A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF ADLAI EWING STEVENSON

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1952 a new figure appeared on the national political scene. Adlai Ewing Stevenson, the relatively obscure Governor of Illinois, was drafted by the Democratic party to be its nominee for President of the United States. In the three months following his nomination, Stevenson captured the attention of the nation, and indeed, the attention of the world, with his fresh approach to campaign speaking. Called "the best Democratic stump speaker to come out of Illinois since Stephen A. Douglas,"¹ he conducted a campaign which was said to be directed "to the mind rather than to the emotions."² His speeches brought superlative praise. "This is a magnificent man, a man so gifted it is something of a miracle that a convention of an American political party would have the sense to pick him."³

Although he was defeated at the polls, Stevenson garnered more votes than had ever been received by any winning candidate except Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. He actually received three

¹Time, XL (September 8, 1952), p. 22.
million more votes than did President Truman, the winner in the preceding campaign.⁴

Never before had a collection of the speeches of a political candidate made the best selling list. Yet Governor Stevenson, a losing candidate, found such popular acceptance of his printed speeches that more than one hundred thousand copies were sold in the United States alone.⁵ The Major Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson was on the New York Times non-fiction best seller list for weeks in 1953, and on May 31 of that year, it was fourth in popularity.⁶ A collection of Stevenson's speeches since 1952, What I Think, also made the New York Times non-fiction best seller list in April, 1956.

What is there about Stevenson's speeches that would account for this phenomenal sale? To the student of political science, a genuine draft of a truly reluctant man to run for the office of President of the United States is worthy of investigation. To the student of public address, the sudden emergence of a speaker acclaimed for his skill by friend and foe alike is also worthy of investigation.

⁵Letter from Jess Stein, editor, Random House, to Dr. Harold F. Harding, The Ohio State University dated March 5, 1956.
A. PURPOSE

Aristotle first set forth the general principles which apply to public address even today. The five divisions of rhetoric he postulates are invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. Invention is the discovery of the available means of persuasion in a given case. Arrangement is the ordering of those arguments. Style is the clothing of the arguments in language which will both aid understanding and please the ear. Memory includes the mental marshalling of material which the speaker may call upon at any time, and his method of mental preparation for the delivery of the speech, whether it be the memorization of an outline of his ideas in the speech or the entire manuscript. Delivery includes the utilization of both the voice and the body in the presentation of the speech.

It is the purpose of this study to analyze the speeches of Adlai Stevenson in the light of these Aristotelian principles in order to determine the characteristics of his speaking.

B. METHOD

While all five of Aristotle's divisions are employed in some measure in this study, invention receives detailed attention. Invention includes, among other things, the speaker's discovery

of ethical, logical and emotional proof. Ethical proof is that which helps establish the speaker's character, intelligence and good will. The criteria for evaluating a speaker's ethical proof have been suggested by Thonssen and Baird.¹

In general, speaker focuses attention upon the probity of his character if he (1) associates either himself or his message with what is virtuous and elevated; (2) bestows, with propriety, tempered praise upon himself, his client, and his cause; (3) links the opponent or the opponent's cause with what is not virtuous; (4) removes or minimizes unfavorable impressions of himself or his cause previously established by his opponent; (5) relies upon authority derived from his personal experience; and (6) creates the impression of being completely sincere in his undertaking.

With certain qualifications varying with the circumstances, it may be said that a speaker helps to establish the impression of sagacity if he (1) uses what is commonly called common sense; (2) acts with tact and moderation; (3) displays a sense of good taste; (4) reveals a broad familiarity with the interests of the day; and (5) shows through the way in which he handles speech materials that he is possessed of intellectual integrity and wisdom.

Finally, a speaker's good will generally is revealed through his ability (1) to capture the proper balance between too much and too little praise of his audience; (2) to identify himself properly with the hearers and their problems; (3) to proceed with candor and straightforwardness; (4) to offer necessary rebukes with tact and consideration; (5) to offset any personal reasons he may have for giving the speech; and (6) to reveal, without guile or exhibitionism, his personable qualities as a messenger of the truth.

A speaker's emotional or pathetic proof includes all those materials and devices calculated to put the audience in a frame of mind suitable for the reception of the speaker's ideas. Among

such devices are appeals to the desire for personal gain, reference to patriotic figures and ideals, and Biblical allusion. The emotions which may be appealed to, according to Aristotle, include anger, love, hatred, fear, pity, indignation, envy, emulation and contempt.

The Aristotelian materials for logical proof are the enthymeme (a special rhetorical form of the syllogism) and examples. Modern rhetoricians have added statistics and testimony. The severity and strictness of the speaker's argumentative development may be tested by analyzing these constituents of logical proof.

The developmental plan for this study is based upon the method employed by Goodrich in his analysis of certain British orations.¹ (1) A memoir of the speaker, revealing his early training in eloquence, the leading events of his public life, the peculiar cast of his genius, and the distinctive characteristics of his oratory. (2) A historical introduction to each of the speeches examined, explaining the circumstances of the case. (3) An analysis of the speeches, giving the divisions and subdivisions of thought. (4) A large body of explanatory notes, bringing out the minuter facts of the case. (5) Critical notes applying to the several parts of the speeches. (6) Translations of passages quoted from foreign languages. (7) A concluding statement of the way in which the question was decided, with occasional remarks on its merits.

While the present study is based upon the method of Goodrich, it includes a more comprehensive analysis of the speaker's preparation of his speeches, the development of his ideas, and comparison with his opponent and other public speakers. The audience and the occasion for each of the speeches analyzed in this study also receive more attention, including critical comment by observers writing in newspapers and magazines.

In the preparation of this study, the author interviewed the Governor and one of his writers, Professor Robert W. Tufts. Books, magazines and newspapers pertaining to the 1952 campaign and to the speaking of Stevenson were intensively examined. In order to study the Governor's vocal and physical delivery, the author listened to recordings of Stevenson's speeches, watched his television appearances in 1952 and later, and attended his commencement address at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio in 1955.

While all of the Governor's major campaign speeches have been carefully examined in the preparation of this study, five speeches were chosen for a more critical analysis. Choosing five speeches representative of the more than two hundred Stevenson delivered during the 1952 campaign posed some difficulty. The problem was somewhat simplified by eliminating the "whistle stop" speeches. However, from August to November, Stevenson delivered forty major speeches.10

The five speeches finally chosen are not necessarily the best Stevenson delivered. They are, however, representative of his campaign. Most of them are addressed to the nation at large, but some are directed to special interest groups. The five speeches cover the campaign from its beginning until its close. Many of the subjects claimed to be issues in the campaign are included. While Stevenson wrote the final draft of all five of the speeches, he depended upon the drafts submitted by his research team in some of the speeches more than in the others. Some were thought out long in advance; others were quickly prepared. Most of the speeches contain the first statements of Stevenson's views on the issues. One speech is a direct reply to a speech by his opponent.

"Improving our Labor Laws," delivered in Detroit on September 1, was selected because it was Stevenson's most important speech before a labor audience. It was the first expression of his views on the Taft-Hartley Act. The speech was the opening gun in the campaign.

"Farm Policy," delivered at Kasson, Minnesota on September 6, was Stevenson's major address to the farmers of the nation. It was also his first statement on the subject of price supports. The speech was important, for the farm vote was in doubt.

"Korea," delivered at Louisville, Kentucky, on September 27, was chosen because it is a direct reply to a speech by Eisenhower. In form and content it is quite different from the preceding speeches. Most of Stevenson's speeches were expository in nature. This one
is a persuasive speech. It was delivered late in the campaign, and deals with one of the Republican's prime charges.

"Safeguards Against Communism" was delivered in Detroit on October 7. Addressed to the entire nation, it sets forth Stevenson's views on a subject which the Republican party injected as an issue in the campaign.

"Tidelands Oil - Foreign Trade," delivered in New Orleans on October 10, was chosen as representative of Stevenson's sectional speeches. Addressed to the South, and particularly to the states concerned with the tidelands oil issue, the speech was one of the few directed to an audience which was not in accord with Stevenson's views. It was one of the last major speeches in the campaign.

The analysis is based on the text of the speeches as they were actually delivered and later published. The five speeches have not been edited. They are, as Stevenson states, "the words, unchanged." In this study, the text of the speeches have been

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12 I have relied upon stenographic transcriptions in most cases. Where lacking, I have used my own typescript with my accompanying notes to reconstruct what I said as accurately as possible. The only deletions are purely local matter, meaningful only at the time and place, like comments about local candidates and local references or jokes which are difficult or impossible to reconstruct from the materials at hand." Major Campaign Speeches, p. xliv.
compared with the texts of the press releases in order to determine last minute changes. In this way, "ad libs" could be detected. Quite often the speeches were cut on delivery due to time limitations. Introductions suited to the audience and the occasion were frequently added to the original press releases.

C. SIMILAR STUDIES

Analyses of the campaign speeches of public figures are not new. For example, the campaign speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt have come under intensive study in recent years. Several aspects of Stevenson's speaking in the 1952 campaign have been examined in recent Masters' theses. There is, however, only one completed doctoral dissertation which touches on his speaking. The present study differs from the others in that a more comprehensive investigation of the speaking of Adlai Stevenson is attempted. This is particularly true in the areas of his training in eloquence, his invention, and his speech preparation.

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Chapter Two, entitled "The Speaker and his Oratory," is concerned with Stevenson's heritage and training, and the characteristics of his style and delivery. Chapter Three deals with his speech preparation, with special attention to the 1952 campaign. Chapters Four through Eight are the individual analyses of the five speeches chosen as representative of the campaign. Each chapter includes an analysis of the audience and the occasion. Chapter Nine is an analysis of Stevenson's invention and arrangement in all of his 1952 campaign speeches, and it is entitled, "Invention and Arrangement." Chapter Ten, "The Emergence of a Statesman," traces the formation, development and expression of Stevenson's ideas. Chapter Eleven contains a summary of the investigation and the conclusions drawn from it.

The appendix contains the texts of the five speeches analyzed, and also the text of Stevenson's hitherto unpublished commencement address at Oberlin College in 1955. A selected bibliography follows.

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Adlai Ewing Stevenson was fifty-two years old in 1952. His weight of 190 pounds made him appear smaller in height than his five feet ten inches. His skin is freckled and blamished with moles. It is rather dark, the kind that tans well. His face is marked by a high forehead and a receding hairline. His features are uneven, marked by a big, irregularly shaped nose. His eyes are blue and very round, almost banjo-eyes. His eyebrows are high and unruly, which tends to give him a skeptical expression.

The Stevenson heritage is closely connected with the growth of the American republic. On both sides of the family, his ancestors have been traced back to pre-revolutionary times. The Stevensons emigrated to America from Ireland in 1748 and served in the American Revolution. Grandfather Stevenson was Vice-President of the United States during Grover Cleveland's second administration. He was defeated in a second bid for the same office in 1900.

Grandfather Stevenson's wife traced her ancestry to men who fought with George Washington, and who had explored the Western wilderness. She was an early and active member of the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Colonial Dames, the Women's Clubs of America and an organizer of the forerunner of the Parent Teachers' Association.
On his mother's side, Stevenson traces his ancestors through eight generations to England. One of them emigrated to America in 1704 or 1705. Great-grandfather Jesse Fell worked on an anti-slavery newspaper in Virginia, studied law in Ohio, and became the first lawyer in Bloomington, Illinois. At one time he lived in the same house as Abraham Lincoln. He is credited with originating the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and was one of the first men to propose Lincoln for the presidential nomination.

Great-grandfather Fell helped bring the Normal College to Bloomington. He founded the first newspaper, and later bought the Bloomington Pantagraph. Adlai Stevenson has a twenty-three percent interest in the Pantagraph, and it is the principal source of his private income.

Adlai's father, Lewis Green Stevenson, was active in Illinois politics. In addition, he served as secretary to Vice-President Stevenson, covered the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 as a war correspondent, and was assistant general manager of the Hearst newspaper, the Los Angeles Examiner, at the turn of the century.

A. EARLY TRAINING IN ELOQUENCE

Although Adlai Stevenson was born in Los Angeles in 1900, his family moved back to Bloomington when he was three. The Steven-

sons were a leading family in Bloomington, living in the best section of town and moving in the best social circles. Summers and Winters were spent in fashionable resort centers in the North and South.

The Governor was reared in an atmosphere of culture and politics. His mother helped form her son's literary taste by reading the works of Scott, Dickens, Thackeray and Greek mythology to him. His grandfather Davis read the poems of Robert Burns to young Adlai, as well as selections from Bret Harte and Lewis Carroll. Grandfather Stevenson was well-versed in American history and had a reputation as a storyteller. Young Adlai listened by the hour to his grandfather's stories.

Stevenson was fascinated by the political atmosphere which surrounded his home. Post-election receptions were frequent, and the distinguished Democrats who visited there included William Jennings Bryan. In 1912, the Stevensons vacationed at Seabright, New Jersey. While there, Adlai met a family friend, Woodrow Wilson. The nomination and election of Wilson to the office of President of the United States that same year was a source of excitement and pride to Adlai. Wilson became his idol, and the devotion was a major factor in Stevenson's selection of Princeton University for his undergraduate work.

Stevenson's formal schooling suffered because of his family's extensive traveling. He did not attend school until he was nine years of age. He studied one year in Switzerland, and infrequently attended the Bloomington Public Schools. This rather haphazard education was not sufficient to enable him to pass the entrance
examinations for college. Therefore, he entered Choate Preparatory School in Connecticut in 1916. While at Choate, Stevenson contributed articles to the school literary magazine and served as a reporter for the Choate News. His efforts were successful, and in his final year he was elected editor-in-chief of the paper and president of his class.

Two years at Choate enabled Stevenson to pass the entrance examinations for Princeton University in 1918. He principally studied English and United States History at the University, but was an indifferent student. He continued his interest in writing, and was on the editorial board of the Daily Princetonian for three years. He was elected managing editor in his senior year. Although several Speech courses were part of the curricula, Stevenson did not enroll in any of them. He did, however, join the Whig-Cliosophic debating club. The group met every Friday and listened to debates. From this experience, he gained a working knowledge of the principles of argument.

Following his graduation from Princeton in 1922, Stevenson attended the Harvard Law School for two years. He failed to complete his degree, due both to a lack of interest and the death of an uncle.

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He returned to Bloomington and worked on the family paper in several editorial capacities. When the courts divided the ownership of the paper in 1925, he decided to complete his work for a law degree. His classmates had already been graduated from Harvard, and since he wished to remain close to home, he entered the Northwestern Law School.

Stevenson received his degree in 1926, and tried his hand as a foreign correspondent for International News Service. Stevenson's only notable achievement in this capacity was an entry into the Soviet Union. He is rather proud of the experience, since the Soviet frontier was then closed and few Western Europeans or Americans were entering Russia. Stevenson remained abroad from June until midwinter, then returned to Illinois and the practice of law. He joined the eminent Chicago firm of Sidley, Austin, Burgess and Smith. Except for his excursions into public life, Stevenson has remained a partner in the firm.

It was in Chicago that Stevenson received his baptism in public speaking. In 1927 he joined the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and was soon called upon to speak. The following year he was elected president of the organization, and under his leadership the Council grew rapidly in membership. Its bi-monthly luncheons regularly attracted a thousand or more Chicago business, professional and industrial leaders. Stevenson's duties with the organization required his services as toastmaster, after-dinner speaker, and lecturer on foreign affairs. Like Demosthenes, he acquired eloquence
through long and diligent practice. He proved to be such a popular after-dinner speaker that during the 1930's he devoted more time to speech writing and public speaking than to his law profession. At this time Stevenson thought of his primary occupation as that of a public speaker.⁴

Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Stevenson took an active part in the "great debate" between the so-called isolationists and the interventionists. He served as chairman of the Chicago branch of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, organizing mass meetings to swing public opinion to that view. It was through his experiences with these organizations that Stevenson developed his skill in speaking.

B. ENTRY INTO POLITICS

Stevenson received his initial experience in political life when the Democratic party took over the administration of the federal government in 1933. George Peek, an Illinois farm-philosopher and a friend of the Stevenson family, was called to Washington by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace to organize the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Peek in turn asked Stevenson to serve as a special counsel. Stevenson accepted, and remained in this capacity for a year. In 1934 he joined the Federal Alcohol Control Administration as the assistant general counsel in order to handle the legal

⁴Martin, p. 53.
and tax problems created by the sudden repeal of Prohibition. Eight months later, he resigned in order to return to his Chicago law firm.

The years 1935-1940 found Stevenson active in the Council on Foreign Affairs. In the course of his work with the organization, he became acquainted with Frank Knox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News. When Knox was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1940, he invited Stevenson to serve as his special assistant. In this capacity Stevenson traveled with Knox, writing speeches for him, and occasionally delivering them.

During the war years, Stevenson led several missions to Europe for the Foreign Economic Administration and the War Department. In 1945 he served as special assistant to Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr. In this role, he helped prepare the foundation for the United Nations Organization, attending the meetings at both London and San Francisco. In 1946 and 1947 he served as senior advisor and alternate representative to the United States delegation in the General Assembly. Because of this wide experience, Stevenson believes that his major strength in politics lies in his knowledge of American foreign policy.5

In the years following the war, Stevenson found time to deliver speeches numbering in the hundreds on his wartime experiences and on foreign policy. In view of Stevenson's heritage and his experience, it was only natural that he should think of politics.

5 Interview with Adlai Stevenson at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, June 13, 1955.
When several of his Chicago friends suggested in 1947 that he should run for the office of Senator from Illinois, Stevenson reacted favorably. About the same time, Colonel Jacob Arvey, political boss of Chicago's Cook County, heard of Stevenson. Senate Secretary Lester Biffle gave a party in July of that year which Arvey attended along with Illinois' Senator Scott Lucas, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, and Secretary of State James Byrnes. During the conversation after lunch, Stevenson's name was mentioned. When Arvey professed ignorance, the other enlightened him. 6

Arvey afterward met Stevenson several times, and was impressed by him. However, he was committed to the support of Paul Douglas for the Senate position. In December, 1947, Arvey met with Stevenson and offered him his support for the Governorship of Illinois. At first Stevenson was not interested, for he had not thought of himself as Governor. By the time the deadline arrived to make up his mind, however, he accepted and was nominated for the position by the Democratic slate-making committee.

Stevenson was politically unknown in Illinois in 1948 just as he was unknown to the nation in 1952. Labelled a "striped-pants diplomat," he had to adapt his speech style from the lofty addresses he had given before polite, intelligent, sympathetic audiences to a down-to-earth approach for farmers, laborers and businessmen.

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Stevenson worked hard at the new experience of campaigning, often delivering several speeches a day.

His campaign speeches show a wide range of quality—windy, low-level campaign oratory to the precinct captains, tightly reasoned attacks on the Green administrations' sins to downstate public audiences, large folksy talks to farmers, speeches charged with genuine emotion to minority groups,' cold technical talks on taxes to taxpayers' associations.

Surprising even his friends and amazing the politicians, Stevenson scored a smashing victory. He was elected Governor by the largest plurality in Illinois history. He carried Illinois by 572,067 votes. Truman carried it by only 33,612. Truman might have lost Illinois, a pivotal state, had it not been for Stevenson.

Besides the usual speeches expected of a Governor, Stevenson made a habit of giving three or four speeches a year outside of the state. He also found time to contribute several thoughtful articles on foreign affairs and national morals to Foreign Affairs and the Atlantic Monthly. During his four years in office, he delivered a "report to the people" over the radio every six months. Once each month during the Spring and Winter he appeared on station WBKB-TV in Chicago. The program, called "Governor's Open House," was a lively report on the affairs of state. His talks on the budget, parks and streams, and the highways attracted a surprisingly high rating. An estimated 500,000 persons—In Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin

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'Martin, p. 76.'
and Illinois — watched his program.  

Stevenson announced his intention to run for a second term as Governor. However, events transpiring in 1952 brought him the presidential nomination from the Democratic party. Stevenson was not interested in the nomination for President in 1952, and repeatedly declared it. In March, 1952, he stated, "People don't believe me, but I'm absolutely frank when I say I don't want to run for President. And having said that, I'll be equally frank and say that four years from now, that's another matter." In spite of his protestations, Stevenson received national publicity and support. In January, *Time* magazine carried his picture on its front cover, and had a major story on him. When Truman announced in March that he would not seek re-election, a Stevenson-for-President boom started. His admirers pressed him to declare himself a presidential candidate. In April he issued a statement which he hoped would eliminate him from consideration.

I have repeatedly said that I was a candidate for Governor of Illinois and had no other ambition. To this I must now add that in view of my prior commitment to run for Governor and my desire and the desire of many who have given me their help and confidence in our unfinished work in Illinois, I could not accept the nomination for any other office this summer.

The statement served its purpose for some six weeks. The Stevenson

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8 *Newsweek*, XL (September 22, 1952), p. 64.

9 *Martin*, p. 163.

boom seemed to have died. During this period other Democratic candidates appeared, but none of them caught fire. By the middle of June, the papers were again full of speculation on Stevenson's intentions.

Without Stevenson's consent, a Volunteers-for-Stevenson group had organized in the Spring and sent background information on the Governor to newspapers, magazines, delegates to the convention and political figures. Although the Volunteers remained active, there is little evidence that they were instrumental in the draft of Stevenson.

The party leaders did not maneuver in secret to draft Stevenson. Colonel Arvey has said that he did not spend three cents for a stamp or ten cents for a phone call, yet he was besieged by political leaders eager to throw their convention delegates to Stevenson.

Governor Stevenson did not campaign at the convention; he even pleaded with the Illinois delegation at the last moment not to vote for him. Yet he won the nomination on the third ballot. What happened was extraordinary: a spontaneous draft. The reasons are not hard to find. There is little question that Stevenson was the best candidate available. When President Truman declined to seek renomination, a great void was created in the Democratic party.

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American political parties are and must be coalitions which represent the diverse and conflicting needs of a large and polyglot population. The man who leads his party must be acceptable to most of the groups which comprise it. Stevenson was the only man who could fulfill that requirement. The draft was the product of necessity. The pieces of the party rearranged themselves in a historical shift. Both Stevenson and the party were caught in this major change.

C. STYLE

Stevenson has a felicity of expression rare in public men. He has a considerable respect for and knowledge of the English language. His command of words is unrivaled by any President since Woodrow Wilson and perhaps since Abraham Lincoln.

Stevenson's style is characterized by perspicuity, adornment and wit. Clarity is the keynote of his style. Although he tends to rely on compound and complex sentences, Stevenson's meaning is always clear. His style is appropriate for his subject matter. It is neither mean nor exaggerated. It is a cut above that to which we are accustomed, for campaign oratory has degenerated in its quality. The structure of his prose is neither metrical nor wholly un rhythmic. The occasional flashes of brilliance which adorn his speeches add sublimity to his style. There is a dignity about his prose which puts it on the side of decorum, avoiding foulness. The following paragraph, taken from Stevenson's "World Policy" address at San Francisco on September 9, 1952, is indicative of his style.
This ancient contest between freedom and despotism, which is renewed in every generation, is acute in ours. And the most important single event, it seems to me, in our history is that it is our turn to be freedom's shield and sanctuary.

Stevenson's prose is well-ordered, proper and pure. His years of reporting for the Choate News, Daily Princetonian, Bloomington Pantagraph, and his writing of articles for the Atlantic Monthly and Foreign Affairs have enabled him to polish his sentence structure. His sentences tend to be periodic (compact), rather than dithyrambic (loose). Stevenson is master of a writing style that is both sprightly and illuminating. His prose is witty, pungent, humorous, clear; and, when occasion demands, effectively sharp. It is his style which makes his oratory appealing and effective.

Ornament in Stevenson's speeches consists primarily of contrast and comparison, involving metaphor and simile. In general, Stevenson employs more ornament when speaking on broad themes on a high plane than when discussing specific, mundane topics. The maxims which sometimes appear in his speeches add beauty to his style.

Stevenson's campaign speeches contain many examples of ornament which please the ear. Speaking to his labor audience in Detroit, he pictures himself as a "fugitive from a sweat-shop" where "the speed-up is in full force." The descriptive language here is a comparison between the evils labor has fought against and the evils besetting the political candidate. He describes the Taft-Hartley Act as a "tangled snarl of legal barbed wire." He graphically describes the "disinterred" labor injunction as a device which "forces
men to work in smothered silence." Metaphor is also present in his analogy that "we pulled ourselves out of the quicksand of depression." He sums up his approach to a new labor law with the maxim, "Human decency is the theme of our history and the spirit of our religion." The ornament in this speech helps to make Stevenson's ideas more attractive and more palatable to his hearers.

There is not as much ornament in Stevenson's address to the farmers as was in his Labor Day address. However, some descriptive language is present. He notes that during the depression, the farmer was "flat on his back." He compares the Republican convention of 1952 to a "fracas," and asserts that Eisenhower tried to "plow under" the Republican farm plank in his speech at Kasson. Stevenson's address contains two maxims which lend color to his speech. They are: "A hungry man is not a free man;" and, "Peace will be won in the turn rows, not on the battlefields." The two maxims are readily acceptable to his audience of farmers.

The speech on Korea also contains some ornament. Stevenson states that he does not want to "blow any trumpets," and accuses his opponent of "pointing the accusing finger." Another metaphor appears in his argument that "communism is not the wave of the future." He employs an epitheton in his reference to the "Sunday-morning quarterbacks on the Republican team." The style of both this speech and the one on farm policy is plain. Ornament plays only a small part in them.

The speech in Detroit on communism, however, is on a higher
plane as far as ornament is concerned. Metaphors receive better
treatment at his hand, and flow throughout the speech. The subject
of communism is "swathed in fog and confusion," he states. He compares
communism to a "disease" which "kills." At one time in our country,
it was a "swelling menace." Communist agents "burrowed like moles
in the ground," seeking to "undermine the foundations of government."
Continuing the metaphorical expression, Stevenson states that although
communism "sank its roots" in this country, the conspiracy today
is "smashed beyond repair." The "beckoning finger of communism's
false light" no longer attracts our people. The extended analogy
affords Stevenson the opportunity to employ more ornament than in
the two previous speeches.

Stevenson's most effective ornament occurs in his speech in
New Orleans. When he departs from his factual material and genera-
lizes, his tropes stand out like jewels, sparkling in their beauty.
His prose in this speech occasionally borders on sublimity. He
refers to New Orleans' civilization as a "jambalaya," where each
man "seasons the dish to his own taste," He adds, "Each man is the
master of his own seasoning." Turning to the late depression, Steven-
son notes that such "mournful recollections" have been "fading in
the sunshine of happier days." In those evil days, however, Louisi-
anians "ate the dry crusts of poverty." They "dragged out their
lives," selling "the sweat of their faces and the toil of their
hands." Louisianians faced the "bone-chilling breath of poverty"
on farms that were only a "corner of the earth." Southern farmers
"vainly sought shelter against the arrows of misfortune," for they were "eroded people living on eroded lands." Today, however, "prosperity walks" on the farms of Louisiana.

It should be noted that the last two speeches, on communism and tidelands oil, are more indicative of Stevenson's style than the previous three. The persuasive type of speaking lends itself more to ornament than the informative type. Stevenson's style is all his own, and it is nowhere more apparent than in the occasional flashes of brilliance. Some of his finest ornament occurs in his address to the American Legion on "The Nature of Patriotism," August 27, 1952. In that speech he employs a comparison in speaking of "striking freedom of the mind with the fist of patriotism." Later, he speaks of "voices" which have the "accent" of patriotism. In an extended metaphor, he states: "The road we travel is long, but at the end lies the grail of peace. And in the valley of peace we see the faint outlines of a new world, fertile and strong." In the conclusion of the speech he effectively employs comparison by stating that "We can pluck this flower, safety, from this nettle, danger."

Stevenson's wit is a distinguishing characteristic of his style. His humor is of three kinds: the bon mot, satire, and anecdotes which he used to warm up a "cold" audience.

The bon mot is the highest type of humor, for it is an intellectual form of wit. It is on a plane well above that of the anecdote and satire. Stevenson has a felicity for expressing his ideas
in the form of little gems from his personal philosophy. Consider the following bit of wit he delivered during the 1952 campaign. "Socrates said that the unexamined life is not worth living. We may say that the unexamined government is not worth having." The bon mot in this case is not only a clever saying, but it is also an argument. The best bon mots, such as Stevenson's, are partial maxims based on disjointed or incomplete enthymemes. The ability to state a bon mot at the right time is a mark of the peculiar cast of the Stevenson genius.

Stevenson relied upon satire to attack the Republican party in general and Eisenhower in particular. His satire was not limited to one part of the speech, but was in both the introduction and the discussion.

Satire is particularly effective in cutting one's opponent down to size. If a speaker can get his listeners to laugh at his opponent, if through ridicule the speaker can show the absurdity of his opponent's arguments, then he can with devastating effect weaken his opponent's appeal better than if he employed logic alone. Stevenson used both logic and satire. In some of his speeches he used satire more than in others. His speech at Denver, September 5, 1952, on the Republican charge of a time for a change, illustrates the sharpness of his satire. The Republican platform, he said, is "pretty good as a Whodunit." He charged that Eisenhower's proposal to liberate the European nations overrun by the Russians has "frightened everyone except the Russians." He ridiculed the Old Guard-Taft wing...
of the Republican party as "the men who don't want anything done for the first time." In refuting the argument that the Democrats should support the Republican party or else that party might disappear, he cuttingly replied, "This is the first time in history that it has been contended that now is the time for all good Democrats to come to the aid of the Republican Party."

The humor that Stevenson employed in his introductions is lighthearted and refreshing. Much of it is at his own expense - self-deprecating. He often assumes the role of an ineffectual hand-wringing lamb among wolves. His humor occasioned frequent criticism during the campaign. He defended it by saying that he used humor as Carl Sandburg said Abraham Lincoln did: "A laugh to cure his own melancholy, yet also to clinch an argument, to lay bare a fallacy, or to disarm an antagonist."13

Insult, if picturesque or vitriolic enough, is by tradition accepted as wit during the slugging of a campaign. But real humor during a political campaign is uncommon. Wit has been considered dangerous and irony fatal. That Stevenson dares to employ all three is proof of how new and refreshing he is to American politics.14

There is an ancient rule in politics that the candidate may poke fun at his opponent, but never at himself or his party. Steven-


14 John Mason Brown, "The General, the Governor, the Grassroots," The Saturday Review, XXXV (October 18, 1952), p. 41.
son broke this rule frequently. His self-depreciatory attitude on occasion "outraged his most loyal campaign supporters," who believed that his humor tended to belittle his own candidacy. The main criticism of Stevenson's humor, however, was not based on its kind, but rather on the amount. Stevenson is not content with pleasant opening remarks; his wit often appears throughout his speeches. Many people believed that Stevenson overplayed his humor during the campaign. His staff of aides feared that he would end up as a "political Bob Hope."

Stevenson's humor is intended as a crowd-warming device. While he deliberately plans a sentence or two to create interest in his introductions, he occasionally comes up with some effective spur-of-the-moment remarks. He is very conscious of audience reaction, and is particularly upset by a "cold" audience. This accounts for his rather lengthy, folksy introductions. He also tries to include some humor in the body of his speeches to maintain audience interest. He is keenly aware of failure in his attempts to provide humor. He notes that there is often a time lag between his puns and when the audience gets the point.

Stevenson is aware of the value of getting and holding audience interest. He keeps a file of "interest-getters" in a medium-sized

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16 Newsweek, XL (September 22, 1952), p. 64.
17 Stevenson interview.
black loose-leaf notebook. It is a collection over the years of phrases he made up and wanted to remember, quotes that caught his attention and funny stories people told him.

During the campaign, there was considerable argument over whether the Republicans were smart to publicize Stevenson's humor by attacking it. Some observers believed that the Governor's wit was distracting, even that it boomeranged against him. Their reasoning was based on the argument that the people expect their statesmen to be "solemn asses." It is apparent now that Stevenson's humor served to make him known to the nation in an extremely short time. The Republican attack helped raise Stevenson from relative obscurity to the focal point of national interest. Probably many people listened to Stevenson because of his growing reputation for humor. His humor would not alone gain him votes, but it did serve to put his audience in a frame of mind wherein they would be more receptive to his ideas. Rhetorically speaking, Stevenson was wise to include humor in his speeches as long as he did not overdo it. On the basis of this examination, his humor was not overdone. It was, simply, unique in modern politics.

Long, complicated sentences liberally sprinkled with words of many syllables are the rule rather than the exception in Stevenson's speeches. However, he is not averse to terse statements. Several formulae are available which help determine the intelligibility level
of his speeches. The Flesch formula\(^{18}\) postulates levels of intelligibility based on the number of syllables, words and sentences found in selected samples. According to this formula, the average level of intelligibility for Stevenson's major speeches is rated fairly difficult. However, the speeches vary greatly in their readability. The speeches on Korea and tidelands oil are rated standard, or average. "Farm Policy" is rated as fairly easy, while the speeches on communism and labor laws are rated as academically difficult. The variance may possibly be explained by the subject matter of the speeches. The speeches rated academically difficult are much more abstract in nature than the others. The number of syllables per word is greater, and there are longer, more involved sentences in them.

The Dale-Chall formula\(^{19}\) compares the level of readability to specified educational levels. The average level of readability for Stevenson's speeches is rated as academic or scholarly. They are thus on an educational level typical of college students. The individual speeches analyzed in this study vary in their readability for educational levels. The speech on farm policy should be understood by those with a seventh grade education or equivalent. The speeches on Korea and tidelands oil are on the educational level


of high school students who read *Time* and *Readers' Digest*. However, the speeches on communism and labor laws are on the educational level of an audience with a college education.

This gives rise to the question, did Stevenson speak over the heads of his audiences? During the campaign, his advisers cautioned that his speeches sailed straight over the heads of a large segment of the common people whose vote he needed to win. The intelligibility level for forty of Stevenson's major speeches is on an average plane suited to people with a college education. Although some of his speeches were within the educational level of most Americans - eighth grade to high school, many of his speeches were well above that plane. According to these formulae, Stevenson did speak over the heads of his audiences. The Detroit speech was definitely over the heads of his immediate audience, for the speech is rated on a college level, and his laboring audience did not measure up to that educational plane. It is apparent that Stevenson gave little thought to the educational level of his immediate listeners, but addressed himself to the educated voter.

In spite of the high educational level of his speeches, there is evidence that his speeches were well-received.

The scores of thousands who poured out to listen to him did not think that he was talking over their heads. On the

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contrary, they were obviously enthralled by the mellifluousness of his phrases, multisyllabic words and all. 21

A point that should be taken into account is that Stevenson's early speeches were informational rather than persuasive in character. He did not give his audiences much to applaud, for he was explaining, rather than attacking. When he completed his series of speeches on the issues as he saw them and turned to the offensive, his reception was much more enthusiastic. There was more appeal to the emotions in the later, persuasive speeches. Stevenson realized that purely informative speeches would not win the campaign for him, but he was caught on the horns of the proverbial dilemma. He first had to establish his personal identity before he could effectively attack his opponent. 22 Under the circumstances, he chose the best course. But he might have had more success if he had included more emotional appeals earlier in the campaign. There is evidence in his 1956 speeches seeking the Democratic presidential nomination that he is adapting his arguments to the educational level of his hearers.

D. DELIVERY

Stevenson admits that he is always nervous while speaking. 23 However, he does not reveal it to his audience. He gives the im-

21 Newsweek, XL (October 27, 1952), p. 28.
22 Stevenson interview.
23 Ibid.
pression that he is poised and at ease when he speaks. He is less nervous before a camera or a microphone, but they are a nuisance to him. While waiting to speak during the campaign, he revealed his nervousness by fumbling with his glasses or his manuscript.

He takes an active interest in the events around him. He is quite curious by nature and interested in people. His glances, when he looks at you, are penetrating, not cursory.

Stevenson appears to be a man of good humor who loves everyone, and does not want to make any enemies. Although he reads from a manuscript, he is not tied to it. He has a habit of turning his head down before he has finished a sentence in order to get ready to read the next one. The audience sees too much of his freckled forehead (which was usually covered by pancake make-up for his TV appearances). He rarely uses his hands for gestures, but emphasizes key words with his body. He leans forward from the waist to make a point. When not encumbered by a lectern, he often tilts backward and forward on the balls of his feet. His approach to a crowd is different from Eisenhower's. When Stevenson waves, it is not with his arms straight out. He tends to keep his elbows at his sides and makes tentative, half-finished gestures. His facial expression usually complements what he is saying.

He moves swiftly and with the energy of a man whose body is at the command of an agile mind. His is the face of an intellectual, registering as he speaks the subtleties of deep thought. Occasionally, one observes his not expansive
smile, and is continually aware of the directness of his eyes. 24

The Governor has an earnestness of manner and a simple directness of attack that command respect. People listen to him. He never seems schoolmasterish, never seems to chide. Instead, he almost apologetically asks his audience to listen. He is never authoritarian or dogmatic in tone; rather, he gently persuades.

While he has the ability to ingratiate himself with people, he apologizes to the point where it may be overdone. He uses an open-faced approach that makes one feel that he has no "gadgets" to sell. The question arises, "Is this bad for a politician?"

Many people were initially shocked by Stevenson's voice. Because he has a weak voice, he tends to strain in out-of-door situations and in large meeting-halls. His pitch rises and his voice quality becomes thin and shrill. This impression gradually disappears as he warms to his subject. Before small groups in more intimate settings, his pitch is lower and the quality is much more pleasing.

However his voice is described, one must grant that he has excellent articulation. His speech is crisp, clear, clipped and exact. Stevenson speaks rather deliberately so that no thought is lost. He gets through long, complicated sentences with only an occasional faltering. When he over-writes his speeches for the time allocated, he is forced to hurry his delivery.

24 Brown, "The General, the Governor, the Grassroots," p. 10.
Stevenson's speech is influenced by family precept, travel in Europe and an Eastern schooling. His years at Choate and Princeton are immediately evident to his audiences. "His speech reminds you a little of Lawrence Olivier." However, the Governor does not have an English or even Rooseveltian New York accent. He has a curious mixture of Eastern and Middle Western speech. He often says "acrost" for "across" and indulges in several other regional eccentricities.

Stevenson pronounces the word "political" in such a way that it is invested with honor, making politics seem the noblest work of all. Pronouncing every syllable, he makes the first one "poh" and not "puh." He utters the word with a mixture of affection, awe and delight.

The Governor has a pleasant radio voice. It has "a warmth, frankness and intimacy missing since the days of FDR." However, Stevenson is at his best in a personal appearance or on television. His platform manner is poised, gracious and confident. He has an acute sense of timing, and senses the appropriate instant to issue a statement or launch a project to an audience. Lou Frankel, Democratic radio chief in Washington during the campaign, believed that Stevenson was a much better speaker than Truman or Sparkman. He

said of Stevenson, "He's our biggest radio and TV asset." 27

Stevenson's crowds were for the most part smaller than Eisenhower's. However, the audiences were not drummed up by an advance team of organizers supplying banners, confetti and such equipment. When Stevenson landed at an airport, he did not play up to the crowd. There was no clearing of areas to spotlight his entry, no pauses to focus attention upon him. Instead, he stepped matter-of-factly out of his plane, usually with no more recognition of the crowd than a brief wave. What his audiences thought after hearing his "whistle-stop" speeches is difficult to assess. The crowds were quietly attentive, and generally unresponsive. For every person who let loose a whoop, there were hundreds who listened thoughtfully, applauded politely, and went quietly on their way. Stevenson's delivery is not conducive to cries of "Give 'em hell, Adlai!" He is too much the product of Princeton and LaSalle Street for that.

Where Harry Truman was as down to earth as a Missouri muleskinner, Stevenson preferred the well-turned phrase, the literary allusion. Where Mr. Truman used a club, Stevenson's weapon was the rapier. 28

However, Stevenson is able to arouse favorable responses from his audiences. In his major speeches, he often inspired outbursts of rapturous applause. He is the most eloquent candidate seen in recent

27 *Time*, XL (September 29, 1952), p. 56.

years. He can read a speech and make it sound like a few brilliant thoughts that had just come to him a moment before. The over-all impression one gets in listening to Stevenson is that here is a good man speaking.
CHAPTER III

SPEECH PREPARATION

Stevenson's method of preparation for a speech varies with the amount of time he has for it. The first major speech that he ever delivered was in 1927 before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The night before, he wrote out the speech in long hand, memorized it carefully and rehearsed it in private. Then, lest he forget, he wrote out the first sentence of each paragraph on a little card which he carried in his pocket. His apparent self-possession and practiced professional glances at the little card in the palm of his hand convinced the audience that he was a veteran at the game.¹

Today, Stevenson does not rely on so many notes in his extemporaneous speaking. However, it is the brief impromptu speeches that give him trouble, and make him feel ill at ease. Under most circumstances, he can "ad lib" without difficulty or discomfort. Some of his most effective remarks are those that have flown into his head as he raised it from his prepared text.² He still feels uncomfortable if he rises before an audience without a text of some

¹Busch, p. 62.
sort. In all of his major addresses, he carefully writes out the speech in long hand, has it typed, and then delivers it from the manuscript.

A. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

The planning for a presidential campaign is tedious and exacting, for campaigns now involve traveling thousands of miles and delivering hundreds of speeches. In 1952 Stevenson made 203 speeches and traveled 32,500 miles. General Eisenhower delivered 226 speeches and covered just under 50,000 miles.\(^3\)

Because he was nominated against his will, Stevenson believed that he was not obligated to any group, including the so-called "Truman influence." He early determined to stress this lack of obligation in his speeches. The theme is prevalent in all of his speeches during the first month of the actual campaign. One writer termed this approach the "blunt truth" technique.\(^4\)

Stevenson told the American Legion that he would resist pressure groups, even the Legion. In Texas and Louisiana, he told his audiences that he differed with them on the question of the tidelands oil. He delivered his speeches on civil rights in the


South. In Detroit, he told labor that his concern was not for labor as a special interest group but because it is a part of the whole people. He talked along similar lines to farmers in Minnesota. In Boston, he took the veterans to task for running slot machines in their club houses. In Los Angeles he told the people that their public servants were about as good as they deserved. In Harlem, Stevenson told the Negroes that FEPC was not a panacea for their troubles. He repeatedly told audiences everywhere that he could not promise a reduction in taxes. He insisted that he had no easy and quick solution for the Korean War.

