The project will help in bringing the great resources of mid-continental North America within easy access to the channels of commerce by opening the area to ocean shipping and reducing transportation costs. It will help in the marketing of farm products in foreign markets at substantial savings in costs of transportation. The project will permit exportation of manufactured products to war damaged countries. 37

on the opposition side, many Senators denounced

the project in no uncertain terms. Led ably by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Massachusetts), the opposing forces raised the numerous older arguments already well worn in congressional debates. Senator John Overton (Louisiana) spoke with bitterness over the harm that he expected the seaway to bring to the port of New Orleans. Senator Millard Tydings (Maryland) raised the same issue in respect to the port of Baltimore. Senator Saltonstall (Massachusetts) spoke calmly but forcefully for the interests of the port of Boston. Senators Smith (New Jersey) and Bricker (Ohio) ran the gauntlet of anti-seaway arguments.

As the debate drew to an exhausted close, both Senator Wiley and Lodge claimed victory for their sides. The big question at the time was how Ohio's Senator Robert A. Taft, powerful chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, would cast his vote. Wiley and Lodge both conferred with Taft, and on February 16th, Ohio's senior Senator announced his decision to oppose the project "at this time." Taft offered reasons of economy for his decision.
So long as this country is involved in the expenditure of billions of dollars for armed forces, so long as it is involved in costly aid to other countries, so long as we have the tremendous obligation of our veterans of two world wars, I do not think the federal Government should undertake any large increase in its public works projects. 38

As the Vandenberg resolution specifically provided that, in the end, both features of the St. Lawrence project would be self-liquidating, Taft's reasons sounded quite weak.

When the debate on the Vandenberg resolution had ceased, Senator Wiley was aware that anti-seaway forces were to win again. The efforts of Wiley and his band of faithful seaway supporters had been to no avail. On February 23, 1948, Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey moved that the Vandenberg resolution be sent back to the Foreign Relations Committee for further study and consideration, an indirect means of killing the bill. On February 27th, a roll call vote on the Smith motion resulted in a serious defeat of the resolution. There were 57 votes for recommittal, 30 against the

38Ibid., p. 8. Taft decision also discussed in "St. Lawrence," Newsweek, 31 (February 22, 1948), p. 29.
motion and 9 not voting. This overwhelming vote against the Vandenberg resolution was the fourth defeat of legislation to approve the St. Lawrence since 1934.

Washington-New York St. Lawrence Power Fight

Completely disgusted over the latest congressional setback of plans to develop the St. Lawrence project, the State of New York began to undertake plans for the power program. It was now most obvious that the State of New York and the Province of Ontario were very badly in need of additional power. The booming post-war economies had far outgrown existing power production. Governor Thomas E. Dewey and the Power Authority launched a new program to develop the power of the St. Lawrence independently of the seaway phase of the project.

At the request of Governor Dewey a conference was held in Washington by representatives of the United States section of the International Joint Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the United States Army Engineers, and the Power Authority on April 26-29, 1948. At this Washington meeting a plan was

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39 Congressional Record, p. 1858. For the Smith motion: 32 Republicans and 29 Democrats. Against the Smith motion: 15 Republicans and 15 Democrats.

formulated for the independent development of power in cooperation with the Province of Ontario. It was the desire of Governor Dewey to build the power installations through an order of approval from the International Joint Commission thereby completely avoiding Administration and congressional approval. This Dewey sponsored attempt to bypass the Congress and the President was designed to obtain immediate development of St. Lawrence power.

On April 30, 1948, Governor Dewey wrote to Premier Drew of Ontario to ascertain his views in regard to joint construction of the power project. The Ontario Premier replied that he was most eager to join with the State of New York in developing the power phase of the project through an order of approval by the International Joint Commission. On May 1, 1948, A. O. Stanley, Secretary of the American section of the International Joint Commission, promised quick favorable action if an application by Ontario and New York were submitted.

Three weeks later the New York Power Authority

\textsuperscript{41} Ib. Ibid., May 1, 1948, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{42} Ib., May 2, 1948, p. 39.
and Ontario Hydro began a series of conferences for the purpose of completing plans for the new power installations. As the power phase of the St. Lawrence project had already been very thoroughly investigated many times before, the Power Authority and Ontario Hydro quickly reached complete accord on the details of construction. Premier Drew announced to the press on June 18th that Ontario's share of the cost of the power program would be met through the floating of a public bond issue based on the credit of the Province of Ontario. On July 15th, Premier Drew informed reporters that his Cabinet had just approved plans to develop St. Lawrence power in conjunction with the State of New York through an order of approval by the International Joint Commission. Simultaneously Governor Dewey announced that New York was ready to join Ontario in submitting an application to the International Joint Commission.

On the surface the Ontario-New York plan to develop the power of the St. Lawrence through an order

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of approval from the International Joint Commission seemed to be a very excellent way of bypassing Washington. In reality, however, in order to submit an application to the International Joint Commission, the approval of the State Department had to be first obtained. In addition, under American law, the Power Authority had to obtain a permit from the Federal Power Commission. As both the State Department and the Federal Power Commission were agencies of the federal Government, President Truman could easily block the Ontario-New York plan by simply refusing permission to file an application with the International Joint Commission. It was highly doubtful that President Truman would permit independent construction of the power phase of the project without the seaway. On previous occasions the President had asserted that navigation and power were inseparable and that one could not be attained without the other.

Nevertheless, Governor Dewey formally requested the State Department to file the Power Authority's application with the Joint Commission and submitted a request for a permit from the Federal Power Commission.

All attention was focused on President Truman by Governor Dewey and Premier Drew while awaiting impatiently for him to give his approval to the Ontario-New York power plan. Doubts about President Truman's view on separating the power phase of the St. Lawrence project from the seaway phase were completely dispelled when at a news conference on September 2, 1948, the Chief Executive told reporters that he was "unalterably opposed" to the plan. Truman's opposition to the Ontario-New York plan meant, in effect, that Project No. 2000 was doomed.

As could then be expected, the Federal Power Commission held hearings on Project No. 2000 from October 4-7, 1948, but decided to hold up its ruling.

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48 Ibid., September 3, 1948, p. 39.
"indefinitely." It appeared that President Truman was still very much determined to gain congressional authorization for the entire seaway and power project. As the American presidential election of November, 1948 had resulted in a surprising victory for the President, he had been granted four more years to develop his federal St. Lawrence plans.

On December 2, 1948, President Truman informed reporters that he was still very much opposed to separation of power from the seaway as proposed by New York. He expressed the opinion that the United States should negotiate directly with the Government of Canada; not through the International Joint Commission as had been suggested by the New York Power Authority.

Although New York was having its difficulties with President Truman, the Canadian Government of Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent was cooperating to the fullest with Premier Drew and the Province of Ontario. As Truman continued his clash with Governor Dewey and the Power Authority, Prime Minister St. Laurent

49 Ibid., October 14, 1948, p. 24.

told the Parliament that he was "disappointed" over the President's decision to oppose the Ontario-New York plan for the development of vitally needed St. Lawrence power. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that President Truman would reconsider his stand.

Charges and countercharges flowed back and forth between Washington and Albany at the latest Truman rejection of Project No. 2000. Dewey, on December 10, 1948, conferred with the Power Authority and announced to the press that New York was being deliberately injured by President Truman merely to forward his seaway program. The State Department countered with a press release on December 15th, expressing the view that it would be unwise to separate the power development of the St. Lawrence from the seaway. Dewey immediately accused the President of "political daisy picking" and reiterated his faith in the project as vital to the economy of New York. Truman's

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51 Ibid., December 4, 1948, p. 28.
52 Ibid., December 11, 1948, p. 11.
53 Ibid., December 16, 1948, p. 59.
54 Ibid., December 17, 1948, p. 15.
effective, but tacit, reply came on December 20, 1948, when the State Department officially denied the Power Authority the right to petition the International Joint Commission for an order of approval.\textsuperscript{55}

President Truman had effectively slammed the door on Ontario-New York plans for the development of St. Lawrence power. His primary motive for so doing was his sincere desire that the seaway and power project should be constructed together. Truman feared that if the power project were completed, the seaway would have even less chance of being approved on its own merits. Truman was clearly attempting to capitalize on the serious power shortage plaguing New York and Ontario and using this shortage as a bargaining point for approval of the seaway.

As the new 81st Congress again controlled by the Democrats convened in January, 1949, it appeared that President Truman was not ready to push any new plans for authorization of the St. Lawrence program. In his State of the Union address on January 4, 1949, the President spoke rather abstractly of the great values of

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, December 21, 1948, p. 2.
the St. Lawrence project but proposed no specific action. At the same time in Albany, Governor Dewey told the New York legislature that President Truman's opposition to the Ontario-New York power plan would work great hardship on all the people of the State.

On January 28th, the Associated Press quoted Prime Minister St. Laurent as stating that the value of the project was so great as to call for serious consideration by Canada of the possibility of developing the power phase of the project without further consultation with the United States. It was quite apparent that the Truman stand was most unpopular with the Government of Ontario as well as with the State of New York.

On March 2, 1949, the New York Power Authority petitioned the Federal Power Commission for a re-opening of hearings on its application for a license to construct power facilities in the international section of the St. Lawrence. On March 8, 1949, the Federal Power Commission issued an order denying the request and

56 Ibid., January 5, 1949, p. 1.
58 Ibid., January 29, 1949, p. 23.
stated, pointedly, that the New York application would be held in abeyance pending congressional consideration of legislation authorizing the St. Lawrence project.59

Although the President continued to oppose independent power development of the St. Lawrence, he did not plot any further strategy to bring congressional authorization to the St. Lawrence project. A very half-hearted attempt was made by Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas (Illinois) to gain congressional approval of the 1941 Agreement during the first session of the 81st Congress when he introduced a resolution.60

Introduced on June 1, 1949, its content was identical with the ill-fated Vandenberg resolution which had been defeated in the preceding 80th Congress. The futility of the Lucas resolution was soon evident as it was not even reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations. No word at all in support of the Lucas resolution came from the White House.

By this time Governor Dewey and Premier Drew were thoroughly exasperated by the tactics of the Truman

59 Ibid., March 9, 1949, p. 5.
60 Senate Joint Resolution 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., June 1, 1949.
Administration. Truman had denied New York and Ontario the power to move ahead with the St. Lawrence plan, and, at the same time, seemed unwilling to push plans for congressional authorization of the 1941 Executive Agreement. Governor Dewey, in particular, continued to flood the newspapers with bitter attacks on the Truman Administration.

The Government of Canada, also, began to take publicly a dim view of Truman's opposition to construction of the power works in the international section of the St. Lawrence. On November 16th, and December 7th, 1949, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson blasted the White House from the floor of the House of Commons. Pearson said that Canada was "most grieved" over the failure of the American Congress to approve the 1941 Agreement although it had been pending in that body for over eight years. He stated that Canada would soon abandon any attempt to reach agreement with the United States on navigational features of the project unless congressional approval came "very shortly." In a direct rebuke to President Truman, Secretary Pearson told Commons that Canada would have to concentrate on increasing production of
steam generated turbines unless the President reversed his stand. 61

The Truman determination, however, was unshakeable. In the face of the rising opposition in New York and in Canada to his stand, the President took the opportunity presented by the reconvening of the 81st Congress in January, 1950, to restate his belief that the seaway and power project should be constructed jointly by Canada and the United States at the very same time. In his Budget Message to the Congress Truman recommended that $6,000,000 be appropriated for the fiscal year of 1950 for preliminary engineering and other investigations of the St. Lawrence project. 62 Again in his State of the Union address on January 14th, the President urged construction of the St. Lawrence project as a measure for promoting the prosperity of the continent. 63 In his Economic Report, President Truman again emphasized the value of the joint construction of the seaway and power project for international and national prosperity. 64

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62 Ibid., January 5, 1950, p. 10.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., January 6, 1950, p. 1.
In the White House on January 5, 1950, reporters pointedly asked the President what action he proposed to take on the New York request for independent power developments. He stated that he did not approve of separating the power phase from the seaway, the newsmen reporting Truman's answer to mean "Both the Seaway and Power Project or Nothing." On February 9, 1950, President Truman sent a letter to Vice President Barkley in which he stressed the importance of construction of the entire St. Lawrence project, and reiterated his stand against the Power Authority's plan.

Certainly, the President was not blind to the controversy which his stand against separate power development had aroused. Truman was well aware that the demand for increased power in both Canada and the United States was far greater than the general demand for the seaway itself. He purposely waited until pressure for power developments on the St. Lawrence became so critical that he could then bargain with the Congress by giving his assent to the New York project.

66Ibid., February 10, 1950, p. 5.
but only in return for congressional approval of the seaway. In view of the general desire for power and the lack of desire for the seaway, he patiently waited for the day when he could trade the former for the latter. This was clearly the reason for his attitude in regard to New York, his policy of "inaction to bring action."

Until Truman considered the time right to jump in with full force, New York was just going to have to wait.

Canada Demands the St. Lawrence Project

What an amazing change had occurred within Canada in regard to the St. Lawrence project in the years immediately following World War II. Throughout the entire Administrations of Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt, the picture had been that of an American President urging a St. Lawrence program upon a very reluctant Canadian Government. Vehement opposition to the St. Lawrence plan in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec had caused Prime Ministers King and Bennett to hesitate repeatedly even to discuss the St. Lawrence question with the United States. By the dawn of the year 1950, it appeared that this previous situation had been almost entirely reversed.
It has been said that time changes all things, and so it was with the St. Lawrence situation, too. What an unusual situation it was to see the Canadian federal Government and the Province of Ontario forcefully pushing a St. Lawrence agreement and, of all things, upon a "reluctant" American President. Such a condition could scarcely have been imagined by President Harding. Yet, such was indeed the case.

Many reasons had brought about this marked reversal of Canadian policy with regard to the St. Lawrence issue. The Canadian post-war economy was booming to a degree unknown to the late Prime Minister King and his Liberal Governments of the 1920's and 1930's. The Government had an actual treasury surplus of $800,000,000 while most nations of the world were deeply in debt. The immature Canadian economy was rapidly expanding at a rate reminiscent of the American business expansions of the latter half of the nineteenth century. With this extremely great industrial boom in Canada following World War II, there was no longer any worry about money to provide for the St. Lawrence project.
By 1950 the Canadian railways were loaded to overflowing with vast cargoes of commodities moving across the nation. The main problem of the Government now was to attempt to provide railroad service which would keep up with this vastly increased commerce brought about by Canada's great new prosperity. Therefore, the very old reluctance of the Canadian Government to consider the seaway because of its competition with floundering publicly owned railroads was completely removed. Now the question before the Government was how to meet increased traffic in the nation.

With respect to the question of electrical power developments, the St. Lawrence project became most desirable also. Where once the Province of Ontario had been very reluctant to develop further additional power from the international section, the vast business boom in that province now dictated a policy of power expansion. The mushrooming Ontario economy could now easily absorb every last bit of horsepower to be produced from the St. Lawrence. The critical power shortage in Ontario had resulted in that province's fullest cooperation with the State of New York to bring about the construction of the power phase.
Ontario Hydro continued to plead with the Liberal Government of Prime Minister St. Laurent to force the American Government to do something about accomplishing its power goals. Otherwise, Ontario would have to remain dependent upon the export of surplus power from the Province of Quebec to help meet its increasing power load. As a matter of fact, Canada, as a whole, had plenty of surplus power and had actually developed only twenty-five per cent of its water power potential. Unfortunately for Ontario, however, there was a very poor distribution of power across the nation. Therefore, while Quebec had a huge surplus of power to export, Ontario faced the bleak prospect of a power famine.

The plain fact of the matter was that Ontario's water power potential was not great enough, even if fully developed, to meet the needs of the economy. To an American observer it might appear strange that Ontario was not satisfied to continue to purchase additional power from the private companies of Quebec. To make such a logical conclusion was to completely misunderstand the internal situation in Canada. The Governments of Ontario and Quebec had a long standing feud with each
other and with the federal Government. Provincial pride and rivalry in Ontario would not permit her to beg for surplus power from Quebec. Ontario was determined to become completely independent of the private power companies of Quebec. Furthermore, the rates which Quebec power companies were charging were considered exorbitant, and Ontario was in the frustrating position of having to pay the price demanded without recourse. Otherwise, Ontario's greatly expanded post-war industries would come to a grinding halt. As the St. Lawrence development offered a conveniently located vast new source of cheap public power, it had become increasingly desirable, if not essential, to the Province.67

For many, many years the Province of Quebec had been unalterably opposed to the seaway phase of the project. At the same time this traditional opposition was fast dying down for two primary reasons. (1) Quebec's "depression neurosis" was being replaced by a feeling of great optimism among business and commercial

67Discussion of the power situation in Canada and in Ontario ably presented by the Canadian Minister of Commerce Clarence D. Howe in "Why Canada is Booming," United States News and World Report, 37 (July 30, 1954), p. 57f.
interests. The post-war boom had brought unknown prosperity to the ports of Montreal and Quebec which were hard pressed to keep up with the demand. Economic conditions in this province had never been better, and fear of the injury of the seaway declined proportionately.

(2) Of a more positive nature was the discovery of vast new deposits of iron ore in northern Quebec and Labrador. These huge iron ore fields were certain to replace the Masabi Range of northern Minnesota as the great ore producers of the future. It was anticipated that a large share of this new iron ore would be carried by railroad to the ports of Quebec and Montreal and there loaded on ships for Great Lakes cities and the ports of the world. Strategically located the cities of Montreal and Quebec looked forward to a thriving iron ore transhipment business. This factor, also, contributed to a decline in the opposition of the Province of Quebec to the seaway.

In the Province of Ontario the seaway phase of the project became increasingly desirable as a result of the post-war economic boom. To open the Great Lakes to the ocean would also mean these sea-going ships could load the iron ore in northern Quebec and ship it
directly to the cities of the Great Lakes.

The situation in Canada, therefore, had undergone a considerable change in the post-war years. There was no longer the slightest doubt that Canadian public opinion was disposed to favor the construction of the St. Lawrence project. As is usually the case in a democracy, the rising tide of pro-St. Lawrence sentiment was quickly reflected in the Canadian national Government.

On March 27, 1950, Prime Minister St. Laurent concluded a new Canada-Ontario Accord on power to be developed from the international section of the St. Lawrence River. As it was hoped that President Truman would change his opposition to the Ontario-New York power plan, Canada was all set for the immediate construction of the power project. The only thing holding it up was the continued presidential opposition to separating the power phase of the project from the seaway.

The St. Laurent Government immediately began to exert pressure on the United States to go along with

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construction of the seaway and power project. Many top Canadian officials voiced their discontent with continual American delays to approve the 1941 Agreement. Foreign Secretary Lester B. Pearson journeyed to New York City on March 8, 1950, where he urged that the United States take favorable action to join Canada in constructing the St. Lawrence project.

Canadians want to see the St. Lawrence development begin in 1951. We are anxious for early ratification of the agreement which our two countries signed in 1941. If that cannot be obtained, however, we shall have to consider the plan put forward by New York State and the Province of Ontario for development of the power alone. If that plan were to be adopted, it might be advisable for Canada to look into the possibility of building at the same time a Canadian deep waterway on our side of the border. But we are still hoping, instead, that our two countries will work together to construct the full St. Lawrence project, as our Governments agreed nine years ago to do in that spirit of friendly cooperation that has become a North American tradition. 69

More pressure from top level Canadian leaders was exerted on the United States with ever increasing sharpness. On June 11, 1950, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent journeyed to St. Lawrence University in

Canton, New York, to address the annual conference on Canadian-American affairs. The Prime Minister told his audience that the Canadian Government was "impatient" over the long delay in approval of the St. Lawrence project by the American Congress. He intimated that his Government would fully support the Ontario-New York power program and would consider the possibility of constructing an all-Canadian seaway.70

On September 15, 1950, Transport Minister Lionel Chevrier told reporters in Ottawa that Canada would act alone if the United States Congress did not approve the combined seaway and power project very soon.71 Clearly the Canadian Government was pushing to gain presidential approval of the Ontario-New York power plan, and at the same time, threatening the construction of the seaway as an all-Canadian venture.

Prime Minister St. Laurent did obtain some action from the American Government. The very badly needed remedial works for Niagara Falls was a source of constant irritation to both Governments. Since President Roosevelt had made this feature a part of his 1941

Agreement, the issue had been firmly entangled with the whole St. Lawrence situation. St. Laurent formally requested that President Truman make the Niagara Falls issue the subject of a special treaty that work might start on it shortly.

As President Truman did not consider the preservation of Niagara Falls to be a vital part of his St. Lawrence program, he agreed. The new Niagara Falls Treaty was signed in Washington on February 27, 1950, by Ambassador Hume H. Wrong for Canada and Secretary of State Dean Acheson for the United States. St. Laurent made it clear that he did not view the Niagara Falls Treaty as any substitute for the whole St. Lawrence basin development. As the Treaty was not controversial, except for its location in the 1941 Agreement, it was quickly and easily ratified by both legislatures. St. Laurent indicated strongly, however,

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that he intended to press the United States for action on the power and seaway phases of the project.

Congress Delays

Unperturbed by the rising tide of Canadian plans to advance the cause of the St. Lawrence project, President Truman patiently awaited the outcome of future developments. He had persistently refused to give favorable consideration to the Power Authority's plan to develop power installations in the international section of the river, and he had made no further major attempts to gain congressional authorization of the 1941 Agreement. This lack of presidential action was not to be construed as disinterest in the St. Lawrence project. The President simply did not consider the time advantageous to pursue any new vigorous congressional campaign. He was counting on the increasing demands of Canada and New York for power developments to swing the tide over to the side of the seaway. When he considered the moment right, he would be ready to launch another all-out campaign for the entire St. Lawrence project.

As the second session of the 81st Congress reconvened in January, 1951, President Truman worked
rather quietly behind the scenes to forward his St. Lawrence program. On January 17, 1951, he asked that the American Federation of Labor reverse its opposition to the St. Lawrence project in a letter addressed to that organization.73 In his customary annual messages to the Congress, he continued to call for approval of the Agreement of 1941.

On January 25-26, 1951, Truman assembled Charles E. Wilson, Defense Mobilizer; Major General Lewis Pick, Army Corps of Engineers; and Stanley Woodward, American Ambassador to Canada; for a series of conferences at the White House for the purpose of promoting the St. Lawrence program.74 On February 13, 1951, the National Security Resources Board of the President reported that the St. Lawrence seaway and power project was vital to American defense and the effective prosecution of the Korean conflict.75

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73 New York Times, January 18, 1951, p. 27.
74 Ibid., January 27, 1951, p. 9.
No action of major consequence, however, took place in the American Congress in the coming months. In the Senate a new resolution was offered by a group of 23 Senators on February 1, 1951. Senate Joint Resolution 27 was introduced to bring about congressional authorization of the 1941 Agreement. As Chairman Tom Connally (Texas), an adamant foe of the project, refused to hold hearings on the resolution, no action resulted.

Evidence of the growing battle over the development of power from the St. Lawrence was vividly reflected by the introduction of three entirely different Senate bills in 1951. Senator Irving Ives (New York) introduced a bill, known as the State Bill, authorizing the Power Authority to build power installations on the St. Lawrence. His bill was designed to let the Power Authority construct and operate the power works but provided for distribution of power to consumers through existing private companies with the Authority controlling rate charges.

76 S. J. Res. 27, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., February 1, 1951.

Senator Herbert Lehman (New York) also introduced a bill designed to make the construction of the St. Lawrence power project a federal undertaking and specifically denied diversion of power to any private company. His bill was referred to as the Federal Bill. Senator Homer Capehart (Indiana) introduced a third bill, known as the private enterprise bill, which provided for construction of all power works by private electrical companies with no governmental participation. Although a great diversity of opinion was represented by these three bills, none of them was even to be reported from committee.

With action stalled in the Senate, President Truman decided to concentrate his efforts on the House Committee on Public Works where it was believed more sympathy for the St. Lawrence project existed. On February 7, 1951, Truman invited all members of this Committee to a conference at the White House where plans were mapped to gain House approval of the St.

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Lawrence project. The following day President Truman told reporters that the committee would prepare plans for hearings on the issue. The Committee on Public Works conducted hearings on the question in the form of seven House resolutions all designed to approve the 1941 Agreement from February 20 to April 30, 1951. Again from October 8 to 10, 1951, the Committee heard further testimony on House Joint Resolution 337 introduced later in the session. On June 1, 1951, fourteen members of the Public Works Committee took off from Washington in an Air Force C-54 for a 3,000 mile tour of the sites of the proposed constructions.