Stevenson lacked professional help in planning his campaign. He bitterly complained later that he had received no aid. An observer corroborated, noting that it had been a one-man show. "There have been no Mark Hannas, and no Jim Farleys to accomplish and master-mind organization. Stevenson was his own strategist." During the third week in August, the Governor, Wilson Wyatt, Carl McGowan and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. held a group meeting to draw up a tentative outline of when Stevenson should give what speech where. It became the master plan for an orderly development of the campaign. Stevenson was politically unknown to the nation, whereas Eisenhower's name was a household word. Stevenson realized this handicap; therefore, he decided that his speeches should reveal

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5 Stevenson interview.

him to the public. During the month of September, his speeches unfolded in sequence his ideas on major subjects. They did not have any particular relation to what was said by the "enemy," as Stevenson referred to the Republicans. The month of October was left to reply to the attacks of the Eisenhower camp. Stevenson does not now feel that this was an ideal plan. In retrospect, he would take the issues as they arose.  

At the beginning of the campaign, Stevenson was hampered by the lack of a favorable press.

Republican nominee Dwight Eisenhower has more newspaper support than any presidential candidate in U.S. history. Last week Editor and Publisher having polled the 1,773 U.S. dailies, reported that returns from 918 (representing 62% of the 54 million daily newspaper circulation) showed papers running 5 to 1 for Ike. . . . The biggest swing to Eisenhower is in traditionally Democratic Southern papers. Partly because of this lack of support, Stevenson decided deliberately to distinguish his speeches from the "usual political dialogue."  

For years I have listened to the nauseous nonsense, the pie-in-the-sky appeals to cupidity and greed, the cynical trifling with passion and prejudice and fear; the slander, fraudulent promises, and the all-things-to-all-men demagoguery that are too much a part of our political campaigns.  

The freshness of Stevenson's approach to his speeches helped him to win over many of the reporters covering his campaign, even

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7 Stevenson interview.
8 Time, XL (September 15, 1952), p. 71.
9 Stevenson interview.
10 Major Campaign Speeches, p. xxiv.
though the papers for which they wrote supported Eisenhower. "The press men who heard him listened not as if doing a duty but as if pursuing an enthusiasm. Stevenson often secured sympathetic reporting from these writers.

B. THE RESEARCH TEAM

Stevenson does not employ "ghost-writers" in the ordinary sense of the word. In fact he assured me, quite solemnly, that he wrote all of his speeches during the campaign. However, he received considerable assistance, both in the campaign of 1952, and while he was Governor of Illinois. It is only natural for a public figure to shy away from publicity revealing that others write his speeches for him. Stevenson is unique in politics, not because he had help in writing his speeches, but rather that so much of his speeches is his own creation.

As Governor, Stevenson relied on his two administrative aides for help with his speeches. Usually, he would tell Don Hindman and Carl McGowan where he was to speak and what, in general, he wanted to talk about. After they got up a rough draft, Stevenson would re-write it extensively. He usually wrote in long hand on a lawyer's pad of ruled yellow paper. His changes would run from marking a letter uppercase to cutting and sharpening paragraphs to recasting

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11Brown, "The General, the Governor, the Grassroots," p. 12.
12Stevenson interview.
ideas completely. Sometimes the speech would be changed even after mimeographed texts were released to the press.13

During the presidential campaign, Stevenson was forced to deliver so many speeches in such a short time that he had to rely on a research team for material. The speeches delivered in September were the expression of his views on major issues. His research team advised him on points of policy, and submitted material for his consideration. By October, however, he was forced to take whole drafts submitted to him by the group. He then re-wrote the drafts, polishing phrases and adapting them to his own speech style.

Stevenson received an avalanche of advice from practical politicians about what to say and especially about themes and allusions with local appeal. He accepted the advice with moderation when it did not do violence to his convictions and over-all program. He was stiff-necked in his determination to wage a national campaign rather than a series of local campaigns.14

The headquarters for Stevenson's writers was the Springfield, Illinois, Elks Club. There seemed to be more writers than politicians in Springfield, and each incoming train "disgorged another fugitive from the Authors' League."15 Many people played a part in writing Stevenson's speeches. Among those with lesser roles were: Clayton

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13 Martin, p. 110.
14 Newsweek, XL (October 27, 1952), p. 34.
Fritchev, administrative aide to President Truman; the poet, Archibald MacLeish, who contributed suggestions and phrases; Bernard DeVoto, historian, who was consulted on speeches concerning conservation and the West; J. Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard economist and chief economist for the wartime OPA; Samuel I. Rosenman, Roosevelt's chief writer, who watched for vulnerable spots in the Republican campaign, and provided language for the attack; and the playwright, Robert Sherwood, also a writer for Roosevelt, who occasionally provided phraseology for the speeches.16

The work of these writers, however, was often no more than suggestions and ideas. For example, Archibald MacLeish contributed to the American Legion speech, but little of his original draft survived to the final manuscript. James Wechsler, editor of the New York Post, contributed quite a bit to Stevenson's address to the Liberal party in New York.17

Four men, however, were the major writers for Stevenson. This group composed the research team, and were constantly on the job throughout the campaign. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., historian, was in charge of the group. It was his responsibility to maintain historical accuracy. William W. Wirtz, a former member of the War Labor Board, guided Stevenson through the intricacies of the Taft-


Hartley Act. David G. Bell, administrative aide to President Truman, provided liaison with the White House. Robert W. Tufts, a former economist on the policy planning staff of the State Department, advised in matters concerning foreign policy. Tufts had resigned from the State Department to assist Stevenson in order to remove foreign policy from the field of political combat. Similar State Department aid was offered to Eisenhower, but it was refused.18

The research group did not see Stevenson very often, meeting with him only three or four times during the entire campaign. When he arrived in Springfield, Illinois, between swings around the country, they all would sit at a big table in his office, tossing ideas around for the next batch of scripts. Generally, Stevenson said little — too little, his staff members complained. He would frequently ask questions, however, and proved to be an adept brain picker.

After the preliminary meeting, the writers would return to the Elks Club and work twelve to fourteen hours a day. They prepared drafts of speeches which they referred to as "position papers." The atmosphere was totally unlike Judge Rosenman's description of the frenetic White House room in which Roosevelt's speech writers worked. There were no whiskey bottles, no sandwiches, not even a coke. Except for the typewriters, the Elks Club office looked much like

18 Interview with Professor Robert W. Tufts, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, June 13, 1955.
Collaboration was generally the rule. A reasonable approximation to the truth is that Stevenson's language was more his own than it was anyone else's, while the information, along with occasional phrases, came mainly from the research team. Their work served chiefly as a kind of point of departure for Stevenson, enabling him to pick up momentum faster than he might if he had nothing to rely on but his own energies. By acting as if the writers' first draft of a speech were in fact his own, he was able to come up with the finished product more quickly.20

The work of the research group consisted principally of drawing up outlines of proposed speeches, supplying material to support ideas, analyzing the opposition's speeches, and refuting their arguments. At first, Stevenson re-wrote entirely the several drafts of a speech that his research team submitted to him. He chose material he liked from each draft, added new paragraphs, shifted others around, and supplied transitional sentences. His tools were a pencil (he always writes in long hand), scissors, pastepot and the inevitable notebook of anecdotes. The last step in the rewrite consisted in editing to improve style. He polished phrases, lifting, moving, and rearranging the words "like gems being placed in a setting

with a jeweler's tongs."  

Stevenson personally wrote all of his back-platform speeches. As soon as one had been delivered, and the train started, he would hasten to his compartment and begin scribbling and revising the next one. He made a point of trying not to repeat himself. 

In the latter stages of the campaign, Stevenson found less time to devote to the rewriting of the drafts sent to him by his research team. He was thus forced to rely more and more on the original drafts as his final copy. His address on the Korean War, delivered in Louisville, Kentucky, on September 27 was typical of this change. The speech was a reply to Eisenhower's charges at Cincinnati on September 23. David Bell took the Eisenhower speech and analyzed it, writing a point by point refutation. Stevenson then modified and reworded the draft, but basically it remained Bell's handicraft. Stevenson never relied upon anyone else's manuscript without at least adapting it to his own style. He did in large measure, write his own speeches as he claimed. This is in contrast to the Republican nominee, who relied upon a staff of ghost writers for his completed speeches. Eisenhower's writers were in large measure the editors of such publications as Business Week, Readers Digest, Life, and Country Gentleman.

22Tufts' interview.
C. WRITING TECHNIQUES

Stevenson started working on a major speech late at night, usually two days ahead of delivery. His drafts of a speech would range in number from one to five. Sometimes his first draft would consist of only a paragraph or two selected from the material sent to him by the research team. At other times, he would draw up a bare outline. Occasionally, he would write out the entire speech in one draft.

Publicity releases and statements to the press in his name were written for him, and he never saw them. He is even now surprised by the statements attributed to him. An incident in the Spring of 1955 illustrates the kind of thing that happens to a political candidate. During the controversy over the Government's handling of the Salk polio vaccine, the press reported that Stevenson had charged the Administration with "playing politics" with the program. The statement is not true, according to the Governor.24

Stevenson writes slowly and painstakingly. He edits as he writes, crossing out phrases, substituting words, and constantly rereads what he has already written. He is not satisfied with his writing, and often feels discouraged with it. He takes his speeches seriously; he cannot give a speech and then forget it. He always evaluates a speech after he has delivered it. He believes that

24 Stevenson interview.
writing is hard work, not genius. He gives much credit for what writing ability he has to his previous newspaper experience. It should be noted, however, that both his father and mother wrote extremely well, and the talent seems to be inherited.

Stevenson usually over-writes. Consequently, he is often forced to hurry his delivery when he is under a time limit. He has difficulty reading a manuscript, for his eyes are poor at short distances. Therefore, his manuscripts are printed in large speech type. He prefers the manuscripts to be in single sheets, not bound together. This has led to some difficulty in out-of-door situations.

D. REHEARSAL AND DELIVERY

The rehearsal techniques that Stevenson employs are limited, to say the least. He likes to read his manuscript aloud once, underlining the key words for emphasis. Often, in speaking, he cannot see the entire sentence, and the underlined words serve him as a cue. Nine times out of ten, however, he does not get the opportunity to practice aloud. This was particularly true of his campaign speeches. The rehearsal techniques for his commencement address at Oberlin College was typical of his campaign preparation. The speech was written two days ahead of time. As he went to bed at one-thirty in the morning of the day he was to deliver the speech, he discussed it with his appointment secretary, William McCormick Blair, Jr. When Stevenson got up on stage at ten that morning to deliver the speech, it was the first time he had seen the manuscript since he
Contrary to a published report, Stevenson did not have a coach for his television appearances. He was already well-versed in the vagaries of microphones and cameras, for he had utilized them extensively as Governor of Illinois. Louis G. Cowan, a prominent New York television producer, volunteered his services in handling the arrangements for the telecasts. He told Stevenson that he should wear colored shirts, and he arranged the lights so that they would not reflect off Stevenson's head and spectacles. He did not, however, coach Stevenson on delivery.

For his telecasts, Stevenson relied on a teleprompter, a machine which magnifies the words of the manuscript so that they can be seen several feet away. The words can be unrolled at any desired speed. The supposed illusion is that of a man speaking as long as he wants, never looking at a note and always peering directly at the viewer. In Stevenson's case, the teleprompter aided him in maintaining eye contact. Sometimes the telecasts were rehearsed, on the somewhat contradictory premise that it was conducive to greater spontaneity.

25 Stevenson interview.
27 Stevenson interview.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF "IMPROVING OUR LABOR LAWS"

Stevenson delivered his views on the Taft-Hartley Act at noon on Labor Day in Detroit's Cadillac Square. An estimated 25,000 persons sweltered in the eighty-five degree temperature to see and hear the Democratic nominee. The speech was televised, which may account for the fact that the size of the audience was less than half that President Truman drew in 1948.1

The subject of the speech was appropriate for both the occasion and the audience, for the rally was jointly sponsored by the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The latter organization had already endorsed Stevenson's candidacy, while the American Federation of Labor did so three weeks later. It is interesting to note that this was the first endorsement of a presidential candidate by the American Federation of Labor since its ill-fated backing of Senator Robert M. La Follette, Senior, in 1924.

The labor vote was considered crucial in the campaign. Both parties accepted this argument, and both candidates chose Labor Day to deliver important speeches. Counting wives and husbands, organized labor offered a potential of some twenty-five million

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votes. While only 65 per cent of the voters actually go to the polls, this still made a measurable voting bloc of sixteen million.\(^2\) At this time, organized labor's vote was pro-Stevenson by a two to one margin. Gallup reported that among union members and their wives, 63 per cent planned to vote Democratic, and only 31 per cent preferred the Republican party.\(^3\) Labor leaders, however, frankly admitted that they could not get their members excited about Stevenson. He had somehow failed thus far to "catch on with the rank and file."\(^4\)

Among the newspapers of Michigan, a poll revealed that only one daily out of thirty-six supported Stevenson. All three of the Detroit dailies, the Free Press, the News and the Times, supported Eisenhower.\(^5\)

It was in the light of this situation that Stevenson had prepared his Detroit address at the Springfield, Illinois, Elks Club. The speech was an important one, for it was his opening gun in the campaign. The major task in its preparation fell on the shoulders of Stevenson's labor adviser, William W. Wirtz, a former member of the War Labor Board. Others on the writing team polished the phrases, so that the end product was almost completely staff-

\(^2\)Newsweek, XL (September 15, 1952), p. 21.
\(^3\)Ibid., (September 8, 1952), p. 24.
\(^5\)Editor and Publisher, LXXXV (November 1, 1952), p. 10.
The speech as written and delivered was closer to the administration's line than to Stevenson's early views on the subject. Before the Democratic convention met, he did not favor repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. In an interview, he stated then, "Some features of the law seem to me to advance the cause of good labor relations. . . . I think the Democratic platform should recommend modifications." 7

The speech was thus a major shift in his previous thinking.

Stevenson's subject was tailored for his labor audience, but his measured phrases appeared far less partisan than the slogans carried by the Labor Day marchers. "Stop Wall Street's Crusade. Back to Hoover and Depression," one banner said. Another read, "GM Likes Ike. He's Wall Street's Boy." Still another bore the message, "Generals Belong in the Army, Not in the White House." 8

Eisenhower addressed the Labor Day crowd in New York City, and he too found fault with the Taft-Hartley Act. He acknowledged, as Stevenson charged, that the law could be used to "break unions" - by allowing strikebreakers to vote in employe elections - and stated that the law must be changed. But Eisenhower favored amendment over repeal, and the rest of his speech was little more than heaping praise upon the Act. Both candidates made certain that they followed

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their respective party platforms.

Stevenson proposed a new labor relations act, and declared his determination to get rid of the infamous labor injunction.

One writer, in commenting on Stevenson's plan, noted the anti-injunction clause, but thought that the rest of the planks laid down by the Democratic candidate in his floor plan for a new labor act indicates that at least three-quarters of Stevenson's law will be indistinguishable from the present statute.9

Stevenson's reception in Detroit was cordial, but not vociferous. Although his listeners were not particularly demonstrative, they seemed satisfied with what he said. It appeared that his audience found it hard to get to know him.

They wanted to cheer, but the Governor, laying down his Taft-Hartley program for the record - and for the editorial writers - didn't call the proper signals. They did not sit on their hands, because they were standing up, but the result was about the same. Michigan is used to slugging, and the Governor did not slug.10

Stevenson afterward confirmed this impression, saying that he was "more than pleased" with the turnout, but that he "didn't think he did too well with his audience."11

Following the speech, labor leaders were quick to express their reaction. Daniel J. Tobin, president of the AF of L Teamster's

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Union, called it "a masterpiece of courage." James B. Carey, president of the CIO Electrical Workers, said that he was "completely in agreement with the premises and conclusions." David Dubinsky, president of the AF of L Ladies Garment Workers, thought that it was a "straightforward discussion," and that "Labor will heartily approve" Stevenson's position. 12

There were, however, some dissenting voices. J.P. Shields, Grand Chief Engineer, Locomotive Engineers, noted that "ominous silence" greeted Stevenson's statement that "We cannot tolerate shutdowns which threaten national safety and the free world." Robert N. Denton, former General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, attacked Stevenson's views.

To one who knows the Taft-Hartley Act and wants national industrial peace, Mr. Stevenson's proposals to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act and write new legislation contribute nothing except encouragement of the Sacred Cow attitude of union leaders that made the Taft-Hartley Act necessary. They are a succession of contradictory and meaningless words meant for political consumption only. 13

Some of the crustier union leaders expressed an active dislike for Stevenson's "dress-suit" rhetoric. They felt that the speech failed to galvanize union voters. 14 Walter Reuther, president of the UAW-CIO, said, "Stevenson was definitely in touch with his subject


14Newsweek, XL (September 15, 1952), p. 33.
matter, but not with the men in the square."15

The New York Times commented editorially that there was much with which it could agree and some with which it must disagree in Stevenson's labor program.

Governor Stevenson nowhere mentions the need for protecting the individual union member from the arbitrary actions of his leaders. . . . The Taft-Hartley Act may not be perfect in this respect, but it does make a start.

It probably is not necessary to remind the Governor that his third point is now a part of the present Act (outlawing unfair bargaining practices by companies or unions). . . .

Where we think the Governor is at fault is in the gap between his rejection of the labor injunction . . . and the absence of important details that must be supplied if 'new methods' are to be found for settling national emergency disputes.

All of Title I is merely an amendment to the Wagner Act. If the present Act is to be repealed, then that part of the Wagner Act would also be wiped out.16

A. THE INTRODUCTION

Stevenson began his speech by acknowledging the presence of Detroit's mayor Albert E. Cobo on the platform with him. He referred to the mayor's recent illness, and humorously noted that the mayor was a Republican. "I am conscious of your recent illness, Mr. Cobo, and I trust that your participation in this tremendous holiday festivity and your association with so many Democrats won't cause any relapse."

Continuing to speak in a light vein in order to gain the good will of his audience, he remarks, "This, my friends, is Labor Day of an election year, and I think candidates ought to get a day off too. But if they got off they might not get in." By poking fun at himself, Stevenson was trying to demonstrate that he was "human" and a "good fellow." The statement created the impression of friendliness and sociability. His purpose for the speech was painlessly introduced in this jocular way. Because candidates might not get in if they get Labor Day off, "I've welcomed the invitation to talk to you about the relationship between the Democratic Party, which I represent, and the working people, which you represent." Stevenson spoke with candor and straightforwardness, which was calculated to gain good will for him.

Stevenson proceeded to remove any unfavorable impressions of himself or his cause. He stated, "Contrary to the impressions fostered by some of the press, you are not my captives, and I am not your captive." Continuing in this vein, he remarked, "On the contrary, I might as well make it clear right now that I intend to do exactly what I think is right and best for all of us--business, labor, agriculture--alike." The statement revealed Stevenson's ethical standing, for he associated himself with what we believe is virtuous. He is saying that if elected he will work for the nation as a whole, and not for one particular interest group. He thus placed himself above partisan politics. He also gave tempered praise to his audience on this freedom of action. "And I have no
doubt that you will do exactly what you think right and best at the election." By taking this forthright stand, Stevenson revealed his personable qualities as a messenger of the truth. He indicated that he would "pull no punches."

Continuing to give tempered praise to his listeners, Stevenson stated, "You are free-born Americans—a proud and honorable station, carrying with it the right and the responsibility to make up your own minds—and so am I." On this basis, he proceeded directly to the conclusion of the thesis. "So if either of us thinks in terms of captivity, let's agree right here and now on a mutual pact of liberation." The well-phrased refutation of his opponent's charge served to gain the respect of his hearers.

He concluded the introduction on a high plane by stating what the office of the President meant to him. "The interest and the obligation of the President must be the common interest. His concern for labor, as for industry is only as a part of the common interest." With this qualification, Stevenson bestowed tempered praise upon himself. "I would intend to honor that office by complete freedom to serve not one man or a few, but the whole nation. And I think that is precisely what you would want me to do." Stevenson properly focused attention upon the excellence of his character.

B. THE DISCUSSION

Stevenson's specific purpose was to demonstrate the relationship between the Democratic party and the working people. In support
of his purpose, he presented three contentions. They were first, the relationship is a simple one; second, there are three sets of common interests in the labor field; and third, a new labor relations law should be based on five general principles.

Labor and the Democratic party go hand in hand. The first major contention, that the relationship is a very simple one, is well-supported by ethical proof. Stevenson associates both the Democratic party and his audience with a virtuous and elevated theme. "We both believe in equal rights for all and in special privileges for none." The statement had special meaning for his hearers, for labor has long accused big business of receiving special privileges from government. Labor sought equal rights for itself. Stevenson thus aligned himself and his party with that which his audience generally accepted as good and right.

He further supports the contention with the statement, "We both believe that the objective of our country and of its Government is to achieve human decency, to meet human needs, and fulfill human hopes." This argument has universal appeal. By placing himself and his party on the same plane of belief as his audience, he reinforces the strength of his character.

Stevenson bestowed praise upon his party with the statement, "We take honest open pride in what the tremendous progress of the last twenty years has meant, not only for the Democratic Party, but for the whole nation." He further eulogizes his party by saying,
"We have made America the best place to live and work in the world has ever known."

Stevenson points out, however, that these gains are not permanent. "They have to be fought for, fought for by each succeeding generation." The working people must not rest content on their present accomplishments, he is saying. He follows through with the argument by stating, "So it's my obligation, I think, to give you my ideas of our common interests, my thoughts about our common future." In speaking of the future of labor and the Democratic party, he reveals his intellectual integrity and wisdom. The past record of the Democratic party is not in itself enough to justify the working people's confidence in the party. The future goals should also be examined, Stevenson implies.

Pathetic proof for this first contention is not strong, but is implied. Stevenson appeals to the love of country (patriotism) in the statement that "America is the best place to live and work in the world." He also appeals to the desire for personal gain when he discusses "a decent wage and security." Protection of others (affections) is evident in the phrase, "the mother can know that her children's opportunities are bright and limitless." These appeals to the emotions are not developed, however. They are passed over rather quickly.

Logical proof for Stevenson's first contention consists solely of four one-sentence examples. For his assertion concerning the tremendous progress during the last twenty years, he states,
"We pulled ourselves, as you know, out of the quicksand of depression."

Another general example appears in the statement, "In fighting an awful war we did our part and we did it gloriously." Neither of these examples is amplified. However, they suffice for assuring common agreement, since it is not likely that his audience would disagree.

It is apparent that the contention is not a major one. It consists of only four paragraphs. Thus the logical and emotional proof are necessarily weak. The emphasis is on what the nation has accomplished under Democratic guidance. The major support consists of ethical proof.

What Labor wants, Democrats want. Stevenson's second contention is, "I see three sets of common interests in the labor field."

Before discussing each of these common interests, Stevenson takes a common sense approach to the problem.

We have talked, it seems to me, too much in terms of labor wars, too little in terms of labor peace, too much in terms of stopping things by law, too little in terms of establishing industrial democracy.

The statement involves two enthymemes drawn from the topos of opposites. The first enthymeme is "If we talk too much in terms of labor wars, then we ought to talk in terms of labor peace." the second enthymeme is "If we talk too much in stopping things by law, then we must talk in terms of establishing industrial democracy." The enthymemes are based on the premise that if a thing is bad, then its opposite must be good. They are drawn from generally accepted premises.
The enthymemes thus suffice as logical proof.

The first common interest that Stevenson discusses is "Securing to all who work the minimums of human decency." Ethical proof is employed when Stevenson reveals his familiarity with the interests of the day. "We must struggle tirelessly to add to these assurances, equality of work opportunity for every one of us—regardless of race, of color or of creed." Stevenson places his argument on a high and virtuous plane by saying, "Human decency is the theme of our history and the spirit of our religion." The statement reveals his good character.

The pathetic proof employed consists of an appeal to the desire for personal gain. Stevenson mentions the basic wants of all working people, adequate wages, unemployment and disability insurance, and old age security. These desires are not embellished or further supported. Stevenson is content to merely mention them. The pathetic proof is thus only implied, and is not developed into a strong appeal.

The logical proof is equally weak in this argument. Stevenson mentions the statistic of "62,000,000" working people in the United States. His examples of the "minimums of human decency" are just the listing of three basic desires of working people.

This means, among other things, that the men and women in our working force, some 62,000,000 of us, shall receive a decent living wage, insurance against the risks of disability and unemployment, and the assurance of solid, not token, security when life's work is done.

The examples are not further developed.

The second common interest is, "The men and women in our
working force are consumers as well as producers." For ethical proof, Stevenson relies on his intelligence. He uses a common sense approach to demonstrate that producers are also consumers. "Our welfare is not measured by what we get from the payroll clerk, but by what we get at the store and the school and the hospital, and by what we have left to put in the bank." After an example to demonstrate his point, Stevenson concludes this segment of his argument with a common sense statement. "It's not just a part of a labor problem because it's part of national problem." His audience would agree that this is a logical argument.

Stevenson offers a mild rebuke to his listeners for any thoughts that the labor problem is separate from the national problem. "The working man cannot and must not think of his welfare as something separate and apart from the common good." Such a rebuke might have been a necessary one. Since it was stated with tact and moderation following the argument he was pursuing, Stevenson was able to maintain the good will of his hearers.

Pathetic proof consists of the same basic appeal to the desire for personal gain that underlined Stevenson's first contention. The discussion centers on the desire for adequate wages to insure a decent living. He alludes to the desire for material things by the word "housing" and the reference to money in the bank. As was true in the first contention, however, the emotional proof is weak.

The logical proof includes examples and enthymemes. The total argument, while not detailed, is extremely well organized.
Stevenson states his thesis, supports it with an example or two, and then draws his conclusion. Such an arrangement is easy to follow, and is extremely effective. For his first thesis, "Our welfare is not measured by what we get from the payroll clerk," Stevenson lists the specific examples of inflation, housing, and the high cost of living. He draws the conclusion that it "is not part of a labor policy, it's part of a national policy."

The second thesis in the argument follows the same organizational pattern. The thesis is, "The working man cannot and must not think of his welfare as something separate and apart from the common good." It is supported by examples of the "factory worker, the white collar worker, the employer, the farmer" whose interests are all "rooted in the soil of national well-being." Stevenson then brings his point directly home to his audience with a specific example. "If your employer's business fails, for example, you are out of a job." The conclusion of the thesis is, "We are utterly dependent on one another, and what is best for the nation is best for all of us and is best for each of us." The conclusion itself involves two enthymemes. The first is drawn from the topos of cause to effect. "Since we are utterly dependent on one another, what is best for the nation is best for all of us." The second enthymeme is drawn from a maxim, "What is good for everyone is good for each one." Since the enthymemes are based on generally recognized maxims, they would be accepted as logical proof by his audience.

The last argument for the contention of three common interests
between the Democratic party and the working people is, "The process of collective bargaining is the keystone of industrial democracy, of free enterprise." This particular argument leads into Stevenson's main contention of the speech dealing with the Taft-Hartley Law.

The subject of collective bargaining lends itself to ethical proof, for Stevenson has the chance to gain the good will of his audience. He immediately does so by identifying himself with the problem of his hearers. The statement that collective bargaining is the "keystone of industrial democracy" achieves this purpose.

Stevenson asserts that "Democracy is working when free men solve their own problems their own way and in their own political and industrial communities." This statement is accepted by an audience consisting primarily of working men and women. With the same common sense approach to the problem, Stevenson avers, "The only legitimate purpose of a Federal labor relations law is to make private bargaining work better."

Stevenson further identifies himself with his audience by stating that he is opposed to the Taft-Hartley Act. The purpose of the Act is to make private bargaining work better, "And that purpose, has not, in my judgment, been served by the Taft-Hartley Act." The statement helps him gain the good will of his audience, for the Act is anathema to organized labor. Stevenson qualifies his position by the statement, "I don't say that everything in the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong." Then he offers a mild rebuke to his audience. "It isn't, and I don't think it's a slave labor law, either." The ex-
pression "slave labor law" has been used frequently by labor leaders. Although Stevenson rebukes the labor leaders, he puts the blame for the Act on the Republicans, for they sponsored and passed it. He states that the Act "was biased and politically inspired." Furthermore, it "has not improved labor relations in a single plant." By linking his opponents with a political scheme which is a failure and which harms the working man, Stevenson is building up his own character in the eyes of his audience.

The pathetic proof for this argument rests on an appeal to fear. Stevenson arouses the emotion by stating that the Taft-Hartley Act threatens collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is labor's chief instrument to secure its desires for better wages, security, and working conditions. It is the only power the working man possesses outside of its corollary, the right to strike. Any threat to collective bargaining is a threat to the working man's very existence. Thus the appeal is a strong one. Stevenson points out that the act is "built around the discredited labor injunction." The injunction is the most-hated feature of the Taft-Hartley Act. It destroys the effectiveness of a strike, or of the threat of a strike, by immobilizing labor's chief weapon. Stevenson's argument thus has a great emotional appeal to his hearers, who represent organized labor.

Specific examples are lacking in the logical proof for this argument. Stevenson is reserving that for the next contention. He does, however, use logical reasoning through the instrumentality of an inductive enthymeme. The enthymeme is constructed by a series
of statements, both examples and generally accepted assertions, which lead into a logical conclusion. The first statement is "80,000,000 private collective bargaining agreements today in effect are alternatives to laws - and better than laws." The second statement in the argument is, "They prove that the most useful thing the Government can do is to assure a fair bargaining balance by guaranteeing to employees the right to act together." The third link in the chain of reasoning is the statement that a Federal labor relations law should make private bargaining work better, and "that purpose has not... been served by the Taft-Hartley Act." The fourth statement is that "not everything in the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong." The conclusion which logically follows is, "We must have a new law and... we can best remedy the defects in the old law by scrapping it and starting all over again." The inductive enthymeme appears to cover the argument, and is readily acceptable. Stevenson removes possible objections to a new law by referring to his charge that the present Act is "biased and politically inspired." "What should be retained from the old law can best be written into the new law after the political symbolism of the Taft-Hartley Act is behind us."

A new labor relations act. Stevenson's third contention is his major one. It is, "I should like to suggest five general principles as the basis for a new labor relations law." He introduces his contention with ethical proof, placing his principles on a high plane. "I believe they represent the public interest in a fair,
solid, durable pattern of free collective bargaining." He continues this ethical argument by pointing out that the principles he advocates are equitable. "I think labor and management can agree on them too, if they'll only throw their guns on the table."

The first principle Stevenson proposes is, "The law must accept labor unions, like employer corporations, as the responsible representatives of their members' interests." Stevenson relies primarily on logical proof for his argument. The ethical proof he employs is found only where he links the Republican Congress of 1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. "The Congress arbitrarily said, 'We know better than unions what is good for employees'."

By linking the opposition with what is not virtuous in the minds of his hearers, Stevenson enhances his own character.

Pathetic proof is employed to support the argument. The statement that "The Taft-Hartley Act assumed that the unions could not be trusted to determine whether their members wanted a union shop," is an appeal to the indignation of his partisan audience. An attack on unions is an attack on the only assurance labor has of protecting its interests in wages, working conditions and security. Stevenson's statement is also an appeal to loyalty to the union.

If what one believes in is attacked, then righteously one should rise to its defense. Another appeal to power lies in the remark that "the Act still prohibits other forms of union security arrangements developed over many years." Stevenson is saying that much of what labor had already achieved to insure security is either lost
or forbidden under the law.

The logical proof in support of the first principle consists of examples and statistics. The proof for the argument that the Taft-Hartley Act did not trust unions to determine whether their members wanted a union shop, lies in what happened in government-held elections. Stevenson points out that "after the expenditure of millions of dollars to hold thousands of Government conducted elections," the answer was the same as what the unions had claimed. In all these elections, "95 per cent of ... the employees voted for the union shop." The provision of the law requiring such elections was, according to Stevenson, "a gratuitous insult to the labor unions." Congress then repealed that section of the law in 1951. The point is made that the Republican Taft-Hartley Act did not trust labor unions on this vital feature.

The argument that the Act prohibits other forms of union security arrangements is supported by reference to three specific cases. Stevenson names the maritime industry, the building trades and the printing trades. No further explanation is given. He evidently expects his labor audience to be familiar with both the practices and the industries named. The result of this particular feature of the Taft-Hartley Act is that "today several thousand employers and several million employees are operating under bootleg agreements in flagrant violation of the statute." This example, while not specific, is presumed to be familiar to his labor audience.

The second principle Stevenson proposes for a new labor relations
law is the other side of point number one. If labor unions are to be accepted as the full representatives and guardians of employee interests in the collective-bargaining process, then labor unions must conform to standards of fair conduct and equal protection in the exercise of their stewardship.

The support for this argument consists almost entirely of ethical proof. The argument itself is a logical one and requires no further proof to gain acceptance. The argument reveals Stevenson's character, for he is placing himself and his cause on a virtuous plane. However, the primary appeal is a common sense one. If labor expects fair treatment, it must itself be fair. The evidence of common sense is found in the argument that if there is anything wrong with unions, "then it's up to you and your fellow members to do something about it. You have your own democratic cleansing process."

Following this statement, Stevenson notes quite practically that "you can't do it by sitting home and complaining."

Stevenson reveals his good will by proceeding with candor and straightforwardness to a subject where necessary rebukes must be made. He does not hesitate to condemn, but does so tactfully. "A few unions, my friends, made by law the exclusive representatives of certain groups of employees, abuse that trust by excluding from membership some who want to work." Stevenson states that such a policy is not "right" and is not "democracy." He tempers his criticism by interjecting "my friends" twice, and then goes on to say that most unions do not follow such practices. "I know it's the view and the practice of the vast majority of American unions and union
members to reject any idea of second-class citizenship based on race or monopoly."

The pathetic proof is solely an appeal to sentiment. It is an appeal to honor, to do what is just, right and noble. The appeal to honor can be an effective one, for all men like to consider themselves and their actions as honorable.

The logical proof employed to support the principle consists of a few specific examples and two enthymemes. Examples of unions abusing their trust are "excluding from membership some who want to work," and "denying them a vote." Some features of unions and union activities which Stevenson lists as objectionable are dishonest officers, unwise union policies, and the association with racketeers and communists.

The first enthymeme is drawn from the topos of correlative terms. "Unions which are given powers by Government, should be open to all on equal terms." If Government which is open to all on equal terms grants some of its power to unions, then those unions should also be open to all on equal terms. What is true for the one ought to be true for the other. The argument is logically acceptable.

The second enthymeme is drawn from the topos of definition. Stevenson states, "(You) have a responsibility to participate in the affairs of your unions. The union exists for your benefit." The missing or unexpressed major premise is "that which is beneficial involves responsibility." This argument, too, is acceptable without
The third principle Stevenson suggests is, "A new Federal labor law must outlaw unfair bargaining practices by companies or unions." The ethical proof involved in support of the principle is derived from both intelligence and good will. Stevenson takes a common sense approach to any prohibition of unfair practices. A federal labor law should outlaw unfair practices by both companies and unions. After pointing out some inequities in the present law, he suggests that a new law should ban the extremes of unfair practices by unions.

These provisions must be completely rewritten, with the intention, not of stripping unions of as much bargaining power as possible, but only to prohibit resort to those extremes which fair minded judgment identifies as unreasonable.

He offers a mild but necessary rebuke to his labor audience. He lists some objectionable and unfair practices by unions which should be eliminated. These practices, which are very familiar to his audience, include "jurisdictional strikes, and strikes or boycotts attempting to force an employer to deal with one union when another has been certified as the representative of his employees." Stevenson lessens the sharpness of the rebuke by prefacing it with the statement, "I think it is only common sense to acknowledge that we must forbid such practices." With a common sense approach to the argument, he gained mutual agreement with his listeners. If he had used the approach, "I am right and you are wrong," he might easily have alienated his hearers.
The pathetic proof is again an appeal to the sentiments of the audience. The appeal underlying the entire argument is to the desire to do what is right and fair. Both ethical and logical proof support this appeal.

Examples and an enthymeme comprise Stevenson's logical proof. He enumerates two examples of unfair practices by employers which are prohibited under the Taft-Hartley Act. They are, "discriminating against union members," and "the forming of company unions." While there may be more practices prohibited by the law than these two, they suffice to show that the law does prohibit some unfair practices by employers. After listing some unfair practices by unions, Stevenson states that the prohibitions in the law "are so broad and jumbled as to outlaw proper, along with improper conduct." He supports the statement with the one striking example of the law requiring, on occasion, "union members to act as strike-breakers." The lone example is enough to prove to this audience that the law is too broad and jumbled, for permitting the use of strike-breakers means that a strike is not effective. To require union members to act as strike-breakers is, of course, an absurdity.

The enthymeme is drawn from the topos of correlative terms. The premises of the argument are stated in factual form, with the conclusion drawn from them. "The Taft-Hartley Act ... prohibits certain types of unfair labor practices by employers ... The Taft-Hartley Act added a list of union unfair practices. The unions have protested vigorously against this addition." The conclusion Stevenson
draws is, "Yet I think it is only common sense to acknowledge that we must forbid such practices." Putting the argument in a more concise form, it may be stated, "If it is right for the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit unfair labor practices by employers, then it is right for the Act to prohibit unfair union practices." The argument may not be popular with his audience, but it is logically sound.

The labor injunction. The fourth principle Stevenson suggests for a new labor law is "rejection of the labor injunction." The support for the argument is short—comprising only five sentences. The approach to the principle is an historical one, requiring factual proof. Thus the ethical and pathetic proofs are limited. Stevenson employs ethical proof to reveal his good will. He identifies himself with his hearers and their problems by first discussing the rejection of the hated labor injunction, and then saying, "We agreed to this once." Stevenson puts himself unequivocally on the side of his audience. He also uses ethical proof to reinforce his own character and to link his opposition with an unvirtuous cause. He does not call the Republicans by name, but his audience knows where to put the blame. When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in the Republican Congress, "no showing of need was made" for the labor injunction. That "process of haphazard prejudgment—was disinterred" by the Republicans.

Pathetic proof consists chiefly of an appeal to the fear of the labor injunction. Stevenson states that the injunction is a
"tyrannical power to have men and women ordered back to work in smothered silence," and it "has no place in today's labor law." He also appeals to labor's desire for power. In this case, it is a desire for power in order to secure what labor deems its fair share of economic wealth. The labor injunction prevents labor from exercising that power. Consequently, the injunction is a crippling instrument which must be destroyed if labor is to achieve its desires.

The logical proof consists of examples and statistics. Stevenson recalls for his hearers the original Act which outlawed the injunction. "In 1932, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Norris-La Guardia Act to prohibit the labor injunction." He buttresses his "overwhelming" assertion by recounting the actual vote in Congress. "The vote was 326 to 14 in the House and 75 to 5 in the Senate." The purpose of this argument is to show that the Congress, representing the people, was almost unanimous in rejecting the idea of a labor injunction. He points out that in spite of this action, the injunction was revived fifteen years later under the Republicans. With an audience strongly opposed to it, Stevenson found it unnecessary to develop his principle of prohibiting the injunction. The mere recital of facts served to accomplish the purpose.

The fifth and last principle Stevenson proposes for a new labor relations law is, "New methods must be found for settling national emergency disputes." The arguments for this principle are organized in the following way: one, we must have collective bargaining; two, we cannot tolerate shutdowns which threaten our national safety;
three, the Taft-Hartley Act has failed to solve the problem; four, a new law must see that the dispute gets settled.

Stevenson employs strong ethical proof in support of this principle. He takes an intelligent approach to the problem by stating that common sense should tell us "the right to bargain collectively does not include a right to stop the national economy." Even a partisan labor audience would generally agree that the argument is a sound one.

Stevenson further takes an intelligent stand in his handling of the problem of strikes that threaten the national economy. "Where the Government must intervene in these private disputes, its purpose must be not just to stop the strike, but to see that the dispute gets settled." The argument is not supported by any other proof; yet it is capable of ready acceptance. It is logical to assume that the forced cessation of a strike will only provide temporary relief unless the basic cause of the strike is eliminated. Elimination of the effect does not eliminate the cause.

For his thesis that "the new law must recognize these emergency cases are always different," Stevenson also relies on ethical proof. The audience will accept the generalized statement that the cases differ, for it falls within their belief and experience. His supporting statement comes within this category too, but is open to more debate. "It's a proven mistake for Congress to prescribe in advance the same old patent medicine for all of them." Stevenson does not attempt to present his "proof." He relies on the weight of his character
plus the belief of his audience. Since the audience will accept the first statement, it is probable that they will also accept the second. However, it is not strictly logical that the second statement necessarily follows from the first one. In this particular instance, most of his listeners would not disagree with his conclusion.

Stevenson again relies on common sense for proof in his statement that the purpose of a new law "should be to keep these cases out of the White House, not to put them in." Such an obviously acceptable statement does not need further proof. Yet its utterance reflects the intelligence of the speaker. Stevenson points out that the new law he proposes "would leave the obligation to settle these disputes where it belongs—and that's with the parties." It logically follows that if strike cases are to be kept out of the White House, then they must be settled by the participants.

Stevenson's ethical proof reveals his character when he discusses strikes which affect the nation. The problem is a serious one, but he admits, "I have no miracle-drug solution for this problem." With this frank admission, he creates the impression of being completely sincere in his undertaking. It should be obvious that such a serious problem cannot be solved by a "one-shot" remedy. Although we all would like to find easy solutions to our problems, we know that such solutions rarely work. In this case, the audience would likely give credit to the speaker who admits that an easy solution is not at hand. The statement should enhance Stevenson's prestige, and make Him more believable as a messenger of the truth.
Stevenson relies on ethical proof when he gives tempered praise to his proposed principle in a new labor relations law. "It would express the firm voice of a nation which demands a fair and a quick settlement, and offers constructive help toward a solution." By pointing out that the principle would be effective in bringing about a quick and fair solution, Stevenson is indirectly praising himself. The principle is his own creation.

The pathetic proof for this fifth principle involves a strong appeal to patriotism in the opening argument. Stevenson avers that while we are in favor of collective bargaining, "We cannot, however, tolerate shutdowns which threaten our national safety, even that of the whole free world." The appeal contained in the argument puts it on a high plane. It involves national safety, and indeed, the safety of the free world. Thus, self-interest should be outweighed by the recognition that our very existence depends upon the maintenance of our nation and our allies in the ideological battle with the communist world. Stevenson infers that our own preservation is dependent upon the preservation of our country and its ideals. We as individuals are willing, and in fact we must be willing, to put our country first over immediate selfish interests.

The rest of Stevenson's pathetic argument is indirectly an appeal to do what is right and just. The solution he proposes is one which will enable labor to secure its just demands while at the same time ensuring the continued safety of our country. Such an appeal to do what is right and just is one that is readily acceptable.
Stevenson employs a great amount of logical proof for his last principle. He uses enthymemes, testimony, examples and statistics. The first proof in support of the principle is an enthymeme drawn from the topos of correlative terms.

We are willing, as a nation, to put up with serious inconveniences when bargaining stalemates result in shutting down production. Collective bargaining is a form of free competition.

The enthymeme can be reconstructed into a syllogism. The missing major premise is, "We as a nation believe in free competition, even when it results in serious inconveniences." The minor premise is, "Collective bargaining is a form of free competition." Stevenson states the conclusion first. We are willing, as a nation, to put up with serious inconveniences when bargaining stalemates result in shutting down production." To buttress the argument contained in the enthymeme, Stevenson quotes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. "Free competition is worth more to society than it costs." The quotation is in itself a maxim, which is a kind of enthymeme.

Employing statistics to show that the injunction has not worked satisfactorily in national emergency disputes, Stevenson states that "This remedy has been administered now nine times." Examination of the individual cases revealed that "in only two of these cases did it do the slightest good." It should be noted here that Stevenson gives as his authority for this statement that "Fair-minded critics have concluded. . . ." He does not mention who these critics were, nor does he attempt to show that they actually were
fair-minded. We must rely on Stevenson's integrity for the truth of his figures. In the other seven cases where the injunction was used, "it either had no effect at all or actually delayed private settlement." The statistics serve to reinforce his argument against the injunction. They are perfectly acceptable to his labor audience. However, with a less partisan audience, the proof should be strengthened by the addition of the source for the statistics.

Stevenson presents an example of how the Taft-Hartley injunction works during a strike affecting the safety of the nation. "All the law boils down to is that in national emergency disputes employees shall be ordered to work for another eighty days on the employer's terms." The objection inferred is that the injunction does not settle the cause of the dispute. It also leaves open to conjecture what happens after the eighty days are up. Stevenson gives examples of what a new law should do. It should be "one that will provide for investigation and reporting to the public on the issues involved." A new law should also "provide for more effective mediation between the parties." These examples are acceptable as suggestions. However, they are not specific enough to be more than just suggestion.

Stevenson is more explicit in discussing procedures for the President to use in disputes affecting national safety. "The Congress should give the President a choice of procedures, not present him with no alternative when voluntary agreement proves impossible."

He then lists four specific examples of procedures which the President might use. They are: "Seizure provisions geared to the circumstances;
or arbitration; or a detailed hearing and recommendation of settlement terms; or a return of the dispute to the parties." The four examples are logical, and seem to fit most circumstances in which disputes affecting the national economy arise.

C. THE CONCLUSION

Stevenson does not sum up his main contentions, nor reiterate his principles for a new labor relations law. He does, however, state that he has presented the outlines of a new law. He gives tempered praise to his proposal when he states that the outlines he has presented are "consistent, it seems to me, with our democratic practices." He points out that the principles only outline a minimum law, but "a minimum law is what we need." The proof for the statement depends upon logical reasoning supported by his character.

Stevenson also demonstrates his good will. He gives praise to his audience by stating that labor could agree with management on his proposed labor relations law.

And, I would hope, indeed, I expect that in the larger area of common agreement that exists today the representatives of labor and management, meeting in a spirit of give and take and of sincere search for industrial peace in the national interest, could agree on such a law.

The entire subject is placed on a high and elevated plane when Stevenson states, "Let none of us forget that labor problems are human problems." He thus takes the subject out of the realm of partisan advantage. "The ultimate answers do not lie in the legislator's inkpot or in the lawyer's brief."
The pathetic appeal in the conclusion relates to the sentiments of the audience. Stevenson appeals to their pride in being free men and women, to their pride in their labor unions, and to their pride in the success they have achieved.

The common denominator of all I have said today is confidence — confidence not in law or government, but in one another, in free men and free women; confidence in the private organizations they have set up, the private processes they have worked out to meet their common problems.

The proposed law relates to the desire for power by the labor members of the audience to protect their rights. The concluding statement of the speech is an appeal to inspire the audience to continue working for their goals.

The logical proof in the conclusion consists of an enthymeme in the final sentences. The enthymeme is drawn from the topos of induction. The first sentence relates to the past, the second sentence to the present, and the third sentence to the future. The past, present and future sequence serves well to end the speech on a plane of hope and confidence.

It's hard to remember that here in Detroit fifteen years ago a mighty industry was paralyzed, and fighting in the streets between bitter men was an imminent possibility. Today the automobile companies and the workers have a five-year contract, giving the nation an assurance of labor peace infinitely firmer than any Congress could ever supply.

My friends, when we have come so far we know that we can go farther.

D. APPRAISAL

Stevenson was adept in employing all three constituents of
ethical proof in his introduction. He quickly gained the good will of his audience by the inclusion of humor. He revealed his familiarity with local events, as well as with the importance of his subject. He established the worthiness of his character by minimizing unfavorable impressions of himself and his cause, and by associating his message with the virtuous and elevated. The introduction of the speech is rhetorically sound.

The three contentions in the body of the speech were developed in order from weak to strong. The main contention, which was his strongest one, came last. The first contention was supported primarily by ethical proof. Pathetic and logical proofs were weak. However, the contention was one that was generally accepted, and did not need much support. The second contention was better supported than the first one. The chief support was ethical proof, but logical proof was more in evidence. His reasoning included five excellent enthymemes and several examples. Pathetic proof remained weak. The last contention, containing Stevenson's five principles for a new labor relations law, was well supported by all three forms of proof.

Ethical proof was evident in abundance. Pathetic appeals were stronger and more in evidence than in the first two contentions. However, the pathetic proof cannot be judged more than moderate in its development. Logical proof appeared to a greater extent, probably because the contention was more extensive in scope and development than the other two contentions.

Stevenson did not present a summary of his contentions in
the conclusion. Instead, he concludes with a strong ethical appeal for common agreement. A definite appeal for action in support of his candidacy is also missing.

While Stevenson did not propose a final answer to the problem of strikes which threaten national safety, such as forbidding them, he did make some forward looking proposals that at least attempted to grapple with the problem.

He analyzed the merits and demerits of the law from the viewpoint of its purpose, concluded judiciously that it would be better to start over than try to revise it, and proposed provisions that he thought a new law should contain.

One might agree or disagree at points, but the approach was impeccable; he would have made the same argument, one could be sure, before industrialists.17

In spite of all the controversy over the Taft-Hartley Act, it would appear that what organized labor objects to most is its political symbolism. Stevenson changed his mind, going from amendment to repeal, not because there was so much difference between the two, but because that seemed the best way to solve the problem. At this time, it still appears to be the best answer.

As the phrasemaker of this campaign, Governor Stevenson brought the controversy on the Taft-Hartley Act into focus by saying that it revolves around the 'political symbolism' of the measure.

Thus in his Labor Day address the Democratic nominee came out for 'repeal' of the Taft-Hartley Act instead of its 'amendment,' which he had advocated earlier, simply because

the first term was more acceptable to organized labor. And whether one deplores the verbal legerdemain in which he was indulging or admires the frankness with which he admitted what he was doing may well be a matter of political opinion.18

Wayne County, which comprises Detroit and its environs, voted for Stevenson 622,236 to 456,371.19 Both candidates received 167,000 more votes than did Truman and Dewey in 1948. Thus Stevenson was able to hold the Democratic majority in Wayne County, but did not increase the percentage of Democratic votes over the Republican votes.

In the nation at large, 77 per cent of union members voted, with 43 per cent supporting Stevenson and 33 per cent voting for Eisenhower. Stevenson’s union support was less than that garnered by Truman in 1948, for the latter drew 55 per cent of the union vote to Dewey’s 13 per cent. Non-union members of the labor force cast the same percentage of their vote for Stevenson as they did for Truman — 26 per cent, but a greater number of the non-union members voted. The Republican percentage increased from 32 per cent for Dewey to 46 per cent for Eisenhower.20 It appears from these studies that Stevenson was barely able to hold the Democratic labor vote

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of 1948, whereas Eisenhower reaped the harvest of the increase in numbers of labor votes over 1948. We may conclude that the working man and woman did not put their concern over the Taft-Hartley Act above other issues. Eisenhower won the election because virtually every major demographic group in American society gave him more votes than it had given the preceding Republican nominee.21

The Eisenhower administration proposed that Congress amend the Taft-Hartley Act. However, Congress has failed to act upon that proposal. There is little doubt but that the Taft-Hartley Act will again be an issue in the 1956 campaign. At this writing, no one has come up with any better ideas than Stevenson proposed. Stevenson's Labor Day address in Detroit in 1952 is as pertinent today as it was then.

21 Ibid., p. 75.
CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF "FARM POLICY"

Following the Labor Day speech in Detroit, Stevenson embarked on his first campaign trip. On this swing through the western states, he delivered a major address at Kasson, Minnesota on Saturday, September 6, 1952. The occasion was the National Plowing Contest held on the Henry Snow farm in Dodge County. Some one hundred thousand dirt farmers, their women and their children, were in attendance.

The farm vote was in doubt, with unrest exhibited over price supports and declining income. Although the daily newspapers in Minnesota were supporting Eisenhower twenty-one to one, politicians rated the state as a toss-up. The candidate who could win the farm vote would assure himself of a solid bloc of electoral votes.

Both candidates addressed the huge gathering of farmers that day. Eisenhower spoke at noon, while Stevenson spoke at four in the afternoon. The time of Adlai's speech was deliberately set to follow that of Eisenhower's. Stevenson arrived at Kasson by plane and motored to the Snow farm. Ninety seconds after the last of Eisenhower's caravan of cars left the scene, the first of Stevenson's

1Editor and Publisher, LXXV (November 1, 1952), p. 10.
2Stevenson interview.
entered. The Democratic nominee spoke from the same raised platform at one end of an eighteen acre field that his opponent had used. Before he spoke, Stevenson received reports on Eisenhower's speech. The Governor later said, "I was taken by surprise to learn when I arrived that Eisenhower had not only taken over the Democratic platform, but had come out for 100 per cent parity." He interjected a comment in his speech that day concerning the General's stand.

Which candidate was best received by the farmers was not suggested by their reactions. The audiences were attentive, but without any great show of enthusiasm. Stevenson drew a somewhat larger audience and slightly more applause. But the time allotted him - at the close of the day when other events were over, and one highway closed in the morning had been re-opened - was better for speechmaking. Also, the most demonstrative knots in the crowd appeared to be groups of pre-convinced Democrats.

The farmers were pleased with both speeches, and didn't see much to choose between them. The attitude of Charles B. Schuman, president of the Illinois Agricultural Association, was fairly typical of the farmers and their leaders.

There is little, if any, difference between the two candidates or the two parties on the issue of price supports. Both candidates are trying to promise the farmer the world with a little white fence around it. In making their choice for the

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3 Ibid.

Presidency, the farmers must look for other issues to decide.\(^5\)

The two candidates seemed to have engaged in an even match. Neither set what politicians look upon as a "prairie fire" among the crowds. Neither man sparked a roaring outburst of enthusiasm for his farm views, which in the opinion of many Minnesota observers, "ran down the same furrow."\(^6\)

The farm policies of Eisenhower and Stevenson were strikingly alike in most respects. In fact, if allusions to the election and to politics had been deleted, the two men could have traded speeches without noticeable effect. Both candidates pledged ninety per cent of parity if elected, although Eisenhower went on later to say that he regarded the real fair share of the farmer "as not merely ninety per cent of parity - but full parity."\(^7\) Both men included perishable products in the crop support program, as well as all sorts of trimmings, such as strengthened co-operatives, continuation of the conservation program, rural electrification, rural telephones, and more and better farm-to-market roads. Governor Stevenson went his rival one better and included housing.

Stevenson spoke more soberly and with fewer flights of eloquence than usual, and he made almost the same promises as Eisenhower. So that there were moments when one asked,

\(^5\) Ibid., (September 22, 1952), p. 28.


\(^7\) The Toledo Blade, September 7, p. 1.
'Wasn't this where I came in?'

Eisenhower's endorsement of high farm parities and his other points in a farm program added up to "me-too-ism." But in 1948 Thomas E. Dewey lost the farm vote because he did not offer enough assurance to the farmers. Evidently, Eisenhower was seeking to avoid Dewey's tactical error.

It appeared at times that the Kasson crowd was not waiting for a farm speech, nor a discussion of price supports, but for the speakers to let go and rip into their opposition. Both candidates received their best applause when they made jibes at the other party. One magazine reported that some of the farmers found both speeches "just plain dull." A favorable comment about Stevenson's speaking ability came from a farmer who was opposed to him. "That man Stevenson was the best speaker. I'm an Eisenhower man myself, but Stevenson seemed to say what he had to say better."

The problem facing Stevenson at Kasson that day was that as a political unknown, he had to convince the farmers that he was qualified to act in their best interests. First, he had to let them know that he was conversant with and sympathetic to their problems. Second, he had to reveal what he had in the past accomplished

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for the farmer. And finally, he had to sell the Democratic party and its platform as best suited for the farmer. Stevenson covered all three points in his speech.

A. THE INTRODUCTION

In his opening remarks, Stevenson quickly identified himself with his farm audience. He described himself as one who understands the farmer's problems. He stated that he owned farm land in Illinois, and that his family "lived in the heart of the Corn Belt for over a hundred years." Anticipating a negative reaction to the usual political candidate's claim of a farm background, Stevenson qualified his remarks. "But I am here today as a candidate for public office—not masquerading as a dirt farmer, but as a politician." The frankness of the statement won for him the good will of his listeners.

Stevenson was more qualified to speak on the farmers' problems than most political candidates, and particularly his military opponent. He therefore set out to describe his qualifications. He pointed out that he had served with the old Agricultural Adjustment Administration, where he learned first-hand of the farmer's problems. He saw then "how bad conditions can get on our farms." He also noted that he was Governor of a great agricultural state for three and one-half years. During that time he worked closely with farmers and farm organizations. Stevenson stated specifically what he had accomplished for the farmer. As Governor of Illinois, he had reorganized the State Department of Agriculture, improved the State Fair, and "cut
down the cost to the tax-payer by two-thirds." He added that he had relied on the farmers' advice in the fields of school and highway legislation. Under his administration, "for the first time a share of our gasoline tax is going to the townships for the rural roads."

Through this recital of the facts, Stevenson builds up his character in the eyes of his listeners by telling them what he had accomplished for them.

Having revealed his competence and authority, Stevenson lets his audience know where he stands on farm problems. He defends the Democratic farm platform by saying that it is a good one. "Its agricultural plank is clear, definite and sound." He offers further praise, stating, "I can stand on it without squirming." He notes that he does not need to modify, explain, interpret, dodge or hedge. Aligning the Democratic farm platform with the national welfare, he remarks, "It's pledges are not just in the interest of the farmer—they are in the public interest." He offers a mild rebuke to his audience, stating, "I know that the American farmers do not want, nor will they get through any effort of mine, anything more than what is justified by the larger good of the commonwealth." With this statement, Stevenson assures the farmer equal rights, but no special privileges. He thus creates the impression that he is a man of principle who will put the welfare of the nation above that of pressure groups. He further enhanced this ethical appeal by quoting Thomas Jefferson to reinforce his position. "Equal rights for all; special privileges for none." Testimony, a form of logical proof
serves in this instance to support his ethical position.

Stevenson concludes his introduction on a high plane of praise for farmers, and the Democratic party and its farm platform. His first two sentences comprise an enthymeme drawn from the topos of correlative terms. By stating a general principle and then drawing a conclusion acceptable to his audience, Stevenson is able to make his point without an extended argument. The enthymeme thus saves many steps which would be necessary in a formal, deductive argument. The two sentences which comprise the enthymeme are: "A society can be no better than the men and women who compose it;" and "The heart of any farm policy must therefore by the life of those who work the farms."

Following this acceptable premise, Stevenson gives praise to his party, stating that the Democrats have always believed our society rests on an agricultural base. He avers that his party is determined to keep that base solid and healthy. Stevenson closed his introductory remarks by quoting another well-known American. "Our farms must grow what Walt Whitman described as the best bar against tyranny—'a large, resolute breed of men.'"

The entire introduction is excellently conceived and executed. It established Stevenson's authority and competence to speak on farm problems, and certainly gained for him the good will of his listeners.

B. THE DISCUSSION

There are two major contentions in Stevenson's speech. The
first one deals with the problem of maintaining farm income. It is a comparison of the Democratic stand on price supports with the stand of the Republicans. The second contention is concerned with the problem of improving farming and farm life. There are five subtopics under it relating to soil conservation, rural electrification, the rural telephone program, farm cooperatives and farm ownership. While the first one receives slightly more attention, both contentions are designed to reveal Stevenson's viewpoint on these vital issues to the farmer.

The Democratic party supports ninety per cent parity. The initial contention is, "Farm policy must focus first on the question of farm income." Stevenson relies upon strong ethical proof for his major support, although logical proof is present in adequate quantity. There are thinly disguised emotional appeals threaded throughout the argument.

Stevenson placed the problem of maintaining farm income on a high ethical plane. Farmers "are entitled to a fair return for their labor and a fair chance in the world for their children." The statement also carries with it an emotional appeal, for the farmer, agreeing with the truth of the argument, knows that it is his own welfare that is at stake. Stevenson notes that in the past the labor of the farmer has remained the same, but his income has risen or sunk according to the unpredictable fluctuations of the market. He then praises his party for its efforts in behalf of the
farmer. "It has been a constant objective of our Democratic farm program to maintain farm income." He adds an emotional appeal based on the desire to protect others. The Democratic objective is "to assure the farmer that he can provide food, medical care and education for his family." The proof Stevenson offers for his assertion is the Democratic platform, and he quotes one sentence from it. "We will continue to protect the producers of basic agricultural commodities under the terms of a mandatory price-support program at not less than ninety per cent of parity."

After placing his own party on the side of the farmer, Stevenson turns his attention to the program offered by the Republicans. He attempts to undermine the ethical appeal of his opposition through logic and ridicule. He infers that the Republicans are insincere and not to be trusted, for there are "two Republican Parties for Agriculture as well as two Republican Parties for foreign policy and almost everything else." He notes the inconsistency between Eisenhower's remark that day in advocating one hundred per cent parity, and the Republican farm plank. "The General evidently decided this morning to plow under the Republican platform altogether." The statement was a damaging blow to Eisenhower. Stevenson had the opportunity to expose a major chink in his opponent's ethical armor, but he failed to follow through. Evidently he was content with moderation in his personal attack, fearing to antagonize the American people and their great respect for the General.

Stevenson did not, however, hold his fire on the General's
party. He points out that the Republican platform only "aims" at the parity. He argues that there is a vast difference between aiming at a target and hitting it. With a little jibe at Eisenhower, he states that his opponent, a military man, ought to be well aware of that fact. Following through on the analogy, Stevenson asks, "How good is their aim anyway?" He then presents an example of it. In June, 1952, "more than half the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against the law that extended price support at 90 per cent of parity through 1954."

The attack concerning the Republican stand on price supports is culminated in an effective appeal to distrust. Stevenson's argument takes the form of an inductive enthymeme which bears a strong emotional connotation.

If the Republican candidate says one thing, and the Republican platform says something else, and the Republican members of Congress say still another—how then can anyone tell what a Republican administration would actually do in Washington?

The argument of inconsistency should be readily accepted by his listeners. It is logical and effective reasoning.

There should be no mystery about price supports, Stevenson states. He explains that the program "places a floor under our agricultural economy" in order to protect the farmer against sudden and violent price drops. Price supports maintain the farmer's purchasing power "in those uneasy moments when there is a temporary glut in the market, or when real depression threatens." Stevenson demonstrates the benefits of such a program through the instrumentality of another
inductive enthymeme. He reasons quite logically that a healthy agricultural state aids the entire nation. The argument follows a line of reasoning acceptable to his audience.

By stabilizing farm income, our program maintains markets for the businessman and the worker. The total effect, obviously, is to help stabilize the whole national economy at a high level of production and employment.

In defense of price supports, Stevenson replies to the critics of the Democratic program. He notes that it has been charged that price supports raise the cost of food to the housewives. While he admits that prices are high, he denies that supports are the cause. High employment and strong purchasing power, he asserts, are the real reasons why most farm prices are above support levels. The support program actually encourages farmers to grow more food, he contends, since the farmer knows that prices will remain good at market time. To further his argument, he points out that farm production "has increased almost 50 per cent in the last twenty years." He concludes his refutation of the charge by stating that the support program helps to balance supply with demand, "and that is the way to keep prices from going up."

Stevenson adds an appeal to the emotions of his audience in the statement that the price-support program "assures a decent life and a fair opportunity for most of our farm families." He strengthens the appeal by showing how the farm program aids everyone, not just the farmer. He asserts that boys and girls in the cities have an improved life because of the support program, but he fails to sub-
stantiate his argument immediately. He inserts the statement that "We are feeding thirty million more people than there were in our land in 1932." Returning to his argument that the farm program aids everyone, he points out that the average American now has a far better diet which costs him "no greater share of his income after taxes than it did in 1932."

Taking the other side of the question, Stevenson notes that while the nation is dependent upon a prosperous agriculture, farmers are also dependent upon a prosperous nation. For that reason, the support program should be constantly reappraised to determine if it is fair to the taxpayer and responsive to the need. The support for this fairly obvious argument is a simple enthymeme drawn from the topos of cause to effect. "We are all dependent on one another and the only certainty of a stable, prosperous agriculture is a stable, prosperous nation."

Stevenson's proof in support of price supports ranges from generalized arguments to specific instances. In the latter category, he lists individual items - corn, cotton, wheat and rice - where the program is working well. He is also specific in listing the items wherein the program is failing - hogs, dairy products, fruits and vegetables. His examples are familiar to his audience, and vital to them. He notes that the perishable products provide about three-fourths of all the income received by farmers. The question uppermost in the minds of his listeners is, "What can be done for the producers of perishable products?" Stevenson has no ready-made solution.
He suggests a strong economic policy that will insure high employment and purchasing power, but admits that it will not alone solve the problem. Along with a strong economic policy, he states, "there should be protection against unreasonably low prices for producers of perishables who need it." Again, Stevenson has no solution. He points out the difficulty in finding a satisfactory method, but offers the hope that "with continued careful study and close consultation with farmers and their leaders ways will be found."

The farm problem has changed considerably since the nineteen thirties, Stevenson asserts. He supports the argument by stating, "Once abundance created surpluses because people could not buy what the farmer could produce." Today, however, we seek even greater abundance with the prospect of a "thirty or forty million increase in our population in the next twenty-five years." Despite the change in the farm problem, Stevenson reasons, there is a constant necessity to adjust output to need in the short run. He notes that "excellent voluntary methods" meet this need. In defense of acreage allotments and marketing quotas, he states, "Farmers have learned from bitter experience that we need these controls in reserve." He points out that he learned that lesson "in the hard school of the triple-A." Stevenson tempers his stand with the statement that he would never favor controls for the sake of control. "But," he states, "I think we have to face a practical problem when we see one." The argument is designed to refute the Republican attack on price supports. Stevenson cleverly aligns himself against the principle of restrictions
on the farmer's ability to produce, yet is in favor of quotas as a practical necessity.

Farmers and the Democratic party go hand in hand. The second major contention in the speech is a "catch-all" that includes all the other issues which directly concern the farmer. He states that while price policy is the heart of the farm program, it is not all of it. "Farming is a way of using our great inheritance of water and land; and it is a way of life." The topics which he discusses under this contention include soil and water conservation, rural electrification, the telephone program, farm cooperatives and farm ownership. He reveals a broad familiarity with the interests of the farmer in discussing each topic. However, he does not develop all of them in detail. He appears content to merely state his position on the topics in many instances.

Stevenson enhances his character in the eyes of his listeners by stressing the importance of farming in the nation's economy. He associates his party with improvement of farm life, noting that in the last twenty years Democratic policies have given farm life "new strength and new dignity." The Democratic party, he asserts, has restored farming "to its old place of honor in the Republic."

The first topic Stevenson discusses under his second contention is soil and water conservation. "We of this generation," he states, "are the trustees of our soil and water resources for our children and their children." He does not, however, develop this argument
further. Logical proof is absent. He merely notes that we have today an elaborate soil-conservation program, but "we still have far to go in upstream flood prevention and water and forest conservation."

Stevenson reveals his views on the subject; he does not make an issue of it. He moderately praises his audience on the subject of conservation. "With the kind of local leadership you have in the Conservation Service and Districts we see here today, we will get the job done everywhere in time, and I would say very soon in Minnesota." Continuing in the vein of local leadership in conservation, Stevenson associates himself with the beliefs of his farm audience. He is opposed to "Big Government" and favors more "farmer participation," he states. "Let us strive for big men, not big government."

We must continue to decentralize the management of agricultural and conservation programs, he avers. "We can go further toward making local administration compact and efficient, and getting dollar-for-dollar value for the money we spend."

The second topic, the rural electrification program, receives high praise from Stevenson. It is "one of our finest national achievements in this generation." It is more than a government program, "it is a blessing." Reviewing the electrification program under Democratic administrations, Stevenson presents specific evidence. In Minnesota, "the number of electrified farms has risen from 7 per cent in 1935 to 80 per cent today." He also presents some excellent examples of what electricity means to farmers. There is a strong emotional appeal in his recital of facts which are vivid, vital and
familiar to his farm audience.

It means electric lights for farm families who have had to live by coal-oil lamps. It means electric power for the farm wife in place of the backbreaking labor of the old-fashioned washtub and the hand pump. It means electric power to grind the farmer's feed, heat his brooder house, and help him with a hundred other chores.

The program of rural electrification must be completed Stevenson asserts. Concluding his discussion of the subject, he adds a "pocket-book" appeal, stating that the cost of electricity must be at prices the farmer can afford to pay.

The third topic under the contention of improving farm life is Stevenson's weakest. He dismisses the subject of rural telephone service with a single sentence. "We must also look forward to the time when every farm home may be in touch with its neighbors, the doctor and the world through rural telephone service." All Stevenson does is put himself in favor of such a program. He does not develop the topic further.

The fourth topic concerns farm cooperatives. It too, is a subject that is not developed, but is stronger than the preceding topic. The farm-owned cooperative, Stevenson states, has been "the chief agency in this miraculous transformation in country living." He strengthens his ethical appeal by revealing that he has been a member of a cooperative for years. He praises the program, saying, "The co-operative seems to me a wonderful example of people solving their own local problems in their own way." Since the farm cooperative program is strong in Minnesota, Stevenson's audience should accept
his praise. He makes a quick emotional appeal for the preservation of the farm cooperative. "Its effectiveness must not be crippled by hostile legislation." He does not indicate what that legislation might be, however.

The final subject Stevenson discusses is farm ownership. He sides with his audience by stating that "Farm ownership and the family farm are the foundation on which our whole agricultural system is built." He points out that from 1880 to 1932, "When Republicans were mostly in power," farm ownership declined. In 1932, "43 percent of all farmers—two out of every five—were either tenants or sharecroppers." Stevenson touched upon a subject that is a sore point with the small farmer, and a problem that has received national attention. He gives praise to his own party for reversing the trend to tenant farming. Thanks to the Democratic party, he states, three-fourths of the farmers now own their farms. "We have recovered, in twenty years, the ground lost in the previous fifty."

Stevenson points out that both he and his running-mate are cognizant of the farm ownership situation. "I've sold some farms and I've seen to it that they were sold to operators, not landlords, where possible." Senator Sparkman, Stevenson notes, was one of eleven children of an impoverished tenant farmer, and thus is well-qualified on the subject. By means of this ethical argument, Stevenson implies that he and Sparkman are sympathetic to and understand the farmer's problem.

The farmer's problem is not solved through farm ownership alone,
Stevenson states. With their existing land and equipment, many farmers cannot make a decent living. He points out that in 1950 more than one million farmers had net incomes of less than one thousand dollars. He adds a strong appeal to the emotions with the question, "How can a farmer rear, clothe and educate a family on that?" The solution Stevenson proffers includes research, housing and credit. "No one should promise miracles here; but there must be ways to help the industrious small farmer who wants to help himself." He fails, however, to elaborate on his proposals.

C. THE CONCLUSION

Stevenson concludes his address by placing his theme on a high plane. In the "stern present and challenging future," the American farmer has a great role to play. An expanding economy "rests upon the continued growth of our agriculture." He stresses the importance of the farmer in the struggle to strengthen the free world against communism. With this high praise of farming, Stevenson adds two maxims which lend beauty to his speech. The two maxims combined form an excellent example of enthymematic reasoning. "A hungry man is not a free man. In the long run, peace will be won in the turnrows, not on the battlefields."

Returning to the political atmosphere, Stevenson asserts that the Democratic administrations of the last twenty years "have established a framework of justice and equity" for the farmer. He concludes by standing firmly behind his party in its relationship
to the farmer.

If I didn't feel that the party which saw our needs and charted our course in the past is the best custodian of our future I would not be the Democratic candidate for President, and I would not be here on this great day in Kasson asking not for your thanks, but for your confidence.

Stevenson has established his own ethical qualifications. He is now placing his party on the same high level of confidence.

D. APPRAISAL

The speech was designed to reveal Stevenson's views on farm policy, and it accomplished his purpose as far as general information was concerned. He skillfully revealed his knowledge of farm problems and the work he has done in the past for the farmer. He was adept at gaining and holding the good will of his audience. His ethical proof was extremely strong throughout the entire speech.

Emotional proof is evident in the speech, but it is not developed enough to achieve overt action. Stevenson appeals primarily to fear and distrust of the Republican party, contrasting the farmer's lot under the Republicans with the gains made under the Democrats. His emotional proof was strong enough to reinforce existing doubts and to create new ones. However, it was not strong enough to produce action. His appeals fitted in well with belief - and that was what Stevenson was trying to accomplish. He succeeded in creating the impression that both he and his party are competent to act in the best interest of the farmer.

Logical proof for Stevenson's first contention was adequate,
for it included examples, statistics, and enthymemes. The second contention, however, was sketchily supported. Some of the topics in the contention received little more than bare mention.

In final analysis, the speech succeeded in establishing Stevenson's capabilities in the field of farm policy. It also succeeded well in reminding his farmer audience that the Democratic party has accomplished much for the farmer. The test of the speech came down to whether a majority of the farmers would choose to rely on past performances in the case of the Democrats, or whether they were disgruntled enough with other phases of the Democratic administration and desirous enough of a change to put their faith in the promises of the Republicans. Since the farmers received substantially the same pledges from both candidates, it appears that the farm issue was, in effect, removed from the campaign. The farm vote was decided upon other issues.

Dodge County, where Kasson is located, gave its vote to Eisenhower, 3,873 to 1,582. In 1948, the county barely went Democratic. The state of Minnesota also voted for Eisenhower, 763,211 to 608,458.\footnote{The World Almanac, p. 596.} The vote margins for the Republican nominee ran better than two to one in Kansas, Nebraska, North and South Dakota.

Farm operators in the nation voted 42 per cent for Eisenhower and 24 per cent for Stevenson, whereas in 1948 Truman received 25
per cent of their votes and Dewey got only 13 per cent. The most
dramatic shift of any demographic group was among farmers and rural
people generally. Some 66 per cent cast a ballot in 1952, while only
41 per cent voted in 1948. The farm vote was not in itself large
enough to account for the Eisenhower majority, but it is indicative
of what happened throughout the nation.

In his farm policy address at Kasson, Stevenson did not employ
enough emotional proof to gain him advantage over his opponent.
In the light of the election result, it is evident that he failed
to convince his hearers that the Republicans, and particularly Eisen­
hower, could not be trusted in the field of agriculture. Again,
other issues were more compelling to the farmer.

The farm problem has not yet been settled, nor is it likely
to be settled in the near future. When the ninety per cent parity
program expired in 1954, the Republicans pushed through Congress a
program of flexible price supports. This, too, has failed to solve
the problem, and with the growing discontent in the farm belt, the
entire problem will be aired again in 1956. This time, the issue
will revolve around what the Republicans have or have not done for
the farmers in the past four years, and not so much what they might
do in the future.

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12 Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 72.
CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF "KOREA"

The border state of Kentucky, nominally Democratic, was in the doubtful column all through the 1952 campaign. The issue was not settled until election day, and even then, the result was not evident until a week later. Although Kentucky voted for Stevenson, the race was extremely close. In September, neither presidential candidate could speak with certainty of victory or defeat in Kentucky, for the number of uncommitted voters was staggering. The state presented an attitude of waiting and indecision.

The sleeping vote is of course not a new phenomenon. . . . What is new is the size of this sleeping vote and the quiet intentness with which it is watching the campaign — an enigmatic intentness that is worrying the political managers in both parties.1

The normally Democratic daily papers of Kentucky were divided in their support of a candidate for President, although Stevenson's support was greater. Six dailies, with a circulation of 90,000 supported Eisenhower, while eleven dailies, with a circulation of 464,000 backed Stevenson. In Louisville, both the Courier-Journal and the Times supported the Democratic nominee.2


2Editor and Publisher, LXXXV (November 1, 1952), p. 10.
Stevenson endeavored to meet Kentucky's indecision with speeches in Paducah and Louisville on September 27. He teamed up with the aging Vice-President, Alben W. Barkley, in a motorcade of the two cities. Reporters who traveled with both presidential candidates agreed that Stevenson's reception was more enthusiastic, but Eisenhower drew 75,000 spectators to Stevenson's 30-50,000. An overflow crowd of 2,400 greeted Stevenson in Louisville's Memorial Auditorium.

Stevenson's speech was not based on one of the pre-determined issues, as were his previous speeches. It was, rather, a radical departure from his pattern of informational speeches. On the Monday preceding this Saturday night address, General Eisenhower spoke in the Music Hall at Cincinnati. The Republican nominee placed the responsibility for the Korean War upon the Democratic Administration, and leveled direct attacks at the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Senator Robert A. Taft, sharing the same platform, beamed his approval.

When Eisenhower's speech was brought to Stevenson's attention, he determined to answer it point by point. David Bell analyzed Eisenhower's arguments and sent his draft of the refutation from the Springfield headquarters to Stevenson's campaign train. Stevenson completed and polished the draft on the campaign train between Tuesday and Saturday. Stevenson's final manuscript employed most of Bell's

4Tufts interview.
5My Brother Adlai, p. 269.
refutation.

The day before Stevenson spoke in Louisville, Secretary Acheson told a news conference that as Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower had been "wholly in accord with the administration's views on Pacific defense." Acheson had first expressed the Administration's views on Pacific defense in a speech before the National Press Club in January, 1950. In his address at Louisville, Stevenson referred to Acheson's statements in the 1950 speech and in the press conference.

Stevenson also expressed in bitter terms his growing anger with the Republican conduct of the campaign. It was his sharpest attack on General Eisenhower personally. Many people were shocked by Eisenhower's intemperate and unwarranted attack placing all the blame on the Administration. Some newspapers commented editorially upon it.

Granting that the party in power can be legitimately blamed when things go wrong, General Eisenhower can properly charge the Administration with contributing to the mess in the world at large which unquestionably exists. But can he in good conscience accuse the Administration of paving the way for the Korean War by weakening America's defenses when there is nothing in the public record to show that he opposed its military policies while he was chief of staff from 1946 to 1948? . . .

The one thing which won't go in politics, where almost anything does, is criticism which is so unfair and unjustified that it raises questions about the sincerity of everything else the candidate who voices it says. . . . General Eisenhower will be ill-advised if he is persuaded

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6 The Toledo Blade, September 26, 1952. p. 3.
to do any distasteful thing which will lower his stature in the belief that it will increase his chances of election.\footnote{Editorial, \textit{The Toledo Blade}, September 28. Section 2, p. 4.} 

A. THE INTRODUCTION

Stevenson was extremely adept in gaining the good will of his Kentucky audience. In this speech he devotes the first four paragraphs to finding common ground with his listeners. He states that he does not "feel at all like a stranger in Kentucky." He has good reason to feel at home, and he quickly points out why: his great-great-grandparents were married in Kentucky, and "some historians say that their marriage is the first recorded" in the state. Continuing to ally himself with his audience, he notes that the home which his forebears built near Danville more than 150 years ago is still standing. He adds that his grandfather was born in the state and attended Centre College, "where he fell in love" and subsequently married the college president's daughter. Tracing his ancestry down to the present, Stevenson remarks that he is related to Alben Barkley, "the greatest Kentuckian of them all." The statement is well-calculated to create friendly rapport, for the "Veep" was held in high esteem by his people.

As if this relationship with Kentucky were not enough, Stevenson notes that his campaign manager, Wilson W. Wyatt, was formerly the mayor of Louisville. This recital of facts served Stevenson
well both to show his friendship for Kentucky and to lay a claim as a "fellow Kentuckian." He has firmly established the link of common ground, thereby gaining the friendship and confidence of his hearers.

Concluding his introduction, Stevenson reveals the subject of his address. "I want to talk to you tonight about the war in Korea."

B. THE DISCUSSION

The body of the speech is divided into two distinct parts: the first is devoted to refuting Eisenhower's charges; the second is an attempt to capitalize on the Republican split over foreign policy.

Stevenson opens his discussion of the war in Korea by placing his own position on a high and virtuous plane. He states that when the campaign started he had hoped "Democrats and Republicans alike would regard this election year as a great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership." He had also hoped that "both parties would talk sense to the American people." Unfortunately, he remarks sadly, this had not occurred, and he has become increasingly disturbed about the tone and spirit of the campaign. With this approach to the subject, Stevenson creates the impression that he is an honorable man who has been reluctantly forced by the circumstances to answer unfair charges against him and his cause.

Referring to the address in Cincinnati, Stevenson attacks
the Republican nominee's position by noting that Eisenhower had not stated the truth about Korea. His opponent has tried "not once but several times, to make a vote-getting issue out of our ordeal in Korea." Stevenson, on the other hand, states that he will confine himself "to the record." Through this charge Stevenson weakens Eisenhower's ethical appeal.

Eisenhower had made several charges against the administration's conduct of the war. Stevenson lists those charges, and then refutes them one by one. Eisenhower had argued that we are fighting in Korea for five reasons: (1) the American Government grossly underestimated the Soviet threat; (2) the Government allowed America to become weak; (3) American weakness compelled us to withdraw our forces from Korea; (4) the Government abandoned China to the communists; and (5) we had announced to all the world that we had written off most of the Far East.

Eisenhower wrong, too. In refutation of the first charge, Stevenson chooses to show that the General had himself grossly underestimated the Soviet threat. He quotes Eisenhower twice to support his thesis. Following World War II, Eisenhower wrote that he saw no reason "why the Russian system of government and Western democracy could not live side by side in the world." In November, 1945, the General told the House Military Affairs Committee: "Nothing guides Russian policy so much as a desire for friendship with the United States." It is obvious that events have shown Eisenhower
to be wrong. He does not make the same choice in this later occasion as he did on an earlier one. Stevenson's method of argument is the refutative enthymeme, which is drawn from the topos of altered choices. Stevenson argues that the Republican nominee is even more culpable, for at the time he was "a professional soldier of great influence and prestige, to whom the American people listened with respect."

He implies that it was Eisenhower's responsibility to tell the Government and the people if there was a threat existing. Instead, Eisenhower had helped to lull the nation into a sense of false security.

In contrast to Eisenhower's position, Stevenson had seen the threat, and warned the nation. Stevenson notes that as early as March, 1946 he said, "We must forsake any hope that the Soviet union is going to lie still and lick her awful wounds." He had warned that Russia "intends to advance her aims . . . to the utmost."

Stevenson does not defend the Administration on the charge that it failed to see the Soviet threat. His argument is rather that the Republican nominee did not see it either. It is a case of he who casts the first stone must himself be free of sin. The most damaging evidence that Stevenson could employ was to use his opponent's own words against him. This Stevenson did, destroying the validity of Eisenhower's charge with the revelation of his views at the time. Stevenson's original views appear even better through hindsight, and especially when contrasted with Eisenhower's statements.

Republicans wanted faster demobilization. The second charge
that Eisenhower made was that the Government demobilized too fast, allowing America to become weak. Again, Stevenson does not defend the Administration's action. He notes instead that the Republicans are acting "self-righteous." He asks, "What were they saying at the time?" Going back to 1944, he reminds his audience that Dewey had accused Roosevelt of deliberately delaying demobilization, promising that the Republicans would do it quicker. He recalls Dewey's exact statement at the time. "Our members of the armed forces should be transported home and released at the earliest practical moment after Victory." Here is proof that the Republicans are as much to blame for the too rapid demobilization as the Democrats.

Turning to his opponent's words, Stevenson gives credit where it is due. He admits that Eisenhower warned against too rapid demobilization. However, he points out that in September, 1946, the Republican nominee had said, "Frankly, I don't think demobilization was too fast." With this quotation of his opponent, Stevenson is arguing that Eisenhower evidently has changed his mind in 1952 only for the sake of winning the election. At the time of demobilization, he was not concerned. The argument is effective in that it shows that Eisenhower was no more right at the time than the Administration he now accuses. The argument is drawn from the topos of altered choices.

Stevenson agrees that demobilization went too far and too fast. He argues, however, "It would have gone farther and faster if the Republicans had been in power."
Eisenhower responsible, too. The third charge that Eisenhower made was that our weakness made us withdraw our forces from Korea. In answering the charge, Stevenson notes that Eisenhower had a hand in the decision to withdraw troops from Korea. He remarks that "the General acts as if this were the result of some secret White House decision," when actually it was the result of the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He notes that Eisenhower was Chief of Staff of the Army when the Joint Chiefs reached the decision. Eisenhower is thus clearly implicated in the decision, since he had a part in formulating it. Stevenson points out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Eisenhower, "advised that South Korea was of little strategic interest," and "recommended withdrawal of the United States forces from the country." Stevenson's reply to the charge is that the administration did not arbitrarily withdraw our forces, but rather it was a decision recommended by our military experts. The revelation that Eisenhower had a part in the decision seriously weakens the validity of the charge. The argument again is drawn from the topos of altered choices.

Republicans offered no solution to China problem. Taking up the fourth charge, that the administration abandoned China to the communists, he asserts, "Nothing except the sending of an American expeditionary force to China could have prevented ultimate communist victory." Stevenson then asks, "Did he propose that: did any of the Sunday-morning quarterbacks on the Republican team propose that?"
Outside of the ridicule involved in the statement, the inherent logic is that there was only one alternative solution - a declaration of war. Stevenson points out that no sensible man in either party ever proposed war with China. He notes that "distinguished American military men--including at least one Republican" declared that China did not fall for lack of American help. The Chinese Nationalist armies had every physical advantage, he avers, because "they were larger and better equipped than the communist armies."

Employing an extremely effective device in refutation, Stevenson quotes one of the opposition's most revered leaders against their position. He asks, "Has my opponent forgotten the wise words of the most responsible Republican of them all, Senator Vandenberg?"

He then notes that Vandenberg said in December, 1948:

I am forced to say that the Nationalist Government has failed to reform itself in a fashion calculated to deserve continued popular confidence over there or over here. . . . If we made ourselves responsible for the army of the Nationalist Government, we would be in the China war for keeps and the responsibility would be ours instead of hers. I am sure that this would jeopardize our own national security beyond any possibility of justification.

Stevenson employs this long quotation in support of his argument that the Republicans had no better solution to offer than the course taken by the administration. The refutative enthymeme serves to destroy the inference that the Republicans could have done better in the handling of the situation. It is drawn from the topos of course of action.