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80 New York Times, February 8, 1951, p. 11.
81 Ibid., February 10, 1951, p. 20.
82 House Joint Resolutions 2, 3, 4, 15, 102, 122, and 159, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
President Truman's hopes to gain House approval of the St. Lawrence program were dashed when on July 19, 1951, the Committee on Public Works voted fifteen to twelve in favor of shelving the resolution, for the time being at least. The vote had been close, but in view of the protracted Senate delay, the Committee on Public Works could not see fit to rush into approval of the St. Lawrence program.

Once again, the Congress had refused to take favorable action on the St. Lawrence question. The Senate, during the first session of the 82d Congress, had been forestalled from any action at all by rulings of powerful Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally. Truman had attempted, therefore, to concentrate action on the House. With the failure of the House Committee on Public Works to approve American participation in the St. Lawrence program, Mr. Truman continued to wait patiently believing that the time would shortly come when outside pressure would mount to the point where he could extend all possible efforts.

Canada Takes Action

With continued failure of the American Congress to approve the St. Lawrence Agreement of 1941 which had now been pending before that body for ten years, the Canadian Government had some provocation for being irritated. Demand for the seaway and power project grew stronger and stronger with the passing of every month. The power situation in Ontario had become so critical that Ontario Hydro facilities were taxed beyond capacity. Demand for the seaway in that Province, as well as in Quebec, continued to make headway. Still, there was no action of any kind from Washington.

High officials of the Canadian Government, as well as prominent provincial leaders, continued to utter many verbal tirades against this perpetual American delay. In February of 1951, Foreign Secretary Pearson stated in Ottawa that he considered the United States delay detrimental to the economy of Canada. He emphasized the great need for power in Ontario, and in rather undiplomatic language accused the United States of purposely delaying the project.

The Americans say we are dragging our feet in world affairs. The biggest and longest dragging of feet I have known in my entire career is that of the Americans on the St. Lawrence seaway. 88

Premier Leslie Frost of Ontario met with top Canadian officials in Ottawa on May 1, 1951, where plans were thoroughly considered for the construction of an all-Canadian seaway. It was becoming increasingly clear that Canada was determined to construct the seaway, with or without American participation. 89 At the conclusion of his Ottawa conference, Premier Frost left no doubt in any one's mind that Ontario was most sincere in demanding construction of the St. Lawrence project.

Now that our friends in the South have decided in their wisdom not to come in with us, we ask that they please get out of the way and let us go ahead with the job. 90

In London, Ontario, former Premier Gordon Conant told reporters that it was time to put the project on an "or else" basis to the United States. He was of the opinion that Canadian newsprint, nickel, iron, and defense cooperation could be "horsetraded" for United

88 "St. Lawrence," *Time*, 58 (February 28, 1951), p. 36.
States approval of the seaway and power project.91

In Winnipeg, Saskatchewan, American Ambassador Stanley Woodward attempted to soothe ruffled Canadian feelings by telling his audience that the American Congress would shortly approve the St. Lawrence project. But, in Toronto, Ontario Hydro Chairman R. W. Saunders suggested that the Ambassador was "talking through his hat." He disclosed that he had received discouraging news indicating no American approval of the project in sight.92

Pressure on the St. Laurent Government grew stronger and stronger in Canada. Many prominent Canadians began to urge Prime Minister St. Laurent to "do something" about the American situation. On July 26, 1951, Premier Leslie Frost and Hydro Chairman Saunders wrote a letter to St. Laurent urging him to take immediate action to construct the St. Lawrence project as an all-Canadian undertaking.93 Frost and Saunders heavily underscored the construction of an

all-Canadian seaway. From other sections of Canada pressure on the St. Laurent Government continued to pour in.

With the mounting tension in Canada, Prime Minister St. Laurent decided to undertake a personal conference with President Truman in order to obtain his acquiescence in the problem. On September 28, 1951, Prime Minister St. Laurent embarked from an airplane in Washington and went immediately to the White House. The sole topic on the agenda was the Canadian desire for a St. Lawrence project with, or without, the United States. Emerging from a one hour conference with the President, St. Laurent smiled to waiting reporters. "We have agreed on a joint statement," he said. "We're prepared to go ahead." 94

At this Washington conference St. Laurent had extracted Truman's promise that he would make one last attempt to obtain congressional approval for the 1941 Agreement. If this last attempt should fail, Truman agreed that he would give his consent not only to the Ontario-New York plan for power development, but

would also authorize construction and operation of an all-Canadian seaway through approval of the International Joint Commission. Congress would not have anything left to legislate upon with regard to this very old problem.

The Canadian Government would finance the construction of the seaway. The Ontario Government would finance its share of the cost of the power project, and New York would pay the remainder. After so many years of debate over the St. Lawrence Treaty of 1932 and the Executive Agreement of 1941, it seemed that the entire project might now be constructed through the simple expedient of an order of approval from the International Joint Commission.

Opponents of the seaway and power project immediately attacked the St. Laurent visit as "a propaganda maneuver" and stated that Canada was "merely bluffing." After the conclusion of the Washington conference, President Truman told reporters that he was planning to give the Congress a "final chance" to

95 Ibid., p. 46.
permit American participation in the seaway. If that failed, he made it very clear that he would approve the Ontario-New York power development and construction of the seaway by Canada through an International Joint Commission order of approval.

Very much elated over the results of his talk with President Truman, Prime Minister St. Laurent took immediate action to prepare for Canada's construction of the seaway and power project. On his way back from Washington, he stopped in Toronto to confer with Premier Frost about Ontario's role in the proposed $400,000,000 power project and reached full agreement with him. He also made a quick trip to Quebec and arrived at full accord with Premier Maurice Duplessis over the seaway and power project.97 With this unusual harmony in his provincial family, St. Laurent announced on October 9, 1951, that his Government would ask Parliament for legislation to authorize construction of the St. Lawrence project.98

97 "Canada," Time, 58 (October 8, 1951), p. 46.
Consequently, on November 16, 1951, Transport Minister Lionel Chevrier opened debate in the House of Commons requesting the Parliament to pass two acts designed to authorize construction of the Ontario-New York power plan, and to provide for the construction of an all-Canadian seaway. On December 1, 1951, Munition's Minister Clarence D. Howe informed the Parliament that construction of an all-Canadian seaway was thoroughly feasible but would be of greater cost than a similar undertaking in cooperation with the United States.

On December 3, 1951, Prime Minister St. Laurent and Ontario Premier Frost signed a new Canada-Ontario Accord thereby completing all plans for the development of St. Lawrence power by Canada.

Quick to respond to the Government's request, the Parliament passed two acts on December 10, 1951, which ended all Canadian plans for the development of the St. Lawrence project. The first act, called the International Rapids Power Development Act, gave official Government approval to the Canada-Ontario

99 Ibid., November 17, 1951, p. 7.
100 Ibid., December 2, 1951, p. 7.
Accord of December 3, 1951. It provided the legal basis for the Province of Ontario to go ahead with the construction of power installations in the St. Lawrence contingent upon the receipt of an order of approval from the International Joint Commission. The Canadian Government agreed to exert all possible efforts to gain speedy approval from the Joint Commission.

The Second Act was entitled the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act. It provided for the creation of a public corporation of Canada called the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority which would have full supervision of the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway. The Seaway Authority was empowered to build the seaway in conjunction with the United States, or if this proved impossible, entirely by itself on Canadian soil. The Seaway Authority was to consist of a President and two other members appointed for indefinite terms with headquarters in Ottawa. This public corporation was authorized to finance the construction by floating


a public bond issue based on the credit of Canada for
a sum not to exceed $300,000,000. In this way Canada
was ready to move ahead with the construction of an all-
Canadian seaway just in case the American Congress
did not decide to join very shortly.

With the passage of these two important acts,
Canada was now completely ready to undertake the
construction of both the seaway and power project.
Provision was made, however, for American participation
in the seaway, but only if Congress quickly passed
necessary enabling legislation. Canada had made it
completely clear that she would still welcome the
United States in the project, but was fully prepared
to "go it alone" if the United States did not choose
to join the program. Thus, Canada, confronted the
United States with a fait accompli. The only issue
left for Congress to decide was merely that of whether
or not the United States would participate in the
construction of the seaway.

Truman's Last Attempt

President Truman, in line with his promise to
Prime Minister St. Laurent, now considered the time
most propitious to conduct another "all out" campaign on the Congress to gain approval of the Agreement of 1941. The St. Lawrence situation had become extremely acute in Canada, and pressure on the American Congress to act was mounting with every passing day. Where once it had been the American President who had urged the project on a reluctant Canada, the situation was now alarmingly reversed. Now Canada was giving the United States its last opportunity to join with her in construction of the project. Truman made the most of this new situation.

On January 28, 1952, the President penned the longest and most comprehensive special message ever written by an American Chief Executive on the project. This special message certainly put the last ounce of the Truman determination into the fight for the power and seaway development. The message left no stone unturned in imploring congressional approval.

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President Truman capitalized on the "new situation" which had been brought about by Canada's completion of plans for moving ahead with the project entirely by itself.

For eleven years, since 1941, there has been before the Congress for approval an Agreement between the Canadian and United States Governments providing for joint construction of the St. Lawrence project. The Congress has not yet approved this Agreement. Now the Canadian Government has officially proposed, if the Congress does not approve the 1941 Agreement at an early date, to construct the seaway as a solely Canadian undertaking, simultaneously with the construction of the power phase of the project by the Province of Ontario in association with an appropriate agency of the United States.

President Truman reminded the Congress of his promise to Prime Minister St. Laurent that he would not stand in the way of an all-Canadian seaway if favorable American action were not quickly forthcoming.

Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada visited Washington last September in order to lay this proposal before the United States Government. At this meeting, we found ourselves in complete agreement on the vital importance to the security and the economies of both Canada and the United States of proceeding as rapidly as possible with both the seaway and the power phases...
of the 1941 Agreement. We also agreed that the Canadian alternative proposal for construction of the seaway by the Canadian Government is feasible and that if an early commencement is not authorized, the seaway and power works should proceed as the Canadians suggest.

Truman bore down very hard on the "or else" proposition which Canada had made to the United States.

It is a very different situation from that which the Congress has previously considered. Through all the years that the St. Lawrence project has been a public issue in this country and in Canada--these years now numbering about fifty--the principal arguments have revolved around the question of whether the seaway part of the project should be constructed; this question is no longer at issue... The question before the Congress now is whether the United States shall participate in its construction, and thus maintain joint operation and control over this development which is so important to our security and our economic progress. I strongly urge that the United States should join as a full partner with Canada in building the seaway. We should not be content to be merely a customer of Canada's for the use of the seaway after it is built.

Truman bluntly informed the Congress that opposition interests could no longer stall the construction of the seaway.

I am fully aware that there has been strong opposition to the seaway on the part of certain railroads and port interests in our country who feel that they would be
adversely affected. I have always believed that this opposition overlooked the fact that economic growth and expansion in our country—which are as important to the railroads and the ports as they are to anyone else—depend on continuous development of our resources to increase our production capacity and job opportunities. Regardless of what may have been their conclusion in the past, however, those who have previously opposed the project must now look at the matter in a new light. The project is to be built whether or not we take part in the construction of the seaway. Those who have opposed the seaway in the past surely must realize these changed circumstances. It is a plain matter of national self-interest to join in its construction.

The Truman message had such a "do or die" quality about it that seaway supporters in Congress immediately launched a new drive for authorization of the 1941 Agreement. Old seaway faithfuls Senators Wiley, Ferguson, and Aiken spearheaded a new drive to force Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally to conduct hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 27, which had been introduced in the first session of the 82d Congress. Implacable seaway foe Connally absolutely refused to rehear the St. Lawrence case. In bitter disgust Senator Aiken told reporters that Connally should quit as chairman if he could
not be fair to the St. Lawrence question. Senator Alexander Wiley attacked the Connally stand in no uncertain terms.

The time has come to end the three decades of talk, talk, talk, and sterile repetition of arguments. The time is overdue to act, to act as every American President has recommended we act on this issue, constructively, favorably.

In an extremely rare move led ably by Wiley the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over-ruled its chairman and directed him to hold hearings on S. J. Res. 27. The Committee, therefore, listened to a monotonous repetition of arguments from both sides from February 25 to 29, 1952. The question of the necessity of joining with Canada in the seaway and power project was heavily emphasized by pro-seaway witnesses.