Korea not written off. The fifth charge is that the Secretary
of State excluded Korea from our defense perimeter in 1950. Stevenson replies, "It is a gross and discreditable distortion to say that the Secretary of State took the lead in this matter." In support of his assertion, he states that the defense perimeter "was a line developed by the military authorities themselves." He notes specifically that General MacArthur, our top commander in the Pacific, twice in 1949 "defined our defense perimeter in the terms later used by the Secretary of State." This bit of evidence removes the stigma of Eisenhower's charge that the abandoning of Korea was a political affair. Stevenson argues that the decision was a military one.

"It was on the recommendation of our military authorities that Korea and Formosa and mainland areas were not included in a direct military commitment."

Stevenson's rebuttal of the charge is two-pronged. After establishing the argument that the exclusion of Korea from our defense perimeter was a military decision, Stevenson recalls the Secretary of State's pledge to come to Korea's aid if it were attacked. He notes that Eisenhower failed to mention the pledge that in the event of attack, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations."

Eisenhower, Stevenson asserts, "stooped at Cincinnati last week to the practice of lifting remarks out of context." He quoted only part of what the Secretary of State said, omitting the pledge to aid Korea. Stevenson's charge is based on the ethical argument
that lifting remarks out of context is morally wrong, and such a practice does not reflect well on the Republican nominee. It is another blow at Eisenhower's ethical armor, attempting to destroy the appeal of his character.

Korea was not "written off," Stevenson argues; its protection came under the auspices of the United Nations. When the Secretary of State made his pledge, "The United States Government thus clearly announced its determination to seek United Nations action against aggression." As subsequent events demonstrate, "that's exactly what we did." Stevenson reasons that Secretary Acheson had been forced by the military situation "to do what he could diplomatically to give some assurance of our interest in the security of the Republic of Korea." Eisenhower himself had come to the defense of our action at the outbreak of the Korean War. He said, "When our Government guaranteed the Government of South Korea, there was no recourse but to do what President Truman said and did." Stevenson's argument is that although we did not offer direct military assistance to Korea as part of our defense perimeter, we did pledge to come to her aid if she were attacked. Thus we did not leave the Republic of Korea open for aggression, as Eisenhower had charged. The enthymeme is drawn from the topos of conflicting facts.

Throughout his refutation, Stevenson quotes his own remarks which reveal that he has in the past judged the world situation quite accurately. He is, however, modest in recounting it. "I have no wish to blow any trumpets here." He constantly stresses the
theme that the entire discussion is distasteful to him, and that he
wishes the subject had never come up at all. "I deeply regret the
necessity for this recital." He expected such nonsense from "extremists
and reactionaries." He was prepared "to ignore the political license
and false charges," but "I cannot ignore them now when they are uttered
by the Republican nominee himself." Revealing his own good character,
Stevenson at the same time links his opponent with unworthy acts.

In replying to the charges of his opponent, Stevenson refrains
from a bitter personal attack. He does not "list these mistakes
in judgment and errors of prediction in order to lay any personal
blame on the General." In his magnanimity, Stevenson would prefer
that the campaigners "talk sense." He states, "Better we refrain
from competing in denouncing each other in a scramble for votes,
admit our common mistakes—and get on with our business." With his
moderation and intelligent approach to the problem, Stevenson is
using strong ethical proof.

His sincerity is illustrated by the fact that he does not
deny that mistakes have been made. He frankly admits what some of
the mistakes have been.

America did demobilize too rapidly and too severely. America
did allow the Russians to develop an undue superiority in
conventional arms and in ground forces. Perhaps this country
should have given a direct military guarantee to the Republic
of Korea. And it might well have been wiser if American forces
had not crossed the 38th parallel in the fall of 1950.

Recrimination, however, does not correct mistakes. Stevenson wisely
points out that the mistakes were made by "many Americans in both
parties." More important than the mistakes is the lesson we should have learned from them. He states, "One lesson which I had hoped that most of us had learned from the past is an understanding of what the present threat to our freedom really is."

Stevenson's ethical appeal is further enhanced when he offers praise for his own party. He notes that in the present situation the need is for military strength. "The Democratic Party," he states, "has been consistently the party of strength--and thus the party of peace." With this statement, he is placing his party on the side of the goal of all Americans—peace.

By associating his opponent with unworthy acts, Stevenson weakens Eisenhower's ethical appeal. He notes that the General has said one thing at one time and then said the opposite later. Stevenson points out the contradictions in two of his opponent's statements on Korea. On June 5th, 1952 Eisenhower said, "There has been built up behind the Yalu River a very definite air strength that would make very dangerous any attempt to extend the war at this moment, until we have a bigger build-up of our own." Only three months later, his statement on Korea was diametrically opposed to it. "I have always stood behind General MacArthur in bombing those bases on the Yalu from which fighter planes are coming." Stevenson asks, "What kind of a straddle is this? . . . This seems to me to be too serious a matter for such wandering opinions." The implication Stevenson presents is clear. Eisenhower is making charges that he thinks are popular at the moment, charges to help him get elected. There is
no regard for accuracy and consistency, Stevenson infers. This is not what is expected from an honorable man. The argument is drawn from the topos of altered choices.

The emotional proof in the refutation is sometimes expressed, but is more often implied. The emotional appeals are not predominant, but are interwoven throughout the logical proof. The very weight of the logical proof in itself serves to predispose Stevenson's audience. The marshalling of evidence, the turning of quotations against his opponent, and the pointing out of Eisenhower's misuse of facts, all serve to arouse emotion.

Stevenson appeals to the emotion of indignation and to the sense of fair play. He appeals to pride in our past accomplishments, to patriotism, and to fear. He creates a sense of shame and disappointment in noting that his opponent has not been straightforward in his charges.

Stevenson is careful in his employment of pathetic proof. He seldom makes an appeal to the emotions alone, but adds it as a consequence to his logic. He appears to be deliberately trying to refrain from overt pathetic appeals. His logical argument is so strong that he does not need to rely solely on emotion for proof.

The Taft foreign policy. Concluding his refutation of the charges, Stevenson turns his attention to the Taft influence in shaping Republican foreign policy. He notes that Senator Taft refuses to recognize the threat of world communism. Instead, Taft "unsmilingly
states that the greatest threat to liberty today is the cost of our own Federal Government!" Stevenson sets out to reveal the fallacy in such reasoning, stating that the decision whether the threat to the United States is internal or external "is fundamental to the making of wise policies." His argument is expressed by means of an enthymeme drawn from the topos of simple consequences.

If we should follow out this theory that the threat is internal, we would undertake the deliberate and systematic weakening of ourselves and our allies. And such a policy of national weakness and international weakness can lead to a single result: that is, to invite the expansion of Soviet power.

Stevenson points out the absurdity of the Taft theory by noting what the Republicans have already proposed. The illogic contained in the idea is self-evident. The examples effectively destroy the theory.

You saw this policy proposed a year ago for Asia when some Republicans wanted at one and the same time to cut the defense budget and expand the war. Now you see it proposed again for Europe by those isolationists who would reduce our aid to our allies and our own defense appropriations and simultaneously speak with 'cold finality' to the Soviet Union.

The attack on Taft's position is an attempt to show the great breach existing between Taft and Eisenhower on foreign policy. The two men had met at Morningside Heights and issued a statement that there were only "differences in degree" between them. Stevenson rebuts that statement and renews his previous charge that there are "two Republican Parties" on foreign policy. He asks three pertinent questions in order to demonstrate how far apart the two Republicans really are.

Is it a difference of degree to be for or against the North Atlantic Treaty?
Is it a difference of degree to blame the Korean War on Stalin or on our own President?
Is it a difference of degree to be for or against the strengthening of our allies?

The questions answer themselves, for Eisenhower and Taft have publicly committed themselves on the opposite sides of these three issues. Stevenson sums up his charge by indicating the possible result of these differences. "Such differences of degree may well turn out to be the difference between success and disaster—between peace and war."

Stevenson presents the solution of military strength as the answer to communist aggression. He is firm in his belief that strength "is the simple truth of peace and war in our times." Employing a simple enthymeme drawn from the topos of opposites, he fortifies his argument. "Strength is the road to peace. Weakness is the road to war." His conclusion is an eloquent statement of the difference in foreign policy between his position and that of the Taft wing of the Republican party. "My opponents say America cannot afford to be strong. I say that America cannot afford to be weak."

Stevenson's character is enhanced in this speech. He offers no panaceas for the world's ills. He frankly states, "I promise no easy solutions, no relief from burdens and anxieties." To thinking men and women, such a statement by a political candidate must well mark him as a sincere and responsible man. To offer easy solutions "would be not only dishonest; it would be to attack the foundations of our greatness."
Underlying Stevenson's refutation are appeals to pride and patriotism in the action of this nation in withstanding communist aggression. He reminds his audience that we did go to the defense of South Korea when it was attacked. By our vigilant and valorous stand, "We have proved to all the peoples of the Far East that communism is not the wave of the future, that it can be stopped." Appealing to the patriotic fervor of his listeners, Stevenson recounts with pride the accomplishments of this country in the Far East. "We have helped to save the peoples of Indo-China from communist conquest." By our action in Korea, "we have smashed the threat to Japan," thereby strengthening this friend and ally. We have also "discouraged the Chinese communists from striking at Formosa." In Korea, "we have trained and equipped a large army of South Koreans."

Stevenson makes a further appeal to patriotism by noting that we are threatened by more communist onslaughts. The communist threat, he states, is a threat to our very survival. There is only one answer to the problem. "The thing which will save the world from war is American strength." A strong appeal to fear is inherent in Stevenson's argument that the Republican party is a party of weakness. He reasons that because the Republicans fear our own government more than they fear the Kremlin, they would weaken our military establishment. The Republican policy, Stevenson avers, would "demoralize the free world." Our weakness would then "embolden the Soviet Union to new military adventures." The Republican policy of weakness would "pull down the world into the rubble and chaos of a third
world war." Stevenson contrasts his appeal to two emotions. On one hand, he appeals to patriotism in support of his own party, and on the other he appeals to fear of the consequences of the Republican policy. The combination of the two appeals is extremely effective.

C. THE CONCLUSION

Stevenson continues to employ emotional proof in his conclusion. He appeals to patriotism in the statement that we are halting communist aggression through "the fidelity and prowess and the sacrifices of young men and women who serve their country." He then appeals to fear in his argument that the threat to our country is clear. "I offer the fate of the enslaved peoples of the world as my evidence." Stevenson concludes with a burst of eloquence based on an appeal to patriotism. "I call upon America to reject the new isolationism and to surpass her own glorious achievements. Then we may, with God's help, deserve to call ourselves the sons of our fathers."

D. APPRAISAL

Stevenson's ethical proof is extremely strong. He establishes himself as an honorable man forced to reply to the half-truths of his opponent. He creates the impression that he is righteously indignant, yet moderate in his reply. He is sincere in placing the actual facts before his listeners, and wisely admits that mistakes have been made. His own ethical appeal is enhanced by the contrast he points out in the actions of his opponent. He effectively challenges
the character of his opponent by noting errors of omission and commission. Stevenson demonstrates that his opponent has said one thing at one time and then said the opposite later, inferring that this was done just to win the election. He points out that his opponent has stooped to the practice of lifting remarks out of context to suit his own purpose. He indicates that Eisenhower helped make some of the decisions that he now criticizes. Stevenson's ethical proof is both powerful and extensive in this speech.

Stevenson's emotional proof is stronger and more effective in this speech than in his earlier informational speeches in the campaign. He explicitly appeals to patriotism and to fear. He employs his appeals to the two emotions in a manner calculated to win response. Reviewing our past accomplishments in halting communist aggression, he calls for new strength to fight further encroachments. Throughout the speech are excellent appeals to the emotions of shame and indignation.

Logical proof in the speech consists primarily of refutative enthymemes and quotations. The quotations are taken from the statements of his opponent, other Republicans, the Secretary of State, and Stevenson himself. The approach to the speech is not one of denying the charges, but rather of demonstrating that the opposition is equally culpable. The refutative enthymeme plays an important role in this approach. Stevenson's enthymemes are drawn from the topoi of altered choices, conflicting facts, course of action, and simple consequences. His enthymemes are generally simple, lucid,
and to the point.

Stevenson's argument is well supported. The speech is powerful in its appeal, and is extremely effective. The logical proof is stronger than in most of Stevenson's other campaign speeches. It must be rated on a par with his ethical proof, which is always strong in all of his speeches. The entire speech is one of Stevenson's best. The subject is one that is important to Americans, and it played an important part in the campaign. The Republicans used the emotional issue of the Korean War as one of their major campaign charges. It was vital to Stevenson and his party that he destroy the effectiveness of the charge. While he may be criticized for not supporting the Administration more, in this speech he did blunt the sharpness of the charge by demonstrating that the Republicans were equally responsible. In refuting Eisenhower's charges, Stevenson skillfully employed ethical, emotional and logical proof to support his argument.

Even though Eisenhower went on to win the election it is apparent that he committed an ethical faux pas which lost him the support and confidence of many educated voters. Had he said, as Stevenson did, that we all were wrong in dispersing our strength after World War II was won, that would have been different. Had he said that the American people and the members of Congress, as well as the Administration, with the acquiescence of our military leaders, all made a great mistake in underestimating the threat of communist aggression, he would have been right. But instead of refraining
from recriminations because, as Winston Churchill once said, "there are too many of us in it," Eisenhower charged the Administration with mistakes in which it was hard for the American people to believe that he did not concur. It was at this point in the campaign that Stevenson came into his own, for he continued to act as a wise and trusted leader, whereas Eisenhower acted more and more like a small-time politician willing and eager to grasp at any political straw in the wind in order to get elected. Once again Stevenson demonstrated that he, like Demosthenes, put truth before misrepresentation, integrity before expediency. Following the two speeches by Eisenhower and Stevenson, many of the people who had earlier climbed on the Eisenhower band wagon in the Spring of 1952 switched their allegiance to Stevenson. Eisenhower's ethical error, however, was evidently shrugged off by the mass of voters who still wanted a change and kept their trust in the Republican nominee.

Sixty-one per cent of the people who voted for Eisenhower were strongly opposed to the administration's handling of the Korean War, while just 51 per cent of those voting for Stevenson favored the administration's policy. The Eisenhower appeal was largely in terms of his presumed ability to handle the problem of foreign policy, and specifically, the Korean War. The voters found it much easier to associate him favorably with their concern over the international crisis than they did Governor Stevenson. For a great many

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8 Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 49.
voters, it was a happy combination of the man and the hour. 9

The election in the state of Kentucky was in doubt throughout the campaign, and the decision was not known until a week afterward. Stevenson finally carried the state by exactly seven hundred votes, 495,729 to 495,029. 10 Stevenson's Louisville address may well have been the deciding factor in keeping the state in the Democratic column, for the increase in Republican votes was surprising. Truman had carried the state by 115,000 votes in 1948. Without Stevenson's appearance, Kentucky would surely have gone Republican.

In approaching the cause of the failure of our Asian policy, there is no doubt that Stevenson handled it better and more wisely than his opponent. It is a sad commentary that the Republicans who denounced the Democratic Administration for allowing our country to become militarily weak after World War II, are today cutting military and foreign economic assistance appropriations following the unstable armistice in Korea.

9 Ibid., p. 176.
10 The World Almanac, p. 593.
CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF "SAFEGUARDS AGAINST COMMUNISM"

With the delivery of this speech on October 7, 1952, Stevenson drastically altered his campaign approach. His previous speeches were the expression of his ideas on what he considered were the major issues confronting the nation, for late in August he had outlined the policy fields he wished to cover, and he generally adhered to that program. With the completion of the policy phase, he turned to the issues raised by his opposition. The style of his later speeches was more like "politicicking," and the "new" Stevenson had a fiercer look, delivering fighting speeches.¹

The speech was delivered in the auditorium of Detroit's Masonic Temple. Billed as one of the most important speeches of the campaign, it was nationally broadcast and televised by the Columbia Broadcasting System.² Michigan Democrats supplied Stevenson with one of the liveliest rallies of his campaign — a noisy, overflow crowd of 5,000 cheering partisans. "Bull-voiced spectators yelled, 'Give it to 'em, Stevie.'"³

Members of the Republican party had harped incessantly on

the communists-in-government theme all through the month of September. Before he took off for Columbia, South Carolina, on September 30, Eisenhower worked on a speech aimed at throwing the Democrats on the defensive on the communist question. For his text, he took the testimony of General Walter Bedell Smith, an old comrade in arms. On September 29, General Smith had testified at a deposition hearing in the two million dollar libel-slander suit of Senator McCarthy against Senator William Benton of Connecticut, stating that he believed communists had infiltrated every security organization of the government, including his own Central Intelligence Agency. At Columbia, two days later, Eisenhower accused the Democratic party of being "soft on communism."

In Milwaukee on October 4 Eisenhower further charged that communism had contaminated every section of the Government, insinuated itself into our schools, our public forums, some of our news channels, some of our labor unions, poisoning two whole decades of our national life and our administration leaders.

General Dwight Eisenhower accused the Administration and Adlai Stevenson of being pro-Communist last night in a speech carefully written to minimize the differences between those led by Wisconsin's Junior Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, who believes in ridding the country of Communist influence in any manner at all, and those who, to use the current popular phrase, 'differ in methods.'

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That he succeeded in the former objective seems clear from the headline of the Hearst-owned Milwaukee Sentinel which termed the speech the 'strongest, sharpest, most uncompromising speech of this campaign.'

The Milwaukee Journal, which supported Eisenhower, took him to task on the speech, and a few weeks later, on October 26, switched its support to Stevenson.

Missing here . . . were the strong words of Abilene in June against 'besmirching the reputation of any innocent man or condemning by loose association.' Missing was the courageous August declaration of Denver that 'it is impossible for me to give . . . blanket support to anyone who holds views that would violate my conception of what is decent, right, fair, and just.' Missing was even a declaration of faith in General George C. Marshall . . . whom he had called 'one of the patriots of this country . . . a perfect example of patriotism and loyal servant.'

In Saint Paul on October 3, Stevenson denounced McCarthy as a "champion of trial by ordeal and slander," and called him a member of a GOP "murderer's row" in Congress. Senator McCarthy was a "defamer of General Marshall, champion of the inquisition," he charged. Following Eisenhower's speech the next day, Stevenson drafted a major address on the menace of communism to deliver in Detroit on October 7. In his discussion of communism, Stevenson was earnest and eloquent. He made little use of his publicized wit, for he was deadly serious about an important subject which had been bandied

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about by his opponents.

The speech was important for several reasons. One, it marked the change from his previous erudite speeches to a more persuasive style complete with charged emotional appeals. Two, the address covered the entire subject of communism, and it should be ranked among his best political efforts. Unfortunately, the speech seems to have been lost in the abundance of oratory. Three, for the first time in the campaign, Stevenson mentioned Alger Hiss. Sixteen days later, in Cleveland on October 23, the Governor was forced to reply to Nixon's charges concerning his deposition for Hiss. Four, Stevenson replied to the charge that he "talked over the heads" of his audiences.

A. THE INTRODUCTION

The opening remarks in the speech are quite unusual for Stevenson. Where his other introductions have been long, humorous and liberally sprinkled with local references, this one is serious and to the point. Stevenson makes no specific reference to his immediate audience or to the occasion, but instead, addresses his remarks to the nation. His opening sentence sets the tone for the entire speech. "I've been trying in this campaign to talk about all the public questions that affect your welfare as Americans." With indignant self-righteousness he states that he has tried to speak "sanely, sensibly, and forthrightly" on those questions, but his opponents have accused him of "talking over the heads of the people." His reply to that charge serves to
gain the attention of his hearers, and at the same time, to create a strong ethical basis for the subject of his address.

The charge that Stevenson talked over the heads of his listeners was often discussed during the campaign, and indeed, afterward. It is interesting to note, therefore, Stevenson's own refutation. To reply to such a charge was difficult. Stevenson chose the only answer he could make that would enhance his position - he neither confirmed nor denied the charge. His refutation served to minimize the unfavorable impression, and it made him seem more worthy of respect. He answered the charge by saying, "Well, if it is a mistake to appeal to intelligence and reason, instead of emotion and prejudice, then I plead guilty to the charge." The evident sincerity serves to heighten the ethical appeal. Stevenson infers that he is taking an honorable approach to the issues of the campaign, but his opponents are not. He implies that appeals to emotion and prejudice are wrong, and his audience would accept such reasoning, for we do not like to admit that we act through emotion and prejudice. Continuing his argument, he states, "I would rather be charged with talking over your heads than behind your backs." His rejoinder is an excellent example of the way in which he was often able to turn his opponent's charges with a boomerang effect. Like Demosthenes, Stevenson not only came through an attack unscathed, but with a stronger appeal based on his good character.

Stevenson appeals for the good will of his listeners by giving praise to them. "People are smarter than some may think." The statement
should have good effect, for everyone likes to think he is intelligent, and certainly, no one wants to be revealed as a dupe or a fool. He gives more substance to the remark by quoting a line which contains a strong emotional appeal, "There's still a God's plenty left in people of the little red schoolhouse and the tall white steeple."
The simple appeal to the "common man" is extremely effective. Offering one more word of praise before turning to his topic of the evening, he states, "So you'll just have to forgive me if I go on trusting your intelligence."

Stevenson introduces his subject by saying that he would talk about a "disease." The comparison is particularly apt, and quickens audience interest in the topic. He does not reveal the subject at first, but arouses curiosity by pointing out how vital it is to arrest a disease which may have killed more people in the world "than cancer, than tuberculosis, than heart disease--more than all of these combined."
The disease "has certainly killed more minds, more souls, more decent hopes and ambitions, than any corruption." It is, he states, "worse than the darkest days of Hitler." With his audience intrigued by his comparison, he reveals his subject at last. "I want to discuss with you the ways that communism has attacked this nation--and the ways in which this attack has been met."

B. THE DISCUSSION

Stevenson notes that the subject of communism has been "swathed in fog and confusion," and he proposes to make precisely clear the
In setting the record straight, he attempts to collectively refute his opposition's charges, rather than reply to them one by one.

In reviewing the case, the Governor alternately praises his party and condemns that of the Republicans. He states that the most serious threat of communism in this country was during the depression years of poverty and despair which followed "twelve years of Republican administrations." The inference in the argument links Republican control with the rise of communism in this country, and it serves to weaken the ethical appeal of the Republicans. Stevenson asserts that it was a Democratic administration that ended the communist threat. The Democrats during the last twenty years "helped the people of America to build that economic strength and that faith in freedom which makes communism impossible." By praising his party, he builds up his own character, for he is associating himself with his party's accomplishments.

The Democratic party overcame this threat of communism, Stevenson continues. After the election of 1932, "the swelling menace of discontent and communism in this country began to wane," for Franklin D. Roosevelt brought "a new spirit, a new hope." Under Roosevelt's leadership, "The American people unlocked from within themselves the strength to drive out communism," and the Democratic party "licked the communist hope for a revolution in the thirties." On the international scene, the Democrats have been "desperately rallying and strengthening the free peoples of the world against communism." They
are "leading the way in building the collective strength which is the only bulwark against communist expansion." All this has been accomplished "over the bitter protest and unrelenting opposition of the Republican Old Guard," for the Republicans fought "every step of the way." Despite the Old Guard, he asserts, the "Democratic leadership has built an elaborate internal security system to protect this nation against communist subversion." Stevenson's review of "the facts of the case" associates his party with that which is held to be good—the fight against communism. He also links the Republican party with what is held to be evil, that is, ignoring the communist threat.

**McCarthy rebuked.** Attacking the character of one specific Republican during the speech, Stevenson notes that Senator McCarthy had quoted a Department of Justice document to prove the existence of communists in the State Department. He makes an effective reply to the charge by pointing out that McCarthy neglected to say that the document described the situation in 1928! Stevenson follows up his revelation with charged irony. "What it proved was the existence of a communist plot under the Presidency of—Calvin Coolidge." McCarthy's charges, he states, are a "wild and reckless campaign against the integrity of our Government itself." He also ridicules McCarthy in a sly manner characteristic of his ridicule of Eisenhower. Just as he never mentions Eisenhower by name, always referring to him as "the General," Stevenson refers to McCarthy as the "junior Senator from Wisconsin." The statement of fact is belittling in this conno-
tation, and it helps weaken McCarthy's ethical appeal.

Stevenson employs an excellent technique to build up his own character in the eyes of his audience, and at the same time, destroy the character of his opponent, by associating himself with organizations and public figures held high in the esteem of the nation. His opponent, he infers, would eliminate or weaken the authority of these popular figures. He states that he believes the F.B.I. "has been doing a superb job," and both J. Edgar Hoover and General Bedell Smith are "excellent, experienced, devoted and trustworthy men in these posts of great responsibility." If Stevenson were elected, he would "back them to the hilt." He questions what Eisenhower would do to improve the situation, asserting that the General "has offered only thundering silence about a cure." He suggests some possible actions that the Republican nominee might take.

What would he do? Would he fire J. Edgar Hoover? Would he fire General Bedell Smith, head of the Central Intelligence Agency and his own former Chief of Staff? Would he discharge General Smith's deputy, Allen Dulles, the brother of his own chief adviser on foreign affairs?

The questions are preposterous, of course, but they serve to make Eisenhower's position untenable.

Stevenson offers no new solutions either, but he takes a firm stand against communists in Government. "If I find in Washington any disloyal government servant, I will throw him out ruthlessly, regardless of place, position or party." Employing ethical proof drawn from his own character to demonstrate that he would be fair in protecting the rights of individuals, he states, "I think my record
is the best evidence that this fight will be conducted with full respect for our system of justice, and for the Bill of Rights of the United States." He takes a firm stand against injustice, allying himself with a pronouncement of several Roman Catholic Bishops.

"Dishonesty, slander, detraction and defamation of character," he quotes the Bishops, "are as truly transgressions of God's Commandments when resorted to by men in political life as they are for all other men." The source of the quotation, as well as its subject, help establish Stevenson's character.

The Democrats have fought communism in America for twenty years, he states. "We have met and destroyed this disease as it has not been met or destroyed in any other country in the world." Stevenson carries this high praise of his party one step further by asserting that in the battle against communism in America, the victory has been won "without the assassination of honest characters, without destroying the principles of freedom upon which this society is based."

Turning to his opponent, Stevenson questions Eisenhower's motive in bringing up the communists-in-government issue. He asks, "Is he only interested in scaring the American people to get the Old Guard into Government?" The thrust is designed to create cracks in Eisenhower's ethical armor.

Republican depression encouraged communism. When referring to his Republican opponents, Stevenson attempts to create doubt and mistrust of them. He calls some of his opponents "political demagogues,"
who are "hunting for votes much more than for communists." In Congress, the Republican party has "opposed, ridiculed and sabotaged" Democratic efforts to make America strong. Stevenson also associates the Republicans with the depression, thereby creating fear of another depression.

He states that "the Republicans fumbled and bungled this nation into the Great Depression," and he employs a highly descriptive and emotional recall of those terrible years.

You remember the bitter winters of 1930 and 1931. Farmers in Arkansas—conservative, law-abiding farmers—organized to march on towns and loot the stores. Children left home to spare their parents another mouth to feed; so many of them left that the railroads put on special open boxcars to keep the kids from breaking into the closed ones. Millions of American men and women waited in the breadlines. An army of ragged veterans actually marched on our national capital.

The recounting is highly charged with emotion, for no one wants a recurrence of those dread days. Stevenson reinforces his appeal to fear by pointing out what might have happened if the Republicans had remained in power. "If the paralysis had continued in Washington, the one million votes cast against capitalism in 1932 might have swelled to ten million by 1936." The appeal to fear is two-pronged, for Stevenson connects the Republicans with both the depression and the growth of communism in this country.

In contrast, Governor Stevenson relates what the Democratic party has done for the nation, touching upon the desire for security, and appealing for loyalty to his party. When the Democrats were elected in 1932, he states, they acted "swiftly and decisively," giving "the farmer a market" and "the worker a job." The Democrats
gave the unemployed "a means of saving their self-respect," and gave youth "opportunity and hope." Underlying the high praise of his party's accomplishments is the implication that the Republican party is not concerned with the welfare of the people. Stevenson brings the indictment into the open with the charge that the Republicans tried "to block, to trim, to obstruct, to prevent" the Democratic program. The very piling on of the charges serves to reinforce their emotional appeal. He further charges that the Republicans were against the "collective-bargaining laws that mean security to the worker," fought "the price-support laws that mean security to the farmer," and opposed "the social-insurance laws that mean security to the aged and the infirm." The essence of Stevenson's argument is not that the Republicans opposed the laws, but rather that they opposed the security of the farmer, the worker, the aged and the infirm.

Stevenson castigates the members of the Republican party as men who are "near-sighted" by asserting that they have never worked for the security of the people. Appealing to the fears of his audience, he remarks, "These men still control the Republican Party." The "thoughtful people of this country are apprehensive" of a Republican victory, and if the Republicans win, it will be "the forerunner of another great depression." On the basis of this emotional reasoning, Stevenson appeals for support. "We must prevent another economic disaster."

Along with his appeal to the fear of a Republican depression, Stevenson adds an appeal to the fear of communism. Another depression,
he argues, "would open up the greatest opportunity the Kremlin could hope for to take over the free world, not by arms, but by invitation."
The Republican "years of misery left a heritage of fanatics and agents in our midst." Stevenson's description of the communist threat is an example of his excellent word choice which arouses the emotion of fear. "We must never forget the dedication, tenacity and fanaticism of this inscrutable, ruthless, restless conspiracy." If another depression should occur, "the beckoning finger of communism's false light would grow stronger in America."

Communism feeds on insecurity. Stevenson's logical proof is based on examples drawn from the parallel of history, and upon demonstrative enthymemes. From what has occurred in the past, he is able to draw trends for the future based on those signs and probabilities. His first enthymeme occurs when he notes how some people turned to communism during the depression. "It was then that some persons like Alger Hiss and Elizabeth Bentley, witnessing the devastation of capitalism and the menacing rise of Hitler, became entangled in the communist conspiracy." When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected, however, "communism in this country began to wane." Roosevelt restored "America's faith in itself." Stevenson states his conclusion from the argument in the form of an enthymeme drawn from the topos of simple consequences. "As long as we hold fast to the progressive spirit of human welfare . . . we need never fear a communist revolution in this country."
The Republican party, Stevenson states, opposed the Democratic program for strengthening the security of the people and of the nation. Not only did the Republicans oppose collective bargaining, price supports, and social insurance laws, but they also opposed "cost-of-living controls which the Democratic Party supports in order to prevent another boom and bust." Similar Republican action has been the rule in the battle against international communism, he asserts. "Time and time again the Republican majority in Congress has voted to slash economic and military aid to our allies." An enthymeme drawn from the topos of correlative terms sums up the argument. "The way to make this country secure is to work for the security of all of the people in it."

The communists, through subversion and espionage, have tried "to undermine the foundations of this and every other government in the world." In support of the statement, Stevenson lists several examples drawn from the parallel of history. He notes that the Nazi Government of Germany was successfully infiltrated. In Japan, the communists in the government "learned in advance about the Japanese plot against Pearl Harbor." The Government of Chiang Kai-shek in China was penetrated "despite the long experience of his secret police in dealing with them." Stevenson states that a dozen European countries were infiltrated, "no matter how anti-communist their policies or pretensions." The examples serve in an inductive manner to lead to his conclusion, which is expressed in an enthymeme drawn from the topos of simple consequences. "No government will be safe from espion-
age and the secret communist attack so long as the Soviet Union pursues its goal of world domination." Referring to General Bedell Smith, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for support, Stevenson states, "We cannot let our guard drop even for a moment."

The Democratic administration has fought communist infiltration. The Democratic party has been conducting the battle against communism for a long time, Stevenson remarks, and he employs many specific examples to support the statement. By reference to government action, he chronologically traces the administration's fight against communists in this country. In 1939 "the Roosevelt Administration made it unlawful for communists to work for the Federal Government." The Smith Act was passed in 1940, and under it, the "thirty-one leaders of the American Communist Party" were subsequently convicted. During World War Two, "the Civil Service Commission and the F.B.I. conducted a continuous screening of Federal employees." Through this surveillance, "nearly 1,500 men and women were denied Federal employment because of doubtful loyalty." Stevenson notes that in 1947, "President Truman set up a new and tighter Federal loyalty-control program." In the same year, he adds, the Attorney General established a list of subversive organizations. In 1948 and 1949 the communist leaders were indicted and convicted.

Stevenson details this action in order to demonstrate that the Democratic administrations have been actively engaged in rooting out subversives. He points out that these acts occurred "in the
years before 1950," that is, before McCarthy. The success of the Democratic program can be compared to that of McCarthy's. "For all his bragging and fear-mongering the junior Senator from Wisconsin has yet to produce evidence leading to the conviction of one single communist agent." Stevenson's refutation of the Republican charge of a "softness towards communism" is a recital of the facts.

The Governor reveals his wisdom in the way in which he handles the communist problem, for he does not deny that it is serious. The protection of our Government from infiltration, he states, requires vigilance and vigor. There is no easy solution. "This is a long and continuous struggle - no single action can win the campaign."

However, he warns, we should never forget that our police work is "aimed at conspiracy, and not at ideas or opinion." Through the use of a maxim, he is able to tie his reasoning together. "Democracy should be a society where it is safe to be unpopular." Stevenson's proposals for fighting communism while at the same time maintaining our freedoms sound reasonable. We will make more progress, he avers, "when we stop capitalizing communism for political advantage." Instead, all of us should "think more of the welfare of the Republic than of how we can spread fear and smear and distrust."

C. THE CONCLUSION

Stevenson's conclusion is an excellent example of an eloquent appeal to patriotism, tempered with moderation. "We will protect
ourselves from communism, and, at the same time, we will protect our liberties, too—those liberties, which, above all, distinguish the United States from the police state." However, he does not summarize his ideas, and here his conclusion is weak. A quick review of his ideas to fix them firmly in his hearer's minds would have aided the speech considerably.

D. APPRAISAL

Stevenson is adept at aligning himself and his party on the side of virtue and justice. Through this technique, he establishes his own good character. He attacks the character of his political opponents by creating doubt and mistrust of their veracity and capability, and he cleverly shifts the charge of "a softness towards communism" from his own party to that of the Republicans. With a sane and sensible approach to the problem of communism, he suggests that he will be able to cope with the problem if he is given the opportunity. He does not, however, offer anything new in the way of a solution to the problem.

Governor Stevenson's emotional proof is stronger and more overt in this speech than in most of his previous speeches. He definitely makes a partisan appeal for support for the first time, but one cannot escape from the basic wisdom in his approach to the problem of communism. Stevenson is particularly vehement in this speech in the attacks on his opponents. Appealing primarily to his listener's fear, he blames the Republicans for the depression and asserts that their
return to power would lead to another one. He also charges the Repub-
licans with sabotaging the fight against communism. The emotional
appeals in the speech are based on the desire for economic and national
security, and to the fear of another depression. They add a factor
which had been missing in Stevenson's earlier campaign speeches, for
he now gave his listeners a chance to cheer in a partisan attack on
the opposition. His supporters could not only agree with his ideas,
but had something to be against - a powerful motivating factor in
politics.

For logical proof, Stevenson relies heavily upon historical
equations to support his argument, and reinforces them with quotations
from authorities. His enthymemes, drawn from the topoi of simple
consequences and correlative terms, are well constructed. The speech
is rhetorically sound, with almost equal dependence upon ethical,
emotional, and logical proofs.

Stevenson delivered two major speeches in Michigan, both in
Detroit, and also several whistle stop speeches. The vote in Michigan
should thus reflect his efforts. The election was close in the state,
but Eisenhower carried it 1,551,529 to 1,230,657. Stevenson held
normally Democratic Wayne County, but the normally Republican up-state
areas more than counter-balanced his lead.

In spite of the fact that the "communists-in-government"
argument was very prominent among the Republican campaign charges,

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8 The World Almanac, p. 595.
a study of the election reveals that the issue was relatively unimpor-
tant to the voters. Only three per cent of the population responding
in the survey mentioned the Republican argument that the Democratic
administration had been "soft to communism" and was "infiltrated with
Communists" as one of their reasons for voting Republican.

While Eisenhower succumbed in 1952 to the reactionary elements
within the Republican party, and wielded the smear-stained cudgel
of McCarthy, Stevenson maintained the ability to "look at the record." The Governor was partisan in his argument that the Democratic party
had stopped the growth of communism in this country, but the facts
supported him and not his opponent. After all the hue and cry, the
Republican administration has not been able to produce any substantial
numbers of communists or to show a Democratic predilection towards
communism. The "numbers game" has even been discredited by some
Republicans, notably former Senator Harry P. Cain, a member of the
Subversive Activities Control Board. Senator McCarthy, too, has
lost much of his influence, particularly since his censure by the
Senate in 1954 after his reckless abuse of the Army. In looking at
the "communists-in-government" issue four years later, Stevenson's
views tend to be substantiated.

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9Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 52.
CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSIS OF "TIDELANDS OIL - FOREIGN TRADE"

The political climate in the South, and particularly in the state of Louisiana, was anything but favorable for Stevenson in October of 1952. The issue of states' rights, which plagued Harry Truman in the 1948 election, appeared to be resolving in favor of the Republican nominee. The revolt got under way when Governor Allan Shivers of Texas interviewed Stevenson in August, stating publicly that if Stevenson refused to support state control of tidelands oil he would "go fishing on election day." Later, in Austin, Shivers announced that he could not vote for Stevenson, for he found his views on both tidelands oil and civil rights "unacceptable."^1

The tidelands oil issue was even more important in Louisiana than it was in Texas, for Louisiana knew that her submerged lands were rich in oil, while Texas only thought hers were. Six of the ten Democratic presidential electors in Louisiana resigned in protest over Stevenson's stand on tidelands oil, and Governor Robert Kennon told a press conference: "Neither political party can safely count Louisiana in its column." The state was, he said, in a "two-party status."^2 The State Central Democratic Committee announced that

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^1 Newsweek, XL (September 1, 1952), p. 18.
^2 Ibid., September 8, 1952, p. 28.
Louisiana voters could vote for Eisenhower and still officially be Democrats. "If Stevenson thinks this election is in the bag, he's crazy," said one prominent state Democrat. "We've got to work like the devil or we are going to lose this thing."\(^3\)

Governor Kennon led the Louisiana revolt against Stevenson, and came out for Eisenhower. The seriousness of the situation for the Democrats is revealed in the lack of newspaper support in the state. In September, four dailies with a circulation of 68,754 supported Eisenhower, and none supported Stevenson.\(^4\) By late October, nine dailies with a circulation of 192,498 backed the Republican nominee, while only one daily with a circulation of 99,260 supported Stevenson.\(^5\)

For the first time in its history, the Shreveport Journal was supporting a GOP candidate. The New Orleans Item, a militantly Fair Deal paper, and the only one supporting Stevenson, warned that he could not take the state for granted, but would have to "come down here and campaign."\(^6\) The two other New Orleans dailies, the Times-Picayune and the States, declared their independence in the campaign and refused to support either candidate.

Political analysts agreed that the race in Louisiana was close.

\(^3\)Harold H. Martin, "Can Ike Crack the Solid South?" Saturday Evening Post, CCXXV (October 25, 1952), p. 124.

\(^4\)Editor and Publisher, LXXXV (September 6, 1952), p. 7.

\(^5\)Ibid., November 1, 1952, p. 10.

While they noted that Eisenhower would get a bigger vote than any Republican had ever polled in the state, they doubted whether it would be enough to win. Eisenhower's stand against compulsory FEPC made him more palatable to Louisiana voters, while Stevenson's statement on tidelands oil alienated many. But Governor Kennon's flat prediction that Eisenhower would capture the state was seriously challenged by former Governor Earl Long, who was capitalizing on Kennon's "Republicanism." A million Louisiana voters were registered as Democrats, however, and only twenty-three hundred as Republicans. The decisive group in the election appeared to be the 49.4 per cent who went over to the States' Rights ticket in 1948. Long time tradition was on Stevenson's side, for ordinarily, Louisiana voters resolve all doubt in favor of the Democratic party.

With the supposedly "Solid South" in revolt, it was vital for Stevenson to campaign there. When he appeared in New Orleans on Friday, October 10, he was "the first Democratic presidential nominee, and perhaps the first presidential nominee, ever to bring his campaign to New Orleans." The reason for choosing New Orleans was obvious: twenty-five per cent of all Louisiana voters live there. In arranging a meeting place, the local Democratic committee ran into difficulty on the segregation problem. Originally, the meeting was scheduled

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7Ibid., September 15, 1952. p. 27.
in the Municipal auditorium, but because a Louisiana law forbids mixed audiences, the meeting was shifted outdoors where the Governor could speak to a non-segregated audience.

Stevenson flew into New Orleans with an entourage in three planes bearing sixty-six newsmen, cameramen and foreign writers. Accompanying the Governor were his sister, Mrs. Ernest Ives, and his aunt, Miss Letitia Stevenson. About 2,500 people met Stevenson at the airport. At eight that night, a torchlight parade was witnessed by an estimated forty thousand people, the largest turnout since President Roosevelt visited in 1937. The speech itself was given in Beauregard Square which was packed with ten thousand persons.10

On the speaker's stand were governors, senators and congressmen from eleven Southern states. There were some holdouts, however. Texas was represented only by the Commissioner of Agriculture, John C. White, and South Carolina by Stevenson's campaign manager there, Nevill Bennett. But the representation from other states was impressive.11 Mayor de Lessups S. Morrison introduced Frank B. Ellis, National Democratic committeeman, who in turn introduced Stevenson.

The crowd received his tidelands oil remarks mainly in silence, although when he paused before going into another subject an enthusiastic follower shouted: "Pour it on Adlai!" "This isn't one of

11 Newsweek, XL (October 20, 1952), p. 28.
those kind of speeches - yet," Stevenson ungrammatically rejoined, smiling. ¹² When he attempted to identify the Republican party with economic depression, he received wild applause and loud cheers, but his biggest round of applause came at the end of the speech when in closing he made a few remarks in French. In the spoken address, he omitted entirely several paragraphs that were in the advance copy, which asserted that Japan cannot support its large and growing population if it is to be denied access to the "world's richest and most compact market" - that of the United States. ¹³

In his speech, Stevenson wisely introduced the most objectionable part first - tidelands oil. Following that necessary bit of information, he turned to praise of New Orleans' growing foreign trade, and then to a scathing attack of Republican treatment of the South since the Civil War. His Southern audience revelled in the denunciation. Some of the writers with Stevenson noted the new, for him, technique.

Stevenson started the campaign by saying that the one thing he wasn't going to do was to 'run against Herbert Hoover.' Now that vulnerable gentleman seems to be all over the place, and the major theme running through the Governor's speeches now is that if the Republicans get in, it will be 1932 and the Depression all over again. ¹⁴

¹³ Ibid., pp. 2-3.
On the Monday following Stevenson's speech, Eisenhower also spoke in New Orleans. The General received a larger turnout than Stevenson, and as much applause. The Republican nominee replied directly to the Democratic candidate's speech, taking issue with the major subjects. Evidently believing that Stevenson had scored heavily with his attacks on "Republican depressions," he spent the first third of his speech trying to refute it. In the second third of his speech, Eisenhower put the few favored states above the national interest, saying only that the tidelands would be available in case of an emergency, such as war. In the last third of the speech, the Republican nominee lumped together a number of topics, mentioning farm policy, foreign trade, corruption in government, taxes, disloyalty, and the Korean War. The speech was a hodge-podge of subjects, but it did set clear for Louisiana voters the stand of both candidates on the tidelands oil issue.15

The election did prove close as forecast. The decision in Louisiana was in doubt until midnight, when Stevenson moved into and held a small lead over his opponent. Without his personal appearance in the state, it is quite possible that he would have lost Louisiana's electoral votes.

A. THE INTRODUCTION

Stevenson's opening remarks are short in length, but they

are long in meaning. Speaking to an audience which could well be hostile over his tidelands oil stand, Stevenson immediately found common ground with them. He reminisced on his boyhood spent in New Orleans, noting that he used to live "out near Audubon Park" and rode the streetcars up and down Canal Street. The story serves to make his audience feel that he is a fellow Louisianian, and that he understands Louisiana problems. Nobody paid attention to him as a boy, Stevenson remarks, but "now I come back forty years later and thousands come out to greet me on Canal Street." The significant fact, he points out, is that either way he is greeted, "I love New Orleans."

Reinforcing his appeal for the good will of his hearers, he bestows lavish praise upon them. "You have made an admirable civilization," he states. It is a "jambalaya." "Here each man seasons the dish to his own taste, for in this amiable society each man is master of his own seasoning." Such high praise is not overdone for a people who are proud of their way of life.

Stevenson regretfully states that he wishes he "could linger over this delectable dish," but as a campaigner, he must "talk at once about things of mutual concern." With this rather vague statement of purpose, he is ready to proceed to his subject. There is no indication what his subject will be, but since he covers several topics in the speech, the statement suffices.

B. THE DISCUSSION

Stevenson develops a variety of topics in this speech in an
order that starts with the weakest in point of audience sympathy and works up to the strongest. Thus, the topics are arranged in an emotional order - from the least favorable to the most favorable. Rhetorical theory and practice support Stevenson's arrangement, providing the speaker first gains the good will of his audience. This Stevenson accomplished in his introduction.

The first topic that he takes up is the Democratic party platform on minority rights. The problem of the Negro in the South is a touchy one, and Stevenson handled it well as far as his Southern audience was concerned. He tried to minimize the unfavorable reaction to that plank in his platform. The single observation that he makes is "one that must sadden you as it saddens me. It is that, after two thousand years of Christianity, we need to discuss it at all." With no further argument than this, Stevenson was able to make his stand clear and yet not antagonize his hearers. It was not his purpose to make the point the major subject of his speech, for he had previously discussed the topic fearlessly in the South at Richmond, Virginia. The glossing over of the point in New Orleans was satisfactory for both the audience and the speaker.

Turning to the subject which vitally concerned his listeners in this campaign, Stevenson revealed the reasons for his position on tidelands oil. He was well aware of the bitter antagonism which existed in the coastal states towards his stand advocating federal control of those lands. He and his party were committed to that program, however, and while he could not hope to persuade all of the
States' Rights advocates to his point of view, he could try to lessen their antagonism. If he could move his audience from a strongly unfavorable attitude to a neutral position, he would eliminate much party friction and gain some much needed support.

Stevenson began his argument by defining his terms, stating that only the submerged lands which lie between the low-water mark and the historical three mile boundary were in dispute. By delimiting the subject, he was attempting to remove some of the prejudice against the tidelands plank. "These are the lands in controversy—and no other."

The Federal Government lays no claim to the true tidelands (those between the low and high-water marks) nor to the lands underlying inland waters; and indeed it could not because the United States Supreme Court has long since expressly recognized that ownership of all these lands clearly resides in the states.

Pointing out his own experience as a governor of a state, Stevenson stated that he respected and understood Louisiana's position on the tidelands dispute. However, he did not believe that position to be the right one. He was not surprised that Louisiana was disappointed with the decision of the Supreme Court, for "The people of Illinois would be equally disappointed had they lost a similar lawsuit." But the court held that the oil beneath the submerged lands is vested in all the people of the United States and not just those of Louisiana; therefore, Stevenson, if elected President, would have to represent "all of the people and not just some." He established himself as an honorable man by asking, "And how, therefore,
should I state my view on it now, if I am to be a responsible President and fair with everyone?" This was the "good man" of Cato and Quintilian speaking. He was, in fact, rebuking the people of Louisiana for their stand, and credit must be given to him for proceeding at once with candor and straightforwardness. He did not antagonize his audience yet he tried to set forth the reasons for his position. His listeners had to give him their respect for not evading the issue. His stand, while not popular with his hearers, was presented tactfully and persuasively.

Stevenson helped achieve his ethical character by pointing out his position in comparison with that of his opponent.

Well, I have stated my position on this—and only ONE position—and I want to make clear that I lack the versatility of my opponent, who has had at least three separate positions on the tidelands question.

He indicates that he made his position clear when Governor Shivers of Texas visited him in August—and he has not wavered from it since. Furthermore, the man who becomes President must follow the court, for he "cannot and should not begin to go behind Supreme Court decisions, saying that this one is right and that one is wrong." Stevenson buttresses his common sense argument with an emotional appeal to the pride of his listeners, remarking that a "great Louisianian"—Edward Douglas White, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court—would have agreed with him. He points out that Justice White was "a distinguished Confederate officer who fought long and honorably for this state in the Great War." Following up this bit of praise,
he states that he had often, as a young lawyer, stopped to look at White's statue in New Orleans. Stevenson's reference to a familiar and revered figure served to reinforce his argument.

The question at issue in the tidelands oil dispute is "one of wise policy in the disposition of that asset." Stevenson states that he does not believe it is a wise policy to institute a practice of giving away such national assets to the individual states. He further minimizes the unfavorable attitude of his audience by comparing the tidelands to other national assets.

I believe this in the case of the submerged lands as much as I would believe it in the case of the national forests, the national parks, the national grazing lands, and all of the other public lands which, though located within the boundaries of individual states, belong to the people of all the states.

It is the duty of the President, he asserts, to conserve the national domain, "be it dollars in the treasury or forests in Oregon." Implied in the argument is that the tidelands oil should be included in that national domain.

Stevenson reveals his wisdom by the way in which he proposes to handle the problem. He doesn't believe in keeping matters in an unsettled state "so that they may be exploited for political purposes," but he would face the problem with "sense and reason and good temper" in order to get on with the business and let development begin. He then presents a solution which will provide for a fair and equitable arrangement. The proposal was employed years ago in the case of other public lands, allocating "37½ per cent of the royalties to the state where the land is located." The proposal is sound, and offers the
coastal states a reasonable solution. However, Stevenson is careful to point out that his proposal is only a suggestion. "I do not think that matters of this importance can be settled wisely in the frenzy of a national campaign or as a means of getting votes." A fair settlement can be worked out, he states, and then warns his listeners, "A President who was careless with the people's assets could hardly be a careful steward of your trust."

Turning to the subject of foreign trade, Stevenson is on safer ground. He knew that his immediate audience was intimately concerned with the continuation of Reciprocal Trade Agreements and a low tariff. Since his party had fought for these goals, all he needed to do was remind his listeners of it, and to point out the position of the Republican party. Stevenson was no longer on the defensive; he could now attack.

By asking a series of questions, the Democratic nominee linked the Republicans with acts inimical to the interests of the South.

Has not the Republican Party always been the party of quotas and high tariffs? Did not the last Republican administration raise tariffs to the highest point in history? . . . Did not the Republican leadership treat your complaints with contemptuous silence? What of the unfair and discriminatory freight rates that long ran against the South? . . . And what of the Republican record on Reciprocal Trade Agreements? Its leadership has always opposed them.

"Republican barriers" to trade, Stevenson asserts, are quickly reflected in New Orleans docks, stores and homes as men lose their jobs. Pointing out the importance of the port, he presents some statistics. "Last year, more than $200,000,000 worth of new industry moved into the
area," and "so far this year, more than $100,000,000 of new industries have arrived." The port may handle close to $2,000,000 of cargo this year, "twice the volume of only five years ago." The growth of New Orleans has been "spectacular" in the last twenty years. But this new growth is vulnerable to depressions, Stevenson warns. Louisiana must, therefore, ask itself this question: "Is the Democratic Party or the Republican Party the more likely to promote foreign and domestic prosperity?" The question is a good one, and has a definite economic appeal.

The Democratic party, Stevenson states, has always been for world trade and liberalized tariffs — the same as the South, and the problems of the South can best be met through the aegis of the Democratic party. He points to Roosevelt's selection of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State as an indication of Democratic sympathy with Southern problems. Hull, he states, fathered the program of reciprocal trade, which encouraged "the prosperity of New Orleans."

What of the record of the Republicans on reciprocal trade, he asks? Answering his own question, he states that the Republicans have always opposed them. Appealing to the emotions of his listeners through their desire for security, he asks another series of questions.

How do you reconcile the Republican position with your International House or your International Trade Mart; your Dock Board and Foreign Trade Zone? New Orleans has done a magnificent job building cordial personal and business relations with Latin America. How long do you think these relations will last if our Latin American friends have trouble earning a living by trading with the United States? What will it do to our Good Neighbor Policy . . . ?
Stevenson quotes Senator Taft's statement at Elgin, Illinois on October 7 that he had "voted time after time against Reciprocal Trade Agreements" as further proof of the Republican position.

Figurative language can be devastating in its visualization. It can be as pointed as barbs, more effective than facts. Stevenson employs it with marked effect in discussing the Republican foreign trade policy. Republican high tariffs "crippled" foreign trade, "injured" home markets and set in motion events which "exploded" in a depression. High tariffs were "riveted on your necks," which forced you to "pay through the nose." A Republican program of political internationalism and economic isolationism is "as insane as asking one Siamese twin to high dive while the other plays the piano."

Taft's stand on reciprocal trade "foreshadows more than the blight that would descend upon New Orleans if his views should prevail. It foreshadows even more sinister results at the hands of Soviet Russia."

Before damning the Republicans for a policy that would play into the hands of the Russians, Stevenson notes that he is not attempting to "frighten you into voting for me." He states that he is not given to exaggeration, but wants his audience to listen carefully. He then reviews the new Soviet line as expounded by Stalin at the recent Party Congress meeting in Moscow. The Russians will not engage us in war, but will wait us out "because we are so blind and so stupid that we will not permit Western Germany and Japan to trade with the free world."

Those two nations will be forced to trade with the Soviet world and
fall under Russian domination. "The mentality of the Republican Party in foreign trade has been well assessed by Stalin," Stevenson asserts. The policies of the Republicans may "condemn this nation to isolationism and destruction." The inference Stevenson makes is clear: if the Republicans are elected, they will play into Stalin's hands.

Stevenson thus links his opponents with a program which is not desirable. Fear is the keynote of this appeal. He concludes his argument with a thrust at Eisenhower's lack of knowledge in the "immensely complicated area of foreign trade and foreign finance." The battle in this field, he states, "cannot be won by a few minutes' briefing of Army officers."

Turning to the subject of the South since the Civil War, Stevenson sounds more like the typical politician. He is on solid emotional ground, since the South has been staunchly Democratic, associating the Republicans with the onerous days of the Reconstruction.

Claiming spiritual kinship with his audience, Stevenson notes that friendliness for the South is nothing new in his family. In the 1870's his grandfather, as a Congressman from Illinois, helped New Orleans men fight the "carpetbaggers on Canal Street." He also opposed the Force Bill, a project to compel the use of troops at Southern elections in order to assure a Republican victory. When grandfather Stevenson was Vice-President under Grover Cleveland, he again opposed the Force Bill. "He stated that its passage might mean the election of Congressmen by bayonets, and that the South was faced with the counterpart of the horrors of the Reconstruction Period."

Reminding his partisan audience of what conditions were like
under previous Republican administrations, he states,

Malaria, pellagra and other diseases sapped the strength of thousands. Your health services were pitifully inadequate. . . . Your roads were poor, especially your farm-to-market roads. There were too few schools and teachers for your children. In rural areas, school terms were often too short for genuine education. There was not enough money for longer terms. . . . By 1933 your condition was little better than that of the natives of India. Your average yearly income per person was $220.00 or 65 cents a day.

Following up this recital of facts, Stevenson makes a highly charged emotional appeal to his listeners. The Republicans were "pitilessly arrayed" against the South, and the sufferings of those times are "painful recollections"; they are "mournful memories." Southerners had been a "long-suffering people" who had eaten "the dry crusts of poverty." They "dragged out their lives in the shadowy world of under-nourishment . . . too weak to live fully and too strong to die." "Working people sold the sweat of their faces and the toil of their hands for a pittance. And so there rested upon this lovely state, this potentially rich state, the bone-chilling breath of poverty." All the South had after forty years of Republican "rule," said Stevenson, was "a corner of the earth where you vainly sought shelter against the arrows of misfortune." Republican control of money and banking made "colonies" of the South. Republicans were "absentee landlords" who tried to keep the South on a "primitive, agricultural economy."

With an audience already distrustful of the Republicans, Stevenson was able to strengthen that pre-disposition. Reminding them of their previous plight, he created fear of the return of such conditions.
Turning to what his own party has done for the South, Governor Stevenson was able to present a much rosier picture. The change from damnation to praise was highly effective. The memory of hardships under the Republicans has been "fading in the sunshine of happier times," Stevenson asserts. Under Woodrow Wilson, the South began its "liberation," and Franklin Roosevelt "began to bring you what had so long been denied you." Since 1933, the South has been moving toward a "better life," for Louisiana, as one of our potentially richest states, is just beginning to develop. Stevenson notes that petroleum, gas, sulphur and salt exist in "prodigal abundance" in the state. Other resources developing through a friendly Democratic administration are fisheries, sugar, furs, forests, cotton and rice. The relationship between the Democratic party and the South has thus been a harmonious one, Stevenson states. We no longer have "eroded people living on eroded lands."

Prosperity walks upon your farms and in the streets of towns. More people of this state own—or are on their way to owning—more houses and farms than ever before. Your children can now find opportunities at home instead of having to go elsewhere for them.

In this argument, Stevenson's excellent use of figurative language aided his play upon the emotions of his listeners. Interwoven throughout were appeals to the honor of the South, and to memories of shameful acts which arouse indignation, anger and even hatred towards the Republican party. This was strictly a sectional appeal, which could only be accepted in the South. While bitter
memories are best forgotten, the arousing of them is a highly successful technique.

C. THE CONCLUSION

Stevenson has no summary in the conclusion of his speech, nor does he ask for the support of his audience. Instead, the closing paragraphs are devoted to a final attempt to maintain the good will of his listeners. He states that Eisenhower has said some hard words about "that great nation which has been the actual motherland for so many of you and a spiritual motherland of us all." Speaking in French, the Governor delighted the French-speaking population of Louisiana. His conclusion was extremely effective, for it was here that he received his greatest applause.

I am a great admirer of France and of French civilization. Whoever says that France is in the process of decline or of degeneration forgets the good French qualities which were brought here . . . qualities which flourish always in the motherland of these people . . .

D. APPRAISAL

Stevenson developed his ideas in an orderly and logical manner. He started with the most important subject, tidelands oil - the one on which he could expect the most opposition from his audience. Then he turned to foreign trade, where his listeners would be more favorable. He concluded with an examination of the attitudes of the two political parties toward the South, a subject which could elicit the greatest emotion and response. Thus he first tried to minimize
the unfavorable reactions of his audience, and then carry his listeners along with him by means of long-standing emotional feelings.

In developing his ethical proof, Stevenson associated himself and his party with the righteous and virtuous, meanwhile, linking his opposition with what is not desirable. He was sincere and logical in removing the opposition to his stand on tidelands oil, relying on the authority derived from his personal experience. And, he created the impression of being completely sincere in his undertaking. Throughout the speech, he established his personal honor and integrity.

Stevenson demonstrated his wisdom in using a common sense approach to the problems before him and his audience. He was tactful and moderate, except in his attacks on the Republicans, and here it may be claimed that the speaker should be strong in his attack, especially in partisan politics. Wherever necessary, he displayed a sense of good taste. This was evident most of all in his introduction and conclusion. He revealed a broad familiarity with the interests of the day for his audience - tidelands oil and foreign trade. All that was missing was a discussion of the Korean War, and this was not the occasion for it. The order in which he developed his subject-matter and the way in which he handled it shows that he possessed both political and rhetorical wisdom.

Gaining the good will of a hostile audience is not an easy trick, but Stevenson was able to accomplish it. First, he gently chastised his listeners for their opposition to federal ownership and control of the tidelands area; then he turned to praise of his hearers.
for their stand with the Democratic party through the years. Thus he was able to capture the proper balance between too much and too little praise of his audience. He repeatedly identified himself with his hearers and their problems, telling of his life in New Orleans, of his experiences there, and of his family's and his party's friendliness for the South.

Stevenson employed much more emotion in this speech than in any of his previous speeches. The last two main ideas are more emotional than logical in their appeal, and although logic is not neglected, it was not as necessary when speaking before a partisan audience. It was the time and place to move the audience, and that is what Stevenson did.

Most of Stevenson's emotional appeal was secured through the use of figurative language, creating vivid mental images. His appeals were closely tied in with sectionalism, honor, shame, indignation and hatred. An appeal to the wrongs of the past is as effective today in arousing an audience as it was in the time of Patrick Henry or of William Yancey. Stevenson used the technique of a series of questions to sway the emotions of his hearers, piling one on top of another, so that by sheer weight of numbers they would crush all opposition. Not so obvious, but intermixed, were appeals to the desire for power, self-protection and property. Foreign trade as an argument was subject to these appeals.

Stevenson did not overlook the constituents of logical proof, for he employed statistics, examples and illustrations to support
his position. He defined terms, and made reference to authorities. His logical proof, where needed, was enough to support his argument and to convince at least a part of his audience.

The speech was well-paced. It did not drag nor bore, for the variety of sentences, fresh imagery, and occasional humor carried it along. Stevenson's subject-matter and his selection of words were both appropriate and intelligible. Here he certainly did not talk over the heads of his audience. The speech is an excellent one to set in contrast to his highly literate addresses during the first six weeks of the campaign. The last section of the speech laid at rest any doubts that Stevenson could appeal to the emotions. The combination of both intellectual and emotional appeals is the best method to secure desired action.

It was eighteen hours after the election before the result was known in Louisiana, but Stevenson carried the state, 345,027 to 306,925. The other two states concerned with tidelands oil, Texas and California, were in the Republican column. It is safe to assume that Stevenson's appearance in Louisiana helped him to achieve his margin of victory there. But in six Southern states, Eisenhower swept to victory partly through Democratic "switchers" and through the high rate of non-voting among Southerners. Only 49 per cent of the eligible voters in the Southern states voted, with 24 per cent

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supporting Eisenhower and 25 per cent voting for Stevenson. With half the eligible voters not voting, the "switchers" and the regular Republicans were able to swing the scale in those six states.

The Southern "switchers" constitute one of the most interesting of the voting groups in 1952. They comprised 43 per cent of the total Republican vote in the South, whereas the Northern "switchers" made up only 21 per cent of the Northern Republican vote. These new-found supporters of the Republican nominee still carried the marks of their earlier allegiance to the Democrats, however. It was, according to a post-election study, a matter of issues and candidates that made the Southerners switch their votes.\footnote{Campbell, The Voter Decides, p. 76.}

When the Republican party took over the White House and the control of Congress, one of its first acts was to push through a law giving the states title to the tidelands. The Republicans carried out their pledge of 1952, but the action appears wrong in the light of this nation's past actions. The trend since 1900 has been to put the national interest above that of the few favored states or individuals. Thus, the tidelands oil area should, as Stevenson argued, belong to all the people. While the tidelands will probably not be a specific issue in the 1956 campaign, there will certainly be a clash of ideas over the philosophy of states' rights versus federal ownership or control.

\footnote{Ibid., p. 172.}
CHAPTER IX

INVENTION AND ARRANGEMENT

In order to ascertain Stevenson's inventive capacity and his arrangement of speech materials, it is necessary to examine all of his major campaign speeches in 1962. This I have done. The trends noted in the analysis of the five representative speeches in this study, however, have been confirmed in the other speeches.

A. INVENTION

The best and most striking feature of Stevenson's speaking is his discovery and use of the means of persuasion. The ideas contained in the speeches are in large measure his own. Although he met with his research team and blocked out the areas on which he wished to speak during the month of September, the ideas are his, and the supporting facts are his writers'. Stevenson relies upon his own experiences and his own understanding of the issues in most cases. In replying to the remarks of his opposition, he often turns to the facts themselves as he knows them. When it comes to exact quotations and statistics, the information is provided by the research team. Stevenson closely follows Aristotle's advice by employing artistic proof, that proof furnished through his own efforts. By non-artistic proofs Aristotle meant those proofs already in existence, that is, statistics and testimony.

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Ethical proof. The first means of persuasion through artistic proof that Aristotle suggests is in the character (ethos) of the speaker. The speaker's character is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him seem worthy of belief. "This trust, however, should be created by the speech itself, and not left to depend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is this or that kind of man."¹ The sources of a speaker's ethical proof are his character, intelligence and good will.

Stevenson's speeches are strong in ethical proof, for he consistently associates himself and his party with that which is right and virtuous. Through all of his speeches runs the theme that he is taking the position that will do the most good for all the people. He stated the idea in his address to the American Legion in New York City August 27, 1952 when he said that he had resisted pressure groups before and would do so "again and again." He expressed the same idea to labor, farmers, religious groups, racial groups, and sectional interest groups, such as to Texans and Louisianians on the issue of tidelands oil. He also bestowed tempered praise on his party for what it has done in the past for the national good. In Seattle on September 8, he praised the Democratic party for gaining public control of our natural resources. In his speech in New Orleans on October 10, he praised the administration's support of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements. Stevenson praised the efforts of his party in the

¹Rhetoric, 1356a, lines 19-22.
field of social welfare on October 3 at Columbus, Ohio, and in a speech at San Francisco on September 9, he praised administration's accomplishments in working toward a "just and durable peace." Although Stevenson praises his party, he cautions that much remains to be done. The praise is tempered, for he does not claim that everything is perfect. He gives praise where praise is due, but does not hesitate to point out failure as well.

Stevenson further employs ethical proof by linking his opponent and the Republican party with that which is not virtuous. In his speech on Korea at Louisville, September 27, and in his San Francisco address on World Policy, September 9, Stevenson points out how the Republicans have consistently fought Democratic efforts to strengthen our foreign policy. In his Louisville address, he particularly attacks Eisenhower's about-face on the Korean war. Governor Stevenson recalls how the Republican leaders "tried to block, to trim, to obstruct, to prevent" the security measures of the Democrats during the depression in his discussion of communism at Detroit on October 7. He employs the technique of comparing and contrasting the statements and the actions of both parties in offering praise of the Democrats and condemnation of the Republicans.

The Democratic nominee is adept at minimizing unfavorable impressions previously created by his opposition. In the Labor Day address in Detroit, he denies that he is a captive of organized labor, or that labor is bound to him. He went out of his way, some say too far out of his way, to point out that he was not Truman's candidate.
In the Denver speech on September 5, he argued that since the Democratic party nominated him for an office he did not seek, that the Democrats wanted a change, too. "And the Democrat who wanted it most of all was President Truman." The President "has not sought to interfere with the considerable changes in the Democratic Party organization that I've already made." He added that no one made or proposed any deals for office, benefit, or favor. Asserting his complete independence was Stevenson's way of removing unfavorable impressions against him. Replying to Nixon's attack on his deposition for Alger Hiss, Stevenson on October 23 in Cleveland reviewed the facts, which made him appear in a much better light.

It is in the area of revealing his personal authority and qualifications to speak that Stevenson strongly employed artistic proof to establish his character. In the address to the farmers at Kasson on September 6, Stevenson devoted the first four paragraphs of his introduction detailing his experience. At Los Angeles on September 11, he spoke on political morality, frequently mentioning his experiences as a Governor, and he did the same in discussing the tidelands oil issue in his New Orleans address on October 10. In Richmond, Virginia on September 20, he spoke of his experience with minority groups in Illinois. Speaking of economy in government at Indianapolis on September 26, he pointed out his record on that score in Illinois. He noted his experience with the United Nations in discussing the Korean War at Louisville on September 27, and reminded his listeners of his work in the federal government during the depression in his
address at Madison, Wisconsin on October 8. In almost every speech, he states his experience as a public servant.

Stevenson's good character is revealed through his speeches, and is thus artistic, whereas Eisenhower's speeches do little to reveal his character, and in fact, detract from it. Eisenhower employs unartistic proof, depending upon his previously established reputation for proof of his good character.

Stevenson revealed his intelligence in the way in which he relied on plain common sense for his arguments. In the discussion of the issues, Eisenhower revealed his lack of understanding of the problems, while Stevenson demonstrated his knowledge of both cause and effect. On the corruption issue, for example, Eisenhower naively stated at Columbia, South Carolina on September 30, that the "politicians" were responsible for the "mess" in Washington. Contrarily, Stevenson argued at Town Hall in Los Angeles on September 11 that the people themselves are responsible for corruption in government. "Your public servants serve you right," he said. "Indeed often they serve you better than your apathy and indifference deserve." Stevenson, not Eisenhower, is the student of political history.

The two candidates' approach to the issue of communists-in-government further illustrates the difference in their understanding of the problem. On October 4 in Milwaukee, Eisenhower proposed the "strictest tests of loyalty" to rid the government of communists, while Stevenson, in Detroit on October 7, admitted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had to continue ferreting out communists, but
argued that the problem was larger than just catching communists. "We must fight communism—not just communists."

Governor Stevenson demonstrates through his speeches that he is possessed of intellectual integrity and wisdom, and his speeches reveal him as an honest man, seeking to do what is right and just. He does not take a position solely for political advantage, nor for just a day. He can stand on his words with a clear conscience. This is the mark of the "good man" Quintilian presupposes for his ideal orator.

The Governor is adept at gaining the good will of his hearers. His introductions contain folksy anecdotes and frequent references in praise of the accomplishments of his audience or of their government. In many of his speeches Stevenson pointed out that he or one of his ancestors lived in the locality, and he often claimed kinship with local men of fame. In Louisville, for example, he noted his kinship with Alben Barkley, who shared the platform with him. Many times he related that his grandfather, Vice-President Adlai Stevenson, had spoken in the same city. The device was particularly effective at Richmond, Virginia on September 20, and at New Orleans on October 10, for his listeners were antagonistic to certain planks in his platform—civil rights and tidelands oil, respectively.

Another aspect of Stevenson's ability to gain the good will of his hearers lay in his artful managing of rebukes with tact and consideration. He did not lose his listeners through his rebukes, but rather gained their respect and admiration for his forthright
stand. It would have been more expedient for Stevenson to have ignored the issues on which he differed from his hearers, but instead he proceeded with candor and straightforwardness to discuss the reasons for his position. The ability to offer rebukes without losing the good will of his listeners revealed his personable qualities as a messenger of the truth.

**Emotional proof.** The second means of persuasion, according to Aristotle, is "effected through the audience, when they are brought by the speech into a state of emotion."\(^2\) Emotional proof includes all those devices and materials calculated to put the audience in a frame of mind suitable for the reception of the speaker's ideas. Among such devices are appeals to the desire for personal gain, reference to patriotic figures and ideals, and Biblical allusion. The emotions which may be appealed to for proof, according to Aristotle, include anger, love, hatred, fear, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and contempt.

There is more emotional proof present in Stevenson's speeches than is generally known. His emotional appeals are not recognized because they are usually directed to the higher order of emotions - pride, patriotism, justice, and magnanimity. Such proof is subtle, but effective, and since his appeals to the higher emotions are more implied than explicit, they are not obvious to his hearers. In the

\(^2\) *Rhetoric*, 1356a, lines 27-29.
Labor Day speech in Detroit, Governor Stevenson makes a mild appeal to patriotism with the statement that "America is the best place to live and work in the world." A stronger appeal to patriotism occurs in his argument that union members should put their country first and not strike if it would threaten national safety. He also appeals to the loyalty of the unions in combatting the Taft-Hartley Act, but stresses the desire to do what is right, just and honorable in maintaining strong unions. The union policy of excluding certain groups of employees is not "right" and is not "democratic," he argues. The conclusion contains appeals to the pride of his laboring audience in their being free men and women, to their pride in their unions, and to pride in the success they have achieved.

In the Louisville address on September 27, Stevenson replied to Eisenhower's charges concerning the Korean War. Employing emotional proof to reinforce his argument, the Governor appealed to indignation and a sense of fair play, to pride in this country's accomplishments, and to patriotism in the face of further communist aggression. He also creates a sense of shame and disappointment in noting that his opponent has not been fair in his charges.

In his speeches on communism at Detroit on October 7 and Albuquerque, September 12, there are further appeals to patriotism, honor, and fair play. The New Orleans address of October 10 appeals to the honor of the South. The Governor's most consistent emotional proofs are these appeals to the higher order emotions.

Stevenson did not, however, ignore the stronger base emotions.
In his speeches to labor and farmers, he appealed to the desire for personal gain, and to the fear of the loss of those gains under a Republican administration. In July through September, Stevenson made implied rather than explicit appeals to the stronger emotions, but in October he changed his tactics and made more obvious appeals to fear, anger, hate and personal gain. The one emotion to which he appealed most often and with the most success in the last month of the campaign was the fear of another depression if the Republicans were elected. He tied in this emotional argument even in the relatively high level discussion of freedom of ideas in a speech to the student body at the University of Wisconsin on October 8. His speech in New Orleans on October 10 was much more emotional than any of his previous addresses. After a logical discussion of the tidelands oil dispute, he turned to foreign trade and a review of the Republican treatment of the South since the Civil War. His proof for the last two ideas contains more emotion than logic, for they were based on sectional honor, shame, indignation, hatred, and fear. While we may question the ethics of recalling the evils of the Reconstruction, there is no doubt but that the technique was extremely successful. The speeches of October, 1952 definitely demonstrate that Stevenson is capable in the employment of emotional proof.

It has already been noted that the Governor's speeches early in the campaign contained appeals to the higher order of emotions which were not recognized as such by his hearers. The reason that his early speeches failed to elicit great emotional response is that
they were informational in character. Stevenson did not give his audiences much to enthusiastically applaud because he was explaining his stand on the issues, rather than attacking his opposition. He was appealing to the heads of his hearers, and not to their hands. When he completed his series of speeches on the issues as he saw them and turned to the offensive, his reception was more enthusiastic. Then people talked about the "new" Stevenson, but in fact he had merely switched from facts to attack. There was, of course, more appeal to the emotions in the latter type of speaking. Stevenson realized that purely informative speeches would not win the campaign, but he was caught on the horns of the proverbial dilemma. He first had to establish his personal identity and his position on the issues before he could effectively attack his opponent. Under the circumstances, he chose the best course. But he might have had more success if he had included stronger emotional appeals earlier in the campaign. In his 1956 primary campaign speeches, there is evidence that Stevenson is employing stronger emotional proof.

Logical proof. In order for the speaker to discover artistic proof for his argument, he must first of all "be provided with a selection of premises or facts from which to argue on the possible and most timely subjects he may have to discuss." The speaker must

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3 Stevenson interview.

4 Rhetoric, 1396b, lines 7-10.
have some knowledge of his subject, else he would have no materials from which to construct an argument. The artistic proofs Aristotle presents are the enthymeme, including the maxim, and the example. The example is a form of induction, whereas the enthymeme is a form of deduction, corresponding to the syllogism. The materials of enthymemes are probabilities and signs, with probabilities corresponding to propositions that are true as a rule, and signs corresponding to propositions that seem to be certain.5

Before examining Stevenson's artistic proof in detail, it would be well to comment upon a broader aspect of his invention. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Stevenson's campaign speeches is that they ordinarily contain but one subject. In choosing a subject, Stevenson considered in general terms the occasion and the audience. This held true not only for the five speeches analyzed in this study, but for most of his other speeches. For example, in addressing the American Legion convention, he spoke on the nature of patriotism, while at Grand Rapids, Michigan, the home of the late Senator Vandenberg, he chose the subject of a bi-partisan foreign policy. In Seattle, the center of much concern with conservation, he spoke on natural resources, and in Hartford, Connecticut, the home state of the late Senator Erien McMahon, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, he chose the subject of our atomic future. The New England tradition was the theme of his speech in Springfield, Massachusetts. At the

5 Rhetoric, 1357a, lines 50-56.
University of Wisconsin, he spoke on the freedom of ideas, with special reference to the progressive movement of the LaFollettes. In Salt Lake City, his subject was liberty of conscience.

Stevenson's practice of one subject per speech is in great contrast to that of Eisenhower, for the Republican nominee invariably spoke on five or more topics in each address, with each succeeding speech becoming a rehash of his previous ones. The topics were chosen with little regard to the audience and the occasion. Where Stevenson developed his speeches in great detail supporting one subject, Eisenhower touched lightly on many subjects with support consisting mainly of unsubstantiated charges and generalizations. Many of the reporters with Eisenhower called his speeches "gray copy," and one of his writers termed his job, "turning issues into platitudes."6

The subjects Stevenson chose to speak upon were not ones that could be considered safe ground for a political candidate. Rather, he chose issues around which controversy swirled, often supporting the side that at the moment was unpopular. For example, it took courage to defend freedom of ideas when the mood of the electorate seemed to favor McCarthyism. Stevenson also spoke out against McCarthy in the latter's own territory, at Saint Paul on October 3, and at Madison on October 8. Eisenhower, on the other hand, kowtowed to McCarthy at Milwaukee on October 4, sacrificing his personal principles for the expedient of winning the election. Stevenson demonstrated

his courage in his other addresses, speaking in favor of desegregation in Richmond, Virginia on September 20, attacking the one party press before a gathering of newspaper men at Portland, Oregon on September 8, and favoring federal ownership of tidelands oil in New Orleans, October 10. "The Governor takes plenty of chances with his subject matter; his speeches are imaginative, original, often extremely bold, but all of these things are planned in advance. He doesn't like to leave anything to chance."  

One reason that Stevenson depended upon a manuscript is that he could not afford to make a slip of the tongue, as the present Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, has so often done. That Stevenson was able to go through the campaign speaking out for what he believed to be right without alienating a large part of the electorate is an indication of his wisdom and excellent speech preparation.

The premises of Stevenson's arguments were based on signs and probabilities drawn from history. His speeches, four years later, are still pertinent, for they deal with the philosophy of government. Eisenhower's speeches were concerned with personalities. Where Stevenson's premises were complex, Eisenhower's were simple. The Republican nominee's premises were based on optimism, that man is inherently good - just throw the rascals out, he implied, and all will be well. Stevenson's premises were based on the knowledge that man is a mixture

of good and bad, and is often the victim of his environment.

Eisenhower's premises forced the controversy to personalities, not issues. Where he argued which man is best, Stevenson argued what policy is best. Stevenson's speeches added to his stature; Eisenhower's speeches revealed his ignorance of politics and history.

Both candidates generalized freely in their speeches, but Eisenhower failed to support many of his assertions at any time during the campaign. Stevenson offered enough documentation in various speeches that by the end of the campaign his assertions were substantiated fairly well. Where Eisenhower would often say to his listeners that they knew of many examples, without mentioning any, Stevenson presented strong summations of historical fact, as he did in his Detroit speech on communism, October 7, or statistics of voting records as he did in his farm policy address at Kasson on September 6.

Governor Stevenson seldom quoted authorities as direct proof except in refutation of the charges of his opposition. In most cases, he relied upon his own authority for artistic support. This is not to say, however, that testimony was ignored. He usually employed quotations as points of departure, a method of introducing his ideas, rather than as direct proof of them. When he did use testimony for support, he would quote Eisenhower's own words back to him, or McCarthy's, or Taft's.

Stevenson closely follows Aristotle's advice in using the artistic means of persuasion, the example and the enthymeme. Indeed, this is the best feature of his oratory, and it sets him apart from
other speakers. The two kinds of argument by example consists of
drawing parallels from the facts of history, and inventing parallels,
either in the form of a comparison or of a fable.8

Stevenson frequently employs examples based on parallels from
history. In his address to the farmers at Kasson on September 6 he
noted that although the Republican platform called for parity for
farm prices, "more than half the Republican members of the House of
Representatives" voted in June against ninety per cent parity. Under
Republican "solicitation" for the farmer, he pointed out, farm owner­
ship declined from 1880 to 1932. In the speech on the people's natural
resources, at Seattle on September 8, Stevenson also presented several
examples drawn from history. He noted that the Republican party opposed
the acquisition of Alaska in 1867, and fought the building of the
Grand Coulee Dam, the Bonneville Dam, and the dams in the Tennessee
Valley. These examples served to support his argument that the Repub­
licans have been and are opposed to the development and conservation
of our natural resources. In his Richmond, Virginia address on Septem­
ber 20, Stevenson used familiar examples of what Republican rule did
to the South. "More than half a century ago," he said, "Southern and
Western farmers pleaded for government warehouses where they could
hold their crops for better prices in exchange for certificates at
80 per cent of the market value." Republican leaders then as now
branded the plan as "socialistic." As far back as 1828, Republican

8Rhetoric, 1393b, lines 51-55.
tariff policies brought injustice to the South. Referring to the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 as a more current example, Stevenson reminded his listeners how the high tariff bill of the Republicans harmed Southern tobacco growers and processors, and cotton growers and manufacturers. For an example of the Republican attitude towards depressions, he quoted Andrew Mellon's formula, "Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate."

Employing historical parallels, Governor Stevenson points out in his Detroit speech on communism, October 7, that our government is not immune from communist penetration. The communists penetrated the Nazi government of Germany, the government of Imperial Japan, the anti-communist government of Chiang Kai-shek "despite the long experience of his secret police in dealing with them." Communists penetrated the governments of a dozen European countries, "no matter how anti-communist their policies."

The examples which Stevenson employs are based primarily on previous Republican actions, which gives him the opportunity to draw parallels on what might happen in the future. The speeches on communism draw upon fairly recent parallels, but there are instances where he goes back farther in history. In Springfield, Massachusetts on September 19, noting that Eisenhower compared his own crusade to that of Oliver Cromwell in England, Stevenson continued the parallel to its ludicrous conclusion. Wondering why Eisenhower chose Cromwell for his model, he pointed out that Cromwell "sent his Roundheads on a bloody crusade against the people of Ireland with religious persecution,
starvation and the sword as his weapons." Cromwell had also "led his army into the House of Commons to seize control by force of the Parliament of England." Obviously, that could not be Eisenhower's reason for choosing Cromwell as his model, Stevenson said. The reason the General admired Cromwell, he continued, must be because Cromwell never "cracked a joke." In his talk before the Town Hall Club in Los Angeles, September 11, Stevenson warned that if we lose faith in our democratic form of government, "there is always that sinister man on horseback waiting in the wings."

Stevenson also employs examples based on the invented parallel. In Detroit on October 7, he compares communism to a "disease" which has killed more people than such familiar diseases as cancer, tuberculosis and heart disease combined. Another example in the same speech compares catching real communist agents to killing poisonous snakes or tigers - both are not jobs for amateurs. In his Los Angeles address, September 11, Stevenson explains why government is no better than it is by employing the invented parallel. "Government is like a pump, and what it pumps up is just what we are." The Governor relies heavily upon the invented parallel, but one more is sufficient to demonstrate his utilization of such artistic proof. In his speech to the Liberal party in New York City, August 28, he commented that the Republican "forward look" is "like a costume taken out of the closet every four years for the big masquerade ball. It often looks nice after a dry cleaning, but the stuffed shirt still shows."

The second prime means of persuasion, besides the example,
is the enthymeme. Aristotle lists two species of enthymemes, the demonstrative and the refutative, and suggests twenty-eight topoi or lines of argument from which the speaker may draw his enthymemes. Stevenson primarily employs demonstrative enthymemes in his speeches early in the campaign when he is discussing the issues. The Labor Day speech in Detroit is an excellent example of his invention through the instrumentality of demonstrative enthymemes. Two enthymemes, drawn from the topos of opposites, are combined in his statement that, "We have talked, it seems to me, too much in terms of labor wars, too little in terms of labor peace, too much in terms of stopping things by law, too little in terms of establishing industrial democracy." The first enthymeme, reconstructed, is: "If we talk too much in terms of labor wars, then we ought to talk in terms of labor peace." The second enthymeme is: "If we talk too much in stopping things by law, then we must talk in terms of establishing industrial democracy." Both are based on the premise that if a thing is bad, then its opposite must be good. The argument is sound, and should be accepted by the labor audience.

Another enthymeme in the same speech, drawn from the topos of cause to effect, is: "Since we are utterly dependent upon one another, what is best for the nation is best for all of us." The argument should be acceptable to his audience. Stevenson also employs an inductive enthymeme to support his argument that we need a new

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*Rhetoric, 1397a - 1401a.*
labor relations law. The enthymeme is constructed through a series of statements which lead into a logical conclusion in the following manner:

1. 80,000 private collective bargaining agreements today in effect are alternative to laws — and better than laws.

2. They prove that the most useful thing the Government can do is to assure a fair bargaining balance by guaranteeing to employees the right to act together.

3. A federal labor relations law should make private bargaining work better.

4. The Taft-Hartley Act has failed in that purpose.

5. Not everything in the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong.

Conclusion: We must have a new law, and we can best remedy the defects in the old law by scrapping it and starting all over again.

The success of this particular enthymeme rests on the acceptance by his hearers of the statements leading into the conclusion. With a labor audience, already publicly committed to repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, Stevenson was assured of the success of his enthymeme. An audience of men from business and industry might have refused to accept the steps in the induction, and so would not accept the enthymeme without further proof.

Governor Stevenson relies on several enthymemes drawn from the topos of correlative terms in his Labor Day speech. An example is his statement that "Unions which are given powers by Government, should be open to all on equal terms." The statement, reconstructed in better enthymematic form, reads: "If government, which is open to all on equal terms, grants some of its power to unions, then unions
should also be open to all on equal terms." What is true for one ought to be true for the other, and the reasoning is logically acceptable.