A new plan for the construction of the seaway

was offered as an amendment to S. J. Res. 27 by Senators Aiken, Moody (Michigan), Douglas, Thye, and Taft. This amendment created a St. Lawrence Development Corporation to administer the construction of the seaway and was almost identical to the recently Canadian created St. Lawrence Seaway Authority. The St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation was authorized to issue bonds based on the credit of the United States to the amount of $485,000,000 to finance the American share of the costs of the project. The bonds were to be retired at the end of fifty years and would pay three per cent interest annually. The United States Treasury would make an initial subscription of only $10,000,000. As the seaway was to be made self-liquidating through the imposition of tolls, this amendment was designed to completely stifle all opposition based on reasons of "economy in Government."

On April 19, 1952, President Truman wrote a letter to Chairman Tom Connally requesting a favorable recommendation from the Foreign Relations Committee.

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108 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
We need the seaway and power. We need them as soon as the necessary works can be built. The best, the simplest, and the quickest way to get them is through legislation by the Congress. Full hearings have been completed. I strongly recommend that your Committee and the Congress promptly complete action on this vital matter. 109

The last minute Truman effort to obtain a favorable report from the Foreign Relations Committee was not successful. On April 22, 1952, the Committee met in executive session to vote on its report to the Senate. A motion was first offered to report the resolution favorably. The vote on this motion was a 6 to 6 tie and, by Senate rules, failed to carry. 110 A second motion was immediately offered by Senator Wiley to send the resolution to the Senate without recommendation. This motion was carried by a vote of 9 to 4. 111 This move undoubtedly further hurt chances of favorable Senate action.

On June 18, 1952, a roll call vote on Senate

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110 For favorable report to the Senate: Green (R.I.), McMahon (Conn.), Sparkman (Ala.), Wiley (Wisc.), Hickenlooper (Ia.), and Tobey (N.H.). Against a favorable report: Connally (Tex.), George (Ga.), Lodge (Mass.), Fulbright (Ark.), Gillette (Ia.), and Smith (N.J.).

Joint Resolution 27 was taken. The Senate was polled on a motion by Senator O'Connor (Maryland) to recommit the resolution to Committee for further study. His motion was carried by a vote of 43 to 40.\textsuperscript{112} It appeared that the Senate had rejected its last opportunity to join with Canada in the St. Lawrence seaway. Pro-seaway Senators had come extremely close to approval for a change in only two votes would have meant Senate confirmation of the 1941 Agreement.

The next day at a presidential news conference, Truman told reporters that he "very much regretted the action of the Senate." He noted that the Congress had been given every possible opportunity. As the seaway had been rejected once again, the President announced his intention of joining with Canada in submitting an application for an order of approval to the International Joint Commission. He also stated that he would interpose no further objection to Canadian plans to develop the seaway within her own territory.\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{113} \textit{New York Times}, June 20, 1952, p. 11.
Certainly, the President gave every indication that he, too, was "fed up" with thirty years of congressional delay.

Action in the International Joint Commission

In anticipation of the defeat of S.J. Res. 27, Foreign Secretary Pearson of Canada had flown to Washington on April 15, 1952, to confer with President Truman about a potential joint Canadian-American application to the International Joint Commission for approval of the Ontario-New York power project.\footnote{Ibid., April 16, 1952, p. 5.}

A Truman-Pearson understanding resulted from this conference. President Truman agreed that should the Senate vote result in failure to approve the 1941 Agreement, he would not delay in joining Canada in a joint submission of a request for an International Joint Commission order of approval for the power project.

Therefore, when the Senate rejected the 1941 Agreement, both Governments were ready with plans to submit the joint application. Truman clearly proved
that he had not been "bluffing" about his intentions to join Canada in the power project. Only twelve days after the Senate rejection, June 30, 1952, Canada and the United States submitted their joint request for an order of approval to the International Joint Commission. 115

The International Joint Commission embarked at once upon a series of hearings on the joint application. The Commission conducted hearings in Toronto, July 23d, in Ogdensburg on July 24th, at Cornwall on July 25th, at Albany on September 3d, at Montreal on September 8th, and at Washington on October 20th. On October 29, 1952, the International Joint Commission granted its order of approval to the proposed power development. 116

The Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission was designated as the agency of Canada to construct the Canadian section of the power plants. The Joint


Commission also approved "an agency to be designated by the United States" to fulfill the American share of the constructions. The order prepared the way for immediate construction by directing Canada and the United States to establish a Joint Board of Engineers to prepare plans and supervise the construction work. The sum of 2,200,000 horsepower of electrical energy was to be divided between the two nations.

This order of approval specifically provided that the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission would be the Canadian agent of power construction. In the United States, the task of designating an American agency was left to the Federal Power Commission which had not yet taken final action. It appeared, however, likely that the Federal Power Commission would be inclined toward granting a license to the New York Power Authority.

In Canada reaction to the International Joint Commission's order of approval was most immediate. On November 4, 1952, the Canadian Ambassador Hume H. Wrong
notified Secretary Acheson that the Canadian Government considered the Executive Agreement of 1941 to be superseded by the International Joint Commission's order of approval. The Niagara Treaty of 1950 and the International Joint Commission's action of 1952 had removed two of the three most important provisions from the 1941 Agreement. All that remained was the question of American participation in construction of the seaway.

A Partial Success:

At the time of the approval of the International Joint Commission for the power project on October 29, 1952, President Harry S. Truman was preparing to leave the White House. He had announced his intentions not to seek another term in March of 1952. Therefore, Truman, like Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt before him, was compelled to leave the office of the Chief Executive without seeing the fulfillment of the St. Lawrence program.

As Truman succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt in office, he had taken up the St. Lawrence project with

new vigor and force. Emphasizing continually the project in terms of post-war economic prosperity, he had been instrumental in bringing the Barkley resolution to the attention of Congress in 1945. As the Republican controlled 80th Congress convened in 1947, he had continued to lend his wholehearted support to the new Vandenberg resolution. With the failure of these two Truman supported resolutions to gain congressional approval, the President withdrew more and more from taking a prominent part in the St. Lawrence battles.

He was firmly convinced that the pressing need for electricity in Ontario and New York would gradually force the entire project to a successful conclusion. Therefore, when Ontario and New York mapped plans for development of the power phase of the project, Truman effectively opposed them for fear that separation of power from navigation would result in everlasting defeat of the latter. He wanted to carry both portions of the project to a successful conclusion.

As President Truman had anticipated, the insistence of Canada and New York for increased public power
focused new attention on the whole project. As continued congressional opposition to the St. Lawrence project became manifest, Truman, in effect, presided over the disintegration of the Executive Agreement of 1941. He permitted the negotiation of the Niagara Falls Treaty of 1950, and, after a final attempt to gain congressional approval for the project in 1952, gave his full support to Canadian plans for immediate power and seaway developments.

Exactly thirty years had passed since President Warren G. Harding first announced his support of the St. Lawrence project to the Congress. For about twenty-eight of those thirty years, consecutive American Presidents had continually urged the negotiation of a treaty or agreement upon the Canadian Government. In the last five years the situation had been completely reversed with Canada taking the initiative in St. Lawrence developments. The increasing Canadian pressure had presented President Truman with the opportunity to push his last attempt for congressional authorization of the 1941 Agreement in 1952. Failing in his nearly eight years of congressional battles,
Truman did not hesitate to acquiesce in Canada's already planned seaway and power plans.

Truman's sincere attempts to gain congressional backing for the entire St. Lawrence project were certainly a partial success. Although rebuked on every attempt by the Congress, Truman was to have the satisfaction of gaining a Niagara Falls Treaty and an International Joint Commission order of approval for the power phase of the project.

As Truman departed from the White House, he knew that the whole St. Lawrence project with its long and bitter fights, was nearing an end. The powerful commercial and sectional interests which had opposed the project for thirty years in the Congress could be counted on to fight to the end, but that end was fast approaching. The power phase was completed. The seaway was to be constructed with, or without, congressional consent. Under these circumstances, the power of the opposition was certain to be greatly reduced, if only for the reason that little was now left within the congressional purview for them to oppose. Except for the question of American participation in the seaway,
there was nothing left for these powerful interests to oppose.

The momentum of the movement for the St. Lawrence project was to carry it to a successful conclusion no matter who occupied the White House. There was no longer the slightest doubt that, one way or another, there would at long last be a St. Lawrence development program.
CHAPTER VII

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND THE

ST. LAWRENCE PROJECT

The Election of 1952

The Republican convention of 1952 passed over its perennial presidential candidate Robert A. Taft who had recently announced his support of the St. Lawrence project and selected World War II hero, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. As Mr. Eisenhower was a career military man, he frankly admitted his need for intensive study of many domestic problems with which he was not familiar. One of those problems was the St. Lawrence project. During the course of his 1952 campaign, Mr. Eisenhower gave no indication whatsoever that he would either support or reject the St. Lawrence program if elected.

His opponents Adlai Stevenson of Illinois and John Sparkman of Alabama left no doubt about the Democratic views of the value of the St. Lawrence project. Governor Stevenson, in fact, devoted the entire contents of one speech to praising the St. Lawrence program. Speaking
at St. Paul, Minnesota on December 4, 1952, Governor Stevenson termed it "the most important untapped natural resource on the North American Continent."\(^1\)

When the results of the election of November 4, 1952 were in, General Eisenhower had won a sweeping victory. His election to the presidency left many doubts in the minds of seaway advocates as to the course of future presidential action on this long pending question. For over thirty years every occupant of the White House had continually pressed for the completion of the St. Lawrence project. As no word was forthcoming from the new President on the issue of the St. Lawrence, seaway advocates waited expectantly for an indication of the Eisenhower policy.

**Growing Demand for the Seaway.**

In the minds of interested persons and organizations there was only one real issue left to the Congress to be decided, i.e., whether or not the United States would participate with Canada in the construction of the seaway. All other questions had been settled by President

\(^1\)New York Times, October 5, 1952, p. 29.
Truman. It was obvious that unless action came very shortly, even this last remaining consideration would be forever removed from the purview of Congress.

Canada left little doubt that she was fully prepared to move ahead with the seaway project entirely on her own.

Official and unofficial pressure on the American Government continued to be applied by Canada. Transport Minister Lionel Chevrier addressed a meeting of New York City engineers on January 26, 1952, and stated that Canada would "go it alone" in developing both the seaway and power phases of the project. He informed the United States that since the creation of the Canadian Seaway Authority, $250,000,000 in bonds had already been subscribed.

Speaking before the Economics Club of Detroit, Michigan, later in the year, Chevrier again warned that time was running out for America to join in the

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construction of the seaway. Speaking before a seaway conference in Toronto, in May, 1952, the Transport Minister stated:

We in Canada still think that a joint undertaking with the United States is the most logical and desirable method of procedure, but we cannot wait forever. Seeing no assurances of an end to congressional delays, the Canadian Government is promoting the all-Canadian seaway as a second best alternative. 5

Minister of Munitions Clarence D. Howe also took the view that the seaway would be built, with, or without, the United States. Speaking before a gathering of seaway supporters in Washington, D.C. on February 8, 1953, Howe stated:

...we already have a ten year record of looking for ratification "next year." Time is now running out. Each additional year of delay costs us more dearly in money and security. Failing early ratification therefore, the Canadian Government has decided to undertake the so-called all-Canadian seaway, and to invite the necessary cooperation with respect to an international power development. We can still hope for ratification of the 1941 Agreement but, meanwhile, we are preparing a second string to our bow. 6

4Lionel Chevrier, Canadian View on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway (Detroit: Economics Club of Detroit, 1952).


On the subject of Canadian willingness to move ahead with the seaway project on its own, Minister Howe stated clearly that Canada was not "bluffing."

It has been suggested in some irresponsible sources that the Canadian proposal was a bluff, that Canada could not and would not undertake such a large project alone. I trust that this official announcement will put an end to this kind of talk. There is no bluff about Canada's attitude. We would need the cooperation of a designated agency in the United States to develop the international power. With that, we can and will complete the other essential works in the St. Lawrence River. 7

New support of many groups for the seaway was found in the United States. Since Canada had announced officially its intention of moving ahead with the seaway regardless of the United States, many persons and organizations launched a last minute campaign to force American participation in the project. Senator Robert A. Taft, who had recently announced his support for the 1941 Agreement, stated that he would continue to support it fully. 8 And, the CIO came out for the

7Ibid., p. 287.
first time giving its unqualified endorsement to the seaway project.  

Numerous Great Lakes cities set up a terrific hue and cry virtually demanding that the United States protect their economic interests by joining with Canada.  

Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Duluth established commissions to plan for expansion of their port facilities in the event of the construction of the seaway. Most of the Great Lakes States established similar commissions.