This one speech contains ten demonstrative enthymemes, drawn from the topoi of opposites, cause to effect, induction, correlative terms and definition. The five topoi employed as the source of the enthymemes are typical of Stevenson's invention. His other speeches also contain demonstrative enthymemes, although they vary in the number.

Stevenson relied upon refutative enthymemes in opposing the charges of Eisenhower and other Republicans, and this was particularly true of his speeches in the latter part of September and all of October when he left his discussion of the issues and turned to the offensive. The address on the subject of the Korean War at Louisville on September 27 is an excellent source of refutative enthymemes. Most of the refutative enthymemes are drawn from the topoi of altered choices and conflicting facts.

In refuting Eisenhower's charge that the administration had underestimated the Soviet threat, Stevenson quotes Eisenhower's statements following World War II that "Russians and the Americans can live side by side," and "Russian policy is guided by friendship with the United States." The General accuses the Government of having underestimated the Soviet threat, Stevenson states, but what about the General himself? He has changed his opinion since then, Stevenson argues. The enthymeme is drawn from the topos of altered choices,
for men do not always make the same choice on a later as on an earlier occasion, but reverse it.

Another enthymeme drawn from the same topos of altered choices appears in Stevenson's reply to Eisenhower's charge that demobilization was too fast. "We know how self-righteous the Republican office seekers are on this question today. But what were they saying at the time?" Stevenson quotes Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate in 1944 as stating that if elected, he would demobilize "at the earliest practical moment." Eisenhower also stated in 1946 that "demobilization was not too fast." "It would have gone farther and faster if the Republicans had been in power," Stevenson concludes. The Republicans and Eisenhower have since changed their minds, and thus the enthymeme is based on their altered choice.

In replying to his opponent's charge that the administration abandoned China, Stevenson employs an enthymeme drawn from the topos of course of action. The alternative to the administration's action in regard to China was war, he asserts. "In the past six years nothing except the sending of an American expeditionary force to China could have prevented ultimate communist victory. Did he propose that?" The argument is an excellent one, for the only course of action other than the one taken was admittedly a bad one.

A refutative enthymeme drawn from the topos of conflicting facts appears in his reply to the charge that Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Korea from our defense perimeter in 1950. Eisenhower lifted the remarks out of context, he states, omitting
the Secretary's pledge to seek United Nations action if Korea were attacked. Further, Stevenson argues, Secretary Acheson did not take the lead in this matter, for twice in 1949 General MacArthur defined our defense perimeter in the same terms. The inconsistencies in Eisenhower's argument form the basis for Stevenson's enthymeme: "The General accuses the administration of writing off Korea, yet he fails to point out that this defense perimeter was a line developed by the military authorities themselves."

The maxim, a third form of artistic proof in logical persuasion, is a general statement concerning human conduct, and is often taken from the premise or conclusion of an enthymeme. People are delighted when the speaker succeeds in expressing as a general truth the opinions which they already entertain. The maxim produces a moral effect, because the speaker in uttering it makes a general declaration of ethical principles, so that if the maxim is sound, it gives the impression of a sound moral character in the speaker.

Stevenson frequently employs maxims in his speeches. After a discussion of an issue he as likely as not will succinctly state a moral which neatly ties his argument together. He has a special knack, akin to Abraham Lincoln's, for the maxim. The conclusion of his speech to the farmers at Kasson, Minnesota on September 6 contains two maxims. One is, "A hungry man is not a free man." A little later he states, "In the long run, peace will be won in the

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10 Rhetoric, 1394a, lines 40-50.
turnrows, not on the battlefields."

In the speech on communism on October 7 at Detroit, Stevenson used a maxim that has been picked up and quoted by others. "A free society is a society where it is safe to be unpopular." Maxims appear in other of his speeches, but it should be sufficient to note just two more in his address at Madison Square Garden in New York City on October 28. The conclusion contains two excellent maxims, easily accepted by his hearers: "To act with enthusiasm and faith is the condition of acting greatly"; and, "To plan boldly is to make dreams come true."

In summary, Stevenson's artistic proof is excellent, for he employs examples and enthymemes, as well as maxims. Although Stevenson has probably never heard of the enthymeme, he uses it extensively in his argument. Aristotle states that the enthymeme "is the very body and substance of persuasion."11 Writers of modern texts in public address have practically ignored the enthymeme, and do not include it in their constituents of logical proof. Although the Sillars' study12 criticizes Stevenson's lack of substantial logical proof, I have shown that the charge is not true. With the inclusion of the enthymeme, it is more than satisfactory, and indeed, Stevenson's artistic proof is the best feature of his oratory.

11Rhetoric, 1354a, lines 22-3.
12Malcolm O. Sillars, op. cit., p. 231.
B. ARRANGEMENT

The essential elements of a speech, according to Aristotle, are the proem or introduction, the statement or narration, the argument, and the epilogue or conclusion. The statement and the argument comprise the body of the speech, or discussion.

The purpose of the introduction is to make clear the end and object of the speech. The introduction may also arouse or allay prejudice, gain the good will of the audience, and capture its attention.

The introduction of Stevenson's speeches tend to be lengthy, with a large amount of humor and local references. The anecdotes and references serve to warm the audience and to gain its good will. Stevenson goes to considerable length in order to gain the attention and interest of his hearers. His introductions also serve to arouse the prejudice of his listeners toward his opponent through the use of satire. Occasionally, he removes prejudice against himself previously aroused by his opposition, as he did at Albuquerque on September 12 in replying to the attack on his use of humor. Ordinarily, Stevenson established his authority to speak on the subject of his address, devoting, as he did in his farm policy speech at Kasson, September 6, several paragraphs detailing his qualifications. After these preliminaries, he announces the subject of his speech, working it in so that there is a smooth transition between his opening remarks and

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13 Rhetoric, 1414b, lines 12-15.
the discussion of the topic. Generally, the statement of his subject is contained in the last sentence of the introduction, so that there is a definite break between the two parts of the speech. The statement, however, is not the specific purpose of his speech, and in this aspect, his speeches could be improved. In comparison, Eisenhower plunged right into his speeches, with no announcement of his purpose or his subject. Stevenson's introductions are well planned, and are an integral part of the whole speech.

In the body of the speech, Stevenson usually develops his subject in one to three ideas. In a one idea speech, he employs five or six supporting points which comprise the various areas or facets of the problem. Most of his speeches, however, contain two or three ideas, and the organizational pattern follows that of problem-solution. His speech to the convention of the American Legion on August 27 illustrates the three idea sequence.

I. Though America is awakened to the need for military preparedness, all is not yet perfect.
II. What is the nature of patriotism?
III. How can we affirm our patriotism?

The first idea is a statement of the problem, the second idea defines the solution, and the last idea presents the method for adopting the solution.

A typical outline of one of Stevenson's informative speeches is reconstructed below. It is taken from his farm policy address at Kasson on September 6.
Introduction

I. Stevenson's competence to speak on farm problems.

II. The farm policy of the Democratic party.

Discussion

I. Farm policy must focus first on the question of farm income.
   A. Price supports is the way to maintain farm income.
   B. The Democratic platform is clear on price supports.
   C. The Republican platform only "aims" at parity.
   D. We must set a floor for perishable products.
   E. Farm policy has changed since the 1930's.

II. Farming is the way of using our great inheritance of water and land; and it is a way of life.
   A. Soil and water conservation.
   B. Rural electrification.
   C. The telephone program.
   D. Farm cooperatives.
   E. Farm ownership

Conclusion

I. In the stern present and challenging future, the American farmer has a great role to play.
   A. The last twenty years have established a framework of justice and equity for the farmer.
   B. The Democratic party is the best custodian for the future.

The body of the speech contains the statement or narration of the case and the argument. In the first idea, Stevenson states the need for maintaining farm income. His first supporting point
relates that both parties have agreed that price supports is the best answer. The second supporting point is his argument that the Democratic platform meets that need, while the third point argues that the Republican platform does not meet it. The fourth point is an expansion of the need argument to include perishable products, and the last supporting point is a transition between price supports and other farm problems.

The second idea in the speech is a "catch all," which permits Stevenson to express his stand on each of the points. It is more of a narration of his views than an argument over issues in controversy.

Stevenson states in the narration the actions that give rise to the issue, and the importance of the issue. While the narration varies in length from speech to speech, it is not brief or over-long. It is just enough to make matters plain - and that is its purpose.

In the narration, Stevenson reveals his own good character and praises the action of his party. He also associates his opposition with acts and views inimicable to the interests of his hearers.

In the arrangement of his arguments, Stevenson usually places first in the speech the one in which he either disagrees with or rebukes his listeners. Succeeding arguments are more favorable to his hearers, and his last argument is usually the strongest emotionally. Thus the arrangement of his arguments is generally in a climactic pattern. In the speech in New Orleans on October 10 he discussed the unpopular idea of federal control of tidelands oil first, and
then he took up foreign trade and Republican policies toward the South, subjects on which his hearers were more favorable to his ideas.

The proofs that Stevenson employs in his arguments bear directly upon the point at issue. Generally, he does not deny the charges made against the Truman administration. His refutation, instead, takes several forms: one, he argues that the action in question was justified at the time; or two, that the harm done was less than alleged; or three, that the opposition is either equally culpable or mainly responsible. The refutation of the charges is Aristotelian, omitting only the denial of the act. There are others besides this writer who believe that Stevenson should have supported the administration more, denying guilt, rather than spending so much time demonstrating that both parties were at fault. Morally, he may have been right, but politically, he did nothing to remove the stigma of the charges.

Refuting the Republican solutions to the issues, Stevenson argues that such proposals will either do no good or will make the situation worse. Proof for the issues and the proposals include both examples and enthymemes. Ordinarily, Stevenson states his argument, supports it with an enthymeme, and backs up his reasoning with an example or two. In this way, the examples serve as witnesses, and just a few are sufficient.\(^{14}\) A typical argument, taken from Stevenson's address on Labor Day in Detroit, illustrates the point.

\(^{14}\) *Rhetoric*, 1394a, lines 23-29.
1. argument: Not everything in the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong.

2. enthymeme (correlative terms): If it is right for the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit unfair labor practices by employers, then it is right for the Act to prohibit unfair union practices.

3. example: Jurisdictional strikes.

Occasionally, Stevenson precedes his enthymemes with examples, although Aristotle warns against the practice, for it seems too much like induction. In the Kasson address, Stevenson employed this technique, and the enthymeme repeated the examples.

1. argument: The Republican party will not maintain price supports at or above ninety per cent of parity.

2. examples: The Republican platform only "aims" at parity.

   Eisenhower came out for one hundred per cent parity this morning.

   Last June more than half of the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against continuing ninety per cent parity.

3. enthymeme: If the Republican candidate says one thing, and the Republican platform says something else, and the Republican members of Congress say still another - how then can anyone tell what a Republican administration would actually do in Washington?

Aristotle also suggests the use of laughter as part of argument, saying that "we must ruin our opponent's earnestness with our jocularity." It is interesting to note how closely Stevenson follows

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15 Ibid., lines 20-21.

16 Rhetoric, 1419b, line 6.
Aristotle's advice, not only in this instance, but in all artistic proofs.

Stevenson is not a writer of paragraphs loosely strung together. He is, rather, a writer of ideas which are fully developed and supported. There is a unity and coherence about his proof that makes his argument close-knit and well-reasoned. However, there is a lack of adequate transition between his ideas in many instances. At times he employs a question as a transitional device, but usually the transition is not smooth. Restatement, to show where he has been, seldom appears, and the lack of both it and transitions are weaknesses in the structure of his oratory.

The Governor sometimes signifies that he is near the end of his discourse by using the terminology "finally," or "in conclusion," and these indicators clearly mark the break between the body of the speech and the conclusion. However, he does not always follow this practice, and the only way his listeners know that he has reached his conclusion is when he leaves a specific issue and returns to high principle.

There are four elements to the epilogue or conclusion: one, rendering the audience well disposed to yourself and ill-disposed to your opponent; two, making whatever favors your case seem more important and whatever favors your opponent's case seem unimportant; three, putting the audience in the right state of emotion; and four,
Stevenson only partly fulfills the first element of the conclusion. He reveals himself as a good man, but does not try to make his opponent appear as a bad man, either in this particular instance or absolutely. The same fault is true in the second element, for he does magnify, but does not depreciate. He makes his own case seem important, but does little in the conclusions to detract from his opponent's ideas. Stevenson is extremely adept in appealing to the nobler emotions of his hearers, but fails to appeal for action in support of his candidacy. The failure may well have weakened the advantage he gained through his argument. In the fourth element, Stevenson is woefully weak, for he fails to recapitulate his arguments in all of his speeches. A summary would have aided his listeners in remembering his ideas, and the structure of his conclusions would thus be improved. Considering Stevenson's conclusions as an entity, however, they are extremely well written. He gives a great amount of attention to a good ending. His conclusions contain motivating appeals to do what is right, fair and noble. Turning from the divisive battle of argument in the discussion, he tries to conclude on a note of hope, confidence and unity. The final paragraph of his speech to the American Legion exemplifies the Stevenson conclusion at its

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Ibid., lines 15-22.
I believe we are living in the twilight of the totalitarian gods; beyond the fury and the turmoil of our times lies an horizon of new hope for embattled humanity. With liberal faith, with cool heads, with warm hearts, we shall make that hope real for our nation and for our century.
Statesmen, like orators, are made not born. Adlai Stevenson is no exception to this rule. Reared in the liberal tradition, Stevenson read and listened, observed and experienced, discussed and questioned the life he saw around him. His maturing political philosophy was first tested in the fire of practicality, and not found wanting, during his term as Governor of Illinois. The presidential campaign of 1952 gave Stevenson the opportunity to publicly express on a national scale his innermost convictions on the philosophy of a democratic government. In the years following that campaign, he has demonstrated the ability to grow and to mature, so that today we see in Stevenson the emergence of a statesman.

The ideas expressed in Stevenson's speeches before, during, and after the 1952 campaign are the culmination of years of intensive soul-searching. While his ideas are not new, they are peculiarly national in nature. Unlike the usual political oratory which is best soon forgotten, Stevenson's speeches do not lose but gain when removed from the emotion and theatre of the campaign platform. Stevenson is a good public speaker and a good politician, but he is first and foremost a philosopher and writer. The impact of his ideas as contained in his speeches make them excellent reading today, and accounts for the phenomenal American sales figure of one hundred thousand copies.
of his collected campaign speeches. As instruments for conveying the ideas he had in mind, Stevenson's speeches are among the best ever crowded into a single presidential election by a single individual.

In the first place, Stevenson's campaign speeches have a greater durability because he dealt with the fundamental issues of our country, both spiritual and political. Secondly, he dealt with those issues with both a sense of history and a sense of humor. Also, he did so after seven years in which there was scarcely an eloquent voice in our public life. As a general proposition, Stevenson appealed more to the best in our national character, and made fewer concessions to self-interest and greed than most political candidates of our time.

A. BASIC PHILOSOPHY

Stevenson has a tremendous aptitude for appreciating his fellow man. Habitually he puts himself in the other man's place, for the Governor likes human beings and gets along with them. All this applies to his advisers, too. He knows that supremely important thing - how far to go in taking advice. A statesman must have able advisers, but he must know when to turn them down. Stevenson's familiarity with international affairs also serves him well. The wide range of his own knowledge, and what he gets by further digging when a decision is to be made, gives him grasp of a subject. He is a public man who is dedicated to high principles.

Through all of Stevenson's speeches run certain themes. They
are ideas that are basic in his political thought and character, and he feels strongly that they are important. First, he believes that people ought to pay attention to government. Government deeply interests Stevenson, and his education enables him to view it with a detachment rare in politicians. He is able to communicate some of this interest to his hearers. Second, Stevenson believes in the importance of the individual. His major speeches stress the theme that the welfare of the individual is the primary concern of the state. Third, Stevenson is more concerned with the rightness or wrongness of a matter than with its legality. His speeches contain a common and almost old-fashioned approach to a problem, the good-and-evil dichotomy. A cornerstone of the Stevenson character is that he is a moral creature and he expects others to be the same. Fourth, Stevenson believes that the fundamental strength of the American democracy rests on the assumption of local responsibility. He urges people to participate in their local government and try to solve their problems on the local level. Fifth, Stevenson is a firm believer in states' rights. He has said that he believes states should regulate their own affairs insofar as they can do so well. If the states fail, then ultimately the Federal Government must step in.

Stevenson meets new issues not piecemeal, one by one, as does an opportunist; he attacks them from positions thought out...

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1 Stevenson interview.

2 Martin, p. 156.
long in advance, positions that come from his deepest beliefs. This makes it hard to compare him with other persons. Whereas Franklin D. Roosevelt was an innovator, Stevenson is not; he is in a stricter sense a reformer, inclined to repair and tighten up and improve existing structures. Roosevelt was an improviser, making up a program as he went along, with no apparent foundation in theory or belief, while Stevenson gives the impression of always acting on principle.

Governor Stevenson cannot be labeled as a radical or as a left-wing liberal. He is a moderate liberal, a gradualist who moves slowly but steadily toward his goal, never so far in front of the crowd that they do not heed him. Where Roosevelt led firmly - some said dictatorially - Stevenson guides. He leads by inspiration.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY

Stevenson was thrust from relative obscurity to national prominence in the space of a few short months, but his political ideas were years in the making. The Stevenson character was shaped and milled by the main and central force of political liberalism since the decisive turn signalized by the New Deal. Exposed as a youth to the progressive era of the early 1900's, as well as an association with the ideals of Wilsonian Democracy, Stevenson worked in the outer fringes of the liberal movement within the New Deal. But Stevenson was not and is not of the old liberal school. He is, instead, a member of the younger generation that this liberalism developed:
taking the values for granted, adaptable to the changed needs of a different time, critical of old errors and aware of new hazards, apt in methods, but above all dedicated to the unchanging ends.\(^3\)

Not only did Stevenson's training and experience shape his views, but they more than adequately prepared him for the national office for which he ran in 1952. He had a considerable share in working out and putting into effect our foreign policy of that time. Stevenson's work with the United Nations, wartime negotiations, and a knowledge of foreign governments gave him a valuable personal acquaintance with the officials who administer them. His service in the Navy Department gave him an equally valuable understanding of the military. The Governor's career was an education and apprenticeship for a presidential campaign.

Stevenson first considered politics as a career while on an economic mission to Italy during World War II. He had read about a public opinion poll which reported that some seven out of ten American parents disapproved their sons going into politics or public service. Stevenson later wrote,

I've often thought of that little morsel of news: fight, suffer, die, squander our substance, yes, but work in peace-time for the things we die for in war, no! There seemed to me something curiously inconsistent about the glorious, eager, uncomplaining sacrifices of war for the security of our homeland and its cherished institutions, and the active distaste of so many respectable people for peace-time participation in the politics and service of that homeland and its institutions. . . . Small wonder, I thought, that our 'politics' is no better, and great wonder that it is as good as it is. It seems to me sad that

\(^3\) DeVoto, "Stevenson and the Independent Voter," p. 66.
'politics' and 'politician' are so often epithets and words of disrespect and contempt, and not without justification, in the land of Jefferson and in a government by the governed.4

It was at this stage of Stevenson's career that his political philosophy seemed to jell. That philosophy was liberal, yet moderate, and was expressed in all of his later speeches. He put people above governments, and directed his ideas to their heads. His purpose in life, as revealed in his messages and speeches, was to inform, to educate, to reason with the people. His concept of government and politicians is clearly expressed in the following passage.

Government by the consent of the governed is the most difficult system of all because it depends for its success and viability on the good judgments and wise decisions of so many of us. But judgment and decision depend upon information and understanding. In matters of public policy, candidates then have the greatest responsibility of all to inform truthfully, so that the people will understand and will have the tools of good judgment and wise decision. . . . One can argue, indeed, that candidates claiming the people's confidence have even a higher mission; honestly to help man know, as St. Thomas Aquinas said, what he ought to believe; to know what he ought to desire; to know what he ought to do.5

The political philosophy that Stevenson espouses is of the highest order in the American democratic tradition. But to hold such a philosophy and to carry it out are two different matters. Stevenson, in his actions and in his public pronouncements, does carry out his expressed philosophy.

4Major Campaign Speeches, p. xviii.
5Ibid., p. xxv.
C. THE GOVERNOR

Stevenson's basic political philosophy was first expressed during his term as Governor of Illinois. He took time to explain his policies and his vetoes to the people, instructing them in his concept of government. The principle of local responsibility runs through his messages and speeches. Efficient government, honest and decent government; law enforcement; equitable treatment of social problems - Stevenson held that the solution of these critical issues of our time lies in community acceptance of responsibilities which the community now tends to evade. He repeatedly stated that he did not want Springfield to take over the control and direction of law enforcement in Illinois. All sign posts on that road, he said, point to Washington. Stevenson preached the theme that a revival of local social consciousness and responsibility is the best if not the only antidote to an expanding welfare state.

As Governor, Stevenson made unremitting efforts to establish a fair employment practices commission. He campaigned against race segregation, attacked political maneuvering that had blocked public housing, and took a firm stand on civil rights and liberties.

His classic veto of the Broyles Bill, which had the purpose of searching out subversive activities by requiring loyalty oaths of teachers and state officials, is indicative of the clear thinking of the man.
Does anyone seriously think that a real traitor will hesitate to sign a loyalty oath? Of course not. Really dangerous subversives and saboteurs will be caught by careful, constant, professional investigation, not by pieces of paper.

The whole notion of loyalty inquisitions is a natural characteristic of the police state, not of democracy. Knowing his rule rests upon compulsion rather than consent, the dictator must always assume the disloyalty, not of the few but of many, and guard against it by continual inquisition and 'liquidization' of the unreliable. The democratic state, on the other hand, is based on the consent of its members. The vast majority of our people are intensely loyal, as they have amply demonstrated. To question, even by implication, the loyalty and devotion of a large group of citizens is to create an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which is neither justified, healthy nor consistent with our traditions.

But we cannot suppress thought and expression and preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. This is our dilemma. In time of danger we seek to protect ourselves from sedition, but in doing so we imperil the very freedoms we seek to protect. In the long run evil ideas can be counteracted and conquered not by laws, but by better ideas.

I know that to veto this bill in this period of grave anxiety will be unpopular with many. But I must, in good conscience, protest against any unnecessary suppression of our ancient rights as free men. Moreover, we will win the contest of ideas that afflicts the world not by suppressing these rights, but by their triumph. We must not burn down the house to kill the rats.

D. THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

The assured and unmistakable authority of a major voice in American politics became apparent to astute observers during Stevenson's term as Governor. As his name was bandied about in the 1952
pre-convention ballyhoo, excerpts of his wit and political ideas attracted the attention of many of the electorate. These little gems of Stevenson's philosophy might well become part of our literature. One of them is, "Socrates said the unexamined life is not worth living. We who believe in democracy may just as truly say that the unexamined government is not worth having."

As a presidential candidate, Stevenson attracted the independent voters, many of whom had already voiced their support of Eisenhower. The Reporter, for example, came out for the Republican nominee as early as November, 1951; yet it switched to Stevenson in September, 1952.

As head of our nation, we thought, he (Eisenhower) could at the same time represent the American people and the broader allied constituency that has no vote but whose very survival is interwoven with ours. But like a very large number of citizens, we were not prepared for what came to pass soon after the General started campaigning.

The independent vote is often the deciding factor in our elections, and indeed, it won the last five. The Gallup Poll reported the number of independent voters in 1952 as 23 per cent of the electorate. Many of these independents, however, were prepared to abandon the Democratic allegiance they had maintained for twenty years and to return a Republican administration. The independents were hoping that the twentieth-century Republicans would succeed in getting Eisen-

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8 The Washington Post, July 22, 1956, p. 3.
hower nominated. Their intention to support a Republican was contingent on there being one who could guarantee that the foreign policy of the United States would remain intact. The liberal faith in Eisenhower, however, broke against the hard fact that his administration would have to make decisions about domestic policies which would support, cripple, or kill the foreign policy for which Eisenhower stood. As president, Eisenhower would have a congress controlled by the men whom it was the sole purpose of his candidacy to defeat. Our foreign policy would then be prisoner to its strongest and most vindicative opponents. By September, many independent voters, just as the editors of The Reporter, switched their allegiance to Stevenson, fearing that Eisenhower and his twentieth-century supporters would be unable to maintain the policy on which, as the General declared, the fate of the free world depends. As a political candidate for the presidency, Stevenson attracted the independent voter by his intelligence and courage, and by his way of expressing basic convictions.9

"Let's talk sense to the American People," was the keynote of Stevenson's acceptance of the nomination, and it was the keynote of his campaign. The Democratic nominee viewed the campaign not as a crusade to exterminate the opposition, "but as a great opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership, not alone of a rich, prosperous, contented country, but of a world in ferment."

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He urged his party to tell the people the truth. "Better we lose the
election than mislead the people."

In the 1952 campaign, Stevenson tried to revitalize a basic
assumption of democracy: that honest political leadership despises
the easy road to popularity and insists on focusing attention on
reality and truth, however distasteful. The politician's appeal,
stripped of its high-sounding platitudes and phony idealism, is usually
nothing more than crass emotionalism. Instead of trying to stimulate
generosity, fellowship, and civic pride, the candidate for office
addresses himself to cupidity, bigotry, clannishness and fear. From
the beginning, Stevenson's campaign was out of the ordinary. His
opening announcement that he intended to talk sense seemed just a
new gimmick, dreamed up by a clever gag-writer. But when Stevenson
actually talked frankly and honestly about the issues, many people
sat up and began to listen.

It was the very manner of Stevenson's utterance - his humi-
liness, his humor, his quiet reasonableness, the dignity of a man
who addressed his countrymen without condescending vulgarities,
on the high level that benefits a serious occasion. Listening
to Stevenson, one feels close once more to the core of the
American tradition. He seemed to banish self-induced fear,
malevolent suspicion, sourrilous accusation, irrational hatred,
hateful irrationality; those dark projections, mirror-images
of their counterpart in Soviet Russia, sank back into the
turbid waters of the American unconsciousness.

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10 Major Campaign Speeches, p. xxvi.

11 "What Stevenson Started," The New Republic, CXXVIII (January
such praise may be superlative, but it is indicative of the reaction to Stevenson and his speeches. For all the lightness of his manner, Stevenson spoke as one given to reflection and moral judgment, aware of the human need for purposes beyond material success or physical survival. He caught and held the respect of many of our foremost thinkers. Stevenson defined a free country as one in which it is safe to be unpopular. He declared that it was his guiding concern to see man stand up in the dignity of reason, to take his place as a being of sentience and nobility in the sight of God. His wisdom and moderation are apparent in his argument that intemperate criticism is not a policy for the nation, denunciation is not a program for salvation.

While addressing his remarks to his hearers, Stevenson seldom condescended to them. He kept his remarks on a high plane of principle, believing that candidates should not treat the electorate as fourteen-year-olds but as adults, challenging them with the assumption that they should and can and will respond to the appeal of reason and imagination.

As a citizen of Illinois steeped in the Lincoln tradition, at his best he has shown Lincoln-wise that behind his humor and eloquence lie a Lincolnian melancholy and mysticism. As a graduate of Princeton and a close student of Wilson, he has in his more important addresses brought to politics an attitude of mind unknown since Wilson's day. Stevenson reveals through his speeches that he is an intellectual.

Brown, "The General, the Governor, the Grassroots," p. 41.
At a Town Hall luncheon in Los Angeles, during a speech on the responsibility of voters, he referred to Disraeli, Shaw, Plato and the London Times Literary Supplement. In Richmond, Virginia, he touched upon the problems of the South with great frankness and understanding, but was no less prepared to discuss Southern literature and the Constitution of the Confederacy. What is more, in his discussion of Southern writing he did not stop with Gone With the Wind, but included Ellen Glasgow and William Faulkner. When he addressed the American Federation of Labor in New York, though he won many loud and often easy laughs and an ovation, he confessed his speech was intended for the heads, not the hands, of his audience. It is to the heads of the voters that he again and again addressed himself. To reach their thoughts, his whole concern as a candidate was, as he said at Quantico, to find the right words, the true, faithful, explicit words, which would make the issues plain and his position on those issues clear.

No defeated candidate in modern political history increased in stature during a campaign as much as Stevenson. It is notable that the newspapers of England and France shifted from their early endorsement of Eisenhower to an enthusiastic backing of Stevenson. The reason for the shift to Stevenson lies in the expression of his ideas. He consistently discussed the issues of the campaign, candidly and frankly. Moreover, Stevenson discussed them more intelligently than his opponent. Eisenhower fell down on the issues as the campaign progressed, ignoring basic issues and speaking in generalities. The Republican nominee's position on the issues was confused and tended
towards sectional partisanship. His endorsement and support of reactionaries within the Republican party - the Taft wing, including McCarthy and Jenner - alienated liberals in this country and abroad. Eisenhower revealed his lack of political knowledge early in the campaign, and the charge that his speeches were ghost-written hurt his ethical appeal. As the campaign wore on, Eisenhower acted more like a politician eager to get into office than as a statesman. His speeches dealt sketchily with many topics, whereas Stevenson as a general rule reserved one topic for each speech.

In a study of campaign speeches covering a period of thirty-six years, Donald Hayworth concludes that political candidates spend very little time in a fair or logical discussion of questions concerning government policy. Stevenson certainly is an exception to that conclusion. He made the discussion of the issues the fundamental basis of his campaign. This was Stevenson's personal decision, and he conducted the campaign in that manner because he thought it was "right and proper." He believed that the public had the right to know where he stood on all questions. He also believed that straightforwardness and candor were right - morally right. In one speech he said, "I could have no better epitaph than 'the man who put candid in candidate.'"

Not a politician like Harry Truman, Stevenson considered the

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14 Stevenson interview.
issues on a statesmanlike plane. He made an honest effort to state the facts as he saw them, looking at both sides. Not even FDR did this. Stevenson is not a debater or a mud-slinger, nor does he cheapen himself by offering gimmicks. Early in August, 1952, he decided to go to Korea if elected. Although the announcement of such a plan was worth a million votes, he rejected it, fearing that it might be construed as a political gesture. Stevenson, no opportunist, decided in favor of maintaining integrity. Eisenhower, on the other hand, accepted the advice of his aides that such an announcement would be politically expedient. The Republican nominee's statement in September that he would go to Korea if elected, rated newspaper headlines throughout the nation. In this instance Stevenson handled the situation as Demosthenes might have done, refusing to accept the gain of expediency at the price of moral principle.

E. THE STATESMAN

The years following the election of 1952 have seen a further maturing of Adlai Stevenson. He has not sunk into oblivion with defeat, but rather has risen to new heights in the role of a statesman. His has been the voice of a wise, mature, and cultivated American. Both political parties can admire a man who combines the qualities of Jefferson and Lincoln. "His speeches are not immoderate and impractical in their wisdom. They breathe the tempered, classic spirit of

15 *Major Campaign Speeches*, p. xxvii.
a philosopher who knows that we cannot 'hurry history.'”

Since 1952, Stevenson has become a better politician. He has made perceptible changes in his campaign approach, and the changes are likely to be more perceptible as the 1956 campaign progresses. In 1952, Stevenson’s idea of campaigning was to spend the bulk of his time working up and polishing a series of speeches, which he then delivered with pride and loving care in strategic cities. Today, Stevenson is meeting political leaders, showing up at unlikely places to shake hands with the electorate, and performing all those rites which touch the heart of a county leader.

Stevenson has also moved far in the direction of professionalism. Not long after his defeat, he took on the task of raising funds to offset the deficit his campaign had incurred for the Democratic party. In the process, he endeared himself to party workers as he had not succeeded in doing in 1952. The Stevenson campaign today is a potent blend of the amateur and the professional.17

A statesman is not only one who is skilled in the art and principles of government, but is especially one who treats the affairs of state with wisdom. As the titular head of the Democratic party since 1952, Stevenson has conducted a policy of loyal and constructive opposition. His role of a statesman is best expressed in his


own words on the subject of criticism.

If I were asked to choose a single principle which underlines more than any other the difference between the communist and the free philosophy of government, I would be inclined to single out this issue of criticism, which we in the West not only tolerate but esteem. . . . Criticism is simply the method by which existing ideas and institutions are submitted to the test of principles, ideas, ideals, and possibilities. Criticism, in the fairest and most honest form, is the attempt to test whether what is, might not be better. 18

Applying this definition of criticism, Stevenson has not hesitated to attack the Republican administration when he believes it to be wrong. However, his attacks have not been out of partisan politics, but rather out of a role as statesman. The Democratic party, he has stated, must contribute more than epithets, smears, and witchhunts to the solution of our country's problems. As Americans first and Democrats second, he called for support of the administration, "if only because of the crises we all face together in the world." At a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner in New York on February 14, 1953, Stevenson called on all Democrats to give the Republican experiment of government by businessmen a thorough and fair test. 19

Stevenson has spoken out on the great issues of the age and the hour, domestic and international. On almost every one of today's problems he has given fearless and reasoned counsel. He has examined our foreign policy in Europe and Asia, the crisis in farming, the


mutually cooperative roles of government and business, conservation of resources, freedom and conformity. He has spoken on these subjects with a statesmanship that offers hope instead of despair, a constructive program and not a negative critique. On the Eisenhower-Dulles proposal of a "psychological" offensive against the Russians, Stevenson said that we are only deluding ourselves if we think that a few words uttered on the short-wave radio will cause the Red regime to shatter and disintegrate. "A few blasts on the trumpets of psychological warfare" will not cause "the walls to come tumbling down." He also noted that we will "frighten no Russians" by threatening financial sanctions against our Allies. 20

When the Army-McCarthy debate raged on television and in the newspapers, Stevenson spoke out against mccarthyism at a Democratic dinner in Miami Beach on March 7, 1954. Arguing that "those who live by the sword of slander also may perish by it," he noted that it was now being used against distinguished Republicans as well as other public servants. However, Stevenson did not attack McCarthy as much as he attacked the distrust and suspicion, the false charges and innuendoes that were part and parcel of mccarthyism.

This system of ours is wholly dependent upon a mutual confidence in the loyalty, the patriotism, the integrity of purpose of both parties. Extremism produces extremism, lies beget lies. The infection of bitterness and hatred spreads all too quickly in these anxious days from one area of our life to another. . . .

20 Ibid., p. 6.
When demagoguery and deceit become a national political movement, we Americans are in trouble; not just Democrats, but all of us.21

The argument that Stevenson offers is not one of a politician gleefully probing a chink in the opposition's armor, but rather of a thoughtful American looking beyond issue to principle.

It is in the field of foreign policy, however, that Stevenson has spoken out most often and most clearly. He has shown increasing concern with the steadily rising communist influence in Asia, and the loss of American prestige in that area. Recognizing that the responsibility for a solution to the Asian problem rested with the Republican administration, he nevertheless felt it was his duty as a loyal American to suggest some steps for a sensible policy. In New Orleans on December 4, 1954, Stevenson argued that the first step in a sensible Asian policy is to take Asia out of party politics. The second step should be to recognize the limitations of our military power in any situation short of a world war, he stated. It is folly to assume we can somehow painlessly bring about the collapse of world communism through the good offices of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee. While not openly advocating recognition of Red China, Stevenson recognized that we must live with her unless we are prepared to embark on a war of liberation. It is interesting to note the current revelation that Eisenhower has thought along the same lines, but feared

that he could not openly express that opinion. In this particular instance, Stevenson served the country well by bringing the issue out in the open for public discussion. The third step Stevenson proposed for a sensible Asian policy is that we must face the fact that security and freedom in much of the world depends more on economic progress than military defense. "The number one problem in Asia today is not Communism but that millions of people want a better life and have discovered that poverty, hunger, and pestilence are not the immutable destiny of man."  

When a Chinese Communist invasion of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu appeared imminent in the Spring of 1955, Stevenson spoke frankly and fearlessly against the administration's policy. In a radio address from Chicago on April 11, 1955 he said that the administration had hinted at intervention in Indo-China and then backed away; when the Chinese Communists made menacing gestures in 1954, the administration backed down on its pledge to protect Formosa and forced Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Tachen islands. Such vacillation, he stated, has brought us to a bitter consequence:

either another damaging and humiliating retreat, or else the hazard of war, modern war, unleashed not by necessity, not by strategic judgment, not by the honor of allies or for the defense of frontiers, but by a policy based more on political

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difficulties here at home than the realities of our situation in Asia.24

Stevenson voiced his misgiving about risking a third World War in defense of Matsu and Quemoy when we would have neither the same legal justification nor the same support as in the defense of Formosa. He pointed out that the islands are different from Formosa, for they have always belonged to China. While many educated and thinking people have felt the same way as Stevenson, it is only in the last year that the American public has seemed to come around to that view. The administration has not officially clarified its policy, nor has it changed it.

Following the resumption of the cold war after the high hopes at the Geneva conference in July, Stevenson warned in Chicago on November 19, 1955, that we should have learned some lessons by now. The cold war is still on, he said, and our security system is deteriorating while our hope for a safe and orderly world is still a distant goal. We should have learned that "peace and security cannot be had for the asking, or by slogans and tough talk, or by blowing alternately hot and cold, rash and prudent." We should also have learned, he stated, that sound foreign policies cannot be devised with one eye fixed on the budget and the other on the divisions in the Republican party. We should have learned too, "that in the fluctuating markets

of world affairs there is no bargain basement where peace is for sale cheap."

Stevenson did not just criticize or point out failure alone, however. He proposed some guiding principles for this nation to follow in its conduct of foreign affairs. He urged that we restore the balance between our strength and our concern in the world. We need to maintain our military forces, but "martial strength is not an end in itself." It should be a base from which we can negotiate whenever negotiation seems fruitful. We must also add a refreshed concern for our less fortunate neighbors, he said. We must play a generous part in the bettering of the human lot, and we should do so not just to compete with communism, nor to preserve colonialism, nor to impose Americanism. "We must make the world understand again what it once knew - that at the roots of our faith we recognize that we belong, all of us, to the family of Man."

During the 1952 campaign and since, Stevenson has accomplished much. A world traveler, author, lecturer, public speaker, philosopher, and a statesman, he has gained a niche of world respect. He has been extremely successful in getting people to listen to him, and in many cases, getting them to think. This latter ability indicates that Stevenson proposes the kind of leadership that through the ages has been held to be the best.

In summary, good speechmaking comes partly from sheer hard work, but mainly it comes from good ideas. In Stevenson's case, his ideas are the by-product of his constant preoccupation with the subject-matter of the speeches, his unceasing search for the essential issues and truths in the vast confusion of problems and arguments that crowd in upon every public man. By keeping the essentials of his subject-matter relatively simple, Stevenson is able to talk understandingly to the common man about highly complicated issues. His search for essentials has been accomplished in determining principles of action. It has been done not only through deep and anguished thinking, evening after evening of work, but in the furnace of events. He has had to make up his mind on a vast range of American political and governmental issues. Once Stevenson finds the right principles, he adheres to them. Although compromise is of the essence in a democratic government, he has learned how to compromise without surrendering principle. Adlai Stevenson is today not only a better politician than he was in 1952, but he has become a new American statesman.
CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The 1952 campaign speeches of Adlai Stevenson, analyzed in the light of Aristotelian principles, reveal the method and characteristics of his speaking. Five speeches, chosen as representative of the campaign, have been intensively examined. A summation of the findings of this study follows.

A. SUMMARY

Training in eloquence. Governor Stevenson never formally studied rhetoric, although he joined the Whig-Cliosophic Debating Society at Princeton University. He achieved his skill in speaking in the hard school of experience, principally through his work in the 1930's with the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Although he boasts that he is devoid of training in rhetorical theory, Stevenson has gained a clear insight into the principles of public address.

The Governor was influenced through family heritage and tradition to turn to law and inevitably to politics. His grand-father was Vice-President of the United States and his father was also active in politics. Stevenson's early family association with William Jennings Bryan, Woodrow Wilson, and other political notables, and his work in the outer fringes of the New Deal, helped shape the pattern of his basic beliefs and ideas.
Style. Stevenson's oral style may be classified as middle, neither plain nor grand. It is characterized by perspicuity, adornment and wit. Clarity is the keynote of his style. Although he tends to rely on compound and complex sentences, his meaning is always clear. His ornament consists primarily of contrast and comparison, involving metaphor and simile. In general, Stevenson employs more ornament when speaking on broad themes such as patriotism, communism or liberty of conscience than when discussing specific topics such as labor laws or farm policy.

Stevenson's wit is of three kinds: the anecdote to warm up a "cold" audience, which he employed to a great extent in his introductions; satire, which he relied upon to attack the Republican party in general and Eisenhower in particular; and the bon mot, the best and most difficult kind of humor.

Delivery. Stevenson is an interesting and provocative speaker, but he is no orator in the classical sense. He possesses a weak voice which hinders his speaking without a public address system. However, he has a pleasing radio voice. In speaking, he seems to be gently pleading for acceptance of his ideas, rather than dogmatically stating them. His dependence upon a manuscript interferes with his eye contact, but the directness of his glance when he does look at his audience and the earnestness of his manner command respect. At times his facial expression is rather bland, but usually it complements what he is saying.
The Governor's physical delivery is poor. He rarely uses his hands for gestures, and when he does, his gestures are awkward. He tends to keep his elbows at his sides and makes tentative, half-finished gestures. Leaning forward from the waist to make a point, he emphasizes key words with his body. When not encumbered by a lectern, he often tilts backward and forward on the balls of his feet. The practice calls attention to itself, and distracts his hearers.

Speech preparation. During the 1952 campaign, Stevenson relied upon a research team to advise him on points of policy and to submit material for his speeches. Although the Governor insists that he wrote all of his speeches, there is evidence that as the campaign progressed he depended upon his research team for whole drafts, which he rewrote, polished, and adapted to his own style. Four men were the major writers on the research team, although others occasionally assisted. Arthur M. Schesinger, Jr., historian, William W. Wirtz, labor adviser, David G. Bell, White House aide, and Robert W. Tufts, former State Department economist, composed the group. Stevenson personally wrote all of his "whistle stop" speeches.

The Governor does not ordinarily rehearse his speeches due to the lack of time, and this was particularly true of his campaign speeches. He read all of his speeches from a manuscript. Stevenson's manuscripts are in large type, with the key words underscored so that he can get the thought of a sentence at a glance. Lack of rehearsal and just glancing at his manuscript has led to his deviations from
Invention. The best and most striking feature of Stevenson's speaking is his discovery and use of the means of persuasion. He relies primarily upon his own ideas and experiences for the discovery of his subject-matter. The Governor closely follows Aristotelian advice in employing artistic proof, that is, proof furnished through his own efforts.