Influential new support poured in from midwestern business interests which had hitherto been either apathetic or antagonistic to the St. Lawrence project.

As the discovery of huge new iron ore deposits in northern Quebec and Labrador were announced, midwest steel interests and their allies suddenly became very interested in obtaining a St. Lawrence seaway. The powerful M.A. Hanna Company of Cleveland, Ohio, had concluded an agreement with Republic Steel, Armco, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and other steel producers,

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to develop these new iron ore fields. George W. Humphrey, Eisenhower's new Secretary of the Treasury and former President of M. A. Hanna Co., was accustomed to referring to the project as "that socialist ditch." Now he took the lead in a campaign to "Bring the Seaway to Cleveland." 11

Midwestern automobile manufacturers joined with the steel producers in giving their full support to the seaway project. As the auto makers were the largest single users of basic steel, they wished to be sure of future adequate supplies of iron ore. The very powerful car makers, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and Nash-Hudson liberally subscribed to the funds of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association. 12 These huge steel and automotive interests carried with them the support of countless affiliates and subsidiaries throughout the nation.

To observers of the St. Lawrence question, the most spectacular reversal of opinion of all was that of

11 "Iron Ore and the St. Lawrence," Time, 57 (June 18, 1951), p. 43.

Business Week magazine which had consistently represented the views of private utility interests and the railroads in denouncing the project. The change of heart of Business Week was very important in that it meant a declining influence of rails and power interests and the rise of influence of powerful steel interests and their important allies. In a short, but effective, editorial the editors of Business Week stated:

Business Week recognizes the honest division of opinion that exists among businessmen on this issue. However, it believes that defense needs made the seaway inevitable. The sooner it and its allied power project are started, the better for the whole nation. 13

The discovery of huge deposits of Canadian iron ore had brought support for the seaway from many of the largest corporations in the United States. Added to the continued support of thousands of Great Lakes commercial, industrial, agricultural, and labor interests, the steel and auto manufacturers were fast becoming and invincible combination.

On the other hand, opposition to the seaway was dwindling proportionately. The very powerful private...

utility interests were no longer greatly interested in the fight against the project. Their doom had been effectively sealed by the order of approval from the International Joint Commission for the construction of power works. The only act remaining in the power fight was relegated to the Federal Power Commission which would designate the American agency to participate with Ontario Hydro in the constructions. Activities of power interests were, therefore, concentrated on the Federal Power Commission. They withdrew their powerful congressional bands simply because the Congress no longer had anything to say about the disposition of the St. Lawrence power. This was a stunning blow to anti-seaway forces remaining.

Deserted by powerful utility interests, only the dwindling remnants of the once powerful anti-seaway forces were left. Atlantic and Gulf ports, led ably by New York City, continued their congressional campaigns against the project. But they simply did not have much of an issue left to debate. The seaway was going to be constructed regardless of what the American Congress did or did not do. In the face of this Canadian "take it or leave it" proposition, there was little left for the
opposition to oppose.

Mayor Vincent Impellitteri of New York continued to denounce the seaway project. Backed up by the Port of New York Authority and the New York State Chamber of Commerce, Impellitteri blasted the seaway. The ports of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans joined hands to the end in opposing the seaway. With the tide of big business support for the seaway turning, the A. F. of L. decided that it was also in the best interests of organized labor organizations to complete the project. The only major labor organizations left who still opposed the project were the United Mine Workers and the Railway Brotherhoods. Every national farm organization was now on record in support of the seaway.

The emaciated opposition was still led by the Association of American Railroads. Almost alone, the railroads redoubled their past efforts to defeat the seaway project. Flooding the national scene with many pamphlets of opposition, the Association of

American Railroads fought to the end from its Washington headquarters to prevent American participation in the seaway. There could no longer be the slightest doubt that the tremendous power of anti-seaway forces in Congress was waning.

Eisenhower Supports the St. Lawrence

With renewed support for the seaway coming from leading national business, labor, and farm organizations there still was no word from the White House about this important subject. Seaway supporters were quite alarmed at the failure of President Eisenhower to announce his support for the seaway in the most unequivocal terms. They simply were not accustomed to having anything less than 100 per cent support from the White House.

When asked by reporters at a press conference on February 15, 1953, about his stand on the seaway, President Eisenhower stated only that he was studying the matter and did not care to make a statement at that time. Ever faithful seaway advocate Senator Alexander

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Wiley, now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 83d Congress, was very disappointed but expressed the hope that the President would announce his support of the seaway very shortly.

Meanwhile, Senator Wiley introduced still another bill to provide for American participation in the seaway constructions. As the first session of the 83d Congress convened in January, 1953, Wiley placed S. 589 before it. This bill made provision for the participation of the United States in the seaway project under the terms of the old 1941 Executive Agreement.

The Wiley bill also provided that tolls would be charged. The Wiley bill had some interesting features which were new to proposed St. Lawrence legislation. The Wiley bill provided for the creation of a United States St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. This Development Corporation was authorized to construct, in conjunction with the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority of Canada, the forty-six miles of canal and channel improvements in the international rapids section of the St. Lawrence.

The Wiley bill also provided that tolls would

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be set under negotiation between the Development Corporation and the Canadian Seaway Authority and revenues divided in proportion to capital investment. The Seaway Development Corporation would be authorized to issue up to $100,000,000 in bonds. Those bonds were based on the credit of the United States and were to be retired in fifty years paying an annual return of three per cent. The Treasury of the United States would make an initial subscription of $10,000,000.

One of the most outstanding features of Wiley’s new approach to the problem was that his bill was very much narrower in scope than preceding bills. It did not touch upon the power developments which were to be constructed jointly by Ontario and an American agency by means of an order of approval from the International Joint Commission. This bill recognized the complete divorce of power from the question of the seaway. The Wiley bill also had the new feature of abandoning the deepening of Great Lakes connecting channels to take shipping beyond Lake Erie. The Wiley bill provided only for American participation in the construction of the seaway within the forty-six mile international section of the river.
Perhaps of even greater significance was the fact that the Wiley bill met with no words of support at all from the White House. This was, indeed, an unusual situation as five preceding American Presidents had always been counted on to lend support for any congressional acts designed to bring about the construction of the project. Senator Wiley conferred with President Eisenhower, but his support remained doubtful. In the words of Senator Wiley:

I can say only that the President said he was studying my bill and that some of its opponents had given him their views on it. I still feel that he will support us when he gets the real facts. 18

In spite of the failure to obtain presidential endorsement for his bill, Wiley continued to work quietly in the Senate to rally support. Senator Edward Thye of Minnesota informed Wiley that he was not satisfied with the narrow scope of his bill because it provided for American participation in the seaway only as far as Lake Erie. He announced his intention of amending the bill to provide $100,000,000 for the deepening of

Great Lakes connecting channels in the upper lakes. Wiley attempted to console Thye by stating that his bill was calculated to "get a foot in the door" and that the deepening of Great Lakes connecting channels would come later through routine appropriation legislation.

Actually Wiley's bill was complementary to the Canadian plans for the seaway. The Canadian Seaway Authority had raised the sum of $300,000,000 to be expended upon increasing the channel depth of the lower St. Lawrence River located entirely within Canadian territory to a uniform depth of 27 feet. The Canadian Seaway Authority was also prepared to construct, in cooperation with the United States, the international section of the project. The $100,000,000 to be used by the American Development Corporation was to be spent in conjunction with Canada for the construction of the seaway in the international section alone. The deepening of channels between the upper lakes was to be left to the United States at a later date.

The bitter contest of both seaway supporters and opponents to win President Eisenhower to their sides.

continued with each passing day. On the morning of March 19, 1952, President Eisenhower seemed to have come to a decision as he told newsmen that he supported the construction of the seaway as an international project between Canada and the United States. The presidential endorsement was given, however, in qualified terms and pointedly made no mention whatever of the Wiley bill. Wiley was disappointed but explained that the President had not had "sufficient time" to study his bill entirely. For the first time, Eisenhower commented on the power development by giving his full support to the order of approval of the International Joint Commission dated October 29, 1952.

Senator Wiley proceeded to conduct hearings of his Senate Foreign Relations Committee from April 14, to May 21, 1953. He expressed confidence that the President would support his bill. The hearings monotonously droned on with only one new element raised.

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Pro-seaway witnesses continued to stress heavily the fact that Canada would build the seaway alone, and that American participation was essential to insure joint control and operation of this great undertaking.

The Association of American Railroads exerted tremendous pressure on the new President as Wiley made his careful plans for American participation in the St. Lawrence seaway. Many seaway supporters were fearful that Eisenhower had changed his mind when Press Secretary James Hagerty announced that the President had had supper at the White House with William T. Faricy of the Association of American Railroads, Fred C. Gurley, president of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, and Walter S. Franklin, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad.

The following day President Eisenhower dispatched identical letters to Senator Wiley and Federal Power Commission chairman Thomas C. Buchanan. Eisenhower informed both men that, at his request, the National


Security Council had considered the St. Lawrence project and had given its full support to the development. The President stated that both the seaway and the power phases of the project had his "complete approval." The presidential letter was interpreted by Senator Wiley to mean that Eisenhower had endorsed his bill, and by Buchanan as a signal for the Federal Power Commission to take action on the long pending (since 1948) application of the New York Power Authority.

Following his policy of seeking advice from top Administration officials, the President immediately thereafter requested the formation of a committee from his own Cabinet to consider the St. Lawrence project and to report their recommendations to him concerning future actions of the United States in regard to the St. Lawrence program. The four member Cabinet committee consisted of John Foster Dulles (State), Charles E. Wilson (Defense), Sinclair Weeks (Commerce), and Douglas McKay (Interior).

On May 8, 1953, the results of this Cabinet study of the St. Lawrence question were revealed by the President in a White House press release.\(^2\) The Cabinet

Committee had reached remarkable accord that the seaway and power projects should start immediately. They were of the opinion that national security and economic growth would be ably served by this new development. They believed that the President should take steps for the construction of the Ontario-New York plan for power developments and should support congressional bills for American participation in the seaway.

Canada Is Ready

While the Eisenhower Administration was working out its policy in regard to the St. Lawrence question, Canadian officials continued their efforts to prod the American Government into taking immediate action on the St. Lawrence project. On April 30, 1953, Transport Minister Lionel Chevrier spoke to a gathering of reporters while visiting Washington D.C. The forceful Minister extolled the work which Canada had already completed to make the seaway a reality.

I submit to you therefore that from Lake Erie to the sea the St. Lawrence seaway has been improved and maintained by Canada. Every important betterment has been carried out and paid for by Canada at a cost in the neighborhood of three hundred million dollars. Nevertheless, ships of every nation have used the present
seaway without payment of tolls for nearly fifty years. An international treaty provides that when tolls on shipping are imposed, they will bear equally on Canadian and United States registered ships. 25

Chevrier urged that the United States take immediate action to bring about participation in the seaway. Otherwise, Canada would have to move ahead on its own.

On the same day Chairman R. W. Saunders of the Ontario Hydro Electric Commission, pursuant to the order of approval of the International Joint Commission, ordered the start of engineering tests in the vicinity of the proposed power sites. He expressed the hope that the United States would shortly designate the American agency to participate with Ontario Hydro in the construction of the power installations. 26

One week later Prime Minister St. Laurent, along with Foreign Secretary Pearson, flew to Washington for the specific purpose of taking up with the President Canada's desire to start seaway and power constructions at once. 27 St. Laurent was cordially

26 Ibid., p. 63.
greeted at the airport by Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary Dulles and escorted to the White House. A two and one-half hour conference ensued.

At the conclusion of the meeting a joint communiqué was issued to the people of both nations. President Eisenhower revealed that he favored the development of power in the international section under the control of the New York Power Authority and would urge the Federal Power Commission to take positive action. St. Laurent was pleased with Eisenhower's willingness to begin the power constructions at once and stated that it was still not too late for the American Congress to approve the seaway phase of the project. He stressed, however, that congressional delay would not be permitted to hold up power developments.

With this Eisenhower-St. Laurent understanding, events continued to move rapidly. On May 12, 1953, the International Joint Commission submitted to the two Governments completed plans for constructing the remedial works at Niagara Falls entailed in the Niagara

Treaty of 1950. A reference to the Commission by the two Governments had been made on October 10, 1952. The report estimated the cost of such constructions at $17,536,000 of which sum half would be paid by each nation. The Commission was then requested to start the proposed remedial works beginning in 1954.

On July 11th, Transport Minister Chevrier told reporters in Ottawa that pursuant to the order of approval of the International Joint Commission on power developments, Canada would shortly name its members to the Joint Board of Engineers. Canada would also make announcement soon of its appointment of the members of the Seaway Authority to supervise Canadian construction of the seaway project. With these developments reported, Canada had little to do except await anticipated American action.

The United States Takes Action

While events looking to the development of the seaway and power project in Canada were advancing rapidly, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations continued its

29 Ibid., (June 1, 1953), pp. 783-784.

investigation into legislation to bring Senate approval to American participation in the seaway project. Chairman Wiley carefully directed strategy in his Foreign Relations Committee designed to bring the desired approval to his measure.

Hearings by the Committee were concluded on May 21, 1953. On June 16th, the Committee met in executive session to consider a report to the Senate. It was very evident that the strategy of Senator Wiley in working for "first things first" had been sufficiently successful to win. Coupled with the fact that the Committee knew that the only issue before it was American participation in the project, a favorable vote was quickly reached. The final vote was thirteen to two in favor of reporting the Wiley bill to the Senate. The Committee's overwhelming endorsement of the project was heralded with great enthusiasm by supporters of the project who believed that the "seaway was assured." Senate consideration of the bill was postponed in view of the summer adjournment of Congress.

Meanwhile in the House of Representatives the

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Committee on Public Works held hearings from June 1 to June 10, 1953, on House Joint Resolution 104, a measure identical to the Wiley bill pending in the Senate. The House Committee did not make a report due to the summer adjournment, but Chairman George Dondero of Michigan promised quick action in the coming session of Congress.

Outside the Congress as the summer of 1953 wore on, the Federal Power Commission resumed its entire consideration of the New York Power Authority's reported Project No. 2000 which had been before that body for nearly five years. On July 9, 1953, the Federal Power Commission voted to approve the plans of the Power Authority to build, in conjunction with Ontario Hydro, the power phase of the St. Lawrence project. The Federal Power Commission granted a license to the Power Authority which was to be effective for a period of fifty years. Jubilant Chairman Burton of the Power Authority happily told the press that, after twenty-two years of waiting, the Power Authority could at last begin the work for which it had been created.

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On November 4, 1953, President Eisenhower completed the American end of the power program by issuing an Executive Order. The President designated the Power Authority of the State of New York as the American agency to participate with Ontario Hydro in all power constructions. The President also established the American section of the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers composed of the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission. The Joint Board of Engineers was created to plan and supervise the construction of all power installations in the international section of the river.

On November 12, 1953, Canadian Ambassador A. D. P. Heeney sent a note to Secretary of State Dulles in which he informed the United States that Canada had appointed its two members of the Joint Board of Engineers. Canada suggested that the two sections of the Joint Board hold meetings at once to plan final

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34Executive Order No. 10500. 18 Federal Register p. 724.

measures to be taken in the actual power constructions. Secretary Dulles replied in a note the same day, stating that the United States was thoroughly agreeable to this proposal. 36 The Governments of Canada and the United States jointly announced, thereafter, that the work of construction would begin very shortly. 37

Only two days after the Canadian-American agreement to constitute the Joint Board of Engineers, President Eisenhower flew to Canada to repay the visit of Prime Minister St. Laurent last May. While in Ottawa, the President conferred with the Prime Minister about the American participation in the St. Lawrence seaway. Eisenhower gave his assurances that Congress would shortly enact legislation to bring the United States into joint construction of the seaway with Canada. He stated quite emphatically that it was his policy to make the seaway a truly international undertaking. St. Laurent expressed Canadian pleasure with the completion of all plans for Ontario and New York to move ahead with the power development, but stated that he would still


expect congressional action on the seaway very quickly, or Canada would have to continue its planning for an all-Canadian seaway. 38

During the course of his two day visit in Canada President Eisenhower addressed a joint meeting of the Canadian Parliament on November 14, 1953. While his address to the Parliament was concerned with many problems of Canadian-American relations, Eisenhower told the Canadian legislators that the United States favored the seaway and power project as a joint undertaking.

Joint development and use of the St.
Lawrence-Great Lakes Waterway is inevitable. It is sure and certain. With you, I consider this measure a vital addition to our economic and national security. Of course, no proposal yet made is entirely free from faults of some sort. But every one of them can be corrected, given patience and cooperation. 39

The President drew heavy applause from the Parliament when he stated his great pleasure over the conclusion of plans for the hydro-electric power development to be undertaken by the Province of Ontario and the State of


39 Ibid., p. 737.
New York. Eisenhower stated that he was confident that the American Congress would approve the seaway phase of the project in its next session. Speaking of the Wiley bill, he stated:

This measure provides for United States participation in a joint development by both countries. The proposal now awaits action by the United States Senate which, I am confident, will act favorably on it or some other measure. The ways and means for assuring American cooperation in this great project will, I hope, be authorized and approved during the coming session of the Congress. 40

After the President’s return to Washington, he began to take steps to aid the seaway phase in its coming battle in the second session of the 83d Congress. On December 18, 1953, the President told reporters that he would back the seaway project, and urged its speedy approval by the Congress. 41 True to his word, Eisenhower took the opportunity presented by his State of the Union Address delivered January 7, 1954, to urge Congress to approve, at once, American participation in the seaway project. He stated that the seaway was of the "most vital interest to national security and to the

40 Ibid.
future economic prosperity of the nation. ¹⁴²

On January 12, 1954, Senator Alexander Wiley presented to the Senate S. 2150, a bill which was identical on major points with his original S. 589 of the preceding session of Congress. ¹⁴³ Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan told reporters that he was confident that the Senate would, at long last, approve legislation authorizing the American participation in the seaway. ¹⁴⁴ The next day Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, opened the debate on S. 2150. In a lengthy speech Wiley extolled the value of American participation in the seaway from the standpoint of economic and national security. He repeatedly emphasized its self-liquidating aspects of the seaway project and his program for financing the seaway through a public bond issue. Throughout the course of the Senate debate, the faithful Wisconsin Republican missed no opportunity to advance the cause of the seaway. ¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵Ibid., January 14, 1954, p. 4.
On January 14th, Massachusetts' newly elected Senator John Kennedy deserted traditional Boston harbor interests and announced his support for American participation in the seaway construction. This was an alarming change in former Massachusetts policy which had been consistently opposed to the St. Lawrence project. In other speeches of the same day, Senators Beal and Butler of Maryland soundly denounced the whole idea of the seaway. They claimed it would be economically unjustifiable whoever constructed it. They were of the opinion that the United States should stay aloof and let Canada suffer the losses if she wanted to. Their faithfulness to the port of Baltimore was clearly implied.

On January 18th, the high point of the debate on S. 2150 was reached. Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, long an uncompromising foe of the seaway, startlingly reversed his past policy and even confessed that his views had been "incorrect." Senator Everett

47 Ibid.
Dirksen of Illinois, at best a very lukewarm supporter of the seaway, came out wholeheartedly for the passage of S. 2150.\footnote{Ibid.} Senator George Aiken of Vermont, who could no longer recall how many times he had taken the floor in behalf of the project, continued the pro-seaway debate with a moving recital of the past history of the project.\footnote{Ibid.} Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, for the first time, came out in favor of the Wiley bill.\footnote{Ibid.} Senator Eugene Millikin of Colorado, powerful chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, called American participation in the seaway "vital to the economy of the entire North American Continent." Maine's Margaret Chase Smith suddenly announced that she now favored S. 2150 although shortly before she had been in the opposition camp.

It was very apparent to all professional observers that the seaway was gaining ground fast in the debates. It was equally apparent that seaway opponents were being reduced to a few "old-time" seaway haters. Rather weakly and with a complete lack
of conviction, Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts took the floor to denounce the seaway more from force of habit than any thing else. The last remnants of the once powerful Mississippi Valley Association had dwindled to the point where only Senators Fulbright of Arkansas and Long and Ellender of Louisiana bothered even to take the floor.

Senator Wiley was most pleased over what appeared to be the buckling of opposition forces. "We're going to win this time," he happily shouted to reporters on his way to the Senate on the afternoon of January 20, 1954. Wiley's prediction proved to be entirely correct, for that afternoon, a Senate roll call vote resulted in 51 votes in the affirmative to 33 in the negative. The long senate battle over the St. Lawrence project had been crowned with success after three decades of battle. As the clerk announced the results of the poll, Senator Wiley, in spite of his 70 years, literally jumped across the aisle to shake hands with all of his fellow seaway supporters. Senator Aiken smilingly told reporters that it was a "most historic afternoon."52.

52Discussion of the Senate vote in "Seaway Victory," Newsweek, 43 (February 1, 1954), p. 17; and "St. Lawrence," Time, 63 (February 1, 1954), p. 11.
Many eminent congressional observers were surprised that the vote had been so decisive although most had predicted its passage by a "close margin." But professional politicians were nearly unanimous in explaining its approval. The overshadowing reason had been Canadian insistence upon constructing the seaway alone, if the United States did not act favorably. The great American economic boom, coupled with the desire to gain easy access for new iron ore from Canada had compelled the United States to go along. The seaway had finally become an invincible force which could no longer be stopped. About the only hope of the opposition had been that Canada was bluffing about an all-Canadian seaway. As this seemingly had not been the case, the very heart of the opposition was ripped out.53

On the practical politics level, some old fashioned congressional log rolling had also helped the seaway cause. In a brilliant bit of political maneuvering by Senator Wiley, two days before the Senate vote, he rammed through his Foreign Relations Committee a bill to approve a $3,000,000 survey of the

53 Ibid., p. 11.
long dormant Passamoquoddy Tidal Power Project on the Maine-New Brunswick border. The coincidental result was that Maine's two Senators, Margaret Chase Smith and Frederick Payne, switched their votes from the negative to the affirmative. Wiley also had told the Senate that Interior Secretary Douglas McKay had approved plans for a billion dollar Colorado River Storage project. This move changed the minds of ten Colorado basin Senators who had been doubtful.

In Canada Prime Minister St. Laurent broadcasted a special address to the people of his nation on February 2, 1954, hailing the Senate approval of S. 2150. He told the entire nation that he was ready to conclude all arrangements with the United States for the start of construction of both the seaway and power project at once.54

Action still remained to be taken by the House of Representatives for complete approval of the Wiley bill. On February 1, 1954, Representative George A. Dondero of Michigan, an old seaway campaigner since 1933

54"St. Lawrence," Time, 63 (February 8, 1954), p. 11.
and now chairman of the House Public Works Committee, told reporters that he anticipated House approval of the seaway very shortly. On February 3, 1954, Chairman Dondero rushed approval of the Wiley bill through his Public Works Committee by the one-sided vote of 23 to 6. On February 18th, Dondero reported the Wiley bill to the House. There his bill met with the stubborn resistance of the powerful Rules Committee which blocked the measure. On April 29th, after two months of delay, Dondero presented a supplementary report to the House again urging approval of the Wiley bill. The same day the House Rules Committee relented, and the bill went to a House roll call vote on May 6, 1954. The House followed the lead of the Senate, as was expected, and approved the bill by a vote of 241 to 158.

With House approval, legislation to authorize the United States to participate in the construction of the

seaway had been approved. When the St. Lawrence bill passed the House, Speaker Joseph Martin handed his gavel to Congressman Dondero and said, "Here, after twenty years, you deserve it." George Dondero later admitted, "At that moment I was up in the clouds."59

Seaway supporters moved out of the House Chamber smiling, talking joyously, and shaking hands.

With House approval completed, the long fight was all over. President Eisenhower signed the Wiley bill on May 13, 1954 with leading congressional backers and Canadian Ambassador Heeney present.60 Slightly more than 32 years had elapsed since President Harding had first expressed his support of the St. Lawrence project.

The Aftermath

With the long battle in the American Congress successfully concluded, plans went forward immediately for the start of construction of both the power and seaway phases of the St. Lawrence project. The Ontario Hydro Electric Commission constructed a full scale model

of the entire St. Lawrence seaway and power project at a cost of $200,000. This model housed in the Commission's main office in Toronto, exactly duplicated the long sought constructions.  

In the region to be affected by the power constructions there was much activity. The 1,000 residents of Iroquois, Ontario, had to evacuate their town as it was to be completely inundated by the waters behind the new power dam at Cornwall. The citizens of Iroquois immediately selected a new site for their town. They appeared to be happy that the whole affair had been settled. "I've been looking for this to happen since I was a boy," said one 87 year old resident of Iroquois.