Stevenson's speeches are strong in ethical proof, that which is derived from his character. Gaining the trust of his hearers, his speeches make him seem worthy of belief. He relies on his own authority drawn from his wide personal experience, for he is his own best expert, and does not need to quote others for support. Stevenson is adept at identifying himself with his hearers and their problems. His excellent introductions demonstrate his ability to gain the good will of his listeners, even when they are opposed to a particular plank in his platform. Through all of his speeches runs the theme that he is taking the position that will do the most good for all the people. Stevenson consistently associates himself and his party with that which is right and virtuous. Relying upon plain common sense for many of his arguments, his speeches reveal him as an honest man, seeking to do what is right and just. Stevenson does not take a position solely for political advantage, nor for just a day. He can stand on his words with a clear conscience. This is the mark of the "good man" Quintilian presupposes for his ideal orator. Stevenson's
speeches reveal him to be possessed of intellectual integrity and wisdom, and that fact drew the educated voter to him.

Governor Stevenson's character is revealed in his speeches, and it is thus an artistic proof. Eisenhower's speeches, on the other hand, do little to reveal his character, and in fact, actually detract from it. The General employs inartistic proof, depending upon his previously established reputation for ethical proof.

Emotional proof is present in Stevenson's speeches as he tries to put his listeners in a receptive mood for his ideas. In the early part of the campaign, July through September, he appealed most often to the emotions belonging to the higher order of justice, honor and nobility. Occasionally, he appealed to the stronger emotions of fear and personal gain, but his appeals were more implied than explicit. In the last month of the campaign, Stevenson changed his tactics and made more obvious appeals to fear, anger, hate and personal gain. The one emotion to which he appealed most often and with the most success was fear, and especially in the form of another depression if the Republicans were elected. However, Stevenson did not go overboard in his emotional appeals, keeping them generally restrained.

For logical proof, Stevenson follows Aristotle by employing both examples and enthymemes. Supporting most of his arguments with examples based on historical parallel, he occasionally presents examples based on the invented parallel, which take the form of a comparison. His speeches are weighted with examples which illustrate and support his meaning. There is no evidence in the five speeches that Stevenson
employs examples based on fables, which Aristotle also recommends
the speaker to use for logical proof.

Stevenson often supports his arguments with enthymemes, preferring
the demonstrative enthymeme to prove his point, although he will use
the refutative enthymeme in replying to his opponent's specific charges.
His demonstrative enthymemes are usually drawn from the topoi of
opposites, correlative terms and induction, while his refutative enthym-
memes are typically drawn from the topoi of altered choices and con-
flicting facts. Stevenson has a special knack, akin to Lincoln's,
for using the maxim. He will on occasion follow up his discussion
of an idea by succinctly stating a moral which neatly ties his argument
together.

The themes of Stevenson's arguments are based on signs and
probabilities from history, from which he draws inferences for the
future from what has gone on in the past. His speeches, four years
later, are still pertinent for they deal with the philosophy of govern-
ment. Eisenhower's arguments had no theme, but were based on the
momentary issues timely only in 1952. There is no political philosophy
apparent in Eisenhower's speeches.

Arrangement. Stevenson's introductions tend to be lengthy,
with several anecdotes to warm up his audiences and to gain their
good will. His introductions also serve to arouse prejudice against
his opponent through the use of satire, and occasionally to remove
prejudice against him previously aroused by his opponent. Stevenson
likes to establish his authority to speak on the subject of the address in his introduction. He does not state the specific purpose of his speech, but he does state the subject. His introductions are usually well planned, and they are effective in gaining attention and interest.

In the body of the speech, Stevenson usually develops his subject in one to three main ideas. Frequently, his ideas are composed in a problem-solution order. In the discussion of the problem, or first main idea, Stevenson narrates the facts of the case at issue, stating the actions that give rise to the issue, and stressing the importance of the issue. While the narration of the case varies in length from speech to speech, it is not brief nor over-long. It is just enough to make matters plain.

In the arrangement of his arguments, Stevenson invariably places first the one in which he either disagrees with or rebukes his listeners. Succeeding arguments are more favorable to his audience, and the last argument is typically the strongest. Thus the arrangement of his arguments is generally in a climactic pattern. The proof that Stevenson employs in his argument bears directly on the point at issue. He does not deny the charges made against the Truman administration. His refutation, instead, takes several forms: one, he argues that the action in question was justified at the time; or two, that the harm done was less than alleged; or three, that the opposition is either equally culpable or mainly responsible. Stevenson's refutation of the charges is Aristotelian, omitting only the denial of the act.
In his refutation of the solutions to the issues offered by the Republicans, Stevenson argues that the proposals will either do no good or will worsen the situation. Argument by enthymeme is the form of proof Stevenson employs in his refutation of his opponent's solutions, and in support of his own. In refuting the charges of his opponents, he relies mainly on examples, although he does not overlook enthymemes.

The overall effect of Stevenson's proof is to support his ideas. There is a unity and coherence about his proof that make his argument closely knit and well-reasoned. However, there is a lack of adequate transition between his ideas. Occasionally he employs a question as a transitional device, but at other times the transition is not smooth. He seldom uses restatement to show where he has been, and the lack of it is a weakness in the structure of his oratory.

The conclusions of Stevenson's speeches are well constructed, containing motivating appeals to do what is right, fair and noble. His speeches end on a note of hope, confidence, and unity. Stevenson does not, however, appeal for action in support of his candidacy, and this failure may well have weakened the partisan advantage gained in his argument. He also failed to recapitulate his arguments, and the lack of a summary is also a weakness in his oratory.

B. CONCLUSIONS

Adlai Stevenson started the 1952 campaign with two strikes against him. First, he was a political unknown running against a
candidate whose name was a household word. Second, he fought an uphill battle against the prejudice of the Catholic Church and the social stigma attached to his divorce. The fact that his former wife and her influential friends openly supported the Republican nominee did not help his cause. In spite of it all, Stevenson bore up well under the pressure.

On the basis of this study, the following conclusions are offered.

1. Although Stevenson never formally studied rhetoric, he unknowingly exemplifies its theory. He is instinctively a wise man in speaking, learning and sensing the right thing to do - then doing it.

2. Stevenson's virtue as a speaker lies in his inventiveness and in his stylistic capacity. His insistence on discussing the basic issues in the campaign, his bold stand for what he thinks is right instead of what is expedient attracted the educated voter. Stevenson closely follows the precepts of Aristotle in the discovery and employment of his proof, and the expression of his ideas in a highly literate style makes his speeches read well years later. This combination, plus the fact that he discussed issues which are still paramount today, accounts for the phenomenal sales both in this country and abroad of the collections of his speeches.

3. Stevenson assumed that he was talking to an educated audience. Although his introductions make reference to the audience and the occasion, he addressed his ideas to intellectuals and independent
thinkers. He was often guilty of the charge of speaking over the heads of his hearers. In the last month of the campaign, Stevenson changed his tactics and took a more down-to-earth approach. In contrast, Truman, in his campaign speeches, assumed that his audiences were composed of dyed-in-the-wool Democrats.

4. Stevenson used more emotional proof than is generally known, appealing to justice, honor, nobility, fear, anger, and personal gain. Because his major appeals were to the higher order of emotions, they were not recognized as such by his hearers.

5. Stevenson’s humor was not overdone in the campaign. His anecdotes were excellent in gaining good will, and his satire was extremely effective in refutation. The bon mots were artistic in construction, for they were based on partial maxims or disjointed enthymemes.

6. The introductions and conclusions of Stevenson’s speeches are powerful. They are a planned, integral part of the whole. The Governor is well aware of the value of gaining rapport with an audience, and his lengthy introductions reveal his successful attempts to gain good will. His conclusions are on a high ethical plane, with an optimistic note for the future. They contain appeals to righteousness, honor, and justice, but they lack summaries and appeals for action.

7. Stevenson has a large share in his speech writing process and he is admired because of it. Even when forced to rely upon a research team for material, he still casts it into his own mold. The personal stamp on all of his speeches sets him apart from other
speakers of this day and age.

8. Stevenson does not cheapen himself by offering political "gimmicks." He is no opportunist, preferring instead to maintain his integrity. That he rejected publication of his projected trip to Korea if elected cost him votes with the electorate when Eisenhower subsequently announced his intention, but it made votes for Stevenson among the educated voters.

9. Although Governor Stevenson had an excellent background and training in foreign affairs, he had a difficult job mastering the details of recent foreign policy. In this field Eisenhower was better prepared, particularly through his service as commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whereas Stevenson was forced to rely upon infrequent briefings by the State Department.

10. Matured politically by the 1952 campaign, Stevenson has become more of a statesman and less a politician in contrast to the change in Eisenhower. Demonstrating his ability to grow, Stevenson's speeches since 1952 have increased his stature. He has not hesitated to "tag" Secretary of State Dulles when the latter is "off-base." Stevenson, the eager candidate for the 1956 Democratic presidential nomination, is a different man than the reluctant candidate of 1952. Today as a candidate, Stevenson is more adept with political realities, and he is not unmindful of his opponents as he was in September, 1952. Showing more concern for his immediate audience, he pays attention to the petty things that count in campaigns, such as the friendly mingling with voters in unlikely places and unstinted handshaking.
In conclusion, both presidential nominees were honest and sincere men in the 1952 campaign, but Eisenhower was the better known of the two. There is no question but that Stevenson was the better speaker, however. He discussed the issues more intelligently, his speeches were better organized and better supported, and his style was much superior to Eisenhower's. Stevenson was also the better candidate. He was better prepared through political experience and training, better prepared through the understanding of the issues confronting the nation, and he was better prepared in the understanding and espousal of a pre-determined political philosophy.

Why then, wasn't Stevenson elected? In the 1952 campaign, minds apparently had been made up from the beginning for the change which so many seemed to want so much. Any other year against any other candidate Stevenson might have won. The amazing fact is not that he lost, but that, handicapped by Eisenhower's enormous personal popularity, by the record of the Truman administration, and by a comparative lack of campaign funds, a newcomer on the national scene could have polled more than twenty-seven million votes in a total count of sixty-one million.

Two studies of the trends that elected Eisenhower agree on several factors. Although thirteen million more persons voted in 1952 than in 1948, both studies leave no doubt that Democratic defections

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supplied the margin of Eisenhower's victory. One of every four of Truman's 1948 supporters switched to Eisenhower. The one effective issue favoring the Democrats was the fear of another depression, but this did not overcome the personal confidence Eisenhower inspired or the anger stirred over Korea. Curiously, in view of all the agitation over Senator McCarthy, both studies agree that the issue of communist infiltration in Washington was relatively unimportant in the voting. Another revealing factor was that one-third of the people sampled split their ballots in 1952, indicating that the trend away from the Democratic party is not deep-seated. In fact, in the next few years we may see the nation politically deadlocked, since neither party has a real majority.²

Two questions arise which require further study, but which ought to concern all of us. First, is the "good man skilled in speaking" enough to win in our political campaigns? Second, are we as a people ready for or really want an "intellectual" approach to the problems of the nation?

As a public speaker, Adlai Stevenson has demonstrated that he considers the issues on a statesmanlike plane. He is no politician seeking partisan advantage, for he makes an honest effort to state the facts as he sees them. No debater or mud-slinger, he is a discusser who sees both sides of an issue, and is not afraid to state the arguments

Stevenson is an intellectual who essentially brought information to the electorate. He has the peculiar ability to size up a difficult rhetorical problem and discover the various ways of treating the subject. His most creditable feature is that he is not an improviser, adapter, or spur-of-the-moment speaker, and his habit of reflection sets him apart from other speakers. Stevenson's speeches have an indelible national stamp upon them. He is a statesman because he puts first what is best for the nation, not what is best for a section of the country or what is best for Adlai Stevenson.
Let me say at the outset that I am very much flattered indeed, by the presence here of his honor the Mayor of Detroit. I am conscious of your recent serious illness, Mr. Cobo, and I trust that your participation in this tremendous holiday festivity and your association with so many Democrats won't cause any relapse.

I stand before you today as a fugitive from a sweatshop down in Springfield, Illinois. Down there the speed-up is in full force, but we aren't complaining a bit. In fact, we like it because we believe in our job and our job is to win in November.

This, my friends, is Labor Day of an election year, and I think candidates ought to get a day off too. But if they got off they might not get in. So I've welcomed the invitation to come to Detroit to talk to you about the relationship between the Democratic Party, which I represent, and the working people, which you represent.

Contrary to the impressions fostered by some of the press, you are not my captives, and I am not your captive. On the contrary, I might as well make it clear right now that I intend to do exactly what I think right and best for all of us—business, labor, agriculture—alike. And I have no doubt that you will do exactly what you think right and best at the election.
You are freeborn Americans—a proud and honorable station, carrying with it the right and the responsibility to make up your own minds—and so am I. So if either of us thinks in terms of captivity, let's agree right here and now on a mutual pact of liberation.

The interest and the obligation of the President must be the common interest. His concern for labor, as for industry, is only as a part of the common interest. I would intend to honor that office by complete freedom to serve not one man or a few, but the whole nation. And I think that is precisely what you would want me to do.

The relationship between the Democratic Party and the working people of America is a very simple one. We both believe in equal rights for all and in special privileges for none. We both believe that the objective of our country and of its Government is to achieve human decency, to meet human needs, and fulfill human hopes.

We take honest open pride in what the tremendous progress of the last twenty years has meant, not for the Democratic Party, but for the whole nation. We pulled ourselves, as you know, out of the quicksand of depression. In fighting an awful war we did our part and we did it gloriously.

We have made America the best place to live and work in the world has ever known—a land where men are assured a decent wage and security when their work is done; a land where the mother can know that her children's opportunities are bright and limitless.

But these things, my friends, are not permanent. They have to be fought for, fought for by each succeeding generation. So it's
my obligation, I think, to give you my ideas of our common interests, my thoughts about our common future.

I see three sets of common interests in the labor field. These are positive interests, constructive interests. We have talked, it seems to me, too much in terms of labor wars, too little in terms of labor peace, too much in terms of stopping things by law, too little in terms of establishing industrial democracy.

There is our first common interest in securing to all who work the minimums of human decency. This means, among other things, that the men and women in our working force, some 62,000,000 of us, shall receive a decent living wage, insurance against the risks of disability and unemployment, and the assurance of solid, not token, security when life's work is done.

It means, too, that we must struggle tirelessly to add to these assurances, equality of work opportunity for every one of us—regardless of race, of color or of creed. Human decency is the theme of our history and the spirit of our religion. We must never cease trying to write its guarantees not just into our laws, but into the hearts and the minds of men.

A second key to our common interest is that the men and women in our working force are consumers as well as producers.

Our welfare is not measured by what we get from the payroll clerk, but by what we get at the store and the school and the hospital, and by what we have left to put in the bank. Meeting such problems as inflation, as housing and the high cost of living, is not part of
a labor policy, it's part of a national policy. It's not just part of a labor program because it's part of a national problem.

The working man cannot and must not think of his welfare as something separate and apart from the common good. The interests of the factory worker, the white-collar worker, the employer, the farmer, are all rooted in the soil of national well-being. If your employer's business fails, for example, you are out of a job. We are utterly dependent on one another, and what is best for the nation is best for all of us and is best for each of us.

Our third common interest is in the process of collective bargaining—the keystone of industrial democracy, of free enterprise.

Democracy is working when free men solve their own problems in their own way and in their own political and industrial communities. The 80,000,000 private collective bargaining agreements today in effect are alternatives to laws—and better than laws.

They are voluntary private solutions which make unnecessary involuntary government decisions. They prove that the most useful thing the Government can do is to assure a fair bargaining balance by guaranteeing to employees the right to act together.

The only legitimate purpose of a Federal labor relations law is to make private bargaining work better. And that purpose has not, in my judgment, been served by the Taft-Hartley Act.

Now, in 1947, we needed some revisions of the old Wagner Act. We needed some new rules for labor peace. Well, we got a new law all right—tangled snarl of legal barbed wire, filled with ugly sneers
at labor unions and built around the discredited labor injunction.

I don't say that everything in the Taft-Hartley Act is wrong. It isn't, and I don't think it's a slave labor law, either. But I do say that it was biased and politically inspired and has not improved labor relations in a single plant.

We must have a new law and my conclusion is that we can best remedy the defects in the old law by scrapping it and starting over again. What should be retained from the old law can best be written into the new law after the political symbolism of the Taft-Hartley Act is behind us.

Now, if I may, I—and I hope I don't impose upon you—I should like to suggest five general principles as the basis for a new labor relations law. I believe they represent the public interest in a fair, solid, durable pattern of free collective bargaining. And I think labor and management can agree on them too, if they'll only throw their guns on the table.

Point number one is that the law must accept labor unions, like employer corporations, as the responsible representatives of their members' interests.

The Taft-Hartley Act assumed that the unions could not be trusted to determine whether their members wanted a union shop. After the expenditure of millions of dollars to hold thousands of Government-conducted elections, in 95 per cent of which the employees voted for the union shop, the Congress last year finally repealed this gratuitous insult to the labor unions.
But the act still prohibits other forms of union security arrangements developed over many years by labor and management together in such cases as the maritime industry, the building trades and the printing trades.

The Congress arbitrarily said, "We know better than unions what is good for employees." The result could have been predicted. Today several thousand employers and several million employees are operating under bootleg agreements in flagrant violation of the statute.

Point number two is the other side of point number one. If labor unions are to be accepted as the full representatives and guardians of employee interests in the collective-bargaining process, then labor unions must conform to standards of fair conduct and equal protection in the exercise of their stewardship.

A few unions, my friends, made by law the exclusive representatives of certain groups of employees, abuse that trust by excluding from membership some who want to work, denying them a vote, because of restrictive notions about employment security. That's not right.

And, my friends, that's not democracy. Unions which are given powers by Government, should be open to all on equal terms. I know it's the view and the practice of the vast majority of American unions and union members to reject any idea of second-class citizenship based on race or monopoly.

And speaking of industrial democracy, let me say that you, too, have a responsibility to participate in the affairs of your unions. The union exists for your benefit. If there is anything wrong with
it, if you don't approve of the officers, if you don't like the union's policies, if there are racketeers or communists, then it's up to you and your fellow members to do something about it. You have your own democratic cleansing process.

But you can't do it by sitting at home and complaining, any more than you can get better men in Government by staying away from the polls. Those who really work at self-government, moreover, will find deep satisfaction, and so will you.

Now number three of my suggestions is that a new Federal labor law must outlaw unfair bargaining practices by companies or unions.

The Taft-Hartley Act, like the Wagner Act, prohibits certain types of unfair labor practices by employers, such as discriminating against union members or forming company unions. The Taft-Hartley Act added a list of union unfair practices. The unions have protested vigorously against this addition.

Yet I think it is only common sense to acknowledge that we must forbid such practices as jurisdictional strikes, and strikes or boycotts attempting to force an employer to deal with one union when another has been certified as the representative of his employees.

It is equally clear, however, that the prohibitions in the Taft-Hartley Act are so broad and so jumbled as to outlaw proper, along with improper conduct--even, on occasion, to require union members to act as strikebreakers.

These provisions must be completely rewritten, with the intention, not of stripping unions of as much bargaining power as possible, but
only to prohibit resort to those extremes which fairminded judgment identifies as unreasonable.

Point number four is rejection of the labor injunction. We agreed to this once. In 1932, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Norris-La Guardia Act to prohibit the labor injunction. The vote was 326 to 14 in the House and 75 to 5 in the Senate.

Then, fifteen years later, in the Taft-Hartley Act, the labor injunction—the process of haphazard prejudgment—was disinterred. No showing of need was made for it, and that tyrannical power to have men and women ordered back to work in smothered silence has no place in today's labor law.

My fifth, and the last point that I presume to make to you, is that new methods must be found for settling national emergency disputes.

We are willing, as a nation, to put up with serious inconveniences when bargaining stalemates result in shutting down production. Collective bargaining is a form of free competition. And, in Justice Holmes' phrase, "free competition is worth more to society than it costs."

We cannot, however, tolerate shutdowns which threaten our national safety, even that of the whole free world. The right to bargain collectively does not include a right to stop the national economy.

The Taft-Hartley answer for this problem was the injunction. All that law boils down to is that in national emergency disputes employees shall be ordered to work for another eighty days on the employers' terms.
This remedy has been administered now nine times. Fair-minded critics have concluded that in only two of these cases did it do the slightest good. In the others it either had no effect at all or actually delayed private settlement.

I have no miracle-drug solution for this problem. I am clear, though, that where the Government must intervene in these private disputes, its purpose must be not just to stop the strike, but to see that the dispute gets settled.

I am clear, too, that the new law must recognize that these emergency cases are always different. It's a proven mistake for Congress to prescribe in advance the same old patent medicine for all of them.

What we need is a completely new law— one that will provide for investigation and reporting to the public on the issues involved, one that will provide for more effective mediation between the parties. Its purpose should be to keep these cases out of the White House, not to put them in.

But the Congress should give the President a choice of procedures, not present him with no alternative when voluntary agreement proves impossible: seizure provisions geared to the circumstances; or arbitration; or a detailed hearing and recommendation of settlement terms; or a return of the dispute to the parties.

Such a law would leave the obligation to settle these disputes where it belongs— and that's with the parties. But it would not strait-jacket this settlement process.

It would express the firm voice of a nation which demands a
fair and a quick settlement, and offers constructive help toward a solution.

Now these, my friends, are the outlines of a law consistent, it seems to me, with our democratic practices. They outline a minimum law, and a minimum law is what we need. And, I would hope, indeed, I expect that in the larger area of common agreement that exists today the representatives of labor and of management, meeting in a spirit of give and take and of sincere search for industrial peace in the national interest, could agree on such a law.

Finally, let none of us forget that labor problems are human problems. The ultimate answers do not lie in the legislator's inkpot or in the lawyer's brief.

The common denominator of all I have said today is confidence—confidence not in law or government, but in one another, in free men and free women; confidence in the private organizations they have set up, the private processes they have worked out to meet their common problems. For, if I can leave anything of certainty with you, it is that the greatest hope for industrial peace is not in laws, but in private agreements.

It's hard to remember that here in Detroit fifteen years ago a mighty industry was paralyzed, and fighting in the streets between bitter men was an imminent possibility. Today the automobile companies and the workers have a five-year contract, giving the nation an assurance of labor peace infinitely firmer than any Congress could ever supply.

My friends, when we have come so far we know we can go farther.
I am grateful for the opportunity to talk with you about national farm policies. I won't waste your time this afternoon telling you, in the political tradition, all about how I am myself a farmer. I own farm land in Illinois, and I come from a family that has lived in the heart of the Corn Belt for over a hundred years. But I am here today as a candidate for public office—not masquerading as a dirt farmer, but as a politician.

My first venture into public service was in Washington in the old Agricultural Adjustment Administration. That was in the desolate days of 1933, when the American farmer, like everybody else, was flat on his back. I do not want to suggest to anyone that we Democrats are still running against Herbert Hoover, but I am thankful for my AAA experience, because it showed me in a way I will never forget how bad conditions can get on our farms—conditions that must never occur again.

In this spirit, Democratic administrations have developed the farm policies of the last twenty years. As a result, we of this generation, who saw farm conditions at their worst in 1932, have had the happy privilege of seeing them over the last decade at their best. I am proud of the work my party has done in these twenty years to restore the American farmer to a position of equality and dignity in
our national life.

For the last three and a half years I have been Governor of a great agricultural state. In this capacity I have worked closely with farmers and farm organizations. With their help and co-operation, we have reorganized our Illinois Department of Agriculture; and, if you will forgive a commercial here at Kasson for a rival show, we have improved our great Illinois State Fair and cut the cost to the taxpayer by two-thirds. I have relied on farmers' advice in other fields too—notably school and highway legislation. We now have under way in Illinois the largest highway program since the advent of the hard road. For the first time a share of our gasoline tax is going to the townships for the rural roads.

I come to you today as the Democratic candidate for the greatest responsibility on earth—the Presidency of the United States. I am running on the Democratic platform. I believe it is a good platform. I believe its agricultural plank is clear, definite and sound. I can stand on it without squirming. I feel no need to modify this provision or that, to explain or to reinterpret, to dodge or to hedge.

And I am for this platform, above all, because I believe that its pledges are not just in the interest of the farmer—they are in the public interest. I know that the American farmers do not want, nor will they get through any effort of mine, anything more than what is justified by the larger good of the commonwealth. We can all stand on the words of the first philosopher of American agriculture, Thomas Jefferson: "Equal rights for all; special privileges for none."
A society can be no better than the men and women who compose it. The heart of any farm policy must therefore be the life of those who work the farms. Our objective is to make that life full and satisfying. We believe, as Democrats have always believed, that our society rests on an agricultural base. It is our determination to keep that base solid and healthy. Our farms must grow more than crops and livestock. They must grow what Walt Whitman described as the best bar against tyranny—"a large, resolute breed of men."

This means that farm policy must focus first on the question of farm income. This is not because farmers are more concerned with money than any other group in society. It is because farmers, like all other citizens, are entitled to a fair return for their labor and a fair chance in the world for their children. In the past, the labor of the farmer has remained the same; but his income has risen or sunk according to the unpredictable fluctuations of the market. It has been a constant objective of our Democratic farm programs to maintain farm income—and thereby to assure the farmer that he can provide food, medical care and education for his family.

The way we have chosen to maintain farm income is to support farm prices. Our platform lays this out in clear language. Here is what it says: "We will continue to protect the producers of basic agricultural commodities under the terms of a mandatory price-support program at not less than 90 per cent of parity."

There are no ifs, buts or maybes about this. And I think it is a policy that most farmers today understand and believe in. I only
wish that everybody understood it so well. One place it was clearly not understood was at the great fracas in the Chicago stockyards, two months ago, where one of the casualties was the farm plank in the Republican platform. There are, of course, two Republican Parties for agriculture as well as two Republican Parties for foreign policy and almost everything else. The General evidently decided this morning to plow under the Republican platform altogether.

As you all know, the Chicago slaughter finally ended in a cease-fire agreement. According to that agreement—better known as the Republican platform—Republican policy is "aimed"—that is their word—is "aimed" at parity levels. That phrase may have looked good in a smoke-filled room in Chicago. It isn't very clear here in the daylight in Minnesota. There is, and no one should know it better than my distinguished opponent, a vast difference between aiming at a target and hitting it.

How good is their aim anyway? Their sights were a mile off in June of this year when more than half the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against the law that extended price support at 90 per cent of parity through 1954.

If the Republican candidate says one thing, and the Republican platform says something else, and the Republican members of Congress say still another—how then can anyone tell what a Republican administration would actually do in Washington?

There should be no mystery about price supports. What our program does is to place a floor under our agricultural economy in
order to protect the farmer against sudden and violent price drops. What it does is to maintain farm income—and the farmer's purchasing power—in those uneasy moments when there is a temporary glut in the market, or when real depression threatens. By stabilizing farm income, our program maintains markets for the businessman and the worker. The total effect, obviously, is to help stabilize the whole national economy at a high level of production and employment.

I know that opponents of the program claim that price supports raise food prices for housewives. Let us examine this charge a moment. Food prices are high enough today, heaven know. But supports are not the reason. High employment and strong purchasing power—in short, prosperity—are keeping most farm prices above support levels.

What the support program does do is to encourage farmers to grow more food. You can now plant crops fairly secure in the knowledge that prices will still be good at market time. That is one reason why farm production has increased almost 50 per cent in the last twenty years. The support program thus helps to keep supply up with demand—and that is the way to keep prices from going up.

The price-support program thus does more than assure a decent life and a fair opportunity for most of our farm families. It also improves the life of the boys and girls in our cities. From your farms today food pours in a steady stream to every corner of the country. Think what this means in the terms of human lives! We are feeding thirty million more people than there were in our land in 1932; and we are giving the average American a far better diet. More than that, this
better diet costs the average person no greater share of his income after taxes than it did in 1932—if he was lucky enough to have any income, after or even before taxes, in that gloomy year.

I am not presuming for a moment to say that support at 90 per cent of parity is necessarily the permanent or only answer. Economic conditions are constantly changing and I think this program, like all our economic policies, should be constantly reappraised to determine if it is fair to the taxpayer and responsive to our needs. We are all dependent on one another and the only certainty of a stable, prosperous agriculture is a stable, prosperous nation.

The price-support program is doing a good job for the basic crops—corn, cotton, wheat, rice and the others—for which loan and storage operations are now in effect. The same protection could be accorded to other storable commodities.

For perishable products, however, such as hogs, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, these loan and storage operations do not work well. Yet these products provide about three-fourths of all the income received by farmers.

Our first line of defense for the producers of perishables is, of course, a strong economic policy that will insure, so far as it is humanly possible to do so, high employment and purchasing power. But behind this there should be protection against unreasonably low prices for those producers of perishables who need it. They should know they can expand production and that the public that benefits will bear part of the risk.
I do not underestimate the difficulty of finding a satisfactory method of doing this. And I can only hope that with continued careful study and close consultation with farmers and their leaders ways will be found to do something both practical and effective.

The farm problem has changed much since the thirties. Once abundance created surpluses because people could not buy what the farmer could produce. Today we seek even greater abundance as we look ahead to a thirty or forty million increase in our population in the next twenty-five years.

Nevertheless, there is the constant necessity to adjust output to need in the short run. We have worked out excellent voluntary methods for doing this.

The Republican leadership would now dispense entirely with production controls. "We do not believe in restrictions on the American farmer's ability to produce," their platform states in one of its rare bursts of clarity. Well, I do not like acreage allotments and marketing quotas myself. I hope—we all have good reason to hope—that a growing population and expanding markets will keep us from again needing controls for staple crops.

But farmers have learned from bitter experience that we need these controls in reserve. I learned how useful they could be in the hard school of the triple-A. Incidentally, there could be no tobacco program at all right now without marketing quotas—as every tobacco farmer knows. I would never favor controls for the sake of control. But I think we have to face a practical problem when we see one.
Price policy is the heart of the farm program but it is not the whole of it. Farming is a way of using our great inheritance of water and land; and it is a way of life. Our effort must be to improve the fertility and productivity of our farms, and to improve the quality and content of life for our farm families. I hope to have a personal part in the continuation and extension of the policies which in the last twenty years have given farm life new strength and new dignity—and so restored it to its old place of honor in the Republic.

We of this generation are the trustees of our soil and water resources for our children and their children. We have an elaborate soil-conservation program. It too should have constant scrutiny to determine if we are getting the maximum value in land improvement out of our conservation tax dollar. We still have far to go in upstream flood prevention and water and forest conservation. And I wish I could say that every farmer was using the best conservation methods to protect his farm—methods such as those demonstrated here at Kasson at this magnificent and celebrated exhibition. With the kind of local leadership you have in the Conservation Service and Districts we see here today, we will get the job done everywhere in time, and I would say very soon in Minnesota.

You may have heard that, where administration is concerned, I am no admirer of mere size. Let us strive for big men, not big government. We must continue to decentralize the management of our agricultural and conservation programs and, if anything, increase farmer participation. I like to think of soil conservation as democracy at
work with technical assistance. I think we can go further toward making local administration compact and efficient, and getting dollar-for-dollar value for the money we spend.

Rural electrification is one of our finest national achievements in this generation. It is more than a government program. It is a blessing.

It means electric lights for farm families who have had to live by coal-oil lamps. It means electric power for the farm wife in place of the back-breaking labor of the old-fashioned washtub and the hand pump. It means electric power to grind the farmer's feed, heat his brooder house, and help him with a hundred other chores. You know about this in Minnesota, where the number of electrified farms has risen from 7 per cent in 1935 to 90 per cent today.

The great task of bringing electricity to the farm is now far along to completion. It must be finished and generation and transmission facilities must be adequate to meet the constantly growing demand for power on the farm, at prices the farmer can afford to pay.

We must also look toward the time when every farm home may be in touch with its neighbors, the doctor and the world through rural telephone service.

The chief agency in this miraculous transformation in country living has been the farmer-owned co-operative. I've been a member of one for years and the co-operative seems to me a wonderful example of people solving their own local problems in their own way. Its effectiveness must not be crippled by hostile legislation.
There is one final part of our farm program which especially concerns me.

Farm ownership and the family farm are the foundation on which our whole agricultural system is built. From 1880 to 1932 we lost ground on farm ownership. In these years—years, incidentally, when Republicans were mostly in power and hadn't yet invented that slogan "it's time for a change" the proportion of farm owners declined, until by 1932, 43 per cent of all farmers--two out of every five--were either tenants or sharecroppers. That trend has now been reversed; three-fourths of our farmers now own their farms. We have recovered, in twenty years, the ground lost in the previous fifty. I've sold some farms and I've seen to it that they were sold to operators, not landlords, where possible.

Things are not yet as they should be. Many young, vigorous and ambitious men would like to become owners of farms. What is more serious, many farmers cannot, with their existing land and equipment, make a decent living from the soil. In 1950, more than one million farmers had net incomes from all sources including outside employment of less than $1,000. How can a farmer rear, clothe and educate a family on that? We can take pride in our remarkable progress, but we cannot be complacent.

Research, housing, and credit programs particularly must be focused on this problem of rural poverty. No one should promise miracles here; but there must be ways to help the industrious small farmer who wants to help himself. That kind of American is a good risk. And no
one knows it better than my running mate, Senator John Sparkman, who
has led the battle for them, and who was himself one of eleven children
of an impoverished tenant farmer.

This nation faces a stern present and a challenging future. The American farmer has a great role to play in these next critical
years of precarious balance in the world. Our national commitment to
an expanding economy rests upon the continued growth of our agriculture.
Our struggle to strengthen the free world against communism demands
the continued and growing productivity of the American farm. A hungry
man is not a free man. In the long run, peace will be won in the turn-
rows, not on the battlefields.

The last twenty years have established a framework of justice
and equity within which the farmer can do his indispensable part for
the greater strength and safety of our nation. Only in an atmosphere
of growth and confidence can the farmer make his necessary contribution
to our nation, and our nation its necessary contribution to the world-
wide fight for freedom.

If I didn't feel that the party which saw our needs and charted
our course in the past is the best custodian of our future I would not
be the Democratic candidate for President, and I would not be here on
this great day in Kasson asking not for your thanks, but for your con-

fidence.

And now let us get back to the plowing.
While I feel very much the uncomfortable politician trying to beguile your votes here tonight, I do not feel at all like a stranger in Kentucky.

My great-great-grandfather and great-great-grandmother were married here in Kentucky. In fact some historians say that their marriage is the first recorded marriage in Kentucky. They built a home near Danville more than 150 years ago which is still standing.

My Grandfather Stevenson was born here before his parents moved to Illinois 100 years ago this year. He was a student at Centre College where he fell in love with the President's daughter--always a sound policy for a struggling student--and thus I acquired a Kentucky grandmother also.

So you will forgive me, I hope, if I claim a very close kinship to Kentucky. But if that's not enough, I'll also claim kinship with Alben Barkley--the greatest Kentuckian of them all.

And I also have Kentucky to thank not only for my ancestors but also for Wilson Wyatt--once the Mayor of this great city and now my campaign manager.

So, my fellow Kentuckians, I want to talk to you tonight about the war in Korea.

When I entered this campaign, I expressed my hope that Democrats and Republicans alike would regard this election year as a great
opportunity to educate and elevate a people whose destiny is leadership. I hoped that both parties would talk sense to the American people.

But I have been increasingly disturbed about the tone and spirit of the campaign.

Last Monday the General spoke in Cincinnati about Korea. He said that this was a "solemn subject" and that he was going to state the truth as he knew it, "the truth—plain and unvarnished." If only his speech had measured up to this introduction! And since he has tried, not once but several times, to make a vote-getting issue out of our ordeal in Korea, I shall speak on this subject and address myself to the record.

We are fighting in Korea, the General declares, because the American Government grossly underestimated the Soviet threat; because the Government allowed America to become weak; because American weakness compelled us to withdraw our forces from Korea; because we abandoned China to the communists; and, finally, because we announced to all the world that we had written off most of the Far East.

That's what he says—now let's look at the record.

First, the General accuses the Government of having underestimated the Soviet threat. But what about the General himself? At the end of the war he was a professional soldier of great influence and prestige, to whom the American people listened with respect. What did he have to say about the Soviet threat? In the years after the war, the General himself saw "no reason"—as he later wrote—why the Russian system of government and Western democracy "could not live
side by side in the world." In November, 1945, he even told the House Military Affairs Committee: "Nothing guides Russian policy so much as a desire for friendship with the United States."

I have no wish to blow any trumpets here. But in March, 1946, I said: "We must forsake any hope that the Soviet Union is going to lie still and lick her awful wounds. She's not. Peace treaties that reflect her legitimate demands, friendly governments on her frontiers and an effective United Nations Organization would be sufficient security. But evidently they are not and she intends to advance her aims, many of them objectives of the Czars, to the utmost."

My opponent's next point is the question of demobilization. We know how self-righteous the Republican office seekers are on this question today. But what were they saying at the time? In the 1944 campaign, the Republican candidate of that year accused President Roosevelt of deliberately delaying demobilization and promised that the Republicans would do it quicker. "I believe," he said, "that our members of the armed forces should be transported home and released at the earliest practical moment after Victory." Although the General warned against too rapid demobilization, he later said—in September, 1946—that: "Frankly, I don't think demobilization was too fast."

Demobilization did go too far and too fast. But it would have gone farther and faster if the Republicans had been in power—and it is nonsense to pretend otherwise.

Next, take the question of the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. The General acts as if this were the result of some secret
White House decision. I would call his attention to the fact that while he was Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the Chiefs of Staff advised that South Korea was of little strategic interest to the United States, and recommended withdrawal of the United States forces from the country.

Next, my distinguished opponent has recently begun to parrot the charge of some of his recently acquired political tutors that the administration abandoned China to the communists. He did not talk this way once; but then he has changed in a good many respects of late. Maybe he's competing for the title of Mr. Republican as well as Mr. President. But he still must know in his heart, even if he does not choose to admit it, that in the past six years nothing except the sending of an American expeditionary force to China could have prevented ultimate communist victory. Did he propose that; did any of the Sunday-morning quarterbacks on the Republican team propose that?

Distinguished American military men—including at least one Republican—have testified that the Chinese Nationalists did not lose for want of supplies or American support. Their armies were larger and better equipped than the communist armies. They had every physical advantage.

Has my opponent forgotten the wise words of the most responsible Republican of them all, Senator Vandenberg? Here is what Senator Vandenberg said in December, 1948, on this subject of China:

"The vital importance of saving China cannot be exaggerated."
But there are limits to our resources and boundaries to our miracles. . . .
I am forced to say that the Nationalist Government has failed to reform itself in a fashion calculated to deserve continued popular confidence over there or over here. . . . If we made ourselves responsible for the army of the Nationalist Government, we would be in the China war for keeps and the responsibility would be ours instead of hers. I am very sure that this would jeopardize our own national security beyond any possibility of justification."

So spoke Senator Vandenberg and his view was shared by intelligent and responsible men in both parties. Now who talked sense about China: Senator Vandenberg or the General?

Then there is the question of "writing off" Korea. The General condemns the Secretary of State's excluding Korea from our defense perimeter in 1950. But the General fails to point out that this defense perimeter was a line developed by the military authorities themselves. Surely it is a gross and discreditable distortion to say that the Secretary of State took the lead in this matter. Twice in 1949 General MacArthur, then our top commander in the Pacific, defined our defense perimeter in the terms later used by the Secretary of State. It was on the recommendation of our military authorities that Korea and Formosa and mainland areas were not included in a direct military commitment.

And I am, frankly, astonished that my great opponent stooped at Cincinnati last week to the practice of lifting remarks out of context. Why did he quote only a part of what the Secretary of State said--why did he skip the Secretary's pledge that, if there should be
an attack on these countries, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations"? The United States Government thus clearly announced its determination to seek United Nations action against aggression. And that's exactly what we did.

The true significance of the Secretary's remark, therefore, is that the military situation made it necessary for him to do what he could diplomatically to give some assurance of our interest in the security of the Republic of Korea. Why does the General not only skip this but distort the whole meaning of these developments? And how does he honestly square this campaign-time charge of writing off Korea with his own statement in July, 1950, that "when our Government guaranteed the Government of South Korea, there was no recourse but to do what President Truman said and did."

I deeply regret the necessity for this recital. I was prepared to ignore the political license and false charges of extremists and reactionaries. But I cannot ignore them now when they are uttered by the Republican nominee himself, a man personally identified with and presumed to be intimately informed about the recent course of our foreign affairs.

Nor do I list these mistakes in judgment and errors of prediction in order to lay any personal blame on the General. I would never have brought these things up had he not pointed the accusing finger. Many Americans of both parties made the same mistakes. Better we refrain
from competing in denouncing each other in a scramble for votes, admit our common mistakes—and get on with our business.

Let's talk sense. Let's admit that mistakes were made. America did demobilize too rapidly and too severely. America did allow the Russians to develop an undue superiority in conventional arms and in ground forces. Perhaps this country should have given a direct military guarantee to the Republic of Korea. And it might well have been wiser if American forces had not crossed the 38th parallel in the fall of 1950.

There is another curious example of my opponent's uncertainty that is worth noting.

At Abilene, Kansas, on June 5th, shortly after his return to this country, he said that: "There has been built up behind the Yalu River a very definite air strength that would make very dangerous any attempt to extend the war at this moment, until we have a bigger build-up of our own."

Three months later the General says this: "I have always stood behind General MacArthur in bombing those bases on the Yalu from which fighter planes are coming . . . ."

What kind of straddle is this? On one occasion he is against bombing across the river. And a little later he is for it. I confess I am bewildered.

This seems to me to be too serious a matter for such wandering opinions.

But enough about the past, and even about the past inconsis-
tendencies of my opponent. I have always agreed with Winston Churchill that if the present tries to sit in judgment on the past, it will lose the future. The important thing is to draw the right lessons from the past and to get on with the job.

One lesson which I had hoped that most of us had learned from the past is an understanding of what the present threat to our freedom really is. I thought that my distinguished opponent, of all Americans, would agree that this threat is the threat of world communism.

But it develops that he has now adopted the theory of Senator Taft, who unsmilingly states that the greatest threat to liberty today is the cost of our own Federal Government!

It is surely fundamental to the making of wise policies to decide whether the threat to the United States is internal or external. Either the threat to our security is world communism or it is not.

This is surely more than the "differences of degree" which, according to Senator Taft's statement following the peace conference on Morningside Heights, are all that separate him from the General on foreign policy matters. It is not a question of degree whether we measure our defense by an arbitrary budget or measure our budget by the needs of survival.

If we should follow out this theory that the threat is internal, we would undertake the deliberate and systematic weakening of ourselves and our allies. And such a policy of national weakness and international weakness can lead to a single result: that is, to invite the expansion of Soviet power.
By adopting this theory, the Republican candidate has reversed the advice of Theodore Roosevelt to speak softly and carry a big stick. The new advice is to talk tough and carry a twig.