On June 2, 1954, a gathering of Canadian and American officials at Niagara Falls took place. The purpose of this gathering was the dedication of the start of the remedial works to be constructed to preserve and enhance the scenic attractions of the Falls and Rapids. At this dedication there were: A. G.

McNaughton, chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission; Roger B. McWhorter, acting chairman of the American section of the International Joint Commission; John Slezak, American Under Secretary of the Army; and Jean LeSage, Minister of National Resources of Canada. As the first machinery was set in operation to start remedial works on the Falls, A. G. McNaughton expressed the feelings of all present.

My colleagues in the International Joint Commission Mr. McWhorter and Mr. Weber of the United States section and Mr. Dansereau and Mr. Spence of the Canadian section, join me in expressing their satisfaction in the memorable event we witnessed today, and from them and for myself and for all those who work with us I pledge the continued trusteeship we are to exercise to the conservation of this rare and beautiful and treasured phenomenon which is Niagara. 63

President Eisenhower shortly thereafter took the necessary steps to initiate joint planning for the construction of the seaway portion of the project.

In a note dated June 7, 1954, American Ambassador to Canada R. Douglas Stuart delivered copies of the
recently approved congressional legislation to the Canadian Government. The American Ambassador requested that officials of the Canadian St. Lawrence Development Corporation meet as soon as possible to initiate planning for the construction of the seaway.64

Canadian Foreign Secretary Lester Pearson replied to Eisenhower's proposal on June 16th. Pearson stated that Canada was most agreeable to the proposed joint meeting. He proposed that delegations from the two nations meet to formulate a list of specific topics which would form the basis for subsequent inter-governmental discussions.65

In compliance with Public Law No. 358, President Eisenhower issued another executive order dated June 9, 1954.66 The President designated the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the general supervision of the St. Lawrence Development Corporation. The actual management of the Corporation, however, was vested by the statute in the Administrator of this organization.

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64 Ibid., (July 12, 1954), p. 958.
65 Ibid.
66 Executive Order No. 10534. 19 Federal Register, p. 3413.
The Administrator of the Development Corporation was to have the actual duty of guiding American participation in the seaway constructions.

On June 24, 1954, President Eisenhower nominated Lewis G. Castle as Administrator of the Seaway Development Corporation67 and, on August 4th, nominated M.V.O. Ottershagen as Deputy Administrator.68 On August 6th, the Senate confirmed the nominations.69 The American St. Lawrence Development Corporation was now ready to assume its duties of constructing the seaway in conjunction with the Canadian Seaway Authority.

As a result of the Stuart-Pearson exchange of notes, a large delegation from the United States arrived in Ottawa on July 5, 1954, to take up consideration of joint planning for the development of the St. Lawrence seaway. The American delegation was headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson and included Ambassador Stuart, Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant, General B. L. Robinson of the Army Engineers, and representatives from the Departments of State, Justice, New York Times, June 25, 1954, p. 28.

68 Ibid., August 5, 1954, p. 43.

69 Ibid., August 7, 1954, p. 32.

Meetings were held with a Canadian delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Pearson and including the newly appointed President of the Canadian Seaway Authority, Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Trade and Commerce Clarence D. Howe, Minister of Transport G. C. Marler, and Clerk of the Privy Council R. S. Bryce. The meeting explored in a constructive manner the existing arrangements for the development of the St. Lawrence seaway. A tentative agenda of the subjects which would require further negotiation between the two Governments was prepared.

Again on August 12-13, 1954, the American delegation returned to Ottawa for further consultations with Canadian leaders. During the course of this second conference, complete agreement as to plans for the seaway constructions was reached. On August 10th, the State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs jointly announced that all arrangements had been completed for the immediate start of seaway constructions. Simultaneously in Ottawa and


Washington, Foreign Secretary Pearson and Secretary Dulles announced their complete approval of plans reached at the Canadian-American conferences. 72

On August 10, 1954, the power constructions on the international section of the St. Lawrence River were started. At the ground breaking ceremonies at Massena, New York, Governor Thomas E. Dewey turned the first spade of earth dedicating the commencement of this great project. Governor Dewey told the cheering crowd at Massena that New York's long awaited St. Lawrence power works would be completed under the direction of the Power Authority within five years. 73

At the same time across the border, Premier Leslie Frost of Ontario turned the first shovel of earth in Ontario's complementary power constructions at Cornwall. A multitude of Canadian dignitaries, including Prime Minister St. Laurent, were present. Frost also told his Canadian listeners that Ontario's power shortage would be at an end within four or five years. 74

On September 24-25, 1954, representatives of the United States Seaway Development Corporation made a full inspection by air of the sites of the seaway and power projects. On November 12, 1954, the Canadian Seaway Authority announced that work on new channels near Montreal had started and that construction experts were now engaged in work to build powerhouses and dams at Cornwall, Ontario. On November 27th, the Power Authority let contracts for the construction of dams at Massena to generate the power from the St. Lawrence.

On January 18, 1955, the United States Seaway Development Corporation announced that it had let the first contracts for seaway excavations in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. Early in February, 1955, the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission awarded contracts to two Canadian companies: to make and install sixteen generators on the Canadian

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75 Ibid., September 26, 1954, p. 16.
76 Ibid., November 13, 1954, p. 33.
side of the power dam. At the same time the New York Power Authority awarded a contract to General Electric for the construction and installation of sixteen generators for the American side of the power dam.\textsuperscript{79}

In May of 1955 the Canadian and American Governments announced that all contracts for construction of the seaway had been awarded and that full construction had started. The plans for the construction of the seaway were complete. Canada is in the process of constructing all navigational works located on the lower St. Lawrence entirely in her own territory. The United States is cooperating with Canada in the construction of all works in the international section of the river. A uniform minimum depth of 27 feet from Quebec to Lake Erie will be the end result. The best informed engineering view is that the seaway will be completed in the Spring of the year 1960. The total cost of the seaway from the Atlantic to Lake Erie is estimated at $400,000,000. Canada will pay $300,000,000 and the United States, $100,000,000. The American Government has agreed, however, to pay all costs of deepening Great

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., February 8, 1955, p. 42.
Lakes connecting channels beyond Lake Erie which is expected to cost more than $100,000,000.

It is anticipated that the huge power phase of the St. Lawrence project will be finished also in the year 1960. Under present plans the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission will build, maintain, operate, and distribute all power from the international section of the river. The New York Power Authority will sell its share of the power to private electrical companies but will set the rates which may be charged by these companies to consumers. One large power dam will be constructed at Massena, New York with a smaller dam for river control purposes only located slightly upstream. Equipment will be installed to generate 2,200,000 horsepower of electrical energy to be divided equally between Ontario and New York. The estimated cost of this combined navigation and power project is $500,000,000 also to be equally divided and financed through public bond issues of Ontario Hydro and the Power Authority.

By the summer of the year 1960, it is reported that navigation for ships drawing up to 27 feet of water will be possible all the way from Duluth, Minnesota, to
the Atlantic Ocean. The total cost of the seaway and power project will be approximately one billion dollars. Reasonable tolls will be charged ships of the world navigating the seaway, and it is believed that this large investment will pay for itself within fifty years. The power phase of the project is expected to more than pay for itself during the same period. The best estimates of shipping experts is that 75 per cent of the ships of the world will be able to sail directly into the heart of the continent of North America. Experts are also of the opinion that by the year 1964 forty-five million tons of cargo will be passing annually through the seaway. This amount is forty per cent greater than the total annual tonnage navigating the Panama Canal.

Plans are busily being prepared by all of the Great Lakes ports on both sides of the border to take full advantage of the coming of ocean-going ships to their docks. Each city is readying expansion and deepening programs to be placed in operation by the year 1960. Joint private international planning between
seven American Great Lakes States and two Canadian Provinces is now underway, and all are cooperating to the fullest extent to open their ports to the anticipated coming of the ships of the world.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

Presidential Leadership

The St. Lawrence project remains a lasting tribute to the work of six consecutive American Presidents who worked for its successful conclusion for over thirty years. Prior to the Administration of Warren G. Harding, the American and Canadian Governments had undertaken several important pioneering investigations into the possibility of building the St. Lawrence seaway. As investigation after investigation showed the impracticability of the construction of an all-American canal, more and more interest was focused on the St. Lawrence itself. Until the Administration of President Harding these early explorations of the St. Lawrence project were instigated almost entirely at the request of midwestern congressmen.

Starting with the short Harding Administration, the White House took up the problem of the St. Lawrence project and made it a part of fundamental administration policy thereafter. With the favorable publicity
attending the investigation of the International Joint Commission in 1920-1921, President Harding first endorsed the project and requested the negotiation of a treaty with Canada. In his limited period in office President Harding had set the stage for future national and international battles over the St. Lawrence.

President Calvin Coolidge continued the Harding policy of attempting to win a St. Lawrence waterway. There was little doubt that the continued persistence of the White House kept the issue very much alive through the years of international investigations which occupied most of the period of his Administration. Under continual presidential urging the question of the seaway engendered both strong support and even stronger opposition. The Administration of Calvin Coolidge was marked by a growing controversy between midwestern and Atlantic and Far South interests. In a geographic manner also, the St. Lawrence waterway was a subject of sharp debate in Canada. The most populous province of Ontario showed considerable desire for the seaway during the Coolidge Administration. Equally strong opposition arose in the Province of Quebec. This split of public
opinion based on sectional interests was a continuing feature of the St. Lawrence battle throughout most of its history. After a period highlighted by further national and international investigations of the seaway, Coolidge again proposed a St. Lawrence treaty with Canada. As Prime Minister King could not find sufficient support for the project in the Dominion, he repeatedly stalled Coolidge's treaty proposals. Were it not for the continued insistence of President Coolidge, the whole seaway issue would have fallen deep into the background.

The Coolidge Administration had laid most of the ground work for the following Hoover Administration. The arrival of the great international depression of 1929 resulted in a change of Governments in Canada. Hoover seized upon the opportunity presented when the Conservative Bennett Government succeeded King's Liberal Government to urge the treaty upon Canada as a measure designed to alleviate the ravages of the depression on the economies of both nations. The Hoover persistence was so strong that, almost by himself, the President managed to extract a treaty from Bennett. The St. Lawrence Treaty of 1932 was a
tribute to an otherwise unsuccessful Administration.

Had it not been for Mr. Hoover's uncompromising desire to obtain a St. Lawrence Treaty, there is little doubt but that the convention of 1932 would never have been brought to consummation. Presidents Harding and Coolidge had prepared the way, and Mr. Hoover brought the Treaty to reality after ten years of continual White House pressure on Canada.

Although Mr. Hoover was compelled to leave the White House prior to Senate consideration of the 1932 Treaty, Franklin D. Roosevelt proved to be even more adamant in his desire to bring the St. Lawrence project to reality. Exerting his efforts in behalf of the Hoover Treaty, President Roosevelt injected into the dispute the very controversial element of public development of St. Lawrence power. His influence in the creation of the New York Power Authority while governor of New York closed the door to powerful private utility interests and earned their most powerful opposition to the Treaty. Regardless of the determination of President Roosevelt, the 1932 Treaty went down to defeat in the Senate in 1934. Clearly
the Treaty had been defeated by sectional interests in combination with powerful rail, utility, banking, and shipping interests.

In the years from 1935 to 1941, President Roosevelt consistently urged upon the Canadian Government of Prime Minister King the negotiation of a new agreement. Canada continued to stall any Roosevelt treaty overtures largely because of the depressed state of the Government owned railroads, the intensity of the opposition from Quebec and Ontario, and the repeated quarrels between the Province of Ontario, the Province of Quebec, and the federal Government. With the coming of World War II, FDR demanded the negotiation of a new agreement based largely on national and international defense considerations. The second St. Lawrence pact of 1941 took the form of an Executive Agreement as it was Roosevelt's hope to avoid continued Senate opposition to the seaway and power project. Canada was subjected to the strongest of Administration pressure and yielded not without faltering in the face of the great new war-born demand for power by the Province of Ontario. Although Canada's Parliament ratified the Agreement almost at once, the entrance of the United
States into active participation in World War II caused the Roosevelt Administration reluctantly to shelve the project "for the duration."