You saw this policy proposed a year ago for Asia when some Republicans wanted at one and the same time to cut the defense budget and expand the war. Now you see it proposed again for Europe by those isolationists who would reduce our aid to our allies and our own defense appropriations and simultaneously speak with "cold finality" to the Soviet Union. This is the policy of tougher words backed up with smaller armies.

I wonder if the General realizes the full implications of the agreed statement issued by Senator Taft. Senator Taft has evidently reassured him by saying that their differences in foreign policy are just differences in degree.

Differences of degree, indeed!

Is it a difference of degree to be for or against the North Atlantic Treaty?

Is it a difference of degree to blame the Korean War on Stalin or on our own President?

Is it a difference of degree to be for or against the strengthening of our allies?

Such differences of degree may well turn out to be the difference between success and disaster—between peace and war.

Tough talk about communism will not deter the Soviet Union from new adventures. The thing which will save the world from war
is American strength, and real strength need not be loud or belligerent. Nor is it just a matter of our national strength alone. It is equally the strength of the free world—the strength of the nations which stand between us and the Soviet Union.

Strength is the road to peace. Weakness is the road to war. This is the simple truth of peace and war in our times. The Democratic Party has been consistently the party of strength—and thus the party of peace. With equal consistency, the opposition has been the party of weakness—the party which persists in the dreary obsession that we must fear above all, not the Kremlin, but our own Government. And as the party of weakness, it gives evidence of pursuing, once in power, a policy of weakness which would demoralize the free world, embolden the Soviet Union to new military adventures, and, in the end, pull down the world into the rubble and chaos of a third world war.

Let's talk sense to the American people. Peace is far more important than who wins this election. Whichever party wins, the American people must be sure to win. Let us not place victory in a political campaign ahead of national interest.

And let's talk sense about what we have gained by our determination, our expenditures, and our valor in Korea.

We have not merely said, we have proven, that communism can go no further unless it is willing to risk world war.

We have proven to all the peoples of the Far East that communism is not the wave of the future, that it can be stopped.

We have helped to save the peoples of Indo-China from communist
conquest.

We have smashed the threat to Japan through Korea and so have strengthened this friend and ally.

We have discouraged the Chinese communists from striking at Formosa.

We have mightily strengthened our defenses and all our defensive positions around the world.

We have trained and equipped a large army of South Koreans, who can assume a growing share of the defense of their country.

We have blocked the road to communist domination of the Far East and frustrated the creation of a position of power which would have threatened the whole world.

We have asserted, and we shall maintain it, that whenever communist soldiers choose freedom after falling into our hands, they are free.

We have kept faith with our solemn obligations.

These are the values won by the fidelity and prowess and the sacrifices of young men and women who serve their country. We have lost many of our beloved sons. All Americans share in the bereavement of so many mothers, and fathers, of wives and sweethearts. The burden lies heavily on us all. We pray God that the sacrifices and the sorrows will soon end.

I would say one thing more about the great debate over our foreign policy. My opponents say the threat to our liberty comes from within.
I say that the threat comes from without—and I offer the fate of the enslaved peoples of the world as my evidence. My opponents say America cannot afford to be strong. I say that America cannot afford to be weak.

I promise no easy solutions, no relief from burdens and anxieties, for to do this would be not only dishonest; it would be to attack the foundations of our greatness.

I can offer something infinitely better: an opportunity to work and sacrifice that freedom may flourish. For, as William James truly said, "When we touch our own upper limit and live in our own highest center of energy, we may call ourselves saved."

I call upon America to reject the new isolationism and to surpass her own glorious achievements. Then we may, with God's help, deserve to call ourselves the sons of our fathers.
I've been trying in this campaign to talk about all the public questions that affect your welfare as Americans, sanely, sensibly, and forthrightly. I hear it said, now and then, that I am talking over the heads of the people.

Well, if it is a mistake to appeal to intelligence and reason, instead of emotion and prejudice, then I plead guilty to the charge.

Besides that, I would rather be charged with talking over your heads than behind your backs.

People are smarter than some may think—"There's still a God's plenty left in people of the little red schoolhouse and the tall white steeple.”

So you'll just have to forgive me if I go on trusting your intelligence.

I want to talk to you tonight about a disease. It is a disease which may have killed more people in this world in the last several years than cancer, than tuberculosis, than heart disease—more than all of these combined.

It has certainly killed more minds, more souls, more decent human hopes and ambitions, than any corruption—including the darkest days of Hitler.

I want to discuss with you the ways that communism has attacked
This subject is swathed in fog and confusion. Most of this has been created by the communists themselves, seeking under confusion's cover to advance their evil purposes. But some of it has been created by political demagogues, who are hunting for votes much more than for communists.

I propose tonight to do what I can to penetrate this fog and dispel this confusion. I propose to make precisely clear the record and the position of the two political parties on this problem. Unhappily facts sometimes get smothered in falsehoods.

These are the facts:

Twenty years ago the most serious threat of communism this country ever faced—a threat arising from poverty and despair, following, as it happens, twelve years of Republican administrations—was stopped by a Democratic administration.

For twenty years my party has helped the people of America to build that economic strength and that faith in freedom which make communism impossible—and every step we have taken has been opposed, ridiculed and sabotaged by the Republican Old Guard.

For years your Government in Washington has been desperately rallying and strengthening the free peoples of the world against communism, and leading the way in building the collective strength which is the only bulwark against communist expansion—and this, too, over the bitter protest and unrelenting opposition of the Republican Old Guard.
Again, Democratic leadership has built an elaborate internal security system to protect this nation against communist subversion—a system which has put the leaders of the Communist Party in this country where they belong—behind bars.

Let's look at the record a moment.

Agents of Soviet communism first began making headway in this country in the 1920's. The administration, you will recall, was Republican at that time. A month ago the junior Senator from Wisconsin quoted what he said was a Department of Justice document to prove the existence of communists in the State Department. It is true that he found the quotation in a Department of Justice document. But he neglected to say that it described the situation in 1928, and that what it proved was the existence of a communist plot under the Presidency of—Calvin Coolidge.

But, as I have said, the great communist conspiracy had its first real chance when the Republicans fumbled and bungled this nation into the Great Depression. ("Fumbled and bungled" is not mine but one of their favorite oratorical epithets for everything the Democrats have done for twenty years.) You remember the bitter winters of 1930 and 1931. Farmers in Arkansas—conservative, law-abiding farmers—organized to march on towns and loot the stores. Children left home to spare their parents another mouth to feed; so many of them left that the railroads put on special open boxcars to keep the kids from breaking into the closed ones. Millions of American men and women waited in the breadlines. An army of ragged veterans actually marched
on our national capital.

It is little wonder that across the land men and women—and especially the young—began to drift toward the terrible conclusion that free government had reached the end of its rope. Reaching out for a solution—any solution—the communist agents found ready converts among the unemployed, the farmers, and workers. It was then that some persons like Alger Hiss and Elizabeth Bentley, witnessing the devastation of capitalism and the menacing rise of Hitler, became entangled in the communist conspiracy.

In the election of 1932, almost one million Americans voted against the capitalist system. If the paralysis had continued in Washington, the one million votes cast against capitalism in 1932 might have swelled to ten million in 1936.

But in 1933 the Democratic Party brought to this nation a great leader—Franklin Roosevelt.

From that day onward, the swelling menace of discontent and communism in this country began to wane. President Roosevelt brought to us a new spirit, a new hope. The Government acted swiftly and decisively to give the farmer a market, to give the worker a job, to give the unemployed a means of saving their self-respect, to give youth opportunity and hope. America's faith in itself was restored. Under his leadership the American people unlocked from within themselves the strength to drive out communism.

This country was saved from depression and despair. Communism in the United States was turned back and as long as we hold fast to
the progressive spirit of human welfare that inspired that leadership
we need never fear a communist revolution in this country—and every
honest man knows that is true.

And where were the Republican leaders during this fight? They cannot conceal the record. They tried to block, to trim, to
obstruct, to prevent, the collective-bargaining laws that mean security
to the worker, the price-support laws that mean security to the farmer,
the social-insurance laws that mean security to the aged and the infirm.

The plain truth is that the Democratic administrations saved
this country from depression and from communism or fascism over the
opposition of the Republican leadership, because these near-sighted
gentlemen never have understood that the way to make this country secure
is to work for the security of all of the people in it. These men
still control the Republican Party. That is why thoughtful people
of this country are apprehensive that a Republican victory this November
would be an Old Guard victory and the forerunner of another great
depression. We must prevent another economic disaster, for that would
open up the greatest opportunity the Kremlin could hope for to take
over the free world, not by arms but by invitation.

We licked the communist hope for a revolution in the thirties. But the years of misery, Republican years, had left a heritage of
fanatics and agents in our midst. Communism was finished as a political
threat; it survived as an instrument of subversion and espionage.
Soviet secret agents and their dupes burrowed like moles in the ground,
trying to undermine the foundations of this and every other government
in the world.

They penetrated the Nazi Government in Germany.

They penetrated the Government of Imperial Japan—so success­fully that they learned in advance about the Japanese plot against Pearl Harbor.

They penetrated the anti-communist Government of Chiang Kai-shek in China—despite the long experience of his secret police in dealing with them.

They penetrated the Governments of a dozen European countries—no matter how anti-communist their policies or pretensions.

No government in the world has been immune from their penetra­tion. Nor has ours. Nor will any government be safe from espionage and the secret communist attack so long as the Soviet Union pursues its goal of world dominion.

We must never forget the dedication, tenacity and fanaticism of this inscrutable, ruthless, restless conspiracy. As General Bedell Smith, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, warned us last week, we cannot let our guard drop even for a moment. The only safe assumption is that no place is safe.

We must, to protect our Government from infiltration, combine vigilance with vigor. This is a long and continuous struggle—no single action can win the campaign.

And the Democratic administration has been conducting this fight for a long time. In 1939 the Roosevelt Administration made it unlawful for communists to work for the Federal Government.
In 1940 there was passed the Smith Act, under which the Department of Justice in President Truman's administration subsequently convicted the thirty-one leaders of the American Communist Party.

During the war, the Civil Service Commission and the F.B.I. conducted a continuous screening of Federal employees. Nearly 1500 men and women were denied Federal employment because of doubtful loyalty.

In 1947 President Truman set up a new and tighter Federal loyalty-control program. Many people have thought it was too tight, fearing an invasion of our ancient principle that a man is innocent until proved guilty. In the same year the Attorney General established a list of subversive organizations. In 1948 and 1949 the Department of Justice indicted and convicted the communist leaders.

The list of subversives uncovered in these years has been long. By hard, patient, silent work these men were exposed, be it noted, in the years before 1950—before the junior Senator from Wisconsin suddenly appeared on the scene and began his wild and reckless campaign against the integrity of our Government itself. Some people have been impressed by his loud talk. But the record is clear on this, too. For all his bragging and fear-mongering the junior Senator from Wisconsin has yet to produce evidence leading to the conviction of one single communist agent, either in or out of government.

The reason for this is clear. Catching real communist agents, like killing poisonous snakes or tigers, is not a job for amateurs or children, especially noisy ones. It is a job for professionals who know their business and their adversaries.
The professionals of the Federal Bureau of Investigation make up a magnificent instrument for the protection of our Government. For years, the F.B.I. has been quietly and remorselessly uncovering the communist plot against America. It has exposed one conspirator after another. It provided the evidence that sent the thirty-one leaders to prison.

I have often wondered what the Republicans think they would do to improve the situation if they were elected. The General has joined loudly in the clamor about the communist menace in Washington. First he said the communists in government were the result of incompetent, loose security policies. More recently, I'm sorry to say, he implies that the Federal Government is deliberately concealing communists. But he has offered only thundering silence about a cure. What would he do? Would he fire J. Edgar Hoover? Would he fire General Bedell Smith, head of the Central Intelligence Agency and his own former Chief of Staff? Would he discharge General Smith's deputy, Allen Dulles, the brother of his own chief adviser on foreign affairs? Would he discharge the experienced men who now protect our nation's security?

I think we are entitled to ask, is the Republican candidate seriously interested in trying to root communists out of the Government, or is he only interested in scaring the American people to get the Old Guard into the Government?

For my own part, I will tell you straight out, I believe the F.B.I. has been doing a superb job. I think J. Edgar Hoover and General
Bedell Smith are excellent, experienced, devoted and trustworthy men in these posts of great responsibility. I would back them to the hilt.

And let me say one more thing, so there will be no shadow of a doubt. If I find in Washington any disloyal government servant, I will throw him out ruthlessly, regardless of place, position or party. I expect to review thoroughly the present loyalty system and if it can be strengthened or improved in any way, it will be done.

As far as I'm concerned this fight will be continued until the communist conspiracy in our land is smashed beyond repair. And I think my record is the best evidence that this fight will be conducted with full respect for our system of justice, and for the Bill of Rights of the United States.

Let us never forget that tension breeds fear, fear, repression, and repression, injustice and tyranny. Our police work is aimed at a conspiracy, and not at ideas or opinion. Our country was built on unpopular ideas, on unorthodox opinions. My definition of a free society is a society where it is safe to be unpopular.

I want to keep our America that way.

I agree with the Roman Catholic Bishops in their pronouncement last November. "Dishonesty, slander, detraction and defamation of character," the Catholic Bishops said, "are as truly transgressions of God's Commandments when resorted to by men in political life as they are for all other men."

We of the Democratic Party have fought communism in America for twenty years—in the Government, in the union halls, in the farm
grange halls, in the schools and in our homes. We have met and destroyed this disease as it has not been met or destroyed in any other country in the world. And we have done it without false accusation, without the assassination of honest characters, without destroying the principles of freedom upon which this society is based. Carelessness about our security is dangerous; carelessness about our freedom is also dangerous.

And let me say another thing that needs saying. I have not said and I do not think for a moment that a single responsible Republican leader in those days of boom and bust in the twenties and early thirties when communism sank its roots in this country was deliberately plotting the downfall of capitalism or covertly encouraging communism. And we will make a lot more progress in solving this problem when we stop capitalizing communism for political advantage and think more of the welfare of the Republic than of how we can spread fear and smear and distrust.

But if the Republican leaders insist on talking incessantly about softness toward communism, I must point out that the record shows that even today the Republican Party opposes those cost-of-living controls which the Democratic Party supports in order to prevent another boom and bust—another period when the beckoning finger of communism's false light would grow stronger in America.

The record shows the Republican Party has steadily tried to block and hobble our worldwide fight against communism time and time again; the Republican majority in Congress has voted to slash economic
and military aid to our allies.

But there is no cheap answer to communism, to world peace, to anything worth having.

The Democratic Party rejects this policy of loud words and soft deeds. We stand for a foreign policy of strength, for that is the only policy that can lead to peace.

We will protect ourselves from communism, and, at the same time, we will protect our liberties, too—those liberties which, above all, distinguish the United States from the police state.
When I was a little boy I spent several years here in New Orleans out near Audubon Park and I used to ride up and down Canal Street on the streetcars. No one ever paid any attention to me, and now I come back forty years later and thousands come out to greet me on Canal Street. Something has happened and you've touched my heart. But the fact of the matter is that I love New Orleans—either way!

For here in New Orleans you have made an admirable civilization. It is a jambalaya containing all that makes for the body's pleasure, the mind's delight, the spirit's repose. Here each man seasons the dish to his own taste, for in this amiable society each man is master of his own seasoning.

I wish I could linger over this delectable dish. But such a luxury is not permitted the campaigner. If, then, you will forgive me my bad manners, I shall talk at once about things of mutual concern.

As you know, I stand on the Democratic Party platform with respect to minority rights. I have only one observation to make on this subject, one that must sadden you as it saddens me. It is that, after two thousand years of Christianity, we need to discuss it at all.

Let me speak for a moment on a subject of special interest to Louisiana. That is the question of the tidelands or, more accurately,
the submerged lands which lie between the low-water mark and Louisiana's historical boundary three miles to seaward.

These are the lands in controversy—and no other. The Federal Government lays no claim to the true tidelands (those between the low and high-water marks) nor to lands underlying inland waters; and, indeed, it could not because the United States Supreme Court has long since expressly recognized that ownership of all these lands clearly resides in the states. I have no designs upon the oysters of Maryland or the clams of Massachusetts!

Now I have been Governor of a state and I know, better than most, something of the problems of the states. I know that Louisiana, like other states, has important functions to perform for its people. It takes money to do those things and each state needs every resource it can muster for this purpose.

I am not surprised, therefore, that Louisiana has been greatly disappointed in the decision of the Supreme Court holding that the right to the oil beneath the coastal submerged lands is vested in all the people of the United States and not just those of Louisiana. The people and the Governor of Illinois would be equally disappointed had they lost a similar lawsuit.

But I am not running for Governor. And if I am elected on November 4th, I will be representing all of the people and not just some. What will be the position I will then find myself in with respect to this controversy? And how, therefore, should I state my view on it now, if I am to be a responsible President and fair with everyone?
Well, I have stated my position on this—and only ONE position—and I want to make clear that I lack the versatility of my opponent, who has had at least three separate positions on the tidelands question. I tried to make my views as clear as I could at the time Governor Shivers of Texas paid his widely advertised visit to me in Illinois. But what I said then has apparently not been circulated widely or set forth fully in this part of the country, and so I am going to say it again now.

The man who becomes the next President of the United States must, in my judgment, take up the submerged-lands controversy at the point where the Supreme Court left off. He cannot and should not begin to go behind Supreme Court decisions, saying that this one is right and that one is wrong and acting accordingly. I think he takes them as they come, whether they involve submerged lands or the seizure of the steel industry.

There was one great Louisianian who, I am sure, would have agreed with me on this. He was a distinguished Confederate officer who fought long and honorably for this state in the Great War. And as a lawyer on earlier trips to New Orleans I have stopped to look at the statue of Edward Douglas White, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

If the submerged lands, by virtue of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court, are a national, and not a state, asset, the question presented is one of wise policy in the disposition of that asset. I do not think it is a wise policy for the Congress to institute a practice
of giving away such national assets to individual states. I believe this in the case of the submerged lands as much as I would believe it in the case of the national forests, the national parks, the national grazing lands, and all of the other public lands which, though located within the boundaries of individual states, belong to the people of all the states. I believe that it is the duty of the President to conserve the national assets, the national domain, be it dollars in the treasury or forests in Oregon.

But to say this is not to solve the problem of the submerged lands. That problem is how to use the submerged lands for the benefit of the people of the country, including the people of Louisiana. The solution lies ultimately with the Congress which makes our laws. At the moment we are on dead center.

I don't believe in keeping matters in an unsettled state so that they may be exploited for political purposes. I believe that what is most needed in the case of the submerged lands is to get rid of the politics, to face the problem with sense and reason and good temper, and to get on with the business so that development can proceed.

I said to Governor Shivers, and I say to you of Louisiana, that my hope and desire is to see the early enactment of legislation which will provide for a fair and equitable arrangement for the administration of these lands and the division of their proceeds. We did this in the case of the other public lands years ago—allocating in some cases $37 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the royalties to the state where the land is located.
I do not know whether the same formula should be followed in the case of the submerged lands. And I do not think that matters of this importance can be settled wisely in the frenzy of a national campaign or as a means of getting votes. I am equally sure that a settlement fair to all, including the people of Louisiana, can be worked out in a realistic rational spirit. A President who was careless with the people's assets could hardly be a careful steward of your trust.

But there is something else I want to talk about here tonight. The windows of the port of New Orleans open upon seas and continents. They open also upon the incomparable empire of the Mississippi Valley. The great river, the sea, and your energies, have made you—in the romantic old phrase—a company of merchant adventurers.

You are deeply concerned both with foreign trade and domestic trade. But the two are now one. Our economic power in the world is so great that a slight downward trend here produces earthquake shocks elsewhere. These shocks immediately register upon the sensitive indicators of your commerce. So, too, Republican barriers to trade, such as quotas and high tariffs, are quickly reflected upon your docks, in your stores and in your homes as men lose their jobs.

This is a powerful industrial city. Last year, more than $200,000,000 worth of new industry moved into the area. So far this year, more than $100,000,000 of new industries have arrived.

In 1952, this port may handle close to $2,000,000 worth of cargo. This is twice the volume of only five years ago.

In brief, a new giant has arisen on the shores of the Missis-
sippi. But giants need more elbow room and more of everything than smaller figures.

Yours has been a long, steady, slow growth. During the past twenty years, however, the progress here has been spectacular. When depressions came in the old days, you could comfort yourselves that you would be less harmfully affected than cities whose growth had been faster than yours. But this is no longer true.

You are geared to a bigger and faster moving wheel than ever before. Louisiana must, therefore, seek the right answer to this question:

Is the Democratic Party or the Republican Party the more likely to promote foreign and domestic prosperity?

Perhaps a few questions may throw light on this subject.

Has not the Republican Party always been the party of quotas and high tariffs?

Did not the last Republican administration raise tariffs to the highest point in history? Didn't that cripple your foreign trade, injure your home market and set in motion events that exploded in the world's most destructive depression?

When these tariffs were riveted on your necks did not the Republican leadership treat your complaints with contemptuous silence?

What of the unfair and discriminatory freight rates that long ran against the South? Did the Republican leadership help right this wrong? Or was it content to see the South pay through the nose?

The Democratic Party has always been for world trade and libe-
ralized tariffs. These are things for which the South has always stood. It is, therefore, no accident that President Roosevelt chose Cordell Hull as his Secretary of State almost twenty years ago. Chief among his great achievements was his program for Reciprocal Trade Agreements to encourage our foreign trade, and incidentally the prosperity of New Orleans.

And what of the Republican record on Reciprocal Trade Agreements? Its leadership has always opposed them. If this leadership prevails, what will happen then to your great port and the thousands of people who earn their living through it? If you have any doubts on this subject, remember the Republican record. Then read the Republican platform and please tell me what it means, if you can.

How do you reconcile the Republican position with your International House or your International Trade Mart; your Dock Board and Foreign Trade Zone? New Orleans has done a magnificent job building cordial personal and business relations with Latin America. How long do you think these relations will last if our Latin American friends have trouble earning a living by trading with the United States? What will it do to our Good Neighbor Policy—and I say to you that the further strengthening of our Good Neighbor Policy will be a major objective of my administration.

It is not possible for this nation to be at once politically internationalist and economically isolationist. This is just as insane as asking one Siamese twin to high dive while the other plays the piano. And that is exactly what the Republican leadership has long
been doing. And that, I believe, is what it would do if it should again come into power.

Even if the Old Guard thinks of foreign trade as a one-way street, that trade is, and must be, a two-way street. We cannot sell without buying and we cannot go on exporting dollars forever.

On October 7th Senator Taft told an audience at Elgin, Illinois, that he had voted time after time against Reciprocal Trade Agreements.

I cannot exaggerate the deadly importance of this statement. It foreshadows more than the blight that would descend upon New Orleans if his views should prevail. And it foreshadows even more sinister results at the hands of Soviet Russia.

I am not a man given to exaggeration. Nor do I want to frighten you into voting for me. I shall continue to try to appeal to your minds rather than to your solar plexus. Yet I now beg you to listen carefully.

The Soviet Party Congress recently convened in Moscow. Its meeting was described by PRAVDA, the chief Soviet Government newspaper, as "the greatest event in the ideological life of the Communist Party and the Soviet people."

Stalin wrote a book for the occasion. The book is an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. It lays down the line that the Soviets may be expected to follow for perhaps the next decade.

This, briefly, is what he tells communists everywhere: That the world struggle will revolve around Western Germany and Japan; that basic Soviet policy is to emphasize that it will be difficult
for Western Germany and Japan to earn a living within the non-communist world. Therefore Soviet Russia will play up the economic opportunities that will be offered these countries to trade with the communist world. And Stalin concludes that conflicts between the free world and Western Germany and Japan will grow as these countries get on their feet and compete more sharply with the free world; that is, with such great trading nations as the United States, Britain and France.

In short what Stalin is saying is this: that he is not so foolish as to engage us in a great shooting war; that he will simply wait it out because we are so blind and so stupid that we will not permit Western Germany and Japan to trade with the free world. They must, then eventually trade with the Soviet world. So doing they will fall within Soviet domination.

Here I bid you pause and think before it is too late. The mentality of the Republican Party in foreign trade has been well-assessed by Stalin. He has seized upon one of the keys that may open the door to our downfall, if we permit him to use it. I say to you with the utmost conviction, that if we follow the suicidal foreign-trade fanaticism of the Republican Party, we may condemn this nation to isolationism and destruction.

Stalin, then, proposes to conquer us, not by arms, but by taking advantage of what he believes to be our stupidity. This is not a battle that can be won by cannon or bombs. And it cannot be won by a few minutes' briefing of Army officers on the immensely complicated area of foreign trade and foreign finance—particularly by Republican poli-
ticians to whom reciprocal trade is distasteful.

But, to come back to the South after this brief excursion abroad. Friendliness for the South is nothing new in my family. Let me tell you what I mean.

In the 1870's, New Orleans men fought carpetbaggers on Canal Street. Standing with them, there was, I am proud to say, my grandfather Adlai Stevenson. A Congressman from Illinois, he fought a Republican project to compel the use of troops at Southern elections. This project was known as the Force Bill. He expressed his distaste for a measure that would have compelled the South to go Republican at bayonet point.

Time passed. In the 1890's the Republican leadership was still unable to convert Democrats to Republicanism through reason. But it was still determined to do it through force. By then, my grandfather was Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate on a ticket headed by Grover Cleveland, a ticket that was elected. In 1892, just sixty years ago, he again opposed the Force Bill. He said that its passage might mean the election of Congressmen by bayonets, and that the South was faced with the counterpart of the horrors of the Reconstruction Period.

I hope, therefore, that with no violation of grace, I may claim spiritual kinship with you in your struggle for freedom and equity. Today it is the struggle of the ordinary man to get his rightful share of the goods produced by him and his community against those who would grab the greater share for themselves. The struggle never takes quite the same form, but its objective is always the same.

Only the weapons change. Yesterday they were bayonets. Today they
are a Republican campaign of fear and intimidation.

For decades these forces were pitilessly arrayed against you. The strong exacted of you what they could, and you granted what you must. The sufferings of those times are painful recollections of thousands of Louisiana families. Your physical hardships were great. But--more important--your self-respect was wounded. The wounds of the body are superficial. But the wounds of the spirit are grievous.

These mournful recollections, however, have been fading in the sunshine of happier times. Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, forty years ago, began your liberation. Twenty years ago, Franklin Roosevelt, leading a strong Democratic Party in the name of a long-suffering people, began to bring you what had so long been denied you. Ever since that time, you have been moving toward a better life.

If I now, for a moment, speak of the past, it is not because of an urgent interest in history. It is because the past and present illustrate two different views of the Republican and Democratic Parties toward man and his place in Society.

Let us then look homeward here in Louisiana. It was--and still is--one of our potentially richest states. Petroleum, gas, sulphur, salt exist here in prodigal abundance. Your fisheries are rich. You have a great sugar bowl and a valuable fur catch. Your forest resources are enormous. Your cotton and rice fields are wide.

You long had everything that makes for prosperity. But, for decades, the great majority of the people of Louisiana ate the dry crusts of poverty. Many of them dragged out their lives in the shadowy
world of undernourishment. They were too weak to live fully and too strong to die.

Malaria, pellagra and other diseases sapped the strength of thousands. Your health services were pitifully inadequate. How many people died because they couldn't get medical treatment, no one knows except God and their families. Your roads were poor, especially your farm-to-market roads. There were too few schools and teachers for your children. In rural areas, school terms were often too short for genuine education. There was not enough money for longer terms and many men couldn't live at all unless their children worked and added something to wretchedly low family incomes.

Farmers sold their produce for what they could get. Working people sold the sweat of their faces and the toil of their hands for a pittance. And so there rested upon this lovely state, this potentially rich state, the bone-chilling breath of poverty.

By 1933 the people of the United States had lived for almost forty years—except for one eight year interval—under Republican rule. Most of you had little to show for it except perhaps a corner of the earth where you vainly sought shelter against the arrows of misfortune. By 1933 your condition was little better than that of the natives of India. Your average yearly income per person was then $222.00, or 65 cents a day.

The thin pretense was maintained that you were sovereign citizens of sovereign States. Actually, Louisiana and the South had long been converted through Republican leadership, with its control of money
and banking, into an American India. That leadership had succeeded in making the whole South colonies of the rich industrial Northeast. They were your absentee landlords. They used every method possible to keep yours a primitive, agricultural economy through their control of the money and banking systems of the nation. It is only during the past twenty years that you were liberated from colonialism and began to come into your rightful estate as free citizens of a free country, fully participating in all of its privileges.

This process of liberation has been described by the Republican leaders—with their usual skill in calling things by their opposites—as "socialism." I don't need to tell you that our Democratic program is the strongest bulwark against socialism that a free society could have. I have repeatedly said that I do not favor socialization of industry or anything else. Those who say that we cannot meet the people's needs without destroying free enterprise are the worst enemies of free society.

But enough of old, unhappy, far-off things. For some years you have been living in a world bright and fresh. Prosperity walks upon your farms and in the streets of your towns. More people of this state now own—or are on their way to owning—more houses and farms than ever before. Their savings are greater than ever before. Your children can now find opportunities at home instead of having to go elsewhere for them. And we no longer have eroded people living on eroded lands.

In determining our course for the future, I think that there
is a simple method. We know what we have. We know how far we have gone. We must now decide how to get from what we have in the present to what we want in the future.

The relationship of the Democratic Party and the people during the twenty years past has been a relationship of good will. The Democratic Party has been responsive to the needs of the people and the people have responded by keeping it in power. I have no doubt at all that this harmonious relationship will be continued at the ballot box next month.

I want to conclude by saying a few words about something that means a good deal to Louisiana—and to me. Some hard words have been said this year by the General—in unmalicious haste, so I hope and suppose—about that great nation which has been the actual motherland for so many of you and a spiritual motherland of us all.

Je voudrais maintenant dire quelques mots à la population de langue française. Je vous adresse mon salut car je suis un grand admirateur de la France et de la civilisation française.

Quiconque dit que la France est en train de dégénérer ou de décéder oublie les belles qualités françaises qui furent apportées ici, en Louisiane, par les ancêtres de la population de langue française, qualités qui fleurissent toujours dans la patrie d'origine de cette population.

Vous êtes de bons citoyens Américains mais vous avez conservé beaucoup de ces belles qualités du peuple français que vos ancêtres ont apportées dans ce pays, et je vous en félicite.
I am happy to be here at Oberlin, and flattered indeed by the honor the college has done me. At least, I was happy until this moment—and now I wish my words this morning did not follow so close upon and thereby contradict so sharply that eloquent and over-generous citation for the honorary degree of this distinguished college, which is respected among the learned as few of its sister institutions in this country.

It is, of course, easy to be cynical about commencement exercises. If the world could be saved by exhortation, aphorisms, and old saws, we would be well on our way to salvation. But the inner meaning of commencement lies in the ceremony itself rather than in the tired phrases with which it is so often adorned—and to which I am about to make some additions. The nation pauses in June not alone to honor you graduates and wish you well, but also to reaffirm its belief that the pursuit of truth is the noblest occupation of man. Perhaps it would be wise as on certain other public occasions to use a set form of words to express this belief; a ritual might gain more in force and solemnity than it would lose in freshness. And of course a form of words would have a further great advantage: no one would have to wonder when the speaker would deliver his last homily of the day!

At any rate, what you will remember, and properly so, is not
today's epigrams and challenges, but the marching and the academic
gowns and the half light of this chapel. A generation born in depression
and raised in war, hot and cold, does not need to be reminded that
the future is obscure, or that its privilege is to live in a world
of perpetual crisis, wrestling with problems of unprecedented solemnity
and visions of unprecedented brilliance.

It is said to be wise, as a means of establishing rapport,
to identify one's self with one's audience. But fortunately there
are discernible differences between us—some that even these ample
robes cannot conceal! In these differences lie the certainty that the
future will be different and the chance that it might be better than
the past. You are eager to be away and doing, while we, to tell the
truth, are glad to linger a while in a spot that almost makes us feel
young again. You are ready for new tasks while we hope to refresh
ourselves before picking up the old ones. You are a bit impatient,
for, as is obvious to you and painfully clear to us, we have made
something of a mess of things, and why should you listen?

I would not presume to tell you, even if I thought I knew,
how to solve the ponderous problems that are yours by inheritance.
This college has given you tools with which to work and some knowledge
of the values we cherish. Perhaps you will be able to solve some of
these problems and even to reach some of the great goals my generation
aspired to. Whether you do depends more, I think, on your attitudes
than on your skills, more on largeness of spirit, if you will, than
on largeness of power.
As I try to understand where and how my generation has fallen short, it seems clear that the failure lies not so much in our skills, for these are adequate to almost any task. We are really very competent technicians. But we have tried to solve problems arising in large part from those very skills, from our technical virtuosity, within limits set by obsolete attitudes. That was impossible. It blocked the adjustment of social and political institutions to man's needs. As an illustration let me remind you that only yesterday, as history counts time, we even refused to join the League of Nations, which might have been, with our support, a step toward a rational organization of the world community.

But attitudes change. The enemies of yesterday are the friends of today. What seemed sound and wise one day is senseless, even incredible, another. What was radical one day is conventional another. And, unevenly, we press ahead, retarded by obsolescence here and propelled by vision there. Probably it is true, as Bertrand Russell wrote, that: "Every orgy of unreason in the end strengthens the friends of reason, and shows afresh that they are the only true friends of humanity."

But that scientific reason has transformed our lives with amazing rapidity there can be no doubt. One after another the physical secrets of the universe have been uncovered and put to use, although the light that has been cast is but a speck in the darkness. Coal and oil and the atom have been harnessed, multiplying our power more rapidly than our understanding. Reason's invisible hands have busily invented cotton gins and hybrid corn and electronic computers.
Science has lengthened our lives and increased our food supplies, and we have responded by doubling world population in a hundred years. The commonplace today was unusual or unknown only yesterday. In 1900 there were a few thousand automobiles in the United States and nowhere were student-faculty relations disturbed by the problem of the car-rule. There were no movies, no TV sets, no airplanes, and little concern about the decline of the home. Instead there were 20 million horses and lots of time to think. And our efforts to build a social order which respects the dignity and brotherhood of man prospered. Our Constitution and Bill of Rights have more profoundly influenced the world than our scientific achievements.

Today we are surrounded and almost overwhelmed by massive phenomena. Economic development has not only increased vastly the output of goods and services, but it has also revolutionized certain fundamental relationships—the relation between man and his tools, between man and nature, between neighbors, between nations. A sharp axe and a good shovel not so long ago were to be prized and treated with care and respect, while today few workers own the tools with which they work. The farmer scanned the evening sky and smelled the morning air instead of switching on the latest weather forecast. In the country and in the small towns neighbors were important, sometimes for survival and always for society. The scale and dimensions of the world were suited to man's nature and adjusted to his senses.

The powers of scientific reason are extraordinary and they have created an extraordinary world, a world in which we are all in some
sense strangers. For the world has changed faster than we have, and we have had a hard time keeping up with it. Man can invent faster than he can adjust. His thinking and his attitudes linger in a simpler time than his body. Mass production, mass consumption, mass communications, mass movements and mass destruction have given strange and sometimes frightening new dimensions to life, dimensions that we do not understand and often cannot measure. Today the economic exploitation we used to talk so much about is less of a threat to the individual than the massive mental and emotional manipulation. It seems to me that today we are more in danger of becoming robots than slaves.

The discovery and application of natural laws have led us into an almost unnatural world where no one feels wholly at home, where no one knows the answers. We may not even know the right questions. How are we to reconcile massiveness and the Bill of Rights, the interchangeable part and the indivisible soul, the tin can and freedom of thought? How are we to turn our marvellous new capacities, our enormous power, to the enrichment of individual life?

Here is the paradox: Man has at last the tools for freedom— for freedom from poverty, for leisure to think and read and create— but his conceptions have not kept step with his capacities.

But all this has become commonplace, the subject I have no doubt of a hundred commencement addresses across the land this very day. And having posed the problem, stated the need—a matter more of phrasing than of analysis—let us turn to what we are to do about it.

And here I must disappoint you, for if there are answers I do
not pretend to know them. But there are relatively clear elements, it seems to me, of an approach to the answer. And one such element is, I think, greatly increased participation in civilizations's most complicated affairs. And that means to beware of the seductions of passive acceptance, the eager embrace of someone else's thinking, the comfortable escape from the exertion of thought. With great and complex forces loose in the world, it is both easy and superficially modest to assume that national and world affairs, and even many local problems, are beyond our competence. Someone else, we think, must know more than we do about the guaranteed annual wage, or slum clearance, or the unification of Germany.

Take, for example, our role as individuals, as citizens, in the forthcoming "conference at the summit." The success of that conference, the effectiveness of this nation's participation in it depends not in any sense upon the President alone. If we the people are uncompromising, if we equate negotiation with appeasement, if we think war is inevitable, if we regard every Soviet proposal as a trick and a trap, if we think that what is advantageous for one is automatically disadvantageous for the other, then we the people will have ruled out bargaining. Not even the President can negotiate if we tie his hands. And we shall have to learn that diplomacy by hindsight is no good; we shall have to learn not to denounce our representatives as traitors or suspicious characters if anything goes wrong in the future. Trading used to be considered a Yankee talent and I think it still is—even by Republicans!—if we don't put our traders in a strait jacket or
scare them stiff in advance.

Our role is to keep our hopes high but our heads clear, to consider every suggestion honestly and dispassionately, to look for the bases of agreement, and, not least, to be willing to take some reasonable chances. To want peace is to want compromise; it is not to demand perfection but to be willing to accept something less, perhaps much less, than perfection—-but better than the alternative which is a sharpening and prolonging of ugly, dangerous tensions.

All manner of new questions will emerge as the ice begins to break up after the long freeze and Europe, East and West, moves from dependence to independence. We shall have to be prepared to take some chances, to risk something to win more. We cannot have total certainty and total security and total self-determination all at the same time.

The point I want to make in connection not only with this forthcoming meeting in Europe but in connection with our participation in all of this nation's public affairs, is that your responsibility as citizens is far more than to be just passive spectators of each successive scene in the exciting drama of our age.

Yet the pressures for such passive acceptance keep increasing. The problems get more and more complex. Greater and greater comfort and security attach to acquiescent conformity. Because we don't understand the structure of the atom, the guiding of missiles, the strategy of jet-warfare, we are inclined to lapse unconsciously into the attitude that we can no longer understand how democracy works, or civilization grows, or faith is maintained as an effective force.
And there is also the problem of access to information in an age when experts in public relations swamp us with press releases and experts in security increasingly employ the stamps of secrecy. The latter is perhaps the more serious, although the flight into entertainment suggests among other things that many of us are getting cynical about the advertising approach and stage management in matters of public concern.

As educated people we are, of course, reluctant to arrive at conclusions on matters about which others are better informed. And this is the proper attitude on technical questions; it is not for us to decide whether an investment in guided missiles will produce a more effective defense against air attack than an additional investment in jet fighters.

But the most important issues are not technical, and on the great issues public opinion must and will form. The question is how. If thoughtful people remain silent because of the lack of the information required for intelligent discussion and consideration of the issues, leadership will pass to the demagogues who suffer no restraints. There are signs that to a degree this has been happening. But in a democratic society the ability to act unitedly depends on consensus, and there are really only two ways to get it. One is to permit the demagogues to inflame us and the other is to reason together. Denial of information which is the indispensable ingredient of reasoned discussion, should be a last resort and justified only by extreme necessity.
There is also the problem of ugly labels. In times of crisis men search for simple explanations. In our time there has been a dangerous tendency to credit Communists with every set-back and to put the Red brand on every unpopular idea. Sometimes this becomes ridiculous. I recall that the late Senator Taft was called a Communist for his support of a modest housing program. And in many equally absurd cases the label sticks. Many people will keep their views to themselves rather than run the risk of acquiring an ugly label. No one knows how seriously this has impaired the quality of government service and the quality of public debate. Whatever the price, it is too high.

In addition to lack of information and fear of misleading labels let me mention again the influence of inertia, of obsolete attitudes toward conformity. At almost every level of government, for example, political organization and social needs are not well adjusted, and the problem of adjustment, as I have said, lies rather in our reluctance to abandon old ways than in any lack of ability to devise new ones.

Although the problem is serious at the local and national levels, it is acute internationally, for science, the child of free inquiry, has released forces which threaten survival itself. The threat, however, lies less in the atom than in outworn ideas.

In the outburst of 20th century nationalism is a narrow luxury, an exclusiveness, we cannot afford. This is a problem of parochialism about which too much should not be expected of my generation, for our attitudes were formed too long ago, in horse and buggy days, to be
precise, and it is hard for most of us to adjust ancient prejudices and revise old ideas.

I say "most of us," for age is not an automatic yardstick of vision. When I visited here at Oberlin last fall I met Professor Emeritus Jazzi, a man old only in years, who has long understood the need for free men to unite but whose understanding, never blurred by sentimentality, recognizes that this is above all a moral problem with hard political implications.

It is the role of this college from which you now graduate to nourish and support such men. We must have teachers if we are to be taught; we must have scholars if we are to continue to turn nature to our use and to adapt our institutions to our needs and purposes. Only through knowledge, learning and the influence of enlightened teaching can we hope to keep our minds supple and adjustable—or, better, expandable. Few of us are fitted to think daringly and creatively and to pursue the truth with devotion. But we can help those who are, by providing them with an environment in which truth is the goal, and above all—by daring to learn.

In a fumbling and groping way I think we are moving toward a political organization of free men which is responsive to the needs of this century. A large part of the task of your generation will be to widen and deepen the community of free men, and this will require advances in attitudes no less remarkable than the advances in physical science.

As you leave, remember that it is the duty of this college
and of this distinguished faculty to teach free men to think freely. And it is your duty to this famous college to defend it and assist it in performing for others the role it has performed for you. The liberation of the mind is a continuing task—for the generation without error and without unreason will remain unborn.

Solomon said: "Knowledge is a wonderful thing; therefore get knowledge; but with all thy getting, get understanding."

I could suggest for you no harder task—nor greater fun!
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I, Raymond Yeager, was born in Smithsferry, Pennsylvania, on April 11, 1920. My parents are E. Ward and Malinda Yeager. I have one brother and one sister.

Most of my early education was received in the public schools of Fostoria, Ohio, my present home. I received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Education in 1949 and the degree of Master of Arts in 1950 from Bowling Green State University. I received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Ohio State University in 1956.

I served four years in the Air Force during World War Two, and was recalled to active duty for eighteen months during the Korean War. I served a combat tour in the Pacific theater in World War Two, and in Korea during the Korean War, as a member of a B-29 aircraft crew. I was separated from the service with the rank of captain.

I am married to the former Maurine Risser, and am the father of two children, Pamela-Rae and Robert Louis.

I am presently an Instructor in Speech at Bowling Green State University, and hold the position of Director of Forensics.