As World War II was nearing its end President Harry S. Truman continued previously established White House policy and worked very hard to gain congressional approval of the 1941 Agreement through his first term in office. Meeting with repeated congressional refusals to approve the Agreement, Truman decided to withdraw in a strategic move from his formerly very active participation in the project. As Ontario and New York made plans for the independent development of the power phase of the project, Truman refused approval hoping that the great demand for the power phase would force congressional acceptance of the seaway. A timely change in Canadian plans in favor of the power and seaway project, coupled with the discovery of vast deposits of iron ore in northern Quebec and Labrador brought about very great pressure on Congress to take action. Near the close of his Administration, President Truman made a mighty last effort to gain approval for the 1941 Agreement. As this move failed also, he acquiesced
in the separation of the power phase of the project from the seaway and permitted its construction through an order of approval from the International Joint Commission. As the Canadian Government demanded in the strongest terms that the United States take immediate steps to develop the seaway as well, chances for the project looked much brighter. Canada had finally confronted the American Congress with a fait accompli stating forcefully that the only choice remaining for United States Law makers was to decide whether or not the United States would participate in its construction.

As President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the office of President in 1953, the St. Lawrence seaway and power project had become an irresistible force which could no longer be stopped. At first Eisenhower refused to express a view on the project, but after a major struggle between seaway advocates and opponents for his support, Eisenhower joined his five immediate predecessors in the White House and gave his full support to the project. Very quietly he urged the Federal Power Commission to complete arrangements for the New York Power Authority to assume its duties in the
development of the power project in conjunction with Ontario Hydro. He simultaneously backed the Wiley bill in the Senate. His timely announcement of support for the St. Lawrence project provided the necessary impetus to overcome thirty two years of congressional opposition.

Throughout the long attempt to complete the St. Lawrence project, American presidential leadership was a vital force. The Administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, brought about the conclusion of the first stage in the development of presidential leadership with reasonable ease. Harding and Coolidge had taken the initiative in bringing pressure to bear upon the Canadian Government for a St. Lawrence Treaty. Had it not been for the persistent efforts of Harding and Coolidge, President Hoover would probably have been unable to complete the Treaty of 1932. Harding had been the first to urge the treaty. Coolidge, meeting with continued Canadian reluctance, waited out a long period of further national and international investigations, and in so doing prepared the groundwork for the treaty to come. Hoover completed the first
stage when, by great force of will, he completed the negotiation of the 1932 Treaty. Here was a clear case of the great power of presidential leadership to bring about an international agreement notwithstanding Canadian doubts and a preponderance of congressional sentiment against the treaty.

When in spite of the most determined efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 1932 Treaty was defeated in the Senate, a second stage of presidential leadership started. The defeat of the 1932 Treaty for the first time plainly showed the tremendous power of opposing forces in the United States Senate. President Roosevelt immediately set about the formulation of new plans to win another St. Lawrence agreement. Using every possible device of diplomacy and publicity, FDR could not budge Prime Minister King from his position of opposing a new agreement. The timely advent of World War II and the emergency situation created by its coming were skillfully used by Roosevelt in a brilliant display of executive leadership to force Canada's compliance in a new St. Lawrence Agreement. As was the case with President Hoover's negotiation of the 1932 Treaty, it
seemed most unlikely that there would have been any new agreement had it not been for the personal drive and perseverance of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Six consecutive years of steady and unrelenting efforts of President Roosevelt had been rewarded by the Executive Agreement of 1941. There was no doubt that, once again, the new pact had resulted from a personal drive of an American President. Once again, the Agreement of 1941 was to prove to be far too premature, but that, in itself, is mute testimony to the Roosevelt persistence.

Although in the prosecution of World War II congressional consideration of the 1941 Agreement was stalled, President Harry S. Truman exerted all possible efforts during the years of 1945 to 1949 to bring congressional approval to the Roosevelt Agreement. As his most conscientious efforts met with continual congressional rebukes, he decided to wait for pressure for the power phase of the project to mount to the point where he could demand approval of the 1941 Agreement. Unsuccessful once again in his last bid for congressional approval, he circumvented the Congress by permitting
the power phase of the project to be constructed by a simple order of approval from the International Joint Commission.

The third stage in presidential leadership began in the year 1950 and was dominated by Canadian insistence upon immediate construction of the St. Lawrence project with, or without, the United States. President Truman had used the increased Canadian pressure to gain congressional approval and had just barely failed. As Truman left the White House, President Eisenhower also capitalized upon Canadian determination to "go it alone." This time, his campaign succeeded in bringing both the seaway and power project to reality.

Why the Leadership of the American President?

A great many factors of varying views on government and politics between Canada and the United States made it possible for the American Chief Executive to lead the way through most of the period under consideration. A very significant factor in the long controversy over the St. Lawrence project was its non partisan nature. At no time in the thirty-two years of White House campaigning for the project could any clear indication of partisan
motives be discovered. The St. Lawrence project was supported by four Republican and two Democratic Presidents within this long period of time. In many respects the lack of a spirit of pronounced party responsibility in the United States worked to the disadvantage of the various Presidents.

The first important congressional test of the St. Lawrence question occurred in 1934 when the Senate voted on the Hoover Treaty. In view of the extremely strong pro-seaway pronouncements of President Roosevelt and the overwhelming majority of Democrats in the Senate, it would have been much better for the St. Lawrence project if FDR could have made the vote a partisan test. The very fact that so powerful a President as Franklin D. Roosevelt could not obtain full support from Democratic Senators on the 1932 Treaty is a clear indication of the low regard for party responsibility in the United States. A thorough analysis of the Senate vote of 1934 plainly revealed that sectional and business interests took precedence over party responsibility.

The lack of party responsibility was again illustrated in the four years devoted by President Truman
to gaining congressional authorization for the 1941 Agreement after World War II. A careful evaluation of all congressional votes in committees and on the floor of the Senate and House revealed very plainly that party responsibility was not existent. Indeed, the majority of leaders in Congress during the Truman attempts to obtain congressional approval of the 1941 Agreement were Republicans. Senators Vandenberg, Wiley, Ferguson, and Aiken merited permanent places in the history of the project as congressional backers of the seaway. Congressman George A. Dondero of Michigan has become the seaway's most distinguished backer of the project in the House, and he, too, is a Republican.

The lack of party responsibility in the United States certainly has applied to many other congressional issues, but the St. Lawrence project stands almost alone as a fine example of a very lengthy issue upon which party loyalties were practically non-existent. What a vivid contrast the lack of American party responsibility makes with Canadian views on the same subject. One of the primary reasons for continued Canadian reluctance and her inability to take the initiative on the issue from 1922 to 1950 was the concept
of Canadian party responsibility. While not so great as that of the parties of Great Britain, Canada was famed for its generally high regard for party responsibility. Prime Minister King would not, and in effect could not, take positive action on the proposals of American Presidents simply because he could not find sufficient support for the measure within his own Liberal Party. The powerful Liberal Party of Quebec stood adamantly against the seaway and power project during most of the period under consideration.

Prime Minister Bennett was enabled to negotiate the St. Lawrence Treaty due to general support for it at the time from his Conservative Party with powerful backing from Ontario. Only the emergency of World War II and Ontario's power plight resulting therefrom caused Prime Minister King to relent and acquiesce in the 1941 Agreement.

At the same time, America's lack of party responsibility had made it possible for the President to embark upon great national and international programs in advance of congressional agreement on them. This factor was well illustrated in Hoover's negotiation
of the Treaty of 1932 and Roosevelt's conclusion of the Executive Agreement of 1941. Both pacts proved to be far too premature in view of general public opinion in both nations, and both were the direct results of personal campaigns by two different American Chief Executives. Had either Hoover or Roosevelt been compelled to consult all members of his party prior to the start of negotiations, there probably would have been no agreement at all.

In no sense has the Canadian Prime Minister ever been so powerful a figure as his British counterpart. In Great Britain a very persuasive leader could conceivably dictate policy to his party members within reason, but in Canada, this was generally not possible. The extreme power and influence of Canada's large provinces and the disproportionate influence of two of them over all others has made the Prime Minister highly dependent upon their support. The very great power wielded by the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec in particular has rendered the federal Prime Minister very weak on more issues than that of the St. Lawrence question alone. This very dependency of the Prime
Minister has made the influence of Ontario and Quebec very strong and out of all proportion to the power of any one American State to influence a President.

The net result of this varying opinion on the principle of party responsibility has made the American President a more powerful potential leader than the Canadian Prime Minister. In Canada, the Prime Minister is accustomed to formulating his Government's policy in regard to any issue only through consultation with party leaders. Then, and usually only then, is action taken by the Government in Parliament. In the United States a powerful President very often makes the policy in advance and then campaigns for congressional approval after the policy has been made. Whether one system or the other is the more desirable is not at issue here, but it has helped to account for the very different approaches of Canadian and American leaders to the problem of the St. Lawrence project.

A differing view over executive leadership in both nations also enters into the St. Lawrence question. An American President is virtually guaranteed four years in office by the Constitution. He is not compelled to
resign no matter how many congressional setbacks he has suffered. In Canada with its parliamentary system of government, a Prime Minister could conceivably be compelled to resign at any time his Government fails on a crucial test vote. For this reason the Canadian Prime Minister tends to be much more attentive to the views of the leaders of his own party than the American President. If he did not, he would either lose his position as party leader, and thus as Prime Minister, or else his whole Government would have to resign to face another national election. This fundamental difference in parliamentary and presidential types of government make it more expedient in the former that demand for any government policy must arise first within his party before it becomes a political issue. At this point it is appropriate to point out that Canada did not assume the initiative in St. Lawrence planning until the year 1950 when public demand for the project was well reflected in Government policy. An American President can often afford to indulge in independent projects, but a Canadian Prime Minister seldom can afford this luxury.
Another characteristic of governmental differences in the two nations is that of the concept of separation of powers against unity of powers. In the United States the Constitution goes to great lengths to make the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government separate from each other. In Canada there is a unity of executive and legislative functions of government. With relation to the St. Lawrence project, this meant, in effect, that there could not be a long standing dispute between the executive and legislative functions of the Government. The Canadian executive is largely a committee of Parliament. Yet, in the United States, there did exist for many years a conflict between the executive and the Congress over the St. Lawrence project. A similar situation in Canada would be unthinkable.

In many respects the views of the Canadian Government over the St. Lawrence project were more truly representative of public opinion in that nation than were the forceful pronouncements of six consecutive American Presidents representative of American public opinion. The very long hesitation of the Canadian Government to
cooperate with the American Chief Executive was truly indicative of the absence of a favorable public opinion toward the seaway within the nation.

It appears obvious that the American President was more successful in surmounting international difficulties over the St. Lawrence project than he was in regard to domestic difficulties. The Hoover Treaty of 1932 and the Roosevelt Agreement of 1941 stand as tributes to these two leaders for their effectiveness in reaching agreement with a foreign nation. If only the American President had been as successful in his campaign for American approval of the project, the question might well have been completely settled twenty years before.

As it was, all American Presidents except Eisenhower grossly underestimated the power of the opposition within the United States Congress. The powerful Atlantic and Gulf coast States and the Mississippi Valley States joined in a powerful coalition with rail, utility, banking, and shipping interests. The total power of this coalition proved to be insurmountable in numerous tests in the American Congress.
It is unlikely that the American Presidents were unaware of the power of the opposition. Each in his own time and each in his own way worked to defeat the power of this opposition. The various methods employed by six American Presidents have been the topic of this consideration. Had it not been for Canada's avowed plans to move ahead with the seaway entirely on its own, the St. Lawrence question might still be pending in the American Congress. Such controversial issues as the Tennessee Valley Authority have been under constant debate for over thirty years, and the TVA is strictly an American issue. Not only did the St. Lawrence project meet with purely domestic problems, but it was immensely complicated by international problems. Other great power and irrigation projects in the Missouri Valley and the great northwest area have been a problem of many years standing.

It is not too surprising, therefore, that the St. Lawrence seaway and power project required thirty-two years of presidential leadership and congressional debate before it was resolved. The very fact that six consecutive American Presidents exerted their full energies to bring it about probably materially
contributed to its final success. Without the encouragement and support of the White House, there might well not be today a St. Lawrence project. To Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower must go the credit for the final consummation of this great international endeavor.
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I, Rudolph Swayne Comstock, Jr., was born in Warren, Ohio, January 26, 1931. I received my secondary education in the public schools of Canton, Ohio, and Newton Falls, Ohio. I received the Bachelor of Arts Degree from Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, in 1951. From the same institution I also received the Degrees of Bachelor of Science in Education in 1952, and Master of Arts in 1954. My major field was Political Science with minors in Economics and History. I taught social studies in the Portage County School system in 1952-1954. I served as a Teaching Assistant at the Ohio State University in 1954. My major field of specialization is International Law and Relations.